

Towards a new partnership between the European Union and the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries after 2020

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Common global interests in a multi-polar world

1. To which degree has the partnership been effective in tackling global challenges?

The EU has been rather ineffectual in tackling global challenges of common interest with the ACPs.

It has been also very ineffective concerning the magnitude and urgency of the migration problem from Africa and other regions.

On climatic changes EU's stance - isolated, costly and of quite limited effect - evokes the image of a fly cochère. The ACPs were ignored and, contrary to the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol, even excluded from the emission trading.

Concerning ODA - Official Development Assistance, EU's largest financial instrument, the EDF - European Development Fund, now disposing of about € 6 billion annually, is quite modest in relation to needs, administratively cumbersome, unable to meet its disbursement objectives in spite of the fact that a large quota of it is misspent in general support to ACPs' national budgets, meaning, mostly, paying salaries of their bureaucracies. An easy way to endear the Commission to ACPs' Governments, but hardly a commendable one to promote development.

Furthermore EU's ODA has largely ignored the role of the private sector in fostering true and sustainable economic and, hence, human development.

2. What would be needed to strengthen results in this respect and on which global challenges could the partnership add most value in the future, in the context of the new SDGs framework and in relevant international fora?

On migration the UE has ignored the magnitude and urgency of the problem until it became explosive and still it is a long way from agreeing on an indispensable common migration policy. More details in answer to question 19.

On climatic changes, the UE should abandon the pretention to lead the world by example and, in the environment's true interest, put European taxpayers' money at more realistic and effective use.

By ignoring Kyoto Protocol's CDM - Clean Development Mechanism of emission trading with the ACPs and other developing countries and by concentrating, in perfect international isolation, on its, rather ineffective, ETS - European Trading System, the EU has hindered the global environment and the pace of energy efficiency improvement in the ACPs.

The EU's environmental policies, by rising the internal costs of energy, have favored the delocalization of manufacturing. It has been calculated that, adjusting for the CO2 content of traded goods, the emission consumption in the EU15 increases about 20%. A kind of huge industrial Marshall plan has been performed in favor of the "environmental heavens" (China in first place) which also casts serious doubts on the true dimension of EU's emissions and their purported reduction.

On ODA, a stricter attitude should be adopted vis-à-vis the less cooperative among the beneficiary countries and attention/efforts concentrated on the better prospects.

ODA should not be indiscriminately "rained around" for "political reasons" onto the 78 ACPs but focused into the most needing countries/sectors and in those which put it at better use (value for money).

The SDGs appear to be too many and too ambitious, the resulting risk is to spread limited ODA resources too thin making them financially un-sustainable.

Human rights, democracy and rule of law, as well as good governance

3. Have the mechanisms provided for in the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) (i.e. political dialogue, financial support, appropriate measures, suspension of the agreement) achieved meaningful improvements on human rights, democracy, rule of law and good governance, including the fight against corruption? Should the future partnership do more in this regard, and in what way?

The progress has been quite limited. A tougher stance must be taken. Definitely more must be done, particularly against corruption. In many APCs kleptocracy is rampant and, has to be keener on caring about substance/results more than complying with its formalities/rules.

4. Has the involvement of local authorities and non-state actors (i.e. civil society organisations, the media), national parliaments, courts and national human rights institutions in the partnership been adequate and useful to promote human rights, democracy and rule of law as well as good governance? Could they contribute more and in what way?

It must be honestly admitted that local authorities, particularly at district or municipal levels, are mostly inadequate. Serious efforts should be made to concentrate support on those actors which, on the basis of experience or of a case-by-case appraisal, may offer sounder prospects of effectiveness and value for money and let the inadequate astray. Avoid “boniments”, entitlement to aid should not be confused with the right to squander it.

Peace and security, fight against terrorism and organised crime

5. Are the provisions on peace and security in the CPA appropriate and useful and has the balance between regional and ACP involvement been effective?

Pondering what the EU has not been collectively able to do at its doorsteps (former Yugoslavia, Libya, Ukraine, Syria) or in Mali, Somalia and Zaire, it is difficult to imagine any truly effective EU-ACP action of peace-enforcing or of peace-keeping in distant places. Military training and operations financed via African organizations have been plagued by corruption and failure.

6. Should the future partnership provide for more effective joint action on conflict prevention, including early warning and mediation, peace-building and state-building activities, as well as on tackling transnational security challenges? Should this be done in the EU-ACP context?

To pursue said goals just in the EU - ACP context seems unrealistic. Would the EU be ready to take any serious intervention in a conflict without a previous clearance from the UN and the “in situ” support from its main interested Member States?

7. How effective has the partnership been in promoting sustainable and inclusive economic development?

Quite ineffective, as it has been ODA in general.

At global level net ODA flows, some US\$ billion 135 a year, represent only about 13% of the net flows of funds to the 154 countries (out of the 194 members of the UN) still labelled as developing ones.

The about € 6 billion a year allotted to the 11th FED will thus represent about 5% of said 13%, i.e. only 0,065% of the total flow of funds to developing countries.

Therefore EU's ODA, already limited, will be irrelevant if it not will be, on one side, better focused on the poorest countries and their most pressing needs and, on another, blended with non-ODA funds in the middle-level countries.

ODA to the upper middle-level countries should be just discontinued. DEVCO's record in supporting the all-important private sector has been dismal.

New instruments, proven by other aid agencies, must be adopted, such as mutual guarantees schemes to facilitate access to credit by MSMEs - Micro, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises, and new ones devised, for instance in order to promote the inclusion of remittances into the formal financial systems of the recipient countries. Let's not forget that, in size, migrants' remittances to developing countries (\$ 635,2 billion in 2013) put global ODA net flows (\$ 135,6 billion) in the shade.

So far "blending" of EU's ODA, i.e. using it as a catalyst to unlock other form of financing, has been limited and about 90% of the funds have supported public projects, not the private sector.

8. Taking into account the new SDGs framework, should the future partnership do more in this respect, and what?

The SDGs seem to be too numerous and too ambitious up to the point to have been labelled "un-sustainable". Also they underrate the crucial role of the private sector.

Future partnership should be more realistic, more focused on basics (as were the MDGs) and by far more supportive of private enterprises in deeds, not just in nice words.

9. How effective has the partnership been in supporting macroeconomic and financial stability? In which areas would there be added value in ACP-EU cooperation on macroeconomic and financial stability?

As far as macroeconomic and financial stability is concerned, the EU-ACP partnership has been irrelevant. Rather than aiming at far-flung and difficult objectives of external macroeconomic stability which can be better pursued in the broader context of UN's global institutions the EU should be realistic and aim at what can actually do with its limited financial resources.

10. How effective has the partnership been in improving domestic revenue mobilisation, in promoting fair and efficient tax systems and in combatting illicit financial flows? Would there be added value and more efficiency in stronger ACP-EU cooperation on these matters?

Promoting tax collection and domestic revenue mobilization is crucial. No amount of external financial support could ever replace them, rather it would just perpetuate a sort of addiction to aid and budget support. So far the EU commitment has been irrelevant. A stronger effort is essential. By far the largest illicit financial flows do not intervene among the ACP and the EU. Combatting financial flows of criminals and terrorists is a global endeavor that transcends Cotonou's framework.

11. Has the partnership been able to contribute substantially to mobilising the private sector and attracting foreign direct investment?

Next to irrelevant.

12. How could the potential of the EU and ACP private sector be better harnessed? What should be the main focus of EU and ACP private sector cooperation in a post-Cotonou framework, and what might be the role of ODA in this?

The role of the private sector will be crucial. Unfortunately, so far DEVCO has been ineffective in supporting it, both in funding and with ideas. It must be recognized that to support private enterprises, particularly MSMEs, directly on a micro/ individual basis is a daunting task because:

- a) the number of firms actually assisted will ever represent just a "drop in the ocean" with respect of the potential demand and
- b) the costs are prohibitive in view of the investments actually promoted.

The way out of this conundrum is not just a matter of increasing funds.

Proven instruments of "meso-finance" supporting local intermediaries, such as lines of credit, mutual guarantee and insurance schemes, already in use by other bilateral and multilateral agencies, should be adopted and put at work.

13. In this setting, what opportunities do you see for the new, digital economy?

ICT is a powerful instrument in improving total factors' productivity thus fostering economic development, is also a complex and too fast-changing one to be planned and managed by bureaucrats. Moreover ICT projects, being mostly commercially viable, scarcely need financial aid. That said, the EU should not see ITC's role as confined to economy, it should support it mainly because its social and political impacts.

14. To what extent has the partnership been able to contribute to increase agricultural development and trade?

General trade preferences have been an important developmental instrument. Their recent re-focusing on the actually needing countries, which reduced the number of the beneficiaries, was an act of realism the EU should replicate in the ODA context. But they may be reaching limits in the context of the inevitable global competition and of the FTAs -Free Trade Agreements the EU has reached or is negotiating with its main - the actually most relevant - trading partners.

It must be also kept in mind that, thanks to WTO, custom duties have largely fallen. Now the main hurdle to international trade development are the so-called "market requirements" - an euphemism for "non-tariff barriers" - which particularly impair the exports from developing countries because they are badly equipped to cope with them, both in terms of negotiating power and of technical expertise. If improved aid to trade is a part of the response, another one may be more attention paid to the ACPs' needs in the context of the FTAs.

So far EU's has been rather weak and meek in fostering its own trade interests (witness the rejection of the proposed Regulation on reciprocity on access to public procurement, the farce of the Global Agreement on Public Procurement, the FTA with South Korea, the one being negotiated with the Japanese, world champions on non-tariff trade barriers). One may assume that many ACPs are in an even weaker position when negotiating with big trading countries. Ideally the mandate of the EU negotiators should be broadened in order to introduce in the FTAs provisions favoring the ACPs, in particular their agricultural productions because of their socio-economic significance.

The amount of EU's agricultural imports from the ACPs is the evidence of the success of the partnership. But a nagging question remains.

In spite of a strong un-scientific opposition, the Commission has taken the correct position on GMOs - Genetically Modified Organisms, but many developing countries still reject them, an absurd and criminal attitude in view of the global goal of eliminating the bane of malnutrition still affecting some 800 million humans and causing an estimated 1,4 million infant deaths a year.

Does it make sense to continue to support agriculture in those countries which oppose the best instrument to reduce malnutrition?

15. What has been the contribution of the partnership trade preferences to the integration of ACP countries in the world economy and to its development goals?

Refer to answer to question nr. 14

16. Is there still a need for specific provisions on trade cooperation in the post-Cotonou framework, also taking into account the ACP countries which have not signed an EPA? If so, what could/should they cover?

Refer to answer to question nr. 14

Human and social development

17. Has the partnership delivered on its human development objective in an effective and efficient way, in particular on poverty eradication, and also concerning gender equality and empowerment of women? How could it be improved?

Thanks mostly to globalization of the economy and to a lesser extent to donors' community efforts, MDGs have been attained, as in the case of poverty reduction, or approached. EU's ODA should follow in the MDGs' foot-steps without spreading too thin its very limited resources.

18. Taking into account the new SDGs framework, what are the main challenges related to human development that the future partnership should focus on?

No human development is sustainable if there is no economic development to sustain it and no economic development can occur without a vibrant private sector.
In this essential aspect EU's ODA has been ineffective.
Concerning the support to the many facets of human development (education, health, gender etc.) concentrate on basic needs and avoid rhetoric.

Migration and mobility

19. Has the partnership been a useful vehicle for discussing migration issues and has it positively contributed? Has Article 13 CPA been fully applied?

The EU's and the Governments of its Member States face the historical blame to have ignored migrations' most obvious and basic aspect: their biblical dimension.

The EU has some 500 million citizens, while Africa, the only continent in full demographic explosion, has 1.200 million and, according to the latest UN's estimates by the end of the century it will have 4.400 million, representing some 40% of the World's total population and 48% of its young segment.

Adding several Middle East and Asian countries, right now one reach the figure of some 2.000 million largely poor humans many of them longing to emigrate to Europe in hope of a better life. In future said figure may double or even treble.

The most urgent bottom-line question, so far studiously eluded, is: based on political, social and economic considerations, how many immigrants and their kids the EU can afford to accept?

50 million, 100 million? And which ones?

20. Should a future partnership do more in this regard, and on which particular aspects should it focus (legal migration and mobility, addressing root causes of migration, return and readmission, tackling human trafficking and smuggling, international protection)?

In view of the figures mentioned in answer to question 19, a truly common policy on immigration - admission and return, and suppression of human trafficking - is an urgently needed and an unavoidable condition precedent. In obeisance to international agreements a clear distinction must be duly kept among refugees, who must be admitted in the Union, and economic migrants who should be subject to a common immigration policy. Until the Union 28 Member States will not devise and reach uniform rules, to discuss migration issues with the 78 ACPs (as well as with North African, Middle East and Asian relevant States!) will be premature and just add to current din.

A stronger political relationship

21. How effective has the political dialogue been and at which level is it the most effective: national, regional and through the joint EU-ACP institutions? Should the scope of political dialogue be widened or narrowed?

Europe is a potential giant, particularly in terms of “soft power”, but the EU has not been able to fully capitalize on such potential. On other hand regional ACP institutions are weak and the high fundamental principles “de facto” difficult to enforce through them. Any actual political, economic and cultural influence the EU will be able to muster could be better put at use directly at each ACP’s national level.

22. Would a stronger involvement of EU Member States, associating their bilateral policies and instruments to the political dialogue at national level, enhance the dialogue's effectiveness and efficiency?

Diversity has its merits in fostering different approaches while bureaucratic top-down coordination from Brussels would just foster the “tyranny of the status quo”.

23. Has the fact that the agreement is legally binding been instrumental to its implementation as compared to other regional partnerships based on political declarations?

Legally binding according to the Treaty yes, but “de facto”?

Coherence of geographical scope

24. Could a future framework be usefully opened up to other countries than the current members of the ACP Group of States? Which countries would that be?

The answer is definitely negative.

The ACPs are 78, the countries still labelled as developing are 154 out of 194 UN's member States. To the last count to care for them there are 40 UN's Agencies, 24 multilateral development banks, 280 bilateral agencies plus a plethora of NGOs and private foundations. Not enough? In such overcrowded and un-coordinated world EU's political influence and modest financial resources will become irrelevant if spread too thin. On the contrary, realistic choices must be made.

Let then Australia, China, Japan, US and other area countries care of the small Pacific island States. Similarly for the Caribbean area where the European collective, as opposed to post-colonial, geopolitical interests and influence are next to nil.

All the available political influence and economic resources the EU can muster must be concentrated on the proximity areas, the ones which actually and most directly matter to the future of Europe, i.e. the Mediterranean, sub-Saharan Africa and Middle East. In brief: let's eliminate from Cotonou's successor treaties the Pacific and Caribbean island-States and focus on the Mediterranean, Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa.

Pacific and Caribbean island-States should be the object of a specific regional agreement.

25. What kind of framework should govern EU and ACP relations? How could an ACP-EU successor framework relate to the more recent EU regional partnerships with Africa, Caribbean and Pacific States? Could a future ACP-EU framework include distinct partnerships with regional partners?

As suggested in previous answers:

a) eliminate from "post Cotonou" treaties the Pacific and Caribbean ACPs where Europe's geo-political influence and collective interests are less relevant, in order to concentrate post-Cotonou into the Mediterranean, Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa;

b) give priority to the bilateral relations with ACPs' Governments rather than to the their still inefficient regional organizations.

26. Is there scope for building in more structured relationships with Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa?

In the Pacific and Caribbean areas as well as in Asia and in Latin America EU's influence is weak, therefore the scope for more structured relationships is minimal. In spite of the obvious present difficulties all efforts should be focused on North Africa, the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa.

Cooperation tailored more towards groups of countries with similar development level

27. Is the current system of allocation of development resources, based on need and capacities as well as performance, sufficient for channelling funds towards those countries where the highest impact can be obtained? Should allocation of resources continue to prioritise countries most in need, including fragile states?

A definition of intelligence is the ability to mediate among conflicting needs. The dilemma among impact (let's better call it "value for money") and the needs of the less advanced countries is a typical example. There is no short-cut answer. DEVCO should just try to be clever and adaptable: to concentrate on performance rather than on humanitarian issues or vice-versa depending on the level of development, the local context and the local authorities' attitudes.

28. What kind of cooperation could help to cover the specific needs of more developed ACP countries with a view to attaining more equitable and sustainable growth?

Following the example of most bilateral agencies (including the Italian) ODA assistance to upper middle income countries should be discontinued.

In the middle income countries ODA should be mainly, if not exclusively, used as a catalyst for commercial financing and local and foreign investments. Assistance should also include guidance on governance, anti-corruption policies, trade facilitation schemes and financing on the commercial or export credit terms they can afford.

"Un-blended" ODA assistance should be limited to the less advanced countries and low income countries.

Strengthen the relationship with key actors

29. Has the current model of stakeholder engagement been conducive to attaining the objectives of the partnership in an efficient way? Which actors could play a more significant role in the implementation of the partnership? How could this be addressed?

In the developing countries, particularly in the less advanced and low income ones, the road to economic and, hence, human development mainly rests in developing a tissue of MSMEs. So far DEVCO has “de facto” neglected the enterprises and their associations as actors in development.

As mentioned in answer n. 12, direct assistance to MSMEs on a “micro”/individual level is a daunting task because a) the number of enterprises assisted will always represent a drop on the ocean of the needs and b) the costs are be very high if compared with the ensuing investments. This essential task can be better pursued at intermediaries’ or “meso” level. Such intermediaries exist and should be identified. Collective or “meso-finance” instruments exist – mutual guaranties, credit insurance, trade facilitation schemes, lines of credit – and are in use by other multilateral and bilateral developmental agencies. They must be copied and adopted.

30. What could be done to promote effective and efficient involvement of both international and domestic private sector, civil society, social partners and local authorities in the partnership?

Refer to answer to question nr. 29

31. Should the partnership be open to new actors as referred above?

The EU has “de facto” ignored the role of diaspora communities and their remittances.

A serious mistake to be redressed!

32. In this regard, should the possibility of opening up the partnership to 'associated members' or 'observers' be considered?

In a future “post-Cotonou” framework partnerships should be opened to enterprises and their organizations as well as to diasporas. Concerning the possible “associated members”, if this means “external financiers” the answer is positive on condition that they will no further complicate the already cumbersome decision processes (by 78 + 28 countries!).

If China is in mind as a possible associate member, let's be aware that its financial muscle and the sheer size of its investments would largely surpass and drown any form of financial assistance the EU and its Member States could muster. To associate China as a member would be paramount to an act of defeatism.

Eventually China could be considered as a possible observer, but let's keep in mind that, so far, its participation as observer in the OECD's working group on ODA and export credits has been non-existent because it has shown no wish whatsoever to adhere to common rules in order to maintain a free hand on its forms of external financing, some of them quite “peculiar” and in blatant contrast with OECD's Consensus rules. A Chinese lesson in “realpolitik”, but not an encouraging precedent.

33. How could a new framework promote triangular and South-South cooperation, including the increased involvement of ACP States as development actors in support of other ACP countries?

Promote free trade agreements, trade guarantee facilities and export credit agencies. Finance the elimination of infrastructural bottlenecks and non-tariff trade barriers.

Streamline the institutional set-up and functioning of the partnership

34. Has the joint institutional set-up (with the ACP-EU Council of Ministers, the ACP-EU Committee of Ambassadors, and the Joint Parliamentary Assembly) been effective in debating and promoting common views and interests and in providing political guidance and momentum to the EU-ACP partnership and the implementation of the CPA?

In terms of sheer effectiveness “trilogue” is quite a hindrance at the internal EU28 level. Even more if dialogues are enlarged at EU-ACP institutional level (28 + 78 = 106 sovereign States). But there is no way around.

35. What is the added value of the joint ACP-EU institutions as compared to more recent regional and regional economic community frameworks for dialogue and cooperation?

The potential of the joint EU-ACP institutions is their broad scope. The actual added value will depend on the Commission's ability to put at good use the EU's "soft power", trade agreements and its quite limited financial muscle.

Influence in the developing world tends to become bipolar: US and the Bretton Wood institutions on one side, China on the other. But both have their limits.

In such a context Europe (meaning its Member States individually and the Union collectively) has a potential space to project itself as "the" third benevolent, law-abiding global player, provided it will be able to put a more realistic, efficient and coherent act together (no silly "boniments", no self-deceptive big dreams nor "grand messes").

36. What institutional arrangements would most effectively help address common challenges and promote joint interests?

Exclude the Pacific and Caribbean island States from the post-Cotonou, preferring to negotiate with them a specific Agreement. Concentrate all the EU's limited political, economic and financial power on the Mediterranean, Middle East and Sub-Saharan areas.

37. Should a higher degree of self-financing of this functioning (ACP-EU Joint institutions and ACP secretariat) by the ACP States be required?

The cost of the ACP Secretariat is miniscule in comparison with the volumes of the EU's external financial assistance. However a higher degree of financing from the ACPs would be welcome, if only for reasons of public image and, may be, stricter costs' control.

Better adapted and more flexible development cooperation tools and methods

38. Is there added value in having a dedicated financing instrument in support of the ACP-EU partnership? If so, what are the reasons and how would it differ from other external financing instruments funded by the general budget of the Union? Is this instrument flexible enough, especially to address crisis situations? Can this instrument be deployed differently?

It should be preferable to concentrate financial instruments on Africa where most of migrants towards Europe are coming from, in order to foster a social and economic endogenous development.

In a fast-changing and contentious world a degree of flexibility and more attention paid to effectiveness would be definitely appreciated (across the board, not only vis-à-vis the ACPs).

39. What is the added value of the EDF's co-management system involving national authorities in the programming and management of aid programmes, as compared to other EU cooperation instruments in non-ACP countries?

Theoretically a significant value can be added if the ownership and transparency principles are respected. But in practice long and cumbersome decision processes and rigid implementation proceedings produce “subtracted value”, meaning the risk that unfulfilled promises-expectations could turn the image of the EU from being a generous donor into that of an unreliable partner unable to properly fulfil its commitments.

40. Does the current set-up of the programming process and implementation of activities lead to real ownership by the beneficiaries? What could be improved? How can the EU and Member States maximise the impact of joint programming?

Ownership levels seem adequate under current set-up, but the programming process is cumbersome and the successive rigid adherence to its outcome contrast with the flexibility needed to adapt to rapidly changing situations in an acceptable time framework. Programs and budgets are indispensable, but they need not to become Gospel. Their implementation stage could benefit from more leeway given to the Commission's Representatives and their local counterparts. For similar reasons, acting in parallel rather than jointly would improve the impact of activities in common with Member States.

41. Does the variety of existing tools adequately support the EU and ACP common principles and interests and are there gaps that should be addressed? How do you assess the effectiveness and efficiency of various implementation modalities?

A huge, dismal gap exists in the support to the ACPs' private sector:

- the funds devoted to the private sector are miniscule;
- the joint organizations and dedicated programs are small, fragmented, discontinuous and, mostly, inefficient. Several have been just closed down rather than face the difficult task of understanding the reasons of their failure and reforming them;
- the tools are inadequate.

Funding should be vastly increased, the present programs and organizations reformed, well known tools, proven by other developmental agencies, adopted.

As mentioned in previous answers, such tools are:

- trade facilitation schemes (enacted by the World Bank and the ERDB) and local export insurance agencies both dedicated to promote intra-ACP and extra-ACP trade (SACE, the Italian official export insurance agency ins promoting one in Kenya);
- mutual guarantee schemes (implemented by USAid, France, plus inside the EU by EIB and several Member States) and partial guarantee schemes (World Bank) to promote SMEs access to credit.

A second, unforgivable deficiency is the disregard for the potential of diasporas and the manifold possible benefits, both at micro and macro level, of migrants' remittances integration into formal financial systems of recipient countries .

Let's remember that participants to the Global Forum on Remittances organized by the World Bank and IFAD in Bangkok in May 2013 agreed that bringing part of the remittances into the formal financial systems could do more for economic development than ODA and foreign direct investments combined.

The agreement among Italy's BancoPosta and Senegal's PosteFinances provides a template for action. Also attention should be duly paid to the evolution of money transferers into providers of basic financial services.

42. Should a higher degree of self-financing from the ACP States be required for activities to ensure ownership? Would this apply to all countries? On which principles should this be based?

In principle definitely yes, based on common-sense principles.

It's evident that the level of self-financing or of co-financing that can be required from a middle-income country cannot apply to a less advanced land-locked one. The same is true for income-generating infrastructures as compared, for instance, to education programs.

43. How can the expertise of the EU and its Member States be better mobilised, particularly in the middle-income countries?

Each EU's Member State has its specific expertise and skills. DEVCO should be proactive, not just reactive, in identifying them and in delegating the implementation of the ensuing projects/ programs to the Member States' bilateral aid agencies (possibly not only to KWF and AFD).

In the middle-income countries EU's and its MSs' bilateral ODA should act as catalyst for other forms of local and external financing on non-ODA terms. In the upper middle income countries ODA is to be discontinued.

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