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ANNEX 3

to the Commission Implementing Decision on the Annual Action Plan for the European Instrument for International Nuclear Safety Cooperation for 2022

Action Document for Nuclear Safeguards 2022

ANNUAL PLAN

This document constitutes the annual work programme within the meaning of Article 110(2) of the Financial Regulation, within the meaning of Article 7 of the INSC Regulation.

1 SYNOPSIS

1.1 Action Summary Table

1. Title OPSYS business reference Basic Act	Action document for nuclear safeguards 2022 OPSYS ACT - 61251 Financed under the European Instrument for International Nuclear Safety Cooperation Regulation
2. Team Europe Initiative	No
3. Zone benefiting from the action	The action shall be carried out in Africa The action shall be carried out at the following location: Pretoria, South Africa and various locations in Africa, in particular at the AFCONE Regional Collaborating Centres (NECSA-DMRE South Africa and COMENA Algeria)
4. Programming document	European Instrument for International Nuclear Safety Cooperation Multiannual Indicative Programme (2021-2027) of 03.12.2021 (C(2021) 8687)
5. Link with relevant MIP(s) objectives / expected results	This action is contributing to the ‘Effective safeguards and effective systems of accountancy and control of nuclear materials which are key elements of nuclear non-proliferation.’
PRIORITY AREAS AND SECTOR INFORMATION	
6. Priority Area(s), sectors	Nuclear Safeguards
7. Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)	Main SDG: 16 (strong institutions) Other significant: SDG 11 (Disaster Risk Reduction).
8 a) DAC code(s)	23510
8 b) Main Delivery Channel	1000 – Public institutions

9. Targets	<input type="checkbox"/> Migration <input type="checkbox"/> Climate <input type="checkbox"/> Social inclusion and Human Development <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Gender <input type="checkbox"/> Biodiversity <input type="checkbox"/> Education <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Human Rights, Democracy and Governance			
10. Markers (from DAC form)	General policy objective @	Not targeted	Significant objective	Principal objective
	Participation development/good governance	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Aid to environment @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Gender equality and women's and girl's empowerment	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Trade development	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Reproductive, maternal, new-born and child health	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Disaster Risk Reduction @	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Inclusion of persons with Disabilities @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Nutrition @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	RIO Convention markers	Not targeted	Significant objective	Principal objective
	Biological diversity @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Combat desertification @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Climate change mitigation @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Climate change adaptation @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11. Internal markers and Tags:	Policy objectives	Not targeted	Significant objective	Principal objective
	Digitalisation @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	digital connectivity digital governance digital entrepreneurship digital skills/literacy digital services	YES <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	NO <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	/
	Connectivity @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	digital connectivity energy transport	YES <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	NO <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	/

	health education and research	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Migration @ (methodology for tagging under development)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Reduction of Inequalities @ (methodology for marker and tagging under development)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Covid-19	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BUDGET INFORMATION				
12. Amounts concerned	Budget line(s) (article, item): 14 06 0100 Total estimated cost : EUR 4 900 000 Total amount of EU budget contribution EUR 4 400 000 This action is co-financed in joint co-financing by: - Finland for an amount of EUR 500 000 ¹			
MANAGEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION				
13. Type of financing	Indirect management with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland			

1.2 Summary of the Action

In accordance with the Multi Annual Indicative Programme 2021-2027², the overall objective of the action is to provide support to development of effective safeguards and effective systems of accountancy and control of nuclear materials as key elements of nuclear non-proliferation.

This action will be implemented in a COVID-19 context and adapted as necessary for a successful completion.

2 RATIONALE

2.1 Context

Regulation EURATOM 2021/948 of 27 May 2021 defines the strategic framework for the implementation of the European Instrument for International Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC) 2021 – 2027³. Deriving from the legal basis the Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2021-2027⁴ has been adopted on 03 December 2021. In its article 2, the Regulation describes ‘establishing efficient and effective safeguards for nuclear material in third countries’ as one of the objectives of the Instrument.

2.2 Problem Analysis

¹ An indicative amount of EUR 100,000 per year, to be granted in phases.

² C(2021)8687

³ COUNCIL REGULATION (Euratom) 2021/948 of 27 May 2021 establishing a European Instrument for International Nuclear Safety Cooperation complementing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe on the basis of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, and repealing Regulation (Euratom) No 237/2014

⁴ (C/2021/8687)

Short problem analysis: The African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (African NWFZ) Treaty (the Pelindaba Treaty) was opened for signature in Cairo, Egypt, on 11 April 1996, and entered into force on 15 July 2009. Pursuant to this treaty, each party undertakes not to conduct research on, develop, manufacture, stockpile or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over any nuclear explosive device by any means anywhere; not to seek or receive any assistance in the research on, or development, manufacture, stockpiling or acquisition, or possession of, any nuclear explosive device; and not to take any action to assist or encourage the research on, or development, manufacture, stockpiling or acquisition or possession of, any nuclear explosive device.

Under the Pelindaba Treaty, each State Party undertakes to conduct all activities for the peaceful use of nuclear energy under strict non-proliferation measures to provide assurance of exclusively peaceful uses, to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA and not to export source or special fissionable material, or especially designed or prepared equipment or material, to Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWSs) unless subject to a comprehensive safeguards agreement.

Since both the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Pelindaba Treaty require State Parties to conclude Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSAs) with the IAEA. Various African Union (AU) Member States (MS) and Pelindaba Treaty State Parties with CSAs in force (some also with small quantities protocols (SQPs) or additional protocols (APs) require assistance in establishing and improving their nuclear material accounting and control system so that they can effectively fulfil their obligations in accordance with such CSAs.

The African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE) according to Article 12 of the Pelindaba Treaty is mandated to review the application of safeguards by IAEA to peaceful nuclear activities.

The proposed budget will be used for: technical consultations, peer review of legislation, regulations, and procedures, joint development of outreach materials, training and instructing, provision of materials, tools, and equipment, exchange of scientific and technical information for collaborative studies, technology modification, testing and common presentations and publications in suitable fora like the IAEA Safeguards Symposium, European Safeguards Research and Development Organisation (ESARDA) and Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM).

Identification of main stakeholders and corresponding institutional and/or organisational issues (mandates, potential roles, and capacities) to be covered by the action:

AFCONE will receive support, which is based on long expertise in implementing IAEA safeguards, from the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) to build capacity of member states for their State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear materials to implement IAEA safeguards agreements, develop inspection activities, improve reporting under and promote implementation of their Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, Small Quantities Protocol and/or Additional Protocol, as applicable; work with partners to address facility-specific safeguards challenges; develop and test innovative safeguards technologies, tools, and approaches.

The preparatory work together with AFCONE will be very important to familiarise to the topic.

The starting point is the survey of the situation with treaties (NPT, Pelindaba) and agreements (CSA, SQP, AP). The information on status to use of nuclear energy (nuclear power, research, mining, export/import, small users) and the 10-years plans are the basis for safeguards system improvement.

Also, mapping the safeguards implementation situation in AFCONE and states is needed, like:

- Roles and responsibilities; IAEA-AFCONE-state
- Legislation
- Licensing
- Export/import control
- State System of accounting for and control of nuclear materials (SSAC)

The IAEA is an essential partner in safeguards. The IAEA current activities in Africa, like:

- Inspections
- Verification activities; measurement, laboratory capability
- IAEA inspector access; approval, visas, access to facilities
- IAEA missions (known by the acronyms ISSAS, IPPAS, IRRS)

will be discussed and clarified.

The main goal of the work is to strengthen the International Nuclear Safeguards Program in Africa and support African Union member states to:

- Build capacity within their State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear materials to implement IAEA safeguards agreements.
- Improve reporting under and promote implementation of their Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, Small Quantities Protocol and/or Additional Protocol, as applicable.
- Work with partners to address facility-specific safeguards challenges.
- Develop and test innovative safeguards technologies, tools, and approaches.

A State's System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear material (SSAC) needs continuous development and improvement.

3 DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTION

3.1 Objectives and Expected Outputs

The Overall Objective (Impact) of this action is to improve nuclear safeguards.

The Specific Objective(Outcome) of this action is to:

1. Efficient and effective nuclear safeguards in African Union Member States as key element of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear safety.

The Outputs to be delivered by this action contributing to the corresponding Specific Objectives (Outcomes) are

- 1.1 contributing to Outcome 1 (or Specific Objective 1): Strengthened capacity and improved knowledge in Pelindaba Treaty state parties and AU member states with regards to nuclear safeguards.
- 1.2 contributing to Outcome 1 (or Specific Objective 1): Improved nuclear material control systems in Pelindaba Treaty State Parties and AU memberstates.
- 1.3 contributing to Outcome 1 (or Specific Objective 1): Improved ability of the AFCONE, as a regional organisation and knowledge hub, to support the state parties to the Pelindaba Treaty & AU member states in nuclear safeguards.

3.2 Indicative Activities

The way of cooperation is sharing experiences and good practices, training and mentoring. Finland, together with the European Commission and the IAEA could organise common side events, prepare common publications and presentations and strengthen the cooperation by planning continuation to the work.

At a practical level, the work carried out during the project will take form of technical consultations, peer review of legislation, regulations, and procedures, joint development of outreach materials, training and instructing, provision of materials, tools, and equipment, exchange of scientific and technical information for collaborative studies, technology modification, testing and common presentations and publications in suitable fora like the IAEA Safeguards Symposium, European Safeguards Research and Development Organisation (ESARDA) and the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM).

Activities relating to Output 1.1

Organisation of seminars, training and instructing, provision of materials, joint development of outreach materials.

Activities relating to Output 1.2:

Training and instructing, technical consultations, peer review of legislation, regulations and procedures, provision of materials, tools, and equipment, exchange of scientific and technical information for collaborative studies, technology modification

Activities relating to Output 1.3:

Joint development of outreach materials, provision of materials, tools, and equipment, exchange of scientific and technical information for collaborative studies, technology modification, testing and common presentations and publications

3.3 Mainstreaming

Gender equality and empowerment of women and girls

As per the OECD Gender DAC codes identified in section 1.1, this action is labelled as G1. This implies that nuclear safeguards development in partner countries includes capacity building that is achieved in particular by means of specific training. In all these activities, the European Commission promotes the participation of women as part of gender equality.

Other considerations if relevant

By strengthening the role of AFCONE in nuclear safeguards and addressing the role of the IAEA, both the regional organisation in Africa is strengthened and the multilateral IAEA.

3.4 Risks and Lessons Learnt

Category	Risks	Likelihood (High/ Medium/ Low)	Impact (High/ Medium/ Low)	Mitigating measures
Legality and regularity aspects	Delay on elaboration of legal documents in African Union member states	Low	Low	Project effective management. Involvement of national and international experts
External environment	Lack of capacity with AFCONE and/or African Union member states	Medium	Medium	Project effective management and good understanding of the task content and set goals
Planning, processes and systems	Delays in implementing commitments undertaken by AFCONE and/or African Union member states	Low	Low	Project effective management. Involvement of different experts, conducting of project implementation assessment

Lessons Learnt:

The expertise in Finland and STUK is based on a strong political commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its practical implementation. Finland is the first state who had the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSAs) in force, since 9 February 1972. Finland has a long experience to use peaceful nuclear energy and nuclear power, and Finland is also increasing the nuclear power in near future. The biggest nuclear reactor in Europe, Olkiluoto 3, just got an operational license, a new nuclear power plant is under licensing and the first in the world final disposal facility for the spent nuclear fuel is under construction and will be operative in mid-2020's.

STUK has a long expertise on supporting the IAEA in safeguards implementation, has been working together with different countries and state regulatory authorities all over the world and done bilateral cooperation especially with the nuclear newcomer states. STUK's way to work is practical 'as simple as possible' and it is based on sharing experiences and guiding to find the better solutions to fix the duties as needed.

Permanent and timely communication is key for the successful implementation of the activities in the partner

countries.

3.5 The Intervention Logic

The underlying intervention logic for this action is that if nuclear material control systems and respective regulatory capacity and knowhow in Pelindaba Treaty State Parties, AU member states and at AFCONE itself, as the regional knowledge-hub, are improved, and all stakeholders of the project, regulatory authorities in particular, are committed to the project goals with sufficient participation and resources, then regulatory authorities in African Union Member States have, at the end of the project, received support in fulfilling their obligations in comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs), additional protocols (APs) and small quantities protocols (SQPs).

The support will help AU member states in establishing efficient and effective nuclear safeguards as a key element of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear safety.

Overall, the project contributes to enhanced nuclear safeguards in the beneficiary countries. Thereby the risk of use of nuclear materials for purposes not intended for will be reduced.

3.6 Logical Framework Matrix

This indicative logframe constitutes the basis for the monitoring, reporting and evaluation of the intervention. On the basis of this logframe matrix, a more detailed logframe (or several) may be developed at contracting stage. In case baselines and targets are not available for the action, they should be informed for each indicator at signature of the contract(s) linked to this AD, or in the first progress report at the latest. New columns may be added to set intermediary targets (milestones) for the Output and Outcome indicators whenever it is relevant.

- At inception, the first progress report should include the complete logframe (e.g. including baselines/targets).
- Progress reports should provide an updated logframe with current values for each indicator.
- The final report should enclose the logframe with baseline and final values for each indicator.

The indicative logical framework matrix may evolve during the lifetime of the action depending on the different implementation modalities of this action. The activities, the expected Outputs and related indicators, targets and baselines included in the logframe matrix may be updated during the implementation of the action, no amendment being required to the Financing Decision.

PROJECT MODALITY (3 levels of results / indicators / Source of Data / Assumptions - no activities)

Results	Results chain (@): Main expected results (maximum 10)	Indicators (@): (at least one indicator per expected result)	Baselines (values and years)	Targets (values and years)	Sources of data	Assumptions
Impact	Improve nuclear safeguards	1 Number of nuclear safeguards authorities from African Union benefitting from EC support	1. To be determined (2022)	1. To be determined (2026)	1. EC reports	<i>Not applicable</i>

<p>Outcome 1</p>	<p>1. Efficient and effective nuclear safeguards in African Union member states as key element of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear safety.</p>	<p>1.1 Number of Pelindaba Treaty state parties & African countries taking steps towards implementing their obligations in comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs), additional protocols (APs) and small quantities protocols (SQPs).</p>	<p>1.1 0 (2022)</p>	<p>1.1 All AFCONE member states (2026)</p>	<p>1.1 AFCONE official documentation</p>	<p>1. AU member states are committed to developing IAEA Safeguards.</p> <p>Factors outside project management's control that may influence on the outcome-impact linkage: 1) AU commitment to support AFCONE in expanding its safeguards activities, 2) lack of commitment among individual member states, 3) others?</p>
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<p>Output 1 relating to Outcome 1</p>	<p>1.1 Strengthened capacity and improved knowledge in Pelindaba Treaty State Parties and AU member states with regards to nuclear safeguards.</p>	<p>1.1.1 Number of trainings organized with the EU support/ 1.1.2 number of participants trained on safeguards for nuclear material with EU support (by sex) 1.1.3 Percentage female trainees</p>	<p>1.1.1 0 (2022) 1.1.2 0 (2022) 1.1.3 N/A (2022)</p>	<p>1.1.1 tbd during inception phase (2026) 1.1.2 tbd during inception phase (2026) 1.1.3 tbd during inception phase (2026)</p>	<p>1.1.1 Project Documentation 1.1.2 Copy of training certificates 1.1.3 Project Documentation</p>	
<p>Output 2 relating to Outcome 1</p>	<p>1.2 Improved nuclear material control systems in Pelindaba Treaty State Parties and AU member states.</p>	<p>1.2.1 Number of AU member states taking steps towards implementing CSA, AP or SQP. 1.2.2 Number of innovative safeguards technologies, tools, and approaches introduced with EU support</p>	<p>1.2.1 0 (2022) 1.2.2 0 (2022)</p>	<p>1.2.1 All AU member states (2026) 1.2.2 to be determined (2026)</p>	<p>1.2.1 Official AU member states documentation 1.2.2 Project documentation</p>	<p>AU member states remain committed to implementing IAEA Safeguards.</p>
<p>Output 3 relating to Outcome 3</p>	<p>1.3 Improved ability of the AFCONE, as a regional organisation and knowledge hub, to support the State Parties to the Pelindaba Treaty & AU member states in nuclear safeguards.</p>	<p>1.3.1 Number of safeguards experts trained at AFCONE and its regional centers</p>	<p>1.3.1 0 (2022)</p>	<p>1.3.2 tbd during inception phase (2026)</p>	<p>1.3.2 Project Documentation</p>	

4 IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS

4.1 Financing Agreement

In order to implement this action, it is not envisaged to conclude a financing agreement with partner countries.

4.2 Indicative Implementation Period

The indicative operational implementation period of this action, during which the activities described in section 3 will be carried out and the corresponding contracts and agreements implemented, is 76 months from the date of adoption by the Commission of this Financing Decision.

Extensions of the implementation period may be agreed by the Commission's responsible authorising officer by amending this Financing Decision and the relevant contracts and agreements.

4.3 Implementation modalities

4.3.1 Indirect Management with a pillar assessed entity

This action may be implemented in indirect management with the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). This implementation entails all activities detailed under chapter 3.2. The envisaged entity has been selected using the following criteria: The MFA, that has the necessary competences and privileges (as e.g. tax exemptions) for the project implementation, is co-funding the activities. MFA is the pillar assessed organisation within the Finnish Government and it will effectively use resources of the the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) for the practical implementation of the project. STUK has a long expertise on supporting the IAEA in safeguards implementation, has been working together with different countries and State Regulatory Authorities all over the world and done bilateral cooperation especially with the nuclear newcomer states.

4.3.2 Changes from indirect to direct management mode due to exceptional circumstances

In case of exceptional circumstances outside of the Commission's control preventing the implementation through indirect management, the implementation modality in indirect management may be replaced by direct management.

4.4 Scope of geographical eligibility for procurement and grants

The geographical eligibility in terms of place of establishment for participating in procurement and grant award procedures and in terms of origin of supplies purchased as established in the basic act and set out in the relevant contractual documents shall apply, subject to the following provisions.

The Commission's authorising officer responsible may extend the geographical eligibility on the basis of urgency or of unavailability of services in the markets of the countries or territories concerned, or in other duly substantiated cases where application of the eligibility rules would make the realisation of this action impossible or exceedingly difficult (Article 11(8) INSC Council Regulation (Euratom) 2021/948 of 27 May 2021).

For this multi-country action, natural persons who are nationals of, and legal persons who are effectively established in the following countries and territories covered by this action, are also eligible: AFCONE member states.

4.5 Indicative Budget

Indicative Budget components	EU contribution (amount in EUR)	Third-party contribution, in EUR
Indirect management with MFA cf. section 4.4.4	4 400 000	500 000
Evaluation – cf. section 5.2 Audit – cf. section 5.3	may be covered by another Decision	N.A.

Totals	4 400 000	500 000
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4.6 Organisational Set-up and Responsibilities

All interventions will include a steering committee. The steering committee will be set up with representatives of the key organisations, including the beneficiary and the implementing partner. The steering committee provides support, guidance and oversight of the interventions and shall meet whenever deemed necessary by the end user, the European Commission, or the implementing partner.

As part of its prerogative of budget implementation and to safeguard the financial interests of the Union, the Commission may participate in the above governance structures set up for governing the implementation of the action.

5 PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT

5.1 Monitoring and Reporting

The day-to-day technical and financial monitoring of the implementation of this action will be a continuous process, and part of the implementing partner's responsibilities. To this aim, the implementing partner shall establish a permanent internal, technical and financial monitoring system for the action and elaborate regular progress reports (not less than annual) and final reports. Every report shall provide an accurate account of implementation of the action, difficulties encountered, changes introduced, as well as the degree of achievement of its results (Outputs and direct Outcomes) as measured by corresponding indicators, using as reference the logframe matrix (for project modality) and the partner's strategy, policy or reform action plan list (for budget support).

The Commission may undertake additional project monitoring visits both through its own staff and through independent consultants recruited directly by the Commission for independent monitoring reviews (or recruited by the responsible agent contracted by the Commission for implementing such reviews).

Roles and responsibilities for data collection, analysis and monitoring:

The contribution agreement will include the requirement to report on the indicators, corresponding data source and baseline as indicated in the logframe matrix above. Arrangements for monitoring and reporting will be specified in the terms of reference annexed to the indirect management including the mandatory schedule and the stakeholder responsible.

5.2 Evaluation

Having regard to the nature of the action, a final evaluation(s) will not be carried out for this action or its components.

In case an evaluation is not planned, the Commission may, during implementation, decide to undertake such an evaluation for duly justified reasons either on its own decision or on the initiative of the partner.]

The evaluation reports may be shared with the partners and other key stakeholders following the best practice of evaluation dissemination. The implementing partner and the Commission shall analyse the conclusions and recommendations of the evaluations and, where appropriate, apply the necessary adjustments.

The financing of the evaluation may be covered by another measure constituting a Financing Decision.

5.3 Audit and Verifications

Without prejudice to the obligations applicable to contracts concluded for the implementation of this action, the Commission may, on the basis of a risk assessment, contract independent audit or verification assignments for one or several contracts or agreements.

6 STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

The 2021-2027 programming cycle will adopt a new approach to pooling, programming and deploying strategic communication and public diplomacy resources.

It will remain a contractual obligation for all entities implementing EU-funded external actions to inform the relevant audiences of the Union's support for their work by displaying the EU emblem and a short funding statement as appropriate on all communication materials related to the actions concerned. This obligation will continue to apply equally, regardless of whether the actions concerned are implemented by the Commission, partner countries, service providers, grant beneficiaries or entrusted or delegated entities such as UN agencies, international financial institutions and agencies of EU member states.

However, action documents for specific sector programmes are in principle no longer required to include a provision for communication and visibility actions promoting the programmes concerned. These resources will instead be consolidated in Cooperation Facilities established by support measure action documents, allowing Delegations to plan and execute multiannual strategic communication and public diplomacy actions with sufficient critical mass to be effective on a national scale.

Appendix REPORTING IN OPSYS

An Intervention (also generally called project/programme) is the operational entity associated to a coherent set of activities and results structured in a logical framework aiming at delivering development change or progress. Interventions are the most effective (hence optimal) entities for the operational follow-up by the Commission of its external development operations. As such, Interventions constitute the base unit for managing operational implementations, assessing performance, monitoring, evaluation, internal and external communication, reporting and aggregation.

Primary Interventions are those contracts or groups of contracts bearing reportable results and respecting the following business rule: 'a given contract can only contribute to one primary intervention and not more than one'. An individual contract that does not produce direct reportable results and cannot be logically grouped with other result reportable contracts is considered a 'support entities'. The addition of all primary interventions and support entities is equivalent to the full development portfolio of the Institution.

The present Action identifies

Action level		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Single action	Present action: all contracts in the present action(OPSYS ACT #61251):
Group of actions level		
<input type="checkbox"/>	Group of actions	Actions reference
Contract level		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Single Contract 1	Component A
<input type="checkbox"/>		
<input type="checkbox"/>	Group of contracts 1	