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External Evaluation of EU's Support to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding (CPPB) 2013-2018

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External Evaluation of EU's Support to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding (CPPB) 2013-2018

Final report

The report consists of three volumes:

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List of acronyms and abbreviations

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
APF	African Peace Facility
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
AU	African Union
AUC	African Union Commission
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CMPD	Crisis Management and Planning Directorate
CPPB	Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding
CRIS	Common External Relations Information System
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSP	Country Strategy Paper
CVE/PVE	Countering and Preventing Violent Extremism
CTSAMM	Cease-fire and Transitional Security Arrangement Monitoring Mechanism
DAC	OECD Development Assistance Committee
DCI	Development Cooperation Instrument
DDR	Disarmament, development and reintegration
DG DEVCO	Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development
DG ECHO	Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
DG NEAR	Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations
EAMR	External Assistance Management Reports
EC	European Commission
ECDPM	European Centre for Development Policy Management
EDF / FED	European Development Fund
EEAS	European External Action Service
EIDHR	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
ENI	European Neighbourhood Instrument
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
ENPI	European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
EQ	Evaluation Question
ERM	Early Response Mechanism
ESDC	European Security and Defence College
EU	European Union
EU-CIVCAP	EU's capabilities in conflict prevention and peacebuilding
EUD	European Union Delegation
EUGS	European Union Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy
EUSR	European Union Special Representative
EUTF	EU Trust Fund
EWS	(Conflict) Early warning system
FPI	Foreign Policy Instruments Service of the European Commission
GAP	Gender Action Plan
GID	Geneva International Discussions
HoD	Head of Delegation
HQ	Headquarters

HR/VP	High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice-President of the Commission
IcSP	Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace
IfS	Instrument for Stability
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IL	Intervention Logic
IPRM	Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms
JC	Judgement criterion
JPNA	Joint Peacebuilding Needs Assessments
MENA	Middle East and North Africa region
MFF	Multiannual Financial Framework
MIP	Multiannual Indicative Programme
MS	Member State
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDICI	Neighbourhood, Development, International Cooperation Instrument
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NIP	National Indicative Programme
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PAMF	Policy Advice and Mediation Facilities
PDNA	Post-Disaster Needs Assessments
PFCA	Political Framework for Crisis Approach
PRISM	Prevention of conflicts, Rule of law/SSR, Integrated approach, Stabilisation and Mediation Division of the EEAS
RCA /CAR	République Centrafricaine / Central African Republic
REC	Regional Economic Community
RG	Reference Group
RIP	Regional Indicative Programme
ROM	Results oriented monitoring
RPBA	Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment
RRM	Rapid Reaction Mechanism
SBC	Statebuilding Contract
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SSF	Single-Support Framework
SSR	Security sector reform
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
US	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WBTF	World Bank Trust Fund
WOSCAP	Whole of Society Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding

Executive Summary

Evaluation objectives

The purpose of this evaluation is to provide an independent, evidence-based assessment of the extent to which the EU has achieved its conflict prevention and peacebuilding (CPPB) objectives and the impact of EU CPPB support on the ground between 2011 and 2018. This global evaluation examines spending and non-spending activities of DG DEVCO, DG NEAR, EEAS and FPI. It also considers the activities of DG ECHO, CSDP missions/operations and EU Member States from the perspective of co-ordination and complementarity.

Context

Fostering peace has been at the centre of the European integration process since its inception. Yet the EU's role as a peacebuilder was traditionally shaped more by its normative power (e.g. by promoting democratic reforms and non-violent means of conflict resolution through its accession policies) than by concrete action abroad. Explicit engagement in CPPB in third countries only emerged in the 2000s with the development of the EU's CPPB policy underpinnings starting in 2001. The EU's operational support for CPPB intensified after 2013 with the introduction of a comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises and the adoption of the EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy (2016). EU CPPB objectives are likely to remain important in the 2019-2024 period with the decision to form a "Geopolitical Commission," which acknowledged and reinforced the linkages between peace, security and development.

The ability of the EU to contribute to CPPB depends on the local context in which its support is provided, on internal EU institutional factors and on its partnerships with other international actors. This evaluation took as its starting point the 2011 CPPB evaluation, which identified both contextual and institutional challenges to the effectiveness of EU support for CPPB. The evaluation has found that the EU had taken important steps to strengthen its CPPB capacities after 2011. Nonetheless, there were areas where substantial additional attention was required.

EU financial commitments to CPPB, 2011-2018

The EU's CPPB spending portfolio was 5,6 billion EUR of contracted amounts (excluding budget support). More than two thirds were funded through the two largest geographical instruments, the European Development Fund (48%) and the Development Co-operation Instrument (20%). The remainder was financed through thematic instruments such as the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace and its predecessors (18%) and the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR, 0,1%) as well as the geographical instruments in support of the European Neighbourhood Region (14%).



Methodology

This design chosen for the evaluation was that of a multiple case study, applying a mixed-methods approach. The evidence underpinning the evaluation was collected through data extraction from the Commission's external relations database, primary and secondary documentation, email queries, phone and extensive face-to-face interviews and an online survey of EU Delegations.

The evaluation terms of reference specified that the evaluation timeframe was "mainly focused on the period 2013-2018" and that to fully assess progress following the 2011 evaluation, "2011 and 2012 [would] be taken into consideration." The team accordingly included interventions that began or were implemented between 2011 and 2018. Additionally, many of the key interlocutors at Headquarters and in EU Delegations (EUDs) took up their positions in 2017 and 2018. While it was sometimes possible to interview individuals who had previously held relevant positions, a good deal of the interview evidence pertained to 2018 and 2019. The online survey requested information from the 2011-2018 period.

The evaluation was conducted between September 2018 and February 2020. It responded to seven Evaluation Questions (EQs), which focused on two broad areas: 1) CPPB strategy and implementation of EU CPPB support and 2) effects of EU CPPB support. Multiple sources of information were systematically triangulated in responding to the EQs.

The main challenges encountered were clarifying the thematic scope of the evaluation in the absence of definitions of "conflict prevention" and "peacebuilding;" accessing intervention level documentation (including information on political/policy dialogue); and the highly sensitive nature of CPPB.

Data collected during this evaluation

Twelve case studies *were conducted. 8 including field missions: Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Georgia, Lebanon, Niger, Philippines, Zimbabwe and the African Peace Facility focusing on South Sudan. 4 desk-only: Afghanistan, CAR, Myanmar and Somalia. Each case study examined multiple spending and non-spending interventions.*

Over 500 documents *were consulted on a range of CPPB-related issues plus an average of some* ***80 additional documents per case study****.*

Over 600 interlocutors *were interviewed in Brussels and case study countries, primarily EU officials at HQ and in the field, EU MS, international, regional and bilateral partners, country-specific authorities and country specific CSOs.*

Twenty-nine EUDs responded to the online survey*, enabling evidence from the case studies to be tested against a broader group of recipients of EU CPPB support.*

Findings

The evaluation findings highlight important areas where the EU strengthened its capacity to support CPPB compared with the previous evaluation period, 2001-2010. In some cases, the EU built on change that started prior to 2011. However, there were areas where the 2011 evaluation highlighted a need for improvement and where little change was evident between 2011 and 2018. An overview of progress in delivering EU support for CPPB since 2011 is presented in the following table.

Capacity strengthened
Overall the EU has strengthened its position as a key player in CPPB:
✓ The policy/strategy foundation for CPPB has been reinforced and increasingly reflected in strategy and programming.

- ✓ The importance of addressing conflict and crises in an integrated/comprehensive manner across the EU and with EU MS is increasingly recognised. Efforts were made to apply the EU's spending and non-spending instruments and tools in a coherent and coordinated manner to support CPPB objectives.
- ✓ The importance of adopting a conflict-sensitive approach to CPPB support is also increasingly recognised. Steps have been taken to strengthen the EU's institutional structure, human resources, tools and aid modalities/delivery mechanisms to deliver CPPB support in a conflict-sensitive manner.
- ✓ The EU's spending instruments have been progressively adapted to the needs of conflict/crisis contexts, especially flexibility, speed of response and ability to support political objectives beyond development cooperation.
- ✓ The EU has improved its mechanisms and tools to make CPPB support more flexible and more effective in conflict/crisis situations, including, among others, the creation of new dedicated units within external action services to support CPPB, policy and guidance documents, training courses, tools for conflict analysis and systems for conflict early warning.

Areas requiring additional attention

Despite progress since 2011 in making the Commission and EEAS a player on CPPB, the EU's comparative advantages in supporting CPPB have not yet been fully exploited:

- ✓ As in the pre-2011 period, the EU frequently adopts a reactive rather than proactive stance in delivering support for CPPB. Translating early warning into early action remains difficult.
- ✓ As in the pre-2011 period, operationalising the integrated/comprehensive approach lags both at HQ and in EUDs because of inadequate mainstreaming of conflict sensitivity across all EU external action, an institutional set-up not fully designed to promote coherence and insufficient staff in political sections at HQ and in EUDs.
- ✓ Inadequate mainstreaming of conflict sensitivity derives in large part from the absence of a human resources strategy to strengthen the availability of adequately capacitated staff.
- ✓ It also reflects inadequate buy-in and leadership on CPPB from EU senior management.
- ✓ Human resources remain one of the major stumbling blocks to making CPPB effective. There are too few EU officials with the expertise necessary to make linkages between politics, programming and context at HQ and in EUDs.
- ✓ Very little progress has been recorded on putting knowledge and learning on CPPB at the heart of the EU's external action and insufficient progress on monitoring for learning and building knowledge.

Conclusions

The evaluation identified fourteen conclusions in the following four clusters.

Policy and strategy

C1. Progress on mainstreaming CPPB at higher policy and strategic levels but in-sufficient at regional, country-related strategic and intervention levels

Overall, the EU made progress in mainstreaming CPPB at higher policy and strategic levels. However, this integration was weaker in regional and country-related strategic and programming documents. At implementation level, most CPPB intervention documents implicitly incorporated EU CPPB policy but there were few explicit references to EU policy and strategic frameworks.

C2. A lack of strategic direction and implementation guidance on CPPB

The EU's progress in promoting CPPB at the policy level and during implementation was undercut by the lack of strategic direction from senior management for framing CPPB as well as insufficient guidance on how the EU wanted to contribute to CPPB efforts.

C3. Overall policy/strategic level alignment to partner priorities, but room for more nuanced alignment and responsiveness to change

At policy and strategic level, EU support for CPPB was overall appropriately aligned with partner country policies and priorities as well as strategies of non-governmental country actors.

However, there was room for improvement in terms of anticipating change, engaging proactively and underpinning EU CPPB engagements with greater shared policy and contextual analyses with national and regional partners to better adapt to changing political and security contexts.

Promoting an integrated/comprehensive approach

C4. Partially successful efforts to strengthen delivery of an integrated/comprehensive approach to CPPB but often undermined by inconsistent political/policy leadership and fragmented institutional environment

Clear efforts were made to improve CPPB coordination, complementarity and comprehensiveness against the background of a fragmented EU external action institutional environment. The ad-hoc nature of political and policy leadership on CPPB and a frequent lack of clarity on the division of labour among those involved in CPPB means challenges to coordination, complementarity and comprehensiveness remain. Applying an integrated/comprehensive approach to CPPB over a longer period generally contributed positively to the effectiveness of CPPB actions but was severely hampered where other EU policy priorities dominated external action.

C5. Contextual and institutional constraints on using spending and non-spending interventions in a mutually reinforcing manner

The EU often sought to comprehensively channel its CPPB support through both spending and non-spending activities. This approach was limited by context-specific factors as well as a range of EU-specific factors. Failure to address or mitigate these often resulted in funding or complementarity disconnects.

C6. Varying depth and quality of mainstreaming human rights and gender sensitivity, sometimes related to particular country circumstances

Human rights and gender sensitivity were increasingly promoted at both the policy and implementation levels, although human rights were in general accorded more attention than gender sensitivity. Human rights integration was overall appropriate, despite difficult country circumstances in some cases. There is room, however, to improve the mainstreaming of gender sensitivity, in particular at the implementation level.

Implementation of CPPB support

C7. Significant EU added value in supporting CPPB

EU support to CPPB has clearly generated an added value by its substantial financial resources, long-term commitment, convening power, relative political neutrality and willingness to invest in complex situations of conflict and protracted crisis as well as its ability to combine these assets. When synergies could be created between two or more components, the EU's added value was correspondingly greater and well appreciated by its partners.

C8. Progress in enhancing institutional efficiency and effectiveness with continuing challenges

The EU enhanced its efficiency and effectiveness in supporting CPPB through improved financing instruments and aid modalities. It worked overall in a cost-effective manner, although multiple "desks" in Brussels were a source of overlap, overhead costs and inefficiency. FPI's regionalisation reform had advantages as well as disadvantages. It allowed for more coverage across countries but – because of the greater geographic spread – did not always help to shape more in-depth integration and synergies of the EU's CPPB support at country level.

C9. Limited human resources a major challenge for CPPB engagement

While funding for CPPB was overall sufficient, the limited availability of qualified EU human resources remained a major stumbling block for a proactive, context specific and well-informed CPPB engagement. In particular, there were too few EU officials with sound CPPB skills who were also capable of making linkages between politics, programming and context at HQ and in EUDs.

C10. Multiple partnerships conducive to successful CPPB support created
While the EU made improvements in terms of coordinating with its Member States and international actors and created partnerships that were often beneficial for the support to CPPB, its efforts could have been of higher quality and intensity – in particular with country actors and at implementation level.

C11. Inadequate mainstreaming of conflict sensitivity despite training and introduction of tools, guidance and new systems
Considerable progress was made in promoting conflict sensitivity at a technical level through guidance, training, introducing tools and new systems. However, despite its policy commitments, the EU was not recognised as a fully conflict-sensitive actor in its external action, including CPPB support, as delivered by DG DEVCO, DG ECHO, FPI and DG NEAR. Visibility of the EU was overall conflict sensitive although context-specific steering or guidance was not given in selected cases.

C12. Inadequate progress on CPPB monitoring, evaluation and learning
Monitoring, evaluation and learning are essential to achieving effectiveness and impact. The evaluation found that M&E and learning were the "poor cousin" of the EU's engagement in support of CPPB. There was significant space for improvement at all levels in the hierarchy, in particular at the strategic country level and among implementing partners, but it remained unused.

CPPB results and sustainability

C13. "Fragmented success" in realising CPPB-relevant outputs and outcomes
The EU achieved short- to mid-term results in support of CPPB processes to a considerable degree, but these were generally "fragmented" successes. Compared to its ambitions set out in the Gothenburg Programme on the Prevention of Violent Conflicts in 2001, and reconfirmed in the Global Strategy in 2016, the EU has still some miles to cover before approaching its goals.

C14. Contribution to intermediate CPPB impacts limited to individual cases rather than achieved at broader scale, with doubtful sustainability
The EU, alongside the broader international community as well as national and local actors, contributed to the prevention of violence, greater structural stability and strengthening the conditions for peace to a limited extent. In most contexts, violence and protracted crisis remained unresolved or even worsened despite substantial inputs by EU and other partners. Sustainability of actions, while fostered by a reasonable level of local ownership, was hampered by capacity challenges and political factors, making continued long-term engagement by the EU a necessity.

Recommendations

The twelve recommendations of the evaluation can be summarised as follows:

Policy and strategy

R1. Integrate CPPB into strategy and programming
Integrate CPPB more clearly and explicitly into country-level strategic documents and decisions in order to strengthen the linkage between the policy and strategic levels and implementation; provide guidance on how to translate high-level CPPB political priorities and objectives into programming and implementation. *(Linked to conclusions 1 and 2)*

R2. Build on existing strands of EU CPPB-related policy to clarify the EU conceptual framework for CPPB and devise a clear Action Plan for mainstreaming CPPB
Clarify the EU's ambition and conceptual framework for CPPB and promote it across all EU institutional actors dealing with external action through a dedicated Communication on CPPB, complemented by an Action Plan. *(Linked to conclusions 2 and 4)*

R3. Enhance policy and strategic engagement at country level
Enhance policy and strategic engagement with country actors at national and local levels

through a shared analysis as well as a negotiated consensus on the support considered priority by the partner and feasible by the EU. *(Linked to conclusions 3 and 10)*

Promoting an integrated/comprehensive approach

R4. Improve leadership to strengthen an integrated/comprehensive approach to CPPB
Build on progress recorded in applying an integrated/comprehensive approach for CPPB by exercising a stronger political/policy leadership to identify priorities and ensure coherence with non-CPPB external action priorities as well as by developing incentives for working in an integrated manner. *(Linked to conclusions 4, 5 and 14)*

R5. Strengthen the integration of human rights and gender in CPPB
Build on past efforts to further strengthen the integration of human rights and gender-related policy and strategic objectives into CPPB action and enhance operational gender capacities to address CPPB. *(Linked to conclusions 6 and 9)*

Implementation of CPPB support

R6. Use the EU's added value in support of CPPB more strategically
Link the EU's political role and ability to mobilise substantial financial resources for CPPB and other EU added values such as its commitment to long-term engagement more strategically to the political aims of the EU in relation to CPPB. *(Linked to conclusions 7 and 14)*

R7. Ensure that financial assistance and key institutional structures are fit-for-purpose

As the proposed Neighbourhood, Development, International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) is established, ensure that financing instruments, delivery mechanisms, aid modalities and key institutional structures are fit-for-purpose in countries in conflict or at risk of conflict. *(Linked to conclusions 8 and 9)*

R8. Invest in more and well-qualified EU human resources
Invest in recruitment, retention, reward and training of well-qualified EU human resources to support CPPB**,** particularly staff with strong expertise in linking politics, programming and context in the domain of CPPB. *(Linked to conclusion 9)*

R9. Strengthen EU coordination
Strengthen the quality and intensity of EU coordination with country actors at regional, national and local levels and improve political and strategic coordination with EU Member States and other key international actors. *(Linked to conclusion 10)*

R10. Promote and enable conflict sensitivity in all EU external action
Promote the uptake of conflict sensitivity more explicitly across all EU services to embed it more deeply across all EU external action and enhance the mandate and capacities of the entities dealing with CPPB at headquarters and field level to better pursue this goal. *(Linked to conclusion 11)*

R11. Improve monitoring, evaluation and learning
Increase investments in monitoring, evaluating and learning to strengthen institutional learning and institutional memory on CPPB at the systemic, strategic and country levels to enhance conflict sensitivity, to optimise the EU's CPPB response and to avoid incoherence. *(Linked to conclusion 12 & 13)*

CPPB results and sustainability

R12. Support the achievement of sustainable CPPB results
Enhance efforts to create capacity and promote ownership for CPPB among national and local partners, with a view to achieving stronger national structures and more capacitated actors to sustain CPPB efforts, in particular by enhancing the coordination and complementarity of EU support. *(Linked to conclusions 13 & 14)*

1 Introduction

The European Commission's Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO), Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR) and the European External Action Service (EEAS) commissioned an external evaluation of EU support for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding (CPPB) (2013-2018), which was undertaken between September 2018 and February 2020. The evaluation was to provide the relevant EU institutions and the wider public with an overall independent assessment of EU support to CPPB during the period 2013-2018.[a] The evaluation examined CPPB interventions undertaken by these services, as well as relevant Foreign Policy Instruments Service of the European Commission (FPI) interventions funded through the Instrument for Stability/Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IfS/IcSP). The EU's Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) actions, including Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions/operations, EU Member States (EU MS) interventions and activities financed by Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO) were examined for coherence, coordination and complementarity with EU CPPB engagement.

This evaluation took place in a context of a renewed momentum on conflict prevention and peacebuilding[b] within the EU, among some EU MS and globally. The UN Security Council and the General Assembly adopted "sustaining peace" resolutions in 2016[1] and UN Secretary-General Guterres began a reform process that gave conflict prevention a higher priority within the organisation. Germany adopted "Guidelines on Preventing Crises, Resolving Conflicts, Building Peace" in 2017,[2] and Sweden adopted a "Strategy for Sustainable Peace" the following year.[3]

Since the previous CPPB evaluation was conducted in 2011, the EU has increased its political commitment to CPPB and further developed its policy framework as discussed in section 2 below.[4] There have also been renewed discussions at various levels in the EU on CPPB concepts and on how to strengthen EU external actions in light of a rapidly changing global context, which has produced new challenges in the European neighbourhood as well as globally.

This evaluation is therefore timely as it addresses an unmet need for more knowledge, lessons learned and best practices on EU CPPB and how to support this vital area in the context of EU external action and its future contribution to global peace. This is particularly relevant since no comprehensive exercise has been carried out since the previous strategic evaluation of EU support for CPPB in 2011 and because the EU has allocated 5,6 billion EUR in this area between 2011 and 2018.[c]

The evaluation provides information on the extent to which the EU has achieved its CPPB objectives in terms of policy, strategic design, implementation, results and capacity. It also examines the impact of EU CPPB engagements on the ground. The findings of the evaluation will help shape future EU CPPB-relevant political engagements and financial support. In particular, it will feed into the ongoing implementation of the Integrated Approach to External Conflict and Crises under the Global Strategy for the EU's CFSP.

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[a] The evaluation terms of reference specified that the evaluation timeframe was "mainly focused on the period 2013-2017" and requested that the team consider information from 2011 and 2012 to the extent possible in order to make a bridge to the 2011 evaluation. Additionally, many of the interventions that began during the 2013-2017 period continued after 2017. In consequence, the evaluation report covers the 2011-2018 period and the title of the evaluation was later modified to reflect this extended period.

[b] Both the 2016 EU Global Strategy and the 2017 European Consensus on Development (cited below) employ "peacebuilding" rather than "peace building" or "peace-building". The evaluation team will use the spelling "peacebuilding" unless referring directly to specific documents that use the other spellings.

[c] The previous 2011 evaluation of EC Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace-Building covered the period 2001-2010.

This report consists of three volumes. Volume 1 starts with an overview of the policy background and context of EU support to CPPB, and then presents a brief summary of the evaluation methodology including key challenges and limitations. Findings presented in the form of answers to the evaluation questions constitute the main body of the report. They provide the basis for drawing conclusions and making recommendations, which are presented in the final chapters of this report. Volume 2 of this report provides detailed responses to evaluation questions at the justification criteria level. Volume 3 contains additional information on methodology, the spending inventory, non-spending activities[d], the EU Delegation (EUD) survey, and sources consulted.

2 Policy background and context of EU support for CPPB

2.1 Key policy orientations

Fostering peace has been at the centre of the European integration process since its inception in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. Yet the EU's role as a peacebuilder was traditionally shaped more by its normative power (e.g. by promoting democratic reforms and non-violent means of conflict resolution through its accession policies) than by concrete action abroad. Explicit engagement in CPPB in third countries only emerged in the last two decades, following the end of the Cold War. The first explicit policy commitment to CPPB appeared in 1996 in a European Commission communication on EU responses to conflicts in Africa.[5] This was followed in 2000 by a legally binding commitment to peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution in the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, which also included an explicit reference to the role of civil society engagement.

Two documents adopted in 2001 were particularly important: the European Commission Communication on Conflict Prevention and the Gothenburg Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts adopted by the European Council. Both were instrumental in laying out an ambitious plan for stepping up EU engagement in conflict prevention as a central objective of EU external action. This included efforts to mainstream conflict prevention into EU development programming and diplomatic activities, foster greater coherence across various policy domains such as trade policy, improve early warning and early action, and build effective partnerships with international and regional organisations and civil society.[6] Conflict prevention also featured in the 2003 European Security Strategy, which identified state fragility as a security threat to Europe and stressed the need for a more coherent and coordinated use of EU policies and instruments to respond to interconnected security and development challenges.[7] The 2006 European Consensus on Development further built on the 2001 commitments by linking peace and security to poverty alleviation.[8] Further elaborations were made in the 2007 Commission communication "towards an EU response to situations of fragility"[9], the Council conclusions on the security-development nexus and on conflict prevention[10] and other communications by the Commission and the Council of the EU in 2013 and 2018.[11] Similar documents guiding potential approaches to preventing conflict and building peace have also been produced by EU MS in the recent years.[12]

More specific policy frameworks were subsequently developed, some jointly by the Commission and EEAS services, such as security sector reform, women, peace and security, youth, peace and security, and mediation and dialogue, all illustrating progress in how the EU has been taking on board concerns about peacebuilding and conflict prevention in its external action. Yet while "conflict prevention" was commonly used as a framing concept in various policy statements and Foreign Affairs

[d] The evaluation team has adopted the following working definition for non-spending activities: EU institutional non-spending activities are carried out by EU institutional actors (EU officials and contracted staff as well as staff of EU Member States delegated to EU institutions) in support of CPPB that is being promoted and facilitated by the EU and its partners. These activities are paid from the administrative budget.

Council conclusions, peacebuilding has been used in a less systematic way.[13] That said, the EU still lacks a single and comprehensive definition of either "conflict prevention" or "peacebuilding".

The evolution of the EU's support for CPPB was a product of its complex legal and institutional structure, split between a supranational pillar managed by the European Commission (guiding for example development cooperation or the European Neighbourhood Policy) and the intergovernmental activities in the domain of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, where Member States remain in charge (albeit with support from the European External Action Service). Operational efforts to bring together the various instruments and policies for conflict prevention, crisis response, security and development translated in the set-up of formal and informal coordination mechanisms and structures at different levels of the EU system for exchange, coordination and joint work (e.g. Inter-service groups, task forces), and made more compelling with the introduction of the EU comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crisis in 2013. The comprehensive approach was an attempt to foster conflict-sensitive and collaborative action across the conflict cycle based on a shared context analysis and strategic vision and bring together different types of responses in terms of timeframe (long vs. short), activities (e.g. humanitarian aid, conflict prevention, development, security) and geographic focus (e.g. local, national, regional).[14]

With the adoption of the EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS) in 2016, CPPB was once more at the centre of EU external policies. The EUGS identifies building state and societal resilience as one of the priorities of EU external action when responding to fragility and instability. It also calls for all external engagements to be both conflict- and rights-sensitive.[15] Centred around the notion of "principled pragmatism", investing in conflict prevention is not simply seen as essential to promote European values, but also as a means to advance EU interests in a changing and increasingly uncertain global environment. In the EUGS, conflict prevention and peacebuilding are central elements of an "integrated approach to conflicts and crises", which recognises the need for a multi-dimensional, multi-phased, multi-lateral and multi-level approach to addressing violent conflict. Council Conclusions from 2018 clarified that the integrated approach should enhance the political profile of conflict prevention in EU decision-making and include a further strengthening of mediation capacities and support to local peace actors.[16]

Peacebuilding, at all levels and throughout the conflict cycle from early warning and prevention to crisis response and stabilisation, and a conflict-sensitive approach to development also feature prominently in the 2017 European Consensus on Development as key elements for realising the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).[17] Likewise, the Consensus also prioritises addressing fragility through contributing to the implementation of the 2011 New Deal for engaging in fragile states and the related Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals. Similarly, the resilience concept, which holds a central position in the EUGS, was further elaborated in a 2017 communication. The communication stresses the importance of building both state and societal resilience by advancing a more all-encompassing approach that emphasises upstream and long-term measures, including conflict prevention, as well as more attention to building inclusive and participatory societies and economic resilience.[18] It outlines an approach that aims at identifying endogenous capacities within societies to prevent or peacefully resolve conflicts. This approach emphasises the need for local ownership, involvement of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), involvement of women and conflict sensitivity.

2.2 Implementing CPPB policy: the institutional and operational building blocks

Over the years, policy commitments were translated into various institutional and financial innovations. The European Commission invested in the development of thematic expertise within its external relations services as indicated by the creation of the Unit "Resilience, Fragility" in DG DEVCO (in 2011 under another name) and of Centres of Thematic Expertise in DG NEAR (e.g. CoTE on Crisis

reaction and Security Sector reform). In the EEAS, the expertise necessary to make linkages between politics, programming and context in the domain of CPPB was also strengthened with the creation of a dedicated unit to lead efforts in promoting internal coordination on conflict prevention and crisis response issues, operationalising and managing the EU conflict Early Warning System and providing mediation support (which was upgraded to a full-fledged directorate named "Integrated Approach for Security and Peace" in early 2019). EU Delegations and FPI staff also played an increasingly important role, for example through information-sharing and analysis, conflict analysis, coordinating EU activities in the field and shaping the EU's preventive diplomacy efforts.[19]

The EU also developed a broad range of instruments and tools to support CPPB, ranging from development funding to diplomatic and mediation activities and crisis management under the CSDP. The EU's development and international cooperation instruments gained more scope for including CPPB in programming in recent years, as an increasing share of EU development aid was concentrated in fragile and conflict-affected environments. The Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) and the European Development Fund (EDF) provided the lion's share of CPPB financing, while EU Trust Funds (EUTFs) became an important channel for delivering CPPB support. The Instrument for Stability and subsequent Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace were designed by funding a broad range of peace- and security-related activities. Most IfS/IcSP funding was foreseen for short-term crisis response activities but a portion was earmarked for longer-term CPPB projects.[20] The EU also became more active in conflict prevention, by engaging in mediation, capacity building and political dialogue in conflict situations through EU Delegations, CSDP missions and its EU Special Representatives EUSRs (e.g. for the Horn of Africa or the Middle East Peace Process).

At the same time, protracted crises and conflicts in the EU's extended neighbourhood (e.g. Syria, Ukraine, Libya, Mali) and record levels of irregular migration to Europe during the evaluation period left their mark on the European political agenda. The creation of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa is just one example of how migration concerns increasingly shaped the EU's engagement with third countries. From 2017 there was a significant evolution in the domain of EU cooperation on security and defence, largely triggered by shifting global power balances and increasing doubts over existing international norms and institutions as a result of a more assertive Russia (e.g., the Crimea crisis), Brexit, the Trump presidency in the US and other events. Security issues also featured more prominently in the 2017 European Consensus on Development, signalling growing interlinkages between the security and development agendas. Such initiatives raised concerns over an increasing "securitisation" of EU development policy and wider external action, as illustrated by the discussions preceding the adoption of the "Capacity-Building for Security and Development" initiative.[21] It also raised the question of how to balance advances in the domains of crisis response and security with a greater prioritisation of peacebuilding and conflict prevention. As the occurrence of violent conflict has surged once again,[22] so has the human and economic cost of conflict, making a case for more investments in conflict prevention.[23]

The EU has also worked closely with the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in advancing its peace and security policies. The EU-UN strategic partnership, which began in 2012, focused on crisis management, exploring complementarities between EU CSDP missions and UN peacekeeping operations in the field, while maintaining a regular high-level dialogue through biannual meetings of the EU-UN steering committee on crisis management. In 2018, the EU and UN agreed to strengthen the use of preventive instruments in peace operations, such as mediation and security sector reform, better coordinating political and strategic communication and co-operating on joint conflict analysis, horizon scanning and early warning.[24] The partnership with NATO has gained increased relevance after concerns grew over security and stability South and East of the EU. In 2016, the EU and NATO signed a Joint Declaration to give new substance to the EU-NATO partnership, identifying areas for enhanced cooperation, including operational cooperation.[25]

3 Evaluation methodology

3.1 Overall approach and evaluation questions

The methodology applied for this evaluation is based on the methodological guidelines on strategic evaluations endorsed by the European Commission and the EEAS. Given the purpose and conditions of the evaluation, the most appropriate design for the evaluation was a multiple case study, applying a mixed-methods approach. A more detailed description of methodological elements is presented in Annex 2 (Volume 3).

The evaluation was managed and supervised by the DG DEVCO Evaluation & Results Unit. Evaluation progress was closely followed by a Reference Group (RG) chaired by the DG DEVCO Evaluation Unit and consisting of representatives from DG DEVCO, DG ECHO, DG NEAR, EEAS, and FPI.

The evaluation was conducted in three main phases (desk, field and synthesis) between September 2018 and February 2020. Field missions were carried out in eight countries (Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Georgia, Lebanon, Niger, Philippines, South Sudan and Zimbabwe) as well as to the EU Delegation to the African Union in Addis Ababa. Desk-only studies were conducted for Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Myanmar and Somalia.

Building on a reconstructed intervention logic (see section 3.3), the evaluation team systematically collected and analysed a large body of primary and secondary documentation, interview evidence and responses to the online survey in order to answer the seven Evaluation Questions (EQs) (see Table 1), and to formulate conclusions and recommendations based on these findings.

Table 1 Evaluation Questions

EQs	*Evaluation criteria*
Cluster 1: Strategy and implementation	
EQ 1 – Relevance and Coherence To what extent has EU support for CPPB been aligned with EU high-level priorities for CPPB, the broader frameworks for EU external action and the priorities and needs of partner countries?	• Relevance (both at start/design and in changing circumstances during implementation) • Internal coherence (within CPPB and with other EU external action)
EQ 2 – Approach to implementation To what extent have the approaches, tools and mechanisms for implementation been appropriate to achieve the intended objectives in an optimal manner?	• Efficiency
EQ 3 – Coordination and Complementarity To what extent has EU support for CPPB been coordinated and complementary with EU MS, and international, regional, national and local actors?	• 3Cs (external coherence, coordination, complementarity)
EQ 4 – Added Value What has been the added value resulting from EU support for CPPB compared with what could have been achieved by EU MS and other actors (national/international organisations, national/regional partners) alone?	• Added value (1. in sense of added value vs EU MS and 2. in sense of additionality to the ensemble of CPPB efforts)
EQ 5 – Cross-cutting Issues To what extent has EU support for CPPB mainstreamed and promoted conflict sensitivity, human rights and gender?	• Relevance • Coherence • Effectiveness

EQs	Evaluation criteria
Cluster 2: Effects of EU Support for CPPB	
EQ 6 – Short- to mid-term results To what extent has EU support for CPPB achieved the expected short- to mid-term results?	• Effectiveness
EQ 7 – Broader effects and sustainability To what extent has EU support for CPPB contributed to conflict/crisis prevention/mitigation, and structural stability and enhanced conditions for peace in a sustainable way?	• Impact • Sustainability

During the evaluation, the team has strictly followed all UN and OECD DAC guidelines related to ethical and quality standards in evaluation.[e] As such, the evaluation was undertaken in a conflict sensitive manner with integrity and honesty as well as with respect of human rights and differences in culture, customs and religious beliefs of all stakeholders and was mindful of gender roles, ethnicity and language. Given the sensitivity of the evaluation topic, the team paid particular attention to protecting the rights and welfare of those interviewed by guaranteeing their anonymity and the confidentiality of interviews. With regard to informed consent, all interviewees were free not to speak to the evaluation team.

3.2 Mapping of EU CPPB support

Conducting a mapping and developing a typology of EU support for CPPB was essential to understand the breadth and composition of EU support for CPPB, to develop the intervention logic, to select a representative sample of case studies, to structure the data collection and, ultimately, to answer the evaluation questions.[f] For the purpose of this evaluation, "mapping" refers to the process of understanding what is and is not part of CPPB (based on a typology) and to identify all relevant EU interventions (spending and non-spending).

As there is no single agreed EU definition of CPPB, the team developed a typology based on a review of key documents and interviews with key informants in Brussels. In the course of defining the CPPB thematic areas, it became evident that some types of EU interventions were more closely linked to CPPB than others. Consequently, the evaluation identified three main categories of interventions related to CPPB (both spending and non-spending), shown in Figure 1. Specific themes were allocated to each of the three categories through an iterative process. This typology led to the development of a spending inventory valued at 5,6 billion EUR and to the identification of non-spending activities, the results of which are found in Annexes 4 and 5 (in Volume 3). The intersection between CPPB, on the one hand, and trade and environment/climate, on the other hand, has received increasing attention on the EU agenda in recent years and was raised in a number of interviews. These topics were, however, outside the evaluation's scope but were included as areas of potential complementary interventions in the CPPB typology (see Figure 1).

[e] See specifically the UNEG Ethical Guidelines and Code of Conduct for evaluations as well as the OECD DAC Quality Standards for Development Evaluation; http://www.unevaluation.org/document/detail/100 and www.oecd.org/development/evaluation/dcdndep/36596604.pdf.

[f] EU support for CPPB includes all financing and non-financing instruments and tools covered by the legal scope of this evaluation: *"The overall EU support for CPPB EU's will be taken into consideration including agreements, the cooperation and any other official commitments. Policies and interventions governed by the instruments such as DCI, EDF, ENI, EIDHR, IcSP, IfS, CFSP, CSDP are at the epicentre."* CSDP missions are to be examined only at case study level and focus on complementarity with other instruments. Where support is provided by the EU and its Member States, the term "EU and EU MS" will be employed.

Figure 1 Typology of interventions

Category 1: Primary CPPB interventions	*This category covers actions that by their nature have clear objectives for exerting positive effects on peace and conflict dynamics, and that would not be implemented in a non-conflict prone/crisis environment.*	**Related thematic areas:** • High level engagement and support to peace processes; • National and local dialogue and reconciliation; • Transitional justice; • CPPB capacity building; • Peace support operations, ceasefire monitoring and human rights monitoring (in the framework of CPPB); • Conflict analysis and early warning; • Oversight and lessons learning for CPPB.
Category 2: Mixed objectives interventions	*This category covers actions that could be implemented to achieve CPPB objectives, but that could also have other types of objectives – usually depending on the context in which they take place.*	**Related thematic areas:** • Security and rule of law/justice; • Democratic governance, elections, civil society, and media; • Socio-economic foundations; • Natural resources and land rights; • Countering/preventing violent extremism.
Category 3: Complementary interventions	*This category covers actions that usually have objectives other than CPPB (fighting organised crime, development, humanitarian assistance, counter terrorism), but that can be considered as contributing to overall EU CPPB objectives within certain contexts.*	**Related thematic areas:** • Organized crime; • Counter terrorism; • Non-proliferation; humanitarian assistance and delivery of basic services (e.g. WASH); • Development, food security, resilience and linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD); • Economic governance and core state functions (other than security); • Macro-economic stability and growth/support to private sector/trade; • Migration and displacement; • Human rights and indigenous rights; • Climate change and environment.

3.3 Reconstructed intervention logic

The evaluation team reconstructed an Intervention Logic (IL) from reviewing five of the most prominent documents that (broadly) outline the EU's approach to promoting peace, stability and security and describe the objectives, scope and political/policy framework for support to CPPB (see Figure 3 below).[26] The basic framework that emerged was further refined through the review of additional policy documents, regulations and guidance notes as well as comments from the RG.[27]

The IL summarises the ultimate intended impact of EU support for CPPB, the intermediate impacts, the outcomes, outputs, key activities by thematic areas of CPPB engagement and major inputs. The IL also takes into account the cross-cutting role of conflict sensitivity, human rights and gender in formulating and implementing EU CPPB actions. It provides a framework for the evaluation, helping to understand how the EU seeks to support CPPB through a variety of interventions and the underlying assumptions guiding these interventions. The IL underpins the evaluation questions and associated judgement criteria (JC) and indicators (see evaluation matrix in Annex 3, Volume 3). This matrix provided the overall framework for data collection and analysis.

3.4 Data collection and analysis

Evidence used to respond to the evaluation questions and develop conclusions and recommendations came from multiple sources: data from CRIS[g], primary and secondary documentation, email queries, phone and extensive face-to-face interviews as well as an online survey which provided responses from 29 EU Delegations in conflict/crisis countries worldwide. In total, over 500 documents were consulted on a range of CPPB-related issues (plus an additional average of roughly 80 extra documents per case study). More than 600 interlocutors were interviewed in Brussels and case study countries (see Annex 9, Volume 3). Figure 2 provides an overview of persons interviewed.

[g] Common External Relations Information System (CRIS) is the information system put in place by the Commission to support the management of external actions.

Figure 2 Statistical overview of persons interviewed

N° interviewees	Category	Explanation on category
108	**Country specific CSOs**	Government-led actors and institutions specific to a certain country, e.g. executive branch, line ministries, legislatures, security services, local authorities.
104	**EU Field**	EU entities outside HQ, mostly EU Delegations and FPI regional offices
83	**International partners**	International organisations, companies and other entities with whom EU is collaborating on a global level, e.g. various bodies of the UN, INGOs.
74	**Country specific authorities**	Actors and organisations of the civil society specific to a certain country, e.g. trade unions, universities, NGOs, religious and professional organisations.
73	**EU HQ**	Entities from EU HQ, e.g. different DGs, EU Parliament, EEAS.
47	**EU MS**	Representatives of EU MS as well as official development agencies and implementers from EU MS
47	**Beneficiaries**	Representatives of groups that benefit from EU support, e.g. internally displaced persons/refugees, rural population, ex-combattants, security actors.
35	**Regional partners**	International organisations, companies and other entities with whom EU is collaborating within a specific regional context, e.g. African Union, multi-national observation and monitoring missions.
22	**Other**	Not fitting into any other category, e.g. individual consultants, academia, think tanks and networks.
15	**Bilateral partners**	Representatives of bilateral partners that are not EU MS, e.g. embassies and development agencies

The combination of data collection methods varied according to the different JCs, but multiple sources were used systematically to triangulate the information collected. Where possible, the evaluation team combined the use of qualitative and quantitative data and relied both on primary and secondary data sources. During all phases, the evaluation team verified that the set of methods and techniques was sufficiently broad to ensure a high level of data reliability and validity of conclusions. In this regard, the online survey enabled the team to test evidence from the 12 case studies against a broader group of recipients of EU support for CPPB.

The evaluation terms of reference specified that the evaluation timeframe was “mainly focused on the period 2013-2018” and that to fully assess progress following the 2011 evaluation, “2011 and 2012 [would] be taken into consideration.” The team accordingly included interventions that began or were implemented between 2011 and 2018. Additionally, many of the key interlocutors at Headquarters and in EU Delegations (EUDs) took up their positions in 2017 and 2018. While it was sometimes possible to interview individuals who had previously held relevant positions, a good deal of the interview evidence pertained to 2018 and 2019. The online survey requested information from the 2011-2018 period.

Figure 3 CPPB intervention logic



3.5 Main challenges and limitations

This evaluation did not face major or unusual challenges that would not be encountered in any other EU global thematic evaluation. However, like other evaluations, it faced a few external challenges over which the evaluation team had limited control, as presented in Table 2.

Table 2 Main challenges and limitations

Challenge	Situation encountered and mitigation response
Related to the evidence base	
Thematic scope	The EU has no agreed or single definition of either "conflict prevention" or "peacebuilding". Definitions employed by others (UN, OECD-DAC) are widely used by CPPB actors, yet did not provide adequate guidance in terms of delineating the thematic scope of the evaluation as they were relatively broad. Therefore, determining the thematic scope of CPPB was challenging. Issues with the scope arose during the first RG meeting: the inclusion of IcSP/IfS articles 3 and 4 and the identification of complementary interventions. Close consultation with the RG allowed all these issues to be resolved.
Project and programme documentation	Relevant information was not always easily retrievable, as only limited progress reporting was available in CRIS. Therefore, the team combined data extracted from CRIS with information found online and documentation shared by EU Delegations (EUDs), geographical desks and case study stakeholders. This process was very time-consuming, with documents still being retrieved well into the field phase. The availability of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) documents continued to be problematic throughout the evaluation.
Political and policy dialogue	Political and policy dialogue is complex, with a multitude of cause and effect linkages that the evaluation team was required to test. While documented effects were often not available in project and programming documents, the team conducted interviews at Headquarters (HQ) and in partner countries, with a particular focus on questions related to policy and political dialogue. The team met with Heads of Delegation (HoD) and/or members of the political sections at EUDs and/or EUSRs during field missions, which helped the evaluation team to assess political and policy dynamics.
The highly sensitive nature of CPPB	The root causes of conflicts, violence, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding are highly sensitive and heavily politicised topics in many (if not all) partner countries benefitting from EU support to CPPB. The evaluation team had to work carefully in such instances, triangulating official government interviews, EUD interviews, discussions with conflict parties, civil society groups and so on to avoid replicating biased or one-sided views.

4 Answers to the evaluation questions

This section presents the responses to the evaluation questions based on the evidence gathered by the evaluation team throughout the evaluation. Each response starts with a short reiteration of the coverage, followed by summary answers at EQ level. Complementary and more detailed information, in particular regarding country examples and sources, is captured in Volume 2.

Cluster 1: Strategy and implementation

4.1 EQ 1 on relevance and coherence

To what extent has EU support for CPPB been aligned with EU high-level priorities for CPPB, the broader frameworks for EU external action and the priorities and needs of partner countries?

Rationale and coverage of the question: Relevance is the starting point for performance assessment. While the alignment of CPPB with high-level EU priorities and objectives for CPPB was stated in many documents, it is important to assess whether this actually occurred. This EQ examines whether CPPB strategy/programming and interventions at the regional/national levels were aligned with high-level EU CPPB priorities and objectives. It also assesses if EU support for CPPB was aligned with partner countries and regional inter-governmental bodies by being responsive and adaptive to their priorities and needs. Relevance closely links to the internal coherence of EU action. The EQ thus examines the extent to which EU support for CPPB was coherent and complementary among the various CPPB engagements and with wider EU external action. It considers the alignment of EU support for CPPB with other key EU policy objectives for development, counter-terrorism, and humanitarian assistance to identify coherence or incoherence. Additionally, the consistency/contradiction of EU support for CPPB is assessed within and across EU institutions.

Summary answer to the Evaluation Question

EU support for CPPB reflected high-level EU priorities and objectives for CPPB, particularly at strategy/programming level, and sought to respond to the needs and objectives of partners at the country and regional levels during the 2011-2018 period. Efforts to tailor EU support to partner context relied on a range of assessment processes including conflict analyses, which were undertaken increasingly frequently during the evaluation period. In most cases the EU was able to respond to changes in regional and national political and security environments and in implementing partner capacities. This enabled the EU to remain relevant as circumstances evolved. Factors promoting responsiveness and adaptiveness included pro-active, high-level engagement, collaborative approaches, risk willingness and the mix of instruments at the disposal of EU officials. However, aspects of the EU's approach to providing support for CPPB and its bureaucratic procedures often worked against responsiveness and adaptiveness.

The quality of CPPB coordination and coherence increased during the evaluation period, partly overcoming the challenges to coherence identified to prior to 2011. Institutional factors that continued to influence the coherence of the EU's CPPB engagements included complexity of the EU system, leadership and division of labour and the role of individuals. In order to reinforce coherence and internal coordination, the EU strengthened its policy framework, modified institutional structures, addressed human resource needs and promoted methods of joint working during the evaluation period with varying degrees of success.

EU support for CPPB was largely coherent with the objectives of broader EU external action at the strategy/programming level. However, at times the degree of coherence fell short during implementation. This was particularly the case for migration management, and, to a lesser extent, countering violent extremism, where clashes between these efforts in a few cases undermined the achievement of EU CPPB objectives. In some instances, the EU's humanitarian assistance had negative effects on conflict dynamics and thus "did harm" or had the potential to "do harm."

The following sections present a more detailed account of the evaluation's findings on relevance and coherence.

Alignment with EU high-level CPPB political priorities and objectives

EU support for CPPB was generally well-aligned with EU high-level priorities for CPPB (intermediate and ultimate impacts in the reconstructed CPPB IL in Figure 3 above). EU high-level CPPB political priorities and policy objectives were adequately reflected in EU strategy/programming documents such as Multi-Annual Indicative Programmes (MIPs), National Indicative Programmes (NIPs), Regional Indicative Programmes (RIPs), Single Support Frameworks (SSFs), Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) and European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Action Plans. Alignment was sometimes implicit in the EU's engagement because the CPPB concept did not fit well with the partner government's vision or priorities and stating specific CPPB objectives would have undermined the EU's ability to pursue those objectives. Alignment at the intervention level was weaker, although many interventions examined for this evaluation were clearly CPPB-oriented even if conflict prevention and peacebuilding was not explicitly stated as an aim or key EU policy/strategy documents were not referenced. Complementary interventions were frequently understood by EU officials as having an implicit link to CPPB, but this was rarely explicitly articulated in project documentation. (See Figure 1 above for a definition of "complementary interventions.")

Alignment with national and local partners and intergovernmental bodies

EU support for CPPB was generally well aligned with the priorities and needs of national and local partners and regional bodies. Findings from the case studies and the responses to the evaluation online survey demonstrated that alignment was generally based on formal strategies and policies and informed by consultations with relevant stakeholders from government, civil society and regional bodies. However, this formal alignment did not always guarantee that relations at the policy level proceeded smoothly, as the commitment of national actors to implement formal strategies and policies varied (see EQ 3). Operationally, many interventions were based on participatory approaches and responsive to local needs and priorities. The evaluation found many examples across the case studies where national stakeholders, community members, local authorities and religious organisations were involved in designing project activities or where projects included consultation meetings, workshops or stakeholder committees.

While efforts were made to tailor EU support for CPPB to the regional/local policy and political-security-cultural context, conflict and/or context analyses were generally not systematically or formally undertaken, either at the strategic or at the intervention level. Nonetheless, some progress was made in comparison with the 2001-2010 period. The 2011 CPPB evaluation found that the Commission's approach to conflict analysis, conflict sensitivity and mainstreaming was not systematised or structured but was mostly ad hoc.[28] This evaluation employed the definition of conflict analysis included in the EU's 2013 Guidance Note on the use of Conflict Analysis in support of EU external action, which had considerable overlap with the definition employed by the 2011 evaluation. The 2013 Guidance Note identified seven key elements of conflict analysis: context, causes of conflict, actors, conflict dynamics, future direction of conflict, existing and planned internal

and external responses to the conflict, and key gaps, options and realistic strategies to respond to the conflict.[29]

Between 2011 and 2018, the EU increasingly undertook strategic conflict analyses.[h] That said, case studies demonstrated that where conducted, strategic conflict analyses were often not widely known among EU staff and their findings were not widely used to inform EU engagement. Alternative assessment processes were used more frequently to help shape the EU's understanding of the context (see Table 3).

Table 3 Alternative assessment processes shaping the EU's understanding of context / conflict dynamics

Assessment process	Description	Observed in
"Eyes and ears on the ground" and regular in-country formal/ informal exchanges and analysis	• EUDs, EUSR offices, Special Envoys and CSDP missions present on the ground or able to make frequent visits • Conflict analysis undertaken by FPI experts	Colombia, DR Congo, Georgia, Guatemala, Horn of Africa region, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Niger, Philippines, Sahel region, Somalia, Yemen
Strategic country assessments, conflict assessment workshops and seminars	• EU strategic country assessments, conflict assessment seminars and workshops • Structural risks assessment by EU and EU MS	CAR, Côte d'Ivoire, Georgia, Nigeria, Zimbabwe
Joint assessments and analysis with other donors[30], especially multilateral actors	• Joint Peacebuilding Needs Assessments (JPNA) • Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessments (RPBA) • Post-Disaster Needs Assessments (PDNA) • Analysis undertaken by UN, World Bank, US/USAID, OSCE	Burkina Faso, CAR, Georgia, Iraq, Lebanon, Moldova, Myanmar, Niger, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Syria, Timor Leste, Ukraine, Yemen
Conflict analysis undertaken by other international and local actors	• Conflict or context[i] analyses by international and local research institutes, international and local think tanks used to inform policies and interventions	Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Myanmar, Pakistan, Philippines, Syria
Conflict monitoring fora/ mechanisms supported by the EU	• Regular meetings through the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) and Geneva International Discussions (GID) contributed to conflict or context analyses,	Georgia, Myanmar, Niger, Philippines, South Sudan

[h] Conflict analysis is a specific tool to enhance context analysis, embed conflict sensitivity, generate recommendations to address root causes of conflict and fragility and support donors and implementers' coordination. Some of the 37 conflict analyses undertaken between 2012 and 2017 may have been risk analyses rather than conflict assessments. Given the broad definition of "conflict analysis," it is not surprising that these analyses can take many forms. According to information provided by the EEAS (from the former PRISM unit), the EU conducted an increasing number of conflict analyses, conflict prevention reports and structural risk assessments for countries in different parts of the world. These were often undertaken through a combination of staff from the EEAS, DG DEVCO, DG NEAR and FPI under the lead of the EEAS, with inputs from external experts. Table 14 in Volume 2 demonstrates that the majority was done for the EU's work in Africa. For some countries two or even three conflict analyses were conducted during the evaluation period. More information on the practice of conflict analysis is found in EQ 5 in both Volumes 1 and 2.

[i] Context analysis is a specific step of programme design. It is not necessarily conflict-informed or conflict sensitive or, indeed, informed by conflict analysis. Some context analyses do, however, include elements of conflict analysis. Therefore in some places in this report we refer to "conflict or context analyses".

Assessment process	Description	Observed in
	early warning and identifying project entry points. • Cease-fire and Transitional Security Arrangement Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM) and Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission were important monitoring/verification mechanisms to help identify changes. • The Myanmar Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Commission – financed through the Joint Peace Fund to which the EU contributed - supported the achievement of the objectives of the National Ceasefire Agreement.	
Context or conflict analyseis at intervention level	• Conflict or context analyses undertaken by implementing partners to inform the design and monitoring of specific interventions.	Afghanistan, CAR, Lebanon, Philippines, Somalia

Sources: Interviews with EU and implementing partner officials, CPPB survey, mission/monitoring reports by EU officials, intervention level documentation.

The EU was moderately successful in responding to changes in national/regional security environments, political context, and implementing partner capacities during the evaluation period, enabling the EU to remain relevant as circumstances evolved. Most of the case studies and the online survey provided evidence of the ability to adjust to changing circumstances. This was facilitated by the generally inclusive and multi-stakeholder approach underlying many CPPB interventions (see Table 4).

Table 4 Factors influencing responsiveness and adaptiveness

Facilitating factors
• HoDs, Special Envoys, EUSRs and EUD staff with dedicated CPPB responsibilities willing to engage proactively and work together • EU risk willingness • Ability to use a mix of instruments, in particular of the IfS/IcSP which allowed for flexible responses and risk-taking
Impeding factors
• Reactive rather than proactive stance on the part of the EU • Early warning not systematically translated into early action • EU willingness to abandon some CPPB sectors when issues of fragility still existed because partner governments were eager to “leave the conflict behind” • Inadequate contextual understanding on the part of the EU • Absence/weakness of bureaucratic procedures and instruments needed to respond quickly to CPPB opportunities

Sources: Interviews with EU and implementing partner officials, CPPB survey, mission/monitoring reports by EU officials, intervention level documentation.

Coherence and coordination across EU institutions

The quality of CPPB coordination and coherence increased during the evaluation period, partly overcoming challenges to coherence identified prior to 2011.[31] The 2011 evaluation found that before the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, the coherence and effectiveness of the EU’s approach in CPPB was challenged by the complexity of the EU’s institutional set-up for external affairs, uncertainties regarding the precise roles of the Commission and the Council in supporting

CPPB and the fragmentation of CPPB issues across various Commission entities.[32] There was evidence that steps taken prior to 2011 had begun to strengthen coherence for CPPB-related activities across EU institutions[33] and additional efforts were made between 2011 and 2018 improve coherence.

Efforts to improve coherence during the evaluation period included strengthening the EU's policy framework, modifying its institutional structures, addressing human resource needs and promoting methods of joint working. There was evidence from case studies that the advent of policies/strategies such as the 2013 Joint Communication on the EU's coordinated approach to external conflicts and crises and the 2016 Global Strategy, which laid out the integrated approach, gradually increased the awareness of the need to work collaboratively across the institution and led to a number of institutional changes. The creation of a dedicated conflict prevention and mediation unit in the EEAS, a unit dealing with fragility and resilience in DG DEVCO and a Centre of Thematic Expertise on Crisis Reaction and Security Sector Reform in DG NEAR helped promote more effective responses to crises and conflicts.[j] These dedicated units provided a cross-cutting institutional home for CPPB issues and some interlocutors suggested that these units strengthened the focus and follow-up to policy initiatives. In addition, human resources were strengthened in some EUDs during times of crisis. Conflict assessment guidance and tools were also developed, which led to an increasing number of conflict analyses being undertaken (see EQ 5 below and Volume 2 for details on the EU's progress in promoting conflict sensitivity).

The EU used formal mechanisms to coordinate operationally and ensure complementarity of actions, such as the interservice consultations and interservice missions involving various Commission and EEAS departments. These formal mechanisms were complemented by informal coordination and information exchanges among EU actors, for example monthly meetings both at Headquarters and Delegations, thematic working groups/meetings, briefing meetings organised by the EUSRs including to the Peace and Security Committee of the European Council. In some cases, interservice task forces were established (Myanmar and Somalia) to promote a coherent response. In some countries, formal or informal country analyses contributed to coherence by establishing a joint understanding of the context.

The degree of coordination at the operational level improved progressively, including between political and cooperation sections. The case studies demonstrated that there often was a good degree of information sharing and coordination of policies and programming between different desks in DG DEVCO, DG NEAR, EEAS, FPI at HQ level and with EUDs, as well as with EUSR and Special Envoy teams, CSDP missions and DG ECHO. For several case studies satisfactory to good working relations existed between the political and cooperation sections at EUDs. All cases studies conducted for this evaluation demonstrated a combined use of spending and non-spending interventions (see EQ 6). At the same time, case studies and external evaluations and assessments provided evidence of variable coordination at Headquarters, between Headquarters and EUDs and other actors in the field. There was also evidence that, in a number of

> *"The political and cooperation elements of CPPB are completely inseparable [in South Sudan]. The programme manager deals with the details of the [locally managed] budget while the Ambassador and Head of political section discuss funding at the higher level. For the most part, the political and cooperation sections have been in agreement on the approach to follow. Political reporting is shared throughout the Delegation. This level of interaction between political and cooperation is somewhat unusual but in South Sudan it is essential."*
>
> Source: Interview with EU official

[j] The name of the unit in EEAS changed several times during the evaluation period: K2; SECPOL.2; PRISM and, in 2019, Directorate for Integrated Approach for Security and Peace (ISP).

cases, the degree of alignment and synergies between the IfS/IcSP and most other financing instruments was affected by a lack of flexibility and lengthy procedures on the part of the other EU financing instruments.[34]

The EU's institutional environment and the existence of strategic/political frameworks for CPPB were key factors affecting the degree to which the EU was able to devise a coherent and coordinated approach to CPPB. Their effects varied according to context. Case studies and general document review revealed that EU coherence and complementarity were strengthened by several factors: explicit CPPB strategies or political frameworks designed to facilitate engagement of multiple national and international actors in dealing with a conflict, clear policy leadership and division of labour among those involved in delivering CPPB. The absence of these factors impeded coherence. Coherence and complementarity of EU support for CPPB was also strongly dependent on personal relationships and the interest of individuals in working collaboratively (see Table 5).

Table 5 Institutional factors affecting coherence and coordination among EU entities in CPPB

Factors	Insights from interviews
Complexity of EU system and number of entities involved in CPPB	• *"There are so many instruments; it is not clear that they are all checked against gaps, overlaps and prioritisation. Sometimes you think that everything should come from one pot to give full visibility of what is happening. Sometimes there are 'surprises' – a unit in the AU gets money from a part of the EU that no one knows about."* • *"The EU has many different voices".* • *"A comprehensive approach is not helped by the system. You have to work hard at it."*
CPPB leadership and division of labour	• *"Somalia has a regular task force meeting (every three months)… [Nonetheless] it is not clear who is in charge of decisions on support to the Somalia Security Forces. DEVCO has money, but no military expertise. Neither does the EEAS Managing Director Africa. CMPD [Crisis Management and Planning Directorate] has expertise, but no policy lead. Some say the EUSR should do it, but the EUSR has no formal mandate and is not capacitated either."* • *"In conflict theatres that have an EUD, EUSR and CSDP mission, more clarity is needed on mandates and definitions."* • *"Despite a Delegation on the ground, the Syria file is tightly steered, due to its political sensitivity, by HQs. Divergent opinions between EEAS and NEAR have increased a fragmented set up that renders any discussion on CPPB extremely complex."*
Individuals involved and personal relationships	• *"The multiple Headquarters in Brussels (and sometimes in the EU MS capitals) are not organised in any institutional set up. Everything relies on the capacity of the HoD to streamline and coordinate the various institutions and tools."* • *"In terms of coherence, a lot depends on personalities. Technically EU Ambassadors are Head of Delegation and Head of Cooperation. But the political sections are embryonic and cooperation sections are well-staffed. There are two separate lines of reporting and sometimes DEVCO can find ways to be independent."* • *"The comprehensive approach is as good as the people."*

Source: Interviews with EU officials; EUD survey.

Coherence between CPPB and other EU external action objectives

Coherence among the various elements of EU external action was increasingly recognised at the highest policy level as central to the EU's ability to achieve its external action objectives. The importance of a consistent and coherent approach to EU external action was stated in multiple EU policy and strategy documents. The 2011 Agenda for Change noted that EU's development, foreign and security policy initiatives should be linked to create a more coherent approach to peace, state-building, poverty reduction and the underlying causes of conflict.[35] The 2016 EU Global Strategy and the 2017 European Consensus for Development further underlined the EU's aim for a consistent approach to external action.[k]

At the strategic/programming level, there was a clear intention to ensure coherence between EU support for CPPB and other EU external actions during the evaluation period. In some cases, strategic/programming documents demonstrated an explicit intention to address the security-development nexus or to engage through an integrated/comprehensive approach. In all case study contexts, the EU emphasised the need for a holistic, comprehensive approach towards development, peace, trade, stabilisation and security, recognising that these objectives were often intertwined. In most cases there were no blatant contradictions between EU support for CPPB with other areas of EU external action.

Nonetheless, in some cases there was strong incoherence between EU CPPB objectives and EU objectives for controlling irregular migration or countering violent extremism. There was, for example, a clear clash between CPPB objectives and objectives for migration management and preventing violent extremism in Niger and, to a lesser degree, in Côte d'Ivoire. In some cases, the EU's engagement or political positioning on these issues severely affected the overall political/policy dialogue with the government, including dialogue on CPPB. While aims and policies were broadly aligned on paper, in reality there was a disconnect between the EU's strong stance on countering irregular migration flows and extremism after 2015,[36] on the one hand, and support for CPPB, on the other hand, in its cooperation with third countries (Box 1).

The EU did not always deal with all of these conflicting objectives in a timely, preventative manner. However, the EU was usually able to deal with these situations through diplomatic efforts and some adaptation in its approach.

Box 1 The effects of migration management in Niger

Reports and analyses from international Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), think tanks and academic researchers argued that EU migration policy had detrimental effects on human rights, local conflicts dynamics and regional mobility and livelihoods in Niger and other countries. Specifically with regard to Niger, one report on the impact of the EU's approach to migration management in Turkey, the Maghreb and the Sahel argued that the EU's focus on countering illegal migration flows had a range of negative impacts: strengthening the government's authoritarian tendencies, skewing budget allocations in favour of the security sector and undermining "livelihoods dependent on cross-border trade and movement, ignoring their benefits for local economies, income diversification and stability."

Source: J. Tubiana and C. Gramizzi, Lost in Trans-Nation, December 2018, http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/U-Reports/SAS-SANA-Report-Lost-in-Trans-nation.pdf; R. Andersson and D. Keen, Partners in crime? The impacts of Europe's outsourced migration controls on peace, stability and rights, July 2019, https://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/partners-in-crime.-the-impacts-of-europes-outsourced-migration-controls-on-peace-stability-and-rights.pdf, citation from p.iv

[k] Following on the European Consensus for Development, the Commission took stock of progress implementing Policy Coherence for Development between 2015 and 2018, including examining "peace as an indispensable condition for development." See, European Commission (2019): Policy Coherence for Development. SWD(2015) 159 final, https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/eu-report-pcd-2019_en.pdf.

While the EU's humanitarian assistance was often provided in a way that did not run counter to EU CPPB objectives, in some instances, EU humanitarian assistance "did some harm" and thus indirectly undermined EU CPPB objectives. Humanitarian assistance is generally seen as a distinct type of assistance that is based on humanitarian principles (such as neutrality and impartiality) and independent of political, religious, ideological, security, economic or other objectives. EU officials working on humanitarian assistance reported "Do No Harm" principles are closely linked to conflict sensitivity through the intention to avoid contributing to conflict, even if only indirectly, when providing humanitarian assistance.[37] Nonetheless, humanitarian assistance may interact in unintended ways with non-humanitarian objectives. In the Philippines and Niger, humanitarian assistance was found to have had some negative effects on conflict dynamics and thus "did harm" or had the potential to "do harm." (see Volume 2, JC 1.4 for additional details.) EU officials reported that they continue to assess how to strengthen the application of conflict sensitivity to EU humanitarian assistance.[38]

4.2 EQ 2 on the approach to implementation

To what extent have the approaches, tools and mechanisms for implementation been appropriate to achieve the intended objectives in an optimal manner?

Rationale and coverage of the question: Four main issue areas are examined in order to assess whether the EU has made the most appropriate use of CPPB resources to achieve results: 1) timely delivery of EU support for CPPB at a reasonable cost; 2) sufficient and appropriate human resources, well-functioning communication channels and decision-making processes to deliver CPPB support, 3) adequate monitoring of CPPB interventions and 4) appropriateness of EU financing instruments, aid modalities and delivery mechanisms to context and expected results.

Summary answer to the Evaluation Question

The EU faced challenges in adapting its approaches, tools and mechanisms to achieve its CPPB objectives in an optimal manner since issuing the Communication on Conflict Prevention and adopting the Gothenburg Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts in 2001. The EU made some progress during the evaluation period. However, at the end of the evaluation period, the EU still needed to adjust how it supported CPPB in order to address institutional constraints that affected 1) the timely and flexible delivery of CPPB support; 2) the availability of sufficient human resources with sound CPPB skills capable of making linkages between politics, programming and context; 3) the ability to strengthen monitoring and evaluation of CPPB engagements and feed lessons into ongoing and future interventions; and 4) further improve the availability of financing instruments, aid modalities and delivery mechanisms that are fit for purpose in situations of conflict and crises. Important institutional constraints included key performance indicators for projects and financing instruments not adapted to local context or to maximising CPPB impact; heavy EU contracting procedures; weak understanding of conflict contexts in Brussels that delayed contracting; reliance on implementing partners with heavy programming procedures such as UN, World Bank; short timeframe of Art 3 IfS/IcSP grants; fragmented institutional responsibility for EU CPPB spending; and some aspects of FPI regionalisation.

The following sections present a more detailed account of the evaluation's findings on efficiency.

Timely and flexible delivery of EU support for CPPB

The 2011 CPPB evaluation identified a number of challenges in responding to situations of conflict and crisis in a timely and flexible manner. EU support for CPPB during the 2001-2010 period suffered from shortcomings in the EU programming cycle, EU procedures for financial assistance and problems in adequately anticipating the dynamic nature of fragile and conflict-affected environments.

Timely and flexible delivery of EU support for CPPB improved after 2011 due to progress in adapting EU institutions, procedures and financing instruments/aid modalities and delivery mechanisms to conflict and crisis environments. In particular, the ability to disburse financing more quickly and the application of administrative procedures to overcome bureaucratic obstacles

helped promote timeliness and flexibility. This included use of Article 3 of the IfS/IcSP, crisis declarations,[l] partly decentralised management mode, direct contracting, retroactive funding, EU Trust Funds with flexible procedures and the Early Response Mechanism (ERM) window of the African Peace Facility APF.[39] These did not entirely eliminate challenges to timeliness, however. Flexible procedures, for example, required greater familiarity with and expertise in procurement processes which the EU sought to address through the Staff Handbook on operating in conditions of conflict and fragility.[40] Implementers who were unfamiliar with EU administrative systems continued to experience difficulties in navigating EU procedures.[41] While this caused serious delays in some instance, constraints were overcome in other cases by the use of experienced implementers who were familiar with EU administrative systems.[42] Additionally, as discussed further below, at times the responsiveness of some EUTFs, the ERM and Art. 3 of the IfS/IcSP was weak, as evidenced by statements from EU and EU MS officials and implementing partners.

While some of the constraints on timely delivery of EU support for CPPB were outside the control of the EU, notably conditions inherent in conflict/crisis environments, many derived from the EU's own institutional setup and procedures. In six of the 12 case studies (Afghanistan, Colombia, Georgia, Myanmar, Niger and Somalia), the political/security environment was a major cause of severe delays in implementing some CPPB interventions during the evaluation period.[43] EU institutional constraints on timely and flexible delivery were identified across the case studies by multiple EU and implementing partner interlocutors and other evaluations. Chief among these were:

- Key performance indicators (KPI) that did not adequately reflect local context (such as for ENI funded projects where other implementers were delivering the same activities)[m] or, in the case of the IcSP, the objective of maximising CPPB impact (notably the IcSP KPI delivering contracts within four months of political approval of an intervention);
- Lengthy contracting procedures especially for EDF and DCI;
- Implementing partners with heavy programming procedures, such as the World Bank, some EU MS and UN agencies;
- The short timeframe of Art 3 IfS/IcSP grants;
- Difficulty of mobilising the right expertise or service provider in conflict-affected areas; and
- Weak understanding in Brussels of the context in which programming occurred, leading to unrealistic contracting requirements that took time to resolve.[44]

Two other aspects of the EU institutional set up emerged as important factors affecting the effectiveness and efficiency of EU support for CPPB: 1) fragmentation of responsibility for EU CPPB spending and 2) FPI regionalisation.

Fragmented responsibility for an issue without adequate mechanisms to compel joint working led to the inefficient use of EU human and financial resources. All case studies reported instances of challenges in achieving coherence among EU actors, but fragmentation of responsibility was particularly acute with regard to Pan African peace and security issues. EU, AU, Intergovern-

[l] The Cotonou Agreement defines "crisis situations" as those posing a threat to law and order or to the security and safety of individuals, threatening to escalate into armed conflict or to destabilise the country. Crisis may also result from natural disasters, man-made crises and disasters, conflict or extraordinary circumstances having comparable effects related inter alia to climate change, environmental degradation, access to energy and natural resources or extreme poverty. The EC is allowed, through the rules attached to the EU budget, the European Development Fund (EDF), the IcSP, the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), the Development and Cooperation Instrument (DCI), as well as the Common Implementing Regulation, to apply flexible procedures necessary to ensure a rapid and efficient implementation of EU aid in order for a country in crisis situation to receive additional and timely support. This flexibility is applied at programming or implementation level.

[m] See, for example, the entry for Lebanon in Table 10 in Volume 2.

mental Authority on Development (IGAD) and EU MS interlocutors argued that the centralised management of the APF risked weakening the overall profile of the EU because leverage over the AU and IGAD rested primarily with those who managed the financing, not those on the ground most familiar with the context. On non-spending engagements, there sometimes were two separate lines of reporting from the EU Delegation to the African Union to EEAS and DEVCO in Brussels, depending on the Head of Delegation. The Office of the EUSR for the Horn of Africa – mandated by the Council and working to support the HR/VP – was also another active EU actor. In the Philippines, there were too many EU instruments deployed in support of CPPB, which promoted internal fragmentation and hindered cooperation. Niger offered evidence that projects designed, managed and implemented from Headquarters without the close involvement of the Government and the EUD led to missed opportunities to better align EU CPPB support with country context and the specific situation in some areas. [45]

The creation of regional FPI offices had a mixed effect in terms of delivering EU support for CPPB. In 2017, FPI relocated staff who had been embedded in EUDs to new regional offices. The principle purpose of this reorganisation was to ensure that IcSP could continue to be implemented across more regions and countries rather than concentrating FPI programme managers in a few EUDs. Evidence from EUDs, FPI Regional Offices and FPI at Headquarters showed that FPI had largely succeeded in meeting this objective and that other benefits accrued to regionalisation. At the same time, EU interlocutors and implementing partners stated that the impact of regionalisation was not uniformly positive (see Table 6).

Table 6 Effects of FPI regionalisation

Advantages
• Ability of FPI to maintain and even increase IcSP geographic coverage and linkages to different stakeholders in the various countries covered in the face of resource constraints • More coherent overview of FPI activities regionally • Cross fertilisation among FPI programme managers regionally • Ability of FPI HQ to work more directly on its mandate without resources being drawn into other priorities of EUDs • Enhanced capacity by EU to engage politically • Availability of more continuous and reliable support through the Regional Teams Observed in FPI HQ, FPI MENA Regional Office, EUD and FPI officers for Colombia, Central African Republic, Georgia, Lebanon
Disadvantages
• Reduced ability to follow country political, policy and conflict dynamics closely, especially for countries where FPI staff were previously based • Increased workload of cooperation sections within EUDs without in-house FPI programme managers for FPI-related logistical, communication-related and other support matters, despite all contracts being managed by Regional Teams • Continued co-optation of FPI programme managers into the work of Delegations where the regional offices were located • Weakening of critical close linkages between FPI programme managers and local stakeholders and implementers in a number of cases • Increased workload of FPI programme managers who had to cover multiple countries Observed in EUD and FPI officers for Central African Republic, Georgia, Lebanon, Niger, Philippines, Zimbabwe

Source: Interviews with EU officials and IcSP implementers, EUD survey.

Finally, in considering whether costs of CPPB interventions were reasonable, it was important to weigh political outcomes against pure cost-effectiveness. The degree to which EU

support for CPPB was delivered at a reasonable cost was difficult to ascertain in view of weak information on cost-effectiveness and the political nature of objectives. However, there was evidence that in at least some cases the costs involved in providing support to CPPB were justified, particularly when measured against the likely political/security outcomes of not engaging. In that sense, the political outcomes sought by CPPB interventions justified greater inefficiencies than might be tolerated for development-oriented interventions. In Niger, Somalia and South Sudan, EU officials, representatives of ES MS and external analysts argued that the costs involved in supporting CPPB were justified when measured against the likely political/security outcomes of not engaging.[46] Where EU provided significant support (spending and non-spending) to peace processes that resulted in peace agreements as in Colombia and the Philippines, there seemed to be general agreement that investing in peace processes made sense, even when implementation of agreements fell short.[47]

Sufficient and appropriate human resources

The 2011 CPPB evaluation found that the Commission's human resources for engaging in conflict/crisis environments needed to be strengthened in terms of both quality and quantity. Conflict expertise was judged to be low during the 2001-2010 period despite an increase in the number of dedicated CPPB staff. Non-dedicated CPPB staff had insufficient CPPB training and experience, despite the availability of training at HQ. There was no human resource policy to increase the number of CPPB qualified staff and career incentives in CPPB were insufficient.[48]

The EU made some progress in strengthening its human resources during the 2011-2018 period, but many of the constraints identified by the 2011 evaluation persisted, both in EUDs and at Headquarters. In particular, the EU lacked adequate staff with sound CPPB skills capable of making linkages between politics, programming and context. Interviews with a broad range of EU and EU MS officials, national and regional actors and implementing partners, the online CPPB survey, independent evaluations and external studies indicated that the knowledge of CPPB among staff was variable, with a heavy reliance on on-the-job training and online courses. Some EUDs had a reasonable amount of expertise necessary to make linkages between politics, programming and context in the domain of CPPB, although generally not throughout the entire evaluation period. Other EUDs experienced definite shortages. FPI was seen by many as a source of politically savvy staff capable of linking the EU's political and operational sections. Difficulties in recruiting staff for EUDs in conflict/crisis environments was partly mitigated by FPI regionalisation starting in 2017 which provided more continuous and reliable support to a greater number of EUDs from the regional teams. At the same time, some EUDs reported a loss of capacity with the transfer of FPI staff to regional teams. Another problem, which existed prior to regionalisation, is that FPI experienced its difficulties in recruiting staff for difficult environments (see Table 6 above). As a result of regionalisation, some offices were in more "attractive" duty stations and it became somewhat easier to find qualified staff. Finally, the EU as a whole also found that it was sometimes difficult to mobilise consultants and implementers to work in countries with active conflicts.

While providing support for CPPB requires sufficient human resources to engage politically as well as to manage financial support, the EU did not deploy adequate human resources with strong political skills during the evaluation period. In particular there was an imbalance between political sections and cooperation sections in EUDs and the human resources available to FPI. EU and EU MS interlocutors saw negative implications of this imbalance for EU understanding of conflict dynamics and a comprehensive EU approach to conflicts and crises. Limited EUD political capacity also negatively affected the ability of the EU to provide support to EU MS, many of whom had very small political sections and reported relying on the EU for political reporting and advice.[49] In many cases, Delegations relied on Seconded National Experts (SNEs) to staff positions relevant to CPPB, which affected institutional memory and continuity when SNEs were not replaced. Additionally, in countries with on-going conflicts or peace processes, the demands on the

political section were extensive. For "evacuated" Delegations, the limitations on the number of expatriate staff allowed in-country at any one time imposed additional burdens.

A small service such as FPI cannot be expected to carry the burden of providing political inputs and analysis and FPI programme officers had been drawn into the work of the Cooperation sections when co-located with EUDs prior to 2017, affecting the amount of time they could devote to FPI business. Nonetheless, FPI officers often provided up-to-date political intelligence and analysis to EUDs and the relocation of FPI staff to regional offices created challenges for the capacity of some EUDs to retain regular CPPB-related contact with in-country partners at policy and implementation levels and to undertake conflict-related analysis at the same time (Box 2). As noted above, FPI regionalisation grew out of the difficult choices FPI needed to make to provide support across the largest possible number of EUDs.[n]

Box 2 Contribution of resident FPI programme officers to peace processes

"One needs a senior advisor in place to catch up with the various (political) changes and dynamics, also on substantive issues. The FPI officer based at the regional EUD in Bangkok does a good administrative job, but he cannot fill the gap left behind by the previous FPI officer, and is unable to provide (political) analysis with regard to CPPB. The EUD is currently highly understaffed in this regard. 'Other partners have excellent dedicated capacity working on the Bangsamoro peace process. After the departure of the Manila-based FPI programme manager this is no longer the case for the EU. The EU will be able to play a significant and visible role if such dedicated capacity is restored'."

Sources: Interviews with EU officials, EU implementing partners and international actors; First Flash Report of the PRISM-coordinated inter-service scoping mission to Manila and Cotabato, 29 January to 2 February 2018.

According to FPI, regionalisation had a positive effect on the EU's engagement in Afghanistan. Regionalisation allowed the peace process to be followed more closely because FPI had never had an FPI officer posted to Afghanistan before.

Source: Comments received from FPI official.

The overall situation in terms of formal experience-sharing and lessons learning mechanisms and their use to inform EU support for CPPB did not appear to have changed appreciably since the early 2000s. Despite some counterexamples, country case studies suggest that, on the whole, the use of research to underpin EU learning was limited: the EU was not – and did not aspire to be – a learning institution. It did not systematically and institutionally build up its knowledge base and shape its analysis, with the result that it depended (and still depends) on the information and views of its partners. There was limited space for strategic thinking and learning, particularly collectively, in part because of EUD staff workload. While individual EU officials reported learning from their experiences, concerns were expressed about institutional memory.

Interviews with EU officials suggested that learning was often a low priority activity in a very time-constrained environment, rather than key to achieving more effectiveness and, ultimately, impact. FPI, however, did appear to have a relatively stronger learning and experience-sharing culture than other EU actors engaged in CPPB activities according to interviews with EU officials and EU evaluations. This included staff training, learning within regional teams, evaluations/assessments commissioned by FPI, IcSP coordination meetings and FPI-organised dialogues.

Monitoring for results

EU M&E for CPPB has been consistently weak since the first CPPB evaluation. The 2011 CPPB evaluation reported it had experienced difficulty in assessing results and impact largely due to the

[n] FPI staff remained at EUDs in Colombia and Ukraine following the creation of Regional Teams.

absence of systematic and detailed monitoring and evaluation of operations.[50] More recent EU thematic and instrument evaluations relevant to CPPB found significant shortcomings in M&E in terms of the existence of systems for monitoring and evaluation, the nature and quality of indicators and anticipated results, the use of baselines to measure results and the availability of monitoring reports (including Results-Oriented Monitoring ROM) and evaluations.[51]

Evidence gathered from the case studies conducted for this evaluation confirmed the continued existence of these systemic challenges. While monitoring frequently did occur for CPPB interventions, monitoring systems were often weak, absent or not properly implemented. Monitoring practices varied considerably from country to country and region to region. Some interventions had baselines; many did not. Indicators to measure progress were of variable quality and tended to be quantitative. Project reports often focused on activities or outputs, rarely on outcomes. Expectations of what EU-supported interventions could achieve were often not realistic. The focus on activity and output reporting meant that change was not well documented by monitoring systems.[52] A significant exception to the absence of routine monitoring was budget support.[53]

EUD workloads also imposed a major constraint on the ability of programme managers to monitor interventions. FPI appeared to have more capacity to monitor than DEVCO staff but some FPI officers were responsible for a large number of contracts which reduced the time available to spend on any given contract. Requirements for reporting/monitoring varied among interventions, with some requiring weekly activity reports, others monthly or quarterly reports and still others annual reports. Attitudes toward the utility of ROMs varied substantially across the EU, influencing the degree to which ROMs were conducted. What is more, data to underpin baselines were often weak due to a lack of reliable data systems, limited data collection and statistical capacities and inaccurate data.[54]

Monitoring in conflict and crisis situations faced particular challenges relating to the security and political environments. In highly unstable environments, the EU had to rely heavily on reporting from implementing partners or other local actors whose reporting capacities were frequently judged by EU officials to be weak. Where ROMs were undertaken, they sometimes lacked depth and quality due to the very limited amount of time monitors were allowed in-country and the challenges of actually visiting project sites, especially in conflict-affected areas.[55]

The EU monitoring approach relied on logframes and quantitative indicators. It was not well suited to conflict/crisis contexts, which required flexibility and adaptivity. Furthermore, it was difficult to identify appropriate indicators for interventions intended to meet urgent political needs, which often jump-started longer term political processes such as mediation, or for relatively short-term interventions aimed at fundamental societal transformation, which require longer-term efforts.[56]

> *"The EU are quite strict and stuck in a way with linear approach to managing work in conflict and peacebuilding. We have been doing more and more work on trying out logic models, outcome harvesting and identifying change stories. But it has been quite hard to translate some of that in a logframe/indicator approach that is not very adaptive."*
>
> Source: Interviews with EU implementing partner

Complementary interventions were sometimes viewed as supporting CPPB objectives, but their monitoring systems did not always capture the extent to which that occurred. To the extent that monitoring was undertaken, it tended to focus on the primary objective of the interventions such as development or providing support to refugee populations and not the linkages with CPPB.[57]

Importantly, beyond the level of individual interventions, the EU lacked upstream strategic M&E and theories of change covering CPPB in a holistic approach. This shortcoming was especially critical given the efforts to implement an integrated/comprehensive approach to CPPB starting in 2013. The absence of such assessments reflected the lack of overarching CPPB frameworks at the country, regional and EU level against which progress could be monitored and evaluated.

More recently, FPI began to address this gap by facilitating the development of theories of change at the strategic level with a variety of EU institutional stakeholders and introducing this methodology into EEAS training desks as part of the Strategic Programming of EU external financial instruments for 2021-2027.

Appropriate financing instruments and aid modalities

One of the main strengths of EU external support has been the synergies that could potentially be generated by the range of instruments and tools at the EU's disposal. In principle, having a well-defined strategic vision of EU political priorities and how financing could help reach them improved the ability to identify the most appropriate mix of financing instruments, aid modalities and delivery mechanisms. However, most EU support for CPPB was not delivered on the basis of such strategic visions. It was therefore difficult to assess whether the choices made by EU officials were optimal for achieving CPPB objectives.

The EU was able to match financing instruments to context and expected results reasonably well during the evaluation period. The survey of 29 EUDs conducted for this evaluation reported that nearly 90% of EUDs considered the mix of actions financed under various EU financing instruments were appropriate for achieving the CPPB objectives in their respective countries, with over 60% responding that they were appropriate "to a great extent." Just 15% judged the EU instruments to be only marginally appropriate (11%) or had no opinion (4%). The case studies conducted for this evaluation confirmed this overall finding (see also Volume 2 and Annex 6 for more details).

Although the IfS/IcSP only accounted for 18% of the total funding for EU CPPB funding over this period, it played a particularly important role in supporting CPPB. Article 3 was flexible and the instrument itself was well suited to achieving political objectives and enabled risk-taking. It was also relatively quick disbursing. EU officials characterised the IfS/IcSP as particularly appropriate for rapid response, jump-starting longer-term processes, addressing highly political issues and acting as a bridge between humanitarian and development objectives. It was the instrument of choice for high risk activities, viewed as "the 'in between' of crisis response and stabilisation."[58] The IcSP was flexible and responsive to needs and opportunities to engage while other EU instruments or international partners were slower, more risk-averse or less flexible.[59]

The situation was less clear with regard to funding channels and delivery mechanisms. The most commonly employed delivery methods were the project approach, trust funds and then budget support. It is not evident that the project approach was particularly well suited to conflict/crisis environments but it was a familiar modality. Budget support, however, was clearly not always suited to the delivery of CPPB support because weaknesses in public finance management systems made it difficult or impossible to channel financing through State Building contracts (SBCs). The most frequently used contracting parties were regional organisations (reflecting the EU contribution to AMISOM via the APF), UN agencies and (I)NGOs. (Figure 4). This demonstrated the preference for working with implementers who could manage large sums of money[o] but were not always flexible or fast-disbursing. It is interesting to note that compared with the 2001-2010 period, regional partners received a significantly larger share of EU financial support for CPPB while UN organisations, which had received over 50% of EU CPPB spending in 2001-2010, received significantly less.

While the IfS/IcSP was particularly well suited to deliver CPPB assistance, using the IfS/IcSP to jump-start activities with objectives that could not be met by an 18- to 24-month project

[o] The capacity of individual contracting parties within these groups varied but in general the organisations in these groups were perceived to have better capacity to manage funding accountably.

did create some problems. One major advantage of IfS/IcSP financing was that it provided opportunities to test approaches and ideas without having to commit significant EU resources over a longer period of time. FPI officials understood, however, that often the standard 18-24 months project timeframe was too short to achieve an intervention's objectives, and other EU officials and implementing partners consistently raised concerns on this score. EU officials offered two views about how FPI could address this problem. One was that FPI should fund projects tailored to what was achievable in 18 months. The second was that FPI should work with DG DEVCO, DG NEAR or EU Member States to identify the funding necessary to enable IcSP projects to continue. In fact, FPI officials frequently followed this second path, but were not always able to secure additional funding.

Figure 4 Breakdown of the CPPB portfolio by main contracting parties[p]



Finally, although the EU improved its institutional capacity to respond rapidly and flexibly to crises and conflicts during the evaluation period, there were still challenges to access financing resources when urgent needs arose. In recognition of the need for access to fast-disbursing funds to support urgent CPPB needs such as mediation, shuttle diplomacy and other political responses to crises, the EU created the Early Response Mechanism within the APF and the Policy Advice and Mediation Facilities (PAMF) within the IfS.[60] Both of these funding channels enabled money to be disbursed without full financing decisions and some degree of retroactivity. While retroactivity was limited for the IfS/IcSP, ERM recipients reported that this option was helpful in allowing them to engage rapidly, although it did create administrative challenges. The ERM existed throughout the evaluation period, while the PAMF was discontinued in 2014 because it was considered as non-compliant with the Financial Regulations.

EU, AU and IGAD interlocutors reported that the ERM became less rapid over time, posing challenges to its effectiveness. There were multiple reasons for this outcome. Bureaucratic obstacles in the AU and the Regional Economic Commissions (RECs) sometimes created delays. Both the AU and RECs faced challenges throughout the evaluation period in preparing clear, complete and consistent requests in a timely fashion. In some cases, slow disbursement by the African Union Commission (AUC) or the RECs undercut the benefit of a quick decision by the EU.[61] At the same time, EU processes at times also created obstacles (Box 3). While the APF team at Headquarters

[p] From the analysis of spending activities. Further details are found in Annex 4 (Volume 3).

addressed all requests submitted within the required 10-day period, ERM recipients identified hurdles they had to overcome before requests could be submitted. A particular challenge was that the technical staff in EUD and Brussels sometimes had different views about the need for a particular activity or the design of proposals that could take months to iron out. Additionally, the involvement of bilateral EUDs in vetting proposals resulted in the withdrawal of some proposals that AU, REC and officials in regional EUDs supported. As the process for developing and approving ERM proposals became more difficult over the evaluation period, fewer proposals were put forward. Particular concerns were raised with failed efforts in Madagascar, Comoros, DRC and Gambia. (See also Volume 2, JC 2.4.)

Box 3 Timely delivery of ERM support

The evidence on the timely delivery of ERM support was mixed:

Approval processes for ERM initiatives were described as being delayed in some cases by the involvement of multiple EU actors at the front end. "You get positive signals from EUD and then you have to wait for several months. The ERM is an important instrument. It is supposed to be approved in a couple of weeks but it can take months. It is no longer ERM – Early Response Mechanism." However, EU officials clarified that EU has either approved or rejected all requests within the established period of 10 working days. In some cases, a preceding informal review of draft request documents has been offered to increase the quality of requests and thus likelihood of approval, but this is not a mandatory part of the approval process.

Source: Interviews with officials from EU, AU and IGAD.

Multiple interlocutors praised the ability of the EU to quickly mobilise funding for mediation in South Sudan through the ERM following the outbreak of violence in December 2013. The funding to IGAD allowed regional actors to mediate the conflict. Additional funding was subsequently provided through ERM and other APF windows to monitor and verify the peace accords and ceasefire agreements.

Source: Interviews with officials from EU, AU, IGAD and international partners.

More generally, however, EU officials and other interlocutors observed that the EU – unlike some other donors – lacked a highly flexible mechanism capable of responding immediately to urgent peace process needs, notably mediation support, and maximising the interplay between spending and non-spending support for CPPB.[62] The creation of the EU's IcSP-funded mediation support facility, ERMES, was not able to compensate fully for this deficiency.

4.3 EQ 3 on coordination and complementarity

To what extent has EU support for CPPB been coordinated and complementary with EU Member States, and international, regional, national and local actors?

Rationale and coverage of the question: In examining coordination and complementarity of EU support for CPPB with the actions of EU Member States and international, regional and national partners, this EQ focuses on three main issues: 1) evidence of shared analysis and common vision and understanding; 2) evidence of factors that either contributed to or undermined coordination and extent to which and how such factors were integrated into the formulation and implementation of EU support for CPPB; and 3) degree to which synergies have been sought and exploited and duplication has been avoided at intervention level.

Summary answer to the Evaluation Question

Prior to 2011, coordination within the international community on CPPB issues consisted primarily of information exchange. During the 2011-2018 period, the EU made progress in working together with the many EU Member States and international, regional and national actors that were involved in delivering support for CPPB objectives. Maximising the effective and efficient use of EU CPPB resources benefited from the ability to identify common CPPB objectives and work in a complementary and synergist manner.

Working together involved varying degrees of information sharing, joint analyses, development of joint positions/common messaging and common vision/shared understanding and/or operational coordination with EU MS and other international actors. It proved difficult, however, to translate all this into joint action. Factors that affected the quality of coordination among international actors ranged from the size of the resident international community to divergent interests and approaches between international actors to the EU's weight as a political and development actor. The EU also sought to work in a coordinated and complementary fashion with its regional and national partners with mixed results. Alignment at the strategic/programming level was often good, but could not always be implemented because the EU and its regional and national partners did not always have a common understanding of the issues or of the best way to move forward operationally.

The EU also made progress on operational coordination by identifying and seeking to exploit potential synergies at both the country strategy/programming and intervention levels. Nonetheless, there was still room for improvement at the end of the evaluation period.

The following sections present a more detailed account of the evaluation's findings on coordination and complementarity.

Coordination and complementarity

During the 2011-2018 period, coordination deepened between the EU and its international partners. Before 2011, coordination within the international community on CPPB issues consisted primarily of information exchange.[63] During the 2011-2018 period, on average, 75% of the 29 EUDs participating in the online CPPB survey reported some or a great deal of coordination and complementarity within the international community while on average 18% reported limited (12%) or no (6%) coordination and complementarity (see Volume 2 and Annex 6 for more details). Sharing analysis and avoiding duplication was ranked most positively while nearly 25% of EUDs expressed dissatisfaction with efforts undertaken to share common visions and increase synergies. Most case studies provided ample evidence of varying degrees of shared analysis leading to a common vision, joint

messaging and adoption of joint positions. While the regular EU Heads of Delegation/Deputy Heads of Delegation/Heads of Cooperation meetings and international coordination group meetings provided venues for assessing and developing common views on the local context, EU and EU MS officials and representatives of international organisations described a range of additional mechanisms to promote coordination.

Joint action within the international community was more difficult to achieve. A common understanding of context and agreement on general priorities did not necessarily translate into joint action. Although the EU and its partners increasingly undertook common analyses and joint programming exercises, the case studies demonstrated that such exercises did not always produce a common understanding of context or promote operational coordination.[64] Furthermore, there were cases where coordination was largely limited to information/analysis sharing but the actions of the EU and its MS nonetheless were complementary and coherent.

EU and EU MS officials and representatives of other international actors identified a range of factors that affected the quality of coordination within the international community on CPPB issues. As shown in Table 7, many of these factors could have either positive or negative implications for the quality of coordination between the EU, its MS and the broader international community. In some instances, coordination functioned best during periods of crisis.

Table 7 Factors influencing capacity for coordination

Factor	Description	Observed in
Size of resident international community	The smaller the resident donor community, the easier it was for the EU to coordinate both EU MS and within the broader international community. It was however important that the EU was proactive, which sometimes depended on the right EU official(s) being in place at the right time to take advantage of opportunities. But in general, a smaller international community presence facilitated reaching consensus.	CAR, Côte d'Ivoire, Niger, Philippines, South Sudan, Zimbabwe.
Degree of divergence in interests/ policies/approaches	When the EU and other international actors had divergent interests in/policies and approaches toward a country/region/conflict coordination was more difficult. This particularly affected the EU's ability to coordinate with its MS but also affected the quality of international coordination more broadly. The presence of non-traditional donors (such as China, Gulf States, Russia, Turkey) also affected broader international coordination. On the other hand, when there were common interests, coordination efforts were strengthened.	APF, Afghanistan, CAR, Colombia, Georgia, Myanmar, Somalia, Zimbabwe.
Transparency among international actors	An unwillingness to share information or coordinate more broadly affected the ability of the EU to coordinate with either EU MS or the broader international community. When the EU set the tone for openness, it contributed to effective coordination.	Lebanon, Niger, South Sudan, Zimbabwe.
Institutional factors within EU/EU MS/broader international community	A number of staffing decisions affected the quality of coordination. These included: 1) frequent staff rotations requiring constant re-education of donor representatives about the importance of coordination; 2) FPI regionalisation, which had	CAR, Colombia, Georgia, Lebanon, Niger, Philippines, Somalia, Zimbabwe.

Factor	Description	Observed in
	both advantages and disadvantages as detailed in Table 6 above; 3) reluctance of some donors to post staff to highly unstable regions, severely reducing the all-important ground-level understanding of the conflict situation for those donors; and 4) the quality of leadership, particularly from HoDs but also Heads of Cooperation/Sectors.	
EU's weight as a political/development actor and source of information	The EU's ability to coordinate its MS increased when it demonstrated that it had capacities that exceeded those of individual MS. For example, when the EU could provide additional information to EU MS (and in some cases other members of the international community), coordination was easier. When EU MS had significant capacity to acquire and analyse information themselves, coordination was more difficult. When the EU had a demonstrably important role as a political player or provider of cooperation assistance (also in the long-term and consequently built trust with actors), coordination was easier, but by no means guaranteed. A good deal depended on how proactive EU actors were.	African Peace Facility; Colombia, South Sudan, Zimbabwe
Balance of power between EU and EU MS/other international actors	Where one international partner was dominant, coordination was often more difficult. In some cases, the EU acted as a counterweight to the more dominant partner.	Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, South Sudan.
Capacities/interests of national/ regional partners in coordination	When national governments or key regional partners were unwilling or unable to play a strong role in implementing CPPB activities coordination became more difficult. For example, when national governments did not have the capacity to make strategic choices coordination mechanisms did not function optimally. When key regional actors did not have the financial capacity to engage fully, their political commitment to CPPB processes decreased and had a negative effect on coordination. Conversely, when national governments were not interested in coordination and/or sought to divide the international community, EU/EU MS and EU/international community coordination sometimes increased.	CAR, Philippines, South Sudan.
Impact of crises	In some cases, violent crises or threats of violence, but also unexpected changes improved/intensified donor coordination.	Colombia, Philippines, Zimbabwe.
Non-EU frameworks	Multi-donor trust funds provided a platform for dialogue that promoted coordination. Similarly, widely accepted international arrangements for delivering assistance to crisis/conflict countries/regions provided thematic frameworks and coordination/joint funding management structures that promoted coordination.	Myanmar, Philippines, Somalia.

Factor	Description	Observed in
Ability to exploit innovative approaches to coordination	Informal WhatsApp groups among donors for rapid response on issues such as human rights abuses, good governance, elections, (e.g. sharing on who is attending meetings, or making statements on arrests, monitoring court cases) were seen as highly effective in sharing information and promoting joint action.	EUD to AU, Zimbabwe.

The situation with regard to coordination and complementary of EU CPPB efforts with regional, national and local actors at operational and policy levels was less clear cut. There was ample evidence of efforts to coordinate at the strategic/policy and operational levels. There was some evidence that these efforts bore fruit in terms of developing a common vision and understanding that informed EU CPPB programming after 2011. The evidence of a common vision and understanding with national actors was based primarily on the alignment of national strategies with EU CPPB objectives and programming. EU strategy/programming documents were broadly in line with strategies and priorities as identified by the national governments or regional partners on CPPB-related issues such as peacebuilding, integrated border management, justice or countering/prevention violent extremism (CVE/PVE). They were also generally informed by consultations with relevant government stakeholders.

Alignment at the level of policy and strategy provided a framework for producing shared visions/common understanding of context and issues. It was not a guarantee, however, that EU and regional, national and local actors actually did have a common understanding of issues or of the best way to move forward operationally. The online CPPB survey undertaken for this evaluation indicated a degree of reservation among the 29 respondents about the existence of a common vision with regional/national partners. Over 40% reported that they either did not share a common vision with national and regional actors or that the alignment was weak while only 25% reported strongly sharing a common vision with national and regional actors (see Volume 2 and Annex 6 for more details). Some case studies demonstrated clearly that the EU and its partners shared an understanding of the context and a vision for how to prevent violence, transform conflicts and promote a more peaceful society. However, there was also evidence that commitment could change over time, in particular when there were changes in the country's political landscape. In other cases, there was reason to question the commitment to fully implement the common understanding/vision as expressed in national CPPB strategies, peace agreements and other formal undertakings such as ENP Action Plans. Unlike the EU's relationships with other members of the international community, there was very little evidence of the factors that promoted or inhibited coordination with regional, national and local actors. Of those factors for which there was evidence available, some were outside the control of the EU, such as the size of the implementing partner community, the political context or the capacity of the government. The EU had some control over others: failure to coordinate implementing partners; pooled funding mechanisms; and in-country FPI officers.

Achieving synergies and avoiding duplication

The EU made some progress on identifying and seeking to exploit potential synergies and avoid duplications with other CPPB actors following the 2011 CPPB evaluation, although it was difficult to assess the degree to which this actually occurred. In the 2001-2010 period, the initiatives that the EU undertook to enhance coordination with EU MS and the wider international community "rarely gave rise to a clear division of roles between partners so as to avoid gaps and duplication and enhance synergies at strategy, programming and implementation levels" according to the 2011 evaluation.[65] During the 2011-2018 period, the EU expressed the intention to create

synergies and avoid duplications between its activities and those of other actors (EU MS, other international actors, regional, national and local) but it was unclear whether and to what extent they succeeded.

While EUDs responding to the online survey were generally positive about their ability to create synergies and avoid duplications with EU MS and other international actors at the national/local level, case study evidence was less clear. Nearly 75% of the 29 survey respondents judged that the EU had succeeded in increasing synergies between EU-supported CPPB interventions and those of EU MS and other international actors somewhat or to a great extent during the 2011-2018 period. A similar number estimated that they had avoided duplications. Although evidence from the case studies was weak and it was difficult to identify commonalities, the case studies did demonstrate that where synergies were achieved, it generally occurred through the use of co-funding, pooled funding (often multi-donor trust funds managed both by the EU and other donors), follow-on funding and complementary funding. At the same time, there was evidence of failed efforts to create synergies.

Implementing partners frequently expressed an intent to identify synergies with previous work they conducted in the same area or with other actors currently engaged in similar activities. Implementing partners in several case study countries noted the absence of EU coordination among interventions in the same thematic and/or geographic areas and the expectation that the implementers would coordinate themselves.[66] In some cases, EU programme managers were responsive when implementers identified areas of overlap with other donor-funded activities and facilitated changes in project activities. In other cases, EU project managers actively sought to ensure that implementers did not duplicate activities across activities.

4.4 EQ 4 on added value

What has been the added value resulting from EU support for CPPB compared with what could have been achieved by EU Member States and other actors (national/international organisations, national/regional partners) alone?

Rationale and coverage of the question: This EQ considers the EU's political weight, its supranational nature, its commitment to long-term engagement, its convening power, its ability to forge partnerships and its knowledge and expertise of CPPB and the countries in which is provides CPPB support in order to identify where the EU brings added value in comparison to EU MS as well as in comparison to other actors (international, regional, national or local).

Summary answer to the Evaluation Question

EU support for CPPB added value in comparison to EU Member States and international, regional, and national partners between 2011 and 2018 primarily in terms of its financial support, political engagement, diversity of instruments and risk willingness.

Overall, the most frequently cited components of the EU's added value were: 1) the volume and duration of EU financial support relevant for CPPB, 2) the EU's relative political neutrality and its political weight/convening power, 3) the EU's capacity to engage over the long term, 4) the diversity of financial, political and security instruments applied by the EU, and 5) the EU's risk willingness. Apart from risk willingness, these factors were also highlighted by the 2011 evaluation, demonstrating a high degree of consistency in the EU's added value in supporting CPPB. The ability to combine multiple factors was important in creating EU value added.

The following discussion presents a more detailed account of the evaluation's findings on EU added value.

The 2011 CPPB evaluation found that the EU support for CPPB had added value in comparison to many other international, regional and national actors during the 2001-2010 period.[67] **Those benefits continued to be felt during the 2011-2018 period.** The EU added value compared with other actors primarily in terms of its financial support, political engagement, diversity of instruments and risk willingness between 2011 and 2018. While the evidence base was not as extensive for international organisations and regional/national partners as for EU MS, the findings for both groups of actors were largely consistent. Table 8 summarises the six main categories of EU value added identified in the course of this evaluation.

Table 8 Value added of EU support for CPPB

Value added via	Contributing factors
Financial support	• Volume (Afghanistan, APF/South Sudan, CAR, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Georgia, Lebanon, Myanmar, Niger, Philippines, Somalia, Zimbabwe) • Duration (APF/South Sudan, Colombia, Georgia, Myanmar, Philippines, Somalia, Zimbabwe) • Predictability (Afghanistan, APF, CAR, Colombia, Myanmar) • Assurance of accountability on the part of recipient (APF/South Sudan)

Value added via	Contributing factors
Political engagement	• Relative political neutrality (Afghanistan, APF/South Sudan, Colombia, Georgia, Lebanon, Philippines, Somalia, Zimbabwe) • Convening power (Afghanistan, APF/South Sudan, Côte d'Ivoire, Georgia, Lebanon, Philippines, Somalia, Zimbabwe) • Political weight (APF/South Sudan, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Georgia, Lebanon, Philippines, Zimbabwe) • Long-term engagement (Afghanistan, APF, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Georgia, Philippines, Zimbabwe) • Supranational nature of EU (APF/South Sudan, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Philippines, Zimbabwe) • High-level engagement, e.g. EUSR, HR/VP (Colombia)
Diversity of instruments	• Ability to combine financial, political and security instruments (APF/South Sudan, Georgia, Lebanon, Niger, Somalia, Zimbabwe) • Existence of multiple financial instruments (CAR, Georgia)
Risk willingness	• Timing of EU engagement in conflict/crises (Côte d'Ivoire, Georgia) • Type of support provided (APF/South Sudan, Lebanon, Niger, Philippines) • Engagement with politically controversial actors (Lebanon, Philippines, Zimbabwe) • Willingness to innovate (Niger)
Developing partnerships	• Balanced approach (Zimbabwe) • Partnerships with civil society (Philippines) • Development of trust with conflict actors/parties (Colombia) • Constructive engagement with multiple actors (APF/South Sudan, Lebanon, Philippines, Zimbabwe)
CPPB/country/regional knowledge and expertise	• Over 50% of the 29 EUDs responding to the online survey judged they had CPPB knowledge/expertise to some extent and country expertise to a great extent. • Demonstrable knowledge when engaging with national authorities (Zimbabwe)

Source: Interviews with EU and EU MS officials, representatives of other bilateral and multilateral international actors, regional organisations, national actors and EU implementers, EUD survey, EU project documents and evaluations.

Of the six main categories of added value identified for the 2011-2018 period, financial support was the largest. It comprised volume of support, duration of support, predictability/reliability of support and the assurance of financial accountability to other potential donors. There was also some evidence that EU Member States were reassured by the EU's financial support for a sector or a programme because of the belief that the EU held its recipients to a high standard of accountability. The diversity of instruments that the EU could bring to bear was also judged to add value compared with the responses that other partners, particularly most EU Member States, were able to make to conflict/crises.

The volume of support was mentioned in all 12 case studies as an added value. Judgements about the degree of political leverage conferred by the EU's large financial investments in CPPB were mixed. In some instances, the EU clearly gained leverage in terms of the ability to press partner governments on sensitive issues and promote CPPB objectives. In others, little or no leverage was gained or even actively pursued.

Political engagement was the second largest category of added value. It comprised the EU's relative political neutrality, its political weight, its convening power, its long-term engagement, its supranational nature and its high-level engagement. The EU's relative political neutrality was mentioned most frequently followed closely by the EU's convening power and its political weight. It is

likely that these factors were mutually supportive in terms of creating a value added for EU CPPB engagement, combining in different ways and degrees of intensity according to the conflict/crisis in question. The EU was judged by a wide range of stakeholders as more neutral and more interested in promoting the EU's global objectives than some EU MS and other international and regional actors that pursued national political and economic interests. This conferred a benefit in terms of the EU as a trusted partner to governments, civil society and some armed opposition groups.

However, the EU was not always able to engage politically. In some cases that was because EU MS were not in agreement on the course to pursue. In others, partner governments were unwilling to engage. While the EU was not always in a strong position to engage politically, a willingness to stay engaged over the long term was an added value of EU CPPB support in comparison with EU MS. The EU's supranational nature also brought added value to the EU in comparison with EU MS acting individually or in small groups.

The EU's risk willingness was seen as bringing added value in comparison to other CPPB partners in a number of cases. This involved the EU's ability to engage early on in a conflict/crisis situation, the type of support the EU was able to provide and engagement with politically controversial actors.

> *"The EU is a 'life line' for JMEC because it provides direct payments to support the Secretariat," a risk that many other donors were not willing to take.*
>
> Source: Interview with JMEC official on EU's risk willingness

The EU demonstrated a capacity to forge partnerships in a number of areas that enabled it to support CPPB in ways that were not possible other CPPB partners. Much of this focused on civil society. But there was also evidence of an ability to engage with a broad number of actors and to promote sectoral engagement.

Finally, multiple factors were important in creating EU value added. While the volume of financing that the EU provided for CPPB was uniformly important, it was not simply the amount of financing that the EU was able to provide the added value. Rather, the added value was greater when it was combined with other factors such as risk willingness, duration of funding, relative political neutrality, ability to work with civil society and the EU's convening power.

4.5 EQ 5 on cross-cutting issues

To what extent has EU support for CPPB mainstreamed and promoted conflict sensitivity, human rights and gender?

Rationale and coverage of the question: This EQ addresses conflict sensitivity, human rights and attention to gender. Conflict sensitivity is assessed from two perspectives: 1) the extent to which it has been mainstreamed throughout the EU's institutional procedures, processes and tools and 2) whether the EU's support has been guided by conflict sensitivity principles in practice. As such, it assesses whether conflict sensitivity has been translated systematically into a better conceptual understanding of CPPB support and the context in which interventions take place and the mainstreaming of do-no-harm approaches into policy and practice. Human rights and gender are key ingredients for the transition of conflicts and crisis towards resilience, better livelihoods, development, governance and peace more broadly. The extent to which these issues have been mainstreamed and promoted in EU support for CPPB is therefore also assessed.

Summary answer to the Evaluation Question

The EU gave considerable attention to mainstreaming conflict sensitivity, human rights and gender into its support for CPPB in strategy/planning and implementation during the evaluation period. At the strategy/planning level, the three cross-cutting issues were largely addressed with equal intensity. At the operational level, human rights protection received most attention, followed by conflict sensitivity and gender. In some cases, mainstreaming these issues contributed to positive change in improved CPPB outcomes, although the evidence was not extensive.

The EU invested in creating institutional and practical capacities to apply a conflict sensitive approach to its external action activities in the 2011-2018 period. Overall, the degree to which these efforts produced a satisfactory degree of mainstreaming of CPPB into external action across EU institutions and – most notably – at the implementation level – were mixed. The variations were due to insufficient resources being allocated to increase the conflict sensitivity of EU external action, the need for improving the conduct of conflict analyses and variations in the application of a conflict sensitive approach to countries in conflict and recovering from conflict.

Human rights were mainstreamed and addressed in an integrated manner across CPPB spending and non-spending activities during the 2011-2018 period at both the policy/strategy and intervention levels. However, EU support for CPPB for the protection and enhancement of human rights at the operational level varied across cases. In some instances, it was very difficult to promote the EU's understanding of human rights in the context of CPPB interventions. Despite the significant role played by the EU in determining the extent to which human rights could be mainstreamed into CPPB, there was still room to deepen the EU's efforts to mainstream human rights into CPPB.

Finally, the EU was not considered a leader in promoting gender equality during the evaluation period compared with other international actors. However, clear efforts were made during the evaluation period to enhance attention to gender. Progress was made by way of formulating the Gender Action Plan II (GAP II, 2016) and in terms of strategy, planning and design of interventions. The record was mixed, however, in terms of actually implementing gender-sensitive CPPB interventions and it was too early to assess the results of GAP II. The latter appeared to be influenced by contextual factors as well as the rather erratic attention given to gender issues within the EU and among implementing partners.

The following sections present a more detailed account of the evaluation's findings on three cross-cutting issues – human rights protection, conflict sensitivity and gender equality.

Conflict sensitivity

The EU has sought to mainstream CPPB for nearly two decades and there has been improvement since 2012. Nonetheless, progress on this cross-cutting issue was rather slow during the current evaluation period. Following the European Commission Communication on Conflict Prevention (2001), which expressed the intention to "develop practical programming tools for mainstreaming conflict prevention measures in co-operation programmes with countries at risk",[68] the EU sought to embed CPPB in EU external action. Steps taken during the 2001-2010 period importantly included the creation of the Instrument for Stability to fund more political interventions in the domain of conflict prevention, conflict resolution and stability. Nonetheless the 2011 EU CPPB evaluation observed that there had been little progress in mainstreaming conflict sensitivity as part of a broader CPPB approach into EU external action in the 2001-2010 period.[69]

There was renewed attention to CPPB at the policy/strategy level after 2011, including the need to adopt a conflict-sensitive approach to external action. Key documents included the 2011 Council Conclusions on Conflict Prevention,[70] the 2013 Communication on the Comprehensive Approach,[71] the 2016 EU Global Strategy,[72] the 2017 New Consensus on Development,[73] the 2017 Resilience Policy Framework on cooperation with partner countries and evaluation of related implementation actions,[74] and the 2018 Council Conclusions on the Integrated Approach.[75] By the end of the evaluation period, the EEAS stated that "the EU has made significant progress in further elaborating its integrated approach to stabilization and conflict prevention" and added that "the EU and Member States agreed on the need to raise the political profile of conflict prevention activities and ensure our tools are fit for purpose."[76] Evaluations undertaken during the evaluation period confirmed that conflict sensitivity was promoted, in particular in the context of IcSP interventions, but that more systematic efforts needed to be made to enhance the attention to conflict sensitivity across all external action interventions.[77]

Beginning in 2011/2012 the EU undertook a number of institutional reforms and practical steps to strengthen its work on CPPB and conflict sensitivity. This included the creation of a dedicated conflict prevention and mediation unit within the newly created EEAS,[q] a unit dealing with fragility and resilience in DG DEVCO, and a Centre of Thematic Expertise on Crisis Reaction and Security Sector Reform DG NEAR's Neighbourhood South Directorate to provide policy and project support. Guidance on conflict sensitivity was produced[78] and an EU conflict Early Warning System was launched in 2014 (see also Volume 2, JC 6.1.). Importantly, DEVCO included conflict sensitivity and resilience in Action Document Templates for development programming.

The importance of working on the basis of a proper conflict analysis was widely acknowledged and the EU produced an increasing number of conflict analyses, conflict prevention reports and structural risk assessments for countries in different parts of the world during the evaluation period. These exercises often involved a combination of staff from EEAS, DG DEVCO, DG NEAR and FPI under the lead of EEAS, with inputs from external experts. This reflected the stipulation in the EU Guidance note on conflict analysis that EU-led conflict analysis should be joint, shared analysis. The majority were done to support the EU's work in Africa. For some of these countries two or even three conflict analyses were conducted between 2011 and 2018. Practitioners stressed that conflict analysis cannot be a long and time-consuming study delivering findings and recommendations which are outdated by the time the study is completed (unless an intervention is

[q] The name of this unit changed several times during the evaluation period: K2; SECPOL.2; PRISM and, in 2019, ISP.

planned from scratch, without any existing knowledge about the context, the nature of the conflict, the actors involved and their respective interests). There is also an issue of confidentiality as implementing partners might possess sensitive information which cannot be shared. More guidance would be needed on how to undertake conflict analyses, particularly their depth and scope, timing and purpose.

Despite the progress made during the evaluation period, there was still scope for improving how conflict analyses were conducted, notably with regard to the EU's engagement in conflict prevention missions and the increased use of civil society inputs. There was also scope to extend the use of conflict analysis to other policy instruments than those of DG DEVCO, DG NEAR and FPI. Conflict analysis needs to fit into a process to be useful. Senior EU officials at Headquarters stated that there was scope for feeding conflict analysis more systematically into the formulation of the Political Frameworks for Crises Approach (PFCA), which are conducted as part of the process of planning CSDP missions. This observation was confirmed by lessons drawn from CSDP missions.[79] In addition, Horizon2020-funded research on "Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities in EU Conflict Prevention" recommended involving "the broad spectrum of civil society" prior to deployment in order to have a good understanding of the local context.[80] Other research conducted as part of the Horizon2020 examination of the EU's CIVCAP capabilities observed that the initiatives to promote conflict sensitivity created considerable appetite within parts of the Commission for conflict analysis, which had the potential to bring real value to the EU's external action. It further concluded that extending the use of conflict analysis to DG Trade would considerably strengthen the EU's potential for conflict prevention as a way of acting in the world, an assessment echoed by representatives of the Brussels-based CPPB community.[81]

Effectively mainstreaming conflict sensitivity in EU external action requires ample well-capacitated human resources. However, the EU did not allocate sufficient human resources for increasing the conflict sensitivity of EU external action during the 2011-2018 period. Nearly 60% of the 29 EUDs that responded to the online CPPB survey reported that their staff had some degree of general knowledge about conflict sensitivity, while 25% reported that their staff had a great deal of general knowledge. Just under 15% reported limited (7%) or no (7%) general knowledge (see Volume 2 and Annex 6 for additional details). This assessment, however, was at odds with the experience of CPPB experts working at the EU who regularly visited their colleagues in the field, as well as representatives of conflict prevention NGOs.

Overall, human resources and time were in short supply within the EU during the evaluation period. The EU was found to have one of the lowest staff-to-budget ratios among donors with little opportunity for staff increases but a need for EU officials to programme increasingly large funding envelopes. This meant that although conflict analysis was a key priority for EU external action, the human resources necessary to conduct conflict analyses and integrate the findings into programming were limited. In consequence, "the extent to which conflict sensitivity, or even 'do no harm', is sufficiently integrated remains unclear." [82] This assessment was in line with the findings of Evaluation Question 2 on the approach to implementation as well as of the strategic EU evaluations cited above.

Training is an important avenue for enhancing staff capacity and mainstreaming conflict sensitivity and conflict prevention approaches into the work of the EU. While serious investments were made during the evaluation period aimed at enhancing the conflict prevention capacity of EU staff, inadequate use was made of the resources developed. A series of face-to-face courses (delivered in Brussels and at EU Delegations) and online courses were developed to provide training on issues such as fragility, resilience, conflict sensitivity and conflict prevention as well as thematic courses with a conflict focus, such as the course on "Land, Natural Resources and Conflict". With the assistance of the UN and international peacebuilding NGOs, a first course on conflict sensitivity and conflict prevention was developed in 2012/2013. In 2017, building on earlier courses, a

dedicated Conflict Sensitivity Course was developed by the EU with the assistance of an international NGO.

None of the courses relating to conflict sensitivity, fragility or security were mandatory for staff. Statistics provided by the EU's training management unit in DG DEVCO indicated that comparatively little use was made of these training facilities during the evaluation period. Some 640 individuals from different EU institutions took such courses. Of these, some 570 were EEAS, FPI, DG DEVCO and DG NEAR staff. Compared to the total staff numbers of these services on average only 8.5 percent of staff made use of these courses. Notable outliers on the low side were EEAS (1.4%) and DG NEAR (2.9%. In contrast, nearly 28% of FPI staff received conflict-sensitivity relevant training.[83]

Finally, the case studies demonstrated that EU attention to conflict sensitivity in its support for CPPB differed from one partner country to another. In most cases, strategic documents did not explicitly refer to conflict sensitivity although elements of contextual analysis that displayed an understanding of conflict dynamics and peace processes were found. The same was true for NIPs and MIPs, which generally lacked specific explanations of how the EU was planning to strategically use both its CPPB and non-CPPB engagements (the complementary interventions) to achieve CPPB goals. There were also no examples found of other country-specific documents that discussed how to mainstream CPPB goals throughout the different sectors of intervention, non-spending as well as spending. The same situation pertained to programming and implementation level documents, which described the actions to be taken.

There was also evidence that very different approaches to working in a conflict sensitive way were deployed. In some countries, the EU ensured that interventions were preceded (or accompanied) by conflict analysis workshops or that guidance on conflict sensitivity was incorporated into implementation-level documents (for example, CAR, Myanmar, Niger). In the majority of countries, conflict sensitivity was implicitly addressed during implementation. This often happened in close exchange with experienced implementing partners. In a number of countries, however, evidence of attention to conflict sensitivity in implementation and M&E of CPPB as well as Complementary (Category 3) interventions was overall weak. Finally, training of staff, or the presence of staff well-versed in the application of conflict sensitivity/ analytical tools in Headquarters as well as at field level was a determining factor in the extent to which conflict sensitivity was mainstreamed.[r]

Human rights

Human rights are a cornerstone of the EU and its external action. Human rights protection was increasingly integrated into the EU's approach to conflict prevention at the policy/strategy level during the evaluation period as evidenced by higher-level strategic documents and policy guidance on human rights. Key documents included the EU Agenda for Change (2011),[84] the EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy (2012),[85] and the European Consensus on Development (2017).[86] This framing at the high policy level was followed up in various ways. The position of an EU Special Representative for Human Rights was created in 2012 to deal with human rights issues globally and its mandate was renewed in 2019.[87] The EEAS and DG DEVCO also formulated guidance on how to address CPPB and security in 2013, stating that security needs to be promoted in a manner that is consistent with human rights.[88] The creation of the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) in 2014 was meant to complement the more crisis-related actions funded under Instrument contributing to Security and Peace.[89] The importance of addressing human rights issues using a combination of funding and non-

[r] Additional information on Afghanistan, CAR, Lebanon, Myanmar, Niger and the Philippines is found on pp. 67-69 in Volume 2.

funding instruments was underscored in the Commission's 2019 report on policy coherence for development.[90]

The EU made significant efforts to address the protection and enhancement of human rights during implementation of CPPB support, although contextual factors influenced the degree to which this occurred in practice. The vast majority of EU Delegations responding to the online survey reported that human rights were promoted and mainstreamed through EU support for CPPB to a great extent (46%) or to some extent (50%). Only 4% reported it was not addressed at all. This was confirmed by the case studies. At the same time, the case studies found a difference between the extent to which CPPB and human rights were reflected in country strategic and implementation-level documents and the extent to which these themes were actually operationalised and included in M&E. From the perspective of the documentation, the picture was generally positive.

> *"The evaluation of EU support for Security Sector Reform in Enlargement and Neighbourhood Countries concluded that cross-cutting societal issues were minimally mentioned or absent from the majority of the sample of 39 examined interventions. […] human rights concerns were not consistently mainstreamed throughout the interventions."*
>
> Source: European Commission. 2018. Evaluation of EU Support for Security Sector Reform in Enlargement and Neighbourhood Countries (2010-2016). Final Report; p. 93.

However, in terms of implementation and M&E, there were notable differences between countries, including mainstreaming human rights considerations into non-spending activities. The context in which the support was delivered and the degree to which support for human rights was the principal rationale for the engagement were additional factors which determined how strongly CPPB and human rights were promoted in an integrated manner. In some countries it was very difficult to promote the EU's understanding of human rights in the context of CPPB interventions. In other cases, partner governments' attitudes toward addressing human rights issues changed markedly during the evaluation period.

Gender

There was strong evidence that the EU sought to mainstream gender into CPPB at the policy/strategy level during the evaluation period. Key reference documents on women, peace and security included the Comprehensive Approach to the EU implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 (2008), Revised indicators for the Comprehensive approach to the EU implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 on Women, Peace and Security (2016), and the EU Strategic Approach on Women, Peace and Security (2018). The EC Communication on Supporting the Prevention of Radicalisation Leading to Violent Extremism (2016) lists women empowerment as one of the approaches to strengthen resilience to violence and extremism. Dedicated gender guidance was developed, such as the EC Guidance Note on Gender and Evaluations (Version 2018), and gender was mainstreamed into various overarching policy documents, through the Gender Action Plans I and II.[91]

The EU reported progress on implementing gender mainstreaming in CPPB, despite some challenges. The first Gender Action Plan (GAP, 2010-2015) was deemed inadequate to translate "the EU's global [gender equality and women's empowerment] commitments into action and results".[92] However, the Annual Implementation Report 2017 of the second Gender Action Plan (GAP II; 2016-2020) found considerable progress in integrating gender equality into all actions of the IcSP.[93] The EU developed a Comprehensive Approach to WPS (2008), now replaced by the Strategic Approach on WPS (2018). Along with human rights, gender perspectives were integrated into the overall European Security and Defence College (ESDC) training programme.[94] A Principal Advisor on Gender was installed under the HR/VP in 2015, tasked with working, *inter alia*, on WPS.

> *"[The EU Council] reaffirmed that the Commission, the High Representative and Member States must substantially increase efforts to reach the five performance minimum standards indicated by the GAP II as a starting point for a gender-sensitive and transformative approach in all EU external action and international cooperation."*
>
> Source: EU Council. 2018. Implementation of the EU Gender Action Plan II in 2017: Strengthening gender equality and women's empowerment in EU external action – Council conclusions (26 Nov. 2018), p. 4

Nonetheless, there was good reason to treat the generally positive self-reporting on gender mainstreaming by the EU with some caution. The EU Council conclusions on the implementation of the EU Gender Action Plan II in 2017 mentioned that progress was made by the EU globally towards achieving gender equality but stressed the need to substantially improve EU efforts. In fact, the report provided no specific information about the extent to which the EU promoted gender in the context of CPPB support along five minimum standards set out in the GAP II.[95] Similarly, the 2018 OECD DAC Peer Review of the European Union found: "The EU has made progress on [promoting gender equality], but there needs to be improvements to enhance capacity, incentives and measures of organisational performance across EU actors to ensure impact on the ground and to meet the level of ambition."96 A similar message emerged from EU evaluations of the IcSP (2017) and EU's Cooperation with countries in Africa and the Indian Ocean region (2017),[97] as well as the Horizon2020-funded project on Whole of Society Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding (WOSCAP). WOSCAP concluded that "the EU lacks a systematic approach that places gender at the centre of its interventions which also results in the weakening of the EU's potential to reinforce its profile more broadly as a civilian peacebuilding actor."[98] It further found that on the basis of the country studies undertaken for this research "it is fair to say that – both in the short and long term – EU security sector reform (SSR) interventions struggle to make an impact and positive impression on its commitment to gender equality."[99]

Internal EU tools, such as the Action Document templates which contains a marker on gender, also suggested that more attention needed to be given to mainstreaming gender in CPPB activities. Some EU staff appeared to "tick the box" when formulating projects, undermining gender mainstreaming. On the positive side, a network of gender focal points from DG DEVCO, DG NEAR, DG ECHO, EEAS and FPI met on an annual basis in addition to ongoing work-related bilateral exchanges. The EU conflict Early Warning System (EWS) included conflict risk assessment indicators relating to gender (although that assessment could be further improved). The EU's 2013 Guidance on conflict analysis was described as "gender neutral" by EU staff, and the EU was testing a gender sensitive lens to conflict analysis which was to be integrated into an update of the EU guidance on conflict analysis.

Compared to the critical findings from the global level described above, desk research and field interviews conducted for the 12 case studies provided a more nuanced view. In none of the case studies was the EU identified as a leader on gender issues. For 10 out of 12 cases, however, there was evidence that guidance on gender sensitivity was considered and mainstreamed in strategy/programming documents, as well as intervention documents. Several projects show that activities with a gender dimension were programmed and mainstreamed into CPPB interventions, such as the inclusion of specific gender modules in training workshops, collection of gender-disaggregated data, plans to undertake a gender analysis, gender-related dialogue or seeking gender-parity in project activities. There also were dedicated gender-related interventions, such as the global project in support of gender-sensitive transitional justice[100] or the fielding of gender advisers to institutions of partner countries.

The context was often an impediment to the implementation of gender-related objectives in interventions. While the intention to work on gender was clearly identified in the design of many interventions, there was evidence from 7 of the 12 cases that this was in fact difficult to follow up and promote during implementation.

Finally, the EU's overall performance in terms of mainstreaming gender sensitivity in CPPB measured by the five GAP II minimum standards was mixed:

1) There was no specific information available allowing the team to assess whether the first minimum standard ("OECD/DAC Gender Marker is always justified") was met.
2) Gender analysis has only been undertaken in selected cases and certainly not for all priority sectors of CPPB support.
3) Sex-disaggregated data was collected in various interventions (mainly in relation to women/men ratio in trainings or workshops).
4) Gender expertise appeared not to be available and used in a timely manner in the programme cycle and programming for CPPB.
5) There was no evidence that GAP II objectives were systematically reported on.

Finally, there was little evidence across the cases that gender was included prominently in policy dialogue. This was not a GAP II minimum standard but needs to be mentioned as an area of attention. In summary, results of this assessment are mixed, although there is evidence from the cases as well from policy and guidance documents that gender was increasingly promoted and mainstreamed during the evaluation period.

Cluster 2: Effects of EU support for CPPB

4.6 EQ 6 on short- to mid-term results

To what extent has EU support for CPPB achieved the expected short- to mid-term results?



Rationale and coverage of the question: This EQ assesses the positive and negative results produced by EU support for CPPB, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended. The focus of this EQ is on short- to medium-term results that are reflected in the reconstructed CPPB IL at the level of outputs. These IL outputs are at a "higher" level than the usual outputs of individual CPPB interventions: they cover the range from outputs to intermediate outcomes for individual interventions. EQ 6 covers most of the outputs as specified in the IL, except for conflict sensitivity which is discussed in EQ 5. The contribution of the short- to medium-term results to higher levels in the IL, i.e. the outcomes and intermediate impacts, are assessed in EQ 7.

This EQ focuses on the results of spending and non-spending tools and interventions and the interaction between spending and non-spending interventions. In view of the assumption that a comprehensive or integrated approach by the EU (and EU MS) makes its external action more effective, this EQ also assesses to what extent an integrated/comprehensive approach was taken and how this has influenced the effectiveness of EU's engagement.

Since unintended effects can influence the effectiveness of EU support for CPPB, this EQ also determines whether unintended effects have been adequately identified and addressed.

Summary answer to the Evaluation Question

EU support for CPPB contributed to achieving short- to mid-term results across all thematic areas identified for this evaluation. The combined use of spending and non-spending actions was critical: financial support often gave the EU entrée to high-level political dialogues or a seat at the negotiation table while the EU's political weight helped to unblock projects and provide the political backing that was needed to create tangible results. Constraints on the achievement of results included 1) national/regional political and security contexts, 2) low political priority accorded to certain conflict situations by the EU (and other international, regional and national actors), 3) insufficient use of EU political leverage to influence CPPB processes, 4) insufficient human resources (amount and expertise) and 5) insufficient financial instruments available for timely responses to political windows of opportunity.

The integrated/comprehensive approach was operationalised to a considerable degree in the evaluation case studies. EU CPPB efforts were broadly in line with CPPB-relevant policies, implemented with a combination of instruments and tools, coordinated across EU entities and with other actors. When successfully implemented, an integrated/comprehensive approach contributed to the effectiveness of CPPB results. Challenges to its application included 1) coherence and coordination among EU entities, 2) availability of human resources to engage politically, 3) availability of instruments to link political opportunities with programmatic approaches, 4) clear strategic policy frameworks and/or clear political direction on CPPB, and 5) differences in EU interests and limitations in terms of the willingness of EU Member States to allow the EU to take up its full role in CPPB.

There was only limited evidence of unintended negative effects of EU support for CPPB, although some negative effects did occur. Additionally, some negative effects occurred from EU wider external action, particularly in the area of EU security interests (migration management and to a lesser extent countering violent extremism), which contradicted EU efforts in CPPB. These effects were not always sufficiently anticipated and mitigated at the earliest possible stage. The EU recognised the need for lowered visibility in some contexts due to the sensitivities related to its support. However, the evaluation identified a need to strengthen context-specific EU guidance on visibility in conflict areas, and particularly guidance on how visibility could be better employed to promote EU CPPB aims, and its image, values and credibility.

The following sections present a more detailed account of the evaluation's findings on effectiveness.

Achieving short- to mid-term CPPB results

EU support for CPPB contributed reasonably well to the achievement of short- to mid-term results through both spending and non-spending interventions. Many positive examples of achieved short- to mid-term results were documented in previous thematic evaluations[101], project documentation and ROMs as well as through field interviews conducted for this evaluation. All case studies demonstrated both strengths and weaknesses in terms of the EU's contribution to achieving short- to mid-term results. Table 9 summarises the achievements of short- to mid-term results for the 12 case studies. In all contexts, EU efforts were affected by various contextual and EU-related factors which prevented all expected short- to mid-term results from being fully achieved, as discussed further below and in Table 9. More detail on all these points is found in Volume 2.

Table 9 Contribution of EU CPPB interventions to achieving short- to mid-term results

Contribution	Observed in
Clear achievement of short- to mid-term results	Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire (especially in the 2011-2016 period), Georgia, the Philippines, Zimbabwe
Good achievement of short-term results (outputs) but uncertain contribution to mid-term results	Afghanistan, CAR, Lebanon, Myanmar, Niger, Somalia, South Sudan

Source: Interviews with EU and EU MS officials, representatives of other bilateral and multilateral international actors, regional organisations, national actors and EU implementers, EU project documents and evaluations.

The EU's 5,6 billion EUR CPPB spending portfolio produced a range of short-to mid-term results across the evaluation's Primary CPPB and Mixed Objective thematic areas.[s] Figure 5 shows that most CPPB interventions were funded through the two largest geographical instruments, the European Development Fund (EDF, 48%) and the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI, 20%). Thematic instruments such as the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) and its predecessors (IfS-RRM, 18%) or the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR, 0,1%) as well as the geographical instruments in support of the European Neighbourhood Region (ENI / ENPI, 14%) provided the remainder.

[s] Details of the spending inventory are found in Volume 3, Annex 4. The CPPB thematic areas are described in Section 3 above and Volume 3, Annex 2. Details of short- to mid-term results are found in Volume 2, EQ 6.

Figure 5 Breakdown of the CPPB portfolio by funding instruments[t]

Instrument	Contracted, EUR m.
EDF	2.733,35
DCI	1.112,47
IcSP/IfS/IfS-RRM	1.043,83
ENI/ENPI	768,91
EIDHR	5,40
Total	**5.663,96**



The EU provided support for CPPB to over 70 countries, yet the weight of EU financial support for CPPB was highly concentrated. Africa was the major regional recipient of EU CPPB support, due in large part to EU support for the AU-led peace operation in Somalia, AMISOM. The four largest recipients (Afghanistan, Somalia, Myanmar, Colombia) received nearly one third of the total funding in the bilateral portfolio while the 15 largest recipients received almost three quarters of the funding. The largest recipients accounted for the vast majority of the CPPB financing in their respective regions. Colombia received two thirds of the funding allocated to Latin America, for example, while Afghanistan and Myanmar together accounted for some 60% of the funding to Asia.

For Primary CPPB efforts (Category 1, see Figure 1), the EU-supported peace processes and mediation efforts led to strengthened dialogue and negotiation among conflict parties. EU support contributed to building CPPB capacities at national and local levels and strengthened dialogue processes, mediation, reconciliation and confidence building. The EU supported local mechanisms that contributed to early warning. It also contributed to some established structures for transitional justice although evaluations, previous ROMs and interviews conducted suggest that not enough was done on transitional justice in a way that promoted peace. Through Mixed Objectives interventions (Category 2), the EU contributed to strengthened capacities and policy reforms in the areas of governance, security, rule of law, justice, border management, preventing violent extremism.

The EU support for CPPB through non-spending activities further contributed towards achieving short- to mid-term results. Between 2011 and 2018, the EU deployed a wide range of non-financial CPPB mechanisms and tools conducted by EU Headquarters under the lead of EEAS and at country/intervention level. Some of these activities were informal and undocumented and few details were available to the evaluation team. These included activities executed during the day-to-day business of senior EU Delegation officials, political dialogue as well as confidential negotiations. Nonetheless, the evaluation found evidence for the following short- to mid-term results as a result of non-spending activities (see Table 10).

[t] From the analysis of spending activities. Further details are found in Annex 4 (Volume 3).

Table 10 Short- to mid-term results achieved through non-spending activities

Category	Results achieved
Conflict analysis	Enhanced (joint) understanding of conflict dynamics and possible future directions among EU, EU MS and other international, regional, national, local partners to inform responses, based on a specific process and an identifiable written document conforming to key elements of international best practice for conflict analysis.
Alternative assessment processes to shape EU's understanding of conflict dynamics	Enhanced (joint) understanding of conflict dynamics (position adopted by actors, causes, trends, and related thematic issues) among EU, EU MS and other international, regional, national, local partners to inform responses, based on a range of alternative assessments processes such as donor meetings at country level, workshops with national/local partners and so on.
Early warning exercises, through the EU conflict EWS and through various mechanisms at country/intervention level	Early warning of emerging crises/conflicts; identification of opportunities and entry-points for CPPB related projects. The main challenge that remained for the EU conflict EWS was moving from early warning to early action.[102]
High-level diplomatic activities, through good offices/diplomatic activities, high-level dialogue and engagement by the HR/VP, EUSRs, Special Envoys, Heads of Delegation and other senior officials	Contributed to progress on political/policy dialogue on CPPB related issues, initiating and sustaining peace negotiations and mediation processes.
Political/policy dialogue by EUD staff and EU high-level officials	Supported EU engagement with regional and national counterparts on a wide range of CPPB-related issues, including direct mediation efforts.
Dialogue and coordination on CPPB with key partners (governments, civil society[103], other donors)	Contributed to joint analysis, improved contextual understanding and coordination on CPPB

Source: Interviews with EU and EU MS officials, representatives of other bilateral and multilateral international actors, regional organisations, national actors and EU implementers and evaluations.

The combined use of spending and non-spending actions was critical for achieving results in CPPB. In order to implement the Comprehensive Approach and the EU Global Strategy, the EU recognised the need to apply the full range of diplomatic/political, financial and security instruments at its disposal as articulated in various policy commitments since 2001. EU officials reported that spending and non-spending actions in the different case study countries often worked together synergistically to achieve CPPB results. Financial support often gave the EU entrée to high-level political dialogues or a seat at the negotiation table while its political weight helped to unblock projects and provide the political backing that was needed to create tangible results.

However, interactions between spending and non-spending activities were not always fully exploited and the reasons for this situation varied across the case studies. Five main factors were crucial in the ability of the EU to maximise interactions between spending and non-spending action: 1) complexity of local political context, 2) degree of adequate staffing at Headquarters and EUDs, particularly with the expertise necessary to make linkages between politics, programming and context in the domain of CPPB, 3) existence of common interests among EU MS, 4) a clear political framework or direction for CPPB, and 5) appropriate instruments to respond to emerging political opportunities. Generally, EU officials in case study countries recognised that it was hard to transform

financial assistance into political leverage. The EU found itself struggling to live up to its aspiration of changing its role from simply being a "payer" to "player".

Despite the many positive aspects in terms of the overall achievement of short- to mid-term results through spending and non-spending CPPB interventions, there was also evidence of more limited effectiveness. Both the national/regional context in which EU support for CPPB was provided and the approach to CPPB taken by the EU and its implementing partners influenced the degree to which the short- to mid-term results of the EU's CPPB engagement were achieved. Table 11 summarises factors observed in the case studies that have affected the ability of the EU to achieve CPPB results.

Table 11 Factors influencing the achievement of CPPB results

Contextual factors	**Challenging security conditions** (Afghanistan, CAR, Niger, Philippines, Somalia, South Sudan) **and/or political conditions and developments** (all case studies) at times prevented results from being achieved or created major delays for interventions during implementation.
	Degree of national ownership of/commitment to CPPB process, including peace negotiations and implementation reforms, especially related to governance, justice sector and SSR, affected the results achieved (CAR, Cote d'Ivoire, South Sudan, Lebanon, Myanmar, Niger, Somalia, Zimbabwe).
Factors related to the EU approach[u]	**The political priority accorded to the conflict/crisis situation by the EU**, sometimes related to diverging geopolitical interests and priorities among EU MS varied. Where conflicts/crises were viewed as a low priority for the EU (and its member states) they received less attention, reducing the effectiveness of the EU's engagement. (Georgia, South Sudan).
	While the EU was willing to take risks to bring sensitive issues to the table (Côte d'Ivoire, Georgia, Lebanon, Philippines, Zimbabwe), it was also criticised for **not always engaging proactively and assertively and using its political leverage** to achieve CPPB outputs and outcomes (Côte d'Ivoire, Georgia, Niger, South Sudan, Philippines, Zimbabwe).
	Availability of human resources to support political engagement and CPPB processes,affecting the capacity to engage in more regular political dialogue with relevant stakeholders and to provide political backing to projects where needed. The degree of buy-in and leadership on the part of senior EU management sent signals about the relative importance of CPPB in EU interactions with partners. At EUDs, posting Heads of Delegation with experience in applying conflict sensitive approaches to conflict/crisis situations improved the EU's response. Political sections at EUDs were often seriously under-staffed, which reduced the capacity to respond. The regionalisation of FPI reduced the extent to which IcSP projects could be supported on the ground and in some cases removed an up-to-date source of political information and analysis from EUDs while it provided some degree of support to EUDs that previously had not been able to draw on FPI resources. (Afghanistan, Côte d'Ivoire Georgia, Lebanon, Philippines, Somalia, South Sudan, Zimbabwe, the EU Delegation to the AU).
	Availability of adequate and quick crisis response mechanisms to respond to opportunities for CPPB emerging from political dialogue or peace processes influenced the effectiveness of the EU response. In some cases, it was felt that insufficient fast and flexible crisis response instruments were available (Afghanistan, Georgia, Zimbabwe).

Source: Interviews with EU and EU MS officials, representatives of other bilateral and multilateral international actors, regional organisations, national actors and EU implementers, EU project documents and evaluations, external reports.

[u] Other EU external action that undermined CPPB results/impacts is discussed in Volume 2, JC 1.3 and JC 6.3.

Implementing an integrated/comprehensive approach

During the evaluation period the EU formalised and refined its understanding that an integrated/comprehensive approach was fundamental to EU external action, including CPPB. The EU took several policy and implementation level initiatives during the 2011-2018 period to advance an integrated/comprehensive approach, including the development of the 2013 Council Conclusions on the Comprehensive Approach to External Crises and Conflicts and the reiteration of these aims in the 2016 Global Strategy. The EU also took further initiatives to enhance coherence among EU entities (see EQ 1) and with EU MS (see EQ 3).

> *The 2016 Global Strategy reiterated the need for an integrated approach to conflicts and crisis that is based on: i) a coherent use of all policies at the EU's disposal, ii) acting at all stages of the conflict cycle, iii) acting at different levels of governance (local, national, regional and global), and iv) acting in cooperation with others through national, regional and international partnerships, fostered and supported by the EU.*
>
> Source: Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy, 2016, p.9.

Where the integrated/comprehensive approach was sufficiently applied, it contributed to the effectiveness of CPPB interventions. Case study evidence, previous evaluations[104] and interviews with EU officials, other international actors and civil society in Brussels confirmed that individual interventions became effective beyond their immediate sphere of influence when they were embedded in a wider EU comprehensive approach to address the conflict/crisis, including both financial and political elements of engagement.

The ability of the EU to apply an integrated/comprehensive approach effectively was influenced by a range of factors, most of which fell into four categories: 1) the degree of coherence and complementarity among EU entities, 2) the degree of coherence with wider EU external action, 3) the availability of human resources, and 4) the degree of coordination with EU MS. All factors had the potential both to promote and to impede the application of an integrated/comprehensive approach. The degree to which they had a positive effect varied across the case studies. Table 12 briefly summarises the most frequently cited factors.

Table 12 Factors affecting the application of an integrated/comprehensive approach in CPPB

Degree of coherence and complementarity among EU entities (see EQ 1)
• Extent of institutional fragmentation, affecting the level of effort required to achieve coherence. • Extent of clear policy leadership on CPPB for a particular conflict/crisis situation (HQ and local level). • Existence of clear division of labour among the EU actors involved in CPPB for a particular conflict/crisis situation (HQ and local level). • Degree to which promoting coherence dependent on personal relationships, rather than a formal institutional set up designed to facilitate working together. • Existence of policy frameworks and political direction in CPPB.
Degree of coherence with wider EU external action (see EQs 1 and 5)
• Degree of alignment of EU interests and priorities between CPPB and other areas of EU external action, most notably in relation to migration responses and engagement on human rights. • Degree of mainstreaming CPPB and conflict sensitivity across all EU external action.
Availability of appropriate human resources and instruments (see EQ 2)
• Role played by Heads of Delegation or EUSRs in promoting an integrated/comprehensive approach and the availability of sufficient EUD human resources (especially political sections) to work in a comprehensive manner. • Influence of FPI regionalisation. • Availability of sufficient and adequate crisis responses instruments to connect financial responses to emerging political opportunities in CPPB.
Degree of coordination with EU and EU MS (see EQs 3 and 6)

• Extent to which EU MS were equal partners in the integrated approach through joint analysis and joint programming • Degree to which different EU MS interests influenced the EU's ability to act in CPPB. • Extent to which the EU was given space by EU MS to act politically in CPPB.

Source: Interviews with EU and EU MS officials, representatives of other bilateral and multilateral international actors, regional organisations, national actors and EU implementers, evaluations, external reports.

Mitigating unintended negative effects

The evaluation found a number of areas where (the risk of) unintended negative effects occurred. These effects fell into two groups: 1) effects of EU support for CPPB at both the strategic/programming and intervention levels and 2) effects of wider EU external action. The EU and its implementing partners generally had a fairly good understanding of the potential of unintended negative effects resulting from CPPB actions (spending and non-spending) and the risks of "doing harm". The approach taken to mitigate (potential) negative effects resulting from CPPB efforts was however neither systemic nor frequently recorded in project documentation and reports. A number of issues were found where negative consequences resulted from EU support for CPPB. In addition, several areas were identified where broader EU external action had a negative effect on CPPB results. The evaluation found that these effects were not always sufficiently anticipated and mitigated at the earliest possible moment. Table 13 summarises unintended negative consequences that were identified in the case studies. Details are found in Volume 2.

Table 13 Unintended negative effects of EU CPPB support

Effects of EU support for CPPB
• The risk of donor dependence • Unbalanced support to institutions supporting peace and security in Africa • Inadvertently fuelling power struggles and legitimising certain actors
Effects of broader EU external action
• EU's focus on certain political/security agendas (refugee crises, migration, violent extremism) undermining CPPB efforts

Source: Interviews with EU and EU MS officials, representatives of other bilateral and multilateral international actors, regional organisations, national actors and EU implementers, evaluations, external reports.

The EU and implementers reduced visibility for sensitivity reasons in many cases. However, the evaluation found there was still considerable scope to better think through and provide guidance on how the EU visibility furthers EU CPPB goals and promotes the EU's image, values and credibility as an actor in CPPB. EU officials, EU implementing partners and evaluations carried out during the 2011-2018 period[105] suggested that there was a particular need to strengthen context-specific EU guidance and its uptake in conflict areas where the EU dealt with propaganda that opposed EU values. Additionally, a need was recognised for better consideration and guidance on how to reduce the loss in "political payback" as a result of indirect management through international organisations such as the UN or the World Bank, which reduces the scope for EU visibility in cases where more visibility would be beneficial for furthering its aims and shifting its identity to "a player and not just a payer".

4.7 EQ 7 on broader effects and sustainability

To what extent has EU support for CPPB contributed to conflict/crisis prevention/mitigation, and structural stability and enhanced conditions for peace in a sustainable way?

Rationale and coverage of the question: This EQ assesses whether the short- and medium-term results identified in EQ 6 have contributed to the higher levels in the reconstructed CPPB IL. It thus focuses on the direct and indirect impact of EU support for CPPB in terms of the extent to which the support has contributed to structural stability and enhanced conditions for peace and to the mitigation or prevention of conflicts/crises and restoration of immediate stability (intermediate impacts level in the CPPB Intervention Logic). While attributing outcomes and intermediate impacts to EU CPPB support is not possible due to the wide range of actors and factors at play, the evaluation examines the contribution of EU support for CPPB to these higher aims. The EQ primarily focuses on Primary CPPB (Category 1) and Mixed Objectives (Category 2) interventions. It also broadly explores the contribution of Complementary interventions (Category 3) to achieving these outcomes.

In terms of assessing sustainability of observed outcomes and intermediate impacts, the EQ examines whether CPPB capacities of regional, national and local actors have been sustained, whether the degree of ownership by regional, national and local actors has increased, whether financial sustainability of CPPB actions has been guaranteed and whether there is overall evidence of persistence of CPPB results.

Summary answer to the Evaluation Question

EU support for CPPB had limited success in preventing/mitigating violence originating from nascent conflicts/crises and restoring immediate stability and in creating/restoring/consolidating structural stability and strengthened conditions for peace during the evaluation period, despite significant EU political and financial support for CPPB.

In terms of enhancing structural stability and strengthened conditions for peace, the EU's support for CPPB contributed to a limited degree both to tangible, visible outcomes/intermediate impacts, such as peace agreements signed, local level conflicts prevented, state security functions restored or strengthened, and to more intangible/less visible outcomes such as jump-starting mediation processes. In this regard, EU support for CPPB contributed to changing conflict dynamics.

In terms of preventing/mitigating violence originating from nascent conflicts/crises and restoring immediate stability, EU support made positive contributions through: 1) high-level dialogue and political engagement, support to peace processes, confidence-building measures and conflict early warning mechanisms; 2) peace operations, monitoring missions and CSDP missions; 3) community-level support for conflict resolution mechanisms and election monitoring; and 4) complementary interventions, most notably humanitarian assistance.

A number of factors affected the achievement of longer-term outcomes and intermediate impact, including 1) the challenging local context/political contexts, 2) the protracted nature of the conflicts, 3) degree of common interests and approaches among international actors, 4) challenges in translating early warning into early action, 5) the degree of EU proactiveness, 6) the availability of instruments to respond very rapidly to emerging windows of political opportunity and 7) the attention given to resolving underlying causes of conflict. Although in theory these factors could either promote or hinder the achievement of longer-term outcomes and intermediate impact depending on

the context, they were most frequently found to have had a negative effect in the instances examined for this evaluation.

The capacities of regional, national and local actors developed as a result of EU CPPB efforts and these actors' ownership of CPPB actions and results were sustained to some extent. Security and geopolitical conditions and the commitment and resources on the part of local and national actors were the factors that largely determined the level of sustained capacities and ownership. Where the EU had a long-term approach to promoting CPPB in specific contexts, that increased the likelihood that CPPB results would be sustained. The degree of financial sustainability of EU CPPB actions and results was mixed, depending on 1) availability of national and local resources; 2) the ability to provide long-term EU funding including through follow up by different instruments; and 3) the degree of continued support provided by EU MS, other donors and trust funds.

The following sections present a more detailed account of the evaluation's findings on impact and sustainability.

Contributing to structural stability and strengthened conditions for peace

In combination with other actors, the EU contributed to greater structural stability and strengthened conditions for peace during the evaluation period in some of the case studies However, in most cases, relatively little progress was recorded despite significant EU political and financial CPPB inputs. Thematic and instrument-level evaluations covering the same timeframe as the current evaluation found that the EU had contributed to structural stability and strengthened conditions for peace to some degree but that the complexity of conflict/crisis environments, the multiplicity of actors at the international, regional, national and local levels and questions about political will to implement necessary reforms made it difficult in most cases to determine the extent of the EU's contribution.[106] The case studies examined for this evaluation confirmed these findings.

In some instances, the EU's support for CPPB contributed to tangible, visible longer-term outcomes and impacts that were comparatively easy to identify, even if their ultimate contribution to long-term sustained peace remained to be seen and depended on a wide range of contextual circumstances and political dynamics. Tangible impacts include signed and implemented peace agreements, prevention of local-level conflicts and the restoration or strengthening of state security functions. Table 14 provides examples of instances where tangible contributions to structural stability and strengthened conditions for peace occurred in selected case studies in environments where the context improved, remained relatively stable or deteriorated during the evaluation period.

Table 14 Tangible longer-term outcomes and impacts for peace and structural stability

Context improved
In **Colombia** and **the Philippines**, the government demonstrated considerable commitment to resolving conflicts. The EU was part of a core group of external actors that provided important political and financial support for the peace processes and assisted the parties to overcome blockages during the negotiations and in implementation of the peace accords. Tangible outcomes and impacts included peace agreements signed and successful steps taken to implement them.
Context remained relatively stable
In **Côte d'Ivoire, Georgia** and **South Sudan**, the EU provided often significant amounts of political and financial support for CPPB in an attempt to move countries toward structural stability and strengthen conditions for peace in collaboration with other international and regional actors. The degree of domestic political commitment to taking fundamental steps to building a durable peace varied considerably within this group and in no case reached the level of commitment in Colombia or the Philippines. In each case the EU

applied a range of spending and non-spending tools and instruments. Tangible outcomes and impacts included restoration of state capacity and presence (Côte d'Ivoire), reducing tensions through enhanced people-to-people contacts (Georgia) and local level conflict resolution (South Sudan).
Context deteriorated
In both **Lebanon** and **Niger** the focus of EU support for CPPB was on activities relating to European security, primarily migration and countering extremism. While EU CPPB support did have the potential for strengthening structural stability and conditions for peace in the two countries, the level of attention to these objectives was considerably less than in the other field mission case studies. Tangible outcomes and impacts included immediate stabilisation due to enhanced capacity of community police (Niger) and strengthened social cohesion in some targeted communities (Lebanon).

Source: Interviews with EU and EU MS officials, representatives of other bilateral and multilateral international actors, regional organisations, national actors and EU implementers, EU project documents and evaluations, external reports.

The EU also contributed to longer-term outcomes and intermediate impacts that were far less tangible or visible. These were difficult to measure in terms of their contribution toward sustainable peace, particularly in the short-term. Nonetheless, they were crucial in creating the foundation for long-term peace and stability. In several contexts, the EU played a significant role in giving support to initiating and sustaining peace processes (through ongoing mediation and dialogue support or confidence-building as in Georgia, Myanmar and South Sudan), maintaining a basic level of stability (through peace operations or election monitoring/dialogue as in Zimbabwe and Somalia) or laying down stepping stones for increased tolerance and social cohesion (for example through the set-up of peace architectures and training police forces as in Côte d'Ivoire, Lebanon and Niger).

The difficulties of measuring the individual or collective impact of these activities, and in particular of those resulting from political engagement (mediation, high-level engagement and diplomacy), and the need for modesty in terms of expectations on impacts in the short term were often emphasised in earlier evaluations and by interviewees. The 2015 ERM evaluation, for example, found that the right indicator of impact was not that conflicts had ended, but whether ERM funding enabled mediators to "engage with the underlying dynamics of conflicts and jump-start longer-term processes that could be taken over by other actors so that violence declined over time." The ERM evaluation warned that "many set-backs along the way should be anticipated. From this perspective there is some evidence that ERM activities made a tangible contribution to conflict prevention, management or resolution efforts, without which parties to a conflict would have found it more difficult to talk."[107]

While complementary interventions (Category 3) were only assessed in terms of coherence and complementarity, some interventions contributed to strengthening conditions for sustainable peace. In Côte d'Ivoire, Georgia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Colombia, CAR, Niger and Zimbabwe, the EU supported interventions in the area of livelihoods restoration, land governance, small-scale community restoration, basic infrastructure, youth employment, stimulation of the private sector, trade and poverty alleviation. These efforts were seen as vital contributions to creating an environment conducive to socio-economic development, stability and sustainable peace.[108]

Despite the contributions that some complementary interventions made to strengthening the conditions for peace, many EU cooperation efforts in conflict areas were primarily development-oriented or focussed on EU security concerns and not sufficiently grounded in context analysis and conflict sensitivity. This reduced the degree to which the EU was able to significantly and comprehensively contribute to overall CPPB objectives through complementary interventions. The 2011 CPPB evaluation[109] and interlocutors in Brussels and case study countries noted that many EU cooperation efforts in conflict areas were often largely focused on development cooperation or on EU security concerns (migration, violent extremism), and that not enough was done in terms of working explicitly on CPPB or mainstreaming conflict sensitivity across EU external action, as discussed also in EQ 5. In addition, concerns were raised by civil society organisations in

Brussels about framing CPPB too widely: sometimes implementing organisations reframed what they did to receive CPPB money (referred to as "convenient labelling"). In other cases, CPPB interventions were re-labelled as "preventing violent extremism (PVE)" in order to obtain funding, while continuing to do the same work on the ground. This approach carried significant risks of "doing harm" (for example by stigmatising communities as potential terrorists and by raising tensions in communities, or by being seen as siding with the government on security efforts)[110].

EU support for CPPB contributions in preventing violence and restoring immediate stability

EU support for CPPB contributed to preventing/mitigating violence originating from nascent conflicts/crisis and restoring immediate stability both at national and local levels only to a minor degree during the evaluation period. According to documentary sources and interviews with a wide range of interlocutors, the EU was able to contribute to some extent to preventing and/or addressing violence and assuring immediate stability in a number of areas as shown in Table 15.

Table 15 Contribution to preventing/mitigating conflict/crisis and restoring immediate stability

Category	Results achieved	Observed in
High-level dialogue and political engagement, support to peace processes, confidence-building measures, conflict early warning mechanisms	Tensions reduced, violence mitigated/ prevented, confidence enhanced	Georgia, Myanmar, Philippines, South Sudan
Peace operations, monitoring missions, CSDP missions[v]	Violence mitigated/ prevented, immediate stability restored	CAR, Georgia, Niger, Philippines, Somalia, South Sudan
Community-level support for conflict resolution and monitoring mechanisms and election monitoring	Tensions reduced, violence mitigated/prevented, immediate stability restored	CAR, Côte d'Ivoire, Lebanon, Niger, Philippines, Somalia, Zimbabwe
Complementary interventions, particularly through delivery of development, human assistance and recovery programmes in conflict-affected areas, including support to refugees	Violence mitigated/ prevented, stability enhanced	Lebanon, Myanmar, Niger, Philippines, Somalia

Source: Interviews with EU and EU MS officials, representatives of other bilateral and multilateral international actors, regional organisations, national actors and EU implementers, EU project documents and evaluations.

Factors affecting achievement of outcomes and impact

The case studies conducted for this evaluation provided insights into the factors that affected the achievement of outcomes and impact. These factors were related both to the context in which the EU operated and to internal EU issues. Their influence could be either positive or negative as demonstrated in Table 16.

[v] CSDP missions per se were not assessed in this evaluation, however their complementarity with other EU CPPB efforts was assessed.

Table 16 Factors affecting the achievement of longer-term outcomes and impact

Context in which CPPB support provided	
Local context	The context in which the EU provided support for CPPB varied considerably. Where the parties to the conflict were committed to CPPB processes, EU support was more likely to have a positive effect. Colombia and the Philippines stood out as examples of this type of context. Other cases demonstrated varying degrees of commitment. In South Sudan, support for mediation efforts by church-based groups at the local level helped prevent/mitigate violence and enhance conditions for peace in specific areas. In contrast the peace process at the national level moved extremely slowly due to an unwillingness of key parties to commit to peaceful solutions. In Côte d'Ivoire, the government sought to become a "country in growth," which made it difficult for the EU and others to work on social cohesion and fragility, undermining progress toward enhancing conditions for peace and structural stability.
Protracted nature of conflicts	EU support for CPPB was generally aimed at conflicts of long duration that required considerable time to resolve. As the 2011 World Bank World Development Report observed: "It took the 20 fastest reforming countries on average 17 years to reduce [the engagement of the] military in politics and 41 years to reform rule of law to a minimum level necessary for development." However, the EU did not generally have CPPB strategies in place to guide EU support over the very long term.
Degree of common interests and approaches among international actors	The larger the resident international community, the more likely it was that key actors would have divergent objectives. The existence of peace agreements (Colombia, Philippines and to a lesser extent South Sudan) promoted common approaches. Where geopolitical concerns underpinned the approaches of the EU and other international/regional actors, the ability to achieve common approaches was reduced.
EU approach to CPPB and institutional setup	
Translating early warning into early action	According to EU documents and external analysts, the EU faced challenges in translating the findings of EU conflict EWS into conflict prevention and early action. This was a considered by some to be a reflection of priority setting and distributing resources among many "at risk" environments and the tendency to focus on urgent cases.[111]
Degree of proactiveness	The 2011 CPPB evaluation found that the Commission was often reactive, not anticipating deteriorating situations and therefore dedicating substantial attention to short term actions.[112] In the post-2011 period, external observers noted the EU was more political, had a better grasp on analysis, and better understood the local context than in the past. At the same time, interlocutors reported that the EU had not entirely shed its reactive stance.
Availability of instruments to respond very rapidly to emerging political opportunities	The EU improved its institutional capacity to respond rapidly and flexibly to crises and conflicts during the evaluation period but there were still challenges around accessing financing resources when urgent needs arose. While the availability of the IfS/IcSP did in some instances help the EU to seize some opportunities for reducing violence and restoring stability, some EU officials felt this instrument was still not sufficiently quick to respond to opportunities for engagement.
Addressing underlying causes of conflict	The EU addressed the underlying causes of conflict/crisis only infrequently and in no way systematically, thus reducing the contribution to longer term peace and structural stability. This was identified as a challenge in the 2011 evaluation[113] and confirmed as a continuing challenge by this evaluation's online survey and case studies. Nonetheless, some individual EU CPPB interventions in Côte d'Ivoire, Lebanon, Niger, Philippines and Zimbabwe did address underlying causes of conflict.

Source: Interviews with EU and EU MS officials, representatives of other bilateral and multilateral international actors, regional organisations, national actors and EU implementers, EU project documents and evaluations, online CPPB survey of EUDs, external reports.

Sustainability

The CPPB capacities of regional, national and local actors and their ownership of CPPB actions and results were sustained to some extent as a result of EU CPPB interventions. Many EU funded CPPB interventions were geared towards building up capacities in CPPB and strengthening ownership of CPPB actions and results. Often projects included elements of capacity building, such as training, leadership courses, networking, counselling and accompaniment. The case studies demonstrated that at the national level, there were serious efforts to increase capacities and ownership by working through government or national commissions (Côte d'Ivoire, Niger, Somalia, Zimbabwe). Combining institutional strengthening (sometimes through budget support) with political/policy dialogue was particularly effective in building capacities and ownership (Côte d'Ivoire, Niger, Zimbabwe). There is some evidence that CPPB capacities at the national level were sustained and that institutional frameworks and systems put in place continued to function. Some CPPB interventions were also clearly owned by national actors who requested assistance in undertaking the activities (Lebanon, Niger).

EU support for CPPB also contributed to strengthening the capacities of civil society organisations and there is some evidence that these capacities were sustained (Côte d'Ivoire, Niger, Zimbabwe). At the local/community level there was mixed evidence that EU support for CPPB contributed to sustained capacities and ownership (Côte d'Ivoire, Lebanon, Myanmar, Niger, Philippines). While some projects led to sustained capacities of CSOs and local committees that continued to function after project ending, other's sustainability prospects appeared to be weak. Frequently, sustainability of local CPPB results was hampered by lack of local resources or a lack of follow up by the EU.

A number of factors determined the degree of sustained capacities and ownership of CPPB efforts. The case studies conducted for this evaluation demonstrated that the degree of sustained capacities and ownership was affected: 1) security and geopolitical conditions; 2) the willingness and ability (resources) of local and national actors to sustain those capacities and demonstrate ownership, 3) degree of long-term approach taken by the EU so that capacities and ownership were assured. The lack of a clear long-term approach at sector level and fragmented support at community level at times reduced the sustainability of EU CPPB results.

The degree of financial sustainability of EU CPPB actions and results was mixed. Financial sustainability depended on 1) availability of national and local resources; 2) the ability to provide long-term EU funding including through follow up by different instruments; and 3) the degree of continued support provided by EU MS, other donors and trust funds. While some co-funding by partner countries was available, most interventions continued to be dependent on external financing. For EU CPPB actions financed through the APF for example, it was found that "sustainability is still far on the horizon" as the AU, RECs and Regional Mechanisms remain heavily dependent on external funding for the peace and security activities.[114] At the community level, capacities and ownership of peacebuilding projects were slowly emerging but needed more time to be sustained. They were also affected by fragmented support across different initiatives and the lack of local resources to continue activities (Lebanon, Côte d'Ivoire, Niger [115]). While there was broad awareness and willingness among EU officials to support some interventions in the long-term, in practice the follow up through different instruments did not always materialise, partly due to EU internal constraints. The EU was able to assure some financial sustainability through using different instruments, trust funds and follow up by other donors, but the case studies demonstrated that the transitioning between instruments could still be improved.

5 Conclusions

The evaluation findings highlight a number of important areas in which the EU strengthened its capacity to deliver support for CPPB compared with the previous evaluation period, 2001-2010. Some improvements built on change that started during the pre-2011 period and intensified post-2011. For example, the importance of addressing conflict in an integrated/comprehensive manner and of strengthening conflict sensitivity was evident before 2011 but received additional emphasis, policy validation and tools in the new post-Lisbon Treaty set up. The creation of divisions/units within EEAS, FPI, DG DEVCO were in their infancy in 2011 and drew heavily initially on staffing and policy focus from pre-Lisbon institutional set up but added some momentum. At the same time, there were a number of areas where the 2011 evaluation had highlighted a need for improvement but where little change was evident during the 2011-2018 such as human resources and mainstreaming conflict sensitivity. Progress and remaining challenges are summarised in Table 17.

Table 17 Progress in delivering EU support for CPPB since 2011

Capacity strengthened
Overall the EU has strengthened its position as a key player in CPPB: ✓ The policy/strategy foundation for CPPB has been reinforced and increasingly reflected in strategy and programming. ✓ The importance of addressing conflict and crises in an integrated/comprehensive manner across the EU and with EU MS is increasingly recognised. Efforts were made to apply the EU's spending and non-spending instruments/tools in a coherent and coordinated manner to support CPPB objectives. ✓ The importance of adopting a conflict-sensitive approach to CPPB support is also increasingly recognised. Steps have been taken to strengthen the EU's institutional structure, human resources, tools and aid modalities/delivery mechanisms to deliver CPPB support in a conflict-sensitive manner. ✓ The EU's spending instruments have been progressively adapted to the needs of conflict/crisis contexts, especially flexibility, speed of response and ability to support political objectives beyond development cooperation. ✓ The EU has improved its mechanisms and tools to make CPPB support more flexible and more effective in conflict/crisis situations, including, among others, the creation of new dedicated units within external action services to support CPPB, policy and guidance documents, training courses, tools for conflict analysis and systems for conflict early warning.
Areas requiring additional attention
Despite progress since 2011 in making the Commission and EEAS a player on CPPB, the EU's comparative advantages in supporting CPPB have not yet been fully exploited: ✓ As in the pre-2011 period, the EU frequently adopts a reactive rather than proactive stance in delivering support for CPPB. Translating early warning into early action remains difficult. ✓ As in the pre-2011 period, operationalising the integrated/comprehensive approach lags both at HQ and in EUDs because of inadequate mainstreaming of conflict sensitivity across all EU external action, an institutional set-up not fully designed to promote coherence and insufficient staff in political sections at HQ and in EUDs. ✓ Inadequate mainstreaming of conflict sensitivity derives in large part from the absence of a human resources strategy to strengthen the availability of adequately capacitated staff. ✓ It also reflects inadequate buy-in and leadership on CPPB from EU senior management. ✓ Human resources remain one of the major stumbling blocks to making CPPB effective. There are too few EU officials with the expertise necessary to make linkages between politics, programming and context at HQ and in EUDs. ✓ Very little progress has been recorded on putting knowledge and learning on CPPB at the heart of the EU's external action and insufficient progress on monitoring for learning and building knowledge.

The progress recorded by the EU in strengthening its capacity to provide support for CPPB contributed to the achievement of many of the short- to mid-term results anticipated for CPPB interventions in the areas of peace processes/mediation, national/local dialogue and reconciliation processes, peace support operations, capacity building for CPPB, SSR/RoL/justice, democratic governance, civil society support, electoral support, social reconciliation and socio-economic foundations of CPPB. In a limited number of cases these results clearly contributed to preventing/mitigating violence, restoring immediate stability and creating/restoring/consolidating structural stability and strengthened conditions for peace. At the same time, the evaluation found that the EU still has a considerable way to go to achieve the ambitious integrated conflict prevention objectives that it set out for itself in 2001[w] and reconfirmed in 2016 in the Global Strategy. These objectives are likely to remain important in the 2019-2024 period with the decision to form a "Geopolitical Commission," which acknowledged the need to have a comprehensive and integrated approach to peace, security and development. Commission President von der Leyen further promoted the importance of the EU investing in long-term stability and seeking to prevent crises, including a key role of conflict prevention. [116]

With this in mind, the evaluation has identified conclusions in four key areas: Policy and strategy; Promoting an integrated/comprehensive approach; Implementation of CPPB support; and CPPB results and sustainability. Table 18 links these conclusions to evaluation criteria. Section 6 presents policy recommendations to further improve the EU's support in these areas.

Table 18 Overview of the conclusions

Cluster	Conclusion	Evaluation criteria
Cluster 1: Policy and strategy	C1. Progress on mainstreaming CPPB at higher policy and strategic levels but insufficient at regional, country-related strategic and intervention levels	Relevance, Coherence
	C2. A lack of strategic direction and implementation guidance on CPPB	Relevance, Effectiveness
	C3. Overall policy/strategic level alignment to partner priorities, but room for more nuanced alignment and responsiveness to change	Relevance
Cluster 2: Promoting and integrated/comprehensive approach	C4. Partially successful efforts to strengthen delivery of an integrated/comprehensive approach to CPPB but often undermined by inconsistent political/policy leadership and fragmented institutional environment	Efficiency, Effectiveness, Three Cs
	C5. Contextual and institutional constraints on using spending and non-spending interventions in a mutually rein-forcing manner	Efficiency, Effectiveness
	C6. Varying depth and quality of main-streaming human rights and gender sensitivity, sometimes related to particular country circumstances	Efficiency, Effectiveness, Impact, Sustainability
Cluster 3: Implementation of CPPB support	C7. Significant EU added value in supporting CPPB	Value added
	C8. Progress in enhancing institutional efficiency and effectiveness with continuing challenges	Efficiency, Effectiveness
	C9. Limited human resources a major challenge for CPPB engagement	Efficiency
	C10. Multiple partnerships conducive to successful CPPB support created	Three Cs

[w] The 2001 commitments were expressed in the European Commission Communication on Conflict Prevention and the Gothenburg Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts adopted by the European Council.

	C11. Inadequate mainstreaming of conflict sensitivity despite training and introduction of tools, guidance and new systems	Coherence, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Impact, Sustainability
	C12. Inadequate progress on CPPB monitoring, evaluation and learning	Efficiency, Effectiveness, Impact
Cluster 4: CPPB results and sustainability	C13. "Fragmented success" in realising CPPB-relevant outputs and outcomes	Effectiveness, Impact
	C14. Contribution to intermediate CPPB impacts limited to individual cases rather than achieved at broader scale, with doubtful sustainability	Effectiveness, Impact, Sustainability

5.1 Cluster 1: Policy and strategy

Conclusion 1: Progress on mainstreaming CPPB at higher policy and strategic levels but insufficient at regional, country-related strategic and intervention levels

Overall, the EU made progress in mainstreaming CPPB at higher policy and strategic levels. However, this integration was weaker in regional and country-related strategic and programming documents. At implementation level, most CPPB intervention documents implicitly incorporated EU CPPB policy but there were few explicit references to EU policy and strategic frameworks.

This conclusion is based mainly on EQs 1 and 5

The EU's CPPB political priorities and political objectives were adequately reflected and mainstreamed in EU higher-level policy and strategic documents like the EU's Global Strategy, the European Consensus on Development and various Communications relating to CPPB, crises, conflict prevention, fragility and resilience. These priorities and objectives were also reflected in EU strategy/programming documents such as RIPs, MIPs, NIPs, SSFs, Country Strategy Papers and European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plans. This alignment was generally implicit, leaving space for improvement. At the intervention level, Primary CPPB and Mixed Objectives interventions, such as on justice sector reform or livelihood/resilience support, were clearly CPPB-oriented although CPPB was often not explicitly stated as an objective. Complementary interventions had in most cases no explicit references to high-level EU CPPB priorities and objectives and CPPB was rarely articulated in project documents though a significant number of implicit links to CPPB were evident.

Conclusion 2: A lack of strategic direction and implementation guidance on CPPB

The EU's progress in promoting CPPB at the policy level and during implementation was undercut by the lack of strategic direction from senior management for framing CPPB as well as insufficient guidance on how the EU wanted to contribute to CPPB efforts.

This conclusion is based mainly on EQs 2, 4 and 5

The EU took commendable steps following the 2011 CPPB evaluation to promote CPPB across EU external action, to provide new technical guidance on how to implement CPPB interventions and to mainstream conflict sensitivity across the EEAS, DG DEVCO and DG NEAR. The EU set up and modified institutional structures, it strengthened the policy framework, it improved funding mechanisms for engaging in conflict and crisis contexts, it promoted methods of joint working to

generate shared thinking on promoting CPPB and it made modest progress on addressing human resource and capacity issues and.

But the EU failed to make progress in clarifying a conceptual framing and definition of what CPPB is and in providing clear guidance on how to translate the high-level CPPB political priorities and political objectives into programming and implementation. The absence of such a framework, which would also explain how CPPB relates to other EU external actions and what the EU aims to achieve by promoting CPPB, meant that CPPB actors within the EU were missing the foundations on which to construct a truly conflict-sensitive approach. It also led to a less than optimal use of resources.

With the exception of a few positive examples, the EU did not have a strong strategic direction and framing of what it wanted to achieve in terms of CPPB and how it wanted to contribute to efforts made to promote peace and security by local, national, regional and international actors. The EU tended to be reactive, following other leaders instead of proactively engaging and working jointly to shape an effective response to conflicts and crises. This can be traced in part to a lack of buy-in on CPPB from senior EU management, which affected the leadership exerted at senior levels.

Conclusion 3: Overall policy/strategic level alignment to partner priorities, but room for more nuanced alignment and responsiveness to change

At policy and strategic level, EU support for CPPB was overall appropriately aligned with partner country policies and priorities as well as strategies of non-governmental country actors. However, there was room for improvement in terms of anticipating change, engaging proactively and underpinning EU CPPB engagements with greater shared policy and contextual analyses with national and regional partners to better adapt to changing political and security contexts.

This conclusion is based mainly on EQs 1 and 3

EU support for CPPB was overall well aligned with the priorities and needs of national and local contexts, partner countries and – for the APF – the intergovernmental bodies at regional level. The EU was also moderately successful in adapting its CPPB support to changing circumstances in partner countries' political contexts or security situations and thereby remained a relevant partner to local actors, partner country government actors as well as regional actors. The EU's approach to addressing CPPB challenges, however, was often reactive rather than proactive as it had been in the pre-2011 period. Anticipating change, adapting the EU's policy and smoothly translating early warning into early action appeared to be difficult.

Shared policy and contextual analysis underpinning the EU's engagement and coordination with national (and regional) actors occurred only to a limited extent. While the EU promoted context-specific policies and strategies, this alignment was not always built on a firm commitment by government partners to implement a common vision (to the extent one existed). The EU and its country partners, primarily governments, did not systematically invest in more formal or structured forms of conflict analysis, either at strategic level or at intervention level. There was, however, a multitude of informal exchanges, consultations and analysis with government, regional bodies and civil society when the EU developed its approach to supporting environments of conflict and protracted crisis. Such processes were valuable but there was room to complementing these with more thorough shared and systemic analysis to guide effective EU action.

5.2 Cluster 2: Promoting an integrated/comprehensive approach for CPPB

Conclusion 4: Partially successful efforts to strengthen delivery of an integrated/comprehensive approach to CPPB but often undermined by inconsistent political/policy leadership and fragmented institutional environment

Clear efforts were made to improve CPPB coordination, complementarity and comprehensiveness against the background of a fragmented EU external action institutional environment. The ad-hoc nature of political and policy leadership on CPPB and a frequent lack of clarity on the division of labour among those involved in CPPB means challenges to coordination, complementarity and comprehensiveness remain. Applying an integrated/comprehensive approach to CPPB over a longer period generally contributed positively to the effectiveness of CPPB actions but was severely hampered where other EU policy priorities dominated external action.

This conclusion is based mainly on EQs 1, 3 and 6

The EU coordinates and promotes its support to CPPB in an imperfect, internally under-resourced and fragmented institutional environment where responsibilities are divided among a multitude of actors dealing with CPPB with different, yet overlapping, tasks. Against this institutional background, the EU improved internal coordination, complementarity and comprehensiveness following the 2011 CPPB evaluation, although the extent to which it was able to implement an integrated/comprehensive approach both internally at headquarters and at partner country level was mixed. Clear efforts were made to work more comprehensively and overall the quality of coordination and coherence increased across EU institutions as well as with other actors (EU MS, international community) compared with the pre-2011 period.

Challenges to coordination, complementarity and comprehensiveness in EU CPPB efforts were posed by the very complexity of the EU system, the absence of clear political and policy leadership on CPPB and an unclear division of labour among those involved in CPPB. At the level of EU Delegations, this translated into the feeling of being “left alone” – a situation that was compounded by limited qualified human resources to engage politically (a problem at field level in particular), the limited availability of instruments to seize political opportunities in a timely manner and (in some cases) the willingness of EU Member States to allow the EU to take up its full role in CPPB.

Successful implementation of the integrated/comprehensive approach over a longer period generally contributed positively to the effectiveness of CPPB actions, but the approach was not applied as frequently and as effectively as it could have been. Major problems in promoting and implementing an integrated/comprehensive approach on CPPB occurred in contexts where the EU’s external action was determined by other EU priorities, such as on migration management, which resulted in blatant policy incoherence. Efforts to “repair” such incoherence were made but results in terms of shaping CPPB-coherent action remained imperfect. Full integration of CPPB in the EU’s external policy and actions were particularly rare.

Conclusion 5: Contextual and institutional constraints on using spending and non-spending interventions in a mutually reinforcing manner

The EU often sought to comprehensively channel its CPPB support through both spending and non-spending activities. This approach was limited by context-specific factors as well as a range of EU-specific factors. Failure to address or mitigate these often resulted in funding or complementarity disconnects.

This conclusion is based mainly on EQs 1, 2, 4 and 6

The EU generally sought to promote CPPB in partner countries through a combination of non-spending activities and spending interventions. This approach was most likely to be successful where interventions were embedded in a well-defined strategic EU or partner government vision of political priorities setting out how different types of CPPB-related interventions could contribute to targeted objectives. But the potential of using spending and non-spending interventions in a mutually reinforcing manner was often not fully exploited. Country context, such as a challenging security and political situation or insufficient country ownership, primarily from the government, clearly worked against this approach. Other factors that affected the EU's capacity to combine different interventions for CPPB effectively were rooted in the discretionary power of the EU. These included the political priority and direction given to a conflict or crisis; the use of EU political leverage to influence CPPB processes; converging/diverging EU interests; contextual knowledge of a country or region and insufficient numbers of staff with the expertise necessary to make linkages between politics, programming and context. The availability of small-scale but very quick disbursing financing instruments was also an issue because the IcSP, compared to a limited number of other financing instruments at the disposal of other international actors, was not considered fast enough for certain situations. Moreover, effectively combining and sequencing IcSP funding with DCI, ENI and EDF proved to be a challenge.

Conclusion 6: Varying depth and quality of mainstreaming human rights and gender sensitivity, sometimes related to particular country circumstances

Human rights and gender sensitivity were increasingly promoted at both the policy and implementation levels, although human rights were in general accorded more attention than gender sensitivity. Human rights integration was overall appropriate, despite difficult country circumstances in some cases. There is room, however, to improve the mainstreaming of gender sensitivity, in particular at the implementation level.

This conclusion is based mainly on EQ 5

Policy and strategic documents on the EU's external action leave no doubt that both human rights and gender sensitivity were systematically stressed, promoted and integrated. Human rights, as one of the fundamental values of the EU, appeared systematically in country strategies and implementation level documents dealing with CPPB. Gender was particularly promoted at the strategic level, such as the formulation of the Gender Action Plan II, but also recognised in intervention level documents as an issue relevant to the promotion of CPPB. The EU supported specific interventions in support of human rights which included a focus on CPPB. There were also interventions which addressed CPPB as part of the EU's promotion of gender sensitivity, such as the support to gender-sensitive transitional justice.

Contextual factors influenced the way in which both cross-cutting issues were implemented. They determined whether there was space to address these issues directly, whether they had to be woven more indirectly into CPPB activities, or whether addressing them was possible at all. The EU consistently promoted human rights operationally and tried to pursue the topic even in difficult human rights contexts to the extent possible despite resistance from certain country partners.

Regarding gender, there is significant room for improvement in translating policy and strategic objectives into the implementation of initiatives. The EU invested considerably in the promotion of gender in external action but this only partially trickled down into implementation. Gender sensi-

tivity was not addressed systematically at implementation level and neither the EU nor its implementing partners possessed sufficient operational gender expertise to translate high-level commitments into practical arrangements at intervention level.

5.3 Cluster 3: Implementation of CPPB support

Conclusion 7: Significant EU added value in supporting CPPB

EU support to CPPB clearly generated an added value by its substantial financial resources, long-term commitment, convening power, relative political neutrality and willingness to invest in complex situations of conflict and protracted crisis as well as its ability to combine these assets. When synergies could be created between two or more components, the EU's added value was correspondingly greater and well appreciated by its partners.

This conclusion is based mainly on EQ 4

In common with the EU's 2011 CPPB evaluation, this evaluation found that EU support for CPPB had a significant added value in comparison to EU Member States, other international actors, national and local actors. At the global level, the EU has an added value compared to EU Member States because of its geographic spread and global reach. The number one added value at country and regional levels was the substantial volume of financial resources the EU was able to mobilise for CPPB, the predictability of that funding as well as the long-term commitment in conflict and crisis contexts (financial as well as political commitments). The second most important added value was the EU's willingness to engage politically.

The EU's added value was further reinforced by its (perceived) relative political neutrality compared to certain EU Member States as it could act without strong national self-interests or "hidden" national agendas. The EU had also considerable convening power, informed partially by the financial resources it had at its disposal. The EU often had a long track record in working with a country or region and was willing to commit long-term. The added value of the EU's engagement for CPPB was further seen in the diversity and specificity of instruments. The IfS/IcSP with its explicit focus on CPPB was particularly appreciated in this regard even if accounting for only 18% of the total funding for EU CPPB funding over this period.

Other factors shaping the added value of the EU were its ability to take certain risks, such as an early engagement in conflict situations and – supported by its political neutrality in certain contexts – to engage with politically controversial actors. Finally, the EU was appreciated for its ability to forge broad and diverse partnerships whereby its long-term cooperation with civil society was highlighted as a particular asset. While the volume of financing was mentioned as a key factor of the EU's engagement for CPPB, its value added lay not simply in the amount of funding that the EU was able to provide. Rather, its added value was greater when synergies could be created with the other factors mentioned, such as substantial financial support with long-term commitment.

Conclusion 8: Progress in enhancing institutional efficiency and effectiveness with continuing challenges

The EU enhanced its efficiency and effectiveness in supporting CPPB through improved financing instruments and aid modalities. It worked overall in a cost-effective manner, although multiple "desks" in Brussels were a source of overlap, overhead costs and inefficiency. FPI's regionalisation reform had advantages as well as disadvantages. It allowed

for more coverage across countries but – because of the greater geographic spread – did not always help to shape more in-depth integration and synergies of the EU's CPPB support at country level.

This conclusion is based mainly on EQ 2

Following its 2011 CPPB evaluation, the EU invested in improved financing and disbursement mechanisms to better channel its support to fragile and conflict-prone environments. The results of these innovations allowed for more flexibility and for a better fit of the EU's CPPB support or for complementary interventions in support of CPPB. Project support was used most frequently, followed by EU Trust Funds as well as World Bank Trust Funds (WBTF) and budget support. The latter was used for state reform and macro-economic stability in some cases but was in most countries not seen as appropriate because of the weakness of public finance management systems and its inability to fine-tune and target support to particular actors or CPPB processes. The EUTF was an important innovation to respond to fragility and protracted crisis because of its scale and flexibility but considerable problems have occurred with its deployment. Positive as well as negative experiences from World Bank Trust Funds' support of CPPB can serve as a base for learning and improving EUTF in terms of procedures as well as management so that it could be used more in different country contexts.

The institutional fragmentation of the EU support for CPPB – discussed under conclusion 4 – contributed to institutional inefficiency. Coordination needs between multiple country and thematic "desks" at the EEAS, DG DEVCO, DG NEAR and FPI created overhead costs, overlaps and, in some cases, delays in taking decisions. Nonetheless, attention to keeping costs reasonable for CPPB interventions was overall high.

Another institutional innovation in support of CPPB was the regionalisation reform of FPI which created mixed results. It unfolded positively with regard to global coverage, access to FPI services and an increase of IcSP-funded disbursements. In terms of management efficiency, the reform resulted in gains on one side (one regional office) and more costs on the other (still requiring support at EU Delegation level, overhead costs for regional coverage). In a number of countries where CPPB processes would require an intense accompaniment, however, the reform did not help to promote the EU's integrated/comprehensive approach to CPPB. While the interactions among FPI officers in the regional offices brought benefits in terms of experience sharing and learning, FPI officers were less present among colleagues in EU Delegations and less able to follow changes in the political and security environment. In some cases, this reduced the Delegation's capacity to bridge the divide between the political and cooperation sections, promote conflict sensitivity on a day-to-day basis and connect regularly with country stakeholders and international partners. The political sections in EU Delegations, lacking the mandate or direct access to dedicated funding instruments in support of the political dimensions of CPPB support, were unable to fill the gaps left behind by departing FPI officers who, in some cases, played an important bridging function between the political and cooperation sections.

Conclusion 9: Limited human resources a major challenge for CPPB engagement

While funding for CPPB was overall sufficient, the limited availability of qualified EU human resources remained a major stumbling block for a proactive, context specific and well-informed CPPB engagement. In particular, there were too few EU officials with sound CPPB skills who were also capable of making linkages between politics, programming and context at HQ and in EUDs.

This conclusion is based mainly on JC 2.2 & 4.1 & 5.1

The EU is one of the principal CPPB donors and highly appreciated for its long-term and substantial funding. But the EU had a significant shortfall of qualified human resources to operationalise its high-level ambitions. The fielding of Heads of Delegation with demonstrated experience in engaging effectively in conflict settings showed remarkably positive results but this practice was not used across all countries. Experienced staff with solid CPPB-related expertise is lacking at the mid and lower levels to bridge the gap between the political work of the EU and the operational engagement in support of CPPB, as well as complementary projects.

There are quite simply too few political staff at EUDs to effectively connect CPPB spending and non-spending activities. Additionally, in some cases EU staff do not have the appropriate political skills to operate in conflict/crisis environments in an optimal manner. FPI staff partially fulfilled this role. Following the regionalisation of FPI they still have the means to fulfil this role, although in a more limited way because resources are spread over more countries (see conclusion 8). Overall, across all EU staff including at headquarters, solid thematic expertise, country and conflict-related knowledge, which are necessary to translate the high-level CPPB objectives into implementation, has been in short supply. As a consequence, the EU often remained a (distant) payer and fund-manager instead of an actor capable of engaging more strategically in resolving conflicts and advancing peace.

Conclusion 10: Multiple partnerships conducive to successful CPPB support created

While the EU made improvements in terms of coordinating with its Member States and international actors and created partnerships that were often beneficial for the support to CPPB, its efforts could have been of higher quality and intensity – in particular with country actors and at implementation level.

This conclusion is based mainly on EQs 3 and 4

The EU proactively engaged with a variety of partners in support of CPPB at policy and intervention levels. Compared to the situation identified by the EU's 2011 CPPB evaluation, the EU was able to deepen coordination and complementarity with EU Member States and international actors. Varying degrees of shared analysis, development of joint views, shared understanding and operational coordination, such as on strategy and programming and, more recently, on joint programming highlight an intention to deepen the quality of coordination and complementarity with efforts by regional, national and local actors. However, the common vision and understanding with government partners was mainly based on the alignment with national strategies on CPPB-related issues and shared analysis or further coordination was rare.

Several factors influenced the extent to which real synergies could be created or duplications and overlaps avoided, mainly the EU's ability to coordinate international partners and avoid competition, the credibility of the Head of Delegation and the presence or absence of an EU officer embedded in the EU Delegation specifically tasked to deal with CPPB. The number of international partners involved and their willingness to coordinate was detrimental to exploiting synergies, but was beyond the control of the EU.

Conclusion 11: Inadequate mainstreaming of conflict sensitivity despite training and introduction of tools, guidance and new systems

Considerable progress was made in promoting conflict sensitivity at a technical level through guidance, training and introduction of tools and new systems. However, despite its policy commitments, the EU was not recognised as a fully conflict-sensitive actor in its external action, including CPPB support, as delivered by DG DEVCO, DG ECHO, FPI and DG NEAR. Visibility of the EU was overall conflict sensitive although context-specific steering or guidance was not given in selected cases.

This conclusion is based mainly on EQs 2, 5 and 6

The EU made serious investments in the creation of dedicated institutional units to enhance conflict sensitivity across DG DEVCO, DG ECHO, FPI and DG NEAR. It provided guidance and set up tools and systems, including training courses, policy and operational advice, conflict sensitivity, conflict early warning and conflict analysis. But contrary to the EU's attention to human rights for which it was widely respected by international and national partners, the evaluation did not find any evidence that the EU was perceived as a particularly conflict-sensitive actor.

EU staff members generally seek to operate in a manner that minimises their potential negative impact on conflict. However, conflict sensitivity as an explicit and key principle of EU external action and CPPB support more specifically did not emerge strongly from policy documents, strategic frameworks or intervention-level documents. This had a negative effect on conflict sensitivity in cases where other external policy objectives were the dominant factor for external action, such as migration governance, humanitarian action or development. The EU recognised the need for lowered visibility in some contexts due to the sensitivities related to its support. There was, however, a need to strengthen context-specific EU guidance on visibility in conflict areas.

Overall, despite progress the EU still had a considerable way to go to embed conflict sensitivity in EU external action across all staff, systems and institutional structures in order to promote CPPB effectively.

Conclusion 12: Inadequate progress on CPPB monitoring, evaluation and learning

Monitoring, evaluation and learning are essential to achieving effectiveness and impact. The evaluation found that M&E and learning were the "poor cousin" of the EU's engagement in support of CPPB. There was significant space for improvement at all levels in the hierarchy, in particular at the strategic country level and among implementing partners, but it remained unused.

This conclusion is based mainly on EQs 2, 3 and 5

The EU's 2011 CPPB evaluation identified M&E and learning for CPPB as deficiencies that EU headquarters needed to overcome, for example by providing training on conflict sensitivity and putting more emphasis on M&E. The results of these efforts were rather disappointing in the post-2011 period. It was obvious that headquarters launched some useful initiatives, such as an increasing number of conflict analyses conducted over the evaluation period, exchanging regularly with CPPB-specialised agencies and promoting mediation. But the EU still had rather few capacities to learn and conduct its own analyses at headquarters and field level and depended significantly on external analysis. While several instrument-level evaluations and portfolio reviews were

conducted, the EU clearly lacked systemic cross-institutional learning and establishing mechanisms to feed lessons learned back into the system. As such, institutional knowledge and memory on CPPB were weak. Internal learning and capacity building through training were poor compared to the magnitude of tasks to be performed.

M&E, as a base for learning, was fragmented, with different practices across EU institutions working in the same areas of conflict and protracted crisis. There was no clear guidance on M&E regarding the EU's engagement in CPPB, for example whether and how to work with logframes or theories of change or what constitutes good qualitative indicators to reduce the reliance on quantitative indicators. ROMs, which can be useful for learning when done well and sufficiently resourced, were not applied systematically (if at all) and monitoring and reporting practices for programmes and projects within the same EU service even differed between geographical regions. Findings at implementation level pointed to instances where serious efforts were made to monitor but overall the degree to which key components of CPPB were regularly checked was quite limited.

5.4 Cluster 4: CPPB results and sustainability

Conclusion 13: "Fragmented success" in realising CPPB-relevant outputs and outcomes

The EU achieved short- to mid-term results in support of CPPB processes to a considerable degree, but these were generally "fragmented" successes. Compared to its ambitions set out in the Gothenburg Programme on the Prevention of Violent Conflicts in 2001, and reconfirmed in the Global Strategy in 2016, the EU has still some miles to cover before approaching its goals.

This conclusion is based mainly on EQs 1 - 6

Improvements of internal processes (see conclusions 2, 4 and 8) helped to realise a range of short- to medium-term CPPB results/outputs in very different contexts of conflict and protracted crisis over the evaluation period. These included, for example, strengthened dialogue and negotiation among conflict parties; enhanced CPPB capabilities at national and local levels for mediation, reconciliation and confidence building; the realisation of peace operations, monitoring missions, civilian protection efforts and conflict early warning. Results and outputs were also realised through interventions in domains which underpin and support CPPB, such as security sector reform; border management; preventing violent extremism and policy reforms; Disarmament, development and reintegration (DDR); election-related assistance and support to livelihoods and rehabilitation in conflict affected areas. The results/outputs could be related directly to EU support in the cases examined for this evaluation and contributed – in several cases – to CPPB outcomes at the higher level and intermediate impact (see conclusion 14, e.g. contributing to enhanced conditions for peace or conclusion of peace agreements).

As a rule of thumb, the likelihood of achieving positive CPPB outputs/short-term outcomes increased when the following could be realised by the EU effectively: exerting appropriate political and policy leadership on CPPB; combining spending and non-spending activities effectively at the right time, in the right amounts, with the right partners; embedding CPPB support in a wider context-related political strategy and integrating this support comprehensively with other complementary interventions (applying an integrated/comprehensive approach); having the right people with the right expertise available at right time at the right place; and being able to fit the CPPB support appropriately to context and the priorities of partners. Finally, the likelihood of achieving CPPB results/outputs depended on the extent to which the EU was able to deal with a range of external factors outside the sphere of EU influence, such as the geopolitical interests of powerful non-EU

countries or radical political change inside a partner country that impacted negatively, and at times unexpectedly, on the EU's CPPB support.

It was rare that these pieces of the puzzle were put together optimally. Rather, the achievements of the EU's support for CPPB were often limited or piecemeal and did not fit coherently together due to internal EU shortcomings (as discussed in conclusions 2, 4, 5, 8 and 9). External factors that the EU could not handle adequately or were beyond its control also affected its success rate. The EU did not fully exploit the opportunities it had to promote CPPB. Too often, success depended on "lucky weddings" whereby the elements of the puzzle fitted together more coincidentally than as the result of political steering or applied conflict sensitivity. Overall, the EU achieved more and better CPPB-related results/outputs compared to the 2001-2010 period but still has a way to travel before it will live up to the ambitions it set out for itself in the 2001 Gothenburg Programme on the Prevention of Violent Conflicts or more recent policy commitments in the Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy (2016) or the Communications on the comprehensive and integrated approach (2013).

Conclusion 14: Contribution to intermediate CPPB impacts limited to individual cases rather than achieved at broader scale, with doubtful sustainability

The EU, alongside the broader international community as well as national and local actors, contributed to the prevention of violence, greater structural stability and strengthening the conditions for peace to a limited extent. In most contexts, violence and protracted crisis remained unresolved or even worsened despite substantial inputs by EU and other partners. Sustainability of actions, while fostered by a reasonable level of local ownership, was hampered by capacity challenges and political factors, making continued long-term engagement by the EU a necessity.

This conclusion is based mainly on EQs 3 and 7

The EU's contribution to shaping structural stability or important preconditions for a path towards peace was limited to several cases. Nonetheless, the EU was able to contribute to promoting peace by building on its short- to mid-term results (conclusion 12). These EU-supported results, realised through a combination of spending and non-spending interventions, helped to diffuse tensions and reduce (the risk of) violent conflicts and instability at national and local levels. Where positive impact could be observed, the EU's substantial financial assistance, its ability to forge partnerships, the variety of instruments it could deploy as well as its (political) convening power, other non-spending activities and an integrated/comprehensive approach under clear political guidance (either from EU or a partner) contributed substantially to that success.

External factors which the EU and other actors could not influence to any significant extent played a decisive role in shaping success. Chief among these were deeply rooted animosities between conflicting parties and geopolitical constellations or diverging interests of national actors as well as regional and international actors. As a result, despite substantial EU inputs, conflict and crisis in many contexts did not make significant progress toward structural stability and peace or even deteriorated. Furthermore, the sustainability of CPPB actions was limited. While EU support to CPPB helped strengthen ownership and enhanced capacities for peace at national or local levels, endogenous resources among these structures to engage and to promote CPPB were mostly minimal or even absent, making the sustaining of CPPB activities in the absence of external funding and political support unlikely or severely compromised.

6 Recommendations

These recommendations build on the progress that the EU has made in developing its capacity to support conflict prevention and peacebuilding since the 2011 CPPB evaluation. They recognise the rapidly changing world the EU is engaging in and the significant political, policy and financial resources (5,6 billion EUR for evaluation period) allocated to CPPB. They provide practical guidance in areas that emerged from this evaluation as essential for the EU to address if it is to live up to its ambitions as stated in the Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Strategy (2016) and the recent announcements and Political Guidance (2019) of the Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen.

The recommendations follow the structure of the conclusions and are divided into four clusters dealing with policy and strategy, an integrated/comprehensive approach to CPPB, implementing CPPB and results and sustainability.

The linkages between EQs (findings), conclusions and recommendations are illustrated in Figure 6.

Figure 6 Linkages between EQs, conclusions and recommendations



Table 19 provides an indication of the relative importance and urgency of each recommendation. However, these recommendations are highly interlinked and addressing one or two in isolation is likely to result in missed opportunities for synergies and enhanced EU performance. Therefore, the recommendations need to be addressed to the extent possible in an integrated manner.

Table 19 Overview and prioritisation of the recommendations

Recommendation	Importance	Urgency
	1 = low, 4 = high	
R1 Integrate CPPB into strategy and programming	3	3
R2 Build on existing strands of EU CPPB-related policy to clarify the EU conceptual framework for CPPB and devise a clear Action Plan for mainstreaming CPPB	4	4
R3 Enhance policy and strategic engagement at country level	3	2
R4 Improve leadership to strengthen an integrated/comprehensive approach to CPPB	4	4
R5 Strengthen the integration of human rights and gender in CPPB	3	2
R6 Use the EU's added value in support of CPPB more strategically	4	3
R7 Ensure that financial assistance and key institutional structures are fit-for-purpose	4	4
R8 Invest in more and well-qualified EU human resources	4	4
R9 Strengthen EU coordination	3	3
R10 Promote and enable conflict sensitivity in all EU external action	4	3
R11 Improve monitoring, evaluation and learning	3	3
R12 Support the achievement of sustainable CPPB results	3	2

6.1 Cluster 1: Policy and strategy

Recommendation 1: Integrate CPPB into strategy and programming

Integrate CPPB more clearly and explicitly into country-level strategic documents and decisions in order to strengthen the linkage between the policy and strategic levels and implementation; provide guidance on how to translate high-level CPPB political priorities and objectives into programming and implementation.

This recommendation is mainly linked to conclusions 1 and 2

The EU's higher-level policy and strategic documents are relevant reference documents for orienting the formulation of country-level strategic documents as well as the integration of CPPB policies and objectives into programming and implementation. The EU has generally succeeded in integrating CPPB into these guiding documents. Suggested actions include:

- Higher-level CPPB policy and strategic objectives should be included explicitly and systematically in strategic and programming decisions for countries and regions where the EU provides CPPB support.
- These objectives also need to be explicitly integrated into programming and intervention-level documents. Clear guidance should be produced on how CPPB could be integrated into final versions of country, thematic and Regional and Multiannual Indicative Programmes for the period 2021-2027.
- Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions on relevant country contexts should make use of EEAS staff with the expertise necessary to make linkages between politics, programming and context in the domain of CPPB in their drafting.

- Any future EEAS/Commission "country assessments", Notes on Cooperation or EU Framework Documents in countries in conflict and at risk of conflict should systematically include CPPB.

Who should act? Thematic and geographic units in EEAS, DG DEVCO, DG NEAR and FPI and EU Delegations (Political and Operational Sections)

Recommendation 2: Build on existing strands of EU CPPB-related policy to clarify the EU conceptual framework for CPPB and devise a clear Action Plan for mainstreaming CPPB

Clarify the EU's ambition and conceptual framework for CPPB and promote it across all EU institutional actors dealing with external action through a dedicated Communication on CPPB, complemented by an Action Plan.

This recommendation is mainly linked to conclusions 2 and 4

The EU has successfully strengthened its capacity to support CPPB by setting up dedicated institutional structures for dealing with CPPB in the EEAS, DG DEVCO and, on a more limited scale, DG NEAR, all of which work closely with FPI. The EU has also provided technical guidance on CPPB and begun to offer specialised training courses on CPPB and conflict sensitivity. These efforts are incomplete in the absence of an EU conceptual foundation for CPPB and an action plan on how to mainstream CPPB more systematically across services. Suggested actions include:

- Twenty years after the Gothenburg Programme (2001) and its last dedicated policy statement, in a vastly changed world, the EU should draft and approve an updated Communication on CPPB that formulates the EU's political objectives in engaging in CPPB, provides a clear conceptual framework defining CPPB and explains how the high-level CPPB political priorities and objectives will be translated into strategy documents, such as regional, country and thematic programming and project implementation documents.
- This Communication should serve as the cornerstone of the EU's approach to CPPB in different situations of conflict and crisis and as the reference point for all services and all partners working with the EU (regional, national, local as well as international partners).
- The EU should devote resources to disseminating and promoting uptake of this framework to all relevant services and partners.

Who should act? Thematic units dealing with CPPB in EEAS, DG DEVCO and DG NEAR, HR/VP and relevant external Commissioners and their Cabinets

Recommendation 3: Enhance policy and strategic engagement at country level

Enhance policy and strategic engagement with country actors at national and local levels through a shared analysis as well as a negotiated consensus on the support considered priority by the partner and feasible by the EU.

This recommendation is mainly linked to conclusions 3 and 10

The EU has generally succeeded in aligning its support for CPPB at the policy and strategic level with the priorities of partner governments and regional actors as well as with the visions and approaches of other national and local actors in countries and regions of engagement. This often occurred in very difficult environments where such alignment is difficult to realise. However, two main challenges remain. First, the EU often sought to align with partner governments, but the

commitment to implementing significant change was variable and often weak. Second, the EU's focus on partner governments meant that the concerns of other important national and local actors were not adequately factored in to EU support for CPPB. Suggested actions include:

- The EU should strengthen its efforts to underpin its engagement with a thorough policy, conflict sensitive and contextual analysis, where possible (due to potential political sensitivities) jointly created and shared with its country partners. Such analyses should be undertaken on a regular basis to enable the EU's support to adapt more flexibly to changing context as well as to provide early warning of deteriorating environments. Positive EU examples on how to engage with partners beyond government should be shared and learnt from.
- If the analysis differs, the EU should be open to the different narrative of the country partners and try to build consensus on how to support CPPB while still staying true to the EU's values and principles. Where alignment with a partner government is politically difficult, working bottom-up through civil society should be prioritised, while also engaging regionally and with the international community to build consensus.

Who should act? EU Delegations (Political and Operational Sections) and EU Regional Delegations (Political and Operational Sections), supported by specialised units in EEAS, DG DEVCO, DG NEAR and FPI

6.2 Cluster 2: Promoting an integrated/comprehensive approach for CPPB

Recommendation 4: Improve leadership to strengthen an integrated/comprehensive approach to CPPB

Build on progress recorded in applying an integrated/comprehensive approach for CPPB by exercising a stronger political/policy leadership to identify priorities and ensure coherence with non-CPPB external action priorities as well as by developing incentives for working in an integrated manner.

This recommendation is mainly linked to conclusions 4, 5 and 14

The EU has made progress in promoting an integrated/comprehensive approach through policy/strategy development and efforts to enhance coordination, promote joint working and foster coherence. It is increasingly understood that working together is an important objective and the base for achieving impact. However, much remains to be accomplished with regard to an integrated/comprehensive approach. Stronger political and policy leadership in support of an integrated approach on CPPB is needed to orient headquarters and EU Delegations on CPPB priorities and objectives and to ensure policy coherence with other EU external action priorities, specifically in areas where the EU adds value. Beyond that, incentives to work through an integrated approach need to be built into the day-to-day work of the bureaucracy at different levels in headquarters as well as EU Delegations. Suggested actions include:

- Leadership should be based a problem-solving culture and a working-together culture to get things done in mostly difficult contexts. Such a culture needs to be promoted, rewarded and learned from but also underpinned by a sensible division of labour among the respective EU external actors at Headquarter and in EUDs if tasks and responsibilities are not fully clear.
- To orient all stakeholders, a key objective should be to formulate a clear strategic framework for each country and region of engagement to guide EU CPPB activities politically

and operationally and to determine the specific mix of funding and non-funding interventions needed to achieve results. CPPB visions and objectives of partner governments and other national and local actors, whether clearly formulated or implicit, should be incorporated into the strategic framework of the EU's engagement.

- Leadership should champion the continued use of tools like the "Theory of Change" approach that involves multiple-stakeholders in understanding and clarifying priorities in highly complex and constantly evolving conflict environments.
- When promoting an integrated/comprehensive approach, the EU should learn from good practice in applying an integrated approach to CPPB and from cases which have resulted in effective CPPB outcomes and impact (see also Recommendation 11).

Who should act? Leadership in EEAS, DG DEVCO, DG NEAR and FPI, Heads of Delegations as well as thematic and geographic units at EEAS, DG DEVCO, DG NEAR, FPI and EU Delegations (Political and Operational Sections), human resources of Commission overall

Recommendation 5: Strengthen the integration of human rights and gender in CPPB

Build on past efforts to further strengthen the integration of human rights and gender-related policy and strategic objectives into CPPB action and enhance operational gender capacities to address CPPB.

This recommendation is mainly linked to conclusions 6 and 9

The EU has done well overall in promoting and integrating the EU's human rights objectives and, to a lesser extent, its gender aims into CPPB action despite the challenges inherent in various conflict and crisis contexts. Suggested actions include:

- Although serious human rights challenges exist in some partner countries, the EU should enhance its efforts to promote human rights and to find innovative ways for integrating this cross-cutting issue into its CPPB support.
- The EU should also work more towards shaping, consolidating and promoting joint EU/ EU Member States positions and approaches to dealing with countries with severe human rights violations.
- As for gender, the EU should more systematically translate its policy and strategic objectives into CPPB action at implementation level and include gender more strongly and systematically in policy dialogue with partners. The forthcoming GAP III clearly should focus on mobilising appropriate expertise.
- The EU should also significantly strengthen its human resource capacities (expertise and amount) (Recommendation 8) to translate the EU's commitments, as formulated in the Gender Action Plan II and the Strategic Approach on WPS (2018), into CPPB actions.

Who should act? EEAS Gender Advisor to the HR/VP, thematic units dealing with human rights and gender at EEAS, DG DEVCO, DG NEAR and FPI, EU Delegations (Political and Operational Sections), Geographic MDs in EEAS, Geographic Directors in DG DEVCO and DG NEAR.

6.3 Cluster 3: Implementation of CPPB support

Recommendation 6: Use the EU's added value in support of CPPB more strategically

Link the EU's political role and its ability to mobilise substantial financial resources for CPPB and other EU added values such as its commitment to long-term engagement more strategically to the political aims of the EU in relation to CPPB.

This recommendation is mainly linked to conclusions 7 and 14

The EU has been noted for its added value in supporting CPPB, including the amount of financing it is able to mobilise, its long-term commitment, its global reach and its comparative neutrality. Those factors should be sustained and further cultivated. While the EU was also valued for its ability to engage politically in some circumstances, there were instances where the EU did not take as proactive a political stance as some actors deemed appropriate.

As a consequence, the EU should make a concerted effort to combine multiple elements of its added value with the promotion of the EU's political and strategic external action objectives, especially CPPB. This will require:

- stronger political leadership and strategic planning for EU engagement in partner countries and regions – including further leadership and sponsorship of innovative tools like the Theory of Change approach (Recommendation 4) – in line with the 2019 decision to form a "Geopolitical Commission",
- negotiation and support of Member States to enable the EU to assume where appropriate a "lead actor" role, as well as
- enhanced deployment of other critical assets, such as more and better qualified human resources to creatively promote CPPB (Recommendation 8).

Who should act? Political leadership of EEAS, DG DEVCO, DG NEAR and Heads of Delegations

Recommendation 7: Ensure that financial assistance and key institutional structures are fit-for-purpose

As the proposed Neighbourhood, Development, International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) is established, ensure that financing instruments, delivery mechanisms, aid modalities and key institutional structures are fit-for-purpose in countries in conflict or at risk of conflict.

This recommendation is mainly linked to conclusions 8 and 9

The EU has employed a broad set of spending instruments and substantial financial resources to support CPPB in different contexts and this was recognised as an added value of EU support for CPPB. It is important that this diversity of approaches (such as short-term/long-term, flexible and swift, small targeted sums and larger investments) be maintained, notwithstanding the establishment of new financing instruments under the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2021-2027. To enhance its ability to act effectively in situations of conflict and crisis the EU needs to strengthen its performance in four areas:

- As conflict sensitivity is relevant to all proposed Neighbourhood, Development, International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) spending, not just those components focussed spe-

cifically on peace and stability or rapid reaction, the EU should ensure that the NDICI regulation contains a clear cross-cutting commitment to conflict sensitivity. Mainstreaming capacity to do this effectively needs to extend deeply into DG DEVCO responsibility for regional, country and thematic NDICI programming and implementation, DG NEAR programming responsibility in the Neighbourhood, and EEAS responsibility in ensuring conflict sensitivity in programming.

- Realising the potential of the proposed NDICI for integrating CPPB will also require that there is better coordination and complementarity among its components: geographic, thematic (including Stability and Peace aspects) and a well-resourced rapid response component.
- The EU needs to further reform and improve the financing instruments and delivery mechanisms it deploys in protracted crises. The longer-term programme Stability and Peace window in the NDICI and the geographic programmes should clearly cover CPPB action, making the link and follow-on from those funded under any rapid reaction component.
- The EU should also improve the functioning of EUTFs, or similar follow-up funding arrangements which might be created under the NDICI, which are not (yet) considered fit-for-purpose to engage in different conflict and crisis contexts because of operational and managerial problems. These instruments and delivery mechanisms are managed by different EU services, and the EU should pay particular attention to avoid overlaps and inefficiencies through better coordination and management arrangements.
- The EU needs to improve its ability to create smooth transitions from rapid, short-term CPPB funding to more long-term geographic funding mechanisms (in NDICI) relevant for CPPB. The EU should reform its procedures, decision making mechanisms and management arrangements to prevent funding gaps.
- The EU should actively explore all options (including adapting the Financial Regulations) to have a financing mechanism that will allow relatively small amounts of financing to be disbursed very quickly to respond to urgent CPPB needs and windows of opportunity, such as mediation or activities to complement EUSR's or Heads of Delegation's thematic or diplomatic work. The IcSP is a flexible instrument, but in such situations has not been able to disburse funding quickly enough, despite the fact that some targeted facilities were established in in an attempt to become flexible (e.g., ERMES for mediation or the Transitional Justice Facility). High-level political mobilisation may be needed to ensure that the European Commission and budgetary authorities adapt overarching regulations and guidelines to make these procedures "fit for purpose" in a rapidly changing world. A case will need to be made for member states support for this special adaptation of the financial regulations given their keen interest in the EU's financial controls.
- The regionalisation of FPI should continue but should be conceptually reviewed. The objective should be to enhance the EU's ability to act more effectively at the interface between the CPPB-related (and often political) engagement led by EEAS and the EU's engagement in development and humanitarian assistance. FPI should revise the mandate of its regional offices and**,** in at least some cases, expand the number of FPI officers posted to EU Delegations with important CPPB portfolios, as is already the case in the FPI antennae in Colombia and Ukraine (which will require more staff, see Recommendation 8). The latter should more directly be involved in supporting CPPB in-country, while the regional FPI level should provide technical support to different countries, oversee management issues and promote knowledge exchange and learning across boundaries in a region.

Who should act? EU political leadership, including EU MS; leadership of EEAS, FPI, DG DEVCO and DG NEAR, European Parliament (in NDICI negotiations), the Council (in NDICI regulations, revision of financial regulations).

Recommendation 8: Invest in more and well-qualified EU human resources

Invest in recruitment, retention, reward and training of well-qualified EU human resources to support CPPB, particularly staff with strong expertise in linking politics, programming and context in the domain of CPPB.

This recommendation is mainly linked to conclusion 9

During the evaluation period, the EU started to mobilise qualified staff to support CPPB. In collaboration with the UN, the EU initiated CPPB training which it has been followed up with more specialised EU training on CPPB and conflict sensitivity. If the EU is to meet its obligations under the 2001 Communication on Conflict Prevention and the Gothenburg Programme and direction given in the EU Global Strategy as well as substantial spend in this area, it will need to invest in mobilising more well qualified staff who are able to support CPPB, in particular at EU Delegation level, and have the necessary experience to link politics, programming and context. Suggested actions include:

- The EU should recognise that CPPB requires an important skillset. The qualification/expertise on CPPB needs to be integrated into the recruitment of permanent staff, Seconded National Experts and contract agents.
- Moreover, the EU should consider creating cadres of thematic CPPB specialists either officially or semi-officially, building on the experiences of some European states (UK, Sweden, Netherlands) and decide strategically on where to deploy these people. This might require an amendment to the EU Staff Regulations to enable the EU to create CPPB focal points, similar to what already exists for Gender specialised staff/ focal points.
- In line with such a step change, the EU should also introduce incentives to promote integrated and conflict sensitive working. In particular, the EU should seriously consider posting a greater number of Heads of Delegation to conflict and crisis environments who are able to lead the EU's work in an integrated, conflict-sensitive manner and who have an experience in supporting CPPB. Another priority would be to ensure that staff with both the requisite expertise to link politics, programming and context in the domain of CPPB are assigned to countries and regions in conflict or at risk of conflict.
- To further increase the capacity of EU Delegations to connect the EU's political and CPPB engagement with the EU's development support, humanitarian assistance and other forms of external action, more qualified staff should be mobilised for the political sections of EU Delegations.
- Additional support for linking political activities led by EEAS with financial assistance and other forms of external action would also be derived from providing FPI with additional resources to enable it to post a greater number of FPI officers to EU Delegations. This would not entail abandoning the FPI regionalisation concept but adapting it with a view to better cater to needs on the ground (Recommendation 7).
- The EU should also enhance its training opportunities on CPPB and conflict sensitivity for EU staff and created incentives for staff to take such courses, possibly linked to career building.

Who should act? EU political leadership, including EU MS; leadership and human resources of Commission overall, EEAS, DG DEVCO, DG NEAR and FPI, European Personnel Selection Office

Recommendation 9: Strengthen EU coordination

Strengthen the quality and intensity of EU coordination with country actors at regional, national and local levels and improve political and strategic coordination with EU Member States and other key international actors.

This recommendation is mainly linked to conclusion 10

The EU succeeded in forging partnerships with a variety of partners, including key international actors, agencies of EU Member states, partner government actors, regional actors, international NGOs and local country actors. It should continue to do so, while at the same time seeking to improve the quality and intensity of CPPB coordination. Suggested actions include:

- strengthen EU efforts to build a shared understanding on how to engage on CPPB with the key stakeholders at the country level and seek to deepen the quality of coordination and complementarity of the actions taken by these actors (Recommendation 3).
- improve operational coordination and joint programming in support of CPPB with EU Member States with a view to avoiding overlaps and promoting synergies. The division of labour between the EU and EU Member States needs particular attention in countries where one or more EU Member States has a more intense relationship with the government for historic reasons.
- improve EU practice of building a shared analysis of the conflict and crisis situation and how to respond with country partners.
- better analyse how the EU can create synergies with the actions of other actors and programme its support more strategically, guided by a CPPB-informed strategic framing per country and region (Recommendation 4).

Who should act? EU Heads of Delegations, Head of Political Section, Head of Cooperation, EU HQ officials interfacing with the Council

Recommendation 10: Promote and enable conflict sensitivity in all EU external action

Promote the uptake of conflict sensitivity more explicitly across all EU services to embed it more deeply in EU external action and enhance the mandate and capacities of the entities dealing with CPPB at headquarters and field level to better pursue this goal.

This recommendation is mainly linked to conclusion 11

Creation of dedicated institutional units dealing with CPPB at the EEAS, DG DEVCO and, to a more limited extent, DG NEAR, all of which worked closely with FPI, were positive steps to gradually promote conflict sensitivity among EU services. The creation of dedicated tools and systems to promote CPPB across EU institutions were similarly innovations that followed up on the EU's 2011 evaluation of support for CPPB that should be continued. Compared to the period covered by the 2011 CPPB evaluation, the findings of this evaluation show that EU staff members seek to operate in a manner that minimises their potential negative impact on conflict. Nonetheless, implementation of commitments in key documents such as the EU Consensus on Development and

the EU Integrated Approach to Conflict and Crisis has lagged. The EU should accordingly give more attention to explicitly promoting conflict sensitivity through action such as::

- promote the EU's conceptual framework for CPPB (Recommendation 2);
- create incentives among staff to take conflict sensitivity training (Recommendation 8);
- include sections in strategic, programming and implementation documents on how the EU, or the partner, expects to approach conflict sensitivity (for example by mainstreaming conflict sensitivity more explicitly into EU programme management (PRAG), into Multiannual Indicative Programming and into country assessment reviews);
- ensure that conflict analysis becomes part of the project cycle, so that in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of international development cooperation interventions ,conflict sensitivity is systematically and explicitly addressed;
- work with partners with a track record on conflict sensitivity and incentivise those with less conflict sensitivity experience to build up related capacities;
- provide better conflict-sensitive guidance on visibility;
- bring questions about conflict sensitivity more systematically into joint discussions and decision making about the type and scope of CPPB to be provided.
- establish conflict sensitivity as a key criteria for strategic level evaluations (country and thematic)

Two additional steps would help promote the uptake of conflict sensitivity:

- The leadership of EU Delegations (Heads of Delegation, Heads of Political Section and Heads of Cooperation) should also be incentivised to promote conflict sensitivity by assessing their performance in this regard.
- Assessing the conflict sensitivity of other aspects of external actions (such as migration management, trade relationships, commercial activities, investment decisions) likely to have an impact on conflict dynamics should become the norm with the outcomes of analyses taken up at a senior level if they are likely to have a negative impact on CPPB.

Who should act? Thematic units dealing with CPPB as well as other thematic and geographic units in EEAS, DG DEVCO, DG NEAR and FPI; human resources of Commission overall, EU Delegations (Political and Operational Sections).

Recommendation 11: Improve monitoring, evaluation and learning

Increase investments in monitoring, evaluating and learning to strengthen institutional learning and institutional memory on CPPB at the systemic, strategic and country levels to enhance conflict sensitivity, to optimise the EU's CPPB response and to avoid incoherence.

This recommendation is mainly linked to conclusion 12 & 13

The EU's practice of commissioning strategic assessments, monitoring exercises and evaluations and doing conflict analyses and theories of change have brought benefits where applied and should be furthered strengthened. However, the EU has so far not created a coherent and comprehensive approach to knowledge management on CPPB which has resulted in a rather unsystematic learning and knowledge sharing to date. It has also created a strong risk of repeating costly errors. More specifically, the EU should:

- invest more seriously in M&E and learning about CPPB at the systemic and strategic levels, including specific evaluations in countries and regions where coherence problems

(such as the EU's growing attention to securitisation, or its attention to preventing migration) seem to be an issue.

- set up approaches and systems that allow CPPB-related learning from M&E to inform programming, design and implementation of new CPPB activities.
- improve its practice of undertaking conflict analyses and feeding their results into conflict-sensitive decisions and action on the ground.
- mainstream conflict sensitivity into monitoring and evaluation processes, including the development of good qualitative indicators at both the strategic and programme levels.
- further strengthen its training efforts on CPPB and conflict sensitivity and create incentives for staff to take such courses, possibly linked to career building (Recommendation 8).
- invest in the creation of a knowledge database on CPPB so that institutional memory about the do's and don'ts of CPPB support can inform strategic decision making and be incorporated into training activities.
- further harmonise its approaches to M&E across the services dealing with CPPB and provide clear guidance on how to make use of monitoring and evaluation for learning. This guidance should be formulated with a view to enhance the EU's internal capacity for doing M&E more thoroughly as well as the capacity of its partners.

Who should act? Thematic units at EEAS and DG DEVCO dealing with CPPB, evaluation units and human resources departments at DG DEVCO, DG NEAR and FPI

6.4 Cluster 4: CPPB results and sustainability

Recommendation 12: Support the achievement of sustainable CPPB results

Enhance efforts to create capacity and promote ownership for CPPB among national and local partners, with a view to achieving stronger national structures and more capacitated actors to sustain CPPB efforts, in particular by enhancing the coordination and complementarity of EU support.

This recommendation is mainly linked to conclusions 13 & 14

Capacity building among national and local partners has been an area of attention for the EU's CPPB support in the past, though with mixed results. Such support was not always built on a thorough knowledge about the actors involved, certainly in rapidly changing contexts. Nor was it always built on a full understanding of the incentives and disincentives of the different national actors (and their networks or alliances) to support capacity building of local actors within their respective country contexts. Investments in fully understanding such contexts, through the EU's own context/situational analyses, were not always made. A major bottleneck for sustaining CPPB results has been the lack of national funding or resources at the local level. In such situations, the EU undertook efforts to continue activities which had been jump-started with short-term funding through a longer-term developmental engagement, but such funding trajectories sometime suffered from gaps in the transition from one instrument to the next. As CPPB focussed organisations were often weak institutionally and operating in delicate political environments, the consequences of these gaps on sustainability, effectiveness and impact was often significant. To further enhance capacities at national and local levels, and thus enhance sustainability of the results of its support, the EU should:

- improve the ability of EUDs (HoDs, Political and Operational Sections) to move beyond mere financial support to engage and support diverse national and local actors and under-

stand where they fit within evolving conflict and peace dynamics through a range of activities such as political dialogue, policy dialogues, human rights dialogues, mediation and diplomacy.

- improve its funding arrangements to follow-up successful initiatives with a view to ensure the sustainability of results (Recommendation 7).
- improve its efforts to build capacity and to promote ownership for CPPB among national and local partners through their enhanced engagement in analysing the context (Recommendation 3), planning and taking decisions for implementation, for example by encouraging EU-funded CSOs to promote more systematic participatory approaches and community-based dialogues.
- enhance, at country programming and project implementation level, its efforts to create capacity among national and local actors for sustaining CPPB results. Such efforts could be realised by integrating capacity assessments into project trajectories at the beginning of a support project (to create a baseline), mid-term and end-of-project. Capacity development support activities should then be tailored and adapted to the specific context.

Who should act? EU Delegations, geographic units at EEAS, DG DEVCO, DG NEAR and FPI; thematic unit at EEAS and DG DEVCO dealing with CPPB

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[48] ADE-Particip (2011): Thematic Evaluation of European Commission Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace-building. Main Report, p. iii, v, 66, 70, 72-74.
[49] The Whole-of-Society Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding (WOSCAP) project, funded by the EU's Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme, conducted eight case studies: Afghanistan, Central America, Georgia, Kosovo, Mali, Sri Lanka, Ukraine and Yemen. It also found that EUDs were often an important source of information for EU MS. Van der Borgh, Chris, Martin, Mary & Bojicic-Dzelilovic, Vesna (2017): EU capabilities in conflict prevention and peacebuilding: Challenges, strengths and opportunities of a Whole-of-Society approach. WOSCAP, Ref. Ares(2017)2746386 - 31/05/2017, p. 42.
[50] ADE-Particip (2011): Thematic Evaluation of European Commission Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace-building. Main Report, p. 18.
[51] Final reports for Study of Evaluations, IfS/IcSP, 2015; Instrument for Stability: Crisis Response Component (2007-2013); IfS/IcSP support under Article 3 and 4 to Security Sector Reform (2007-2016); European Court of Auditors, Support to APSA (2014-2016); DG NEAR Security Sector Reform (2010-2016);
[52] These observations are based on a review of documentation for CPPB Category 1 and 2 interventions for the 12 case studies. More details are found in Volume 2.
[53] For example, SBC II DoA (D-38436), p. 35/36; Indicateurs de performance pour le décaissement de la tranche variable de l'appui budgétaire 2017 (SBC II + avenant 1 AJUSEM) ; République du Niger, Ministère des Finances, Note d'évaluation des conditions générales et spécifiques en vue du décaissement de l'appui budgétaire de l'Union Européenne au titre de l'année budgétaires 2016, octobre 2016 ; Budget Support Steering Committee, Soumission par la Direction Géographique E de 4 dossiers de paiements pour le NIGER, Procédure Ecrite, Ares(2017)6305318 - 21/12/2017.
[54] European Commission (2014): Support to state building and peace building sectors, FED/2014/037-616 Annual Action Programme; European Commission (n.d.): 360953 UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund for Somalia Description of Action; European Commission (2009): Support to governance and security sectors, Somalia FED/022-755. Action document.
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[56] For example, see: Early Response Mechanism (ERM) II, ROM report, C-365457, 25/06/2018, p. 3, 7; ROM Report: APF Support to the Implementation of the Cease-fire and Transitional Security Arrangement Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM) in South Sudan, C-376450, 21/08-2017 – 30/08/2017; ROM Report: IGAD-led Monitoring and Verification Mechanism in South Sudan, C-FED/354039, 08/02/3016; ROM Monitoring Questions: APF Support to the Implementation of the Cease-fire and Transitional Security Arrangement Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM) in South Sudan, C-376450, 21/08-2017 – 30/08/2017.
[57] For example, see Particip Consortium (n.d.) EU Regional Trust Fund for the Syrian Crisis. 1st Results Reporting Against the Madad Results Framework. Selected Output Indicators, Summary Report.
[58] European Commission (2010): Identification Fiche for Project Approach, p. 6.
[59] For example, see Decision 023-300/2011; Decision 024-459/2012; Decision 037-938/2015; Decision 039-791/2016 regarding the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.
[60] European Commission (2017): African Peace Facility Annual Report 2016, p. 22-24; International Conflict and Security (INCAS) Consulting (2011): Evaluation of the Crisis Response and Preparedness Components of the European Union's Instrument for Stability (IFS). Overall Programme-level Evaluation, Final Report. p. 13, 21-22.
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[64] See also, Koenig, Sybille & Brusset, Emery (2019): Joint Programming in Conflict-Affected and Fragile States. https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/joint-programming/documents/report-joint-programming-conflict-affected-and-fragile-states.
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[103] The Civil Society Dialogue Network (CSDN) is a mechanism for dialogue between civil society and EU policy-makers on issues related to peace and conflict. It is co-financed by the EU IcSP and managed by EPLO, EC and EEAS. The third phase of the CSDN will last from 2017 to 2020. See www.eplo.org.
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[116] See the Political Guidelines for the Next European Commission 2019-2024, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/political-guidelines-next-commission_en.pdf., and von der Leyen, U. 2019. Keynote speech by President von der Leyen at the World Economic Forum, 22nd of January, European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_20_102