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*The opinions expressed in this document represent the authors' points of view
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EQ:1 Relevance of EU cooperation objectives

EQ 1 – To what extent has the EU regional strategy adequately taken into account and reacted to the evolution of interests and needs of Central American stakeholders (SICA, national governments, civil society) in view of the dynamics of the regional integration process?

JC 1.1 – EU cooperation objectives are consistent with the policy priorities expressed in EU-Central American Dialogue and Central American policy declarations (2007 – 2013 RSP)

Statement on JC1.1

EU cooperation objectives directly reflect the stated priorities of key declarations of the Presidents and Heads of States of Central American states (in 2006¹ and 2010²), made in the context of respective special presidential summits. Heads of states of all Central American countries specifically endorsed the launching of negotiations for the Association Agreement with the EU their 2006 Panama Declaration, and also committed themselves to the deepening of economic integration and the completion of a customs union. The Heads of States re-committed themselves to the regional integration process in 2010 and defined the 5 pillars of regional integration, that since then have become the major themes of EU regional cooperation (democratic) security, disaster risk reduction, social and economic integration, institutional strengthening of RIOs). In the same declaration, the heads of states also affirmed their commitment to the development of a regional response to food insecurity. EU cooperation objectives are also largely coherent with the priorities stated key agreements of the EU-Central American political dialogue, such as the 2003 Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and the Central American countries.

For the most part, the RSP and the RIP are coherent with the main cooperation priorities that had been included in the political dialogue between 2007 and 2012 (leading up to the signing of the Association Agreement). These include the importance of regional and economic integration, security, environmental sustainability and disaster risk reduction.

However, key strategic documents of the European Union, such as the European Consensus for Development (2005), the EU-Central American Cooperation Agreement (2003) and the Vienna Declaration (2006) emphasize the importance of using EU development cooperation to ensure that partner countries can make better use of the benefits of increased intra-regional and international trade (e.g., through Aid for Trade) to achieve inclusive economic growth and to pursue a more equitable distribution of the rewards of economic growth: The EU Consensus on Development, for example, strongly emphasizes inclusive wealth creation, among other things also specifically in the context of trade and regional integration, where the EU pledges to “assist developing countries on trade and regional integration through fostering, equitable and environmentally sustainable growth, smooth and gradual integration into the world economy, and linking trade and poverty reduction or equivalent strategies”.

¹ The Declaración de Panama of March 9, 2006

² Declaración Conjunta, Cumbre Extraordinaria San Salvador, July 20, 2010

	<p>Support in these areas (integration of trade into national development strategies) is also considered one of the areas where the EU can provide “value added” to development support offered by EU member states, according to the Consensus on Development. The EU and Central America also integrated these priorities in the three objectives of the 2003 EU-CA Cooperation Agreement; to “contribute to higher economic growth” and to the “gradual improvement of quality of life” of the Central American population. An “integrated trade cooperation agenda” was meant to help Central American stakeholders to “best tap the opportunities that trade implies, broadening the productive based that will benefit from trade, including the development of mechanisms to face the challenges of greater market competition, and building those skills, instruments and techniques required to accelerate the enjoyment of all benefits of trade”. The agreement also specifically foresaw the promotion of a favourable environment for the development of medium-sized and micro-enterprises, including those in rural areas. The 2006 Vienna Declaration reiterated most of these cooperation principles and objectives.</p> <p>It is not clear at this point in the evaluation, to what extent these priorities were adequately reflected in the EU regional and bi-lateral development strategies with Central America. In contrast to the emphasis on linking trade and poverty reduction in key EU strategy documents (see above) these issues have not been included in the EU RSP in a particularly prominent position. Although the RSP is acknowledging the severity of income and wealth inequality, and the importance of increasing social cohesion in Central America, the EU does not specifically address these issues in their strategy, and does not put them in relation to its efforts of promoting economic integration and intra-regional as well as international trade.</p> <p>Instead, the RSP treats the promotion of equality and the avoidance of exclusion of particular groups merely as one of four major cross-cutting issues. Also, equality is not being framed specifically in economic terms, but is mostly treated as “social equality”.</p> <p>Only in 2012, the EU signed a financing agreement for a € 7 million regional project (ADESEP³) to help improve the business environment and the productive and trade capacities of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises in Central America. In addition, at Latin American level, AL INVEST-IV and LAIF (KfW-CABEI, Program for Entrepreneurial and Promotion of MSME in Central America, which started in 2013) were meant to offer Aid for Trade beyond trade-related assistance.</p> <p>At national level the EU had pledged to finance Aid for Trade beyond trade-related assistance already in the various bi-lateral Country Strategy Papers (see Table 1.10). CSPs for Guatemala and Nicaragua, for example, include the focal sector of “economic and trade issues”; albeit with a different focus. In Guatemala, the EU initially focused on “long-term and inclusive rural economic growth and food security”, with an emphasis on the more depressed and isolated areas of the country and only under NIP II shifted its focus to the development of the productive capacity and decent work conditions in the countries SMEs. Nicaragua’s only NIP (covering the entire 2007 – 2013 period) committed the EU to a relatively broad strategy of “ensuring policy coherence & effective redistribution mechanisms”, “contributing to equitable economic growth”; “facilitating national pro-poor policies”, including also support to SMEs through national trade exchanges. Interestingly, none of these bi-lateral efforts is referenced in the 2012</p>
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³ Apoyo al desarrollo del sector privado en Centroamérica (ADESEP)

	<p>Action Fiche of the regional project ADESEP. Four of the CSPs also indicated the intent of fine-tuning their related strategies based on the findings of national “Trade Needs Assessments” (e.g. Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras). None of these four Trade Needs Assessments have been carried out.</p> <p>Finally, in spite of the formal correspondence of Central American priorities with regional cooperation objectives of the European Union, the level of agreement of Central American governments on the details of the integration process and its overall direction has been called into question. A number of important documents and outputs supported by the EU financially as well as technically were ultimately not approved politically, i.e. by SICA’s Council of Presidents. The list of these initiatives and the associated outputs includes key prerequisites of economic integration, such as a tax restitution mechanism, a regional competition policy, and a common trade safeguards policy. It also includes the regional food security policy and a proposal to reform the Central American Court of Justice (CCJ). The outcome of these initiatives suggests that the opposing Central American governments had not been sufficiently consulted during agenda setting and the subsequent development of these inputs.</p>
<p>I-1.1.1 – Stated EU cooperation objectives reflect the Central American priorities stated in Declarations of SICA summits/ presidential declarations</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>EU cooperation objectives directly reflected the stated priorities of key declarations of the Presidents and Heads of States of Central American states (in 2006⁴ and 2010⁵), made in the context of respective special presidential summits. In 2006, heads of states/ presidents specifically endorsed the launching of negotiations for the Association Agreement with the EU, and also committed themselves to the deepening of economic integration and the completion of a customs union. In 2010, the heads of states broadly re-committed themselves to the regional integration process, and specifically included a wide range of areas into these efforts. The statement defines the 5 pillars of regional integration, which are directly reflected in the major cooperation priorities of the European Union (such as (democratic) security, disaster risk reduction, social & economic integration, institutional strengthening of RIOs). In the same declaration, the heads of states also affirmed their commitment to the development of a regional response to food insecurity.</p> <p>In spite of the correspondence of these formally declared regional priorities with regional cooperation objectives of the European Union, the agreement of these governments on details of the integration process and direction is not certain. A number of important documents and outputs supported by the EU financially as well as technically were ultimately not approved politically, i.e. by Central American governments. The list of these initiatives and the associated outputs includes key prerequisites of economic integration, such as a tax restitution mechanism, a regional competition policy, and a common trade safeguards policy. It also includes the regional food security policy and a proposal to reform the Central American Court of Justice (CCJ). The outcome of these initiatives suggests that the opposing Central American governments had not been sufficiently consulted during agenda setting and the subsequent development of these inputs.</p>

⁴ The Declaración de Panama of March 9, 2006

⁵ Declaración Conjunta, Cumbre Extraordinaria San Salvador, July 20, 2010

Data, sources, extracts

Supporting evidence:

Table 1.1: Stated Central American policy & cooperation priorities – economic integration/ Association Agreement

Quotes (Source)	Interpretation/ Significance
<p>“9. Instruir al Consejo de Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores a que, en coordinación con el Consejo de Ministros de Integración Económica, continúe con las acciones y gestiones necesarias tendientes a lograr que, en el marco de la Cumbre de Viena, a celebrarse en el mes de mayo de 2006, se anuncie el lanzamiento de las negociaciones del Acuerdo de Asociación entre Centroamérica y la Unión Europea, que comprende un Tratado de Libre Comercio.” (Declaración de Panamá, March 9, 2006)</p>	<p>Endorsement of launching of negotiations of Association Agreement with EU.</p>
<p>“10. Reafirmar nuestro firme compromiso político con la profundización del proceso de Integración Económica Centroamericana y, en especial, con la consecución de la Unión Aduanera a la mayor brevedad, convencidos que es uno de los instrumentos esenciales para impulsar el desarrollo económico y social de Centroamérica y que, a la vez, nos permitirá contar con los mecanismos que posibiliten los procesos de negociación de forma conjunta.” (Declaración de Panamá, March 9, 2006)</p>	<p>Express endorsement of advancing economic integration, including customs union.</p>
<p>“13. Considerar la importancia de fortalecer el proceso de integración centroamericana y favorecer un mayor contacto y movilidad entre sus respectivos pueblos y gobiernos, por ello los Presidentes de Guatemala, Honduras y Nicaragua y la Vicepresidenta de El Salvador instruyen a las autoridades correspondientes para que, en coordinación con SG- SICA y SIECA, propongan el mecanismo necesario para la pronta eliminación de los controles migratorios en sus respectivos puntos fronterizos.” (Declaración de Panamá, March 9, 2006)</p>	<p>Endorsement of removal of border controls/ migratory controls</p>
<p>“14. Instruir al Consejo de Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores para que continúe trabajando en la obtención de los recursos del programa plurianual de cooperación de la Unión Europea hacia Centroamérica 2007-2013. Asimismo, que parte de esos recursos puedan ser canalizados en apoyo a la implementación de un futuro Acuerdo de Asociación entre la Unión Europea y Centroamérica, y principalmente para la consecución de un Tratado de Libre Comercio entre ambas regiones.” (Declaración de Panamá, March 9, 2006)</p>	<p>Specific endorsement of the regional cooperation programme/ RSP of the European Union for the cooperation period 2007 – 2013.</p>
<p>“12. Reafirmar nuestra voluntad de continuar promoviendo el proceso de integración económica, con miras a avanzar en el establecimiento de una Unión Aduanera, tomando en cuenta el esfuerzo que están desarrollando El Salvador, Guatemala y Honduras.” (Declaración Conjunta, Cumbre Extraordinaria San Salvador, July 20, 2010).</p>	<p>Confirmation of commitment to economic integration process, at time of EU MTR, and RIP for 2010 - 2013</p>

Table 1.2: Stated Central American policy and cooperation priorities – regional integration (overall)

Quotes (Source)	Interpretation/ Significance
<i>“1. Ratificar que el objetivo fundamental que nos guía de manera inequívoca es la realización de la integración regional, para consolidar en la región la Paz, Libertad, Democracia y Desarrollo, como un todo armónico e indivisible, de conformidad con el Protocolo de Tegucigalpa.” (Declaración Conjunta, Cumbre Extraordinaria San Salvador, July 20, 2010).</i>	Endorsement of and commitment to the deepening of regional integration in Central America
<i>“4. Relanzar el proceso de integración regional, basado en el compromiso histórico que hoy ratificamos, a través del desarrollo de acciones en cinco grandes pilares: seguridad democrática; prevención y mitigación de los desastres naturales y de los efectos del cambio climático; integración social; integración económica; y el fortalecimiento de la institucionalidad regional.” (Declaración Conjunta, Cumbre Extraordinaria San Salvador, July 20, 2010).</i>	Definition of 5 pillars of regional integration, which are coherent with the focal areas of EU regional cooperation (in particular “democratic security”, DRR, social and economic integration, institutional strengthening.

Table 1.3: Stated Central American policy & cooperation priorities – democratic security

Quotes (Source)	Interpretation/ Significance
<i>“7. Redoblar los esfuerzos para fortalecer la seguridad democrática regional, a través de la implementación de la Estrategia de Seguridad de Centroamérica y México, para combatir el crimen organizado, en particular el narcotráfico, el tráfico ilícito de armas, pandillas delictivas, grupos de exterminio, trata de personas, tráfico de personas y contrabando.” (Declaración Conjunta, Cumbre Extraordinaria San Salvador, July 20, 2010).</i>	Commitment to “democratic security”, including the implementation of the Central American Strategy for Security.

Table 1.4: Stated Central American policy & cooperation priorities – food security

Quotes (Source)	Interpretation/ Significance
<i>“11. Fortalecer la integración social, mediante la implementación de la Agenda Estratégica Social del SICA, particularmente para disminuir y erradicar la desnutrición infantil, combatir efectivamente las enfermedades epidémicas e infectocontagiosas, ampliar las compras conjuntas de medicamentos, así como garantizar la seguridad alimentaria y nutricional.” (Declaración Conjunta, Cumbre Extraordinaria San Salvador, July 20, 2010).</i>	Confirmation of food security as part of regional cooperation & integration

Table 1.5: Stated Central American policy & cooperation priorities – disaster risk reduction/ response to climate change

Quotes (Source)	Interpretation/ Significance
<i>“9. Destacar con preocupación que en los últimos años la región ha debido enfrentar de manera recurrente situaciones de emergencia frente a desastres y diversos escenarios de riesgo, motivados por la</i>	Commitment to a regional strategy to respond to climate

	<p><i>variabilidad y el cambio climático. Por lo anterior, reafirmar nuestro compromiso de concluir, aprobar y aplicar a la brevedad la Estrategia Regional de Cambio Climático y desarrollar las diferentes políticas y planes centrados en la mitigación y adaptación, para enfrentar las amenazas del Cambio Climático.” (Declaración Conjunta, Cumbre Extraordinaria San Salvador, July 20, 2010).</i></p>	<p>change, in the context of disaster risk reduction.</p>
	<p><i>“10. Instruir a la SG-SICA para que, en coordinación con las autoridades competentes, promuevan la adopción de una Resolución ante la Asamblea General de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas, así como ante la Conferencia de las Partes de la Convención Marco de las Naciones Unidas sobre Cambio Climático, a realizarse en Cancún, México, en noviembre y diciembre del presente año; que contemple la creación de un fondo regional destinado a la prevención, mitigación de desastres naturales y la reconstrucción de los países afectados. En este mismo sentido, impulsar ante esa Organización y otros organismos regionales y extra-regionales el apoyo a dicho fondo.” (Declaración Conjunta, Cumbre Extraordinaria San Salvador, July 20, 2010).</i></p>	<p>(Among others), commitment to actions in DRR</p>
<p>Detracting evidence: In spite of broad (formal) agreement of EU objectives, and Central American priorities, the actual commitment of individual stakeholders to the details of regional integration and the availability of corresponding political support is called into question:</p> <p><i>“However, there is no consensus among CA governments on a thorough overhaul of SICA, e.g. the creation of a Single Secretariat. Regional institutions remain weak as there is insufficient political support from all CA countries, and no regional financing mechanisms have yet been adopted, despite the fact that several proposals have been tabled.” (EU Delegation Nicaragua, 2010)</i></p> <p>A number of important documents and outputs supported by the EU financially as well as technically were ultimately not approved politically, i.e. by Central American governments. This suggests that the opposing Central American governments had not been sufficiently consulted during agenda setting and the subsequent development of these inputs (see Table 1.6 below).</p>		
<p>Table 1.6: Key documents, proposals and initiatives drafted and facilitated with EU resources that failed to gain approval</p>		
<p>Sector</p>	<p>Description of EU-supported initiative / output</p>	<p>Comments</p>
<p>Economic Integration</p>	<p>Development of a tax restitution mechanism (ADAPCCA)</p>	<p>Although a key component of the customs union, the proposed mechanism was ultimately not adopted at the political level. (see EQ 3 on economic integration)</p>
	<p>Technical outputs / proposal for regional competition policy</p>	<p>Governments of member countries of Central American Customs Union ultimately did not agree to put regional competition policy on the regional economic integration agenda, in spite of the fact that the harmonization of competition policy is part</p>

			of the Association Agreement. (see EQ 3 on economic integration)
		Common trade safeguards policy in Central America	Central American national governments slowed down the programme ADAPCCA on this subject, as they were hesitant to release their positions while they were negotiating the Association Agreement with the EU. (see EQ 3 on economic integration)
		SIECA proposal for advancing economic integration (published in 2013)	Not approved by Central American Governments
	Food Security	Regional food security policy	Policy proposal received heavy criticisms from national stakeholders (including food security coordinating secretariats) during multi-lateral review of draft policy and draft policy was ultimately not approved by the Central American Presidents. (see EQ 7 on Food Security)
	Institutional Strengthening	Proposal to reform the CCJ (financed under the EU programme PAIRCA 2)	Not accepted by Central American Governments

I-1.1.2 – EU cooperation objectives reflect priorities stated in 2003 Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement, Declarations of Vienna Summit, Association Agreement

<i>Findings at indicator level</i>	<p>EU cooperation objectives are coherent with the priorities stated in the 2003 cooperation agreement between the European Community and the Central American countries. The RSP and the RIP also reflect many of the main priorities of the Association Agreement, including the importance of regional integration, economic integration, security, environmental sustainability and disaster risk reduction.</p> <p>The Association Agreement emphasizes the importance of pursuing greater social cohesion and social equality through development cooperation, in addition to the facilitation of economic integration and regional integration overall. Among other things, development cooperation was meant to contribute to gender equality and was tasked to help promote social development and social cohesion by reducing social and economic imbalances “between and within the parties”. These goals should be achieved in particular by “promoting fair globalisation and decent work for all”, associated with the mobilisation of “significant financial resources, from both cooperation and national resources”. As means to achieve these ends, the AA commits the signing parties to promote policies to achieve a better income distribution, trade and investment policies to stimulate fair trade, rural and urban micro, small and medium enterprises, and employment policies that could help creating decent work and economic opportunities for all, including poorest and most vulnerable groups and the most disadvantaged regions.</p> <p>In contrast to the relatively strong emphasis on social and economic equality and equity in the AA, issues related to social and economic equality have not been included in the EU RSP in a particularly prominent position. The promotion of (social) equality, and the avoidance of (social) exclusion of particular groups is merely being treated as one of four</p>
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	<p>major cross-cutting issues. Also, equality is not being framed specifically in economic terms, but is mostly introduced as “social equality”.</p>
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p>Supporting evidence: EU cooperation objectives are broadly coherent with the priorities stated in the 2003 cooperation agreement between the European Community and the Central American countries.</p> <p><i>“1. The Parties agree that the cooperation provided for in the 1993 Framework Cooperation Agreement shall be strengthened and extended to other areas. It shall focus on the following objectives: (a) promotion of political and social stability through democracy, respect for human rights and good governance; (b) deepening of the process of regional integration among the countries of Central America to contribute to higher economic growth and gradual improvement of quality of life for their peoples; (c) poverty reduction and promotion of more equitable access to social services and the rewards of economic growth, ensuring an appropriate balance between economic, social and environmental components in a sustainable development context.”</i></p> <p><i>“2. The Parties agree that cooperation shall take account of cross-cutting aspects relating to economic and social development, including issues such as gender, respect for indigenous peoples and other Central American ethnic groups, natural disaster prevention and response, environmental conservation and protection, biodiversity, cultural diversity, research and technological development. Regional integration shall also be considered as a cross-cutting theme and in that regard cooperation actions at national level should be compatible with the process of regional integration.”</i></p> <p><i>“3. The Parties agree that measures aimed at contributing to regional integration in Central America and strengthening inter-regional relations between the Parties shall be encouraged.” (European Union, 2003)</i></p> <p>Further supporting evidences can be found in table 1.7 at the end of EQ 1</p> <p>The RSP and the RIP also reflect many of the main priorities of the Association Agreement, including the importance of regional integration, economic integration, security, environmental sustainability and disaster risk reduction. <i>(EU Delegation Nicaragua, 2007), (EU Delegation Nicaragua, 2010) and (European Union / Central America, 2012).</i></p>
	<p>Detracting evidence: <u><i>EU principles / objectives and EU-CA priorities and objectives in most (if not all) key strategic documents of the European Union emphasize the importance of using EU development cooperation to ensure that partner countries can make better use of the benefits of increased intra-regional and international trade (better leveraging of trade) to achieve inclusive economic growth and to pursue a more equitable distribution of the rewards of economic growth.</i></u></p> <p>EU Consensus on Development strongly emphasizes inclusive wealth creation, among other things also specifically in the context of trade and regional integration, where the EU pledges to “assist developing countries on trade and regional integration through fostering, equitable and environmentally sustainable growth, smooth and gradual integration into the world economy, and linking trade and poverty reduction or equivalent strategies” (European Consensus on Development).</p> <p><i>“The priorities in this area are institutional and capacity building to design and effectively implement sound trade and integration policies, as well as support for the private sector to take advantage of new trading opportunities.” (European Consensus on Development).</i></p>

Support in these areas (integration of trade into national development strategies) is also considered one of the areas where the EC can provide “value added” to development support offered by EU member states:

*“49. Second, with the support of Member States, ensuring policy coherence for development in Community actions (1), in particular where Community policies have significant impacts on developing countries, such as trade, agriculture, fisheries and migration policies, and promoting this principle more widely. Drawing on its own experiences, and exclusive competence in trade, the Community has a comparative advantage in providing support to **partner countries to integrate trade into national development strategies.**” (European Consensus on Development, 2005)*

The EU and Central America also integrated these priorities in the three objectives of the 2003 EU-CA Cooperation Agreement. The parties pledge to deepen the process of regional integration to “contribute to higher economic growth” and to the “gradual improvement of quality of life” of the Central American population (EU-CA Cooperation Agreement; (European Union, 2003)). The “integrated trade cooperation agenda” was meant to help Central American stakeholders to “best tap the opportunities that trade implies, broadening the productive based that will benefit from trade, including the development of mechanisms to face the challenges of greater market competition, and building those skills, instruments and techniques required to accelerate the enjoyment of all benefits of trade” (EU-CA Cooperation Agreement (European Union, 2003)). The agreement also foresaw the promotion of a favourable environment for the development of medium-sized and micro-enterprises, including those in rural areas (EU-CA Cooperation Agreement (European Union, 2003)).

The 2006 Vienna Declaration reiterated most of these cooperation principles and objectives. It highlighted the importance of the promotion of equitable and sustained economic growth to create more and better jobs and to fighting poverty and social exclusion. The parties committed themselves to promoting public policies for a “better distribution of wealth and of the benefits of economic growth”, also seeking to “incorporate the informal sector into the formal economy”. Finally, the declaration also affirms that “decent work is a key element for sustaining economic and social development”, in particular for Central America’s youth. (Declaration of Vienna - IV EU-LAC Summit, 2006). Adequate employment, and the enjoyment of the benefits of economic growth “with equity and social justice” was also confirmed to be an important element of the joint efforts to enhance social cohesion in the region (Declaration of Vienna - IV EU-LAC Summit, 2006).

It is not clear at this point in the evaluation, to what extent these priorities were adequately reflected in the EU regional and bi-lateral development strategies with Central America. In contrast to the emphasis on linking trade and poverty reduction in key EU strategy documents, in the 2003 EU-CA cooperation agreement, and in the Vienna Declaration, these issues have not been included in the EU RSP in a particularly prominent position. Although the RSP is acknowledging the severity of income and wealth inequality, and the importance of increasing social cohesion in Central America, the EU does not specifically address these issues in their strategy, and does not put them in relation to its efforts of promoting economic integration and intra-regional as well as international trade.

Instead, the RSP treats the promotion of (social) equality and the avoidance of exclusion

	<p>of particular groups merely as one of four major cross-cutting issues. Equality is also not being framed specifically in economic terms, but is mostly introduced as “social equality”.</p> <p><i>“6.6. Cross-cutting issues</i></p> <p><i>Cooperation between the two sides should be based on the objective of broad participation by civil society and the principles of social equality – including as regards gender, respect for minorities and different cultures, especially indigenous peoples, conflict prevention and environmental sustainability. All action prepared in these areas must take into consideration the following cross-cutting issues:</i></p> <p><i>Equal opportunities and exclusion: All action under this strategy will take into consideration equal participation by men and women and access for indigenous communities, in order to combat exclusion and marginalisation. In particular, gender equality will be promoted at regional level (policy making, pilot initiatives, and exchange of good practices) as a complement and in coherence with the EC Country Strategy Papers for 2007-13. These foresee specific actions in this area; additionally a Gender profile is annexed to the CSPs for Central America.”</i> (EU Delegation Nicaragua, 2007)</p> <p>Only in 2012, the EU signed a financing agreement for a € 7 million regional project (ADESEP⁶) to help improve the business environment and the productive and trade capacities of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises in Central America. In addition, at Latin American level, AL INVEST-IV and LAIF (KfW-CABEI, Program for Entrepreneurial and Promotion of MSME in Central America, which was due to start in 2013) were meant to offer Aid for Trade beyond trade-related assistance.</p> <p>At national level the EU had pledged to finance Aid for Trade beyond trade-related assistance already in the various bi-lateral Country Strategy Papers (see Table 1.10). CSPs for Guatemala and Nicaragua, for example, include the focal sector of “economic and trade issues”; albeit with a different focus. In Guatemala, the EU initially focused on “long-term and inclusive rural economic growth and food security”, with an emphasis on the more depressed and isolated areas of the country and only under NIP II shifted its focus to the development of the productive capacity and decent work conditions in the countries SMEs. Nicaragua’s only NIP (covering the entire 2007 – 2013 period) committed the EU to a relatively broad strategy of “ensuring policy coherence & effective redistribution mechanisms”, “contributing to equitable economic growth”; “facilitating national pro-poor policies”, including also support to SMEs through national trade exchanges. Interestingly, none of these bi-lateral efforts is referenced in the 2012 Action Fiche of the regional project ADESEP.</p> <p>Many of the CSPs also indicated the intent of fine-tuning their related strategies based on the findings of national “Trade Needs Assessments” (e.g. Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras). These assessments have not been implemented.</p> <p>The Association Agreement (signed in 2012) continues to emphasize the importance of inclusive economic development and growth, i.e., to pursue greater social cohesion and social equality through development cooperation. EU cooperation is meant to help reduce inequality and social exclusion, as well as all forms of discrimination by means of sustainable development, with a view to reducing the imbalances “between and within the</p>
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⁶ Apoyo al desarrollo del sector privado en Centroamérica (ADESEP).

	<p>Parties”, as stated in the AA.</p> <p><i>“1. The general objective of cooperation is to support the implementation of this Agreement in order to reach an effective partnership between the two regions by facilitating resources, mechanisms, tools and procedures.</i></p> <p><i>“2. Priority shall be given to the following objectives [...]: (b) contributing to [...] gender equality, all forms of non-discrimination, cultural diversity, pluralism, promotion and respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, transparency and citizen participation; (c) contributing to social cohesion through the alleviation of poverty, inequality, social exclusion and all forms of discrimination so as to improve the quality of life for the peoples of Central America and the European Union; (d) promoting economic growth with a view to furthering sustainable development, reducing the imbalances between and within the Parties and developing synergies between the two regions;” (European Union / Central America, 2012, p. 11)</i></p> <p>Under Title III of the Association Agreement, the document lays out further details and language on the priority of pursuing social development and social cohesion by means of development cooperation. The AA emphasizes in this passage that these goals should be achieved in particular by “promoting fair globalisation and decent work for all”. Furthermore, accomplishing these goals is meant to be associated with the mobilisation of “significant financial resources, from both cooperation and national resources”.</p> <p><i>TITLE III SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL COHESION Article 41 Social Cohesion including the Fight against Poverty, Inequalities and Exclusion 1. The Parties, acknowledging that social development shall go hand in hand with economic development, agree that cooperation shall aim at enhancing social cohesion through the reduction of poverty, inequity, inequality and social exclusion, in particular in view to the fulfilment of the Millennium Development Goals and of the internationally agreed objective of promoting fair globalisation and decent work for all. The accomplishment of these objectives shall mobilise significant financial resources, from both cooperation and national resources. (European Union / Central America, 2012).</i></p> <p>To this end, EU cooperation should promote policies to achieve a better income distribution, supporting reduced inequalities, including corresponding trade and investment policies that would stimulate fair trade, rural and urban micro, small and medium enterprises, as well as employment policies to help create decent work for all and economic opportunities with a particular focus on the poorest and most vulnerable groups and the most disadvantaged regions.</p> <p><i>“2. For this purpose, the Parties shall cooperate in order to promote and to support the execution of: (a) economic policies with a social vision oriented to a more inclusive society with a better income distribution in order to reduce inequality and inequity; (b) trade and investment policies, bearing in mind the link between trade and sustainable development, fair trade, the development of rural and urban micro, small and medium enterprises and their representatives organisations and to corporate social responsibility; [...] (f) employment policies directed towards decent work for all and the creation of economic opportunities with a particular focus on the poorest and most vulnerable groups and the most disadvantaged regions, and specific measures promoting tolerance to cultural diversity at work;” (European Union / Central America, 2012, p. 16).</i></p>
<p>JC 1.2 – Ownership of regional integration process and concept among national stakeholders</p>	

(private sector, civil society, and national governments)	
<i>Statement on JC1.2</i>	<p>Among Central American and European civil society, attitudes towards the direction of the regional integration process, and the support of the process through EU regional cooperation between 2007 and 2013 were mixed. Civil society organisations who were members of the CC-SICA at the time of the Vienna Summit (in coordination with members of other consultative bodies for civil society in other sub-regions of Latin America) voiced cautious support of the principle of regional integration, and welcomed the start of the negotiations of the Association Agreement between Central America and the European Union.</p> <p>At the same time, civil society organisations were careful to emphasize that a strong social emphasis was required in the regional integration process to redress inequalities, and promote social cohesion along with regional integration, that would include a labour dimension in the negotiations, also avoiding drastic increases in intra-regional migration. A broad coalition of European and Latin American/ Central American CSO reiterated this demand in 2011, as a reaction to the publication of the second Regional Indicative Programme (RIP) for EU regional cooperation with Central America for the years 2011 – 2013. Another report by members of that same CSO coalition published in 2011 emphasized that the strong focus placed by the European regional cooperation strategy on the promotion of interregional trade between the EU and Central America (by using the RSP and RIP to facilitate the signing and implementation of the Association Agreement) could end up distorting the development of trading capacity of SMEs in Central America towards international trade, instead of intra-regional trade, which might have had a stronger effect on economic advancement and poverty reduction in the region.</p> <p>Finally, CSOs strongly emphasized the need for strengthening of civil society structures for dialogue/ civil society consultation, also with respect to Association Agreement.</p> <p>Press articles from different Central American countries published over the period covered by the evaluation illustrate support of the Central American regional integration process from different private sector stakeholders and commentators. A number of articles consider regional integration as essential for economic advancement, and criticise Central American political leaders for their lack of follow-through on pro-integration political statements. Central America’s tourism industry, for example, has lobbied for promoting a single Central American brand in tourism since 2008, and has also called on Central American political leaders to demonstrate more political will to advance regional integration. The Federation of Chambers of Exporters of Central America, Panama and the Caribbean (FECAEXCA) also called for advancing regional and economic integration as the most important tool for increasing trade in the region and generating the economies of a scale necessary to compete in the global market. Numerous other columns offered similar assessments and sentiments.</p>
I-1.2.1 - % of population/ business community/ civil society organisations supporting recent course of regional integration	
<i>Findings at indicator level</i>	[Indicator dropped – no data available]
I-1.2.2 - Concept and approach of regional integration is endorsed in articles of major newspapers and other news outlets in Central American countries	
<i>Findings at indicator level</i>	Press articles from different Central American countries published over the period covered by the evaluation illustrate support of the Central American regional integration

	<p>process from different parts of the private sector. A number of articles consider regional integration as essential for economic advancement, and criticise Central American political leaders for their lack of follow-through on pro-integration political statements. Central America's tourism industry, for example, has lobbied for promoting a single Central American brand in tourism since 2008, and has also called on Central American political leaders to demonstrate more political will to advance regional integration. The Federation of Chambers of Exporters of Central America, Panama and the Caribbean (FECAEXCA) also called for advancing regional and economic integration as the most important tool for increasing trade in the region and generating the economies of a scale necessary to compete in the global market. Numerous other columns offered similar assessments and sentiments.</p>																			
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p>Table 1.7: Selected press articles / columns on status and perspectives on Central American Integration</p>																			
	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th data-bbox="662 734 1155 801">Title of Article (Date)</th> <th data-bbox="662 801 1155 869">Description of Content</th> <th data-bbox="662 869 1155 936">Publication (Country)</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td data-bbox="662 801 1155 1131"> <p>Central America -- a single brand - At the International Fair Tourism inaugurated today in London, Central America is projecting itself as a combined brand. (November 10, 2008)</p> </td> <td data-bbox="662 801 1155 1131"> <p>Article arguing that Central American countries need to take advantage of the fact that "European visitors want to see more than one country" when they fly such a long distance.</p> </td> <td data-bbox="662 801 1155 1131"> <p>Proceso Digital (Honduras)</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="662 1131 1155 1294"> <p>Regional Integration, the key to facing the crisis (November 24, 2008)</p> </td> <td data-bbox="662 1131 1155 1294"> <p>Commentary on publication of IMF report "Central America: Economy, progress and reforms", broadly supporting the concept of regional integration</p> </td> <td data-bbox="662 1131 1155 1294"> <p>Elsalvador.com (El Salvador)</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="662 1294 1155 1563"> <p>The Integration of Central America - Paralyzed in political terms, the integration of Central American countries continues to advance in commercial terms.</p> </td> <td data-bbox="662 1294 1155 1563"> <p>Column criticizing the paralysis of the political process towards greater regional integration that at the same time finds that commercial integration is advancing.</p> </td> <td data-bbox="662 1294 1155 1563"> <p>El Financiero (Costa Rica)</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="662 1563 1155 1854"> <p>Central American Customs Union is Essential</p> </td> <td data-bbox="662 1563 1155 1854"> <p>Article on a statement released by the Federation of Chambers of Exporters of Central America, Panama and the Caribbean (FECAEXCA) that states that the Central American Customs Union is the most important tool for increasing trade in the region and generating the economies of a scale necessary to compete in the global market.</p> </td> <td data-bbox="662 1563 1155 1854"></td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="662 1854 1155 1986"> <p>"More Political Will" for Regional Tourism Integration (September 24, 2012)</p> </td> <td data-bbox="662 1854 1155 1986"> <p>Call of the Federation of Tourism Chambers of Central America (FEDECATUR) for more political will to promote tourism integration in the</p> </td> <td data-bbox="662 1854 1155 1986"> <p>La Nación (Costa Rica)</p> </td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Title of Article (Date)	Description of Content	Publication (Country)	<p>Central America -- a single brand - At the International Fair Tourism inaugurated today in London, Central America is projecting itself as a combined brand. (November 10, 2008)</p>	<p>Article arguing that Central American countries need to take advantage of the fact that "European visitors want to see more than one country" when they fly such a long distance.</p>	<p>Proceso Digital (Honduras)</p>	<p>Regional Integration, the key to facing the crisis (November 24, 2008)</p>	<p>Commentary on publication of IMF report "Central America: Economy, progress and reforms", broadly supporting the concept of regional integration</p>	<p>Elsalvador.com (El Salvador)</p>	<p>The Integration of Central America - Paralyzed in political terms, the integration of Central American countries continues to advance in commercial terms.</p>	<p>Column criticizing the paralysis of the political process towards greater regional integration that at the same time finds that commercial integration is advancing.</p>	<p>El Financiero (Costa Rica)</p>	<p>Central American Customs Union is Essential</p>	<p>Article on a statement released by the Federation of Chambers of Exporters of Central America, Panama and the Caribbean (FECAEXCA) that states that the Central American Customs Union is the most important tool for increasing trade in the region and generating the economies of a scale necessary to compete in the global market.</p>		<p>"More Political Will" for Regional Tourism Integration (September 24, 2012)</p>	<p>Call of the Federation of Tourism Chambers of Central America (FEDECATUR) for more political will to promote tourism integration in the</p>	<p>La Nación (Costa Rica)</p>	
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		region, criticising the lack of follow-through of Central American presidents on pro-integration political statements	
	Central American Integration is a Matter of Political Will (October 8, 2013)	Report on expert meeting in support of regional integration that pointed the lacking political will among regional governments to press ahead in the otherwise desirable and favourable project of regional integration	El Periódico (Guatemala)
	The Essential Central American Customs Union (April 28, 2014)	Call for realization of full customs union; and criticism of unwillingness / inability of Central American Governments to take the required steps	La Tribuna (Honduras)
	Customs Offices Should be Open 24/7 for Cargo (June 12, 2014)	Report on study commissioned by Federation of Chambers of Commerce of Central America (FECAMCO) for greater 24/7 access to customs services. Study concluded that there are concluded that there are 87 barriers to trade in the region, one of the major ones being operations of the systems at customs offices at borders, followed by bureaucratic requirements and lack of adequate infrastructure.	La Prensa (Panama)
	The Key to Development is Integration - There are too many entities in the field of integration and they do not seem to be working with the speed they should. (September 17, 2014)	Article examining the state of regional integration in Central America, emphasizing the economic benefits of more integration, and questioning why integration has not advanced more in the last 50 years.	La Prensa (Honduras)

I-1.2.3: National networks of civil society organisations support concept & approach of regional integration

<i>Findings at indicator level</i>	<p>Civil society organisations who were members of the CC-SICA at the time of the Vienna Summit (in coordination with members of other consultative bodies for civil society in other sub-regions of Latin America) voiced cautious support of the principle of regional integration, and welcomed the start of the negotiations of the Association Agreement between Central America and the European Union.</p> <p>At the same time, civil society organisations were careful to emphasize their opinion that a strong social emphasis was required in the regional integration process to redress inequalities, and promote social cohesion along with regional integration, that would include a labour dimension in the negotiations, also avoiding drastic increases in intra-regional migration. A broad coalition of European and Latin American/ Central American CSO reiterated this demand in 2011, as a reaction to the publication of the second Regional Indicative Programme (RIP) for EU regional cooperation with Central America for the years 2011 – 2013. Another report by members of that same CSO coalition published in 2011 emphasized that the strong focus placed by the European</p>
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	<p>regional cooperation strategy on the promotion of interregional trade between the EU and Central America (by using the RSP and RIP to facilitate the signing and implementation of the Association Agreement) could end up distorting the development of trading capacity of SMEs in Central America towards international trade, instead of intra-regional trade, which might have had a stronger effect on economic advancement and poverty reduction in the region.</p> <p>Finally, CSOs strongly emphasized the need for strengthening of civil society structures for dialogue/ civil society consultation, also with respect to Association Agreement.</p>										
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p>Supporting evidence:</p> <p>Table 1.8: Themes arising from final declaration of preparatory meeting of civil society organisations⁷ during Vienna Summit (1)</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="379 701 1391 1032"> <thead> <tr> <th data-bbox="379 701 683 734">Theme</th> <th data-bbox="691 701 1391 734">References</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td data-bbox="379 741 683 1025"> Cautious support of the overall regional integration initiative, including the linking of regional integration with the Association Agreement </td> <td data-bbox="691 741 1391 1025"> “Regional integration is a strategic factor in relations between the two continents.” (EU-LAC CSO, 2006) “The integration processes and association agreements involve both challenges and opportunities which will require a clear, shared political commitment” (EU-LAC CSO, 2006) “request that a decision be taken at the Fourth Vienna Summit to open negotiations for association agreements with the Andean Community and with Central America. This should lead to greater integration for these regions” (EU-LAC CSO, 2006) </td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>Detracting evidence:</p> <p>Civil Society Organisations participating at the Vienna Summit in 2006 stress the importance of complementing an economic focus in the integration process with social issues, such as redressing inequalities and promoting social cohesion, the inclusion of labour dimensions into the regional integration process, and, in particular the strengthening of dialogue structures for civil society to provide more opportunities for CSOs to participate in the shaping of the regional integration process, including the negotiation and implementation of the Association Agreement.</p> <p>Table 1.9: Themes arising from final declaration of preparatory meeting of civil society organisations⁸ during Vienna Summit (2)</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="379 1402 1391 1827"> <thead> <tr> <th data-bbox="379 1402 683 1435">Theme</th> <th data-bbox="691 1402 1391 1435">References</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td data-bbox="379 1442 683 1765"> Redressing inequalities/ promoting social cohesion through regional integration (including Association Agreement) </td> <td data-bbox="691 1442 1391 1765"> “(P)articipants of the Fourth Meeting: 4.1.1. strongly believe that the regional integration processes should include financial mechanisms for redressing inequalities and promoting social and territorial cohesion and economic, social and environmental sectoral impact studies” (EU-LAC CSO, 2006) “strongly believe that civil society in both continents should not only take part in the negotiation processes and monitoring of the association agreements between the EU and the countries and regions of Latin America, but also in ensuring that they contain a social, as well as an economic, dimension” (EU-LAC CSO, 2006) </td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="379 1771 683 1827"> Inclusion of labour dimension into </td> <td data-bbox="691 1771 1391 1827"> “are of the opinion that these integration processes need to include a social and a labour dimension, bring in indigenous populations and </td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Theme	References	Cautious support of the overall regional integration initiative, including the linking of regional integration with the Association Agreement	“Regional integration is a strategic factor in relations between the two continents.” (EU-LAC CSO, 2006) “The integration processes and association agreements involve both challenges and opportunities which will require a clear, shared political commitment” (EU-LAC CSO, 2006) “request that a decision be taken at the Fourth Vienna Summit to open negotiations for association agreements with the Andean Community and with Central America. This should lead to greater integration for these regions” (EU-LAC CSO, 2006)	Theme	References	Redressing inequalities/ promoting social cohesion through regional integration (including Association Agreement)	“(P)articipants of the Fourth Meeting: 4.1.1. strongly believe that the regional integration processes should include financial mechanisms for redressing inequalities and promoting social and territorial cohesion and economic, social and environmental sectoral impact studies” (EU-LAC CSO, 2006) “strongly believe that civil society in both continents should not only take part in the negotiation processes and monitoring of the association agreements between the EU and the countries and regions of Latin America, but also in ensuring that they contain a social, as well as an economic, dimension” (EU-LAC CSO, 2006)	Inclusion of labour dimension into	“are of the opinion that these integration processes need to include a social and a labour dimension, bring in indigenous populations and
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⁷ Consisting of members of the CC-SICA

⁸ Consisting of members of the CC-SICA

integration process	<i>other social groups and support young people and develop their professional skills” (EU-LAC CSO, 2006)</i>
Avoidance of increased migration, due to regional integration	<i>“request that handling migration flows be made a priority in relations between the two regions, in compliance with the principles of combating the trafficking of human beings, legalising the situation of migrants and ensuring their economic, social and political integration. They also call for the adoption of joint policies which would create favourable conditions for people to stay in their countries of origin, focusing on their economic and social development” (EU-LAC CSO, 2006)</i>
Strengthening of civil society structures for dialogue/ civil society consultation (also with respect to Association Agreement)	<p><i>“consider that it is a key responsibility of Latin American and Caribbean governments to support civil society structures for dialogue, including through financial support, particularly at regional level”</i></p> <p><i>“believe that European cooperation programmes must (through training and information initiatives) foster a culture of participation among Latin American and Caribbean civil society organisations, and help to strengthen consultative bodies within regional integration institutions”</i></p> <p><i>“agree to request that a programme be submitted, to the EU and other international bodies, supporting the institutional reinforcement of the consultative bodies ([...] the Central American Integration System's Consultative Committee, [...]). Similarly, they agree to call for a training programme to boost a culture of regional integration processes”.</i></p> <p><i>“propose that all agreements should provide for a consultative body (joint consultative committee – JCC) for the monitoring and reinforcement of these agreements; thus, have decided to draw up a proposal on the required tasks, membership and content of these JCCs” (EU-LAC CSO, 2006).</i></p>

In 2011, a coalition of CSO networks also criticizes the marginalisation of issues related to social cohesion in EU development cooperation as it exists and is being carried out after the Mid-Term Review of the RSP 2007 – 2013.

“Social cohesion is a priority in EU development cooperation with Latin America and highlighted in the Green Paper as an ingredient for inclusive growth. However, there is no clear definition of the concept of social cohesion in EU development cooperation and it fails to recognise that social cohesion is closely linked to other policies such as trade, investment and finance. In Central America a broad range of programmes and projects from trade liberalization to justice and security are carried out under the objective of social cohesion. This allows too much flexibility for the EC in programming and implementation and makes any closer evaluation of it difficult. The EU should center its support to social cohesion on programmes aimed at supporting social and fiscal policies to promote equity, access to basic services and decent work.” (ALOP, CIFCA, CIDSE, APRODEV, 2011)

Another report by members of that same CSO coalition points out the possibility that the strong focus on interregional trade between the EU and Central America, including the emphasis of EU regional cooperation on ensuring the signing and implementation of the Association Agreement as an international trade agreement, could end up distorting the development of trading capacity of SMEs in Central America towards international trade, instead of intra-regional trade, which might have had a stronger effect on economic advancement and poverty reduction in the region.

	<p><i>“At the same time, the EU should focus on supporting intraregional markets instead of promoting interregional trade with aid instruments. This is extremely important considering that the EU promotes trade agreements with all Latin American regions and is keen to utilise aid instruments in order to show the utility of these agreements. In Central America the EC already uses aid instruments to build strategies for SMEs to start exporting their exports to the EU. This ends up in distorting SMEs own strategies which mainly focus on local, national and at most, intraregional markets.” (APRODEV, CIDSE, CIFCA, 2011)</i></p> <p>Overall, the coalition of CSO networks criticizes that priorities of EU development cooperation had changed its focus “over the past decades, away from democracy, governance and human rights towards a stronger focus on trade and economic growth”.</p> <p><i>“Human rights, democracy and governance should be objectives in their own right in EU development cooperation. In EU cooperation with Central America, there has been a change in focus over the past decades, away from democracy, governance and human rights towards a stronger focus on trade and economic growth. EC priorities and specific development cooperation programmes fail to respond adequately to the widespread problems of poverty, injustice and inequality in the region.” (APRODEV, CIDSE, CIFCA, 2011)</i></p>
<p>I-1.2.4: National business associations support/ endorse concept and recent progress in regional integration</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>Central America’s tourism industry, for example, has lobbied for promoting a single Central American brand in tourism since 2008, and has also called on Central American political leaders to demonstrate more political will to advance regional integration. The Federation of Chambers of Exporters of Central America, Panama and the Caribbean (FECAEXCA) also called for advancing regional and economic integration as the most important tool for increasing trade in the region and generating the economies of a scale necessary to compete in the global market. Numerous other columns offered similar assessments and sentiments.</p>
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p>See Indicator 1.2.3 above</p>
<p>JC 1.3 - Responsiveness of EU programming and support to changes in regional priorities</p>	
<p><i>Statement on JC1.3</i></p>	<p>The EU has taken Mid-Term Review of the RSP 2007 – 2013 as an opportunity to adjust its cooperation strategy to some of the changes or shifts in cooperation priorities in the region. Changes to EU objectives responded in particular to the deepening economic crisis and associated job losses, the increasing environmental concerns and the precarious security situation and corresponding Central American initiatives to respond to it. Firstly, the EU concluded that it was necessary to make social, economic and environmental benefits of regional integration more concrete and tangible for all parts of the Central American population. Around the same time, a coalition of European and Latin American CSOs had voiced concerns that the predominant focus of the RSP on economic integration and trade issues essentially sidelined issues such as poverty eradication, the reduction of inequality, etc. The EU eventually complemented its focus on economic integration with a second cluster of issues in its RSP for 2011 - 2013, evolving around the sustainable development of vulnerable (cross-) border areas; with a focus on climate change adaptation, management of natural resources, and promotion of sustainable energy. The major programme associated with this focal area for the second RIP was meant to be the “Programa de desarrollo local integral transfronterizo de Golfo</p>

	<p>de Fonseca” (GOLFONSECA), with a financial volume of € 20 million.</p> <p>Secondly, in response to the Central American initiative to develop the Central American Security Strategy in 2011 by Central American countries, the EU committed € 7 million of the funds of the second RIP to assist Central American stakeholders with its development and implementation. The specific objectives foresaw the improved availability and exchange of intelligence on cross-border movements; the strengthening of cooperation between the authorities in charge of cross-border control (customs, police, justice) and law enforcement agencies of CA countries (as well as related human resource development). The main programme associated with this component was meant to be the “<i>Programa de Apoyo a la Estrategía de Seguridad de Centroamérica</i>”.</p> <p>As part of the review process, the EU consulted selected regional stakeholders (civil society, regional institutions, CA governments) in parallel with the negotiations on the Association Agreement in Tegucigalpa. However, statements issued by a coalition of Latin American (including Central American) and European CSO Networks (ALOP, APRODEV, CIDSE, CIFCA) suggest substantial shortcomings of the openness and transparency of the consultative process for civil society. Contributing factors were thought to be associated primarily with a lack of up-to-date and sufficiently disaggregated information provided to civil society, a failure to distribute available information to participating CSOs ahead of meetings, an intransparent selection of a small circle of CSOs for participation in these consultations, and the general brevity of the consultative meetings.</p>
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I-1.3.1 – Significant shifts in regional priorities (stated in official declarations) are followed by formal adjustments of EU cooperation objectives, priorities and approaches

<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>As already identified in the inception report for this evaluation, the mid-term review of the implementation of the 2007 – 2013 RSP (2010) called for the realignment of the European support strategy. In particular the economic crisis and associated job losses, increasing environmental concerns linked to effects from climate change and the precarious security situation in the region were seen to increase the social and environmental vulnerability of the Central American societies. The EU concluded that it was necessary to help Central American stakeholders to make social, economic and environmental benefits of regional integration more concrete by helping to address some of the social and environmental concerns in the region, focusing in particular on specific cross-border regions.</p> <p>In order to respond to the increased social and environmental vulnerability in the region, the EU complemented its focus on economic integration with a second cluster of issues, evolving around the sustainable development of vulnerable (cross-) border areas; with a focus on climate change adaptation, management of natural resources, and promotion of sustainable energy. The major programme associated with this focal area for the second RIP is the “<i>Programa de desarrollo local integral transfronterizo de Golfo de Fonseca</i>” (GOLFONSECA), with a financial volume of € 20 million.</p> <p>Also, in response to the Central American initiative to develop the Central American Security Strategy in 2011 by Central American countries, the EU committed € 7 million of the funds of the second RIP to assist Central American stakeholders with its development and implementation. According to the RIP, the specific objectives of this component included, among other things, the improvement of the availability and exchange of intelligence on cross-border movements; the strengthening of cooperation</p>
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	<p>between the authorities in charge of cross-border control (customs, police, justice) and law enforcement agencies of CA countries (as well as related human resource development). The main programme associated with this component is the “Programa de Apoyo a la Estrategía de Seguridad de Centroamérica”.</p>
<p>Data, sources, extracts</p>	<p>Supporting evidence: References regarding sustainable development:</p> <p><i>“Sustainable development of vulnerable (cross-)border areas, with a focus on climate “change adaptation, management of natural resources, and promotion of sustainable energy Justification: Support for the development of the Central American border zones, in the most vulnerable areas, will contribute to enhancing cultural and economic exchanges between groups of citizens on both sides of borders and creating a culture more inclined and open to regional integration. In addition, interventions focusing on climate vulnerability, adaptation and mitigation are key to promoting regional integration and ensuring the region’s sustainable development. These measures can be supported and strengthened by an integrated and coordinated approach, particularly where the impact of climate change transcends boundaries (e.g. river and sea basins and bio-geographic regions). The coordination of these interventions with the possible setting up of a financial fund for the development of Central America, linked to implementation of the Association Agreement, will be considered in due course.</i></p> <p><i>Experience with other regional programmes, including social infrastructure in border areas (e.g. Bi-National Programme El Salvador-Honduras, ZONAF, PREVDA and PRESANCA), has shown that they promote a spirit of cross-border cooperation and exchange. The consultation process has emphasised the need to make regional integration less abstract — not a subject just for bureaucrats — by bringing the issue ‘into the field’ and showing local people the advantages of this process in a context of economic crisis and job losses. One or two bi-national or tri-national border zones will be selected to develop pilot projects. The priorities here also come under SICA regional strategies or policies: strategy linking agriculture, environment and health (ERAS, 2008); the climate change strategy; and the regional strategy on renewable energy until 2020. To address urgent social needs, all supported activities will need to maximise positive social impacts and lead to sustained employment creation.” (EU Delegation Nicaragua, 2010)</i></p> <p>References regarding increased support for regional security:</p> <p><i>“[S]upport for regional security (sector 3) should be strengthened, given the high priority for the region and the needs of the regional security strategy. On the basis of a pilot project, starting in 2009/2010, the concept of integrated border management should be further expanded, and steps taken to improve the exchange and accessibility of data on the movement of people and goods in a context of free circulation.” (EU Delegation Nicaragua, 2010)</i></p> <p>Detracting evidence: <i>“On the basis of these findings, we would like to make the following recommendations. Focus of development cooperation</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>The eradication of poverty, reduction of inequality, strengthening of governance and human rights and the achievement of the MDGs is critical and should be the main focus of EC development cooperation. The current CSP/RSP for Central America are not properly placing these issues as the main objectives but rather moving to an emphasis on supporting market-driven economic growth.</i> • <i>When introducing new priorities of the EU, such as aid for trade and climate change, it is important to make sure that funds are not dispersed from poverty reduction and that it complies with ODA criteria.” (ALOP, APRODEV, CIDSE and CIFCA, 2009 (02))</i> <p>In 2009, a coalition of civil society organisations from Europe and Latin America raises concerns over the establishment of a “credit and investment fund” (the eventual LAIF),</p>

	<p>in particular over the potential of a redirection of development funds away from areas directly related to poverty reduction, good governance, human rights and other areas related to sustainable development and social cohesion.</p> <p><i>“In the framework of negotiations for an Association Agreement with Central America there is a discussion concerning a credit and investment fund. Concrete information on the exact nature of such a fund, the volume, the criteria that would be applied for its implementation and how it would be financed is not yet known as negotiations are being held behind closed doors.</i></p> <p>These flexibilities and uncertainties underline the importance to closely monitor the implementation and to make sure that funds are not being redirected from areas directly related to poverty reduction, good governance and human rights and that all support financed within the development cooperation strategies comply with ODA criteria.</p>
<p>I-1.3.2 – Mid-term review of EU RSP accompanied by comprehensive consultation of national, regional stakeholders in CA</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>During the mid-term review of the Regional Indicative Programme 2007 – 2009, the EU consulted selected regional stakeholders in parallel with the negotiations on the Association Agreement in Tegucigalpa. According to information from the EU, all parties agreed that regional integration should receive further support. Additionally, the economic sector (including SMEs should be supported, “with a view to stimulating access to the intra-regional market (productivity, competitiveness) and creating employment. Finally, it was agreed that assistance should help to involve civil society in the regional integration process, and that it “should benefit both economic and social actors and contribute to the Social Cohesion Agenda adopted by the region”.</p> <p>Statements issued by a coalition of Latin American (including Central American) and European CSO Networks (ALOP, APRODEV, CIDSE, CIFCA) suggest substantial shortcomings of the openness and transparency of the consultative process for civil society. Contributing factors were thought to be associated primarily with a lack of up-to-date and sufficiently disaggregated information provided to civil society, a failure to distribute available information to participating CSOs ahead of meetings, an intransparent selection of a small circle of CSOs for participation in these consultations, and the general brevity of the consultative meetings.</p>
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p>Supporting evidence: <i>“Consultations were held in March/April, in parallel with the seventh round of negotiations on the Association Agreement in Tegucigalpa, and in June with Member States. All stakeholders shared the view that regional integration should be supported through actions to reduce the impact of the economic and social crisis. They in particular underlined the need to support the economic sector, including SMEs, cooperatives and farmers, with a view to stimulating access to the intra-regional market (productivity, competitiveness) and creating employment. They also emphasised the need to concentrate on actions at local level and to involve relevant actors within civil society. All activities should benefit both economic and social actors and contribute to the Social Cohesion Agenda adopted by the region. Environmental issues, in particular forest conservation and water management, were also emphasised.”</i> (EU Delegation Nicaragua, 2010)</p> <p>Detracting evidence: Statements issued by a coalition of Latin American (including Central American) and European CSO Networks (ALOP, APRODEV, CIDSE, CIFCA) suggest substantial shortcomings of the openness and transparency of the consultative process for civil society. Contributing factors were thought to be associated primarily with a lack of up-to-date and sufficiently disaggregated information provided to civil society, a failure to distribute available information to participating CSOs ahead of meetings, an intransparent</p>

	<p>selection of a small circle of CSOs for participation in these consultations, and the general brevity of the consultative meetings.</p> <p><i>“1. The lack of availability of the most basic information on projects and spending which has made it impossible to compare the different sectors and amounts defined in the CSP/RSP 2007-2013 and to evaluate how EC money was actually spent.</i></p> <p><i>2. The only information available was aggregated data in annual reports, delegation websites (which are out of date), as well as very general and brief responses obtained from delegation staff.</i></p> <p><i>3. The implementation of the CSP and RSP have experienced serious delays making the MTR process problematic, as there are few</i></p> <p><i>4. There have been serious limitations regarding the participation of civil society organisations (CSOs) in the MTR consultations carried out by the EC delegations in Central America. These were mainly due to the following:</i></p> <p><i>a. Consultation meetings were convened at a very short notice.</i></p> <p><i>b. Very few organisations were invited to these meetings.</i></p> <p><i>c. The criteria for selecting and inviting the participants were unclear.</i></p> <p><i>d. Lack of consensus regarding the joint participation of national and international civil society.</i></p> <p><i>e. Consultation meetings being too short.</i></p> <p><i>f. Relevant documents and agendas were not distributed prior to the meetings, impeding substantive analysis and effective discussions. This occurred, despite several requests made by civil society to the EC in this regard.” (ALOP, APRODEV, CIDSE and CIFCA, 2009)</i></p>
<p>JC 1.4 – Correspondence between regional support and other EU support to region and policies (including LA thematic programmes, EU environmental policy)</p>	
<p><i>Statement on JC1.4</i></p>	<p>The RSP and the RIP reflect many of the main priorities of the Association Agreement, as the central treaty regulating European policy towards Central America. Areas of agreement include the importance of regional integration, economic integration, security, environmental sustainability and disaster risk reduction.</p> <p>However, in contrast to the relatively strong emphasis on social and economic equality and equity in the AA, issues related to social and economic equality are only being treated as one of four major cross-cutting issues of the EU cooperation strategy. In addition, the principle of “equality” has not been specifically applied to economic conditions, but is mostly referred to as “social equality”.</p> <p>This is also significant as the overall beneficial economic effects for Central America that are predicted to result from the implementation of the Association Agreement are not expected to automatically and immediately benefit all countries and groups of the population to the same extent. While the EU-commissioned Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment of the Association Agreement of 2009 predicted a 0.6 percent reduction of poverty across the region⁹, the accrual of beneficial effects to currently marginalised groups was expected to be dependent on the extent to which investments could be dispersed into more domestically focused SMEs, instead of an exclusive focus on large export-oriented firms. For this purpose, it was suggested to use EU cooperation and</p>

⁹ With a slight rise of poverty levels in Panama.

	<p>other instruments to promote intra-regional trade opportunities particularly for smaller firms with less of an international focus, in addition to opportunities for increased global, international trade. Also, effects of the AA on labour, wages and labour conditions (and thus social welfare, income and poverty reduction) in Central America were predicted to depend in large part on accompanying policies and other measures to avoid a “race to the bottom” of wages and standards in a competition for foreign direct investment. Among other things, these efforts were suggested to aim at the establishment of uniform labour standards, the stimulation of tripartite cooperation in labour relations (involving employers, employees and the government) and social dialogue, also involving the cooperation pillar of the AA. It is not clear to what extent EU development cooperation between 2007 and 2013 has adequately anticipated these possible adverse effects, and prepared for their mitigation with appropriate development interventions in areas like labour (both wages and labour standards), and the preparation of domestic markets for at least regional trade opportunities.</p> <p>The implementation of the Association Agreement was also expected to add to the increase of food prices in Central America, with the potential for worsening food insecurity in the region. While rising output in the FVN (Fruit, Vegetable and Nuts) sector¹⁰ was predicted to increase employment opportunities in the sector, domestic food prices for consumers were also expected to increase, partly or completely offsetting any income effects. Overall, in spite of the expected long-run benefits for Central American societies, many population groups, and in particular vulnerable groups (including women) were expected to incur significant adjustment costs in the short-run. The Sustainability Impact Assessment of the EU suggested paying particular attention to these short-run implications and adjustment costs associated with the Agreement. Again, it is not clear at this point, to which extent EU development cooperation has adequately anticipated and prepared to respond to these adjustment effects, and the associated costs.</p> <p>Finally, the increased output of fruit, vegetables and nuts was also predicted to increase the pressure on forests and biodiversity, as more forests were converted to farmland and legal as well as illegal logging would increase. While the further global integration of the Central American forest and agricultural sectors may actually stimulate the region’s commitment to international and multilateral environment agreements, the EU’s Sustainability Impact Assessment maintained that this would require clear sustainability provision included in the AA, as well as other accompanying policy and cooperation measures as part of the EU-Central American relationship</p>
<p>I-1.4.1 – Stated priorities of EU agricultural, trade policies consistent with stated objectives of EU development cooperation</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>As discussed under Indicator 1.1.1, the RSP and the RIP reflect many of the main priorities of the Association Agreement, which has become the central treaty regulating European policy towards Central America. Areas of agreement include the importance of regional integration, economic integration, security, environmental sustainability and disaster risk reduction.</p> <p>However, in contrast to the relatively strong emphasis on social and economic equality and equity in the AA, issues related to social and economic equality have not been included in the EU RSP in a particularly prominent position. The promotion of (social)</p>

¹⁰ E.g., between 20 and 23 percent in Costa Rica; and even by between 58 and 65 percent in Panama.

	equality and the avoidance of (social) exclusion of particular groups is merely being treated as one of four major cross-cutting issues. Also, equality is not being framed specifically in economic terms, but is mostly introduced as “social equality”.
<i>Data, sources, extracts</i>	See data and sources under Indicator 1.1.1 above.
I-1.4.2 – Trends in trading streams, types of traded goods and services, production patterns of traded goods and services are consistent with principles and priorities of EU development cooperation	
<i>Findings at indicator level</i>	<p>The overall economic effect of the AA on poverty levels in Central America was expected to be positive, based on the Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment of the Association Agreement that had been commissioned by the European Commission. The 2009 study expected a 0.6 percent reduction of poverty across the region, albeit with varying effects in the different countries. Still, all countries except Panama were expected to gain economically from the agreement, an effect in line with the poverty reduction objective of EU development cooperation. For Panama, however, the AA was expected to raise poverty levels slightly. Any economic gains were expected to be heavily dependent on the depth of regional integration Central America would be able to achieve.</p> <p>However, at the micro-level, and considering the effects of increased trade on individual population groups and social cohesion, the inclusiveness of economic benefits was expected to be dependent on the extent to which investments could be dispersed into more domestically focused SMEs, instead of an exclusive focus on large export-oriented firms. For this purpose, it was suggested to promote intra-regional trade opportunities, which smaller firms with less of an international focus could take advantage of, in addition to opportunities for increased global, international trade (which was likely to mostly benefit larger, international export-oriented firms). Also, effects of the AA on labour, wages and labour conditions (and thus social welfare, income and poverty reduction) in Central America were predicted to depend in large part on accompanying policies and other measures to avoid a “race to the bottom” of wages and standards in a competition for foreign direct investment. Among other things, these efforts should aim at the establishment of uniform labour standards, the stimulation of tripartite cooperation in labour relations (involving employers, employees and the government) and social dialogue, also involving the cooperation pillar of the AA.</p> <p>The implementation of the Association Agreement was also expected to add to the increase of food prices in Central America, with the potential for worsening food insecurity in the region. While rising output in the FVN (Fruit, Vegetable and Nuts) sector¹¹ would likely increase employment opportunities, domestic prices for consumers for fruits, vegetables and nuts were also expected to increase, at least partly or completely offsetting any income effects. Overall, in spite of the expected long-run benefits for Central American societies, many population groups, and in particular vulnerable groups (including women) were expected to incur significant adjustment costs in the short-run. The Sustainability Impact Assessment of the EU suggested paying particular attention to these short-run implications and adjustment costs associated with the Agreement.</p>

¹¹ E.g., between 20 and 23 percent in Costa Rica; and even by between 58 and 65 percent in Panama.

	<p>Finally, the increased output fruit, vegetables and nuts was also predicted to increase the pressure on forests and biodiversity, as more forests were converted to farmland and legal as well as illegal logging would increase. While the further global integration of the Central American forest and agricultural sectors may actually stimulate the region's commitment to international and multilateral environment agreements, the EU's Sustainability Impact Assessment maintained that this would require clear sustainability provision included in the AA, as well as other accompanying policy and cooperation measures as part of the EU-Central American relationship.</p>
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p>Supporting evidence:</p> <p>The overall economic effect of the AA on poverty levels in Central America was expected to be positive, based on the Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment of the Association Agreement that had been commissioned by the European Commission. The 2009 study expected a 0.6 percent reduction of poverty across the region, albeit with varying effects in the different countries. Still, all countries except Panama were expected to gain economically from the agreement, an effect in line with the poverty reduction objective of EU development cooperation. For Panama, however, the AA was expected to raise poverty levels slightly. Any economic gains were expected to be heavily dependent on the depth of regional integration Central America would be able to achieve.</p> <p><i>“The trade part of the AA has an overall poverty-reducing effect for all Central American countries except for Panama, but the degree of this effect differs per country. For the Central American region as a whole, the aggregated estimated effect is 0.6 percent reduction in poverty levels (in the scenario where Panama joins the AA). For Nicaragua, El Salvador and Honduras the poverty reductions are relatively most pronounced. For Costa Rica the effect is much smaller in the short run, but the largest in the long run. For Panama, the AA is expected to raise poverty levels slightly whether or not it decides to join, though far less so if Panama joins (0.2 percent compared to 1.2 percent if it does not join).” (ECORYS, 2009)</i></p> <p>For the quantitative details see Table 1.11 at the end of this section.</p> <p><i>“The national income effects are positive for the EU and all Central American countries (see the Table 1.11 at the end of EQ 1) at the aggregate level. At sector level there is a slight decline in EU output for FVN and electronics (which could be regionally concentrated). Specialisation occurs in Central America especially with respect to textiles & clothing and electronics. Some secondary effects may be important. For example, the potential secondary effects of increases in maritime services (i.e. better infrastructure in ports) may allow some Central American economies to manage increased trade flows while smoothing customs procedures. The degree of regional integration is important for the potential benefits from the AA because more regional integration – leading to lower cross-border NTMs and more regulatory harmonisation – would allow the Central American countries to benefit more.</i></p> <p><i>Investments and FDI are expected to increase and benefit both the Central American countries and the EU– on top of the predicted national income gains. Important to note is that – again – the potential gains are heavily dependent on regional integration in Central America (a regional approach to investment conditions would help significantly).” (ECORYS, 2009)</i></p> <p>Detracting evidence:</p> <p>Inclusive economic benefits are dependent on the dispersion of investments (through policy) into more domestically focused SMEs, instead of an exclusive focus on large export-oriented firms.</p> <p><i>“Dispersion of investment and FDI flows into more domestically focussed SMEs instead of only the large export-oriented firms can help make benefits more inclusive.” (ECORYS, 2009)</i></p> <p><i>“Allowing investments to spread beyond the international export-oriented firms and beyond the export-</i></p>

sector into domestic sectors and towards SMEs would significantly increase their positive social impact.” (ECORYS, 2009, p. 69)

“Social: The expected increase in employment, especially of Central American women, is expected to reduce the levels of poverty and mitigate illegal immigration to the US. Moreover, also an increase of internal immigration is foreseen towards the urban centres where maquilas are located, offering new employment opportunities. For social effects to be positive, it should be noted that efforts to include the smallscale (domestically oriented) textile producers need to be made.” (ECORYS, 2009, p. 64)

“The potential benefits from investment flows especially in Central America are largely dependent on the extent:

- To which regional integration in the Central American region is facilitated, especially addressing intra-regional horizontal issues like customs procedures, labelling requirements, IPR and investment climate amelioration; and
- To which the investments not only flow to export-oriented large firms, but spread and disperse into the more domestically focused small producers.” (ECORYS, 2009, p. 73)

Although output in the FVN (Fruit, Vegetable and Nuts) sector was expected to rise considerably (e.g., between 20 and 23 percent in Costa Rica; and even by between 58 and 65 percent in Panama), and with it real income from increased production and increased employment, domestic prices for consumers for fruits, vegetables and nuts were also expected to increase, at least partly or completely offsetting the income effects.

“Economic: Output of the FVN sector in Central America is expected to increase considerably, especially in Costa Rica (output increases of 20 to 23 percent) and Panama (output increases of 58 to 65 percent). The other countries of the region are also expected to gain, though to a smaller extent. Real incomes are increasing considerably, but domestic prices in the sector are also expected to increase, implying that the producer surplus will increase considerably. For consumers, there is a positive income effect (from increased employment) on the one hand and a negative effect from higher domestic prices on the other hand.” (ECORYS, 2009)

Effects of the AA on labour, wages and labour conditions (and thus social welfare and income opportunities) were determined to depend on the accompanying policies of the free trade agreement. It was thought to be important to avoid a “race to the bottom” of wages and standards in a competition for foreign direct investment, among other things by advocating and offering assistance for the establishment of uniform labour standards, “through EU funds offered for stimulating tripartism and social dialogue through the ILO and the political dialogue and cooperation pillars of the AA”.

“The AA can stimulate the improvement of labour standards as EU firms make higher demands on Central American exporters and EU investors adhere to the ILO Decent Work Agenda. This is under the proviso that firms in the Central American region do not lower wages and standards in a competition for scarce FDI and thereby start a ‘race to the bottom’ in labour regulations. Policy initiatives in this field have a large influence over which effect may come to dominate.” (ECORYS, 2009, p. 16)

“In addition, the inclusion of a sustainable development or labour chapter can serve to identify these issues and the means to tackle them. If the EU insists upon standards being met in the production of goods to be exported there and the implementation of ILO Conventions, then this could benefit Central American workers, in particular the most vulnerable groups (women, children and indigenous populations). However, the means to do this must come from domestic will to do so and cooperation of Central America countries with the EU, for example through EU funds offered for stimulating tripartism and social

dialogue through the ILO and the political dialogue and cooperation pillars of the AA. In addition, a monitoring and evaluation system of labour issues, such as that included in the EU-Chile agreement, should also be put into place following implementation of the agreement. The Sustainable Development Chapter could also implement the enforcement mechanisms implemented as a result of the DR-CAFTA White Paper including employer sanctions, the provision of direct support to labour unions, and urging governments to create laws to regulate employment subcontracting.” (ECORYS, 2009, p. 77)

The Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment for the AA concedes that in spite of expected long-run benefits for Central American countries and societies from the AA, in the short-run, many population groups, and in particular vulnerable groups (including women) might incur significant adjustment costs. The report suggests paying particular attention to these short-run implications and adjustment costs associated with the AA.

“[I]n the short run, the transition process may come with (adjustment) costs in some regions or sectors, the more so for vulnerable social groups and for female employment. This short-run effect requires special attention. For example, female workers in a declining textile sector may find it harder to find work in other sectors where female participation is more difficult or less accepted. Due to the different wage levels, levels of economic growth and production, we also expect some migration towards Costa Rica (and Panama) from the other Central American countries in search of better working conditions and as a result of strongly increased demand in especially the FVN sector.” (ECORYS, 2009, p. 16)

The expected increased output in the fruit, vegetable and nut sector, and the associated conversion of land from forest to agricultural land has been predicted to increase the pressure on forests (such as through illegal logging) and biodiversity (which was already under pressure in Central America prior to the AA). While the further global integration of the Central American forest and agricultural sectors may stimulate the region’s commitment to international and multilateral environment agreements, this would require clear sustainability provision included in the AA, as well as other accompanying policy and cooperation measures as part of the EU-Central American relationship.

“Land use is expected to change significantly, especially in Costa Rica and Panama, in favour of land use for FVN. Smaller changes are expected – also towards FVN for Honduras and El Salvador. The deeper the integration, the stronger these reallocation effects are expected to be.

Loss of biodiversity and deforestation are existing large concerns in Central America, especially because a very large share of global biodiversity can be found in the region. As production changes expected in the forestry and wood products sector as a result of the AA are very small, no large direct effects on deforestation and biodiversity loss are expected from that source. However, the significant changes expected in land use allocated towards the expanding FVN sector, can pose a significant threat to forest-areas and biodiversity. This pressure on forests (and related biodiversity) can further induce illegal logging, posing an additional indirect threat not captured in the quantitative estimates. To counter these predicted negative impacts, pro-active measures are needed, both in terms of the trade and co-operation provisions of the Agreements; specific policy recommendations on how this can be done are made in the section below.

On the other hand, the AA can stimulate implementation of effective EU-Central America cooperation and policies on e.g. illegal logging and other deforestation issues, which can have positive effects in mitigating deforestation and biodiversity loss. In general, specific Sustainable Development provisions in the AA can stimulate the commitment to and implementation of international and multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), thereby encouraging further progress on issues of international concern such as climate change, biodiversity and natural resources.” (ECORYS, 2009, p. 17)

Table 1.10: Treatment of trade capacity development in bi-lateral EU cooperation strategies (CSPs)

Country	Relevant sectors / issues included in CSPs	Specific initiatives, concepts or programmes / projects	Comments / Observations
Costa Rica	<p><u>CSP / NIP I: “Regional Integration” (Focal Sector)</u>: no specific focus on trade capacity building / support to SMEs, etc. Focal Sector mirrors the “regional integration” focus of the RSP (customs union, implementation of relevant international standards, strengthening public institutions dealing with foreign trade, etc.</p> <p>CSP / NIP mentions “measures aimed at making country more competitive to cope with opening up of markets”, but w/o further explanations.</p>	<p>“Programme will be defined on the basis on an assessment of the country’s needs in terms of trade and regional integration, to be carried out a year before the project launch.” (CSP / NIP Costa Rica, 2007 – 2013)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ No further details given on planned Trade Needs Assessment. 	<p>No particular focus on SMEs, trade capacity building, efforts to make Costa Rica more competitive in light of the opening of markets.</p>
El Salvador	<p><u>CSP: Economic growth, regional integration and trade (focal sector)</u>: “Establishment of genuinely participatory and inclusive poverty reduction model”; “creating an alternative to the limits of the agricultural sector”; “bring about diversification of traditional and non-traditional exports”.</p> <p>Expansion, diversification, competitiveness and productivity of domestic private sector businesses, in particular small and micro enterprises at local level / focusing on rural areas.</p> <p>(in addition: support to enhance El Salvador’s integration in international markets; complementing the focus of RSP)</p> <p><u>NIP II</u>: Change in focus from NIP I; “SME support” had been operationalized as “support to the development and implementation of a national quality system” (as the “most appropriate action” for the focal sector of “economic</p>	<p>Support through “FOMYPE”: Growth and diversification policies, export promotion and job creation; Improvement of legal, regulatory and financial environment for micro and small businesses; Creation of fora favouring innovation, research and development in the private sector with the aim of creating employment (incentives for entrepreneurship and business skills, inter alia by incorporating such modules in secondary education programmes and curricula); Trade related assistance on the basis of a Trade Needs Assessment study (was foreseen for 2007).</p> <p><i>No additional funds for SME support / FOMYPE under NIP II</i></p>	<p>Support to SMEs never seems to have materialized; money of “economic growth & trade” sector was assigned to support national quality systems (also because FOMYPE was deemed not to be successful). Support to quality system (“PROCALIDAD”) was delayed; so that focus was shifted away from focal sector entirely; remaining money from NIP I was re-dedicated to support “fiscal reform”.</p> <p>Overall, no consistent effort to support trade capacity building / improve the business environment for SMEs in El Salvador.</p>

Country	Relevant sectors / issues included in CSPs	Specific initiatives, concepts or programmes / projects	Comments / Observations
	<p>growth, regional integration, trade”; However, “PROCALIDAD” SPSP was delayed (because National Quality Law was not being passed). FOMYPE was deemed to not have been successful, either.</p> <p>As a result, no additional funds allocated to focal sector “Economic Growth, Regional Integration, Trade”. Funds from NIP I to be used for “Economic Recovery Program for El Salvador (PAREES)”</p>		
Guatemala	<p><u>CSP: Economic Growth and Trade (Focal Sector):</u> focus on “long-term and inclusive rural economic growth and food security”. Emphasis on “more depressed and isolated areas”, through development of “natural, physical, financial, human, social, political, institutional” assets and their combination “to take advantage of economic opportunities”</p> <p><u>NIP II: Economic Growth & Trade (Focal Sector): Youth Employment:</u></p> <p>NIP states “lack of employment and of income generation opportunities” as “one of the main issues” to improve the poverty situation. Acknowledges “well-established private sector”, but absence of “national employment policy”, of a “clear unified strategy for job creation”, of a “vocational training and education”, and of a “reliable and continuously updated labour statistics system”.</p>	<p><u>CSP / NIP I:</u></p> <p>Support for agricultural & non-agricultural activities “in highly vulnerable areas”</p> <p>Support to “national and regional authorities for development of enabling policies and facilitating an institutional framework”</p> <p>Cooperation to market integration “further considered and based on Trade Needs Assessment” (had been planned for 2007)</p> <p><u>NIP II:</u></p> <p>“Increase # of SMEs”, improve business environment, and entrepreneurial capacities of economically active population</p> <p>“Improve conditions and level of productivity and income of economic actors / workers”</p> <p>Assist in formulation of national employment policy</p> <p>Strengthen national vocational training system</p>	Change from strategy to support rural development in “most disadvantage rural areas” under NIP I to broad-based strategy to strengthen SME sector, working conditions and income potential, in particular of young people in NIP II.
Honduras	<p><u>Regional Integration Facility (non-focal sector):</u></p> <p>Focus on “sustained and well-designed adaptation” to the Association Agreement, ensuring that “Honduras is to catch up with its more integrated Northern neighbours (El Salvador and Guatemala) and reap the benefits of the integration process.</p>	<p><u>CSP / NIP I</u></p> <p>Country-based integration facility, to help translate “regional ambitions into national reform policies” (“addressing the main shortcomings identified after evaluating Honduras’ preparedness to regional integration”) (EU Delegation Honduras, 2007, p. 28)</p> <p>Trade needs assessment study (to prepare the Regional</p>	Support of Regional Integration Facility was stated to be contingent on “several factors and processes, whose outcome is yet partially undefined”, such as the negotiations of the Association Agreement, the “evaluation process as regards regional integration”, “support

Country	Relevant sectors / issues included in CSPs	Specific initiatives, concepts or programmes / projects	Comments / Observations
	<p>Acknowledgement of uneven preparedness of CA countries towards economic integration; and the contingency of Honduras' development prospects on preparations for (economic) integration (EU Delegation Honduras, 2007, p. 27).</p> <p><u>Poverty reduction / support to SMMEs (Focal Sector; NIP II):</u> "Support, through improving the business climate and training and small grants to small, medium-sized and micro enterprises (SMMEs), would benefit the 700 000 or more people employed in small business, helping them to enter the formal sector, become more competitive, with emphasis on quality systems, and thus benefit from the opportunities offered by trade, including the EU-CA Association Agreement." (European Commission - Honduras, 2010)</p>	<p>Integration Facility)</p> <p>Trade-related technical assistance / private sector (supporting Honduras' insertion in regional and world markets for specific products w. export potential (e.g., for non-traditional exports, certified forestry products, non-timber forest products)</p> <p><u>NIP II</u></p> <p>Support to SMMEs (strengthening SMMEs, especially providing help to generate employment and to improve their (and the Government's) quality support systems, and also through developing or stimulating export potential)</p>	<p>measures contained in the RSP", etc. These statements left the prospect of the Facility very vague.</p> <p>In MTR / NIP II, integration facility is no longer mentioned; however, NIP II now foresees "support to SMMEs", to increase their chances to benefit from free trade agreements (including DR-CAFTA and AA).</p>
Nicaragua	<p><u>Economic and trade issues (Focal Sector):</u> Ensuring policy coherence & effective redistribution mechanisms, contributing to equitable economic growth; facilitating national pro-poor policies. Coherence of bi-lateral support with regional integration [support] at Central American level.</p> <p>"Proper integration with Central America is an essential complement [...] if [Nicaragua] is to take advantage of the opportunities of a global economy and correct possible losses of competitiveness"</p> <p>NIP 2010 – 2013: focus on 'social cohesion and poverty' should be implemented through improved social services and social security, food security, etc.</p>	<p>Supporting trade policy & standards</p> <p>Trade exchanges (with particular emphasis on small- and medium enterprises) / "supporting SME strategy"</p> <p>Facilitate compliance w. international labour standards</p> <p>"more widely-based support, in connection with general conditions"</p>	<p>Despite inclusion of trade capacity development, SME support and even labour issues in CSP, and the two associated NIPs, little concrete interventions were suggested, not even in the second NIP (2010 – 2013). Suggests that little concrete support has been offered.</p>

Table 1.11: Summary of forecasted macroeconomic changes as a result of AA (long run, comprehensive free trade agreement)

Scenario/Variable	CRI	NI C	GT M	ES	HO N	PA N	EU- 27	LD C	RO W
Scenario 2c: Very comprehensive FTA (long run, including Panama)									
National income (% change)	3.5	0.5	0.6	1.6	2.2	1.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
National income (€ million)	919.4	44.3	368.3	502.2	422.3	380.8	2,286.4	82.0	-411.6
Unskilled wages (% change)	3.2	0.9	0.7	-0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Skilled wages (% change)	2.8	0.6	0.2	-0.8	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Total exports (% change)	17.7	3.4	4.6	4.2	8.2	14.2	0.1	0.0	0.0
Total imports (% change)	20.9	2.0	2.8	10.9	0.1	0.0	0.0		
Scenario 2d: Very comprehensive FTA (long run, excluding Panama)									
National income (% change)	3.5	0.5	0.6	1.6	2.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
National income (€ million)	925.3	47.6	347.9	503.1	423.1	-5.9	2,018.9	29.4	-671.4
Unskilled wages (% change)	3.2	0.9	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Skilled wages (% change)	2.8	0.6	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Total exports (% change)	17.8	3.6	4.8	4.3	8.4	-0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0
Total imports (% change)	21.1	2.1	2.8	-0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0		

* CRI = Costa Rica, NIC = Nicaragua, GTM = Guatemala, ES = El Salvador, PAN = Panama, HON = Honduras, LDC = Least Developed Countries, ROW = Rest of World
Source: (ECORYS, 2009, p. 15)

EQ:2 Institutional Strengthening

EQ 2 – To what extent has EU support helped to put into place an autonomous capacity of RIOs in Central America that helps to improve their performance in line with their stated organisational mission, objectives and work (results) plans?

JC 2.1 – Legal and financial frameworks of SICA system supports its mission

Statement on JC2.1

The need to put in place a legal and regulatory framework for economic integration and the key mechanisms and instruments to support and manage it has been recognised by the CA Member States, and the RIO for many years although no single document actually specifies the nature and scope of that legal and regulatory framework, and the links between regional integration and the selected frameworks. Some progress has been achieved in establishing a comprehensive legal and regulatory framework, but there is a great deal more that needs to be in place. Some decisions (such as the nature of a customs union) may appear to be geared to a comprehensive regional integration process, but they fall very short of potential or even the visions of Heads of State (for example, border-related decisions are mostly based on facilitating trade administration rather than creating a situation where internal border controls are eliminated altogether).

The EU has provided a considerable level of support for the development of legal and regulatory frameworks for the RIO, (some examples include the PAIRCA 2 and PRAICA 1, as well as PRIAA and PRACAMS); but the extent to which this effort was instrumental in clarifying these frameworks is very limited. Various country-level “structuring” initiatives supported by the EC were also put into place to help generate regulatory frameworks (ex. phytosanitary measures in Costa Rica, country-level improvement of legal and financial environment in El Salvador). The documentation does not identify how these initiatives are coordinated or planned and fieldwork shows that there was no formal coordination mechanisms in place. The CA Member States are the key to the development of regulatory and legal frameworks under which the RIO will operate and it is they that should lead this development. It is clear, however, that they do not; it is also clear that the RIO have had limited success and that donors have shown little success in bringing about the changes required. Efforts at reform have been of little value: the reform of SICA resulted in the approval of the five pillars but of little else, and the reform of the CCJ was not accepted. There is no SICA-System wide strategic or operational plan and there is no accepted statement of needs and priorities.

Part of the legitimacy of RIO can also be found in the support they can muster for their work plans (and the financial allocations that go with them). Although the work plans examined from key RIO provide activity planning support, they don’t include all financial resources and in the case of SG SICA specifically, only relate to EU funds (the same applies to PAIRCA 2). Moreover, they rarely are valid for more than six months, the time period that corresponds to the rotation of the pro-temp Presidency of the SICA; as such they do not provide a long-term vision of what needs to be done, and they restrict resource allocation to the short-term. A longer temporal perspective would also provide a backdrop against which to analyse the coherence and relevance of donor programming (and ideas on how donor coordination and complementarity could be made more effective).

What is not documented is the extent to which the work that needs to be done by the RIOs to meet performance expectations (the performance of their mandates) is actually capable of being done by these RIO (because of financing limits, or absorption capacity or even

institutional ability). What is also not documented is the allocation of financial resources to “results”. Given that a significant part of the stated results remain at process or output levels, the analysis in the field showed that RIO work plans do not relate REQUIRED financial assets to REQUIRED FUNDS, but rather reflect the link between WHAT CAN BE DONE with AVAILABLE resources. The budgets are always equivalent to secured funding levels. Strictly speaking, that is what annual operational plans are supposed to do, but the missing logical link is the capability that the RIO should have in place to meet the performance expectations of the CA Member States in generating a “working” integration. The existing work plans MAY be appropriate but they do not reflect what still needs to be done. The documents examined (see bibliography) were also limited to specific institutions and did not reflect “issue” planning, or the need to involve other partners and stakeholders in the business ecosystem in the budgeting.

Even if the EU and other donors have supported work in this domain, the RIOs have not put into place a coordination or management function to move the consensus building (between RIO) forward for regional integration. There is still a significant amount of inefficiencies (ex. mandates exist without the ability to monitor or ensure compliance; region-country work programs out of sync; fragmentation of planning functions) that are caused by the lack of a centralizing function (planning, priorities, coordination, etc.) for the RIO. In terms of some of the sectors, the RIOs do not appear to be facilitating and coordinating the development of common policy positions. An example is the environment where CA national institutions often have legal frameworks that do not correspond to regional approaches (ex. climate change and disaster management). In that case the Executive Secretariat of the Central American Commission for the Environment and Development, (SECCAD) or even the CCAD should be in a position to demonstrate greater levels of goal achievement. Some sector RIOs, however, appear to be more effective (ex. Central American Economic Integration Secretariat, (SIECA) and the Central American Corporation for Air Control (COCESNA). The same challenges exist in relation to intra-CA and RIO Member States legal frameworks.

A key issue to consider is the extent to which legal and regulatory frameworks match the authorities and organisational needs of RIO if they are to exercise their mandates. Financial resources should be allocated to the most appropriate result area in order to prioritize. Mechanisms should be in place to monitor progress and to inform management decisions. Although planning documents for EU funded projects all contain a means of examining the allocation of funds to results, there are still important issues that limit the usefulness of these analyses, including the nature of supervision of the intervention and the accountability (and delegated authority) of the relevant managers. The research in the field clearly shows that the RIO do not have the capability to manage at this (fairly basic) level of strategic decision-making, even if the EU has provided funds to develop and roll-out these systems.

Key institutions that have an impact on the cooperation support priorities laid out in EU-CA agreements often do not yet have the capability or capacity to carry out their mandates, even though significant progress has been made in developing sub-systems in these institutions, in large part through donor support. Overall, the CA Member States cannot, at his time, know the extent to which the RIO are able to execute their mandates.

The issue of frameworks is further complicated by the nature of the SICA System. Almost all of the RIO were created by treaties of agreements between a small number of the CA MS. Under the Tegucigalpa and Guatemala agreements it was made (legally) clear that the SG-SICA is to “coordinate” the RIO, not manage them. The result is a relatively loose

	<p>association of organisations that do not have to recognise SG-SICA as anything more than a “coordinator”. They all seek out donor funding independently of each other and the council of Ministers is trying to get them all to have their proposals “pre-approved”, at least for relevance.</p> <p>The existing legal frameworks reflect an inter-governmental institutional architecture based on collaboration; it is highly inefficient under any standard, but that model was promoted within the system by SG-SICA during the past years. Efforts by the EU to rationalise and improve effectiveness in those domains have had very limited success.</p>
<p>I-2.1.1 – Political decisions made to provide a legal framework for SICA system</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>The need to put in place a legal and regulatory framework for regional integration and the key mechanisms and instruments to support and manage it has been recognised by the CA Member States and RIO for many years. However, no single document actually specifies the nature and scope of that legal and regulatory framework, and the links between such decisions. Documents show that some progress has been achieved in this regard, but that there is a great deal more that needs to be in place. Some decisions may appear to be geared to a comprehensive regional integration process, but they fall short of potential or even the visions of Heads of State (for examples, border –related decisions are mostly based on facilitating trade administration rather than creating a situation where internal border controls are eliminated altogether (refer to Panama 2 Declaration and the intent and decisions of the Vienna 2006 Conference that fully recognised the need for legislation and regulation for RIOs to define and implement a judicial framework and its mechanisms).</p> <p>Documents point to the finding that the problem may not be the intent, but the implementation. The CA RSP and the MTR for PAIRCA 2 pointed this out. The problems are not only with the economic integration but with all domains, including environment and social domains. An effort was made in the 2007-08 period to provide a better framework for the SICA system, and that was essential, but it was mostly dealing with internal regimes amongst RIOs and within Member States concerning border management. The only significant result of that reform effort in that period was the acceptance of what is now the “five pillars”, essentially the priority concerns for RI. The pillars are not priority results per se, but represent domains in which the political leaders wanted to focus their attention.</p> <p>The EU has provided a considerable level of support for the development of legal and regulatory frameworks (examples include those for the harmonisation of tariffs and trade as well as the structures and procedures for customs unions). The EU has also supported the more “political” consensus processes, including a significant effort to obtain consensus amongst CA Member States during the preparatory and negotiating phases of the AA (that all have a direct link to regional integration). CA Member States are the key to this issue and it is they that should lead this development; a plan or even a statement of needs and priorities has not been prepared.</p> <p>Various country-level “structuring” initiatives supported by the EC were also put into place to help generate regulatory frameworks (ex. phytosanitary measures in Costa Rica, country-level improvement of legal and financial environment in El Salvador). The documentation does not identify how these initiatives are coordinated or planned., but field research has shown that there is essentially no coordination or supporting region-wide policy dialogue. The CA Member States are the key to the development of regulatory and legal frameworks under which the RIO will operate, but they have never shown leadership in generating common approaches and harmonisation of processes and standards (for example). A plan for a more effective framework or even a statement of needs and priorities has not been</p>

	<p>prepared. The analysis done for Evaluation Question 1 contains a table (1.6) that analyses the country-level planning and implementation that the EU has supported throughout CA. Overall it shows that although the intent to strengthen the main actors of economic growth are present in CSPs, there is no particular framework to develop the comparative advantage of individual countries or to create enabling frameworks to guide growth on a regional basis, a strategy that would require the development of capabilities within RIO to provide the leadership.</p> <p>The field interviews with senior officials in the DUE and in RIO emphasised that since the SICA System (including its political structures) is essentially an inter-governmental architecture, its key challenges will not be fixed through technical efficiency or effectiveness. A much greater part must be played by political dialogue. The EU, according to regional officials, had not played that card strongly enough yet to have made a real difference; that political dialogue must take place not only at the regional level but must be coordinated with national level dialogue over a long period of time.</p> <p>A large number of RIO officials noted that the behaviours and practices of political decision-makers resulted in RIO that appeared to have a mandate to act but cannot in reality. Eventually the leaders and champions of RI will need to better define their JOINT expectations and require accountability from their technical staffs within the MS. There is, for example, a clear lack of the DEFINITIVE MODELS that should be applied; for example, PRIAA will soon undertake a mandate to propose an economic model. The model that should be used for community-level law also needs to be defined. The model for the transit and treatment of border controls also needs to be defined and promulgated. (Many other models can be identified). The EU cannot be expected to continue to support the development of technical solutions to problems when the overall model and performance expectations are not yet agreed upon.</p> <p>In fact, documents and comments from EU officials clearly point to the fact that the CA Member States are not prepared to delegate powers to RIO, including delegated authorities for economic integration. The EU officials note that a reform plan for SICA has been prepared but that the Member States are not supportive of any supranational institutions.</p>
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p>The need to put in place a legal and regulatory framework for economic integration and the key mechanisms and instruments to support and manage that has been recognised by the Member States for many years although no single document actually makes that official. Some progress has been achieved:</p> <p><i>“Major achievements have been to put in place legal instruments and other measures for deepening sub-regional trade including: a) establishment of a dispute settlement mechanism; b) trade facilitation by eliminating most of the 60 obstacles to trade identified at the beginning of 2002; c) progress with modernisation of customs and border crossing formalities; and d) reduction in the list of exceptions for the products excluded from free movement between SIECA members.”</i></p> <p><i>CA RSP 2007-13 p. 8</i></p> <p>Other mechanism have been implemented but they are essentially geared towards facilitating but are not, strictly speaking, the elements of a customs union, which would remove border controls altogether. At the time of the preparation of the RSP major policy and legal impediments halted the evolution towards customs unions, including the problems of tax revenue distribution, and the need for a legal framework that would create a common external tariff, the harmonisation of sales and consumption taxes, and the complexity and accountability that comes with control. Another problem is the legal framework that is</p>

created with the putting into place of a trade agreement with third party countries; these need to be harmonised and this generally means renegotiation with those parties. (CA RSP 2007-13, p.9).

The INTENT of the CA Member States (specifically SIECA Member States) is clear.

“A set of quite ambitious guidelines established by the Panama II Central American Presidential Declaration of 12 July 1997 aims at rationalising and strengthening the regional integration framework. These reforms include: closer coordination between all parties, unifying the different secretariats in a single Secretariat-General, working towards a single legal instrument reviewing and rationalising the statutes, cost and functioning of PARLACEN (the Central American Parliament) and the Central American Court of Justice in the process, and adopting an automatic financing mechanism plus a single budget.”

CA RSP p.10

In addition, the Vienna meeting of 2006, the Panama 2006 meeting, the seeking of ways to ratify the CA treaty on investment and services and its intent to develop a jurisdictional mechanism to enforce regional economic legislation throughout the region are all indications of that intent and represent a clear sign that the Heads of State were well aware of the need for legislation and regulation as well as for mechanisms and instruments (CA RSP p.9)

The problem appears to not be at the intent level, but at the implementation level. Even the 2007 RSP noted that this was a major issue:

“However, this progress has not been backed up by similar progress on implementing the institutional reforms adopted in Panama in 1997 or advancing on this issue. The slow progress with carrying out this reform is acting as a brake on implementation of the regional initiatives and achievement of the regional integration objectives agreed at the highest level.

In this regard, a number of critical issues require attention. These include:

The persisting serious problems with coordination, follow-up, execution and evaluation of presidential and ministerial decisions, identified in the Panama II Reform Guidelines;

The need to consolidate the legal base of the institutional set-up and to amend the statutes of the CCJ and PARLACEN in order to streamline their cost and operation. The system must have a clearly defined legal base outlining the powers and mandates of each instance so that roles cannot be misinterpreted. It is also essential to ensure that the powers/mandates of regional institutions are focused primarily on matters of a regional nature;

The need to establish an automatic financing mechanism for the regional institutions, to be defined by the Ministers of Finance, and an audit or financial control mechanism;

The need to ensure administrative efficiency, by attempting to unify sectoral (sic) integration secretariats in a single Secretariat-General and by providing all concerned with clear mandates together with adequate financial and human resources. A number of secretariats do not have the necessary resources to carry out their mandates;

The strength of regional integration also depends to a large extent on achieving the broadest possible participation by member countries in the regional institutions and the effective participation of the key players (governments, civil society and regional entities) in the process.“

CA RSP 2007-13 p. 10

The 2007-13 CA RSP, p. 13 also makes clear that:

“Significant work remains to be done to improve the coordination, legal base, financing, mandates, organisation and technical competence and human resources of the various technical secretariats.”

And

While the entire issue of compliance and the binding nature of decisions remains a significant issue that seriously weakens the legal and regulatory frameworks that are, or need to be, put into place:

“The embryonic nature of common legislation and binding instruments, together with the weakness of enforcement mechanisms, threatens to damage the legitimacy of the process through lack of practical application of measures and decisions.”

CA RSP 2007-13 p. 14

The overarching issue of environmental management and especially that of the coordination and facilitation of policies and environmental positions on a regional level has not been resolved through the SICA system. The national counterparts and legal frameworks take precedence in all but a few policy areas but neither the national or RIO have the legal frameworks and political support to manage the environment according to international standards. Institutions are always seen as being weak and therefore ineffective.

“The region has a rich biodiversity, but is affected by man-made environmental degradation and is highly vulnerable to natural disasters, which particularly affect the poorest populations.

Environmental institutions and policies are weak and cannot properly address environmental damage.”

CA MTR 2010 p.1

In large measure the weaknesses in the environmental domain are ascribed to very limited regulatory frameworks, political interference and an unwillingness to support the institutions responsible for compliance (various media reports). Moreover, the fragmentation of the various SICA institutions has led to a lack of coordinated and sustained efforts that can only be overcome through a reform of the organisational structure of SICA and a re-distribution of authorities in certain important sectors. The region has yet to undertake this concentration:

“However, there is no consensus among CA governments on a thorough overhaul of SICA, e.g. the creation of a Single Secretariat.

Regional institutions remain weak as there is insufficient political support from all CA 6 countries, and no regional financing mechanisms have yet been adopted, despite the fact that several proposals have been tabled.”

CA MTR p.5

Political decisions concerning the institutional architecture of the RIOs and their relationship to Member States and to each other have been taken in the 2007-2008 period that appear to improve the management of the SICA System. These are not very difficult decisions to take; the rationalisation of the RIOs is much more difficult:

“... some substantial reforms have been introduced to improve the management of the Central American Integration System (SICA). Worth mentioning are: the creation of the Executive Committee of the Member States in February 2008; the establishment of a Regional Court of Auditors for SICA; the creation of a Directorate for Planning and Analysis in the Secretariat (SG); improved follow-up of Presidential decisions;

and the adoption of sector strategies in areas such as energy, regional security, social cohesion, forestry, agriculture, food security and climate change. The Presidents have also instructed SG-SICA to propose a multiannual work programme for integration.

PARLACEN has undergone some reforms, while Guatemala has decided to participate in the CA Court of Justice.”

CA Mid-term Review p. 6

Key officials in both SG SICA and SIECA reported that a key consideration concerning the present structure of the “SICA System” is that the vast majority of its component parts are the remnants of past Treaties (between as few as two but often much more) countries in CA; they were not created to be part of the SICA system at all. The organisational architecture of the entire system, therefore, was designed for other purposes except all-encompassing Regional Integration. Not all heads of these sub-organisations recognise the SG of SG SICA as a hierarchical relationship and therefore do not follow the suggestions made by SG SICA. In this way, the political image of a “SICA System” has no real existence except through collaboration.

Reference 22 of field notes

The field interviews with senior officials in the DUE and in RIO emphasised that since the SICA System (including its political structures) is essentially an inter-governmental architecture, its key challenges will not be fixed through technical efficiency or effectiveness. A much greater part must be played by political dialogue. The EU, according to regional officials, had not played that card strongly enough yet to have made a real difference; that political dialogue must take place not only at the regional level but must be coordinated with national level dialogue over a long period of time.

Reference 21 of field notes

A large number of RIO officials noted that the behaviours and practices of political decision-makers resulted in RIO that appeared to have a mandate to act but cannot in reality. Eventually the leaders and champions of RI will need to better define their JOINT expectations and require accountability from their technical staffs within the MS. There is, for example, a clear lack of the DEFINITIVE MODELS that should be applied; for example, PRIAA will soon undertake a mandate to propose an economic model. The model that should be used for community-level law also needs to be defined. The model for the transit and treatment of border controls also needs to be defined and promulgated. (Many other models can be identified). The EU cannot be expected to continue to support the development of technical solutions to problems when the overall model and performance expectations are not yet agreed upon.

Reference 115 in field notes

“Still, a large number of deputies do not have a clear idea how and where the RI is to take place. But it is not only them, but most of the “funcionarios” in the region don’t know either. A large part of the problem is that there is no definition of the legal and financial structures or even how this is all supposed to work in practice”. The speaker went on to say that this can either be a long process (following the existing practices and behaviours) or a shorter one (following a practice that is much more concerted and directed).

	<p>Reference 143 in field notes</p> <p>Many senior officials noted, in one way or another, that there is no installed capacity to plan and manage at the strategic level throughout the RIO and their political masters. The capacity gap is further extended to the inability to deal with “results” or “targets” or “performance”. The SG SICA is only now developing a Strategic Plan but it is not based on results; the PARLACEN has prepared an Hoja de Ruta but it has not been approved. SIECA is in its second or third Strategic Planning Cycle depending on what is counted as a formal document. In practice, many of these efforts at organising and planning are cut short because they are not approved. Officials also noted that it is relatively useless to spend much effort at developing plans if the only thing being monitored are budgets. The paradigm shift (term used by the interviewer) has to be towards understanding CAPABILITY and not capacity and its integration into PERFORMANCE specifications.</p> <p>Reference 136 of field notes</p> <p>“One on the key results of the EU in SG SICA is to put into place a planning function (Directorate) paid for by PAIRCA 1</p> <p>Reference 68 field notes</p> <p>Interviewees in the DEU noted that a recurring issue is the disjointed overlaps of leaderships in the various RIO. For example, the SICA System has its Cumbre of Presidents that, in 2014, will have presidents that are from Belize and the Dominican Republic. That leadership is not expected to be very effective, given their status in the SICA.</p> <p>Reference 25 in field notes</p> <p>The need to find diplomatic common ground on which to proceed in an environment in which the individual CA MS want to retain their heritage systems and privileges has resulted in a shift away from a directed approach in political decision-making to an approach that is much more conceptual. Numerous interviewees indicated, when asked why there was not a greater emphasis on “results” and “targets”, replied that the political decision-makers found it much easier to agree on “themes” or “pillars” or on statements of intent. They felt that the CA MS will eventually begin to be much more specific and directive, but could offer no timetable. They also referred to the evolution of the nature of the agreements and protocols over the past twenty years, from Teguscigalpa (creation of SICA as a concept) to Guatemala (in reality an update and reinforcement of the 1970 regional agreement) and the shifts in emphasis from commercial issues to the present “five pillars” of economic, social, political, cultural and environmental concerns that forms the basis of the SICA “strategic plan”, such as it is. They also noted the evolutionary nature of those shifts with the current emphasis on “Democratic Security” as a “theme”</p> <p>Reference 111 of field notes</p> <p>A very senior RIO official noted that the EU can be particularly and uniquely useful to the RI process and should not get discouraged by the problems it faces in its regional programming. It has a unique model to offer and should continue to help the region to adapt that model (ex. should there be a regional parliament if no supranational delegations are in place?). The Fact is that the various RIO have no real power to impose anything, and are mandated to recommend and implement decisions taken elsewhere. If those decisions are not accepted by all CA MS then the regional-level harmonisation has its limits. MS still</p>
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	<p>have not begun to internalise the fact that the decisions they take have regional impacts, and that their decision-making has to take that into account. “The average citizen and the majority of organisations in the CA zone are not aware of how to act within a regional context”, it was noted.</p> <p>Reference 115 of field notes</p> <p>“There has been a large number of exchanges (ex. CCJ and PARLACEN) and studies (PAIRCA 1 and 2) to see how the EU model can be applied here”</p> <p>Reference 26 of field notes</p> <p>Many interviewees in all countries visited mentioned the efforts in the past to “reform” the system. They noted that generally speaking, the political heads are supporting an effort to reform but when it comes to decision-making concerning structure and architecture, the reforms fall flat. They note that PAIRCA 1 was very much interested in reform, as has been PAIRCA 2. The latter has done feasibility studies, diagnostics, gap analyses and other studies but the approval of the Presidents has not been forthcoming. (refer to five pillars). The need for some of these reforms is obvious (ex: placing Cenpromype under SIECA (an economic body) instead of SG SICA (a political body), and reforming the financial (funding) structures to guarantee that the available funding goes to the highest priority needs.</p> <p>Reference 27 of field notes</p>
<p>I-2.1.2 – Existing work plans relate required financial assets to available resources</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>Work plans are essential for planning but they are useful only if accompanied by monitoring and supervision. In terms of monitoring, there are a number of observations that have been made in various documents concerning the lack of precision within planning documents, including the PAIRCA 2 work plan and its LFA and the SIECA Work plan. In fact the MTR posits that the LFA is invalid for a number of reasons, including its vagueness and lack of specificity. Although the work plans provide activity planning support, they do not include all financial resources and in the case of SG-SICA specifically, only relate to EU funds.</p> <p>As noted above, the PAIRCA 2 Action Fiche also used vague descriptors for its expected results, and therefore there is no way to link performance to financial needs or to financial budgets. For example the following are found as key result areas: “deepen...in the process...”, “...capacities...are improved...” “...collaboration ...strengthened”, “participation...increased”, and “...awareness ...increased”. None of these expressions are further defined and none have baselines or targets.</p> <p>What is never documented is the extent to which the work that needs to be done to meet performance expectations is actually able to be done (because of financing limits, or absorption capacity or even institutional ability). So what is documented is the allocation of financial resources to “activities”. Given that a significant part of the stated results remain at process or output levels. The finding must be that there work plans do not relate REQUIRED financial assets to AVAILABLE resources. The documents examined were also limited to specific institutions and did not reflect “issue” planning, or the need to involve other partners and stakeholders in the business ecosystem in the budgeting. It is noteworthy that the key examples of work planning and reporting are all contained in EU-financed documents; they may be used as models to develop an ability to plan on the basis</p>

	<p>of the link between results and resources.</p> <p>In terms of distributing financial assets to work plans, it was brought to the attention of the interviewer that PAIRCA 1 and 2 sis not put into place any “logical” filters to choose amongst requests for financial support. The PAIRCA 2 was designed with allocations already defined and the management team has little or no discretion; the various “projects” that were identified for funding were done without reference to results and systems were not designed to monitor on that basis. Overall, the project design did not include a means to define the “theory of Change” so that the whole would be greater than the sum of the parts. The design also enabled the SG SICA to get involved in projects that are ex-mandate (ex: working at the municipal level and in tourism). The logic of the support for these types of interventions is not clear.</p> <p>Furthermore, it is noted that much of the financial support provided to SIECA and SG-SICA will not result in autonomous institutional abilities; the PAIRCA 2 MTR even goes on to question the commitment of RIO to reform, and the performance (or lack thereof) of some of these RIO would support that claim.</p>
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p>In terms of monitoring, there are a number of observations that have been made (see below) concerning the lack of precision within planning documents, including the PAIRCA 2 WP and its LFA. The MTR for that initiative spoke to that problem. In fact the MTR posits that the LFA is invalid for a number of reasons.</p> <p><i>“El Marco Lógico original fue elaborado en la fase de la formulación y los indicadores fueron definidos con poca precisión para no convertirlos en una camisa de fuerza para el programa desde el inicio. Esto es correcto; mientras se vayan definiendo las actividades debe haber una cierta flexibilidad.</i></p> <p><i>En el 2011 se hizo un ejercicio en el equipo de gestión para revisar el primer Marco Lógico y se elaboró el Marco Lógico Actualizado. En este segundo Marco Lógico, que estaba vigente en el momento de esta evaluación, todavía los indicadores son difícilmente medibles y sigue faltando precisión para que pueda servir como un instrumento verdadero de seguimiento y evaluación.»</i></p> <p>And</p> <p><i>«La lógica de intervención y la coherencia entre actividades, resultados y objetivos es válida en teoría. En cuanto al Objetivo General se debe anotar que la legitimidad del sistema ante los gobiernos y la ciudadanía no se logra únicamente mediante reformas internas de las instituciones, sino sobre todo por el acercamiento y el involucramiento de Gobiernos y la ciudadanía y es en estos campos donde la intervención del PAIRCA II ha incidido relativamente poco.</i></p> <p><i>Muchas de las hipótesis del Marco Lógico no han sido válidas; la gran mayoría de ellos se formularon en términos de “voluntad política, buena disposición, interés de las instituciones en reformas, decisiones de órganos y autoridades”. Se puede argumentar que en muchos casos hubo ambigüedades en el nivel de compromiso con procesos de reforma necesarios para un verdadero fortalecimiento.»</i></p> <p><i>MTR PAIRCA 2, p.19</i></p> <p>The MTR recommended that institutional support to SICA be eliminated in future PAIRCA interventions until certain conditions are met. The intent appears to be to “force” CA Member States to provide the SICA institutions with the required authority and finances to enable them to support the regional integration process. It does not specify how</p>

the same institutions could develop the capacity to bring the conditions to fruition.

“Bajo las actuales circunstancias no se recomienda seguir financiando programas de fortalecimiento institucional con el SICA en esta línea con un PAIRCA III. Futuras cooperaciones de la CE con el SICA, si hubiese, deben ser condicionadas a mejoras sustanciales en el sistema de autofinanciamiento, presupuesto único, adherencia a un plan plurianual funcional hecho y respetado por el SICA y una alineación mucho mayor entre el sistema, la CE y todos los demás donantes a la hora del diseño de los programas »

MTR PAIRCA 2, p.10

Overall, insecurity prevails over the scope of the work that can be done by RIOs and that means that they cannot direct their efforts at longer-term outcomes; this insecurity is largely due to non-sustainable funding because there is no permanent mechanism in place:

“... no regional financing mechanisms have yet been adopted, despite the fact that several proposals have been tabled.”

CA MTR p.6

“There is evidently financial absorption capacity given the many priorities and financial needs of SICA. However, the absence of consensus among governments on adopting a financial mechanism, despite the various proposals tabled (e.g. through PAIRCA), represents an important weakness. As a result, regional institutions depend (too much) on external assistance. The establishment of such a financial mechanism is key to the sustainability of the regional institutional system and represents an important political challenge for the countries of the region.”

CA MTR p.10

The PARICA 2 Action fiche noted that:

‘...as a result institutions have remained highly dependent on external cooperation for the provision of funds, normally on a project basis, as there is no regional strategy to align to and no conditions for GBS or SPSP. Still they have difficulties to cover co-financing demands and to meet sustainability requirements as well as to set up appropriate mechanisms to ensure ownership, harmonisation and alignment’

PAIRCA 2 Action Fiche p. 2.

The Action Fiche also used vague descriptors for its expected results, and therefore there is no way to link performance to financial needs or to financial budgets. For example the following are found as key result areas: “deepen...in the process...”, “...capacities...are improved...” “...collaboration ...strengthened”, “participation...increased”, and “...awareness ...increased”.

PAIRCA 2 Action Fiche pp. 5-8.

There is a fundamental problem with PAIRCA 2 when it comes to linking results to finances. The results framework of the LFA is overly vague and not specific.

“...pero los resultados son demasiado abiertos y debe concretarse el nivel de alcance esperado”... “tampoco son útiles los indicadores inicialmente establecidas”

Response sheet to ROM, dated 14 June 2010, p. 1

The second PAIRCA Annual Work Plan (the so-called PT2) did provide a link between budgets and activities. In fact, it does so by linking financial allocations to expected results of PAIRCA 2, but the results are not specific enough.

The PAIRCA 2 Work Plan example noted below does not necessarily reflect on SICA's ability to manage and report in the appropriate fashion (by result, and not by activity or input).

The same breakdown is provided for Result 3 and Result 4, both of which being entrusted to the UNDP. It is observed that most of the activities that were to be undertaken by UNDP dealing with civil Society could likely have been executed by NGOs. As it is, the UNDP is developing ITS abilities to strategize, plan, contract, manage and evaluate. In fact, it is going to provide training to national counterparts in many ministries and RIO agencies. The WP does not specify "capacity for what" (refer to p. 36-37).

See PAIRCA 2 WP p. 19 for an example of results based financial budgeting for actions managed by SG SICA. See Page 33 to 50 for UNDP's analysis.

Documents show that there is a great deal of consensus (coherence) between the objectives of the SICA and the PAIRCA 2:

«Los niveles de apropiación en la Secretaría General son altos. Hay una coincidencia muy grande entre lo que considera la Secretaría sus objetivos y lo propuesto por el PAIRCA II. El hecho que el programa está dentro de la estructura de la SG ha contribuido sin duda a esta apropiación. Según altos funcionarios del SG, muchos de los procesos iniciados por PAIRCA II se seguirán consolidando aún después de finalizar el programa, pero claro está; con menos velocidad por no contar con los recursos para realizar la misma cantidad de actividades y eventos.»

MTR PAIRCA 2 p. 18

Documents also show that there is a fundamental issue with the conviction, on the part of RIO, to reform:

«Sin embargo, a medida que se alejan los beneficiarios del programa, el caso de PARLACEN, la CCJ y otros beneficiarios, se puede observar que los niveles de apropiación bajan. La conclusión del análisis de las entrevistas es que los fondos del PAIRCA II son muy bienvenidos pero a la vez se concluye que los niveles de compromiso real de algunos beneficiarios con las reformas tangibles que pretende lograr el programa, no siempre convencen. Es probable que hay una relación entre, por un lado, la intensidad de la consulta durante el diseño de las actividades y, por otro, los niveles de apropiación que se observan actualmente en los diferentes beneficiarios.»

...

«La apropiación por parte de los Países Miembros del SICA, específicamente por parte de las cancillerías visitadas por la Misión, se considera baja. En parte se debe a una frecuente rotación de personal en algunas cancillerías pero también es por el bajo volumen de actividades con estos actores y una comunicación mejorable.»

MTR PAIRCA 2 p. 18

Overall, there has been a problem with the issue of the extent to which AT are well used. Analysis shows that they have spent little effort in capacity development and considerable time in non-content applications:

“No obstante, en la calidad y cantidad en capacitaciones estructuradas de la ATI en temas de integración u otros temas sustantivos del programa, ya sea vía los expertos principales o los expertos corto plazo, ha sido muy poco, contrastando con la alta cantidad de hombres día ya consumidos, lo que apunta a una productividad baja en términos de transferencia de conocimientos. Vale mencionar, que las propias dinámicas del beneficiario han jugado un rol importante, empero, se podrían haber identificado, formulado e implementado en base a análisis de necesidades de capacitación, múltiples formaciones en temas derivados de la integración regional, tanto para instituciones del SICA como para Cancillerías, estas últimas en gran necesidad de estos temas.»

MTR PAIRCA 2, p. 37

A very senior SICA official as well as a senior SIECA official noted that many donors, including the EU, do not take sufficiently into account that the CA MS represent a highly asymmetrical group of countries. While they may, on the surface, appear to be homogeneous, there are wide differences between them in all respects, including their ability to support RIO, the economic activities that they favour and the administrative processes that they see as most appropriate. The EU should not, therefore, expect equal contributions, and should view changes concerning harmonisation or alignment as being very, very difficult. The SICA System, its frameworks and the various processes that are inherent in the CA environment are the reflection of those differences. One interviewee noted that “there is much more that keeps them apart than keeps them together”

Reference 52 of field notes

Interviewees identified that the RIO are not doing their mid to long term budgeting on the basis of what has to be done but on the basis of what funds they have (estimates were provided that 90% of the activities of SICA are funded from donors. This could not be verified). The interviewees also validated that the budget systems used by RIO is not based on results.

Reference 28 of field notes

The mandates of most RIO are not supported by the funding they receive. Interviews with CCAD showed that this once-important RIO has been reduced to relative marginality because the MS that used to fund it have moved on. The CCJ has important mandates (refer to article 22f of Tegucigalpa Agreement that notes that CCJ is a means to intervene to resolve disputes between countries relative to RI) but has only three funding partners amongst MS (ES, Honduras and Nicaragua. Guatemala is a member but does not contribute financially). To illustrate the sensitivities involved it has been pointed out that the CCJ has organised capacity development events in Panama (not a member of CCJ yet) with the support of the Supreme Court there, and Costa Rica has territorial disputes with Nicaragua and has decided not to support the CCJ in part because it is located there (there are also differences of opinion on approach taken by CCJ). The various law schools in the region are now concerned that the graduates and existing lawyers across the region are not aware of community-based law (derecho comunitario), and the CCJ has the mandate to change that, but has no funding. The CCJ also has a role to play in arbitration under the AA but will need financial and institutional support.

It should be noted that under PAIRCA 2, a significant amount of support was provided to the CCJ for project-based operations, In fact, almost 2000 majistrates and lawyers have received some form of development, but the need still great for deeper knowledge. Institutionally, PAIRCA also provided some funding to help equip a school that is located in Granada, Nicaragua, to train members of the legal profession. That support has dried up and the strategy for the development and implementation of the CCJ's operations needs to be defined.

Most RIO must find their own funding and INDEPENDENTLY approach donors. The Executive Council of SICA is trying to put into place a requirement that would force these RIO to seek some form of approval from the Exec Com before approaching the donors, but this is a RELEVANCE check and not a solution to the financing crisis.

References 65 and 43 field notes

In terms of distributing financial assets to work plans, it was brought to the attention of the interviewer that PAIRCA 1 and 2 sis not put into place any "logical" filters to choose amongst requests for financial support. The PAIRCA 2 was designed with allocations already defined and the management team has little or no discretion; the various "projects" that were identified for funding were done without reference to results and systems were not designed to monitor on that basis. Overall, the project design did not include a means to define the "theory of Change" so that the whole would be greater than the sum of the parts. The design also enabled the SG SICA to get involved in projects that are ex-mandate (ex: working at the municipal level and in tourism). The logic of the support for these types of interventions is not clear.

Reference 66 field notes

"... each organisation (i.e. RIO or part thereof) has its own plans, cooperants, budgets, admin systems, IT systems etc. The net result is that the "SICA SYSTEM" is not a system in the managerial sense of the word, even if it is a conglomeration of organisations with a common thread (i.e. regional "integration")". In this light, it is impossible to allocate resources on a rational basis.

Reference 67 field notes

The EU has also had an indirect impact on the status of the PARLACEN and what it stands for. "The court systems are only as good as the credibility they have. The EU helped the PARLACEN to develop its relationships with national and international organisations including EUROLAT through the generation of a major white paper that helped PARLACEN be elected to the CO-Presidency of that organisation. As a result, there is now a strategic plan for EEUROLAT paid for, in part, through PAIRCA 2.

Senior officials noted that the ongoing funding for PARLACEN remains a major issue, but part of the evolution of PARLACEN has been to put into place the basis for work planning that could be tied to results and funding sources. For example, thanks to the EU, it now has a positioning plan and a communications programme to inform CA citizens and organisations of the nature and benefits of PARLACEN; it now has programs and activities to integrate indigenous peoples into the organisation; it has a programme to include gender

	<p>issues in its deliberations; it has user manuals and better defined processes, and it has a voice in key process issues involving the SICA System as a whole. It is now in a better position to begin working with accountability but it has not been able to secure its financial sustainability. Nor has it been able to “justify” its existence with all political decision-makers.</p> <p>Overall, PARLACEN representatives were aware that there have been issues with the nature of the spending of PAIRCA 2 money (much of it, they claim, is the perception of the usefulness of those expenditures). They also note that the support to that RIO started late and did not last long enough to be as effective as it should have been (the original request was for 36 months but that was reduced to less than half)</p> <p>Reference 134 and 139 in field notes</p>
<p>I-2.1.3 – Legal frameworks are translated into mission statements and objectives</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>Overall, the mandates of RIO are stated in minimalist terms in their legislative frameworks (or decisions without a legislative basis, as may be the case). The organisational architecture of the SG-SICA has been challenged by many as being ineffective, but no political decision has been reached at this stage; the entire economic integration thrust in CA is not managed through an international organisation but through inter-governmental processes (ex. decisions taken in consensus by the Ministers of Economic Integration) that is technically supported by SIECA (and not, interestingly, SG SICA). The mission and objectives are therefore not managed or coordinated by SICA RIOs but those of Member States that need to achieve some form of consensus before each decision is made. There is also no real coordination or management function to move this consensus building forward per se. There is still a significant amount of inefficiencies that are caused by the lack of a centralizing function (planning, priorities, coordination, etc. for the RIO).</p> <p>In terms of some of the sector RIOs such as environment, documents note that CA national environmental institutions often have legal frameworks that do not correspond to modern needs and international collaboration in the important fields of climate change and disaster management. Other documents point to the same problem where intra-CA and RIO- Member States legal frameworks are concerned.</p> <p>It was also reported that discussions with PAIRCA 2 managers indicated that there was a serious lack of awareness generally on RI across the zone, both amongst the general population (including CSO) and, more importantly, amongst public servants. As a result of ICAPs activities it was recognised that the technical level officials either did not receive instructions from their superiors on what to do to implement RI, or they chose to ignore it.</p> <p>In fact, it was noted that “Hay poca comunicaciones entre los pronocimientos de presidents y la implementation” and “... no hay seguimiento de los decisions presidenciales”</p>
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p>It is important to note that the entire economic integration thrust in CA is not managed through an international organisation but through inter-governmental processes (decisions taken in consensus by the Ministers of Economic Integration) that is technically supported by SIECA. The mission and objectives are therefore not SIECA’s but those of Member States.</p> <p>CA national environmental institutions often have legal frameworks that do not correspond to modern needs and international collaboration in the important fields of climate change</p>

and disaster management:

“A major effort, already under way to some extent in the region, is needed to better understand the potential impacts of climate change, help strengthen adaptive capacity, and promote adaptation measures. This will require the swift integration of climate change adaptation into sustainable development planning and within the development strategies for key sectors, at both national and regional level. Central American countries would benefit, as regards possible impact of climate change, from greater adaptation of research results and attention to technology transfer, where appropriate.”

CA MTR 2010-13 p. 5

The issue of what to develop in terms of capacity was recently brought forward by the MTR for PAIRCA 2 in 2012. The same report also questioned whether the capacity development was in fact development or operational subsidy (i.e. not geared to sustainable change or to the capability of the institution), and decided for the latter

Se observa en el programa un entendimiento ambiguo del significado de “fortalecimiento institucional”. Por un lado puede ser entendido como un apoyo a una reforma institucional o la modernización y, por otro lado, como la provisión de liquidez para el financiamiento de actividades ordinarias del sistema. Los consultores opinan que esta última interpretación no es un “fortalecimiento” sino un “subsidio” que no resulta en fortalecimiento. Gran parte del PAIRCA II constituye un subsidio y no conduce necesariamente a un fortalecimiento.

MTR PAIRCA 2

That the SIECA did not have an adequate institutional planning mechanism in place is supported by the following reference:

“SIECA had a work plan consisting of a kind of “check list” semi-annual which lacked proper professional technical rigor, marked by the absence of a vision defined, protected in the legal framework and mandates of higher organisms such as the Plan of work of the Presidency Pro-Tempore of the integration system in affable parts to the subsystem Economic and work plans of COMIECO, as well as the lack of goals, activities and scheduled deadlines. In order to overcome such flaw, proceeded to make a diagnosis that establish the State of affairs in the different areas of institutional work.

As a result of the above, it has the date with a Plan of management Strategic 2011-2014, set to the period 2012-2014, structured in four axes (theme: 1) deepening of the economic integration process; 2) Processes internally efficient and transparent; 3) Cooperation and 4) institutional projection. As knowledge of this Council, in the framework of the institutions of the SICA is not entrenched a culture of planning and management by results. To end to overcome these gaps in the SIECA, was developed in each of its units, Operative plans annually, which are monitored permanently and which the corresponding adjustments are made every six months”.

Letter written by former DG SIECA to Ministers on July 2, 2013

A senior RIO official noted that the legal framework that defined his organisation was, in many respects, misleading because it clearly gave the impression that it was a decision-making body that could influence policy. " this... has little influence on decision-makers. We don't have that mandate in practice". The “theory” or “architectural concept” in the domain of that institution is clearly designed to place authority in the hands of ministers.

The reality, according to the interviewee, is that the ministers meet rarely, don't master the technical concepts and do not impose decisions CA-wide. As a result, the same topics (for decisions) are continually placed on the agenda for discussion. The slightest discrepancy in approach that is presented by a CA MS is cause to reject the technical proposal.

Reference 125 field notes

A high ranking official noted that "SIECA sees its counterparts as the "aduanas" of this world, and not the higher level functions such as "commerce" or growth or security. The former is the embodiment of protectionist behaviour and as such bringing about changes to policy or practice at the CA-wide levels is almost impossible.

"The World Bank, BID and other donors have tried to change this, but the decisions that are published by the highest levels read like wish lists and are not concrete". Furthermore, according to the interviewee, the decisions have no means of being monitored and rarely is it clear who has the responsibility (accountability) to implement the decision. There is no formal follow-up system.

Based on the above, one could surmise that the objectives and mission statements of that RIO are out of phase with its legal framework.

Reference 125 and 126 field notes

Various interviewees noted that the need to align the legal framework to the objectives and then to work plans and strategic plans has not always been possible partly because of the fluid nature of the legal frameworks and the lack of further clarification from political decision-makers. One example is PARLACEN where AT were requested and then assigned to support a "commission" dealing with a specific topic. They were largely unable to accomplish "institutional development" tasks because the logical framework for those expected results were not commonly agreed to, and a considerable amount of consensus-building would have to have been carried out on the basic structural elements in order to proceed .

The EU thus provided technical assistance but the institution was largely unable to direct them due to weak institutional frameworks. Again, it was noted that has the funding frameworks been better rationalised (ex. All MS are part of and contribute to all RIO) there would have been pressure to clarify the building blocks.

Reference 142 field notes

Interviews with senior officials resulted in an apparent consensus on the need for a greater level of activity involving detailed knowledge of the concepts, mechanics and values of RI. Part of this function has been provided by ICAP in Costa Rica which, over the years, has been mandated with the training of public servants concerning RI. PAIRCA 2 provided support to that institution which in turn prepared a training programme in RI and delivered that programme to people across CA. One thrust of the training dealt with economic integration and the other was political integration.

	<p>It was also reported that discussions with PAIRCA 2 managers indicated that there was a serious lack of awareness generally on RI across the zone, both amongst the general population (including CSO) and, more importantly, amongst public servants. As a result of ICAPs activities it was recognised that the technical level officials either did not receive instructions from their superiors on what to do to implement RI, or they chose to ignore it.</p> <p>In fact, it was noted that “Hay poca comunicaciones entre los pronocimientos de presidents y la implementation” and “... no hay seguimiento de los decisions presidenciales”</p> <p>ICAP officials indicated that they believe that the recent ex-SG of SG SICA had placed a high priority on the development of common values across the CA and awareness of RI generally.</p> <p>Reference 146 and 147 field notes</p>
<p>I-2.1.4 – Financing and funding mechanisms in place to relate results or objectives to sources of funding</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>Although the documentation points to the fact that planning documents for EU-funded projects within the RIO all contain, as implied objectives tied to the adoption of “Results-based management) a means of eventually examining the allocation of funds to results, there are still important issues that limit the usefulness of these analyses. First is the lack of specificity of what constitutes results, effects, activities. These are evident not only in EU documents and project design documents, but also within RIO, as field analysis shows that RIO do not manage by results. Second, the ability to spend money is not necessarily an indicator of progress in development, as documents and interviews that speak to a serious lack of absorption capacity in SICA RIO may attest. Third, the funding plans and budgets of Projects are not comprehensive because they deal only with EU funds and not the entire resource base that would include other donors and the financing by Member States themselves; project management in this context is equivalent to the management of n EU project and not an RIO project.. Fourth, the monitoring systems are not in place to enable the analysis of progress towards effects or results. Fifth, the use of some of the funds to specifically achieve results targets has been put into question in key documents and interviewees: there is significant documentation base that shows that a considerable portion of project funding has not been sustainable or has been spent on activities that are not clearly and directly related to the expected results that were proposed.</p> <p>The key issue here is the fact that existing planning docs do not identify the relationship of the funds to outcomes. Budget proposals do not spell out what has to be done; instead they deal with what can be done with the money available; as a result the EU is faced with partial results or worse, intermediate outputs. .</p>
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p>The financial commitment of CA Member States to SG SICA is not even enough to enable donor interventions for capacity development to be implemented due to institutional absorption ability. It also highlighted the inability of the institutions to monitor (therefore an inability to supervise). This resulted in its first recommendation that asks for the reinforcement of monitoring capacity:</p> <p><i>“La cooperación al SICA está disponible en proporciones que no son asumibles dada la capacidad de absorción del beneficiario »</i></p> <p><i>MTR PAIRCA 2, p. 8</i></p> <p>And</p> <p><i>« Reforzar las capacidades de seguimiento del Equipo de Gestión para los próximos meses y plasmarlo en</i></p>

	<p><i>un plan de acción y compromisos firmes »</i> MTR PAIRCA 2, p. 9</p> <p>The 2012 SIECA results report does not make a link between the results it seeks to accomplish and the funding plan for the organisation. SIECA –Informe por resultados 2012, Dec 2012</p> <p>At least up to the time of the PAIRCA 2 project being implemented the work plans of key RIO were not vetted or approved by Member States.</p> <p>Moreover, the Action Fiche suggested that RESULTS should not be the basis for the set-up of PARICA 2 but that PROCESS, through its milestones as indicators of achievement, should be used. This is not in accordance with EC guidelines and effectively puts aside any objectively verifiable accountability regime. Fiche Action PAIRCA 2, section 3.1.</p> <p>The Action Fiche also notes that the EC is subsidizing SG SICA rather than providing for the development of an autonomous capacity when it notes: <i>“The programme will provide coordination support....on the daily management of its different components”, and “...a permanent core of experts acting as focal points for main institutions (fully integrated...)”</i> Fiche Action PAIRCA 2, p.13</p> <p>This issue is noted in more detail in a monitoring report: <i>“Mientras la SG SICA apuesta por concentrar esfuerzos en el desarrollo de sus propias capacidades de gestión, asumiendo directamente mediante su personal las áreas técnicas, administrativas y la interlocución política que implica el proyecto, con funcionamiento autónomo de la SG SICA, la ATI transmite su preferencia por la existencia de una célula de gestión y administración, con funcionamiento autónomo de la SICA, tal y como ocurrió durante PAIRCA 1)... »</i> Response sheet to ROM report June 2010 p. 2</p> <p>The second phase of the RSP 2007-2013 (RIP 2) was to be specifically oriented towards the customs union as a means of preparing the region for the AA. In this context the EU support could significantly contribute to sustainable financing: <i>“In this context, this support could also contribute to the launching of new financial instruments (financial fund) currently under discussion in parallel with the Association Agreement negotiations and to promoting complementarity with the new Latin America Investment Facility (LAIF) and the increased role of the EIB and other IFIs in supporting regional development.</i></p> <p>The interventions to be funded will follow up - and should complement - earlier support for SIECA in connection with the customs union (UAC, CONSUAC, ADAPCCA and PRACAMS). Having advanced on the economic and commercial front, the customs union could be better perceived by the public at large (including SMEs) if some social aspects (e.g. labour market) could also be brought into the scheme.” CA RSP MTR 2007-2013 p.13</p> <p>The PAIRCA 2 budget was modified in a way that does not change the overall budget</p>
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amounts. The overall effect, however, is to **reduce the content** portion of the project (AT, Studies, etc.) and **increase the overhead portion** of the project (Implementation unit and meetings).

Nota explicative for budget re-allocation PRAIA 2 (no date)

The TAPS for PAIRCA 2 contain a table that defines the allocation of PAIRCA 2 financing to the project's results, It does not, however, define the financial allocations at the SICA level, not does it define the expected results of most of its terms, including 4.1 "Formacion, educacion, investigacion"; 2 (Strengthening if SICA institutions and its national counterparts).

For the detailed information see table 2.1 at the end of this EQ

Regardless of the planning that might (or not) have related finances to results, the PAIRCA 2 project has not lived up to its design logic in that it has incurred significant implementation issues that have delayed it. At the time of the MTR of PAIRCA 2 in late 2012, the initiative had spent only 22 percent of its funds in over 37 months of implementation (Only 17 months remained at that time). The naming of a new administrator and JATI resolved many implementation issues but the project formulation process took place in a hurry and without solid results definition or quality criteria. There was also a major problem with R3 and R4 (UNDP):

«La misión lamenta que no hubo capacidad para iniciar todas las actividades de R3 y R4 porque posiblemente es precisamente en este último sentido que el proceso de integración requiere de apoyo »

MTR PAIRCA 2 p. 8

Another problem notes is the absorption capacity of SICA so the EU cooperation is not being used effectively:

« La cooperación al SICA está disponible en proporciones que no son asumibles dada la capacidad de absorción del beneficiario. Únicamente es justificable esta magnitud de cooperación internacional si es un "financiamiento puente", es decir si está condicionada con garantías reales de autofinanciamiento y capacidad del sistema. La Misión concluye que esto no es el caso y por tanto la cooperación de la CE puede haber contribuido a la materialización de los siguientes riesgos:

- a. Las instituciones del SICA se transforman cada vez más en gestores de fondos externos, distrayéndolos así de su misión institucional y objetivos.*
- b. La SG-SICA y los demás beneficiarios, priorizan sus respectivas actividades en base a las agendas de los donantes según los fondos que reciben y las agendas e intereses de estos últimos, dificultando así la definición de una agenda estratégica hecho por el SICA.*
- c. Desincentivo para priorizar el tema de la autofinanciación del Sistema y en la implementación de los mecanismos de financiación ya existentes.*
- d. Desincentivo al uso eficiente de los recursos debido a la necesidad de demostrar que los fondos que se ponen a disposición sí se ejecutan, aunque el sistema no pueda absorberlos.*
- e. Uso de los fondos para financiación de actividades ordinarias que no contribuyen a los objetivos del PAIRCA II. »*

MTR PAIRCA 2 p.9

The use of the PAIRCA 2 funds has been a concern for some time. Besides the low rate of use of the funds, there is also the gap between the spending levels and the percentage of targeted result/activity completion, especially by the UNDP but also by SICA. The amount being consumed (too costly, too much. Too many people going) for attending meetings worried the MTR team. That team also noted that spending money was not the objective of the intervention. Nevertheless there are a number of financial “issues” that are raised in the MTR that lead to a questioning of the discriminating ability of SICA managers and the PIU and AT in place

(refer to MTR PAIRCA 2 p. 30-31 and its reference to the ERNST and Young audit in 2012)

Before an organisation can set up a system to relate results or objectives to sources of funding, it must have an effective system in place to define the nature and level of its expected results and another (related) system to define the resources it requires to realise those results. Interviewees in many RIO indicated that they did not have a results- based planning in place at this time. This analysis was backed up verbally by key executing agencies working for, or with, the EU regional programme.

Reference 30 field notes

“...the budget of each institution is dependent on the member states that participate. Each organisation negotiates with these countries on an annual, or medium-term basis” Under this condition it is impossible to relate performance results to sources of funding except in broad terms.

Reference 64 field notes

Two senior SICA officials noted that one of the financial quality results of PAIRCA 1 and 2 is the putting into place of the Fiscalisador Regional, or CFR. That office actively supports the use of results as a planning base and advocates accountability for the use of funds from all sources. The CFR recently opined on PAIRCA 2 indicating that it had not produced the results it had proposed since the 2011-2012 period.

Reference 70 and 71 field notes

There is a strategic plan in place for the SG SICA. It has gone through various iterations since a first draft was prepared through PAIRCA 1, but has never been formally approved. A last version was approved by the SG of SG SICA in The first quarter of 2014 but at the time of writing of this report it has not been approved by Presidents. It is not based on result targets but on the pillars that were approved by the Presidents a few years ago. The document does not tie results to funding, nor does it provide the strategies to implement. It is, in fact, more of a long-term vision based on a scoping into the pillars.

Reference 72 field notes

“...neither during PAIRCA 1 or PAIRCA 2 has SICA system organisations expressed their needs in a holistic way (ex. urgency, why these needs, what will the investment enable) so that the resources of those two initiatives could be allocated to the priorities of the SICA System as a whole”

PAIRCA 2 AT prepared a template for project identification and approval based on the needs of the RIO and their sub-organisations. When accompanied by coaching and support

	<p>to fill in the template, it appears to work, providing harmonisation of concepts across all organisations. But that does not resolve how to choose among the proposed projects. For that the SG SICA managers have to develop a selection matrix or an “adjudication grid”. SG SICA refused to bind itself to such an adjudication process, preferring to divide the resources as provided for in the design documents of PAIRCA 2 (organisationally, and not by result)</p> <p>Since there is no analysis, the system for allocation of resources is thus inadequate. Reference 83 field notes</p> <p>Since the Exec Com has decided to pre-approve all requests for funding from RIO, the SG SICA will have to get involved in providing adjudication services (recommendations on appropriateness and priority) for each proposal to the Exec Com. Of the 40 PAIRCA 2 sub-projects, most would not pass such scrutiny, in part because they cannot justify that they have the capacity to implement and because they are not stated in terms of expected results. Reference 84 field notes</p> <p>In terms of relating financing and expected results, it is interesting to note that neither SG SICA nor SIECA have Strategic Plans that are results-based or approved” Reference 85 field notes</p> <p>Four interviewees in three RIO noted that they found it difficult to work on results using the strategies that were built into the projects. A significant problem is that most of the support they received was not sustainable (i.e there was no capacity to sustain the results of the work). They all noted that the managers of the RIO, the executing agencies and the EU would have known this before the work was actually started.</p> <p>What could have been done, in a few cases noted during the interview, could not be financed through the EU because the types of inputs were already defined and could not be changed. Training, for example, could have been more sustainable using WEB-based means instead of person-to-person as the design foresaw (the EU project allowed only for the payment of living expenses and travel) Reference 132 field notes.</p>
<p>I-2.1.5 – Legal frameworks and delegated authorities are clear and coherent with mandates</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>Overall, the documentation reviewed describes a highly politicised process that concentrates authority in few organisational instances. Most RIO do not have enough legitimacy (lack of funding, poor political support, no authority to ensure compliance, etc.) to be in a position to exercise their mandates. The Annual SIECA Report, while a major step forward, is clearly geared towards closing the planning cycle and not towards enabling supervision and adjustment. It does not, for example, show if SIECA managed to accomplish what COMIECO or the other “organismos” asked it to do. The report identifies the 4 pillars of its management plan. They cover:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Deepen the Central American economic integration process; Internal processes and transparency; External cooperation (donors);

	<p>Institutional visibility.</p> <p>The report is organised according to these 4 pillars but does not have a comprehensive and all-out-front financial link to any of them. Moreover, it does not make a link between its ability to act (what it is allowed to do and what it has the ability to do) and its mandate or legal framework (what capabilities it needs in order to execute its mandate at expected performance levels). The case of SG SICA parallels that of SIECA, although documentation shows that the institutional ability of SICA is very restricted (compared to SIECA) and its ability to absorb additional resources to bring about increases in organisational ability is severely constrained. The EU has supported both these organisations in the development of their organisational architecture and their sets of regulatory instruments (ex. SIECA and its data collection protocols), but the SG-SICA has only recently prepared a strategic plan, and not an operational plan.</p> <p>Legal frameworks may be there, but they could be a great deal clearer and more specific; taking past key documentation into account. There is overwhelming consensus that the entire organisational architecture of the SICA System needs to be reformed; there is even documented evidence and a general consensus that the EU has provided the means to undertake the planning for that reform, but the political decision-makers have not moved in that direction, even at the technical level.</p>
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p>The 2012 SIECA results report does not make a link between what it has accomplished and what it should have accomplished. The latter could have been in terms of its mandate or in terms of the “work that remains to be done to achieve strategic goals”. The reader is left with a long list of “results” without being able to understand if that was enough or even a well-chosen list of things to work on. The report does not relate results to mandate. It does, however, have a section that identifies “What is SIECA” (see Section 3) and spells out Articles 43 and 44 of the Guatemala Protocol that deals with the mandate of that organisation.</p> <p>The Report also does not show if SIECA managed to accomplish what COMIECO or the other “organismos” asked it to do (see p. 4 for list of key “organismos”).</p> <p>The report identifies the 4 pillars of its management plan. They cover:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Deepen the Central American economic integration process; Internal processes and transparency; External cooperation (donors); Institutional visibility. <p>The report is organised according to these 4 pillars but does not have a comprehensive financial link to any of them (see p. 12 for a summary of the Management plan). Moreover, it does not make a link between its ability to act (what it is allowed to do) and its mandate or legal framework.</p> <p><i>SIECA –Informe por resultados 2012, Dec 2012</i></p> <p>The TAPs for PAIRCA 2 support the contention that there is a problem with the legal frameworks not matching mandates:</p>

Otro elemento a considerar son las debilidades encontradas en la **aplicación práctica de las medidas acordadas en las Cumbres Presidenciales y Ministeriales**, causada sobre todo por la falta de instrumentos vinculantes y por la fragilidad de las herramientas y reglamentos de aplicación. A esto debe añadirse un cierto nivel de incertidumbre en lo que se refiere al marco legal e institucional del Sistema y a la asignación de competencias entre las instituciones de la integración, que deriva en parte de la falta de legislación secundaria. Esto es así en el caso del CCJ y el PARLACEN, pero también a nivel de las diferentes Secretarías Técnicas. En cuanto a estas últimas, cabe apuntar que sigue habiendo cierta dispersión y ambigüedad en lo que respecta a la atribución de responsabilidades procedentes de decisiones presidenciales y ministeriales, si bien es cierto que en el último periodo se han realizado importantes esfuerzos para clarificar y articular este complejo entramado. Un logro importante en este campo ha sido la puesta en marcha de un mecanismo de seguimiento de decisiones de alto nivel, el cual pretende proporcionar las bases para un trabajo más equilibrado en la asignación de tareas y recursos entre las Secretarías. Esto ha venido acompañado de avances en materia de capacidades tecnológicas y de gestión, particularmente tras la creación del Sistema Integrado de Información del SICA.

TAPS Annex 2 PAIRCA 2 p. 6

The evaluation team recognises the difficulty and complexity of the situation and has already made observations to this effect in the report. We also agree, in principle, with the RSP Mid-term Review that suggested that there is no sense in pursuing capacity development in an organisation that does not want (or cannot want) to change. Perhaps an optional approach would be to clearly define how an “intergovernmental” model can be made to perform in an acceptable manner. If that approach is not going to be taken up, the EU should discontinue its capacity development unless conditions are met.

A member of the reference group brought to the attention of the evaluation team that the “assurance” function (typically represented through audit and evaluation functions as well as through “monitoring and reporting for accountability”) is not in place within the RIO framework. Specifically, there are no regional audit or evaluation organizations. The assurance function, it should be remembered, is not limited to “compliance” but provides invaluable insights into efficiency, effectiveness, learning and knowledge management, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of management systems and control frameworks as well.

Three interviewees noted that here is a particularly difficult problem to resolve when it comes to mandates and delegated authorities. The fact is that the RIO are essentially independent of each other as it now stands and, being very small with no staff (ex. CCAD) cannot do any technical work. Most of their financing goes for overhead and management. But they cannot be “gotten around” and divide the efforts in their sectors. It was noted that the vast majority of these RIO do not have the capability (resources, authorities, delegations, abilities and systems) to undertake what they were created for.

Reference 35 field notes

The CCJ sees that it has a mandate and a responsibility to train the necessary people and institutions in the area of security. The ramifications of a concerted effort to improve security will involve a number of areas where the Court will eventually have to intervene, including lawyer and court processes and jurisdiction; fiscal policy and its application; commercial law, trans-boundary exchanges including migration. The precise mandate is not yet clear and the CCJ does not have the financial strength to develop those “responsibilities”

Reference 41 field notes

The case of CC-SICA is interesting because no one has ever defined “formally” what “consult” or “consultation” means. The CC-SICA wants to be in a position to proactively consult its “membership” and inform management of the results of this process, whereas the management side has so far retained the services of that RIO on a reactive basis. The mandate, according to CC-SICA has to be changed. At the same time, it must be made clearer what managers and political decision-makers should be obliged to do with the results of consultation. One of the reasons that the CC-SICA has not set up all of its operating consultation processes is that the PAIRCA 2 process was late getting the funds into its hands. In fact, the PAIRCA Focal Point only stayed in place for about half of the proposed length of time.

Reference 104 field notes

“...there is no capacity in-house to develop the systems and skills we need to do an important part of our job: advocacy”, noted a group of interviewees. Our legal base (Teguscigalpa and Guatemala accords) does not use that word per se, but that is what the CC-SICA sees as its mandate and has believed that since its creation.

The interviewees noted that the CC-SICA offers a considerable value-added to the SICA System:

A large and growing network

Advocacy through a means to search for the most qualified and competent respondents to deal with an issue

QA on peer reviews

Structure for the various sectors (use CC-SICA to gain professional analysis on proposed norms, policies, standards, etc)

Reference 150 field notes

It is quite possible that some mandates may evolve as a result of recent work done by PAIRCA 2 in the area of M and E. That project has developed a proposal for an internal M and E system for interventions that could easily be converted to increase its scope across all RIO. In that light it could enable Ministers (Exec Com specifically) to monitor the performance of the various RIO initiatives that are funded directly or indirectly through CA financing or through donors. Those RIO that do not perform could be reformed or amalgamated with others.

The “pilot” has been rolled out and is being improved upon. It is a simple system based on Excell and works well for the purposes that the Ministers would require, mainly because it is highly visual and dynamic.

Reference 153 field notes

A recurring issue is that people and policy makers continue to say that it is impossible to know what is happening within the SICA System in terms of mandates, projects, initiatives and action plans. A system called SICOR was developed to provide that information, but it

	<p>is rarely updated and provided mainly project descriptions that were not based on results. The system to provide information is there, but needs an investment in personnel and a commitment to be transparent.</p> <p>Reference 107 field notes</p> <p>Many interviewees and donor officials put forth the idea that reform of the entire system is long overdue. Most RIO must disappear or be integrated into others. Mandates and AUTHORITIES must be made much clearer. This is a required step and must be done in tandem with a financial sustainability plan that spans all the (new_ RIO, they noted.</p> <p>Reference 125 field notes</p>
<p>I-2.1.6 – Periodic reports (such as monitoring reports or evaluations) indicate that the RIOs have/ exercise authority to carry out their mandates</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>Key institutions that have an impact on the cooperation support priorities laid out in EU-CA agreements often do not yet have the capability or capacity to carry out their mandates, even though significant progress has been made in developing these institutions, in large part through EU support. There remain important limits to the ability of SG-SICA to monitor and thus it will be difficult, for that institution, to supervise (see MTR PAIRCA 2). The documents that were examined to date for this indicator deal essentially with SG SICA, SIECA, PARLACEN, and CC-SICA. The first two have only recently been preparing work plans much less reports to analyse their influence and effect. Nor does SICA have a M and E system that is used by officials. The latter two do not, produce periodic reports based on results. Documents show that PARLACEN has critical problems with legitimacy; nor does it have any power or mandate to impose much of its decision-making.</p>
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p>Insofar as PAIRCA 1 was concerned the following is a brief description of the objectives of that programme:</p> <p><i>“In 2003, a €15 million Programme of Support to Central American Integration (PAIRCA) was approved. It aims to support capacity building of the principal regional integration institutions in Central America and the involvement of civil society in the process of regional integration. This project will provide institutional strengthening to the Secretariat-General of the Central American Integration System (SG-SICA) as well as for the reform of the Central American Court of Justice (CCJ) and the Central American Parliament (PARLACEN). In addition, support will be provided to SIECA for the development of statistical information systems. The strengthening of the role of civil society in the process of integration will be carried out through the building up the capacity of the Consultative Committee of SICA (CC-SICA) and developing sectoral (sic) and other initiatives involving civil society actors including universities, NGOs, unions and private sector organisations.”</i></p> <p><i>CA RSP 2007-13 p. 49</i></p> <p>Based on the documents studies, all of which indicating that the institutional capability of the SICA system and national counterparts is very weak, it is observed that the EU is not planning to continue supporting institutional development after the present RSP. The reasons for this decision are not found in the documents indicated and it appears as if this would place not only the Regional Integration Progress at risk but would also weaken the potential scope of benefits that could accrue to the CA through the AA.</p> <p><i>refer to the CA Mid-term Review pp 2-3</i></p> <p>Key institutions that have an impact on the cooperation support priorities laid out in EU-CA agreements often do not have the capability or capacity to carry out their mandates, even though significant progress has been made in developing these institutions, in part</p>

	<p>through donor support.</p> <p>Environment:</p> <p><i>“Among the root causes of this situation are inadequate environmental policies and legislation, institutional weakness and destructive farming practices such as burning fields prior to sowing, coupled with the effects of poverty and the persistence of polluting or harmful methods of production.”</i></p> <p>...</p> <p><i>“In addition, it (i.e. the Regional Environmental Profile –LeBlanc) underlines the progress made over the past decade on establishing environment-related institutions, policies and programmes and the significant amount of donor funding in this sector.’</i></p> <p><i>CA RSP 2007-13 p. 7</i></p> <p>The SIECA published, for the first time in 2012, a report of its annual results. It is a relatively comprehensive report:</p> <p>It is based on activities (things SIECA participated in) and outputs (things that were produced).</p> <p>Most activities are characterised by actions that are not defined further so as to enable the reader to judge the relevance or the priority, or even the extent of progress towards the achievement of some expected goal: “...apoyo a acciones de facilitacion (p. 15)” or “ brinda asistencia tecnica (p. 20).</p> <p>There is no link between the results and the resources used. In the above example the “apoyo” could have been an hour or a year.</p> <p>There are many outputs identified. Especially, but not exclusively in the field of border administration.</p> <p><i>SIECA –Informe por resultados 2012, Dec 2012</i></p> <p>There are important limits to the ability of SICA to monitor and therefore supervise:</p> <p><i>El programa antecesor, PAIRCA, también trató de apoyar los mecanismos de seguimiento y monitoreo del sistema. Oficialmente existe el SIGPRO, sistema en que se ha invertido importante sumas de dinero, pero este sistema actualmente no se está usando. Para los consultores esto de alguna manera se debe interpretar como una indicación de la poca importancia que se le está dando en la institución y de nuevo hacemos referencia al carácter político del SG-SICA que según lo que expresan altos funcionarios, no se deja planificar fácilmente</i></p> <p>...</p> <p><i>Volviendo al PAIRCA II, el sistema de seguimiento parece ser un instrumento útil, pero tal vez no suficiente para para un buen monitoreo de las actividades que en su gran mayoría están por comenzar. Funciona por medio de formularios que llenan los beneficiarios y que luego se usan para alimentar el sistema. Esto puede constituir una debilidad porque es un seguimiento de indicadores cuantitativos a distancia que debe complementarse con un seguimiento de cerca y cualitativa, pero actualmente el equipo de gestión no tendría los recursos humanos para realizarlo.»</i></p> <p><i>MTR PAIRCA 2 p. 38</i></p> <p>Overall, the capability and capacity of most RIO (exceptions include SIECA) to carry out their relatively “generic” mandates has been recognised as being deficient. Initiatives aimed at improving the extent to which the RIO can meet their expected performance targets have been put into place by the EU, the WB, GIZ and others, but the effectiveness of these initiatives has been wanting even though the requests for support in capacity development</p>
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	<p>continue to come from key RIO such as PARLACEN, CCJ and SG-SICA. The mid-term evaluation of the RSP 2006-13 recommended that such capacity development support to regional institutions should be stopped.</p> <p><i>“Durante la evaluación de medio término del RSP 2006-2013 se llegó a la conclusión de no continuar con programas dirigidos únicamente al fortalecimiento de las instituciones regionales, sin embargo, sigue siendo una de las principales demandas por parte de los representantes del PARLACEN, CCJ y SG SICA.»</i></p> <p><i>Comments from Reference Group to Evaluation Team, February 2014</i></p> <p>“no hay informes institucionales del SIECA o del SG-SICA, ni de cualquier otro OIR» The interviewee was speaking to results-based reports based on progress.</p> <p>Reference 3 field notes</p> <p>Except for the periodic reports of the various donor interventions (including PAIRCA 2, PRIAA, PRESANCA, etc.), the RIO definitely do not prepare any monitoring reports or engage in any actions that might be construed as systematic supervision of plans and progress towards results.</p> <p>Reference 154 field notes</p> <p>“I know of no evaluations that were initiated by any RIO”.</p> <p>Reference 128 field notes</p> <p>RIO rarely coordinate their efforts or seek complementarity, The links between the political SG-SICA and the CA court, for example are not operational except at a formal level. SIECA does not have links to the CCJ, and the CCAD has only developed perfunctory links with the main economic arms of the SICA System (ex. SIECA and CENPROMYPE). Much of the work thus becomes reactionary rather than preventive.</p> <p>Reference 38 and 39 field notes</p> <p>Much of the work done by RIO is done independently of the RIO. Three interviewees in three different organisations reported that since the EU decided to delegate part of its regional programme to the UNSP, it has been difficult, if not impossible, to influence what will be done and how in the result areas 3 and 4 (PAIRCA 2). It is as if the “social” or “community “ aspects of RI are being treated in parallel and without integration into the result areas covered by 1 and 2. The economic sectors and their projects (ex. PRIAA, PRACAMS) also have an impact on the “social” equation, but the latter is not mainstreamed.</p> <p>Reference 42 and 106 and 120 field notes)</p> <p>A very highly placed official in SICA noted that: “there is no regional strategy to develop the entire region. The present model focusses on individual countries and treats the community of countries (i.e. the intersection of MS) as a marginality”. But for political reasons that are theirs alone, the Presidents speak glowingly of RI while the reality is that they don’t place enough personal priority on RI to justify follow-up to ensure implementation.</p> <p>Reference 54 of field notes</p> <p>“It is important”, said one very senior official, “to disaggregate what is happening in reality</p>
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	<p>from what is being said publicly”. For example, the following was discussed:</p> <p>When the 5 pillars are examined, we note that there is no agreement on whether social development is a regional or a national responsibility. The issue is not the anthropological vision but the link between economic growth and the way that social development should be financed from that growth. That is why most CA MS do not have a strategy to re-distribute the economic gains that will arise from CAFTA or AA. The interviewee also noted that the values of transparency and accountability are still merely concepts in CA because they have not yet been disaggregated from the concepts of “power”. It is interesting to note that there is no RIO that deals simultaneously with both social and economic development (except for SG-SICA in its “secretariat” role).</p> <p>Reference 54 field notes</p> <p>In terms of the overall development of the institutional capacity of RIO, a group of interviewees noted in a meeting that even the most obvious actions that should be conducted at a regional level are very difficult to implement. The example of the pooling of purchases for pharmaceutical products or for fertilisers was put on the table as being extremely difficult, in spite of the obvious economic and social benefits that would accrue to CA MA with lower prices. A more robust capacity for regional-level purchasing, combined with a clear mandate from leaders to do so, are required.</p> <p>Reference 57 field notes</p> <p>It was brought up several times by various interviewees that there is a movement among front-line technical officials and commercial partners towards trying to find ways to implement RI. The transport sector is an example, as is trans-border immigration. The challenges they face are enormous and there are many constraints (including vested interests of entrepreneurs and large families with substantial holdings, not to mention the rampant corruption and security concerns that are endemic in the region). So although the RIO are not making as much progress as they might, these people are chipping away at the bottom.</p> <p>Reference 61, 62 and 63 field notes</p>
<p>JC 2.2 – SG-SICA and SIECA meet expected results targets in tandem with national counterparts</p>	
<p><i>Statement on JC2.2</i></p>	<p>The evaluation found no mention of any mechanism that would seek to align regional with national work plans or to manage their collaboration. There are few guiding strategies for regional integration that involve regional and national collaboration, but most do not appear to be used as direction (i.e. “obligation”). There is, however, a “SICA Multi-Annual Plan for Integration) that was adopted by the SICA Member States. (refer to CA MTR 2010, p.13), but it was not the entire plan that was retained.</p> <p>Interviews in the field showed that the coordination of activities between RIO agencies, between RIO and national counterparts, and between RIO and external donors needed to be reformed if higher performance levels are to be brought about (in terms of meeting targets “in tandem”). Annex 1 to the PARICA 2 Contribution Agreement notes that the programme will ensure an appropriate level of coordination with other EU programmes at CA and Latin American Regional levels (p.8) and with other donors (p.9-10). The problem has been the non-coordination of regional and national plans. Documentation points to the fact that the EU (through PAIRCA1) did not actively develop national level counterparts for this type of collaboration, or any other type of sector ability. PAIRCA 2 projects also do not have a specific activity related to this.</p>

The evaluation examined all major work plans and progress reports and did not find even one reference to the harmonisation or alignment (or putting in sync) between national (CA Member States) and regional (RIO) work plans; nor did it find references to the synchronisation of EU regional and country-level interventions. Fieldwork confirmed this analysis

Part of the problem with analysing the extent to which alignment (or being in sync) is becoming more focussed is that SG-SICA does not define its work plans in terms of performance or specific results. The PAIRCA 2 project appears to have adopted this lack of specificity as noted by the Response to the 2010 ROM report. Within the RIO generally, there has been considerable difficulties observed in harmonising and aligning the actions and priorities of these RIOs and the issue of working in tandem with national counterparts appears to not be important because it is not mentioned.

From the documentation examined, there does not appear to be a consensus of what will constitute an integrated region within CA, except at a very conceptual level, so joint work with national counterparts should be a basic necessity, according to interviewees. Other than sector roundtables that appear to not be well attended, a Joint working group was set up to “provide a clear picture of the region’s requirements” but the report of that Group is only a few pages long and quite conceptual in nature. It has not been used to make decisions on specific action

The Member States are engaging in behaviours that demonstrate their lack of consensus on the vision for an integrated CA, including bilateral agreements with third party countries and the non-ratification by some countries of agreements to create RIOs. In effect, the PAIRCA 2 Work plan notes that there is still considerable concern about the viability and practicality of regional integration on the part of Member States. In fact the SIECA published **its** vision of economic integration in 2013. It does not identify if this is a shared vision and to what extent is the timetable or priority for implementation shared.

Overall there is a considerable amount of institutional inefficiency in the SICA RIO system. Part of the problem is precisely what is the “work” or “mandate” of the various RIO and the national counterparts. At the moment there are dozens of agencies and bodies that relate directly to a region-level mandate (one very senior official quoted the figure of 162 agencies). The consequences of this fragmentation are important including overlapping, mandate gaps, financing sustainability of many organisations and lack of influence or power. Although the stakeholders in the “interface” may be well defined and known at this time (it is conjectured from documentation), that is not necessarily the case in non-economic domains such as environment, social, security, cohesion, industrial promotion etc. Past efforts at institutional rationalisation have not been successful, even though PAIRCA 1 began a process to improve national counterpart abilities with respect to regional integration that was not particularly successful, mostly because it was too limited and tied to face-to-face training sessions.

A member of the reference group provided an observation to the effect that:
“The only organization really interested in passing the four pillar assessment was SIECA. The others were not interested and do not have capacity to pass audit on all four pillars.”

This fits seamlessly into the opinion of other individuals (ex. mid-term review and interviewees in the field) that have commented on the institutional weaknesses of a number

	of CA RIO.
I-2.2.1 – Regional and national work plans are aligned and comprehensive	
<i>Findings at indicator level</i>	<p>The evaluation found no mention of any mechanism that would seek to align regional with national work plans. There were no documents identified that do this and all interviewees noted that there were no such documents. There are few guiding strategies for regional integration that involve regional and national collaboration, and most do not appear to be used as direction (i.e. “obligation”).</p> <p>The coordination of activities between RIO agencies, between RIO and national counterparts, and between RIO and external donors needed to be reformed. Annex 1 to the PARICA 2 Contribution Agreement notes that the programme will ensure an appropriate level of coordination with other EU programmes at CA and Latin American Regional levels (p.8) and with other donors (p.9-10). That coordination has not been rigorous and is superficial. The problem has been the lack, by both regional and national entities, of a demonstrated interest to generate such integrated plans.</p> <p>Research in the field has found no examples where “regional and national work plans are aligned and comprehensive” In fact the opposite has shown to be true. PRACAMS is working on standards and processes where the national level is not working or not interested. The CCJ is advancing on regional processes that are not in sync with those of Costa Rica. CCAD is working alone without work plan links to national governments. The Strategic plans of both SG SICA and SIECA have been developed without ensuring that they are in sync with national plans. There are many more examples.</p> <p>Discussions with representatives of RIO noted that the basis of RI in CA (no supranationality) requires precisely the type of coordination that will be required to link regional and national plans at both the objective and the results levels. This capability is not in place at any level and will need to be developed.</p> <p>It has even been very difficult to develop leadership and to align the work plans between RIO. PAIRCA 2 tried to align work plans with SIECA and other key RIO but SEICA declined. So even at the intra-RIO level, that form of alignment is still not a reality.</p> <p>Documentation points to the fact that the EU (through PAIRCA 1) did not actively develop national level counterparts for this or any other type of ability.</p>
<i>Data, sources, extracts</i>	<p>The basis for analysis is the 2007-13 CA RSP which notes, on p. 25:</p> <p><i>“The objective of this component (i.e. Strengthening the institutional system for regional integration-LeBlanc) of the strategy is to strengthen the institutional system for the process of Central American integration. It will serve to strengthen the Central American Integration System (SICA) as a whole by developing greater coordination and effective implementing capacity on the part of all involved in the process. It must be stressed that this support will be limited to these institutions’ involvement in questions strictly related to regional integration.” (Emphasis added)</i></p> <p>CA RSP 2007-2013</p> <p>The same document (p. 48-49) describes the main objectives of the CA RSP 2002-06 as:</p> <p><i>“The 2002-2006 Regional Strategy (RSP) for Central America, which is based on a Memorandum of Understanding signed with the region in 2001, established three focal sectors for cooperation: 1) Support to</i></p>

the process of regional integration, implementation of common policies and institutional strengthening (60%); 2) Strengthening the role of civil society in the process of regional integration (10%); and 3) Reducing vulnerability and improving environmental management (30%). Under the 2001 Memorandum of Understanding, an indicative €74.5 million was allocated to this programme.”

There are few guiding strategies for regional integration, and most do not appear to be used as direction (i.e. “obligation”). There is a SICA Multi-Annual Plan for Integration that was adopted by the SICA Member States.

refer to CA MTR 2010, p.13

There is a need to ensure that not only do CA and Member States counterpart plans become aligned but that they are also both aligned and coherent with the strategies and plans of the EU LA Region. Broadly speaking they are:

“...a certain number of measures to help the region as a whole could be taken in line with the priorities of Article 6(b) of the DCI Regulation:

(1) promote the activities of business networks in the two regions in the area of trade and investment through measures such as exchanges between companies;

(2) promote dialogue and institutional capacity building on policy, macroeconomic dialogue, standards, human rights, mobility, the connectivity of infrastructure networks and environmental protection to provide a secure and effective framework to foster sustainable investment flows to promote the region’s sustainable development;

(3) promote cooperation, regional dialogue and the exchange of experience and good practice on environmental aspects of sustainable development; particular attention should be given to: climate change(renewable energies and exchanges of innovative experience in the transport sector, adjustment to the adverse effects of climate change); water (European Water Initiative, cross-border management of water courses, sewage treatment); biodiversity (implementation of the Biodiversity Convention) and forests (tackling deforestation).

(4) promote interconnectivity and regulatory dialogue at Latin American level, especially under the new EIB mandate;

(5) promote studies and conferences to meet regional priorities (with ECLAC, ILO, EIB, etc.).

The sectors covered could include strategic policy and technological sectors, the Information Society, the environment, cultural, audiovisual, research, higher education and energy, which are all sectors with an international dimension.”

LA RSP p. 17

There are many references to the fact that the coordination of activities between RIO agencies, between RIO and national counterparts, and between RIO and external donors needed to be reformed.

Annex 1 to the PARICA 2 Contribution Agreement notes that the programme will ensure an appropriate level of coordination with other EU programmes at CA and Latin American regional levels (p.8) and with other donors (p.9-10). The problem has been the non-coordination (...haya visto como necesario un ordonamiento de la cooperacion regional p. 9) and was specifically requested by the Member States Heads in Tegucigalpa in 2005, and again in Vienna and then in San Jose in 2006.

As a follow-up, a Tegucigalpa meeting in 2008 called for a revision of the revision of the Action Plan for regional cooperation and a proposal to create a “mixed” Working Group (donors and Member States) to prepare a Road Map for the cooperation process.

The problem is exacerbated by the fact that these actions essentially involved SG-SICA and left out other RIOS such as PARLACEN, CC-SICA and others. In fact, many RIO have created their own coordination mechanisms with Member States and with donors.

Annex 1, PAIRCA 2 Contribution Agreement, p. 10

In terms of intra-EU cooperation and management of European cooperation development actions, the Mid-term Review indicated that this was satisfactory. It should be noted that performance parameters were not defined by the MTR team so it is not possible to judge the nature or benefits of the cooperation:

“Regional cooperation has been relatively satisfactory in the last few years. This assessment is based in particular — but not exclusively — on the implementation of cooperation under the RSP 2002-2006. In addition, important programmes have been implemented in other areas, notably thematic budget lines (such as food security, human rights and NGO co-financing).

Implementation rates are quite high throughout, despite the fact that the regional programmes are executed by weak institutions, lacking — for the most part — adequate human and financial resources. It is safe to say that the good performance is due partly to the considerable technical assistance provided through the various programmes and partly to close monitoring by the European Commission. In the majority of cases, the CA regional programmes suffer many delays in the start-up phase due to problems of coordination and decision-making, often exacerbated by the complex design of projects. Once a programme is up and running, however, implementation gradually gains in efficiency, thanks to the strong commitment of the majority of people involved. Delays in the start-up period have led to several extensions of implementation periods beyond the dates originally agreed.”

Mid-term Review CA RSP 2007-13 p. 9

Documentation points to the fact that the EU (through PAIRCA1) did not actively develop national level counterparts up to 2009 at least.

“Otra carencia del programa es que muchos eventos debieron concentrarse en el último año debido a los atrasos y al enfoque tomado. Más aún, algunos entrevistados objetaron el esquema de beneficiarios que el programa terminó apoyando. También, la falta de incidencia de los estados nacionales en la definición de los beneficiarios del PAIRCA apareció en algunas entrevistas como una falencia del programa.”

Ex-post evaluation of PAIRCA 1, p. 8

With respect to the work plans and results for result areas 3 and 4 of PAIRCA 2, interviewees noted (with confirmation by the UNSP) that it is not possible to report on results yet, especially with respect to women, youth and natives. Moreover, the plans prepared by UNDP are not done jointly with national RI counterparts for the majority. This left interviewees wondering why the social elements of the project were not done to support the non-social (i.e. results 1 and 2).

The evaluators asked for but did not receive the monitoring reports of the result areas 3 and 4 other than what was in PAIRCA 2’s periodic reporting to EU. That report (s) are not essentially result-based as noted above.

Reference 17 and 18 field notes

With respect to aligning regional and national work plans, it was brought to the attention of the evaluator that PAIRCA 1 has a pre-condition for success: that all the MS would agree to a customs union and that it would be implemented. It was not even at these last phases of PAIRCA 2. The national plans and priorities were thus obviously not aligned to the regional priorities.

Reference 23 field notes

Research in the field has found no examples where “regional and national work plans are aligned and comprehensive” In fact the opposite has shown to be true. PRACAMS is working on standards and processes where the national level is not working or not interested. The CCJ is advancing on regional processes that are not in sync with those of Costa Rica. CCAD is working alone without work plan links to national governments. The Strategic plans of both SG SICA and SIECA have been developed without ensuring that they are in sync with national plans. There are many more examples.

Discussions with representatives of RIO noted that the basis of RI in CA (no supranationality) requires precisely the type of coordination that will be required to link regional and national plans at both the objective and the results levels. This capability is not in place at any level and will need to be developed.

Reference 23 field notes

It has even been very difficult to develop leadership and to align the work plans between RIO. PAIRCA 2 tried to align work plans with SIECA and other key RIO but SIECA declined. So even at the intra-RIO level, that form of alignment is still not a reality.

Reference 69 field notes

Some interviewees noted that the reason that their EU support did not result in a greater level of autonomous capability is that the EU support was late in arriving (especially the focal points) and that it did not go far enough. Closer examination by the evaluator shows that the RIO were generally incapable of preparing a CD strategy for themselves and of supervising the work that was done on their behalf. There are many examples where money was not spent on the development of “results” but on “process” or overhead. (Ex. Trips by PARLACEN, conferences by most RIO, furniture, IT and IM, etc.), or to pay for systems that are not complete (ex. legal documentation system CCJ or membership inventory of CC-SICA)

Reference 149 and 120 field notes

Most of the 36 plus 2 projects supported by PAIRCA 2 have their own timelines and are linked to each other. In other words it is clear that there is no “system” being generated. Further, the work plans for those 38 projects are not, in any way, being synchronised with national work plans.

Reference 106 field notes

An interesting exception to the above is that the general objective of PRACAMS is a

specific objective of the SIECA, indicating a clear alignment within the RIO.

Reference 120 field notes

In terms of the support provided by PAIRCA 2 to the institutional capability of the SICA System RIO, it is interesting to note that for the first two years of the project, according to the PAIRCA 2 managers, “the first two years were essentially non-productive in terms of results because the time and effort were used to put into place the processes and the mechanisms (financing management, contracts, resources) to assist the RIO (in the 40 projects). Over the years, PAIRCA 2 has had 4 EU Task managers and has encountered bottlenecks with EU processes (an impressive 19 drafts of the programme budget were required!).

References 47, 48, 49 and 50 field notes

The Planning directorate of SG SICA does not consider the means to ensure that regional and national work plans are aligned except where meetings and conferences are concerned. Based on a reading of their products, they do not consider the alignment of regional and national plans as being a priority (they do not demonstrate the alignment and they have no systems in place to monitor that alignment within the execution of plans). The systems for M and E developed by PAIRCA 2 could serve to monitor the alignment of aligned work plans, providing some adjustment was done.

Reference 79 and 80 field notes

There are examples where there is a regional sector strategy and a series of national strategies in the same sector, but where there are no formal or systemic links between them (ex. Tourism)

Reference 11 field notes

Interviewees indicated that the UNDP’s project management is done independently of the strategies and plans in the CA MS. The UNDP indicated that it does not manage its EU projects from a multi-national perspective (i.e. coordination of national-level efforts) but manages the project as would any executing agency based in Nicaragua. It does not, for example, use its offices in any CA MS to influence decision makers on the topics of interest to EU. In that regard, it does not add value to the EU programme except as a means of reducing the workload associated with contracting.

Reference 16 and 18 field notes

“We know for sure that the SICA System RIO do not sync their work plans with the national governments. We also know that MIFIC (Nicaragua) or other national departments in other countries do not synchronise its work plans with those of the regional RIO.”

Reference 31 field notes

Two interviewees noted that the 1997 agreement called for SG-SICA to be responsible for coordinating the RIO across the system. It has done that very superficially up to now. There are no meetings on a regular basis, when there are meetings it is not to coordinate per se. Priorities are not developed amongst RIO, etc. There are no RIO-wide coordination systems and no systems-wide reporting on the progress being made on RI.

Reference 60 field notes

The ex-SG of SICA does not want the RIO to become a project management unit. He sees the deciders in the systems as the Ministers of Foreign Affairs (political issues) and the Ministers of COMIECO (for economic issues). According to him, only SIECA has a structured approach to planning and M and E. The others do not.

He indicated that there has not always been clarity on the role of the SG of SG-SICA, especially in terms of the hierarchical role of that position amongst the other heads (and RIO). Some RIO assume a dependency role but most do not.

Further, the vision of the role of the SG SICA has not been stable. He now sees the role as one of a secretariat. The Presidents and Ministers decide and there is an Exec Com that ensures follow-up (the Exec Com is mostly deputy heads from the ministries of foreign affairs, indicating once again that there is a real disconnect between the economic, the social and the political domains. It also means that the SG SICA sees that that RIO no role to play in structuring the RI process or in following-up on progress in terms of implementation of institutional capability.

Reference 74 and 75 field notes

That interviewee also noted that he thought that any follow-up to CD support (such as PAIRCA 2) should not happen the way it has been done. There has been a lot of wasted effort and the countries (CA MS) should accept the responsibility of financing the RIO and their reform. He noted that the money “should go to the people”. He did not identify what would be the impact if donors stopped supporting CD efforts and the CA MS did not support the SICA System financially.

Reference 74 field notes

There was no request to develop systems to ensure that regional and national plans were aligned.

Reference 74 field notes

Another illustration of how difficult it is to develop systems that could link regional and national work plans and could coordinate pan-RIO planning as well is the fact that the M and E systems in SG SICA are not built around the 4 EU-specific results areas identified for PAIRCA 2, but on the SICA systems own procedures and processes. This should show ownership, according to interviewees, but it complicates matters at all levels because it forces stakeholders (donors, RIO, countries) to work on the basis of results frameworks that have not been approved by the key stakeholders (including CA MS).

An examination of the M and E system designed by PAIRCA 2 shows that the vast majority of the results that are included in it are very “soft” and often are not results but inputs or outputs. A large number are merely process milestones, and many activities are not really necessary to develop the results they are supposed to generate. The system itself is simple yet powerful and if it were used to its maximum potential could be a significant support to the management teams of the RIO and to the Exec Com. No one in SICA took charge of the process that resulted in the definition of the 40 projects that were approved, and no one

<p>ensured that the results that they promoted were, in fact, results. This was not a problem brought on by the present management team but by SICA itself when it participated in the design phases.</p> <p>The evaluation of the PAIRCA 2 sub-projects is beyond the scope of this regional evaluation; an ex post evaluation will shed some light on specific issues. Some points of interest are:</p> <p>A large number of the projects cannot prove that they have achieved the results they claim to have achieved.</p> <p>Many projects will not likely meet their expected objectives</p> <p>Many projects have spent their allocated funds but are not near to achieving their expected results</p> <p>Some project titles (ex. number 4) have impressive titles but are of marginal value</p> <p>Over 800, 000 euros are reserved for awareness over and beyond what the UNDP is doing. All organisations what to do sensitization but there are no clear indicators, the monitoring is non-existent and the actions are not linked to those of the UNDP. Much of this type of activity is of doubtful use and has been associated with freebies, useless travel and questionable presence of people at events.</p> <p>Videoconferencing systems were installed but are not typically used for the purposes for which they were intended.</p> <p>One project (number 28) has 15 sub-projects for a total of 1.5 M euros, but no one is responsible for the results, SICA has been late in exercising ownership, resulting in the fact that results will be late, if ever. Indicators are poor in this project (ex. number of participants)</p> <p>Some projects are too small and really related to results. Number 18 is worth less than 1000 euros and was to purchase o piece of IT hardware. It should not have made the list in the first place.</p> <p>Reference 87, 88 and 89 field notes</p> <p>One of the immediate problems with the M and E system, when the foregoing is taken into account, is that the system developed by PAIRCA 2 contains all of the projects and does not discriminate between soft ones, hardware, etc. The PAIRCA 2 tried to get management to deal with the issue and improve the system but has only had some success so far. The Exec Com appear to be interested.</p> <p>The M and E analyst of PAIRCA 2 was not on board when the “projects” were designed, even though the experience with other projects and PAIRCA 1 showed that the beneficiaries were very weak in terms of capacity to deal with results.</p> <p>One interviewee noted that: “The standards commonly used in results-based management are too difficult for RIO. What they conceive as RBM is a very fussy concept.”. The evaluator examined the documents produced in various RIO and agrees that the concepts are overly simplistic, monitoring is aligned to expected results and the Theory of change analysis is generally superficial if it exists at all.</p> <p>Reference 89 field notes</p>

One organisation that has shown that can prepare comprehensive strategic plans that are supported by detailed work plans is CENPROMYPE. That organisation presented the evaluator with a USB drive that contained:

Annual reports (including 2012)

Regional agendas and Plans. The intro to the Exec Summary reads

The general premise underlying the development of an agenda of priorities in policies and programs for MSMEs in Central America and the Dominican Republic is that in terms of economic development, MSMEs represent a fundamental and dynamic aspect of national and territorial economies, providing increased production, job creation, greater social mobility, greater opportunities and generating economic and social well-being at regional level.

In order to build such agenda of priorities for action at the regional level, led to the development of the MSME sector, CENPROMYPE urged in 2010 a broad consultation process that identified the priorities of regional public-private consensus, and outline a strategic vision commitment to the joint efforts for the promotion of MSMEs in Central America and Dominican Republic.

The objective of the Regional MSME Agenda is to articulate efforts and actions from the regional space in order to promote knowledge management and multiply the benefits to MSMEs.

A comprehensive document on the development model (called the SBDC model-Americas) it plans to use

An analysis of that information showed that the models are robust and the reporting is based on results. Strategic plans for 2007-13 were created and approved and the 2014-2018 Strategic plan is being developed for approval.

Because of the way it is organised, CENPROMYPE can claim to develop region-level plans that support national level plans, even if the latter are formulated by NSA. To reflect national priorities.

Reference 101 field notes

Although it is illogical to speak of regional-national alignment when dealing with CC-SICA it is noteworthy that they are, in fact, highly integrated from that perspective. Their networks are designed to support the regional level RIO from the ground floor,

CC-SICA notes that the processes of the PAIRCA 2 project, based on EU demands, were overly long and technical. The focal point was late in getting on the scene even though that person was critical in the process of identification of ID needs and solutions. They admit that they need to better develop their systems make “consultation” faster and more relevant. Of particular concern will be how to make consultation and advocacy “pan national” (with its subtle and sometimes not-too-subtle differences between countries and not just “regional” (where the lowest common denominator is often used).

They point out that the EU has helped the CC-SICA through the development of better content processes and administration, as well as more robust planning and a vision that both short and long term.

Reference 102 and 103 field notes

	<p>It was pointed out that CC-SICA did not participate in the TOR or selection process for project 28 dealing with civil society. It thought, at the time, that the project was poorly designed and would not yield much in the way of results, primarily because of its lack of anchors in CSO.</p> <p>Reference 156 field notes</p>
<p>I-2.2.2 – Follow-up (in the form of active supervision) is performed on work plans and progress reports, annual reports to ensure that national and regional efforts are in sync.</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>Based on the findings of Indicator 2.2.1, and based on the various analyses done for the EU on capacity at the national and regional levels (see CA RSP 2007-13 and 2002-2006), there is clearly a great need for supervision and more effective use of the resources that the EU has contributed. This need was confirmed by a wide variety of RIO managers and EUD officials. Management structures for EU programmes at the regional level are not very effective for operational supervision and there is little in the way of flexibility once contracts have been awarded. The research in the field and in documents related to EU projects identifies that even the design of the projects does not lend itself to “active supervision”: the architecture of the initiatives promotes and encourages “monitoring” (As stated elsewhere even this is a problem) but not supervision. That would require authority to act and change and adapt on the part of managers. It would also require precise targeting of required performance. In fact, as noted in the previous indicator, the bases of management monitoring are not the same for the EU, SG SICA, SIECA or the other RIO.</p> <p>Interviewees noted that “during the past few years there has not been a regional-country-project meeting organised by the EU where the objective was to ensure that regional and national work plans could be monitored and that they were in sync at any one time” This type of meeting used to held during the past RSP cycle.”</p> <p>It should also be noted that although PARICA 1 supported the creation of a planning directorate in SG of monitoring and supervision is the SICA, that organisation is not ensuring that national and regional plans are in sync</p> <p>The evaluation examined all major work plans and progress reports and did not find even one reference to the harmonisation or alignment (or putting in sync) between national and regional work plans.</p>
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p>A number of analyses done by or for the EU showed that there was a great need for capacity development. This should be reflected in downstream documentation dealing with programming, and supervision and monitoring should weigh in heavily in that regard:</p> <p><i>“However, a number of recommendations may be derived from a series of analyses taken into account at the time of preparation of the RSP for 2002-06. In short, these analyses underline, inter alia, that:</i></p> <p>The EC support to sub-regional integration processes is relevant and is boosted by a very real demand for regional cooperation;</p> <p>Support for regional integration in the form of strengthening institutions and civil society in Central America should be the EC priority. Community support should concentrate on creating a regulatory framework and management and monitoring tools aimed at facilitating greater mobility of people, capital and goods;</p> <p>The effectiveness of inter-state cooperation through regional integration bodies could be improved by the prior requirement to establish common regulations and legislation. Any initial verification of the relevance of regional cooperation should give fuller consideration</p>

to the capacities and willingness of all the players, national and regional, private and public.”
CA RSP 2007-13 p. 16

The first ROM for PAIRCA 2 report in 2010 identified a significant number of implementation issues that could, according to the report, become serious risks to the achievement of the programme’s objectives. All of these issues should have been monitored closely but there is no record of the way that they were monitored or the decisions that were taken to correct the path of the programme. Some of the problems identified were:

“the “presupuesto-programa” was a new mechanism that would be difficult to implement.

...la elaboración de procedimientos muy restrictivos...riesgo para el programa...”

«La gestión compartida con el PNUD ...sigue siendo cuestionada...por la nula gestión técnica del programa...»

Se perciben diferencias de visión...(entre) SICA y ATI

Response sheet to ROM report June 2010 p. 2

The responses by the DUE to the ROM report specified that some of these issues were dealt with. It noted, for example, that there had been training in EC procedures. The RG meeting in November in Brussels resulted, inter alia, in a statement by the EC to the effect that the SG SICA was not yet able to master the EC’s procedures and processes,

The DUE in the Response to the ROM report of June 2010 noted that the UNDP was able to be more flexible than the EC or SICA when it came to structuring responses for civil society, and that that was the reason why it was selected for that part of the programme. The Difference in vision between SICA and ATI is not a reality. In fact it is not the ATI that have decided to implement the programme in that manner but rather the EU.

Refer to Response sheet to ROM June 2010 p. 3

It is interesting to consider the observation that while the CA Mid-Term Review 2007-2013 speaks glowingly of how regional integration has progressed in CA (see pp 8-10), the analysis it provides is based solely on inputs and processes. There is not a word on sustainable results and a putting in place of an autonomous capability to continue in the strategic path chosen for regional integration. Moreover, the results section of the MTR is much more optimistic and upbeat concerning results and capacity than are other documents that portray the SICA System as institutionally weak and the progress towards economic integration, social cohesion and customs integration as being fraught with difficulties

See CA MTR 2007-2013 pp 8-10

PAIRCA 1 was instrumental in putting in place the essential management systems that were required to “institutionalise” the role that SICA was to assume. SICA should therefore have been in a position to be autonomous in its key management areas, even if, as the reference indicates, work plans were overly general. The report does not, however, speak to the synchronisation of regional and national planning or the development of capacities at the national level, even if on p.3, it recognises that the national level counterparts were beneficiaries:

“5. Merced al apoyo recibido del PAIRCA, el SICA puso a tono la institucionalidad según el diseño que se había hecho de ella en sus inicios. Hay sin dudas “un antes y un después del PAIRCA” en materia de

institucionalidad centroamericana, la cual hoy funciona más cerca de lo que se diseñó de ella. Dos instancias creadas por el Protocolo de Tegucigalpa pero que nunca habían entrado en funcionamiento, lo hicieron con apoyo del PAIRCA: el Comité Ejecutivo (función de rendición de cuentas y seguimiento por parte de los Gobiernos) y el organismo de control y evaluación del SICA (función de contraloría).

Otra acción pionera de PAIRCA que merece destacarse es el aporte a nivel de modernización de los sistemas de gestión de la información, con el desarrollo de sistemas integrados de información en las instituciones y sobretodo la importantísima generación de estadísticas armonizadas y comparables para la región, producidas por los institutos nacionales de estadísticas como fuente directa.

...

10. Con respecto al R1, los evaluadores pudieron constatar que el PAIRCA dejó a la SG-SICA beneficios tangibles que pueden resumirse en la definición de una propuesta de agenda estratégica, la preparación de su plan plurianual y la modernización del sistema en general. De acuerdo a la gráfica siguiente, se ve claramente que este componente del PAIRCA invirtió la mayor parte de los recursos presupuestados en el desarrollo del sistema de información y estadísticas.»

PAIRCA 1 Ex post Evaluation, p. ii

The above observation is important because it suggests that the ability to supervise and adjust plans was in place at the end of 2009, the last year of PAIRCA 1. A further reference confirms this:

“El PAIRCA permitió mejorar la capacidad de planificación y seguimiento de las decisiones del máximo órgano político (la Cumbre de Presidentes) mediante la creación de una dirección de planificación en la SG-SICA y la creación de un sistema de seguimiento del cumplimiento de las decisiones de las Cumbres, además del apoyo a las Presidencias Pro-tempore (PPT). Se inició 71o rinde un proceso de planificación estratégica, apoyando la elaboración de un plan plurianual para el SICA y ordenando dicho mecanismo y modelo para todos los Consejos de Ministros. Asimismo, se contribuyó a mejorar la capacidad del sistema para abordar la política social regional, dar funcionamiento permanente al CC-SICA y abrir puertas para la sociedad civil.”

PAIRCA 1 Ex post Evaluation, p. 7

The ex post evaluation of PAIRCA 1 is clear on the weak ability of major RIOs in CA to manage. The degree to which institutions are have been “strengthened” was not clarified or defined in the report:

« Un punto a valorar es que la ejecución de actividades de la CCJ y el PARLACEN estuvo supeditada a la capacidad de dichas instituciones para ejecutar y apropiarse de las sistencias técnicas y consultorías del PAIRCA. La débil institucionalidad de la CCJ y del PARLACEN limitó su capacidad de ejecución por falta de recursos humanos especializados que pudieran acompañar la ejecución de las consultorías e implementar las recomendaciones y productos generados. A pesar de estas debilidades, se puede concluir que con el apoyo del PAIRCA la CCJ y el PARLACEN han fortalecido su institucionalidad, cuentan con una mejor visión sobre su desarrollo y tienen una mejor capacidad de absorción de apoyo externo »

PAIRCA 1 Ex post Evaluation, p. 8

At least until 2009, the ability of key RIO and PAIRCA managers to manage on the basis of expected results was seriously limited since they did not use the results framework of the PAIRCA 1 at all. This does not mean that results were not produced, but it implies that the reference frame was either not useful for supervision and monitoring or that the managers did what they wanted in spite of the expectations framework.

“Esta evaluación final confirma la temprana percepción de los colegas y subraya además que los informes de avance no utilizaron el Marco Lógico como método sino que simplemente listaron en forma cronológica las actividades realizadas a pesar de las indicaciones formuladas por la DCE en repetidas ocasiones. La justificación de la CCT fue siempre la alta exigencia de las actividades a implementar, que se concentraron en el 2008 y generaron enormes presiones, por lo que los informes llegaron con muchos meses de atraso y baja calidad. El equipo de la CCT, es evidente, se concentró más en la realización de actividades que en el logro de los resultados esperados del Programa. Si se hubiese tomado el Marco Lógico como referencia, quizás algunas actividades se habrían llevado a cabo con más orden y siguiendo criterios de mayor racionalidad, además de mayor comunicación y trabajo coordinado con todas las contrapartes.”

PAIRCA 1 Ex post Evaluation, p.10

As of 2012, the SICA had the advantage of a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation system (SyE) that was developed with the EU’S support. This would be the basis for the SICA monitoring and supervision function. The SyE is also tied to the LFA for PAIRCA 2; an analysis of that LFA shows that the indicators were mostly output or process based, and not always specific enough to be used for ongoing monitoring of an ongoing initiative.

Moreover, the EXPECTED RESULTS of PAIRCA 2 are not stated in terms of absolute performance but of relative states (...”se ve reforzado...”; “...se ven fortalecidas...”; “...se mejora la participación...”; “...Se mejora el nivel de sensibilización...“.

PAIRCA 2 WP p. 10-11

At the level of the EU’s PAIRCA 2 project, the MTR noted that the initiative did not have sufficiently well developed and useful (for management) indicators in place and recommended a comprehensive overhaul. It also noted that the installed capacity for monitoring:

*“Se sugiere una reunión urgente entre el EGP, DRN y la DUE para evaluar los fondos disponibles provenientes de actividades no ejecutables, Consultorías de corto plazo no necesarias, imprevistos y demás rubros para un **adendum que permita:***

***Reforzar las capacidades de seguimiento** del Equipo de Gestión para los próximos meses y plasmarlo en un plan de acción y compromisos firmes.*

***La prolongación de la fase de ejecución**, cuya duración debe ser sujeto a los fondos disponibles para evitar una modificación del CdF.*

*En vez de reformular el **Marco Lógico** del programa, se recomienda **reforzarlo a nivel de los indicadores** de desempeño medibles (número, tiempo, porcentaje, escala, etc), por medio de la conexión lógica con los indicadores que están siendo definidos actualmente para cada proyecto. »*

MTR PAIRCA 2 p. 9

“...the EUD has never asked for an operations budget or a funding strategy from either SG SICA or SIECA”

Reference 4 field notes

The UNDP supervises its activities and those that execute them. Quality is monitored. “but the vagueness of the results stems from the nature of what we are asked to do. Awareness, for example, is not measured easily”

<p>Reference 14 field notes</p> <p>It was noted that the SG of SICA prepared a report in 2013 on the status and progress of development cooperation projects within SG SICA. It was sent to Ministries (foreign affairs). The new system that the Exec Com and Ministers want to put into place would consist of the following steps:</p> <p>All organisations send Project Fiches to SG SICA concerning what they want donor funding to cover</p> <p>Feedback on relevance is sent back</p> <p>SG SICA prepares a recommendation to Ministers</p> <p>When ready, Ministers in the sectors approve the project</p> <p>The organisation are then free to look for financing.</p> <p>It should be noted that neither the Ministers nor SG SICA are not going to be involved in monitoring.</p> <p>Reference 78 field notes</p> <p>As noted in the previous indicator, the bases of management monitoring are not the same for the EU, SG SICA, SIECA or the RIO.</p> <p>Reference 87 field notes</p> <p>“during the past few years there has not been a regional-country-project meeting organised by the EU where the objective was to ensure that regional and national work plans could be monitored and that they were in sync at any one time” This type of meeting used to held during the past RSP cycle.</p> <p>Reference 32 field notes</p> <p>It was noted that although PARICA 1 supported the creation of a planning directorate in SG of monitoring and supervision is the SICA, that organisation is not ensuring that national and regional plans are in sync</p> <p>Reference 68 field notes</p> <p>The PAIRCA 1 managers, according to their regular reports, were concerned that the planning systems in the RIO were not robust enough. They also proposed that part of the problem was a complete lack of ownership by political and technical decision makers. The evaluator was able to examine the planning systems in place and noted that the strategic planning systems are not sufficiently robust even if they have evolved considerably over time.</p> <p>Reference 80 field notes</p> <p>Various interviewees noted that part of the problem with monitoring and supervision is the absence of a clear model against which to compare progress. SIECA indicated that it was going to prepare an economic management model for discussion. They also noted that the entire set of SICA System institutions lacks the capability to generate a “corporate vision” based on political, economic and social models that contain performance targets. It was</p>

	<p>observed by many interviewees that there is not one RIO that has a capability development strategy; in large part, according to the managers of RIO this is largely due to the fact that they don't have a real strategic plan that spans the entire RI system. Political leaders have not directly asked for this except to ask for a reform plan (both are compatible). The reform is stalled.</p> <p>Reference 112 field notes</p> <p>Interviewees in key RIO noted that it has been difficult in the past to structure pan-national monitoring systems to ensure that a pan-national objective was attained. They cited the examples of CONSUAC and WAC where systems were created (still used) and training facilities (in Honduras) were put into place. History shows that for various reasons (including issues of security) the AIC system enabled some form of monitoring to take place but the San Pedro Sula facilities were abandoned even if all countries were initially supporting it. (Taiwan is now involved in this endeavour) In the end, it was RIO that became the champions of these initiatives and not the national governments. Getting national level leadership for regional efforts has been, and continues to be, very difficult.</p> <p>Reference 112 field notes</p> <p>SIECA noted that it has a real role to play in the implementation of major trade agreements such as the CAFTA and the AA, especially in the harmonisation of the systems and infrastructures that support the trade inherent in these agreements.</p> <p>SIECA needs to be involved in the coordination of regional-national efforts to ensure harmonisation of the norms and infrastructure related to trade: roads, security corridors, etc.</p> <p>Reference 111 field notes</p>
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I-2.2.3 – Results of meetings with national counterparts indicate that both regional and national efforts are managed in sync

<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>The evaluation team did not find a single document that reflected the results of coordination meetings (regional and national levels) on work plans or strategic plans. Moreover, neither the SIECA nor the PAIRCA2 reports that were examined spoke of meetings to manage efforts “in sync”. However, both SIECA and SICA do engage in training programmes with national counterparts (historically this has been mostly on border management but other domains were handled as well).</p> <p>The field research has identified that there are no mechanisms in place to encourage regional-national meetings on a regular basis. There are, it has been reported by interviewees, technical visits in all directions, but these are not designed to ensure synchronicity, but to allow bilateral efforts to proceed.</p> <p>Part of the problem with analysing the extent to which alignment (or being in sync) is becoming more focussed is that the SG-SICA does not define its work plans in terms of performance or specific results. The PAIRCA 2 project appears to have adopted this lack of specificity as noted by the Response to the 2010 ROM report. Within the RIO, there have been considerable difficulties observed in harmonising and aligning the actions and priorities of the RIOs. Up to the end of 2009, intra-RIO coordination was still a problem, The PAIRCA 1 contributed the possibility of face to face meetings to resolve the problem, but the results were inconclusive, In fact, in a context of rapid turnover of personnel and poor levels of coordination ability, this evaluation wonders why other strategies for improved coordination were not developed, perhaps using technology.</p>
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<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p>The 2012 SIECA results report identifies that SIECA is training and providing technical assistance to national counterparts, especially but not only in the domain of border management, Page 19 provides a description of that support in the sanitary and phytosanitary regulations.</p> <p>The SIECA report does not deal with the issue of being ‘in sync’, nor does it deal with how that coordination is exercised. <i>SIECA –Informe por resultados 2012, Dec 2012</i></p> <p>Part of the problem with analysing the extent to which alignment is becoming more focussed is that the SG-SICA does not define its work plans in terms of performance or specific results. The PAIRCA 2 project appears to have adopted this lack of specificity as noted by the Response to the 2010 ROM report. Some progress is being realised: <i>“durante la fase de programacion del PP1 se ha hecho un esfuerzo importante por presentar el programa en mayor detalle y involucrar...representantes de los diferentes contrapartes regionales y nacionales...a fin de asegurar su involucramiento et de sentar bases de trabajo comun ...con vision de conjunto y de largo plazo”.</i> ROM Response Sheet p. 2</p> <p>The field phase has identified that there are no mechanisms in place to encourage regional-national meetings on a regular basis. There are, it has been reported by interviewees, technical visits in all directions, but these are not designed to ensure synchronicity, but to allow bilateral efforts to proceed. Reference 99 field notes</p> <p>The evaluator could not find any example of an RIO that regularly met with national counterparts to co-manage efforts or to ensure that regional and national efforts were complementary of in sync. Reference 99, 112 and 167 field notes</p>
<p>I-2.2.4 – National and regional visions of regional integration issues become more aligned over time</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>From the documentation examined and the significant number of interviews carried out in the field with RIO and project personnel, there is no consensus of what will constitute an integrated region within CA, except at a very conceptual level. A joint working group was set up to “provide a clear picture of the region’s requirements” but the report of that Group has not been applied.</p> <p>The Member States are engaging in behaviours that demonstrate their lack of consensus on the vision for an integrated CA, including bilateral agreements with third party countries and the non-ratification by some countries of agreements to create RIOs. In effect, the PAIRCA 2 work plan notes that there is still considerable concern about the viability and practicality of regional integration on the part of Member States, and this has been validated during our interviews.</p> <p>Most interviews that dealt with this topic supported the concept that regional integration needs to be defined and accepted by the CA Member States themselves. PAIRCA helped to open a door but leadership was not there to take advantage and provide the roadmap. Another key issue is the financial support provided by Member States to the regional integration effort. As of 2010, there was still no real and permanent response and</p>

	<p>sustainable financing is still a problem in 2013. The PAIRCA 2 WP notes in March 2012 that there is still a requirement for major political commitment to regional integration. One has to conclude, on the basis of documentation and interviews, that no response means: ‘no real support’. And that has necessarily translate into difficulties in narrowing the gap between regional and national perceptions of how to proceed.</p> <p>With respect to sustainable funding, the response from one interviewee, and supported by others, is important: “...there is a major problem with the entire concept of RI that must be changed. Although there are many reasons for it, the existing financial structures need to be entirely changed. If you are going to be part of a RI process, you don’t expect to go to a cafeteria and choose what pleases you”</p> <p>To support the above, interviewees noted that each RIO spent a considerable amount of time seeking the funding for their next cycle. They become, over time, like consulting firms that seek to please their key clients. “Over time, the vision of RI takes a back seat to the needs to seek funding to pay the payroll” A senior EU official indicated that the reliance on donor funding meant that he donors were essentially directing the RIU process. In this evaluator’s opinion, there is no evidence to back this up.</p>
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p>P.25 of the 2007-13 CA RSP identifies that “Support will be channelled to the economic integration process, taking into consideration the findings of the joint assessment of regional economic integration in Central America being carried out by the ad hoc Joint Working Group” and that the Joint Working Group that is “expected to provide a clear picture of the region’s requirements”</p> <p><i>2007-13 CA RSP</i></p> <p>Some progress is observed with respect to the harmonisation of policies and RIO objectives:</p> <p><i>‘In the last two years, the institutions and sector strategies of the Central American integration System (SICA) have seen some substantial reforms adopted in areas such as energy, regional security, social cohesion, agriculture, food security and climate change. The Presidents have also instructed SG-SICA to propose a multiannual work programme for integration. PARLACEN has undergone reforms, while Guatemala has decided to participate in the CA Court of Justice. There is no consensus among CA governments on a thorough overhaul of SICA, with regional institutions remaining weak as there are no regional financing mechanisms.</i></p> <p><i>A higher degree of economic integration has been achieved since the entry into force of CAFTA and the decision to launch an Association Agreement with the European Union. The latter has prompted the participating countries to negotiate as a region for the first time.</i></p> <p><i>All CA countries have concluded bilateral free trade agreements with other Latin American and Asian countries and have developed policy dialogue. Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras have signed a Customs Union Agreement, which could give a new impetus to the regional system. In the Association Agreement negotiations, new priority areas for cooperation have been highlighted, in particular the facilitation of trade and the establishment of a financial mechanism for regional development”.</i></p> <p><i>CA Mid-term Review of RSP</i></p> <p>The PAIRCA 2 Annual Work Plan supports the observation above by noting that there are factors that negatively affect the integration process. One of these is bilateralism (especially but only on the part of Costa Rica and Nicaragua) which would endanger the application of a Common External Tariff.</p>

In effect, there is still considerable concern about the viability and practicality of regional integration on the part of Member States.

PAIRCA 2 WP, p. 5-6

Within the RIO, there have been considerable difficulties observed in harmonising and aligning the actions and priorities of the RIOs. It is proposed as self-evident that regional-national coordination cannot take place if the regional level is not in sync. Up to the end of 2009, intra-RIO coordination was still a problem, The PAIRCA 1 contributed the possibility of face to face meetings to resolve the problem, but the results were inconclusive, In fact, in a context of rapid turnover of personnel and poor levels of coordination ability, this evaluation wonders why other strategies for improved coordination were not developed, perhaps using technology.

“En el pasado la principal característica de la institucionalidad era el funcionamiento aislado de los organismos del nivel gerencial. De igual forma se apoyó la comunicación entre la Secretaría General y los otros órganos de la integración (PARLACEN, CCJ), mediante el financiamiento de reuniones con dichos órganos que tenían débiles vínculos con el resto de la institucionalidad. Esta comunicación está empezando a dar sus frutos en términos de búsqueda de apoyo mutuo entre las instituciones, aunque queda camino por recorrer.”

Ex post evaluation of PAIRCA 1, p. 13

There are many that support the concept that Regional Integration needs to be defined and accepted by the CA Member States themselves. PAIRCA helped to open a door but leadership was not there to take advantage and provide the roadmap. Another key issue is the financial support provided to the regional integration effort. As of 2010, there was still no real and permanent response. One has to conclude that no response, no real support. And that would necessarily translate into difficulties in narrowing the gap between regional and national perceptions of how to proceed.

“Los evaluadores no pueden más que coincidir con algunas apreciaciones recogidas en las entrevistas en el sentido que Centroamérica debe construir su propio modelo de integración acorde a las realidades y capacidades de los países centroamericanos. Para que esto ocurra se debe impulsar el debate entre sectores académicos, políticos, tanques de pensamiento y sociedad civil en general. El PAIRCA abrió una brecha, generó inquietud, promovió discusión, pero lo que no pudo hacer, como no podía ser de otro modo, fue reemplazar los liderazgos que se necesitan para hacer el proceso de integración sostenible en el tiempo.

...

La sostenibilidad de las numerosas actividades del PAIRCA en particular está asociada a la capacidad financiera y apropiación de las mismas por parte de las instituciones. Esto no está garantizado en la actualidad debido a la carencia de políticas de largo plazo y al carácter personalista y transitorio de los tomadores de decisiones en las instituciones beneficiarias, aspectos que se conjugan con el permanente déficit financiero de las mismas.»

Ex post evaluation of PAIRCA 1, p. 41

The PAIRCA 2 WP notes, as recently as March 2012, that there is STILL a requirement for a MAJOR POLITICAL COMMITMENT to regional integration. In the meantime, PAIRCA 2 will support the Executive Committee and the Consejo Fiscalizador Regional del SICA, the former in order to obtain direction and decisions and the other for fiscal and financial control.

	<p><i>PAIRCA 2 WP p. 6</i></p> <p>The indicators for PAIAA under result 5 dealing with national counterpart training are essentially input and output based. There is no reflection on “capability” or “ability” identified as targets.</p> <p><i>PAIAA FALFA p. 3</i></p> <p>The SIECA published a vision of economic integration in 2013. Interviews in the field noted that this has not been adopted at all, and in fact still needs to be discussed. It wants to generate a project that will expand on the model.</p> <p>It identifies the best practices that should be obtained:</p> <p><i>“Fortalecimiento jurídico institucional de la integración: ampliación del proceso hacia otros ámbitos (social, político, cultural, ambiental).</i></p> <p><i>Capacidad de adaptación a los cambios que se han dado en el entorno económico mundial.</i></p> <p><i>Utilización de mecanismos para la solución de controversias en los diferentes ámbitos de la integración regional (CCJ, MSCCA, procedimiento para solución de BNAS). »</i></p> <p>As well as the next stages of integration:</p> <p><i>“Consolidación de la Unión Aduanera.</i></p> <p><i>Mejorar la competitividad (infraestructura y servicios, mayor facilitación del comercio).</i></p> <p><i>Atraer mayor IED a la región.</i></p> <p><i>Optimizar el aprovechamiento de los TLCs:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>– Incrementar la capacidad productiva y cadenas de valor</i> <i>– Mejorar el conocimiento de los TLCs del sector productivo</i> <i>– Integrar a las MIPYMES al esfuerzo exportador</i> <i>– Mejorar la capacidad de los gobiernos para la administración del comercio exterior”</i> <p><i>(PPT) El proceso de integración económica regional SIECA 2013 Berlin</i></p> <p>The vision of RI continues to evolve insofar as the CCJ is concerned. Primarily, this evolution is due to the need to take international trade agreements into account. It claims that the political leaders should try to create a solid legal base that can be used as a baseline. The reform that was proposed for the CCJ did not alter the vision of what the RI process was about.</p> <p>Reference 45 Field notes</p> <p>“...there is a major problem with the entire concept of RI that must be changed. Although there are many reasons for it, the existing financial structures need to be entirely changed. If you are going to be part of a RI process, you don’t expect to go to a cafeteria and choose what pleases you”</p> <p>Reference 63 field notes</p>
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	<p>To support the above, interviewees noted that each RIO spent a considerable amount of time seeking the funding for their next cycle. They become, over time, like consulting firms that seek to please their key clients. “Over time, the vision of RI takes a back seat to the needs to seek funding to pay the payroll”</p> <p>Reference 64 field notes</p> <p>There is still a wide range of opinions concerning what IR should include and why. For example, the PAIRCA 1 and PAIRCA 2 projects were designed in the absence of real contributions from MS, according to interviewees. Since these projects supported Civil Society, Nicaragua was not in agreement with the projects. Dealing with the issue of society across the MS is clearly not a domain on which the MS have reached consensus.</p> <p>Reference 77 field notes</p> <p>The field mission did not discover any document that would indicate what form political dialog would take (EU-region-country) so that the EU could help a common vision of RI to emerge. The EU had supported the RI process at the highest levels for decades, but the political dialogue in the field does not appear to be organised (Structured, planned, directed, purposeful) or focussed. Interviewees believed that a concerted effort would be required (political dialogue) to get the political leaders of the region to take important decisions. They further believed that this effort should be led by the EU (and not, say, by the WB, UN, USA or other political body).</p> <p>Reference 33 field notes</p> <p>When asked about the development of common policies to facilitate a greater level of alignment, two interviewees noted that early versions of ADAPCCA had visions of doing just that. “... but as it got closer to the time of signing it got further away from a project to develop common high level policies”. The reality seems to be different, however; there was consensus amongst the signatories that the DTA would be composed of three parts, including the strengthening of COMIECA as a governance body, the development of tariff-related policies and non-tariff processes, and the development of complementary policies in commercial and customs domains. If successful, these would have surely enabled a greater level of alignment, at least at the technical end. If the COMIECA efforts that been successful it would have generated a more focussed form of alignment in economic domains as well. In practice, according to ex-post evaluation reports as validated by interviewees, the project: “did not develop common policies but tried to coordinate the preparation of options and common norms. The majority of these proposals were never approved.”</p> <p>Reference 114 field note</p> <p>Three interviewees noted that the use of “projects” to promote alignment on RI has its practical limits in that in reality, the projects take on a life of their own, and the leadership decision-makers view them as technical, and not political.</p> <p>Reference 108 field notes</p>
<p>I-2.2.5 – Amount of resources assigned to regional-national interface sufficient to allow both levels to do its work</p>	
<p><i>Findings</i></p>	<p>The documentation examined did not mention this issue, either to define what was done,</p>

<p><i>at indicator level</i></p>	<p>or how much effort has been devoted. It is noted that according to the PAIRCA 2 Action Fiche, the EU allocated only € 300,000 through the RIP to “National Counterparts”. On average that means that each of the seven Member States in CA will receive about € 40, 000 through the RIS, not a significant amount to accomplish what is, in reality, a herculean task. The contribution through NIPs is above and beyond that amount. The Ma and E system set up by PAIRCA 2 shows that this budget line will not lead to significant results in terms of increased integration through better interface.</p> <p>Many interviewees in a number of RIO, as well as six project managers and technical support staff in EU –funded interventions noted that the Exec Com, the council of ministers of foreign affairs and the members of COMIECO all have a mandate to do this, but no officials are charged with follow-up, there is no budget line for that purpose and there are no M and E systems in place to supervise that.</p> <p>Past efforts at institutional rationalisation (regional-national and inter-regional) have not been successful, even though PAIRCA 1 began a process to improve national counterpart abilities with respect to regional integration that was not particularly successful, mostly because it was too limited and tied to face-to-face training sessions.</p>
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p>The EC allocated only € 300,000 through the RIP to “National Counterparts”. On average that means that each of the seven Member States in CA will receive about € 40,000 through the RIS, not a significant amount. The contribution through NIPs is above and beyond that amount.</p> <p><i>Action Fiche PAIRCA 2, p.11</i></p> <p>It is observed that there is a considerable amount of institutional inefficiency in the SICA RIO system. Part of the problem is precisely what is the “work” or ”mandate” of the RIO and the national counterparts. At the moment there are dozens of agencies and bodies that relate directly to a region-level mandate. The consequences of this fragmentation are important including overlapping, mandate gaps, financing sustainability of many organisations and lack of influence or power. Past efforts at institutional rationalisation have not been successful.</p> <p><i>“There is no consensus among CA governments on a thorough overhaul of SICA, with regional institutions remaining weak as there are no regional financing mechanisms.”</i></p> <p>In many ways the problem is exacerbated because the Member States are signing a number of bilateral trade agreements with third parties. Harmonisation and conformity thus becomes more difficult and any integration process becomes more complex because non-CA Member States are immediately required at the negotiation table.</p> <p><i>CA Mid-term RSP Review p. 2</i></p> <p>PAIRCA 1 began a process to improve national counterpart abilities with respect to regional integration, but the efforts were too small (in terms of scope and budget) and not sustainable. The use of distance-based training resulted in 120 people participating, but a part of these people were in EUDs. The high turnover of personnel also made the results unsustainable.</p> <p><i>“En el primero se realizó el fortalecimiento del sistema de comunicaciones remotas a través del uso del Sistema de Videoconferencias en las cancillerías de los países del SICA. El PAIRCA realizó la</i></p>

	<p><i>consultoría, diseño e hizo la instalación del sistema, con la dotación de equipos. La SG-SICA administra. Los equipos fueron instalados en las sedes de las cancillerías en 2009. El sistema permitirá mejorar la conectividad y la comunicación entre los países miembros del sistema y los entes del SICA, aborrandando tiempo y recursos por traslados. Dentro del programa de formación y capacitación, se reportan cinco cursos con la participaron 120 personas de Cancillería y otras instituciones gubernamentales vinculadas con la temática. En consecuencia, la valoración de esta actividad es que aunque con algunos retrasos el fortalecimiento de las instancias nacionales ha tenido efectivamente lugar. Hay que considerar no obstante que el grado de rotación de personal en las Cancillerías podría relativizar su impacto a largo plazo. A pesar de haber llevado a cabo acciones interesantes y útiles para las Cancillerías, este componente no llegó a cubrir todas las expectativas que se tenían de él al inicio del programa, más bien acabó ajustándose a lo que realmente era factible hacer dentro del tiempo disponible.”</i></p> <p><i>Ex post evaluation of PAIRCA 1, p. 34</i></p> <p>The report noted above notes that one needs to take into account the fact that any sustainability of PAIRCA activities destined to strengthen the SICA system as a whole is very heavily dependent upon political whim and direction.</p> <p><i>“...fortalecer al sistema en su conjunto es mucho y depende principalmente de la voluntad política de los países centroamericanos” (p. 35).</i></p> <p>An EU official and a SIECA official both noted that: “The EC is paying for local people to work in SIECA since Costa Rica stopped paying”. The fact is that there is no one in any RIO, that is specifically entrusted with ensuring that there an interface is in place to enable both the regional and national levels to do their work in sync.</p> <p>Many interviewees in a number of RIO, as well as six project managers and technical support staff in EU –funded interventions noted that the Exec Com, the council of ministers of foreign affairs and the members of COMIECO all have a mandate to do this, but no officials are charged with follow-up, there is no budget line for that purpose and there are no M and E systems in place to supervise that.</p> <p>References 6, 63, 78, 112 and 145 field notes</p> <p>There is a small budget in PAIRCA 2 to support the projects proposed by national governments but none of this money is destined to ensure that there is a regional-national interface.</p> <p>Reference 76 field notes</p>
<p>JC 2.3 – Improved coordination among key RIOs and between RIOs and donors in the achievement of regional integration targets</p>	
<p><i>Statement on JC2.3</i></p>	<p>Note: <i>Many of the indicators identified for the inception report do not have data with which to analyse them, nor are these data likely to exist. The evaluation team recommends consolidating indicators under JC 2.3, as discussed below.</i></p> <p>The CA RSP 2007-2013 is quite specific about the need for coordination even though it does not specify the expected performance metrics of the coordination or how it will take place. Documents show that up until 2010, national counterpart institutions had not yet all appropriated the regional integration programme (exceptions being those involved in trade). And as a result, they were not motivated to undertake coordination actions or targeted monitoring. There was still a perception that the entire SICA set of institutions (including</p>

regional institutions not generally considered as RIOs) represented an exaggerated architecture and did not deliver advertised benefits. For years now the various donors have recognised that the work of the SICA system's institutions needed to be coordinated (see World Bank and EU documents going back to mid-90's). Furthermore, donors have set up donor coordination mechanisms but the evaluation has not been able to obtain any documentation on the results of that effort. A 2010 document reports that a donor matrix had been developed by SGSICA's DG Cooperation, which contains basic data on all cooperation projects for the Secretariats, including SIECA. No systematic information was available for the other institutions, such as CCJ, PARLACEN or CC SICA, at that time, but it is unknown if this system is maintained and if it is, the extent to which it adds value to coordination.

As of 2010, efforts were ongoing, under the coordination of SG-SICA with EU support, to bring the 'harmonisation and alignment of regional cooperation' to a higher level and more into line with the Paris and Accra Declarations. The results of those efforts are not known. More recently, The EU's PRAIAA intervention noted that there was still a significant need for coordination, and the PAIRCA 2 MTR (2012) provided an update on the coordination activities in place. In effect, past efforts at creating a system had stalled. In addition, organisation structures that were set up to monitor and supervise did not work. The MTR did, however, make a good link between monitoring and supervision.

Almost all donor and CA documents incorporate a principle of inclusiveness into the planning for the regional integration process, and the EU has funded a broad range of interventions to develop the capacity of NSA to do just that. The results have not been spectacular, especially at the national level where relatively autocratic governments do not actively engage NSA in policy development, save for business associations.

One aspect that does not show up in the documentation analysed in the Desk Phase is the division of labour (read: coordination, complementarity and coherence) between RIOs, the EU, European Member States and other donors. Some documentation may, however, exist in the field at both national and regional levels. For example, the World Bank project P 121646 appears to be a close copy of PAIRCA 1 and 2. A large number of donors have put into place various types of initiatives dealing with regional integration in the region, but the documentation examined did not speak to how complementarity was sought. The field research will also research the extent to which the national counterparts actually participate in the coordination process.

It is noteworthy, from a coordination perspective, that the Contribution Agreement with the UNDP does not specify any requirements for, or targets for, coordination or complementarity. Since much of the "social" results are handled through the UNDP in R3 and R4, there is an issue that needs to be clarified in the field.

The documentation examined by this evaluation did not find any references to «complementarity» except as a reference to the Maastricht Treaty. There is a significant difference between documents as to the number of stakeholders that need to be included in a coordination (complementarity) seeking process, so even the baseline is not a settled thing. Documents from June 2010 report that inter-institutional (i.e. Inter-RIO) coordination is a very sensitive subject and are overly complex (it is implied that they are not working well but that is not specifically stated). They go on to note that there is a wide range of capacities for coordination amongst the RIO, but that these continue to be relatively weak. It goes on to note that the high turnover of personnel contributes to the weakness within the various

	<p>ministries, RIO and technical bodies.</p> <p>The extent to which coordination systems actually do provide a means of seeking complementarity will be determined through “perception analysis” that will be carried out in the field.</p> <p>So overall, it is hypothesised that the coordination systems in place are fairly basic if they exist at all, and the effort devoted to coordination at higher levels is likely inconsistent and sporadic</p>
<p>I-2.3.1 – Coordination systems in place and resourced, periodic coordination monitoring</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>The CA RSP 2007-2013 is quite specific about the need for coordination even though it does not specify the expected performance metrics of the coordination or how it will take place.</p> <p>Up until 2010, national counterpart institutions had not yet all appropriated the regional integration programme (exceptions being those involved in trade). And as a result, they were not motivated to undertake coordination actions or targeted monitoring. There was still a perception that the entire SICA set of institutions (including regional institutions not generally considered as RIOs) represented an exaggerated architecture and did not deliver advertised benefits; in addition, the organisational architecture of the SICA System is designed to be managed closely by political interests, so motivation amongst institutions appears to be weak. For years now the various donors have recognised that the work of the SICA system’s institutions needed to be coordinated (see World Bank and EU documents going back to mid-90’s). Furthermore, donors have set up donor coordination mechanisms but the evaluation has not been able to obtain any documentation on the results of that effort. A 2010 document reports that a donor matrix had been developed by SG-SICA’s DG Cooperation, which contains basic data on all cooperation projects for the Secretariats, including SIECA. No systematic information was available for the other institutions, such as CCJ, PARLACEN or CC SICA, at that time. It is unknown that this system is not maintained.</p> <p>As of 2010, efforts were ongoing, under the coordination of SG-SICA, to bring the ‘harmonisation and alignment of regional cooperation’ to a higher level and more into line with the Paris and Accra Declarations. The results of this work have not produced sustainable results, although an office for international coordination has been set up relatively recently.</p> <p>More recently, PRAIAA noted that there was still a significant need for coordination, and the PAIRCA 2 MTR (2012) provided an update on the coordination activities in place. In effect, past efforts at creating a system had stalled. In addition, organisation structures that were set up to monitor and supervise did not work. The MTR did, however, make a good link between monitoring and supervision.</p> <p>Interviews with over a dozen interviewees in the field indicated that neither the SG SICA, nor the EU projects, nor the EUD or UNDP had put into place a working coordination process to focus RI efforts. All indicated that they were “independent” and did what they wanted, or could (according to their mandate or contract).</p> <p>So overall, various coordination systems in place are fairly basic and not holistic. Moreover</p>

	<p>the effort devoted to coordination at higher levels is inconsistent and sporadic.</p>
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p>Up until 2010, the national counterparts had not yet appropriated the regional integration programme. And as a result were not motivated to undertake coordination actions or targeted monitoring. There was still a perception that the entire SICA set of institutions (including regional institutions not generally considered as RIOS) represented an exaggerated architecture and did not deliver advertised benefits</p> <p><i>“La no apropiación por parte de las autoridades políticas de cada país de los programas regionales resultan en pérdida de interés y escasa voluntad de aportar fondos para garantizar la sostenibilidad (mecanismo de financiación) y la toma de decisiones sobre los grandes temas de la integración.</i></p> <p>...</p> <p><i>Se percibió que muchos entrevistados/as ven la actual institucionalidad regional como exagerada para las necesidades de América Central y asignan ese exceso de instituciones a la incidencia de los fondos europeos. Consultados sobre el tema, otros interlocutores dijeron no estar de acuerdo sobre esto puesto que las instituciones estaban allí antes de la llegada de los fondos europeos y sin perspectivas de desaparecer.”</i></p> <p><i>Ex post evaluation of PAIRCA 1 p. 42</i></p> <p>The 2007-13 CA RSP identified briefly the main donors of the time of writing and the potential areas for coordination:</p> <p><i>“An overview of the main international cooperation programmes is contained in the attached donor matrix (Annex 3). The analysis of the main donors at regional level shows a clear comparative advantage for the EC in supporting the regional integration process.</i></p> <p><i>As regards the EU, Spain is one of the most prominent EU Member States in the Central American region. Its main areas for cooperation in this region include strengthening public administration, health, education, sustainable development and natural resources and environmental management, disaster prevention and reducing ecological vulnerability, tourism, micro-enterprise and fisheries. Germany has been/still is present, with sub-regional approaches in themes such as the creation of employment and (sustainable) industrial competitiveness; renewable energies; micro credits; prevention of catastrophes and watershed management. Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and Finland also provide significant amounts of cooperation through regional programmes. Over the past few years the substantive part of funding provided by these donors has been directed to environmental management and natural resources, in particular by Sweden which plans to put even more emphasis on this area of regional integration over the period 2004-2008.</i></p> <p><i>Other donors</i></p> <p><i>The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) remains the most important provider of multilateral lending to the Central American region. Its regional programme focuses on three basic spheres: economic growth and infrastructure; human development; and sustainable development. Its support centres on three key regional initiatives, namely the Madrid 2001 Regional Consultative Group, the Plan Puebla Panama (PPP) and the Free Trade Agreement negotiated between Central America and the United States (CAFTA) in 2003/2004. Infrastructure initiatives in the context of the PPP, in particular road and electricity interconnection, have absorbed the bulk of the IDB’s lending. Its support for regional integration and trade capacity building in the context of CAFTA is also important. In the area of HIV/AIDS, national HIV/AIDS programmes are being consolidated regionally through a US\$8 million loan provided by the World Bank to assist the region in developing better access to high-quality diagnosis, a regional surveillance system for the epidemic, better prevention and control practices and mechanisms to reduce the vulnerability of mobile populations to HIV/AIDS.</i></p> <p><i>The new USAID strategy for Central America and Mexico for 2003-2008 has the overarching regional</i></p>

goal of a more democratic and prosperous Central America and Mexico, sharing the benefits of trade-led growth broadly among their citizens. It narrows the focus of USAID investment to a limited number of “performance arenas” established in the Millennium Challenge Account: ruling justly, economic freedom, and investing in people.”

CA RSP 2007-13 p.18

A complete list of donors involved in CA is included as Annex 3 in the CA RSP 2007-13. Total commitments of the IADB were a little more than US\$ 805 million with total co-financing of US\$ 2.8 billion in IADB projects. Bilateral donors had committed over US\$ 160 million, not counting the World Bank.

For years now the various donors have recognised that the work of the SICA system’s institutions needed to be coordinated (see World Bank and EU documents going back to mid-90’s). Furthermore, donors have set up donor coordination mechanisms.

“A number of international donors provide support to SICA through a project approach, especially in the areas of vulnerability, environment, food security, etc. Main donors include EU Member States (mostly Spain, Germany, France, Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Austria), the US, Taiwan, Japan, and Switzerland as well as Mexico through the Plan Puebla Panama. However, the European Commission (EC) and Spain (AECID plus decentralised cooperation), as well as Taiwan, seem to provide most of the specific support to the institutional system as such. There are a few sector round tables for donor coordination, but there is no ‘institutional’ global round table.

A donor matrix has been developed by SGSICA’s DG Cooperation, which contains basic data on all cooperation projects for the Secretariats, including SIECA. No systematic information is available for the other institutions, such as CCJ, PARLACEN or CC SICA, for example. Care has been taken to ensure that EC programmes do not overlap with other activities and donor programmes.

Efforts are currently ongoing, under the coordination of SG-SICA, to bring the ‘harmonisation and alignment of regional cooperation’ to a higher level and more into line with the Paris and Accra Declarations. In general, new EC programmes are oriented to building capacities in counterpart institutions and supporting their own regional processes. Programme activities are in line with agreed regional strategies, and close coordination with other donors is ensured when needed (e.g. AECID and UNDP). There is a need to support implementation of these strategies throughout all levels of cooperation.”

CA MTR 2010 p. 8

It should be noted that this excerpt says that the “care has been taken to ensure that ERC programmes do not overlap...” but the rest of the review does not specify how that “care” is exercised or what effect it has had.

The CA RIOs nevertheless are not well coordinated amongst themselves or between them and donors:

“In addition, important programmes have been implemented in other areas, notably thematic budget lines (such as food security, human rights and NGO co-financing).

Implementation rates are quite high throughout, despite the fact that the regional programmes are executed by weak institutions, lacking — for the most part — adequate human and financial resources. It is safe to say

that the good performance is due partly to the considerable technical assistance provided through the various programmes and partly to close monitoring by the European Commission. In the majority of cases, the CA regional programmes suffer many delays in the start-up phase due to problems of coordination and decision-making, often exacerbated by the complex design of projects.”

CA MTR p. 9

The RSP for CA 2007-13 is quite specific about the need for coordination although it does not identify what form that coordination should take and what performance specifications it should be given:

“However, a number of recommendations may be derived from a series of analyses taken into account at the time of preparation of the RSP for 2002-06. In short, these analyses underline, inter alia, that:

The effectiveness of inter-state cooperation through regional integration bodies could be improved by the prior requirement to establish common regulations and legislation. Any initial verification of the relevance of regional cooperation should give fuller consideration to the capacities and willingness of all the players, national and regional, private and public.”

CA RSP 2007-13 p. 16

The same RSP 2007-13 also referred to past evaluations when it raised the need to seek coherency between actions taken out at different levels, thereby including, ipso facto, the need for heightened performance levels in coordination:

*“Finally, as regards the **thematic initiatives at regional level**, a key issue will be to enhance coherence between the action carried out at regional and national level and to support the regional integration process more clearly. To this end, action should include a component aiming at strengthening the capacity of the regional institutions and dialogue with civil society.”*

Ibid, p.19

In the 2005 to 2007 period, coordination in the region was essentially non-existent:

“Finally, it must be added that the only effective coordination mechanism in the region is in the IADB-backed infrastructure plan with two main infrastructure systems - electricity and roads – being covered within the framework of the Plan Puebla Panama. Although there are no institutionalised mechanisms for local donor coordination, Central America is analysing the possibility of launching pilot initiatives for harmonising and aligning cooperation at regional level and, in this context, the EC could analyse the possibility of supporting this process.”

CA RSP 2007-13 p. 24

The PRAIAA Fiche Identification notes that the following interventions relate to the PRAIAA (and should therefore be coordinated):

Regional or multi-country projects from other donors related to specific components

Transport: Mesoamerica Programme, with funding by IADB and other donors, includes the development of a Pacific corridor to facilitate regional and international trade.

Trade Facilitation: Normative and Institutional Framework for a Regional Competition Policy, with cooperation from IADB, IMF and WB to the Council of Bank Superintendents

It also identifies EU funded interventions at a bilateral level that relate to regional integration and trade:

EU Programs in CA regarding regional integration and trade

Programme to support the creation of a regional system for quality control and the application of sanitary and phytosanitary measures in CA (PRACAMS) Regional

II Programme to Support the Regional Integration of C.A. (PAIRCA II) Regional

Facilitation Project for the participation of Guatemala in the Regional Integration Process and the Association Agreement between CA and the EU Guatemala

Support Project to the business and investment climate (PRAMECLIN) Nicaragua

Assistance Cooperation Project for the strengthening of SMEs competitiveness Nicaragua

Project to support the public administration and regional integration (PAAPIR) Honduras

Identification in Panama for the design of a national project to strengthen the customs administration for its incorporation to C.A. Customs Unions has been taken into account.

PRLAA Fiche Identification

The TAPS for PAIRCA 2 identified a much broader range of donors than in most documents:

El Sistema de Integración Centroamericana recibe el apoyo de diferentes donantes internacionales, entre los que destacan varios de los Estados Miembros de la Unión Europea (particularmente España, Alemania, Austria, Dinamarca, Finlandia, Francia y Suecia), así como otros donantes relevantes (Estados Unidos, Taiwán, Japón, Noruega, Suiza, BID, India y también México a través del Plan Puebla Panamá, entre otros).

En total, se estiman alrededor de 46 fuentes oficiales de cooperación, con casi una centena de proyectos comprometidos con la institucionalidad regional. Esta cooperación se estructura principalmente sobre la base de iniciativas sectoriales que incluyen a menudo componentes de fortalecimiento institucional y construcción de capacidades (ej. el apoyo sectorial de GTZ a CENPROMYPE, etc.). Adicionalmente, existe un apoyo sustancial a la institucionalidad regional en sí misma por parte de la Comisión Europea y de España, así como de Taiwán y otros donantes.

El número creciente de donantes ha hecho que en los últimos años se haya visto como necesario un ordenamiento de la cooperación regional. Esta preocupación se ha visto reflejada en las Declaraciones Presidenciales de Tegucigalpa (Junio 2005), León (Diciembre 2005) y Panamá (Junio 2006), donde se establecen mandatos para emprender formal y sistemáticamente actividades que conlleven a una mayor articulación de la cooperación y actores en la región, generalmente a iniciativa de los países miembros comprometidos con estos procesos a nivel nacional. A fin de dar cumplimiento a estos mandatos, se realizó inicialmente un diagnóstico en el que se evidenció una cooperación regional dispersa y con elevados costos de transacción (alto número de misiones, duplicación del trabajo analítico, unidades paralelas de gestión y descoordinación de la asistencia técnica, alto consumo de tiempo del personal regional, etc.).

Estos temas fueron abordados en el Foro Especial de Armonización y Alineamiento de la Cooperación Regional para Centroamérica que tuvo lugar en Viena en mayo de 2006, previo a la IV Cumbre de América Latina y el Caribe – Unión Europea. De este encuentro surgió la Iniciativa de Viena, documento que establece compromisos y derechos recíprocos entre los países socios y los países cooperantes, al tiempo que define un Plan de Acción de la Cooperación Regional. Tras este encuentro, solamente se realizó una reunión a nivel técnico de seguimiento en San José de Costa Rica (diciembre 2006), si bien se fueron desarrollando iniciativas varias con el apoyo de la CE y otros cooperantes, entre ellas la creación de una base de datos (SICOR) que compila información básica sobre los proyectos de cooperación de todas las Secretarías, además de otros trabajos de acompañamiento.

El proceso ha sido relanzado recientemente mediante el Foro sobre Armonización y Alineamiento de la Cooperación Regional que tuvo lugar en Tegucigalpa el día 10 de noviembre de 2008. Entre los resultados de éste, se encuentra una primera revisión del Plan de Acción de la Cooperación Regional y una propuesta para la creación de un Grupo de Trabajo mixto con representación de donantes y contrapartes centroamericanas a fin de establecer una Hoja de Ruta para el proceso.

Eventualmente se esperaría que este trabajo desemboque en la creación de una mesa regional de donantes bajo el liderazgo de la SG SICA, que serviría para coordinar la cooperación regional y también para dar un marco de coordinación a las diversas mesas sectoriales que están ya funcionando a nivel de algunas Secretarías Técnicas (por ejemplo, CENPROMYPE; CCAD, etc.). Sin embargo, faltan todavía algunos pasos para poder lanzar un proceso de A&A con todas sus implicaciones, por lo que se hace necesario un plan gradual de avance.

Por el momento el proceso se circunscribe a las Secretarías del SICA y no se ha hecho aún extensivo a otras instituciones, tales como la CCJ, el PARLACEN y el CC-SICA. Estas cuentan con aportaciones de varios donantes (además de la cooperación de la CE, hay aportaciones de Taiwán al PARLACEN, AECID y Suecia al CC-SICA, etc.), con lo cual se hace necesario acordar medidas concretas con todas ellas para optimizar la coordinación entre donantes.

TAPS PAIRCA 2

Recently the PAIRCA 2 MTR provided an update on the coordination activities. In effect, past efforts at creating a system have stalled somewhat. In addition, organisation structures that were set up to monitor and supervise do not work. The MTR does, however, make a good link between monitoring and supervision, and shows that a body with authority is required to adjust as required and when required.

“Ya en las DTA de PAIRCA II se menciona el alto número de fuentes de cooperación, alrededor de 50 diferentes donantes, y la necesidad de un ordenamiento de la cooperación internacional. Existe una Hoja de Ruta que pretende avanzar en ese ordenamiento, una base de datos con información sobre la cooperación (SICOR) y un grupo de Seguimiento que recibe apoyo del programa. Sin embargo, la misión concluye que la Dirección de Cooperación Internacional no da abasto para liderar este proceso y no conoce indicaciones que se ha avanzado sustantivamente hacia este objetivo.

El Comité de Dirección debería reunirse por lo meno una vez cada 6 meses, pero en realidad reunido solamente 3 veces desde el inicio del programa²⁶. Teóricamente, un Comité de Dirección puede ser muy importante en un programa que tiene problemas en su gestión. Se impone la pregunta; ¿Porqué este Comité no ha intervenido cuando el PAIRCA II no avanzaba”? La respuesta es que el término “Comité de Dirección” no cubre la función que en realidad tiene. No dirige el programa. Más bien en los comités se discuten algunos problemas de avance, no de fondo, y se explican los procedimientos a seguir. También se utilizan esta reuniones para comunicar sobre la aprobación de los PPs, presupuestos, etc. Además, como lo constituye mayoritariamente los principales beneficiarios, no tendría lógica que fuera la máxima instancia en la gestión del programa. Se detecta aquí una discrepancia entre las facultades que se le asigna al Comité en las DTA y las que en realidad están teniendo. Por esta razón, probablemente no pudo resolver los

problemas del programa en su momento.”

MTR PAIRCA 2 p. 40

Various interviewees in RIO and the EC indicated that, as far as they knew, the DG-Trade and DEVCO never reached an accord on how to link development and trade. Documents and interviews in the EUD point to a strategy where the delegation was not intimately involved. Interviewees noted that they saw a considerable shift towards AA (mostly trade) facilitation and a corresponding near-absence of emphasis (i.e. interest in) on development (poverty reduction, inequality, etc.) even if, in their view, the AID for TRADE policy of the EU emphasises that the former is the point of emphasis and the latter is in support of the former.

References 7, 44, 48 and 70 (and others) field notes

Interviews with over a dozen interviewees in the field indicated that neither the SG SICA, nor the EU projects, nor the EUD or the UNDP had put into place a working coordination process to focus RI efforts. All indicated that they were “independent” and did what they wanted, or could (according to their mandate or contract).

References 44 and 45, 151, amongst others, field notes

The EUD did not really get involved in content issues except when an approval was required according to the financial processes of the EC. This would not have been such a serious problem except that the EU needed to provide policy dialogue for much of what we wanted to achieve.

Reference 7, 44, 106 and 87, amongst others, field notes

The result area 3 of PAIRCA 2 dealt with Civil Society, but “we never saw, in the UNDP-managed programme, an effort to coordinate CS or to develop the ability of the CS to coordinate”

Reference 83, supported by 154, field notes

One senior official interviewed indicated that there are meetings that are sometimes organised by SIECA once or twice a year that presents all SICA System RIO with an opportunity to meet. These are normally 1-3 hours long and deal mainly with economic issues and processes and are not directive in nature. Information on current activities is shared. “This is not what one would call value-added coordination, but it does and has developed a sort of Team Building thrust amongst RIO”

Reference 9 field notes

“Since the EC has started being re-structured (now for nth time), we have lost a lot of people in the Delegation. The people in HQ have less time to work with us. On top of that the projects we manage are getting more and more complex. Our processes are getting more complicated to manage from our side as well as from the side of the beneficiaries and executing agencies so we spend more time on QA. We don’t have time for content. What is expected from us is the management of the administrative and financial systems.”

Reference 4, 6 and 10 field notes

The EU and UNDP meet regularly for joint site visits and for annual project supervision and management meetings (Comite Technical y Seguimiento). The agendas show that they are not primarily used for coordination but for governance and problem resolution and change management in formal agreements. Reports on activities are provided periodically, but are not for coordination but accountability.

Reference 13 field notes and review of agenda and minutes of CTS meeting.

The issue of coordination at large and donor coordination in particular has been raised over and over again in CA. A 2013 Forum on Regional Coordination was held where one of the conclusions was a request for more transparency on budgets on the part of all concerned. Spain, the EU and UNDP noted that they would support coordination and greater complementarity amongst regional donors.

It is important to note, said a key interviewee, that the EU accepted, in 2008, to be responsible for donor coordination at the regional level. It has not followed-up on that commitment for many years.

Reference 24 field notes

SG-SICA has never has an approved multi-annual work plan. It has no coordination strategy or plan. It has just (2014) proposed a strategic plan for itself as an RIO that is based on the 5 pillars but where there are no real priorities, and no clear link between what it needs to do and the financing needed to do that.

Importantly, there is no strategic plan for the development of the SICA System as a whole (equivalent to RI in CA)

Reference 19 field notes and examination of 5 pillars document and 2014 strategic plan

In terms of a lost opportunity for coordination, it was noted that SIECA is part of the management committee set up for PAIRCA 2 but it has not participated of shown interest.

Reference 70 field notes

There are no formal coordination links between PAIRCA 2 and PRAIAA even though part of their mandates and responsibilities (CD and M and E) are the same. Developing two M and E systems is a form of duplication,

Reference 70 field notes

Part of the complication of getting RIO to seek ownership of coordination and M and E is the fact that EU projects do not discriminate between performance indicators that need to be used by operational managers and those that need to be used by governance and Heads of Agencies. For example, the PAIRCA 2 designers presented 78 indicators. The SICA organisations did not even set themselves up to be able to manage this number of indicators (gather data, analyse, supervise, etc.). An attempt was made to simplify when the PAIRCA 2 M and E expert arrived but there was a wide discrepancy between what the SICA people wanted (around 10) and what the EUD wanted (around 60). At the moment, all the indicators are being managed but SICA managers, (as we are told by both PAIRCA 2 managers and SICA managers), are not using the entire set of indicators to manage. An

	<p>analysis by the evaluator showed that most (over 75%) of the indicators are either overly general in nature or are highly technical amounting to process milestones instead of progress towards results.</p> <p>To support this analysis it was confirmed by RIO and project personnel that SG SICA does not have rigorous working guidelines and standards (that would, at least, ensure consistency and quality management) for:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">Project designFeasibility studiesFinancial project analysisTenderingMonitoringM and EFinancial management <p>...so it cannot be said that they are autonomous.</p> <p>Reference 82 field notes</p> <p>It was pointed out that the change in Secretary General of SICA in 2009 did not coincide with a renewed sense of ownership on the part of SG SICA. The projects dealing with the unified treaty reform (135 K euros and budget and financial system reform could have, it is noted, been directly managed by the SG office. As it is these two projects are not likely going to achieve their intended results, with the unified treaty project being only able to provide, as a result, a copy of a minute of a meeting. Both of these projects, among others, would have reinforced the harmonisation of policies and management and therefore enabled closer coordination across all RIO.</p> <p>Reference 92 field notes</p> <p>One interviewee noted that although the CC-SICA had received a significant amount of resources to build up its management systems, it did not significantly increase the effectiveness of the coordination systems it needed, many of which were working (albeit slowly) within the networks they had. The CC-SICA used both formal (hierarchical) processes and informal processes to consult with their key sub-groups of CSO and NSA:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">EmpresarialesUniversitariosCooperativasLaboralSocial (mujeres, indigenas, ambiente, jovenes, etc.) <p>A number of examples were provided where the CC-SICA was able to coordinate responses from various groups across the spectrum of NSA and provide input into the decision-making processes of SICA.</p>
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	<p>Since there are no MS that directly support CC-SICA, its funding is always a problem. The volunteers are only supported by one full-time person. They claim that the system will fail if they don't get some form of support. Reference 94 field notes</p> <p>“The system that the Ministers council wants to put into place to pre-approve the relevance of projects that the RIO will seek donor support to pay, is not a coordination system.” Reference 153 field notes</p> <p>One of the countries interviewed at the Chanceleria level noted that: “SIECA and SG-SICA are not good at coordinating the countries or the RIO among themselves” Reference 118 field notes</p> <p>Another interviewee from the EU system, noted that the Managua EUD does not always share monitoring reports or evaluation or progress reports with other EUD.</p> <p>“the SICOR system is supposed to provide information on what is going on, but it is too shallow and is not updated regularly.” Reference 118 field notes</p> <p>The new SG of SIECA has incorporated the heads of technical coordination of PRIAA, PRACAMS and PYME into her weekly management meetings. “This is recent and is the first time it happens in SIECA” It does not happen in other RIO. Reference 121 of field notes</p> <p>Although not an RIO per se, IICA does coordinate donors and seeks complementarity on the issues that it deals with. It has been doing this for years and appears to excel at it, especially when concerns issues of crisis suchas coffee rust, where most of the research in that topic are being coordinated by or researched by IICA in CA Reference 144 field notes</p>
<p>I-2.3.2 – Level of inclusiveness of preparation for and participation in, coordination processes</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>Almost all donor and CA documents incorporate a principle of inclusiveness into the planning for the regional integration process, and the EU has funded a broad range of interventions to develop the capacity of NSA to do just that. The results have not been spectacular; especially at the national level where relatively autocratic governments do not actively engage NSA in policy development, save for business associations.</p> <p>One aspect that does not show up in the documentation analysed is the division of labour (read: coordination, complementarity and coherence) between RIOs, the EU, European Member States and other donors. For example, the World Bank project P 121646 appears to be a close copy of PAIRCA 1 and 2. A large number of donors have put into place various types of initiatives dealing with regional integration in the region, but the documentation examined did not speak to how complementarity was sought.</p>

	<p>The UNDP managed project is not seen, by at least three interviewees at senior levels, as promoting coordination between the NSA or between them and the RIO. In the same vein, an interviewee noted that “Although 1.5M euros were allocated to working with CS, there has not been one request for information on results (in terms of progress or who is involved, for example) from any of the RIO, including SG-SICA or CC-SICA. It is not even in SICOR”</p> <p>Even though on the surface one might think that the CC-SICA has access to millions of potential respondents (in a consultation), interviewees note that the consultation objective is not being achieved in terms of any influence being exercised. There has to be a change in the process and a change in “paradigm” if civil society and NSA in general are to have a stronger voice in RI.</p>
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p>Although mostly a statement of inclusion in the planning process (and not in the coordination process per se) the CA RSP for 2007-13 notes that a broad range of NSA should be part of the regional integration process and supported by the EU:</p> <p>Cooperation between the two sides should be based on the objective of broad participation by civil society and the principles of social equality – including as regards gender, respect for minorities and different cultures, especially indigenous peoples, conflict prevention and environmental sustainability. All action prepared in these areas must take into consideration the following cross-cutting issues:</p> <p><i>“Support to civil society: The three priority sectors for cooperation will include a specific component aiming at promoting participation by civil society in the integration process and social ownership of the process, including: programmes on discussion and dissemination of information, training and awareness-raising measures to facilitate appraisal of the integration process by local stakeholders. Efforts would also be needed to strengthen existing networks, coordination mechanisms and civil society organisations to improve their capacity to participate effectively in formulating and implementing initiatives, including preparing common policies. The need to encourage participation by representatives of indigenous peoples and minority ethnic groups in these measures and to enhance the visibility of the EC action should also be borne in mind.”</i></p> <p><i>CA RSP for 2007-13 pp. 28-29</i></p> <p>The design of PAIRCA 2 is perceived to have had problems because there is a definite lack of ownership felt by other RIO in the process, despite the attention given to inclusiveness by the DUE in initial design:</p> <p><i>“...pese a haber liderado el DUE un diseno participativo con distintas instituciones, sus representantes durante el proceso actualmente no estan vinculados a las mismas. Como consecuencia, los representantes actuales de algunas de ellas no se sienten plenamente identificados con el diseno final”.</i></p> <p><i>Response sheet ROM report June 2010</i></p> <p>The ROM report in June 2010 suggested that the design of the programme should be refocused in order to avoid atomisation so that civil society could better participate.</p> <p>The DUE agreed.</p> <p><i>Response sheet ROM report June 2010</i></p> <p>One aspect that does not show up in the documentation analysed in the Desk Phase is the division of labour (read: coordination, complementarity and coherence) between RIOS, the</p>

EU, European Member States and other donors. Some documentation may exist in the field at both national and regional levels. For example, the World Bank project P 121646 appears to be a very close copy of PAIRCA 1 and 2. It was designed to finish in late 2013. Its objectives are:

“To promote the regional integration agenda in CA through: i) building institutional capacity within SIECA to coordinate and implement policies including in particular to improve prospects for intraregional trade and ii) enhancing the capacity of policy makers and public officials in five countries covered by SIECA...”

The report further notes that the capacity for policy-makers component was finished at the time of reporting and that the other four components were going to re-engage due to changes in leadership within SIECA. It is believed that the project is valued at US\$ 5 million.

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There are a large number of donors that have put into place various types of initiatives dealing with regional integration in the region. The documentation examined did not speak to how complementarity was sought.

The Contribution Agreement with the UNDP does not specify any requirements for, or targets for coordination or complementarity.

PAIRCA 2 has supported “mesas de cooperantes “ since 2013. In principle, the topics discussed include effectiveness of donor cooperation. It should meet about four times a year and includes EU, Spain, GIZ and UNDP; it has formed a working group to coordinate but the EU is not seen as the leader (refer to 2008 decision). It has not had any impact on effectiveness or efficiency of donor collaboration so far, in part because it has only met a few times. It is also not specifically funded, so no one is really responsible.

Reference 55 field notes

The SICOR data base was to be a web-based information system to inform interested parties on what the donors were doing or about to do. It is very basic and needs to be updated regularly; as such it is not seen as a tool to improve the interest of people.

Reference 56 field notes

The UNDP managed project is not seen, by at least three interviewees at senior levels, as promoting coordination between the NSA or between them and the RIO.

Reference 82 field notes

The AECID has a programme with SG-SICA and the representative there notes that there is practically no effective coordination between donors on the development of RI and how it should be supported.

Reference 152 field notes

“An EUD official indicated that “SICA has not had a history of dealing with national Governments or Civil Society with respect of harmonising how to achieve RI and what it

<p>should look like” Reference 2 field notes.</p> <p>“The CCJ is very seldom called upon to provide comments on any initiative”, noted one interviewee. Another noted the same for PARLACEN. A third noted that for CCAD. Reference 17, 48 and 87 field notes</p> <p>There was a consultation process in CA to discuss the 2014 RSP programming. It involved CS and NSA but in terms of timing, it was clear that the EC had already decided what it wanted in its RSP Reference 34 field notes</p> <p>The PAIRCA 1 and PAIRCA 2 were designed with the SG-SICA and not member states. Reference 77 field notes</p> <p>Because PAIRCA 2 gave funds to CS, it was not well received by Nicaragua Reference 77 field notes</p> <p>An interviewee noted that “Although 1.5M euros were allocated to working with CS, there has not been one request for information on it (in terms of progress or who is involved for example) from any of the RIO, including SG-SICA or CC-SICA. It is not even in SICOR” Reference 86 field notes</p> <p>“CC-SICA needs to be better mainstreamed into decision-making. It has no budget and needs to be able to coordinate better with RIO or organisations that are working on policy development” . In terms of the entire SICA system, it is interesting to note that “only SS-SICA sector leaders are working for free” Reference 95 field notes</p> <p>Even though on the surface one might think that the CC-SICA has access to millions of potential respondents (in a consultation), interviewees note that the consultation objective is not being achieved in terms of any influence being exercised. There has to be a change in the process and a change in “paradigm” Reference 96 field notes</p> <p>In terms of consultation on trade and trade agreement matters, four interviewees in RIO indicated that there has been a superficial form of consultation but it took place once the AA was almost into its final drafting stages. CA negotiators tried to use CC-SICA but did not manage to convince the SG-SICA that “that participative route should be used.” Reference 100 field notes</p> <p>CC-SICA notes that when P-38 was approved (1.5 M euros in PAIRCA 2), it was composed of 15 projects having to do with CS and awareness but was very weak in terms of what were the expected results and related indicators. As a result, it was impossible to</p>

	<p>identify the extent to which a representative segment of the CS was actually going to participate. Reference 113 field notes</p> <p>Senior managers of all RIO interviewed informed the evaluation team that they are essentially unaware of the EU's strategy with respect to promoting RI and certainly are left out of the loop in terms of progress or coordination or best cases. Reference 115 field note</p> <p>A senior official in SIECA indicated that "SIECA now has political support to begin to ensure that donors are coordinated with respect to RI". It was not clear how that was to happen and in fact we were informed that the mandate was recent. "The challenge across all RIO, especially at the political level, is to put RI on the agenda and as a priority." Reference 127 field notes</p>
<p>I-2.3.3 – Coordination systems are used to seek complementarity in planning and implementation</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>The documentation examined by this evaluation did not find any references to « complementarity » except as a reference to the Maastricht Treaty. There is a significant difference between documents as to the number of stakeholders that need to be included in a coordination (complementarity) seeking process, so even the baseline is not a settled thing.</p> <p>Documents from June 2010 report that inter-institutional (i.e. Inter-RIO) coordination is a very sensitive subject and are overly complex (it is implied that they are not working well but that is not specifically stated). They go on to note that there is a wide range of basic capacities for coordination amongst the RIO, but that these capacities continue to be relatively weak. Overall, coordination is not supported financially and is not seen as a key management function; managers have noted that their leaders are more interested in other functions, such as the ability to spend and the ability to seek harmony among potential beneficiaries. . It goes on to note that the high turnover of personnel contributes to the weakness within the various ministries, RIO and technical bodies.</p> <p>The field research showed that while the terms "complementarity" is often used in documents, the reality is quite different; the evaluation used the term complementarity to mean "a search for completeness or leveraging of effectiveness in the attainment of a common objective", a definition that was accepted by the Steering Committee responsible for the 3C evaluation. In that light, avoidance of duplication is not complementarity although working on two components of a problem so that the combined result will be a sustainable solution is (ex. one donor supports primary education curriculum development and another donor supports teacher training in pedagogy and the construction and purchasing of equipment of new schools based on the new curriculum).</p> <p>It is noteworthy, from a coordination perspective, that the Contribution Agreement with the UNDP does not specify any requirements for, or targets for, coordination or complementarity, even if the contribution agreement was set up to create a division of labour that would support a common goal. The UNDP is not seen as providing a means of providing added value to the EU, in part because it is behaving like an execution agency and not using its national bodies to provide political dialogue influence of occasions for complementarity.</p>

	<p>From the perspective of the EU, the issue of coordination is doubly sensitive and important in the region because it accepted, in 2008, to coordinate donor activity dealing with RI. Overall, there is a consensus of opinion among stakeholders that the coordination is not efficient or effective.</p> <p>Two interviewees noted that: “There is a security strategy being prepared, but there is no other multi-RIO strategy in place”. In fact, notes the interviewee, even the security strategy is not likely to be coordinated except by donors, because at the moment the key donors, including the USA, are negotiating bilaterally. Even CAFTA was negotiated bilaterally.</p> <p>When coordination is in place in the region, there is evidence to show that it does help to achieve results. For example, “AECID, the WB and other donors are helping the SG-SICA to develop a common statistics protocol with common storage, retrieval and analysis processes”. Noted some interviewees.</p>
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p>To analyse coordination, it is essential to define the participants and stakeholders of any coordination process. In terms of donors the CA RSP 2007-13 notes that:</p> <p><i>“With the exception of the European Commission, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and Spain, the remaining donors active in Central America (mainly United States, United Nations and World Bank) have an agenda that barely includes the regional dimension. As indicated by the donor matrix, the EC is the key donor supporting the regional integration institutions and process, via the SG-SICA and the SIECA. This leadership is recognised by the EU Member States. In addition, the exclusion of new EC support for the environment should limit the possibility of duplication and inconsistency with the EU Member States.</i></p> <p><i>The IADB is the other main donor in support of integration, but the diversity of sectors addressed, with particular emphasis on interconnection of the infrastructure systems, shows that they complement the EU contributions. Regular contacts are maintained between the EU and the IADB and should include a specific dialogue on regional integration.”</i></p> <p><i>CA RSP 2007-13 p. 24</i></p> <p>It is important to observe that the statements do not indicate whether or not there is a region-level donor forum (even if a donor works in a Member States it may still have an impact on regional integration).</p> <p>The DUE notes in June 2010 that inter-institutional (i.e. Inter-RIO) coordination is a very sensitive subject and are overly complex (it is implied that they are not working well but that is not specifically stated). The DEU goes on to note that there is wa wide range of capacities for coordination amongst the RIO, and continue to be weak. It goes on to note that the high turnover of personnel contributes to the weakness within the various ministries, RIO and technical bodies.</p> <p><i>Response sheet to ROM report of June 2010, p. 4</i></p> <p>Throughout the field mission, interviewees were asked about how and if coordination mechanisms sought complementarity in planning and implementation. The consensus was that whatever coordination mechanisms there were were generally used to share information, not o add value through complementarity, joint monitoring, subsidiarity or other strategies.</p>

	<p>References 6, 12, 7, 24, 40, 97, 117, 122 and 135 for field notes</p> <p>“... no one in SG-SICA has been given the responsibility of managing coordination or complementarity”. There is, however a senior official that is responsible for international cooperation, but it appears that that role does not include operational and managerial coordination. Reference 6 field notes</p> <p>The UNDP is not seen as providing a means of providing added value to the EU, in part because it is behaving like an execution agency and not using its national bodies to provide political dialogue influence of occasions for complementarity. Reference 12 field notes</p> <p>The EU accepted, in 2008, to coordinate donor activity dealing with RI. Reference 24 and 25 field notes</p> <p>“There is a security strategy being prepared, but there is no other multi-RIO strategy in place”. In fact, notes the interviewee, even the security strategy is not likely to be coordinated except by donors, because at the moment the key donors, including the USA, are negotiating bilaterally. Even CAFTA was negotiated bilaterally. Reference 40 field notes</p> <p>“AECID, the WB and other donors are helping the SG-SICA to develop a common statistics protocol with common storage, retrieval and analysis processes”. “... there has been significant coordination between various regional networks that deal with statistics”. Reference 97 field notes</p> <p>USAID is helping SIECA to develop manuals and its 2014-2017 Strategic Plan Reference 117 field notes</p> <p>The USAID supported SIECA with its PROALCA 1 and 2 projects, considered as being essentially “complementary” because it paid for what would hve been financed by Costa Rica. It also helped to train people in CA on how to negotiate CAFTA.</p> <p>Once CAFTA started, the USAID informed the region that it could no longer support RIO involved in the negotiation Reference 122 field notes</p>
<p>I-2.3.4 – Interchanges at coordination meetings is geared toward leveraging of the efforts of each stakeholder and seeking greater levels of complementarity in order to achieve targets</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>Because document and field research indicated that coordination meetings are not specifically geared to complementarity but to the development of operational plans, this indicator will be integrated into I-1.3.3</p>

<i>Data, sources, extracts</i>	
I-2.3.5 – Coordination is valued by national and regional level stakeholders	
<i>Findings at indicator level</i>	<p>The findings identify that overall, there is a clear distinction to be made in terms of what is valued and when.</p> <p>When ownership, control and vested interests are not part of the equation, coordination is valued (ex. Statistics). When transactions or when payments or services are involved, or when collusion and personal gain are involved, coordination (because it may lead to change) is not valued.</p> <p>Interviewees noted that donors should invest much more in this management function. Many of their interventions will fail without it.</p>
<i>Data, sources, extracts</i>	<p>“Given the nature of the complexity that surrounds the RI process in CA, donors should be much more reliant on coordination mechanisms to support their objectives. The various countries would also gain from coordination, especially at the technical level”.</p> <p>Interviewees noted at various times that they feel that CA senior officials do not value management per se, so they don’t value coordination as a sub-function. They aren’t judged on effectiveness or even results, so if coordination is going to be part of a donor strategy, it has to be valued by stakeholders. Leaders (political and official) never mention the concept for example. There is no down-side to not seeking coordination, and there is much to gain from exploiting non-complementarity or even outright duplication.</p> <p>Reference 36 field notes</p> <p>It stands to reason that an organisation cannot value coordination if it does not care about results or whether its decisions are taken into account. Interviewees noted on numerous occasions that there was no mechanism in place to ensure that political level decisions, from presidents or ministers alike are ever implemented.</p> <p>Reference 73 field notes</p> <p>The system for the pre-approval of the seeking of donor-funding for RIO projects was only approved in a decree in December 2013. It is not a coordination system but a relevancy system whose first function is to stop unrestricted demands on donors for questionable funding.</p> <p>Reference 75 field notes</p> <p>‘I always found it interesting to note that everyone was always cooperative when it came to changing the date for a conference that was going to be held at some resort, but not cooperative when it came to changing even the smallest administrative process’</p> <p>Reference 96 field notes</p> <p>“The real issue surrounding collaborative behaviour is that when someone’s personal sources of revenue are going to be affected, the good of the nation does not matter much”</p> <p>Reference 7 field notes, supported by interviews in most RIO especially those with economic mandates</p>

Field interviews have demonstrated that RIO are not particularly concerned with coordination, save perhaps CENPROMYPE, CC-SICA and to some extent SIECA. It is interesting to note that both CENPROMYPE and SIECA are institutionally within a larger organisational infrastructure whose design was meant to ensure (inter alia) coordination and a focus on decision-making (coherency)

Reference 96 and 97 field notes

As noted previously, there appears to be a considerable level of coordination between SG-SICA and a network of national agencies responsible for statistics. The sharing of data and the opening up of networks was not difficult to organise, we were informed by senior SG-SICA officials. In fact, without having to have recourse to further decision making (leading to the creation of a separate RIO), the SG-SICA has become the Technical Secretariat for statistics in the region. (based on the ERDE model that is now commonly applied across the CA region). A Statistics Development Plan has been prepared and is being approved at all regional and national levels and clearly identifies areas where coordination and consensus will be required (ex. software and hardware protocols and standards) it should be noted that some of the hardest things to decide upon, including the meta data models and the open systems that should be applied, have already been agreed. At least in the Statistics domain, coordination is valued!

References 97 and 98 field notes

The Central America Security Commission was constituted under the Framework Agreement of Democratic Security in 1995. It is charged not only with the analysis of security issues in the region but also with communication and coordination with the bodies, institutions and secretariats of the regional integration sub-system and the organization of the Central American Security Information and Communication Mechanism, among other things. The Commission is composed of the Vice-Ministers of External Affairs, Vice-Ministers of Public Security and/or Governance, and the Vice-Ministers of National Defense of each country, and has two subordinate bodies: the Democratic Security Directorate that supports the work of the Commission and OBSICA that manages research, analysis, information and statistics on democratic security issues in the region. Each Member State has also created National Multidisciplinary Commissions and focal Points for Border Security and SALW control.

In 2011 the Central American governments and security system, along with support from the international community, defined the first internationally recognized and lauded security strategy for Central America – ESCA. The international donor community created ‘The Group of Friends’ (the first donor coordination body for security issues) to support implementation of this strategy and within a few months 22 projects had been formulated and approved by the Security Commission – 8 of which were to be initiated immediately at a cost of \$333 million. A Mechanism for Coordination, Evaluation and Follow-up was approved, as well as a follow-up committee for the projects and a technical secretariat under the auspices of the SG SICA. As of December 2013 only about 20% of the funds for the initial 8 projects has been forthcoming and the Group of Friends are facing internal contradictions that undermine the principles for support. Major projects are suffering serious challenges - the SEFRO project has yet to define a model for integrated border management due to lack of consensus by Member States and startup for the project on Social Prevention of Violence at the Local level has been stalled due to lack of agreement by member States on the identification of the 36 municipalities to be involved. Administrative

	<p>problems also have resulted in the CASAC project not yet providing the technological systems for access to INTERPOL databases.</p> <p>The Coordination bodies have been established and do meet regularly, broad frameworks for collaboration have been accepted however political consensus has not been consolidated sufficiently to guarantee full implementation of the strategies, including the consensus of the international donor community.</p> <p>Reference: Analysis by team members based on visit to field</p>
<p>I-2.3.6 – Coordination systems (RIOs and donors) interface with non-state actors</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>The few examples of coordination mechanisms in place do not interface with NSA on a formal level. Most are either RIO-donor or donor-donor.</p>
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p>The CC-SICA notes that RIO do not often interface with NSA, although they may indirectly interface through a consultative process that the CC-SICA executes. Only some RIO use CC-SICA at all.</p> <p>Reference 157 field notes</p> <p>One interviewee noted that “There are no “systems” of coordination in place. For that to happen one would have to have regular meetings with some form of progress on issues that would be discussed from meeting to meeting. One would also have to do more than present one’s opinion for quick reaction” . The interviewee was referring to consultation by the EU (specifically but only dealing with AA) as well as consultation by RIO.</p> <p>Reference 93 field notes</p> <p>PARLACEN sees taking the interests of minority groups such as Indigenous groups, CSO and NSAs into the policy making mechanisms of the SICA System as part of its mandate (much like the Senate in the UK or Canada)</p> <p>Reference 94 field notes</p> <p>The EU generally interfaces with NSA when it has a new position or policy to have approved (ex. an RSP or the AA) but these are not seen as part of a partnership but a social responsibility on its part.</p> <p>The AA, for example, was subjected to a consultative process that many interviewees thought was useless because the EU had already decided what it wanted to do. References include 132 and 153 of field notes, but many interviewees, including AT and EUD, noted the same</p> <p>“Part of the problems that are faced by the EUD in its regional programme and its next RSP is that the nature of regional programmes within a region that has an AA is not clear.” Interviewees noted their belief that DEVCO and DG Trade have not yet come to some agreement (that needs to be made public) on what the roles of development cooperation are in respect to trade development and vice versa. Most interviewees believe that at the moment the trade proponents are more powerful and thus push their own agenda. Many</p>

interviewees believe that development should be the focus, and that both should work together. A number of interviewees notes that the apparent lack of cooperation within the EU has put in place a powerful AA that is not accompanied by a development strategy. Reference 7, 93 and 158 , among others, field notes

I-2.3.7 – Coordination systems are used to identify and make use of non-programmed resources from EU (thematic budget lines, Latin America regional programme, WB funding, NSA support, etc.)

Findings at indicator level
Document research, supported by field interviews, show that the RI process has fundamentally been using EU project-based funding. Other donors such as SPAIN, USA and WB have also used project based funding for their support. However, all respondents indicated that the support provided to RIO was not generated or initiated through coordination mechanisms. Much of it was done using individual “sales” to donors.

<i>Data, sources, extracts</i>	PAIRCA 1, PAIRCA 2 and PAIAA			
	Direct Organisation ONES ONLY)	Beneficiary (MAIN	Type of Support	Main Outputs
	SG SICA At regional levels		All forms of support including TA, equipment, studies, payments for services such as meetings and training. R1 and R2 are managed directly by SG SICA (programme budgets) while R3 and R4, dealing mostly with NSA and visibility and networking, are managed by the UNDP.	For PAIRCA 2 (conceptually an extension of PAIRCA 1): R1 Reinforced decision-making process at regional level, and progress in institutional reform R2 Regional institutional capacity reinforced as well as inter-institutional cooperation and coordination with national counterparts R3. Civil society participation in regional integration process improved, and interchanges between CA and EU R4. Improvements in the level of sensitivity, public awareness and information, and academic training in regional integration and the regional integration theme is progressively inserted into the education agenda in the region. AN LFA and a WP for PAIRCA2 is available

	<p>SIECA <i>COMIECO (Council of Economic Integration Ministers of CA) SIECA (CA Economic Integration Secretariat) -</i> <i>SECMCA (CA Monetary Council) –SG SICA (General Secretariat of CA Integration System) –</i> as the organization in charge of the global coordination of the regional institutional system, and administrator of Programme PAIRCA II</p> <p><i>CENPROMYPE (Centre for the Promotion of SMEs)</i> <i>CCIE (Consultative Committee on Economic Integration)</i> <u>Regional Committees of the Economic Integration Sub-system and of the AA –</u> expected to collaborate in consults on policy discussion concerning customs and trade facilitation matters.</p> <p><i>Technical Committees of all topics of economic integration of the Programme</i></p> <p><i>Special Committee on Customs, Trade Facilitation and Rules of Origin</i></p> <p><i>Sub-Committee on intellectual property for the AA</i></p> <p><u>Other actors involved in the implementation of dispositions and measures derived from the CA integration process and the AA</u></p> <p><i>The Ministers of Finance of Central America (including Panama) –</i> particular collaboration and coordination with SIECA should be held in the implementation of activities concerning R1 regarding the</p>	<p>TA, operating expenses, equipment, meetings.</p> <p>The complete decentralisation model is used in PAIAA.</p>	<p>SIECA benefits from both PAIRCA 2 and PAIAA</p> <p>The TAPS for PAIAA notes that the key results areas are the following:</p> <p><u>R1. Harmonization, standardization and simplification of customs procedures facilitated and customs' electronic interconnection improved in countries implementing the AA.</u></p> <p><u>R2. Certain areas of Trade in Services strengthened</u></p> <p><u>R3. Certain complementary policies harmonized</u></p> <p><u>R4. Improved knowledge and acceptability of the economic integration concept and the Association Agreement's benefits among civil society and private sector</u></p> <p><u>R5. Regional and National Institutions responsible for the economic integration process have been strengthened</u></p>
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	<p>refunding of multiple payments of tariffs and taxes within the Customs Union – specifically through their <i>Customs Offices</i>.</p> <p><i>Other Ministries and national agencies directly linked to the economic integration process:</i></p> <p>Possible beneficiaries of TA and capacity building initiatives.</p> <p><i>Private sector representatives and civil society organizations (Associations, cooperatives, NGOs, and the Academia):</i> These organs will be beneficiaries and should have the possibility to execute specific activities from R4.</p>		
<p>PARLACEN</p>	<p>Listed as beneficiary Activities are listed in the Annex 1 TAPS of PAIRCA 2 and PAIAA</p>	<p>Capacity development and technical support in sector issues</p>	
<p>CC SICA</p>	<p>Listed as beneficiary for Pairca 1 and 2 Activities are listed in the Annex 1 TAPS of PAIRCA 2 and PAIAA</p>	<p>Capacity development and technical support in sector issues</p>	
<p>National counterparts</p>	<p>Listed as beneficiary Activities are listed in the Annex 1 TAPS of PAIRCA 2 and PAIAA</p>	<p>Capacity development and technical support in sector issues</p>	
<p>NSA</p>	<p>Listed as beneficiary. Activities are listed in the Annex 1 TAPS of PAIRCA 2 and PAIAA</p>	<p>Capacity development and technical support in sector issues</p>	
<p>Other RIO See specific workplans under PAIRCA and PAIAA</p>	<p>Specific to requirements. See workplans under PAIRCA 1/2, and PAIAA</p>	<p>Capacity development and technical support in sector issues</p>	

“...from our perspective, we have only used the project mechanisms. We are unaware of other instruments or mechanisms”

Reference 76 field notes

“The few all-RIO and EU meetings that I have attended never discussed the fact that other instruments and mechanisms (such as the evaluator was describing) are available”

Reference 147 field notes

What the SG SICA and SIECA both want is to develop their financial systems so that they can get involved in managing their own programme budgets and eventually negotiate a budget support instrument with the EU, noted four interviewees in SG-SICA and SIECA.

References 34, 47 and 87 field notes

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The Coordination bodies have been established and do meet regularly, broad frameworks for collaboration have been accepted however political consensus has not been consolidated sufficiently to guarantee full implementation of the strategies, including the consensus of the international donor community.

JC 2.4 – The mechanisms and instruments that were in place to support the development of RIOs were appropriate and timely given their ability to strategically manage them and the existing capability of those organisations	
<i>Statement on JC2.4</i>	
I-2.4.1 – Types and roll-out of instruments and mechanisms matches needs	
<i>Findings at indicator level</i>	<p>All RIO had trouble dealing with the project modality and none of them actually put into place mechanisms to “own” the results of the projects.</p> <p>The capability of RIO to manage projects is very weak, especially in terms of the management of EU processes and the parts of the project cycle dealing with supervision, project management and monitoring.</p> <p>Key RIO are interested in being certified or eligible for budget support. They are a long way from being able to manage that.</p> <p>The project modality, as used in CA, was not supported by policy dialogue, seriously lessening the impact the project was supposed to have.</p>
<i>Data, sources, extracts</i>	<p>“The regional institutions, including SG-SICA, are still not able to manage anything more complicated than a project where most of the content, management and administration is done by external providers”, noted a senior RIO manager.</p> <p>Reference 21 field notes</p> <p>Four interviewees noted that they thought that SIECA has a great deal of experience in terms of developing content, but it has limited capability to manage complex projects, especially if the project management process of the donor, such as the EU, is factored in. SIECA’s ability to deliver, just as is the case for all RIO (with the exception of CCJ), is limited by their lack of authority.</p> <p>References 21, 47 and 154 field notes</p> <p>For the time being, and until the key RIO have deepened their capability to manage projects and be able to show results, the project is the only mechanism that applies.</p> <p>Reference 51 field notes</p> <p>At the end of PAIRCA1 there was a long process within SG-SICA of trying to identify lessons learned and the capacity of that RIO to manage EU-based support. The EU, against the findings of that review, decided to use programme budgets. That was a big mistake because the RIO could never manage it and thus could never gain ownership. The result is that there still is not an autonomous capability in SG Sica to manage EU projects.</p> <p>Reference 51 field notes</p> <p>When asked how PAIRCA 2 was negotiated, interviewees noted that the EU sent consultants to the field. They decided who to see, what to talk about and what should be proposed to the EU. There was no “joint” design. There was no final design document that was put up for consultation and there still is not a final draft on the table for consultation.</p> <p>The Member States did not contribute although they believed they would have a chance. Many were irritated by some of the recommendations, including the use of programme budgets (it was not understood how that would affect the various sub-demands for funds); the support to CS (Especially, but not only, from Nicaragua) and most Countries because they saw too much money going to RIO when it was a “regional development” project.</p>

<p>References 58 and 59 field notes</p> <p>The project mechanism was a quick way to get the resources in place but it implies ownership and governance by the partner. These were not there when the initiative was described and implemented. The mechanism was efficient at spending but not effective.</p> <p>Reference 9, 57 field notes</p> <p>The majority of the 40 PAIRCA 2 projects are not based on RI needs in a comprehensive manner. They are not parts of a holistic approach to ID but an artificial distribution of a lot of money without focus.</p> <p>Reference 22, 91 (others) field phase</p> <p>The mechanisms and their roll-out processes were extremely difficult to manage and in fact often complicated the carrying out of the results we wanted to achieve. The focal points were very late in arriving on site; the contracts were too slow in getting done and in some cases (ex. CCJ) were executed once the RIO had already done the job by itself; the mechanism did not allow us to do feasibility or scoping (it did not pay for those types of things).</p> <p>Reference 106 field notes</p> <p>We have a great deal of trouble with the financing mechanism because we are not able to put up counterpart funding. Some of our projects will lapse.</p> <p>Reference 141 field notes</p> <p>The EU and its project model has enabled us to do many things we did not think we could do. It financed workshops on information society that were very successful and that have incited Panama and Costa Rica to take leadership on adapting their models.” The same interviewee noted that the PRIAA project gave everyone a chance to select priorities and it was not difficult to get the EUD to agree to changes to actions that were in the project document, even if it was long, it was not difficult.</p> <p>Reference 151 field notes</p> <p>One thing that makes a difference in the PRIAA and PRACAMS cases are that the project mechanisms were owned by SIECA that placed senior and experienced SIECA people in place as managers. These people had the ability and experience to not only define activities but to monitor progress and take appropriate action. In that way the project reflected the need, even if it has been difficult to obtain approvals from all concerned over the implementation of recommendations.</p> <p>Reference 106 field notes</p> <p>The PAIRCA project (and its processes) are difficult to understand but the support it provided has clearly been responsible for the SI-SICA system that was developed. Without PAIRCA 2 there would be no SI-SICA or any Statistics Strategy, for example.</p> <p>Other donors still use the project modality because that is the most effective way to resolve development issues in the RIO at the moment. They note, however, that that is for two reasons: projects require the lowest level of capacity and involvement from the beneficiary, and the projects enable the donor to keep tabs (control) over what is happening. There is not much trust in the RIO at the moment.</p> <p>Reference 109 field notes</p> <p>A senior PRIAA manager noted that in a way, PRIAA either should have started earlier to have more time to harmonise and align pan-national plans with a view to AA, or later in order to support its implementation but backed up, this time, by the influence of commercial interests that could have “leveraged” the countries to coordinate and consolidate.</p>
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	<p>Reference 120 field notes</p> <p>There was a serious flaw in the types of mechanisms used by the EU, noted three different interviewees in three RIO. Going back as far as UAC, and PAAIRCA 1, and even before, the EU needed to support its projects with political and policy leveraging, notably through coordination mechanism, policy dialogue and political dialog. CA politicians and their technical supports are very good at promising everything and signing documents without the slightest interest in ensuring that they get implemented, so the EU needed to apply pressure to get the results on the table. It did not, and the CA did not.</p> <p>References 122, 123, 57 and 152 field notes</p> <p>“There are no means at our disposal to provide assurances of accountability. Money can be spent without having to justify its use or guarantee that it will be used for the purposes intended” . Project managers have their hands tied when the project design is already done and “... there is no room to adapt to changing times and to more detailed information that becomes evident” because the project model is inflexible unless you have a lot of time on your hands</p> <p>Reference 124 field notes</p> <p>“The problem sometimes is not the project modality, but the contractual complexities of the EU.” When experts have to be replaced, or when initially mobilizing, and especially in the inception stage, the length of time it takes is often largely underestimated. “The EU does not seem to learn from lessons in this domain: in our case we have less than two and a half years to do what it would surely take five years to do, at least.”. The experience of PRACAMS with its personnel loading, is a case that the EU could use to better its project management</p> <p>References 128 and 87 field notes</p> <p>“The confines of project modality are real, and often one is forced to use the wrong resources, at the wrong cost, do proceed. PRACAMS used over 380 days of its precious ITA resources merely to identify equipment needs and write performance specs. This should all have been done before the scarce resources got in the field”. This is important also because while they were writing specs they were not able to spend time doing what they know best: developing project content. The interviewees also noted that the former JATI personally wrote all equipment specifications and TORs. The job would normally have been done closer to the point of use for the equipment and, in this case, over 90% of the meteorological specs for the equipment were wrong.</p> <p>The point of the above is that the project modality tied the hands of the EUD and the project. On-the-ground reality could not be integrated into the contract and managers had to scramble to make the project work (evaluator analysis).</p> <p>Reference 129, 130 and 131 field notes</p>
<p>I-2.4.2 – Capacity analyses support the use of the mechanisms and instruments</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>The field and document research shows that capability analyses was not used to define the mechanisms that were supported in regional programming. In fact, interviewees were mostly unaware of how do such an analysis and identified that their RIO did not have performance targets.</p>
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p>Not one of the interviewees could point to a capacity analysis being done before a project design was presented to the EU.</p> <p>Based on interviews with the EUD and with key RIO, there is no document that analyses the best and most appropriate mechanism that should be used to fill a need concerning RIO.</p>

<p>References 6 and 15 field notes</p> <p>SIECA and SG-SICA never presented a capacity analysis to the EUD. Its requests were based on activities to produce some output other, but CD results were not part of that.</p> <p>Reference 15 field notes</p> <p>PAIRCA 2 has many CD-related activities (conferences, systems in IM, etc.) but they are not part of a capability analysis. There is no document that ties all of the CD effort and investment of the project together.</p> <p>References 15 and 16 field notes</p> <p>SG-SICA has prepared a Strategic plan for itself but it does not specifically deal with a strategy to develop its Capabilities</p> <p>Reference 20 field notes</p> <p>As noted before in this document, a major review was done at the end of PAIRCA 1 to identify lessons learned and to define what still had to be done, including priority setting. The PAIRCA 2 is reputed to have been designed without taking those lessons and gaps into account. PAIRCA 2 was negotiated without regard to the lessons learned and was not based on capability.</p> <p>Reference 51 and 58 field notes</p> <p>In PAIRCA 2, interviewees noted that “one CD indicator and thrust that was just not retained was the one dealing with certification of SG-SICA processes against international standards. At first it was rejected by the SG and the PAIRCA 2 design team but the recently resigned SG believed in the requirement to baseline the processes and put in place QA systems to ensure standards compliance. One of the benefits of being certified is that the RIO could do what the UNDP was retained to do directly.</p> <p>But the interviewees that were approached on this topic noted that, as far as they knew, the existing capability and the robustness of the systems that would be certified, were not known.</p> <p>Reference 90 field notes</p> <p>“Many RIO cannot logically get involved in capability analysis because they don’t know what their mandates and priorities and performance targets are”</p> <p>Reference 133 field notes</p> <p>Team evaluators have observed that SEFRO and CASAC were not built upon capacity analysis, even though a significant part of the effort is directed at ID and CD generally. SEFRO still does not have a model and there is no real coordination to speak of at the moment.</p> <p>Reference: Team member field notes</p>
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I-2.4.3 – Ability of RIO to manage the support in a sustainable manner	
<i>Findings at indicator level</i>	<p>Based on the field results indicated in Indicator 2.4.1 and the observations below, the findings for this indicator point clearly to an inability of RIO to manage EU support in any sustainable manner. There are exceptions, especially SIECA.</p> <p>One of the main reasons for this situation is that whenever they are faced with donor (i.e. result-based development) funding, RIO do not adopt a management paradigm based on performance or results. It becomes, so to speak, “available money to spend”, and is not managed with the objective of achieving some finality based on a Theory of Change logic.</p>
<i>Data, sources, extracts</i>	<p>“The regional institutions, including SG-SICA, are still not able to manage anything more complicated than a project where most of the content, management and administration is done by external providers”, noted a senior RIO manager.</p> <p>Reference 21 field notes</p> <p>Four interviewees noted that they thought that SIECA has a great deal of experience in terms of developing content, but it has limited capability to manage complex projects, especially if the project management process of the donor, such as the EU, is factored in. SIECA’s ability to deliver, just as is the case for all RIO (with the exception of CCJ), is limited by their lack of authority.</p> <p>References 21, 47 and 154 field notes</p> <p>For the time being, and until the key RIO have deepened their capability to manage projects and be able to show results, the project is the only mechanism that applies.</p> <p>Reference 51 field notes</p> <p>The project mechanism was a quick way to get the resources in place but it implies ownership and governance by the partner. These were not there when the initiative was described and implemented. The mechanism was efficient at spending but not effective.</p> <p>Reference 9, 57 field notes</p> <p>The majority of the 40 PAIRCA 2 projects are not based on RI needs in a comprehensive manner. They are not parts of a holistic approach to ID but an artificial distribution of a lot of money without focus.</p> <p>Reference 22, 91 (others) field phase</p> <p>The mechanisms and their roll-out processes were extremely difficult to manage and in fact often complicated the carrying out of the results we wanted to achieve. The focal points were very late in arriving on site; the contracts were too slow in getting done and in some cases (ex. CCJ) were executed once the RIO had already done the job by itself; the mechanism did not allow us to do feasibility or scoping (it did not pay for those types of things).</p> <p>Reference 106 field notes</p> <p>We has a great deal of trouble with the financing mechanism because we are not able to put up counterpart funding. Some of our projects will lapse.</p> <p>Reference 141 field notes</p> <p>Other donors still use the project modality because that is the most effective way to resolve development issues in the RIO at the moment. They note, however, that that is for two reasons: projects require the lowest level of capacity and involvement from the beneficiary, and the projects enable the donor to keep tabs (control) over what is happening. There is not much trust in the RIO at the moment.</p> <p>Reference 109 field notes</p> <p>One interviewee noted that “no ID or CD project will be sustainable until the countries get involved and do something on their side to help themselves and the region”</p>

	<p>Reference 59 field notes “When the SG changed in 2009 he could have chosen to take ownership of EU projects. He did not. The sub-projects dealing with a unified treaty and budget unification were not monitored and managed by the SG’s office.”</p> <p>Reference 92 field notes Three interviewees noted that projects in SG-SICA and in SIECA take on a life of their own. They are no so much managed by officials to meet corporate level needs, but become the reason for the official to exist. The project becomes the organisational focus, not he need of the organisation.</p> <p>Reference 108 field notes “... la competencia no fue integrada en la gestion del proyecto por la organisation regional”</p> <p>Reference 112 field notes « ...where (this organisation) needs to provide counterpart funding it cannot, so the model is not appropriate”</p> <p>Reference 138 field notes The results attained (i.e. by PAIRCA 2 in this organisation) are not sustainable. The EU should not have left us in this situation. Our base is in place but we have no way to continue its development. If it were finished we could go to (MS) and ask them to finance it on an ongoing basis because they would see the benefits).</p> <p>Reference 140 field notes The people met at IICA noted that there was an important lesson they learned over the years: it is important to take the time to learn the problem well in its detailed context. “Spend the time and the effort to learn and then start to design”</p> <p>Reference 145 field notes</p>
<p>I-2.4.4 – EU ensures RIO are able to manage/administer instruments and mechanisms</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>The findings clearly identify that the RIO are not capable of managing EU instruments and mechanisms. The EU has provided some level of training, but the results are conclusive: there is no autonomous capacity</p>
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p>Interviewees in all RIO indicated that they could not, if prompted, manage EU instruments and processes and saw the projects as being in place to do that (some referred to projects as mini-PMU, at least in CA RIO).</p> <p>Reference 21 field notes The RIO have not been able to initiate policy dialogue with donors. They feel much more at ease with counterparts in other countries (e. PARLACEN, CCJ)</p> <p>Reference 21 field notes The EU and WB processes are particularly impossible for us to manage. They change and are inherently complex. In fact there is a domain of expertise in the region that is highly sought after and that is the ability to manage those processes. Those who can are sought after.</p> <p>Reference 90 field notes</p> <p>One interviewee related that the managers of RIO are not placed in a position of equality when it comes to negotiating the design of an intervention. The EC often seeks agreement at he last moment, and seemingly always speaks of the development logic. But experience has shown us that the details often get left out and the problems of implementation are</p>

	<p>likely to be in the details, not the objectives.</p> <p>Reference 51 field notes</p> <p>Although the EU has offered many courses on its processes, the RIO do not feel capable of autonomous management. SG SICA, for example, often spoke of the 19 versions of the first tranche for the programme budget. In essence they asked: “if Europeans hired for the purpose cannot get this right in 19 tries, how can we expect to do it?”</p> <p>Reference 51 field notes</p>
OTHER RELEVANT INFORMATION (NOT CAPTURED ELSEWHERE IN THIS EQ)	

Table 2.1: TAPS Annex 2 to FA PAIRCA 2

Por su parte, la distribución estimativa del presupuesto por actividad será la siguiente:

Actividades	Contribución UE
R1. Apoyo a la toma de decisiones en materia de reforma, estructuración y modernización del SICA en su conjunto	2,550,000
1.1. Reforma Institucional, Estructuración y Modernización	950,000
1.2. Sociedad de la Información	1,600,000
2. Fortalecimiento de las instituciones del SICA y de sus vínculos con sus contrapartes nacionales	4,890,000
2.1. SG SICA	1,640,000
2.2. CCJ	1,000,000
2.3. PARLACEN	1,000,000
2.4. CC SICA	650,000
2.5. Otras Instituciones del Protocolo	300,000
2.6. Contrapartes Nacionales	300,000
3. Participación de la Sociedad Civil y Conectividad CA-UE	1,900,000
3.1. Participación de la Sociedad Civil	1,500,000
3.2. Programa de Conectividad UE-CA	400,000
4. Formación, Educación e Investigación	1,000,000
4.1. Formación, Educación e Investigación	700,000
4.2. Apoyo a Think Tanks y Otros	300,000
5. Información y Visibilidad	1,000,000
5.1. Campaña de Sensibilización	800,000
5.2. Visibilidad	200,000
6. Gastos Operativos	800,000
7. Asistencia Técnica Internacional *	2,000,000
8. Auditoría, Monitoreo y Evaluación **	400,000
9. Imprevistos ***	201,000
10. Overhead PNUD	259,000
TOTAL	15,000,000

EQ:3 Economic Integration

EQ 3 – To what extent did EU interventions contribute to restructuring the institutional framework of the Central American Customs Union and to the adoption of other trade related common policies?

JC 3.1 – The EU interventions contributed to lay the foundations for a Customs Union

<i>Statement on JC3.1</i>	<p>In 2003, 96 % of tariffs were harmonized, but this percentage fell to 54% as a consequence of the bilateral negotiations that prevailed for the conclusion of the free trade agreement DR-CAFTA and of many free trade bi-lateral agreements between countries of the region and countries outside the region. Presently the common external tariff (SAC, Sistema Arancelario Centroamericano) concerns only 76% of Customs Schedules. The prospect is to reach again 96 % in 2018. Inside the region, there are no tariffs, but the Customs Union is far from finished as non-tariff barriers remain. The harmonizing of the tax structure of the five CA countries was an objective of the Programme ADAPCCA but was not achieved. ADAPCCA also defined a mechanism of tax restitution but it was not adopted.</p> <p>Progress in harmonization is very slow and even sometimes challenged. An example: in January, El Salvador started inspecting goods with a scanner, charging 18 US\$ for each inspection and making border crossing much longer. Still, the support of the EU delivered positive results like a regional computer network for customs and tax authorities (<i>Sistema de Información Aduanera Unificado de Centroamérica-SIAUCA</i>), allowing to exchange intra-regional customs and tax information. However, a one year delay in the start of CONSUAC did not allow the project to implement all activities planned. Also, its design had weaknesses and it lacked a sustainability plan.</p> <p>The implementation of a regional information portal (AIC), was initiated under the Programme UAC and finished under the programme CONSUAC. It describes all requisites (duties, taxes, health and other certificates) for all imports to the region. It was a meaningful contribution although it is only an information tool, not an instrument in Customs operations, and is not regularly updated, particularly for non-tariff barriers.</p> <p>The start of UAC and CONSUAC was very late due to the long process of approval by several beneficiary countries. The financial execution of CONSUAC was short of 7 M€, with a disbursement rate of only 72 %. In spite of some progresses in the past, the economic integration is going backwards because of the insecurity of transport.)</p> <p>The project ADAPCCA did not meet its objective to harmonize 50 percent of SPS measures. The harmonization was limited to few areas, mostly milk products. The project PRACAMS, which is supposed to continue the support to the objectives of meeting and harmonizing technical norms and SPS requirements started almost a year late. The project can show its first outputs like the training of around 1500 beneficiaries of the private and public sectors and the tendering of most of the equipments (around € 6 million) meant to strengthen the regional network enhancing quality. The COMIECO published a list of around 80 regulations on norms of a great variety of goods, but there are more than 1000 norms to be harmonized. Slow progress in minimizing trade barriers is not due mainly to technical issues, but to bureaucratic interests of Customs Administrations and protectionism. It boils down to insufficient political will.</p> <p>The <i>Escuela Centroamericana Aduanera y Tributaria</i> (ECAT) created in Honduras with the</p>
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	<p>support of the EU was a success, with 5000 people trained in three years. Similarly, seminars, diplomas, technical assistance and internships helped create a large network of alumni that will allow in the future the "networking" and exchange of experiences and ideas. It was set up, became operational and met its objectives under the project CONSUAC. However, there were no plans for the sustainability of the (ECAT) which is no longer functioning. SIECA elaborated in 2012 a new plan for a "Centro de Estudios de la Integración Económica" (CEIE). Taiwan offered 2.2 MUS\$ for its construction, but SIECA is still looking the financial support needed for its operational costs.</p>
<p>I-3.1.1 – Tariffs and taxes have been harmonized</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>In 2003, 96 % of tariffs were harmonized, but this percentage fell to 54% as a consequence of the bilateral negotiations that prevailed for the conclusion of the free trade agreement DR-CAFTA and of many free trade bi-lateral agreements between countries of the region and countries outside the region. Presently the common external tariff (SAC, Sistema Arancelario Centroamericano) concerns only 76% of Customs Schedules. The prospect is to reach again 96 % in 2018. Inside the region, there are no tariffs, but the Customs Union is far from finished as non-tariff barriers remain. The harmonizing of the tax structure of the five CA countries was an objective of the Programme ADAPCCA but was not achieved. ADAPCCA also defined a mechanism of tax restitution but it was not adopted.</p>
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p><u>Tariff Schedule</u></p> <p><i>In 2003, 96 % of tariffs were harmonized, but this percentage fell to 54% as a consequence of the negotiations of DR-CAFTA. The prospect is to reach again 96 % in 2018.</i></p> <p><u>Meeting with</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ruben Najera, Director of PRACAMS - Palmira Lopez-Fresno, Jefe ATI <p><u>Customs Union</u></p> <p><i>The 4% of tariff schedules excluded from harmonization are basically products of agriculture like coffee, sugar, alcoholic beverages (ron, beer,...) and oil products.</i></p> <p><i>Customs documents have been harmonized but are not necessary in use, due to political or other circumstance, for instance the conflict between Honduras and Nicaragua that followed the coup in Honduras.</i></p> <p><i>Panama does not support clearly the regional integration. It only joined the regional efforts due to the negociation of the AA.</i></p> <p><i>Meeting with Karina De Leon, DUE Managua</i></p> <p><u>Panama within the Union Centro Americana</u></p> <p><i>Panama never saw the interest of joining the CA Union. This is mostly due to a higher degree of development reached a long ago thanks to a high degree of internationalization. This internationalisation</i></p>

rests on a service sector that accounts for more than three-quarters of GDP. They include the Panama Canal, logistics, banking, re-exports through the Colon Free Zone, insurance, container ports, flagship registry, and tourism. Economic growth will be bolstered even more by the Panama Canal expansion project estimated to be completed by 2015. The expansion of the project will more than double the Canal's capacity, enabling it to accommodate ships that are too large to traverse the existing canal. Panama's booming transportation and logistics services sectors, along with aggressive infrastructure development projects, have led the economy to continued high growth.

Panama joined the Union because it had the obligation to do so in order to participate and benefit from the Association Agreement signed with the EU. Due to the Canal, Panama was from the start a service oriented country. It did not go through the usual phases of agricultural and industrial development.

Interview Ahmed Elias Moron, Director Nacional de Industrias y Desarrollo Empresarial, Ministerio de Comercio E industrias (MIFIC), Panama

Customs Union

It is far from being completed. The free circulation of goods within the region remains an objective. 96% of tariff schedules have been harmonized within the five countries that started SIECA, but Panama has only 60 % of its tariff schedules harmonized with them. When joining SIECA, Panama pledged it would catch up with the five at the beginning of 2016.

Of the same importance, goods still go through Customs at the border of each member of SIECA. Also, the mechanism of restitution of Custom taxes is not yet operating.

Prior to joining SIECA in 2012, Panama was part of SICA. However it had already a free trade agreement with Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador. The agreement with the last one covers more than 90% of tariff schedule.

Interview Yenia Diaz, Head of the Department of Norms, Autoridad Nacional Aduanera, Panama

“En enero de 2009, los Presidentes de las Repúblicas de Guatemala y El Salvador suscriben el Protocolo de Modificación al Convenio Marco del año 2000, estableciendo las bases para la eliminación de fronteras comunes en la circulación de personas y mercaderías entre ellos, así como para la eliminación del doble cobro de los derechos del Arancel Externo Común (DAI). Honduras y más tarde Nicaragua se adhieren a ese Protocolo de Modificación, por lo que formalmente el grupo de cuatro países conocidos como CA4 quedan comprometidos en avanzar hacia la Unión Aduanera sin fronteras ni cobros de arancel en los pasos fronterizos entre estos países.”

Final Evaluation CONSUAC, p 10

“En la política arancelaria se ha avanzado en su aplicación, pero la contribución del proyecto ha sido casi exclusivamente la de financiación de gastos de las contrapartes y capacitaciones.”

Final Evaluation ADAPCCA, p 16

“El AEC está armonizado en un porcentaje superior al 96% al final del Proyecto. Sin embargo la contribución del proyecto ha sido casi exclusivamente de financiar los gastos corrientes de las contrapartes de la SIECA en las reuniones de los comités arancelarios y algún otro viaje y pasantía al extranjero. Adicionalmente, el proyecto financió la realización de un seminario regional sobre “Clasificación Arancelaria” impartido en Guatemala, con participación de funcionarios gubernamentales miembros del Grupo Arancelario, de Integración y de Aduanas. (5-11/7/2009).”

	<p><i>Final Evaluation ADAPCCA, p 31</i></p> <p><i>“Propuesta de armonización de las estructuras tributarias de los cinco países miembros, elaborada y consensuada al final del proyecto: no se cumple, ya que no se realizan actividades en este Resultado. Sin embargo, se elaboró un estudio y documentación complementaria que se entregó por el Proyecto a la SIECA para su entrega al COSEFIN, que asumió la tarea de promover el mecanismo de recaudación de los derechos del Arancel de importación (DAI). Sin embargo, aparentemente la mala comunicación entre la SIECA y COSEFIN ha dado como resultado que no se haya conseguido avanzar en este campo.”</i></p> <p><i>Final Evaluation ADAPCCA, p 37</i></p>
<p>I-3.1.2 – Customs procedures have been harmonized</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>Progress in harmonization is very slow and even sometimes challenged. An example: in January, El Salvador started inspecting goods with a scanner, charging 18 US\$ for each inspection and making border crossing much longer. Still, the support of the EU delivered positive results like a regional computer network for customs and tax authorities (<i>Sistema de Información Aduanera Unificado de Centroamérica-SIAUCA</i>), allowing to exchange intra-regional customs and tax information. However, a one year delay in the start of CONSUAC did not allow the project to implement all activities planned. Also, its design had weaknesses and it lacked a sustainability plan.</p> <p>The implementation of a regional information portal (AIC), was initiated under the Programme UAC and finished under the programme CONSUAC. It describes all requisites (duties, taxes, health and other certificates) for all imports to the region. It was a meaningful contribution although it is only an information tool, not an instrument in Customs operations, and is not regularly updated, particularly for non-tariff barriers.</p> <p>The start of UAC and CONSUAC was very late due to the long process of approval by several beneficiary countries. The financial execution of CONSUAC was short of 7 M€, with a disbursement rate of only 72 %. In spite of some progresses in the past, the economic integration is going backwards because of the insecurity of transport.)</p>
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p><u><i>Custom procedures</i></u></p> <p><i>Progress in harmonization is very slow and even sometimes challenged. In January, El Salvador started inspecting goods with a scanner, charging 18 US\$ for each inspection and making border crossing much longer. This unilateral decision was obviously a violation of the Customs code of Central-America. SIECA complained to the government of El Salvador, but the answer was that SIECA had no right to question a decision of the government of El Salvador. Nobody sent the case to the Court of Justice of Central America (CCJ), maybe because it is too costly and too slow. The truck drivers took action. This example indicates the weakness the regional integration process.</i></p> <p><i>The main motivation of the government of El Salvador is the increase of revenue. The countries of the region always relied on tariffs for government revenue. On average the share in the region of tariff taxes in total of revenue is 40 %.</i></p> <p><i>The support of the EU delivered positive results like the Formulario Unificado Centro-americano (FAUCA), and the SIAUCA which allows the connection of Customs systems (Nicaragua and El Salvador are the only countries using ASYCUDA). SIECA is working towards the integration of Panama.</i></p> <p><i>Another positive result is the portal AIC which provides information on tariff and non-tariff barriers of the region, including now Panama.</i></p> <p><i>Meeting with William Garcia, Director of integration economica, SIECA</i></p>

Customs

With the support of the programme UAC, the region adopted the Formulario Aduanero de Centro America (FAUCA) and a regional information portal (AIC). Also with the support of UAC, four countries of the region created a computer network for customs and tax authorities (Sistema de Información Aduanera Unificado de Centroamérica-SIAUCA), allowing all countries to exchange intra-regional customs and tax information. However, its design had weaknesses and it lacked a sustainability plan.

Meeting with

- Jose Carlos Garcia, Coordinador tecnico, PRALAA
- Diana de Mazarigos, Administradora de Anticipos

Customs procedures

The portal AIC was initiated under the Programme UAC and finished under the programme CONSUAC. But it is not regularly updated, particularly for non-tariff barriers. Also Panama joined the SIECA almost two years ago and its tariff is not yet accessible and not even accessible from a smartphone. Although the AIC was supposed to facilitate comparisons between countries, the exporters and Customs agents not no use much the AIC as they prefer to consult the website of each country.

FAUCA was created in the 70's with no relation with EU support.

SIAUCA was started under UAC and finished under CONSUAC.

In spite of some progresses in the past, the economic integration is going backwards because of the insecurity of transport.

Meeting with Esbin Miranda, Experto en procedimientos aduaneros, PRALAA, Panama

Customs procedures

In spite of technical work and the adoption of common procedures, exports of goods are hampered regularly by protectionist barriers. A sounding recent example is the exports of the major company of frozen chicken in Nicaragua that were rejected by Customs in Nicaragua, supposedly because of salmonellosis.

In fact, the shipment had its certificate of conformity, but when the company went to Nicaragua to discuss the issue, the goods had been destroyed by fire. The company had been exporting without any problem for many years to Taiwan, Colombia, Honduras and other markets. It had to forget about the market of Nicaragua. Similar barriers that discourage exports to the region are also experienced with Costa Rica.

Interview Ahmed Elias Moron, Director Nacional de Industrias y Desarrollo Empresarial, Ministerio de Comercio E industrias (MIFIC),Panama

“El proyecto CONSUAC fue formulado como seguimiento al proyecto “Unión Aduanera Centroamericana –UAC” (2002-2006), e inició sus actividades con un retraso de un año debido a la

	<p><i>necesidad impuesta de contrafirmar el Convenio de Financiación por los gobiernos de Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala y Nicaragua en noviembre de 2007. Este retraso inicial afectó negativamente todo el proyecto, que no tuvo suficiente tiempo para contratar las licitaciones ni ejecutar adecuadamente las actividades.”</i></p> <p><i>Final Evaluation Report of CONSUAC p 4</i></p> <p><i>“...el desembolso de los fondos disponibles (los € 7,5 million) asciende algo hasta el 72 percent. Estos porcentajes bajos de desembolso fueron como mencionado en parte causados por el retraso en el proceso de firma del CdF por parte de los países, lo que generó un período demasiado corto para la licitación de contratos y su posterior ejecución.”</i></p> <p><i>Final Evaluation Report of CONSUAC P 4</i></p> <p><i>“El primer resultado esperado (R-1), Transformación e implantación del marco institucional necesario para la puesta en marcha de la UAC, <u>no ha podido cumplir totalmente su objetivo, definido como la “puesta en marcha de la unión aduanera centroamericana”, ya que ésta aún no existía. Debido a la firma del Protocolo de Modificación del Acuerdo de Unión Aduanera entre Guatemala y El Salvador, enfocó su actividad hacia el apoyo de la Unión Aduanera Guatemala-El Salvador y hacia el equipamiento de las aduanas periféricas. Estos suministros fueron bien valorados y causaron mejoras de rapidez y eficiencia en las aduanas.</u></i></p> <p><i>El resultado esperado (R-2), Operación y sostenibilidad del Sistema de Información Aduanera Unificado de Centroamérica (SLAUCA), <u>SI que ha cumplido su objetivo, ya que cuatro países actualmente ya utilizan el sistema SLAUCA regional para el intercambio de la información correspondiente a los documentos FAUCA- para el comercio intrarregional de productos originarios. La clave del sistema en estos momentos, es su uso continuo y ampliado por los países y asegurar la sostenibilidad de los equipos informáticos operados por la SIECA.</u></i></p> <p><i>El resultado esperado (R-3), Operación y sostenibilidad del Arancel Integrado Centroamericano (AIC), <u>también ha cumplido su objetivo, dentro de los límites de su valoración como herramienta de información y consulta solamente (y no de uso operativo, como algunos pretendían, por las autoridades aduaneras y tributarias).</u> La aparición del esperado AIC, iniciado en el anterior proyecto UAC y que el CONSUAC continuó, creó ciertas expectativas de que se convertiría en una herramienta definitiva de integración arancelaria y tributaria del comercio exterior. Sin embargo, en la actualidad por diseño es solo una herramienta de consulta para importaciones, ya que técnicamente sus respuestas a consultas de estas importaciones no son un “acto administrativo”, y por lo tanto, no evitan el tener que después acudir a los sistemas arancelarios y tributarios nacionales de los países donde se efectuarán las operaciones, o a las Ventanillas Únicas en un futuro si estas también incluyen las importaciones.”</i></p> <p><i>Final Evaluation Report of CONSUAC P 5 - 6</i></p>
<p>I-3.1.3 – Technical barriers and SPS requirements have been harmonized</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>The project ADAPCCA did not meet its objective to harmonize 50 percent of SPS measures. The harmonization was limited to few areas, mostly milk products. The project PRACAMS, which is supposed to continue the support to the objectives of meeting and harmonizing technical norms and SPS requirements started almost a year late. The project can show its first outputs like the training of around 1500 beneficiaries of the private and public sectors and the tendering of most of the equipments (around € 6 million) meant to strengthen the regional network enhancing quality. The COMIECO published a list of around 80 regulations on norms of a great variety of goods, but there are more than 1000 norms to be harmonized. Slow progress in minimizing trade barriers is not due mainly to technical issues, but to bureaucratic interests of Customs Administrations and protectionism. It boils down to insufficient political will.</p>

<p>Data, sources, extracts</p>	<p><u>Diseno de PRACAMS</u></p> <p><i>El Programa fue disenado a nivel gubernamental, con participacion limitada del sector, pero responde a sus necesidades, con una metodologia adecuada.</i></p> <p><u>Resultados del Apoyo</u></p> <p><i>El Programa PRACAMS ofrecio capacitaciones de calidad. Sin embargo, la seleccion de participantes se hizo desde la direccion del Programa con poca participation de APEN. Mas importante todavia: la capacitacion no es suficiente. Falta una asistencia tecnica individualizada a nivel de empresas.</i></p> <p><i>Con otros programmas, se logro facilitar los procesos de exportacion, en particular gracias a la creacion du una ventana unica de exportacion. Sin embargo, el comercio de productos sigue enfrentando trabas en la aduanas de los paises vecinos. Y la importacion a Nicaragua sigue padeciendo de las deficiencias de Aduanas. No se puede hablar de procesos mas eficientes que en el pasado.</i></p> <p><i>Meeting Asociacion de Productores par la Exportacion de Nicaragua (Apen)</i> <i>Managua, March 25 2014</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Sigrid Morales, Gerente servicios de exportacion</i> - <i>Azucena Reyes Blandon, encargada de AT</i> <p><u>Non-tariff barriers</u></p> <p><i>The provision of TA to national institutions dealing with quality is part of PRACAMS. It will start in 2014. The design of PRACAMS, with 50 activities in the DTA, is lacking flexibility, which incurs in long delays due to the recourse to Addenda. The absence of civil service laws in the region, with the exception of Costa Rica, explains institutional weaknesses. In three years, on average half of the civil servants trained are removed.</i></p> <p><i>Meeting with</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Ruben Najera, Director of PRACAMS</i> - <i>Palmira Lopez-Fresno, Jefe ATI</i> <p><u>Non-Tariff Barriers</u></p> <p><i>APEX participated in the design of PRACAMS, which is adequate. Progress in harmonization has been registered mostly for raw products, not so for transformed products. There is a long way to go towards modernization and harmonization. An example: in order to export to countries of the region, companies in the sector of fish and seafood need their license to be renewed every year. Every inspection, carried out by two inspectors, amount to a cost of more than 2000 US\$. Slow progress in minimizing trade barriers is not due mainly to technical issue, but to bureaucratic interests of Customs Administrations and protectionism. It boils down to insufficient political will.</i></p> <p><i>Meeting with Juan Bulnes, Secretario Asociacion Panamena de Exportadores (APEX)</i> <i>April 2. Panama</i></p>
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PRACAMS

The Programme delivers training of high quality in norms and in metrology and supports also meetings of negotiation between the countries of the region. But it could have been designed better taking more into account the plans of the government, like an approach based on value-chain of sectors. Quality is only one part of the task needed for a more competitive economy.

The harmonization of norms is important for exporters of the EU who want to access the markets of the region under the same norms.

The support of PRACAMS is also important in strengthening the laboratories and metrology, including with equipment.

PRACAMS also provided a very valuable Guide of best practise in the elaboration of norms.

Harmonization of norms

In spite of the support of PRACAMS, the negotiation meetings do not give the expected results. Each country prepares for those meetings a draft of regulations on a specific subject, but without their adoption. Even worse, Nicaragua was absent of those meetings, and even Panama at the last meeting in February. So far there are no regional norms, while Guatemala has around 1000 norms and Costa Rica around 2000.

Meeting with

- Franky Reyes, Director, Direccion del Sistema Nacional de Calidad, MINECO, Guatemala
- Hector Rene Herrera, Secretario Ejecutivo, Comision Guatemalteca de Normas, MINECO, Guatemala

PRACAMS

The programme PRACAMS delivers training of excellent quality on issues of SPS.

Inspections

True that access to the markets of the region requires certificates of conformity to the norms of each country, but not every year, only every three years. It will be so until the norms are harmonized and inspection by the authorities of one country be recognized by the other countries.

NB. *The COMIECO published a list of around 80 regulations on norms of a great variety of goods. Still, a review indicates that only 11 have been adopted. Out of those 11, four deal only with labelling.*

Meeting with Alex Salazar, Director, Direccion de Inocuidad de Alimentos, MAGA, Panama

PRACAMS

Panama participated in the design and is very satisfied by its implementation, although it started late.

What is needed from PRACAMS is a Manual of elaboration of norms, with scientific criteria that are lacking too often. The modality of support should also go beyond training and include the provision of direct technical assistance to the national authorities in charge of establishing and controlling norms of quality, whether technical or SPS.

Non-Tariff Barriers

Many norms lack in the region a scientific basis. The region needs to adopt a more scientific based and less protectionist approach. For instance it is presently discussing a project of labelling for apparel goods that Panama opposes. The new rule would require the name of the producer, of the exporter, of the importer and the registry of the retailer. Another example is the case of veterinary products.

Meeting with Alexis Pineda, Director Nacional, Oficina de Negociaciones Comerciales, Panama

Norms

The process of harmonization is very slow. The regional organizations do not have the capacity nor the authority to push the process faster. The Consejo Consultativo de Integracion Economica (CCIE), the most representative body of the private sector of the region should receive support, at least for regional meetings and studies .

Meeting with AGEXPORT

- *Fanny Estrada, Directora Ejecutiva*
- *Invan Bultron, Gerente division desarrollo*
- *Luis Godoy, Director General*
- *Ricardo Santa Cruz Rubi, Director Division Agricola and Pesca*

Context

The region has not managed to involve all countries in the participation of a lasting coordination of their policies and regulations. The difference between countries may prove too large and not allow the success of the objective of the Programme.

A previous attempt to harmonize norms of energy efficiency has proved already how hard it is to come to common agreements in the region.

Nicaragua progressed in some areas, like market regulations, but has a long way to go. Some countries of the region are luckier than Nicaragua as they benefit from a specific EU project aiming at improving their quality policy and infrastructure. The harmonization is a different story. The Council of Ministers has not managed yet to create the institution that would harmonize norms.

Design of PRACAMS

MIFIC and other public institutions of the sector in the other countries were consulted at the formulation stage of PRACAMS. This was a progress compared to the process of design of ADAPCCA that dealt also with quality issues.

Results to date of PRACAMS

Due to a late start, PRACAMS has not advanced as planned in its activities.

It has delivered information and training of high quality. The topics retained are of high relevance and the training of high quality. The training, given sometimes at the regional level, helped develop useful regional contacts and also fruitful relations with trainers usually prone to answer further questions through e-mails. For a year the training was geared at civil servants but will target now the private

	<p><i>sector.</i></p> <p><i>The short-coming of the programme is that it does not provide us with TA, that is experts that would work in the institution for several months</i></p> <p><i>The programme will soon provide equipment to the beneficiary countries, particularly computer and metrological equipment.</i></p> <p><i>Meeting Noemi Solano, Direccion de Normalizacion y Metrologia, Ministerio de Fomento de la Industria y del comercio (MIFIC)</i></p> <p>Panama is committed to harmonize norms with the region, but the process is of harmonization of norms is far from being completed because most norms in Panama are higher than in the rest of the region and cannot be lowered.</p> <p>Some examples:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Juices in Panama are required 35% of pulp content, when the norm is only 25% in the CA region. - Gasoline is 95 octanes in Panama when it is only 85 or 89 in the regio - Diesel has a lower content of sulphur in Panama <p>Interview Ahmed Elias Moron, Director Nacional de Industrias y Desarrollo Empresarial, Ministerio de Comercio E industrias (MIFIC),Panama</p> <p><i>“Indicador 1.4.1: Los requisitos sanitarios y fitosanitarios de importación y exportación a nivel regional están en unos 50% armonizados en los 5 Estados Parte al final del proyecto</i></p> <p><i>Logro del Indicador:</i></p> <p><i>Estas dos actividades se pueden medir con Indicador 1.4.1. Sin embargo, la meta de un 50% de armonización era muy ambiciosa, y en la práctica lo que sí es posible identificar son los avances en sectores o temas específicos, tal como la armonización de normas y reglamentos de productos lácteos, análisis de riesgos, etc.”</i></p> <p><i>Final Evaluation ADAPCCA, p 43</i></p> <p><i>“Se realizó un diagnóstico “sobre la situación de políticas sanitarias y fitosanitarias”, y además existió una ejecución coordinada con SCAC y el IICA vinculada a la Política Agregada Común Centroamericana (PACA). ADAPCCA ha adaptado su implementación al PACA, lo que ha incluido:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>La armonización de la normativa sanitaria y fitosanitaria.</i> • <i>Fortalecimiento del uso de análisis de riesgos.</i> • <i>Avances en acuerdos de equivalencias en MSF.</i> • <i>Desarrollo de capacidades de laboratorios oficiales para garantizar la competencia.</i> • <i>Fortalecimiento del uso del análisis de riesgos por parte de los países de la</i>
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	<p style="text-align: center;"><i>región.”</i></p> <p><i>Final Evaluation ADAPCCA, p 43</i></p> <p>“Indicador 1.5.1. Se han realizado al menos 2 seminarios en los 5 Estados Parte cada año (2008-2010), integrando representantes del sector público y privado con el fin de:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i) Propiciar un mejor entendimiento en los Países del rol, posición actual respecto a la reglamentación técnica a nivel regional. ii) Conocimiento de los pasos necesarios hacia la conclusión de acuerdos de reconocimiento mutuo. <p><i>Logro del Indicador: Se considera cumplido en general el indicador: INCOTEC realizó un diagnóstico sobre la situación regional de normativa técnica, evaluación de conformidad y metodología, que fue discutido con los entes nacionales en varios seminarios, y también la identificación de productos con mayor intercambio comercial dentro de la región, para evaluar la necesidad de reglamentarlos a nivel regional. Se presentó el Modelo Europeo de Normalización y su Relación con las Regulaciones Regionales, cuyo objetivo es generar conocimiento sobre experiencias de éxito.</i></p> <p><i>Final Evaluation ADAPCCA, p 49</i></p> <p>“Indicador 1.5.2. Una Red de Laboratorios de servicios fitozoosanitarios y de inocuidad de alimentos a nivel regional establecida de forma piloto en al menos 2 Estados Parte al final del proyecto.</p> <p><i>Logro del Indicador: Se considera que no se llegó a cumplir totalmente con el indicador, ya que se generó una Propuesta Inicial sobre reglamento para el Reconocimiento Mutuo en la región Centroamericana, que fue analizada, revisada y consensuada a nivel técnico con los países; está pendiente su adopción y planificar su implementación. Se capacitó a 29 funcionarios para mejorar el conocimiento y comprensión del concepto y aplicación práctica sobre las ventajas y desventajas de los <u>Acuerdos de Reconocimiento Mutuo en los esquemas de integración. Sin embargo no se llegaron a realizar todas las numerosas sub-actividades: notificación por adelantado, estudios especializados, etc.”</u></i></p> <p><i>Final Evaluation ADAPCCA, p 50</i></p> <p>“Actividad.1.5.6. Asistencia técnica, capacitación e intercambio de experiencias a los países y a los foros regionales competentes para:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i) Elaboración de un estudio que contenga una clara distinción entre lo que es esencial armonizar, en las futuras iniciativas sobre mercado interno, y lo que puede ser dejado al mutuo reconocimiento de los reglamentos y estándares nacionales; ii) Elaboración de una propuesta de reglamento para el mutuo reconocimiento de los test y de las certificaciones; <p><i>Indicador 1.5.6. No existe en el Marco Lógico de referencia indicador para esta actividad</i></p> <p><i>Logro del Indicador: Se ha reglamentado cómo armonizar Normas Técnicas en base a criterios comunes con el fin de reconocimiento mutuo. No se realizó el estudio de priorización, pero se ha tomado al Sector Lácteos como un modelo para reglamentación y armonización regional, incluyendo la elaboración de 15 propuestas de RTCA sobre: términos lecheros, leche pasteurizada, leche UAT, leche en polvo, leche evaporada, leche condensada, quesos en general, quesos no madurados, quesos madurados, queso Mozzarella, queso fundido o procesado, mantequilla, crema y crema ácida, yogurt, helados y mezclas de helados lácteos. La armonización en el sector lácteo es un logro relevante, dada la importancia económica del sector, su complejidad e historial de barreras no arancelarias.”</i></p> <p><i>Final Evaluation ADAPCCA, p 52</i></p>
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	<p>“INCOTEC realizó y consensuó con las autoridades nacionales un diagnóstico sobre la situación regional de normativa técnica, evaluación de conformidad y metodología. Asimismo, identificó productos con mayor intercambio comercial dentro de la región a fin de evaluar la necesidad de reglamentarlos a nivel regional. Se presentó el Modelo Europeo de Normalización y su Relación con las Regulaciones Regionales. Se elaboró y consensuó a nivel técnico una propuesta sobre reglamento para el Reconocimiento Mutuo en CA. Se cuenta con una propuesta de Diseño de red de laboratorios complementarios a nivel regional, y de Establecimiento de una Red de Laboratorios que brinden servicios fitosanitarios y de inocuidad de alimentos a nivel regional. Se ha reglamentado cómo armonizar Normas Técnicas en base a criterios comunes para el reconocimiento mutuo, y se elaboraron 15 propuestas de RTCA sobre productos lácteos. También se proveyeron capacitaciones al sector público y privado.”</p> <p>Ficha de Programma ADAPCCA (Delegation) p 5</p> <p>“Situación Actual (11/2013)</p> <p>Se han llevado a cabo misiones de asistencia técnica para sensibilizar y dar formaciones sobre la importancia del control de calidad, la trazabilidad, acreditación, normalización y metrología. Autoridades nacionales participaron activamente y PRACAMS ya ha podido definir una línea base de trabajo con las necesidades reales de Centroamérica en términos de calidad y medidas sanitarias y fitosanitarias. La coordinación con programas nacionales, donantes e instituciones regionales fue clave para que los grupos de trabajo y las líneas base de trabajo fueran un éxito.</p> <p>La mayor parte de las licitaciones del PRACAMS ya ha sido lanzada. La más relevante ha sido la licitación de suministros y equipos de laboratorio por € 6 millones, que implicó un involucramiento activo de todos los beneficiarios a nivel de los 6 países tanto en la identificación de los suministros que se necesitaban como en el proceso de evaluación de ofertas.</p> <p>A partir del 1ro de julio de 2013 comenzó el Presupuesto Programa de Ejecución Plena 2. Antes del D+3 se contrataron alrededor de € 10 millones correspondientes a equipo de laboratorio para los seis países centroamericanos y en contratos de formación dirigidos al sector privado, público y academia.</p> <p>Muchas actividades han tomado lugar en los diferentes países de la región en aras de fortalecer las capacidades técnicas de las autoridades competentes y en términos de sensibilización y formación del sector privado sobre los requisitos relevantes en términos de calidad y medidas sanitarias y fitosanitarias de la Unión Europea.</p> <p>Alrededor de 1,500 personas del sector privado y público han sido beneficiados con las actividades del PRACAMS.”</p> <p>Ficha de Programa PRACAMS (Delegation) p 3</p>
<p>I-3.1.4 – ECAT (the Customs and Tax Training School) has become sustainable</p>	
<p>Findings at indicator level</p>	<p>The <i>Escuela Centroamericana Aduanera y Tributaria</i> (ECAT) created in Honduras with the support of the EU was a success, with 5000 people trained in three years. Similarly, seminars, diplomas, technical assistance and internships helped create a large network of alumni that will allow in the future the "networking" and exchange of experiences and ideas. It was set up, became operational and met its objectives under the project CONSUAC. However, there were no plans for the sustainability of the (ECAT) which is no longer functioning. SIECA elaborated in 2012 a new plan for a “<i>Centro de Estudios de la Integración Económica</i>” (CEIE). Taiwan offered 2.2 MUS\$ for its construction, but</p>

	SIECA is still looking the financial support needed for its operational costs.
Data, sources, extracts	<p><u>ECAT</u> The ECAT created in San Pedro Sula with the support of EU was a success, with 5000 people trained in three years. The Centro de Estudios de la Integración Económica (CEIE) is supposed to start this year targeting not only civil servants but the private sector and civil society.</p> <p>Meeting with William Garcia, Director of integración económica, SIECA</p> <p><u>ECAT</u> With the support of CONSUAC, Costa Rica joined the regional cooperation in Customs issues, Customs Administrations received modern equipment, the SLAUCA was extended to Costa Rica and the Escuela Centroamericana Aduanera y Tributaria (ECAT) was created in Honduras. However, there was no plan of sustainability. In spite of support offered by Taiwan (2.2 MUS\$), the ECAT was moved to SIECA premises because of the political conflict in Honduras. ECAT is no longer functioning. SIECA elaborated in 2012 a new plan for a “Centro de Estudios de la Integración Económica” (CEIE) but is still looking for financial support. However, the start of UAC and CONSUAC were very late due to bureaucratic process of approval by the beneficiary countries. The financial execution of CONSUAC was short of 7 M€.</p> <p>Meeting with</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Jose Carlos Garcia, Coordinador tecnico, PRAIAA - Diana de Mazarigos, Administradora de Anticipos <p><u>ECAT</u> Panama was a beneficiary of the Escuela Centro-Americana Aduanera y Tributaria (ECAT) in spite of the fact that it did not belong to SIECA at the time. Participants always expressed satisfaction for the training offered.</p> <p>Interview Yenia Diaz, Head of the Department of Norms, Autoridad Nacional Aduanera, Panama</p> <p>“El CONSUAC y el proyecto paralelo ADAPCCA han tenido bastantes sinergias; hasta el punto que ADAPCCA financió costes de la ECAT antes del lanzamiento del CONSUAC. Final Report CONSUAC p 53: La ECAT ha sido de suma importancia y ha tenido un impacto considerable gracias a la calidad y extensión de la formación otorgada en las áreas de aduanas, comercio y tributación, y además de mejorar el conocimiento de funcionarios y técnicos en estas áreas ha permitido el conocimiento mutuo e intercambio de experiencias de funcionarios de los países. La ECAT ha provisto formación durante el proyecto a 1,059 funcionarios de los seis países y 361 personas del sector privado en apenas 2 años. De igual forma, mediante los seminarios, diplomaturas, asistencias técnicas y pasantías, se ha creado una gran red de ex alumnos que permitirá en el futuro el “networking” e intercambio de experiencias, ideas para el intercambio de información y para ofrecer a los grupos técnicos Aduaneros y Tributarios de integración regional, beneficiando así a un amplio espectro de beneficiarios e involucrados en el proyecto. Asimismo, la ECAT ha invertido en crear contenidos utilizables en varios formatos para el auto-aprendizaje (mediante “e-learning”) por diferentes instituciones de los países, si son adecuadamente</p>

	<p><i>distribuidos.</i></p> <p><i>Desgraciadamente, por factores externos (la crisis de Honduras), la ECAT tuvo que mudarse de su sede en San Pedro de Sula (Honduras) a la SIECA en Guatemala, donde tenía un espacio reducido para ejercer las actividades y cursos. Ello, combinado con la falta de compromiso claro de las autoridades aduaneras y tributarias de los países de seguir financiándola tras el fin del proyecto europeo, ha dado lugar a la necesidad de replantear el modelo de la Escuela, y buscarle un socio académico, público o empresarial que le pueda dar continuidad aunque sea en un formato más reducido o con formación semi-presencial (“blended”).”</i></p> <p><i>Final Report CONSUAC p 20:</i></p> <p><i>“...se reactivó la cooperación con China-Taiwán. Para tal efecto, la SIECA ha elaborado un perfil de proyecto cuyo propósito principal es la reorientación de recursos aprobados en mayo de 2007 por la Comisión Mixta China Taiwán - Centroamérica, para la ampliación y remodelación de la Escuela Centroamericana Aduanera y Tributaria (ECAT) por un valor de US\$ 2.272,550. Dado que la ECAT ya no está operando, dichos fondos servirán para la creación, implementación y puesta en funcionamiento del Centro de Estudios de la Integración Económica (CEIE), que tendrá su sede en la SIECA.”</i></p> <p><i>Informe de Gestion de SIECA al COMIECO 2011-2013</i></p>
<p>JC 3.2 – Customs have become more efficient</p>	
<p><i>Statement on JC3.2</i></p>	<p>Regional interventions efficiently supported the efforts at the national level. The EU delivered a large variety of equipment for a total value de € 1.9 million to the Customs of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. Staff responsible for their use was trained and appointed by Customs administrations. The equipment supplied allowed Customs to double or triple the speed of work. The supply of X-ray equipment, significantly resulted in a fast and efficient customer service. In Panama, which joined the CA Customs Union in 2012, the Project designed a national initiative to strengthen the Customs Administration for its incorporation to the Union. The regional projects in this area (CONSUAC and ADAPCCA) were complementary to national interventions in El Salvador (Programme to support the National System of Quality in El Salvador-PROCALIDAD) and in Honduras (Project to support the public administration and regional integration PAAPIR).</p> <p>The EU support contributed to a significant improvement in export time and cost in most countries, according to the comparison of the Doing Business index of the World Bank elaborated for year 2005 and year 2012. The situation remained excellent in Panama, improved significantly in Costa Rica and in Nicaragua, slightly in El Salvador and Honduras, but did not improve at all in Guatemala. In Panama, the export time and cost remained the same over the time scope of the Evaluation in a context where Panama is ranking number 11 by this WB index in the word for its export and import procedures. In spite of progress, the exporters wish Customs could be more efficient. For example, nowhere in the region Customs work 24/24 hours, neither the entire Saturday.</p>
<p>I-3.2.1 – Regional interventions supported efforts at the national level</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator</i></p>	<p>Regional interventions efficiently supported the efforts at the national level. The EU delivered a large variety of equipment for a total value de € 1.9 million to the Customs of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. Staff responsible for their use was trained and appointed by Customs administrations. The equipment</p>

<i>level</i>	<p>supplied allowed Customs to double or triple the speed of work. The supply of X-ray equipment, significantly resulted in a fast and efficient customer service. In Panama, which joined the CA Customs Union in 2012, the Project designed a national initiative to strengthen the Customs Administration for its incorporation to the Union. The regional projects in this area (CONSUAC and ADAPCCA) were complementary to national interventions in El Salvador (Programme to support the National System of Quality in El Salvador-PROCALIDAD) and in Honduras (Project to support the public administration and regional integration PAAPIR).</p>																																																								
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p><i>“Debido a la firma del Protocolo de Modificación del Acuerdo de Unión Aduanera entre Guatemala y El Salvador, enfocó su actividad hacia el apoyo de la Unión Aduanera Guatemala-El Salvador y hacia el equipamiento de las aduanas periféricas. Estos suministros fueron bien valorados y causaron mejoras de rapidez y eficiencia en las aduanas.”</i></p> <p><i>Final Evaluation CONSUAC p 6</i></p> <p><i>“El objetivo “Equipamiento de aduanas periféricas” (objetivo heredado del Proyecto UAC) sí se cumplió, y a satisfacción de los beneficiarios.”</i></p> <p><i>Final Evaluation CONSUAC p 17</i></p> <p><i>“El diagnóstico de las necesidades de equipo se realizó en el marco del Proyecto “Unión Aduanera Centroamericana-UAC- en el año 2006. En el marco del CONSUAC tuvieron lugar as consultorías siguientes:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Colaboración prestada por contraparte de SIECA para la actualización de las necesidades de los países, en visita de comprobación de necesidades efectuadas por los Países miembros.</i> • <i>Consultoría para los procesos de licitación para el suministro del equipamiento acordado, de agosto 2009 a enero 2010, en concepto de ATL.</i> • <i>Colaboración de contraparte de SIECA para elaborar el inventario físico del equipamiento.</i> <p><i>Se entregó equipamiento destinado al fortalecimiento y se incrementó la eficiencia de las funciones de las aduanas periféricas, conforme requerimiento previo de las administraciones aduaneras y atendiendo a sus necesidades y prioridades.</i></p> <p><i>El equipo entregado a cada administración aduanera, se describe a continuación:</i></p> <table border="1" data-bbox="354 1552 1366 2000"> <thead> <tr> <th>DESCRIPCIÓN EQUIPO</th> <th>DEL</th> <th>CR</th> <th>SV</th> <th>GT</th> <th>HN</th> <th>NI</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Plantas eléctricas</td> <td></td> <td>1</td> <td>3</td> <td>2</td> <td>1</td> <td>2</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Equipos aire acondicionado</td> <td></td> <td>24</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>13</td> <td>15</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Computadores de escritorio</td> <td></td> <td>15</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>52</td> <td>34</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Escáner Rayos X</td> <td></td> <td>7</td> <td></td> <td>2</td> <td></td> <td>9</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Computadoras portátiles</td> <td></td> <td>9</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>UPS</td> <td></td> <td>15</td> <td>3</td> <td></td> <td>52</td> <td>34</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Lectores código de barras</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>27</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	DESCRIPCIÓN EQUIPO	DEL	CR	SV	GT	HN	NI	Plantas eléctricas		1	3	2	1	2	Equipos aire acondicionado		24			13	15	Computadores de escritorio		15			52	34	Escáner Rayos X		7		2		9	Computadoras portátiles		9					UPS		15	3		52	34	Lectores código de barras			27			
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Servidores		3			2
Radio comunicadores portátiles				44	30
Radio base				3	4
Central telefónica				1	
Impresoras láser				20	22
Tóner				60	
Cámaras de seguridad					29
Medidor de radioactividad					8
Dispositivo de grabación					1
Báscula industrial					2
Báscula de plataforma					3
Montacargas					1
Teléfonos IP					35
Adaptadores IP					11
Equipo telecomunicaciones					6
Software de virtualización					1
2 MBPS de ancho de banda					1
Impresoras para Boucher					11

Final Evaluation CONSUAC p 34

“De las entrevistas y comprobaciones de campo efectuadas ante las administraciones de aduanas receptoras del equipamiento facilitado por el proyecto, se establece que:

- *El equipo, principalmente las plantas eléctricas, las básculas de plataforma y el equipo de telecomunicaciones, fue instalados correctamente.*
- *Se capacitó al personal, que fue designado por las administraciones aduaneras como responsable de su uso.*
- *El equipo se encuentra en condiciones normales de funcionamiento y se está utilizando para lo que fue requerido por las administraciones.*
- *El equipo suministrado constituye una herramienta muy importante para el desempeño de las funciones de las oficinas o unidades que lo utilizan ya que les ha permitido duplicar o triplicar el rendimiento de trabajo.*
- *Con el suministro del equipo de Rayos X, se ha reducido considerablemente las horas/hombres, lo cual redundo en una atención rápida y eficiente al usuario.*
- *Las administraciones aduaneras a las que se les suministró servidores (Dirección de*

	<p><i>Aduanas de El Salvador y Honduras), han manifestado su total satisfacción y agradecimientos por suministrarles equipo que es muy valioso para realizar sus funciones, especialmente para la transmisión electrónica de los FAUCAS con Guatemala.”</i></p> <p><i>Final Evaluation CONSUAC p 35</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>“Se capacitó, de agosto 2008 a noviembre 2010, a 1059 funcionarios de las administraciones aduaneras y tributarias de los países de: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua y Panamá, y 361 personas del sector privado relacionados con actividades y operaciones del comercio exterior, y otros involucrados sobre temas de integración, aduaneras y tributarias (1420 personas en total).</i> • <i>Se impartieron 40 seminarios presenciales en las instalaciones de la ECAT sobre temas de integración, aduaneros y tributarios.</i> • <i>Se impartieron 2 Diplomados en Aduana, de 6 módulos el primero y 7 el segundo y 1 Diplomado en Tributos Internos de 7 módulos.</i> • <i>Se suministraron 6 asistencias técnicas in situ sobre técnicas de auditoría, a las administraciones aduaneras de los países centroamericanos, incluida Panamá.</i> • <i>Se realizó 1 pasantía al Colegio de Europa, Bélgica, para conocer la experiencia europea sobre su proceso de integración y las mejores prácticas aduaneras, con la participación de 14 estudiantes de los diplomados, tanto de aduanas como de tributos que obtuvieron las mejores notas.</i> • <i>Se realizó 1 pasantía a la Administración Federal de Ingresos Públicos de la Argentina (AFIP) para conocer las mejores prácticas aduaneras y tributarias, con la participación de 6 funcionarios de las administraciones aduaneras de Centroamérica y Panamá y 5 funcionarios de las administraciones tributarias de Centroamérica.</i> • <i>Se diseñó y elaboró un Curso Virtual en Aduana (e-learning) que consta de 6 módulos que administrará y pondrá a disposición del público en general la SIECA a través de su página Web, cuando existan fondos para su adaptación.”</i> <p><i>Final Evaluation CONSUAC p 46</i></p> <p><i>“Curso sobre Reglamento Centroamericano del Origen de las Mercancías, impartido por la contraparte de SIECA, para funcionarios de aduanas y del sector privado. (El Salvador, 6-11/9/2009).”</i></p> <p><i>Final Evaluation ADAPCCA p 34</i></p> <p><i>“Entrega de € 1.9 millones en equipamientos a laboratorios de aduanas y sanitarios a nivel regional.”</i></p> <p><i>Final Evaluation ADAPCCA p 43</i></p> <p><i>“Programme to support the National System of Quality in El Salvador (PROCALIDAD) – El Salvador</i></p> <p><i>Project to support the public administration and regional integration (PAAPIR) – Honduras</i></p> <p><i>An identification in Panama for the design of a national initiative to strengthen the customs administration for its incorporation to CA Customs Unions has been taken into account.”</i></p> <p><i>Ficha de acción de PRAIAA</i></p>
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I-3.2.2 – Export time and cost were improved.																																																																		
<i>Findings at indicator level</i>	<p>The EU support contributed to a significant improvement in export time and cost in most countries, according to the comparison of the Doing Business index of the World Bank elaborated for year 2005 and year 2012. The situation remained excellent in Panama, improved significantly in Costa Rica and in Nicaragua, slightly in El Salvador and Honduras, but did not improve at all in Guatemala. In Panama, the export time and cost remained the same over the time scope of the Evaluation in a context where Panama is ranking number 11 by this WB index in the word for its export and import procedures. In spite of progress, the exporters wish Customs could be more efficient. For example, nowhere in the region Customs work 24/24 hours, neither the entire Saturday.</p>																																																																	
<i>Data, sources, extracts</i>	<p><u>Customs procedures</u> <i>Customs procedures are not faster and trade within the region has become more difficult than a few years ago due to the increased insecurity of transport.</i></p> <p><i>Meeting with AGEXPORT</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Fanny Estrada, Directora Ejecutiva</i> - <i>Invan Bultron, Gerente division desarrollo</i> - <i>Luis Godoy, Director General</i> - <i>Ricardo Santa Cruz Rubi, Director Division Agricola and Pesca</i> <p>“DOING BUSINESS”; http://doingbusiness.org/</p> <p><i>Doing Business</i> (World Bank indicator) measures the time and cost (excluding tariffs) associated with exporting and importing a standardized cargo of goods by sea transport. The time and cost necessary to complete every official procedure for exporting and importing the goods are recorded; however, the time and cost for sea transport are not included. All documents needed by the trader to export or import the goods across the border are also recorded. The most recent round of data collection for the project was completed in June 2013.</p> <p>Costa Rica</p> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <thead> <tr> <th rowspan="2">Economy</th> <th rowspan="2">Year</th> <th rowspan="2">Ease of Doing Business Rank</th> <th colspan="7">Trading Across Borders</th> </tr> <tr> <th>Rank</th> <th>Documents to export (number)</th> <th>Time to export (days)</th> <th>Cost to export (US\$ per container)</th> <th>Documents to import (number)</th> <th>Time to import (days)</th> <th>Cost to import (US\$ per container)</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Costa Rica</td> <td>DB2006</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>5</td> <td>35</td> <td>1,065</td> <td>5</td> <td>35</td> <td>1,100</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Costa Rica</td> <td>DB2007</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>5</td> <td>35</td> <td>1,065</td> <td>5</td> <td>35</td> <td>1,100</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Costa Rica</td> <td>DB2008</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>5</td> <td>17</td> <td>1,065</td> <td>5</td> <td>18</td> <td>1,100</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Costa</td> <td>DB20</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>5</td> <td>17</td> <td>1,155</td> <td>5</td> <td>18</td> <td>1,190</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>									Economy	Year	Ease of Doing Business Rank	Trading Across Borders							Rank	Documents to export (number)	Time to export (days)	Cost to export (US\$ per container)	Documents to import (number)	Time to import (days)	Cost to import (US\$ per container)	Costa Rica	DB2006			5	35	1,065	5	35	1,100	Costa Rica	DB2007			5	35	1,065	5	35	1,100	Costa Rica	DB2008			5	17	1,065	5	18	1,100	Costa	DB20			5	17	1,155	5	18	1,190
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Rica	09								
Costa Rica	DB2010			5	13	1,155	5	14	1,190
Costa Rica	DB2011			5	13	1,155	5	14	1,190
Costa Rica	DB2012			5	13	1,155	5	14	1,190
Costa Rica	DB2013	109	42	5	13	995	5	14	1,020
Costa Rica	DB2014	102	44	5	13	1,015	5	14	1,070

Source: built from data of Doing Business

El Salvador

Economy	Year	Ease of Doing Business Rank	Trading Across Borders						
			Rank	Documents to export (number)	Time to export (days)	Cost to export (US\$ per container)	Documents to import (number)	Time to import (days)	Cost to import (US\$ per container)
El Salvador	DB2006			6	22	540	9	30	540
El Salvador	DB2007			6	22	540	9	30	540
El Salvador	DB2008			7	21	540	9	18	540
El Salvador	DB2009			7	14	880	7	10	820
El Salvador	DB2010			7	14	880	7	10	820
El Salvador	DB2011			7	14	845	7	10	845
El Salvador	DB2012			7	14	845	7	10	845

El Salvador	DB2013	115	69	7	14	980	7	10	980
El Salvador	DB2014	118	64	7	13	980	7	10	970

Source: built from data of Doing Business

Guatemala

Economy	Year	Ease of Doing Business Rank	Trading Across Borders						
			Rank	Documents to export (number)	Time to export (days)	Cost to export (US\$ per container)	Documents to import (number)	Time to import (days)	Cost to import (US\$ per container)
Guatemala	DB2006			7	18	1,783	4	35	1,985
Guatemala	DB2007			7	18	1,783	4	32	1,985
Guatemala	DB2008			9	17	1,052	8	17	1,177
Guatemala	DB2009			8	17	1,182	7	17	1,302
Guatemala	DB2010			8	17	1,182	7	17	1,302
Guatemala	DB2011			8	17	1,182	7	17	1,302
Guatemala	DB2012			8	17	1,127	7	17	1,302
Guatemala	DB2013	93	112	8	17	1,307	7	17	1,425
Guatemala	DB2014	79	116	8	17	1,435	7	17	1,500

Source: built from data of Doing Business

Honduras

Econo	Year	Ease	Trading Across Borders
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my		of Doing Business Rank	Rank	Documents to export (number)	Time to export (days)	Cost to export (US\$ per container)	Documents to import (number)	Time to import (days)	Cost to import (US\$ per container)
Honduras	DB2006			5	19	1,065	8	22	975
Honduras	DB2007			5	19	1,065	8	22	975
Honduras	DB2008			5	19	1,065	8	22	975
Honduras	DB2009			5	19	1,163	7	22	1,190
Honduras	DB2010			5	19	1,163	7	22	1,190
Honduras	DB2011			5	19	1,193	7	22	1,205
Honduras	DB2012			5	18	1,242	7	22	1,420
Honduras	DB2013	125	83	5	12	1,342	7	16	1,510
Honduras	DB2014	127	84	5	12	1,345	7	16	1,500

Source: built from data of Doing Business

Nicaragua

Economy	Year	Ease of Doing Business Rank	Trading Across Borders						
			Rank	Documents to export (number)	Time to export (days)	Cost to export (US\$ per container)	Documents to import (number)	Time to import (days)	Cost to import (US\$ per container)
Nicaragua	DB2006			6	38	1,020	7	37	1,020
Nicaragua	DB2007			5	36	1,021	5	37	1,054
Nicaragua	DB2008			5	36	1,021	5	37	1,054
Nicaragua	DB2009			5	29	1,300	5	28	1,420

Nicaragua	DB2010			5	29	1,340	5	28	1,420
Nicaragua	DB2011			5	26	1,140	5	25	1,220
Nicaragua	DB2012			5	24	1,140	5	23	1,220
Nicaragua	DB2013	123	82	5	21	1,140	5	20	1,245
Nicaragua	DB2014	124	82	5	21	1,140	5	20	1,245

Source: built from data of Doing Business

Panama

Economy	Year	Ease of Doing Business Rank	Trading Across Borders						
			Rank	Documents to export (number)	Time to export (days)	Cost to export (US\$ per container)	Documents to import (number)	Time to import (days)	Cost to import (US\$ per container)
Panama	DB2006			3	10	450	3	9	850
Panama	DB2007			3	10	450	3	9	850
Panama	DB2008			3	10	450	3	9	850
Panama	DB2009			3	10	529	3	9	879
Panama	DB2010			3	10	529	3	9	879
Panama	DB2011			3	10	565	3	9	915
Panama	DB2012			3	10	615	3	9	965
Panama	DB2013	61	11	3	10	615	3	9	965
Panama	DB2014	55	11	3	10	625	3	9	965

Source: built from data of Doing Business

I-3.2.3 – Import time and cost were improved	
<i>Findings at indicator level</i>	The EU interventions improved import time and cost in all countries. Panama remained during the time scope of the evaluation one of the countries with the most efficient import procedures. In Costa Rica and El Salvador the situation improved significantly, while the situation improved slightly in Nicaragua and Guatemala. In Panama, the situation did not improve but Panama was already ranked as having one of the most efficient import procedures, in terms of number of documents, time and cost.
<i>Data, sources, extracts</i>	<p><u>Aduanas</u></p> <p><i>In spite of progress, the exporters wish Customs could be more efficient. Nowhere in the region Customs work 24/24 hours, neither the entire Saturday.</i></p> <p><i>Meeting with Juan Bulnes, Secretario Asociacion Panamena de Exportadores (APEX)</i></p> <p><i>April 2. Panama</i></p> <p>Also see tables built from Doing Business under section 3.2.2 above.</p>
JC 3.3 – The EU contributed to the development of a common market	
<i>Statement on JC3.3</i>	<p>Trade competition policies are discussed thanks to the network RECAC (Red de Coordinacion de Agencias de Competencia) but trade competition policies are far from being harmonized in the region. Panama has a strong Competition Agency, which is not the case for other countries. A telling example of a dominant position is the case of the Costa Rican company Dos Pinos (milk products).</p> <p>The programme ADAPCCA did a good technical work on competition policy, but the countries of the Central American Customs Union expressed no interest in the matter. Only El Salvador and Costa Rica had a competition policy. More: there was no consensus on putting the issue on the agenda of regional economic integration, although it is part of the Association Agreement. Under the commitments of the AA, the region is supposed to have a harmonized regime before 2021.</p> <p>The progress in harmonization of intellectual property was limited to the issue of geographic indications. However judges, prosecutors and customs officials were trained. Some benefited from an internship in Mexico on the "Tequila" case.</p> <p>The EU efforts did not result as planned in the adoption of a common trade safeguards policy. The beneficiary countries received assistance for a revision of trade safeguard policies, but this did not lead to the adoption of common trade safeguard policies. The CA countries slowed down the programme ADAPCCA on this subject because they did not want to release their positions while they were negotiating the AA.</p>
I-3.3.1 – The region implements a common competition policy	
<i>Findings at indicator level</i>	<p>Trade competition policies are discussed thanks to the network RECAC (Red de Coordinacion de Agencias de Competencia) but trade competition policies are far from being harmonized in the region. Panama has a strong Competition Agency, which is not the case for other countries. A telling example of a dominant position is the case of the Costa Rican company Dos Pinos (milk products).</p> <p>The programme ADAPCCA did a good technical work on competition policy, but the countries of the Central American Customs Union expressed no interest in the matter.</p>

	<p>Only El Salvador and Costa Rica had a competition policy. More: there was no consensus on putting the issue on the agenda of regional economic integration, although it is part of the Association Agreement. Under the commitments of the AA, the region is supposed to have a harmonized regime before 2021.</p>
<p>Data, sources, extracts</p>	<p><u>Competition policy</u> The programme ADAPCCA did a good technical work on competition policy, but it was not adopted.</p> <p>Meeting with</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ruben Najera, Director of PRACAMS - Palmira Lopez-Fresno, Jefe ATI <p><u>Trade Competition</u></p> <p>Trade competition policies are discussed thanks to the network RECAC (Red de Coordinacion de Agencias de Competencia) but trade competition policies are far from being harmonized in the region. Panama has a strong Competition Agency, which is not the case for other countries. A telling example of a dominant position is the case of the Costarican company Dos Pinos (milk products).</p> <p>Meeting with Alexis Pineda, Director Nacional, Oficina de Negociaciones Comerciales, Panama</p> <p><u>Competition policy</u></p> <p>The region registers no progress, rather it is going backwards.</p> <p>Meeting with Juan Bulnes, Secretario Asociacion Panamena de Exportadores (APEX) April 2. Panama</p> <p><u>Competition policy</u></p> <p>Guatemala is the only country of the region that has no law nor any authority protecting competition. A project of Law will be soon presented to Congress, but it will not protect competition. Under the commitments of the AA, Guatemala will adopt a competition law in 2017 and the region is supposed to have an harmonized regime before 2021.</p> <p>Meeting with AGEXPORT</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Fanny Estrada, Directora Ejecutiva - Invan Bultron, Gerente division desarrollo - Luis Godoy, Director General - Ricardo Santa Cruz Rubi, Director Division Agricola and Pesca <p>“...en competencia y en comercio de servicios no hubo interés de parte de los países...Por ello, la eficacia (o efectividad) ha sido variable según el Resultado y Actividad concretos, siendo en unos muy alto (sanitario/fitosanitario- MSF, normas técnicas- NT, transporte, etc.), y en otros (propiedad intelectual, competencia, etc.) bastante limitados...”</p> <p>En el Segundo Componente, con un desembolso de solo € 474,791, se ha gastado relativamente poco debido en parte a que unos Componentes (Migraciones y Medio Ambiente) no tuvieron casi actividad (en Migraciones se hizo una base de datos de normativas migratorias y en Medio Ambiente nada), y en otros dos Componentes se trabajó muy marginalmente (Competencia y Propiedad Intelectual).”</p> <p>Final Evaluation of ADAPCCA p 5</p>

“Indicador 2.1.1. Políticas de competencia nacionales elaboradas en los 5 Estados Parte como precondition para una política de competencia regional común al final del proyecto

Logro del Indicador: No se cumplió el indicador, ya que las políticas de competencia ya estaban elaboradas en El Salvador y Costa Rica, y en los demás países no se avanzó.

Actividad 2.1.2. Realizar actividades de apoyo al Grupo de Trabajo de Política de Competencia en la Integración Económica:

- i) Realización estudios sectoriales (3) prioritarios para el buen funcionamiento de la Unión Aduanera, en coordinación con la CEPAL, institución que ha apoyado a la región en este tema*
- ii) Un Sistema de Información Regional de Políticas de Competencia ha coadyuvado decididamente a informar a los sectores privados y público en general, sobre este tema y sus implicaciones sobre el espacio aduanero común y el resto de políticas económicas y comerciales dentro de la Unión Aduanera*
- iii) Apoyo técnico en materia de capacitación e intercambio de experiencias en materia de normativas comunitarias de política de competencia*

Indicador 2.1.2. La política de competencia es parte de la agenda económica regional

Logro del Indicador:

El indicador no se ha cumplido. La actividad e impacto han sido muy bajos, ya que se han realizado solo acciones puntuales (estudio de situación), pero sin un enfoque regional. Según se menciona en repetidas entrevistas, NO existe aún consenso en que la política de competencia sea parte de la agenda de integración regional, pero es un compromiso del AdA.

Actividad 2.1.3. Instituciones nacionales:

- i) Propuesta de apoyo técnico para el diseño de normativa específica en los países de la región que no cuentan con legislación de competencia de manera que resulte compatible con las normativas regionales.*
- ii) Asistencia técnica, capacitación e intercambio de experiencias en materia de normativas y prácticas nacionales de Política de Competencia de manera que resulte compatible con las normativas regionales.*

Indicador 2.1.3. No existe en el Marco Lógico de referencia indicador para esta actividad

Logro del Indicador:

Se ha cumplido parcialmente el indicador, ya que se han realizado pocas acciones como:

- Propuesta de apoyo técnico para el diseño de normativa específica en los países de la región que no cuentan con legislación de competencia de manera que resulte compatible con las normativas regionales.*

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Se han financiado viajes e intercambio de experiencias del grupo regional de política de competencia • Se ha realizado un estudio base de ATI sobre la relación entre política de competencia y Unión Aduanera. • Se apoyó la realización de dos Foros de Competencia Regionales (el I y el II, el tercero en 2010 ya no se puede financiar y lo hizo el BID). Estos foros han resultado muy útiles, pues han sido la primera actividad realizada por los países sobre esta temática <p><i>Actividad 2.1.4. Realización de actividades de información, sensibilización y capacitación.</i></p> <p>i) <i>Diseño e implementación de programas locales y regionales de fomento a la cultura de la competencia. Especial énfasis en la Asamblea Legislativa y organismos judiciales de cada país, gremios del sector privado y academia</i></p> <p>ii) <i>Diseño e implementación de un plan de capacitación y difusión sobre la política de competencia a nivel regional y en cada uno de los países</i></p> <p><i>Indicador 2.1.4. No existe en el Marco Lógico de referencia indicador para esta actividad</i></p> <p>Logro del Indicador: <i>No se han realizado actividades de información o promoción en los países (excepto los Foros mencionados en la A-2.13)."</i></p> <p><i>Final Evaluation of ADAPCCA p 58</i></p>																									
I-3.3.2 – Intellectual property rules have been harmonized																										
<i>Findings at indicator level</i>	The progress in harmonization of intellectual property was limited to the issue of geographic indications. However judges, prosecutors and customs officials were trained. Some benefited from an internship in Mexico on the "Tequila" case.																									
<i>Data, sources, extracts</i>	<p><i>"... en propiedad intelectual se centró en dimensiones complementarias de normas de origen e indicaciones geográficas,... Por ello, la eficacia (o efectividad) ha sido variable según el Resultado y Actividad concretos, siendo en unos muy alto (sanitario/fitosanitario- MSF, normas técnicas- NT, transporte, etc.), y en otros (propiedad intelectual, competencia, etc.) bastante limitados..."</i></p> <p><i>Final Evaluation ADAPCCA p 5</i></p> <p>Table 3.12: Avances en Políticas Comunes a la fecha</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="352 1637 1366 1966"> <thead> <tr> <th>Política</th> <th>Formulación</th> <th>Adopción</th> <th>Aplicación</th> <th>Evaluación y Seguimiento</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Arancelaria</td> <td>X</td> <td>X</td> <td>X</td> <td>X</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Tributaria</td> <td>-</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Comercial</td> <td>X (AdA)</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Sanitaria y Fitosanitaria</td> <td>X</td> <td>X</td> <td>X</td> <td>X</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Política	Formulación	Adopción	Aplicación	Evaluación y Seguimiento	Arancelaria	X	X	X	X	Tributaria	-				Comercial	X (AdA)				Sanitaria y Fitosanitaria	X	X	X	X
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Sanitaria y Fitosanitaria	X	X	X	X																						

Normativa Técnica	X	X	X	X
Comercio de Servicios e Inversiones	X (Inv)	X (Inv)	X (Inv)	
Solución de Controversias	X	X	X	X
Competencia	X			
Migratoria	-			
Propiedad Intelectual	X (IG/DO)			
Comercio y Ambiente	-			
Transporte	X	X	X	X

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“Actividad 2.3.1. Realización de estudios, actividades de asistencia técnica, programas de capacitación, intercambio de experiencias y sensibilización para la formulación y/o armonización del marco legal regional relativo a derechos de propiedad intelectual y derechos conexos, en el contexto de la Unión Aduanera Centroamericana.

Indicador 2.3.1. No existe en el Marco Lógico de referencia indicador para esta actividad

Logro del Indicador:

No se ha cumplido el indicador, si bien se realizaron algunas reuniones del grupo de propiedad intelectual al que acudió un funcionario de la SIECA con fondos del proyecto.

Actividad 2.3.2. Desarrollo e implementación de un mecanismo regional de intercambio de información para apoyar la aplicación de los derechos de propiedad intelectual y derechos conexos.

Indicador 2.3.2. No existe en el Marco Lógico de referencia indicador para esta actividad

Logro del Indicador:

No se ha cumplido, ya que no se realizaron Acciones en esta Actividad.

Actividad 2.3.3. Prestación de asistencia técnica, capacitación e intercambio de experiencias para el fortalecimiento de la capacidad y especialización de las autoridades responsables de proteger los derechos de propiedad intelectual y los derechos conexos en el territorio de la Unión Aduanera Centroamericana.

Indicador 2.3. Realización de al menos 2 seminarios de capacitación cada año (2008-2009) en los 5 Estados Parte y a nivel regional, con el fin de contar con un mínimo de 10 elementos jurídicos en el área de derechos de propiedad intelectual armonizados y aplicados en los 5 Estados Parte

	<p><i>Logro del Indicador:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Se cumplió parcialmente, ya que se capacitaron jueces, fiscales y funcionarios aduaneros y se realizó una pasantía en México sobre el caso “Tequila”.</i> • <i>No alcanzado el indicador de celebrar 4 (2 por 2 años) seminarios en cada uno de los 5 países.</i> • <i>En general, este Resultado ha tenido un impacto bajo, si bien en temas específicos como Indicaciones Geográficas se ha avanzado algo, tanto en la SIECA como en varios países, tanto en comprensión de su importancia en la implementación del AdA como de sus mecanismos de registro y defensa.</i> <p><i>Actividad 2.3.4. Asistencia técnica para la evaluación de la situación y perspectivas de la implementación a nivel regional de los artículos 17, 22, 23 del ADPIC.</i></p> <p><i>Indicador 2.3.4. No existe en el Marco Lógico de referencia indicador para esta actividad</i></p> <p><i>Logro del Indicador:</i> <i>No se ha cumplido, ya que no se realizaron Acciones en esta Actividad.</i> <i>Final Evaluation ADAPCCA p 25</i></p>
<p>I-3.3.3 – The region adopted common trade safeguards policies</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>The EU efforts did not result as planned in the adoption of a common trade safeguards policy. The beneficiary countries received assistance for a revision of trade safeguard policies, but this did not lead to the adoption of common trade safeguard policies. The CA countries slowed down the programme ADAPCCA on this subject because they did not want to release their positions while they were negotiating the AA.</p>
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p><u><i>Safeguard policies</i></u> <i>The CA countries slowed down the programme ADAPCCA on this subject because they did not want to release their positions while they were negotiating the AA.</i></p> <p><i>Meeting with</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Ruben Najera, Director of PRACAMS</i> - <i>Palmira Lopez-Fresno, Jefe ATI</i> <p><u><i>Safeguard policies</i></u> <i>No progress since every common policy adopted is hampered by the fact that every country remain sovereign in its application.</i></p> <p><i>Meeting with Juan Bulnes, Secretario Asociacion Panamena de Exportadores (APEX)</i> <i>April 2. Panama</i></p> <p><i>“Los resultados esperados han sido alcanzados en muy distinta medida según actividades: se han obtenido buenos resultados a través de asistencia técnica y apoyo financiero del proyecto en las políticas sanitarias/fitosanitarias (MSF), en normas técnicas (NT) y más limitados en soluciones de controversias y comercio de servicios e inversiones en el Componente 1.”</i> <i>Final Evaluation of ADAPCCA, p 16</i></p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “Se prestó asistencia técnica a los países y a sus foros regionales para la revisión y actualización del Reglamento de Prácticas desleales de comercio. • Se prestó asistencia técnica a los países y a sus foros regionales para la revisión y actualización del Reglamento de Salvaguardias.” <p><i>Final Evaluation of ADAPCCA, p 40</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “No se ha avanzado durante el proyecto en elaborar una propuesta de política comercial común, ni áreas relacionadas como en converger en la aplicación de medidas contra las prácticas desleales de comercio ni en las cláusulas de salvaguardias. • Se justifica la falta de estas actividades en que no había demanda de los países; sin embargo en algunas entrevistas realizadas se menciona que algunos países tenían interés en armonizar al menos los Reglamentos de prácticas desleales de comercio y de salvaguardias.” <p><i>Final Evaluation of ADAPCCA, p 41</i></p>
<p>JC 3.4 – Intra and extra regional trade progressed significantly</p>	
<p><i>Statement on JC3.4</i></p>	<p>The EU support was meant to increase intra and extra regional trade in goods. Total trade of CA grew by 62 percent between 2006 and 2012. Exports grew by 76 percent. The share of intra-regional trade without free zones stagnated around 25 %. None of the CA countries increased its share of intra-regional exports. El Salvador was in 2012 the country with the highest share of goods imported by the region (46 percent).</p> <p>These calculations are based on SIECA statistics that exclude free zone goods. Considering that free zone activities developed during the time scope of the evaluation and that their destination is not regional, the level of trade integration is even less than calculated above.</p> <p>This share is likely to go further down in coming years due to the growth of trade with China. The exports of the region to China are still very limited, but grew by 33 % over the period 2001-2011 while its total exports grew only by 14 %.</p> <p>The region does not have data on trade in services.</p> <p>The EU support to regional integration did not result in a growth of the share of intraregional FDI. FDI inflows in CA registered a strong fall from US\$ 7.8 million in 2008, to US\$ 4.5 million in 2009, due to the world economic crisis, and picked up again in 2010, 2011 and 2012, but the level of US\$ 8.9 million reached in 2012 is only a small growth in real terms against the level of 2007, that is US\$ 7.2 million. The information provided by ECLAC indicates that the share of FDI from the Central American region remains minimal.</p>
<p>I-3.4.1 – Growth of intra and extra regional trade in goods</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>The EU support was meant to increase intra and extra regional trade in goods. Total trade of CA grew by 62 percent between 2006 and 2012. Exports grew by 76 percent. The share of intra-regional trade without free zones stagnated around 25 %. None of the CA countries increased its share of intra-regional exports. El Salvador was in 2012 the country with the highest share of goods imported by the region (46 percent).</p> <p>These calculations are based on SIECA statistics that exclude free zone goods. Considering that free zone activities developed during the time scope of the evaluation and that their destination is not regional, the level of trade integration is even less than calculated above.</p> <p>This share is likely to go further down in coming years due to the growth of trade with</p>

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Data, sources, extracts	<p><i>Trade in goods</i> SIECA trade statistics are elaborated from Central Bank statistics relying on Customs statistics. They exclude imports and exports of free zones. The share of intra-regional trade, around 25 % has been stagnating if not going down over the recent years. This is due to the importance of free zone exports, beginning with the importance of Intel exports in CR. It is also due to the growth of trade with China. The exports of the region to China grew by 33 % over the period 2001-2011 while its total exports grew only by 14 %.</p> <p>Meeting with Eduardo Espinoza, jefe Unidad Estadística, SIECA</p> <p>The value of the commercial exchange of goods from Central America to the world has evolved very favourably in recent years. Trade (exports + imports) grew at an average annual rate of 10.1 percent over the period 2005-2011. In that period, the value of goods exported by Central America in the world displayed a very dynamic behavior, growing at an average annual rate of 11.1 percent despite the fact that they were affected in 2009 by the fall of the market of the United States of America, which is the main trading partner of the region. The exports registered a recovery in 2011 growing at an annual average rate of 16.0 percent against 2009. Meanwhile, the value of imports also showed a dynamic behavior in the period, with a permanent upward trend, growing at an average annual rate of 9.6 percent. Like exports, these were affected in the year 2009 by the financial crisis that affected the world trade, but recovered in 2011 to grow at an average rate annual de 19.5 percent compared to the year 2009. Source: Extract translated from: http://www.sieca.int/Documentos/DocumentosMostrar.aspx?SegmentoId=2&DocumentoId=3325</p> <p>Centroamérica: Comercio de Mercancías con el mundo, US\$ million</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>País/Año</th> <th>2006</th> <th>2007</th> <th>2008</th> <th>2009</th> <th>2010</th> <th>2011</th> <th>2012</th> <th>QI&I I 2013</th> <th>% Growth 2006-2012</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>CA</td> <td>---</td> <td>---</td> <td>---</td> <td>---</td> <td>---</td> <td>---</td> <td>---</td> <td>---</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Intercambio</td> <td>53,614</td> <td>63,013</td> <td>72,227</td> <td>57,995</td> <td>67,813</td> <td>81,651</td> <td>86,613</td> <td>57,886</td> <td>62</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Exportaciones</td> <td>16,870</td> <td>19,898</td> <td>22,282</td> <td>20,208</td> <td>23,221</td> <td>27,803</td> <td>29,636</td> <td>19,842</td> <td>76</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Importaciones</td> <td>36,744</td> <td>43,115</td> <td>49,945</td> <td>37,787</td> <td>44,592</td> <td>53,848</td> <td>56,977</td> <td>38,044</td> <td>55</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Costa Rica</td> <td>---</td> <td>---</td> <td>---</td> <td>---</td> <td>---</td> <td>---</td> <td>---</td> <td>---</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Intercambio</td> <td>19,073</td> <td>21,450</td> <td>24,498</td> <td>19,820</td> <td>22,711</td> <td>26,141</td> <td>28,176</td> <td>19,087</td> <td>48</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Exportaciones</td> <td>7,790</td> <td>8,865</td> <td>9,313</td> <td>8,534</td> <td>9,271</td> <td>10,219</td> <td>11,154</td> <td>7,536</td> <td>43</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Importaciones</td> <td>11,283</td> <td>12,585</td> <td>15,185</td> <td>11,286</td> <td>13,440</td> <td>15,922</td> <td>17,022</td> <td>11,551</td> <td>51</td> </tr> <tr> <td>El Salvador</td> <td>---</td> <td>---</td> <td>---</td> <td>---</td> <td>---</td> <td>---</td> <td>---</td> <td>---</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Intercambio</td> <td>8,942</td> <td>10,711</td> <td>12,085</td> <td>9,641</td> <td>11,273</td> <td>13,568</td> <td>13,785</td> <td>9,809</td> <td>54</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Exportaciones</td> <td>2,251</td> <td>2,790</td> <td>3,272</td> <td>2,921</td> <td>3,471</td> <td>4,240</td> <td>4,233</td> <td>3,012</td> <td>88</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	País/Año	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	QI&I I 2013	% Growth 2006-2012	CA	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---		Intercambio	53,614	63,013	72,227	57,995	67,813	81,651	86,613	57,886	62	Exportaciones	16,870	19,898	22,282	20,208	23,221	27,803	29,636	19,842	76	Importaciones	36,744	43,115	49,945	37,787	44,592	53,848	56,977	38,044	55	Costa Rica	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---		Intercambio	19,073	21,450	24,498	19,820	22,711	26,141	28,176	19,087	48	Exportaciones	7,790	8,865	9,313	8,534	9,271	10,219	11,154	7,536	43	Importaciones	11,283	12,585	15,185	11,286	13,440	15,922	17,022	11,551	51	El Salvador	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---		Intercambio	8,942	10,711	12,085	9,641	11,273	13,568	13,785	9,809	54	Exportaciones	2,251	2,790	3,272	2,921	3,471	4,240	4,233	3,012	88
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Guatemala	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	
Intercambio	13,789	16,366	18,216	15,074	17,843	21,596	22,019	14,827	60
Exportaciones	3,716	4,520	5,377	4,998	5,812	7,061	7,146	4,867	92
Importaciones	10,073	11,846	12,839	10,076	12,031	14,535	14,873	9,960	48
Honduras	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	
Intercambio	7,739	9,753	11,646	8,586	9,947	13,018	13,920	8,846	80
Exportaciones	2,096	2,529	2,833	2,362	2,819	4,002	4,416	2,742	111
Importaciones	5,643	7,224	8,813	6,224	7,128	9,016	9,504	6,104	68
Nicaragua	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	
Intercambio	4,071	4,733	5,782	4,874	6,039	7,328	8,713	5,317	114
Exportaciones	1,017	1,194	1,487	1,393	1,848	2,281	2,687	1,685	164
Importaciones	3,054	3,539	4,295	3,481	4,191	5,047	6,026	3,632	97

Source: elaborated from SIECA statistics. NB Does not include Free Zones

Total intraregional trade grew by 66 percent over the same period. El Salvador was the country that increased most its intraregional trade (by 76 percent).

Centroamérica: Comercio Intraregional de Mercancías, US\$ millon

País/Año	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	QI&I I 2013	% Growth 2006-2012
CA	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	
Intercambio	9,172	10,894	12,633	10,877	11,782	14,286	15,186	11,454	66
Exportaciones	4,590	5,438	6,414	5,389	6,155	7,245	7,473	5,636	63
Importaciones	4,582	5,456	6,219	5,488	5,627	7,041	7,713	5,818	68
Costa Rica	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	
Intercambio	1,487	1,691	2,025	1,677	1,937	2,250	2,342	2,143	57
Exportaciones	1,061	1,181	1,406	1,138	1,292	1,434	1,498	1,380	41
Importaciones	426	510	619	539	645	816	844	763	98
El Salvador	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	

Intercambio	2,319	2,715	3,139	2,823	3,117	3,752	3,841	2,750	66
Exportaciones	1,126	1,339	1,617	1,389	1,586	1,906	1,987	1,446	76
Importaciones	1,193	1,376	1,522	1,434	1,531	1,846	1,854	1,304	55
Guatemala	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	
Intercambio	2,661	3,179	3,672	3,098	3,586	4,138	4,222	3,266	59
Exportaciones	1,578	1,875	2,221	1,867	2,243	2,644	2,659	1,804	69
Importaciones	1,083	1,304	1,451	1,231	1,343	1,539	1,563	1,462	44
Honduras	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	
Intercambio	1,697	2,106	2,391	2,020	1,831	2,530	2,634	2,088	55
Exportaciones	474	611	673	546	619	814	816	650	72
Importaciones	1,223	1,495	1,718	1,474	1,212	1,716	1,818	1,438	49
Nicaragua	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	
Intercambio	1,008	1,203	1,406	1,259	1,311	1,571	1,747	1,207	73
Exportaciones	351	432	497	449	415	447	513	356	46
Importaciones	657	771	909	810	896	1,124	1,234	851	88

Source: elaborated from SIECA statistics. NB Does not include Free Zones

Share of CA intra-regional trade (2006-2012)

País/Año	2006	2012	Share of intra-regional trade 2006	Share of intra-regional trade 2012
CA	---	---		
Intercambio	53,614	86,613	17	18
Exportaciones	16,870	29,636	27	25
Importaciones	36,744	56,977	12	14
Costa Rica	---	---		
Intercambio	19,073	28,176	8	8
Exportaciones	7,790	11,154	14	13
Importaciones	11,283	17,022	4	5

El Salvador	---	---		
Intercambio	8,942	13,785	26	28
Exportaciones	2,251	4,233	50	47
Importaciones	6,691	9,552	18	19
Guatemala	---	---		
Intercambio	13,789	22,019	19	19
Exportaciones	3,716	7,146	42	37
Importaciones	10,073	14,873	11	11
Honduras	---	---		
Intercambio	7,739	13,920	22	19
Exportaciones	2,096	4,416	23	18
Importaciones	5,643	9,504	22	19
Nicaragua	---	---		
Intercambio	4,071	8,713	25	20
Exportaciones	1,017	2,687	35	19
Importaciones	3,054	6,026	22	20

Source: elaborated from SIECA statistics. NB Does not include Free Zones

“Trade flow in goods between the EU and Central America has increase significantly, by 15% in average between 2008 and 2012, up to € 14,9 billion.

The EU's share in Central American trade has remained largely stable at 11.3 percent in 2012. Historically the bulk of most Central America countries trade is with the USA and Latin America, and it is only recently that the region has actively sought to increase its trade with Europe and Asia.

- *EU imports from Central America are dominated by office and machinery and transport equipment (59.6 percent) and agricultural products (30.1 percent in 2012).*
- *The most important exports from the EU to Central America are machinery and transport equipment (47.2 percent) and chemicals (21.5 percent in 2012).”*

Portal of DG Trade of the EU Commission

I-3.4.2 – Growth of intra and extra regional trade in services

<i>Findings at indicator level</i>	The region does not have data on trade in services.
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Data, sources, extracts	Not yet available.																																								
I-3.4.3 – Share of intraregional investment in total foreign direct investment (FDI)																																									
Findings at indicator level	The EU support to regional integration did not result in a growth of the share of intraregional FDI. FDI inflows in CA registered a strong fall from US\$ 7.8 million in 2008, to US\$ 4.5 million in 2009, due to the world economic crisis, and picked up again in 2010, 2011 and 2012, but the level of US\$ 8.9 million reached in 2012 is only a small growth in real terms against the level of 2007, that is US\$ 7.2 million. The information provided by ECLAC indicates that the share of FDI from the Central American region remains minimal.																																								
Data, sources, extracts	<p><u>Results of economic integration</u></p> <p>In any case, it will be difficult for Panama and the region to increase the share intra-regional trade, given the size and differences in their economies.</p> <p>The story seems to be different in terms of services, where exports keep on developing. Concerning integration through investments, they tend to continue to be more at the initiative of multinationals than companies of the region.</p> <p>Interview Ahmed Elias Moron, Director Nacional de Industrias y Desarrollo Empresarial, Ministerio de Comercio E industrias (MIFIC),Panama</p> <p><i>“Since 1993, the AL-INVEST programme has been facilitating inter-national activities by Latin American small and medium enterprises (SMEs) through a network of Latin American and European business organizations which provides business services and technical assistance. Between 1993 and 2008, AL INVEST generated cross-border business totaling €513 million. Phase IV (2009-2012) aims to promote social cohesion and regional integration by sup-orting international activities for SMEs whose participation in foreign markets can result in benefits for local development as well as closer relations among Latin American countries and the EU. The EU contribution amounts to a total of €50 million for the period 2009-2012.AL-INVEST IV is implemented by three consortia of partners be-longing to three distinct geographic sub-regions of Latin America. The Mercosur-Chile-Venezuela consortium is led by the National Confederation of Industries (CNI) of Brazil. The consortium for Mexico-Central America-Cuba is headed by Nacional Financiera SNC (NAFIN), of Mexico and that of the Andean Region by the Chamber of Industries and Trade of Santa Cruz (CAINCO) of Bolivia.”</i></p> <p><i>European Union – Latin America Development Cooperation Guide Update 2010</i></p> <p>FDI inflows in Central America</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="352 1666 1362 1962"> <thead> <tr> <th>Country</th> <th>2000-2006</th> <th>2007</th> <th>2008</th> <th>2009</th> <th>2010</th> <th>2011</th> <th>2012</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Central America</td> <td>3 046</td> <td>7 278</td> <td>7 769</td> <td>4 515</td> <td>6 228</td> <td>8 305</td> <td>8 876</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Costa Rica</td> <td>747</td> <td>1 896</td> <td>2 078</td> <td>1 347</td> <td>1 466</td> <td>2 157</td> <td>2 265</td> </tr> <tr> <td>El Salvador</td> <td>311</td> <td>1 551</td> <td>903</td> <td>366</td> <td>117</td> <td>385</td> <td>516</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Guatemala</td> <td>370</td> <td>745</td> <td>754</td> <td>600</td> <td>806</td> <td>1 026</td> <td>1 207</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Country	2000-2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	Central America	3 046	7 278	7 769	4 515	6 228	8 305	8 876	Costa Rica	747	1 896	2 078	1 347	1 466	2 157	2 265	El Salvador	311	1 551	903	366	117	385	516	Guatemala	370	745	754	600	806	1 026	1 207
Country	2000-2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012																																		
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Guatemala	370	745	754	600	806	1 026	1 207																																		

Honduras	454	928	1 006	509	969	1 014	1 059
Nicaragua	229	382	626	434	508	968	810
Panama	935	1 777	2 402	1 259	2 363	2 755	3 020

“FDI flows in Central America have regained the momentum they had in the years before the 2008 crisis, with some countries in the sub region (Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras and Panama) reaching record levels of FDI in 2012. FDI to Central America as a whole grew by 7 percent over 2011.

The strongest growth was in El Salvador (34% increase), followed by Guatemala (18%), Panama (10%), Costa Rica (5%) and Honduras (4%). FDI income in Nicaragua fell by 16%.”

ECLAC - Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean - 2012.- p 23

“Panama is still the principal receiver of FDI in this sub region: US\$ 3.020 billion (34% of the total) in 2012. Although there are no official data on FDI-receiving sectors, data on mergers, acquisitions and investment projects announced in 2012 indicate that a large share of FDI went to services, especially logistics, energy and the construction industry. Noteworthy among the announcements made in 2012 are the investment by Brazil’s GMR Energia in the energy sector, and the investment by Denmark’s AP Moller-Maersk in maritime transport logistics. The Swiss company Glencore International increased its equity interest in the mining company Samref Overseas; the US\$ 480 million investment was the largest that Panama received in 2012, underscoring the growing importance of 33.”

ECLAC - Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean – 2012 - p 32

“The buoyant food industry (particularly the dairy sector) was on the receiving end of substantial investments: Colombia’s Grupo Nutresa acquired the Central American ice cream company Panamanian American Franchising Corp (AFC) for US\$ 110 million.

Costa Rica maintained its position as the second leading destination for FDI in Central America (26% of the total). According to official estimates, FDI totaled US\$ 2.26 billion, a 5% increase over 2011. Costa Rica is consistently a strong draw for greenfield projects, primarily in the services sector, in keeping with the trend that began in 2011 with the liberalization of activities such as telecommunications. This drove the share of FDI flowing to the manufacturing sector down from an average 46% during the past decade to 25% in 2012. In the manufacturing sector, Colombia’s Pintuco acquired the paint maker and distributor Grupo Kativo. Sealed Air Corporation, ArthroCare, ATEK Companies, Covidien and Nitinol Devices & Components (NDC) made investments related to the medical device industry.

Forty high-technology greenfield projects in advanced manufacturing, life sciences and certain services accounted for 27% of inward FDI in 2012. Infosys, based in India, will establish a service centre to serve the United States market and support its growing operations in Latin America. EPC Ingeniería, the first Korean-owned service company in Costa Rica, located its new engineering and design centre there. It plans to invest US\$ 3 million during 2012-2015. The German power project developer Junwi announced a US\$ 155 million investment. Other announcements included investments in information technology (software and technological services) and business services (Amazon, Honeywell, Thomson Reuters and Telefónica, among others).

According to preliminary figures, FDI flowing into El Salvador totaled US\$ 516 million in 2012. This is a 34% increase over 2011 and accounts for 6% of the investments made in Central America. The main receiving sectors were financial services (44%) and manufacturing (43%). AES, a power generation and distribution company based in the United States, invested US\$ 26.1 million in infrastructure in 2012. Ubiquity Global Services, a business process outsourcing company headquartered in the United States, invested US\$ 2 million in opening a call centre. Taiwan-based Speedtech Energy Co. (which designs and manufactures solar and LED lighting products) and the Government of El Salvador signed a letter of intent for a substantial investment to begin operations in the country. In 2012, Speedtech made an initial investment of US\$ 2 million. Competition policy issues kept some of the investments announced (like the purchase of Digicel by América Móvil) from moving ahead. The government has conducted investment roadshows in Brazil, Viet Nam and countries in Central America and elsewhere.


Guatemala received US\$ 1.207 billion in FDI—18% more than in 2011 and a record high. Despite being the largest economy in Central America, it ranked third among the receivers of FDI flows, at 14% of the total for the sub region. Data by sector show that the main recipient sectors were natural resources (26%), followed by banking and commerce (19% each). The largest project announced in 2012 was the nearly US\$ 500 million that the Canadian mining company Taboe Resources plans to invest for working a silver deposit. South Korea's Sollensys, which makes touch screens and cellular phones, announced a US\$ 20 million investment to build a plant. Colombian-owned Empresa de Energía de Bogotá will invest more than US\$ 300 million in expanding the power transmission system. In December 2011, Telefónica Guatemala announced a US\$ 20 million investment in remodeling a number of its stores and opening two new locations as part of its domestic expansion strategy. In 2012, Mexico's Grupo Herdez and Grupo Financiero Ficobsa of Honduras began operations in Guatemala.

During 2012, Honduras received US\$ 1.06 billion in FDI—a 12-year high that was 4.3% more than in 2011. Telecommunications continued to be the strongest draw. It took in US\$ 295.4 million in 2012 (27.9% of total FDI for the year), and it is the economic activity that has received the most foreign capital over the past 10 years. However, FDI targeting telecommunications dropped 21.5%.”

ECLAC - Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean - 2012. Chapter I.

ANNEXES

COMPLEMENTARITY OF UAC, CONSUAC AND ADAPCCA



Source: Final Evaluation of CONSUAC

PROGRAMMES SUPPORTING REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND TRADE IN CA

Ongoing EU programmes:

Programme to support the creation of a regional system for quality control and the application of sanitary and phytosanitary measures in CA (PRACAMS) – **Regional;**

II Programme to Support the Regional Integration of CA (PAIRCA II) – **Regional;**

Facilitation Project for the participation of Guatemala in the Regional Integration Process and the Association Agreement between CA and the EU – **Guatemala;**

Programme to support the National System of Quality in El Salvador (PROCALIDAD) – **El Salvador;**

Support Project to the business and investment climate (PRAMECLIN) – **Nicaragua;**

Assistance Cooperation Project for the strengthening of SMEs competitiveness – **Nicaragua;**

Project to support the public administration and regional integration (PAAPIR) – **Honduras;**

Identification in **Panama** for the design of a national initiative to strengthen the customs administration for its incorporation to CA Customs Unions has been taken into account.

Cooperation projects administered/ coordinated by SIECA:

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Trade Facilitation for Regional Integration World Bank; • Elaboration of the trade facilitation agenda, IADB; • SIECA's Institutional Strengthening Programme, World Bank. <p>Other regional or multi-country projects from other donors related to specific components:</p> <p>Regional Technical Assistance Programme for Central America (CAPTAC) – IMF;</p> <p>Mesoamerica Programme (Plan Puebla Panama), - IDAB and other donors;</p> <p>Normative and Institutional Framework for a Regional Competition Policy - IADB.</p>
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OTHER RELEVANT INFORMATION (NOT CAPTURED ELSEWHERE IN THIS EQ)

Table 3.2: Summary of projects/programs reviewed – CONSUAC

<p>“Consolidación de la Unión Aduanera Centroamericana” (CONSUAC). 29/11/2006 - 29/05/2011 Total budget € 7.5 million, EU contribution € 7 million</p>		
Direct Beneficiary Organisation	Type of Support	Main Outputs
<p>At regional and national levels</p> <p>At macro and meso level</p> <p>At micro level</p> <p>The direct beneficiaries of the project (paragraph 1.2. of TAP of the FA) are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The economic actors (producers, workers, exporters, importers, consumers); • Council of Ministers of economic integration (COMIECO); • National customs; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Workshops • Training • “Learning by Doing” • LT TA • ST TA • Purchase of equipment for Customs • Purchase of software for Customs • Studies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transformation and implementation of the institutional framework for the implementation of the Central American customs union; • Operation and sustainability of the system of information of Central American Customs (SIAUCA); • Operation and sustainability of the computerized integrated tariff (AIC); • Training in customs and tax matters and consolidation of the Central American School of customs and tax (ECAT); • Public information and promotion of the advances and benefits of the Customs Union, as a means to promote its appropriation by the Central American societies.

- SIECA;
- Institutions linked to the administration of the Customs Union.

Table 3.3: Summary of projects/ programmes reviewed – ADAPCCA

Programa de Apoyo al Diseño y Aplicación de Políticas Comunes en Centroamérica (ADAPCCA)

April 2006- June 2011

Total Budget: € 11,4 million - EC Contribution: € 10 million

Direct Beneficiary Organisation	Type of Support	Main Outputs
At regional and national levels At macro and meso level At micro level The direct beneficiaries are - The "operators" (producers, workers, exporters, importers, consumers); - The Council of Ministers for Economic Integration (COMIECO); - The Central American Economic Integration Secretariat (SIECA).	- International TA - Local TA - Studies - Training - Twinning - Furniture equipment for PMU - Computer equipment for PMU - Equipment for laboratories - Video-conference equipment	Se están aplicando ya en varios países centroamericanos algunas de las normativas, reglamentos, manuales y procedimientos, etc., generados gracias al apoyo del proyecto (sobre todo en MSF, NT, transporte, inversiones, etc.), incluso algunas de forma voluntaria antes de ser aprobadas por COMIECO. También es demostrable el impacto en la mejora, variedad y calidad de los análisis de los suministros de laboratorio, y del uso frecuente y utilidad de los equipos de teleconferencia. Resultado 1: Políticas Prioritarias: Diagnósticos, propuestas de políticas y decisiones oficiales adoptadas, mecanismos de ejecución en funcionamiento, informes de ejecución. Acciones de Asistencia Técnica, capacitación, divulgación y sensibilización ejecutadas. Resultado 2: Otras Políticas Complementarias: Diagnósticos propuestas de políticas y planes de acción elaboradas. Acciones de Asistencia Técnica, Capacitación, divulgación y sensibilización ejecutadas. Resultado 3: Entidades regionales y nacionales fortalecidas: Ejecutado el

apoyo institucional a entidades regionales y nacionales incluyendo Ministerios, instituciones especializadas en normas, estándares y control de calidad, y el sector privado.

Table 3.4: Summary of projects/programs reviewed – PRACAMS

“Programa de Apoyo a la Creación de un Sistema Regional de Calidad y a la Aplicación de Medidas Sanitarias y Fitosanitarias en Centroamérica” (PRACAMS)

Nov. 2010- April 2017

Total Budget € 25 million – EU contribution € 23.5 million

Direct Beneficiary Organisation	Type of Support	Main Outputs (Expected)
<p>At regional and national levels</p> <p>At macro and meso level</p> <p>At micro level</p> <p>The direct beneficiaries are</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the "operators" (producers, workers, exporters, importers, consumers) - Ministries related to issues of SPS and TBT -the Central American Economic Integration Secretariat (SIECA) -Secretariat of the Central American Council for Agriculture (SCAC) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Training - Workshops - LT TA - ST TA - Purchase of equipement for laboratories - Twinning - Studies 	<p>(Expected)</p> <p>Component “Quality”:</p> <p>The regional regulatory system is strengthened and coordinated.</p> <p>The regional network of accreditation is strengthened.</p> <p>The regional network of metrology is strengthened.</p> <p>The regional bodies for assessment of conformity and their support networks are strengthened.</p> <p>Component “Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures:</p> <p>Risk analysis and monitoring system for pests, diseases and ETA (food borne illness) are strengthened and harmonized.</p> <p>Traceability is set up for the main exported products with a system of unique identity for Central America.</p> <p>The inspection process is harmonized, efficient, effective and transparent both.</p> <p>Component “Support to the private sector”:</p> <p>The private sector (private companies and producer organizations) is informed, trained and assisted technically to meet TBT, SPS requirements</p>

and standards of importing countries

Table 3.5: Summary of projects/programs reviewed – PRAIAA

“Programa Regional de apoyo a la integración económica centroamericana y a la implementación del Acuerdo de Asociación” (PRAIAA) October 2012 – April 2017.

EU Contribution € 10 million

Direct Beneficiary Organisation	Type of Support	Main Outputs (Expected)
<p>At regional and national levels</p> <p>At macro and meso level</p> <p>The main beneficiaries are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -COMIECO -SIECA -SECMCA (CA Monetary Council) -SG SICA -CENPROMYPE (Centre for the Promotion of SMEs) -CCIE (Consultative Committee on Economic Integration) -Ministries of Finance of Central America (including Panama) through Customs administrations -Other Ministries and agencies linked to integration process: -Private sector organizations -NGOs -Academia 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Training - LT TA - ST TA - Purchase of software - Studies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Harmonization, standardization and simplification of customs procedures - Facilitation and improvement of electronic interconnections customs in the countries part of the Association Agreement. - Strengthening of areas of trade in services, transport, statistics, among other priority areas considered. - Harmonization of instruments and mechanisms of complementary areas such as competition, trade defense, intellectual property and geographical indications, anti-dumping and countervailing measures, public contracts and disputes settlement mechanism. - Improved knowledge and acceptance of the concept of economic integration and of the benefits of the Association Agreement by civil society and the private sector. - Strengthened national and regional institutions responsible for the process of economic integration.

EQ:4 Regional Integration and the Association Agreement

EQ 4 – To what extent has the EU contributed to supporting the regional integration organisations and their national counterparts in their efforts to take full advantage of the economic developmental potential of the AA?

JC 4.1 – EU cooperation support to RIOS and national counterparts has contributed to national and regional economic strategies being put in place in order to leverage the trade provisions and objectives of the AA

*Statement
on JC4.1*

Overall, while there is a number of EU programmes that support the development of SMEs (such as ADESEP), we were unable to find data in the documentation that specifically refers to the fact that economic strategies were adopted at either the regional (RIO) or national (Country administrations) levels that would clearly relate to the leveraging of the trade provisions of the AA. EU cooperation programmes have been put into place to develop social cohesion, regional integration and the development of human resources, but that is not necessarily related to a “leveraging” of the AA. Further, there are EU programs that operate through RIO but that are designed to work on the private sector (ex. CENPROMYPE)

There is no doubt that the economic development models in place in CA need to be adjusted, at both the national and regional levels. CA MS are overly dependent (and therefore vulnerable) upon the export of raw commodities and the export mix is not diversified enough. It is also characterised by a high level of ownership of production capacity in key areas such as commodities and services. The EU is clearly and definitely committed to helping the region to develop solutions to its economic vulnerabilities and social conditions. At the regional level the EU has offered to assist in export development and economic infrastructure (for networking) through various initiatives and financial facilities as well as through the export banking and infrastructure loans. Parts of these resources are for “soft” capacity development and the CA programmes complement the LAC programmes. Finally, the EU contribution to PRAIAA contains provisions facilitating commerce in CA and beginning the implementation of the AA; there is no mention of leveraging, and the relevant strategies and policies of CA Member States will need to be examined in the field.

No documentation was found that linked the regional integration process (or the AA) to more “sophisticated” economic strategies noted in the statement of the JC above. PRAIAA speaks to the development of “foundational” policies, indicating that they are not yet in place at a regional level.

The issue of the development of an “autonomous” capacity to develop and implement these types of strategies will likely be a difficult problem to resolve, given the poor performance of capacity development initiatives to date (see other indicators dealing with capacity). The team will need to interview key economic planning individuals in CA Member States to judge the extent to which these types of strategies are going to be put into place, and the effect, if any, of the EU contribution in the development of those strategies.

In terms of the EU support to the ability of national and regional organisations to participate fully in the negotiation process for economic mechanisms and policies, it is noted that the CA already has experienced negotiators in the economic (mostly trade

	<p>related) domains covered by the AA, but the JC's indicators specifically asks about the capacity of "institutions". There are many EU initiatives that cover the development of capacity in fields that support the AA, where national institutions will need to interface with their negotiators in a variety of domains such as tariffs, human rights, SME development, etc. or where legislation and regulation needs to be developed. Documentation examined to date does not specify what individual or organisational abilities have been created at either the national or the regional levels, so it will ne be possible to draw findings from there.</p> <p>It is clear that the EU has promoted itself as being open and willing to provide any support needed to push the AA agenda along until signing. The CA RSP 2007-09, for example, clearly identifies that the target beneficiaries for support go beyond regional level institutions (the aim is to promote and reinforce the legislative and legal frameworks...). But very little detail is given as to how national institutions will be made to become in a better position to negotiate the AA, even if flexibility has been incorporated into strategic plans to address specific national needs that are essential to regional goals (such as the AA). And no mention is made of capacity to "leverage" the AA per se.</p> <p>The EU also contributes through support to SIECA via PRAIAA where that institution is to strengthen national institutions responsible for economic integration. It should be noted that PRAIAA has just recently begun so it is unlikely that it has had any effect on capacity yet. Part of the issue of the development of capacities is the performance of TA, and the recent MTR for PAIRCA2 (among other documents) shows that TA are not being used to develop autonomous capacity, at least not in regional level interventions such as PAICA 2. The extent to which the TA in SICA has developed the capacity of national counterparts to support the AA negotiations is undocumented (or at least we did not find any reports).</p> <p>Since no data has been found linking the EU directly or indirectly with the reduction of the time required to start up a business, that indicator will be dropped. Moreover, an analysis of existing documents available to the team shows that this is not an issue for the AA specifically, but is a national, rather than a regional, concern more closely linked to national economic development strategies and the control frameworks envisaged by the Member States.</p> <p>In terms of strategies being in place for the management of financial adjustment mechanisms and the the re-alignment of SME that will be disadvantaged by the trade provisions of the AA, it is noted that while the AA speaks to adjustment, it has not yet begun to be implemented. Since it is critical to the overall economic (and social) impact of the AA, the evaluation team will examine this issue in more detail in the field, and especially at SIECA and in the CA Member States.</p>
<p>I-4.1.1 – Recently adopted strategies concerning the leveraging of economic provisions are in place</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>Overall, there is no data in the documentation that specifically refers to the fact that strategies were adopted at either the regional or national levels that would clearly relate to the leveraging of the trade provisions of trade agreements in general, including the AA. Programmes, financed by the EU, have been put into place to develop social cohesion (through Results 3 and 4 of PAIRCA 2 and through CSP at bilateral level mostly), regional integration and the development of human resources, but that is not necessarily related to a "leveraging" of the AA. In fact, it appears to be designed to lend support and credence to regional integration per se., including social awareness.</p>

	<p>From a purely economic development model perspective, there is no doubt that the economic models in place in CA MS need to be adjusted. They are overly dependent (and therefore vulnerable) upon the export of raw commodities and they are not diversified enough. It is also characterised by a high level of ownership of production capacity in key areas such as commodities and services.</p> <p>At both the regional and country levels the EU has offered to assist in export development and economic infrastructure (for networking) through various initiatives and financial facilities (such as the Latin American Investment Facility) as well as through the export banking and infrastructure loans offered through EIB. Parts of these resources are for “soft” capacity development and the CA programmes complement the LAC programmes. Finally, the EU contribution to PRAIAA contains provisions facilitating commerce in and for the CA region and preparing for the implementation of the AA through such administrative issues as standards; there is no mention of any leveraging strategies being in place by MS or the region.</p>
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p>Economic development in CA is dependent upon the ability of the region to gain economic surpluses from exports. Statistics show that the exports of goods from CA are overwhelmingly composed of a small number of commodities that have a low level of value-added:</p> <p><i>“Although there has been some degree of diversification in the region’s exports, traditional products such as coffee, bananas and sugar still constitute a large proportion, particularly to Europe. The CA share of total EU imports and exports is rather limited (close to 0.3% in 2005), with exports from Central America being mainly agricultural goods... however Costa Rica and Panama absorbed together 55% of the total EU export in 2005.”</i></p> <p><i>CA RSP 2007-13, p. 4</i></p> <p>Yet the region still has that fundamental weakness that must be addressed (see above), and the AA could have been a unique window to not only increase the quantity and value of traditional exports, but to diversify the export mix and put in place development strategies that would leverage the competitive advantages that the AA could offer:</p> <p><i>“Still, Latin American economies remain over-dependent on commodity exports with the vulnerability which that entails, and levels of poverty and inequality remain high.”</i></p> <p><i>LA MTR and RIP 2011-13</i></p> <p>The EU has recognised that the development of the ability of the private sector to grow (especially through exports) is crucial and has supported various initiatives in the region to that effect, including AL-INVEST and the Latin American Investment Facility. It has also demonstrated that it places considerable importance on intra-regional and extra-regional trade through its support in the Caribbean and LA via CARICOM and MERCOSUR; it has supported the CA region in this domain through, for example, support to harmonise trade levels and to develop a customs union (with its corresponding norms and procedures).</p> <p>At the CA and the Latin American level the EU has put into place a number of programs that relate to the development of social cohesion, regional integration and the development of human resources.</p>

*“A number of programmes have been launched to foster dialogue on these priorities, to exchange experiences and develop best practices. The **EUROSociAL** and **URB-AL** programmes have been addressing the issue of social cohesion at national and local level; the **AL-INVEST** programme has helped the internationalisation of SMEs in the region by developing business networks and @lis programme has promoted a better policy and regulatory environment for the development of an inclusive Information and Communication Technology (ICT) infrastructure interconnected with European research networks (GEANT); the **ALFA** and **AlBan/Erasmus Mundus** programmes have facilitated academic exchanges between EU and Latin America and helped improve higher education systems in Latin America. Finally the **EUrocLIMA** and **COPOLAD** programmes will help the region to address the important challenges of climate change and drug trafficking. A targeted project on migration is also being prepared.”*

LA MTR and RIP 2011-13

Part of the EU’s strategy lies in further investment to link social cohesion and poverty reduction on the one hand and regional integration on the other:

*“For the period 2011-2013 we propose to fuse together the first two priorities, in particular due to the strong inter-linkages between the two. The objectives for this merged priority will be pursued through a new approach based on a new initiative, the **Latin American Investment Facility (LAAA IF)** (€ 102 million). This initiative is designed to mobilise additional resources **to stimulate investments in the areas of interconnectivity and infrastructure, social and environmental sectors, and private sector growth**. By promoting investment in physical infrastructure, this new initiative strongly complements other regional programmes such as EUrocLima, EUROSociAL and AL-INVEST. These programmes address the same priorities as LAIF, but pursue them using ‘soft action’ such as capacity building, exchanging best practices, creating networks and developing common agenda.” (Emphasis added)*

LA MTR and RIP 2011-13

In fact, the LAAA IF (now more commonly called LAIF) has put into place a project known as the “Programme for Entrepreneurial Development and Promotion of Micro, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (MSMEs) in Central America.” As at December 31, 2012, the private sector represented a little more than 4 percent of the LAIF portfolio and it was primarily concerned with institutional-level capacity (i.e. not direct to entrepreneurs).

“LAIF also facilitates the creation of favourable conditions for sustainable economic development in Latin America through initiatives like the Programme for Entrepreneurial Development and Promotion of MSMEs in Central America. Here, LAIF funds will be used to build the capacities of entrepreneurial development centres so that they can improve their levels of support for entrepreneurs.”

LAIF Annual Report 2012, p. 10

Through the PRAIAA project, the EU is committed to supporting the putting into place a support mechanism to SIECA so that it can facilitate commerce in CA and begin the implementation of the AA.

“...la puesta en marcha de los compromisos adquiridos por CA en el pilar comercial des ...AA”

Financing Agreement PRAIAA p.3

Our analysis of the bilateral interventions in this domain shows that the trade capacity

	<p>building, and Aid for Trade (beyond trade-related support), including support to the SME sectors in Central American countries was among the bilateral objectives of EU development cooperation. However, these efforts were not really sustained and were also quite disparate between countries. There does not appear to be any overarching logic chain for the investment in SMEs at any level. This finding will be validated in the field in order to ensure that the EU did more than meets the eye in this domain.</p> <p>Field interviews with RIO officials, academics, IICA and EUD officials indicated that no CA MS has a published economic development or industrial development strategy that specifically deals with leveraging the CAFTA or the AA.</p> <p>Moreover, each interviewee indicated that they knew of no CA MS that had modified its internal policies so that the surpluses generated by the CAFTA or the AA were redistributed to the society generally and to the poorest specifically.</p> <p>Reference 205 field notes</p> <p>Interviewees pointed out that although many firms were interested in the provisions of the AA and other free trade agreements, most were preoccupied with the export requirements that were going to be required. Even the national exporter's associations did not refer to strategies that would leverage economic provisions. Largely because the majority of the increase in exports is predicted to take place from firms that already have clients in Europe or that are simply going to export more of the same product.</p> <p>Reference 206 field notes</p> <p>The projects that we are asked to fund do not deal with added-value to exports or to improvements in the supply chain or value chain of a product.</p> <p>Reference 217 field notes</p> <p>Costa Rica and Panama are the only countries that have an industrial or economic strategy, and they have not adapted it to the AA or CAFTA.</p> <p>Reference 217 field notes</p> <p>Four interviewees were asked about new strategies that could be adopted as a result of the AA. They responded by indicating that in Nicaragua (all used the same example) there are close ties between the government in power and the large family-owned firms. By and large they control competitiveness. The firms were likely involved in the design of the AA and there will not be any national policy changes associated with the AA in that country. To a lesser extent the same is true for all the CA MS, especially those that export raw or unsophisticated products such as agricultural products.</p> <p>Reference 217 field notes</p> <p>Interviewees noted that the governments in the region and the EU have held a number of meetings to discuss the AA, raise awareness of its provisions or to provide information on new export opportunities and requirements. These meetings never spoke of the "trickle down" theory per se, but they proposed the same logic. Two interviewees noted that they have attended a number of meetings and the topic of the growth hypotheses from the AA was never discussed.</p> <p>Reference 217 and 218 field notes</p> <p>Because of initial problems with the execution of communication and approval protocols between the EU, the EUD, SI SICA, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs in the CA MS and the various ministries in the CA MS, the evaluation team was only able to interview ministries in Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador and Panama. The interview in El Salvador focussed on the issue of EU support to trade. Overall, the MINEC / El Salvadorian government acknowledges the need to better prepare the private sector for trade</p>
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opportunities under the AA; and acknowledges that it has not done enough to date (for which it had been criticized by private sector representatives). El Salvador has a number of initiatives to explain the AA / and offer support to SMEs / private sector overall; only some of which have been financed with limited EU funds (from DG Trade); and some of which have been financed with bi-lateral EU support.

Regional programmes are seen as “removed” from the direct needs of national level stakeholders (RIOs are seen as beneficiaries), also as a result of lack of national involvement during programme development (e.g, PRACAMS).

The interview notes are reproduced here in their entirety. Emphasis is provided by the evaluator:

MINEC was in charge of negotiations of trade parts of AA, while the Cancilleria was in charge of other (social) chapters.

*At outset of negotiations (in 2007), El Salvador (**as all the other participating countries**) received \$ 1 million to cover expenses in relation to the preparation of the negotiation rounds (logistics, etc.). However, El Salvador used this money (among other things) to launch a number of initiatives to inform the El Salvadorian private sector of the provisions of the AA. Still, the Ministry / Government was criticized by the private sector for not having sufficiently prepared the private sector for being able to take advantage of the AA as a free trade agreement (“often, trade deals are not used by local producers”). What was missing was (in part) training to ensure that producers learned how to take advantage of the trade provisions of the AA.*

The Ministry developed four tools (partly financed by the \$ 1 million from the EU):

1. *A “Caja de Herramientas” for SMEs, to help them take advantage of the AA / inform them of the AA provisions (<http://www.minec.gob.sv/cajadeherramientasue/>), was financed mostly by GIZ.*
2. *A book to summarize the AdA (copy was given;...)(partly financed with EU resources; although likely DG Trade); edition of 2 million books.*
3. *“Platform to understand the AdA”*
4. *“Guía practica para el exportador”*

El Salvador / MINEC also carried out a study of the needs of the private sector in relation to making use of export opportunities under the AdA / AA (with its own national resources). Study is completed [asked for copy, but as it is an internal document,].

In addition (w/o EU support), there are some other organisations that are running programmes:

- *“PROESA” (<http://www.proesa.gob.sv/>), running, among other things a programme called “Exportar Más” (<http://www.proesa.gob.sv/exportaciones/programas-de-apoyo/exportar-mas>)*
- *FondePro (programme designed to help enterprises to adapt their production technologies) (funded with Government funds). (<http://www.fondepro.gob.sv/>)*

Regional programmes (e.g. PRACAMS, to support harmonization of SPS / NTBs) “is very important for the region in principle”, however it is not clear at this point what effect this is having as “the programme is still in the process of being set up”. Overall, the effect of regional programmes is a “a little

more indirect” as the main beneficiaries are RIOs. Also, the “final beneficiaries” (governments, relevant line ministries) could have been more involved in the definition of the programmes (by SIECA), and the decision, which resources were most needed, and thus should be provided by the regional programmes (based on existing needs).

E.g., the SME case (i.e., the fact that GIZ started support PYMES already in 2007; but that the EU only recently started to work with CEMPROMYPE on the same issue) is an example of how SIECA did not sufficiently take into account the needs of its constituents (i.e., as the SME support had been a prevalent need throughout). Also, “PRACAMS is a programme that was thought up by consultants”, without involvement of the national stakeholders.

In terms of bi-lateral support, the EU has been supporting a programme called “Procalidad” since 2009 (see <http://www.minec.gob.sv/procalidad/>); but “more needs to be done”.

Overall, the EU (in the eyes of the interviewee is very committed to economic integration; but of course trade with the EEUU makes up a much bigger share of the overall trade volume of El Salvador.

Interview notes MS

I-4.1.2 – Leveraging strategies refer to economic development options including innovation, clustering, sophistication, financial pathways for new business ecosystems, incubators for SME creation, financial credit and fiscal support etc.

Findings at indicator level

The evaluation team did not find any documentation that directly linked the regional integration process to these types of strategies at the RIO or country administration levels. PRAIAA speaks to the development of “foundational” policies, indicating that they are not yet in place at a regional level.

The AA itself speaks of various aspects of economic development in several articles: for examples, refer to Article 70 (Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises): “The parties agree to promote the competitiveness and insertion of rural and urban MSMEs”, incl. points h) (promotion of transfer of both technology and knowledge); i) support to innovation, as well as research and development”. See also Article 71 which deals with “Cooperation on Microcredit and Microfinance”. But the AA has not yet been ratified and the mechanisms that will be used to bring these provisions about are not widely known at this time.

There are also a number of EU projects and programmes that support the development of the private sector: a) under LAIF, support is given to the institutional development of centres for entrepreneurs b) ADESEP (“Enhanced competitiveness and internationalisation of Central American MSME - The project will support CENPROMYPE's small business development centres (SBDC) strategy”). These initiatives are clearly designed to “develop” the private sector, but they are not designed to put into place the types of national or regional leveraging strategies that are covered by the indicator.

The issue of the development of an “autonomous” capacity to develop and implement these strategies will likely be a difficult problem to resolve, given the poor performance of capacity development initiatives to date (see other indicators dealing with capacity). The team has interviewed key economic planning individuals in CA regional institutions and in some MS to judge the extent to which these types of strategies are going to be put into place, and the effect, if any, of the EU contribution in the development of those

	<p>strategies. The clear result is that the MS and RIO have not yet begun to generate these types of strategies.</p>
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p>The PAIAA project was justified in part on the need to put into place policies that would “facilitate trade”, but these same policies can be viewed as cornerstones or pre-requisites for the development of leveraging mechanism for economic development. The policies deal with: competition policy; intellectual property; trade capacity (called “defence” in the case of anti-dumping and countervailing measures), and dispute settlement mechanisms.</p> <p>The Project Fiche identifies the need for capacity development in economic integration institutions, but it notes that this capacity is needed as a result of “a lack of clear funding mechanisms”. It is, in fact, noting that the intervention is not part of a capacity development strategy but of a capacity substitution strategy.</p> <p><i>Identification Fiche PRALAA p, 5</i></p> <p>“In terms of being able to strategize and prepare operational plans, most ministries responsible for trade in the region are not sophisticated enough. They do not have the analytical capability to prepare detailed scenarios and risk assessments and they always present the good news to their political masters.” Most have had to be informed of what “registros indicaciones geograficas” were and why they are important.</p> <p>Reference 204 field notes</p> <p>Nicaragua tried to implement a Porter Cluster analysis but it stayed too narrow, focussing on basic products with little or no value-added . It never got political support and it was eventually transformed into a standard value-chain analysis. There were two lessons we got from that: first, the concept was too difficult to understand or they would not have simplified it (they say) to value-chain. Second, the focus on basis products shows they did not understand how the concept works. The level of capability on this type of thinking needs to be raised throughout the region, and the practice of constantly changing the most qualified public servants at every election is a catastrophe to this type of strategic thinking.</p> <p>The EU did not participate in these analyses</p> <p>Reference 209 and 201 field notes</p> <p>An EU official noted that the EU did not support the “development of leveraging strategies at either the regional or national levels” The interviewee also noted that policy dialogue, as far as was known, did not bring up this topic.</p> <p>Reference 210 field notes</p> <p>The EU has supported the understanding of, and preparation for the implementation of the AA in a number of ways including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contributions to national governments to help private sector firms to adapt (ex. El Salvador) • Application of the AA through SIECA (10 M euros) • Support to SME (7M euros CENPROMYPE). This was not only to help know about how to export, but was to develop networks and sector strategies. • PRACAMS <p>.... And others</p> <p>Reference 213 field notes</p> <p>The region still has to develop a strategy for rationalising investment in Capability, but</p>

	<p>there is no one that is doing that. Nor has anyone analysed the non-trade impacts per se, even if there was supposed to be an impact study done on the AA by each CA MS. In fact the EU’S impact study was done during the final stages of AA negotiation.</p> <p>Reference 215 field notes</p> <p>Two interviewees noted that each country in CA has its own set(s) of innovation facilities or centres. Most are horribly underfunded and underperforming when one considers the globalisation realities that countries and local industries face. If CA politicians were rational decision makers they would consolidate these into 2-3 centers.</p> <p>Another noted that, in a way, the EU is rationalising innovation centers because it has focused on IICA to help the REGION to reposition the coffee industry, but MS have not yet seen the necessity of consolidating research, finance, marketing, etc.</p> <p>Reference 228 field notes</p> <p>“At least in CA there is a working organisational architecture for RI. There is none for Mercosur, CARICOM and Comunidad Andina.” The interviewee was speaking about intra-regional trade.</p> <p>Reference 229 field note</p>
<p>I-4.1.3 – Documentation that attests that the regional and national institutions have developed capacities and strategies that will have assisted them during the negotiations for the AA</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>The CA MS already have experienced negotiators in the economic (mostly trade related) domains covered by the AA (most recently CAFTA but there are many bilateral agreements that are in negotiation or have been signed), but the indicators specifically asks about the capacity of “institutions”. There are many EU initiatives that cover the development of institutional capacity in fields that support the AA, where national institutions will need to interface with their negotiators in a variety of domains such as tariffs, human rights, SME development, etc. or where legislation and regulation needs to be developed. The EU, through DG Trade, has allocated one million euros to each country to help them prepare for the negotiations, including the support to private sector firms in each country to help them participate. Documentation examined to date does not specify what individual or organisational abilities have been created at either the national or the regional levels, so it will not be possible to draw findings from there. MS and RIO interviewed note that their institutions were prepared for the negotiations but that they are not capable of working as a community to implement the provisions.</p> <p>It is clear that the EU has promoted itself as being open and willing to provide any support needed to push the AA agenda along. The CA RSP 2007-09, for example, clearly identifies that the target beneficiaries for support go beyond regional level institutions (the aim is to promote and reinforce the legislative and legal frameworks...). But very little detail is given as to how national institutions will have been made to become more capable, even if flexibility has been incorporated into strategic plans to address specific national needs that are essential to regional goals. Research in the field has shown that RIO and MS do not have a clear picture of what capabilities are required and what performance levels those capabilities need to represent.</p> <p>The EU also contributes through support to SIECA via PRAIAA where that institution is to “strengthen national institutions responsible for economic integration”. It should be noted that PRAIAA has just recently begun so it is unlikely that it has had any effect.</p>

<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p>The CA region has a long history of cooperative behaviour in the free trade arena. They have thus accumulated a certain experience in the preparation for and the negotiation of trade agreements:</p> <p><i>“All countries of the region have concluded bilateral free trade agreements with other Latin American and Asian countries, and have developed dialogue through mechanisms such as the Consejo Monetario Centroamericano (CMCA), Consejo de Secretarios de Finanzas y Ministros de Hacienda de Centroamérica, Panamá y República Dominicana (COSEFIM), Consejo de Ministros de Integración Económica (COMIECO) and Sistema de Integración Económica (SIECA). Progress has also been achieved on customs union and codification (CAUCA), the creation of a Central American Customs School, the interconnectivity of customs services, and tariff harmonisation. The regional programmes ADAPCCA, UAC, PAIRCA (support for regional institutions, customs union) have greatly contributed to these achievements.”</i></p> <p><i>CA MTR p.6</i></p> <p>Section 5.5 of the CA RSP 2007-13 pp.22-24 analyses the coherence between country strategies and regional strategies, and part of that analysis deals with regional integration (i.e. the economic factors). It mentions that CSPs will cover national institutional strengthening and notes that the “aim” is to:</p> <p><i>“promote and reinforce the legislative and legal frameworks adopted by Central America with a specific impact on the creation of a customs union and, more generally, of an internal market, by encouraging free movement of persons, capital, services and goods. Assistance to the productive sector will thus be covered by specific actions at country level, coherently with the regional framework.”</i></p> <p>...</p> <p><i>“The priority sector selected for cooperation, i.e. regional integration, fully complements the country strategies proposed for the individual Central American countries. In some cases it will depend on the strength of national institutions involved in the process of regional integration, and sufficient flexibility has been provided at regional level to address specific national needs that are essential to the regional goals.”</i></p> <p>These statements may be interpreted as tying the economic objectives of the RSP, CSP and AA together. Although the CSPs in three CA countries were examined¹² and found to contain the need to take regional integration needs into account, determining the combined effects of regional and country-level efforts by the EU in the achievement of these goals can only be done in the field through interviews with officials.</p> <p>The CA RSP 2007-13 directly ties the AA to the scope of the response under the regional programme, and notes that any FURTHER needs for the AA will be dealt with under EU support.</p> <p><i>“The objective of this component of the strategy is to consolidate implementation of the Central American customs union in line with the Central American Plan of Action for Economic Integration, as well as with the decisions taken by Presidents in Panama, in March 2006. In addition, it aims to support the development of intra- and extra-regional trade, services and investment, intellectual property rights, sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures develop a regional approach to the regulatory approach and common approach on standardisation activities based on international standards (free movement of goods) and avoid technical barriers to trade, to, and at developing and implementing other harmonised and common policies that will contribute to the creation of a common</i></p>
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¹² Nicaragua, Guatemala and Honduras

*market. For the latter, initiatives that could be considered range from fiscal policy, notably taxation, and labour legislation to environmental measures, inter alia. Support will be channelled to the **economic integration process**, taking into consideration the findings of the joint assessment of regional economic integration in Central America being carried out by the ad hoc Joint Working Group, which is expected to provide a clear picture of the region's requirements. **In addition, further needs arising from the process of negotiating and implementing an Association Agreement, once launched, will be systematically taken into consideration in the design of support programmes under this component.**" (emphasis added)*

The Financing Agreement for PRAIAA, signed on June 5 2012, identifies that one of its five result areas is the strengthening of regional and national institutions that are responsible for the economic integration process. The LFA for the project does not speak to the AA at all in its indicators. It needs to be remembered that that intervention has just started. The activities spelled out in that document refer to the AA as:

"A51 Apoyo a los ministerios responsables de la integracion economica regional, a las administraciones aduaneras y a la SIECA en su participacion en reuniones y actividades de capacitacion en integracion economica, incluyendo los compromisos del AA

A52 Asistencia tecnica para evaluar y dar respuesta a las necesidades de los departamentos tecnicos responsables de la implementacion del proceso de integracion economica y del AA"

PRAIAA FA Annex p.8

The PRAIAA FA identifies a small number of requirements concerning capacity development in a section devoted to "specific projects". These deal with the nature of the capacity development (essentially training) and note the preference that will be given to the Escuela Centroamericana de Aduana y Tributos (ECAT). No content issues are treated.

PRAIAA FA Annex p. 15

The concern with substitution (of TA for other personnel) is taken up in the MTR for PAICA 2 on two occasions. Once when dealing with the concept of capacity development and again when noting that AT are being (mis)used to do administration. This form of TA utilisation is clearly not conducive to the development of autonomous capacity, including those needed for negotiation.

*"Se observa en el programa un entendimiento ambiguo del significado de **"fortalecimiento institucional"**. Por un lado puede ser entendido como un apoyo a una reforma institucional o la modernización y, por otro lado, como la provisión de liquidez para el financiamiento de actividades ordinarias del sistema. Los consultores opinan que esta última interpretación no es un "fortalecimiento" sino un "subsidio" que no resulta en fortalecimiento. Gran parte del PAIRCA II constituye un subsidio y no conduce necesariamente a un fortalecimiento."* (p.7)

And ...

*"En el diseño de la intervención y las modalidades de gestión, debe garantizarse que una parte del personal de la ATI se pueda liberar de los procedimientos y dedicarse a los asuntos técnicos del caso. La ATI debe dedicarse a Asistencia **Técnica** Internacional, no a la Asistencia **Administrativa** Internacional. (p. 10)."*

MTR PAIRCA 2

The DG Trade provided 1 M euros to each CA MS to assist them in negotiations and

<p>specifically in developing strategies to assist the private sector to be better prepared for the AA</p> <p>Interview notes MS relative to ES</p> <p>Each country was to do a trade impact assessment, but interviewees could not indicate which ones had been able to do so, They noted that he EU had prepared one.</p> <p>Reference 200 field notes</p> <p>Some Country Strategy Papers for the EU contain references to plans to work with the private sector in the context of the AA (Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala particularly. (Perhaps more but could not verify). In some cases the capacity of the national institution is also a target.</p> <p>Reference 208 field notes</p> <p>PAIRCA 1 and PAIRCA both had funding to pay for the development of national capabilities in this domain, but no follow-up was done to indicate whether the expenditure generated any capability at either the individual or institutional basis</p> <p>Reference 210 field notes</p> <p>As seen in Indicator 4.1.2, the EU has provided a variety of mechanisms to support the AA process. The CA MS were recognised as being relatively capable in negotiating, even though the rigour of their analyses was not questioned. Interviewees noted that it was fairly easy to deal at the negotiation levels of analysis but they were essentially incapable to generate the technical bases on any issues that would deal with norms, standards and processes. The proof is that RIO need to do that and the CA MS cannot agree on them to approve them</p> <p>Reference 213 field notes</p> <p>There was no real broad-based participation process for the AA, and in fact most of what was called participation or consultation took place almost at the end of the negotiation process. The EU tried to use CC-SICA to consult, but the SG SICA did not want to use that route and it was not implemented. Other than the CC-SICA route, there is no capability for broad-based consultation within the SICA System.</p> <p>Reference 214 field notes</p> <p>The negotiation process stopped all work that had to do with the development of common policies (through COMIECO).</p> <p>Reference 216 field notes.</p> <p>Interviewees at SIECA noted that they were conscious of the need to address some of the issues raised by EQ 4 (leverage, re-distribution, economic strategies at a regional level) but could not because it was not their mandate.</p> <p>Reference 218 field notes</p> <p>It is clear that the border management of any country is incapable of dealing with</p>

	<p>integrated borders at this time. Further, it will take a political decision and plenty of monitoring and supervision to achieve that objective. : “the objective is for a product to receive approval for entry into one country and that would be automatically extended to others” noted one interviewee.</p> <p>On that topic, numerous interviews brought to the fore that the top levels (political) will never tell the bottom levels to collaborate on changing any process that justifies their jobs (bottom) or that enables them to gain power and revenue (top)</p> <p>References 219 and 220 field notes</p>
I-4.1.4 – Measures in place to reduce time required for business start-up	
<i>Findings at indicator level</i>	<p>Since no data has been found linking the EU directly or indirectly with the reduction of the time required to start up a business, this indicator will be dropped. Moreover, an analysis of existing documents available to the team shows that this is not an issue for the AA specifically, but is a national, rather than a regional, concern more closely linked to national economic development strategies.</p>
<i>Data, sources, extracts</i>	<p>N. A. This indicator will be dropped</p>
I-4.1.5 - Strategies are in place for the management of financial adjustment mechanisms and for re-aligning the SME that will be disadvantaged by the trade provisions of the AA	
<i>Findings at indicator level</i>	<p>With the exception of parts of CENPROMYPE, the EU has financed only little in the area of “wider aid for trade”, in categories such as trade-related infrastructure (e.g., transport and storage, communications), or the building of productive capacity (business development, improvements of business climate, assistance to banking/ financial services, etc.), at least at regional level.</p> <p>At regional level, the EU eventually signed a financing agreement for a € 7 million regional project (ADESEP¹³) in 2012, aimed at improving the business environment and the productive and trade capacities of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises in Central America. In addition, at Latin American level, AL INVEST-IV and LAIF (KfW-CABEL, Program for Entrepreneurial and Promotion of MSME in Central America, which was due to start in 2013) are meant to offer Aid for Trade (beyond trade-related assistance, i.e., Categories 1 and 2 of aid for trade¹⁴), also in part focusing on Central American SMEs. Finally, the EU also financed the <i>Programa Regional de Investigación e Innovación de Cadenas de Valor Agrícola (PRIICA)</i>, aimed at strengthening the productive capacity of small agricultural producers in Central America, through the development and dissemination of innovative methods for the cultivation of four key crops (yucca, potato, avocado and tomato). The project effectively started in 2012.</p> <p>The EU did put a clearer emphasis on wider aid for trade at national level in Central America, pledging to provide, among other things, SME support and the development of productive capacity in the bi-lateral Country Strategy Papers. The CSPs for Guatemala</p>

¹³ Apoyo al desarrollo del sector privado en Centroamérica (ADESEP)

¹⁴ See http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/development-policies/intervention-areas/trade/aid-for-trade_en.htm for more information.

	<p>and Nicaragua, for example, defined “economic and trade issues” as one of the focal sectors, albeit with differing emphases.¹⁵ Many of the CSPs also indicated the intent of fine-tuning their related strategies based on the findings of national “Trade Needs Assessments” (e.g. Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras), but respondents note that only the EU carried out an impact assessment and that was done towards the end of the AA process. According to interviewees, the relatively disparate initiatives at national level were not able to achieve marked improvements in the business environment and the productive capacity of Central America’s small and medium enterprises, with or without any consecutive regional level support. None of these bilateral efforts were referenced in the 2012 Action Fiche of the regional project ADESEP (which was signed in 2012), although this project also specifically aims at strengthening the business environment for Central American SMEs.</p>
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p>The second Regional Indicative Programme (RIP) puts a slightly stronger emphasis on sustainable development (i.e., of vulnerable border areas), including an improved productivity of agriculture and diversified economic activities within these areas. The RIP also targets the region’s SMEs, pledging to improve the knowledge and acceptance of economic and regional integration among Central American small and medium enterprises.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>“The interventions to be funded will follow up — and should complement — earlier support for SIECA in connection with the customs union (UAC, CONSUAC, ADAPCCA and PRACAMS). Having advanced on the economic and commercial front, the customs union could be better perceived by the public at large (including SMEs) if some social aspects (e.g. labour market) could also be brought into the scheme.”</i></p> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>EU MTR / RIP II, 2010</i></p> <p>During the later years of the 2007 – 2013 implementation period, the EU launched a number of programmes aimed assisting SMEs with the adjustment to the AA; and also with the development of productive capacity in certain sub-sectors of the agricultural sector in Central America.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • See ADESEP Action Fiche: Focusing on strengthening/ supporting of SMEs, in cooperation with CENPROMYPE • See also documentation on the Programa Regional de Investigacion e Innovación de Cadenas de Valor Agrícola (PRIICA (2012)) • Finally, see documentation on LAIF & AL-INVEST (in particular the programme “The Internationalisation of SMEs from Central America, Mexico and Cuba as an engine of economic development”).¹⁶

¹⁵ In Guatemala, the EU initially focused on “long-term and inclusive rural economic growth and food security”, with an emphasis on the more depressed and isolated areas of the country and only under NIP II shifted its focus to the development of the productive capacity and decent work conditions in the countries SMEs. Nicaragua’s only NIP (covering the entire 2007 – 2013 period) committed the EU to a relatively broad strategy of “ensuring policy coherence & effective redistribution mechanisms”, “contributing to equitable economic growth”; “facilitating national pro-poor policies”, including also support to SMEs through national trade exchanges.

¹⁶ http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/latin-america/regional-cooperatiol-invest/index_en.htm

	<p>Also, the EU has financed an agenda of “wider aide for trade” through its bi-lateral cooperation (see Indicator 1.1.2 in evaluation questions 1 (relevance) above).</p>
<p>JC 4.2 – EU cooperation support to RIOs and national counterparts has contributed to national and regional social strategies being put in place to leverage the non-economic provisions and objectives of the AA</p>	
<p><i>Statement on JC4.2</i></p>	<p>It is noteworthy that we have not yet been able to identify a document that specifically analyses what is “required” in concrete terms insofar as national and regional social strategies that should be put in place to leverage the non-economic provisions and objectives of the AA. There are documents that speak globally of the issue but it is clear that there is an absence of documents that specifically address targets or performance of political dialogue or social cohesion, among other areas touching the AA and regional integration.</p> <p>The EU has been consistent in its approach to the development of non-economic capacities and it continues to support interventions and agencies that deal in social and “soft” issues as a cornerstone of regional integration (refer to the EQ on this issue). The PRAIAA, for example, specifically incorporates two social principles dealing with gender and minorities in the integration process. PAIRCA 2 has two entire results areas out of four that deal with social issues. This approach is also consistent with the Latin America RSP. <i>What is not available in the existing documentation is the extent to which the EU has contributed to the introduction of national legislation or strategies that use the AA as a reference point and leverage the social “window of opportunity” that the agreement proposes to offer.</i> We searched for, but did not find any examples of efforts to coordinate or harmonise these types of strategies, or even to formally share data and options and then seek complementarity.</p> <p>Many documents point to the unfortunate fact that there is little in the way of a comprehensive vision of how CA regional integration will actually work (the SICA did not have a comprehensive or an ecosystemic vision of its mandate in relation to the regional integration process as late as 2014, and the past two Secretary Generals have had radically different visions of that role and how it is exercised). This does not mean that there is a complete lack: the more the analyst concentrates on trade administration or border management, the clearer the picture becomes (refer to CA MTR p. 13). But the overall finding is that this type of consensus is not current in <u>social</u> matters.</p> <p>The issue at hand, however, is that the vulnerability of people of all kinds caused by the security problems and the concentration of economic vectors in the region needs to be addressed through a cooperative effort amongst CA Member States (it should be remembered that that is the basic Theory of Change strategy that underpins the regional integration process in CA). The logic that will be used to go from inputs to effects (intermediate impacts at least) needs to be clear and shared; that strategy has not been defined (or at least it has not been found, even though the LA MTR and RIP recognises, for instance, that there are many links to be dealt with, including (for example) the justice system (relationships and contracts or transactions cannot be secure without an operating, transparent and effective justice system). From that point on, plans can be developed to implement the strategy.</p> <p>Notwithstanding the fact that the EC bases its evaluations on a ToC concept utilising various conceptual tools and frameworks such as Intervention logic and LFAs, these are not generally referred to in documents, including MTR. Most intervention or programme</p>

	<p>documents are very weak in terms of defining precise effects and targets, ostensibly as a means of ensuring flexibility, but the result is a lack of precision in all aspects including the link between the social benefits that can arise as a result of the AA (trade objectives and development objectives) and the CA support (decisions) that are required to bring them about.</p> <p>From an evaluation perspective, it is noteworthy that the EU spends a great deal of money to support and promote regional integration without this "transformational" logic being abundantly clear and shared by and with all relevant stakeholders. Almost all EU CA strategic documents deal with process descriptions and not the reasoning behind the selection of strategies. In that light, risk analysis, when done at all, is superficial. No plans for the <u>management</u> (as opposed to a <u>description</u>) of risk were found, a weakness in ToC logic management.</p> <p>The EU has in its possession a number of important analyses that highlight the need for reform and strengthening of national institutions in order to enable more coherent social development. The region, however, although it has a Social Cohesion Agenda in place, does not clearly lay out what needs to be done in order to be able to extract the maximum benefit from regional integration, and documentation shows that there is little consensus on what the priorities of that social thrust should be, even if the CA MTR noted that all stakeholders shared the view that regional integration should be supported through actions to reduce the impact of the...fdsocial crisis, and that the economic integration process would create jobs. The lack of consensus on a plan may be due in part to the fact that the agenda is described in high-level or society-level terms.</p> <p>Based on the documentation at hand it is also clear that there is a major problem with political support to the entire regional integration social development process, including a lack of legitimacy that spans the entire LA region including CA. Without political leadership, the EU may help improve the mechanics and the operating frameworks of the trade related aspects of the AA but it cannot help the region to leverage the social effects of the AA.</p> <p>Key EU documents do not specify the priorities for, or the strategies to implement, a greater level of capacity amongst national counterparts to manage social cohesion.</p> <p>Finally, it is noteworthy that the up-to-date data on which analysis and "social effects" strategies could be based is not readily available. In fact the EU has contributed in a significant way to the development of a number of databases including those for internal monitoring, economic factors, statistics on economic life in the region, etc. (In large part during PAIRCA1 and PAIRCA 2); the documentation does not speak to social databases although these may be part of what was developed for SIECA. The UNDP has not developed any new databases on this topic. . PAIRCA 1 was to develop a data base for PARLACEN but that did not happen, and the SyE system put into place in SICA is not being used. It did, however, lay down the bases for a network of NGO, NSA and institutions that could, if it wanted, share information. Documents show that this only happened for a short time. Nevertheless, documents point to the conclusion that PAIRCA 1 was instrumental in beginning the process of linking societal issues to the regional integration and eventually the AA. Documents show that the regional integration and its social ramifications can only be managed by the CA Member States themselves, albeit in a coordinated and strategic manner; in fact the MTR for PAIRCA 2 notes that the strengthening of SICA institutions is not the only means of support the process of</p>
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
	regional integration in CA, and suggests that more could be done to support non-economic interventions.
I-4.2.1 – Statements or analysis of requirements clearly spell out what has to be in place and when	
<i>Findings at indicator level</i>	<p>As noted in other indicators, it is noteworthy that we have not yet been able to identify a document that specifically analyses what is required in concrete terms. The observations noted below address the issue of the non-economic benefits or provisions of the AA, but it is clear that there is no document that specifically addresses targets or performance of political dialogue or social cohesion, among other areas touching the AA and regional integration.</p> <p>The EU is consistent in its approach to the development of non-economic capacities and it continues to support interventions and agencies that deal in social and “soft” issues as a cornerstone of regional integration. The PRAIAA specifically incorporates two social principles dealing with gender and minorities in the integration process. This approach is also consistent with the Latin America RSP.</p> <p>What is not available in the existing documentation is the extent to which the EU has contributed to the introduction of national legislation or strategies. We searched for, but did not find any examples of efforts to coordinate or harmonise these types of strategies, or even to share data and options.</p> <p>Many interviewees reported that a key problem that they encounter in practice is the lack of performance models or process models against which to compare the proposals they prepare (norms, standards, systems, etc). The required capacity is never spelled out, and CA MS often do not approve proposals because they are too easily able to state that what is proposed does not represent “what was asked for”</p>
<i>Data, sources, extracts</i>	<p>The EU continues to realise that the development of human resources is critically important in Latin America overall and concentrates on higher education. Those programmes are not specifically focussed on economic development through the regional integration process and the AA per se, and do not indicate what the timing or the performance requirements will be with respect to regional integration.</p> <p><i>“The objective of this priority is to provide fellowships for the Latin American teachers and students to the European universities in the period 2011- 2013, and to reinforce the EU-LA cooperation in the area of mutual understanding and higher education and strengthen the academic programmes, with a particular attention to the most socially disadvantaged groups. Within this priority (€ 92,6 million), the Erasmus Mundus programme will be continued.”</i></p> <p><i>LA MTR and RIP 2011-13</i></p> <p>The Financing Agreement for PRAIAA indicates that the intervention’s objectives take into account two socially-based principles that were included in the Regional Strategy for CA 2007-13; these objectives were not further developed into performance (or results)-based expected effects</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Gender equality and b) Promotion of minorities in the economic integration process <p>The FA does not spell out the requirements, nor the specificities concerning the need that will be filled by the project.</p> <p><i>Financing agreement PRAIAA</i></p>

	<p>Interviewees at senior levels in the EU and in the RIO indicated that while the EU supported development activities in the economic sphere in support of broader Aid for Trade, the macro analysis that would support how this strategy would be applied in the CA context was not shared widely. Discussions with these participants showed that what this meant was that the “theory of change” or “development logic” that related trade to poverty reduction was not an integral part of the implementation of the regional development cooperation programme. Or at least it was not shared.</p> <p>Since the EU’s primary objectives with respect to regional cooperation, as stated in the RSP, was to:</p> <p>6.1. Main objectives</p> <p><i>The overall objective of the 2007-2013 Regional Strategy for Central America will be to support the process of political, economic and social integration in the context of preparation of the future Association Agreement with the EU.</i></p> <p><i>RSP section 6.1</i></p> <p>...and since the policies and priorities of the EU are to reduce poverty, the links between the regional strategies and poverty reduction were not sufficiently well established either at the strategic level or at the level of the interventions, according to the interviewees.</p> <p>As an example, the interviewees could not recall examining a strategy documents that indicated what logic would tie the political, economic and social thrusts of the RSP together in a coherent plan (in terms of what would have to be done, when and by who).</p> <p>References 201, 206, 211, 212 of field notes</p> <p>An interviewee noted that the development logic of PRIAA, as stated in the LFA, does not match the development logic of SIECA as stated in the strategic plan that was in effect at the time of intervention start-up.</p> <p>Reference 223 field notes</p>
<p>I-4.2.2 – Documents indicating the Theory of Change logic that shows how regional or national support and the AA would generate the expected social effect</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>Many documents point to the unfortunate fact that there is little in the way of a comprehensive vision of how CA regional integration will actually work (the SICA did not have a comprehensive or an ecosystemic vision of its mandate in relation to the regional integration process as late as 2012). This does not mean that there is a complete lack: the more the analyst concentrates on trade administration or border management, the clearer the picture becomes (refer to CA MTR p. 13). But the overall finding is that this type of consensus is not current in social matters.</p> <p>The issue at hand, however, is that the vulnerability of people of all kinds caused by the security problems and the concentration of economic vectors in the region needs to be addressed through a cooperative effort amongst CA Member States. The logic that will be used to go from inputs to effects (intermediate impacts at least) needs to be clear and shared. That strategy has not been defined (or at least it has not been found, even though the LA MTR and RIP recognises, for instance, that there are many links to be dealt with, including (for example) the justice system (relationships and contracts or transactions</p>

	<p>cannot be secure without an operating, transparent and effective justice system). From that point on, plans can be developed to implement the strategy.</p> <p>Notwithstanding the fact that the EC bases its evaluations on a ToC concept utilising various conceptual tools and frameworks such as Intervention logic and LFAs, these are not referred to in documents, including MTR. Most intervention or programme documents are very weak in terms of defining precise effects and targets, ostensibly as a means of ensuring flexibility, but the result is an apparent lack of precision in all aspects including the link between the social benefits that can arise as a result of the AA and the CA support (decisions) that are required to bring them about.</p> <p>From an evaluation perspective, it is noteworthy that the EU spends a great deal of money to support and promote regional integration without this social (including poverty reduction) logic being abundantly clear. Almost all EU CA strategic documents deal with process descriptions and not the reasoning behind the selection of strategies. In that light, risk analysis, when done at all, is superficial. No plans for the <u>management</u> (as opposed to a description) of risk were found, a weakness in ToC logic management.</p>
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p>It is noteworthy that various documents, including the one referenced below, point to the fact that until recently (at least 2011) the SICA did not have a ecosystemic vision of its position or its structure:</p> <p><i>“El SICA parece haber estado tan concentrado en avanzar su propio proceso, que ha encontrado dificultad para plasmar, al menos formalmente, una agenda integrada común que permitiera, conocer y visualizar el rumbo que tiene Centroamérica, más allá de la simple suma de sus partes y desde una óptica integral e integrada. El PAIRCA dedicó esfuerzos a sintetizar y sistematizar, con la SG SICA y sucesivas Presidencias Pro-Témpore de SICA, un documento ejecutivo, de carácter instrumental, para el seguimiento y la toma de decisiones; una suerte de agenda de trabajo, decantada en un plan plurianual e interinstitucional, para un periodo que abarcara a varias PPT’s, emulando de cierta forma los planes multi-anales de la Unión Europea. A pesar de todo, esto no agota la totalidad de la agenda ni las prioridades regionales. En general, las acciones hacia los Estados Miembros quedaron por debajo de los deseos y expectativas que se tenían en un inicio, aunque terminaron dando resultados en el plano técnico, Hubo avances muy importantes en el seno del CE-SICA.”</i></p> <p><i>Ex post evaluation of PAIRCA 1, p. 36</i></p> <p>The MTR and other documents highlight the need for strategies to promote economic growth and to reduce the risk of vulnerability to commodity export fluctuations:</p> <p><i>“Nevertheless, the Latin American economies remain over-dependent on commodity exports, and this makes them vulnerable to developments on the export markets and to fluctuations in the global commodity prices.”</i></p> <p><i>LA MTR and RIP 2011-13 p. 5</i></p> <p>But the MTR also makes a logical mistake because it assumes a direct causality between so-called improvements in the justice system and increases in trade. This is not a provable link and there is no evidence provided to justify the proposed causality:</p> <p><i>“When it comes to trade and investments, most Latin American countries have adopted policies aimed at greater participation in the world economy. While there is room for improvement, governments in the region acknowledge that in order to secure sustainable investment flows, a stable and transparent judicial system must be in place. This has consequently encouraged greater trade flows, which more than doubled since the year 2000.”</i></p>

LA MTR and RIP 2011-13 p. 6

Moreover, according to ECLAC, the Direct Foreign Investment (2001 to 2010) in the CA, Mexico and Caribbean Basin have not risen nearly as fast as the DFI in South America.



LA MTR and RIP 2011-13 p. 5

This is explained in the LA MTR as:

“The recession in the United States slowed activity among the export platforms located in the sub region, which had been set up mainly to serve the United States market, and this stemmed the flow of export-oriented FDI. At the same time, the downturn in local economic growth had a negative impact on domestic market-seeking FDI.”

Later on the same report posits that the region is overly-dependent on traditional commodity exports and, to a much lesser extent, on export-related low-labour-cost manufacturing in a small number of areas in the region.

The RIP did lay out some form of simplified logic in order to justify the selection of priorities and the levels of support proposed. As far as economic integration was concerned it specified:

“Justification: After completion of the first phase of economic integration, supported by EC cooperation, priority is to be given to deepening the customs union and enhancing its acceptance among the main stakeholders (governments at all levels and civil society, in particular SMEs and rural producers). This might prepare the region for the successful application of the EU-CA Association Agreement. In this context, this support could also contribute to the launching of new financial instruments (financial fund) currently under discussion in parallel with the Association Agreement negotiations and to promoting complementarity with the new Latin America Investment Facility (LAIF) and the increased role of the EIB and other IFIs in supporting regional development.”

CA MTR p. 13

The reader should note the lack of causal linkages in the justification and the use of

	<p>'could'. Overall, the justification is process description rather than a Theory of Change. In the next paragraph in the MTR, the authors note that the interventions (funded by the RIP) will follow-up and should complement earlier support."</p> <p>As far as security, energy, natural resources management and climate change adaptation were concerned, the MTR RIP justifies the priority and level of resources with the following:</p> <p><i>"Justification: Support for the development of the Central American border zones, in the most vulnerable areas, will contribute to enhancing cultural and economic exchanges between groups of citizens on both sides of borders and creating a culture more inclined and open to regional integration. In addition, interventions focusing on climate vulnerability, adaptation and mitigation are key to promoting regional integration and ensuring the region's sustainable development. These measures can be supported and strengthened by an integrated and coordinated approach, particularly where the impact of climate change transcends boundaries (e.g. river and sea basins and bio-geographic regions). The coordination of these interventions with the possible setting up of a financial fund for the development of Central America, linked to implementation of the Association Agreement, will be considered in due course."</i></p> <p>CA MTR p. 15</p> <p>Overall, the Theory of Change is not specified and the RIP part of the MTR essentially describes the programme of activities that will be put into place without specifying how they (and their effects) will bring about any specific outcomes. Further, the expected results specified in both priorities noted in the RIP are either not "outcomes" but "outputs", and the indicators are overly descriptive and not specific enough to be monitored and supervised. For example, those results stated for the second priority, stated below, are not structured or designed to provide clear expectations or an explanation of the Programme Logic of the programme:</p> <p><i>"improved socio-economic indicators among populations; creation of common and shared infrastructure; job creation; protection and sustainable management of the environment and natural resources, in particular water, forests and biodiversity; access to renewable energy; reduced risks associated with natural disasters; adaptation to climate change; awareness of the benefits of regional integration"</i></p> <p>CA MTR p. 16</p> <p>To support the observation that a Theory of Change is not specified, the following shows that the expected result was offered as an objective and not the reason why the actions proposed would bring about the results:</p> <p><i>"The EC support for regional integration is intended to strengthen political and economic relations between the EU and Central America and thereby facilitate negotiation and implementation of the future Association Agreement based on the mutual interest of both regions. To support regional integration three groups of potential measures can be considered:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>The first group will entail strengthening the institutional system for the process of Central American integration;</i> • <i>The second group will focus on reinforcement of the regional economic integration process;</i> • <i>The third group will cover aspects of strengthening regional security."</i> <p>CA RSP 2007-13 p.20</p>
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	<p>The CA RSP 2007-13 provides a list of expected results which are not specific but narrative.</p> <p><i>“The objective of this component is to support the reform of the integration system established by Central America’s own agenda by means of reinforced capacity, improved coordination, legal bases, effective financing mechanisms, mandates, organisation and improved technical competence and human resources amongst the various players involved. In this context, cooperation may be directed towards regional institutions, inter-governmental coordination systems and national entities involved in the integration process. It must be stressed that this support will be limited to these institutions’ involvement in questions strictly related to regional integration.</i></p> <p>ii) Support for the economic integration process</p> <p><i>The main objectives of this component will be to support the creation of a regional customs union and to reduce non-tariff obstacles to intra-regional trade with the prospect of a possible future common market”</i></p> <p>The RSP then goes on to list standards and domains in which the EC could work, without specifying what type or level of outcome is expected. In fact, it goes on to suggest that the initiatives could be just about anything, from x to y:</p> <p><i>“For the latter, initiatives that could be considered range from fiscal policy (for instance, support to tax administration to improve the collection of taxes and facilitate transparency and effective exchange of information), and labour legislation to environmental measures, inter alia”</i></p> <p>CA RSP p. 20</p> <p>The Referenced EU document defines the broad logic that ties the trade parameters of the AA to “sustainable development”:</p> <p><i>“An overarching objective of the Association Agreement is to contribute to sustainable development in both Central America and the European Union, taking due account of the differences and specificities of each region. This objective is embedded in all the sections of the Agreement and finds a specific expression in the trade part through a chapter addressing the interrelation between trade and social and environmental policies.</i></p> <p><i>The chapter reflects the Parties' commitments as regards internationally recognised core labour standards and multilateral agreements addressing environmental issues of international concern. It recognises the right and the responsibility of the Parties to adopt social and environmental regulations in the pursuit of legitimate objectives, and puts much emphasis on the effective enforcement of domestic labour and environmental laws. The parties also undertake to encourage and promote trade and marketing schemes based on sustainability criteria, and to work towards a sustainable management of sensitive natural resources. An important element in the overall structure of the Association Agreement is the role of civil society in the follow-up. A Joint Consultative Committee is foreseen and, specifically in the trade area, consultation of civil society stakeholders at domestic level goes hand in hand with a "Bi-regional Civil Society Dialogue Forum" to facilitate exchanges across the Atlantic regarding sustainable development aspects of the trade relations. Should divergences between the Parties arise in the implementation of this chapter's provisions, recourse to an impartial panel of experts is possible under conditions of transparency.</i></p> <p>MEMO/11/429 Brussels, 20 June 2011 “Highlights of the trade pillar of the Association Agreement between Central America and the European Union” p. 4</p> <p>The “Future of EU development in Central America: in support of people or business?”, a document published in 2010 by a consortium of NGOs in the field (ALOP) and three European NGOs (CIFCA, CIDSE and APRODEV) describes their conclusions on the</p>
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	<p>EU's support for social cohesion in the following terms:</p> <p><i>Social cohesion is a priority in EU development cooperation...and is highlighted in the Green Paper as an important element of inclusive growth. However the concept of social cohesion is overly broad and allows too much flexibility (in interpretation), p.9.</i></p> <p>In the regional EU strategy for CA, the social cohesion programmes focus mainly on economic aspects on trade liberalisation. Inequality and redistributive measures and strategies are not mainstreamed into interventions.</p> <p>In Honduras (CSP) social cohesion is equated with budget support but no means to monitor it (with a view towards outcomes of social cohesion) are in place. No new funds are in place for social cohesion in the last round of CSP/ NIP. In El Salvador, all funds allocated in the 2011-2013 period are earmarked for social cohesion and human security. The funds will be allocated across a broad range of sectors and domains including natural disasters effects mitigation. In Guatemala, € 45 million were allocated in 2010-2013 for the Social Cohesion and Human Security sector. In Costa Rica and Panama, EU cooperation in that same period will support the modernisation of the State, studies, surveys training and equipment.</p> <p>While it is clear that a considerable amount of money is earmarked for social cohesion, the analysis shown in evaluation question 1 shows that these initiatives are disparate in their objectives and logics; they are not coordinated in a way that will enable regional bodies to lay down a common base in all Member States in order to support the AA. Evaluation question 1 also shows that the priorities in these countries (at the NIP level) were changed significantly from NIP 1 to NIP 2.</p> <p>In terms of the Theory of Change logic refer to References 201, 206, 211, 212 of field notes as stated in Indicator 4.2.1</p>
<p>I-4.2.3 – EU bilateral programming supports the strategies for leveraging long-term social effects of AA</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>The EU has in its possession a number of important analyses that highlight the need for the reform and strengthening of national and regional institutions in order to enable more coherent social development. The region, however, although it has a Social Cohesion Agenda in place, does not clearly lay out what needs to be done in order to be able to extract the maximum benefit from regional integration, and documentation shows that there is little consensus on what the priorities of that social thrust should be, even if the CA MTR noted that all stakeholders shared the view that regional integration should be supported through actions to reduce the impact of the social crisis, and that the economic integration process would create jobs. The lack of consensus on a plan may be due in part to the fact that the agenda is described in high-level or society-level terms.</p> <p>Based on the documentation at hand it is also clear that there is a major problem with political support to the entire regional integration process, including a lack of legitimacy that spans the entire LA region including CA. Without political leadership, the EU may help improve the mechanics and the operating frameworks of the trade related aspects of the AA but it cannot help the region to leverage the social effects of the AA.</p> <p>Key EU documents do not specify the priorities for, or the strategies to implement, a</p>

	<p>greater level of capacity amongst national counterparts to manage social cohesion.</p> <p>As a final note in this sub-section, it is noteworthy that the up-to-date data on which analysis and “social effects” strategies could be based is not readily available. In fact the EU has contributed in a significant way to the development of a number of databases including those for internal monitoring, economic factors, statistics on economic life in the region, etc. (In large part during PAIRCA1); the documentation does not speak to social databases although these may be part of what was developed for SIECA. PAIRCA 1 was to develop a data base for PARLACEN but that did not happen, and the SyE system put into place in SICA is not being used. It did, however, lay down the bases for a network of NGO, NSA and institutions that could, if it wanted, share information. Documents show that this only happened for a short time. Nevertheless, documents point to the conclusion that PAIRCA 1 was instrumental in beginning the process of linking societal issues to the regional integration and eventually the AA. Documents show that the regional integration and its social ramifications can only be managed by the CA Member States themselves, albeit in a coordinated and strategic manner; in fact the MTR for PAIRCA 2 notes that the strengthening of SICA institutions is not the only means of support the process of regional integration in CA, and suggests that more could be done to support non-economic interventions.</p>
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p>The EU has in its possession a number of important analyses that highlight the need for reform and strengthening of national institutions in order to enable more coherent social development:</p> <p><i>“Several governments have carried out significant constitutional and institutional reforms so that traditionally marginalised sections of the population can be integrated into the country’s political and economic life. However, in a number of countries, greater effort is still needed to strengthen institutions so that the State can fully and effectively assume its responsibilities in areas such as security, justice and taxation.</i></p> <p><i>In many cases, institutional weakness makes it very difficult for the State to tackle nationwide challenges such as narcotics trafficking and organised crime. Criminal organisations can take advantage of such weakness and in some cases this can threaten the very foundations of the State. This is why the EU is supporting efforts to strengthen democratic institutions in several Latin American countries.</i></p> <p><i>In recent years, Latin America has shown clear signs of willingness to move ahead in regional integration, coordination and political dialogue. For example, the Rio Group and UNASUR (Union of South American Nations) have played a key mediating role in conflicts that recently affected some of the countries in the region. The creation of the South American Defence Council and of Bank of the South (Banco del Sur) are further manifestations of this willingness to find regional solutions to regional problems.”</i></p> <p><i>MTR and RIP 2011-2013 p.3</i></p> <p>But there is a region-specific characteristic that the EU needs to consider: there is more than one major model for social development being put forward in the region:</p> <p><i>“At the same time, a group of countries (i.e. ALBA – Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas) is coming together on the basis of common principles and socio-economic and political models, with an ideological content that somewhat differs to the rest of the region. This development needs to be monitored, as we are witnessing two different models of political and economic management, which in some cases could hinder further dialogue and integration.”</i></p>

	<p><i>MTR and RIP 2011-2013 p.4</i></p> <p>The 2010 MTR noted that Civil Society, regional institutions, CA governments and Member States need to participate in parallel with the 7th round of negotiations on the AA.</p> <p><i>“All stakeholders shared the view that regional integration should be supported through actions to reduce the impact of the economic and social crisis. They in particular underlined the need to support the economic sector, including SMEs, cooperatives and farmers, with a view to stimulating access to the intra-regional market (productivity, competitiveness) and creating employment. They also emphasised the need to concentrate on actions at local level and to involve relevant actors within civil society. All activities should benefit both economic and social actors and contribute to the Social Cohesion Agenda adopted by the region. Environmental issues, in particular forest conservation and water management, were also emphasised.”</i></p> <p><i>CA MTR 2010 p. 12</i></p> <p>Unfortunately, the 2011-13 RIP only had two priorities “in the context of the implementation of the Association Agreement”, i.e.</p> <p><i>“- Support for the economic integration process, consolidated customs union and related harmonised policies, and for sustainable development in cross-border areas (€ 44 million)</i> <i>- Support for regional security at the borders (€ 7 million)”</i></p> <p>And neither of these dealt directly with developing or leveraging social effects.</p> <p>The LA RSP identifies that there is a major problem in political legitimacy in the entire region and notes how that problem can put the region at risk. The following is an excerpt from a section that begins with a preamble that notes that the strategies that follow are designed with the creation of AA in mind,</p> <p><i>“Latin American citizens blame the ruling classes and their incapacity to adopt adequate reforms. They also criticise political parties for their failure to provide political mediation. This demonstrates the structural weaknesses in the rule of law, which are a threat to the credibility of national institutions, democracy, good governance and stability in the region.</i></p> <p><i>It is recommended that these priorities be tackled as a matter of urgency in any economic reform; that a wide public debate be instigated, and that institutional capacity and legitimacy be built up.”</i></p> <p><i>LA RSP p. 6</i></p> <p>Section 5.5 of the CA RSP 2007-13 analyses the coherence between country strategies and regional strategies, and part of that analysis deals with social cohesion, regional governance and security as well as the environment. For social cohesion, there is no reference to developing the capacity of national counterparts although it may be assumed under what is called “sector initiatives”. For governance and security, the RSP does not mention capacity but speaks to the CSP of various countries and its key focal points. Insofar as environment is concerned, the RSP notes that:</p> <p><i>“Finally environment will be integrated into the chosen focal sectors of the present RSP (mainstreaming):</i> <i>i) the component dedicated to strengthening the regional integration institutional system includes possible specific support to the part of the system dedicated to regional cooperation in the field of environment; ii)</i></p>
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the component aiming at strengthening economic integration includes, inter alia, developing and implementing harmonised and common policies that will contribute to the creation of a common market (including environmental measures).”

It does not, however, specifically deal with the AA in the sense that developing a capacity for leveraging the long-term social effects of the AA is not mentioned. **It needs to be remembered that the RSP was put into place years before the signing of the AA.**

Section 5.5 of the CA RSP 2007-13

In terms of being able to develop long-term strategies for leveraging the long-term social effects of the AA, it is clear that such strategies cannot be developed without data on which to base the analysis. PAIRCA 1 was instrumental in developing the data bases for SIECA in the 2007-09 period, and this action consumed about 2M € out of the 15€ budget for PAIRCA 1.

“La experiencia del SIECA en el manejo de estadísticas y el apoyo de EUROSTAT fueron clave para lograr resultados positivos de corto plazo en esta actividad, que con una inversión de fondos UE de aproximadamente €2M fue el componente individual más grande del PAIRCA. En síntesis, el PAIRCA permitió la implantación, en el ámbito de la SG-SICA, de un sistema de información de estadísticas básicas para apoyar la integración y la configuración de una red con participación de todos los institutos nacionales de estadísticas de la región (aspecto que se consiguió tras esfuerzos significativos) y de 8 secretarías técnicas del SICA.”

Ex post evaluation of PAIRCA 1, p. 14

Specifically with respect to PARLACEN, the ex-post evaluation of PAIRCA 1 concluded that that RIO did not, as of 2010, have the legal framework in place to carry out its mandate, thereby depriving CA of its potential benefits. On p.14 the report also notes that the capacity development actions in PARLACEN were restricted to “punctual actions” concerning some of its Commissions. One of the indicators for PARLACEN related to the reform of SICA and was to take place in 2008. The action did not take place (see p. 15).

“Sin embargo persiste la debilidad del PARLACEN por su falta de universalidad, amenazada aún más con la solicitud formal de Panamá de retirarse, en agosto de 2009. La imagen de la institución aún no es sólida en cuanto a sus capacidades de generar beneficios tangibles para la integración, por lo que la reforma institucional aún sigue siendo pertinente.”

Ex post evaluation of PAIRCA 1, p. 14

PAIRCA 1 was to work with PARLACEN to make available a comprehensive data base to national counterparts and to the general public. This did not take place so another source of important data is not available.

Ex post evaluation of PAIRCA 1, p. 23

PAIRCA 1 laid the foundation for a network of NSA of various types that became much more enabled to influence the direction of, and then participate in the regional integration process, including the effects of the AA. The PAIRCA 1 worked in sectors, in university networks in supporting NGOs and marginalised groups such as women and children and in connecting institutions such as FORPEL. Much of the effects of the contribution took place in the latter years of PAIRCA 1:

	<p><i>“Pero una evaluación imparcial no puede más que relevar la importancia del PAIRCA para introducir la variable “integración” en la sociedad civil de la región. Aquí no hay dudas que “no hay marcha atrás”. Una vez que se dispararon los detonantes y se sembró la inquietud sobre el valor de la integración, la sociedad civil se apoderó de esta bandera y la hizo propia.”</i></p> <p><i>Ex post evaluation of PAIRCA 1, p. 24-27</i></p> <p>The PAIRCA 1 contribution to linking civil society to the AA was addressed by the ex post evaluation of that initiative. The results were assessed as being very positive:</p> <p><i>“También se participó de forma activa en los temas vinculados al proceso de negociación del Acuerdo de Asociación entre la Unión Europea y Centroamérica. Se contribuyó a que la sociedad civil realizara gestiones con los Gobiernos de la región y presentara planteamientos en instancias especializadas como el “II Foro Sociedad Civil Centroamérica-Unión Europea perspectivas hacia un acuerdo de Asociación Unión Europea y Centroamérica”, así como los Mecanismos de Participación y Consulta del CC-SICA de cara al Acuerdo de Asociación. Los resultados del II Foro de la Sociedad Civil Centroamérica-Unión Europea, abarcan cuatro áreas: diálogo político, cooperación, zona de libre comercio e integración regional. Estos temas fueron el resultado de una amplia consulta realizada con representantes de la sociedad civil.</i></p> <p><i>La participación de la sociedad civil centroamericana en la discusión del Acuerdo de Asociación con la Unión Europea y la creación de un comité bilateral de seguimiento con Europa, impulsó el posicionamiento de la sociedad civil en el sistema de integración. El apoyo técnico del CESE Europeo como modelo de integración robusteció al CC-SICA. Entre los resultados están los foros efectuados con los empresarios/as, en Bruselas y Guatemala, que impulsaron contactos institucionales clave y generaron interés para fomentar el intercambio comercial entre las regiones.”</i></p> <p><i>Ex post evaluation of PAIRCA 1, p. 24-27</i></p> <p>Notwithstanding the above observation, there are many that support the concept that Regional Integration needs to be defined and accepted by the CA Member States themselves. PAIRCA helped to open a door but leadership was not there to take advantage and provide the roadmap. Another key issue is the financial support provided to the regional integration effort. As of 2010, there was still no real and permanent response. One has to conclude that no response=no real support. And that would necessarily translate into a weakening of long-term social effects.</p> <p><i>“Los evaluadores no pueden más que coincidir con algunas apreciaciones recogidas en las entrevistas en el sentido que Centroamérica debe construir su propio modelo de integración acorde a las realidades y capacidades de los países centroamericanos. Para que esto ocurra se debe impulsar el debate entre sectores académicos, políticos, tanques de pensamiento y sociedad civil en general. El PAIRCA abrió una brecha, generó inquietud, promovió discusión, pero lo que no pudo hacer, como no podía ser de otro modo, fue reemplazar los liderazgos que se necesitan para hacer el proceso de integración sostenible en el tiempo.</i></p> <p>...</p> <p><i>La sostenibilidad de las numerosas actividades del PAIRCA en particular está asociada a la capacidad financiera y apropiación de las mismas por parte de las instituciones. Esto no está garantizado en la actualidad debido a la carencia de políticas de largo plazo y al carácter personalista y transitorio de los tomadores de decisiones en las instituciones beneficiarias, aspectos que se conjugan con el permanente déficit financiero de las mismas.»</i></p> <p><i>Ex post evaluation of PAIRCA 1, p. 41</i></p> <p>The MTR for PAIRCA 2 notes that strengthening institutions of SICA is not the only</p>
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	<p>means of supporting the process of regional integration in CA, and suggests that less-economic sector support would be necessary:</p> <p><i>“El fortalecimiento institucional a los órganos e instituciones del SICA no es la única vía para fomentar y apoyar el proceso de la integración centroamericana. Se puede argumentar que el fortalecimiento a las instituciones y secretarías del SICA tiene un límite de absorción o un punto de saturación y una vez llegado a este punto, mayor avance y eficacia se puede esperar del fortalecimiento de la sociedad civil y de la identificación de la población en general con el proceso de integración.”</i></p> <p>MTR PAIRCA 2 p. 18</p>
<p>JC 4.3 – The development logic behind the RSP is consistent with the EU’s key regional developmental strategies and priorities, including the CA and LA RSPs</p>	
<p><i>Statement on JC4.3</i></p>	<p>All evaluation and monitoring documents (including the MTR or the CA RSP 2007-2013) inherently support the proposition that the goals and priorities of the AA do not conflict with the principles and objectives of the EU development policy. In fact, the broad range of cross-cutting issues that for part of the basis for EU development cooperation policy are reflected in the both the CA RSP and the AA’s articles on Political Dialogue.</p> <p>The goals and priorities of the EU are, perhaps by necessity and design, described at a relatively high conceptual level, and as such allows for a great deal of liberty in interpretation. The EU insisted, for example in 2004, that CA must significantly deepen its integration process in order to become eligible for a full AA with the EU. In fact, most documents examined under this EQ would question whether what has happened since could be described as “significantly deepened”. This is not a criticism of the negotiation team but a reflection on the fact that EU policies and priorities in this domain are not well bordered or limited (at least those that are made public).</p> <p>An important finding is that the EU consistently tried to include references and links to the AA in its plans and strategies. For example, that there is a link between the AA and the response strategy is spelled out in the CA RSP 2007-13. In fact, the AA is presented as a means of reducing the risk factors associated with the RSP. In addition, CSP’s in three CA countries refer to the link between country-level focus and the regional integration process.</p> <p>The articles of the AA and its annexes are, in fact, the result of a long process of negotiation with the CA, but it is also the result of a long series of agreements, policies, declarations and other EU decisions. In that way the AA reinforces the intent of the decisions on which it was based. The AA deepens (makes more explicit) and integrates (into a coherent structure that is comprehensive in its scope) all the values, strategies and policy/political thrusts that are contained in EU cooperation documents, specifically the RSP for Latin America and the RSP for CA. The AA articles dealing with Political Dialogue, Cooperation and Trade specifically identify the logic links to these strategic documents.</p> <p>Our hypothesis is based on the role of EU development (re: poverty, equity, rights, etc.) on one hand, and the comparative advantage of the EU (as stated in many documents including the Consensus on the other hand. The EU was clearly in a position to understand that merely providing access to markets and the statistical “growth” that accompanies higher export sales is no guarantee of “development”. Nor is the mere signing of an AA adequate enough to promote equitable growth and a re-distribution of wealth within society. Many research documents make that point, including te UNDP</p>

	<p>Human Development Report of 2010 (p. 46), Hammil, M. in “Growth, poverty and inequality in Latin America” (ECLAC), and the UNCTAD 2010 Trade and Development Report. All of these research papers and more point to the fact that access to markets must be accompanied by a number of regulatory and systemic frameworks if growth is to be pro-poor (notice that over 50 percent of the world’s poor live in middle-income countries).</p> <p>The RSP should have been better designed to support Member States (and the RIO) in their quest for poverty reduction, social equity and human rights and not essentially focussed on the context of the AA. Logically then the RSP should have prepared the region and its Member States. The emphasis here is not on the AA and its negotiation but on the development.cooperation programmes that supported regional integration.</p>
<p>I-4.3.1 – The RSP and the initiatives that it generated do not conflict with the principles and objectives of the EU development policy, specifically with respect to “Aid for Trade)”</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>All evaluation and monitoring documents (including the MTR or the CA RSP 2007-2013) support the proposition that the goals and priorities of the AA do not conflict with the principles and objectives of the EU development policy. In fact, the broad range of cross-cutting issues that form part of the basis for EU development cooperation policy are reflected in the both the CA RSP and the AA’s articles on Political Dialogue.</p> <p>The goals and priorities of the EU are, perhaps by necessity and design, described at a relatively high conceptual level, and as such allows for a great deal of liberty in interpretation. The EU insisted, for example in 2004, that CA must significantly deepen its integration process in order to become eligible for a full AA with the EU. In fact, most documents would question whether what has happened since could be described as “significantly deepened”. This is not a criticism of the negotiation team but a reflection on the fact that EU policies and priorities in this domain are not well bordered or limited.</p> <p>An important finding is that the EU consistently tried to include references and links to the AA in its plans and strategies. For example, that there is a link between the AA and the response strategy is spelled out in the CA RSP 2007-13. In fact, the AA is presented as a means of reducing the risk factors associated with the RSP.</p>
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p>The overarching set of policies that govern the EU’s development cooperation thrusts are contained in the following:</p> <p><u>Article 177 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community.</u> The Community’s policy in this area shall contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms.</p> <p><u>The 2005 European Consensus on Development,</u> which defines the prime objective of development as the eradication of poverty in the context of sustainable development (including the MDG), along with the promotion of democracy, good governance and respect for human rights. The Consensus also stresses the importance of partnership with the developing countries and of promoting good governance, human rights and democracy with a view to more equitable globalisation.</p> <p><i>“It reiterates the principle of ownership of development strategies and programmes by partner countries and advocates enhanced political dialogue plus a more prominent role for civil society in development cooperation”.</i></p> <p><i>(Refer to CA RSP 2007-13 p. 1-2).</i></p>

On the basis of Article 179 of the same **Treaty Establishing the European Community**, a new Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) was adopted in December 2006. Central America is eligible to participate in cooperation programmes financed under the DCI (European Parliament and Council Regulation (EC) No. 1905/2006 of 27 December 2006 establishing a financial instrument for development cooperation). The 2004 Guadalajara Summit put the emphasis on regional integration and social cohesion (defined at that Summit as “reducing poverty and combating inequalities and exclusion” see CA RSP 2007-13 p. 3). In the 2005 Communication on “A reinforced European Union - Latin American partnership”, “the Commission restated its aim of a strategic partnership with the entire region and stressed the need for policy dialogues, targeted cooperation, promotion of trade and investment and closer alignment of cooperation with the political agendas and needs of recipient countries) (Ibid, p. 3). The San Jose Dialogue of 1984 remains the principal channel for political dialogue in Central America:

“This annual dialogue was originally set up to support the peace process and democracy in the region. It was confirmed in 1996 and 2002 and expanded to include other issues, such as economic and social development.”

CA RSP 2007-13 p. 3

A Regional Development Cooperation Agreement was originally signed between six CA countries and the EU in 1993 provides a monitoring and dialogue process for specific sectors. A 2003 Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement was to institutionalize the San Jose Dialogue and expand the scope of cooperation to other areas including migration and counter-terrorism. It also opened the door to the Association Agreement as the manifestation of

“...the common strategic objective of both parties, as established at the ...Guadalajara of May 2004, including a free trade agreement”

(Ibid p.3)

The last major decision leading to the AA was:

*“At the **Vienna Summit in May 2006**, and based on the positive outcome of a joint evaluation of the regional economic integration in Central America carried out during 2005-2006, the Heads of State and Government of the European Union and of Latin America and the Caribbean decided to launch negotiations of an Association Agreement between the EU and Central America, including a free trade area. On that occasion, Central America reaffirmed its commitment to enhance the economic regional integration, including the establishment of a customs union.”*

(Ibid p.4)

In terms of the AA, the EU noted that as a principle it would require a fairly deepened integration process before committing in writing:

“This support (i.e. the money allocated to the region-L&Blanc) is closely tied to the approach adopted by the EU at the EU-Latin America and Caribbean Summit in Madrid 2002, and reiterated in Guadalajara in 2004, when it insisted that Central America must deepen its integration process in order to be eligible for a full Association Agreement with the EU.”

CA RSP 2007-13 p. 15

However, the term “deepened” was never really well defined. The Guadalajara agreement

	<p>does not specify the meaning of the term.</p> <p>The analysis of this indicator must start with the question: “what is a Regional Programme supposed to do?” the answer provided in the 2007-1013 LA RSP on p.9:</p> <p><i>“Regional programmes have a specific purpose, and operate according to the principle of subsidiarity.</i></p> <p><i>Their aim is to promote partnership between the two regions on issues concerning common challenges.</i></p> <p><i>They have been built on the basis of policy dialogue priorities, which are reflected in Commission communications and declarations at the Summits of Heads and State and Government of the two regions.”</i></p> <p>All RSP’s must be coherent with the EU’s policies and directions. In this case the LA RSP outlined its coherency in this way:</p> <p><i>“EU policy priorities are incorporated within the three components of the EU-CA Association Agreement: political dialogue, cooperation and trade. The Agreement includes general clauses on terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, serious crimes of international concern, and the International Criminal Court. The objective is to join forces with Central America in combating insecurity and promoting a rules-based international order. In relation to regional integration, the Agreement addresses a comprehensive range of issues, more specifically the need to support institutions and civil society, customs union, trade and economic issues, and common policies in areas such as security, energy and the environment.</i></p> <p><i>It also includes provisions for regional financial instruments to finance transborder infrastructure and networks. Migration is also addressed under the political dialogue and cooperation chapters of the Agreement. Migration, security and drugs issues are also addressed at different levels through bilateral, thematic and Latin American regional cooperation. Climate change issues are included in existing regional programmes, such as PREVDA (disaster prevention, management of water basins) and PRESANCA II (food security), as well as in thematic and Latin American regional programming. Ongoing and future bilateral cooperation focuses on strengthening national institutions and governance (e.g. financial management, justice and security) and on economic sectors (e.g. productivity, SMEs and trade support).</i></p> <p><i>In conclusion, the priority sectors of the CA RSP respond to the new EU-CA agenda and are coherent and complementary with EU policies, bilateral cooperation and other financial instruments”.</i></p> <p><i>CA MTR p. 7</i></p> <p>An important observation is that there is a link between the AA and the response strategy spelled out in the CA RSP 2007-13. In fact, the AA is presented as a means of reducing the risk factors associated with the RSP:</p> <p><i>“Main risks associated with the response strategy</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Lack of political commitment and willingness to deepen regional integration; possible changes in governments and political attitude towards regional</i>
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	<p><i>integration; lack of social legitimacy and credibility of regional integration process;</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Slowdown in implementation and application of common provisions; low capacity effectiveness of inter-state cooperation and of regional institutions; lack of financial resources for regional integration;</i> • <i>Macroeconomic stability. Economic slowdowns due to unfavourable external conditions (oil prices, US demand, prices of commodities);</i> • <i>Different vision of definition of security policies.</i> <p><i>The negotiation and implementation of the future Association Agreement between the EU and CA, which is also aimed to impulse the integration process in the Isthmus, is expected to contribute diminishing the root causes of a part of the risks associated with the response strategy.”</i> <i>CA RSP 2007-13 p. 22</i></p> <p>The Mid-term Review of the CA RSP 2007-2013 analysed the coherence between the regional programme and the objectives of the EU in the region, notably through the AA. It found that they are coherent and complementary:</p> <p><i>“EU policy priorities are incorporated within the three components of the EU-CA Association Agreement: political dialogue, cooperation and trade. The Agreement includes general clauses on terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, serious crimes of international concern, and the International Criminal Court. The objective is to join forces with Central America in combating insecurity and promoting a rules-based international order. In relation to regional integration, the Agreement addresses a comprehensive range of issues, more specifically the need to support institutions and civil society, customs union, trade and economic issues, and common policies in areas such as security, energy and the environment. It also includes provisions for regional financial instruments to finance trans-border infrastructure and networks. Migration is also addressed under the political dialogue and cooperation chapters of the Agreement.</i></p> <p><i>Migration, security and drugs issues are also addressed at different levels through bilateral, thematic and Latin American regional cooperation. Climate change issues are included in existing regional programmes, such as PREVDA (disaster prevention, management of water basins) and PRESANCA II (food security), as well as in thematic and Latin American regional programming. Ongoing and future bilateral cooperation focuses on strengthening national institutions and governance (e.g. financial management, justice and security) and on economic sectors (e.g. productivity, SMEs and trade support).</i></p> <p><i>In conclusion, the priority sectors of the CA RSP respond to the new EU-CA agenda and are coherent and complementary with EU policies, bilateral cooperation and other financial instruments.”</i> <i>Mid-term CA RSP Review, 2007-2013 p. 7</i></p> <p>The conclusion of the CA MTR 2007-2013 expressed on pages 7 to 8 were validated by examining the AA. The team observes that the conclusion arrived at by the MTR was fully justified based in the facts. For example, AA Articles 1 part 1, 2 and 3 clearly reflect the basic principles of the EU in its establishment documentation. The objectives noted in Article 2 are also a reflection of EU policies imbedded in the RSP, specifically sub-section a) on political dialogue, cooperation and trade; b) on democracy and human rights; c) on sustainability; d) on trade agreements as a means of reducing poverty; e) on strengthening regional integration as a means of being able to participate in an AA etc.</p>
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The Institutional provisions also reflect the RSP in that Article 10 specifically calls for a Joint Consultative Committee:

“1. ...Its work shall consist in submitting the opinions of civil society organisations to this Council regarding the implementation of this Agreement without prejudice to other processes in accordance with Article 11. The Joint Consultative Committee shall further be tasked with contributing to the promotion of dialogue and cooperation between the organisations of civil society in the European Union and those in Central America.

2. The Joint Consultative Committee shall be composed of an equal number of representatives of the European Economic and Social Committee, on the one side, and of representatives of the Comité Consultivo del Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana (CC-SICA) and of the Comité Consultivo de Integración Económica (CCIE), on the other side.”

Refer to AA General and institutional provisions, pp 2-3 and p.11

The broad range of cross-cutting issues that form the basis of EU policy are reflected both in the RSP and in the AA’s articles on Political Dialogue:

“The political dialogue between the Parties shall prepare the way for new initiatives for pursuing common goals and for establishing common ground in areas such as: regional integration; the rule of law; good governance; democracy; human rights; promotion and protection of the rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous peoples and individuals, as recognised by the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples; equal opportunities and gender equality; the structure and orientation of international cooperation; migration; poverty reduction and social cohesion; core labour standards; the protection of the environment and the sustainable management of natural resources; regional security and stability, including the fight against citizens' insecurity; corruption; drugs; trans-national organised crime; the trafficking of small arms and light weapons as well as their ammunition; the fight against terrorism; the prevention and peaceful resolution of conflicts.”

AA Part 2, Article 12

The trade provisions of the AA have been designed to link to development at large.

“Further economic development through trade Thanks to this Agreement Central American countries will benefit from liberalised access to the European markets in numerous sectors. This entails important economic and social benefits in Central America with gains in national income for Central America as a whole expected to amount at € 2.6 billion. The change in national income is estimated to vary from 0.5% in Nicaragua to 3.5% for Costa Rica in the long run due to the Agreement. In addition, the Agreement is expected to have an overall poverty-reducing effect across the Central American region.

According to an independent Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment commissioned by the EU, the Agreement is expected to contribute to large sectoral (sic) gains in the fruits, vegetables, and nuts (FVN) sector, especially for Panama and Costa Rica. Guatemala and Nicaragua are expected to become more competitive in the textiles and clothing sector for example, while El Salvador and Honduras will see an increase in their export of transport equipment. By granting Central American countries immediate and fully liberalised access to European markets in industrial goods and fisheries, the Agreement will help exporters from these countries to move up the value-added chain. When fully enacted, the reduced costs of trade will have a beneficial impact on growth and jobs in all Central American countries”

MEMO/11/429 Brussels, 20 June 2011 “Highlights of the trade pillar of the Association Agreement between Central America and the European Union”

I-4.3.2 – Goals and priorities of the AA and of the EU development policy for the region are mutually reinforcing	
<i>Findings at indicator level</i>	<p>There is a hierarchy of “detailed prescription” that is inherent in development cooperation: For example, corporate-level policies are less detailed than regional or country strategies, and these are by necessity less detailed than planning or implementation documentation. Parallel to these are various declarations, communications, and partnership descriptions etc. that provide boundaries to planners and decision-makers and offer potential directions for collaboration. The AA is considerably more detailed than the CA regional strategies and offers a venue (figuratively) for describing what will be done to achieve expected results. It must be remembered that the AA is an agreement (contract) that contains clauses to bind the parties to specific actions, whereas the regional strategies are not. In that way they are mutually reinforcing. In a way, the RSP now can support the AA whereas the AA is not in a position to “support” the RSP.</p> <p>The articles of the AA and its annexes are, in fact, the result of a long process of negotiation with the CA, but it is also the result of a long series of agreements, policies, declarations and other EU decisions. In that way the AA reinforces the intent of the decisions on which it was based. The AA deepens (makes more explicit) and integrates (into a coherent structure that is comprehensive in its scope) all the values, strategies and policy/political thrusts that are contained in EU cooperation documents, specifically the RSP for Latin America and the RSP for CA. The AA sections dealing with Political Dialogue, Cooperation and Trade specifically identify the logic links to these strategic docs</p> <p>When it comes to “social cohesion”, a recent (2010) paper published by a CA NGO association and three large European NGOs (validated by interviews in the field) finds that while the EU stresses the need for “social cohesion”, the concept remains vague and is interpreted in different ways by different stakeholders. The 2005 “evaluación de la Estrategía Regional de la CE en América Latina” also identified «vagueness of concept» as a major problem, while noting that the EU LA programme did not define the indicators for social cohesion in a way that it could be measured.</p>
<i>Data, sources, extracts</i>	<p>The coherency and strategic logic of the Latin American RSP are spelled out as:</p> <p><i>“Latin American regional programming slots into the framework of the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) and the follow-up to the summits between the EU and Latin America and the Caribbean, and in particular the 2004 Guadalajara summit and the 2006 Vienna summit, and is aimed at strengthening the strategic partnership between the European Union and Latin America. This partnership is conducted at three coordinated levels: regional, sub-regional and bilateral.</i></p> <p><i>It is in line with the communication on a stronger partnership between the European Union and Latin America adopted by the Commission on 8 December 2005 and with development policy documents.</i></p> <p><i>The EU and Latin America pledged at the summits to develop a regional strategic partnership establishing close relations in the political, economic and social spheres. Regional development cooperation between the EU and Latin America has traditionally been a key element in their relations and must be seen as complementing national and sub-regional programmes. It brings value added; a fact made clear by the evaluations, and has focused on networking initiatives between actors from the two regions. Its preparation and implementation demand close coordination with other donors (ECLAC, IDB, UNDP,</i></p>

	<p>ILO, etc.).</p> <p><i>Cooperation with the Latin American countries combines a burgeoning network of association agreements between the EU and Mexico, Chile and, in the future, Mercosur, Central America and the Andean Community with the regional development cooperation programmes already under way, the aim being to foster the concept of partnership between the two regions: the EU and Latin America and the Caribbean. In future programming, operations of this kind will have to be focused on the region's priorities. Three areas of regional activities have been identified for the period 2007-2013 on the basis of regional needs and the lessons drawn from past cooperation, which will need to be made sufficiently visible.</i></p> <p><i>The three areas have been chosen to tackle the following regional challenges:</i></p> <p><i>(1) Social cohesion to consolidate the social fabric by, inter alia, reducing poverty, inequality and exclusion and cooperation in the fight against drugs: URB-AL, EUROsociAL</i></p> <p><i>(2) Regional integration and economic cooperation: AL-INVEST, @LIS</i></p> <p><i>(3) Human resources and mutual understanding between the EU and Latin America: ALFA, ERASMUS MUNDUS”</i></p> <p><i>CA RSP 2007-13 p.21</i></p> <p>The CA RSP document goes on to explain which strategic decisions and strategies enable the LA programme to exist in its proposed form:</p> <p><i>“The main legal and financial instrument governing European Community cooperation with Latin America in the period 2007-2013 is the Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation (DCI), which is based on Article 179 of the EC Treaty.</i></p> <p><i>The European Union's cooperation policy is based on Article 177 of the EC Treaty. It provides that Community policy in the sphere of development cooperation shall foster the sustainable economic and social development of the developing countries, and more particularly the most disadvantaged among them, the smooth and gradual integration of the developing countries into the world economy and the campaign against poverty in the developing countries. It also contributes to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms.</i></p> <p><i>Article 181a of the EC Treaty also provides that the Community shall carry out economic, financial and technical cooperation measures with third countries that are complementary to those carried out by the Member States and consistent with the development policy of the Community. Community policy in this area shall contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms.</i></p> <p><i>The Joint Declaration by the Council and the Commission of November 2005 on European Union development policy defines the objectives and principles which should guide Community action, in particular greater coordination between the Commission, Member States and leading donors to ensure better complementarity of aid, concentration of Community activities, examination of consistency with Community policies and the preparation of country strategic papers.</i></p> <p><i>The Commission's programming is intended to underpin closer dialogue on policies and reform in Latin</i></p>
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America through action which is conducted at the most appropriate levels (national and regional) and tailored to different categories of country, priority being given to helping the poorest countries. Regional programmes have a specific purpose, and operate according to the principle of subsidiarity and their aim is to promote partnership between the two regions on issues of mutual interest. The Commission set out its objectives for relations between the EU and Latin America at the fifth Summit of Heads of State and Government of the European Union, Latin America and the Caribbean in Vienna in May 2006. These focus on three priority areas: multilateralism, social cohesion and regional integration. The strategic partnership between the EU and Latin America, which was set in motion by the Summit process, underpins political dialogue with countries, sub-regions and the Rio Group. It has led to association agreements with Mexico and Chile. Negotiations are under way with three sub-regions: Central America, the Andean Community and Mercosur. These have reached differing stages according to the level of integration; these stages were fixed at the last summits.

On 8 December 2005 the Commission adopted a new communication (COM(2005) 636 final) on a stronger partnership between the European Union and Latin America. This underlines the need to establish a closer strategic partnership through a network of association agreements (emphasis added) involving all countries in the region and helping to contribute to the region's integration as a whole through the following measures:

-establishment of genuine political dialogues to increase the influence of both regions on the international scene;

-development of effective sectoral (sic) dialogues with a view to reducing inequalities sustainably, promoting sustainable development and tackling poverty;

-contribution to the development of a stable and predictable framework to help the Latin American countries attract more European investment, which will eventually contribute to economic development;

-tailoring of aid and cooperation to the needs of the countries concerned;

-increasing mutual understanding through education and culture.”

CA RSP 2007-13 p.21

The EU outlined in the 2007-13 RSP what its priorities should be (in the sense of its major contribution areas) with respect to economic integration.

“As underlined by the donor matrix, the Commission is essentially the key supporter, with the aid of grant funds, of the process of establishing a customs union, developing and implementing common policies and strengthening regional institutions through the SG-SICA and the SIECA.”

CA RSP 2007-13 p.21

“At the same time, regional integration has to be seen as a longstanding objective for cooperation between the EU and Central America in order to promote political stability and sustainable socio-economic development in the region and reduce vulnerability. In this context, as this analysis shows, a clear awareness has emerged of the importance of regional integration in terms of strengthening the region's position on the global markets and in external negotiations as well as in defending Central America's own development agenda and permitting it to join forces to face new common challenges. A more efficient institutional system and deeper integration will also be a means to contribute to tackling other challenges which the region faces, as identified in the previous sections, such as:

- **Strengthen democracy.** *Regional integration in Central America has proved to contribute to political stability and to enhancing regional dialogue and cooperation between the countries in order to reinforce democracy and the rule of law in the region.*

- **Decrease the economic vulnerability and dependence of the region.** At the same time, swifter implementation of the economic integration agenda would contribute to diversifying intra-regional trade, stimulate competitiveness, attract foreign investment and guarantee smoother integration of Central America into the world market.
- The prospect of negotiation of an Association Agreement between the EU and Central America is also expected to stimulate faster **convergence of the different visions and levels of interest regarding integration.** Closer cooperation and economic integration at regional level, together with a higher level of social cohesion, would also contribute, at a later stage, **to reducing intra-regional economic disparities.**”

CA RSP 2007-13 p.22

The Policies and priorities outlined in both the LA and CA RSPs are fully in line with the Key policy statement on EU-Latin American relationships as outlined in “A Stronger Partnership between the European Union and Latin America- Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 2006”. The policies of that document, as outlined in its “strategy” section- Section 3” deal with societal cohesiveness, democratic governance, security, regional integration, sustainable development and conflict prevention and crisis management. It also deals with better targeting of development cooperation, greater inclusion for certain actors, creating a common higher education area and improving visibility.

These are the thrusts and policies of the CA RSP as outlined above.

A Stronger Partnership between the European Union and Latin America- Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 2006

The AA deepens (makes more explicit) and integrates (into a coherent structure that is comprehensive in its scope) all the values, strategies and policy/political thrusts that are contained in EU cooperation documents, specifically the RSP for Latin America and the RSP for CA. The AA sections dealing with Political Dialogue, Cooperation and Trade specifically identify the logic links to these strategic documents.

The goals and objectives for EU-CA development cooperation for Central America, as spelled out in the overall and the specific sections of the “EU-LAC Development Cooperation Guide 2010 update”, are fully in keeping with the CA RSP. Specifically addressed in that document are political dialogue, development cooperation framework, the search for a regional cooperation agreement and favourable trade regimes. Another point specifically noted in the document is the “negotiations for an Association Agreement between the EU and CA, including a free trade area.”

EU-LAC Development Cooperation Guide, 2010 Update, p.31 and pp. 15-20

PAIRCA 1, PAIRCA 2 and PAIAA

Direct Beneficiary Organisation (MAIN ONES ONLY)	Type of Support	Main Outputs

	<p>SG SICA At regional levels</p>	<p>All forms of support including TA, equipment, studies, payments for services such as meetings and training. R1 and R2 are managed directly by SG SICA (programme budgets) while R3 and R4, dealing mostly with NSA and visibility and networking, are managed by the UNDP.</p>	<p>For PAIRCA 2 (conceptually an extension of PAIRCA 1): R1 Reinforced decision-making process at regional level, and progress in institutional reform R2 Regional institutional capacity reinforced as well as inter-institutional cooperation and coordination with national counterparts R3. Civil society participation in regional integration process improved, and interchanges between CA and EU R4. Improvements in the level of sensitivity, public awareness and information, and academic training in regional integration and the regional integration theme is progressively inserted into the education agenda in the region AN LFA and a WP for PAIRCA2 is available</p>
	<p>SIECA - <i>COMIECO (Council of Economic Integration Ministers of CA) SIECA (CA Economic Integration Secretariat)</i> - - <i>SECMCA (CA Monetary Council) – SG SICA (General Secretariat of CA Integration System)</i> – as the organization in charge of the global coordination of the regional institutional system, and administrator of Programme PAIRCA II - <i>CENPROMYPE (Centre for the Promotion of SMEs)</i> - <i>CCIE (Consultative</i></p>	<p>TA, operating expenses, equipment, meetings. The complete decentralisation model is used in PAIAA.</p>	<p>SIECA benefits from both PAIRCA 2 and PAIAA The TAPS for PAIAA notes that the key results areas are the following: R1. <u>Harmonization, standardization and simplification of customs procedures facilitated and customs' electronic interconnection improved in countries implementing the AA.</u> R2. <u>Certain areas of Trade in Services strengthened</u> R3. <u>Certain complementary policies harmonized</u> R4. <u>Improved knowledge and acceptability of the economic integration concept and the Association Agreement's benefits among civil society and private sector</u></p>

	<p><i>Committee on Economic Integration)</i></p> <p><u>Regional Committees of the Economic Integration Sub-system and of the AA</u> – expected to collaborate in consults on policy discussion concerning customs and trade facilitation matters.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Technical Committees of all topics of economic integration of the Programme</i> - <i>Special Committee on Customs, Trade Facilitation and Rules of Origin</i> - <i>Sub-Committee on intellectual property for the AA</i> <p><u>Other actors involved in the implementation of dispositions and measures derived from the CA integration process and the AA</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>The Ministers of Finance of Central America (including Panama)</i> – particular collaboration and coordination with SIECA should be held in the implementation of activities concerning R1 regarding the refunding of multiple payments of tariffs and taxes within the Customs Union – specifically through their <i>Customs Offices</i>. - <i>Other Ministries and national agencies</i> 		<p><u>R5. Regional and National Institutions responsible for the economic integration process have been strengthened</u></p>
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	<p><i>directly linked to the economic integration process:</i></p> <p>Possible beneficiaries of TA and capacity building initiatives.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Private sector representatives and Civil Society Organizations</i> (Associations, cooperatives, NGOs, and the Academia): These organs will be beneficiaries and should have the possibility to execute specific activities from R4. 		
	PARLACEN	Listed as beneficiary Activities are listed in the Annex 1 TAPS of PAIRCA 2 and PAIAA	Capacity development and technical support in sector issues
	CC SICA	Listed as beneficiary for Pairca 1 and 2 Activities are listed in the Annex 1 TAPS of PAIRCA 2 and PAIAA	Capacity development and technical support in sector issues
	National counterparts	Listed as beneficiary Activities are listed in the Annex 1 TAPS of PAIRCA 2 and PAIAA	Capacity development and technical support in sector issues
	NSA	Listed as beneficiary. Activities are listed in the Annex 1 TAPS of PAIRCA 2 and PAIAA	Capacity development and technical support in sector issues
	Other RIO	Specific to	Capacity development and technical

	See specific workplans under PAIRCA and Paiaa	requirements. See workplans under PAIRCA 1/2, and PAIAA	support in sector issues
OTHER RELEVANT INFORMATION (NOT CAPTURED ELSEWHERE IN THIS EQ)			

EQ:5 Regional Security

EQ 5 – To what extent has EU support helped to establish and improve the capacity of Central America’s National institutions and Regional Integration Organisations (RIOs) to initiate, coordinate and implement a regional response to security concerns in Central America, in particular relating to cross-border security and social prevention of violence?

JC 5.1 – Improved information exchange systems⁴¹, and coordination capacity of SICA security bodies⁴² enhance strategic and operational planning and implementation of regional security measures and the regional security strategy

*Statement
on JC5.1*

I-5.1.1 – Participation of regional and national authorities and institutions/organizations in meetings, conferences, forums and other mechanisms (newsletters etc.) of coordination and monitoring on regional security matters, particularly border security - numbers of activities and individuals involved, and quality of activities

*Findings
at
indicator
level*

The EC regional focus has encouraged greater levels of communication, cooperation and collaboration among security sector actors, and coordination with the SICA system security bodies. The high incidence of armed violence and cross border criminal activity necessitates a coordinated regional approach to crime prevention and response.

The Central America Security Commission has two subordinate bodies: the Democratic Security Directorate that supports the work of the Commission and OBSICA that manages research, analysis, information and statistics on democratic security issues in the region. The Commission is charged not only with the analysis of security issues in the region but also with communication and coordination with the bodies, institutions and secretariats of the regional integration sub-system and the organization of the Central American Security Information and Communication Mechanism, among other things. The Commission is composed of the Vice-Ministers of External Affairs, Vice-Ministers of Public Security and/or Governance, and the Vice-Ministers of National Defence of each country.


The SG-SICA implemented project SEFRO (Regional Border Security Project in Central America) began in 2010 and was conceived as an effort to integrate border-crossing management among security institutions (police, customs and immigration) and to streamline the bi-national procedures. This project was established with an eye to the future when internal borders in an integrated Central America would be abolished. One of the main objectives of the project was to improve greater institutional communication, coordination and cooperation.. The project has taken strides in bringing institutions together and has facilitated regular coordination meetings with the regional and national bodies. Various visits to the 19 border crossings of this pilot project have been made and a newsletter called the International Bulletin on the progress and activities of the integrated border-crossings is available for the regional community involved in the project. Another Document on Consolidated Contributions of the Border Authorities (customs, immigration and police) has been published and shared with the participating institutions.

The SEFRO Direction Committee has been established to support, supervise and make

	<p>recommendations on the direction and policies of the programme and is made up of the Secretary General, and representatives of the principle beneficiary institutions involved in the programme, the Security Commission of Central America, the Commission of Police Chiefs and Directors of Central America, Mexico and the Caribbean, the Central America Commission of Migration Directors (OCAM), SIECA and Directors of Customs, the Delegation of the EU and INTERPOL. The Commission meets at least twice a year with a focus on contributing to regional integration through support to the implementation of ESCA (Central American Security Strategy) and strengthening of border security through institutional, technical and technological support, increased connectivity, information sharing and integrated management</p> <p>The Subcommittee for Border Security (subordinate to the Commission of Police Chiefs and Directors of Central America, Mexico and the Caribbean) was created and each country identified national Focal Points. The responsibility of the Focal Points, among other things is to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Guarantee the high level commitment and continuous communication with national authorities for decision making regarding the advances and challenges in the programme; • Inform the authorities of the Central America Security Commission of advances and challenges of the programme; • To be the official liaison for coordination and follow-up for activities and actions undertaken by the programme. <p>The above structures and activities have facilitated communication among governments and security institutions, as well as technical training of police, immigration and customs border officials involved with integrated border management, however collaboration has not to date resulted in more fluid decision making, policy development or sufficient consensus to define and consolidate a model for integrated border management. There still exists a lack of common vision for what constitutes a fully integrated border management unit. A major focus of SEFRO has shifted away from integrated border management to a strengthened emphasis on intergovernmental border security, and a date for the eradication of internal borders is far from clear. The efforts of SEFRO to introduce a European model for border integration have not led to the adoption of a Central American model. Consequently, with no defined model it has been impossible to consolidate an action plan or an internal monitoring system for the full implementation of this concept. The focal points for the national governments continue to differ in their perceptions regarding the extent of integration needed for the three border services and the extent of information sharing among the SICA member States.</p> <p>The Coordination bodies have been established and meet regularly, broad frameworks for collaboration have been accepted however political consensus has not been consolidated sufficiently to guarantee full implementation of the strategies.</p> <p>The EC support to the CASAC I / II projects focuses on the control, regulation, collection and destruction of small and light weapons (SALW). To achieve these goals coordination and cooperation have been central to their efforts. The project has promoted the constitution of National Multidisciplinary Commissions to institutionalize the SALW concepts. Five Commissions have been legally created and two are in the</p>
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	<p>process. These Commissions act as operational counterparts to the CASAC programme and are seen to be an important tool for institutional coordination, and also with civil society. National focal points and coordinators for the National Multidisciplinary Commissions have been identified in all member States and sit in the Foreign Ministries.</p> <p>The coordination mechanisms among national governments and institutions relating to security issues have been established however lack of consensus between governments, territoriality between institutions and the frequent rotation of government officials in the region hinders the full achievement of goals and supranational commitments. Considerable concern persists in Central America over the full sharing of security information. There continues to be a lack of the sufficient trust necessary to create political will on the part of member States to open security files and widespread corruption creates obstacles to achieving goals.</p> <p>From the angle of civil society organizations the IEPADES project on “Supporting the implementation of security strategies in Central America in fighting and preventing crimes related to small arms and light weapons and armed violence” has set out in its design to enter into an exchange of good practices on border controls, fire arms controls and the prevention of armed violence. Subsequently REDCEPAZ (the regional network IEPADES supports) made advances to participate with CC-SICA and to SEFRO. The contact with CC-SICA was not initially successful however they did sign a letter of understanding with SG-SICA that opened spaces for participation and collaboration in areas of common interest, and presented the possibility for collaboration with SEFRO and CASAC. Although this collaboration has grown REDCEPAZ, supported by the EC within the ESCA strategy, is still looking to increase the spaces of participation and collaboration between civil society and governmental bodies that will permit civil society to have a greater influence in policy development, the prevention of armed violence and the promotion of improved regional security. In the meantime the project has hosted a Regional Encounter between Government and CSOs – in order to socialize findings from their investigations, improve communication and to concretize contacts for future collaboration on the topic “Prevention of armed violence, control of illicit trade and border security”. The participants of the event included representatives from the SEFRO and CASAC projects, representatives from the national Ministries of Foreign Affairs, customs, immigration, police, judicial authorities, military, arms control bodies and civil society. REDCEPAZ has also established a website to inform the public on control of arms and armed violence, prepared and presented various reports in this thematic area.</p>
<i>Data,</i>	<u>Supporting evidence:</u>

*sources,
 extracts*



Slideshow presentation: “El SICA, la Estrategia de Seguridad de Centroamerica y la Direccion de Seguridad Democrática”, San Salvador, octubre 2013

The data from the following chart comes from the 5 ‘Informe Semestral ATP’ Reports between January 2011 and July 2013 and from the ROM reports of 2012/2013

SEFRO Coordination Activities: (January 2011 - July 2013)

Activities	Themes	Participants
>55 coordination meetings	Training courses, workshops at border crossings Creation of National Commissions on border security Programme documents for SEFRO Operational Plan with INTERPOL Activities being planned Visits to the 19 border crossings Diagnostic analysis of border crossings Coordination with FRONTEX and EUROPOL Policy on transnational crimes Infrastructure of border crossings Best practices for integrated border crossings	SEFRO Coordinator, technical assistance OCAM, national project security institution re officers, SIECA, I Security Commission America, regional Customs, police, milit Group of Friend EUROPOL, FRONTE

	<p>Harmonization and coordination of policy, norms and procedures Presentation of SEFRO to Regional Community</p>		
<p>Important political work has facilitated a coming together of the key institutions for this programme and the definition of implementation strategies for border security (SEFRO ROM reports 2013)</p> <p>“A través de las reuniones entre funcionarios de alto nivel, intercambio de experiencias, capacitaciones y seminarios se está logrando la creación de mecanismos nacionales y regionales en la temática de Seguridad Fronteriza, se ha elevado el conocimiento en modelos como Gestión Integrada de Fronteras, se han coordinado acciones interinstitucionales a nivel binacional, significando todos ellos efectos directos claves para el logro del OE” (SEFRO ROM Response Sheet -2013).</p> <p>The ROM report 2013 indicates: The International Bulletin has been published Document on Consolidated Contributions of the Border Authorities has been presented The Subcommission for Border Security was created National Focal Points were established for border security issues</p> <p>The evaluation report for CASAC (Evaluacion Formativa del Proyecto CASAC con enfoque participativo; Dic. 2011) indicates:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The project was able to promote a wide discussion on arms control at national, regional and international levels. The level of awareness and appreciation of the importance of the issues grew significantly among the regional states and institutions, including the highest authorities, the services charged with control and prevention of crime, the universities and civil society organizations. • Los Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno del Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana (SICA), en su Trigésima Reunión Ordinaria, instruyeron la conformación de un grupo interinstitucional integrado por los Ministerios de Gobernación, Fiscalías Generales, Comisión de Seguridad de Centroamérica y la Comisión de Jefes de Policía de Centroamérica, México y el Caribe, el cual llevó a consenso la Estrategia de Seguridad de Centroamérica y México, siendo aprobada durante la XXXI Reunión Ordinaria de los Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno de los Países Miembros del SICA celebrada en Guatemala el 12 de diciembre de 2007. Las comisiones nacionales multidisciplinarias (CNM) son una herramienta importante de la coordinación institucional y por su vínculo con la sociedad civil. • All Focal Points are named and the National Multidisciplinary Commissions are operative; 5 legally constituted and 3 in process. (Boletín CASAC, Nov. 2013) • According to the Intermediate Descriptive Report covering the period January – December 2012 for the IEPADES project, “Supporting the implementation of security strategies in Central America in fighting and preventing crimes related to small arms and light weapons and armed violence” the project 			

	<p>produced:</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="359 342 1366 974"> <tr> <td data-bbox="359 342 1366 398"> <p>REDCEPAZ - Reports, Research and Diagnostics</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="359 398 1366 974"> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National reports (6) on implementation of the Strategy for the Central America Security Strategy (ESCA) including an integrated perspective on armed violence, arms trafficking and the CNM • National reports on implementation of international instruments • Regional Report on compliance with international agreements on firearms • Report on the situation of armed violence and arms trafficking in the region • Regional report on the implementation of ESCA • Matrices for observation and monitoring of ESCA implementation • Validation of National reports with authorities and civil society during the Regional meeting in Guatemala • Study on ‘good practices’ for border areas on the prevention of armed violence • Study on ‘good practices’ for border areas on combatting illicit trafficking in SALW </td> </tr> </table> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • REDCEPAZ signed a letter of understanding with SG-SICA to collaborate in border security, the control of firearms and the prevention of armed violence, signifying the entry of civil society in this area (Intermediate Descriptive Report covering the period January – December 2012 for the IEPADES). • REDCEPAZ hosted a Regional Encounter between government and Civil Society in which participated SEFRO and CASAC (Intermediate Descriptive Report covering the period January – December 2012 for the IEPADES). • Although there has been no international donor coordination mechanism for regional security as of the Guatemala Conference on ESCA (2011) EC is a member of the Group of Friends that supports ESCA (SEFRO 5th Informe Semestral ATI). • SG SICA, Martinez (March 2014) announced the creation of a webpage for ESCA. “Estos nuevos apartados son específicamente sobre la Estrategia de Seguridad de Centroamérica (ESCA) y la Comisión de Seguridad de Centroamérica, incorporaciones que contribuyen a fortalecer la divulgación de información relacionada a la seguridad democrática en la región, sus avances y retos. Pueden ser consultados dentro de la página web institucional del SICA en “Temas de Actualidad”, aunque también de manera directa en las direcciones: www.sica.int/esca y www.sica.int/csc. <p>Actualmente, el Portal Integrado del SICA consolida información de más de 40 secciones especializadas de información proveniente de diferentes instancias regionales que se impulsan en el Sistema y que trabajan en los ámbitos sociales, medioambientales, económicos, de equidad de género y culturales en busca del bienestar de las ciudadanos y los ciudadanos centroamericanos.”</p> <p><u>Detracting evidence:</u></p>	<p>REDCEPAZ - Reports, Research and Diagnostics</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National reports (6) on implementation of the Strategy for the Central America Security Strategy (ESCA) including an integrated perspective on armed violence, arms trafficking and the CNM • National reports on implementation of international instruments • Regional Report on compliance with international agreements on firearms • Report on the situation of armed violence and arms trafficking in the region • Regional report on the implementation of ESCA • Matrices for observation and monitoring of ESCA implementation • Validation of National reports with authorities and civil society during the Regional meeting in Guatemala • Study on ‘good practices’ for border areas on the prevention of armed violence • Study on ‘good practices’ for border areas on combatting illicit trafficking in SALW
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	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interviews with SEFRO project staff, Focal Points and government officials identified the fact that the member States of SICA have still not defined a ‘model’ for integrated border management. One government Focal Point responded in a bemused manner at being asked if and when RI would happen. Sovereignty concerns definitely trump RI – at least for the moment. She also clearly stated that Central America does not want European imposed models for their border management. Although other informants strongly support the concept of RI no one could offer a timeframe for when it might be possible. It was stated that in spite of the institutions created, activities undertaken and improved communications, none of this has resulted in more fluid decision-making or policy development. National interests come first, and when conflicts erupt between States they affect decision-making. • Una de las limitaciones y riesgos del proyecto (y de todo proyecto regional) es, además de los enfrentamientos o falta de consenso entre los países, las fechas de entrada y salida de los gobiernos en la región retrasan la continuidad hacia el cumplimiento de las metas y compromisos supranacionales. A pesar de los esfuerzos de SG-SICA dirigidos a propiciar mayor continuidad y una transferencia dinámica de los procesos de integración regional, ésta no se ha dado de tal forma cuando hay cambios de gobierno. (Evaluacion Formativa del Proyecto CASAC con enfoque participativo; Dic. 2011) • Changes in the governments of the region, particularly those that reflect changes in political stance, complicate and often hinder the implementation of decisions already made. Some governments have demonstrated greater support to these programs and changes than others. (Interview in Brussels; Nov. 2011) • The “abdication” of the SG-SICA following the Salvadoran elections (2014) and his recall to become the Foreign Minister in El Salvador prompted speculations and criticisms over the effect his leaving would have on the consistency and continuity of SICA policy and operations. The SG SICA is seen to strongly influence the direction of SICA. As one informant put it “change the person, change the policy”. (Field study informants, April 2014) • Interviews with government and institutional officials during the field phase of this evaluation have identified a common concern that a lack of trust and on-going conflicts between regional governments are significant and continue to hinder the RI process. These governments are more inclined to enter into intergovernmental agreements rather than agreements that would infringe upon national sovereignty or would confer supranational powers to SICA. (Field study, April 2014) During the field study period Honduras occupied the Isla de Conejo which El Salvador considers national territory. This conflict was identified repeatedly in interviews as being an example of why trust is not forthcoming. • Por otro lado, el dominio temático corresponde a instituciones específicas del área de la seguridad, Ministerios de Defensa, Seguridad Pública y fuerzas de seguridad pública en general. Lo que implica una importante segmentación de funciones, dificulta la coordinación y potencia la lucha por los dominios. Le corresponde a las Cancillerías las comunicaciones externas en relación con esta temática, y según un importante número de personas consultadas, no en todos los países la información fluye con la premura requerida. (Evaluacion Formativa del Proyecto CASAC con enfoque participativo; Dic. 2011)
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- One senior security official stated that “tenemos una estrategia de reserva”, implying that certain information cannot be shared even when a common regional security strategy has been adopted. (Field study, 2014)
- According to the SEFRO ROM Report 2013 the customs agencies are still not fully integrated with the police and immigration in integrated border management. Interviews during the field study confirm this situation.
- There is evidence of a lack of coordination and some duplication of efforts, in part due to the high level of rotation of government personnel and those in charge of this subject in the nations of the region. CASAC, in its role executing the project, has had limited capacity of articulation and coordination with these institutions. (Evaluacion Formativa del Proyecto CASAC con enfoque participativo; Dic. 2011)
- Improved collaboration among CASAC, SEFRO and civil society organizations working in this area would increase the impact of these projects. (Evaluacion Formativa del Proyecto CASAC con enfoque participativo; Dic. 2011)
- There is an apparent protectionist stance of the national governments based on concepts of sovereignty that restricts the exchange of information. (Intermediate Descriptive Report – 2012; IEPADES). Interviews with government officials during the field study (2014) confirm this position.
- REDCEPAZ has encountered difficulties to incorporate into CC-SICA. (Intermediate Descriptive Report – 2012; IEPADES) The experience of REDCEPAZ is not unique, other civil society organizations related similar experiences. It was also noted by various informants that if the head of an NGO network is politically astute, connected and knows how to manoeuvre they will have a better chance of entering CC-SICA than others. There is no functioning ‘invitation mechanism’ on the part of CC-SICA that encourages the participation of civil society organizations.
- Corruption Perception Index, Transparency International for 2012 indicate that all Central American countries, with the exception of Costa Rica, have scores of less than 50, indicating serious corruption problems. Out of 177 countries Central America ranks:

Ranking	Country	Score
49	Costa Rica	53
83	El Salvador	38
102	Panama	35
123	Guatemala	29
123	Dominican Republic	29
127	Nicaragua	28
140	Honduras	26


- Corruption was mentioned frequently in conversations during the Field visit. There is a concern that rampant corruption in government institutions is affecting the achievement of goals in security programmes. It was also mentioned that anti-corruption programmes

	should be introduced into EU supported institution building projects.
I-5.1.2 – Access to Interpol information systems for national border agents (customs, immigration and police)	
<i>Findings at indicator level</i>	<p>A major part of the insecurity in the region relates to cross-border crime such as human, arms and drug trafficking, organized crime and gang activity. In order to respond to these challenges the SEFRO project has incorporated INTERPOL into its programme to facilitate experience sharing, information exchange and to provide access to INTERPOL international databases and other services to the integrated border crossings.</p> <p>The activities to be undertaken in relation to the work of INTERPOL include the establishment of an agreement between Immigration, Customs and Police for the connectivity of the border posts to the national central office databases of INTERPOL located in each country. Also the development of connective systems and operational procedures need to be established between INTERPOL, the national central offices and the border posts. This activity includes the formation of operators and the contracting of experts in information technology to deal with high security systems, and the purchase of high technology information equipment.</p> <p>Contract difficulties significantly delayed INTERPOL's contribution to the SEFRO project. These difficulties between SEFRO and INTERPOL delayed the signing of a contract until February 2013 and the fulfilment of INTERPOL's obligations. Until July 2013 no expert had been hired and in April 2013 no border posts had yet been connected to INTERPOL databases. In April, the time of the field study, INTERPOL was still awaiting the arrival of the systems equipment to Central America. With the arrival of the equipment INTERPOL will install parallel communications systems for the police, customs and immigration services to directly link to each head office in the respective capital cities of the Central American countries and then each headquarters will link to the INTERPOL databases. Where necessary, mainly with the police, generators will also be installed at the border crossings to enable the computers to function.</p> <p>These connective systems will permit almost immediate information transfer from border crossings through national headquarters to INTERPOL databases and back to the border officials. The verification of a passport presented at a regional border will be possible within a very short timeframe. The systems will be parallel, there will not be an integrated information system between police, customs and immigration. Most people are anxiously waiting for the equipment to arrive and the connections to be made – this connectivity is widely thought to be fundamental to improved security systems in Central America.</p>
<i>Data, sources, extracts</i>	<p>Supporting evidence:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● According to the SEFRO ROMs of 2012 / 2013 and the 5 'Informe Semestral' Reports: INTERPOL personnel have been participating in training workshops and activities of the (SEFRO) project. ● During interviews with INTERPOL personnel as part of the field visit it was explained how the technology would permit greater sharing of information and ultimately provide access to INTERPOL international databases. Also the specific expert knowledge of INTERPOL in border management (identification of documents, stolen documents, stolen vehicles, international

	<p>criminality etc.) will be transferred to Central American border officials.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Most local officials spoken to during the field phase identified the future connectivity and access to INTERPOL databases as being major accomplishments. <p><u>Detracting evidence:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Until July of 2013 the principal expert in information technology had not been hired and there was little advance in the obligations of INTERPOL (SEFRO 5th Informe Semestral ATI). • The type of contract utilized to contract INTERPOL (Contrato de Subvencion) has been deemed inadequate for these circumstances (SEFRO 5th Informe Semestral ATI). • Interviews (Field study 2014) with INTERPOL, government officials and project staff confirm that communications equipment has yet to arrive – they hope to have it within the next few months for installation. Access to INTERPOL databases is awaiting the installation of equipment.
<p>I-5.1.3 – Implementation of the Central American Security Strategy</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>The Central American region is facing extreme violence inflamed by transnational organized crime and drug trafficking. El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras experience some of the highest homicide rates in the world and the opinion is widely held that in order to effectively combat the rampant violent crime in the region it is necessary for Central America to respond as a region. Citizens in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador identify ‘delinquency / public security’ as the most important problem faced by their countries, and in Costa Rica delinquency / public security is second only to corruption.</p> <p>The Democratic Security Framework Treaty was signed in Honduras, on December 15, 1995. This instrument became the Central American Democratic Security model based on democracy, institutional strengthening, rule of law, existence of governments elected by popular, free and secret vote, and full respect for human rights by the Central American States. The Central American Security Commission was constituted on the basis of this Treaty. In 2007 a Central American Security Strategy was approved by the Heads of State of the regional countries and in 2011, as an outcome of revision and prioritizing, a strengthened strategy was presented and endorsed by all SICA member States and the international community. The Guatemala Conference on Support to the Central America Security Strategy (ESCA), attended by all Presidents of the region, identified four components, 14 intervention priorities and 22 project profiles.. .</p> <p>The EU has supported Democratic Security under the Framework agreement (1995) and the Security Strategy (2007) with the implementation of the regional CASAC projects for arms control and the SEFRO integrated border project. Since the Guatemala Conference (2011) the EU has increased its portfolio and embraced the principle of shared and differentiated responsibility as a member of the Group of Friends for the Central America Security Strategy and supported new interventions.</p> <p>The EU helped in the preparation of the ESCA conference in Guatemala in 2011 and committed itself to continued support to the security strategy for Central America. The international donor community established the Group of Friends (the first donor coordination mechanism for security related projects) in support of the ESCA and on the basis of the following four principles: fresh funds, regional projects, SICA leadership and shared and differentiated responsibility between the member states and the international cooperation community.</p>

	<p>Within a few months 22 projects had been formulated and approved by the Security Commission – 8 of which were to be initiated immediately at a cost of \$333 million. A Mechanism for Coordination, Evaluation and Follow-up was approved, as well as a follow-up committee for the projects and a technical secretariat under the auspices of the SG SICA. As of December 2013 only about 20% of the funds for the initial 8 projects has been forthcoming (or less than 3% than that committed for the 22 projects) and the Group of Friends are facing internal contradictions that undermine the principles for support. Major projects are suffering serious challenges - the SEFRO project has yet to define a model for integrated border management due to lack of consensus by Member States and start-up for the project on Social Prevention of Violence at by Local Government has been stalled due to lack of agreement by member States on the identification of the 36 municipalities to be involved. The original project plan was to locate the project in municipalities around the border areas where SEFRO is operating as to be complementary to the objectives of increased security in border regions and to create synergy between projects.</p> <p>The Central America Security Strategy is structured around four main pillars: law enforcement, prevention, rehabilitation and institutional strengthening. They are regional in character, taking advantage of economies of scale, coordination capabilities, and “best practice” exchanges. The EU has chosen the components of law enforcement, prevention and, institutional strengthening to focus its assistance. The CASAC and the SEFRO projects had been operative prior to the Guatemala Conference but were refocused under ESCA, the AECID project was formulated as a result of the ESCA, as were the PREVENIR and IEPADES projects. The DIAKONIA project, RETE and JURCA are complementary to the ESCA strategy.</p> <p>The ESCA is the first regional security strategy to be adopted by the SICA countries and the international community. Security, because of the nature of organized crime and international drug, human and arms trafficking, is seen by many as requiring a regional / international, if not integrated, approach. The ESCA was widely supported in 2011, however there are growing indications that support – as it was originally defined – is floundering. Political consensus by member States on project objectives / details is not always forthcoming, and members of the international community are having second thoughts regarding the principles for support. Bi-lateral projects and funding are in some cases replacing regional projects with SICA leadership. The Group of Friends is facing internal contradictions over these issues and has proposed changes to SICA. As of April 2013 no resolution has been encountered. Also promised funding has not been forthcoming.</p>
<p><i>Data, sources,</i></p>	<p><u>Supporting evidence:</u></p>

extracts



Slideshow presentation: “El SICA, la Estrategia de Seguridad de Centroamerica y la Direccion de Seguridad Democratica”, San Salvador, octubre 2013

- La Estrategia de Seguridad de Centroamérica es la única Estrategia Regional existente hasta ahora y reconocida por la Comunidad Internacional (http://www.cocatram.org.ni/conference/files/6_Erich%20Vilchez_Presentacion%20Estrategia%20de%20Seguridad.pdf)
- Durante la conferencia, panelistas evaluaron los dos retos más importantes que enfrentan hoy los países de Centroamérica y México: Primero, el riesgo que representan el crimen y la violencia para la gobernabilidad, el progreso social y económico, la ley y el orden. Segundo, las dificultades que enfrentan Estados Unidos, México y Centroamérica para solucionar eficazmente los problemas políticos, sociales, y de seguridad.
- En su discurso, el Secretario General del SICA subrayó la importancia que tiene para todos los países centroamericanos una verdadera integración regional, y la coordinación entre todos los gobiernos, como solución a los problemas de seguridad provocados, en gran medida, por el crimen organizado. “Sí, hemos avanzado en los niveles de coordinación. No estoy satisfecho aún, no es lo suficiente; lo que tenemos que aprender es que si hay un crimen organizado que no respeta fronteras, que no respeta códigos, tenemos que hacer un trabajo como región para poder combatirlo”. (Secretario General del SICA resalta importancia de cooperación regional en Centroamérica lunes, 3 de marzo de 2014 Publicado por: Secretaría General del Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana Fuente: SG-SICA)
- Latinobarometro (2013) has demonstrated that citizens in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador identify ‘delinquency / public security’ as the most important problem faced by their countries, and in Costa Rica delinquency /

	<p>public security is second only to corruption.</p> <p>According to the United Nations (Transnational Organized Crime in Central America and the Caribbean: A Threat Assessment; UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna, 2012) and other sources the Central American region faces:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>“extreme violence inflamed by transnational organized crime and drug trafficking... El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras now have some of the highest homicide rates in the world.</i> • <i>There is little doubt, therefore, that these transnational issues present major challenges to countries within the region and to the wider international community. Criminal networks and their activities disrupt stability, undermine democratic institutions and hinder economic activity so vital to the region. All of these issues are apparent in Central America and the Caribbean” (p. 11)</i> • <i>To avoid displacement of crime problems from one area to another, these national efforts must be internationally coordinated. International crime prevention strategies are needed for both the region and the contraband flows affecting it.”(p. 13)</i> • A broad consensus of opinion emerged among security sector officials, government authorities and civil society groups during the field study in that in order to effectively combat the rampant violent crime in the region it is necessary for Central America to respond as a region. • The Central American nations working within their multidimensional Integration System (SICA), have organized themselves regionally, understanding the regional dimension must be enhanced in order to be more effective, and complement national ones. A regional security strategy has been developed, and has resulted in 22 projects, which should start implementation, at least some of them, on January 2012. (Central America Security Strategy; SG-SICA) • The Central America Security Strategy is structured around four main pillars: law enforcement, prevention, rehabilitation and institutional strengthening. They are regional in character, taking advantage of economies of scale, coordination capabilities, and “best practice” exchanges. Their financing is based on the principle of additionality, vis-a-vis resources assigned to national projects. (Echeverria, SICA) • The Strategy has been endorsed by a coalition of national governments and multilateral entities, the so-called “Group of Friends” (GoF), in which so far the US and Spain, have taken a necessary and valued leadership role. All of them accept another principle: that of shared and differentiated responsibility. (Echeverria, SICA) • The revised ESCA strategy has been adopted by the Central America Heads of State and the international community. (The Conceptual Framework of the First International Conference for Support to the Central America Strategy for Security in Central America; SG-SICA, Guatemala 2011) • The EU is a member of the Group of Friends supporting these actions. (Informe de Avance del Proyecto – IEPADES). The Group of Friends includes an ‘executive’ or ‘core’ group within which the EU participates, and four
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	<p>working groups that correspond to each of the four pillars. The EU committed € 14 million towards the institution building and prevention of violence pillars. The working group on institution building is co-chaired by the EU (comments by EU Delegation member in Managua).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • New security related projects (AECID, IEPADES) have been designed and implementation has begun by the international community and formulated on the basis of the revised strategy. The projects in progress (CASAC II and SEFRO) have adopted the guidelines and refocused under ESCA (Project documents). <p>According to the “Informe Ejecutivo de Avance del Portafolio de Proyectos de la Estrategia de Seguridad de Centroamerica. Al 31 de Diciembre de 2013”:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Guatemala Conference on Support to the Central America Security Strategy (ESCA), attended by all Presidents of the region, identified four components, 14 intervention priorities and 22 project profiles. • An information webpage on the ESCA has also created. http://www.sica.int/consulta/Noticia.aspx?idn=84924&idm=1 <p><u>Detracting evidence:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>“La propuesta de la Red consideró como hipótesis que había la total anuencia por parte de los Estados de la región de implementar la Estrategia de Seguridad de Centroamérica. Si bien el compromiso de los países se mantiene, ante todo el proceso de desplazamiento y apoyo que concitó la ESCA se esperaba que iniciara de forma inminente. Esta situación no se ha producido aún y en mucho, parte de los acompañamientos que la Red tenía programados debieron ser modificados, esta situación actúa como un condicionante de la totalidad del proyecto. De hecho, se consideró como un riesgo la reducción del apoyo de los gobiernos en razón de cambios políticos y sin embargo, el mayor obstáculo lo ha sido la ausencia de apoyo financiero a la ESCA y la redefinición a la cual ha sido sometida, sobre todo por parte de los donantes.”</i> (Informe Descriptivo Intermedio - 2012; IEPADES) <p>According to the “Informe Ejecutivo de Avance del Portafolio de Proyectos de la Estrategia de Seguridad de Centroamerica” Diciembre 2013 and “Informe de Situacion de la Estrategia de Seguridad de Centroamerica; Presidencia Pro Tempore Honduras”, SG SICA. Managua, 25 April 2012 (slideshow)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 22 projects had been formulated and approved by the Security Commission – 8 of which were to be initiated immediately at a cost of \$333 million. A Mechanism for Coordination, Evaluation and Follow-up was approved, as well as a follow-up committee for the projects and a technical secretariat under the auspices of the SG SICA. As of December 2013 only about 20% of the funds for the initial 8 projects has been forthcoming (or less than 3% than that committed for the 22 projects) • According to conversations (EUD, AECID, GIZ, project staff) during the field visit the Group of Friends for ESCA has encountered internal difficulties. The USA, Germany, Canada and Australia are entering into and funding bi-lateral projects rather than the agreed upon regional projects under the leadership of SICA. Meetings of the Group of Friends have been irregular and communication has not been optimal. A proposal was made on how to
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	<p>circumvent these issues and presented to SICA in March 2013. SICA responded that it would have to consult with member States and to date has not replied. A meeting might happen in May 2014.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “Con el fin de asegurar asistencia tecnica y financier para la ESCA, SICA ha incluido una amplia diversidad de modalidades de financiamiento, buscando incrementar el acceso de los paises centroamericanos a una mayor variedad de Fuentes de cooperacion internacional. En tal sentido, con el fin de lograr un acuerdo comun entre las partes involucradas en el proceso de implementacion de la ESCA y para mejorar tanto la coordinacion como la eficiencia y el impacto de la totalidad de las contribuciones en el area de seguridad, se propone incluir tambien recursos tecnicos o financieros de caracter bilateral o trilateral como contribuciones a la ESCA, siempre que dichos proyectos busquen mejorar las condiciones de seguridad ciudadana y justicia en Centroamerica y que son llevados a cabo bi-/tri-lateralmente entre las entidades donantes/internacionales y un determinado pais en la logica de la ejecucion modular.” (Propuesta del Grupo de Amigos: Fortalecimiento de la Estrategia de Seguridad de Centroamerica (ESCA), Marzo 2013)
<p>I-5.1.4 – Statistical changes on cross border security crimes/ offenses (human trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, drug trafficking, organized crime, etc), and incidents of violence in border regions</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>The SEFRO project is still far from implementing fully integrated border management units in the 19 border crossings of the pilot project. It still has not achieved the planned technical connectivity with access to INTERPOL databases, therefore it is impossible to determine, at this point, whether or not the training that has been undertaken for border personnel has contributed in anyway to changes in cross-border criminal activity.</p> <p>OBSICA is the SICA body that will produce the comparative statistical data and analysis relating to regional cross-border crimes and incidents of violence in border areas but is only in the early stages of its work.</p>
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p><u>Supporting evidence:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • OBSICA, (Observatory and Index for Democratic Security of SICA) was founded by the SG SICA in 2010 to generate reliable data (taken from official national sources), determined through a rigorous methodology, which would permit the monitoring, follow-up and evaluation of the principal indicators for violence and criminality in Central America. OBSICA is a tool of the Central American Mechanism for Information and Communication on Security Issues. In this capacity, OBSICA produces annual reports on violence and criminal activity, including an analysis of the regional context and conclusions. (Documento Conceptual y Cooperacion Internacional para OBSICA; SICA 2012) • SEPOLCAC – Estadisticas Policiales: 2010 Anuario Regional; Comision de Jefes (as) y Directores (as) de Policia de Centroamerica, Mexico, El Caribe y Colombia, 2013 and Anuario Regional de Estadisticas Policiales: 2011 – 2012; Observatorio e Indice de Seguridad Democraticadel SICA are 2 annual publications issued by OBSICA). <p><u>Detracting evidence:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Information garnered from interviews with project personnel and institutional officials (police, immigration, customs) during the field phase indicates it is

	<p>premature to expect statistical data to indicate changes in criminal activity resulting from the SEFRO project activities. Border officials have mixed views as to whether the training provided by SEFRO has resulted in changes in cross border criminality. There is not statistical data available to indicate such changes.</p>
<p>JC 5.2 – Improved harmonization and coordination of policy, norms and procedures for regional security, particularly border security, among the SICA member states supports regional integration and improved security</p>	
<p><i>Statement on JC5.2</i></p>	
<p>I-5.2.1 – Development and implementation of management concepts, guidelines, procedures and mechanisms for national authorities on integrated border crossing management, and in the prevention of illicit arms possession and trafficking</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>The SEFRO project has made major progress in training and socializing methodology for integrated border management and the CASAC projects have done the same for control of small arms. Training programmes and coordination meetings have focused on the introduction of policy, norms and procedures as well as promotion of the Central America Security Strategy. Mechanisms for national and regional border security are in the process of being adopted and there appears to be a general goodwill to proceed in this area, however the lack of political consensus on what model Central America wants to implement for integrated border management has presented a major obstacle for advancement in the identification and implementation of policy – and consequent norms and procedures - that needs to be coherent with a chosen model.</p> <p>There is an uneven implementation of new guidelines and procedures presented in the training programmes dependent upon who has been trained, where they are working and the political will of authorities. At certain border crossings officials claim to have achieved greater integration of their work among the 3 border services while others say nothing has changed. It appears that customs works with greater independence than do the police or immigration. The customs service manages a technological programme that communicates the manifest for a shipment from border to border crossing prior to the arrival of the transport vehicle – it connects the export with the import in 5 countries. This programme has the capacity to be expanded and utilized for other border services but it has not happened.</p> <p>The CASAC project, with the assistance of INTERPOL, is training in international systems for border detection of stolen or illicit documents, identification of stolen vehicles, human trafficking, identification of arms, and the use of scanners for vehicles crossing borders. El Salvador has installed scanners at its border crossings to a mixed reception – the security benefits are recognized however truckers are not happy with the cost (\$18.00) or the time lost. The other above mentioned procedures are dependent upon the technological transfer of information – access to databanks. The computer systems currently utilized by each country are not necessarily compatible with those of the neighbours and the equipment to be contributed by the SEFRO project has not yet arrived.</p>
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p><u>Supporting evidence:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> SEFRO training activities are found in the chart below and indicate the subject matter involved in this training. (4th and 5th Informe Semestral ATI, covering

the period January 2011 to July 2013)		
Activities	Subject Matter	Participants
6 Regional Seminars	Harmonization of Policy, Norms and Procedures; Interpol data base, passenger profiling; regional and national conventions on border management.	261 border officials (immigration, customs, police), foreign affairs and military.
5 Training Workshops	Implementation of CA Security Strategy, including themes relating to organized crime, coordination strategies, customs crimes, management model for integrated border crossings.	339 border officials (customs, immigration, police, military).
1 Seminar	Sharing of Good Practices at Integrated Border Crossings	20 senior officials from the police, immigration, and customs from altos Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua y Panamá.
Training Operation on 'stolen vehicles' at all 19 border crossings	Stolen Vehicles	Personnel from 19 border crossings.
Meetings in Holland and Poland	Exchange of experience on border security management.	Frontex and Europol with 26 customs, immigration and police from Honduras, El Salvador, Panamá, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Se valora muy positiva la voluntad política y nivel de integración de las instituciones como Migración, Policía Nacional, Ministerios de Relaciones Exteriores. (SEFRO ROM 2013) <p>A través de las reuniones entre funcionarios de alto nivel, intercambio de experiencias, capacitaciones y seminarios se está logrando la creación de mecanismos nacionales y regionales en la temática de Seguridad Fronteriza, se ha elevado el conocimiento en modelos como Gestión Integrada de Fronteras, se han coordinado acciones interinstitucionales a nivel binacional, significando todos ellos efectos directos claves para el logro del OE. (SEFRO ROM 2013)</p> <p>“La Secretaría General del Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana (SICA) a través</p>		

	<p>del Programa Regional de Seguridad Fronteriza en América Central (SEFRO), y el Instituto Centroamericano de Administración Pública (ICAP), inauguró el 10 de febrero el primer “Diplomado Virtual en Seguridad Fronteriza y Gestión Integrada de Fronteras”, en donde se capacitará a 35 funcionarios involucrados en la administración de las fronteras en la region...</p> <p>La capacitación tendrá una duración de seis meses y será impartida de forma virtual a través de tres módulos: Seguridad, Fronteras y Globalización; Políticas, Normativas y Procedimientos de Seguridad en las Fronteras Centroamericanas y Gestión Integrada de Fronteras.” (Inicia primer Diplomado Regional en Seguridad Fronteriza y Gestión Integrada de Fronteras; SG SICA, 12 febrero 2014)</p> <p>Todos los países de la región disponen de una legislación especializada en materia de control de armas de fuego, sus partes, componentes y municiones; algunos de ellos incluyen medidas de control de los explosivos en sus respectivas leyes, como Nicaragua, Guatemala, Panamá y Costa Rica. Por ejemplo, en la mayor parte de los países los avances en materia de registros, licencias, marcaje se aplican como medidas administrativas, sin que necesariamente haya homogeneidad en términos de la implementación de mejoras a lo largo de la región, pues los países muestran niveles de avance disimiles. Las recomendaciones de CIFTA aporta valor técnico y legal a los Estados partes de la OEA y, debido a la naturaleza misma del derecho administrativo, los mismos pueden y deben formular medidas complementarias a las disposiciones hemisférica, congruente con el marco constitucional. (Evaluacion Formativa del Proyecto CASAC con enfoque participativo; Dic. 2011)</p> <p>The CASAC project, with the assistance of INTERPOL, is training in international systems for border detection of stolen or illicit documents, identification of stolen vehicles, human trafficking, identification of arms, and the use of scanners for vehicles crossing borders. (Programa de INTERPOL de Gestion de Fronteras; INTERPOL)</p> <p><u>Detracting evidence:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Se preocupa el menor grado de integración de Aduanas, siendo el tercer actor clave de presencia territorial en los puestos fronterizos. (SEFRO ROM 2013) ● Comments by border officials indicate that in at least one of the 19 border crossings participating in the pilot project nothing has changed because none of the officials at that particular crossing has received training. (Field visit 2014) ● Testimony of SEFRO project staff and civil society organizations indicates that the experience of an average person of crossing a border in CA has not changed as a result of SEFRO implementation. ● The customs service manages a technological programme that communicates the manifest for a shipment from border to border crossing prior to the arrival of the transport vehicle – it connects the export with the import in 5 countries. This programme has the capacity to be expanded and utilized for other border services but it has not happened. (Conversation with SIECA official, field visit.) ● Existen quejas acerca de la capacidad de respuesta de parte de la Dirección de Asuntos Políticos y del Área de Seguridad de la SG-SICA, la falta de toma de decisiones, y las largas esperas para obtener una cita o ser atendidos en una consulta. Hay falta de diálogo entre los mismos funcionarios de esta dirección, que se pone en evidencia cuando se presentan a discutir asuntos en reuniones con delegados de los países o, en este caso, del proyecto CASAC. (Evaluacion Formativa del Proyecto CASAC con enfoque participativo; Dic. 2011)
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I-5.2.2 – Development and implementation of a normative and political framework for border security	
<i>Findings at indicator level</i>	<p>Although it has been indicated that there was an initial lack of political will by the participating governments of the region to fully embrace the integration of border management both the SEFRO and CASAC projects have undertaken numerous activities related to creating awareness among government and regional officials for the need to develop a political framework and norms for border security, including arms control. There have also been training activities for border personnel in the implementation of these policies norms, as indicated in the previous section. The SEFRO project organized a visit of Central American security authorities to EURPOL and FRONTEX offices in Holland and Poland to share European policy and procedures on integrated border management, including the Schengen system (SIS). The European model is being shared and studied in order to understand its possible relevance to an integrated border management design for Central America. As it has already been explained the member States of SICA have not yet identified a model for integrated border security therefore although SEFRO has provided visits to Europe to present European working models no consensus has been reached as to a Central American model.</p> <p>The CASAC project has contributed to border security goals by conducting a regional diagnosis on the situation of SALW in the region plus a short, medium and long-term strategy that responds to overall needs of the involved countries. It has supported the production of Practical Guides on Arms Control for Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama and Honduras and creating a regional forum between Central America and the European Union to analyse a code of conduct for Central American States on the Transfer of Arms, Munitions, Explosives and other Related Materials. CIFTA (Convención Interamericana contra la Fabricación y el Tráfico Ilícitos de Armas de Fuego, Municiones, Explosivos y otros Materiales Relacionados) has been ratified by all Central American countries.</p> <p>Supporting evidence:</p> <p>As part of the programme twenty-six customs, immigration, police officials from Honduras, El Salvador, Panama, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Costa Rica visited the FRONTEX and EUROPOL offices in Holland and Poland to exchange experiences on border security management and to learn about the European systems in integrated border management. The following topics were covered:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Coordination, communication and information exchange methods used by the European agencies; The technological platform used to connect the different institutions; Legislation (norms and conventions) governing inter-institutional connectivity, information exchange coordination for operative procedures, inter-institutional communication; The kinds of legislation that establish limits for the Integrated Border Complex and decontaminate border activities from others that are not specifically border control; The different types of informal activities (i.e. commercial, travel insurance, food sales) that are permitted to operate in the border complex. <p>Detracting evidence:</p> <p>Conversations during the field visit (April 2014) with project staff and border officials.</p>

	This issue has been extensively discussed in other sections.				
<i>Data, sources, extracts</i>					
I-5.2.3 – Development and implementation of policies and practices of coordination and cooperation between SICA member states on border security					
<i>Findings at indicator level</i>	<p>The EU has supported the development and adoption of integrated border management policy and practices in the area of coordination and cooperation through the training programmes organized by the SEFRO project. More than 261 border officials (immigration, customs and police) have been trained. Information exchange has been central to these activities and INTERPOL has facilitated training, border diagnostic analysis and the promise of access to information technology and INTERPOL databases.</p> <p>There has been a delay in the installation of information technology equipment and database access in the border posts due to contract difficulties between SEFRO and INTERPOL limiting communication via computer systems, and the current systems where present are often not compatible between countries. The customs agencies have not yet been fully incorporated into the integrated border management system, and the member States of SICA have also not yet determined a model for border management.</p> <p>Coordination and cooperation are facilitated by the structure of institutions and specific bodies created for Central American security issues. These structures have been discussed in other sections of this report and although they are operative and meet regularly political consensus is difficult to achieve and consequently implementation of policy and practices has been hindered.</p>				
<i>Data, sources, extracts</i>	<p><u>Supporting evidence:</u> SEFRO 4th and 5th Informe Semestral ATI indicate that the following Seminars have been conducted.</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="359 1395 1366 1644"> <tr> <td>6 Regional Seminars</td> <td>Harmonization of Policy, Norms and Procedures; Interpol database, passenger profiling; regional and national conventions on border management.</td> <td>261 border officials (immigration, customs, police), foreign affairs personnel and military.</td> </tr> </table> <p>“The development of a regional diagnosis has been one of the most important activities. It has provided an evaluation of the situation that exists in relation to light arms in the region and has defined a short, medium and long-term strategy that responds to the overall needs of the countries. The diagnosis was being developed at the time that the EU project began, which has allowed to improve the formulation process by incorporating new phases for the completion of the diagnosis, for which purpose the resources of the project have been used. The pre-validation and validation phases, and the preparation of the final version in October 2009, were financed by the EU project. The EU project has also facilitated the participation of the National Multidisciplinary</p>		6 Regional Seminars	Harmonization of Policy, Norms and Procedures; Interpol database, passenger profiling; regional and national conventions on border management.	261 border officials (immigration, customs, police), foreign affairs personnel and military.
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	Committees.” (Progress and Evaluation Report: CASAC, Jan. 2010)
	<p><u>Detracting evidence:</u></p> <p>Lack of political will to identify a model for border management and delays in the arrival of information systems technical equipment have hindered the implementation of guidelines for coordination and cooperation at a practical working level. Even though at the State level structures have been created and implemented for coordination and cooperation these have not translated into consistent operative guidelines at the field level.</p>
<p>I-5.2.4 – Incorporation of the work of the SICA Observatory (OBSICA) in border security management</p>	
<i>Findings at indicator level</i>	The SEFRO project documents mention collaboration between SEFRO and OBSICA, however it is too early to identify practical achievements from this collaboration. OBSICA has the mandate to generate, monitor, follow-up and evaluate the principle indicators for violence and criminality in Central America and therefore should be able to assist SEFRO in establishing databases relating to cross border criminality. To date this has not yet happened although in 2013 OBSICA published two reports on police statistics for the years 2010 - 2011 and 2012.
<i>Data, sources, extracts</i>	<p><u>Supporting evidence:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • OBSICA, (Observatory and Index for Democratic Security of SICA) was founded by the SG SICA in 2010 to generate reliable data (taken from official national sources), determined through a rigorous methodology, which would permit the monitoring, follow-up and evaluation of the principal indicators for violence and criminality in Central America. OBSICA is a tool of the Central American Mechanism for Information and Communication on Security Issues. In this capacity, OBSICA produces annual reports on violence and criminal activity, including an analysis of the regional context and conclusions. (Documento Conceptual y Cooperacion Internacional para OBSICA; SICA 2012) • SEPOLCAC – Estadísticas Policiales: 2010 Anuario Regional; Comision de Jefes (as) y Directores (as) de Policia de Centroamerica, Mexico, El Caribe y Colombia, 2013 and Anuario Regional de Estadísticas Policiales: 2011 – 2012; Observatorio e Indice de Seguridad Democratica del SICA, 2013 <p><u>Detracting evidence:</u></p> <p>OBSICA only began work in early 2013 and they have not yet consolidated a SEFRO / OBSICA collaboration.</p>
<p>I-5.2.5 – Harmonisation of criminal legislation to combat organised crime in Central America implemented with the support of the Conference of Ministers of Justice of Ibero-American Countries (COMJIB)</p>	
<i>Findings at indicator level</i>	The Conference of Ministers of Justice of the Latin American countries (COMJIB) is collaborating with SICA to promote the harmonization of legislation in order to offer the necessary legal instruments to fight impunity. The first phase began in January 2011 with the participation of authorities from the Supreme Courts, Attorney Generals Offices and Ministers of Justice and Security in workshop to define the types of crime and the legal instruments to be incorporated. The second phase commenced one year later and proposes to draft specific norms as for harmonization parametres. These parameters will be examined in national workshops in order to produce a regional proposal. Finally each country will elaborate a national reform proposal, with technical

	<p>assistance from COMJIB, to harmonize their national legislation to regional parameters. COMJIB will also be collaborating with the Judicial Council for Central America and the Caribbean (CJCC) in the harmonization of criminal legislation in /Central America. This work is in progress and will be advancing under the ESCA institution-building component.</p>
<i>Data, sources, extracts</i>	<p><u>Supporting evidence:</u></p> <p>Desarrollado por la Conferencia de Ministros de Justicia de los Países Iberoamericanos (COMJIB) y el SICA, tiene como objetivo promover una armonización legislativa, para brindar los instrumentos necesarios que impidan los espacios de impunidad debidos a las actuales diferencias en la legislación sustantiva procesal. El proyecto de armonización cuenta con el respaldo del Fondo España-SICA, se desarrolla en el marco del Plan de Apoyo a la Estrategia de Seguridad de Centroamérica y responde por tanto a los planteamientos y demandas que recoge la citada Estrategia.</p> <p>En la primera fase, que se inició en enero de 2011, con un Taller de Alto Nivel, en el que las máximas autoridades de las Cortes Supremas, las Fiscalías Generales y los Ministerios de Justicia y Seguridad, definieron los tipos penales y los instrumentos procesales sobre los que era necesario promover la armonización y los parámetros mínimos para conseguirla.</p> <p>En la segunda fase del trabajo, iniciada en diciembre de 2012, se elaborará una propuesta concreta para las distintas normas, que sirvan de referentes como parámetros de armonización. Esa propuesta se contrastará en distintos talleres nacionales con los actores relevantes del sector justicia, hasta llegar a una propuesta regional sobre los diferentes delitos e instituciones procesales. Posteriormente, cada país elaborará su propia propuesta de reforma, con la asesoría técnica de COMJIB, para armonizar su legislación a los parámetros regionales que ellos mismos han establecido. (Logros 2009 – 2012; SG-SICA)</p> <p>“Otro de los aspectos abordados en conjunto por el CJCC y la Secretaría General del SICA como parte de la ESCA, ha sido la Armonización de la Legislación Penal en Centroamérica. En este sentido, ambas entidades reafirmaron su compromiso para ser partícipes de la promoción de las reformas a legislaciones nacionales necesarias e impulsar el proceso de identificación y análisis de nuevas propuestas de normativas penales e instrumentos jurídicos regionales,”. SG SICA, Feb. 2014.</p> <p><u>Detracting evidence:</u></p>
<p>JC 5.3 – Strengthened human capacity, improved technology and infrastructure of RIOs and national institutions in the security sector</p>	
<i>Statement on JC5.3</i>	
<p>I-5.3.1 – Construction of integrated border facilities and infrastructure</p>	
<i>Findings at indicator level</i>	<p>19 border crossings have been identified for a pilot project on integrated border management (there are 53 border crossings in the region), the project is operative, significant training sessions have been conducted with border officials (customs, immigration and police) and numerous expert visits made to the border crossings. A diagnostic analysis by technical experts was finally undertaken in the fall of 2013 and along with it a needs assessment for technological improvements. The concept for</p>

	<p>border infrastructure has changed from the original idea of one common building for all 3 services to work out of, to one of maintaining the physical separation of border services as they currently operate. The concept of integrating border services with a vision for ultimately removing internal border controls within an integrated Central America has been put on hold as a model for an integrated border management unit has not been decided upon and it is unlikely to happen soon. The prime concern at this time is improved security in the region. The set-up of the technological infrastructure is also delayed due to administrative difficulties between SEFRO and INTERPOL. Vehicle scanners have been installed in 6 border crossings in El Salvador and facilitate the search of vehicles. However these scanners imply an \$18.00 charge and wait at the already slow border crossings. Truckers are not happy with either the time loss or the cost. Official security mechanisms are not always received with enthusiasm by the truckers who already have their own informal security systems in place.</p>
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p><u>Supporting evidence:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Realización de diagnóstico de 19 puestos fronterizos (SEFRO; ROM Report 2013) <p><u>Detracting evidence:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● “Las acciones vinculadas al fortalecimiento de las capacidades tecnológicas y de infraestructuras necesarias para hacer efectiva la conectividad y el manejo integrado y compartido de la información en los sectores fronterizos todavía tienen un avance menor. Se considera que se alcanzará la puesta en marcha de la conectividad e interconectividad.” (SEFRO; ROM Report 2013) ● The SEFRO project has experienced significant delays in the implementation of the 19 integrated border management units, the original concept of constructing a common building to house the three border services (police, customs and immigration) has been discarded and the services will remain for the indefinite future in their own physical spaces – in some cases distant from each other. A final model for an integrated service has not yet been defined. (Conversations with EUD, SEFRO project staff, and government officials during the field phase) ● “We don’t want a European model” was the comment from one government official, others suggested that perhaps something closer to a Chilean model would work and yet others spoke of implementing the model Costa Rica currently uses. (Comments expressed by government officials during the field phase, regarding what kind of model could be adopted for integrated border management.) ● The police, customs and immigration should remain separate as we don’t want them “all mixed up together”. (Comment from a government official regarding housing the 3 services in one building.) ● Informants (from civil society and SICA/government institutions) indicated that the “transportistas” are not happy with the security mechanisms being put in place at border crossings - such as the scanners. The use of the scanner implies an \$18.00 cost and time delays. Time is of an essence at border crossings as the infrastructure cannot efficiently handle the amount of traffic crossing the borders and long line-ups are frequent. Also the transportistas already have a well-established informal security system of their own.
<p>I-5.3.2 – Participation of national institution personnel in technological transfer and capacity</p>	

building training and experience sharing programmes for cross-border management – numbers of activities and individuals involved and quality of programmes							
<i>Findings at indicator level</i>	<p>The SEFRO project has organized and implemented training activities that have included approximately 700 participants (this number may reflect a duplication of numbers where one individual attended more than one workshop). The activities undertaken include regional seminars on harmonization of policy, norms and procedures; Interpol databases, technology transfer, and passenger profiling. Regional and national conventions on border management, implementation of CA Security Strategy, including themes relating to organized crime, coordination strategies, customs crimes, management model for integrated border crossings have also occurred. Sharing of ‘best practices’ and a training operation on stolen vehicles were conducted. These activities were directed at border control officials.</p> <p>In February 2014 it was announced that SEFRO will support a virtual diploma programme taught by ICAP that will provide training for integrated border management and border security, composed of 3 modules: security, borders and globalization; policy, norms and procedures for Central American border security; and integrated border management.</p> <p>When asked about the training border officials responded with a general consensus that the training was beneficial, and joint training helped one understand better what other services do, and how to coordinate work more efficiently. The concept of integrated border management was seen to be positive and trained border officials were keen to integrate. However not everyone has received training in integrated border management and certain entire border crossings have no staff that has yet been trained. These people comment that there is no integration at their crossing. When people from civil society were questioned as to their experience crossing a border everyone commented that they perceived no changes.</p> <p>Even when border officials are trained they are rotated frequently to different crossings or into areas outside of the border work. This rotation is intentional and meant to curb corruption, however it also creates a lack of continuity of trained officials, a loss of experience and an increased cost for continual training needs. Frequent rotation has been recognized (government official in charge of integration) as a problem and it is planned for future officials to sign a contract guaranteeing a certain period of time in their functions.</p> <p>Also mentioned was the consideration that the “bosses” need to be trained because it is difficult to incorporate new procedures when your boss does not know about it.</p>						
<i>Data, sources, extracts</i>	<p>Supporting evidence:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The 4th and 5th SEFRO Informe Semestral ATI identified the following training activities conducted by the programme: <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <thead> <tr style="background-color: #800000; color: white;"> <th>Activities</th> <th>Subject Matter</th> <th>Participants</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>6 Regional Seminars</td> <td>Harmonization of Policy, Norms and Procedures; Interpol data base, passenger profiling; regional and national conventions on border</td> <td>261 border officials (immigration, customs, police), foreign affairs and military.</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Activities	Subject Matter	Participants	6 Regional Seminars	Harmonization of Policy, Norms and Procedures; Interpol data base, passenger profiling; regional and national conventions on border	261 border officials (immigration, customs, police), foreign affairs and military.
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Training Operation on 'stolen vehicles' at all 19 border crossings.	Stolen Vehicles.	Personnel from 19 border crossings.
Meetings in Holland and Poland.	Exchange of experience on border security management.	Frontex and Europol with 26 customs, immigration and police from Honduras, El Salvador, Panamá, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica.
<p>Conversations during the field phase with border personnel offered the following comments on training:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “Es excelente porque se adquieren conocimientos sobre aspectos que se manejan por las otras instituciones que prestan servicios en la frontera y se procuren mejores relaciones y coordinaciones” • “Muy bueno, ya que, permite la integración, intercambio y agrupación de los miembros de diversas entidades para mejor enlace.” • “La Secretaría General del Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana (SICA) a través del Programa Regional de Seguridad Fronteriza en América Central (SEFRO), y el Instituto Centroamericano de Administración Pública (ICAP), inauguró el 10 de febrero el primer “Diplomado Virtual en Seguridad Fronteriza y Gestión Integrada de Fronteras”, en donde se capacitará a 35 funcionarios involucrados en la administración de las fronteras en la region... <p>La capacitación tendrá una duración de seis meses y será impartida de forma virtual a través de tres módulos: Seguridad, Fronteras y Globalización; Políticas, Normativas y Procedimientos de Seguridad en las Fronteras Centroamericanas y Gestión Integrada de Fronteras.” (Inicia primer Diplomado Regional en Seguridad Fronteriza y Gestión Integrada de Fronteras; SG SICA, 12 febrero 2014)</p>		

	<p><u>Detracting evidence:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Comments from the border crossings indicate that not all staff have received training and in certain crossings no one has been trained. (Field visit 2014) • During the field phase of the project it became evident that there is a significant turnover of service personnel at border crossings, and moreover there has been a policy of rotating these functionaries frequently into other services so as to discourage corruption at the borders. One government official stated that this rotation policy will have to change in order not to jeopardize the potential for trained personnel to gain experience and perform at a maximum level. (Field visit conversations, 2014)
<p>I-5.3.3 – Undertaking of a diagnostic analysis of needs and functioning for border security</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>A multi-disciplinary team undertook a techno-strategic diagnostic analysis of 19 chosen border crossings in order to collect information and data on the current status of these crossings located between Guatemala/Mexico and Panama/Colombia. The team of experts and technical personnel included representatives from OCAM, CJCAMCC (The Commission of Chiefs and Directors of Police of Central America, Mexico, the Caribbean and Colombia), INTERPOL and SEFRO.</p> <p>The study looked at the data networks, internet connection, supply of electricity, telecommunications, human resources, infrastructure and performance of customs, immigration and police border officials. The results of the inquiry have been presented in a Final Report for each of the beneficiary countries of SICA within the framework of the SEFRO programme, and are serving as the basis for taking policy and technical decisions by the institutional authorities of each country involved. This data gathered has been used to determine the feasibility for supporting the interconnectivity of an integrated border management system wherein the border control would be conducted with full connection, coordination, communication and exchange of information in real time. It has also contributed to the planning for the incorporation of new information technology under the auspice of INTERPOL, and subsequently for a substantial improvement of regional border security.</p> <p>The study was delayed however it has now been completed, equipment has been purchased and delivery is to occur within the next few months. INTERPOL is awaiting arrival of the equipment to install the systems and to hook up the connectivity.</p>
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p><u>Supporting evidence:</u></p> <p>According to the 4th ‘Informe Semestral ATP’ and the ROM 2013</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The border diagnostic was completed for 19 border crossings. • Data was collected and analysed in order to determine the necessities for developing an integrated border management system. <p>Conversations during the field study clarified that although the study had been delayed it has now been completed, equipment has been purchased and delivery is to occur within the next few months. INTERPOL is awaiting arrival of the equipment to install the systems and to hook up the connectivity.</p> <p><u>Detracting evidence:</u></p> <p>(4th ‘Informe Semestral ATP’ and the ROM 2013)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There exists a strong compartmentalization of the different services involved in

	<p>border security, and customs is the least integrated.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Weakness is present at the technological capacity and infrastructure levels that prevent channels of connectivity within and between the countries.
<p>I-5.3.4 – Exchange of experiences with the EU about the creation of a free zone of movement for people, goods and capital (Schengen Agreement (SIS), EUROPOL) – number of individuals involved and quality of activities</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>The Central America region has minimal experience in technological support that integrates border control activities therefore SEFRO has involved European experts with internationally recognized experience in this area to introduce European systems such as the Schengen Information System (SIS) and the EUROPOL and FRONTEX expertise. FRONTEX and EUROPOL experts are participating in the training of the border security services as part of the SEFRO programme.</p> <p>As part of the programme twenty-six customs, immigration, police officials from Honduras, El Salvador, Panama, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Costa Rica visited the FRONTEX and EUROPOL offices in Holland and Poland to exchange experiences on border security management and to learn about the European systems in integrated border management. The following topics were covered:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Coordination, communication and information exchange methods used by the European agencies; The technological platform used to connect the different institutions; Legislation (norms and conventions) governing inter-institutional connectivity, information exchange coordination for operative procedures, inter-institutional communication; The kinds of legislation that establish limits for the Integrated Border Complex and decontaminate border activities from others that are not specifically border control; The different types of informal activities (i.e. commercial, travel insurance, food sales) that are permitted to operate in the border complex. <p>Even after completion of the above-mentioned exchanges, no model for integrated border management has been chosen. There is a clear reticence to adopt a fully integrated border system in CA.</p>
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p><u>Supporting evidence:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The 4th and 5th 'Informe Semestral ATP' and the ROM Report 2013 discuss the trips made by 26 customs, immigration and police officials from Central America to Europe to learn about the Schengen, Europol and Frontex systems as part of the SEFRO project. The objective was to understand the European model of integrated border management in order to see what might be adopted for the CA context. <p><u>Detracting evidence:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Informants (government / institution officials, civil society) during the field visit, demonstrated contradictory positions with regard to full regional integration over intergovernmental collaboration. Many informants stated that RI is the only way to go for Central American countries that are small and powerless in the global arena, however they also stated that trust must be developed first and integration will be a

	<p>long process. Others are unwilling to sacrifice any degree of sovereignty or to offer supranational powers to a regional organization. The vision for integrated border management has fallen to uncertainty and doubt. (Field visit 2014)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Some informants during the field visit spoke of the need for another information gathering trip to Chile to compare practices there in order to determine what might be compatible with the Central American context.
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I-5.3.5 – Capacity building and provision of technology and equipment to national bodies involved in the prevention and reduction of illicit arms possession and trafficking

<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>The CASAC I project was the first security project to be supported by the EC after the adoption of the Central America Security Strategy in 2007, and it was the first project to introduce a regional model, in this case to combat illicit arms possession and trafficking. CASAC I ran from 2008 – 2010, a second phase of the project began in 2012 and is to continue for three years. This project aims to support the fight against illicit possession and trafficking of firearms and explosive material in Central America and neighbouring countries by helping to improve the capacity of regional organisations. It responds directly to the increase in social violence and armed criminality in the region.</p> <p>In this endeavor CASAC has assisted in the establishment of national multidisciplinary commissions (CNM) on small arms and light weapons (SALW) in the regions countries and held a number of national workshops on ‘an inter-institutional and interdisciplinary approach to small arms control’. CASAC has also provided technical assistance on national legislation to Member States and planned and conducted, with INTERPOL and regional security forces, two operations to collect and destruct weapons (ORCA I/ORCA II) resulting in the destruction of nearly 20, 000 weapons. It has presented and approved, in a participatory manner with police and military units, a mapping and modus operandi methodology that provides information to identify the routes for trafficking illicit firearms along with the ten crimes with greatest impact in each country. Operation FRONTIER was also conducted to develop strategies and capacity to investigations and take action against car theft. It resulted in 118 interventions, seizure of 1,282 vehicles and the detention of 1,112 persons. New methodology for police investigations has been introduced and technology for the identification of arms will be implemented.</p> <p>A Code of Conduct for Central American States on the Transfer of Arms, Munitions, Explosives and other Related Materials has been approved, and advances have been made in the coordination, standardization and application of international, regional and national instruments related to small and light weapons. Progress has also been made in the application and implementation of the International Treaty on Arms Trade (ATT). CIFTA (The Interamerican Convention against the Fabrication and Illicit Traffic of Firearms, Munitions, Explosives and other related materials) has been ratified and adopted by all Central American countries.</p> <p>Even in light of the advances made it has been said that none of the countries of the region yet have an effective system for the control of arms and greater attention should be placed on implementation of existing legal instruments rather than new legislation or legal reforms. Some countries do not even consider arms trafficking a crime. There is a discussion on the most effective forum for the discussion, approval and homogenization of laws based on regional models and compatibility with international norms. It is said that some parliamentarians charged with security issues show little motivation, and decisions made by Parlecon are not binding. It is considered that FOPREL (Network of Presidents of the National Assemblies and Congress) would be a more appropriate arena for these</p>
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	<p>discussions and decisions.</p> <p>One of the principle achievements of the CASAC project has been the hands-on work by the regional security institutions in the preparation and conduction of the special operations (ORCA I/II and FRONTIER). These operations require planning, sharing of information, conduction of activities and evaluations – all undertaken in a joint manner by the different security forces from different countries. These activities produce shared experiences, shared information and most importantly the development of trust.</p>				
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p>Supporting evidence:</p> <p>Evaluación Formativo del proyecto CASAC con enfoque participativo; Informe Final, Dic. 2011:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Durante la Cumbre de Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno realizada en la ciudad de León, Nicaragua con fecha del 2 de diciembre del año 2005, se aprobó el Código de Conducta de los Estados Centroamericanos en Materia de Transferencia de Armas, Municiones, Explosivos y Otros Materiales Relacionados. El mismo, constituyo un acuerdo político regional que fue elaborado previo al establecimiento del CASAC. • Las acciones sustantivas del resultado tres se centran en una estrategia de sensibilización, capacitación e incidencia dirigida a los grupos metas y el impulso para el consenso regional frente al ATT, en este sentido se han aprovechado los espacios para sensibilizar a miembros de las sociedad civil, fiscales, jueces y funcionarios de las empresas de seguridad privada y durante las reuniones regionales de puntos focales, de contacto, y coordinadores de la Comisiones Nacionales Multidisciplinarias, los delegados de los países representados presentaron los avances en la aplicación de instrumentos internacionales y la ratificación del ATT. • Dentro de las acciones ejecutadas en materia del ATT se pueden mencionar - Taller sobre ATT con miembros de la Comisión de Seguridad de Centroamérica. - Taller Centroamericano Sobre Interdicción y Seguridad Regional de Armas Cortas y Ligeras en conjunto con ATF. • According to the CASAC Progress Report January 2012 the following activities were carried out: <table border="1" data-bbox="320 1487 1362 1991"> <thead> <tr> <th data-bbox="320 1487 644 1536">Project</th> <th data-bbox="644 1487 1362 1536">Activities</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td data-bbox="320 1536 644 1991"> <p>CASAC I</p> <p>Capacity Building activities with national institutions and officials and activities to enable the establishment of spaces of dialogue, information and experiences exchange between those national agencies linked to</p> </td> <td data-bbox="644 1536 1362 1991"> <p>Inter-parliamentary Conference for Central America and the Caribbean on “Parliamentary Action on Small Weapons: Regional Policies, Legislation and Approaches; 40 Parliamentarians from CA and Caribbean, plus from Mozambique Germany and Sweden.</p> <p>Mission to El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras: February 3-6. To make a consultation in each country, in order to get their viewpoints on the preliminary draft of the different components of the regional diagnosis (legislation, survey, mapping, etc.).</p> <p>VI Seminar on Small and Light Weapons. Cartagena, Colombia – February 16-20. To analyze the level of implementation of the United Nations Programme of</p> </td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Project	Activities	<p>CASAC I</p> <p>Capacity Building activities with national institutions and officials and activities to enable the establishment of spaces of dialogue, information and experiences exchange between those national agencies linked to</p>	<p>Inter-parliamentary Conference for Central America and the Caribbean on “Parliamentary Action on Small Weapons: Regional Policies, Legislation and Approaches; 40 Parliamentarians from CA and Caribbean, plus from Mozambique Germany and Sweden.</p> <p>Mission to El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras: February 3-6. To make a consultation in each country, in order to get their viewpoints on the preliminary draft of the different components of the regional diagnosis (legislation, survey, mapping, etc.).</p> <p>VI Seminar on Small and Light Weapons. Cartagena, Colombia – February 16-20. To analyze the level of implementation of the United Nations Programme of</p>
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	<p>SALW control.</p>	<p>Action and the proposed international arms trade treaty.</p> <p>Mission to El Salvador/ February 25. Presentation by the REU at the plenary session of the Central American Parliament on the situation of SALW control legislation in Central America, ratification of international instruments, legislative reform bills in process, and recommendations of the PARLACEN.</p> <p>Mission to Guatemala and Honduras / March. Follow-up of the Regional Diagnosis on Small and Light Weapons in order to jointly plan the final phase.</p> <p>Mission to El Salvador and Guatemala / April. Presentation of questionnaires on technological mechanisms and systems for exchange of information and border control.</p> <p>Mission to Costa Rica / May 5-6. Follow-up of the Regional Diagnosis.</p> <p>Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, Mexico, March 18- 19. Presentation of the CCC and parallel meetings related to trans-regional relations with MERCOSUR, the Andean Community and CARICOM.</p> <p>Mission to El Salvador, September 29 – October 1 Presentation of the results of the regional diagnosis.</p> <p>Mission to Panama – October 5-7: Presentation of the results of the regional diagnosis.</p> <p>13th training course on prevention and control of illicit trafficking of firearms, ammunition and explosives held in San Andres, Colombia, from the 6 - 17 of July. Training on practical tools for enforcement, security, justice and customs officials in order to improve inter-agency cooperation.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>During the field visit it was repeated frequently from CASAC project members, from security and government officials that the experience of the ORCA and FRONTIER operations served greatly to create trust among the participants. The sharing of experiences, of information and the learning of new possibilities brought people together more so than any policy directive can do.</u> 		
<p><u>Detracting evidence:</u></p> <p>(Evaluacion Formativo del proyecto CASAC con enfoque participativo; Informe Final, Dic. 2011):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Algunas legislaciones no tipifican el tráfico de armas de fuego como delito y no se contabilizan en la región condenas contra estructuras del tráfico de armas de fuego. • Ninguno de los países tiene un sistema de control de armas efectivo, ya que es tema más de gestión que de leyes. Es posible observar que la mayoría de los países ya tienen instrumentos que podrían hacer efectiva una lucha contra el tráfico ilícito de armas y se ha demostrado que tienen herramientas para trabajar en operaciones conjuntas con otros países de la región, como el reciente ejemplo de las campañas coordinadas entre las diferentes organizaciones policiales de Centroamérica, denominada “ORCA” (Octubre, 2011). Por tanto, un proyecto limitado en el 		

	<p>tiempo y en recursos no debería hacerse tanto énfasis en la preparación de normas, leyes y acuerdos sino más bien en la aplicación práctica de las mismas, motivando la oportuna toma de decisiones.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Especial atención ha dado esta evaluación al tema de la motivación por parte del CASAC a parlamentarios encargados del área de seguridad en los respectivos países, así como a los cuerpos regionales como PARLATINO, PARLACEN, y el Foro Parlamentario de Armas Pequeñas y Ligeras, constituido oficialmente en el Congreso de Diputados de España en 2002, siendo la única red de parlamentarios dedicada a específica y exclusivamente a los temas de control y desarme de armas pequeñas y ligeras además de la prevención de la violencia armada. También tuvo oportunidad de reunirse con el FOPREL, como red de presidentes activos de asambleas y congresos de la región. El CASAC destinó tiempo y recursos para promover la discusión y aprobación de las leyes y sobretodo de la homologación de las mismas en todos los países, basándose en modelos regionales de acuerdo con normas internacionales. Sin embargo, debido a la limitación de tiempo y al carácter externo de las deliberaciones, estas metas trascienden el ámbito del proyecto. En el caso de PARLACEN, por ejemplo, <i>las decisiones no tienen carácter vinculante</i>. La mayor parte de las personas consultadas con experiencia en el tema parlamentario y legal consideran que el FOPREL tendría mayor posibilidad de impulsar la aprobación de leyes y normas.
<p>JC 5.4 – Social prevention of violence mechanisms or community policing designed to facilitate greater cooperation and trust between citizens and law enforcement authorities and improved citizen security</p>	
<p><i>State ment on JC5.4</i></p>	
<p>I-5.4.1 – Design and development of municipal/community committees on prevention of violence, with citizen participation and community assessments leading to operational plans for the prevention of violence and crime</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>The AECID is implementing the EC funded project ‘Social Prevention of Violence at the Local Level in Central America’. This project proposes to reduce insecurity in the region by conducting community diagnostic studies that will form the basis for specific Municipal policy and plans to promote the social prevention of violence. These activities are to be located in 36 municipalities in the following border regions: Trifinio – Trinational border area between El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, the border region between Honduras and Nicaragua and the border between southern Costa Rica and Panama. Local committees will be established to conduct studies, design and implement municipal plans. The complete process will be undertaken in a participatory manner among local municipal personnel, security institutions and members of civil society, including youth, women and indigenous peoples. The programme will provide training and technical assistance to the local Committees in the management of citizen security and support for coordination with government bodies and the police.</p> <p>The concept of working from the bottom up to improve security – work with communities, the municipal authorities, security officials and civil society - has broad support and other experiences indicate that working with people at the local level can lead to influence at institutional and national levels.</p> <p>It has been impossible to evaluate this project as administrative delays along with a lack of consensus on the part of member States to agree on the location of the participant</p>

	<p>municipalities have stalled the initiation of this project. The difficulty to arrive at an agreement on details, once concepts have been accepted, again reflects political sensitivities and a lack of common vision.</p> <p>The EU is also supporting the RETE, JURCA and PREVENIR projects that also promote the social prevention of violence from different angles. RETE works with child garbage dump workers and their families in order to reinsert the children into schools and their social milieu while assisting in the improvement of the families' socio-economic level and in improved application of ILO, national and international legislation against child labour.</p> <p>JURCA promotes strengthened technical and administrative capacity of the Regional Youth Network and 7 national networks for the prevention of violence, increased capacity for political participation (to propose and to influence) of the Regional Youth Network in restorative justice, prevention of violence, respect for human rights and gender equality. And PREVENIR supports the training of multidisciplinary teams composed of municipal officials, education, labour, security, youth, governance and civil society personnel, linked to universities that can advise on the elaboration and implementation of municipal plans for the prevention of violence. Also this project supports job skills training for youth and the promotion of youth employment. These three programmes provide services in some but not all countries of Central America.</p>
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p><u>Supporting evidence:</u></p> <p>The AECID 'Action Fiche' (Support to Central America Security Strategy) indicates:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Result 1. Strengthened capacity of both public officials and local communities to manage social prevention of violence. It aims at creating appropriate conditions for the formulation and implementation of participatory municipal plans through applied learning processes. • All agreements/documents have been signed to operationalize this project. (EUD Managua informants.) • DIAKONIA, JURCA and RETE project staff (during the field visit) all expressed the opinion that working from bottom up can influence institutional and national policy. • Project documents for the PREVENIR, RETE and JURCA projects. <p><u>Detracting evidence:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The AECID project has not yet commenced due to lack of agreement by member States in the identification of the 36 municipalities..
<p>I-5.4.2 – Regional/ national institutional training for police, prosecutors, judges, other stakeholders in social prevention of violence (including # training programmes for local committees to design, implement and monitor municipal plans for prevention of violence, and training programmes for community promoters)</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>The AECID project proposes to train community promoters in violence prevention and to facilitate training for security and judicial sector officials in order to improve citizen security. This project has been delayed due to the inability of member States to agree on which municipalities will participate., therefore no training has yet begun.</p> <p>The DIAKONIA project that works with four national women's networks and deals with the prevention of violence against women is utilizing social prevention of violence methodology in this area and has conducted research, training and awareness raising</p>

	activities both within the networks but also with national and regional institutions, including FLACSO (an academic research centre).																		
<i>Data, sources, extracts</i>	<p>Supporting evidence:</p> <p>The AECID ‘Action Fiche’ (Support to Central America Security Strategy) indicates:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Result 4. Increased capacities and efficiency of police bodies and institutions responsible for security and justice. It involves training of police, prosecutors and judges. The implementation of training activities will be mainly the responsibility of existing national institutions (e.g. police academies, law schools) according to the criteria of the overall and annual planning of activities. Combined trainings between the 3 services will be promoted. • DIAKONIA (Feb 2012 – January 2013) has conducted the following activities according to the ‘Informe narativo intermedio del proyecto’. <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Activities</th> <th>Subject Matter</th> <th>Participants</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>4 Regional Planning Meetings</td> <td>Rights of Women and Security</td> <td>64 – Network Delegates, COMMCA</td> </tr> <tr> <td>National Planning Meeting</td> <td>Rights of Women and Security</td> <td>141 Members of womens’s organizations, project coordination team</td> </tr> <tr> <td>5 Network Meetings</td> <td>Monitoring</td> <td>>126 members of the network</td> </tr> <tr> <td>63 Interviews</td> <td>Interviews between networks and regional representatives</td> <td>2 delegates from each national network and a FLACSO representative in each interview</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Meeting</td> <td>Presentation of document on variables for national Observatories to monitor policy and incidence of violence against women.</td> <td>>48 police, mayors, Security Reform Commission, Security Secretariat, National Women’s Institute, Human Rights Secretariat, National Assembly, Public Ministry, Supreme Court, CC-SICA</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>Detracting evidence:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project to date has not begun operations due to a lack of agreement by member States to decide upon which municipalities will participate in the project. 	Activities	Subject Matter	Participants	4 Regional Planning Meetings	Rights of Women and Security	64 – Network Delegates, COMMCA	National Planning Meeting	Rights of Women and Security	141 Members of womens’s organizations, project coordination team	5 Network Meetings	Monitoring	>126 members of the network	63 Interviews	Interviews between networks and regional representatives	2 delegates from each national network and a FLACSO representative in each interview	Meeting	Presentation of document on variables for national Observatories to monitor policy and incidence of violence against women.	>48 police, mayors, Security Reform Commission, Security Secretariat, National Women’s Institute, Human Rights Secretariat, National Assembly, Public Ministry, Supreme Court, CC-SICA
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I-5.4.3 – Youth training programmes in job skills and entrepreneurship																			
<i>Findings at indicator level</i>	The EC support to the AECID project that deals with social prevention of violence in 36 border municipalities has proposed to promote job skills and entrepreneurial training directed at employment for vulnerable youth. This indicator will also be examined during the field study. The project however, has not yet commenced.																		
<i>Data,</i>	Supporting evidence:																		

<i>sources, extracts</i>	<p>R3A2: Promotion of employment and youth entrepreneurship for vulnerable populations in collaboration with existing vocational training institutions at district level (Action Fiche; Support to Central America Security Strategy).</p> <p><u>Detracting evidence:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> It has been impossible to initiate this project as member States do not agree on which municipalities will participate.
I-5.4.4 – Change in # of public spaces recovered and incidence of violence	
<i>Findings at indicator level</i>	
<i>Data, sources, extracts</i>	<p><u>Supporting evidence:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Within the strategy of social prevention of violence the AECID project proposes to recuperate urban spaces as part of the municipal security plans. This objective is combined with providing community centres and activities for at risk youth and children <p><u>Detracting evidence:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> This project has not yet commenced.
I-5.4.5 – Improved relationship between citizens and security sector officials	
<i>Findings at indicator level</i>	As this project has yet to begin it is impossible to determine whether relationships have improved..
<i>Data, sources, extracts</i>	<p><u>Supporting evidence:</u></p> <p><u>Detracting evidence:</u></p>
JC 5.5 – EU support facilitates greater participation of civil society organizations and other social sectors (i.e., women, youth, indigenous, ethnic minorities etc.), and gender equity in planning and implementation of security policy and programmes	
<i>Statement on JC5.5</i>	
I-5.5.1 – # / quality of initiatives to promote participation of civil society, indigenous groups and other social sectors (in policy development, planning and implementation of security related activities)	
<i>Findings at indicator</i>	The integration of civil society organizations into the political process of regional integration is officially established within the SICA structure. The Consultative Committee (CC-SICA) is the independent and autonomous body for civil society. It was established in 1996 to strengthen integration, development and democracy

<p><i>tor level</i></p>	<p>in Central America. The mission of CC-SICA is to promote the participation of civil society in order to assure that integration reflects the reality, the needs and the interests of the population within the framework of the Tegucigalpa Protocol.</p> <p>The EU also promotes the participation of civil society in the preparation and implementation in all programmes supporting regional integration and encourages the social ownership of this process. In reality the participation of civil society has been minimal and limited mainly to the private sector and labour. The lack of participation of other sectors has been explained as being due to the lack of regional level civil society organizations – they just have no regional presence. On the other hand CSOs complain that there are many obstacles to their incorporation into CC-SICA. The private sector is the most active group; it apparently has a strong influence on national government decision-making as well as having a specific interest in the perceived benefits integration can offer its business interests.</p> <p>Although civil society participation is a crosscutting issue in EU strategies most of the interventions do not include clear project lines for its inclusion. Civil society organizations maintain networks, both nationally and some regionally, that offer training and awareness-raising of the population around citizen security issues (i.e. DIAKONIA and REDCEPAZ) . These organizations can provide grass roots support for crime prevention and in collaboration with the security authorities methods for the combat of crime. The social prevention of crime mechanisms that include community studies and the participatory development of municipal plans for crime prevention and control, as proposed in the EU supported intervention ‘Social Prevention of Violence at the Local Level’ (AECID), offer new and broader approaches to insecurity than those of the traditional security sectors.</p> <p>Although there have been difficulties for civil society organizations to participate with SEFRO there has been a growing recognition within the SEFRO and CASAC projects that coordination and collaboration with civil society is both necessary and beneficial. These connections have been made with REDCEPAZ and they now need to be strengthened and extended. By gaining the trust of civil society organizations and the regional networks added value to security efforts will be achieved and consolidation of programme sustainability.</p> <p>Only the IEPADES, DIAKONIA and AECID interventions have included indigenous and marginalized groups within their activities.</p> <p>There has also been a sense of reticence found on the part of some NGOs to work with governmental authorities as governments are seen as their opposition, some governments have also indicated they do not want to work with civil society organizations, particularly in security matters..</p> <p>REDCEPAZ made advances to participate with CC-SICA. The contact with CC-SICA was not initially successful however they did sign a letter of understanding with SG-SICA that opened spaces for participation and collaboration in areas of common interest. Although this collaboration has grown REDCEPAZ, supported by the EC within the ESCA strategy, is still looking to increase the spaces of participation and collaboration between civil society and governmental bodies that will permit civil society to have a greater influence in policy development, the prevention of armed violence and the promotion of improved regional security.</p>
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<i>Data, source s, extracts</i>	<p><u>Supporting evidence:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Specific provision will be made in all three components of this response strategy for participation of civil society in preparation and implementation of the programmes in support of the regional integration process and to enhance the social ownership of the integration process and the visibility of the EC action. (RSP – Central America 2007 – 2013) p. 21 ● The Protocol of Tegucigalpa, defined as an autonomous entity within the SICA system, linked for operation purposes to the General Secretariat, the so called SICA’s Consultative Committee. CC-SICA, as it is known, groups in a set-up that promotes collaboration, regional umbrella type organizations from the business, labor, academic and other sectors of Central American society. They work together, are consulted, and provide Civil Society opinions to the Heads of State and Government Summits, and other SICA bodies. Let me assure you that the exchanges, even if still a long way to go towards perfection, are lively and useful. (Echeverria, SICA) ● “The effort to develop the Central American Security Strategy would have been incomplete, without the input that Civil Society has provided. The effort ... comprise formal and informal consultation mechanisms with civil society, including NGOs and other entities that were not members or did not fit within the conceptual definition of a regional civil society entity. Workshops, meetings, panels, etc., with participants physically in some occasions and virtually present in some others via videoconference, were held. Civil Society contributed in a very constructive manner.” (Echeverria, SICA) ● In recent meetings in Panama (December 2013) CC-SICA publicly stated that “... la importancia de seguir promoviendo la participación activa de la sociedad civil, para que el proceso de la integración responda efectivamente a la realidad, necesidades e intereses de la población de los países del SICA.” (CC-SICA webpage) ● The following list is from 2003 but it does indicate the predominance of private sector and labour groups. It will be important find an updated list during the field visit. (CDF Profiles: The Central America Integration Process, World Bank, 2004) <hr style="width: 50%; margin-left: 0;"/> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>Civil Society Members of the Consultative Group:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Federation of Municipalities of the Central American Isthmus, FEMICA. ➤ Federation of Central American Chambers and Associations of Industry, FECAICA. ➤ Central American and Caribbean Confederation of Small and Medium Enterprises, CONCAPE. ➤ Central American Confederation of Workers, CTCA. ➤ Central American Federation of Transportation, FECATRANS. ➤ Association of Private Universities of Central America and Panama, AUPRICA. ➤ Union of Small and Medium Coffee Producers of Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean, UPROCAFE. ➤ Central American Coordinating of Workers, COCENTRA. ➤ Association of Central American Farmer Organizations for Development Coordination, ASOCODE.
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- Central American Agreement of Developmental Organizations, CONCERTACION CENTROAMERICANA.
 - Federation of Chambers of Commerce of the Central American Isthmus, FECAMCO.
 - Federation of Private Entities of Central America and Panama, FEDIPRICAP.
 - Supreme University Council of Central America, CSUCA.
 - Confederation of Central American Workers, CCT.
 - Confederation of Cooperatives of the Caribbean and Central America, CCC-CA.
 - Central American Council of Workers for Education and Culture, CONCATEC.
 - Central American Chapter of the World Council of Indigenous People, CMPI.
- Civil society is involved throughout the evolution of the project, particularly as regards to the prevention component (Action Fiche, IEPADES)
 - An opportunity to consolidate a coordinated effort among REDCEPAZ, SEFRO and CASAC occurred with the “Primer Encuentro Regional entre Gobiernos y Organizaciones de la Sociedad Civil sobre prevención de la violencia armada, control de tráfico ilícito y seguridad fronteriza, el cual se realizó en colaboración con CASAC y SEFRO; el mismo sirvió de espacio para presentar los hallazgos de las investigaciones y concitar contactos para futuras colaboraciones”. (Informe Descriptivo Intermedio – 2012; IEPADES)

See chart below.

Activities	Subject Matter	Participants
Regional Encounter between Government and CSOs – in order to present findings from their investigations and to concretize contacts for future collaboration	Prevention of armed violence, control of illicit trade and border security	REDCEPAZ and associates (IEPADES, CIPRODEH, FESPAD, FUNPADEM, IEEPP), SEFRO, CASAC, representatives from national Ministries of Foreign Affairs, customs, immigration, police, judicial authorities, armed forces, arms control bodies and civil society.

- DIAKONIA activities have incorporated CSOs, indigenous peoples and other sectors during the period of Feb 2012 – January 2013. (Informe narativo intermedio del proyecto)

Activities	Subject Matter	Participants
4 Regional Planning Meetings	Rights of Women and Security	64 – Network Delegates, COMMCA

Meeting	Presentation of document on variables for national Observatories to monitor policy and incidence of violence against women.	>48 police, mayors, Security Reform Commission, Security Secretariat, National Women's Institute, Human Rights Secretariat, National Assembly, Public Ministry, Supreme Court, CC-SICA
6 Module Training Programme	Prevention of Violence Against Women	176 women delegates from 4 countries – including young, adult and indigenous women (Mayas, Tolupanes, Lencas, Miskitas, and Mayagnas) and African descendants.

The Final Evaluation report for the CASAC I project recommends:

- Ganar la confianza de las OSC y de las redes regionales de investigación que aportarían valor agregado y consolidarían los esfuerzos de sostenibilidad con las comunidades, las alcaldías municipales, el sistema educativo, y los gobiernos. Dándoles la oportunidad se crean multiplicadores de bajo costo en la región donde trabajan el tema CASAC (p58).
- Establecer una administración del CASAC basada en resultados, promoviendo la implementación del proyecto de abajo hacia arriba, buscando la construcción de procesos participativos, teniendo en cuenta que se trata de un proyecto “global” con enfoque regional: empoderamiento local, fortalecimiento de las organizaciones locales, logros nacionales y, finalmente, integración regional. (P 59).
- Buscar la articulación, comunicación y coordinación entre los gobiernos y las organizaciones de sociedad civil para establecer procesos sostenibles (p. 60).

Detracting evidence:

- Comments from the RG meetings in Brussels indicated that civil society has decreased its presence in recent years and is not a significant player at the regional level. The civil society sectors that have participated are primarily the private sector and labour. The private sector has strong influence over government decisions and is very keen on regional integration as they consider it will benefit their own business interests. Human rights, women and youth groups are not represented. (Interview, Brussels)
- The Consultative Committee (CC-SICA)

“The civil society has been the other target of the Parlacen's campaign to expand its role and enlarge the spectrum of integration. Even more than political society, civil society was completely excluded from the regional integration process. Certainly, the general political situation of Central American countries did not make easy for civil society to exist, in the first place, much less to intervene in a process considered primarily of being competency of the executive. The creation of the Consultative Committee of the SICA, according to Art. 12 of the Protocol of Tegucigalpa (1991) and paragraph 34 of the Agenda of Guatemala (1993) of the XV Meeting of Central American Presidents. and its effective incorporation in the SICA as independent and autonomous body of the civil society responsible for strengthening integration, development and democracy in the region in 1996, bringing together a series of non-governmental organisations and platforms allowed, for the first

time, to these non-state actors to have a saying, be it a consultative one, over the developments in regional integration. The Parlacen snatched this opportunity and multiplied its contacts with various local, national and regional organisations and movements with the objective both to recall the existence of the Parliament to them and to take into account their needs and demands. These contacts were useful: in the past civil society, especially those movements that challenged the governments in place, tended to reject all expressions of organised political life and considered that the Parlacen was nothing more than a group of highly-remunerated establishment politicians, completely detached from the real needs of the people. The permanent relations thus created broke, little by little, this diffidence and permitted to both sides to find common ground for discussions as well as to determine their adversaries and act together on various cases.” (Central America Integration System; International Democracy Watch)

- REDCEPAZ has reported that when it approached CC-SICA there was difficulty in integrating their ranks. (Informe Descriptivo Intermedio – 2012; IEPADES)
- “La Red realizó un acercamiento a SEFRO, el programa de SICA de Seguridad Fronteriza con la finalidad de aunar esfuerzos en este componente debido al trabajo natural que SEFRO se encuentra realizando en la zona de frontera. En una primera instancia se convergió en realizar una alianza estratégica para generar y compartir información respecto a temas de interés común. En ese sentido se programó una intervención coordinada sobre la base de una propuesta metodológica elaborada por la Red. En este ámbito el avance ha sido limitado, establecido en un 20% que corresponde con la elaboración de la propuesta metodológica de abordaje. Los atrasos sufridos en esta área correspondieron a la falta de concreción de los acuerdos que se establecieron con el Programa SEFRO. La Red no excluye mantener y realizar acercamientos a SEFRO y a sus miembros, no obstante, se parte de una postura diferente, entendiendo REDCEPAZ que el abordaje de SEFRO es eminentemente institucional y que es difícil viabilizar acuerdos dentro de una visión tan burocrática”. (Informe Descriptivo Intermedio – 2012; IEPADES)
 - “El mayor reto sigue siendo la capacidad de la sociedad civil de incidir en la mejora de las condiciones del control y prevención de los gobiernos y los agentes que participan en estos procesos. Los aspectos que reiteradamente se mencionan entre los gobiernos como ausentes son la coordinación, la comunicación, la disposición de información y las capacidades técnicas, humanas y financieras. Hay una tendencia, que varía de país a país y según coyunturas y contextos específicos, de renuencia a colaborar con las organizaciones de la sociedad civil. Algunos representantes gubernamentales rechazan la información provista por la Red, pese a que la información consignada es incluso obtenida de las propias fuentes oficiales de gobierno; esta situación es característica de lo que acontece en Nicaragua. Ante esta situación la Red reconoce que ampliar los espacios de interlocución sobre bases inclusivas y multisectoriales aporta al mantenimiento del tema en la agenda.” (Informe Descriptivo Intermedio – 2012; IEPADES)
 - “Many problems exist in the work with some NGOs that specialise in violence and SALW. Many follow their own agendas and, in some cases, their relations with the governments are characterized by tension and mutual distrust. Besides, in the research and diagnoses it is difficult to use the data and information provided by some NGOs because they are usually questioned by the governments. All this makes it difficult to

	<p>incorporate these organizations in the NMCs and affects some actions of the programme, considering that the programme has to promote the participation of civil society organisations and NGOs in different instances and processes for addressing this issue in an integral manner. In some countries, the governments have clearly indicated that they do not want to work with NGOs in general or with some specific NGOs, and they have expressed their disagreement regarding the integration of these organisations in the NMC.” (CASAC Progress Report January 2012)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> As expressed above REDCEPAZ has encountered difficulties to incorporate into CC-SICA. This experience is not unique, other civil society organizations related similar experiences. It was also noted by various informants that if the head of an NGO network is politically astute, connected and knows how to manoeuvre they will have a better chance of entering CC-SICA than others. There is no functioning ‘invitation mechanism’ on the part of CC-SICA that encourages the participation of civil society organizations. (Conversations during the Field visit, April 2014)
<p>I-5.5.2 – Incorporation of human rights guidelines, including gender equality and equity policy (SICA- PRIEG) in RIOs and national institutions in the security sector</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>A gender perspective has been institutionalized in SICA beginning with the incorporation of COMMCA into SICA in June 2005, during the XXIV Presidents Meeting, then the XXXV Presidents Meeting (June 2010) decided to incorporate gender equality and equity as strategic themes of high priority in national and regional development policies and plans both at the level of SICA and the Member States. Also during the III Meeting of CENTROESTAD (incorporated in 2008) it was agreed to incorporate a gender perspective into the production of regional statistics with the objective to identify the differentiated reality between men and women. The first step to operationalize this agreement was to request that all statistics be divided by gender. PRIEG (La Política Regional de Igualdad y Equidad de Género) was adopted in December 2013)</p> <p>The EU has a well-established gender policy, however gender and human rights issues have been included in the security projects in an unbalanced manner. The CASAC projects have not included the crosscutting issues of human rights and gender in their project design but there is now indication that a gender perspective will be incorporated in CASAC II. The SEFRO project considers that these issues have been dealt with “in a different manner” Gender is considered to be a priority for the programme as the vulnerability of women and children is implicit in border security; however there is no planning for specific activities or policy development related to gender or human rights. There have been only two lectures on Gender and Border issues imparted within broader workshops during the duration of this project.</p> <p>Now that the PRIEG policy has been adopted by SICA all RIOs and member States, are compelled to assume and operationalize the tenants of this policy. A monitoring system for implementation is being developed and COMMCA is working with OBSICA to identify indicators. Projects supported by the EU in Central America are increasingly adopting gender awareness and policy into programming, even when not officially written into project budgets and activities.</p> <p>The Central American model for democratic security is based on human rights concepts but there is still no specific institutional policy for human rights, as there now is for gender.</p>

<p><i>Data, source, extracts</i></p>	<p><u>Supporting evidence:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Institutionalization of a gender perspective in SICA ✓ Begins with the incorporation of COMMCA into SICA in June 2005, during the XXIV Presidents Meeting ✓ The XXXV Presidents Meeting (June 2010) decides to incorporate gender equality and equity as strategic themes of high priority in national and regional development policies and plans both at the level of SICA and the Member States. ✓ During the III Meeting of CENTROESTAD (incorporated in 2008) it was agreed to incorporate a gender perspective into the production of regional statistics with the objective to identify the differentiated reality between men and women. The first step to operationalize this agreement was to request that all statistics be divided by gender. (Presentacion: “Politica Regional de Igualdad y Equidad de Genero; Sra. Markelda Montenegro de Herrera, Dic. 2013) ● Equal opportunities and exclusion: All action under this strategy will take into consideration equal participation by men and women and access for indigenous communities, in order to combat exclusion and marginalisation. In particular, gender equality will be promoted at regional level (policy making, pilot initiatives, and exchange of good practices) as a complement and in coherence with the EC Country Strategy Papers for 2007-13. These foresee specific actions in this area. (RSP Central America, 2007-2013) ● PRIEG policy - Política Regional de Igualdad y Equidad de Género del Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana (PRIEG/SICA), Dic. 2013 ● Informants (SEFRO / CASAC) personnel, SICA officials), during the field phase, commented that gender policy is gradually being adopted into programming and policy of all activities, even when it is not written into budgets and project activities. <p><u>Detracting evidence:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Con respecto a los temas transversales, se detectó que no hay una definición clara del enfoque de género o de derechos humanos como parte integral del proyecto, aunque la evaluación detectó varios casos en los cuales la vinculación de Organizaciones de la Sociedad Civil (OSC) aportaron elementos y prácticas que incluyen el papel de mujeres en la detección y denuncia de armas ilegales, violencia intrafamiliar asociada a armas de fuego y procesos de intercambio y destrucción de pistolas, revólveres y otros armas. (Evaluacion Formativa del Proyecto CASAC con enfoque participativo – Informe Final; Dic. 2011) ● The Central American model for democratic security is based on human rights concepts but there is still no specific human rights policy within SICA. (Conversations with SICA officials 2014 Field visit)
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I-5.5.3 – Comparative statistics on numbers of women employed in national institutions and RIOs in the security sector																						
<i>Findings at indicator level</i>	<p>These statistics have not been officially determined within the SICA system and therefore are not available. However training programmes undertaken by ESCA projects have trained 2,989 persons – 36% of these are women. The national police forces have the following statistics for the year 2012.</p> <table border="0" style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <td style="width: 30%;">Costa Rica</td> <td style="width: 40%;">2,968 women</td> <td style="width: 30%;">18.40%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>El Salvador</td> <td>2,084</td> <td>9.60</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Guatemala</td> <td>2,997</td> <td>12.20</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Nicaragua</td> <td>3,129</td> <td>28.20</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Honduras</td> <td>1,008</td> <td>6.90</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Panama</td> <td>2,302</td> <td>11.80</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Rep. Dominicana</td> <td>3,258</td> <td>13.60</td> </tr> </table>	Costa Rica	2,968 women	18.40%	El Salvador	2,084	9.60	Guatemala	2,997	12.20	Nicaragua	3,129	28.20	Honduras	1,008	6.90	Panama	2,302	11.80	Rep. Dominicana	3,258	13.60
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	<p><u>Detracting evidence:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> A high level SICA official stated that SICA has no official gender data relating to how many men/women work in the system. (Field study 2014) 																							
<p>I-5.5.4 – Budget lines for including civil society, women and other social sectors in above-mentioned activities</p>																								
<i>Findings at indicator level</i>	<p>Budget lines for the inclusion of civil society, women and other sectors have been absent from most of the projects except those undertaken by CSOs.</p>																							
<i>Data, sources, extracts</i>	<p>Table 5.1: Projects with a Gender Focus (Project documents)</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Project</th> <th>Budget for CC Issues</th> <th>Identified activities/diagnostic tools for CC issues</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>SEFRO</td> <td>Nil</td> <td>2 talks given on gender issues during broader workshops Inclusion of civil society has begun with a developing relationship of collaboration with REDCEPAZ</td> </tr> <tr> <td>CASAC I</td> <td>Nil</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>CASAC II</td> <td>Nil</td> <td>It has been noted in the ROM that a gender perspective must be incorporated into the programme A relationship with REDCEPAZ exists and recommendations to collaborate with other CSOs have been made.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>AECID</td> <td>Gender focus present in all activities</td> <td>Gender equality present in planning, execution and monitoring of project, including all decision making, with a perspective to empower women, and in all activities of the programme. The methodology identified is inclusive and civil society, youth and indigenous will participate in all activities of the project.</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>Table 5.2: Projects implemented by CSOs</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Project</th> <th>Budget for CC issues</th> <th>Identified activities/diagnostic tools for CC issues</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>IEPADES</td> <td>Project Budget = € 812,500 Budget for CC issues = € 132,000</td> <td>The nature of this project is the inclusion of civil society in security issues therefore all funding is dedicated in some way to civil society activities and the promotion of collaboration with official sectors.</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>			Project	Budget for CC Issues	Identified activities/diagnostic tools for CC issues	SEFRO	Nil	2 talks given on gender issues during broader workshops Inclusion of civil society has begun with a developing relationship of collaboration with REDCEPAZ	CASAC I	Nil		CASAC II	Nil	It has been noted in the ROM that a gender perspective must be incorporated into the programme A relationship with REDCEPAZ exists and recommendations to collaborate with other CSOs have been made.	AECID	Gender focus present in all activities	Gender equality present in planning, execution and monitoring of project, including all decision making, with a perspective to empower women, and in all activities of the programme. The methodology identified is inclusive and civil society, youth and indigenous will participate in all activities of the project.	Project	Budget for CC issues	Identified activities/diagnostic tools for CC issues	IEPADES	Project Budget = € 812,500 Budget for CC issues = € 132,000	The nature of this project is the inclusion of civil society in security issues therefore all funding is dedicated in some way to civil society activities and the promotion of collaboration with official sectors.
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	DIAKONIA	€ 811,501 Entire budget is targeting women's security	The activities conducted by this project are organized and conducted by and for civil society organizations for the prevention of violence against women. They include women, youth and indigenous peoples.
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OTHER RELEVANT INFORMATION (NOT CAPTURED ELSEWHERE IN THIS EQ)

Table 5.3: Overview of main beneficiary organisations, type of support and main outputs in EU support to regional security

Direct Beneficiary Organisation	Type of Support	Main Outputs
SICA Secretariat	<u>SEFRO</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TA in integrated border management • TA and technological transfer for police to improve inter-connection of information systems • Capacity building for police to prevent organized crime and trafficking at borders 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 19 integrated border-crossings <p>Harmonized regional policy, procedures and norms</p> <p>Access to INTERPOL data bases and services</p> <p>Regular regional inter-institutional meetings, coordination and cooperation within ESCA</p>
SICA Secretariat	<u>CASAC I/ II</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TA for improved arms registering and control • TA in coordination, standardization and application of international instruments for arms control • TA for conducting regional operations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mapping and modus operandi of the trafficking routes for arms in CA • Improved regional cooperation between police and security sectors against arms trafficking • Strengthened National Units charged with arms registering and control • Improved

			<p>information sharing</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Adequate and harmonized regional legislation
	IEPADES	<p><u>Support to the Implementation of ESCA in the Components of Prevention and Combatting Crime Related to Small and Light Arms and Armed Violence</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training for the design and implementation of security strategies for fighting and preventing crimes related to small and lightweight arms 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A regional action programme for the implementation of ESCA relating to arms control and armed violence • Strengthened National Commissions on firearms control and prevention of armed violence • Strengthened Central America Network for Peace Building and Human Security (REDCEPAZ) • Improved coordination between CSOs and regional and national institutions
	DIAKONIA	<p><u>Observation, Participation and Influence of the Women's Networks of Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador for a Central America Safe for Women</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training for the implementation of regional security policies with a gender focus • Support to strengthening national women's networks in Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consolidation of security policies which include security proposals for women • Strengthened national women's networks in analysis, advocacy and articulation • A regional women's security agenda

		Nicaragua	
	AECID	<p><u>Social Prevention of Violence by Local Government</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training for the implementation of ESCA in the components of prevention of violence and institution building at the local level • TA for security institutions on the social prevention of violence 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reduced insecurity in CA • Community diagnostic reports on their security situation • 36 Municipalities formulating security policy and plans based on diagnostic for the social prevention of violence • Implementation of security plans in a participatory manner including security institutions, civil society and women, youth and indigenous
	SOLETERRE	<p><u>Promotion of the Rights of Working Children and Adolescents in Honduras and Nicaragua (RETE)</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>Technical assistance for improved application of legal instruments regarding child labour</u> • <u>Capacity building and strengthening of community structures and participatory processes to protect the rights of the child.</u> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1430 children / adolescent garbage dump workers to be reinserted into schools and social milieu • Improved socio-economic level of families in order to prevent child labour • Creation and strengthening of social spaces and networks for the defence of the rights of the child and against child labour at community, municipal and national levels • Improved application of ILO, national and international instruments against child labour

	<p>GIZ</p>	<p><u>Prevention of Juvenile Violence in Central America (PREVENIR)</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Technical assistance and capacity building for development, coordination and exchange of knowledge and experience for the prevention of juvenile violence. • Technical assistance for the harmonization of prevention, education and youth policies in the area of prevention of violence. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Trained multidisciplinary teams composed of municipal officials, education, labour, security, youth, governance and civil society personnel, linked to universities that can advise on the elaboration and implementation of municipal plans for the prevention of violence. • Training programmes for youth that will provide marketable skills • Regional webpage for youth with information regarding training possibilities, scholarships and job offers. • A Diploma programme in Education for Peace • Trained teachers and parents that can support youth in confronting challenges and preventing violence.
	<p>SOLETERRE</p>	<p><u>Youth Networks for Restorative Justice in Central America (JURCA)</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>Technical assistance in restorative justice</u> • <u>Capacity building and training to create and strengthen</u> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthened technical and administrative capacity of the Regional Youth Network and 7 national networks for the prevention of violence • Increased capacity for political participation (to

		<u>youth networks regionally</u>	propose and to influence) of the Regional Youth Network in restorative justice, prevention of violence, respect for human rights and gender equality.

EQ:6 Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR)

EQ 6 – To what extent has European Union support helped to strengthen the capacity of RIOs and other relevant stakeholders at regional, national and local level to develop a regionally consistent legal and institutional framework for disaster risk reduction, including for the integrated management of risks linked to environmental degradation?	
JC 6.1 – Improved information exchange systems⁴¹, and coordination capacity of SICA security bodies⁴² enhance strategic and operational planning and implementation of regional security measures and the regional security strategy	
<i>Statement on JC6.1</i>	
I-6.1.1 – SICA bodies carry out an increased number of tasks related to (coordination of) disaster risk reduction, integrated risk management	
<i>Findings at indicator level</i>	<p>The EU cooperation in Central America through its PREVDA program (2006-2011) contributed significantly to improve communication and coordination among SICA bodies related to DRR, Water and Environment and increasing the number of joint actions and initiatives particularly between 2009 and 2011 when the programme developed most of the expected outcomes and outputs.</p> <p>Regarding the cooperation and coordination amongst SE-CEPREDENAC, SE-CCAD and SE-CRRH, the most important achievement was the creation of the Environmental Subsystem (SSA) with a shared agenda of the three secretariats to promote the Integrated Management of Risk, Water and Environment (GIRAA), but especially the opportunity for the three SE to meet and share their own agendas in relation to climate change influencing the formulation of the Regional Strategy on Climate Change (ERCC) supported by other donors. According to interviews held during the field phase the key stakeholders of the RIOs integrating the Environmental Sub-System-SSA are convinced of the added value and need to work together with common planning and integrated approaches. The change in their mid-set and the ownership of GIRAA approach, both are considered from their perspective the main contribution of EU cooperation in this regard.</p> <p>However, for different reasons, to date, the SSA has not reached the strength and official recognition expected and originally planned and once PREVDA concluded SSA had difficulties to implement the joint strategy plan because of resources limitations and institutional turnover, particularly affecting CCAD and CRRH. An example to illustrate the above is the draft for discussion of the “Strategic Framework for Enhanced Management of Climate Risk” produced in December 2011 as a joint effort CEPREDENAC and CCAD, that finally was neither approved nor adopted. Most recently, since middle 2013, CEPREDENAC has made some efforts to keep SSA alive and recently, beginning of 2014, the three Executive Secretaries have been discussing plans and formulas to strengthen and revive the efforts and objectives of the SSA.</p> <p>Looking at the future, the main challenge is still the rebirth, institutionalization and consolidation of SSA as space of influencing and decision-making that may contribute significantly to strengthen joint efforts and regional coherence and cooperation amongst RIO’s related to DRR, water and environment management.</p>

<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p><u>Actions/outputs to improve coordination amongst SSA:</u></p> <p>Improved mechanisms of coordination amongst Executive Secretaries (SE), implementing the Environmental Subsystem (CEPREDENAC, CCAD, CRRH).</p> <p>Guide of Inter- Secretaries Coordination</p> <p><i>Source: Experiences and Lessons of PREVDA, page 24.</i></p> <p><u>Examples of joint efforts and collaboration among SE of SSA:</u></p> <p>CEPREDENAC and CRRH have developed close coordination on the provision and interpretation of hydrometeorological information to support the implementation of PCGIR and PACAGIRH (particularly with respect to the development and use of observing systems, forecasting, monitoring and early warning integrated regional);</p> <p>The CCAD and CEPREDENAC confirmed they have established a joint technical team from late 2011 to establish a harmonious strategic framework covering the GIR in the ERCC. (the first draft of the strategic framework was produced in December 2011)</p> <p>Development of the Strategic framework</p> <p>The CCAD is currently in the process of restructuring to lead the implementation of inter-sectoral ERCC way in the region, which includes the articulation of the roles of the SSA in ERAS and within the ERCC.</p> <p>The SE confirmed its intention to include regional representatives of civil society (and possibly a representative of a local regional association) at future meetings of SSA.</p> <p><i>Sources: PREVDA’s Final Evaluation Report, page 18.</i></p> <p><u>Deliver of the “Strategic Framework for Enhanced Management of Climate Risk” (December 2011) as a tool to improve joint management of GDR and CCAD.</u></p> <p><i>“El Marco Estratégico para la Gestión Integral del Riesgo Climático unifica los criterios para la gestión del riesgo y la adaptación al cambio climático. Esta integración ya se anticipaba en la Política Centroamericana de Gestión Integral de Riesgo de Desastres y en la Estrategia Regional de Cambio Climático y el punto de confluencia parte del reconocimiento de que los mayores riesgos actuales para Centroamérica son los derivados del Cambio Climático y la Variabilidad Climática asociada y de la necesidad de gestionarlos como parte inherente del desarrollo, con una lógica adecuada de planificación y asignación de recursos, así como con una mejor comprensión de la comunidad internacional sobre el grave impacto que el cambio climático ya tiene en la region”</i> (Source: excerpt from the Discussion Draft of the “Strategic Framework for Enhanced Management of Climate Risk”, CEPREDENAC-CCAD, December 2011, page 5.)</p> <p><u>The sustainability of SAA institutions (CEPREDENAC, CRRH, CCAD)and their efforts represent a challenge within the CA integration process.</u></p> <p><i>“No obstante, la ejecución de los PEP depende en gran parte de la capacidad técnica y sostenibilidad financiera de los SE. PREVDA ha contribuido a establecer los medios y formación necesaria para reforzar dicha capacidad, como se ha afirmado en la sección 4.1 arriba. Sin embargo, es evidente ninguna de las tres SE ha consolidado su sostenibilidad financiera y es evidente que la coyuntura política es un factor importante en contra de la sostenibilidad de la ejecución de los PEP del SSA a nivel nacional.</i></p> <p><i>No hubo el tiempo en la MEF de analizar los ingresos y egresos de las tres instituciones, pero en términos generales consta que la institución con la situación financiera más crítica es CRRH. PREVDA apoyó CRRH</i></p>
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	<p>y sus enlaces nacionales con un estudio sobre la formulación de un plan de negocios con el fin de identificar y ejecutar la generación de fondos propios para cubrir más planilla y mejorar la capacidad logística (CRRH tiene fondos muy restringidos para viajar en la región, atender conferencias y seguir iniciativas apoyados por PREVDA, como los Foros de Clima y el CIMHAC). La SE de CRRH confirmó su debilidad financiera y de su dependencia de un proyecto nuevo para poder “aterrizar” la ECAGIRH y PACAGIRH en los PEP nacionales de los SMHN.</p> <p>CEPREDENAC carece de fondos desde el cierre de PREVDA, aunque es evidente que tiene capacidad propia para trabajar con otros donantes y tiene mayores oportunidades de movilizar fondos debido a la PCGIR. También, fue objeto del estudio sobre la identificación y puesta en práctica de un plan de negocios, pero como CRRH, las provisiones legales y la coyuntura política han dictado que estas instituciones no pueden generar fondos propios, por ejemplo, a través de la venta de servicios. En cambio el SE de CEPREDENAC informó la MEF sobre su misión actual de crear el fondo FOCEGIR para respaldar la ejecución de la PCGIR en la región, aunque por el momento no ha identificado fuentes financieras para iniciar este fondo.</p> <p>La CCAD tiene una historia de dependencia de fondos de donantes. En estos momentos está en un proceso de reestructuración que incluye la incorporación de la sección administrativa en Guatemala en las nuevas oficinas de la sede en San Salvador para reducir costos. También, está reuniendo su amplia gama de Comités Técnicos en tres áreas específicas: Cambio Climático/ERCC, Patrimonio/Biodiversidad y Gestión de la Calidad Ambiental/Gobernanza. En cuanto a los cuatro perfiles de proyectos elaborados con el apoyo de PREVDA, ninguno ha logrado financiamiento hasta la fecha. (Source: Excerpt from PREVDA’s Final Evaluation Report, pages 46-47)</p> <p><u>Some key stakeholders recognised that the main contributions of EU cooperation through PREVDA were the changes in their mind-set and GIRAA approach encouraging coordination and collaboration amongst the three Secretariats.</u></p> <p>“La mayor contribución que nos dejó PREVDA fue el cambio de mentalidad para comprender que las tres secretarías debíamos trabajar juntas y reconocer que tenemos agendas conjuntas” (Source: interview with “Patricia Ramirez, SE-CRRH”, via skype)</p> <p>“El modelo de GIRAA demostró desde el principio ser un enfoque acertado y hoy todavía tiene vigencia no solo para la región sino para los países, a pesar de las limitaciones para implementarlo” (Source: interview with “Marcio Baca, INETER”, Nicaragua)</p> <p>“El PREVDA fue el primer proyecto que tuvimos que nos invitó a trabajar de forma coordinada y en sinergia entre los diferentes sectores” (Source: interview with Eddy Sánchez, INSIVUMEH, Guatemala)</p>
<p>I-6.1.2 – Increased number of staff positions with clearly delineated responsibilities</p>	
<p>Findings at indicator level</p>	<p>EU Cooperation contributed directly, mainly through PREVDA, to improve the institutional capacities of the three SE related to GIRAA (CEPREDENAC, CCAD and CRRH) with particular focus on: improving internal management and coordination procedures; equipment for monitoring and information collection; training and qualification programs for key staff and stakeholders; and the development of systems and mechanisms to manage information and decision-making processes.</p> <p>Regarding the improvement of internal procedures the programme contributed with the organizational re-structuring of the three secretaries, and the development of operational manuals. Through the training and qualification programmes key technical staff of the three SE</p>

	<p>and other SICA bodies were trained on different topics such as high level management, GIRH, Communication, etc. Regarding systems and mechanisms to manage information the main contributions were related to the implementation of regional platforms and hosts and nodes to improve information sharing and decision-making processes. During field visits staff of the SE-CEPREDENAC confirmed that all the support received to improve internal procedures and operations manuals was very useful to improve their internal management towards working more efficiently.</p> <p>The above mentioned contributions were significant to improve the institutional capacity of the three SE to improve planning and decision-making processes in regards to DRR and GIRAA, however the main challenge is related to the institutional capacity and financial autonomy to keep alive an active the systems and mechanisms (CIMHAC¹⁷, SIAM, Virtual Forum, technical equipment, etc.) once the EU cooperation has ended, as it was stressed in the report of the PREVDA's Final Evaluation. Findings during the field visit confirmed that some of the contributions were effectively some difficulties in their sustainability such as the CIMHAC that faced problems to guarantee the maintenance of the equipment because of lack of resources, while others still remain alive with an extraordinary effort of the related RIOs and the support of new donors, as it is the case of the FCAC¹⁸ celebrated every year with the participation of key institutions related to climate monitoring. In fact the FCACs celebrated in April 2013 was coordinated in close collaboration with PRESANCA II.</p>
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p><u>Main actions and outcomes developed to strengthen the institutional capacities of the three SICA Executive Secretariats related to Risk, Water and Environment.</u></p> <p><u>Related to the CEPREDENAC:</u></p> <p>The organizational and functions restructuring Adoption and implementation of the Manual of Administrative, Financial and Personnel Procedures; Training in planning and monitoring; Installing the Unified Project Management System (SUAP). Adoption of Rules.</p> <p><u>Related to the CCAD:</u></p> <p>The design of a new organizational structure of the SE- CCAD (apparently pending of approval and implementation)</p> <p><u>Related to the CRRH:</u></p> <p>Promotion of the CRRH as regional organization for the management of studies and hydrological, meteorological and water resource information (including the completion of the Climate Forum) and the establishment and management of financial resources and the implementation of development projects in benefit of national institutions (including the CIMHAC); Development of Business Plans for CRRH and national Hydrometeorological Services. (Apparently have not been approved to date due to the lack of political agreement on the role</p>

¹⁷ Centro de Integración de Información Meteorológica e Hidrológica de América Central

¹⁸ Foros del Clima de América Central

<p>of CRRH and its national linkages/partners. <i>Source: PREVDA's Final Evaluation Report, pages 16-17.</i></p> <p><u>Main instruments and outcomes implemented to improve information management and decision-making processes.</u></p> <p>Support SIAM Technical Committee in formulating the Plan for the Development of SIAM 2011-15, particularly in the development of the strategic lines and lines of action.</p> <p>Establishment of Community Learning Platform designed to promote the use of SIAM, especially actors and stakeholders on issues such as territorial strategic planning.</p> <p>Improved the SIAM website and the SINIA in each country to make them more user-friendly.</p> <p>Establishment of the host PROLEGIS within the Regional Node of the CCAD</p> <p>The creation of the water thematic node that facilitates national links of the CRRH and other stakeholders with an interest in water resources</p> <p>Creation of the thematic node of risk and design of a communication and information platform for comprehensive disaster risk management based on a holistic view of risk management to encompass disaster response, prevention and mitigation.</p> <p>Installation the Concordance System of Indicators in the Regional Node SIAM in CCAD.</p> <p>Establishing a Geographical Platform with maps and data on the current situation (2010) and previous decades (2000, 1990 and 1980) on the use and management of land in the region.</p> <p>Central American Atlas for Sustainable Land Management carried out with the participation of a wide range of institutions in the region.</p> <p>Creation of the Centre for Meteorological and Hydrological Research in Central America (CIMHAC) located in the INSIVUMEH (Guatemala).</p> <p><i>Source: PREVDA's Final Evaluation Report, pages 23-25.</i></p> <p><u>Evidence about the usefulness of the support received from PREVDA to institutional strengthening:</u></p> <p><i>“ Los procedimientos y manuales apoyados con PREVDA ayudaron a tener una institución más eficiente y mejorar los procesos de gestión interna y todavía se siguen aplicando varios de ellos” (source: interview with Victor Ramírez, SE-CEPREDENAC, Guatemala)</i></p> <p><u>Some testimonies related to the usefulness and sustainability of some outcomes/ products of PREVDA</u></p> <p><i>“ El CIMHAC instalado en el INSIVUMEH ha sufrido algunas dificultades para su sostenimiento sobre todo el relación on el mantenimiento y reparación de equipos de monitorio por falta de recursos. Sin embargo el FCAC se ha venido desarrollando todos los años desde que finalizó PREVDA gracias al apoyo de otros donantes y programas de la UE como ha sido el caso de PRESANCA II-PRESISAN y USAID que están apoyando el foro de este año” (Source: Interview with Patricia Ramírez, SE-CRRH, via Skype)</i></p> <p><i>“ El Atlas Centroamericano para al gestión territorial sostenible es una publicación muy linda pero que no es apropiada para la toma de decisiones por no tener la escala apropiada y además de que nunca se entregaron los archivos modificables para actualizar las capas de los mapas” (Source: Interview with Marcio Baca, INETER, Nicaragua)</i></p>
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I-6.1.3 – Relevant SICA bodies have developed and are implementing policies, strategies and plans (PSP)/ standard operating procedures related to disaster risk reduction/ integrated risk management	
<i>Findings at indicator level</i>	<p>The contribution of the EU cooperation to the development/update of policies, strategies and plans related to DRR and GIRAA enabled the delivery of relevant achievements/outcomes, including the development of the Central American Policy for Comprehensive Risk Management (PCGIR), the update of PARCA by developing the PARCA III (2010-2014) and the writing up of the Central American Strategy for Comprehensive Management of Water Resources 2010-2020 (ECAGIRH) together with the Central America Plan for Integrated Water Resources Management (PACAGIRH) to implement the first period of the ECAGIRH (2010-2012).</p> <p>The above instruments, besides their contribution to an integrated management of risks, water and environment (GIRAA), also integrate elements towards Comprehensive Risk Management on Climate Change allowing a flexible and natural adaptation of the region and national authorities to the most recent approaches and priorities of SICA. Additionally the development of these instruments has contributed to promote the development of the Environmental Subsystem (SSA) within SICA while improving the dissemination and sensitization of regional and national authorities and key stakeholders on Comprehensive Risks Management, Comprehensive Management of Water Resources and Environmental Management. These processes contributed to raise in the region the profile of DRR and CC related issues and one of the main achievements was that in 2011 during the XXXVII Ordinary Summit of Presidents and head of states of SICA, Disasters Risk Management and Climate Change was defined as one of the main priorities/pilars for the process of regional integration and the approval of the Regional Strategy on Climate Change.</p> <p>However, despite the above positive outcomes, there are still some important challenges that SICA bodies and national governments must face mainly in relation to the need of allocation of appropriate resources for the implementation and dissemination of the developed and the political ownership and implementation of key stakeholders and other relevant SICA bodies (see Indicator 6.1.1).</p> <p>Field visit interviews confirmed that the PCGIR had real impact at regional level and SE-CEPREDENAC lead the process of dissemination and advocacy with National Governments since the approval with the institutional and financial support of another EU donors such as DG-ECHO through its DIPECHO programme and partners and AECID. However, on the other hand various testimonies pointed out some constraints in the dissemination and implementation of PARCA III, ECAGIRH and PACAGIRH due mainly to the limited capacity and resources of CCAD and CRRH to lead and manage the processes because of internal changes and the limited attention and prioritization of National Governments in relation to environmental issues.</p>
<i>Data, sources, extracts</i>	<p><u>Main Policy and Strategic Instruments developed at regional level by SICA bodies.</u></p> <p><u>Related to the CEPREDENAC:</u></p> <p>Development of the Central American Policy for Comprehensive Risk Management (PCGIR), which was adopted at the Council of National Representatives of CEPREDENAC in December 2009 and approved by the presidents of SICA in June 2010.</p> <p><u>Related to the CCAD:</u></p> <p>Update of PARCA (PARCA III 2010-2014) which was approved by the Council of Ministers of</p>

<p>the CCAD in late 2009.</p> <p><u>Related to the CRRH:</u></p> <p>Preparation of a proposal for the Regional Convention of Integrated Water Resources Management (CONVERGIRH) (no information about the legal status of this proposal)</p> <p>Writing up of the Central American Strategy for Comprehensive Management of Water Resources 2010-2020 (ECAGIRH) together with the Central America Plan for Integrated Water Resources Management (PACAGIRH) to implement the first period of the ECAGIRH (2010-2012). These were approved by the interagency group (SG-SICA, CRRH, CCAD, COMISCA and CEPREDENAC).</p> <p><i>Source: PREVDA's Final Evaluation Report, pages 16-17.</i></p> <p><u>Key GIRAA related policy and strategic instruments developed by SICA integrate elements towards Comprehensive Risk Management on Climate Change.</u></p> <p>PCGIR - C axis - set: 1) harmonization of the policy framework and strategies at risk, water, environment and 2) mainstreaming risk management in climate change</p> <p>PACADIRH - Strategic Objective 4 - states: Improve risk management of water resources and their associated infrastructure to variability and climate change.</p> <p>PARCA III - Strategic Area 4 - states: Adaptation and mitigation of climate change and integrated risk management</p> <p><i>Source: PREVDA's Final Evaluation Report, pages 16-17</i></p> <p><u>Disasters Risk Management and Climate Change as one of main priorities of the CA integration process and the approval of the Regional Strategy on Climate Change along with its Action Plan.</u></p> <p><i>"La creciente vulnerabilidad que la región experimenta por los impactos y eventos asociadas al Cambio Climático, lo cual plantea impostergables retos y determina que los países del SICA brinden especial atención en las áreas de Gestión Integral del Riesgo de Desastres y adaptación al Cambio Climático"</i> (Source: Excerpt from the "Declaration of the XXXVII Ordinary Summit of Presidents and head of states of SICA", San Salvador, July 2011.)</p> <p><i>"Expresar nuestra complacencia por la aprobación y puesta en marcha de la Estrategia Regional de Cambio Climático (ERCC) y la Política Centroamericana de Gestión Integral de Riesgo (PCGIR), conscientes que ambas constituyen importantes herramientas consensuadas que orientan las acciones en materia de gestión integral de riesgo, cambio climático y variabilidad climática en la región."</i> (Source: Excerpt from the "Declaration of the XXXVIII Ordinary Summit of Presidents and head of states of SICA", San Salvador, December 2011)</p> <p><u>Some testimonies of limited impact and implementation of regional instruments developed with the support of EU cooperation:</u></p> <p><i>" PARCA III y otros instrumentos nunca se han implementado realmente y se han quedado en el papel sin impacto a nivel de los países, pues éstos no priorizan la gestión medioambiental"</i> (Source: interview with Victor Campos, Centro Humboldt, Nicaragua)</p>
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	<p><i>“Varios de los instrumentos desarrollados por PREVDA a nivel nacional como PARCA III o ECAGIRH hasta la fecha han quedado en el papel y con muy poco impacto o ningun en los países debido sobre todo a la fragilidad institucional de las secretarías regionales y la falta de interés de los países en algunos casos”</i> (Source: interview with Mauricio Peñalva, Regional EUD, Managua)</p> <p><i>“Durante los últimos años la capacidad de gestión y liderazgo de la CCAD ha quedado prácticamente desmantelada y desde que llegué a mi posición principios de año hemos tenido que trabajar fuerte para recuperar la capacidad de gestión institucional”</i> (Source: interview with Christa Castro, SE-CCAD, El Salvador)</p>
<p>JC 6.2 – Harmonization of national policies, frameworks and practices with regionally promoted approaches and frameworks for disaster risk reduction and integrated risk management at national/ local level (legislative and executive)</p>	
<p><i>Statement on JC6.2</i></p>	
<p>I-6.2.1 – National Governments/parliaments and (where applicable) ratify regional frameworks/ adopt national legislation to reflect regionally agreed principles</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>The adaptation of national legislation and instruments to the regional frameworks approved/proposed by SICA bodies has been uneven amongst the different countries. All the Central American countries already ratified the PCGIR in 2010 and have already adapted/developed national instruments/legislations to the PCGIR (See Indicator 6.2.2).</p> <p>As mentioned above (indicator 6.1.3) most of countries (XX) have not adapted their national instruments to integrate appropriately PARCA III and ECAGIRH and key informants consulted during the field phase acknowledge lack of coherence/harmonization between national instruments and regional the related regional frameworks.</p> <p>Regarding other regional frameworks in 2011 the Regional Strategy for Climate Change (ERCC) was approved by the Council of Ministers of the Central American Commission on Environment and Development (CCAD). However, according to evidences collected during the field phase the dissemination and adaptation of national instruments/legislation to ERCC is still a pending issue and since its approval only some countries have developed national instruments aligned the Strategy accordingly.</p>
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p>The PCGIR was approved and ratified by SICA governments.</p> <p><i>“En la XXXV reunión ordinaria de Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno de los países del Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana, celebrada en Panamá el 29 y 30 de junio de 2010, bajo el Acuerdo No.15, se aprueba la Política Centroamericana de Gestión Integral de Riesgo de Desastres (PCGIR), identificando y priorizando acciones para enfrentar estos desafíos. Esta Política pretende orientar a la región en la reducción y prevención de riesgo de desastres para contribuir con una visión de desarrollo integral en Centroamérica”</i> (Source: CEPREDENAC Website: http://www.sica.int/cepredenac/pcgir.aspx)</p> <p>Approval of the Regional Strategy on Climate Change (ER-CC) with the external cooperation, including EU, playing a key role.</p> <p><i>“El Consejo de Ministros de la Comisión Centroamericana de Ambiente y Desarrollo (CCAD), órgano ambiental del Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana (SICA), bajo la Presidencia Pro Tempore de Belizé,</i></p>

aprobó la Estrategia Regional de Cambio Climático (ER-CC) en su XLVII Reunión Ordinaria, celebrada en la ciudad de Belice los días 10 y 11 de noviembre del presente año. De esta manera se da cumplimiento al mandato recibido en la Declaración de la Cumbre de Presidentes y de Jefes de Estado de los países SICA celebrada el pasado 20 de julio de 2010 en San Salvador”

“Por otro lado, el apoyo de la cooperación externa ha sido importantísima para todo el proceso de fortalecimiento institucional de la CCAD, el trabajo del Comité Técnico de Cambio Climático, el funcionamiento de la Unidad de Cambio Climático en la Secretaría Ejecutiva de CCAD y el proceso ampliado de formulación y consulta de la misma a nivel regional y de los países”¹⁹

I-6.2.2 – National stakeholders adapt their DRR/ integrated risk management procedures following publication of regional guidelines/ changes in regional frameworks

<i>Findings at indicator level</i>	<p>EU programmes, mostly PREVDA, supported SICA bodies to enable the implementation and dissemination of regional instruments at country level. SE-CEPREDENAC played a key role implementing training to key stakeholders at country level and providing advice to national authorities and institutions to adapt their strategic and planning instruments to the approved PCGIR. As a result, to date, Costa Rica (2010) Panama (2011) Guatemala (2011), Honduras (2013) have already developed and officially approved their national policies/plans according to the axes and priorities defined in the PCGIR. In the case of Nicaragua and El Salvador although the National Policies have been developed, these have not been officially approved yet. It is important to remark that the support provided by the EU cooperation has been crucial to the development and success of the PCGIR, although it has been the result of an articulated work of various stakeholders and donors beyond EU contribution. Other national stakeholders, such as NGOs and civil society have also made an extraordinary effort to adapt their strategies and plans to the strategic axes and priorities of the PCGIR, and now the PCGIR represents along with the global Hyogo Framwork for Action (HFA) the two main references in DRR in CA.</p> <p>According to different evidences and testimonies collected during the evaluation, the harmonization and complementarity at national level of DRR, water and environment related legal and policy instruments have been quite limited in all the countries due to several factors such as: the weight of geopolitical factors (i.e Coup d 'Etat in Honduras, strategic value of the Gulf of Fonseca); bilateral rifts (i.e. tensions in Rio San Juan between Nicaragua and Honduras, conflict about Isla Zapatera between El Salvador and Honduras, etc.); different national priorities and political interests; and contradictions/inconsistences between national/regional environmental management frameworks and existing practices/interests on the exploitation of natural resources ad use of land (i.e. Mining, Sugar cane, African Palm, Shrimp, melon industry, etc.) that National and Local Governments need to target and find solutions.</p> <p>The above-factors represented a serous constraint/limitation to build and consolidate the necessary and desired national commitments and trans-national impact with regional view.</p> <p>An example to illustrate the above is GOLFONSECA, that finally was not ratified by all National Governments and was not implemented. With a total budget of 12 Million Euros, it was expected to contribute significantly with an integrated approach to the implementation regional frameworks and approaches at national and local level, with a strong emphasis in the developing a development model various municipalities and communities of the Gulf of Fonseca involving Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador. During the field visit it was difficult to</p>
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¹⁹ Source: <http://www.freshwateraction.net/es/content/consejo-de-ministros-aprueba-estrategia-regional-de-cambio-climático-cr-cc>

	<p>find out the detailed reasons because of the project was not implemented but most sources consulted agreed that represented a serious setback for the sustained development of the area and a missed opportunity to contribute with specific impacts to regional integration processes.</p> <p>Finally, the Initial hypothesis/approach, of EU regional programme, that by supporting/strengthening RIOs, there would be a cascade effect in national and local levels did not work as expected. RIOs (CRRH, CCAD and CEPREDENAC) do not have the mandate or formal mechanisms to force the fulfilment and implementation of regional agreements, instruments and frameworks at country level, and therefore their decisions and actions are not binding for national governments, whose priorities and institutional context did not always happen with the same rhythm, interest and level of priority than regional processes.</p>
<p>Data, sources, extracts</p>	<p><u>CA countries have already adapted national instruments to the PCGIR.</u></p> <p><u><i>“Panamá ha adoptado la Política Centroamericana de Gestión Integrada del Riesgo (PCGIR), que fuera aprobada en la XXXV Reunión Ordinaria de Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno de los países del SICA, en junio de 2010, en la ciudad de Panamá. Los lineamientos de la PCGIR brindan una orientación y una referencia fundamental para la formulación de este documento de Política.</i></u></p> <p><u><i>En respuesta a estos compromisos, la Política Nacional de Gestión Integral de Riesgo de Desastres (PNGIRD) complementará el desarrollo nacional, insertando procesos de coordinación y promoción interinstitucional que contribuyan a la intensificación y aumento en la calidad de la de gestión integral del riesgo en Panamá.</i></u> (Source: Excerpt from the “Política Nacional de Gestión de Riesgos de Desastres”, Panamá, noviembre 2010, page 4)</p> <p><u><i>“El marco normativo que rige la gestión integral de riesgo en el país se fundamenta en la Política Nacional para la Reducción de Riesgos a los Desastres y en la Política de Desarrollo Social y Poblacional y se concreta en otras normas que de ellas se derivan. Destaca también el cumplimiento de las acciones acordadas en el MAH y de otras plataformas regionales y subregionales organizaciones intergubernamentales como CEPREDENAC y la PCGIR.”</i></u> (Source: Excerpt from the preliminary version of the “Informe sobre la Gestión Integral del Riesgo de Desastres in Guatemala 2013, EIRD-CEPREDENAC-SE-CONRED, December 2013, page 39)</p> <p><u><i>“La Política Nacional de Gestión Integral de Riesgo fue elaborada bajo la coordinación de la Dirección General de Protección Civil con la implementación de un plan de consulta en el que participaron funcionarios, responsables institucionales y representantes de sectores vinculados a la gestión de riesgos del nivel nacional, departamental y municipal. Se encuentra en proceso de ajuste para su aprobación, por tanto aún no es posible valorar su grado y calidad de cumplimiento”.</i></u></p> <p><u><i>“La política responde en sus ejes estratégicos a la Política Centroamericana de Gestión Integral de Riesgo de Desastres y a las cinco prioridades del Marco de Acción de Hyogo. El proceso de construcción de la política pública de Gestión de riesgo fue impulsada por la actual administración de COPECO con el apoyo de CEPREDENAC en sintonía con los esfuerzos regionales que este viene desarrollando”</i></u> (Source: Excerpt from the preliminary version of the “Informe sobre la Gestión Integral del Riesgo de Desastres in El Salvador 2013, EIRD-CEPREDENAC-Secretaría paa Asuntos de Vulnerabilidad, December 2013, page 31)</p> <p><u><i>“La Política de Estado para la Gestión Integral del Riesgo en Honduras, se aprobó en consejo de Ministros el día martes 22 de octubre de 2013, a este momento está en proceso de revisión de estilo y publicación en el diario</i></u></p>

<p><i>oficial la Gaceta de Honduras” (Source: Excerpt from the preliminary version of the “Informe sobre la Gestión Integral del Riesgo de Desastres in El Honduras 2013, EIRD-CEPREDENAC COPECO, December 2013, page 32)</i></p> <p><i>“Dentro del marco normativo se incluye la Política Nacional de Gestión Integral del Riesgo de la República de Nicaragua, con vigencia hasta el 2015. Esta tiene como objetivo general el reducir el riesgo generado por las amenazas de fenómenos naturales, antropogénicos y de cambio climático que afectan la seguridad de la ciudadanía, sus bienes y los del país, a través de la construcción de una cultura de prevención en los distintos actores sociales, considerando la equidad de género y la multiculturalidad. (Source: Excerpt from the preliminary version of the “Informe sobre la Gestión Integral del Riesgo de Desastres in Nicaragua 2013, EIRD-CEPREDENAC-SE-SINAPRED, December 2013, page 23.)</i></p> <p>PCGIR becomes progressively a key reference for all key stakeholders working on DRR in Central America.</p> <p><i>Example 1: “Los Presidentes y Jefes de Estado del SICA dan por constituido el Foro Consultivo Regional de la Política Centroamericana de la Gestión Integral del Riesgo y reconocen los avances que se han experimentado en esta material y manifiestan que promoverán las recomendaciones emitidas por dicho foro, en el Encuentro Centroamericano de Gestión Integral del Riesgo y Adaptación al Cambio Climático, realizado el 14 de diciembre de 2011, en San Salvador, El Salvador y que han sido sintetizadas en la Carta del Foro Consultivo Regional de la Política Centroamericana de la Gestión Integral del Riesgo a la XXXVIII Reunión Ordinaria de Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno de los Países del SICA” (Source: Joint communication of SICA countries “Advisory Group for the Reconstruction and Development of Central America”, SICA, San Salvador, 16th Dec. 2011.)</i></p> <p><i>Example 2: “... All actions supported by DG ECHO under the DIPECHO programme have to be aligned and to fit into the respective national and regional (PCGIR) DRR frameworks. This includes policies, strategies, legislation and planning at various levels. Promotion of the roll out and implementation of respective regional and national DRR frameworks and programmes, through enhancing the core interface between DIPECHO projects, the National Disaster Management Systems and CEPREDENAC will be supported.” (Source: Excerpt from “Technical Annex: Financial, Administrative and Operational Information: Call for proposals for the DIPECHO Action Plan for CA 2014-2015”, DG-ECHO, December 2013, page 6.)</i></p> <p>Some bilateral on-going projects implemented at country/regional levels have also contributed to adopt and implement regional frameworks at national level.</p> <p><i>“Componente 3: se han contratado las asistencias técnicas descentralizadas (ATD) y adquirido la mayor parte de los equipos. Se han capacitado a los actores involucrados en el proyecto en temas relacionados con: gobernabilidad, concertación ambiental y coordinación territorial, gestión ambiental descentralizada, Planes Ambientales Municipales (PAM), y manejo colaborativo de áreas protegidas. Se apoyó con equipamiento y la puesta en marcha de las ventanillas únicas y de los nodos territoriales del Sistema Nacional de Información Ambiental (SINAI). Además, se han conformado redes ambientales con 75 promotores locales y realizado múltiples campañas ambientales” (Source: Excerpt from “PS-Sipnosis del Proyecto Gobernabilidad Local en la Cuenca del Lago Cocibolca”, EU Regional Delegation, May 2013, page 2)</i></p> <p>The regional project GOLFONSECA as example of relevant initiative that finally was not</p>
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	<p>approved by National Governments due to geo-political and institutional factors related to SE-SICA and the decision-making processes:</p> <p><i>“Resultado 1. La integración regional se ve reforzada en el ámbito transfronterizo, mediante el establecimiento de mecanismos de coordinación entre las instituciones públicas locales y los diferentes actores con las autoridades regionales, una identidad transfronteriza es articulada. Este resultado apunta a fortalecer el liderazgo local y subregional de los actores locales (gobiernos, asociaciones regionales y/o actores no estatales) con el fin de tener la capacidad de liderar el desarrollo sub-regional. En particular, se trata de facilitar, apoyar y fortalecer el proceso de integración progresiva de las entidades transfronterizas en la sub-región.</i></p> <p><i>Resultado 2. Marcos regulatorios locales y sub-regionales están armonizados y alineados, su puesta en práctica es apoyada. Este resultado apunta a mejorar la gobernabilidad local para que los ciudadanos y las autoridades en todos los niveles de la administración (comunitaria, municipal, nacional y sub-regionales) sean capaces de formular y ejecutar políticas, planes y normas que buscan la mejora de las condiciones sociales, económicas y ambientales de la zona y para alinear a las políticas regionales relacionadas con el desarrollo local.</i></p> <p><i>Resultado 3. Reforzadas las capacidades de las instituciones (regionales, nacionales y locales) que actúan en el ámbito transfronterizo, así como de los actores sub-regionales para proporcionar servicios públicos adecuados relacionados con el desarrollo sostenible. A través de este resultado, el proyecto apoyará y fomentará la creación de las condiciones y capacidades entre las instituciones públicas y otros actores clave en los tres países con el fin de mejorar la cobertura y la calidad de los servicios de apoyo necesarios para complementar las inversiones económicas realizadas por los ciudadanos organizados y las sinergias con la estrategia de desarrollo económico, tanto a nivel local como sub-regional.”</i> (Source: Excerpt from “Ficha Resumen del ” Programa de Desarrollo local integral transfronterizo en el Golfo de Fonseca (GOLFONSECA), EU Regional Delegation, 2013, page 2.)</p> <p>Some examples of testimonies collected during the field phase pointing out some of the main constraints for effective implementation of agreed and ratified regional instruments at national level:</p> <p><i>“ Hay varias versiones de porqué GOLFONSECA no fue finalmente firmado por todos los países pero todas ellas están relacionadas con motivos político-institucionales entre SE-SICA y los gobiernos nacionales así como intereses particulares prioridades de cada país”</i> (Source: interview with Guillermo Rodriguez, Director Amigos de la Tierra, Nicaragua)</p> <p><i>“ Muy pocos países and adaptado sus marcos nacionales a instrumentos como la ERCC o PARCA III y es debido sobre todo a la falta de interés político y priorización para hacerlo”</i> (Source: interview with Victor Campos, Centro Humboldt, Nicaragua)</p> <p><i>“ El conflicto reciente entre Honduras y El Salvador por la situación de la Isla Zapatera ha afectado directamente los procesos de trabajo en proyectos dentro del Golfo de Fonseca”</i> (Source: interview with Xavier Fernández, Amigos de la Tierra, Honduras)</p>
<p>I-6.2.3 – National stakeholders use information/ apply guidelines/ follow procedures disseminated by relevant SICA bodies</p>	
<p><i>Findings at</i></p>	<p>There is an on-going process in which national governments and institutions are progressively applying regional guidelines and procedures proposed by the relevant SICA bodies; however it is very difficult to find written evidence of how far the different institutions inspire their work</p>

<p><i>indicator level</i></p>	<p>in the regional instruments (this should be better explored during field phase).</p> <p>Between 2006 and 2011 the EU cooperation, through PREVDA, supported CEPREDENAC, CCAD and CRRH to develop mechanisms and instruments to improve the work and decision-making of their national natural counterparts, however some of these instruments have not been yet appropriated, approved or institutionalised by the relevant national level bodies (i.e business plans to improve CRRH, PSA proposal, etc.). Most of these outputs were produced by external actors (consulting services) without an appropriate integration and active participation of the key stakeholders resulting on products not always adapted and appropriate to the institutional capacities and reality. This finding was confirmed during the field phase with various examples of relevant stakeholders.</p> <p>Apart from PREVDA, other programmes/projects have contributed or are in the process to contribute to the implementation of regional instruments at national and local levels. One of them visited during the field phase is The Trinationcal-ECOPESCA project under implementation in the Gulf of Fonseca (NI, HN and ES) supporting conformation of National and Tri-National Committees for the management of Fonseca Gulf and the development of instruments for a sustainable management of the resources in the Gulf area. The project has not finished yet, but they have already some important achievements and contributions to regional, national and local processes with a trans-border approach, although it is still soon to measure the real impact and sustainability of the on-going outputs/outcomes.</p>
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p>Instruments/outputs developed with the support of PREVDA at service of national stakeholders/institutions that are not always used/ implemented:</p> <p>A normative compendium which is a useful reference for future regulatory harmonization initiatives. However, there is no formal commitment to ensure the updating and maintenance of the compendium in the SIAM.</p> <p>A normative diagnostic of about 400 regulations and the proposed regulatory framework to start harmonization, however by middle 2012 the proposal had not been implemented because of lack of funding for implementation and follow-up.</p> <p>The production of an interactive CD on standards related to using GIS mapping tools - provides the basic spatial analysis to support the identification of Risk, Water and Environment related legislation applicable in the development of projects on river basins. However, to date there is not evidence that CCAD and its national counterparts are using it.</p> <p>The development of the thematic node PROLEGIS - integrated in SIAM to the benefit of the Executive Secretaries. However, no resources were identified to ensure future update and maintenance of the node.</p> <p>Preparation of four project profiles promoting adaptation to climate change in the following areas: biodiversity, coastal and marine areas and cleaner energy production. However, CCAD has not identified potential financial sources to date.</p> <p>A proposal for a conceptual framework of OT for Central America.</p> <p>A proposal of Payment for Environmental Services (PSA) and the mechanism of selling goods and environmental services in six basins/ subbasins, has not been implemented in any country because they lack the necessary legislation to enable implementation PSA with utilities.</p> <p>A study of the economic valuation of hydrometeorological information for different users in Central America in order to reducing vulnerability. The results of this study were incorporated in the communication strategy of CRRH.</p> <p>A proposal of business plan to improve the competitiveness of CRRH and hydrometeorological services in the countries of the region - the proposal was not approved and executed by differences of political opinion on the role of CRRH and national linkages.</p>

	<p><i>Source: PREVDA's Final Evaluation Report, pages 20-23.</i></p> <p><u>Some testimonies with examples of deliveries/products from PREVDA that were not appropriate or according to institutional needs:</u></p> <p><i>“Nosotros trabajamos con un modelo de estaciones meteorológicas diferentes a las que el proyecto nos ofrecía y que son incompatibles con nuestros sistemas, finalmente como ya estaban compradas antes de consultarnos perdimos la donación y se fue para otro país”</i> (source: interview with Marcio Baca, INETER, Nicaragua)</p> <p><i>“ Muchos de los productos generados como estudios, mapas, y manuales fueron desarrollados por firmas consultoras externas sin involucramiento de las instituciones y finalmente algunos productos no eran adecuados y ni existía apropiamiento y por parte de las instituciones”</i> (Source: interview with Patricia Ramírez, SE-CRRH, via Skype)</p> <p><i>“Hubo mucha inversión en documentos regionales de alto coste que no siempre tenían la calidad esperada para la toma de decisiones”</i> (Source: Interview with Luis Espinoza, DNRH-SERNA, Honduras)</p> <p>Some contributions of TRINATIONAL-ECOPESCA to implement instruments and guidelines produced by SICA at local level collected during the field visit:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Acuerdo Corredor Mangle y Contratos MARENA • Fortalecimiento Áreas Protegidas (MARENA) • Fondo Áreas Protegidas Vida Silvestre (FAPVS) • Acuerdo Fideicomiso Golfo Fonseca Honduras • Foro Directrices FAO sobre Pesca Sostenible • Aprobada 3 países veda 10sp. Declaratoria León • Borrador Decreto Veda Golfo Fonseca Honduras <p>(Source: PPT presentation of project achievements, Amigos de la Tierra, Nicaragua)</p>
<p>JC 6.3 – Change of local practices with regard to resource management/ use of natural resources (e.g. for productive activities) in targeted areas.</p>	
<p><i>Statement on JC6.3</i></p>	
<p>I-6.3.1 – Local authorities, technical staff and other stakeholders know and understand implications for local DRR/ resource management practices associated with major regional initiatives</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>Various EU programmes/projects have been focused on influencing changes of practices, behaviours and knowledge at local level in relation to an enhanced management of risk, water and environment with river basin management approach. PREVDA was one the main initiatives implemented in strategic river basins of each Central American country with specific actions to strengthen capacities of local stakeholders to better understand and plan on DRR and natural resources management and put in practice regional and national developed frameworks and approaches. Through PREVDA key people from targeted municipalities such as authorities, technical public servants and local producers/families had access to different levels of training according to their needs and responsibilities (masters, diplomas, technical courses, etc), in total more than 450 people graduated in different topics/themes such as land planning,</p>

	<p>GIRH, communication, watersheds management, etc. Key informants interviewed during the field phase mentioned the training process as one of the main achievements and contributions of PREVDA. Some of the gave examples of public servants and technical staff who participated in different trainings and still work/collaborate with the relevant public institutions.</p> <p>Some Mayors from 35 municipalities of 6 countries took part in three Mesoamerican Forums of Watersheds gaining know-how and experiences exchange to better plan and manage DRR in their respective municipalities. Additionally, approximately 40 students with specializations in Risk, water and environment provided technical assistance to local planning and environmental units of the targeted municipalities through the elaboration of hazards/ risk mapping and training on resources management. However the continuity and sustainability of these achievements is compromised by the very high</p> <p>Local producers of the 35-targeted municipalities were also trained and sensitized to change their farm management practices as explained in the findings of indicator 6.3.3. In summary, according to secondary information consulted, we may conclude that, more information and evidence should be collected during the field phase to better understand the influence of the EU intervention in the targeted river basins and municipalities and the real impact of the specific actions/practices implemented by key local stakeholders aiming to reduce future vulnerability and improve natural resources management with an environmental sustainability approach.</p> <p>Through the above EU cooperation made an important contribution to influence changes of perceptions and implementation of new practices in the geographical areas where PREVDA was implemented. And although it was difficult to find field evidences because of the lack of systematization and baseline information, most of stakeholders interviewed recognised that those changes happened in an important number of local actors.</p> <p>As seen above, EU cooperation during the period left good examples of changes in the mind-set and in local authorities, producers and families concentrated in specific targeted areas, selected because of the strategic value in terms of the sustainable management of environmental resources and their level of vulnerability, and it was expected that national and local governments and public institutions would sustain and replicate the changes in other geographical areas. However, the expected continuity and replication did not happened in most cases, mainly due to factors such as: the instability of public institutions and the lack of continuity of the authorities and public servants already trained and sensitized after each government turn over/transition; the scarcity of resources allocated to DRR and CC actions from ordinary public budgets; and, in some cases, the limited interest and poor prioritization of GIRAA themes amongst public stakeholders and decision-makers.</p>
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p>Detail of training events (Diplomas, masters and specialized courses) and people graduated (including public servants) with the supportof PREVDA at national and local levels.</p>

No.	Evento de Capacitación	Sede	Institución responsable	GUATEMALA			EL SALVADOR			HONDURAS			NICARAGUA			COSTA RICA			PANAMA			TOTAL		
				H	M	TOTAL	H	M	TOTAL	H	M	TOTAL	H	M	TOTAL	H	M	TOTAL	H	M	TOTAL	H	M	TOTAL PERSONAS
1	Maestría en Planificación y Gestión Territorial	Guatemala	INCAP - USAC	5	4	9	4	1	5	5	1	6	6	1	7	3	3	6	3	1	4	26	11	37
2	Maestría en GIRH	Guatemala	ERIS - USAC	2	1	3	3	0	3	1	1	2	3	0	3	0	0	0	1	0	1	10	2	12
3	Curso Técnico en Gestión y Planificación Territorial	Guatemala	INCAP - USAC	4	1	5	2	0	2	1	2	3	3	2	5	2	1	3	0	2	2	12	8	20
4	Diplomado para Comunicadores	Guatemala	INCAP - USAC	4	3	7	0	2	2	1	4	5	1	1	2	0	1	1	0	1	1	6	12	18
5	Diplomado en GIRH	6 Países	ZAMORANO	5	2	7	6	1	7	6	0	6	5	1	6	4	2	6	2	4	6	28	10	38
6	Curso Alta Gerencia	Panamá	UTP	5	5	10	1	6	7	4	0	4	5	2	7	6	3	9	5	5	10	26	21	47
7	Curso Sensores Remotos	Guatemala y Panamá	CATHALAC			8			3			5			2		3			7			28	
8	Pasancias (capacitación en servicio) en SIMEPAR	Brasil	SIMEPAR	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	4	2	6
9	Curso itinerante sobre meteorología	Guatemala	INCAP/CRRH	40	10	50															40	10	50	
10	Curso-Taller Modelación y Práctica Climática	Guatemala	SIMEPAR	5	0	5	3	0	3	3	0	3	3	0	3	1	2	3	0	3	3	15	5	20
11	Programa Regional de Capacitación Local y Municipal en Planificación y Gestión Territorial de los Riesgos, del Agua y el Ambiente, Cambio Climático y Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional.	Guatemala	INCAP - USAC	10	15	25	16	10	26	19	9	28	13	15	28	10	14	24	25	14	39	93	77	170
12	Guía para el uso del pronóstico y alerta temprana de inundaciones Capacitación sobre el uso del modelo CAFIG	Costa Rica	INCAP	5	1	6	4	0	4	4	0	4	2	0	2	7	4	11	2	3	5	24	8	32
SUMATORIA POR PAIS				85	42	136	40	20	63	45	17	67	41	23	66	33	31	67	39	33	79			
TOTAL																						284	166	478

Source: *Experiences and Lessons of PREVDA*, pages 32 and 35.

Some testimonies of key informants recognising the benefit of formal education and training offered by PREVDA:

“PREVDA tuvo como un logro relevante la capacitación técnica de cientos de personas en diferentes niveles y aunque muchos de ellos ya no trabajan en las instituciones se trata de capacidades que quedan en la region y los países allí donde vayan las personas” (Source: Interview with Mauricio Peñalba, EUD, Managua)

“Una de las mejores cosas que nos dejó PREVDA fue las personas capacitadas técnicamente tanto a nivel nacional como local y de hecho varios de ellos aún continúan laborando con la institución” (Source: interview with Marcio Baca, INETER, Nicaragua)

“PREVDA ofreció capacitaciones técnicas en varios niveles y nosotros nos beneficiamos y hoy en día varias personas capacitadas siguen trabajando en INSIVUMEH con gran profesionalismo” (Source: interview with Eddy Sánchez, INSIVUMEH, Guatemala)

I-6.3.2 – Local ordinances, planning and management mechanisms for DRR/ integrated risk management are adopted and enforced

Findings at indicator level

Various initiatives/projects financed by the EU during the period influenced changes at local level in targeted territories/municipalities selected according to their level of vulnerability and strategic relevance to the countries/region. Particular emphasis was given to bi-national initiatives and trans-border river basins, first with the Bi-national project in trans-border areas of El Salvador and Honduras and the trans-border project in Rio Coco Basin implemented by UNOPS and later with other specific initiatives some of them still being implemented such as ECOPECSA and CIDEA-UCA in the Gulf of Fonseca.

According to documentation consulted (PREVDA), there is evidence of specific actions implemented by authorities of targeted municipalities intended to improve planning and regulatory instruments to integrate DRR and natural resources sustainable management approach. In this regard, thanks to PREVDA, for the past 5-6 years there have been some relevant achievements at local level such as the establishment of local DRR related ordinances in targeted river basins/geographical areas, the strengthening of municipal development plans by integrating a DRR approach, the development of 7 Plans for the Enhanced Management of

	<p>the river/sub-river basins, The strengthening of Environment Municipal Units and the implementation/improvement of local EWS in strategic geographical areas.</p> <p>River Basin Councils/authorities were also supported/strengthened as permanent mechanisms to improve DRR and resources management. However during the field visit the evaluation team could collect evidence and testimonies confirming that some River Basin Councils had difficulties to be active to date (i.e. lower basin of Choluteca river in Honduras) while others still remain active (i.e. Reventazon in Costa Rica and Los Altos in Guatemala). This is due mainly to the different realities in country and levels of institutional strengths, prioritization and resources management of local authorities and other relevant stakeholders.</p> <p>Regarding mechanisms to improve management of natural resources, there were written 7 proposals of Payment for Environmental Services (PSA) and the mechanism of selling goods and environmental services for seven basins / sub-basins, however, according to documents consulted and testimonies during the field phase, none of them have been implemented to date.</p> <p>Another relevant achievement is related to the involvement of civil society and social actors in the processes of integrating DRR and GIRAA at local level. This strategy, although, according to some documents, developed in the atomization of efforts affecting the overall impact and optimization of resources, also represented a unique opportunity to increase ownership and the chances of sustainability of the resulting outcomes. According to reports, only through PREVDA more than 139 social organizations were strengthened. Nonetheless, during the field phase some local testimonies pointed out that these processes were implemented in short periods of time and with a limited implication of local stakeholders during the implementation.</p> <p>Finally we may conclude that significant changes to adopt/adapt regulations and planning mechanisms to integrate DRR and resources management approaches were achieved in target river basins and municipalities. However the continuity/sustainability and replication of these experiences still represents a challenge because of the limited resources at local level, the need to harmonise instruments at national level and clearer leadership/guidance of national level institutions to support processes at local level.</p>															
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p>Examples of Local Ordinances and normative instruments implemented with the support of PREVDA.</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="311 1456 1412 1993"> <thead> <tr> <th>Country</th> <th>Basins/Sub Basins</th> <th>Ordinance</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Guatemala</td> <td>Samalá river upper basin</td> <td>Regulation for the implementation of participatory management plan (2011). No municipal ordinances.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Honduras</td> <td>Choluteca river, upper basin Angels Valley</td> <td>Ordinance for the protection of water sources and recharge area covering seven communities (Declaration, April 2012).</td> </tr> <tr> <td>El Salvador</td> <td>Cayaguanca river watershed</td> <td>Committees Ordinances for prevention and mitigation adopted by municipalities of La Palma, San Ignacio and Citalá and published in the Official Journal (2011).</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Nicaragua</td> <td>Malacatoya River sub-basin</td> <td>Ordinance establishing local policy for the implementation of the strategic plan for the integrated Sub Malacatoya river basin management. Municipal ordinances to protect water sources in Santa Lucia and San Jose (supported by</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Country	Basins/Sub Basins	Ordinance	Guatemala	Samalá river upper basin	Regulation for the implementation of participatory management plan (2011). No municipal ordinances.	Honduras	Choluteca river, upper basin Angels Valley	Ordinance for the protection of water sources and recharge area covering seven communities (Declaration, April 2012).	El Salvador	Cayaguanca river watershed	Committees Ordinances for prevention and mitigation adopted by municipalities of La Palma, San Ignacio and Citalá and published in the Official Journal (2011).	Nicaragua	Malacatoya River sub-basin	Ordinance establishing local policy for the implementation of the strategic plan for the integrated Sub Malacatoya river basin management. Municipal ordinances to protect water sources in Santa Lucia and San Jose (supported by
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Nicaragua	Malacatoya River sub-basin	Ordinance establishing local policy for the implementation of the strategic plan for the integrated Sub Malacatoya river basin management. Municipal ordinances to protect water sources in Santa Lucia and San Jose (supported by														

Costa Rica	Reventazón River Upper Basin	Municipal policy for integrated water resources management (2009) Expansion Project in the Basin Planning and Management Act of Reventazón River Basin (File 18166, 2011).
Panamá	River Indio Basin River Pacora basin	Approval of three municipal ordinances to protect water sources (2010-11) and its incorporation into the national system Protected Areas under the ANAM (on-going in 2012). Adoption of strategic plan of an integrated management watershed by ANAM (2010). Proposal to convert the high basin recharge area, water supply and tourism (under development, 2012).

Source: PREVDA's Final Evaluation Report, pages 22- 23.

Main achievements related to the role of River basin management authorities and their capacity of environmental management to reduce vulnerability and environment degradation.

The Associations of Metropoli (Guatemala), Cayaguanca (El Salvador), AMUB (Nicaragua/ Malacatoya Alta) have their own office, equipment, personnel, vehicle and monthly income of municipalities to provide a limited service management and monitoring on the basin/ sub-basin.

The Council of the Upper Basin of the Rio Choluteca in Valle de Ángeles (Honduras) has only one volunteer manning the office within the municipality basin since March 2012. This is despite the declaration achieved in April 2012 recognizing the protection of a recharge zone and water sources covering seven communities in April 2012. Basin Councils in Choluteca and Texiguat were abandoned in 2011 for changes infighting and financial reasons.

The Board of the Network Users of Pacora River basin has an equipped office in the expanded offices of Community Board of San Martin funded by PREVDA. The Board has been expanded to include new members since 2011 (new representatives of Health, Agriculture, ANAM and civil society). For Chagres, the Board Network Users of Indian River Basin is still active and is funded by the Mayor of Chagres to further promote PREVDA actions.

The COMCURE (Costa Rica) has its own office, equipment, personnel, and use of a vehicle. It has consolidated its administrative capacity and generates its own funds by selling services and receives an annual budget.

Source: PREVDA's Final Evaluation Report, pages 28- 29.

Examples of testimonies collected during the field phase related to the implementation of mechanisms at local level and their sustainability:

“ Los procesos entre países no se pueden comparar ya que el nivel de institucionalidad y capacidad de gestión de Costa Rica y Panamá, por ejemplo es diferente al de Honduras o Nicaragua. Y lógicamente eso se traduce en diferentes resultados de cara a la sostenibilidad de los procesos. Sirva como ejemplo la sostenibilidad y gestión del Consejo de Cuenca en el Río Reventazón en Costa Rica...” (Source: Interview with Mauricio Peñalba, EUD, Managua”

“ De los tres consejos de cuenca formados en el Río Choluteca solo uno de ellos funciona, el de La Soledad en la parte alta, los otros dos están actualmente inactivos debido sobre todo a la falta de estatus legal lo que limita la posibilidad de gestión de recursos y la falta de priorización por parte de las autoridades locales, así como la alta rotación de personas por razones políticas” (Source: Interview with Luis Espinoza, DGRH-SERNA, Honduras)

<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>EU cooperation programmes/projects contributed to the implementation of actions/practices aimed to improve DRR and resources management at local level. In this sense various initiatives were executed in pre-selected targeted river-basins/municipalities. Some of the most relevant are the following:</p> <p>At Municipal/authorities level the improvement of Municipal Development Plans to integrate DRR, the elaboration of Risk and resources management maps and the implementation of EWS along with Response Plans. (Evidence 1)</p> <p>At community/family level the implementation of new agriculture practices such as soil conservation practices and production of Bio-pesticides and organic fertilizers in approximately 5600 Has; Protection of water sources (approx. 50), construction of water storage/collecting systems (189) and water distribution systems (38); Installation of Ecological kitchens in rural farms/houses (1025). During the field phased some testimonies were collected showing good examples of good impact at community level</p> <p>Additionally to PREVDA there are other significant programmes/projects that have contributed/are contributing to implement good practices and examples at local level, most of them implemented in trans-border geographical areas with particular emphasis on Climate Change Adaptation and sustainable management of Environment resources (ECOPESCA, CIDEA-UCA, UNOPS, bi-national, COCOCECA and GVC-Coco River Basin). Most of these projects started in 2011 and are supposed to finish between 2014 and 2016 when their real contribution and impact to sustainable changes may be evaluated. Nonetheless, ECOPESCA project visited during the field phase have already demonstrated some good examples of changes in practices at local level, for instance through the management and restock of mangle areas and sensitization of local fishers to respect close seasons for fishing shrimp amongst, others.</p>
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p>Summary of initiatives, actions and practices implemented by different stakeholders at local level with a river basin approach thanks to the support of PREVDA.</p>

**RESULTADOS Y/O PRODUCTOS EN CUENCAS
SURGIDOS DE LA APLICACIÓN DE LAS TÉCNICAS Y PRÁCTICAS DE
CONSERVACIONES SUELOS ASÍ COMO DEL FORTALECIMIENTO INSTITUCIONAL**

Ejecutado =

Programado =

Descripción	Cantidad									GLOCAL
	Costa Rica	El Salvador	Guatemala	Honduras		Nicaragua		Panamá		
				VA	Tex/Cho	L1	L2	R India	R Pacara	
Has, con distintas tecnologías de conservación de suelo aplicadas	1711	640	219	224	300	2225	570	622	344	6855
	670	620	365	224	300	2225	570	430	265	5669
# de Fuentes de agua protegidas	25	15	20	5	7			5		77
	10	15	20	5	7			3		60
# de Reservorios y/o cosechadoras de lluvia construidos		7	0		132	11	50		0	200
		7	0		121	11	50		0	189
# de sistemas de agua potable construidos y/o mejorados		6	7	3	6	1		10	10	43
		6	9	3	6	1		4	9	38
# cocinas/fogones ahorradoras de leña				200	550	125	150		0	1025
				200	550	125	150		0	1025
# planes de alerta temprana	2	6	1	1	2		5	1	1	17
	2	6	1	1	2		5	1	1	19
# letrinas construidas		218		62		260	100		0	19
		200		62		260	100		0	622
# de mapas de riesgo elaborados	2	0	17	12	30	32	9	9	10	121
	2	0	26	12	30	32	9	9	10	130
# de organizaciones sociales fortalecidas	24	25	0	14	27	25	9	9	10	143
	17	25	0	14	27	25	12	9	10	139
# de ordenanzas elaboradas	0	9	0	1	1	6		5	1	23
	1	9	3	1	1	6		5	1	27
# de entes de cuenca formados y/o fortalecidos	1	1	1	1	2	5	0	1	1	13
	1	1	1	1	1	5	3	1	1	15
# de PSA elaborados	0	1	1	1	1			1	1	6
	1	1	1	1	1			1	1	7
Municipalidades fortalecidas	7	3	9	1	5	6	2	1	1	35
	7	3	9	1	5	6	2	1	1	35
# de personas capacitadas	1867	9231	2655	560	1078	972	783	950	3809	21905
	1000	3100	4425	500	2000	972	500	950	2401	15848
Mujeres	580	3837	1062	150	631	731	133	505	1903	9532
Hombres	1287	5394	1593	410	947	241	650	445	1906	12873

Source: *Experiences and Lessons of PREVDA*, page 37.

Good examples of Agro-Environment actions/practices implemented by local producers/farmers in their farms thanks to the support of PREVDA local initiatives.

Development of integrated farms in Costa Rica incorporating the bio-digester and macro tunnels have increased opportunities for economic, social and environmental development, achieving a reduction of vulnerability at the farm.

Development of integrated farms in El Salvador in sloping areas incorporating contours, coffee and fruit have greatly increased opportunities for economic, social and environmental development.

Agricultural conversion to fruit trees in areas unsuitable for agriculture has reduced runoff, saves time and allows higher economic benefits than conventional farming practices.

The local production of bio pesticides (such as Trichoderma) to support pest management, reduce costs of chemical inputs and improve products quality.

Production of organic fertilizers conserves soil, facilitate organic production and reduce production costs by about 20 per cent/ year.

Source: *PREVDA's Final Evaluation Report*, page 30.

Some good examples of changes in practices at local level from ECOPECSA:

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Comunidades han desarrollado Plan Extracción Sostenible de Bivalvos (PLES) • Planes de Manejo Areas Protegidas actualizados, aprobados e implementándose • Centros comunitarios de Tortuga marina liberan 150000 tortuguillos • 1300 pescadores formados en Pesca Responsable (527 mujeres) <p>(Source: PPTof Project Advances, Amigos de la Tierra, Nicaragua)</p>
<p>JC 6.4 – Vulnerability of beneficiaries to effects from disasters reduced, in particular women, indigenous communities, minorities</p>	
<p>Statement on JC6.4</p>	
<p>I-6.4.1 – Adverse effects from natural events reduced (flooding from rain, mudslides, forest fires, etc.)</p>	
<p>Findings at indicator level</p>	<p>Direct relation between EU support and reduction of disaster effects could not be established since actions at local level were limited, geographically and resources, and local experiences are not well systematized. EU programmes/projects impact was limited to the geographical areas (river basins/municipalities) where local level initiatives were implemented mainly through PREVDA and trans-border and bi-national actions.</p> <p>However, the written information/evidence to demonstrate the reduction of these effects is quite limited, mainly due to lack of detailed registration of events/information at local level and the absence of relevant/medium-large scale disasters related to hidro-meteorological events for the past two years (2012 and 2013), once major interventions at local level like PREVDA had close-down operations (2011).</p> <p>Nonetheless, in some cases it has been possible to find some evidences of adverse effects reduction as is the case of the reduction of erosion in the upper basin of Reventazón River (8 percent) in Costa Rica (According to a local study carried out in 2010).</p>
<p>Data, sources, extracts</p>	<p>Some examples of contributions to the reduction of adverse effects of natural events (i.e. forest fires and erosion):</p> <p><i>“A nivel de las cuencas/sub cuencas el impacto más positivo ha sido el fortalecimiento de la sociedad civil en comités y mesas locales que actúan activamente en la multiplicación de la ampliación de los beneficios comunales de la GIR, la GIRH y la GA en sus municipios. Un impacto muy notable debido a esto es el descenso considerable de fuegos forestales entre 2008-12 en las cuencas/sub cuencas de intervención donde los bomberos equipados y la movilización y equipamiento de brigadas de contraincendios están generando cambios importantes de actitud cívica. Otro impacto es el movimiento y la priorización de proteger las fuentes de agua y zonas de recarga para hacer funcionar los sistemas de agua potable, que ya está dando resultados importantes en la mejora de la salud y el ahorro de tiempo para las mujeres.</i></p> <p><i>En Costa Rica, las cifras de un estudio en 2010 confirmaron una baja en la erosión de la cuenca alta del río Reventazón (hasta 8%). La señal más importante detrás de este impacto positivo es que la promoción de las buenas prácticas agrícolas a nivel de la finca ha generado una nueva conciencia de los beneficios económicos que estas prácticas amigables al medio ambiente y en términos de salud y nutrición generan.”</i> (Sources: PREVDA’s Final Evaluation Report, page XIV and Management of Reventazón River Basin-Costa Rica http://www.inbo-news.org/IMG/pdf/Marchena1.pdf)</p>

I-6.4.2 – DRR Actions/measures cover marginalized groups, indigenous communities, minorities				
<i>Findings at indicator level</i>	Most of programmes and projects did not include nor implemented specific strategies targeting particularly vulnerable groups. The main regional programme implemented during the evaluated period, PREVDA, did not have any specific objective or result targeting particularly vulnerable groups such as indigenous communities or integrating appropriately the needs and perspective of women. On the other hand, only few proposals financed by the thematic funding, integrated specific objectives and/or results targeting vulnerable groups or gender equity topics.			
<i>Data, sources, extracts</i>	Evidence of programmes/projects that integrate Objectives/Results targeting particularly vulnerable groups:			
	Organization/ Program/project	Girls/Women	Indigenous Groups	Another vulnerable Groups
	PREVDA	No	No	No
	Amigos de a Tierra/ECOPECA (210/258-497)	YES	No	No
	CIDEA-UCA (C-256823)	No	No	No
	GVC-Río Coco (2010/256 143)	No	Yes	No
	ADA-EEP/AEP (20558)	YES	YES	YES
	M. AFRICA 70 (010/221- 259)	No	No	No
	Oxfam (2010/221-449)	No	No	No
	UNOPS (2007/019-577)	No	No	No
I-6.4.3 – Implementation of sustainable vulnerability reduction measures/ actions in targeted at risk communities/ watersheds/ regions				
<i>Findings at indicator level</i>	<p>EU programmes/projects related to DRR and sustainable environment management were implemented in strategic geographical areas prioritised by each country according to levels of vulnerability and value-added for sustainable DRR and protection of water sources recharge areas and prevention of environmental degradation.</p> <p>In the case of PREVDA, most of the resources were allocated to regional and national levels, and to lesser extend to groups of municipalities “mancomunidades” and/or River Basin Councils, while actions with communities had in most cases only demonstrative purpose and were implemented within very short timeframes and limited involvement of key local stakeholders, what represented a serious constraint for a minimum ownership of the communities and an appropriate follow-up to guarantee the necessary sustainability of the processes. These actions were mainly related to water management and hidro-meteorological related hazards (i.e, management of recharge areas, reforestation, water harvesting, innovative agriculture practices, etc.).</p>			

	<p>On the other hand, some of the projects, supported under the thematic funding, implemented at national level or in trans-border areas had stronger linkages with communities and therefore a greater impact in processes that reduced their levels of vulnerability.</p> <p>During the field phase, key informants highlighted that the main contribution related to vulnerability reduction was the sensitization of local actors including authorities, technical people, producers and families and how now people feel better informed to face any adverse event. However, because of the lack of systematised information and appropriate KAP or Baseline studies, it was very difficult to measure and understand the real influence and impact of the implemented actions.</p>
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p>Examples of actions to support environmental management and reduction of communities' vulnerability:</p> <p>Protection of water sources and / or recharges areas through municipal ordinances or the central state. This badge has been summarized and demonstrates the considerable rise of political will to protect strategic areas in their watersheds.</p> <p>Drinking water projects that are linked to the activities of protection of sources of water recharge areas.</p> <p>Projects linked to basic sanitation facilities to improve drinking water and public health.</p> <p>Installation of rainwater harvesting in educational centres in areas of drought.</p> <p>Remodelling and equipment • Emergency Centre in La Palma (El Salvador) has been very positive and represents a significant benefit to the citizens (treating more than 100 emergencies in 2010 in the area)</p> <p>Training and delivery of equipment to fire departments and fire brigades has resulted in considerable reduction of forest fires in El Salvador and Honduras.</p> <p>Promoting awards for innovative practices has allowed access to technical knowledge and technologies unknown but high environmental, social and economic interest such as in the production of pesticides.</p> <p><i>Source: PREVDA's Final Evaluation Report, page 29.</i></p> <p>For more details evidences at community level see information related to communities of indicators 6.3.1, 6.3.2 and 6.3.3)</p> <p>Some examples and key testimonies on vulnerability reduction:</p> <p><i>“ Algunos de las acciones de reducción de vulnerabilidad a nivel local que dejó PREVDA fueron los sistemas de micro-riego, reservorios de agua, proyectos productivos de Tilapia, y sistemas agroforestales entre otros , encaminados a mejorar la gestión de recursos y adaptación al Cambio Climático”</i> (Source: Interview with Luis Espinoza, DNRH-SERNA, Honduras)</p>
<p>JC 6.5 – Logical consistency of strategies and interventions from different funding mechanisms, donors (incl. ECHO, EU Member States) (Coherence, 3Cs)</p>	
<p><i>Statement on JC6.5</i></p>	

I-6.5.1 – EU programmes/ projects identified synergies/collaboration amongst them (i.e. ECHO/DIPECHO, PRESANCA, FORCUENCAS, etc.)	
<i>Findings at indicator level</i>	<p>EU funded initiatives showed a good number of examples of specific collaboration and synergies to join efforts optimize resources and avoiding duplications. However most of these examples were related to benefiting from opportunities identified during the implementing phase rather than the result of a joint integrated strategic planning from the identification phase. Some good examples of collaboration between regional programmes were the different agreements of coordination and synergies between PREVDA and the DIPECHO programme of DG-ECHO , PRESANCA, FORCUECAS and URBAL amongst others.</p> <p>Evidence and testimonies during field phase showed that the coordination and information sharing between EC Regional Programme in Central America and DG-ECHO has also improved progressively and from a while they have established mechanisms of information exchange and collaboration around the planning process of Humanitarian Implementation Plans (HIPs) and most recently in the development of the new RSP for the period 2014-2019 where technical experts from DG-ECHO have been participating actively.</p> <p>Another good example of internal coordination is the information exchange and implementation of joint activities of some thematic projects implemented in similar geographical areas seeking to optimise resources and avoiding duplications. However, these good examples happen thanks to the initiative and commitment of individuals and the lack of formal mandatory mechanisms within the EC for joint planning, coordination and complementarity, limits the scope of these synergies and its institutionalization at regional and country levels.</p> <p>On the other side of the coin, most of sources consulted identified the limited internal coordination and communication between the EU regional office/programme and country offices/strategy as a critical constraint/limitation to guarantee EU cooperation’s coherence and complementarity of the different initiatives in general and on Disaster Risk Reduction in particular in order to avoid duplications and optimise existing resources with an improved strategic approach. Internal coordination/synergies between regional strategies (RSP) and National strategies (NIPs) still remains as an important challenge.</p> <p>Finally it is important to highlight another synergies and collaborations in certain geographical areas (i.e. Gulf of FONSECA, Valle de Angeles) and/or thematic priorities (PCIGR, ERCC, etc) that allowed optimising resources of different programmes.</p>
<i>Data, sources, extracts</i>	<p>Examples of Collaboration and synergies between PREVDA and other EU funded programmes/projects (DIPECHO, PRESANCA, FORCUENCAS)</p> <p>Collaboration with DIPECHO VII:</p> <p>Support for the production, printing and distribution of the publication: Knowing the PCGIR in 2011.</p> <p>Joint development of the Emergency Civil Protection located in the municipality of La Palma (El Salvador) where DIPECHO provided some specific equipment and training.</p> <p>Support for the development of the SAT in the upper basin of the river Samala where DIPECHO has provided some equipment.</p> <p>Participation in regional forums and meetings organized by PREVDA.</p> <p><u>Collaboration with PRESANCA II:</u></p>

	<p>To share experiences and lessons learned on their training courses, which encouraged PREVDA to integrate internships in INCAP / PAHO courses. Support to encourage the inclusion of SAN in the courses run by INCAP / PAHO. Participation in regional forums organized by PREVDA.</p> <p><u>Collaboration with Programme FORCUENCAS in Honduras (2006-2011):</u> Technical support work and municipal strengthening, especially in the lower basin of the river Choluteca. In the case of sub Texiguat, FORCUENCAS hired former staff PREVDA interventions for prevention and mitigation, reforestation and sanitation in 2010-11. In Valle de Angeles, FORCUENCAS supported the implementation of a series of complementary interventions for reducing vulnerability and environmental degradation (water and sanitation, solar panels, etc.). Participation in national forums and meetings organized by PREVDA.</p> <p><u>Collaboration with The Rural Development Programme Totonicapán in Guatemala (1996-2002):</u> Support the development of the cooperative Xe- Ixtamayacen (canton Paxtocá Totonicapan) whose members have been active beneficiaries in the PREVDA Program (greenhouses, water harvesting, solid waste management, etc. and who were rewarded by PREVDA).</p> <p><u>The Regional Programme URBAL:</u> Financial support in the development of the Office of Planning and Land Management (OFPLAGEST) in Cayaguanca commonwealth, El Salvador. <i>Source: PREVDA's Final Evaluation Report, pages XV and 53.</i></p> <p>Additional evidence and testimonies of coordination between EU Regional Programmes and DG-ECHO:</p> <p><i>“ Durante la implementación de PREVDA hicimos un gran esfuerzo por ambas partes para buscar coordinación y sinergias con el DIPECHO y todos los socios, para ello se elaboraron matrices conjuntas por país para indentificar colaboraciones, en varios países hubo ejemplos concretos de complementariedad. No obstante de cara al futuro esas colaboraciones deben hacerse desde la primera planificación”</i> (Source: Interview with Virginie Andre, DG-ECHO, Managua)</p> <p><i>“ Con ECHO y el programa DIPECHO en todo momento hubo muy buena comunicación y se buscaron sinergias y complementariedad con PREVDA si bien a veces no era fácil por los diferentes ritmos de implementación y las diferentes zonas egeográficas”</i> (Source: Interview with Mauricio Peñalba, EUD, Managua)</p> <p><i>“ Por invitación de ECHO nosotros hemos participado en el proceso de revision de propuestas de DIPECHO en la última convocatoria y ha sido un ejercicio de colaboración muy interesante y necesario aunque no exista un mecanismo obligatorio”</i> (source: Interview with Sandra Mejía, EUD, Nicaragua)</p>
<p>I-6.5.2 – EU interventions coordinated with/complementary to other donors actions (EU Member States, JICA, WB, USAD, IDB, etc.)</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>The EU programmes/project implemented during the period were able to identify and benefit from the collaboration with other donor's initiatives implemented in the same geographical areas (i.e. river basin, municipalities, countries, etc.) and/or with some thematic affinities (i.e. DRR, Water Management, Food Security, etc.)</p>

	<p>According to the secondary sources reviewed in most of cases the collaborations had not been planned beforehand but identified during the implementation and in most of cases were “stand alone” opportunities without a common strategic vision or shared outcomes.</p> <p>These collaborations in some cases prevented from duplication/overlapping of activities while in others may have helped to build more sustainable processes by combining and optimizing exiting resources and different timeframes (i.e. short, medium and long term actions). In other cases, although isolated, EU programmes/projects provoked certain duplications due to lack of coordination agreements and / or co-financing.</p> <p>During field phase some key informants recognised that communication and coordination between EU Regional/Country Programmes and bilateral cooperation of EU Member States is not always as desired and tight agendas of everyone do not help, however they are aware that some mechanisms to improve this situation should be put in place from both sides.</p>
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p>Examples of complementarity and joint efforts of PREVDA with other donors’ initiatives.</p> <p><u>In relation to EU Member States:</u></p> <p>Collaboration with The Spanish Cooperation (AECID): Support the development of PCGIR, particularly in relation to public funding; support the development of the ERCC; Support the development of associations in the region, including its role in the management of watersheds/ sub watersheds, especially in Guatemala that has strengthened the role and importance of the Metropolitan commonwealth; Monitoring organizational processes promoted by PREVDA with Local Development Project in the Indio River Basin (PIDCAC/ AECID)</p> <p>Collaboration with The Austrian Cooperation: Co -financing of social projects in the lower basin of the river Choluteca. For example, the co-financing and PREVDA FINIDA for potable water and renewable energy in the community Las Pitás.</p> <p>Collaboration with the German Technical Cooperation (GIZ / KfW): Support for the construction of a treatment plant in Granada for the benefit of the lower basin of the Malacatoya river in Nicaragua. The Forests and Water Project (KfW) in Trifinio region (El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras) that is supporting the Cayaguanca and employed former PREVDA staff.</p> <p>Collaboration with the Swedish Cooperation Agency (ASDI): Support for the development of the Basin Council of the Los Angeles Valley until 2009 and where PREVDA had been involved since 2008 with the management plan for the basin identified by CATIE.</p> <p>Collaboration with the Finnish Cooperation (FINIDA): Support the development of the AMUB to manage medium-high basin of Malacotoya river in Nicaragua until 2010 and where PREVDA has intervened since 2008 with the identification of the management plan by CATIE and also the promotion of best practices for managing Risk, Water and Environment. Co-funding of PRESANCA II</p> <p>Collaboration with the Dutch Cooperation: University of San Marcos in Quetzaltenango cooperation in Climate Change and environmental issues.</p> <p><u>Added-Value in relation to other donors-funded interventions:</u></p> <p>The World Bank: Support in the preparation of PCGIR, particularly in relation to the forecasts analysis; Support the development of the ERCC (RUTA funding), which was made in full consistency with the PREVDA contract 2.12.</p> <p>The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB): Several loans</p> <p>The Central American Bank for Economic Integration (BCIE): Funding for the establishment of a hydrometeorological database for the region to support future climate forecasts at the level of CIMHAC and use of CEPREDENAC.</p>

	<p>The U.S. Cooperation (USAID): Support the development of PROLEGIS by PROARCA Program which was updated by PREVDA through the Contract 2.1.</p> <p>The Norwegian Cooperation (NORAD): Support the elaboration of PCGIR particularly in relation to the seismic part.</p> <p>The Taiwan Cooperation: Support in the preparation of PCGIR, particularly on issues of information and communication.</p> <p>The Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA): Support the Municipality of Quetzaltenango (Natural Resources, Conservation and Tourism).</p> <p>Some cases of duplication between PREVDA and other initiatives:</p> <p>Indian River Basin in Chagres, Panama, where Local Development Project (PIDCAC), funded by the AECID failed to coordinate their interventions with PREVDA until 2011.</p> <p>Upper basin of Samala River, Guatemala, where the NGO CEDEPEM and the Commonwealth failed to coordinate with the installation of greenhouses and exchange of experiences on technical construction, operation and maintenance.</p> <p><i>Source: PREVDA's Final Evaluation Report, pages 55-56.</i></p>
OTHER RELEVANT INFORMATION (NOT CAPTURED ELSEWHERE IN THIS EQ)	

EQ:7 Food Security

EQ 7 – To what extent has European Union support contributed to the consolidation of a regional political, legal and institutional framework and the corresponding organisational capacities to facilitate the harmonized planning and implementation of food security and nutrition interventions in Central America?

JC 7.1 – Increased harmonization of food security policies between regional and national level

Statement
on JC
7.1

The EU has made some limited progress in the facilitation of increased harmonization of food security policies in Central America. PRESANCA I did not have sufficient staff; or staff with the correct professional profile to become engaged and make a difference in the complex political (and politicised) landscape in FNS / SAN at the four targeted countries (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua). This was also linked to the underestimation of the complexity and difficulty of the task of affecting FNS policy at national level. This notwithstanding, however, in 2008, PRESANCA I helped to bring about a mandate of the Central American Presidents for the creation of the *Comité Consultivo Regional para la SAN (CCR-SAN)*. CCR-SAN was meant to help revitalize policy making at regional level in food and nutrition security, but the mechanisms met with some difficulties during its existence.

Even with CCR-SAN in place, it proved difficult for PRESANCA I to affect the creation national-level food security observatories as common national-level structures that would facilitate the collection and dissemination of data and information on FNS. These difficulties were partly caused by disagreements between some of the members in the *Comité Consultivo Regional para la SAN (CCR-SAN)*, with whom PRESANCA I was aligned and some of the national governments on the particular institutional model promoted by these CCR-SAN members at that time. Formally after the end of PRESANCA I, a coalition of key food security stakeholders, including former members of the CCR-SAN (and former partners of the programme (i.e., SISCA, CAC and INCAP)) initiated the drafting of a regional policy for food security and nutrition. Although PRESANCA II (the successor of PRESANCA I) had formally started in March of 2010²⁰, the programme initially did not participate in this drafting process.

With the beginning of PRESANCA II, the mandate for coordination in SAN was transferred from CCR-SAN to SG-SICA. In the wake of this change, the PRESANCA II itself was formally placed in SG-SICA, and CCR-SAN ceased to exist in the wake of this change. From this new position, PRESANCA II (now as part of SG-SICA) began to participate in and facilitate a review process of the draft policy was being developed by the former members of the now defunct CCR-SAN. The forum used for this exchange was the *Foro de Secretarías e Instancias Nacionales Coordinadoras de la Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional en los Estados Miembros*, whose creation PRESANCA II had facilitated. In addition to food security coordinating Secretariats from El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras²¹ and the Ministry of Health of Costa Rica, as well as the Ministry of Agriculture of the Dominican Republic²², the *Foro* also included representatives of those regional organisations that had initiated the process of drafting the policy. During these consultations, some members of the forum called for the policy to be simplified, and to better respect the nature and competencies of the national food security coordinating institution (such as UTSAN in Honduras, SESAN in

²⁰ According to information in PRESANCA II ROM report (Dixon, 2012).

²¹ As well as Belize, which is not covered by PRESANCA II.

²² Based on a list of attendees of the first meeting of the forum in September of 2012.

	<p>Guatemala, CONASAN in El Salvador).</p> <p>Ultimately, the Presidential Summit (Cumbre de Presidentes) of December 2013 failed to reach consensus and approve the regional policy on food security, due to opposition from various national Governments, including those with inter-sectoral food security secretariats, such as Guatemala. Different opinions on the function and purpose of the regional food security policy and on the relative importance of specific sectors (such as health and agriculture) vs. a more cross- and multi-sectoral interpretation of food security (and the corresponding organisational set-up) were among the factors that led to the rejection of the policy proposal. These objections are related to the concerns voiced during the meetings of the respect the nature and competencies of the cross-sectoral national food security coordinating secretariats and other entities) had been voiced during preceding meetings of the <i>Foro de Secretarías e Instancias Nacionales Coordinadoras de la Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional en los Estados Miembros</i> (see above). Those objecting to the policy felt that it did not sufficiently reflect that in a number of Central American countries, the mandates for overseeing and coordinating a national policy response in food security were in the hands of cross-sectoral food security secretariats (i.e., in Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala), instead of under the authority of sector-specific ministries for health or agriculture.</p> <p>In addition, PRESANCA II has facilitated the placement of students enrolled in the “Maestría Regional en Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional” (developed with the help of PRESANCA II / PRESISAN) to national coordinators (i.e. national Ministries & Agencies responsible for FNS coordination). Similarly to the coordination mechanisms, however, it is not clear at this point how these students were able to influence the operations of these agencies.</p>
<p>I-7.1.1 – National parliaments (where applicable) ratify regional frameworks / adopt national food security legislation to reflect regionally agreed principles</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>Slow progress in particular during the first years of the programming period (2007 – 2010). The programme design of PRESANCA I did not provide sufficient staff / staff with the correct professional profile, which affected the ability of the programme work in the diverse and complex political (and politicised) landscape in FNS / SAN at the four targeted countries (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua). This was also linked to the underestimation of the complexity and difficulty of the task of affecting FNS policy at national level. PRESANCA was not represented sufficiently at the national level to become engaged in policy dialogue and to affect policy changes.</p> <p>Although formally after the end of PRESANCA I, a coalition of key food security stakeholders and former partners of the programme (SISCA, CAC and INCAP) initiated the drafting of a regional policy for food security and nutrition. Although PRESANCA II (the successor of PRESANCA I) had formally started in March of 2010²³, the programme initially did not participate in this drafting process. This changed in the second half of 2012, when SG-SICA and PRESANCA II began to participate in an facilitate a review process of the draft policy, through the <i>Foro de Secretarías e Instancias Nacionales Coordinadoras de la Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional en los Estados Miembros</i> (whose creation PRESANCA II had facilitated). In addition to food security coordinating Secretariats from El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras²⁴ and the Ministry of Health of Costa Rica, as well as the Ministry of Agriculture of the Dominican Republic²⁵, the <i>Foro</i> also included representatives of those regional organisations that had initiated the process of drafting the policy.</p>

²³ According to information in PRESANCA II ROM report (Dixon, 2012).

²⁴ As well as Belize, which is not covered by PRESANCA II.

²⁵ Based on a list of attendees of the first meeting of the forum in September of 2012.

	<p>During these consultations, some members of the forum called for the policy to be simplified, and to better respect the nature and competencies of the national food security coordinating institution (such as UTSAN in Honduras, SESAN in Guatemala, CONASAN in El Salvador).</p> <p>Ultimately, the Presidential Summit (Cumbre de Presidentes) of December 2013 failed to reach consensus and approve the regional policy on food security, due to opposition from various national Governments, including those with inter-sectoral food security secretariats, such as Guatemala. Different opinions on the function and purpose of the regional food security policy and on the relative importance of specific sectors (such as health and agriculture) vs. a more cross- and multi-sectoral interpretation of food security (and the corresponding organisational set-up) were among the factors that led to the rejection of the policy proposal. These objections are related to the concerns voiced during the meetings of the respect the nature and competencies of the cross-sectoral national food security coordinating secretariats and other entities) had been voiced during preceding meetings of the <i>Foro de Secretarías e Instancias Nacionales Coordinadoras de la Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional en los Estados Miembros</i> (see above). Those objecting to the policy felt that it did not sufficiently reflect that in a number of Central American countries, the mandates for overseeing and coordinating a national policy response in food security were in the hands of cross-sectoral food security secretariats (i.e., in Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala), instead of under the authority of sector-specific ministries for health or agriculture.</p>
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p><u>Supporting evidence:</u></p> <hr/> <p><u>Detracting evidence:</u></p> <p><u>PRESANCA I:</u></p> <p>PRESANCA I did not have the required resources to lobby for and affect change at national level, in view of the fragmented national organisational and institutional landscapes in the FNS Sectors:</p> <p><i>[At national level] “el programa se enfrenta a un panorama altamente diverso, sectorizado, complejo y político. Ni la estrategia, ni el personal parecen estar con el perfil ó el peso suficiente para enfrentar la magnitud de cuatro gobiernos Nacionales y todas sus instituciones. No se critica la calidad del personal que por lo general es altamente calificado. Pero la estructura de personal y la cantidad de personas parece ser una manifestación de una subestimación de la tarea al momento de la formulación del programa. En pocas palabras, no es viable para un programa como el PRESANCA de obtener resultados significativos a nivel de cuatro gobiernos nacionales en cuanto a la introducción de temas SAN, sistemas de información nacionales y observatorios nacionales.” (Palermo, Pijnenburg, Munoz, & Salas, 2007, p. 68)</i></p> <p>In particular, PRESANCA I was not adequately represented and present at national level, as its only presence in the four targeted countries were focal points it shared with the WHO and INCAP. In practice, this meant that these focal points were mostly involved in tasks related to RE4 / Component 4 of PRESANCA I (i.e., investment and development for FNS at local level); with little time to spare to support work at policy level at national level:</p> <p><i>“Por otro lado, en la actualidad el PRESANCA basa su presencia nacional en los puntos focales que comparte con la OPS y el INCAP. Estas múltiples representaciones y las diversas cargas de trabajos que estas generan, hace que el actual centro de atención de estos ‘representantes’ esté básicamente dirigido al seguimiento del componente 4. Esto no permite un tratamiento eficiente y eficaz de las políticas y estrategias impulsadas desde los componentes 1 y 2, ni el desarrollo de correctos niveles de interlocución con los múltiples actores que en materia de SAN, requerirían de una estrategia de convergencia, coordinación e impulso para favorecer la materialización de las iniciativas SAN, tanto al</i></p>

interno de los países, como en el marco regional.” (Palermo, Pijnenburg, Munoz, & Salas, 2007, p. 15).

PRESANCA II:

In spite of interest at presidential level, progress in RE1 has been slow. As of mid-2012, some progress had been made in taking actual steps towards the development of a common (regional) policy framework for FNS / SAN:

“Existen avances importantes en los tres Resultados aunque el R1 (políticas y estrategias fortalecidas) se esta probando más difícil de conseguir y, en la práctica, pese a un expresado interés, a nivel presidencial, en el desarrollo de políticas y estrategias comunes relacionadas con la SAN, este ambiente político, aparentemente favorable, no se ha concretado en políticas comunes. En este sentido, esta claro que el logro de este Resultado estaría sujeto a muchos factores externos como son: la estabilidad política de la región; los niveles de colaboración y compromiso de las instituciones regionales, nacionales y municipales; los avances lentos en la integración regional centroamericana sectorial y la polarización de políticas nacionales.” (Dixon, 2012)

PRESANCA II (PMU) took part in the process of commenting on drafts of the regional food security and nutrition policy in 2012 and 2013, through the *Foro de Secretarías e Instancias Nacionales Coordinadoras de la Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional en los Estados Miembros*, whose creation PRESANCA II had facilitated, and where SG-SICA (as organisational host of PRESANCA II) and PRESANCA II were represented. In addition to food security coordinating Secretariats from El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras²⁶ and the Ministry of Health of Costa Rica, as well as the Ministry of Agriculture of the Dominican Republic²⁷, the *Foro* also included representatives of some of the regional organisations that, initially without the participation of PRESANCA II²⁸, had initiated the process of drafting a regional policy on food security and nutrition, i.e., namely CAC, SISCA, and INCAP, the former “permanent technical secretariat” of the (by then disbanded) CCR-SAN.²⁹ (PRESANCA II, 2013).

Main steps in this consultative process surrounding the drafting and discussion of the regional FNS policy:

April – June 2012:

Draft of regional FNS policy was prepared and discussed within working group (including SISCA, INCAP, CAC, COMISCA);

Draft of regional policy presented to (and broadly endorsed by) the Presidential Summit (in June 2012, Ciudad de Tegucigalpa) (PRESANCA II, 2013).

July – September 2012:

Drafts of regional FNS policy presented in meetings w. national FNS coordinators (during “Cumbre Extraordinaria de Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno del SICA, la cual tuvo como sede la Ciudad de Managua, Nicaragua el día 8 de agosto de 2012”; at the same meeting, national coordinators proposed the creation of a “permanent regional dialogue mechanism / forum for

²⁶ As well as Belize, which is not covered by PRESANCA II.

²⁷ Based on a list of attendees of the first meeting of the forum in September of 2012.

²⁸ According to interview with staff of PRESANCA II; May 2014

²⁹ Based on interviews with staff of INCAP, PRESANCA II; April and May 2014

	<p>FNS” (which was accepted by SG-SICA).</p> <p>Follow up work of “Regional SAN working group” (SISCA, INCAP, CAC, COMISCA, SG-SICA (including PRESANCA II)) on draft regional FNS policy (including liaison with relevant regional and national organisations/ agencies) (PRESANCA II, 2013).</p> <p>In particular during the third meeting of March 2013, the <i>Foro</i> noted the need to better reflect the nature of the document as a policy framework in its structure and content. The members called for the policy to be simplified, and for future drafts to better respect the nature and competencies of the national food security coordinating institutions (SG-SICA, 2013). Related concerns regarding the effect of the regional policy on the autonomy, nature and competencies of the national food security coordinating institutions contributed to the fact that the final draft of the food security policy was not approved by the Cumbre de Presidentes in December of 2013 (Interviews with Government officials).</p> <p>Ultimately, the Presidential Summit (Cumbre de Presidentes) of December 2013 failed to reach consensus on the draft of the regional policy on food security, and it was not approved based on opposition from Government of Guatemala³⁰ and other Governments.³¹ Differences in the opinions of the function and structure of the regional food security policy; the division of labour between the regional and the national level were among the factors that led to the rejection of the policy proposal. Similar concerns (regarding the need of the regional policy to respect the nature and competencies of the cross-sectoral national food security coordinating secretariats and other entities) had been voiced during preceding meetings of the national food security coordinators and respective line ministries with SICA (SG-SICA, including PRESANCA II), INCAP and COMISCA) (SG-SICA, 2013) (also see Indicator 7.1.2). It was felt that the policy did not sufficiently reflect that national mandates for overseeing and coordinating a policy response in food security in many countries had been assigned to cross-sectoral food security secretariats (i.e., in Honduras, El Salvador³² and Guatemala), instead of under the authority of sector-specific ministries for health or agriculture.³³</p>
<p>I-7.1.2 – National stakeholders adapt their food security-related procedures to regional guidelines / changes in regional frameworks</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>As explained in greater detail below (see Indicator 7.2.1, Judgment Criterion 7.2) it proved difficult for PRESANCA I to affect the creation national-level food security observatories as common national-level structures that would facilitate the collection and dissemination of data and information on FNS. These difficulties were partly caused by disagreements between some of the members in the <i>Comité Consultivo Regional para la SAN (CCR-SAN)</i>, with whom PRESANCA I was aligned and some of the national governments on the particular institutional model promoted by these CCR-SAN members at that time (see Indicator 7.1.1 above).</p> <p>Until 2008, no platform had existed to facilitate the coordination and harmonization of national structures and practices (such as a “forum of experts” or practitioners). In 2008, PRESANCA I</p>

³⁰ Interviews with government officials, staff of SICA organisations.

³¹ Interview with INCAP, SG-SICA staff

³² Where CONASAN still remained aligned to and was formally part of the Ministry of Health

³³ Interviews with staff of SG-SICA, INCAP; Also (SG-SICA, 2013)

	<p>helped to bring about a mandate of the Central American Presidents for the creation of the <i>Comité Consultivo Regional para la SAN</i> (CCR-SAN). CCR-SAN was meant to help revitalize policy making at regional level in food and nutrition security, but the mechanisms met with some difficulties during its existence. With the beginning of PRESANCA II, the mandate for coordination in SAN was transferred from CCR-SAN to SG-SICA. In the wake of this change, the PRESANCA II itself was formally placed in SG-SICA. CCR-SAN ceased to exist in the wake of this change.</p> <p>From this central position in the SICA system, PRESANCA II was able to help facilitate the establishment of a new coordination mechanism, the <i>Mecanismo Regional de Diálogo permanente en SAN</i>, consisting of coordinating secretariats for food and nutrition security from Belice, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, and of the Ministries of Health and Agriculture for Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic, respectively. Between its establishment until mid-2013, the group met three times, defining its objectives, and discussing and commenting on the emerging draft regional policy for food security (see Indicator 7.1.1 for more information on this process). PRESANCA II has also worked on strengthening a “Mecanismo de Diálogo entre la SG-SICA y los gobiernos locales”.</p> <p>PRESANCA II also facilitated the placement of students enrolled in the “Maestría Regional en Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional” (MARSAN), which was developed and is implemented with the support of PRESANCA II / PRESISAN. Out of the first two classes of the programme, 9 out of 51 graduates transitioned into a position in the national coordinating secretariats or the line ministries responsible for food security (CONASAN in El Salvador, UTSAN in Honduras) or the Ministry of Health (in Costa Rica). Another four graduates started working in government at the level of local authorities.³⁴ to national coordinators (i.e. national Ministries & Agencies responsible for FNS coordination).. Salaries for these students were being paid by the organisations themselves, without support of PRESANCA II.</p> <p>Finally, PRESANCA I and II, as well as “Hambre Cero” have also engaged directly with local authorities (Man-Comunidades) under Component 4 / 3 of PRESANCA I / II. This also carried with it the potential to establish certain practices at sub-national level (see JC 7.3 and 7.4 for more information).</p>
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p><u>Supporting evidence:</u> <u>PRESANCA II:</u></p> <p>In August 2012, SG-SICA and national FNS coordinators formally created a regional dialogue mechanism for Food and Nutrition Security; to facilitate ongoing exchange between regional level and those at national level who are responsible for FNS coordination (PRESANCA II, 2013). A first meeting of representatives of these institutions was held in September 2012 in San Salvador, with the participating organisations including the specific food security coordination secretarits (e.g., for Belice, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras); and the Ministries of Health and Agriculture for Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic, respectively. Follow-up meetings were held in November 2012 and in March of 2013.</p>

³⁴ The largest individual share of these two classes, however (15 out of 51 graduates) was employed by the programmes PRESANCA II and PRESISAN themselves.

Geographical Unit (Country / Regional Level)	Representing Organisation
Regional Level (SICA System)	SG-SICA (incl. PRESANCA II & PRESISAN), INCAP, OSPESCA, SISCA
Belize	SAN Belice
Costa Rica	Ministry of Health
Dominican Republic	Ministry of Agriculture
El Salvador	CONASAN
Guatemala	SESAN
Honduras	UTSAN

Source: Listado de Asistencia, Primera Reunión de Secretarías y Instancias Nacionales Coordinadoras de la SAN

During the second meeting, the participants defined the objectives of the regional mechanism as consisting in “exchange of experiences and good practices”, “technical assistance at regional level and between countries”, “regular consultation and discussion on processes linked to SAN”, and “accompaniment of implementation, monitoring and evaluation of mandates linked to food and nutrition security”. The group was also commented on and contributed to the drafting process of the regional food security policy (see information on Indicator 7.1.1).

Detracting evidence:

“The main challenge has been to secure the assignment of high priority to food security on national policy agendas. The questions that this document seeks to address are to what extent the objectives aimed at relieving hunger are being attained and the causes and particular consequences of this phenomenon in the Central American countries.” (Espíndola, León, Martínez, & Scheijtman, 2005)

PRESANCA I:

Lack of sufficient “presence” of PRESANCA I at national level to really make a difference in / influence national practices / policies in SAN / FNS, the more so as the national organisational landscapes were very fragmentized (at least up to 2007 /2008) and (in many cases) had been lacking coordination mechanisms themselves.

In this situation, PRESANCA I was mainly represented at national level through the national FNS focal points; who had a broad range of responsibilities; and were not primarily concerned with normative work (i.e., liaising with national stakeholders / policy makers on harmonization of FNS policies, laws and practices); Instead, they were actually more involved in component 4 of PRESANCA I; (concerning URD – “Urgencia, rehabilitación y desarrollo”). (Palermo, Pijenburg, Munoz, & Salas, 2007, p. 15).

	<p>Until 2008, no body or platform existed to facilitate the coordination and harmonization of national structures and practices (such as a “forum of experts” or practitioners)³⁵ (Palermo, Pijenburg, Munoz, & Salas, 2007, p. 15). In 2008, a mandate of the Central American Presidents led to the creation of the Comité Consultivo Regional para la SAN (CCR-SAN) to revitalize policy making at regional level in food and nutrition security. Participating organisations were SISCA, FEMICA, CEPREDENAC, CRRH, CAC, BCIE, INCAP, CCAD, OSPESCA, CECC, CSUCA and FOCARD. INCAP was assigned the role of “permanent technical secretariat” (Secretaría Técnica Permanente) (CCR-SAN, 2008) (Interview with PRESANCA II staff, March 2014).</p> <p>Under PRESANCA I, and through the creation and resulting structure of CCR-SAN, food security and nutrition at regional level in Central America was broadly aligned with a wide range of sectors, including Agriculture (i.e, through the <i>Consejo Agropecuario Centroamericano</i> (CAC)), Education (through the <i>Coordinación Educativa y Cultural Centroamericana</i> (CECC) and the <i>Consejo Superior Universitario Centroamericano</i> (CSUCA)), Environment (through the <i>Comisión Centroamericana de Ambiente y Desarrollo</i> (CCAD)), Disaster Risk Reduction (through the <i>Centre de Coordinación para la Prevención de los Desastres Naturales en América Central</i> (CEPREDENAC)), Water and Sanitation (through the <i>Comité Regional de Recursos Hidráulicos</i> (CRRH) and the <i>Foro Centroamericano y República Dominicana de Agua Potable y Saneamiento</i> (FOCARD)), Fisheries (through the <i>Organización del Sector Pesquero y Acuícola del Istmo Centroamericano</i> (OSPESCA)), the financial sectors (represented through the <i>Banco Centroamericano de Integración Económica</i> (BCIE) and social issues (represented by the Secretaría de la Integración Social Centroamericana (SISCA)) as well as the local authorities of Central America (represented through the <i>Federación de Municipios del Istmo Centroamericano</i> (FEMICA)). INCAP, as the permanent technical secretariat of CCR-SAN, was aligned in particular with the health sector, in accordance with its institutional mandate; and illustrated by the fact that the Ministers of Health of all Central American countries formed the board of directors of the organisation (Interviews w. staff of PRESANCA II, INCAP (March / April 2014), (CCR-SAN, 2008).</p>
<p>JC 7.2 – Improved harmonization and coordination of policy, norms and procedures for regional security, particularly border security, among the SICA member states supports regional integration and improved security</p>	
<p><i>Statement on JC7.2</i></p>	<p>At the beginning of the evaluation period, the EU and its partners were faced with a professional culture in the national (and regional) food security without a well-developed “culture of analysis”, and the common hesitation among national stakeholders to share their data with other national or regional organisations. With these challenging circumstances as a starting point, the teams of EU-financed programmes (in particular PRESANCA I) had difficulties establishing themselves at national level, and to ensure that their initiatives could create organisational structures that ultimately would allow an easier sharing of food security data between national and regional level.</p> <p>As a result, PRESANCA (I) was able to help establish organisational structures for food security observatories at regional and local levels, but did not make any headway in promoting the corresponding structures at national level. At regional level, PRESANCA cooperated with the “Comité Consultivo Regional para SAN” (CCR-SAN) to establish the FNS Observatory (OBSAN-R). PRESANCA also made progress in the establishment of local level observatories (OBSAN-L) in pilot municipalities where progress consisted primarily in the changing of minds of local</p>

³⁵ The creation of such a body or entity was one of the recommendations coming out of the 2007 evaluation / mid-term review of PRESANCA I

stakeholders, who previously had not understood the importance of data analysis to support decision making w. regard to food security. At the end of the first phase of PRESANCA, the programme had made some steps towards preparing the installation of corresponding information systems.

However, the effort got only really underway during the last months of PRESISAN and the beginning of PRESISAN II, as follow-up programmes of PRESANCA I. PRESANCA II and PRESISAN (I and II) began to cooperate closely with CENTROESTAD and its initiative to develop an “Estrategia Regional de Desarrollo Estadístico” (ERDE), as well as with the Directorate for Planning and Analysis of SG-SICA, SG-SICA (which functions as the technical and administrative secretariat of CENTROESTAD). PRESISAN placed and financed a technical staff member in the Directorate, who has been supporting SG-SICA in the development of “ERDE”, and with the integration of SIRSAN in the future Si-ESTAD (the common statistical system of SG-SICA). In 2011, PRESISAN and CENTROESTAD also developed and started implementing a joint action plan to eventually achieve automatic updates of the SG-SICA database with official statistics from the national statistics offices of Central American countries, based on a jointly agreed calendar. SIRSAN is meant to eventually be linked to and published through the future “Sistema de Estadísticas Centroamericanas e Indicadores Comunes de la SG-SICA” (Si-ESTAD) (PRESANCA II - PRESISAN, 2013). At the time of the evaluation, the SIRSAN platform had been established and installed on SG-SICA servers as part of the PRESANCA II “OBSAN-R” model. Out of the 74 indicators that SIRSAN is made up of 28 are supposed to be generated by the national statistical organisations (ONEs), who also committed themselves to entering the data directly to SIRSAN (PRESANCA II - PRESISAN, 2013) At the time of this evaluation (May 2014) this initiative was still developing, and thus it was not possible to gauge to what extent the sharing of information occurred reliably and regularly.

The establishment and consolidation of national level observatories has proved to be more difficult. National observatories and corresponding information systems were meant to play an important role in ensuring the integrity of the information chain reaching from the local level to the regional level, However, PRESANCA I encountered difficulties in reaching agreements with national Governments on the establishment of these observatories and information systems. Some of the national governments disagreed with the specific institutional model and framework promoted by PRESANCA I (and its partners in the CCR-SAN³⁶) at that time, as it was thought to be at odds with existing national frameworks and the role of the already existing food security secretariats.³⁷ Until 2010, PRESANCA I pursued the idea of using country chapters of CCR-SAN member organisations to host the OBSAN-N function. However, eventually, this approach was abandoned due to the lack of interest from the national Governments (i.e., in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Honduras). In Guatemala, PRESANCA I continued to try building on its prior collaboration with the Office of the national Human Rights Ombudsman, and with the Special Rapporteur of the United Nations for the Right to Food³⁸. However, also this effort was eventually abandoned.

³⁶ , i.e. the consultative body that had been established to improve coordination in food security at regional and national level.

³⁷ Such as those that exist in Guatemala, Honduras or El Salvador.

³⁸ Who was at that time responsible for FNS-related issues in Guatemala and Nicaragua

With the beginning of PRESANCA II, the mandate for coordination in SAN was transferred from CCR-SAN³⁹ to SG-SICA, as mentioned above (see JC 7.1). PRESANCA II and PRESISAN (I)⁴⁰ approached the national-level FNS coordinating secretariats⁴¹ to work towards the establishments national level food security observatories in these organisations. As a result, national level food security observatories are now formally situated in the national coordinating secretariats in Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras (i.e., UTSAN, SESAN, and CONASAN). PRESANCA II / PRESISAN also provided some assistance to strengthen the organisational capacities of these secretariats (El Salvador, Guatemala). In the case of Guatemala, PRESISAN helped to design and implement the national “*Sistema de Información Nacional de Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional*” (SIINSAN).

At local level, the development of food security information management systems (SIMSAN) in the 8 pilot municipalities in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua started with some delay. In 2011, the development of the 8 “*Sistemas de Información Municipal en SAN*” (SIMSAN) could not advance as planned. However, in 2012, PRESISAN was able to make some progress in initiating the development of these pilot databases in the 8 selected municipalities. At the time of the evaluation, the local databases (SIMSAN) in the 8 pilot communities had been set up and at least partly populated with data.

However, a number of factors pose a threat to the sustained maintenance and upkeep of the pilot databases after the end of PRESISAN II. The scope of the information contained in the current version of the SIMSAN is very wide. Each of the pilot databases includes information on a wide range of sectors, in reflection of the fact that food security and nutrition is approached as a “cross-cutting” issue. Most SIMSAN databases contain information on at least 8 different sectors, ranging from overall demographic information, economy, education and health to housing, water and sanitation and infrastructure. Updating and maintaining a database with this wide range of information is a very time-consuming proposition, which already led some municipalities to seek more resources for database maintenance.

Additionally, the integration and harmonization of the SIMSANS with other existing databases at local and, more importantly, at national level in each of the benefitting countries had not yet been achieved. At the time of this evaluation, there was no yet an apparent link between the SIMSAN pilot initiative in Guatemala, for example, (i.e., in the municipalities of Comapa and Conguaco, Department of Jutiapa), and the national “*Sistema de Información Nacional de Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional*” (SIINSAN).⁴² At the time of the evaluation, no concept existed to integrate or combine these two models; and the SIMSAN concept was not well known at the national level in Guatemala.⁴³ The example of Guatemala is significant in this respect, as it is the

³⁹ Which had been given the mandate for coordination in the sector in 2008

⁴⁰ The successor of Component III of PRESANCA I, after the cooperation agreement with the FAO had been cancelled)

⁴¹ E.g., SESAN in Guatemala, UTSAN in Honduras and CONASAN in El Salvador

⁴² SIINSAN, which also was developed with technical assistance from PRESISAN, is described by the Guatemalan Government as “un sistema descentralizado, capaz de concentrar, administrar, utilizar y divulgar información de otras entidades relacionadas con la seguridad alimentaria y nutricional”. It provides a information, disaggregated to the level of municipalities, on many of the same sectors as the pilot “SIMSAN” databases, such as “nutritional information”, “economy”, “demography”, “environmental”, “educational”, etc.

⁴³ In Guatemala, the respective efforts will be able to refer to the Guatemalan Food Security Law of 2005 that puts the responsibility of “Información, monitoreo y evaluación de la SAN” into the hands of the Guatemalan Secretaría de Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional (SESAN). This assignment of responsibility for monitoring and evaluation to

	<p>country in Central America with the best established food security institutional framework in Central America.</p> <p>In El Salvador, another country covered by the SIMSAN pilot initiative, the level of integration of the local SIMSAN concept and national food security information systems is similarly low. Also, the EU-programmes have been faced with a very different institutional set-up with respect to food security compared to Guatemala. In El Salvador, the coordinating entities for food security (CONASAN / COTSAN) have been created not by law, but by presidential decree under the national Ministry of Health in 2013.⁴⁴ The current Strategic Plan of CONASAN foresees the establishment of a “Sistema de Vigilancia, Monitoreo, Evaluación y Alerta Temprana en Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional” that should provide information and should support decision-making at national and departmental, and also at municipal level. The fact that this plan also foresees the establishment of food security information systems at municipal level can be an opportunity for PRESISAN. However, it also makes it important that the establishment of any pilot systems in El Salvador is done in close coordination with the respective national authorities of the country.</p>
<p>I-7.2.1 – Relevant information systems are integrated / specifications are mutually compatible (allowing easy / automatic exchange of data)</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>During the first half of the evaluation period, EU support helped to put in place a regional level FNS Observatory (OBSAN-R), in cooperation with the “Comité Consultivo Regional para SAN” (CCR-SAN) (supported by PRESANCA I). The programme also had made some progress in the establishment of local level observatories (OBSAN-L) in pilot municipalities / mancomunidades. At local level, the process involved in particular the changing of minds of local stakeholders, who previously had not understood the importance of data analysis to support decision making w. regard to food security. At the end of the first phase of PRESANCA, the programme had made some steps towards preparing the installation of corresponding information systems. However, the effort got only really underway during the last months of PRESISAN and the beginning of PRESISAN II, as follow-up programmes of PRESANCA I.</p> <p>At regional level, PRESANCA II and PRESISAN (I and II) cooperated closely with CENTROESTAD and its initiative to develop an “Estrategia Regional de Desarrollo Estadístico” (ERDE). The EU-funded programmes were able to closely cooperate with the Directorate for Planning and Analysis of SG-SICA, SG-SICA (which functions as the technical and administrative secretariat of CENTROESTAD), by placing and financing a technical staff member in the Directorate. This staff member has been supporting SG-SICA in the development of “ERDE”, as well as with the integration of SIRSAN in the future Si-ESTAD, as the common statistical system of SG-SICA. In 2011, PRESISAN and CENTROESTAD also developed and started implementing a joint action plan to eventually achieve automatic updates of the SG-SICA database with official statistics from the national statistics offices of Central American countries, based on a jointly agreed calendar. SIRSAN is meant to eventually be linked to and published through the future “Sistema de Estadísticas Centroamericanas e Indicadores Comunes de la SG-SICA” (Si-ESTAD) (PRESANCA II - PRESISAN, 2013). At the time of the evaluation, the SIRSAN platform had been established and installed on SG-SICA servers as part of the PRESANCA II “OBSAN-R” model.</p>

SESAN makes it even more important for the SIMSAN initiative in Guatemala to seek close coordination and harmonization with SESAN (see Table 22 below).

⁴⁴ Although a food security law is currently in the legislative process, its outcome is not clear yet, and number of controversial issues still need to be resolved before its passage can be expected.

	<p>The establishment and consolidation of national level observatories has proved to be more difficult. National observatories and corresponding information systems were meant to play an important role in ensuring the integrity of the information chain reaching from the local level to the regional level, However, PRESANCA I encountered difficulties in reaching agreements with national Governments on the establishment of these observatories and information systems. Some of the national governments disagreed with the specific institutional model and framework promoted by PRESANCA I (and its partners in the CCR-SAN⁴⁵) at that time, as it was thought to be at odds with existing national frameworks and the role of the already existing food security secretariats.⁴⁶ Until 2010, PRESANCA I pursued the idea of using country chapters of CCR-SAN member organisations to host the OBSAN-N function. However, eventually, this approach was abandoned due to the lack of interest from the national Governments (i.e., in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Honduras). In Guatemala, PRESANCA I continued to try building on its prior collaboration with the Office of the national Human Rights Ombudsman, and with the Special Rapporteur of the United Nations for the Right to Food⁴⁷. However, also this effort was eventually abandoned.</p> <p>With the beginning of PRESANCA II, the mandate for coordination in SAN was transferred from CCR-SAN⁴⁸ to SG-SICA. PRESANCA II, now situated within SG-SICA, adopted an approach for establishing national food security and nutrition observatories that was significantly different from that of its predecessor: PRESANCA II and PRESISAN (I)⁴⁹ approached the national-level FNS coordinating secretariats⁵⁰ to work towards the establishments national level food security observatories in these organisations. As a result, national level food security observatories are now formally situated in the national coordinating secretariats in Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras (i.e., UTSAN, SESAN, and CONASAN). PRESANCA II / PRESISAN also provided some assistance to strengthen the organisational capacities of these secretariats (El Salvador, Guatemala). In the case of Guatemala, PRESISAN helped to design and implement the national “<i>Sistema de Información Nacional de Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional</i>” (SIINSAN).</p> <p>The development of SIMSAN in the 8 pilot municipalities in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua started with some delay. In 2011, the development of the 8 “Sistemas de Información Municipal en SAN” (SIMSAN) could not advance as planned. In 2012, PRESISAN was able to make some progress in initiating the development of these pilot databases in the 8 selected municipalities.</p> <p>However, a number of factors pose a threat to the sustained maintenance and upkeep of the pilot databases after the end of PRESISAN II:</p> <p>The scope of the information contained in the current version of the SIMSAN is very wide. Each of the pilot databases includes information on a wide range of sectors, in reflection of the fact that food security and nutrition is approached as a “cross-cutting” issue. Most SIMSAN databases</p>
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⁴⁵ , i.e. the consultative body that had been established to improve coordination in food security at regional and national level.

⁴⁶ Such as those that exist in Guatemala, Honduras or El Salvador.

⁴⁷ Who is responsible for for Guatemala and Nicaragua

⁴⁸ Which had been given the mandate for coordination in the sector in 2008

⁴⁹ The successor of Component III of PRESANCA I, after the cooperation agreement with the FAO had been cancelled)

⁵⁰ E.g., SESAN in Guatemala, UTSAN in Honduras and CONASAN in El Salvador

	<p>contain information on at least 8 different sectors, ranging from overall demographic information, economy, education and health to housing, water and sanitation and infrastructure. Updating and maintaining a database with this wide range of information is a very time-consuming proposition, which already led some municipalities to seek more resources for database maintenance.</p> <p>Additionally, the integration and harmonization of the SIMSANS with other existing databases at local and, more importantly, at national level in each of the benefitting countries had not yet been achieved. At the time of this evaluation, there was no yet an apparent link between the SIMSAN pilot initiative in Guatemala, for example, (i.e., in the municipalities of Comapa and Conguaco, Department of Jutiapa), and the national “Sistema de Información Nacional de Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional” (SIINSAN). SIINSAN, which also was developed with technical assistance from PRESISAN, is described by the Guatemalan Government as “un sistema descentralizado, capaz de concentrar, administrar, utilizar y divulgar información de otras entidades relacionadas con la seguridad alimentaria y nutricional”. It provides a information, disaggregated to the level of municipalities, on many of the same sectors as the pilot “SIMSAN” databases, such as “nutritional information”, “economy”, “demography”, “environmental”, “educational”, etc. At the time of the evaluation, no concept existed to integrate or combine these two models; and the SIMSAN concept was not well known at the national level in Guatemala.⁵¹ The example of Guatemala is significant in this respect, as it is the country in Central America with the best established food security institutional framework in Central America.</p> <p>In El Salvador, another country covered by the SIMSAN pilot initiative, the level of integration of the local SIMSAN concept and national food security information systems is similarly low. Also, the EU-programmes have been faced with a very different institutional set-up with respect to food security compared to Guatemala. In El Salvador, the coordinating entities for food security (CONASAN / COTSAN) have been created not by law, but by presidential decree under the national Ministry of Health in 2013.⁵² The current Strategic Plan of CONASAN foresees the establishment of a “Sistema de Vigilancia, Monitoreo, Evaluación y Alerta Temprana en Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional” that should provide information and should support decision-making at national and departmental, and also at municipal level. The fact that this plan also foresees the establishment of food security information systems at municipal level can be an opportunity for PRESISAN. However, it also makes it important that the establishment of any pilot systems in El Salvador is done in close coordination with the respective national authorities of the country.</p>
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p><u>Supporting evidence:</u></p> <p><u>PRESANCA I:</u></p> <p><i>Regional level:</i></p> <p>PRESANCA I succeeded in establishing the regional “Observatorio de la region Centroamericana” (OBSAN-R), relying on the support and participation of the CCR-SAN (the “Comité Consultivo Regional para la SAN”).</p>

⁵¹ In Guatemala, the respective efforts will be able to refer to the Guatemalan Food Security Law of 2005 that puts the responsibility of “Información, monitoreo y evaluación de la SAN” into the hands of the Guatemalan Secretaría de Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional (SESAN). This assignment of responsibility for monitoring and evaluation to SESAN makes it even more important for the SIMSAN initiative in Guatemala to seek close coordination and harmonization with SESAN (see Table 22 below).

⁵² Although a food security law is currently in the legislative process, its outcome is not clear yet, and number of controversial issues still need to be resolved before its passage can be expected.

“A nivel Regional se ha logrado, en el marco del Comité Consultivo Regional para la SAN (CCR-SAN), instalar el Observatorio de la región Centroamericana. Facilita un proceso de propuesta de políticas basado en la administración del conocimiento y el análisis de datos multisectoriales de utilidad para el mejoramiento de la situación alimentaria-nutricional.” (Palermo, Pijenburg, Munoz, & Salas, 2007, p. 19)

It is not quite clear, however, how established this regional observatory was in the early years of the evaluation period (i.e. around the year 2007). It is described as a “process for the analysis [of FNS data] to guide public policies and associated actions regarding FSN”.

El observatorio SAN Regional, entonces, se debe entender como un proceso de análisis para orientar acciones de políticas públicas sobre SAN y que se desarrolla en el marco del Sistema de Integración Centroamericana (SICA) a través del Comité Consultivo Regional para la SAN (CCR-SAN). Se vincula con los Sectores: Agrícola, Económico, Social, Ambiental, Político, cultural, Agua, entre otros.” (Palermo, Pijenburg, Munoz, & Salas, 2007, p. 19)

The team of PRESANCA I still had considered (in 2007, see MTE) to use the local offices of the members of the CCR-SAN to host and maintain the national FNS observatories. However, with the beginning of PRESANCA II, the mandate for coordination in SAN was transferred from CCR-SAN (which had been given the mandate for coordination in the sector in 2008) to SG-SICA. CCR-SAN ceased to exist, and the main body to ensure coordination between SG-SICA and the national level (that in a way has taken the place of CCR-SAN) is now the *Mecanismo de diálogo permanente entre las instancias nacionales en SAN y la SG-SICA*.⁵³ CCR-SAN ceased to exist in the wake of this change; and in Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras the OBSAN-N’s are now situated in the coordinating secretariats (UTSAN, SESAN, CONASAN) at national level. The idea of an OBSAN-N for Nicaragua was abandoned when SG-SICA and programme officials realized that the administrative and institutional structure in Nicaragua does not allow the set-up of that kind of institution in the country.⁵⁴

Structure and content of OBSAN-R:

OBSAN-R is meant to help promote the availability and utilization of knowledge and evidence to guide policy making and management related to food and nutrition security at the different levels (i.e., regional, national, local). The 5 main components (and associated main “outputs”) are listed below in Figure 1:

Figure 1: Main components and associated outputs – OBSAN-R (PRESANCA I)

⁵³ Interview with PRESANCA II staff / SG-SICA staff, May 2014.

⁵⁴ Interview with PRESANCA II staff / SG-SICA staff, May 2014.

COMPONENTE DEL OBSAN	PRODUCTOS
Bases de datos (encuestas y estudios especializados)	Epidemiología nutricional y nutrición pública Factores condicionantes de la nutrición. Resultados del Programa Regional SAN- SICA (PRESANCA)
Foros especializados	Incidencia Política: discusión conceptual, Agendas y mandatos, gobernabilidad regional y nacional, movilización de recursos financieros y no financieros Determinantes de la SAN: crisis del alza de precio de los alimentos, crisis económica y financiera global, salarios y precios de alimentos, clima y SAN, desarrollo municipal y SAN
SIRSAN	76 Indicadores en 8 categorías: Socio-demográfica, Económica, Gasto Social, Disponibilidad, Acceso, Consumo, Utilización Biológica, Condiciones Nutricionales - Actualización periódica (julio/09).
Bases Documentales	Documentos de estudios vinculados a la SAN (PRESANCA u otras instituciones): evaluaciones de programas, estudios de eficacia, efectividad y eficiencia
Recursos Humanos	Aula virtual y presencial: Programas de Maestría, Diplomados, Actividades de capacitación (cursos, talleres, seminarios, tutoriales) voluntariado, pasantías.

Part of the 5 components of OBSAN-R is the establishment and strengthening of food security databases at regional, national and local levels (SIRSAN, SINSAN, and SIMSAN). At regional level, the establishment of the “Sistema Integrado de Información Regional en Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional” (SIRSAN) has advanced considerably.

- PRESANCA II and PRESISAN (I and II) sought close cooperation with CENTROESTAD and its initiative to develop a “Estrategia Regional de Desarrollo Estadístico” (ERDE), which aims at developing a common statistical system for SICA, i.e., the SICA system. SG-SICA, i.e., specifically the Directorate for Planning and Analysis, functions as the technical and administrative secretariat of CENTROESTAD. This has provided PRESANCA II and PRESISAN, the opportunity to seek close cooperation with the Directorate for Planning and Analysis, among other things by placing and financing a technical staff member in the Directorate. This staff member is now supporting SG-SICA (as the Technical and Administrative Secretariat of CENTROESTAD) in the development of “ERDE”, as well as with the integration of SIRSAN in the future Si-ESTAD, as the common statistical system of SG-SICA (PRESANCA II / PRESISAN, 2012)⁵⁵.
- In 2011, PRESISAN and CENTROESTAD also developed and started implementing a joint action plan (“Plan de Acción 2011 – 2012 de cooperación técnica PRESISAN – CENTROESTAD”) to work towards a situation where information in SIRSAN would be regularly and remotely / automatically updated with official statistics from the national statistics offices of Central American countries / CENTROESTAD members, based on a jointly agreed calendar⁵⁶ SIRSAN is meant to eventually be linked to and published through the future “Sistema de Estadísticas Centroamericanas e Indicadores Comunes de la SG-SICA” (Si-ESTAD) (PRESANCA II - PRESISAN, 2013)⁵⁷.
- The SIRSAN platform has been established as part of the PRESANCA II “OBSAN-R” model, and will eventually allow the compilation and presentation of statistics related to food

⁵⁵ Interview with SICA and PRESISAN staff, March 2014.

⁵⁶ Interviews with SICA and PRESISAN staff; Analysis of programme documents.

⁵⁷ Interview with Presisan staff, March 2014.

security and nutrition in a number of categories, including a) contextual statistics on demographic, social, economic, environmental and “cross-cutting” aspects Central American countries; b) information on the primary “pillars” of food security (nutritional conditions, food availability, access, quality, utilization and “structural factors”), c) “determinants” of food security, such as environmental factors, physical factors, human factors and economic factors.

National level observatories:

PRESISAN (in 2011) has continued to work on establishing the “capítulos país” of OBSAN-R (following the model proposed by PRESANCA I, using the members of CCR-SAN to help establish national level observatories (“OBSAN-N”) (see “detracting evidence” for this indicator). However, at least in Guatemala, PRESISAN seems to have succeeded in enlisting the support of a national-level stakeholder (CEDESAN – the Centro de Documentación e Información para la Seguridad Alimentaria) to participate in the establishing of a national level observatory.

“El PRESISAN busca en este componente ampliar y fortalecer el trabajo ya iniciado en el OBSAN-R. Durante 2011 se hizo énfasis en el desarrollo e implementación de los capítulos país del OBSAN-R en Guatemala y Honduras, en el caso del primer país ya se había iniciado el apoyo del CEDESAN, los foros y el desarrollo de recursos humanos; el avance logrado en la instrumentación del SIINSAN contribuyó a la consolidación de esos procesos. La experiencia ganada por la UCT en estas actividades contribuirá a fortalecer la capacidad de apoyo al resto de países.” (PRESISAN, 2012)

Overview of work on establishing national-level observatories:

Table 7.1: Overview of work on establishment of national level SAN / FSN observatories

Country	Partner	Description and Assessment of work / progress
Costa Rica	Grupo Intersectorial de SAN integrado por el Sector Agropecuario (Secretaría Ejecutiva de Planificación Sectorial Agropecuaria (SEPSA), Ministerio de Salud, Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos (INEC))	Apoyar el diseño conceptual y metodológico para la implementación del Sistema de Información de Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional (SINSAN), y, ii) Revisar las boletas diseñadas por el INEC para el levantamiento de la encuesta de ingresos y gastos de los hogares 2012. (PRESISAN, 2013)
El Salvador	Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional (CONASAN)	Se iniciaron las actividades de coordinación con la CONASAN de El Salvador con el objetivo principal de establecer una adecuada coordinación con el Programa Interagencial de las Naciones Unidas que apoya a la CONASAN para la creación del SISAN; posteriormente se acordó que el SISAN debería desarrollarse dentro de un OBSAN nacional, para lo cual el PRESISAN preparó una propuesta que fue aceptada e incluida dentro de los términos de la

		asistencia técnica que se prevé ejecutar con la CONASAN a través de un convenio con PRESANCA II – PRESISAN. (PRESISAN, 2013)
Guatemala	Secretaría de Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional (SESAN) Centro de Documentación e Información para la Seguridad Alimentaria (CEDESAN)	Iniciado el apoyo del CEDESAN, los foros y el desarrollo de recursos humanos; el avance logrado en la instrumentación del SIINSAN contribuyó a la consolidación de esos procesos. La experiencia ganada por la UCT en estas actividades contribuirá a fortalecer la capacidad de apoyo al resto de países. (PRESISAN, 2012)
Honduras	Unidad Técnica de Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional (UTSAN) (part of “Secretaría de Estado Del Despacho Presidencial”)	Se acordó el desarrollo de un Sistema de Información en SAN bajo el modelo conceptual y contenidos del OBSAN R, para lo cual se empezó a negociar la firma de un convenio de transferencia de recursos necesarios para iniciar las actividades de diseño y desarrollo del Sistema. Como resultado de los primeros contactos sostenidos, se acordó iniciar las acciones para el diseño e implementación del Sistema de Seguimiento de Indicadores de Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional, SISESAN (PRESISAN, 2013)
Nicaragua		Decision taken not to work on establishing a food security observatory similar to those in other countries (Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador; established mostly independently of PI / PII support.
<p>In addition, PRESISAN was able to (in coordination w. CENTROESTAD / SG-SICA) to agree on a “plan of action” with national statistical organisations (ONE) to work towards the development of a joint methodology for FNS monitoring and the harmonization of indicators for SAN in the region:</p> <p><i>“Es importante destacar en este informe que gracias a la coordinación que en 2011 se logró con la CENTROESTAD a través de la SG SICA, fue posible acordar un Plan de Acción con las ONE, el cual permitirá iniciar actividades orientadas a la generación y armonización metodológica de indicadores relevantes y especializados en SAN en la región. En este sentido, se acordó la armonización de lineamientos metodológicos comunes para la elaboración de la Canasta Básica de Alimentos (CBA), Hojas de Balance de Alimentos (HBA). Un reto para 2012 es establecer las acciones necesarias para hacer un trabajo similar con los censos de talla en escolares de primer grado de primaria y Encuestas Nacionales de Consumo de Alimentos (ENCA).” (PRESISAN, 2012)</i></p> <p>In the first half of 2012, the PRESISAN had started the first bilateral technical assistance of the national statistical organisation of Guatemala (with regard to measurement of food availability and access to a “basic food basket” (canasta básica de alimentos; CBA), and of the ONE / NSO of</p>		

Panama, with regard to the development of a nutritional balance sheet (Hoja de Balance de Alimentos) (PRESANCA II / PRESISAN, 2012), (Vuurmans, 2012).⁵⁸

Local level observatories:

PRESANCA I had made progress in establishing the observatories at local / municipal level; starting by changing the minds of local groups and mayors on the importance of FNS:

“La misión quiere destacar que en la mayoría de las municipalidades, tal vez con la excepción de algunas de Guatemala, han realizado una labor positiva. En todos los casos, el tema SAN no estaba bien entendido y encontraba altos niveles de malentendidos que se traducían a menudo en resistencia. Por experiencias previas, se asociaba el tema SAN con la repartición de comida como lo ha hecho en el pasado el PMA y otros. Se inició un proceso intensivo de cabildeo, visitas y actividades que ha provocado un cambio radical en las municipalidades hacia el tema SAN. Durante las visitas se encontró una actitud altamente positiva hacia el tema y proactivo por parte de los alcaldes y concejales. En breve, todo indica que el tema se ha permeado a nivel local, por lo menos en los 24 municipalidades atendidas.local, por lo menos en los 24 municipalidades atendidas.” (Palermo, Pijenburg, Munoz, & Salas, 2007, p. 20).

This work was continued through PRESISAN, i.e., in 2011:

“A nivel local, la estrategia en los municipios del PRESISAN se orientó al fortalecimiento de las acciones iniciadas durante el PRESANCA, al mismo tiempo se introdujeron nuevos elementos vinculados al trabajo mancomunitario que impulsa el PRESANCA II, en el enfoque de CEDESAN, del OBSAN-L, la capacitación y el intercambio de experiencias y definición de acciones en el conjunto de municipios.” (PRESISAN, 2012)

Detracting evidence:

PRESANCA I

Advances in data sharing and knowledge sharing was limited until 2010, because of the shortcomings in Component 3 of PRESANCA I. Prior to PRESISAN, the first phase of PRESANCA (I) had signed a cooperation agreement with the FAO, to support the development of statistical capacity with regard to Food Security in Central American communities. However, the 2007 mid-term evaluation of PRESANCA (I) found that little progress had been made in the respective “Component 3” of PRESANCA (I).

The evaluation linked the limited progress to a number of different factors:

The design of PRESANCA (I) aligned the implementation of its “Component 3” (dealing with the development of statistical capacity) with SIECA. SIECA, during this time, was in the process of developing its own food security information system; and had been weighing the available options for much of the programme period (i.e., until December 2007; (Palermo, Pijenburg, Munoz, & Salas, 2007)

The FAO had tried to promote the implementation of its existing information systems (“GIEW Workstation”; the “Sistema de información y cartografía sobre la inseguridad alimentaria y la vulnerabilidad (SICIAV)”, both at regional and at national level. However, these systems had not

⁵⁸ Interview with PRESISAN staff, March 2014

corresponded sufficiently to the diverse information needs across the Region with regard to FNS (Palermo, Pijnenburg, Munoz, & Salas, 2007).

A Joint Thematic Evaluation on “Support to Information Systems for Food Security” (2009) finds that standards tools developed by FAO (including the GIEWS Workstation) had often not been sufficiently adapted to the specific circumstances and needs at country level, which limited their use and usefulness:

This was also confirmed in the final evaluation of Phase II of FSLA, which concludes that FSLA has been most successful in tools development and less successful in adapting to decision-making processes and strengthening of analytical capacities at country level. Similarly, a 2007 evaluation of an EC funded project to promote food security in Central America, which included development of ISFSs through FAO support, expressed concern about FAO’s use of standard packages developed at HQs, including the GIEWS workstation (FAO / WFP, 2009).

The component of PRESANCA I associated with RE3 (see above) was eventually cancelled; and the agreement between FAO and the European Commission was rescinded/ cancelled in late 2007 (as a result of the mid-term evaluation of PRESANCA I) (European Union, 2010).

Also see JC 6 on the “financial implications” of this decision.

PRESISAN I & II

The development of SIMSAN in the 8 pilot municipalities in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua started with some delay. In 2011, the development of the 8 “Sistemas de Información Municipal en SAN” (SIMSAN) could not advance as planned (PRESISAN, 2012). In 2012, PRESISAN was able to make some progress in initiating the development of these pilot databases in the 8 selected municipalities (Vuurmans, 2012), (PRESISAN, 2013).

A number pose a threat to the sustained maintenance and upkeep of the pilot databases after the end of PRESISAN II:

The scope of the information contained in the current version of the SIMSAN (the pilot implemented in the 8 municipalities) is very wide. Each of the pilot databases includes information on a wide range of sectors, in reflection of the fact that food security and nutrition is approached as a “cross-cutting” issue. As Table 13 below shows, information on at least 8 different sectors are contained in the SIMSAN database for Marcala / Honduras, ranging from overall demographic information, economy, education and health to housing, water and sanitation and infrastructure. Updating and maintaining a database with this wide range of information is a very time-consuming proposition, which already led some municipalities to seek more resources for database maintenance.⁵⁹

Table 13: Sectors included in SIMSAN (Marcala, Honduras)

Sectors included in	Types of Indicators (year)	Sources
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⁵⁹ Interviews with municipal staff in Nicaragua, Honduras.

SIMSAN (Marcala, Honduras)		
Demography	Densidad Poblacional (2001)	Census (each 10-15 years)
Economy	Porcentaje de familias receptoras de remesas (2008)	Not provided
Education	Tasa de deserción escolar primaria del sexo femenino (2013) Cobertura del sistema educativo (2012)	Dirección Distrital de Educación N° 2, Marcala, La Paz, Honduras. Secretaria de Educación Dirección Municipal de Educación
Health	Esperanza de vida al nacer (2009) Tasa de mortalidad materna (2013) Prevalencia de Enfermedades Diarreicas Agudas (EDAs) en menores de 5 años (2013)	Human Development Report Honduras Secretaria de Salud (Indicators 2 and 3)
Housing	Condiciones de la Vivienda (2012)	Census (each 10-15 years)
Infrastructure (Electricity)	Cobertura del servicio eléctrico en el área urbana (2008)	Empresa Nacional de Energía Eléctrica (ENEE), nivel municipal
Social / Human Development	Indice de Desarrollo Humano IDH (2009)	Informe Nacional de Desarrollo Humano 2011
Water and Sanitation	Cobertura de agua potable en el área rural (2008) Cobertura de agua entubada en el área urbana (2012)	Alaldía Municipal (agua entubada) Source of “agua potable” not given.

Source: Analysis of SIMSAN by evaluators, Date: 10.05.2014

The integration and harmonization of the SIMSANS with other existing databases at local and, more importantly, at national level in each of the benefitting countries has not yet been achieved. This is the case, at least for some countries, for the integration of newly developed national food security databases, such as the “Sistema de Información Nacional de Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional” (SIINSAN) of Guatemala. SIINSAN, which also was developed with technical assistance from PRESISAN, is described by the Guatemalan Government as “un sistema descentralizado, capaz de concentrar, administrar, utilizar y divulgar información de otras entidades relacionadas con la seguridad alimentaria y nutricional”. It provides a information, disaggregated to the level of municipalities, on many of the same sectors as the pilot “SIMSAN” databases, such as “nutritional information”, “economy”, “demography”, “environmental”, “educational”, etc. However, at the time of the evaluation, there was no apparent link between the SIMSAN pilot initiative in Guatemala (i.e., in the municipalities of Comapa and Conguaco (both in the Department of Jutiapa), and the SIINSAN database.⁶⁰ Although this is only one of the four countries where PRESISAN II has been active, it is significant as Guatemala is the country in Central America with the best established food security institutional framework in Central

⁶⁰ Interviews with Guatemalen Governmental official; PRESISAN II staff, March / April 2014.

America.

Integrating and harmonizing municipal databases with a scope as wide as that of the SIMSAN model with the information systems and data collection protocols of all other involved entities, such as line ministries, or their local offices in education, economic development, health, housing, water and sanitation, and infrastructure is likely to be a challenging endeavour, especially since PRESISAN is faced with a diverse set of institutional set-ups across the different Central American countries. In Guatemala, the respective efforts will be able to refer to the Guatemalan Food Security Law of 2005 that puts the responsibility of “Información, monitoreo y evaluación de la SAN” into the hands of the Guatemalan *Secretaría de Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional* (SESAN). This assignment of responsibility for monitoring and evaluation to SESAN makes it even more important for the SIMSAN initiative in Guatemala to seek close coordination and harmonization with SESAN (see

Table 7.3 below).

Table 7.3: Division of responsibilities of Guatemalan Line Ministries in food security (according to Guatemalan Food Security Law).

Thematic area related to Food and Nutrition Security	Ministries responsible (according to Guatemalan Food Security Law) ⁶¹
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⁶¹ http://www.sesan.gob.gt/pdfs/sesan/marco-legal/Ley_de-SAN.pdf

	Ministerio de Alimentos, Ganadería y Alimentación (MAGA)	Ministerio de Economía	Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsión Social	Ministerio de Comunicaciones, Infraestructura y Vivienda	Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social	Ministerio de Educación	SESAN
Disponibilidad de Alimentos	X						
Acceso a los alimentos	X	X	X	X			
Consumo de alimentos		X			X	X	
Utilización biológica de los alimentos.					X		
Tratamiento de la desnutrición					X		
Información, monitoreo y evaluación de la SAN							X

Source: Analysis of Capítulo VIII of "Ley Del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional".

In El Salvador, another country covered by the SIMSAN initiative, PRESISAN I and II are facing a very different institutional set-up with respect to food security. Here, the coordinating secretariat for food security has been created under the national Ministry of Health, by presidential decree in 2013⁶². Although a food security law is currently in the legislative process, its outcome is not clear yet, and number of controversial issues still need to be resolved before its passage can be expected.⁶³ Still, even the current Strategic Plan of CONASAN (the Salvadorean *Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional*) foresees the establishment of a "Sistema de Vigilancia, Monitoreo, Evaluación y Alerta Temprana en Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional [...] para apoyar las decisiones a nivel nacional, departamental y municipal" (CONASAN, 2012). The fact that this intended action also includes structures to be established at municipal level makes it important that the establishment of any pilot systems in El Salvador is done in close coordination with the respective national authorities of the country (i.e. CONASAN and COTSAN).

⁶² Interview with line ministry staff, El Salvador, March 2014.

⁶³ Interviews with donors, programme staff (March / April 2014)

I-7.2.2 – National stakeholders make available/ provide national information on food security situation to relevant SICA bodies	
<i>Findings at indicator level</i>	<p>At national level, PRESANCA I had difficulties in establishing itself at national level to set-up national level FNS observatories. Some of the national governments did not agree with the specific institutional model and framework promoted by PRESANCA I, and its partners in the CCR-SAN, i.e. the consultative body that had been established to improve coordination in food security at regional and national level. Some governments found the model promoted by PRESANCA I at that time to be at odds with their specific national institutional framework, and the already existing food security secretariats, such as those that existed in Guatemala, Honduras or El Salvador. Also, the four governments concerned (Guatemala, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras) had different FNS policies; and did not see the need to link their policies to any regional-level system and agenda. As a result, PRESANCA I was not able to officially establish national level food security observatories, and to develop data-sharing agreements with national counterparts. Without these institutions as a “foundation” the opportunities to improve the availability of regularly updated food security data on the regional level were limited under PRESANCA I.</p> <p>As mentioned above (Indicator 7.2.1. on the integration of information systems), PRESANCA II and PRESISAN (I and II) approached the national-level FNS coordinating secretariats (SESAN in Guatemala, UTSAN in Honduras and CONASAN in El Salvador) to work towards the establishments national level food security observatories in these organisations. In addition, PRESANCA II / PRESISAN I, PRESISAN and CENTROESTAD developed and started implementing a joint action plan (“Plan de Acción 2011 – 2012 de cooperación técnica PRESISAN – CENTROESTAD”) to work towards a situation where information in SIRSAN would be regularly and remotely / automatically updated with official statistics from the national statistics offices of Central American countries / CENTROESTAD members, based on a jointly agreed calendar SIRSAN is meant to eventually be linked to and published through the future “Sistema de Estadísticas Centroamericanas e Indicadores Comunes de la SG-SICA” (Si-ESTAD). Out of the 74 indicators that SIRSAN is made up of 28 that are supposed to be generated by the ONE, who also committed themselves to entering the data directly to SIRSAN (PRESANCA II - PRESISAN, 2013) At the time of this evaluation (May 2014) this initiative was still developing, and thus it was not possible to gauge to what extent the sharing of information occurred reliably and regularly.</p>
<i>Data, sources, extracts</i>	<p><u>Supporting evidence:</u> <u>PRESANCA II / PRESISAN I & II:</u></p> <p>In 2011, under PRESANCA II / PRESISAN I, PRESISAN and CENTROESTAD developed and started implementing a joint action plan (“Plan de Acción 2011 – 2012 de cooperación técnica PRESISAN – CENTROESTAD”) to work towards a situation where information in SIRSAN would be regularly and remotely / automatically updated with official statistics from the national statistics offices of Central American countries / CENTROESTAD members, based on a jointly agreed calendar SIRSAN is meant to eventually be linked to and published through the future “Sistema de Estadísticas Centroamericanas e Indicadores Comunes de la SG-SICA” (Si-ESTAD). Out of the 74 indicators that SIRSAN is made up of 28 that are supposed to be generated by the ONE, who also committed themselves to entering the data directly to SIRSAN (PRESANCA II - PRESISAN, 2013) At the time of this evaluation (May 2014) this initiative was still developing, and thus it was not possible to gauge to what extent the sharing of information occurred reliably and regularly (Interview with PRESANCA II staff, May 2014).</p> <p><u>Detracting evidence:</u> <u>PRESANCA I:</u> At national level, PRESANCA I had encountered several difficulties in establishing itself at</p>

national level to set-up national level FNS observatories. Some of the national governments did not agree with the specific institutional model and framework promoted by PRESANCA I, and its partners in the CCR-SAN, i.e. the consultative body that had been established to improve coordination in food security at regional and national level. Some Government found the model promoted by PRESANCA I at that time to be at odds with their specific national institutional framework, and the already existing food security secretariats, such as those that existed in Guatemala, Honduras or El Salvador. Also, the four Governments concerned (Guatemala, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras) had different FNS policies; and did not see the need to link their policies to any regional-level system and agenda (Palermo, Pijenburg, Munoz, & Salas, 2007). Much of the relevant information on FNS at national level that the regional observatory would have had to rely on was “concentrated in a small number of specialized organisations, who did not have a proactive policy of data sharing and exchange” (Palermo, Pijenburg, Munoz, & Salas, 2007).

In the final report of PRESANCA I (2010), the programme team still maintained the idea of using the “capítulos país” of the supporters of OBSAN-R (i.e., the members of CCR-SAN) to host the OBSAN-N function – up to 2010 with differing levels of success. In Nicaragua, El Salvador and Honduras the initiative had been abandoned by 2010, due to the lack of interest from the Government; in Guatemala, the programme intended to build on prior collaboration with the Office of the national Human Rights Ombudsman, and with the Special Rapporteur of the United Nations for the Right to Food (for Guatemala and Nicaragua). However, this effort was eventually also abandoned, in favour of a significantly different approach for establishing national presence, or better, partnerships at national level (European Union, 2010, p. 100) (Interview with PRESANCA II staff, May 2014) (see below):

PRESANCA II / PRESANCA I & II:

Table 7.4: Number of indicators per food security pillar across existing SIMSAN databases

0	Comapa (GT)	Conguaco (GT)	Ahuachapán (El Salvador)	Tacuba (El Salvador)	Marcala (Honduras)	Cabañas (Honduras)	Yusguare (Honduras)	El Paraíso (Honduras)	Dipilto (Nicaragua)	San Lucas (Nicaragua)	Somoto (Nicaragua)
Condiciones Nutricionales	0	1	2	1	1	0	1	0	2	1	1
Aceptabilidad	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	3	12	0	4
Disponibilidad	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Acceso	0	3	13	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	3
Estructurales	3	10	23	12	17	14	9	12	8	5	13

Utilización Biológica	0	1	23	4	8	0	0	0	5	0	4
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Source: Analysis of SIMSAN by evaluators, 10.05.2014⁶⁴

The SIMSAN model has been designed with a view to providing data for decisions at local level, and not with a view to providing information / feeding information into national databases. Thus, to date, SIMSAN initiative has not yet made contribution to national data availability in Food Security.

- Interview (PRESISAN / PRESANCA II staff), March / April 2014 confirms that SIMSAN was targeted almost exclusively at decision making at local / municipal level.
- Integration of SIMSAN pilot model, and national databases not foreseen (no concepts for this integration exist; SIMSAN was not known at national level in Guatemala).

In their current forms, the SIMSAN databases do not provide a model for improving the availability of data on food security nationwide in the Central American countries, in particular as SIMSAN is functioning more like a “data platform” that compiles information from local, national and international secondary sources (e.g. Ministry of Health, Department of Statistics, Secretary of Education / Municipal Directorate for Education, etc.)

Moreover, at the time of the evaluation, there were only few indicators for core aspects of food security (acceptability, availability and access) (see Table 7.4):

- 7 of 11 local databases had no indicator for “acceptability” of food; 9 of 11 local databases had no indicators for food availability (the remaining 2 two SIMSANS had each one indicators); 6 of 11 SIMSANS had no indicator on “access” to food.
- Some of the indicators that were available were only indirectly linked to the constructs they were supposed to capture. For example, in Marcala (Honduras), “Acceptability” of food / food supply was meant to be measured by the “school dropout rate at primary level” (by gender) and the “coverage of the education system”. The only indicator for “access to food” was the percentage of families receiving remittances”. In both cases, there exists an indirect link between the information collected, and the constructs to be measured. However, the database does not explain the linkage; nor does it explain how this data should be used / what kind of information this information is thought to help support.

Table 145: Indicators of SIMSAN Marcala (Honduras) for area “Pilares de SAN”

Indicators – “Pilares de SAN” (Marcala, Honduras)	Types of Indicators (year)	Sources
Condiciones Nutricionales	Prevalencia de Desnutrición Aguda en menores de 5 años (2013)	Secretaria de Salud, Red n° 5, Departamento de Estadística.
Aceptabilidad	Tasa de deserción escolar primaria del sexo femenino (by gender) (2013)	Secretaria de Educación, Dirección Municipal de Educación.

⁶⁴ Note: Count of indicators does not reflect disaggregation of each indicator. E.g. one indicator disaggregated into 5 age groups is still only counted as one indicator.

	Cobertura del sistema educativo (2012)	
Disponibilidad	“No Encontrado”	
Acceso	Porcentaje de familias receptoras de remesas (2008)	Not available
Estructurales	Densidad Poblacional (2001)	Not provided
	Esperanza de vida al nacer (2009)	Informe sobre Desarrollo Humano, Honduras 2008/2009 De la exclusión social a la ciudadanía juvenil.
	Número de hogares (2001)	Not provided
	Población (2001)	Not provided
	Tasa de mortalidad materna (2013)	Secretaria de Salud, Red n° 5, Departamento de Estadística.
	Tasa de mortalidad Infantil (2013)	
	Indice de Desarrollo Humano IDH (2009)	Informe Nacional de Desarrollo Humano 2011.
	Población por Sexo / grupos quinquenales de edad / urbana vs. rural (2001)	Instituto Nacional de Estadística Informe de Censo 2001
	Viviendas (urban vs. rural)	Not provided
Utilización Biológica	Prevalencia de Infecciones Respiratorias Agudas (IRAs) en menores de 5 años (2013) Prevalencia de Enfermedades Diarreicas Agudas (EDAs) en menores de 5 años (2013)	Secretaria de Salud, Red n° 5, Departamento de Estadística.
	Condiciones de la Vivienda (2001)	Instituto Nacional de Estadística Informe de Censo 2001
	Cobertura de agua potable en el área urbana / rural (2008)	Not provided
	Cobertura de agua entubada en el área urban / rural (2011)	Alcaldía Municipal/Oficina de servicios públicos.
	Cobertura del servicio eléctrico en el área urbana / rural (2008)	Empresa Nacional de Energía Eléctrica EENE a nivel municipal.
	Porcentaje de viviendas que usan leña para cocinar en el área urbana / rural	Not provided
<p>As mentioned above (Indicator 7.2.1), PRESANCA II / PRESISAN I and II managed to agree on a joint workplan with CENTROESTAD that foresees that national ONE directly update a list of 28 indicators in the regional database “SIRSAN” (initiative was still under development at time of evaluation). The list of the 28 indicators has been requested from PRESANCA II but had not been shared yet at the time this report was written. Although PRESANCA II / PRESISAN I&II has</p>		

technically supported the development national level SAN databases, e.g., in Guatemala and in El Salvador; and has supported the establishment of local level databases (SIMSAN). However, these initiative have not yet improved the overall availability of data on food security in the region.

I-7.2.3 – National stakeholders utilize data and information from regional sources for forecasting/ management of food stock levels

Findings at indicator level Especially during the first half of the evaluation period (2007 – 2010), the professional culture in the national agencies responsible for food security programming in Central America was largely characterized by the absence of a “culture of analysis”. In order to improve on the ability, capability and capacity at regional, national and local level to use data for needs-oriented food security programming, the EU had supported the “Maestria Regional en Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional” (MARSAN) (under both PRESANCA I and II), and had facilitated the placement of Masters students and programme graduates in regional, national and local agencies in charge of food security programmes.

Data, sources, extracts **Supporting evidence:**
PRESANCA II (parts also in PRESANCA I):

Both “PRESANCA” phases have supported the “Maestria Regional en Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional” (MARSAN).

Table 156: Actual and projected participants in Maestria Regional en Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional (MARSAN)
Distribución por tipo y promoción de estudiantes en programa de Maestria de SAN. PRESANCA II-PRESISAN- Ajustado a 2012

Énfasis	I Promoción 09/11-02/13	II Promoción 04 / 12-10/13	III Promoción 01/13-06/14	IV Promoción 01/14- 06/15	Total
Gestión Local	22	12	18	21	73
Gestión Pública de Programas	4	-	5	5	14
Integración Regional	-	2	6	6	14
Sistemas de Información	6	5	-	-	11
Total	32	19	29	32	112

CRONOGRAMA DE DESARROLLO DEL PROGRAMA DE MAESTRÍA Y DE TECNICOS EN SAN. Ajustado a 2011

Énfasis Semestre	2011		2012		2013		2014		2015	
	I	II	I	II	I	II	I	II	I	II
Gestión local										
P-I		■	■	■	■					
P-II			■	■	■	■				
P-III					■	■	■	■		
P-IV							■	■	■	■
Gestión Pública										
P-I		■	■	■	■					
P-II					■	■	■	■		
P-III							■	■	■	■
P-IV									■	■
Integración Regional										
P-I										
P-II			■	■	■	■				
P-III					■	■	■	■		
P-IV							■	■	■	■
Sistemas de Información										
P-I		■	■	■	■					
P-II			■	■	■					
P-III										
P-IV										
TECNISAN										
P-I		■	■	■						
P-II			■	■						
P-III							■	■		

Table 7.7: Participants in MARSAN I and II by country

Pais	MARSAN I	MARSAN II	TOTAL	Sexo Masculino	Sexo Femenino
Guatemala	6	2	8	6	2
Nicaragua	7	6	13	9	4
El Salvador	6	6	12	6	6
Costa Rica	3		3	1	2
Honduras	9	4	14	8	6
Panamá	1	1	2		2
	32	19	52	30	22

Work at national level

PRESANCA II resources (staff, etc.) were also used to support national-level organisations / governmental agencies (FNS Ministries, Councils, etc.) in implementing FNS-related events that were part of the national FNS agenda (see (PRESANCA II, 2013, p. 50).

Part of the support consisted in the training of students in the post-graduate programme “MARSAN” (Maestría Regional de Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional). At least some of the graduates of this programme (9 out of 51 graduates from the first and second class of the

programme) transitioned into a position in the national coordinating secretariats or the line ministries responsible for food security, including CONASAN in El Salvador, UTSAN in Honduras or the Ministry of Health in Costa Rica. Another four graduates started working in government at the level of local authorities. The largest individual share of these two classes, however (15 out of 51 graduates) was employed by the programmes PRESANCA II and PRESISAN themselves (see Table 16.8).

Table 16.8: Overview of place of work of MARSAN graduates (PRESANCA II, Promociones I and II)

	National Gov. (SAN)	Local Gov. (SAN)	Academia	PRESANCA / PRESISAN	SICA (other than Presanca)	Private Sector / Non-Government. ⁶⁵	No information	Total
Promoción I	7	1	4	12	0	4	4	32
Promoción II	2	3	0	3	1	2	8	19

Source: PRESANCA II documentation

Detracting evidence:

PRESANCA I:

Absence of “culture of analysis” in FNS (at national level):

“Ante la situación de la inseguridad alimentaria y nutricional, PRESANCA correctamente señala que parte de la problemática es la ausencia de una cultura de análisis de SAN y que se requiere de la creación de una masa crítica de personas e instituciones en la región para generar esta cultura necesaria de análisis independiente.” (Palermo, Pijnenburg, Muñoz, & Salas, 2007, p. 19)

This makes it all the more important that PRESANCA I succeeds with its intention to “help put in place a number of organisations and individuals who understand the importance of careful FNS analysis; and who have the know-how to do so”, see (Palermo, Pijnenburg, Muñoz, & Salas, 2007).

JC 7.3 – Increased participation of civil society (e.g., PRESANCA (I&II); PECOSOL & CONSUACCION) in policy/ political process w. regard to food security


<i>Statement on JC7.3</i>	In connection with EU assistance, opportunities for civil society participation in FNS interventions, and the shaping of FNS-related policies, guidelines and practices have developed primarily at local level, i.e., in the selected communities in which FONSAN funds have been disbursed . Here, local planning bodies for food and nutritional security interventions that have been supported by the EU, provide opportunities for the involvement of civil society organisations in these processes. However, the extent to which this these opportunities and this potential are realized ultimately depends on the overall openness of government institutions in each country for this kind of participation. Factors such as the willingness of mayors / local administrations to
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⁶⁵ Private sector, Non-Governmental Organisations.

	<p>invite this kind of partnership, and the overall atmosphere in each country that influences the relationships between civil society and government influence the extent of participation more than the EU support of the local planning bodies.</p> <p>Coordinators of FONSAN investments/ projects, who in many cases had graduated from the EU-supported postgraduate programme MARSAN, or the technical programme TECNISAN either are required to live in the benefiting communities, or had been recruited into the training programmes as local residents, putting them in much closer touch with final beneficiaries, and local civil society overall</p> <p>EU-support to increase participation of civil society at national and regional level had only begun shortly before this evaluation. The project “Desarrollo de la Plataforma PECOSOL – CONSUACCIÓN” (which started only in 2012) is designed to reach out to a large range of civil society stakeholders to foster their involvement in food security-related policy making, the strengthening of analytical capacity for food security interventions at different levels (regional, national, local), and the fostering of a political debate on the topics to increase the awareness and commitment of political stakeholders to food security interventions. The stakeholder groups include local partner organisations in 5 countries (CDC, El Salvador; MTC, Guatemala; RED COMAL, Honduras; FEMUPROCAN, Nicaragua; y CMC, Costa Rica); community-based organisations in 105 communities, PECOSOL and CONSUACCIÓN member organisations, as well as regional level civil society organisations and networks (such as the “Consejo Latinoamericano y del Caribe de Organizaciones de Consumidores” (OCLAC)).⁶⁶ No information on project results was available at the time this evaluation was carried out.</p>
<p>I-7.3.1 – Civil society networks have access to/ are members of key policy/ political food security platforms</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>The EU supported establishment of local chapters of OBSAN (under PRESANCA I and II) and enabled civil society participation in these local observatories, allowing local administrations, and representatives from civil society to contribute to the development of FNS interventions at local level. The institution of OBSAN was adapted to the specific institutional set-up in the different Central American countries. In Guatemala, for example, <i>COMUSAN</i>'s (i.e., municipal planning committees for food security) that had been created through Guatemala's food security law were being supported by PRESANCA II, through training and technical assistance. The format of the meeting allowed the attending NGOs and CBOs to provide input and feedback on the municipal food security planning. One key facilitating factor in this case was the leadership of the mayor of Olopa, who was requiring NGOs working in his municipality to register and inform his administration on their projects; but also had been able to facilitate the commitment of NGOs to do just that, and to coordinate their efforts with those of other FNS stakeholders, using the EU-supported COMUSAN as coordination platform. In Nicaragua, on the other hand, where the relationship between civil society and government institutions has been more difficult, the local planning bodies that were equivalent to the COMUSANs in Guatemala did not maintain active contacts with NGOs active in food security. This suggests that the support of these types of local food security observatories (OBSAN-L) has the potential to facilitate a stronger involvement of civil society in food security planning, but that the extent to which this potential is realized ultimately depends on the overall openness of government institutions for this kind of participation.</p>

⁶⁶ As the project only started in 2012, it will not be possible to examine tangible results; instead, the evaluators plan to look at the project set up and design, and attempts that have been made (e.g. by the programme team for PRESANCA II or PRESISAN) to create synergies between both interventions.

	<p>Rules and guidelines of the UNDP-administered (and EU co-funded) FONSAN also facilitate the involvement of different types of stakeholders at the local level, i.e. mayors, commissioners, NGOs, etc. Coordinators of FONSAN investments/ projects, who in many cases had graduated from the EU-supported postgraduate programme MARSAN, or the technical programme TECNISAN either are required to live in the benefiting communities, or had been recruited into the training programmes as local residents, putting them in much closer touch with final beneficiaries, and local civil society overall.</p>
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p><u>Supporting evidence:</u> <u>PRESANCA I:</u></p> <p>According to the final report of PRESANCA I, the “OBSAN-L” (local level observatories for Food Security) had become important places for public participation that allowed civil society/ the overall population to contribute at local level to FNS interventions:</p> <p><i>“Es importante mencionar que los OBSAN-L se han convertido en un mecanismo importante de participación, consulta, visibilidad, sensibilización y toma de decisiones a nivel local. Cuando se desarrolle el RE4 se entrará en una mayor descripción al respecto” (European Union, 2010, p. 101)</i></p> <p>PRESANCA I had developed a “model” for an OBSAN-system at all three levels (regional, national, local, see Figure 2) that bypassed the (at times) uncooperative national agencies/ national counterparts for FNS; and utilized instead the “national chapters” of the CCR-SAN members (who were constituting partners of the OBSAN-R at regional level).</p> <p>Figure 2: OBSAN Model developed by PRESANCA I</p>



participation from important stakeholders, both at regional level, but also at the “field” level, i.e, in by representatives of “mancomunidades y municipalidades en areas transfronterizas” (Dixon, 2012):

Los principales socios y actores beneficiados por la intervención participan activamente en los procesos, comprenden sus objetivos y su enfoque estratégico y disponen de sus recursos humanos, físicos y financieros. Se manifiesta el buen nivel logrado de apropiación, especialmente al nivel regional y territorial (mancomunidades y municipalidades en áreas transfronterizas. Pese a no contar con estrategias explícitas, los abordajes de género, medioambiente, buena gobernanza y derechos humanos están adecuadamente integrados al Programa (Dixon, 2012).

In Olopa / Guatemala, a several international and national non-governmental organisations, as well as a number of community committees working on food security (COCODES) attended a session of the local COMUSAN (a municipal planning committee for food security) (observed on April 2, 2014). The committee had been meeting monthly, led by a mayor who had committed himself to the cause of food security / had been a strong partner of PRESANCA II and PRESISAN (interview with Presanca staff, 2.4.2014). The meeting was structured to provide opportunities for international NGOs and community-based organisations to provide input into the municipal plans for food security.

NGO staff (attending meeting): “We have committed ourselves to working with the municipality and to participate in this platform, to get away from the situation in which organisations did what they wanted without telling the municipality” (heard during COMUSAN meeting, 2.4.2014). Note: The mayor of Olopa is requiring NGOs to seek approval of the projects they are financing in the municipality; making COMUSAN into a more central body to coordinate FNS interventions in the municipality.

The presence of PRESANCA II staff; and others (graduates of the PRESANCA II supported post-graduate programme *MARSAN*; and municipal staff who are graduates of the PRESANCA II supported *TECNISAN*) facilitates contact between community members / representatives; representatives of other civil society organisations and the regional programme (PRESANCA II / PRESISAN). *MARSAN*, *TECNISAN* and even students of either programme live in the communities (Interviews with PRESANCA II staff; local authorities, civil society organisations, 31.3. – 3.4.2014

Detracting evidence:
PRESANCA II / PRESISAN II:

In Nicaraguan municipalities where PRESANCA II and PRESISAN II were active, the relationship between NGOs and local administrations was decidedly different from those in Guatemala, but also than those in Honduras. Staff of the Association of Municipalities in the región (*Asociación de Municipios de Madriz; AMMA*) stated that “no NGOs are working on food security in the región”, and that therefore no coordination between the Association and civil society was required (Interview with AMMA staff, 26.03.2014). However, the presence of NGO staff and vehicles; as well as signs on the side of roads indicated that NGOs were present and active in Madriz.

Programme stakeholders confirmed that the relationship between the programme; and the opportunities of the programme to work with civil society were significantly different in Nicaragua

	compared to the other countries (various interviews with programme staff, 26.03. – 10.04.2014).
I-7.3.2 – Civil society representatives make regular, identifiable substantive contributions to policy/political process	
<i>Findings at indicator level</i>	The project “Desarrollo de la Plataforma PECOSOL – CONSUACCIÓN” (which started only in 2012) intends to reach out to a large range of civil society stakeholders to foster their involvement in food security-related policy making, the strengthening of analytical capacity for food security interventions at different levels (regional, national, local), and the fostering of a political debate on the topics to increase the awareness and commitment of political stakeholders to food security interventions. The stakeholder groups include local partner organisations in 5 countries (CDC, El Salvador; MTC, Guatemala; RED COMAL, Honduras; FEMUPROCAN, Nicaragua; y CMC, Costa Rica); community-based organisations in 105 communities, PECOSOL and CONSUACCIÓN member organisations, as well as regional level civil society organisations and networks (such as the “Consejo Latinoamericano y del Caribe de Organizaciones de Consumidores” (OCLAC)). The project only started in 2012, and was still in its start-up phase during the implementation of this evaluation.
<i>Data, sources, extracts</i>	<p>Supporting evidence:</p> <p><u>PRESANCA I:</u></p> <p>Component 4 (investments in SAN at local level) include the “active participation of local groups” (governmental and non-governmental) among the three selection criteria for participating/benefitting communities (based on these selection criteria, 25 communities where chosen):</p> <p><i>“a) focalización con base en criterios técnicos: a partir de la prevalencia de retardo en talla a nivel de municipios y comunidades, utilizando para ello la información disponible de los censos de talla en cada uno de los países, este indicador fue combinado con indicadores de riesgo de crisis alimentaria-nutricionales producidas por condiciones climáticas (sequía o inundaciones) y de deterioro ambiental.</i></p> <p><i>b) focalización con base en criterios políticos: que aseguran la sinergia en la inversión pública y basada en políticas nacionales de inversión social y macroeconómica, convenios y acuerdos de concertación entre grupos de presión, acuerdos de paz y estrategias de reducción de la pobreza, entre otras, y</i></p> <p><i>c) focalización con base en criterios de participación de grupos a nivel local: participación activa a nivel municipal y comunitario de alcaldes, consejos de desarrollo, líderes, y grupos organizados de acuerdo a áreas de interés.” (Palermo, Pijnenburg, Munoz, & Salas, 2007, p. 48).</i></p> <p>However, it is not clear (based on this information), what significance public participation had for the subsequent management of the programme/ programme component.</p> <p><i>Results and process of (participatory) project selection:</i></p> <p>In most cases, the selected projects seem to have matched with the expectations of the beneficiary communities (see below; also (Palermo, Pijnenburg, Munoz, & Salas, 2007))</p> <p><u>PECOSOL - CONSUACCION</u></p> <p><i>“R1: Fortalecida la capacidad organizacional y articulación de las Redes PECOSOL y CONSUACCION con decisores políticos y otros actores relevantes a nivel nacional, regional e internacional.</i></p>

	<p>R2: <i>Desarrollados procesos de análisis, propuesta, información y sensibilización sobre los efectos de la R3: Promovido un debate político, constructivo y propositivo, que incida en la mejora de la seguridad alimentaria y derecho a la alimentación en Centroamérica inseguridad alimentaria y acceso a la alimentación.</i>” (OIKOS, 2011)</p> <p><i>“Indicador 1. Se cuenta con al menos 10 propuestas elaboradas participativamente para la construcción de políticas públicas, que protegen el Derecho a la Alimentación y la SAN y contribuyen a reducir la vulnerabilidad alimentaria a nivel nacional; y 1 a nivel regional; Indicador 2. Las Plataformas y Organizaciones de las Redes CONSUACCIÓN y PECOSOL participan en reuniones de definición política a nivel nacional y/o regional; Indicador 3. Cada país ha tomado al menos una medida de incremento presupuestario de inversión pública, para el incremento de la producción y acceso de alimentos locales y mejora de la seguridad alimentaria y nutricional (SAN).” (OIKOS, 2011)</i></p> <p>The project “Desarrollo de la Plataforma PECOSOL – CONSUACCIÓN” (which started only in 2012) intends to reach out to a large range of civil society stakeholders to foster their involvement in food security-related policy making, the strengthening of analytical capacity for food security interventions at different levels (regional, national, local), and the fostering of a political debate on the topics to increase the awareness and commitment of political stakeholders to food security interventions. The stakeholder groups include local partner organisations in 5 countries (CDC, El Salvador; MTC, Guatemala; RED COMAL, Honduras; FEMUPROCAN, Nicaragua; y CMC, Costa Rica); community-based organisations in 105 communities, PECOSOL and CONSUACCIÓN member organisations, as well as regional level civil society organisations and networks (such as the “Consejo Latinoamericano y del Caribe de Organizaciones de Consumidores” (OCLAC). As the project only started in 2012, it will not be possible to examine tangible results; instead, the evaluators plan to look at the project set up and design, and attempts that have been made (e.g. by the programme team for PRESANCA II or PRESISAN) to create synergies between both interventions. (OIKOS, 2011)</p>
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Cuadro de Grupos destinatarios y Beneficiarios finales

PAIS	Organizaciones			Grupos Destinatarios			Beneficiarios Finales
	Gr. Base	Pecosol	Consumación	Hombres	Mujeres	TOTAL	
El Salvador	17			1,263	966	2,229	11,145
		11		12,261	6,454	18,715	93,575
			1	1,500	900	2,400	12,000
	17	11	1	15,024	8,320	23,344	116,720
Guatemala	13			1,223	1,466	2,689	13,892
		9		12,650	15,980	28,630	171,780
			1	1300	935	2,235	11,175
	13	9	1	15,173	18,381	33,554	196,847
Honduras	8			1,762	1,738	3,500	17,500
		6		16,939	7,966	24,905	124,525
			1	1,235	1,560	2,795	13,975
	8	6	1	19,936	11,264	31,200	156,000
Nicaragua	17			0	2,200	2,200	4,200
		16		71,811	48,099	119,909	599,545
			1	755	950	1,705	8,525
	17	16	1	72,566	51,249	123,814	612,270
Costa Rica	50			0	700	700	3,500
		9		9,385	4,880	14,265	44,500
			1	1245	1450	2,695	13,475
	50	9	1	10,630	7,030	17,660	61,475
Totales	105	51	5	133,329	96,244	229,572	1,143,312

Source: (OIKOS, 2011)

Detracting evidence:

In some cases (i.e., in Guatemala, see below) the selected projects did not match with the needs that had been previously identified by the community, i.e. by their local leaders and other (civil society) representatives, putting those leaders in a difficult position with their constituents: (Palermo, Pijnenburg, Munoz, & Salas, 2007, p. 49).

I-7.3.3 – Civil society networks assume clearly defined responsibilities in official policy/ political process related to food security

Findings at indicator level The extent of participation and of assumption of clearly defined responsibilities in official policy/ political process by civil society organisations depends, however, on the openness of each specific national (and local) government for this kind of cooperation. In Central America, this differs significantly among countries

Data, sources, extracts **Supporting evidence:**
PRESANCA I:
Component 4 selected local NGOs (albeit not further specified) as “entidades ejecutoras” (EE) to design and implement local FNS projects (Palermo, Pijnenburg, Munoz, & Salas, 2007, p. 51).
PRESANCA II:
As mentioned under Indicator 7.3.2, the local food security observatories (supported under both

	<p>PRESANCA I and II) present opportunities for participation of NGOs in local food security planning, if local administrations are willing to grant these opportunities to civil society organisations. The extent of participation and of assumption of clearly defined responsibilities in official policy/ political process by civil society organisations depends, however, on the openness of each specific national (and local) government for this kind of cooperation. In Central America, this differs significantly among countries.</p>
	<p><u>Detracting evidence:</u></p>

JC 7.4 – Policy framework facilitates improvements in the food security situation of women, indigenous communities, minorities

<p><i>Statement on JC7.4</i></p>	<p>Although it is possible that EU-supported food security programmes (including PRESANCA I and II) have helped to improve or at least stabilize the food security-related situation in some of the communities these programmes have targeted, no data was available to verify if this has in fact occurred. PRESANCA I and II did not actually develop a system to monitor changes in the food security situation in the target communities. PRESANCA’s contribution was considered to consist in the facilitation of changes of the planning processes at local level, to mainstream food security into all planning decisions at local level; and not in the direct easing of food insecurity at local level. The intention has been to support local administrations in developing customized indicators and data collection systems to track changes in local food security conditions. At the time of this evaluation, however, this effort (supported by PRESANCA I and II) had not yet progressed sufficiently to have yielded operational food security monitoring systems in the 8 targeted communities.</p> <p>In some cases, PRESANCA’s support at local level has encouraged local administrations to submit applications for additional food security projects. This was the case, for example, for the project “Hambre Cero” (contracted in 2012) in the area of the Mancomunidad Trinacional Fronteriza Rio Lempa (MTFRL) (El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras). In the particular case of Hambre Cero, no results data were yet available, as the project had only started shortly before this evaluation.</p> <p>In a few cases, PRESANCA II has worked directly with national governments to revise their national food security frameworks, such as was the case for the “Hambre Cero” initiative in Guatemala. No data were available to gauge if these policy changes have made a difference in the capability of the Guatemalan Government to address the food security crisis in the country.</p> <p>A look at national food security indicators helps to assess the <i>potential</i> for a future effect of EU regional policy level support on national food security policy frameworks, and, eventually the prevalence of food insecurity at national level. The most significant finding in this regard is the diversity of national food security situations throughout the evaluation period, both in terms of magnitude of the problem, and in terms of the trends of some key food security indicators.</p> <p>Based on this data, the group of 5 Central American countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama) falls into three fairly distinct groups: Two countries out of this group (Panama, Honduras) have seen significant improvements of the Average Annual Energy Supply Adequacy, as a measure of the overall availability of food at</p>
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	<p>national level, along with significant reductions in the prevalence of undernourishment (among adults) over the last 10-12 years⁶⁷ over the same time period.</p> <p>In two other countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador), the Average Annual Energy Supply Adequacy has declined between 2000-2002 and 2011-2013; and also, specifically, between 2007-2009 and 2011 – 2013. Correspondingly, undernourishment among adults has slightly increased in both countries (see above), between 3 and 3.5 percent.</p> <p>Costa Rica has seen much lower food insecurity over the same time period as the other four countries. Undernourishment among adults has remained comparatively low, oscillating around 5 percent between 2000 – 2002 and 2008 – 2010. However, adult undernourishment decreased by approximately 3.2 percent (to 8.2 percent) between 2009 – 2011 and 2011 – 2013, associated with a 7 percent decrease of food availability (Average Annual Energy Supply Adequacy) at national level over the same time period.</p> <p>Finally, changes in food prices have had very different effects on the prevalence of food insecurity and Energy Supply Adequacy in Honduras, as a country that has seen improvements in food security, and Guatemala, whose food security indicators have worsened over the evaluation period. In both countries, prizes for red beans and maize, two important food staples, have increased considerably between 2000 – 2002 and 2011 – 2013.⁶⁸ Yet, in spite of the similarity of price trends, adult undernourishment showed very different trends in both countries: While it decreased by about 8 percent in Honduras, undernourishment among adults increased in Guatemala over the same period, by approximately 6 percent.</p>
<p>I-7.4.1 – Reduced prevalence of underweight children under-five years of age (boys and girls) among targeted populations</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>Although it is possible that EU-supported food security programmes (including PRESANCA I and II) have helped to improve or at least stabilize the food security-related situation in some of the communities these programmes have targeted, no data was available to verify if this has in fact occurred. PRESANCA I and II did not actually develop a system to monitor changes in the food security situation in the target communities. PRESANCA’s contribution was considered to consist in the facilitation of changes of the planning processes at local level, to mainstream food security into all planning decisions at local level; and not in the direct easing of food insecurity at local level. The intention has been to support local administrations in developing customized indicators and data collection systems to track changes in local food security conditions. At the time of this evaluation, however, this effort (supported by PRESISAN I and II) had not yet progressed sufficiently to have yielded operational food security monitoring systems in the 8 targeted communities.</p> <p>In some cases, PRESANCA’s support at local level has encouraged local administrations to submit applications for additional food security projects. This was the case, for example, for the project “Hambre Cero” (contracted in 2012) in the area of the <i>Mancomunidad Trinacional Fronteriza Rio Lempa</i> (MTFRL) (El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras). In the particular case of Hambre Cero, no results data were yet available, as the project had only started shortly before this evaluation.</p>
<p><i>Data, sources,</i></p>	<p>Supporting evidence: <u>Hambre Cero:</u></p>


⁶⁷ Panama having reduced the percentage of undernourished adults from 25 percent in 2000 – 02 to 8.7 percent for the period 2011 – 2013; and Honduras having reduced the percentage of undernourished adults in the same period from 16.6 percent to 8.7 percent.

⁶⁸ Prizes for red beans have increased by 46 percent in Guatemala and by even 72percent in Honduras (measured in US\$/kg) between 2000 – 2002 and 2011 – 2013. Similar prize increases can be found for maize as well.

<p><i>extracts</i></p>	<p>Hambre Cero was a follow-on project that was initiated by the Mancomunidad Trinacional Fronteriza Rio Lempa (MTFRL). The Mancomunidad had been receiving support from URB-AL (for institutional strengthening), as well as PRESANCA II / PRESISAN (for institutional strengthening, specifically in the area of food security and nutrition). Staff of the MTFRL used this support as an opportunity to develop a proposal for a bigger-scale follow-up programme, i.e. “Hambre Cero”, which is now being supported by the European Union (Interview with staff of MTFRL, PRESANCA II, 01.04.2014).</p> <p>No results data on Hambre Cero were available, as programme had only started shortly before this evaluation.</p> <p><u>Detracting evidence:</u></p> <p>Neither PRESANCA I, nor PRESANCA II had developed a system to monitor changes in the food security situation in the target communities; instead this was considered to be part of the responsibilities of the targeted communities, i.e. to develop food security indicators that would best monitor changes in the food security situation at local level. As a result, no quantitative results data have been available to gauge the impact (in terms of changes to the food security situation) of PRESANCA II and PRESISAN at local level.</p> <p><i>There was a proposal to monitor the impact of PRESANCA II in the region and in the communities, but then we determined that it was not PRESANCA II that had the responsibility of having an impact. What we decided therefore to collect two kinds of information a) to conduct a kind of meta-analysis to analyse the broad trends in the region; b) to analyse other historical data on food security. For day-to-day monitoring of changes in food security in targeted communities: municipalities are supposed to develop indicators for themselves that are more sensitive to changes (Interview PRESANCA II staff, 14.05.2014).</i></p> <p>Note: This applies to all indicators</p>
<p>I-7.4.2 – Percentage of adults who are underweight/ Prevalence of undernourishment (among target population)</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>The prevalence of undernourishment (as indicated by the percentage of adults who are underweight) varies greatly among the countries in Central America, both with regard to the magnitude of the problem, as well as with regard to the historical trend.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Two countries, i.e., Panama and Honduras, have seen significant reductions in the prevalence of undernourishment over the last 10-12 years, Panama having reduced the percentage of undernourished adults from 25 percent in 2000 – 02 to 8.7 percent for the period 2011 – 2013; and Honduras having reduced the percentage of undernourished adults in the same period from 16.6 percent to 8.7 percent. • Two other countries, El Salvador and Guatemala, have seen increases over the same period, whereby the incidence of undernourishment in Guatemala has been much higher than in El Salvador. In the period 2011 – 2013, an average of 30.5 percent of all adults was estimated to be undernourished in Guatemala, up from 25.4 percent in the 2000 to 2002 period. • In Costa Rica, undernourishment among adults has remained comparatively low over this period, oscillating around 5 percent, albeit with a slight increase to 8.2 percent since 2009 – 2011. <p>No data differentiated by gender, ethnicity, locality, etc. was available during the desk phase, to assess the changes of undernourishment among marginalized groups of the population.</p>

Data,
sources,
extracts

Figure 3: Prevalence of Undernourishment, Central America (2000 – 2013)



Source: FAO - FOOD SECURITY INDICATORS, release October 1st, 2013

The Prevalence of Undernourishment expresses the probability that a randomly selected individual from the population consumes an amount of calories that is insufficient to cover her/his energy requirement for an active and healthy life.

The indicator is computed by comparing a probability distribution of habitual daily Dietary Energy Consumption with a threshold level called the Minimum Dietary Energy Requirement. Both are based on the notion of an average individual in the reference population.

This is the traditional FAO hunger indicator, adopted as official Millennium Development Goal indicator for Goal 1, Target 1.9.

More details on the methodology for computing the Prevalence of undernourishment are in Annex 2 of the State of Food Insecurity in the World 2013 Report.

I-7.4.3 – Reduced fluctuations of major food staples in areas commonly affected by food insecurity/ Domestic food price volatility

Findings
at
indicator
level


The diversity of the food security situation and the underlying causes in Central American countries is also illustrated by a comparison of price trends of major food staples (beans, maize) between two Central American countries, Honduras and Guatemala, and the association of these price trends with changes in the national prevalence of undernourishment. In both countries, prizes for red beans (measured in US\$/ kg) have increased considerably between 2000 – 2002 and 2011 – 2013; by 46 percent in Guatemala and by even 72 percent in Honduras. Similar price increases can be found for maize as well, in both countries. Yet, in spite of the similarity of price trends, adult undernourishment showed very different trends in both countries: While it decreased in Honduras (from over 16 percent in 2000 – 2002 to just over 8 percent in 2011 – 2013), undernourishment among adults increased in Guatemala over the same period, by approximately 6

percent.

Again, these numbers do not say anything about the effect of EU regional cooperation in food security, but merely illustrate the diversity of conditions any regional food security policy framework has to accommodate.


*Data,
sources,
extracts*

Figure 4: National Trends in Wholesale Food Prices (Beans & Maize, 2000 – 2013) - Honduras



Sources: GIEWS Food Price Data Analysis Tool (extracted on 12/30/2013); FAO - FOOD SECURITY INDICATORS, release October 1st, 2013

Figure 5: National Trends in Wholesale Food Prices (Beans & Maize, 2000 – 2013), Guatemala



Sources: GIEWS Food Price Data Analysis Tool (extracted on 12/30/2013), FAO - FOOD SECURITY INDICATORS, release October 1st, 2013

I-7.4.4 – Per capita food supply variability

Findings at indicator level

Food supply variability was measured on the basis of the “Average Dietary Energy Supply Adequacy”. This indicator expresses the Dietary Energy Supply (DES) as a percentage of the Average Dietary Energy Requirement (ADER) in each country. Each country's or region's average supply of calories for food consumption is normalized by the average dietary energy requirement estimated for its population, to provide an index of adequacy of the food supply in terms of calories.

Analyzed together with the prevalence of undernourishment, the Average Dietary Energy Supply Adequacy allows discerning whether undernourishment is mainly due to insufficiency of the food supply or to particularly bad distribution. Again, the data illustrate the diversity of situations in the 5 Central American countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama):


In two countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador), the Average Annual Energy Supply Adequacy has declined between 2000-2002 and 2011-2013; and also, specifically, between 2007-2009 and 2011 – 2013. Correspondingly, undernourishment among adults has slightly increased in both countries (see above), between 3 and 3.5 percent.

In another two countries (Panama, Honduras), Average Annual Energy Supply Adequacy has increased over the same time period, in both case by about 15 to 16 percent. These increases have gone along with substantial decreases in undernourishment among adults (by between 8 and 16 percent over the time period), suggesting that at least some of the increased availability of food has benefitted the population of undernourished in both countries.

In Guatemala, the Average Annual Energy Supply Adequacy has seen an increase of only 2.5 to 3 percent between 2000 – 2002 and 2001 – 2013, an increase that overall was not able to make a difference in the magnitude or trend of adult undernourishment in the country.

Data,
sources,
extracts

Figure 6: Average Dietary Energy Supply Adequacy, Central America (1998 – 2013)




Source: FAO - FOOD SECURITY INDICATORS, release October 1st, 2013

The indicator expresses the Dietary Energy Supply (DES) as a percentage of the Average Dietary Energy Requirement (ADER) in each country. Each country's or region's average supply of calories for food consumption is normalized by the average dietary energy requirement estimated for its population, to provide an index of adequacy of the food supply in terms of calories.

Analyzed together with the prevalence of undernourishment, it allows discerning whether undernourishment is mainly due to insufficiency of the food supply or to particularly bad distribution.


Figure 7: Depth of Food Deficit per Country, Central America (1999 – 2013)



Source: FAO - FOOD SECURITY INDICATORS, release October 1st, 2013


The depth of the food deficit indicates how many calories would be needed to lift the undernourished from their status, everything else being constant. The average intensity of food deprivation of the undernourished, estimated as the difference between the average dietary energy requirement and the average dietary energy consumption of the undernourished population (food-deprived), is multiplied by the number of undernourished to provide an estimate of the total food deficit in the country, which is then normalized by the total population

Figure 8: Trends in Undernourishment and Dietary Energy Supply (DES), Costa Rica (2000 – 2013)




Source: FAO - FOOD SECURITY INDICATORS, release October 1st, 2013

Figure 9: Trends in Undernourishment and Dietary Energy Supply (DES), El Salvador (2000 – 2013)




Source: FAO - FOOD SECURITY INDICATORS, release October 1st, 2013

Figure 10: Trends in Undernourishment and Dietary Energy Supply (DES), Guatemala (2000 – 2013)




Source: FAO - FOOD SECURITY INDICATORS, release October 1st, 2013

Figure 11: Trends in Undernourishment and Dietary Energy Supply (DES), Honduras (2000 – 2013)



Source: FAO - FOOD SECURITY INDICATORS, release October 1st, 2013

Figure 12: Trends in Undernourishment and Dietary Energy Supply (DES), Panama (2000 – 2013)



Source: FAO - FOOD SECURITY INDICATORS, release October 1st, 2013

JC 7.5 – Consistency between regional and bilateral EU support to food security (coherence, 3Cs) (also w.DG ECHO)	
<i>Statement on JC7.5</i>	<p>Although key strategic documents guiding EU regional support, bilateral assistance and humanitarian aid (DG ECHO) all make reference to the food security-related priorities of the respective other programmes, no specific operational coordination mechanisms were found to be in place to ensure operational coordination and synergies between EU regional support, bi-lateral support or assistance offered by DG ECHO.</p> <p>In the absence of these mechanisms and procedures, coordination between EU-financed regional and bi-lateral food security interventions relied on individually initiated contacts and exchanges between regional food security staff, and their colleagues in the other EU Delegations and offices in the region. The resulting coordination and coherence were weak, at least in the first half of the evaluation period (2007 – 2010), as EU and project staff at regional and national levels only contacted each other sporadically. Regional level project staff liaised with the relevant SICA agencies, but did not engage with national authorities (and with the donors, including EU, who supported them). Similarly, staff of EU Delegations in charge of bi-lateral cooperation generally did not reach out to stakeholders of regional programmes.</p> <p>Contact between staff associated with regional and national programmes has increased during the second half of the evaluation period. Operational planning for PRESANCA II included an inventory of all bi-lateral EU-financed food security projects. At the same time, PRESANCA II staff has been directly participating in and supporting (technically) FNS initiatives of CA countries; and has also foreseen to support FNS initiatives/ interventions at local level. Under these conditions, the careful coordination between EU regional support and bi-lateral support is an important prerequisite for the efficiency and effectiveness of EU FNS support.</p>
I-7.5.1 – Mechanisms and standard procedures exist to support strategic and operational coordination	
<i>Findings at indicator level</i>	<p>EU regional support and EU bi-lateral support in Food Security covered a number of related (and potentially overlapping) topics and sub-topics, ranging from support of food production at local level (El Salvador), working with local communities on improving the sustainable management of natural resources (including food related resources) (Honduras), and food security policy support (Honduras). While bi-lateral CSPs make reference to regional level support to food security, these references are mostly of a very general nature, without detailing any provisions or mechanisms for coordination or concrete possibilities for synergies. In two CSPs (Honduras, Nicaragua), regional level EU food security programmes are not mentioned at all.</p> <p>In its operational planning, the team of PRESANCA II took note of the range of EU-financed bi-lateral food security interventions in Central America, relating each of them to the respective Components of PRESANCA. It could not be determined at this point, however, what kind of coordination mechanisms were put in place to ensure the smooth cooperation between national and regional level EU-financed food security interventions under PRESANCA II.⁶⁹</p> <p>Both EuropeAid and ECHO strategic documents make reference to the need for coordination between EU-financed humanitarian and development interventions, albeit often in a very general, unspecific manner. Thematic areas with a seemingly high potential and need for coordination are support of food security-related information management systems, and generally more “long-term” support of communities response capability to food insecurity. However, no specific mechanisms that could aid this</p>

⁶⁹ Under PRESANCA I, the actual coordination between regional and bi-lateral EU food security support had been weak, see subsequent Indicator.

coordination are mentioned.

*Data,
sources,
extracts*

Supporting evidence:

Table 7.9: Overview of EU financed bi-lateral food security interventions, Central America (as of 03/2011)

País	Proyecto	Monto	Fecha de cierre	PRESANCA			PRESISAN
				RE1	RE2	RE3	
Guatemala	Programa Extraordinario de Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional	FAO: 4.491.698 Euros PMA: 6.350.000 Euros	31 octubre 2011			✓	
Guatemala	Programa de Apoyo a la Política Nacional de Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional de Guatemala y su Plan Estratégico (DCI-ALA/2008/020-396)	33.8 MEUROS	11 diciembre 2012	✓			
Guatemala	Programa de Desarrollo Rural y Local (ALA/2006/018152)	20 MEUROS	Enero 2012	✓		✓	
Guatemala	Fortalecer sistemas agrarios alimentarios sostenibles y equitativos con pertenencia cultural en 5 microregiones de Guatemala	1.084.718 Euros	30 octubre 2011			✓	
Guatemala	Mejora de la disponibilidad alimentaria en 80 comunidades indígenas del departamento de Chimaltenango	1.156.500 Euros	Octubre 2011			✓	
Guatemala	Asistencia agropecuaria productiva sostenible y nutricional a comunidades rurales pobres en vulnerabilidad alimentaria del occidente de Guatemala	1.350.000 Euros	Octubre 2011			✓	
Guatemala	Respuesta a la crisis alimentaria en las comunidades vulnerables de Guatemala	1.032.000 Euros	30 agosto 2011			✓	
Honduras	Programa Temático de Seguridad Alimentaria Apoyo Presupuestario Sectorial Programa en Apoyo a la Seguridad Alimentaria (PASAH)	14 millones MEUROS	Diciembre 2011	✓			
Nicaragua	Programa de Mejora de la Asistencia Alimentaria para grupos vulnerables y fortalecimiento de sus medios de vida para una mayor seguridad alimentaria (PAMAA)	3 MEUROS	Septiembre 2011			✓	

País	Proyecto	Monto	Fecha de cierre	PRESANCA			PRESISAN
				RE1	RE2	RE3	
Nicaragua	Proyecto de Apoyo a la Producción de semillas por la seguridad alimentaria en Nicaragua (PAPSSAN)	10.5 MEUROS	2014	✓		✓	
Nicaragua	Programa de Desarrollo Local y Seguridad Alimentaria (PRODELSA)	13 MEUROS	Diciembre 2011	✓		✓	
Nicaragua	Fortalecimiento de la productividad de las asociaciones de pequeños agricultores	2.96 MEUROS	Abril 2011			✓	
Nicaragua	Mejora de la oferta, acceso y disponibilidad de alimentos de las familias pobres de los Departamentos Nueva Segovia y Jinotega, en el norte de Nicaragua	1.180.484 Euros	1 agosto 2011			✓	
Nicaragua	Fortaleciendo la agricultura familiar para una mayor producción de alimentos	1.361.073 Euros	31 de octubre 2011			✓	
Nicaragua	Fortalecimiento de las capacidades de respuesta de la población campesina del departamento de Madriz ante los efectos de la crisis alimentaria	1.002.146 Euros	7 octubre 2011			✓	
Nicaragua	Cooperativas enfrentando la subida de los precios de los alimentos	1.084.78 Euros	3 octubre 2011			✓	

Source: (UNDP, 2011)

Honduras:

“Given the number of past and present interventions linked to FS, the preparatory documents of PASAH insisted on the necessity of synergies and cooperation between some of these interventions and with programmes from other donors. [...] Strategic alliances were sought with other EC programmes such as PRESANCA or FORCUENCAS but did not lead to joint action.” (ADE, 2011, p. 34)

Coordination with ECHO

The EU RSP for Central America makes reference to the need for coordination/ complementarity with ECHO and the DIPECHO programme, albeit in a general manner:

“The link between the DIPECHO programme and this regional initiative should be promoted” (European Commission - Nicaragua, 2006).

“Fourth DIPECHO Programme for Central America: Fourth DIPECHO Programme for Central America: This €6 million programme aims to contribute to reducing the risk of the most vulnerable populations to natural disasters through

improved preparedness of local populations in Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua. 90% of this programme is implemented by 14 international NGOs, with the remainder covering operations administered by CEPREDENAC in Guatemala and by PAHO at regional level.” (European Commission - Nicaragua, 2006)

ECHO also acknowledges potential for coordination and complementarity with EU Delegations and EU development assistance.

“Although the EU Delegations in the region do not allocate specific resources for DRR, certain initiatives offer possibilities for complementarities with DG ECHO projects (Food Security Thematic Support Programme, Instrument for stability, among others).” (ECHO, 2012)

Coordination with EU Delegations is foreseen in ECHO strategic documents, however, no specific mechanisms are being mentioned that would aid in the coordination.

“As mentioned above, the strategy is structured in such a way as to strengthen local capacities, developing tools and information mechanisms, and disseminating good practices, advocating and facilitating the intervention of development actors and local/national authorities, therefore enabling a proper hand-over of activities. In this sense all development actors and relevant local and national institutions will be involved in the action and will take part in the coordination mechanisms that will be established or supported in the framework of these operations.

This initiative will be implemented in close coordination with the EU Delegations at regional and national levels to facilitate complementarities and a proper exit strategy of the actions. In this sense, LRRD (Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development) will remain crucial as it permits the exit strategy to be defined and puts a time-limit.

Furthermore, coordination with the EU Delegations will allow DG ECHO to take advantage of the direct relationships established between them and Government institutions and use this platform for advocacy towards related Ministries.” (ECHO, 2011)

Table 7.10: Treatment of Food Security in four EU Country Strategy Papers f. 2007 – 2013 (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras)

Country	Treatment of Food Security	References to EU FS support at regional level in bilateral CSP	Potential for overlap/ need for coordination
Costa Rica	Not mentioned under EU strategy (CSP or NIP)		
El Salvador	Treated as <u>cross-cutting issue</u> (subsumed under “Environment”) Focus on education, health, water and sanitation and to support production at local level)	General reference to PRESANCA, w/o detailing of coordination approach, intended actions, focus areas f. coordination (European Delegation El Salvador, 2007)	In particular potential for overlap w. regard to support of food production at local level.
Guatemala	FS included in <u>Focal Sector</u> “Economic Growth and Trade” (along w. support to country policies for decentralisation, rural development, food security,	General Reference to PRESANCA, w/o detailing coordination, relevance, possibilities for synergies, etc. (European Delegation	Need for coordination/ pursuing synergies in particular w. regard to FS policy

		<p>employment-based growth, trade)</p> <p>Sustainable land tenure and registry</p> <p>FS policy support (aiming at malnutrition)</p> <p>Strengthening of social services</p> <p>Reducing physical isolation of rural communities through economy-related infrastructure</p> <p>Market integration (European Delegation Guatemala, 2007)</p>	Guatemala, 2007).	support (malnutrition).
	Honduras	<p>FS only mentioned in CSP 2007 – 2013 under “other thematic programmes and budgetary instruments” (w. reference to the Food Security Instrument, under which Honduras should be considered in particular, due to the persistent food insecurity in Honduras (EU Delegation Honduras, 2007)</p> <p>Honduras: PASAH (including creation of “COTISAN”). “Activities geared towards planning regulations for sustainable management of natural resources were conducted in 44 municipalities. PASAH also helped finance 118 small productive projects (local initiatives on food security) benefiting 397 women and included in the Municipal Development Plans Activities such as cadastre and land”. (ADE, 2011)</p>	No reference to regional-level food security programmes (EU supported)	Selection of communities to support/ types of support to offer under PASAH in selected communities (see column on “treatment of food security”).
		<p>FS treated a “cross-cutting issue” as part of “development of rural areas” as a larger/ broader cross-cutting issue. CSP specifies that “some limited specific activities focussing on food security should be considered (financed through the ad hoc budgetary line” (EU Delegation Nicaragua, 2007)</p>	<p>Regional support to food security not mentioned under “Activities financed under other EC programmes and instruments” (although the RSP is mentioned in a general way) (EU Delegation Nicaragua, 2007, p. 29). Food security is not mentioned in Annex 9 on “Regional strategy for Central America – priorities for cooperation” (EU Delegation Nicaragua,</p>	<p>Avoid overlap between small-scale food security support (bi-lateral), and LRRD support financed at regional level (PRESANCA II)</p>

	<p>2007, pp. 71 - 72)</p> <p>When discussing <i>Linking emergency (sic) rehabilitation and development</i>, the RSP mentions ECHO, and ECHO's DIPECHO programme, but does not make reference to any particular coordination mechanism that will be employed to ensure the complementarity and coordination of assistance from both parties. (European Commission - Nicaragua, 2006, p. 65)</p> <p><u>Detracting evidence:</u></p>
<p>I-7.5.2 – Ongoing strategic and operational coordination between regional food security programmes and corresponding bi-lateral interventions</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>At least in the first half of the evaluation period (2007 – 2010), coordination between EU-financed regional and bi-lateral food security interventions has been weak, and contact between EU and project staff at the regional and at the national level has been sporadic. Staff working at regional level liaised with the relevant SICA agencies, but did not engage with national authorities (and with the donors, including EU, who supported them). Similarly, staff of EU Delegations in charge of bi-lateral cooperation generally did not reach out to stakeholders of regional programmes, either. The “distance” between bilateral and regional FNS programmes was thought to also be facilitated by the fact that staff in “national” Delegations and in the “regional” Delegation (Managua) had different approaches to FNS, also exemplified in their different professional backgrounds.</p> <p>Contact, and possibly coordination, between staff associated with regional and national programmes has likely increased during the second half of the evaluation period. As mentioned in relation to the previous indicator, operational planning for PRESANCA II included an inventory of all bi-lateral EU-financed food security projects. The need for close regional-national coordination is certainly present: PRESANCA II has been directly participating in and supporting (technically) FNS initiatives of CA countries; it has also foreseen to support FNS initiatives/ interventions at local level. Under these conditions, the careful coordination between EU regional support and bi-lateral support is an important prerequisite for the efficiency and effectiveness of EU FNS support.</p> <p>Both ECHO and EuropeAid refer to the need and potential for cooperation and coordination in key strategic documents (see previous indicator). No information on the actual extent of coordination is available at this time. This issue will be picked up during the field phase.</p>
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p><u>Supporting evidence:</u></p> <p><u>Coordination/ Cooperation with “bi-lateral” EU Delegations</u></p> <p><u>PRESANCA II:</u></p> <p>PRESANCA II has been directly participating in and supporting (technically) FNS initiatives of CA countries; it has also foreseen to support FNS initiatives/ interventions at local level.⁷⁰ This makes the careful coordination between EU regional support and bi-lateral support an important prerequisite for the efficiency and effectiveness of EU FNS support.</p> <p>EU regional support/ PRESANCA II focused here in particular on the collection and updating of data and information on the prevalence of food insecurity in different localities in CA countries (e.g., in</p>

⁷⁰ See extensive list of supported activities in 2012 in (PRESANCA II, 2013, pp. 49 - 55)

Nicaragua, Guatemala (PRESANCA II, 2013, p. 53)).

Coordination with ECHO

ECHO documents mention key EU regional development interventions in Food Security, including PRESANCA II, PRESISAN, and state a “strong interest of EU Delegations” in the region to “work together”:

“In Central America, there is a strong interest of the EU Delegations to work together on this matter. For example, at regional level, there is a needs' identification process related to Food Security for the Dry Corridor currently ongoing. A programme for Food Security in this area might be implemented at the end of 2012 under the Thematic Programme for Food Security, complementing and providing sustainability to the processes initiated by this present initiative. Also, this initiative will establish strong links with the PRESANCA II (Regional Programme on Food Security and Nutrition) and PRESISAN (Food Security Information System); EU funded projects being implemented respectively until 2015 and 2013; and complementarities can be established with the present initiative.” (ECHO, 2011)

ECHO acknowledges and shares concern for the scarcity of reliable food security data and information that EU regional development programmes (such as PRESISAN) are meaning to address:

“Whilst the European Commission's Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (DG ECHO) engagement is motivated by a humanitarian entry-point (drought and abnormally acute food insecurity), considering the nature of the problem and the increasing predictability of drought in these areas, short-term emergency response operations need to be complemented by building local capacities for sustainable drought preparedness and management.

To complement that, in order to strengthen needs assessments, to facilitate the design of appropriate assistance frameworks, and to provide early warning that can trigger targeted mitigation actions, a significant effort needs to be made to improve food security information in the region. At the same time, existing knowledge about how local livelihoods react to drought is weak and needs to be strengthened.” (ECHO, 2011)

Detracting evidence:

Coordination/ Cooperation with “bi-lateral” EU Delegations

2010 study on the status of food security and FNS intervention in Central America finds that there is little to no regular contact between stakeholders of regional FNS programmes (including the EU Delegation in Managua and the implementers of regional FNS programmes, who liaise directly with RIOS/ SICA, but do not engage with national authorities. At the same time, staff of other EUD who are in charge of bilateral cooperation also – for a lack of time – to not often reach out to stakeholders of regional programmes:

“Escasa apropiación en las DCE a nivel país. En El Salvador, Honduras y Guatemala han manifestado claramente la existencia de un problema de apropiación e involucramiento en general de los Programas Regionales en sus países; debido a una falta de prioridad manifiesta del sistema en generarlo, debido a dos factores principales: a) por un lado, la DCE Regional coordina directamente con el SICA y con los Unidades Ejecutoras ó responsables de ejecución de dichos Programas Regionales, pero no hace lo mismo a nivel de país. Además, los implementadores de los Programas Regionales (por ejemplo en SAN fue mencionado específicamente el PRESANCA I), tampoco lo realizan. A lo anterior, se suma que la mayoría de las Misiones regionales, no toman contacto con las Delegaciones país. Por lo que no existe una fluidez de información. b) por el otro, debido a la existencia de escaso tiempo disponible a nivel de país, se limita la capacidad del seguimiento y contacto con

los Programas Regionales.” (Caldeyro Stajano & Aulicino, 2010)

The “distance” between bilateral and regional FNS programmes was thought to also be facilitated by the fact that staff in “national” Delegations and in the “regional” Delegation (Managua) had different approaches to FNS, also exemplified in their different professional backgrounds:

“Existencia de diferentes enfoques vinculados a la SAN dentro del personal de las Delegaciones: los diferentes enfoques de cómo abordar la SAN (productivos, integrales, etc.), también están representados en el personal de las propias Delegaciones, lo cual dificulta el dialogo e intercambio interno. En otras DCE (Panamá y CR), no se maneja el concepto de SAN ya que no hay proyectos en el país” (Caldeyro Stajano & Aulicino, 2010).

However, the national FNS-related situation across the CA countries is also sufficiently different (Caldeyro Stajano & Aulicino, 2010), possibly requiring differing approaches among the different countries.

CLE Honduras (2011) finds that coordination between PRESANCA and national level FS programmes in Honduras has been lacking

“Evenso, strategic alliances were sought with other EC programmes such as PRESANCA or FORCUENCAS but did not lead to join action.” (ADE, 2011, p. 48)

“No harmonization (not even coordination) has been sought with the regional FS programme PRESANCA which was executed independently from the national programmes.” (ADE, 2011, p. 194)

Coordination & Coherence with ECHO

Potential for gains from coordination exists in the area of evidence-creation/ the improvement of food security management information systems that both ECHO and EuropeAid seem to be targeting. While ECHO acknowledges its “entry-point” to DRR and food-security related work to be humanitarian, it does emphasize as part of its envisaged response in Central America “a more strategic response” that builds “stronger links between agencies with technical expertise in water and food security respectively”, hinting, among other things at the need to improve the availability of reliable data on food insecurity in the region.

No information is available on actual ECHO interventions or coordination attempts between ECHO and EuropeAid. This issue will be taken up during the field phase.

“Recurrent droughts in Central and South American countries have had serious impact on the health and food security of populations in areas such as the Chaco (covering parts of Argentina, Bolivia and Paraguay), and the “dry corridor” in Central America (covering parts of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua). Drought, causing devastation to coping mechanisms and abnormally acute food insecurity, necessitates a humanitarian response on a recurrent scale and ECHO has responded on a regular basis.

Considering the nature of the problem and the increasing predictability of drought in these areas, short-term emergency response operations need to be complemented by a specific broader intervention to build local capacities, foster food security and protect livelihoods as well as building capacities in drought preparedness and management.

	<p><i>In responding to this situation, DG ECHO has funded several initiatives at local level both as emergency response and through DIPECHO projects. Among certain DG ECHO partners who have worked in the target areas there is a good understanding of the problem and its related challenges. However, although results have been good, the response has been ad hoc and reactive, and a more strategic regional response is needed to build stronger links between agencies with technical expertise in water and food security respectively, and to advocate for consistent budgetary commitments among the respective authorities at local, regional and national level supporting replication and sustainability of critical drought preparedness activities.” (ECHO, 2011)</i></p>
<p>JC 7.6 – Consistency between regional and bilateral EU support to food security (coherence, 3Cs) (also w.DG ECHO) Adequacy of EU implementation methods and mechanisms for delivery of regional food security-related assistance and cooperation</p>	
<p><i>Statement on JC7.6</i></p>	<p>Using delegated cooperation with UNDP and FAO to implement food security interventions has had both advantages and drawbacks. On the one hand, delegated cooperation made it possible to disburse EU funds according to the more flexible fiduciary rules of the programme partners, allowing these programmes to spend their resources in response to concrete funding opportunities, instead of on the basis of fixed three-year funding cycles (in line with the N+3 rule). The UNDP rules also permitted the programme to fund relatively small-scale projects (in particular projects at local level, resourced by FONSAN), which would have been more difficult under EU rules. Finally,, UNDP was able to advance resources for certain activities if funds from the EU were delayed for one reason or another.</p> <p>Using the more flexible UNDP rules allowed PRESANCA II to align projects that were financed through FONSAN more closely with the administrative structures of the local administrations, thus enabling these administrations to better respond to existing needs of their constituents. The leadership of municipal associations were able to directly request funding from FONSAN for projects that had been designed locally, with technical support from PRESANCA II staff.</p> <p>However, the use of intermediaries always increases the risk for loss of resources, for example due to poorly managed operations. In the case of PRESANCA I, the third component of the programme (related to the development of food security information systems at national level) had to be cancelled after it became evident that no or very little progress had been made by FAO, the cooperation partner in question. The money intended for the implementation of Component 3 had already been paid to FAO, and could not be recuperated.</p>
<p>I-7.6.1 – Funds are disbursed to implementers and beneficiary organisations in a timely manner</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>The use of delegated cooperation with international organisations (UNDP, FAO) to implement key programmes in support of food security seems to have had both advantages and certain drawbacks. On the one hand, delegated cooperation made it possible to disburse EU funds according to the fiduciary rules of the programme partners (e.g., UNDP in the case of PRESANCA I (apart from component 3) and II). This meant that, appropriate for a capacity development programme, funds could be spend with greater flexibility, in part, because the “N+3” rule did not apply, under which unused funds would have to be decommitted if they hadn’t been spent during a three year time period. The UNDP rules also permitted the programme to fund relatively small-scale projects (in particular projects at local level, resourced by FONSAN), which would have been more difficult under EU rules. Finally, UNDP was able to advance resources for certain activities if funds from the EU were delayed for one reason or another.</p> <p>On the other hand, the use of intermediaries always increases the risk for loss of resources, due to badly managed operations, etc. In the case of PRESANCA I, the third component of the programme (related to the development of food security information systems at national level) had to be cancelled after it became evident that no or very little progress had been made by FAO, the cooperation partner in question. The money intended for the implementation of Component 3 had already been paid to FAO, and could not be recuperated.</p>

	<p>Beyond this, only little information has been available on the adequacy and timeliness of disbursements to implementers and beneficiaries. This issue will be picked up during the field phase.</p>
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p><u>Supporting evidence:</u> <u>PRESANCA I:</u></p> <p>Greater flexibility in timing the spending of money can also be seen as an advantage. While normally, EC-funded projects and programmes are subject to the “N+3” rule⁷¹, this does not apply in the case of the delegated cooperation with UNDP (as UNDP is following its own fiduciary/ financial rules) (see (Palermo, Pijenburg, Munoz, & Salas, 2007, p. 58). This provides UNDP/ PRESANCA more flexibility in spending the resources, which is an advantage as, in particular in capacity building interventions, the pace of implementation can vary depending on the availability of “openings” and “opportunities” that PRESANCA can capitalize on.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “En momentos de atrasos de la transferencia de los fondos, el PNUD ha podido adelantar fondos de sus propios medios, evitando atrasos por la falta de liquidez.” (Palermo, Pijenburg, Munoz, & Salas, 2007, p. 59). <p><u>Detracting evidence:</u> <u>PRESANCA I:</u></p> <p>PRESANCA I was executed by SISCA, albeit “in representation of SG-SICA” (as opposed to PRESANCA II, which was executed by/ situated directly within SG-SICA) (European Union, 2010).</p> <p>The third component of PRESANCA I (RE 3: Information systems to support decision making in FNS) was eventually cancelled in 2007, after the negative findings of the mid-term review of the programme. This meant that the money that had been planned for RE3 was no longer available; and none of the foreseen deliverables of the respective component could be produced. Certain deliverables or assets that were necessary and required for the implementation of the other, remaining components (associated with RE 1, 2 and 4) thus needed to be “inserted” into and financed by some of the other components (in particular those associated with REs 2 and 4). (European Union, 2010).</p> <p>In particular in Component 4 (investments in FNS in 25 communities), the (participatory) selection process for projects to be financed was thought to be at times too lengthy, “leading to a certain loss of credibility of PRESANCA among communities” (Palermo, Pijenburg, Munoz, & Salas, 2007).</p> <p><u>PRESANCA II</u></p> <p>By the time of the evaluation ((Dixon, 2012), Interview with programme staff) UNDP had not yet contributed the € 5 million that it had pledged to contribute to FONSAN, to finance investments at field level (in support of the third expected result of PRESANCA II)</p>

⁷¹ The term “N+3” relates to financing rules for the annual allocation of money from the European Budget. If the funding in question has not been spent by that date, the Commission can 'decommit' future budget allocations. Automatic decommitments are made if funding is not spent, or requests for payments are not made, by the end of the third year (N+3).

	Using delegated cooperation, with UNDP as the administrator of PRESANCA II, has allowed the programme a relative greater amount of flexibility and agility in the management and use of its funds. In particular FONSAN is funding relatively small-scale projects (from US\$20,000 upwards), whose funds are disbursed in relatively small tranches. Programme managers estimate that this approach would not have been feasible under EC procedures (programme estimates) (Interview with PRESANCA II staff, 28.03.2014).
I-7.6.2 – Administrative effort/ overhead for management of programme funds in line w. international benchmarks (EU and beyond)	
<i>Findings at indicator level</i>	[Indicator was dropped – no data on benchmarks available]
<i>Data, sources, extracts</i>	<u>Supporting evidence:</u>
	<u>Detracting evidence:</u>
I-7.6.3 – Implementation methods / mechanisms allow timely adaptation of programme to changing needs and context conditions	
<i>Findings at indicator level</i>	<p>The use of delegated cooperation with UNDP enabled PRESANCA II and PRESISAN I and II to rely on UNDP's more flexible financial / fiduciary rules for the management of its funds, which was particularly useful for the support of food security interventions at local level. The more flexible rules allowed PRESANCA II to align project structures more closely with the administrative structures of the local administrations. The leadership of municipal associations were able to directly request funding from FONSAN for projects that had been designed locally, albeit with technical support from PRESANCA II staff.</p> <p>Although the programme is performing well overall (see above), a number of its characteristics limit its alignment with SICA structures and institutions; and, consequently, with SICA priorities and needs: As a result of the relocation of the programme in the transition from PRESANCA I to PRESANCA II from SISCA (with INCAP as a technical secretariat) to SG-SICA, PRESANCA II has lost its institutional linkages to INCAP, the specialized agency within the SICA system that is formally in charge of food security; and that also has spearheaded the recent development of the regional food security and nutrition policy (that was ultimately not adopted).⁷²</p>
<i>Data, sources, extracts</i>	<p><u>Supporting evidence:</u></p> <p>The use of delegated cooperation with UNDP has made it possible for PRESANCA II (and PRESISAN I and II) to rely on UNDP's more flexible financial / fiduciary rules for the management of its funds. This was particularly significant for all projects of Component 3 of PRESANCA II, i.e., the support of food security interventions directly at local level. Here, the use of UNDP's rules allowed PRESANCA to align project structures more closely with the administrative structures of the local administrations. The leadership of municipal associations were able to directly request funding from FONSAN for projects that had been designed locally, albeit with technical support from PRESANCA II staff (Interview with</p>

⁷² At the time of the transition, INCAP was in a crisis, because the WHO had withdrawn its funding and support from the organisation. Moving PRESANCA II from SISCA and INCAP to SG-SICA was considered to be necessary by SG-SICA management for saving the programme (Interview with SG-SICA staff / management).

	<p>PRESANCA II staff; representatives of local administrations, 26.03. – 10.04.2014 (Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala).</p> <p>Detracting evidence:</p> <p>Although PRESANCA II staff is formally employed by SG-SICA, it is not governed / administered by SG-SICA's fiduciary roles (see above). Also, the programme has been completely reliant on external donor funding, and 1.5 years before the end of the programme (at the time of the evaluation), no mechanism had yet been developed for the time after (Interviews with EU staff / programme staff (Nicaragua, El Salvador).</p> <p>Although the programme is performing well overall (see above), a number of its characteristics limit its alignment with SICA structures and institutions; and, consequently, with SICA priorities and needs: As a result of the relocation of the programme in the transition from PRESANCA I to PRESANCA II from SISCA (with INCAP as a technical secretariat) to SG-SICA, PRESANCA II has lost its institutional linkages to INCAP, the specialized agency within the SICA system that is formally in charge of food security; and that also has spearheaded the recent development of the regional food security and nutrition policy (that was ultimately not adopted) (Interview with INCAP representatives, 10.4.2014, Guatemala; Interview with PRESANCA II staff). At the time of the transition, INCAP was in a crisis, because the WHO had withdrawn its funding and support from the organisation. Moving PRESANCA II from SISCA and INCAP to SG-SICA was considered to be necessary by SG-SICA management for saving the programme (Interview with SG-SICA staff / management).</p>
OTHER RELEVANT INFORMATION (NOT CAPTURED ELSEWHERE IN THIS EQ)	
	<p>COMITÉ CONSULTIVO REGIONAL PARA LA SEGURIDAD ALIMENTARIA Y NUTRICIONAL (CCR-SAN): En el marco regional y en cumplimiento de los mandatos presidenciales se consideró la creación de una Instancia técnica-política, integrada por instituciones regionales, para favorecer la formación y gestión de políticas públicas en SAN. Es así como se ha conformado el Comité Consultivo Regional para la SAN (CCR-SAN) – anteriormente denominado Instancia Técnica Conjunta Regional para la promoción de la Seguridad Alimentaria Nutricional (ITCR-SAN). En el CCR-SAN participan instituciones regionales tales como: SISCA, FEMICA, CEPREDENAC, CRRH, CAC, BCIE, INCAP, CCAD. OSPESCA, CECC, CSUCA. Este foro brinda espacio de sinergias y busca impulsar a política regional de Ordenamiento y Optimización de la Inversión y Cooperación en SAN. En este foro se deja abierto el espacio de participación a otras instancias del SICA, así como a la cooperación en el marco del foro interagencial.</p>
	<p>See also the table 7.11 at the end of this EQ</p>

Table 7.11: Overview of main type of support and main outputs associated with selected EU-financed programmes / projects in support of food security

Direct Beneficiary Organisation	Type of Support (corresponding programme / project)	Main Outputs
<i>Judgment criterion 7.1: Increased harmonization of food security policies between regional and national level</i>		
SG-SICA	<p>PRESANCA II: Drafting of technical “input papers” (e.g., on FSN-related challenges in the region; study on the “situation and tendencies in relation to chronic and acute food insecurity in the region”, “CIF document”⁷³) “Coordination” events / forums w. donors; other stakeholders (FOPREL, PARLACEN, also national stakeholders) In particular also w. SISCA, INCAP, CAC, COMISCA (organisations that play a role in promoting food security), who formed “working group” for this purpose in early 2012 Support of SG-SICA during “Cumbre Extraordinaria de Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno del SICA” (e.g., in August 2012) Meetings w. “national FNS coordinators” (instancias nacionales coordinadores de la SAN) Coordination meeting w. CE-SICA (definition of FNS priorities; action plans) (not yet started as of March 2013) (PRESANCA II, 2013, p. 59).</p>	<p><u>PRESANCA II:</u> Networks and forums for regular regional exchange and coordination in SAN / FNS (incl. gender) SICA “Action framework” (marco de acción) for SAN / FNS (“que oriente alianzas, sinergias y cooperación regional”) “Coordination Mechanisms” for SG-SICA: Regional policy proposal for FNS / SAN (draft produced in early 2012; presented to “jefes de estado” and national FNS coordinators) Support during “presidential summit”: Work plans f. 2012 - 2013 Cooperation Agreement between SG-SICA and IFPRI (International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington DC) Document analysing the joint FNS mandates of SICA RIOS (presented at summit to facilitate greater coordination among RIOS). “Mecanismo Regional de Diálogo permanente en SAN” (accepted and created in 2012) “Mecanismo de Diálogo entre la SG-SICA y los gobiernos locales” (strengthened in October – December 2012)</p>
CAC (Consejo Agropecuario Centroamericano) / CCAD (Comisión Centroamericana de Ambiente y Desarrollo)	Various	<p><u>PRESANCA I & II</u> Contributions to the “Estrategía Regional Agroambiental y de Salud” (ERAS) (2009) Contributions to the “Estrategía Regional de Cambio Climático” (ERCC, 2010)</p>
CONCADECO (Consejo		<u>Intended:</u> National (regional?) Strategy to promote

⁷³ Mentioned in “Informe PAT 2012” of PRESANCA II (PRESANCA II, 2013)

Direct Beneficiary Organisation	Type of Support (corresponding programme / project)	Main Outputs
Centroamericano de Protección al Consumidor)		transparency, competition and consumer protection in the market for grains Reference studies under preparation in 2012
FOPREL (Foro de Presidentes de Poderes Legislativos de Centro América y la Cuenca del Caribe) Including “4 comisiones interparlamentarias priorizadas en el marco de la SAN”: Salud y Educación - Belice, Medio Ambiente y Cambio Climático - Costa Rica, Asuntos Municipales- Honduras Cohesión social y lucha contra la pobreza – Honduras	Coordination meetings w. FOPREL / signing of “support agreement” between SG-SICA / PRESANCA II and FOPREL. “Institutional Strengthening” of FOPREL External assessment of organisation (resources, TA) (Short-term?) Technical Assistance of Executive Secretary of FOPREL Integration of a masters student of the “Maestría Regional de Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional” (functioning as “Adviser for FSN”). Support to national “Frentes Parlamentarios Contra El Hambre” (FPHs) in Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica [Only limited support in 2012 – see (Sánchez Gutierrez, 2012)]	Created / “strengthened” “Frentes Parlamentarios Contra El Hambre” (FPHs) (e.g., in Guatemala, El Salvador)
PARLACEN	Meetings (establishing a common FNS / SAN agenda; discussing the responsibilities of PARLACEN with regard to SAN / FNS, food reserves, etc.)	[not clear at this point which “deliverables” or outputs were produced]
National Authorities / Agencies in charge of coordination of FNS at national level (differs by country)	“Placement” of students enrolled in new “Maestría Regional en Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional” (developed with the help of PRESANCA II / PRESISAN) to national coordinators (PRESANCA II, 2013, p. 52). Technical and other support of national FNS agencies (e.g., COTAN (El Salvador), SESAN (Guatemala) in planning and implementation of FNS-related activities Also participation in meetings, coordination meetings, etc. (PRESANCA II, 2013, p. 50)	Various
SISCA (Secretaría de la Integración Social Centroamericana) Within it created a CCT (“Célula de	<u>PRESANCA I:</u> Technical Assistance (provided by INCAP (Instituto de Nutrición de Centroamérica y Panamá)	Various

Direct Beneficiary Organisation	Type of Support (corresponding programme / project)	Main Outputs
coordinación técnica”)		
Local Authorities / “Mancomunidades”	Technical and other support of local authorities ⁷⁴ (coordination) meetings, etc.) Meetings to discuss integration of FNS / SAN into local development projects / strengthening of “Mancomunidades” (PRESANCA II, 2013, p. 58).	Various
<i>Judgment criterion 7.2: Improved exchange and use of data and information from national and regional level for forecasting and management related to food security</i>		
SG-SICA		Baseline study – PRESANCA II (2012)
[Not clear]		Longitudinal study on the impact of migration on FNS / SAN (w. World Bank and FAO) (2012)
CSUCA (Consejo Superior Universitario Centroamericano)		Research Network “SAN” (“Red de Investigación en SAN”) (2012) 10 research projects in FNS (located in members of the SCUCA-administered research network” (PRESANCA II, 2013, p. 70)
“OBSAN-R” (Observatorio Regional de Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional) ⁷⁵ [in itself an “output” or “deliverable” of EU support]	Up to 2007: Studies (financing and TA), e.g. on “regional analysis of FNS trends in CA” (indicator based) 2012: Technical Assistance / Short-term TAs Workshops and Trainings Meetings Publications Assistance in M&E of MARSAN and TECNISAN	
OSPESCA		Study on “tecnología alimentaria” and its use in fishery products

“CCR-SAN” (the Regional Consultative Committee for the Promotion of FNS), which is involved in the development of SIRSAN (a (trans-national) information system for FNS – supported by PRESISAN, among others).

⁷⁴ E.g., including “Mancomunidad Trinacional del Rio Lempa” (see project “Hambre Cero”)

⁷⁵ Created through PRESANCA (I); and PRESIAN.

EQ:8 Cross-cutting issues

EQ 8 – To what extent has the EU appropriately integrated key cross-cutting issues into the design and implementation of its interventions?

JC 8.1 – Defining human rights, exclusion and gender equity as cross-cutting issues identifies the intrinsic value of these issues to development processes

Statement on JC8.1

I-8.1.1 – Cross-cutting issues are mainstreamed through EU programming

Findings at indicator level

The EU identifies human rights and participation of civil society, including women, indigenous peoples and marginalized communities as cross-cutting issues to be mainstreamed in all of its interventions. Environmental protection is also subject to mainstreaming. These issues are to be included and addressed in all EU supported projects.

In practice however, most project documents make mention of at least some of these issues but only a few specify activities and budget lines for cross-cutting issues. Of 17 selected EU funded projects managed by regional institutions only four have identified specific budget lines and seven have included specific activities for cross-cutting issues, which do not demonstrate optimal mainstreaming of these issues. On the other hand of 10 EU funded projects managed by CSOs 5 identified budget lines for cross-cutting issues, and three designated the entire budget to these issues, which were also the objectives of the projects.

Cross-cutting issues are generally not dealt with seriously by many project management teams and although there is a growing tendency to incorporate gender and some participation of civil society organizations into projects the practice has been basically to pay lip service only to these issues. Both the SEFRO and the CASAC projects are now collaborating with civil society organizations but only after REDCEPAZ made the necessary approaches and was insistent on participating with the projects that share the same subject matter as they are working on.

EU funding of projects that result from competitions have a higher level of inclusion of cross-cutting issues. When a proposal must face competition in order to receive funding the incorporation of cross-cutting issues means the proposal will be seen to have added value and will be more highly graded than a proposal without.

Data, sources, extracts

Supporting evidence:

RSP Central America 2007 – 2013 p. 19 states:

“...the 2007-2013 Regional Strategy for Central America will centre on one main objective: to support the process of political, economic and social integration in the context of preparation of the future Association Agreement between the EU and Central America.

The EU support for regional integration is intended to strengthen political and economic relations between the EU and Central America and thereby facilitate negotiation and implementation of the future Association Agreement based on the mutual interest of both regions. To support regional integration three groups of potential measures can be considered:

	<p><i>The first group will entail strengthening the institutional system for the process of Central American integration;</i></p> <p><i>The second group will focus on reinforcement of the regional economic process;</i></p> <p><i>The third group will cover aspects of strengthening regional security.</i></p> <p><i>Specific provision will be made in all three components of this response strategy for participation of civil society in preparation and implementation of the programmes in support of the regional integration process and to enhance the social ownership of the integration process and the visibility of the EU action.</i></p> <p><i>Cross-cutting issues:</i></p> <p><i>Cooperation between the two sides should be based on the objective of broad participation by civil society and the principles of social equality – including gender, respect for minorities and different cultures, especially indigenous peoples, conflict prevention and environmental sustainability.”</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • During the Field visit (April 2014) informant statements indicated that when project proposals have to go to competition to be funded there is a much higher degree of compliance with the inclusion of cross-cutting issues. The reason for this phenomenon is that a project proposal is seen to have added value when cross-cutting issues are included and therefore a greater chance of receiving funding.
	<p><u>Detracting evidence:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conversations during the Field visit explained that most project personnel only pay lip service to the inclusion of cross-cutting issues. Many people believe they are not necessary nor relevant to their specific project. • When a SEFRO project staff member was asked if civil society organizations participated in their training sessions the response was that the material was too technical and therefore civil society organizations were not appropriate. (Field visit, April 2014) • Con respecto a los temas transversales, se detectó que no hay una definición clara del enfoque de género o de derechos humanos como parte integral del proyecto, aunque la evaluación detectó varios casos en los cuales la vinculación de Organizaciones de la Sociedad Civil (OSC) aportaron elementos y prácticas que incluyen el papel de mujeres en la detección y denuncia de armas ilegales, violencia intrafamiliar asociada a armas de fuego y procesos de intercambio y destrucción de pistolas, revólveres y otros armas. (Evaluación Formativa del Proyecto CASAC con enfoque participativo – Informe Final; Dic. 2011) • The Central American model for democratic security is based on human rights concepts but there is still no specific human rights policy within SICA. (Conversations with SICA officials 2014 Field visit) • “La Red realizó un acercamiento a SEFRO, el programa de SICA de Seguridad Fronteriza con la finalidad de aunar esfuerzos en este componente debido al trabajo natural que SEFRO se encuentra realizando en la zona de frontera. En una primera instancia se convergió en realizar una alianza estratégica para generar y compartir información respecto a temas de interés común. En ese sentido se programó una intervención coordinada sobre la base de una propuesta metodológica elaborada por la Red. En este ámbito el avance ha sido limitado,

	<p>establecido en un 20% que corresponde con la elaboración de la propuesta metodológica de abordaje. Los atrasos sufridos en esta área correspondieron a la falta de concreción de los acuerdos que se establecieron con el Programa SEFRO. La Red no excluye mantener y realizar acercamientos a SEFRO y a sus miembros, no obstante, se parte de una postura diferente, entendiendo REDCEPAZ que el abordaje de SEFRO es eminentemente institucional y que es difícil viabilizar acuerdos dentro de una visión tan burocrática”.</p>
<p>I-8.1.2 – Cross-cutting issues receive equal attention in project programming as targeted thematic areas</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>Out of 17 selected projects the EU funded with regional organizations (i.e. SICA institutions) only 4 of these projects had specific budget lines for cross-cutting issues, 7 had programmed activities that addressed cross-cutting issues and one project states that all activities will include cross-cutting issues. The interventions that do not identify budget lines or activities for cross-cutting issues often mention in the documents that they are dealing with gender or civil society participation, unfortunately there is no solid information identifying how that has been done or the impact. In some project evaluations it has been mentioned that greater attention should be placed on cross-cutting issues. These 17 EU supported projects with regional institutions included budgets totalling € 159.8 million; however, only € 10.8 or approximately 6.76 percent, were clearly designated for cross-cutting issues.</p> <p>Of 10 projects managed by CSOs that received EU funding all included activities focused on cross-cutting issues and the relevant populations. Five of these projects have specific budget lines that address cross-cutting issues, and four dedicate their entire budget to these issues, totalling approximately 56 percent identified as targeting cross-cutting issues.</p> <p>When specific budgeting and/or planning of activities do not happen cross-cutting issues appear to be strongly neglected.</p>
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p>Supporting evidence: RIP 2007 – 2013 p. 28 indicates: Cross-cutting issues <i>“Cooperation between the two sides should be based on the objective of broad participation by civil society and the principles of social equality – including as regards gender, respect for minorities and different cultures, especially indigenous peoples, conflict prevention and environmental sustainability. All action prepared in these areas must take into consideration the following cross-cutting issues:</i> <i>Equal opportunities and exclusion: All action under this strategy will take into consideration equal participation by men and women and access for indigenous communities, in order to combat exclusion and marginalisation. In particular, gender equality will be promoted at regional level (policy making, pilot initiatives, exchange of good practices) as a complement and in coherence with the EC Country Strategy Papers for 2007-13. These foresee specific actions in this area; additionally a Gender profile is annexed to the CSPs for Central America.</i> <i>Environmental sustainability: The repercussions of natural disasters and the fragility of the environment are serious obstacles to sustainable development in Central America. Issues concerning management of natural resources, including water, forests and biodiversity, are particularly important. Criteria should be developed to evaluate the environmental impact and sustainability of all action. In this context, whenever appropriate, the Commission will encourage Strategic Environmental Assessments (SEA) of the regional policies and other common action to be taken at regional level in order to devise measures to avoid/reduce any negative impact on the environment and optimise any positive impact. Initiatives should be consistent with the priorities of EC environmental policy and with future measures aimed at reducing the vulnerability of the region to natural disasters and preserving its environment. In the context of the 2002-</i></p>

	<p>2006 regional strategy for Central America, in 2005 the European Commission approved a €20 million regional programme for the reduction of vulnerability and environmental degradation that will focus on disaster prevention, water and environmental management. Its results and the lessons learned could feed into implementation of the component addressing institutional strengthening and capacity-building. The link between the DIPECHO programme and this regional initiative should be promoted. In addition, risk management should be mainstreamed into all action at regional level, in particular under the component for reinforcing the institutional system for regional integration.</p> <p><i>Support to civil society:</i> The three priority sectors for cooperation will include a specific component aiming at promoting participation by civil society in the integration process and social ownership of the process, including: programmes on discussion and dissemination of information, training and awareness-raising measures to facilitate appraisal of the integration process by local stakeholders. Efforts would also be needed to strengthen existing networks, coordination mechanisms and civil society organisations to improve their capacity to participate effectively in formulating and implementing initiatives, including preparing common policies. The need to encourage participation by representatives of indigenous peoples and minority ethnic groups in these measures and to enhance the visibility of the EC action should also be borne in mind.</p> <p><i>Annex 1:</i> Migration, justice and home affairs: EC action at regional level should address factors that make people vulnerable to human trafficking and insecurity, including illegal migration, with particular emphasis on vulnerable groups (women and children, indigenous peoples). Measures in this area should be based on an integrated approach founded on respect for human rights and calling for a coordinated policy response, including the area of freedom, security and justice, development, employment, gender equality and non-discrimination.</p> <p><i>Annex 2:</i> Others issues which should be appropriately addressed by the RSP: decentralisation, promotion of information technology, the fight against corruption, promotion of and respect for human rights (such as children’s rights, indigenous people, core labour standards, etc.) and HIV/AIDS and sexual and reproductive health. Combating HIV/AIDS has been mainstreamed as a cross-cutting issue in the programming process by analysing, in the context of the CSPs for the CA region, the government’s policy agenda on HIV/AIDS and sexual and reproductive health in particular, as well as the importance of the theme in the partner country.”</p> <p>For more details, see table 8.2 ‘PROJECTS WITH CSOs AND CCI’ at the end of this EQ.</p>
	<p><u>Detracting evidence:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Con respecto a los temas transversales, se detectó que no hay una definición clara del enfoque de género o de derechos humanos como parte integral del proyecto, aunque la evaluación detectó varios casos en los cuales la vinculación de Organizaciones de la Sociedad Civil (OSC) aportaron elementos y prácticas que incluyen el papel de mujeres en la detección y denuncia de armas ilegales, violencia intrafamiliar asociada a armas de fuego y procesos de intercambio y destrucción de pistolas, revólveres y otros. (Evaluación Formativa del Proyecto CASAC con enfoque participativa; Dic. 2011) <p>For more details see table 8.1 ‘PROJECTS WITH REGIONAL INTEGRATION BODIES’ at the end of this EQ</p>
<p>JC 8.2 – The classification of strategic priorities as ‘cross-cutting issues’ allows for the prioritizing of human rights, exclusion and gender equity in project programming</p>	
<p><i>Statement on JC8.2</i></p>	
<p>I-8.2.1 – Development of policy and guidelines by RIOs and national institutions directs the</p>	

implementation of cross-cutting issues in EU supported programmes and the regional integration process	
<i>Findings at indicator level</i>	<p>The EU has clearly defined policy and identifies human rights and participation of civil society, including women, indigenous peoples and marginalized communities as cross-cutting issues to be mainstreamed in all of its interventions. Environmental protection is another issue subject to mainstreaming. These issues are to be included and addressed in all EU supported projects. SICA policy reflects these EU principles and clearly states the need for civil society participation (CC-SICA) in all aspects of the regional integration process. Gender policy (COMMCA) that targets equality and equity within the process is also a formalized policy (PRIEG), and the first of SICA's (SG-SICA) nine principles is to protect, respect and promote human rights as the fundamental basis for Central American Integration.</p> <p>Even though policy has been developed there does not yet appear to be a clear correlation between policy and implementation of that policy. The majority of projects funded by the EU and managed by SICA affiliated institutions do not identify in project designs the implementation of activities or policies relating to cross-cutting issues that correspond to policy developed in the areas of gender, human rights or the participation with civil society organizations. In December 2013 PRIEG (Politica Regional de Igualdad y Equidad de Generao) was formally adopted by the SICA system and SICA is now mandated to promote and implement these principles throughout the system as with National governments. Some departments within SICA have already hired gender specialists.</p>
<i>Data, sources, extracts</i>	<p>Supporting evidence:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Institutionalization of a gender perspective in SICA ✓ Begins with the incorporation of COMMCA into SICA in June 2005, during the XXIV Presidents Meeting ✓ The XXXV Presidents Meeting (June 2010) decides to incorporate gender equality and equity as strategic themes of high priority in national and regional development policies and plans both at the level of SICA and the Member States. ✓ During the III Meeting of CENTROESTAD (incorporated in 2008) it was agreed to incorporate a gender perspective into the production of regional statistics with the objective to identify the differentiated reality between men and women. The first step to operationalize this agreement was to request that all statistics be divided by gender. (Presentacion: "Politica Regional de Igualdad y Equidad de Genero; Sra. Markelda Montenegro de Herrera, Dic. 2013) • The Protocol of Tegucigalpa, defined as an autonomous entity within the SICA system, linked for operation purposes to the General Secretariat, the so called SICA's Consultative Committee. CC-SICA, as it is known, groups in a set-up that promotes collaboration, regional umbrella type organizations from the business, labor, academic and other sectors of Central American society. They work together, are consulted, and provide Civil Society opinions to the Heads of State and Government Summits, and other SICA bodies. Let me assure you that the exchanges, even if still a long way to go towards perfection, are lively and useful. (Echeverria, SICA) • Misión: La misión del CC - SICA es promover la participación activa de la sociedad civil, para que el proceso de la integración responda efectivamente a la realidad, necesidades e intereses de la población de la región, contribuyendo a la efectiva observancia y ejecución de los propósitos, objetivos y principios del

	<p>Protocolo de Tegucigalpa, los cuales guiarán sus recomendaciones, estudios y análisis. http://www.sica.int/ccsica/ccsica_breve.aspx?IdEnt=63)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In recent meetings in Panama (December 2013) CC-SICA publicly stated that “... la importancia de seguir promoviendo la participación activa de la sociedad civil, para que el proceso de la integración responda efectivamente a la realidad, necesidades e intereses de la población de los países del SICA.” (CC-SICA webpage) • Principios de SICA: Para la realización de los propósitos citados del Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana y sus Estados Miembros procederán de acuerdo a los principios fundamentales siguientes: La tutela, respeto y promoción de los Derechos Humanos constituyen la base fundamental del Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana;... (http://www.sica.int/sica/principios.aspx?IdEnt=401&Idm=1&IdmStyle=1) • PRIEG policy (Política Regional de Igualdad y Equidad de Género del Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana (PRIEG/SICA), Dic. 2013)
	<p><u>Detracting evidence:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Comments from the RG meetings in Brussels indicated that civil society has decreased its presence in recent years and is not a significant player at the regional level. The civil society sectors that have participated are primarily the private sector and labour. The private sector has strong influence over government decisions and is very keen on regional integration as they consider it will benefit their own business interests. Human rights, women and youth groups are not represented. (Interview, Brussels) • Con respecto a los temas transversales, se detectó que no hay una definición clara del enfoque de género o de derechos humanos como parte integral del proyecto, aunque la evaluación detectó varios casos en los cuales la vinculación de Organizaciones de la Sociedad Civil (OSC) aportaron elementos y prácticas que incluyen el papel de mujeres en la detección y denuncia de armas ilegales, violencia intrafamiliar asociada a armas de fuego y procesos de intercambio y destrucción de pistolas, revólveres y otros armas. (Evaluación Formativa del Proyecto CASAC con enfoque participativo – Informe Final; Dic. 2011) • PAIRCA II (2009-2015) MTR, dic 2012: Los consultores no han podido constatar que el programa haya incluido cuestiones transversales como la igualdad de género, el medio ambiente, la buena gobernanza de manera explícita. Por ende, además de por la falta de ejecución, quedará en manos de la evaluación final toda valoración al respecto. • <u>The Consultative Committee (CC-SICA)</u> <p>“The civil society has been the other target of the Parlacon's campaign to expand its role and enlarge the spectrum of integration. Even more than political society, civil society was completely excluded from the regional integration process. Certainly, the general political situation of Central American countries did not make easy for civil society to exist, in the first place, much less to intervene in a process considered primarily of being competency of the executive. The creation of the Consultative Committee of the SICA, according to Art. 12 of the Protocol of Tegucigalpa (1991) and paragraph 34 of the Agenda of Guatemala (1993) of the XV Meeting of Central American Presidents. and its effective incorporation in the SICA as independent and autonomous body of the civil society responsible for strengthening integration, development and democracy in the</p>

	<p>region in 1996, bringing together a series of non-governmental organisations and platforms allowed, for the first time, to these non-state actors to have a saying, be it a consultative one, over the developments in regional integration. The Parlamen snatched this opportunity and multiplied its contacts with various local, national and regional organisations and movements with the objective both to recall the existence of the Parliament to them and to take into account their needs and demands. These contacts were useful: in the past civil society, especially those movements that challenged the governments in place, tended to reject all expressions of organised political life and considered that the Parlamen was nothing more than a group of highly-remunerated establishment politicians, completely detached from the real needs of the people. The permanent relations thus created broke, little by little, this diffidence and permitted to both sides to find common ground for discussions as well as to determine their adversaries and act together on various cases.” (Central America Integration System; International Democracy Watch)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • La construcción sociocultural de género existente en los países de la región limita el pleno reconocimiento y ejercicio de los derechos humanos de las mujeres en condiciones e igualdad como actora claves en el desarrollo de la región. (Presentación realizada por Miosotis Rivas Peña, Secretaria Técnica de la Mujer COMMCA/SICA en reunión de CENTROESTAD. 3 de setiembre 2010). <p>See table 8.1‘PROJECTS WITH REGIONAL INTEGRATION BODIES’</p>
<p>I-8.2.2 – Designated financing supports the inclusion of cross-cutting issues</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>Of the 17 selected EU funded projects with regional SICA affiliated bodies and total financing of € 159.8 million only € 10.8 million or approximately 6.76 percent, was identified in project documents as going specifically to cross-cutting issues and activities. Only four of the 17 projects identified specific budget lines for cross-cutting issues, although a fifth project (AECID) that recently began in 2013 states that cross-cutting issues are included in all project activities. Specific budget lines obviously reflect the effort to mainstream these issues however, only 4 of 17 projects actually specified budgets. One must ask whether this small percentage fulfils the criteria of mainstreaming the cross-cutting issues.</p> <p>EU funded interventions with CSOs frequently target as objectives of the project issues defined as cross-cutting, when this occurs the total budget goes to these issues. When the objectives are not cross-cutting issues these projects still identify budget lines to cover cross-cutting issues. The EU ends up funding not only the project activities but by funding a CSO they also clearly acknowledge and reinforce the participatory role of the CSO in the regional integration process. The project beneficiaries are acknowledged and supported but also the CSO is itself empowered within the Central American context. With respect to 10 selected EU supported projects managed by CSOs, 5 defined budget lines for cross-cutting issues and 4 dedicated their entire budget to cross-cutting issues, resulting in 56 percent of financing clearly targetting cross-cutting issues.</p>
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p><u>Supporting evidence:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The PAIRCA I project (2003-2009) budgeted € 750,000 from a budget of € 15 million to address the cross-cutting issues of gender, youth, indigenous and afrodescendent people and people with disabilities. Project documents indicate: <i>Resultado 4: Apoyo a la participación de la sociedad civil en el proceso de integración A.4.4: Apoyo a ONGs y otras instancias de representación de sectores habitualmente excluidos (mujeres, jóvenes, indígenas, discapacitados y afro-descendientes).</i> <p>Evaluación final: Si bien el FIRI ha facilitado un espacio de interacción regional y el</p>

	<p>desarrollo de acciones regionales, se detectaron tres necesidades importantes: (1) el mejoramiento de las capacidades institucionales de los sectores más vulnerables y excluidos; (2) el reforzamiento de acciones regionales concertadas, dentro de cada sector y a nivel intersectorial para la construcción de una agenda de incidencia regional y de sus planes de acción de cabildo para la integración regional; y (3) la capacitación en torno al conocimiento de experiencias de integración, así como de la institucionalidad regional centroamericana y de las formas de participación civil para incidir dentro de los procesos de decisión regional.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PRESANCA (2010-2016) From Eur. 13,000,000 financing for the PRESANCA project Eur. 152,000 were budgeted to address gender, indigenous and afrodescendent people as cross-cutting issues. “A3.1.1. Desarrollar un proceso de gestión de conocimiento orientado a la integración regional e interinstitucional, de forma incluyente respecto a la población indígena y afro-americana, al género y generacional.” • The Final Evaluation (EF – 2012): concludes that: “La mejora de la estrategia de género y multiculturalidad dentro de la cual se ejecutaron actividades basadas en estudios y diagnósticos específicos, capacitación y sensibilización, visibilizar a la mujer y grupos étnicos en el Programa, visibilizar la diversidad cultural, promover la participación equitativa y promover la cultura de respeto de los derechos humanos con equidad e igualdad.” The Final evaluation however does not provide any example as to how it was taken into account nor the specific impact. <p><u>Detracting evidence:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PRESANCA (2010-2016) The Final Evaluation does not identify nor analyse indicators systematically. The "Matriz de Sintesis de Logros, Impacto, Sostenibilidad, Lecciones Aprendidas y Conclusiones" does not mention the cross-cutting issues. <p>See tables ‘PROJECTS WITH REGIONAL INTEGRATION BODIES’ and ‘PROJECTS WITH CSOs AND CCI’</p>
<p>I-8.2.3 – Definition of specific activities allows for the (targeting) clear inclusion of cross-cutting issues</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>The EU supported projects that do identify specific activities for cross-cutting issues show a strengthening of the sectors involved. The PAIRCA I project reports an increased number and sector involvement of civil society organizations becoming members and participating with CC-SICA as a result of their activities. These activities also permitted the identification of the existing needs that require attention and support. Other projects that identified activities were unable to implement all that had been planned or the level of implementation was insufficient to meet objectives. It was also found that some projects that did not plan specific activities for cross-cutting issues recognized that they needed greater participation with civil society. The CASAC I project reports that success for small arms control will require working with CSOs at the community and regional levels. From the data collected it appears that although the incorporation of gender policy and work with CSOs is increasing in some areas insufficient attention is being given to cross-cutting issues even when specific project activities are identified.</p>
<p><i>Data, sources, extracts</i></p>	<p><u>Supporting evidence:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Final Evaluation of the PAIRCA I project identifies: El fortalecimiento de la participación misma de la sociedad civil a través del CC-SICA, observándose un

	<p>incremento en su número de miembros y la inclusión de segmentos tradicionalmente excluidos como mujeres, discapacitados, jóvenes e indígenas. La participación de la sociedad civil ha favorecido un enfoque de integración no sólo económico y político sino también social. It also states: “Si bien el FIRI ha facilitado un espacio de interacción regional y el desarrollo de acciones regionales, se detectaron tres necesidades importantes: (1) el mejoramiento de las capacidades institucionales de los sectores más vulnerables y excluidos; (2) el reforzamiento de acciones regionales concertadas, dentro de cada sector y a nivel intersectorial para la construcción de una agenda de incidencia regional y de sus planes de acción de cabildeo para la integración regional; y (3) la capacitación en torno al conocimiento de experiencias de integración, así como de la institucionalidad regional centroamericana y de las formas de participación civil para incidir dentro de los procesos de decisión regional.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The project has identified the importance of supporting work with faith organisations and universities given the results obtained by the former in disarmament of gangs and by the latter in research and diagnoses. The programme has been able to identify a series of joint operations that could be carried out with NGOs. Linkages have been established with the CEPAZ network to project it towards to the National Commissions. NGOs in the 7 countries have participated in training events organised by the project, as well as in dialogue and coordination spaces generated by the project. • The CASAC I progress Report for Jan. 2010 indicates: The project has identified the importance of supporting work with faith organisations and universities given the results obtained by the former in disarmament of gangs and by the latter in research and diagnoses. The programme has been able to identify a series of joint operations that could be carried out with NGOs. Linkages have been established with the REDCEPAZ network to project it towards to the National Commissions.
	<p><u>Detracting evidence:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • According to the Final Evaluation of the ADAPCCA project in 2011. “No se ha cumplido el indicador de ese resultado, ya que se canceló el Componente, aparentemente por falta de consenso en COMIECO, a pesar de recomendaciones de iniciar alguna actividad para incorporar la política ambiental al comercio.” • The MTR of PAIRCA II reports: La misión lamenta que no hubo capacidad para iniciar todas las actividades de R3 y R4 porque posiblemente es precisamente en este último sentido que el proceso de integración requiere de apoyo. La implementación de estas actividades apenas estaban arrancando - 36 meses después del inicio del proyecto hay 0.50% de ejecución. • The PRECAMS project report (ROM 23.05.2012) indicates: Talleres abril 2012: Se plantearon observaciones por parte de los participantes sobre productos, actividades y resultados (incluyendo la poca inclusión de temas transversales de género y medioambiente).
<p>I-8.2.4 – The utilization of diagnostic tools allows for analysis to determine the status of respect for human rights, exclusion and gender equity</p>	
<p><i>Findings at indicator level</i></p>	<p>Cross-cutting issues are identified because they are considered areas that require special attention – most of these issues have been marginalized in development processes. Diagnostic tools offer the possibility of enquiring about the status of particular issues in a</p>

	<p>specific environment – in order to make appropriate decisions relating to the necessary approach to be taken. Of 17 SICA related projects only two mention in project documents the intention to use diagnostic tools to further the understanding of issues – one to determine levels of and reasons for insecurity in the communities, and the other to better understand the situation of gender in the project domain.</p> <p>See charts ‘PROJECTS WITH REGIONAL INTEGRATION BODIES’</p>
<i>Data, sources, extracts</i>	<u>Supporting evidence:</u>
	<u>Detracting evidence:</u>
OTHER RELEVANT INFORMATION (NOT CAPTURED ELSEWHERE IN THIS EQ)	

Table 8.1: Projects with Regional Integration Bodies

Sector	Name/number/date of Project	Contraparte	Overall Budget	Budget for CC Issues	CCI according to Action fiche	Identified activities/ diagnostic tools for CC issues	Identity/ # of Participants/ beneficiaries of CC activities	Observations based on ROMs, evaluations and analysis of documents
Sector 1: Institutional Strengthening	PAIRCA II 2009-2015	SG SICA	€ 16,500,000		Human Rights, Gender, environmental sustainability, indigenous people, youth	None		MTR, dic 2012: Los consultores no han podido constatar que el programa haya incluido cuestiones transversales como la igualdad de género, el medio ambiente, la buena gobernanza de manera explícita. Por ende, además de por la falta de ejecución, quedará en manos de la evaluación final toda valoración al respecto.
				€ 650,000	CS	R.2: Institutional capacities of individual regional institutions are improved and collaboration with their national counterparts is strengthened. A.2.4. Support to CC-SICA in areas such as: a) Support to the institutionalization of the Executive Secretariat, as well as to the activities of	Organizaciones SC	MTR, dic 2012: Se ha producido, además, un sesgo estratégico al priorizar la integración “desde arriba” (R1 y R2) por presiones de la regla N+3 lo que provocó un relativo descuido de la integración “desde abajo” (R3 y R4). La misión lamenta que no hubo capacidad para iniciar todas las actividades de R3 y R4 porque posiblemente es precisamente en este último sentido que el proceso de integración requiere de apoyo. La implementación de estas actividades apenas estaban arranquendo - 36 meses después del inicio del proyecto hay 0.50

Sector	Name/number/ date of Project	Contraparte	Overall Budget	Budget for CC Issues	CCI according to Action fiche	Identified activities/ diagnostic tools for CC issues	Identity/ # of Participants/ beneficiaries of CC activities	Observations based on ROMs, evaluations and analisis of documents
						<p>the Directorate in the area of policy coordination, advocacy to consolidate the institution's role, etc.; b) Support to the activities, management and coordination of CC-SICA's National Chapters, as well as to the celebration of General Assemblies; c) Support to the definition and implementation of an action plan for institutional strengthening, which would include assistance to the implementation of strategic activities and training to civil society leaders, as well as consultations related to the work of the institution</p>		<p>percent de ejecución.</p>

Sector	Name/number/ date of Project	Contraparte	Overall Budget	Budget for CC Issues	CCI according to Action fiche	Identified activities/ diagnostic tools for CC issues	Identity/ # of Participants/ beneficiaries of CC activities	Observations based on ROMs, evaluations and analisis of documents
				€ 1,500,000	CS	<p><i>R.3: Participation of civil society in regional integration is increased and exchanges are promoted.</i></p> <p><i>A.3.1. Participation of Civil Society: Targeted call for proposals addressed to strategic non-state actors with the purpose of promoting their participation in the integration process and creating sector and/or thematic initiatives around this topic. The main goal is to promote cooperation and political dialogue between civil society organisations and SICA institutions in general, although special emphasis should be placed in creating synergies with CC-SICA as</i></p>	Organizaciones SC	

Sector	Name/number/ date of Project	Contraparte	Overall Budget	Budget for CC Issues	CCI according to Action fiche	Identified activities/ diagnostic tools for CC issues	Identity/ # of Participants/ beneficiaries of CC activities	Observations based on ROMs, evaluations and analysis of documents
						<p>the official representative body of civil society in the System and PARLACEN due to its new mandatory competences in the area of social consultation. Activities with civil society should be mostly oriented to enhance their capacity of defining and forwarding agendas, establishing platforms and advocacy strategies, developing social networks and partnerships, etc., as well as to establish work patterns with the regional institutions when possible.</p>		
				€400,000	Cs	<p><i>A.3.2. Connectivity Programme UE-CA:</i> Exchange of experiences with the</p>		

Sector	Name/number/ date of Project	Contraparte	Overall Budget	Budget for CC Issues	CCI according to Action fiche	Identified activities/ diagnostic tools for CC issues	Identity/ # of Participants/ beneficiaries of CC activities	Observations based on ROMs, evaluations and analysis of documents
						EU on regional integration issues, mostly addressed to SICA institutions and national counterparts, but also open to targeted exchanges with relevant bodies of civil society and strategic sectors. It might include bi-regional meetings such as EUROLAT.		
	PAIRCA I 2003-2009	SG SICA	€15,000,000	€750,000	gender, youth, indigenous and afrodescendent people, people with disability	<i>Resultado 4: Apoyo a la participación de la sociedad civil en el proceso de integración</i> A.4.4: Apoyo a ONGs y otras instancias de representación de sectores habitualmente excluidos (mujeres, jóvenes, indígenas, discapacitados y afro-descendientes)	879 líderes indígenas (350 jóvenes indígenas y afrodescendientes) 929 líderes jóvenes (120 con discapacidad, 474 mujeres)	Evaluación final: Si bien el FIRI ha facilitado un espacio de interacción regional y el desarrollo de acciones regionales, se detectaron tres necesidades importantes: (1) el mejoramiento de las capacidades institucionales de los sectores más vulnerables y excluidos; (2) el reforzamiento de acciones regionales concertadas, dentro de cada sector y a nivel intersectorial para la construcción de una agenda de incidencia regional y de sus planes de acción de cabildeo para la integración regional; y (3) la capacitación en

Sector	Name/number/ date of Project	Contraparte	Overall Budget	Budget for CC Issues	CCI according to Action fiche	Identified activities/ diagnostic tools for CC issues	Identity/ # of Participants/ beneficiaries of CC activities	Observations based on ROMs, evaluations and analysis of documents
								torno al conocimiento de experiencias de integración, así como de la institucionalidad regional centroamericana y de las formas de participación civil para incidir dentro de los procesos de decisión regional.
				€200,000	Sociedad Civil	<i>A.4.5: Fortalecimiento del CC-SICA</i>	no especifica	Evaluación final: El fortalecimiento de la participación misma de la sociedad civil a través del CC-SICA, observándose un incremento en su número de miembros y la inclusión de segmentos tradicionalmente excluidos como mujeres, discapacitados, jóvenes e indígenas. La participación de las sociedad civil ha favorecido un enfoque de integración no sólo económico y político sino también social.
Sector 2: Consolidation of Economic Integration	PRECAMS 2010 - 2016	SIEGA	€23,500,00 0		SC and environmental sustainability			ROM 23.05.2012: Marco lógico revisado en octubre 2011. Talleres abril 2012: Se plantearon observaciones por parte de los participantes sobre productos, actividades y resultados (incluyendo la poca inclusión de

Sector	Name/number/ date of Project	Contraparte	Overall Budget	Budget for CC Issues	CCI according to Action fiche	Identified activities/ diagnostic tools for CC issues	Identity/ # of Participants/ beneficiaries of CC activities	Observations based on ROMs, evaluations and analysis of documents
								temas transversales de género y medioambiente). Recomienda: (ii) Hacer explícito en el Marco Lógico los temas de género y medio ambiente. El ROM del 31.05.2013: No menciona nada sobre los transversales, ni de revisión del marco lógico.
	PRAIAA 2012 - 2016	SIEGA	€10,000,00 0		None mentioned in the Action Fiche			
	CONSUAC 2008 - 2011	SIEGA	€7,000,000		None mentioned			
	ADAPCCA 2007 - 2011	SIEGA	€10,000,00 0		None mentioned	<i>RESULTADO 2.4.2. Se cuenta con una propuesta de lineamientos estratégicos en el marco de la Unión Aduanera Centroamericana para fortalecer la relación entre la protección y defensa del medio ambiente y la política comercial regional bajo.</i>		Según evaluación final 2011: No se ha cumplido el indicador de ese resultado, ya que se canceló el Componente, aparentemente por falta de consenso en COMIECO, a pesar de recomendaciones de iniciar alguna actividad para incorporar la política ambiental al comercio.
	UAC 2002 - 2008	SIEGA	€8,000,000					we do not have any documents

Sector	Name/number/ date of Project	Contraparte	Overall Budget	Budget for CC Issues	CCI according to Action fiche	Identified activities/ diagnostic tools for CC issues	Identity/ # of Participants/ beneficiaries of CC activities	Observations based on ROMs, evaluations and analysis of documents
	ADESEP 2013 - 2017	SICA Y CENPROMYP E	€7,000,000		Good governance, gender, youth, environment and social responsibility issues.			Even if good governance, gender, youth, environment and social responsibility issues are mentioned as cross-cutting issues in the action fiche, they are not elaborated further in the document.
Sector 3: Security	SEFRO DCI- ALA/2009/021- 386 27/09/2010 - 27/09/2014	SG SICA	€5,500,000		Women, children		Women and children	2 lectures on gender and border security were offered during broader workshops. Women and children, as primary victims of trafficking and violence, are mentioned as implicit beneficiaries when the security situation improves
	CASAC I 2008 - 2009	SG SICA	€1,000,000		Civil Society	Objective 3: To strengthen and increase the capacities of civil society organisations in the promotion of SALW control.		The project has identified the importance of supporting work with faith organisations and universities given the results obtained by the former in disarmament of gangs and by the latter in research and diagnoses. The programme has been able to identify a series of joint operations that could be carried out with NGOs. Linkages have been established with the CEPAZ network to project it towards to the National Commissions. NGOs in the 7

Sector	Name/number/ date of Project	Contraparte	Overall Budget	Budget for CC Issues	CCI according to Action fiche	Identified activities/ diagnostic tools for CC issues	Identity/ # of Participants/ beneficiaries of CC activities	Observations based on ROMs, evaluations and analysis of documents
								<p>countries have participated in training events organised by the project, as well as in dialogue and coordination spaces generated by the project.</p> <p>Con respecto a los temas transversales, se detectó que no hay una definición clara del enfoque de género o de derechos humanos como parte integral del proyecto, aunque la evaluación detectó varios casos en los cuales la vinculación de Organizaciones de la Sociedad Civil (OSC) aportaron elementos y prácticas que incluyen el papel de mujeres en la detección y denuncia de armas ilegales, violencia intrafamiliar asociada a armas de fuego y procesos de intercambio y destrucción de pistolas, revólveres y otros.</p>

Sector	Name/number/ date of Project	Contraparte	Overall Budget	Budget for CC Issues	CCI according to Action fiche	Identified activities/ diagnostic tools for CC issues	Identity/ # of Participants/ beneficiaries of CC activities	Observations based on ROMs, evaluations and analysis of documents
	CASAC II Apoyo a la lucha contra la tenencia ilícita y tráfico de armas de fuego en Centroamérica y Países Vecinos start 04/09/2012 - 36 months	SG SICA	€2,300,000		CSOs		160 CSO and private security companies, 30 special investigators, SICA orgs	Civil Society organizations were to be included although not specifically budgetted for and it has been recognized that greater effort must be made to achieve this element. Collaboration has begun with REDCEPAZ - a regional network of CSOs that promote peace and human security.
	AECID Social Prevention of Violence from Local Government in CA EuropeAid/2012/2 90150/1 48 months from 2013	SG SICA	€7,000,000	CC activities are budgeted into all activities		Cross-cutting issues defined by the European Union principles of environmental sustainability, equal opportunities, good governance and human rights will be integrated in the project as expressed in the RSP 2007- 2013. The project will have a particularly positive impact on vulnerable groups such as children, adolescents, migrants and	Local authorities, associations of 36 municipalities and national institutions present also at municipal level, such as the Police, Ministry of Social Welfare and Ministry of Education as well as civil society organisations, churches, community	This project has only recently commences but it does contemplate diagnostic studies in each municipality to determine plans of action for improved security.

Sector	Name/number/ date of Project	Contraparte	Overall Budget	Budget for CC Issues	CCI according to Action fiche	Identified activities/ diagnostic tools for CC issues	Identity/ # of Participants/ beneficiaries of CC activities	Observations based on ROMs, evaluations and analysis of documents
						<p>women. Gender equality policies regarding access of women to all training opportunities as well as equal participation in the municipal prevention committees will be encouraged. In terms of environmental sustainability, the project will have a low environmental impact. Further, increasing the capacity and efficiency of police and justice institutions to fight against organised crime may result in the prosecution of groups dedicated to illegal logging and illicit use of natural resources.</p>	<p>groups and activists working with populations at risk. Municipal committees for violence prevention will be consolidated or established and composed by local authorities, national civil servants and civil society representatives. National authorities and SICA.</p>	

Sector	Name/number/ date of Project	Contraparte	Overall Budget	Budget for CC Issues	CCI according to Action fiche	Identified activities/ diagnostic tools for CC issues	Identity/ # of Participants/ beneficiaries of CC activities	Observations based on ROMs, evaluations and analysis of documents
Sector 4: Reduction of vulnerabilities and environment	PREVDA 2006-2012	SG SICA	€24,000,00 0	cannot estimate	gender, multiculturality, human rights, indigenous people	<i>OG, OE, R1, R2, R3 all take into account gender and multiculturality (indigenous people). Indicator 2, 3, 8, 9, 12 and 18 all take explicitly into account gender and indigenous people</i>	según la EF: 478 capacitados, 166 eran mujeres, es decir, casi 35% del total.	EF concluye que la recomendación 5b) del EMT fue tomada en cuenta: La mejora de la estrategia de género y multiculturalidad dentro de la cual se ejecutaron actividades basadas en estudios y diagnósticos específicos, capacitación y sensibilización, visibilizar a la mujer y grupos étnicos en el Programa, visibilizar la diversidad cultural, promover la participación equitativa y promover la cultura de respeto de los derechos humanos con equidad e igualdad; Ojo: aunque en los TdR de las evaluaciones de la CE, siempre piden evaluar enfoques transversales, género, medio ambiente y pobreza en los componentes, pertinencia, eficacia, impacto y sostenibilidad - no he visto una evaluación final que lo ha aplicado En relación al presupuesto, en lo más de 300 documentos de PREVDA, No he podido identificar ni el informe final del programa ni el POG o los POAs

Sector	Name/number/ date of Project	Contraparte	Overall Budget	Budget for CC Issues	CCI according to Action fiche	Identified activities/ diagnostic tools for CC issues	Identity/ # of Participants/ beneficiaries of CC activities	Observations based on ROMs, evaluations and analisis of documents
								de 2010, 2011 y 2012, por lo que no he podido estimar el presupuesto de los CCI
				€153,000.0 0	gender, multiculturality, human rights, youth	<i>A3.1.1. Desarrollar un proceso de gestión de conocimiento orientado a la integración regional e interinstitucional, de forma incluyente respecto a la población indígena y afro-americana, al género y generacional.</i>		

Sector	Name/number/ date of Project	Contraparte	Overall Budget	Budget for CC Issues	CCI according to Action fiche	Identified activities/ diagnostic tools for CC issues	Identity/ # of Participants/ beneficiaries of CC activities	Observations based on ROMs, evaluations and analysis of documents
	PRESANCA 2010-2016	SG SICA	€13,000,00 0	€152,000	gender, indigenous and afrodescendent people	A3.1.1. Desarrollar un proceso de gestión de conocimiento orientado a la integración regional e interinstitucional, de forma incluyente respecto a la población indígena y afro-americana, al género y generacional.	no especifica	Evaluación final (EF) 2012: concluye que la recomendación 5b) del EMT fue tomada en cuenta: La mejora de la estrategia de género y multiculturalidad dentro de la cual se ejecutaron actividades basadas en estudios y diagnósticos específicos, capacitación y sensibilización, visibilizar a la mujer y grupos étnicos en el Programa, visibilizar la diversidad cultural, promover la participación equitativa y promover la cultura de respeto de los derechos humanos con equidad e igualdad; Comment: The Final evaluation does not provide example on how it was taken into account not the specific impact. The EF does not analyse indicators sistematically. The "Matriz de Sintesis de Logros, Impacto, Sostenibilidad, Lecciones Aprendidas y Conclusiones" does not mention the cross-cutting issues
	PRESISAN I 2010 - 2012	SG SICA	€3,000,000		gender, indigenous people,	<i>Cannot be identified</i>		No mention of cross-cutting issues in ROM 2012, PAT 2011, PAT 2012

Sector	Name/number/ date of Project	Contraparte	Overall Budget	Budget for CC Issues	CCI according to Action fiche	Identified activities/ diagnostic tools for CC issues	Identity/ # of Participants/ beneficiaries of CC activities	Observations based on ROMs, evaluations and analysis of documents
					environment, migration			
	PRESISAN II 2013 - 2015	SG SICA	€2,000,000		gender, indigenous people, environment, migration	Cannot be identified		El POG establece que: En todas sus acciones, el Programa considerará cuatro ejes transversales: a) el tener en cuenta el ciclo de crisis alimentaria; b) el enfoque de género, introduciendo un análisis diferenciado de los géneros; c) la protección del medio ambiente y de los recursos naturales y d) el apoyo institucional. Sin embargo, el ROM 23.05.12 concluye que el diseño falla porque no desagrega los RES, ACT o IOV en términos de género, M.Ambiente o DDHH, invisibilizándolos.
	PRIICA 2011 - 2014	IICA	€5,000,000		gender	Realizar procesos de sensibilización sobre las cuestiones de género mediante talleres participativos y capacitaciones Ejecución de diagnósticos participativos con	no especifica	A gender strategy is defined in the POG. As we dont have PATs or ROM, we can not appreciate the implementation or identify specific budget or activities

Sector	Name/number/ date of Project	Contraparte	Overall Budget	Budget for CC Issues	CCI according to Action fiche	Identified activities/ diagnostic tools for CC issues	Identity/ # of Participants/ beneficiaries of CC activities	Observations based on ROMs, evaluations and analysis of documents
						enfoque de género Actividad 1.1.1 Definir TdR para la identificación de investigaciones en cadenas, demandas tecnológicas y formación de consorcios, considerando en este último la participación de gremios, jóvenes y mujeres.		

Table 8.2: projects with CSOs and CCI

Sector	Name/number/ date of Project	Contraparte	Overall Budget	Budget for CC issues	CCI according to Action fiche or reports	Objetivos	Identity/ # of Participants/ beneficiaries of CC activities	Observations based on ROMs, evaluations and analysis of documents
Sector 3 Security and migration	IÉPADES: IFS/RRM/2010/ 022-458 1/01/2012 - 31/12/2015	IÉPADES/ REDCEPAZ	€ 812,500	€ 132,000	CSOs participation, gender	To create a regional action program for the implementation of the Strategy; to strengthen National Commissions on fire arms control and armed violence prevention; to create debates and discussions on border issues related to fighting illicit traffic and to strengthen the Central America Network for Peace Building and Human Security.	Los grupos destinatarios son los Gobiernos de Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica y Panamá; Consejo Consultivo del SICA y Secretaría General del SICA; sociedad civil articulada en la Red Centroamericana para la construcción de la Paz y la Seguridad Humana – REDCEPAZ- y el beneficiario final lo constituye la población centroamericana en su conjunto.	The nature of this project is the inclusion of civil society in security issues therefore all funding is dedicated in some way to civil society activities and the promotion of collaboration with official sectors.

Sector	Name/number/ date of Project	Contraparte	Overall Budget	Budget for CC issues	CCI according to Action fiche or reports	Objetivos	Identity/ # of Participants/ beneficiaries of CC activities	Observations based on ROMs, evaluations and analysis of documents
	DIAKONIA IFS- RRM/2011/278- 583 01/02/2012 - 31/07/2014	Diakonia	€ 811,501	Entire budget is targeting women's security	Women's networks and victims of violence	Specific objective: Strengthen national women networks in Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and Nicaragua, their organizations, as key actors for the consolidation and implementation of effective security policies on the prevention and elimination of violence against women in all four countries and regionally.	1660 women belonging to 165 organizations within 4 national networks, 22 State officials (attorney generals, prosecutors and parliamentarians, 200 public servants, SICA (Secretary General, Security Commission, CC- SICA, CIM – OEA, 60 media outlets, and 400 people from CSO, international community and womens movement in 4 countries	The activities conducted by this project are organized and conducted by and for civil society organizations for the prevention of violence against women. They include women, youth and indigenous peoples and mapping of incidences of violence.

Sector	Name/number/ date of Project	Contraparte	Overall Budget	Budget for CC issues	CCI according to Action fiche or reports	Objetivos	Identity/ # of Participants/ beneficiaries of CC activities	Observations based on ROMs, evaluations and analysis of documents
Sector 4: Reduction of vulnerabiliti es and environment	PECOSOL 2013-2017	OIKOS	€ 1,870,39 8		SC, gender, participation and cultural relevance	General: Contribuir a la participación de la sociedad civil en políticas nacionales y regionales centroamericanas sobre gobernanza democrática y seguridad alimentaria. Específico: Fortalecer la capacidad de las redes PECOSOL y CONSUACCION para promover, junto a los espacios de decisión políticos y organismos internacionales, políticas y estrategias que protejan el derecho a la alimentación y reduzcan la vulnerabilidad alimentaria de las poblaciones. Según la descripción de la actividad, la propuesta contempla realizar acciones de capacitación,		Empezó implementación en el 2013-12-11

Sector	Name/number/ date of Project	Contraparte	Overall Budget	Budget for CC issues	CCI according to Action fiche or reports	Objetivos	Identity/ # of Participants/ beneficiaries of CC activities	Observations based on ROMs, evaluations and analysis of documents
						organizativas o de incidencia pública que ayuden a transformar patrones culturales y sociales de desigualdad interiorizados por la población, incluida la desigualdad de género.		
	HAMBRE CERO 2013 - 2017	MTFRL	€ 3,000,00 0		gender, participation, civil society	El objetivo es contribuir con la Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional (SAN) de familias que viven en condiciones de marginación, pobreza y vulnerabilidad en el Trifinio Centroamericano, a través de fortalecimiento de capacidades de las organizaciones de productores. La metodología de aprendizaje y enseñanza contempla el enfoque de género.		La descripción de la acción estipula que el diseño e implementación de las herramientas metodológicas se tendrá como referencia constante las temáticas transversales de enfoque de género y enfoque de participación y pertinencia cultural. No se puede identificar presupuesto específico por acciones.

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	ECOPECSA	Asociación amigos de la tierra española	€ 1,761,964	€ 36,790	Gender, women, environment, gobernabilidad	<p><i>OG: Contribuir a la conservación y gestión efectiva de la biodiversidad marina con mejora de condiciones de vida para el sector de pesca artesanal en comunidades del ecosistema trinacional Golfo de Fonseca.</i></p> <p><i>OE.1 Restaurar y manejar sosteniblemente los ecosistemas de manglar, los recursos pesqueros, las áreas protegidas y sus áreas próximas de influencia en el Golfo de Fonseca.</i></p> <p><i>OE.2 Contribuir a la mejora de la calidad de vida del sector pesquero con enfoque ecosistémico mediante tecnificación y alternativas económicas complementarias de bajo impacto, con participación de la mujer.</i></p> <p><i>R.2.3: Fortalecida la organización en 46 comunidades costeras en tres países con mujeres participando en la toma de</i></p>	Beneficiarios según ficha: Un estimado de 21,175 personas, 13,480 de estas son mujeres. Informe a medio tiempo: Hasta el segundo año, el proyecto capacitó y sensibilizó a 6702 personas, entre pesqueros/os, marisqueros/os, estudiantes (2267 personas en el año 1 de las 956 son mujeres; y 4435 en el año 2 de los cuales 2292 son mujeres)	El objetivo específico 2, el resultado 2.3 y las actividades 2.3.1 se refiere a género y mujeres Según el ROM: 30.05.2013: El resultado R.2.3 (Fortalecida organización comunitaria e igualdad género): en cuanto a la promoción de la mujer el proyecto está alcanzando buenos efectos directos tanto en Honduras como en El Salvador (menos en Nicaragua) - Los efectos producidos hasta la fecha son de buena calidad. Igualmente concluye que: Los temas transversales (género,

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						<p><i>decisión.</i></p> <p><i>2.3.1. Desarrollar una campaña sostenida de sensibilización para disminuir la desigualdad de género en la toma de decisiones en las organizaciones comunitarias.</i></p> <p><i>2.3.2 Desarrollar un programa de formación de líderes mujeres y promover su participación en juntas directivas de organizaciones comunitarias.</i></p>		medioambiente, gobernabilidad y derechos humanos están oportunamente considerados en el diseño.
Sector 6: Human Rights	Jovenes rurales 2010 - 2013	Ministerio de Salud	€ 615,371	€ 615,371	Migration, youth, indigenous people, gender, human rights	<p>General: Jóvenes rurales centroamericanos participan, inciden y superan la exclusión política, económica y logran alternativas a la emigración.</p> <p>OE1 Al final de la acción, jóvenes rurales de 8 municipios centroamericanos son conscientes de sus derechos políticos y económicos,</p>	<p>Beneficiarios finales: 154,862 personas de los 8 Municipios Centroamericanos, 51% mujeres y 49% hombres.</p> <p>Grupos destinatarios: 950 jóvenes entre 15 y 30 años, 40% mujeres y 60% hombres:</p> <p>Nicaragua 300, Honduras 300, El</p>	<p>El ROM: 10.05.2011 concluye que: Los IOV de los OG y OE no permiten medir la calidad de la participación de la juventud rural en las políticas públicas, la reducción de inequidades (incluida la de género) y si las políticas suponen</p>

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						<p>participan en la construcción de democracia local y desarrollan actividades económicas sostenibles como alternativa a la emigración.</p> <p>OE2 Al final de la acción, jóvenes rurales de 8 municipios centroamericanos fortalecen su participación en alianzas y redes juveniles al nivel local, nacional, regional y transnacional.</p> <p>Actividades: Diseño e implementación de un programa de capacitación en derechos políticos económicos y metodologías para facilitar participación juvenil efectiva.</p>	Salvador 150 Guatemala 200.	<p>una alternativa a la emigración. El proyecto no contempla en su diseño una estrategia de salida y los aspectos de género fueron débilmente formulados. Formula recomendaciones en este sentido que vale la pena retomar en la evaluación:</p> <p>Recomendación:</p> <p>ii) profundizar en el análisis de género y establecer adecuadas estrategias sin descuidar necesidades específicas de jóvenes LGBT vii) establecer algunos IOV que permitan medir las transformaciones operadas por el P</p>

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								en la dinámica institucional (local, nacional y regional) así como en el interior de las organizaciones sociales a partir de una mayor participación juvenil y de las mujeres;
	SC y niñez - democracia 2013 - 2016	PLAN INTERNATIONAL	€ 1,440,00 0	€ 1,440,00 0	human rights, childrens rights	Objetivo general: Contribuir a la promoción de una sociedad global, democrática e inclusiva a través de la promoción del diálogo entre las organizaciones de la sociedad civil y los grupos organizados de niños, niñas y adolescentes, con las autoridades locales nacionales y los mecanismos de integración regional en Centroamérica. OE 1. Fortalecer la red regional		Begun implementation in 2013. We only have the two page information fiche

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						<p>centroamericana de organizaciones de la sociedad civil de defensa de los derechos de la niñez y sus plataformas nacionales en Panamá, Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala y El Salvador y reforzar sus capacidades de incidencia política para la prevención de todo tipo de violencia hacia niños, niñas y adolescentes (NNA). OE 2. Establecer/fortalecer espacios de dialogo entre grupos organizados de NNA, las organizaciones de la sociedad civil y las instituciones garantes de derechos para la protección contra todo tipo de violencia y la defensa de los derechos de la niñez a nivel regional y nacional en</p>		

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						<p>Centroamérica.</p> <p>All results incorporates childrens rights, adolescents rights, civil society participation. specific activities cannot be identified</p>		
	JURCA 2013-2015	Solterre	€ 609,129	€ 349,200	<p>security, violence prevention, youth, human rights, civil society, participation, gender</p>	<p>General: Contribuir al desarrollo y a la consolidación de la democracia en CA, reforzando la participación ciudadana de la población juvenil, con enfoque de género, ante las instancias gubernamentales, a través del ejercicio del derecho a la libertad, seguridad e integridad personal.</p> <p>Específico: Fortalecer las capacidades de las</p>		<p>Begun implementation in 2013</p>

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						estructuras juveniles nacionales y regional, que trabajan en la difusión y aplicación del Modelo de Justicia Restaurativa (JR) como Mecanismo Alternativo de Resolución de Conflictos (MARC), finalizado a prevenir la violencia y promover una cultura de paz y el derecho a la seguridad e integridad personal.		
	Primero aprendo (PA) 2011 - 2014	CARE	€ 996,250	€ 486,000	childrens rights, gender, indigenous people	Objetivo general: Erradicar progresivamente el trabajo infantil en las peores formas y universalizar el derecho a la educación primaria de acuerdo a los Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio (ODM) en Guatemala, El Salvador y Nicaragua, al final del proyecto. Objetivo específico:	Beneficiarios finales y/o grupos destinatarios1 (si son diferentes) (incluyendo el número de hombres y mujeres): 1000 niñas, niños y adolescentes trabajadores (335 trabajadores domésticos infantiles en Guatemala (78% niñas y 22%	falta ROM de 2013

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						<p>Crear un ambiente facilitador de políticas, coordinación intersectorial, modelos educativos y alianzas, para que las niñas, niños trabajadores (NNT) en las peores formas de trabajo infantil gocen plenamente de su derecho a la educación.</p> <p>All activities are relevant for cross-cutting issues</p>	niños); 300 trabajadoras en riesgo de ser explotadas sexualmente en El Salvador (81% niñas y 19% niños); 335 trabajadores infantiles agrícolas en Nicaragua (44% niñas y 56% niños).	
	Niños trabajadores y en las calles 2011 - 2014	RE.TE.	€ 826,850	€ 330,395	childrens rights, gender, governance, environment	<p>Objetivo general: Contribuir a la erradicación del trabajo infantil en Honduras y Nicaragua.</p> <p>Objetivo específico: Promover el respeto de los derechos y la integración social de los Niños y Niñas trabajadores en los basureros y en las calles de los</p>	Los destinatarios de la acción son 1473 Niños, Niñas y Adolescentes trabajadores (631 Varones y 842 Mujeres) y sus familias	ROM 31.05.2013, concluye, sin profundizar más, que los ejes transversales derechos, género, gobernabilidad, medio ambiente, están presentes.

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						Municipios de Tegucigalpa, San Pedro Sula y Managua. All results are relevant for CCI		