



# Evaluation of the European Union's cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (2007-2014)

## Volume II - Annexes

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*"By forming Community Organisations to work as a team we are achieving higher  
levels of productivity and success. " Hayatullah Khan – President, Pattankot One*

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# Annex A1 Overall Country Context

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## Acronyms

AJK	Azad Jammu and Kashmir
DFID	Department for International Development
EC	European Commission
EEAS	European External Action Service
EU	European Union
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GIZ	German Agency for International Cooperation
GNI	Gross National Income
GPE	Global Partnership on Education
GSP	General System of Preferences
IMF	International Monetary Fund
KP / KPK	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
LRRD	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MTDF	Mid-Term Development Framework
NEP	National Education Policy
NSS	National Skills Strategy
NWFP	North-West Frontier Province (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa)
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WB	World Bank

A sound understanding of the Pakistani context is essential for laying solid grounds for this evaluation. It has been taken into account when designing the evaluation questions. The present chapter provides key elements of the context in a succinct way. It highlights in particular (i) the national context; (ii) national development policies; (iii) and the cooperation context. Further analysis is conducted at the level of each evaluation question.

## 1. National context

The evaluation period is characterised by a complex and evolving national context<sup>1</sup>. The following dimensions, of particular interest to the evaluation, are briefly described hereafter:

- the geographical and demographic dimension;
- the economic and the social context;
- the governance context;
- the environmental and rural development context.

### 1.1 Geography and demography

Pakistan is the world's sixth most populous country, with an estimated population exceeding 180 million in 2013 (34% of the population falls in the 0-14 age group, 62% in the 15-64 group and 4% in the 65 and above group, whilst average population growth is estimated at 1.7% per year over the period 2007-2013)<sup>2</sup>. The population's high growth rate creates both a need to provide adequate services and employment as well as a potential demographic dividend as the working age population grows. Pakistan is furthermore South Asia's most rapidly urbanizing country.

Pakistan is bordered by the Arabian Sea, and located between India on the east, Iran and Afghanistan on the west, and China in the north. Pakistan shares a 2,640 km border with Afghanistan, over which 1.5 million registered Afghan refugees have arrived, the largest protracted refugee situation in the world<sup>3</sup>. Persistent conflict in the border areas and the security threat posed by terrorists throughout the country remain a fact of life and impact on development progress and the business environment. Pakistan is affected by certain elements of fragility<sup>4</sup>, and access to the FATA and parts of Baluchistan and KP, as well as to some other zones remain limited.

### 1.2 Socio-economy

Pakistan is a lower-middle income country with a GNI per capita of US\$ 1,360 in 2013. Pakistan's economy is dominated by the services sector which has contributed to around

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<sup>1</sup> Figure 1 at the end of this section provides an "helicopter view" of key events in Pakistan and EU international commitments over the period of the evaluation.

<sup>2</sup> World Bank DataBank <http://databank.banquemoniale.org>. No census has been organised since 1998 – the launch of a new census is expected in 2016.

<sup>3</sup> UNHCR: 2015 UNHCR Country Operations Profile <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e487016.html>

<sup>4</sup> Pakistan ranks for instance 10 out of 178 countries on the Fragile States Index, an index created a decade ago by The Fund for Peace and published by Foreign Policy <http://foreignpolicy.com/fragile-states-2014/>. There are many other definitions and lists. In-depth analysis on this subject will be conducted during next stages of this evaluation.



54% of GDP in 2013.<sup>5</sup> Agriculture accounted for 25% of GDP, while representing 40% of labor force occupation (33% for the services sector). Industry accounted for 21% of the GDP. Agriculture products include cotton, wheat, rice, beef and milk. Industries include textiles, food processing, and pharmaceuticals. Textiles accounted for most of Pakistan's export earnings.

Pakistan's failure to diversify its exports has left the country vulnerable to shifts in world demand. The rise in global oil and food prices since 2007, the impact of recurring natural disasters such as the 2010 and 2011 floods, and the effect of the 2008 financial crisis on inward investment, have all had a negative impact on the Pakistani economy. Located at a strategic crossroads between South Asia, Central Asia, China and the Middle East, Pakistan has access to a potentially vast, but as yet untapped, regional marketplace.<sup>6</sup> Our evaluation will therefore examine if this (changing) context has been duly taken into consideration by the EU when designing and implementing its trade-related cooperation activities in Pakistan.

Pakistan is moreover a nuclear power, the only nation in the Muslim world, and the second in South Asia. It has also the seventh largest standing armed forces in the world.<sup>7</sup>

Poverty levels have reduced significantly compared to the early 2000s, with the poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (% of population) shrinking from 34.5% in 2001 to 17.2% in 2007/8.<sup>8</sup> Whilst 2008 saw a significant deterioration of Pakistan's macroeconomic situation, with GDP growth declining from 5.5% in 2007 to 0.4% in 2009, the poverty headcount ratio continued to drop, reaching 12.4% in 2011.

Pakistan has recorded progress in human development but many indicators will need more time to achieve MDGs' targets. Regarding education, the net enrollment rates have been increasing (from 68% to 72% for enrollment in primary school over the evaluation period). Nevertheless, Pakistan has almost 5.5 million children that are out of school, the second highest number in the world only after Nigeria. It also has the highest number of illiterate adults in the world, after India and China. The country is also among 21 countries facing an extensive learning crisis, according to UNESCO, based on a number of indices, including dropout rates, academic performance and literacy. Gender disparities also persist (67% for the net female primary school enrollment versus 77% for male). Despite the worrying state of education, especially amongst the poor, the resource allocation as a percentage of the GDP remained low, at 2.4% of GDP on average over the evaluation period (Pakistan is ranked as one of the lowest spenders on education).<sup>9</sup> This aspect will be further examined in detail in next stages of the evaluation (notably in relation to EU budgetary support to this sector).

Social and economic exclusions, resulting notably from a lack of a proper access to school and quality teaching for too many children, have contributed to the radicalisation and

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<sup>5</sup> See tables 1 and 2 for an overview of key social and economic indicators and their evolution.

<sup>6</sup> World Bank, Pakistan Overview, downloaded from <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/pakistan/overview> on 16th April 2015.

<sup>7</sup> International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2013.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> World Bank Databank, downloaded from <http://data.worldbank.org/country/pakistan> on 16th April 2015.

insurgency that is increasingly affecting the security and the stability in Pakistan<sup>10</sup>. The role of education, especially in marginalized areas, is hence essential.

### 1.3 Governance

The Islamic Republic of Pakistan is a federal parliamentary republic consisting of four provinces (Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa -KP<sup>11</sup>, Punjab and Sindh) and four federal territories (Islamabad Capital Territory, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas -FATA, Gilgit-Baltistan, and Azad Kashmir -AJK). It has assigned greater power, autonomy and funds to provincial governments since 1999. The 18<sup>th</sup> Constitutional Amendment passed in April 2010 has cemented Pakistan's progress towards federalization and devolution of power to the provincial level. Parliament approved wide-ranging constitutional reforms. Measures included transferring key powers from the President to the Prime Minister. Moreover, 17 federal ministries have been devolved, including those covering key areas for this evaluation (e.g. education and environment). This increase in autonomy has been paired with additional revenue share granted to provincial administrations through the National Finance Commission Award. Nevertheless, capacity constraints at the provincial level present a challenge to development progress and create a need for institutional development at the sub-national level.

Human rights concerns remain, in particular in relation to the blasphemy laws and Hudood decrees on adultery and rape which have been established since long. Furthermore, following the attack at Peshawar military school in December 2014, the country considers to be "at war", and exceptional measures, including the lifting of the moratorium on the death penalty, have been put in place. Women, children, ethnic minorities and the poor are particularly vulnerable to human rights violations.<sup>12</sup> Specific attention will be paid to these vulnerable groups in the evaluation.

Given the role played by provincial governments in the improvement of basic service delivery, reinforcing national governance systems is a key to improve living conditions in Pakistan. The removal of gender imbalances in access to services including justice, education and the labor market, should also be considered carefully.

### 1.4 Environment and rural development

Whereas arable land represents only 27% of the Pakistan's 796,000 km<sup>2</sup> of area, agriculture is nevertheless still important to most of the two-third of the Pakistani population living in rural areas. The sector faces environment degradation, and the rising population increases the issue of the utilisation of natural resources. Water scarcity (which results from glacial receding, erratic rains and prolonged droughts) affects agriculture, livestock and poultry farming. The problem is aggravated by water pollution from various sources and increasing salinity. Inadequate pricing policy and poor management and maintenance of the Indus irrigation network are also key issues. Moreover, Pakistan's biodiversity is under threat, with implications in terms of flooding, desertification, loss of livelihoods as well as local insecurity. Actually, Afghan refugees often compete with the local population in developing

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<sup>10</sup> EU, *EU-Pakistan Multi-Annual Indicative Programme 2014-2020*, p.9.

<sup>11</sup> formerly known as the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP)

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., p.7

sustainable livelihoods. Forest resources are seen as a means of generating income and source of fuelwood, and their livestock contribute to degradation of the lands.

In addition, the country has suffered from multiple natural disasters during the evaluation period, including the severe flooding of 2010 and 2011 and the  $M_w7.7$  earthquake that took place in Baluchistan in 2013. Pakistan is highly vulnerable to the effects of climate change and environmental degradation, implying an increasing risk of floods and droughts. The impact of disasters on the Pakistani economy and the livelihoods and food security of its people is significant, and creates a pressing need for immediate humanitarian assistance as well as a strong Link between Relief Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD).

With approximately 95% of the water allocated to agriculture/rural areas<sup>13</sup>, the need to adopt efficient and effective methods for water (and more broadly natural resources) management is of importance to sustain the country's economic and human development, especially in rural areas. In combination with natural resources management, rural development also implies the reinforcement of local governance (especially given the decentralisation) and the improvement of access to basic services such as education and health facilities, as they constitute structural causes of poverty and limited economic growth.

## 2 National development policies

Two major documents define the federal government's strategies over the evaluation period. The first one is the **Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP)**, finalised in 2004. It provides a comprehensive policy framework for continued growth and development in Pakistan. The strategy is built around four pillars: (i) achieving broad-based economic growth focusing on the **rural economy**, (ii) improving **governance** and consolidating devolution, (iii) investing in **human capital** and delivery of **basic social services**, and (iv) targeting the **poor and vulnerable**. It also focuses upon attainment of **Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)** for sustainable development and poverty reduction, and aims at forging an alliance between civil society and the private sector. To implement the PRSP strategies and MDG action plans, the government presented a Medium-Term Development Framework (MTDF) for 2005-10, which focuses on three aspects of growth, namely: development of infrastructure, human resources development and technology within the broad parameters of the macroeconomic framework.

The second document is the **PRSP-II**, in its final draft version of early 2009. This is an updated version of the first PRSP. It takes into account political, economic and social events, both domestic and international, that impacted Pakistan. The Strategy is built upon nine pillars, including the areas covered by EU cooperation (e.g. Increasing Productivity and Value Addition in **Agriculture, Human Development** for the 21st Century, **Governance for a Just and Fair System**, and **Protecting the Poor and the Vulnerable**). Women empowerment and reduction of gender disparities, and environmental sustainability are cross-cutting themes of the PRSP-II.

The country's latest global strategy, relating to the forthcoming period, was issued by the federal government in 2014. This ten-year strategy, entitled "Pakistan Vision 2025", is based on five 'enablers' and seven 'pillars'. Each of these pillars aims at finding resonance

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<sup>13</sup> Government of Pakistan (2014), *Pakistan 2025 – One nation, one Vision*, p. 64

with one or more of the latest proposals for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and Pillars 1-4 with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). They relate, from 1 to 7, to people, growth, governance, security, entrepreneurship, knowledge economy, and connectivity.

In terms of **rural development**, while the entire rural economy is directly or indirectly dependent upon agriculture, the agricultural policy was not announced during the last eight years before the PRSP II. During the PRSP-II period, the vision of the agriculture strategy was to raise productivity and profitability of the farming community, to enhance the living standards of rural masses, to protect the natural resource base by protecting land and water and countering situations of short water supply or drought, and to ensure food security, especially for the rural and urban poor.<sup>14</sup>

The **National Environmental Policy** of 2005 constitutes the government's overarching strategy for achieving the goals of sustainable development. The strategy for responding to natural disasters has been laid out in the **National Disaster Management Framework**. It has been developed through wide consultation with stakeholders at the local, provincial, and national levels. A Natural Disaster Management Ordinance promulgated in 2006 provides institutional and policy structures (at the federal, provincial, and district levels) for implementing the policies formulated under the National Disaster Management Framework<sup>15</sup>. Additional environment related policies (such as the National drinking water policy), also exist. Moreover, the Government has approved in 2012 a National Climate Change Policy. It has also set up a National Ministry of Climate Change, which they claim to be the World's first full-fledged ministry on this theme.

Pakistan has also developed sector strategies and policies (or revised existing ones) over the evaluation period. To provide a guideline for development of the education sector, the **National Education Policy** (NEP) was finalized in 2009 by the Federal Ministry of Education, with comprehensive input from provincial governments and other stakeholders. It replaces the previous National Education Policy 1998-2010. In October 2010, the 18<sup>th</sup> Amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan was undertaken, which included Article 25-A, which states the Right to Education: "The state shall provide free and compulsory education to all children of the age of five to 16 years in such manner as may be determined by law". A major implication of the 18<sup>th</sup> Amendment for education was that the responsibility for curriculum development, syllabus, policy and planning, centres of excellence and standards of education was transferred to the purview of the provinces. Since 2010, the provinces are at different stages in dealing with Article 25-A and its concomitant responsibilities. All provinces have developed provincial education strategies, which have been supported through the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) in Sindh and Balochistan, by GIZ (initially) and DfID in KP and by DfID in Punjab, and by the EU's support to the education sector plans in Sindh and KP. In terms of **TVET**, Pakistan's overall strategic document is the National Skills Strategy (NSS) 2009-2013. It has been translated into a federal and eight provincial action plans. A national TVET policy has been recently developed in March 2015 but has not been validated by the Cabinet of the Prime Minister as of the drafting of this report.

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<sup>14</sup> Government of Pakistan (2009), Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper-II

<sup>15</sup> Government of Pakistan (2009), Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper-II, p

### 3 EU Cooperation context

The first EU-Pakistan comprehensive agreement was signed in 1976. The legal and political basis for current relationships between the EU and Pakistan is the **EU-Pakistan Cooperation Agreement** concluded in 2004, and establishing an **EC-Pakistan Joint Commission**<sup>16</sup>. The first meeting of this Joint Commission was held in Islamabad, at the beginning of the evaluation period (May 2007). Latest meetings conducted were on 24<sup>th</sup> June 2014 in Islamabad and 8<sup>th</sup> September 2015 in Brussels.

The Cooperation agreement concluded in 2004 has been reinforced by the **EU-Pakistan 5-Year Engagement Plan**, adopted in March 2012. This Engagement Plan provides an overall political framework for the EU to enhance its involvement with Pakistan through a comprehensive approach that links political and trade measures with security issues and crisis and development cooperation instruments<sup>17</sup>.

Under this Plan, a Strategic Dialogue provide political guidance to the bilateral relationship. The first **EU-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue** took place in Islamabad in June 2012. The second Strategic Dialogue, between the EU High Representative/Vice President Catherine Ashton and National Security and Foreign Affairs Advisor Sartaj Aziz was held in Brussels on 25 March 2014.

The two sides agreed that a first dedicated dialogue on non-proliferation and disarmament should take place as soon as possible. As stressed by the CSP 2007-2013 (p.15), Pakistan's relations with the EU are indeed in large measure influenced by its important role as a partner in the fight against terrorism<sup>18</sup>. Initiatives include the **EU-Pakistan Political Counter-Terrorism Dialogue** (under the framework of the EU-Pakistan 5 year Engagement Plan) and, to a lesser extent, the **EU-Pakistan Joint Readmission Committee**, established so as to monitor the application of the EU-Pakistan readmission agreement (2010).

The EU-Pakistan Joint Commission, with its sub-groups on development cooperation, human rights, and trade, review the bilateral relations on an annual basis. The Joint Commission is now complemented by a **Political Dialogue** at Senior Officials level.

In terms of EU internal organisation, following the creation of the European External Action Service, the EU's diplomatic service, as per the Lisbon Treaty (December 2009), the European Commission Delegation to Pakistan became the Delegation of the European Union, with staff members coming from the Commission and the EEAS.

Since 1 January 2014, Pakistan also benefits from the EU preferential trade scheme **GSP+** which provides trade incentives to developing countries on the condition that they implement core international conventions on human and labour rights, sustainable development and good governance.

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<sup>16</sup> Delegation of the EU in Pakistan website, [http://www.ceas.europa.eu/delegations/pakistan/eu\\_pakistan/chronology/index\\_en.htm](http://www.ceas.europa.eu/delegations/pakistan/eu_pakistan/chronology/index_en.htm) consulted on April 20, 2015.

<sup>17</sup> EU, *EU-Pakistan Multi-Annual Indicative Programme 2014-2020*, p.5.

<sup>18</sup> This includes fighting proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the associated means of delivery, assisting in disarmament efforts, contributing to clearing explosive remnants of war, facilitating successful implementation of the Afghanistan project, supporting reconciliation with India, tackling the narcotics business, and promoting human rights, democratisation and a tolerant society.

Table 1. Pakistan: Selected economic indicators

		2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
<b>Growth, inflation and employment</b>									
Real GDP	Growth rate	4.8	1.7	2.8	1.6	2.7	3.5	4.4	5.4
GDP deflator	"	7.3	13.2	20.7	10.9	19.6	6.0	7.4	7.2
Consumer price index		7.6	20.3	13.6	13.9	11.9	9.7	7.7	7.2
Unemployment rate	% of labour force	5.1	5.0	4.9	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.1	-
<b>Structure of GDP (Production &amp; Services)</b>									
Agriculture	% of GDP	23.1	23.1	23.9	24.3	26.0	24.5	25.1	25.1
Industry	"	21.1	22.3	20.2	20.6	21.2	22.1	21.1	21.3
of which manufacturing	"	14.0	15.2	13.4	13.6	14.3	14.5	14.0	14.1
Services	"	55.8	54.6	55.9	55.1	52.7	53.4	53.8	53.6
Gross capital formation	% of GDP	18.8	19.2	17.5	15.8	14.1	15.1	14.6	14.0
Private		12.6	12.8	11.7	10.5	9.3	9.7	9.6	8.9
Gross domestic savings		12.23	8.38	10.27	9.97	9.11	7.06	7.86	7.51
<b>Public sector</b>									
Overall fiscal balance	% of GDP	-7.3	-5.0	-	-6.9	-8.4	-8.1	-4.7	-4.6
Primary fiscal balance	"	-2.5	-0.1	-	-3.1	-4	-3.7	-0.2	0
Total government debt (domestic & foreign)	"	-	55.6	56.8	55.3	60.5	62.3	63	61.8
<b>Foreign trade, BoP and foreign debt</b>									
Trade balance	\$US billion					-15.8	-15.4	-16.7	-18.1
Current account balance	% of GDP	-8.4	-5.6	-	0.1	-2.1	-1.1	-1.3	-1.2
Exports of goods and services	Growth rate	1.5	-4.6	-3.4	15.7	2.4	-15.0	13.6	-1.4
Imports of goods and services	Growth rate	-4.1	5.9	-15.9	4.3	-0.1	-3.1	1.6	3.7
External debt	% of GDP	27	30.5	31.2	31.1	29.1	26.2	26.1	24.6
Exchange rate (end of period)	(PRs/\$US)	68.2	81.4	84.1	85.8	94.3	98.7	98.6	-
Gross international reserves in months of imports of goods & services	Months	2.6	2.8	-	3.6	2.7	1.5	2.2	3.6
<b>FDI &amp; Remittances</b>									
Personal remittances received	\$US million	5 998	7 039	8 717	9 690	12 263	14 005	14 629	17 066
Foreign direct investment, net inflows	\$US million	5 590	5 438	2 338	2 018	1 309	859	1 333	1 778
<b>Memorandum item</b>									
Population	Million persons	163.9	167.0	170.1	173.1	176.2	179.2	182.1	185.1
Population	Growth rate	1.86	1.86	1.83	1.78	1.73	1.69	1.65	1.63
Nominal GDP in national currency	Billions of rupees	-	13 200	14 867	18 276	20 047	22 489	25 402	28 084
GDP (or GNI)/head	\$US	930	1 018	989	1 025	1 213	1 254	1 275	1 334


Sources: WB World Development Indicators Database; IMF

Table 2. Pakistan: Selected social indicators

		2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
<b>Population</b>									
Population	Million persons	163.9	167.0	170.1	173.1	176.2	179.2	182.1	185.1
Population	Growth rate	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.6
Urban population	% total pop.	35.4	35.8	36.2	36.6	37.0	37.4	37.9	38.3
Life expectancy at birth	Years	65.6	65.8	66.0	66.1	66.3	66.4	66.6	-
<b>Poverty</b>									
% of population under the international poverty line (\$1.25 a day in purchasing power parity terms)	% total pop.	21	21	21	21	21	21	-	-
Malnutrition prevalence (% children under 5)	% children under 5	-	-	-	-	30.9	31.6	-	-
<b>Education</b>									
Public expenditures on education in % of GDP	% of GDP	2.6	2.7	2.6	2.3	2.2	2.1	2.5	-
Adult literacy rate (% of population > age 15)	% of population > age 15	-	55.5	54.9	55.4	54.7	-	-	-
Net primary school enrollment ratio	Ratio of enrolment of children in the age of primary	67.9	69.3	71.5	74.0	72.0	72.5	71.9	-
Gross secondary school enrollment ratio	"	33.1	33.5	33.5	34.1	34.9	36.6	38.3	-
<b>Health</b>									
Public health expenditures	% GDP	0.9	0.9	0.8	1.0	0.9	1.0	1.0	-
Mortality rate, infant	per 1000 live births	97.5	95.6	93.6	91.8	89.9	87.8	85.5	-
<b>Water and sanitation</b>									
Access to improved water source	% population	90.3	90.6	90.9	91.2	91.4	91.4	-	-
Access to improved sanitation facilities	"	44.4	45.4	46.4	47.3	47.4	47.6	-	-

Sources: WB World Development Indicators Database; IMF; Human Development Report (UNDP)

Figure 1: Pakistan time line over the evaluation period



Source: ADE





# Annex A2: Pakistan, a fragile situation and the EU response

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## Acronyms

BTI	Bertelsmann Transformation Index
CC	Council Conclusion
CPIA	Country Policy and Institutional Assessment
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSP	Country Strategy Paper
DG	Directorate General
EC	European Commission
ECHO	European Commission Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection
EEAS	European External Action Service
EU	European Union
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
GoP	Government of Pakistan
GSP	General System of Preferences
HR	Human Rights
ICG	International Crisis Group
IDA	International Development Agency
KP	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
KPK	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
MIP	Multi-annual Indicative Programme
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
ODA	Official Development Aid
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PATA	Provincially Administered Tribal Area
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

This annex reviews the state of EU and international practice *vis-à-vis* fragile situations (Section I) and the state of Pakistan (Section II) at the beginning of the evaluation period (2007). It then examines the trajectory of Pakistan over the evaluation period (2007-2014) (Section III); whether EU has respected the OECD Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations (Section IV); and the extent to which the EU may have contributed to Pakistan's trajectory (Section V).

## 1. The EU and International Practice vis-a-vis Fragile Situations In 2007

In 2007, the European Union had a number of policies relevant to fragile situations, listed in Table 1. These include, notably, the 2001 Communication on “Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development”; the 2007 Communication “Towards an EU response to situations of fragility - engaging in difficult environments for sustainable development, stability and peace”, and the related 2007 Conclusions and 2007 Parliament Resolution.

Moreover, there was a range of international instruments and standards to engage in conflict-affected or fragile situations. They were borne from the multiple civil wars that followed after the end of the Cold War (peaking in 1992); and from the lessons learned from international engagement in such situations (whether diplomatic, developmental, humanitarian or security-related). These international instruments and standards included:

- Early warning systems for conflict and multidimensional crises, since 1998 if not before<sup>1</sup>
- The “Do No Harm” principle, applied to development cooperation, since 1999 if not before<sup>2</sup>
- UN standards such as the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and its 2000 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, and the 2000 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on the impact of war on women, and women's contribution to preventing conflict and promoting sustainable peace.
- Conflict-sensitive development, since 2001 if not before<sup>3</sup>
- Conflict analysis frameworks, since 2002 if not before<sup>4</sup>
- Community-driven development aiming for the restoration of trust in divided societies<sup>5</sup>
- The 2003 Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles, which aim to enhance the coherence and effectiveness of humanitarian action, as well accountability to beneficiaries, implementing organisations and domestic constituencies
- The 2007 OECD Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile Situations, endorsed by the European Commission in 2007, reflected a growing consensus that

<sup>1</sup> For example [www.swisspeace.ch/projects/previous-projects/fast-international.html](http://www.swisspeace.ch/projects/previous-projects/fast-international.html)

<sup>2</sup> For example Anderson, M., 1999, Reflecting on the Role of Aid' in Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace - or War, Lynne Rienner Publishers, USA, pp. 145-147

<sup>3</sup> [www.gsdrc.org/index.cfm?objectid=4F50B286-14C2-620A-271842F4BDFFD483#guidance](http://www.gsdrc.org/index.cfm?objectid=4F50B286-14C2-620A-271842F4BDFFD483#guidance).

<sup>4</sup> [www.gsdrc.org/index.cfm?objectid=3133E975-14C2-620A-277DFFB9CA069184](http://www.gsdrc.org/index.cfm?objectid=3133E975-14C2-620A-277DFFB9CA069184)

<sup>5</sup> For example Barron, Patrick, Rachael Diprose, et Michael Woolcock. Contesting development: participatory projects and local conflict dynamics in Indonesia. Yale University Press, 2011.

fragile states require responses that are different from better performing countries. In this sense, they complement and inform the commitments set out in the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. These Principles are used to review [collective donor engagement](#) in some countries (including Afghanistan in 2009), and are being used in evaluations of support to countries in fragile situations.

**In 2007, there was, therefore, a body of instruments and standards to guide international engagement in fragile situations. It was widely shared among development partners and, although diversely applied in practice, served as a point of reference to monitor and evaluate practice. In the following decade, additional policies and guidance papers were added:**

- EU policies, such as the Council Conclusions “An EU Response to Situations of Fragility” (2007), on Conflict Prevention (2011), on Sustainable Change in Transition Societies” (2013) and on Resilience (2013) (see Table 1 for a more comprehensive list)
- Global policies, such as the OECD Guidelines for Statebuilding (2011), which builds on the OECD Principle “make statebuilding the central objective”.
- The New Deal for Fragile States (2011), a joint commitment between countries in fragile situations (Pakistan is not part of them) and development partners. The Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (2011) highlights the unique challenge posed by countries in fragile situations and refers to the New Deal.

**Table 1. European Union policies relevant to fragile situations**

	Security agenda	Development agenda	Humanitarian agenda	Geographic focus
<b>Pre-2007</b>	European Security Strategy (2003) EU Strategy WMD (2003) EU Guidelines on Children and Armed Conflicts (2003) Headline Goal 2010 (2004) EU Concept for ESDP SSR (2005) EU Strategy on SALW (2006) EU Concept for DDR (2006)	EC CDM LRRD (1996 & 2001) EC CDM EU Election Assistance and Observation (2000) Göteborg EU Programme (2001) EC CDM Conflict Prevention (2003) EC CDM Governance and Development (2003) EU Consensus on Development (2006) EC CDM Governance in the European Consensus on Development (2006)	Council Regulation Concerning Humanitarian Aid (1996)	EC CDM CPPB in Africa (1996) EC CDM Europe & Asia (2001) Cotonou Agreement (2005) EC CDM EU & Latin America (2005) Council Common Position on Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Africa (2005)
<b>2007</b>	CC on New Civilian Headline Goal 2010 CC on Security and Development	CC: An EU Response to Situations of Fragility	Council Decision on Establishing a Community Civil Protection Mechanism	Africa-EU Strategic Partnership
<b>2008</b>	Council: EU Approach to Implement UN Resolutions on Women, Peace & Security Report on Implementation of European Security Strategy EC/EU HR Paper on Climate Change and Security		European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid EU Consensus on Humanitarian Aid — Action Plan	
<b>2009</b>		CC on Policy Coherence for Development Council: Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities	EC CDM: EU Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction	EC CDM: EU & Latin America
<b>2010</b>			CC on Role of Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid	2nd Revision Cotonou Agreement
<b>2011</b>		CC on Conflict Prevention	Implementation Plan of EU Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction	CC on EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel CC on Horn of Africa
<b>2012</b>	CC on Common Security and Defence Policy	CC: An Agenda for Change	CC on Future Approach to EU Budget Support in Third Countries	Joint CDM EU-Pacific Development Partnership
<b>2013</b>	Joint EC/EU HR CDM: EU's Comprehensive Approach to Conflict and Crises	EC CDM: A Decent Life for All CC on EU Support for Sustainable Change in Transition Societies CC on EU Approach to Resilience: Action Plan for Resilience in Crisis-Prone Countries	Council and Parliament Decision on Establishing a Union Civil Protection Mechanism	CC on Great Lakes Region
<b>2014</b>				EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea

**Note:** To eliminate repetition, only Council conclusions (CC) are listed where a policy is also cited in a communication. All items are hyperlinked to the source document.

Source: European Commission, 2014, Operating in Situations of Conflict and Fragility, [http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/file/16/12/2014\\_-\\_1658/staff\\_handbook-web-dec12.pdf](http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/file/16/12/2014_-_1658/staff_handbook-web-dec12.pdf)

## 2. Pakistan in 2007: a Fragile State, and a Fragile Society

The European Commission defines such situations of fragility as those where “*the social contract is broken due to the state’s incapacity or unwillingness to deal with its basic functions, meet its obligations and responsibilities regarding service delivery, management of resources, rule of law, equitable access to power, security and safety of the populace and protection and promotion of citizens’ rights and freedoms*” (EC, 2007). While Pakistan has not joined the g7+, a group of countries created in 2010 that self-identifies as being in a fragile situation and therefore requiring special attention (in terms of funding, context analysis, scenario planning, probable impact, aid modalities, policy coherence etc.), Pakistan has been in a fragile situation for some time, if not from independence: whether through the prism of state capacity, state legitimacy or security, Pakistan is often counted as the world’s “big five” countries combining a large population and a high degree of fragility. In 2007, Pakistan was ranked among the world’s 20 most fragile states globally by the Fund for Peace’s Fragile States Index, the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment, the Brookings Index of State Weakness in the Developing World, and the Carleton University Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (see Tables A and E for some data). Moreover, Pakistan has been on the European Commission’s Crisis Declaration list at least since 2012.

**The EU’s Country Strategy Paper for Pakistan 2007-2013, prepared in 2006, underlines good economic performance overall, but acute challenges when it comes to democratic governance and human rights, human development and the environment.** It summarised the situation as follows:

1. Although some progress on democratisation has been made by installing an elected parliament in October 2002, army influence is still strong and strengthening democratic institutions and processes remains an important task. Other political challenges include eliminating religious extremism and sectarian violence, addressing regional imbalances and improving the human rights situation.
2. Since 1999 Pakistan has been successfully implementing a macroeconomic reform programme. However, the reforms have not yet had a major impact on reducing poverty. Poor governance remains a key issue and has had a negative impact on social service delivery. While the devolution process has strengthened local political institutions, more needs to be done to address management and capacity issues at local level.
3. In spite of large contributions of official development aid, Pakistan’s human development indicators worsened during the 1990s and social inequalities deepened.
4. Pakistan is facing major environmental problems, including growing water shortages due to demographic pressure, deforestation and degradation of rangelands. There are fears that Pakistan could enter a downward spiral of environmental degradation and poverty.

**This is echoed by analyses of Pakistan in 2007, for example:**

- For Aziz (2007), “the Pakistani military has become a parallel state, and given the extent of its influence, will continue to define the nature of governance within the polity.”<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Aziz, Mazhar. *Military control in Pakistan: The parallel state*. Routledge, 2007.

- For Faisal (2007), “the state's inability, caused by decades of systemic corruption, to provide any appreciable level of public goods or services, broadly defined, is responsible for the delegitimisation of the state and its inability to maintain law and order in the cities or suppress Islamist insurgents in the rest of the country.”<sup>7</sup>
- For Markey (2007), “the challenges facing democracy in Pakistan go far beyond rigged elections or exiled politicians. Weak civilian institutions and a history of dysfunctional civil-military relations mean that bringing democracy to Pakistan is less a matter of resuscitation than of reinvention.”<sup>8</sup>
- For the BTI (2008), “large segments of the population have experienced a dramatic loss of confidence in democracy, and Islamic extremists are once again gaining ground”—although it should be said that the latter do not have the support of the former, not in 2007, and not by 2014. Religious parties, for example, have thus far been unsuccessful at elections.
- Meanwhile, human rights continued to be violated. The US Department of State report on Human Rights (2008) highlights “curbs on the media and arrested and/or detained over 6,000 lawyers, judges, political party workers/leaders, and civil society activists”, related to the 2007 Lawyers’ Movement (popular protest movement initiated by the lawyers of Pakistan and backed by political parties, in response to the former president Musharraf’s suspension of the chief justice). “Other major human rights problems included restrictions on citizens’ right to change their government, extrajudicial killings, torture, and disappearances.”

**2007 itself was an eventful year:** it saw the suspension, then dismissal of Chief Justice and the declaration of a state 42-day state of emergency, which included curbs on the media and the arrests of over 6,000 lawyers, judges, political and civil society activists. In 2007, civilian casualties related to terrorism were already above 1,500, double the number in 2006. At the same time, 2007 marked a sea change in what had been a deteriorating situation since the 1999 coup (if not before): “President Musharraf faces the most serious challenge to almost eight years of military rule. Opposition has gathered momentum following his failed attempt to remove the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. Moderate political parties, all segments of civil society and the public at large are vociferously demanding restoration of democracy and rule of law and the military’s withdrawal from politics” (ICG, 2007)<sup>9</sup>. Indeed, “major political changes occurred in Pakistan in 2007. Civil society emerged as a key player for a brief period, catalysing this change (...) Major political unrest and street demonstration spearheaded by lawyers led to the resignation of Musharraf” (Paul, 2014)<sup>10</sup>. It is in this context that the EU’s 2007-2010 Multiannual Indicative Programme (MIP) was implemented.

**Based on these and other analyses (see Bibliography), the drivers of fragility in 2007 were multidimensional and self-reinforcing,** as summarised in Graph 1. They span the security, political, social, economic and environmental dimensions, and are influenced by subregional dynamics (India, Afghanistan) and donor agendas too.


<sup>7</sup> Khan, Feisal. "Corruption and the Decline of the State in Pakistan." *Asian Journal of Political Science* 15, no. 2 (2007): 219-247.

<sup>8</sup> Markey, Daniel. "A false choice in Pakistan." *Foreign Affairs* 86, no. 4 (2007): 85-102.

<sup>9</sup> International Crisis Group, 2007, Elections, Democracy and Stability in Pakistan

<sup>10</sup> Paul, Thazha Varkey. *The warrior state: Pakistan in the contemporary world*. Oxford University Press, 2014.

**Graph 1. Pakistan in 2007: security, political, social, economic, environmental and international drivers of fragility that reinforced each other**



Sources: ADE, based on BTI (2008-2014), Cordesman and Vira (2010), Paul (2012), Fair (2014), Lievin (2015), and interviews.

It should be noted that, while the 2010 EU Conclusions of the Mid-Term Review of the Country Strategy Paper for Pakistan (2007-13) states “a big challenge for the government now is to strike *a balance between stability objectives and social issues*”, **stability cannot come from security alone and stems from social and economic issues too** (EC, 2007, Towards an EU response to Situations of Fragility). While security is a precondition of stability, including in Pakistan where the post 9/11 realities put great pressures on the Pakistani state, the drivers of fragility must at some point be addressed too (highly unequal access to services, extreme poverty, discrimination and human rights violations, group grievances...).

In Pakistan specifically, as underlined by Vira and Cordesman (2011), “Pakistan cannot succeed if its civilian leaders, senior officers, and security forces rely on internal security, counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency – important as improvement in these activities remain. Pakistan’s leaders must also focus on investing in its people’s welfare and addressing their core grievances. Pakistan also needs to give priority to its internal needs over dealing with external threats. Pakistan continues to give priority to strategic competition with India, and in ways that create growing problems in Afghanistan as well as strengthen internal extremists. It devotes an inordinate amount of its attention and resources to this struggle, and does so at the direct expense of the welfare and future of its

people.”<sup>11</sup> Pakistani analyst Huma Yusuf concurs: "Pakistan's war against violent extremism will not be won in the battlefields, but in classrooms, madressahs, mosques, the offices of bureaucrats and at police stations... Political leaders need to focus on pushing through the policies and reforms that will help counter extremism in the long run."<sup>12</sup>

### 3. Trajectory of Pakistan 2007-2014

On the basis of a review of the literature on Pakistan (Bibliography), including EU project documents and evaluations, of indicators and of interviews (September-December 2015), **the trajectory of Pakistan between 2007 and 2014 is contrasted and paradoxical** (Graph 3):

- On the one hand, growth has been sustained in spite of the 2008 global crisis; the poverty headcount has diminished from 35m in 2004 to 22m in 2010<sup>13</sup>; unemployment has dropped from 7.4 to 5.1 between 2007 and 2013; relations with India have and the situation in Afghanistan have improved slightly (albeit from a low point); Pakistan has returned to civilian rule and democratic institutions have improved (Table D): the judiciary, civil society and the media were able to assert some autonomy from the executive (re-instatement of Chief Justice Chaudhry in 2009), and the 18th Amendment to Pakistan's Constitution, which reduces the powers of the president in favour of the parliament and prime minister, devolves a large share of federal resources and responsibilities to the four provinces. 2008 is often described by Pakistan watchers as the year Pakistan returned to democracy, at least formally (Jonas et al., 2013<sup>14</sup>), with the end of military rule, or the beginning of “a long march to democracy” (Fruman, 2011<sup>15</sup>).
- On the other hand, there are self-reinforcing dynamics of continued poverty affecting particular groups and districts (Map A) and the lesser-constitutional status in areas like FATA and PATA (Siddique, 2012<sup>16</sup>); grievances (culminating in secessionism and terrorism); and a heavy-handed state response that leads to civilian casualties and a further deterioration of state-society relations. There was a first surge in violent extremism, culminating in 2300 civilian casualties in 2009, then a second surge with over 3,000 civilian casualties in both 2012 and 2013 (Graph A and B). By 2013, they were still extrajudicial and targeted killings, disappearances, torture, lack of rule of law (including lack of due process, poor implementation and enforcement of laws, and frequent mob violence and vigilante justice), and sectarian violence—which continued unabated, leading to GoP lifting the moratorium on the death penalty.
- All in all, the 2007-2014 period could be described as “growth, poverty reduction, more democracy and political participation – but less peace and less civil liberties” (Table B),

<sup>11</sup> Cordesman, Anthony H., Arleigh A. Burke, and Varun Vira. "Pakistan: Violence vs. Stability." *Center for Strategic and International Studies* (2011): 183-184.

<sup>12</sup> Huma Yusuf, « Home-Grown Threat », *The Dawn*, 23 November 2015, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1221556/home-grown-threat>

<sup>13</sup> World Bank database, <http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/country/PAK>, accessed August 2015, and Graph E in this Annex.

<sup>14</sup> Wolff, Jonas, Hans-Joachim Spanger, and Hans-Jürgen Puhle. *The comparative international politics of democracy promotion*. Vol. 23. Routledge, 2013.


<sup>15</sup> Fruman, Sheila. *Will the long march to democracy in Pakistan finally succeed?*. US Institute of Peace, 2011.

<sup>16</sup> Siddique, Osama, *The Other Pakistan: Special Laws, Diminished Citizenship and the Gathering Storm* (December 5, 2012).



an autocracy-to-electoral democracy trajectory that is quite common<sup>17</sup> and is summarised Graph 2.

**Graph 2. From illiberal autocracy to electoral democracy (and later to liberal democracy?)**



Source: Jorgen Moller, 2007, adapting from Larry Diamond

**This contrasted performance** is summarised by Lieven (2015) as follows: “Many of the same features which (aim to) hold Islamist terrorism in check are responsible for holding back development”<sup>18</sup>. It is confirmed by the Fragile States Index, which shows that eight dimensions of fragility have progressed between 2007-2014, especially poverty/economic decline, while four other have declined, especially uneven development and human flight. Overall, the fragility score in 2014 is slightly worse compared to 2006 levels, although it had improved in 2008-09 (see Table A).

**Another paradox is how public opinion evolved:**

- Whereas the middle class is rising and now represents more than half of Pakistan’s population, and whereas « the army drives the country’s most disruptive policies » (Fair, 2014)<sup>19</sup>, the Pakistani military receives an extremely high level of public support (87% give the military positive ratings) (Pew, 2015).
- Moreover, subregional security seems to be a greater concern than domestic security. Whereas terrorism at home is rising, and relations with India are (relatively speaking) improving (Graph A), Pakistanis tend to view India as a bigger threat over time (from 38% of people surveyed in 2013 to 51% in 2015), and a bigger one than the Taliban (25% in 2015). In line with these findings, 12% give al Qaeda a favourable rating, while 8% hold a positive view of the Taliban.
- For Blair *et al.* (2013), how public opinion has evolved need close, granular scrutiny: they find that “poor Pakistanis dislike militants more than middle-class citizens. This dislike is strongest among the urban poor, particularly those in violent districts.” An implication may be that “winning hearts and minds” against terrorism requires promoting growth and development with little beneficiary targeting and, along with considering the main factors that make radicalism prospers, targeting the rural poor rather than the urban poor.

<sup>17</sup> See, for example, Zakaria, Fareed. *The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (Revised Edition)*. WW Norton & company, 2007.

<sup>18</sup> Lieven, Anatol. *Pakistan: a hard country*. PublicAffairs, 2011.

<sup>19</sup> Christine, Fair, C. "Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War." (2014).

**Graph 3. Pakistan’s trajectory 2007-2014**

International	Security	Political	Social	Economic	Environment
Taliban insurgencies in Afghanistan	Taliban insurgencies at home	Narrow elites with a narrow agenda (security, not developmental)	Limited public services	Growth and jobs	Natural disasters causing loss of life and massive displacements
“Too big to fail”: donor agendas dominated by geostrategic (rather than development) priorities: Taliban, Al-Qaeda, nuclear weapons, India-Pak-China relations	Security prioritised over all else	Weak checks and balances and rule of law	Low human development and ten of millions in poverty	Small tax base (1% pop) despite growing middle class	
	A mainly security response to insurgencies		Hybrid regime (army, intelligence and civilian power)		
	Sectarian and ethnic violence		Grievances, sectarian and ethnic divides, secessionism, extremism		
An “unwinnable war with India”	Other HR violations incl. political and gender-based		Massive displacements		Overexploitation/poor management of water
			Weak social support for democracy and human rights		

Note: Green (improvement), red (deterioration) and beige (no significant change) denote how things *evolved* since 2007, not whether the current situation is satisfactory or not.  
Sources: ADE

What was the EU’s contribution to this contrasted performance, and has the EU adapted to context? Section III looks at whether the EU has implemented the OECD Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations it has signed up to, and Section IV correlations and any evidence of EU contributions to this trajectory.

#### 4. EU Implementation of the Fragile States Principles

The 2007 Communication “Towards an EU Response to Situations of Fragility” refers to the OECD Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, which were formally endorsed by the European Commission in April 2007. This section uses the Principles to gauge whether EU development cooperation with Pakistan has strived to understand the evolving context, to address the drivers of fragility, and to be conflict-sensitive in both its areas of intervention and its development modalities.

**The Principles touch on a wide range of sensitive issues related to the EU’s objectives** of helping Pakistan fight poverty and follow a sustainable growth path, “founded on political stability, social cohesion, creation of productive and decent work opportunities, human and social development, the rule of law and diversification of economic activity” (CSP, 2007). These issues include the varying reach of the state institutions and their equally varying legitimacy; the issue of alignment of development

partners' development and geostrategic agenda (Paul, 2014); the issue of alignment of agendas and values between Pakistan elites, different Pakistan groups in its fractured society, and development partners; the issue of security challenges to aid delivery development and frequent natural disasters; and the increasing diversity of development partners. Based on a desk review and field visits to Islamabad, Karachi, Lahore and Peshawar, Table 2 indicates whether EU cooperation with Pakistan has broadly conformed with the Principles.

**Table 2. EU development cooperation with Pakistan and the Fragile States Principles<sup>20</sup>**

1. Take context as the starting point	B EU context analysis the evaluation team has had access to is of consistent quality, reflects learning over time, and incorporates inputs from national reformers in government and civil society. However, project documents often continue to present issues as being mainly issues of capacity, rather than of interests and incentives.
2. Ensure all activities do no harm	B The EU does not have a system in place to ensure its cooperation “does no harm”. However, most non-EU interviewees and third party analysts do not consider that EU cooperation may be doing harm.
3. Focus on statebuilding as the central objective <i>NB: Consistent with OECD definitions, statebuilding is understood as not just strengthening the executive but of all branches of government, federal and provincial, and fostering more constructive state-society relations and social cohesion.</i>	B EU cooperation with Pakistan emphasises capacity development at all levels (executive branch of the central and provincial governments but also the legislative and the judiciary, and increasingly women and youth). Support to rural development via community mobilisation should be highlighted in this respect. Support to focal areas (rural development and education) and to justice tends to channel aid through government. However, there is scope for much more direct and systematic support to <i>Government accountability to citizens</i> , through public information and means of citizen feedback (for example in the work of Parliament, of government in education and justice). Moreover, areas where development partners (including the EU) support initiatives that benefit from GoP support and commitments remain scarce.
4. Prioritise prevention	B The EU supports community-level ability to manage conflicts peacefully, notably via its rural development project and access to justice projects (which, by the way, could be connected), and to fighting violent extremism, notably via its law enforcement projects and access to justice projects but also through its wider portfolio (education, rural development). The EU has also provided humanitarian aid through DG ECHO, including for <b>early warning/early response mechanisms with relation to natural disasters</b> . In its areas of support (both thematic and geographic), it is plausible that without EU support, combined with that of other development partners, Pakistan would be more prone and less resilient to crisis.
5. Recognise the links between political, security and development objectives	B There is evidence of a whole-of-EU approach (involvement of ECHO, multiple DGs, EEAS, Parliament) and that the EU treats the political, security, economic and social spheres as inter-dependent (e.g. GSP+ status hinging on ratification of labour conventions). The overall theory of change (i.e. what change is expected and why) is sometimes alluded to in strategies, programme documents and interviews: better population access to and trust in basic social services, especially in crisis-prone rural areas, will contribute to stability, which in turn will benefit economic and social development. It should be noted, however, that job creation and greater government accountability

<sup>20</sup> A - Satisfactory ; B - Relatively satisfactory ; C - Not satisfactory

	are not (yet) seen as central to this change. More specific attention could mean trade dialogue focused on job creation and measurement thereof, and a more systematic focus on government accountability re. services supported by the EU. This would include better control of corruption, which in spite of a timid improvement remains high (Graph D) and perceived as such by citizens (Transparency International database, accessed 2015).
6. Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies	A EU cooperation with Pakistan emphasises gender equity, social inclusion and human rights. These are part of long-term strategies to prevent fragility. Measures to promote the voice and participation of women and youth are sensible, although it is too early to say if they are effective.
7. Align with local priorities in different ways and in different contexts	A There is evidence of EU consultations and cooperation with a wide range of national stakeholders, and the identification of opportunities for partial alignment at the sector level. Support to focal areas (rural development and education) and to justice tends to channel aid through government, including sector budget support While EU cooperation in human rights and elections is mostly channelled through NGOs and multilateral organisations, and Government is increasingly reticent to this approach, this approach support checks and balances and democratic dialogue. Care could be given to ensure simultaneous support to Government and civil society does not pit one against the other, but rather helps civil society carry out informed and constructive advocacy and services.
8. Agree on practical co-ordination mechanisms between international actors	A Although there can be an inflation of coordination <i>fora</i> and there is no formal division of labour (thematic or geographic), the EU takes a pragmatic approach to coordination, and it seems to be working (see Evaluation Question 10). There is some evidence of upstream and shared analysis; shared strategies; coordination of political engagement – for example through the Friends of Democratic Pakistan forum—and coordination at the sector and sometimes provincial level. There are examples where implementing partners in the same sector should harmonise their approach and standards (e.g. access to justice in KP and Punjab).
9. Act fast... but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance	B Assistance to Pakistan seems to have taken advantage of windows of opportunity with the return to civilian rule in 2008 (it grew steadily over the years, peaking in 2011). However, it has been rather volatile, with an aid shock every year since 2011 (decrease in ODA per capital year-to-year exceed 15%), which can be potentially destabilising.
10. Avoid pockets of exclusion	B Although the choice of provinces and target groups is not always explicit, it makes a lot of sense through interviews: KP and South Punjab for their instability, current and potential; Sindh for education as it is left behind by other development partners; etc. The EU has and should remain engaged in provinces where it has invested considerable efforts and resources to build relationships and trust. The EU could, however, multiply its social impact by analysing how each programme (including bricks-and-mortar, including trade) impacts on vulnerable groups specifically, and creates social cohesion across communities (sectarian, religious or otherwise).

## 5. Correlations and Contributions of the EU Engagement and the Pakistan Trajectory 2007-2014

Has EU development cooperation aim to address drivers of fragility in Pakistan, and with what results? Judging from strategies, project documents and documents relating to the political and policy dialogue, EU cooperation has aimed to address the full range of drivers of fragility: in the security, political, social, economic and environmental spheres. Specifically, the EU has aimed to address issues of human rights violations, checks and balances and the rule of law, human development, gender equality, growth, and natural disasters (Graph 4):

- There is a positive correlation where checks and balances and the rule of law are concerned, as well as human development: both are areas where progress is tangible.
- There is a negative correlation in the areas of human rights violations, although it could be surmised that absent the EU, the situation could have been worse
- Finally, there is a lack of clear progress in other areas where the EU is directly engaged: gender equality, society’s support for democracy and human rights (beyond civil society organisations), and natural disasters mitigation.

**Graph 4. Correlations between areas of EU intervention and how drivers of fragility evolved**

International	Security	Political	Social	Economic	Environment
Taliban insurgencies in Afghanistan	Taliban insurgencies at home	Narrow elites with a narrow agenda (security, not developmental)	Limited public services	Growth and jobs	Natural disasters causing loss of life and massive displacements
“Too big to fail”: donor agendas dominated by geostrategic (rather than development) priorities: Taliban, Al-Qaeda, nuclear weapons, India-Pak.-China relations	Security prioritised over all else		Low human development and ten of millions in poverty		
	A mainly security response to insurgencies	Weak checks and balances and rule of law	Discrimination vz. women and minorities	Small tax base (1% pop) despite growing middle class	
	Sectarian and ethnic violence	Hybrid regime (army, intelligence and civilian power)	Grievances, sectarian and ethnic divides, secessionism, extremism		
An “unwinnable war with India”	Other HR violations incl. political and gender-based		Massive displacements		Overexploitatio n/poor management of water
			Weak social support for democracy and human rights		

Note: Green (improvement), red (deterioration) and beige (no significant change) denote how things *evolved* since 2007, not whether the current situation is satisfactory or not. Circles denote which drivers of fragility the EU is directly engaged in addressing.

Source: ADE


Beyond these correlations, is there evidence of direct EU contribution to these positive developments? Table 3 gives some examples of probable contribution.

**Table 3. Evidence of contribution and level of contribution**

Documented impact	Documented contribution (examples)	Level of contribution to the impact (in a large, beyond-the-project sense)
1. Checks and balances and the rule of law	Increased voter turnout (see for example Table D)	High
	Better transparency on the work of the National Assembly and Senate	Low
2. Improvement in human development	Significant number of CSOs promoting human development formed; increased number of CSO members elected in Local Government	High in districts covered
3. Improvement in human rights situation	Use of forensic evidence in criminal cases	High
	Better access to legal services	Nil for now, potentially important in future (in districts covered)
4. Gender equality, minorities	Better access to legal services(women)	Nil
5. Natural disasters prevention and mitigation	Early warning/early response mechanisms with relation to natural disasters (provided confirmation in the on-going Evaluation of ECHO support to Pakistan 2010-2014).	High in districts of intervention? (to be confirmed in the on-going Evaluation of ECHO support to Pakistan 2010-2014).


**Statistical annex “fragility”**

**Graph A. Violence by type (2010)**




Source: Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, “Pakistan Security Report 2010, quoted in Vira and Cordesman (2011)

**Graph B. Casualties from terrorism by year and type (2007-2015)**




**Graph C. Reasons for conflict in selected districts of KP**




Source: UNDP, 2011.

**Graph D. Control of corruption, 1996-2014 (Worldwide Governance Indicators)**



Note: Higher values mean better control of corruption.

**Graph E. Absolute number and percentage of Pakistanis living in extreme poverty (US\$1.25, PPP 2005), 1991-2011**



Source: ODI 2015, from World Bank, 2015.



**Table A. The Fund for Peace's Fragile States Index for Pakistan**

	Global Rank		Demographic Pressures	Refugees and IDPs	Group Grievance	Human Flight	Uneven Development	Poverty and Economic Decline	Legitimacy of the State	Public Services	Human Rights	Security Apparatus	Factionalized Elites	External Intervention
2006	9	103,1	9,3	9,3	8,6	8,1	8,9	7	8,5	7,5	8,5	9,1	9,1	9,2
2007	12	100,1	8,2	8,5	9	8,1	8,5	5,8	8,7	7,1	8,7	9,5	9,5	8,5
2008	9	103,8	8	8,6	9,5	8,1	8,8	6,2	9,5	7,1	9,5	9,6	9,8	9,1
2009	10	104,1	8,3	8,6	9,6	8,3	8,8	6,4	9,1	7,5	8,9	9,5	9,6	9,5
2010	10	102,5	8,1	8,9	9,4	7,9	8,4	6,2	8,9	7,3	8,9	9,7	9,5	9,3
2011	12	102,3	8,8	9,2	9,3	7,5	8,5	6,6	8,6	7,3	8,7	9,4	9,1	9,3
2012	13	101,6	8,5	9	9,6	7,2	8,2	7,2	8,3	7	8,6	9,3	9,1	9,4
2013	13	102,9	8,9	9,1	9,7	6,9	7,9	7,5	8,4	7,3	8,7	9,8	9,2	9,6
2014	10	103	8,8	8,8	10	6,9	7,6	7,5	8,5	7,6	8,6	9,9	9,5	9,3
2015	13	102,9	9	8,9	10	7	7,3	7,7	8,6	7,9	8,4	9,6	9,2	9,3
Δ 2007-2014		2,9	0,6	0,3	1	-1,2	-0,9	1,7	-0,2	0,5	-0,1	0,4	0	0,8

**Table B. Political rights and civil liberties 1999-2014 (Freedom House)**

	Political rights	Civil liberties	Status
1999	7	5	Not free
2000	6	5	Not free
2001	6	5	Not free
2002	6	5	Not free
2003	6	5	Not free
2004	6	5	Not free
2005	6	5	Not free
2006	6	5	Not free
2007	6	5	Not free
2008	4	5	Partly free
2009	4	5	Partly free
2010	4	5	Partly free
2011	4	5	Partly free
2012	4	5	Partly free
2013	4	5	Partly free
2014	4	5	Partly free

Source: Freedom House database, accessed September 2015

Note: A lower score denotes more freedom.

**Table C. Democracy status, 2006-2014 (BTI)**

	<b>SI   Democracy Status</b>				<b>Q1   Stateness</b>				<b>Q2   Political Participation</b>				<b>Q3   Rule of Law</b>				<b>Q4   Stability of Democratic Institutions</b>		<b>Q5   Political and Social Integration</b>					
	Q1.1	Q1.2	Q1.3	Q1.4	Q2.1	Q2.2	Q2.3	Q2.4	Q3.1	Q3.2	Q3.3	Q3.4	Q4.1	Q4.2	Q5.1	Q5.2	Q5.3	Q5.4						
2006	3,6	4,8	5,0	6,0	3,0	5,0	4,0	4,0	2,0	5,0	5,0	4,0	4,0	3,0	5,0	4,0	1,5	2,0	1,0	3,7	4,0	3,0	n/a	4,0
2014	3,5	3,8	3,0	5,0	3,0	4,0	4,3	6,0	2,0	5,0	4,0	3,0	4,0	3,0	3,0	2,0	3,0	3,0	3,0	3,7	4,0	3,0	n/a	4,0
Δ	-0,1	-1,0	-2,0	-1,0	0,0	-1,0	0,3	2,0	0,0	0,0	-1,0	-1,0	0,0	0,0	-2,0	-2,0	1,5	1,0	2,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	n/a	0,0

Source: BTI database, accessed September 2015

Note: A lower score denotes more democratic governance.

**Table D. Increased voter turnout (Parliamentary elections 1997-2013)**

Year	Voter Turn-out	Total vote	Regi- stration	VAP Turn- out	Voting age popu- lation	Population	Invalid votes	Compulsory voting
2013	53.62%	46,217,482	86,189,802	41.72%	110,782,605	193,238,868		No
2008	44.55%	35,610,001	79,934,801	38.77%	91,856,744	164,741,924	2.70%	No
2002	41.80%	29,829,463	71,358,040	38.93%	76,627,450	144,616,639	2.60%	No
1997	35.17%	19,058,131	54,189,534	31.47%	60,565,705	137,649,330	2.30%	No


**Table E. Quality of country policies and institutions, 2007-2014 (World Bank)**

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	Δ2007-2014
CPIA building human resources rating	3,5	3,5	3,0	3,0	3,5	3,5	3,5	3,5	0,0
CPIA business regulatory environment rating	4,0	4,0	4,0	3,5	3,0	3,0	3,0	3,0	-1,0
CPIA debt policy rating	4,5	4,0	3,5	3,5	3,5	3,5	3,5	3,5	-1,0
CPIA economic management cluster average	3,8	3,0	3,2	2,8	2,8	2,8	2,8	3,2	-0,7
CPIA efficiency of revenue mobilization rating	3,5	3,0	3,0	3,0	3,0	3,0	3,0	3,0	-0,5

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	Δ2007-2014
CPIA equity of public resource use rating	3,5	3,5	3,5	3,5	3,5	3,5	3,5	3,5	0,0
CPIA financial sector rating	4,5	4,0	3,5	3,5	3,5	3,5	3,5	3,5	-1,0
CPIA fiscal policy rating	3,5	2,5	3,0	2,5	2,5	2,5	2,5	3,0	-0,5
CPIA gender equality rating	2,0	2,0	2,0	2,0	2,5	2,5	2,5	2,5	0,5
CPIA macroeconomic management rating	3,5	2,5	3,0	2,5	2,5	2,5	2,5	3,0	-0,5
CPIA policies for social inclusion/equity cluster average	3,1	3,0	2,9	2,9	3,1	3,1	3,1	3,2	0,1
CPIA policy and institutions for environmental sustainability rating	3,5	3,0	3,0	2,5	2,5	2,5	2,5	3,0	-0,5
CPIA property rights and rule-based governance rating	3,0	2,5	2,5	3,0	2,5	2,5	2,5	2,5	-0,5
CPIA public sector management and institutions cluster average	3,2	3,0	3,0	3,1	3,0	3,0	3,0	3,0	-0,2
CPIA quality of budgetary and financial management rating	3,5	3,5	3,5	3,5	3,5	3,5	3,5	3,5	0,0
CPIA quality of public administration rating	3,5	3,5	3,5	3,5	3,5	3,5	3,5	3,5	0,0
CPIA social protection and labor rating	3,0	3,0	3,0	3,5	3,5	3,5	3,5	3,5	0,5
CPIA structural policies cluster average	4,2	4,0	3,7	3,5	3,3	3,3	3,3	3,3	-0,8
CPIA trade rating	4,0	4,0	3,5	3,5	3,5	3,5	3,5	3,5	-0,5
CPIA transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector rating	2,5	2,5	2,5	2,5	2,5	2,5	2,5	2,5	0,0
IDA resource allocation index	3,6	3,3	3,2	3,1	3,1	3,1	3,1	3,2	-0,4

Note: 1=low to 6=high

Map A. Headcount poverty incidence by district, 2012



Source: Naveed, Arif, and Nazim Ali. *Clustered deprivation: District profile of poverty in Pakistan*. Sustainable Development Policy Institute, 2012.



# Annex A3: Overview of the political, administrative and fiscal devolution (18<sup>th</sup> Amendment to the Constitution) and the main challenges of fiscal decentralisation and PFM reform process in Pakistan

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## Acronyms

ADB	Asian Development Bank
BS	Budget Support
CCI	Council of Common Interests
CPDI	Centre for Peace and Development Initiatives
DFID	Department for International Development
DPRC	Development Policy Research Centre
EAD	Economic Affairs Division
ECNEC	Executive Committee of the National Economic Council
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FBR	Federal Board of Revenue

FY	Fiscal Year
GB	Gilgit, Baltistan
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GDS	Gas Development Surcharge
GIZ	German Agency for International Cooperation
GSTS	General Sale Tax on Service
HEC	Higher Education Commission
IMF	International Monetary Fund
KP	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
LG	Local Government
LGO	Local Government Ordinances
LUMS	Lahore University of Management Science
MDA	Ministries, department and agencies
MINFAL	Ministry of food, agriculture and livestock
MMBTU	Million British Thermal Unit
MPNR	Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources
NAM	New Accounting Module
NEC	National Economic Council
NFC	National Finance Commission
NFCA	National Finance Commission Award
NWFP	North-West Frontier Province (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa)
PATA	Provincially Administered Tribal Area
PEFA	Public Expenditures and Financial Accountability
PFC	Provincial Finance Commission
PFM	Public Financial Management
SRC	Sector Reform Contract
TA	Technical Assistance
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
VAT	Value-Added Tax
WB	World Bank

## **1. Political, administrative and fiscal devolution: the 18<sup>th</sup> Amendment to the Constitution**

Passed in April 2010, the 18th constitutional Amendment is considered the most wide-ranging constitutional reform package since adoption of the 1973 constitution. Described by Senator Raza Rabbani as the “most comprehensive restructuring of the federal and provincial administration since 1947”, the 18th constitutional amendment responded to the longstanding demands for provincial autonomy, control/management of natural resources and equitable sharing of nation's wealth among the federation and its constituent units. This Amendment introduced changes to about 36 per cent of the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan: 102 out of 280 Articles of the Constitution were amended, inserted, added, substituted or deleted.

The 18th Amendment has restored the parliamentary system originally envisaged by the 1973 constitution by significantly reducing the power of the President. It has abolished the notorious Article 58 (2) B, allowing the President to dissolve Parliament at his discretion and restored authority of appointing the army chiefs and the provincial governors to the Prime Minister.

The 18th Amendment has significantly devolved political, administrative and fiscal authority<sup>1</sup> from the central government to the provinces by re-demarcating the jurisdictions of Pakistan's multi-level governance at the federal, inter-provincial and provincial levels by revising the Federal Legislative List Part I and Part II and abolishing the erstwhile Concurrent Legislative List (See box 1). Subsequently, the legislative and executive authorities of the federal and provincial governments have been delimited by assigning the exclusivity of 53 subjects to the federal government, 18 subjects to the Council of Common Interests (CCI) and all residual subjects to the provincial governments. Further redistribution of functions at the district, tehsil and union council levels has been vested with the provincial governments in accordance with the policy framework enunciated in Article 140 (A) of the Constitution.

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<sup>1</sup> According to the Constitution the four provinces are Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP, formerly NWFP North Western Frontier Province), Punjab and Sindh. No constitutional changes have been made with regard to KP or FATA as part of 18<sup>th</sup> Amendment. Article 247 of the Pakistani Constitution provides that no Act of Parliament applies to FATA, unless the President of Pakistan provides consent. Only the President is authorised to amend laws and promulgate ordinances for the tribal areas. Northern Territories, officially named Gilgit Baltistan are not part of Pakistan constitutionally and all packages extended to GB are administrative in nature.

**Box 1: The legislative lists**

The Constitution of Pakistan 1973 divided the legislative powers between the Centre and the Provinces by delineating two legislative lists:

Schedule IV

- i). Federal Legislative List [Part I (59 items & Part II (8 items)
- ii). Concurrent Legislative List (47 items)

In the Federal List, there were enumerated subjects on which the Federal Centre alone could legislate. This list comprised two parts, which had 67 items.

The second legislative list, designated as the Concurrent List, had 47 items. On these items, both the Centre and the provinces were entitled to legislate, but it was also laid down in the Constitution that in case of conflict between the laws made by the Centre and a province with respect to a subject in the Concurrent List, it was the federal law which was to prevail, no matter which of the two laws were made first. This means that the Centre had actual competence not only over the subjects specifically reserved for it, but also over those mentioned in the Concurrent Legislative List.

The residuary powers in matters not enumerated in Legislative Lists were left to the competence of the provinces.

(PART I (where jurisdiction is strictly federal) ; PART II (where Council of Common Interests advises)

As a result, the 18th Amendment has substantially reduced the size of federal government and altered the balance of power between centre and provinces. It has also corrected the highly skewed distribution of resources between the federal and provincial governments and amongst the provinces themselves.<sup>2</sup>

## 1.1 Political and Administrative Devolution

With the 18th Amendment, almost all direct public services have become a provincial responsibility. As a consequence, 17 central government ministries have been devolved to the provinces (See Table 1 on division of federal and provincial jurisdiction). Most of these ministries existed at the centre due to the concurrent list, meaning that similar ministries were also present at the provinces. However, it is a tremendous shift of power and resources from the centre to provinces and management of this transition is a huge challenge.

The Amendment has altered the functional responsibilities of different levels of government. It has abolished the Constitution's concurrent legislative list and changed the federal legislative list (Parts I and II). With the major exception of electricity, the concurrent list's functions have been devolved to the provinces. The amendment has also transferred certain subjects from Part I of the federal legislative list—comprising those functions allocated

<sup>2</sup> Ijaz Nabi Hina Shaikh , Fiscal Federalism In Pakistan: A Radical Departure And Some New Challenges, DPRC Working Paper, LUMS, December 2010



exclusively to the federal government—to Part II, making them a joint provincial–federal responsibility under the Council of Common Interests (CCI).<sup>3</sup> The provinces have also been strengthened with the transfer of some powers from the federally appointed provincial governors to the elected Chief Ministers of the provinces. All the residual functions not enumerated in the constitution also fall within the provinces' domain.

**Table 1: Reassignment functions among different orders of government under the 18th Amendment<sup>4</sup>**

<b>Federation/CCI (joint federal-provincial) tasks (Federal Legislative List Part II)</b>	
Electricity	Provincial police operations beyond provincial boundaries
Minerals, oil, and natural gas	Industrial policy
Railways	National planning and national economic coordination
Major ports	Coordination of scientific and technological research
Censuses	All regulatory authorities under a federal law
Public debt	Standards in higher education and research, scientific and technical institutions
Federal corporate entities, including the Water and Power Development Authority and Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation	Interprovincial matters and coordination
Legal, medical, and other professions	
<b>Federal functions (Federal Legislative List Part I)</b>	
Defense	International and interprovincial trade
External affairs and international treaties	Nuclear energy
Immigration and citizenship	Airports, aircraft, air navigation, air and sea travel and shipment, lighthouses
Post and telecommunications	Patents, trademarks, copyrights
Central banking, currency, foreign exchange	Stock exchanges and futures markets
Corporate regulation, including banking and insurance	National highways and strategic roads
Fishing beyond territorial waters	Federal geological surveys and meteorological organizations
Standards of weights and measures	Local government in cantonment areas
<b>Provincial responsibilities</b>	
All residual functions	
<b>Local government responsibilities</b>	
Determined by provincial government	

<sup>3</sup> Aisha Ghaus-Pasha, Making Devolution Work in Pakistan, The Lahore Journal of Economics 17 : SE (September 2012)

<sup>4</sup> Anwar Shah, The 18th Constitutional Amendment: Glue or Solvent for Nation Building and Citizenship in Pakistan?, The Lahore Journal of Economics 17 : SE (September 2012)

Local governments have gained formal recognition in the Constitution after the 18th Amendment and have come under the command of the provincial governments under Clause 140 A of the Constitution. The clause states: "Each Province shall, by law, establish a local government system and devolve political, administrative and financial responsibility and authority to the elected representatives of the local governments." This article, makes it mandatory for provinces to legislate on local government and it is required to further devolve political, administrative and financial authority, presently vested in the provincial governments. (See Box 2 and Table 2)

**Box 2: Devolution to local governments in the areas of rural development/agriculture and education. Sind and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.**

Both Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa passed their LG Acts in 2013. Both LG Acts provide for local government elections on a party basis. Both provinces have/will have Union Councils and District Councils in the rural areas and Union Councils/Committees and Municipal Committees in the urban areas. The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa LG Act also provides for Tehsil Councils and Village Councils in the rural areas and Neighbourhood Councils in the urban areas. However, the term limits of the local governments varies; while it is four years in Sindh, it is three years in case of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Both LG Acts provide for the establishment of Provincial Finance Commissions (PFC), headed by the provincial Finance Ministers. The local councils would receive allocations through the respective Provincial Finance Commission Awards, and would have limited powers to impose taxes or exercise regulatory functions. The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Act provides greater fiscal autonomy to the local government as it empowers Village and Neighborhood Councils to supervise all local government functionaries including revenue officials in their jurisdiction. Both LG Acts require audits of the local councils by the Office of the Auditor General.

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa act devolves the administrative and financial authority for the management of the departments of primary & secondary education, vocational education, special education, adult education & literacy, mother & child health centres, basic health units, rural health centres, social welfare, community development, sports & culture and revenue & estate, livestock, on-farm water management, soil conservation & soil fertility, fisheries, co-operatives, social & farm-forestry, hospitals other than district headquarters, teaching & tertiary hospitals, rural development & rural works and district roads & buildings, public health & public health engineering, population welfare and co-ordination, human resources management, planning, development, finance & budgeting functions for the devolved offices would also stand devolved to the district government of the district concerned.

The Sindh Local Government Act confines the local government's functions largely to basic municipal services and retains provincial subjects with the provincial government. The corporations/councils would have a 'consultative role' especially in primary education and primary health.

Both provincial governments have retained the authority to suspend or remove the heads of an elected local government.

**Table 2: Legislative Authority**

<b>S. no</b>	<b>Legislative powers</b>	<b>Competent forum</b>
1	<i>Federal Legislative List-I and II</i>	<i>The Parliament</i>
2	<i>Fundamental Rights: Right to Education, Right to Information and all other justice and fundamental rights</i>	<i>Federation and the Provinces</i>
3	<i>(a) Local Government (b) Only for Cantonments (entry 2-FL-I)</i>	<i>(a) Provinces (b) Federal Government</i>
4	<i>Criminal Law, Procedures and Evidence (Article 142 (b))</i>	<i>Both the Federal Parliament and the Provinces. It is a sort of new concurrency.</i>
5	<i>Residual subjects (including the subjects of erstwhile Concurrent List)</i>	<i>Provinces</i>
6	<i>For Islamabad Capital Territory and other territories outside Provinces</i>	<i>The Parliament</i>
7	<i>Assigned under Article 144 (for one or more Provinces by consent)</i>	<i>The Parliament</i>
8	<i>(a) Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) 1) Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATAs)</i>	<i>(a) The President can extend/ direct (b) The Governor can extend/ direct</i>

## 1.2 Fiscal Devolution

The 18th Amendment made significant changes to the special provisions of the Constitution, in the finance, audit and borrowing powers clauses. As mentioned above, a key change relates to the composition and functioning of the CCI which has been greatly strengthened. The federal government has also been constrained in terms of its authority over banking, finance, and insurance as its regulatory authority no longer extends to provincially owned entities or private entities operating in a single province.

There has also been a limited reassignment of taxing powers. The federal government has ceded responsibility for taxes on immovable property, estate and inheritance taxes, value-added tax (VAT) on services, and zakat and usher (religious taxes) to the provinces. The sales tax on services alone, if effectively collected could yield revenues equivalent to 0.5–1% of gross domestic product (GDP), thus providing a dynamic and buoyant tax base to provinces. Taxes on personal incomes (salaries etc...) and enterprises benefits, VAT on goods, excise duties, external trade taxes remain with the Federal Government.

According to Article 172(3), the oil and gas producing provinces are entitled to have 50 per cent ownership and management control on oil and gas and mineral resources in their respective regions. Very importantly, the provinces have been given borrowing powers. Provincial borrowing privileges have been expanded to include domestic and foreign loans, subject to limits and conditions imposed by the National Economic Council. The federal government has been mandated to consult the provinces prior to initiating any hydroelectric projects. The provinces, on the other hand, have been given a free hand in all

public services delivered within their territory, and control over all local government institutions.

Following the 18th amendment, and abolition of the concurrent list, national planning, and economic coordination has now become a joint responsibility of the federal and provincial governments. Supervision and management of public debt, federal regulatory authorities, and inter-provincial coordination are now new entries under the list of joint responsibilities. For this purpose, institutional strength and mechanisms are very important.<sup>5</sup>

### 1.3 Education and 18th Amendment

The most important change in the constitution of Pakistan related to education sector is insertion of Article 25-A that obligates the state to provide free and compulsory quality education. The article states: “The State shall provide free and compulsory education to all children of the age of five to sixteen years in such a manner as may be determined by law”. The jurisdictional changes introduced by the 18th Amendment have significant bearing on the education sector. Before introduction of the 18th Amendment, education was on the concurrent list, governed by both the federal and the provincial governments. As a result of deletion of the list, education is now solely a provincial subject. Two key entries of the constitution that gave the federal government authority to legislate and administer on education policy, planning, curriculum, standards, centres of excellence and Islamic education have been devolved to the provincial ambit.

### 1.4 Rural Development

Rural development requires an integrated approach combining efforts of various government departments at all three levels of government i.e. federal, provincial and local. Most important ministries and departments in this regard include local government, education, health, labour and manpower, agriculture, livestock and various financial institutions. Most of these departments have been completely devolved to the provincial level.

In health sector, for example, the subjects of drugs and medicines including poisonous and dangerous drugs have been transferred to the Provinces. Similarly, the Provinces now have the responsibility for “prevention of the extension from one Province to another of infectious or contagious diseases or pests affecting men, animals or plants.” The Ministry/Division of Food and Agriculture that was responsible mainly for policy formulation, economic coordination, and planning with respect to food grains and agriculture has also been devolved.

The landmark 18th Amendment has devolved 12 functions and attached departments of the now defunct federal ministry of food, agriculture and livestock (MINFAL) to provinces or other federal ministries. The devolved functions include those of plant protection; economic studies for framing agriculture policies; farm management/ research for planning; project formulation and evaluation; crops forecast and crop insurance; marketing intelligence;

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<sup>5</sup> Ijaz Nabi, Hina Shaikh, Fiscal Federalism In Pakistan: A Radical Departure And Some New Challenges, DPRC Working Paper, LUMS, December 2010.

agriculture commodity, market and laboratory research; soil survey and preparing comprehensive inventory of soil resources; production of special crops like UT olive; standardisation of agriculture machinery; economic planning and coordination with regard to cooperatives; socio-economic studies for framing agriculture research policies; and high level manpower training for agriculture research.

## 1.5 Issues, challenges and way forward

Provinces are still marred with the issue of capacity and coordination with regard to additional responsibilities shifted to them through the 18th amendments. There is an urgent need to develop inter-provincial mechanisms for experience sharing and mutual learning on effective management of devolved subjects while the Federal government need to play an effective role as a 'coordinating government'. Similarly, a comprehensive coordination and communication mechanism on implementation and reporting on international agreements, treatise, protocols and covenants need to be established.

Major fundamental reforms are needed that right-size the federal and provincial governments, strengthen local governance, enforce fiscal discipline and citizen-based accountability for service delivery performance on all orders of government, dismantle provincial barriers to factor mobility and internal trade.<sup>6</sup>

Five years after the devolution, many issues remain unresolved between the provinces and the centre. For example, the 18th Amendment empowered provinces to access foreign loans but up till now, required rules and limitations of loan amounts have not been framed by the Executive Committee of the National Economic Council (ECNEC). Similarly, Article 25-A has not been operationalised because provinces have not carried out necessary legislation in this regard. Similarly, a permanent Secretariat of the Council of Common Interests as per constitutional requirement has not yet been established and the Inter Provincial Coordination Division is working as secretariat for CCI though it was an interim arrangement till establishment of the permanent Secretariat of the Council. For effective devolution, it is important to set up the permanent secretariat of the CCI.

There is an ongoing conflict over interpretation between provinces and the Federal Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources (MPNR) on Article 172(3) that has shifted 50 percent ownership of oil and gas to provinces. Sindh claims its exclusive right in the extension of exploration licenses to oil and gas companies, while Balochistan demands the abolition of the MPNR. The exploration of oil and gas in 50 blocks allotted to national and international oil exploration companies in different provinces two years ago could not begin due to the absence of consensus framework between federal petroleum ministry and respective provinces.<sup>7</sup>

The administration of Pakistan Baitul Mal has been allocated to the Prime Minister's Secretariat.

<sup>6</sup> Anwar Shah, The 18th Constitutional Amendment: Glue or Solvent for Nation Building and Citizenship in Pakistan?, The Lahore Journal of Economics 17 : SE (September 2012)

<sup>7</sup> Amjad Bhatti, Five years after 18th Amendment, The News on Sunday, April 12, 2015

Provinces demanded its devolution.

Status of government servants transferred to provinces remains uncertain because provinces claim that their salaries and privileges would add sizable burden on their resources. Provinces also claim that the federal government has not provided required funds for the vertical programs related to health and other ministries.

Though devolution from centre to provinces has happened, provinces have not yet taken effective steps to devolve resources and authority to the local level. There was a natural expectation that provincial governments following the transfer of enhanced resources and functions would, in turn, strengthen local governments by transferring more funds and functions to them. However, the opposite has happened. Unfortunately, most provincial governments have been reluctant to hold local government elections till courts forced them to do so. In Punjab, for example, certain functions such as secondary education, curative health, and public safety have been taken back from the local governments and made the responsibility of the provincial government. As a result, the dream of devolution of power to the grassroots remains unrealized.

Though the provinces have acquired more resources through the devolution of powers from the centre but these resources are ironically being used for the benefit of only those who are living in big urban centres. The gulf between the 'haves and the have nots' has widened due to an uneven development route being planned without any consideration to the priorities of different regions in the country.<sup>8</sup>

Having decentralized vital subjects and services, the 18th Amendment now poses enormous political, legislative and administrative challenges to the provincial governments in transferring its powers and authorities further to the district governments. Hence, it requires wide - ranging structural changes and processes in the realms of legislation, governance, capacity building and devolved financial and administrative powers to the local government to effectively plan and implement development projects and basic services to the citizens.

Provincial governments need to review their Rules of Business and bring amendments therein to further devolve fiscal, policy and planning authorities to the district, tehsil and union councils through elected local governments. Provinces also need to address intra-province disparities by constituting Provincial and District Finance Commissions, ensuring fiscal equalization at the grassroots level.

After devolution of curriculum to the provincial domain, the federal bureau of curriculum has been closed down. However, the limited mandate of the inter-governmental bodies is a challenge to generate a national response to the issues of quality and equity of education. Many questions have arisen regarding formulation of curriculum and common minimum standards of education. The prospective change on the one hand poses a daunting challenge for the provincial governments for formulation of curriculum and standards, and on other it presents the federal government with a serious question to ponder upon as how to ensure common minimum standards in all the constituent units without compromising the

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<sup>8</sup> Nargis Sethi, Provinces Must Act to Complete 18<sup>th</sup> Amendment, Development Advocate Pakistan, UNDP, April 2015.

autonomy as envisaged by Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment. The devolution of the curriculum also poses questions regarding the possible issues of uniformity of curriculum and implications for national cohesion and identity.<sup>9</sup>

With the devolution of higher education, Sindh and Punjab have established their respective provincial higher education commissions, while the Central HEC and Federal Law Ministry terms them as “unconstitutional”. CCI in its last meeting in March 2015 has established a task force to resolve the issue between central and provincial HECs.

In area of agriculture, not much progress on transfer of institutions and organizations to provincial governments. As a result, provincial governments have not been able to take necessary steps to take over the responsibilities in this sector. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, for example, after over four years of passage of the 18th amendment, the provincial government has not gone beyond preparing first draft of the food and agriculture policy.<sup>10</sup>

The rural areas of Pakistan remain neglected. A large number of children are still out of schools, basic health facilities are in bad shape, toilet facilities are not available and a large percentage of the rural population does not have access to clean drinking water.

The civil society organizations, who have a history of engaging with the federal government for advocacy are still struggling to broaden their base to advocate with four provincial governments instead of one government at the centre.

Impact of devolution resulting from the 18th Amendment on the communities has not been fully studied and understood.

## **2. Main challenges of fiscal decentralisation and PFM reform process in Pakistan**

### **2.1 Overview and contextualisation of PFM reform and fiscal decentralisation process**

#### *2.1.1 PFM reform process*

1. In the absence of an integrated national PFM reform strategy, the Government of Pakistan have started since the mid 1990's to implement several reforms related to different compartments of the PFM system with the support of the main development partners (WB, ADB, IMF, DFID, GIZ...). These reforms have particularly focused on the improvement and automation of the budgeting, accounting and financial reporting system, the adoption of medium term budgetary frameworks, the development of audit

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<sup>9</sup> 18th Constitutional Amendment: Issues and Challenges in Curriculum and Standards, Institute of Social and Policy Sciences (I-SAPS)

<sup>10</sup> CPDI, Citizens' Oversight of 18th Amendment in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Centre for Peace and Development Initiatives, October 2014.

practises, the consolidation of the single treasury account, the divesting of audit functions from accounting, the introduction of New Accounting Module (NAM) and the improvement of the tax system. PFM diagnostics and PEFA assessments have been carried out since mid-2000 at federal and provincial levels and have demonstrated improvements in some areas. However the repeated PEFA diagnosis for KP province (2001), for the Federal Government (2012) and for the Sindh province globally concluded that whilst improvements have been achieved in a number of areas, on-going PFM reforms did not result yet in major progress in the performance of the PFM system. All these diagnostics have revealed the need for further important reforms and consolidation process in order to ensure genuine progress in fiscal discipline, strategic allocation of resources, better budgetary outcome and more efficient public service delivery. Weaknesses of capacities in the provincial and lower tier administrations were also acknowledged.

2. **Key PFM weaknesses concern the internal and external control and audit systems (noncompliance with rules and regulations), the credibility of the budget execution, the procurement functions and procedures and the legislative oversight.** As currently observed in several developing countries undertaking similar PFM reforms, upstream planning and forecasting improved progressively whilst spending the budget in accordance with the policy priorities, fiscal discipline and scrutiny of the budget has remained more of a challenge. The overall PFM framework was also characterised by a high level of centralisation and fragmentation with the dominant role in budgeting and control of the Ministry of Finance, the lack of delegation of responsibility and authority to the line ministries, department and agencies (MDA) to manage their budget leading to weak budget management capacities of MDA in terms of preparing realistic budget estimates, budget management, allocation of resources and professional financial management. Despite some improvements, cash forecasting and management remains weak at central and provincial government's levels due to centralised accounting and payments function and slow progress in commitment and expenditure arears accounting.

### 2.1.2 *Political, institutional and fiscal context*

3. **The last decade has been characterised by a general context of tight fiscal consolidation process under successive IMF programmes** and covariate risks related to economic distress, adverse climatic conditions and highly volatile political and regional security environment. In addition to these related unanticipated contingencies that have often put additional pressure on public expenditures, the PFM reforms in Pakistan have been carried out in an evolving institutional and fiscal environment characterised by a fiscal decentralisation and devolution process (7<sup>th</sup> National Finance Commission<sup>11</sup> Award signed in December 2009 and in force since FY 2010/11 and the subsequent 18<sup>th</sup> Amendment to the Constitution ratified by the Parliament in April 2010). This process has implied important transfers of management responsibilities of a

<sup>11</sup> The 1973 Constitution established the Federation of Pakistan and created the Council of Common Interest (CCI) to deal with dispute between the centre and the provinces. The National Finance Commission (NFC) was created to set up the common pool of resources from federal tax receipts and distribute it through specific "Award" among provinces. The common and/or divisible pool of resources consists of different federal taxes and represent almost 100% of all federally collected taxes.



majority of service delivery-related functions to the provinces, particularly in the social and agricultural areas, as well as increased transfers of financial means to sub-national levels.

4. Consequently **the need to strengthening and developing PFM capacity, systems and process at provincial and district levels has quickly emerged as a key concern and challenge**. Based on recent PFM subnational assessments<sup>12</sup> (PEFA, Public expenditure review, Fiduciary Risk assessments...) supported by the development partners, main weaknesses have been identified and has guided the (recent) adoption of integrated PFM reform strategy at provincial level. Whilst the pace of reform has been unequal throughout the provinces, weaknesses have been initially addressed by the consolidation of PFM reforms implemented at national level such as the adoption of medium term budgetary frameworks, the automation of budgeting, accounting and financial reporting as well as the modernisation of auditing practises.
5. While mandatory under the 18<sup>th</sup> Amendment of the 1973 Constitution, **local government elections and implementation of local government acts have been delayed**. If the addition of the article 140A in the constitution aimed at further devolving political, administrative and financial responsibility and authority to the elected representatives, the lapse of the 2001 local governance ordonnance in the provinces have led to the dissolution of elected bodies at district and lower tiers level (such as Union Councils) and the abolishment of elected mayors. This situation has considerably limited the expected devolution process between the provincial and the lower tiers leading to a weakened district governance system. Local powers have been essentially assumed by unelected and appointed district administrators. A top-down approach between the provinces and the districts has been established with the abandon of the Provincial Finance Commissions (PFC)<sup>13</sup>. This increased provincial control and centralisation over local public finance management, including the prioritisation of local budget allocations on behalf of district authorities, and reduced the amount of funds directly transferred to and managed by local administration. Overall, this period is characterised by a re-concentration of budgetary management responsibilities and functions at provincial level weakening local accountability systems.
6. From a federal macro-fiscal point perspective, **the new revenue sharing agreement proposed under the 7<sup>th</sup> NFC**, favouring the redistribution to the provinces (cf. Table 1), **presents a challenge to the federal fiscal consolidation effort** and the Pakistani authorities have recognized the risks to the country's public finances arising from decentralisation. Started under previous constitutional amendments and NFC<sup>14</sup>, increased transfers to the provinces which culminated under the 7<sup>th</sup> NFC have occurred at a time when the federal government has struggled to address its large fiscal deficits.

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<sup>12</sup> In this note we will focus essentially on the two provinces (Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) where the EU is providing budget support.

<sup>13</sup> PFC were established since 2001 in all the provinces and were in charge of formulating transparent mechanism for vertical and horizontal distribution of funds between provinces and districts and among districts.

<sup>14</sup> The article 160 of the Constitution of Pakistan provided for the establishment of a National Finance Commission (NFC) every 5 years or less in order to advise the President on the distribution of resources between the federal and provincial governments in order to address the country's structural horizontal and vertical fiscal imbalances.

The provinces are then increasingly required to contribute to the consolidation effort while facing tremendous needs in terms of public expenditure for services deliveries to its respective population. The 7th National Finance Commission (NFC) award has also devolved to the provinces taxation authority in agriculture, property and services which left the federal government with a severe imbalance between its remaining expenditure responsibilities and its revenue net from the transfers to the provinces. However most of the revenues are still collected by the central government and redistributed to the provinces. This dependence derives from the structural vertical fiscal imbalance due to uneven allocation of functional responsibilities and fiscal powers between the federal and provincial governments in Pakistan.

	Federal and Provincial Fiscal Balances (% of GDP)			
	2012/13	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16
Overall balance	-8.5	-5.5	-4.4	-3.6
Provincial balance	-0.1	0.5	1.0	1.4
Share in federal revenue	5.2	5.7	6.2	6.6
Federal balance	-8.4	-6.0	-5.4	-5.0

Source: IMF 2015

7. The federal government was then confronted to a weaker structural fiscal position aggravated by **an extremely weak tax-to-GDP ratio by regional and international standards** (less than 10%, among the world's lowest, for a fiscal deficit around 8% and a public debt-to-GDP ratio above 60%). According to the IMF and the World Bank, in the last two decades, the provincial tax-to-GDP ratio has oscillated between 0.35% and 0.55% and the share of subnational tax revenue in total national tax revenue was estimated at 5% in 2011/2012. Such inadequacy of provincial revenue collection has become a serious concern because it puts greater stress on scarce federal resources in a context of expanded outlays associated with the new devolved functions from the 18th Amendment. In 2011/12, all provinces spent about nine times the revenue they collected from tax and nontax sources (provincial revenue accounted for 11.4 percent of expenditure in 2011/12) compared to six times in 2008/2009. Provincial taxes are even smaller than pre-7<sup>th</sup> NFC federal grants and loans from the federal government, which also created disincentives for provincial governments to increase their revenue. The small share of provincial spending covered by provincial revenues creates a risk for fiscal discipline and stability. While fiscal decentralization aimed at improving the delivery of public goods and services, this situation underlines the need for a careful management of the decentralisation process and for a coordinated approach and enforcement of clear rules governing provincial and federal fiscal targets to ease the attainment of the general government fiscal policy objectives.
8. As federal government has embarked in a comprehensive tax policy and administration reform process, the provinces need to raise their own tax revenues, including revenues from general sales tax on services, urban and agriculture property tax and motor vehicle

tax, while at the same time improving the capacity to manage their new spending responsibilities. Some provinces such as Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have established provincial Revenue Board to collect sales tax on services after the introduction of the 18<sup>th</sup> Amendment. In addition to weak administrative and functional capacities, main challenges for efficient tax administration at provincial level concern the lack of updated survey of potential taxpayers and the need for clarification of discretionary powers with respect to tax assessment and levy of penalties (agricultural income and property tax).

9. At the heart of the tax problem is that provinces have the wrong incentives to collect taxes, though from the pure perspective of raising taxes, the provincial agenda is quite straightforward: (a) approve a provincial tax-friendly fiscal transfer mechanism. This implies approving a provincial more tax-friendly fiscal transfer mechanism by reviewing the current fiscal transfer mechanism to rebalance provincial revenue collection with expenditure needs - as the 18th Amendment stipulated that the share of provinces in the divisible pool of federal revenue cannot drop below the level defined by the 7th National Finance Commission Award (57.5 percent), this requires a constitutional amendment, (b) to enhance capacity of provincial tax administration, (c) broaden the tax basis for the general sale tax on service (GSTS)...
10. Stark interprovincial structural disparities lead to different tax bases and expenditure needs. While Punjab and Sindh have greater potential to raise tax revenue, given their higher income per capita, Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have a lower provincial income level, a narrow tax basis and, on the opposite, face greater social needs. According to recent rough estimates (World Bank), Sindh collects about 50 percent of total provincial taxes; Punjab 25 percent; Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Federally Administered Tribal Areas 13 percent; and Baluchistan 12 percent.

### **2.1.3 *Institutional and Fiscal implications of the 7<sup>th</sup> NFC Award and the 18<sup>th</sup> amendment to the Constitution***

#### **Salient features and financial implications of the 7<sup>th</sup> NFC Award for the federal government and the provinces**

11. The 7<sup>th</sup> NFCA (running for 5 years from FY 10/11 to FY 14/15) introduced important structural changes in the intergovernmental transfers and the criteria for vertical and horizontal distribution of federal funding between the provinces. It has first contributed to end federal dominance over fiscal resources while it has once again underlined the high dependence of the provinces towards federal fiscal resources. Inter-governmental revenue transfers are the lifeline of provincial governments as they account form 80 up to 90 percent of provincial revenues.

**Box 1. Salient Features of the 7th NFC Award**

- **Enlargement of the Divisible Pool** with the reduction of collection charges from 5.2% to 1%.
- Recognition that **sales tax on service becomes a provincial subject** and devolution of services under the ambit of federal excise duties to the provinces
- **Higher provincial share in vertical transfers** from 46.15 up to 57.5% of the divisible pool.
- Diversification from a single (size of the population) to **a multi-criteria sharing formula for horizontal transfers** between provinces:
  - ✓ Population (82%)
  - ✓ Poverty and backwardness (10.3%)
  - ✓ Revenue collection/generation (5%)
  - ✓ Inverse population density (2.7%)
- Special considerations to support “war on terror” (1% of the total divisible pool earmarked discretionary allocation for the KP province) and consider special development needs of Baluchistan (increased share of the province in the provincial divisible pool up to 9.09% and earmarking of RS 83 billion instead of unguaranteed estimated revenues transfers)
- **Enhancement in straight transfers** (resolution of longstanding disputes with KP and Baluchistan provinces on arrears of hydel electricity profits and gas development surcharges (GDS), royalty on natural gas and GDS notionally clubbed into one rate per million British thermal unit (MMBTU) – this rate of excise duty on gas was increased from Rs 5.09 MMBTU to Rs 10 MMBTU)..

12. With regards to **vertical distribution** dimension, the share of provinces in federal receipts - consolidated under a “divisible tax pool<sup>15</sup>” - has been increased from 47.5 percent to 56 percent the first year (2010/11) and then to **57.5%** subsequently. At the same time, the collection charge of the federal government was reduced from 5.2% to 1% increasing de facto the available amount in the divisible tax pool<sup>16</sup>. General Sale Tax (GST) on services collected in the Central Excise mode by the FBR was also considered by the 7<sup>th</sup> NFC as a provincial tax and therefore its revenue proceeds were reverted to the provinces and excluded from the divisible pool. However, provinces were given the choice to collect GST on services provincially or allow the FBR to collect it on their behalf with proceeds reverted back as a straight transfers.

13. This assignment of tax revenues to the provinces confirmed an absolute dependence on federal government and a restricted provincial fiscal autonomy with all broad-based and most buoyant taxes going to the federal government while provinces remaining responsible for a few small, inelastic taxes.

14. In terms of **horizontal distribution** dimension, while previous distribution of NFC Awards and Revenues and Grant-in aid Orders was based only on the size of provincial

<sup>15</sup> Divisible tax pool was formed by excluding federal excise duty on natural gas, export duties, provincial GST, and collection charges from the total FBR tax revenues.

<sup>16</sup> Historically, 5 percent of the gross revenue was retained by federal government as collection charges to cover the expenditure of revenue collecting agency – the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR).

population, the 7th NFC Award expanded the distribution criteria for the divisible pool through a multiple indicators revenue sharing formula. New criteria have been added to the one on the size of population and concern poverty and backwardness, revenue collection/generation, and inverse population density/area. If the weight for the **population criteria remained the most influent (82%)**, the new formula integrated an explicit dimension on horizontal fiscal equalisation through the acknowledgement of poverty ratio at provincial level as well as the relative cost of public services delivery according to the province's area and population density. Such updated weightage provided the province of Balochistan with a gain of almost 4% in the sharing formula.

<b>Table 3. Horizontal distribution of Federal Transfers (%)</b>				
NFC Awards	Punjab	Sindh	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	Baluchistan
Last FY 2008/2009 under previous the 7 <sup>th</sup> NFC Awards	57.36	23.71	13.82	5.11
First FY 2009/2010 under 7 <sup>th</sup> NFC Awards	51.74	24.55	14.62	9.09

Source: Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan

15. Recognising the role of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as a frontline province against the war on terror, the Federal Government and the provinces agreed to earmark one percent of net proceeds of the divisible pool for KPK for the entire Award period. As an example, the funds earmarked represented an additional Rs 15 billion for FY 2010/2011. The 7<sup>th</sup> NFC Award also ensured a floor on transfers to the province of Balochistan, the largest region of Pakistan (44% of the country's total area) but also the least inhabited (5% of total population) and developed, in order to ensure that the province got at least Rs 83 billion of transfer under the divisible pool for the first year of the Award. For the rest of the award, it was guaranteed that the province would receive a provincial share from the divisible pool based on the budgeted or targeted revenue such as planned in the approved budget and not based on actual collection as for the other provinces. In case of any shortfall is to be compensated at the expense of the federal government revenue but not from the provincial divisible pool.
16. The FBR tax revenue for 2010-11 was estimated at Rs 1,568 billion. **The 7<sup>th</sup> NFC Award has implied an enlargement of the divisible pool** of Rs 1,236 billion during the 5 years Award for the provinces which meant an increase up to Rs 2,764 billion by 2014-15. The total amount of resources to be transferred to the provinces during the life of the 7<sup>th</sup> NFC Award was expected to be 2.5 times more than what were transferred previously. This situation has raised several challenges in terms of predictability, absorption capacity and sound fiscal and budget management of these additional resources for the provinces. These challenges were also more acute due to the increase of the national fiscal deficit (the Government primary balance increased from -1.9% in 2009/2010 up to -3.9% in 2012/2013), the rise of security and defence expenditures

related to the “war on terror” and the burden of debt interest payments (with an increase of domestic debt from 31% of GDP up to 43.4% between 2010 and 2014) during the period covered by the 7<sup>th</sup> NFC award.

**Table 4: Transfers to the provinces (million Rs)**

Fiscal Years	2009/2010	2010/2011	2011/2012	2012/2013	2013/2014
Total federal taxes	1312806	1540095	1868226	1927377	2287040
Transfers to provinces	575623	907234	1011107	1134194	1278156

Source: Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan

17. **According the latest PEFA assessment of the Pakistan Federal Government (June 2012), a structured rule-based allocation system governs the allocations to and among sub-national levels under the direction of the NFC.** As provincial governments follow the same budget calendar as the Federal Government, an indicative amount is given at the start of the budget preparation process and the final allocation are communicated to the provinces by early June once the Federal budget is finalised. The federal budget is tabled two weeks before the provincial budgets which leaves rooms for provincial governments to adapt their budget proposals. During the fiscal year, transfers to the provinces are based on actual tax collection which make actual transfers from the Federal Government during the fiscal year contingent upon actual tax collection of the FBR (exception of Baluchistan that has to receive under the 7<sup>th</sup> NFC Award a provincial share from the divisible pool based on the budgeted or targeted revenue of the Federal Board of Revenue). As underlined by the PEFA assessments at federal and provincial levels and by budget information analysis derived from the Ministry of Finance, annual shortfalls in FBR projected revenues have occurred regularly during the last fiscal years. While provincial share in the indicative federal budget revenue has been within +/- 5% of the actual budget allocate to provinces before 2012, the situation has evolved with important discrepancies between budget and actual collection of FBR tax revenues in federal budget as approved by the National Assembly (cf. Table 3).

**Table 5. FBR: actual collection versus budgeted (Rs billion)**

Fiscal year	Budgeted	Actual collection	Deviation %
2009/2010	1380	1329	-3.7
2010/2011	1667	1558	-6.5
2011/2012	1952	1881	-3.6
2012/2013	2381	1936	-18.7
2013/2014	2475	2272	-8.2

Source: Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan and IMF ART IV and Programme Reviews

18. The fact that the amount to be transferred by the federal government to the provinces depends on actual revenue collection makes the provincial governments highly dependent on the capacity of the federal government to collect targeted tax revenues. Several PEFA assessments at provincial level (Sindh 2013, KP 2011) have recorded the difficulties faced by federal government in reaching its target on federal tax between 2009/10 and 2012/13 though the annual deviations between budgeted and actual transfers to the provinces stayed in a range of 10%. In addition to weak tax policy and administration, weak economic conditions emerging from volatile law and order situation coupled with energy crises have also contributed to this underperformance. However, a key issue deriving from the unpredictability of tax collection by federal government lies in the timeliness of federal transfers to the consolidated account of the provinces. According to the last PEFA for the Sindh Province, the budget documents do not clearly state the timetable of the distribution of the disbursement and that established practice expects biweekly release of funds to the subnational government in equal instalments. Significant delays have been observed during the fiscal year affecting the predictability of fiscal resources at provincial level and consequently cash and budget expenditure management.
19. Regarding expenditures the share of the federal government has decreased by almost three percentage points from an estimated 71.5% in 2009/2010 to 68.7% in 2014/2015. Provincial expenditures grew at an average rate of 15% per year during the first four years of the 7<sup>th</sup> NFC Award period whereas federal expenditures grew at 13% per year. Higher growth in current expenditure compared to development expenditure at provincial level may indicate that a large share of additional federal transfers under the 7<sup>th</sup> NFC Award was used for current expenditure while the utilisation rate of development expenditure has decreased due to financial constraint, and limited absorption capacity. This situation has also resulted in the constitution of budget surpluses at provincial level after a slight deficit observed at the beginning of the 7<sup>th</sup> NFC Award. During the same period, the overall deficit has increased from 6.2% in 2009/10 to 8.3% in 2012/2013 before decreasing in 2013/14 to 5.5%.
20. **Fiscal space provided to the provinces by the 7<sup>th</sup> NFC Award was reduced in the first years of the Award (2010-2012) with the unilateral and precipitated decision of the federal government to increase by 25% then by 50% the salaries and pensions of government employees** forcing Provincial government to follow this increase. Such decision considerably squeezed provincial budgets crowding out funding for operating, maintenance and development expenditures whilst the bulk of districts budgets is often considered to be absorbed by staff wages. From 2013 onwards, the federal government has also pressed the provinces to keep their budget in surplus in the framework of its negotiations on macroeconomic and fiscal stability criteria with the IMF<sup>17</sup> and despite the approval by provincial parliament of provincial budget showing aggregated small deficit. Coupled with lower Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) collection

<sup>17</sup> Following the approval by the provinces during the fiscal year 2013/14, through the Council of Common Interest (CCI), to deliver the required fiscal surplus through saving additional revenue transfers, the State Bank of Pakistan was expected to remunerate with interest rate the deposits held by each province. In the context of the IMF/government fiscal consolidation programme, the federal government has also encouraged the provinces to limit its spending through the provision of three-month Treasury bill interest rate on their cash balances.

rate that have impacted the level and timing of fiscal transfers to the provinces, the latter faced difficulties to save budget funds to finance development expenditures while the bulk of the provincial budgets was already earmarked for salaries and current expenditures. If the Federal government became under strong fiscal constraints to increase its tax-to-GDP ratio, it has not been able to timely release development funds to the province to allow proper commitment and management of funds at local level leading to low level of budget execution on investment expenditures. During 2008/09 to 2009/10 (pre 7<sup>th</sup> NFCA), the average provincial utilisation rate of development expenditures was estimated at almost 95% whereas it has been reduced to 75% in the post 7<sup>th</sup> NFCA period.

21. The 7<sup>th</sup> NFC Award assumed that the federal and provincial governments would reform the tax administration and policy in order to raise the tax-to-GDP ratio from 9 to 15% by the end of the Award. This decision derived from the negotiations on the 7<sup>th</sup> NFC Award were meant to make the federal government able to collect adequate level of resources to finance its functions despite a reduction of its share from the divisible pool (estimated from more than 50% before the 7<sup>th</sup> NFC Award to 44% in 2010/11 and to 42.5% the subsequent years). However, the federal government failed to increase its tax collection whilst the provinces have increased their tax revenues essentially on the ground of the transfer of the GST on services while performances on tax income from agriculture and property have stalled<sup>18</sup>.
22. While straight transfers, grants and constitutional subventions do not explicitly fall under the domain of the NFC, they were an integral part of the 7<sup>th</sup> NFC Award deliberations. Considered as a concurrent part of NFC Awards, discretionary grants-in-aid to all provinces were abolished by the 7<sup>th</sup> NFC Awards. The province of Sindh was given a grant of 0.66 percent of the provincial divisible pool to partly offset losses due to the merger of one-sixth of GST in the divisible pool. Arrears on the payment of hydel profits to KPK were paid and arrears of Gas Development Surcharge (GDS) was expected to be paid retroactively to the province of Baluchistan.

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<sup>18</sup> In addition to weak technical and administrative capacities fiscal underperformances in enhancing revenues from property tax and agricultural income tax can also be explained by political resistance by provincial and local political party representatives to hurt urban and rural voting population whilst increased federal transfers under the 7<sup>th</sup> NFC have contributed to provide disincentive for genuine provincial fiscal efforts.



### ***Salient features of the 18<sup>th</sup> Amendment with regard to PFM***

23. The direct devolution to the district authorities proposed by the Musharraf military regime in the aftermath of the 9/11 did not bring sufficient clarification of responsibilities and strengthening of capacities at local level. This devolution process was essentially politically motivated in order to avoid and bypass the established political parties and powers centres in the provinces considered as centre of civilian political power<sup>19</sup>. The 2001 Local Governance Ordinance (LGO) devolved some key functions to local governments including related financial responsibilities. The related devolution plan increased the scope and authority of elected local government and established a rule-based system of fiscal transfers between the provinces and the local governments through the setting up of Provincial Finance Commissions (PFC). However, such devolution plan could not provide a viable and integrated framework for the provincial and local governments. This process was finally reversed with the return to democratic rules in 2008, and the 18<sup>th</sup> constitutional amendment which devolved full functions to provinces in 2010 putting local governments under the control of provincial government officials rather than elected local representatives.
24. **The 18<sup>th</sup> Amendment made important changes in the Constitution which led to significant impact on intergovernmental fiscal transfers.** It has explicitly made sales tax on services a provincial tax by amending the Federal Legislative List and has also confirmed the tax on property (tax on the capital value on immovable property) as a provincial subject. While potentially buoyant tax bases (services, agricultural income and immovable property) became in the exclusive fiscal domain of provincial government, the level of under-taxation is well acknowledged and improvement of tax policy and tax administration at provincial still needs further consideration and efforts to enhance provincial tax-to-GDP ratio and to contribute to reducing the vertical imbalance in intergovernmental fiscal relations. The potential negative impact of the 7<sup>th</sup> NFC award will also need further analysis. Indeed, there is a *de facto* negative relationship between provincial own tax revenues and the level of transfers from the divisible pool. It is not yet possible to clearly assess whether higher transfers from the federal government may have slacken provincial own fiscal effort, contributing to substitute rather than complement provincial own revenues.
25. **The transfer of additional funds under the 7<sup>th</sup> NFC Award was accompanied by the transfer of more spending responsibilities to the province under the 18<sup>th</sup> Constitutional Amendment.** While preceded by the 7<sup>th</sup> NFC Award, the 18<sup>th</sup> Constitutional Amendment deleted the Concurrence Legislative List (formerly a part of the Constitution) and has devolved an increasing number of functions under provincial responsibility including local government and rural development, health, education, food and agriculture, population planning and welfare, labour and environmental pollution and ecology as well as a significant share of development spending. The number of Divisions in the federal government declined from 55 to 33 and the total employment in Divisions being devolved was estimated at more than 35,000 including 14,000 in

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<sup>19</sup> Like previous military governments, the attempts to strengthen local governments aimed at depoliticise public governance and establish new political elite to challenge political opposition at provincial level.

education alone. On the other hand, subjects such as electricity, legal, medical and other professions as well as standards in higher education were added to the Federal Legislative List.

26. Provinces have also been authorised to borrow on domestic and international market under the aegis and control of the National Economic Council (NEC). However, control modalities regarding domestic bank borrowing from Central Bank and provincial Bank have not been clarified yet. International loans that were previously routed through the Economic Affairs Division (EAD) of the Federal Government have been surrounded by criticisms on cumbersome procedures and high interest rates charged by the Federal Government on the concerned provinces. Prior to the 1996 NFC award, Cash Development Loans used to be made by the Federal Government to the provincial governments. In 2010/11, the provincial outstanding debt was estimated at about 5% of the GDP with 77% being foreign debt of a concessional nature and interest payments accounted for 5% of current expenditure leading to the conclusion that the current debt levels of Provincial government remained relatively small and sustainable. According to preliminary figures from the Ministry of Finance, increase in provinces' fiscal space derived from the 7<sup>th</sup> NFC Award did not lead to a serious increase of borrowings of funds during the first years of the Award. However, fiscal risks exist particularly with the large employment of personnel by the provincial government and the potential growth in contingent liabilities due to the rise in the pension's bill. **Shortfall of revenue transfers due to lack of achievement of FBR 's targets under the 7<sup>th</sup> NFC Award**<sup>20</sup>, the large hike in salaries of 50% that took place in 2010/11, the financing of devolved current and development expenditures, including the expenditure on relief and rehabilitation after devastating floods, and the over-optimistic projections of foreign assistance have also represented important sources of fiscal risks that should imply the development of fiscal rules and debt ceiling for a sustainable level of provincial borrowing over the medium term.
27. The 18<sup>th</sup> Amendment brought constitutional provisions for the NFC by enforcing that future NFC Awards cannot reduce the share of provinces from the existing 57.5% of the divisible pool. This provision will impact the negotiations on the next NFC award that have stalled since 2014.

#### 2.1.4. *Provincial lower tiers: intra-provincial transfers and PFM relations*

28. **Local governments have benefited from fiscal autonomy between 2001 and 2008.** During this period, Provincial Finance Commissions were established in each provinces every three years to decide award on vertical and horizontal distribution of resources including development and current transfers. District governments were formed under each Provincial Local Government Ordinance (LGO) with their own political representation and they were empowered with the preparation of their own budget, management of funds for key public services (including education and healthcare) and preparation of financial statements according to the new accounting model developed at

<sup>20</sup> While initial commitment under the 7<sup>th</sup> NFC Award foresaw a tax-to- GDP ratio of 15% at the end of the award period, under performances led a tax-to GDP ratio of 9.4% in 2014/2015.

the country's level. The PFC system was needed as Provincial LGO devolved substantial administrative authorities with expenditure requirement far in excess of districts' own revenues. The PFC grants system were based on multiple criteria specific to each provinces while taking into account varying existing level of developments throughout provinces and among districts. In the case of Sindh province, the criteria selected by the latest PFC (2007) to calculate the award to lower tiers included population (40%), service infrastructure (35%), backwardness/development needs (10%), area (5%) and performance (tax effort/revenue generation and primary school enrolment).

29. Since 2008 and pending local elections and installation of local governments in all provinces, **the PFC system has been discontinued putting on hold the fiscal decentralisation process at provincial level.** The provincial LGO were either repealed (e.g. in 2011 in the Sindh province) or lapsed (in 2008 in the KP province). In the case of Sindh Province, while budget allocation for districts were still determined through each latest PFC award, budget planning and allocation were recentralised at provincial level. District administrations were placed under direct control of the provinces and the district budget preparation and related financial statements were not prepared by the district governments anymore but managed by the District Accounts Office and District Commissioner. In the case of KP province, the decentralisation process has also reversed following the lapse of the 2001 LGO and its replacement by a local governance bill adopted by the provincial Assembly that implied a lesser role for the PFC and the revert of planning and development functions to the province e.g. for the education services.
30. In terms of budget documentation, the allocations for each district have been included in the provincial budget and have been recorded as cost centres in the Government Financial Management Information System. However, financial statements of provinces report data of district budgetary allocation and expenditure only as a single line item which does not provided sufficient disaggregated level to analyse district fiscal data and to ensure that electorates of the districts and provinces can be better informed about detailed spending by the public sector in key policy areas. Pakistan's 2015 Open Budget Index score was 43/100, less than the average score of 45 for the countries surveyed in 2015.
31. Up to now, **the share of local governments in provincial expenditures has remained limited.** While the resources available at local government level is weak, such as in the provinces of KP and Sindh, transfers to local governments of these two provinces represented respectively approximately 6 percent and 5 percent of the corresponding total provincial expenditures between 2013 and 2015. In addition, district development funds have been progressively squeezed by wages and current expenditures. Weak capacities at district level have comforted the provincial governments not to devolve funds. They have started planning, funding and delivery of public services from provincial capital through a top-down approach and transfer earmarked funds to district for them to deliver while a tiny part of the provincial development budget was devolved to district control, leaving few margin of manoeuvre in terms of PFM at local level. This situation did not provide incentives to further improve budget planning, rigorous financial management and accountability at local level despite the need to strengthen public financial management systems and capacities at provincial and district levels.

32. **The absence of effective own-source revenues at provincial and local level has remained a fundamental problem** and one of the key weakness of the devolution process in Pakistan. Progress in domestic resource mobilisation at provincial level still require the governments to further tap local tax base potential. Improvement of the capacity to manage provincial new spending responsibilities under the 18<sup>th</sup> amendment need also strengthen PFM capacities at the provincial and lower tiers in order to and to ensure the promotion of districts' fiscal equalisation and the financing of better public services delivery at the local level while deepening the fiscal decentralisation and devolution process.

## **2.2. Main considerations for BS policy dialogue on macroeconomic, tax policy and public expenditure management with federal and provincial governments**

### Key issues:

On-going sector budget supports in Pakistan concern the education and rural development sectors. They can be considered as budget support to decentralised service delivery. They are provided at provincial level (sub national entity) to which these sectors' policy functions, financing and implementation responsibilities have been devolved following the 18<sup>th</sup> Amendment. However, the provinces remain financially extremely dependent from the federal intergovernmental transfers under the NFC Award and will remain so in the near future due to the weak local tax basis. Issues related to the improvement of (a) the tax basis (tax to GDP ratio) at federal and provincial level, (b) the predictability of federal transfers to the province under the NFC Award and (c) the overall credibility of the budget management and execution at provincial level should be at the core the policy dialogue with the concerned authorities. While policy dialogue on PFM and sector policy can be managed at provincial level, ensuring a constructive policy dialogue with the federal authorities on overall macroeconomic, PFM, tax reform, consolidation of fiscal decentralisation and coordination of fiscal policies at federal and provincial levels should be instrumental to maximise and ensure the sustainability of the specific objectives of the on-going and future sector reform contracts while addressing potential macroeconomic and fiscal risks.

While Sector Reform Contracts (SRC) at provincial level should be continued, it is also important to consider the relevance to allow the EU policy dialogue to focus on the required macroeconomic and fiscal reforms that are still under the responsibility of the federal authorities. If it could be relevant to combined SRC at provincial level with a BS at federal level focusing on these macroeconomic issues, the policy dialogue under the SRC with the provincial authorities may also be as much as possible complemented by a regular policy dialogue with the federal authorities particularly in the context of the macroeconomic and PFM eligibility criteria. The ongoing PFM TA project that includes a component with the federal authorities has provided since 2014 a valuable entry point in that regard.

Sector policy dialogue at provincial level should be as much as possible informed by up-to-date PFM assessments such as PEFA but also through more “drill-down” diagnostic such as public expenditure reviews and public expenditure tracking surveys in order to better assess flows of public funds and weaknesses of administrative capacities and public expenditure management throughout the different tiers under the provincial level. This approach will be particularly relevant and informative for the ongoing and future EU interventions in the education sector and the expected reinitiating of Provincial Finance Commission Awards (PFC) in the context of the implementation of the Local Government Acts and the fiscal devolution to the districts.

Efforts should also be pursued to place improvement of the budget credibility at the core of the EU policy dialogue with Pakistani authorities particularly in the context of the country's Constitution that allows the Executive to amend budget ceilings and priorities without prior approval from the Parliament.

33. **In the absence of progress in tax policy and tax administration reform at federal and provincial (characterised among others by the failure of the General Sale Tax and the low buoyancy of main federal and local taxes), fiscal decentralisation has considerably limited the ability of the federal government to conduct counter cyclical stabilisation policies and discretionary fiscal policy.**  
 The large devolution of federal revenues to the provinces with more limited than expected devolution of spending responsibilities (such as the central payroll of devolved ministries) have left the federal budget in a weaker structural position.
34. **Underperformances of the FBR in increasing the tax-to-GDP ratio up to 15% as agreed during the negotiations of the 7<sup>th</sup> NFC Award coupled with increasing defence/security expenditures, debt-servicing, wage payroll and energy subsidies have put the fiscal decentralisation process under severe financial constraint.** A cooperative framework between the federal government and the provinces is still needed to ensure conformity between sub-national policies and macro-economic objectives and particularly to assure attainment of the general government deficit target by coordinating provincial and federal fiscal targets. Stronger institutional arrangements may be also required to ensure that the focus put the envisaged fiscal consolidation process be on par with the one on social and development needs faced by the provinces
35. **Strengthening fiscal sustainability of the decentralisation process is also complex as any efforts of the federal government towards fiscal consolidation and increase of tax revenues will automatically lead to an increased amount of divisible pool fund from which will directly benefit the provinces.** While the absorption capacities observed at provincial level have been low, rules governing repartition of funds between provinces may need to be redefined to avoid promoting fiscal profligacy at provincial level. However, in the long term and in view of social and development needs in the provinces, it will be sub-optimal to constrain the provinces to run surpluses in order to compensate for large federal government deficit as it has been agreed recently by the CCI in the framework of the IMF programme. **Federal and provincial tax reforms and appropriate borrowing for development objectives, high return investment and PFM reforms to increase effectiveness and efficiency of public expenditure should provide solutions for an increased fiscal space for federal and provincial governments.**
36. **The large dependence of the province on shared revenues and transfers from federal government to finance their expenditure (ranging from 80% to 95% according to provinces) may not contribute to create incentive for provinces to raise their own revenues to cover an increasing share of their spending.** The low share of provincial spending financed by provincial taxes can also blur the awareness of taxpayers with regards to the link between their tax and the provided public services they get from their local government eroding *de facto* local accountability.
37. **The non-buoyant provincial tax base and near-total reliance on federal transfers make provincial governments extremely vulnerable to adverse revenue shocks including federal transfer volatility.** It is estimated that provincially collected revenues used to finance less than 20% of provincial government with lower level in some

provinces. Questions surrounding disincentive effects for the provincial government to collect revenue from its assigned bases including political economy considerations with regards to easing political costs for provincial governments that may avoid imposing additional tax burden on the voting population.

38. **The devolution of resources under the 7<sup>th</sup> NFC preceded the devolution of spending by the 18<sup>th</sup> Amendment and it is estimated that the amount corresponding to the devolved fiscal resources** (approx. Rs 200 billion – to be checked) **was much more important than the devolved spending** (approx. between Rs 70 and 90 billion – to be checked). This rapid augmentation of resources allocated to the provinces has put pressure on the provincial expenditures control, PFM and related allocative efficiency as well as on their absorption capacities. Several provinces have engaged into comprehensive and integrated PFM reform process with the support of the donor's community.
39. **Revenue mobilisation remain the most important way to create additional fiscal space.** Provincial governments have taken step to restructure their tax systems and while remaining weak by federal standard, some provinces have succeeded to progressively increasing their tax-to-GDP ratio. These reforms have included the streamlining of the numerous provincial taxes, the inter-provincial harmonisation of taxes (motor vehicle, agricultural income tax...), the setting up of tax facilitation centres, and computerisation of tax records.... The provinces have also pursued a debt management strategy aiming at maximising donor's funds and they have used additional NFC transfers to retire expensive federal cash development loans.
40. With the repeal of 2001 SLO, the delay in local election and the abandon of the PFC mechanisms, PFM has been recently re-concentrated while the essential part of service delivery particularly for the social sector is made at district level. Greater clarity in the assignment of responsibilities at different levels of government will be needed at provincial level in order to strengthen PFM and local accountability at all level of the provincial lower tiers.
41. The lack of functional classification and reliable and detailed data on actual versus budgeted spending makes it difficult to properly assess the implementation of the budget at provincial and lower tier levels and to compare effective spending and outcome of spending among jurisdiction while these information are at the core of local accountability. This issue should be addressed in the context of the policy dialogue of each budget support programme at provincial level.
42. Negotiations have taken place on a new NFC award which the authorities plan to use to adjust the revenue sharing arrangements to provide a better balance between revenue and spending responsibilities. The new agreement will aim at ensuring that the terms of fiscal decentralisation find a balance between devolution of revenue and expenditure responsibilities and be consistent with the imperatives of macroeconomic stability. These issues should be also considered in any Budget support policy dialogue.





# Annex A4 EQ1: Overall Strategy

## Acronyms

ADB	Asian Development Bank
AIF	Asia Investment Facility
AKRSP	Aga Khan Rural Support Programme
BS	Budget Support
CAPRI	Counter terrorism Associated Prosecution Reform Initiative
CBDRM	Community Based Disaster Risk Management
CCBLE	Civilian Capacity Building for Law Enforcement
CMAM	Community-based Management of Acute Malnutrition
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (of OECD)
DEVCO	European Commission Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development
DFID	Department for International Development
DIPECHO	Disaster Preparedness of the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office
DRR	Disaster risk reduction
EC	European Commission
ECHO	European Commission Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection
EIB	European Investment Bank
EQ	Evaluation Question
EU	European Union
EUD	European Union Delegation
EW	Early Warning
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FoDP	Friends of Democratic Pakistan
FS	Food Security
GoP	Government of Pakistan
GSP	General System of Preferences
HEA	Household Economy Assessment
HIP	Humanitarian Implementing Plan
HQ	Headquarters
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
IYCF	Infant and Young Child Feeding
JC	Judgement Criteria
KP / KPK	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
LRRD	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
MIP	Multi-annual Indicative Programme

MN	Meeting Notes
MS	Member State
NFI	Non-Food Item
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NWFP	North-West Frontier Province (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa)
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PCNA	Post Crisis Needs Assessment
PEACE	Programme for Economic Advancement and Community Empowerment
PEFSA	Pakistan Emergency Food Security Alliance
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RAHA	Sustainable rural development in the Refugee Affected and Hosting Areas of Pakistan
RD	Rural Development
ROM	Results Oriented Monitoring
RSP	Regional Strategy Paper
SBDRM	School Based Disaster Risk Management
SWP	German Institute for International and Security Affairs
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USA	United States of America
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene promotion
WINS	Women and Infant Nutrition in Sindh

## Findings per JC and Indicators: EQ1 Overall strategy

<b>EQ1</b>	<b>To what extent did the EU cooperation strategy respond to development priorities and challenges of the country?</b>
<b>JC-1.1</b>	<b>The EU has based its cooperation on sound analyses of the development priorities and challenges of the country</b>
	<p>Several EU context analyses underpinned the EU cooperation strategy with Pakistan. They were of consistent quality, reflected learning over time, and incorporated inputs from state and non-state actors in Pakistan.</p> <p>EU analyses have by and large reflected several of the OECD's 10 principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States. They have for instance "taken context as the starting point" (principle #1), factored in crisis prevention (principle #4) and non-discrimination (principle #6). However, when it comes to "focusing on statebuilding as the central objective (principle #3), strategies and project documents rightly emphasised capacity development but paid little attention to interests and incentives and fast-deteriorating state-society relations.</p>
I-1.1.1	<p><b>Existence of reports and documents demonstrating the recourse to analyses of the needs and priorities of Pakistan (populations, institutions, etc.)</b></p> <p>Several stand-alone analyses (produced by the EU or by third parties) were made available (see sources below). Moreover, the European Commission's Country and Regional Strategy Papers for the evaluation period provide a comprehensive, dynamic and "best practice" analysis of the developmental needs and priorities of Pakistan. The analyses cover the political situation, economic situation and trade, social development, and environmental situation. For example, the analysis in the Country Strategy Paper for 2007-2013 is largely echoed by Aziz (2007), Faisal (2007), and Markey (2007).</p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; background-color: #FFDAB9; padding: 5px; margin-top: 10px;"> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory.</b></p> </div>
	<p><i>Sources:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <i>European Commission, 2002, Pakistan country strategy paper (2002-2006)</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and the Islamic republic of Pakistan, 2004</i></li> <li>▪ <i>European Commission, 2006, Multiannual Indicative Programme (2007-2010)</i></li> <li>▪ <i>European Commission, 2010, Pakistan country strategy paper (2007-2013), 2007</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Joint Communiqué following the ad hoc EU- Pakistan Summit of 17 June 2009</i></li> <li>▪ <i>EU-Pakistan 5-year Engagement Plan</i></li> <li>▪ <i>EU, 2010, Plan for Strengthening EU Action in Afghanistan and Pakistan</i></li> <li>▪ <i>European Commission, 2011, Conclusions of the Mid-Term Review of the Country Strategy Paper for Pakistan and Multiannual Indicative Programme (2011-2013)</i></li> <li>▪ <i>EU Counter-Terrorism/ Security Strategy on Pakistan, 2012</i></li> <li>▪ <i>European Commission, 2014, Multiannual Indicative Programme (2014-2020)</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Asian Development Bank, European Union, United Nations, World Bank, 2010, Post-Conflict Needs Assessment</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Draft minutes of the EU-Pakistan Joint Commission subgroup on Human Rights and Governance, 23 June 2014</i></li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <i>Minutes of the EU-Pakistan Joint Commission, 24 June 2014</i></li> <li><i>Third-party analyses</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Aziz, Mazhar. Military control in Pakistan: The parallel state. Routledge, 2007.</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Boer, Monica Den. "Counter-Terrorism, Security and Intelligence in the EU: Governance Challenges for Collection, Exchange and Analysis." Intelligence and National Security 30.2-3 (2015): 402-419.</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Brattberg, Erik, and Mark Rbinard. "The EU as a global counter-terrorism actor in the making." European Security 21, no. 4 (2012): 557-577.</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Brookings, 2015. Empowering Pakistan's Civil Society to Counter Global Violent Extremism.</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Cordesman, Anthony H., Arleigh A. Burke, and Varun Vira. "Pakistan: Violence vs. Stability." Center for Strategic and International Studies (2011): 183-184.</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Fair, Christine. "Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War." (2014).</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Fruman, Sheila. Will the long march to democracy in Pakistan finally succeed?. US Institute of Peace, 2011</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Gareth Chappell, 2009, « Pakistan : What role for the EU ? », SWP-Berlin</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Geeraerts, Gustaaf, and Eva Gross. Perspectives for a European Security Strategy Towards Asia: Views from Asia, Europe and the US. Vol. 18. ASP/VUBPRESS/UPA, 2011.</i></li> <li>▪ <i>International Crisis Group, 2007, Elections, Democracy and Stability in Pakistan</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Khan, Feisal. "Corruption and the Decline of the State in Pakistan." Asian Journal of Political Science 15, no. 2 (2007): 219-247.</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Khattak, Sadia, and Muhammad Zubair. « EU-Pakistan Relationship in Areas of Trade, Terrorism and Democracy ». Journal of Applied Environmental and Biological Sciences, 4(9)24-24, 2014.</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Lieven, Anatol. Pakistan: a hard country. PublicAffairs, 2011.</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Markey, Daniel. "A false choice in Pakistan." Foreign Affairs 86, no. 4 (2007): 85-102.</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Mezzera, Marco, and Safiya Aftab. "Pakistan State-Society Analysis." Brussels: Initiative for Peacebuilding, Democratisation and Transitional Justice Cluster (2009)</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Paul, Thazha Varkey. The warrior state: Pakistan in the contemporary world. Oxford University Press, 2014.</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Rashid, Ahmed, 2012. Pakistan on the Brink.</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Shad, Muhammad Riaz. "An Assessment of Opportunities for the EU's Enhanced Engagement with Pakistan." Journal of European Studies 30.2 (2014).</i></li> <li>▪ <i>UNICEF, 2014, Conflict Analysis Summary (Pakistan)</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Wolff, Jonas, Hans-Joachim Spanger, and Hans-Jürgen Pöhl. The comparative international politics of democracy promotion. Vol. 23. Routledge, 2013.</i></li> </ul>
I-1.1.2	<p><b>Existence of conflict and/or fragility analyses (conducted or used), including on regional aspects of stability</b></p> <p>There was a good range and number of conflict/fragility analyses of Pakistan available over the period. Although Country and Regional Strategy Papers and project documents do not reference them, they reflect similar findings and generally robust analysis.</p> <p style="background-color: #fce4d6; padding: 5px;">Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory.</b></p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <i>As above (I-1.1.1)</i></li> </ul>

I-1.1.3	<p><b>Compliance of the conflict and/or fragility analyses with related EU policies and international best practices (notably the OECD's 10 principles and Busan's New Deal)</b></p> <p>EU analysis, as reflected in strategies and project documents, has, by and large, “taken context as the starting point” (OECD principle #1), factored in crisis prevention (principle #4) and non-discrimination (principle #6) (see Fragility Note). There is also evidence of extensive consultation with state and non-state actors; efforts to engage in political dialogue with GoP and align with GoP priorities; and to “agree practical coordination mechanisms” with other international actors (principles #7 and 8).</p> <p>However, the EU does not have a system in place to ensure its cooperation does no harm (principle #2). Moreover, while EU analyses point to a wide range of drivers of fragility, when it comes to “focusing on statebuilding as the central objective (principle #3), strategies and project documents emphasise capacity development (as they should, Mezzera and Aftab, 2009) but pay little attention to interests and incentives and fast-deteriorating state-society relations. There is little hard evidence of the EU having taken into account these elements. Re. “links between political, security and development objectives” (principle #6), the EU makes them at the strategic level but it remains to be seen whether they are operationalised in practice, especially between security and development (besides trade and human rights, for which there is evidence).</p> <p>Please see the Fragility Note (Annex A2) for a more comprehensive assessment of the implementation of the OECD Principles.</p> <p>Pakistan has not signed the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, agreed at Busan and is not a member of the g7/ group. However, with regards to its five peacebuilding and statebuilding goals, EU cooperation with Pakistan has mainly supported the goal “Address injustices and increase people’s access to justice”. Some but overall little effort has been directly targeting the other goals: “Foster inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution”; “Establish and strengthen people’s security”; “Generate employment and improve livelihoods” and “Manage revenue and build capacity for accountable and fair service delivery”. While the first two require sufficient access and influence, the EU could engage more on the latter two.</p> <p>As for other aspects of the New Deal, the EU has mainly “supported national leadership”, “strengthened national capacities”, and to some extent “increased transparency”, but has done less to manage “risk linked to the use of country systems”, and the “timeliness and predictability of aid”.</p> <p><b>Quality of evidence: More than satisfactory.</b></p>
	<p><i>As above, plus:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <i>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2007, ‘Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations’, Development Assistance Committee (DAC), OECD, Paris</i></li> <li>▪ <i>New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, 2011</i></li> </ul>

I-1.1.4	<p><b>Existence and periodicity of risk analyses (conducted and used)</b></p> <p>While no standalone risk analyses were found, every MIP includes an analysis of risks for each focal and non-focal area. These analyses do not include mitigation measures, however, which is regrettable since many risks can be better mitigated at the strategic, rather than project, level.</p> <p>At project level, risks are systematically identified in project documents, along with mitigation measures. A recurrent risk identified is the lack of ownership/the absence of political will – for which mitigation measures are only sometimes satisfactory.</p> <p>More generally, risks to outputs are usually well identified, but risks to outcomes and impact rarely.</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>Strong</b></p>
	<p><i>Sources:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <i>European Commission, Pakistan country strategy paper (2002-2006), 2002</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and the Islamic republic of Pakistan, 2004</i></li> <li>▪ <i>European Commission, Multiannual Indicative Programme (2007-2010), 2006</i></li> <li>▪ <i>European Commission, Pakistan country strategy paper (2007-2013), 2007</i></li> <li>▪ <i>EU-Pakistan 5-year Engagement Plan, 2010</i></li> <li>▪ <i>European Commission, Conclusions of the Mid-Term Review of the Country Strategy Paper for Pakistan and Multiannual Indicative Programme (2011-2013), 2011</i></li> <li>▪ <i>EU Counter-Terrorism/ Security Strategy on Pakistan, 2012</i></li> <li>▪ <i>European Commission, Multiannual Indicative Programme (2014-2020), 2014</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Documents of the projects selected for in-depth study (identification fiches, actions fiches, agreements, etc.)</i></li> </ul>
I-1.1.5	<p><b>Existence of specific assessment of environmental issues and issues faced by vulnerable or socially excluded groups (notably women, children and ethnic minorities)</b></p> <p>Environmental issues and issues of vulnerable or socially excluded groups are at the center of strategies and MIPs, and of many project documents. They were often at the center of project implementation, when projects did target citizens (rather than/on top of institutions).</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory.</b></p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <i>European Commission, Pakistan country strategy paper (2002-2006), 2002</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and the Islamic republic of Pakistan, 2004</i></li> <li>▪ <i>European Commission, Multiannual Indicative Programme (2007-2010), 2006</i></li> <li>▪ <i>European Commission, Pakistan country strategy paper (2007-2013), 2007</i></li> <li>▪ <i>EU-Pakistan 5-year Engagement Plan, 2010</i></li> <li>▪ <i>European Commission, Conclusions of the Mid-Term Review of the Country Strategy Paper for Pakistan and Multiannual Indicative Programme (2011-2013), 2011</i></li> <li>▪ <i>EU Counter-Terrorism/ Security Strategy on Pakistan, 2012</i></li> <li>▪ <i>European Commission, Multiannual Indicative Programme (2014-2020), 2014</i></li> </ul>

I-1.1.6	<p><b>Consultation of stakeholders (government, civil society, other donors) and integration of their views in these analyses</b></p> <p>There is evidence of extensive consultations with state and non-state actors; efforts to engage in political dialogue with GoP and align with GoP priorities; and to agree practical coordination mechanisms with other international actors. For example, the 2009-2010 post-crisis needs assessment (following the Pakistan government's 2009 military offensive to drive militants from FATA and KP), undertaken jointly by GoP, the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, UN, and European Union, gives a detailed picture of citizen priorities (i.e. jobs and justice). Moreover, many documents reflect a policy dialogue that is increasingly strategic and integrated.</p> <p>The field phase found that their views were to a large extent integrated in EU analyses.</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory</b>, based on desk review and interviews with a selection of key stakeholders (government, civil society, other donors).</p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <i>European Commission, Pakistan country strategy paper (2002-2006), 2002</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and the Islamic republic of Pakistan, 2004</i></li> <li>▪ <i>European Commission, Multiannual Indicative Programme (2007-2010), 2006</i></li> <li>▪ <i>European Commission, Pakistan country strategy paper (2007-2013), 2007</i></li> <li>▪ <i>EU-Pakistan 5-year Engagement Plan, 2010</i></li> <li>▪ <i>European Commission, Conclusions of the Mid-Term Review of the Country Strategy Paper for Pakistan and Multiannual Indicative Programme (2011-2013), 2011</i></li> <li>▪ <i>EU Counter-Terrorism/Security Strategy on Pakistan, 2012</i></li> <li>▪ <i>European Commission, Multiannual Indicative Programme (2014-2020), 2014</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Press releases relating to</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <i>2007 first meeting of the EC-Pakistan Joint Commission</i></li> <li>○ <i>2009 second meeting of the EC-Pakistan Joint Commission</i></li> <li>○ <i>2009 first EU-Pakistan summit</i></li> <li>○ <i>2010 first EU-Pakistan summit</i></li> <li>○ <i>2012 third meeting of the EC-Pakistan Joint Commission</i></li> <li>○ <i>2012 <a href="#">the EU-Pakistan 5-year Engagement Plan</a></i></li> <li>○ <i>2012 first <a href="#">EU-Pakistan-Strategic Dialogue</a></i></li> <li>○ <i>The EU granting <a href="#">GSP+ status</a> to Pakistan (2013) and linking it to human rights</i></li> <li>○ <i>2014 second <a href="#">EU-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue</a></i></li> </ul> </li> <li>▪ <i>Proceedings from consultations with Government, CSOs and other stakeholders in preparation of the 2014-2020 MIP</i></li> <li>▪ <i>“Friends of Democratic Pakistan” (FoDP) statement on working in strategic partnership with Pakistan to combat violent extremism; develop a comprehensive approach to economic and social development; coordinate an approach to stabilizing and developing border regions; address Pakistan’s energy shortfall; and support democratic institutions; FoDP meetings include an FODP/Donors’ Conference in Tokyo (2009), and summit meetings</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Progress reports, ROM reports and evaluation reports</i></li> </ul>

I-1.1.7	<p><b>Views of the stakeholders and other development partners on the relevance of the EU interventions to address the needs</b></p> <p>Interviews point to perceptions of EU strategies and programmes that are highly relevant to the priorities of Pakistan and targeted beneficiaries, at least as far as objectives are concerned. Interviewees were more nuanced about the activities themselves, suggesting for example more upstream work (on policies, norms and rules) and in some cases less training divorced from such policy work.</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory</b>, based on interviews with a selection of key stakeholders (government, civil society, other donors).</p>
	<p><i>Interviews (MN403, MN407, MN410, MN420 on the relevance of objectives, and MN407, MN414, MN416, MN419, MN420 recommending specific adjustments to the current balance of activities, ...)</i></p>
JC-1.2	<p><b>The composition of the portfolio of cooperation addressed the priorities and challenges identified and adapted to their evolution.</b></p>
	<p>Judging from strategies, project documents, and documents relating to the political and policy dialogue, EU cooperation has aimed to address a wide range of priorities and challenges – in the security, political, social, economic and environmental spheres. Specifically, the EU has aimed to address the challenges of human rights violations, checks and balances and the rule of law, human capital, poverty and to some extent disenfranchisement in the border provinces, gender equality, civil society support for democracy and human rights, growth, and natural disasters. As for adapting to an evolving situation, the EU has seized opportunities, such as the dialogue on trade to progress exchanges on labour issues and other human rights, and devolution to engage at the provincial and district level and promote more effective and accountable local administration.</p> <p>However, the EU has not worked on the demand side for reform (i.e. citizen demand for reform) except in some areas and recently so (e.g. Access to Justice in Punjab).</p> <p>On modalities, political will is often assumed or seen as a risk, yet EU programmes continue to emphasise capacity development at the expense of improving, for example, inter-departmental cooperation, or constructive state-citizens dialogue and collaboration, or supporting drivers of change (see Fragility Note).</p>
I-1.2.1	<p><b>Existence of a clear and realist roadmap/action plan addressing the priorities identified</b></p> <p>Analysts cautioned that the EU's "limited influence and relatively small aid contribution mean that Europe must target its support carefully" (FRIDE, 2011).</p> <p>While at first glance, the EU may seem thinly spread over many areas (two focal and two non-focal), projects, regions and levels, there is a well-argued logic for engaging in the four cooperation areas, and both at central and provincial/district levels (Country Strategy Papers). Moreover, while projects were initially focused on specific actors, mainly technical in nature and stop-and-go<sup>1</sup>, over time it became more systemic; more strategic and tied to political and policy dialogue; and balanced between support to federal and provincial levels.</p> <p>Five areas where the roadmap/action plan is less clear is on:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Which cooperation modalities</b> would help to build (rather than undermine)</li> </ol>

<sup>1</sup> For example, Chappell, 2009, notes "a limited and technical response to the growing instability".




	<p>much-needed trust and cooperation between government (federal and provincial) and civil society;</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2. <b>Whether the EU should specifically target urban and peri-urban areas</b> (which concentrate job creation, wealth creation, and risks of violence) on top or instead of mainly rural areas;</li> <li>3. <b>How the EU understands elite behaviours and if the EU hopes to influence them</b>, on top of supporting an enabling environment to “fight poverty and help Pakistan follow a sustainable growth path” (2007-2013 Country Strategy Paper).</li> <li>4. <b>Whether the EU should work on the demand side for change.</b> A recurrent theme in interviews was the opportunity for the EU to support greater transparency to citizens on service delivery, increased citizen engagement and GoP accountability.</li> <li>5. <b>The linkage between poverty and stability:</b> the 2007-13 Country Strategy Paper states that “the primary means for the EC to address these issues [terrorism, nuclear proliferation, unexploded ordnance, narcotics, relations with Afghanistan, human rights democratisation and tolerance] through its aid programmes <i>is by way of reducing poverty and promoting good governance</i>”. It would be helpful to investigate how these relationships play out specifically, and what the evidence entails for EU engagement. For example, poverty is usually not the only driver of terrorism, and not the main either (Abadie, 2004; Blair <i>et al.</i>, 2013). For example, “good governance” being a wide agenda, what is it that matters most (state capacity, checks and balances, state-society relations, factionalism, having a nominal democracy, civil liberties...)? There is no evidence base as yet, to guide future EU cooperation.</li> </ol>
	<p>Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory.</b></p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <i>Abadie, Alberto. Poverty, political freedom, and the roots of terrorism. No. w10859. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2004.</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Blair, G., Christine Fair, C., Malhotra, N. and Shapiro, J. N. (2013), Poverty and Support for Militant Politics: Evidence from Pakistan. American Journal of Political Science, 57: 30–48. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00604.x</i></li> <li>▪ <i>European Commission, Pakistan country strategy paper (2002-2006), 2002</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and the Islamic republic of Pakistan, 2004</i></li> <li>▪ <i>European Commission, Multiannual Indicative Programme (2007-2010), 2006</i></li> <li>▪ <i>European Commission, Pakistan country strategy paper (2007-2013), 2007</i></li> <li>▪ <i>EU-Pakistan 5-year Engagement Plan, 2010</i></li> <li>▪ <i>European Commission, Conclusions of the Mid-Term Review of the Country Strategy Paper for Pakistan and Multiannual Indicative Programme (2011-2013), 2011</i></li> <li>▪ <i>EU Counter-Terrorism/ Security Strategy on Pakistan, 2012</i></li> <li>▪ <i>European Commission, Multiannual Indicative Programme (2014-2020), 2014</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Gareth Chappell, 2009, « Pakistan: What role for the EU ? », SWP-Berlin</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Goldstone, Jack A., and Jay Ulfelder. "How to construct stable democracies." Washington Quarterly 28.1 (2004): 7-20.</i></li> </ul>

**I-1.2.2 The areas of selected interventions addressed the priorities identified in the analyses.**

Judging from strategies, project documents and documents relating to the political and policy dialogue, EU cooperation has aimed to address a wide range of priorities and challenges – in the security, political, social, economic and environmental spheres. Specifically, the EU has aimed to address the challenges of human rights violations, checks and balances and the rule of law, human capital, poverty and to some extent disenfranchisement in the border provinces, gender equality, civil society support for democracy and human rights, growth, and natural disasters. Graph 2 below lists drivers of fragility (i.e. the main challenges presented by the Pakistan context), and identifies areas of direct EU intervention (circled).

Graph 2



Source: ADE

Quality of evidence: **More than satisfactory.**

- *European Commission, Pakistan country strategy paper (2002-2006), 2002*
- *Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and the Islamic republic of Pakistan, 2004*
- *European Commission, Multiannual Indicative Programme (2007-2010), 2006*
- *European Commission, Pakistan country strategy paper (2007-2013), 2007*
- *EU-Pakistan 5-year Engagement Plan, 2010*
- *European Commission, Conclusions of the Mid-Term Review of the Country Strategy Paper for Pakistan and Multiannual Indicative Programme (2011-2013), 2011*
- *EU Counter-Terrorism/Security Strategy on Pakistan, 2012*
- *European Commission Multiannual Indicative Programme (2014-2020), 2014*

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <i>Aziz, Mazhar. Military control in Pakistan: The parallel state. Routledge, 2007.</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Cordesman, Anthony H., Arleigh A. Burke, and Varun Vira. "Pakistan: Violence vs. Stability." Center for Strategic and International Studies (2011): 183-184.</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Fair, Christine. "Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War." (2014).</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Fruman, Sheila. Will the long march to democracy in Pakistan finally succeed? US Institute of Peace, 2011</i></li> <li>▪ <i>International Crisis Group, 2007, Elections, Democracy and Stability in Pakistan</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Khan, Feisal. "Corruption and the Decline of the State in Pakistan." Asian Journal of Political Science 15, no. 2 (2007): 219-247.</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Lieven, Anatol. Pakistan: a hard country. PublicAffairs, 2011.</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Markey, Daniel. "A false choice in Pakistan." Foreign Affairs 86, no. 4 (2007): 85-102.</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Paul, Thazha Varkey. The warrior state: Pakistan in the contemporary world. Oxford University Press, 2014.</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Wolff, Jonas, Hans-Joachim Spanger, and Hans-Jürgen Pöhl. The comparative international politics of democracy promotion. Vol. 23. Routledge, 2013.</i></li> </ul>
I-1.2.3	<p><b>The areas of intervention selected are aligned on GoP priorities.</b></p> <p>The Country Strategy Paper for 2007-2013, the MIP for 2007-2010 and the MIP for 2011-2013 define as main areas of interventions: rural development and natural resources management; education and human resources development; human rights and good governance; and trade cooperation (also some anti-money laundering activities for 2007-2010 and counter-terrorism and security activities for 2007-2013).</p> <p>This is broadly aligned to GoP priorities, as reflected in the 2003 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (economic growth focusing on the rural economy; improved governance and consolidated devolution; human capital; reduced inequalities) and the 2010 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (among other pillars, protecting the poor and vulnerable; human development; and governance). Moreover, EU support is framed by the mutually agreed Cooperation Agreement of 2004, which aims to promote trade, sustainable and inclusive development, economic capability, as well as “investment, economic, technical, and cultural links”.</p> <p>Several interviewees noted that, beyond the stated GoP priorities of Energy, fight against Extremism, Education and Economy (known as the 4 Es), defence and intelligence were also key priorities: "it's not the development cooperation they care about; it's the armament and the defence cooperation" (MN 608, 819). The EU's cooperation with Pakistan is only civilian and therefore does not cater to these priorities. We find, however, that this allows the EU to be perceived as more neutral and dependable than other development partners (see Fragility Note).</p> <p>One interviewee however (a respected academic and policy analyst), finds that “vital synergies are still largely missing”: “much still needs to be done across the donor programmes to better tie in donor interventions with government/political initiatives of promise that enjoy government support and commitment”.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Quality of evidence: More than satisfactory.</b></p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <i>Government of Pakistan, ND, Education Sector Reform</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Government of Pakistan, 2001, Local Government Ordinance</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Government of Pakistan, 2003, Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</i></li> <li>▪ <i>EU-Pakistan Cooperation Agreement, 2004</i></li> <li>▪ <i>European Commission, Pakistan country strategy paper (2002-2006), 2002</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and the Islamic republic of Pakistan, 2004</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Government of Pakistan, 2005, Medium-term Development Framework 2005-10</i></li> <li>▪ <i>European Commission, Multiannual Indicative Programme (2007-2010), 2006</i></li> <li>▪ <i>European Commission, Pakistan country strategy paper (2007-2013), 2007</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Government of Pakistan, 2010, Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</i></li> <li>▪ <i>EU-Pakistan 5-year Engagement Plan, 2010</i></li> <li>▪ <i>European Commission, Conclusions of the Mid-Term Review of the Country Strategy Paper for Pakistan and Multiannual Indicative Programme (2011-2013), 2011</i></li> <li>▪ <i>EU Counter-Terrorism/ Security Strategy on Pakistan, 2012</i></li> <li>▪ <i>European Commission, Multiannual Indicative Programme (2014-2020), 2014</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Interview MN 423</i></li> </ul>
I-1.2.4	<p><b>The selection of programmes takes into account the risk analyses.</b></p> <p>Beyond what is highlighted under JC-1.4, there is no evidence on the extent to which risk analysis is factored in the selection of programmes. Generally, it appears that the EU has not been risk adverse, but rather has engaged in areas that are critical, where it could have specific value and entry points.</p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; background-color: #fce4d6; padding: 5px; margin-top: 10px;"> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory.</b></p> </div>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <i>European Commission, Pakistan country strategy paper (2002-2006), 2002</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and the Islamic republic of Pakistan, 2004</i></li> <li>▪ <i>European Commission, Multiannual Indicative Programme (2007-2010), 2006</i></li> <li>▪ <i>European Commission, Pakistan country strategy paper (2007-2013), 2007</i></li> <li>▪ <i>EU-Pakistan 5-year Engagement Plan, 2010</i></li> <li>▪ <i>European Commission, Conclusions of the Mid-Term Review of the Country Strategy Paper for Pakistan and Multiannual Indicative Programme (2011-2013), 2011</i></li> <li>▪ <i>EU Counter-Terrorism/ Security Strategy on Pakistan, 2012</i></li> <li>▪ <i>European Commission, Multiannual Indicative Programme (2014-2020), 2014</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Project documents</i></li> </ul>
I-1.2.5	<p><b>The interventions under the national and regional programmes have been designed and implemented so as to be complementary and mutually supportive.</b></p> <p>The documentation shows that strategies, programmes and projects have been conceived with complementarity in mind, but is not explicit about the synergies across them – except for education and terrorism (MIP 2007-10, p.12).</p> <p>In practice, there have been such linkages, for example in the trade dialogue that included human rights.</p> <p>As for regional programmes, the EU Plan for Strengthening EU Action in Afghanistan and Pakistan (2010) draws priorities for improved peace and</p>

	<p>development for the “AfPak” region as a whole, including support to regional integration (on trade, transit, border management and crime). Other operations remain separately conceived, separately implemented and separately evaluated.</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory.</b></p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <i>European Commission, Pakistan country strategy paper (2002-2006), 2002</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and the Islamic republic of Pakistan, 2004</i></li> <li>▪ <i>European Commission, Multiannual Indicative Programme (2007-2010), 2006</i></li> <li>▪ <i>European Commission, Pakistan country strategy paper (2007-2013), 2007</i></li> <li>▪ <i>EU-Pakistan 5-year Engagement Plan, 2010</i></li> <li>▪ <i>EU, 2010, Plan for Strengthening EU Action in Afghanistan and Pakistan</i></li> <li>▪ <i>European Commission, Conclusions of the Mid-Term Review of the Country Strategy Paper for Pakistan and Multiannual Indicative Programme (2011-2013), 2011</i></li> <li>▪ <i>EU Counter-Terrorism/Security Strategy on Pakistan, 2012</i></li> <li>▪ <i>European Commission, Multiannual Indicative Programme (2014-2020), 2014</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Project documents</i></li> </ul>
I-1.2.6	<p><b>The selection of programmes was coordinated with those of other donors, in particular EU MS.</b></p> <p>Successive strategies (Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013; MIP 2011-2013) map broad areas of support from other donors, notably member states. Moreover, there are coordination mechanisms in place (see EQ10), and interviews indicate that a broad division of labour by province has taken place (MN421).</p> <p>However, it is not clear from documentation whether synergies are identified and exploited with interventions in similar areas and locations (e.g. in 2007, UK support to education in NWFP; German support to rural development in northern Pakistan – in 2011, US and Japanese support to education; ADB support to government and civil society). The interviews confirm that, beyond a broad division of labour by province, there are few synergies in practice.</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>Indicative but not conclusive.</b></p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <i>European Commission, Pakistan country strategy paper (2007-2013), 2007</i></li> <li>▪ <i>European Commission, Conclusions of the Mid-Term Review of the Country Strategy Paper for Pakistan and Multiannual Indicative Programme (2011-2013), 2011</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Interviews, notably MN421</i></li> </ul>
I-1.2.7	<p><b>The portfolio of cooperation activities was complementary with those of other DGs (ECHO and Trade in particular) and the EIB.</b></p> <p>According to the desk report of the on-going Evaluation of ECHO's interventions in Pakistan 2010-2014 (the final report isn't yet available at the time of writing – January 2016), there have been ECHO-funded projects in Pakistan over the period 2010-2014. The evaluation conducted a “light-touch assessment” for 41 of those projects, which were implemented by 13 organisations. They have all worked in KP and in in Sindh during the period. Then of them were also active in Punjab. They related to a wide range of humanitarian aid domains (Shelter, Food, Nutrition, Protection,</p>

WASH, NFI, DRR, Livelihood, Health, Coordination, NGOs' Security, and Advocacy HF). The DEVCO evaluation team doesn't have data on the cumulated financial amount of these projects.

ECHO support addressed early warning/early response mechanisms vz. natural disasters. As mentioned by ECHO: *"Since 2010 and before ECHO consistently funding DIPECHO projects; currently CARE and HOPE 87 (CBDRM and SBDRM). IPC funded by ECHO up till now. EU to carry forward from 2016. IPC effective early warning of FS and nutrition emergencies – it was IPC that flagged the issue of food security and nutrition crisis in Sindh since end of 2013. ECHO funded HEA key to IPC information/analysis. Substantive information generated by ECHO partners; SMART, SQUEAC., which can be used for EW purposes."* (Source: MN 703)

Nevertheless, interviewees on ECHO and DEVCO sides converge to say that:

- The portfolios of DEVCO and ECHO in Pakistan are largely complementary and coherent. They avoid overlaps. There is for instance a de facto focus in recent years for DEVCO on well-watered areas and ECHO on drought prone eastern districts;
- Coordination between DEVCO and ECHO on the overall approach or on the projects in Pakistan has increasingly taken place on key issues of common interest, e.g. on the WINS and IPC programmes. However, it hasn't been as strong as it could have been;
  - o There was for instance potential for more coordination / synergies in the fields of Rural Development and Education, and for policy dialogue in the field of nutrition;
- There was potential for more synergies or coordination in terms of LRRD in the field of nutrition (which represent a modest part of the funding, though);

*Sources: MN 001, 003, 701, 702, 703, 704*

ECHO reported that:

- ECHO promoted the setting up of the Women and Infant Nutrition in Sindh (WINS) programme, based on activities of PEFSA (Pakistan Emergency Food Security Alliance, i.e. a consortium of 6 international NGOs). In addition, a Joint Humanitarian Development Framework will be developed in 2016 (i.e. after the evaluation period);
- There is a focus on nutrition throughout ECHO and EU Delegation (DEVCO) since the floods in 2010. As of 2010 ECHO identified issues and started to alert the EUD, which came up with WINS and LRRD projects. Links between ECHO and DEVCO on nutrition: support over the last five years on an annual basis to PEFSA, a consortium of six INGOs, which has looked at these areas. Discussions were held with the EUD, incl. on needs and gaps identified by ECHO. This led to the set-up of the WINS programme. The WINS programme is in flood areas where ECHO focused following 2010 floods and exited when EU-WINS materialized. Future EU projects are in

	<p>higher potential (well-watered) areas. ECHO focuses on drought prone eastern districts of Sindh. However working in different districts.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Rural Development: DEVCO activities in this area are of particular importance to ECHO. But no real cooperation so far on RD.             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o Since 2010, ECHO supported the provincial authorities in KP in developing community-based risk management. Note. NGO Sahrad is part of the RSP network like AK RSP (used by PEACE programme)</li> <li>o For nutrition: Agriculture should include issues of soil, productivity, yields, access to markets, and community empowerment. However, government is only interested in yields and productivity. There is hence a need to coordinate for ECHO and DEVCO to coordinate and convince the government that all these issues can be addressed in developing the agriculture, without loss of production.</li> </ul> </li> <li>- ECHO's interventions are for maximum 12 months, and are immediate projects to address priority emergencies. They consist usually in provision of food and specific products. Moreover, in nutrition-sensitive areas, they also provide cash.</li> <li>- ECHO has commented on DEVCO future proposals and ECHO has on the MIP 2014 2020. ECHO has been participating to the AUP launch workshop. ECHO is participating to the weekly management meeting and has been able to call on technical meeting with different OPS sections.</li> <li>- DEVCO will take over funding of IPC (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification) by mid-2016 while ECHO will stop supporting IPC.</li> <li>- ECHO has been participating to the portfolio reviews with Federal authorities (EAD) and Provincial Authorities.</li> <li>- Coordination on access matters (2013 New INGO Regulation and Foreign Contribution Bill, EU Demarche)</li> <li>- Early warning mechanisms:             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o ECHO considers it addressed it in relation to natural disasters. It is effective for nutrition / food security. They supported (FAO's) IPC, which ECHO will hand over in effect to DEVCO from 2016. Effective early warning system for FS emergencies.</li> <li>o ECHO also funded household economy assessment (HEA), which may feed into the IPC. This consisted in smaller scale quick surveys, smart surveys etc. in the districts where they work to identify FS problems. They permit to flag urgent problems and possible responsive actions.</li> </ul> </li> <li>- Refugees: limited interface between ECHO and DEVCO. ECHO was working more on legal aspects; DEVCO on community-based empowerment in refugee-affected areas.</li> <li>- For coherence, good record by DEVCO and ECHO of tracking respective policies. Consistency of both organizations within this overall framework.</li> <li>- <i>“There has been pattern incomplete follow up and mixed results in follow up of key policy reviews notably the ENAS and RSO Mission Report, mainly because of challenges encountered in rolling out of multi-sectoral approach and on-ground capacities of ECHO partners. EU and ECHO show some success with Food Security and Nutrition</i></li> </ul>
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*Surveillance; development of IPC and recent HEA baseline. EU WINS is a further achievement. Similarly both ECHO and EU have invested effort and resources in enhancing nutrition capacity, with training of government staff and development of CMAM/IYCF guidelines. However there are challenges experienced by ECHO in trying to pursue multi-sector approach. Furthermore the development of a Cluster Strategy is constrained by capacity of key players (UNICEF). There remains a need to Intensify LRRD efforts. Dialogue should for both agencies extend to HQ level. JDHF was not incorporated into ECHO 2016 HIP.”*

- → There is a need for more coordination:
  - Need for coordination clearly expressed by ECHO, notably in the field of nutrition with DEVCO RD programmes.
  - Coordination on the refugees should have been stronger in the RAHA programme.
  - Currently much overlapping between different donors (not necessarily EUD) in KP and Baluchistan = missed opportunity.
  - Need for additional coordination and mutual information on RD BS and activities through the RSPs in KP, for example in the area of Gilgit Baltistan Chitra (GBC).
  - Essential to coordinate with DEVCO at programming level, otherwise the scope for coordination at implementation level is very limited.

*Sources: MN 703 and MN 704*

ECHO staff further provided the following views on DEVCO cooperation activities in Pakistan:

- *“Potential for demonstrating nutrition sensitive activities. Needs dialogue to both influence and ensure synergies with PC-1 Agriculture and WASH, such as developing of agricultural models which similarly address nutrition and agronomic/environmental objectives as well as merely production. EU WINS already properly coordinated with PC-1 Nutrition. Need for coordination with other development donors, especially DFID.”* An interviewee complements that “there is a need to improve government’s sensitiveness to nutrition issues. This requires longer-term perspective, such as by programmes like WINS and in Wash, which require coordination with DEVCO.”
- *“Support of the EU Del as regards INGOs access and information sharing*
- *Possibility of coordination with rural dev. support programmes to be explored?*
- *Room for coordination of education programmes in 2016.”*

*Sources: MN 703 and 704*

Complementarity and coherence of DG DEVCO and **DG TRADE** activities have been most interesting in Pakistan. This is developed under EQ7 on Trade.

There is little data on how cooperation activities were mutually supportive with **EIB** operations. There has been a single EIB operation in Pakistan during the evaluation period, which contract has been signed at the end of the period (17/11/2013) and



	<p>which underlying operation hasn't most probably started during the period (Keyal Khwar Hydropower Project; Energy; 100 million Euros). Another EIB project in the same energy sector has been signed a few months ago (Rehabilitation Warsak Hydroelectric Project; Energy; 50 million Euros; 17/11/2015). The sector of intervention (hydroelectricity) is far from the EU's sector of cooperation during the evaluation period, which may explain the limited linkages observed with DEVCO.</p> <p><b>Blending:</b> Pakistan transferred 23 M€ from the MIP to the Regional Programme and the Asia Investment Facility in 2011 for blending project. However there have been no <b>blending</b> operations in Pakistan during the evaluation period (2007-2014). Some are envisaged with AFD through the Asia Investment Facility AIF, but hadn't been signed yet before 2014. This relates to two proposals, reportedly one of € 2.5 m for training institute for hydro-electricity; and another of €4.5 m for the environmental component of the Warsaq project with € 40.5m concessional AFD loan.</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory.</b></p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <i>European Commission, Pakistan country strategy paper (2007-2013), 2007</i></li> <li>▪ <i>European Commission, Conclusions of the Mid-Term Review of the Country Strategy Paper for Pakistan and Multiannual Indicative Programme (2011-2013), 2011</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Evaluation of ECHO's interventions in Pakistan 2010-2014 (on-going)</i></li> <li>▪ EIB website (<a href="http://www.eib.org/projects/loans/regions/ala/pk.htm">http://www.eib.org/projects/loans/regions/ala/pk.htm</a> and <a href="http://www.eib.org/infocentre/press/releases/all/2014/2014-031-eur-100-million-loan-in-support-of-renewable-energy-in-pakistan.htm">http://www.eib.org/infocentre/press/releases/all/2014/2014-031-eur-100-million-loan-in-support-of-renewable-energy-in-pakistan.htm</a>)</li> <li>▪ <i>Asian Investment Facility (AIF) Briefing Paper, 2015</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Interviews: MN 001, 003, 701, 702, 703, 704, 835</i></li> </ul>
JC-1.3	<p><b>The selection of the intervention geographic zones and institutional levels (federal/provinces/district) was best suited to achieve expected cooperation results.</b></p>
	<p>The selection of geographic zones of intervention and institutional levels is well presented and argued in the 2007-13 Country Strategy Paper and the MIP for 2011-13. The criteria are a mixture of need, opportunities, and gaps left by other development partners. This approach could be more effective to promote “reduced poverty and sustainable growth” (2007-2013 Country Strategy Paper) and “peace and development” (2012 EU Counter-terrorism/Security Strategy for Pakistan), if there was more joint work on policies, and projects following similar standards (e.g. in justice programmes).</p>
I-1.3.1	<p><b>Existence of mapping of EU and other donors' activities</b></p> <p>Both EU and other donors' activities were mapped, at least at the beginning of each MIP period (see I-1.2.6) and sometimes at the sector level (e.g. 2012 mapping of activities related to countering violent extremism funded by the EU and Member States, by non-EU donors and by Pakistani institutions). A donor mapping in Pakistan was also made by the UN and another by UNRCO, which we used for building our inventory of donor funding (see Annex B1)<sup>2</sup>. According to an interviewee (MN 843) the EAD also used to do a mapping of interventions, although it is not very much used - the evaluation team did not receive it (yet). The main</p>

<sup>2</sup> « Pakistan Donor Profiles”, UNRCO Pakistan, April 2015

	<p>national source is in fact no more available: the Pakistan Development Assistance Database (DAD) planned for external development assistance coordination, and created after the receipt of international aid following the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan. According to a 2007 set of procedures, its purpose was to be a coordination tool (between needs and resources) and an instrument for accountability. The DAD is no longer used by the Government of Pakistan and cannot be accessed.</p> <p>There is however little evidence of comprehensive mapping at the level of provinces in the field of development cooperation. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) provides detailed mappings, but for humanitarian aid only.</p> <p>There are furthermore coordination mechanisms in place (see EQ10).</p> <p style="background-color: #fce4d6; padding: 5px;">Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory.</b></p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <i>European Commission, Pakistan country strategy paper (2007-2013), 2007</i></li> <li>▪ <i>European Commission, Conclusions of the Mid-Term Review of the Country Strategy Paper for Pakistan and Multiannual Indicative Programme (2011-2013), 2011</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Sarah Ladbury and Jose Luis Penas, for an identification and formulation study for a project on countering violent extremism in Pakistan, 2012</i></li> <li>▪ <i>UN, Pakistan Donor Profile and Mapping, 2014</i></li> <li>▪ <i>United Nations Resident Coordinator's Office (UNRCO, Pakistan Donor Profiles, April 2015</i></li> </ul>
I-1.3.2	<p><b>Existence of analytical justification underlying the selection of zones/levels</b></p> <p>The selection of zones/levels is justified in the 2007-13 Country Strategy Paper: alignment on GoP PRSP; and focus on the most volatile and most disadvantaged provinces in terms of poverty, other human development indicators, and stress from conflict and displacement – NWFP and Balochistan – but which at the same time have regional development policies that provide entry points. Interviews point that EU engagement in Punjab is also justified: dense population; reform-minded provincial government; instability in South Punjab.</p> <p>Partners and other stakeholders did not call into question the zones of intervention, but did stress that the EU should remain engaged in current provinces, because it takes so much effort to build trust and relationship with provincial governments, and that the EU has had some success – even painstakingly – in doing so. This is important to note, as the EU Delegation has been advised towards the end of the period to restrict its geographical focus to only two provinces (for security and visibility reasons). This downsizing of the EU's geographical intervention coverage was not considered as appropriate by the EU Delegation, some EU MS, and independent researchers interviewed in the field (MN 420, 423, 601, 607).</p> <p>On levels, partners and other stakeholders stressed the need to continue and accelerate the ongoing shift of emphasis to the provincial levels, including for policy work, since policy development is increasingly in the purview of provincial governments.</p>

	Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory.</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <i>European Commission, 2002, Pakistan country strategy paper (2002-2006)</i></li> <li>▪ <i>European Commission, 2006, Multiannual Indicative Programme (2007-2010)</i></li> <li>▪ <i>European Commission, 2010, Pakistan country strategy paper (2007-2013), 2007</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Joint Communiqué following the ad hoc EU- Pakistan Summit of 17 June 2009</i></li> <li>▪ <i>EU-Pakistan 5-year Engagement Plan</i></li> <li>▪ <i>EU, 2010, Plan for Strengthening EU Action in Afghanistan and Pakistan</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Asian Development Bank, European Union, United Nations, World Bank, 2010, Post-Conflict Needs Assessment</i></li> <li>▪ <i>European Commission, 2011, Conclusions of the Mid-Term Review of the Country Strategy Paper for Pakistan and Multiannual Indicative Programme (2011-2013)</i></li> <li>▪ <i>EU Counter-Terrorism/ Security Strategy on Pakistan, 2012</i></li> <li>▪ <i>European Commission, 2014, Multiannual Indicative Programme (2014-2020)</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Interviews, notably MN 420, 423, 601, 607</i></li> </ul>
I-1.3.3	<b>Degree to which migration issues are addressed in the selection of zones/levels</b>
	<p>Migration has gained a very high position in the EU agenda in the course of recent years and notably in 2015. A recent internal EU document recognises that the recent migration crisis in Europe raised the interest for the migratory movements from Pakistan and confirms that a reflection is on-going on how to increase the coherence between development programmes and optimisation of emigration. A large part of the bilateral cooperation under the MIP 2007-2013 and 2014-2020, regional cooperation and many thematic funding are in fact focusing on how to reduce poverty and improve conditions of life in rural areas in Pakistan, including some actions in favour of uprooted people. Nonetheless, migration to Europe (and the Middle East) is very much rooted in society and mostly linked with the desire to find more resources for a better life, with also influence of family links; emigration in Pakistan is part of the possible careers for young people. See also EQ4 on TVET: one of the government priorities is to produce high level skilled people specifically dedicated to move to foreign countries- - this should be put in the light of the fact that the remittances flow is twice more important than the ODA flow.</p> <p>Little can be found however in documentary sources on any relationship of the EU's migration agenda in the selection of zones or levels of intervention of EU cooperation with Pakistan during the evaluation period. This is confirmed by interviews. A recent EU internal document goes in that same direction, mentioning that EUD programmes do not specifically target the key 5 districts in Punjab where the large majority of illegal migrants to the EU are originated from.</p> <p>Nevertheless, one may also note the existence of an EU-Pakistan Readmission Agreement (2010), which focuses on the return and readmission of persons staying illegally in the EU territories. The government of Pakistan has recently announced (November 2015) that it will refuse to take back any of its nationals who are being deported from Europe for illegal immigration or terrorism offenses. (Around 50.000 residence permits in the EU are allocated each year for Pakistani people. Currently, around 400.000 Pakistani have residence permits in the EU.)</p>

	<p>According to an EU informant, the EU welcomes discussions on legal migration of qualified Pakistani workers. Brussels seeks to use the cooperation policies implemented with Pakistan to reduce the migratory flows. Unfortunately, the EU may not have the possibility to complement GSP+ policies with sector-based development projects.</p> <p>Sources: MN 819; internal EU document n°11 ; EQ4</p>
	<p>Quality of evidence: <b>Indicative but not conclusive.</b></p>
I-1.3.4	<b>Partners' and stakeholders views on the appropriateness of proposed zones/levels</b>
	See above (I-1.3.2).
JC-1.4	<b>The projects and programmes took account of the main lessons of the analyses conducted</b>
	<p><b>EU programming choices reflected continuity and learning-by-doing.</b> They showed a commitment to staying engaged while introducing new areas of thematic focus (anti-money laundering activities for 2007-2010 and counter-terrorism and security activities for 2007-2013), flexibility as to geographic engagement (not only in KP and Balochistan) and deeper and more strategic dialogue on policies. They also factored into lessons learnt from past cooperation, and in particular the need to (i) nurture high-level political commitment; (ii) deepen policy dialogue; and (iii) support implementation in districts. However, at project level, with the exception of budget support programmes, there was little evidence regarding the incorporation of lessons learned.</p>
I-1.4.1	<p><b>References in the programme documents and financial agreements to the main lessons of context, conflict, fragility and risk analyses.</b></p> <p>Lessons were identified in the 2007-2013 Country Strategy Paper, notably through evaluations. They included the need to (i) nurture high-level political commitment; (ii) deepen policy dialogue; (iii) support implementation in districts; (iv) develop GoP absorption capacity; (v) work through non-state actors; and (vi) accelerate results on gender equality. These lessons were directly translated into the 2007-2010 MIP, most notably the first three lessons.</p> <p>As for the 2011-13 MIP, it is built on the mid-term review of the 2007-13 Country Strategy Paper. Based on the review, the MIP introduces more flexibility in areas and levels of EU engagement (not only in KP and Balochistan), bring climate change IDPs and disaster risk reduction closer to the heart of EU programmes, and builds on findings from the 2010 PCNA. It also factors in more limited access to many areas of the country, for security reasons, and Government absorption capacity that remains limited.</p> <p>At project level, project documentation reviewed during the desk phase shows very little reference to lessons learned from needs analysis. This is with the exception of the budget support programs, all of which included a country level needs analysis in Annex to the project fiche.</p>

	Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory.</b>
	<i>As above, plus project documents.</i>
I-1.4.2	<b>Stakeholder views on the inclusion of lessons from context, conflict, fragility and risk analyses in the projects and programmes.</b>
	Stakeholders did not have strong views on this matter. The only case that was repeatedly mentioned was CAPRI, which builds on CCBLE lessons, and will itself be a base for “replication” in KP.
	Quality of evidence: <b>Indicative but not conclusive.</b>
	<i>Interviews, notably MN419.</i>

JC-1.5	<b>There is no incoherence between EU development cooperation policies and EU policies in other fields affecting Pakistan</b>
<p><b>By and large, the evaluation found no incoherence between EU development cooperation policies and EU policies in other fields affecting Pakistan.</b> The relationship between trade and human rights emerged as an interesting case where GSP+ provided trade benefits to the textile industry and raised awareness to comply with international legislation on human rights and working conditions. However, no active linkage was established between security and development.</p>	
I-1.5.1	<p><b>Absence of incoherence between the EU's development cooperation strategy and interventions in Pakistan, and EU policies in the fields of stability, security and counter-terrorism</b></p> <p>The evaluation finds that the EU has a human rights-based approach to counter-terrorism, i.e. rule of law is central to both preventing and addressing terrorism. However, beyond the lack of incoherence, there is a need to look at whether the EU adopted a systemic approach:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>Instead of focusing on one agency, it may have been more impactful to support several and collaboration between them</b>, for example between Parliament (re. legislative loopholes), law enforcement, and community-level development initiatives (see EQ6)</li> <li>- <b>Documentation provides no evidence of linkages actively made between security and development.</b> In Pakistan, the government response is skewed towards a security-first response to security challenges: the 2010 EU Conclusions of the Mid-Term Review of the Country Strategy Paper for Pakistan (2007-13) states “ a big challenge for the government is to strike a balance between stability objectives and social issues”. Stability cannot come from security alone and stems from social and economic issues too (EC, 2007, Towards an EU response to Situations of Fragility): while security is a precondition of stability, the drivers of fragility must at some point be addressed too (highly unequal access to services, extreme poverty, discrimination and human rights violations, group grievances...). In any country – but especially in Pakistan where there is a security-first response – it is crucial that not only human rights/the rule of law but also tangible development results and improved service delivery (notably in security, justice and education) are brought into fight against terrorism (see Fragility Note).</li> </ul> <p>We further refer to I-5.1.8 for details on the internal coherence within the field of EU development support to human rights (vs. coherence with EU non-development policies which is addressed in the present JC).</p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; background-color: #fce4d6; padding: 5px; margin-top: 10px;"> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory.</b></p> </div>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <i>ICG (2015)</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Vera and Cordesman (2011)</i></li> <li>▪ <i>CCBLE final evaluation (2012)</i></li> <li>▪ <i>EU annual report on human rights (2014)</i></li> <li>▪ <i>ROM report for CAPRI (2014)</i></li> </ul>	

I-1.5.2	<p><b>Absence of incoherence between the EU's development cooperation strategy &amp; interventions in Pakistan and EU policies in the field of migration</b></p> <p>No such incoherence has been observed. See also I-1.3.3 above.</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>Indicative but not conclusive</b></p>
I-1.5.3	<p><b>Absence of incoherence between the EU's development cooperation strategy &amp; interventions in Pakistan and EU policies in other fields</b></p> <p>The main issue that emerged from interviews and the literature is the <b>relationship between trade and human rights</b>. Most interviewees see the dialogue on trade and GSP+ as an effective forum for trust-building and continuing dialogue on human rights (e.g. MN403, MN410, MN412), even if progress can only be made over time. Only one interviewee held the view that there are not enough human rights gains, present or foreseen (e.g. MN402). An internal EU document further mentions that opportunities to reinforce the human rights dialogue have been significantly enhanced with the approval of GSP+ end of 2013, initiation of direct collaboration with the Government through the Human rights Division of the Ministry of Law and the integration of human rights into the parliamentary support programme. Priorities for the annual EIDHR call for proposals are oriented according to the EU human rights strategy for Pakistan.</p> <p>In addition, EU's support to the <b>trade</b> sector was a coherent complement to the local development activities undertaken under the <b>rural development</b> programmes, insofar as it aimed at promoting employment opportunities for local qualified workers in a geographically isolated area. This is further detailed in EQ7 on Trade (see I-7.1.1).</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory</b></p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <i>High Commission on Human Rights (NGO)</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Interviews / meeting notes (notably MN402, MN403, MN410, MN412)</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Internal EU document n°8</i></li> </ul>

# Annex A5: EQ 2 Rural development and natural resources

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## Acronyms

ADB	Asian Development Bank
ALC	Adult Literacy Center
ARI	Agriculture Research Institute
AsDB	Asian Development Bank
BIG	Business Interest Group
BK-PAP	Bacha Khan Poverty Alleviation Programme
BS	Budget Support
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CDLD	Community Driven Local Development
CO	Community Organization
CPI	Community Physical Infrastructure
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DCI-NSAPVD	Non State Actors – Pays en voie de développement
DFID	Department for International Development
EAD	Economic Affairs Division
EC	European Commission



ECHO	European Commission Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection
EDT	Enterprise Development Training
EIDHR	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
EU	European Union
EUD	European Union Delegation
EUR	Euro
FA	Financing Agreement
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FY	Fiscal Year
GBV	Gender Based Violence
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GoKP	Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
GoP	Government of Pakistan
GST	General Sales Tax
HBRI	Honey Bee Research Institute
HQ	Headquarters
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IGA	Inter-Governmental Agreement
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IWMI	International Water Management Institute
JP	Joint Programming
KP	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
KP-DGCD	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa District Governance and Community Development Programme
KP GGDC	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Good Governance and Development Contract
LFM	Logical Framework
LRRD	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
LSO	Local Support Organization
MCO	Men Community Organisation
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MHP	Micro hydro power
MIS	Management Information System
MN	Meeting Notes
MoF	Ministry of Finance (United Kingdom)
MoFS&R	Ministry of National Food Security and Research
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MTR	Mid-Term Review
NARC	National Agriculture Research Center
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NRM	Natural Resources Management
NRSP	National Rural Sector Programme

NSA	Non State Actors
NWFP	North-West Frontier Province (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa)
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PCNA	Post Crisis Needs Assessment
PEACE	Programme for Economic Advancement and Community Empowerment
PFM	Public Financial Management
PKR	Pakistan Rupees
PPP	Public Private Partnership
PRHS	Pakistan Rural Household Survey
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RAHA	Sustainable rural development in the Refugee Affected and Hosting Areas of Pakistan
RD	Rural Development
ROM	Results Oriented Monitoring
RSP	Reform Support Programme
RSP	Rural Support Programme
RSPN	Rural Support Programmes Network
SAFRON	Ministry of States and Frontier Regions
SDPF	Strategic Development Partnership Framework
SRC	Sector Reform Contract
SRSP	Sarhad Rural Support Programme
TA	Technical Assistance
UC	Union Council
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHABITAT	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNWOMEN	United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
VO	Village Organization
WCO	Women Community Organisation
WFP	United Nations World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

## 1 Overview of sector context

### 1.1 Agricultural and natural resource context

Pakistan covers some 800,000 sq km and is predominantly a semi-arid country in which nine agroclimatic zones are recognised (figure 1). The diversity in climatic conditions, from sub-tropical to high mountain allows a wide diversity in both crops grown and harvesting dates. Some 35.2 million hectares (59%) of the total land area is suitable for arable cultivation. Of this available land about 22.1 million hectares is actually cultivated<sup>1</sup>, about 4 million hectares is covered by forest and some 9.1 million hectares unutilised (26%), largely due to limited water availability, waterlogging and salinity. Generally good water availability allows some 80% of the cropped area to be irrigated, while the remaining 20% is rainfed. This high level of irrigation makes significant levels of production possible even in arid and semi-arid regions.

Pakistan's principal natural resources are arable land, water, hydroelectric potential, and natural gas reserves. While the country has extensive energy resources, including fairly sizable natural gas reserves, some proven oil reserves, coal, and large hydropower potential, exploitation of these resources has been slow due to a shortage of capital and domestic and international political constraints. Domestic gas and petroleum production totals only about half the country's energy needs, so that there is still dependence on imported oil. Privatization in the oil and gas sector has been identified as a priority by the Government<sup>2</sup>.

### 1.2 Contribution of Agricultural sector to Pakistan's economy

Pakistan's economy has been undergoing rapid modernisation and diversification since formation in 1947, at which time agriculture contributed some 60% to GDP. Agricultural contribution to total gross domestic product (GDP) has since declined, by some 7-10% per decade until 1990, since when it has remained between 20-30% of GDP<sup>3</sup>.

The agricultural sector (including fisheries and forestry) registered an average annual growth rate of 5.4% during the 1980s, followed by 4.4% in the 1990s. The slowdown in growth rate during the 1990s is attributed to climatic variability, the floods in 1993 and a prolonged drought at the end of the decade, which continued into the early 2000s, leading to reduced river flows and consequently reduced irrigation. Growth rate was consequently low in the early 2000's (also affected by impact of 9/11 on trade), but has improved recently due to more favourable weather in some years and trade conditions and improved river flows, with a high growth rate of 7.5% in 2004/5.

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<sup>1</sup> Actually cultivated land includes both cultivated land and that left temporarily fallow.

<sup>2</sup> <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3453.htm>

<sup>3</sup> Economic surveys, economic advisors wing, MoF, quoted in ADB (2006) Evaluation of the agricultural and NRM sector.

### 1.3 Growth and productivity trends

Overall agricultural growth is a composite of the growth of different sub-sectors, namely crops, livestock, fisheries and forestry. The contribution of different sub-sectors as a share of agricultural value added shows crop production (both major and minor) and livestock sub-sectors contributing similar amounts, between 45% and 51%, with fisheries and forestry contributing 1-2% and 2-3% respectively. The series of low rainfall years in late 1990s and early 2000s led to water shortages that particularly impacted on crop production. The large fluctuations that can occur in the crop sub-sector due to climatic conditions has a major effect on overall performance of the agricultural sector, with the negative growth rate of -2.2% in 2000/01 reflecting the reduction in crop growth rate of -8.1% and the positive 7.5% growth rate in 2004/05 influenced strongly by the crop growth rate of 13.5%. In contrast the livestock sub-sector showed continued growth during the same period and forestry, though erratic, made overall positive contributions. However, there is some debate as to the accuracy of the statistics, with the suggestion of over-reported growth in livestock value added in 1996 and also over reporting in the forestry sector in 2000<sup>4</sup>.

### 1.4 Agriculture and poverty trends

The consensus emerging from studies looking at poverty trends since the 1960s suggest that poverty increased in rural areas during the 1960s, despite high growth rates in the agricultural sector. It is suggested that this was partly because initial beneficiaries of agricultural subsidies in the 1960s were mostly large farmers and that the increase in agricultural growth did not “trickle down” effectively to impact on poverty levels<sup>5</sup>. The 1970s were marked by the decreasing incidence of rural poverty. This was also the time that private investment in agriculture reached its peak and smaller farmers were benefiting from improved seeds, fertilisers and irrigation introduced with the green revolution. There was also heavy outmigration from rural areas at this time, resulting in increased foreign remittances. About 67.5% of the population lives in rural areas (having declined from about 72% in 1981) with agriculture providing employment for about 43% of the total workforce.

57% of the rural poor are from non-farm households<sup>6</sup>. Partly for this reason, crop production only benefits some of the rural poor. For farm households, crop production only contributes a part of household income, often small. It contributes about 25% of rural income with livestock producing a further 8%. Wage labour contributes 4%, non-farm incomes about 40%, remittances 9% and “other income”<sup>7</sup>, 15%. These ratios differ from region to region. For example, in the Dir project evaluation, households derived less than 40% of family income from agriculture, though agriculture was still by far the most important economic activity in the region<sup>8</sup>.

<sup>4</sup> Malik, S J (2005) Agricultural Growth and Rural Poverty: A review of the evidence. Pakistan resident mission working paper series, No 2. Asian Development Bank.


<sup>5</sup> Arif, G M and Munir, Ahmed (2001) Poverty across the agro-ecological zones in rural Pakistan. Paper presented at the national workshop on pro-poor intervention strategies in irrigated agriculture in Asia: Pakistan, IWMI, Lahore.

<sup>6</sup> World Bank, **Pakistan, Promoting Rural Growth and Poverty Reduction**, 2007, p.10

<sup>7</sup> Other income was not differentiated from non-farm incomes by the World Bank.

<sup>8</sup> Office of Evaluation, Evaluation of Direct Area Support Project, 2007, p.2

**Figure 1. Pakistan Agro Ecological Regions**



I - Indus Delta	V - Barani Lands	IX - Dry Western Plateau
II - Southern Irrigated Plain	VI - Wet Mountains	X - Sulaiman Piedmont
III - Sandy Desert (a&b)	VII - Northern Dry Mountains	
IV - Northern Irrigated Plain (a & b)	VIII - Western Dry Mountains	

Source: Pakistan Agricultural Research Centre, 2007 <http://www.parc.gov.pk/agroeco.html>

## 1.5 National priorities with regard to rural development

Over the period of review, 2007-2014 there is clear direction from Government over priorities and approach to development through a number key policy documents. At national level these include the last phase of the Ten Year Perspective Development Plan<sup>9</sup>, Poverty Alleviation Strategy Paper (Ministry of Finance, 2004); Medium Term Development Framework 2005-2010 (Planning Commission, 2005, A Framework for translating Vision 2030 into action) and Strategic Directions for achieving Vision 2030 (Planning commission, 2006). There are, in addition, numerous sector policies and plans. This strong focus on policy and strategic direction, has not always been matched, however, by levels of success in achieving goals and targets set. Implementation of policy has been adversely affected, at different times, by the level of funding available, frequent changes in government, heightened militarization and insurgency problems, environmental disasters and refugee problems.

The community-based, community empowerment approach adopted in all projects is very much in line with Pakistan's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) adopted in 2004. The 2004 PRSP is built around four pillars:

- (i) achieving broad-based economic growth focusing on the rural economy,
- (ii) improving governance and consolidating devolution,
- (iii) investing in human capital and delivery of basic social services, and
- (iv) targeting the poor and vulnerable.

The PEACE project also follows the new Governance Framework for Community Driven Local Development (CDLD), which is being piloted in six districts in Malakand in KP province (Swat, Shagla, Malakand, Lower Dir, Upper Dir and Chitral). The goal of this policy is “to achieve a sustainable improvement in the coverage and quality of public front line service delivery through the active involvement of local communities” Three areas of activity support this goal:

- i. Put in place a fiscal and regulatory framework for CDLD where local communities are in charge of executing local development/service delivery initiatives.
- ii. Build the capacity of the relevant public sector entities and functionaries at the district level to rationalize CDLD.
- iii. Provide an enabling environment for CBOs to access public funds earmarked for CDLD initiatives. (Governance Framework CLDP, KP, 2013).

The CDLD policy was also shaped by stabilization and needs/post crisis assessments of the Malakand Strategy and Post Crisis Needs Assessment (PCNA) for KP (see below). In August 2009 the Malakand Comprehensive Stabilisation and Socio-Economic Development Strategy was published by the provincial Government, shortly after the end of the military activity. Its aim was to coordinate relief and early recovery and to prepare the transition to a sustainable development. The Strategy suggests community driven

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<sup>9</sup> Ten Year Perspective Development Plan, Planning Commission, 2001.

participative development approaches as basis for “social regeneration” and to strengthen the resilience of local communities.

In October 2010 a more profoundly analysed and publically consulted peace-building strategy, the Post Crisis Needs Assessment for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA (PCNA), was developed with support of the federal government and international community, including the EU. Recommendations relate to the need for the state to enact fundamental reforms that will ensure basic rights, empower citizens and address key governance, security and development shortcomings and inequalities through an inclusive and participatory approach. Community driven activities are emphasized as key to achieving better service delivery and economic development, as well as re-engagement of citizens with the state. More specifically, the PCNA identifies four Strategic Objectives<sup>10</sup>:

- (i) Build responsiveness and effectiveness of the State to restore citizen trust;
- (ii) Stimulate employment and livelihood opportunities;
- (iii) Ensure the delivery of basic services; and
- (iv) Counter radicalization and foster reconciliation.

Implementation of the PCNA was costed at EUR 2.1 billion for four years, i.e. annually about the same magnitude as the combined development budget for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA<sup>11</sup>.

The newly elected Government of Pakistan (in May 2013) seems to remain committed to follow the strategy initiated through RAHA programme. This strategy is in line with the decentralization process foreseen by the 18th amendment of the constitution of Pakistan<sup>12</sup>.

## 1.6 National priorities with regard to conservation and the environment

Environmental degradation is a severe issue in Pakistan and it is estimated to cost the country at least 6% of GDP, or about Rs. 365 billion per year. These costs fall disproportionately upon the poor<sup>13</sup>. The most significant causes of environmental damage identified are (i) illness and premature mortality caused by air pollution (indoor and outdoor), (almost 50 percent of the total damage cost); (ii) diarrhoeal diseases and typhoid due to inadequate water supply, sanitation and hygiene (about 30 percent of the total), and (iii) reduced agricultural productivity due to soil degradation (about 20 percent of the total). Key recommendations from review of the National context suggest (i) strengthening institutional design (in particular to guide Federal oversight of environmental authorities delegated to provinces); (ii) Update of regulatory framework (to set health-based air quality standards; use-based water quality standards, and standards for drinking water. Vehicle emission and fuel quality standards should also be updated); (iii) Build capacity for environmental management and (iv) reinforce incentives and accountability (through greater public consultation and disclosure in the EIA process) (ibid).

<sup>10</sup> Post Crisis Needs Assessment for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA (PCNA), 2010.

<sup>11</sup> KP DGCD, 2014, Financial Agreement, Annex1.

<sup>12</sup> RAHA, 2013, Mid-Term Review.

<sup>13</sup> World Bank Strategic Country Environmental Assessment, 2007.  
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT>

The National Conservation Strategy, introduced in 1992, seeks to conserve natural resources, support sustainable development and improve use and efficiency of management of natural resources<sup>14</sup>. There are various provincial strategies that support and feed into the National strategy. In particular the Sarhad Provincial Conservation Strategy (1996)<sup>15</sup> and the Balochistan Conservation Strategy (2000) are relevant in areas benefitting from EU support. To strengthen implementation of the NCS, The National Environmental Action Plan was approved in 2001 and a more far-reaching National Environmental Policy adopted in 2005, with increased budget allocation for environmental management<sup>16</sup>. World Bank funded activities intend to help ensure that efforts to support poverty-reducing growth and environmental management are mutually reinforcing.

The National Environment Policy provides an overarching framework for addressing key environmental issues, particularly pollution of fresh water bodies and coastal waters, air pollution, lack of proper waste management, deforestation, loss of biodiversity, desertification, natural disasters and climate change. It also gives direction to address cross sectoral issues, meet international obligations, as well as the underlying causes of environmental degradation<sup>17</sup>.

## 1.7 Women and Gender in Development

According to the World Economic Forum's Global Gender Gap Report, 2012, Pakistan ranked 134th out of 135 Countries<sup>18</sup>, among the worst places for women in the world. The recent report of the United Nations Development Program ranked Pakistan 123 out of 148 countries in the 2012 Gender Inequality Index (UNDP, 2013). Disadvantages are all pervasive, demonstrated in an adult literacy rate half that of men, lower life expectancy, high maternal mortality rates, low labour force participation, low earned income share and with representation in parliament and top business positions of only a few percent.

Looking at the status of women in Pakistan, complicated layers of state, society are found to interplay, with specific legal, social, political and insurgency dimensions, that lead to high levels of both discrimination and violence against women<sup>19</sup>.

Successive governments in Pakistan have been increasingly concerned that the disadvantaged position of Pakistani women is not only inequitable, but also constrains the achievement of the country's developmental potential<sup>20</sup>. The Government has taken major

<sup>14</sup> <http://projects.wri.org/sd-pams-database/pakistan/national-conservation-strategy>

<sup>15</sup> <https://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/spcs.pdf>

<sup>16</sup> World Bank Strategic Country Environmental Assessment, 2007. <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT>

<sup>17</sup> <http://environment.gov.pk/NEP/Policy.pdf>

<sup>18</sup> The ranking has been on decline since the year 2006. It was 112 in 2006, 126 in 2007, 127 in 2008, 132 in both 2009 and 2010, 133 in 2011 and 134 in 2012 (World Economic Forum, 2012: 9).

<sup>19</sup> Bhattacharya, S (2014) JRSP Vol 51 No1 p179-211

<sup>20</sup> [http://www.sdpi.org/research\\_and\\_news\\_bulletin/Vol.%2017,%20No.%203%20\(July%20-%20September,%202010\)/women\\_development\\_in\\_pakistan.htm](http://www.sdpi.org/research_and_news_bulletin/Vol.%2017,%20No.%203%20(July%20-%20September,%202010)/women_development_in_pakistan.htm) .



steps in the establishment of the National Commission on the Status of Women (NSCW) in 2000, followed by the development of a National Policy for the Development and Empowerment of Women (2002). Engagement with international initiatives include Pakistan's National Report to the FWCW (Beijing, 1995), and its follow-up National Plan of Action (NPA/MoWD, 1998). The report of the Pakistan Commission of Inquiry on Women (MoLJ&HR, 1997), as well as the reports of the NSCW on the Hudood Ordinances (2003), Women in Public Sector Employment (2004), Qisas & Diyat (2005) and Home-Based Women Workers (2005) have helped provide background data in a previously poorly documented area. The more recent Gender Reform Action Plan (2007) focuses on disbursement of Gender Development Grants, training for federal implementing partners in gender sensitization and provision of facilities to enable women's employment in the public sector<sup>21</sup>. An overarching Policy Framework for Women's Equal Rights has been introduced in 2010<sup>22</sup>. The translation of the recommendations of the NSCW and the above reports into legislation, and implementable operation as plans and programmes is an on-going challenge. The NSCW requires the administrative and financial autonomy necessary to carry out its policy watch role<sup>23</sup>. At present it is an attached department of the MoWD.

The community-based, community empowerment approach adopted in all projects, in-line with Pakistan's Poverty Reduction Strategy adopted in 2004 and the new Governance Framework for Community Driven Local Development, offers huge opportunities for taking forward gender mainstreaming. It is encouraging to see the specific call for women's project proposals under CDLD in Lower Dir (2016)<sup>24</sup>. There is need for greater encouragement of women's inclusion and empowerment, together with gender-disaggregated reporting within all projects and programmes to effectively monitor progress.

## 1.8 Land and land ownership

Some 35.2 million hectares (59%) of Pakistan's land area of 59.4 million hectares is land suitable for agriculture. Actual cultivated area<sup>25</sup> is about 22.1 million ha (some 63% of this), with just over 4.0 million ha (11%) under forest. The 9.1 million ha unutilised is due to unavailability of water for irrigation, or waterlogging and/or salinity problems. It has been estimated that some 38% of irrigated area is affected by waterlogging and some 14% by salinity<sup>26</sup>.

Land distribution is highly unequal, with some 45% of the land held by just 5% of owners. There are about 6.3 million farm owners in the country, 87% of whom own less than 5 hectares, a further 8% of farmers own between 5 and 10 hectares (16% of the cultivated

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<sup>21</sup> [http://www.jica.go.jp/english/our\\_work/thematic\\_issues/gender/background/pdf/e10pak.pdf](http://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_work/thematic_issues/gender/background/pdf/e10pak.pdf) a

<sup>22</sup> <http://www.ncsw.gov.pk/previewpublication/7>.

<sup>23</sup> [http://www.sdpi.org/research\\_and\\_news\\_bulletin/Vol.%2017,%20No.%203%20\(July%20-%20September,%202010\)/women\\_development\\_in\\_pakistan.htm](http://www.sdpi.org/research_and_news_bulletin/Vol.%2017,%20No.%203%20(July%20-%20September,%202010)/women_development_in_pakistan.htm).

<sup>24</sup> <http://www.cdldta.pk/index.php/cdld-progress>.

<sup>25</sup> Actual cultivated area includes land both land under cultivation and currently under fallow.

<sup>26</sup> Pakistan Millennium Development Goals Report 2004. Government of Pakistan, planning commission.

area)<sup>27</sup>. There are a further 0.3 million share croppers, cultivating some 12% of the area, while about 8% of farms are operated by owner-cum-sharecroppers on about 15% of the farm area<sup>9</sup>.

High rates of tenancy and sharecropping impacts on management of the land as incentives for investment in soil fertility and long-term soil conservation measures are less, or even not allowed by the owners (for example due to rights associated with tree planting). Inequality in land ownership has implications for productivity as, larger operated areas tend to produce lower yields and show less overall productivity. Consequently, improvement in equity of land distribution would not only reduce household poverty levels, but facilitate improved husbandry of land and lead to improved production levels.

A recent estimation suggests that almost one half of rural households own no land at all<sup>28</sup> and that as many as 64% of the poorest households are landless<sup>29</sup>, making agricultural interventions of limited relevance to IFADs current focus clients.

There are major economic costs to the lack of land title security that exists in Pakistan, as no bank will lend more than 50% of the value of the property, because of potential litigation in recovering the loan. Lack of title security is due to a number of factors which include the absence of any central register of land title, the fact that land revenue records relate to liability to pay tax, not ownership, and the continued legality of oral land transactions and existence of historic settler rights (pre-emptive laws). The resulting confusion with regard to title to land can take decades to sort out if taken to court<sup>30</sup>.

## 1.9 Water resources

By far the majority of Pakistan's total cropped area (80%) is irrigated, with progressive developments over the last century leading to development of the world's largest canal irrigation system in the Indus River Basin. Of the total irrigated area some 78% is supplied by canals (supplemented by tubewells). 17% of farmed area is irrigated solely by tubewells and shallow wells and the remaining 5% by tanks, ponds and streams. Groundwater accounts for about 40% of the total water available for irrigation and combined use of ground water with surface water is important, particularly in the Punjab province. Numbers of tubewells have increased by some 50% since the mid 1990's, to over three quarters of a million by 2003/04<sup>31</sup>. There is concern that groundwater is being over exploited, reducing the water table and having adverse ecological impact on the land on which it is applied, particularly where salt content is high and areas where fresh groundwater recharge is limited.

Only about 35% of the water delivered by the irrigation systems is used directly by crops. Most evaporates, or is lost to seepage, which can cause groundwater tables to rise unless

<sup>27</sup> Pakistan Agricultural Census 2000. Statistics division, Agricultural Census organisation, Islamabad.

<sup>28</sup> Pakistan Rural household Survey (PRHS), 2001.

<sup>29</sup> IFAD Performance based allocation system, Rural sector issues in Pakistan, 2007. p6.

<sup>30</sup> Greer, R and Jagirdar, S A H (2006) Evaluation of the Agriculture and Natural Resource management Sector. A report to the Operations Evaluation Department, Asian Development Bank.

<sup>31</sup> Pakistan Agricultural Statistics, 2004.

adequate drainage is supplied. Efficiency of water use in Pakistan is consequently low by international standards.

### 1.10 Rural Development and public sector institutions

Pakistan, since 2001, has had five elected levels of government: federal, provincial, district, *tehsil/taluka*, and union with budgeting, planning and development of much service provision being delegated to the district level. Administrative authority has been devolved to the district level and below, with public participation in decision making recognized in administrative systems; local councils monitoring public sector performance; and administrative structures being rationalized. Responsibility for health, education, assessment and collection of land taxes and agricultural income tax, agricultural extension and farm water management, planning and design of district roads and buildings are officially delegated to the district level of government. District budgets, however, are determined by the provincial level of government and do not necessarily reflect local priorities. The province level of government still has a lot of influence as it is responsible for public service appointments at district levels. The Local Government Commission, established to resolve intergovernment disputes, has not been effective to the general advantage of the provincial level. One benefit of the devolution has been greater local community influence on decision making about their development, improved community access to government officials and some improvement in service delivery<sup>32</sup>.

A 2001 Local Government Ordinance provides for Village Development Councils to mobilize community resources. The councils can maintain village facilities and can assume authority for the delivery of some services in their localities. There is also provision for Citizen Community Boards which are voluntary organisations to mobilize resources to improve service delivery and act as a conduit to pass on community concerns to government. A major issue for some districts and *tehsils* is that their expanded responsibilities have not been accompanied by corresponding increases in revenue flows, which in turn impacts on their capacity to support Village Development Councils.

Constitutionally, agriculture is a provincial responsibility with the exception of national issues like import and export of agricultural inputs and products, price setting, standardization and quarantine issues, national research and inter-provincial issues, such as the rehabilitation, operation and maintenance of primary irrigation infrastructure. The sub-sector tends to be underfunded. Both at national and provincial levels, ministries and departments, including research institutions tend to be chronically short of resources to meet their responsibilities including that their staff possess the range of competencies required to deliver on their mandates. Two important consequences are low levels of maintenance of infrastructure like irrigation and drainage and the inability of agricultural extension and other services to support rural populations effectively. Indeed, the service that is provided tends to support wealthy farmers rather than smallholders and the poor.

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<sup>32</sup> World Bank, **Pakistan, Promoting Rural Growth and Poverty Reduction**, 2007, p.117

### 1.11 Decentralisation and Devolution

Devolution occurred in 2002, when significant powers were devolved from provincial to district level. District Governments were formed, under the overall control of a District Coordinating Officer. The post of Executive District Officer (Agriculture) was created and agricultural extension was one of 5 subjects (also water management, forestry, fisheries and livestock) that came under his charge, with one technical officer (District Officer, Agricultural Extension) in charge of each. A Deputy District Officer (Agric) is in charge at tehsil level, and Agricultural Officers and Field Assistants respond to him (at Union Council level).

Whilst at federal level decision-makers might talk of the need to encourage growth in the agricultural sector to promote GDP, these do not necessarily match the immediate realities facing district level officers facing impending floods. Often district priorities over-rode agricultural ones, with agricultural staff diverted to other tasks such as flood duty. District level priorities no longer necessarily matched federal or provincial ones. Whilst funds were maybe sufficient, there was uneven distribution that did not always favour the agricultural sector. In 2015, a process of de-devolution is about to take place, with power being handed back to provincial level from the districts. Agricultural resources – budgets and staff – will be handed back to the provincial authorities, and provincial priorities in the sector re-established.

Decentralisation, a separate process, occurred in 2010. This involved the disbanding of the Ministry of Agriculture, with the MoFS&R created to cover coordination of both technical and bureaucratic machineries at federal level, and with research separated out and retained by MoFS&R. Agriculture became a provincial subject, with Provincial Directorates of Agriculture created. One of the downsides of this is that at federal level this decentralization process means that they no longer have the power and capacity to leverage funds from external sources. Provincial discretion as to fund allocation may also lead to less prioritization of agriculture (motorways get votes but not growth).

The implications of both of these processes for development is that power now lies firmly at provincial level, not only relating to implementation, but also increasingly for policy and advocacy matters, and for vision. The other side of this coin is that, with this aggregation of power, mechanisms for coordinating the activities of the provincial authorities need to be in place and need to be effective.

### 1.12 Public-private partnerships in agricultural development

While public private partnerships (PPPs) have grown in importance in Pakistan over the last two decades, implementation has been largely in the education, health and infrastructure sectors. PPPs are beginning to be supported in the agricultural sector, with the AsDB collaboration with the Government on *Agriculture Diversification and Agribusiness Development program*. One component of the program aims to promote crop diversification and commercialization, which includes support for institutional reforms to improve the quality of research and extension and policy reforms to eliminate market distortions. The World Bank identifies areas for intervention as including

diversification into high value products, agro-processing, and better integration in supply chains.

Pakistan is the fourth largest milk producer in the world<sup>33</sup>, but yield per animal are significantly lower than in other countries, a fifth of annual yield per cow in Germany and one third of that in New Zealand<sup>34</sup>. Average price for milk in Pakistan is significantly lower than that in neighbouring countries, such as India, because it is not linked to world prices for butter and skimmed milk powder<sup>35</sup>. There is consequently opportunity for development of the dairy sector and in 2006 a Public-Private Partnership was launched, including support for establishing 1,200 model dairy farms and 2,950 farms for raising livestock. Government support for development includes removal of sales tax from dairy products and dairy and livestock equipment, which are also exempt from custom duty<sup>36</sup>. Organisations involved in the partnership include: Dawood Group, Engro Chemical, Packages Ltd, Nestle Pakistan, TetraPak Pakistan, Aga Khan Foundation, Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund, the Pakistan Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority and the Prime Minister's Secretariat. Nestlé in March 2007 opened a state-of-the-art milk processing plant in Kabirwala, Punjab<sup>37</sup>. The plant, Nestlé's largest milk reception facility in the world, will start to linking milk prices to world prices.

Other areas identified as having potential for PPP initiatives include off-season vegetable production, increasing exports to the Middle East and Europe; dehydration of vegetables for local services market and similar export markets; tomato paste production; oil extraction from rice bran for tallow import substitution, and increased mutton and goat meat production<sup>14</sup>.

Opening-up of the seed industry in 1994 has enabled rapid expansion of private companies into the seed production and distribution sector, with 586 private firms active in the sector by the end of 2005<sup>38</sup>. While private firms are now responsible for the majority of seed production, varietal development is still almost exclusively in the public domain. The private sector tends to select seed for production on a commercial basis, so that there is a shortage in availability of varieties suited to more marginal areas. There is a need for more closely controlled public private partnerships in seed production, to ensure that less commercially advantageous seed production (often of varieties suited to rained, marginal and niche agro-climatic zones) are produced alongside the mainstream commercial seed varieties. This could be done by tying access by private sector companies to breeder seed, produced by the public sector, with production and distribution targets for a range of varieties. At present no such control is being introduced, although registration of private seed companies, dealers and processing companies is to become mandatory. This is to

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<sup>33</sup> [http://www.indiadairy.com/ind\\_world\\_number\\_one\\_milk\\_producer.html](http://www.indiadairy.com/ind_world_number_one_milk_producer.html)

<sup>34</sup> Garcia, O et al., (2002) A review of milk production in Pakistan, with specific emphasis on small scale producers. A living from livestock. Pro-poor livestock initiatives.

[http://www.fao.org/AG/AGAINFO/projects/en/pplpi/docarc/execsumm\\_wp03.pdf](http://www.fao.org/AG/AGAINFO/projects/en/pplpi/docarc/execsumm_wp03.pdf)

<sup>35</sup> [http://www.milkproduction.com/Library/Articles/Milk\\_prices\\_and\\_costs\\_of\\_milk\\_production\\_in\\_2003.htm](http://www.milkproduction.com/Library/Articles/Milk_prices_and_costs_of_milk_production_in_2003.htm)

<sup>36</sup> Board of investment (2006) Investors Guide. Government of Pakistan.

<http://www.pakboi.gov.pk/word/Agriculture%20overview.doc>

<sup>37</sup> <http://www.just-food.com/article.aspx?ID=97842&lk=ht>

<sup>38</sup> Seed Information No 32 January 2007

[http://www.icarda.org/News/Seed%20Info/SeedInfo\\_32/Contributions\\_32.htm](http://www.icarda.org/News/Seed%20Info/SeedInfo_32/Contributions_32.htm)

address quality issues, including those associated with labelling and branding in order to prevent sale of unregistered and non-recommended varieties<sup>39</sup>.

### 1.13 EU support to the sector

Three major programmes frame the support to this sector:

- RAHA: Sustainable rural development in the refugee-affected and hosting areas of Pakistan.  
Period of implementation of the EU programme: 2011-2015.  
Total cost: € 100 m. EU contribution: € 40 m.  
Implementation: joint management through a contribution agreement with UNDP  
Other contributing donors to this programme: UNDP, UNHCR, Germany, Japan, Denmark
- PEACE: Programme for Economic Advancement and Community Empowerment  
Period of implementation: 2012-2016  
Total cost € 40 m. EU contribution: € 40 m.  
Implementation: grant contract with the NGO Sarhad Rural Support Programme.
- KP DGCD: Khyber Pakhtunkwa District Governance and Community Development Programme  
Period of implementation: 2013/14-2017/18  
Total cost: € 80m. EU contribution € 80m.  
Implementation/modality: sector budget support to Khyber Pakhtunkwa

In addition the EU has launched a number of smaller complementary interventions in the targeted provinces and interventions in the same sector in other provinces:

- Balochistan Community Development Programme (BCDP, 2013-2018), € 7m.
- Support to capacity building and promotion of a sector wide approach in KP and Baluchistan (2 projects totaling € 0.17 m in 2010)
- Several interventions through the regional programme to stimulate community development and capacity building to grass roots organisations for approximately €0.64 m.
- Interventions via the thematic budget lines (EIDHR, NSAPVD) for approximately € 5.7 m.
- Support to capacity building on climate change in coastal areas: €1.9m

Finally, LRRD/Food security interventions have been funded by the EU to respond to emergency situations. These activities will be mainly assessed under the on-going ECHO evaluation, the findings of which will inform the present study.

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<sup>39</sup> August, 2007. [http://www.phdeb.org.pk/topstoriesEvents/events\\_detail.php?id=2399](http://www.phdeb.org.pk/topstoriesEvents/events_detail.php?id=2399)

## 2. Findings per JCs and indicators: EQ2, Rural development and natural resources

<b>EQ2</b>	<b>To what extent has the EU facilitated community empowerment and contributed to community driven development, in KP and Baluchistan?</b>
<b>JC-2.1</b>	<b>The design of the three large interventions and the selection of the provinces have been based on an analysis of the needs and challenges, and adapted to the evolving context.</b>
<p>The three projects share the same underlying intervention modality, that of working to promote community development and empowerment through design, implementation and monitoring of activities by representative, democratic community organisations. These CBOs are united at village level to form village organisations, which are then federated at Union Council level to form Local Support Organisations, which help maintain and develop their component community organisations. This broadly follows the participatory guidelines of the Rural Support Programme approach, which is widely recognized by Government, donors and civil society as the most effective approach to rural development in Pakistan at present<sup>40</sup>. The three projects are located in the two provinces, Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, bordering Afghanistan, containing remote tribal areas and most impacted over the last 30 years by militancy, insurgency and affects of civil war in Afghanistan. Whereas RAHA and PEACE address the demand side and follow a bottom up approach to support local empowerment and social mobilisation, the KP GGDC programme also addresses the supply side by supporting the provincial government in developing a capacity and a policy to respond to the needs and demands of the local communities. Consequently all projects have a dimension of seeking to stabilize the areas through community ownership of infrastructure developments and increasing the responsiveness and linkages between government service providers and communities, to restore citizens trust (Financial Agreements of all three projects). Documentation shows the projects to be closely aligned with government policy and strategies, and the stakeholders consulted on their insertion of the EU cooperation strategy. Information collected directly from stakeholders confirms the importance and the relevance of the rural development programmes to address poverty and stability issues. However, although there is no doubt about the relevance of the three projects, their alignment on government policies and their response to objective needs, the RAHA suffered from severe design deficiencies that affected its potential impact.</p>	
I-2.1.1	<p><b>Existence of underlying analyses to identify which and whose needs to address and the regions of intervention.</b></p> <p><i>The rural development programmes have been the object of a long preparation involving analyses, exchanges with actors already involved in the sector and with the federal and provincial authorities in view of identifying the need, the modalities and the areas of intervention.</i></p> <p>The project programming documents duly explain the problems the EU support wants to address and the strategy to address them. The needs are immense and obvious: (high rural poverty in KP and Baluchistan, millions of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, low human development, degradation of natural resources further</p>

<sup>40</sup> NRSP is currently supported by 18 international donors as well as Government of Pakistan and Provinces of Sindh, Balochistan and Punjab. It is active in all 4 provinces, in 61 districts and currently assisting over 2.6 million poor households, through a network of some 173,304 community organisations. <http://nrsp.org.pk> accessed 24.09.15.

aggravating the poverty situation, scarcity of rural infrastructure, recurrent natural disasters and upsurges of violence). Identification and programming documents show clearly that the EU has selected its interventions in taking into account in its analyses the following factors:

- Attempt to address the most urgent problems in regions where they were most acute;
- Alignment on government policies ;
- Complementarity with the support of other donors given to achieve a critical mass of resources to address the gigantic needs;
- Lessons learned from previous integrated rural development in particular regarding the importance of establishing partnerships with local communities, the potential role of women community organisations, the mobilisation of community based organisations in order to improve their empowerment, their capacity to initiate development activities and to have access to development funds.

The selection of the modalities of intervention in the rural development sector have been the object of analyses and discussions with potential partners early in the identification process:


- While initially a sector budget support program was planned, but identification was hardly possible due to the security constraints, the Delegation presented this program as an alternative to assess the possibility and readiness for Sector Budget Support in the area of Rural Development and Natural Resource Management in the two MIP target Provinces. Discussions were held with Govt of Balochistan and with the Economic Affairs Division on federal level.
- Delegation has tried to prepare jointly with several UN agencies an intervention on rural development (RD) and natural resources management (NRM). Dialogue with the UN agencies on this program has been good and open but AIDCO E was critical of the identification sheet. In addition and even more importantly, the proposed One UN fund for Pakistan foresees 7 % overhead costs plus 1 % remuneration for the administrative agent, which is not in line with the FAFA. There are also a number of other issues that require assessment and follow-up from HQ. If no solution is found, the Delegation cannot proceed with the formulation of the program.
- There are little alternative options, if any, to working with the international organizations on the ground although more joint actions with other EU Member States and direct work with civil society are definitely possible and also being pursued/envisaged by the Delegation for certain sectors (education, rural development, human rights etc). However, the Delegation believes that in view of the existing human resources constraints in the Delegation, in many cases it would be better to use these human resources to try to effectively steer joint or delegated programs while ensuring visibility for EC. Working through budgetary support mechanisms on the other hand remains a risky business in view of corruption issues and very limited implementation capacity of government staff.

(IntDoc-3)



The three projects share the same underlying intervention modality, that of working to promote community development and empowerment through design, implementation and monitoring of activities by representative, democratic community organisations, which together form village organisations that are federated at Union Council level to form Local Support Organisations, which help maintain and develop their component community organisations. These broadly follow the participatory guidelines of the Rural Support Programme approach, which is widely recognized by Government, donors and civil society as the most effective approach to rural development in Pakistan at present. It can be represented by the following diagram:

### Three-Tiered Social Mobilisation



Source: Website of the Rural Support Programme Network

The three projects differ in terms of financial modalities:

- The Sustainable Rural Development Programme in the Refugee Affected and Hosting Areas of Pakistan (RAHA, €40m) implemented through a contribution agreement with the UN Agencies UNDP/UNHCR. The programme was targeted on 103 Union Councils of KP and focused on small scale physical infrastructures, community mobilisation and local government. It was implemented through UNDP (refugee affected areas) and UNHCR (refugee hosting areas). The EU contribution channelled through UNDP follows UNDP's National Implementation modality, whereby project activities are implemented and overseen by the provincial governments of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through the provincial Planning and Development Departments. (RAHA, 2014, Annual Report).

Although RAHA has been developed as a standalone project targeted to the Union Councils, it is also inscribed in the tree tiered approach described

above: “ Area Development Approach under RAHA calls for empowering communities through proper social mobilization & quality training, transformation of Community Organizations (COs) into Village Organizations (VOs) & Local Support Organizations (LSOs), block allocation for Union Council ( UC) level to identify, prioritize, plan & execute small scale projects through grass root community institutions.” (UNDP/UNHCR Refugee Affected and Hosting Areas Program, Review Mission Report, April 2011)

The RAHA project suffered from severe weaknesses in term of design that do not seem to have been perceived in the early stage of the programme but deeply affected its implementation. Indeed the mid-term evaluation of 2013 notes “The design of the project is based on an extensive critical review and is robust. It plans to support pro-poor strategy of the Government of Pakistan and to contribute to achievement of MDGs in Pakistan. The components of the project (objectives, expected results, potential activities, outputs) relate well with each other and have the potential to contribute to achievement of the results. The area based development and bottom up demand driven approaches as well as strategies (social cohesion, social protection, capacity building, sustainable livelihoods, social mobilization) are relevant and comprehensive. Overall the design can be replicated with a review of the logical framework. “ (Mid-term Review 2013, p. 19)

The final review of December 2015 has a much more negative view and shows, convincingly, that the design suffered from major flaws that were not corrected during implementation and therefore had an impact on its results. They can be summarised as follows:

Implementation mechanism too complex

- Security: imposes key constraints but known though not factored in the programme. Instead programme expanded from 1578 communities (initial objective) to 2352, many in inaccessible geographic areas): unmanageable
- Weather: winter prevents to work 3months/year. Should have been anticipated.
- Joint UNDP-UNHCR was a questionable option:  
UNHCR reports to SAFRON, UNDP to EAD  
UNHCR fiscal year July-june; UNDP calendar  
UNHCR humanitarian interventions (sustainability of community organisation not in their brief), UNDP approach had to aim at sustainability of Cos  
UNHCR works through “partners”, whereas UNDP works through the government. Capacity of UNHCR’s partners proved low.
- Geographic spread: 2352 communities in the most remote security-challenged areas with extreme scarcity of qualified HR and difficult access  
Multiplicity of micro projects = deliberate choice, but excessive spread (to clarify, cf. Doubtful argumentation of last § of p.14)

Very poor logframe: no indicators linked to the results, focused on activities. [The FA provides that the logframe may be updated or adapted to the Overall Work Plan (which was not done; interesting also because it shows that the IL was regarded as a catalogue of activities, not a real LF)

Absence of specific targeting criteria to select interventions. criteria too vague: to select intervention??). Not corrected by the Steering Committee or the Federal Task Force (both with EU observer)

*Source: Final Evaluation of the RAHA programme*

- The Programme for Economic Advancement and Community Empowerment (PEACE, €40m), implemented in partnership with the NGO SARHAD Rural Support Programme through a grant contract. It supported initiatives from community based organisations for physical infrastructures and the building of social capital through a three tier approach consisting in 1° setting up Community Based Organisations, i.e. local interests groups for shared economic/social activities, 2° the networking of these into Village Organisations, and 3° on top of the hierarchy Local Support Organisations that can stimulate and relay local development activities of their members and also act as a counterpart to local government. PEACE is implemented by the NGO SARHAD RSP through a grant contract with the EU. This mirrors an earlier project by SARHAD, funded by the Government of Pakistan, which is successfully implemented the Rural Support Programme (RSP) approach in four districts of KP, with a budget of 1 Billion rupees (PEACE Grant contract, p5). PEACE is looking to test the feasibility of up-scaling this approach, to seven districts, with a significantly larger budget.
- Whereas the two previous programmes addressed the demand of public services by rural communities, the KP District Governance and Community Development Programme (KP DGCD, €80m) widens the scope of the previous approach to address also the supply side. It is implemented through budget support (€64m), technical assistance to support the provincial and local authorities (€8.6m) and a grant component (€7.5) to contribute to the mobilisation of communities. (KP-DGCD, 2013, Financial Agreement.

The evolving approach of the EU can be illustrated by the fact that RAHA worked mainly at the level of two lower tiers, whereas PEACE has been based on the three tiered approach. Both projects are focused on the demand side of public services. With the KP government reforms decided in 2012 and the elaboration of the CDLD policy (supported by the EU) the DP-DGCD programme complements this approach by including massive support to the supply side, via SBS and institutional strengthening TA.

The three projects are located in the two provinces, Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, bordering Afghanistan, containing remote tribal areas and impacted over the last 30 years by militancy, insurgency and affects of civil war in Afghanistan. Consequently all projects have a dimension of seeking to stabilize the areas through community ownership of infrastructure developments and increasing the responsiveness and linkages between government service providers and communities, to restore citizens trust (Financial Agreements of all three projects).

The EU supported interventions aim to support the Government of Pakistan's pro-poor development efforts to bring the poor and backward areas and communities in Baluchistan and KP into the mainstream of development by improving access to, and reducing existing inequalities in resources, incomes and livelihood opportunities. Specific objectives include improvement to livelihoods, rehabilitation of the environment and enhancement of social cohesion within communities,

	<p>original communities and those including refugees. Different projects also pilot different funding mechanisms to support community development and build capacity of both communities and service providers in identifying needs, opportunities and constructive ways to interact and collaborate.</p> <p>The government services are decentralised with a large autonomy of the Province Governments, which can decide upon and levy their own taxes. The administrative apportionment at the province level includes several districts themselves divided in Tehsils. The Tehsil covers few Union Councils (UC) and the UCs several villages. A village consists of various clans, or enlarged families, representing as many interest groups. However, state line departments are not represented below the Tehsil level and planning issues remain at the district level.</p> <p>The support to development of community organisations at the level of specific interest groups, federated into village organisations, which in turn join together to form Local Support groups at Community Union level, is hoped to provide the mission link between District Line agencies and the community.</p> <p>In rural development, building on the design of the new KP District Governance and Community Development programme, the Delegation has been given the opportunity to contribute in discussions with the GoKP on modalities of the implementation of the new Local Governance Act, the pursuance of a provincial policy for community driven development and the roll out of the provincial financial management reforms at local level. (IntDoc-7)</p> <p><i>Sources: PEACE, 2012, Grant Contract</i>  <i>RAHA, 2014, Annual Report</i>  <i>KP-DGCD, 2013 Financial Agreement</i>  <a href="http://nrsp.org.pk">http://nrsp.org.pk</a> accessed 24.09.2015  <a href="http://www.rspn.org/index.php/work/social-mobilisation/">http://www.rspn.org/index.php/work/social-mobilisation/</a>  <i>UNDP/UNHCR Refugee Affected and Hosting Areas Program, Review Mission Report, April 2011</i>  <i>RAHA, 2009, Financial Agreement</i>  <i>PEACE, 2012, Financial Agreement</i>  <i>PEACE, 2013, ROM</i>  <i>Int.Doc-3, Int.Doc-7</i>  <i>Interviews: MN 501; MN901; MN201</i></p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; background-color: #f4b084; padding: 5px; width: fit-content; margin-top: 10px;"> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>Strong</b></p> </div>
<p>I-2.1.2</p>	<p><b>Reference in these analyses to the 10 OECD principles of engagement in fragile states</b></p> <p><i>Although there is no specific reference in any documents to the 10 OECD principles of engagement in fragile states, but the analysis of the programming documents shows that the EU has in practice</i></p>

	<p><i>taken them into account.</i></p> <p>There is clear alignment of EU initiatives with taking the context as the starting point (Principle 1). This is shown in alignment with National policies, design of programmes to work in conflict affected areas, with components to address refugee issues (both external and internal); original community needs, environmental issues and raising awareness and capacity through widespread training in conflict resolution, social cohesion, rights based approaches, and disaster risk management. There has been a growing acknowledgement of the negative impact of refugee presence on hosting communities in Pakistan. The most serious aspect of which has emerged as sense of exclusion and alienation among the poorer sections of the hosting population, as with international assistance, refugee populations get better access to services, particularly education, health and water and sanitation than is available to them. The EU, working closely with UN agencies, is actively seeking to address this problem, helping leverage funds from multiple sources to address this breach of do no harm (principle 2) and avoiding pockets of exclusion (principle 10). The programmes supported by the EU are helping to strengthen the state (principle 3) through both assistance in addressing poverty through basic service delivery and in strengthening civil society engagement, promoting democratic organisation at grass roots level and inclusion of all sectors of society within development processes.</p> <p>Development and capacity building of community organisations, inclusion of women and poorer sectors of society within these organisations and federation into village level and then local support organisations is a considered, long-term EU strategy. It aims at promoting non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies (principle 6), and at aligning to local priorities in different ways in different contexts (principle 7) while taking into account the importance of prevention (principle 4). Combined with focus on conflict affected areas, inclusion of refugee affected areas and support to service providers, a clear recognition of links between political, security and developmental objectives is apparent in the programming documents (principle 5).</p> <p><i>Source: Analysis of the programming documents of the three main projects</i></p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>Strong</b></p>
I-2.1.3	<p><b>References to these analyses in the programming documents</b></p> <p>No specific reference in any documents to the 10 OECD principles of engagement in fragile states. But practice they are applied, see I-2.1.2</p> <p><i>Sources: Same as I-2.1.2</i></p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>Strong</b></p>

I-2.1.4	<p><b>Existence of risk assessment studies, including risks of corruption and frauds.</b></p> <p><i>Risks have been assessed and taken into account within the design of the programmes; mitigation measures are identified but in the case of the RAHA project the design did not factor in the constraints imposed by security and weather. Risks are monitored.</i></p> <p>For RAHA the biggest risk identified is the security situation: “Even though the RAHA programme would target relatively safer areas, the situation in the country remains very volatile and unpredictable, this may inhibit the availability of international projects staff and could result in program activities involving international and nationals having to temporarily cease. Moreover, the present and any future confrontations with militancy and insurgency may result in a high influx of IDPs. If the influx of IDPs becomes too high, there is a risk that no real development action can be undertaken and that there is only space for humanitarian organisations. Other important risks are potential regional conflicts and/or cross border unrest, lack of political will and engagement from Government of Pakistan, as well as lack of acknowledgement and recognition to provide asylum space and some measures of protection in exchange of benefits/assistance to host communities as a result of the RAHA projects. Other risks include weak partnership and trust among stakeholders and inadequate participation by disadvantaged and marginal groups including women.” Mitigation measures are incorporated in the design of the programme: “As far as security is concerned, it is expected that should security get worse, UNDP and its implementing partners will adapt their modus operandi accordingly with measures such as temporary reducing the exposure of staff. Moreover, depending on the situation, there might be a shift to humanitarian instead of development activities”.</p> <p>Another risk identified is that of inadequate participation of disadvantaged groups, to mitigate it: “the program will put particular emphasis on the participation of disadvantaged groups, and benefits-sharing criteria and mechanisms will be developed and implemented transparently. Efforts will be made to organise women into exclusive ‘women groups’ (as in many rural areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan conservative traditions preclude participation of women in mixed groups) giving them an equal say in decision-making.”</p> <p>Other mitigating strategies are also envisaged: decentralised implementation avoiding as far as possible interference from federal government other than SAFRON and EAD, using community based organisations, provincial or national NGOs, ability to roll out modular programmes to improve flexibility and to avoid suspension of entire programme or components when major risk materialise.</p> <p>Risks are also monitored during implementation with special emphasis on tracking “a) insufficient capacity and resources from the Federal, Provincial and Local Governments to implement the strategic programmes supported by the Joint Programme, b) insufficient resource mobilization; c) the inability of duty-bearers to perform properly their functions; d) insufficient funding commitment from the donors to support the achievement of JP/JPC outcomes; e) insufficient collaboration among the Implementing Partners; f) insufficient engagement of vulnerable communities in the process of social change; g) insufficient compliance</p>
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of the Private Sector with norms, standards and regulations; h) inclusion of more federal department leading to more centralized rather than decentralized control and i) insecure political and operational environment.” (Annex 1 of Contribution Agreement with UNDP).

The Final Evaluation of the RAHA programme highlights the fact that well known risks were not properly factored in the design of the programme:

- Harsh weather conditions in winter prevent most activities about three months every year, corresponding to 1 year inactivity of the planned programme life. The lack of anticipation of this in the programme resulted in the need to provide two no cost extensions.
- Security constraints were duly identified rendered the programme extremely difficult to manage. Notwithstanding this the project expanded from an initial objective of 1578 communities to an unmanageable number of 2352 many of which in inaccessible and unsecure geographic areas.

(RAHA Final Evaluation report)

For the PEACE programme an in-depth risk and mitigation measures has also been included in the programming documents and constant monitoring during implementation is foreseen. It is summarised in the following matrix:

Category	Level of the Risk	Risk Mitigation
Security Risks	High	SRSP keeps a low profile in the target area and will prefer the same for the PEACE Programme implementation. Local staff will be taken on board for project implementation, which are aware of the local culture and contexts. The movement of the staff in the field will be subject to the prevailing situation. Coordination on security issues with District Administration will be ensured to keep project team aware of potential threats and dangers.
Acceptance of women's programme by the beneficiaries	High	Encourage women participation as per local context, situation and conditions. Experienced women staff will be taken on board to interact with women community members. Concentrated efforts will be made at sensitizing men and women communities on their rights. Local activists developed as community recourse persons. They will be utilized in ensuring transparent, efficient and effective delivery of programme packages. SRSP has played an active role in the rehabilitation of the communities both after conflict and floods. It has, thus, gained for itself public credibility and good will of the communities and the local administration. It also has the required outreach in the district. Therefore, it foresees minimal risk of project rejection at the community level. However, conservative mind-set and traditional taboos may bar women from active participation in the project activities.
Participation and contribution of community	Low	Investing in institutions and their development will be the key factor in sustainability. Developing linkages with relevant agencies, donors and civil society organizations. Focusing on community needs by investing in community leadership and organizations.
Relationship with the Government	High	Involvement in Steering Committee Participation in district and provincial events Regular meetings for progress update Exposure visits to programme areas
Natural Disasters	Low	Regular progress update meetings with the field teams will be integral to plan activities and strategize the programme effectively so that targets are achieved within specified timelines and any unforeseen situation does not adversely affect the progress Disaster Risk Reduction will be specifically catered to while doing infrastructure schemes and MHP (SRSP will benefit from its extensive experience in this case)

(Grant contract with Sarhad RSP, Annex 1)

However, risks of corruption and fraud are not specifically mentioned in the programming documents of the RAHA and PEACE projects.

For the KP DGCD programme, the Risk Management Framework applicable to BS operations has been completed and updated at the time of disbursement of the first tranche. The intervention is regarded as a high risk but also high potential reward one.

Risks of corruption and frauds are identified and mitigation measures proposed mainly through the monitoring of the PFM reform. (KP DGCD: Annex to the action fiche.)

*Sources: RAHA, PEACE and KP GCD programming documents and agreements with implementing parties. RAHA Evaluation Reports.*

Quality of evidence: **Strong**



<p>I-2.1.5</p>	<p><b>Proposals of risk mitigating measures in the programming documents.</b></p> <p>See I-2.1.4</p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; background-color: #f4b084; padding: 5px; margin-top: 10px;"> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>Strong</b></p> </div>
<p>I-2.1.6</p>	<p><b>Documents, minutes and meetings, demonstrating the existence of a policy dialogue with the governments and the alignment on their policies.</b></p> <p><i>From the identification stage a dialogue has taken place with the Government, at federal level with the EAD and with the Governments of Balochistan and KP, on the organisation of this support, the sector wide approach, the possible use of BS and the provincial policies. Extensive consultations also took place on the occasion of the midterm review and in 2012 to start the preparation of the 2014-2010 programming cycle. They confirmed the EU diagnostic, the relevance and the approach in the rural development and natural resources management sector. They also expressed a demand for a wider geographic coverage.</i></p> <p>Policy dialogue with the government on rural development took place at federal and provincial level and started at the identification stage:</p> <p>“GoP and GoKP/B have indicated interest in a broader rural development approach combining this programme with the newly agreed ASIE/2009/21577 Integrated sustainable development through agricultural growth”.</p> <p>“In rural development, building on the design of the new KP District Governance and Community Development programme, the Delegation has been given the opportunity to contribute in discussions with the GoKP on modalities of the implementation of the new Local Governance Act, the pursuance of a provincial policy for community driven development and the roll out of the provincial financial management reforms at local level.”</p> <p>(Int.Doc 3, 7)</p> <p>Over the period of review, 2007-2014 there is clear direction from Government over priorities and approach to development through a number key policy documents. At national level these include the last phase of the Ten Year Perspective Development Plan (Planning Commission, 2001); Poverty Alleviation Strategy Paper (Ministry of Finance, 2004); Medium Term Development Framework 2005-2010 (Planning Commission, 2005, A Framework for translating Vision 2030 into action) and Strategic Directions for achieving Vision 2030 (Planning commission, 2006). There are, in addition, numerous sector policies and plans. This strong focus on policy and strategic direction, has not always been matched by levels of success in achieving goals and targets set. Implementation of policy has been adversely affected, at different times, by the level of funding available, frequent changes in government, heightened militarization and insurgency problems, environmental disasters and refugee problems.</p> <p>The community-based, community empowerment approach adopted in all projects</p>

is very much in line with Pakistan's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) adopted in 2004. The 2004 PRSP is built around four pillars: (i) achieving broad-based economic growth focusing on the rural economy, (ii) improving governance and consolidating devolution, (iii) investing in human capital and delivery of basic social services, and (iv) targeting the poor and vulnerable.

The PEACE project also follows the new Governance Framework for Community Driven Local Development (CDLD) which is being piloted in six districts in Malakand in KP province (Swat, Shagla, Malakand, Lower Dir, Upper Dir and Chitral). The goal of this policy is “to achieve a sustainable improvement in the coverage and quality of public front line service delivery through the active involvement of local communities” Three areas of activity support this goal:

(i) Put in place a fiscal and regulatory framework for CDLD where local communities are in charge of executing local development/service delivery initiatives.

(ii) Build the capacity of the relevant public sector entities and functionaries at the district level to rationalize CDLD.

(iii) Provide an enabling environment for CBOs to access public funds earmarked for CDLD initiatives. (Governance Framework CDLD, KP, 2013). The CDLD policy was also shaped by the stabilization and needs/ post crisis assessments of the Malakand Strategy and Post Crisis Needs Assessment for KP (see below).

In August 2009 the Malakand Comprehensive Stabilisation and Socio-Economic Development Strategy was published by the provincial Government, shortly after the end of the military activity. Its aim was to coordinate relief and early recovery and to prepare the transition to a sustainable development. The Strategy suggests community driven participative development approaches as basis for “social regeneration” and to strengthen the resilience of local communities.

In October 2010 a more profoundly analysed and publically consulted peace-building strategy, the Post Crisis Needs Assessment for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA (PCNA), was developed with support of the federal government and international community, including the EU. Recommendations relate to the need for the state to enact fundamental reforms that will ensure basic rights, empower citizens and address key governance, security and development shortcomings and inequalities through an inclusive and participatory approach. Community driven activities are emphasized as key to achieving better service delivery and economic development, as well as re-engagement of citizens with the state. More specifically, the PCNA identifies four Strategic Objectives (SO): (i) Build responsiveness and effectiveness of the State to restore citizen trust; (ii) Stimulate employment and livelihood opportunities; (iii) Ensure the delivery of basic services; and (iv) Counter radicalization and foster reconciliation. (PCNA, 2010 quoted in Grant contract with SRSP p.4).

Implementation of the PCNA was costed at EUR 2.1 billion for four years, i.e. annually about the same magnitude as the combined development budget for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA. (KP DGCD Annex1 FA).

The newly elected Government of Pakistan (in May 2013) seems to remain committed to follow the strategy initiated through RAHA programme. This strategy is in line with the decentralization process foreseen by the 18th amendment of the constitution of Pakistan. (ROM, 2014).

Internal Documents show that extensive consultations have taken place with the government and with the stakeholders on the occasion of the midterm review of the EU Country Strategy and in 2012 at the start of the preparation of the MIP 2014-2020. These consultations were based on experience of past and ongoing cooperation. Their main messages for the rural development sector include:

- Analysis of the country situation by the EU is regarded as comprehensive and valid.
- Natural Resources Management is critical with rural development but also for urban development.
- Recognition that Rural Development and Natural Resources Management are particularly difficult areas due to lack of government leadership and absorption capacity.
- The poor, because they are particularly affected by environmental degradation, must be targeted by the environment programmes.
- There is a demand for a geographic expansion of the EU support to rural development (poverty stricken areas of Punjab, desert areas of Sindh,...)
- The approach of the Rural Support Programmes are regarded as very successful and provincial governments expressed wished that the EU worked with them (which it did)
- Tapping into local communities' experience and models to ensure ownership and sustainability.
- The focus on civil society and community empowerment seems to be working. More accountability of NGOs is needed towards their beneficiaries including transparency and participation in decision-making.
- EU should prioritize social structure activities over infrastructure and build the capacities of people at grassroots level rather than supporting national elites.

*Int.Docs: 15, 16, 17, 18*

*National Consultations EU-Pakistan Cooperation, Summary of Discussions (September 2012)*

The final evaluation of the RAHA programme confirms the relevance of the programme to the overall objective of the EU and its coherence with the GoP's policies:

- It focuses on the provinces identified as primary beneficiaries of the focal areas 1 in the CSP 2007-2013
- It supports, in close coordination with the international community, a comprehensive solution to the situation of Afghan refugees.
- It is in line with the GoP's rural development strategy and the targets of the GoP's Medium-Term Development Framework and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper.

The final evaluation also confirms the full relevance to the needs of the target groups, since interventions within the programme are community driven, i.e. have been selected on the basis of needs prioritised by the communities.

*Sources: Ten Year Perspective Development Plan (Planning Commission, 2001);*

*Poverty Alleviation Strategy Paper (Ministry of Finance, 2004);*

*Medium Term Development Framework 2005-2010 (Planning Commission, 2005);*

*A Framework for translating Vision 2030 into action and Strategic Directions for achieving*

	<p><i>Vision 2030 (Planning commission, 2006).</i>  <i>Governance Framework CLDP, KP, 2013</i>  <i>Malakand Comprehensive Stabilisation and Socio-Economic Development Strategy, 2009.</i>  <i>Post Crisis Needs Assessment for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA (PCNA), 2010.</i>  <i>Decentralization process foreseen by the 18th amendment of the constitution of Pakistan.</i>  <i>ROM, 2014</i>  <i>National Consultations EU-Pakistan Cooperation, Summary of Discussions (September 2012).</i>  <i>External Evaluation of the Sustainable rural Development in the Refugee-Affected and Hosting Areas of Pakistan Programme, Final Report, December 2015</i>  <i>Int.Docs 3, 4, 5, 7, 15, 16, 17, 18.</i>  <i>Interviews: MN201, MN809</i></p> <p style="background-color: #fce4d6; padding: 5px;">Quality of evidence: <b>Strong</b></p>
I-2.1.7	<p><b>Existence of documentation (internal notes, minutes of meetings, etc.) demonstrating that stakeholders have been consulted and their views taken into account (or reasons for not taking them into account) on the appropriateness of the intervention to the needs and the contextual challenges.</b></p> <p><i>Consultations have taken place at identification, programming but also during implementation with CSOs, Union Councils, the RSPN. The latter in particular has paved the way for a long term constructive relationship. See also I-2.1.7.</i></p> <p>In the rural development sector the Delegation has consulted the civil society organisations, the Rural Support Programmes Network, Union Councils. These consultations took place at identification stage but also during implementation.</p> <p>“A good example of a fruitful relation with civil society is the one offered by the consultation of the rural development planning when the Rural Support Programmes Network was engaged to formulate a more responsive and practical area-based intervention. The members of the network are frequently involved into policy discussions with the Delegation”. (Int.Doc 6)</p> <p>“The close involvement with direct participation in the UNDP contracted mid-term evaluation and subsequent reformulation of the RAHA programme, has been the major achievement during the first half of 2011. It commanded respect from UNDP and UNHCR as implementing agencies and significant appreciation from the respective provincial governments who now recognise a clear EU hand in the programme. The new approach to working with Union Councils is innovative and potentially contains important lessons for our future interventions in rural development in the same provinces.” (Int.Doc 6)</p> <p>In the Rural Development focal sector: the constructive and positive relationship with the RSPs and their umbrella network RSPN, has clearly provided numerous elements to the EUD to believe in a long term relationship. We are now working with RSPN and provincial RSPs in KP, Balochistan and Sindh. (Int.Doc 9)</p> <p><b>RAHA</b></p> <p>Project documents provide a background analysis to refugee situation and evolution, starting with exodus during Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979-1992), the</p>

setting-up of 340 refugee camps in Balochistan and KP (then NWFP) and continued presence of 1.7 million registered refugees after 30 years of civil war, strife and insecurity in Afghanistan. Environmental and economic impact of refugee presence in affected and hosting areas is put in context of high local poverty levels, existing pressure on natural resources and public services, and relatively low infrastructure development.

The fact that health, education, water and sanitation facilities are better within refugee communities than within mainstream public sector, leading to a sense of exclusion in hosting population, recognizes the existence of “pockets of exclusion”.

The more recent development of internally displaced persons (IDPs) within the local population, in response to unusually heavy monsoon rains and flash flooding, together with increased militancy and insurgency, highlights previous lack of consideration of societal divisions created by international interventions and lack of prioritization of prevention. IDPs estimated as over 3 million and increasing with further climatic pressures and insurgency.

The importance of meeting meet local communities development needs in sustainable way is duly identified.

(RAHA, 2009, FA)

The project's overall objective is to support the Government of Pakistan's pro-poor development efforts by bringing the poor communities in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa into the mainstream of development by improving access to, and reducing existing inequalities in resources, incomes and livelihood opportunities.

The specific objective is to improve livelihoods, rehabilitate the environment and enhance social cohesion within communities of refugee/IDP affected and hosting areas; the development unit being a Union Council – a total of 103 UCs in KP and Balochistan. (RAHA, 2013, MTR)

### **PEACE**

In the aftermath of the security crisis, the Government of Pakistan (GoP) requested support from the international community to develop a peace building strategy for KP and FATA. The result was the ‘Post-Crisis Needs Assessment for KP and FATA’ (PCNA). Moreover, the ‘Malakand Comprehensive Stabilization and Socio Economic Development Strategy’ (Malakand Strategy) forms part of the GoP's integrated approach for reconstruction and realization in KP and is in line with the PCNA.

(Grant Contract with SRSP p4).

The overall intervention logic of the PEACE Programme is derived from the strategic pillars of the PCNA and the strategic objectives of the Malakand Stabilisation Strategy, and other strategic objectives of the Government's road maps for socio-economic development and stabilization in the region. The following table presents a schematic overview of how the action's expected results feed into the four pillars of the Malakand Strategy and the strategic objectives of the PCNA.

Malakand Strategy Pillars		PEACE Expected Results		PCNA Strategic Objectives
Security, Rule of Law and Governance		Establishment and strengthening of an inclusive and representative system of community mobilization for social and economic development federating villages at the level of Union Councils		Counter radicalisation and foster reconciliation
Delivery of Basic Social Services		Improvement of Community Infrastructure (CPI) and Basic Social Services		Ensure the delivery of basic services
Economic Growth and Infrastructure Development		Growth of economic activities facilitated		Stimulate employment and livelihood opportunities
Technical Education and Poverty Alleviation		Electrification for rural households through setting up of community managed micro hydro power generating systems		Build responsiveness and effectiveness of the State to restore citizen trust
		Self-confidence of women and their ability to independently participate in social and economic activities enhanced		

(PEACE Grant Contract, Annex 1, p13)

Considering the wider dimension of the impact of the insurgency, the Government of Pakistan, with support of the international community including the EU through the Friends of Democratic Pakistan, launched in October 2009 the Post Crisis Needs Assessment (PCNA). Based on an extensive consultation process the final PCNA document presented in October 2010 as a broader peace building strategy for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA was widely endorsed by the international community and formally adopted by the Government at federal and provincial levels. The core PCNA recommendations relate to the necessity for the state to swiftly enact fundamental political and other reforms that ensure and protect basic rights, empower citizens and address key governance, security and development shortcomings and inequalities through a transparent, non-discriminatory, inclusive and participatory approach. Echoing the Comprehensive Development Strategy, it recognises local development and community driven approaches as key to better service delivery and economic development and in order to ensure re-engagement of the citizens with the state.

The PEACE Programme builds on the Malakand Strategy and PCNA, which very comprehensively state the priorities of the Government for rebuilding the Division and helping its people to resume social and economic recovery through a set of various initiatives.

SRSP was selected as the implementing agency for PEACE due to its earlier successes in piloting community driven approaches and specifically during implementation of the Government funded Bacha Khan Poverty Alleviation Programme (BK-PAP) in four districts of KP (Mardan, Karak, Upper Dir and Battagram). This two year programme, with a Rs. one billion budget, champions the use of grassroots, bottom-up approaches to community development in these complex, often chaotic, conflict affected areas. It is a successful model of public-private partnership to achieve poverty alleviation. Reducing rural poverty through reviving livelihoods, improve human and productive assets and developing

government's capacity for pro-poor, vulnerable and women development in KP. It builds synergies between the strengths of the government, the civil society and communities to address the needs of poor and vulnerable groups and picks the best practices in this field from the region. (Grant contract with SAHAD, ANNEX 1, p5)

A Multi Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) was established early 2010 to channel funding for reconstruction and development in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, FATA and parts of Balochistan. The MDTF focuses on three streams of interventions: (i) improving local services and community support, (ii) economic growth and job creation and (iii) policy reforms and governance support. It is administered by the World Bank and operates through the Government using fund transfers for projects implemented by line ministries or other government agencies. (Grant contract with SRSP, p4).

100 Union Councils of total 238 UCs in 7 districts of Malakand were selected for interventions under PEACE. Selection of UC based on five criteria related to high poverty and social exclusion levels, potential for both on-farm and off-farm livelihood development, willingness of community to encourage women's participation and to engage (PEACE, 2013, 1<sup>st</sup> Implementation report, Annex G).

- Potential for both on- and off-farm value chains, enterprise and employable skills
- The union council has the lowest socio-economic indicators as compared to others
- Weak social cohesion and social inequality are more pronounced in the union council than in the others
- Communities willingly organize for collective action
- Communities encourage women participation

### **KP DGCD**

The Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province in the north-west Pakistan is responding to unprecedented levels of destruction and disruption caused by militancy and civil unrest resulting from the Afghan war and the 2010 monsoon floods. The insurgency spill-over, initially contained to the Federal Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) along the Afghan border, expanded into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province by the end of 2007, severely affecting the northern mountainous and predominantly rural Malakand division. The military offensive in spring 2009 to re-establish the State's writ displaced some 2,300,000 people and resulted in severe losses of infrastructure. Large parts of the Malakand division were further devastated by flash floods in August 2010, virtually wiping out the entire local economy. Whilst the provincial government re-established administrative control over all seven districts of the Division, socio-economic situation of the approximately 6,300,000 inhabitants remains precarious and fragile. (CDLD, KP, 2013 (Forward))

Aware of the root causes that triggered the extremist forces to build a foothold in

	<p>the area, the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa seeks to consolidate and stabilize the current transition process of post-crises measures and to overcome the trust deficit with its citizens. Building on a successful provincial budgetary reform programme, the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, therefore, proposes to prioritise Malakand division for a roll-out of an innovative results-based approach to district budget management, governance and community driven development. The approach entails implementation of a local development strategy that combines restoration and enhancement of frontline public services and livelihood opportunities across all 238 union councils<sup>1</sup> of the division. The EU supports this intervention, through a Sector Reform Contract in accordance with the objectives defined for rural development as one of the focal sectors under the Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2011 – 2013. (Annex 1, FA for KP DGCD, 2013)</p> <p><i>Sources: RAHA, 2009, FA</i>  <i>RAHA, Mid-term Report, 2013</i>  <i>Malakand Comprehensive Stabilization and Socio Economic Development Strategy, 2010. (Malakand Strategy, 2010).</i>  <i>Post Crisis Needs Assessment (PCNA), 2009.</i>  <i>Grant contract with SRSP</i>  <i>PEACE, 2013, 1<sup>st</sup> Implementation report, Annex G).</i>  <i>CDLD, KP, 2013 (Forward)</i>  <i>FA for KP DGCD, 2013 Annex 1,</i>  <i>Int.Doc 6, 9</i>  <i>Interviews: MN 201, MN815, MN810</i></p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; background-color: #fce4d6; padding: 5px; text-align: center;"> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>Strong</b></p> </div>
I-2.1.8	<p><b>Review of those who were consulted and of the selection process. Are they representative of the groups and minorities targeted by the interventions?</b></p> <p><i>Numerous consultations with a variety of groups took place mainly via the implementing agencies as reported in their reports. Over the evaluation period the Commission consulted increasingly representatives of the RSPN as highlighted under Indicator I-2.1.3. These consultations, as far as can be inferred from documents and interviews included representatives of the groups targeted.</i></p> <p>Reports from implementing partners provide lists of contacts with members of varieties of community organisations targeted by the projects. (e.g. Raha, Review Mission Report, April 2011; Peace Programme Guidelines for the Selection of Union Councils, ..)</p> <p>The first implementation report of the PEACE programme spells out in great details its approach to identify and mobilise bottom-up community driven participatory development (PEACE, Implementation Report 2012-13, especially p. 14 and sq.)</p>



	<p>The negotiation process leading to the signing of the grant contract clearly indicates that the management of SRSP were fully involved in the project preparation. During this period consultations between SRSP and other stakeholders took place. As SRSP was fully conversant with the area and the needs of the people through existing work there was little consultation at primary beneficiary level.</p> <p>(Peace Monitoring Report 8/9/2012)</p> <p>Discussions with SRSP team revealed that all the members of the community have had an equal opportunity to participate and become members of the CBOs</p> <p><i>Sources: UNDP and Sarhad RSP progress reports on RAHA and PEACE programmes.</i> <i>Interviews: MN505, MN901, MN813, MN 508</i></p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory.</b> There are converging documents and opinions, but the geographic and social coverage of the programmes is so vast that evidence collected cannot be regarded as sufficiently representative to be qualified of strong.</p>
I-2.1.9	<p><b>Opinions of stakeholders (national and provincial authorities, EU staff, beneficiaries, other donors....) on the appropriateness of the intervention to the needs and the contextual challenges.</b></p> <p><i>According to the documents consulted and the stakeholders interviews, the two programmes RAHA and PEACE are considered as important and relevant contributions to address poverty, but also stability, issues in the rural areas.</i></p> <p><i>In terms of design, the RAHA programme suffered from many deficiencies, particularly in terms of implementation mechanisms (absence of coordination UNDP/UNHCR, excessive complexity of the project, inadequate monitoring and reporting). The design of the PEACE programme follows the approach developed by the RSP over the last 30 years and the relationship established by the EU with the RSPN. This approach is regarded as successful by the Government, the stakeholders and the international community. The introduction of BS in the KP-DGCD programme permitted to develop a two pronged approach: on the one hand support to the demand side through to bottom up local empowerment and social mobilisation, on the other hand support to the supply side with budget support to provincial government to develop their capacity of response to the needs expressed by the local organisation is valued by the stakeholders interviewed.</i></p> <p><i>Overall, these interventions were appropriate and there is a demand to continue them.</i></p> <p>The RAHA project faced major deficiencies in terms of design and management, the two being deeply intertwined as the implementation did not correct the deficiencies in the design, although the structures put in place, to that end, the National Steering Committee and the Federal Task Force, could have been used to that end. The main flaws, highlighted in the recent Final Evaluation, can be summarised as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Joint UNDP-UNHCR implementation was problematic: both agencies report to different ministries, have different calendar year, different mandates</li> </ul>

(development/humanitarian). UNHCR has works through partners (recognised as weak), UNDP through the government.

- An excessive geographic spread: 2352 communities have been served by the programme in areas with security risks and poor qualified human resources.
- An absence of targeting. The programme involved deliberately a multitude of micro-projects which made it extremely difficult to manage; as the selection criteria were vague the contribution of these project to the overall objectives of the programme is unclear.
- Absence of strategic management by the Steering Committee and Federal Task Force, led to an absence of targeting.
- Weak (unacceptable according to the Final Evaluation) financial monitoring of the individual projects
- Poor quality of the logical framework, entirely focussed on activities, which prevents measuring results.
- Statistics on results provided by UNDP are unreliable.

(Final evaluation of the RAHA project, December 2015)

The PEACE project is successfully establishing Community organizations (COs), Village Organizations (VOs) and Local Support Organizations (LSOs) under the UC umbrella. Numerous training and communication activities are being held at staff, stakeholder and beneficiary level which are proving effective. The response of communities to the MHP programme was unquestionably positive with surveys in full swing and construction work underway. A major problem for many rural producers has been the preparation and marketing of produce. The discussion groups on value chains have already proven their worth and effectively assisted in stabilising and in some instances improving the price of produce. Planned targets for women's empowerment at the end of March have not been reached but there has been some movement from March till June though it is not possible to calculate effectiveness as yet. Benefits are targeted at all groups as per the project philosophy. It is not clear however after several meetings how the poor and vulnerable will benefit if normal village hierarchal structures are maintained. Meetings were dominated by what appeared the more influential and prosperous members. (PEACE, Monitoring Report 8/8/2012)

*Sources:*

*Mid-term evaluation and monitoring reports of the projects RAHA and PEACE.*

*External Evaluation of the Sustainable rural Development in the Refugee-Affected and Hosting Areas of Pakistan Programme, Final Report, December 2015*

*Interviews: MN201, MN850, MN501, MN502.*

Quality of evidence: **More than satisfactory**

I-2.1.10	<p><b>Existence of a diagnostic analysis of the partner government's institutional capacity to use properly the BS to implement its policy.</b></p> <p>See below I-2.2.9 to I-2.2.17</p>
I-2.1.11	<p><b>Existence and nature of complementary capacity building assistance offered to improve the use of the SBS by the partner government.</b></p> <p>See below I-2.2.9 to I-2.2.17</p>
<b>JC-2.2</b>	<p><b>The interventions have been implemented according to plan and achieved their expected results.</b></p>
<p>The RAHA programme implemented by UNDP/UNHCR under a contribution agreement faced difficulties in meeting the EU reporting requirements and has been a concern for the Delegation. Its design and implementation mode, as indicated under JC-2.1 suffered from major flaws: a very poor logframe focused on activities rather than on results, excessively complex implementation mechanisms, management structures that did correct these deficiencies. Moreover, capacity building proved too light and insufficient for ensuring proper sustainable community organisation. It resulted in an absence of strategic focus and a severe mismanagement of the resources allocated to many individual interventions.</p> <p>Notwithstanding these difficulties the programme delivered a large quantity of outputs and achieved many outcomes. A multiplicity of interventions were provided in response to the wishes of the local communities and this favoured ownership, but the absence of strategic focus and the scarcity of qualified human resources, insufficiently addressed by capacity strengthening, make it difficult to assess their contribution to the objectives of the programme among others in terms of social cohesion and stabilisation.</p> <p>The PEACE programme implemented by the Sarhad Rural Support Programme NGO is much more anchored into the local communities to which SARHAD has a long term commitment. As a consequence implementation is slower but appropriation and empowerment are stronger and more sustainable. The BS programme KP-DGDC, faced initial delays due to the time required by the assimilation of major institutional reforms (decentralisation) and meeting the conditions for the disbursement of the first tranche. It was an incentive to improve and a support to the elaboration of a policy of response to the needs of the local communities.</p>	
I-2.2.1 to I-2.2.4	<p><b>For contribution agreements (case of the RAHA programme):</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <b>documents showing that the funds were transferred in time to the implementing multilateral organisation;</b></li> <li>▪ <b>monitoring reports showing that the multilateral organisation conducted the agreed activities ;</b></li> <li>▪ <b>reports from the multilateral organisation on the progress and the outputs of the intervention;</b></li> <li>▪ <b>opinion of the partner's authorities and of final beneficiaries.</b></li> </ul> <p><i>The RAHA programme has been implemented under a contribution agreement. It was a high risk ambitious programme. Available indicators show that it was fully relevant, compliant with the government policy and a response to pressing needs in difficult areas. It was fully compatible with the</i></p>

*objectives of the EU to fight poverty and contribute to stabilisation in difficult areas. Its designed proved largely inappropriate and this was not corrected during implementation. However, the programme delivered a large quantity of outputs to the local communities. As the services and resources provided were quasi entirely determined by the local communities themselves, this favoured appropriation by the beneficiaries. However, the absence of strategic management of the programme did not guarantee that the results achieved contribute sustainably to the overall objectives of the programme.*

### **2.2.1 Transfer of funds and delays**

Monitoring reports and the mid-term review of the programme identify a number of weaknesses in the implementation by the partner agencies.

The modus operandi of the implementing agencies (UNDP/UNCHR) was not fully compliant with the requirements of the EU as mentioned in internal documents “Within the implementation of the "Sustainable rural development in the refugee-affected and hosting areas"- RAHA programme, the implementing and reporting capacity and response (of UNDP) towards EU requirements has proven to be weak and is currently an issue of concern for the Delegation. “ (Int.Doc.-9)

“Sustainable rural development in the refugee-affected and hosting areas of Pakistan-RAHA (260022) - There are concerns regarding the implementation of some of the activities (community mobilization, some infrastructure works) and the implementation of a coordinated approach (one UN). UN reporting on implementation and visibility of both RAHA and EU funding of RAHA are extremely weak” (ROM RAHA August 2012)

Doubts about effectiveness and efficiency of implementation by the UN agencies, substandard reporting, and allegations of fraud and misappropriation led to two suspension of interim payments linked to annual reporting by:

- from December 2013 to April 2014, resumed after production of a revised annual report by UNDP;
- from February to May 2015 and were resumed after oral debriefing of the first field mission of the final evaluation.

UNDP suspended implementation pending the payments on the ground that it could not prefinance activities, among other reason because the FAFA did not allow it.

(Final Evaluation of the RAHA programme; December 2015).

We may also note that some interviewees mentioned that frequent changes in the project management staff of the implementing partners, and the interventions of Provincial governments in project implementation proved an impediment to swift programme execution. It may also raise the issue the capacity of the new staff to understand the complexities of the project quickly enough to manage it effectively. It is particularly important in the projects where there is a large part of the project activities require understanding of engineering projects. It is worth noting that these interviews reflect a wrong perception of the reality by the interviewees since,

whereas there has been a high turnover of staff at the EU Delegation, for the RAHA programme there were only two project managers over a period of 4.5 years Sources (MN506, MN507)

### **2.2.2 Agreed activities conducted**

Short independent monitoring missions were conducted in 2012 (4 day) and 2013 (5 day) which indicate good, but slow progress (ROM, 2012, ROM, 2013). The 2013 reports flags confusion in reported progress in one report (RAHA, Progress from July 2011-February 2013), where activities in overall RAHA programme with regard to CO establishment and clean drinking water provision (started in 2009) are reported in progress with EC component, that only started in July 2011 (ROM, 2013 p3).

The MTR looked more closely at implementation of the programme and while applauding surpassing of targets on many training and capacity building outputs, identified slow progress with development of third tier organisations (LSOs) and training centers to support the new trainees. Gaps were also identified in UNDP project staff's capacity and training in thematic areas of livelihoods development, promoting social cohesion, social audit and area based planning. (RAHA, MTR, 2013 p55).

The Final Evaluation of 2015 mentions a number of deficiencies in the implementation of the programme by UNDP that affected negatively its results. Beyond the inappropriate reporting that reflects an insufficient monitoring and command of the programme implementation already mentioned under I-2.2.1, key weaknesses have been:

- The lack of strategic management. According to the contribution agreement the overall strategic management of the programme was to be conducted at national level by a Joint Programme Steering Committee that never convened. A Federal Task Force that should have met every 6 months but did so only in 2011, 2012 and 3 time in 2013. So that the strategic management was conducted independently by the two provincial task forces, without guidance from the federal one. At provincial level overall coordination was strong by the absence of central management guidance does did not permit to guarantee that all activities were leading to the overall objectives of the programme.
- The fact, already mentioned, that the logframe was focused more on activities than on results compounded with the lack of strategic management.
- Monitoring, and in particular financial monitoring, agencies proved insufficient.
- Capacity building provided to cope with the weak human resources proved too light for proper community organisation.

### **2.2.3 Progress and outputs from interventions**

The following results are assessed against the indicators defined in the logical framework to assess the achievement of the expect results in the 6 results areas. They are based on the reports of the implementation agencies and reported in the

## Final Evaluation of the RAHA.

The monitoring and reporting by the implementing agencies UNDP/UNHCR has been particularly weak as highlighted in this quotation “*The statistics provided in this report were all provided by UNDP. Section 4.9 analyses the quality and reliability of the reporting. The lack of reliable factual data has been the greatest problem during this evaluation. Not only do figures often not add up (see details in section 4.9), but also, has it been extraordinarily hard to obtain consequent and coherent figures. Expenditure tables use different figures even when covering identical time periods. For example, the total number of CPIs was reported on 30 October 2015 to be 2,352. However, the totals of 2,356 and, even, 2,366 have been used. The Evaluation Team has decided, for the sake of uniformity and clarity, to keep to the figure of 2,352. It has been incredibly difficult to obtain reliable and workable documentation in the field. This is in no doubt due, amongst other factors, to the large amount of micro-projects, but also – as extensively addressed in this report – to severe management deficiencies.*” (Final Evaluation of the RAHA Programme, December 2015, p. 10)

The present evaluation confirms this finding. Figures collected through the various reports were contradictory, huge numbers could not be explained, etc. The figures of the following table are taken from the annex of the RAHA final evaluation, and they differ from the same tables provided in the main report of this evaluation, an additional sign of the difficulty faced by the evaluators<sup>41</sup>.

<sup>41</sup> As an example of the difficulty of getting accurate figures, it is worth pointing to the difference between figures provided in the main report he final evaluation of the RAHA and in the annexes of this report for the number of CBOs, VOs and LOs:

	CBO	VO	LSO
RAHA (according to final report 2015, vol. I main report)	3 005	238	16
(according to final report 2015, vol. II annexes)	3 312	298	35

LOGICAL FRAMEWORK							
Expected Results	Targets	Progress					
		Balochistan		KP		Total	
		Project Target	Updated Progress	Project Target	Updated progress	Total Project Target	Total Target Achieved
ER1: Greater social cohesion and empowerment through community development in refugee/IDP affected and hosting areas.	1.1.1: Organize communities (60% Men & 40% Women) into 2000 COs, 350 VO and 40 LSOs	800 140 16	985 94 6	1200 210 24	2020 144 10	2000 350 40	3005 238 16
	1.1.2: Train 4000 CO representative in CMSTs, 700 VO representatives in LMSTs and 80 LSO representatives on leadership management skills and other relevant areas	1873	3182	2907	2113	4780	5295
	1.1.3: Conduct 2390 need identification and prioritization (at least three needs of each community)	956	884	1434	1704	2390	2588
	1.1.4: Identify 4500 most vulnerable households to be supported under livelihood initiatives	1800	1382	2700	2828	4500	4210
	1.1.5: Organize 350 village assemblies to develop 350 VDPs through participatory and right based approach, ensuring the participation of communities and other stakeholders (Govt & Non Govt)	150	87	200	122	350	209
		150	87	200	46	350	133
	1.1.6: Awareness raising of (4000) community members on social development and environmental conservation, (6000) members on water sanitation and health, (2000) members on solid and liquid waste management and (1000) on GBV and human rights	1500	3182	2500	2113	4000	5150
		2500	4808	3500	3295	6000	8103
		700	330	1300	1980	2000	2310
	400	3164	600	1114	1000	4278	
1.2.1: Conduct 2 training need assessments of Government Officials in target districts and provinces.	1	1	1	1	2	2	

	1.2.2: Train 500 government officials (men and women) in relevant profession/expertise from national level recognized institutes in Pakistan.	200	164	300	237	500	401
ER 2: Improve livelihood and local economies in refugee/IDP affected and hosting areas	2.1.1: Conduct 6 livelihood training need assessments at community and market level to identify potential livelihood opportunities in target UCs, districts and provinces.	3	2	3	2	6	4
	2.1.2: Train 4500 members from most vulnerable households on different potential vocational training skills and provide toolkits to off farm trainees enabling them to initiate their enterprises after successful completion of trainings	1800	1382	2700	2828	4500	4210
	2.1.3: Strengthen 9 government employment information centers for providing post training support and referral to public and private enterprise	4	1	5	3	9	4
	2.2.1: Conduct 510 social, technical and environmental feasibility of proposed social service projects	200	244	310	505	510	749
	2.2.2: Implement at least 500 social services projects such as road/irrigation/solar energy	200	244	300	505	500	749
	2.2.3: Trained 3000 O&M committee members	1000	884	2000	1704	3000	2588
	ER3: Restoration of social services and infrastructure in refugee/IDP affected and hosting areas.	3.1.1: Conduct 1020 social, technical and environmental feasibility study of proposed social Services (Water, Sanitation, Health, Education etc.)	505	505	515	516	1020
3.1.2: Implement 1000 proposed social services projects to improve the access of communities to Water, Sanitation, Health, Education etc.		500	505	500	516	1000	1021
ER 4: Improve social protection among coexisting refugee/IDP and host communities	4.1.1: Strengthen at least 16 social welfare centers	6	5	10	15	16	20
	4.1.2: Establish 120 protection committees to address GBV	48	152	72	105	120	257
	4.1.3: Develop mechanism at 120 communities to identify and link the vulnerable (men, women and children) to social welfare centers	48	121	72	84	120	205

	4.1.4: Train 400 individuals on GBV and human rights	160	3164	240	1114	400	4278
ER 5: Restoration/Improvement of environment in refugee/IDP affected area	5.1.1: Establish/rehabilitate 40 nurseries and carry out agro forestry activities such as tree grafting, new plans generation	16	34	24	20	40	54
	5.1.2: Plant 20000 trees of various indigenous species that require less water	8000	216000	12000	160000	20000	376000
	5.1.3: Conduct at least 63 social, technical and environmental feasibility studies of proposed natural resource protection/conservation services projects	24	45	39	56	63	101
	5.1.4: Implement 60 proposed natural resource protection/conservation service project	24	45	36	56	60	101
	5.1.5: Conduct 50 awareness raising sessions on environmental awareness and hygiene	20	8	30	50	50	58
ER 6: IDP return anchored and absorptions capacity created by small-scale community based integration.	6.1.1: Organize IDP communities (60% Men & 40% Women) into 400 COs, 10 VOs	N/A	N/A	400	488	400	488
	6.1.2: Train 800 community representatives in CMST	N/A	N/A	800	125	800	125
	6.1.3: Conduct 400 needs identification and prioritization exercises (at least three needs)	N/A	N/A	400	835	400	835
	6.1.4: Identify 700 most vulnerable households to be supported under livelihood initiatives	N/A	N/A	700	1229	700	1229
	6.1.5: Organize 10 village assemblies to develop 10 VDPs through participatory and right based approach, ensuring the participation of communities with other stakeholders (Govt & Non Govt)	N/A	N/A	10	23	10	23

The above indicators on expected result 1, community organisation and empowerment, indicate that in a majority of cases targets have been achieved and even exceeded. But this needs to be qualified:

Some targets assigned in the logframe were too low. For instance, the objective of 2000 was insufficient for the specific objective target (40% of the target population have their income increased by 10%), but the number of communities necessary to achieve that target was not calculated so that it is not possible to conclude whether the reported figures of 3005 communities organised is adequate or not. Moreover, while the number of Community Organisation may have been reached, the attribution to UNDP. Whether the Community has mobilised is better assessed by the number of Village Development Plans, where the target has not been achieved. According to the final evaluation the capacity building at LSO level has been of good quality and solid groundwork has been laid to make it sustainable.

On result 2, improvement of livelihood in refugee/IDP affected areas the data provided by the RAHA programme point to a high level of community members provided with skills development training (3151 in KP, of which 1563 females) and as a result 1730 enterprises have been established. The final evaluation of Raha contests those results because they are contradicted by figures from the Peshawar employment centre.

On result 3, restoration of social services and infrastructure, the data provided by the implementing agencies point to overachievement (although with a great lack of precision as exemplified in the final evaluation of the RAHA programme: the total target achieved for indicators 3.1.1. and 3.1.2 is 1398 in the table of the main report, but 1021 in the annex of that report, which is use here above). Whatever the actual figures, these small scale projects resulted in communities having received reliable water supply, paved roads, solar energy, improved school amenities.

On result 4: Improved social protection. The indicators also point to an overachievement of the targets. More significantly the final evaluation of the programme points to important realisations in this area:

- A vulnerability mapping conducted in KP that identified about 10 000



	<p>individuals who could then be linked to social welfare mechanisms;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Gender issues have been addressed and the final evaluation report highlights the contrast between the conservative context of the target provinces and the extent of awareness gender issues. Links with the project are impossible to ascertain but one cannot deny the efforts of the project in this field.</li> </ul> <p>On result 5, restoration/improvement of environment, a considerable number of small scale environment-friendly activities were initiated: planting three, waste management, which led to positive results in terms of awareness raising.</p> <p>On result 6: IDP return anchored and absorption capacity created by small scale community based integration, indicators point to a number of factors that contributed to the social cohesion between host and IDP communities;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The Community Organisation capacity building process</li> <li>- The provision of training to IDP in learning skills</li> <li>- Development of community physical infrastructure in a participatory manner involving joint planning between the host and IDP communities.</li> </ul> <p><i>Sources: RAHA, 2009 Financial Agreement</i>  <i>RAHA, 1<sup>st</sup> Annual Report, 2012</i>  <i>RAHA, ROM, 2012.</i>  <i>RAHA, MTR, 2013</i>  <i>RAHA, Progress from July 2011-February 2013</i>  <i>RAHA, ROM, 2013.</i>  <i>RAHA, 3<sup>rd</sup> Annual progress report, 2014</i>  <i>MTR 2013</i>  <i>External Evaluation of the RAHA Programme, Final Report, vol. I and II.</i>  <i>Int.Doc. 8</i>  <i>Meeting notes: MN850, MN201, MN409, MN501, MN506, MN507</i></p> <p style="text-align: center; background-color: #fce4d6; border: 1px solid black;">Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory</b></p>
I-2.2.5- I-2.2.8	<p><b>For grant contracts: (case of the PEACE programme)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ documents showing that the funds were transferred in time to the contracted NGO;</li> <li>▪ monitoring reports showing that the contracted NGOs conducted the agreed activities ;</li> <li>▪ existence of reports from the NGO on the progress and the outputs of the intervention;</li> <li>▪ opinion of the partner's authorities and of final beneficiaries.</li> </ul> <p><i>In the rural development sector the PEACE programme is implemented through a grant contract. The performance and the results of this programme are very much linked, as was the case for the RAHA programme considered in the previous set of indicators, to the mode of intervention of the partners. The PEACE programme is implemented by a militant organisation whose staff is committed to the cause. The organisation is in closer contact with the situation and the people on the ground and is very much investing in training and in development of leaders within the communities. This tends to lead to better appropriation and sustainability of the interventions. Whereas both</i></p>

*RAHA and PEACE have succeeded in mobilising numerous community based organisations and organising village level activities, only PEACE has achieved local support organisations. These LSOs are essential for long term sustainability because they would eventually be able to bid for and win further funding for community led development initiatives.*

### **2.2.5 The PEACE programme is implemented under a grant contract agreement.**

It is implemented by the NGO SRSP. The agreement is for 40 million Euros and was signed on the 8<sup>th</sup> of August 2012, with a duration of 48 months. The first instalment planned for 80% of forecast budget for the first year (7,763,643 Euro), subsequent year instalments will also be 80% of forecast budget so long as at least 70% of previous years budget has been spent (28,236,357 Euro over three years) and a final payment of 4 million Euro on completion (PEACE, 2012 FA).

The project started implementation in October 2012 with advance of 3 million Euro. The project does not follow a yearly reporting cycle, due to financial guarantee constraints, so a more frequent reporting and payment procedure is followed (Arshad Rashid, 24th October 2014, comments on Third implementation report).

Project started on the 1st of October 2012 following signing of financing agreement on the 8<sup>th</sup> of August. Implementation of activities was delayed for six-seven weeks due to the elections

The first implementation report received just 8 months after start of the project showed slow implementation to date, though had expenditure of 80% of initial 3 million Euro advance. Agreement to further payment request only given after receipt of further progress report (30th September) showing accelerated implementation and likelihood of meeting and indeed surpassing some first year targets (Arshad Rashid, 31<sup>st</sup> October 2013, comments on First implementation report).

### **2.2.6 Monitoring reports**

Only one ROM monitoring report made available, the first one, in June 2013. No mention of MTR, yet overdue (September 2014 midpoint).

Progress with the project was swift, the first monitoring visit in June 2013, just 7 months after start of project activities, found “Considerable time and effort has been expended in the few months since start up to establish the project and results are impressive. Not only have the staffing and administrative arrangements been completed, with the exception of the delivery of the vehicle fleet due to start in late July, but sites of physical works have been identified and a good number are already under construction.” Community organization was also well underway and high likelihood for achievement was forecast. This is linked with the existing presence of the implementing organization in the area and their considerable experience with community mobilization and community organization establishment. A good choice of implementing organization for this project, by the EU.

### 2.2.7 Progress and outputs from programme

This programme has also very large population and important results in terms of number of final beneficiaries. They are summarised for the 5 results areas:

1. Inclusive and representative system of community mobilisation

According to the Fourth Interim Technical Report August 2014-March 2015 of the PEACE programme, more than 5000 Community Based organisations have been formed under the programme:

Formed by:		CBO			VO			LSO
		Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Total
PEACE	Number	3 630	1 629	5 259	402	161	563	6
	% of total	69%	31%	100%	71%	29%	100%	

This has created a system which trained and motivated thousands of men, women and youth with the capacity and motivation to promote personal and social development in their communities, therefore strengthening responsible citizenship.

2. Rural electrification (micro hydro power generating (MHP systems)

78 MHP generating 6.05 megawatt electricity benefitting 27 000 households have been built. Making communities responsible to manage and maintain these resources is on-going.

3. Community infrastructure and basic social services

The project targeted the rehabilitation of government health and education local facilities (100 schemes so far) and identification, implementation and maintenance by communities of new productive infrastructure schemes (130 completed and handed to local institutions).

4. Self-confidence and ability of women to participate in socio-economic activities

Training of 196 women master trainers facilitated the formation of community based organizations and women interventions under the programme. Resulted in a large number of Adult Literacy Centers which have produced numerous graduate, with literacy and numeracy skills. Business Interest Groups have been created by and for women potential entrepreneurs. These efforts were meant to lead to a gradual empowerment of women to become actors of development in their areas.

5. Facilitating economic growth activities:

The programme has organized over 2,000 farmers around Business Interest Groups (BIGs). Over 1,202 men and women members have been trained in 8 different value chain development systems.

More details of progress under these six expected result areas is provided hereunder.

#### **Result Area 1: Establishment & strengthening of an inclusive & representative system of community mobilization**

The programme by July 2014 was operational in 98 union councils in the selected seven districts. Social mobilization and support to communities has led to the development and establishment of 4,061 new community based organizations,

representing over 83,000 men and women. These Community organisations have federated to form 389 village organisations. Despite working in religiously charged areas, trends of women participation in programmatic activities have shown remarkable improvement, with the formation of 1,215 women community based organizations covering 24,000 women members during the year ending in July 2014. These women have taken a step further to federate at least 460 community based organizations into 115 village based organizations. Capacity building of men and women office bearers continued and during this period, nearly 19,000 men and women activists were trained in technical and managerial skills. An integral part of the programme was to provide exciting and challenging opportunities to 11,000 youth members for their overall cognitive, personal and social development. Their engagement is likely to continue throughout programme period as return on investment at this young age is very high besides being a major contributor in developing this youth as responsible citizen of Pakistan.

**Result Area 2; electrification for rural households through micro hydro power generating systems,**

109 potential sites have been identified suited to micro hydro-electricity projects (MHPs) in all seven districts of Malakand Division. The total number of MHPs initiated/in process or completed by the programme (by July 2014) was 78 generating 6.05 megawatt electricity and benefiting 27,000 households. Sustainability, being a prime concern, has urged the programme to develop community based operation and maintenance mechanism. Under the mechanism, MoUs have been signed with respective communities, which entails assigning responsibilities for ensuring placement of an effective local mechanism to generate resources and develop technical capacity of local communities to manage these micro hydro projects in the long run. Several interviewees mentioned the satisfaction of the KP government with the achievements of this component of the project (MN507; MN508)

**Result Area 3; improvement of community physical infrastructure & basic social services,**

A two pronged approach has been adopted; rehabilitation and improvement of government schemes (predominantly health and education), together with identification, implementation and maintenance by communities of new productive infrastructure schemes. MoUs signed with provincial education and health departments enables SRSP-PEACE to develop and rehabilitate facilities, 100 schemes initiated so far. New schemes identified and initiated by communities is 315, benefitting some 570,000 people. These schemes, in order of preference at local level, comprise drinking water supply schemes, communication, sanitation and irrigation. 130 productive infrastructure schemes have been completed and handed over to local institutions. Following RSPs approach, operation and maintenance committees have been constituted and their capacities enhanced in maintaining these schemes.

**Result Area 4; Self-confidence of women & their ability to independently participate in social & economic activities enhanced**

To be relevant to local context and keep pace of activities at optimum level, SRSP has developed some 196 women master trainers to facilitate formation of community based organizations and women interventions under the programme. With this new women work force, noticeable achievements have been observed. A total of 129 Adult Literacy Centers (ALCs) have been established, out of which 53 ALCs have completed one full 5 months course. This has produced 1,302 graduates possessing functional command over literacy and numeracy skills, while 1,900 women have enrolled themselves in 76 newly established ALCs. To engage women in economic development the programme has constituted 91 Business Interest groups covering over 1,500 potential women entrepreneurs. Out of these 1,062 women went through basic enterprise development trainings (EDT), while livelihood skill trainings were imparted to 91 EDT trainees. Upon successful completion of livelihood skill development trainings, 47 trainees were provided with livelihood resources or tool kits to establish economically feasible and financially viable small scale businesses. To refine women leadership, 453 members were developed on technical aspects related to management of community and village based organizations. This could be seen as one of the strategic steps to start handing over roles and responsibilities to these women members to take charge of development in their areas.

**Result Area 5; facilitating growth of economic activities,**

The programme has organized over 2,000 farmers around Business Interest Groups (BIGs). Over 1,202 men and women members have been trained in 8 different value chain development systems. Depending on nature of value chains or businesses, at least 289 men and women were exposed to major markets besides developing their linkages with Business Development Service Provider (BDSPs); National Agriculture Research Center (NARC), Islamabad, Honey Bee Research Institute (HBRI), Islamabad, Agriculture Research Institute (ARI), Islamabad, Fisheries Department Government of Pakistan, Agriculture Extension Department, Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Federal Seed Certification and Registration Department. Involvement of these BDSPs has helped improving and refining products as per national and international standards. Under this component 30 tons of certified rice seed has been produced and cut flowers (glades) introduced to poor communities in upper Swat and Dir Upper. These farmers were exposed to down country markets and supported with imported quality seeds of cut-flowers. The participating farmers succeeded in producing over 50,000 plants of glades, which would be ready for marketing in following months.

The PEACE project would appear to be well on schedule for meeting targeted outputs, involving both women and poorer sections of society with in the community mobilization so that there is a real sense of inclusion within the village organisations formed. Information sources since July 2013 are all from the project and it would be timely for a Mid-term Review to get an external perspective on achievements and progress with the intended outcomes.

*Sources: PEACE, 2012, Financial Agreement  
PEACE Grant contract with SRSP, 2012*

	<p>PEACE, 2013, <i>1st Implementation report, Oct 2012-July 2013.</i>  PEACE, 2014, <i>2<sup>nd</sup> Implementation report, Aug 2103-Feb 2014.</i>  PEACE, 2014, <i>3<sup>rd</sup> Implementation report, March 2014-July 2014</i>  PEACE, 2015, <i>4<sup>th</sup> Implementation report, August 2014-March 2015</i>  PEACE, ROM, <i>July 2013.</i>  Interviews: MN201, MN501, MN507, MN508</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory.</b></p>
<p>I-2.2.9 to 17</p>	<p><i>The implementation of the BS programme was meant to complement the bottom up approach of RAHA and PEACE, aiming at the creation of LSOs, with the top down approach to strengthen the provincial government capacity to formulate and implement a policy of financing these local needs in the longer run. Severe constraints had to be overcome: insufficient and uncertain financial transfers from central government to provinces, lack of understanding by the provincial government of the BS modality, weak institutional capacities and public finance management. The inputs provided by the BS addressed these constraints but there is a long process before they are overcome. However, there are already important results linked to the EU support:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <i>significant fiscal space has been widened; although it may not be crucial in an environment characterised by a low execution of the budget and notoriously weak mobilisation of domestic revenue, it helped the budget management because the BS funds are more predictable and secure than the intergovernmental transfers.</i></li> <li>▪ <i>The policy framework needed to support LSOs was particularly weak. The introduction in 2014 in KP of the CDLD Policy, developed with the support of the EU, both delayed the start of the BS programme but improved the conditions under which it would be implemented by clarifying the policy options and means.</i></li> </ul> <p><b>2.2.9 The KP-DGDC Programme is implemented under a BS agreement</b></p> <p>Following the identification and formulation process started in April 2012, the Financial Agreement (FA) for KP-DGDC was signed on 25<sup>th</sup> November 2013. The late signature of the FA derived from the long formulation process characterised by uncertainties on the fulfilment of the macroeconomic and public policy eligibility criteria and the related risk assessment (e.g. interruption of dialogue between IMF/Government in 2011 finally resumed in 2013) as well as internal EC discussions regarding the most appropriate choice of the BS contract (Sector Reform or State Building Contract due to the sector cross-cutting dimension of the supported public policy - Rural <u>community-driven development</u> has been defined as a "sector" for the purpose of the EU programme intervention while one of the expected results such as described in the FA concern investment in community development in six district budgets of the Malakand Division to respond to local demands for public investment in service delivery and community infrastructure that can encompass several sectors (rehabilitation, health, education,; water and sanitation, agriculture...).</p> <p><b>BS inputs</b></p> <p><b>1° Funds</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <b>documentary evidence of the release of the first tranche(s) and/or reasons</b></li> </ul>

**for delays**

The BS component of the programme KP DGCD represents 80% of the total amount (€64M out of € 80 M). It consists in four instalments, the first one being a fixed tranche while the next ones being a mix of fixed and variable tranches.

According to the FA signed in November 2013, the disbursement of the first fixed tranche of € 9 M, was initially planned for the 3<sup>rd</sup> quarter of the Pakistan Fiscal Year 2013/2014 (FY running from July to June) meaning January-March 2014. However, the disbursement request from the Government to the EU Delegation (EUD) was only issued in November 2014 and subsequently analysed by the EUD in January. The disbursement authorisation was finally approved by EUROPAID HQ in March 2015 following the validation of its Budget Support Steering Committee.

Funds (€ 9M counter value in Pakistani Rupees) have been transferred to the Treasury Account of the Government of Pakistan and, according to the provisions of the FA, to the Treasury account of the provincial government of KP (provincial consolidated account). While BS is untargeted and fungible with the fiscal resources of the KP Government, it is understood from the review of the documentation (Action Fiche, Financing agreement, Disbursement dossier) that this amount has increased the KP government's fiscal space, as the EU funds came on top of federal transfers under the 7<sup>th</sup> National Finance Commission Award (cf. Annex A3 on the monograph on fiscal decentralisation process) and own provincial fiscal resources. The FA has been designed in order to provide fiscal space at lower administrative tiers for community driven development purposes. Such expected additionality of funds for the provincial budget together was part of the four strategic pillars of the programme:

*More efficient use of provincial government budget* – To improve the use of the provincial government's recurrent and development budgets, **as well as increase the fiscal space for community-driven rural development approaches;**

ii. *Increased community development, social mobilisation and capacity building* – To empower rural communities to influence local governance through improved interaction between the state and citizens;

iii. *Improved front line public service delivery* – To enhance the technical capacity of Government agencies to establish constructive relations with local communities through the participatory process and decision-making, so as to improve the delivery of front line public services; and

iv. *Improved community infrastructure* – To assist local communities at Union Council (UC) level to take the lead in developing intra-UC community-driven economic and social infrastructure, whilst recognising that some priority requirements will be at inter-UC level, in order to gain economies of scale e.g. a health unit, or a rural road to improve market access.

Reasons for delays may be essentially related to the late signature of the Financing Agreement in November 2013, as acknowledged by EUROPEAID, that made a first disbursement between January and March 2014 unrealistic taking into account

the time needed to complete the full disbursement assessment and decision process involving the Government, the EUD and the EUROPEAID including the Budget Support Steering Committee in accordance with the new EU BS Guidelines of 2012.

One other reason that may explain the delay in the late disbursement request from the Government is the new KP provincial policy framework enacted during 2014 on Community Driven Local Development (CDLD). This provincial initiative was implemented in the context of the national reforms triggered by the 18<sup>th</sup> Amendment of the Pakistan constitution on increased devolution of government functions, resources and services delivery. While this CDLD policy was developed with the support of the EU during 2012-2013 in parallel with the process of design of the Financing Agreement, it was not possible to find relevant documentation on such EU policy support/capacity development.

The proposed new policy framework aims at achieving a sustainable improvement in the coverage and quality of frontline public service delivery through the active involvement of local communities.

The assessment of the relevance and credibility of this new policy framework was not included in the disbursement request of the Government, the latter having carried out an assessment based on the sole provisions of the FA with regards to specific sources of verifications and set of policies/strategies and reforms process on **local governance** and **local development** initiated by the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (GoKP) since 2009:

- the Post Crisis Needs Assessment Report (PCNA) on Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA);
- the Malakand Comprehensive Stabilisation and Socio-Economic Development Strategy of 2009;
- the Comprehensive Development Strategy 2010-17;
- the Economic Growth Strategy for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa of 2012; and the Integrated Financial Reform Strategy of 2011.

The EUD and the HQ has however considered this new CDLD policy framework at the core of their public policy eligibility criteria assessment. A team of consultant was hired to support the EUD in assessing the latest CDLD Policy in order to reflect the latest development of GoPK's policies. It was agreed to amend later on the FA in order to take into account this new policy reference (including its monitoring and evaluation framework that was not yet developed at the time of the first tranche assessment) for the assessment of the eligibility criteria on public policy. The mission of the consultants was mobilised in November 2014 and has informed the preparation of the disbursement file by the Delegation.

## 2° Policy dialogue

- **documentary evidence of the existence, contents and frequency of the policy dialogue (meeting notes, minutes, opinions of participants) and importance attached by the Government to the dialogue process;**



▪ **policy dialogue is conducted at appropriate government level;**

Available documentation shows that policy dialogue started well before the launch of the BS Sector Reform Contract and particularly during the identification and formulation process. However, it is difficult to clearly identify the full range of interlocutors and each kind of policy dialogue developed by the EU (Finance and Planning & Development Departments of Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the local authorities and/or the relevant non-state actors and civil society...).

According to the EU, the quality of the policy dialogue has improved with the launch of a Strategic Development Partnership Framework (SDPF) by the GoKP in 2013. This SDPF aims at reflecting a total recasting of the donor-KP relationship from a traditional donor-recipient relationship to a peer-to-peer partnership to address regional and provincial development challenges. It is expected to provide a basis for discussion of top-level strategic priorities and set the context for the delivery of assistance in line with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa's priorities. Sectoral Coordination Committees have been established along the specific pillars of the Strategic Framework. One of the 7 pillars is directly related with the CDLD (improved citizen participation and bringing the state closer to citizens"). The GoKP has then led the coordination policy dialogue process with development partner through this SDPF. It is expected to provide an opportunity for better harmonisation of donor intervention with the policy/reform agenda of the Provincial Government. However, there are no minutes available of the outcome of such consultation process.

In its eligibility criteria assessment on PFM, the EUD confirmed the existence of an on-going dialogue that takes place between the EUD and the GoKP through various channel including regular meetings with the provincial authorities (essentially the EAD of the Finance Department). However, no evidence is available. Questions also remain regarding the policy dialogue at district and lower tiers level where no information or evidence is available. As the Community Driven Local Development Framework had been just enacted and developed at the time of the first disbursement, the government was still in the operationalisation process of its new policy including coordination mechanism at provincial and local level including the coordination with the donors.

The FA stipulates that the EU's policy dialogue with the GoKP should "address the challenges and progress made within the remits set by the Community Driven Local Development Policy framework" and should be "primarily focussed around the nine (9) broad areas of indicators identified within the Performance Matrix (Fiscal space; Regulatory Framework; Organisational framework; Legal registration and proposal submission; Government responsiveness; Strategic planning; Management Information System/MIS and M&E; Verification and Audit; Infrastructures)".

However, there is no evidence that the CDLD Provincial Coordination and Review Committee (PCRC), to be chaired by the Finance Department and which was expected to be the main forum for policy dialogue on the programme

implementation and the related policy reform process, was established and conveyed between the signature of the financing agreement and the finalisation of the first disbursement. This situation could be easily explained by the relative new framework at the time of the first BS KP DGCD disbursement process and the fact that the Provincial government was still in the process to develop the new policy framework mechanisms. The PCRC is expected to be regularly convened on a quarterly basis and allow strategic policy reviews based on evidence from Management Information System, continuous audit and 3rd party verification.

According to division of labour in the province, the PFM policy dialogue was led by DFID and shared under the Strategic Development Partnership Framework. This SDPF

On the macroeconomic and fiscal policy, there is no evidence of policy dialogue with the Federal Government in charge of the implementation of the IMF programme (Extended Fund Facility).

Policy dialogue on key macroeconomic issues at provincial level (intergovernmental arrangements, provincial fiscal balance, tax policy and tax reform, fiscal decentralisation process including devolution of GST on services...) is neither recorded in the available documentation but it is expected that these issues may have been discussed between the EUD and the EAD of the Finance Department or in the context of the SDPF.

### 3° Conditions

- **number, clarity of the conditions and related indicators;**
  - **the indicators reflect the policy objectives and/or point to core issues in the sector; opinion of the partner government on their realism, their clarity and their feasibility;**
  - **disaggregation of the indicators by gender and other characteristics;**
- opinion of the EU staff on their realism, their clarity and their feasibility**

The first (and unique) instalment disbursed so far has been a fixed tranche conditioned upon the fulfilment of the four EU BS eligibility criteria in line with the 2012 EU BS guidelines:

1. Implementation of a credible stability-oriented macroeconomic policy.
2. Satisfactory progress in the implementation of the programme to improve public finance
3. Satisfactory progress with regard to the public availability of accessible, timely, comprehensive, and sound budgetary information.
4. Satisfactory progress in the implementation of PCNA (Post Crisis Needs Assessment) Report on Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA (ADB, EU, UN, World Bank, September 2010), the Comprehensive Development Strategy 2010-17 (GoPK, 2010), the Economic Growth Strategy - Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Planning & Development Department, GoKP, 2011), the Malakand Comprehensive Stabilisation and Socio-Economic Development

Strategy, (Government of North West Frontier Province, August 2009), the Annual Strategy Review developed in preparation of the budget 2012-13, and continued credibility and relevance of that or any successor strategy.

With regards to the latest eligibility criteria related to the public sector policy, at the time of design of the financing agreement, the comprehensive CDLD Policy was not yet developed which explain the reference to several existing policies and strategies (PCNA, CDS, EGS, Makaland Strategy...) that were considered as the main source of verification to assess the implementation of the sector public policy related to district governance and community development. The new CDLD policy framework identifies its founding origin, rationale and principle in these policies and strategies.

The CDLD Policy has the overarching goal to achieve a sustainable improvement in the coverage and quality of front-line public service delivery through the active involvement of local communities, through the following objectives:

1. Put in place a fiscal and regulatory framework for CDLD where local communities are in charge of executing local development/service delivery initiatives;
2. Build the capacity of the relevant public sector entities and functionaries at the district level to operationalize CDLD; and
3. Provide an enabling environment for Community Based Organizations to access public funds earmarked for CDLD initiatives

Salient features of the Policy include:

- Earmarking of funds in the annual budget for community driven local development initiatives, following the Output Based Budget approach;
- Setting of eligibility criteria to give community based organizations access to funds, as well as setting criteria for validation, selection and approval of initiatives and procedures for disbursement;
- Setting protocols for Monitoring and Evaluation, including 3rd party verification and continuous audit;
- Empowerment and capacity building for provincial and district government entities to operationalize and implement the Policy;
- Adjustment of the regulatory environment and mobilization and support for community based organizations

Salient Principles and guidelines of the Policy include:

- Community involvement in decision making and execution of development initiatives;
- Transparency, accountability and responsiveness;
- Subsidiarity;
- Inclusiveness;

The Policy represents a multi-sector approach to Rural Development where the

main stakeholders are the provincial and district government agencies concerned with social service delivery and development of physical infrastructure and the multitude of rural communities and local rural support agencies.

The rationale for the development of this policy framework lies also in the response to an urgent need for post-crisis recovery and to improve governance mechanisms and restore a level of trust in the districts through involvement of local communities in development and public service delivery, along with strengthening of public finance management and linking service delivery with budgetary allocations on a results-based approach to district budget management. Taking into account the communities' demand for services, the CDLD Policy aims at promoting a more active and visible involvement of local governments agencies to achieve a combination of welfare and governance outcomes.

The design of the Policy was based on the GoKP's previous experience with Conditional Grants Transfers in the Health and Education departments with the specific purpose to expand fiscal space at the local level and fill the gaps in service delivery to communities. This system involved the district offices to submit proposals for grants based on specific activities, outputs and service delivery indicators as well as Community organisations to identify local needs and monitor the execution of the grants (e.g. Parents Teacher Councils or Health Care Management Committees). Considering the origins of the Policy in the overall reform process in Public Finance Management, notably in the Conditional Grants initiatives which emanated from the Finance Department, the Finance Department assumed a leading role in the design of the CDLD Policy and took responsibility for its implementation.

The EUD was of the opinion that the CDLD policy framework will need to be adapted to the evolving local environment regarding the implication of the future entry into force of the Local Government Act of 2013 that will regulate the devolution of political, administrative and fiscal powers to future elected local councils as well as the implementation of the provincial integrated PFM reform strategy. The future elected local councils will become the direct beneficiaries of the transfers from the province (under Provincial Finance Commission Award) meaning that the CDLD policy be integrated in this system with the councils in charge of contracting out community initiatives.

In addition to the four eligibility criteria for BS contracts, a set of 10 indicators were initially defined to assess the performance of the programme and the disbursement of the variable tranches (3 annual variables tranches from FY 2015/16 to FY 17/18)./ These indicators were structured around 4 pillars:

- More efficient use of provincial government budget
- Increased community development , social mobilisation and capacity development
- Improved front line public service delivery
- Improved community physical infrastructure

No baseline was available at the time of the signature of the financing agreement.

Following the adoption of CDLD policy for the six districts of Malakand Division, a

revised framework was made in February 2015 to better align the performance assessment framework of the EU SRC to the provincial policy framework. Structured around the three objectives of the CDLD:

- Put in place a fiscal and regulatory framework where local communities are in charge of executing local development/service delivery initiatives
- Build the capacity of the relevant public sector entities and functionaries at the district level to operationalise the CDLD
- Provide an enabling environment for CBA to access public funds earmarked for CDLD initiatives.

6 indicators were defined (process orientated) with baseline and annual targets from FY 2015/16 to FY 2017/18:

- Number of CDLD projects approved
- Percentage of CDLD allocation in proportion to the Provincial Annual Development Plan allocations
- Budgetary allocations under CDLD in proportion to District Development strategies based cost estimated
- Percentage of relevant public sector officers with CDLD competency (measured by the corresponding CDLD government officer capacity scorecard)
- Percentage of annual CDLD allocated funds disbursed to CBOs
- Percentage of CDLD budget allocated for women specific projects (gender dimension)

This revised performance assessment framework came from an extensive consultative process between the EU and the GoPK.

However, no preliminary assessment has been made with regards to the policy implementation performance with regard to these 6 indicators as no variable tranches have been assessed. Evaluation should occur during the FY 15/16.

Specific Management Information and monitoring and evaluation systems were expected to be developed through 2014/2015 but no assessment has been provided yet on progress made in these areas.

The first disbursement of the first fixed tranche has occurred in the absence of a clear policy performance assessment framework as the CDLD policy framework was new. The GoKP had concentrated its efforts to operationalise this new policy by means of designing business rules, providing capacity building at district level and developing a MIS capable of tracking physical and financial progress and a M&E system as well as supporting the development of the districts development strategies. The Reform Monitoring Unit of the Finance Department is in charge of these developments and was expected to provide technical assistance support under the EU KP DGCD SRC.

The assessment of the sector policy implementation at the time of the first

disbursement included a strong prospective/forward-looking dimension with regards to political commitment for institutional/policy reforms as no funding was made available at that time and the CDLD institutional capacities and financial implementation mechanisms were still in the process to be developed. The main focus of the EU related to the following key milestones:

- District Development Committees have been re-constituted according to Policy membership criteria;
- Eligibility criteria for participating community based organizations and selection criteria for proposed projects have been formulated and adopted in consultation with the foreseen social mobiliser;
- Funding mechanisms have been determined;
- Procedures for grant execution and handling of grievances have been determined;
- A Policy Coordination and Review Committee was established, conducting its first meeting in January 2014 and several meetings of the Reform Monitoring Unit were conducted to draft the Policy Notifications
- Training and awareness building on the Policy to around 430 staff of district offices and production of manuals on Policy implementation and procedures;
- District Development Strategies have been formulated and adopted through a consultative process with, eventually, the purpose to mainstream these strategies into the Provincial/District Annual Development Plan for 2014/15;
- Design of ToR for tender procedure to hire 3rd party verification and continuous audit services;
- Tender Notice for the establishment of the CDLD MIS.
- Notification of the Policy rules of business/procedures has been drafted and issued to all relevant Provincial Departments, District Deputy Commissioners, Districts Accounts officers and the Division Comptroller of Accounts in Malakand. This notification combines 10 key aspects of the implementation process of the Policy.
- Development of a Digital MIS capable to track physical and financial progress of policy implementation.
- Allocation of resources in the budget for FY 2014/15, for an amount 1,78 billion PKR (comprising 500 million Government matching grant and 1,28 billion PKR from Foreign Program Assistance corresponding to the fiscal space provided by the EU KP DGCD)

According to the EUD assessment, the EU funded PEACE programme and EU TA provided under a service contract (no documentation available) have indirectly contributed to mobilise local communities and to prepare the ground for the implementation of the CDLD policy.

#### 4° Capacity building

- documentary evidence of preliminary identification, with the partner, of capacity constraints;
- provision of resources by the EU within the BS contract or via complementary TA, or by other donors in the context of a coordinated effort, to strengthen capacities crucial for the successful implementation of the intervention.

The BS component of the KP DGCD SRC is complemented by: i) EUR 7,500,000 support to involve civil society organisations to facilitate mobilisation of rural communities including preparation of quality proposals for possible district government financing, as well as remain engaged in the follow-up and decision making processes i.e. in the demand side of governance; and ii) EUR 8,500,000 of technical cooperation aimed at supporting capacity development of the administration and reinforcement of government audit control.

The social mobilisation component foreseen will be implemented through 2 to 4 grant contracts following a call for proposals and the technical cooperation component will be implemented through approx. 6 service contracts following calls for tender. The programme will be implemented by the European Union, through its Delegation in Pakistan. The implementing agency of the programme will be the Department of Finance of the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

No information was available concerning preliminary commitments/implementation under these complementary supports.

Difficulties in the implementation of the social mobilisation component have been taken into account through the possibility to provide flexibility with the co-financing requirement by the EC for grants as Delegation experience with NSA/CSO have underlined that the majority of CSO do not always have their own financial resources to support such co-financing requirement. EU shall fully finance the grants to be awarded for this social mobilisation component.

*Sources: Action Fiche, Financing Agreement/TAPS, Disbursement dossier/eligibility criteria assessment, CDLD policy framework, Strategic Development Partnership Framework, GoKP Integrated PFM Strategy 2001. Interviews: MN201, MN 810; MN502.*

Quality of evidence: Availability of data: **Strong**

JC-2.3	<b>The EU contributed to the mobilisation of Community based organisations</b>
<b>There are convergent sources mentioning that thousands of community based organisations have been mobilised in districts of operation in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in the context of the activities of the EU supported programmes.</b>	
I-2.3.1	<p><b>Evidence of increase in the number of CBOs, village organisations, initiatives involving refugees, set up.</b></p> <p>There is clear evidence from the two operational projects in December 2014, that the number of CBOs and village level organisations have been increased. See tables provided under indicator I-2.2.3</p> <p>All projects have found federation of CBOs into village and then Local Support Organisations more challenging. With RAHA only achieving 20% of target number of LSOs, by end of 2014 (one year from end of project). PEACE project, implemented by SRSP who was already active in community mobilisation in the area prior to project initiation, seems to have progressed most rapidly with community mobilisation, including the very challenging inclusion of 24,000 women members within 1,215 women's CBOs by July 2014.</p> <p>Projects progress and monitoring reports and interviews indicate that thousands of Community based organisations have been mobilised through the programmes. Number quoted are 6 000/7 000.</p> <p>Gender issues are an important component of community life. Under the RAHA programme there has been no gender strategy in the initial design. The mid-term review recommended that one be developed. Following that the programme produced a "gender strategy" with overambitious objectives and no sufficient account of the conservative context of the target provinces; this document was inadequate and not contractually binding. Unfortunately the RAHA progress reports do not make a distinction between Women Community Organisations and Men Community organisation, contrarily to what is done by the implementers of the PEACE programme, and although it is foreseen in the Contribution Agreement. However, the project implemented numerous gender-positive activities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Training. Disaggregated data are provided: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In KP <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1397 women out of 2897 persons attended capacity training</li> <li>2014 women out of 3950 persons attended vocational training</li> <li>187 women out of 400 persons attended Gender Based Violence training</li> <li>86 session out of 169 on environmental awareness focused on women</li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> <li>▪ Livelihood development: 3950 persons including 2014 females with very low income were trained in marketable skills; about 70% of female trainees have been reported to be gainfully employed.</li> <li>▪ Women's access to basic facilities: 66 specific women Village Organisations, 28 mixed ones are set up. 2658 COs including 1053 Women Cos were formed. 202 VOs, including 66 women and 28 mixed were formed.</li> <li>▪ Implementation of infrastructure projects: a number of local infrastructure</li> </ul>




were initiated by Women CO (road, irrigation, solar energy) benefitting more than 87 000 females. Projects improving access of communities to water, sanitation, health and education were completed benefitting tens of thousands women.

- Protection committees: out of 60 social protection committees 30 female and 22 mixed social protection committees were formed. 67 conflicts related to GBV were resolved by these committees.

Reports of RSPN suggest that PEACE has developed a low cost social mobilisation that is sustainable. It is based on the identification and training of Community Resources Persons in doing social mobilisation. These CRPs are permanent local residents in the area with adequate livelihood and no monetary expectations from being CRP. The fact that they belong to the community and are fully dedicated to it is a strong factor of sustainability. ( RSPN: Various notes for record)

A recent assessment of the level of development of Men and Women CBOs has been conducted by trained professionals of the SRSP (SRSP: An assessment of Institutional Development of Men and Women Community Organizations under EU-SRSP PEACE Programme in Malakand Division, KP, November 2014.)

The study was based on primary data collected through a sample survey of men and women CBO benefitting from the PEACE programme. 417 men and women CBOs from 300 villages of Malakand Division were assessed. The methodology made use of the Institutional and Organisational Assessment (IOA) model developed by Universalia and IDRC-Canada (1995) and modified by RSPN to assess institutional development of men and women CO in 4 broad areas : Organisational motivation, Organisational performance, organisational capacity and external environment. It is illustrated in the diagram:



*Figure 01- Modified version of IOM Model*

The four dimensions have been developed into indicators, eventually converted into specific questions. The questions were compiled into an instrument used in the field by regional and district monitoring and evaluation professional with backstopping from the Head Office.

The results are summarised in the following quotation from the study and the table summarising the main findings:

*“The programme has completed its two years of implementation and the results achieved so far are promising. An ownership of three tier social mobilization process at local level has resulted in formation of apex level organizations; an aspect which would be one of the core focuses in upcoming periods. The programme has also been able to achieve formation of significant number of women community organizations, a milestone not less than a miracle keeping in view local socio-cultural context of Malakand Division in view. The completed schemes (MHPs and CPIs) by end of year 2 have started generating benefits at local level, which essentially have contributed to improving socio-economic conditions in target areas. Value chains, enterprises, and entrepreneurs developed and supported through the programme has started producing immediate impacts; generating net profits contributing to an improved and strengthened livelihoods in programme districts besides generating local employment. The programme has developed good working relationship at regional and district level and with all government line agencies and other major important stakeholders. Their participation is ensured for adding value to the programme. Formal agreements and Memorandum of Understanding have been developed and signed with relevant departments to strengthened and formalize working relationships. The programme is not static rather continuously refining its approaches and strategies based on field learning, experiences and local needs. This adaptable nature of the programme has helped in overcoming challenges through local solutions.” (p.11, underlining is ours)*

<b>Summary of results of the Institutional and Organisation assessment model applied to the PEACE Programme</b>				
<b>Area of investigation</b>	<b>MCO</b>	<b>WCO</b>	<b>Both</b>	<b>Remarks (from the authors of the study)</b>
<b>1. Organisational motivation</b>				
Awareness of goals and objectives: % of CO updating regularly their annual development plans and sharing it with SRSP and other development agencies	10%	12%		
Leadership/democracy: % of CO holding regular elections or inculcated democratic values.	18%	18%		Leadership reasonably fair in distributing benefits among members, but need to improve engaging all members in planning local development interventions
% leadership of CO continuing on basis of one time election	72%	69%	72%	
% of CBOs that ensured excellent or good participation in identification and planning	71%	71%	71%	Greater proportion of WCOs (46%) than MCOs (33%) achieving excellent participation
Proportion of CO leadership that involved and engaged members and took collective decisions			By and large half of the CO (Men & women)	Suggest that leadership, to a considerable level, is sensitized on "downward accountability".
% of CO leadership which dominates but distributed benefits fairly among members	24%	23%	24%	
% of CO that are part of VO	25%	34%		
% of CO that have taken practical steps to mainstream women in development process			27%	
<b>2 Organisation performance</b>				
% of CO that have held 8 or more meetings in one year	21%	9%		Issues discussed: infrastructure, generating employment opportunities, education, health of women/children, technical/employable skills. Less meetings but higher participation rate in WCO than in MCO
Financial capital developed at local level, average savings in PKR	8 700	5 800		
Inclusiveness: % of WCO that ensured participation of a maximum of poor members in their CBO		57%		
<b>3. Organisational capacity</b>				
Proportion of CO that were able to show their proceedings registers, attendance records, bank receipts or activity records			Nearly half CO	A key aspect of institutional capacity
% of office bearers (president & managers) having received managerial training			62%	
Proportion of CO that have efficiently managed 4 to 6 interventions			20%	The study assessed the programme half way through its life. At this stage it concentrated on MHP and CPI. In its second half it plans to invest in micro interventions at community and household levels; it is expected that these CO will score high in terms of management.
Proportion of CO that have efficiently managed 1 to 3 interventions			80%	
<b>Overall institutional assessment</b>				
% of CO considered as "institutionally independent" (= excellent)	6%	4%		
% of CO considered as "institutionally developed" (= good)	45%	41%		
MCO = Men Community Organisations; WCO = Women Community Organisations.				

	<p>These results demonstrate that the EU support through the PEACE programme has contributed to the development of viable local development institutions that are already bringing benefits to the local population. The most remarkable achievement is the high mobilisation of WCO.</p> <p><i>Sources: PEACE, 2013, 1st Implementation report, Oct 2012-July 2013. PEACE, 2014, 2nd Implementation report, Aug 2013-Feb 2014. PEACE, 2014, 3rd Implementation report, March 2014-July 2014 PEACE, ROM, July 2013. RAHA, 1st Annual Report, 2012 RAHA, ROM, 2012. RAHA, MTR, 2013 RAHA, Progress from July 2011-February 2013 RAHA, ROM, 2013. RAHA, 3rd Annual progress report, 2014 RSPN: European Union PEACE Programme, Note for record, September 3-7 2014. RSPN: European Union PEACE Programme Revisited, Note for record, May 25 2015. SRSP: An assessment of Institutional Development of Men and Women Community Organizations under EU-SRSP PEACE Programme in Malakand Division, KP, November 2014. Interviews: MN 201, MN505, MN507</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory</b></p>
I-2.3.2	<p><b>Evidence of training and capacity building offered to these CBOs by the implementing partners</b></p> <p>Following a similar pattern to formation of community groups at the three levels, training and capacity building has been amply provided for the newly set-up CBOs. This has taken the form of both organisational and technical training. Some new community groups have been used as an avenue for introduction of disaster and risk preparedness training. Slower formation and development of federations of village organisations and finally Local Support Organisations has led to slower implementation of training and capacity development at this level.</p> <p>There is a difference in the training provided to the community organisations by the two programmes.</p> <p>The RAHA final evaluation concludes that capacity training offered to the local communities, though of good quality, was too light and insufficient for proper community implementation:</p>

Capacitation of the local communities is confined to:

- (1) the four day basic Community Management Skills Training (CMST) training course;
- (2) an Leadership Management Skills Training (LMST) for two members per community organisation;
- (3) village conferences (one day);
- (4) follow-up visits; and
- (5) the standard list of additional training on gender, water and sanitation, ...

There is little evidence that either community or duty bearers are fully capacitated by means of this training. The capacity building process is not a sustained, continuous, four year long process that would have constituted a proper capacity building programme. It is a focused crash course process that has an obvious objective, consisting in providing the target communities with "just enough" management capacity to implement the infrastructure works. The Chief Foreign Aid of Balochistan confirms that RAHA is an infrastructure project and not a capacity building project.

(RAHA Final Evaluation Report, 2015)

The PEACE programme has put much effort on developing the managerial capacity not only of the leaders but also of the members of the local communities: “

Community Management Skills Training (CMST) followed by Leadership Management Skills Trainings (LMST) are considered to be an integral part of support provided to respective men and women CBOs in order to develop and enhance their managerial capacities and leadership skills. A two pronged approach to deliver these managerial and leadership trainings have been adopted. The CMSTs predominantly are delivered at local level ensuring broad based participation. So instead of office bearers, other community members/activists are also involved to develop their know-how on participatory development. In contrast the advance level in-house trainings (LMSTs) are arranged in commercial venues (local hotels) with participation of leadership of respective community institutions.

During reporting period, 273 basic level capacity building events (CMSTs) have been arranged at community level ensuring participation of 6,840 men and women members from organized community institutions. This trained cadre has been utilized effectively by the programme to expand outreach and maintain proper record in respective community organizations. Overall since inception, SRSP-PEACE has developed capacity of more than 22,276 men and women.”

(PEACE, 4<sup>th</sup> Implementation Report, 2015.)

*Sources: PEACE, 2013, 1st Implementation report, Oct 2012-July 2013.*

*PEACE, 2014, 2<sup>nd</sup> Implementation report, Aug 2103-Feb 2014.*

*PEACE, 2014, 3<sup>rd</sup> Implementation report, March 2014-July 2014*

*PEACE, 2015, 4<sup>th</sup> Implementation report, August 2014-March 2015*

*PEACE, ROM, July 2013.*

*RAHA, 1<sup>st</sup> Annual Report, 2012*

*RAHA, ROM, 2012.*

*RAHA, MTR, 2013*

*RAHA, Progress from July 2011-February 2013*

*RAHA, ROM, 2013.*

	<p>RAHA, 3<sup>rd</sup> Annual progress report, 2014  RAHA, Final Evaluation, December 2015  Interviews: MN502, MN505</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>Indicative but not conclusive.</b></p>
<p>I-2.3.3</p>	<p><b>Evidence from existing evaluations, other documentations and interviews with on the importance of EU funded activities for the observed improvements.</b></p> <p>The RAHA project is a 100 million euro project with 40 million euro from the EU. All mobilisation of communities and formation of CBOs is being funded under the EU component, implemented by UNDP.</p> <p>The PEACE project is being implemented by the NGO SRSP who was actively engaged in community mobilisation and formation of CBOs, Village organisations and Local Resource Organisations, prior to the PEACE project. Consequently, some improvements in the area are prior to EU funded interventions. EU funding has enabled rapid up-scaling of activities and the prior presence and capacity of the implementing agency in the area has enabled rapid progress, despite the difficult environment, affected by militarisation and conflict.</p> <p>The KP-DGDC project had yet to start implementation by the end of 2014, as first release in funding was in March 2015, a year later than planned.</p> <p>There is no doubt, given the importance of the funding of the EU in these different projects, that EU contribution to their achievements has been significant. However, since all these projects are implemented by organisations (UN agencies, RSPs, Provincial government) whose activities go beyond the implementations of these specific projects the interviewees do not feel they can prove any assessment of the EU contribution; they assess positively the whole programmes but without identifying responsibilities.</p> <p><i>Sources: PEACE, 2013, 1st Implementation report, Oct 2012-July 2013.  PEACE, 2014, 2<sup>nd</sup> Implementation report, Aug 2013-Feb 2014.  PEACE, 2014, 3<sup>rd</sup> Implementation report, March 2014-July 2014  PEACE, ROM, July 2013.  RAHA, 1<sup>st</sup> Annual Report, 2012  RAHA, ROM, 2012.  RAHA, MTR, 2013  RAHA, Progress from July 2011-February 2013  RAHA, ROM, 2013.  RAHA, 3<sup>rd</sup> Annual progress report, 2014</i></p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>Indicative but not conclusive.</b></p>

<b>JC-2.4</b>	<b>The CBOs supported by the programmes have developed and maintained local infrastructure and mechanisms, which are used by local communities and improved their livelihood.</b>															
There is documentary evidence of development of local infrastructure by both the RAHA and PEACE programmes which are used by local communities to improve their living conditions and livelihoods. The evidence of development of sustainable operation and maintenance systems is less clear.																
I-2.4.1	<p><b>Quantity and type of local infrastructure built by CBOs</b></p> <p>Both RAHA and PEACE delivered a considerable number of CPIs:</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Community Physical Infrastructure implemented</b></p> <table border="1" data-bbox="336 757 1211 954"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>Target</th> <th>Achieved</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>RAHA Final Evaluation Main Report</td> <td>1000</td> <td>1398</td> </tr> <tr> <td>RAHA Final Evaluation Annexes</td> <td>1000</td> <td>1021</td> </tr> <tr> <td>PEACE initiated as of March 2015</td> <td>771</td> <td>415</td> </tr> <tr> <td>completed as of March 2015</td> <td></td> <td>267</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p><i>Sources</i>  RAHA: Final Evaluation, 2015, vol. I Main Report and vol. II: Annexes  PEACE: Eu 4th Interim Technical Implementation Report</p> <p>As mentioned earlier figures for RAHA must be taken with caution given the lack of rigour of the reporting by the UN implementation agencies.</p> <p>Within the RAHA project improved access to clean drinking water, sanitation, health and education enabled via 1,364 social service projects (2728%) of target. Further investigation of success/ importance of this aspect of the project and operation and maintenance systems in place to ensure sustainability. Construction of irrigation channels and farm to market roads benefiting some 661,067 individuals implemented through 749 projects. Number of major infrastructure projects has been less than planned (18 of 50, 36%). Interviews with RAHA team and EUD staff showed that construction of irrigation channels have had a positive impact on food production and has created conditions for making food production systems more sustainable.</p> <p>Within the PEACE project, 27,000 households benefited from electricity generated through micro-hydro, 100 old (mainly Health and Education facilities) schemes were rehabilitated. 315 new schemes benefiting some 570,000 people instigated, including drinking water supply, communication, sanitation and irrigation.</p> <p>The following table, extracted from the programme 4<sup>th</sup> Technical Interim Report, 2015 of the PEACE programme provides an overview of the progress achieved in March 2015. It shows that the approach of Sarhad-RSP fully integrates the needs assessment, the design, the managerial training, the physical implementation and the maintenance/sustainability of the individual projects.</p>		Target	Achieved	RAHA Final Evaluation Main Report	1000	1398	RAHA Final Evaluation Annexes	1000	1021	PEACE initiated as of March 2015	771	415	completed as of March 2015		267
	Target	Achieved														
RAHA Final Evaluation Main Report	1000	1398														
RAHA Final Evaluation Annexes	1000	1021														
PEACE initiated as of March 2015	771	415														
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**Table 12: Snapshot of Activities under Expected Result 3**

#	Indicative Activities	Targets Overall 4 Years	Achievements		
			Previous (Oct 12 to July 14)	Current (Aug 14 to March 15)	Cumulative (Oct 12 to Mar 15)
3.1	Sign MoU with concerned government authorities for rehabilitation of govt. basic social service delivery facilities	2 MoUs	Achieved	Achieved	Achieved
3.2	Site Identification for community physical infrastructure schemes	771 Schemes	315 schemes	100 schemes	41 schemes
3.3	Conduct feasibility surveys and prepare project designs	771 digests	315 schemes	100 schemes	415 schemes
3.4	Sign Memoranda of Understanding and 'Works Contracts', if necessary with Community Institutions	771 MoUs	315 MoUs	100 MoUs	415 MoUs
3.5	Prepare & delivery technical training for community-based project management, audit, operational and maintenance committees	2, 313 Committees	945 committees	300 committees	1,245 committees
3.6	Initiate and complete schemes	771 CPLs	315 schemes	100 schemes	415 schemes
3.7	Facilitate process of establishing community-based Operational & Maintenance mechanisms for CPLs	771 Schemes	315 schemes	100 schemes	415 schemes

Details of activities under Expected Result 3 are discussed in detail below.

It is difficult to identify precisely what have been the achievements of one particular EU programme since they are conducted under the umbrella of larger programmes of the RSPN. However, it is reasonable to assume that positive results documented by the RSPN can be at least partially attributed to the EU programmes when these have contributed significant resources. This is the case for instance with the Sarhad Support Programme, which benefitted from the PEACE programme: "Since 2004, SRSP has installed 189 hydro systems with total capacity 15 MW. These have brought power to over 51,000 households with about 365,000 family members in total, as well as to a wide range of community facilities and businesses.

For about 90% of households, an SRSP hydro scheme provides the first ever access to electricity, and it has huge impact on lives. An immediate change is electric light, replacing dim and dirty kerosene lamps and pine-torches. This brings many benefits. Domestic work is easier and income-generating work, like embroidery, can be done in the evening. Children study better with electric light and parents can read and teach their children to read too. Teachers note that electric light improves both performance and attendance because children have completed their homework and so aren't afraid to go to school. Electric light also makes it safer to be outdoors at night. This, like many of the benefits of light, is particularly valued by women and children. Labour-saving appliances like washing machines and electric butter churners cut the drudgery of housework for women. Wood-burning stoves and heaters can be replaced with cleaner, quicker, electric versions. With power for phone-charging in the home (and also to run phone masts and telephone exchanges), families are able to keep in touch. Access to radio, TV and internet all provide a window on the wider world and reduce the isolation of the region. Again, this is particularly valued by women, who are more restricted than men in mixing outside the home. Electricity greatly improves community services. Health centres and hospitals have good quality lighting for examinations and procedures, and can also run pathology tests and refrigerate vaccines. Schools with good lighting and computers can teach better and broaden their curriculum. In some villages, IT centres have been set up, providing both access and training on computers and the internet. SRSP notes that communities often 'gel' through working together on a hydro scheme. Once the scheme is in use, people say there is less pressure to leave



	<p>their home village because of the better services that become available.” (RSPN: Winner case study summary: Sarhad Rural Support Programme, Pakistan.)</p> <p><i>Sources: RAHA, 3<sup>rd</sup> Progress Report, 2014.</i>  <i>RAHA, MTR, 2013,</i>  <i>RAHA 2<sup>nd</sup> Progress Report, 2013,</i>  <i>PEACE, 2013, 1st Implementation report, Oct 2012-July 2013.</i>  <i>PEACE, 2014, 2<sup>nd</sup> Implementation report, Aug 2013-Feb 2014.</i>  <i>PEACE, 2014, 3<sup>rd</sup> Implementation report, March 2014-July 2014</i>  <i>PEACE, ROM, July 2013.</i>  <i>RSPN: Winner case study summary: Sarhad Rural Support Programme, Pakistan, May 2015.</i>  <i>Interviews: MN501; MN506; MN507</i></p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; background-color: #f9e79f; padding: 5px;"> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory.</b> Convergence of documents and interviews, insufficient coverage of interviews to qualify it as strong.</p> </div>
I-2.4.2	<p><b>Evidence of maintenance of these infrastructure</b></p> <p>In terms of maintenance and sustainability RAHA and PEACE have developed different approach. As shown under indicator I-2.3.2, RAHA has accompanied the development of new CPIs with a minimal crash course sufficient to implement a new infrastructure but not to guarantee its maintenance and sustainability throughout its life. In contract within the PEACE project, the Rural Support Programme Approach is followed and this includes the setting up of operation and maintenance committees and training of members in the sustainable operation and effective maintenance of the buildings, electricity generation, water delivery and other schemes constructed.</p> <p>Reports of RSPN suggest that PEACE has developed a low cost social mobilisation that is sustainable. It is based on the identification and training of Community Resources Persons in doing social mobilisation. These CRPs are permanent local residents in the area with adequate livelihood and no monetary expectations from being CRP</p> <p>Within the PEACE project, the establishment of micro hydro power generating systems (result area 2) includes the development of community based operation and maintenance committees, to ensure effective use and longer-term sustainability of the infrastructure developed. Similarly the improvement of community physical infrastructure and basic social services (result area 3) includes the formation of committees for the proper operation and maintenance of the infrastructure once rehabilitated, or constructed. This follows the tried and tested Rural Support Programme approach to ensuring sustainability of introduced developments.</p> <p>However, given the fact that running of hydro power generating systems require some capacity within the CBOs in order to be able to participate in the management of the power plants. Project implementing partners will have to pay attention to this issue</p>

	<p><i>Sources: RAHA, 3<sup>rd</sup> Progress Report, 2014.</i>  <i>RAHA, MTR, 2013,</i>  <i>RAHA 2<sup>nd</sup> Progress Report, 2013,</i>  <i>PEACE, 2013, 1st Implementation report, Oct 2012-July 2013.</i>  <i>PEACE, 2014, 2<sup>nd</sup> Implementation report, Aug 2103-Feb 2014.</i>  <i>PEACE, 2014, 3<sup>rd</sup> Implementation report, March 2014-July 2014</i>  <i>PEACE, ROM, July 2013.</i>  <i>Interviews: MN508</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Quality of evidence: <b>Indicative but not conclusive</b></p>
I-2.4.3	<p><b>Evidence of the use of these infrastructure by local communities</b></p> <p>There are no reports in available documents as to use of the infrastructure constructed. Subject to logistics, the security situation and limited time available, field visits were not possible to organise consultations with communities and stakeholders at the local level.</p> <p>Interviews with implementing partners and officials mentioned that the RAHA project was implemented in a very challenging and complex social, political and geographic environment. Given these challenges many results could be regarded as positive. For instance, the irrigation schemes that have been set up under the programme are contributing to viable food production and improving food security for the local communities.</p> <p>Several meeting notes mention that the micro hydro-power units (developed under the PEACE programme), responded to needs identified by the communities and implemented with their active participation have been much appreciated and are used.</p> <p><i>Sources: MN 506, MN507, MN508, MN850, MN325.</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Quality of evidence: <b>Indicative but not conclusive</b></p>
I-2.4.4	<p><b>Evidence from existing evaluations, other documentations and interviews with stakeholders that living standards have improved in supported local communities (e.g. reduction in the cost of, and/or improvement of the access of local communities to the services provided by the local infrastructure and mechanisms that have been set up).</b></p> <p>There are numerous indications that the communities targeted by the projects benefitted from an improvement in their daily life: the many small infrastructure that were developed under the RAHA programmes improved, at local level, the quality of life of the population in terms of access to water, availability of energy, communications, sanitation, rehabilitated school buildings. These are non negligible benefits. The SRSP evaluation of the PEACE programme shows convincingly that the programme has achieved significant results in terms of livelihoods: “<i>Value chains,</i></p>

	<p><i>enterprises, and entrepreneurs developed and supported through the programme has started producing immediate impacts; generating net profits contributing to an improved and strengthened livelihoods in programme districts besides generating local employment.” (SRSP Assessment of EU PEACE Programme).</i></p> <p>Interviewees with mentioned a significant number of cases of women who acquired skills through the projects and were subsequently able to develop their businesses because development of improved infrastructure offered better linkages with the market.</p> <p><i>Sources: Interviews MN501; MN502; MN 201</i>  <i>SRSP: An assessment of Institutional Development of Men and Women Community Organizations under EU-SRSP PEACE Programme in Malakand Division, KP, November 2014.</i>  <i>RAHA, MTR, 2013</i>  <i>RAHA, Final Evaluation, December 2015</i></p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; background-color: #f9f9f9;"> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory.</b> Convergence of evaluations and interviews. However, the evidence cannot be qualified of strong given the impossibility, for security and logistical reasons, to complete this information with representative focus groups.</p> </div>
I-2.4.5	<p><b>Evidence from existing evaluations, other documentations and interviews with stakeholders on the importance of EU funded activities for the observed improvements</b></p> <p>There is no doubt, given the importance of the funding of the EU in these different projects, that EU contribution to their achievements has been significant. However, since all these projects are implemented by organisations (UN agencies, RSP, Provincial government) whose activities go beyond the implementations of these specific projects the interviewees do not feel they can proved any assessment of the EU contribution; they assess positively the whole programmes but without identifying responsibilities.</p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; background-color: #f9f9f9;"> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>Weak.</b></p> </div>
JC-2.5	<p><b>The EU support contributed to improve communities’ access to public services in the targeted areas</b></p> <p>The development of community based organisations and the numerous local infrastructures achieved in areas such as local roads, bridge, water and sanitation, irrigation, rehabilitation/upgrading of schools, communications, etc. implies that the access to public facilities and the services they render to the communities have been significantly improved by the supporting programmes. However, no direct evidence could be collected on possible improvement of access to disadvantaged groups to, for example, education, health, justice. There are, however, cases were reported where community mobilisation strengthened the communities to exert pressure and to voice more effectively their demands.</p>

<p>I-2.5.1</p>	<p><b>Evidence of favourable evolution of the indicators for the sector</b></p> <p>As indicated in previous indicators the rural development programmes have succeeded in setting an impressive amount of community organisations and supported the realisation of numerous local infrastructures. These infrastructures include local roads, bridges, water and sanitation, micro hydro power, irrigation, rehabilitation of local schools, etc.</p> <p>These are collective goods and therefore their improvement implies de facto a better access to public facilities. It was gathered from different meetings with officials and implementing partners that more than 7000 community organizations have been formed. Communities now have the capacity to collectively approach and ensure access to public services. However, most of the organisations are newly formed and will require more maturity to be more effective. There is no evidence on the maturity of the CBOs formed.</p> <p>Another issue is improving access to services like education, health, justice by persons who were excluded or disadvantaged in making use of these services because of their gender, social status or poverty. The evaluation could not collect direct evidence of improvement of these situations. Interviewees also mention some cases of effective community mobilisation around health and education issues. For instance, there are several examples of community pressure leading to attendance of health professionals in health care clinics and teachers in primary health schools where previously they had no access, with impunity.</p> <p>Several interviewees mentioned the importance of Local Support Organisations, both as an indicator of and as a factor contributing to effective social mobilisation. As already indicated the approach adopted by SRSP in implementing the PEACE programme involves a stronger and longer term commitment to the communities it engages with and results in more effective social mobilisation.</p> <p><i>Sources: MN501, MN201; MN502; MN505</i></p> <p style="background-color: #f4b084; padding: 5px;">Quality of evidence: <b>Indicative but not conclusive</b></p>
<p>I-2.5.2</p>	<p><b>Opinions of stakeholders (as available in existing evaluations, other documentations and interviews with stakeholders) on the evolution of the conditions of access to public services.</b></p> <p>No solid information on the evolution of the conditions could be found. However, the assessment conducted by the SRSP of the Institutional Development of Men and Women Community Organizations under EU-SRSP PEACE programme in Malakand Division indicates that the empowerment of local communities allows them to voice their needs and acquire support for: “During focus group discussions, 46% of men and women COs considered membership of Village Organization or Local Support Organization to be essential, while 54% deemed it to be useful or very useful. Amongst number of possible benefits, a large number of men and women COs expressed that networking provides an effective opportunity to</p>

	<p>undertake joint efforts to resolve local issues, reduce poverty through mobilizing resources, develop human capacity for improved livelihoods, share and create awareness and acquire necessary support for new projects.”</p> <p>Source: <i>An assessment conducted by the SRSP of the Institutional Development of Men and Women Community Organizations under EU-SRSP PEACE programme in Malakand Division</i>, Nov. 2014.</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>Weak.</b></p>
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## **Annex A6: EQ 3 - Education (non TVET)**

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## Acronyms

ADP	Annual Development Plan
AEPEAM	Academy for Educational Planning and Management
AusAID	Australian Agency for International Development
CCI	Council of Common Interests
DFID	Department for International Development
DSSP	Devolved Social Service Programme (ADB)
EFA	Education For All
EMO	Education Management Organisation
ESR	Education Sector Reform
ESRO	Education Sector Reform
GoP	Government of Pakistan
IFI	International Financing Institutions
ITC	Information Technology
IMU	Independent Monitoring Unit
KP	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MTDF	Mid-Term Development Framework
NEAS	National Education Assessment System
NEP	National Education Policy
NL	Netherlands
PEAS	Provincial Education Assessment System
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategt Paper
PSDP	Public Sector Development Programme
SAT	Standardized Assessment Test
SBS	Sector Budget Support
SEMIS	Sindh Education Management Information System
SESSP	Sindh Education Sector Support Programme
SMC	School Management Committee
STEVTA	Sindh Technical Education & Vocational Training Authority
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training
UK	United Kingdom
USAID	United States Agency for International Development



## **1. Overview of education (non TVET) context and its evolution**

### **1.1 National and/or provincial strategies and policies**

In the year 2000 world leaders from 189 nations established The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) pledging to reduce poverty, hunger, literacy, and disease with specific targets to be achieved by 2015. There are 7 broad goals, 11 targets, and 32 indicators to monitor progress in achieving the goals.<sup>1</sup> The goals, targets and indicators dealing with education are as below:

Goal 2: Achieve Universal Primary Education

Target 3: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling

Indicators

- I. Net enrolment ratio in primary education
- II. Proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who reach grade 5
- III. Literacy rate of 15-24 year olds

In addition, the Ministry of Education, Government of Pakistan has established several core education indicators. These indicators have been developed by the Policy and Planning Wing of the Ministry of Education and are reflected in all policy documents including Education for All (EFA), Education Sector Reforms (ESR) and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) of the GOP.

1. Gross Intake Rate in Primary Education
2. Net Intake Rate in Primary Education
3. Gross Enrolment Rate in Primary Education and Secondary Education
4. Net Enrolment Rate in Primary Education and Secondary Education
5. Repetition Rates by Grade in Primary Education
6. Survival Rate to Grade 5
7. Transition rate to Secondary Education
8. Drop Out Rate
9. Percentage of Trained Teachers at Primary Education
10. Pupil-Teacher Ratio at Primary Education
11. Public Expenditure on Primary Education as a Percent of Total Public Expenditure on Education
12. Gender Parity Index for Gross and Net Enrolment Rates in Primary and Secondary Education.
13. Promotion rate by grade in primary and secondary
14. Gender Parity Index for Survival Rate to Grade 5
15. Gender Parity Index for Transition rate to Secondary Education

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<sup>1</sup> MDGs and Core indicators of education ([http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/Pnadw901.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnadw901.pdf))

16. Percentage of female enrolment in Primary and Secondary Education
17. Percentage of female teachers in Primary and Secondary Education
18. Repetition Rates of girls and boys in Primary and Secondary Education

Data on several of the above 18 indicators are collected annually for all public schools in the country via a questionnaire. Each province has its own annual census data retained in a Provincial Education Management Information System.

The Medium Term Development Framework (MTDF) 2005-10 set various objectives for country's improving status of which the objective no. ii stated as "Move, in an organized and disciplined manner, towards an efficient, balanced, internationally competitive, environment friendly, and technologically driven knowledge economy for rapid and sustainable growth to become an industrialized nation in 25 years" refers to Government's priority for developing an educated society.<sup>2</sup>

Among the other features of MTDF, the strategic thrust has the following relevant features:

- i) Maximizing benefits to economy through the use of inherent potentials and strategic advantages such as inherent skills and large work force; abundant natural resources including water, land, oil, gas and mineral resources; large domestic market demand; competitive manpower; and geographical location
- ii) Facilitating the development of human capital and private sector as the engines of economic growth

The National Education Policy (NEP) 2009 remains a key guiding document for the sector even after the devolution of the subject of education to the provinces<sup>3</sup>. Although the provinces have developed their policy directions and translated them to mostly 4 year Education Sector Plans<sup>4</sup>, most of the work and inspiration is still being drawn from the NEP. Since the NEP 2009 was a document for the whole country, it remained the guide for the educational reforms in the provinces. However, over the course of time beyond devolution, development of Education Sector Plans guided the budgetary provisions and developmental priorities, which was almost the same in each province despite differences in the number and certain innovations from time to time.

In Sindh, although primary education was already compulsory formally, it was not implemented in practice until the Sindh government promulgated the Compulsory Primary Education Ordinance in December 2001. A recent EMIS survey reveals that school enrolment figures increased by 0.9 million (17 %) in those talukas (sub-districts) where the Act was enforced. However, the improvements may not only be due to the compulsory education Act but also linked to some other improvements such as, for example, the provision of free books to students<sup>5</sup>.

<sup>2</sup> MTDF 2005-10 : Overview

<sup>3</sup> Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 18<sup>th</sup> Constitutional Amendment

<sup>4</sup> Education Sector Plans (ESPs) of Sindh, Balochistan, Punjab, KPK and ICT

<sup>5</sup> NEMIS

Furthermore, the Act specifies that schools exist within 2 kilometres distance for boys and 1.5 km for girls (different in urban and rural areas). In fact, less than half of the girls' schools were located within 1 km, in contrast to 95% of boys' schools. Furthermore, the ratio of boys' to girls' schools is 5.5 to 1. This discrepancy contributes to a huge gender disparity in educational participation and attainment, which seems to have even increased in recent years.

Most literate people live in urban areas with a literacy rate of about 62% compared to 27% in rural Sindh, though in fact with a very broad range in each district. In a few districts literacy rates are at a mere 10%. This highlights the huge urban and rural discrepancy in education. The Government of Sindh and the Department of Education has specified its targets for primary education for the next few years. For example

- More than 1,800 presently closed schools shall be re-opened
- Buildings shall be provided for 5,000 currently shelter-less schools
- Net enrolments rates shall be increased from 52% to 82% by 2005, i.e. an increase by nearly 2 million
- 12,000 currently untrained teachers shall be trained by 2004
- 10,000 SMCs shall be trained by 2005

In KP, the GoKP's sector reform agenda is based on a 4- pillar concept:<sup>6</sup>

Pillar-1: Improving fiscal sustainability and effectiveness of public expenditures

Pillar-2: Improving education sector management

Pillar-3: Improving access to schooling

Pillar-4: Improving the quality of teaching

The provinces are on their way to formulate education policies applicable in their spheres. Meanwhile, the NEP 2009 has been referred to, which emphasizes the need for educational reforms addressing financing for the sector, which despite increasing, falls short of the requirements. Significant reforms include: strengthening the planning and implementation capacity of the government; improving utilization of resources by educational institutions; enhancing governance for greater accountability of education service providers to the community; capacity building of district and local level institutions; and strengthening the role of communities through school committees<sup>7</sup>.

Table 1 provides an overview of selected basic education sector indicators and their evolution during the evaluation period for Pakistan and the provinces Sindh and KP, broken down by gender, and, when data are available, compared to middle income countries aggregate data.

<sup>6</sup> PEU, Evaluation Mission report – 20-07-2012, p.1

<sup>7</sup> Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance,, PRSP-II, p.10

It permits to highlight the following points:

- For all indicators for which a comparison with the group of middle income countries is available Pakistan is far below the group, revealing the importance of improving the offer of education services and its quality.
- All indicators, at federal and provincial level, reveal an important gender bias, significantly more important than in the overall group of middle income countries.
- The comparison of the data at both ends of the evaluation period shows that some progresses have been achieved but they have been modest and were unequal across the two provinces. There is a small improvement in the country and in the two provinces of the share of the population that has completed primary education level of higher and the improvement is slightly better for female than for male. The gross and net enrolment ratios have improved for male and female in KP, but they have deteriorated in Sindh. Literacy rates have slightly improved in the country, but remain largely inferior to those of the middle income group, and they have deteriorated from male Sindh.

Table 1: Basic education indicators

	2007-2008			2013-2014			Source
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	
<b>Population that has completed primary level or higher</b>							
Pakistan	58	37	47	58	40	49	(1)
Sindh	60	36	49	60	46	53	(1)
KP	54	24	38	59	28	42	(1)
<b>Primary Gross Enrolment Ratio (Class 1-5, Age 5-9)</b>							
Pakistan	97	83	91	98	81	90	(1)
Sindh	87	72	80	85	67	76	(1)
KP	94	71	83	102	76	89	(1)
<i>Middle income countries</i>	<i>111.6</i>	<i>108.5</i>	<i>110.1</i>	<i>110.7</i>	<i>108.7</i>	<i>109.7</i>	(2)
<b>Primary Net Enrolment Ratio (Class 1-5, Age 5-9)</b>							
Pakistan	59	52	55	60	53	57	(1)
Sindh	55	46	51	53	43	48	(1)
KP	55	41	49	62	46	54	(1)
<i>Middle income countries</i>	<i>90.5</i>	<i>88.5</i>	<i>89.5</i>	<i>90.2</i>	<i>89.2</i>	<i>89.7</i>	(2)
<b>Gross enrolment rate at the middle level (age 11-13)</b>							
Pakistan	66	54	60	66	52	59	(1)
Sindh	63	45	54	57	45	51	(1)
KP	72	42	57	81	49	65	(1)
<b>Net enrolment rate at the middle level (age 11-13)</b>							
Pakistan	35	30	33	38	32	35	(1)
Sindh	37	28	33	32	26	29	(1)
KP	36	22	29	46	27	37	(1)
<b>% of children 10-18 years old that left school before completing primary level</b>							
Pakistan	9	10	9	8	9	8	(1)
Sindh	6	7	7	7	6	7	(1)
KP	8	16	11	8	11	9	(1)
<b>Literacy rate. Population 10 years and older</b>							
Pakistan	66	44	56	70	47	58	(1)
Sindh	69	42	56	67	43	56	(1)
KP	68	33	49	72	36	53	(1)
<i>Middle income countries</i>	<i>88.1</i>	<i>78.7</i>	<i>83.4</i>	<i>88.1</i>	<i>78.7</i>	<i>83.4</i>	(2)
<b>Expenditure on education in % of total government expenditure</b>							
Pakistan			14.1			11.6	(2)

Sources: (1) Pakistan Social & Living Standards Measurement Survey (PSLM) 2007-2008 and 2013-2014  
(2) World Bank, database: Education Statistics

Legend:  Data show an improvement  
 Data show a deterioration

## 1.2 Institutional context

Primary, middle and secondary education have been devolved to the provinces under the 18<sup>th</sup> Amendment to the Constitution and are now the responsibility of the district governments.

The Preamble to the 18th amendment states that: “Whereas it is expedient further to amend the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the purposes hereinafter appearing; and whereas the people of Pakistan have relentlessly struggled for democracy and for attaining the ideals of a Federal, Islamic, democratic, parliamentary and modern progressive welfare State, wherein the rights of the citizens are secured and the Provinces have equitable share in the Federation.” It is presumed that the authors of the 18th amendment after deep and thoughtful meditation had arrived at the consensus that a modern progressive welfare state (Pakistan) will be achieved through devolution of curriculum, syllabus, standards of education and Islamic education on the four federating units. According to Dr. Ishrat Hussain, former Governor of the State Bank, “the reasons for Pakistan’s low educational status are varied but one important factor is that Pakistan’s educational system is highly fragmented and segmented.

The government maintains a system of segregated schools for boys and girls although schools are allowed to enrol students of the opposite sex.

The parents have the choice to send their children either to a madrassah or to an English Medium primary school or Urdu medium primary school. The English medium schools are further divided into ‘elite’ schools and ‘non-elite’ schools. Most English medium schools are in the private and not-for-profit sector while the majority of the Urdu medium schools are run by the Government. The latter were provided education to about 73 percent of the total primary school enrolment in 2000. This fragmentation does not end at the primary level but persists throughout the education cycle and spills over into the labor market as well.

In Pakistan, there are 146,185 formal primary, 42,147 middle level (Lower Secondary) and 29,874 secondary schools; 75% are public sector schools; 10% private sector schools and the remaining almost equally divided between non-formal basic education schools and 'Deeni Madrassas.

Government teachers are moderately well paid within the context of Pakistan and generally earn more than private teachers. The teacher profession is highly politicised particularly at district and local level due to strong teacher unions that are often linked to political parties.

Pakistan is among the countries that will not meet the United Nations education-related millennium development goals by the scheduled date, 2015. About 25 million children are still denied the right to education. In rural Pakistan, only 1 girl in 3 attends a school and 2 out of 3 Pakistanis between the ages of 6 and 16 are illiterate. Literacy levels among young people are low, with 31 % of men and 41% of women aged 15 to 24 years unable to read or write. With these numbers Pakistan ranks 112 out of 139 in terms of gender equality. Less than 1.5 % of the Gross Domestic Product in 2010 was spent on Education. In 2006,

it was 2.5 %. According to international estimates, it should be at least 4 %. The low level of school participation cannot be explained by poverty. Other nations in the region, most notably India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, have higher rates despite worse economic conditions. Defence spending and internal security top the government budget. The issue is both political and policy-related. Since the founding of the state in 1947, Pakistan has had 10 educational reforms, but none of these have turned the budget situation around. This state of affairs explains a massive shift of children to private schools (about 30 % of children study in private institutions) and to madrassa schools (about 6 % study at Quran schools).

The children of upper-middle classes, residing in urban localities, mostly attend high cost private schools, offering foreign curricula and international examination systems and are staffed with qualified and trained teachers, well-equipped classrooms, all essential facilities of good quality, and imported teaching-learning materials. In addition to the public and private schools, there is another stream of 'Deeni Madrassas'(Religious Schools) offering free religious education with free boarding and lodging. These Madrassas are usually managed by local communities and are financed through charity and donations. These parallel systems of education in Pakistan have perpetuated inequalities and economic stratifications, and are root cause for behavioral divisions and social conflict in the society.

Private schooling, particularly at the primary level has become increasingly more important in education in Pakistan both in absolute terms and relative to public schooling. It is generally agreed that the main reasons for parents to send their children to non-government schools is the perceived better quality of education, their successfulness in the pass rate for (entrance) exams to a higher level of education, and also the perceived increase in status for parents with children studying at private schools. While the coverage of private schools is much higher in the urban areas the rural urban gap has become smaller over the past years. Contrary to perceptions, private schools are not merely an urban elite phenomenon. Not only have they become more prevalent in rural areas, but private schools are also affordable to middle and even low income groups. This is made possible because of low teacher salaries. Nevertheless, the majority of the children residing mainly in rural and semi-urban areas and belonging to the low income families, attend public schools which offer free education but are characterized by poor quality of education due to lack of physical facilities, shortage or absence of teachers, and non-availability of suitable learning materials.

Before the 18<sup>th</sup> Amendment, the departments of education and literacy were responsible for implementing the NEP and structuring their resources and services according to that. The curriculum was centralized and the governance was also at federal level. The targets were set at national level and achieved through departments in provinces; from primary to higher education, all were centralized. But since education was a provincial subject as per the Council of Common Interests (CCI), the administrative affairs were looked after at provincial level. It was the responsibility of provinces to ensure quality efforts and outputs.

The 18<sup>th</sup> amendment to the constitution has empowered the provinces to plan and implement the interventions within their resources. However, the federal government still has the authority in terms of managing higher education, international funding/donor liaison, etc. The structure of organisation is fairly similar in every province; the departments

of education manage all the streams including primary, elementary, secondary and higher secondary education. Teacher training, curriculum development, textbook development, academic monitoring and data collection are also their responsibility.

In the wake of the 18<sup>th</sup> Amendment (April 2010), education is now a provincial subject with province enjoying greater autonomy in education policy making and implementation. All province have a minister of education and education directors (bureau of curriculum, textbook board, reform support unit and provincial institute for teacher education PITE).

At the district level, there are Districts Education Officers/departments that are responsible for monitoring and supervision of schools, coordination of the entire sub-sector of education, formulation of the district annual plan and its implementation and collection and compilation of education data. The district education departments also monitor development projects, support the strengthening of the Education Management Information system, conduct standards examinations up to the middle level and transfer teachers. The power to create and abolish teaching and non-teaching positions lies with the provincial government therefore the district government is unable to meet a school's demand for additional teacher. This situation has often led to the situation where several schools are under-staffed in rural areas. The financing is done at provincial level, with projects based on needs and added in Public Sector Development Programs (PSDP) through the Annual Development Plan (ADP).

While PFM at provincial level is characterised by low efficiency, funding remains insufficient particularly for current non-salary operational and development expenditures. The education budget represents often more than 20% of the provincial budget due to an important payroll which limits the sector fiscal space for current and investment expenditures.

The above context implies that EU intervention, to be meaningful and efficient, should focus on the provincial and district levels and focus on the need to increase fiscal space for key current and development expenditure programmes that are at the core of quality schooling and improvement of access.

The share of education in Current Revenue Expenditure is 28.65% or Rs. 144.67 billion including medical and technical education expenses. This figure is an increase of 7.6%, up from Rs.134.37 billion in 2014-15. Grants for universities and educational institutions are included in the Rs. 145 billion and are proposed to be Rs.6.12 billion. For the coming fiscal year the volume of Annual Development Plan (ADP) funds for education has increased to Rs. 13.2 billion, including Rs. 2 billion for boards and universities, 1 billion for *Sindh Technical Education and Vocational Training Authority* (STEVTA) and Rs.200 million for special education. This is up from the education sector ADP of Rs. 10.71 billion in FY 2014-15. The Sindh government has also set aside Rs.2.616 billion for education development programs being run in collaboration with foreign investments and organizations. These include Rs.2.113 billion for the Sindh Basic Education Program with USAID and Rs.0.5 billion to upgrade Primary Schools into Elementary Schools in Rural Sindh with JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency).



The Sindh Education Sector Plan 2014-18 will cost Rs.940 billion. The new policies will focus on increasing access to quality education with a focus on marginalized segments of society and girls, increasing enrolment and retention rates, ensuring merit based recruitment and capacity building and strengthening governance and service delivery. In addition to the Adopt a School Intervention to increase participation rates in government schools at various levels, the government will distribute Rs. 200 million to Education Management Organization (EMOs), with proven track record, to subsidize operational costs and a pilot project will start in collaboration with the Sindh Basic Education Program and USAID support, which is expected to benefit more than 200,000 children<sup>8</sup>.

In KP, a record amount of 111 billion rupees has been allocated for education sector showing 33% increase as compared to the previous fiscal year. Welfare and administrative budget for elementary and secondary education (including provincial and district level budget) is Rs.88 billion against the previous years' Rs.73 billion, an increase of 20.5%. The allocation (provincial and district level) for higher education been increased by 28.5%, from Rs.7 billion (budget estimates of 2014-15) to Rs.9 billion.

The development budget for elementary and secondary education in KP is Rs.15 billion, while for higher education, Rs.6 billion have been earmarked. Analysis shows that a major part (around 89%) of this current budget is unavoidably spent in paying salaries. Out of the non-salary budget, 47% will be directed towards provision of missing facilities 12% is budgeted for trainings. Out of the funds allocated to Elementary and Secondary Education, it is seen that the highest amount of funds are apportioned to Secondary Education (42.9%), followed by Primary Education (39.9%).

It is difficult to assess the effective fiscal space provided by EU interventions at a time provinces have benefited from increased federal transfers under the 7<sup>th</sup> National Finance Commission Award while facing absorptive capacity problems and low level of non-salary budget execution. Pakistan's education expenditure as percentage of GDP has progressively increased from 1.9% in 2011/12 to 2.4% in 2014/15 and the size of provincial education budget has increased consistently over the same period (e.g. + 50% in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). Nevertheless the capacities of provinces to execute their education budget has been and remain severely constrained by weak capacities and inefficient PFM procedures as well as low budget credibility due to regular within-year budget adjustments by the executives. In addition, the share of salaries approaching 80% of total education sector expenditures in Sindh and KP provinces has considerably limited the margin of manoeuvre in terms of fiscal space for non-salary current and development expenditures at provincial level.

In the province of Sindh, the non-salary current and development education expenditure allocations budgeted for the fiscal years 2012/13 and 2013/14 were finally executed at 44% and 41% respectively. These levels of budget execution were even weaker when considering the sole primary and secondary education sub-sectors. By comparison, EU BS annual disbursement in the Sindh province during 2013/14 were less than Rs 1 billion

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<sup>8</sup> Education Budgets : Sindh Budget 2015-16 (<http://data.org.pk/blog/education-budgets-sindh-budget-2015-16>)

compare to a total annual budget allocation of Rs 40 billion and effective annual expenditures (budget execution) of Rs 24 billion in these two subsectors.

### 1.3 Strategies of relevant development partners in the sector

The EU support to Pakistan's educational development has been designed within a continued dialogue at the federal and provincial levels to mobilise political support to allocate additional resources to human development and improved sector planning. Major objectives include enhancing education indicators for achieving the MDGs, strengthening the public education system, persuading the government to continue reforms of *madrassas*, enhancing the overall productivity of the work force and building up the capacity of civil society.<sup>9</sup> This approach has involved supporting improvements in governance at district and provincial levels, for instance on budget processes. Partnerships with other donors including IFIs (DFID, World Bank, AusAid, GIZ), has been reinforced. The outcome of the National Education Policy Review process has further informed the fine tuning of the proposed intervention strategy in the education sector.

In Sindh and KP the EU is working within the multi-donor sector approach (cf. above) that led to common or harmonised performance assessment framework of intervention as well as joint mission and evaluation. This approach is meant to become a model for other provinces. It helps to build up institutional capacity at the provincial and district levels and addresses concerns over the efficiency of expenditure in the education sector and absorption capacity. The ultimate aim is to provide quality education services, levels of learning, improve teacher performance and facilitate access to better quality schools, especially for girls and socially disadvantaged groups.

In KP, the EU's sector budget support aims to contribute to the Government's policy reforms, the overall objective of which is "Accelerating Human Development by Improving Delivery of Education Services". The KP-ESRP supports the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in implementing the reforms outlined under the mutually supportive pillars of its Provincial Education Sector Plan.

- i. ***Accelerating human development*** through improving access, equity, quality and governance of the education system.
- ii. ***Improving fiscal stability and public expenditure management***, through improving: (a) macroeconomic stability, (b) fiscal sustainability of the reforms, and (c) better planning and monitoring of public expenditures.
- iii. ***Strengthening governance*** through improving: (a) public financial management and accountability, (b) transparency and accountability in public procurement, and (c) obtaining reliable and timely human resource data for planning, budget

<sup>9</sup> CSP 2007-13, Focal Area 2: Education and Human Resources Development, p.21

preparation and control of establishment expenditure, and to monitor compliance with legal and policy stipulations.

**While the emphasis has remained on supporting basic education, the EU, in line with stated government priorities, has also looked into the needs in other areas of education.** According to allocation and expenditure, priorities and focus, it seems that too little is being done for middle, secondary and vocational education, especially with a view to providing better qualifications for job entrants in response to the challenge of providing employable skills for Pakistan's economy, as identified in the PRSP and Mid Term Development Framework (MTDF). Provision of quality higher education is another area where Pakistan is striving for improvements to which the EU can contribute.

The EU strategy in tertiary education focused on enhancing international cooperation capacity of universities by facilitating transfer of know-how and good practices in the field of student and academic staff mobility. The main tool was the regional Asia Erasmus Mundus programme<sup>10</sup>, a mobility scheme between European universities holding an Erasmus Charter and third country universities to complement existing programmes in the field of higher education. The types of mobility funded are masters, doctorate and post-doctorate opportunities for students and exchanges for the purposes of teaching, practical training and research for academic staff.

In the context of 18<sup>th</sup> amendment in the constitution, EU's choice to work with provincial governments brought more visibility on the ground and improved accessibility.

#### **1.4 EU interventions in the sector (with distinction of activities of the European Commission and those of the member states).**

The main EU support to the sector (excluding TVET analysed under EQ 4) has been provided through 4 BS programmes:

- SEPS SP Sind Education Plan Support Programme  
Period of implementation: 2007-2011  
Total cost: € 114 m. EU contribution: € 39 m.  
Implementation: BS at provincial level  
Other contributing donors: ADB (DSSP) €45m
- SESSP Sind Education Sector Support Programme  
Period of implementation: 2012-2017  
Total cost: € 30 m. EU contribution: € 30 m.  
Implementation/modalities: SBS at provincial level. Others donors: WB
- KP-ESRP Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Education Sector Reform Program  
Period of implementation: 2009/10-2012/13  
Total cost: approx € 203 m. EU contribution: € 35 m.  
Implementation/Modalities: SBS  
Other contributing donors: NL €40m, UK €94.5m, AusAid €28.3m, Germany €5.5m
- KP-ESPSP Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Education Sector Plan Support Program  
Period of implementation: 2014/15-2017/18

<sup>10</sup> CSP 2007-13, Focal Area 2: Education and Human Resources Development, p.22

Total cost: approx € 40 m. EU contribution: € 40 m. So far there are no contracts under this programme.

Implementation/Modalities: SBS

Other EU support:

- A few smaller projects for a 2011 study (€0.11m) on the quality of education in KP, for the improvement of a website.
- A €15m PFM support programme, targeted partly to the federal level, partly to the province of Sindh is not a support to the education sector as such but is important to improve the financial management of the sector.
- The regional programme Erasmus Mundus to promote individual mobility of students, professors and researchers. The programme is based on calls for proposals and funds courses and partnerships that involve several countries. Over the period of the evaluation the programme has allocated about €36.7m to Pakistan and a least three other countries for each contract<sup>11</sup>.

DFID has numerous interventions in Pakistan's Education sector and is a key player in education in Sindh and KP. In KP, DFID ensured the lead for policy dialogue and cooperation on PFM including specific education PFM.

## 2. Findings per JCs and Indicators

<b>EQ3</b>	<b>To what extent has the EU support to the education sector (non TVET) contributed to improve service delivery, quality and equitable access to education in the provinces Sindh and KP?</b>
<b>JC-3.1</b>	<b>The identification of the interventions has been based on an analysis of the needs and challenges and an alignment on the government policies.</b>
<p>At a strategic level, the EU Country Strategy Paper covering the evaluation period provide an analysis of needs and challenges faced in the education sector in Pakistan. It moreover provides a reasonable rationale for the selection of intervention areas. The identification and formulation process of the first Sector BS Programme have required extensive analysis of key sector challenges with regards to the country commitments towards MDG and Education For All. It has also provided an analysis of the policy, institutional and financial environment of the education sector at provincial level in order to prepare sector wide approaches. The choice of BS modality was justified by a dynamic and pragmatic approach with regards to the eligibility criteria assessment for sector policy support programmes and to the need to promoting alignment and coordination in the sector as well as support to emerging provincial education sector plan.</p> <p>The choice of the Sindh and NWFP (future KP) provinces derived from a mix of considerations related to the political and socio economic situation of these two provinces prone to fragility and crisis situations, the opportunity to capitalise, complement and build</p>	

<sup>11</sup> As mentioned in the Evaluation of EU's Regional Cooperation with Asia (March 2014) " the financial information in CRIS for Erasmus Mundus interventions could not been used for the inventory, as these interventions are implemented by the Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA) under an indirect, centralised management. Thus, for these specific interventions the inventory used the data provided by key informants from DG DEVCO and EACEA"

on existing donors interventions in the education sector or in related public policy and financial governance areas. At the same time the implications of the progressive devolution process and the transfer of education responsibilities to the provinces, while adding to the complexity and risks associated with support to the country education policy process, have provided an important entry point for the EU to engage into sector policy dialogue with provincial authorities.

This dialogue focused on how supporting the revision of provincial Education Sector Plans, the design of their sector reform agenda and the improvement of the education sector management. In this regards, the proposal for BS modality coupled with frontloaded capacity development and technical assistance components was design to influence policy and budget framework in order to support required reform agenda in the right directions.

According to the characteristics of BS modality, the EU has designed its programmes with a strong focus on strengthening the policy making process and the institutional capacities in the sector. The proposed comprehensive performance assessment framework of the EU programmes have also attempted to capture the outcome of the EU policy dialogue with the provincial authorities and the donors' community on the required improvement in human resource, public financial management and governance in the sector but also in the access to quality schooling, quality of teaching and student learning. As an example, the identification and formulation process of the SBS in Sindh and NFWP have provided an entry point to assist the provincial governments in starting a reform and streamlining process of its school consolidation and teacher recruitment policy. The design process of the follow-up BS programme in the two provinces was aligned on the 2012 revised EC BS guidelines. It has capitalised on the lessons learnt from the first programmes and intended to support the reform process launched by the provincial authorities in order to consolidate the achievements while progressively moving from process to output-orientated objectives.

I-3.1.1	<p><b>Existence of underlying analyses to identify which and whose needs to address and the regions of intervention, including with relation to gender and other social barriers to accessing education</b></p> <p>The EU CSP 2007-2013 provided related analysis that underlined slow progress in social development and insufficient priority given to education and investment in human capital and skills. Improvement in these areas is considered among the key challenges for the country's democratic, social and economic development. The CSP has stressed that the national education sector reform and the Education for All action plans while being at the core of the PRSP and the National Education Sector Policy were not properly implemented due to insufficient investment, weak institutional capacities and low efficiency &amp; quality of public spending and public service delivery at provincial and districts levels.</p> <p>This EU strategic analysis also acknowledged that provincial programmes that accounted for the bulk of the country education expenditure deserved more attention. Weaknesses were identified particularly with regards to the lack of resources, weak human resource management (teacher recruitment, deployment and training policies...), low level of needs of access to basic, primary and secondary education (poverty, geographic and gender-related dimensions) and</p>
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poor public financial governance in the whole sector.

When reviewing the available documentation, the identification/formulation phases of the first BS interventions in the sector (Sindh first then KP, former NWFP) have been a long process reflecting the need to mobilize identification missions to further deepen the analysis of key challenges in the sector, develop a policy dialogue with the concerned authorities (at federal and provincial level) and discuss coordination with other donors involved in the provinces and/or the education sector.

The programmes' formulation process and the related analyses and policy dialogue have aimed at promoting the development of a multi-donor sector approach at provincial level and assessing the feasibility of the most appropriate financing options to support a sector policy support programme in the education.

While focusing on assisting the provincial authorities to promote better access, quality of service delivery, good governance and management capacity in the education sector, the Commission decided to design its development intervention through sector wide approach and sector policy support in order to strengthen the capacities of provincial governments in the sector and assist them in the design, and development of their education policy reforms and sector plans.

According to the documentation and interviews with representatives from DEVCO Geographical Directorate, the EC and particularly the Delegation adopted a more focused geographical approach during the formulation, targeting sector interventions at provincial rather than federal level in order to make a difference and ensure leverage. The rationale came also from the on-going devolution process of education sector policy responsibilities towards the provinces. This devolution process was further strengthened through the 18<sup>th</sup> amendment passed in April 2010 devolving political, administrative and fiscal authority from the central government to the provinces including the responsibility of education policy development. (cf. Annex A3).

The choice of region for intervention derived not only from previous involvement of the EC in the concerned provinces as well as socio-economic criteria (poor provinces, critical situation with regards to school attendance indicators, net enrolment rate, low access for girls and children from poor families...). Political considerations (regions prone to crisis, fragility, militancy and natural disasters implying negative impact on the education provincial infrastructure and services delivery) were also determinant as well as the will to complement and build on existing donors' interventions related to provisions of budget support loans and/or PFM/policy reform support programmes (world bank, ADB, DFID).

The full-fledged education sector approach was still in the making at the time of the formulation. Moreover, the evolving local political and administrative situation at the time of the formulation process (ongoing devolution process and

	<p>corresponding transfer of powers and responsibility from the federal to province and district levels) have also contributed to make the identification and formulation process of the first BS operations a lengthy process (e.g. starting in 2004 in the case of Sindh province before the finalization of a financing agreement in 2007). Several requests from DEVCO HQ were made to improve the design of the BS programmes focusing on the prerequisites for a genuine sector policy support programme, asking for further analysis of the BS/SWAP eligibility criteria, strengthened policy dialogue and coordination framework. Issues related to weak policy and institutional capacities in the two provinces, including the specific fragility and security situation in KP, were explicitly acknowledged during identification/formulation and have further added to the complexity of the formulation process. Consequently; discussions have also focused on the design of technical assistance/capacity development components to be attached to the EU interventions.</p> <p><b>Sources:</b> The EU CSP 2007-2013, EU Identification and Action Fiches, complementary documents (eligibility criteria assessment), QSG checklists meeting notes MN 850</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Quality of evidence: <b>strong.</b></p>
I-3.1.2	<p><b>Evidence of thorough analysis of the partner' sector policy in the area of intervention (particularly in the case of BS; verification of the relevance and credibility of the supported policy)</b></p> <p>Based on the documentation of the identification and formulation process of the first two sector BS programmes in Sindh and KP, it appears that at the time of the process, budget support became the preferred aid modality particularly for sector policy support programmes.</p> <p>In the case of NWFP/KP, the analysis of the eligibility criteria was provided using the 7 areas of assessment pertaining to EC Guidelines on support to sector programmes (Macroeconomic situation, sector policy &amp; overall strategic framework, MTEF, accountability and PFM systems, donors coordination, performance monitoring framework and institutional capacities).</p> <p>While acknowledged existing weaknesses it favored a dynamic approach to allow the approval of BS programmes taking into account ongoing provincial reforms process in the education sector (revision of the national education policy and preparation of education sector reform plans in KP and Sindh) as well as efforts supported by donors (e.g. WB Development Policy Credits, PIFRA project, DFID provincial reform programme) in the areas of PFM (integrated financial information management system, development of Medium Term Expenditure Framework in the provinces, output-base budgeting, adoption of comprehensive PFM reform...). References were also provided to the outcome of the 2007 PEFA in NWFP that was in its final completion stage at the time of the</p>

formulation process.

A pragmatic and dynamic approach was followed to design related capacity development interventions attached to these Sector budget support programmes with planned frontloaded implementation to assist the provincial government in key areas to achieve progress in the fulfillment of the BS eligibility criteria. In KP, capacity building support was expected to be managed by the World Bank through a Trust Fund (multi-donor) arrangement with a central focus on financed activities to support the education sector reform program of the province.

The analysis of the sector policy eligibility criteria for the NWFP/KP province underlined the key strength and weaknesses to be addressed in the sector policy area. The analysis attempted to assess the relevance and credibility of the provincial education sector reform programme of the provincial government. As an example, the NWFP's government education sector reform programme was assessed as a programme aimed at improving access and quality of education in line with the MDG objectives. It provided with the introduction of a range of policy initiatives to expand school enrolment and attendance, especially among girl: provision of tuition free education and free textbooks, implementation of a phased programme to reduce supply side constraints, especially for children in rural areas, by increasing essential school facilities such as classrooms, sanitation, water, and boundary walls for security; increasing the number of primary school teachers; and seeking to promote private-public partnerships in education to enhance access....

The eligibility criteria assessment also underlined that in line with the federal Education Sector Reforms (ESR), efforts were under way to mainstream Madrassa schools in the Province, providing incentives for registration. The assessment also provided with the main trends of the MTEF for the sector underlying that provincial expenditures for the education sector were burdened with structural rigidities (rapidly growing salary, pensions and debt servicing obligations) that constrained resources for development, operation and maintenance of education provincial infrastructure and public services.

Similar analysis were provided for the formulation of the first sector BS programme in the Sindh province.

Policy dialogue with federal and provincial authorities on the conditions to provide BS in the context of these education policy support programme has been developed during the whole identification and formulation process. In addition to the discussions surrounding the SWAP/BS eligibility criteria and the ownership of the provincial government of their education sector reform programmes and plans, a key issue concerned the negotiations on the design of the transfer modalities of BS funds to the provinces in order to ensure that BS funds while transiting through the Federal treasury account would be fully transferred to the provincial treasury account to ensure full additionality of BS on top of intergovernmental transfers under the National Finance Commission pool fund



allocation system (cf. Annexe XXX). The fungibility principle was however preserved at the level of the provincial treasury account.

The eligibility criteria analysis on sector public policy, was further streamlined and strengthened during the identification/formulation process of the second education BS programmes in Sindh and in KP in line with the revised 2012 EU BS Guidelines.

These analysis have also been able to capitalise on an improved knowledge and policy dialogue developed during the implementation of the first BS programmes. At that time the provincial authorities had also achieved progress in the definition and design of their education sector plan considered in the case of KP as a “medium-term development plan for sector development” and set up Reform Support Unit under the department of Education.

Policy dialogue was further streamlined through the set up of specific coordination structures between the provincial government and the donors in the sector such as the Education Partnership on Sector Budget Support in KP or the Local Education Group in Sindh (and their associated joint sector reviews) that intended to provide a policy and coordination forum for the provincial government to engage with development partners on education and related governance issues.

Analysis has however underlined numerous persistent weaknesses e.g.: the human resource management (recruitment, deployment and training of teachers...), the major disconnect between education expenditures and the policy priorities set out by the provincial authorities, the unevenness of budget allocation between primary and secondary education, the modest or weak improvement in enrollment rates, literacy indicators and overall student performance, the failure to move away from incremental budget making towards output based budgeting, the delay in developing district strategic plans as well as the weakness of the monitoring and evaluation framework for the education sector policy. The eligibility criteria assessment was supported by several studies and assessment carried out with the support of the EU, other donors and centers/institutes (education budget analysis, analysis of public financing of education in the two provinces, public expenditure reviews...).

Regarding the formulation of the second Education sector Policy in Sindh in 2013, the QSG process acknowledged that “the Action Fiche and the relevant supporting documents (eligibility criteria assessments) identified the gaps and weaknesses and explain how these challenges were envisioned to be tackled”. Reserves were however made by the education thematic department of DEVCO to further develop the conditions for a meaningful policy dialogue between the EU, the others donors involved and the provincial authorities on the quality of education public services.

During the formulation process, discussions have also often focus on the

	<p>weaknesses observed at the macroeconomic stability situation of the country (essentially the fiscal risks at federal level with key weaknesses in debt management and tax policy and the overall weak achievement in PFM reforms at provincial and districts levels) that could impact the provinces due to their high reliance on intergovernmental transfers and weak PFM capacities.</p> <p>Sources: MN 850, Identification and Action Fiches of SBS programmes, QSG, Eu internal documents.</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>strong</b>.</p>
I-3.1.3	<p><b>References to these analyses in the programming documents.</b></p> <p>Each Action Fiches have taken on board these analysis and the design of the programmes has essentially aimed to propose actions to address the observed weaknesses of the education sector policy and reform process in the provinces with specific focus on improving the education system in terms of institutional and technical capacities, access, governance and PFM, quality and learning outcomes. The policy dialogues leading to the finalisation of Financing Agreements have also aimed at putting at the core of the programme's performance assessment framework measures and indicators addressing the key sector weaknesses revealed by these analysis. This approach led to a strong process dimensions of this sector BS programmes (improvement of policy design and implementation, institutional strengthening, governance and PFM...) while aiming at medium term result-orientated objectives (quality, access and equity of education public service delivery).</p> <p>These analysis of the education sector have also been helpful in informing the design of the technical assistance/capacity development component attached to the sector BS programmes in the two provinces.</p> <p>The conclusions of the mid-term review of the CSP 2007-2013 and the preparation of the MIP 2011-2013 have also capitalised on these analysis and build on the lessons learnt during the first phase of implementation of these BS programmes. The programming document provided with a specific annex (n°8) of provide on a report on budget support operations where an analysis on the evolution of the eligibility criteria on sector policy and strategy including the national and provincial education policies of the Sindh and NWFP provinces that draw on the above mentioned analysis.</p> <p>The recent EU Pakistan MIP 2014-2020 has also made reference to the Risk management framework developed during the formulation of the second SBS in the Sindh and KP provinces in line with the revised 2012 EU BS guidelines. This RMF largely build on the eligibility criteria provided during the formulation process of the latest SBS programmes especially concerning the education sector policy and the PFM. These analysis and the information deriving from the policy dialogue under these BS programmes have also obviously feed the narrative</p>

	<p>included in the paragraphs dealing with the Government's financial and policy commitment in the education sector as well as the donor's coordination and policy dialogue (pp 12-14).</p> <p>Sources: Action Fiches, QSG meeting minutes, MN 850, EU CSP 2007-2013, EU MIP 2014-20120</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>strong</b>.</p>
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I-3.1.4	<p><b>Documents, minutes and meetings, demonstrating the existence of a policy dialogue with the government and the alignment on its policies</b></p> <p>Based on the documentation available at the time of the identification and formulation of these BS programmes and on interviews with representatives from DEVCO HQ, policy dialogue has been an important input and was instrumental in presenting to the federal and provincial authorities the objectives and operational modalities of these programmes as well as for preparing the design of the programmes especially the general and specific conditions for the release of the BS instalments (including the transfer modalities of BS funds to the provincial treasury accounts) and the capacity development components .</p> <p>In terms of alignment, the EU policy dialogue has focused on supporting and accompanying the revision by the national authorities of the national education policy and the design of the education sector plans and reform programmes by the provincial authorities. This dialogue occurred in the framework of Pakistan's international commitments to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the Dakar Framework of Action for Education for All (EFA) as well as the devolution process to the provinces of education sector policy institutional, financial and operational responsibilities mentioned above.</p> <p>Policy dialogue has also been instrumental through discussions between federal/provincial authorities and the donors' community to promoting a sector wide approach in education in the provinces and developing common policy matrix and complementary capacity development/technical assistance supports in the context of sector policy support programmes.</p> <p>The Action fiches and QSG check list while translating the awareness of the challenges and limits of this process have also acknowledged the development of genuine a sector policy dialogue.</p> <p>The conclusions of the Mid Term Review of the CSP 2007-2013 have acknowledged this. The review has recognised that an important achievement of the policy dialogue during the formulation process of the EU Education Sector Budget Support Programme for NWFP was the dialogue process that has promoted the finalisation by the provincial government of its Education Sector Plan and the agreements among all donors to work in line with this new provincial sector reform plan and to further strengthen coordination.</p> <p>Policy dialogue during the formulation stages of the first SBS programmes has then focused on the development and ownership by provincial governments of their sector education and reform plans based on the revision process of the National Education Policy (2008/2009). This has provided an entry point for the EU and the others donors to assist the provincial government in streamlining their sector policy, address the main weaknesses (e.g. human resource management, PFM...) and promote the progressive development of policy monitoring and evaluation framework.</p>
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	<p>As mentioned in the mid-term review, the policy dialogue at provincial level for the two BS education sector programme is captured by the respective policy matrix indicators of these programmes that related to four key pillars: 1) fiscal sustainability, effectiveness of public expenditures and adherence to the agreed fiduciary and PMF standards, 2) improvement of the education sector management, 3) improvement of access to quality schooling and 4) improvement of the quality of teaching and student learning.</p> <p>Main discussions with DEVCO thematic units (BS/macroeconomic, education) during the formulation process have often raised the need to strengthen the policy dialogue on macroeconomic policy and tax policy at federal and provincial level. This issue is linked to the fiscal sustainability dimension of the provincial public policies in the context of heavy reliance on federal transfers and narrow provincial tax basis.</p> <p>Documentation available concerns: various mission reports, aide memoire and minutes of joint donors missions, fact finding or back-up support missions from EU DEVCO HQ, minutes of meetings with provincial authorities to discuss external support to the preparation and implementation of education sector policy and plan, mapping of proposed donor support for the sector at provincial level, discussions on modality of interventions and ideas for joint donor/government collaboration. Each formulation process has led to extensive discussions with the main provincial Education government departments as well as representatives' from the federal authorities (Finance, Economic Affairs Division, and Education). It was not possible to verify whether policy dialogue for the lower tiers of the provinces (districts) occurred during the BS programme's formulation stage. Preparation of technical assistance/capacity building components has however allowed a technical policy dialogue in each province at the stage of the formulation.</p> <p><b>Sources:</b> MN 821, MN 822, MN 826, MN 850, MN 313, mid-term review of the CSP, EU internal documents, ROM, BS Evaluation Reports).</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Quality of evidence: <b>satisfactory</b></p>
I-3.1.5	<p><b>Opinions of stakeholders (national and provincial authorities, EU staff, beneficiaries, other donors....) on the appropriateness of the intervention to the needs and the contextual challenges.</b></p> <p>According to interviews with the EU staff, donors and provincial authorities, as well as analysis of documentation, EU interventions in the education sector together with other donors' programmes have been instrumental in assisting provincial governments to design relevant education policy framework in the context of the devolution process and the province new sectoral responsibilities. These interventions are considered as highly appropriate given the development challenges in the concerned provinces (low levels of literacy and school enrolment including for girls, weak institutional capacities at provincial and district level in the area of policy planning and public finance management...). The mix and</p>

sequencing of institutional capacity building components with financial budget support and its associated policy dialogue with the EU programmes specific objectives and the overall efforts together with others donors to promote a sector wide approach was also considered as an appropriate approach.

The focus of EU interventions on school reconstruction/consolidation, free textbook delivery, overall education policy and management processes, institutional and human resource management (curricula policy, teacher training and deployment policy ...), public financial governance and promotion of local community involvement (school management/parent teacher commissions) are also assessed relevant as positive developments in these areas are considered mandatory in order to improve future quality outcome in the sector.

As underlined by the Mid- term Review of the CSP (annex 8), “the Delegation’s experience reveals that as the provinces are responsible for policy implementation, sector budget support is more workable at provincial level than at federal level”.

The choice of providing budget support at provincial level, while acknowledging the risks (weak governance and institutional capacities...), was then considered as relevant.

Provincial authorities (cf. MN 313) have also acknowledged that “the key performance indicators attached to the BS programmes were relevant with mutual understanding on policy and planning reforms which are needed by the Department of Education”.

However issues related to specific weaknesses in the sector such as teacher absenteeism, quality and operationalisation of monitoring systems, budget credibility at provincial and district levels (extensive use of supplementary and re-appropriations, Executive power to re-allocate and extend appropriations without prior approval from the Legislative...) as well as the lack of outcome-orientated indicators related to service delivery was highlighted as potential issues undermining the appropriateness of the intervention. The need to put more emphasis on actual outcomes at school levels was for example often raised by several stakeholders.

BS programmes have strongly supported the Reform Support Units in the Provinces which became in charge of the management and coordination of institutional capacity building component of the EU interventions. But questions arose regarding the fact that a most appropriate location would have been the whole Provincial Education Policy Departments to promote better and wider ownership as well as sustainability of supported reforms and strengthened capacities. In addition, the centralisation at provincial level of policy decision questioned also the appropriateness and impact of the EU interventions in ensuring and promoting sufficient trickle-down effects in terms of PFM management, capacity development and reform process at district and sub-district

	<p>(Taluka) level where an important share of education public expenditures (salaries) and management responsibilities are executed. BS intervention have however included in their design specific objectives and triggers related to education sector management at decentralised level (districts, sub-districts and talukas).</p> <p><b>Sources:</b> MN 821, MN 822, MN 826, MN 850, MN 313, mid-term review of the CSP, EU internal documents, ROM, BS Evaluation Reports).</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>satisfactory</b></p>
<b>JC-3.2</b>	<b>The design of the BS programmes favoured the achievement of the expected results.</b>
<p>The formulation of the first Education SBS in the Sindh and KP Provinces has been complicated as local political and administrative situation was evolving with an ongoing devolution process under the 18th amendment and the corresponding transfer of policy responsibilities for delivery in education from the federal to province whilst the latter remained financially dependent (close to 90%) from federal financial transfers under the NFC Award. Issues related to weak capacities and risks of corruption at provincial level for the two provinces including the specific fragility and security situation in KP have made the formulation process complicated. The fully-fledged education sector approach was also still in the making at the time of the formulation. It was clearly acknowledged that the Governments of Sindh and KP had weak planning capacities and donor co-ordination systems while set and structured had not been implemented yet. The capacity building components sequenced at the beginning of the EU BS programme such as for the Sindh Province BS programmes has been instrumental in designing the provincial education policy and implementation plan framework that were a key prerequisite to smooth the implementation of BS programmes and guide the provincial governments in their sector policy reform and improvement plan process.</p> <p>The Funds of the BS programmes have also intended to provide fiscal space for the provinces to finance key reform process and expenditure programmes. However, the structure of the sector public expenditures with more than 90% dedicated to wages coupled with non-negligible difference between budgeted and actual federal transfers, low budget credibility (weak level of execution of non-salary and development expenditures) as well as insufficient funds for the primary education sector, have left the provincial governments with a tiny margin of manoeuvre in front of important structural needs to achieve meaningful progress against the education related MDG objectives and to face post-crisis and natural disasters situations.</p> <p>The situation of post-conflict rehabilitation in Malakand (KPK) has also influenced the implementation of the first EU BS programmes in this province region with a more flexible approach in terms of conditions and performance assessment but predictability of fund disbursement has been globally weak. This lack of predictability has been compensated with the additionality and “earmarking” of part of the EU BS for the provinces’ budgets to finance specific public expenditures programmes, through terms of partnership mechanisms at provincial and district levels related to the performance objectives of the provincial sector policy and reform action plans. Additionality has occurred essentially through the targeted</p>	

support to the School rehabilitation programmes that were earmarked and implemented under Term of Partnership together with other donors support. These expenditures have particularly focus on the improvement of PFM, school rehabilitation and construction, education sector management structures, access to schooling, quality of teaching and learning outcomes.

I.3.2.1	<p><b>The amount of SBS funding</b></p> <p><b>Sindh Province</b></p> <p>No particular justification can be found regarding the amount of budget support allocated under the two budget support programmes for the Sindh Provinces</p> <p>In the case of the first BS programme to the Sindh Province (Sindh Education Plan Support Programme (2005/017-667), the SEPSP, the TAPs underlined the importance to ensure that external financing of reforms be properly aligned with Governments' Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks (MTEFs) in order to provide a comprehensive sector financing framework. References were made to the cost of development budget of the Sindh Education Plan (SEP) - which provide the overall framework for EC support as well as the amount of other donors interventions in support of this Plan: SEP: Government of Sindh (development budget) € 30M, EC SEP-SP (€ 39 M o/w 33 as BS and 6 as complementary support)) and ADB intervention of (€ 45M) <i>totaling</i> € 114 million</p> <p>In addition to the Sector programme support from the EC and ADB to the SEP, several other donors were provided project support to education development in Sindh. They include: ADB through DEEP (€ 62 million), USAID through its ESRA project (€ 20M) and <u>UNICEF (€ 5M)</u>. <u>Furthermore</u>, CIDA planned a debt conversion in favour of education in Sindh (€ 1M) and the Netherlands was studying the possibility to also support the elementary education sector in Sindh in a complementary, coherent and fully co-ordinated manner with the EC SEP-SP.</p> <p>The EU financing proposal mentioned that under its poverty reduction strategy (PRSP) the Federal Government was committed to increasing development expenditures as a percentage of GDP, including increasing support for the education budget by about 15% per year. The Government of Pakistan had recognised education as the single most important factor contributing to national economic growth and stability and for reducing chronic poverty, as indicated in the Medium Term Development Framework 2005-2010. Education was also seen to be a budgetary priority for the Government of Sindh with nearly one quarter of the overall budget of Sindh spent on education.</p> <p>The EC SBS was expected to be additional to and not substitute for domestic or other donor resources. The release of the 1<sup>st</sup> tranche of the SBS was, among other, conditioned by the elaboration of an agreed overall investment plan for the SEP showing the additionality of EC SBS-funding. Improvement of education sector management, improvement of access to quality schooling and</p>
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improvement of the quality of teaching and student learning.

This additionality dimension has rather to be understood in terms of improving the rate of transfer/budget execution (comparison between planned and revised/actual expenditures. Indeed, the tight fiscal constraint in which the provincial government executed its budget led often to revise estimates compared to budgeted allocation meaning low level of budget execution. In that regards, BS funds were expected to be over and above the current trend of Budgets that were allocated to the provincial budget while these EC funds remained, once transferred to the Treasury account of the provincial government , fully fungible with the rest of the provincial fiscal resources (NFC Award, local taxes) sector at provincial and district levels.

**The subsequent BS to the Sindh province in the education sector (2011/023-009), the SESSP,** for an amount of € 30 M o/w € 25.5M for BS did not provide information or rational regarding the justification of the proposed amount of BS. Unlike the previous programme composed of fixed instalment, the funds of this second programme was expected to be disbursed in two variable tranches. Less emphasis was put on the additionality of BS funds with regards to the provincial budget for the education sector

#### **KP Province**

A first BS programme, 2008 DCI –ASIE/2007/018-465 was signed in 2008 for an amount € 20 M with three fixed instalment of € 6M and complementary support of € 20 M (KPK Education Sector Reforms Programme) out of which € 18 M for BS divided in 3 fixed instalment of 6M each and € 1.6 M for capacity building which was managed through the World Bank multi donor Trust Fund in support of the implementation of the NWFP (after KPK) Education Sector Reform Programme. The programme has made as pre condition the adoption by the provincial government new education sector plan (ESP) based on the new National Education Policy adopted in August 2009 and that obliged provinces to develop related Sector Plans. This adoption of the ESP on July 2010 allowed the disbursement of the first fixed instalment in December 2010. A top up of € 15 million was provided in 2010 through a rider in 2013 increasing the third instalment up to € 11M and creating a 4<sup>th</sup> tranche of €10M. This supplementary amount was justified by the deterioration of the situation of the province and the reconstruction costs of the education infrastructure following the flow of IDP population accommodated in the provincial education infrastructures that implied rehabilitation costs for the provincial budget and the destructions of other education infrastructures caused by military operations.

A subsequent programme (KP ESPSP) was signed in 05/2014 for a total amount of € 40 M o/w € 35 M of budget support to be disbursed in 4 variable tranches (3 of € 9M and the last on of €8 M) at the beginning of each FY (14/15 to 17/18) and aiming at supporting the education system of the province.

It is difficult to assess BS attribution as BS amounts represented a tiny part of the

	<p>provincial budgets. However the EU has rather made it utmost to ensure predictability of disbursement with fixed instalment and flexible considerations to define scoring methodology to maximize the chance of full disbursement of each installment.</p> <p><b>Sources:</b> Financing agreement and TAPs of EU SBS programmes, Riders and justification notes, notes to the file, exchange of letters/exchanges between EUD, the provincial authorities and Headquarters, MN 850, MN 826.</p> <p style="background-color: #fce4d6; border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">Quality of evidence: <b>strong</b>.</p>
I-3.2.2.	<p><b>The conditions of disbursement</b></p> <p><b>Sindh Province</b></p> <p>The fact that the fist SEPSP programme was set up before the DCI entered into force and was governed by the ALA regulation, the programme did not included the compliance with BS eligibility criteria (sector policy framework, macroeconomic policy and PFM)</p> <p>Rather, three criteria were defined to assess the release each 5 annual tranches:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The presentation of a report from the Government of Sindh on fulfilment of the tranche release milestones and criteria providing information on the compliance with the SERP annual key benchmarks and payment triggers.</li> <li>▪ The positive assessment of this report by a Joint Review Mission (involving key BS donors such as the World Bank and the EU)</li> <li>▪ The recommendations by the JRM for the tranche release.</li> </ul> <p>The overall performance of the programme has to be monitored by the Government of Sindh province (GoS) and the main SEP partners and be informed by the regular review of the policy matrix and results framework composed of annual government reform actions to be implemented with output/outcome and process indicators that can be monitored for each of the four pillar mentioned above (cf. Annex 1 of the TAPs). This framework refer to the first Sindh Education Sector Reform Policy which served as the over-arching education policy (SERP I). It was closely aligned with the National Education Policy and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper of 2007. In the absence of a full-fledged sector policy, SERP I provided the basic set of conditions for reform policy and effective service delivery in education that has been used by the EU and the World Bank. The SEPSP programme also added dimensions on improved fiscal sustainability and fiduciary environment.</p> <p>Globally, the system of conditionality adopted by the <b>SEPSP</b> seemed to be based on a World Bank trigger type of approach and could be explained by the coordination with the World Bank which was the main donor intervening in the sector.</p> <p>The Second Programme (SESSP) has been streamlined with the introduction for the conditions of disbursement of the two viable tranche the compliance with the three eligibility criteria and a set of output and outcome indictors related to the</p>

education sector

**Output indicators related to** Pupil/teacher ratio, Pupil/classroom radiation , Pupil/book ratio, Teacher salary as % of GDP, Private schools enrolment, Number of teachers employed (male, female), Number of teachers trained (male, female), teacher deployment....

**Outcome indicators related to** Primary gross or net intake rate (%), boys, girls, Primary gross or net enrolment rate (%), boys, girls, Primary gross or net attendance rate (%), boys, girls (%), Primary gross or net absenteeism rate (%), boys, girls, Primary gross or net dropout rate (%), boys, girls , Primary completion rate (%), boys, girls , Repetition rates (%), Progression / transition rates boys, girls, Secondary gross or net enrolment rate (%), boys, girls, Literacy rates, boys, girls, Numeracy rates, boys, girls.

**Financial indicators:** Spending on education as a % of provincial budget, Spending on primary as a % of education budget, % Increase in Education sector budget, Extent of application of MTEF/MTBF in Education sector, Improved financial management and planning at all levels, Improved budgeting, reporting and monitoring, Improved PFM systems, including implementation and enforcement..

With such an impressive list of indicators, no baseline or target were proposed. Rather the FA stipulated that the variable tranche performance will be assessed relying on an "individual performance score" and a "weight" attached to each indicator in order to arrive at an overall performance score, the technical assistance/complementarity support (€ 4 M) attached to the programme was expected to assist the Government to develop its sector education policy and its performance assessment framework on which basis the programme's instalment will be disbursed.

The programme was supposed to be implemented in two phases (i) the Technical Cooperation contract (capacity building and TA), that was aiming at assisting the Sindh Government, during the first year of the programme, to establish, following the 18th amendment to the Constitution, a full-fledged Sindh Education sector policy, sector development plan, school consolidation plan, sector based Medium Term Expenditure Framework and PFM, as well as a structured, government-led sector donor coordination; and (ii) at the end of year 1, and based on the new education sector policy of the province, the policy matrix for budget support and the disbursement conditions should be finalised with the Government of Sindh. An addendum to the Financing Agreement was expected to formalise the changes. The Budget Support variable tranches will be released at the end of year 2 and 3, upon satisfactory progress of the general conditions and the specific conditions agreed being met. The technical cooperation component will continue during phase two in order to support the Government in the implementation of the policy.

Following a first rider to extend the operational period for 06 months from 13.02.16 to 13.08.2016, a second rider was signed in July 2014 proposing amendment of an updated policy matrix of performance criteria and indicators to be used as payment triggers for variable tranches. The Sindh Education Sector Plan (SESP) was approved by the Chief Minister in December 2013 and endorsed by the relevant development partners, including the EU, on 4 March 2014. On this basis the new policy matrix for budget support and the specific disbursement conditions for the release of tranches was defined. This policy matrix, which has been developed in close consultation with the Education & Literacy Department and was based on the SESP, and has replaced the previous one.

**The new matrix was structured around 3 main results areas: improved efficiency of public education spending, better access and overall improvement in service delivery through school consolidation and, improved quality of education and student learning outcomes.** A total of 8 key performance indicators (process and outcome) were defined to condition the release of the two variable tranches with precise baselines, performance targets and source of verifications:

KP1 refers to education budget release and utilisation, KP2 to school consolidation, KP 3 to staffing and resources for consolidate school, KP 4 to the implementation of a curriculum implementation framework (CIF), KP 5 to the approval of a Sindh textbook an material development policy aligned with the CIF, KP 6 to the clarification and active role of education institutions to train teachers, KP 7 to the revision of the teacher education development policy and KP 8 to the development of an instrument for assessment of Grade IV students.

KPI were in line with the provincial sector strategies and relevant with its objectives.

### **KPK Province**

The first BS programme conditions focused on the adoption of the new education sector plan and its implementation, the progress made with the compliance of the BS eligibility criteria, the financing of reconstruction and rehabilitation costs of the Malakand district and pro-poor services delivery in education. The policy matrix provides for 10 triggers/indicators that were defined **around 4 similar pillars from the Sindh BS programme (fiscal sustainability and effectiveness of public expenditure with a strong focus on public procurement rules and procedures, education sector management, access to schooling and quality of teaching).** The EU took into account the crisis situation in the province to soften the conditions for disbursement.

The 10 indicators:

- i. Increased effectiveness of public expenditures procurement (including education sector).
- ii. Improved fiscal and budgetary management within Elementary & Secondary Education Sector

- iii. Effective parent Teachers Council (PTCs) in all government schools.
- iv. Improved governance, enhanced efficiency and effectiveness of the education sector
- v. Strengthened and improved Education Management Information System (EMIS).
- vi. Early recovery of regular educational activities in the conflict affected area of Malakand Division.
- vii. Provision/distribution of free textbooks to all government schools from Class I to Class XII.
- viii. Increasing the availability of teachers in schools.
- ix. Provision of missing facilities to government schools.
- x. Implementation of Institutional Framework for Teacher Development (IFTD)

Following a first rider, the first instalment was assessed against only 3 indicators (increased effectiveness of public expenditure, consistency of education budget with the provincial MTBF and the construction of fully damaged schools and repair recovery of partially damaged schools in the conflicted affected area of Malakand Division). The remaining tranches were expected to be disbursed under the condition of at least 6 target indicators met out of 10 leading to a kind of floating tranche structure as all indicators were not time bound.

The matrix of conditions of the programme was further amended in 2013 and was replaced by a common donor policy matrix aligning the EU intervention on the DFID/AusAID 12 Key Performance Indicators and proposing a joint review mechanism for the assessment of the performance indicators.

This common matrix was also used (the matrix was however amended and updated in coordination with donors and the provincial authorities) in the subsequent EU programme of € 40 M (o/w € 35 M of budget support funds). This second programme had stronger focus on specific performance achievement and the disbursement of the funds was structured around 4 full variable tranches of €9M and €8M). Out of three tranches of EUR 9 million and one tranche of EUR 8 million, EUR 7 million should be disbursed if 8 out of the 12 KPIs are met (which is the same requirement for the disbursement of DfID/AusAID tranches) and an additional EUR 2 or 1 million, respectively, would be released only if among the 8 indicators that are met, at least 2 are indicators on quality and learning outcomes.

The second EU BS support aims to help the Government of Khyber Paktunkhwa (GoKP) in improving the education system in terms of access, governance and PFM, quality and learning outcomes. Fully aligned with the UK (DfID) in supporting the GoKP sector reform plan through the Provincial budget process, the EU budget support aimed at enhancing impact on quality of education services through a 'school effectiveness' approach.

<b>KP-ESPSP aligned to DfID/AusAID support expects the following:</b>	<b>EU complementary support focuses on improving quality of services delivered and expects the following:</b>
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	<p><b>Impact:</b> More educated people in KP making a positive social and economic contribution;</p> <p><b>Outcome:</b> More children in school, staying longer and learning more;</p> <p><b>Output:</b> A better managed, more accountable school system;</p> <p><b>Output:</b> Better teacher performance and teaching in the classroom;</p> <p><b>Output:</b> Improved school infrastructure and conducive learning environment;</p> <p><b>Output:</b> improved access to education, especially for girls.</p>	<p><b>Outcome:</b> Improved learning outcomes for both girls and boys;</p> <p><b>Output:</b> Enhanced professional capacity and performance of head teachers, teachers and Parent Teacher Councils (PTCs) as shown by quality of school improvement plans and actions taken;</p> <p><b>Output:</b> Enhanced professional capacity of circle offices for providing adequate support to development and implementation of school improvement plans as shown by quantity (% of schools visited) and quality of provided support to schools and PTCs.</p> <p><b>Output:</b> Yearly increase in the take up by GoKP of regular cost for the school effectiveness approach.</p>
	<p>The EU budget support has progressively be aligned with the DfID/AusAID sector budget support to the education sector guided by 12 key sector performance indicators (KPIs). These indicators have been developed from the GoKP Education Sector Plan 2010-2015 and cover three broad areas: 1) governance and PFM (out-put based budgeting; developing audit systems; organisational development of key institutions; protecting non-salary and development budget allocations); 2) access and facilities (provision of stipends for girls; developing the capacity of PTCs; developing low-cost private sector; developing the Elementary Education Foundation to provide second-chance education for children and training for women); and 3) quality and learning outcomes (improving students learning outcomes; improving school performance; improving teacher management; curriculum innovation and implementation). As necessary third party verifications was expected to be conducted and budget support tranches paid once eligibility criteria and other additional requirements were met and in agreement with DfID and AusAID to ensure consistency in assessment and release of budget support funds.</p> <p><b>Sources:</b> Financing agreement and TAPs of EU SBS programmes, Riders and justification notes, notes to the file, exchange of letters/exchanges between EUD, the provincial authorities and Headquarters, MN 850, MN 826.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Quality of evidence: <b>strong.</b></p> <p><b>The design of the tranches and the calendar of disbursements</b></p> <p><b>Sindh Province</b></p> <p>I-3.2.3. The SEPSp initially consisted of 5 annual fixed tranches with a set of specific indicators proposing de facto a kind of floating tranche approach <u>with the tranches not released in one year could remain available and may be added to subsequent tranches for future release, subject to meeting the criteria and milestones for disbursement of enhanced tranche sizes.</u></p>	

## Indicative SEPSP SBS tranche releases (€ million)

<u>EC SBS Tranche breakdown</u>	2007 (n)	2008 (n+1)	2009 (n+2)	2010 (n+3)	2011 (n+4)
Province portion	1	2	2	1	1
District portion	3	5	6	6	6
Total Tranche	4	7	8	7	7

In the wake of delayed start of programme complementary support, the first tranche scheduled for Fiscal Year 2006-07 could not be actualized. Consequently, in consultation between the Department of Education and the EC TA the grant disbursement schedule had been rescheduled for four annual tranches. 12 trigger were attached to each tranche with the necessity to have at least 8 triggers fulfilled to release the tranche (cf. FA/TAPS)

The second programme consisted of two annual variable tranche for FY 2013/14 and FY 2014/15 with a series of 8 KPI counting each for 12.5% to calculate the overall performance (out of 100%) (cf. FA/TAPS). Each KPI could be score at 0, 0.5 or 1 according to the level of progress achieved or the target fully met. The amount to be disbursed depends of an overall performance score. The 8 KPI derived directly from the Policy matrix of the Education Sector Plan developed by the Government between 2012 and 2014 with the technical support of the EU (capacity building component of the EU BS programme)

**KP province**

The design of the tranches has evolved from fully annual fixed tranches planned during the first programme (4 in total) to fully annual variable tranches (4 in total) in the second programme translating the will of the EU to focus more on quality and performance. Initial timetable planned for disbursement in the FA have focus on the need to release each annual tranche at the beginning of the fiscal year. No particular frontloading of funds was planned with equal amount for each annual tranches.

While fungible in the provincial budget, these funds were expected to include some additionality dimension for the government of KP. This approach could be explained by the rapid expansion of the education system to meet the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa's new constitutional obligation to provide universal education that required significant additional resources allocated to and utilized in the sector. Whilst the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was committed to increase education spend to 5% of GDP equivalent, a considerable funding gap needed to address. The international community including the EU was expected to provide financial assistance to help close this funding gap and assist the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to meet its education commitments.

**Sources:** Financing agreement and TAPs of EU SBS programmes, Riders and

	<p>justification notes, notes to the file, exchange of letters/exchanges between EUD, the provincial authorities and Headquarters, MN 850, MN 826.</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>satisfactory</b></p>
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I-3.2.4	<p><b>The policy dialogue framework</b></p> <p><b>Sindh province</b></p> <p>In the case of the two BS, a steering committee was set up chaired by the Chief secretary with members from the Finance Department, the Education department, the EC and the main donors involved in the sector and an annual joint review mission was planned as well as regular bilateral meetings between the EC and the Government. In the context of the second BS programme (SESSP), and in order to foster the implementation of the Sindh Education Sector Plan, an oversight Task Force was constituted by the Government of Sindh, Education and Literacy Department. The task force has representation of the Government, development partners and civil society. Sub groups for leading the oversight process of various aspects of SESP implementation, are being set up by the Task Force. District Education Sector Plan under the overall Sindh Education Sector Plan are being developed and the process has been launched at the District level. The formal launch of a national development partners/donor conference on SESP have been organised at the end of 2014.</p> <p><b>KP Province</b></p> <p>The Education Sector Policy (ESP) did not have a monitoring and evaluation framework with annual targets and indicators; although the Capacity Building Strategy that was developed by the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to strengthening the ability of the administration to implement the ESP has a policy matrix for measuring the 10 outcomes in the strategy. The Government of KP has not regularly reviewed this CDS matrix and donors use the CDS as a reference document, but have not yet entered into joint planning, joint reviewing or pooled funding of TA / capacity building interventions. This could be remedied by stronger government leadership in donor coordination.</p> <p>During the first programme, there was no system per se for monitoring the progress of the implementation of the education sector plan. This was the purview of the Provincial Education Management Information System (EMIS) the Elementary and Secondary Education Department (ESED) in combination with third party evaluations. However the existing EMIS system did not allow for structured and periodic reporting at the service delivery level or to report progress on the implementation of the ESP on a regular basis. In addition there was gaps in timely availability of data for informed decision making.</p> <p>The first multilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (including DESE and the Financial Department) and seven Development Partners in March 2009. The purpose of the MoU was to harmonize donor support to the Elementary &amp; Secondary Education Sector in the Province so as to avoid duplication of efforts and ensure effective utilization of funds provided by the donors. Thereafter in 2011 the KP government signed an MoU with the Federal Republic of Germany, the</p>
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	<p>Netherlands, AUSAID and the EU for implementing a Capacity Development Plan. Despite the support by different donors to the Education Sector Plan and its aligned CDP through the technical support of GIZ this joint support did not result in joined planning, joint reviewing etc.</p> <p>However, a number of monitoring activities have then taken place either periodically or as part of a sub-programme. Development partners including the EU have pushed for an agreed joint review mechanism with a joint performance framework. In this purpose the EU has adopting the DfID/AusAid policy matrix for the 4<sup>th</sup> and final tranche of the first EU SBS KP-ESRP as well as for the subsequent one (KP-ESPSP) and has jointly reviewed performance with the Government of KP, DfID and Australia against the key performance indicators (KPIs) from the FY 2012/13 onwards.</p> <p>In addition, various mechanisms for policy dialogue have been explored including regular bilateral discussions with the DESE/GoKP, donor meetings, or Joint reviews. Under since the 4<sup>th</sup> instalment of the KP ERSP. With the new KA ESPSP, the EU was expected to partner DfID, AusAID and the GoKP in regular “Roadmap” stock-taking reviews. This approach focuses on high level political dialogue at 2-monthly stocktaking meetings and involves presenting progress in the sector using data collected on a regular basis by an independent monitoring unit (currently being contracted by the Education department) focussing on 4 main indicators for progress district by district: student participation; teacher presence; district administration visits (% of schools visited); and availability and functioning of facilities (% functioning electricity, drinking water, toilet, and boundary walls).</p> <p>Specific impacts of Policy dialogue are difficult to assess. However, PD under EU BS has provided a forum for discussions and monitoring of sector policy design and implementation between the EU and the provincial governments, often in coordination with others donors involved in the sector (WB, DFID...).</p> <p><b>With regards to PFM TA and policy dialogue, DFID has taken the lead on behalf of the other BS donors.</b></p> <p><b>Sources:</b> Financing agreement and TAPs of EU SBS programmes, Riders and justification notes, notes to the file, exchange of letters/exchanges between EUD, the provincial authorities and Headquarters, MN 850, MN 826, MN 312, MN 313.</p>
	<p style="text-align: center;">Quality of evidence: <b>Indicative but not fully conclusive</b></p>
I-3.2.5	<p><b>The proposed support to capacity building</b></p> <p><b>Sindh Province</b></p> <p>The EU support to SERP I was implemented through the Sindh Education Plan Support Programme (SEP-SP) and combined sector budget support with the provision of technical support to strengthen governance, financial management, budgeting and planning, monitoring and evaluation, and human resource systems.</p>

This capacity building has been instrumental to support the Sindh Education Reform (SER) process at the Reform Support Unit of the Department of Education. This EU TA was complementary to already available TA of other Donors Partners supporting the Government of Sindh SERP: WB, USAID EDLINKS, USAID and UNICEF.

The EU SER-Technical Assistance (lead by the British Council) aimed to achieve the objectives by:

- Contributing to an integrated GoS education policy and education sector reform framework
- Contributing to co-ordinated donors support interventions in the Sindh education sector
- Contributing to mobilising and engaging all relevant sector stake-holders
- Providing Capacity-building support to put in place a more transparent sector budget support accountability, and sector performance review system
- Providing targeted support to improve implementation capacity by:
  - Developing more effective sector management, particularly in projecting, programming and monitoring of budget and other resources (utilization) at provincial and district levels.
  - supporting the DoE Reform and Support Unit in the development and operation of a mature sector-wide monitoring system and its capacity to conduct or supervise surveys, data collection, and information-dissemination exercises
  - Provision of needs-related capacity-building to realize quality education services delivery and quality assurances at district and school level.

The TA has focus on three main areas: PFM, Sector General and Quality Education Areas:

PFM Areas: PFM and SERP Results Matrix Compliance Assessment, Procurement Rules Compliance, Timeliness, Targeting SERP Incentives, Education District Bottom-up MTEF, Public Expenditure tracking surveys with more systemic output/outcome and audit

Education Sector General Areas: Improve Implementation Effectiveness at School Level: Model Functional School Concept, Performance Assessment Systems (School, Taluka, District), Sector Performance Monitoring, Human Resource Development, RSU Implementation and Monitoring Systems

Quality Education Areas: promotion of awareness of education quality issues at the RSU level, Teacher standards and competencies, Improvement of teacher subject content knowledge, Teacher Assessment Systems Reading Literacy Programme Development of a Code of Conduct, Planning Tools for School Management...

During the second programme (SESSP), TA has been provided up-front during the first years to assist the GoS and the provincial education department to take over the devolved responsibilities in terms of education policy development in the wake of the 18<sup>th</sup> Amendment, development the government education sector plan, strategy, policy and performance assessment framework at provincial level.

EU TA assisted the GoS to develop its Sindh Education Sector Plan 2014-18 and supported the provincial administration to strengthen governance, financial management, budgeting and planning, monitoring and evaluation, and human resource systems.

### **KP Province**

Under the KP ESRP, €1.6 million was earmarked for a The Technical Assistance Programme that was originally intended to provide a harmonized joint approach in capacity building through a multi-donor trust fund (led by World Bank) and serve as an entry point for policy dialogue of both TA and financial donors with the GoKP. However, since the withdrawal of the World Bank from the KP education sector (government opted for grants only as opposed to credits) the TA fund was used to co-finance the GIZ managed Capacity Development Programme (through a delegation agreement) consisting of an in-service teacher training programme for elementary education teachers in 5 districts (to check whether an evaluation of this project was carried out?).

While this in-service teacher aimed to contribute towards an integrated system of continuing professional support to teachers. However, the expected large numbers of teachers without the basic content knowledge impose a major risk on the system with an important content knowledge gap among these teachers that in-service training alone cannot not fill the gap.

The EU formulation process of the follow-up BS programme (KA ESPSP) has acknowledged that that the Integrated In-service Teacher Training and Supervision System in selected schools has produced evident improvement in learning outcomes of children. However, it has underlined that to sustain such initiative, there was a need to move away from such project based approach and seek a better integration in the education system with direct funding through the budget.

The non-materialisation of the initial purpose of the EU TA programme (through the Multi donor trust fund) has, during the implementation of the BS programme, reduced the expectations that the proposed TA will provide an useful and efficient platform for effective donor coordination and regular policy dialogue with the GoKP. This issue was important due the limited capacity in the education department in coordinating and directing support to the education sector. The coordination between the different actors responsible for the implementation of the ESP at provincial and district levels has suffered from insufficient allocation of resources and the security situation in the province that has limited the mobility of donors. The UE Delegation had acknowledged in its BS disbursement assessment that following the elections in 2013 the new Government of KP has re-engaged in donor coordination and has already taken steps in asserting its leadership in this regard. The harmonisation of donors around a common matrix and a joint review mechanism has contributed to put on

	<p>the agenda this sector coordination issue.</p> <p>€ 4M was also earmarked under the second BS programme (KA ESPSP). But up to now, according to the documentation available, no TA project have started yet. The proposed EU support was planned to complement (a) other donor's capacity building and TA interventions with a specific emphasis on quality of education provisions and (b) on-going activities under other EU funded programmes for KP, notably the KP District Governance and Community Development BS Programme in its support to the GoKP in reforming public administration at district level to improve service delivery, including education, through investing in community development targeting six district budgets of the Malakand Division. During the formation process, reflexions have focussed on the improvement of service delivery at school level in six districts and professionalization at school level management at district level.</p> <p>Sources: Action Fiche, Financing Agreements and TAPs of the respective EU BS programmes, EUD evaluation of public policy Eligibility criteria, SBS KP and Sindh Education Evaluations 2012, MN 850,</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Quality of evidence: <b>more than satisfactory</b></p>
<b>JC-3.3</b>	<b>The EU national and regional interventions in education in Pakistan have been coherent</b>
<p>No particular risks of incoherence have been noticed between EU national and regional interventions in the education sector. SBS programmes focused on the primary and secondary education sectors whereas Erasmus Mundus programme concerned the higher/tertiary education sector and the international cooperation capacities of Pakistani universities. These interventions have been implemented without being particularly linked to each other and the related programme documents do not establish specific links between their respective objectives and implementation process.</p> <p>The sector wide approach supported by the EU SBS interventions at provincial level has essentially concerned the basic/elementary and secondary education sectors. However it is reasonable to consider that contribution of these SBS interventions aiming at improving and streamlining sector resources management (human resources, public finances, institutional and teaching capacities) and the quality and equity of the sector service delivery can only prepare a favourable ground for the reforms to be promoted in the tertiary education sector the latter facing similar challenges in terms of quality, access, and institutional and financial governance.</p>	
I-3.3.1	<p><b>Evidence in documents, reports, evaluations and interviews showing the coherence of the EU national and regional (Erasmus Mundus) interventions in the sector.</b></p> <p>Coherence with regional interventions in the education sector (under the Asia Erasmus Mundus programme) is not specifically addressed in the programming, formulation and implementation objectives of SBS. BS interventions in education have essentially focused on primary and in a less extent secondary education</p>

sectors whereas regional intervention through Erasmus Mundus concerned higher/tertiary education sector (specific focus on enhancing international cooperation capacity of universities). These interventions have been implemented without being linked to each other due to their different and specific objectives.

It is fair to assume that the absence of specific link between these interventions did not imply major risks of incoherence. The Regional Strategy Paper 2017-2013 and MIP 2007 -2010: "Higher education is a strategic sector for sustainable development in Asia which will strengthen the EU-Asia relationship and support the development of concerned countries. This is not at the expense of the priority given to basic education and its contribution to the achievement of the MDGs. The programme will actively respond to the needs of Asian countries for higher education, in accordance with their level of development. Attention will be given to the promotion of equal opportunities and the values of democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms". "Activities carried out in the field of higher education will be financed within the context of the regional programming for Asia".

The sector wide approach supported by the EU SBS interventions at provincial level has essentially concerned the basic and secondary education sectors. However it is reasonable to consider that objectives promoted by SBS interventions with regards to addressing structural weaknesses (governance reforms, institutional capacity strengthening, human resource management including teacher recruitment and training and overall quality of public service delivery) in the primary and secondary education sectors can only contribute in a coherent manner to prepare the ground for the reforms needed in the tertiary education sector, the latter facing similar challenges in terms of quality, access, and governance.

Interviews have not provided any additional or meaningful information. Consequently, the indicator I 3.3.1 and its associated JC are not considered as particularly relevant and informative to answer the evaluation question concerning the impact of EU intervention on improving service delivery, quality and equitable access to education in the provinces Sindh and KP.

All sub-components of the adopted provincial education and sector plan or reform plan were going in the right direction to prepare the ground for performance in the tertiary education. Reforms at primary and secondary level focus on aligning reform process in PK along international best practices & standards (merit base recruitment policy, streamlining of curriculum and revision of textbook, improving the quality of teacher training, improvement of school facilities, involvement of local communities...).

Sources: SCP, MIP, RIP, Action Fiche of SBS programme

Quality of evidence: **weak**

<b>JC-3.4</b>	<b>The SBS interventions have been implemented according to plan</b>
	<p>Regular delays have been observed in the disbursement of Budget Support funds, due initially to the familiarisation of the national authorities with the specific operational and managerial implications of the budget support aid modality particularly between the federal and provincial levels and then to the late or incomplete Government disbursement requests, mirroring the lengthy reform process in the sector, the weak institutional capacities at provincial and districts level and the time necessary to collect the relevant evidence to inform the SBS performances. The validation procedures of the payment files has also taken several months due to EC internal procedures for discussions and validations process. However, all planned instalments of on-going programmes were finally disbursed. Efforts have also been made to ensure as much as possible a proper sequencing of the different components of the SBS interventions with an attempt to frontload institutional capacity building activities and assistances that were instrumental to assist the provincial authorities to progress toward the programmes objectives.</p> <p>The EU has also adopted a flexible and pragmatic approach in the design of the Budget Support tranches compared to the standard approach outlined in the Budget Support Guidelines (including, e.g. floating tranche, overall performance rating, non-time-bound targets etc.). Financing Agreements of Budget Support programmes have also been regularly amended in order to take into account (1) the evolving approaches of associated donors (e.g. World Bank) and the promotion of alignment of policy matrix, (2) difficult and evolving federal and provincial environment (i.e. decentralisation, elections, coordination/harmonisation of performance assessment frameworks among donors and the provincial governments), and (3) changes brought by crisis context in the provinces and impacting the programmes rationale and objectives (notably natural disasters and insecurity in the concerned provinces).</p>
I-3.4.1	<p><b>Analysis of the delivery of the 4 categories of inputs and direct outputs</b></p> <p><b>1° Funds</b></p> <p>Sindh Province (SEPSP and SESSP)</p> <p>Due to the “floating” nature of the fixed tranches of the SEPSP (A floating tranche is a tranches without defined decision date in the FA). as well as the delay of the implementation of the TA component that was instrumental to assist the government to fulfil the conditions, and the riders to the FA, delays have occurred in the disbursement timetable at the beginning of the programme leading to a first disbursement two year after the signature of the FA before a progressive normalisation to ensure annual disbursements (09/2008, 12/2009, 11/2010, and 11/2011).</p> <p>In the case of the SESSP, while the FA was signed in February 2012, the programme was sequenced in two phases with the phase I dedicated to the TA component aiming at assisting the provincial government to finalise its education sector policy and the definition of the sector policy matrix/performance assessment framework that was instrumental to assess the sector policy condition</p>

of the programme and make the Government fulfilling the sector policy eligibility criteria. The Government finally launched its Education Sector Plan in September 2014.

The first disbursement was then planned two year after the signature of the FA (FY 13/14). The government request was made in September 2014 after the end of the FY 2013/14 and the disbursement of the full first variable tranche (€ 10M) was made with a one year delay in March 2015 corresponding to the end of the 3<sup>rd</sup> quarter of FY 2014/15.

While the four tranches of the KP ESRP programme have been all disbursed, several delayed have occurred. The first instalment was released in December 2010 compared to an initial indicative timetable of January 2010. The disbursement was conditioned to the adoption of the Education Sector Plan (prior condition) that was adopted in July 2010. While the second instalment was released in November 2011 due to a late request for the government, the release of the third tranche (€ 11 M), was considerably delayed. Following the Government request in November 2011 and the need for additional information asked by the EUD, the latter suspended the processing of the payment request due to an outstanding balance of the 2<sup>nd</sup> tranche under the programme that had not been transferred from the Ministry of Finance to the Province of KP. On 11 June 2012 the Government of Pakistan confirmed that out of the remaining balance of Rs 100 million (€840.000) an amount of Rs 54 million had been transferred to the province. On 24 September DEVCO H advised the Delegation that the outstanding transfer should not block the release of the pending tranche in 2012, provided that the Delegation assessment confirms eligibility and satisfactory progress in the education sector. The disbursement was finally made in November 2012, one year later than the indicative timetable.

## **2° Policy dialogue**

No meeting notes on policy dialogue. Disbursement dossiers and related analysis of the EUD confirmed the existence of meeting with concerned representatives of provincial and districts administrations during the implementation of the programme to discuss and monitor the programmes' implementation as well as with others donors in the context of annual/bi annual joint review missions (e.g. with the World Bank and DFID /AUSAID under the Sindh and KP SBS programmes). No particular policy dialogue was carried out at the federal level except at the time of the signature of riders or transfers of funds from the federal to the provincial treasury account. The TA on PFM, although still in its infancy stage, has however allowed discussions with the federal level due to its intervention component at federal level.

But in general, for BS operations, the dialogue took/takes place exclusively at provincial level, except if there are problems. Typical example of problem that required to lift the dialogue to federal level concerned the interpretation of the requirements for the second instalments of the Sindh/KP BS programmes during which long delays and/or incomplete transfers have been observed. This issue has



been progressively solved with the increase experience of this aid modality by the federal government.

Policy dialogue has essentially included the education public policy and PFM related eligibility criteria as well as the progress made on the KPI itself.

### **3° Conditions**

Sindh:

During the first programme and in the absence of a specific provincial education sector policy, the matrix of condition was based on triggers orientated to track sector reform process actions that were relevant to the challenges faced by the education sector at provincial and district level. But the FA did not included the set of 3 BS eligibility criteria. The policy matrix derived essentially from an agreement between the World Bank and EU negotiations with the Government. In the subsequent programme, general conditions on the compliance of the 3 BS eligibility criteria was included in the FA and following the adoption of the Government Sector Education Plan in 2014, the related performance assessment framework of the Plan was attached to the FA through specific rider ensuring full compliance and coherence of the indicators of the programme with the supported provincial sector policy. Issues related to PFM and budget planning and execution of the sector policy were included in the PAF with specific baseline and annual targets.

In KP, taking into account the fragility and the crisis situation, condition have been softened for the first fixed tranches while the rest of the instalment have been based on the eligibility criteria and the matrix of performance that has been streamlined during the course of the programme in order to harmonise the disbursement conditions/performance indicators (essentially process-based and reform-related key actions) with the others BS partners. The indicators were consistent and relevant as directly related to the Provincial Sector Plan. However, in 2014, DFID was currently revising their overall programme as they felt the original design of their programme was too optimistic and did not fully reflect ground realities and that their Road map, logframe and KPIs were currently disconnected. To be followed in the context of the common performance assessment framework matrix with the EU and AusAID.

C.f. I3.2.2 for the details on the key performance indicators governing the release of the variable instalments.

### **4° Capacity building**

Despite delays, the TA provisions have been sequenced at the onset of each BS programme (e.g. Sindh BS programmes) as capacity building was instrumental to assist the Government to develop its education policy and monitoring/performance assessment framework. And fulfilled the conditions for the disbursement of the different BS instalments. In the case of the second BS programme in the Sindh province (SESSP), the development of the Sindh

	<p>Education Sector Plan 2014-18 (SESP) fronted by the Reform Support Unit of the Department of Education with the support of the TA provided by the EU BS programme took almost two years. The adoption of the Plan was a key condition to consider the release of the first instalment of the programme.</p> <p>TA has also been used to carry out preliminary diagnostics to fine future capacity building interventions.</p> <p>The adoption of sector reform plan in Sindh was for example a direct results from the TA support of the EU.</p> <p>Sources: EU FA, disbursement dossiers for each SBS tranches, EU internal documents, MN 822, MN 850, MN , MN 314, MN 313, MN 312, MN 809, 2012 SBS evaluations for Sindh and KP.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Quality of evidence: <b>more than satisfactory</b></p>
<b>JC-3.5</b>	<b>The BS interventions have permitted to improve the formulation and implementation of the education policies in the beneficiary provinces</b>
<p>Formulation and implementation of education sector policy and reform actions plans has been at the core of the SBS interventions in Sindh and KP. The development of education policy framework was not only captured through the eligibility criteria on sector public policy but also under specific process indicators of the programme related to specific sub component of the provincial education policies.</p> <p>As the first SBS started when education sector policy was still a share responsibility between the federal and provincial level, support to policy formulation and implementation focused on improving and streamlining existing reforms and actions with regards to specific components of the education sector management policy at provincial, district and sub-district level: strengthening education sector planning and budgeting, improving efficiency and quality of school rehabilitation and consolidation action plans, streamlining of teacher recruitment and training policy, free textbook and girl stipend delivery services, and development of education management information systems. These first BS interventions were targeted to specific actions that have allowed the financing of specific flood-related crisis interventions, school public rehabilitation works and free delivery of textbook and girl stipends at sub-district level.</p> <p>Following the 18<sup>th</sup> amendment and the full responsibility for the education policy, the SBS have supported the development of formal and comprehensive provincial education sector development policy and reform action plans (In addition to the area mentioned above, the implementation of MTBF at district level was also one area of support) In both provinces the capacity building/TA components of the EU BS programme have been instrumental to accompany the provincial government to develop its policy formulation and reform process in the sector as well as improving institutional, budget planning and PFM capacities and education management structures at provincial and district levels. However, SBS interventions could not tackle all the institutional, financial and political challenges and the rising needs of the primary and secondary education sector faced by the provinces and districts authorities. Such situation has not always allow a swift implementation of elaborated sector education policy and reform action plans and the achievement of outcome results</p>	

related to the quality of public service delivery and education learning outcomes. The budget of the education sector still suffers from important structural weaknesses such as the lack of connection between education strategy and expenditure allocation due to the infancy stage of the reform of the budgeting process, the disparity of allocations of funds between primary and secondary education sectors, the low credibility of the budget execution particularly for non-salary current and development public expenditures and the lack of predictability of fiscal resources.

**Evidence that the policy dialogue is conducted at appropriate level (i.e. involving people who have an influence political, technical, etc. on the decisions made in the sector)**

According to the documentation available, the policy dialogue has been conducted with the relevant authorities at provincial level: the Department of Finance, the Reform Support Unit and Department of Education at provincial level as well as with the representatives of the authorities at district level (Education Districts Officers) Policy dialogue with newly established Education Reform Support Units at provincial level has been instrumental in discussing and monitoring the implementation of the SBS and the reform process. During the first SBS implemented before the 18th amendment, the federal authorities were also part of the policy dialogue. The EU Delegation has played a proactive role in setting the basis of sector wide approach in a much coordinated approach in the spirit of aid effectiveness. It has assisted KP and Sindh Governments in developing and approving their Education Sector Plans and has had an important role in Education Sector Donor Coordination.

I.3.5.1

EU policy dialogue has been as much as possible coordinated and streamlined with the main other donor partners involved in supporting the education sector through joint review missions, steering committees and sector working group meetings. PFM assessments under the SBS eligibility criteria were made in the context of joint donor group in the Sindh province.

The adoption of the Capacity Development Strategy

In KP, the management of KP-ESRP SBS is coordinated at the provincial level by the Secretary of the E&SED, overseen by the Minister of Education and supported by Education Sector Reforms Unit (ESRU) of the E&SED. ESRU is headed by an Additional Secretary/Programme Director and consists of a small number of staff.

Policy dialogue with the concerned provincial authorities has been progressively streamlined in coordination with other donor during the evaluation period through increasing ownership and efforts of the authorities to organise coordination fora (eg: Local Education Group established in Sindh, capacity development strategy in KP to provide a coordinated approach to policy dialogue and provision of technical assistance and capacity building as well as the setting up of a Strategic Development Partnership Framework (SDPF) as an overarching tool to coordinate between donors and the Authorities where the EU has played a

	<p>key role in the education sector group with a specific policy dialogue focus on budget planning and preparation. Through SBS programme regular meeting took place with Finance and Education Ministries allowing discussion on the objectives and the strategy of the provincial governments in the education sector with an impact on the budget preparation.</p> <p>It is however difficult to address in which extent policy dialogue has occurred between the EU and the concerned authorities at federal and provincial level and has led to specific actions with regards to the composition of public expenditures in the educations sector (primary/secondary, current/development expenditures) and the overall macro-economic policy with key issues related to the imperative needs to broaden the local tax basis and buoyancy, improve the predictability of federal intergovernmental transfers in order to ensure fiscal sustainability of the financing of supported education policies. These issues, often politically sensitive (domestic resource mobilisation) are indeed at the core of one important weakness of PFM in the sector (but also for the whole provincial budgets) related to the low credibility of the budget and the associated low level of budget execution of non-salary and development expenditure in the education sector.</p> <p><b>Sources:</b> Several disbursements dossiers of BS annual tranches, EU internal documents, MN 850, MN 826, MN 809, MN 312,</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Quality of evidence: <b>more than satisfactory</b></p>
I-3.5.2	<p><b>Verification that issues raised in the dialogue have been subsequently followed by concrete actions.</b></p> <p>While there was no specific meeting notes regarding policy dialogue carried out with provincial authorities, commitments of the provincial government to implementing measures discussed in the policy dialogue forum with the donors involved in the sector including the EU were demonstrated by several documentations (Joint review mission aide memories, SBS disbursement files analysis and public policy eligibility criteria assessment, EU internal documents). Actions implemented by the provincial authorities were closely related to the policy reform matrix adopted under each SBS interventions and the recommendations provided by the donors' community included the EU.</p> <p>This has been particularly the case for the finalisation and adoption of provincial policy framework documents and action plan (Education Sector Plan and sector reform agenda) in the wake of the 18<sup>th</sup> Amendment, the development of merit-based teacher recruitment policy, the school consolidation process at district level and the establishment of monitoring unit and the improvement of information monitoring system. In the PFM area, the provincial governments have developed their PFM reforms strategy and action plans based on PEFA diagnostics (ex of Sindh province). Focus of the policy dialogue on public financial governance at provincial and districts level have also led to progress in the design of medium-term budgeting process and regulatory framework to streamline public procurement procedures and process.</p>

Complementary support/technical assistance attached to the SBs programmes have also been instrumental to assist and guide provincial authorities in their decision with regards to sector policy framework and actions.

Regular under performance of SBS indicators concerning the execution of sector budget execution have however underlined the difficulty to overcome structural and institutional problems undermining budget credibility in the sector despite efforts of the provincial authorities to plan important budget allocations. Problems in absorption capacity, fluidity of public expenditures procedures and unpredictability/weakness of budget execution rate have often impeded the implementation of development expenditure budget related to the financing of specific reform measures and actions.

Limited skills at provincial, districts and school level have also constrained the capacity of the provincial authorities to deliver reform. In addition, measures taken and progress achieved by the provincial authorities have also been dependent from several complex political economy elements pertaining at provincial and districts and sub-districts levels including the uneven leadership in the education department although as in the case of Sindh new government established during the evaluation period have demonstrated stronger commitment.

**Sources:** BS Disbursement dossiers, EU internal documents, Aide memoires of joint review missions, Rom, BS Evaluation reports, MN 821, 850, 822, MN 826.

Quality of evidence: **more than satisfactory**

I.3.5.3	<p><b>Increased financial resources available for the sector in the provincial budget</b></p> <p>Context:</p> <p>One of the declared objectives of the first BS programmes was to improve fiscal sustainability and effectiveness of public expenditure in the education sector and create fiscal space to the concerned provinces to finance the education budget and ensure the implementation of their respective education policy and sector reform plans. A number of PFM diagnostic had underlined the low credibility of the budget of the Sindh and KP governments concerning budget out-turns with substantial variations in budgeted amount and actual expenditures. These discrepancies were considered as an obstacle to the improvement of education budget planning and execution. This situation is particularly problematic in view of the over-reliance of provinces on federal transfers and at the same time the low Tax-GDP ratio of the country. Problem of budget credibility lies in the fact that actual transfers from Federal Government during each fiscal year are contingent upon actual revenue collection of taxes. However, preliminary analysis of the 7<sup>th</sup> NFC have demonstrated that federal government remained unsuccessful in collecting targeted revenues due to weak economic conditions, slow structural tax reforms and weak administrative and institutional capacities. Despite progress, the failure of the tax reform expected during the 7<sup>th</sup> NFC projections proved unrealistic. The expected target of a 15% tax to GDP ratio was impossible to reach for the Federal Board of Revenues (FBR). While effort were made to develop provincial tax receipts, like in the case of the Sindh Government, a province like Sindh still highly depended from federal revenues (around 80%) in 2013.</p> <p>Deviation were less than 10% between fiscal years 2009/10 and 2011/12. Straight transfers (on duties and taxes collected buy federal government ex. crude oil, gas surcharge...) have often complemented the NFC tax award transfers. Unpredictability concern also the timing of transfers during the fiscal years with significant delays. The sub-indicators of the 2013 Sub-national PEFA for the Sindh Province was rated D (in year timeliness of transfers form the Federal Government with actual disbursement delays exceeding 25% in 2 of the 3 years covered by the PEFA. The HLG 1 Predictability of transfers from Higher Level of Government was assessed at D+ in 2013 underlying the poor predictability of inflows of federal transfers that affects the provincial government's fiscal management and ability to deliver public services.</p> <p>Unpredictability of federal transfers leading to monthly shortfall has affected the financial position of the provinces making cash management more problematic particularly in the education sector taking into account the lack of discretionary margin of manoeuvre with 80% of the overall expenditures earmarked for payroll. Implications of the financial crisis and the floods have also particularly affected the cash management position of the provinces during the evaluation period.</p>
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Answer to the indicator:

Under the first SBS, financial amount provided by BS transfers, especially in the Sindh Province, was expected to be additional to the resources provided by the federal transfers. Indeed each BS disbursement was expected to be transferred directly to the provincial treasury account and be *de facto* additional to the NFC allocations and direct transfers from the federal government. However, these BS amount remained fully fungible with the rest of the provincial financial resources.

The first BS in the Sindh province was earmarked towards education civil works related to schools reconstruction/rehabilitation as well as. Since districts have independent budget-making processes, these interventions have been designed to be undertaken through a terms of partnership (TOP) mechanism between the provincial and districts governments.

The targeted approach of the first SBS interventions to specific non-salary expenditures programmes (rehabilitation of school following flood damages, free delivery of text book, and distribution of girl stipends), including part of the annual tranches being earmarked for district finances, have directly contributed to influence the amount of actual non-salary expenditures at provincial and districts levels and can be considered as having brought an additional increase of financial resources earmarked to the education sector.

During the financial crisis and the floods that have had a severe financial impact on availability of budget funds, policy dialogue under the SBS programme have also allowed to ensure a commitment of the provincial government to secure and prioritise budget allocations and execution of key public expenditure programmes in the educations sector.

In the case of the first Sindh SBS, agreed baselines of government budget allocations and expenditures as well as projections in the medium term budget framework for the education sector and concerned subsectors have been at the core of the annual review of the SBS programme implementation and have played a key role to ensure a certain level of additionality of EC BS funding.

At the time of first payments of SBS for the Sindh province, the EC acknowledged regular increased of the federal annual education sector budget allocations: Rs 31,6 billion for FY 2009-10 compared to Rs 24.6 billion for FY 2008-09 (+ 28%) and to Rs 24.2 billion for FY 2007-08 (+ 1.65%) as well as the provincial education sector allocation with an increase of 3.4% for recurrent expenditure (Rs 15 billion) and more than 88% for development expenditures (Rs 4.7 billion) between 2007/08 and 2008/09 and global increase of 17% for the overall provincial education sector budget.

A particular focus was then put on the medium term education sector budgeting to ensure a budget execution in line the sector MTEF. Execution rate was 74% of the budget estimates and for FY 2009-10 and 77% for FY 2010/11. Execution of key sub programmes related to cash stipends, textbook distribution and

establishment and functioning of School Management Committees have been particularly secured. However, execution of public expenditures related to Terms of Partnership with districts, SEMIS, monitoring, capacity building and Staffing have suffered from lower execution rate due to slow procurement, overall inefficient PFM and weak absorption capacities at district level.

In the case of KP SBS, the targeted approach was not selected while specific performance indicators focused on progress made under specific public expenditure programme with third party evaluation (rehabilitation/construction of damaged education infrastructure in the Makaland division, financing of free delivery of textbooks, transfers of funds to parent teacher councils to procure missing basic facilities...) and PFM (alignment of education budget sector with the MTBF and progress in execution of the budget)

Available study and analysis on public financing of the education sector in Pakistan including at provincial and district level have demonstrated a trend of increased budget allocations to the education sector. Recent public expenditure review and Education Budget analysis have particularly underlined that the allocations for education sector have been in the range of 18%-29% of the total provincial outlay for all the provinces. In 2012-14, the highest allocation for education was in KP province with 29% of its total budget earmarked for the sector while Sindh province allocated 23% of its total budget for education.

In the Sindh province, budget allocation to the Education sector has grown over the last few years, from 20.5 % of total Sindh Government expenditure in 2009/10 to 22.6 % in 2013-14.

GoS education budget (Rupees billion)

	2009-10	2010-11	2011-12	2012-13	2013-14
<b>Total GoS Budget</b>	311,302	403,352	424,238	546,475	585,911
<b>Total Education Budget</b>	63,739	77,987	127,373	115,908	132,341

Government of Sindh Education Budget 2011/12 to 2014/15 (in rupees billion)

	2011/12 actual	2012/13 Actual	2013/14 budget	2013/14 revised estimate	2014/15 budget
Recurrent budget	57.4	92.4	120.5	107.7	134.4
Development budget	10.1	5.5	10.6	4.8	8.8

Sources: GoS Budget Analysis 2014-15

While annual BS disbursement were estimated at a maximum of Rs 1 billion, it is however difficult to assess whether these BS programmes have provided



additional funds to the education sector itself at provincial level (the specific contribution of BS transfers to these increase of resources directed to the sector) as these programmes (excepted for the first years of the first BS programmes) have been implemented at the time where the provincial government have benefited under the 7<sup>th</sup> NFC from a large increase of their fiscal space (from 46.5% to 57.5% of federal revenues) to carry out the sector policies they were in charge of. In the wake the 7<sup>th</sup> NFC Award and the 18<sup>th</sup> amendment, the provinces have indeed benefited at the same time from an important increase of financial allocation.

The 7<sup>th</sup> NFC Award made a substantial increase of the share of provinces in the federally collected taxes. Federal transfers to the provinces have increased from 3.9% of GDP in 2005/2006 up to 5.3% in 2011/12. However, the bulk of such raise was allocated to salary increases. In the case of the Sindh province, the proportion of education in the total budget while declining gradually until 2010/2011 when it picked up sharply essentially due to the jump in the wage bill making this salary bill proportion above 80% of the total budget of the education sector compared to a proportion of 46% in the overall provincial budget.

According to the World Bank (2015, Programme document for proposed credit), overall public spending on education increased from 1.9% of GDP to 2.1% between 2005 and 2012.

In the Sindh province, WB and EU annual funding to the Sindh Education sector was estimated at about Rs 9 billion per year (Rs 1 billion in average for the sole EU funds) or about 11% of the Government of Sindh budget outlay for education that was estimated at Rs 80 billion for the FY 2011-12.

If budget allocations to the Education sector have grown over the last few years, from 20.5 % of total Sindh Government expenditure in 2009/10 to 22.6 % in 2013-14, the rate of budget execution for development expenditure has remained weak underlining the need to focus not only on upstream PFM reforms (policy planning and budgeting) but also on budget execution process and procedures.

Ex: few trends and characteristics of Sindh provincial education budget:

- Education expenditures represented 20% of the overall provincial budget in 2009/10 and 2010/11 and then increased up to 30% in 2011/12 before going down to 22% in 2012/13 and 2013/14
- Current expenditure (wages essentially) represented more than 85% of the total provincial education budget between 2009/2010 and 2013/14.
- The annual execution of the education budget has been closed to 77% (variance from 19% to 32%) on average between 2007 and 2013, highlighting governance and management issues (gap in planning and capacity to spend)
- Compared to a major share of payroll expenses managed at district's level (65% on average between 2007 and 2012), development expenditures are managed centrally at provincial level
- Federal transfers: 91% effectively received in 2011/2012 FY, 84.7% in

2012/13

According to the SBS evaluation of 2012, in the KP the government has been expending a major share of the provincial budget on the education sector as in FY 2011-12, 20% of provincial budget was allocated to education. If expenditures for primary and secondary education rose from Rs.32.5 billion in FY2009/10 to Rs.51.6 billion in FY2011/12, this increase was largely due to salary increase. At districts level about 95-98% account for salary costs, 2-3% non-salary costs and about 0.5%-1% for development costs. The Finance Department's MTBF estimates for education 2012-2015 showed a steady increase of funds for development expenditures from Rs.10.7 billion in 2011/12 to Rs.17.7 billion in 2012/13, Rs.17.9 billion in 2013/14 and a decline to Rs.14.7 billion in 2014/15. However, it is acknowledged that the overall resource envelope needed for the province Education Sector Plan is much larger than what the province can afford, even with current donor support, which covers only a small portion of the overall budget and future needs

The EU targeted approach was abandoned during the second Sindh BS programme which rather focused through policy dialogue and a specific performance indicator on the monitoring of the overall budget execution of the education sector budget with a particular emphasis on the rate of execution of development and non-salary operational and maintenance expenditures. However the regular under performance of this indicator has underlined the recurrent problem of weak credibility of the budget execution at provincial level. The PEFA assessment demonstrated that the performance of PFM systems in Sindh has not improved between 2009 and 2013 and both Sindh PEFA have identified among the range of weaknesses in the PFM systems the critical shortcomings in budget execution processes.

In KP province, the second SBS focused on indicators developed from the GoKP Education Sector Plan 2010-2015 and covering the governance and PFM area with issues related to out-put based budgeting and the protecting of non-salary and development budget allocations)


According to studies on PER, the recurrent budgets of provincial education sector have been subject to various forms of rationalization and adjusting measures, except for items pertaining to wages and salaries. Spending restraint have also affected negatively the provision of textbooks, teachers training, maintenance of school facilities and other operating expenses often addressed through the creation of donor-led fiscal space. The EU SBS together with others donors may have then contributed to increase or ring-fence the budget execution of key recurrent and development expenditures in the sector at provincial level. These aspects as stipulated previously have been among the areas of performance indicators used for the disbursement of EU annual tranches and was at the core of the policy dialogue between the EUD and the Provincial authorities. However, specific PFM reforms supported by donors have not always yield result such as the introduction of output-based budgeting and the axct that the shifts in expenditure

have been volatile, in both current and development expenditures, with no direct linkage with performance.


In addition to the funds provided by the EU SBS Programmes themselves, an important indirect contribution of SBS in providing additional financial resource to the Sindh Education Budget has materialised following the development of the Sindh Education Sector Plan 2014-18 (SESP) that was at the core of the eligibility criteria of the 2<sup>nd</sup> SBS and its associated policy dialogue and capacity development programme. The Plan was developed by the RSU with technical assistance provided by the EU SBS. Funding for development of the Plan was consigned from the Global Partnership for Education (GPE). Based on the prerequisite of having developed the SESP, the Government of Sindh has indeed received funding and assistance from the Global Partnership for Education (GPE). The GPE funds have been directed towards (1) enhanced monitoring at the school level, (2) better communications on education policies and implementation thereof, and (3) development and implementation of a Human Resource Management Information System (HRMIS).

Overview/general analysis of Sector Education Budget in the two provinces were provided (Sindh and KP)

Share of Educational Levels in percentage of  
Total Education Budget 2013-14




Education Sector Budgetary Allocation in percentage of  
Total Provincial Budget 2013-14



Source: FABS Reports from PIFRA SAP System

The Study on Public financing of Education (2015, Institute of social and policy science in collaboration with DFID, source PIFRA/IFMIS) has confirmed that current expenditure accounts for the bulk of the education provincial budget and that provincial budgets (e.g. Sindh) provide for low allocation for development budget (12.5% for FY 2013-14 in Sindh). Sindh education budget represented during FY 2013-14 23% of the total provincial budget (allocation), 33% of the current provincial budget and 7% of the development provincial budget.

Problems with budget credibility were also confirmed for FY 2012-13 with an extremely low level of utilisation of the allocated funds for development budget. The table hereinafter provide an overview of the trends in development budget allocations and expenditures in the Sindh province between FY 2010-11 and FY 2013-14:



In terms of execution, non-salary budget represent a very small proportion of the current executed education budget despite being at the core of the day-to-day functioning of schools. Although around 19% of the total current education budget for 2012-13 was earmarked for non-salary expenditure, the utilisation rate remained only at 44% underlying the weak level of budget execution of non-salary expenditure in the Sindh province.

### Conclusion

Against all these elements, it could be concluded that SBS have provided an opportunity to help prioritise specific expenditure programmes inside the provincial education budgets of Sindh and KP, such as the improvement of budget allocation and execution at district level for important expenditures: rehabilitation/reconstruction of schools, textbooks free delivery, provision of basic facilities, provision of stipends for girls, development of capacities of PTCs...

It is difficult to assess the effective fiscal space provided by EU interventions at a time provinces have benefited from increased federal transfers under the 7<sup>th</sup> National Finance Commission Award while facing absorptive capacity problems and low level of non-salary budget execution. Pakistan's education expenditure as percentage of GDP has progressively increased from 1.9% in 2011/12 to 2.4% in 2014/15 and the size of provincial education budget has increased consistently over the same period (e.g. + 50% in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). Nevertheless the capacities of provinces to execute their education budget has been and remain severely constrained by weak capacities and inefficient PFM procedures as well as low budget credibility due to regular within-year budget adjustments by the executives. In addition, the share of salaries approaching 80% of total education sector expenditures in Sindh and KP provinces has considerably limited the margin of manoeuvre in terms of fiscal space for non-salary current and development expenditures at provincial level.

In the province of Sindh, the non-salary current and development education expenditure allocations budgeted for the fiscal years 2012/13 and 2013/14 were finally executed at 44% and 41% respectively. These levels of budget execution were even weaker when considering the sole primary and secondary education sub-sectors. By comparison, EU BS annual disbursement in the Sindh province during 2013/14 were less than Rs 1 billion compare to a total annual budget allocation of Rs 40 billion and effective annual expenditures (budget execution) of Rs 24 billion in these two subsectors.

However, based on the key performance indicators and conditions of donors' programmes, sector policy dialogue and financial supports of all concerned donors (EU, DFID, World Bank) have focused on promoting public spending for critical reform process and critical public expenditure programmes to meet day-to-day expenses of the education department and schools as well as to improve quality: teaching and learning materials, repair and maintenance of schools, provisions of basic facilities, girl stipends or vouchers for low-cost private schools. In response, concerned provincial governments have progressively included these considerations that were at the core of their education sector plans in their budget planning process. Budget allocations for core non-salary operating and development expenditures, while still representing a low share of provincial education budget and characterised by unsteady pattern across provinces, have been progressively increased such as in KP where budget allocations for non-

salary current and development expenditures were increased by 100% and 35% respectively between 2011/2012 and 2013/14. Budget allocations to improve quality of teaching and learning outcome in public schools were increased between 2011 and 2014 by more than 100% and 50% respectively in the Sindh and KP provinces. Except in the case of school rehabilitation, free textbook distribution and girl stipends public expenditure programmes, progress was generally unsatisfactory concerning the effective budget execution of key non salary expenditures where EU BS could not have a meaningful impact so far. As an example, operational requirements for teacher training programmes were mainly met through donor's projects funding.

In the case of Sindh province, the EU SBS together with other donors involved has promoted the implementation of the Sindh Education Reform Programme (SERP) aiming at addressing keys constraints and improve quality, equity and efficiency in education service delivery. Specific programmes of incentives consisted in free textbooks, stipends for girls, School Management Committee grants and a school rehabilitation fund. These initiatives were all centrally procured and issued directly to beneficiaries except for the school registration funds that were transferred to districts as part of their development budget. According to the Sindh Education Action Plan, the budget allocation for the SERP has showed a growth of 30% in FY 2012/13 compared to previous FY. However regular negative variance (between budgeted expenditures and actual expenditures) has been observed each year underlying the under-utilisation of allocated funds though the magnitude of the variance was progressively declining over the recent fiscal years.

At the same time budget allocation for this SERP has progressively represented an increasing share of the provincial non-salary budget (78% in 2012-13). While the SBs has supported the implementation of the SERP linking its capacity development activities and key performance criteria to the different sub-programmes of this action plan, the budget execution has been improved but not sufficiently to curb the important variance between budget allocation and execution. The BS amount annual provided to the budget has represented a tiny part of the non-executed amount. Consequently it is difficult to conclude that BS have provided a meaningful fiscal space to the provincial budget. However, policy dialogue surrounded the implementation of the SBS and the capacity development contribution of the SBS to progressively improved the capacity of the provincial and districts authorities may have provided important incentives to the overall budget execution of the reform programme.

While the education expenditures of the Sindh and KP Governments have globally registered a positive trend in the recent fiscal years particular in terms of budget allocation, it is difficult to affirm that the financial resources provided by the SBS programmes have been able to create a meaningful fiscal space due to the specific composition of public expenditures in the provincial education sector (majority earmarked for wages, low share for development and non-salary recurrent expenditures) and the magnitude of un-allocated or non-used budget

	<p>allocations particularly for development and non-salary expenditures (e.g. in Sindh where this represents 49% of the non-salary development budget ).</p> <p>As an example, in the case of Sindh province, out of an education sector budget for the FY 14-15 of roughly Rs 100 billion, the total of non-salary expenditure (current and development) was estimated at a total of Rs 24 billion with a rate of budget execution close to 51% compared to an annual SBS disbursement of less than Rs 1 billion.</p> <p>But the reform-orientated policy dialogue and the attached reform process promoted by the programmes (together with others donors involved) concerning the overall education sector management and the PFM (including the streamlining/cleaning of the wage bill) may contribute to progressively increase the fiscal space of the provincial governments and to improve the budget credibility of provincial education sector budgets.</p> <p>Issues related to the improvement of the tax basis (tax to GDP ratio) at federal and provincial level, the predictability of federal transfers to the province under the NFC Award and the overall credibility and predictability of the budget management and execution are also instrumental to allow such positive development with regards to provincial fiscal space and PFM..</p> <p><b>Sources:</b> Assessment of general and specific conditions of each annual BS tranches by EU Delegation and EuropeAID HQ. 2012 EC PK Evaluation Mission – Education Sector Programme in Khyber Pakhtunkhawa, Pakistan, 2012 Final Evaluation Report on SEPSP, EUD – Safege May 21 2012 MN 822, MN 823, MN 850 Source: GoS Budget Analysis 2014-15, budget information from the Ministry of Finance Public financing of Education in Pakistan, analysis of federal, provincial and districts budgets , 2010/11 to 2013-14 – Institute of Social and Policy Sciences, 2013</p>
	<p>Quality of evidence: <b>indicative but not conclusive</b></p>
I.3.5.4	<p><b>Increased financial resources (from provinces to district and for education)</b></p> <p>According to the final evaluation of the SEPSP of May 2012, while the BS programme had initially designed its financial lay out to intend circumventing the problem of resources diversion from major public expenditure programme designated to improve education schooling quality and access with a specific focus of special budget heads, the BS programme has not been able to find a way of fully protecting the education sector budget especially at the district level where the operations of primary and secondary schooling are funded. This is explained by the fact that funding to the districts is made under a system of single line transfer (SLT) by the provincial government under the Provincial Finance Commission (PFC) Award and that thereafter district financial managers have</p>

discretion over use of funds. However, establishment of terms of partnership (TOP) for the execution of specific public expenditure programme at district level (school rehabilitation funds) were considered as an additionality to districts governments' budget and a way to ensure proper execution of non- salary public expenditure programmes. PFM has been progressively recentralised at provincial level particularly concerning the management and execution of development expenditures.

In the absence of throughout public expenditure tracking surveys (PETS) carried out in the two provinces (up to districts) and taking into account the rising wage bill, it is difficult to assess the relative contribution of the EU BS operations to the non-salary and investment budget expenditures outlays. One of the key issue was the share of pay and allowance estimated at 80% of total education sector expenditures. This has considerably limited the margin of manoeuvre in terms of fiscal space for non-salary operational and development expenditures at district levels.

The close monitoring of the first BS programme in Sindh included monitoring of expenditures at district level that could have contributed to increasing financial allocation and execution at district budget for non-salary expenditure. However, PFM at provincial and district level has witnessed a re-centralisation at provincial level of development expenditure management.

However, poor planning and monitoring at district level in the use of non-salary resources have so far contributed to inefficient allocations of resources in public education. The focus of EU SBS programme to improve education sector management structures and skills at district level may have contributed to increase efficiency in the use of financial resources and improved absorption and PFM capacities, preparing the ground for increased financial allocations to the districts. At the same time, it appeared also that such specific PFM reforms as the recent adoption of biometric measures and the setting up of new management framework (deputy district officers...) may have, in the short term make, the PFM procedures more cumbersome, thought more secured, leading to the reduction of execution rate of the budget delay in the disbursement and execution of specific budget allocation

According to available study on Public financing in the Education sector, some districts are disproportionately disadvantaged in terms of their share in education expenditure. District expenditure accounts for about two-thirds of total education expenditure in the provinces. By and large, it consists of salary and non-salary expenditure for primary, middle and secondary schools. Development expenditure is rather planned and executed by the provincial tier. In the case of the Sindh province, the recurrent expenditure on primary and secondary education was the responsibility of districts as part of devolved departments under Local Government Ordinance 2001. But the Local government system was rolled back in 2012-13 and the entire budget became under the control of provincial government.



	<p>In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, during 2012-13, six districts accounted for 40 per cent of the total district education expenditure whereas a second group of 7 districts consumed 33 per cent of the total district education expenditure. Combined, these 13 districts used 73 per cent of the district expenditure for education out of total 25 districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.</p> <p>In KP, district expenditure accounts for about three quarters of the total education budget in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. District expenditure accounted for 74 percent, 73 percent and 71 percent of total education budget in 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 respectively. District expenditure comprises of salary and non-salary expenditure on primary and secondary education. The role of districts in development budget of education sector is negligible. The provincial government is responsible for framing the education policy and planning and it also controls the development work.</p> <p><b>Sources:</b> GoS Budget Analysis 2014-15, budget information from the Ministry of Finance Public financing of Education in Pakistan, analysis of federal, provincial and districts budgets , 2010/11 to 2013-14 – Institute of Social and Policy Sciences, 2013</p> <p style="text-align: center; background-color: #fce4d6;">Quality of evidence: <b>indicative but not conclusive</b></p>
I.3.5.5	<p><b>Increased capacity and pro-active strategies to address education issues</b></p> <p>Technical assistance/capacity building provided by the BS programmes to the provincial and district administrations have been instrumental in this regards in terms of education policy making (assistance to the development of provincial education sector reform and action plans), education management structures (PTC, SMC, deputy districts officer...) and improvement and operationalisation of an efficient monitoring system regarding the quality of service delivery at district levels.</p> <p>The EU capacity development interventions have been as much as possible prepared in coherence and complementarity with other donors interventions.</p> <p>EUD has played a proactive role in setting the basis of sector wide approach in a much coordinated approach in each province and has assisted KP and Sindh Governments in developing and approving their Education Sector Plans that were fully owned and has led to specific action plans and implementation process targeting key challenges in the sector.</p> <p>EU TA was particularly instrumental regarding the improvement of quality schooling e.g. in diagnose the main weaknesses of the whole cycle of textbook provision from planning to delivery including fiduciary risk assessment leading to adoption of action plan to improve the overall system. EU TA has also focus on developing third party verification and diagnosis for the expenditures on girls' stipends. The EU has also increased capacities in terms of development of</p>

curriculum framework. The Bureau of Curriculum, the PEACE (which provides diagnostic assessment for students learning), the Sindh Textbook Board, the Provincial Institute for Teacher Education (PITE), and Parents Teacher Committees have also been supported. In the case of KP, the EU capacity development has also been instrumental in the development and approval of an Institutional Framework for Teacher Development. In Sindh draft Curriculum Implementation Framework was adopted in 2014. An implementation plan was developed but the impacts were not yet visible.

The EU has also provided TA to develop teacher competencies and standards to be used as baselines for teacher performance and recruitment process and designed improved teacher entry tests based on core competencies in the overall framework of the reform of the quality of teaching and the set-up of merit based school specific recruitment of teachers. It has also assisted the Sindh government and most specifically the STEDA (Sindh Teacher Education Development Authority) and the PITE (Provincial Institute of Teacher Education) to develop a Teacher Education Development roadmap.

All these areas of support and capacity development were among the main issues that provincial government intended to address through their education sector policy and reform action plans. These interventions were also related to the key performance indicators governing the policy dialogue under the Sector Budget Support Programmes.

To address teacher absenteeism in Sindh, the government is getting data of all teachers in the first phase and 180k teaching and non-teaching staff is in the biometric system. They have brought in M&E officers from the private sector who report to the directorate of M&E for education, since 2014. The monitors have linked biometric gadgets connected with a biometric system.<sup>12</sup>

EMIS data is also being rechecked by monitors since it kept changing and could not be trusted. The government wants the data to be cross-verified and the EMIS census will now be conducted through a third party in all 29 districts.

In KP, the Independent Monitoring Unit monitors all schools through the data collection monitoring Data Collection and Monitoring Assistant (DCMA). They use android phones transmitted to a database which is an independent unit. Actions are taken by the Department of Education (DOE) to improve transparency. The data is accessible to the public through IMUKP.gov.pk

**Sources:** BS annual disbursement dossiers for each BS programme and the related assessments made by the Government, the EU Delegation and EUROPEAID HQ  
Evaluations (2012) of SBS in Sindh and in KP.  
MN 313, MN 312, MN 310

	<p>EU internal documents ROM</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>more than satisfactory</b></p>
I-3.5.6	<p><b>Evidence that the government policy remains supportive of intended objectives of the BS programme</b></p> <p>All assessment of BS disbursement files for each BS programme have confirmed the commitment of the provincial governments with regards to the objectives of the programmes particularly with regards to education sector policy implementation and fulfilment of performance targets of the programme as the latter are fully consistent with the provincial policies and sector action plans and the main challenges to be addressed in the education sector. The second round of BS programmes have confirmed the commitment of the provincial government to improve, consolidate and deepen the reform process in the sector at provincial and district levels. Several actions developed with the support of the EU SBS have been fully owned by the provincial governments.</p> <p>Adoption of sector reform plans, financing (or at least budgeting) of relevant public expenditure programmes was considered as evidence of commitment but capacities and availabilities of funds together with other factors (monsoon, earthquake, militancy, low institutional capacities, cultural factor in provincial rural areas ...) can explain also part of the lack of progress or even deterioration of key educational indicators.</p> <p>This commitment and ownership to education reform process has also often materialised in difficult political setting, serious economic situation, and pressures on the security front. Moreover, promulgation of laws for the implementation of devolution following the 18<sup>th</sup> constitutional amendment has been delayed due to disagreement between the legislators of various parties and a lot of time has been wasted on the issuance, cancellation and re-issuance of the Local Government Act. Despite these challenges, it has to be concluded that the Pakistan authorities are making progress, albeit slow, in advancing a number of politically difficult reforms, in order to stabilise the economy. The Education Department of Sindh and KP and the concerned reform support units have also made effort to protect the education budget in a tight fiscal environment (natural disasters, financial crisis).</p> <p>In the area of Sindh education policy reform an important step forward has been made with the development of the Sindh Education Sector Plan 2014-18 (SESP), prepared by the RSU with the assistance of the EU. Funding for development of the Plan was consigned from the Global Partnership for Education (GPE). This plan focus on promoting an enhanced governance and accountability; improving the education access and participation, reducing disparity in education services, improving student learning outcomes and ensuring sustainable sector financing. The Plan was launched by the Government of Sindh in September 2014 and provided the required framework for a comprehensive education reform and</p>

implementation process for the next years.

In KP, the August 2014 Annual Review Team reviewed the Results and Activities Framework (RAF). Their assessment of progress was that particular progress has been made on the strengthening of the capacity of the provincial education department, the revision of the education sector plan, the teacher rationalisation process, and the Independent Monitoring Unit. More work was however required on curriculum and learning assessment, the Internal Audit cell, the education complaints hotline and the merit-based appointments of District Education Officers. The GoKP budget for 14/15 demonstrates also the Provincial Government's commitment to education as the education sector (primary, secondary and tertiary) has been allocated 30% of the GoKP annual budget in this fiscal year with an increase of 11% of the Elementary and Secondary Education Department's total budget.

The Reform Support Units have been instrumental in ensuring ownership and support to the sector reform process spearheaded by the EU SBS programmes. This owned policy process was in the process to trickle down at the level of the whole Education Department. It is however difficult to find evidence of such diffusion process at district and sub district level as the reform process at provincial level has been highly centralised despite actions to strengthen the education sector management structures and responsibilities at district and sub-districts level.;

One important issue also concerns the provincial fiscal constraints and the macroeconomic and fiscal policy of the federal government, including tax reform, as provincial government are highly dependent from federal transfers and donors support to finance their education sector policies. However, it is difficult to assess whether the SBS intervention in the education sector at provincial level have been able to make a difference with regards to the required reform at the level of provincial tax policy and asses in which extent the policy dialogue has been instrumental in this regard. Similarly, it is difficult to assess whether the provincial government have made a dent in developing proper actions to tackle the budget credibility as related performance indicators attached to the SBs programme have regularly underperformed.

In the PFM areas, the provincial Governments have developed credible PFM Reform Strategy aimed at ensuring efficient and effective budget utilization, accurate and timely accounting and reporting, and effective scrutiny and review of the expenditure of public resources.

In the Sindh province, a specific EU TA project was deign in 2012. One of its component aims at assisting the Government of Sindh to develop its PFM reform strategy and establish a MTBF.

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has been pioneering on PFM reform starting from 2008 onwards. The reform process has been reinforced in the last two years with the

	<p>consolidation of a Provincial Reform Programme which has two key components; a Medium Term Budgetary Framework (MTBF) and output-based budgeting (OBB). The Provincial Government approved an Integrated Public Financial Management Strategy in 2011 which takes account of the findings of the PEFA's and focuses on the following: MTBF development; making the budget credible and result oriented for better service delivery; improving budget execution and reporting; capacity building of the workforce in audit, internal audit, Public Accounts Committee, Monitoring &amp; Evaluation; and accountability for results. Significant support to PFM reforms has been/is being provided by WB, ADB, IMF and DFID. The EU has prepared a support on PFM to the Federal Government under AAP 2012. At the provincial level it was decided to focus the EU support to PFM reform on Sindh, as major support is already being provided to KP from other donors.</p> <p>The new KP Government has put Education on the top of its priorities.</p> <p><b>Sources:</b> Disbursement files, EU Eligibility criteria assessments, EU SBS evaluation reports (2012) MN 305, MN 309, MN 310, EU internal documents</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Quality of evidence: <b>more than satisfactory</b></p>
I-3.5.7	<p><b>Progress in the delivery of the sector outputs</b></p> <p>Sindh:</p> <p>According to the final evaluation of the first Education BS programme in the Sindh Province, the following progress were acknowledged along the four pillars of the SEPSP (fiscal sustainability effectiveness of public expenditure and fiscal space for sector reform; education sector management and governance; access to quality schooling in rural areas and for girls; quality of teaching and learning):</p> <p><b>Pillar 1:</b> Overall effectiveness and policy influence are both scored as medium. While excellent progress has been made at the legal and institutional levels in the Government of Sindh, enforcement of procurement regulation has not yet taken place; textbook procurement issues<sup>79</sup> being a case in point. No programme-related intervention/ progress was made to enhance revenue generation at the provincial/ district levels that would ensure sustained increase in education sector allocations. Budget-making improvements were only limited to the macro/ top-down and did not aim to redress issues of functionality of the schools, the units of service delivery.</p> <p><b>Pillar 2:</b> Overall the effectiveness of SERP is high to medium, however, it is only medium when it comes to change within the various tiers of the education sector in Sindh. School rehabilitation under SERP (TOP) is an isolated programme intervention with unit costs much higher than the government's cost estimates. The TOP criteria and processes have also not been mainstreamed in the government education works department. While ASC process has been improved during the course of the programme, there is considerable room for improvement</p>

for stakeholders and planners to be sensitized to use of this huge database and employ it for managing the education sector on a scientific basis. Likewise, a number of initiatives have been taken for improvement of district education management, but these are yet to be implemented at the district level and below. SMCs have been reached and activated but their roles appear to be a little too advanced and these need to be simplified along with processes to ensure effective school community participation in management of schools.

**Pillar 3:** This is the 'strongest' pillar of the programme in terms of effectiveness of the execution of programme interventions and impact on the functioning of the education department. The latter is mainly because these government initiatives were only undertaken under the SERP. Textbook delivery and girl stipend programmes have been streamlined and their functioning much improved under the programme, partly due to technical assistance provided by the development partners and also by the willingness of the government to improve its functioning and being open to experimenting with new ideas. Open competitive method have been adopted for the publishing /printing of textbook. Survey-based TPV of textbook delivery have been organised.

According to the EU evaluation of the programme, 23 districts in Sindh have achieved the target of 90% of delivery rate (share of beneficiary girls from public schools that received stipend).

**Pillar 4:** Overall outcome of this pillar is rated at a 'medium' level, since two of the three interventions are systemic improvements and enabling in nature with results still to show. Merit-based teacher recruitment has been the glaring success of the programme and its lessons need to be noted for improving other interventions. TED and PEACE interventions need to be internalised in the system and permeate before they start showing results that can reflect at the systemic level.

In the context of the second Sindh Education BS Programme, SESSP, the EU has acknowledged significant progress through the development of the Sindh Education Sector Plan 2014-18 (SESP), which was endorsed by the Development Partners in March 2014 and launched by the GoS in September 2014. If the process of Plan development took almost two years, with additional technical assistance provided by the EU, the Plan provides a framework for education reform and implementation within those reforms for the next five years. Based on the prerequisite of having developed the SESP, the GoS is receiving funding and assistance from the Global Partnership for Education (GPE). The GPE funds will be directed towards, (1) enhanced monitoring at the school level, (2) better communications on education policies and implementation thereof, and (3) development and implementation of a Human Resource Management Information System (HRMIS).

Alongside the development of the SESP, there has been satisfactory progress in areas such as the school consolidation process for an agreed number of schools in the Sindh province, including a teacher rationalization exercise; the development

of a framework that supports curriculum reform and identifies roles and responsibilities for key implementers in this regard; and the continuation of student assessment processes and programmes. Challenges remain in the areas of merit based recruitment of teachers, retention and increases in girl students enrolment at primary level or closed schools.

Globally, the Evaluation was of the opinion that there has been significant progress in terms of policy implementation over the last years. Progress is expected to continue given the structured framework for reform implementation provided by the SESP and the continued attentiveness of the development partners in providing support for these efforts.

In KP, satisfactory progress was made in aligning the DESE Budget with the MTBF

According to The Rom of the KP-ERSP, the preliminary direct impact prospects of the Programme at overall objective level were mixed. Progress was reported regarding (i) literacy rate (increase from 43% in 2003/4 to 53% in 2010/11); (ii) enrolment (net enrolment rate for primary education increased from 32% (2005/6) to 34% (2010/2011) for girls but decreased at secondary level); (iii) student-teacher-ratio (improvements in urban areas and declining in rural areas). The Programme have had a positive impact on the availability and quality of teachers by creating increased fiscal space (SBS) and through capacity building, but given the magnitude of the target group the impact prospects remained limited. The GoKP published the Capacity Development Strategy in June 2010 and the EUD (through GIZ) implemented capacity building interventions (i.e. in service teacher training) within this framework. The existence of the CDS have improved impact prospects as it has allowed for a coordinated approach among the key stakeholders. However, governance of the education sector remains an area of concern and impact prospects are regarded as limited. Despite some progress (e.g. increased power of disbursement for local parent-teacher councils who are in charge of maintenance and construction of school facilities), the devolution process has not yet generated a positive impact on the quality and management of basic education in KP Province. The Districts, officially in charge of service delivery, still have no effective discretion regarding allocation and management of funds and most district education officers do not have the capacity needed for the planning and implementation of ESP. Capacities are still weak in the main stakeholders (ESRU, District Offices, and Parent Teacher Councils on school level).

The 2012 evaluation have considered that the KP-ESRP has provided complementarities to other donor assistance to KP province's education sector creating opportunity for greater synergy and harmonization. Although a relatively small part of GoKP's overall education budget, the EU's SBS programme has provided additional fiscal space to education budget and should provide some leverage for continued policy dialogue on sector policy reforms.

Extract from the 2012 Evaluation of the KP BS Programme:

At the time of evaluation (end 2012) of the KP-ESRP progress can be summarised as follows:

- (i) progress has been made with regard to both public procurement of goods, works and services, and aligning the E&SED budget with the core priorities of the ESP as part of the MTBF 2011/12-2014/15;
- (ii) Parent Teacher Committees (PTC) have been established in 27,207 schools and elections to PTCs were held in 13 districts while conditional cash grants (CCG) scheme has been successfully launched in 2 pilot districts of Buner and D.I. Khan through PTCs (3rd party validation report shows positive impact of PTCs);
- (iii) teaching and management cadres have been separated although recently there has been a part reversal of deployment rules for the management cadre staff in that can be posted back to schools as teachers/principals causing disaffection and low morale among management cadre staff; in addition there is an urgent need to provide training to this category of staff so that they can perform their duties effectively;
- (iv) although successful in producing annual school census reports Education Management Information System (EMIS) both at provincial and district levels is still weak in terms of timely collection and analysis of data and meeting the planning and development needs of the sector including distribution of textbooks, and stipends scheme for girls; the EMIS needs to be substantially augmented with staff, resources and technical assistance. A 3<sup>rd</sup> party validation report finds considerable differences in EMIS enrolment data especially as well as teaching staff which is 3% at primary level and 9% at secondary level; similarly there are noticeable differences in basic facilities in schools;
- (v) free textbooks were distributed to nearly 100% students from class I to Class XII in government schools during academic year 2011-12, although direct EMIS data couldn't be used due to time lag in the collection and validation of data, same is true with regard to the distribution of girls stipend scheme for classes 1-X (mentioned earlier);
- (vi) According to 2010-2011 Annual Statistical Report the average teacher student ratio in government primary schools in the province is 1:39. However, in some districts and schools the individual STR is more than 1:40. Therefore, E&SED has made a case with the Finance Department for creation of 9000 more teacher posts to achieve the standard STR throughout the province. A 3% increase in enrolment was expected but the actual increase was reported to be 5%;
- (vii) PTCs are being empowered with funds to address the "missing facilities" (water, electricity and sanitation/toilets for boys and girls, boundary walls etc.) in their respective schools; evidence suggests that given the opportunity PTCs can do more with less including hiring teachers to fill in existing vacancies on short-term contract basis;
- (viii) there has been some movements to establish an Institutional Framework for Teacher Development (IFTD) that would ensure continued professional development of teachers throughout their career; however this needs to be



	<p>vigorously pursued with effective commitment of resources and technical expertise. In addition, various institutions involved in curriculum, textbook printing/publishing and teacher training activities such as DCTE (Directorate of Curriculum &amp; Teacher Education), Textbook Board, PITE (Provincial Institute of Teacher Education), RITE (Regional Institutes of Teacher Education), and PEAC (Provincial Education Assessment Centre) etc. seem to be engaged in overlapping or sometimes conflicting roles. This needs to be rationalized to enhance their efficiency and effectiveness.</p> <p><b>Sources:</b> Sindh SEPSP, EU , Final Evaluation Report 2012 Disbursement dossiers of BS instalments, ROM of KP ERSP MN 305, EU internal documents, MN 308,</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Quality of evidence: <b>more than satisfactory</b></p>
I-3.5.8	<p><b>Evidence of contribution of BS through TA and policy dialogue to the building of an evidence base allowing to follow up the implementation and results of the policies</b></p> <p>The TA has been instrumental in developing education sector policy and plan as well as performance assessment and monitoring of their implementation. Progress have been made to improve during the course of each BS implementation the quality of the performance assessment framework particularly to monitor the implementation of the provincial education policy as well as strengthening the Education Management Information System at provincial and district levels (cf. I 3.5.5 above). However, weaknesses remain with regard to the provincial information system.</p> <p>Policy dialogue in the KP province in coordination with the key partners has also contributed to streamline the performance assessment framework of the newly adopted Education sector Plan with definition of SMART KPI with appropriate source of verification. .</p> <p><b>Sources:</b> EU internal documents, disbursement dossiers, 2012 evaluation reports on SBS intervention, and sources used above for I 3.5.5</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Quality of evidence: <b>indicative but not conclusive</b></p>
I-3.5.9	<p><b>Minutes and other documents demonstrating the existence of a dialogue on the key policy issues pertaining to the sector.</b></p> <p>No specific minutes of meeting available but each disbursement assessment of the EUD confirmed the existence of a regular policy dialogue on the eligibility criteria and the performance indicators between the EU and the concerned authorities at provincial level, including in the context of joint coordination with the other donors involved in the sector.</p> <p><b>Sources:</b> BS disbursement files, 2012 evaluations of SBS, EU internal documents</p>

	Quality of evidence: <b>indicative but not conclusive</b>
I-3.5.10	<p><b>Conclusions of IMF and other donor studies on the evolution of the financial and administrative governance of the sector.</b></p> <p>The IMF reports confirmed the track record of the government of Pakistan with regards to macroeconomic and fiscal policies after problems encountered between 2010/2012 where a review of EFF was note concluded. The country has since pursued a credible and relevant stability oriented macroeconomic policy aiming at restoring fiscal and external stability and sustainability. The Government negotiated a three year USD 6.6 billion Extended Fund Facility with the IMF in September 2013. The fifth Review was successfully completed in December 2014, marking the middle of the programme with half of the Extended Fund Facility (around USD 3.2 billion) fully disbursed by December 2014. The government reform programme is broadly on track and the IMF is encouraged by the overall progress in strengthening macroeconomic stability and output growth. Macroeconomic conditions are improving, but significant risks (security, political constrains, energy, climate) to the recovery remain. The measures taken by the authorities to address short-term macroeconomic vulnerabilities and implement structural reforms are bearing fruit, but continued efforts are needed to make the economic transformation more sustainable. Macroeconomic indicators generally improved during 2014, with growth continuing to gain momentum and inflation on downward trajectory. GDP growth is expected to rise to 4.3% in 2014/2015. Despite recent progress under the program, Pakistan's tax revenue remains very low relative to comparator developing countries and the tax effort expected for the country's level of development. This reflects narrow tax bases, overgenerous tax concessions and exemptions, weak and fragmented revenue administrations, and structural features of the economy. The tax revenue to GDP ratio has rebounded in recent years, mainly owing to the elimination of concessions and exemptions, and improved to 11 percent in 2015. It is, however, still significantly below comparator developing countries and Pakistan's own tax potential. The IMF recently suggested that a concerted agenda of well-designed federal and provincial policy adjustments and institutional reforms aimed at expanding tax bases, reducing tax concessions and exemptions, addressing structural weaknesses in fragmented tax administrations, and improving tax compliance across all sectors of the economy will not only boost revenue mobilization, but also improve the perceived fairness of the tax system in Pakistan.</p> <p>According to the Word Bank, although Pakistan has made some progress in improving access to education over the past decade, it still faces major challenges in providing access to quality education at all levels. It has the world's second highest out-of school population (7 million) two-thirds of them girls (though enrolment rates vary appreciably between and within provinces). National surveys of student learning suggest that achievement is also very low—a sizable share of school leavers do not achieve even minimum mastery of mathematics, reading, and language, as defined by the government. The main contributing factors include poor teacher quality and accountability, inadequate and inefficient funding, and weak management and governance. Since the 18th Amendment was</p>

passed in 2010, the management and financing of education has been decentralized to the provinces, but national standards need to be set and their achievements monitored to address disparities in access to quality education between provinces. The federal government should play this role and coordinate and facilitate the provision of “education for all”.

The WB recommendations for reform priorities concern:

- making learning outcomes an explicit goal of education policy, improve teacher effectiveness and accountability with the development and implementation of policies that focus on teacher performance and management. These policies should be the cornerstone of an education system that is effective and efficient in providing quality education to all children. Sindh has already launched reforms to improve teacher quality and accountability, focusing on recruitment and management policies. These policies should be implemented throughout the country and entail four steps. First, clear standards need to be set for recruitment, deployment, transfers, and postings, with strong safeguards against decisions not based on merit. Second, operate preservice and in-service training needs. Third, provide intensive support to teachers in low-performance schools. Fourth, teachers need to know that if they acquire new skills and perform well, they will be rewarded—and vice versa. EU has provided TA to develop teacher test, advice on recruitment procedures and set up of teacher competencies standards.
- Another priority concerns the need to improve governance, efficiency, and quality, using financing as a tool. School finance systems must provide the necessary resources so that all students, regardless of background, can learn. All provinces and areas need mechanisms that ensure adequate resources for all schools. The mechanisms should be aimed at meeting the minimum requirements for creating and maintaining acceptable learning conditions. Minimum funding standards for schools should be developed and implemented—and be objective, criteria-based, and linked closely with the needs of schools (most specifically, the number of students in the schools). As more funding is required to improve resource-use efficiency and learning outcomes, Pakistan could consider financing tools that have shown promise in other countries, such as changes in the incentives structure for both teachers and schools.
- Enhanced learning-assessment systems are necessary to monitor progress in learning outcomes and in improvements in schooling quality over time.
- In the face of capacity and resource constraints, leveraging the contribution of the private sector is key to meeting the challenges of improved access and quality.

Several studies on public financing/PFM in the education sectors have been used to inform the answer to the previous indicators. These studies have often revealed the lack of connections between education policies/strategies and actual budget allocations for the sector. While the education policies emphasize output-based budgeting, the practice is still the traditional incremental budget making in the province. Most of the current expenditure on education sector goes to salary of

	<p>the employees thus leaving very little space for other important heads and leaves very little room for operation &amp; maintenance. Despite the fact that the bulk of enrolment and school infrastructure in provinces is in primary schools, primary sector receive less than proportionate share of budget. Due to this neglect, the literacy indicators at the primary level remain almost stagnant. More than half of government primary schools have two or less rooms. Similarly, half of the schools are run by two or less teachers. The study also reveals large intra district disparities in terms of allocation of resources. On the development expenditure side, in the case of KP, budget to the tune of 80 percent goes to the secondary education and thus neglecting the development of primary education sector in the province, totally in contrast with the stated policy focus on the primary education in all the policy documents of the provincial government. To achieving the MDGs, provincial authorities have to shift focus to primary education and make efforts to improve basic infrastructure to bring-in the out of school children to schools, especially girls.</p> <p><b>Sources:</b> IMF and WB reports, macroeconomic eligibility criteria assessment under SBS disbursement dossiers, existing PFM studies on the education sector (CGPA 2014)</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>more than satisfactory</b></p>
<b>JC-3.6</b>	<p><b>The EU contributed to improved offer and quality of education services in the provinces and districts supported.</b></p> <p>Improvement of coverage and quality of public service delivery in the education sector is at the core of the provincial education sector and reform plans. BS have been instrumental together with others donors (World Bank, DFID...) in supporting this policy &amp; reform making process and their implementation through specific provincial action plans - All this supports have contributed to mobilise political support in favour of allocating additional resources to human development, improved sector planning, budget execution and institutional strengthening.</p> <p>Regarding additional resources, BS are expected to have promote the pace of rehabilitation of schools in KP and the provision of basic facilities. In general a distinction should be made between the budgetary allocations to non-salary current expenditures where an increasing trend was observed and the effective execution that have been lower.</p> <p>In this context, EU BS interventions have particularly targeted and supported, financially and technically, and in complementarity with other donors, specific pillars of the provincial sector strategies related to the education sector management, the access to quality schooling and the quality of teaching that will consolidate the provincial and district capacities to improve the education services to the population.</p> <p>EU BS have promoted, through the support to the rehabilitation and reconstruction process of damaged schools due to conflicts or natural disaster situations, the required school consolidation process needed in several districts. This process spearheaded the merging of several schools and the progressive development of streamlined schooling administrative structures at district level. In the framework of these public works, the EU has also supported the development of Terms of Partnerships at district levels in order to strengthen the financial and administrative relations between the provinces and the districts as well as a</p>

greater involvement of local communities.

BS has then supported complementary specific government's public expenditure programmes that have improved the number of students benefitted from textbooks distribution as well as better schooling conditions through the delivery of basic facilities to rural schools. In this specific area, the EU has contributed to government piloting of new procedures introducing competitive and transparent practise in textbook development and management (procurement/printing, concept of book bank...).

The BS has also assisted the provincial government in the development and implementation of a merit-based teacher recruitment and teacher education policies, including the progressive operationalisation of improved teacher training programme based on updated curriculum frameworks leading up to now to a progressive improvement of the quality of new teacher hired and the teachers' training effectiveness and quality.

Finally, EU BS programmes have supported the progressive development, training and operationalisation of the School Management Committees and/or Parent Teacher Councils (PTC) in an increasing numbers of schools as well as the first stages to strengthen management capacities at district and sub-district education offices. In doing so, the EU BS have attempted to support the provincial governments in answering the needs in the education public sector to further decentralise and strengthen policy, planning and financial management at district and sub district level, improve the overall quality education at school level and promote greater accountability and transparency. Increasing participation of parents and local community in the education activities at district level is expected to contribute to address key sector challenges such as teacher absenteeism and equity in access to school.

Contribution of BS programme have been more limited with regards to several over challenges such as the need to increase the availability of teachers in schools but the specific focus of EU and other donors on this issue has allowed to accompany the provincial government in their efforts to streamline teacher recruitment and deployment policy with a focus on reducing the number of vacant teacher position and preparing the provision of the concerned districts with the recruitment authority for observed vacant positions.

It has to be reminded that these policy and institutional reform process have occurred in a complex political economy environment but are expected to lay the ground for improved education public services delivery -

I-3.6.1	<p><b>Degree of realisation of the verifiable indicators of outcomes provided in the matrices of conditions of the different SBS projects as assessed in the disbursement files.</b></p> <p>In both provinces, SBS have a component related to offer and quality of education public services.</p> <p>Key performances Indicators related to <b>improving offer and quality of education services have concerned</b> the improvement of quality and learning outcomes through a focus on curriculum development, student learning outcomes, school performance and teacher management an training. Provisions</p>
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of textbook and basic facilities as well as reconstruction or rehabilitation civil work for public schools in several districts have also been promoted by the programmes to improve quality schooling, particularly in the conflicted affected area of Malakand Division (KP provinces) but also in others districts in the Sindh and KP provinces that have been affected by monsoon floods. Monitoring of progress in these related policy process and output orientated activities have concluded several achievement that were expected to contribute directly or indirectly to the offer and quality of educations public services.

In Sindh a Number of School Management Committees have also been activated for several main and functional schools in the province and funds/grant allocations were released directly by the provincial Education Department to these SMC in order to allow a decentralisation of capacity building in school improvement planning. Distribution of new textbooks within the first month of academic year has also been made in the majority of schools at districts level and new procedures introducing competitive and transparent practise in textbook development and management (procurement/printing, concept of book bank...) have been piloted. Progress in implementation of merit and need-based teacher recruitment has also contributed to the quality of new teacher hires while policy on teacher education development was formulated and implemented to proactively improve teacher training effectiveness and quality. Piloting of continuous professional development programme (CPD) in several districts have been carried out. The second SBS programme, in the continuity of the first programme, has particularly supported the development and implementation if the teacher education development policy (TED) in line with an updated curriculum implementation framework in line with the 2006 curriculum of the Education Department (cf. detailed in I.3.6.4 hereinafter).

Key findings of the 2012 evaluation of the Sindh Education Plan Support Programme (SEPSP, grant):

Table 1. A Summary of the Results

	Pillar/ Intervention	Effectiveness in achieving key programme objective (s)			Impact at Policy/ Sector Level		
		High	Medium	Low	High	Medium	Low
<b>A</b>	<b>Fiscal Sustainability and effectiveness of public expenditures</b>		<input type="checkbox"/>			<input type="checkbox"/>	
1	Procurement Reform	<input type="checkbox"/>				<input type="checkbox"/>	
2	MTBF/ Revenue generation			<input type="checkbox"/>			<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>B</b>	<b>Education Sector Management</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>				<input type="checkbox"/>	
3	Efficiency and Quality of School Rehabilitation		<input type="checkbox"/>				<input type="checkbox"/>
4	Timeliness and Quality of ASC	<input type="checkbox"/>					<input type="checkbox"/>
5	Strengthening District Education Management		<input type="checkbox"/>			<input type="checkbox"/>	
6	Strengthening SMCs		<input type="checkbox"/>				<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>C</b>	<b>Access to Quality Schooling</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>			<input type="checkbox"/>		
7	Textbook Delivery	<input type="checkbox"/>			<input type="checkbox"/>		
8	Stipends for Girls	<input type="checkbox"/>			<input type="checkbox"/>		
9	Public Private Partnership	<input type="checkbox"/>			<input type="checkbox"/>		
<b>D</b>	<b>Quality of Teaching and Student Learning</b>		<input type="checkbox"/>			<input type="checkbox"/>	
10	Merit Based School Specific Teacher Recruitment	<input type="checkbox"/>			<input type="checkbox"/>		
11	Teacher education development		<input type="checkbox"/>			<input type="checkbox"/>	
12	Learning assessment of students		<input type="checkbox"/>			<input type="checkbox"/>	

Source: SEPS – Final Evaluation Report (21-05-2012), p.7

In KP, the programme has supported the development, training and operationalisation of Parent Teacher Councils (PTC) in all government schools to contribute to quality education, timely execution of developmental projects and promoting the participation and cooperation of the parents and communities in the education activities. In 2012, the trigger of the concerned KPI of having operating PTC in 50% of Schools in the province was achieved and Provision of missing facilities to more than 50% of government schools being part of a priority list of schools under a planning commission (PC-1). 100% of students of government schools from class I to class XII had also received textbooks at the end of 2012. Nominations of several Education District Officers also contributed to progressively separate at district level the management and teaching cadres while developing specific personnel management information system to identify training and deployment needs. Performance have been more nuanced on the increased availability of teachers in schools as the objectives was to reduce each year the percentage of schools with Student Teacher Ratio greater than 40/1 compared to a baseline established under the annual school census; While the target was not reached, government made progress to streamline the teacher recruitment and deployment policy with a focus on reducing the number of vacant teacher position and providing the concerned districts with recruitment authority for observed vacant positions. The observed additional recruitment and vacancies during the programme implementation have not been sufficient to reach the target set with the EU SBS programme as financial factors have also constrained the overall recruitment process.

	<p><b>Sources:</b> SEPPSP – Final Evaluation Report (21-05-2012) Evaluation of KP SBS programme BS Disbursement files related to KP an Sindh SBS</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>more than satisfactory</b></p>
I-3.6.2	<p><b>Verification that the indicators mentioned under I-3.6.1 are disaggregated in line with the population targeted by the intervention (e.g. gender, ethnic minority, social group, etc.)</b></p> <p>The process, policy and output orientated indicators were not disaggregated but aim at targeting a specific geographical rural population affected by flooding, poorest education infrastructure and basic facilities, as well girls at school through a specific system of targeted stipends. As an example the intervention related to the financing of term of partnership for school reconstruction was considered as highly relevant and desirable as research have shown that a girl in rural Sindh was 16 times more likely to be out of school than a boy in urban Sindh, and in view of the exacerbated rural-urban inequities in Sindh.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The key education indicators of access, equity and quality are included in consultation with different stakeholders in the NEMIS data collection framework and analysis. (Source: EU, Evaluation Mission – Education Sector Programme in Khyber Pakhtunkhawa, Pakistan)</li> <li>▪ In Sindh, the Sindh Education Reform – Technical Assistance (SERTA) has also given weightage to access (of education with focus on girls) under Sindh Education Sector Plan as a fully functional Pillar 3: Improving Access to Quality Schooling Particularly in Rural Areas and for Girls. (EU, SERTA Input Plan 2009)</li> </ul> <p><b>Sources:</b> EU, Evaluation Mission – Education Sector Programme in Khyber Pakhtunkhawa, Pakistan, EU, SERTA Input Plan 2009</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>indicative but not conclusive</b></p>
I-3.6.3	<p><b>Evolution of PRSP indicators for the sector</b></p> <p>In Sindh, the progress of the sector is measured through the Provincial Education Assessment System (PEAS), the Sindh Education Management Information System (SEMIS) and the Standardized Assessment Test (SAT) Reports published by Sindh Education Department, separately. Focus of the PEAS is on curriculum effectiveness and it is based on sample tests while focus of the SAT is on learning achievements. Consolidated progress reports on the reform of the sector are not published by the Education Department. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa the progress is tracked through Independent Monitoring Unit (IMU) technically supported by DFID. At the federal level, the education census is conducted by Academy for Educational Planning and Management (AEPAM) whereas the National Education Assessment System (NEAS) is responsible for monitoring the effectiveness of curriculum based teaching and learning through sample assessments.</p>



The government (PRSP secretariat – finance Division) has published its first quarterly progress report on PRSP for FY 2011/12 indicating the evolution of PRSP budgetary expenditures in the education sector. It was acknowledged that for Sindh and KP provinces, education expenditures have respectively increased by 19.9% and 22.8% in first quarter of the FY 2011-12 compared to FY 2010-11.

Aggregate PRSP expenditures in Education sector experienced a healthy growth of 33.35 percent from Rs. 66,367 million in Q1-FY 2010/11 to Rs. 88,503 million in Q1-FY 2011/12. Expenditures growth in Federal and Punjab province (55.75 percent and 39.64 percent respectively) provided huge contribution to Education sector's overall expenditures growth. At provincial level, strongly positive growth were observed in all the provinces with maximum expenditures growth in Punjab i.e. 39.64 percent; followed by Balochistan, KP and Sindh with 26.08 percent, 22.84 percent and 19.94 percent respectively. Primary education witnessed at national level an increase of 20.66 percent in its expenditures with Sindh experiencing the highest increase of 33.64 percent and KP 27.45 percent.

No specific indicators were provided with regards to **offer and quality of education services**. However, the PRSP report monitored **intermediate output indicators for the education sector that include information about the functioning of public schools, percentage of teachers trained, and an update on basic facilities in these schools**. In the last available PRSP progress report, for FY 2011-12, slight increase of the number of functional public schools were recorded between FY 2010-11 and 2011-12 in Sindh and KP provinces:

Sindh province: FY2011/12 40,822 functional primary schools (compared to 39,762 in FY 2010/11)

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa FY2011/12 22,760 functional primary schools (compared to 22,608 in FY2010/11)

Source Academy of Educational planning and management, MET.

Regarding the percentage of trained teachers, the report mentioned for the Sindh region a 3% point increase between FY 2010-11 and FY 2011- 12 in the number of teacher trained at the primary level from 94% to 97% and from 96% to 98% for the middle/secondary level. In KP, the percentage of trained teachers remained stable at 99% for the primary level.

Another intermediate indicators focus on the proportion of basic facilities in public schools (water, latrine, electricity and boundary wall in schools). The total figures for schools including both primary and middle schools depicted a 64 percent increase in both water and latrines facilities during FY2011-12.

In Sindh Electricity facility recorded a significant increase of 18 percentage point from 24 percent to 42 percent between FY 11 and FY 12. Proportion of schools having boundary walls registered an increase of 7 percentage points from 53 percent to 60 percent. Proportion of public schools having water facilities

increased by 1 percentage point from 49 percent to 50 percent. While Schools with latrine facilities also increased by 2 percentage point from 56 percent to 58 percent during FY12 when compared to FY11.

In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Schools with latrine facilities increased by 1 percentage point from 74 percent to 75 percent. Proportion of schools having boundary walls increased by 1 percentage points, from 71 percent to 72 percent. The growth in Electricity facility remained at 52 percent in FY11 and in FY12. A 1 percentage point decrease from 66 percent to 65 percent was recorded in water facilities during FY12 when compared with FY11.

No subsequent PRSP progress report were available report adter 2011/12.

According to the latest UN report on MDG in Pakistan (2013):

#### MDG 2 Universal Primary Education

The MDG2 for Pakistan targets 100 percent primary school enrolment, 100 percent completion of education from grades 1-5 and an 88 percent literacy rate. Rates of net primary enrolment and completion increased up to the mid-2000s but thereafter slowed and fluctuated, and in 2011/12 were 57 percent and 50 percent respectively. The literacy rate is 58 percent overall, but this is highly skewed towards males – 70 percent of males are literate compared to 47 percent of females. Pakistan is thus off-track on all three targets, and therefore not likely to achieve MDG 2.

#### MDG 3 Promote Gender Equality & Women's Empowerment

MDG3 aims to eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education by 2005, and in all levels of education by 2015. Gender parity in education has improved –for primary education, secondary education and youth literacy, but still falls short of the MDG targets set for 2015. Punjab, with its higher base, remains the leader in education indicators, but inter-provincial disparities between Punjab, Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have narrowed; Overall, with all four sub indicators (with set targets) of this goal off-track, Pakistan is unlikely to meet MDG 3.

#### **Goal 2: Achieve Universal Primary Education (2013)**

Net primary enrolment ratio (percent) 57 (target 100)

Completion/survival rate Grade 1 to 5 (percent) 50 (target 100)

Literacy rate (percent) 58 (target 88)

#### **Goal 3: Promote Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment**

GPI Primary Education 0.9 (target 1.00)

GPI Secondary Education 0.81(target 1.00)

Youth Literacy GPI 0.81(target 1.00)

In terms of offer and quality of education services in the provinces and districts supported, according to the Pakistan Education Statistics, the pupil teacher ratio at primary education have improved between 2007-08 and 2013-14 from 35 to 29 in the Sindh region while it has slightly deteriorated from 42 to 43 in the KP province.

	<p><b>Sources:</b> PRSP Progress Report FY 2011/12, PRSP Finance Department</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>indicative but not conclusive</b></p>
I-3.6.4	<p><b>Evolution of curricula</b></p> <p>The national curriculum was updated in 2006 and the Teacher Education curriculum was updated during 2007 and 2008. Training manuals were developed and used by all regional, institutes of teacher education in the provinces.</p> <p>The 2006 National Curriculum is considered the first curriculum to have clearly identified 'students learning outcomes' (SLOs). In addition the teaching learning process is activity-based and concept clearance instead of rote memorization. The National Textbooks Policy 2007 evolved through an interprovincial consultative process calls for outsourcing of the publishing functions of the Provincial Textbook Boards (PTB) to the private sector. The implementation of the new curriculum was done in three phases (years) and started in 2010 with the development of new textbooks.</p> <p>Following the devolution process the Ministry of Federal Education and Professional Training (MFEPT) that was in charge of the 2006 curriculum at federal institutions has attempted to work on minimum standards of curriculum across all regions by taking them on board.</p> <p>The EU SBS in Sindh has supported the provincial efforts in development of teacher education. While the first programme has supported the gradual implementation of a comprehensive Teacher Education Development (TED) in order to address the serious deficiencies in teacher education and professional development and improve teacher training effectiveness and teacher quality, the second programme has supported the Government effort to develop, approve and operationalise a Curriculum Implementation Framework (CIF) including the development of an action plan based on the 2006 national curriculum.</p> <p>After working on the development of the curriculum with the setting up of an advisory committee on curriculum and textbook reforms the government has approved the CIF in 2014 and the issuance of the Curricula and School Standards Act 2014 as well as a specific implementation plan. In this context the Sindh government has first reviewed and aligned the Sindh textbook and material development policy with the CIF as well as the TED policy. Similarly, in order to take into account the new CIF impact on teacher education, the strategy on this teacher education was in the processed to be revised in line with the CIF and a plan of training of all primary school teachers was developed with as a first step the completion of training of critical mass of teacher trainers in the all teacher training institution.</p> <p>Textbooks from grade 1 to 5 were developed and 25000 teachers were trained on new textbooks through PITE.</p> <p>The first Sindh SBS programme had envisioned an integrated and coherent</p>

system for pre-service training, termed Initial Teacher Education (ITE) and systematic in-service (referred to as Continuous Professional Development (CPD)) in the medium to longer term. Implementation prioritised CPD in order to raise the standards of existing teachers, while impacting mid-to-long term capacity by means of raising the quality of new teachers within ITE. The BoC and the PITE were strengthened and rationalised in their redefined roles: PITE serving as the single operational body responsible for all ITE and CPD provision, while the BoC is responsible for curriculum and assessment.

KP has attempted to standardise content development in textbooks and standards for assessment were developed for the eight Boards of Intermediate and Secondary Education (BISEs). KP has new curriculum. It had developed and approved in 2007 an Institutional Framework for Teacher Development (IFTD) that provided strategies and guidelines for the changes in teacher preparation and support including the revision of the curriculum of the pre and in service programme, equipping the instructors of training institutes with latest development and technology and overall development of the teacher. In order to achieve the objectives of the IFTD, the Education Department had formulated a Capacity Development Strategy. The Directorate of Curriculum and Teacher Education (DCTE) has been in charge of teacher training based on the updated curriculum and manuals. Regular monitoring of these training programmes are carried out. A specific joint steering committee was set up in April 2012 (Bureau of intermediate & secondary education of Peshawar BISE, PITE, DCTE...) to prepare the Curriculum implementation Framework for the KP province.

BS, essentially through policy dialogue with other donors, have promoted the budgeting of the Capacity Development Strategy that included the Institutional Framework for Teacher Development.

The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Education Sector Program (KESP) technical assistance (TA) works through an annual work plan. GIZ focused on quality whereas the KESP was not focused on that. However; while referring to the KESP 2010-15 it was assessed that the document has a complete chapter on the improvement of quality. There was standardization of content development in textbooks and standards for assessment were developed for the eight Boards of Intermediate and Secondary Education (BISEs). Moreover, with a new curriculum there was a need for new assessment patterns, and a need for linking training institutions and textbook boards with assessment. Further, it has been agreed by the provinces to have a National Curriculum Council to agree on minimum standards and for alignment of curriculum with assessment and content development.

So far 25,000 primary teachers have been trained on the new textbooks and curriculum through the Provincial Institute of Teacher Education (PITE), Sindh. A Curriculum and School Standards Act was also passed in 2014 by the provincial assembly. The representative of the Ministry of Federal Education and Professional Training further elaborated on the Curriculum Council that it includes the provincial governments. The curriculum design is at an advanced

	<p>stage. He was of the view that federal government should do minimum standards on curriculum. The Sindh govt. would like to engage more on these areas with external donors, and need to pilot the activity of introducing new textbooks in some schools. The 2006 curriculum is an ongoing process with the federal ministry carefully reviewing their requirements and assessing their needs.</p> <p><b>Sources:</b> MN-310 2015-11-25; MN-313 2015-11-26; MN-314 2015-11-27 Disbursement files of Sindh and KP SBS, FA.</p> <p style="text-align: center; background-color: #f4b084;">Quality of evidence: strong.</p>
I-3.6.5	<p><b>Existing evidence (evaluations, studies) of the effectiveness of the Government policy at provincial and district levels (positive links between output and outcomes in the sector)</b></p> <p>In Sindh, progress is measured through indicators set against benchmarks. The progress shared with Economic Affairs Division Islamabad as well as Sindh Government. However; no consolidated annual progress report is published. Neither any academic, technical nor any impact study was commissioned by RSU/Third party except EU midterm evaluation. Similarly in Punjab, Government does not develop consolidated Progress Report or any impact assessment study on Education ASER report may be termed as “Impact Report”.</p> <p>The UNESCO had conducted policy analysis of education policies of provinces of Pakistan in year-2011. According to which very few targets were touched including girls subsidy, formation of STEDA, etc.</p> <p>The eligibility criteria assessment of the Commission provide also information regarding the relevance, credibility and effectiveness of the education sector policy at provincial level One of the conclusions is that the provincial governments have engaged into a structural policy reform process in the sector that will require a certain period of time before it brings results in terms of outcome and impact in the sector as witness by the comparison of the key MDG indicators between 2007 and 2013 hereinafter:</p>

	2007-2008			2013-2014			Source
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	
<b>Population that has completed primary level or higher</b>							
Pakistan	58	37	47	58	40	49	(1)
Sindh	60	36	49	60	46	53	(1)
KP	54	24	38	59	28	42	(1)
<b>Primary Gross Enrolment Ratio (Class 1-5, Age 5-9)</b>							
Pakistan	97	83	91	98	81	90	(1)
Sindh	87	72	80	85	67	76	(1)
KP	94	71	83	102	76	89	(1)
<i>Middle income countries</i>	<i>111.6</i>	<i>108.5</i>	<i>110.1</i>	<i>110.7</i>	<i>108.7</i>	<i>109.7</i>	(2)
<b>Primary Net Enrolment Ratio (Class 1-5, Age 5-9)</b>							
Pakistan	59	52	55	60	53	57	(1)
Sindh	55	46	51	53	43	48	(1)
KP	55	41	49	62	46	54	(1)
<i>Middle income countries</i>	<i>90.5</i>	<i>88.5</i>	<i>89.5</i>	<i>90.2</i>	<i>89.2</i>	<i>89.7</i>	(2)
<b>Gross enrolment rate at the middle level (age 11-13)</b>							
Pakistan	66	54	60	66	52	59	(1)
Sindh	63	45	54	57	45	51	(1)
KP	72	42	57	81	49	65	(1)
<b>Net enrolment rate at the middle level (age 11-13)</b>							
Pakistan	35	30	33	38	32	35	(1)
Sindh	37	28	33	32	26	29	(1)
KP	36	22	29	46	27	37	(1)
<b>% of children 10-18 years old that left school before completing primary level</b>							
Pakistan	9	10	9	8	9	8	(1)
Sindh	6	7	7	7	6	7	(1)
KP	8	16	11	8	11	9	(1)
<b>Literacy rate. Population 10 years and older</b>							
Pakistan	66	44	56	70	47	58	(1)
Sindh	69	42	56	67	43	56	(1)
KP	68	33	49	72	36	53	(1)
<i>Middle income countries</i>	<i>88.1</i>	<i>78.7</i>	<i>83.4</i>	<i>88.1</i>	<i>78.7</i>	<i>83.4</i>	(2)
<b>Expenditure on education in % of total government expenditure</b>							
Pakistan			14.1			11.6	(2)

Sources: (1) Pakistan Social & Living Standards Measurement Survey (PSLM) 2007-2008 and 2013-2014  
(2) World Bank, database: Education Statistics

Legend:  Data show an improvement  
 Data show a deterioration

However, these sector reform action plans are considered relevant with the challenges faced in the respective province and progress are already materialising with regards to the quality of teaching, the rationalisation of the geographic school network, the implementation of a merit based teacher recruitment system and teacher education development and textbook delivery policies.... As proof of progress and despite delays in disbursements, all instalment were disbursed under the first EU SBS programmes in KP and Sindh. Performance indicators have essentially accompanied the government reform process with a focus on sector policy making process, progressive streamlining of the sector management at provincial and district level, improvement of PFM, rationalisation of the school consolidation process, improving quality of teaching and access to schooling.

Main weaknesses that have impeded rapid progress and stronger impact on outcome indicators of the sector derive from the daunting institutional and financial challenges raised by the MDG and EFA objectives. The devolution process has also required the preliminary strengthening of capacities and

	<p>development of adequate provincial education policy framework. Finally the devolution process at provincial level with the district and sub district level is still in the making.</p> <p><b>Sources:</b>  MN-319 2016-01-06; MN-320 2016-01-07; Chapter 8, Table 74, Implementation status of NEP 2009 in Sindh – Policy Analysis of Education in Sindh by Dr. Sajid Ali – UNESCO 2011; Education for All 2015 National Review – M/o FE&amp;PT, AEPAM supported by UNESCO; Education Reforms in Pakistan – International Crisis Group – 2014; Policy Analysis of Education in Punjab Province – UNESCO 2011; Education Policy Analysis Report of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa – UNESCO 2012; KP Teacher Education Strategy 2013-18; Balochistan Education Sector Plan 2013-17; Policy Analysis of Education in Balochistan – UNESCO PSLM</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Quality of evidence: <b>indicative but not conclusive</b></p>
I.3.6.6	<p><b>Conclusions of technical and academic studies on the progress in the sector and its governance</b></p> <p>Overall at national level, the unstable political conditions and low economic growth indicators are referred as hurdle in achieving the goals of EFA and further implementation of policies. The provinces, after the 18<sup>th</sup> amendment were empowered to either implement NEP 2009 or make their own plans to improve the standards of education. Almost every province remained low on meeting the expectations of NEP 2009. However, no specific technical and or academic studies were carried out.</p> <p><b>Sources:</b> MN-319 2016-01-06; MN-320 2016-01-07;</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Quality of evidence: <b>weak</b></p>

JC-3.7	<p><b>The EU contributed to improve equitable access (reduce gender and regional disparities) to basic and secondary education.</b></p>
<p>Both SBS in Sindh and KP may have indirectly contributed to promote the conditions for improving education sector gender balance in Pakistan by supporting the strengthening and financing of public expenditure programmes relate to differentiated stipend policy, school consolidation and rehabilitation process in rural area, improvement of basic facilities, merit-based teacher recruitment policies as well as involvement of parent and local community in schools management. These issues have been at the core of some of the key performance indicators attached to the EU programmes together with others donors programme (World Bank) and have also been part of the capacity development activities provided by the technical assistance provided by these EU interventions. Policy dialogue during joint review missions of these interventions have consequently raised these issues with the Provincial authorities that like in the Sindh province, have demonstrated strong ownership and commitment to achieved progress in these areas. However, impact on trends in gender gap and other equity access related indicators over the evaluation period cannot provide evidence that EU contributions have made a dent so far but can expected to have contributed to consolidate the ground for future positive impacts.</p> <p>According to the information available on the SBS programmes in Sindh and KP, their specific focus on supporting (a) provincial governments' school rehabilitation and consolidation process in poor districts areas, (b) provision of basic facilities to rural schools, (c) gender-differentiated stipend policy programmes and (d) operationalisation of decentralised school management committees/parents teachers committees, these interventions may have indirectly contribute to laid the ground for future positive impacts in terms of improved equitable access to basic and secondary education particularly in the rural area. The programme may have indirectly contributed to enhance conditions for better access to schooling by children from poor families and remote locations leading to their increased lifetime earnings (international empirical evidence shows higher social return from basic education than any other levels and significant increase on the productivity of educated farmers). In the absence of statistical evidence it is however difficult to provide evidence of real impact of the programme on cross-cutting issues i.e. poverty alleviation (focus on poorer districts/communities), gender equity (more enrolment and retention for girls through improved access including better school environment, recruitment of female teachers through EU SBS supported merit-based teacher recruitment policy).</p> <p>Progress were achieved in KP but were stalling even with slight deterioration in Sindh. According to the 2015 national review on EFA, primary gross enrolment rate has increased from 82,7% in 2006 to 104% while in Sindh it increased form 79.5 in 2006 to 80% in 2010 before to decrease to 76.4% in 2013.</p>	
I-3.7.1	<p><b>Degree of realisation of the verifiable indicators of outcomes provided in the Financing Agreements or matrices of conditions (BS) as estimated in the monitoring/evaluation reports or in the disbursement files.</b></p> <p>Focus on improving efficiency and quality of school rehabilitation and consolidation process in the two provinces at district levels and through Terms of Partnerships with the provincial authorities has been assessed as highly relevant and desirable by the 2012 BS evaluation with regard to promote gender schooling</p>



access. Research shows that a girl in rural Sindh is 16 times more likely to be out of school than a boy in urban Sindh, and in view of the exacerbated rural-urban inequities in Sindh, this was a highly relevant intervention. Over the three rounds of TOP, since all districts were given equal amounts of financial resources, this automatically was a pro-rural district intervention.

The SBS programme aimed also to improve the effectiveness of school level management through enhanced participation of stakeholders (parents, teachers and local community members) through strengthening the role of school management committees (SMCs) or Parent Teacher Commissions (PTCs) in school level management and building their capacity in school improvement planning. Progress in this area was also considered as relevant for monitoring gender balance issues. Indeed, SMCs/PTCs are expected among others to have responsibilities and influence with regards to: (i) spearheading enrolment drives and motivating and monitoring student attendance and retention and (ii) monitoring service delivery such as TOP school rehabilitation works, stipends to secondary school girls.; Parents and children could benefited from being consulted about school design, since girls in particular can be affected by poor designs. The progress on SBS indicators related to the provision of basic facilities to public schools (e.g. latrine) could have contributed to promote girl student enrollment or retention. Similarly as a serious issue, especially for girls, being the lack of adequate or functioning toilets in the public schools in several districts, progress achieved in providing funds to SMC to address this issue with appropriate funding could have also contribute to have a gender impact

According to the 2012 evaluation of the SBS in Sindh, the support of EU SBS to the provincial sector education reform programme "SERP"'s girl stipend programmes ("Differential Stipends Programme" have been instrumental with the assistance of an EU TA for piloting third party evaluations and the development of a revised programme. Progress in this area derived from the strong ownership and willingness of the Sindh government to improve the girl stipends programme functioning and its openness to experimenting with new ideas related to pilot gender differential policy targeting. For the fourth and last tranche of the EU SBS programme in Sindh, a TPV was carried out confirming the receipt by 90% of intended beneficiaries in each concerned districts of secondary schools and an increased number, up to 45, of 45 talukas (sub districts) were concerned by this programmes.

Although successful in producing annual school census reports EMIS both at provincial and district levels is still weak in terms of timely collection and analysis of data and meeting the planning and development needs of the sector including distribution of stipends scheme for girls.

Sources: 2012 Evaluation mission of EU SBS Programmes in Sindh and in KP, BS Disbursement file and analysis of programmes' KPI, WB-EU joint review missions in the Sindh province, EU internal documents

	Quality of evidence: <b>more than satisfactory</b>									
I-3.7.2	<b>Evolution of PRSP indicators for the sector</b>									
	Taking into account the latest PSLM 2013-2014 and its indicators used for the monitoring of MDG's, trend in terms of gender cross cutting issue show a positive trend over the evaluation period (GPI for primary education and second and education in slight progress while youth literacy GPI has increased from 0.68 in 2004-05 to 0.80 in 2013-14).									
	<b>Indicator</b>	<b>1990-91 (Base line)</b>	<b>2004-05</b>	<b>2007-08</b>	<b>2008-09</b>	<b>2010-11</b>	<b>2011-12</b>	<b>2012-13</b>	<b>2013-14</b>	<b>MDG Target 2015</b>
	<b>Education</b>									
	Net Primary Enrolment Ratio	46	52	55	57	56	57	57	57	100
	Literacy Rate	35	53	56	57	58	58	60	58	88
	Gender parity Index (GPI) for primary education	0.73	0.85	0.88	0.88	0.88	0.9	0.89	0.88	1.00
	Gender parity Index (GPI) for secondary education	N.A	0.83	0.81	0.8	0.85	0.81	0.89	0.84	0.94
	Youth Literacy GPI	0.51	0.68	0.78	0.77	0.79	0.81	0.82	0.80	1.00
	Source: Government of Sindh, Department of Education, Sindh Education Sector Plan – 2014-18; PSLM 2007-08 and 2013-14									
Quality of evidence: <b>indicative but not conclusive</b>										

I-3.7.3	<p><b>Conclusions of technical and academic studies on the evolution access conditions to and use of education services</b></p> <p>No consolidated or comprehensive structured progress reports, technical studies were reported. Sources: <i>MN-319 2016-01-06; MN-320 2016-01-07;</i></p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>weak</b></p>
I-3.7.4	<p><b>Opinion of the stakeholders</b></p> <p>In KP, to the question asked under the EMIS on “why parents are not letting girls go to school” the answers were lack of washrooms, boundary walls, and other basic facilities. The implementing agencies as partners are found engaged in consultative process at different stages. But their consultations have mostly remained on monitoring purposes and operational issues. At that level, i.e. where operational issues and monitoring concerns were to be addressed, their opinions seems attended.</p> <p>Sources: SERTA – Progress Report 2009, SEPSP – Final Evaluation Report (21-05-2012), Description of the Action “BEDP-KPK” by GIZ – May 2011 PK SBS evaluation 2012</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>weak</b></p>



# Annex A7: EQ4 TVET

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## Acronyms

ACR	Annual Confidential Report
ADB	Asian Development Bank
AFD	French Development Agency
AJK	Azad Jammu and Kashmir
AJKTEVTA	Azad Jammu and Kashmir Technical Education & Vocational Training Authority
AusAID	Australian Agency for International Development
BMZ	German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
BTEVTA	Baluchistan Technical Education & Vocational Training Authority
CBT	Competency Based Training
CSP	Country Strategy Paper
DCI	Development Cooperation Instrument
DFID	Department for International Development
EDT	Enterprise Development Training
EU	European Union
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FIT	Fund for Innovative Training
GB	Gilgit, Baltistan
GIZ	German Agency for International Cooperation
GTC	Government College of Technology
HRD	Human resources Development
ICT	Islamabad Capital Territory
IDA	International Development Agency
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMC	Institute Management Committee
JD	Job Description

JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
KOICA	Korean International Cooperation Agency
KP / KPK	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
LMIS	Labour Market Information System
LRC	Learning Resources Centre
MCI	Micro Credit Institutions
MF	Micro-Finance
MFI	Micro-Finance Institutions
MIP	Multi-annual Indicative Programme
M&E	Monitoring & Evaluation
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MS	Member State
MTR	Mid-Term Review
NAVTEC	National Vocational and Technical Education Commission
NAVTTTC	National Vocational & Technical Training Commission
NEP	National Education Policy
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NL	Netherlands
NQF	National Quality Framework
NSS	National Skills Strategy
PFU	Provincial Facilitation Unit
PKR	Pakistan Rupees
PTEVTA	Punjab Technical Education & Vocational Training Authority
RAC	Real Applications Cluster
ROM	Results Oriented Monitoring
RSP	Reform Support Programme
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SMEDA	Small and Medium Enterprises Development Authority
STEVTA	Sindh Technical Education & Vocational Training Authority
TEVTA	Technical Education & Vocational Training Authorities
TNA	Training Needs Assessment
TOT	Training of Trainers
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training
TWG	Technical Working Group
UK	United Kingdom
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VTI	Vocational Training Institute

## 1. Overview of education (TVET) context and its evolution

### 1.1 National and/or provincial strategies and policies

The stream of students is very low with 315 000 enrolled in TVET courses<sup>1</sup>. The authorities have perceived the importance of vocational and job skills in view of responding to the demands of the market and of providing opportunities for employment and increased earnings including in remote rural areas and for vulnerable groups of the population. Moreover, the flow of Pakistani workers abroad (5.7 million<sup>2</sup>) is extremely important and their remittances (\$ 11.2 billion<sup>3</sup>) a major source of foreign exchange and sustainability of the current account balance. These migrant workers are in majority skilled and semi-skilled workers but Pakistan's productivity is declining and increased skills are needed: "The export of labour is a positive labour market policy but Pakistan faces competition from countries that are investing in skills and increasingly importing nations will want workers with internationally recognised qualifications"<sup>4</sup>.

TVET in Pakistan is organised in two tiers. At federal level there is a National Vocational & Technical Training Commission (NAVTTTC) while at the provincial level there are Technical Education & Vocational Training Authorities (TEVTAs). The programs are administered by a number of federal, provincial and private agencies; vocational institutes are managed by the Provincial Education Department while Technical Training Centers and Apprenticeship Training Centers are administered by the Provincial Labour Departments.<sup>5</sup> The sector faces major challenges "The first is the shortage of teachers: 30-40 per cent of teaching posts are lying vacant and teachers do not have enough industrial experience. The next is course curriculum: most text books are imported and in the English language, the curriculum followed in the institutes is out-dated and the examination system is mainly theory oriented. The teaching and learning materials are of not good quality, and drop-out rates from the institutes are very high. Finally, there is a lack of linkages between schools and industry". The lack of productive skilled labour is also discouraging investment, needed to create jobs and reduce unemployment. In 2010, Pakistan had 110 million people of working age – but only 55 million in active labour and 30% counted as employed were unpaid family helpers. The low labour productivity, particularly in rural areas, is largely due to under-investment in education and particularly TVET.<sup>6</sup>

In order to address these issues the Government launched its National Skills Strategy (2009-2013) along which the EU support to the sector is aligned.

<sup>1</sup> TVET Institutes in Pakistan, website of the NAVTTTC (:http://www.navttc.org/TVET\_Pakistan.aspx) Insights into Pakistan. Fiscal Year 2012-2013.

<sup>2</sup> NAVTTTC Website

<sup>3</sup> NAVTTTC Website.

<sup>4</sup> Skills for Growth and Development; a consultation document of the National TVET Policy Taks Group, November 2014Y TASK GROUP

<sup>5</sup> Agrawal, Tushar: Vocational Education and Programs (VET): An Asian Perspective, *Asia-Pacific Journal of Cooperative Education*, 2013, 14(1), 15-26.

<sup>6</sup> Analyses based on Labour Force Surveys from 2010 to 2014

In the NEP 2009, chapter 7 on “Strengthening Skill Development & Innovation”<sup>7</sup> supports and emphasizes the provision of Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) in every professional field across the board. It suggests policy actions and strategies to complement the strategies proposed by NAVTEC<sup>8</sup>, for example establishment of a national quality framework, development of public-private partnership models, development of coordination mechanisms between industry and academia, provision of capacity building frameworks, and establishment of tracking and monitoring systems.

The NSS carries policy status in providing guidelines for modernising the TVET system in Pakistan. It has an integrated approach over improving access and promotion of relevant skills for quality industrial and economic development and thereby improving employability in Pakistan. It focuses on as many as 20 strategic<sup>9</sup> initiatives to initiate reforms in the technical and vocational trainings. In April 2011<sup>10</sup>, the NSS gave birth to a 5-year TVET Reform Support Programme (TVET-RSP), which was co-financed by the European Union, the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany. Currently this program supports the National Vocational and Technical Training Commission (NAVITTC) and the Technical Education and Vocational Training Authorities (TEVTAs) in the provinces and regions to implement NSS with the active collaboration of public and private sector stakeholders across Pakistan.

To further the NSS’s achievement of its vision, various elements are incorporated in eight different skill development plans including provinces/regions and stakeholders’ planning, budget requirement for activities (as per NSS framework categories), current status of activities and prospective planning and priority setting for current and proposed activities.

Skills for Growth & Development: National TVET Policy (Draft) is a consultative effort that augments NEP 2009 and NSS 2009-13. It not only suggests advancing paths of the said policies but also enlarges their scope from primary to secondary and tertiary level frameworks reaching to different stakeholders on the subject<sup>11</sup>. It further provides policy review and delineates the parameters for engaging private sector<sup>12</sup>, research organizations, public forums and think tanks in overall growth of TVET in Pakistan at the national and provincial levels.

Provincial and regional skill development plans were introduced under TEVT Reforms. In almost all areas these plans have quite similar policy provisions and functionality<sup>13</sup>. The differences are at the levels of strategies in accordance with priority areas, contextual realities and socio-economic profiles of the provinces and regions.

The establishment of TEVTAs in the different areas of Pakistan shows the commitment of government towards the provision of demand driven technical education, their seriousness

<sup>7</sup> Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Education, National Education Policy, 2009, p.51

<sup>8</sup> Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Education, National Education Policy, 2009, p.53

<sup>9</sup> National Skill Strategy 2009-13, Government of Pakistan, p.6

<sup>10</sup> <http://www.tvetreform.org.pk/about/tvet-reform-support-programme>

<sup>11</sup> Government of Pakistan, Skills for Growth & Development: National TVET Policy (*Draft*), p.21

<sup>12</sup> Government of Pakistan, Skills for Growth & Development: National TVET Policy (*Draft*). P.24

<sup>13</sup> Introduction sections of Skill Development Plans and after workshop updates of provinces and areas



about coordination between stakeholders, and the promotion of public private partnerships. In addition to technical education's core subject, various policies cross cutting the theme are being implemented in all the provinces and areas under different names, e.g. economic growth, Sustainable Development Strategies, etc. These are funded and managed by different sectors including Education, Planning & Development and Finance Department, etc.

## 1.2 Institutional context

TVET in Pakistan is largely funded by donors and development partners and to some extent through an internee support and learning system in different public and private companies<sup>14</sup>. No doubt this practice helps carrier aspirants at lower stage and young age for careers and professions that are traditionally non-academic and directly related to a specific occupation or vocation. The principal sources of TVET provision currently in Pakistan are the various programmes offered by public and private training providers. At some stages, skills training given to their staff by employers may also be considered an informal institutional support. Another element of institutional support is the training provided to access barred youth by non-governmental organizations directly at their doorstep through various means and involving a variety of stakeholders<sup>15</sup>.

, Before the 18<sup>th</sup> amendment in the Constitution of Pakistan the various initiatives were spread across the country with regional supervision. As a consequence of the devolution (18<sup>th</sup> Amendment) these TVET initiatives are now associated with direct and indirect contributors across Pakistan. At federal level these efforts may be associated primarily with Ministry of Federal Education and Professional Training. The other national level institutes that have contributed at great length include, National Vocational & Technical Training Commission, NAVTTC and TVET Reform Support Programme. Similarly, in provinces and regions, the flagship goes to area wise TVET Authorities that include AJKTEVTA, BTEVTA, GB Secretariat, FATA Secretariat, PTEVTA, STEVTA and other agencies and programmes focusing on youth and income support initiatives.

Other parties concerned by the subject include Employers Federation of Pakistan, The Federation of Pakistan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, National Institute of Science and Technology Education, Vocational Training Councils at national and local level, Vocational and Training Councils, Pakistan Skills Development Councils, Benazir Income Support and youth develop programmes. Another support has been gained through educational institutions offering subjects on technical education, semi/autonomous organizations and regulatory authorities, working in both public and private sectors. They include universities, Small and Medium Enterprise Development Authority (SMEDA), trade development authorities, training bureaus and the engineering council<sup>16</sup>.

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<sup>14</sup> Government of Pakistan, Skills for Growth & Development - A Draft National Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) Policy 2014 (Consultation Document), p.10

<sup>15</sup> GoP, Skills for Growth & Development - A Draft National Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) Policy 2014 (Consultation Document), p.10

<sup>16</sup> GoP, Skills for Growth & Development - A Draft National Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) Policy 2014 (Consultation Document), p.2

### 1.3 Strategies of relevant development partners in the sector

Besides national and provincial level public institutions and programmes, the international development partners are also a trestle for TVET initiatives. Besides the EU, major supporters in this regard include UNESCO, The World Bank, Asian Development Bank, International Labour Organization, British Council, DFID, UNDP, USAID, GIZ, JICA, KOICA Pakistan and UNHCR.

All these development partners share a common view regarding to this sector and their support focuses on improving access, equality, quality and relevance of the TVET system in Pakistan. This implies a paradigm shift from content-based to competency-based training with active involvement of the private sector. However, within this common approach their respective interventions are coordinated to the extent that there is very little overlapping.

For example, ILO provides support to the Ministry of Labour and has worked with the Federal Bureau of Statistics in labour market information analysis. ILO and UNDP further supported the capacity to provide and analyse up to date labour market data with the establishment of a Labour Market Information and Analysis Unit<sup>17</sup>. UNESCO provided support to the provincial TEVTA in Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK). It also supported the rehabilitation of TVET providers in the earthquake affected regions of AJK and KP. Further it supports NAVTEC with developing standards for the crafts sector. The British Council supports training providers through its various projects and provides exposure for NAVTEC personnel to components of the British TVET system. It offers support for standard development to NAVTEC on a limited scope. The World Bank has initiated a project in Sindh, with the objective of building capacities at the TEVTA in Sindh primarily through the Benazir Bhutto Youth Development Programme. A similar program is planned with Punjab TEVTA through the DFID funded Punjab Skills Development Fund. USAID promotes better work skills, including also aspects of vocational counselling and scholarships under its different projects

The intervention pattern of the development partners and the government is the same on two grounds; i.e. improving the capacity of HR and improving outreach.

**EU has a multipronged strategy in the TVET sector and has invested heavily in Pakistan by engaging relevant development partners<sup>18</sup>** to improve the accessibility in the TVET sector and reaching to almost every trade, occupation and vocation that has so far been reviewed and considered compliant with the socio-economic conditions of population specifically and economic growth of Pakistan in general.

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<sup>17</sup> Capacity Enhancement of Ministry of Labour through Establishment of Labour Market Information and Analysis Unit : [http://www.ilo.org/islamabad/whatwedo/projects/WCMS\\_125528/lang-en/index.htm](http://www.ilo.org/islamabad/whatwedo/projects/WCMS_125528/lang-en/index.htm)

<sup>18</sup> EU Agreements with GIZ, PLAN, CONCERN, ACTED, CARE, TUSDEC AND OXFAM

## 1.4 EU interventions in the sector.

The EU has provided support in the field of TVET mainly through two programmes:

- “**TVET I**” €20 m programme: Support to the Technical and Vocational Education and Training Sector in Pakistan, **2012-2017** (DCI-ASIE/2008/019-952). A total of 19M€ has been contracted so far (June 2015) and 8M€ paid. It comprises two components: 1° a support to build up capacity of TVET authorities and training providers, implemented via a delegation agreement to GIZ, 2° a programme to increase the outreach of the vocational training in rural areas, implemented via grants to six NGOs.
- “**TVET II**” programme: Supporting TVET Reform in Pakistan, **2011-2016** (DCI-ASIE/2009/021-329). The EU provides 26M€ out of a total programme cost of €43m, which is also funded by the Netherlands, Germany and the Pakistani government. The GIZ was given the overall responsibility for implementing the programme, as delegate body. The National Vocational and Technical Training Commission (NAVTTTC - formerly NAVTEC) is the lead executive agency. It consists of three components. Component I addresses governance issues (TVET policy, governance and reform). Component II supports the development of a National Qualifications Framework (NQF) including the development of training standards and curricula. Component III supports capacity building of relevant stakeholders to analyse and coordinate labour market information for TVET development.

The two programmes are complementary and run mostly in parallel. TVET I was designed first with a focus on a reform of the policy and planning aspects of the TVET system. At the time of the design the federal agency NATVEC was not included in the support provided because its action was limited to implementation and it had no strategic role. However, it soon appeared that support to NATVEC was also necessary given its important guiding role. Hence, the design of TVET II to cover the missing issues. Both projects support the implementation of the National Skill Strategy, yet with different focal areas. TVET I supports the quality and outreach of skills trainings provision predominantly in the rural areas of Pakistan, whereas TVET II aims at increasing the access, equity, relevance and quality of the TVET sector. They are implemented through delegation agreements with GIZ for component 1 (Capacity building for TVETAs) of TVET I and for TVET II, and through grant contracts with 6 NGOs for the component 2 (outreach) of TVET II.

Other MS active in the Sector are UK, Netherlands and Germany. Their contribution is outlined briefly here:

The **UK** is supporting work to provide vocational skills. In partnership with the Punjab government, DFID has jointly funded a £55million programme providing skills training for 250,000 poor people (40% women and 10% marginalized) and promoted a competitive skills training market. This is linked to programmes to improve access to financial services and markets, helping poor people in Pakistan to lift themselves out of poverty. The British Council is poised to re-launch its “Skills for Employability” programme, a skills programme with Pakistan’s National Authority for Vocational and Technical Education and its provincial equivalents<sup>19</sup>.

<sup>19</sup> <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ukpakistan-education-april-2014/ukpakistan-education-april-2014>

The **Netherlands** Embassy contributed € 15 million to support TVET Reforms in Pakistan subsequently the EU has provided € 25.4 million and GIZ, € 2 million for the same program.

The National Skills Strategy declared that skill development is a national priority; the main aim is to ensure economic growth and to reduce the poverty rate.

The Technical Education and Vocational Training Authorities (TEVTA) in the provinces, which are not included in the NAVTTC structure, constitute additional implementing bodies. With the exception of the Punjab TEVTA, all are very young institutions and need capacity development support. The objective of the reform program is to improve access to vocational education and training, in which equal opportunities, relevance and quality are enhanced. The Netherlands and partners provide assistance for better skilled labour in Pakistan<sup>20</sup>

The geographical focus of **Germany's** international cooperation with Pakistan is Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province in the north-west of the country. GIZ concentrates on the following priority Areas:

- good governance
- basic education and vocational training
- renewable energies and energy efficiency
- health.

For a number of years, GIZ has been working on behalf of BMZ to support development and reconstruction in politically sensitive areas, such as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which border Afghanistan, and the Swat region. On behalf of the German Federal Foreign Office, GIZ is building the capacities of the prosecution services and police in Sindh and Punjab Provinces, and is working to improve social standards in the textile and garment industry.

Due to GIZ's widely recognised services and longstanding presence in Pakistan, several donors are providing additional co-financing for BMZ projects. In the education sector, co-financing agreements exist with the European Commission, the Netherlands, Norway and the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID). In the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) on the border with Afghanistan, the French development agency Agence Française de Développement (AFD) cofinances services in the health sector, while the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) provides co-financing for measures to improve people's livelihoods.<sup>21</sup>

Supporting TVET Reforms in Pakistan program is one of the landmarks of Germany – Pakistan relations.

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<sup>20</sup> <http://pakistan.nlembassy.org/news/2014/01/tvet-programme.html>

<sup>21</sup> <http://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/362.html>

## 1.5 Interventions from other development partners

The other most important development partners intervening in the sector have been: the World Bank, JICA,

### The World Bank

The World Bank provides financial and technical support to Sindh's Education Sector Reform Program through a USD 400 million credit from the International Development Association (IDA), with disbursements linked to fulfilment of agreed performance indicators. A US\$7 million technical assistance component has been included in the project that finances the project's essential capacity-building needs.<sup>22</sup> Within this envelope two projects have targeted TVET

Project <sup>23</sup>	Category	Committed Amount (Mil. USD)	Status	Approval
Punjab Skills Development	TVET	50	Active	30-Apr-15
Pakistan: Sindh Skills Development Project	TVET	21	Active	31-May-11

### JICA

Strengthening TVET is one of the prioritized areas of national development identified by the Government of Pakistan. Enhancing human resource development especially through technical and skill development is expected to contribute the development of value-added manufacturing with enhanced global competitiveness in the county. Besides, the Government of Pakistan expects expansion of skill development programme will facilitate induction of ever-increasing young populations into the labour market. The Government of Pakistan drafted the National Skills Strategy 2009-2013 for the first time to set a direction of strengthening TVET activities. Establishing industry specific centers of excellence is one of the strategies of the National Skills Strategy. The JICA project focuses on the development of centres of excellence for mechanical and architectural courses which can provide the skill training relevant to the needs of industries.

JICA has four active projects in Pakistan of which three are based on Technical Cooperation, whereas one is based on Grant Aid.

<sup>22</sup> <http://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2015/04/15/second-sindh-education-sector-project>

<sup>23</sup> [http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/pakistan/projects/all?qterm=education&lang\\_exact=English&cos=60](http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/pakistan/projects/all?qterm=education&lang_exact=English&cos=60)

<b>Project for Development of Center of Excellence (CoE) for Technical Education<sup>24</sup></b>	
<b>Term</b>	December 15, 2008 to December 14, 2013 (5 years)
<b>Total Amount of Aid</b>	370 million Yen
<b>Project Location</b>	Lahore, Punjab
<b>Executing Agency</b>	Government College of Technology (GCT), Railway Road, Lahore / Technical Education and Vocational Training Authority, Punjab
<b>Project for Promotion of Student-Centered and Inquiry-Based Science Education<sup>25</sup></b>	
<b>Term</b>	May 1, 2009 to April 27, 2012 (3 years)
<b>Total Amount of Aid</b>	Approximately 350 million Yen
<b>Project Location</b>	Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT)
<b>Executing Agency</b>	National Institute of Science and Technical Education
<b>Non-Formal Education Promotion Project<sup>26</sup></b>	
<b>Term</b>	July 2011 to June 2014 (3 years)
<b>Total Amount of Aid</b>	182 million Yen
<b>Project Location</b>	Lahore, Punjab
<b>Executing Agency</b>	Literacy and Non-Formal Basic Education Department, Punjab
<b>The Project for Strengthening of DAE Mechanical and Architecture Departments in GCT Railway Road of Punjab Province<sup>27</sup></b>	
<b>Term</b>	July 6, 2011 to April 30, 2014 (3 years approx.)
<b>Total Amount of Aid</b>	867 million Yen
<b>Project Location</b>	Lahore, Punjab
<b>Executing Agency</b>	Government College of Technology (GCT), Railway Road, Lahore / Technical Education and Vocational Training Authority (TEVTA), Punjab

<sup>24</sup> [http://www.jica.go.jp/pakistan/english/activities/activity02\\_01.html](http://www.jica.go.jp/pakistan/english/activities/activity02_01.html)

<sup>25</sup> [http://www.jica.go.jp/pakistan/english/activities/activity02\\_02.html](http://www.jica.go.jp/pakistan/english/activities/activity02_02.html)

<sup>26</sup> [http://www.jica.go.jp/pakistan/english/activities/activity02\\_22.html](http://www.jica.go.jp/pakistan/english/activities/activity02_22.html)

<sup>27</sup> [http://www.jica.go.jp/pakistan/english/activities/activity02\\_16.html](http://www.jica.go.jp/pakistan/english/activities/activity02_16.html)

## 2 Findings per JCs and Indicators

<b>EQ4</b>	<b>To what extent has the EU contributed to improve TVET service delivery, and skills and employability of trained students?</b>
<b>JC-4.1</b>	<b>EU support to TVET has been based on an analysis of the needs and challenges, and adapted to the evolving context.</b>
<p>The EU support to the sector has been based on the national analysis and diagnostic of the needs of the sector and as a support to the National Skills Strategy formulated by the Government. It is therefore fully aligned on the Government policy.</p> <p>The risk analysis has been relatively limited at programming stage and did not include specific regard for corruption and fraud implying that this particular category of risk was not regarded as major potential obstacle for the implementation of the TVET projects.</p> <p>A policy dialogue has been conducted with the government at the programming stage and led to add to identification of the needs and design of the programme in conformity with the National Skills Strategy. During implementation the dialogue was pursued through the steering committee but the focus has been more on implementation issues than on policies.</p> <p>Risk assessment at programming stage has been limited, and inexistent regarding risk of corruption and fraud. At implementation stage several, but not all, implementing partners have reportedly identified risks and general mitigation measures. Overall the institutional weaknesses of the TVET institutional system at national and provincial levels had been insufficiently assessed but a correction was made with the provision of two TVET programmes. Stakeholders from private sector point to a bias towards pedagogic training rather than effective transfer of skills.</p>	
I-4.1.1	<p><b>Existence of underlying analyses to identify which and whose needs to address and the regions of intervention.</b></p> <p><i>The EU support to the sector has been based on a national analysis of the needs in the sector. In addition baseline studies have been conducted within each project. A common weakness of these studies is that they focused on established formal sector enterprises and not sufficiently on micro-enterprises and ignored the informal sector. The focus of the EU programmes on disadvantaged groups was coherent with the overall objectives of the EU in this sector.</i></p> <p>The findings of different Labour Force Surveys of Pakistan reveal a lack of employable skills particularly in rural areas and conclude that this is largely due to under-investment in education and notably TVET. There is strong link between Pakistan's poverty and low productivity levels. The National Skills Strategy 2009-13 also mention the importance of the remittances from Pakistani workers abroad and the need to strengthen this major source of external revenue by ensuring a sufficient offer of qualified labour.</p> <p>The justification of the EU intervention in the sector is based on the analyses conducted by the Pakistan Government on which the National Skills Strategy is based. The EU programming documents also indicate that the EU has consulted available studies and data (from State Bank of Pakistan, WB, ADB) related to growth and productivity, employment and education in Pakistan and used these studies to conclude on the importance of strengthening the TVET as a factor of productivity and employability. The EU concluded from these studies that the</p>

	<p>whole institutional setting of the sector needed overhauling and that in terms of outreach the focus should be set on the employability of youth in rural and remote areas. The TVET programmes have been designed accordingly.</p> <p>All projects conducted under TVET I have commissioned baseline studies (mostly contracted out to consultants), which differed enormously in content (and quality). The studies were supposed to provide inter alia data on poverty in the selected districts, identify useful (i.e. demand-driven) trades and assess suitable training centres for the respective projects. In practice the studies suffered from the fact that no standard approach was imposed to the six implementing NGOs. Moreover they focused on established formal sector firms, whereas the inclusion of micro-enterprises, including in the informal sector, would have been relevant given that they are often the main opportunity of getting a job.</p> <p>The mid-term review of TVET I underlines the relevance of the focus of the project on disadvantaged groups: unemployed youth, women, rural communities and people with disabilities.</p> <p>A general EU study on TVET and Skills Development in EU Development Cooperation comments on the design of the Pakistan TVET programmes “the projects provide an almost complete coverage of TVET policy, systems, management, external and internal efficiency and quality, including financing mechanisms and a strong emphasis on the inclusion of marginalised groups and Active Labour Market Policies”, Annex 3, p. 25</p> <p><i>Sources:</i>  <i>Government of Pakistan: Labour Force Surveys from 2010 to 2014.</i>  <i>TVET I Financing Agreement, 2009 and Addendum 1 to Financing Agreement</i>  <i>TVET II: Financing Agreement 2010</i>  <i>TVET programmes: Progress Reports 2014</i>  <i>Government of Pakistan: National Skills Strategy 2009-2013</i>  <i>Government of Pakistan: Skills for Growth &amp; Development: A Draft National Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) Policy 2014</i>  <i>EU; MIPS 2007-10 &amp; 2011-13</i>  <i>Survey of TVET in Pakistan, NAVTEC, 2006. Pakistan.</i>  <i>The Politics of Skill, and the Challenge of Supporting Technical Vocational Education and Training (TVET) in Pakistan. The Role of UNESCO, Past, Present and Future, (unpublished), King, K, 2007. Edinburgh, UK.</i>  <i>ACE: Support to the TVET sector in Pakistan, Mid-Term Review, Final Report, January 2014.</i>  <i>EU: Skills Development in EU Development Cooperation, Report 2012/308055/1.</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Quality of evidence: <b>Strong</b>. Many documents converging.</p>
I-4.1.2	<b>Stakeholder views on the inclusion of lessons from context, conflict fragility, and risk analyses in the projects and programmes.</b>



	<p><i>Context has been duly taken into account the programme design. Weakness of institutional and managerial structures of TVET organisations in Pakistan has been underestimated.</i></p> <p>On this issue one must note that the EU has quickly adapted its approach: as it was observed that the initial project did not sufficiently address the systemic issue of the organisation of TVET across the country and the provinces the first TVET was completed by a second one to address the problem. However, many interviewees highlight <i>the lack of monitoring and evaluation systems</i>, at national and provincial levels (with exception in KP), to follow up progress in the sector and take stock of lessons from mistakes and successes.</p> <p>On risk analysis see I-4.1.3</p> <p><b>Sources:</b> <i>Government of Pakistan: National Skills Strategy 2009-2013</i>  <i>FAs of TVET I and TVET II</i>  <i>TVET I: Mid Term Review, 2014</i>  <i>TVET II: Mid Term Review, 2014</i>  <i>TVET I Rom Reports 2013</i>  <i>Interviews: MN317, MN320, MN323, MN324,</i></p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; background-color: #f4a460; padding: 5px; text-align: center;"> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>Strong</b></p> </div>
I-4.1.3	<p><b>Existence of risk assessment studies, including risks of corruption and frauds</b></p> <p><i>Programming documents generally identify assumptions and risks as well as broad mitigation possibilities. Reports of the implementing partners tend to be more specific in the identification and the mitigation measures. Risks of corruption and fraud are not specifically mentioned, suggesting that in this sector they may not be too important.</i></p> <p>However, assumptions and risks are generally identified in the programming documents and assumptions are formulated about risk mitigations activities. In the case of project TVET II, for instance, the MTR considers that the assumptions made at the time of project design were realistic and that project progress was not influenced to any large extent by those assumptions.</p> <p>Some indirect references regarding previously conducted assessments are referred in the CSP. <i>However, some implementing partners mentioned an identification of the risks faced by their project there has been some attempt to identify the risks, and mitigation measures, by the implementing partners.</i> For example:</p> <p>“GIZ is fully aware of the ‘risks’ of institutional changes, to suit political or individual goals and the economic risks associated with an economic slowdown and thus insufficient revenues to adequately finance the sector.”</p> <p>“The awareness raising activities certainly have generated a demand for the services provided by the project witnessed in the large number of applicants for limited seats. The project will have to consider the risk of limited supply when demand</p>

	<p>increases. Some advocacy with relevant public authorities for filling this vacuum may be in order so that the potential trainees do not feel discouraged and disappointed with lack of training facilities. Linkages with STEVTA can be useful in addressing this concern.”</p> <p>It should be noted that several documents and interviewees do not speak of risks but mention “challenges” that are risks for the achievement of the projects’ objectives and possible solutions. Examples are: scarcity of technical skills among the teachers, financial resources constraints, staff retention at EUD, NAVTC, C and TEVTA</p> <p><i>Risks of corruption and frauds are also not directly referred in the programming documents.</i></p> <p><i>Sources: TVET I: Mid-term review: Project 7 GIZ-TVETA; Project 4: Oxfam; TVET I and TVET II: Financing Agreements. EU: CSP Pakistan 2007-2013. Interviews MN306, MN307.</i></p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; background-color: #f9e79f; padding: 5px; margin: 10px auto; width: 80%;"> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory.</b> Several documents and interviews converging. However, coverage of available documentation on the programming phase is insufficient to allow for a strong evidence.</p> </div>
I-4.1.4	<p><b>Proposals of risk mitigating measures in the programming documents</b> Cf. I-4.1.3</p>
I-4.1.5	<p><b>Documents, minutes and meetings, demonstrating the existence of a policy dialogue with the government and the alignment on its policies</b></p> <p>The evaluation team did not have access to minutes of policy dialogue meetings. <i>However, the existence of consultations and policy dialogue with the government is confirmed in several documents.</i> But we have no information on the precise nature of this policy dialogue, the key issues it raised and, more important, to extent to which it influenced the government policy and the EU intervention strategy in the sector.</p> <p>“Based on discussions and consultations, the programme was “a much-needed project” given Pakistan’s fragmented TVET sector. Many stakeholders and officials supported donor’s approach for the TVET sector and expressed its appreciation for the opportunities to build its staff capacity through training and participation in policy dialogues. The programme enjoys buying-in from most stakeholders except in the FIT programme by NAVTC).”</p> <p>The Mid-Term Review also mentions that the steering committee meetings tend to concentrate on implementation issues and insufficiently on policy issues.</p> <p><i>Source: TVET II: MTR 2014. Interviews MN306, MN311</i></p>

	<p>Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory.</b> Several documents converging. However, coverage of available documentation on the programming phase is insufficient to allow for a strong evidence.</p>
I-4.1.6	<p><b>Existence of documentation (internal notes, minutes of meetings, etc.) demonstrating that stakeholders have been consulted and their views taken into account (or reasons for not taking them into account) on the appropriateness of the intervention to the needs and the contextual challenges.</b></p> <p><i>Consultation took place, more with public sector stakeholders. Some doubts of public-private sector organisation on the relevance of the institutional support to NAVTTC and TVTEAs.</i></p> <p>Project design is supported by public sector stakeholders (mainly NAVTTC and provincial Technical and Vocational Training Authorities (TEVTAs), but public-private industry led initiatives like the Punjab Vocational Training Council have raised doubts regarding the relevance of NAVTTC and TEVTAs for the reform of the TVET sector in Pakistan. <i>Source: TVET II MR 2012</i></p> <p>The program meets with the contextual realities and challenges of the TVET sector in Pakistan.</p> <p><i>Sources: Skills for Growth &amp; Development: A Draft National Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) Policy 2014, Final Review 2014, MIP 2007-10, 2011-13 &amp; 2014-20, MTR 2014, Monitoring Reports of partners, Planned Skill Development Workshop documents</i></p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>Indicative but not conclusive.</b></p>
I-4.1.7	<p><b>Review of those who were consulted and of the selection process. Adequacy with the groups targeted by the interventions.</b></p> <p>The selection processes involve multiple dimensions: selection of the trainers and the subjects of training, selection of participants to workshops and beneficiaries of training. No common methodology in this regard has been imposed to the different implementing NGOs so that each developed its own approach. Consultations have been carried out and their reviews are documented. They show that institutions, potential employers, civil organisations have been consulted and the selection process of participants has been attentive to gender issues and to include people in vulnerable situations (disabled, e.g.)</p> <p><i>Sources: Meeting Notes, MTR 2014, ROM Reports, Progress reports of partners, Planned Skill Development Workshop documents</i></p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>Indicative but not conclusive.</b></p>

I-4.1.8	<p><b>Opinions of key stakeholders (EU staff, NAVTTC, TEVTAs, implementing agencies, teachers/trainers and students, other donors) on the appropriateness of the intervention to the needs and the contextual challenges.</b></p> <p>The program meets with the contextual realities and challenges of TVT sector in Pakistan. Some interviewees, however, pointed that the programme was organised and implemented with a <i>bias towards pedagogical training, whereas the needs were more for transfer of technical and professional skills.</i></p> <p><i>Sources: Skills for Growth &amp; Development: A Draft National Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) Policy 2014, Final Review 2014, MIP 2007-10, 2011-13 &amp; 2014-20, MTR 2014, Monitoring Reports of partners, Planned Skill Development Workshop documents; Interviews: MN307, MN306, MN315.</i></p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; background-color: #fce4d6; padding: 5px; margin-top: 10px;"> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory.</b> Several converging documents and interviews, but coverage of final beneficiaries insufficient to make it strong.</p> </div>
JC-4.2	<p><b>The interventions have been implemented according to plan and produced their expected results</b></p> <p>Keeping in mind that the two projects are mostly conducted in parallel, one needs to distinguish activities targeted to institutional strengthening of the TVET sector at national and provincial levels (Component 1 of TVET I, and TVET II) and activities to outreach TVET to remote areas and vulnerable people (6 grant contracts under TVET 1).</p> <p>At the very outset of the programmes severe difficulties were encountered that delayed the launch of the projects: poor quality of ILO (initially viewed as implementing agency) proposal, no or late release of funds by the international partners cofinancing the projects, and weak governance structures and ill-defined responsibilities on the side of the national and provincial TVET agencies. Once the project launched different situations occurred: with few exceptions NGO managed projects faced important delays in their start phase due to internal organisation weaknesses, difficulty to recruit coordinators and skilled staff. Moreover, the project was very complex and there has been no coordinated methodology across the 6 NGOs. Activities in support of the TVET institutions were also delayed by high turnover of staff and bureaucratic constraints. Notwithstanding these initial difficulties, all projects broadly conducted all their activities and achieved important and positive results, notably in terms of institutional strengthening and provision of training and improved curricula. However, there is no evidence of significant improvement in the employment or earnings of the beneficiaries of the programme. The reasons mentioned in the evaluations and by the interviewees being an approach insufficiently based on an analysis of the demand of skills by the market and the transfer of these skills.</p>
I.4.2.1	<p><b>Documents showing that the funds were transferred in time to the implementing partners and the programmes implemented according to plan.</b></p>

*The launching of the TVET projects was delayed by various factors regarding the quality of the envisaged implementation partner's contributions, the allocation of funds expected from co-financing partners and the unclear government policies. These delays impacted the timing of the realisation of the activities and the disbursement rate of the projects.*

Programmes TVET I and TVET II faced important difficulties before they could effectively start:

- At the outset of the implementation of TVET I resulted from the fact that several development partners (NL, DFID, GTZ) could not allocate funds at the planned time. This obliged the EU to increase its contribution in 2009.
- Another difficulty was the lack of clear Government strategy and policy for the sector: "A TVET strategy has recently been presented and will form the basis of the supplementary package, in complementarity with the presented program. The supreme authority (NAVTEC) is lacking clarity on its own role and moved into implementation mode, creating hereby unwanted competition with the Provincial Governments that are in charge of organising trainings. Clear lack of capacity at Provincial level – for this reason an important part of the allocation is dedicated to capacity building, while at the same time providing for Direct support to the rural poor through private-public partnerships. Lack of funds for identification and formulation restricted the participation of experienced experts. The lack of funds from Germany for cofounding prevented the EC to go ahead with GTZ. In the meantime, however, the German Development Cooperation seems to be able and willing to provide additional funds and therefore a tripartite (DFID, GTZ, EC) additional programme will be prepared in 4<sup>th</sup> quarter 2008/1<sup>st</sup> qtr 2009"  
As explained in an internal document, the lack of required commitment from Government's supreme TVET authority (NATVEC) caused delays in launching the Identification and Formulation Missions. There is still lack of clarity in NATVEC on its own role (it is still involved in the implementation of trainings). However, during the Identification and Formulation Missions, it was made clear to NATVEC that it will have to be clear about its role in order to succeed in attaining funds from donor agencies.

*Source: Internal EU document n°3.*

Another reason for the delay in starting TVET I has been the decision of Commission for re-allocation of funds after the 2010 floods for re-habitation of flood victims. However, the funds were again available in 2011 and so the contracting was done in 2012.

*Source: Internal EU documents n°5 and 6*

The start of the implementation of the programme TVET I was postponed by the lack of capacity of ILO, the institution that was initially envisaged as implementation agency and co-financing of the project, to provide a proposal of good quality.

- The negotiations with ILO on the CA remain undecided at the end of 2009

	<p>due to low quality of the ILO proposal, lack of clarity on the ILO co-financing, lack of ability of ILO to present a transparent budget, and repeated attempts to include the ILO agenda into the project. Despite proposals of the Delegation to facilitate the conclusion of the CA, ILO has not yet been able to respond (at the time of writing, and in spite of several reminders, we are waiting for two months now for a revised proposal).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The reason for the short fall is that it was not possible to conclude in 2009 the Contribution Agreement with ILO for TVET I (9.5 mio EUR). The two issues causing the delay are that ILO is so far unable to adequately justify the magnitude of its proposed contribution in terms human resources and a low quality elaboration on the main project component.</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: internal EU document n°4 and n°5</i></p> <p>The consequences for TVET I was that the start of several projects has been delayed and this was unsurprisingly reflected in budget expenditure, in that the budgets in several cases have been under-spent.</p> <p>Documents from different sources converge in pointing the delays in launching the project and, as a consequence executing the activities, but there is no documentary source nor mention in the interviews held of unjustified delayed funding once the activities were launched.</p> <p>The activities relating to training depend on the development of training material and specifically at times on their availability in the local language.</p> <p>The complexity of the financial procedures, however, is underlined in some documents and may have been a source of delayed payments. For instance, the MTR of TVET II notes: “The MTR Team believes that financial information reporting for the project is unduly complicated. Based on access to financial information, the reporting pattern, the format of financial summary provided, and the unavailability of financial information (apart from a consolidated expenditure summary sheet for 2013 and 2014), it has been very difficult to interpret directly the degree of execution costs against project activities for the purpose of this present MTR”</p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; background-color: #fce4d6; padding: 5px; margin: 10px 0;"> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>Indicative but not conclusive.</b></p> </div> <p><i>Sources:</i>  <i>Internal EU document n°3, 4 and 5</i>  <i>MTR of TVET I and TVET II</i></p>
I-4.2.2	<p><b>Monitoring reports showing that the implementing partners conducted the agreed activities</b></p> <p><i>Project reporting documents, monitoring reports, mid-term reviews, note a difference between the projects developed under the TVETs to outreach TVET activities and those dealing with the</i></p>

*improvement of the management and organisation of the TVET institutions.*

*In the first case we are speaking of 6 projects managed by 6 different NGOs (1 international, 5 local). Problems with implementations were observed by the monitors in 4 out of 6 cases. The difficulties were usually due to the NGOs internal inefficiencies, lengthy recruitment of coordinators, insufficient skills of the staff, poor methodological approach and lack of good understanding by the NGOs of their role.*

*For the component of TVET I dealing with the systemic aspects of the TVET system and for TVET II, both implemented by GIZ in the second case severe limitations in terms of management and turnover of staff in the beneficiary institutions resulted in delays and partial implementation of activities.*

TVET I includes 7 projects, 6 of which are related with the outreach of TVET activities and implemented by local NGOs. ROM reports consider highlights implementation problems for 4 of these 6 projects :

ACTED: Improving access, quality and service delivery of the TVET sector to marginalised rural communities through innovative approaches: “In the first year, efficiency has been lower than expected. The organisation of operations has taken an unacceptably long time for partners that have been in the country for about 20 years. The delays encountered were mainly due to NGO's internal management procedures. Most of the delays have been made up by now. Nevertheless, the project faces the risk of new delays as discussions on the strategies for the implementation of certain activities is still ongoing. Moreover, the skills of the staff in the field are insufficient at the moment to work effectively with the management of training centres to bring about cultural, methodological and organisational changes in their work with the labour market.” (MR 19/7/2013)

OXFAM: Equate-enhancing quality and access to TVET for employability. “Project efficiency in the first nine months has been lower than expected. The organisation of operations has taken an unacceptably long time for partners that have been in the country for several years. The delays were mainly due to the NGO's internal management procedures and lengthy recruitment of coordinators. The project is still recovering from these delays but is also facing new delays due to general slow implementation pace.”(MR 19/7/2013).

PLAN: Provision of access to market-driven training and employment opportunities to vulnerable youth and women in rural districts of Southern Punjab. “In the first ten months a significant delay has been accumulated, mainly as a result of the long inception phase caused by administrative bottlenecks on Plan International's side, but also due to a slow implementation pace.... Activities in the four results have an average delay of 7 to 8 months, particularly in the components related to TVET institutions capacity building, delivery of TVET and mobilisation of employers, although community mobilisation and in-village basic skill training (Handy Skills Training, HST) are reasonably on track. ” (MR 16/7/2013)

TUDESC: Supporting TVET sector for the socio-economic uplift of rural marginalised communities in Pakistan. “TUSDEC took a long time to set up the office and form the team (still in process; no women on the team). The project manager was hired this March; the management gap during the inception phase led to a lack of guidance on the implementation methodology, management has not fully understood project role as a facilitator.” (MR 19/7/2013)

In contrast the two other projects were swiftly managed and conducted their activities as planned:

CARE: Enhancing socio-economic development through investing in human capital in Punjab and Sindh: “The project is very efficiently managed. Provision and use of inputs is going smoothly and with no major obstacles. The staffing arrangements are adequate, with CARE oriented to technical advisory and FPAP and Awaz to field implementation. Staff was recruited in a timely manner, although hiring local professionals with good backgrounds in TVET proved challenging. ... The work plan is overall on track or even ahead of planning in some components.” (ROM 19/7/2013)

CONCERN: Supporting TVET in Northern Baluchistan: “Implementation of activities is behind schedule, due mainly to the time taken to form the project team (Concern and local partners) and long, though effective, inception phase (Market Survey, Mapping and Capacity Assessment conducted; Baseline Study still in process)..... Local partners were actively involved in the studies carried out in the inception phase, enabling good connections with different key stakeholders at district and provincial levels. In each district the Market Survey identified the training institutes existing and their needs, the most in-demand trades and the community's view of the TVET sector. The project has a clear implementation methodology to provide training to the most vulnerable rural people. .... Especially for women, the project will provide community-based training.” (ROM 19/7/2013)

The two major Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) programmes (TVET I& II) contracted in 2012 are being implemented in full swing. Quality skills trainings are provided to youth and women across Pakistan through better trained teachers and updated curricula. Progress is made on development of TVET policy, accreditation, national qualifications framework, introduction of competency based training system and better apprenticeship system. (internal EU document n°9)

An important exception was project 7 of TVET I (Capacity building of TEVTAs): “However in the case of the TEVTAs, which Project 7 is focussed on, there are very serious management issues in several of the TEVTAs, so serious that several aspects of the project have been delayed.” (MTR TVET I, 2014).

TVET II: Faced difficulties similar to that of project 7 of TVET I (both are implemented by GIZ): “The partnership between the GIZ, the implementing agency, and the NAVTTC the executive agency has to date been less than effective, leading to delays in implementing a majority of activities. Outputs in the form of policy documents are evident, but as they have not been acted on there are no practical outcomes. It would appear that due to different organisational cultures and priorities an opportunity for a productive working environment between GIZ and NAVTTC has been missed. This has been exacerbated with the late appointment of a long term expert for Component I (Governance) and frequent changes in the management of NAVTTC. Direct involvement with provincial and



regional TEVTAs has however been more fruitful. The project has played a key role in the development, approval and implementation of KP TEVTA (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) which had been formally created in 2002.” (MTR TVET II, 2014)

Implementation of components related to the institutional strengthening of NAVTTC and TEVTAs met difficulties due to high turnover of staff and governance weaknesses in these agencies: “There were challenges that hindered the implementation of the project necessitated by the various layers in the bureaucratic hierarchy responsible for project implementation. These delays were caused by frequency of staff movement at NAVTTC, lack of guiding rules in relation to NAVTTC and TEVTAs and decision making.” (MTR TVET II, 2014)

*Sources:*

*Internal EU document n°9*

*MTR TVET I, 2014*

*MTR TVET II, 2014*

*ROM Reports for the 6 projects of TVET I.*

Quality of evidence: **Strong**

I-4.2.3	<p><b>Reports from the implementing partners on the progress and the outputs of the intervention</b></p> <p><i>Important and positive results in terms of training, new and improved curricula, sensitisation of beneficiaries and potential employers but there is little evidence of improved employment of earnings. The improvement have been notable on the supply of TVET services but not on the demand for beneficiaries of TVET. The reasons mentioned in the evaluations and by the interviewees being an approach insufficiently based on an analysis of the demand of skills by the market and the transfer of these skills.</i></p> <p>The MTR of TVET I rightly distinguishes between</p> <p>1° considerable progresses achieved by the projects on the supply side of the TVET sector, notably in terms of</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Community awareness programmes to raise interest in the value of vocational training and applications for training.</li> <li>▪ Training of Trainers in new programmes and upgraded programmes.</li> <li>▪ TVET institutions delivering a range of short-term training programmes for thousands of marginalized students.</li> <li>▪ Training for people with disabilities.</li> </ul> <p>These progresses are reported at lengths in the reports of the implementing partners and confirmed by interviews.</p> <p>2° But severe limitations regarding the demand side insofar as the different NGO projects have been based on social demands rather than market demand. Social demand means the demand by the applicants for places (employment and self-employment, access to income generating opportunities, enhanced socio-economic status of the poor...) whereas market demand refers to the demand by the economic operators for graduates of the TVET institutions. Interviews with stakeholders also point to the fact that training under TVET II and component 1 of TVET I was more pedagogical than skills transfer. (MTR TVET I).</p> <p>Monitoring report of TVET II points to satisfactory delivery of the expected outputs:</p> <p>The project, the execution of which only started in July 2011, has effectively contributed to the achievement of planned results mainly in Component 2 (revision of 27 curricula ahead of time and development of 18 new curricula), and in Component 1 (development of provincial skills strategies for the implementation of the NSS). Under Component 3, fourteen pilot projects financed through the FIT have started but with a limited out-reach and numbers of trainees. (MR August 2012)</p> <p>The following tables are extracted from Annex B3 of the present evaluation report provide a summary of the indicators used in the log frames of the different components to assess the degree of the expected results. They call for the following comments:</p>
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TVET I: There has been no verification in the monitoring reports or MTF of the realisation of the indicators for the total project, only for the separate components, therefore treated as fragmented independent programmes and not as jointly contributing to an overall programme which would be more than the sum of its components. The six components of TVET 1 implemented by NGOs have been conducted satisfactorily and delivered. It is a general picture that their results have been significant in terms of training, new and improved curricula, sensitisation of beneficiaries and potential employers but there is little evidence of improved employment of earnings confirming the diagnostic of the MTR mentioned above that improvements are clear on the supply side but not on the demand side.

Component 2: PLAN Project	
<b>Expected Results</b>	
<b>Expected result 1 - TVET institutions deliver accredited, market-driven, competency based training curricula and workskills training appropriate for rural youth, women, and young people with disabilities</b>	Baseline study completed
Number of revised competency based training modules approved and used by TVET institutions (target = determined following market assessments)	Design of EDT (Enterprise Development Training) completed
Completion and dropout rate in new/ revised curricula (male, female, disabled)	Design & introduction of life skills module completed
Percent of youth (male, female, disabled) aware about training courses being offered by TVET institutions in their area (target =75%)	
Percent of youth (male, female, disabled) aware about TVET institutions working in their area (target = 75%)	
Number of persons (male, female, disabled) trained in new curricula	TVET staff training: 63/90
Number of persons (male, female, disabled) trained by EDT Master Trainers	Training for EDT Master Trainers: 20/30
Number of private institutions registered / certified by government (target = 15)	13
Percentage time in courses allocated to practical instruction (target=80%, to be revised according to module)	
<b>Expected result 2 - Employers formally linked with targeted TVET institutions, and contributing to the design of competency-based curricula, and supporting job placements and apprenticeships for trained youth</b>	
Number of persons (male, female, disabled) provided apprenticeship by employers / local enterprises	
Number of employers providing input into design or revision of competency based training curricula (target = 40)	Work with 40 local employers to support job placements: 14/ 40
Number of employers aware of contents of training courses offered by TVET institutions in their area	
Number of consult ative meetings between employers and TVET institutions	
Number of employers / local entrepreneurs aware of the Decent Work Agenda (target = 40)	
Number of MoUs signed with employers (target = 40)	37
Percent of trained women joining formal sector / non-traditional trades (to be defined following baseline & market assessments)	

<b>Component 2: PLAN Project (continued)</b>	
<b>Expected result 3 - 3,694 vulnerable young men and women supported to access free TVET, youth enterprise training, workforce skills training, and job placement support</b>	
Number of students awarded free TVET place and enrolled in TVET institute, workforce skills training and Enterprise Development Training (male/ female/ disabled) (target =1,244/ [missing])	Number of trained men: 825/1,244 women: 1,277/2,350 total: 2,144/3,694 disabled: 42/100
Number / percent of drop outs (male, female, disabled)	
Number / Percent of trained youth (male, female, disabled) provided information about job opportunities on quarterly basis	
Number of young women and men participating in 3-day workforce preparation training (target = 10,000)	
Attendance in the training course (male, female, disabled)	
Number of training institutes with improved training facility, equipment	
Number of monitoring visits during the courses	
Type of youth friendly microfinance services offered by MFIs (target = 1)	
Number of youth accessing MF services (savings, loans)	
Number of youth living with disabilities enrolled and supported with trade specific tool kits (target = 100)	Handy skills events: 249/500 Handy skills trainees: 5,466/10,000
Indicator not present in the logframe: Career counselling	2,144/3,694
<b>Expected result 4 - Increased recognition of the value of vocational training amongst 133 communities particularly for young women and youth living with disabilities.</b>	
Number of villages reached for awareness sessions relating to TVET services (target = 133)	120
Percent of youth (male, female, disabled) aware about training courses being offered by TVET institutions in their area	
Number of district level youth forums formed and meeting regularly (target = 3)	Youth forums: 180/266
Number of advocacy events organised by youth forums at district level with stakeholders	
Number of women from targeted communities enrolling in TVET institutions	

<b>Component 2: CARE Project</b>	
<b>Specific Objective</b>	
To increase access of rural women and youth to income generation opportunities through innovative TVET approaches.	
2,800 of women and youth accessing improved TVET services and are satisfied with quality and usefulness of training	891
60% of TVET beneficiaries (1,680) avail apprenticeship or employment	715
At least 60% (840) of TVET graduates / micro-entrepreneurship training beneficiaries establish successful (micro) enterprises	388
At least 60% of beneficiaries trained under the project receive orientation on micro credit services.	7
At-least 60% of rural home-based women establish successful enterprises	420
<b>Expected Results</b>	
<b>Expected result 1 - An improved TVET Programme is established for rural women and youths</b>	
8 disciplines with high demand for vocational training prioritized	23
2,550 youth and rural women trained in 8 priority vocational disciplines in courses ranging between 3-6 months, in government TVET institutes	891
250 youth and rural women trained in 4-6 priority vocational disciplines in three-month courses from private/ semi government TVET institutes	125
60% of all TVET graduates securing apprenticeship/internships ranging between one – three months	715
7 District level CCs established and provide advice and guidance on TVET services	7
14 TVET staff trained on secondary research and data analysis for course improvement	8
42 TVET staff members trained in packaging and dissemination of information	
42 quarterly updates on TVET services disseminated	

<b>Component 2: CARE Project (continued)</b>	
<b>Expected result 2 - Innovative approaches and new teaching methodologies are developed and access to TVET services is increased</b>	
Designing of micro entrepreneurship/service industry course for TVET by the end of year 1	0
140 TVET instructors trained on micro entrepreneurship/service industry course	41
1400 youth and women (TVET graduates and/or others) trained on micro entrepreneurship/service industry course	205
At least 60% of the graduates of micro-entrepreneurship / service industry training program start earning by the end of the project	0
Life Skills (LS) Training module developed and TOTs conducted for 175 TVET instructors from participating target districts	0
IST sessions introduced and attended by at-least 700 TVET graduates (100 in each district) by the end of project.	0
50 home based wrokers trained in designing product accordng to market demand, basic marketing and communication, business development and basic accounting, in 7 districts, and linked with industry/ private sector.	420
42 boys and gilrs high school teachers oriented on importance of giving students and exposure to TVET services.	42
3150 boys and girls in 21 schools participate in day long exposure visits to TVET institutes to learn about selected/market demand driven trades	60
<b>Expected result 3 - Linkages between TVET graduates and employers are promoted</b>	
35 TVET instructors on trained on counselling and coaching	43
15 Career Counselling Centres established and operational in project districts	15
14 job fairs/exhibitions organized; 1 in each year in the project districts	2
Quarterly meetings of Coordination Committees in participating districts	35
2 biannual advocacy events organized in each district	6
2 provincial and 1 national advocacy events organized with the policy makers and key stakeholders for improved TVET services	0
14 women home-based worker entrepreneur groups formed; 2 in each district, each having 25 members	23
350 women home-based entrepreneurs trained on identified skills	420
<b>Expected result 4 - Small Enterprises and self employment amongst Rural women and youths is promoted and linkages with MFIs are strengthened</b>	
63 orientation sessions conducted by MCIs / MFIs for TVET trainees	50
TVET graduates have knowledge for accessing loans from MFIs for setting up of micro-enterprises	250
Miro-entrepreneurs utilize annual exhibitions for display of their products for promotion of their products	0
<p>The most visible results are those related to capacity building of TVET institutes and provision of training. Result in terms of development of micro-enterprises and self-employed are very scant.</p>	

<b>Component 2: ACTED Project</b>	
<b>Overall Objective</b>	
<b>To enhance socio-economic development through the improvement of access to TVET services in rural areas in Pakistan</b>	
At least 70% of vocational trainees who have started an income generating activity report increased income after completing trainings at the target TVET centres	<b>On track</b> - One month after graduation, 13% of interviewed graduates have started earning additional income. The average increase in income in AJK was 1240 PKR, in KP 978 PKR and in Sindh 2200 PKR
80% of training centres report that they will continue to offer the training courses beyond the project period	<b>Achieved</b> - 96% of Centres plan to continue at least one of the courses introduced by ACTED. Centres were interviewed with regards to one specific course for a range of different courses. All Centres were planning to continue the courses introduced by ACTED. Only 1 Centre in Muzaffarabad was planning to discontinue a course (Building Electrician)
<b>Specific Objective</b>	
<b>To improve availability, quality, relevance and equity of TVET services specifically for marginalized community members in rural areas of AJK, KP and Sindh provinces</b>	
80% increase in the enrolment of marginalised groups in target TVET centres	
At least 20 TVET centres supported by the action	<b>Achieved</b> - MOU signed with 22 Centres
8000 people are trained by TVET centres targeted under the project	<b>On track</b> - 1791 students/graduates
80% of beneficiaries who participate in trainings at the targeted TVET centres report satisfaction with the training and services of the centre	<b>Achieved</b> - On average 83% of students and graduates are satisfied with the services and trainings offered. Indicators captured were the training venue, duration, skills learnt, teaching methods used, hours of the course, and the practical work.
80% of teachers trained through the action using new teaching manuals report satisfaction with the quality of trainings	<b>Achieved</b> - 80% of trainers rated the TOT excellent or good.
80% of training centres report having established at least 1 linkage with private sector and/or MFIs/banks by the end of the project	<b>On track</b> - 65% of Centres have developed market linkages for internship placement, provision of services or with select businesses in addition to the establishment of Advisory Councils at almost all Centres
<b>Expected Results</b>	
<b>Expected result 1 - Quality, market-oriented vocational training programs are established for marginalised communities</b>	
1 labour market survey identifies relevance, quality, access, equity and employability of TVET services in Pakistan	<b>Achieved</b> - 1 Labour market survey completed and published
1 directory of TVET services available in target areas developed	
At least 20 TVET centres are teaching new training skills curricula	<b>Achieved</b> - Updated curricula introduced for eight trades in 23 Centres.
At least 80 teachers trained in new curricula	<b>On track</b> - 81% of trainers trained. 65 Trainers trained in new curricula. RAC Training and training on short courses (business development, computer) pending.
At least 8 market-oriented vocational training manuals tailored to the needs of the target population are used as part of the project	<b>On track</b> - Printing and delivery of training manuals delayed due to translation into Urdu by TUSDEC.

<b>Component 2: ACTED Project (continued)</b>	
<b>Expected result 2 - Increased access to and equity of TVET services for marginalized communities.</b>	
80% of TVET centres have measures in place throughout the project period to support access by marginalised communities	<b>On track</b> - 50% of Centres in AJK, 64% of Centres in KPK and 75% of Centres in Sindh have fee concessions in place to support access by marginalized students.
At least 8,000 individuals attend trainings	<b>On track</b> - Currently, 1791 students are enrolled/have graduated.
At least a third of trainees are women	<b>On track</b> - 44% of students/graduates currently reached are women
95% of trainees complete their training	
<b>Expected result 3 - Improved relevance of TVET services and linkages with market actors</b>	
8,000 trainees receive kits containing tools or other relevant equipment	<b>On track</b> - 292 Toolkits distributed to date
1 database of beneficiaries who intend to start small enterprises created and shared with MFIs	<b>On track</b> - Database for all enrolled students is maintained.
1 comprehensive set of guidelines produced providing information on the needs of marginalised groups for MFIs	<b>Achieved</b> - 1 Advocacy Report published by PMN.
At least 60% of male beneficiaries start income generating activities based on the vocational training by the end of the project period	
At least 40% of female beneficiaries start income generating activities based on the vocational training by the end of the project period	
<p>For Acted also results in terms of training provided and improvement of TVET centres are largely achieved but results in terms of the trainees starting income generating activities are not visible.</p>	
<b>Component 2: OXFAM Project</b>	
<b>Expected Results</b>	
<b>Expected result 1 - 3200 (2630 male and 570 female) poor unemployed youth (men, women, youth and disabled) are gainfully employed and earn income 30% above the baseline finding</b>	
By October, 2015: At least 70% of the trained/graduated beneficiaries are gainfully self employed/employed by the trade and industry and report earnings 50% above the baseline findings	47 trainers received trade specific refresher courses 1206 men and 582 women graduated from LRCs. 291 men and 214 women received career counseling 1301 (829 men and 472 women) placed in training institutes; 640 (382 men and 258 women) graduated. 288 men and women earning (13 men and 5 women as intern; 78 men and 6 women as employee; 92 men and 94 women self-employed. 329 men and 183 women received employability kit of various trades.
<b>Expected result 2 - Improved economic and social status of 1600 poor women in 3 target districts of Sindh trained in new handicraft, designing, production and entrepreneurial skills with better market linkages</b>	
By October, 2015:	50 groups (12 Jamshoro, 18 Dadu and 20 Khaipur) formed; 1000 women trained in basic preparatory courses; the Skillful Artisan training completed for 480 crafts women
At least 70% of the women take pride in their handicrafts	
At least 70% of the trained women producing value added handicrafts and are well connected in supply chain mechanism	
At least 70% of the trained women feel empowered and enjoy economic freedom	
<p>This project also produced visible results but there is no evidence that beneficiaries have improved their earnings or acquired a job.</p>	



<b>Component 2: CONCERN Project</b>	
<b>Expected Results</b>	
<b>Expected result 1 - Existing public and private sector TVET institutions are strengthened and are providing effective and demand based employable skills</b>	9 Curricula developed in different trades 5 vocational institutions registered with Trade Testing Board (B-TEVTA)
Percentage of functional TVET institutions with quality service delivery	
20 vocational training facilities improved (government, private and traditional)	2 Vocational training facilities improved (Government, private and traditional) and 13 in process will be completed till Nov 30, 2014
Percentage of newly trained traditional vocational service providers that are effectively providing certified trainings	
200 instructors trained in new vocational skills, teaching methodology	173 Trainers trained (9 ToTs Conducted)
4 new trades and modules introduced.	
No of trainees trained after the introduction of new trades in TVET institutions	
<b>Expected result 2 - Target groups have improved access to relevant, market oriented and quality TVET services for enhanced income</b>	170 men and 25 women provided internship opportunities
Percentage of TVET graduates (men/women) making successful use of newly acquired skills for their income generation	
3,800 individuals (men/women) completed trainings on various skills	Total 1346 beneficiaries (Man and Women) (636 completed training and 710 continue)
No. of vulnerable trainees (particularly women, the disabled) completed trainings on various skills	Identification done; training to begin soon
1,500 trainees (disaggregated by gender) assisted in development of business plans	Total 414 beneficiaries assisted in development of business plans
<b>Expected result 3 - Public image of and demand for TVET is improved and linkages between TVET institutions, trainees, micro-finance/microenterprise institutions and the market are strengthened</b>	
No of TVET graduates who get micro credit as a direct result of facilitation by the Action	
Evidence of increased TVET support from the government for the target group	
Evidence of change in perception for TVET in the target communities.	
Many beneficiaries of training, development of curricula but no evidence that these improvements proved useful to the beneficiaries.	

<b>Component 2: TUDESC Project</b>	
<b>Expected Results</b>	
<b>Expected result 1 - Establishment of a functioning provincial set up linked to the private sector that facilitates in demands and placement for technical training</b>	
Establishment of Facilitation Unit (FU)	PFU established and fully operational
At least 50% increase in the number of private sector organisations participating in the action after baseline assessment	
At least 08 trades identified after baseline assessment	Almost 50 trades prioritised for training
At least 10 TVET institutes identified and selected for delivery of trainings	30 institutes selected for trainings in 1st phase
At least 10 TVET institutes linked with private sector employers (industries, businesses, local & international recruitment agencies etc.)	4
At least 20 private sector employers identified for employability	8 potential employers identified and linked for employability under proper MOU's
Quarterly meetings of stakeholder groups	Regular facilitation meetings held with stakeholders
<b>Expected result 2 - At least 12,000 employable women and men (at least 10% women) from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the Federal Administered Tribal Area trained in various technical skills and their post-training professional situation monitored</b>	
12,000 employable students trained in demand driven trades	2,050 trainees (including 80 female) have been inducted for training in pilot phase; 720 trained so far
At least 10% (of 12,000) are women	80 female = 4%
At least 75% of the graduates will be employed or self employed	
<b>Expected result 2 - Critical assistance provided to enhance capacities of selected technical and vocational training institutes.</b>	
At least 4 TVET institutes linked with NAVTTC/GIZ	3 institutes are identified and linked with NAVTTC for accreditation
At least 4 TVET institutes are upgraded and facilitated as per the standards of NAVTTC/GIZ	2 institutes are identified for upgrading
Outreach of the project and linkages made with TVET bodies and organisations working for TVET in Pakistan	Regular meetings with TVET stakeholders and participation in workshops conducted at country level
<p>Visible results in terms of training and upgrading of TVET facilities but limited evidence of increase of beneficiaries employed.</p> <p><i>Sources: MTR TVET I Monitoring reports of projects TVET I and TVET II Progresses Report and Final Report from Implementing agencies CARE International, Revised progress report. Acted, Revised report. Acted, Staff Turnover, revised report. Oxfam Novib, revised report. TUSDEC revised report. Interviews: MN315, MN316, MN307, MN306 MN839, MN838, MN306</i></p>	
<p>Quality of evidence: <b>Strong</b>. Converging documents and interviews from different categories of stakeholders.</p>	

I-4.2.4	<p><b>Opinions of key stakeholders on the factors influencing the implementation of interventions</b></p> <p>Stakeholders from implementing organisations and TVET agencies tend to stress on the importance of the capacity to deliver training of good quality and improved curricula and to target vulnerable people, remote areas. This has been largely done by the projects. Evaluations, monitoring reports and interviews with private sector and specialists point to an insufficient effort to respond to market demands and transfer of skills responding to these demands.</p> <p>The activities relating to training depend on the development of training material and specifically at times on their availability in the local language. It is reported that the trainings were delayed due to these two factors in some regions. But this was somehow covered and the pace was caught up. It was also reported that the MTR team has only been able to observe a small number of programme meetings in action and so it would be unwise to draw any firm conclusions from these few experiences. The impression gained was of no consistent approach but of 'making it up as we go along' (ACTED, revised report)</p> <p>Another hindrance in smooth sailing of the projects were the staff retention issues in local NGOs (ACTED, Staff Turnover, Revised Report).</p> <p>The other important factor is the institutional weakness in terms of policy, governance, organisation and management of the many public organisations involved in the TVET sector: ill-defined missions. In particular staff turnover in NAVTCC and the TEVTAs is an issue although it was part of the agreement with the government to ensure staff retention. Moreover, NAVTCC has shortage of technical staff.</p> <p>The EU TVET programmes have commendably put considerable effort in addressing these issues.</p> <p><i>Sources:</i>  <i>Monitoring reports of TVET I and TVET II programmes.</i>  <i>Mid Term Reviews of TVET I and TVET II.</i>  <i>Acted, Revised report.</i>  <i>Acted, Staff Turnover, revised report.</i>  <i>Interview MN306.</i>  <i>Internal EU document n°3</i></p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; background-color: #fce4d6; padding: 5px; margin-top: 10px;"> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory</b> Converging documents and opinion of various interviews, but insufficient coverage given the wide distribution (geographic, professional, etc.) of beneficiaries.</p> </div>
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<b>JC-4.3</b>	<b>The EU has contributed to strengthen and implement reform of the TVET sector, including strengthening of TEVTAs</b>
	<p>This objective has been pursued through component 1 (Capacity building of TVETAs and Training Providers) of the TVET I programme and the three components of TVET II (1: Governance; 2 NQF and HRD; 3: Efficient and innovative training) aimed to strengthen the reform of the sector. Together these elements of the two programmes provided an almost complete coverage of TVET policy, systems, management, external and internal efficiency and quality, including financial mechanisms and a strong emphasis on the inclusion of marginalised groups and active market policies.<sup>28</sup></p> <p>The main visible results in terms of institutional developments can be summarised as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Raised awareness about the importance of a well-functioning TVET system and identified the key elements for reforming the system.</li> <li>▪ Important contributions to support sector policy and planning.</li> <li>▪ Strengthening of status, organisation and management practices of TVETAs</li> <li>▪ Improvement in offer and diversification of courses</li> <li>▪ Improvement in the quality due to better teacher training and better monitoring of teachers (reduction of absenteeism, recruitment on merit)</li> <li>▪ Skills development strategy providing directions for the selection of curricula and training programmes to develop.</li> </ul> <p>Notwithstanding these achievements the overall performance of the TVET system remains insufficient. There is a converging view of employers and graduates that there is a deficiency in skills quality, and this is due to insufficient availability of skills and therefore to a lack of focus of the TVET institutions on necessary skills.</p>
I-4.3.1	<p><b>Evidence of progress in the strengthening and implementation of TVET reform (identification of concrete changes)</b></p> <p>The TVET programmes have contributed to the strengthening of the very complex TVET system. Comprehensive analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the TVET institutions has contributed to consolidation of the reform of the sector (establishment/strengthening of provincial TVETAs, introduction of biometrics to reduce absenteeism, strengthening of MIS, accreditation, and other aspects). However the implementation of a reform remains limited by unclear distribution of responsibilities and inefficient bureaucracy.</p> <p>TVET I:</p> <p>Component 1 of TVET I aimed at (a) building capacity (b) organising a suitable public private partnership model (PPP) and (c) applying a modernized apprenticeship scheme.</p> <p>From the mid-term review, progress and monitoring reports and interviews one can sum up the key contributions of the programme:</p>

<sup>28</sup> TVET and skills development in EU development cooperation [http://ec.europa.eu/europaid/sites/devco/files/tvet-study-acts-2012-final-report\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/europaid/sites/devco/files/tvet-study-acts-2012-final-report_en.pdf), annex 3

Capacity building: GIZ conducted a thorough and holistic assessment of the capacity of all the provinces in November 2013. The key findings were an accurate description of the TEVTAs and an identification of their main weaknesses as well as recommendations to overcome them. This provided major inputs for organisational and human capacity developments in the various agencies. Reforms were implemented (MTR TVET I, 2014; Project 7, Support to building the Capacity of TVETAs, TVET-ACE, 2014; MN307, MN316, )

In the case of project 7 (TEVTAs), the achievements have been limited but this is largely due to the fact that there are deep-seated and major problems in the current organization and division of responsibilities, which must be addressed if the progress is to be maintained. It is necessary to consider the scale of the project is trying to achieve. Some of the provincial TEVTAs have such a weak structure, poor leadership and unmotivated staff that it will require considerable effort and patience to overhaul part of the system. It is a very ambitious undertaking and it may be wiser for the project to upgrade a few priority provinces and then use the experience and achievements to extend some of the best practices to the others, rather than attempting to hit them all at once. (Mid-Term Review of TVET I, January 2014).

The lack of clarity over responsibilities (between national and provincial authorities) and the constant changes of TEVTA chairpersons, has limited the impact component 1 of TVET I, which is responsible for developing TEVTA capacity. The combination of the lack of clarity and the late start of the project has resulted in limited development of the TEVTAs. Stakeholders expressed considerable frustration in working with the TEVTAs because of the inefficient bureaucracy. (MTR TVET I 2014).

TVET II:

*Overall the programme has seen good progress within Component 1 (Governance) of TVET II.* The Programme supported the incorporation of the Skills Development Plans (SDPs) 2013/2014 into the Annual Development Plans (ADPs) of the provinces and regions with between 30%- 60% of the SDPs' activities started receiving government funding. The implementation of activities is being monitored by provincial monitoring committees. The Programme is also supporting the updating of the SDPs in consultation with all stakeholders and based on lessons learned so far. In this area of the Component, the Programme has been both effective and efficient at making its support directly relevant to improving the coverage, ownership, and impact of the National Skills Strategy (NSS).

There are many visible activities under this component, but achievements are mixed. There are activities such as accreditation of programmes, communication strategies that will be achieved whereas the quality assurance system and the M & E system are still a matter of discussion in terms of implementation during the remaining project period.

*Under Component 2 (NQF & HRD) the Competency- Based Training (CBT) programme development is largely on track.* The Programme assisted the NAVTTC in the development of curricula as well as sets of competency standards. Major progress has been made in the area of teacher training. The in-service teacher training process, using already trained Pakistani lead trainers, has been piloted and a teachers have been trained. A comprehensive management and quality assurance system ensured that the training remained on track.

*Innovative training delivery and labour market information and services (Component 3) witnessed some good progress with a substantial number of activities to set-up and manage the Fund for Innovative Training (FIT) projects.* One of the successful project is Hunargh (learning region) project. The total number of beneficiaries will exceed 100,000 once all projects have been completed. 50% of the beneficiaries are female and 24% are from poor households in KP, FATA, Balochistan, and Gilgit-Baltistan. There has been good progress with the implementation of the learning region in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), although the security situation continues to slow down and delay some activities. The three selected training farms have been established, and the farmers are being trained and supported in applying modern and environmentally friendly farming methods. The Programme has established a system of on-going advisory and support services to the beneficiaries, which includes a help desk and technical advice by the farm assistants under the supervision of the learning region manager.

Similarly, good progress has been made in the area of vocational counselling and job placement as well as in the area of labour market information. The basic training courses for vocational guidance and job placement officers have been designed. With the support of the Programme, NAVTTC has also established a national Skills Information System (SIS) cell, consisting of four permanent staff members. The capacity development process for the staff of the cell started in September 2013 and regular formal training sessions as well as on-the-job training are being used to upgrade their skills. The first national SIS report was finalised in January, 2014. A Technical Working Group (TWG), which includes stakeholders from TEVTAs and NAVTTC, has been set up as a national platform to guide the process of establishing this national SIS in Pakistan. The Programme has supported NAVTTC in developing the SIS website and in defining the data requirements for skills demand and supply for the SIS network. In addition, the first SIS report for KP has been produced and the Programme has assisted with the field work and data entry of the first labour market survey for the textile sector.

*All these efforts have contributed to visible improved practices in TVETAs:*

- Improving the quality of the staff and its monitoring: Development of job descriptions (JD), and ensuring the completion of JDs the Training Needs Assessment (TNA) was conducted. After the completion of the HRD plans, medium term training programmes were planned for senior and middle level TEVTA staff.  
HR manuals, which cover inter alia recruitment, conflict of interest, employment policies, transfers, allowances, benefits, interview guidelines, travel claim forms etc. have been prepared.

Performance appraisal is a key factor in not only improving performance but also steadily building confidence. The TEVTAs had inherited the standard Annual Confidential Report (ACR) system, which is usually not shown to the staff member. A more developed appraisal system, which discusses the official's progress, strengths and alleged weaknesses, was recommended by the project. A one year Leadership training programme, which received strong approval was initiated in the TVETAs.

- Provision of training to upgrade the quality of teachers  
40 seminars/workshops (between October 2013 and August 2014) on a range of activities, some focussed on particular TEVTAs, others for all TEVTAs were organized. Overall these training sessions, conducted by professionals were useful to the TEVTAs.
- Development of Public Private Partnerships: The TEVTAs were introduced to a range of possible models (43 in all, reduced to 09) to encourage greater Public Private Partnership (PPP). Each TEVTA was expected to choose 03 models to run currently.
- All the TEVTAs opted for the Institute Management Committee (IMC) as their first choice. This model will operate as the name suggests at the VTI level and may also be supplemented by district committees. They are gradually being introduced. The draft rules of business have been designed for the IMCs, but subject to revision to reflect the interests of both the VTIs and the employers. The MTR team have some slight reservations about this model, namely that it could, unless managed well, just become a talking shop like some of the stakeholders meetings. It would be useful to supplement the IMC with small sector advisory committees, whereby the instructors can talk directly to the heads of the relevant micro-enterprises to discuss content of the training programmes and opportunities for graduates. The outcome of these sessions could then be submitted annually to the IMCs, which would have representatives from industry.

It remains that considerable progresses remain needed in terms of reform of the TVET System. The Stakeholder Workshop organised by the 2014 MTR of TVET II summarises the key suggestions made by the participants to this workshop with regard to the TVET system:

- Develop significant expertise on design, development, regulation, solution-building and reform of TVET system;
- Focusing effectively on country's TVET reform priorities;
- Further strengthening required in core issues like reform with NAVTTC, TEVTAS, TVET institutions, skills providers and other relevant organisations;

(MTR II 2014, Annex F)

Apart from the formal apprenticeship scheme, there is a need for support for the traditional apprenticeship scheme (Ustad-Shagird), under the master craftsman. Since both the master and hence the apprentice can be out of date on new techniques, it is necessary for both to be upgraded by combining the practical experience in the enterprise with theory training, done at a private or public VTI

	<p>(TEVTAs - Support to building the capacity of Technical Education Vocational Training Authorities – revised report, various sections of the report)</p> <p><i>Sources:</i>  MTR TVET I, 2014;  Project 7, Support to building the Capacity of TVETAs, TVET-ACE, 2014;;  TVET II: Progress Reports 2012, 2013, 2014  MTR TVET II: 2014  Annex F of MTR TVET II 2014: Key conclusions from stakeholder workshop.  Capacity Assessment of TVETAs. GIZ Feb 2014  Progress Report – TVET Reform Support Programme 2013-14  TEVTAs - Support to building the capacity of Technical Education Vocational Training Authorities – revised report, various sections of the report  Interviews MN307, MN316, MN321; MN311</p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; background-color: #fce4d6; padding: 5px; margin-top: 10px;"> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory.</b> Converging documentary and interview sources but insufficient coverage given the regional and institutional spread of the programme.</p> </div>
I-4.3.2	<p><b>Evidence of increased capacity of TVETAs (identification of concrete changes)</b></p> <p>The reforms programme contributed in development of Management Information System cells, M&amp;E Frameworks, development of Human Resource Development policy, user of computers for preparing lesson plans under TEVTAs, etc.</p> <p>Most concrete changes are in</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Improvement of the quality of the staff through training, monitoring of teachers.</li> <li>▪ Improvement of the curricula</li> </ul> <p>The following examples can be cited as indicating concrete changes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Under the reforms in TVET various steps have been taken including introduction of Fund for Innovative Training (FIT) programme, Centers of Excellence and Stakeholders workshop (MTR 2014).</li> <li>▪ TEVTAs identified practical skills training as a priority for the TVET sector. A FIT type HRD programme based on partnerships between TEVTAs, schools and local industries could in the short term provide a qualitative stop gap approach which will enhance teacher skills and the development of Competency Based Training (CBT) programmes.</li> <li>▪ The TVET services were extended through implementing organizations across Pakistan in selected districts/regions. Care manages 07 districts of Sindh and Southern Punjab, Oxfam has the responsibility of 03 districts of Sindh, Acted looks after the operation in one district of AJK and 03 districts in each KPK and Sindh, Concern has 03 Districts of Northern Balochistan and TUSDEC is responsible for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and the Federal Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) selected areas.</li> </ul>



- At different locations, TVET instructors were trained in Micro- enterprise students in micro-entrepreneurship course, rural sales women trained in marketing and craftswomen are being prepared with only traditional skills such as tailoring, embroidery and food preservation trainings and men with pest management, livestock management, motorcycle repair, welding, carpentry and UPS/solar system installation, maintenance and repair. Innovative work for women with linkages to the market has not been explored
- The number of interneers in 7 districts of Sind reached 45% and in Punjab it is 71% (Care International). Whereas, there are 50% trained centers in AJK, 64% in KPK, 75% in Sindh under Acted's Intervention. TUSDEC has selected 03 MFI's and MOU has been signed with one Micro credit organization (WASFD). Apart from outreach improvement, the curricula were also developed in different trade fields to ensure better quality TVET services. (Data extracted from annual progress and monitoring reports of implementing partners (Acted, Care, Concern, Oxfam, TUSDEC)).

However, severe weaknesses of the TVET system subsist in terms of adequacy between the offer of TVET services and the demands of the market. This is highlighted in the conclusions of the Stakeholder Worksop organised by the MTR 2014: the following recommendations were made by the participants regarding the quality of the services of the TVET networks:

- Pragmatic approach to employer and industry engagement in TVET system;
- Address professional links and quality assurance for TVET networks;
- Further strengthening for the development of market led materials and curriculum in new emerging sectors;
- Strong linkages in enterprise, innovation and technology with TVET;
- Emphasise entrepreneurial and innovative approaches in TVET;
- Expansion of areas of interventions: recognition of prior learning (RPL), establishing work-based learning and assessment, implementation of occupational standards, national qualifications framework

(Annex F of MTR 2014)

Another evidence of a certain mismatch between the services offered and the demands of the markets is found in the recent British Council study "Skill disconnect in Sindh". The study surveyed 157 employers, 120 graduates and 161 skill institutes with the objective to identify disparities between skills demanded and skills available in the labour market in Sindh. The study identifies three major problems:

- Employers and graduates opinions converge towards a deficiency in skills quality.
- Employers report that the availability of skills is deficient to begin with;
- This permits to conclude that there is not only an overall skill deficit but also that skills institutes are lacking in their focus on necessary skills.

The survey shows that these problems are relevant to the four major skills gaps reported: English skills, computer and information technology skills, numeracy and computation skills, and proficiency in updated technology.

	<p><i>Sources: Progress Report – TVET Reform Support Programme 2013-14; MTR of TVET I and TVET II 2014</i>  <i>Interviews MN 321, MN311, MN306</i>  <i>Usman Mustafa, Junaid Alam Memon and Hasnain Khalil: Skills Disconnect in Sindh, British council, June 2015.</i></p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory</b> Converging documents and opinion of various interviews, but insufficient coverage given the wide distribution (geographic, professional, etc.) of beneficiaries.</p>
I-4.3.3	<p><b>Evidence from existing evaluations, other documentation and interviews with stakeholders on the importance of the EU-funded activities for the achievement of the identified changes</b></p> <p>According to interviews conducted in field, it was learnt that as such no academic/technical or impact study was commissioned by TEVTAs. The progress is measured through M&amp;E System at TEVT at project level.</p> <p><i>Sources: MN 317 and 318</i></p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>Indicative but not conclusive.</b> Many actors are intervening in the field of TVET and it is not possible to disentangle their respective contribution to the observed results.</p>
JC-4.4	<p><b>The EU has contributed to improved offer, quality and distribution of TVET services at federal and provincial levels</b></p> <p>There is evidence of progress in the offer and quality of TVET services in terms of outreach (regional but also to disadvantage groups and more vulnerable populations), prioritisation of skills addressed, introduction of competency based training.</p>
I-4.4.1	<p><b>Evidence of progress in the offer of TVET services at federal and provincial levels</b></p> <p>The following points can be regarded as marking concrete progresses in the offer of TVET services:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Various steps were taken including introduction of a Fund for Innovative Training (FIT) programme, Centres of Excellence and Stakeholders workshop.</li> <li>▪ Prioritisation by the TEVTAs of priorities in terms of skills training</li> <li>▪ The TVET services were extended through implementing organizations across Pakistan in selected districts/regions.</li> <li>▪ The implementation of the programme could reach remote areas and target vulnerable groups leading to <u>an important outreach improvement</u>: Care manages 07 districts of Sindh and Southern Punjab, Oxfam has the responsibility of 03 districts of Sindh, Acted looks after the operation in one district of AJK and 03 districts in each KPK and Sindh, Concern has 03</li> </ul>

	<p>Districts of Northern Balochistan and TUSDEC is responsible for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and the Federal Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) selected areas. At different locations, TVET instructors are trained in Micro-enterprise students in micro-entrepreneurship course, rural sales women trained in marketing and craftsmen are being prepared with only traditional skills such as tailoring, embroidery and food preservation trainings and men with pest management, livestock management, motorcycle repair, welding, carpentry and UPS/solar system installation, maintenance and repair. However, innovative work for women with linkages to the market has not been explored. The number of interneers in 7 districts of Sind is 45% and in Punjab it is 71% (Care International). Whereas, there are 50% trained centres in AJK, 64% in KPK, 75% in Sindh under Acted's Intervention. TUSDEC has selected 03 MFI's and MOU has been signed with one Micro credit organization (WASFD). Apart from outreach improvement, the curricula are also developed in different trade fields to ensure better quality TVET services.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Competency Based Training (CBT) has been introduced for the first time. The IMC identifies trades and develops a training plan for the employer and does monitoring activities. There is an industry- institute linkage and performance and evaluation reporting. The students pay a nominal fee for their studies. There is a job placement center in each institute to assist students with getting jobs.</li> </ul> <p><i>Sources:</i>  MTR of TVET I and TVET II, 2014  Data extracted from annual progress and monitoring reports of implementing partners (Acted, Care, Concern, Oxfam, TUSDEC)  Annual progress reports of implementing partners (Acted, Care, Concern, Oxfam, TUSDEC)  ROM Reports of the 7 TVET I projects and TVET II  Interviews: M306; MN311</p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; background-color: #f4a460; padding: 5px; text-align: center;"> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>Indicative but not conclusive.</b></p> </div>
I-4.4.2	<p><b>Evidence of progress in the quality of TVET services at federal and provincial levels</b>  <i>Cf. I-4.4.1</i></p>
I-4.4.3	<p><b>Evidence of progress in the distribution of TVET services at federal and provincial levels, disaggregated in line with the population targeted by the intervention (e.g. gender, ethnic minority, social group, etc.)</b></p> <p><i>The TVET programmes have been designed with the clear objective to extent the outreach of TVET services to vulnerable populations, marginalised youth, women, population in deprived areas, etc.</i></p>

Different projects, each with its own overall and specific objectives and expected results have been implemented. It is not possible given these differences in scope and different reporting formats to consolidate the data on the target populations. However, when they have been monitored or measured the indicators of realisation of the expected results included in the projects contractual documents (see I-4.2.3 above) allow a partial picture or progress achieved in this areas:

Project PLAN (achievements/target)

- Nr. of persons (male, female, disabled) trained in new curricula: 63/90
- Nr. of persons (male, female, disabled) trained by EDT master trainers: 20/30
- Nr. of students awarded free TVET place and enrolled in TVET institute, workforce skills training and enterprise development training:  
Women 1277/2350; disabled: 42/100

CARE

- Women and youth accessing improved TVET services and satisfied with quality and usefulness of training: 891/2800
- Youth and rural women trained in 8 priority vocational disciplines: 891/2500.
- Youth and rural women trained in 4-6 priority vocational disciplines: 125/250
- Youth and women trained on micro entrepreneurship/service industry course: 205/1400
- Women home based entrepreneurs trained on identified skills 350/420
- 12000 employable students trained in demand driven trades: 2010 trainees (of w. 80 female) inducted for training in pilot phase; 720 (of which 80 female) trained.

ACTED:

- At least a third of trainees are women: 44% of students/graduate reached are women.

OXFAM

- 1206 man and 582 women graduated from LRCs  
291 man and 582 women received career counselling  
829 men and 258 women placed in training institutes  
382 man and 258 women graduated

*These results, though very limited, show that the programmes have definitely addressed gender and disadvantaged people issues that an effort has been made by the project in these areas, but that the objectives are achieved only to a very limited degree.*

*Sources:*

*Grant contracts with the NGOs of TVET I*

*Delegation Agreement with GIZ.*

*Progress reports of Care, Acted, TUSDEC, Oxfam, Concern and GIZ, Monitoring Reports*

Quality of evidence: **Indicative but not conclusive.**

I-4.4.4	<p><b>Evidence from existing evaluations, other documentation and interviews with stakeholders on the importance of the EU-funded activities for the improvements in the offer, quality and distribution of TVET services</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• According to interviews conducted in field, it was learnt that as such no academic/technical or impact study was commissioned by TEVTAs. TVET is monitored though M&amp;E Systems and there is no attempt to assess the specific contribution of activities of a particular donor.</li> <li>• Similarly EU commissioned MTR and monitoring reports assess the outcomes of the implemented projects but do not provide evidence on their relative contribution to the improvement of the macro-level situation or, in some cases, to the limitation of its deterioration.</li> </ul> <p><i>Sources:</i>  <i>Mid Term Reviews and ROMs of TVET projects.</i>  <i>Interviews: MN 307, M317, MN318</i></p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; background-color: #f4a460; padding: 5px; text-align: center;">Quality of evidence: <b>Weak</b></div>
JC-4.5	<p><b>The EU has contributed to employability of workers</b></p>
<p>Attempts to measure employability of students having been through the TVET system are inexistent (no tracing studies e.g.) but there are clear indications of a mismatch between offer of TVET services and demands of the market. There is evidence from the previous JCs that the potential employability of TVET beneficiaries has improved (improved training, improved curricula, better coverage) but there is no visible indication that this translated into them finding a job or improving their earnings.</p>	
I-4.5.1	<p><b>Evidence of (increased) employability of TVET graduates at federal and provincial levels, disaggregated in line with the population targeted by the intervention (e.g. gender, ethnic minority, social group, etc.)</b></p> <p>Programming and contractual documents include indicators of employability among the beneficiaries of the TVET programmes. However, the project progress reports, monitoring and evaluation reports and studies do not include data on these points (see tables in I-4.2.3 above. The TVET agencies do not conduct tracing studies of their trainees. Private sector operators interviewed and sector specialist point to <i>very limited, if not insignificant, results regarding the number of beneficiaries from TVET training who could get an employment and/or increase their earnings.</i></p> <p>Studies and interviews also point to a mismatch between the supply and the market demands of graduates from the TVET system. Example of comment “even if students trained on their own machinery, employers are not willing to sign up people”.</p> <p><i>Sources:</i>  <i>FA, Grant agreements and Delegation agreements of the different TVET projects.</i></p>

	<p><i>MTR 2014</i>  <i>Usman Mustafa, Junaid Alam Memon and Hasnain Khalil: Skills Disconnect in Sindh, British council, June 2015.</i></p> <p><i>Interviews MN317, MN318, MN839, MN838, MN307</i></p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>Indicative but not conclusive.</b> Converging information from documents and interviews but partial coverage.</p>
I-4.5.2	<p><b>Evidence from existing evaluations, other documentation and interviews with stakeholders on the importance of the EU-funded activities for such increased employability</b></p> <p>Absence of sufficient assessment of effective employability of people having been through the TVET system (I-4.5.1) prevents any attempt of contribution assessment.</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>Weak</b></p>

## Annex A8 EQ5: Democratisation

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### Acronyms

AR	Appraisal Report
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CRS	Common Reporting Standard
DCI	Development Cooperation Instrument
DEVCO	European Commission Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development
DFID	Department for International Development
EC	European Commission
ECP	Election Commission of Pakistan
EEAS	European External Action Service
EIDHR	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
EU	European Union
EUD	European Union Delegation
FA	Financing Agreement
FAFEN	Free and Fair Elections Network
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FoDP	Friends of Democratic Pakistan
GoP	Government of Pakistan
HQ	Headquarters
IDEA	Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IFS	Instrument for Stability
IP3	Improving Parliamentary Performance
JC	Judgement Criteria
KP	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
LTEOOP	Long Term Election Observation and Oversight in Pakistan
MIP	Multi-annual Indicative Programme
MN	Meeting Notes
M&E	Monitoring & Evaluation
MP	Member of Parliament
MR	Monitoring Report
MS	Member State
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation

OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PFM	Public Financial Management
PIPS	Pakistan Institute for Parliamentary Service
ROM	Results Oriented Monitoring
SERP	Support to Electoral Reform in Pakistan
TDEA	Trust for Democratic Accountability
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDP-IPU	UNDP Inter-Parliamentary Union
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development



## 1. EU support to the sector

Beyond political and policy dialogue, which is a major instrument to promote the democratisation process, the EU supported a range of projects/programmes over the 2007-2014 period. The most significant ones are summarised in Table 1. Over US\$122m were committed for democratisation and security over 2007-2013 (OECD CRS code 150 “government and civil society”), of which over US\$59m were disbursed (OECD CRS database, accessed September 2015).

#	Project	Implementation period	Allocation	Commitment	Disbursement	Instrument / CRIS decision	Objective	Channel
1	Improving Parliamentary Performance (IP3)*	2012-2014	€ 6.6 M	€ 5.8 M	€ 2.0 M	DCI-ASIE/2009/021-157	Capacity building of elected representatives and parliamentary institution mainly at federal level	British Council
2	Long Term Election Observation and Oversight in Pakistan (LTEOOP)	2012-2014	€ 2.5 M	€ 2.5 M	€ 2.2 M	IFS-RRM/2012/023-688 (contract 284-456)	Long term election observation and oversight in Pakistan	Trust for Democratic Education and Accountability (TDEA) / Free and Fair Elections Network
3	Support Electoral reforms in Pakistan	2009-2011	€ 2.1 M	€ 2.1 M	€ 2.1 M	IFS (contract 224 115)		International Alert
4	Support Electoral reforms in Pakistan (SERP)	2012-2014	€ 3 M	€ 2.9 M	€ 1.7 M	IFS	To strengthen the democratic legal framework for elections through support to the election Commission of Pakistan, as well as to reinforce the management capacity of the Election Commission	International Foundation for Electoral Systems
5	EU Electoral Observation Mission	2007/2008	€ 4.3 M	€ 4.3 M	€ 4.3 M	EIDHR		UNDP
6	Electoral cycle support to the Election Commission of Pakistan	2012-2014	€ 2.5 M	€ 2.5 M	€ 2.3 M		To increase the capacity of the election Commission	UNDP.
7	Supporting advocacy for electoral reforms in Pakistan	2012-2013	€ 1.9 M	€ 1.9 M	€ 1.9 M		To strengthen the preparations for and conduct of credible and inclusive elections through better informed electoral stakeholders	Democracy Reporting International

## 2. Findings per JC and Indicators: EQ5 Democratisation


<b>EQ5</b>	<b>To what extent did the EU contribute to strengthen the democratisation process in Pakistan?</b>
<b>JC-5.1</b>	<b>EU support to the democratisation process has been based on an analysis of the needs and challenges, and adapted to the evolving context</b>
<p>EU analyses that were available to the team demonstrate consistent quality, are informed by what appears to be sustained policy dialogue, and are explicit about the issues and actors EU programmes aim to address and engage – more so than other development partners’ analyses that are publicly available. What is less clearly formulated is the intervention logic underlying the Improving Parliamentary Performance project: what are the main binding constraints on greater capacity and assertiveness of National Assembly and Senate members, and what can EU support do about them?</p>	
I-5.1.1	<p><b>Existence of underlying analyses to identify which and whose needs to address and the regions of intervention, including of vulnerable groups (such as ethnic minorities):</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The 2009-2010 post-crisis needs assessment (following the Pakistan government’s 2009 military offensive to drive militants from FATA and KP), undertaken jointly by GoP, the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, UN, and European Union, gives a detailed picture of citizen priorities (i.e. jobs and justice). Moreover, there are identification and formulation reports for several projects (Table 2). Finally, several projects were meant to produce analysis and did so, e.g. “Support to Electoral Reforms in Pakistan” and “Access to Justice for Poor and Vulnerable Groups in Punjab”.</li> <li>▪ There is no documentation of conflict analysis, political economy analysis or fragility analysis as such undertaken by the EU, but there is evidence of access to analysis undertaken by others, e.g. a Clingendael report “State-society Analysis” (2009) funded by the EC; a UNICEF “Conflict analysis” (2012); and of course all relevant analyses in the public domain (see Bibliography).</li> <li>▪ Analysis of priority provinces of intervention is rarely provided in project documents, and interviews reveal that the criteria are not clear either: a mix of needs, division of labour with other partners, and opportunities/entry points for EU engagement.</li> <li>▪ The IP3 identification fiche reflects consideration of several options and argues for tendering, with some direct contracting by a Pakistani NGO.</li> <li>▪ With regard to coordination with other donors, there is no data available that analyses were shared with others (in particular MS). At the intervention level, project documents often mention how the project is in line with government priorities and policies, but rarely mention what other partners (including MS) are doing. The Annual Report on the EU’s development and external assistance policies and their implementation in 2012 states that “the EU is actively seeking structured donor coordination and providing synergies and complementarities of activities in education, PFM and human rights.” The ROM of IP3 goes as far as to underline “an antagonistic relationship” with the UNDP “Strengthening Democracy through</li> </ul>

	<p>Parliamentary Development” project, because of differences in approaches. The Paris Declaration Monitoring Report (2011) highlights that technical assistance (not just in governance) is particularly uncoordinated in Pakistan. The 2007-2013 Country Strategy Paper (2007) notes that the EC plays a prominent role in the donor group on Governance, and the 2011 MIP was planning that “ongoing donor coordination efforts by the National Assembly (future establishment of aid coordination committee) and by donors (USAID, UNDP/IPU) (were) to be followed closely.” The ROM of IP3 (2013) further mentions that “donor coordination is an issue. There is a Governance Group, in which the EUD participates, but it is only about the exchange of information”. Interviews during the field phase (2015) indicate that donor coordination in electoral support (led by DFID) is “very good” (MN411), although it could have been better from the outset for support to Parliament (MN408).</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory.</b></p>
	<p>Sources: 2009-2010 post-crisis needs assessment, identification reports, action fiches, formulation reports, service contracts, 2007-2013 CSP.</p>
<p>I-5.1.2</p>	<p><b>References to these analyses in the programming documents</b>  While there are no such references to the analyses listed above, not even to the Post Conflict Needs Assessment, in any of the available programme document, analyses are nevertheless reflected in programme documents.</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>Strong.</b></p>
	<p>Source: identification reports, action fiches, formulation reports, service contracts.</p>
<p>I-5.1.3</p>	<p><b>Existence of risk assessment studies, including risks of corruption and frauds</b>  Risks are systematically identified in project documents, along with mitigation measures (e.g. Identification Fiche of “Building up the Capacity of Elected Representatives”, 2009; Action Fiche of IP3, 2009). A recurrent risk identified is the lack of ownership/the absence of political will. See also I-1.1.4</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>Strong.</b></p>
	<p>Source: identification reports, action fiches, formulation reports, service contracts.</p>
<p>I-5.1.4</p>	<p><b>Proposals of risk mitigating measures in the programming documents</b>  As mentioned in I-5.1.3, both risks and mitigation measures are systematically identified in project documents. While mitigation measures made sense (to identify champions or drivers of change), they have not been very effective. Often, lack of ownership remained a serious (if not the main) constraint to programmes. The ROM of IP3 goes as far as to underline “an uncooperative attitude” from the Pakistan Institute for Parliamentary Service/PIPS (a direct IP3 beneficiary).</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>Strong.</b></p>

	Source: identification reports, action fiches, formulation reports, service contracts.
I-5.1.5	<p><b>Documents, minutes and meetings, demonstrating the existence of a policy dialogue with the government</b></p> <p>Many documents reflect a policy dialogue (involving both Delegation and HQ staff, both DEVCO and EEAS staff) that is increasingly strategic and integrated.</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>Strong.</b></p>
	<p>Source:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Strategic Dialogue and the Engagement Plan, which includes a chapter on Democracy, Governance, Human Rights and Socio-Economic Development</li> <li>▪ Press releases relating to <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 2007 first meeting of the EC-Pakistan Joint Commission</li> <li>- 2009 second meeting of the EC-Pakistan Joint Commission</li> <li>- 2009 first EU-Pakistan summit</li> <li>- 2010 first EU-Pakistan summit</li> <li>- 2012 third meeting of the EC-Pakistan Joint Commission</li> <li>- 2012 <a href="#">the EU-Pakistan 5-year Engagement Plan</a></li> <li>- 2012 first <a href="#">EU-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue</a></li> <li>- The EU granting <a href="#">GSP+ status</a> to Pakistan (2013) and linking it to human rights</li> <li>- 2014 second <a href="#">EU-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue</a></li> </ul> </li> <li>▪ Proceedings from consultations with Government, CSOs and other stakeholders in preparation of the 2014-2020 MIP</li> <li>▪ “Friends of Democratic Pakistan” (FoDP) statement on working in strategic partnership with Pakistan to combat violent extremism; develop a comprehensive approach to economic and social development; coordinate an approach to stabilizing and developing border regions; address Pakistan’s energy shortfall; and support democratic institutions; FoDP meetings include an FODP/Donors’ Conference in Tokyo (2009), and summit meetings.</li> </ul>
I-5.1.6	<p><b>Existence of documentation (internal notes, minutes of meetings, etc.) demonstrating that stakeholders have been consulted and their views taken into account (or reasons for not taking them into account) on the appropriateness of the intervention to the needs and the contextual challenges.</b></p> <p>Identification reports, the 2010 civil society mapping, consultations for the current MIP, and interviews reflect a good deal of consultations with stakeholders, including sometimes among vulnerable groups.</p> <p>On the subject of modalities it is hard to say that stakeholders’ views have been taken into account, as the EU remains an actor that supports many different groups and institutions using many different modalities, and is therefore not seen as having been very decisive. On the subject of objectives, however, EU objectives in democratisation are very much in line with those of champions of change in both government and society.</p>

The choice of partners (NGOs, UNDP, Government...) and adoption of each modality is duly justified (including the level of intervention: federal, provincial, district) by the evidence (in the form of documents, minutes of coordination meetings...). Democratisation activities have been increasingly implemented through NGOs and less and less through the public sector (Graph 1). Even after the field phase, it is unclear what the rationale and effects were (no elements from interviews, no documentation).

**Graph 1. How EU aid for OECD CRS code “Government and civil society” has been disbursed in 2006 and 2013**



Quality of evidence: **More than satisfactory**

Sources: identification reports, action fiches, formulation reports, service contracts, interviews, EU Delegation website.

I-5.1.7

**Review of those who were consulted and of the selection process. Are they representative of the groups targeted by the interventions?**

Consistent with the systemic approach favoured by the EU, EU interventions in the area of democratisation target institutions as well as civil society and ultimately common citizens. Identification reports, the 2010 civil society mapping, consultations for the current MIP, and interviews reflect a good deal of consultations with stakeholders, including sometimes among vulnerable groups.

	<p>Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory</b></p>
	<p>Sources: identification reports, action fiches, formulation reports, service contracts, interviews, EU Delegation website.</p>
<p>I-5.1.8</p>	<p><b>Opinions of key stakeholders (e.g. staff from the EU, EU implementing partners, CSOs, other donors, government, parliament, beneficiaries and community leaders) on the appropriateness of the intervention to the needs and the contextual challenges</b></p> <p>Stakeholders (mainly analysts at this stage) are divided in two groups:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Those that find that the EU lacks coherence, focus, and clarity about its goals beyond development, in the field of democratisation, for example             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- “The EU has so far failed to develop a strategic response to Pakistan’s problems”, and “its limited influence and relatively small aid contribution mean that Europe must target its support carefully.” (FRIDE, 2011);</li> <li>- “The EU is willing to send experts to build Pakistan’s capacity to better absorb international financial assistance. It is interested in providing support for the police and judicial system but does not want to abolish anti-dumping duties or remove the ban on seafood and some other items”, Sultana, 2013);</li> <li>- “The first step for Europeans should be to develop a clearer sense of what they want from Pakistan”; “The EU has been unable to translate its resources into European leverage over the security situation in Pakistan, which has continued to deteriorate” (Stanzel, 2014<sup>1</sup>)</li> </ul> </li> <li>▪ Those that find that the EU is actually better placed than other development partners to promote democratisation and human rights (thanks to the EU being perceived as “an all-weather friend”, “a peacebuilder” and an important partner for Pakistani growth and jobs, which themselves may slow down unrest) and has played to its strengths, for example by supporting civil society and engaging in structured, multi-sector policy dialogue (Abbasi, 2009; Chappell, 2009; Riaz Shad, 2014<sup>2</sup>).</li> </ul> <p>Interviews in the field were mostly in support of the second view: although the EU is involved in many areas and at many levels (subregional, federal, provincial, district), this gives the EU <b>a systemic view and influence on the whole system. Moreover, Pakistan’s “problems” are many-fold and deep-rooted, and the EU is focusing on promoting both democracy and democrats.</b></p> <p>We further refer to JC 5.2 on support in the field of elections; to JC 1.5 for matters of coherence between EU development cooperation overall and other policies (e.g. humanitarian aid and trade including the GSP+); and to EQ7 on trade for further details on GSP+.</p>

<sup>1</sup> Angela Stanzel, 2014, *After “Afpak”: Reframing Europe’s Pakistan Policy*, European Council on Foreign Relations  
<sup>2</sup> Abbasi, 2009, *The EU and Democracy Building in Pakistan*, International IDEA; Gareth Chappell, 2009, « Pakistan: What role for the EU? », SWP-Berlin; Muhammad Riaz Shad, 2014, *An assessment of opportunities for the EU’s enhanced engagement with Pakistan*, Journal of European Studies

	Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory</b>
	Source: FRIDE, 2011; Sultana, 2013; Stanzel, 2014; Abbasi, 2009; Chappell, 2009; Riaz Shad, 2014; interviews (for example MN408, 414, 416 and 420).
<b>JC-5.2</b>	<b>The interventions have been implemented according to plan.</b>
	<p>In terms of project outputs, the record is decidedly mixed, <i>when performance is recorded</i>: The IP3 project's effectiveness and impact are rated C (Monitoring report, 2013). The Supporting Electoral Reforms in Pakistan (SERP) project (2012-2014), co-funded with DFID, did not produce many of its outputs (mainly related to building the capacity of the Electoral Commission of Pakistan (ECP) because of other short-term needs ("firefighting") that took priority. Moreover, nearly all implementing partners spontaneously highlighted numerous delays in obtaining non-objections, which impeded operations (the EU, on its part, states that delays were mainly due to delays on the part of GoP and implementing partners not submitting documentation to standard).</p> <p>On the other hand, they saluted EU support that is not limited to the Electoral Commission of Pakistan (ECP) or election day but, rather, supports the whole electoral cycle, including electoral reform, through the ECP, civil society, and Parliament.</p>
I-5.2.1	<p><b>Documents showing that the funds were transferred in time to the implementing partners</b></p> <p>There is no such document available, but rather oral comments on the untimely transfer of funds.</p> <p>Note. A ROM report for the IP3 project mentions that the EUD has developed a close relationship with the project team and project stakeholders (source: ROM background conclusion sheet, 2013).</p>
	Quality of evidence: <b>Indicative but not conclusive</b>
I-5.2.2	<p><b>Monitoring reports showing that the implementing partners conducted the agreed activities</b></p> <p>Monitoring reports are available for one project (IP3) out of three.</p> <p>That ROM report (2013) provides a relatively negative picture of project implementation, as per the ratings to the following questions (scale: "A. Very Good"; "B. Good"; "C. Problems"; "D. Serious Deficiencies"):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- How well is the availability and use of inputs and resources managed? C</li> <li>- How well are the activities implemented? C</li> <li>- How well are the outputs achieved? B</li> <li>- How well are the Partners involved and contributing? C</li> </ul>
	Quality of evidence: <b>Indicative but not conclusive</b>
I-5.2.3	<p><b>Reports from the implementing partners on the progress and the outputs of the intervention</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Progress reports from implementing partners are only available for one project (Support to Electoral Reform in Pakistan/SERP, 2009-2011) out of three.</li> </ul>

	<p>SERP 2009-2011, implemented by International Alert, was found to have “delivered highly against its intended design”, including a direct contribution to the promulgation of the 18<sup>th</sup> constitutional amendment.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ There is one evaluation of EU electoral support to Pakistan 2009-2014 (2014), which covers Support to Electoral Reform in Pakistan/SERP, 2009-2011), Supporting Advocacy for Electoral Reforms in Pakistan, 2012-2013, and Long-term Election Observation and Oversight in Pakistan, 2012-2014). The latter finds that SERP 2012-2014 was “able to achieve some important landmarks with the ECP and its role was generally viewed as positive, although not in the way envisaged by the programme”.</li> </ul>
	<p>Quality of evidence: <b>Indicative but not conclusive</b></p>
<p>I-5.2.4</p>	<p><b>Opinions of key stakeholders</b></p> <p>The opinion of key stakeholders is recorded mainly for IP3 and is positive (source: ROM, 2013). Moreover, the 2014 Impact Evaluation of DFIDs Electoral Programmes in Pakistan (Collective for Social Science Research) finds that SERP 2012-2014 was “able to achieve some important landmarks with the ECP and its role was generally viewed as positive, although not in the way envisaged by the programme”.</p> <p>The field mission provided an opportunity to collect further opinions and these, too, are positive in the main. One UN implementing partner sees EU contribution in “support for elections, training of officials, training of the police, the results-based management, supporting women voters... This has had a positive influence.” One NGO (implementing partner) notes “the EU has procedures that are slower and more complicated than others, but the EU has more legitimacy than other development partners because it is seen as citizen-focused, principled in its approach, and consistent in promoting democracy. We always felt the EU was a partner rather than a donor. We design things together. They help us become compliant. Also, EU encourages us to work with others (donors). Our relationship is excellent.” This runs contrary to the 2014 Evaluation of the EU Electoral Support of Pakistan, 2009-2014, which finds that projects did not always find a way to support CSO and media engagement with the electoral reform process.</p>
	<p>Quality of evidence: <b>Partly available.</b></p> <p>Final beneficiaries were not met, as most projects in democratisation are geared towards government bodies and CSOs, and when they involve direct beneficiaries, there were hard to reach for reasons of security, logistics, budget, and timing e.g. Access to Justice in (South) Punjab had only just started to deploy its paralegals). However, the evaluation team had the opportunity to do some direct observation (local elections at the time of the mission) and, besides government officials, to meet a wide range of CSOs, including CSOs not benefitting from EU support.</p>



<b>JC-5.3</b>	<b>The EU has contributed to promote more credible and inclusive elections in Pakistan</b>
<p>Pakistan has an improved record in terms of free and fair elections, political rights and political participation, which allows analysts to state that, although not more peaceful, Pakistan is more democratic in 2014 than in 2006.</p> <p>It is hard to establish a direct EU contribution to democratisation in Pakistan, overall, given that (i) EU institutions are only the seventh largest donor in the area of democratisation and (ii) the mixed record of EU projects in terms of producing their expected outputs (see JC-5.2).</p> <p>However, on the basis of interviews and available data, there are clear areas where stakeholders attribute positive outcomes to EU cooperation (EU and domestic electoral observation; foundation work for future electoral reforms). Moreover, some interviews point to the EU's special role to play in promoting core values, a multi-track, "soft" approach (dialogue rather than conditionalities), and a better track record (compared to some other partners) in the area of democratisation. Overall, EU projects in electoral support have produced results well beyond election day, and the foundations are in place for high impact over time (more ECP engagement, electoral reform).</p>	
<b>I-5.3.1</b>	<b>Evidence of increased credibility and inclusiveness of elections (in documentation from electoral observation missions, projects' M&amp;E reports and other types of documents, and interviews with stakeholders)</b>
<p>There is evidence<sup>3</sup> of increased credibility and inclusiveness of elections over 2007-2013<sup>4</sup>, and some of EU contribution to that. The 2014 Evaluation of the EU Electoral Support of Pakistan (2009-2014) finds that "collectively, projects contributed towards improved registration for women, inroads towards gender mainstreaming in the ECP's organisation and processes, enfranchising IDPs and generally integrating human rights wherever possible in the reform driven or promoted."<sup>5</sup></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <i>The Support Electoral Reforms in Pakistan (SERP) project (2009-2011)</i>, implemented by International Alert, was found to have "delivered highly against its intended design", including a direct contribution to the promulgation of the 18<sup>th</sup> constitutional amendment.</li> <li>▪ <i>The Support Advocacy for Electoral Reforms project (2012-2013)</i>, implemented by Democracy Reporting International, aimed to strengthen the preparations for and conduct of credible and inclusive elections through better-informed electoral stakeholders. It was also found to have made direct contributions to increased credibility and inclusiveness of elections, notably through effective and joint civil society advocacy; the adoption of a voluntary code of conduct for media reporting on the 2013 elections; enhanced political party awareness of electoral reform issues; an authoritative assessment of the 2013 Balochistan</li> </ul>	

<sup>3</sup> See the evidence paper "Annex A2: Pakistan, a fragile situation and the EU response"

<sup>4</sup> Even if the 2013 elections were marred by irregularities and a lack of transparency, resulting in a long, drawn-out political crisis, there were two rounds of general elections in 2008 and 2013, with an increased turnout (both general and for female voters). Local elections have been held in Balochistan in 2013, and in Islamabad, KP, Punjab, and Sindh in 2015.

<sup>5</sup> Partecip consortium, 2014, Evaluation of the EU Electoral Support of Pakistan, 2009-2014.

local elections; and, overall, « a solid repository of analysis that may be difficult to ignore by future legislative processes ».<sup>6</sup>

- The *Support Electoral Reforms in Pakistan (SERP) project (2012-2014)*, implemented by IFES, aimed to strengthen the democratic legal framework for elections through support to the ECP, as well as to reinforce the management capacity of the ECP. It has led to a number of results, such as training of over 240,000 polling staff; the adoption of Codes of Conduct for candidates, polling staff, observers, and security services; enfranchising IPDs; improved voter lists; voter education reaching over 880,000 people. However, the DFID evaluation of this project (2014) finds that “while it may have been successful in providing improved electoral processes in the May 2013 elections, it has not yet been effective in achieving its stated objective of improving the capacity of the ECP to be able to independently conduct credible and inclusive elections” and that the issue of social exclusion would merit more attention (Collective for Social Science Research, 2014, *Impact Evaluation of DFIDs Electoral Programmes in Pakistan*).
- The *Long-Term Election Observation and Oversight in Pakistan project (2012-2014)*, implemented by the Trust for Democratic Education and Accountability/the Free and Fair Elections Network (FAFEN), was found to have been “highly effective in providing a transparency window to an otherwise fairly opaque electoral process and in prompting corrective action by both the Elections Commission of Pakistan and political parties”, which both enhanced public confidence in the electoral process and reduced the opportunities for violence. This is in spite of weak planning resulting in delays in observer training, for example, and mishaps in analysis of electoral operations.<sup>7</sup>
- *The Electoral Cycle Support to the Elections Commission of Pakistan project (2007-2008)*, implemented by UNDP, aimed to increase the capacity of the ECP.
- Third party analyses confirm Pakistan’s democratic progress (see Fragility Note, and in particular Tables C and D on the democracy status and on voter turnout): the judiciary, civil society and the media were able to assert some autonomy from the executive (re-instatement of Chief Justice Chaudhry in 2009), and the 18th Amendment to Pakistan's Constitution, which reduces the powers of the president in favor of the parliament and prime minister, devolves a large share of federal resources and responsibilities to the four provinces.

### Opinions of stakeholders

Several interviews point to the EU’s special role to play in promoting core values, a multi-track, “soft” approach (dialogue rather than conditionalities), and a better track record (compared to some other partners) in the area of democratisation and human rights, especially with regards to the enabling environment (“We may not have access to the 200m Pakistanis, but we are working on influencing top senior officials, and on the legislation”, MN403). See also I-5.1.8 and I-5.2.4.

<sup>6</sup> Particip consortium, 2014, Evaluation of the EU Electoral Support of Pakistan, 2009-2014.

<sup>7</sup> Particip consortium, 2014, Evaluation of the EU Electoral Support of Pakistan, 2009-2014.

	<p>Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory</b></p> <p>Final beneficiaries were not met, as most projects in electoral support are geared towards government bodies and CSOs (with exceptions, e.g. voter education under SERP). However, the evaluation team had the opportunity to do some direct observation (local elections at the time of the mission) and, besides government officials, to meet a wide range of CSOs, including CSOs not benefitting from EU support.</p>
I-5.3.2	<p><b>Evidence from existing evaluations, other documentation and interviews with stakeholders on the importance of the EU-funded activities for identified improvements</b></p> <p>The level of EU contribution to increased credibility and inclusiveness of elections has generally been high, according to stakeholders interviewed, especially when compared to other development partners. The fact that the EU electoral (EOM) mission was the only one accepted by GoP is telling.</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>Indicative but not conclusive</b></p> <p>Final beneficiaries were not met, as most projects in electoral support are geared towards government bodies and CSOs (with exceptions, e.g. voter education under SERP). However, the evaluation team had the opportunity to do some direct observation (local elections at the time of the mission) and, besides government officials, to meet a wide range of CSOs, including CSOs not benefitting from EU support.</p>

<b>JC-5.4</b>	<b>The EU has contributed to improve the three main strands of parliamentary action: law-making, oversight and representation</b>
	<p>With two successful rounds of elections, the return to civilian rule, and the 18th Amendment to Pakistan's Constitution, which reduces the powers of the president in favour of the parliament and prime minister, the Pakistan Parliament was expected to re-assert itself, and on many accounts Parliament performance has improved. FAFEN, 2014, summarises the lower house's performance as follows: "The five years of 13<sup>th</sup> National Assembly achieved a legislative agenda that altered the country's governance structure by ensuring provincial autonomy and restoring the 1973 constitution and promoted women's empowerment"<sup>8</sup>.</p> <p>However, in 2014, there was still a backlog of over a hundred bills pending in the National Assembly; there were issues of mandate between parliament and the judiciary; budgets could be and were changed in-year by the executive without parliamentary approval; committees, which "should be the lifeblood of a legislature", had been largely dormant until 2008, and were not yet functional (Freedom House; Bertelsmann Institute; International IDEA; Human Rights Watch; US Department of State, all 2014).</p> <p>While there have been activities conducted to support law making; oversight; and representation, three goals in the Improving Parliamentary Performance/IP3 project (started in 2012), it is too early to say whether EU support has had a direct and sustainable impact. IP3 has built trust with some senior MPs and should stay the course when it comes to supporting specific Committees, but could also address the incentives (and not only capacities) of MPs, for example by investing in public information on the Parliament's role and performance, and engage with political parties.</p>
I-5.4.1	<p><b>Evidence of improved law-making, notably at the federal level</b></p> <p>For IP3, there are no data against indicators of outputs and outcomes provided in the Financing Agreements, but the ROM reports do provide a general indication of effectiveness (rated "C. Problems" for achievement of the project's outcomes and "B. Good" for likely achievement of the project's purpose). A four-page report produced for the evaluation documents activities that are well placed to contribute to improved law-making and oversight, but it is too early to identify impact as yet: assessment of legislative drafting skills and proposed training package; deployment of a Young Parliamentary Associates programme; support to the members of the National Assembly and Senate to better understand and scrutinise the budget process; support to the development of the National Assembly Strategic Plan; etc. Engagement with Provincial Assemblies remains very limited.</p> <p><b>Opinions of the stakeholders</b></p> <p>A confidential mission report (2011) states "So far the programme has successfully delivered on a number of fronts and has been well received by Parliamentarians." The field phase confirmed that, while it has taken some time to build relationships, IP3 is well received by Parliamentarians who know of it (MN412).</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Quality of evidence: <b>Weak</b></p>
I-5.4.2	<b>Evidence of improved parliamentary oversight, notably at the federal level</b>

<sup>8</sup> FAFEN, 2014, Performance of the 13th National Assembly, 2008-2013.

	See I-5.4.1.
I-5.4.3	<p><b>Evidence of improved representation of diverse population groups, incl. minorities, notably in the federal parliament</b></p> <p>The Constitution reserves 60 seats for women to be filled by proportional representation among parties with more than 5% of the vote, and 10 seats for religious minorities. In 2006, there were 72 women representatives in the Assembly, 67 in 2013.</p> <p>Source: International IDEA database accessed December 2015.</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory</b></p>
I-5.4.4	<p><b>Evidence from existing evaluations, other documentation and interviews with stakeholders (including beneficiaries) on the importance of the EU-funded activities for identified improvements</b></p> <p>As the impact is too early to establish, the level of EU contribution to impact is too early to establish as well.</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>Weak</b></p>
I-5.4.5	<p><b>Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International) – trend</b></p> <p>This indicator does not provide information on EU support to Parliament. Moreover, the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index provides scores year to year on how Pakistani citizens perceive the extent of corruption in their country, but scores cannot be compared over time given frequent methodological adjustments. However, a better indicator is the control of corruption index (see Fragility Note, Graph D): in spite of some improvement since 2010, corruption remains high, and perceived as such by citizens ((Transparency International database, accessed 2015).</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>N/A</b></p>



# Annex A9 EQ 6: Human Rights & Rule of law

## Acronyms

BTI	Bertelsmann Transformation Index
CAPRI	Counter terrorism Associated Prosecution Reform Initiative
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CCBLE	Civilian Capacity Building for Law Enforcement
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSP	Country Strategy Paper
CT	Counter Terrorism
DEVCO	European Commission Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development
DFID	Department for International Development
EC	European Commission
EEAS	European External Action Service
EIDHR	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
EQ	Evaluation Question
EU	European Union
EUNIDA	European Network of Implementing Development Agencies
FoDP	Friends of Democratic Pakistan
GoP	Government of Pakistan
GSP	General System of Preferences
HCHR	Human Rights Commission of Pakistan
HQ	Headquarters
ICG	International Crisis Group
JC	Judgement Criteria
KP	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
MIP	Multi-annual Indicative Programme
MN	Meeting Notes
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MP	Member of Parliament
MTR	Mid-Term Review
NACTA	National Counter Terrorism Authority
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NWFP	North-West Frontier Province (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa)
PFSA	Punjab Forensic Science Agency
ROM	Results Oriented Monitoring

STE	Short-term Expertise
STRIVE	Strengthening Resilience to Violence and Extremism
TOR	Terms of Reference
UK	United Kingdom
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UPR	Universal Periodic Review

## 1. EU support to the sector

Title	Implementation years	EU Allocation	EU Commitments	EU Disbursements, (09/2015)
Citizens Justice and Peace Programme in KP	2012-2016	€ 14 M	€ 9.5 M	€ 0.1 M
Civilian capacity building for law enforcement in Pakistan ( <b>CCBLE</b> )	2010-2011	€ 14.7 M	€ 14.7 M	€ 14.7 M
Counter terrorism associated prosecution reform initiative ( <b>CAPRI</b> )	2012-2015	€ 1.8 M	€ 1.8 M	€ 1.2 M
Combating abusive child labour II ( <b>CACL-II</b> )	2008-2013	€ 5 M	€ 4.9 M	€ 4.6 M
Access to Justice for Poor and Vulnerable Groups through Support of Legal and Civil Society Organisations and the Judiciary in Punjab	2014-2017	€ 8 M	€ 7.5 M	€ 3.0 M
Strengthening Resilience to Violence and Extremism ( <b>STRIVE</b> ) in Pakistan	2014-2017	€ 5 M	€ 5 M	€ 1 M



## 2. Findings per JC and Indicators: EQ6 Human rights / Rule of law

<b>EQ6</b>	<b>To what extent did the EU contribute to the protection and promotion of human rights, the improvement of justice, and to security and counter-terrorism?</b>
<b>JC-6.1</b>	<b>EU support to human rights has been based on an analysis of the needs and challenges, and adapted to the evolving context</b>
<p>The desk review and interviews reflect in-depth analysis, informed by sustained and high-level policy dialogue. Several projects (e.g. Citizen Justice and Peace in KP, Civilian capacity building for law enforcement (CCBLE) and STRIVE) relied on an in-depth analysis of needs, dynamics and opportunities with regards to human rights. An increasingly strategic and integrated policy dialogue took place with the government on human rights. However, the connection between political instruments (policy dialogue, joint action plans) and cooperation projects were made only at times, except in the area of electoral support. Except for STRIVE, risks were systematically identified in project documents, along with appropriate mitigation measures. Stakeholders, included ultimate beneficiaries, were consulted at design stage.</p>	
I-6.1.1	<p><b>Existence of underlying analyses to identify which and whose needs to address and the regions of intervention</b></p> <p>We had access to several standalone analyses of the human rights and security situation undertaken or commissioned by the EU, on top of the descriptions in the EU Annual Reports on Human Rights and the MIPs, and analyses produced by third parties (human rights NGOs, including the reputable Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, academics, etc.). Moreover, some programme documents contain some in-depth analysis of needs, dynamics and opportunities with regards to human rights (see also I-6.1.2).</p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; background-color: #ffe6e6; padding: 5px; margin-top: 10px;"> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory.</b></p> </div>
	<p>Sources: EU implementation report 2015 on the EU-Pakistan 5-year Engagement Plan; EU-Pakistan Joint Commission briefing documents and draft minutes (2015); EU Annual Reports on Human Rights and the MIPs, and analyses produced by third parties (human rights NGOs, including the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, academics, etc.).</p>
I-6.1.2	<p><b>References to these analyses in the programming documents</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Programming documents sometimes include an in-depth analysis of needs, dynamics and opportunities with regards to human rights, notably the Citizen Justice and Peace in KP project, Civilian capacity building for law enforcement (CCBLE) project, and the STRIVE project.</li> <li>▪ Available programme documents on the Access to Justice in Punjab project provides somehow lighter analysis of the human rights context (mainly a mention of the lack of human rights protection, through inadequate access to justice, being a cause of terrorism; and the risk of extremist application of Shari'a law becoming attractive). Available project documents for the €1.8m Counter-terrorism</li> </ul>

	<p>Associated Prosecution Reform Initiative (CAPRI) provide an overview of terrorism and counter-terrorism measures, but do not specify why highly targeted and technical support to forensics was seen as more critical than, for example, wider police reform (or support to better collaboration between the police and judiciary on CT matters, or support to better legislation on CT to promote human rights and/or better interagency cooperation, etc.); nor what synergies are envisaged with previous (e.g. the €12m CCBLE project, ended in 2012) or present projects running in parallel (e.g. the €5m STRIVE project on countering violent extremism and radicalisation). Interviews were more informative, especially on the crime scene-to-courtroom continuum: besides forensic capacity development, there is also engagement with the judiciary and work on legislation, and recognition that “half the battle is connecting the dots across agencies”.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Beyond projects, strategic documents also tend to include in-depth analysis, e.g. the 2012 EU Counter-Terrorism/Security Strategy on Pakistan as agreed by the Political and Security Committee.</li> </ul>
	<p>Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory.</b></p>
	<p>Sources: project documents, strategic documents; interviews (September-November 2015), especially MN406 and MN419.</p>
I-6.1.3	<p><b>Existence of risk assessment studies, including risks of corruption and frauds</b>  <b>Generally speaking, risks to project deliverables are usually well identified but risks to impact seldom.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Except for STRIVE (no mention of risk or risk mitigation), risks are systematically identified in project documents, along with mitigation measures (e.g. Action Fiche of “Access to Justice for Poor and Vulnerable Groups through Support of Legal and Civil Society Organisations and the Judiciary in Punjab”, 2009; description of the action “strengthening Rule of Law Programme for Citizens’ Justice and Peace in KP”; ToRs for CAPRI). Moreover, a ROM report mentions that CAPRI has a “risk register” that is updated regularly in Islamabad.</li> <li>▪ Several project documents include human rights violations as a risk to projects (e.g. Access to Justice in Punjab and Citizen Justice in KP), but we did not find standalone assessments of risks <i>to</i> human rights (e.g. scenario planning or “drivers of change” analysis).</li> </ul>
	<p>Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory.</b></p>
	<p>Source: Project documents (identification reports, action fiches, formulation reports, service contracts)</p>
I-6.1.4	<p><b>Proposals of risk mitigating measures in the programming documents</b>  <b>Risk mitigation measures are usually well identified:</b> The Access to Justice in Punjab project contains appropriate measures to mitigate the risk mentioned in I-6.1.2 (“train media on drawbacks of justice implemented by Islamist extremists. Sensitize general public through legal awareness campaigns”), measures that were in part taken but too locally and too recently to have any measurable impact. The same goes for</p>

	<p>CCBLE, and for CAPRI, which mention the risk “that the support for the Punjab Forensic Science Agency from the Provincial Government is withdrawn” and proposes as mitigation “support the PFSA to become an integral part of the counter-terrorism criminal justice system in Punjab; also support the PFSA to increase its commercial revenue”.</p> <p><b>However</b>, the CCBLE documents state that in case there is “political instability and a deteriorating security situation”, equipment will be “delivered to a more secure area” (and nothing else). Finally, a ROM report mentions that another big issue is whether CAPRI “will help address issues of a much taller order (e.g. mutual distrust and lack of a cooperation culture or a general shortage of capacity).</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory.</b></p>
	Sources: project documents, ROM reports.
I-6.1.5	<p><b>Documents, minutes and meetings, demonstrating the existence of a policy dialogue with the government</b></p> <p>There is ample evidence in the documents reviewed of policy dialogue with government on human rights, and one that is increasingly strategic and integrated. Policy dialogue has involved both the Delegation and headquarters (both EC and EEAS), and on GoP side, the Ministry of Finance, Foreign Affairs, and line ministries (notably “Interior and Narcotics Control”, “Law, Justice Law and Human Rights”). This dialogue has taken place around/in the EC-Pakistan Joint Commission (since 2007); “Friends of Democratic Pakistan” (FoDP) meetings (since 2008); EU-Pakistan summits (since 2009); the EU-Pakistan 5-year Engagement Plan; the EU-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue (since 2012) ; the 2012 EU Counter-Terrorism/Security Strategy on Pakistan; the EU granting GSP+ status to Pakistan (2013) and linking it to human rights; preparation of the 2014-2020 MIP and the EU-Pakistan Cooperation Agreement.</p> <p>However, staff interviews reveal that the connection between political instruments (policy dialogue, joint action plans) and cooperation projects are made only at times: there is scope for them leveraging each other more. The exception is in the area of electoral support, where projects made inroads directly thanks to electoral observation missions (see EQ5).</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory.</b></p>
	<p>Sources: Interviews (September-November 2015); documents relating to the Strategic Dialogue and the 5-year Engagement Plan, which includes a chapter on Democracy, Governance, Human Rights and Socio-Economic Development; the 2012 EU Counter-Terrorism/Security Strategy on Pakistan as agreed by the Political and Security Committee on 2 May 2012; Proceedings from consultations with Government, CSOs and other stakeholders in preparation of the 2014-2020 MIP; 2015 report on the implementation of the 5-year Engagement Plan; “Friends of Democratic Pakistan” (FoDP) statements; press releases relating to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 2007 first meeting of the EC-Pakistan Joint Commission</li> <li>- 2009 second meeting of the EC-Pakistan Joint Commission</li> <li>- 2009 first EU-Pakistan summit</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 2010 first EU-Pakistan summit</li> <li>- 2012 third meeting of the EC-Pakistan Joint Commission</li> <li>- 2012 the EU-Pakistan 5-year Engagement Plan</li> <li>- 2012 first EU-Pakistan-Strategic Dialogue</li> <li>- The EU granting GSP+ status to Pakistan (2013) and linking it to human rights</li> <li>- 2014 second EU-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue</li> <li>- 2015 sixth meeting of the EU-Pakistan Joint Commission</li> </ul>
I-6.1.6	<p><b>Existence of documentation (internal notes, minutes of meetings, etc.) demonstrating that stakeholders have been consulted and their views taken into account (or reasons for not taking them into account) on the appropriateness of the intervention to the needs and the contextual challenges.</b></p> <p>There is evidence of stakeholder consultation, although no documentation of ultimate beneficiaries (population, including vulnerable groups) being consulted:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Strategic Dialogue and the 5-year Engagement Plan, which includes a chapter on Democracy, Governance, Human Rights and Socio-Economic Development</li> <li>▪ Press releases e.g. on the meetings of the EU-Pakistan Joint Commission</li> <li>▪ The 2012 EU Counter-Terrorism/Security Strategy on Pakistan as agreed by the Political and Security Committee on 2 May 2012</li> <li>▪ Proceedings from consultations with Government, CSOs and other stakeholders in preparation of the 2014-2020 MIP</li> </ul> <p style="text-align: center;">Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory.</b></p>
	<p>Sources: Identification and formulation documents; documents relating to the Strategic Dialogue and the 5-year Engagement Plan; press releases e.g. on the meetings of the EU-Pakistan Joint Commission; the 2012 EU Counter-Terrorism/Security Strategy on Pakistan as agreed by the Political and Security Committee on 2 May 2012; proceedings from consultations with Government, CSOs and other stakeholders in preparation of the 2014-2020 MIP</p>
I-6.1.7	<p><b>Review of those who were consulted and of the selection process. Are they representative of the groups targeted by the interventions?</b></p> <p>See I-6.1.6: There is evidence of stakeholder consultation and, according to interviews, ultimate beneficiaries (population, including vulnerable groups) were consulted in the early planning stages of each project.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory.</b></p>
	<p>Sources: Project documents and ROM reports, including in particular CCBLE 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> interim reports (all, 2011); identification of EU Rule of Law Programme (2013); CAPRI ROM report (2014); interviews (November 2015)</p>
I-6.1.8	<p><b>Opinions of key stakeholders (EU staff, implementing partners, CSOs, other donors) on the appropriateness of the intervention to the needs and the contextual challenges</b></p> <p>Perhaps <i>because</i> human rights and security are such central challenges to the nation's management and identity, little documentation was found articulating why EU</p>

	<p>support to human rights and security is relevant. All interviewees but one (on Counter Terrorism) argued that the EU had the right experience, expertise and perception, and that the situation would be worse without EU engagement.</p> <p>On modalities however, the 2015 report on the implementation of the 5-year engagement plan notes that “the EU is facing difficulties launching new projects on human rights and governance due to reservations made by Pakistan on the choice of implementation modalities”: specifically, the Government of Pakistan is requesting to be the exclusive beneficiary and manager of governance-related actions. Moreover, several interviewees commented on European MPs delivering messages that are counterproductive and create “static” for day-to-day work: “Blasphemy cases are a small percentage of all criminal cases. The best way to address this is not by having Europeans MPs coming here to make speeches on this, but rather through broader support to security and justice, going for the jugular, i.e. the laws, and pitching reforms in a way that will earn politicians some electoral mileage” (MN407, MN410, MN414).</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory.</b></p>
	<p>Source: 2015 report on the implementation of the 5-year engagement plan; interviews (November 2015)</p>
I-6.1.9	<p><b>See I-1.2.7: Absence of incoherence between EU development cooperation and EU approach to stability and security</b></p>
	<p>No specific instances of incoherence were found, although there is scope for articulating the relationship with more clarity and precision (e.g. should rural or urban populations be targeted, youth, middle class or poorer segments of the population, specific sect/religious communities...)</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>Indicative but not conclusive.</b></p>
	<p>Source: strategy and programme documents; interviews (November 2015)</p>
JC-6.2	<p><b>The interventions have been implemented according to plan</b></p>
	<p>In terms of project outputs, the record is mixed, when performance is documented, and there are notable gaps in monitoring (no data for two out of six projects):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>For the €14.7m CCBLE, a 2012 evaluation notes “some positive and concrete contributions” but with varying degrees of success (Table 3).<sup>1</sup></li> </ul>

<sup>1</sup> EPRD, 2012, CCBLE Final Evaluation. On capacity strengthening of the National Counter-Terrorism Authority (NACTA), “the objectives have not been fully realised”, and “there is minimal evidence of tangible impact”. On support to the development of provincial CT capability in KP and Punjab, there were more deliverables, and “has been managed fairly well”, and stakeholders have expressed positive opinions (“the project has come a long way and has been successful in sowing the seeds of change”). On development of police-media relations, particularly on CT issues, some of the objectives were met (outputs), but the impact is viewed as “minimal”, and “this was the responsibility of Pakistan institutions”. On criminal justice in Punjab, it was “the most successful of all the programme components, in terms of effectiveness, impact and sustainability”

**Table 3. Effectiveness of CCBLE**

Component 1: capacity strengthening of NACTA	B-C
Component 2: support to the development of provincial CT capability in KP and Punjab	B
Component 3: Development of police-media relation, particularly on CT issues	A-D
Component 4: Criminal justice in Punjab	A
Component 5: Knowledge base re. governance issues in the Tribal Areas (1% of CCBLE budget)	B

Source: grading by authors, based on the CCBLE final evaluation.

- For the €1.8m CAPRI (plus UK financing), a 2014 ROM report (a year since project launch) indicates that a number of outputs have been delivered<sup>2</sup>, and others are on track to be delivered<sup>3</sup>. However, “the biggest challenge at present appears to be the fragmented institutional landscape, with limited relations between PFSA, the police, prosecutors and judges”.
- For the €5m Combating Abusive Child Labour II project, available monitoring reports grade effectiveness “B”, “C” and “B” in 2009, 2010 and 2012 respectively.
- There is no available data to date on whether outputs or outcomes have been delivered, for the €14m Citizens Justice and Peace in KP (only some monthly reports listing activities, no indicators and no evaluations), for the €8m Access to Justice in Punjab (no monitoring or evaluation), and for the €5m STRIVE (no monitoring or evaluation).
- From 2014, it has become increasingly difficult to launch new human rights projects due to reservations made by Pakistan on the choice of implementation modalities (GoP preference for budget support).

Beyond project outputs, however, the impact (actual or potential) could be quite important (see below).

I-6.2.1	<p><b>Documents showing that the funds were transferred in time to the implementing partners</b></p> <p>There are data on whether funds were disbursed but not whether they were transferred in time to the implementing partners. Delays mentioned in progress reports and evaluations were mostly administrative (e.g. signing of Pakistan-EU MoU on CCBLE; procurement of equipment for civilian capacity building of law enforcement agencies in Pakistan) or due to Pakistan delays in passing legislation (e.g.</p>
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<sup>2</sup> A 20-week training course for CT prosecutors from three provinces; travel of PFSA scientific staff to the UK and the Netherlands; training of PFSA staff in biological evidence recovery; STE visits, reports and recommendations, DNA awareness material being developed etc. However, Because of the slow pace of delivery, effectiveness is graded C.

<sup>3</sup> “SO1 could be met through the increased use of forensic evidence to support terrorism cases. Similarly, the quality of evidence used in CT prosecutions (SO2) is expected to increase thanks to PFSA standards raised in view of future ISO17025 accreditation, and improvements already underway in PFSA. However, increased understanding of forensic evidence by the police, prosecutors and the judiciary (SO3) is more of a long-term objective, given the limited cooperation between these stakeholders. The professional relations between the Punjab police and the prosecution service can be improved (SO4) through the active engagement of provincial political authorities, ideally at the Chief Minister's level.”

	<p>the NACTA Act, for CCBLE). Interviews shed more light on this issue (see JC-5.2 under EQ5).</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>Indicative but not conclusive.</b></p>
	<p>Sources: project documents and ROM reports</p>
I-6.2.2	<p><b>Monitoring reports showing that the implementing partners conducted the agreed activities</b></p> <p>Monitoring reports are available for projects as indicated in Table 2. Citizens Justice and Peace in KP and STRIVE are the least documented: they were both signed in 2014. The evaluation team did not have access even to monthly reports.</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>Indicative but not conclusive.</b></p>
	<p>Sources: Monitoring reports available for projects, as indicated in Table 2.</p>
I-6.2.3	<p><b>Reports from the implementing partners on the progress and the outputs of the intervention</b></p> <p>See I-6.2.2</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>Indicative but not conclusive.</b></p>
	<p>Sources: Monitoring reports available for projects, as indicated in Table 2.</p>
I-6.2.4	<p><b>Opinions of key stakeholders</b></p> <p>Beyond the positive opinions of stakeholders interviewed on relevance (I-6.1.8) and effectiveness (I-6.1.3 through I-6.1.8), on implementation specifically the CCBLE evaluation (2012) quotes, “many interviewees were of the opinion that EC wanted to ‘make a political show,’ rather than actually deploy technical expertise in order to ensure concrete results, ownership and sustainability” (this relates to the issue of the choice of EUNIDA as implementer).</p> <p>Several interviewees brought up the issue of international consortia, saying they did not make sufficient use of local experts, which would help both effectiveness and efficiency. Others were concerned that training were too short (although one GoP counterpart thought it was too long, and energy should have been spent on policy work).</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory.</b></p>
	<p>Sources: CCBLE evaluation (2012); 2015 report on the implementation of the 5-year engagement plan; interviews (September-November 2015), notably MN407, MN414, MN416, MN418, MN420</p>

JC-6.3	<b>The EU has contributed to increase the capacity of the Government of Pakistan to address human rights issues, in particular for the vulnerable groups, and to fulfil its international human rights obligations</b>
There is some evidence of increased Government capacity to address human rights issues and to fulfil its international human rights obligations, although these does not yet translate into a better human rights situation. However, there is some evidence to suggest that, without the EU, the situation may be worse.	
I-6.3.1	<p><b>Evidence of increased Government capacity to address human rights issues, in particular for vulnerable groups, and to fulfil its international human rights obligations (identification of concrete changes):</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. There is <i>some</i> evidence of increased Government capacity to address human rights issues. For example, a ROM report for CAPRI (2014) grades capacity development as “B”. The CCBLE final evaluation underlines good results in the CCBLE component relating to the development of Provincial Counter-Terrorism Capability in KP and Punjab. Interviews pointed to positive results in the areas of forensics and prosecution (MN406, MN417, MN419), although several also deplored too much has been done on training and not enough to “think and act politically”, to “connect the dots” across GoP agencies; and on more structural issues (policies and rules, for which progress can be less tangible): “Get judges, the police, the prosecution and politicians together: there’s only so much you can do with just the bureaucracy; human rights are not a box to tick” (MN410, 414, MN416, MN419, MN420).</li> <li>2. This increased capacity does not yet translate into better outcomes in these areas: the state of human rights is no better in 2014 than 2007 (Fragile States Index 2007-2014; Freedom House 2007-2014). Besides human rights violations by non-state actors, which may be greater than those by government (interviews of EU staff and BTI 2014), in 2014 government arrested scores of activists in disputed circumstances and lifted the moratorium on the death penalty. Women’s rights remain under threat, with 869 killed in 2013 in the name of honour (The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan/HCHR, an NGO). Similarly, HCHR finds that “the Government’s performance in fulfilling its commitments during the 2012-2013 UPR at the mid-cycle period has been far from satisfactory. Out of 69 accepted recommendations reviewed, 39 recommendations -a majority have not been implemented at all; 30 recommendations have only been partially implemented; and not a single recommendation has been implemented in full.”<sup>4</sup></li> <li>3. The EU has worked extensively on capacities and has engaged in policy dialogue with the federal government. However, with the trust created thus far, there are opportunities to deepen the policy dialogue with both the federal and provincial governments, and to accelerate work on legal norms and procedures.</li> </ol> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory.</b></p>
Sources: Fragile States Index 2007-2014; Freedom House 2007-2014; interviews of	

<sup>4</sup> Oral Statement of HRC in the General Debate under Agenda Item 6, the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), June 2015.



	EU staff; BTI 2014; Human Rights Commission of Pakistan/HCHR (in particular: Oral Statement of HRCP in the General Debate under Agenda Item 6, the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), June 2015); ROM reports, notably for CAPRI (2014); evaluations, notably for CCBLE; interviews (September-November 2015).
I-6.3.2	<p><b>Evidence from existing evaluations, other documentation and interviews with stakeholders on the importance of the EU-funded activities for the achievement of the identified changes</b></p> <p><b>Whilst the importance of the EU funded activities for the achievement of the identified changes is in question (I-6.3.1), there is some evidence to suggest that, without the EU, the situation may be worse.</b> An EU staff member (MN403) states: "I'm not sure what the EU is doing is making an enormous difference. But the situation without the EU would probably be worse. We the EU promote core values and have a better track record than Pakistan's other top partners. We may not have access to the 200m Pakistanis, but we have some success in influencing top senior officials, and the legislation." This is echoed by Pakistani stakeholders, e.g. "Pakistanis used to say: "the EU gives lessons but nothing else". This has changed with the GSP+" (MN410).</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>Indicative but not conclusive.</b></p>
	Source: interviews (September-November 2015)
JC-6.4	<b>The EU has contributed to empowering and enabling civil society organisations to defend human rights, in particular for the vulnerable groups</b>
	The capacity of CSOs supported by the EU to promote and protect human rights has improved, but not the one of other CSOs, or at least not significantly, because of increasing challenges to their day-to-day operations.
I-6.4.1	<p><b>Evidence of civil society organisations defending actively and forcefully human rights, in particular for the vulnerable groups</b></p> <p>Pakistan is often cited as having one of the most robust civil societies in the developing world, with over 100,000 CSOs operating across the country (Brookings, 2015<sup>5</sup>), and their capacity seems to have improved over the years (Mezzera, 2009; Gross, 2011<sup>6</sup>). However, <b>on the basis of the desk review and interviews, the capacity of CSOs supported by the EU to promote and protect human rights specifically appears to have improved, but not the one of other CSOs, or at least not significantly, because of increasing challenges to their day-to-day operations.</b> The 2015 report on the implementation of the 5-year plan notes that "human rights defenders run significant risks in carrying out their work with a lack of proper mechanisms in place to protect them and their organizations", as dramatically illustrated by the 2015 assassination of Ms. Sabeen Mahmood, a prominent Karachi-</p>

<sup>5</sup> Brookings, 2015.

<sup>6</sup> Mezzera, Marco, and Safiya Aftab. "Pakistan State-Society Analysis." *Brussels: Initiative for Peacebuilding, Democratisation and Transitional Justice Cluster* (2009); Geeraerts, Gustaaf, and Eva Gross. *Perspectives for a European Security Strategy towards Asia: Views from Asia, Europe and the US*. Vol. 18. ASP/VUBPRESS/UPA, 2011.

	<p>based human rights activist, along with the assassination of many journalists and anti-Taliban activists. Moreover, only 13 out of 58 international NGOs have received a MoU that allows them formally to operate in Pakistan (2015 report on the implementation of the 5-year plan). Other issues frequently cited that constrain the capacity of CSOs to promote and protect human rights include visas for project personnel; the slow or non-approval of project MoUs (available project evaluations and progress reports).</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory.</b></p>
	<p>Sources: Brookings, 2015; Mezzera, 2009; Gross, 2011; 2015 report on the implementation of the 5-year plan; interviews (September-November 2015)</p>
I-6.4.2	<p><b>Evidence from existing evaluations, other documentation and interviews with stakeholders on the importance of the EU-funded activities for empowering and enabling civil society organisations to defend human rights</b></p> <p>The EU contribution is important when it comes to CSOs directly supported by the EU. There is no basis to establish improved CSO capacity to defend human rights beyond that group of CSOs.</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory.</b></p>
	<p>Sources: Available project evaluations and progress reports; interviews (September-November 2015)</p>
JC-6.5	<p><b>The EU has contributed to strengthen the effectiveness of the police and the judiciary in delivering high-quality services to all citizens while respecting human rights</b></p>
	<p>The police and judiciary do not appear more effective in 2014 (compared to 2007) in delivering high-quality services to all citizens while respecting human rights. Moreover, available project evaluations and progress reports do not provide any evidence of EU operations having improved police and judiciary services as yet. Moreover, as several analysts find and interviewees emphasised, strengthening capacity will not by itself improve the justice and security substantially, unless work is done on rules and incentives, notably for cross-department, cross-agency collaboration. Some seeds have been planted to do so in future (relationships built at provincial level with state and non-state actors; audit of judiciary in Punjab...).</p>
I-6.5.1	<p><b>Evidence of improved police services to all citizens while respecting human rights (identification of concrete changes)</b></p> <p><b>EU support to the police so far is solely focused on forensics</b> (and only just starting with police stations in KP). This indicator is therefore not relevant yet. Moreover, documentary review revealed no evidence for this indicator and interviews during the field phase did not provide evidence of progress. The 2015 report on the implementation of the 5-year plan mentions that “the police and security forces” continue to be a source of violence and abuses”.</p>

	Quality of evidence: <b>Weak.</b>
	Sources: project documents and publicly available documents; interviews (September-November 2015).
I-6.5.2	<p><b>Evidence of improved judiciary services to all citizens while respecting human rights (identification of concrete changes)</b></p> <p><b>EU support to the judiciary so far mainly consists in an audit of the court management system in Punjab.</b> This indicator is therefore not relevant yet. Moreover, documentary review revealed no evidence for this indicator, and interviews during the field phase did not provide evidence of progress. The 2015 report on the implementation of the 5-year plan mentions that “court officials are often the victims of threats and intimidation and corruption and political interference in the judicial process is prevalent.” The 2014 Bertelsmann Transformation report finds that the lack of credibility of the judiciary “has benefitted the Pakistani Taliban, especially in the Swat Valley”. As for women, they probably find very limited access to security and justice as there were for example only 560 women in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s 60,000- strong police force (Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, 2014).</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>Weak.</b></p>
	Sources: 2015 report on the implementation of the 5-year plan; 2014 Bertelsmann Transformation report; 2014 Human Rights Commission of Pakistan; interviews (September-November 2015).
I-6.5.3	<p><b>Evidence from existing evaluations, other documentation and interviews with stakeholders on the importance of the EU-funded activities for improving police and judiciary services</b></p> <p>Available documents (project documents and third party analysis) stress trainings were delivered, equipment bought and documents produced, but do not point to any tangible evidence of improved service delivery by the police and judiciary (nor, <i>a fortiori</i>, to EU contribution to such improvement). Moreover, a lot of EU efforts focus on strengthening capacity, and hinge on the assumption that capacity is the main binding constraint, or the only workable constraint, on better security and justice. But several analysts and interviewees (quoted under I-6.3.1) find that <b>strengthening capacity won’t by itself make a difference, and that the intervention needs to become more structural (engaging on rules and norms), promote inter-agency cooperation, and domestic accountability to generate political will.</b></p> <p>For Vera and Cordesman, 2011, “the inability of Pakistani internal security agencies to cope with the Punjabi Taliban threat is as much a result of shortfalls in law enforcement capacity and related government services as it is a lack of political will”, a finding echoed by the CCBLE final evaluation (“As it stands and without the required legislation in place, NACTA has been described as an ‘empty shell’”) and by the EU annual report on human rights 2014 (“institutional weaknesses included limited accountability by law enforcement agencies, with reports of extra-judicial killings,</p>

	<p>disappearances, torture, overcrowded prisons and illegal detention”).</p> <p>The EU report also notes: “While Pakistan has acceded to most of the core international human rights instruments, progress is still needed on incorporating these into domestic law and on implementing measures to achieve their objectives”.</p> <p>Further, the 2015 report on the implementation of the 5-year plan notes that commitment from the Pakistani government to work with the EU on CT issues leads to “a certain difficulty exists in carrying out concrete co-operation activities in this field, due also to the limited availability of MS agencies for that purpose.”</p> <p>Moreover, several project reports also see the lack of coordination between Pakistani institutions and loopholes in the legislative framework that organises them as a bigger problem than capacity (e.g. ROM report for CAPRI, 2014).</p> <p>The ICG (2015) notes that police capacity has been gravely eroded not only because of the inadequacy of resources and training but also of internal accountability and autonomy. An interviewee echoes this: “The police is handpicked, and runs as a private militia” (MN414).</p>
	<p>Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory.</b></p>
	<p>Sources: ICG (2015); Vera and Cordesman (2011); CCBLE final evaluation (2012); EU annual report on human rights (2014); ROM report for CAPRI (2014); interviews (September-November 2015)</p>
<b>JC-6.6</b>	<b>The EU has increased access to justice, in particular for vulnerable groups</b>
I-6.6.1	<p><b>Evidence of increased access to justice, in particular for vulnerable groups</b></p> <p>The 2015 report on the implementation of the 5-year Plan finds that “access to justice is severely restricted by a massive backlog of cases in the civilian courts, inadequate training of judges, lawyers and police personnel, as well as lack of education and awareness of rights by the general public.” In 2013, there was still a heavy backlog of cases across all levels of the judicial system (e.g. 20,000 cases pending in the Supreme Court) (Human Rights Commissions of Pakistan, 2014). For women, there remains a cultural norm that prevents them from taking issues to court (with some exceptions, for example re. property disputes), taking matters to the <i>jirga</i> or <i>masalibate anjuman</i> instead.</p> <p>Vulnerable groups often recourse to alternative and traditional dispute resolution: while not devoid of flaws (e.g. women can never present their case directly at <i>jirga</i>), stakeholders interviewed continue to find it a fair enough and effective process, especially when decisions are translated into court orders (for enforcement).</p> <p>Available documents (project documents and third party analysis) stress trainings were delivered, equipment bought and documents produced, but do not point to any tangible evidence of increased access to justice. However, where the EU Access to Justice has supported community-based legal empowerment officers, there is already a</p>

	<p>notable increase in citizens (notably women) having access to paralegals and lawyers (MN407, MN410, MN417, MN420; no progress reports document this as of November 2015).</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory.</b></p>
	<p>Sources: 2015 report on the implementation of the 5-year plan; Human Rights Commissions of Pakistan (2014); interviews (November 2015).</p>
I-6.6.2	<p><b>Evidence from existing evaluations, other documentation and interviews with stakeholders on the importance of the EU-funded activities for increased access to justice</b></p> <p>There is no evidence of increased access to justice, and therefore no evidence of EU contribution to increased access to justice.</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory.</b></p>
	<p>Sources: Human Rights Commissions of Pakistan, 2014; interviews (November 2015)</p>
<b>JC-6.7</b>	<b>The EU has contributed to increase public confidence in the rule of law</b>
	<p>Increased public confidence in the rule of law is not a specific objective of the six projects concerned (except for the Access to Justice in Punjab project, which specifically emphasises public information), but it is a generally acceptable proxy of increased capacity and improved services. Public confidence in the rule of law has not increased, nor is there evidence of EU operations having increased public confidence in the rule of law – the big exception is the electoral process, for which, based on interviews, the EU contribution is clear.</p>
I-6.7.1	<p><b>Evidence of increased public confidence in the rule of law, in particular for the target groups</b></p> <p><b>Public confidence in the rule of law has not increased.</b> The Human Rights Commissions of Pakistan finds that “even as the government looked for ever stringent laws to deter terrorists and bring them to justice, the perennial question on the ability of those tasked with investigation and prosecution remained unanswered. In many parts of the country, crime and lawlessness grew to such an extent that the people preferred to remain indoors after dusk... Violence in Karachi grew unchecked despite security forces’ operations” (Human Rights Commissions of Pakistan, 2014). A survey on the causes of conflicts in KP shows that “a dysfunctional judicial system” and “lack of justice by the state” are the top causes of the Taliban takeover in Swat in 2009 (UNDP, 2012<sup>7</sup>).</p> <p>However, as above: where the EU Access to Justice has supported community-based legal empowerment officers, there is already a notable increase in citizens (notably</p>

<sup>7</sup> UNDP, 2012. Perception Survey on Reconciliation in Malakand Division. Sustainable Development Through Peace Building, Governance & Economic Recovery Project In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, UNDP.

	women) having access to paralegals and lawyers (interviews; no progress reports documents this as of November 2015).				
	Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory.</b>				
	Sources: Human Rights Commissions of Pakistan, 2014; UNDP, 2012; interviews (November 2015).				
I-6.7.2	<p><b>Evidence from existing evaluations, other documentation and interviews with stakeholders on the importance of the EU-funded activities for increased public confidence in the rule of law</b></p> <p>There is no evidence of direct EU contribution yet, although it is expected that the EU Punjab Access to Justice project, for example, will make a directly measurable contribution.</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>Weak.</b></p>				
	Sources: project documents and publicly available documents reviewed, but no data available; interviews (November 2015).				
JC-6.8	<p><b>The EU has contributed to increase state, media and civil society's capacity to strengthen resilience against terrorism</b></p> <p>State and society's resilience against terrorism has not notably increased, but it could be argued that without the EU's high-level policy dialogue and broad cooperation portfolio and specific support to law enforcement/criminal justice (mainly in Punjab, starting in KP), things would be worse.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>On the face of it, state efforts to fight terrorism have demonstrated some results. However, the deadly December 2014 attack on a Peshawar school was a sober reminder that terrorism will require sustained and targeted engagement on addressing both the roots and manifestations of terrorism. Moreover, the values and principles that underpin this fight are also essential. Civil society and the media working to strengthen resilience against extremism have improved their capacity and demonstrated some success, but suffer from increasing challenges to their day-to-day operations.</li> <li>Available project evaluations and progress reports provide some evidence of EU operations having increased state, media and civil society capacity to strengthen resilience against terrorism in some specific areas. Moreover, it is plausible that without the EU's high-level policy dialogue and support to education, rural development, access to justice and law enforcement/criminal justice, things would be worse.</li> </ul>				
I-6.8.1	<p><b>Evidence of increased capacity and accountability of national authorities and justice in relation to counter-terrorism</b></p> <p><b>On the face of it, state efforts to fight terrorism have demonstrated some results:</b> the offensive to take back the Swat valley in 2009 was successful, and total casualties related to terrorism have diminished between 2007-2014, including for civilians and security forces respectively (while terrorists/insurgents killed have grown slightly).</p> <table border="0" style="width: 100%; text-align: center;"> <tr> <td>Civilians</td> <td>Security Force Personnel</td> <td>Terrorists/Insurgents</td> <td>TOTAL</td> </tr> </table>	Civilians	Security Force Personnel	Terrorists/Insurgents	TOTAL
Civilians	Security Force Personnel	Terrorists/Insurgents	TOTAL		

2007	1522	597	1479	3598
2008	2155	654	3906	6715
2009	2324	991	8389	11704
2010	1796	469	5170	7435
2011	2738	765	2800	6303
2012	3007	732	2472	6211
2013	3001	676	1702	5379
2014	1781	533	3182	5496
2015	646	220	1843	2709
<b>Total*</b>	<b>20583</b>	<b>6251</b>	<b>31887</b>	<b>58721</b>

Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal accessed September 2015.

**However, the deadly December 2014 attack on a Peshawar school was a sober reminder that terrorism will require sustained and targeted engagement on addressing both the roots and manifestations of terrorism... Moreover, the values and principles that underpin this fight are also essential:**

- **CT in Pakistan is mainly coercive:** without a rights-based approach to CT, the governance reforms that are needed to improve access to justice, and politics of inclusion and reconciliation, the root causes of violent extremism will remain, and violent extremism may take hold as in Swat.
- **Moreover, there have been a number of discretionary measures, a lack of legal certainty, a weakening of constitutional protections and due process<sup>8</sup>.** For the ICG, “the militarisation of counter-terrorism policy puts at risk Pakistan’s evolution toward greater civilian rule, which is itself a necessary but not sufficient condition to stabilise the democratic transition.” (ICG, 2015). Similarly, Lieven (2015) finds that “Many of the same features which (aim to) hold Islamist terrorism in check are responsible for holding back development.”<sup>9</sup>
- **Government CT offensives have involved pre-emptive strikes that caused civilian deaths** (no numbers available) and led to massive displacements (over 1.5 million in 2009; over one million in North Waziristan in 2014 (Rashid, 2012; Human Rights Watch, 2015<sup>10</sup>). WikiLeaks also exposed the Pakistan army’s complicity with the US on the use of drones, which have claimed thousands of civilian lives.

Quality of evidence: **More than satisfactory.**

<sup>8</sup> The 2015 report on the implementation of the 5-year plan indicates that the most serious terrorism cases are dealt with by special military courts (including for civilians, as per the January 2015 21st constitutional amendment) and the first trials have been held “in complete secrecy”, when such trials should take place under conditions which safeguard the rights of the defendants to due process and a fair trial. In June 2015, Pakistan has acknowledged that eight of ten Taliban allegedly jailed of the attack on activist Malala Yousazai were secretly acquitted in April (Wall Street Journal, BBC). The same report also indicates that many criminals “have been convicted under Pakistan’s Anti-Terrorism Act that offers considerable leeway in its definition of terrorists empowers special military courts to try all terrorism suspects, including civilians. For the ICG, “the vast majority of the 176 executions since late December have been for crimes unrelated to terrorism”.

<sup>9</sup> Lieven, Anatol. Pakistan, a hard country. Public Affairs, 2011.

<sup>10</sup> Rashid, Ahmed, 2012. Pakistan on the Brink.

	Sources: South Asia Terrorism Portal accessed September 2015; (ICG, 2015); Similarly, Lieven (2015); Rashid, 2012; Human Rights Watch, 2015; interviews (September-November 2015).
I-6.8.2	<p><b>Evidence of increased media and civil society's capacity of strengthening resilience against extremism and violence</b></p> <p>Like civil society promoting human rights in general (see I-6.4.1), <b>civil society and the media working to strengthen resilience against extremism have improved their capacity and demonstrated some success<sup>11</sup>, but suffer from increasing challenges to their day-to-day operations</b> (see I-6.4.1). Brookings (2015) also notes some donor unease with supporting faith-based organisations, and a bias towards supporting urban-, elite-based CSOs at the expense of more grassroots CSOs, which have much more influence in at-risk zones.<sup>12</sup></p> <p style="background-color: #f2f2f2; padding: 5px;">Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory.</b></p>
	Sources: Brookings (2015); the Tribune (2015); interviews (November 2015).
I-6.8.3	<p><b>Evidence from existing evaluations, other documentation and interviews with stakeholders on the importance of the EU-funded activities for increased state, media and civil society capacity to strengthen resilience against terrorism</b></p> <p>On counter-terrorism generally, Brattberg and Rhinard (2012) note that an external factor constrains CT efforts: "UK relations with Pakistan present (an) example of a relationship that inhibits the EU's technical assistance efforts. The UK and other supportive member states are keen to retain diplomatic and support links on a bilateral basis (...) Without the support of key member states the EU will have difficulties designing and implementing a common approach to third countries in the external dimension of EU counter-terrorism."<sup>13</sup> Boer (2015) echoes this finding: "the EU's counter-terrorism role has remained subsidiary, both legally and politically, to that of its member states. Furthermore, a lack of its own operational capabilities, its institutional complexity, and its problems of cross-policy coordination continue to act as powerful constraints on the EU's counter-terrorism responsibilities."<sup>14</sup> One interview finds "It is not clear what the value-added of the EU on CT is: no hard skills; heavy bureaucracy; and money is already plenty".</p> <p>The EU aimed to increase state, media and civil society capacity to strengthen resilience against terrorism via, most directly, the following projects: CAPRI (Forensics component, cofounded with DfID) and CCBLE. STRIVE (launched in</p>

<sup>11</sup> One such success, reporting by The Tribune, is the social communication campaign against extremism launched by activist Jibran Nasir. Think tanks such as the Jinnah Institute also continue conducting research to support the fight against violent extremism.

<sup>12</sup> Brookings, 2015. Empowering Pakistan's Civil Society to Counter Global Violent Extremism.

<sup>13</sup> Brattberg, Erik, and Mark Rhinard. "The EU as a global counter-terrorism actor in the making." *European Security* 21, no. 4 (2012): 557-577.

<sup>14</sup> Boer, Monica Den. "Counter-Terrorism, Security and Intelligence in the EU: Governance Challenges for Collection, Exchange and Analysis." *Intelligence and National Security* 30.2-3 (2015): 402-419.



	<p>2014) is also relevant. There is evidence of direct EU contribution to increased state, media and civil society capacity to strengthen resilience against terrorism in specific areas: under the Forensics component of CAPRI (with the caveats mentioned under JC-6.2); the development of positive media-police relations on counter-terrorism issues and some improved provincial capacities in KP and Punjab under CCBLE (see JC-6.2). Moreover, it is plausible that the EU support to education, rural development, justice and trade has contributed to stemming radicalism and violent extremism, and it would be worth documenting that in a specific evaluation. Moreover, Riaz (2014) notes a “soft”, and productive approach to counter-terrorism: that “the EU-Pakistan summits held in 2009 and 2010 have made newspaper headlines in Pakistan. In its political dialogue with Pakistan, the EU has emphasized that the issue of terrorism and extremism in the country should be addressed through socio-economic development, law enforcement and strengthening of democracy.”<sup>15</sup></p> <p style="text-align: center; background-color: #f8d7da; border: 1px solid black;">Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory.</b></p>
	<p>Sources: Brattberg and Rhinard (2012); Khattak and Zubair (2014); Riaz (2014); Review of commission-funded activities for Pakistan under the EIDHR (European instrument for democracy and Human Rights) 2000-06; Boer (2015); interviews (November 2015).</p>

<sup>15</sup> Shad, Muhammad Riaz. "An Assessment of Opportunities for the EU's Enhanced Engagement with Pakistan." *Journal of European Studies* 30.2 (2014).



# Annex A10 EQ7: Trade

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## Acronyms

AA	Association Agreement
ADB	Asian Development Bank
AfT	Aid for Trade
AKRSP	Aga Khan Rural Support Programme
APTA	Afgan Pakistan Transit Agreement
ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nations
BDS	Business Development Services
BIO	Business Intermediate Organisations
BSE	Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
CCP	Competition Commission of Pakistan
CMO	Collective Management Organisation (for copyrights)
CNA	Competitiveness Needs Assessment
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
DFID	Department for International Development
DG	Directorate General
EAD	Economic Affairs Division
ECO	Economic Cooperation Organisation
EDF	Export Development Fund
EMS	Environmental Management System
EPB	Export Promotion Bureau
EPZA	Export Processing Zone Authority
EU	European Union
FA	Financing Agreement
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment

FIA	Federal Investigation Agency
FPCCI	Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce
FVO	Food and Veterinary Office
FY	Fiscal Year
GAP	Good Agriculture Practice
GBC	Gilgit, Baltistan and Chitral
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GTZ	German Technical Cooperation Agency
GoP	Government of Pakistan
G&J	Gems and Jewellery
HACCP	Hazard Analysis at Critical Control Points
IBA	Institute of Business Administration, Karachi
IDA	International Development Agency
IEC	International Electrotechnical Commission
IFI	International Financing Institutions
IP	Intellectual Property
IPAS	Intellectual Property Automation System
ISO	International Standards Organisation
ITC	International Trade Centre
IPDF	Infrastructure Project Development Facility
IPO	Intellectual Property Organisation
IPR	International Property Rights
LFM	Logical Framework
LLM	Master of Law in Intellectual Property (WIPO Turin)
LP	Leather Products
LUMS	Lahore University of Management Science
MFD	Marine fisheries Department
MFN	Most Favoured Nation
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MR	Monitoring Report
MTR	Mid-Term Review
NAPHIS	National Agency for Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services
NEP	National Enquiry Point
NFSAPHRA	National Food Safety Animal and Plant Health Regulatory Authority
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NPO	National Productivity Organisation
NTTFC	National Trade and Transit Facilitation Committee
ODA	Official Development Aid
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OVI	Objectively Verifiable Indicators
PBS	Pakistan Bureau of Statistics

PC	Planning Commission
PFMA	Pakistan Footwear Manufacturers Association
PGMEA	Pakistan Gloves Manufacturers and Exporters Association
PITAD	Pakistan Institute for Trade and Development
PiNET	Pakistan innovation Network
PLCIP	Pakistan Leather Competitiveness Improvement Programme
PLGMEA	Pakistan Leather Garments Manufacturers and Exporters Association
PNAC	Pakistan National Accreditation Council
PPD	Public Private Dialogue
PRAG	Procedures and practical guide
PSD	Private Sector Development
PSQCA	Pakistan Standards and Quality Control Authority
PTA	Pakistan Tanners Association
QMS	Quality Management System
RAFFS	Food and Feed Safety Alerts (European Commission)
ROM	Results Oriented Monitoring
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SAFTA	South Asian Free Trade Area
SMEDA	Small and Medium Enterprises Development Authority
SPS	Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary measures
SRO	Statutory Regulatory Orders
STPF	Strategic Trade Policy Framework
TBT	Technical Barriers to Trade
TDAP	Trade Development Authority of Pakistan
TPR	Trade Policy Review
TRTA	Trade Related Technical Assistance
TTF	Trade and Transport Facilitation
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UAF	University of Agriculture of Faisalabad
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organisation
UNSD	United Nations Statistics Division
USA	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UVAS	University of Veterinary & Animal Sciences, Lahore
VET	Vocational Education and Training
WIPO	World Intellectual Property Organisation
WTI	World Trade Institute
WTO	World Trade Organisation

## 1. Overview of sector context and its evolution

### 1.1 Key features and evolution of Pakistan trade over the period

Pakistan is a lower income country which has experienced positive real GDP growth since 2010 but lower than neighbouring South Asian countries (cf. Table 1 and fig. 1).


Economic growth fell sharply in 2007-08 as Pakistan was hit by the international crisis but it has been steadily resuming since 2010.

**Table 1: Population and growth**

	FY2007	FY2013	Average annual growth rate
Population (million)	158	182	1.8%
Current GDP (PRs billion)	10 638	25 402	15.6%
Real GDP (PRs billion, prices of 2005/06)	8 760	10 713	3.4%
Current GDP (US\$ billion)	170.1	247.0	6.4%
Current GDP/capita ( US\$)	1 022	1 313	4.3%


*Source: UNDP Human Development Reports, Pakistan Bureau of Statistics*

**Figure 1a: Real GDP growth in Pakistan and South Asia 2006-2014 (Constant \$US of 2010)**



*Source: World Bank, Pakistan at a glance.*

**Figure 1b: GDP/capita (thousand US\$)**



*Source: IMF Eighth Review under the Extended Arrangement and Request for Waivers of Non observance of Performance Criteria, October 2015*

The country's openness to trade is limited and has declined over the period of the evaluation with a trade to GDP ratio evolving from 39% in 2006 to 32% in 2013<sup>1</sup>. The balance of payments (cf. table 2) is characterised by a negative trade balance which deteriorated in absolute terms but has slightly improved (in terms of % of GDP) over the period due to higher growth of merchandises exports than imports. Within the period the trade balance improved until 2009 (US\$ 10.5m) but deteriorated sharply after the catastrophic floods of 2010. The deficit of the balance of non-factor services has also been reduced over the period. The balance of factor services exhibits an important and growing surplus, essentially due to the workers' remittances. Overall the current account deficit has been curbed from 8.2% of GDP in 2007 to 1.2% of GDP in 2013. The three components (trade balance, balance of non-factor services and balance of factor services/remittances) contributed in equal proportions to this improvement.

**Table 2: Balance of payments (current account)**

	FY2007	FY2013	Average annual growth rate	FY2007	FY2013
	US\$ million			% of GDP	
Exports of goods	20 427	25 169	3.5%	12.0%	10.2%
Imports of goods	35 397	41 685	2.8%	20.8%	16.9%
Trade balance	-14 970	-16 516		-8.8%	-6.7%
Balance on non factor services	-6 457	-2 642		-3.8%	-1.1%
Balance of factor services and net unrequited transfers	7 553	16 233		4.4%	6.6%
of w. remittances	6 449	15 832	16.1%	3.8%	6.4%
Current account	-13 874	-2 925		-8.2%	-1.2%

Source: State Bank of Pakistan

The main sources of external financing are, by order of importance, the remittances from Pakistani workers abroad, the official development assistance (ODA), foreign direct investments (FDI), and, to a minor extent, non ODA official flows (cf. Table 3).

**Table 3: Pakistan External Financing Inflows (\$US million)**

	2006/08	2013	Δ 2013-2006/08
Remittances	6 053	14 626	142%
FDI Inflows	5 100	1 307	-74%
Other Official Flows	164	572	250%
Official Development Assistance	1 900	2 993	57%
(of w. Aid for Trade)	339	772	128%


Source: OECD, *Aid for Trade at a Glance 2015, Reducing trade costs for inclusive, sustainable growth*

<sup>1</sup> WTO Secretariat, quoted by Aid for Trade at a Glance, 2015.

**Consistently strong remittances have provided Pakistan a growing and much needed source of foreign exchange over the whole period.** Their growth stems from multiple factors<sup>2</sup>: the growing Pakistani Diaspora, emigrated workers sending more than before (notably due to a higher share of skilled and qualified workers among the emigrants, which shows that the availability of jobs for qualified people in Pakistan is more an issue than the availability of qualified people), and the increased use of formal channels to transfer money. Whereas in the beginning of the period the USA were the main country of origin of the remittances (US\$ 1.46 m in FY2007), followed by Saudi Arabia (US\$ 1.02 m in FY2007), in FY 2013 Saudi Arabia was the first source (US\$ 4.11 m) followed by the USA (US\$2.19 m) and the UK (US\$1.98 m).

**Although Pakistan has one of the most liberal foreign investment regimes in South Asia, benefits from a strategic location, natural resources and a large skilled workforce, its performance to attract foreign direct investment has been low and deteriorated sharply over the period of the evaluation.** This can be attributed to the precarious security situation, chronic power and gas shortages and the high cost of doing business, leading to Pakistan occupying one of the lowest ranks for competitiveness in the Global Competitiveness Index (fig. 2).

**Figure 2: Pakistan's ranking in Global Competitiveness Index (2014)**



It is worth quoting the State Bank of Pakistan in its latest annual report *“Pakistan’s investment potential is significant (especially in infrastructure and energy sectors); business regulations are investor friendly; labour markets are flexible and abundant with both skilled and unskilled workforce; and above all, the size of domestic market. If only Pakistan is able to tackle governance related issues and provide a sense of security to businesses, it can attract significant volumes of FDI that would not only solve its foreign exchange problems, but would also contribute in enhancing productivity and efficiency of the economy”*.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Cf. State Bank of Pakistan, Annual Report FY 2013-2014 (State of the Economy).

<sup>3</sup> State Bank of Pakistan, Annual Report FY 2013-2014 (State of the Economy). p. 113



Official Development Assistance has overtaken FDI as a source of foreign exchange and a growing share comes from Aid for Trade revealing the interest of both Government and donors to develop the trade potential of Pakistan.

**Pakistan is exporting mostly manufacturing products but over the period of the evaluation the share of primary commodities has been increasing at the expense of manufacturing products, revealing an absence of diversification of the economy.**

As seen in table 3, exports of primary products have risen from 19.7% to 26.4% of total merchandise exports between 2007 and 2013, whereas the share of exports of manufactures has declined from 80% to 73% over the same period. **Manufacturing exports are concentrated on textile and clothing products** which together represented more than 62% of total exports in 2007 reduced to 55% in 2013. Table 3 provides also the figures for leather and jewellery products as these have been specifically targeted by the TRTA of the EU.

**Table 3: Composition of merchandises trade**

<b>Exports (% of total exports)</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2013</b>
Primary products	19.7	26.4
Manufactures	80.1	73.6
Textiles	41.3	37.2
Clothing	21.3	18.1
of w. articles of leather or of composition	3.4	2.3
leather		
Jewellery	0.6	1.7
<b>Imports (% of total imports)</b>		
<i>Primary products</i>	43.2	52.2
<i>or wich: food</i>	8.9	10.2
<i>fuels</i>	25.6	34.8
<i>Manufactures</i>	54.8	46.9

*Source: WTO Trade Policy Review of Pakistan, 2015 (based onUNSD Comtrade database)*

Similarly the composition of imports shows an increase in the share of primary products, particularly fuels, and a decrease in manufacturing. **Overall these trends correspond to a reduced insertion of Pakistan trade in the international division of labour.**

The main destinations of Pakistan's exports are the EU, the USA and the Middle East (table 4). Over the evaluation period the share of Pakistan's exports to the EU remains stable; the Chinese market is gradually absorbing a higher share of Pakistan's exports, whereas the relative importance of the USA and the Middle East markets is reduced. Pakistan's imports are predominantly and increasingly coming from the Middle East, the main source of fuel imports.

**Table 4: Pakistan's directions of trade.**

	Exports (% of total exports)		Imports (% of total imports)	
	2007	2013	2007	2013
EU (28)	26.9	25.0	14.7	10.1
USA	25.1	18.0	10.2	4.9
Middle East	17.4	12.2	19.8	39.1
Afghanistan	4.7	8.0	0.3	0.7
China	3.4	10.6	12.8	15.1
India	1.6	1.6	3.9	4.3
Other	20.9	24.6	38.3	25.8

Source: UNSD, Comtrade database.

The EU is the most important export market for Pakistan and remained so over the whole period. Table 5 gives the annual trade flows between EU and Pakistan. It shows that the Pakistani trade balance with the EU which was traditionally negative became positive after 2010. Pakistan exports to EU consist mainly in textile and clothing products (table 6) whereas the main imports are machinery and chemicals.

**Table 5: Exports and imports of Pakistan to and from the EU (€ billion)**

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Exports (€ billion)	3.6	3.7	3.4	3.6	4.7	4.1	4.5	5.5
<i>Growth (%)</i>	4.7	5.1	-8.3	15.9	20.4	-11.5	9.7	21.2
Imports (€ billion)	3.8	3.9	3.6	3.7	3.8	4.1	3.8	4.1
<i>Growth (%)</i>	-10.3	3.6	-7.6	3.5	0.7	9.6	-6.7	6.4
Balance (€ billion)	-0.2	-0.3	-0.3	-0.2	0.9	0.0	0.7	1.4

Source: "European Union, Trade in goods with Pakistan", European Commission, DG Trade 2015

**Table 6: Pakistan's merchandise trade with the EU (2014)**

Exports to EU	€ billion	% of total	Imports from EU	€ billion	% of total
Clothing	2.15	39.1%	Machinery and transport equipment	1.42	34.7%
Textiles	2.03	36.9%	Chemicals	0.85	20.8%
Agricultural products	0.42	7.6%	Agricultural products	0.51	12.5%
Fuels and mining products	0.16	2.9%	Fuels and mining products	0.43	10.5%
Chemicals	0.11	2.0%	Iron and steel	0.13	3.2%
Other	0.63	11.5%	Other	0.75	18.3%
Total	5.5	100.0%	Total	4.09	100.0%

As evidenced by the figures of table 4 **regional trade integration in South Asia is among the lowest in the world.** The geopolitical context in South and Central Asia, especially the longstanding conflict with India and the political volatility and insurgency on the Western frontier with Afghanistan, has impeded effective economic integration in the region and thus has been an obstacle to economic growth and development. "Pakistan and

*India account for almost 92 per cent of South Asia's gross domestic product (GDP), 85 per cent of South Asia's population and 80 per cent of South Asia's surface area, whereas only 20 per cent of the regional trade is India–Pakistan trade. South Asia's two largest economies barely trade with each other, although they share 3,323 km of Land border between the Indian states of Punjab, Rajasthan and Gujarat and the Pakistani provinces of Punjab and Sindh.”<sup>4</sup>*

## 1.2 National trade strategy and policies

In May 2005, Pakistan adopted its **Vision 2030** the goal of which was to “achieve a developed, industrialized, just, and prosperous country by 2030 through rapid and sustainable development in a resource-constrained economy, by deploying knowledge imports, to, *inter alia*, raise productivity and international competitiveness as well as the share of manufacturing in GDP and total exports.”<sup>5</sup> Currently the objective of the trade policy is “*contributing to the national economy through trade liberalization and facilitation, improving export competitiveness and reducing cost of doing business. Aim to achieve higher market access for Pakistani products in existing markets as well as new markets with ultimate aim of improving quality of life of the people of Pakistan.*”<sup>6</sup>

Over the evaluation period Pakistan has slowly moved from an import substitution model and paved the way towards **trade liberalisation**, taking “cautious steps”<sup>7</sup> to reach it. The MFN tariff is a good indicator of this precaution, the “average applied MFN tariff is 14.3% in 2014/2015, slightly down from 14.8% in 2008”<sup>8</sup>. As stated in the 2007 WTO *Trade Policy Review*, “the tariff remains Pakistan’s main trade policy instrument”<sup>9</sup>. Until 2008 the **national trade policy** of Pakistan “used to be announced on an annual basis. From 2009 onwards, Pakistan has adopted a three-year national trade policy. Accordingly, Strategic Trade Policy Framework (STPF) 2009-2012, and STPF 2012-2015 issued by the Ministry of Commerce have defined the main pillars of the trade policy.”<sup>10</sup>

The comparison of the key components of these two trade policy frameworks (table 7) shows an evolution towards policy increasingly focused on the improvement of the sector governance and regulatory framework, regional trade and export promotion. This is further illustrated by initiatives to achieve these goals as specified in the STPF 2012-2015: a. Institutional Strengthening and Governance; b. Measures to enhance Export competitiveness; c. Regulatory amendments in the trade regulations; d. Payment of Outstanding EDF dues and streamlining EDF<sup>11</sup> releases in future.

<sup>4</sup> Raihan, S. and De, P., *India-Pakistan Economic Cooperation: Implications for Regional Integration in South Asia*, Commonwealth Trade Policy Discussion Papers, Commonwealth Secretariat, 2014.

<sup>5</sup> TPR Secretariat 2007

<sup>6</sup> Pakistan's Ministry of Commerce online information.

<sup>7</sup> TPR Secretariat 2015

<sup>8</sup> TPR Secretariat 2015

<sup>9</sup> TPR Government 2007

<sup>10</sup> Ministry of Commerce, Government of Pakistan, *Strategic Trade Policy Framework 2009-2012*, and *Strategic Trade Policy Framework 2012-2015*.

<sup>11</sup> EDF is the Export Development Fund. An Export Development Surcharge of 0.25% is levied on all exports to strengthen and develop export promotion infrastructure. In practice, there has been a lack of transparency on the use these funds and the results achieved. The business community complained that was not used to boost exports but rather to cover salaries and administrative costs. Source: The Express Tribune, March 2014.

**Table 7: Key elements of Pakistan's trade policy frameworks**

STPF 2009-2012	STPF 2012-2015
(i) Supportive macro policies and services (ii) Enhancing product sophistication level in Pakistan's exports (iii) Enhancing firm level competitiveness (iv) Domestic commerce reform and development (v) Product and market diversification (vi) Making trade work for sustainable development in Pakistan	i. Focus on Regional Trade ii. Create Regulatory Efficiencies iii. Promote Agro-processed exports iv. Increase Exports from less developed Regions of Pakistan v. Promote exports of Services Sector vi. Enhance access to export financing and credit guarantees vii. Revamp Export Promotion Agencies viii. Mobilize new investment in export oriented industries ix. Facilitate Exporting industry overcome energy crisis x. Enhance Product and Market Development and Diversification xi. Undertake effective Trade Diplomacy xii. Increasing Green Exports xiii. Rationalize the Tariff Protection Policy xiv. Enhance Role of Women in Exports xv. Reform and Develop Domestic Commerce

**Statutory Regulatory Orders (SROs) are a major characteristic of the trade regime in Pakistan** and “remain an important source of deviation from MFN rates”<sup>12</sup>, showing that the actual movement towards trade liberalisation is linked with the protection to infant industries. The SROs are “tools through which the executive, i.e. the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR), decides the fate of taxation affairs in the country. This bypasses the need for Parliament and the ensuing debate that ought to follow any suggestion to cut or raise taxes, or exemptions and concessions thereof.”<sup>13</sup>

The importance of this tariff-emption system is widely shown in its global application: thus, “more than 90 percent of the total 7,016 tariff lines of Pakistan customs tariffs are covered under one or more SROs”<sup>14</sup> in 2014. Nevertheless, this situation is not static during the evaluation period, the *Trade Policy Review* stating in 2007 that some rationalization was led by the government of Pakistan<sup>15</sup> while in 2015 the SROs were qualified as “a significant drain on fiscal revenue”<sup>16</sup>. Indeed, in May 2014, the government “prepared a calendar to eliminate the vast majority of SROs and convert the remainder into regular legislation”<sup>17</sup>. No change would be seen before Fiscal Year 2015.

**Pakistan is a member of WTO and provides at least MFN status to all except 2 WTO members.** Trade with India used to be conducted on the basis of a positive list of products (about 2000) that could be imported from India. In 2012 this has been replaced by a negative list of products (about 1200) that cannot be imported from India.

Pakistan is part of several plurilateral arrangements among which:

<sup>12</sup> TPR Secretariat 2015

<sup>13</sup> [http://www.pk.undp.org/content/pakistan/en/home/library/hiv\\_aids/development-advocate-pakistan--volume-i--issue-3/analysis--sros--the-story-of-sordid-regulatory-orders.html](http://www.pk.undp.org/content/pakistan/en/home/library/hiv_aids/development-advocate-pakistan--volume-i--issue-3/analysis--sros--the-story-of-sordid-regulatory-orders.html)

<sup>14</sup> [http://www.pk.undp.org/content/pakistan/en/home/library/hiv\\_aids/development-advocate-pakistan--volume-i--issue-3/analysis--sros--the-story-of-sordid-regulatory-orders.html](http://www.pk.undp.org/content/pakistan/en/home/library/hiv_aids/development-advocate-pakistan--volume-i--issue-3/analysis--sros--the-story-of-sordid-regulatory-orders.html)

<sup>15</sup> TPR Government 2007

<sup>16</sup> TPR Secretariat 2015

<sup>17</sup> [http://www.pk.undp.org/content/pakistan/en/home/library/hiv\\_aids/development-advocate-pakistan--volume-i--issue-3/analysis--sros--the-story-of-sordid-regulatory-orders.html](http://www.pk.undp.org/content/pakistan/en/home/library/hiv_aids/development-advocate-pakistan--volume-i--issue-3/analysis--sros--the-story-of-sordid-regulatory-orders.html)

The **ECO Trade Agreement** signed by Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey along with six Central Asian states in July 2003. The ECO trade and Development Bank is the main tool developed to enhance “the intra-regional trade” and the “regulatory framework in the region”: the overall objective of this group is to create favourable conditions for attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) which includes improvements in investment legislation, privatization of state-owned enterprises, and liberalization of investment flows”<sup>18</sup>.

The **D-8 Group** comprises Pakistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, and Turkey. It was created in 1997 with the objective to “to improve member states’ position in the global economy, diversify and create new opportunities in trade relations, enhance participation in decision-making at international level, and improve standards of living.”<sup>19</sup>. In fact, trade is one area of the activities of this forum as pointed out in the 2007 *Trade Policy review*: “Trade and nine other sectors have been identified for cooperation and project development”<sup>20</sup>.

It is also signatory of a number of regional arrangements (table 8)

**Table 8 Regional Trade Agreements**

Name of the agreement	Date	
Free Trade Agreement		
<b>Agreement on South Asian Free Trade Area</b>	2004 (signature) 2006 (entry into force)	Regional
<p><b>Zone of application:</b> the <b>South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)</b> was established on December 1985: it is composed of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives. “Though it is home to around a quarter of the world’s population, the region produces less than two per cent of global GDP.”<sup>21</sup></p> <p>The Agreement on South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) was signed in 2004 with entry into force in 2006. <b>Type of agreement:</b> this agreement relies mainly on tariffs reduction in two phases: “Phase-I (2006-2008) Existing tariff rates above 20% to be reduced to 20% within two years Tariff below 20% to be reduced on margin of preference basis of 10% per year. Phase-II (2008-2013) Tariff reduced to 0-5% within 5 years”<sup>22</sup></p>		
<b>Pakistan – Malaysia Free Trade Agreement</b>	2007 (signature)	Bilateral
<p><b>Type of agreement:</b> tariffs reduction</p> <p>“For trade in Goods Pakistan will eliminate tariff on 43.2% of the current imports from Malaysia by 2012. On the other hand Malaysia will eliminate tariff on 78% of imports from Pakistan. In trade in services, both countries have provided WTO plus market accesses to each other.”<sup>23</sup></p>		
<b>Pakistan-China Free Trade Agreement</b> <sup>24</sup>	1. 2006 2. 2009	Bilateral
<p>This is a two-part agreement:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Free Trade Agreement in <b>Goods &amp; Investment</b> Bilateral tariffs reduction</li> <li>Free Trade Agreement in <b>Services</b></li> </ol>		

<sup>18</sup> <http://www.etdb.org/content/ecoregioninbrief>

<sup>19</sup> <http://www.developing8.org/About.aspx>

<sup>20</sup> TPR Secretariat 2007

<sup>21</sup> <http://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/14125.html>

<sup>22</sup> [http://www.commerce.gov.pk/?page\\_id=72](http://www.commerce.gov.pk/?page_id=72)

<sup>23</sup> [http://www.commerce.gov.pk/?page\\_id=195](http://www.commerce.gov.pk/?page_id=195)

<sup>24</sup> [http://www.commerce.gov.pk/?page\\_id=202](http://www.commerce.gov.pk/?page_id=202)

Bilateral market access facilities		
Trade Agreement		
<b>Afghan Pakistan Transit Agreement (APTA)</b>	2010 2013 (update)	Bilateral
<b>Objective:</b> “further promoting bilateral trade and eliminating the smuggling of goods in Pakistan by traders claiming to be transiting goods into Afghanistan.” <sup>25</sup>		
<b>Pakistan-Sri Lanka Trade Agreement</b>	2005	Bilateral
<b>Type of agreement:</b> tariffs reduction and market access granting “Sri Lanka and Pakistan have agreed to offer preferential market access to each other’s exports by way of granting tariff concessions. Sri Lanka would be able to enjoy duty free market access on 206 products in the Pakistani market including tea, rubber and coconut. Pakistan, in return, would gain duty free access on 102 products in the Sri Lankan market. These products include oranges, basmati rice and engineering goods.” <sup>26</sup>		
Preferential Trade Agreement		
<b>Pakistan-Iran Preferential Trade Agreement</b>	2005 (signature) 2006 (entry into force)	Bilateral
“Under the Agreement, Pakistan offered concessions to Iran on 338 tariff lines, whereas Iran gave concessions on 309 tariff lines. Preferences granted by both countries to each other cover approximately 18% of MFN tariff of both countries.” <sup>27</sup>		
<b>Pakistan-Mauritius Preferential Trade Agreement</b>	2007	Bilateral
“Pakistan offered concessions to Mauritius on 130 items / tariff lines i.e. 1.9% of its total existing national tariff lines, whereas Mauritius has given concession on 102 items / tariff lines i.e. 1.64% of its total existing national tariff lines.” <sup>28</sup>		
<b>Pakistan-Indonesia Preferential Trade Agreement</b>	2012	Bilateral
<b>Type of agreement:</b> Tariff reductions		

### 1.3 Institutional context

Trade policy formulation and implementation in Pakistan is a coordinated process. The Ministry of Commerce is responsible for multilateral, bilateral, and regional trade arrangements. It also has primary responsibility for trade policy formulation and implementation along with the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR), which administers Customs and collects domestic federal taxes on imports. The Ministry's WTO wing deals with multilateral issues, including agreements and negotiations. The WTO Council, chaired by the Minister of Commerce, comprises many ministers, departmental secretaries, and the central bank governor. The Council examines matters relating to WTO Agreements, develops strategies for protecting Pakistan's interests while meeting its multilateral obligations, and ensures inter-ministerial and inter-provincial coordination. Standing parliamentary committees in the Senate and the National Assembly also meet as required to supervise the Ministry of Commerce in formulating and implementing WTO-related policies. The Government also receives formal and informal advice from the private sector such as the Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FPCCI), which is the apex body of trade and industrial chambers and associations representing specific products or industries.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>25</sup> TPR Secretariat 2015

<sup>26</sup> [http://www.commerce.gov.pk/?page\\_id=215](http://www.commerce.gov.pk/?page_id=215)

<sup>27</sup> [http://www.commerce.gov.pk/?page\\_id=218](http://www.commerce.gov.pk/?page_id=218)

<sup>28</sup> [http://www.commerce.gov.pk/?page\\_id=221](http://www.commerce.gov.pk/?page_id=221)

<sup>29</sup> TPR Secretariat 2015

Table 9 lists the key institutions and stakeholders in the sector.

**Table 9: Trade sector: institutional stakeholders**

Institutions	Hyperlink
<b>Related ministers and general services</b>	
Ministry of Finance	<a href="http://www.finance.gov.pk/index.html">http://www.finance.gov.pk/index.html</a>
State Bank of Pakistan	<a href="http://www.sbp.org.pk">http://www.sbp.org.pk</a>
Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (PBS)	<a href="http://pbs.gov.pk">http://pbs.gov.pk</a>
Federal Board of Revenue (FBR)	<a href="http://www.fbr.gov.pk/">http://www.fbr.gov.pk/</a>
Ministry of Planning, Development and Reform	<a href="http://www.pc.gov.pk/?p=2461">http://www.pc.gov.pk/?p=2461</a>
<b>Trade specific services</b>	
Economic Affairs Division (EAD)	<a href="http://www.ead.gov.pk">http://www.ead.gov.pk</a>
Trade Development Authority of Pakistan (TDAP) (since ex-Export Promotion Bureau – EPB)	<a href="http://www.tdap.gov.pk">http://www.tdap.gov.pk</a>
Pakistan Institute of Trade and Development (PITAD)	<a href="http://www.pitad.org.pk/">http://www.pitad.org.pk/</a>
Directorate General of Trade Organisations	<a href="http://www.dgto.gov.pk/">http://www.dgto.gov.pk/</a>
Export Processing Zones Authority (EPZA)	<a href="http://www.epza.gov.pk/about.html">http://www.epza.gov.pk/about.html</a>
<b>Commissions</b>	
Planning Commission (PC)	<a href="http://www.pc.gov.pk">http://www.pc.gov.pk</a>
Privatization Commission	<a href="http://www.privatisation.gov.pk">http://www.privatisation.gov.pk</a>
Competition Commission of Pakistan	<a href="http://www.cc.gov.pk">http://www.cc.gov.pk</a>
Securities & Exchange Commission of Pakistan	<a href="http://www.secp.gov.pk">http://www.secp.gov.pk</a>
<b>Private sector development related institutions</b>	
National Saving Organization	<a href="http://www.savings.gov.pk">http://www.savings.gov.pk</a>
Small & Medium Enterprise Devt. Authority (SMEDA)	<a href="http://www.smeda.org">http://www.smeda.org</a>
Infrastructure Project Development Facility (IPDF)	<a href="http://www.ipdf.gov.pk">http://www.ipdf.gov.pk</a>
Pakistan Industrial Credit & Investment Corporation	<a href="http://http://www.picicamc.com">http://http://www.picicamc.com</a>
<b>Chambers of Commerce &amp; Industry</b>	
Lahore Chamber of Commerce & Industry	<a href="http://www.lcci.org.pk">http://www.lcci.org.pk</a>
Silakot Chamber of Commerce & Industry	<a href="http://www.scci.com.pk">http://www.scci.com.pk</a>
Sarhad Chamber of Commerce & Industry	<a href="http://www.kpcci.org.pk">http://www.kpcci.org.pk</a>
Quetta Chamber of Commerce & Industry	<a href="http://http://www.qcci.com.pk">http://http://www.qcci.com.pk</a>
Karachi Chamber of Commerce & Industry	<a href="http://http://www.kcci.com.pk/">http://http://www.kcci.com.pk/</a>

#### 1.4 Strategy and interventions of (non EU) development partners in the sector

For most donors support to trade is mixed with industry in an “Industry & Trade” sector (for USAID or ADB for instance) or “Private sector development and trade”.

Substantial donor interventions in the area of TRTA are limited to a few donors. **The United States Agency for International Development (USAID)** has implemented a major programme of US \$10 million with matching grants from Government of Pakistan (GoP) on competitiveness but assistance is not primarily focused on the trade sector. The World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and some bilateral donors including Japan are supporting the Trade and Transit corridor under the National Trade and Transit Facilitation Committee (NTTFC). The focus of Trade and Transit programme is on

infrastructure development and supporting trade facilitation which is complementary to the EU programme for TRTA-II.

**The World Bank leads in Pakistan 24 projects (in January 2014) for a total budget of \$4.4 billion<sup>30</sup>.** Three of them are trade-related projects (Table 10):

**Table 10: World Bank programmes in the trade sector**

Projects	Date	Total cost
<b>Trade and Transport Facilitation II</b>	12/05/2009 31/12/2013	USD 25 million
<p><b>Project components:</b> Trade facilitation and market access (76% of the project) Export development and competitiveness</p> <p><b>Main objective:</b> “to improve performance of trade and transport logistics by facilitating: (a) the implementation of the National Trade Corridor Improvement Program (NTCIP); and (b) the simplification and modernization of Pakistan's international trade procedures and practices.”<sup>31</sup></p> <p>The trade-related component of the project, called Trade and Transport Facilitation (ITF) “builds on the results achieved by the first trade and transport facilitation project closed in 2006, extending efforts to streamline and integrate trade data exchange and official controls, sustain public/private sector collaborative institutional framework and strengthen the domestic logistic industry”</p>		
<b>Competitive Industries Project for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa</b>	28/06/2013 31/10/2015	USD 9 million
This project was meant to provide support to “infrastructure services for private sector development” and to “micro, small and medium enterprise” <sup>32</sup> .		
<b>MDTF-Economic Revitalization of KP and FATA</b>	22/08/2011 31/10/2015	USD 20 million
This project was meant to provide support to “micro, small and medium enterprise” (45% of the project) and to “rural non-farm income generation” and “private sector development” <sup>33</sup> .		

**The Asian Development Bank (ADB) provides lending, grants and technical assistance to Pakistan out of which 4.35% are meant to support “Industry and Trade”<sup>34</sup>.** The data provided on the website of the AsDB does not allow us to look at specific trade-exclusive projects or to specify the trade-related part of the projects led during the evaluation period.

Moreover, **Pakistan is the 18<sup>th</sup> (out of 20) biggest recipient of Aid for Trade** for a decade<sup>35</sup>. More globally, the sub-region benefits consequently from this aid, India being the first recipient and Afghanistan the 4<sup>th</sup>. (Tables 11 and 12)

<sup>30</sup> <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/pakistan/projects>

<sup>31</sup> <http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P101684/trade-transport-facilitation-ii?lang=en>

<sup>32</sup> <http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P143661/competitive-industries-project-khyber-pakhtunkhwa?lang=en>

<sup>33</sup> <http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P124268/mdtf-economic-revitalization-kp-fata?lang=en>

<sup>34</sup> "Asian Development Bank & Pakistan - Fact Sheet", ADB, 2015

<sup>35</sup> "Aid for Trade at a glance - Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Pakistan - 2015", OECD-WTO, 2015



**Table 11: Aid for Trade, Commitments (USD million, 2013 constant)**

	2002- 2005 avg.	2006-2008 avg.	2009-2011 avg.	2012	2013
India	1.58	2.38	2.72	3.55	5.17
Afghanistan	791	1.56	1.86	1.83	2.27
Pakistan	619	731	766	1.60	697
Total AfT	25.27	33.15	44.02	53.60	55.38

Source: Adapted from "Aid for Trade at a glance - Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Pakistan - 2015", OECD-WTO,

**Table 12: The top Aid for Trade donors for Pakistan are the following:**

2006/2008	Value (USD million)	%	2013	Value (USD million)	%
IDA	190.0	56	United States	232.0	30
United States	47.1	14	Japan	169.1	22
Japan	37.3	11	IDA	160.3	21
Germany	29.6	9	ADB Special Funds	80.6	10
United Kingdom	12.5	4	UAE	43.5	6

Source: Adapted from "Aid for Trade at a glance - Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Pakistan - 2015", OECD-WTO, 2015

## 1.5 EU and MS strategies and interventions in the sector

In the field of trade the EU entertains with Pakistan an important non-financial cooperation in addition to the specific trade projects conducted in the framework of the development cooperation.

### Non-financial cooperation

The legal basis is the Cooperation Agreement with Pakistan<sup>36</sup> of 2004 and the 5 Year Engagement Plan<sup>37</sup> adopted in 2012. Under the Cooperation Agreement the parties have set up a Joint Commission and specific sub-groups to ensure the implementation of the agreement. The sub-group on trade meets at least every year and deals with any issues that are hindering or may facilitate/promote bilateral trade and investment, issues of common interest in the WTO, GSP+ issues, etc. The agenda and the timing of the sub-group are organised so as to prepare the meetings of the Joint-Commission. Example of topic discussed: the ban on imports of live animals imposed by Pakistan in 2001 on alleged risk of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). According to the EU the risk was unjustified and the measure not in line with the BSE standards of the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and prevented imports from several EU countries. The issue has been continuously raised in the trade sub-group meetings<sup>38</sup>.

<sup>36</sup> Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on partnership and development, 23/12/2004.

<sup>37</sup> EU Pakistan – 5 Year Engagement Plan.

<sup>38</sup> The ban has been lifted by the Government of Pakistan on 4<sup>th</sup> July 2014.

After the **2010 devastating floods**, Pakistan was granted autonomous trade concessions by the EU on humanitarian grounds. 75 categories of products were covered by this regime. It entered into force in November 2012 (after acceptance by the WTO) until 31 December 2013<sup>39</sup>.

Since 2014 Pakistan benefits from the EU's **Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)** scheme. The 2007 *Trade Policy Review* noted that "duty-free exports excluded leather and leather products, yarn, and fabrics, and, as from 1 January 2005, clothing; this meant that some 80% of exports to the EC were ineligible"<sup>40</sup>. The scope of this preference system has nonetheless been broadened during the evaluation period. In 2013, "78 percent of Pakistan's exports enter the EU market at a preferential rate"<sup>41</sup>. Since 1 January 2014, Pakistan benefits from **GSP+** arrangement "aiming to support sustainable development and good governance. In order to maintain GSP+ Pakistan has to keep ratification and effectively implement 27 core international conventions on human and labour rights, environmental protection and good governance."<sup>42</sup> The final objective of GSP+ is to encourage democratic governance and human rights. Trade preferences are granted on the condition that companies implement labour standards, which entails a cost. The obligation is on the government not on the companies. The EU verifies that the government implements and enforces appropriate regulations. This control is based on the reports of the UN monitoring bodies and leads to a dialogue with various EU bodies: DG employment, DG environment, etc...

#### **Specific EU programmes<sup>43</sup>**

The sector has benefitted from three trade related technical assistance (TRTA) EU projects covering the period 2004-2015, the first one before the evaluation period.

- TRTA I
  - Period of implementation 2004-2007
  - Total cost € 6.11 m
    - EU contribution €5.00m including contributions from 3 UN agencies: ITC €0.15m, UNIDO € 0.20m, WIPO € 0.05m
    - Government contribution: € 1.11
  - Programme components: 1° WTO Agreements, implemented by ITC, 2° Quality and Standards, implemented by UNIDO, 3° Intellectual property rights, implemented by WIPO
- TRTA II
  - Period of implementation 2009-2017
  - Total cost €12.045 m
    - EU contribution €11.545 m
    - UNIDO €0.500

<sup>39</sup> Id. "EU-Pakistan: New Opportunities for Trade and Investment", EC, 2013

<sup>40</sup> TPR Secretariat 2007

<sup>41</sup> European Delegation to Pakistan (EU-Pakistan: New Opportunities for Trade and Investment)

<sup>42</sup> <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/pakistan/>

<sup>43</sup> For a synopsis of the TRTAs programmes see Annex B2: Synopsis of selected projects.

- Programme components 1° Trade Policy Capacity Building, 2° Export Development through Improvement of Quality Infrastructure, implemented through 3° Strengthening of Intellectual Property Rights System.  
UNIDO has been contracted (Contribution Agreement) by the EU to implement the project and two contribution agreements have been concluded with ITC (for component 1) and WIPO for component 3.
- TRTA III
  - Period of implementation: 2011-2017
  - Total cost: €4.944 m  
EU contribution: € 4.50 m.  
Contribution of grantees: € 0.444  
Two grant contracts have been signed with:
    - PITCO Ltd, (€2.16) a Pakistani BIO to implement the Pakistan Leather Improvement Programme
    - AKRSP, an development (€ 1.94m) a NGO to implement the project Gilgit-Baltistan, the Jewel of Pakistan: Developing a Sustainable Value Chain for Gems and Jewellery Sector in Northern Pakistan.

The last two TRTA programmes have been designed and led during the evaluation period as a continuation of a first one and have been designed as continuation of TRTA I in order to consolidate “the gains made in trade policy formulation and facilitation”, providing “a real opportunity for TRTA to have a meaningful impact on the trade development of Pakistan”<sup>44</sup>. The WTO 2015 *Trade Policy Review* refers to this programme, stating that, among other activities, “a large number of milestones have been, and continue to be, achieved as regards conformity assessments and technical standards”<sup>45</sup>.

In addition to these major programmes (which cover 99% of the sector aid), a €88,240 programme designed to “Support the fisheries sector” has been implemented by the EU. Support has also been provided under regional programmes for studies and trade needs assessments (all together € 0.127m).

Non-financial cooperation in the area of trade has been continuous under the EU-PAK Cooperation programme and the 5 years engagement plan. It included regular dialogue on trade issues and the granting, after the floods of 2010, of important exceptional and temporary (November 2012 – December 2013) trade concessions over 75 categories of products on humanitarian grounds. Since 2014 Pakistan benefits from GSP+ status

### Member States

The United Kingdom and Germany are among the first European trade partners of Pakistan. DFID and GIZ are currently leading numerous projects in Pakistan on their own but very few projects concern the trade sector.

### United Kingdom (DFID)

According to the *Development Tracker* which gives a view of all DFID programmes, two projects have a trade-oriented component:

<sup>44</sup> TRTA II, Monitoring report, 2010

<sup>45</sup> TPR Government 2015

**Table 13: DFID Trade related programmes**

Projects	Date	Total cost
<b>Poverty and Growth Programme</b>	July 2013 December 2021	£4.5 million
<b>Project components:</b> Public sector policy (main part) Trade policy and administrative issues (a quarter of the project) <b>Overall goal:</b> to “increase public and political support for economic reform by improving the communication of evidence to target audiences on the constraints to growth” <sup>46</sup> .		
<b>Pakistan Economic Corridors Programme</b>	February 2015 March 2020	£265.1 million
<b>Project components:</b> Road transport (65%) Trade facilitation (16.5%, second sector) <b>Main objective:</b> to “improve transport infrastructure in Pakistan along with enhancing private sector involvement [...] leading to increased trade and economic growth in Pakistan” <sup>47</sup> .		

### Germany (GIZ)

GIZ is currently leading 16 projects in Pakistan, making this country project portfolio “one of GIZ’s largest worldwide.”<sup>48</sup> Among these two programmes are currently being led in Pakistan in the “Economic Development and Employment” area:

**Table 14: GTZ trade related programmes**

Projects	Date	Total cost
<b>Implementation of Social Standards in the Textile and Garment Industry in Punjab (AA)</b>	2014 2016	unknown
<b>Main objective:</b> “To be eligible for GSP Plus status, countries must ratify and implement core labour rights and other sustainable development and good governance conventions. [...] Tangible steps towards their implementation are a prerequisite for maintaining GSP Plus status.” <sup>49</sup> GIZ supports Pakistan in the enforcement of the ratified convention.		
<b>Promotion of intra-regional trade potentials in the SAARC region</b>	2014 2016	unknown
<b>Main objective:</b> “the project is supporting the SAARC Trade Promotion Network (SAARC-TPN) and its five working groups (Non-tariff Trade Restrictions; Quality Infrastructure; Business-to-Business Initiatives; Trade Information Portal; Trade Promotion in SMEs; Donor Co-ordination) in improving strategic management and organisational development.” <sup>50</sup>		

<sup>46</sup> DFID, Development Tracker (<http://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-203508/>)

<sup>47</sup> DFID, Development Tracker (<http://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-204358/>)

<sup>48</sup> <http://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/362.html>

<sup>49</sup> <http://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/32073.html>

<sup>50</sup> <http://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/14125.html>

## 2. Findings per Judgement Criteria and Indicators: EQ7 Trade

<b>EQ7</b>	<b>To what extent has EU cooperation support to trade contributed to increasing trade and investment flows with the EU and South Asia?</b>
<b>JC-7.1</b>	<b>The design of the TRTA interventions has been based on an analysis of the needs and challenges and an alignment on the government policies.</b>
	<p>The two programmes conducted during the evaluation period, TRTA II and TRTA III are inscribed in the continuity of TRTA I implemented previously. Together, the three TRTA programmes form a consistent support to trade development: TRTA I focused on strengthening the compliance of Pakistan's trade policy and institutions to the participation in the multilateral trading system and membership of WTO. TRTA II and III, implemented largely in parallel, focused respectively on institutional strengthening and private sector development.</p> <p>Serious needs assessment studies have been conducted at the programming stage and in the initial phase of the projects. The results of these analyses have been taken into account in the preparation of the programmes. Three TRTA programmes have been implemented and lessons have been passed from one to the next</p> <p>There is a general acknowledgement that the TRTA programmes have been properly aligned on the objectives of the government policies and conform the objectives of the EU.</p> <p>TRTA III, in addition to its relevance for the trade sector is a coherent complement to the local development activities undertaken under the rural development programmes, insofar as it aims at promoting employment opportunities for local qualified workers in a geographically isolated area.</p> <p>A regular policy dialogue has taken place, in part through the trade sub-group created under the Joint Commission, in part directly between the Delegation and stakeholders. It proved constructive but faced difficulties due to limitation of human resources in the Delegation and unwillingness of the government to discuss deep economic reforms.</p>
<b>I-7.1.1</b>	<p><b>Existence of underlying analyses to identify which and whose needs to address and the regions of intervention.</b></p> <p><i>Needs assessments studies have been conducted and the programmes proposed by the EU have been based on a clear diagnostic and the identification of essential needs in the areas of required TRTA to meet the WTO requirements. The programmes have been mostly articulated on institutional building but support has also been provided to strengthen the private sector capacity to trade, particularly under TRTA III. The strategy in this sector has been consistently pursued from 2004 and lessons from previous interventions have been passed into the successive programmes.</i></p> <p>The EU is the main provider of focused support in trade in Pakistan. Other development partners (USAID, World Bank, ADB ...) provide more general support to enhance private sector productivity and competitiveness. In 2003-2004 the EU volunteered to provide TRTA in the context of the Doha Development Agenda diagnosing important needs on how to understand and put into practice the WTO regulations; in particular quality infrastructure in Pakistan was extremely weak a required long lasting effort and technical assistance. The EU TRTA programmes are characterised by their continuity. "The first phase of the European Union (UE) trade related technical assistance (TRTA I of € 6.5 m., 2004-2007) focused on public sector-capacity building related to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and its rules.</p>

TRTA II (€10 m., launched in 2009) is also concentrating on the public sector with the objective to further enhance its capacity in trade policy as well as strengthening the quality of infrastructure for export and to enhance compliance with intellectual property rights (IPR). TRTA PSD III is to provide the missing link: a direct intervention aimed at the private sector to enhance its export oriented trade capacities through the provision of appropriate services and activities by Pakistani Business Intermediary Organisations (BIOs).” This continuity has allowed the EU to deepen its knowledge of the sector and the issues it faces so that the successive programmes have benefitted from the lessons of the previous one and are hooked on their achievements.

*Source: FA TRTA III.; MN817;MN818*

Trade Needs Assessments studies have been conducted in 2005 (not available) and in 2012. The 2012 is an in depth study based on extensive consultations with Government, Private sector, Academia, Development partners. The study is very comprehensive and meant to orientate future EU programming in the field.

*Source: ADE, Need Assessment of Trade and Trade Related Technical Assistance for Pakistan, Final Report, June 2012 (Framework Contract EuropeAid: 127054/C/SER/multi – Lot 10).*

Programme TRTA II is a continuation of TRTA I. The programming documents include

- An analysis of the context characterised by the transition from import substitution and import control trade regime towards more export led growth and integration into multilateral trade system; and a low degree of trade openness.
- An identification, based on the lessons of TRTA I, of key issues and weaknesses to address :
  - Under TRTA I there was an insufficient coordination of the three components (1. WTO agreement, implemented by ITC; 2. Quality and standards, Unido; 3. IPR, WIPO)
  - Needs analysis under TRTA I was insufficient
  - Articulation of explicit capacity building lacking
  - Insufficient involvement of private sector in policy dialogue
  - Crucial need identified for training on trade and investment policies and trade and investment strategies

*Source: EC, Action fñbe n°4 for Pakistan, Trade Related Technical Assistance Programme (TRTA II), AIDCO (2008) D/15933 p.2*

TRTA II is a continuation of TRTA I which enables the EU to provide seven years of continued support in the same fields, thus consolidating the gains made in trade policy formulation and facilitation of the first project while drawing on the lessons learned from the previous project. This continuity and consolidation provides a real opportunity for TRTA to have a meaningful impact on the trade development of Pakistan.’

*Source: TRTA II Monitoring Report 15/7/2010*

‘There are nevertheless some deficiencies in the design of the programme as set out in the latest draft of the inception report reviewed at the time of the mission. A major concern is that the project may be overly ambitious in scope covering effectively five core areas, since component 2 is effectively 3 areas covering: i) improving Sanitary, Phytosanitary management (SPS); ii) enhancing competitiveness in 3 sectors; and iii) strengthening conformity assessment.’

*Source: TRTA II MR 15/7/2010*

'The project Overall Objective and Purpose are fully consistent with and supportive of the policies of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, representing one of the pillars of the EU – PK cooperation, targeted on alleviation of poverty and institutional capacity building of the key PK actors in charge of trade related policy matters and barriers to trade'

*Source: TRTA II MR*

The TRTA III programme is conducted partly in parallel and meant to complement the TRTA II approach, focused on strengthening the trade related institutions, with a support to the private sector in view of stimulating export diversification.

The financing agreement of TRTA III refers to international surveys (the *Economic Survey of Pakistan 2009*, *Pakistan Competitiveness Report 2009*) that have been used to diagnose the needs and justify a direct intervention aimed at the private sector to enhance its export oriented trade capacities through the provision of appropriate services and activities by Pakistani Business Intermediary Organisations (BIOs). The selection of the sector is based on the following reasons:

- being two of the eight GoP Strategic Trade Policy Framework 2009-12 identified sectors with export growth potential;
- TRTA III formulation mission recommendation and outcomes of stakeholders' consultations;
- taking into account the activities of other donors (complementarity);
- taking into account the capacity and growth potential at the level of BIOs in the country;
- best potential to maximise improvement of trade competitiveness;
- potential to access international markets without major investments in physical infrastructure; value addition through design and branding;
- serving as pilots for possible further interventions covering other sectors in future programmes.

The project is articulated on two mutually supporting pillars: an economic pillar to develop the professional capacities and create employment opportunities; a social pillar targeting grass root communities (non state actors), and helping them to organise themselves so as to be actors and beneficiaries of the developments of the economic pillar. In that sense the programme is creating a convergence between EU efforts to support TRTA and Rural Development.

*Source:*

*TRTA III, Financing Agreement*

*ADE, Need Assessment of Trade and Trade Related Technical Assistance for Pakistan, Final Report, June 2012 (Framework Contract EuropeAid: 127054/C/SER/multi – Lot 10).*

*Interview: MN820*

Interviews with staff of the EU Delegation, members of government institutions, of implementing agencies, of private sector association confirm the relevance of the approach targeted on institution strengthening with the particular focus on trade policy formulation and WTO (component 1 or TRTA II) and complemented with support to the private sector. These interviews were also unanimous in welcoming the long perspective: trade reforms and

	<p>trade capacity building require long efforts and the continuity of the support is regarded as a major quality.  <i>Sources: MN817, MN818, MN831, MN832, MN839, MN840, MN841</i></p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>strong</b>. Abundant documentary sources and several converging interviews.</p>
I-7.1.2	<p><b>References to these analyses in the programming documents.</b></p> <p><i>Needs assessment and preparatory studies have been used in the programming document consulted by the evaluators.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The action fiche of TRTA II refers clearly to the lessons from TRTA I</li> <li>▪ Needs assessment and capacity building part of component 1 of TRTA II</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: EC, Action fiche n°4 for Pakistan, Trade Related Technical Assistance Programme (TRTA II), AIDCO (2008) D/15933 p.2</i></p> <p>TRTA II is a continuation of TRTA I (aimed at building awareness and capacity for WTO). Lessons from TRTA I have been duly taken into consideration, in particular the need to involve more the private sector in the formulation of the trade development strategies and the quality of production processes. In terms of programming the need to improve coordination between different components, to develop more explicit capacity building strategies, have been given due attention in the new programme.  <i>Source: TRTA II, Financing agreement 2009.</i></p> <p>The financing agreement of TRTA III refers to international surveys (the Economic Survey of Pakistan 2009, Pakistan Competitiveness Report 2009) that have been used to diagnose the needs and justify a direct intervention aimed at the private sector to enhance its export oriented trade capacities through the provision of appropriate services and activities by Pakistani Business Intermediary Organisations (BIOs).  <i>Source: TRTA III, Financing agreement</i></p> <p>At the outset of programme TRTA III an in depth value chain analysis of the Gems and Jewellery and Leather sectors has been conducted involving numerous field visits and consultations with 90 stakeholders. It has paved the way for the programme.  <i>Source: ADE, Value Chain of the Gems Jewellery and Leather Sector in Pakistan, 2012.</i></p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>Strong</b>. Supported by documentary sources.</p>
I-7.1.3	<p><b>Existence of risk assessment studies, including risks of corruption and frauds.</b></p> <p><i>Risk analyses have been conducted at the programming stage in the case of TRTA II but during implementation risk analysis and monitoring have been limited; for TRTA III the risk analyses and identification of mitigating measures have been conducted by the parties contracted to implement the programme. Analyses did not include corruption and fraud which can imply that this was not perceived as a major issue for these programmes.</i></p>



In the preparatory documents for TRTA II, risks and mitigation measures are clearly identified and rated (medium and high), with distinction of the risks that are within and beyond the project control. No corruption/fraud risk is mentioned. Notwithstanding this general risk assessment in the programming phase of TRTA II, a Monitoring report for this programme also point to some weaknesses in assessing the risks during implementation: 'Other concerns relate to the need for a smarter monitoring framework with more quantifiable and relevant OVIs, particularly in components 1, 2.3 and 3. In the case of SPS, the critical path to rolling out this component is for certain legislation to be passed related to food safety and plant/animal health, particularly the bill on the National Agency for Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services (NAPHIS). The risks of this not happening have not been identified and a risk management strategy is lacking.'

*Source:*

*EC, Action fiche n°4 for Pakistan, Trade Related Technical Assistance Programme (TRTA II), AIDCO (2008) D/15933 p.2*

*TRTA II MR 15/7/2015*

For the programme TRTA III risks and risk management are not mentioned in the general Financing Agreement and logframe, but taken into account in the separate contribution agreements with PITCO and AKRSP.

TRTA III risk analyses are made by the "secondary" implementers. Available for the PITCO grant contract. The contract with AKSRP identifies and describes different risk categories (political, physical, environmental, and economic) and prescribes AKSRP to provide a detailed risk analysis and contingency plan.

Corruption and fraud are not risks mentioned in these analyses.

A clear assessment of risks and mitigation measures is provided in the contribution agreement with PITCO.

Risk	Assessment of Risk and its Mitigation
The commitment of all partners	Is guaranteed by common understanding and mutual trust.
Key stakeholders (BIOs) are reluctant to participate in Action	Program has done extensive consultation with PLGMEA, PGMEA, PTA and PFMA. They expressed the need for improving the product diversification and improving the competitiveness of the LP sector. PLGMEA is a co-applicant, and PGMEA and PFMA are associates in PLCIP; the setup of TRTA LCC at these BIOs will ensure their continued support.
BDS/VET providers not willing to participate	Some BDS/VET Providers have been contacted at the proposal stage, and are very enthusiastic about the program. Demonstration of Business Opportunity based on findings of CNA will further ensure their participation.
BDS/VET are not adopted by target group	Identification of most relevant BDS/VET will be done through comprehensive CNA. Selection of most relevant BDS/VET will be ensured through constant contact with the target group. This is guaranteed as the TRTA LCC is situated in the BIOs and through the cluster focussed approach.
Little interest from the side of the final beneficiaries	Setting up the TRTA LCC at the BIOs will ensure that there is sufficient buy in and interest from the final beneficiaries, as the majority of the LP firms are members of the respective BIOs. As well, clusters will be used to reach a large number of LP firms. Activity cluster 5 addresses this issue.
Economic and Physical risks	All new BDS / VET services are designed and implemented with the support of stakeholders. However, financial sustainability of BDS / VET services needs to be addressed with all stakeholders by offering demand driven BDS.
Environmental/social risks	Aspects of sustainable development, cleaner production, solid waste reduction and OHS will be included in the services provided by the BDS/VET providers. Women participation will be fostered through awareness campaign.
Political risks	May of course impact some parts but not the whole project. Unforeseen developments should not influence the program as it is based on the provision of intangible know-how.
<p><i>Sources: Grant Contract with PITCO</i> <i>Grant contract with AKSRP</i></p>	
I-7.1.4	<p><b>(Proposals of risk mitigating measures in the programming documents)</b></p> <p>This initial indicator was in fact redundant with I-7.1.3 it is therefore proposed to replace it by</p> <p><b>Justification of the selection process of the implementing partners.</b></p> <p><i>Implementing partners for institution building programmes (TRTA I and II) have been selected on the basis of experience, coverage of the field and procedural reasons. For private sector support programme (TRTA III) the selection was made through competitive bidding.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ For TRTA II experience and procedural reasons have determined the choice of the</li> </ul>

	<p>implementing partner. For TRTA III the selection process has been based on competitive bids open to non-state actors.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ For TRTA II the main reasons for selecting UNIDO have been their experience in the field and the regions but also procedural reasons:</li> <li>▪ Reason for selecting UNIDO to implement TRTA I I:</li> <li>▪ UNIDO selected to implement because “it has a strong presence and work experience in Pakistan”.</li> <li>▪ ‘The 'contribution contract' between UNIDO and the EU Delegation leads to a unique implementation modality. UNIDO are the responsible implementing agency not required to use PRAG and effectively operates as a Programme Management Unit. They are not integrated or embedded in any government structure but operate from their own offices. Nevertheless, the programme does operate closely with the government via five focal points for each component and sub component. ‘</li> </ul> <p><i>Sources:</i>  TRTA II, Action Fiche;  TRTA II MR 15/7/2015  Financing Agreement between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, TRTA III, 24/6/2015  MN817, MN818, MN820, MN831</p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; text-align: center;">Quality of evidence: <b>Strong</b>. Documentary sources and interviews</div>
I-7.1.5	<p><b>Existence of documentation (internal notes, minutes of meetings, etc.) demonstrating that stakeholders have been consulted and their views taken into account (or reasons for not taking them into account) on the appropriateness of the intervention to the needs and the contextual challenges.</b></p> <p><i>In general there is evidence that the stakeholders have been consulted. However, for the majority of activities devoted to institutional strengthening consultations have mainly been conducted with institutional representatives but were more limited with the private sector organisations using these institutions.</i></p> <p>On this indicator there are different views:</p> <p>1) There is documentary evidence that an effort has been made to identify all the stakeholders and that consultations have taken place with the governmental authorities and the direct beneficiaries (which are often also the implementing agencies)</p> <p>‘The appropriation by the primary stakeholders concerned by the project (beneficiaries of contribution agreements or grant contracts) is real but an effort of transparency and communication by these agencies is needed to ensure the full understanding and appropriation of the national agencies and end beneficiaries’.</p> <p><i>TRTA II: Stakeholders identified in the programme:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Primary stakeholder and beneficiary: GOP, in particular Min. Commerce, Foreign Trade Institute of Pak, Ministry of Science and Technology, MinFin, MinFood Agriculture &amp; Livestock, Min Industries &amp; Production, IPO Pakistan</li> </ul>

- Private sector: sectoral organisations and chambers of commerce including SAARC–CCI, FPCCI, women chambers of commerce etc and other entities such as TDAP and SMEDA.
- Academic institutions: LUMS, IBA, IIUI and SDPI, PIDE
- No mention is made that they have been consulted.

Source: EC, *Action fiche n°4 for Pakistan, Trade Related Technical Assistance Programme (TRTA II)*, AIDCO (2008) D/15933 p. 2 and 6

‘The TRTA II programme fits well into this strategy aiming at strengthening trade links with the rest of the world. Most of the principal stakeholders of the programme including the Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Science and Technology, Ministry of Industries and Production, and the Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan, as well as technological institutions and Competent Authorities operating under these Ministries were appropriately selected as they continue to play a key role in implementing policies and programmes in the area supported by the programme.’

*Source: Ecorys MTR 2013*

‘Private sector associations concerned with fisheries, horticulture, and industrial clusters are relevant beneficiaries of implementation activities. The Ministries of Food and Livestock have become less important, as their responsibilities have been devolved to the provincial level and their federal responsibilities for SPS management have been moved to the Ministry of Food Security and Research. These changes could not be anticipated at the time of formulating the project, though they have had an adverse impact on the project’s initiatives with respect to SPS management.’

*Source: Ecorys MTR 2013*

TRTA III: The Value Chain Analysis of the three sectors covered by the project is the key analytical document supporting the implementation of the programme. It contains a thorough analysis of the sector and reflects on abundant consultations with the stakeholders. A list of 91 stakeholders consulted is provided; it is very comprehensive and includes the major actors in the sectors and regions targeted. Government authorities, private sector, the government authorities.

*Source: ADE, Value Chain of the Gems Jewellery and Leather Sector in Pakistan, 2012.*

*Confirmed by interviews: MN820, MN831.*

The main upstream stakeholders have been involved and there is a fairly good ownership of the project, its design and its goals. The coordination, management and financing arrangements are those practised in now traditional EU partnership with UN System of aid agencies, with not only UNIDO as the implementing agency but also, among others, ITC and WIPO, which intervene in sizeable portions of the project's activities. This is appropriate at this stage, but should be viewed in a dynamic manner, allowing for progressive induction of the Pakistan "front line" partners into the managerial and coordination responsibilities so that the overall local ownership can be reinforced and national actors’ capacity building accomplished.

This also confirms that the TRTA II overall objectives and project purposes are well understood by these first line national partners, but still less so by a number of beneficiaries and target groups who do not necessarily have the insight in the project reporting and formal communication and coordination procedures and related documents, so that the TRTA II

	<p>programme managers should devote more efforts in order to ensure full transparency and appropriate feedback to all. <i>Source: TRTA II Monitoring Report of 12/7/2011.</i></p> <p>2) For TRTA II, which was mainly concerned with institutional strengthening, consultations with the beneficiaries institutions are reported and acknowledged. However, some end beneficiaries complain that they have not been consulted and that the programmes have not sufficiently taken into considerations their own needs.</p> <p><i>Sources: Interviews MN839, MN838</i></p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>more than satisfactory.</b> There are several sources of evidence (documents and interviews) and they converge. However, given the number and the geographical spread of stakeholders the coverage of the evidence cannot be complete.</p> </div>
<p>I-7.1.6</p>	<p><b>Review of those who were consulted and of the selection process. Are they representative of the groups targeted by the interventions?</b></p> <p><i>In the two programmes the stakeholders are duly identified and mentioned in the programming documents. They cover comprehensively all the parties involved in the domains covered by the projects. Some information is missing on the extent to which they were consulted for programme TRTA II and will need to be collected during the field mission. For programme TRTA III the consultations have included all the relevant beneficiaries.</i></p> <p>See I-7.1.5 For both programmes TRTA II and TRTAIII the relevant stakeholders representatives of the beneficiaries have been well identified. For TRTA II, no documentation is available demonstrating they have been consulted. For TRTA III those consulted are listed and correspond to the targeted beneficiaries of the interventions.</p> <p>The consultation of the stakeholders directly targeted by the programmes is conducted within the implementation of the programme itself by the implementing partners.</p> <p>There is evidence that PITCO and AKRSP consulted, and associated and involved local partners in the implementation of the leather and gems and jewellery component.</p> <p><i>Sources:</i> <i>TRTA III, First Interim Narrative Report and Second Interim Report of AKRSP.</i> <i>TRTAIII, First Interim Report Feb2014-Feb2015 of PITCO.</i> <i>Interviews: MN 818, MN820, MN831, MN838, MN839.</i></p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>Indicative but not conclusive.</b> There are several sources (documents and interviews) but insufficient triangulation.</p> </div>
<p>I-7.1.7</p>	<p><b>Documents, minutes and meetings, demonstrating the existence of a policy dialogue with the government and the alignment on its policies.</b></p> <p><i>The policy dialogue with the government on trade issues and on the identification of EU support has been</i></p>

*regular and constructive. It took largely place through the trade technical sub-group created by the Joint Commission under the Cooperation Agreement. The programming and monitoring documents also provide evidence on an alignment on the government policies. Interviews with various stakeholders confirm the existence of the policy dialogue but point to a bias in favour of discussion with institutional authorities and less with the private sector actors. The documents and interviews also point to constraints in the dialogue linked to reluctance of the Government to engage into discussion of structural economic reforms and limitations of human resources on the Delegation side.*

- Programming documents refer duly to the government policies and show the alignment of the proposed interventions to these policies as well as to the EU policies. They point implicitly the existence of a policy dialogue with the authorities but do not elaborate in its contents:

‘These objectives are well aligned with both the priorities of the government and the EU, as set out in Pakistan's Strategic Trade Policy Framework and the EU's Country Strategy for Cooperation with Pakistan, where trade development is seen as a core area of support.’

*Source: TRTA II, Monitoring report 15/7/2010*

‘The design was well researched with in depth consultations with a range of relevant stakeholders in each of the areas resulting in good local ownership.’

*Source: TRTA II MR 15/7/2010*

The selection of the sectors and the regions for TRTA III fits well into Strategic Trade Policy Framework (STPF 2009-12) of the Government of Pakistan which presents a strategic approach towards foreign trade policy of the country in view of fostering growth and reducing poverty. The non-agricultural small and medium sized enterprises (SME) sector makes 30% contribution to the GDP, and accounts for almost 25% of Pakistan's exports. It is the biggest employer of skilled and unskilled, but mostly seasonal, labour after the agriculture sector. The gems sector is recommended in the Economic Development Report Gilgit-Baltistan as well as in the Mid Term Development Framework as a potential sector for income, employment and growth especially for youth.

*Source: Grants contracts with PITCO and AKRSP*

It is worth noting that the Aid for Trade in the particular case of Pakistan has not provided a framework for a policy dialogue on trade issues: “Delegation and EU MS liaise closely on trade policy issues while there is no regular dialogue or discussion on AfT as well as insufficient follow up as how to move forward”.

*Source: PK Annex D-Jan 2010, Aid for Trade.Doc*

- Internal EU documents mention clearly the existence of policy dialogue with the government on trade issues:

The Delegation is engaged in a dialogue with GoP on issues of mutual interest. The first Joint Commission (JC) under the 3rd generation Cooperation Agreement was held on 24th May 2007. Preparatory meetings on cooperation, trade and governance/human rights and migration were held prior to the JC. Sub-groups on these topics as well as on science and technology have been established. These will meet at least once a year and will further formalise and strengthen the political dialogue with GoP. The Trade sub-group, one of the sub-groups created by the Joint Commission, met in October 2007 in

Brussels, and agreed on the TOR for a joint trade-related study.

The Delegation is pursuing a dialogue with the relevant government authorities, donor agencies and other stakeholders on key trade, investment and economic issues. It is a member of the Donor Group on Microfinance and SME. The initial findings of the identification mission for a new Trade Sector Development Programme, foreseen in the MIP 2007-2010, were shared with GOP, Donor community and MS via three separate workshops and their comments taken on board.

*Source: internal EU documents n°1 and 2*

- These documents also points to limitations and difficulties, in particular when it comes to economic reforms, both on the side of the government and the resources of the Delegation:

Document n°6 states the absence of any meaningful dialogue and progress between the international community, i.e. IFIs and principal donors, and the Pakistan government on the economic reform process. Several attempts to improve the extraordinary low tax base and reduce the exceptionally high levels of subsidies, especially for energy, have been mostly in vain due to lack of political consensus or the intricacies of bureaucratic incompetence. Expectations are of a further aggravation of the already poor economic performance and a need to come to a renewed negotiation with the IMF for a new stand by arrangement by early spring 2012.

*Source: internal EU document n°6*

The Delegation is aware of how important it is to have a good level of technical and political understanding of the different sectors to improve design of interventions and be able to deliver quality inputs for policy dialogue in support of reforms. It is so far less the variable quality and willingness on the side of the Pakistani counterparts that forms the constraint, but rather the ability of the Delegation to interact more frequently and with credible and professionally sound contributions. Ongoing changes and the significant expansion of both operational and political staff in the Delegation offer an important opportunity to make structural progress and advance the capacity of the EU to deliver, matching its growing ambitions set out in the 5-years EU-Pakistan engagement plan.

*Source: internal EU document n°7*

- Interviews with direct beneficiaries and implementing agencies provide a somewhat contrasted picture:
  - There is general acknowledgement that the EU has aligned on the government policies and responded to needs expressed by the authorities.
  - Dialogue with the EU in the context of the EU-Pakistan Cooperation Agreement and the Joint Commission are regarded as important and constructive. The dialogue on the GSP+ in particular has been mentioned by several interviewees as particularly positive and helpful to understand the implications of the regime and the opportunities it offers.
  - Direct beneficiaries interviewed have generally mentioned their positive appreciation of their dialogue with the EU delegation. They regret, however, the lack of availability of the EU Delegation staff which tends to restrict the dialogue to administrative issues and not enough on technical ones. A beneficiary institution has expressed deep regret that the Delegation could not be more proactive and did not respond to demands.

	<p><i>Source: Interviews MN818, MN820, MN831, MN832, MN837, MN838, MN839, MN841, MN840.</i></p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory.</b> Good triangulation between documents and interviews but insufficient coverage (no minutes of policy dialogue meetings, only a limited number of government agencies/beneficiaries could be interviewed).</p>
<p>I-7.1.8</p>	<p><b>Opinions of stakeholders (national and provincial authorities, EU staff, beneficiaries, other donors....) on the appropriateness of the intervention to the needs and the contextual challenges.</b></p> <p>Cf. I-7.1.4</p> <p>‘The design was well researched with in depth consultations with a range of relevant stakeholders in each of the areas resulting in good local ownership.’</p> <p><i>Source: TRTA II MR 15/7/2010</i></p> <p>Representatives of governmental trade institutions consulted were very positive on the relevance of the EU support to trade:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- All interviewees praised the continuity of the EU support, and the consistency in the approach of TRTA I, II, and III.</li> <li>- The institutional support was regarded very relevant and necessary; particularly component 1 (trade policy and WTO), some reservation were made about the component 3 of TRTA II (Intellectual property) mostly due to the fact the implementation agency had no representative in Pakistan.</li> <li>- TRTA III with its approach directed to the private sector and the upgrading of the value chain in selected regions is also highly appreciated by the interviewees.</li> </ul> <p>Interviewees from private sector organisations expressed the view that if more consultation had taken place with them when programming component 2 or TRTA II (quality infrastructure) it could have been designed so as to be more useful for the trade operators.</p> <p>Sources: MN817, MN818, MN820, MN831, MN832 MN839, MN840, MN841</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory.</b> Same qualification as I-7.1.7</p>
<p>JC-7.2</p>	<p><b>The interventions have been implemented according to plan and have produced their intended results</b></p>
<p>Implementation of TRTA II has been satisfactory and available information on the implementation of TRTA III is also very positive. Activities were relevant, have been duly conducted by the implementing agencies and the outputs (training, capacity strengthening, professional transfer of know how) appreciated by the targeted groups. Outcomes for TRTA II are visible in terms of improved performance of targeted institutions and companies. They translate in increased productivity, better compliance with international SPS regulation, reduction of testing costs, reduction of costs associated with search oriented tasks for managing and preparing trademarks or patents. The opinion of representatives of the partner’s authorities confirm the implementing agencies reports. However, opinions of representative of the private sector and exporters as well as those of some representative of public sector point to an “institutional” bias, with an excessive focus on responding to the needs of the institution and insufficient concern for those of their private sector “clients”. As a result private</p>	



sector operators are insufficiently aware of the benefits they could get from using more the quality infrastructure, for example. There are also mixed views about the results in terms of trade strategy formulation and the impact on it of the improved PPD.

**Evidence from the reports from the contractors/implementing agencies and from the monitoring and evaluation reports on the conduct of activities and the implementation of the interventions**

*Implementation of TRTA II started with a difficult inception phase but after that the project conducted all the prescribed activities. Institutional capacities of key trade institutions have been increased and their credibility strengthened through the provision of professional training, preparation of draft legislation, technological support. The targeted beneficiaries were government agencies and public or semi-autonomous trade institutions with responsibilities for training in trade policy and trade management, quality infrastructure, accreditation and certification, SPS, Intellectual property. TRTA III is still in an early stage but first progress reports and interviews confirm that activities are swiftly implemented.*

I-7.2.1 As a preliminary finding on this indicator it is important to mention that TRTA II and TRTA III followed TRTA I, after a bridging period of 2 years (2007-2009) funded by UNIDO and the Norwegian Cooperation and continued the activities of TRTA I in the field of trade infrastructure and accreditation systems. TRTA I has been a successful project as recognised by the EU, as well as interviews with the beneficiaries and the implementing agencies. Implemented by UNIDO, ITC and WIPO, the project ended on 30 September 2007 and has successfully completed its activities and accomplished the targeted milestones. The component on intellectual property rights resulted in the setting up of a unified Intellectual Property Office (IPO) with specialised staff. Under the second component, 18 Testing Laboratories were accredited and will reduce the cost for Pakistani exporters and facilitate entering into new markets. The national enquiry point on standards and technical regulations based at PSQCL Karachi is fully functional. This component was also significant in mobilising counterpart government funding amounting to €10m for upgrading of Lab facilities. In the fisheries sector, UNIDO provided technical advice for the renovation of a major auction hall to meet the sanitary and hygienic EC requirements but the restrictions on fish import by EU market could not be lifted yet. Capacity building on WTO matters and trade policy raised considerable awareness to understand and tackle the negotiation on WTO related issues and its implication on the trade sector. The Export Promotion Bureau (EPB) was transformed in the Trade Development Authority of Pakistan (TDAP).

*Sources: Internal EU document n°1*

Trade Related Technical Assistance/TRTA (ASIE/2003/005-718): Implemented by UNIDO, ITC and WIPO, the project ended on 30/9/2007 and has successfully completed its activities and reached all the targeted milestones.

*Source: internal EU document n°2*

These views are confirmed by documents and reports from implementing agencies:

*Sources: TRTA 1 2004-2007: Final Reports by UNIDO, ITC and WIPO.*

*B. Valunzuolo: 12 Years of the TRTA Programme – Overview, Islamabad November 2015.*

*And by interviews: MN818, MN832, MN837, MN839, MN840, MN841, MN845.*

This constituted therefore a sound basis for the further implementation of TRTA II.

1) TRTA II  
1.1) Summary of monitoring reports

TRTA II: monitoring reports point to a satisfactory project, relevant, implemented with some delays but which conducted correctly its activities and delivered its outputs. The weakest point is the support of the stakeholders (see I-7.1.5): whereas the UN agencies implementing the project (UNIDO and for specific components ITC and WIPO) have well understood and duly appropriated the objectives of the projects and are familiar enough with the procedures to follow up its implementation, it is not sufficiently the case for the national actors.

Monitoring reports TRTA II	15/07/ 2010	12/07/ 2011	17/06/ 2013
Relevance / design	b	b	b
Project relevance	a	a	
Intervention logic	c	b	
Support of stakeholders	b	c	
Cross cutting issues	c	a	
Efficiency	b	b	b
Management of inputs	b	c	
Implementation activities	b	c	
Achievement of outputs	b	b	
Partner involvement		b	
Effectiveness	b	b	b
Achievement of planned results	b	b	
Probability to achieve PP	b	b	
Impact prospects	c	b	b
Direct impact prospects (overall objective level)	c	b	
Indirect positive/negative impact	b	b	
Sustainability	b	b	b
Financial/economic viability	c	b	
Policy support/Link project/policy	b	b	
Contribution to capacity bdg	b	b	

Source: TRTA II, Monitoring Reports.

1.2) Implementation of activities

Monitoring reports, progress reports, evaluations and other internal documents point to a swift implementation of activities after a difficult inception phase.

Following the signature of FA in August and CA with UNIDO in November 2009, the inception phase completed during January - June 2010 period. The draft inception report however was of insufficient quality & detail and revised version was received and approved by the Delegation in September 2010. A validation workshop was held followed by the first PSC meeting taking place on 30 September at the Ministry of Commerce, approving the

inception report. First ROM mission took place in July 2010 providing positive comments about the programme. The next ROM mission is foreseen in July 2011. Second instalment of pre- financing € 2.28 million was made to UNIDO in December 2010.

*Source: internal EU document n°7*

ROM - Trade related technical assistance: Project is progressing well, in particular in terms of institutional capacity building, strengthening of public-private sector dialogue, support to requirement compliances allowing resumption of particular food export to the EU (sea food, mango and kinnow). Inter-institutional coordination requires further attention.

*Source: internal EU document n°8*

TRTA II: "Overall the programme performed well and activities were conducted in time. Note that the MTR mentions that initial delays were due to the fact that interagency agreements (between EU and UNIDO and between UNIDO, ITC and WIPO) took time and created initial delays these could be caught up and eventually the programme was conducted within the specified time frame. The explanation can be provided in the MR which mention that an advantage for the EU of contracting with UN agencies is that these could recruit subcontractors with their own procedures much more rapidly than could have done the EU."

*Sources: Ecorys MTR TRTAII 2012, MR 2011.*

'Two Public Private Dialogues (PPDs) have been implemented, one on Services Sector Export Development Strategy for Pakistan and one on Enhancing Regional Trade with Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) countries in Textile Made-ups and Light Engineering. In preparation of the PPDs five research studies were sub contracted to individual researchers. The PPDs were found to be effective forums for policy dialogue. The research papers served as good discussion guides. Based on the PPDs relevant policy recommendations could be formulated which have served as an input into the preparation of the Strategic Trade Policy Framework (STPF) 2012/2015, Pakistan's national export strategy.'

*Source: Ecorys, MTR TRTA II 2012*

'UNIDO: As the responsible implementing agency it is recommended that UNIDO:

- i) Puts forward a more focused work plan with fewer areas of intervention and greater prioritisation e.g. fewer sub- sectors, drop some activities and focus on others;
- ii) Adjusts the LFM to include SMARTer OVIs, particularly components 1 and 3. Include component 2.3 into LFM and appropriate assumptions for SPS. i.e. NAPHS bill passed;
- iii) Undertakes an analysis of TRTA1 lab accreditation and consider providing further support to these labs to support commercial viability;
- iv) Streamlines steering committee into sub-steering committees and an overarching steering committee with focal point institutions, UNIDO and EU;
- v) Mainstreams environmental issues in the intervention supporting fisheries which takes on board the declining fish stocks;
- vi) Includes a more transparent activity based budget which breaks down the inputs and allocates resources by activity;
- vii) Introduces a more formalised donor co-ordination mechanism in key areas where other donors such as USAID and AUS Aid are active.'

*Source TRTA II MR 15/7/2010*

'The MoC and PITAD have both voiced their satisfaction with TRTA II work. Two other

UN agencies are contracted by Inter Agency agreements to manage specific components; the International Trade Centre, Component 1- Trade Policy Capacity Building and the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), Component 3- Strengthening of Intellectual Property Rights. ITC have placed an official in the UNIDO project office but WIPO work through the Intellectual Property Office Organization in the Cabinet Office. The former arrangement has seen a more close knit working relationship whereas the IPO is seen as a more distant autonomous unit.'

*Source TRTA II MR 18/7/2013*

Successful capacity building in PITAD has enabled PITAD to conduct trainings and research at a sufficiently high level which has positioned it as a national think tank on international cities. These enhanced capacities have led the Federation Pakistani Chamber of Commerce and the Rawalpindi to submit requests to PITAD for capacity building initiative.

*Source: TRTA II Progress Report April-October 2014*

'Agreement has been reached with three universities (UAF, University of Karachi and UVAS in Lahore) on the implementation of a post-graduate diploma course for food inspectors. The project has supported the development of the curricula, which have been approved by the boards of the universities. It will be a one year programme including internships, which are scheduled to start in September 2012. The TRTA II programme is pursuing international recognition by a university in the UK for the diploma course. Accreditation is important to give the degree the required stature and to attract qualified applicants.'

*Source: Ecorys, MTR TRTA II, 2012*

Many activities and outputs provided:

Sector studies, in fan and cutlery (to develop benchmarks), horticulture, mango & kinnow (support to 20 clusters of farmers) and fisheries sectors (training to the Marine Fisheries Department and to staff of training companies).

Support to accreditation laboratories (32 laboratories)

Provision of equipment to the National Productivity Organisation (NPO)

Improvement of software and capacity of staff to use it in view of enhancing the capacity of the IPO and strengthen the IPR system.

*Source: Ecorys MTR TRTA II, 2012*

## 2) TRTA III Implementation of activities

Leather (Pitco). According to the progress report activities foreseen in the grant contract have been conducted, though with some delays in a few cases. They involved consultations with stakeholders for participation during project inception and to ensure their regular involvement throughout project life cycle. These consultations took the forms of series of meetings and workshops with 17 institutions.

*Source: PITCO First Interim Report, Feb. 2014-Feb2015*

AKRSP: According to progress reports activities foreseen in the grant contract have been conducted. Severe winter conditions provoked some delay. Significant activities:

- Detailed Value-Chain analysis was completed
- 2 associations namely, Shigar Gems and Minerals Association and Pakistan Gems and Minerals Association were selected for support on merit.
- Service providers were supported for promotion of certification and valuation services in

	<p>GBC.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Professional training provided in different locations.</li> <li>▪ Planning workshops with stakeholders were held in program area (Gilgit, Baltistan and Chitral). A total of 135 individuals from across GBC belonging to stakeholders such as Pakistan Gems and Minerals Association, Gemstone Summayar Association, Ghizer Association (Gupis, Yaseen &amp; Pakora), Hunza Gems Miners Association, Gilgit-Baltistan Metals and Minerals Association from Gilgit region while; Shigar Gems &amp; Mineral Association, Pakistan Gems &amp; Mineral Association,, Baltistan Gems &amp; Mineral Association.</li> <li>▪ Provision of technical assistance and technological support to service providers in the targeted areas.</li> </ul> <p>Source: AKRSdP <i>First Narrative Report 2013-2014</i> and <i>Second Interim Progress Report June 2014-June 2015</i>.</p> <p style="background-color: #fce4d6; padding: 2px;">Quality of evidence: <b>Strong</b>. Multiplicity of converging documentary sources.</p>
I-7.2.2	<p><b>Opinion of the partner's authorities and of beneficiaries on the activities implemented</b></p> <p><i>In general the views of the partner's authorities and of beneficiaries are very positive about the technical assistance provided and the activities conducted under TRTA II. They clearly corresponded to the demands and the perceived needs of the beneficiary institutions. Some reservation, however, mostly by trade operators, about an "institutions" bias at the expense of a real concern for the needs of the operators. Their view is that many activities took the form of short training sessions, study tours, newsletters and pamphlets that were not really meeting the needs of the trade operators in terms of transfer of professional know how. Activities of TRTA III, according to existing documentation and interviews, are conducted according to plan, and for some even faster and deeper, at the satisfaction of the beneficiaries.</i></p> <p>TRTA II: The three components were implemented by different agencies, all under the supervision of UNIDO:</p> <p>Component 1: ITC (Trade policy and Public Private Dialogue)</p> <p>The main activities conducted under this component targeted the strengthening of PITAD in its capacity to provide training and research to improve trade policy making and the promotion of Public Private dialogue mechanisms. Among other activities the project provided training of trainers, development of training module, a new building for PITAD, assistance with the institutionalisation of a PPD consultative mechanism. This component also supported the Competition Commission of Pakistan.</p> <p>The view of the beneficiary institutions is extremely positive; the activities that have been implemented corresponded to their needs. The technical support from and the dialogue with ITC proved excellent and was very much appreciated. The strong points according to the interviewees have been the quality of the technical assistants provided by ITC, their professionalism, and the contacts that could be made with foreign agencies and which favoured a real transfer of professional expertise. Final beneficiaries consulted had a less positive view noting in particular that the focus had been too much on institutions and not sufficiently on reaching the end users, private sector and trade operators.</p>

Component 2: UNIDO (Improvement of quality infrastructure).

Activities under this component cover three vast areas:

- Strengthening the SPS management system; key activities: the preparation of legislation and strengthening SPS/hygiene controls in particular in the fisheries sector. The preparation NAPHIS Bill for the NFSAPHRA has been an important activity and resulted to the bill being prepared and submitted to the Cabinet but not approved. According to several interviews this bill is important and its adoption would be beneficial. However, the implementation of this activity may reflect a lack of adaptation to circumstances: the Government of Pakistan adopted the 18<sup>th</sup> constitutional Amendment in April 2010. The programme could have taken into account during its inception phase that ended in October 2010 the fact that the responsibility for animal and plant health was transferred to the provinces instead of focusing on the national level which creates a difficulty for the adoption of the much needed bill.
- Improving quality/productivity in fishery, horticulture and key industrial sectors. Activities were mainly training of food inspectors, studies and guidance manuals and codes for the development of good practices. Numerous signs of satisfaction of trained inspectors and seed testers, Kinnow mandarin farmers and others about the assistance they received have been collected by the TRTA programme. Direct interviews with a (too) limited number of beneficiaries express some reservations notably that the assistance provided was too superficial and pedagogical (short training sessions, newsletters, manuals, but not enough direct professional assistance.
- Compliance of export products with market requirements. Activities consisted in the rehabilitation. The main activities conducted aimed at the accreditation of laboratories and development of testing schemes and the preparation of business plans to make them sustainable. Few interviewees expressed opinions on the quality of implementation of the activities of this component but some mentioned that quality infrastructure is essential and that the support of the TRTA programme had been useful but did not sufficiently address the need for the staff of these institutions to be committed to perform their functions for the benefits of the farmers and exporters. And the private sector has not been sufficiently sensitised to the potential benefits of using these infrastructure.

Component 3 (WIPO: strengthening intellectual property rights). Activities involved digitization of patents, trademarks and copyrights, upgrading automation system at the IPO, training to IPO technical team, support to strengthen legislation and enforcement. Beneficiaries expressed satisfaction with these activities with one reservation due to that there has been no permanent presence in Pakistan of a WIPO representative during the implementation of the project; it limited the interactions between the beneficiaries and the implementation agency.

*Sources: Interviews: MN 832, MN839, MN817, MN846, MN841, MN840, MN845*

*Pakistan: A Trade Route to Prosperity, [www.trtpakistan.org](http://www.trtpakistan.org)*

Quality of evidence: **More than satisfactory.** Convergence of opinions of beneficiaries and implementation agencies with the documentary sources, but limited coverage of opinions of beneficiaries for TRTA III.

### Achievement of outputs and outcomes according to the reports from the contractors/implementing agencies and to the monitoring and evaluation reports

*Significant outputs have been delivered by the different components of the TRTA II programme and have led to positive outcomes. The most significant ones are:*

- *The upgrading and strengthening of PITAD the trained modules of which are now accredited by WTO with the result that PITAD is used by the Government of Pakistan to train the staff of the Ministry of Commerce, the trade diplomats and asked by the private sector (Chambers of Commerce), and foreign government (Nepal, Afghanistan) to provide specialised training.*
- *A national Private Public Dialogue has been initiated on GSP+ (compliance and potential benefits).*
- *Key trade institutions among which IPO, CCP have been reorganised with the result that their performance is improved (as evidenced, for instance by the reduction in the time for releasing patents and licence.*
- *SPS and metrology services have been improved (accreditation and testing) leading to reopening access to EU market for export products.*
- *Productivity increased in the horticulture sector as a result of introduction of best practices (HACCP, etc.)*

*For TRTA III it is too early to assess outcomes, but its outputs so far are encouraging and indicate that expected outcomes are likely to materialise.*

#### TRTA II:

I-7.2.3

The table below reproduces the list of expected results as from the log frame of TRTA II with the performance indicators mentioned in the programme and the degree of realisation as measured in progress reports and midterm evaluation.

Practically all indicators are measuring outputs rather than outcomes. Most output indicators are satisfied or partially satisfied, indicating a correct implementation of the programme (confirmed by the monitoring reports, see infra)

Outcome indicators (underlined> have been essentially provided for under component 2 and are partially satisfied.

Objectives	Indicator definition and target value	Realisation
<b>Component 1</b> Coherent trade policy and regulatory reform for export competitiveness		
1.1 PITAD's institutional capacity strengthened.	PITAD's technical materials and publications assessed and procurement made of items required to carry out high-level research, analysis and training	Indicator satisfied. 14 master trainers mentored. <i>Source: (2)</i>

1.2 PITAD's and other research institutes' expertise on trade policy strengthened	Twining arrangement signed with international training institution	Indicator satisfied. MOU signed between PITAD and WTI in 2011.
	Trainers and researchers trained (target 8 by 2011, 16 by 2012)	Researchers/trainers selected from PITAD, IBA, LUMS and TDAP. 7 trained in 2011/12, 7 more to be trained in 2012. <i>Source (1)</i>
	PITAD modules and trade policy research projects carried out, completed and assessed to be of a high standard. Target 6 by 2013.	Indicator satisfied. 6 training modules developed and finalised in 2012. <i>Source (1)</i>
1.3 Government officers' capacity on specific trade policy and international trade negotiations strengthened	Number of officers from government offices and implementing agencies successfully trained. Target: 3 by 2011	3 training conducted in 2011/12. <i>Source (1)</i>
1.4 Research studies contributing to the development of a national export strategy conducted.	Number of research papers that feed into public-private dialogue produced and approved through peer review mechanisms. Target: 15 by 2014.	4 done in 2011/12, 7 more in 2014.
1.5 Public-private dialogue for a coherent national export strategy is fostered	A core group of key stakeholders is constituted to develop a national export strategy	Done by 2012. <i>Source (1)</i>
	Number of PPDs held	10 by 2014. <i>Source (1)</i>
<b>Component 2</b> Improved compliance of exported products with export market requirements		



2.1 Strengthened SPS controls.	<u>Controls on exports of fishery products “at least equivalent” to EC by 2012;</u>	Many results achieved but no clear link with the indicators. (Drafted and refined the NAPHS bill; Provided training to staff of MFD and fish processing plants; Conducted two study tours abroad; The post graduate diploma courses for food safety inspectors designed for 3 local universities; MFD quality inspection capacity improved; Dossier to resume fish exports to EU sent to DG SANCO and waiting for reply, if approved, two companies will start exporting fish products to EU; <i>Source (1)</i> Code of practices for small vessels in fisheries developed. <i>Source (3)</i>
	<u>No. of EU RASFF alerts for products of plant origin/year reduced to &lt;10/year by 2014.</u>	25 in 2011/12. <i>Source (1)</i>
2.2 Improved quality, value addition and compliance in fishery, horticulture and industrial sectors.	<u>10 additional fishery establishments compliant with EC market requirements by 2014;</u>	Application for 5 additional fish processing plants submitted by MFD to DG SANCO to expand platform for export (2 in January 2015, 3 in Marc 2015). <i>Source (3)</i>
	<u>Value of fishery/horticulture products at first sale increased by 5% in real terms by 2014;</u>	No indication.
	40 fishery/horticulture/ fans/cutlery enterprises certified to quality, environment, food safety, GAP, CSR management system including CE	No indication.

2.3 Improved conformity assessment infrastructure and services.	Internationally recognized accreditation (1) compliance testing (24), metrology (6), system certification (5) and metrology (6) services achieved by 2013	Certification bodies in Pakistan accredited by PNAC for QMS and EMS will be allowed to operate and their certifications will be globally accepted. <i>Source (2)</i> 22 testing labs accreditate by PNAC (2014/15); 84 testing and calibration laboratories & 04 CBs, and 07IBs accredited by PNAC (2015). <i>Source (3)</i>
	30 testing/metrology labs paying accreditation fees to PNAC by 2014.	To date seventeen (17) labs (6 metrology + 11 testing) receiving TRTA II support has been accredited by PNAC. <i>Source (2)</i>
<b>Component 3</b> Strengthened IP system facilitating increased investment and trade in IP protected goods and services		
3.1 Strengthened IP Institutions.	Adoption of results based management practices in IPO-Pakistan by 2014;	No information.
	3 IP officials with LLM degrees by 2013;	2 IPO officials confirmed by 2013-14. <i>Source (1)</i> 1 IPO official completed LLM course in Turin. <i>Source (2)</i>
	Report on validation of Trade Marks and Patents Administration procedures by 2012;	No information.
	Examiners trained on Trade Marks and Patent examination by 2012	No information.
	Upgraded IT infrastructure established by 2014	No information.
	Upgraded IP automation system (WIPO IPAS Java) deployed and streamlined IP procedures automated by 2012	IPAS Java operational at the Patent Office and Trade Marks Registry with streamlined procedures. <i>Source (2)</i>
	IP records digitized and IP databases completed by 2014	80 % completed. <i>Source (2)</i>

	Back-office administrative systems identified and first phase implemented by 2013	Contract awarded for Admin System. <i>Source (2)</i>
	4 IPO IT officials with certificates in technical skills by 2013	7 IPO IT officials with upgraded technical skills
	Availability of online IP services and interfaces by 2014	Web portal development contract awarded and work initiated
	CMO study available by 2012	No information.
3.2 Strengthened IP Legislation and Policy Framework.	Position paper on utility models by 2013;	No information.
	National stakeholders consultations on GISd and PBRs by 2013;	National consultations on PBRs and report completed <i>Source (2)</i>
	National stakeholders consultations on Madrid System and PCT by 2013;	Done by 2012. <i>Source (1)</i> Experts, speakers and participants identified for the Roundtable. Consultations are in progress for feasible dates <i>Source (2)</i>
	National Roundtable on IP Policy by 2013.	No information.
3.3 Improved enforcement of IPRs.	Judges colloquium by 2012;	Planned activities for this result area were completed earlier. However, consultations are being held with various stakeholders (Customs, IPO Pakistan) to ensure sustained outcomes of the implemented activities. <i>Source (2)</i>
	Up to six (6) master trainers trained from FIA/Police and Customs Academy by 2012;	
	IP enforcement training courses commenced by Police, Customs and Judicial Academies by 2012.	
3.4 Increased use of IP system by businesses and research institutions.	Public information campaign (media briefings, provision of public awareness materials) commenced by 2011;	World Intellectual Property Day Seminar, 26 <sup>th</sup> April 2015. <i>Source (4)</i>

	Up to 15 national trainers on IP for businesses trained by 2012;	In depth training of IPO technical team provided (but no indication of numbers). <i>Source (3)</i>
	Roundtable on IP and trade policy by 2012;	No information.
	IP modules in up to six public-private consultations by 2013;	No information.
	National Roundtable on TMOs by 2013;	No information.
	E-forum on technology transfer to industry established.	e-Forum (PiNET) pilot version completed and under review by stakeholders. <i>Source (2)</i>
<p><i>Sources:</i>  (1) <i>Mid-Term Review Report (Ecorys for EC/UNIDO) – September 2012</i>  (2) <i>Progress Report (EC/UNIDO- April-October 2014.</i>  (3) <a href="http://www.trtapakistan.org">www.trtapakistan.org</a> and documentation provided by UNIDO TRTA team in Islamabad  (4) <i>Trade Time, quarterly newsletter, vol 5, issue 2, June 2015</i></p>		
<p>Some <b>outcomes</b> could already be observed at the time of the mid-term review of TRTA II:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Establishment of a Food Safety Authority in the province of Punjab as a result of activities of the project.</li> <li>▪ As a result of the sector studies (10 firms) conducted and support (11 companies) provided to develop competitive benchmarking, one fan company has implemented process flow improvements with significant effects on productivity and reduced stock requirement. However, replication is low in other companies.</li> <li>▪ Support provided to fisheries sector aimed at reopening the EU market for fish from Pakistan. Dossier for requalification of exports to the EU has been submitted to DG Sanco. If approved 2 companies could be able to export to EU. 2 other are interested but due to alternative markets (notably China) the appeal of the EU market has significantly declined.</li> <li>▪ Support provided to Pakistan National Accreditation Council (PNAC) and Pakistan Standards and Quality Control Authority (PSQCA) and improvement of capacity in these institutions resulted in increased demand for local testing services. The accreditation by PNAC has contributed to reducing costs for tests that otherwise would have been done abroad</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: Ecorys MTR TRTA II 2012</i></p> <p>Following up the work done by the project to support and prepare the establishment of a National Animal Plant Health Service ‘a National Food Safety Animal and Plant Health Regulatory Authority (NFSAPHRA) bill has been finalized and approved by the Ministry of Food Security and Research. This Bill was presented to the Federal Cabinet in April 2014 and approved in principal.’  TRTA II <i>Progress Report April – November 2014.</i></p> <p>‘Impact is already being felt in both the government and private sectors through training and</p>		

the introduction of accreditation and legislation. The impact of the Private Sector Dialogue has been very positive with the MoC incorporating recommendations into the 2012-2015 Strategic Trade Policy Framework. Impact would be improved if WIPO/IPO could increase delivery to SMEs. There are no available impact studies to date despite the suggestions of an early consultancy. PPDs have been a success in impacting on both the public and private sectors. Visibility of the EU support is now clearly stated.'

*Source TRTA II MR /2011*

'The programme has been successful in strengthening the capacity of PITAD through provision of equipment and books, and through the master training programme which represents an innovative approach to capacity building. This new capacity has been applied in a number of training courses. However, there is scope for improving the utilization of its newly developed resources by expanding its training and research activities. '

*Source: Ecorys MTR TRTA II 2012*

Numerous activities have been conducted by the implementing partners including training, preparation of draft legislation, and produced many outputs. In the area of SPS a draft legislation for the establishment of a national SPS authority the National Animal Plant Health Inspection Services (NAPHIS) was prepared by the programme. It has not been adopted by the government due to concerns of some stakeholders at provincial level.

*Source: Ecorys, MTR TRTA II 2012*

'Prior to the interventions of TRTA II the efforts to improve the quality infrastructure in the Country were fragmented and to address this issue NAPHIS Project was initiated by the government. However, due to the complexity and dynamic nature of this field the Project had limited success. Hence, it was agreed that TRTA II should support NAPHIS in a more concerted way. Because of TRTA II efforts a National Food Safety Animal and Plant Health Regulatory Authority (NFSAPHRA) bill has been finalized and approved by the Ministry of Food Security and Research. This Bill was presented to the Federal Cabinet in April 2014 and approved in principal.'

*TRTA II Progress Report April-November 2014*

'An activity that had not been envisaged in the inception phase is the support provided to food safety initiatives at the provincial level. Particularly in Punjab support was provided in the formulation of a food safety act ensuring that it is consistent with the NAPHIS act at the national level. In the province of Punjab, training was provided to staff in food safety control issues, as well as technical advice on the launch of a Food Safety and Standards Authority of Punjab. The interventions of the project have contributed to the establishment of a food safety authority in Punjab, which started operations on a pilot basis in the district of Lahore, on 1 July 2012.'

*Source: Ecorys, MTR TRTA II*

The programme supported three manufacturers of protective gloves (with 11 different models) and three manufacturers of electric fans (with 17 models in total) for the acquisition of the CE Marking. All these products have successfully passed the technical requirements to achieve CE Marking certification.

*Source: TRTA II Progress Report April-November 2014*

TRTA II addressed the enforcement of IPR by supporting capacity strengthening in the key

enforcing agencies. The most important progress is linked to the computerisation of trademark, copyright and patent offices, initiated under TRTA I and upgraded under TRTA II. The replacement of manual work by IT has considerably reduced search-oriented tasks and was accompanied by a steady growth of trademark applications and patents, the latter fluctuating with the economic activity.

Ecorys, *Mid-term Review of TRTA II*, 2012

As an example, the possibility that was given to the Competition Commission of Pakistan to send resource persons to DG competition in Brussels and to the US Federal Trade Commission led to a reorganisation of the CCP and the strengthening of its capacity in its two functions; enforcement of competition regulation and market research and analysis.

*Sources: Progress final reports by the implementation agencies, Monitoring reports, Mid-term evaluation.*

### TRTA III:

#### PITCO:

- The output of the consultations with the stakeholders resulted in the signature of a Cooperation Agreement amongst the partners. Additionally, a key outcome of the meetings conducted with program stakeholders (i.e. Pakistan Leather Garments Manufactures and Exporters Association, PLGMEA, Pakistan Gloves Manufacturers and Exporters Association, PGMEA, and Pakistan Footwear Manufacturers Association, PFMA) was a requirement to bring forward the completion of the Competitiveness Needs Assessment and the Situational Analysis of exports and the project has been able to gather the support from PLGMEA, PGMEA and PFMA during the CNA of the respective sectors. CNA of footwear and leather garment sector is completed.
- Completion of a visibility and communication study

Source: PITCO *First Interim Report*, Feb. 2014-Feb2015

#### AKRSP

- “Value Chain Analysis”: the study has detailed information and covers every aspect of G&J value chain such as identification of issues, opportunities and proposed intervention plan to convert maximum number of challenges into tangible opportunities in long run.
- A gender strategy and an institutional development strategy
- Professional training.

Training sessions	Number of people trained		
Subject	M	F	Total
Safe and productive artisanal mining	1 122	29	1 151
Jewellery making	68	163	231
Faceting	6	53	59

Mining prospecting			156
Basic level gems cutting and polishing	37	100	137
Advanced level gems cutting and polishing	16	64	80
Total			1 814

Sources: PITCO and AKRSP progress reports.

The programme TRTA III is still in an early stage so that it is premature to assess **outcomes**.

The first two columns of the following table are the expected outcomes as from the financing agreement, whereas the third column indicates their degree of realisation as perceived at this stage of the evaluation on the basis of the available reports from the implementing partners. However, so far there has been no measure of these indicators in the progress reports and no monitoring reports.

Objectives	Definition and target	Realisation
<p><b>Specific Objective</b> To strengthen the capacity of Pakistan's BIOs at the federal, provincial and local level. This objective shall be achieved via capacity building facility on the ground via service portfolio development of grant beneficiaries as well as of other relevant (smaller) BIOs active in the two chosen sectors: (i) gems and jewellery (G&amp;J) and (ii) Leather Product (LP). Such portfolio shall be aimed mainly at the needs of export oriented private firms and especially SMFs in either of the two sectors to improve their export competitiveness and job creation capacity. It shall be part of activities specified under the CfP. Capacity Building Needs assessment will be done independently.</p>	20-40% of the firms in the G&J and LP sector are able to compete at the international level.	Indicator has not been measured yet. However, the interest manifested by the key professional associations in the leather sector, as well as the success of the training and the use of the technical assistance and technological support by the professional organisations of the gems and jewellery sector indicate a strong commitment of the stakeholders and augurs favourably for the strengthening of the service providers and firms in the sector.
<p><b>Expected Results</b></p>		
<p>a) improve quality of production through provision of business development services (BDS), taking into account environmentally friendly production</p>	10-20% increase in the levels of exports of LP and G&J products	

<p>b) enhance product development and improved design as to moving products up the value chain through state of the art production techniques</p>	<p>Business development services are availed by the firms in the G&amp;J and LP.          10-20% increase in the export of diversified products</p>	<p>Too early to assess</p>
<p>c) marketing and branding</p>	<p>20-30% exportable products are branded in the G&amp;J and LP sectors</p>	
<p>d) provide access to knowledge: upgrading skills of employees (through technical training relevant for each of the focal sectors) with focus on gender balance; and training in management and organisational skills of middle management</p>	<p>10-25% of the workers improves their technical skills by the end of the programme</p>	
<p>e) improved access to regional and international markets as a result of the above and through provision of necessary information provided by the BIOs specifically on product compliance for export (as for example compliance with the EU Reach Directive for leather production/tanning) and export &amp; customs documentation</p>	<p>Increased access to regional markets like SAARC and ASEAN as well as to the international market on account of standards compliance.</p>	

Overall, the message is that activities conducted by the two implementing partners are likely to produce their expected outcomes.

For instance, in the AKRSP some immediate outcome of the training provided in mining prospecting could already be observed: two different gemstones stones Emeralds and Peridot and one industrial mineral Copper were explored at Garamchashma area of Chitral region.

*Source: AKRSP 2d Interim Progress Report.*

Phase II of the Trade Related Technical Assistance is advancing satisfactory while covering a wide range of activities in trade negotiations, standardization, quality control and international property rights. While this is mostly highly specialized and pertinent and for



	<p>which it is often difficult to trace outcomes resulting into increased trade volume and creation of jobs, <u>a tangible outcome is the lifting of the phyto-sanitary ban on exports of fisheries products to the EU.</u> TRTA expert support contributed significantly in Pakistan to reopen a potential market for 50 M€ additional trade returns.</p> <p><i>Source: internal EU document n°7</i></p> <p style="background-color: #fce4d6; padding: 5px;">Quality of evidence: <b>Strong.</b> Converging messages from different documentary sources.</p>
<p>I-7.2.4</p>	<p><b>Opinion of the partner’s authorities and of beneficiaries on the outputs and outcomes</b></p> <p><i>Partner authorities and beneficiary institutions are extremely positive about the benefits of the TRTA programmes in terms institution building leading to improved public private dialogue, formulation and implementation of specific policies (e.g. competition). There is a prevalent view that EU support contributed to achievements in terms of improved compliance with SPS, increased quality of export products and reduction of costs (testing, patents) even if there is some reservation about the “institutional” bias of the interventions and the insufficient attention to maximising their benefits for the private sector operators.</i></p> <p>Opinions of partner authorities and direct beneficiaries are extremely favourable as far as the results on terms institutional strengthening of various beneficiary institutions are concerned.</p> <p>Example of appreciation formulated in letters from beneficiary institutions:</p> <p>“The Ministry of Commerce is appreciative of the research work and the institutionalisation of public private dialogue (PPD) mechanism conducted by the International Trade Centre ITC under the TRTA II programme. The work conducted by ITC and other research entities could be integrated into the proposed National Export Growth Strategy for mid and long term policy implementation”.</p> <p><i>Source: Letter from Ministry of Commerce, June 2014</i></p> <p>The outcomes which are most emphasised are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The establishment of the PPDSC. It is a permanent Committee and comprises representatives from the public and private sector for trade policy consultations and follow up. According to several officials interviewed it has brought a major shift to the trade policy formulation from a traditional bureaucratic way to evidence base and research policy making.</li> </ul> <p>It must be underlined that this view, widely shared among the officials interviewed maybe challenged: indeed if one compare the successive Strategic Trade Policy Frameworks 2009-2012 and 2012-2015, the first one is more substantiated and elaborated than the second. Moreover, according to numerous articles in the press, the production of the 2015-2018 Strategic Trade Policy Framework is delayed and private sector organisations complain that they have not been consulted.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The institutional strengthening of PITAD as key government training institution for the civil servants and trade diplomats. The training modules of PITAD are certified by an accreditation committee of WTO and are used to train Pakistan’s officials but also to respond to demands from foreign countries (Nepal, Afghanistan) and private sector organisations (Chambers of Commerce).</li> <li>▪ PITAD has also been strengthened in its capacity to conduct research and has been mandated to conduct a study on the consequences of granting MFN status to India in</li> </ul>

the context of the preparation of the new trade strategy. The study is not available publicly but highlights the benefits for Pakistan of such reform as well as the points that should be negotiated with India in return.

- Consultations and training organised in the context of GSP+ have been regarded as instrumental in helping government and enterprises to take advantage of the regime and to comply with its requirements.
- Numerous letters of officials indicate that institutional strengthening has been used and led to improved private-public consultations, and to inputs into major policy programmes.
- The accreditation of laboratories and testing centres. Since 2004 49 laboratories have been assisted to obtain accreditation (30 under TRTA II). A study to analyse their performance concluded that “. Findings from the study provide evidence for the need of accredited laboratory testing services to different extents by exporters in the fields of food, textile, mechanical/materials, electrical, leather and calibration. The survey of private sector customers of the laboratories indicates that users have benefited from the provision of local accredited services and exporters have increased the competitiveness of their products in sectors such as food. At least some part of this competitiveness can be attributed to TRTA intervention of laboratory accreditation. Firms were also able to reduce costs significantly by switching to local testing services.
- Whereas interviewees from beneficiary institutions do positively appreciate the TRTA support, some reservations were made by representatives of private stakeholders, as already observed under I-7.2.2. As a result of activities conducted with an insufficient attention to the needs of the private sector operators those are not using the quality infrastructure as much as they could. The interviewees insist that this is not a question of cost but of insufficient understanding of the importance of quality to put their products on the international markets.
- Sustainability of the outcomes seems to be reasonably guaranteed according to the implementing agencies and the institutional beneficiaries. Governmental institutions like TDAP, CCP are funded from budget resources, semi-governmental like PITAD benefit from budget resources and charge part to their costs for the services they provide. Laboratories charge their clients but there is no information on their degree of cost recovery. However, the 2014 assessment of the performance of laboratories shows that, with the exception of textile, their revenue have significantly increased from 2009 to 2013:

Revenue generated by the accredited laboratories:

Laboratory Scope	Revenue Generated (US\$)		
	2009	2011	2013
Calibration (Total)	72,693	132,334	180,620
<i>NPSL</i>	10,204	14,286	20,408
<i>PCSIR Karachi</i>	11,469	27,742	50,926
<i>PCSIR Lahore</i>	51,020	90,306	109,286
Electrical	14,702	15,781	35,082
Food (chemical)	10,747	11,260	14,474
Food (microbiology)	71,613	106,762	109,466
Leather (chemical)	10,747	11,260	14,474
Leather (physical)	3,461	4,327	5,393
Mechanical/Materials	324	2,908	3,133
Textile	2,421	1,286	2,259
<b>Total</b>	<b>361,234</b>	<b>489,512</b>	<b>577,443</b>

(Assessment of Performance of Accredited Laboratories in Pakistan, April 2014)

Message emerging from studies by academics or international institutions on the assessment of performance of accredited laboratories, on export barriers, on challenges faced by exporters... can be summarized as follows

- Use of testing and accreditation is limited by the lack of awareness of trade issues: "The Pakistan government has increased support for various quality, environmental, and social certifications when a manufacturing unit obtains four of the specified standards. However, exporters' low levels of awareness of these systems make such measures practically ineffective" ((Rashid Amjad and al.: Export Barriers in Pakistan, Results from a firm-level survey, 2012).
- "Quality certification and adherence to health, labor, and environment standards is still a problem for exporters. There is an urgent need to increase awareness of these standards, and to simplify procedures to avail the facilities provided in this regard. While Pakistan has set up the necessary institutional arrangements for certification, implementation remains limited mainly because exporters are not aware of these standards in the first place. (Ernesto Sanchez-Triana & al.: Revitalizing growth in Pakistan, World Bank 2014).
- Judgment of the firms on the quality of testing laboratories is ambiguous: 40% consider quality is average, but 50% acknowledge that testing costs have been reduced (Assessment of Performance of Accredited laboratories)
- 96% of respondents to the survey (assessment of testing laboratories) believe that public sector laboratories need to make significant progress to compete with private sector laboratories.

In some sectors (fisheries, e.g.) firms are by-passing markets with stringent food safety requirements when they have alternative possibilities (which is the case with China)

*Sources:*

*Interviews: MN 817, MN818, MN832, MN837, MN839, MN846, MN840*

*TRTA II Programme: Assessment of Performance of Accredited Laboratories in Pakistan & Gains to Export Sector, A preliminary Study, April 2014, Islamabad, Pakistan.*

	<p>Rashid Amjad, Ejaz Ghani, Musleh ud Din, Tariq Mahmood: <i>Export Barriers in Pakistan: Results from a Firm-Level Survey</i>, The Lahore Journal of Economics, September 2012</p> <p>Ernesto Sanchez-Triana, Ernesto, Dan Biller, Ljaz Nabi, Leonard Ortolano, Ghzal Dezfuli, Javaid Afzal, Santiago Enriquez, <i>Revitalizing growth in Pakistan: Trade, Infrastructure, and Environmental Performance</i>, World Bank, 2014</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>Strong</b>. Good triangulation of several interviews.</p>
<b>JC-7.3</b>	<b>EU support contributed to strengthen the capacity of the Business Intermediate Organisation at federal, provincial and local levels</b>
<p>This JC concerns exclusively the programme TRTA III which supported BIOs and individual firms. No real outcomes can yet be observed due to the early stage of advancement of the programme. However, the first progress reports permit to consider that the way the beneficiaries have been selected, the kind of service that has been provided by the project, and the interest and commitment of the participants indicate that the project is likely to induce behavioural changes such as improved management skills, undertaking of new activities as a result of improved awareness. BIOs are key beneficiaries of this project and have been professionally selected by the implementing organisation which relied on their knowledge of their sectors.</p>	
I.7.3.1	<p><b>Identification of supported BIOs and nature of support provided by the EU</b></p> <p><i>Beneficiary organisations in sectors leather, and gems and jewellery have been carefully selected to ensure their commitment and dedication to the project.</i></p> <p>It is essentially programme TRTA III which was meant to support the BIOs. In the leather sector, project documents and interviews show that the implementing organisation, PITCO, have an in depth knowledge of their sector and that they devoted much effort to incapacitate the BIOs they selected.</p> <p>In the gems and jewellery sector the approach is based on community based participation which has been developed by AKRSP and proved successful in managing social, economic and natural resources in diverse parts of Pakistan. It aims at developing professional capacities at local level and to link up with national operators in the jewellery sector. Associations and networks of artisans engaged in gems cutting, jewellery making and other services are supported and promoted. The basic function of these associations and networks is to provide market information and work as advocacy groups to protect the rights of the members of the organization.</p> <p><i>Sources:</i>  <i>Pakistan Leather Competitiveness Improvement Program (PLCIP), Yearly Progress Report, February 2014 – February 2015.</i>  <i>AKRSP: Developing a Sustainable Value chain for Gems and Jewellery Sector in GBC: Institutional Development Strategy for executing the G&amp;J project in GBC.</i></p> <p><i>Interviews MN817, MN831, MN820</i></p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>Indicative but not conclusive</b>. Sources of evidence (documents and</p>

	interviews) are of good quality but insufficient to conduct a robust triangulation. No monitoring report available yet.
I-7.3.2	<p><b>Changes in staff skill, procedures, organisation and functional setup.</b></p> <p><i>Although the project is still in its infancy there are positive indications that it is likely to achieve its intended outcomes.</i></p> <p>At this stage we only have the first progress reports of PITCO and AKRSP and the programme is in a too early stage to obtain information on the behavioural changes of the enterprises benefitting from their support.</p> <p>However, the number of participants to the training events, their interest suggests that the project is likely to lead to such outcomes. It is already evidenced by the exploration of two new gemstones as a result of the training in mining prospecting.</p> <p><i>Sources: cf. I-7.2.3 and I-7.3.2</i></p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>Indicative but not conclusive.</b> Sources of evidence (documents and interviews) are of good quality but insufficient to conduct a robust triangulation. No monitoring report.</p>
I-7.3.3	<p><b>Evidence from existing evaluations, studies, other documentation and interviews with stakeholders on the links between the results observed and the EU support.</b></p> <p>At the stage of the projects the available documentation permits to observe (partially) activities and outputs, and only the likeliness to achieve outcomes. Therefore all results observed are still confined directly within the activities of the project and directly linked to the EU support.</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>Weak</b></p>
<b>JC-7.4</b>	<b>The EU support contributed to the reduction of barriers to trade</b>
	<p>This JC concerns the TRTA II programme.</p> <p>TBT have been and still are an important issue for Pakistan trade. On the one hand, they have been used by Pakistan to protect its industries, on the other hand the Pakistani standards and accreditation systems required to control imports and ensure that exports satisfy international regulation lack skilled resources and investment.</p> <p>These complex issues of standards and TBT have been addressed by the programme in several ways:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Training to government staff provided by PITAD (which itself benefitted from capacity building and training). The mid-term evaluation and monitoring reports recognise the relevance and the quality of the training provided by PITAD as well as the enhanced credibility and capacity of that institution as a result of the EU programme.</li> <li>▪ Institutional strengthening of key standards and accreditation institutions such as PNAC and PSQCA have benefitted from capacity building assistance in the form of training, transfer of professional know how, investment in infrastructure. This permitted the international recognition of PNAC as national apex agency, contributed to setting up or upgrading a large number of laboratories, but important organisations, e.g. PSQCA are still lacking the human, technical and other resources to implement strategies in conformity with international requirements.</li> <li>▪ On the area of SPS the programme has contributed to drafting the important NAPHIS bill the</li> </ul>

adoption of which has been delayed for reasons beyond the reach of the project. It has also contributed to reopen the EU market from fish from Pakistan.

Moreover, the non-financial cooperation played an important role in offering, through the technical trade sub-groups preparing the Joint Commission under the Cooperation Agreement, a technical and political platform to discuss issues related to TBTs.

There is thus evidence that the EU supported institutions have improved their management and their capability to deal with TBT. Everything indicates that this is a favourable factor to ease trade available statistics and studies do not provide sufficient information to quantify the effective increase in trade it produced.

**Evolution of Doing Business in Pakistan indicators relative to barriers to trade.**

*Pakistan ranking in the ease of doing business surveys and its component trading across borders have deteriorated over the evaluation period. However, the key components of these indicators, cost and time to import and export has improved, but less than in other surveyed countries so that the relative position of Pakistan was downgraded.*

	2008	2015
	Rank out of 178 countries	Rank out of 189 countries
Ease of doing business	74	136
Trading across borders	94	168
Components of trading across borders		
Documents to export (number)	9	na
Time to export (days)	24 days	79 hours
Cost to export (\$US per container)	515	426
Document to import (number)	8	na
Time to import (days)	19 days	141 hours
Cost to import (\$US per container)	1 336	957

I-7.4.1

Comparing ease of doing business surveys of 2008 and 2015 on sees that:

- The relative position of Pakistan in the Ease of doing business surveys has deteriorated over the period, meaning that, although a number of reforms’ and efforts to improve the business environment have been conducted in Pakistan, other countries have undertaken deeper reforms.
- The deterioration is even more profound for the indicator “trading across borders” since Pakistan moved from the third quintile of the ranking to the fifth.

The specific indicators underlying the trading across borders ranking show an improvement of Pakistan’s performance in terms of time and costs to export and import, confirming that the path of reforms has been slower in Pakistan than in other countries.

*Source: Doing Business indicators*

Quality of evidence: **More than satisfactory.**

I-7.4.2

**Conclusions of WTO and studies on the barriers to trade**

*Available studies tend to show that Pakistan used TBT to protect its industries, but they refer to a period anterior to the gradual liberalisation. No documented evidence of a removal of TBT although Pakistan is signatory of the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade.*

Pakistan's considers the multilateral trading system to be the cornerstone of its trade policy. It signed the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (article 10.6) of the WTO and set up in 1996 the Pakistan Standards and Quality Control Authority (PSQCA). The PSQCA is responsible for the formulation of Pakistan standards as well as their promulgation. The PSQCA develops and adopts standards and provides conformity/testing assessments. It advises the Government on standardization policies, programmes and activities to promote industrial efficiency and development, as well as consumer safety and health. It is the focal point for national, regional and international organizations and institutions such as ISO, IEC and Codex Alimentarius, and its Karachi office is the National Enquiry Point (NEP) for the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT).

The TRTA II programme is working closely with the PSQCA to operationalise the NEP.

*Source: WTO TPR 2015 and PSQCA Website.*

Pakistan also believes that preferential trade agreements and regional trade arrangements are complementary to the multilateral trading system and by reducing the TBTs between their members promote bilateral trade.

*Source WTO TPR 2015*

There are few studies available on the evolution of TBTs imposed by Pakistan. A recent one concludes that Pakistan TBTs favoured Pakistan textile exports over the period 1990-2005 because these measures protected infant industries. Unfortunately this study refers to a period in which Pakistan's trade policy was predominantly based on the import substitution model. There are no available studies on the effects of the gradual liberalisation policy pursued in the period of this evaluation.

*Source: Shah S.M.H., Sajid A. and Ali S.M, The impact of technical barrier to trade on Pakistan textile industry, Pakistan Journal of Science (vol. 66, 2 Jun 2014).*

A recent study shows that Pakistan has enacted much less NTBs barriers to trade than China and India but their negative effects on Pakistan's trade are worse. In particular, Pakistan NTBs tend to be "across the board" and do not specifically protect high growth and strategic industries, contrarily to the NTBs imposed by China and India. Moreover, many Pakistan NTB involve bans of certain imports thus shutting the concerned business from foreign competition and thus from incentives to improve. The study shows that the best solution would be for the three countries to remove their NTBs; this being not realist the second best solution would be an unilateral removal of its NTBs by Pakistan as it would benefit Pakistan's consumers and create an incentive for enterprises to become more competitive.

*Source: Shah, S.A. and Kayani, U.J. Non-Tariff Barriers in Pakistan, India and China: A Comparative Analysis of the Legal, Economic and Policy Implications. International Growth Centre (IGC), Working Paper, Marc 2014.*

Quality of evidence: **More than satisfactory.** Convergence of reliable documentary source on the willingness of Pakistan to remove TBT but insufficient coverage of results achieved in this regard.

**Evidence from existing evaluations, studies, other documentation and interviews with stakeholders on the links between the reduction of barriers to trade and EU support in this respect.**

*Institutional and technical capacity of trade institutions as well as management of the issues linked to TBT have benefitted from support provided to the institutions via the programmes TRTA I and TRTA II, and from the regular dialogue under the non-financial cooperation. Other factors have also played a role and whereas there is evidence of an EU contribution in strengthening the capacity and credibility of key institutions (e.g. PITAD, PNAC) and in improving the compliance with EU SPS regulations (e.g. fish) there is no evidence that this resulted in increased trade flows or to lowering the relative decline of Pakistan trade. There is also evidence that institutions that benefitted from institutional strengthening have a better capacity, and use it, to analyse the issues related with TBTs.*

At least two components of the programme TRTA II dealt with Technical Barriers to Trade. Component 1 on trade capacity building whose main function is to train government staff in trade policy issues and component 2 focused on export development through quality infrastructure. Under component 1 a nine month specialised training programme on international trade law and commercial diplomacy has been organised by PITAD for 35 government staff. More directly linked to TBT, under component 2, the programme has provided considerable assistance and training on SPS management systems, an area where TBT are particularly present and complex to deal with.

I-7.4.3

In order to strengthen the capacity of Pakistan to deal with technical standards and technical barriers to trade, the Trade Needs Assessment Study of 2012 notes that “obstacles to trade. While standards (being voluntary) and technical regulations (being compulsory) are intended to protect consumers and can create generally competitive advantages for producers, they, on the other hand, can become significant hurdles for many developing countries to increase their exports due to their difficulties meeting those.

Meeting standards requirements in Pakistan, or in international markets, requires an overall national quality infrastructure system in which standards and technical regulations, metrology, testing and laboratories, accreditation, product certification, besides sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS) for plants and animal health, represent the key components. Pakistan is in the midst of the process of establishing and operating a well-functioning quality infrastructure system and has progressed substantially in recent years, with significant support from the EU funded “Trade Related Technical Assistance” programmes I (2004 – 2007) and II (ongoing from 2009 till 2013). Existing SPS/TBT related institutions have been or continue to be supported in capacity building – technical, institutional, and human resources.”

Key achievements and remaining weaknesses include:

- Pakistan National Accreditation Council (PNAC) is internationally recognised as a national apex agency to accredit conformity assessment bodies and certification bodies.
- Pakistan Standards and Quality Control Authority (PSQCA) is the body responsible for standardization. So far Pakistan’s representation and participation in international standardization activities is not up to the requirements. An international standardization strategy is being developed, but then needs implementation for which technical, human and financial resources seem to be lacking presently.
- With significant technical assistance under TRTA I and II, but also with sizeable



investment funding from the Pakistan government, a considerable number of laboratories have been set up in Pakistan.

“Plant Health, Animal Health, and Food Safety” system in Pakistan remains a work in progress, NAPHIS (National Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service) was created in 2007 to assist in putting in place an SPS system focusing on international requirements for exports and imports of agricultural and animal products. TRTA II supported the drafting of a food safety law (NAPHIS bill) which is delayed due to institutional changes in government resulting, among other factors, from the 18<sup>th</sup> amendment. The support provided under TRTA II. The bill is assessed by the team who conducted the mid-term evaluation of TRTA II as “appropriate in formulating the responsibilities of an authority that will merge tasks now allocated to different bodies in terms of standard setting and developing systems of controls. At the same time it allows substantial delegation of tasks to other bodies at the provincial level to implement SPS systems through implementing controls. The bill also allows the commissioning of testing to independent labs, including many of the existing ones. It is clear, however, that having this authority at the national level will require effective coordination of tasks between the national and the provincial level and reporting from bodies at the provincial level to the national level.”

*Sources:*

*ADE, Needs Assessment of Trade and Trade Related Assistance for Pakistan, June 2012*

*Ecorys, Mid-Term Review TRTA II Programme Pakistan, 28/9/2012*

The support to the fisheries sector provided by the programme aims at reopening the EU market for fish from Pakistan. The support provided involved training of the Marine Fisheries Department (MFD) staff as well as of training companies' staff (10 staff of 4 companies). In addition a study tour to the EU was supported. The programme furthermore assisted with the improvement of HACCP manuals. With the support of the project MFD has developed a dossier for requalification of exports to the EU. This dossier has been submitted to DG Sanco for approval. If approved, two companies would be able to start exporting to the EU. There are two other companies that have expressed a serious interest in qualifying for exports to the EU. For most other companies the importance of the EU as a market has become less significant as they have found alternative markets, especially China.

*Source: Ecorys, Mid-term review TRTA II Programme Pakistan, 2012.*

The non-financial cooperation has been the main channel of dialogue on TBT with Pakistan. Technical sub-groups to prepare the meetings of the Joint Commission set up under the Cooperation Agreement. An example is the ban on imports of live animals imposed by Pakistan in 2001 on alleged risk of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). According to the EU the risk was unjustified and the measure not in line with the BSE standards of the World Organisation for Animal Health and constituted a technical barrier preventing imports from several EU countries. The issue has been continuously raised with the Pakistan Ministry of Commerce in the trade sub-groups meetings. The ban has been lifted by the Government of Pakistan in July 2014. It is not possible to determine the contribution of the EU to this resolution because other countries, notably the USA also had an active dialogue with the Government of Pakistan on this problem.

*Sources: MN808.*

<http://www.dawn.com/news/1093720>,

<http://tribune.com.pk/story/706306/us-requests-pakistan-to-lift-ban-on-import-of-live-animals/>

Interviews with representatives of institutions supported by the EU programmes confirm

	<p>that their capacity to conduct studies on the effects of TBT has improved, and more important, that they are doing such analysis. An example is a recent study conducted by PITAD, at the request of the Government, on the issue of granting MFN status to India. The study, which remains an internal document, involved an analysis of TBT imposed by both countries and how to suppress them. It includes an assessment of which TBTs in each country constitute the most important obstacle to trade and a view of the priorities to address in a possible negotiation.</p> <p><i>Sources: MN840, MN841, MN839</i></p>
<b>JC-7.5</b>	<p><b>As a result of EU support Pakistan investment and trade with EU and South Asia increased</b></p>
	<p>There has been no significant expansion of trade over the evaluation period. Pakistan openness has been reduced, regional integration in South Asia is among the lowest in the world and foreign direct investment has dramatically dropped. However, trade with the EU shows a specific pattern. The EU was over the whole period and remains the main export market for Pakistan. Pakistan exports to the EU consist mainly in textile products and have benefitted from the temporary (2012-2013) by the tariff concessions granted on humanitarian grounds after the floods of 2010 Support for Pakistan's access to EU market is continued under the GSP+ regime granted to the country since 2014.. Exports of fish have also increased as a result of Pakistan renewed capacity to meet the EU SPS requirements. These evolutions, confirmed by statistical data, indicate that the EU support to trade, both through the programmes that strengthened the sector and the performances of selected operators and through the concessions granted, has permitted Pakistan to develop and maintain important trade relationship with the EU.</p>
I-7.5.1	<p><b>Evolution of trade and foreign investment flows between Pakistan, the rest of the world and the EU and South Asia.</b></p> <p><i>Investment flows have dramatically dropped over the evaluation period. This is due to security issues but significantly also to the poor governance and lack of enabling environment for private sector activities. Regarding international trade: the trade openness of Pakistan has deteriorated between 2007 and 2014 and participation to the growing international division of labour (favoured by globalisation) has declined as testified by the lower share of manufacturing products in the country's total exports. In this very unfavourable context the TRTA II programme contributed to helping the Marine Fisheries Department to satisfy EU SPS requirements. It permitted the reopening by DG Sanco of the EU market and led to an important increase of fish exports to the EU. The favourable regime offered by temporary tariff concessions after the 2010 floods, and, after that, the accession of Pakistan to GSP+ regime allowed Pakistan to increase substantially its exports to the EU. So far neither GSP+ nor the TRTA programmes has resulted in a diversification of Pakistan exports. The TRTA III programme by upgrading the value chain in specific sectors is moving in that direction but due to its early stage of development and limited resources are it is not likely to generate results at a macroeconomic level.</i></p> <p>The sector context analysis in section 1 of this annex (tables 2 and 4) shows that exports have been steadily growing over the evaluation period, but the trade openness has declined and there has been a shift from trade in manufactures towards trade in basic commodities, reflecting a reduced insertion in the international division of labour.</p> <p>Total exports of Pakistan to the EU (tables 5 and 6) have been growing over the evaluation period (on average 7% per year) and the EU remained the main market absorbing more than</p>

25% of Pakistani exports. Over the same period exports to the USA declined while the Chinese market absorbed a growing share of Pakistani exports. Trade with India remains insignificant, revealing an absence of progress of regional trade integration.

Looking at a more disaggregated level of Pakistan-EU trade, table 6 shows that the most important category of exports to the EU is textile with 37% of total Pakistani exports to the EU. These exports have been fast growing since 2012 due to important tariff concessions granted by the EU after the 2010 floods. The higher level of exports of Pakistan textiles to the EU is likely to remain, although the concessions applied only until end 2013, but since 2014 Pakistan benefits from the GSP+ regime and its advantages in terms of access to the EU market.

Source: Sector context analysis in section 1 of this annex.

'For example, in the fisheries sector there has been a ban on export of fish into the EU from Pakistan, since they do not meet the food safety and HACCP requirements. It is expected that this ban will be lifted in the course of this project due to a number of improvements that have and will be made with the support of TRTA.'

*Source: TRTA II MR 15/7/2010*

'Record increase of fish exports following the opening of EU markets

After the Marine Fisheries Department (MFD) had satisfied the sanitary, hygiene and traceability requirements of FVO, DG SANCO allowed resumption of fish exports from Pakistan as of 12 March 2013. Following this the MFD has certified the shipment of 40 containers for export to the EU as of 05 September 2014. The main destinations of these exports are: Valencia Spain (3-4 containers/month) and Felixstowe, UK (2 containers/month). Over this period of 19 months the exports of fish to EU has surpassed US\$ 8 million. This is a record increase in export of fish & fishery products from Pakistan. Export earnings of US\$: 367.472 million is over and above the target fixed by Marine Fisheries Department which was US\$: 340.00 million.'

*TRTA II Progress Report April-Nov 2015*

After the natural catastrophes of 2010 the EU granted tariffs concessions to Pakistan. They concerned 75 products covering 35% of Pakistan exports to the EU. The concessions were for a limited period from 15/11/2012 to 15/12/2013. Currently a report is in preparation but not yet available. Preliminary data show an increase of 30% of exports to the EU of the products benefitting from the concessional tariffs and a total increase of 10% of Pakistan exports to the EU. It is likely that exports of Pakistan to the EU will remain at a higher level even after the concessions are ended because the products benefitting from these concessions are now benefitting from the advantages of the GSP+ regime. It is impossible assess the impact on employment and jobs in Pakistan of the increase in exports to the EU. The quality of the available trade statistics does not make it possible to verify if the increase in trade with the EU has been a distortion of trade with other countries or a trade creation.

*Source: MN808*

As the figures presented under I-7.5.2 indicate there has been a substantial increase of exports from Pakistan to the EU linked to GSP+. However, the evaluation could not obtain the corresponding figures for the total Pakistan's external trade so that it is not possible to conclude if the additional trade to the EU has been a creation of trade or a displacement.

Experts interviewed tend to consider that there has been a mixture of the two with probably more distortion than creation.

Sources: MN 808, MN840, MN839

FDI in Pakistan have dramatically declined over the evaluation period, notwithstanding the fact that Pakistan has a very liberal foreign investment regime and several assets (availability of skilled workers, natural resources, large internal market) mainly due to the security situation and the poor performance of Pakistan in terms of enabling environment for business.

*Source: Data from context note in section 1 of this annex.*

Quality of evidence: **Strong**

**Evidence from existing evaluations, studies, other documentation and interviews with stakeholders on the links between increase in investment and trade with EU and South Asia, and EU support in this area.**

*See I-7.5.1. As shown in I-7.5.2 the EU TRTA programmes have improved the management capacities and governance of Pakistan's trade related key institutions. The contribution on the evolution of the trade flows is difficult to assess with the available statistical material and requires more information from trade operators and from beneficiaries of the EU programmes. However, there are some positive indications that exports of textile products and of fish to the EU have increased as a result of the trade concessions for the textile sector and of the support that permitted Pakistan to meet the SPS requirements of DG Sanco and reopened the EU market for fish.*

The following data on the effects of GSP+ on Pakistan exports to the EU have been provided by the Ministry of Commerce:

**Sector impact of Pakistan GSP+ on Pakistan's exports:**

I-7.5.2

Sector	Pak exports to EU 2013(US\$ million)	Pak exports to EU 2014 (US\$ million)	Increase (US\$ million)	Increase (%)
<b>Total Textiles increase</b>	<b>4,312.19</b>	<b>5,330.16</b>	<b>1,017.97</b>	<b>23.61</b>
Textile Garments	1,915.96	2,501.26	585.30	30.55
Home Textiles	1,141.35	1,489.44	348.09	30.50
Towels	201.23	250.01	48.79	24.24
Cotton and intermediate goods of Textiles	1,012.13	1,046.10	33.97	3.36
Carpets and Rugs	41.51	43.34	1.83	4.40

**1. Impact of GSP Plus on exports of Footwear to EU**

Sector	Pak exports to EU 2013 (US\$ million)	Pak exports to EU 2014 (US\$ million)	Impact of GSP Plus (US\$ million)	%change increase
Footwear	77.12	99.73	22.61	29.32

**1. Impact of GSP Plus on exports of Leather to EU**

Sector	Pak exports to EU 2013 (US\$ million)	Pak exports to EU 2014 (US\$ million)	Impact of GSP Plus (US\$ million)	%change increase/decrease
Leather	573.41	628.73	55.32	9.65

**Impact of GSP Plus on exports of Intermediary goods of Leather to EU**

Sector	Pak exports to EU 2013 (US\$ million)	Pak exports to EU 2014 (US\$ million)	Impact of GSP Plus (US\$ million)	%change increase/decrease
Raw Hides and Intermediary goods of Leather	136.28	151.92	15.64	11.48

**Impact of GSP Plus on exports of articles of Leather to EU**

Sector	Pak exports to EU 2013 (US\$ million)	Pak exports to EU 2014 (US\$ million)	Impact of GSP Plus (US\$ million)	%change increase/decrease
Articles of Leather	437.13	476.81	39.68	9.08

**4. Impact of GSP Plus on exports of Plastics to EU**

Sector	Pak exports to EU 2013 (US\$ million)	Pak exports to EU 2014 (US\$ million)	Impact of GSP Plus (US\$ million)	%change increase/decrease
Plastics	44.45	77.68	33.23	74.76

*Sources: Data provided by Ministry of Commerce in November 2015.*

Quality of evidence: **Strong.**



# Annex A11 EQ8: Aid modalities

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## Acronyms

AFD	French Development Agency
AJK	Azad Jammu and Kashmir
AusAID	Australian Agency for International Development
BS	Budget Support
CA	Contractual Agent
CACL	Combating Abusive Child Labour
CAPRI	Counter terrorism Associated Prosecution Reform Initiative
CCBLE	Civilian Capacity Building for Law Enforcement
CRIS	Common RELEX Information System
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DCI	Development Cooperation Instrument
DCI-ENV	Environment and natural resources sustainable management
DCI-FOOD	Food security
DCI-NSAPVD	Non State Actors – Pays en voie de développement
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
EC	European Commission
EIDHR	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
EMIS	Education Management Information System
EU	European Union
EUD	European Union Delegation
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
GoP	Government of Pakistan
GTZ	German Technical Cooperation Agency
HQ	Headquarters
HR	Human Resources
IcSP	Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace
IFI	International Financing Institutions
IFS	Instrument for Stability
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IP3	Improving Parliamentary Performance
KP	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

KP-DGCD	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa District Governance and Community Development Programme
KP-ESPSP	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Education Sector Plan Support Programme
KP-ESRP	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Education Sector Reform Programme
LTEOOP	Long Term Election Observation and Oversight in Pakistan
MIP	Multi-annual Indicative Programme
MS	Member State
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
PEACE	Programme for Economic Advancement and Community Empowerment
PFM	Public Financial Management
PFM-SPP	Public Financial Management Support Programme for Pakistan
PRAG	Procedures and practical guide
PSD	Private Sector Development
RAHA	Sustainable rural development in the Refugee Affected and Hosting Areas of Pakistan
ROM	Results Oriented Monitoring
SEPSP	Sindh Education Plan Support Programme
SESSP	Sindh Education Sector Support Programme
TA	Technical Assistance
TRTA	Trade Related Technical Assistance
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organisation
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WB	World Bank




## **1. Overall overview of instruments and aid modalities used in Pakistan**

Four instruments (DCI-Asia, Instrument for Stability (IfS) and two thematic budget lines) have been mostly used to deliver aid in Pakistan: they comprise 95% of the total contracted amounts. Overall during the period, the geographic instrument DCI-Asia, comprising mostly bilateral programmable aid (MIP), was the largest source of funding for Pakistan (73% of the total contracted). All other sources remain relatively modest, except for the Instrument for Stability (12%), focusing on conflict prevention and strengthening of the rule of law, and the thematic DCI-Food (8%), specific to food security (see below figure).

Regarding the implementation channels, almost a third of the aid was contracted with the Government. Aid implemented by the UN (mainly UNDP and UNIDO), IFIs, EU MS and NGOs represented together 61%. Delegation agreements were used with EU MS, IFIs and the UN agencies. NGOs benefited from grants. Service contracts with private sector organisations totaled 8% (see below figure).

**Figure 1 - EU funding sources and EU implementation modalities in Pakistan over 2007-2014, €m**



(1) Including DCI-ENV (1,9 M€), DCI-HUM (1,4 M€), MIGR (0,9 M€).  
 (2) EU Member States, including UK, GIZ and AFD

Source: ADE analysis, based on EuropeAid database (Data Warehouse), April 2015. Total contracted includes all the contracts related to Pakistan over the period 2007-2014, from commitments specific to Pakistan and commitments that are not country specific

## 2. Findings per JC and Indicators: EQ8 Aid modalities

<b>EQ8</b>	<b>To what extent did the mix of aid modalities and the selection of implementing partners facilitate achievement of expected cooperation results?</b>
<b>JC-8.1</b>	<b>The rationale for adopting a modality (contribution agreement, grant contract, sector budget support) and financial instrument, and for selecting the implementing partner(s) is based on a sound analysis which duly explains why it is considered most conducive to achieving expected results</b>
<p>The selection of financial instruments and aid modalities was based on a sound analysis and generally adapted to the country context. It was primarily driven by the need to make the EU support flexible and adaptable to a context marked by a number of political, social and security challenges. It also aimed to fit the evolving structural and institutional reform process, with corresponding capacity constraints emerging at provincial level. This was especially the case for Budget Support operations. Moreover, the rationale behind the adoption of aid modalities took account of risks, and in particular of a recurrent identified risk: the lack of ownership/the absence of political will. However, mitigation measures were only sometimes satisfactory. In addition, joint efforts were made to seize opportunities to ensure a strong complementarity between financial instruments across the sectors of intervention. Finally, the continuity of support in rural development, education and trade led to gradual improvement of modalities and partners selection.</p> <p>However, BS eligibility analysis in the context of BS operations at sub-national level (provinces) was more challenging, in particular on macroeconomic policy that was a responsibility of the federal government and the PFM aspects. While PFM weaknesses were acknowledged (e.g. on credibility of the budget and absence of a PFM reform strategy at federal level and of a sound one at provincial level), eligibility was confirmed because there was a vision that the system could improve, especially in light of the strong level of qualification and motivation of the administration. Besides, one should note that the comprehensiveness and quality of the BS eligibility analysis positively evolved over the time with a progressive alignment with the EU budget support guidelines of 2007 and then 2012. Confusions arose with the formulation of the first BS programme under the ALA regulation (SEPS for the Sindh Province) where the three BS eligibility criteria were not clearly defined. Situation has been normalised with the entry into force of the DCI .</p> <p>The choice of implementing partners was generally pragmatic. It took account of the local and technical knowledge and experience of the implementing partners and of transaction costs, while ensuring adherence to procedures.</p>	
<b>I-8.1.1</b>	<p><b>Existence of analyses, shared with EU MS and possibly other donors, that the proposed modality and financial instrument are well suited to achieve intended results (including an analysis of the BS eligibility criteria)</b></p> <p>Generally, the rationale for selecting aid modalities and partners was well documented in the projects under review for this evaluation. While there is no clear evidence of shared EU MS and possibly other donor analysis, the Action Fiches of several BS programmes and projects provide the rationale behind the use of the proposed</p>

modality. They also inform on the complementarity of the EU intervention with other EU MS/donors interventions in the sector/province. Except for the pre-DCI ones, the formulation of BS programmes included the analysis of the BS eligibility criteria in line with the 2007 EU BS guidelines and the general condition related to the compliance with these eligibility criteria.

For the 21 projects under review, internal EU documents n°5 and 9 show that the implementation arrangements selected were generally judged as being appropriate (see table below). Implementation arrangements typically (i) fitted the context, (ii) were well owned, (iii) showed a clear link towards results and (iv) were coordinated with other donors.

Quality assesment of the 21 projects according to EU internal documents								
Projects	Contractor name	Type of Implementation	Quality assessment year	Quality Assessment				
				Fits the Context	Adequate Ownership	Clear Link to Results/ Outcome	Coordinated with Donors	Appropriate Implement- tation Arrangement
1. KP-DGCD	no implementing partner for this project							
2. RAHA	UNDP	CA	no quality assessment available					
3. PEACE	Sarhad Rural Support Programme	SV	2014	b	a	a	b	b
4. SEPSP	no implementing partners for these projects							
5. SESSP								
6. KP-ESRP								
7. KP-ESPSP								
8. TVET I								
<i>Delegation Agreement with GiZ to implement Capacity Building Component of TVET I</i>	GIZ	DA	2014	a	b	a	b	c
<i>Enhancing socio-economic development through investing in human capital in Punjab and Sindh</i>	Care Intl. UK	Grant	2014	a	b	a	a	a
<i>Provision of access to market-driven training and employment opportunities to vulnerable youth and women in rural districts of Southern Punjab</i>	Plan International. UK	Grant	2014	a	b	a	b	a
<i>Supporting TVET in Northern Balochistan</i>	Concern Worldwide	Grant	2014	a	b	a	b	a
<i>Improving Access, Quality and Service Delivery of the TVET Sector to Marginalised Rural Communities through Inovative Approaches</i>	ACTED	Grant	2014	a	b	a	b	a
<i>EQUATE- Enhancing Quality and Access to TVET for Employability</i>	Oxfam Novib	Grant	2014	a	b	a	b	a
<i>Supporting TVET sector for the socio-economic uplift of rural marginalized communities in Pakistan</i>	TUSDEC	Grant	2014	a	b	a	b	a
9. TVET II	GIZ	DA	2010 2014	b a	b b	a a	a b	b c
10. IP3	British council	SER	2014	a	b	b	b	b
11. LTEOOP	FAFEN	GC	no quality assessment available					
12. Support Electoral reforms in Pakistan	DRI	GC	2010	b	b	b	a	b
13. CJP Programme in KP	UNDP	CA	2014	a	a	b	a	b
14. Access to Justice in Punjab	GDSI Ltd.	SV	2014	a	a	b	a	too early to say
15. CCBLE	GIZ	SC	2010	b	b	b/c	b/c	b
16. Enhancing support for ending violence and discrimination against women	CAVISH	GC	no quality assessment available					
17. CACL-II	ILO	CA	2010	a	b	b	b	b
18. CAPRI	FCO	SC	no quality assessment available					
19. PFM-SPP	Oxford policy Management Ltd	SER	2014	b	b	b	b	b
20. TRTA II	UNIDO	CA	2010 2014	a a	a b	NA a	a c	b b
21. TRTA-PSD III	PITCO	GC	no quality assessment available					

Sources : EU internal documents n°4 and 9  
Quality assessment: a = Very Good; b = Good; c = Has problems; d = Serious deficiencies

In the specific case of the BS programme in KP (KP-DGCD), the AF notes that the “design and preparation of the proposal have been closely coordinated with UK Department for International Development (DFID) and Germany. In addition to the EU funding, DFID, under its new Sub-national Governance Programme, is expected

	<p>to support a similar output based budgeting reform programme into six more districts elsewhere in the province. Germany is supporting capacity building in public administration and revenue management at tehsil level in few districts of the Malakand division and may consider further investment in renewable energy and local infrastructure”.</p> <p>In the area of democratisation, the internal EU document n°3 calls for a rethink of Human Rights projects when it comes to modalities, as the Call For Proposals creates huge workload for very little funds. In the various projects reviewed, the choice of partners (NGOs, UNDP, Government...) and adoption of each modality was duly justified (including the level of intervention: federal, provincial, district) by the evidence (in the form of documents, minutes of coordination meetings...). Democratisation activities have been increasingly implemented through NGOs and less and less through the public sector (see also I-5.1.6).</p> <p>Towards the end of the period, the EUD stressed that the decisions on the choice of aid modalities were not sufficiently well anchored in the political economy of the respective sector and driven by a realistic assessment of level of EU leverage and results sought by the intervention. It should also more taken into account the local context where sometimes delays will not help in maintaining a good working relationship with the government partners. It then suggested to HQ to be open to the Delegation view to design a programme, as per ground realities and local context, in order to avoid implementation modalities not adapted in Pakistan political economy context. For instance, the EUD is of the opinion that Pakistan is not ready for BS in this the human rights field based on the experience of project, and that HQ should not push for it. (EU internal document n°9).</p> <p style="background-color: #fce4d6; padding: 5px;">Quality of evidence: <b>Strong</b>.</p>
	<p>Sources: EU, internal documents over the period 2008-2014 Programme level identification documents (including for BS operations).</p>
I-8.1.2	<p><b>Existence of analyses showing that complementarities between modalities/instruments have been sought</b></p> <p>The various EU internal documents during the period 2011-2014 indicate that efforts were made to ensure a strong complementarity between financial instruments across sectors. The internal document n°9 reports for instance that under the Rule of Law, a decision was made to engage DCI and the IFS /IcSP in a complementary manner to ensure a comprehensive approach to address key structural and governance issues affecting the functioning of civilian security and justice institutions as well as technical aspects related to counter terrorism. These complementarities were rather the result of opportunities than of a specific strategic approach regarding the use of instruments (MN 804).</p> <p>In the case of BS programmes, complementarities between BS financial input and TA/capacity building have been addressed in each programme as well as with other modalities such as grant allocations to CSOs (e.g. KP DGCD Programme).</p>

	<p>The KP DGCD BS programme aimed to enhance ongoing activities under several EU funded programmes for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. It particularly aimed at complementing the missing link to district administrative reforms in two EU programmes using the project modality: the Refugees Affected and Hosting Areas programme implemented by UNDP and the Programme for Economic Advancement and Community Enhancement (PEACE) implemented by the Sarhad Rural Support Programme. (Source: Action Fiche).</p> <p>In the case of the BS SESSP in the education sector for the Sindh province, the programme was sequenced in two phases. Phase I was dedicated to the TA component aiming at assisting the provincial government to finalise its education sector policy and to define the sector policy matrix/performance assessment framework -that was instrumental to assess the sector policy condition of the programme and make the Government fulfilling the sector policy eligibility criteria-. The Government finally launched its Education Sector Plan in September 2014. The capacity development under Phase 2 aimed at assisting the Sindh Government during the first year of the programme to establish, following the 18th amendment to the Constitution, a full-fledged Sindh Education sector policy, a sector development plan, a school consolidation plan, a sector based Medium Term Expenditure Framework and PFM, as well as a structured, government-led sector donor coordination. This EU TA was complementary to already available TA provided by other donors supporting the Government of Sindh Sector Education Reform Programme: WB, USAID EDLINKS, USAID and UNICEF...</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory.</b></p>
	<p>Sources: EU internal documents over the period 2007-2014 BS programmes identification documents Interviews with key stakeholders</p>
I-8.1.3	<p><b>Existence of documents, minutes of meetings... providing evidence of dialogue with the Government and partners to select a mutually agreed modality</b></p> <p>Documents consulted do not report on the dialogue held with the GoP and partners to select aid modalities.</p> <p>From 2014, it has become increasingly difficult to launch new human rights projects due to reservations made by Pakistan on the choice of implementation modalities: GoP requested to be the exclusive beneficiary and manager of governance-related actions and showed preference for budget support. (See I-6.1.8 and JC 6.2 for details)</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>Indicative but not conclusive.</b></p>
	<p>Sources: EU internal documents over the period 2008-2014 2015 report on the implementation of the 5-year engagement plan; interviews (November 2015)</p>

<p>I-8.1.4</p>	<p><b>Existence of analysis of the risks and benefits involved in the use of a particular modality/instrument at the federal, provincial, or district level</b></p> <p>At project level, risks were generally identified in project documents, along with mitigation measures. On modalities, a recurrent risk identified is the lack of ownership/the absence of political will – for which mitigation measures are only sometimes satisfactory. The EU approach was generally unclear on how modalities would help to build (rather than undermine) much-needed trust and cooperation between government (federal and provincial) and civil society (See I.1.1.4 and I-1.1.6).</p> <p>In the early period, the EU recognized the risks associated with BS in view of corruption issues and very limited implementation capacity of government staff (EU internal document n°3). The formulation of the first Education SBS in the Sindh and KP Provinces was based on an assessment of risks. Issues related to weak capacities and risks of corruption at provincial level for the two provinces including the specific fragility and security situation in KP were acknowledged and complicated the formulation process. (See JC3.2).</p> <p>A Comprehensive Risk Management Framework has been provided for the BS programmes formulated after the issuance of the 2012 EU BS guidelines. Risk analysis has been conducted for the recent BS with the RMF. The EU internal document n°9 notes that substantial or high risk payments were analysed by the Budget Support Steering Committee (BSSC). For previous programmes (also non BS), risk analysis has generally been fairly comprehensive.</p> <p style="background-color: #fce4d6; padding: 5px;">Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory.</b></p>
	<p>Sources:                  EU internal documents over the period 2008-2014                  BS programmes identification documents.</p>
<p>I-8.1.5</p>	<p><b>Existence of analyses of the risks and benefits involved in working with a particular partner</b></p> <p>In Pakistan, the EU worked with a range of implementing partners: UN, EU MS, private sector, and international &amp; local NGOs. The choice of implementing partners was based on an assessment of their local and technical knowledge and of the transaction costs, as well as on procedural adherence. (Source: interviews held in the field).</p> <p>In the trade sector, experience and procedural reasons have determined the choice of the implementing partner for the Trade Related Technical Assistance project TRTA II. The main reasons for selecting UNIDO have been its strong presence and work experience in Pakistan. Procedural reasons were also mentioned: “The 'contribution contract' between UNIDO and the EU Delegation leads to a unique implementation modality. UNIDO is the responsible implementing agency; it is not required to use PRAG and effectively operates as a Programme Management Unit. An advantage for the EU of contracting with UN agencies is that these could recruit subcontractors</p>



	<p>with their own procedures much more rapidly than could have done the EU". (TRTA II MR 15/7/2015).</p> <p>For the TVET project (DCI-ASIE/2009/021-329), the AF justifies the proposed delegation agreement with GTZ according to its substantial knowledge and experience of the TVET sector (active since 1960) and the "Learning Region" concept, its technical capacity to support the sector at federal level, its active role in donor coordination in the field of education and the fact that GTZ had a project office in Peshawar and FATA.</p> <p>In the justice sector, the project on access to justice for poor and vulnerable groups through support to legal and civil society organisations and the judiciary in Punjab (DCI ASIE 2009 19192) implemented through calls for proposal for NGOs benefited from the active role of NGOs in developing capacities in terms of enhanced access to justice and in providing direct support for legal aid and advocacy.</p> <p>In the democracy and governance sector, for the project "Citizen Justice and Peace Programme in KP" (DCI ASIE/2013/024162), the proposed joint management with UNDP was presented as an asset due to the Agency's extensive work experience with the KP authorities. Similarly, the involvement of UNDP under joint management for the implementation of the IfS Consolidation of Democracy intervention (IfS 2012/06) was explained by the agency's comparative advantage in dealing with politically sensitive issues and given its long-standing relationship with the Government of Pakistan.</p> <p>In the rural development sector, the contribution agreement with UNDP (sustainable rural development in the RAHA of Pakistan DCI ASIE/2009/021-577) derived from the Agency's strong administrative capacity and its previous involvement and responsibility in this area. The NGO SARHAD was selected as implementing agency for PEACE due to its earlier successes in piloting community driven approaches, and specifically during the implementation of the Government-funded Bacha Khan Poverty Alleviation Programme (BK-PAP) in four districts of KP. NGOs were usually considered as potential relevant implementers for assistance delivery to promote community involvement and participation and to properly involve local and provincial authorities.</p> <p>Similarly, the choice of grant contracts with the Free and Fair Election Network (FAFEN) NGO for the EU interventions under the IfS and projects on improvement of parliamentary performance (IPP) and consolidation of democracy was justified by the fact that this NGO was actively engaged on electoral reform issues and domestic election observation, well placed to undertake the advocacy activities related to the projects, experienced in parliamentary watch tools and benefited from good reputation, impartial stand and positive track record with earlier stability instrument-funded projects. (Sources: Action Fiches).</p>
	<p>Quality of evidence: <b>Strong.</b></p>
	<p>Sources: Programme level identification documents.</p>

I-8.1.6	<p><b>Existence of analysis on the availability of appropriate resources to manage the interventions, in particular at the EU Delegation</b></p> <p>The findings related to this indicator are presented under I-8.2.1 below on EU human resources.</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>Strong.</b></p>
I-8.1.7	<p><b>For the BS projects, analyses showing the compliance with the eligibility criteria of BS interventions</b></p> <p>Cf. I.8.1.1 – Analyses have been provided at the formulation stage and for each disbursement file. The comprehensiveness and quality of these analyses have evolved over the time along the specification of required analysis, template and analytical methodology in the successive EU BS guidelines and the evolution of the dialogue between the EUD and the Headquarters with regards to BS formulation and disbursement quality process.</p> <p>The third BS education follows the guidelines. The first two BS education programmes were under ALA and, as such, not concerned by the BS guidelines (MN 836).</p> <p>Interviews showed that BS eligibility analysis showed some weaknesses, in particular on PFM issues. Macroeconomic eligibility was first assessed at federal level (which raises 80% of provincial income). In terms of fiscal discipline, provinces are not heavily indebted and there are strong rules at provincial level; hence the risk of fiscal indiscipline at provincial level spilling over to federal level is rather negligible. Revenue mobilisation is a major issue, facing political blockage. Concerning PFM eligibility, it was recognized that the credibility of the budget was particularly weak both at federal and provincial levels (notably as far as allocation is concerned). At federal level, there was no PFM reform strategy in 2014, notwithstanding IMF pressure and years of DFID support. In Sindh, a PFM reform strategy was prepared with WB support, but it failed giving a proper sequencing. Eligibility was confirmed because there was a vision that the system could improve, especially with the strong level of qualification and motivation of the administration. Policy dialogue was envisaged as mitigating measure. Besides, provinces were considered as stronger vectors of change than the federal level due to the stimulation emerging from competition between provinces (MN 016, 826, 805).</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>Strong.</b></p>
	<p>Sources: BS programmes identification documents; interviews with key stakeholders Interviews</p>

<b>JC-8.2</b>	<b>The EU could adapt its organisation and/or mobilise the qualified expertise to manage the interventions in an evolving country context</b>
<p>The EUD faced severe human resources constraints, particularly until end 2012. The EUD remained under-staffed until end 2012 whilst the financial envelope for cooperation considerably increased since 2007. High turnover rendered the situation even more difficult. Besides, sectoral expertise was limited while training remained insufficient, particularly for the newly recruited contractual agents. This has negatively influenced the ability of the EUD to conduct a proper policy dialogue with national and provincial authorities, which was much needed in the context of an increasing number of BS operations. Staff shortage was partly compensated with useful back-up support provided by headquarters, especially during the formulation stage of complex BS operations. Constraints on human resources were progressively relieved, with the EUD being fully staffed end 2013 and in 2014. In addition, the EUD was able to recourse abundantly to qualified external staff.</p> <p>The EU adapted its aid modalities to fit the evolution of the country context. In response to the decentralisation and devolution process from the federal to the provincial level, the EU adopted a flexible approach, allowing BS at provincial level. Since 2011, BS has been increasingly used, reflecting the need to strengthen the financial and institutional capacities of the provincial governments and administrations. These operations allowed the EU to strengthen the capacity of the provincial governments and to establish a strategic policy dialogue on key provincial sector policies – including education and rural and community development – as well as public governments reform processes. Moreover, the EU often included capacity development interventions for provincial and district administrations and direct support to the local communities in the design of these Budget Support operations. These interventions were implemented through contribution agreements with experienced partners having comparative advantage (solid administrative capacity, substantial knowledge and experience in the country for the concerned sectors and provinces (UNDP, GTZ...)) as well as services contracts for the delivery of technical assistance (e.g. British Council in the Sindh education sector) and delegation agreements (GIZ in the KP education sector).</p> <p>Some implementing partners, in particular CSOs, lacked capacities to properly manage EU programmes. They notably experienced difficulties in complying with EU procedures and requirements.</p> <p>Monitoring and evaluation systems at project level often showed weaknesses. For the projects monitored, the performance was generally positively rated. The logframes of the projects under review generally did not include proper information to monitor results. They generally did not define a baseline or set a target value to be reached. For BS programmes, policy matrices and results frameworks constituted adequate frameworks to monitor results. About half of the projects (10 out of 21) were monitored at least one time. The situation varied across sectors, with most projects in the democracy and governance area not having been monitored. The performance of the projects that were monitored was rated as ‘good’ or ‘very good’ in most cases.</p>	

I-8.2.1

**Availability of staff in EU Delegation and HQ with capacity to conduct a policy dialogue with the government and the implementing partners in the sectors and at the level of the interventions (federal, provincial, district)**

According to several EU internal documents, and while the need of additional staff in the operation section was clearly identified by AIDCO and RELEX management in 2006, the EUD remained under-staffed until 2012 whilst the financial envelope for cooperation considerably increased since 2007. Temporary absences of staff and/or vacant official positions have made the matter more complicated. In addition, such problematic situation has sometimes coincided with periods of demanding workload and needs of remobilisation and adjustment to start up contracting due to delayed decisions such as in 2010 where the GoPK declined the reprogramming of the unspent MIP I funds towards assistance for early recovery after the 2010 floods (EU internal documents n°6 and 7). Sectoral expertise among several programme staff has been limited while training has been insufficient, particularly for the newly recruited contractual agents (CA). This has negatively influenced the ability to work on policy and strategic matters and to properly informed the required EUD policy dialogue with national and provincial authorities needed for example in the context of increasing share of BS operations in the MIP (cf. table below). The important turnover of CAs during 2011/2012 has made it difficult for Operations to realize the full potential of programmes while putting strong work pressure on the rest of the Delegation staff. Over the last two years, the situation improved with increase in staff (MN 701). OPS achieved by the end of September for the first time since the deconcentration in 2007 a full staffing. The recruitment and the introduction of the new staff have taken a substantial amount of time, in particular from the Head of Cooperation (internal document n°8). Full staffing of the Cooperation Section continued in 2014 (internal document n°9). The EUD could also have recourse to abundant qualified external staff (Interviews and internal document n°9).

Types of implementation of the MIPs 2007-2013				
Type of implementation	2011	2012	2013	2014
Budget support	18%	27%	39%	41%
Service contracts			17%	22%
Delegation agreement	15%	20%	11% (with GIZ)	3% (AFD, through the Asia Investment Facility)
Grants to mainly Pakistani NGOs	38%	32%	18%	18%
Share of funding through UN agencies	29%	23%	16%	16%

Source: EU internal documents. Note in 2013&2014: the breakdown does not include thematic funding which is uniquely done through NGOs, mostly international, even though the Delegation has been putting a strong emphasis in 2013 to increase involvement with national civil society organizations.

Despite human resources constraints, the EUD notes in 2011 that it has increased the degree in which it engages itself in the different programmes, not only to enable a close monitoring of the implementation, but also to follow up wider sectoral issues as

these emerge from a regular dialogue with the stakeholders including GoP. Being seen on the ground was considered the best way to ensure an improved understanding and also contributed to a greater visibility and association of the EU whilst “making EUD’s contributions in steering committees etc. more meaningful.” However this approach challenged the programme managers to broaden their role from just formal contract oversight to start thinking along with the programme implementation teams and play a more significant role in related policy dialogues (internal document n°6).

The EUD also acknowledges (internal document n°6) the useful strengthening of the Pakistan desk team in Brussels and the constructive back-up support of EUROPAID HQ during the identification/formation stages of complex BS programmes with in-country support missions such as in the case of the second BS Education Programme for the Sindh province. This support mission has contributed to compensate the deficit of EUD HR at that time.

With full staffing achieved during last quarter of 2013 and in 2014, the EUD notes towards the end of the period that there is adequate strength and capacity to ensure high quality and timely implementation of the cooperation programme (internal documents n°8 and 9).

Besides, the formulations of BS programmes have systematically earmarked funds for the provision of capacity building as well as expertise for monitoring and evaluation to assist the EUD in the technical and analytical monitoring of these programmes, including the comprehensive assessment of general and specific conditions (eligibility criteria assessment, monitoring of attainments of targets for the indicators attached to each BS instalment). This contracted expertise has been instrumental to support the preparation of the EUD BS disbursement dossiers for the HQ as well as informing the EUD policy dialogue.

As far as CSOs/NGOs are concerned, in the early period, the EUD recognized that many partners lack implementation capacity and do not have sufficient understanding of the EC rules and regulations, often resulting in failure to comply with contractual obligations. As a result, the Delegation staff is regularly consulted on micro issues. In addition, there often is a lack of trust between international and local NGOs, which sometimes leads to an exclusion of the local NGOs in the decision-making process. (Internal document n°1).

In 2011, the EUD notes that in the framework of project steering committees or review meetings, the Delegation interacts with a variety of civil society actors and holds discussions on priorities for the future programmes, and opportunities and challenges’. Information the EUD gets on latest developments, priorities, and needs is then used as a basis for programming and to further improve implementation of EU-Pakistan cooperation. The Delegation also ‘maintains a roster of civil society representatives that are invited to different informal meetings, thematic discussions, PR events, etc. that feed a long-term relationship between the EU and individual civil society organisations and networks. (internal document n°6).

	<p>The internal document n°9 notes that the full EIDHR CBSS 2012 allocation was awarded as one grant to a consortium of NGOs. The leader of the consortium did not have experience of managing a EU grant and requested additional assistance, which was granted in the form of a consultant expert in EU procurement and financial management processes. This was clearly extremely beneficial and the improvement in their ability to monitor and report on financial aspects was marked, while their confidence clearly also increased.’ Besides, it also notes that ‘rapid staff turnover at senior management level within the Government in general at federal and provincial level hampered the continuity of policy dialogue (chronic situation).</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>Strong.</b></p>																																			
	Sources: EU internal documents over the period 2009 – 2014; Interviews																																			
I-8.2.2	<p><b>Flexibility of the procedural arrangements with the implementing partners</b></p> <p>The evolution of modalities used during the last four years (cf. table below) shows an increasing share of the BS modality translating the need to strengthen the financial and institutional capacities of the provincial governments and administrations, particularly in the framework of the decentralization and devolution of policy and administrative responsibilities from the federal to the provincial level.</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="454 1055 1299 1417"> <thead> <tr> <th colspan="5">Types of implementation of the MIPs 2007-2013</th> </tr> <tr> <th>Type of implementation</th> <th>2011</th> <th>2012</th> <th>2013</th> <th>2014</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Budget support</td> <td>18%</td> <td>27%</td> <td>39%</td> <td>41%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Service contracts</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>17%</td> <td>22%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Delegation agreement</td> <td>15%</td> <td>20%</td> <td>11% (with GIZ)</td> <td>3% (AFD, through the Asia Investment Facility)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Grants to mainly Pakistani NGOs</td> <td>38%</td> <td>32%</td> <td>18%</td> <td>18%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Share of funding through UN agencies</td> <td>29%</td> <td>23%</td> <td>16%</td> <td>16%</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>Source: EU internal documents. Note in 2013&amp;2014: the breakdown does not include thematic funding which is uniquely done through NGOs, mostly international, even though the Delegation has been putting a strong emphasis in 2013 to increase involvement with national civil society organizations.</p> <p>At provincial level, the EU has often implemented a portfolio of programmes and projects approaches using a wide range of modalities: projects, grants to NGOs, contribution/delegation agreements, technical assistance, and budget support. This mix of modalities contributed to answer in a complementary manner specific needs at different institutional and community levels whilst taking into account the evolving political, institutional and security environment of Pakistan in specific provinces (decentralisation, crisis/security and fragility situations in KP province and the Malakand crisis....).</p> <p>The case of the €80 million Khyber Pakhtunkhwa District Governance and Community Development Programme is instructive. This programme aims at supporting the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa's budget reform process using the Sector Reform Contract modality. Out of the € 80 million EU support and the</p>	Types of implementation of the MIPs 2007-2013					Type of implementation	2011	2012	2013	2014	Budget support	18%	27%	39%	41%	Service contracts			17%	22%	Delegation agreement	15%	20%	11% (with GIZ)	3% (AFD, through the Asia Investment Facility)	Grants to mainly Pakistani NGOs	38%	32%	18%	18%	Share of funding through UN agencies	29%	23%	16%	16%
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Grants to mainly Pakistani NGOs	38%	32%	18%	18%																																
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	<p>untargeted budget support of € 64 million (to be used to support the provincial government to sustain adequate fiscal space in the district budget for community-driven rural development), this programme was complemented by: i) € 7.5 million support to involve civil society organisations to facilitate mobilisation of rural communities including preparation of quality proposals for district government financing, as well as remaining engaged in the follow-up and decision-making processes i.e. in the demand side of governance; and ii) € 8.5 million of technical cooperation aimed at supporting capacity development of the administration and reinforcement of government audit control.</p> <p>During the formulation of the programme, as the government of KP province had to respond to an unprecedented fragile situation (destruction and disruption caused by military and civil unrest resulting from the Afghan war and the 2010 monsoon floods), the Government institutions did not have the capacity and outreach to implement the social mobilization component and it was agreed that civil society organizations were better placed. The design of the BS programme has then foreseen for its complementary support a call for proposals for the implementation of the social mobilization component to award grants to civil society organizations. Informed by the Delegation's experience with Non-state Actors &amp; Local Authorities, EIDHR, and many other Calls for Proposals, the lack of own financial resources among all the indigenous competent CSOs and their incapacity to support a co-financing was well identified by the EU (the guidelines for calls for proposals encourage co-financing and take co-financing into account as an assessment criterion). The EU adopted a flexible approach with derogation on this co-financing principle and afforded to CSOs the possibility of a 100% financing.</p> <p>This mixed approach aimed to accompany and support the provincial Government of KP in its engagement to work with civil society based organizations on a large scale in the context of the adoption of the Government Community Driven Local Development policy and governance framework. This policy aimed at strengthening the involvement of local communities and widening the role of civil society in working together with Government to improve service delivery.</p> <p>Several other Financing Agreements of BS Programmes propose a mix of modalities with complementary support for capacity building and technical assistance attached to BS funds.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Quality of evidence: More than satisfactory.</b></p>
	<p>Sources:  EU, internal documents n°7, 8 and 9  KP-DGCD, project documents  Interviews</p>

**Quality and quantity of information allowing to monitor partner activities and assess results**

*(i) quantity of information to monitor partner activities and assess results*

For the projects under review, we examined the logframes and monitoring reports along the following lines:

- the logframe:
  - o was a baseline defined?
  - o was a target value defined?
  - o were values for each indicator available in the evaluation reports?
- the monitoring reports:
  - o was the project monitored?
  - o is the detailed grading grid available?
  - o is the narrative associated to each monitoring question available?

This review (see below table) shows that the logframes of the projects generally did not include proper information to monitor results. They generally did not define a baseline or set a target value to be reached. The table also shows that about half of the projects (10 out of 21) have been monitored at least one time. The situation varies across sectors, with most projects in the democracy & governance sector not having been monitored (see table and MN 018, 019, 409).

I-8.2.3

Projects	Logframe			Monitoring report		
	Baseline	Target	Value	Report	Grade	Grade explanation
KP-DGCD	N	N	N	N	N	N
RAHA	N	Y	Y	Y	Y 2012 Y 2013	Y 2012 N 2013
PEACE	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
SESPSP	Y / N (not for all the indicators)	N	Y	Y	Y	Y 2009 Y 2010 Y 2011 Y 2012
SESSP	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
KP-ESRP	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
KP-ESPSP	N	Y	N	N	N	N
TVET	8 logframes available			6 MR available (no MR for GLZ component)		
	N	N	Y (except for the project-level LF)	Y	N	N
TVET II	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
IP3	N	N	N	Y	Y	N
LTEOOP	N	N	N	N	N	N
Support Electoral reforms	N	N	Y	N	N	N
Citizens Justice in KP	N	N	N	N	N	N
Access to Justice	N	N	N	N	N	N
CCBLE	N	N	Y	N	N	N
Ending violence & discrimination	N	N	Y	N	N	N
CACL-II	N	Y	Y	Y	N 2009 Y 2010 Y 2012	N 2009 Y 2010 Y 2012
CAPRI	No logframe			Y	Y	N
PFM-SPP				N	N	N
TRTA II	N	Y	Y	Y	Y 2010 Y 2011 Y 2013	Y 2010 Y 2011 N 2013
TRTA / PSD III	N	N	N	N	N	N



During the period, the EUD conducted an increasing number of project visits. The 'percentage of visited projects during the EAMR period' is one of the key performance indicator selected by the EU. The benchmark for this indicator was set to 'at least 80%'. The period 2011-2014 presents a positive evolution, with the benchmark not met in 2011 and 2012, and then met in 2013 and 2014.

K18 % of visited projects during the EAMR period			
Year	A: Number of visited projects	B: Total number of projects	% (A/B)
2011	not available		56%
2012	not available		60%
2013	24	28	85.71%
2014	18	21	85.71%

Source: EU internal documents n°6, 7, 8 and 9. For 2012 the figure is given by the EU Delegation. Benchmark at least 80%.

*(ii) quality of information to monitor partner activities and assess results*

The performance of the projects that have been monitored during the period was rated as 'good' or 'very good' in most cases. The benchmark of 'at least 70% of ROM reports giving a very good or good performance rating' was met during the period 2010-2013.

KPI 7 ROM: performance of the projects % of the ROM reports giving a category I or II (very good or good) performance rating			
Year	A: Number of ROM reports in 2013 giving a VG or G	B: Total number of ROM reports in 2013	% (A/B)
2010	not available		100%
2011	not available		92%
2012	not available		83%
2013	10	12	83.33%

Source: EU internal documents n°6, 7 and 8. Benchmark: at least 70%

The quality of the monitoring systems varied across projects. The measurement of the results of EU support in Rural Development was generally weak (MN 801). In specific cases (CACL-II, TVET I and PEACE), the quality of the system in place to follow results was recognised:

- When the indicators are followed up, the logframe is once said to be used "as a management tool", with OVI's "appropriate and measurable" (MR CACL-II, 09/11/2009).
- "The Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) system is comprehensive and adequate to measure progress towards results." (MR TVET I – CARE, 19/07/2013)
- "Baselines studies have been established where the project is already working and the process is on-going as they move further with implementation at community and village level where a socio-economic profile is prepared. A cumulative project implementation sheet showing progress against each result is prepared and is updated quarterly for management use. This is a very strong management tool and its transparency is enhanced by the inclusion of financial expenditure." (MR PEACE, 19/07/2013)

	<p><i>(iii) Monitoring of BS programmes</i></p> <p>In the case of BS programmes, policy matrices and results frameworks were used. The performance assessment frameworks have been as much as possible aligned with the provincial sector policy allowing policy dialogue and monitoring of progress achieved on the general and specific conditions of the programme. The 2012 MR of the SEPSP indicates that ‘this framework is clear and adequate and results are reported against it’ (MR SEPSP, 10/08/2012).</p> <p>In several occasions, EU and other donors’ capacity building and TA support have contributed to develop or improve government’s policy, sector reform plan, performance monitoring framework and monitoring information system at provincial and national levels. Indicators triggering the disbursement have often consisted of process or key reform actions that could be easily tracked during meeting and policy dialogue with the concerned authorities and in progressive coordination with other donors involved in the concerned sector. Each government produced implementation reports and assessments of progress achieved on the key conditions and indicators at the time of the request for BS disbursement. On quality of public services, government sector reform process and budget performance, the EU and other donors have used information provided under the Education and Monitoring Information System (EMIS) at national and provincial levels, and the PIFRA and Department of Finance data with regards to PFM/budget planning and execution as well as policy dialogue to analyse the performance of the concerned public administration and services support by the BS programmes. Progress in Education in KP is tracked through the Independent Monitoring Unit (IMU), which is supported by DFID. IMU collects day-to-day information on various issues with 600 monitors (MN 305, MN 320).</p> <p>To monitor specific government reform actions and assess impact and results in terms of public service quality and delivery, the design of the BS programmes has also earmarked funding for required third party survey, verification and evaluation.</p> <p>While funds of BS were expected to contribute to the strengthening of institutional capacities of specific provincial administration, providing the required fiscal space, it is difficult to assess the extent to which these programmes have also contributed to improving the provincial government information system. This issue was rather implicit such as in the assessment of the eligibility criteria for the concerned sector public policies (credibility dimension) but it was not at the core of the set of conditions/objectives of the BS programmes.</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>Strong.</b></p>
	<p>Sources:</p> <p>EU internal documents over the period 2008-2014</p> <p>Financing agreements, evaluation reports and monitoring reports for the projects under review</p> <p>Financing Agreement, Action Fiche, EU BS Disbursement dossiers (eligibility criteria assessment) dossiers EU 2012 Evaluation of BS in KP.</p>

<b>JC-8.3</b>	<b>During implementation the chosen aid modalities, instruments and partners facilitated the achievement of the expected results</b>
	<p>The implementation of the cooperation programme, which was heavily slowed down in the early period due to difficult security conditions, advanced in full cruising speed from 2013 onwards. At project level, the ten monitored projects (out of the 21 projects sampled) typically show a good efficiency, with a score of 'b' for most of them. Several programmes however experienced implementation delays, mostly owing to the following reasons: security concerns, weaknesses in the institutional capacities of the governments, insufficient skills in the expertise mobilised, and inefficiencies in the internal organization of implementing partners. In order to adapt to the implementation delays of BS programmes, the EU was flexible in the assessment of conditions and performance and provided riders to adapt the operational provisions of the programmes (e.g. policy matrices).</p> <p>The achievement of intended results was facilitated when three conditions for partners selection were met: (i) knowledge of the local reality, (ii) technical capacity, and (iii) management capacity, including with respect to EU procedures. International NGOs and the private sector were the ones showing the strongest technical and management capacities. The GoP, the UN and large local NGOs proved to be strong partners when considering the knowledge of the local context.</p>
I-8.3.1	<p><b>Respect of the initial implementation agenda and/or reasons for adaptations or slippages</b></p> <p>In 2009 and 2010, difficult security conditions slowed down implementation. The EU internal document n°6 indicates that the accumulated delays in the implementation of MIP I programmes and the virtual cessation of visits to the provinces for almost 2 years because of security posed a major challenge to the startup of the belatedly approved financing agreements while at the same time the EUD was preparing the programming of MIP II. Towards the end of the period, the situation improved. The EU internal document n°8 indicates that implementation of the EU - Pakistan Cooperation Programme is advancing in full cruising speed. All funds of the MIP 2011-2013 have been programmed. The earlier backlog related to delays in contracting of the MIP 2007-2010 has now been cleared, while the contracting and start-up of all other programmes is progressing satisfactory.</p> <p>At project level, MRs show that implementation delays were encountered for 4 projects out of the 10 monitored (e.g. CACL-II, Access to Justice project, IP3, TVET I). These were often due to:</p> <p>(i) <i>Security concerns</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ CACL-II: “A slow start was caused by a substantial lead-in time for preparatory activities (identification and mobilisation of stakeholders, staff recruitment) as well as a deteriorating security environment in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. As a result, the office initially set up in Haripur was closed and Sahiwal district in the Punjab province was selected instead.” (MR CACL-II, 19/07/2010)</li> <li>▪ CACL-II: “The project has encountered a number of significant problems causing</li> </ul>

delays in its implementation. These have to do with the political and social unrest in Baluchistan and the Taliban attack on the UN in Peshawar with the result that development work ceased to be delivered in KPK, including the work associated with the project. Further delays were caused by floods in Sindh province in 2010 and 2011.”(MR CACL-II, 10/08/2012)

- Access to Justice project: until now the major problem for the project was the start of implementation of the activities was delayed due to Pakistani visa issuance problems of three international experts. The contract with the beneficiary GDI Ltd. was signed in December 2013, however due to visa issuance delays the experts were able to come to Pakistan only in September 2014. The official starting date of the project (in CRIS) was 1 March 2014. In the future this 36 months project most probably will need extension (at least 6 months) due to mentioned delay. (EU internal document n°9)

*(ii) Human resources concerns*

- IP3: “The management of human resources has been complicated, less than optimal to date, and cost-effectiveness (of both project staff recruitment and backstopping) needs to be taken into consideration. The composition of the team was marked by a number of changes, including the replacement of the team leader.” (MR IP3, 19/07/2013)
- TVET I – TUSDEC: “The delay in forming the project team has led to a lack of guidance in the implementation methodology” “Moreover, the skills of the staff in the field are insufficient at the moment to work effectively with the management of training centres to bring about cultural, methodological and organizational changes in their work with the labour market.” (MR TVET I – TUSDEC 19/07/2013)
- CACL-II: Insufficient human resources (MR CACL-II, 09/11/2009)
- Access to Justice project: the programme has been hampered by i) lack of expertise among the earlier DEVCO contracted CA team, ii) sudden departure after 6 months of newly recruited CA with RoL expertise, iv) poor consultant support, (EU internal document n°7).

*(iii) Inefficiencies in partners' internal organization*

- TVET I – ACTED & Oxfam: “Project efficiency in the first nine months has been lower than expected. The organisation of operations has taken an unacceptably long time for partners that have been in the country for several years. The delays were mainly due to the NGO's internal management procedures and lengthy recruitment of coordinators.” (MR TVET I – Oxfam, 19/07/2013 and MR TVET I – ACTED, 19/07/2013)
- TVET I – Plan: “In the first ten months a significant delay has been accumulated, mainly as a result of the long inception phase caused by administrative bottlenecks on Plan International's side, but also due to a slow implementation pace.” (MR TVET I – Plan, 16/07/2013)
- CACL-II: “an approach that is at times overly academic and insufficiently project management based, which is imposed by ILO Geneva quality assurance concerns (e.g. baseline survey).” (MR CACL-II, 09/11/2009)

	<p>BS programmes implementation was often delayed compared to the initial indicative timetable (MN 822) due to the weak institutional capacities of the governments, the volatile environment of the country and the concerned provinces or the changes in the coordination and/or involvement of the donors community at provincial level (such as the exit of the WB from the education sector in KP following the Government refusal to take loan and while the EU Programme had allocated an amount of €1.6 M to finance the multi donors trust fund managed by the World Bank). For SEPS in particular, “the programme has been implemented effectively, despite the political changes and the decline in the security situation. The implementation at district and school level is more susceptible to the erratic security situation in Pakistan.” (MR SEPS, 05/08/2011)</p> <p>The EU has responded to the situation through a flexible approach in terms of assessment of conditions and performance, policy dialogue, and provision of riders to adapt the operational provisions of the BS programmes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ extension of the period of execution of the programme,</li> <li>▪ increased of the amount of the programme (top-up) following identified additional financial needs from the government due to post crisis/recovery situation (e.g. KP province BS Education Sector Programme)</li> <li>▪ adaptation/amendment of the programme policy matrix and performance assessment criteria (e.g. alignment of the KP ERSP BS programme’s policy matrix with the one of DFID/AusAID),</li> <li>▪ change in modalities or partner for the implementation of complementary support....</li> </ul> <p style="text-align: center; background-color: #fce4d6;">Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory.</b></p>																																					
	<p>Sources: EU internal documents over the period 2008-2014 MR of projects under review</p>																																					
I-8.3.2	<p><b>Disbursement ratios</b></p> <p>At project level, the 10 monitored projects (out of the 21 projects sampled) generally present a score of ‘b’ for efficiency to date (see below table).</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="427 1547 1326 1995"> <thead> <tr style="background-color: #c00000; color: white;"> <th colspan="4">Monitoring reports – Efficiency and effectiveness</th> </tr> <tr style="background-color: #d3d3d3;"> <th>Monitored projects</th> <th>MR date</th> <th>Efficiency of implementation to date</th> <th>Effectiveness to date</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td rowspan="2">2. RAHA</td> <td>10/08/2012</td> <td>b</td> <td>b</td> </tr> <tr> <td>19/07/2013</td> <td>b</td> <td>b</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3. PEACE</td> <td>19/07/2013</td> <td>a</td> <td>a</td> </tr> <tr> <td rowspan="3">4. SEPS</td> <td>09/11/2009</td> <td>b</td> <td>a</td> </tr> <tr> <td>07/07/2010</td> <td>b</td> <td>c</td> </tr> <tr> <td>05/08/2011</td> <td>b</td> <td>b</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td>10/08/2012</td> <td>b</td> <td>c</td> </tr> <tr> <td>6. KP-ESRP</td> <td>10/08/2012</td> <td>c</td> <td>c</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Monitoring reports – Efficiency and effectiveness				Monitored projects	MR date	Efficiency of implementation to date	Effectiveness to date	2. RAHA	10/08/2012	b	b	19/07/2013	b	b	3. PEACE	19/07/2013	a	a	4. SEPS	09/11/2009	b	a	07/07/2010	b	c	05/08/2011	b	b		10/08/2012	b	c	6. KP-ESRP	10/08/2012	c	c
Monitoring reports – Efficiency and effectiveness																																						
Monitored projects	MR date	Efficiency of implementation to date	Effectiveness to date																																			
2. RAHA	10/08/2012	b	b																																			
	19/07/2013	b	b																																			
3. PEACE	19/07/2013	a	a																																			
4. SEPS	09/11/2009	b	a																																			
	07/07/2010	b	c																																			
	05/08/2011	b	b																																			
	10/08/2012	b	c																																			
6. KP-ESRP	10/08/2012	c	c																																			

8. TVET I	ACTED	19/07/2013	c	b
	CARE	19/07/2013	b	b
	Concern	19/07/2013	b	b
	Oxfam	19/07/2013	c	b
	Plan	16/07/2013	c	c
	TUSDEC	19/07/2013	c	b
9. TVET II		10/08/2012	b	b
10. IP3		19/07/2013	c	c
17. CACL-II		09/11/2009	b	b
		19/07/2010	b	c
		10/08/2012	c	b
18. CAPRI		17/02/2014	c	c
20. TRTA II		15/07/2010	b	b
		05/08/2011	b	b
		19/07/2013	b	b

MRs show absorption issues for several projects (e.g. CACL-II, CAPRI, RAHA):

- CACL-II: “In addition, by the time of the ROM mission and at 45% of the project duration only one tranche (18% of the EC commitment) had been disbursed, due to lengthy discussions between the EUD and the ILO on financial reporting procedures. The issue has now been resolved and absorption is expected to gain pace, in accordance with the implementation of project activities from now on. While the delivery of outputs is lagging behind by approximately six months, the project team is confident that the gap can now be reduced, though a short no-cost extension may have to be considered if all project activities are to be fully accomplished.” (MR CACL-II, 19/07/2010)
- CAPRI: “To date, resource absorption (KE2: 13%, STEs: 20%, incidentals: 10%) remains much lower than planned.” (MR CAPRI, 17/02/2014)
- RAHA: “By the end of May 2013, € 9,499,133 has been spent out of a total budget of € 40,735,000. The spending incurred so far relates only to the EC contribution, amounting to € 39,800,000. The project is exactly half way through whereas only 23.32% of the budget has been spent. However, main investments are expected to take place in the near future. Another financial issue is the transfer of USD 1,911,894.42 to UNHCR, without prior agreement of the EC, which still needs to be settled.” (MR RAHA, 19/07/2013)

The flexible approach to the conception of BS tranches (“floating tranche, “tranche balai”) and the period of execution of the related programmes have allowed BS programmes to be implemented in full without important level of de-commitment on BS annual instalments. For SEPSP, the 2010 MR indicates that “At present, the project is at 60% of its implementation time, with overall resource absorption at 63%. However, this is mostly due to expenditure from the international TA budget, whereas the absorption of the national TA budget is lagging behind. Only 52% of the Institutional Development (ID) budget has been spent and the Human Resources Development (HRD) budget line has been used to a limited extent.” (MR SEPSP, 07/07/2010)

	Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory.</b>
	Sources: EU internal documents over the period 2008-2014 Monitoring reports of the projects under review
I-8.3.3	<p><b>Implementation difficulties for the different types of partners, modalities, and instruments, as reported by the implementing partners, EU staff and beneficiaries</b></p> <p>See I-8.3.1 above which details the implementation difficulties encountered.</p> <p>The EU has implemented specific components of projects in several sectors (education, rural development, TVET, trade, democracy and governance/justice, electoral reform and observation process), including the IFS, with the support of UN (UNDP, UNIDO, ITC...) and other international agencies/organisations (GIZ, WIPO) through similar contribution/delegated agreements and joint management process. In addition the EU has used grants agreements and call for proposals with international, regional and local NGOs (DRI, FAFEN, SAHRAD...) actively engaged in the country and the concerned provinces and benefiting from established reputation in terms of previous or ongoing community empowerment and driven approaches, advocacy works or impartial stand for monitoring of electoral process.</p> <p>Interviews held in the field showed the following strengths and weaknesses according to the various modalities used:</p> <p><u>Contribution agreement with UN Agencies:</u>  Strong and weak points vary according to the type agency and the type of support expected from them. We can roughly distinguish two categories:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ UNDP/UNCHR (rural Development), UNIDO (Trade), (ILO TVET<sup>1</sup>): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Strong points: knowledge of the country; capacity of deployment in the field, knowledge of the subject/matter, and generally excellent contacts with the authorities.</li> <li>○ Weaknesses: work on the basis of a business model that pays more attention to the needs as expressed by the authorities/institutions they support than to those of the market/basis communities. Very poor capacity to respond to reporting and other administrative requirements of the EU (especially for UNDP, ILO)</li> </ul> </li> <li>▪ Technically specialised institutions: ICT, WIPO: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Provided excellent technical advice and support</li> <li>○ Proximity with beneficiary was important but varied: ICT was highly appreciated; WIPO technically good but the fact that they had no presence in the country prevented a more fruitful cooperation.</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p>Note: UNIDO is somewhere in between the two categories because it has the weaknesses of the first one, but the technical strengths of the second.</p>

<sup>1</sup> ILO interesting for it was first envisaged to be the implementation agency for the TVET programme but their proposals were so weak that the EU chose GIZ instead.

Delegation agreement with MS agencies

## Case of GIZ in Education and TVET:

- Was a relatively obvious choice in the sense that they were very actively involved in the sector with abundant resources and had an historical relationship with the government.
- Strong points: very systemic and comprehensive approach.
- Weaknesses: some rigidity to adapt to external suggestions.

Grant contracts with NGOs:

- Large national NGOs (like AKRSP, Sarhad RSP, +possibly some working in HD/democracy sectors):
  - Strengths: excellent presence and knowledge of the ground; the NGOs from the RSP network have developed a model of social mobilisation and local empowerment which seems quite effective because it enables appropriation and sustainability.
  - Weak point: less familiar with EU procedures, etc.
- International NGOs:
  - Strengths: familiarity with EU procedure and good technical expertise;
  - Weaknesses: no particular knowledge of the field, not always appreciated by government

BS

It was relevant (and unavoidable) to use this instrument at provincial level. It is important to complete with capacity strengthening TA, both at provincial/district and federal levels.

- Strengths: the most appropriate modality to support a policy.
- Main difficulties: the partner lacks familiarity with the instrument (in particular when it does not spend the BS resources before having received them). It also requires very important resources on the Delegation side, to conduct policy dialogue in particular.

Projects

Were useful for TA, in particular in complement of BS

The achievement of intended results was facilitated when three conditions for partners selection were met: (i) knowledge of the local reality, (ii) technical capacity, and (iii) management capacity, including with respect to EU procedures. International NGOs and the private sector were the ones showing the strongest technical and management capacities. The GoP, the UN and large local NGOs proved to be strong partners when considering the knowledge of the local context.

In addition, the documentary review shows that in the cases of TVET I and CACL-II the EU and ILO experienced tensions on contractual negotiations and on reporting procedures in the early period.

- TVET I - The contracting process of TVET (DCI-ASIE/2008/019-952) was abrogated in 2010 partly because of dispute with ILO as the main implementing



	<p>partner and subsequently because it was considered to re-programme the entire decision as part of the proposed flood response programme. The later was rejected in Jan 2011, which necessitated a redesign of the programme changing to GIZ as implementing partner and substantially increasing the budget for NGO led initiatives. The request for a rider was submitted 19 September 2011 to HQ, for which a final approval was expected by March this year. (EU internal document n°6)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ CACL-II - On contracting level, the protracted negotiations with ILO (Child Labour II-Decision 17640-€5M) on overhead costs in the budget, further delayed by changes of staff in ILO, and the necessity to modify the COM Decision as regards the implementation date have caused the postponement of this Contribution Agreement into 2008. This is the major deviating element, as the contract level would have reached almost 97% if realised in 2007. (EU internal document n°1). The Child Labour II project is now gradually making progress. [...] The capacity of ILO to deliver quality reports is questionable, though results on the policy level are positive, but hampered by bureaucracy. (EU internal document n°5). “As a lesson learnt, EC-UN co-operation requires a full agreement on financial contributions and reporting procedures prior to the launch of joint EC funded interventions.” (MR CACL-II, 19/07/2010)</li> </ul> <p style="background-color: #fce4d6; padding: 5px;">Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory.</b></p>
	<p>Sources:  EU internal documents  Programme level documents (in particular monitoring reports)  Interviews</p>



## Annex A12 EQ9: Visibility

### Acronyms

AKRSP	Aga Khan Rural Support Programme
CACL	Combating Abusive Child Labour
CAPRI	Counter terrorism Associated Prosecution Reform Initiative
CCBLE	Civilian Capacity Building for Law Enforcement
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CRIS	Common RELEX Information System
CSP	Country Strategy Paper
DFID	Department for International Development
DRI	Democracy Reporting International
EC	European Commission
EOM	Election Observation Mission
EU	European Union
EUD	European Union Delegation
FAFEN	Free and Fair Elections Network
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
GIZ	German Agency for International Cooperation
GSP	General System of Preferences
HoD	Head of Department
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IP3	Improving Parliamentary Performance
KP	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
KP-DGCD	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa District Governance and Community Development Programme
KP-ESPSP	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Education Sector Plan Support Programme
LTEOOP	Long Term Election Observation and Oversight in Pakistan
MIP	Multi-annual Indicative Programme
MN	Meeting Notes
MS	Member State
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OPM	Oxford Policy Management
PEACE	Programme for Economic Advancement and Community Empowerment
PFM-SPP	Public Financial Management Support Programme for Pakistan
PIO	Press and Information Officer
RAHA	Sustainable rural development in the Refugee Affected and Hosting Areas of Pakistan

RSU	Reform Support Unit
SEPSP	Sindh Education Plan Support Programme
SESSP	Sindh Education Sector Support Programme
TA	Technical Assistance
TRTA	Trade Related Technical Assistance
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organisation
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
USA	United States of America
WB	World Bank

## Findings per JC and Indicators: EQ9 Visibility

<b>EQ9</b>	<b>What has been the visibility and perception of the EU in its pursuit of development cooperation objectives?</b>
<b>JC-9.1</b>	<b>EU cooperation has been visible to key stakeholders in Pakistan</b>
	<p>The EU Delegation paid attention to visibility issues throughout the period. Attempts to formulate a specific communication strategy for promoting EU activities in Pakistan were made in 2008 and 2013, but they did not materialize with the formal adoption of such a strategy. As a part of these efforts, the EU identified at times the audiences to be targeted, but this was not systematic and there was no shared view on the stakeholders to be targeted, which spanned a wide variety of actors (media representatives, civil society organisations, business representatives, government officials, development partners, the population at large, EU taxpayers, etc.). Similarly, at project level, generic contractual clauses on visibility as well as budget provisions to finance visibility actions were generally foreseen.</p> <p>The EUD implemented visibility actions, in particular to disseminate information on its projects. These generally included conferences, launch events, web sites, press releases, brochures, newsletters, and other promotional materials. In terms of communication channels, the EUD actively used the Facebook, Twitter and official EUD webpages. But visibility actions implemented remained below expectations due to a combination of factors: limited human and financial resources, limited staff capacity and attention given to visibility, and the security situation posing difficulties.</p> <p>Some documentary evidence shows that the overall EU visibility, which was rather low in the early period, increased during the period. At project level, the lack of well-defined indicators was a challenge to assess the effects of the actions implemented on EU visibility. Some projects gave high visibility to the EU (e.g. EU EOM in 2007) though this was not linked to the implementation of specific visibility actions. For projects implemented through international organizations, EU visibility remained relatively low. The awareness of IOs of EU guidelines on visibility and reporting was uneven across partners throughout the period. EU MS (and in particular the UK and Germany) -who had more (financial and human) resources than the EU to lead visibility actions- promoted bilateral visibility before EU's one.</p>
I-9.1.1	<p><b>Existence of a sound overall EU visibility strategy</b></p> <p>The EU developed overall guidelines to enhance its visibility, namely the 'EU Visibility Guidelines for external actions' (September 2005) and its updated version, the 'Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Actions' (2010). The 2005 visibility guidelines specify that it is important to 'ensure that projects that are wholly or partially funded by the EU visibly acknowledge the support of the EU'. The 2010 manual sets out guidance and requirements regarding communication and visibility actions to raise the awareness of the audiences on 'the reasons for the action' and the 'results and the impact' of EU support. It encourages contractors and implementing partners to develop a communication and visibility plan 'that will highlight in a dynamic way the impact of the EU support'. It includes a template to develop a general communication strategy. It further recommends that all communication and visibility activities shall 'be carried out in close cooperation with the appropriate Delegation of the European Union or the relevant department of the European Commission'.</p>

<p>The EU Delegation to Pakistan paid attention to visibility issues, and in particular to develop a communication strategy. But this never led to the adoption of a specific communication strategy for EU activities in Pakistan.</p> <p>The EUD financed in 2008 a study ('Visibility - Study on the image of and the level of awareness, perception, knowledge, and attitude towards EC activities in Pakistan') that presents an assessment of the current the situation as regards EU communication and visibility in the country and an outline for a visibility strategy. The proposed strategy aims 'to improve – expand and deepen – the relations between the European Union and Pakistan'. Its specific objectives are:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. To promote the European Union as an important political partner to Pakistan</li> <li>2. To promote the EC Delegation to Pakistan as an important partner to its stakeholders in development and economic cooperation</li> <li>3. To improve and develop the Communication Tools and Procedures, used by the EC-Delegation to Pakistan</li> <li>4. To outline possible projects contributing to higher visibility of the EC in Pakistan and the South Asian region in line with the CFSP priorities of the European Union.</li> </ol> <p>This strategy was never formally adopted.</p> <p>In 2013, the EUD undertook a stock-taking and forward-looking visibility exercise within the framework of the preparation of the 2013 EU Delegation's Information &amp; Communication Annual Report. It defined its communication objectives for 2014 with a view to 'increase awareness about the EU in general' (see below table).</p>
<p><b>Overall objectives</b></p> <p><i>Increase level of general knowledge about EU amongst the target audience</i></p> <p><i>Increase visibility of EU as a separate political entity in Pakistan</i></p> <p><i>Publicise political events taking place in bilateral forum (visits, meetings)</i></p> <p><i>Promote the European Union as an important political partner to Pakistan</i></p> <p><i>Increase visibility of specific trade ties between EU and Pakistan</i></p>
<p><b>Specific objective 1</b></p> <p><i>Use the goodwill generated by GSP+ to enhance EU's image and visibility in Pakistan</i></p> <p>GSP+ has created an unprecedented media attention for the EU. The Delegation will work to maintain and to capitalize on this, by ensuring a steady flow of information on implementation of the scheme and its benefits for Pakistan's economy and human rights.</p>
<p><b>Specific objective 2</b></p> <p><i>Enhance the visibility of EU cooperation activities by better communication of results.</i></p> <p>Media training will be carried out for project managers and a communication focal point will be appointed in the operations section. The PIO will regularly meet with project managers to identify communication opportunities and define goals.</p>
<p><b>Specific objective 3</b></p> <p><i>Increase the use of the internet and social media to communicate about the EU in Pakistan.</i></p>

<p>This will include further efforts to improve user-friendliness of the Delegation website and enhance the use of the Delegation twitter account to communicate positions and events. The Delegation will also during 2014 establish a Facebook page.</p>
<p><b>Specific objective 4</b>  <i>Enhance the use of cultural cooperation with member states as a communication tool.</i></p>
<p>An informal working group for cultural cooperation and coordination has been established with EU Member States in 2013. This will also take initiative for joint cultural promotion activities. A first event will be an EU Film Festival to be held in the second half of 2014.</p>
<p>The report also includes the following communication and visibility activities foreseen for 2014: media (e.g. press breakfasts/lunches/dinners), events (e.g. Europe Day) and diffusion of project-related information through specific websites.  <i>Source: EU Delegation's Information &amp; Communication Annual Report (2013)</i></p> <p>EUD staff interviewed in the field indicated that a communication strategy was a necessity to improve EU's visibility, in particular to explain the purposes of the projects and share their objectives with the stakeholders. A new strategy should be implemented during the year 2016 for promoting the communication actions of most projects and the visibility of the EU in Pakistan. To that effect, a major media company, with experience in structuring and monitoring the media, should be selected through tender and then contracted (MN 602, 603, 606, 609).</p> <p><i>Sources:</i>  <i>"Particip for the EU, Visibility - Study on the image of and the level of awareness, perception, knowledge, and attitude towards EC activities in Pakistan" (2008)</i>  <i>"EU, Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Actions" (2010)</i>  <i>"EU Delegation's Information &amp; Communication Annual Report" (2013) &amp; "Forward Planning" (2013)</i>  <i>Interviews: MN602, MN606, MN606, MN60906</i></p>
<p>Quality of evidence: <b>Strong.</b></p>

I-9.1.2

**Design and set-up of clear and effective EU communication strategies targeting key stakeholders in Pakistan (notably within Government and Civil Society)**  
**Identification of key target groups**

The 2010 EU *Visibility Manual* indicates that ‘target audiences should be clearly identified in communication and visibility plans’ in order to communicate effectively. In the case of Pakistan, some efforts were made to identify targeted audiences in general-level documents (e.g. 2008 visibility study) but this was not systematic. Besides there was no shared view on the key groups to be targeted.

There was no systematic or common definition of the key stakeholders to be targeted in the EU documentation. The EU *Visibility study* (2008) identifies six main groups as the EU main stakeholders and opinion makers (media representatives, civil society organisations, business representatives, education sector representatives, public sector representatives and politicians) while the 2013 Annual Report identifies four main groups (government officials, the business community, civil society and the population at large, and the media).

Moreover, there was no shared view across people met during the field mission on the audiences to be targeted, which span a wide variety of actors: actors based in the provinces (communities, civil societies, and organisations), development partners (donors, NGOs, INGOs), think tanks, private companies, religious organisations, a broader range of Pakistani stakeholders (political intelligentsia, population, local population/broad Pakistani society) and EU taxpayers (MN 602, 603).

In 2013, the actions led by the EUD targeted the following audience:

TYPE OF ACTIVITY	TARGET AUDIENCE
Media	Electronic and Print media through which the info is automatically transferred to the masses, government officials and representatives of national and international organisations
Trade Event	Media, Businessmen, Members of Chamber of Commerce & Industry, Diplomats, Business School alumni, Pakistan Business Council and other business bodies
Europe Day	General public, Stakeholders, Diplomats and Government officials
Sakharov Prize award ceremony	Members of Parliament, Students, Media Representatives, Stakeholders, Diplomats and Government officials
Information Products	General public including Diplomats and Government officials, media, development partners and the business community
Social media accounts used	General Public

*Source: EU Delegation’s Information & Communication Annual Report (2013)*

*Sources:*

*“Particip for the EU, Visibility - Study on the image of and the level of awareness, perception, knowledge, and attitude towards EC activities in Pakistan” (2008)*



	<p>“EU Delegation’s Information &amp; Communication Annual Report” (2013)                  “EU Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Actions” (2010)                  Interviews: MN602, MN603</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory.</b></p>																					
<p>I-9.1.3</p>	<p><b>Types of action and magnitude of resources envisaged for ensuring visibility in Pakistan</b></p> <p><b>1. Overall visibility actions and magnitude of resources</b></p> <p>The EUD in Pakistan has a specific budget line devoted to information activities. In 2013, the budget foreseen for this budget line equalled €41,509 (<i>EU Delegation’s Information &amp; Communication Annual Report, 2013</i>).</p> <p>The EUD also funded three specific projects relating to visibility for a total (contracted) amount of €645,340 (one is due to end at the beginning of 2016).</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="284 945 1426 1317"> <thead> <tr> <th>Contracted</th> <th>Paid</th> <th>Date</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td colspan="3">Visibility - Study on the image of and the level of awareness, perception, knowledge, and attitude towards EC activities in Pakistan</td> </tr> <tr> <td>168,017</td> <td>168,017</td> <td>01/2008 – 04/2008</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="3">Framework Contract to improve Visibility for EU Support to the TVET Sector in Pakistan</td> </tr> <tr> <td>177,323</td> <td>172,943</td> <td>03/2013 – 03/2015</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="3">Improving Communication and Visibility of EU Cooperation in Pakistan Rural Development and Nutrition (contract 332-051)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>300,000</td> <td>90,000</td> <td>01/2014 – 01/2016</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p><i>Source: ADE, Inventory based on CRIS extractions</i></p> <p>Different channels were used to disseminate information about the EU Delegation activities, events and positions of the Ambassador and its staff: the EU Delegation’s Facebook page (which is an institutional page allowing to better track statistics related to the followers) and Twitter account (created in May 2013), together with the webpage of the EU Delegation in Pakistan. Facebook and Twitter accounts are considered to be active and well followed, notably due to daily actions to post and feed in stories. (MN 603, 606).</p> <p>Overall, visibility actions implemented have been below expectations due to a combination of factors: limited human and financial resources, limited staff capacity and attention given to visibility, and the security situation posing difficulties.</p> <p><b>a. Human resources issues</b></p> <p><b>Number and capacity:</b></p> <p>Both dedicated staff for communication and other EUD staff devoted time to information</p>	Contracted	Paid	Date	Visibility - Study on the image of and the level of awareness, perception, knowledge, and attitude towards EC activities in Pakistan			168,017	168,017	01/2008 – 04/2008	Framework Contract to improve Visibility for EU Support to the TVET Sector in Pakistan			177,323	172,943	03/2013 – 03/2015	Improving Communication and Visibility of EU Cooperation in Pakistan Rural Development and Nutrition (contract 332-051)			300,000	90,000	01/2014 – 01/2016
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work.

The EUD has had a Press and Information Officer (PIO) in charge of the overall communication and visibility actions throughout the period. Visibility was affected by the poor performance of the person in post from 2007 until August 2009 (*EU internal document n°1*). Besides, the P&I officer, which is also acting as a Public Relations officer, focuses more on the political side. Hence the EUD lacked a dedicated person to visibility issues. The EUD recognized that 'it continues to be difficult for one PIO to deal with all the Delegation's communication, press coverage and visibility'. (*EU Delegation's Information & Communication Annual Report, 2013*). A professional communication consultant was contracted for two years (starting in 2013) by the rural development section in order to enhance EU's visibility. The consultant also provided media training on lessons learned to project managers and some projects partners (MN 602, 603). A part-time communication officer was also appointed in April 2015 as a focal point in the operations sections of the EU Delegation. Part of his duty consists in collecting all the information on the different operational projects and sharing it with the P&I officer for media visibility. This improved the human resources situation (MN 602, 603, 606).

Project managers also dealt with visibility in their daily work. They fed the Facebook, Twitter and official EUD webpages and are responsible to make sure that actions are visible. EU internal documents show improvements regarding the update of project/programme information on the Delegation website, from once a year (EU internal document n°6) to at least monthly (EU internal document n°7). But attention given to visibility varied across project managers (MN 602, 603, 606). Besides, even though 'project managers have been sensitised to the importance of EC visibility of aid delivery' (EU internal document n°4), the EUD recognizes 'they should receive media training to realise the importance of communication and visibility aspects of their work.' (*EU Delegation's Information & Communication Annual Report, 2013*). Towards the end of the period, project managers showed limited attention to communication. They are supposed to prepare yearly planning for projects communication activities, but 'so far this has been lacking'. (*EU Delegation's Information & Communication Annual Report, 2013*).

Finally, the Head of Delegation, the Heads of Section and the secretaries devoted between 10% and 30% of their time to information work. (*EU Delegation's Information & Communication Annual Report, 2013*).

***Institutional aspects:***

Visibility opportunities were lost due to institutional aspects. With local staff and contract agents not being authorized to give feedback to the press, 'opportunities for visibility are frequently lost.' (*EU Delegation's Information & Communication Annual Report, 2013*). Moreover, the HoD is the one to speak on behalf of the EUD, which prevents task managers from representing the EUD at federal levels. This reduces the chances for seizing visibility opportunities (MN 603, 606, 609).

**b. Financial issues:**

Throughout the period, the EUD had restricted budget, which prevented it from increasing EU's visibility. With the existing financial and human resources, not to mention the security

situation, the EUD was not able to implement the recommendations of the 2008 visibility study. (EU internal document n°3). The main concern is the financial one: resources are said to be limited, leading to less ambitious actions than expected. (EU internal documents)

### c. Security situation

Visibility actions were frequently reduced or cancelled due to the security situation:

- 2007: As described in internal document n°2, the deteriorating security situation, particularly during the second semester 2007, further hampered the Delegation staff in conducting all the envisaged monitoring missions, visibility activities and other consultative missions.  
A number of planned press and information activities could not be undertaken due to the security concerns, as well as for some projects visibility had to be reduced (e.g. removal of stickers, flags etc.).
- 2008: The Delegation has not been able to increase visibility activities in Pakistan due to the continuously deteriorating security situation in the country. (EU internal document n°3)
- 2009: Visibility (particularly EC's) has been reduced to avoid threats or attacks. Without an urgent and proper solution, the Delegation might find itself in a position where scaling down of staff in the country remains the only alternative. (EU internal document n°4)
- 2010: "Too much visibility could create security concerns". (*Democracy Reporting International, Interim narrative report (Dec 2009 – Aug 2010) for the "Support Electoral reforms in Pakistan" project*)
- 2013: "The security situation also continues to pose difficulties by preventing field visits for journalists." (*EU Delegation's Information & Communication Annual Report, 2013*)
- 2013: "For security reasons and to keep a low profile, the project management decided not to include the EU logo on either the office banner or the project letterhead." (*ROM 9/07/2013 of the project "Supporting TVET sector for the socio-economic uplift of rural marginalised communities in Pakistan" from TVET I, implemented by the NGO TUDESC*)
- Interviews held during the field mission showed that a case-by-case assessment on the ongoing situation was made before undertaking any visit. Generally, visibility actions have been reduced outside big cities and in sensitive regions.
- "For security reasons and to keep a low profile, the project management decided not to include the EU logo on either the office banner or the project letterhead."
- There was no overall strategy to compensate for the visibility actions that did not take place. (MN 602, 603, 606).

## 2. Visibility budget for the 21 projects (Source: Budget annexe of the financing agreements)

The team reviewed the financing and contribution agreements of the 21 projects studied in depth to evaluate the funding and resources allocated to visibility. Most of the projects reviewed included a budget for visibility issues, comprised between 0,2% and 4% of the total budget of the project. The financial contribution envisaged for visibility was not justified in the financing agreements reviewed. These actions generally included: conferences/workshops/information sessions, launch events, web sites, press releases,

brochures and posters, newsletters, use of specific media (e.g. TV, radio) and other promotional materials.

Besides, EU internal documents show improvements regarding the % of projects having a communication plan: 7% in 2012; 64.3% in 2013; 71.4% in 2014 (EU internal documents n°7, 8 and 9).

#### a. Rural development (€)

Main types of actions envisaged at design stage generally included for the rural development sector:

- Promotional material (banners, calendars...) (RAHA, PEACE)
- Workshops and documentaries (RAHA)
- Websites (RAHA, PEACE)
- Facebook page/newsletters (PEACE)

Projects	Part of the budget dedicated to visibility	Total EU contribution to the project/the component	Ratio
1. KP-DGCD	250 000	80 000 000	0.3%
2. RAHA			
<i>Contribution agreement with UNDP</i>	100 000	40 735 000	0.2%
3. PEACE			
<i>Grant contract with SARHAD</i>	not available	40 000 000	

#### b. Education and TVET (€)

Projects	Part of the budget dedicated to visibility	Total EU contribution to the project/the component	Ratio
4. SEPPSP	not available	39 000 000	
5. SESSP	not available	30 000 000	
6. KP-ESRP	not available	35 000 000	
7. KP-ESPSP	200 000	40 000 000	0.5%
8. TVET I	300 000	20 000 000	1.5%
<i>Comp. 1: Delegation agreement with GIZ</i>	146 160	3 933 973	3.7%
<i>Comp.2: Grant contract with ACTED</i>	8 272	3 046 494	0.3%
<i>Comp.2: Grant contract with CARE</i>	34 917	2 702 468	1.3%
<i>Comp.2: Grant contract with Concern</i>	7 544	1 700 000	0.4%
<i>Comp.2: Grant contract with Oxfam</i>	18 925	3 120 397	0.6%
<i>Comp.2: Grant contract with Plan</i>	4 343	2 484 726	0.2%
<i>Comp.2: Grant contract with TUSDEC</i>	69 254	3 934 072	1.8%
9. TVET II			

<i>Delegation agreement with GIZ</i>	500 000	26 000 000	1.2%
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Note: For TVET II, the overall budget for the programme is €43,000,000 (EC: €26,000,000; GIZ: €2,000,000; RNE: €15,000,000; GoP: €1,919,401). GIZ is in charge of visibility; the €500,000 covers the "TVET Reform Communication Strategy" for the whole project. The visibility ratio is calculated on the total amount: 500,000/43,000,000.

### c. Democratisation and human rights/rule of law

Projects	Part of the budget dedicated to visibility	Total EU contribution to the project/the component	Ratio
10. IP3	20 000	7 000 000	0.3%
<i>Service contract with BCRC</i>	not available	4 750 450	
11. LTEOOP			
<i>Grant contract with FAFEN</i>	19 650	2 507 035	0.8%
12. Support Electoral reforms in Pakistan			
<i>Grant contract with DRI</i>	60 000	2 387 721	2.5%
13. CJP Programme in KP	150 000	14 000 000	
<i>Contribution agreement with UNDP</i>	180 000	9 500 000	1.9%
14. Access to Justice in Punjab	50 000	8 000 000	0.6%
<i>Service contract with GDSI</i>	not available	7 524 500	
15. CCBLE	not available	15 000 000	
<i>Service contract with GIZ</i>	not available	11 500 000	
<i>Contribution agreement with UNOPS</i>	not available	3 500 000	
16. Enhancing support for ending violence and discrimination against women		165 678	
<i>Grant contract with CAVISII</i>	7 200	207 098	3.5%
17. CACL-II (Budget = EC + ILO)	35 410	5 197 900	0.7%
18. CAPRI			
<i>Service contract with FCO</i>	not available	1 800 000	

#### Notes:

For project 11 "Long Term Election Observation and Oversight in Pakistan" the visibility budget refers to a "Manager Communication and Public Outreach" who "will be responsible for managing a team of relevant staff to enhance the visibility of the project, build relationships with relevant stakeholders, liaise with election authorities and disseminate observation findings using all available media." No specific reference is made to the cost of the "relevant staff" or to the expenses forecast for the visibility activities.

For project 16, Enhancing support for ending violence and discrimination against women, the EU gives 80% of the total amount.

For item 17, CACL-II, the Budget is attributable to the EC and ILO (via a contribution agreement); ILO's total contribution is €447,900, the EC's €4,750,000; the €35,410 amount

is the "Communication and Information" budget for the whole project.

#### d. PFM and Trade

Projects	Part of the budget dedicated to visibility	Total EU contribution to the project/the component	Ratio
19. PFM-SPP	400 000	15 000 000	2.7%
20. TRTA II		11 545 000	
<i>Contribution agreement with UNIDO</i>	212 230	8 895 000	2.4%
21. TRTA-PSD III	190 000	4 500 000	4.2%
<i>Grant contract with PITCO</i>	16 000	2 220 778	0.7%
<i>Grant contract with AKRSP</i>	11 512	2 159 510	0.5%

Note: For project 20, TRTA II, UNIDO -who is the implementing partner- provides €500,000. The ratio applies only to the UNIDO contribution.

#### Sources:

“EU, *Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Actions*” (2010)

“*Particip for the EU, Visibility - Study on the image of and the level of awareness, perception, knowledge, and attitude towards EC activities in Pakistan*” (2008)

“*EU Delegation’s Information & Communication Annual Report*” (2013)

*Projects documents (Financing agreements and annexes)*

*EU internal documents n°2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9.*

*Interviews: MN602, MN603, MN606, MN609*

Quality of evidence: **More than satisfactory.**

I-9.1.4

#### Inclusion of visibility clauses in EU-funded project/programme contracts

##### Contractual clauses for the 21 projects

All 21 projects include a generic contractual clause on visibility in the contracts or in the agreement with the implementing partner. This clause takes the following form: (i) ‘every project/programme financed by the EU shall be subject to the appropriate communication and information measures. Unless otherwise agreed, the Beneficiary shall take the necessary measures to ensure the visibility of the EU funding for the project/programme. These measures shall be defined under the responsibility of the Beneficiary with the approval of the Commission’; and (ii) ‘These communication and information measures shall follow the rules in the Communications and Visibility Manual for EU External Actions laid down and published by the Commission, in force at the time of the measures.’

#### a. Rural development

Projects	FA - Annex I General conditions	FA - Annex 2 TAPs	Contract with IO - Annex 1 DoA	Contract with IO - Annex 2 General conditions
1. KP-DGCD	X	X		
2. RAHA	X	X		
<i>Contribution agreement with UNDP</i>			X	X
3. PEACE				
<i>Grant contract with SARHAD</i>			X	X

**b. Education and TVET**

Projects	FA - Annex I General conditions	FA - Annex 2 TAPs	Contract with IO - Annex 1 DoA	Contract with IO - Annex 2 General conditions
4. SEPSp	X	X		
5. SESSP	X			
6. KP-ESRP	X	X		
7. KP-ESPSP	X	X		
8. TVET I	X	X		
<i>Comp. 1: Delegation agreement with GIZ</i>			X	X
<i>Comp.2: Grant contract with ACTED</i>				X
<i>Comp.2: Grant contract with CARE</i>				X
<i>Comp.2: Grant contract with Concern</i>				X
<i>Comp.2: Grant contract with Oxfam</i>				X
<i>Comp.2: Grant contract with Plan</i>				X
<i>Comp.2: Grant contract with TUSDEC</i>				X
9. TVET II	X	X	X	
<i>Delegation agreement with GIZ</i>			X	

**c. Democratisation and human rights/rule of law**

Projects	FA - Annex I General conditions	FA - Annex 2 TAPs	Contract with IO - Annex 1 DoA	Contract with IO - Annex 2 General conditions
10. IP3	X	X		
<i>Service contract with BCRC</i>				Annex 3
11. LTEOOP				
<i>Grant contract with FAFEN</i>			X	X
12. Support Electoral reforms in Pakistan				
<i>Grant contract with DRI</i>				X
13. CJP Programme in KP	X	X		
<i>Contribution agreement with UNDP</i>				
14. Access to Justice in Punjab	X	X		
<i>Service contract with GDSI</i>			X	Annex3
15. CCBLE				
<i>Service contract with GIZ</i>			X	
<i>Contribution agreement with UNOPS</i>				
16. Enhancing support for ending violence and discrimination against women				
<i>Grant contract with CAVISH</i>				X
17. CACL-II	X	X		
<i>Contribution agreement with ILO</i>			X	
18. CAPRI				
<i>Service contract with FCO</i>			X	

For projects 10, “Improving Parliamentary Performance” and 14, “Access to Justice in Punjab”, information concerning the service contract is available in Annex 3 – Organisation & Methodology.

#### d. PFM and Trade

Projects	FA - Annex I General conditions	FA - Annex 2 TAPs	Contract with IO - Annex 1 DoA	Contract with IO - Annex 2 General conditions
19. PFM-SPP	X	X		
<i>Service contract with OPM</i>			X	
20. TRTA II	X	X		
<i>Contribution agreement with UNIDO</i>			X	X
21. TRTA-PSD III		X		
<i>Grant contract with PITCO</i>				X
<i>Grant contract with AKRSP</i>			X	

Sources:

“EU, Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Actions” (2010)



	<p>“Particip for the EU, Visibility - Study on the image of and the level of awareness, perception, knowledge, and attitude towards EC activities in Pakistan” (2008)  EU EU internal documents n°3 and 4  Projects documents (Financing agreements and annexes)</p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>Strong.</b></p>
I-9.1.5	<p><b>Agreements/actions with other donors, notably EU MS, with a view to favouring EU visibility</b></p> <p>A substantial proportion of EU projects has been implemented through international organizations. The terms and conditions of EU/UN or EU/WB cooperation are set in specific framework agreements, which include provisions for visibility. These agreements indicate that visibility activities should reflect the multi-party nature of multi-donor agreements, even as they highlight partnership with the EC. In the early evaluation period, EU visibility in projects implemented through international organisations was generally low (<i>Visibility study, 2008</i>). Towards the end of the period, the EUD noted that in the projects funded by the EU (and implemented by the UN and other partners) it had to ensure more coverage through successful branding. (<i>2013 Information and Communication Annual Report</i>). Besides, the awareness of IOs of EU guidelines on visibility and reporting was uneven across partners throughout the period. The EU internal document n°3 indicates that for earthquake-related projects ‘UNDP is strictly following the EC visibility guidelines. (..) UNICEF on the contrary has to be reminded regularly of the guidelines’ (EU internal document n°3). Interviews held in the field show that development partners were not equally aware of the visibility actions to be undertaken. Besides, different interviewees underlined the general downplaying of EU visibility by the UN (UNICEF being an exception).</p> <p>When looking at bilateral donors, US, UK, France and Germany are the actors that were the most recognised in Pakistan throughout the evaluation period. The EU indicates in its 2013 Annual Report that “the US Embassy usually has the lead in the diplomatic community as far as Educational and Cultural activities are concerned, due to much larger human resources and budgets. Among Member States, the UK, including DFID and the British Council, also have considerable resources for media relations and communication and enjoy a special status. Germany, France and Italy are also active, in particular through their respective cultural institutes. The German political foundations are also very active in Pakistan.” (<i>EU Delegation’s Information &amp; Communication Annual Report, 2013</i>). This was confirmed through the interviews held in the field, which indicated that EU MS have more resources (financial and human) than the EU to lead visibility actions, and that the UK and Germany chancellery services were quite efficient with regard to visibility (MN606, 609). Moreover, the EUD notes in 2013 that “visibility cooperation with EU Member States has improved, yet the Member States still tend to pursue their bilateral visibility first and, at best, EU’s visibility comes in second place.” (<i>EU Delegation’s Information &amp; Communication Annual Report, 2013</i>)</p> <p>For NGOs, the 2008 Visibility Study shows that in the early evaluation period “EC’s Visibility Guidelines were quite overwhelming for organisations without sufficient professional communication’s staff and led to angst of making errors when</p>

	<p>communicating.” (<i>Visibility study, 2008</i>)</p> <p><i>Sources:</i>  “EU Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Actions” (2010)  “EU Delegation’s Information &amp; Communication Annual Report” (2013)  EU internal documents n°3, 7 and 8</p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; background-color: #f9e6d3; padding: 5px;"> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>Indicative but not conclusive.</b> There are several converging documentary sources but insufficient triangulation with non EU sources.</p> </div>
<p>I-9.1.6</p>	<p><b>Effects of these visibility actions on EU visibility <i>vis-à-vis</i> key stakeholders in Pakistan</b></p> <p><b>Overall evolution of EU visibility in Pakistan</b>  According to internal documents, EU visibility increased during the period, starting from a low point. The EU internal document n°2 sums up the factors affecting visibility at the early evaluation period : i) attitude of the Pakistani public, that often perceives Western funded interventions as imperialist/colonial; ii) the absence of strategic visibility and communication plan; and iii) the poor performance of the press and information officer, who meanwhile resigned. (EU internal document n°2). The other internal documents at the end of the evaluation period show a “positive trend” in EU visibility in Pakistan: they confirm the noticeable increase in visibility of EU cooperation. The number of news items related to EU – Pakistan cooperation on the delegation’s website doubled in 2013 as compared to 2012. (EU internal document n°8). Indeed, EU projects’ visibility increased especially in social media (website, Tweeter and Facebook). (EU internal document n°9). The last document explains that this positive trend should be confirmed for 2015.” (EU internal document n°9)</p> <p><b>Effects of visibility actions at project level</b>  At project level, it is hard to establish the real effects of visibility actions on the persons or organisations targeted, notably due to the lack of appropriate indicators defined to follow-up visibility issues as well as the type of reporting.</p> <p>Interviews held in the field indicated that the lack of well-defined indicators was a challenge to assess EU visibility and communication strategies and measure their progress (MN 602, 603, 606, 609). Only some relatively loose indicators have been mentioned: comparison of “before and after activities” scenarios to judge the involvement of partners, indicators of a cultural change (e.g. # reactions after EU’s statement against death penalty), Facebook and Twitter followers (MN 606). The EUD envisages contracting in 2016 a media company that will help defining a communication strategy and a set of indicators to evaluate how the EUD communication and visibility is doing in the media (radio, TV, Twitter, Facebook, etc.). The same media company should also help in the training of the implementing partners on communication and visibility strategies (MN 603).</p> <p>The reports on the different projects, when addressing visibility issues, mostly focus on what was done, enumerating the means (seminars, publications...), without assessing for each action or each group of actions the success achieved by them (see below table).</p>

Monitoring reports and EMAR cover the issue of visibility. The table below sums-up the findings for the projects under review as well as for two positive examples (EU EOM 2007 and Food Facility project) cited in internal documents that are not part of the selection of projects.


### Monitoring reports & internal documents

*Does the project contribute to promoting EC visibility (e.g. does it comply with the EC Guidelines?)*

Project	Year	Answer	Narrative
RAHA	2012	Yes	Excellent EU visibility
	2013	Yes	-
PEACE	2013	Yes	-
SESP	2009	Yes	Visibility at the TA office is in accordance with the EC guidelines. Publications and seminars all have the required visibility. [...] Clear distinction is made between EC funded parts of the premises and government-funded parts. This sensitivity needs to be taken into account, but the balance with visibility is satisfactory.
	2010	Yes	The contributor of the EC to SEP is acknowledged by all stakeholders.
	2011	Yes	The programme is visible through its strong and well-functioning TA unit and its placement in the RSU. The RSU, as well as the programme itself, are open to the partners maintaining the visibility in the implementation of the reform program.
KP-ESRP	2012	N/A	No conclusion on visibility due to the security situation.
IP3	2013	Yes	-
CACL-II	2010	Yes	The Contractor is regularly making reference to the EC financial contribution in all events and publications. [...]
	2012	Yes	Every item bought for the project as well as promotional material carry the EC logo.
CAPRI	2014	No	-
TRTA-II	2010	Yes	One of the lessons to be learned from TRTA I is that greater effort needs to be made to ensure EC visibility so that there is widespread awareness that the EU is the

			principal donor funding this initiative. In the inception report, a communication and visibility plan has been included to address this issue.
	2011	Yes	The EC visibility requirements are formally met but a deeper visibility effort should be maintained so that all the project target groups and in particular end beneficiaries would be fully aware of the project identity and EC involvement.
	2013	Yes	-
EU-Election Observation Mission (2007)	2009		The EU-Election Observation Mission has given high visibility to the European Commission and the EU is seen as a credible and impartial partner in the support of the democratisation process in Pakistan. It ensured high visibility for the EU as a credible and impartial partner and opened a door for the EC to become a more influential partner on democracy-related issues. In particular, the EC is seen to be a significant stakeholder in supporting the electoral reform process in Pakistan.
Project Food Facility	2010		This project received a lot of EU visibility, with several programmes on national TV dedicated to it EU visibility remains high in national media as a number of PR related events have taken place both at the local and national levels
<p>Interviews held in the field also indicated that the Erasmus+ programme has been widely promoted and received a good visibility in education centers. This programme consists of opportunities for higher education, including scholarship opportunities for Pakistani students to study a period of time in Europe and funding for Pakistani universities to propose joint master degrees in Europe. (MN 603, 606).</p> <p><i>Sources:</i>  <i>EU Monitoring reports</i>            EU internal documents n°2, 3, 5, 8 and 9  <i>Interviews: MN603, MN606</i></p>			
Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory.</b>			

JC-9.2	<p><b>National actors and key stakeholders perceived the EU development cooperation as an important contribution to fighting poverty and helping Pakistan following a sustainable growth path</b></p>
<p>Throughout the period, the EU kept the image of a rather neutral and credible partner towards key stakeholders in Pakistan. The overall opinion of Pakistanis on the EU slightly improved during the period. But the EU has not done sufficiently to boost its visibility; this resulted in an under-exploited potential to reinforce its economic and political messages.</p>	
I-9.2.1	<p><b>Stakeholders' perceptions (and their evolution) of the benefits and weaknesses of EU development cooperation</b></p> <p>In the early period, the 2008 Visibility Study shows the EU was perceived as being neutral and there was a significant potential to improve EC's image: "Common for all groups was the perception that EU is not seen to have an independent policy but rather is perceived as a follower of U.S. and to some degree of U.K. EU and EC are not very well known but tend to have a neutral or slightly positive image. The stakeholders recommended EU to make its policy visible. With an edge to U.S. there would be a great potential for EU to obtain a very positive image in Pakistan." (..) "It is a general perception among journalists that EC/EU has done very little to become visible in the Pakistan media and society. The EC/EU has a great potential to play an important role as a credible neutral actor, which does not focus on promoting its own political interests but represents positive social values and social life." (<i>Visibility study, 2008</i>)</p> <p>The conclusions of the Mid-Term Review of the CSP for Pakistan (2007-13) and MIP 2011-13 mention that the European Commission is considered to be a credible development partner, without any hidden agenda. The 2008 EU Election Observation Mission has even further reinforced this image.</p> <p>Towards the end of the period, the EU recognises it 'has a political space to fill in Pakistan that goes beyond press and information activities' and that 'through increased visibility' the EU can reinforce its 'political and economic messaging' (<i>EU Delegation's Information &amp; Communication Annual Report, 2013</i>).</p> <p>Views collected during the field phase reveal that the EU still has a blurred image in Pakistan. The EU doesn't have bad press and keeps a neutral to positive image (more so than the USA). But it could be more visible (some people even questioning whether EU is a NGO...). Due to its civilian aid program (no military defense partnership), the EU is recognized as a true development partner. As a result, the EU by itself is not perceived as a threat but rather as a good donor. However, in some sensible regions, the EU keeps a low profile and its logo is not put forward. Mostly outside of major urban areas, many people don't distinguish between all the Western people, often considered to be US citizens (MN 602, 603, 606, 609).</p> <p>The overall opinion of Pakistanis on the EU slightly improved during the period: from 45% of unfavorable opinion during 2007-2011 to 22% in 2013.</p>



Note: 'Full question wording: Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of the European Union.'

Source: Pew Research Center database; polling data from 2015 spring survey.

<http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator/28/country/166/>

*Sources:*

*'Particip for the EU, Visibility - Study on the image of and the level of awareness, perception, knowledge, and attitude towards EC activities in Pakistan' (2008)*

*'EU Delegation's Information & Communication Annual Report' (2013)*

*Interviews: MN602, MN603, MN606, MN609*

*Pew Research Center database*

Quality of evidence: **Strong**

# Annex A13 EQ10: Coordination and complementarity

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## Acronyms

AJK	Azad Jammu and Kashmir
AKRSP	Aga Khan Rural Support Programme
AsDB	Asian Development Bank
BRSP	Balochistan Rural Support Programme
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CSP	Country Strategy Paper
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (of OECD)
DAD	Development Assistance Database
DEVCO	European Commission Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development
DFAT	Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
DFID	Department for International Development
DK	Denmark
EAD	Economic Affairs Division
EQ	Evaluation Question
EU	European Union
FAPF	Foreign Assistance Policy Framework
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FoDP	Friends of Democratic Pakistan
GIZ	German Agency for International Cooperation
GoP	Government of Pakistan
IDA	International Development Association (World Bank)
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IOM	International Organization for Migration
JC	Judgement Criteria
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
JP	Joint Programming

KFW	German Development Bank
KOICA	Korean International Cooperation Agency
KP	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
KP-ESRP	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Education Sector Reform Programme
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MIP	Multi-annual Indicative Programme
MN	Meeting Notes
MS	Member State
MTR	Mid-Term Review
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NL	Netherlands
ODA	Official Development Aid
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PBA	Programme-Based Approach
PDCR	Pakistan Development Cooperation Report
PDF	Pakistan Development Forum
PEFA	Public Expenditures and Financial Accountability
PFM	Public Financial Management
RAHA	Sustainable rural development in the Refugee Affected and Hosting Areas of Pakistan
RSP	Rural Project Sector
RSPN	Rural Support Programmes Network
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SRSP	Sindh Rural Support Programme
SWAP	Sector Wide Approaches
TRTA	Trade Related Technical Assistance
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNRCO	United Nations Resident Coordinator's Office
USA	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WB	World Bank
WTO	World Trade Organisation



## 1. Overview of donors' activities in Pakistan

### 1.1 Activities of the major donors in Pakistan

We draw in the first part of this annex a picture of the activities of the major donors in Pakistan, as reported in the public sources and the information gathered in the meetings held during the field mission. For doing so, we build on a donor mapping made by the UNRCO in Pakistan<sup>1</sup>. Nevertheless, no data was reported for important development partners like China.

The main national source is no more available: the Pakistan Development Assistance Database (DAD) planned for external development assistance coordination, and created after the receipt of international aid following the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan. According to a 2007 set of procedures, its purpose was to be:

- a coordination tool (between needs and resources)
- an instrument for accountability<sup>2</sup>

The DAD is no longer used by the Government of Pakistan and cannot be accessed<sup>3</sup>.

Total flows of ODA are approximately 6-8% of Pakistan's annual budget. In 2010, after the USA, the World Bank, Japan and the UK, the European Commission was the fifth biggest grant donor in Pakistan. The top five donors provided 83% of Pakistan's core ODA. The World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (AsDB) were by far the largest providers of development loans to the country. Among the biggest grant donors in Pakistan were the USA, the UK, Japan and the European Commission<sup>4</sup>.

Pakistan has historically received large volumes of aid<sup>5</sup> but this overall sum, however, came from diverse sources in an erratic fashion and was being spent on many different activities, often through a combination of budgetary and non-budgetary arrangements. So development aid led to a complex and increasingly difficult task of aid coordination.

Like the changing mix of aid channels, the composition of aid to Pakistan also changed in terms of its sources and modalities (i.e. loan versus grants). Pakistan has witnessed an increase in the role of non-DAC donors, such as China and the Persian Gulf countries, whose assistance is mainly channelled through non-budgetary mechanisms. According to OECD-DAC disbursement statistics, the average number of donors in Pakistan has increased from 25 in the 1970s to 40 in 2009. In 2008, China+4 (including the United Arab Emirates) accounted for 8 percent of all disbursements to ongoing regular projects, according to

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<sup>1</sup> « Pakistan Donor Profiles”, UNRCO Pakistan, April 2015

<sup>2</sup> "DAD Pakistan - Development Assistance Database. Standard Operating Procedures for Data Entry and Validation", Government of Pakistan – Economic Affairs Division, January 2007

<sup>3</sup> The link <http://www.dadpak.org/> cannot be used. Reference is made to the base here: <https://datahub.io/dataset/pakistan-dad>

<sup>4</sup> OECD, *OECD Report on Division of Labour: Addressing Cross-country Fragmentation of Aid*, OECD Publishing, 2011.

<sup>5</sup> As an example, in 2007, Pakistan received more than U.S. \$2.2 billion in Official Development Assistance, ranking the country as the sixth largest recipient of official aid in the world. (Source: Malik Abdul, *Quality and coordination of official development aid in Pakistan*, 2009)

DADpak. And the funds from China+4 were spent exclusively on off-budget activities in 2008. As a result, coordinating aid in Pakistan is becoming an increasingly complex affair<sup>6</sup>.

While the role of non-DAC donors remains crucial to expand the pool of financial resources for Pakistan, it also poses new challenges for coordination, especially when such new players do not participate, voluntarily or involuntarily, in the dialogue on aid policy and coordination: “Experience suggests that China and other non-DAC donors do not actively participate in aid coordination forums in Pakistan. Discussions with various actors suggested that this exclusion from policy forums is voluntary”<sup>7</sup>.

Among European countries, the United Kingdom was by far the largest contributor to development aid, followed by Germany and the Netherlands. In 2013, the EU Delegation, Germany, Denmark, France, Italy, Netherlands and the United Kingdom were implementing medium to long-term cooperation programmes with Pakistan, representing over 95% of all EU assistance to the country<sup>8</sup>.

Tables below show that rural development and education, the two main priorities of the EU in Pakistan, are thematic focus for several other development partners. For example:

- *Rural development and natural resources management* were also covered by the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, France, United States, Japan, Turkey, Switzerland, Norway, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, IFAD.
- *Education and human resources development* were objectives for the United Kingdom, Germany, United States, Canada, Australia, Switzerland, Norway, Korea, the World Bank.

Despite these shared priorities, common arrangements to manage and deliver aid in support of Pakistan remained weak (see below).


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<sup>6</sup> Malik Abdul, *Quality and coordination of official development aid in Pakistan*, 2009.

<sup>7</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>8</sup> EC, *EU–Pakistan Multi-Annual Indicative Programme (MIP) 2014–2020*.

**Figure 1. Country Programmable Aid to Pakistan – biggest donors (2007-2013)**



Source: ADE analysis based on OECD database (OECD.Stat), April 2015. Data in M US\$.

### 1. EU Member States

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
United Kingdom	162.98	228.71	197.30	146.52	214.14	250.96	473.38
Germany	44.50	57.43	43.52	47.97	48.92	47.50	52.63
Netherlands	35.34	26.90	35.81	35.64	23.54	29.35	27.27
France	2.74	7.70	1.46	5.62	9.92	20.64	33.67
Italy	2.14	0.31	3.40	1.26	20.37	40.33	13.63

Source: ADE analysis based on OECD database (OECD.Stat), April 2015

- a. The United Kingdom (UK Department for International Development - DFID)

Thematic focus	
1. Building peace and stability 2. Making democracy work 3. Promoting macroeconomic stability, growth and jobs 4. Effective delivery of public services Eight priority areas: 1. Education; 2. Health; 3. Economy; 4. Democracy and governance; 5. Women and girls; 6. Building peace and stability; 7. Humanitarian assistance; 8. Programmes and Projects	
Geographical focus	Aid modalities
Nation-wide	Grant Trust fund modalities Technical assistance Budgetary support on a limited scale

b. Germany

Priority areas <sup>9</sup>	
Good governance Basic education and vocational training Renewable energies and energy efficiency Health	
Geographical focus	Aid modalities
KP, in particular Malakand Division  KP (41%), FATA (2%), KP & FATA (9%) Country-wide (13%), Punjab (3%), Debt Swaps (24%), Gilgit-Baltistan (4%), AJK (4%)	Implementation through GIZ (Technical cooperation) and KfW (Financial cooperation)

c. The Netherlands

Priority areas	
1. Human security, rule of law and human rights 2. Promotion of trade and investment under the slogan: from aid to trade	
Geographical focus	Aid modalities
Malakand Division of KP	Unknown

d. France

Priority areas <sup>10</sup>	
General mandate for AFD: Green and equitable growth In Pakistan, support to renewable energy, especially hydro-electricity	
Geographical focus	Aid modalities
Malakand, AJK	Mainly loans Grants (small part)

e. Italy

Priority areas <sup>11</sup>	
Rural development (supporting local agriculture, natural resources management and environmental protection)	
Geographical focus	Aid modalities
KP (biggest rural development project)	Grants, soft loans, debt-swap and supports through the multilateral aid system.

<sup>9</sup> <https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/362.html>

<sup>10</sup> <http://www.afd.fr/lang/en/home/pays/asia/geo-asia/agence-pakistan>; meeting note

<sup>11</sup> <http://openaid.esteri.it/en/code-lists/recipients/665/?year=2014>

## 2. Non EU donors

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
United States	365.42	323.06	453.61	704.65	712.09	439.77	468.80
Japan	112.68	84.38	157.14	198.10	284.71	283.44	248.78
Turkey	34.62	76.92	20.29	19.58	173.57	9.93	49.64
Australia	6.80	13.84	29.84	104.41	60.11	71.83	49.97
Canada	34.35	40.19	19.93	37.58	34.50	18.87	27.59
Norway	22.61	22.61	43.66	44.97	16.09	16.33	15.30
Switzerland	14.67	14.38	12.82	12.10	7.52	7.83	11.25
Korea	2.90	1.82	1.38	17.60	8.48	7.05	34.22

Source: ADE analysis based on OECD database (OECD.Stat), April 2015

### a. The United States (US Agency for International Development - USAID)

Priority areas	
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Increased sustainable energy supplied to the economy</li> <li>2. Improved economic status of focus populations</li> <li>3. Increased stability in focus areas</li> <li>4. Improved opportunities for learning and work</li> </ol>	
Geographical focus	Aid modalities
Focus on: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. FATA,</li> <li>2. KP,</li> <li>3. Southern Punjab,</li> <li>4. Sindh,</li> <li>5. Balochistan,</li> <li>6. Gilgit-Baltistan,</li> <li>7. Azad Jammu Kashmir</li> </ol>	Direct funding: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. for federal government projects and programs</li> <li>2. for provincial government projects and programs</li> <li>3. to Pakistani NGOs</li> <li>4. to Pakistani private sector companies</li> <li>5. to international NGOs</li> <li>6. to non-Pakistan private sector companies</li> </ol> Multi-donor trust funds Direct grants to multilateral organisations Public-private partnerships with private sector companies

### b. Japan (Japan International Cooperation Agency - JICA)

Priority areas	
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Ensuring human security and human development</li> <li>2. Development of a sound market economy</li> <li>3. Achievement of balanced regional socio-economic development</li> </ol>	
Geographical focus	Aid modalities
Nation-wide + focus towards neglected areas of the country	As of 2011: Loans (71%) Grants aid (18%) Technical cooperation (11%)

c. Turkey (Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency - TIKA)

Priority areas <sup>12</sup>	
Assistance of Education Health Projects Water and Sanitation	
Geographical focus	Aid modalities
Nation-wide except south Balochistan	Technical cooperation

d. Australia (Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade – DFAT)

Priority areas	
1. Education and Health 2. Humanitarian and disaster preparedness and response 3. Economic development 4. Governance 5. General development support	
Geographical focus	Aid modalities
Nation-wide Special focus on federal level and KP	Mostly development grants to GoP

e. Canada

Priority areas	
1. Children and youth with an emphasis on improved basic education through teacher training 2. Sustainable economic growth with an emphasis on women's economic empowerment 3. Improved governance through accountable public institutions Strengthen routine immunization and health systems (global effort to eradicate polio)	
Geographical focus	Aid modalities
Nation-wide	Mostly grant funding Also debt forgiveness

f. Norway

Priority areas <sup>13</sup>	
Objective: Contribute to the development of good governance and to combat poverty Priority areas: good governance, education, rural development, women, gender equality and human rights, and security	
Geographical focus	Aid modalities
Federal level No specific geographical focus	Grants

<sup>12</sup> [http://www.tika.gov.tr/en/news/what\\_tika\\_did\\_in\\_pakistan\\_in\\_the\\_last\\_six\\_years-15707](http://www.tika.gov.tr/en/news/what_tika_did_in_pakistan_in_the_last_six_years-15707). This priority areas represented the activities led over the period 2010-2015.

<sup>13</sup> <https://www.norad.no/en/front/countries/asia-and-oceania/pakistan/>

g. Switzerland (Swiss Development Cooperation - SDC)

Priority areas	
1. Promotion of micro enterprises through finance and vocational education 2. Support to sustainable practices regarding the use of natural resources 3. Promotion of human rights and education, with emphasis placed upon the education of women and girls	
Geographical focus	Aid modalities
Nationwide Focus on KP, FATA and Northern areas	Direct implementation or through implementation partners (GoP or NGOs)

h. Korea (Korea International Cooperation Agency - KOICA)

Priority areas	
1. Developing human resources 2. Improving health 3. Assisting the rural poor 4. Providing humanitarian assistance	
Geographical focus	Aid modalities
Mainly in Punjab	Grant Technical cooperation

### 3. Arab donors & the Islamic Development Bank

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Kuwait (KFAED)	2.99	3.43	38.67	7.77	10.49	33.56	16.39
United Arab Emirates	29.55	28.64	75.26	1.17	66.09	83.98	136.08
Isl. Dev Bank	28.37	1.23	1.07	2.98		0.26	

Source: ADE analysis based on OECD database (OECD.Stat), April 2015

Among these three donors, the United Arab Emirates are a significant player with a total amount of 421 USD million over the period 2007-2013.

Priority areas <sup>14</sup>	
Transport & Storage Health	
Geographical focus	Aid modalities
FATA, Malakand Islamabad	Mostly direct project implementation Contributions to national NGOs and civil society institutions

<sup>14</sup> The information is available over the period 2011-2013, which corresponds to an increase in the UAE disbursements. Source: "United Arab Emirates Foreign Aid 2013", UAE Ministry of International Cooperation and Development, 2013

#### 4. International institutions

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
AsDB Special funds	482.81	639.78	477.83	364.22	35.86	44.47	87.25
WB - IDA	1073.55	190.07	1233.93	384.86	541.06	554.84	443.89
IFAD	17.82	11.44	20.81	22.85	20.33	5.83	11.57

Source: ADE analysis based on OECD database (OECD.Stat), April 2015

##### a. Asian Development Bank (AsDB)

Priority areas	
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Investment and reforms in energy and infrastructure</li> <li>2. Reforms to strengthen governance and promote structural transformation</li> <li>3. Development of urban services</li> <li>4. Effective implementation of projects and programs and capacity building</li> </ol>	
Geographical focus	Aid modalities
Nation-wide	Equity investments Loans (including co-financing) Guarantees Policy dialogue Technical assistance Lending, non-lending, cost-sharing arrangements

##### b. The World Bank

Priority areas	
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Economic governance</li> <li>2. Human development and social protection</li> <li>3. Infrastructure to support growth</li> <li>4. Security and reducing the risk of conflict</li> </ol>	
Geographical focus	Aid modalities
Nation-wide, including FATA	Lending Grants (through MDTF)



c. International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)

Priority areas	
Eradicating poverty in vulnerable and remote areas Achieving community participation Identifying opportunities for innovation Supporting partnerships between the public and private sectors	
Geographical focus	Aid modalities
“areas that have a high incidence of poverty or that suffer from specific development problems due to their geographical location” <sup>15</sup> e.g. Punjab, KP, South FATA	Mainly loans Grants

## 1.2 Coordination and alignment

Official aid to Pakistan, though large in volume, is characterised by high volatility and fragmentation. These problems, particularly volatility, have increased in the last decade, coinciding with the surge in aid flows due to renewed donor interest in the region after September 11, 2001, and owing to growth in funding for post-earthquake relief and reconstruction work in 2005-06<sup>16</sup>.

Improved choice and risk diversification resulting from multiple partnerships are to be balanced against extra transaction costs, specifically those resulting from small additional donors. Avoiding further aid fragmentation, phasing out non-significant aid relationships and increasing the number of significant ones together with joint donor arrangements, including financing arrangements, is a way to reduce fragmentation and transaction costs, in line with mutually agreed targets. Aid effectiveness is indeed enhanced when donors use common arrangements to manage and deliver aid in support of partner country priorities.

In Pakistan in 2010, 31% of funds were delivered through programme-based approaches<sup>17</sup> (PBAs), significantly below the OECD target of 66%. There were big differences between the different donors’ performances. The World Bank, the United States and United Nations provided 62% of all programme-based aid, while the Asian Development Bank, one of the other main donors, did not provide any of its aid through PBAs<sup>18</sup>.

Table 1 shows the results from a 2012 OECD study measuring the percentage of coordinated missions by development partner in Pakistan in 2010. At 17%, the total score for joint missions is 23% away from the OECD's target of 40%. Out of 21 donors, United Nations, World Bank and United Kingdom provided the vast majority of all the coordinated missions;

<sup>15</sup> <http://operations.ifad.org/web/ifad/operations/country/home/tags/pakistan>

<sup>16</sup> Malik Abdul, *Delivering Aid Differently: Lessons from the Field*, 2010.

<sup>17</sup> For an activity to qualify as PBA, all four of the following tests must be met:  
 a. The host country or organisation is exercising leadership over the programme supported by donors;  
 b. A single comprehensive programme and budget framework is used;  
 c. There is a formal process for donor co-ordination and harmonisation of donor procedures for at least two of the following systems: (i) reporting, (ii) budgeting, (iii) financial management and (iv) procurement;  
 d. Your support to the programme uses at least two of the following local systems: (I) programme design, (ii) programme implementation, (iii) financial management and (iv) monitoring and evaluation.  
 Source: [www.oecd.org/dac/stats/44479916.pdf](http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/44479916.pdf)

<sup>18</sup> Malik Abdul, *Quality and coordination of official development aid in Pakistan*, 2009.

however none of them managed to co-ordinate more than half of their missions. The variation in donor performance suggests that there is an opportunity for the government to better initiate donor co-ordination<sup>19</sup>.

The same study uses, as a proxy for measuring aid alignment, the percentage of aid disbursed by donors for the government sector that is included in the annual budget for the same fiscal year. It was calculated that, in 2010, 60% of Pakistan's incoming aid was aligned with the government's national priorities. All the major donors except the UN performed relatively well; the average weighted by donor was much lower reflecting very poor performance from the minor donor<sup>20</sup>.

**Table 1. Percentage of coordinated missions by development partner, Pakistan, 2010.**

	Co-ordinated donor missions * (missions) a	Total donor missions (missions) b	2010 * (%) c = a / b
Asian Dev. Bank	18	34	53%
Australia	0	3	0%
Canada	1	10	10%
EU Institutions	0	3	0%
Finland	1	1	100%
France	0	20	0%
GAVI Alliance	0	0	--
Germany	0	15	0%
Global Fund	1	4	25%
IFAD	11	11	100%
IOM	0	1	0%
Isl.Dev Bank	8	8	100%
Italy	0	8	0%
Japan	0	12	0%
Korea	0	6	0%
Netherlands	0	2	0%
Norway	0	6	0%
Switzerland	2	70	3%
Turkey	0	10	0%
United Kingdom	19	38	50%
United Nations	29	104	28%
United States	0	0	--
World Bank	38	121	31%
<b>Total</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>487</b>	<b>17%</b>

\* The total of coordinated missions has been adjusted to avoid double counting. A discount factor of 35% is applied.

Source: OECD (2012), *Aid Effectiveness 2011: Progress in implementing the Paris Declaration*, Better Aid, OECD Publishing.

<sup>19</sup> OECD, *Aid Effectiveness 2011: Progress in implementing the Paris Declaration*, Better Aid, OECD Publishing, 2012.

<sup>20</sup> Ibidem.

### **Note 1. The MDTF for the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, FATA and Balochistan**

The MDTF for the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, FATA and Balochistan supports the implementation of a multi-year program of coordinated activities for reconstruction, rehabilitation and development reforms, in the aftermath of the 2009 crisis. The first round of the MDTF is covering the years 2010-2015 (it has been prolonged for a second round (2015-2020)).

The MDTF program is divided into three programme streams (with relevant percentage of financial allocation): improving local services and community support (68%), growth and job creation (20%) and policy reforms and governance support (12%). Under the three programme streams, the MDTF has 11 projects relating to health, infrastructure, education, governance, disaster management and livelihoods.

The MDTF, totalling US \$212.9 million pledged, is administered by the World Bank and supported by eleven development partners - Australia, Denmark, European Union (US \$19.9 million), Finland, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, Turkey, UK, and the USA.

The World Bank, as the Administrator of the MDTF, is responsible for appraisal, implementation review, and monitoring and reporting on all performance aspects of the MDTF. With an experience in managing trust funds, it provides guarantees against corruption and fraud but no really guidance on implementation.

A Steering Committee oversees the MDTF's activities and decides the budget allocation to be made. It is co-chaired, on one side, by representatives from provincial governments and development partners and, on the other side, by the Government of Pakistan and the World Bank.

Finally, an Advisory Committee prepares the issues to be covered by the Steering Committee, which decides the budget allocation to be made. The Advisory Committee is co-chaired by a province representative and a donor representative<sup>21</sup>.

<sup>21</sup> Sources: www.pakistanmdtf.org, MN 815.

## 2. Findings per JC and Indicators: EQ10 Coordination and complementarity

<b>EQ10</b>	<b>To what extent have EU interventions been complementary with those of other MS and coordinated with those of the other donors?</b>
<b>JC-10.1</b>	<b>The EU cooperation strategy is complementary with that of the MS</b>
	<p>In the absence of formal division of labour, the EU and its MS followed a pragmatic approach to complementarity. There was no overarching strategy established and implemented during the period to ensure complementarity of the EU strategy with that of EU Members States. While a discussion on Joint Programming emanated from an initiative of the EU and Germany in 2013, no concrete follow-up emerged after that, notably due to the fact that the UK –who is a major donor- did not express interest to participate, but also to doubts of some other MS. Towards the end of the period, the EU and its MS were preparing their own cooperation multi-annual frameworks. Instead, cooperation between the EU and its MS at policy and programme level was based on regular contacts through the monthly meetings of the EU Development Counsellors and at sector level through both formal and informal mechanisms. Efforts were also made to concentrate the aid activities of each MS in the areas/regions of their respective comparative advantage. The EU often left the lead to more important development partners in specific sectors (e.g. UK in the education sector).</p> <p>General coordination in the monthly meetings proved effective while coordination at sector level showed a mixed picture across sectors. The monthly meetings emerged as an effective discussion platform on what each Member State is doing in the country. They were also considered as a way to meet with others with whom some do not have common operations. Overall, the role played by the EU in promoting the circulation of information was recognized as a very positive contribution. At sector level, successes were registered in the education and rural development sectors while challenges were encountered to coordinate work in the 'TVET' sector.</p>
	<p><b>Existence of formal and informal mechanisms to ensure complementarity of the EU strategy and its implementation with that of the MS.</b></p> <p>There was no overarching strategy, such as Joint Programming, established and implemented during the period to ensure complementarity of the EU strategy with that of EU Members States. Coordination between the EU and EU MS mostly took place through the monthly meetings of the EU development counsellors and to some extent at sector level through both formal and informal mechanisms.</p>
I-10.1.1	<p><b>Background</b></p> <p>The EU committed in 2009 to 'improve internal coordination as well as coordination with key third countries' and recognized the need to align EU and EU MS assistance to Pakistan on government policies and priorities, as well as to better align resources between Member States and the Commission taking into account the fact that 'several Member States have financial resources available, but only a limited number have the logistical and security capacity to deliver on the ground'. Source: Council of the EU, Strengthening EU Action in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2009</p> <p><b>Formal mechanisms</b></p>

- Joint programming discussion:

Pakistan was a potential candidate for JP implementation, with a discussion in 2013 among the EU Heads of Mission on a potential joint programming for 2016. The discussion emanated from a joint initiative of the EU and Germany in 2013; but no follow-up emerged directly after that. In April 2015, a regional workshop was organised with the representatives of the EU, Germany, France and Italy. The UK didn't join and confirmed its then lack of interest for the JP framework. With the aid from the UK represented around 40% to 50% of the European aid in Pakistan, establishing a JP without UK's participation was considered inappropriate. EU MS expressed diverging views on Joint Programming: some showed enthusiasm for a Joint Programming Framework and a corresponding Joint Programming matrix, while others perceived JP as a "loss of time" and a project difficult to believe in, as it encompasses highly political issues and divergent priorities. The EU internal document n°9 notes that Germany and Denmark were preparing their own cooperation multi-annual frameworks, while the Netherlands were on the way to reduce significantly their cooperation.

Interviews with one MS indicated that they were very sceptical about the benefits of Joint Programming while fearing that it would be a cumbersome and bureaucratic process. Their opinion is that beyond the necessary upstream coordination on the main strategies, the coordination that matters is the operational one. Common operations require to align their objectives, processes and methodologies whereas joint programming is a strenuous exercise with few practical benefits.

Sources: EC, *EU–Pakistan MIP 2014 – 2020*; *DEVCO (Kirosigh), Joint Programming, Presentation to Trialog, 2014*; EU internal document n°9; MN 607, 825, 835, 829.

- EU – EU MS coordination meetings:

In the absence of a JP framework, the main formal mechanism for improved complementarity between the EU and the EU MS in Pakistan was the monthly meetings gathering representatives from the EU Delegation and the EU Member States (UK, Germany, France, Italy, DK and NL). These meetings allowed exchanging useful information on the different portfolios (programming and implementation) for the active MS, enabling potential cooperation on the spot. Cooperation fiches, established for each Member State within the framework of these meetings, provided mutual information on the respective activities. These meetings also addressed bilateral coordination issues between the EU and some MS. In 2015, some non-EU members (Switzerland and Norway) have also been invited to participate to these meetings.

Sources: EU internal document n°9; MN 807, 815, 825, 829, 835.

- The Multi-Donor Trust Fund:

The Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) for the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Balochistan represents another important cooperation mechanism, established in 2010, as an instrument for resource mobilization and aid coordination in these provinces (see note 1). Source: *ibidem*.

- Mechanisms at sector level:

Coordination groups or dialogue mechanisms were established at sector level in some sectors.

	<p>- In April 2008 an exercise on “Division of Labour in the Frame of Aid effectiveness” for the education and health (selected as pilot) sectors was developed. “It was decided that UK (DFID) would take the role of lead donor in the two sectors, with Germany active in both sectors and the EC, France (for higher education) and the Netherlands active in the education sector.” The groups meanwhile met several times but it is not clear what were its concrete outcomes, Interviews with MS indicate that coordination at sector level is effective.</p> <p>- In the education sector in KP, the support to education reform was implemented in close collaboration with UK and Australia through a strong DFID lead joint bi-monthly dialogue mechanism with the GoP. In the KP region, the EU delegation, DFID and DFAT (Australia) regularly met.</p> <p>- In the democratisation sector, there was a forum on election reform.</p> <p>- In the TVET sector, an overall coordination group held irregular meetings about once a year.</p> <p>Sources: EU internal document n°8; EU internal document n°9; MN 904, 829.</p> <p><b>Informal mechanisms</b></p> <p>Informal mechanisms enhancing complementarity and coordination mostly took place at sector level. Informal meetings between the EU Delegation and the MS have been held on an ad-hoc basis to discuss policies and programmes. The intensity of this follow-up varied according to each MS, with Germany for example, probably the most active partner for the EU Delegation, having frequent (once or twice a week) and close contact with the EU Delegation. Efforts were also made to concentrate the aid activities of each MS in the areas and regions of their respective comparative advantage. Collaboration was expressed by leaving the lead to the most important development partner (e.g. UK in the education sector).</p> <p><i>Source:</i> EU internal document n°9</p> <p>Sources:</p> <p><i>Council of the EU, Strengthening EU Action in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Council meeting Luxembourg, 27 October 2009.</i></p> <p><i>DEVCO (Kirosigh), Joint Programming, Presentation to Trialog, 2014.</i></p> <p><i>EU internal documents n°8 and 9EC, EU–Pakistan Multi-Annual Indicative Programme (MIP) 2014 – 2020.</i></p> <p><i>Interviews: MN 607, 815, 825, 829, 835, 904.</i></p> <p style="background-color: #fce4d6; border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;">Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory.</b></p>
I-10.1.2	<p><b>Evidence of the effectiveness of these mechanisms, and results so far of the joint programming with the MS (in particular the joint programming for the period 2016-2020).</b></p> <p>In the absence of formal division of labour with the MS, the EU and EU MS followed a pragmatic approach to complementarity.</p>

At policy and programme level, cooperation between the EU and its MS was based on regular contacts and common strategy objectives for development. It was quite active and proved effective.

The monthly meetings gathering the EU Delegation and the Member States' Heads of Delegation have emerged as an effective discussion platform on what each Member State is doing in the country. It was also considered as a way to meet with others with whom some do not have common operations. The cooperation fiches, coming out of the monthly meetings and established for each Member State, were also considered useful for visibility reasons and as a baseline for potential coordination in implementing tasks. Overall, the role played by the EU in promoting the circulation of information was recognized as a very positive contribution.

Common work took place in some regions (e.g. FATA, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and sectors (e.g. TVET, education, energy sector).

EU MS representatives (such as Germany, UK and France) expressed preference for an 'operational coordination' rather than an 'upstream (top-down) strategy'. This operational coordination conveys the idea that the best coordination results when operations are mounted together and participants have to align their objectives, processes and methodologies. It also recognizes the sovereignty of Member States in defining their own cooperation strategy. In terms of financing modalities, EU MS favoured co-financing, which is adequate to join forces. It might even get a bigger momentum if non-EU countries, such as Norway and Switzerland, were also invited to cooperate.

*Sources :*

*EC, Memo on the "Friends of Democratic Pakistan" Ministerial meeting, n°10/491, 2010.*

*EC, Annex Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Education Sector Reforms Programme 2007/018-465 (ESRP), in Annual action programme 2007 for Pakistan-Asia, 2012.*

*EC, EU Delegations' Information and Communication Annual Report (2013) & Forward Planning (2014).*

*EC, EU-Pakistan Multi-Annual Indicative Programme (MIP) 2014 – 2020.*

*EC, Conclusions of the Mid-Term Review of the Country Strategy Paper for Pakistan (2007-13) and Multiannual Indicative Programme 2011-13, 2014.*

*EU internal documents n°8 and 9 Council of the EU, Strengthening EU Action in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Council meeting Luxembourg, 27 October 2009.*

*Italian Foreign Affairs Ministry, Stream 2013-2015 Pakistan. Italian development aid in brief, 2015.*

*Malik Abdul, "Pakistan" in Fengler W. & H. Kharas, Delivering Aid Differently: Lessons from the Field, Brookings Institution Press, 2010.*

*OECD, Aid Effectiveness 2011: Progress in implementing the Paris Declaration, Better Aid, OECD Publishing, 2012.*

*Interviews: MN 604, 605, 607, 608, 815, 825, 829, 835, 901.*

Quality of evidence: **Strong**

<b>JC-10.2</b>	<b>The elaboration of the EU cooperation strategy and its implementation have been the object of a close coordination with the other development partners</b>
<p>Concerning other development partners, aid generally remained quite fragmented. While the EU often aligned its inputs on the ones of the international partners, such as the United Kingdom, Germany, the USA or the World Bank, there was still ample scope for improved donor coordination towards the end of the period.</p> <p>Overall, policy objectives were shared and information sharing good between the EU and like-minded donors, such as EU MS, the USA, Canada, Norway and Switzerland. There were some points of divergence with other partners (e.g. Japan, the AsDB, the Arab donors (Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates) and the Islamic Development Bank). These were the result of (i) differing geographical and political priorities; (ii) types of implementing partners and financing modalities and (iii) weaknesses in government leadership in coordinating donors.</p> <p>At national level, several coordination mechanisms emerged under the auspices of the GoP (EAD), but donor coordination remained rather weak and was mostly done on an ad hoc basis. This is partly linked to the fact that the Government was generally not active in coordinating donors. Useful exchange of information and policy dialogue took place in the various international forums promoting aid effectiveness, for instance the Foreign Assistance Policy Framework, the D-10 meetings or the Pakistan Development Forum. With an insufficient involvement of national authorities, the situation remained deficient and mostly left to donors among themselves.</p> <p>Donor coordination rather took place at provincial level. With the devolution of powers to provinces in 2011, the different provincial governments got increasingly involved in donor coordination. The situation varied across provinces and sectors. The strongest coordination was witnessed in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. Donor coordination was effective in education (both in the KP and Sindh provinces), TVET, PFM and on political reforms.</p> <p>For the interventions implemented through international organizations (UN agencies, the World Bank) and supported by the EU, the degree of coordination was generally satisfactory (e.g. the MDTF for the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, FATA and Balochistan).</p> <p>While there was no formal division of labour, some donors had recognized comparative advantages, the EU having added value in the support to democratisation, human rights, and technical and vocational training.</p> <p>The EU has had a leading role in donor coordination groups at sector level (e.g. education), was actively involved in the policy dialogue held within the framework of the MDTF, and led donors' actions concerning human rights and elections.</p>	
Overall	<p><b>EU approach to complementarity with other partners</b></p> <p>The EU tried to be aligned on the strategies set out by the Pakistani government and to take into consideration the strategy-level decisions of other donors (e.g. choice of sectors of intervention) when making its own. It also tended to focus on areas where the EU has had a stronger comparative advantage (democratisation, human rights, technical and vocational training). It developed a constructive strategy in aligning its inputs on the ones of the international partners, such as the United Kingdom,</p>



	<p>Germany, the USA or the World Bank for example. However, with the exception of few initiatives related to specific sectors, including the Multi-Donor Trust Fund in the western border regions, there was still ample scope for improving donor coordination in Pakistan towards the end of the period.</p> <p>Source: EC, <i>Ccls of the MTR of the CSP 2007-13 and MIP 2011-13</i>, 2014.</p> <p>Note: comparative advantages were recognised for other donors, in particular: USAID in private sector development/trade, DFIF in education, Japan in mature and sophisticated technologies</p> <p>Source: MN605.</p>
I-10.2.1	<p><b><i>Existence of formal and informal coordination mechanisms between the development partners and the EU</i></b></p> <p><i>Despite the emergence of several coordination mechanisms, donor coordination at national level remained rather weak and was mostly done on an ad hoc basis. Besides, Government leadership in coordinating development partners remained poor. Furthermore, with the devolution of power to provinces in 2011, in line with the Constitution 18th amendment, donor coordination rather took place at provincial level (mostly in the KP province) than at federal level in some sectors, notably in education. For programmes implemented through international organisations, the degree of coordination was generally good.</i></p> <p><b><i>A. General coordination</i></b></p> <p><u><i>Cooperation between the GoP and the development partners</i></u></p> <p><i>At national level, Pakistan's <b>Economic Affairs Division (EAD)</b> is the government's coordinating body for official development assistance, along with the Ministry of Finance and the Planning Commission. It has been in charge of donor alignment under the Aid Effectiveness Agenda, developing coordination between the government and the development partners through different channels:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>• The Pakistan <b>Foreign Assistance Policy Framework (FAPF)</b>, where the Government of Pakistan and its development partners are formulating guiding principles and aid effectiveness joint priorities. The EAD had the lead in developing the foreign assistance policy framework that outlines the government's priorities with respect to aid modalities, areas of support, and division of labour. In line with the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action, this framework seeks to foster national ownership and alignment, reduce fragmentation and ensure coordinated technical cooperation at the sector level.</i></li> </ul> <p><i>Source: OECD, <i>Aid Effectiveness 2011: Progress in implementing the Paris Declaration</i>, 2012.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>• The "<b>D10-meetings</b>" organised infrequently by the EAD that bring together the principal donors (multilateral and bilateral) such as the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, USAID, DfID, the EU and the Embassy of Japan. These D10 meetings served as joint Government-Partners Aid Effectiveness Steering Committee and were acknowledged for providing useful exchanges of information. But the Strategic Development Framework used by the GoP to provide the overall umbrella for cooperation has also been criticised by all development partners. In these meetings, the GoP tends to</i></li> </ul>

advocate for direct financial transfers rather than using multilateral financial structures (such as MDTF).

Source: MN 815; Malik Abdul, *Delivering Aid Differently: Lessons from the Field*, 2010.

- The **Pakistan Development Assistance Database (DAD or DADpak)** launched within weeks of the 2005 earthquake that devastated the Kashmir region to facilitate exchange of information for better aid coordination. It was established with technical and financial support from the UNDP and was eventually extended beyond the initial earthquake aid to track all assistance provided to the country. Managed and maintained by the EAD, it served as a national aid information management system, allowing to consider all financial flows by the partner countries/agencies, their sectors of intervention and geographic location. The database was intended to facilitate online entry of information on aid flows: development partners were invited to provide project-level information on their development assistance, including commitments, disbursements and expenditures by sector and geographic location.

Source: OECD, *Aid Effectiveness 2011: Progress in implementing the Paris Declaration*, 2012.

The DADpak objective was to support harmonisation of partners' systems and procedures as well as to promote alignment and monitoring of external assistance with national development priorities. The Pakistan Development Cooperation Report (PDCR), an annual development report based on DAD data, was also expected to be a tool for reliability and accuracy of aid flows to Pakistan. Some occasional donor portfolio meetings on DAD data validation and consultations were vehicles to discuss on the country's analytical work. However, donors' enthusiasm for the DADpak was rather limited in practice, as many donors viewed data entry as an additional burden. Given that the effectiveness of the database was greatly affected by the amount and quality of data fed into the system, the completeness and accuracy of the data and the reports generated by the system remained in doubt. The number of visits to the dadpak.org website was rather limited by any standard. GoP no longer uses the DAD and development partners cannot access it any longer.

Source: Malik Abdul, *Delivering Aid Differently: Lessons from the Field*, 2010.

- Four **Strategic Sector Working Groups** to ensure a forum for active dialogue on aid effectiveness and alignment in priority areas:

- the Financial Management and Procurement Harmonization and Country Systems Group, chaired by the Ministry of Finance and co-chaired by the World Bank;

- the Sector Wide Approaches (SWAP) Group, chaired by the Ministry of Education and co-chaired by the World Bank;

- the Capacity Development Group, chaired by the Economic Affairs Division and co-chaired by the AsDB;

- the Harmonizing Monitoring and Evaluation Systems Group, chaired by the Planning and Development Division and co-chaired by the Department for International Development.

These sector working groups aimed to provide a forum where line ministries could ensure that analytic needs were met. Donors could then harmonise their support around these government-led requests.

Source: Malik Abdul, *Delivering Aid Differently: Lessons from the Field*, 2010; OECD, *Aid Effectiveness 2011: Progress in implementing the Paris Declaration*, 2012.

- The **Pakistan Development Forum (PDF)**: with a focus on coordination and alignment on development strategy, it is the most broad-based and all-inclusive forum for discussions between the government and its development partners. Since 2001, the EAD, in collaboration with key partners

such as the World Bank and the AsDB, has convened the Development Forum on an annual basis to share the government's priorities, initiatives, and plans with its development partners. In that respect, the forum has been crucial for information sharing and general discussions on broader development themes.

Sources: Malik Abdul, *Delivering Aid Differently: Lessons from the Field*, 2010; Council of the EU, *Strengthening EU Action in Afghanistan and Pakistan*, 2009

- The **Friends of Democratic Pakistan** group (FODP): it is a forum for policy dialogue and strategic discussion between the GoP and development partners to extend support to the GoP in its efforts to consolidate democracy, social and economic development in Pakistan. The FODP group has 26 members and the EU is a founding member of the group.

Sources: EC, *Memo on the "Friends of Democratic Pakistan" Ministerial meeting*, n°10/491, 2010; Council of the EU, *Strengthening EU Action in Afghanistan and Pakistan*, 2009.

Whilst a coordination scope has been designed through the D-10 meetings and the 'Friends of Democratic Pakistan' group, "to date there has been no structured group of aid agencies coordinating with regional development banks and the UN Development Program".

Source: Italian Foreign Affairs Ministry, *Stream 2013-2015 Pakistan. Italian development aid in brief*, 2015.

Along these main channels, some additional coordination mechanisms have been put in place. These include the occasional meetings between the EAD and the development partners, such as the group of donors from Islamic countries; or the individual and frequent meetings between relevant government agencies and the development partners, including small aid agencies, to discuss their aid agenda and programs.

Regarding coordination between the EU and the EAD, policy dialogue meetings between them have been rather weak. However, there has been a recent demand from the EU Delegation to reinforce the cooperation and to formalise regular meetings once or twice per month, for policy exchanges in support of the wider agenda. The objective is to favour ownership by associating the GoP to programming and implementation issues. Source: MN 815.

#### Cooperation between the EU and the development partners

- The **Heads of Development Agencies meetings**, led by the Asian Development Bank, have been a platform of exchange of information used to discuss cooperation issues with the development partners. These meetings were not held very regularly; they were organised monthly or twice a year. They allowed partners exchanging information but were viewed by some partners as being very soft on content. Sources: EC, EU–Pakistan MIP 2014 – 2020; EU internal document n°8; MN 815.

- Donors could also convene meetings among themselves in an informal **Poverty Reduction Working Group**, though participation has been rather limited.

Source: Malik Abdul, *Delivering Aid Differently: Lessons from the Field*, 2010.

The EU Action Plan for Pakistan underlined that "the EU will work together and coordinate closely with international partners, most notably the US, which plays a dominant role in terms of presence, assistance and political dialogue." Following that objective, at federal and provincial levels, cooperation

between the EU and several development partners has taken place through bilateral relations and policy dialogue. However, in general, this coordination hasn't been as close as planned with the development agencies, mostly due to constraints shaped by political programmes.

Sources: EU Council, *Strengthening EU Action in Afghanistan and Pakistan*, 2009; MN 605, 607, 608, 825, 835.

### **B. Cooperation at provincial and sector levels**

With the 18th Constitutional Amendment passed in 2010, partnerships also targeted the provinces, where the EU has been active. Only the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province set up a strategic partnership development framework, which was nevertheless viewed as a poorly effective with countless groups and sub-groups. Source: MN 815.

Coordination mechanisms varied considerably across sectors. Donor coordination was effective in education, TVET, PFM and on political reforms.

In the **education sector**, donors active have been USAID, United Kingdom, Germany, CIDA, Norway, Australia, and the EU. The EU Delegations' Information and Communication Annual Report (2013) & Forward Planning (2014) indicates that "the US Embassy usually has the lead in the diplomatic community as far as Educational and Cultural activities are concerned, due to much larger human resources and budgets. Among Member States, the UK, including DfID and the British Council, also have considerable resources for media relations and communication and enjoy a special status. Germany, France and Italy are also active, in particular through their respective cultural institutes. The German political foundations are also very active in Pakistan."

Coordination has rather been effective at provincial level than at federal level. There is however a government-led education donor group at federal level, of which the EU is a member. Donors active in the education sector also met regularly at national level, notably due to DfID's involvement in promoting donors' contacts in the sector.

At provincial level, donor coordination in education has significantly improved for both the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh provinces. The EU Delegation aligned inputs with DfID and DFAT in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and aligned on the objectives of the GoP's education programme with the World Bank in Sindh.

Sources: EC, EU–Pakistan MIP 2014 – 2020; EC, Ccls of the MTR of the CSP 2007-13 and MIP 2011-13, 2014; EC, EU internal document n°9; MN 815.

In Sindh, three major donors have been active: the World Bank, the EU and USAID. Coordination with USAID took place at project level, with USAID and the EU financing education management systems in different districts. The WB and the EU financed the GoP education programme in Sindh. The EU decided to support the education sector in Sindh partly because the UK is not active in this province. The WB and the EU have had regular consultations through their Joint Review Missions of the Sindh Education Plan Support Programme. The MIP 2014-2020 underlines that the EU and the WB have supported the education sector in a coordinated and complementary way since 2007. Sources: EC, Ccls of the MTR of the CSP 2007-13 and MIP 2011-13, 2014; EC, EU–Pakistan MIP 2014 – 2020; MN 825, 835.

*In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, all active donors (including DfID, USAID, the EU, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Australia Aid (AusAid), GTZ (Germany), the World Bank, JICA, CIDA and Norway) committed to contribute and align assistance and support to the education sector reform plan approved by the government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. United Kingdom was the lead donor for education in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, providing the largest external financing for the sector with co-financing from Australia. United Kingdom, Australian Aid and the EU have aligned their education support programmes around a common performance assessment framework. Furthermore, while the EU and the UK initially had diverging views on analyses and diagnoses (e.g. public vs. private education, etc.), they closely coordinated their sector budget support assessments and participated with the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Government in stock-taking reviews and high level political dialogue.*

*Sources: EC, EU–Pakistan MIP 2014 – 2020; EC, Annex Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Education Sector Reforms Programme 2007/018-465 (ESRP), in Annual action programme 2007 for Pakistan-Asia, 2012; MN 825.*

*In the **Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) sector**, the main donors have been United Kingdom, the World Bank, the EU, Netherlands and Germany. Other donors included JICA and USAID. The National Vocational and Technical Training Commission (NAVTTTC - a federal apex body on technical education) set up a Donor Working Group, which has met once or twice a year and has been quite effective in harmonising donor intervention. While the EU also tried to push the GoP to promote coordination, there has been a shift in the focus of coordination, moving more towards provinces and with a higher participation from the private sector.*

*Sources: EC, EU–Pakistan MIP 2014 – 2020; MN 815.*

*In the **rural development sector**, there has been a lack of national coordination with the development partners. Concerning the promotion of economic activities in rural areas, coordination was highly fragmented and occurred at technical level, mostly involving the UN and other implementing agencies. There were difficulties with the management of the RAHA program by the UNDP (implementing partner for the EU). The EU then moved to other partners on the RSP (Rural Project Sectors), RSPN (Rural Support Programmes Network), AKRSP (Aga Khan Rural Support Programme), BRSP (Balochistan Rural Support Programme) and SRSP (Sindh Rural Support Program).*

*Sources: EU internal document n°8; MN 815.*

*In the **sectors of democratisation process, governance, justice and human rights**, the EU has gained a significant comparative advantage (for instance with the Election Observation Mission and the follow-up to its recommendations on electoral reform, initiated through the Instrument for Stability). However no formalised donor coordination group has been established.*

*Sources: EC, Ccls of the MTR of the CSP 2007-13 and MIP 2011-13, 2014; MN 825, 835.*

*On **political reforms**, the EU was working closely with the UK, the USA, Japan and China on the institutional reform for FATA, in line with the constitutional change (18th Amendment) devolving powers to provinces. With these partners, the EU promoted a common message about the current political status of FATA fuelling Taliban insurgency. With USAID, the EU also supported in different ways the rights of women and marginalized communities (Shia, Christians and Hindus, Muslim Ahmadis). Source: MN608.*

*Towards the end of the period, there was a new coordination momentum between the EU, the UK, and the US on the future long-term support to the FATA in the context of the return of IDPs after the on-going military operations in North Waziristan and in the surrounded agencies, aiming to target a coordinated support for the long-term development of the FATA region.*

*Source: EU internal document n°9*

*Due to the status of the EU and the US as Pakistan's major export markets, **trade** has been an important sector for Pakistan. In this respect, the EU and the GoP signed the Third Generation Cooperation Agreement in 2001; its objectives are to promote trade in accordance with the WTO Agreements. No formalised donor coordination group has been put in place for coordination in Trade-Related Technical Assistance (TRTA), even though the EU declared itself prepared to take the lead in donor coordination.*

*Source: EC, Ccls of the MTR of the CSP 2007-13 and MIP 2011-13, 2014.*

*In the **energy sector**, the EU was not particularly active. Lead donors were the AsDB and the World Bank. Besides, countries such as the USA, Japan and China also ranked the power sector as high priority. For coordination issues, there was an active donor forum at federal level led by the AsDB and involving the World Bank, USAID, JICA, France, Germany and the EU.*

*Sources: EC, EU–Pakistan MIP 2014 – 2020; EU internal document n°8; EC, Ccls of the MTR of the CSP 2007-13 and MIP 2011-13, 2014.*

*On **public finance management** (PFM), donor coordination was already common practice for a core donor group consisting of the World Bank, AsDB, DfID, and the EU (with some interest expressed by USAID) in the early period and progress was made during the period. In the absence of concerted coordination led by the Government, donors exchanged information on a bilateral basis and met on a regular bi-monthly basis in a working group chaired by the World Bank. Close cooperation took place between the World Bank and the EU during the implementation of the programmes (at federal level and in the Sindh Province) and Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) assessments.*

*In spite of efforts to modernize PFM, neither the Federal Government nor the Provincial Governments came out with a comprehensive and overarching PFM reform strategy to lead the reform efforts in a coordinated and sequenced way. Only the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government adopted the Integrated Public Finance Management Strategy, the first such document in Pakistan. In 2007, a complete PEFA assessment was carried out by the World Bank, AsDB, DfID and the EU in this province. The core donor group, in cooperation with federal and provincial governments, then launched PEFA reviews for all four provinces in 2008 (and updated in 2009) and later at federal level.*

*Sources: EC, EU–Pakistan MIP 2014 – 2020; EC, Ccls of the MTR of the CSP 2007-13 and MIP 2011-13, 2014; EC, Annex Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Education Sector Reforms Programme 2007/018-465 (ESRP), in Annual action programme 2007 for Pakistan-Asia, 2012; EU internal document n°9*

### **C. Coordination in projects implemented through IOs**

*The EU supported different interventions that were implemented through international organizations (e.g. UN agencies, World Bank); the degree of coordination was good in general.*

	<p><i>With the World Bank, coordination in the planning of their Sindh governance reform programme resulted in a good division of tasks, with the EU support focusing on capacity building in PFM, within the Department of Finance, while the World Bank took in charge other aspects including taxation, procurement and roll out of possible investments across the districts.</i></p> <p><i>Source: EU internal document n°8</i></p> <p><i>Regarding the MDTF for the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, FATA and Balochistan, its cooperation and coordination objectives were positively acknowledged, as it represented an important instrument to bring donors together with the provincial and federal governments. But, as mentioned in some interviews, the MDTF mechanism has also had its challenges. For example, the implementation process in the different provinces could not be controlled correctly because the government, while appreciating that money is fungible, could not always adequately conduct the pooled funds. In addition, the fact that the MDTF envelope was directed to different provinces led to strong competition between the beneficiaries. Some other dissensions on policy objectives and donors financial commitments have also emerged between the World Bank and the EU, among other donors.</i></p> <p><i>Sources: MN 604, 607, 815, 825.</i></p> <p><b>Quality of evidence: Strong.</b></p>
	<p><i>Sources:</i></p> <p><i>ADE Meeting Notes 605, 607, 608, 825, 815, 835, 901.</i></p> <p><i>EC, Memo on the “Friends of Democratic Pakistan” Ministerial meeting, n°10/491, 2010.</i></p> <p><i>EC, Annex Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Education Sector Reforms Programme 2007/018-465 (ESRP), in Annual action programme 2007 for Pakistan-Asia, 2012.</i></p> <p><i>EC, EU Delegations’ Information and Communication Annual Report (2013) &amp; Forward Planning (2014).</i></p> <p><i>EC, EU–Pakistan Multi-Annual Indicative Programme (MIP) 2014 – 2020.</i></p> <p><i>EC, Conclusions of the Mid-Term Review of the Country Strategy Paper for Pakistan (2007-13) and Multiannual Indicative Programme 2011-13, 2014.</i></p> <p><i>EU internal documents n°8 and 9 Council of the EU, Strengthening EU Action in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Council meeting Luxembourg, 27 October 2009.</i></p> <p><i>Italian Foreign Affairs Ministry, Stream 2013-2015 Pakistan. Italian development aid in brief, 2015.</i></p> <p><i>Malik Abdul, “Pakistan” in Fengler W. &amp; H. Kharas, Delivering Aid Differently: Lessons from the Field, Brookings Institution Press, 2010.</i></p> <p><i>OECD, Aid Effectiveness 2011: Progress in implementing the Paris Declaration, Better Aid, OECD Publishing, 2012.</i></p>
I-10.2.2	<p><b>Initiatives and role of the EU in setting up and animating these coordination mechanisms.</b></p> <p>The EU has had a leading role in donor coordination groups at sector level (e.g. education), was actively involved in the policy dialogue held within the framework of the MDTF, and led donors’ actions concerning human rights and elections.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Coordination leader in the <b>Sindh Education Donors Group</b></li> </ul>

The EU was member of the government-led education donor group at federal level and led the donor roundtable in Sindh in 2004 to formulate the Sindh's Education Sector Plan and since then remained an important member of the Sindh Education Donors Group. Since there were not many development partners working on education in Sindh, the work done by the EU was considered of paramount importance and its lead was acknowledged. Coordination between the EU and the World Bank was good since 2007, on the basis of a common performance assessment framework and a sector-wide approach. There are monthly meetings on their respective projects between the development partners and the government to make sure they are aligned and complement each other. Sources: EC, MIP 2014-2020; MN 604, 825.

- Prominent role in **sectoral donor groups** on the environment (climate change) and forestry, the Interagency Gender and Development Group (INGAD), trade policy, micro-finance and financial services and governance.

Source: EC, *Pakistan Country Strategy Paper for 2007-2013*.

- The **MDTF for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, FATA and Balochistan**.

Through the MDTF the Delegation has been involved in policy dialogue between donors and the provinces of KP, Balochistan and FATA. The EU should take more importance in the MDTF in sharing the Advisory Committee from 2015 (see Note 1). This was requested by the MS and should make the EU as a whole more central in the process of preparation of the MTF round II which could start early 2016.

Sources: EU internal document n°9

- **PFM monitoring**

For PFM issues, the EU was part of a joint steering Committee together with the World Bank. The PFM programme has been judged by some development partners to be very large and maybe exclusive, not allowing enough flexibility for further exchanges of views.

Sources: MN 805, 825.

- Coordination leader on the **human rights issues** with the EU Human Rights Working Group and on the response to death penalty. Source: MN 825.

- Coordination leader on the **electoral process and electoral reform**, where the EU performed three successive EU Election Observation Missions (2002, 2008 and 2013). Sources: EC, *EU-Pakistan MIP 2014 – 2020*; MN 815, 825.

- The EU led a series of **consultative meetings** for which around 250 participants were invited from all over Pakistan, representing the National Assembly, the Senate, Provincial and Legislative Assemblies, civil society and private sector, international donor agencies and United Nations' agencies.

Source: Delegation of the EU to Pakistan, *National Consultations EU-Pakistan Cooperation 2014-2020. Summary of Discussions*, 2013.

Sources:

EU internal document n°9.



	<p><i>EC, EU–Pakistan Multi-Annual Indicative Programme (MIP) 2014 – 2020</i>  <i>EC, Pakistan Country Strategy Paper for 2007-2013.</i>  <i>Delegation of the EU to Pakistan, National Consultations EU-Pakistan Cooperation 2014-2020. Summary of Discussions, 2013.</i>  <i>Interviews: MN604, MN805, MN825</i></p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>Strong.</b></p>
I-10.2.3	<p><b>Degree of convergences between the EU cooperation strategy and that of the other development partners.</b></p> <p>Policy objectives of the EU strategy and of the strategies of EU Member States (Germany, Netherlands, United Kingdom, France, Italy), the USA, Norway and Switzerland generally converged. The strategies all promoted common values (e.g. liberal democracy, human rights, the rule of law, the role of the government in the economy) and shared common views on the needed economic and institutional reforms (e.g. FATA institutional question, energy reform). As expressed by one interviewee: “We come from the same perspective. Harmony is really striking.” Source: MN 608.</p> <p>On the other hand, there were some points of divergence with the policy objectives pursued and implementing methods used by Japan, the AsDB, the Arab donors (Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates) and the Islamic Development Bank. Interviews held in the field showed that cooperation between the EU and these development partners could be closer. However, it was also recognized that all donor agencies face political constraints (i.e. they have to report to their own political authorities). Sources: MN 605, 608.</p> <p>Information sharing has been good between like-minded donors and relatively poor with some others (e.g. China, Arab donors, Islamic Development Bank). Sources: EC, <i>Ccls of the MTR of the CSP 2007-13 and MIP 2011-13, 2014</i>; Malik Abdul, <i>Quality and coordination of official development aid in Pakistan, 2009.</i></p> <p><i>Sources:</i>  ADE Meeting Notes 605, 608.  EU internal document n°8Malik Abdul, <i>Quality and coordination of official development aid in Pakistan, Wolfenshon Center for Development WP 11, 2009.</i></p> <p>Quality of evidence: <b>More than satisfactory.</b></p>
I-10.2.4	<p><b>Reasons for the possible differences between the EU cooperation strategy and that of the other development partners (e.g. divergence of views regarding the appropriate response to needs, absence of information on mutual activities, ...)</b></p> <p>Overall, cooperation strategies between donors generally converged. When there were divergences, these were the result of (i) differing geographical and political priorities; (ii) types of implementing partners and financing modalities and (iii) weaknesses in government leadership in coordinating donors.</p>

• **Differing geographical and political priorities**

Aid fragmentation and the lack of concerted and co-ordinated aid programs were partly due to the fact that each donor, bilateral and multilateral, had its own strategic priorities and incentives framework. In general, donors tended to decide unilaterally the areas and the organisations and programmes to be funded. As mentioned in the *MTR of the CSP 2007-13 and MIP 2011-13*, security considerations were important criteria to decide whether and where intervening: “some of the major donors have substantially increased their engagement. Others have reduced or adjusted their presence, mainly for security reasons.” (...) “some donors have increased their involvement in the border provinces with Afghanistan while others have relocated their activities either within those provinces or to other provinces. All donors have to a varying extent increasingly had to cope with a lack of access to certain parts of the country and the need for increased security measures.”

Source: EC, *Ccls of the MTR of the CSP 2007-13 and MIP 2011-13*, 2014.

• **Types of implementing partners and financing modalities**

Some development partners always worked through federal government partnerships (e.g. Japan, World Bank), even when implementation took place at the provincial level. Others did not transfer funds to the federal government, but used instead local and international NGOs, private sector companies or local and international implementing partners (GIZ, KfW, UN). The EU worked with a wide range of implementing partners and external contractors both at federal and provincial levels.

Besides, the EU favoured, where and when possible, the adoption of sector-wide approaches (SWAp) and budgetary support. This de facto limited cooperation with the development partners that have not used these approaches. For instance, not all development partners agreed to participate in co-financing mechanisms such as the MDTF (e.g. Japan, France). Sources: MN 604, 605, 607.

• **Weak government leadership on coordination**

As recognised in the *MTR of the CSP 2007-13 and MIP 2011-13*, there was limited interest on the part of some government line agencies in a more effective coordination process. In general, the lack of adequate capacity and commitment of the GoP for aid delivery and the deteriorating security situation have had a negative impact and delayed the implementation of programmes and projects. Overall, coordination has been recognized as the “key missing element in Pakistan” and direct funding for projects and programs of federal and provincial governments have been described as “very difficult given the terrible execution rate of federal government”.

Sources: EC, *Ccls of the MTR of the CSP 2007-13 and MIP 2011-13*, 2014; MN 608.

*Sources:*

EC, *Conclusions of the Mid-Term Review of the Country Strategy Paper for Pakistan (2007-13) and Multiannual Indicative Programme 2011-13*, 2014.

Delegation of the EU to Pakistan, *National Consultations EU-Pakistan Cooperation 2014-2020. Summary of Discussions*, 2013.

Interviews: MN604, MN605, MN607, MN608.

Quality of evidence: **More than satisfactory.**



# Annex B1: Inventory of EU interventions in Pakistan 2007-2014

This annex section shows our analysis of how the EU's country strategy has materialised in terms of projects and programmes. It provides a pretty reliable database of EU development cooperation to the country across sectors and funding sources during the evaluation period 2007-2014.<sup>1</sup> It hence forms a sound basis for analyses performed on the overall project portfolio and in key sectors.

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## Acronyms

AAP	Annual Action Programme
AFD	French Development Agency
AJK	Azad Jammu and Kashmir
AKRSP	Aga Khan Rural Support Programme
AWP	Annual Work Programme
CAPRI	Counter terrorism Associated Prosecution Reform Initiative
CBSS	Country Based Support Scheme
CfP	Call for Proposals
CRIS	Common RELEX Information System
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSP	Country Strategy Paper
DCI	Development Cooperation Instrument
DCI-ENV	Environment and natural resources sustainable management
DCI-FOOD	Food security
DCI-HUM	Human and Social Development
DCI-MIGR	Migration and asylum
DCI-NSAPVD	Non State Actors – Pays en voie de développement
DG	Directorate General
DWH	Data Warehouse
EC	European Commission


<sup>1</sup> We have elaborated this inventory on the basis of EuropeAid's CRIS database (Common RELEX Information System), and its Data warehouse (DWH). Extracts were made in April 2015. Data relate to EuropeAid and EEAS cooperation interventions (not to ECHO or other DGs) in line with the scope of this evaluation.

ECHO	European Commission Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection
EEAS	European External Action Service
EIDHR	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
ENRTP	Environment and Natural Resources Thematic Programme
EOM	Election Observation Mission
EQ	Evaluation Question
EU	European Union
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FSTP	Food Security Thematic Programme
GIZ	German Agency for International Cooperation
HRG	Hogg Robinson Group
IFI	International Financing Institutions
IFS	Instrument for Stability
ILO	International Labour Organisation
KP	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
KP-ESRP	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Education Sector Reform Programme
LA	Local Authority
LRRD	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
MIP	Multi-annual Indicative Programme
MS	Member State
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NSA	Non State Actors
NWFP	North-West Frontier Province (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa)
PAPCE	Poverty Alleviation through Community Empowerment
PEACE	Programme for Economic Advancement and Community Empowerment
PFM	Public Financial Management
PFM-SPP	Public Financial Management Support Programme for Pakistan
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PSD	Private Sector Development
PWRP	Parliament Watch and Reforms Project
RAHA	Sustainable rural development in the Refugee Affected and Hosting Areas of Pakistan
RRM	Rapid Reaction Mechanism
SCE	Stabilisation and Counter Extremism
SEPSP	Sindh Education Plan Support Programme
SERP	Support to Electoral Reform in Pakistan
TRA	Trade Related Assistance
TRTA	Trade Related Technical Assistance
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organisation
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene promotion

## 1. General overview of the cooperation


Over the period 2007-2014, the EU commitments specific to Pakistan reached over 520 M€, of which approximately 290 M€ (56%) have been paid at this stage.

### Evolution of EU's funding to Pakistan (contracted amounts), 2007-2014



As is shown in the Figure above, **the total contracted per year varied significantly over the period.** The average contracted per year amounted to 35 M€ during the period 2007-2010, while it goes up to 96 M€ for 2011-2014. Amounts contracted in three years (2011, 2012 and 2014) thus correspond to 68% (357 M€) of the total contracted over the evaluation period and have been heavily influenced by sector budget support deployed to uphold rural development and education programmes. The figure above also indicates that a significant share of the amounts allocated to Pakistan under the MIP 2007-2010 has been only contracted after 2009.

### EU funding sources and EU implementation modalities in Pakistan over 2007-2014, €m



(1) Including DCI-ENV (1,9 M€), DCI-HUM (1,4 M€), MIGR (0,9 M€).  
 (2) EU Member States, including UK, GIZ and AFD

Source: ADE analysis, based on EuropeAid database (Data Warehouse), April 2015. Total contracted includes all the contracts related to Pakistan over the period 2007-2014, from commitments specific to Pakistan and commitments that are not country specific

Four instruments (DCI-Asia, Instrument for Stability (IfS) and two thematic budget lines) have been mostly used, comprising 95% of the total contracted amounts. Overall during the period, the geographic instrument DCI-Asia, comprising mostly bilateral programmable aid (MIP), was the largest source of funding for Pakistan (73% of the total contracted). All other sources remain relatively modest, except for the Instrument for Stability (12%), focusing on conflict prevention and strengthening rule of law, and the thematic DCI-Food (8%), specific to food security.


Regarding the implementation channels, almost a third of the aid was contracted with the Government. Aid implemented by the UN<sup>2</sup>, IFIs, EU MS and NGOs represented together 61%. Contract services with private sector organisations totalled 8%. This does not represent a usual distribution of aid channels. The choice of modalities and implementing partners is hence investigated in depth in EQ8.

<sup>2</sup> Mainly UNDP and UNIDO

## 2. Overview of the cooperation by sector

The interventions cover a wide range of thematic areas (see figure below). They include the focal sectors indicated in the CSP, i.e. rural development and education, and non-focal sectors such as trade and democratisation, human rights and security. Support was also provided in other areas, notably in LRRD/Food Security.

**Contracted amounts in Pakistan by sector of cooperation, 2007-2014**



(1) Including Reconstruction Relief and Rehabilitation, Water and sanitation, productive sector development and Health.


Source: ADE analysis, based on EuropeAid database (Data Warehouse), April 2015. Total contracted includes all the contracts related to Pakistan over the period 2007-2014, from commitments specific to Pakistan and commitments that are not country specific.

As highlighted in the figure above, over 75% of the EU cooperation contracted amounts went to the three main areas of cooperation: rural development (33%), education (28%), and democratisation, human rights and security (15%).

Nevertheless, whereas rural development was the main sector of intervention of the EU in Pakistan over the period 2007-2014 *in terms of contracts (and in the MIP)*, EU *disbursements* in that sector (56 M€ or 19% of all payments) were about half of those in the field of education (97 M€ or 33% of all payments). This is illustrated in the figure below. It is largely due to the fact that nearly the total amount of resources allocated to the rural development sector over the period comes from one large (80 M€) but recent programme that has hardly disbursed so far.



**Amounts contracted and paid in Pakistan for the sector of cooperation, 2007-2014**



The table next page provides a comprehensive mapping of EU interventions in Pakistan over the period 2007-2014 and identifies for each sector the funding sources/instruments deployed.

**Table 1 - Overview of EU interventions in Pakistan, 2007-2014**

Sector	Funding source/instrument	Contracted	Paid	Contracted	Paid	Paid/contracted %
		Million €	Million €	% of total	% of total	
<b>1. Rural Development</b>		<b>173.91</b>	<b>79.05</b>	<b>33.4%</b>	<b>22.4%</b>	<b>45.5%</b>
	DCI-Asie (national)	165.94	73.82	31.8%	20.9%	44.5%
	DCI-Asie (regional --> Pakistan) <sup>(1)</sup>	0.41	0.40	0.1%	0.1%	98.1%
	DCI-NSAPVD	5.68	3.14	1.1%	0.9%	55.3%
	EIDHR	0.01	0.01	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
	DCI-ENV	1.87	1.68	0.4%	0.5%	89.8%
<b>2. Education</b>		<b>145.72</b>	<b>116.56</b>	<b>28.0%</b>	<b>33.1%</b>	<b>80.0%</b>
	DCI-Asie (regional --> Pakistan) <sup>(2)</sup>	0.15	0.14	0.0%	0.0%	92.5%
<b>3. Governance &amp; democracy</b>		<b>77.81</b>	<b>54.38</b>	<b>14.9%</b>	<b>15.4%</b>	<b>69.9%</b>
	DCI-Asie (national)	52.61	35.13	10.1%	10.0%	66.8%
	DCI-Asie (regional --> Pakistan)	0.44	0.43	0.1%	0.1%	97.7%
	IFS-RRM	4.57	4.17	0.9%	1.2%	91.2%
	DCI-FOOD	0.04	0.04	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
	IFS	6.79	2.24	1.3%	0.6%	33.0%
	EIDHR	9.90	9.07	1.9%	2.6%	91.6%
	DCI-HUM, DCI-MIGR, DCI-NSA, DDH, MIGR, ONG-PVD	3.46	3.30	0.7%	0.9%	95.4%
<b>4. PFM</b>		<b>13.67</b>	<b>5.08</b>	<b>2.6%</b>	<b>1.4%</b>	<b>37.2%</b>
	DCI-Asie (regional --> Pakistan)	0.36	0.36	0.1%	0.1%	100.0%
<b>5. Trade</b>		<b>15.27</b>	<b>12.79</b>	<b>2.9%</b>	<b>3.6%</b>	<b>83.7%</b>
	DCI-Asie (regional --> Pakistan)	0.13	0.13	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
<b>6. Food Security/ LRRD</b>		<b>72.95</b>	<b>64.95</b>	<b>14.0%</b>	<b>18.4%</b>	<b>89.0%</b>
	DCI-Asie (regional --> Pakistan)	32.71	32.71	6.3%	9.3%	100.0%
	DCI-FOOD	39.88	31.88	7.6%	9.0%	79.9%
<b>7. Other</b>		<b>22.03</b>	<b>19.77</b>	<b>4.2%</b>	<b>5.6%</b>	<b>89.8%</b>
	DCI-Asie (national)	3.33	4.42	0.6%	1.3%	132.8%
	DCI-Asie (regional --> Pakistan) <sup>(3)</sup>	7.89	5.42	1.5%	1.5%	68.7%
	DCI-Asie (N/A)	0.02	0.02	0.0%	0.0%	92.3%
	IFS-RRM	0.11	0.11	0.0%	0.0%	102.9%
	DCI-FOOD	0.12	0.12	0.0%	0.0%	98.3%
	DCI-NSAPVD	7.81	7.70	1.5%	2.2%	98.6%
	IFS	1.27	0.76	0.2%	0.2%	59.8%
	EIDHR	0.09	0.09	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
	ENV, DDH, ADM-MULTI, DCI-HUM, DCI-NSA, DCI-SANTE, EVA, ICSP, ONG-PVD	1.39	1.13	0.3%	0.3%	81.3%
	<b>Total</b>	<b>521.36</b>	<b>352.57</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>67.6%</b>

Source: ADE based on DEVCO databases (CRIS and DataWarehouse)

<sup>(1)</sup> For regional programmes and all countries programmes (e.g. EIDHR, DCI-FOOD, DCI-HUM, DCI-MIGR, DDH, MIGR, ONG-PVD), the inventory records the amounts contracted for Pakistan.

<sup>(2)</sup> Does not include Erasmus Mundus in Pakistan. Erasmus Mundus is not recorded in CRIS. The inventory of the *Evaluation of EU's regional co-operation with Asia*, Final Report, Ecorys, March 2014, identifies 19 Erasmus Mundus regional projects involving Pakistan and four or more Asian countries. The payments made there regional programmes over the period amount to € 39.9m but the share of Pakistan is not identified.

<sup>(3)</sup> Does not include Pakistan' share of regional AUP programmes in support of Afghan refugees (DCI ASIE/2007/019-101 and /2011/023-063), mentioned in the Regional Evaluation of Ecorys but not recorded in CRIS.

### **3. Implications of the inventory for the evaluation**

Two characteristics of this inventory are important for this evaluation:

1° EU interventions in Pakistan have been very diverse, using a wide variety of instruments, modalities and implementation channels. This requires due attention to the justification of this approach, the rationale behind it, and to the complementarity between the different modalities and instruments. A particular difficulty comes from the fact that the overwhelming share of the EU support has been allocated to the two focal sectors through a few large programmes which the evaluation has to analyse in depth. This absorbs a large share of the resources of the evaluation. Therefore, the selection of a necessarily limited number of smaller interventions, particularly in the fields of democratisation, human rights and security, has to be very careful to ensure that their analysis leads to strategic messages for the cooperation as a whole.

2° In relative terms the EU is a small contributor to the total support provided by the donor community to Pakistan. As a consequence the value of the design and implementation of its interventions largely depend on the way they are coordinated and complementary with those of the other donors, and, evidently, with the Government. This issue is therefore duly analysed in the evaluation questions.

### **4. List of all EU contracts in Pakistan (2007-2014)**

The table below presents a list of all contracts of EU cooperation with Pakistan that fall under the evaluation scope (funding through all financial instruments from EuropeAid and EEAS in the key sectors of development cooperation during the 2007-2014 period).

This list has been constructed on the basis of an April 2015 extraction of the EuropeAid CRIS database (Common RELEX Information System) and its Data warehouse (DWH).

This list is sorted respectively by sector, domain, decision level, decision year and decision title (of the decision to which the contract belong). It then provides information on the contracts themselves, notably contract year, title, contracted and paid amounts in the evaluation period, and CRIS contract number.

The sectors used are the following:

1. Rural Development
2. Education
3. Democratic Governance
4. Public Financial Management (PFM)
5. Trade
6. Other

### List of all EU development cooperation contracts in Pakistan, 2007-2014

Sector	Domain	Decision Level	Decision Year	Decision Title	Decision Number	Contract Year	Contract Title	Total Contracted 2007-2014 (M€)	Total Paid 2007-2014 (M€)	Contract Number
1.Rural Development	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2008	Improving Livelihoods through Application of Renewable Energy	019-974	2012	Programme for Economic Advancement and Community Empowerment (PEACE)	23,000,000	12,222,739	283007
1.Rural Development	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2008	Supporting Rural Development and Natural Resources Management in NWFP and Balochistan through Capacity Building and Promotion of Sector-Wide Approaches	020-199	2010	Supporting rural development and natural resources management in NWFP through capacity building and promotion of sector-wide approaches	77,949	77,949	229668
1.Rural Development	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2008	Supporting Rural Development and Natural Resources Management in NWFP and Balochistan through Capacity Building and Promotion of Sector-Wide Approaches	020-199	2010	Supporting rural development and natural resources management in NWFP and Balochistan through promotion of sector-wide approaches - PHASE 1	90,483	90,483	229667
1.Rural Development	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2009	Integrated Sustainable Rural Development through Agricultural Growth	021-581	2012	Programme for Economic Advancement and Community Empowerment (PEACE)	17,000,000	3,693,320	283007
1.Rural Development	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2009	Integrated Sustainable Rural Development through Agricultural Growth	021-581	2013	Balochistan Community Development Programme	7,000,000	4,705,056	327025
1.Rural Development	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2009	Integrated Sustainable Rural Development through Agricultural Growth	021-581	2013	Improving Communication and Visibility of EU Cooperation in Pakistan Rural Development and Nutrition	300,000	90,000	332051
1.Rural Development	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2009	Integrated Sustainable Rural Development through Agricultural Growth	021-581	2013	Organising rural development and nutrition related conferences	99,532	79,626	332273
1.Rural Development	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2009	Sustainable Rural Development in the Refugee-Affected and Hosting Areas of Pakistan	021-577	2011	Sustainable rural development in the refugee-affected and hosting areas of Pakistan (RAHA)	39,800,000	38,939,913	260022
1.Rural Development	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2012	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa District Governance and Community Development Programme (part I)	023-634	2014	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa District Governance and Community Development Programme	37,200,000	9,000,000	337112

Sector	Domain	Decision Level	Decision Year	Decision Title	Decision Number	Contract Year	Contract Title	Total Contracted 2007-2014 (M€)	Total Paid 2007-2014 (M€)	Contract Number
1.Rural Development	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2012	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa District Governance and Community Development Programme (part I)	023-634	2014	Social Mobilisation in Support of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa District Governance & Community Development Programme	7,500,000	3,422,374	339723
1.Rural Development	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2012	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa District Governance and Community Development Programme (part I)	023-634	2014	Technical Assistance Contract – Khyber Pakhtunkhwa district governance and community development programme (KP-DGCD)	6,876,903	1,375,381	346862
1.Rural Development	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2012	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa District Governance and Community Development Programme (part I)	023-634	2014	Technical Assistance for Local Development and Local Governance Programmes in Pakistan	198,880	119,328	343154
1.Rural Development	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2013	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa District Governance and Community Development Programme (part 2)	024-349	2014	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa District Governance and Community Development Programme	26,800,000	-	337112
1.Rural Development	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2007	Operational Short-Term Technical Assistance Related to the Political, Economic, Cultural, Financial and Technical Cooperation with Developing Countries in Asia	018-889	2008	Technical Assistance for EC on Rural Development and Natural Resource Management	5,650	5,650	164695
1.Rural Development	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2010	Operational Short-Term Technical Assistance Related to the Political, Economic, Cultural, Financial and Technical Cooperation with Developing Countries in Asia	022-571	2011	EU Technical Adviser for Community Development	199,940	199,940	276411
1.Rural Development	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2012	Operational short-term technical assistance related to the political, economic, cultural, financial and technical cooperation with developing countries in Asia	023-636	2013	EU Technical Adviser for Rural Development (Pakistan)	101,872	101,872	312961

Sector	Domain	Decision Level	Decision Year	Decision Title	Decision Number	Contract Year	Contract Title	Total Contracted 2007-2014 (M€)	Total Paid 2007-2014 (M€)	Contract Number
1.Rural Development	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2012	Operational short-term technical assistance related to the political, economic, cultural, financial and technical cooperation with developing countries in Asia	023-636	2013	Procurement Consultant for PEACE Programme	98,937	94,086	315312
1.Rural Development	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2013	Operational short-term technical assistance related to the political, economic, cultural, financial and technical cooperation with developing countries in Asia	024-732	2013	Procurement Consultant for PEACE Programme	1,276	-	315312
1.Rural Development	DCI-ENV	All countries	2009	General Call for Proposals for Priority 1, 2 and 5 of the strategy paper ENRTP	020-656	2010	Building Capacity on Climate Change Adaptation in Coastal Areas of Pakistan	1,869,496	1,682,546	222510
1.Rural Development	DCI-NSAPVD	All countries	2010	NSA & LA Programme > Obj. 1 NSA (In-country + multi-country)	022-312	2011	RDE - Capacity Building of Local Grassroots Organisations in Governance, Transparency and Gender Sensitisation	253,338	253,338	278997
1.Rural Development	DCI-NSAPVD	All countries	2011	The thematic programme Non State Actors (NSA): Objective Nr. 1 - In-country + multi-regional/country	022-941	2012	Supporting inclusive development through community-government capacity building and partnership in Southern Sindh	999,984	899,986	306550
1.Rural Development	DCI-NSAPVD	All countries	2012	Non State Actors (NSA): Objective 1 - Actions in partner countries (in-country and multi-country interventions)	023-482	2013	Deepening Participatory Governance in Gilgit-Baltistan	750,000	435,127	322061
1.Rural Development	DCI-NSAPVD	All countries	2012	Non State Actors (NSA): Objective 1 - Actions in partner countries (in-country and multi-country interventions)	023-482	2013	PACE-PD: Poverty Alleviation through Community Empowerment and Participatory Development in District Bhakkar, Punjab, Pakistan	719,807	321,180	321380
1.Rural Development	DCI-NSAPVD	All countries	2012	Non State Actors (NSA): Objective 1 - Actions in partner countries (in-country and multi-country interventions)	023-482	2013	Supporting Inclusive Development through Community-Government Capacity Building and Partnership in three districts of AJK	743,129	592,938	321723

Sector	Domain	Decision Level	Decision Year	Decision Title	Decision Number	Contract Year	Contract Title	Total Contracted 2007-2014 (M€)	Total Paid 2007-2014 (M€)	Contract Number
1.Rural Development	DCI-NSAPVD	All countries	2013	Non State Actors (NSA): Objective 1 - Actions in partner countries (in-country and multi-country interventions)	024-630	2014	Local Authorities and Civil Society Organizations in Development of Flood Affected Population in Muzaffargarh and Rajanpur Districts, Pakistan	750,000	246,253	344840
1.Rural Development	DCI-NSAPVD	All countries	2013	Non State Actors (NSA): Objective 1 - Actions in partner countries (in-country and multi-country interventions)	024-630	2014	Poverty alleviation and community development project	716,597	164,919	344850
1.Rural Development	DCI-NSAPVD	All countries	2013	Non State Actors (NSA): Objective 1 - Actions in partner countries (in-country and multi-country interventions)	024-630	2014	Supporting inclusive development through community-Government capacity building and partnership in four districts of AJK	748,500	221,808	344580
1.Rural Development	EIDHR	All countries	2011	EIDHR 2011 AAP - CBSS (Country Based Support Schemes)	022-810	2012	Annual Conference on International Day of Rural Women 2012	8,695	8,695	303935
2.Education	ASIE	Bilateral	2005	Sindh Education Plan - Support Programme (SEP-SP)	017-667	2007	Sindh Education Reform Programme, Sector Support	33,000,000	33,000,000	139231
2.Education	ASIE	Bilateral	2005	Sindh Education Plan - Support Programme (SEP-SP)	017-667	2007	Technical Assistance Support for Sindh Education Plan Support Programme, Karachi and Sindh Province, Pakistan	4,246,293	4,246,293	133597
2.Education	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2007	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Education Sector Reforms Programme - KP-ESRP	018-465	2009	NWFP Education Sector Reforms Programme - Sector Support	18,000,000	18,000,000	172724
2.Education	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2007	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Education Sector Reforms Programme - KP-ESRP	018-465	2011	Addendum to Contract No. 2009/172-724	15,000,000	15,000,000	269415
2.Education	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2007	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Education Sector Reforms Programme - KP-ESRP	018-465	2011	Delegation Agreement with GIZ to impement Basic Education Development Programme KP	1,550,000	1,550,000	267075
2.Education	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2007	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Education Sector Reforms Programme - KP-ESRP	018-465	2012	Technical evaluation and review of contracting/construction of schools in Malakand Division, KP Province	6,560	6,560	307967

Sector	Domain	Decision Level	Decision Year	Decision Title	Decision Number	Contract Year	Contract Title	Total Contracted 2007-2014 (M€)	Total Paid 2007-2014 (M€)	Contract Number
2.Education	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2008	Support to the Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) sector in Pakistan	019-952	2012	N/A	2,741,844	2,333,958	284419
2.Education	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2008	Support to the Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) sector in Pakistan	019-952	2012	Delegation Agreement with GiZ to implement Capacity Building Component of TVET I	3,933,973	2,980,689	277532
2.Education	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2008	Support to the Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) sector in Pakistan	019-952	2012	Enhancing socio-economic development through investing in human capital in Punjab and Sindh	2,418,657	1,843,092	284406
2.Education	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2008	Support to the Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) sector in Pakistan	019-952	2012	EQUATE- Enhancing Quality and Access to TVET for Employability	2,496,318	2,140,523	284421
2.Education	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2008	Support to the Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) sector in Pakistan	019-952	2012	Provision of access to market-driven training and employment opportunities to vulnerable youth and women in rural districts of Southern Punjab	2,236,253	1,857,944	284414
2.Education	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2008	Support to the Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) sector in Pakistan	019-952	2012	Supporting TVET in Northern Balochistan	1,530,000	1,337,941	284416
2.Education	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2008	Support to the Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) sector in Pakistan	019-952	2012	Supporting TVET sector for the socio-economic uplift of rural marginalized communities in Pakistan	3,540,665	1,153,892	299277
2.Education	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2009	Supporting TVET Reform in Pakistan (TVETII)	021-329	2011	Delegation Agreement with GIZ to implement Supporting Technical and Vocational Education and Training Reform in Pakistan Programme	25,400,000	19,671,010	265674
2.Education	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2011	Sindh Education Sector Support Programme	023-009	2012	Interim Technical Assistance: Technical / Policy Advisor, Education Sector, Sindh	162,467	162,467	292754
2.Education	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2011	Sindh Education Sector Support Programme	023-009	2012	Sindh Education Sector Support Programme	25,500,000	10,000,000	289807



Sector	Domain	Decision Level	Decision Year	Decision Title	Decision Number	Contract Year	Contract Title	Total Contracted 2007-2014 (M€)	Total Paid 2007-2014 (M€)	Contract Number
2.Education	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2011	Sindh Education Sector Support Programme	023-009	2013	EDU - Technical Assistance under Sindh Education Sector Support Programme Pakistan	3,809,380	1,134,667	315499
2.Education	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2007	Operational Short-Term Technical Assistance Related to the Political, Economic, Cultural, Financial and Technical Cooperation with Developing Countries in Asia	018-889	2008	Support Formulation mission TVET sector Pakistan	10,000	10,000	159360
2.Education	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2007	Operational Short-Term Technical Assistance Related to the Political, Economic, Cultural, Financial and Technical Cooperation with Developing Countries in Asia	018-889	2008	Support Identification mission TVET-Pakistan	8,000	8,000	154654
2.Education	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2010	Operational Short-Term Technical Assistance Related to the Political, Economic, Cultural, Financial and Technical Cooperation with Developing Countries in Asia	022-571	2011	Qualitative Research Study: Quality of Education in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	111,310	111,310	279994
2.Education	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2012	Operational short-term technical assistance related to the political, economic, cultural, financial and technical cooperation with developing countries in Asia	023-636	2013	Service contract for development of a website and its maintenance	18,400	13,800	325853
3.Democratic Governance	ASIE	Bilateral	2005	Combating Abusive Child Labour II	017-640	2008	Combating Abusive Child Labour II	4,750,000	4,491,492	144940
3.Democratic Governance	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2009	Access to Justice for Poor and Vulnerable Groups through Support of Legal and Civil Society Organisations and the Judiciary in Punjab	019-192	2012	Technical assistance on human rights	5,990	5,990	283464

Sector	Domain	Decision Level	Decision Year	Decision Title	Decision Number	Contract Year	Contract Title	Total Contracted 2007-2014 (M€)	Total Paid 2007-2014 (M€)	Contract Number
3.Democratic Governance	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2009	Access to Justice for Poor and Vulnerable Groups through Support of Legal and Civil Society Organisations and the Judiciary in Punjab	019-192	2013	Access to Justice for Poor and Vulnerable Groups through Support of Legal and Civil Society Organisations and the Judiciary in Punjab	7,524,500	1,504,900	284412
3.Democratic Governance	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2009	Improving Parliamentary Performance	021-157	2012	Improving Parliamentary performance	5,750,450	2,780,738	277934
3.Democratic Governance	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2009	Improving Parliamentary Performance	021-157	2012	Parliament Watch and Reforms Project (PWRP)	500,000	415,322	284415
3.Democratic Governance	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2009	Improving Parliamentary Performance	021-157	2013	Technical assistance for strengthening the interface between the Delegation, Pakistan parliamentary and electoral stakeholders and relevant parliamentary projects	12,010	12,010	313941
3.Democratic Governance	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2013	Citizens Justice and Peace Programme in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	024-662	2014	Strengthening Rule of Law Programme for Citizens' Justice and Peace in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	9,500,000	3,029,957	355202
3.Democratic Governance	IFS-RRM	Bilateral	2009	Civilian capacity building for law enforcement in Pakistan	022-083	2010	Civilian capacity building for law enforcement in Pakistan	11,263,135	11,263,135	231840
3.Democratic Governance	IFS-RRM	Bilateral	2009	Civilian capacity building for law enforcement in Pakistan	022-083	2010	Civilian Capacity Building for Law Enforcement in Pakistan - Procurement of Equipment	3,475,385	3,475,385	258897
3.Democratic Governance	IFS-RRM	Bilateral	2012	Consolidation of democracy in Pakistan through support for elections	023-688	2012	Electoral cycle support to the Election Commission of Pakistan	2,500,000	2,250,000	284461

Sector	Domain	Decision Level	Decision Year	Decision Title	Decision Number	Contract Year	Contract Title	Total Contracted 2007-2014 (M€)	Total Paid 2007-2014 (M€)	Contract Number
3.Democratic Governance	IFS-RRM	Bilateral	2012	Consolidation of democracy in Pakistan through support for elections	023-688	2012	Long Term Election Observation and Oversight in Pakistan	2,504,939	2,310,399	284456
3.Democratic Governance	IFS-RRM	Bilateral	2012	Consolidation of democracy in Pakistan through support for elections	023-688	2012	Support for Electoral Reform in Pakistan (SERP) Project -2012-2014	2,911,028	1,686,764	284454
3.Democratic Governance	IFS-RRM	Bilateral	2012	Consolidation of democracy in Pakistan through support for elections	023-688	2012	Supporting advocacy for electoral reforms in Pakistan	1,908,626	1,908,626	284424
3.Democratic Governance	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2007	Operational Short-Term Technical Assistance Related to the Political, Economic, Cultural, Financial and Technical Cooperation with Developing Countries in Asia	018-889	2008	Pakistan: Evaluation of NSA/LA Concept Notes Cfp Reference EuropeAid/126693/L/ACT/PK (Actions in Pakistan)	3,200	3,200	158037
3.Democratic Governance	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2007	Operational Short-Term Technical Assistance Related to the Political, Economic, Cultural, Financial and Technical Cooperation with Developing Countries in Asia	018-889	2008	Study on Division of Labour in the Frame of Aid Effectiveness	9,950	9,950	164522
3.Democratic Governance	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2008	Operational Short-Term Technical Assistance Related to the Political, Economic, Cultural, Financial and Technical Cooperation with Developing Countries in Asia	019-770	2008	Project Identification Mission Building Up the Capacity of Legal Representatives	65,500	65,500	172247
3.Democratic Governance	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2010	Operational Short-Term Technical Assistance Related to the Political, Economic, Cultural, Financial and Technical Cooperation with Developing Countries in Asia	022-571	2011	Technical Assistance for formulation for support to democratic Institutions programme	53,856	53,856	278339

Sector	Domain	Decision Level	Decision Year	Decision Title	Decision Number	Contract Year	Contract Title	Total Contracted 2007-2014 (M€)	Total Paid 2007-2014 (M€)	Contract Number
3.Democratic Governance	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2010	Operational Short-Term Technical Assistance Related to the Political, Economic, Cultural, Financial and Technical Cooperation with Developing Countries in Asia	022-571	2011	Technical assistance on justice and rule of law	9,600	9,600	270221
3.Democratic Governance	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2012	Operational short-term technical assistance related to the political, economic, cultural, financial and technical cooperation with developing countries in Asia	023-636	2012	Identification of EU Rule of Law Programme in Pakistan 2013	102,648	102,648	304255
3.Democratic Governance	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2013	Operational short-term technical assistance related to the political, economic, cultural, financial and technical cooperation with developing countries in Asia	024-732	2014	Organisation of South Asia Labour Conference in collaboration with the Government of Punjab	194,674	189,181	338448
3.Democratic Governance	IFS-RRM	Regional - Asia	N/A	N/A	N/A	2009	Support Electoral reforms in Pakistan	2,053,903	2,053,903	224115
3.Democratic Governance	DCI-FOOD	Regional - Asia	N/A	N/A	N/A	2013	Supplementary contract for payment on Actual contract no. DCI-FOOD/2009/213-097	36,176	36,176	320389
3.Democratic Governance	DCI-HUM	All countries	2009	Support to social inclusion of vulnerable groups at community level: Call for proposals	021-148	2010	Support social protection and decent work of brick kiln workers and bonded labourers in Pakistan	1,367,844	1,215,346	236497
3.Democratic Governance	DCI-MIGR	All countries	2011	Support Measures AAP 2011 Migration and Asylum	023-088	2011	Promotion of Rights, Capacity Building Measures and Initiatives to Curb & Temporary Migration including Human Smuggling & Trafficking (C-PRISM)	20,465	20,465	271083

Sector	Domain	Decision Level	Decision Year	Decision Title	Decision Number	Contract Year	Contract Title	Total Contracted 2007-2014 (M€)	Total Paid 2007-2014 (M€)	Contract Number
3.Democratic Governance	DCI-NSA	All countries	2013	Non State Actors (NSA) - Objective 3 coordination, cooperation and networking: call for proposals + targeted projects + accompanying measures	024-650	2014	Shaping the EU's Engagement with CSOs and LAs in Pakistan	19,750	11,850	353166
3.Democratic Governance	DCI-NSAPVD	All countries	2007	Global commitment for local calls for proposals Objective 1 - PVD Projects - Non State Actors - AAP 2007	019-404	2008	CfP Information Session at Karachi (Pearl Continental Hotel Karachi)	915	915	152441
3.Democratic Governance	DCI-NSAPVD	All countries	2007	Global commitment for local calls for proposals Objective 1 - PVD Projects - Non State Actors - AAP 2007	019-404	2008	Production of Information Packages for Participants of CfP Information Sessions	677	677	152079
3.Democratic Governance	DCI-NSAPVD	All countries	2008	Global commitment for in-country calls for proposals -Objective 1- PVD projects - Non State Actors - AAP 2008	020-081	2009	Consultation with Civil Society	1,087	1,087	200000
3.Democratic Governance	DDH	All countries	2006	EIDHR micro projects AWP 2006 Central Asia & Asia	018-139	2007	Creating a supportive environment for female sex workers to advocate for their human rights and play their vital role in the national HIV/AIDS response.	89,604	89,604	139779
3.Democratic Governance	DDH	All countries	2006	EIDHR micro projects AWP 2006 Central Asia & Asia	018-139	2007	Human resource development to support victims of torture	84,416	84,416	139782
3.Democratic Governance	DDH	All countries	2006	EIDHR micro projects AWP 2006 Central Asia & Asia	018-139	2007	Mainstreaming minorities' rights in Pakistan	73,312	73,312	139675
3.Democratic Governance	DDH	All countries	2006	EIDHR micro projects AWP 2006 Central Asia & Asia	018-139	2007	Minority communities empowerment to protect their rights and promote understanding for peace, tolerance and equity for conflict prevention.	80,270	80,270	139718
3.Democratic Governance	DDH	All countries	2006	EIDHR micro projects AWP 2006 Central Asia & Asia	018-139	2007	Programme for development of human rights culture in Sialkot	94,674	94,674	139749
3.Democratic Governance	DDH	All countries	2006	EIDHR micro projects AWP 2006 Central Asia & Asia	018-139	2007	Restoring dignity amongst indigenous desert border	72,450	72,450	139670

Sector	Domain	Decision Level	Decision Year	Decision Title	Decision Number	Contract Year	Contract Title	Total Contracted 2007-2014 (M€)	Total Paid 2007-2014 (M€)	Contract Number
							communities.			
3.Democratic Governance	EIDHR	All countries	2007	Commitment of funds to finance Chief Observer Contracts for EU Election Observation Missions	019-431	2007	ELE - Chief Observer for the EU Election Observation Mission (EAT Election Assessment Team) for elections in Pakistan foreseen for 08/01/2008	15,509	15,509	147477
3.Democratic Governance	EIDHR	All countries	2007	EIDHR 2007 AAP - COUNTRY BASED SUPPORT SCHEMES	019-377	2008	Information session Call for Proposals EIDHR CBSS Pakistan 2007/2008	1,163	1,163	152821
3.Democratic Governance	EIDHR	All countries	2007	EIDHR 2007 AAP - COUNTRY BASED SUPPORT SCHEMES	019-377	2008	Juvenile Justice Reform in Pakistan	298,172	298,172	169259
3.Democratic Governance	EIDHR	All countries	2007	EIDHR 2007 AAP - COUNTRY BASED SUPPORT SCHEMES	019-377	2008	Rape Survivors Support Programme	70,164	70,164	168250
3.Democratic Governance	EIDHR	All countries	2007	EIDHR 2007 AAP - COUNTRY BASED SUPPORT SCHEMES	019-377	2008	Seminar International Day in Support of Victims of Torture	1,007	1,007	161055
3.Democratic Governance	EIDHR	All countries	2008	EIDHR 2008- AAP without country based support schemes, without targeted projects, without EOMs	019-715	2009	Promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms in Pakistan	692,940	692,940	216586
3.Democratic Governance	EIDHR	All countries	2008	EIDHR 2008 AAP-Country Based Support Schemes (CBSS)	019-719	2009	Enhancing support for ending violence and discrimination against women in Pakistan	149,110	149,110	223084
3.Democratic Governance	EIDHR	All countries	2008	EIDHR 2008 AAP-Country Based Support Schemes (CBSS)	019-719	2009	Fostering the protection of children in detention through legal assistance, psycho-social rehabilitation and capacity building.	278,016	278,016	223080

Sector	Domain	Decision Level	Decision Year	Decision Title	Decision Number	Contract Year	Contract Title	Total Contracted 2007-2014 (M€)	Total Paid 2007-2014 (M€)	Contract Number
3.Democratic Governance	EIDHR	All countries	2008	EIDHR 2008 AAP-Country Based Support Schemes (CBSS)	019-719	2009	Police training and capacity building for democracy and human rights.	127,060	127,060	223083
3.Democratic Governance	EIDHR	All countries	2009	EIDHR 2009 Annual Action Programme - CBSS (Country Based Support Schemes)	021-318	2009	Police training and capacity building for democracy and human rights.	73,653	73,653	223083
3.Democratic Governance	EIDHR	All countries	2009	EIDHR 2009 Annual Action Programme - CBSS (Country Based Support Schemes)	021-318	2010	Event on World Press Freedom Day: 3 May 2010 - Pakistan	9,733	9,733	239078
3.Democratic Governance	EIDHR	All countries	2009	EIDHR 2009 Annual Action Programme - CBSS (Country Based Support Schemes)	021-318	2010	Launch of EU Strategy for Human Rights Defenders in Urdu (10/12/2010)	1,360	1,360	257825
3.Democratic Governance	EIDHR	All countries	2009	EIDHR 2009 Annual Action Programme - CBSS (Country Based Support Schemes)	021-318	2010	Locked up and forgotten: prevention of torture in prisons in NWFP, Pakistan.	232,855	232,855	223086
3.Democratic Governance	EIDHR	All countries	2009	EIDHR 2009 Annual Action Programme - CBSS (Country Based Support Schemes)	021-318	2010	Working women use legislation to combat harassment.	216,047	216,047	223081
3.Democratic Governance	EIDHR	All countries	2009	EIDHR 2009 Annual Action Programme - Without country based support schemes, targeted projects and EOMs	021-315	2010	EIDHR Obj 1 Enhancing respect for HR and FF in countries and regions where they are most at risk	194,804	194,804	251359

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3.Democratic Governance	EIDHR	All countries	2009	EIDHR 2009 Annual Action Programme - Without country based support schemes, targeted projects and EOMs	021-315	2010	Ending torture and ill-treatment of women in police custody in Pakistan	937,553	843,798	246127
3.Democratic Governance	EIDHR	All countries	2010	EIDHR 2010 Annual Action Programme - CBSS (Country Based Support Schemes)	022-196	2011	Forum on the safety and security of the media in Pakistan	7,550	7,550	269260
3.Democratic Governance	EIDHR	All countries	2010	EIDHR 2010 Annual Action Programme - CBSS (Country Based Support Schemes)	022-196	2011	HRG - "Meri Awaz Suno" (Listen to my voice)	92,450	92,450	277432
3.Democratic Governance	EIDHR	All countries	2010	EIDHR 2010 Annual Action Programme - CBSS (Country Based Support Schemes)	022-196	2011	HRG - Tahaffuz: State-Civil society action for the protection of children, especially working children, from sexual exploitation and abuse in Rawalpindi District.	147,459	147,459	277429
3.Democratic Governance	EIDHR	All countries	2011	EIDHR 2011 AAP - CBSS (Country Based Support Schemes)	022-810	2011	HRG - Expanding sustainable child advocacy, protection and empowerment (ESCAPE) Project	444,644	401,610	277433
3.Democratic Governance	EIDHR	All countries	2011	EIDHR 2011 AAP - CBSS (Country Based Support Schemes)	022-810	2011	HRG - "Meri Awaz Suno" (Listen to my voice)	350,845	190,137	277432
3.Democratic Governance	EIDHR	All countries	2011	EIDHR 2011 AAP - CBSS (Country Based Support Schemes)	022-810	2011	National Child Rights Arts Festival 2011	25,500	25,500	277980



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3.Democratic Governance	EIDHR	All countries	2011	EIDHR 2011 AAP - CBSS (Country Based Support Schemes)	022-810	2012	Technical assistance for celebration of Human Rights Day 2012	5,775	5,775	307661
3.Democratic Governance	EIDHR	All countries	2011	EIDHR 2011 AAP - CBSS (Country Based Support Schemes)	022-810	2012	Technical assistance for the organisation of a dialogue with human rights defenders	3,106	3,106	306199
3.Democratic Governance	EIDHR	All countries	2012	EIDHR 2012 AAP - CBSS (Country Based Support Schemes)	023-791	2013	International Day of Rural Women Conference 2013	20,000	20,000	328734
3.Democratic Governance	EIDHR	All countries	2012	EIDHR 2012 AAP - CBSS (Country Based Support Schemes)	023-791	2013	Training of Trainers for Human Rights Defenders personal and organisational security	19,880	19,880	328125
3.Democratic Governance	EIDHR	All countries	2013	EIDHR 2013 AAP - CBSS (Country Based Support Schemes)	024-556	2013	Service contract for publication of advertisement for EIDHR Call for Proposals	3,062	3,062	333424
3.Democratic Governance	EIDHR	All countries	2013	EIDHR 2013 AAP - CBSS (Country Based Support Schemes)	024-556	2014	Addressing Violence Against Women and Girls In Pakistan By Promoting Women and Girls' Empowerment	280,000	154,159	348771
3.Democratic Governance	EIDHR	All countries	2013	EIDHR 2013 AAP - CBSS (Country Based Support Schemes)	024-556	2014	An innovative model for strengthening community based measures to curb violence against women and girls (VAWG) in Mansehra, Nawabshah and Mirpurkhas districts, Pakistan	280,000	101,125	348766

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3.Democratic Governance	EIDHR	All countries	2013	EIDHR 2013 AAP - CBSS (Country Based Support Schemes)	024-556	2014	From Vulnerability to Proficiency: Fostering Economic Empowerment of Women in the AJK Region	64,450	-	351379
3.Democratic Governance	EIDHR	All countries	2013	EIDHR 2013 AAP - CBSS (Country Based Support Schemes)	024-556	2014	Performance Art to End Violence Against Women	257,997	146,310	348673
3.Democratic Governance	EIDHR	All countries	2013	EIDHR 2013 Annual Action Programme - Without Country based support schemes and Targeted Projects	024-472	2014	EIDHR CBSS Support Measures 2013	65,000	52,250	349710
3.Democratic Governance	EIDHR	All countries	2013	EIDHR 2013 Annual Action Programme - Without Country based support schemes and Targeted Projects	024-472	2014	From Vulnerability to Proficiency: Fostering Economic Empowerment of Women in the AJK Region	215,550	177,407	351379
3.Democratic Governance	EIDHR	All countries	2007	Missions d'observation electorale de l'UE en 2007	019-026	2007	ELE - EU EOM Pakistan 2007/2008	4,317,715	4,317,715	146262
3.Democratic Governance	IFS	All countries	2011	Annual Action Programme covered by the programming documents 'Strategy Paper 2007-2011' and by the 'Indicative Programme 2009-2011' for the Instrument for Stability for 2011 (Priority 2, Article 4(1))	023-136	2012	Counter Terrorism Associated Prosecution Reform Initiative - (CAPRI)	1,800,000	1,232,471	298204
3.Democratic Governance	IFS	All countries	2013	Annual Action Programme covered by the programming documents 'Strategy Paper 2012 - 2013' and by the 'Indicative Programme 2012-2013' for the Instrument for	024-778	2014	Strengthening Resilience to Violence and Extremism (STRIVE) in Pakistan	4,998,000	999,600	337859

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				Stability for 2013 (Priority 2, Article 4(1))						
3.Democratic Governance	IFS-RRM	All countries	2010	Instrument for Stability - Crisis Preparedness Component (Peace-Building Partnership) - Annual Action Programme constituting an Annual Work Programme - IFS/2010/06	022-458	2011	Promoting Peace in KPK & FATA - Connecting Youth NSAs and Policy-Makers through Mediation and Dialogue	575,240	416,146	269389
3.Democratic Governance	IFS-RRM	All countries	2010	Instrument for Stability - Crisis Preparedness Component (Peace-Building Partnership) - Annual Action Programme constituting an Annual Work Programme - IFS/2010/06	022-458	2011	SCE - Plural Business Partnership for Peace in Pakistan	471,103	423,993	269327
3.Democratic Governance	IFS-RRM	All countries	2010	Instrument for Stability - Crisis Preparedness Component (Peace-Building Partnership) - Annual Action Programme constituting an Annual Work Programme - IFS/2010/06	022-458	2011	SCE - Promoting participatory approaches in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan.	810,853	680,581	269398
3.Democratic Governance	IFS-RRM	All countries	2010	Instrument for Stability - Crisis Preparedness Component (Peace-Building Partnership) - Annual Action Programme constituting an Annual Work Programme - IFS/2010/06	022-458	2011	SCE-Communities Waging Peace; Piece by Piece	630,814	571,236	269392
3.Democratic Governance	IFS-RRM	All countries	2012	Expenditure on administrative management 2012 IFS	023-633	2012	Technical assistance for appraisal of the rule of law programme in Malakand	28,123	28,123	284466

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3.Democratic Governance	MIGR	All countries	2006	PAT 2006 Aeneas	018-381	2007	Promotion of Rights, Capacity Building Measures and Initiatives to Curb & Temporary Migration including Human Smuggling & Trafficking (C-PRISM)	884,577	884,577	143930
3.Democratic Governance	ONG-PVD	All countries	2006	pré-engagement dont dependront les contrats PVD projets	018-227	2007	Healing the Wounds of Domestic Violence in Punjab	671,734	671,734	135355
4.PFM	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2008	Supporting Rural Development and Natural Resources Management in NWFP and Balochistan through Capacity Building and Promotion of Sector-Wide Approaches	020-199	2012	Analysis of PFM and political economy aspects as required to formulate future EU funded interventions in district governance, community development and educational reforms in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan	51,653	51,653	291103
4.PFM	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2008	Supporting Rural Development and Natural Resources Management in NWFP and Balochistan through Capacity Building and Promotion of Sector-Wide Approaches	020-199	2012	Technical cooperation assistance on public financial management to selected districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	1,025,017	1,025,017	295933
4.PFM	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2009	Integrated Sustainable Rural Development through Agricultural Growth	021-581	2012	Technical cooperation assistance on public financial management to selected districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	500,000	498,767	295933
4.PFM	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2012	Public Financial Management Support Programme for Pakistan, PFM-SPP	023-505	2013	Coordination Public Finance Management Reform Sindh Province	145,796	87,478	329850

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4.PFM	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2012	Public Financial Management Support Programme for Pakistan, PFM-SPP	023-505	2013	Support to Federal Medium Term Budgetary Framework (MTBF) Reforms 2013/2014	237,200	234,994	324816
4.PFM	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2012	Public Financial Management Support Programme for Pakistan, PFM-SPP	023-505	2014	Public Financial Management Support Programme for Pakistan, PFM-SPP	11,347,250	2,823,071	345089
4.PFM	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2010	Operational Short-Term Technical Assistance Related to the Political, Economic, Cultural, Financial and Technical Cooperation with Developing Countries in Asia	022-571	2011	PFM - EU contribution to 2012 Federal PEFA assessment in Pakistan	68,716	68,716	277245
4.PFM	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2010	Operational Short-Term Technical Assistance Related to the Political, Economic, Cultural, Financial and Technical Cooperation with Developing Countries in Asia	022-571	2011	Training on financial and contractual procedures.	74,242	74,242	278037
4.PFM	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2012	Operational short-term technical assistance related to the political, economic, cultural, financial and technical cooperation with developing countries in Asia	023-636	2012	Pakistan: Support to Federal Medium Term Budgetary Framework (MTBF) Reforms	199,800	199,800	301608
4.PFM	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2012	Operational short-term technical assistance related to the political, economic, cultural, financial and technical cooperation with developing countries in Asia	023-636	2013	Short Term PFM Reform Support Sindh Province 2013	17,846	17,846	325762
5.Trade	ASIE	Bilateral	2003	Trade related technical assistance	005-718	2007	Support to the fisheries sector	88,240	88,240	141402

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5.Trade	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2008	Trade related technical assistance	019-792	2009	Trade Related Technical Assistance -II, All components, specifically implementation of component 2.	8,895,000	8,895,000	221591
5.Trade	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2008	Trade related technical assistance	019-792	2014	Addendum No. 1 to CTR no. 221591: Trade Related Technical Assistance- II, All components, specifically implementation of component 2	2,000,000	910,500	342953
5.Trade	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2010	Trade Related Technical Assistance Programme, Private Sector Development Phase Three (TRTA/PSD-III)	022-378	2013	EU– Competition Commission of Pakistan Int: Conference on Role of Competition in Fostering TRADE and INVESTMENT IN PAKISTAN".	106,745	106,745	313287
5.Trade	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2008	Trade related technical assistance	019-792	2012	Formulation Mission: Public Financial Management in Pakistan	61,321	61,321	282629
5.Trade	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2010	Trade Related Technical Assistance Programme, Private Sector Development Phase Three (TRTA/PSD-III)	022-378	2011	Value Chain Analysis for Gems- Jewellery and Leather Sector in Pakistan	67,385	67,385	267906
5.Trade	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2010	Trade Related Technical Assistance Programme, Private Sector Development Phase Three (TRTA/PSD-III)	022-378	2013	Gilgit-Baltistan, The Jewel of Pakistan: Developing a sustainable value chain for Gems and Jewellery sector in Northern Pakistan	1,943,559	1,193,067	275229
5.Trade	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2010	Trade Related Technical Assistance Programme, Private Sector Development Phase Three (TRTA/PSD-III)	022-378	2013	Pakistan Leather Competitiveness Improvement Programme (PLCIP)	1,981,600	1,344,275	331589

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5.Trade	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2009	Operational Short-Term Technical Assistance Related to the Political, Economic, Cultural, Financial and Technical Cooperation with Developing Countries in Asia	021-502	2010	Production of an issue paper on export diversification and promotion in the framework of a formulation mission to design the Trade Related Technical Assistance (TRTA III) programme in the field of Private Sector Development (PSD).	9,500	9,500	231409
5.Trade	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2010	Operational Short-Term Technical Assistance Related to the Political, Economic, Cultural, Financial and Technical Cooperation with Developing Countries in Asia	022-571	2011	TRA - Need Assessment of Trade and Trade Related Technical Assistance	117,575	117,575	277752
6.Food Security	DCI-FOOD	Regional - Asia	N/A	N/A	N/A	2013	Small claim linked to Contract no. DCI-FOOD/2009/214202	94	94	313492
6.Food Security	DCI-FOOD	All countries	2009	Set of measures for implementing the facility for rapid response to soaring food prices in devolopping countries.	021-494	2009	Enhancing Food Security and Resilience of Small Farmers in Sindh and Baluchistan provinces of Pakistan.	2,059,490	2,059,490	212791
6.Food Security	DCI-FOOD	All countries	2009	Set of measures for implementing the facility for rapid response to soaring food prices in devolopping countries.	021-494	2009	Enhancing productive capacities and promoting sustainable agricultural practices amongst small scale farmers in 8 food deficient districts of Pakistan	1,162,457	1,162,457	212809
6.Food Security	DCI-FOOD	All countries	2009	Set of measures for implementing the facility for rapid response to soaring food prices in devolopping countries.	021-494	2009	Food Security Through efficient agriculture production of small farmers in Pakistan	2,361,883	2,361,883	213707
6.Food Security	DCI-FOOD	All countries	2009	Set of measures for implementing the facility for rapid response to soaring food prices in devolopping countries.	021-494	2009	Improving livelihoods of rural households to mitigate the effects of severe price increases through improving the productive output	1,845,362	1,845,362	214202

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							and supply mechanism of the livestock sector			
6.Food Security	DCI-FOOD	All countries	2009	Set of measures for implementing the facility for rapid response to soaring food prices in devolopping countries.	021-494	2009	Mansehra Food Security Project	1,193,048	1,193,048	213097
6.Food Security	DCI-FOOD	All countries	2009	Set of measures for implementing the facility for rapid response to soaring food prices in devolopping countries.	021-494	2009	Strengthening community responses to food insecurity in the Northern Areas and Chitral (NAC), Pakistan	1,328,251	1,328,251	212676
6.Food Security	DCI-FOOD	All countries	2011	LRRD Component AAP 2011	023-072	2012	AFS - WINS: Women and Children/Infant Improved Nutrition in Sindh (Merlin)	9,928,611	5,886,025	284409
6.Food Security	DCI-FOOD	All countries	2011	LRRD Component AAP 2011	023-072	2012	AFS - WINS: Women and Children/Infant Improved Nutrition in Sindh (SCF-UK)	10,000,000	8,943,065	284408
6.Food Security	DCI-FOOD	All countries	2011	LRRD Component AAP 2011	023-072	2012	AFS-WINS: Women and Children/Infant Improved Nutrition in Sindh-(ACF)	10,000,000	7,098,648	284413
7.Reconst., Relief & Rehab.	IFS-RRM	Bilateral	2010	Pakistan - measures aimed at supporting post-crisis reconstruction and development	022-612	2010	Multi Donor Trust Fund	15,000,000	15,000,000	249232
7.Reconst., Relief & Rehab.	IFS-RRM	Bilateral	2010	Recovery from floods	022-901	2011	Local Governance Rehabilitation	14,700,000	14,700,000	260114
7.Reconst., Relief & Rehab.	IFS-RRM	Bilateral	2010	Recovery from floods	022-901	2011	Media for Early Recovery from Floods 2010	3,000,000	3,000,000	260109
7.Reconst., Relief & Rehab.	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2013	Operational short-term technical assistance related to the political, economic, cultural, financial and technical cooperation with	024-732	2014	Local Governance Rehabilitation (contract n°260114) – Technical Audit	12,040	12,040	338434



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				developing countries in Asia						
7.Reconst., Relief & Rehab.	IFS-RRM	All countries	2009	PAMF 3	021-842	2010	Pakistan Post Crisis Needs Assessment - Standby Recovery Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery Trust Fund	300,000	300,000	241306
7.Reconst., Relief & Rehab.	IFS-RRM	All countries	2013	Expenditure on Administrative Management - IfS 2013	024-645	2013	Local Governance Rehabilitation (contract n°260114) – Final Evaluation	60,904	60,904	333883
8.Other	ASIE	Bilateral	2000	PAK/00/06 - Institute for Educational Development	002-582	2007	Final Evaluation of Institute for Educational Development Project	56,500	56,500	136208
8.Other	ASIE	Bilateral	2001	PAK/2001/129 - Strengthening of Livestock Services	002-966	2003	Technical Assistance to the Strengthening of Livestock Services	992,787	2,116,028	70966
8.Other	ASIE	Bilateral	2002	Financial Services Sector Reform Programme	002-640	2007	Feasibility study for the Financial and Business Support Services Network	104,464	104,464	136207
8.Other	ASIE	Bilateral	2002	Financial Services Sector Reform Programme	002-640	2007	Support to PRSP-II Formulation	26,980	26,980	133755
8.Other	ASIE	Bilateral	2002	The Northern Pakistan Education Programme	002-468	2008	Ex-post Evaluation of Northern Pakistan Education Programme	63,006	63,006	156212
8.Other	ASIE	Bilateral	2003	Trade related technical assistance	005-718	2008	Final Evaluation of Trade Related Technical Assistance Programme (TRTA) Pakistan	178	178	163755

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8.Other	ASIE	Bilateral	2005	Combating Abusive Child Labour II	017-640	2011	Mid Term Review- Combating Abusive Forms of Child Labour II Project	75,816	75,816	259915
8.Other	ASIE	Bilateral	2005	Combating Abusive Child Labour II	017-640	2012	Verification mission to ILO for the project Combating Abusive Child Labour II, Contribution Agreement ASIE/2007/144-940	15,628	15,628	296926
8.Other	ASIE	Bilateral	2005	Combating Abusive Child Labour II	017-640	2013	Final Evaluation- Combating Abusive Child Labour II Project	61,506	61,506	328154
8.Other	ASIE	Bilateral	2005	Sindh Education Plan - Support Programme (SEP-SP)	017-667	2008	External Monitoring of Sindh Education Plan Support Programme	228,640	228,640	162168
8.Other	ASIE	Bilateral	2005	Sindh Education Plan - Support Programme (SEP-SP)	017-667	2012	Financial Audit - The British Council - Technical Assistance Support for Sindh Education Plan Support Programme, Karachi and Sindh Province, Pakistan, service contract No ASIE/2007/133-597	25,310	25,310	289772
8.Other	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2007	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Education Sector Reforms Programme - KP-ESRP	018-465	2012	Evaluation Mission - Education Sector Programme in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan	68,850	68,850	289626
8.Other	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2007	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Education Sector Reforms Programme - KP-ESRP	018-465	2013	Financial On the Spot Check " Delegation Agreement with GIZ to Implement Basic Education Development Programme KP, No. DCI-ASIE/2011/267075	20,860	20,860	325405
8.Other	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2008	Improving Livelihoods through Application of Renewable Energy	019-974	2010	Baseline survey on renewable energy in NWFP and Balochistan, Pakistan	25,000	25,000	231969
8.Other	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2008	Improving Livelihoods through Application of Renewable Energy	019-974	2012	Climate change adaptation and impact assessment study for Munda dam, Pakistan	1,098,073	1,098,073	296800

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8.Other	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2008	Support to the Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) sector in Pakistan	019-952	2010	Publications of TVET Call for Proposals (Grant Component)	4,341	4,341	237192
8.Other	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2008	Support to the Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) sector in Pakistan	019-952	2012	Framework Contract to improve Visibility for EU Support to the TVET Sector in Pakistan	177,323	172,943	295479
8.Other	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2008	Support to the Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) sector in Pakistan	019-952	2014	Mid Term Review of the Support to the Technical and Vocational Education and Training Sector in Pakistan Project	122,676	108,283	344770
8.Other	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2009	Supporting TVET Reform in Pakistan (TVETII)	021-329	2014	Mid Term Review of the Supporting Technical and Vocational Education and Training Reform in Pakistan Project	80,924	70,581	337383
8.Other	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2009	Sustainable Rural Development in the Refugee-Affected and Hosting Areas of Pakistan	021-577	2014	Verification Mission of an UN managed Action -Refugee Affected and hosting Area Programme (RAHA), Contribution Agreement No. DCI-ASIE/2011/260-022	11,900	11,900	341463
8.Other	DCI-ASIE	Bilateral	2011	Sindh Education Sector Support Programme	023-009	2014	Assessment of fulfilment of General Conditions and Specific Conditions for Tranche Releases for i) Sindh Education Sector Support Programme and ii) KP District Governance and Community Development Programme.	67,940	67,940	347050
8.Other	ASIE	Regional - Asia	2006	Asia Invest Programme 2006-2007	017-485	2007	IMPECABLE Improving Management in Pakistan and Bangladesh through the Establishment of a Centre to Accredite Business management Learning in Enterprises	195,677	195,677	142684

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8.Other	ASIE	Regional - Asia	2006	Asia Invest Programme 2006-2007	017-485	2007	ISFAT - Investing in a Sustainable Flower Agriculture and Trade	580,082	580,082	145553
8.Other	ASIE	Regional - Asia	2006	Asia Invest Programme 2006-2007	017-485	2007	SACCCEIT - South Asian Chamber of Commerce Cluster for Electronic International Trade	282,373	282,373	146807
8.Other	ASIE	Regional - Asia	2006	Global Framework Contract - Lot 6	017-566	2007	Identification Mission for the Trade Related Assistance Programme in Pakistan	101,853	101,853	141713
8.Other	ASIE	Regional - Asia	2006	Operational short-term TA related to Financial and Technical Co-operation with Asian developing countries	018-300	2007	Study on Anti-money Laundering Ordinance 2007, Pakistan	9,750	9,750	145811
8.Other	ASIE	Regional - Asia	2006	Operational short-term TA related to Financial and Technical Co-operation with Asian developing countries	018-300	2007	Study to improve the aid effectiveness in Pakistan with particular emphasis on the implementation of an EU road map	87,124	87,124	146742
8.Other	ASIE	Regional - Asia	2006	Operational short-term TA related to Financial and Technical Co-operation with Asian developing countries	018-300	2007	Visibility - Study on the image of and the level of awareness, perception, knowledge, and attitude towards EC activities in Pakistan	168,017	168,017	146850
8.Other	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2007	Operational Short-Term Technical Assistance Related to the Political, Economic, Cultural, Financial and Technical Cooperation with Developing Countries in Asia	018-889	2008	Audit of Service Contract "Technical Assistance - Strengthening of Livestock services in Pakistan" CDR 70966	13,230	13,230	166902
8.Other	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2007	Operational Short-Term Technical Assistance Related to the Political, Economic, Cultural, Financial and Technical Cooperation with Developing Countries in Asia	018-889	2008	Audit of the grant contract "The Northern Pakistan Education Programme" (CTR 51687)	22,871	22,871	154888
8.Other	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2007	Operational Short-Term Technical Assistance Related to the Political,	018-889	2008	Formulation Mission TRTA - II , Team Leader ( a Private Sector	10,000	10,000	157771

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				Economic, Cultural, Financial and Technical Cooperation with Developing Countries in Asia			Development Specialist )			
8.Other	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2007	Operational Short-Term Technical Assistance Related to the Political, Economic, Cultural, Financial and Technical Cooperation with Developing Countries in Asia	018-889	2008	Identification mission review - Access to justice for extremely poor and vulnerable groups in Pakistan	5,650	5,650	165270
8.Other	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2007	Operational Short-Term Technical Assistance Related to the Political, Economic, Cultural, Financial and Technical Cooperation with Developing Countries in Asia	018-889	2008	Identification mission review - Access to justice for extremely poor and vulnerable groups in Pakistan	4,330	4,330	165276
8.Other	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2007	Operational Short-Term Technical Assistance Related to the Political, Economic, Cultural, Financial and Technical Cooperation with Developing Countries in Asia	018-889	2008	Study on EU Donors Mapping in Health and Education in the Frame of Aid Effectiveness	9,980	9,980	164544
8.Other	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2007	Operational Short-Term Technical Assistance Related to the Political, Economic, Cultural, Financial and Technical Cooperation with Developing Countries in Asia	018-889	2008	Verification of expenditure, UNCDAD-ITC, TRTA Component 1 & 3	16,384	16,384	166172
8.Other	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2007	Operational Short-Term Technical Assistance Related to the Political, Economic, Cultural, Financial and Technical Cooperation with Developing Countries in Asia	018-889	2008	Verification of expenditure, UNIDO, TRTA component-2	14,691	14,691	165853
8.Other	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2007	SWITCH-Asia, Promoting Sustainable Consumption and Production	019-266	2008	SUSTAINABLE AND CLEANER PRODUCTION IN THE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES OF PAKISTAN (SCI-PAK)	1,045,071	1,045,071	153248
8.Other	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2008	Operational Short-Term Technical Assistance Related to the Political, Economic, Cultural, Financial and	019-770	2009	Financial Audit "Strengthening of Livestock services project", Local Cost	8,164	8,164	215102

Sector	Domain	Decision Level	Decision Year	Decision Title	Decision Number	Contract Year	Contract Title	Total Contracted 2007-2014 (M€)	Total Paid 2007-2014 (M€)	Contract Number
				Technical Cooperation with Developing Countries in Asia						
8.Other	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2008	Operational Short-Term Technical Assistance Related to the Political, Economic, Cultural, Financial and Technical Cooperation with Developing Countries in Asia	019-770	2009	Formulation Mission Building up the Capacity of Elected Representatives	67,950	67,950	204246
8.Other	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2009	Operational Short-Term Technical Assistance Related to the Political, Economic, Cultural, Financial and Technical Cooperation with Developing Countries in Asia	021-502	2010	Financial Audit "Improvement of Maternal and Reproductive Health among Low Income Women in Pakistan through Partnership with Government and Community (Pakistan)"	18,315	18,315	247756
8.Other	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2009	Operational Short-Term Technical Assistance Related to the Political, Economic, Cultural, Financial and Technical Cooperation with Developing Countries in Asia	021-502	2010	Financial Audit "Integrated Development Programme for AJK and Balochistan, IDPAB"	18,899	18,899	247754
8.Other	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2009	Operational Short-Term Technical Assistance Related to the Political, Economic, Cultural, Financial and Technical Cooperation with Developing Countries in Asia	021-502	2010	Financial Audit "ISFAT-Investing in a Sustainable Flower Agriculture and Trade"	10,415	10,415	247751
8.Other	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2009	Operational Short-Term Technical Assistance Related to the Political, Economic, Cultural, Financial and Technical Cooperation with Developing Countries in Asia	021-502	2010	Financial On Spot Check "Earthquake Emergency Assistance Project (Education) in the Earthquake-Affected Districts of AJK".	39,299	39,299	253706
8.Other	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2009	Operational Short-Term Technical Assistance Related to the Political, Economic, Cultural, Financial and Technical Cooperation with Developing Countries in Asia	021-502	2010	Identification Mission - Sindh Education Reforms Programme-II	75,917	75,917	246008
8.Other	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2009	Operational Short-Term Technical Assistance Related to the Political,	021-502	2010	Re-committment audit contract (2009/215-102) Financial audit	29,823	29,823	232830

Sector	Domain	Decision Level	Decision Year	Decision Title	Decision Number	Contract Year	Contract Title	Total Contracted 2007-2014 (M€)	Total Paid 2007-2014 (M€)	Contract Number
				Economic, Cultural, Financial and Technical Cooperation with Developing Countries in Asia			"Strengthening of Livestock Services Project", Local cost			
8.Other	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2010	Operational Short-Term Technical Assistance Related to the Political, Economic, Cultural, Financial and Technical Cooperation with Developing Countries in Asia	022-571	2011	Financial Audit of "The Northern Pakistan Education Programme, Contract No. ASIE/2003/051-687" for the extended period of the Contract.	23,252	23,252	274278
8.Other	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2010	Operational Short-Term Technical Assistance Related to the Political, Economic, Cultural, Financial and Technical Cooperation with Developing Countries in Asia	022-571	2011	High level event on public-private partnerships for a more sustainable and social agro-industry in Pakistan	5,560	5,560	266888
8.Other	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2010	Operational Short-Term Technical Assistance Related to the Political, Economic, Cultural, Financial and Technical Cooperation with Developing Countries in Asia	022-571	2011	Identification mission for Human Rights Programme in Pakistan	39,478	39,478	270747
8.Other	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2010	Operational Short-Term Technical Assistance Related to the Political, Economic, Cultural, Financial and Technical Cooperation with Developing Countries in Asia	022-571	2011	Identification Mission: Public Financial Management in Pakistan	74,567	74,567	273182
8.Other	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2010	Operational Short-Term Technical Assistance Related to the Political, Economic, Cultural, Financial and Technical Cooperation with Developing Countries in Asia	022-571	2011	Technical Appraisal and Monitoring of a Micro-Hydel Programme in Pakistan	107,330	107,330	275461
8.Other	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2010	Operational Short-Term Technical Assistance Related to the Political, Economic, Cultural, Financial and Technical Cooperation with Developing Countries in Asia	022-571	2011	Technical Assistance for Scoping Mission for Climate Change Programme in Pakistan	64,649	64,649	273279
8.Other	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2010	SWITCH-Asia, Promoting Sustainable Consumption and Production	022-008	2011	TRA - Sustainable cotton production in Pakistan's cotton ginning SMEs (SCPIPCG)	1,590,560	953,035	277903

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8.Other	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2011	Asia Investment Facility	022-036	2012	Capacity Building and Development of the Hydropower Sector in Pakistan	2,675,000	875,000	307540
8.Other	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2012	Operational short-term technical assistance related to the political, economic, cultural, financial and technical cooperation with developing countries in Asia	023-636	2012	Organisation of consultations for EU - Pakistan Cooperation Programming 2014- 2020	36,136	36,136	297572
8.Other	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2012	Operational short-term technical assistance related to the political, economic, cultural, financial and technical cooperation with developing countries in Asia	023-636	2012	Technical assistance for EU - Pakistan Cooperation Programming 2014- 2020	6,600	6,600	297475
8.Other	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2012	Operational short-term technical assistance related to the political, economic, cultural, financial and technical cooperation with developing countries in Asia	023-636	2012	Technical assistance for moderation of national consultative meetings in preparation of EU - Pakistan Cooperation Programming 2014-2020	4,000	4,000	302212
8.Other	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2012	Operational short-term technical assistance related to the political, economic, cultural, financial and technical cooperation with developing countries in Asia	023-636	2013	Financial Audit - Grant contract no. DCI-ASIE/2008/153-248 - Sustainable and Cleaner Production in the Manufacturing Industries of Pakistan (SCI-Pak)	13,912	13,912	317924
8.Other	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2012	Operational short-term technical assistance related to the political, economic, cultural, financial and technical cooperation with developing countries in Asia	023-636	2013	Formulation Mission – Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Education Sector Plan Support Programme	53,977	53,977	313782
8.Other	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2012	Operational short-term technical assistance related to the political, economic, cultural, financial and technical cooperation with developing countries in Asia	023-636	2013	Formulation of EU Rule of Law Programme 2013	59,038	59,038	317041



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8.Other	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2012	Operational short-term technical assistance related to the political, economic, cultural, financial and technical cooperation with developing countries in Asia	023-636	2013	Monitoring - Education Sector Reform Programme in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan	79,599	79,599	319077
8.Other	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2012	Operational short-term technical assistance related to the political, economic, cultural, financial and technical cooperation with developing countries in Asia	023-636	2013	Re-examination for the documents of AKRSP for contract DCI-FOOD/2009/212-676	8,672	8,672	323147
8.Other	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2012	Operational short-term technical assistance related to the political, economic, cultural, financial and technical cooperation with developing countries in Asia	023-636	2013	Survey of personnel costs in grant, contribution agreements and delegation agreements	17,218	17,218	321850
8.Other	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2012	Operational short-term technical assistance related to the political, economic, cultural, financial and technical cooperation with developing countries in Asia	023-636	2013	Verification Mission "Trade Related Technical Assistance-II" Contract No. DCI-ASIE/2009/221-591, UNIDO	18,719	18,719	324828
8.Other	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2013	Operational short-term technical assistance related to the political, economic, cultural, financial and technical cooperation with developing countries in Asia	024-732	2014	Formulation Mission - Balochistan Education Support	43,434	27,181	345581
8.Other	DCI-ASIE	Regional - Asia	2013	Operational short-term technical assistance related to the political, economic, cultural, financial and technical cooperation with developing countries in Asia	024-732	2014	Formulation mission for SUCCESS	127,736	112,610	339584
8.Other	ASIE	Regional - Asia	N/A	N/A	N/A	2008	Re-Commitment of Contract No. 2005/112560, Moore Stephens to execute final payment	21,678	21,678	168628
8.Other	ENV	Regional - Asia	N/A	N/A	N/A	2008	Re-Commitment of Contract No. 2006/126021, Mazars to make final payment	7,968	7,968	162401

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8.Other	ENV	Regional - Asia	N/A	N/A	N/A	2008	Re-Commitment of Contract No. 2006/126023 with Mazars to make final payment	7,319	7,319	162399
8.Other	DDH	Regional - Asia	N/A	N/A	N/A	2008	Re-Commitment of Contract No. 2006/126028, Mazars to make final payment	4,344	4,344	162402
8.Other	DCI-FOOD	Regional - Asia	N/A	N/A	N/A	2009	Two Workshops on Food Security in Pakistan	3,612	3,612	228213
8.Other	ADM-MULTI	All countries	2007	DCI-NSA Support measures 2007 not covered by strategy papers	019-144	2007	Audit for "KASHMIR COMMUNITY WATSAN PROGRAMME(KCWP)- PAKISTAN" (Contract No 11764)	12,546	12,546	139792
8.Other	ADM-MULTI	All countries	2007	DCI-NSA Support measures 2007 not covered by strategy papers	019-144	2007	Audit for "Tackling poverty in Pakistan coastal communities" (Contract No 20028)	14,587	14,587	139794
8.Other	ADM-MULTI	All countries	2009	Administrative support 2009 - ATA DCI Thematic Programmes - Directorate F	021-205	2009	Evaluation of Proposals: NSA-LA (In-country Actions, Pakistan) 2008 CfP No EuropeAid/127750/L/ACT/PK	1,950	1,950	205316
8.Other	ADM-MULTI	All countries	2009	Administrative support 2009 - ATA DCI Thematic Programmes - Directorate F	021-205	2009	Evaluation of Proposals: NSA-LA (In-country Actions, Pakistan) 2008 CfP No EuropeAid/127750/L/ACT/PK	2,200	2,200	211920
8.Other	ADM-MULTI	All countries	2009	Administrative support 2009 - ATA DCI Thematic Programmes - Directorate F	021-205	2009	Financial Audit "Theme II/HIV/AIDS, Sexually Transmitted Diseases and Malaria Prevention in Partnership with the Government, NWFP, Pakistan"	4,935	4,935	215163
8.Other	DCI-FOOD	All countries	2010	"Support measures for FSTP AAP 2010".	022-144	2011	Financial Audit - Oxfam Novib - Food Security Through efficient agriculture production of small farmers in Pakistan – CTR– 2009/213-707	24,047	24,047	268138

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8.Other	DCI-FOOD	All countries	2010	"Support measures for FSTP AAP 2010".	022-144	2011	Financial Audit - The Aga Khan Rural Support Programme Ltd. - Strengthening community responses to food insecurity in the Northern Areas and Chitral (NAC), Pakistan- CTR- 2009/212-676	21,367	21,367	268869
8.Other	DCI-FOOD	All countries	2011	"Support measures for FSTP AAP 2011".	022-936	2011	Financial Audit - Actionaid LBG - Enhancing productive capacities and promoting sustainable agricultural practices amongst small scale farmers in 8 food deficient districts of Pakistan- CTR- 2009/212-809	15,773	15,773	268872
8.Other	DCI-FOOD	All countries	2011	"Support measures for FSTP AAP 2011".	022-936	2011	Financial Audit - ConcernWorldwide - Mansehra Food Security Project - CTR- 2009/213-097	20,425	20,425	268873
8.Other	DCI-FOOD	All countries	2011	"Support measures for FSTP AAP 2011".	022-936	2011	Financial Audit - Oxfam GB LBG - Enhancing Food Security and Resilience of Small Farmers in Sindh and Baluchistan provinces of Pakistan - CTR- 2009/212-791	23,285	23,285	268871
8.Other	DCI-FOOD	All countries	2011	"Support measures for FSTP AAP 2011".	022-936	2011	Financial Audit - Plan International UK - Improving livelihoods of rural households to mitigate the effects of severe price increases through improving the productive output and supply mechanism of the livestock sector - CTR- 2009/214-202	13,570	13,570	268875
8.Other	DCI-HUM	All countries	2007	Thematic Programme Investing in People - Support measures 2007 not covered by strategic papers	019-163	2007	Audit for "B7-6312/2001/0466 - Safe Motherhood Applied Research And Training Project. PAKISTAN" (Contract No 60807)	8,249	8,249	139789

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8.Other	DCI-HUM	All countries	2008	Thematic Programme Investing in People - Support measures 2008 not covered by strategic papers - Unit F3	019-818	2008	Audit of the grant contract "Increasing TB case detection and Treatment in Balochistan" (CTR 101571)	12,199	12,199	154887
8.Other	DCI-HUM	All countries	2014	Support measures 2014 to the Human development programme	037-390	2014	Financial Audit - "Support social protection and decent work of brick kiln workers and bonded labourers in Pakistan - Grant no. DCI-HUM/2010/ 236-497"	21,957	21,957	352050
8.Other	DCI-NSA	All countries	2008	DCI-NSA Support measures 2008 - Allocation AIDCO/F	019-819	2008	Evaluation of Full Proposals; NSA-LA (In-country Action, Pakistan) 2007 Cfp No EuropeAid/126638/L/ACT/PK	1,600	1,600	161238
8.Other	DCI-NSA	All countries	2008	DCI-NSA Support measures 2008 - Allocation AIDCO/F	019-819	2008	Evaluation of Proposals; NSA-LA (In-country Action, Pakistan) 2008 Cfp No EuropeAid/127750/L/ACT/PK	1,950	1,950	171188
8.Other	DCI-NSA	All countries	2009	Global commitment for support measures - AAP 2009	021-114	2009	Audit "BLOCK GRANT 2004: Istituto Sindacale per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo (ISCOS-CISL)"	20,145	20,145	215055
8.Other	DCI-NSA	All countries	2011	Non State Actors: i) Objective 3 Coordination, cooperation and networking activities. ii) Targeted projects. iii) Support Measures	022-945	2011	External Audit "Sustainable Livelihood Initiatives in Disaster Prone Areas of Pakistan" ONG-PVD/2005/094-712	11,808	11,808	268870
8.Other	DCI-NSA	All countries	2011	Non State Actors: i) Objective 3 Coordination, cooperation and networking activities. ii) Targeted projects. iii) Support Measures	022-945	2012	Adhoc Financial Audit of "World Vision UK, Grant Contract no. DCI-NSAPVD/2009/205-051"	17,807	17,807	303785
8.Other	DCI-NSA	All countries	2011	Non State Actors: i) Objective 3 Coordination, cooperation and networking activities. ii) Targeted projects. iii) Support Measures	022-945	2012	Financial Audit - Oxfam GB - Community-based Disaster Risk Management and Livelihoods Programme in Drought, Flood and Cyclone-prone Areas of Pakistan - CTR - ONG-PVD/2007/135-201	16,512	16,512	296286

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8.Other	DCI-NSA	All countries	2011	Non State Actors: i) Objective 3 Coordination, cooperation and networking activities. ii) Targeted projects. iii) Support Measures	022-945	2012	Financial Audit – Improved sexual and Reproductive Health status of women, men, youth and adolescent in Pakistan - Grant contract no. DCI-NSAPVD/2008/158-840	14,041	14,041	297671
8.Other	DCI-NSA	All countries	2011	Non State Actors: i) Objective 3 Coordination, cooperation and networking activities. ii) Targeted projects. iii) Support Measures	022-945	2012	Financial Audit "Interact Worldwide LBG Contract Nos. ONG-PVD/2006/118-948 & ONG-PVD/2007/135303 (2 Contracts)	22,288	22,288	295475
8.Other	DCI-NSAPVD	All countries	2007	Global commitment for global multi-country calls for proposals - Objective 1 - PVD projects - Non State Actors - AAP 2007	019-406	2008	Publication of NSAs/LAs CfP (Actions in Pakistan)	5,855	5,855	172029
8.Other	DCI-NSAPVD	All countries	2007	Global commitment for global multi-country calls for proposals - Objective 1 - PVD projects - Non State Actors - AAP 2007	019-406	2008	Rights Driven Institutionalisation of Sexual and Reproductive Health in Pakistan	572,603	572,603	171425
8.Other	DCI-NSAPVD	All countries	2007	Global commitment for local calls for proposals Objective 1 - PVD Projects - Non State Actors - AAP 2007	019-404	2008	Improved sexual and Reproductive Health status of women, men, youth and adolescent in Pakistan	957,729	957,729	158840
8.Other	DCI-NSAPVD	All countries	2007	Global commitment for local calls for proposals Objective 1 - PVD Projects - Non State Actors - AAP 2007	019-404	2008	MUMKIN - "Possibility"	334,494	334,494	158763
8.Other	DCI-NSAPVD	All countries	2007	Global commitment for local calls for proposals Objective 1 - PVD Projects - Non State Actors - AAP 2007	019-404	2008	Publication of NSAs/LAs CfP (Actions in Pakistan)	2,472	2,472	151310
8.Other	DCI-NSAPVD	All countries	2008	Global commitment for in-country calls for proposals -Objective 1-PVD projects - Non State Actors - AAP 2008	020-081	2009	EHSAR (Environmental health and sanitation reforms) in refugee-impacted areas	97,053	97,053	205051

Sector	Domain	Decision Level	Decision Year	Decision Title	Decision Number	Contract Year	Contract Title	Total Contracted 2007-2014 (M€)	Total Paid 2007-2014 (M€)	Contract Number
8.Other	DCI-NSAPVD	All countries	2008	Global commitment for in-country calls for proposals -Objective 1- PVD projects - Non State Actors - AAP 2008	020-081	2009	Improved delivery of water and sanitation facilities in refugee impacted areas of Balochistan through capacity building of service providers and communities.	871,552	871,552	205053
8.Other	DCI-NSAPVD	All countries	2008	Global commitment for in-country calls for proposals -Objective 1- PVD projects - Non State Actors - AAP 2008	020-081	2009	Improving Access to Water and Sanitation in Districts Pishin and Qilla Saifullah	713,623	713,623	204851
8.Other	DCI-NSAPVD	All countries	2009	Global commitment for in-country and multi-country calls for proposals - Objective 1 - PVD projects - Non State Actors - AAP 2009	021-105	2009	EHSAR (Environmental health and sanitation reforms) in refugee-impacted areas	213,887	213,887	205051
8.Other	DCI-NSAPVD	All countries	2009	Global commitment for in-country and multi-country calls for proposals - Objective 1 - PVD projects - Non State Actors - AAP 2009	021-105	2010	Post Floods WASH Rehabilitation Project	937,500	867,435	258651
8.Other	DCI-NSAPVD	All countries	2009	Global commitment for in-country and multi-country calls for proposals - Objective 1 - PVD projects - Non State Actors - AAP 2009	021-105	2010	Promoting Civil Society Participation in Water and sanitation Governance in Pakistan	562,487	524,299	204856
8.Other	DCI-NSAPVD	All countries	2009	Global commitment for in-country and multi-country calls for proposals - Objective 1 - PVD projects - Non State Actors - AAP 2009	021-105	2010	Publication of NSA-LA CfP (Actions in Pakistan)	4,702	4,702	232210

Sector	Domain	Decision Level	Decision Year	Decision Title	Decision Number	Contract Year	Contract Title	Total Contracted 2007-2014 (M€)	Total Paid 2007-2014 (M€)	Contract Number
8.Other	DCI-NSAPVD	All countries	2009	Global commitment for in-country and multi-country calls for proposals - Objective 1 - PVD projects - Non State Actors - AAP 2009	021-105	2010	Rehabilitation of flood damaged water and sanitation systems and improved service delivery in Swat District	294,991	294,991	259306
8.Other	DCI-NSAPVD	All countries	2010	NSA & LA Programme > Obj. 1 NSA (In-country + multi-country)	022-312	2010	Rehabilitation of flood damaged water and sanitation systems and improved service delivery in Swat District	589,631	589,631	259306
8.Other	DCI-NSAPVD	All countries	2010	NSA & LA Programme > Obj. 1 NSA (In-country + multi-country)	022-312	2011	Post-floods WASH Rehabilitation in Districts Jaffarabad and Zhob, Balochistan	852,501	852,501	264666
8.Other	DCI-NSAPVD	All countries	2010	NSA & LA Programme > Obj. 1 NSA (In-country + multi-country)	022-312	2011	Water & Sanitation Rehabilitation and Reconstruction in Dera Ismail Khan District of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP)	724,090	724,090	263661
8.Other	DCI-NSAPVD	All countries	2011	The thematic programme Non State Actors (NSA): Objective Nr. 1 - In-country + multi-regional/country	022-941	2012	Publication of NSAs/LAs CfP (Actions in Pakistan)	3,744	3,744	286057
8.Other	DCI-NSAPVD	All countries	2012	Non State Actors (NSA): Objective 1 - Actions in partner countries (in-country and multi-country interventions)	023-482	2013	Financial Audit of Grant DCI-NSAPVD/2011/ 264-666 - Post-floods WASH Rehabilitation in Districts Jaffarabad and Zhob, Balochistan	10,194	10,194	330254
8.Other	DCI-NSAPVD	All countries	2012	Non State Actors (NSA): Objective 1 - Actions in partner countries (in-country and multi-country interventions)	023-482	2013	Financial Audit of Grant no. DCI-NSAPVD/2009/ 205-053 - Improved delivery of water and sanitation facilities in refugee impacted areas of Baluchistan	18,300	18,300	317573

Sector	Domain	Decision Level	Decision Year	Decision Title	Decision Number	Contract Year	Contract Title	Total Contracted 2007-2014 (M€)	Total Paid 2007-2014 (M€)	Contract Number
							through capacity building of service providers and communities.			
8.Other	DCI-NSAPVD	All countries	2012	Non State Actors (NSA): Objective 1 - Actions in partner countries (in-country and multi-country interventions)	023-482	2013	Financial Audit of "Water & Sanitation Rehabilitation and Reconstruction in Dera Ismail Khan Districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa" Contract No. 263661	13,030	13,030	325446
8.Other	DCI-NSAPVD	All countries	2012	Non State Actors (NSA): Objective 1 - Actions in partner countries (in-country and multi-country interventions)	023-482	2013	Publication of the NSA-LA Call for Proposals (Actions in Pakistan)	3,947	3,947	313838
8.Other	DCI-NSAPVD	All countries	2013	Non State Actors (NSA): Objective 1 - Actions in partner countries (in-country and multi-country interventions)	024-630	2014	EU Grant Management Training	13,500	13,500	337070
8.Other	DCI-NSAPVD	All countries	2013	Non State Actors (NSA): Objective 1 - Actions in partner countries (in-country and multi-country interventions)	024-630	2014	Financial Audit of Grant No. DCI-NSAPVD/2010/258-651 - "Post Floods WASH Rehabilitation Project"	11,447	11,447	341523
8.Other	DCI-NSAPVD	All countries	2013	Non State Actors (NSA): Objective 1 - Actions in partner countries (in-country and multi-country interventions)	024-630	2014	Publication of NSA/LA CfP (Actions in Pakistan), AAP 2013	2,384	2,384	339779
8.Other	DCI-SANTE	All countries	2010	Support measures for Health 2010	022-137	2011	Re-Commitment Contract with Mazars against base contract No. 2008/154887	9,446	9,446	265700
8.Other	DDH	All countries	2006	expertise Missions Exploratoires elections	018-159	2007	Exploratory Mission regarding a potential Election Observation Mission to Pakistan for election foreseen end of 2007	66,930	66,930	140608



Sector	Domain	Decision Level	Decision Year	Decision Title	Decision Number	Contract Year	Contract Title	Total Contracted 2007-2014 (M€)	Total Paid 2007-2014 (M€)	Contract Number
8.Other	EIDHR	All countries	2007	EIDHR 2007 AAP - COUNTRY BASED SUPPORT SCHEMES	019-377	2008	Evaluation of full proposals in the framework of EIDHR - CBSS Pakistan 2007/2008: CfP EuropeAid/126638/L/ACT/PK	2,400	2,400	161068
8.Other	EIDHR	All countries	2007	EIDHR 2007 AAP - COUNTRY BASED SUPPORT SCHEMES	019-377	2008	Publication of EIDHR CBSS CfP	2,472	2,472	151441
8.Other	EIDHR	All countries	2007	EIDHR Support measures 2007 not covered by strategy papers	018-873	2007	Audit for "Enhancing Women's political participation" (Contract No 90533)	11,280	11,280	139791
8.Other	EIDHR	All countries	2009	Partial decision for EIDHR support measures 2009 not covered by strategy papers	021-062	2009	Evaluation of Concept Notes EuropeAid/127780/L/ACT/PK	2,000	2,000	205559
8.Other	EIDHR	All countries	2009	Partial decision for EIDHR support measures 2009 not covered by strategy papers	021-062	2009	Evaluation of Concept Notes EuropeAid/127780/L/ACT/PK	2,000	2,000	205563
8.Other	EIDHR	All countries	2009	Partial decision for EIDHR support measures 2009 not covered by strategy papers	021-062	2009	Evaluation of Full Proposals EuropeAid/127780/L/ACT/PK	1,800	1,800	210466
8.Other	EIDHR	All countries	2011	EIDHR Support measures not covered by strategy papers	023-027	2011	Evaluation of the EIDHR in Pakistan	55,980	55,980	272419
8.Other	EIDHR	All countries	2012	EIDHR 2012 AAP - CBSS (Country Based Support Schemes)	023-791	2013	Flight and Visa for Professor Hood for World Death Penalty Day Event	2,079	2,079	329165
8.Other	EIDHR	All countries	2012	EIDHR 2012 AAP - CBSS (Country Based Support Schemes)	023-791	2013	Venue hire and lunch for gender training 23-25 October 2013	1,258	1,258	329573
8.Other	EIDHR	All countries	2013	EIDHR 2013 AAP - CBSS (Country Based Support Schemes)	024-556	2014	Financial Audit on Grant Contract No EIDHR/2010/246-127	14,491	12,674	340933
8.Other	EVA	All countries	2013	Operational expenditure programme for the evaluation results of external assistance actions, monitoring and audit-Policy Strategy Coordination 2013	024-619	2014	Evaluation of the EU co-operation with Islamic Republic of Pakistan	259,767	-	351585

Sector	Domain	Decision Level	Decision Year	Decision Title	Decision Number	Contract Year	Contract Title	Total Contracted 2007-2014 (M€)	Total Paid 2007-2014 (M€)	Contract Number
8.Other	ICSP	All countries	2014	Expenditure on administrative Management - IcSP 2014	037-332	2014	Appraisal of EU electoral interventions 2009-2013 to feed into EU ongoing federal and provincial parliamentary programmes	120,047	120,047	338261
8.Other	IFS	All countries	2010	Annual Action Programme covered by the programming documents 'Strategy Paper 2007-2011' and by the 'Indicative Programme 2009-2011' for the Instrument for Stability for 2010 (Priority 2, Article 4(1))	022-367	2011	Support to the Commission - Exploratory missions in Pakistan and in Afghanistan in the bio safety and bio security fields	166,203	166,203	280508
8.Other	IFS	All countries	2011	Annual Action Programme covered by the programming documents 'Strategy Paper 2007-2011' and by the 'Indicative Programme 2009-2011' for the Instrument for Stability for 2011 (Priority 2, Article 4(1))	023-136	2012	Identification and Formulation Study for a project on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan	163,027	163,027	299586
8.Other	IFS	All countries	2011	IFS Priority 1 - Support Expenditure Programme 2011	023-003	2011	Explanatory mission for future cooperation with Pakistan	9,999	9,999	268550
8.Other	IFS	All countries	2013	AAP 2013 - IFS Priority 1 "Support for the objectives of the EU Non-Proliferation of Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) Strategy"	024-696	2014	One Health Project in Pakistan	927,608	417,424	350752
8.Other	IFS-RRM	All countries	2010	IFS - Expenditure on administrative management	022-267	2010	Independent evaluation and finalisation of Technical Specifications (TS) for the tender supply of equipment for law enforcement agencies in Pakistan	6,264	6,264	250100
8.Other	IFS-RRM	All countries	2011	Expenditure on administrative management 2011 - Instrument for Stability	022-934	2011	Financial Audit - Democracy reporting International gGMBH - Support to electoral reforms in Pakistan, contract No IFS-RRM/2009/224-115	15,217	15,217	276957

Sector	Domain	Decision Level	Decision Year	Decision Title	Decision Number	Contract Year	Contract Title	Total Contracted 2007-2014 (M€)	Total Paid 2007-2014 (M€)	Contract Number
8.Other	IFS-RRM	All countries	2011	Expenditure on administrative management 2011 - Instrument for Stability	022-934	2011	Financial Audit - GIZ GMBH - CCBLE Civilian Capacity Building for Law Enforcement in Pakistan, contract No IfS-RRM/2010/231-840	15,091	15,091	277027
8.Other	IFS-RRM	All countries	2011	Expenditure on administrative management 2011 - Instrument for Stability	022-934	2011	Financial Audit - Internews Europe Association - Media for Early Recovery from Floods 2010 - contract No IfS-RRM/2011/260-109	20,249	20,249	277017
8.Other	IFS-RRM	All countries	2012	Expenditure on administrative management 2012 IFS	023-633	2012	Ex-post evaluation of the project 'Civilian Capacity Building for Law Enforcement'	50,063	50,063	293346
8.Other	ONG-PVD	All countries	2006	pré-engagement dont dependront les contrats PVD projets	018-227	2007	Models for Scaling Up Integrated and Linked SRH and HIV Responses with Key Vulnerable Communities in Punjab, Pakistan.	729,666	729,666	135303

## Annex B2 : Synopsis of selected projects

This annex provides an overview of key features of the EU's main programmes in Pakistan during the period 2007-2014, sorted by sector of intervention.

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## Overview of Key Programmes in Pakistan 2007-2014

#	Title	Implementation years	EU Allocation	EU Commitments	EU Disbursements, (09/2015)	CRIS Decision #
<b>1. Rural Development</b>						
1	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa District Governance and Community Development Programme ( <b>KP-DGCD</b> )	2013-2018	€ 80 M	€ 78.6 M	€ 13.9 M	DCI-ASIE/2012/023-634 and DCI-ASIE/2012/024-349
2	Sustainable rural development in the refugee-affected and hosting areas of Pakistan ( <b>RAHA</b> )	2009-2013	€ 40 M	€ 39.5 M	€ 38.9 M	DCI-ASIE/2009/021-577
3	Programme for Economic Advancement and Community Empowerment ( <b>PEACE</b> )	2012-2016	€ 40 M	€ 40.0 M	€ 15.9 M	DCI-ASIE/2008/019-974 / and DCI-ASIE/2009/021-581
<b>2. Education and TVET</b>						
4	Sindh Education Plan Support Programme ( <b>SESP</b> )	2007-2011	€ 37.5 M	€ 37.5 M	€ 37.5 M	ASIE/2005/017-667
5	Sindh Education Sector Support Programme ( <b>SESSP</b> )	2012-2017	€ 30 M	€ 29.5 M	€ 11.4 M	DCI-ASIE/2011/023-009
6	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Education Sector Reform Program ( <b>KP-ESRP</b> )	2009-2013	€ 34.6 M	€ 34.6 M	€ 34.6 M	DCI-ASIE/2007/018-465
7	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Education Sector Plan Support Programme ( <b>KP-ESPSP</b> )	2014-2018	€ 40 M	-	-	DCI-ASIE/2013/024-616
8	Support to the Technical and Vocational Education and Training Sector in Pakistan ( <b>TVET</b> )	2012-2017	€ 19.5 M	€ 19.2 M	€ 13.9 M	DCI-ASIE/2008/019-952
9	Supporting TVET Reform in Pakistan ( <b>TVET II</b> )	2011-2016	€ 26 M	€ 25.5 M	€ 19.7 M	DCI-ASIE/2009/021-329
<b>3. Democratisation and human rights / rule of law</b>						
10	Improving Parliamentary Performance ( <b>IP3</b> )	2012-2014	€ 6.6 M	€ 5.8 M	€ 2.8 M	DCI-ASIE/2009/021-157
11	Long Term Election Observation and Oversight in Pakistan ( <b>LTEOOP</b> )	2012-2014	€ 2.5 M	€ 2.5 M	€ 2.3 M	IFS-RRM/2012/023-688 (contract 284-456)
12	Support Electoral reforms in Pakistan	2009-2011	€ 2.1 M	€ 2.1 M	€ 2.1 M	TBD (contract 224-115)
13	Citizens Justice and Peace Programme in KP	2012-2016	€ 14 M	€ 9.5 M	€ 0.1 M	DCI-ASIE/2013/024-662
14	Access to Justice for Poor and Vulnerable Groups through Support of Legal and Civil Society Organisations and the Judiciary in Punjab	2014-2017	€ 8 M	€ 7.5 M	€ 3.0 M	DCI-ASIE/2009/019-192
15	Civilian capacity building for law enforcement in Pakistan ( <b>CCBLE</b> )	2010-2011	€ 14.7 M	€ 14.7 M	€ 14.7 M	IFS-RRM/2009/022-083
16	Enhancing support for ending violence and discrimination against women	2009-2012	€ 43.6 M	€ 0.15 M	€ 1.5 M	EIDHR/2008/019-719
17	Combating abusive child labour II ( <b>CACL-II</b> )	2008-2013	€ 5 M	€ 4.9 M	€ 4.6 M	ASIE/2005/017-640
18	Counter terrorism associated prosecution reform initiative ( <b>CAPRI</b> )	2012-2015	€ 1.8 M	€ 1.8 M	€ 1.2 M	IFS-RRM/2012/023-136 (contract 298204)
<b>4. PFM</b>						
19	Public Financial Management Support Programme for Pakistan ( <b>PFM-SPP</b> )	2014-2019	€ 15 M	€ 11.7 M	€ 3.1 M	DCI-ASIE/2012/023-505
<b>5. Trade</b>						
20	Trade Related Technical Assistance Programme ( <b>TRTA II</b> )	2009-2017	€ 11.5	€ 11.0 M	€ 9.9 M	DCI-ASIE/2008/019-792
21	Trade Related Technical Assistance, Private Sector Development Programme Phase III ( <b>TRTA/PSD III</b> )	2011-2015	€ 4.3 M	€ 4.1 M	€ 2.7 M	DCI-ASIE/2010/022-378

## 1. Synopsis of Rural development programmes

### 1.1 KP DGCD

Title	<b>Khyber Pakhtunkhwa District Governance and Community Development Programme</b>																																																				
Regions of intervention	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa																																																				
Sector	MULTISECTOR/CROSS-CUTTING / Rural Development																																																				
Budget	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Programme Components</th> <th>EU contribution (EUR)</th> <th>Total (EUR)</th> <th>Contracting/Paying Authority</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td><b>1. Sector Budget Support</b></td> <td><b>64 000 000</b></td> <td><b>64 000 000</b></td> <td rowspan="10">European Commission</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>2. Grants</b></td> <td><b>7 500 000</b></td> <td><b>7 500 000</b></td> </tr> <tr> <td>2.1 Social mobilisation</td> <td>7 500 000</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>3. Services</b></td> <td><b>8 500 000</b></td> <td><b>8 500 000</b></td> </tr> <tr> <td>3.1 Training and coaching of government agencies</td> <td>7 300 000</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>3.2 Monitoring</td> <td>500 000</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>3.3 Evaluation</td> <td>250 000</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>3.4 Audit</td> <td>200 000</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>3.5 Visibility</td> <td>250 000</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>Total</b></td> <td><b>80 000 000</b></td> <td><b>80 000 000</b></td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>Disbursements:</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Tranche</th> <th>Period</th> <th>Fixed and Variable</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>First</td> <td>3<sup>rd</sup> quarter FY 2013/14</td> <td>Fixed: Eur. 9 million</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Second</td> <td>2<sup>nd</sup> quarter FY 2015/16</td> <td>Fixed: Eur. 6 million Variable: Eur. 12 million</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Third</td> <td>2<sup>nd</sup> quarter FY2016/17</td> <td>Fixed: Eur. 6 million Variable: Eur.13 million</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Fourth</td> <td>2<sup>nd</sup> quarter FY 2017/18</td> <td>Fixed: Eur. 6 million Variable: Eur. 12 million</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>Source: FA 2013</p>			Programme Components	EU contribution (EUR)	Total (EUR)	Contracting/Paying Authority	<b>1. Sector Budget Support</b>	<b>64 000 000</b>	<b>64 000 000</b>	European Commission	<b>2. Grants</b>	<b>7 500 000</b>	<b>7 500 000</b>	2.1 Social mobilisation	7 500 000		<b>3. Services</b>	<b>8 500 000</b>	<b>8 500 000</b>	3.1 Training and coaching of government agencies	7 300 000		3.2 Monitoring	500 000		3.3 Evaluation	250 000		3.4 Audit	200 000		3.5 Visibility	250 000		<b>Total</b>	<b>80 000 000</b>	<b>80 000 000</b>	Tranche	Period	Fixed and Variable	First	3 <sup>rd</sup> quarter FY 2013/14	Fixed: Eur. 9 million	Second	2 <sup>nd</sup> quarter FY 2015/16	Fixed: Eur. 6 million Variable: Eur. 12 million	Third	2 <sup>nd</sup> quarter FY2016/17	Fixed: Eur. 6 million Variable: Eur.13 million	Fourth	2 <sup>nd</sup> quarter FY 2017/18	Fixed: Eur. 6 million Variable: Eur. 12 million
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Dates	2013/14 → 2017/18																																																				
Objectives	<p>The <b>General Objective</b> is to contribute to an effective development and peace building strategy for the government of Pakistan that supports transformation of the functioning of the State in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA, improving democracy and rule of law, making it more accountable and providing equitable opportunities for better health, education and employment.</p> <p>The programme addresses three of the four <b>strategic objectives</b> of the Post-Crisis Needs Assessment:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Build responsiveness and effectiveness of the State to restore citizen trust</li> <li>▪ Stimulate employment and livelihood opportunities</li> <li>▪ Ensure the delivery of basic services</li> </ul> <p>The <b>Specific Objective</b> is to support the government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in reforming public administration at district level to improve service delivery, economic growth and local governance through promotion of community driven development in the crisis affected Malakand Division.</p> <p>Source: FA 2013</p>																																																				

Programme description	<p>The <b>four strategic pillars</b> of the programme are:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. <i>More efficient use of provincial government budget</i> – To improve the use of the provincial government's recurrent and development budgets, as well as increase the fiscal space for community-driven rural development approaches;</li> <li>ii. <i>Increased community development, social mobilisation and capacity building</i> – To empower rural communities to influence local governance through improved interaction between the state and citizens;</li> <li>iii. <i>Improved front line public service delivery</i> – To enhance the technical capacity of Government agencies to establish constructive relations with local communities through the participatory process and decision-making, so as to improve the delivery of front line public services; and</li> <li>iv. <i>Improved community infrastructure</i> – To assist local communities at Union Council (UC) level to take the lead in developing intra-UC community-driven economic and social infrastructure, whilst recognising that some priority requirements will be at inter-UC level, in order to gain economies of scale e.g. a health unit, or a rural road to improve market access.</li> </ol> <p>The main <b>expected results</b> are:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. Increased investment in community development in six district budgets of the Malakand Division responding to specific local demands for public investment in service delivery and community infrastructure (rehabilitation, expansion and maintenance of intra- and intercommunity social and productive assets and infrastructure - education, health, water and sanitation, access, disaster risk reduction, irrigation, renewable energy, agriculture and livestock and natural resource management).</li> <li>ii. An inclusive, representative system of community mobilisation that federates villages exists in all union councils of the Malakand division.</li> <li>iii. Enhanced human, technical and organisational capacities of district and tehsil government agencies to support community driven development and be more service and outcome oriented.</li> </ol> <p><i>Source: FA 2013</i></p>
Implementation mechanisms	<p>SBS untargeted: Tsfr → national Treasury → KP Treasury</p> <p><i>Source: FA 2013</i></p>
Main achievements of the programme	<p><b>No monitoring/evaluation reports available yet</b></p>
Results chain/Verifiable indicators	<p><b>Attached Performance Matrix from the Addendum n°2 to the FA - no measures have been made so far</b></p> <p><i>Source: FA 2013</i></p>
Sources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ FA between the EU and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan: "Khyber Pakhtunkhwa District Governance and Community Development Programme", 25/11/2013.</li> </ul>

## 1.2 RAHA

Title	<b>Sustainable rural development in the refugee-affected and hosting areas of Pakistan (RAHA)</b>																																																																						
Regions of intervention	NWFP (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and Balochistan																																																																						
Sector	Rural Development																																																																						
Budget	<p>Total <b>100 000 000€</b></p> <p>Total EU contribution <b>40 000 000€</b></p> <p>Other donors' contribution:</p> <p>UNDP : 575 000€</p> <p>UNHCR: 360 000€</p> <p>Parallel co-financing:</p> <p>Official pledges so far are</p> <p>(i) Beneficiary contribution- Government of Pakistan (GoP) Ministry of States and Frontier Regions (SAFRON): 720 000€</p> <p>(ii) German development cooperation: 345 000€</p> <p>(German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ): 100 000 000€, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GtTZ): 3 000 000€)</p> <p>Remains to be pledged: 44 895 000€</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Category breakdown</th> <th>EU Contribution (EUR)</th> <th>Contribution of UN (EUR)</th> <th>Contribution of Pakistan (EUR)</th> <th>Contributions of other donors (EUR)</th> <th>Other funding (not pledged)</th> <th>Total (EUR)</th> <th>Contracting and Paying Authority</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td><b>I. Services</b></td> <td><b>200 000</b></td> <td>/</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td><b>200 000</b></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>1.1 Monitoring and Evaluation</td> <td>200 000</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>200 000</td> <td>EU</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>2. Joint Management</b></td> <td><b>39 800 000</b></td> <td><b>935 000</b></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td><b>40 735 000</b></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>2.1. Contribution agreement UNDP (joint funding)</td> <td>39 800 000</td> <td>935 000</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>40 735 000</td> <td>EU</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Parallel funding</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>720 000</td> <td>13 450 000</td> <td></td> <td>14 170 000</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Not yet pledged</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>44 895 000</td> <td>44 895 000</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>TOTAL</b></td> <td><b>40 000 000</b></td> <td><b>935 000</b></td> <td><b>720 000</b></td> <td><b>13 450 000</b></td> <td></td> <td><b>100 000 000</b></td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p><i>Source: FA 2010</i></p> <p><b>Summary of commitments to the RAHA project in Million USD (as of December 2013)</b></p> <p><b>Total = 146.21 (using the same exchange rate 112.25 euro)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Ministry of SAFRON = 1</li> <li>▪ BPRM = 3.3</li> </ul>							Category breakdown	EU Contribution (EUR)	Contribution of UN (EUR)	Contribution of Pakistan (EUR)	Contributions of other donors (EUR)	Other funding (not pledged)	Total (EUR)	Contracting and Paying Authority	<b>I. Services</b>	<b>200 000</b>	/				<b>200 000</b>		1.1 Monitoring and Evaluation	200 000					200 000	EU	<b>2. Joint Management</b>	<b>39 800 000</b>	<b>935 000</b>				<b>40 735 000</b>		2.1. Contribution agreement UNDP (joint funding)	39 800 000	935 000				40 735 000	EU	Parallel funding			720 000	13 450 000		14 170 000		Not yet pledged					44 895 000	44 895 000		<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>40 000 000</b>	<b>935 000</b>	<b>720 000</b>	<b>13 450 000</b>		<b>100 000 000</b>	
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	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ German Govt thru (KfW) = 26.05 (20 million euro)</li> <li>▪ German Govt. thru GIZ = 6.96</li> <li>▪ Govt. of Japan = 34.8</li> <li>▪ EU = 52 (40 Million Euro) for five years</li> <li>▪ Danish Govt = 4.3</li> <li>▪ UNDP = 1.3</li> <li>▪ UNHCR = 16.5</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: Annual Report 2013</i></p> <p><b><i>NB. Document attached that shows the contributions for each component of the project.</i></b></p>
EU Ref.   Contract Ref(s).	DCI-ASIE/2009/021-577 260022 / 341463
Dates	2011-2015 (48 months + 2 no cost extensions of three month each) .
Objectives	<p>The <b>overall objective</b> is to support the Government of Pakistan's pro-poor development efforts to bring the poor and backward areas and communities in Baluchistan and NWFP into the mainstream of development by improving access to, and reducing existing inequalities in resources, incomes and livelihood opportunities.</p> <p>The <b>specific objective</b> is to improve livelihoods, rehabilitate the environment and enhance social cohesion within communities of refugee-affected and hosting areas.</p> <p>Sustainability and ownership of the project will be ensured by the involvement of communities in the planning and design of interventions and by ensuring community contributions and investments in the programme components' costs. Furthermore, an assessment of community environment and capacity to ensure local ownership, motivation and incentives to maintain and operate resources and assets created with programme support will be executed. Effective capacity building will be ensured to provide communities with managerial skills. Other programme partners include federal and provincial line ministries, district and local level governments, resulting in cooperation between these partners and Community Organisations.</p> <p><i>Source: FA 2010</i></p>
Programme description	<p>Over an implementation period of 96 months, the Programme will target people from NWFP and Balochistan, in line with the CSP and because these provinces are the most affected by the refugees.</p> <p>The refugee-hosting communities in NWFP and Balochistan are affected by poverty, a degraded natural resource base, a low degree of available infrastructure, lack of employment opportunities, low levels of income generation, and unequal access to resources are the root causes of their poverty. These problems have been exacerbated by the prolonged presence of Afghan refugees who put a burden on the host communities and most are not likely to leave as long as the situation in Afghanistan is not conducive to their return. Moreover, the present IDP emergency is putting additional pressure on the host communities and their livelihoods. Therefore, there is a dire need to assist host communities, refugees and IDPs in the refugee affected and hosting areas.</p> <p>There are 6 expected results in this programme:</p> <p>Result 1: Restoration/improvement of the environment in IDP- and refugee-affected areas</p> <p>Result 2: Restoration of social services and infrastructures in IDP- and refugee-affected and hosting areas</p> <p>Result 3: Improved livelihoods and local economies areas</p> <p>Result 4: Greater social cohesion and empowerment and refugee affected and hosting areas in IDP- and refugee-affected and hosting through community development in IDP</p> <p>Result 5: Improved social protection among co-existing host communities and IDPs/refugees</p>

	<p>Result 6: IDP return anchored and absorption capacity created by small-scale community-based reintegration</p> <p><i>Source: FA 2010</i></p>
Implementation mechanisms	<p>The project will be implemented through:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- joint management (signature of a Contribution Agreement with UNDP as the implementing partner).</li> <li>- direct centralised management for the signature of services contracts (monitoring evaluation and audits)</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: FA 2010</i></p> <p>UNDP and UNHCR are the lead implementing agencies of the RAHA programme. Two separate implementation arrangements for the RAHA at provincial level are currently in operation. The Refugee Affected Areas (RAA) UNDP component is coordinated through the Planning and Development Department (P&amp;DD) of the respective provinces where a Project Management Unit (PMU) is directly responsible for field implementation. The Refugee Hosting Areas (RHA) UNHCR Component is under the SAFRON and the Chief Commission for Afghan Refugees (CCAR) while field execution is outsourced to local NGOs. The Provincial Task Force (PTF) of the RAA &amp; RHA components is headed by the Adjunct Chief Secretary (P&amp;DD) and Commissioner for Afghan Refugees (CAR) respectively. However, according to the Financial Agreements (FA), only one PTF should be in charge of the programme coordination in each province. In this regard, the national level Joint Programme Task Force (JPTF) recently decided to make the structure consistent with the FA.</p> <p><i>Source: MR 2012</i></p>
Results chain/Verifiable indicators	<p><b>Attached Logical Framework from the Annual Report 2014 – based on the logical framework in the Contribution Agreement</b></p> <p><i>Source: FA 2013</i></p>
Main achievements of the programme	<p>ER-1: Greater Social cohesion and empowerment: According to UNDP data, number of COs, VOs and LSOs in the target area has increased from 4% to 23%. Two third of these Organisations have been formed under EU support. Almost the same proportions of COs/VO/LSO members have been trained in community management skills trainings and leadership management skills trainings under EU project. 82% of village development plans have been developed and 78% of community members have been trained on courses such as rights based approaches, social cohesion, and conflict resolution, with EU funding. There was a greater focus on building capacity of government officials under Japan funding. Only a quarter of the 763 government officers have been supported under EU funding (since the initiation of the project).</p> <p>ER-2: Improved livelihoods and local economies: Livelihood trainings (on-farm, off-farm and nonfarm) have been imparted to 3859 community members. 72% of these trainings have been supported under EU funding. No employment centers were planned under Japan funding while three employment centers have been established under the EU support. Three fourth of 413 community based physical infrastructure schemes (Latrines, street payment, solar geysers, solar pumps, etc) have been supported under EU component. However, only a small number of major physical infrastructure projects focusing on improving the livelihoods of the poor have been planned and implemented under EU component. Only 50 such projects have been planned under EU component while 164 projects were planned and completed under Japan funding. Based on field visits, MTR team is of the opinion that there is a significant need for such projects in the target areas.</p> <p>ER-3: Restoration of social services and infrastructure: More than 90% of the outputs contributing to restoration of social services and infrastructure completed in</p>

	<p>the target areas have been completed under EU component. Though, only 50 Water, Sanitation, Health and Education projects were planned to be repaired/constructed under the EU agreement, around 516 projects (1000% of the planned number of projects) have been completed under this component. Moreover, 90% of the targets for training of community members on WASH have been supported under EU funding.</p> <p>ER-4: Improved social protection among co-existing Pakistani and Afghan communities: n/a</p> <p>ER-5: Restoration and improvement of the environment: EC component is primarily focusing on distribution of trees to farmers, sensitization on solid waste management and environment related issues and lining and construction of water channels and flood protection wall. However, activities planned under Japan funding, to a great extent, are focusing on establishment of nurseries. Under restoration of environment, out of 60,000 trees distributed to men and women farmers for agro forestry related activities, 67 % trees have been distributed from EC component.</p> <p>ER-6: IDP return anchored and absorption capacity created by small-scale community-based organizations: An additional result aimed at anchoring IDP return and creating absorption capacity has been added under EU component (only). 124 different schemes have been implemented under this project against a target of 50 schemes.</p> <p><i>Source: MTR Report 2013</i></p>																		
Monitoring report	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>10/08/2012</th> <th>19/07/2013</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Relevance / design</td> <td>b</td> <td>b</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Efficiency</td> <td>b</td> <td>b</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Effectiveness</td> <td>b</td> <td>b</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Impact prospects</td> <td>b</td> <td>b</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Sustainability</td> <td>b</td> <td>b</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>a = very good; b = good; c = problems; d = serious deficiencies.</p>		10/08/2012	19/07/2013	Relevance / design	b	b	Efficiency	b	b	Effectiveness	b	b	Impact prospects	b	b	Sustainability	b	b
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Impact prospects	b	b																	
Sustainability	b	b																	
Key issues/problems	<p><b>Deteriorating law and order situation:</b> Owing to their proximity to Afghanistan and presence of Afghan refugee camps, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan and the Federally Administered Tribal areas are the priority locations for the RAHA programme. Since RAHA's inception in 2009, these areas are faced with a consistently worsening law and order situation.</p> <p><b>Change in the political environment and government transfers:</b> RAHA works in partnership with the government at all levels. The oversight role is also led by the government through the provincial and federal task forces and the district coordination committees, chaired by relevant government officials. After the elections in May 2013, there has been a transition in the political leadership in both Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as well as in Islamabad.</p> <p><b>The government's perception of community driven development:</b> On most occasions, it is a challenge for the project staff to explain the rationale for adopting a bottom-up approach to a district government official, who has worked in a different style during his entire career.</p> <p><b>Bringing (RA) refugee affected and (HA) hosting areas to be ONE RAHA</b></p> <p><i>Source: Annual Report 2014</i></p>																		
Sources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ FA between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, "Sustainable rural development in the refugee-affected and hosting areas of Pakistan (RAHA)", 27/12/2010</li> <li>▪ Contribution Agreement between the European Union and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) "Sustainable rural development in the refugee-affected and hosting areas of Pakistan (RAHA)", 17/06/2011</li> <li>▪ Sustainable Rural Development in the Refugee Affected and Hosting Areas of</li> </ul>																		

	<p>Pakistan (RAHA) - Annual Progress Report July 2011-June 2012</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ Sustainable Rural Development in Refugee Affected and Hosting Areas - Annual Report (Revised) July 2012-November 2013</li><li>▪ Sustainable Rural Development in the Refugee Affected and Hosting Areas of Pakistan (RAHA) - Annual Progress Report December 2013-December 2014</li><li>▪ Mid-Term Review of Sustainable Rural Development in the Refugee Affected and Hosting Areas of Pakistan (Draft Report), 12/2/2013</li><li>▪ Refugee Affected and Hosting Areas Program - Review Mission Report (Draft), 7/04/ 2011</li><li>▪ Monitoring reports (10/08/2012 and 19/07/2013)</li><li>▪ External Evaluation of the Sustainable Rural Development in the Refugee-Affected and Hosting Areas of Pakistan Programme. Vol. I Final Report, and vol. II. Annexes. December 2015</li></ul>
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### 1.3 PEACE

Title	<p><b>Programme for Economic Advancement and Community Empowerment (PEACE)</b></p> <p>NB. This programme was financed under two different decisions along with other projects: Integrated Sustainable Rural Development through Agricultural Growth (25 M€) Improving Livelihoods through Application of Renewable Energy (25 M€)</p>						
Regions of intervention	7 districts of Malakand Division						
Sector	MULTISECTOR/CROSS-CUTTING / Rural Development						
Budget	<p>Total € 40.0 mln Total EU contribution: € 40.0 mln</p> <p>Disbursements:</p> <table border="1"> <tr> <td>First instalment of pre-financing (80% of the part of the forecast budget for the first 12 months of implementation financed by the Contracting Authority):</td> <td>7,763,643 EURO</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Forecast further instalment(s) of pre-financing: (subject to the provisions of Annex II)</td> <td>28,236,357 EURO</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Forecast final payment: (subject to the provisions of Annex II)</td> <td>4,000,000 EURO</td> </tr> </table> <p>Source: Grant Contract 2012</p>	First instalment of pre-financing (80% of the part of the forecast budget for the first 12 months of implementation financed by the Contracting Authority):	7,763,643 EURO	Forecast further instalment(s) of pre-financing: (subject to the provisions of Annex II)	28,236,357 EURO	Forecast final payment: (subject to the provisions of Annex II)	4,000,000 EURO
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EU Ref.   Contract Ref(s).	DCI-ASIE/2008/019-974 / and DCI-ASIE/2009/021-581 231969 / 283007 / 296800 and 283007 / 295933 / 327025 / 332051 / 332273						
Dates	2012-2016						
Objectives	<p><b>Overall objective:</b> To support the Government of Pakistan to reduce the negative impact of economic deprivation, poverty and social inequality in areas affected by security crisis and natural disasters and to turn this into opportunities to build and empower resilient communities that participate actively in development activities.</p> <p><b>Specific objective:</b> To revitalize rural economy and promote renewable energy to enhance social cohesion and opportunities for sustainable livelihoods in Malakand Division of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province.</p> <p>Source: Grant Contract 2012</p>						
Programme description	<p>Over an implementation period of 48 months, the Programme will target 2.7 million conflict/disaster affected people in Malakan Division.</p> <p>The expected results:</p> <p><b>ER 1:</b> Establishment and strengthening of an inclusive and representative system of community mobilization for social and economic development federating villages at the level of Union Councils</p> <p><b>ER 2:</b> Electrification for rural households through setting up of community managed micro hydro power generating systems</p> <p><b>ER 3:</b> Improvement of Community Infrastructure (CPI) and Basic Social Services</p> <p><b>ER 4:</b> Self-confidence of women and their ability to independently participate in social and economic activities enhanced</p> <p><b>ER 5:</b> Growth of economic activities facilitated</p> <p>The main activities are described below:</p>						

	<p>Organize and form broad-based community institutions and federate them at village and union council level; Prepare and delivery community management and leadership management training, and training on financial management and proposal writing; Initiate and complete micro-hydel and community physical infrastructure schemes; Prepare and deliver technical training for community-based Project Management, Audit, and Operation &amp; Maintenance Committees; Prepare and deliver training on literacy and numeracy skills and livelihoods for women activists; establish mechanisms for income generating units and provide toolkits; Prepare and deliver training on Value Chains and Enterprise Development; Facilitate linkage development with Business Development Service providers</p> <p><i>Source: Grant Contract 2012</i></p>
Implementation mechanisms	<p>The programme was implemented by the Sarhad Rural Support Programme LBG, a private non-profit association, contracted by the European Commission, through its Delegation in Pakistan.</p> <p><i>Source: Grant Contract 2012</i></p> <p>The programme is implemented in field through establishing Programme Support Units (PSU) and field offices. The PSU is basically an extension of the head office which supports in day-to-day management of the programme. Together, the programme team and the HO are also responsible for updating the Board of Directors on the progress and performance of the programme.</p> <p><i>Source: First interim report (1<sup>st</sup> October 2012 to 31<sup>st</sup> July 2013)</i></p>
Verifiable indicators	<p><b>Attached Summary of impacts from the Interim Report 2014 – no indicative logical framework available</b></p> <p><i>Source: Interim Report 2014</i></p>
Main achievements of the programme	<p><b>Under Result 1;</b> establishment &amp; strengthening of an inclusive &amp; representative system of community mobilization, a rapid expansion in terms of coverage to new union councils has been observed during reporting period. With addition of 11 new union councils, the programme now is operational in 98 union councils in; selected seven districts.</p> <p>Tapping potential of natural resources, the programme <b>under Result 2;</b> electrification for rural households through micro hydro power generating systems, has identified 109 potential sites to initiate micro hydro-electricity projects (MHPs) in all seven districts of Malakand Division. During this reporting period, it has initiated 15 new MHPs with an active support of local communities. The total number of MHPs initiated/in process or completed by the programme is 78 generating 6.05 megawatt electricity and benefiting 27,000 households.</p> <p><b>Under Result 3;</b> improvement of community physical infrastructure &amp; basic social services, the programme has also taken proactive measures to improve delivery of basic social services through developing and improving small scale infrastructure schemes. So far at least 100 schemes have been initiated with these mentioned public institutions. These schemes, in order of preference at local level, comprise drinking water supply schemes, communication, sanitation and irrigation</p> <p>The careful approach adopted during first year of the programme to initiate women activities (<b>under result 4;</b> Self-confidence of women &amp; their ability to independently participate in social &amp; economic activities) is paying dividends now. To be relevant to local context and keep pace of activities at optimum level, SRSP has developed at least 196 women master trainers to facilitate formation of community based organizations and women interventions under the programme. With this new women work force, noticeable achievements, if not amazing, have been observed. A total of 129 Adult Literacy Centers (ALCs) were established by the end of reporting period, out of which 53 ALCs have completed their 5 months course. These 53 ALCs produced 1,302 graduates possessing functional command over literacy and</p>

	<p>numeracy skills, while 1,900 women have enrolled themselves in newly established 76 ALCs.</p> <p><b>Under Result 5;</b> facilitating growth of economic activities, a comprehensive approach entailing technical and managerial support for establishing and supporting potential value chains, small scale enterprises and entrepreneurs have been adopted. So far the programme has been able to organize over 2,000 farmers around Business Interest Groups (BIGs). A total of 171 farmers were provided with numerous trainings during this period thus overall SRSP-PEACE has been able to train over 1,202 men and women members in value chain development. Depending on nature of value chains or businesses, at least 289 men and women were exposed to major markets besides developing their linkages with several organisations has helped improving and refining products as per national and international standards. An interesting aspect under this component was introduction of agro climate compatible Cut Flower (glades) in upper Swat and Dir Upper. The farmers were exposed to down country markets and supported with imported quality seeds of cut-flowers. The participating farmers succeeded in producing over 50,000 plants of glades, which would be ready for marketing in following months.</p> <p><i>Source: Interim Report 2014</i></p>
Sources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Grant Contract – External Actions of the European Union - DCI-ASIE/2011/283-007, 08/08/2012</li> <li>▪ Programme for Economic Advancement and Community Empowerment (PEACE) – 1<sup>st</sup> Interim Report (1st October 2012 to 31st July 2013), submitted by Sarhad Rural Support Programme (SRSP)</li> <li>▪ Programme for Economic Advancement and Community Empowerment (PEACE) - Interim Technical Implementation Report (August 2013 to February 2014), submitted by Sarhad Rural Support Programme (SRSP)</li> <li>▪ Sarhad Rural Support Programme (SRSP), Programme for Economic Advancement and Community Empowerment (PEACE) - Interim Technical Implementation Report (March 2014 to July 2014), submitted by Sarhad Rural Support Programme (SRSP)</li> </ul>

## 2. Synopsis of Education programmes and TVET programmes

### 2.1 SEPS

Title	<b>Sindh Education Plan Support Programme (SEPS)</b>	
Regions of intervention	Sindh Province	
Sector	EDUCATION / Primary Education	
Budget	<p>Total <b>€ 114.0 mln</b></p> <p>Total EU contribution <b>€ 39.0 mln</b></p> <p>Sector budget support</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">Province level € 7.0 mln</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">District level € 26.0 mln</p> <p>Services (capacity building) € 4.6 mln</p> <p>Services (other) € 1.4 mln</p> <p>Other donors</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">Government of Sindh (development budget) € 30.0 mln</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">ADB (DSSP) € 45.0 mln</p> <p>In addition to sector programme support from EC and ADB-DSSP to the SEP, several other donors continue to provide project support to education development in Sindh. They include: ADB through DEEP (€ 62 million), USAID through its ESRA project (€ 20 million) and UNICEF (€ 5 million). Furthermore, CIDA plans a debt conversion in favour of education in Sindh (€ 15 million) and the Netherlands is studying the possibility to also support the elementary education sector in Sindh in a way which is complementary, coherent and fully co-ordinated with the EC SEP-SP.</p> <p>SBS released in 5 annual tranches (each with a province and a district portion)</p> <p><b><i>NB in the inventory the EU contribution is € 37 500 242.84</i></b></p>	
EU Ref.   Contract Ref.	ASIE/2005/017-667 133597 / 139231 / 162168 / 289772	
Dates	2007-2011	
Objectives	<p><b>Overall objective :</b> The overall objective of the Sindh Education Plan Support programme (SEPS) is poverty alleviation in Sindh Province</p> <p><b>Programme purpose:</b> the purpose of the SEPS is improved capacity at school, district and provincial level to deliver quality elementary education services in an equitable way.</p> <p><i>Source: FA, 2006</i></p>	
Programme description	<p>The Sindh Education Plan (SEP) builds on existing federal and provincial policy documents articulated with a clear recognition of core sector and cross-sectorial issues. The national Education Sector Reform (ESR) and the Education For All (EFA) action plans form the centre piece of the education strategy and include reform and mainstreaming of madrasa schools. While these policies have a major significance in outlining the strategic framework and the reform agenda it is in the provincial programs and budgets. which represent over 90% of the country's education expenditures, that EFA/MDGs and national policy goals for the country are being taken forward.</p>	



	<p>The SEPSP is a Sector Policy Support Programme and will focus on following <b>4 pillars of the reforms</b>:</p> <p><b>A. Improving fiscal sustainability and effectiveness of public expenditures</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Increase effectiveness of public expenditures (including education sector) through procurement reforms</li> <li>2. Fiscal and budget management: Improving medium education sector budgeting</li> </ol> <p><b>B. Improving education sector management</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>3. District Terms of Partnership (TOP): Improving efficiency and quality of school rehabilitation</li> <li>4. Monitoring and Evaluation: Improving the timeliness and quality of Annual School Census (ASC)</li> <li>5. District and sub-district education management: Strengthening district education management for service delivery</li> <li>6. School Management Committees (SMCs): Strengthening SMC participation and capacity for supporting school management</li> </ol> <p><b>C. Improving access to quality schooling</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>7. Textbook delivery</li> <li>8. Stipends for girls in public schools: Strengthening the efficiency and effectiveness of incentives</li> <li>9. Public Private Partnership in education: Leveraging the private sector to extend service delivery to underserved areas</li> </ol> <p><b>D. Improving the quality of teaching and student learning</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>10. Merit-based school-specific recruitment of teachers; Improving the quality of new teacher hires</li> <li>11. Teacher education development (TED): Improving teacher training effectiveness and teacher quality</li> <li>12. Learning assessment of students: Improving the regular measurement of learning</li> </ol> <p><i>Source: FA, 2006</i></p>
Implementation mechanisms	<p>The programme is to be steered by the Chief Secretary of the Province and will be implemented by the Department of Education in coordination with Departments of Finance and Planning &amp; Development with active involvement of District Governments, SMCs and Civil Society Organizations. All donor inputs will be coordinated through a Reform Support Unit already established, in the Department of Education, for this purpose.</p> <p><i>Source: FA, 2006</i></p> <p>This is a Sector Policy Support Programme (SPSP), World Bank led, with a US\$300 million Sector Investment Credit that uses a Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) in implementation of the programme which has a duration of three and a half years. The EC contributed EUR 33 million to this programme which follows a standard World Bank design frequently used in client countries in the education sector.</p> <p><i>Source: MR (2012)</i></p>
Verifiable indicators	<p><b>Attached Policy Matrix from Progress Report 2009.</b> It has been measured in 2009/2010 and 2010/2011.</p> <p><i>Source: Progress Report, 2009</i></p>
Main achievements of the programme	<p>Under pillar 1, “Improving Fiscal Sustainability and Effectiveness of Public Expenditures”, the findings show that although the procurement reforms concept is very valid, the enforcement of the new regulations has yet to be implemented and institutionalized. In terms of fiscal and budget management, progress is being made in implementing new budgetary structures. However, the instability of provincial resources prevents full incorporation of the spirit of the public expenditure reforms.</p> <p>Under pillar 2, “Improving Education Sector Management”, the findings show that the provincial reform program is fully incorporated in provincial management, but has yet to be conceptualised or implemented at the district level. However there is</p>

	<p>awareness in the latter due to frequent meetings and communications. The district terms of partnership (TOP) is operating fairly efficiently, with considerable oversight by private engineering firms and many procedures that are being followed. The main issue here is the cost of the program since it is estimated to be 2-3 times of regular government spending on construction and repairs and maintenance. The Sindh Education Foundation (SEF) schools are deemed quite cost-efficient, and it is recommended that these be considered in future, as well as further cost analyses of the TOP programme.</p> <p>Under pillar 3, “Improving Access to Quality Schooling”, the textbook delivery intervention has progressed efficiently, given the traditional and considerable reaction against any changes in policy regarding textbooks. There are still management issues to work out such as delivery and quality areas, which can be dealt with more comprehensively in future iterations of SEPSP. The girls’ stipends intervention is ongoing, but the evidence on its impact on enrolments and retention is not available and has not been systematically analysed. The recommendation is that the cost-benefit issues be further considered prior to further support of this intervention. Finally, the public private partnerships (PPP) intervention, being implemented through the Sindh Education Foundation (SEF), seems to be cost-effective in terms of construction, and well implemented.</p> <p>Under pillar 4, “Improving the Quality of Teaching and Student Learning”, the teacher needs to be made the primary focus in SERP2. One of the bigger successes of the programme evaluated was the merit-based teacher recruitment and political ownership was assured through EU / WB dialogue, which was critical to its implementation. This is a good example where good practice and political economy compulsions were made to coincide. <i>Source: Final Evaluation Report, 2012</i></p>																														
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## 2.2 SESSP

Title	<b>Sindh Education Sector Support Programme (SESSP)</b>
Regions of intervention	Sindh Province
Sector	EDUCATION / Education policy and administrative management
Budget	<p>Total <b>€ 30.0 mln</b>  Total EU Contribution <b>€ 30.0 mln</b>  Sector budget support € 25.5 mln  Services (TA) € 4.0 mln  Other services € 1.0 mln</p> <p>Disbursed in two variable tranches (10 mln in FY 13/14; 15.5mln in FY 14/15). Progress and performance will be assessed at the sector level at the occasion of the two annual joint reviews based on agreed policy implementation milestones and process indicators, using the policy matrix and results framework developed for the programme. Eligibility criteria will also have to be met for disbursement of the variable tranches.</p>
EU Ref.   Contract Ref(s).	DCI-ASIE/2011/023-009 289807 / 292754 / 315499 / 347050
Dates	2012-2016 (2017 with Addendum)
Objectives	<p><b>Objective:</b> Through improving quality and access in primary and Secondary Education, achieve the education-related MDGs in the Province of Sindh,</p> <p><b>Purpose:</b> EU sector support will assist the Government of Sindh to improve management and service delivery in the primary (including pre-primary) education sector.</p> <p>There are significant gender inequities at all levels of the education service and in terms of school enrolment. Ensuring equitable access to schooling has been emphasised under the Government of Sindh SERP and the provision of quality education as a priority of the Government of Sindh will focus on availability of gender disaggregated data for planning and management as well as in the reduction of the drop-out rate for girls. With its focus on implementation and management practices, devolution support, public finance, accountability and monitoring, good governance is a central element in the EU programme.  <i>Source: FA 2012</i></p>
Programme description	<p>Expected results and main activities:</p> <p>i. The Government of Sindh approves a coherent Education sector policy and plan and establishes and leads an effective donor coordination mechanism.  Main activities: The Government of Sindh will conduct a structured and inclusive sector review and dialogue process, involving all education donors and civil society resulting in the formulation of a Sindh province education reform policy and plan, including a school consolidation plan.</p> <p>ii. The Government of Sindh implements a School Consolidation Plan aimed at improving quality and access indicators and improves service delivery accordingly.  Main activities: The Government of Sindh, will reduce the number of schools in the Province through a school consolidation process in combination with measures to</p>

	<p>improve teacher management, student-teacher ratios, teacher absenteeism, governance of the education system at school level, and reliability of education statistics for planning and management purposes.</p> <p>iii. The GoS improves education service delivery in Sindh through technical cooperation focusing on strategic capacity development. Main activities: The GoS at provincial and district level strengthens its capacity in policy formulation, public finance management, performance based monitoring and reporting, to continuously improve access to and quality of education services, and donor coordination. <i>Source: FA 2012</i></p>
Implementation mechanisms	<p>The programme will be implemented by the European Commission, through its Delegation in Pakistan. The implementing agency of the government will be the Department of Education (DoE) of the provincial Government through its Reform Support Unit (RSU). <i>Source: FA 2012</i></p> <p>The Reform Support Unit (RSU) of the Education &amp; Literacy Department has been charged with the responsibility to coordinate and facilitate the development of the three-year basic education plan for Sindh. The European Union, in its capacity as Coordinating Agency for the GPE initiative in Sindh, along with UNICEF (as co-CA), is responsible for facilitating the development of an education sector plan. EU responded to its mandate with mobilisation of this technical assistance as part of its ongoing support to the Sindh education sector. <i>Source: Final report (March 2013)</i></p>
Results chain/Verifiable indicators	<p><b>Attached Policy Matrix from Report from TA Final Report - no measures have been made</b> <i>Source: TA Final Report 2012</i></p>
Main achievements of the programme	<p><b>No monitoring/evaluation reports available yet</b></p>
Sources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ FA between the EU and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Sindh Education Sector Support Programme, 13/02/2012.</li> <li>▪ Technical and Policy Advisor: Education Sector Programme in Sindh – Final Report, March 2013</li> </ul>

## 2.3 KP-ESRP

Title	<b>Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Education Sector Reform Program (KP-ESRP)</b>																																																																						
Regions of intervention	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province																																																																						
Sector	EDUCATION / Education policy and administrative management																																																																						
Budget	<p>Total: Approx. <b>€ 203.0 mln</b>  Total EU Contribution: <b>€ 35.0 mln</b> (of w. 20 mln 2007, 15 mln 2010)  € 18.0 mln SBS + 15.0 mln (addendum 1)  € 1.6 mln TA  € 0.4 mln other services</p> <p>Other donors:  NL: € 40.0 mln (SBS and TA)  UK: € 94.5 mln (SBS and TA)  Aus Aid € 28.3 mln (SBS and TA)  Germany € 5.5 mln (TA)</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Programme Components</th> <th>EU contribution (in EUR)</th> <th>Other Donor contributions</th> <th>Total</th> <th>Contracting /Paying Authority</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td><b>1. Services</b></td> <td><b>400 000</b></td> <td></td> <td><b>400 000</b></td> <td>EU</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1.1 Monitoring and Evaluation</td> <td>300 000</td> <td></td> <td>300 000</td> <td>EU</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1.2 Audit</td> <td>100 000</td> <td></td> <td>100 000</td> <td>EU</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>2. Sector Budget Support</b></td> <td><b>33 000 000</b></td> <td><b>162 796 218</b></td> <td><b>195 796 218</b></td> <td>EU</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2.1 Sector Budget Support</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>33 000 000</td> <td>EU</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Budget 2007:</td> <td>18 000 000</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Budget 2010:</td> <td>15 000 000</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>3. Technical Assistance (Indirect Centralised Management via Delegation Agreement with GIZ)</b></td> <td><b>1 600 000</b></td> <td><b>5 500 000</b></td> <td><b>7 100 000</b></td> <td>EU</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>Total</b></td> <td><b>35 000 000</b></td> <td><b>168 296 218</b></td> <td><b>203 296 218</b></td> <td>EU</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>Tranche release:</p> <p><b>Table 3: Indicative tranche releases (€ million)</b></p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Year</th> <th>n + 1 (2010)</th> <th>n + 2 (2010)</th> <th>n + 3 (2011)</th> <th>n + 4 (2012)</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Amount as per current FA</td> <td>6</td> <td>6</td> <td>6</td> <td>0</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Amount proposed through AF</td> <td>0</td> <td>0</td> <td>5</td> <td>10</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>Total Amount</b></td> <td><b>6</b></td> <td><b>6</b></td> <td><b>11</b></td> <td><b>10</b></td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>Tranche 1 (2009/10): eligibility criteria are satisfied (= fixed tranche?)  Tranche 2: (2009/10) Policy matrix of annex 3  Tranches 3 (2010/11) and 4 (2011/12): FA mentions that the matrix will be replaced by a common donors matrix, following the same logic; however annex 3 includes indicators for tranche 3 (just in case?) NB Important text of annex 3 just above the matrix.</p>	Programme Components	EU contribution (in EUR)	Other Donor contributions	Total	Contracting /Paying Authority	<b>1. Services</b>	<b>400 000</b>		<b>400 000</b>	EU	1.1 Monitoring and Evaluation	300 000		300 000	EU	1.2 Audit	100 000		100 000	EU	<b>2. Sector Budget Support</b>	<b>33 000 000</b>	<b>162 796 218</b>	<b>195 796 218</b>	EU	2.1 Sector Budget Support			33 000 000	EU	Budget 2007:	18 000 000				Budget 2010:	15 000 000				<b>3. Technical Assistance (Indirect Centralised Management via Delegation Agreement with GIZ)</b>	<b>1 600 000</b>	<b>5 500 000</b>	<b>7 100 000</b>	EU	<b>Total</b>	<b>35 000 000</b>	<b>168 296 218</b>	<b>203 296 218</b>	EU	Year	n + 1 (2010)	n + 2 (2010)	n + 3 (2011)	n + 4 (2012)	Amount as per current FA	6	6	6	0	Amount proposed through AF	0	0	5	10	<b>Total Amount</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>10</b>
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Dates	2009/10 → 2012/13																																																																						
Objectives	<p><b>Overall objective:</b> (of EU SBS): to contribute to “Accelerating Human Development in NWFP (later KP) Province of Pakistan” by improving Delivery of Education Services.</p> <p><b>Specific objectives:</b> KP ESRP Supports the gov of KP in implementing the reforms outlined under the mutually supportive pillars of its Provincial Education Plan:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Accelerating human development through improving access, equity, quality and governance of education system</li> </ul>																																																																						

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Improving fiscal stability and PFM (macro stability, fiscal sustainability of reform, planning/monitoring of public expenditures)</li> <li>▪ Strengthening governance (PFM accountability; transparency and accountability of public procurements; reliable and timely human resources data for planning, budget preparation and control of expenditures)</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: Addendum n°2 to the FA 2011</i></p>
Programme description	<p>The KP-ESRP consisted of 2 actions/elements:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>I. <b>Sector Budget Support Programme;</b> and complementary</li> <li>II. Capacity Building Technical Assistance Programme</li> </ol> <p>The main activities of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa - ESRP</p> <p><b>I. Sector Budget Support Programme</b></p> <p>Given the nature of a Sector Budget Support programme, the actual activities in support of the reform will be undertaken by the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and funded through the budget. These are reflected in the policy matrix / results framework, which also sets out the triggers for tranche releases. With regard to the flood disaster the Policy Matrix will be adapted together with the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and in coordination with other donors involved in the sector in order to reflect the increased need of rehabilitation and reconstruction of school buildings and equipment. The list below includes examples from the current policy matrix:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Improvement in financial reporting &amp; auditing (PIFRA), SBDs and regulations, benchmarks established by first M&amp;E report, and Public Accounts Committee Audits conducted;</li> <li>• Budget procedures revised and credible steps made to align with Provincial MTBF;</li> <li>• Parent Teacher Councils (PTCs) complete their elections; have an operational bank account and a school improvement plan; have received PTC guidelines; and have received funds in the PTC bank account;</li> <li>• Professionally qualified personnel will be recruited through the Provincial Public Service Commission;</li> <li>• Strengthened and improved Education Management Information System (EMIS) to complete annual schools census in a timely manner, and to improve monitoring &amp; evaluation and promote information-based decision making;</li> <li>• Repair partially damaged schools, award contracts for construction of fully damaged schools;</li> <li>• Provision / distribution of free textbooks to all government schools from class-I to class-XII in the first month of academic year;</li> <li>• Merit and need based recruitment of teachers as per approved criteria;</li> <li>• Provision of missing facilities including boundary walls, water and sanitation services, and adequate classrooms to government schools;</li> <li>• Strategies and guidelines for the changes in teacher preparation and support including revising the curriculum of the pre- and in-service programme, equipping the instructor of training institutes with latest developments and technology and overall development of the teacher.</li> </ul> <p>While the main counterpart in policy dialogue is the Provincial government, the implementation/service delivery will need to be ensured at District level.</p> <p><i>Source: Addendum n°2 to the FA 2011</i></p>
Implementation mechanisms	<p>Standard SBS: Transfer to Min Fin Pak → KP provincial budget.</p> <p><i>Source: Addendum n°2 to the FA 2011</i></p> <p>The KP-ESRP consists of two actions: (1) Sector Budget Support Programme (SBS) (33m €) and (2) Technical Assistance Capacity Building Programme (1.6m€). Technical assistance and capacity building is provided through a Delegation agreement with, and implemented (indirectly centralised) by the German “Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH” (GIZ).</p> <p><i>Source: MR (2012)</i></p>
Results chain/Verifiable	<p><b>Attached Policy Matrix from Report of the Evaluation Mission 2012.</b> It has been measured in the years 2009/2010, 2010/2011 and 2011/2012.</p> <p><i>Source: Report of the Evaluation Mission 2012</i></p>

indicators	
Main achievements of the programme	<p><b>Overall programme impact and lessons learned</b></p> <p>The substance of the programme is highly relevant in terms of the GoKP's policy and strategy on education development and achieving EFA, and the education-related MDG goals, as well as the EU's country policy and sector strategy to Pakistan that identified education as a focal sector.</p> <p>There are a number of lessons that can be drawn from the assessment on the initial impact of the SBS programme implementation. The provincial authority possesses a significant position in initiating the process of change. However, such change will not have a positive impact if the provincial and district capacity in education management is still low. The positive impact of decentralization on educational changes will occur in a sustainable manner if such changes are carried out based on their own initiative, as this will encourage higher commitment on the part of the province in carrying out the policy of education reforms. Therefore, any socializing effort of strategic policies must be carried out by directly involving the districts and schools so that public accountability in education management becomes optimal.</p> <p>The KP-ESRP has provided complementarities to other donor assistance to KP province's education sector creating opportunity for greater synergy and harmonization. Although a relatively small part of GoKP's overall education budget, the EU's SBS programme has provided additional fiscal space to education budget and should provide some leverage for continued policy dialogue on sector policy reforms. Currently there is a perception that donor coordination in KP's education sector has not been effective partly due to the government's lack of capacity to provide leadership and the absence of a common donor position in supporting the reform agenda envisaged in the ESP. It's considered important that a common donor position with the provincial government buy-in is developed in the spirit of Paris declaration.</p> <p>The modality of assistance in the form of sector budget support seems to be appropriate in that not only does it reduce the transaction costs of a project type operation it also provides additional fiscal space to the already constrained budget of the government. Notwithstanding this, the associated TA component does not serve the purpose as originally intended. In addition, given the current state of macroeconomic and fiscal situation of the province as well as the low capacity of the provincial and district governments it is important that tranche release conditions are fully understood by the government and that appropriate TA support to enable the government meet the tranche conditionalities is considered for any future sector budget support programme. In this context its is recommended that while designing budget support programme for KP education sector consideration be given to using variable tranches to incentivise and respond to specific performance issues measured by an indicator framework .In addition, formulation of an associated capacity development and technical cooperation should be realistic taking into consideration the ownership by the beneficiaries (jointly by GoKP and selected districts).</p> <p><b>Potential impact on cross-cutting issues</b></p> <p>ESRP contributes to enhanced access to schooling by children from poor families and remote locations leading to their increased lifetime earnings (international empirical evidence shows higher social return from basic education than any other levels and significant increase on the productivity of educated farmers). Immediate impact of the programme on cross-cutting issues i.e. poverty alleviation (focus on poorer districts/communities), gender</p>

	<p>equity (more enrolment and retention for girls through improved access including better school environment and recruitment of female teachers) and good governance (increased transparency and accountability at different levels and community participation through PTCs etc) was visible although limited in scope. However, when scaled up the programme has the potential to exert significant impact on the cross-cutting subjects.</p> <p><i>Source: Report of the Evaluation Mission 2012</i></p>
Monitoring report	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>10/08/2012</b></p> <p>Relevance / design            c</p> <p>Efficiency                            c</p> <p>Effectiveness                    c</p> <p>Impact prospects                c</p> <p>Sustainability                    c</p> <p>a = very good; b = good; c = problems; d = serious deficiencies.</p>
Sources:	<p><i>Mention here accurately all the documentation used to complete this fiche.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Addendum n°2 to the FA AIDCO/2007/018465 Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Education Sector Reform Program (ESRP), 31/05/2011</li> <li>▪ Final Report of the Evaluation Mission – Education Sector Programme in Khyber Pakhtunkhawa, Pakistan, 20/07/2012</li> <li>▪ Monitoring report, 10/08/2012</li> </ul>
<i>Observations from the evaluation team</i>	<p>Due to the worsening security situation in KP province since the signing of the FA about 3000 schools in the host areas were used to accommodate IDPs from Malakand Division which needed repairs and 356 schools in the Malakand Division were damaged by direct military operations. This has a direct impact on access to education and needed immediate attention. To respond to the situation, an additional amount of €15,000,000 has been added to this Programme through an FA amendment signed between GoP and EU. Consequently this new contract is required to reflect additional EU contribution of €15 million to the Education Sector Reform Programme as top up to the original EU contribution of €18 million provided under contract No. 2009/ 172-724 and thus with this new contract the total EU contribution to Sector Budget Support will amount to €33 million.</p>



## 2.4 KP-ESPSP

Title	<b>Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Education Sector Plan Support Programme (KA-ESPSP)</b>																																																		
Regions of intervention	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province																																																		
Sector	EDUCATION / Education policy and administrative management																																																		
Budget	<p>Total <b>€ 40.0 mln</b>  Total EU contribution <b>€ 40.0 mln</b>  BS (SRC) € 35.0 mln  TA € 4.0 mln  Other services € 1.0 mln</p> <p>Disbursements:</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Table A: Indicative disbursement timetable</b></p> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <thead> <tr> <th rowspan="2">Country FY</th> <th colspan="4">Year 1: FY 2014/15</th> <th colspan="4">Year 2: FY 2015/16</th> <th colspan="4">Year 3: FY 2016/17</th> <th colspan="4">Year 4: FY 2017/18</th> </tr> <tr> <th>Q1</th> <th>Q2</th> <th>Q3</th> <th>Q4</th> <th>Q1</th> <th>Q2</th> <th>Q3</th> <th>Q4</th> <th>Q1</th> <th>Q2</th> <th>Q3</th> <th>Q4</th> <th>Q1</th> <th>Q2</th> <th>Q3</th> <th>Q4</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Variable tranche</td> <td>9M</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>9M</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>9M</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>8M</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>Note: Q1 of FY 2014/15 is the third quarter of calendar year 2014 because the FY 2014/15 starts in July 2014.</p> <p>There will be one variable tranche disbursement each year of the programme (total of 4 tranches), to be disbursed early in the financial year of the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa based on progress made against the indicators for the previous financial year. Out of three tranches of €9 million and one tranche of €8 million, €7 million will be disbursed if 8 out of the 12 KPIs are met (which is the same requirement for the disbursement of DfID/AusAID tranches) and an additional €2 or 1 million, respectively, would be released only if among the 8 indicators that are met, at least 2 are indicators on quality and learning outcomes. Disbursement of all tranches submitted to eligibility criteria.</p> <p><b><i>NB. No contracts have been made under this decision yet</i></b></p>	Country FY	Year 1: FY 2014/15				Year 2: FY 2015/16				Year 3: FY 2016/17				Year 4: FY 2017/18				Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Variable tranche	9M				9M				9M				8M			
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Variable tranche	9M				9M				9M				8M																																						
EU Ref.   Contract Ref(s).	DCI-ASIE/2013/024-616 No contracts under this decision yet.																																																		
Dates	2014/15 → 2017/18																																																		
Objectives	<p>General objective of KESPSP: to assist the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in eradicating poverty, promoting sustainable and inclusive growth, and consolidating democracy.</p> <p>Specific objective of KP-ESPSP</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Improve the financial capability of the government to achieve its education sector policy objectives;</li> <li>- Promote Education sector policies and reforms;</li> <li>- Improve service delivery in the Education sector; and</li> <li>- Improve governance within the Education sector.</li> </ul> <p>(NB for IL see section 1.2)  Source: FA 2014</p>																																																		
Programme description	<p>The KP-ESPSP aims to support the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in addressing the challenges present in the education system particularly those around access, governance, PFM, quality, and learning outcomes. Particular emphasis is on improving quality of the education services delivered through systematising a 'school effectiveness' approach. The EU support will be fully aligned with the current DfID AusAID support to the education sector.</p> <p>Source: FA 2014</p>																																																		

Implementation mechanisms	Standard BS procedure: transfer to Treasury of KP. <i>Source: FA 2014</i>
Results chain/Verifiable indicators	<b>Attached Performance Matrix from the FA 2014 - no measures have been made so far</b> <i>Source: FA 2014</i>
Main achievements of the programme	<b>No monitoring/evaluation reports available yet</b>
Sources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ FA n° DCI-ASIE/2013/024-616 between the EU and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Education Sector Plan Support Programme, 12/05/2014</li> </ul>

## 2.5 TVET I

Title	<b>Support to the Technical and Vocational Education and Training Sector in Pakistan (TVET )</b>																																																																											
Regions of intervention	All Pakistan																																																																											
Sector	EDUCATION / Vocational Education																																																																											
Budget	Total		<b>€ 21 000 000</b>																																																																									
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Objectives	<p>The <b>overall objective</b> is to enhance socio-economic development through investment in human capital.</p> <p>The <b>project purpose</b> is to improve the quality and outreach of skill trainings provision predominantly in the rural areas of Pakistan in response to the needs of the economic sector.</p> <p>The provision of improved skill training is expected to increase the employability of the population. As a result their socio-economic situation is expected to improve.</p> <p>Gender equity will be pursued in the selection of training programs, selection of trainees, facilities for training, and the placement of graduates or the linking of graduates with micro-credit providers.</p> <p>The project will address governance issues through promoting effective systems and procedures and mechanisms to ensure transparency and accountability in all aspects of project implementation. Integration of environmental issues will be given weight in the selection of proposals.</p> <p><i>Source: Addendum n°1 to the FA 2012</i></p>																											
Programme description	<p>This program fits in the national skills strategy framework and its priorities. It supports the reform agenda and is expected to produce significant impact on institutions to be assisted and ultimately on the target beneficiaries. It also takes into consideration existing and planned activities of other donors in the TVET sector to avoid duplication and ensure complementarity.</p> <p>The project has three main components. The first is the strengthening of the Labour Market Information Analysis (LMIA) at the federal and provincial level. The second component is strengthening the planning, coordination and implementation capacity of relevant Technical Education and Vocational Training Authorities (TEVTAs) at the provincial level. The third component is to increase the outreach of the skill and vocational training programmes in the rural areas.</p> <p>The programme has the following two components:</p> <p><u>Component 1: Capacity Building of TEVTAs and Training Providers</u></p> <p>Key activities include: (i) Organization development study and training needs assessment of TEVTAs; (ii) Development of management and operating systems within TEVTAs; (iii) Staff development of selected personnel (in-country); (iv) Development of partnership model with prioritized private business sector in a selected trade area in at least one training institute;</p> <p><u>Component 2: Outreach Programme</u></p> <p>Key activities include: (i) Preparation of guidelines and procedures for direct award including the definition of eligibility criteria and evaluation criteria; (ii) Assessment of eligible proposals, and awarding of contracts; (iii) Implementation of actions; (iv) Monitoring and reporting of implementation progress.</p> <p><i>Source: Addendum n°1 to the FA 2012</i></p> <table border="1" data-bbox="475 1529 1409 2027"> <thead> <tr> <th>Project implemented by</th> <th>Cost (Euro Million)</th> <th>Main Specific Objective</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td colspan="3">Component 1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>GIZ</td> <td>3.9</td> <td>To build capacity of provincial and regional TEVTAs.</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="3">Component 2</td> </tr> <tr> <td>PLAN</td> <td>2.5</td> <td>To support marginalised young men and women to secure employment and self-employment</td> </tr> <tr> <td>CARE</td> <td>2.7</td> <td>To increase access of rural women and youth to income generation through TVET</td> </tr> <tr> <td>ACTED</td> <td>3</td> <td>To generate employable skills for marginalized communities in rural areas</td> </tr> <tr> <td>OXFAM</td> <td>3.1</td> <td>To equip poor youth with marketable skills</td> </tr> <tr> <td>CONCERN</td> <td>1.7</td> <td>To enhance the socio-economic status of the extreme poor and vulnerable group in 3 poverty-stricken rural</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Project implemented by	Cost (Euro Million)	Main Specific Objective	Component 1			GIZ	3.9	To build capacity of provincial and regional TEVTAs.	Component 2			PLAN	2.5	To support marginalised young men and women to secure employment and self-employment	CARE	2.7	To increase access of rural women and youth to income generation through TVET	ACTED	3	To generate employable skills for marginalized communities in rural areas	OXFAM	3.1	To equip poor youth with marketable skills	CONCERN	1.7	To enhance the socio-economic status of the extreme poor and vulnerable group in 3 poverty-stricken rural
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One project relates to the provincial organisation of TVET. The phased inputs into the development of the organizational capacity of the TEVTAs are well designed.</p> <p><i>Component 2</i></p> <p>The EU is financing six different NGOs (and their local partner NGOs and consulting firms) to design and manage projects to improve the delivery of TVET to marginalized rural communities. Each has adopted a different approach to the development of training for rural youth, especially in the formulation of linkages to employers and micro-finance.</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>NGO</th> <th>Major objective</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>1</td> <td>Plan</td> <td>to secure well paid employment and self-employment</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2</td> <td>Care</td> <td>access to income generating opportunities</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3</td> <td>ACTED</td> <td>access to income generating activities</td> </tr> <tr> <td>4</td> <td>Oxfam</td> <td>training for jobs for which there is a demand</td> </tr> <tr> <td>5</td> <td>Concern</td> <td>enhance socio-economic status of the poor</td> </tr> <tr> <td>6</td> <td>TUSDEC</td> <td>prepare young people for employment or self-employment</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Project implemented by</th> <th>Cost (€Million)</th> <th>Main Specific Objective</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td colspan="3" style="text-align: center;"><b>Component 2</b></td> </tr> <tr> <td>PLAN</td> <td>2.5</td> <td>To support marginalised young men and women to secure employment and self-employment</td> </tr> <tr> <td>CARE</td> <td>2.7</td> <td>To increase access of rural women and youth to income generation through TVET</td> </tr> <tr> <td>ACTED</td> <td>3</td> <td>To generate employable skills for marginalized communities in rural areas</td> </tr> <tr> <td>OXFAM</td> <td>3.1</td> <td>To equip poor youth with marketable skills</td> </tr> <tr> <td>CONCERN</td> <td>1.7</td> <td>To enhance the socio-economic status of the extreme poor and vulnerable group in 3 poverty-stricken rural areas.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>TUSDEC</td> <td>3.9</td> <td>To uplift the socio-economic status of rural/marginalised communities by improving the quality of TVET</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="3" style="text-align: center;"><b>Component 1</b></td> </tr> <tr> <td>GIZ</td> <td>3.9</td> <td>To build capacity of provincial and regional TEVTAs.</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>			Sub- projects	Implementing Agency	Title Of Action	Provinces	<b>Component 1</b>				1	GIZ	Capacity Building for TEVTAs	All	<b>Component 2</b>				1	ACTED	Promoting and supporting TVET	AJK, KP & Sindh	2	CARE	Investing in Human Capital	Punjab & Sindh	3	CONCERN	Supporting TVET	Balochistan	4	OXFAM	Enhancing quality and access to TVET	Sindh	5	PLAN	Access to TEVT for youth	Punjab	6	TUSDEC	Supporting TVET	KP (and FATA)		NGO	Major objective	1	Plan	to secure well paid employment and self-employment	2	Care	access to income generating opportunities	3	ACTED	access to income generating activities	4	Oxfam	training for jobs for which there is a demand	5	Concern	enhance socio-economic status of the poor	6	TUSDEC	prepare young people for employment or self-employment	Project implemented by	Cost (€Million)	Main Specific Objective	<b>Component 2</b>			PLAN	2.5	To support marginalised young men and women to secure employment and self-employment	CARE	2.7	To increase access of rural women and youth to income generation through TVET	ACTED	3	To generate employable skills for marginalized communities in rural areas	OXFAM	3.1	To equip poor youth with marketable skills	CONCERN	1.7	To enhance the socio-economic status of the extreme poor and vulnerable group in 3 poverty-stricken rural areas.	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Verifiable indicators	<b>Attached Logical Framework from the Addendum n°1 to the FA and Logical Framework for each of the projects from the MTR.</b> <i>Source: FA 30/06/2009, Addendum n°1 to the FA 2012 and MTR Report 2014</i>																																																
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Key issues/problems	<p>The TVET1 Project recognises that in the past that too much attention was given to training for the formal sector and insufficient attention has been given to the contribution of micro and small-enterprises (MSEs) to job and income creation for the marginalized. The MTR team is aware of that the Project is a very ambitious undertaking, training young people for self and /wage employment. It is not sufficiently realized that training for self-employment for the disadvantaged groups is a very difficult task.</p> <p>It recognises that the projects should mainly be seen as a form of poverty alleviation. To merely focus on skill development may not be enough to substantially 'reduce poverty' but by providing basic skills, it may ensure that inequalities do not widen further with an expanding informal economy. The informal sector will continue to absorb the vast majority of new entrants to the workforce.</p> <p><i>Source: MTR Report 2014</i></p>																																																

Sources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ FA 30/06/2009 and Addendum n°1 to the FA between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, "Support to the Technical and Vocational Education and Training Sector in Pakistan", 26/06/2012</li> <li>▪ Support to the TVET sector in Pakistan Mid-term review – Final Report, January 2014</li> <li>▪ Mid-Term Review, Final report, January 2014</li> </ul>
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## 2.6 TVET II

Title	<b>Supporting TVET Reform in Pakistan (TVET II)</b>																																																
Regions of intervention	All Pakistan																																																
Sector	EDUCATION / Vocational Education																																																
Budget	Total cost		<b>€ 43 000 000</b>																																														
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	GIZ Contribution		€ 2 000 000																																														
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	Government Contribution (in-kind)		€ 1 919 401																																														
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		RNE	BMZ																																														
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1.1 Delegation Agreement with GIZ	25 400 000	15 000 000	2 000 000	42 400 000	GIZ																																												
<b>2. Services</b>	<b>600 000</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>600 000</b>	EU																																												
2.1 Evaluation	300 000	0	0	300 000	EU																																												
2.2 Audit	300 000	0	0	300 000	EU																																												
<b>Total</b>	<b>26 000 000</b>	<b>15 000 000</b>	<b>2 000 000</b>	<b>43 000 000</b>																																													
	<i>Source: Addendum n°1 to the FA 2011</i>																																																
EU Ref.   Contract Ref.	DCI-ASIE/2009/021-329 265674 / 337383																																																
Dates	2011-2016																																																
Objectives	<p>The <b>overall objective</b> of the project is poverty reduction through increased and improved access to employable skills. The <b>project purpose</b> is to increase the access, equity, relevance and quality of the TVET sector in Pakistan.</p> <p>Increasing the access, equity and relevance of the TVET sector will provide the skills to the labour force of Pakistan which will ultimately contribute in the country's economic development.</p> <p>The project addresses crosscutting issues like environmental sustainability, gender equality and good governance. The programme will contribute to create awareness for environmentally friendly production and use of materials by including such topics in standards, curricula and course programmes. Training activities related to agri-business and livestock might reduce the waste of agricultural products and draw attention to environment-friendly production.</p> <p>The project will specifically focus on involving females, by increasing access and broadening the fields of interest. Female trainers will be identified and trained in areas that have a potential for female inclusion. Of the total upgraded teachers/trainers, 30% will be female. Similarly atleast 30% of the total persons completing competency-based training will be females.</p> <p>One of the main objectives of the project is to improve the governance structure of the TVET sector. The project will promote appropriate systems and procedures to ensure transparency and accountability during project implementation.</p>																																																

	<i>Source: Addendum n°1 to the FA 2011</i>
Programme description	<p>The need for TVET Reform in Pakistan was the result of the absence of a National Skills Strategy implementation plan. The rationales for interventions are as follows: The project supports the implementation of the NSS by addressing key issues of the TVET sector: fragmented governance structures; insufficient coordination; poor quality and irrelevant trainings; low efficiency of teaching and management personnel; absence of job counselling services; and lack of innovative approaches to provide TVET services for the poor and vulnerable. It is expected to produce significant impact on institutions to be assisted and ultimately on the target beneficiaries. It also takes into consideration existing and planned activities of other donors in the TVET sector to avoid duplication and ensure complementarity.</p> <p>The project has three components. The first is improving the institutional structure and governance of the TVET sector. The second is developing the National Qualifications Framework (NQF) for TVET and Human Resource Development (HRD) of TVET institutions. The third component is to provide efficient and innovative training and labour market services in selected economic sectors.</p> <p><i>Source: Addendum n°1 to the FA 2011</i></p>
Implementation mechanisms	<p>The Project is implemented by the EU Delegation (EUD) and the Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) under a Delegation Agreement.</p> <p><i>Source: MR (2012)</i></p>
Verifiable indicators	<p><b>Attached Logical Framework from the MTR, which is a revised version from the one in the FA. No measurements were made.</b></p> <p><i>Source: MTR Report 2014</i></p>
Main achievements of the programme	<p>The main achievements of the project are ongoing. A considerable number of guidelines and manuals have been developed to support TVET reform as well as systems for monitoring outcomes. Considerable support has also been provided at national level to NAVTTC and at provincial level to TEVTAs. TEVTA KPK could not praise the project highly enough for the support it has received in its institutionalisation, pointing out that, without the high profile created for TVET by the project and expert support in formulation, the TEVTA would still not be operational.</p> <p>Setting up of e-learning centres, and training 100 master trainers / teacher trainers (at least 30% female). E-learning centres have been developed with master trainers in place. The programmes are operational and to date 698 teachers have attended the programme. Target indicator for in service teacher training is 10,000 by the end of the project. Based on the current rate of progress, it is difficult to see how the target can be achieved.</p> <p>The allocation of funding for the FIT programme reached one hundred percent of its budget allocation and 15 pilot programmes have been completed and a further 20 programmes have been or are currently being implemented. Target numbers of beneficiaries for the FIT programme (a Logframe indicator) are difficult to verify. In addition, one learning region has been set up with and 2 training farms are operational, and a second learning region – the development of trout farms in the SWAT valley – has been identified.</p> <p>Under Component I governance area, considerable work has been done with regard to the development of five policy documents. However, although tabled, these are still in the draft/final draft level.</p> <p>Under Component II as of the end of March 2014, only 698 (7 percent) of the target 10,000 teacher training has been achieved. With regard to completed CBT programmes, only 14 CBT programmes (24 percent) of the target 60 output have been achieved. Of the 14 CBT programmes developed, 4 have been piloted within 18 institutions. At the request of NAVTTC, 107 curricula have been fast tracked and updated. Further, 52 Vocational Counselling/Job Placement is operational (out of 100 Logframe target). The development of the Quality Management System (QMS) has been delayed until a framework agreement between NAVTTC, TEVTAs and</p>

	stakeholders are agreed. <i>Source: MTR Report 2014</i>
Monitoring report	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>10/08/2012</b></p> <p>Relevance / design            b</p> <p>Efficiency                            b</p> <p>Effectiveness                    b</p> <p>Impact prospects                b</p> <p>Sustainability                    c</p> <p>a = very good; b = good; c = problems; d = serious deficiencies.</p>
Key issues/problems	<p><b>Delays in Implementation:</b> There were challenges that hindered the implementation of the project necessitated by the various layers in the bureaucratic hierarchy responsible for project implementation. These delays were caused by frequency of staff movement at NAVTTC, lack of guiding rules in relation to NAVTTC and TEVTAs and decision making.</p> <p><b>FIT Programmes:</b> With the exception of a few, the short term trainees under the FIT programme will be difficult to trace. As a result, it is very difficult to verify and validate the outcomes of some programs other than in the documents provided by the implementers that relate to outputs. At present, there is no structured tracking mechanism to follow-up on the trainees to find out clearly what kind of employment they secured post-training intervention and the status of start-up kits provided to them.</p> <p><i>Source: MTR Report 2014</i></p>
Sources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ FA 20/12/2010 and Addendum n°1 to the FA between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, "Supporting TVET Reform in Pakistan (TVET II)", 02/09/2011</li> <li>▪ Mid Term Review of the Supporting Technical and Vocational Education and Training Reform Project in Pakistan – Final Report, 08/08/2014</li> <li>▪ TVET Reform Support Programme, Pakistan – Inception Report, May 2012</li> <li>▪ TVET Reform Support Programme, Pakistan – Progress Report, April 2012 to March 2013</li> <li>▪ TVET Reform Support Programme, Pakistan – Progress Report, April 2013 to March 2014</li> <li>▪ Monitoring report, 10/08/2012</li> </ul>



### 3. Synopsis of Democratisation and human rights / rule of law programmes

#### 3.1 Improving Parliamentary Performance

Title	<b>Improving Parliamentary Performance</b>																																																											
Regions of intervention	The project will be implemented in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Activities will be planned and implemented in principle from Islamabad where the project will be based, and they will be aimed at benefiting the National Assembly, the Senate and the Provincial Assemblies.																																																											
Sector	Legislature and political parties																																																											
Budget	<p>Total: €7,055,555 Total EU contribution : €7,000,000</p> <table border="1"> <tr> <td><b>TOTAL COST</b></td> <td>EUR 6 055 555 million</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• EU Contribution: EUR 6 000 000</li> <li>• Co-financing (Grant Agreement): EUR 55 555</li> <li>• Parliament Contribution (in kind): EUR 230 000</li> </ul> </td> </tr> </table> <p><i>Source: FA (2010)</i></p> <p><b>4.3 Programme Budget</b> The total cost of the project is estimated at EUR 7 055 555 of which EUR 7 000 000 shall be financed from the general budget of the EU, and EUR 55 555 by the Grant Beneficiary.</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Category breakdown</th> <th>EU Contribution (in €)</th> <th>Other Contribution (in €)</th> <th>Total</th> <th>CA/PA</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td><b>1. Services</b></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>1.1 Technical assistance</td> <td>5 330 000</td> <td>0</td> <td>5 330 000</td> <td>EU</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1.2. Media services (Activity B3)</td> <td>800 000</td> <td>0</td> <td>800 000</td> <td>EU</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1.3 External Evaluation</td> <td>200 000</td> <td>0</td> <td>200 000</td> <td>EU</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1.4 Audit</td> <td>50 000</td> <td>0</td> <td>50 000</td> <td>EU</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1.5 Visibility<sup>4</sup></td> <td>20 000</td> <td>0</td> <td>20 000</td> <td>EU</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>2. Grants</b></td> <td></td> <td>0</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>2.1. Direct award of grant</td> <td>500 000</td> <td>55 555</td> <td>555 555</td> <td>EU</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>3. Contingency</b></td> <td>100 000</td> <td></td> <td>100 000</td> <td>EU</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>Total</b></td> <td><b>7 000 000</b></td> <td><b>55 555</b></td> <td><b>7 055 555</b></td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p><i>Source: Addendum to FA (2013)</i></p>	<b>TOTAL COST</b>	EUR 6 055 555 million		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• EU Contribution: EUR 6 000 000</li> <li>• Co-financing (Grant Agreement): EUR 55 555</li> <li>• Parliament Contribution (in kind): EUR 230 000</li> </ul>	Category breakdown	EU Contribution (in €)	Other Contribution (in €)	Total	CA/PA	<b>1. Services</b>					1.1 Technical assistance	5 330 000	0	5 330 000	EU	1.2. Media services (Activity B3)	800 000	0	800 000	EU	1.3 External Evaluation	200 000	0	200 000	EU	1.4 Audit	50 000	0	50 000	EU	1.5 Visibility <sup>4</sup>	20 000	0	20 000	EU	<b>2. Grants</b>		0			2.1. Direct award of grant	500 000	55 555	555 555	EU	<b>3. Contingency</b>	100 000		100 000	EU	<b>Total</b>	<b>7 000 000</b>	<b>55 555</b>	<b>7 055 555</b>	
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Dates	<p>2010-2014</p> <p>The execution period of the Agreement will be 72 months. This execution period will comprise two phases under the conditions provided for in article 4.1 of the General Conditions (Annex I of the present Agreement):</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Operational implementation phase that starts from the entry into force of the financing agreement and will have duration of 48 months.</li> <li>2. Closure phase of a duration of 24 months that starts from the expiry date of the operational implementation phase.</li> </ol> <p><i>Source: FA (2010)</i></p>																																																											

Objectives	<p>Overall objective: To foster democratisation in Pakistan by building up the capacity of elected representatives and institutions.</p> <p>Programme purpose: To improve the three main strands of parliamentary function: law making, oversight and representation.</p> <p><i>Source: FA (2010)</i></p>
Programme description	<p>The programme will primarily operate at the federal level. However some participants from the provincial assemblies (members and secretariat staff) will be invited to attend federal level events (trainings etc.). Some members and secretariat staff from the legislative assemblies of Azad Jammu Kashmir and the Northern Areas will also be invited to attend federal level events. Subject to security, the programme will also undertake a limited number of events in the provinces (primarily training and mentoring). All work with provincial assemblies will be subject to allocation of a focal point from the respective assembly.</p> <p><b>A) Improved functioning of elected representatives, secretariats and selected committees, primarily at federal level</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Provision of legislative drafting expertise, mentoring, training and skills development for PIPS, secretariat staff and members</li> <li>2. Provision of training and expertise in international law for PIPS, secretariat staff and members</li> <li>3. Design and help implement improved procedures for the federal assemblies' legislation branches (covering e.g. bill tracking, legislative drafting, questions, motions and rules of procedure)</li> <li>4. Help partner committees produce and implement activity plans in line with strategic plans</li> <li>5. Provision of subject training and expertise for partner committee members and staff</li> <li>6. Assist with partner committee events and train on good reporting</li> <li>7. Design and supply of appropriate equipment package for partner committees, compliant with the parliamentary system.</li> </ol> <p>Partner committees will be supported with the intention of providing examples of good practice that will then promote parliament establishing a realistic budget for full resourcing and support for committees.<sup>6</sup> Selection of partner committees will be based on: need, interest from the committee, the institution's strategic plan, and the work of other donors.</p> <p><b>B) Improved parliamentary transparency and access</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Assist in the development of website content for Senate, National Assembly and partner committees</li> <li>2. Assist in the development of and support to the implementation of communication strategies</li> <li>3. Strengthen media coverage of federal and provincial assemblies through e.g. journalism school curriculum development and faculty training, media training to journalists, outlets (including new media) and NGOs</li> <li>4. Support civil society parliamentary watch coverage of Senate<sup>7</sup> and selected federal level committees and annual review of parliamentary performance using international parliamentary standards</li> </ol> <p>This component will put an emphasis on local language media coverage of provincial assemblies and the work of minority members. Particular focus will be on female members and the work of women's caucuses within the assemblies. The increased scrutiny from civil society should also contribute to momentum for sustainable parliamentary reform.</p> <p><b>C) Increased capacity of parliament to promote international human rights standards</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Provide training and expertise on international human rights principles and obligations, with focus on domestic legislation compliance and implementation issues</li> <li>2. Provide expert assistance to relevant committees (such as, but not limited to human rights, foreign affairs, law and justice, parliamentary affairs)</li> <li>3. Provide technical assistance for specialised thematic research, seminars and reporting</li> <li>4. Provide technical assistance on ICCPR standards for elections, including domestic legislation compliance and implementation issues</li> <li>5. Provide technical assistance on parliament's role in electoral oversight and reform</li> </ol> <p><b>D) Increased interaction between Pakistani elected assemblies and the European Parliament (EP) and Member State parliaments (MSPs)</b></p>

	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Provide best practice information from EP and MSPs</li> <li>2. Establish links with EP Office for Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy (OPPD)</li> <li>3. Facilitate fellowships, amongst others with OPPD</li> <li>4. Facilitate meetings between visiting MEPs and Pakistani MPs and secretariat staff</li> <li>5. Organise targeted study tours to EP and MSPs</li> </ol> <p><i>Source: FA (2010)</i></p> <p>IP3 is a highly relevant intervention aiming to contribute to stronger democracy in Pakistan by empowering the federal Parliament and indirectly provincial assemblies. Both chambers of Parliament, the National Assembly and the Senate, and their respective Secretariats are under-resourced with regard to research, law making, quality debates and oversight. Parliamentary committees are not well-structured, the Rules of Procedures need to be updated and expertise is in short supply.</p> <p><i>Source: MR (2013)</i></p>																																																		
Implementation mechanisms	<p><b>2.3. Activities and implementation timetable</b></p> <table border="1" data-bbox="539 831 1426 1227"> <thead> <tr> <th>Activity</th> <th>Tentative Deadline</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Signature of Financing Agreement with GOP</td> <td>Q1 2010</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Tendering and Contracting (T&amp;C) of main technical assistance (TA)</td> <td>Q1-Q2 2010</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Main TA Contract Inception Phase</td> <td>Q3 2010</td> </tr> <tr> <td>T&amp;C of media services</td> <td>Q1 2011</td> </tr> <tr> <td>T&amp;C of equipment for partner committees</td> <td>Q1 2011</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Direct Grant Agreement Parliamentary Watch</td> <td>Q1 2011</td> </tr> <tr> <td>T&amp;C Evaluation Contract</td> <td>Q3 2011</td> </tr> <tr> <td>T&amp;C Audit Contract</td> <td>Q3 2011</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Mid-term evaluation</td> <td>Q1 2012</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Completion of TA contracts and Direct Grant Agreement</td> <td>Q3 2013</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Programme Audit</td> <td>Q4 2013</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Post completion evaluation</td> <td>Q4 2013</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>The project will be implemented by the European Commission through the EU Delegation in Pakistan.</p> <p>The programme will be carried out through signature of service contracts following call for tenders (for technical assistance to the Parliament and for media activities, activity B3), signature of supplies contract following call for tenders (equipment for partner committees, activity A7) and a direct grant agreement with the NGO FAFEN for Parliamentary Watch Activities (activity B4).</p> <p><i>Source: FA (2010)</i></p> <p><b>2.3. Activities and implementation timetable</b></p> <table border="1" data-bbox="531 1507 1402 1901"> <thead> <tr> <th>Activity</th> <th>Tentative Deadline</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Signature of Financing Agreement with GOP</td> <td>Q4 2010</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Tendering and Contracting (T&amp;C) of main technical assistance (TA)</td> <td>Q1-Q2 2012</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Main TA Contract Inception Phase</td> <td>Q3 2012</td> </tr> <tr> <td>T&amp;C of media services</td> <td>Q1-Q2 2012</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Direct Grant Agreement Parliamentary Watch</td> <td>Q1-Q2 2012</td> </tr> <tr> <td>T&amp;C Evaluation Contract</td> <td>Q4 2013</td> </tr> <tr> <td>T&amp;C Audit Contract</td> <td>Q1 2014</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Mid-term evaluation</td> <td>Q4 2014</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Completion of TA contracts and Direct Grant Agreement</td> <td>Q4 2016</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Programme Audit</td> <td>Q2 2017</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Post completion evaluation</td> <td>Q2 2017</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p><i>Source: Addendum to FA (2013)</i></p> <p>The contractor, the British Council, leads a group of international partners (the Westminster Foundation for Democracy and Democracy Reporting International)</p>	Activity	Tentative Deadline	Signature of Financing Agreement with GOP	Q1 2010	Tendering and Contracting (T&C) of main technical assistance (TA)	Q1-Q2 2010	Main TA Contract Inception Phase	Q3 2010	T&C of media services	Q1 2011	T&C of equipment for partner committees	Q1 2011	Direct Grant Agreement Parliamentary Watch	Q1 2011	T&C Evaluation Contract	Q3 2011	T&C Audit Contract	Q3 2011	Mid-term evaluation	Q1 2012	Completion of TA contracts and Direct Grant Agreement	Q3 2013	Programme Audit	Q4 2013	Post completion evaluation	Q4 2013	Activity	Tentative Deadline	Signature of Financing Agreement with GOP	Q4 2010	Tendering and Contracting (T&C) of main technical assistance (TA)	Q1-Q2 2012	Main TA Contract Inception Phase	Q3 2012	T&C of media services	Q1-Q2 2012	Direct Grant Agreement Parliamentary Watch	Q1-Q2 2012	T&C Evaluation Contract	Q4 2013	T&C Audit Contract	Q1 2014	Mid-term evaluation	Q4 2014	Completion of TA contracts and Direct Grant Agreement	Q4 2016	Programme Audit	Q2 2017	Post completion evaluation	Q2 2017
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	<p>experienced in work with Parliament and elections, and a second layer of local civil society actors.</p> <p><i>Source: MR (2013)</i></p>										
Verifiable indicators	<i>Attachement I – Logical framework</i>										
Main achievements of the programme	<p>The project has yet to make a difference due to the above delays. At the same time, there are indications that R1 could contribute to capacity building through the training material produced, sessions delivered and support to committees that will be set up soon. The newly recruited expert will be instrumental in the provision of assistance and will help engage the targeted parliamentary committees. Outreach and media coverage (R2) are still being designed, but are expected to help increase the transparency of Parliament. High-quality orientation in election dispute resolution has been delivered under Result area 3 and the upcoming LEFA will be yet another significant contribution to the process of human rights promotion and electoral reform, particularly at provincial level. A PIPS strategy seminar to be held together with the European Parliament (R4) will mark the launch of direct exchanges of experience with counterparts overseas. As regards the SO, the quality of parliamentary debate or the degree of compliance with international law can only be assessed once the baseline survey has been carried out. Representation can improve over time through electoral reform, but it is in the area of oversight that "quick wins" can be ensured. For instance, the recent elections have shown, among other things, a growing demand for accountability with regard to public finance management. IP3 has already made a meaningful contribution to the recent budget debate and support will rightly be provided to parliamentary committees dealing with public accounts.</p> <p><i>Source: MR (2013)</i></p>										
Monitoring report	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>19/07/2013</b></p> <table> <tr> <td>Relevance / design</td> <td>b</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Efficiency</td> <td>c</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Effectiveness</td> <td>c</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Impact prospects</td> <td>c</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Sustainability</td> <td>c</td> </tr> </table> <p>a = very good; b = good; c = problems; d = serious deficiencies.</p>	Relevance / design	b	Efficiency	c	Effectiveness	c	Impact prospects	c	Sustainability	c
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Sustainability	c										
Key issues/problems	<p><b>Key observations and recommendations</b></p> <p>Key observations A strategically important and highly visible intervention. While there have been considerable delays in project implementation, a re-conceptualised approach to key stakeholders and management/operational improvements could in due course ensure very meaningful outcomes.</p> <p>Lessons learned Ideally the design and launch of this type of interventions need to be synchronised with the electoral cycle.</p> <p>Recommendations To IP3: 1) Advocacy needs to be substantially enhanced as a cross-cutting theme. 2) OVIs should be reviewed upon completion of the baseline survey. 3) Consider creating a PIPS desk in Parliament that would facilitate requests for services. 4) Allocate extra human resources for YPA administration. 5) Produce a detailed incidental expenditure plan. 6) The formal constitution of the PSC will give IP3 a considerable boost in terms of visibility and commitment of stakeholders. To EUD: 7) Consider granting IP3 an adequate time extension, which would allow the project team (i) to engage PIPS and selected Parliament committees more effectively; (ii) to manage the three YPA batches smoothly and to maximise their impact; (iii) to assess the performance of selected committees more thoroughly; (iv) to translate project outputs into policy outcomes and to enhance their sustainability; (v) to increase input utilisation.</p> <p><i>Source: MR (2013)</i></p>										
Sources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Financing agreement between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the European Commission "Improving Parliamentary Performance in Pakistan", 2010</li> <li>▪ Monitoring report by Stepantsova Larissa, 19/07/2013</li> <li>▪ Addendum to the Financing agreement between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and</li> </ul>										

	<p>the European Commission “Improving Parliamentary Performance in Pakistan”, 2013</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Monitoring report (19/07/2013)</li> </ul>
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### 3.2 Long Term Election Observation and Oversight in Pakistan

Title	<b>Long Term Election Observation and Oversight in Pakistan</b>
Regions of intervention	Pakistan
Sector	Democratisation and human rights / rule of law
Budget	<p>Total: €2,504,939.19 Total EU contribution : €2,504,939.19</p> <p>3.1 The total eligible cost of the Action is estimated at 2,504,939.19 EURO, as set out in Annex III. 3.2 The Contracting Authority undertakes to finance a maximum of 2,504,939.19 EURO, equivalent to 100% of the estimated total eligible cost of the Action specified in paragraph 1. The final amount of the Contracting Authority's contribution shall be established in accordance with Articles 14 and 17 of Annex II. <i>Source : Grant contract (2012)</i></p>
EU Ref.   Contract Ref(s).	IfS/RRM/2012/284-456
Dates	2011-2012 (18 months)
Objectives	<p><b>The <u>overall objective</u> of the action</b></p> <p>The overall objective of the FAFEN strategy is to strengthen democratic institutions in Pakistan by contributing to transparent and accountable electoral processes. Free and fair elections are a vital element of democratic processes. The freedom and fairness of elections are not confined to Election Day. All aspects of the electoral cycle contribute to the freedom and fairness of elections and the democratic process as a whole. FAFEN aim to provide a long term observation and monitoring programme as part of their overall strategy, encompassing the observation and monitoring of both pre and post electoral processes.</p> <p>Increased levels of scrutiny in election processes will lead to increased transparency and accountability within the electoral process. In particular, long term observation activities will encourage greater accountability and effect behavioural change in relation to key stakeholders, including the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP), the government institutions assisting ECP, as well as other government institutions, political parties and individual electoral candidates.</p> <p>Increased levels of transparency and accountability will also increase levels of trust in the electoral process amongst Pakistan’s voting populace. Increased confidence in electoral processes will, over time, increase trust in democratic processes. Moreover, this will lead to increased expectations of transparency and accountability in relation to wider state functions and procedures.</p> <p><b>The <u>specific objective</u> of the action</b></p> <p>The specific objective of the long term observation programme in relation to the 2012/2013 General Election is to strive for improvement in legislative and administrative frameworks earning greater public trust and guaranteeing a level playing field to all contesting candidates.</p>

	<p>The long term observation programme will provide a basis for increased accountability of irregularities within the overall electoral process. By observing and monitoring both pre and post election processes and producing and disseminating data on compliance and irregularities, the programme will enhance accountability of election administration. Existing relationships and liaison with the ECP, as well as with political parties, will be reaffirmed and enhanced. Regular interactions will occur in order to raise issues of compliance and infringement. The public dissemination of data and analysis alongside these direct interactions will place pressure upon the ECP and other stakeholders to comply with electoral processes.</p> <p>Dissemination of information on the electoral process, levels of compliance and infringement and the identification of areas of potential reform will be vital for the public perception of democracy in Pakistan. Pre-election observation and monitoring will play an important part in increasing public confidence in the election process and participation in elections. Post-election observation and monitoring will complete the analysis of the electoral process by examining the implementation of election results, resolution of disputes and transfer of power. These elements are crucial for the perceived legitimacy of the democratic process and the level of trust held by the voting populace in the new administration. Furthermore, the identification of lacunae or areas of weakness in the process are essential for the system's long-term sustainability.</p> <p><i>Source : Description of the action (2012)</i></p>
Programme description	<p><b>Result 1: “Citizen groups systematically oversee and generate independent information on the quality of pre and post electoral processes”</b></p> <p>Activity 1:1 Designing of election observation methodology and implementation plan  Activity 1:2 Training of Long-Term Observers (LTOs)  Activity 1:3 Training of Trainers and Short-Term Observers (STOs) for Election Day Observation  Activity 1:4 Long-term observation, monitoring and reporting activities  Activity 1:5 Accreditation of STOs with Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP)</p> <p><b>Result 2: “Civil society organizations and their networks make efforts for corrective measures and greater enforcement of existing laws”</b></p> <p>Activity 2:1 Prompt dissemination of information to ECP for corrective measures  Activity 2:2 Sharing of observation findings with media and general public  Activity 2:3 Meetings with national and international observation groups  Activity 2:4 Meetings with political parties on select electoral issues</p> <p><b>Result 3: “FAFEN develop and advocate recommendations for election reforms based on observation findings”</b></p> <p>Activity 3:1 Analysis of electoral process data  Activity 3:2 Advocacy activities  Activity 3:3 Publications and press releases</p> <p><i>Source : Description of the action (2012)</i></p>
Implementation mechanisms	The programme was implemented by Trust for Democratic Education and Accountability (TDEA-FAFEN) contracted by the European Commission on 2012.
Verifiable indicators	<b>Result 1: Citizen groups systematically oversee and generate independent information on the quality of pre and post electoral processes</b>

	<p><b>Key Indicators:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Methodology established for objective scrutiny of electoral processes based on law</li> <li>2. Number of districts and NA constituencies with well-functioning LTOs</li> <li>3. Number of STOs prepared and facilitated by LTOs for Election Day observation</li> <li>4. Number of LTO pre and post-election reports submitted to FAFEN secretariat</li> <li>5. Accreditation by the ECP of STOs attained</li> </ol> <p><b>Result 2:</b> Civil society organizations and their networks make efforts for corrective measures and greater enforcement of existing laws</p> <p><b>Key Indicators:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Number of issues raised with local, constituency, district, provincial and national ECP officials</li> <li>2. Number of briefings for electoral stakeholders, including other observer groups and political parties</li> <li>3. Number of engagements with the media, including interviews and press conferences</li> <li>4. Number of issues raised by FAFEN that are carried forward by media and other stakeholders</li> <li>5. Number of ECP remedial actions based on FAFEN's election observations</li> </ol> <p><b>Result 3:</b> FAFEN develops and advocates recommendations for election reforms based on observation findings</p> <p><b>Key Indicators:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Number of FAFEN recommendations formulated for election related constitutional, legal, regulatory and administrative reforms</li> <li>2. Number of publications and press releases based on LTO reports and other analysis</li> <li>3. Number of advocacy engagements with provincial and national ECP officials</li> <li>4. Number of FAFEN recommendations that are addressed by ECP or other stakeholders</li> </ol> <p><i>Source : Description of the action (2012)</i></p>
Main achievements of the programme	<b>No monitoring report available</b>
Sources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Grant contract between the European Commission and TDEA-FAFEN, Long Term Election Observation and Oversight in Pakistan, 2012</li> <li>▪ Grant contract, Annex 1, Description of the action, 2012</li> </ul>

### 3.3 Support Electoral reforms in Pakistan

Title	<b>Support Electoral reforms in Pakistan</b>		
Regions of intervention	Islamabad, all Pakistan		
Sector	Legislature and political parties		
Budget	<p>Total: €2,387,720.62 Total EU contribution : €2,387,720.62</p> <p>3.1 The total cost of the Action is estimated at 2,387,720.62 EURO, as set out in Annex III.</p> <p>3.2 The Contracting Authority undertakes to finance a maximum of 2,387,720.62 EURO, equivalent to 100% of the estimated total eligible cost of the Action; the final amount of the eligible costs shall be established in accordance with Articles 14 and 17 of Annex II.</p> <p><i>Source: Grant Contract (2009)</i></p>		
EU Ref.   Contract Ref(s).	IFS-RRM/2009/224-115		
Dates	<p>2009-2011</p> <p>2.3 The Action's implementation period, as laid down in Annex I, is eighteen (18) months.</p> <p><i>Source: Grant Contract (2009)</i></p> <table border="1" data-bbox="472 1003 1441 1084"> <tr> <td>Total duration of the action</td> <td>18 months with a possible extension by 6 months</td> </tr> </table> <p><i>Source: Description of the action (2009)</i></p>	Total duration of the action	18 months with a possible extension by 6 months
Total duration of the action	18 months with a possible extension by 6 months		
Objectives	<p>The <b>overall objective</b> of the programme is to contribute to peace and stability in Pakistan through improved election processes.</p> <p>The <b>specific objectives</b> of the programme are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- to improve the Parliament's, namely the National Assembly's (N.A.) role in electoral reform and oversight;</li> <li>- to promote the frameworks for local elections, in line with international standards;</li> <li>- to improve media reporting on electoral reform and actual elections</li> <li>- to enhance civil society's effective long-term engagement in the electoral process.</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: Description of the action (2009)</i></p> <p><b>Purpose and Objectives of the Contract:</b> The purpose of the contract is the direct award of a grant by the European Union to Democracy Reporting International (DRI) for the implementation of the Action entitled "Support Electoral Reforms in Pakistan". The project aims to improve the parliament and the media's role in electoral reform and implementation with respect to federal provincial and local elections. As a result, the National Assembly and possibly the provincial assemblies are to have greater capacity in analysing electoral issues and in enacting relevant legislation, as well as exercising limited oversight of the election administration, taking into account its independency. Media should become more professional and active in reporting on electoral issues.</p> <p>The project is composed of five inter-related components ((1) electoral reform activity performed by the parliament; (2) improved electoral legislation which meets the international standards and best practices; (3) parliamentary oversight of the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) and of any provincial administration of elections; (4) improved media coverage of election reform issues and local elections; (5) improved conduct of local elections)) which target Members and secretariats of National Assembly and provincial Assemblies, civil society, media journalists and political parties.</p>		



	<i>Source: Explanatory note (2009)</i>			
Programme description	<table border="1"> <tr> <td data-bbox="477 497 735 777">Estimated results</td> <td data-bbox="735 497 1434 777"> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increased electoral reform activity by the National Assembly and possibly the provincial assemblies</li> <li>• Improved electoral legislation, which meets international standards and best practice</li> <li>• Establishment of effective parliamentary oversight of the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) and of any provincial election management body</li> <li>• Improved media coverage of election reform issues and local elections</li> <li>• Improved conduct of the local elections</li> </ul> </td> </tr> </table>	Estimated results	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increased electoral reform activity by the National Assembly and possibly the provincial assemblies</li> <li>• Improved electoral legislation, which meets international standards and best practice</li> <li>• Establishment of effective parliamentary oversight of the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) and of any provincial election management body</li> <li>• Improved media coverage of election reform issues and local elections</li> <li>• Improved conduct of the local elections</li> </ul>	<p><b>COMPONENT I: Increased Electoral Reform Activity by the Federal Parliament (namely the National Assembly)</b></p> <p><i>a.) Provision of information on different strategies the assemblies can use to address electoral reform.</i> Based on the inception mission's findings, further analyse the current legislative process (review the constitution, the N.A.'s rules and procedures, etc.), including law-drafting capacity and possible strategies in addressing electoral reform.</p> <p><i>b.) Advocacy/awareness raising events</i> As part of a comprehensive advocacy strategy the programme will seek to highlight the issue of electoral reform by various advocacy/awareness raising events, such as workshops, press conferences, special closed-door briefing sessions with MNAs, other politicians or selected journalists. This should involve wherever possible high-level personalities, such as the 2008 EU EOM's Chief Observer.</p> <p><i>c.) Provision of on-going support and expert advice, briefings and trainings to the N.A. or other relevant bodies</i> This activity should largely result in response to requests by bodies of the N.A., relevant MNAs or the Senate. DRI will offer a variety of assistance options to stimulate Parliament's thinking. It could include providing researchers to the N.A., to support the development of legal drafting skills, to provide secretarial services, to provide expert advice, such as briefings (oral and written), to organise stakeholder consultations or any other activity that may further the electoral reform agenda in parliament. In this context the programme will also look at supporting the N.A. or other chambers to develop mechanisms of meaningful oversight over the ECP, in a manner that respects the ECP's independence.</p> <p>Some support could also be given to a relevant ministry (for example in legal drafting), the ECP, political parties, or other institution, if such support would be beneficial to the objectives of this component, namely to generate political will and capacity in the N.A.</p> <p><b>COMPONENT II: Improving the Framework for Local Elections through Reporting and Assistance to the Provincial Assemblies</b></p> <p><i>a.) Conducting a Local Election Framework Assessment (LEFA) in each province to evaluate the conditions for the local elections as far as possible in advance of the election, with recommendations.</i> Framework assessments would provide systematic analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the frameworks for local elections in the four provinces in light of international standards, including relevant recommendations. For LEFAs to be</p>
Estimated results	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increased electoral reform activity by the National Assembly and possibly the provincial assemblies</li> <li>• Improved electoral legislation, which meets international standards and best practice</li> <li>• Establishment of effective parliamentary oversight of the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) and of any provincial election management body</li> <li>• Improved media coverage of election reform issues and local elections</li> <li>• Improved conduct of the local elections</li> </ul>			

	<p>meaningful there needs to be sufficient time between the adoption of new frameworks for local elections and the actual holding of such elections. Where such time is not available, the qualitative assessment (see below) would come first and a more comprehensive review after the elections, in light of the qualitative assessment and other input (domestic observer reports, etc.). LEFAs would be carried out, wherever possible, in conjunction with local civil society organisations, most likely FAFEN and its constituent organisations. Given security restrictions, it may not be possible to carry out LEFAs with the same depth of research in each province.</p> <p><i>b.) Qualitative assessment of local elections.</i></p> <p>The actual local elections in the four provinces would be assessed in a qualitative manner, analysing selected aspects such as the actual implementation of the legal framework, on the basis of the EU EOM's (2008) recommendations and international standards. This activity would rely on interviews, news reports, input from national observers and limited observation.</p> <p>This activity may be carried out in co-operation with national observer organisations, it may also take the form of supporting these organisations in their own observation efforts. Given that the level of access to information may differ between the provinces – due to security considerations – the level of reporting may also differ.</p> <p><i>c.) Supporting Provincial Assemblies in addressing reform of local elections</i></p> <p>The assemblies of the provinces would be supported in addressing electoral reform, namely by co-operation with the relevant assembly committees or key members of provincial assemblies and, as appropriate, promoting exchange of information on this topic between the relevant N.A. committees and provincial committees. This co-operation will be based on the LEFAs and qualitative assessments. This activity should result in response to requests by bodies of the provincial assemblies. It could include providing researchers to the assemblies, to support the development of legal drafting skills, to provide secretarial services, to provide expert advice, such as briefings (oral and written), or any other activity that may further the electoral reform agenda. Given the varying security conditions and electoral timetables, the approach would have to be flexible in terms of timing and in seizing opportunities for cooperation.</p> <p><b>COMPONENT III: Improved Media Coverage of Election Reform Issues and the Local Elections.</b></p> <p>The main activities of this component will include training and preparation for media coverage of electoral reform issues, as well as actual elections, including the role of different institutions, in particular legislatures.</p> <p>This will include a national consultation conference of selected media professionals, training-of-trainers sessions and workshops on coverage of electoral reform. The workshops will be held in the different provinces with local journalists (TV, print, radio, including local language radio stations).</p> <p>Through consultative meetings a draft voluntary code of conduct for media coverage of local elections will be developed.</p> <p>A series of workshops will be dedicated to the coverage of actual elections. A regular monitor will be produced to report on coverage of election issues in local-language media.</p> <p>The training curriculum and the workshop content will be closely co-ordinated with the programme's expert for local elections, to ensure that it is in line with the electoral framework and priorities in each province. For example, in one province campaign funding may be a priority for reporting, while in another province the counting and aggregation of results may be more important.</p>
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	<i>Source: Description of the action (2009)</i>
Implementation mechanisms	The programme was implemented by Democracy Reporting International (DRI) contracted by the European Commission on 2009.
Verifiable indicators	<p><b>Indicative Activities/Output of Component I:</b> 10 briefing papers (published or for specific interlocutors), 10 oral briefings of relevant committees and bodies, 5 training sessions, 8 workshops, 8 advocacy events (such as press conferences), on-going support to N.A. through researchers or other experts. Indicative Expert Input: 200 international expert days, 250 local expert days</p> <p><b>Indicative Activities/Output under Component II:</b> 3 LEFAs, 4 qualitative assessments, 8 briefing papers, 4 workshops, 8 oral presentations to provincial assemblies, support to assemblies by researcher or other short-term experts, support to national observer organisations through secondment of short-term experts. Expert Input: 200 international expert days, 250 local expert days</p> <p><b>Indicative Activities/Output under Component III:</b> Output: National conference, training of trainers session, 20 workshops, code of conduct, a regular written monitor Input: The activities of component III will be implemented by a Pakistani media organisation to be sub-contracted under the programme. <i>Source: Description of the action (2009)</i></p> <p><b>Logical framework for the project available.</b></p>
Key issues/problems	<p>There are a number of risks that could seriously constrain the programme:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Parliament being dissolved</li> <li>• Lack of cooperation by the N.A. and other partners, because of absence of political will or competing national agenda items</li> <li>• Duplication of work of other actors and/ or competing approaches</li> <li>• Security</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: Description of the action (2009)</i></p>
Sources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Grant contract with DRI, Support Electoral Reforms for Pakistan, 2009</li> <li>▪ Annex 1 to the Grant contract, Description of the action, 2009</li> <li>▪ Addendum 1 to the Grant contract, Explanatory note, 2009</li> </ul>

### 3.4 Citizens Justice and Peace Programme in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

Title	<b>Citizens Justice and Peace Programme in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa</b>																																											
Regions of intervention	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa																																											
Sector	Security System Management and Reform / Legal and Judicial Development																																											
Budget	Total: <b>14.0 M</b> Total EU contribution : <b>14.0 M</b> Under A: Technical Assistance for developing KP Police Strategy and formulation 'service contract' 2.8 M Under B: Operational implementation at District level 'a contribution agreement (Joint management with UNDP)' 9.8 M Under C: Monitoring Mechanism 'The same service contract as per results under A' 1.2 M Service contracts for visibility (or FWC) 0.15 M Service contracts for Monitoring (or FWC) 0.2 M Service contracts for Evaluation and Audit (or FWC) 0.15 M																																											
	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Categories</th> <th>EU contribution</th> <th></th> <th></th> <th>Total</th> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td>EUR (000)</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>EUR (000)</td> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Activities under ERs A and C - Technical Assistance for: - KP police and home policy planning capacity; - community based monitoring (service contract)</td> <td>4,000</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>4,000</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Activities under ER B – Joint Management (Contribution Agreement with UNDP)</td> <td>9,500</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>9,500</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Communication/ Visibility</td> <td>150</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>150</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Monitoring</td> <td>200</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>200</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Evaluation and audit</td> <td>150</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>150</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>TOTAL</b></td> <td><b>14,000</b></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td><b>14,000</b></td> </tr> </tbody> </table>				Categories	EU contribution			Total		EUR (000)			EUR (000)	Activities under ERs A and C - Technical Assistance for: - KP police and home policy planning capacity; - community based monitoring (service contract)	4,000			4,000	Activities under ER B – Joint Management (Contribution Agreement with UNDP)	9,500			9,500	Communication/ Visibility	150			150	Monitoring	200			200	Evaluation and audit	150			150	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>14,000</b>			<b>14,000</b>
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	<b><i>NB only 9.5M where contracted under this decision yet.</i></b>																																											
EU Ref.   Contract Ref(s).	DCI-ASIE/2013/024-662 355202																																											
Dates	2012-2016																																											
Objectives	<p>The <b>overall objective</b> of the programme is to contribute to strengthening Khyber Pakhtunkhwa state responsiveness to citizens' security and justice needs and to restoring trust between KP citizens and state.</p> <p><b>(Specific Objectives)</b> In order to do this, the programme is designed to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strengthen Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) security governance and organizational structure at provincial and local level by supporting the Police and Home Departments in their management and policy reform processes.</li> <li>• Contribute to strengthening the relationship between KP state and citizens to build public trust and support a paradigm shift from police force to police service by improving the performance of existing mechanisms for police accountability, police-community engagement and the delivery of justice.</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: FA 2013</i></p>																																											
Programme	The "Citizens Justice and Peace Programme in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa" contributes to																																											

description	<p>the efforts of the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and the judiciary to improve security and justice service delivery in the province by supporting state responsiveness to citizens' needs and promoting the restoration of trust between KP citizens and the state. The programme will assist in strengthening KP security governance and organizational structure by supporting the Home and Police Departments in taking the lead to determine strategic directions for reform and in coordinating different interventions in the sector. It will also help develop and strengthen existing mechanisms for police accountability and police-community engagement, as well as Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), while enhancing communication between security services and civil society.</p> <p>The programme responds to the stated objectives of the Government of KP to foster stability, democratic governance and prosperity by strengthening the rule of law.</p> <p>The expected results (ER) of the programme are threefold:</p> <p><b>ER A:</b> KP Government capacity to formulate, implement and monitor policing policies and plans is strengthened and conditions to sustain reforms for effective and professional provision of public security and law enforcement are improved;</p> <p><b>ER B:</b> Relations and trust between KP citizens and the state are enhanced, by improving policing techniques and accountability, and quality and legitimacy of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.</p> <p><b>ER C:</b> Ability of civil society to monitor and assess the impact of the project's activity on community police relations, the delivery of security-related services by the police and police approach to communities is improved.</p> <p>Activities under result A will focus on providing expertise and the tools for the on-going strategic review and formulation of an integrated and comprehensive strategic police sector approach that increase effectiveness and reduces the current reactive mode. Activities under result B will focus on the operational level of the Police Department and will contribute to operationalise the strategy, policies and plans developed under result A, contributing to refining these policies and plans by providing regular feedback to the Police Department and the EU Technical Assistance about best practices and constraints.</p> <p>Activities under result C will support community based organisations (CBOs) in the area of programme implementation to introduce community based monitoring mechanisms of police performance and impact of police professionalization efforts.</p> <p><i>Source: FA 2013</i></p>
Implementation mechanisms	<p>ER A and ER C: The project will be implemented by the European Commission, through its delegation in Pakistan. For ERs A and C, a service contract will be signed for the provision of technical expertise to the KP Home and Police Departments and to support the capacity of community based organisations in the beneficiary communities.</p> <p>ER B: The project will be implemented by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) through joint management as contracted through a standard Contribution Agreement. UNDP, in partnership with the Government of KP, is currently implementing the <i>Strengthening Rule of Law in Malakand Project</i>, which seeks to achieve results in line with the expected result B of this action.</p> <p><i>Source: FA 2013</i></p>
Verifiable indicators	<p><b>Attached Logical Framework from the FA - no measures have been made so far</b></p> <p><i>Source: FA 2013</i></p>
Main achievements of the programme	<p><b>No monitoring/evaluation reports available yet</b></p>

Sources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ FA between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, "Citizens Justice and Peace Programme in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa ", 20/12/2013</li> </ul>
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### 3.5 Access to Justice in Punjab

Title	<b>Access to Justice for Poor and Vulnerable Groups through Support of Legal and Civil Society Organisations and the Judiciary in Punjab</b>
Regions of intervention	Punjab
Sector	Legal and Judicial Development
Budget	<p>Total cost of the project: <b>€ 8 086 111</b></p> <p>EC contribution: <b>€ 8 000 000</b></p> <p>Grantees' contribution: € 86 111</p> <p>Beneficiary country: in kind contributions of an estimated counter value of total € 460 000:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Government of Punjab: € 60 000</li> <li>- Punjab Bar Council: € 30 000</li> <li>- Punjab High Court: € 30 000</li> <li>- Bar associations: € 340 000</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: Addendum n°1 to the FA 2013</i></p>
EU Ref.   Contract Ref(s).	DCI-ASIE/2009/019-192 283464 / 284412
Dates	2014-2017
Objectives	<p><b>Objective:</b> To increase access to justice for the poor and vulnerable in Punjab province.</p> <p><b>Purpose:</b> To encourage and enable the poor and vulnerable to better claim their legal rights.</p> <p><i>Source: Addendum n°1 to the FA 2013</i></p>
Programme description	<p>EC will implement a programme in Punjab Province with three major components:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(1) strengthening civil society;</li> <li>(2) accountability and awareness; and</li> <li>(3) strengthening governmental justice providers.</li> </ol> <p>The intervention will pursue a holistic approach possibly covering all aspects of access to justice, including civil, administrative and criminal law and their procedures. The focus of activity should take place in three target districts chosen by the EC Delegation during a six months' inception phase.<sup>1</sup> This will ensure an integrated impact of the full array of activities, while also permitting close monitoring and evaluation. However, some of the envisioned activities are province-wide by nature, so that the district focus is not absolute. Overall, the programme has a demand-driven approach and aims at building capacities of change drivers in civil society.</p> <p><i>Source: Addendum n°1 to the FA 2013</i></p>
Implementation mechanisms	<p>Direct centralised management through the signature of a Financing Agreement with the Beneficiary Government, represented by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Statistics (EAD).</p> <p>The programme will be implemented by the EC Delegation in Pakistan through signature of services and supplies contracts, following calls for tender and signature of grant contracts, following a call for proposal.</p> <p><i>Source: Addendum n°1 to the FA 2013</i></p> <p>A service contract is signed with Galway Development Services International</p>

	(GDSI) in December 2013. <i>Source: Service contract with GDSI (2013)</i>
Verifiable indicators	<b>Attached Indicative logical framework from the Addendum n°1 to the FA 2013- no measures have been made so far</b> <i>Source: Addendum n°1 to the FA 2013</i>
Main achievements of the programme	<b>No monitoring/evaluation reports available yet</b>
Sources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ FA 7/10/2010, Addendum n°1 to the FA between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, "Access to Justice for Poor and Vulnerable Groups through Support of Legal and Civil Society Organisations and the Judiciary in Punjab", 02/12/2013</li> <li>▪ Service contract with GDSI, December 2013</li> </ul>

### 3.6 CCBLE

Title	<b>Civilian capacity building for law enforcement in Pakistan</b>								
Regions of intervention	mainly in Islamabad and Punjab								
Sector	Democratisation and human rights / rule of law								
Budget	<table style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td>Total</td> <td style="text-align: right;"><b>€ 15.0 mln</b></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Total EU Contribution</td> <td style="text-align: right;"><b>€ 15.0 mln</b></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Services (TA)</td> <td style="text-align: right;">€ 11.5 mln (services contract n. 231840)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Supplies / Procurement</td> <td style="text-align: right;">€ 3.5 mln (procurement contract n. 258897)</td> </tr> </table> <p>Activity 1 (Support to NACTA): € 1 million (services)  Activity 2 (Support the development of provincial counter-terrorism capability in NWFP and Punjab police forces): € 8 million (services and supplies)  Activity 3 (Development of police-media relations, particularly on counter-terrorism issues): € 1.5 million (services and supplies)  Activity 4 (Criminal justice in Punjab province): € 2.5 million (services and supplies)  Activity 5 (Improve understanding of governance issues in the tribal areas close to the Afghan border): € 100,000 (services)  Project office: € 1,800,000  Audit and evaluation: € 100,000</p> <p><b><i>NB that because the objective of the action, the Commission will finance the action in full.</i></b></p>	Total	<b>€ 15.0 mln</b>	Total EU Contribution	<b>€ 15.0 mln</b>	Services (TA)	€ 11.5 mln (services contract n. 231840)	Supplies / Procurement	€ 3.5 mln (procurement contract n. 258897)
Total	<b>€ 15.0 mln</b>								
Total EU Contribution	<b>€ 15.0 mln</b>								
Services (TA)	€ 11.5 mln (services contract n. 231840)								
Supplies / Procurement	€ 3.5 mln (procurement contract n. 258897)								
EU Ref.   Contract Ref(s).	IFS-RRM/2009/022-083 231840 / 258897								
Dates	2010-2011								
Objectives	<p><b><i>Overall objectives:</i></b> Support civilian capacity building for law enforcement in Pakistan.</p> <p><b><i>Specific objectives:</i></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Improve the capacity of NACTA</li> <li>▪ Improve the capacity of the provincial police forces in NWFP and Punjab to handle counter-terrorism investigations.</li> <li>▪ Improve the ability of law enforcement agencies to handle media relations</li> <li>▪ Support more effective interaction between the prosecution service and the police by assisting the improvement of investigation standards, while fully</li> </ul>								

	<p>respecting the independence and impartiality of the prosecutors service</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Improve the understanding of governance issues in the border areas with Afghanistan</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: IfS 2009</i></p>
Programme description	<p>Over an implementation period of 18 months, the Programme: “Civilian Capacity Building Building for Law Enforcement” will take place in Pakistan, mainly in Islamabad and Punjab.</p> <p>This programme includes measures to strengthen law enforcement agencies, i.e. support to the National Counter-terrorism Authority (NACTA) as well as support to police forces in the North-Western Frontier Province (NWFP) and Punjab Province. The programme will also support media training for high ranking law enforcement officials, work on the relations between the prosecution service and the police in Punjab province, and studies on governance issues in the border areas with Afghanistan.</p> <p>The Programme operated in the law enforcement and criminal justice sectors and consists of the following five components:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(i) Support to National Counter-Terrorism Authority (NACTA)</li> <li>(ii) Support the development of provincial counter-terrorism capability in NWFP and Punjab police forces</li> <li>(iii) Development of police-media relations, particularly on counter-terrorism issues</li> <li>(iv) Criminal justice in Punjab province</li> <li>(v) Improve understanding of governance issues in the tribal areas close to the Afghan border</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: IfS 2009</i></p>
Implementation mechanisms	<p>The programme was implemented by the European Network of Implementing Agencies (EUNIDA) and its member Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit International Services (GIZ-IS) contracted by the European Commission, through its Delegation in Pakistan.</p> <p>The Commission will also sign an audit and evaluation contract with a contractor to be determined.</p> <p><i>Source: IfS 2009</i></p> <p>The CCBLE programme is being implemented through the European Union Network of Implementing Development Agencies (EUNIDA) with the Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH as the lead agency.</p> <p><i>Source: Inception report (May 2010)</i></p>



	<p>Delegation of European Union, Economic Affairs Division, Ministry of Economic Affairs and Ministry of Interior signed a MOU on 24 November 2010. Under the MOU, European Union as part of the Tokyo pledge contributed 15 million Euro for improving "Civilian Capacity Building for Law-Enforcement in Pakistan" (CCBLE).</p> <p>Due to increased number of terrorist activities in Pakistan, the Delegation of European Union in Pakistan in consultation with the Federal Ministry of Interior, concerned provincial law enforcing agencies of Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK); agreed to procure non lethal bomb disposal equipment for civilian capacity building of law enforcement agencies.</p> <p>Need assessment was conducted and technical specifications as well tentative quantities for the special response bomb disposal units were agreed. A budget of Euro 3.5 million were made available to procure up to eight (8) special response units. As this was a complex procurement action therefore an Action plan was developed and signed on 23<sup>rd</sup> December between European Union and United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS).</p> <p><i>Source: UNOPS, Final report (March 2012)</i></p>
Results chain/Verifiable indicators	<p><b>Attached Indicative Logical Framework from the IfS - no measures have been made so far</b></p> <p><i>Source: IfS 2009</i></p>
Main achievements of the programme	<p><b>Although the programme is already finished there are no monitoring reports available</b></p>
Sources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Draft Commission Decision on Adopting an Exceptional Assistance Measure under the Instrument for Stability (IfS) on Civilian capacity building for law enforcement in Pakistan, 2009</li> <li>▪ Service Contract No IfS-RRM/2010/231-840 for European External Actions financed from the EU General Budget, 23/02/2010</li> <li>▪ Inception report, May 2010</li> <li>▪ UNOPS, Final report, 22 March 2012</li> </ul>

### 3.7 Enhancing support for ending violence and discrimination against women

Title	<b>Enhancing support for ending violence and discrimination against women</b>
Regions of intervention	Region: Punjab: Districts of Rawalpindi and Chakwal
Sector	Democratisation and human rights / rule of law
Budget	Total: €207,098 Total EU contribution : €165,678  The total expenditures incurred, however, were lower than anticipated: €184,159.45 resulting in an EC contribution of €147,327.56. No final payment was made resulting in a RAL of € 16,568. In fact, taking into account the eligible cost of the project and the amounts of pre-financing paid, the Delegation issued a recovery order for € 1,782.44 on 20 September 2012. <i>Source: Explanatory note (2009)</i>
EU Ref.   Contract Ref(s).	EIDHR/2009/223-084
Dates	2009-2012 The duration of the project was 26 months. The starting date of activities was 1st January 2010 and they extended until 28 February 2012 <i>Source: Explanatory note (2009)</i>
Objectives	<b>Overall Objective:</b> To enhance the support for elimination of discrimination and violence against women in Pakistan through capacity building of civil society actors and police officials and enhancing support for legal reforms. <b>Specific objectives</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ To increase capacity of police officials and law students in Rawalpindi and Chakwal on international human rights standards and instruments and on dealing with violence and abuse against women.</li> <li>▪ To enhance coordinated support by rallying civil society (lawyers, CSOs, media activists, academics etc.) for approval of domestic violence bill from Senate and firm implementation of domestic violence bill.</li> <li>▪ To create awareness and understanding about VAW and women's human rights among masses in Chakwal and Rawalpindi.</li> <li>▪ To establish community based support system for supporting survivors of violence by building capacities of 40 CBOs.</li> </ul> <i>Source: Explanatory note (2009)</i>
Programme description	<b>Expected result 1.</b> Police officials and lawyers are aware and have understanding on UDHR, CEDAW and Appropriate dealing with violence survivors <b>Expected Result 2.</b> Support for movement for approval of domestic violence bill from senate and its subsequent implementation is enhanced. <b>Expected Result 3.</b> Awareness is created about violence against women and human rights of women at mass level <b>Expected Result 4.</b> Support system for dealing with the violence against women is created at community level.  <b>Main activities:</b> <b>1. Human Rights education of Police and Lawyers</b> 1.1. Curriculum Development; 1.2. Training of Police trainers and law teachers; 1.3. Sessions with police officials and law students; 1.4. Seminars with in-service Police

	<p>offices.</p> <p><b>2. Movement for Passing the Bill on Ending Violence against women</b>  2.1. Dialogues on Domestic Violence Against women bill; 2.2. Roundtable with Parliamentarians; 2.3. Peaceful Demonstrations; 2.4. National Conference on Violence against women.</p> <p><b>3. Awareness rising about the violence against women</b>  3.1. Radio Programs; 3.2. Debate and speech Competition; 3.3. Interactive theatre; 3.4. IEC Material.</p> <p><b>4. Support system for domestic violence against women</b>  4.1. Development of training program; 4.2. Formation of 20 New CBOs 4.3. Training of CBOs; 4.4. Establishment and running of violence support centres.  <i>Source: Description of the action (2009)</i></p>
Implementation mechanisms	The programme was implemented by Cavish, contracted by the European Commission on 2009.
Verifiable indicators	<b>Logical framework for the project available.</b>
Sources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Grant contract with Cavish, Enhancing support for ending violence and discrimination against women in Pakistan, 2009</li> <li>▪ Grant contract with Cavish, Explanatory note, 2009</li> <li>▪ Grant contract with Cavish, Annex 1, Description of the action, 2009</li> </ul>

### 3.8 Combating abusive child labour II

Title	<b>Combating abusive child labour II</b>
Regions of intervention	<p>All Pakistan</p> <p>The programme will be implemented in Pakistan (nation-wide, but with emphasis on two selected districts, preferably one in the province of Sindh and one in the province of NWFP). The selection of the target districts will be finalised in close consultation with the federal and provincial governments during the inception period of the programme. It will take into account the selection criteria set forward by the Identification Mission in 2004 (main elements: the volume and prevalence of child labour, local political commitment, socio-economic state and urban informal sectors or rural farming present), and the results of the August 2005 local elections.</p> <p><i>Source: Annex 2 to FA (2006)</i></p>
Sector	Employment policy and administrative management
Budget	<p>Total cost of the project: <b>€ 5,447,900</b></p> <p>EU contribution: <b>€ 5,000,000</b></p> <p>2.1 The total cost of the programme is estimated at 5,447,900 euro (five million four hundred forty-seven thousand nine hundred euro).</p> <p>2.2 The Community undertakes to finance a maximum of 5,000,000 euro (five million euro). The breakdown of the Community's financial contribution into budget headings is shown in the budget included in the Technical and Administrative Provisions in Annex II.</p> <p><i>Source: FA (2006)</i></p>
EU Ref.   Contract Ref(s).	ASIE/2005/017640
Dates	2008-2013
Objectives	<p><b>1.1. Overall Objective</b></p> <p>The overall development objective of the programme is to contribute to the Government of Pakistan's efforts in eliminating child labour including its worst forms in Pakistan.</p> <p><b>1.2. Programme Purpose</b></p> <p>The purpose of the programme is to capacitate Government and civil society structures with requisite knowledge base in order to take sustained action against child labour, in particular its worst forms, and to develop a district based holistic model to reduce child labour across sectors in the target districts of the programme.</p> <p><i>Source: Annex 2 to FA (2006)</i></p>
Programme description	<p>The main results of the programme are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) A sustainable and holistic district based model is developed to reduce and gradually eliminate abusive child labour across sectors in the target districts</li> <li>(b) The institutional and technical capacity of the target district governments and the four provincial and one federal Child Labour Units (CLUs) is strengthened</li> <li>(c) The knowledge base on child labour including its worst forms in Pakistan is expanded and awareness increased to promote child labour friendly policies and legislative framework</li> </ul>

	<p><u>Component 1)</u></p> <p>The main thrust of the programme will be at the district/local level. This component will aim to contribute towards the gradual elimination of child labour and undertake immediate measures to eliminate its worst forms, introduce alternative options to working children and their families, prevent more children at risk from joining hazardous jobs and gradually phase out child labour from the informal sectors where most working children are found. An important starting point will be to mobilise, support and build the capacity of local community groups and leaders to raise awareness and monitor the incidence of child labour. Other key strategies will include education and vocational skills training, alleviation of working conditions, linking child labourers and their families with non-hazardous labour prospects and referral to existing social safety nets and credit facilities.</p> <p>The programme aims to tackle the root causes of child labour in the wider context by primarily addressing children in their working environments and their families, both of which will be the main beneficiaries of this component. A key strategy is to create and facilitate durable solutions based on public-private partnerships to reduce the physical, mental and psychological abuse of working children. This component foresees a set of direct interventions in the target districts that will be implemented by NGOs, social partners, technical agencies and local service and credit providers in collaboration with the district governments and local communities.</p> <p><u>Component 2)</u></p> <p>The ultimate responsibility for the elimination of child labour rests with the Government. In order for the government to fulfil this responsibility in a sustainable manner, the programme aims to strengthen its capacity to plan, coordinate, monitor, and implement anti-child labour interventions at a grand scale. Emphasis will be made to build the capacity of the target district governments to gradually take responsibility for the provision, coordination and management of improved social services, which are made more easily available for child labourers and their families. Institutional capacity building efforts at provincial and federal levels will ensure coordination and interactive communication between federal, provincial and district levels and enhance and sustain an enabling environment that facilitates the programme interventions in the target districts.</p> <p>The target group and direct beneficiaries under this component consist of the two target district governments including their relevant offices, such as District Office for Education, Literacy, Community Development (having both labour and social welfare offices), Health, Finance, Planning, Micro Credit Providers and District Zakat Committees, as well as the district and province level Labour Departments. The Ministry of Labour and the four provincial Labour Departments will be the main counterparts in implementing the capacity building of the Child Labour Unit at the federal and provincial levels respectively. The ultimate beneficiaries will be children in labour and their families, which will benefit from better access to improved and timelier government services.</p> <p><u>Component 3)</u></p> <p>A comprehensive understanding amongst key stakeholders of the nature, extent and dynamics of child labour is an essential starting point to achieve effective and sustainable changes at the national as well as local level. The programme will facilitate the government and stakeholders in improving the understanding of child labour and its causes and to use the knowledge as a tool to push for development planning, policy and/or legislative formulation or reform. In addition, a particular effort will be made to ensure the EC input and presence is more visible within the wider public in Pakistan.</p> <p>The direct target group under this component consists of policy makers to achieve long term reforms and keep child labour on the Government agenda. Intermediate beneficiaries will be trade unions, employers, civil society and the general public. The indirect beneficiary group will be children in labour and their families.</p>
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	<i>Source: Annex 2 to FA (2006)</i>			
Implementation mechanisms	ILO implements the project. Contribution agreement between the EC and ILO (2008-2013) signed in March 2008.			
Verifiable indicators	<b>Attached Logical framework, Attachment n°1 to the FA</b>			
Main achievements of the programme	<p>Three monitoring reports are available.</p> <p><b>Key observations and recommendations</b></p> <p>There are two key observations to be made with respect to this project and three recommendations:  The success of the project is a result of every relevant ministry/ body /agency /person involved in solving the problem of abusive child labour being involved. This outcome mainly comes from the successful implementation of components 2 and 1 in the two districts. The relevant fields are education, labour, health care, unions, employer organisations and administrators at district and provincial levels (Provincial Child Labour Units, PCLUs). Sustainability of the efforts is ensured as a result of the fact that project management has been able to make the relevant government bodies feel responsible for the project.  Recommendations: Project: (i) As teachers play a key role in having children removed from Abusive Child Labour, it is recommended that all teachers are trained to do so in the districts concerned; (ii) it is also strongly recommended to offer ICT courses to both men and women at TVET facilities; (iii) Women should be offered more innovative training than just beautician and tailoring courses at TVET facilities.</p> <p><i>Source: MR (2012)</i></p>			
Monitoring report		<b>11/09/2009</b>	<b>22/07/2010</b>	<b>10/08/2012</b>
	Relevance / design	a	b	a
	Efficiency	c	b	c
	Effectiveness	b	c	b
	Impact prospects	b	b	b
	Sustainability	b	b	b
	a = very good; b = good; c = problems; d = serious deficiencies.			
Sources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Financing agreement between the European Commission and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Child abusive labour II, 2006</li> <li>▪ Financing agreement, Annex 2, Technical and Administrative provisions, 2006</li> <li>▪ Monitoring reports, 11/09/2009, 22/07/2010, 10/08/2012</li> </ul>			

### 3.9 CAPRI

Title	<b>Counter Terrorism Associated Prosecution Reform Initiative (CAPRI)</b>
Regions of intervention	Pakistan
Sector	Democratisation and human rights / rule of law
Budget	Total cost of the project: <b>€ 1,800,00</b> EU contribution: <b>€ 1,800,00</b>  <i>Source: Service agreement (2012)</i>
EU Ref.   Contract Ref(s).	IFS 2012/298-204
Dates	2013- 2016  <b>(4) Commencement date</b>  The date for commencing implementation shall be 02 January 2013.  <b>(5) Period of implementation</b>  The period of implementation of the tasks identified in Annexes II is 36 months from the Commencement date.  <i>Source: Service agreement (2012)</i>
Objectives	<p>“The overall objective is to support national capacity in the fight against terrorism and organised crime networks.”</p> <p>“The purpose of this action is to improve the ability of Punjabi agencies to successfully investigate, prosecute, convict and detain terrorists.</p> <p>The specific purpose of this project is to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Increase the use of forensic evidence to support terrorism cases;</li> <li>▪ Improve the quality of the evidential package used to support hard core terrorism prosecutions;</li> <li>▪ Increased understanding of forensic evidence by police, prosecutors and judiciary;;</li> <li>▪ The professional relations between Punjab police and prosecution service are improved.”</li> </ul> <p>“Overall expected result of the project:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Counter terrorism cases are supported by comprehensive and enhanced evidential packages;</li> <li>▪ The number of Punjab Forensic Science Agency contributions to terrorism cases is increased impacting the number of terrorism cases brought to justice;</li> <li>▪ Improved coordination between police, prosecutors and forensic scientists, which in turn leads to higher quality casework being submitted to court.”</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: ToR (2012)</i></p>
Programme description	<p>“The Counter Terrorism Prosecution Reform Initiative (CAPRI) aims to improve the ability to successfully investigate, prosecute, convict and detain terrorists. As part of the discussions preparing this programme, the Punjab Government has identified the following key priorities:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <b>Recruitment and training of Specialist Counter Terrorism Prosecutors</b> to</li> </ol>

	<p>ensure that CT prosecutors have the capacity to efficiently and effectively prosecute high profile cases, as opposed to the current Anti-Terrorism Court prosecutors who are in court every day and are unable to devote sufficient time to be part of a Joint Investigation Team;</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2. <b>Develop the CT Department of the police's investigative capacity</b> to improve the quality of cases presented to the Specialist Counter Terrorism Prosecutors and Anti-Terrorism Courts;</li> <li>3. <b>Increase the use of forensic evidence to support CT cases</b> by developing the capacity of the Punjab Forensic Science Agency.</li> </ol> <p>This project will focus on the third priority – increasing the use of forensic evidence. The project will be scheduled over <u>three</u> years of delivery, from January 2013. The project will be delivered as part of the overall seven-year CAPRI programme.”</p> <p><i>Source: ToR (2012)</i></p>										
Implementation mechanisms	<p>Service contract</p> <p>“The UK (British Foreign &amp; Commonwealth Office - FCO) will support the Government of Pakistan at the federal and provincial levels to improve capacity in the counter terrorism criminal justice system to successfully investigate, prosecute, convict and detain high profile terrorists, in accordance with human rights standards. Specifically, the UK will support the development of an improved CT legislative framework to ensure that law enforcement officers, prosecutors and judges have the tools they need to tackle hard-core terrorism. In parallel, the UK will also support the reform of the key elements of the related institutions. The UK lead CAPRI is a seven-year programme with; the scale and extent of the activities in subsequent phases of delivery that depend on the earlier experience of delivery. In addition to UK funding, <b>the EU has committed to providing the current €1.8 million to CAPRI over three years from January 2013.</b>”</p> <p><i>Source: ToR (2012)</i></p> <p>By focusing on CT, the project matches strategic priorities of both the Government of Pakistan and the EU which has provided funding to the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in the frame of its CAPRI programme. FCO has sub-contracted Torch Light Solutions, specialising in Counter-Threat services, and Cellmark Forensic Services. Both companies contribute the implementation of the EU project on the basis of a simpler version of the EU ToR.</p> <p><i>Source: MR (2014)</i></p>										
Verifiable indicators	<b>No Logical Framework available</b>										
Main achievements of the programme	<table border="1" data-bbox="480 1624 1431 1767"> <tr> <td>Relevance and quality of design</td> <td>C</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Efficiency of Implementation to date</td> <td>C</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Effectiveness to date</td> <td>C</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Impact prospects</td> <td>B</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Potential sustainability</td> <td>B</td> </tr> </table>	Relevance and quality of design	C	Efficiency of Implementation to date	C	Effectiveness to date	C	Impact prospects	B	Potential sustainability	B
Relevance and quality of design	C										
Efficiency of Implementation to date	C										
Effectiveness to date	C										
Impact prospects	B										
Potential sustainability	B										



	<p><b>Effectiveness to date</b></p> <p>The slow pace of project implementation has led to limited outcomes (and thus project effectiveness) to date with regard to training delivered, improvements in internal PFSA procedures and relations with other stakeholders. Nonetheless, beneficiaries of project activities, still few at present, express a high degree of satisfaction. Overall, while the project goals can be only be attained in part within the timeframe of the project, the foundations for a meaningful long-term process can well be laid. SO1 could be met through the increased use of forensic evidence to support terrorism cases. CAPRI has been successful in making sure that forensic findings are accepted as 'primary evidence', as reflected in Art 27B of the recently amended Anti-Terrorism Ordinance. Similarly, the quality of evidence used in CT prosecutions (SO2) is expected to increase thanks to PFSA standards raised in view of future ISO17025 accreditation, and improvements already underway in PFSA. However, increased understanding of forensic evidence by the police, prosecutors and the judiciary (SO3) is more of a long-term objective, given the limited cooperation between these stakeholders. While PFSA has a high technical capacity (with the exception of DNA analysis), its contribution to advanced CT investigations is still low. Therefore, an intensive advocacy and demonstration strategy (ER3) will be needed on the part of PFSA, which remains somewhat isolated at this stage. The professional relations between the Punjab police and the prosecution service can be improved (SO4) through the active engagement of provincial political authorities, ideally at the Chief Minister's level - an important goal of CAPRI which, however, requires time to be achieved.</p> <p><i>Source: Monitoring report (17/02/2014)</i></p>
Monitoring report	<p style="text-align: right;"><b>17/02/2014</b></p> <p>Relevance / design      c</p> <p>Efficiency                      c</p> <p>Effectiveness                c</p> <p>Impact prospects            b</p> <p>Sustainability                b</p> <p>a = very good; b = good; c = problems; d = serious deficiencies.</p>
Key issues/problems	<p>“Key observations and recommendations</p> <p>A highly relevant intervention, with useful lessons learned in terms of project design which, however, is still in need of a conceptual focus and alignment to contractual provisions. CAPRI has yet to finalise the project implementation strategy in line with the EU strategic framework and financial/reporting requirements, so that delivery is fully ensured and effectiveness is further enhanced. FCO: 1) Consult with the EC on keeping the SOs as ERs and turning the initial ERs into SOs; OVI should also be updated; 2) Clarify, in consultation with the EC, the project team structure and remaining budget as soon as possible; 3) Update the work plan and expenditure plan against a realistic timeline; 4) Seek linkages to projects run by other EU partners. PFSA: 1) Devise a strategy for the development of close relations with other CT-related stakeholders.”</p> <p><i>Source: Monitoring report (17/02/2014)</i></p>
Sources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Service contract with Foreign &amp; Commonwealth Office, 2012</li> <li>▪ Annex II to Service contract, Terms of reference, 2012</li> <li>▪ Monitoring report, 17/02/2014</li> </ul>

## 4. Public Financial Management

### 4.1 PFM-SPP

Title	<b>Public Financial Management Support Programme for Pakistan PFM-SPP</b>																				
Regions of intervention	All Pakistan																				
Sector	GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY / Public Finance Management																				
Budget	<table> <tr> <td>Total:</td> <td><b>15 000 000 €</b></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Total EU contribution (1 + 2 + 3)</td> <td><b>15 000 000 €</b></td> </tr> <tr> <td>1. PFM Reform in Sindh</td> <td>9 350 000 €</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1.1 Sindh PFM Reform strategy</td> <td>7 000 000 €</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1.2 Sindh MTBF</td> <td>2 350 000 €</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2. PFM Reform at federal level</td> <td>4 000 000 €</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2.1 Federal Level Reform strategy</td> <td>1 000 000 €</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2.2 Federal MTBF</td> <td>2 000 000 €</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2.3 Macro economic modelling</td> <td>1 000 000 €</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3. M&amp;E, contingencies, etc.</td> <td>1 650 000 €</td> </tr> </table> <p><i>Source: FA 2013</i></p>	Total:	<b>15 000 000 €</b>	Total EU contribution (1 + 2 + 3)	<b>15 000 000 €</b>	1. PFM Reform in Sindh	9 350 000 €	1.1 Sindh PFM Reform strategy	7 000 000 €	1.2 Sindh MTBF	2 350 000 €	2. PFM Reform at federal level	4 000 000 €	2.1 Federal Level Reform strategy	1 000 000 €	2.2 Federal MTBF	2 000 000 €	2.3 Macro economic modelling	1 000 000 €	3. M&E, contingencies, etc.	1 650 000 €
Total:	<b>15 000 000 €</b>																				
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EU Ref.   Contract Ref(s).	DCI-ASIE/2012/023-505 324816 / 329850 / 345089																				
Dates	2014-2019																				
Objectives	<p><b>The overall objective is to contribute to the improvement of public financial administration to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency in the utilization of government budget resources in order to deliver better public services and to reduce the impact of poverty and social inequality. The specific objectives are:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>To support a comprehensive public finance management reform process in Sindh province including support for a Medium Term Budgetary Framework.</b></li> <li><b>To support public finance management reform process at the federal level through the design of an overarching and comprehensive PFM reform strategy; and consolidation of the Medium Term Budgetary Framework process.</b></li> </ul> <p><i>Source: FA 2013</i></p>																				
Programme description	<p><b>The Public Financial Management Support Programme for Pakistan, PFM-SPP will focus its action on the province of Sindh.</b> This province faces important challenges related to urban/rural development, poverty and social/economic underdevelopment in many areas of the province. EU has provided budget support to the provincial Government in the education sector and intends to maintain its support in the near future.</p> <p><b>The programme will also support the Federal Government as a relevant coordinating unit between the centre and the provinces and due to the important role played by the Federal Government on public financial management.</b></p> <p>The expected results of the programme are the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Result 1: A PFM reform strategy is developed, a PFM action plan is implemented and a medium term budgetary framework is effectively established in the province of Sindh.</b> This result will provide the province of Sindh with the basic components to improve public financial management at provincial level.</li> <li><b>Result 2: A PFM reform strategy is developed; the Medium Term Budgetary Framework is consolidated and macro-economic and fiscal modelling and forecast is strengthened at federal level.</b> This result will act upon macro-economic modelling and forecast as well as MTBF and provide the basis for a PFM reform strategy.</li> </ul>																				

	<i>Source: FA 2013</i>
Implementation mechanisms	<p>The activities regarding the Government of Sindh will be executed in Karachi (Sindh province). The rest of the activities regarding the Federal Government will be executed in the Islamabad and will have a nation-wide impact.</p> <p>One steering committee shall be set up to oversee and validate the implementation of the project with representation from the Federal Government, the Government of Sindh and the EU Delegation. The project steering committee shall meet, at least, once a year or when necessary to discuss progress of the programme. The steering committee may invite civil servants, technical assistance staff, donors and other stakeholders to discuss issues relevant to the implementation of the project.</p> <p><i>Source: FA 2013</i></p> <p>A Service contract is signed with Oxford Policy Management Limited (OPM). The maximum contract value is 11,347,250</p>
Verifiable indicators	<b>Attached Performance Matrix from the FA - no measures have been made so far</b> <i>Source: FA 2013</i>
Main achievements of the programme	<b>No monitoring/evaluation reports available yet</b>
Sources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ FA between the EU and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Public Financial Management Support Programme for Pakistan PFM-SPP, 11/03/2013</li> <li>▪ Service contract with Oxford Policy Management Limited, 2014</li> </ul>

## 5. Synopsis of trade projects

### 5.1 TRTA II

Title	<b>Trade Related Technical Assistance Programme (TRTA II)</b>																																																																																						
Regions of intervention	All Pakistan																																																																																						
Sector	TRADE POLICY AND REGULATIONS AND TRADE-RELATED ADJUSTMENT / Trade Policy and Regulation																																																																																						
Budget	<p>Total: <b>12 045 000 €</b> with addendum                      Total EU contribution: <b>9 545 000 € + 2 000 000</b> (addendum 1)                      Other donors                      UNIDO : 500 000 €                      Government's contribution (in kind) 500 000 €</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Categories Breakdown</th> <th>EU EUR</th> <th>GoP*</th> <th>Other contributions (UNIDO)</th> <th>Top-up</th> <th>Total</th> <th>Contracting Authority</th> <th>Paying Authority</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td><u>I. Services</u></td> <td><u>300 000</u></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td><u>300 000</u></td> <td>EC</td> <td>EC</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1.1 Monitoring and Evaluation</td> <td>200 000</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>1.2 Audit/ Verification mission</td> <td>100 000</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>2. CA with UNIDO</td> <td><b>8 895 000</b></td> <td></td> <td>500 000</td> <td><b>2 000 000</b></td> <td><b>11 395 000</b></td> <td>EC</td> <td>EC</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2.1 Component 1</td> <td>1 018 000</td> <td></td> <td>50 000</td> <td>200 000</td> <td>1 268 000</td> <td>UNIDO</td> <td>EC</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2.2 Component 2</td> <td>6 764 000</td> <td></td> <td>400 000</td> <td>1 750 000</td> <td>8 914 000</td> <td>UNIDO</td> <td>EC</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2.3 Component 3</td> <td>1 113 000</td> <td></td> <td>50 000</td> <td>50 000</td> <td>1 213 000</td> <td>UNIDO</td> <td>EC</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3. Contingencies</td> <td><u>350 000</u></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td><u>350 000</u></td> <td>EC</td> <td>EC</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>TOTAL</b></td> <td><b>9 545 000</b></td> <td></td> <td>500 000</td> <td><b>2 000 000</b></td> <td><b>12 045 000</b></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>*The Government of Pakistan contribution in kind ( equivalent EUR 500 000 ) consists of the provision of two rooms fully furnished with all necessary office equipment, communication facilities, one support staff and a full time availability of one highly level official from FTIP, for the entire duration of the TRTA-II in the premises of FTIP, Islamabad.</p> <p>Budgetary situation in September 2015                      Contracted: € 10.96 m                      Paid: € 9.25 m</p>							Categories Breakdown	EU EUR	GoP*	Other contributions (UNIDO)	Top-up	Total	Contracting Authority	Paying Authority	<u>I. Services</u>	<u>300 000</u>				<u>300 000</u>	EC	EC	1.1 Monitoring and Evaluation	200 000							1.2 Audit/ Verification mission	100 000							2. CA with UNIDO	<b>8 895 000</b>		500 000	<b>2 000 000</b>	<b>11 395 000</b>	EC	EC	2.1 Component 1	1 018 000		50 000	200 000	1 268 000	UNIDO	EC	2.2 Component 2	6 764 000		400 000	1 750 000	8 914 000	UNIDO	EC	2.3 Component 3	1 113 000		50 000	50 000	1 213 000	UNIDO	EC	3. Contingencies	<u>350 000</u>				<u>350 000</u>	EC	EC	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>9 545 000</b>		500 000	<b>2 000 000</b>	<b>12 045 000</b>		
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EU Ref.   Contract Ref(s).	DCI-ASIE/2008/019-792 221591 / 282629 / 342953																																																																																						
Dates	2009-2012(14 ?) (2017 with addendum) (90 months with addendum)																																																																																						
Objectives	<p><b>Global Objective :</b> to support sustainable development and poverty reduction in Pakistan</p> <p><b>Programme Purpose:</b> to support the economic integration of Pakistan into the global and regional economy and to stimulate decent work and employment creation in increasing exports and enhancing the enabling climate for international trade.</p>																																																																																						
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	<p>TRTA-II has the following three Components:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Component 1: Trade Policy Capacity Building</li> <li>2. Component 2: Export development through improvement of the quality infrastructure</li> <li>3. Component 3: Strengthening of the Intellectual Property Rights</li> </ol> <p><b>Component 1: Trade Policy Capacity Building:</b> This component is specifically aimed at the Ministry of Commerce (MoC) and promoting more comprehensive dialogue among government, the private sector and civil society. The programme aims to build capacity within the MoC on trade related issues. It also seeks to strengthen inter-ministerial co-operation, to facilitate donor co-ordination, and to develop common indicators for results achieved in Trade Related Assistance.</p> <p><b>Component 2: Export development through improvement of the quality infrastructure</b> This component will provide an enabling environment in terms of market requirements for quality and safety requirements for Pakistani exports. To this purpose, the main list of System Certifications for enterprise will include ISO 9001 (Quality Management System), ISO 14001(Environmental Management System), ISO 22000 (Food Safety Management System), HACCP (Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points) and SA 8000 (Social Accountability). ISO 17025 (Accreditations of Labs). A total of 31 labs (24 testing Labs and 7 Metrology Labs) will be targeted for accreditation to ISO 17025. The testing labs, after accreditation will be able to issue internationally acceptable test reports for 6 different analyses in 6 main product sectors.<sup>4</sup></p> <p><b>Component 3: Strengthening of the Intellectual Property Rights</b> This component will work closely with the Intellectual Property Organization Office (IPO) and would support it in implementing its strategy once approved by Government of Pakistan. The objective is to strengthen the Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) regime in Pakistan and make SMEs aware of the opportunities which IPO offers along with addressing a major concern of trade related FDI into Pakistan.</p> <p>In view of addressing issues of economic growth and employment creation, addendum 1 of 2014 has added four activities (with an additional budget of €2m and extension of 24 months): (i) Support for Competition Commission of Pakistan and (ii) Business environment improvement, (iii) Global Value Chain competitiveness, and (iv) Regional trade in South Asia.</p>
Implementation mechanisms	The project is implemented through centralised management and joint management (signature of a Contribution Agreement with UNIDO as the implementing partner). Contribution agreements have been concluded with ITC and WIPO to implement specific components, ITC for component 1 on trade policy capacity building and WIP for component 3 on intellectual property rights. UNIDO has established a (PMO) to implement the project with backstopping from the UNIDO Vienna office. The programme implementation is also supported through backstopping from the ITC and WIPO offices in Geneva.
Verifiable indicators	<b>Attached Logical Framework from Progress Report 2014.</b> It has been measured in the years 2012 and 2013/2014 and 2014.
Main achievements of the programme	<p>The programme has been well implemented and its outputs have generally been provided according to plan.</p> <p><b>Component 1: Trade Policy Capacity Building</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The programme has provided considerable training in trade related areas (trade policy, public private dialogues, SPS, benchmarking/lean manufacturing, accreditation services, IPR, etc.). The quality of the consultants (international and national ones) and the relevance of the subject matters have been appreciated.</li> <li>▪ Needs and remedies for institutionalisation of PITAD identified</li> <li>▪ Demand for PITAD training services is expanding</li> <li>▪ Consultation process on policy formulation informed with evidence based studies</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Further support to assist exporters to use the GSP+ Scheme</li> <li>▪ Synergies to assist exporters in benefiting from GSP+ Scheme are taking place</li> <li>▪ Continuous national wide consultation process for a coherent national export strategy is being fostered through the auspices of the Public Private Dialogue Steering Committee (PPDSC)</li> <li>▪ National wide and informed consultation process carried out under TRTA II recognized and replicated</li> </ul> <p><b>Component 2: Export Development through Improvement of Quality Infrastructure</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ National Food Safety Animal and Plant Health Regulatory Authority (NFSAPHRA) Bill submitted to Ministry of National Food Security and Research (MNFS&amp;R) for approval.</li> <li>▪ Record increase of fish exports following the opening of EU markets</li> <li>▪ Post Graduate Diploma course in food safety &amp; controls is now accredited by Royal Environmental Health Institute of Scotland (REHIS) and first batch of students graduated.</li> <li>▪ NPO capacities build to carry out Benchmarking</li> <li>▪ Three Success Stories at Electric Fans units and one at Gloves Manufacturing Unit has been created through Interventions in Industrial Sector on Process Control and CSR initiated</li> <li>▪ TRTA II Provision of polishing machines to four pilot companies in the industrial Sector</li> <li>▪ Codes of Practice COPs Revised</li> <li>▪ Mango Fruit Fly Controlled effectively</li> <li>▪ Protective Gloves Achieved CE marking</li> <li>▪ Electric Fans submitted for CE marking Passed LVD and EMC testing</li> <li>▪ Samples of Motor Bike Gloves Submitted to EU Notified Body</li> <li>▪ All the phases for Master Trainers for CE marking has been Completed</li> <li>▪ Surgical Instruments manufacturers trained on CSR and Process Control</li> <li>▪ Roadmap for implementation of CSR and Process Control at factory level Developed</li> <li>▪ The preparation of National Quality Policy under the aegis of ministry of science and Technology</li> </ul> <p><b>Component 3: Strengthening of the Intellectual Property Rights System</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Strengthened IP Institutions</li> <li>▪ Strengthened IP Legislation &amp; Policy Framework</li> <li>▪ Improved Enforcement of IPRs</li> <li>▪ Increased Use of IP by Business and Research Institutions</li> </ul>
Key issues/problems	<p><b>Overall:</b> the export target assigned to the project (32% of GDP) was grossly overambitious. Value addition targets set for fisheries and horticulture proved unfeasible.</p> <p><b>Component 1: Trade Policy Capacity Building</b> Normal difficulties as associated with projects were experienced which were solved through project management techniques.</p> <p><b>Component 2: Export Development through Improvement of Quality Infrastructure</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The procurement and provision of polishing machines to the selected companies has been delayed because of limited suppliers' available and protracted procurement procedures. Now these problems have been tackled and PO has been issued to the selected supplier.</li> <li>▪ Re-engineering of PSQCA.</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ After working primarily as a regulator as regards mandatory standards for the past decades, the notion of becoming a service organization that also has the additional responsibility for the administration of mandatory standards will need a change of business culture within PSQCA. This will not come about easily and would probably require outside intervention before the transition will be successfully concluded. Continuous and lengthy dialogue with MoST and PSQCA was necessary to initiate the process. A “win-win” situation as regards conformity assessment and providing for “firewalls” as regards the pure regulatory work was developed which found general acceptance within PSQCA and MoST.</li> <li>▪ Recruitment of an IE in Plant Health: Despite numerous meetings, letter from DPP requesting for assistance and an agreement between all relevant shareholders, FAO has yet to identify an appropriate person to be recruited by the Programme to help GoP, DPP to address the reformation of plant health law and address the IPPC requirements for PCE analysis.</li> <li>▪ Impasse between MNFS&amp;R &amp; MoST to come to a consensus on the NAPHIS Bill, despite the agreement and support of MoC. TRTA II experts to hold final discussions with representatives from both ministries in December to resolve the matter.</li> </ul> <p><b>Component 3: Strengthening of the Intellectual Property Rights System</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Currently, there are shortages in IPO Pakistan's IT human resources which is impacting the implementation of the two remaining modernization activities, namely the Web Portal and the Admin System. Meetings were held with the Cabinet Division Secretary and the DG IPO Pakistan to address this issue.</li> <li>▪ The required follow-up activities by the participants of various study visits and workshops are largely taking place. However, this needs to be constantly monitored so as to ensure that specific activities actually lead to the desired outcomes. Close liaison is being maintained with the senior management of IPO Pakistan to ensure that necessary follow-up activities do take place.</li> <li>▪ In order to facilitate effective follow up of certain activities, WIPO has financed, out of its own regular budget, the participation of IPO-Pakistan officials in related events - Patent Drafting Workshop in April 2014; Technology Transfer Course in June 2014 and Traditional Knowledge Seminar in July 2014.</li> <li>▪ The security situation in Pakistan continues to pose problems for sending international experts, and alternate solutions (i.e. undertaking the activities outside Pakistan or through videoconferencing sessions) are used but may not necessarily be as effective. This remains unavoidable till the security situation improves in the country.</li> </ul>																								
Monitoring reports	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>15/07/2001</th> <th>12/07/2011</th> <th>17/06/2013</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Relevance / design</td> <td>b</td> <td>b</td> <td>b</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Efficiency</td> <td>b</td> <td>b</td> <td>b</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Effectiveness</td> <td>b</td> <td>b</td> <td>b</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Impact prospects</td> <td>c</td> <td>b</td> <td>b</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Sustainability</td> <td>b</td> <td>b</td> <td>b</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>		15/07/2001	12/07/2011	17/06/2013	Relevance / design	b	b	b	Efficiency	b	b	b	Effectiveness	b	b	b	Impact prospects	c	b	b	Sustainability	b	b	b
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Sources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ ADE, Need Assessment of Trade and Trade Related Assistance for Pakistan, June 2012</li> <li>▪ Financing Agreement between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, “Trade Related Technical Assistance Programme II”.+3 annexes? 30/06/2009.</li> </ul>																								

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Addendum n°1 to FA between the EU and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1st January 2014</li> <li>▪ Trade Related Technical Assistance (TRTA II), Action Fiche n°4 for Pakistan, Aidco(2008)D/15933, 6/11/2009</li> <li>▪ Addendum n°1 to Contribution Agreement between the European Community and the UNIDO, Trade Related Technical Assistance, 5/5/2014</li> <li>▪ Addendum to DCI-ASIE/2009/221-591 and DCI-ASIE/2014/342-953</li> <li>▪ UNIDO, Trade Related Technical Assistance Programme (TRTA II), Inception Report, 1/10/2010</li> <li>▪ TRTA II - Progress Report April 2013 to March 2014</li> <li>▪ TRTA II Progress Report April 2014 to October 2014</li> <li>▪ Ecorys, Mid-Term Review, TRTA II Programme Pakistan, 28/9/2012</li> </ul>
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## 5.2 TRTA/PSD III

Title	<b>Trade Related Technical Assistance, Private Sector Development Programme Phase III (TRTA/PSD III)</b>																																																										
Regions of intervention	All Pakistan. Preference however will be given to certain regions of Pakistan with BIOs and SME clusters in specific sectors.																																																										
Sector	TRADE POLICY AND REGULATIONS AND TRADE-RELATED ADJUSTMENT / Trade Policy and Regulation, management, private sector development																																																										
Budget	<p>Total: <b>4 944 444 €</b>  Total EU contribution: 4 500 000 €  Other donors  Government of Pakistan: 444 444 €</p> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <thead> <tr> <th style="text-align: center;">Category breakdown</th> <th style="text-align: center;">EU Contribution (EUR)</th> <th style="text-align: center;">Contribution of Grantees (EUR)</th> <th style="text-align: center;">Total (EUR)</th> <th style="text-align: center;">Contracting/ Paying Authority</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td><b>1 Services</b></td> <td style="text-align: right;"><b>440 000</b></td> <td style="text-align: center;">/</td> <td style="text-align: right;"><b>440 000</b></td> <td style="text-align: center;"><b>European Commission</b></td> </tr> <tr> <td>1.1. Monitoring</td> <td style="text-align: right;">20 000</td> <td style="text-align: center;">/</td> <td style="text-align: right;">20 000</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>1.2 Evaluation</td> <td style="text-align: right;">80 000</td> <td style="text-align: center;">/</td> <td style="text-align: right;">80 000</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>1.3 Audits</td> <td style="text-align: right;">50 000</td> <td style="text-align: center;">/</td> <td style="text-align: right;">50 000</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>1.4 TA on Value Chain Analysis</td> <td style="text-align: right;">100 000</td> <td style="text-align: center;">/</td> <td style="text-align: right;">100 000</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>1.5 TA on Visibility</td> <td style="text-align: right;">190 000</td> <td style="text-align: center;">/</td> <td style="text-align: right;">190 000</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>2. Grants</b></td> <td style="text-align: right;"><b>4 000 000</b></td> <td style="text-align: right;"><b>444 444</b></td> <td style="text-align: right;"><b>4 444 444</b></td> <td style="text-align: center;"><b>European Commission</b></td> </tr> <tr> <td>2.1. Call for Proposals</td> <td style="text-align: right;">4 000 000</td> <td style="text-align: right;">444 444</td> <td style="text-align: right;">4 444 444</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>3. Contingency</b></td> <td style="text-align: right;"><b>60 000</b></td> <td style="text-align: center;">/</td> <td style="text-align: right;"><b>60 000</b></td> <td style="text-align: center;"><b>European Commission</b></td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>4. TOTAL</b></td> <td style="text-align: right;"><b>4 500 000</b></td> <td style="text-align: right;"><b>444 444</b></td> <td style="text-align: right;"><b>4 944 444</b></td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>Budget situation in September 2015  Contracted: € 4.10 m  Paid: € 1.99 m  Two grants contracts signed wit:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Aga Khan Rural Support Programme (AKRSP) for the implementation of the action “Gilgit-Baltistan, The Jewel of Pakistan: Developing a Sustainable Value Chain for Gems and Jewellery Sector in Northern Pakistan” (€2.16m)</li> <li>▪ PITCO Ltd, Pakistani BIO, to implement the leather sector component</li> </ul>				Category breakdown	EU Contribution (EUR)	Contribution of Grantees (EUR)	Total (EUR)	Contracting/ Paying Authority	<b>1 Services</b>	<b>440 000</b>	/	<b>440 000</b>	<b>European Commission</b>	1.1. Monitoring	20 000	/	20 000		1.2 Evaluation	80 000	/	80 000		1.3 Audits	50 000	/	50 000		1.4 TA on Value Chain Analysis	100 000	/	100 000		1.5 TA on Visibility	190 000	/	190 000		<b>2. Grants</b>	<b>4 000 000</b>	<b>444 444</b>	<b>4 444 444</b>	<b>European Commission</b>	2.1. Call for Proposals	4 000 000	444 444	4 444 444		<b>3. Contingency</b>	<b>60 000</b>	/	<b>60 000</b>	<b>European Commission</b>	<b>4. TOTAL</b>	<b>4 500 000</b>	<b>444 444</b>	<b>4 944 444</b>	
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	(€1.98m)
EU Ref.   Contract Ref(s).	DCI-ASIE/2010/022-378 267906 / 275229 / 313287 / 331589
Dates	2011-2017 96 months with Addendum
Objectives	<p><b>General objective:</b> to support the GoP's trade strategy, in particular to foster sustainable economic development and poverty reduction via trade competitiveness by private sector's export diversification and export promotion and via job creation.</p> <p>The overarching <b>specific objective</b> is to strengthen the capacity of Pakistan's BIOs at the federal, provincial and local level. This objective shall be achieved via capacity building on the ground via service portfolio development of grant beneficiaries as well as of other relevant (smaller) BIOs active in the following two chosen sectors: (i) gems &amp; jewellery (G&amp;J) and (ii) leather products (LP). Such portfolio shall be aimed mainly at the needs of export oriented private firms and especially SMEs in either of the two sectors to improve their export competitiveness and job creation capacity.</p>
Programme description	<p>The focus of the programme is to enable intermediary private sector organisations to provide comprehensive services to the private sector in the sectors of leather products and Gems &amp; Jewellery. This will lead to improved quality production and product development (e.g. design, state of the art production techniques, and quality management and labour skills), export diversification and improved market penetration (marketing, branding, and standards).</p> <p>The <b>geographical focus</b> is not restricted to certain regions in Pakistan. Preference, however, will be given to regions &amp; clusters with production activities in the two chosen sectors.</p> <p><b>Choosing the sectors:</b> G&amp;J and LP have been identified as sectors for intervention of TRTA PSD III for the following reasons:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- being two of the eight GoP STPF 2009-12 identified sectors with export growth potential;</li> <li>-TRTA III formulation mission recommendation and outcomes of stakeholders' consultations;</li> <li>-taking into account the activities of other donors (complementarity);</li> <li>-taking into account the capacity and growth potential at the level of BIOs in the country;</li> <li>-best potential to maximise improvement of trade competitiveness;</li> <li>-potential to access international markets without major investments in physical infrastructure; value addition through design and branding;</li> <li>-serving as pilots for possible further interventions covering other sectors in future programmes.</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: Addendum n°1 to FA 2014</i></p> <p>The programme is part of a continuous EU support to the trade sector:  TRTA I: (6.5m 2004-07): focus on WTO rules;  TRTA II: (2009- ): trade policy capacity, quality infrastructure for export &amp; IPR + dimension vocational training.  TRTA III: missing link: dvpt export oriented capacities, via support to BIOs (Business Intermediate Organisations) to enable them to provide services enterprises of the sector leather products (LP) and Gems &amp; Jewellery (G&amp;J)</p>
Implementation mechanisms	<p>The project is implemented by direct centralised management through the EU delegation to Pakistan. Technical and financial management by beneficiary implementing agency: Ministry of Economy and Statistics. Two grant contracts, respectively with PITCO to implement the leather component and with AKRSP to implement the gems and jewellery component.</p> <p>Calls for proposals for grants to Business Intermediate Organisations (BIOs) as</p>

	beneficiaries and implementing partners with the objective to strengthen their capacities and to improve their provision of Business Development Services (BDS) to firms.
Verifiable indicators	Attached Performance Matrix from the Addendum n°1 to FA 2013 - no measures have been made so far. <i>Source: Addendum n°1 to FA 2014</i>
Main achievements of the programme	In the gems sector the project revealed the existence of an enormous potential in gems and jewellery sector in Gilgit-Baltistan and Chitral (GBC); particularly for educated youth and women. The project witnessed positive results during the first year. There was a huge gap of knowledge and awareness about the gemstones found in GBC. The programme developed a gender strategy, an Institutional Development Strategy and a communication strategy to manage communication needs and visibility of the initiatives implemented by the programme in a region which traditionally remained incommunicado with the rest of the world due to its geographical position. In the leather sector at the end of the first year the project was in place and operational and a Competitiveness Needs Assessment of the sector had been completed. At this stage of the project no result yet could be observed.
Key issues/problems	In the gem sector a number of constraints including security situation in GBC, transition in the management of the project, unclear policy regarding leasing and gemstone caused slow progress of the project in terms of achievements and financial progress. Steps have been taken to address these issues.
Sources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Financing Agreement between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, "Trade Related Technical Assistance, Private Sector Development Programme, Phase III (TRTA/PSD III)". 24/06/2011.</li> <li>▪ Addendum n°1 to FA to DCI-ASIE/2010/022-378. 22/02/2013</li> <li>▪ ADE, Value Chain Analysis of the Gems Jewellery and Leather Sector in Pakistan, February 2012.</li> <li>▪ Grant Contract with AKRSP, to implement "Gilgit-Baltistan, The Jewel of Pakistan: Developing a Sustainable Value Chain for Gems and Jewellery Sector in Northern Pakistan", January 2012.</li> <li>▪ Grant Contract with PITCO (private) Limited, to implement the "Pakistan Leather Competitiveness Improvement Programme" (PLCIP), December 2013.</li> <li>▪ AKSRP, Gilgit-Baltistan, The Jewel of Pakistan: Developing a Sustainable Value Chain for Gems and Jewellery Sector in Northern Pakistan, Interim Narrative Report, June 2013 – May 2014.</li> <li>▪ AKSRP, Gender checklist and strategy for EU funded Gilgit-Baltistan, The Jewel of Pakistan: Project Gender and Social Development Section.</li> <li>▪ AKSRP, Communication Strategy for Gilgit-Baltistan, The Jewel of Pakistan.</li> <li>▪ AKSRP, EU funded Gilgit-Baltistan: The Jewel of Pakistan, Developing a Sustainable Value Chain for Gems and Jewellery Sector in GBC, Institutional Development Strategy.</li> <li>▪ Pakistan Leather Competitiveness Improvement Programme (PLCIP), Yearly Progress Report February 2014-February 2015.</li> </ul>
Observations from the evaluation team	No monitoring report available so far.



KP-DGCD														
Indicator			Baseline Value	Target	Value each Fiscal Year									Progress
Objectives	Definition	Source of verification	2013/2014	Value	2006-2007	2007-2008	2008-2009	2009-2010	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014	2014	
<b>Pillar 1</b> More efficient use of provincial government budget														
<i>Fiscal space</i>														
1. Budget Allocation for Districts (both development and current), inflation-adjusted, increases at least 10% each year		GoKP budget and Finance Department budgetary analysis	Rps 4,79 billion											
<i>Organisational framework</i>														
2. CDLD Provincial Coordination and Review Committee (PCRC) regularly convened and strategic review carried out based on evidence from MIS, continuous audit and 3rd party verification		PCRC meetings reports Strategic review reports MIS quarterly reports Continuous audit and 3rd party verifications reports	not in place											
<b>Pillar 2</b> Increased community development social mobilisation and capacity development														
<i>Legal registration and proposal submission</i>														
3. Database of applicants (with progressive status of their application) and legally registered Cos, Vos and LSOs is published on GoKP website		Database of applicants within Finance Department GoKP website	not in place											
<b>Pillar 3</b> Improved front line public service delivery														
<i>Government Responsiveness</i>														
4. Assessed proposals over total applications		Finance Department CDLD Implementation reports	not in place											
<i>Strategic Planning</i>														
5. Area based units undertake a territorial diagnosis in combination with a documented process of consultation for the formulation of District Development Strategies / strategic planning (including analysis and mi-term projection of budgetary and regulatory frameworks, stakeholder roles and resource mobilisation as well as outlooks for key sectors and prioritisation of investments)		Finance Department CDLD implementation reports	not in place											
<i>MIS and M&amp;E</i>														
6. Quarterly feedbacks from M&E, continuous audit and 3rd party verification, support periodical review and revision of CDLD Governance Framework and its regulatory and implementation mechanisms		Finance Department quarterly M&E, continuous audit and 3rd party verification reports	not in place											
<i>Verification and Audit</i>														
7. At least 80% of third-party verification and continuous audit findings are responded to within the timeframe set in the CDLD Policy Framework		Finance Department quarterly M&E, continuous audit and 3rd party verification reports	not in place											
<b>Pillar 4</b> Improved community physical infrastructure														
<i>Infrastructures</i>														
8. Disbursement rate, at district level, of funds allocated for CDLD interventions		GoKP budget and Finance Department budgetary analysis	not in place											
9. Percentage of successfully completed approved proposals		Finance Department CDLD implementation reports	not in place											
10. Existing and new infrastructures are systematically inventoried and reflected in MIS		Finance Department M&E Reports	to be defined											

Source: Financing Agreement (2013)

RAHA			Baseline Value	Target	Value each Fiscal Year									Achievement
Objectives	Indicator	Source of verification	Value		2006-2007	2007-2008	2008-2009	2009-2010	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014	2014	
<b>Expected Results</b>														
<b>ER1 Greater social cohesion and empowerment through community development in refugee, IDP affected and hosting areas</b>														
<b>1.1 Communities empowered to promote social cohesion and harmony in refugee/ IDP affected and hosting areas</b>														
1.1.1 Set up community (COs)/ village organizations (VOs) & Local Support Organisations (LSOs) in the targeted areas	(COs)/ (VOs) & (LSOs) formed			COs: 3,000 LSOs: 40									COs: 3,005 LSOs: 16	COs: 94% LSOs: 40%
1.1.2 Strengthen COs, VO and LSOs through various training programmes	CO/VO members trained in Community and Leadership Management Skills			4,000									5,154	129%
1.1.3 Use Poverty Score Card data to identify the poorest/ most vulnerable individuals in the community & set the baseline	Number of people identified as poor and vulnerable in the target UCs of RAHA			4,500									4,210	94%
<b>1.2 Community &amp; village level participatory monitoring systems established in refugee/ IDP affected and hosting areas</b>														
1.2.1 Hold village assemblies for developing community and village development plans	Village development plans developed			350									133	38%
1.2.2 Develop village development plans through a participatory and rights based approach	Village assemblies conducted for developing village development plans			350									209	60%
<b>1.3 Government functionaries trained (special focus on women government functionaries) to strengthen local government institutions.</b>														
1.3.1 Conduct Training Needs Assessment for building capacities of the government officials and local elected representatives.	Male and female government officials trained			500									401	80%
1.3.2 Train government officials and local elected representatives in planning, better coordination and project management based on need assessments	Community members trained on courses such as right based approaches, social cohesion, conflict resolution, disaster risk management, awareness, etc.			2,000									4,278	214%
<b>ER2 Improved livelihoods and local economies in IDP and refugee affected and hosting areas.</b>														
<b>2.1 Improved household income through diversified livelihood opportunities in refugee/ IDP affected and hosting areas</b>														
2.1.1 Conduct needs assessment in partnership with the private or civil society organisations to identify vocational training needs and market opportunities for communities so that they are gainfully employed.	Livelihood training need assessments conducted			6									4	67%
2.1.2 Conduct trainings on trades identified by the needs assessment based on market research regarding available job opportunities.	Number of community members trained in livelihood skills			4,500									4,210	94%
2.1.3 Strengthen/ establish government Employment Information Centre for providing post training support	Number of employment information centers strengthened			9									4	44%
<b>2.2. Major physical infrastructure restored e.g. Local irrigation systems and networks revived in the targeted areas by construction and repair of irrigation channels, protection walls, and checking of dams, farm to market and village roads rehabilitated or constructed through community and Government support.</b>														
2.2.1 Conduct needs assessment in consultation with the communities and the relevant government departments for rehabilitating/ constructing major physical infrastructure	Total Need assessments			4									2	50%
2.2.2 Rehabilitate/construct major physical infrastructure at the tehsil/union council level based on the need assessment	Number of major infrastructures implemented			30									18	60%
<b>2.3 Community physical infrastructure repaired or constructed in refugee/ IDP affected and hosting areas</b>														
2.3.1 Conduct participatory resource constraints analysis at CO level to identify pressing community needs through follow-up visits and prioritize	Number of community based physical infrastructure schemes implemented (energy, streets/roads, irrigation)			1,000									749	75%
2.3.2 Rehabilitate and construct Basic Community Physical Infrastructure (CPIs) through the communities.	Number of O&M committees formed			1,000									749	75%

Indicator			Baseline Value	Target	Value each Fiscal Year										Achievement
Objectives	Definition	Source of verification	Value		2006-2007	2007-2008	2008-2009	2009-2010	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014	2014		
<b>ER3 Restoration of social services and infrastructures in IDP and refugee affected and hosting areas.</b>															
<b>3.1. Enhanced quality of social services at the community-level based on the needs identified by the communities.</b>															
3.1.1 Conduct needs assessment by the line departments and communities to identify the social services that require restoration and rehabilitation.	Number of Needs assessment conducted for rehabilitation and retrofitting of social services			4									2	50%	
3.1.2 Rehabilitation and retrofitting of social sector government buildings through private sector engagement.	Education and Health Projects			100									343	343%	
<b>3.2 Increased community access to safe drinking water, improved sanitation schemes and other social services in the targeted areas</b>															
3.2.1 Construction and repair of Water Supply Schemes as identified by the community in targeted areas	Participatory resource constraints analysis			500									529	106%	
3.2.2 Build up technical capacity of water supply departments at TMA level i.e., provision of water quality testing kits	Projects/schemes for water supply			500									529	106%	
<b>3.3 Proper sanitation services introduced at household and community levels and existing sanitation schemes rehabilitated.</b>															
3.3.1 Carry out need assessment at the community level to identify sanitation related issues.	Number of sanitation PRCAs (Participatory Resource Constraints Analysis) conducted			500									492	98%	
3.3.2 Construction and repair of Sanitation Schemes as identified by the community	Number of sanitation projects conducted			500									492	98%	
3.3.3 Awareness raising on environmental and health-related issues connected to poor hygiene and water conservation will be initiated through Behavioral Change Communication initiative.	Number of Community members trained in health and hygiene awareness			6,000									5,463	91%	
<b>ER4 Improved social protection among co existing host communities and IDPs/ refugees</b>															
<b>4.1 Community organisations formed/strengthened to support women's increased participation in various self-reliance activities including literacy classes on Water, Sanitation , Hygiene, awareness of basic human rights and creation of a secure employment environment.</b>															
4.1.1 Community organisations engaged in self awareness sessions on subjects such as Gender Based Violence, human rights and other issues relating to achieving a secure employment environment	Individuals trained in GBV and human rights			N/A									4,278		
<b>4.2 Child Protection Drop-in Centers established and functional in Balochistan.</b>															
4.2.1 Establish new and/or strengthen existing Child protection Drop in Centers in Balochistan	Welfare centers for children and other vulnerable individuals strengthened			16									10	63%	
<b>4.3 Community welfare centers and safe houses for Women established/strengthened for ensuring legal assistance and referral mechanism for victims of domestic violence and sexual abuse.</b>															
4.3.1 Provision of community welfare centers and safe haven for victims of SGBV and expansion of social/ welfare centers	Welfare centers for women strengthened			5									5	100%	
<b>4.4 Basic social services (health, education) in RAHA target areas mainstreamed and functioning in line with international standards.</b>															
4.4.1 Improvement of accessibility for and equal treatment of refugees and IDPs into social services (education and health)	Number of Basic social service projects implemented			No target									356		
<b>4.5 Poorest of the poor provided with identification documents to safeguard legal protection and facilitate access to basic social services.</b>															
4.5.1 Registration (and other forms of documentation) of the poor segment of the population to facilitate issuance of national identity cards and access to basic social services.	Number of unregistered individuals registered			1,722									1,126	65%	
<b>ER5 Restoration/ improvement of the environment in IDP and refugee affected areas</b>															
<b>5.1 Natural forest covers rehabilitated by establishing nurseries distributing trees and sensitization of targeted community members.</b>															
5.1.1 Establish nurseries and plantations and carry out agro forestry activities	Number of Nurseries established that sell/distribute 20,000 plants for plantation			40									30	75%	
	Number of Trees distributed to men and women for agro-forestry			2,000									376,000	18800%	

Indicator			Baseline Value	Target	Value each Fiscal Year										Achievement
Objectives	Definition	Source of verification	Value		2006-2007	2007-2008	2008-2009	2009-2010	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014	2014		

### 5.2 Flood protection measure installed, slope stabilization techniques adopted and water reservoirs and check dams for water conservation constructed.

5.2.1 Rehabilitate/construct flood protection walls/water reservoirs, check dams, slope stabilization etc.	Number of Participatory resource constraints analysis		60										101	168%
	Number of Protection/conservation service projects		60										101	168%

### 5.3 Communities facilitated to develop their capacity to address the issues of the solid and liquid waste management by providing training to community members including women communities on the subject.

5.3.1 Capacity development for local communities in solid and liquid waste management, rain water harvesting and other activities.	Individuals trained on solid and liquid waste management		2,000										2,310	116%
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### ER6 IDP return anchored and absorption capacity created by small-scale community-based reintegration

6.1.1 Rehabilitate and construct Basic Community Physical Infrastructure (CPIs) through the communities.	Number of social service projects implemented		304										400	132%
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Source: Progress Report (2014)

Monitoring report (2012-08-10)	
a = very good; b = good; c = problems; d = serious deficiencies.	
<b>1. Quality of design</b>	
1.1 What is the present level of relevance of the project?	B
1.2 As presently designed, is the intervention logic holding true?	B
1.3 Is the current design sufficiently supported by all stakeholders?	B
1.4 Is the current design sufficiently taking cross-cutting issues into account?	B
<b>2. Efficiency to date</b>	
2.1 How well is the availability/usage of inputs managed?	C
2.2 How well is the implementation of the activities managed?	B
2.3 How well are the outputs achieved?	B
2.4 How well are the Partner Contribution/Involvement working?	B
<b>3. Effectiveness to date</b>	
3.1 How well is the project achieving its planned results?	B
3.2 As presently implemented, what is the likelihood of the PP to be achieved?	B
<b>4. Impact prospects</b>	
4.1 What are the direct impact prospects of the project at Overall Objectives level?	B
4.2 To what extent does/will the project have any indirect positive and/or negative impacts? (i.e. environmental, social, cultural, gender and economic)?	B
<b>5. Potential sustainability</b>	
5.1 Financial / economic viability?	B
5.2 What is the level of ownership of the project by target groups and will it continue after the end of external support?	B
5.3 What is the level of policy support provided and the degree of interaction between project and policy level?	B
5.4 How well is the project contributing to institutional and management capacity?	B
<b>6. Horizontal issues</b>	
6.1) Role of Quality Support Group (QSG) and ROM in project quality	
a) Whether the comments, particularly regarding stakeholders and needs analysis, institutional capacity assessment of the implementing partner and risks and assumptions made in the checklist and minutes against the quality and content of the Action Fiche were appropriate / relevant?	N/A
b) Whether the comments were taken into consideration and included in the Project documents, e.g. TAPs, financing agreements, IFM, Inception reports, etc. and if so, did they improve project implementation?	N/A
c) If the comments were not taken into consideration, was there any consequence during the implementation of the project? If so, please describe in the free text box.	N/A
d) Has any monitoring (including internal monitoring systems or ROM) or evaluation resulted in improvements in the project?	N/A

MR (2013-07-19)	
a = very good; b = good; c = problems; d = serious deficiencies.	
<b>1. Relevance</b>	
1.1 Does the intervention presently respond to the needs of the target groups?	B
1.2 Does the operation presently support the policy (or its development) of the partner government and is it in line with existing policy?	A
1.3 Is the operation in line with EC development policy and strategies?	A
<b>2. Quality of Design</b>	
2.1 Does the present intervention logic still hold true and is it clear and coherent?	C
2.2. Do the implementation arrangements take into account the capacity of the partners, and is the design fully supported by them?	B
2.3 Is the current design sufficiently taking cross-cutting issues into account?	B
<b>3. Efficiency</b>	
3.1 How well is the availability and use of inputs and resources managed?	B
3.2 How well are the activities implemented?	B
3.3 How well are the outputs achieved?	B
3.4. How well are the Partners involved and contributing?	C
<b>4. Effectiveness</b>	
4.1. How well is the operation achieving its expected outcomes?	B
4.2. As presently implemented, what is the likelihood that the project purpose will be achieved?	B
<b>5. Impact to date</b>	
5.1. What are the operation's direct impact prospects (i.e. contribution at the level of overall objective)?	B
5.2 To what extent does/will the operation have any indirect (positive/negative) impact?	B
<b>6. Sustainability to date</b>	
6.1 What is the financial/economic viability of the continuation of benefits after the end of the operation?	B
6.2. What is the level of ownership of the operation by the target group and relevant stakeholders?	B
6.3. To what degree does the policy environment support the operation?	A
6.4. To what extent does the operation contribute to partners' capacity development?	B
<b>7. Horizontal issues</b>	
7.1 Quality Systems, Monitoring and Evaluation	
a) Were the QSG comments taken into consideration and included in the final design and applied during implementation?	No

## 6.2) Review of TC Quality Criteria

Do local partners effectively lead in the planning and management of TC support (i.e. beyond formal endorsement)?	Yes
Do local partners provide the required inputs enabling TC to perform (e.g. human and/or physical inputs)? (refer to Box 22 of the Guidelines)	Yes
Is the TC support likely to achieve its objectives without critical constraints?	Yes
Is the TC support adequate vis-à-vis the capacity of the local partner?	Yes
Is the TC support taking into account TC from other donors in the same sector? (Ask the EC Delegation to acquire this data)	N/A
Is the present TC support from the EC delivered jointly with other donors? (If no other donors are active in the sector then mark N/A)	N/A
If the TC support from the EC is not harmonised with other donors, are relevant steps being taken for a more harmonized TC in the future?	N/A
Are the TC deliverables (outputs and outcomes) clearly specified (e.g. in the TA ToR) and regularly assessed (e.g. through a joint performance dialogue/assessment)?	Yes
Are there innovative forms of TC support being used (e.g. peer review, South/South and/or Public/Public cooperation, twinning, networking, etc)?	Yes
Are partner country staff effectively managing the programme (and not TA)?	Yes
Do the experts take instructions from and report to the partner (and not the EC)?	Yes

## 6.3. EC Visibility

Does the project contribute to promoting EC visibility (e.g. does it comply with the EC Guidelines)?	Yes
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## 7. Cross-cutting issues

7.1) Have practical and strategic gender interests been adequately considered in the project strategy?	Yes
7.2) Is the project respecting environmental needs?	Yes
7.3) Has (good) governance been mainstreamed in the project/programme (P/P)?	Yes
7.4) Does the project actively contribute to the promotion of Human Rights?	Yes

MR  
(2012-08-10)

Relevance and quality of design  
Efficiency of Implementation to date  
Effectiveness to date  
Impact prospects  
Potential sustainability

B  
B  
B  
B  
B

MR  
(2013-07-19)

B  
B  
B  
B  
B

b) Are the issues identified by ROM regarding design the same as those addressed in the QSG checklist?	Yes
c) Have previous evaluations or reviews (such as ROM, reviews by the EU operational manager) led to changes in the operation?	Yes
d) Is the available monitoring and reporting information on the operation's progress comprehensive and reliable in order to ensure the possibility to evaluate results and learn lessons?	No
7.2 Review of Technical Cooperation / Capacity Development Quality Criteria	
a) Are there critical constraints in the context which are likely to prevent the CD support from achieving?	No
b) Is the CD support adequate vis-à-vis the present capacity of the local partner?	Yes
c) Do local partners effectively lead in the planning of CD support beyond formal endorsement?	Yes
d) Do local partners provide the inputs (human or physical) that would be required to enable the CD support to be effective?	Yes
e) Are the outputs or outcomes of the CD support clearly specified and still relevant (or adjusted to changes of context)?	Yes
f) Are they regularly monitored and/or assessed (e.g. through a joint performance dialogue or an annual reporting)?	Yes
g) Is the CD support taking into account CD interventions from other donors in the same sector?	Yes
h) Is there a donor coordination mechanism led by local partners and encompassing CD support?	Yes
i) Is CD support embedded in the broad institutional context of the local partners and have unnecessary?	Yes
j) Do contracted experts, project managers and NGO staff take instructions from the partner and not the EC? (while some form of reporting to the EC can still take place)	Yes
7.3. EC Visibility	
Does the operation contribute to promoting EC visibility (e.g. does it comply with the EC Guidelines)?	Yes

## 8. Cross-cutting issues

8.1. Have practical and strategic gender interests been adequately considered in the operation's strategy?	Yes
8.2. Is the operation respecting environmental needs?	Yes
8.3. Has (good) governance been mainstreamed in the operation?	Yes
8.4 Does the operation actively contribute to the promotion of Human Rights?	Yes



PEACE														
Indicator	Indicator	Indicator	Target		Value each Fiscal Year									Achievement
Objectives	Definition	Source of verification	Overall (4 years)	2 Years	2006-2007	2007-2008	2008-2009	2009-2010	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014	July 2014	
<b>Overall Objective</b>														
To support the Government of Pakistan to reduce the negative impact of economic deprivation, poverty and social inequality in areas affected by security crisis and natural disasters and to turn this into opportunities to build and empower resilient communities that participate actively in development activities.														
<b>Specific Objective</b>														
To revitalize rural economy and promote renewable energy to enhance social cohesion and opportunities for sustainable livelihoods in Malakand Division of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province.														
<b>Expected Results</b>														
<b>ER1</b> Establishment and strengthening of an inclusive and representative system of community mobilization for social and economic development federating villages at the level														
1.1 Establish baselines using PRA, Socio-economic Profiling and Poverty Score Card.	Number of villages		500	250									121	24%
1.2 Mobilize & organize communities & form broad-based CIs & federate them at village/UC level	Number of CBOs		12000	6,000									5,357	45%
1.3 Prepare and delivery CMST to community institutions	Number of events		960	480									618	64%
1.4 Prepare and delivery LMST to community institutions	Number of events		480	240									194	40%
1.5 Prepare and deliver training on FM and systems, and proposal writing at community level	Number of events		12	4									Nil	
1.6 Develop Master Trainers	Number of events		48	24									20	42%
1.7 Facilitate experience sharing among CBOs through Manager Conferences	Number of conferences		224	112									62	28%
1.8 Arrange exposure visits for community activists	Number of visits		100	35									7	7%
<b>ER2</b> Electrification for rural households through setting up of community managed micro-hydro power generating systems;														
<b>Indicator</b>														
<b>Indicator</b>														
<b>Indicator</b>														
<b>Target</b>														
<b>Value each Fiscal Year</b>														
<b>Achievement</b>														
<b>Objectives</b>														
<b>Definition</b>														
<b>Source of verification</b>														
<b>Overall (4 years)</b>														
<b>2 Years</b>														
<b>2006-2007</b>														
<b>2007-2008</b>														
<b>2008-2009</b>														
<b>2009-2010</b>														
<b>2010-2011</b>														
<b>2011-2012</b>														
<b>2012-2013</b>														
<b>2013-2014</b>														
<b>July 2014</b>														
<b>Achievement</b>														
1.9 Engage youth in development process by arranging co-curricular/recreational activities	Number of events		400	200									169	42%
1.10 Organize provincial level ISO convention for influencing pro-poor policies	Number of conventions		3	1									-	
1.11 Organize and facilitate stakeholder's meetings/workshops	Number of meetings		112	56									44	39%
1.12 Programme Planning Meeting (PPM)	Number of meetings		112	56									46	41%
1.13 Capacity Building for Programme Delivery	Number of events		25	8									22	88%
1.14 PPM of Community Resource Persons	Number of meetings		252	84									9	4%
<b>ER3</b> Improvement of Community Physical Infrastructure and Basic Social Services														
2.1 Sites identification for micro hydro power units	Number of sites		240	109									109	45%
2.2 Feasibility surveys and project technical digest preparation	Number of project digests		240	109									78	33%
2.3 Sign MoUs and 'Works Contracts', if necessary with Community Institutions	Number of MoUs		240	109									78	33%
2.4 Prepare & delivery technical training for CB Project Management, Audit, O & M Committees	Number of committees		720	327									234	33%
2.5 Initiate and complete schemes	Number of MHPs		240	109									78	33%
2.6 Facilitate process of establishing community-based O & M mechanisms for MHP	Number of MHPs		240	109									78	33%
2.7 Technical Assistance on Micro Hydel Component	P. days		128	106									61	48%
2.8 Operation, Maintenance & Management Trainings for Communities	Number of events		25	8									4	16%
<b>ER3</b> Improvement of Community Physical Infrastructure and Basic Social Services														
3.1 Sign MoU with concerned government authorities for rehabilitation of govt. basic social service delivery facilities			On Need Base										Achieved	
3.2 Site Identification for community physical infrastructure schemes	Schemes		771	448									315	41%
3.3 Conduct feasibility surveys and prepare project designs	digests		771	448									315	41%
3.4 Sign Memoranda of Understanding and 'Works Contracts', if necessary with Community Institutions	MoUs		771	448									315	41%
3.5 Prepare & delivery technical training for community-based project management, audit, operational and maintenance committees	Committees		2,313	1344									945	41%
3.6 Initiate and complete schemes	CPIs		771	448									315	41%
3.7 Facilitate process of establishing community-based Operational & Maintenance mechanisms for CPIs	Schemes		771	448									315	41%
3.8 Operation, Maintenance & Management Trainings for Communities	Events		200	67									5	3%

**ER 4 Self-confidence of women and their ability to independently participate in social and economic activities enhanced**

4.1 Prepare and deliver training on literacy and numeracy skills for women activists	Events		240	120										129	54%
4.2 Prepare and deliver Livelihood training for women	Events		240	120										4	2%
4.3 Prepare and deliver training for Village Organization in their roles and managing their organizations	Events		80	40										19	24%
4.4 Train women community activists at village level to extend technical support to the trained cadre	Events		8	2										-	
4.5 Provision of community-managed livelihoods resource (toolkit/unit)	women		6,000	3,000										47	1%

**ER5 Facilitating growth of economic activities**

5.1 Orient project staff on developing value chain concept	Staff members		20	40										25	
5.2 Prepare and deliver training on Value Chains (production, new samples etc)	men and women		4,000	2,510										1,202	30%
5.3 Prepare and deliver training on Enterprise Development.	men and women		4,000	2,746										602	15%
5.4 Conduct knowledge sharing and exposure visit of Business Interest Groups (BIGs) of Value Chain and Enterprises.	men and women		4,000	2,964										289	7%
5.5 Facilitate Linkages Development with Business Development Service Providers (BDSPs)	Linkages		132	91										10	8%
5.6 Support Growth of Economic Activities	men and women		4,000	2,533										1,387	35%
5.7 Technical Assistance on Value Chain Component	Person day		480	360										16	3%
5.8 Business mobilization and BIG formation	men and women BIGs		400	120										160	40%
5.9 Introduce Innovation within the value chain / subsectors	Innovations		8	5										2	25%
5.10 Market trial for business linkages in value chains	events of market Trials		40	19										3	8%

Indicator	Indicator	Indicator	Target		Value each Fiscal Year									Achievement		
			Overall (4 years)	2 Years	2006-2007	2007-2008	2008-2009	2009-2010	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014	July 2014			
Objectives	Definition	Source of verification														

**Major Highlights on PEACE****ER1 Establishment and strengthening of an inclusive and representative system of community mobilization for social and economic development federating villages at the level**

Increase percentage of participation and collective action of communities in decision making, planning and implementation at local level.	Number of community based organization (number of member households)													1,296 (28,810)	5,357
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**ER2 Electrification for rural households through setting up of community managed micro-hydro power generating systems;**

Increase in the number of rural households with access to electricity.	Number of households without electricity in 6 districts													79,000	52,000
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**ER 3 Improvement of Community Physical Infrastructure and Basic Social Services**

Access to clean water (on 344,000 households in 7 districts)														225,240	237,622
Access to sanitation facility														139,939	147,888
Access to link roads														173,323	147,888
Access to irrigation channel														152,484	180,688
Access to RCC/suspension bridges														134,294	147,212

Source: Interim Technical Implementation Report (March 2014 - July 2014)

**Monitoring report (2013-07-19)**

a = very good; b = good; c = problems; d = serious deficiencies.

**1. Relevance**

1.1 Does the intervention presently respond to the needs of the target groups?	A
1.2 Does the operation presently support the policy (or its development) of the partner government and is it in line with existing policy?	A
1.3 Is the operation in line with EC development policy and strategies?	A

**2. Quality of Design**

2.1 Does the present intervention logic still hold true and is it clear and coherent?	A
2.2 Do the implementation arrangements take into account the capacity of the partners, and is the design fully supported by them?	A
2.3 Is the current design sufficiently taking cross-cutting issues into account?	B

**3. Efficiency**

3.1 How well is the availability and use of inputs and resources managed?	A
3.2 How well are the activities implemented?	A
3.3 How well are the outputs achieved?	B
3.4. How well are the Partners involved and contributing?	A

<b>4. Effectiveness</b>	
4.1. How well is the operation achieving its expected outcomes?	A
4.2. As presently implemented, what is the likelihood that the project purpose will be achieved?	A
<b>5. Impact to date</b>	
5.1. What are the operation's direct impact prospects (i.e. contribution at the level of overall objective)?	B
5.2. To what extent does/will the operation have any indirect (positive/negative) impact?	B
<b>6. Sustainability to date</b>	
6.1. What is the financial/economic viability of the continuation of benefits after the end of the operation?	B
6.2. What is the level of ownership of the operation by the target group and relevant stakeholders?	B
6.3. To what degree does the policy environment support the operation?	B
6.4. To what extent does the operation contribute to partners' capacity development?	B
<b>7. Horizontal issues</b>	
<i>7.1. Quality Systems, Monitoring and Evaluation</i>	
a) Were the QSG comments taken into consideration and included in the final design and applied during implementation?	N/A
b) Are the issues identified by ROM regarding design the same as those addressed in the QSG checklist?	N/A
c) Have previous evaluations or reviews (such as ROM, reviews by the EU operational manager) led to changes in the operation?	N/A
d) Is the available monitoring and reporting information on the operation's progress comprehensive and reliable in order to ensure the possibility to evaluate results and learn lessons?	Yes
<i>7.2. Review of Technical Cooperation/Capacity Development Quality Criteria</i>	
a) Are there critical constraints in the context which are likely to prevent the CD support from achieving its objectives?	No
b) Is the CD support adequate vis-à-vis the present capacity of the local partner?	Yes
c) Do local partners effectively lead in the planning of CD support beyond formal endorsement?	Yes
d) Do local partners provide the inputs (human or physical) that would be required to enable the CD support to be effective?	Yes
e) Are the outputs or outcomes of the CD support clearly specified and still relevant (or adjusted to changes of context)?	Yes
f) Are they regularly monitored and/or assessed (e.g. through a joint performance dialogue or an annual reporting)?	Yes
g) Is the CD support taking into account CD interventions from other donors in the same sector?	Yes
h) Is there a donor coordination mechanism led by local partners and encompassing CD support?	Yes
i) Is CD support embedded in the broad institutional context of the local partners and have unnecessary parallel mechanisms been avoided?	Yes
j) Do contracted experts, project managers and NGO staff take instructions from the partner and not the EC? (while some form of reporting to the EC can still take place)	Yes
<i>7.3. EC Visibility</i>	
Does the operation contribute to promoting EC visibility (e.g. does it comply with the EC Guidelines)?	Yes
<b>8. Cross-cutting issues</b>	
8.1. Have practical and strategic gender interests been adequately considered in the operation's strategy?	Yes
8.2. Is the operation respecting environmental needs?	Yes
8.3. Has (good) governance been mainstreamed in the operation?	
8.4. Does the operation actively contribute to the promotion of Human Rights?	
<b>Monitoring report (2013-07-19)</b>	
Relevance and quality of design	A
Efficiency of Implementation to date	A
Effectiveness to date	A
Impact prospects	B
Potential sustainability	B

SESP							
Indicator		Baseline	Value each Fiscal Year			Achievement	
Objectives	Definition	Source of verification	Value	2009-2010 (1)	FY 2010-2011 (1)	May 2012 (2)	
<b>Expected Results</b>							
<b>Area 1 - Improving fiscal sustainability and effectiveness of public expenditures</b>							
<b>1. Procurement reform:</b> increase effectiveness of public expenditures (including education sector) through procurement reforms							
1.1 Effective regulatory framework in place			Rules notified, and Standard Bidding	Implementing regulations adopted			
1.2 Realistic cost estimation for planning purposes			Quarterly updates provided	Quarterly updates provided	Rs. 4 billion for procurement (billion annually: school rehabilitation Rs2.5; free textbooks Rs1).		
<b>2. Fiscal and Budget Management:</b> improving medium-term education sector budgeting							
Education budget, including SERP expenditures, consistent with MTFP			FY09/10 education budget (including SERP) executed in alignment with FY09/10-11/12 MTFP	FY10/11 education budget (including SERP) executed in alignment with FY10/11-12/13 MTFP			
<b>Area 2 - Improving education sector management</b>							
<b>3. District Terms of Partnership:</b> improving efficiency and quality of school rehabilitation							
Share of prioritised schools completed and meeting stipulated design, construction quality and functionality standards			At least 40%, as validated by third party construction supervision firm	At least 60%, as validated by third party construction supervision firm	Intervention was not able to bring about a change in mainstream government behaviour of using it on civil works funding for education works.		
<b>4. Monitoring and Evaluation:</b> improving the timeliness and quality of the Annual School Census (ASC)							
4.1 Number of months to complete administration of ASC		2007/08 administration of ASC took 8 months.	At most 4 months	At most 4 months	The activity is very efficient in terms of a relatively small budget		
4.2 Share of schools with less than 10% discrepancy in ASC data from validation data, based on sample validation			At least 50%, based on third party validation	At least 75%, based on third party validation			
Indicator		Baseline	Value each Fiscal Year			Achievement	
Objectives	Definition	Source of verification	Value	2009-2010 (1)	FY 2010-2011 (1)	May 2012 (2)	
<b>5. District and Sub-District Education Management:</b> Strengthening education management for service delivery through reforms to strengthen the functioning, capacity and accountability of education managers							
Implementation of Education Management Reform (EMR) to strengthen capacity and accountability of education managers			Implementation EMR in at least 2 pilot 25 districts	Continue implementation of EMR pilot.	An EMR programme was initiated in two districts under SERP and has been extended to additional districts		
<b>6. School management committees (SMCs):</b> Strengthening SMC participation and capacity for supporting school management							
6.1 Share of public schools with active SMCs			At least 60% of SMCs activated.	At least 70% of SMCs activated; expenditures validated by third party.	Although an efficient system has been developed and implemented for release of funds into the SMC bank accounts, the releases are often delayed		
6.2 Number of schools in SMC pilot mobilisation for capacity building in school improvement planning			At least 2500 schools supported under pilot following impact evaluation 26 design.	At least 2500 additional schools supported under pilot following impact evaluation design			
<b>Area 3 - Improving access to quality schooling</b>							
<b>7. Textbook delivery</b>							
7.1 Share of schools receiving new textbooks within first month of academic year		90% in 2006/07. Performance not sustained in 2007/08 and undermined by weakness in monitoring system.	90%	90%, as validated by third party.	The EU SER-ITA fiduciary assessment raises many questions about the efficiency of the textbook delivery intervention at almost every step		
7.2 Improved monitoring of textbook delivery			Improved accuracy of data collection and entry for monitoring textbook delivery	Improved accuracy of data collection and entry for monitoring textbook delivery			
7.3 Introduction competitive transparent practices in textbook development and printing/publishing			Review of textbook authorship and printing/publishing procurement procedures and practices completed	Implement time-bound action plan to introduce competitive and transparent practices in textbook development and printing/ publishing			

## 8. Stipends for Girls in public schools: Strengthening the efficiency and effectiveness of incentives

8.1 Share of beneficiary girls that received stipends		80% delivery of 2007/08 stipends by 2008/09.	At least 90% of intended beneficiaries in each district.	At least 90% of intended beneficiaries in each district, as validated by third party.	Though leakages in delivery are less than when the programme started, there is ample evidence to arouse considerable concern on this count.
8.2 Number of low transition-rate talukas (sub-districts) with higher stipends (Differential stipends programme)			At least 30 talukas, following impact evaluation design.	At least 45 talukas, following impact evaluation design.	

## 9. Public Private Partnerships (PPP) in Education: Public Private Partnership in education: Leveraging the private sector to extend service delivery to underserved areas

9. Number private primary schools supported under fully-funded pilot public subsidy programme in qualifying underserved rural localities (Promoting Low-Cost Private Schooling in Rural Sindh)			At least 300 operational, following programme and impact evaluation design.	At least 450 operational	The per child cost works out to about Rs.16,000 per child per year for the Sindh Education Foundation for about 100,000 children, although it may decline as the number of children increases.
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## Area 4 - Improving the quality of teaching and student learning expenditures

## 10. Merit Based School Specific Recruitment of Teachers: Improving the quality of new teacher hires

Implementation of merit and needs based teacher recruitment			Implementation of teacher recruitment following merit based criteria, as validated by third party.	Implementation of teacher recruitment following merit based criteria, as validated by third party.	The shifting of teaching posts for primary, middle, and elementary schools, will cause savings
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## 11. Teacher Education Development (TED): Improving teacher training effectiveness and teacher quality

11.1 Standards and competency based continuous professional development (CPD)			New standards and competencies for teachers piloted and in place.	New CPD programme piloted in at least 2 districts.	About 2% of SERP budget is going to this intervention which makes it very cost-effective.
11.2 Quality assurance of CPD providers			Financing & establishment of TED co-ordination / accreditation body;	At least 3 CPD providers accredited.	
11.3 New diploma for certification of teachers				New diploma in use in training of all new teachers in at least 5 colleges	

## 12. Learning Assessment of Students

12.1 Subject and grade for fielding of diagnostic assessment in district representative sample of public schools			Class 4 language test implemented (representative at district level).	Class 4 mathematics, science and class 8 mathematics tests implemented (representative at district level).	Given the relatively low PEACE financing compared to its immense potential benefit, the intervention is giving full value for money.
12.2 Subject and grade for analysis report of diagnostic assessment			Class 4 mathematics report produced	Class 4 language report produced.	

Source: (1) Progress report 2009 (January 2010) (2) Final Evaluation Report (05/2012), SAFEGE

	Monitoring report (2009-09-11)	Monitoring report (2010-07-27)	MR (2011-08-11)	MR (2012-08-10)
<b>a = very good; b = good; c = problems; d = serious deficiencies.</b>				
<b>1. Quality of design</b>				
1.1 What is the present level of relevance of the project?	A	A	B	B
1.2 As presently designed, is the intervention logic holding true?	B	A	B	A
1.3 Is the current design sufficiently supported by all stakeholders?	A	B	B	B
1.4 Is the current design sufficiently taking cross-cutting issues into account?	A	B	B	A
<b>2. Efficiency to date</b>				
2.1 How well is the availability/usage of inputs managed?	B	B	B	A
2.2 How well is the implementation of the activities managed?	B	B	B	B
2.3 How well are the outputs achieved?	A	C	B	B
2.4 How well are the Partner Contribution/Involvement working?	D	B	B	C
<b>3. Effectiveness to date</b>				
3.1 How well is the project achieving its planned results?	A	C	B	C
3.2 As presently implemented, what is the likelihood of the PP to be achieved?	A	C	B	B
<b>4. Impact prospects</b>				
4.1 What are the direct impact prospects of the project at Overall Objectives level?	B	B	B	B
4.2 To what extent does/will the project have any indirect positive and/or negative impacts? (i.e. environmental, social, cultural, gender and economic)?	C	A	B	B
<b>5. Potential sustainability</b>				
5.1 Financial / economic viability?	B	B	B	C
5.2 What is the level of ownership of the project by target groups and will it continue after the end of external support?	B	B	B	C
5.3 What is the level of policy support provided and the degree of interaction between project and policy level?	B	C	B	C
5.4 How well is the project contributing to institutional and management capacity?	B	C	B	C
<b>6. Horizontal issues</b>				
<i>6.1) Quality Support Group (QSG) and ROM, lessons learnt</i>				
Did the comments on the formulation phase (QSG checklist) essentially hold true (provided the QSG data is available)? Please comment.	N/A	Q asked in 2009	Q asked in 2009	
Whether the comments, particularly regarding stakeholders and needs analysis, institutional capacity assessment of the implementing partner and risks and assumptions made in the checklist and minutes against the quality and content of the Action Fiche were appropriate / relevant?	Q asked in 2010	Yes	Yes	
Whether the comments were taken into consideration and included in the Project documents, e.g. TAPs, financing agreements, LFM, Inception reports, etc. and if so, did they improve project implementation?	Q asked in 2010	Yes	N/A	
If the comments were not taken into consideration, was there any consequence during the implementation of the project? If so, please describe in the free text box.	Q asked in 2010	N/A	N/A	
Has any monitoring or evaluation (including ROM) resulted in improvements in the project? Please comment.	N/A	Yes	Yes	
<i>6.2) Review of TC Quality Criteria</i>				
Does the TC fit the context of the project? Please comment.	Yes	Q asked in 2009	Q asked in 2009	
Is there clear commitment and adequate ownership from partners? Please comment.	Yes	Q asked in 2009	Q asked in 2010	
Is the link between activities and expected results and outcomes clear? Please comment.	Yes	Q asked in 2009	Q asked in 2010	
Is the TC support harmonised with that of other donors and has the sustainability of benefits been considered? Please comment.	No	Q asked in 2009	Q asked in 2010	
Is the PIA appropriate? – also mention the type of PIA, integrated unit or parallel structure etc. Please comment.	Yes	Q asked in 2009	Q asked in 2010	
Do local partners effectively lead in the planning and management of TC support (i.e. beyond formal endorsement)?	Q asked in 2010	No	Yes	
Do local partners provide the required inputs enabling TC to perform (e.g. human and/or physical inputs)? (refer to Box 22 of the Guidelines)	Q asked in 2010	Yes	Yes	
Is the TC support likely to achieve its objectives without critical constraints?	Q asked in 2010	No	Yes	
Is the TC support adequate vis-à-vis the capacity of the local partner?	Q asked in 2010	No	Yes	
Is the TC support taking into account TC from other donors in the same sector?(Ask the EC Delegation to acquire this data)	Q asked in 2010	Yes	Yes	
Is the present TC support from the EC delivered jointly with other donors? (If no other donors are active in the sector then mark N/A)	Q asked in 2010	Yes	Yes	
If the TC support from the EC is not harmonised with other donors, are relevant steps being taken for a more harmonized TC in the future?	Q asked in 2010	N/A	N/A	
Are the TC deliverables (outputs and outcomes) clearly specified (e.g. in the TA ToR) and regularly assessed (e.g. through a joint performance dialogue/assessment)?	Q asked in 2010	Yes	Yes	
Are there innovative forms of TC support being used (e.g. peer review, South/South and/or Public/Public cooperation, twinning, networking, etc.)?	Q asked in 2010	No	No	
Are partner country staff effectively managing the programme (and not TA)?	Q asked in 2010	No	Yes	
Do the experts take instructions from and report to the partner (and not the EC)?	Q asked in 2010	No	Yes	
<i>6.3. EC Visibility</i>				
Does the project contribute to promoting EC visibility (e.g. does it comply with the EC Guidelines)?	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
<b>7. Cross-cutting issues</b>				
7.1) Have practical and strategic gender interests been adequately considered in the project strategy?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
7.2) Is the project respecting environmental needs?	N/A	No	N/A	N/A
7.3) Has (good) governance been mainstreamed in the project/programme (P/P)?	Yes	Yes	No	No
7.4) Does the project actively contribute to the promotion of Human Rights?	N/A	No	Yes	Yes
	<b>MR (2009-09-11)</b>	<b>MR (2010-07-24)</b>	<b>MR (2011-08-11)</b>	<b>MR (2012-08-10)</b>
Relevance and quality of design	A	A	B	B
Efficiency of Implementation to date	B	B	B	B
Effectiveness to date	A	C	B	C
Impact prospects	B	B	B	B
Potential sustainability	B	B	B	C

SESSP														
Indicator			Baseline Value	Target	Value each Fiscal Year									Achievement
Objectives	Definition	Source of verification	2011/2012	2015	2006-2007	2007-2008	2008-2009	2009-2010	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014	2014	
<b>Expected Results</b>														
<b>I. IMPACT All children realising their full potential and contributing to long term development and poverty alleviation</b>														
<b>Reduced poverty and vulnerability</b>														
1.	% children of out of school (Age 5-16)	PSLM	40%	30%										
2.	Adult Literacy Rate (Aged 15 year and older)	PSLM	58%	65%										
<b>II. OUTCOME A well governed and accountable education system capable of providing equitable and quality education services.</b>														
<b>1. Enhance sector governance and accountability</b>														
3.	Teacher attendance rate	ASER	85,30%	95%										
4.	SEMIS ASC data accuracy	TPV	46%	85%										
5.	% of Education officials and teachers receiving computerised ID no. & smart card	DoF	0%	100%										
6.	% of public schools (PS) randomly monitored	RSU/	-	75%										
7.	no. of public primary schools have head teachers	RSU/	0	6.000										
8.	% of SMC conduct election of the exec. Committee	RSU/	20% (est.)	100%										
9.	% of Non-functional government schools	SEMIS	10,50%	1%										
10.	Reduction in the number of audit paras													
11.	No. Of officials in the management cadre receiving induction training	RSU	0	6.000										
<b>2. Improved Education Access &amp; Participation</b>														
12.	Primary net enrolment rate (NER Age 5-9)	PSLM	53%	60%										
13.	Middle secondary gross enrolment rate (GER Age 10-12)	PSLM	48%	55%										
14.	Secondary gross enrolment rate (GER Age 13-14)	PSLM	55%	60%										
15.	Class 1 to 2 dropout rate in public schools	SEMIS	26,40%	15%										
Indicator			Baseline Value	Target	Value each Fiscal Year									Achievement
Objectives	Definition	Source of verification	2011/2012	2015	2006-2007	2007-2008	2008-2009	2009-2010	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014	2014	
16.	Class 5 to 6 promotion rate in PS	SEMIS	58,00%	70%										
17.	% of age 6-16 children never attended schools (rura)	ASER	32,40%	15%										
18.	Student attendance rate in public schools	ASER	61,60%	90%										
19.	Primary Completion Rate													

## 3. Reduced disparity in education services

20. Gender Parity Index (GPI) on Primary GER	PSLM	0,77	0,83										
21. GPI on Middle Secondary GER	PSLM	0,81	0,85										
22. Primary GER gap between best/worst performing districts	PSLM	53%	45%										
23. Middle Secondary GER gap between best/worst performing districts	PSLM	51%	45%										
24. Primary GER gap between urban/rural	PSLM	31%	25%										
25. Middle GER gap between urban/rural	PSLM	37%	30%										

## 4. Improved Student Learning Outcomes

26. Class 3 students learning outcomes (Rural Sindh):	ASER												
- % of class 3 pupils can read sentence		33,80%	40%										
- % of class 3 pupils can do math subtraction		22,20%	30%										
27. Class 5 students assessment results	SAT												
- Language													
- Mathematics													
- Science													
28. Class 8 students assessment results	SAT												
- Language													
- Mathematics													
- Science													
29. Class 10 matriculation exam pass rate	BISE												
30. Class 12 intermediate exam pass rate	BISE												

## 5. Sustainable sector financing

31. Education share of the overall provincial expenditure outlay	FD	17%	20%										
32. Education share of the total provincial ADP Budget	FD	6,70%	10,00%										
33. Salary share of the education current budget	FD	80%	75%										
34. Primar/Elementary and NFE share of the education current budget	FD	46.5% (FY 2012/13)	46,50%										

Source: Technical and Policy Advisor: Education Sector Programme in Sindh, Final report, March 2013

KP-ESRP												
Indicator		Baseline	Target	Value each Fiscal Year					Achievement			
Objectives	Definition	Value	Value	2006-2009	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014	2014-2015	2015-2016		
<b>Expected Results</b>												
<b>Pillar 1 - Improving fiscal sustainability and effectiveness of public expenditures</b>												
1. Effective regulatory framework in place	Number of contracts awarded following the procurement rules and SBDs as validated by a Third Party	The Project for Improvement in Financial Reporting & Auditing (PIFRA) reporting; SBDs and regulations; and benchmarks established by first M&E report. Public Accounts Committee Audits									90%	



Indicator			Baseline	Target	Value each Fiscal Year			Achievement
Objectives	Definition	Source of verification	Value	Value	2006-2009	2010-2011	2011-2012	
2. E & SE Sector Budget and expenditures consistent with Medium Term Budgetary Framework (MTBF)	Budget procedures revised and credible steps made to align with Provincial MTBF. MTBF shows functional links to policy and planning processes	PIFRA reporting facilities Published Budget document of Finance Department.				MTBF for FY 10/11 – 12/13 approved		
<b>Pillar 2 - Improving education sector management</b>								
3. Number of government schools with active PTCs	PTCs are the official parental bodies which all school have for monitoring, checking the teachers absenteeism, purchase of minor items and community mobilization for increase enrollment.	Approved training work plan/PTC guides Monitoring reports and meeting minutes from PTCs and Education Department, which include data about funding. Minor repair plans prepared TPV reports				Reelection of all PTCs completed in all government schools and all PTCs trained and activated PTCs meetings conducted regularly in 60% government schools	PTCs monthly meetings conducted in 100% schools	
4. Separation of management and teaching cadres and recruitment of the needed management cadres as per assessment from the open labour market	Improvement in governance means that professionally qualified personnel will be recruited through Provincial Public Service Commission; hence they will bring improvement in management area by taking informed timely decisions in carrying out their official obligation	PIMS and EMIS data				PIMS design approved and technically linked with EMIS. Training Need Assessment for management cadres carried out and budget allocated for this training for FY 2010/11 Training Plan for management cadre Developed. Performance Management Framework developed in FY 2009/10 completed and approved.	All required data available in PIMS and linkage established with EMIS 60% of management cadres recruited up to previous year trained as per TNA and majority performed to standards set by Performance management Framework.	
5. Up-to-date statistics compiled for planning, management and decision making	Strengthening of EMIS systems to conduct annual schools census, improve monitoring & evaluation, and promote information-based decision making.	EMIS Report Annual School Census Statistical Bulletins at district and provincial levels				Required human and material resources provided for improved EMIS at the provincial and district levels. Credible evidence provided that EMIS information has been used for planning and budget purposes. Training to all programmers and data entry operators at provincial and district levels provided on a yearly basis.	District and provincial statistical bulletins are published. Credible evidence provided that EMIS information has been used for planning and budget purposes.	
<b>Pillar 3 - Improving access to schooling</b>								
6. The construction of fully damaged schools and repair/recovery of partially damaged schools.	Repair partially damaged schools, award contracts for construction of fully damaged schools and complete the construction work before end 2012.	Terms of partnership with district governments for rehabilitation of damaged schools and the contracts of construction. And /or Contracts awarded by relevant works department. TPV reports.				Contracts awarded for construction of 50% of fully damaged schools and for repair of 75% of partially damaged schools.	Contracts awarded for construction of remaining 50% of fully damaged schools and for repair of remaining 25% of partially damaged schools.	
7. No of government schools from Class I to Class XII receiving new textbooks within first month of academic year	Successful delivery of books is indicated by headmasters, district & circle focal persons signing off on stock and issue registers verifying that the books were received in the first month of academic year. % of students of government schools (Class-I to Class-XII) who received books	Schools Stock and issue register (where students sign that they have received) District Stock and issue register Provincial Stock Register TPV reports				95%	100%	
8. Teacher recruitment on a merit basis	Merit-based teacher recruitment and needs-based teacher placement as per approved criteria. Core principles to be assessed include merit criteria, local placement and school specific, fixed term contract and needs-base criteria for teacher placement.	Administrative data; Third Party Validation Reports; Implementation plans and schedules.				Teachers' recruitment and placement as per approved criteria in all primary schools	Teachers' recruitment and placement as per approved criteria in all primary, middle and high/higher secondary schools	

9. Share of schools provided missing basic facilities	Basic facilities include: - boundary walls, water and sanitation services, adequate classrooms.	EDO progress reports Monitoring Report of ESRU Directorate progress report TPV reports				Priority list of govt. schools with missing basic facilities prepared Transfer of funds to the PTCs to procure missing basic facilities	Priority list of govt. schools with missing facilities prepared Transfer of funds to the PTCs to procure missing basic facilities 50% govt schools as established in priority list FY 10/11 provided with missing basic facilities	
Indicator			Baseline	Target	Value each Fiscal Year			Achievement
Objectives	Definition	Source of verification	Value	Value	2006-2009	2010-2011	2011-2012	
<b>Pillar 4 - Improving the quality of teaching</b>								
10. a) Effective training programme and curriculum development for teachers of government schools	The IFTD provided strategies and guidelines for the changes in teacher preparation and support including revising the curriculum of the pre and in service programme, equipping the instructor of training institutes with latest developments and technology and overall development of the teacher.	IFTD training manual Training reports from Regional Institute of Teachers Education and Provincial Institute of Teachers Education TPV reports				Budget allocated IFTD plan prepared and approved	Teachers' training programmes and curriculum developed in line with IFTD Training of teachers in-line with the new curriculum in light of IFTD has begun Regular monitoring and impact assessment of the applied curriculum carried out.	
10. b) Implementation of the Multi-Level Integrated School Supervision and In Service Teacher Training System								

Source: Final Report, 20 July 2012

**Monitoring report  
(2012-08-10)**

a = very good; b = good; c = problems; d = serious deficiencies.

**1. Quality of design**

1.1 What is the present level of relevance of the project?	B
1.2 As presently designed, is the intervention logic holding true?	C
1.3 Is the current design sufficiently supported by all stakeholders?	C
1.4 Is the current design sufficiently taking cross-cutting issues into account?	C

**2. Efficiency to date**

2.1 How well is the availability/usage of inputs managed?	C
2.2 How well is the implementation of the activities managed?	C
2.3 How well are the outputs achieved?	C
2.4 How well are the Partner Contribution/Involvement working?	C

**3. Effectiveness to date**

3.1 How well is the project achieving its planned results?	C
3.2 As presently implemented, what is the likelihood of the PP to be achieved?	C

**4. Impact prospects**

4.1 What are the direct impact prospects of the project at Overall Objectives level?	C
4.2 To what extent does/will the project have any indirect positive and/or negative impacts? (i.e. environmental, social, cultural, gender and economic)?	B

**5. Potential sustainability**

5.1 Financial / economic viability?	C
5.2 What is the level of ownership of the project by target groups and will it continue after the end of external support?	C
5.3 What is the level of policy support provided and the degree of interaction between project and policy level?	C
5.4 How well is the project contributing to institutional and management capacity?	B

**6. Horizontal issues**

*6.1 Role of Quality Support Group (QSG) and ROM in project quality*

a) Whether the comments, particularly regarding stakeholders and needs analysis, institutional capacity assessment of the implementing partner and risks and assumptions made in the checklist and minutes against the quality and content of the Action Fiche were appropriate / relevant?	Yes
b) Whether the comments were taken into consideration and included in the Project documents, e.g. TAPs, financing agreements, LFM, Inception reports, etc. and if so, did they improve project implementation?	Yes
c) If the comments were not taken into consideration, was there any consequence during the implementation of the project? If so, please describe in the free text box.	N/A
d) Has any monitoring (including internal monitoring systems or ROM) or evaluation resulted in improvements in the project?	N/A

## 6.2) Review of TC Quality Criteria

Do local partners effectively lead in the planning and management of TC support (i.e. beyond formal endorsement)?	Yes
Do local partners provide the required inputs enabling TC to perform (e.g. human and/or physical inputs)? (refer to Box 22 of the Guidelines)	Yes
Is the TC support likely to achieve its objectives without critical constraints?	Yes
Is the TC support adequate vis-à-vis the capacity of the local partner?	Yes
Is the TC support taking into account TC from other donors in the same sector? (Ask the EC Delegation to acquire this data)	Yes
Is the present TC support from the EC delivered jointly with other donors? (If no other donors are active in the sector then mark N/A)	No
If the TC support from the EC is not harmonised with other donors, are relevant steps being taken for a more harmonized TC in the future?	No
Are the TC deliverables (outputs and outcomes) clearly specified (e.g. in the TA ToR) and regularly assessed (e.g. through a joint performance dialogue/assessment)?	Yes
Are there innovative forms of TC support being used (e.g. peer review, South/South and/or Public/Public cooperation, twinning, networking, etc)?	No
Are partner country staff effectively managing the programme (and not TA)?	No
Do the experts take instructions from and report to the partner (and not the EC)?	No

## 7.3. EC Visibility

Does the project contribute to promoting EC visibility (e.g. does it comply with the EC Guidelines?)	N/A
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## 7. Cross-cutting issues

7.1) Have practical and strategic gender interests been adequately considered in the project strategy?	Yes
7.2) Is the project respecting environmental needs?	N/A
7.3) Has (good) governance been mainstreamed in the project/programme (P/P)?	Yes
7.4) Does the project actively contribute to the promotion of Human Rights?	Yes

Monitoring report  
(2012-08-10)

Relevance and quality of design	C
Efficiency of Implementation to date	C
Effectiveness to date	C
Impact prospects	C
Potential sustainability	C

## KP-ESPP

Objectives	Indicator	Definition	Source of verification	Baseline	Target	Value each Fiscal Year								Achievement
				Value	Value	2006-2007	2007-2008	2008-2009	2009-2010	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014	

## Expected Results for Year 1 2012/2013

## GROUP 1: GOVERNANCE &amp; PFM

DLI 1: E&amp;SED non-salary and development budget allocation increase both in real terms and as a percentage of total education budget is protected

E&SED/ GoKP to approve PC-I for Girls stipend, summary for recurrent PTC expenditures as well as summary for Monitoring function and start judicious expenditures to ensure additionality of DFID funds.															
E&SED actual expenditure on Non-salary & development to be at least 75% of the budget estimates (Provincial & District level)															
Institutional analysis of ESRU, EEF and SED with a view to develop recommendations for organizational restructuring															

DLI 2: Organizational Development

Indicator			Baseline	Target	Value each Fiscal Year									Achievement
Objectives	Definition	Source of verification	Value	Value	2006-2007	2007-2008	2008-2009	2009-2010	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014	2014	
DL1 3: Audit system	Internal audit charter & cell established (organizational structure approved, posts sanctioned & appointments made) at FD & similar actions taken for establishing & operationalizing the internal Audit function at E&SEED. Capacity building plan designed & implemented													
	Internal audit report													
	Annual External audit of KPESP by Auditor General's office covering the flow & utilization of DFID funds along with any irregularities found during the course of audit													
DL14: Output based Budgets	E&SEED OBB approved with improved targets & indicators. OBB rolled out to at least 6 Districts													
<b>GROUP 2: ACCESS &amp; FACILITIES</b>														
DL1 5: Girls Stipends	100% girls who meet attendance criterion receive stipends in time according to the on-going programme													
	Branchless banking pilot initiated for stipends delivery in 4 Districts													
	Analytical work to re-design the programme through improved targeting, benefit structure and attendance verification completed													
DL1 6 : Community Level Management	Without overlap with OBB Districts & in line with recommendations of TPV on PTCs in KP, PTCs policy, financial & procurement rules improved & notified with a continuous capacity development programme (CCDP) developed													
DL1 7: Low Cost Private Sector	Establish a comprehensive strategy for public private partnership (PPP) in education facilitating the low cost private sector with setting out clear standards for quality													
	Analyse (using EMIS data & through EEF) location & viability of low cost private sector primary & secondary schools & draw partnership proposal													
DL1 8: Elementary Education Foundation (EEF)	Second chance return to learn opportunities provided to primary & secondary aged out of school children according to the agreed proposal & as validated by TPV													
	Literacy & skills trainings provided to illiterate women according to the agreed proposal & as validated by TPV													

Indicator			Baseline	Target	Value each Fiscal Year									Achievement
Objectives	Definition	Source of verification	Value	Value	2006-2007	2007-2008	2008-2009	2009-2010	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014	2014	
<b>GROUP 3: QUALITY &amp; LEARNING OUTCOMES</b>														
DLI 9: Curriculum Implementation														
	Establish joint steering committee comprising of (BISE, PEAS, KPTBB & DCIE) to execute the curriculum implementation framework													
	Adapting the Punjab lesson plans to contextual realities of KP, utilize lesson plans for teaching all subjects at primary level in at least 10 Districts													
DLI 10: Students Learning Outcomes														
	Develop a home grown strategy for systematically measuring & improving students learning outcomes in KP													
	Development of effective reading instruction strategies as part of GPE Reading Action Plan													
DLI 11: Improving School Performance														
	School report cards developed & tested in at least 25% of primary & secondary schools in 5 Districts													
DLI 12: Improving Teachers Management														
	Minimum classroom level performance standards for teachers established													
	Establish a teachers professional development framework													
	Strategy developed for rationalizing teaching posts at school level based on school needs including enrolment													

## Supporting TVET Reform in Pakistan (TVET I)

Indicator			Baseline	Target	Value Each Fiscal Year				Progression
Objectives	Definition	Source of verification	Value	Value	2006-2007	2007-2013	2013-2014		2014
<b>Logical Framework from the FA</b>									
<b>Overall Objective</b>									
	Pakistan HDI improved by end of Project implementation period	UN report on HDI Annual national budget							
	Ratio of education budget to GDP increased over the Project implementation period								
<b>Specific Objective</b>									
	Number and quality of training courses in vocational education available in rural areas in Pakistan	Labour market studies Labour Force Survey Tracer studies of graduates							
	90% of trainees successfully completing or graduating from TVET programs in a given year								
	70% of TVET graduates hired/(self) employed after training								

Indicator	Indicator	Indicator	Baseline	Target	Value Each Fiscal Year			Progression
Objectives	Definition	Source of verification	Value	Value	2006-2007	2007-2013	2013-2014	2014
<b>Expected Results</b>								
<b>Expected Result 1 - Planning, coordination and implementation capacity of TEVTAs and other stakeholders strengthened at the provincial level</b>								
	Organization and training needs assessment study of TVETAs completed within 3 months from Project commencement	Progress reports of Implementing Partner Independent monitoring reports from EC, TVETAs, other stakeholders						
	Management and operating systems of TEVTAs developed and installed/adapted within 2 years							
	All persons identified for management training will have participated in at least one training by the end of third year of implementation							
	Partnership model with business sector on selected trades within at least one TVET institution in each province piloted and functioning by the 4th year							
	5 training programs (one per province) of TVET institutions equipped/rehabilitated (318)							
	25% of training courses updated/initiated by TEVTAs further to skills competencies identified at enterprise level							
	Quality assurance and monitoring procedures in TEVTAs developed and installed within 2 years							
	TVETAs strengthened as major role players in TVET on provincial level, conducting a number of activities related to the project							
<b>Expected Result 2 - TVET suppliers provide a wide range of qualitative, innovative and relevant programmes in response to the needs of the economic sectors for a public targeted in the rural areas provided</b>								
	Baseline socio-economic profile of priority poor districts in rural areas established within 1st year after contracting	Progress reports of Implementing Partner Independent monitoring reports from EU, TEVTAs, other stakeholders Tracer studies of graduates Unemployment statistics						
	About 33,660 beneficiaries (at least 40% female) in poor districts provided relevant and quality training							
	At least 11,220 trainees enrolled each year							
	About 70% of trained beneficiaries wage- or self-employed							
	50% of projects visited at least once by EU Delegation/ROM/other donor							
	50% of evaluated projects scored at least 'good'							

Indicator	Indicator	Indicator	Baseline	Target	Value Each Fiscal Year				Progression
Objectives	Definition	Source of verification	Value	Value	2006-2007	2007-2013	2013-2014	2014	

Logical Framework from Delegation Agreement with GIZ (Annex 1 - Description of Activities)

#### Overall Objective

**Project purpose:** The capacity of TEVTA staff to manage successfully the overall working procedures is improved

1. PTEVTA and STEVTA are certified against International Standard of Quality Management ISO 9001:2008	reports on preparation results award of ISO certification								
2. Private sector representatives confirm that they are satisfactorily involved in TVET planning and monitoring in the provinces/regions	private sector representatives' perception survey								
3. TEVTAs have developed and implemented concepts for personal development and motivation	7 HRD plans								

#### Expected Results

##### Component 1 TEVTA management

Result /direct benefit: Generic management capacity of TEVTAs focused on managing people is increased	1. A three-years capacity building programme addressing high and middle management staff in all departments of all TEVTAs strengthening the "organisational learning capacity" is successfully implemented	capacity building programme execution reports evaluation of participants' feedback sheets analyses of applied training course content							
	2. The management team of each TEVTA conducts annually organisational evaluations, discuss the findings with the staff, define improvement tasks and publish reports	evaluation questionnaires reports on discussed findings and agreed tasks, published reports							
Output 1.1: Training needs of high and middle management staff assessed	1. TNA regarding leadership competences and Corporate Identity and Culture carried out within 3 months after project start	7 TNA reports					Output 1.1: completed		
Output 1.2: Training courses strengthening leadership skills successfully implemented	1. Set of training courses designed based on TNA and implemented (at least 7 programmes)	course programmes for high and middle management					Output 1.2: completed		
	2. Interviews with TEVTA staff confirm improvement of managing and leading people competences	documentation of staff feedback to managers							
Output 1.3: Organisational learning leads to first results	1. Ideas on improvement of TEVTAs' performance has been shared between the staff and at least one idea has been realised	minutes of sessions to generate and share ideas for improving TEVTAs' performance							
	2. Periodical exchange of experiences between the TEVTAs and responsible organisations in GB and FATA has led to at least 2 thematic inter-TEVTA working groups	minutes of exchange sessions minutes and working results of thematic TEVTA consultancy groups							
Output 1.4: Human Resource Development plans for priority TEVTA department staff designed and implemented	Competency development plans for selected people are signed, carried out and evaluated	competency development plans					Output 1.4: to be undertaken		
Output 1.5: Institutionalized forms of cooperation between TEVTAs and private sector implemented	Institutionalized modalities for direct participation of private sector in planning and/or monitoring of TVET development agreed and implemented	agreements and minutes of joint meetings/activities							

Indicator	Indicator	Indicator	Baseline	Target	Value Each Fiscal Year			Progression
Objectives	Definition	Source of verification	Value	Value	2006-2007	2007-2013	2013-2014	2014
<b>Component 2 Public Private Partnerships</b>								
Result /direct benefit: Public Private Partnerships of TEVTAs and their training institutions strengthened	1. At least one Public Private Partnership model between business sector and TVET institutions in each province and region piloted and functioning in the 2d year	documentation of at least 7 Public Private Partnership models including tracer studies documentation on apprenticeship training						
	2. Apprenticeship scheme modernized and successfully implemented in at least 5 enterprises in Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and at least 4 enterprises in Balochistan, FATA, AJK and Gilgit-Baltistan	tracer studies						
Output 2.1: Public Private Partnership (PPP) models introduced in provinces and regions	1. Special evaluations of PPPs at the end of the 3rd year have identified replicable models	evaluation reports					Output 2.1: being introduced	
	2. Calculation of the training costs demonstrates cost sharing between TVET institutions and private sector	compilation of TVET unit costs and calculation evidencing cost sharing						
Output 2.2: Apprenticeship scheme modernised and successfully implemented	1. TEVTA staff competent to facilitate revitalization of apprenticeship in enterprises	documentation of TEVTA staff preparation for revitalization of apprenticeship scheme					Output 2.2: awaiting Parliamentary approval of the Bill	
	2. At least 2 types of incentives for enterprises participating in the modernized apprenticeship scheme are piloted	documentation of the incentives and analysis of their impact						

**Logical Framework for PLAN project**

**Overall Objective**

Employment status of young people aged 18-29 (male, female, disabled) according to categories: Percent employed; Percent self employed; Percent working as apprentices; Percent looking for jobs	Mid-term and final evaluation Employment surveys							
Percent age of young people aged 18-29 (male, female, disabled) reporting increased income	Mid-term and final evaluation Employment surveys							
Changes in National or Provincial strategies, policies or practice relating to making TVET services appropriate for rural youth and marginalised groups including young women and young people living with disabilities	Mid-term and final evaluation							



Indicator	Indicator	Indicator	Baseline	Target	Value Each Fiscal Year				Progression
Objectives	Definition	Source of verification	Value	Value	2006-2007	2007-2013	2013-2014	2014	
<b>Specific Objective</b>									
	Employment status of the targeted youth (male, female, disabled) according to categories: Percent employed; Percent self employed; Percent working as apprentices; Percent looking for job (target = 75% employed or self-employed)	Project Management Information System (MIS) Mid-term and Final Evaluation							
	Percentage of targeted youth (male, female, disabled) reporting increased income (target = 75%)	Mid-term and Final evaluation							
	Gross Enrolment in TVET (male, female, disabled)	TVET institutional data							
	No. of families with improved PPI scores at the end of the project (target = 1600)	Progress Out of Poverty Index							
<b>Expected Results</b>							<b>July 2014</b>		
<b>Expected result 1 - TVET institutions deliver accredited, market-driven, competency based training curricula and workskills training appropriate for rural youth, women, and</b>							Baseline study completed		
	Number of revised competency based training modules approved and used by TVET institutions (target = determined following market assessments)	TVET institutional data					Design of EDT (Entreprise Development Training) completed		
	Completion and dropout rate in new/revised curricula (male, female, disabled)	TVET institutional data					Design & introduction of life skills module completed		
	Percent of youth (male, female, disabled) aware about training courses being offered by TVET institutions in their area (target =75%)	TVET institutional data							
	Percent of youth (male, female, disabled) aware about TVET institutions working in their area (target = 75%)	TVET institutional data							
	Number of persons (male, female, disabled) trained in new curricula	TVET institutional data					TVET staff training: 63/90		
	Number of persons (male, female, disabled) trained by EDT Master Trainers	TVET institutional data					Training for EDT Master Trainers: 20/30		
	Number of private institutions registered / certified by government (target = 15)	TVET institutional data					13		
	Percentage time in courses allocated to practical instruction (target=80%, to be revised according to module)	TVET institutional data							
<b>Expected result 2 - Employers formally linked with targeted TVET institutions, and contributing to the design of competency-based curricula, and supporting job placements</b>									
	Number of persons (male, female, disabled) provided apprenticeship by employers / local enterprises	Project Management Information System (MIS)							
	Number of employers providing input into design or revision of competency based training curricula (target = 40)	Project Management Information System (MIS)					Work with 40 local employers to support job placements: 14/40		
	Number of employers aware of contents of training courses offered by TVET institutions in their area	Project Management Information System (MIS)							
	Number of consult ative meetings between employers and TVET institutions	Project Management Information System (MIS)							

Indicator	Indicator	Indicator	Baseline	Target	Value Each Fiscal Year				Progression
Objectives	Definition	Source of verification	Value	Value	2006-2007	2007-2013	July 2014	2014	
	Number of employers / local entrepreneurs aware of the Decent Work Agenda (target = 40)	Project Management Information System (MIS)							
	Number of MoUs signed with employers (target = 40)	Project Management Information System (MIS)					37		
	Percent of trained women joining formal sector / non-traditional trades (to be defined following baseline & market assessments)	Project Management Information System (MIS)							

**Expected result 3** - 3,694 vulnerable young men and women supported to access free TVET, youth enterprise training, workforce skills training, and job placement support

	Number of students awarded free TVET place and enrolled in TVET institute, workforce skills training and Enterprise Development Training (male/ female/ disabled) (target = 1,244/[missing])	TVET institutional data					Number of trained men: 825/1,244 women: 1,277/2,350 total: 2,144/3,694 disabled: 42/100		
	Number / percent of drop outs (male, female, disabled)	TVET institutional data							
	Number / Percent of trained youth (male, female, disabled) provided information about job opportunities on quarterly basis	Project Management Information System (MIS)							
	Number of young women and men participating in 3-day workforce preparation training (target = 10,000)	Project Management Information System (MIS)							
	Attendance in the training course (male, female, disabled)	TVET institutional data							
	Number of training institutes with improved training facility, equipment	Project Management Information System (MIS)							
	Number of monitoring visits during the courses	Project Management Information System (MIS)							
	Type of youth friendly microfinance services offered by MFIs (target = 1)	Project Reports							
	Number of youth accessing MF services (savings, loans)	Project Management Information System (MIS)							
	Number of youth living with disabilities enrolled and supported with trade specific tool kits (target = 100)	TVET institutional data					Handy skills events: 249/500 Handy skills trainees: 5,466/10,000		
	Indicator not present in the logframe: Career counselling						2,144/3,694		

**Expected result 4** - Increased recognition of the value of vocational training amongst 133 communities particularly for young women and youth living with disabilities.

	Number of villages reached for awareness sessions relating to TVET services (target = 133)	Project Management Information System (MIS)					120		
	Percent of youth (male, female, disabled) aware about training courses being offered by TVET institutions in their area	Mid-term and Final evaluation							
	Number of district level youth forums formed and meeting regularly (target = 3)	Project Management Information System (MIS)					Youth forums: 180/266		
	Number of advocacy events organised by youth forums at district level with stakeholders	Project Management Information System (MIS)							
	Number of women from targeted communities enrolling in TVET institutions	Project Management Information System (MIS)							

Indicator	Indicator	Indicator	Baseline	Target	Value Each Fiscal Year				Progression
Objectives	Definition	Source of verification	Value	Value	2006-2007	2007-2013	2013- 2014	2014	
<b>Logical Framework for CARE project</b>							January 2014		
<b>Overall Objective</b>									
	Increase in enrolment of rural women and youth for improved TVET services	Government statistics, TEVTA Reports, Project evaluation							
	New/improved TVET courses adopted by the Govt./semi-govt./Pvt sector TEVT service providers	TVET Syllabi							
	At least 20% of project audience (graduates of TVET Courses, micro-entrepreneurship, women homebased etc.) start making additional income	Project evaluation report							
	Improved capacity of TVET bodies to make better contribution for work-force development	LSF, ME, career counselling, Internships added in TVET services							
<b>Specific Objective</b>									
	2,800 of women and youth accessing improved TVET services and are satisfied with quality and usefulness of training	Project records, mid-term and end or project report, case study					891		
	60% of TVET beneficiaries (1,680) avail apprenticeship or employment	Project records, end of project evaluation					715		
	At least 60% (840) of TVET graduates / micro-entrepreneurship training beneficiaries establish successful (micro) enterprises	Field reports, project reports					388		
	At least 60% of beneficiaries trained under the project receive orientation on micro credit services.	Project reports, mid-term survey, final evaluation report					7		
	At-least 60% of rural home-based women establish successful enterprises	Field reports, project reports					420		
<b>Expected Results</b>									
<b>Expected result 1 - An improved TVET Programme is established for rural women and youths</b>									
	8 disciplines with high demand for vocational training prioritized	Baseline market assessment and skill gap analysis reports.					23		
	2,550 youth and rural women trained in 8 priority vocational disciplines in courses ranging between 3-6 months, in government TVET institutes	Trainee's enrollment, training attendance sheets, trainee handbooks developed and printed, graduation certificates issued.					891		
	250 youth and rural women trained in 4-6 priority vocational disciplines in three-month courses from private/ semi government TVET institutes	Trainee's enrollment, training attendance sheets, trainee handbooks developed and printed, graduation certificates issued, MoUs with institutes					125		
	60% of all TVET graduates securing apprenticeship/internships ranging between one – three months	Meetings notes with employers, reference letter of completed internship from employers					715		
	7 District level CCs established and provide advice and guidance on TVET services	Minutes of meetings, record of CC members' details, reports of events by CCs					7		
	14 TVET staff trained on secondary research and data analysis for course improvement	Participant attendance sheets, training material developed, training reports					8		
	42 TVET staff members trained in packaging and dissemination of information	Participant attendance sheets, training material developed, training reports							
	42 quarterly updates on TVET services disseminated	Copies / record of quarterly information updates							

Indicator	Indicator	Indicator	Baseline	Target	Value Each Fiscal Year				Progression
Objectives	Definition	Source of verification	Value	Value	2006-2007	2007-2013	January 2014	2014	
<b>Expected result 2 - Innovative approaches and new teaching methodologies are developed and access to TVET services is increased</b>									
	Designing of micro entrepreneurship/service industry course for TVET by the end of year 1	Course module and trainee handbooks					0		
	140 TVET instructors trained on micro entrepreneurship/service industry course	ToT manual and Training reports					41		
	1400 youth and women (TVET graduates and/or others) trained on micro entrepreneurship/service industry course	Participants enrollment, training materials developed and printed					205		
	At least 60% of the graduates of micro-entrepreneurship / service industry training program start earning by the end of the project	Project records, mid-term survey report, communication notes case study reports					0		
	Life Skills (LS) Training module developed and TOTs conducted for 175 TVET instructors from participating target districts	LS Education needs, module on LSE, training material, training reports, participants' registration					0		
	LST sessions introduced and attended by at-least 700 TVET graduates (100 in each district) by the end of project.	TVET notification/ announcement, session reports					0		
	50 home based workers trained in designing product according to market demand, basic marketing and communication, business development and basic accounting, in 7 districts, and linked with industry/ private sector.	Project records/ field reports, training material developed, case studies					420		
	42 boys and girls high school teachers oriented on importance of giving students and exposure to TVET services.	Report of FGD/needs assessment with teachers, ToT manual and Training reports					42		
	3150 boys and girls in 21 schools participate in day long exposure visits to TVET institutes to learn about selected/market demand driven trades	Acceptance for the program by EDO/school management, students handbook, handing over of vocational training labs					60		
<b>Expected result 3 - Linkages between TVET graduates and employers are promoted</b>									
	35 TVET instructors on trained on counselling and coaching	ToT manual and Training reports					43		
	15 Career Counselling Centres established and operational in project districts	Expenditure records, records of graduates seeking counseling service					15		
	14 job fairs/exhibitions organized; 1 in each year in the project districts	Record of meetings with industry and private sector employers, event reports, press releases					2		
	Quarterly meetings of Coordination Committees in participating districts	Meeting minutes, progress reports					35		
	2 biannual advocacy events organized in each district	Event reports, attendance records, press releases/media coverage					6		
	2 provincial and 1 national advocacy events organized with the policy makers and key stakeholders for improved TVET services	Event reports, attendance records, press releases/media coverage					0		
	14 women home-based worker entrepreneur groups formed; 2 in each district, each having 25 members	Registration of group members					23		

Indicator	Indicator	Indicator	Baseline	Target	Value Each Fiscal Year				Progression
					2006-2007	2007-2013	January 2014	2014	
Objectives	Definition	Source of verification	Value	Value	2006-2007	2007-2013	January 2014	2014	Progression
	350 women home-based entrepreneurs trained on identified skills	Rapid needs assessment, training material, training reports, participant registration record					420		
<b>Expected result 4 - Small Enterprises and self employment amongst Rural women and youths is promoted and linkages with MFI's are strengthened</b>									
	63 orientation sessions conducted by MCIs / MFIs for TVET trainees	Social return on investment exercise report, Progress reports, Progress reports, List of successful enterprises and employments					50		
	TVET graduates have knowledge for accessing loans from MFIs for setting up of micro-enterprises	Project reports, mid-term survey, final evaluation report					250		
	Miro-entrepreneurs utilize annual exhibitions for display of their products for promotion of their products	Record of entrepreneurs showcasing products in exhibitions					0		
							January 2014		
<b>Logical Framework for ACTED project</b>									
<b>Overall Objective</b>									
	At least 70% of vocational trainees who have started an income generating activity report increased income after completing trainings at the target TVET centres						<b>On track</b> - One month after graduation, 13% of interviewed graduates have started earning additional income. The average increase in income in AJK was 1240 PKR, in KP 978 PKR and in Sindh 2200 PKR		
	80% of training centres report that they will continue to offer the training courses beyond the project period						<b>Achieved</b> - 70% of Centres plan to continue at least one of the courses introduced by ACTED. Centres were interviewed with regards to one specific course for a range of different courses. All Centres were planning to continue the courses introduced by ACTED. Only 1 Centre in Muzaffargarh		
<b>Specific Objective</b>									
	80% increase in the enrolment of marginalised groups in target TVET centres	End of project evaluation							
	At least 20 TVET centres supported by the action						<b>Achieved</b> - MOU signed with 22 Centres		
	8000 people are trained by TVET centres targeted under the project						<b>On track</b> - 1791 students/graduates		
	80% of beneficiaries who participate in trainings at the targeted TVET centres report satisfaction with the training and services of the centre						<b>Achieved</b> - On average 83% of students and graduates are satisfied with the services and trainings offered. Indicators captured were the training venue, duration, skills learnt, teaching methods used, hours of the course, and the practical work.		
	80% of teachers trained through the action using new teaching manuals report satisfaction with the quality of trainings						<b>Achieved</b> - 80% of trainers rated the TOT excellent or good.		
	80% of training centres report having established at least 1 linkage with private sector and/or MFIs/banks by the end of the project						<b>On track</b> - 65% of Centres have developed market linkages for internship placement, provision of services or with select businesses in addition to the establishment of Advisory Councils at almost all Centres		
<b>Expected Results</b>									
<b>Expected result 1 - Quality, market-oriented vocational training programs are established for marginalised communities</b>									
	1 labour market survey identifies relevance, quality, access, equity and employability of TVET services in Pakistan						<b>Achieved</b> - 1 Labour market survey completed and published		
	1 directory of TVET services available in target areas developed	End of project evaluation							
	At least 20 TVET centres are teaching new training skills curricula						<b>Achieved</b> - Updated curricula introduced for eight trades in 23 Centres.		
	At least 80 teachers trained in new curricula						<b>On track</b> - 81% of trainers trained. 65 Trainers trained in new curricula. RAC Training and training on short courses (business development, computer) pending.		

Indicator	Indicator	Indicator	Baseline	Target	Value Each Fiscal Year					Progression
Objectives	Definition	Source of verification	Value	Value	2006-2007	2007-2013	January 2014			2014
	At least 8 market-oriented vocational training manuals tailored to the needs of the target population are used as part of the project						On track - Printing and delivery of training manuals delayed due to translation into Urdu by TUSDEC.			
<b>Expected result 2 - Increased access to and equity of TVET services for marginalized communities.</b>										
	80% of TVET centres have measures in place throughout the project period to support access by marginalised communities						On track - 50% of Centres in AJK, 64% of Centres in KPK and 75% of Centres in Sindh have fee concessions in place to support access by marginalized students.			
	At least 8,000 individuals attend trainings						On track - Currently, 1791 students are enrolled/have graduated.			
	At least a third of trainees are women						On track - 44% of students/graduates currently reached are women			
	95% of trainees complete their training	End of project evaluation								
<b>Expected result 3 - Improved relevance of TVET services and linkages with market actors</b>										
	8,000 trainees receive kits containing tools or other relevant equipment						On track - 292 Toolkits distributed to date			
	1 database of beneficiaries who intend to start small enterprises created and shared with MFIs						On track - Database for all enrolled students is maintained.			
	1 comprehensive set of guidelines produced providing information on the needs of marginalised groups for MFIs						Achieved - 1 Advocacy Report published by PMN.			
	At least 60% of male beneficiaries start income generating activities based on the vocational training by the end of the project period	End of project evaluation								
	At least 40% of female beneficiaries start income generating activities based on the vocational training by the end of the project period	End of project evaluation								

### Logical Framework for OXFAM project

#### Overall Objective

Employment in the selected districts of Sindh is increased. TVET services are promoted for the marginalized people in Sindh	Baseline survey and end line survey									
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#### Specific Objectives

##### 1. Improving accessibility and success rate of 3,200 unemployed poor youth in three selected districts (Dadu, Khairpur and Jamshoro) of Sindh in TVET leading to

Improved access of poor unemployed youth to the TVET trainings in Sindh	Baseline survey and end line survey									
At least 70% of the beneficiaries are employed in the trade and industry/self employed and earning minimum 50% above the minimum wage announced by the Government	Trainee database/ Reported earnings									

##### 2. Improving economic empowerment of 1600 poor women in three target districts by enhancing handicraft, designing, production and entrepreneurial skills , and

Improved handicrafts skills to 1600 poor women in three target districts	Baseline survey and end line survey Trainee database New product profiles Government certifications of new courses									
50% increase in income/earning level of 70% of the beneficiaries										
50% of the trained women are contributing in family earnings										
10-15 new product designs introduced in the potential markets										
5 new skill development courses certified by the relevant government authorities and institutions										

Indicator	Indicator	Indicator	Baseline	Target	Value Each Fiscal Year			Progression	
Objectives	Definition	Source of verification	Value	Value	2006-2007	2007-2013	January 2014	2014	
<b>Expected Results</b>									
<b>Expected result 1 - 3200 (2630 male and 570 female) poor unemployed youth (men, women, youth and disabled) are gainfully employed and earn income 30% above the</b>									
	By October, 2015: At least 70% of the trained/graduated beneficiaries are gainfully self employed/employed by the trade and industry and report earnings 50% above the baseline findings	Baseline survey and end line survey Records of employment by trainee/industry Earnings reported by the beneficiary					47 trainers received trade specific refresher courses 1206 men and 582 women graduated from L.R.Cs. 291 men and 214 women received career counseling 1301 (829 men and 472 women) placed in training institutes; 640 (382 men and 258 women) graduated. 288 men and women earning (13 men and 5 women as intern; 78 men and 6 women as employee; 92 men and 94 women self-employed. 329 men and 183 women received employability kit of various trades.		
<b>Expected result 2 - Improved economic and social status of 1600 poor women in 3 target districts of Sindh trained in new handcraft, designing, production and entrepreneurial</b>									
By October, 2015:	At least 70% of the women take pride in their handcrafts	Baseline survey and end line survey					50 groups (12 Jamshoro, 18 Dadu and 20 Khaipur) formed; 1000 women trained in basic preparatory courses; the Skillful Artisan training completed for 480 crafts women		
	At least 70% of the trained women producing value added handcrafts and are well connected in supply chain mechanism	Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM)							
	At least 70% of the trained women feel empowered and enjoy economic freedom	Beneficiary Customer Satisfaction Index							
<b>Logical Framework for CONCERN project</b>									
<b>Overall Objective</b>									
	Significant increase in livelihoods opportunities for target groups	Poverty/economic survey reports (lead by government, done by UN agencies, Worldbank, Asian Development Bank)							
<b>Specific Objectives</b>									
	Percentage increase in income of skill graduates/trainees (disaggregated by gender)	Sources: Evaluations' and completion reports of the Action, B-TEVTA reports, KAP study report.  Methods: Evaluations (midterm, final), KAP study, Case studies,							
	Percentage increase in self-employment for the skill graduates/trainees (disaggregated by gender)								
	Percentage increase in enrolment in TVET institutions (disaggregated by gender)								
	Degree of change in availability of diverse, affordable and quality skills in the local market								
	Evidence of increased support from government and acceptance from community for TVET sector								
	Evidence of increased linkages established among skill graduates, financial institutions and TVET service providers								

Indicator	Indicator	Indicator	Baseline	Target	Value Each Fiscal Year			Progression	
					Value	Value	Value		
Objectives	Definition	Source of verification	Value	Value	2006-2007	2007-2013	January 2014	2014	
<b>Expected Results</b>									
<b>Expected result 1 - Existing public and private sector TVET institutions are strengthened and are providing effective and demand based employable skills</b>			9 Curricula developed in different trades						
	Percentage of functional TVET institutions with quality service delivery	Sources: Output indicators tracking database, Curriculum & trades copies, Inventory/stock register, Enrollment/attendance registers.  Methods: Periodic surveys, regular monitoring, review of records, quick impact assessment							
	20 vocational training facilities improved (government, private and traditional)						2 Vocational training facilities improved (Government, private and traditional) and 13 in process will be completed till Nov 30, 2014		
	Percentage of newly trained traditional vocational service providers that are effectively providing certified trainings								
	200 instructors trained in new vocational skills, teaching methodology						173 Trainers trained (9 ToTs Conducted)		
	4 new trades and modules introduced.								
	No of trainees trained after the introduction of new trades in TVET institutions								
<b>Expected result 2 - Target groups have improved access to relevant, market oriented and quality TVET services for enhanced income generation opportunities.</b>			170 men and 25 women provided internship opportunities						
	Percentage of TVET graduates (men/women) making successful use of newly acquired skills for their income generation	Sources: Output indicators tracking database, Trainings database, M&E reports, case studies  Methods: Periodic surveys, FGDs, case studies, regular monitoring, quick impact assessment							
	3,800 individuals (men/women) completed trainings on various skills						Total 1346 beneficiaries (Man and Women) (636 completed training and 710 continue)		
	No. of vulnerable trainees (particularly women, the disabled) completed trainings on various skills						Identification done; training to begin soon		
	1,500 trainees (disaggregated by gender) assisted in development of business plans						Total 414 beneficiaries assisted in development of business plans		
<b>Expected result 3 - Public image of and demand for TVET is improved and linkages between TVET institutions, trainees, micro-finance/microenterprise institutions and the</b>									
	No of TVET graduates who get micro credit as a direct result of facilitation by the Action	Sources: Copies of IEC materials, baseline/KAP study reports, events reports  Methods: Conducting KAP study/baseline, Community based organizations' feedback							
	Evidence of increased TVET support from the government for the target group								
	Evidence of change in perception for TVET in the target communities.								
<b>Logical Framework for TUSDEC project</b>									
<b>Overall Objective</b>									
	Overall increase in socio-economic welfare of KP and FATA	Statistics gathered by local organisations at district level							
	Quantifiable increase in employment level	Reports on overall development by GoP/United Nations (UN)							



## Specific Objective

At least 50% increase in the number of private sector organisations participating in the action compared to baseline assessment	Quarterly progress/evaluation reports on the Project, stakeholders' meetings, feedback from trainees on employment status & from private employers on graduates employed. Baseline assessment, Annual project performance, End of project evaluation reports								
At least 08 trades identified as per the demand of employers after baseline assessment									
Increase in employment (at least 75% trainees are paid/self-employed)									
By the end of the project, the private sector contributes at least 50% in the training cost.									
Indicator	Indicator	Indicator	Baseline	Target	Value Each Fiscal Year				Progression
Objectives	Definition	Source of verification	Value	Value	2006-2007	2007-2013	January 2014	2014	

## Expected Results

**Expected result 1** - Establishment of a functioning provincial set up linked to the private sector that facilitates in demands and placement for technical training

Establishment of Facilitation Unit (FU)	Quarterly progress/evaluation reports on the Project, stakeholders' meetings, feedback from trainees on employment status & from private employers on graduates employed. Baseline assessment, Annual project performance, End of project evaluation reports						PFU established and fully operational			
At least 50% increase in the number of private sector organisations participating in the action after baseline assessment										
At least 08 trades identified after baseline assessment								Almost 50 trades prioritised for training		
At least 10 TVET institutes identified and selected for delivery of trainings								30 institutes selected for trainings in 1st phase		
At least 10 TVET institutes linked with private sector employers (industries, businesses, local & international recruitment agencies etc.)								4		
At least 20 private sector employers identified for employability								8 potential employers identified and linked for employability under proper MOU's		
Quarterly meetings of stakeholder groups								Regular facilitation meetings held with stakeholders		

**Expected result 2** - At least 12,000 employable women and men (at least 10% women) from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the Federal Administered Tribal Area trained in various

12,000 employable students trained in demand driven trades	Project reports Attendance records from TVET centres Final examination records Tracer studies of graduates						2,050 trainees (including 80 female) have been inducted for training in pilot phase; 720 trained so far		
At least 10% (of 12,000) are women							80 female = 4%		
At least 75% of the graduates will be employed or self employed									

**Expected result 2** - Critical assistance provided to enhance capacities of selected technical and vocational training institutes.

At least 4 TVET institutes linked with NAVTTC/GIZ	Quarterly reports of project updates to relevant authorities (stakeholders/EC) Minutes of quarterly coordination meetings Quarterly Progress Evaluation report of TVET institutes Annual project performance report End of project evaluation report Development Evaluation Reports by World Bank, UN, etc						3 institutes are identified and linked with NAVTTC for accreditation		
At least 4 TVET institutes are upgraded and facilitated as per the standards of NAVTTC/GIZ.							2 institutes are identified for upgrading		
Outreach of the project and linkages made with TVET bodies and organisations working for TVET in Pakistan								Regular meetings with TVET stakeholders and participation in workshops conducted at country level	

Source: Financing Agreements, Mid-Term Review - Final report (January 2014)

	Monitoring report (2013-07-19)	Monitoring report (2013-07-19)	MR (2013-07-19)	MR (2013-07-19)	MR (2013-07-16)	MR (2013-07-19)
	ACTED	CARE	Concern	OXFAM	Plan	TUSDEC
Relevance and quality of design	B	A	B	B	A	C
Efficiency of Implementation to date	C	B	B	C	C	C
Effectiveness to date	B	B	B	B	C	B
Impact prospects	B	B	B	B	B	B
Potential sustainability	B	B	C	B	B	C

Supporting TVET Reform in Pakistan (TVET II)										
Indicator			Baseline	Target	Value each Fiscal Year					Progress
Objectives	Definition	Source of verification	Value	Value	2006-2007	2007-2008	2008-2013	2014		
<b>Overall Objective</b>										
	By 2020: The skilled population is an increased proportion of the Pakistani Labour Force	Labour Force Survey Tracer studies Sample surveys Ex post evaluation								
	By 2020: Significant increases in income due to NQF training (measured against those who have not had training)									
Indicator			Baseline	Target	Value each Fiscal Year					Progress
Objectives	Definition	Source of verification	Value	Value	2006-2007	2007-2008	2008-2013	2014		
<b>Specific Objective</b>										
By the end of the programme period:	At least 100,000 completers of improved short and long training courses linked to labour market needs;	School/Training Course Data (Regional / Educational / TVET statistics) TVET MIS data, tracer studies, surveys among employing companies in selected sectors and regions. Programme end-of-term evaluation								
	At least 40,000 (40%) female completers;									
	At least 50% of training course graduates employed/ self-employed in the area of their training within six months of course completion;									
	Significant improvement in employer satisfaction in competence of graduates (technical concepts, practical skills, safety consciousness, quality mindedness, communication skills and motivation)									
<b>Expected Results</b>										
<b>Result 1</b> Institutional structure and governance of the TVET sector improved; cooperation and coordination modalities agreed between NAVTEC, provincial authorities, the										
	Agreed and clear roles and mandates between NAVTEC, provincial authorities and the private sector by the end of 2014	Yearly Progress Report by NAVTEC and provincial authorities, minutes of meetings Register of accredited institutions and NAVTEC/provincial authorities' Yearly Reports, TVET Management Information System Policy Documents, stakeholder meeting minutes, NAVTEC yearly progress report, Independent review of TVET Reform (mid-2015) Programme end-of-term evaluation								Clear roles defined
	At least 1,000 TVET programmes accredited within the NSS context by July 2015									One milestone achieved is that 140 assessors have been trained to evaluate programmes, and as of 31st March 2014 only 107 out of a target of 1,000 programmes have been accredited.
	At least four policy documents (including Apprenticeship, TVET Financing, and the Quality Management Framework) developed for NSS Implementation by end-2014									Not surprisingly, to date, the programme has failed to make any significant progress in the approval and the implementation of draft policies.
	Policy documents acting as change agents by mid-2015									The HRD Policy document has been approved and is being implemented but there are serious delays in related outputs such as the accreditation of TVET institutes, implementation of quality management system, TVET monitoring and evaluation system, and the development and formulation of policy documents.
<b>Result 2</b> National Qualification Framework (NQF) for TVET developed and introduced in priority sectors, Private and public TVET institutions better managed with										
	Agreed format for NQF available for implementation by end-2014	TVET MIS NAVTEC and regional authorities' yearly reports, minutes of Meeting from Industrial Advisory Groups Documentation of certification								
	NQF operational, all CBT programmes mapped, schools implementing programmes at correct NVQ level by mid-2015									
	At least 60 standards, 60 course concepts and 60 assessments packages in trades suitable for females (minimum 30%) and males students by end-2014									With regard to completed CBT programmes, only 14 CBT (24 percent) of the target 60 output have been achieved. Of the 14 CBT programmes developed, 3 have been piloted within 17 institutions.

	At least 10,000 (with 30% females) upgraded male and female teachers (in teaching methods and technical skills). By July 2015	NAVTEC and regional authorities' yearly reports; minutes of meeting from Industrial Advisory Groups Documentation of occupational standards, curricula and certification of new teachers. Tracer studies Programme end-of-term evaluation.								To date, the programme has achieved some 7 per cent of the total teacher training (10000) while the team is reworking on the NQF and hence failed to make any significant progress in this component as well. Regarding CBT, under component II, as at the end of March 2014, only 698 (7 percent) of the targeted 10,000 teacher training numbers has been achieved.	
	At least 30 TVET institutions with CBT programmes based on NQF by end-2014										
	At least 100 master trainers / teachers trained (at least 30% female) by June 2014									100 master trainers/ teachers trained. 100 newly qualified lead teachers (30% female) are supposed to start their employment at TVET institutes as vocational teachers, there has been no progress towards this.	
Indicator			Baseline	Target	Value each Fiscal Year					Progress	
Objectives	Definition	Source of verification	Value	Value	2006-2007	2007-2008	2008-2013	2014			
<b>Result 3</b> Training delivery and labour market services in selected economic sectors successfully adapted to local conditions by capitalizing on innovative elements of the TVET											
	At least 30 skills development and employment promotion programmes for specific target groups with "good" or "very good" results available for replication. by July 2015	Innovation Fund documentation, M&E guidelines, good practice manual Innovation Fund documentation, NSS Implementation Plan and yearly reviews Innovation Fund documentation, School / Training centre data (Regional / Educational / TVET statistics) Survey, TVET centre development plans, TVETA reports. Programme end-of-term evaluation									
	Number of public-private partnerships established through Learning Regions by July 2015										
	Pilot PPPs positively influencing TVET reform by end of programme period										
	100% disbursement rate of TVET innovation fund from mid-2015 onwards										
	Of the total 100,000 completer, at least 20% youths (male/female) from poor households in border areas (NWFP/ FATA and Baluchistan), and at least 50% (male/female) from poor households in Punjab, Sindh, AJK and Gilgit Baltistan and at least 30% from other than poor households participate in TVET and employment through stipends or other means of support and/or new training modalities by the end of the programme period										The project has taken initial measures to implement the Fund of Innovating Training (FIT) programme providing short term training courses to 90,000 marginalised and vulnerable target groups
	At least 25% of TVET graduates tracked and findings being applied in range, design and content of TVET courses from 2015 onwards										
	100 TVET and other centres integrated vocational counselling into their services. by end-2014									The Integration of Vocational counselling into TVET centres is on track and is well received in the field. Approximately 30% of the indicated total are operational while 51 (50%) Vocational Counselling and Job Placement Centres have been selected and the training and implementation is ongoing.	

Source: Mid-Term Review Report, 28-08-2014

Monitoring report  
(2012-08-10)

a = very good; b = good; c = problems; d = serious deficiencies.

**1. Quality of design**

1.1 What is the present level of relevance of the project?	B
1.2 As presently designed, is the intervention logic holding true?	B
1.3 Is the current design sufficiently supported by all stakeholders?	B
1.4 Is the current design sufficiently taking cross-cutting issues into account?	C

**2. Efficiency to date**

2.1 How well is the availability/usage of inputs managed?	B
2.2 How well is the implementation of the activities managed?	C
2.3 How well are the outputs achieved?	B
2.4 How well are the Partner Contribution/Involvement working?	B

**3. Effectiveness to date**

3.1 How well is the project achieving its planned results?	B
3.2 As presently implemented, what is the likelihood of the PP to be achieved?	B

**4. Impact prospects**

4.1 What are the direct impact prospects of the project at Overall Objectives level?	B
4.2 To what extent does/will the project have any indirect positive and/or negative impacts? (i.e. environmental, social, cultural, gender and economic)?	A

**5. Potential sustainability**

5.1 Financial / economic viability?	C
5.2 What is the level of ownership of the project by target groups and will it continue after the end of external support?	C
5.3 What is the level of policy support provided and the degree of interaction between project and policy level?	C
5.4 How well is the project contributing to institutional and management capacity?	B

**6. Horizontal issues***6.1 Role of Quality Support Group (QSG) and ROM in project quality*

a) Whether the comments, particularly regarding stakeholders and needs analysis, institutional capacity assessment of the implementing partner and risks and assumptions made in the checklist and minutes against the quality and content of the Action Fiche were appropriate / relevant?	Yes
b) Whether the comments were taken into consideration and included in the Project documents, e.g. TAPs, financing agreements, LFM, Inception reports, etc. and if so, did they improve project implementation?	Yes
c) If the comments were not taken into consideration, was there any consequence during the implementation of the project? If so, please describe in the free text box.	N/A
d) Has any monitoring (including internal monitoring systems or ROM) or evaluation resulted in improvements in the project?	N/A

*6.2 Review of TC Quality Criteria*

Do local partners effectively lead in the planning and management of TC support (i.e. beyond formal endorsement)?	No
Do local partners provide the required inputs enabling TC to perform (e.g. human and/or physical inputs)? (refer to Box 22 of the Guidelines)	Yes
Is the TC support likely to achieve its objectives without critical constraints?	Yes
Is the TC support adequate vis-à-vis the capacity of the local partner?	No
Is the TC support taking into account TC from other donors in the same sector? (Ask the EC Delegation to acquire this data)	Yes
Is the present TC support from the EC delivered jointly with other donors? (If no other donors are active in the sector then mark N/A)	No
If the TC support from the EC is not harmonised with other donors, are relevant steps being taken for a more harmonized TC in the future?	N/A
Are the TC deliverables (outputs and outcomes) clearly specified (e.g. in the TA ToR) and regularly assessed (e.g. through a joint performance dialogue/assessment)?	Yes
Are there innovative forms of TC support being used (e.g. peer review, South/South and/or Public/Public cooperation, twinning, networking, etc.)?	Yes
Are partner country staff effectively managing the programme (and not TA)?	No

Do the experts take instructions from and report to the partner (and not the EC)?	No
<i>7.3. EC Visibility</i>	
Does the project contribute to promoting EC visibility (e.g. does it comply with the EC Guidelines?)	No
<b>7. Cross-cutting issues</b>	
7.1) Have practical and strategic gender interests been adequately considered in the project strategy?	Yes
7.2) Is the project respecting environmental needs?	Yes
7.3) Has (good) governance been mainstreamed in the project/programme (P/P)?	Yes
7.4) Does the project actively contribute to the promotion of Human Rights?	N/A

**Monitoring report  
 (2012-08-10)**

Relevance and quality of design	B
Efficiency of Implementation to date	B
Effectiveness to date	B
Impact prospects	B
Potential sustainability	C

Improving Parliamentary Performance in Pakistan		Indicator	Baseline	Target	Value each Fiscal Year							Progress		
Objectives	Definition	Source of verification	Value	Value	2006-2007	2007-2008	2008-2009	2009-2010	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014	2014	
<b>Overall Objective</b>														
	1. Quantitative and qualitative improvement in parl. performance	Independent assessments of parliamentary performance												
	2. Executive responsiveness to parliament	Independent assessment of executive actions in relation to parliament												
	3. Accepted elections that meet international standards	*												
<b>Specific Objective</b>														
	1. Number of bills tabled and improved quality of laws passed	Parliamentary records and official gazette												
	2. Activities of key oversight committees	Committee records												
	3. Number of committee consultations and public hearings	Parliamentary and committee records, CSO reports												
	4. Quality of parliamentary debate	*												
<b>Expected Results</b>														
A) Improved functioning of elected representatives, secretariats and selected committees, primarily at federal level														
	1. 3 legislation branch modules in operation. (mainly bill tracking, question and motions, committee functions)	Project reports, assembly websites and intranet												
	2. 8 committee work plans produced and measurable implementation	Project and committee reports												
	3. Successful committee events (minimum 16) with timely public reports	Project and committee event reports												
	4. Increased reference to international law. Increased compliant legislation.	Project and parliamentary reports, legislation analysis												
	5. Appropriate package of equipment in use by programme end	Project and parliamentary reports												
B) Improved parliamentary transparency and access														
	1. Updated web content within 1 yr of start	Project and independent reports, websites												
	2. Parliament communication programme developed within 1 yr of start	Project and independent reports, parliamentary media records												
	3. Improved quantity and quality of media coverage, with improved reference to provincial assemblies and women /religious minorities representatives	Project, civil society and parliamentary reports, media cover representatives												
	4. Min 6 extended civil society reports on parliamentary performance	Civil society parliamentary watch reports												
C) Increased capacity of parliament to promote international human rights standards														
	1. Increased reference to international human rights law	Project reports, committee records and reports												
	2. Number of research papers issued (minimum 8) and thematic seminars held by committees (minimum 8)	Project and committee reports												
	3. Compliance with ICCPR election standards	Project, civil society and other observer reports												
	4. Measurable improvement in electoral reform and oversight. (improved quality of legislation). Minimum 4 committee meetings discussing electoral reform and oversight issues)	Project and electoral monitoring reports												

Indicator			Baseline	Target	Value each Fiscal Year									Progress
Objectives	Definition	Source of verification	Value	Value	2006-2007	2007-2008	2008-2009	2009-2010	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014	2014	
D) Increased interaction between Pakistani elected assemblies and the European Parliament (EP) and Member State Parliaments (MSPs)														
	1. Effective links established with EP /MSPs (1 visit of EU MPs/yr)	Project and OPPD reports												
	2. Number of OPPD fellowships	Project and OPPD reports												
	3. Number of meetings and study tour participants by project end (min 8 members and 8 staff)	Project and parliament reports												
	4. Number of good practices identified and promoted/ applied in Pakistan elected assemblies).	*												

Source: Financing agreement (2010)

### Monitoring report (2013)

a = very good; b = good; c =problems; d = serious deficiencies.

#### 1. Relevance

- 1.1 Does the intervention presently respond to the needs of the target groups? A
- 1.2 Does the operation presently support the policy (or its development) of the partner government and is it in line with existing policy? B
- 1.3 Is the operation in line with EC development policy and strategies? A

#### 2. Quality of Design

- 2.1 Does the present intervention logic still hold true and is it clear and coherent? C
- 2.2 Do the implementation arrangements take into account the capacity of the partners, and is the design fully supported by them? C
- 2.3 Is the current design sufficiently taking cross-cutting issues into account? C

#### 3. Efficiency

- 3.1 How well is the availability and use of inputs and resources managed? C
- 3.2 How well are the activities implemented? C
- 3.3 How well are the outputs achieved? B
- 3.4 How well are the Partners involved and contributing? C

#### 4. Effectiveness

- 4.1. How well is the operation achieving its expected outcomes? C
- 4.2. As presently implemented, what is the likelihood that the project purpose will be achieved? B

#### 5. Impact to date

- 5.1. What are the operation's direct impact prospects (i.e. contribution at the level of overall objective)? C
- 5.2 To what extent does/will the operation have any indirect (positive/negative) impact? B

#### 6. Sustainability to date

- 6.1 What is the financial/economic viability of the continuation of benefits after the end of the operation? C
- 6.2. What is the level of ownership of the operation by the target group and relevant stakeholders? C
- 6.3. To what degree does the policy environment support the operation? B
- 6.4. To what extent does the operation contribute to partners' capacity development? B

#### 7. Horizontal issues

##### 7.1 Quality Systems, Monitoring and Evaluation

- a) Were the QSG comments taken into consideration and included in the final design and applied during implementation? Yes
- b) Are the issues identified by ROM regarding design the same as those addressed in the QSG checklist? N/A
- c) Have previous evaluations or reviews (such as ROM, reviews by the EU operational manager) led to changes in the operation? N/A
- d) Is the available monitoring and reporting information on the operation's progress comprehensive and reliable in order to ensure the possibility to evaluate results and learn lessons? Yes

##### 7.2 Review of Technical Cooperation/Capacity Development Quality Criteria

- a) Are there critical constraints in the context which are likely to prevent the CD support from achieving its objectives? Yes
- b) Is the CD support adequate vis-à-vis the present capacity of the local partner? Yes
- c) Do local partners effectively lead in the planning of CD support beyond formal endorsement? No
- d) Do local partners provide the inputs (human or physical) that would be required to enable the CD support to be effective? Yes

e) Are the outputs or outcomes of the CD support clearly specified and still relevant (or adjusted to changes of context)?	No
f) Are they regularly monitored and/or assessed (e.g. through a joint performance dialogue or an annual reporting)?	No
g) Is the CD support taking into account CD interventions from other donors in the same sector?	No
h) Is there a donor coordination mechanism led by local partners and encompassing CD support?	Yes
i) Is CD support embedded in the broad institutional context of the local partners and have unnecessary parallel mechanisms been avoided?	Yes
j) Do contracted experts, project managers and NGO staff take instructions from the partner and not the EC? (while some form of reporting to the EC can still take place)	Yes
<i>7.3. EC Visibility</i>	
Does the operation contribute to promoting EC visibility (e.g. does it comply with the EC Guidelines)?	Yes
<b>8. Cross-cutting issues</b>	
8.1. Have practical and strategic gender interests been adequately considered in the operation's strategy?	Yes
8.2. Is the operation respecting environmental needs?	N/A
8.3. Has (good) governance been mainstreamed in the operation?	Yes
8.4. Does the operation actively contribute to the promotion of Human Rights?	Yes

**Monitoring report (2013)**

Relevance and quality of design	B
Efficiency of Implementation to date	C
Effectiveness to date	C
Impact prospects	C
Potential sustainability	C

Long Term Election Observation and Oversight in Pakistan														
Indicator	Baseline	Target	Value each Fiscal Year										Progress	
Objectives	Definition	Source of verification	Value	Value	2006-2007	2007-2008	2008-2009	2009-2010	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014	2014	
<b>Overall Objective</b>														
1. State of political and civil liberties	Freedom Index of political rights and civil liberties (Freedom House)													
2. Levels of expressed public trust in the electoral processes	International election monitoring reports (European Union, US Government etc.) FAFEN and other data relating to the 2008 election process													
<b>Specific Objective</b>														
1. Legislative and administrative measures by the Parliament and the ECP to improve electoral processes	Legislation by Parliament ECP Notifications													
2. Voter turnout in General Elections	ECP Data													
Indicator	Baseline	Target	Value each Fiscal Year										Progress	
Objectives	Definition	Source of verification	Value	Value	2006-2007	2007-2008	2008-2009	2009-2010	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014	2014	
<b>Expected Results</b>														
A) Citizen groups systematically oversee and generate independent information on the quality of pre and post electoral processes														
1. Methodology for objective scrutiny of electoral processes	30 Partnerships Methodological framework and sample drawn													
2. Number of trainings for observers conducted	Training Manuals developed, Observers trained													



3. Number of independent election monitoring reports published	Analysis of compliance with ICCPR and other international standards Records of correspondence/meeting with the Election Commission of Pakistan, other government institutions, stakeholders, INGOs and the donor community.																			
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B) Civil society organizations and their networks make efforts for corrective measures and greater enforcement of existing laws

1. Number of issues raised with the ECP	Correspondence with the ECP and other election stakeholders (internal logs)																			
2. Number of briefings for electoral stakeholders	Media Reports																			
3. Number of engagements with media	Media Reports																			

C) FAFEN develop and advocate recommendations for election reforms based on observation findings

1. FAFEN proposals for election related constitutional, legal, regulatory and administrative reforms	FAFEN Reports Advocacy briefs																			
2. Number of publications and press releases	FAFEN Reports																			
3. Analytical reports	FAFEN Reports																			
4. Number of advocacy engagements	Meeting minutes, brief reports																			

Source: Grant contract with TDEA/FAFEN (2012)

Support Electoral reforms in Pakistan		Indicator	Baseline Value	Target Value	Value each Fiscal Year			Progress												
Objectives	Definition	Source of verification			August 2010 (1)	January 2011 (2)	October 2011 (3)													
<b>Overall Objective</b>	Peaceful elections assessed to be held according to international standards and best practice.	International and local observation reports, media reports.																		
<b>Specific Objective</b>	1. Amendments to the electoral framework adopted by the national assembly and possibly the provincial assemblies. New strategies and policies developed by national assembly and possibly the provincial assemblies. Increased oversight of the election administration by the assemblies.	Amendments of the electoral framework (legal acts by the assemblies, which are published), as well as policies and strategies officially adopted by the assemblies (either as a whole, or by relevant task forces, secretariats, political groups) and which are published as papers, manuals, etc. Reports by parliament on the performance of the election administration. Reports by domestic groups, which monitor parliamentary performance, such as PILDAT																		
	2. Number of consultations and meetings between members of the assemblies and stakeholders and the media on the topic of electoral reform and preparation of elections.	Reports by parliament and the media.																		

3. Electoral information campaigns developed by the media.	Local media news on electoral reform and elections preparation. International observer reports on information campaigns carried out by the local media. Quantitative and qualitative analysis of the media coverage of electoral campaigns, using established media monitoring methodology.																		
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**Expected Results**

A) Increased electoral reform activity by the parliament.

	Internal and external consultations on electoral reform held by the National Assembly and possibly the provincial assemblies.	Parliamentary reports, information gathered through the project. Reports of organizations which monitor Parliamentary performance (PILDAT). Media reports.			Meetings, training sessions and workshops have been hindered by the lack of a vibrant, dedicated committee on electoral reform. The Subcommittee on Electoral Reform under the Law, Justice Parliamentary Affairs Committee has not been active since its first meeting in April.	The Subcommittee on Electoral Reform under the Law, Justice Parliamentary Affairs Committee has not been active since its first meeting in April 2010.	DRI will seek a meeting with the Standing Committee and hopes to learn more about the report in November.	
	Establishment of a special body (committee, task force, or similar) to address electoral reform.							
	Number of meetings and output of such a body.							
	Number of publications by parliament on electoral reform.							

Indicator	Definition	Source of verification	Baseline Value	Target Value	Value each Fiscal Year	Value each Fiscal Year	Value each Fiscal Year	Progress
Objectives	Definition	Source of verification	Value	Value	August 2010 (1)	January 2011 (2)	October 2011 (3)	Progress

B) Improved electoral legislation, which meets international standards and best practice.

Electoral framework amended by the National Assembly, in line with international standards and best practices, as outlined in the 2008 EU EOM recommendations.	Published legislation, assessed by the project and other organisations (FAFEN, IFES, etc.).			To date, Balochistan is the only province that has passed a new local government law. DRI is in the process of assessing the law. DRI will conduct the election framework assessments (LEFAs) in the other provinces once the new laws are in place. Local elections have not been called in any of the provinces. The floods may further delay local elections.	The developments regarding the working on the new LG law slowed down in KPK as of December 2010 due to the lack of interest by the provincial government.	DRI held the All Provinces Forum-Legislation for Local Government Elections (APF II) on 7-9 October. Apart from DRI, there were 22 participants. The meeting of the Balochistan committee on Local Government scheduled for late October was postponed.	
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C) Establishment of effective parliamentary oversight of the ECP and of any provincial administration of elections.

Parliamentary hearings of election administrators	Information gathered by the project and other organizations, published audit reports, minutes of parliamentary hearings, media reports.						
ECP reports to Parliament							
Parliament audits electoral expenditure.							

D) Improved media coverage of election reform issues and the local elections.

Increased quantity and quality of media coverage of electoral reform.	Media monitoring reports			The national media conference scheduled for September will be postponed until October due to the floods and limited availability of journalists.	All activities planned under this component for this period were completed.	Pakistan's first Code of Ethics on Reporting of Local Elections – developed by media practitioners under the DRI programme- was printed in the shape of a large, dual language (English/Urdu) poster.	
Establishment of a voluntary code of conduct for media in local elections							

E) Improved conduct of the local elections.

Local election framework improved and local elections held in line with international standards. Results accepted, or if contested only through legal-constitutional channels.	Assessment of local elections made by the project as well as other organisations that observe or assess the local elections. Media reports.																			
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Source: (1) Interim narrative report (Dec 2009 - Aug 2010) (2) Interim narrative report (Sept 10 - Jan 2011) (3) Monthly report (October 2011)

Enhancing support for ending violence and discrimination against women														
Objectives	Indicator	Definition	Source of verification	Baseline	Target	Value each Fiscal Year						Progress		
				Value	Value	June 2010		Dec 2010		June 2011				
<b>Overall Objective</b>														
	1. Police officials are supportive to violence survi	Final evaluation report												
	2. No tolerance among community towards VAW	Media coverage and reports												
	3. Civil society active in addressing VAW and related issues and pushing policy reforms	Case studies												
<b>Specific Objectives</b>														
1. To increase capacity of police officials and law students in Rawalpindi and Chakwal on international human rights standards and instruments and on dealing with violence and														
	% Police officials and lawyers are using UDHR and CEDAW in their argument in Rawalpindi and Chakwal districts	Interviews and meetings with police officials and lawyers												
2. To enhance coordinated support by rallying civil society (lawyers, CSOs, media activists, academics etc) for approval of domestic violence bill from Senate and firm														
	Domestic violence bill passed by the upper house and notified as law	Copy of approved domestic violence bill											The bill was approved by National Assembly of Pakistan in August 2009	
	% of people benefiting from the domestic violence bill	Photos of events												
	A movement for ending domestic violence against women through legal reforms is initiated	Reports of events and meetings with parliamentarians												
	Senators support is achieved in order to get domestic violence bill approved by the senate													
3. To create awareness and understanding about VAW and women's human rights among masses in Chakwal and Rawalpindi														
	Lower tolerance about VaW among masses	Reports of interviews and discussions with general public about women rights and violence against women												
	% of people give waitega to human rights of women													
4. To establish community based support system for supporting survivors of violence by building capacities of 40 CBOs														
	Number of CBOs supporting violence survivors in their communities	Physical validation of the support centers												
	Number of VAW cases being dealt by CBOs	Record of support centers Field visit reports of Bedari and Cavish staff												

**Expected Results**

A) Police officials and lawyers are aware and have understanding on UDHR, CEDAW and Appropriate dealing with violence survivors

10 master trainers in police training schools have delivered trainings to 1000 police students on UDHR CEDAW and appropriate dealing with violence survivors	Copies of manuals, Lists of participants, Training reports, Photographs, Copies of training schedules by Master trainers, Reports by master trainers, Financial receipts of payment to master trainers					Background research completed. Outline for the booklets and manual set. A consultant designated to develop the booklets and manuals. Bedari has completed the first draft of the booklet on dealing the VAW cases. Draft under review by both organizations. (1) Initial contact with the Sihala Police academy made. Initial meeting held with Training Incharge followed by meeting with Commanding Officer. (1)	6 seminars in both the districts have been conducted so far (3 in District Rawalpindi and 3 in District Chakwal). More than 400 police officials attend these seminars. (2) Drafts of the booklets and training manual have received by the office and it is now in printing processes. (2)	During the reporting period a total of 03 seminars were conducted with police on the role of police in ending violence against women. The seminars were conducted in District Chakwal and Rawalpindi. More than 120 participants attended the seminars consisting of 106 men and 17 women. (3)						
10 master trainers in law schools have delivered trainings to 1000 law students on UDHR CEDAW and appropriate dealing with violence survivors						Colleges identified and contact made. Chakwal: there are 2 colleges; Rawalpindi: 4 law colleges. Only two law colleges are functional. (1)								
1500 police men and lawyers participate in the seminars														

Indicator	Definition	Source of verification	Baseline Value	Target Value	June 2010	Dec 2010	June 2011	Progress
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B) Support for movement for approval of domestic violence bill from senate and its subsequent implementation is enhanced

Number of Parliamentarians raise voices in the House on issue of VAW	Press clippings of sessions related to VAW in the parliament, Interviews with people, Recorded impressions of people for different activities, Photographs of the events, Press clippings, Attendance lists of the participants													
Number of lawyers, elected representatives, activists, and other individuals from a cross section of society favouring policy reforms to end VaW														

C) Awareness is created about violence against women and human rights of women at mass level

%age of persons who discourage VAW in their communities	Records of cases referred to Bedari Crises center by communities. Interviews of VAW survivors and community members. Recorded Impressions by audience of theatre performances													
VAW is taken as an important issue in the communities														

C) Support system for dealing with the violence against women is created at community level.

40 CBOs trained and functional	List of CBO members				A total 10 CBOs were finally selected	20 existing CBO's have been								
Number of new CBOs formed	Reports of the CBO training				Under the project we have also	20 new CBOs have been formed (2)								
Number of women attending the support centers per month	Physical validation of support centers, Record of support center													

Source: (1) CAVISH Progress update January-June 2010 (2) CAVISH Progress update January-December 2010 (3) CAVISH Progress update January-June 2011

#### Citizens Justice and Peace Programme in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

Indicator			Baseline	Target	Value each Fiscal Year										Progress
Objectives	Definition	Source of verification	Value	Value	2006-2007	2007-2008	2008-2009	2009-2010	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014	2014		
<b>Overall Objective</b>															
	Increased efficiency and coordination of all security sector actors	KP Police reports Evaluation reports													
	Increased public dialogue with citizens and awareness of the Rule of Law and Human Rights in the security sector.	UN, NGOs and civil society reports Surveys on public perception reports													
	Increased transparency in the security sector														
Indicator			Baseline	Target	Value each Fiscal Year										Progress
Objectives	Definition	Source of verification	Value	Value	2006-2007	2007-2008	2008-2009	2009-2010	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014	2014		

#### Specific Objectives

1. To strengthen Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) security governance and organizational structure at provincial and local level by supporting the Home and KP Central Police in their

	Strategic vision and priorities defined and developed into annual and mid-term policy based budgets													
	Policy based policing planning and procedures developed for efficient resource utilization in specific areas that may include human resources management, accountability, community police-relations, community policing, gender responsive policing;	KP Police Strategy and Action Plan; Human resources policy and development plans; Other policy documents as prioritised by the home and Police Department; Minutes of established working groups; Number of policy dialogue seminars/workshops held and minutes of it; SoPs; Increased number of women in Police and Gender policy strategic reflected in plans and budget;												
	Establishment of policy dialogue process on security and justice needs that engages both KP government and civil society and coordinates donor assistance	Home and Tribal Affairs Department document and respective financial allocation reflecting the KP Police strategy; Trainings plans and curricula in line with human resources policy; Reviews and monitoring reports; KP Criminal; Investigations reports; KP Police logs; Public surveys; Accessible and reliable internal Complaint mechanism; Witness management SOPs												
	More effective accountability mechanisms in Police with clearly defined procedures and transparent follow up and monitoring processes established lead to a reduction of public complaints on police misconduct from the selected districts for operational implementation over the end of the project													

2. To contribute to strengthening the relationship between KP state and citizens to build public trust and support a paradigm shift from police force to police service by existing

Action Plan District policing plans developed in line with the Sector Police Strategy and Action Plan	District policing plans, Including District Police outreach plans, gender responsive policing plans District Police complaint logs District Police general logs Minutes of public for a held District Police SoPs on Complaint system District Police guidelines on victims and witness support units District Police disciplinary logs and reports (annual complaint reports and data) Number of trained Women police officers deployed in selected districts. Police communication and media campaign for the dissemination of produced information.														
Increased use of the police law enforcement powers (e.g., arrest, search, seizure and detention) in strict accordance with the law.															
Increased proportion of male and female citizens who report crimes to access sevulnerable citizens.rvices of KP Police through the Implementation of antidiscrimination policies and procedures, including special procedures for witnesses, minorities															
Increased ability of members of the public to trigger an investigation of alleged misconduct by thepolice especially at district and sub-district level.															
Improved capacity and increased representation of police women at district level.															
Increased availability of local alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.															

Indicator		Baseline	Target	Value each Fiscal Year										Progress
Objectives	Definition	Value	Value	2006-2007	2007-2008	2008-2009	2009-2010	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014	2014		

	Increased percentage of citizens who feel they have a say in how justice and security services are delivered, express confidence and satisfaction with KP Police and alternative dispute resolution provided, and have a better understanding on the role of the police and about citizens rights and duties.													
	Developed communication strategy and regular production and dissemination of information regarding process and outcome of complaints against police officers, of police budgets and expenditures, and successes and failings of police operations, including cases of violation of human rights.													

**Expected Results**

A) KP Government's capacity strengthened to develop strategic policing, formulate, implement and monitor policing policies and plans providing necessary conditions to sustain

Inputs of national consultations and inputs from district in the strategy	SoPs; Case management system and protocols KP /HOME Strategy document and its related Plan of Action; Organigram of KP Police; Criminal investigation data statistics; Complaints logs; Statistics of cases against police officers processed Number of workshops												
A systematic protocol of internal SoPs for the KP Police implemented													
Increase number of disciplinary cases for Police Officers and logs of complaints established with clear protocols, follow up and outcome reflected including monitoring mechanisms													

Working group established to work on the security sector strategy. Development of a strategy and Action Plan with objectives, monitoring performance indicators reflected in line with best practices	KP trainings Curricula Human Rights organizations reports District Police complaint logs; Evaluation projects reports; UN reports													
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B) Enhanced relations and trust between KP citizens, the state and civil society, by improving policing techniques and accountability and quality and legitimacy of alternative

Better awareness and dissemination of human rights among security sectors by having: - Regular conferences organised - Trainings on human rights and rule of law provided to all staff - Visibility of Human Rights in KP Police curricula modified	Police outreach strategy													
Effective police outreach strategy	KP District Police Curricula													
Improved quality of security / police interventions	Police reports													
Code of ethics and performance measures on police and MoI staff	Code of Ethics													
District policing plans developed in line with the Sector Police Strategy and Action Plan	Logs on cases forwarded to ADR and outcomes													

Indicator			Baseline	Target	Value each Fiscal Year									Progress
Objectives	Definition	Source of verification	Value	Value	2006-2007	2007-2008	2008-2009	2009-2010	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014	2014	

C) Improved civil society's understanding of security systems and processes and ability to monitor and assess the impact of the projects' activity on community police relations, the

Level of public satisfaction with KP Police increased	Civil society reports Monitoring reports and survey contents													
Or negative perception decrease at least														
Better understanding from the public on the role of the police and about citizens rights and duties														

Source: Financing agreement (2014)

**Civilian capacity building for law enforcement in Pakistan (CCBLE)**

Indicator			Baseline	Target	Value each Fiscal Year					Achievement
Objectives	Definition	Source of verification	Value	Value	2006-2011	March 2012			2013-2014	2014

Overall Objective

Punjab and KP bomb disposal sets available to tackle high level threat and are able to use it safely.	Receipt and Inspection of Goods Training certifications EU - GIZ IS CCBLE Programme Reports													
Equipment procured and brought in country and handed over														

Specific Objectives

Procure sets of non-lethal bombs disposal equipment, each set comprising: 1 Bomb disposal vehicle 1 Bomb disposal vehicle equipment 1 Bomb disposal trailer 1 Bomb disposal robot 1 Portable X-ray device 2 sets of bomb disposal suits and helmets	1. The contract award following a successful tender process 2. The delivery of units of bomb disposal equipments to end users 3. The enhanced capacity of bomb disposal sing the equipments, training and services provided by this action	Financial & Progress Reports - Monthly EU - GIZ IS CCBLE Programme Reports Action committee reports and meeting minutes Established relations between suppliers and Bomb Disposal Units in Punjab and KP												
Actual Procured non-lethal bomb equipment, comprised: 8 Bomb disposal vehicle 8 sets Bomb disposal vehicle equipment (as per list) 2 Bomb disposal trailer 4 Bomb disposal robot 6 Portable X-ray device & 6 Explosive detector 8 sets of bomb disposal suits and helmets														





	4. Number of prisoners who have access to legal counseling and representation in the selected districts is increased by 40% in year 3 and by 50% by the end of the project	Monitoring reports review the performance as well as the progress and impact of provision of legal aid.													
	5. Improved accountability of lawyers and competence and quality of legal aid provided														
Indicator			Baseline	Target	Value each Fiscal Year										Progress
Objectives	Definition	Source of verification	Value	Value	2006-2007	2007-2008	2008-2009	2009-2010	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014	2014		

**Component 2** Enhanced quality and efficiency of judicial process at Punjab provincial level and in selected pilot districts through improved case management, continued legal education and legal judicial research

Improved case and court management system through electronic management system implemented in Punjab judiciary and prosecution services both at provincial level and selected pilot districts should result in:  Moreover, enhanced legal education results in:	1. Increase in the proportion of cases that are finalised in 12 months and reduced differences by income, gender, ethnicity.	Case and Court management policy and plans drafted and approved Software on improved case management developed and Lahore High Court IT staff to manage and further develop features as necessary Judicial officers and non judicial court staff are trained with newly developed bench books New case and court management is implemented in Lahore High Court and district courts and monitored through regular reports Quality of judicial decisions is improved and assessed by the research unit in the Lahore High Court Publication of annual reports, judgments and data is increased													
	2. Enhanced equal treatment of poor and vulnerable people, including equal application of law by judges independently of victims and defendant's personal status and change in the number of hours victims wait before having an initial interview with prosecutors.														
	3. Improved quality of prosecutors and court records														
	4. Improved performance monitoring system of prosecutors and judges														
	5. Improved competence of subordinate judiciary to use discretionary powers and adjudicate cases independently from personal status of victims and defendants														
	6. Decreased number of defendants in jails who cannot pay their bail or afford counsel														
	7. Change in the level of perceived fairness in prosecution among disadvantaged victims														
	8. Improved capacity of the Lahore High Court's to analyse and report and ability to assess the quality of judicial decisions.														

**Component 3** Enhanced and regularised public legal and judicial information to improve citizens' awareness of legal rights and access to legal services and to increase

1. Increased availability of legal and judicial reports and information for the public about substantive issued within justice system, including performance of legal and judicial processes stakeholders	Annual and other reports and publications on legal aid Websites Baseline and follow-up surveys conducted among target constituency in pilot districts													
2. Change in level of awareness of fundamental rights among target beneficiaries, in particular women and families														
3. Increased public interest to support legal aid mechanisms														

Source: Financing Agreement (2010)

**Combating abusive child labour II**

Indicator			Baseline	Target	Value each Fiscal Year					Progress
Objectives	Definition	Source of verification	Value	Value	2006-2007	Period 1, 2, 3 & 4 Apr. 08 - Mar. 10	Period 5 & 6 Apr. 10 - Mar. 11	Period 7 & 8 Apr. 11 - Mar. 12	Period 9 & 10 Apr. 12 - Apr. 13	

**Overall Objective**

Contribute to the Government of Pakistan's efforts in eliminating child labour including its worst forms (WFCL) in Pakistan.

Incidence of Child labour reduced and GoP mechanisms to address it strengthened	Reports of Labour Force Survey Reports of School Surveys by Ministry of Education Child Labour statistics published by the UN organizations or other international organization such WB and ADB												
School drop out of children reduced and GoP mechanisms to address it strengthened													

**Specific Objective**

Government and civil society structures are capacitated and have requisite knowledgebase to take sustained action against child labour particularly its worst forms and to develop district based holistic model to reduce child labour across sectors in the target districts of the EC Programme.

Improved GoP development planning resulting in utilization of 75% fund already available with Ministry of Labour for education of child labourers by 2011	Minutes of National Steering Committee on Child Labour												
District based disaggregated data is available on the incidence of child labour in Pakistan	Reports/web-site of Ministry of Labour providing details on the funds utilization for child labourers.												
Child labour reduced by 30% in the target districts by 2011	Published Report of the second National Child Labour Survey by Ministry of Labour and other relevant public offices; and media Reports. Published report of the repeat Baseline survey on incidence of child labour in the target districts Reports on the activities of one federal and four Provincial Child Labour Units; and related media reports												

**Expected Results**

A) A sustainable and holistic district based model to reduce and gradually eliminate abusive child labour cross sectors is developed in the target districts.

1. Number of children in worst forms of child labour (WFCL) and children at risk enrolled in non-formal education, literacy and VT programmes.	Annual District Development Plans and budget documents of target district governments. District Education Plans Minutes of District Coordination Committees Minutes and reports of CLU meetings. Media reports on CLU activities The published reports of National Child Labour survey and media reports.	No baseline	9,000		703	4,052	7,058	11,958	
2. Number of children in worst forms of child labour and children at risk retained in non-formal education, literacy and VT programmes.		No baseline	9,000		703	3,593	5,888	9,876	
3. Number of children in worst forms of child labour and children at risk completing in non-formal education, literacy and VT programmes.		No baseline	9,000			204	2,212	6,849	
4. Number of children in worst forms of child labour and children at risk mainstreamed to formal government schools from NFE system.		No baseline	4,000			45	1,277	3,828	

Indicator			Baseline	Target	Value each Fiscal Year					Progress
Objectives	Definition	Source of verification	Value	Value	2006-2007	Period 1, 2, 3 & 4 Apr. 08 - Mar. 10	Period 5 & 6 Apr. 10 - Mar. 11	Period 7 & 8 Apr. 11 - Mar. 12	Period 9 & 10 Apr. 12 - Apr. 13	
	5. Number of children in WFCL and children at risk who have received basic health services.	Annual District Development Plans and budget documents of target district governments. District Education Plans Minutes of District Coordination Committees Minutes and reports of CLU meetings. Media reports on CLU activities The published reports of National Child Labour survey and media reports.	No baseline	9,000			2,516	6,451	9,876	
	6. Number of children in worst forms of labour and children at risk benefiting from social safety nets		No baseline	35			0	0	35	
	7. Number of families (with children in WFCL and children at risk) that have accessed social safety nets.		No baseline	N/A			0	0	96	
	8. Number of families (with children in WFCL and children at risk) where reliance on income from children has decreased.		No baseline	1,600			0	362	1,206	
	9. Number of children in worst forms of labour withdrawn from hazardous occupations.		No baseline	7,500			0	1,689	5,296	
	10. Number of children at risk prevented from being entered in to WFCL.		No baseline	1,500			20	627	1,553	
	11. Number of instances where employers' organizations conducted awareness campaigns on WFCL, related legislation, and OSH concerns.		No baseline	20			10	21	29	
	12. Number of instances workers' organizations conducted awareness campaigns on WFCL, related legislation, and OSH concerns.		No baseline	20			9	15	19	
	13. Number of employers who only offer non-hazardous employment to older children.		No baseline	No target			0	0	14	
	14. Number of Community-based Organizations (CBOs) taking action against Child Labour issues		No baseline	10			0	0	0	
	15. Number of employers agreed to remove hazards and unacceptable working conditions from their workplaces.		No baseline	20			0	0	14	

B) The institutional and technical capacity of the target district governments and the four provincial and one federal Child Labour Units (CLUs) is strengthened.

1. Enhanced knowledge, training, awareness raising and advisory services on child labour issues are available at five child labour units (CLUs).	All CLUs are effectively functioning both technically and institutionally.				Orientation sessions conducted for PCLU officials.	32 DOL officials received training.	81 DOL officials received training.	87 DOL officials received training.	
2. Child labour databases are available at five CLUs.	Child labour databases at PCLUs and FCLU are periodically updated.						Being done at district level.	Databases at Sahiwal & Sukkur, being developed at PCLU-Punjab	
3. Capacities and experiences to disseminate knowledge (on child labour) for district governments are available at four PCLUs.	Technical advisory services are provided to districts on regular basis by the PCLUs.						14 dist. trained	14 dist. trained 'Training to 4 districts' officials in Punjab held.	
4. Five CLUs making coordinated efforts through joint planning to combat worst forms of child labour.	5-year work plan is followed and resources are being mobilized accordingly.				5-year work plan drafted for all PCLUs while Punjab & Sindh finalized it.	AP to be begun in Sindh & KPK	APs are in progress in Sindh, KPK & Baluchistan	APs are in progress except Baluchistan and Sindh	
5. Number of officials at federal, provincial and district levels received training on child labour and its concerned issues.	No specific target.					113	748	1,633	

Indicator			Baseline	Target	Value each Fiscal Year					Progress
Objectives	Definition	Source of verification	Value	Value	2006-2007	Period 1, 2, 3 & 4 Apr. 08 - Mar. 10	Period 5 & 6 Apr. 10 - Mar. 11	Period 7 & 8 Apr. 11 - Mar. 12	Period 9 & 10 Apr. 12 - Apr. 13	
	6. Quantitative data and qualitative information on the child labour situation in the target districts are available.	The reports of baseline surveys and OSH studies in Sukkur & Sahiwal are available.				Baseline survey in Sukkur is in progress.	Results shared with DCCs.	Final reports are available		
	7. Community based Child Labour Monitoring System (CLMS) is in place.	A periodically updated CLM&R system is available in Sukkur and Sahiwal districts.						Estb. in 4 UCs.	Estb. in Sukkur and Sahiwal (135 UCs).	
	8. Number of instances where District Government interacted with media to share its experience on tackling worst forms of child labour in the target districts.	No specific target.				1	13	32	59	
	9. Child labour concerns are mainstreamed into district planning process and thus are reflected in the District Education and Health Plans of Sukkur and Sahiwal.	District Education & Health Plans in Sukkur & Sahiwal address the child labour concerns.					DEP consultant in Sukkur hired.	DEP of DG-Sukkur is available.	DEP of DG-Sahiwal is available	
	10. Target District Governments are allocating resources for addressing child labour concerns in annual district development plans.	No specific target.						Rs. 50,000/= allocated by DG Sukkur.	DG-Sahiwal trained 150 WFCL children at 6 VT labs in Govt. schools under DEP.	

C) The knowledge base on child labour including its worst forms is improved and awareness increased in support of adopting child labour friendly policies and legislative

	1. Number of instances where electronic and print media covered incidence of worst forms of child labour and about interventions that are being implemented to combat WFCL.	No specific target.					122	282	421	
	2. The Second National Child Labour Survey Report is officially released by the Government.	2 <sup>nd</sup> National Child Labour Survey is completed.					SIMPOC/ ILO, MOL & FBS agreed on the time frame for conducting NCLS.	NCLS II is cancelled.	Instead RA surveys on WFCL are being carried out in 25 districts.	
	3. Number of instances where the Government took steps to bring changes to the current legislation and/or to create the enabling environment to curb WFCL (e.g. introduction of child –friendly classrooms).	No specific target.						Provincial law on Prohibition of Employment of Children is drafted.	Provincial law on Prohibition of Employment of Children is being enacted in 4 provinces.	
	4. Number of institutions and individuals from outside the project coverage took action against the worst forms of child labour.	No specific target.					2	6	16	

Source: Technical Progress Report (TPR) - Pakistan April 2013, ILO-IPEC. Note: Figures are cumulative

	Monitoring report (2009-09-11)	Monitoring report (2010-07-22)	MR 2012
<b>a = very good; b = good; c = problems; d = serious deficiencies.</b>			
<b>1. Quality of design</b>			
1.1 What is the present level of relevance of the project?		A	A
1.2 As presently designed, is the intervention logic holding true?		B	B
1.3 Is the current design sufficiently supported by all stakeholders?		C	A
1.4 Is the current design sufficiently taking cross-cutting issues into account?		B	A
<b>2. Efficiency to date</b>			
2.1 How well is the availability/usage of inputs managed?		C	C
2.2 How well is the implementation of the activities managed?		C	B
2.3 How well are the outputs achieved?		B	C
2.4 How well are the Partner Contribution/Involvement working?		B	B
<b>3. Effectiveness to date</b>			
3.1 How well is the project achieving its planned results?		C	B
3.2 As presently implemented, what is the likelihood of the PP to be achieved?		C	B
<b>4. Impact prospects</b>			
4.1 What are the direct impact prospects of the project at Overall Objectives level?		B	B
4.2 To what extent does/will the project have any indirect positive and/or negative impacts? (i.e. environmental, social, cultural, gender and economic)?		B	B
<b>5. Potential sustainability</b>			
5.1 Financial / economic viability?		C	B
5.2 What is the level of ownership of the project by target groups and will it continue after the end of external support?		C	B
5.3 What is the level of policy support provided and the degree of interaction between project and policy level?		B	B
5.4 How well is the project contributing to institutional and management capacity?		A	B
<b>6. Horizontal issues</b>			
<i>6.1) Role of Quality Support Group (QSG) and ROM in project quality</i>			
a) Whether the comments, particularly regarding stakeholders and needs analysis, institutional capacity assessment of the implementing partner and risks and assumptions made in the checklist and minutes against the quality and content of the Action Fiche were appropriate / relevant?		N/A	Yes
b) Whether the comments were taken into consideration and included in the Project documents, e.g. TAPs, financing agreements, LFM, Inception reports, etc. and if so, did they improve project implementation?		N/A	Yes
c) If the comments were not taken into consideration, was there any consequence during the implementation of the project? If so, please describe in the free text box.		N/A	N/A
d) Has any monitoring (including internal monitoring systems or ROM) or evaluation resulted in improvements in the project?		Yes	Yes
<i>6.2) Review of TC Quality Criteria</i>			
Do local partners effectively lead in the planning and management of TC support (i.e. beyond formal endorsement)?		No	Yes
Do local partners provide the required inputs enabling TC to perform (e.g. human and/or physical inputs)? (refer to Box 22 of the Guidelines)		No	Yes
Is the TC support likely to achieve its objectives without critical constraints?		N/A	Yes
Is the TC support adequate vis-à-vis the capacity of the local partner?		N/A	Yes
Is the TC support taking into account TC from other donors in the same sector? (Ask the EC Delegation to acquire this data)		No	N/A
Is the present TC support from the EC delivered jointly with other donors? (If no other donors are active in the sector then mark N/A)		No	N/A
If the TC support from the EC is not harmonised with other donors, are relevant steps being taken for a more harmonized TC in the future?		No	N/A
Are the TC deliverables (outputs and outcomes) clearly specified (e.g. in the TA ToR) and regularly assessed (e.g. through a joint performance dialogue/assessment)?		No	Yes
Are there innovative forms of TC support being used (e.g. peer review, South/South and/or Public/Public cooperation, twinning, networking, etc.)?		No	No
Are partner country staff effectively managing the programme (and not TA)?		No	Yes
Do the experts take instructions from and report to the partner (and not the EC)?		No	Yes
<i>7.3. EC Visibility</i>			
Does the project contribute to promoting EC visibility (e.g. does it comply with the EC Guidelines?)		Yes	Yes
<b>7. Cross-cutting issues</b>			
7.1) Have practical and strategic gender interests been adequately considered in the project strategy?		Yes	Yes

7.2) Is the project respecting environmental needs?	No	N/A
7.3) Has (good) governance been mainstreamed in the project/programme (P/P)?	Yes	Yes
7.4) Does the project actively contribute to the promotion of Human Rights?	Yes	Yes

	Monitoring report (2009-09-11)	Monitoring report (2010-07-22)	MR 2012
Relevance and quality of design	A	B	A
Efficiency of Implementation to date	C	B	C
Effectiveness to date	B	C	B
Impact prospects	B	B	B
Potential sustainability	B	B	B

CAPRI															
Indicator			Baseline	Target	Value each Fiscal Year										Progress
Objectives	Definition	Source of verification	Value	Value	2006-2007	2007-2008	2008-2009	2009-2010	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014	2014		
No logframe available for this project															

**Monitoring report - Field visits (2014-02-17)**

a = very good; b = good; c = problems; d = serious deficiencies.

**1. Relevance**

1.1 Does the intervention presently respond to the needs of the target groups?	B
1.2 Does the operation presently support the policy (or its development) of the partner government and is it in line with existing policy?	B
1.3 Is the operation in line with EC development policy and strategies?	B

**2. Quality of Design**

2.1 Does the present intervention logic still hold true and is it clear and coherent?	C
2.2. Do the implementation arrangements take into account the capacity of the partners, and is the design fully supported by them?	C
2.3 Is the current design sufficiently taking cross-cutting issues into account?	B

**3. Efficiency**

3.1 How well is the availability and use of inputs and resources managed?	C
3.2 How well are the activities implemented?	C
3.3 How well are the outputs achieved?	C
3.4 How well are the Partners involved and contributing?	C

**4. Effectiveness**

4.1. How well is the operation achieving its expected outcomes?	B
4.2. As presently implemented, what is the likelihood that the project purpose will be achieved?	C

**5. Impact to date**

5.1. What are the operation's direct impact prospects (i.e. contribution at the level of overall objective)?	B
5.2 To what extent does/will the operation have any indirect (positive/negative) impact?	C

**6. Sustainability to date**

6.1 What is the financial/economic viability of the continuation of benefits after the end of the operation?	A
6.2. What is the level of ownership of the operation by the target group and relevant stakeholders?	C
6.3. To what degree does the policy environment support the operation?	C
6.4. To what extent does the operation contribute to partners' capacity development?	B

**7. Horizontal issues***7.1 Quality Systems, Monitoring and Evaluation*

a) Were the QSG comments taken into consideration and included in the final design and applied during implementation?	Yes
b) Are the issues identified by ROM regarding design the same as those addressed in the QSG checklist?	No
c) Have previous evaluations or reviews (such as ROM, reviews by the EU operational manager) led to changes in the operation?	N/A
d) Is the available monitoring and reporting information on the operation's progress comprehensive and reliable in order to ensure the possibility to evaluate results and learn lessons?	No

*7.2 Review of Technical Cooperation/Capacity Development Quality Criteria*

a) Are there critical constraints in the context which are likely to prevent the CD support from achieving its objectives?	Yes
b) Is the CD support adequate vis-à-vis the present capacity of the local partner?	Yes

c) Do local partners effectively lead in the planning of CD support beyond formal endorsement?	Yes
d) Do local partners provide the inputs (human or physical) that would be required to enable the CD support to be effective?	Yes
e) Are the outputs or outcomes of the CD support clearly specified and still relevant (or adjusted to changes of context)?	No
f) Are they regularly monitored and/or assessed (e.g. through a joint performance dialogue or an annual reporting)?	No
g) Is the CD support taking into account CD interventions from other donors in the same sector?	Yes
h) Is there a donor coordination mechanism led by local partners and encompassing CD support?	No
i) Is CD support embedded in the broad institutional context of the local partners and have unnecessary parallel mechanisms been avoided?	Yes
j) Do contracted experts, project managers and NGO staff take instructions from the partner and not the EC? (while some form of reporting to the EC can still take place)	Yes
<i>7.3. EC Visibility</i>	
Does the operation contribute to promoting EC visibility (e.g. does it comply with the EC Guidelines)?	No
<b>8. Cross-cutting issues</b>	
8.1. Have practical and strategic gender interests been adequately considered in the operation's strategy?	N/A
8.2. Is the operation respecting environmental needs?	N/A
8.3. Has (good) governance been mainstreamed in the operation?	Yes
8.4. Does the operation actively contribute to the promotion of Human Rights?	Yes

**Monitoring report (2014-02-17)**

Relevance and quality of design	C
Efficiency of Implementation to date	C
Effectiveness to date	C
Impact prospects	B
Potential sustainability	B

PFM														
Objectives	Indicator	Definition	Source of verification	Baseline	Target	Value each Fiscal Year								Progress
				Value	Value	2006-2007	2007-2008	2008-2009	2009-2010	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014	

**Overall Objective**

To contribute to the improvement of public financial administration to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency in the utilization of government budget resources in order to deliver better public services and to reduce the impact of poverty and social inequality

Improvement in economic, financial and social indicators	Government official reports and statistics; Reports (international organisations, think-tanks, research institutions and CSOs); Surveys													
Improvement in main macroeconomic indicators	Indicators from Human Development Index and Millenium Development Goals; Media coverage													

**Specific Objective**

To support a comprehensive public finance management reform process in Sindh province including support for a Medium Term Budgetary Framework  
 To support public finance management reform process at the federal level through the design of an overarching and comprehensive PFM reform strategy; and consolidation of the Medium Term Budgetary Framework process

Improvement of relevant sections of PEFA assessment reports	Government official reports and statistics including those from State Bank of Pakistan													
Improvement of fiscal stability indicators	PEFA reports FRA assessments Doing Business Report													

Indicator			Baseline	Target	Value each Fiscal Year									Progress
Objectives	Definition	Source of verification	Value	Value	2006-2007	2007-2008	2008-2009	2009-2010	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014	2014	
<b>Expected Results</b>														
<b>Result 1</b> A PFM reform strategy is developed, a PFM action plan is implemented and a medium term budgetary framework is effectively established in the province of Sindh														
<b>Activity 1.1 Sindh PRM reform strategy</b>														
A comprehensive, over-arching and sequenced PFM reform strategy is developed, which provides a base-line status of PFM elements, and which serves as a basis for an EU supported PFM reform program identifying priorities, objectives and strategy for their achievement, opportunities for coordination of donor participation, and essential institutional and civil service reforms		PEFA assessments beyond 2013 Monitoring reports of Government and donors Annual budgeting results												
Based on the PFM reform strategy, action plans and integrated program interventions are designed and agreed for addressing the priority emergent and emerging issues across the spectrum of PFM reform		Enacted laws, decrees and relevant rules, regulations and procedures Monthly and internal monitoring reports Feedback from other relevant donors, MoF officials and institutional stakeholders												
Verifiable indicators for the implementation of agreed action plans and interventions are developed and agreed		Training modules and documents, training evaluation reports, assessment reports Relevant EU/EC reviews, evaluations and reports												
By end of the program, improvements in key and relevant PEFA indicators for budget predictability, policy based budgeting, transparency, predictability, accounting and reporting.														
<b>Activity 1.2 Sindh MTBF</b>														
Improvements in relevant PEFA scores for budget credibility, policy based budgeting, predictability and control in budget execution, and budget reporting		PEFA assessments beyond 2013												
By end of project quality budget information based on MTBF is received from target budget agencies for the annual budget process		Revised and updated budget documents and guidelines and budget forms available for review Annual budget delivered by the GoP												
MTBF information is produced in a timely way during the annual budget process so that it can be used by the authorities and Government to take decisions on strategic budgeting choices		MTBF budget statements and reports Monitoring reports of Government and donors IFI reports												
DoF enforces timeframes and quality of agency submissions required by the Budget Circular and methodological guidelines based on the MTBF, and has capacity to provide guidance and training to target line agencies to comply with the budget circular and MTBF budget instructions		Training material for line ministries and MoF available for review and names of trained officials Enacted laws, decrees and relevant rules, regulations and procedures Training modules and documents, training evaluation reports, assessment reports Relevant EU/EC reviews, evaluations and reports												
There is improved integration of the budgetary procedures for consideration of the recurrent and capita budgets														



Indicator			Baseline	Target	Value each Fiscal Year									Progress
Objectives	Definition	Source of verification	Value	Value	2006-2007	2007-2008	2008-2009	2009-2010	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014	2014	
<b>Result 2</b> A PFM reform strategy is developed; the Medium Term Budgetary Framework is consolidated and macro-economic and fiscal modelling and forecast is strengthened at														
<b>2.1 PFM Reform strategy</b>														
	A comprehensive, over-arching and sequenced PFM reform strategy is developed, which provides a base-line status of PFM elements, and which serves as a basis for a PFM reform program identifying priorities, objectives and strategy for their achievement, opportunities for coordination of donor participation, and essential institutional and civil service reforms	Development of strategy in consultation with all relevant stakeholders, provinces and EU as well as other donors												
	Based on the PFM reform strategy, action plans and integrated program interventions are designed and agreed for addressing the priority emergent and emerging issues across the spectrum of PFM reform	Feedback from other relevant donors, MoF officials and institutional stakeholders Relevant EU/EC reviews, evaluations and reports												
	Verifiable indicators for the implementation of agreed action plans and interventions are developed and agreed													
<b>2.2 Federal MTBF</b>														
	Improvements in relevant PEFA scores	MTBF budget statements and reports												
	By end of project quality budget information based on MTBF is received from target budget agencies for the annual budget process	Revised and updated budget documents and guidelines and budget forms available for review International Financial Institutions (IFI) assessments/reviews												
	MTBF information is produced in a timely way during the annual budget process so that it can be used by the authorities and Government to take decisions on strategic budgeting choices	Feedback from other relevant donors, MoF and Planning Commission officials and institutional stakeholders Delivered training modules and documents, training evaluation reports, and assessment reports												
	MoF enforces timeframes and quality of agency submissions required by the Budget Circular and methodological guidelines based on the MTBF, and has capacity to provide guidance and training to target line agencies to comply with the budget circular and MTBF budget instructions	GoP official economic and forecasting reports Relevant EU/EC reviews, evaluations and reports Incorporation of macroeconomic techniques into training curricula PEFA assessments beyond 2013 Revised and updated budget documents and guidelines and budget forms available for review												
	There is integration of the budgetary procedures for consideration on the recurrent and capital budgets	Annual budget delivered by the GoP												
	There is recognition by relevant members of the National Assembly, MoF officials and line agencies that the MTBF is a useful tool for budget and fiscal management, and delivers enhanced management and planning of budget resources in accordance with strategic priorities													

Indicator			Baseline	Target	Value each Fiscal Year									Progress
Objectives	Definition	Source of verification	Value	Value	2006-2007	2007-2008	2008-2009	2009-2010	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014	2014	
<b>2.3 Macroeconomic forecast/modelling</b>														
	Macroeconomic and fiscal management and forecasting tools and models are developed and available for application in the annual budget context and for longer term economic planning, and can be used to provide projections on what is fiscally affordable and analyse economic scenarios over the short, medium and long term	Macro/fiscal/revenue/tax policy models, tools and calculators available International Financial Institutions (IFI) assessments/reviews Monthly and internal monitoring reports Feedback from other relevant donors, MoF and Planning Commission officials and institutional stakeholders Delivered training modules and documents, training evaluation reports, and assessment reports												
	Relevant MoF and Planning Commission officials can apply the models and tools to understand macroeconomic and fiscal phenomena and contribute to fiscal analysis and economic policy formulation, including responding to economic shocks and meeting emergent needs for competent economic studies/analyses on important and urgent policy issues	GoP official economic and forecasting reports Relevant EU/EC reviews, evaluations and reports Incorporation of macroeconomic techniques into training curricula PEFA assessment beyond 2013 Revised and updated budget documents and guidelines and budget forms available for review Annual budget delivered by the GoP MTBF budget statements and reports												
	Coordination mechanisms with other agencies responsible for macroeconomic and fiscal projections are established from Year 1 of the Project, and fragmentation and inconsistency in macroeconomic framework development is reduced													
	By end of the Project, improvements in relevant PEFA indicators													

Source: Financing agreement

<b>TRTA 2</b>														
Indicator			Baseline	Target	Value each Fiscal Year									Progress
Objectives	Definition	Source of verification	Value	Value	2006-2007	2007-2008	2008-2009	2009-2010	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013	April to October 2014 (4)		
<b>Overall Objective</b>														
	1. Poverty rate in Pakistan decreases over the programme end	Data and Statistics from GoP, WB, ADB and UN HDI		21.6% in 2014		21% as of 2008 (2)								
	2. Pakistan HDI improved by end of implementation period			1.5% in 2014				0.504 in 2010 (2)	0.503 as of 2011 (2)					
<b>Specific Objective</b>														
	Exports as a share of GDP	Data and Statistics from GoP, Eurostat, WB Cost of doing business survey		32.1% in 2014						12.6% (2)				
	Volume, value and unit value of exported goods to EU, SAFTA, China and Malaysia			+5%				10.9% (2)	11.6% (2)					
	Comparative costs of exports			- 5 points										

Indicator			Baseline	Target	Value each Fiscal Year								Progress
Objectives	Definition	Source of verification	Value	Value	2006-2007	2007-2008	2008-2009	2009-2010	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013	April to October 2014 (4)	
<b>Expected Results</b>													
<b>Component 1</b> Coherent trade policy and regulatory reform for export competitiveness													
1.1 PITAD's institutional capacity strengthened.	PITAD's technical materials and publications assessed and procurement made of items required to carry out high-level research, analysis and training			Done by 2011						done (2)		Total of master trainers mentored under Component 1: 14 (4)	
1.2 PITAD's and other research institutes' expertise on trade policy strengthened	Twining arrangement signed with international training institution			MOU signed between PITAD and WTI by 2012					MOU signed in 02/2011				
	Trainers and researchers trained			8 by 2011 16 by 2012						7 trained (2)	7 to be trained in 08/12		
	PITAD modules and trade policy research projects carried out, completed and assessed to be of a high standard			6 completed by 2013						6 training modules (2)			
1.3 Government officers' capacity on specific trade policy and international trade negotiations strengthened	Number of officers from government offices and implementing agencies successfully trained			6 by 2011						3 trainings conducted (2)			
1.4 Research studies contributing to the development of a national export strategy conducted	Number of research papers that feed into public-private dialogue produced and approved through peer review mechanisms			15 by 2014						4 (2)		7 (4)	
1.5 Public-private dialogue for a coherent national export strategy is fostered	A core group of key stakeholders is constituted to develop a national export strategy			Done by 2012						done (2)			
	Number of PPDs held			10 by 2014								4 (4)	
<b>Component 2</b> Improved compliance of exported products with export market requirements													
2.1 Strengthened SPS controls.	Controls on exports of fishery products "at least equivalent" to EC by 2012;												
	No. of EU RASFF alerts for products of plant origin/year reduced to <10/year by 2014.									25 (2)			
2.2 Improved quality, value addition and compliance in fishery, horticulture and industrial sectors.	10 additional fishery establishments compliant with EC market requirements by 2014;												
	Value of fishery/horticulture products at first sale increased by 5% in real terms by 2014;												
	40 fishery/horticulture/fans/cutlery enterprises certified to quality, environment, food safety, GAP, CSR management system including CE												
2.3 Improved conformity assessment infrastructure and services.	Internationally recognized accreditation (1) compliance testing (24), metrology (6), system certification (5) and metrology (6) services achieved by 2013											Certification bodies in Pakistan accredited by PNAC for QMS and EMS will be allowed to operate and their certifications will be globally accepted (4)	
	30 testing/metrology labs paying accreditation fees to PNAC by 2014.											To date seventeen (17) labs (6 metrology + 11 testing) receiving TRTA II support has been accredited by PNAC. (4)	

Indicator			Baseline	Target	Value each Fiscal Year								Progress
Objectives	Definition	Source of verification	Value	Value	2006-2007	2007-2008	2008-2009	2009-2010	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013	April to October 2014 (4)	
<b>Component 3 Strengthened IP system facilitating increased investment and trade in IP protected goods and services</b>													
3.1 Strengthened IP Institutions.	Adoption of results based management practices in IPO-Pakistan by 2014;												
	3 IP officials with LL.M degrees by 2013;										2 IPO officials confirmed (2)	1 IPO official completed LL.M course in Turin (4)	
	Report on validation of TM and Patents Administration procedures by 2012;												
	Examiners trained on TM and Patent examination by 2012												
	Upgraded IT infrastructure established by 2014												
	Upgraded IP automation system (WIPO IPAS Java) deployed and streamlined IP procedures automated by 2012											IPAS Java operational at the Patent Office and Trade Marks Registry with streamlined procedures (4)	
	IP records digitized and IP databases completed by 2014											80% completed (4)	
	Back-office administrative systems identified and first phase implemented by 2013											Contract awarded for Admin System (4)	
	4 IPO IT officials with certificates in technical skills by 2013											7 IPO IT officials with upgraded technical skills	
	Availability of online IP services and interfaces by 2014											Web portal development contract awarded and work initiated	
	CMO study available by 2012												
3.2 Strengthened IP Legislation and Policy Framework.	Position paper on utility models by 2013;												
	National stakeholders consultations on Gis and PBRs by 2013;											National consultations on PBRs and report completed (4)	
	National stakeholders consultations on Madrid System and PCT by 2013;										done (2)	Experts, speakers and participants identified for the Roundtable. Consultations are in progress for feasible dates (4)	
	National Roundtable on IP Policy by 2013.												
3.3 Improved enforcement of IPRs.	Judges colloquium by 2012;												
	Up to six (6) master trainers trained from FIA/Police and Customs Academy by 2012;												Planned activities for this result area were completed earlier. However, consultations are being held with various stakeholders (Customs, IPO Pakistan) to ensure sustained outcomes of the implemented activities (4)
	IP enforcement training courses commenced by Police, Customs and Judicial Academies by 2012.												
3.4 Increased use of IP system by businesses and research institutions.	Public information campaign (media briefings, provision of public awareness materials) commenced by 2011;												
	Up to 15 national trainers on IP for businesses trained by 2012;												
	Roundtable on IP and trade policy by 2012;												
	IP modules in up to six public-private consultations by 2013;												
	National Roundtable on TMOs by 2013;												
	E-forum on technology transfer to industry established.											e-Forum (PNET) pilot version completed and under review by stakeholders (4)	

Sources: (1) Inception report (UNIDO) - October 2010 (2) Mid-Term Review Report (Experts for EC/UNIDO) - September 2012 (3) Progress Report (EC/UNIDO) - April 2013 - March 2014

	Monitoring report (2010-07-15)	Monitoring report (2011-08-23)	Monitoring report (2013-07-19)
a = very good; b = good; c = problems; d = serious deficiencies.			
<b>1. Quality of design</b>			
1.1 What is the present level of relevance of the project?	A	A	B
1.2 As presently designed, is the intervention logic holding true?	C	B	A
1.3 Is the current design sufficiently supported by all stakeholders?	B	C	A
1.4 Is the current design sufficiently taking cross-cutting issues into account?	C	B	
<b>2. Efficiency to date</b>			
2.1 How well is the availability/usage of inputs managed?	B	C	B
2.2 How well is the implementation of the activities managed?	B	C	B
2.3 How well are the outputs achieved?	B	B	C
2.4 How well are the Partner Contribution/Involvement working?	B	B	
<b>3. Effectiveness to date</b>			
3.1 How well is the project achieving its planned results?	B	B	B
3.2 As presently implemented, what is the likelihood of the PP to be achieved?	B	B	B
<b>4. Impact prospects</b>			
4.1 What are the direct impact prospects of the project at Overall Objectives level?	C	B	B
4.2 To what extent does/will the project have any indirect positive and/or negative	B	B	B
<b>5. Potential sustainability</b>			
5.1 Financial / economic viability?	C	B	B
5.2 What is the level of ownership of the project by target groups and will it continue after	B	B	B
5.3 What is the level of policy support provided and the degree of interaction between	B	B	B
5.4 How well is the project contributing to institutional and management capacity?	B	B	B
<b>6. Horizontal issues</b>			
<i>6.1) Role of Quality Support Group (QSG) and ROM in project quality</i>			
a) Whether the comments, particularly regarding stakeholders and needs analysis,	N/A	Yes	Yes
b) Whether the comments were taken into consideration and included in the Project	N/A	Yes	Yes
c) If the comments were not taken into consideration, was there any consequence during	N/A	N/A	Yes
d) Has any monitoring (including internal monitoring systems or ROM) or evaluation	N/A	Yes	Yes
<i>6.2) Review of TC Quality Criteria</i>			
Do local partners effectively lead in the planning and management of TC support (i.e.	No	Yes	Yes
Do local partners provide the required inputs enabling TC to perform (e.g. human and/or	No	Yes	Yes
Is the TC support likely to achieve its objectives without critical constraints?	Yes	Yes	Yes
Is the TC support adequate vis-à-vis the capacity of the local partner?	Yes	Yes	Yes
Is the TC support taking into account TC from other donors in the same sector?	No	Yes	Yes
Is the present TC support from the EC delivered jointly with other donors? (If no other	No	Yes	Yes
If the TC support from the EC is not harmonised with other donors, are relevant steps	Yes	No	Yes
Are the TC deliverables (outputs and outcomes) clearly specified (e.g. in the TA ToR) and	Yes	Yes	Yes
Are there innovative forms of TC support being used (e.g. peer review, South/South	Yes	N/A	Yes
Are partner country staff effectively managing the programme (and not TA)?	No	No	Yes
Do the experts take instructions from and report to the partner (and not the EC)?	No	No	Yes
<i>7.3. EC Visibility</i>			
Does the project contribute to promoting EC visibility (e.g. does it comply with the EC	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>7. Cross-cutting issues</b>			
7.1) Have practical and strategic gender interests been adequately considered in the project	No	N/A	Yes
7.2) Is the project respecting environmental needs?	No	Yes	Yes
7.3) Has (good) governance been mainstreamed in the project/programme (P/P)?	Yes	Yes	Yes
7.4) Does the project actively contribute to the promotion of Human Rights?	No	N/A	Yes
<b>1. Relevance</b>			
1.1 Does the intervention presently respond to the needs of the target groups?			B
1.2 Does the operation presently support the policy (or its development) of the partner government			A
1.3 Is the operation in line with EC development policy and strategies?			A
<b>2. Quality of Design</b>			
2.1 Does the present intervention logic still hold true and is it clear and coherent?			B
2.2. Do the implementation arrangements take into account the capacity of the partners, and is the			B
2.3 Is the current design sufficiently taking cross-cutting issues into account?			C
<b>3. Efficiency</b>			
3.1 How well is the availability and use of inputs and resources managed?			B
3.2 How well are the activities implemented?			B
3.3 How well are the outputs achieved?			C
3.4. How well are the Partners involved and contributing?			B
<b>4. Effectiveness</b>			
4.1. How well is the operation achieving its expected outcomes?			B
4.2. As presently implemented, what is the likelihood that the project purpose will be achieved?			B
<b>5. Impact to date</b>			
5.1. What are the operation's direct impact prospects (i.e. contribution at the level of overall objective)?			B
5.2 To what extent does/will the operation have any indirect (positive/negative) impact?			B
<b>6. Sustainability to date</b>			
6.1 What is the financial/economic viability of the continuation of benefits after the end of the			B
6.2. What is the level of ownership of the operation by the target group and relevant stakeholders?			B
6.3. To what degree does the policy environment support the operation?			B
6.4. To what extent does the operation contribute to partners' capacity development?			C
<b>7. Horizontal issues</b>			
<i>7.1 Quality Systems, Monitoring and Evaluation</i>			
a) Were the QSG comments taken into consideration and included in the final design and applied			Yes
b) Are the issues identified by ROM regarding design the same as those addressed in the QSG			Yes
c) Have previous evaluations or reviews (such as ROM, reviews by the EU operational manager) led			Yes
d) Is the available monitoring and reporting information on the operation's progress comprehensive			Yes
<i>7.2 Review of Technical Cooperation/ Capacity Development Quality Criteria</i>			
a) Are there critical constraints in the context which are likely to prevent the CD support from			No
b) Is the CD support adequate vis-à-vis the present capacity of the local partner?			Yes
c) Do local partners effectively lead in the planning of CD support beyond formal endorsement?			Yes
d) Do local partners provide the inputs (human or physical) that would be required to enable the CD			Yes
e) Are the outputs or outcomes of the CD support clearly specified and still relevant (or adjusted to			Yes
f) Are they regularly monitored and/or assessed (e.g. through a joint performance dialogue or an			Yes
g) Is the CD support taking into account CD interventions from other donors in the same sector?			Yes
h) Is there a donor coordination mechanism led by local partners and encompassing CD support?			No
j) Is CD support embedded in the broad institutional context of the local partners and have			Yes
j) Do contracted experts, project managers and NGO staff take instructions from the partner and not			Yes
<i>7.3. EC Visibility</i>			
Does the operation contribute to promoting EC visibility (e.g. does it comply with the EC			Yes
<b>8. Cross-cutting issues</b>			
8.1. Have practical and strategic gender interests been adequately considered in the operation's			No
8.2. Is the operation respecting environmental needs?			Yes
8.3. Has (good) governance been mainstreamed in the operation?			Yes
8.4 Does the operation actively contribute to the promotion of Human Rights?			Yes

	Monitoring report (2010-07-15)	MR (2011-08-23)	MR (2013-07-19)
Relevance and quality of design	B	B	B
Efficiency of Implementation to date	B	B	B
Effectiveness to date	B	B	B
Impact prospects	C	B	B
Potential sustainability	B	B	B

TRTA - PSD III															
Indicator			Baseline Value	Target	Value each Fiscal Year										Progress
Objectives	Definition	Source of verification	Value	Value	2006-2007	2007-2008	2008-2009	2009-2010	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014	2014		
<b>Overall Objective</b>															
	1. Poverty rate in Pakistan decreases over the programme end	Data and Statistics from GoP, WB, ADB and UN publications													
	2. Pakistan HDI improved by end of implementation period														
	3. Employment increases in the export sector														
<b>Specific Objective</b>															
	20-40% of the firms in the G&J and LP sector are able to compete at the international level.	Exports data in all categories mentioned (MOC, UNIDO, WB, ADR, Euro stat)													
<b>Expected Results</b>															
a) improve quality of production through provision of business development services (BDS*, taking into account environmentally friendly production)	10-20% increase in the levels of exports of LP and G&J products	Project progress reports, mid-term and final evaluation reports													
b) enhance product development and improved design as to moving products up the value chain through state of the art production techniques	Business development services are availed by the firms in the G&J and LP. 10-20% increase in the export of diversified products	Project progress reports, mid-term and final evaluation reports													
c) marketing and branding	20-30% exportable products are branded in the G&J and LP sectors	Project progress reports, mid-term and final evaluation reports													
d) provide access to knowledge: upgrading skills of employees (through technical training relevant for each of the focal sectors) with focus on gender balance; and training in management and organisational skills of middle management	10-25% of the workers improves their technical skills by the end of the programme	Project progress reports, mid-term and final evaluation reports													
e) improved access to regional and international markets as a result of the above and through provision of necessary information provided by the BIOs specifically on product compliance for export (as for example compliance with the EU Reach Directive for leather production/tanning) and export & customs documentation	Increased access to regional markets like SAARC and ASEAN as well as to the international market on account of standards compliance.	Project progress reports, mid-term and final evaluation reports													

Source: Financing Agreement (2011)



# **Annex C1: Terms of Reference**

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EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation — EuropeAid

EU Development Policy - Evaluation

**Evaluation of the European Union's  
co-operation  
with the  
Islamic Republic of Pakistan  
  
Country Level Evaluation**

**TERMS OF REFERENCE**

**November 2014**

***Framework contract EVA2011/ Global price***

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## **1 MANDATE AND OBJECTIVES**

Systematic and timely evaluation of its programmes, activities, instruments, legislation and non-spending activities is a priority<sup>1</sup> of the European Commission<sup>2</sup> in order to demonstrate accountability and to promote lesson learning to improve policy and practice.<sup>3</sup>

The evaluation of the European Union's co-operation with **Pakistan** is part of the **2014** evaluation programme as approved by the Development Commissioner.

The generic purpose of geographic evaluations is:

- to provide the relevant external co-operation services of the European Union and the wider public with an **overall independent assessment** of the European Union's past and current cooperation;
- to identify key lessons and to produce recommendations to improve current and inform future choices on co-operation strategy and delivery.

## **2 EVALUATION RATIONALE AND OBJECTIVE**

The objective is to provide an overall independent assessment of the EU's co-operation strategy and delivery with Pakistan between 2007 and 2014. This must include lessons to be learned and recommendations to improve current co-operation, and future strategic choices. In particular, the specific rationale for undertaking this evaluation is also to feed into the **mid-term review** and in a possible joint programming exercise which is envisaged to start in 2016.

The evaluation will draw on pertinent major EU policy documents, and those specifically relating to Pakistan (e.g. Multi-annual Financing Framework).

The evaluation will cover:

- All of DEVCO's co-operation with Pakistan;
- All particular thematic themes or issues focus as set out in section 4;
- EEAS co-operation in so far as it relates to development in Pakistan;
- The interaction of DEVCO's interventions with those of EU Member States, ECHO and EIB in Pakistan;
- Spending and non-spending activities completed, in progress and being planned in the evaluation period;
- All **EU financial instruments and channels relevant** to the country during the evaluation period.

The main users of this evaluation include the EU Commissioner(s), EU Management, geographic and thematic units and the European Union Delegation to Pakistan as well as Government of Pakistan, EU

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<sup>1</sup> EU Financial Regulation (art 27); Regulation (EC) No 1905/2000; Regulation (EC) No 1889/2006; Regulation (EC) No 1638/2006; Regulation (EC) No 1717/2006; Council Regulation (EC) No 215/2008.

<sup>2</sup> SEC(2007) 213 "Responding to Strategic Needs: Reinforcing the use of evaluation".

<sup>3</sup> COM (2011) 637 final "Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change".

Member States and other external partners and donors. The evaluation will also be of interest to the wider international development community.

### **3 BACKGROUND**

#### **3.1 Country context**

Pakistan has an estimated population of 173.6 million and the highest population growth rate in South Asia with a life expectancy 64.9 years. It is a lower middle income country.

Pakistan is one of the most disaster prone countries in the world, with multiple **natural disasters** every year impacting on livelihood and nutritional security. The **Food insecure** population in Pakistan is rated at 58% of the total population and in the province of Sindh 72%. Global Acute Malnutrition rates are 15.1% (beyond emergency thresholds) as defined by the World Health Organisation with an estimated 3.5 million children suffering from acute malnutrition (National Nutrition Survey, 2011). Besides, Pakistan's social indicators remain among the lowest in the world and the country lags behind on many key Millennium Development Goals. Increased spending is needed for social sectors like health, education and social protection, which remains a challenge given the very narrow tax base.

Pakistan also faces other major **environmental problems** including serious water shortages due to demographic pressure, deforestation and degradation of rangelands.

**Access to energy** is increasingly difficult, despite of the potential offered by hydropower. The energy crisis is dramatic, and potentially the most serious test for the current government for which tackling the crisis remains a priority. Energy shortages lead to periods of 'load shedding' (8 hours per day on average). On 30 July 2013, a National Energy Policy 2013-18 was approved by the Council of Common Interests. The new policy constitutes a step in the right direction, including an incremental suppression of subsidies and a progressive privatisation of the distribution companies, but it lacks a clear roadmap for implementation. Increasing domestic electricity production is a priority for the government which has taken steps to multiply the construction of hydroelectric plants throughout the country, including through public/private partnerships. Efforts to improve efficiency of the system together with reforms of governance remain, however, of paramount of importance to curb social discontent.

The **economic growth** of recent years appears to have had little impact on **poverty**, affecting over a third of the population. Pakistan is ranked 110 out of 189 in terms of doing business in 2014<sup>4</sup>.

Pakistan's economy is marred by low savings, low investment, low revenue and lack of adequate infrastructure. The potential of regional trade is huge but remains untapped for political reasons; hence the European Union remains Pakistan's first trading partner. Against this background, PM Sharif's government negotiated a new three years IMF stand-by agreement (US\$6,6 billion) to avert a crisis of the balance of payment in exchange of pledges to undertake structural reforms. In the spring of 2014, the Pakistani rupee experienced a sudden and rapid appreciation following a financial donation of US\$1,5 billion by Saudi Arabia in exchange, most probably, of closer cooperation on foreign policy. In 2013 EU imports from Pakistan amounted to around €4,5 billion, which represents about 20% of Pakistan's total exports. Around 75% of Pakistan's exports to the EU consist of textiles, clothing and leather products. While the textiles and clothing industry are the backbone of the Pakistani economy (it provides employment to 15 million people or 30% of the total workforce, contributes to 8,5% of GDP and over 50% of export earnings), relying too heavily on one product category carries risks for Pakistan. The EU's trade policy has been supportive of Pakistan's economic development, in particular

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<sup>4</sup> <http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/pakistan/>

through its Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). In November 2012 the EU granted autonomous trade preferences to Pakistan for 75 products in view of contributing to economic recovery from the devastating floods in 2010 and 2011. These trade preferences expired end 2013. From 1 January 2014 Pakistan was granted the so called GSP+ (to promote sustainable development) on condition that Pakistan ratifies and implements 27 international conventions related to human and labour rights, the environment and good governance. The implementation of GSP+ is subject to monitoring and assessment by the Commission.

The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has included Pakistan in the list of 51 '**Fragile States 2014**' report for mobilising less than 14 per cent of GDP in tax revenue and high level of security situation. On The fragile state index, Pakistan ranks 10 out of 178 countries<sup>5</sup>. Pakistan was also rated 'high-risk' and 'non-cooperative jurisdictions' by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)<sup>6</sup> in 2012.

Pakistan has undergone changes to several areas of **governance** since 1999, including a major one, i.e. the devolution of functions, powers and funds to provincial governments. The 18<sup>th</sup> Constitutional Amendment passed by the National Assembly of Pakistan in 2010 has placed Pakistan firmly on the way towards further **federalisation** and the **devolution** of public administration to provinces and districts. It has resulted in significant autonomy for the provincial Governments, including on matters of taxation, local governance and law and order as well as the delivery of public services in the areas of education, health, agriculture and public infrastructure. While all four provinces have enacted legislation for local governance, replacing the since 2010 suspended federal act, only Balochistan has held elections in 2014. Remaining provinces and the federal capital seem instead to be entangled into a legislative labyrinth (reconstitution of the Election Commission of Pakistan, fresh census, and electoral reforms) with no immediate resolution in sight.

Pakistan has an ambitious and comprehensive programme of reforms to accelerate growth and poverty reduction. Governance reforms, particularly in the areas of tax administration, procurement, financial management and devolution of power to local governments are key features of the programme. However, the deteriorating security situation and the global economic meltdown, coupled with high energy and food prices, had a disastrous effect on the economy. Poor governance has added to the misery of the people. Corruption remains an obstacle to political, social and economic development. In The Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International in 2013, Pakistan ranked 127 out of 177 countries.

In the **education sector**, all legislation and administration of all aspects of elementary and secondary education were transferred to provincial level. As of July 2011, the functions of the Federal Ministry of Education (such as policy, strategic planning, curriculum and syllabi, centres of excellence, standards of education and Islamic education) were devolved to the provinces. Each Province is responsible for developing, implementing, and monitoring an Education Sector Plan as well as ensuring the constitutional right to free and compulsory education for all 5-16 year olds (Article 25a of the 18th Amendment). Thus the aim of EU's support to education is at the provincial level to improve access to and quality of **education for all boys and girls**.

Similarly, all government responsibilities pertaining to **rural development** and related sectors ranging from local governance, water and sanitation, environment to agriculture, irrigation and livestock have been devolved to the provinces. However, unlike in the education sector there are currently no overarching federal or provincial policy or governance framework documents addressing specifically

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<sup>5</sup> <http://ffp.statesindex.org/2014-pakistan>

<sup>6</sup>Financial Action Task Force (FATF) was set up to initially examine and develop measures to combat money laundering. And now they incorporate efforts to combat terrorist financing.  
[http://issuu.com/fatf/docs/fatf\\_annual\\_report\\_2012\\_2013?e=2854558/5954304#search](http://issuu.com/fatf/docs/fatf_annual_report_2012_2013?e=2854558/5954304#search)

rural development, which the EU is aiming to address through future interventions that also aim to contribute to the elaboration of dedicated policy and budgetary frameworks for community-driven local development.

More recently, the government unveiled its Vision 2025(<http://pakistan2025.org/>) in order to define clearly the long term aspiration of the country. This vision after nationwide consultations has identified seven pillars (priority areas):

- “people first”: developing social and human capital and empowering women;
- Growth: sustained, indigenous and inclusive growth;
- Governance: institutional reform of the democratic governance and modernization of the public sector;
- Security: energy, water and food security;
- Entrepreneurship: private sector and entrepreneurship-led growth;
- Knowledge economy: developing a competitive knowledge economy through value addition;
- Connectivity: modernising transport infrastructure and regional interconnectivity.

**Local conflict** in the northwest of Pakistan (FATA, an area with a specific status inherited from the colonial period), fuelled by Afghan wars and the arrival of militants, and the military intervention by the Pakistani Army, has led to the internal displacement and emergency needs of more than one and a half million people. The most recent displacements from NorthWaziristan following military operations beginning in May 2014 have resulted in the displacement of over half a million people. Military operations in the Khyber agency since mid-October 2014 have resulted in 200 000 people being forced to leave their homes. In addition, the provinces of Sindh and Punjab have also experienced radicalisation and terrorism fomented by Pakistani extremists. Recently, some groups of the Pakistani Taliban have announced their allegiance to the IS. The Government is seriously concerned by the possible internal repercussions of the on-going conflict in Iraq and Syria on the internal situation, where a majority of Muslims belonging to Sunna coexist with Shia Muslims. At the same time, inter-sectarian violence is on the increase.

**Terrorism**-related losses in Pakistan amount to 50,000 lives since 2001. Since the 2013 elections – which led to the first ever handing over of power from one elected civilian government to the next – terrorist attacks have continued and threatened to undermine the government's economic recovery program. The government has been pursuing a policy of dialogue with the TTP which has not yielded any concrete results so far. Meanwhile, the army, who has been sceptical about peace talks from the outset, increasingly carried out "surgical" air strikes in North Waziristan reportedly resulting in the death of up to 150 militants. The situation remains fluid, as exemplified by the major terrorist attack carried out by TTP at Karachi's airport on 9 June. Furthermore, a National Internal Security Policy was adopted in February 2014, which is Pakistan's first ever comprehensive security strategy; the provision of resources for its implementation and the strengthening of civilian control over the military establishment remain challenges.

There are over 1.6 million registered Afghans **refugees** and an estimated additional 1.2 million undocumented Afghans in Pakistan; support continues to be needed for protection activities including the preservation of asylum space, status determination and resettlement.

Pakistan is signatory to a number of international **human rights conventions**. In 2010, it ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention against Torture. Pakistan underwent a Universal Periodic Review (UPR) at the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva on 30 October 2012. Risks to deviate from core international commitments are indeed present and relate to multiple factors such as tribal culture, a defiant legal system, weak institutional capacity of duty bearers in the area of human rights, and inadequate funding from the state to provide basic services, including education, health and justice. Redressing these ground realities requires a long-



term consistent effort of the state as well as of society as a whole<sup>7</sup>. Following Pakistan's commitment to ratify and effectively implement 27 core international conventions in the fields of human rights, labour rights, environment protection and good governance, the EU offered Pakistan preferential access to the EU market under the GSP+ scheme as from 1 January 2014.

### **3.2 Regional context**

Situated in an extremely politically **volatile region**, the relation between Pakistan and the neighbouring countries has proven difficult since many years. Pakistan and India experienced three wars (1947, 1965 and 1971, serious tensions in 1999, 2001 - 2002 and even currently October 2014); most of the conflicts are linked to the disputed region of Kashmir. In recent weeks, there have been a series of incidents at the Line of Control, with both sides accusing the other of initiating the shelling. There are also mutual accusations by India and Pakistan of interference in their respective internal affairs and of attempts at destabilisation.

Relations with Iran are delicate, and Balochistan bordering Iran is a province where stability has been hampered by nationalist militants since years, with a hard-handed response by law enforcement and security agencies, accused of grave human rights offences, including enforced disappearances and extra-judicial killings on a large scale.

Pakistan is a member of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) since 2007 and of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) since 1985. As a founding member of the SAARC, Pakistan's role in the regional cooperation is mainly characterised through its active role in the SAARC summits and activities.

Much of the regional dimension in which EU-Pakistan relations are taking place have focused on the Afghanistan-Pakistan security nexus, but there is scope to widen the SAARC angle and capitalise on the EU's trade and aid links to develop a broader vision of the EU's cooperation in Pakistan that takes into account also the wider region, notably the growing role of China, as well as opportunities to deepen regional integration and cooperation on joint areas of interest.

### **3.3 The donor community in Pakistan**

Total flows of ODA are approximately 6-8% of Pakistan's annual budget. After the USA, the World Bank, Japan and the UK, the European Commission is the fifth biggest grant donor in Pakistan.

In response to the November 2004 decision by the General Affairs and External Relations Council, the Commission is conducting an EU roadmap for donor harmonisation in Pakistan. The EU Delegation leads the process of coordination, harmonisation and alignment of donors' efforts in close cooperation with some key Member States, like the UK, the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, France and Italy under the Donor Poverty Reduction Working Group.

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<sup>7</sup> The UNSR on the independence of judges and lawyers from 2013. In it reference is made in particular to problematic ambiguities in jurisdictions and legal systems; the new system for appointing judges of the superior courts; the lack of protection for judicial actors; the application of discriminatory laws; the Supreme Court's judicial activism and the use of its suo moto powers; the precarious situation of women in the justice system; and the existence of informal "justice" systems. Additionally, one should also scrutinize how previous operations tackled the issues raised by CEDAW report from 2013.

The EU Delegation plays a prominent role in other several sector donor groups such as in education, environment, in the Interagency Gender and Development Group (INGAD), and in groups on human rights, trade policy, micro-finance services and governance.

There is a large degree of similarities in goals and objectives between the EU and Member States reinforcing a strategic EU-Pakistan partnership for peace and development. Rooted in shared values, principals and commitments, it sets out clear priorities to invest in catalysing reforms aiming at: i) peace building and stabilization; ii) enhancement of democracy and human rights; iii) building macroeconomic stability with high economic growth that will accelerate job creation and reduce poverty; iv) ensuring the effective delivery of basic public services such as education, health, water and sanitation and social protection, and v) support for regional integration. Division of labour is presented in annex 8.

The World Bank and the Asian Development Bank are by far the largest providers of development loans to the country, followed by KfW and AFD.


The principal platform for coordination of all financial and technical cooperation between the donor community and the EU is managed by the Economic Affairs Division (EAD) of the Pakistani Ministry of Finance.

**Pakistan**

Receipts	2010	2011	2012
Net ODA (USD million)	3 013	3 508	2 019
Bilateral share (gross ODA)	71%	69%	63%
Net ODA / GNI	1.6%	1.6%	0.8%
Net Private flows (USD million)	134	473	521
<i>For reference</i>	<i>2010</i>	<i>2011</i>	<i>2012</i>
Population (million)	173.1	176.2	179.2
GNI per capita (Atlas USD)	1 050	1 120	1 260

Top Ten Donors of gross ODA (2011-12 average)		(USD m)
1	United States	951
2	IDA	717
3	Japan	438
4	United Kingdom	318
5	EU Institutions	223
6	Germany	161
7	Turkey	108
8	GAVI	87
9	Australia	81
10	United Arab Emirates	80

**Bilateral ODA by Sector (2011-12)**



Sources: OECD - DAC, World Bank; [www.oecd.org/dac/stats](http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats)

**3.4 Overview of European Union's cooperation with Pakistan**

**The EC Treaty Objectives for External Co-operation and other applicable documents:**

On the basis of Article 179 of the Treaty of the European Union, a new Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) was adopted in December 2006. Pakistan is eligible to participate in cooperation programmes financed under the DCI [regulation (EC) N° 1905 of the European Parliament and the Council of 18 December 2006 establishing a financial instrument for development cooperation.

The EEC and Pakistan signed their first agreement in 1962. In 1976, The **EU-Pakistan comprehensive agreement** was signed and currently the legal and political basis for the relationship is the **2004 Cooperation Agreement**<sup>8</sup> which contains the following four objectives:

- To secure the conditions for and to promote the increase and development of two way trade between the Parties in accordance with the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation (WTO);
- To support Pakistan's efforts for comprehensive and sustainable development, including economic and social development policies which take account of the poor and disadvantaged sections of its population, particularly women in these sections, as well as the sustainable management of natural resources;
- To promote investment and economic, technical and cultural links in their mutual interest;
- To build Pakistan's economic capability to interact more effectively with the Community.

The 2001 Communication *Europe and Asia*<sup>9</sup> further defines the framework the following 6 objectives: (i) contribute to peace and security in the region and globally, through a broadening of our engagement with the region; (ii) further strengthen our mutual trade and investment flows with the region; (iii) promote the development of the less prosperous countries of the region, addressing the root causes of poverty; (iv) contribute to the protection of human rights and to the spreading of democracy, good governance and the rule of law; (v) build global partnerships and alliances with Asian countries, in appropriate international fora, to help address both the challenges and the opportunities offered by globalisation and to strengthen our joint efforts on global environmental and security issues; (vi) and help strengthen the awareness of Europe in Asia (and vice versa).

Given the changes in the nature of the Lisbon Treaty, introduced by the European Union in December 2009, the **EU Pakistan Five Year Engagement Plan**<sup>10</sup> was adopted in 2012 which considerably widens and deepens the cooperation between the EU and Pakistan and provides a framework for an EU-Pakistan strategic dialogue.

The overall aims of EU's support to Pakistan are to **fight poverty** and put the country on a path of sustainable growth. This is seen to succeed only if growth is founded on **political stability, social cohesion, the creation of productive and decent work opportunities, human and social development, the rule of law, and diversification of economic activity.**

### **The EU cooperation under the period 2007-2013:**

Under the Development Cooperation Instrument (**DCI**), an allocation of **€398 million** has been earmarked for Pakistan. There are two areas and one non-focal area under the EU-Pakistan country cooperation strategy for the period 2007 - 2013:

- **Rural development and natural resources management** in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (ex-North West Frontier Province) and Balochistan– with a particular emphasis on halting environmental degradation and water conservation. The aim is to improve livelihoods, income generation and employment in rural communities; including refugee-impacted areas. Specific objectives include improved natural resources management, development and rehabilitation of

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<sup>8</sup><http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/treatiesGeneralData.do?step=0&redirect=true&treatyId=368> Council Decision of 29th April 2004, 2004/870/EC between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

<sup>9</sup>Commission Communication COM(2001)469 "Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for enhanced partnerships"

<sup>10</sup>[http://eeas.europa.eu/pakistan/docs/2012\\_feb\\_eu\\_pakistan\\_5\\_year\\_engagement\\_plan\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/pakistan/docs/2012_feb_eu_pakistan_5_year_engagement_plan_en.pdf)

community physical infrastructure, participation of women in development activities and better livelihoods and incomes;

- **Education and human resources development National/in Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa** – the aim being to increase access to basic education and to support measures to improve the quality of education and to improve vocational training to prepare a growing number of youths for the job market;
- **Trade development** with a view to further integration of Pakistan into the world economy;
- **Human rights and democratisation.**

EU funding to address the priorities amounts to €213 million for the 2011-2013 period. A €200 million funding sum was allocated from 2007 to 2010.

**Annex 1 Indicative Allocations for Pakistan 2007-13**

MIP 2007-10: € 200 million			
Sector	Intervention Areas	Indicative Allocations (€ million)	% of MIP
FS 1	Rural Development and Natural Resources Management	108	54%
FS 2	Education and Human Resources Development	64	32%
NFS 1	Trade Development and Economic Cooperation	13	7%
NFS 2	Democratisation and Human Rights	13	7%
NFS 3	Anti-money Laundering	2	1%
<b>Total</b>		<b>200</b>	<b>100%</b>

MIP 2011-13: € 225 million			
Sector	Intervention Areas	Indicative Allocations (€ million)	% of MIP
FS 1	Rural Development and Natural Resources Management	90	40%
FS 2	Education and Human Resources Development	70	31%
NFS 1	Governance and Human Rights	50	22%
NFS 2	Trade Cooperation	15	7%
<b>Total</b>		<b>225</b>	<b>100%</b>

As EU policy in general favours, where and when possible, the adoption of sector-wide approaches (SWAP) and **budgetary support** wherever feasible the European Commission has provided **sector budget support (SBS)** to Pakistan in the past in the areas of **education, and health** and recently the district governance and community development programme in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). Currently, the European Commission's SBS is limited to the education sector (in Sindh Province and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) provinces), district governance and community development (in KP) with possible future support for a sector-wide approach in rural development (RD) and natural resource management (NRM) in NWFP and Baluchistan (a TA project to assess the possibilities of cooperation with the respective provincial Governments).

EU **thematic programmes** and Asia-wide programmes also provide support to Pakistan, e.g. in the areas of human rights, civil society and the environment. EU support is also developing EU-Pakistan trade and supporting three grant projects under SWITCH ASIA Programme promoting sustainable consumption and production in Pakistan.

EU programmes in Pakistan are aligned, to the strategies set out by the Pakistani government.

As for aid modalities, the implementation of the MIPs 2007 - 2013 comprises **39% budget support**, 17% through service contracts, 18% through grants to mainly Pakistani NGOs, 11% in delegation agreements with GIZ and blending of grants and loans through the Asia Invest Facility.

The share of funding through UN agencies is 16% contracted to UNDP, UNIDO, UNICEF and UN-Women. The breakdown does not include thematic funding, which is uniquely done through NGOs, mostly international, even though the Delegation has been putting a strong emphasis to increase involvement with national civil society organizations.

The total EU - Pakistan cooperation portfolio for 2007-2013 is breakdown as follow:

- 81% DCI country programme;
- 10% DCI horizontal and EIDHR;
- 9% IFS.

The backbone of the cooperation with Pakistan is the 5 years engagement plan signed in 2012, which details commitments from the two sides in the following areas:

- Strategic/Political area: regular strategic dialogue at ministerial level, complemented by dialogue at lower appropriate levels in each of the sectors referred;
- Security: comprehensive cooperation in the areas of counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics and fight against organised crime, and disarmament;
- Democracy, Governance, Human Rights and Socioeconomic Development: parliamentary exchanges, capacity building in the related fields (judiciary, police,...), dialogue on macro-economic reforms and dialogue on Human Rights;
- Trade and Investment: dialogue concentrated on GSP+, EU comprehensive Trade agreement, promotion of conducive environment for business, encourage Public Private dialogue and partnership, transfer of technologies;
- Energy: promote corporate joint ventures in the energy sector including hydro-electricity power and renewable, transfer of technologies;
- Sectoral Cooperation: in the field of aid effectiveness, local development, migration, culture, education and TVET training, Higher Education, agriculture, Water (flood protection), research through EU Framework Programmes.

**Other relevant financing available to Pakistan during the period 2007-2013 includes:**

**1) The thematic programmes of the DCI:**

- Investing in People – €1,367 million;
- Environment and Sustainable Management of Natural Resources €2 million;
- Food security €30 million ;
- Non-State Actors and Local Authorities (NSA-LA) €13 million;
- Migration and Asylum €11.1 million.

**2) Other EU Instruments:**

- The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) – €4.2 million
- Instrument for Stability (IFS) – €64.2 million
- Food facility – €50 million

The European Union's current humanitarian actions in Pakistan focus on three separate but interrelated crises: **support for people affected by the conflict** and over a million internally displaced persons (IDPs); **support for those malnourished and food insecure**; **support for Afghan refugees** living in Pakistan, mostly through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Response to natural disasters is also an integral part of the humanitarian commitment, together with disaster risk reduction. ECHO's total humanitarian aid to Pakistan for the period 2008 - 2013 was €436.5 million.

In order to create a **strategic accent on priority areas when evaluating the overall framework**, consider the current Multi Annual Indicative Programme 2014 - 2020, with an allocated budget of approximately €653 million, shared among the following focal areas:

- Sector 1: Rural Development, approximately €340 million (52%);
- Sector 2: Education, approximately €210 million (32%);
- Sector 3: Good Governance, Human Rights and Rule of Law, approximately €97 million (15%);
- Support measures during the identification phase, during the formulation phase, for macroeconomic and political risk assessments, for public finance management assessments, for policy dialogue and visibility, other studies and unforeseen needs: approximately €6 million (1%).

## **4 SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION**

### **4.1 Legal, temporal and thematic scope**

#### **4.1.1 Legal scope**

The overall engagement with **Pakistan** must be taken into consideration including agreements, the co-operation framework and any other official commitments. This concerns notably all the financing instruments relevant to Pakistan: the Development Co-operation Instrument (DCI) for bilateral geographic cooperation and thematic instruments, of which the most important are the Food Security Thematic Programme and the Instrument for Stability (IfS) – both short-term and long-term, the Non-State Actors-Local Authorities thematic programme, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), Erasmus Mundus programme and occasionally allocations from the migration thematic programme and the Investing in people thematic programme.

Changes in the European Union institutional set-up with the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) should be taken into account.

#### **4.1.2 Temporal scope**

The evaluation covers the European Union's co-operation strategy with the country/region and its implementation during the period 2007 to 2014.

#### **4.1.3 Thematic scope**

The evaluation should cover the following areas of European Union co-operation with Pakistan:

- **Rural development including livelihood and community driven local development;**
- **Education, including vocational training;**

- **Democracy and good Governance, Human rights, rule of law.**<sup>11</sup>

The provision of sector budget support for Rural Development and Education sectors is included in the analysis.

The evaluation should also cover the following cross-cutting issues: **Gender equality** and **Environment sustainability**.

## **5 EVALUATION FOCUS**

The evaluation must be **strategic**. It should therefore assess the extent to which the EU strategy as a whole and the aid modalities used (including Budget support) represented an appropriate response to the challenges faced by Pakistan, taking into account the evolution of the country context over the evaluation period (e.g. situation of fragility, devolution process, risk of corruption and fraud, etc.). For the fragility aspects, this might include for instance an analysis of the extent to which EU support was in line with the OECD/DAC Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations issued in 2011 – (see annex 9).

The evaluation will then focus on the three main sectors of Cooperation with Pakistan, namely: **Rural development, Education and Governance**. In each of these areas the evaluation must assess whether and to what extent the various interventions financed by the EU, have been appropriately chosen and contributed to the achievement of the **EU sector strategic objectives**.

The actual coverage of the evaluation in each sector will be fine-tuned in the inception phase based on the intervention logic and in close cooperation with the reference group, including EU Member States. In the 3 sectors mentioned above, the evaluation must thoroughly assess the complementarity and coordination of the EU projects and programmes with the other interventions implemented at sector level by the EU Member States. **The main objective of this analysis is to inform a joint programming exercise which might be launched in 2016**. The coordination with other major development partners may also be considered if relevant.

The contractor should also analyse whether the following cross-cutting issues have been taken into account in the programming documents and during the implementation: **Gender equality**<sup>12</sup>; and **Environment sustainability**. The evaluation should also cover **trade related assistance**.

The evaluation will therefore assess:

- the relevance and coherence<sup>13</sup> of the European Union’s co-operation strategies for the period 2007 - 2014;
- the results of the European Union’s co-operation, focusing on impact, sustainability, effectiveness and efficiency for the period 2007-2014<sup>14</sup> - and on intended effects for the period under the programming cycle 2014 - 2020;

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<sup>11</sup> the analysis of the previous Asian regional evaluation shall be taken into consideration

<sup>12</sup> The gender commitments of EU development policy are spelled out in the **EU Plan of Action on Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment (2010-2015)**, which aims to reinforce EU coordination on gender equality policies in development cooperation and improve the work on this matter. SEC (2010) 265 final: [http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/SEC\\_2010\\_265\\_gender\\_action\\_plan\\_EN.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/SEC_2010_265_gender_action_plan_EN.pdf).

<sup>13</sup> For the definition of relevance and coherence as evaluation criterion see annex 5.

<sup>14</sup> *This is normally either the period since the last evaluation undertaken or a period covering the previous cycle and the current one till when it is implemented.*

- the consistency between programming, identification, formulation and final implementation;
- the value added<sup>15</sup> of the European Union's interventions (at both the strategic; choice of instruments and implementing partners, and implementation levels);
- the 3Cs: coordination of the European Union's interventions with the EU Member States ' interventions which are active in Pakistan; the Coordination with other donors; coherence with the development objectives of Pakistan; Internal coherence (consistency) between the various bilateral programmes as well as with the regional and thematic programmes; finally the external coherence with other European policies (see annex 5);
- the appropriateness of the mix of aid modalities (projects, budget support and technical assistance) used in the 3 main sectors evaluated.

Interventions funded by ECHO (European Commission Humanitarian Office), and EIB (European Investment Bank) are not part of the evaluation scope. However, coherence and complementarity between these interventions and the strategy evaluated must be examined. In this context, the on-going evaluation of ECHO's interventions in Pakistan 2010-2014 should be taken into account as one of the issues it covers is Linking Relief Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD).

The analysis of budget support should: i) assess the extent to which the provision of budget support at sub-national level has been effective; ii) take into consideration the risk management framework, where the delegation of EU and Headquarters (incl. EEAS) analyse the main risks related to Budget support (i.e. political; macro-economic; developmental; public finance management and corruption /fraud).

## **6 RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF THE EVALUATION**

The EuropAid Evaluation Unit is responsible for the management and the supervision of the evaluation. The progress of the evaluation will be followed closely by a Reference Group consisting of representatives of all concerned services in the Commission and EEAS, as well as (when Regional programs are managed by a EUD) the EU Delegation in Pakistan, the Embassy of Pakistan to the European Union in Belgium as observer, under the Evaluation Unit's chairmanship.

Its principal functions will be to:

- Discuss draft reports produced by the evaluation team during meetings in Brussels;
- Ensure the evaluation team has access to and consults all information sources and documentation on activities undertaken;
- Discuss and comment on the quality of work done by the evaluation team;
- Provide feedback on the findings, **perspectives on possible mitigating measures in the respective sectors**, conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation.

The Reference Group communicates with the evaluation team via the Evaluation manager.

All meetings with the Reference group will be attended at least by the team leader and by one sectoral expert, member of the evaluation team. Other experts will be available to be reached by phone. The contractor shall prepare draft minutes of the meetings. Once approved, these minutes shall be distributed by the Evaluation manager to the participants.

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<sup>15</sup> See annex 5.



## 7 PROCESS AND DELIVERABLES

The overall guidance to be used is available on the web page of the DG DEVCO Evaluation Unit under the following address:

[https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/evaluation-approach-and-methodology\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/evaluation-approach-and-methodology_en)

The basic approach to the assignment consists of three **main phases**, which encompasses several stages. **Deliverables** in the form of reports<sup>16</sup> and slide presentations should be submitted at the end of the corresponding stages.

The table below summaries these phases:

<i>Evaluation phases:</i>	<i>Stages:</i>	<i>Deliverables<sup>17</sup>:</i>
1. <u>Desk phase</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inception: Structuring of the evaluation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ <i>Slide presentation</i></li> <li>➤ <i>Inception report</i></li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Data collection</li> <li>• Analysis</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ <i>Desk report</i></li> </ul>
2. <u>Field phase</u> (mission in the country/region)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Data collection</li> <li>• Verification of the hypotheses</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ <i>Slide presentation</i></li> <li>➤ <i>Country notes for regional evaluations</i></li> </ul>
3. <u>Synthesis phase</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Analysis</li> <li>• Judgements</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ <i>Draft final report</i></li> <li>➤ <i>Slide presentation adapted + minutes of the country seminar</i></li> <li>➤ <i>Final report</i></li> </ul>

All reports will be written in **English**. The reports must be written in Arial or Times New Roman minimum 11 and 12 respectively, single spacing. Inception and Desk reports will be delivered only electronically. The Draft Final report and the Final report will also be delivered in hard copies. The Executive summaries in **English, French and Urdu (using Arabic characters)** required as well as the cover page photo (free of any copyright, free of charge) will be delivered separately in electronic form. The electronic versions of all documents need to be delivered in both editable and not editable format.

<sup>16</sup> For each Report a draft version is to be presented. For all reports, the contractor may either accept or reject through a *response sheet* the comments provided by the Evaluation manager. In case of rejection, the contractor must justify (in writing) the reasons for rejection. When the comment is accepted, a reference to the text in the report (where the relevant change has been made) has to be included in the response sheet.

<sup>17</sup>The contractors must provide, whenever requested and in any case at the end of the evaluation, the list of all document reviewed, data collected and databases built.

## 7.1 The desk phase

The desk phase comprises two components: the Inception stage covering a presentation and the delivery of the *Inception report* and a second stage which ends with the production of the *Desk report*.

### 7.1.1 Presentation of the Intervention Logic & Evaluation Questions (Inception meeting)

The assignment will start with the Team leader's **mission to Brussels for a briefing session**.

The Team leader will carry out a **preparatory visit to the field** to discuss main issues with the EU Delegation, **EU Member States**, and key beneficiaries **including the national counterpart, the Economic Affairs Division (EAD) of the Ministry of Finances**. It may be carried out before drafting the diagrams and the evaluation questions or after the Inception meeting, in agreement (written ex-ante approval) with the Evaluation manager. **The actual coverage of the evaluation in each sector will be defined in the Inception Phase based on the intervention logic and in close cooperation with the reference group, including EU Member States.**

This visit should not exceed one week. It will be quoted but the cost of the related inputs will not be eligible for payment if the visit does *in fine* not take place. Alternatively, the related eligible costs will be revised if it is substantially modified (duration, number of experts, category etc.). After that, the contractor shall prepare a *slide presentation* including the Intervention logic (IL) diagrams, the evaluation questions, inclusive their justification, and judgement criteria.

For this presentation, the main work consists in:

- Identifying and prioritizing the co-operation objectives as observed in relevant documents regarding the European Union's co-operation with **Pakistan** and translate these specific objectives into intended results;
- Reconstructing the intervention logics (faithful and reconstructed) of the EU in the framework of its co-operation with **Pakistan**;
- Defining the Evaluation Questions with their rationale.

More information on the main principles for drafting evaluation questions, on the evaluation criteria and key issues can be found in the annexes 5 and 6.

A half-day inception meeting will be held with the Reference group in Brussels, to present via a **slide presentation**:

- the IL diagrams;
- the evaluation questions (their justification and judgement criteria).

These documents will be revised to take into account the comments formulated by the Reference group.

**Furthermore, for all meetings (briefing meeting and Reference group meetings), the contractor shall prepare draft meetings minutes to be distributed by the Evaluation manager after their approval by participants.**

### 7.1.2 The Inception report

Taking into account the outcome of the Inception meeting, the contractor must deliver an **Inception report** which should contain the following elements:

- the national background/context (political, economic, social, etc.) and the cooperation context between the European Union and the partner country/region;
- a concise description of the European Union's cooperation rationale with Pakistan;
- the intervention logics (both faithful and reconstructed) of the European Union's cooperation;
- an inventory of spending and non-spending activities carried out by the EU during the period to be finalised in the desk report;
- the validated evaluation questions (upon validation by the Evaluation unit, the evaluation questions become contractually binding); a limited number of appropriate judgment criteria per evaluation question and a limited number of quantitative and/or qualitative indicators related to each judgment criterion;
- a proposal outlining suitable methods of collection and analysis of data and information, indicating any limitations;
- a detailed work plan for the next phases.

If necessary, the report will also suggest modifications to the composition of the evaluation team and/or to the work plan and schedule.

### 7.1.3 The Desk report

Upon approval of the Inception report, the contractor will carry out the last stage of the desk phase and will prepare and present a **Desk report** which should include at least the following elements:

- The agreed evaluation questions with judgement criteria and their corresponding quantitative and qualitative indicators;
- A first analysis and first elements of response to each evaluation question and the hypotheses and assumptions to be tested in the field phase;
- Progress in the gathering of data. The complementary data required for analysis and for data collection during the field mission must be identified;
- The comprehensive list of EU activities finalised and a list of activities examined during the desk phase, bearing in mind that activities analysed in the desk phase must be representative<sup>18</sup>;
- Methodological design, including the evaluation design, data collection tools to be applied in the field phase, and appropriate methods to analyse the information, indicating any limitations;
- A work plan for the field phase: a list with brief descriptions of activities for in-depth analysis in the field. The Evaluators must explain their representativeness and the value added of the planned visits.

The contractor will present (slides presentation) and discuss the Desk report with the Reference group in a half-day meeting in Brussels. The report will be finalised on the basis of the comments received.

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<sup>18</sup> The representativeness must address the different dimensions (percentage of funds, sample size and choice – diversity, illustration of the chosen interventions ...).

The field mission cannot start without the authorisation of the Evaluation manager.

All the evaluations performed during the period should be analysed, included those where success was moderate or absent, where it is possible to extract key lessons for the future.

## 7.2 Field phase

The fieldwork shall be undertaken on the basis set out in the Desk report. The work plan and schedule of the mission will be agreed in advance (in principle at least three weeks before the mission starts). If it appears necessary to substantially deviate from the agreed fieldwork approach and/or schedule, (duration, number of experts, category etc.), the contractor must ask for the approval of the Evaluation manager before any changes can be applied. The related eligible costs will be revised accordingly. At the conclusion of the field mission the contractor will present the preliminary findings of the evaluation:

- (1) to the EU Delegation(s), during a de-briefing meeting; and
- (2) to the Reference group in Brussels with the support of a **slide** presentation (half-day meeting).

## 7.3 Synthesis and dissemination phases

### 7.3.1 The Draft final report

The contractor will submit *the Draft final report* in conformity with the structure set out in annex 2. The **Draft final report** will be discussed with the Reference group in Brussels. Following the meeting with the Reference group, the consolidated comments will be sent by the Evaluation Manager and the contractor will make appropriate modifications to the Draft final report taking into consideration comments received during de-briefing meetings with the Delegation and with the Reference group.

### 7.3.2 The in-country seminar

The approved Draft final report will be presented at a seminar in **Islamabad - Pakistan** using a slide presentation. The purpose of the seminar is to present the results, the conclusions and the preliminary recommendations of the evaluation to the national authorities, the Delegation and to all the main stakeholders (EU Member States, representatives of civil society organisations, other donors etc.) and obtain their reactions.

For the seminar, 50 hard copies of the main report (see annex 2 of the ToR) have to be produced and delivered (in principle) to the EU Delegation (the exact number of reports, addressee and delivery date will be specified by the Evaluation manager). Before printing, a proof copy shall be sent to and approved by the Evaluation manager.

The contractor shall submit the minutes of the seminar. These minutes, once approved by the Evaluation manager, will be included as an annex of the Final report. The (if necessary) updated slide presentation will be made available to the Evaluation manager (to be published on Internet).

The seminar logistics (room rental, catering etc.) costs are not to be included in the offer. The cost related to the presence of the experts is to be covered by the offer.

### 7.3.3 The Final report

The contractor will prepare the **Final report** taking into account the comments expressed during the seminar. The Final report must be approved by the Evaluation manager before it is printed. The executive summary not exceeding 5 pages shall be translated in **French and Urdu (using Arabic characters)** and included into the Final main report.

The offer will be based on 50 hard copies of the **final main report** (without annexes) and 2 copies with annexes. The Evaluation manager will indicate in due time how many copies exactly are to be sent to the DEVCO Evaluation Unit and how many to be delivered at the place of the dissemination seminar. Before printing, a proof copy shall be sent to and approved by the Evaluation manager. A non-editable version on KEY USB support shall be added to each printed Final main report.

The Evaluation Unit will make a formal judgement on the quality of the evaluation in the "Quality Assessment Grid" (see annex 3) to be sent to the contractor before publication on Internet.

#### 7.3.4 Dissemination

Dissemination activities such as seminars may be requested by the Contracting authority. In case of financial implications on the total contractual amount, such request (requests) will be formalised via a rider.

## 8 THE EVALUATION TEAM

The evaluation team as such is expected to possess expertise in:

- **Evaluation methods and techniques** in general and, if possible, of evaluation in the field of external relations and development cooperation. It is highly desirable that at least the Team leader is fully familiar with the Commission's methodological approach cf. EuropAid Evaluation Unit's website:

[http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/evaluation/methodology/methods/mth\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/evaluation/methodology/methods/mth_en.htm) );

- **Evaluation methods in fragile situations**—*see annex 9* (given the programme focus, expertise in the security-development nexus will be an advantage)
- **Democracy, good governance, rule of law, conflict prevention, Conflict prevention, Human rights (mention religious minorities, death penalty, women), Political economy.**
- Geographical experience: **knowledge of the region:** Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India.
- **Expertise in budget support modalities, included OECD/DAC methodology to evaluate Budget Support operations**
- **Rural Development**, including livelihood
- **Education and TVET**
- **Women empowerment and gender mainstreaming**
- **Environment and Disaster Management, Climate Change Adaptation** as cross-cutting issue
- **Economic and Trade Development** (included Private Sector Development)
- Languages :
  - All team members must have working knowledge of **English**;
  - At least one team member should have a **working knowledge of Urdu** (knowledge of Pashtu shall be an advantage).

The key skills are indicated **in bold**. In their absence, the 80 points threshold may not be reached. It is expected that the Team leader will be an expert of category Senior.

The team composition should be justified and the team coordination and members' complementarity should be clearly described. **A breakdown of working days per expert and per evaluation stage must be provided.**

The team members must be independent from the programmes/projects/policies evaluated. Should a conflict of interest be identified in the course of the evaluation, it should be immediately reported to the Evaluation manager for further analysis and appropriate measures.

The team will have excellent writing and editing skills. The Contractor remains fully responsible for the quality of the report. Any report which does not meet the required quality will be rejected.

During the offers evaluation process the contracting authority reserves the right to interview by phone one or several members of the evaluation teams proposed.

The Framework Contractor must make available an appropriate logistical support for the experts, including their travel and accommodation arrangements for each assignment, the secretarial support, appropriate **software and** communication means. The experts will be equipped with the standard equipment, such as an individual laptop, computer, mobile phones, etc. No additional cost for these items may be included in the offer.

## **9 TIMING**

The project implementation is due to start in January 2015. The expected duration is **12 months**. As part of the technical offer, the framework contractor must fill-in the timetable in the Annex 4.

## **10 OFFER FOR THE ASSIGNMENT**

The financial offer will be itemised to allow the verification of the fees compliance with the Framework contract terms as well as, for items under h to k of the contractual price breakdown model, whether the prices quoted correspond to the market prices. In particular, the local travel costs will be detailed and if necessary, justified in an Explanatory note. The per diems will be based on the UN per diem which are the maxima not to be exceeded.

The total length of sections 2, 3 and 4 of the technical offer (Framework contract, Annexe 1, section 10.3. b) may not exceed **15 pages**; a CV may not exceed 4 pages. References and data relevant to the assignment must be highlighted in bold (font minimum Times New Roman 12 or Arial, 11).

The methodology submitted shall not contain terms such as "if time allows", "if the budget allows", "if the data are available" etc. Should it appear that an activity foreseen in the methodology is impossible or inappropriate to be carried out due to force majeure or other reasons in the interest of the assignment, the change to the methodology as well as its financial impact must be agreed by the Evaluation manager.

The offer is expected to demonstrate the team's understanding of the ToR in its own words. Should the offer contain quotations, these sections must be clearly identified and sources indicated.

## **11 SECURITY PROVISIONS**

Given the prevailing security conditions in Pakistan, the contractor is advised to take out an insurance policy to cover the costs of repatriation and other measure that would be considered appropriate after consultation of the European Delegation in Islamabad. In order to cover these costs and envelope should be foreseen and clearly described and costs introduced under reimbursable costs.

## **12 TECHNICAL OFFERS EVALUATION CRITERIA**

The offers must contain as minimum all items referred to in the Annex 1, art. 10.3.b. of the Framework contract.

The offers evaluation criteria and their respective weights are:

	<b>Maximum</b>
<b>Total score for Organisation and methodology</b>	
Understanding of ToR	10
Organization of tasks including timing	10
Evaluation approach, working method, analysis	25
Quality control mechanism	5
<b>Sub Total</b>	<b>50</b>
<b>Experts/ Expertise</b>	
Team leader	20
Other experts	25
Expert for quality control	5
<b>Sub Total</b>	<b>50</b>
<b>Overall total score</b>	<b>100</b>

### **13 ANNEXES**

The contracting authority reserves the right to modify the annexes without prior notice.

## Annex C2: Methodological Approach

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### Acronyms

ADB	Asian Development Bank
AKDN	Aga Khan Development Network
AKRSP	Aga Khan Rural Support Programme
CACL	Combating Abusive Child Labour
CAPRI	Counter terrorism Associated Prosecution Reform Initiative
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CCBLE	Civilian Capacity Building for Law Enforcement
CDLD	Community Driven Local Development
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (of OECD)
DCI	Development Cooperation Instrument
DEVCO	European Commission Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
EEAS	European External Action Service
EHD	Encourage the Human Development
EIDHR	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
EQ	Evaluation Question
EU	European Union
FAFEN	Free and Fair Elections Network
FSP	Fragile States Principles
GIZ	German Agency for International Cooperation
IP3	Improving Parliamentary Performance
JC	Judgement Criteria
KP	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa



KP-DGCD	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa District Governance and Community Development Programme
KP-ESPSP	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Education Sector Plan Support Programme
KP-ESRP	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Education Sector Reform Programme
LPRN	Law and Policy Research Network
LTEOOP	Long Term Election Observation and Oversight in Pakistan
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MS	Member State
MTS	Margin Trading System
NAVTC	National Vocational & Technical Training Commission
NOC	No objection certificate
NSA	Non State Actors
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PEACE	Programme for Economic Advancement and Community Empowerment
PFM	Public Financial Management
PFM-SPP	Public Financial Management Support Programme for Pakistan
PITAD	Pakistan Institute for Trade and Development
PSD	Private Sector Development
RAHA	Sustainable rural development in the Refugee Affected and Hosting Areas of Pakistan
SEPSP	Sindh Education Plan Support Programme
SESSP	Sindh Education Sector Support Programme
SRSP	Sarhad Rural Support Programme
TA	Technical Assistance
TDEA	Trust for Democratic Accountability
TEVTA	Technical Education & Vocational Training Authorities
TRTA	Trade Related Technical Assistance
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organisation
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

## 1 Overall methodological approach

The methodology for this evaluation follows **EuropeAid's methodological guidelines** for thematic and other complex evaluations<sup>1</sup>, which is itself based on the OECD/DAC approach. It also takes account of recent developments promoted by DG DEVCO's Evaluation Unit, and good practices developed by ADE for strategic evaluations and notably for country-level evaluations.

As in most strategic evaluations conducted for DG DEVCO, we will apply a **theory-based non-experimental design** for this evaluation<sup>2</sup>, using a reconstructed intervention logic as the basis for assessing the contribution of EU cooperation to expected results. The analytical framework is mainly based on 'contribution analysis' principles. The approach uses an intervention logic analysis to consolidate all the most relevant elements of EU cooperation in a single framework that links rationale to strategy, projects and results (this is close to theory of change analysis). An evaluation framework consisting of evaluation questions (EQs), judgement criteria and indicators structures data collection and verification. Analysis is then performed on this basis, to assess to what extent and how the EU contributed to attainment of its cooperation objectives. This allows determining the extent to which judgment criteria may be validated, and then providing a synthesised answer to the EQ. The approach at the level of the EQs is presented below. From the answers to the EQs, the team derives a set of Conclusions and Recommendations.

The **intervention logic** is presented in Annex C3. The **Evaluation Questions** with their Judgement Criteria and Indicators are presented in Annex C4.

## 2 Approach for defining and responding to the EQs

### 2.1 Definition of the set of Evaluation Questions

This section presents the approach followed for the definition of the ten evaluation questions (EQs), and for responding to them. The global set of EQs is presented in the table below. Full EQs with Judgment Criteria and Indicators are provided in Annex C4.

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<sup>1</sup> [http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/evaluation\\_guidelines/](http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/evaluation_guidelines/)

<sup>2</sup> Theory-based evaluation is an approach in which attention is paid to *theories* of policy makers, programme managers or other stakeholders, i.e. collections of assumptions, and hypotheses - empirically testable - that are logically linked together.

**Table 1 - Set of Evaluation Questions**

<b>EQ1</b>	<b>Overall Strategy</b>	To what extent did the EU cooperation strategy respond to development priorities and challenges of the country?
<b>EQ2</b>	<b>Rural Development</b>	To what extent has the EU facilitated community empowerment and contributed to community driven development, in KP and Baluchistan?
<b>EQ3</b>	<b>Education</b>	To what extent has the EU support to the education sector (non TVET) contributed to improve service delivery, quality and equitable access to education in the provinces Sindh and KP?
<b>EQ4</b>	<b>TVET</b>	To what extent has the EU contributed to improve TVET service delivery, and skills and employability of trained students?
<b>EQ5</b>	<b>Democratisation</b>	To what extent did the EU contribute to strengthen the democratisation process in Pakistan?
<b>EQ6</b>	<b>Human Rights /Rule of law</b>	To what extent did the EU contribute to the protection and promotion of human rights, the improvement of justice, and to security and counter-terrorism?
<b>EQ7</b>	<b>Trade</b>	To what extent has EU cooperation support to trade contributed to increasing trade and investment flows with the EU and South Asia?
<b>EQ8</b>	<b>Aid modalities</b>	To what extent did the mix of aid modalities and the selection of implementing partners facilitate achievement of expected cooperation results?
<b>EQ9</b>	<b>Visibility</b>	What has been the visibility and perception of the EU in its pursuit of development cooperation objectives?
<b>EQ10</b>	<b>Coordination &amp; complementarity</b>	To what extent have EU interventions been complementary with those of other MS and coordinated with those of the other donors

Source: ADE

The set of EQs has been defined with a view to cover:

- A. the main **expected results** of EU cooperation, as made explicit in the intervention logic;
- B. the **evaluation criteria** and key issues to be covered in a country-level evaluation for DEVCO;
- C. the **10 principles** for good international engagement in fragile states and situations (FSPs).

*A. Reflecting expected results, as per the intervention logic*

Four evaluation questions relate to the most important sectors of the EU cooperation with Pakistan over the period: rural development (EQ2), Education (EQ3), TVET (EQ4), and Trade (EQ7). In addition, two thematic evaluation questions relate to the democratisation process (EQ5) and human rights/rule of law, justice, security and counter-terrorism (EQ6).

One question further addresses the overall EU cooperation strategy (EQ1).

This is shown in the figure on the next page, showing the linkage with the (summarised) intervention logic.


*B. Reflecting evaluation criteria and key issues*

The set of Evaluation Questions addresses all OECD-DAC evaluation criteria and the EU criteria and key issues, as shown in the table which follow thereafter.

*C. Reflecting the OECD-DAC's 10 principles for engagement in FSPs*

The set of evaluation questions further covers the 10 principles for good international engagement in fragile states and situations defined by the OECD-DAC in 2007, as shown in the next table.

Figure 1 - How the EQs cover the main areas of the Intervention logic



Source: ADE

**Table 2 - Coverage of the evaluation criteria by the EQs**

	EQ1 Strategy	EQ2 Rur. Dev.	EQ3 Education	EQ4 TVET	EQ5 Democrat- isation	EQ6 Human Rights/ Rule of Law	EQ7 Trade	EQ8 Aid modalities	EQ9 Visibility	EQ10 Compl.& Coord.
<b>DAC Criteria</b>										
Relevance	◆	◆	◆	◆	◆	◆	◆			
Effectiveness		◆	◆	◆	◆	◆	◆	◆		
Efficiency			◆					◆		
Impact			◆	◆						
Sustainability		◆	◆	◆			◆			
<b>Key EU criteria/issues</b>										
Coherence	◆							◆		◆
EU Value added		◆	◆	◆	◆	◆	◆			
3Cs	◆	◆	◆	◆	◆	◆	◆	◆		◆
Cross cutting issues (gender, env.)	◆	◆	◆	◆	◆	◆				
Visibility	◆								◆	

Source: ADE

**Table 3 - Coverage of the 10 FSPs by the EQs**

DAC Principle	Evaluation Question
1. Take the context as the starting point	Monograph on fragility EQ1 Strategy EQ2, EQ3, EQ4, EQ5, EQ6, EQ7: all sectors of intervention
2. Ensure that all activities do no harm	EQ2, EQ3, EQ4, EQ5, EQ6, EQ7: on design and implementation of interventions
3. Focus on state-building as the central objective	EQ1 Strategy EQ2 Rural development and community development EQ3 Education EQ5 Democratisation EQ6 Human rights / Rule of law EQ8 Modalities
4. Prioritise prevention.	EQ1 Strategy EQ6 Human rights / Rule of law
5. Recognise the links between political, security and development objectives	EQ1 Strategy Monograph on fragility
6. Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies	EQ2 Rural development, community development EQ3 Education EQ4 TVET EQ5, EQ6: Democratisation, Human rights / Rule of law
7. Align with local priorities in different ways in different contexts	EQ2 Rural development, community development EQ3 Education EQ4 TVET EQ5, EQ6: Democratisation, Human rights / Rule of law EQ8 Aid modalities and partners
8. Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors	Specific JCs on complementarity and coordination in EQ2 Rural development EQ3 Education (non TVET) EQ4 TVET EQ5 Democratisation EQ6 Human rights / Rule of law EQ7 Trade
9. Act fast... but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance	EQ1 Strategy
10. Avoid pockets of exclusion ('aid orphans').	EQ2 Rural development EQ3 Education EQ5 Democratisation EQ6 Human rights / Rule of law

Source: ADE

## 2.2 Structure of the Evaluation Questions

The four “sector” and the two “thematic” evaluation questions (EQ2 to EQ7) follow a similar structure and aim at capturing:

- 1) How have the challenges and needs been identified and analysed by the Commission (relevance)
- 2) What was the proposed response? (relevance/efficiency)
- 3) What was achieved? (effectiveness/efficiency)
- 4) What were the reasons behind the achievements/non achievements?

The first three points result from the factual information the collection of which is described in the sequence of judgement criteria (JC) and indicators. The fourth point is not handled as a specific JC in the sector questions, because a ‘judgment criterion’ is meant to be validated or not on the basis of the factual evidence collected through indicators. Rather, it is dealt with in the preliminary answer to the evaluation question making use of the information collected through the JCs of the EQ.

The assessment of these evaluation questions therefore largely follows a similar pattern:

EQn: To what extent did the EU contribute to *the intermediate impacts or expected outcomes as in the IL for that sector/theme/focal area?*

JCn1 The needs and the challenges in the sector have been duly identified and analysed by the EU

JCn3 The interventions have been implemented according to plan

JCn4 The BS interventions have produced their induced outputs

JCn5 to JCNx The interventions have achieved their expected outcomes

The questions on the strategy (EQ1), aid modalities, visibility/perception and complementarity/ coordination (EQ8 to EQ10) have an ad hoc structure and, where necessary, cover the sector aspects.

A synthetic overview of the Evaluation Questions with their Judgment Criteria is presented on the next page. Details (including indicators) are provided in Annex C4.



Figure 2 – Overview of Evaluation Questions and Judgment Criteria

<b>EQ1 EU cooperation strategy : response to development priorities and challenges</b>	1.1 Analysis of priorities and challenges	1.2 Portfolio addressed priorities & challenges	1.3 Suitable geographic & institutional selection	1.4 Lessons of analyses taken into account	1.5 Coherence with other EU policies			
<b>EQ2 Rural Development: community empowerment and community-driven development</b>	2.1 Analysis of needs and challenges	2.2 Interventions implemented as planned	2.3 Contribution to mobilisation of CBOs	2.4 CBOs developed & maintained local infrastructure	2.5 Access to public services improved			
<b>EQ3 Education: improved service delivery, quality and equitable access</b>	3.1 Analysis of needs, challenges & government policies	3.2 Design of BS programmes favoured outcomes	3.3 Coherence between national and regional support	3.4 SBS implemented as planned	3.5 Education policies improved by SBS	3.6 Offer and quality of education improved	3.7 Equitable access to education improved	
<b>EQ4 TVET: improved service delivery, skills and employability</b>	4.1 Analysis of needs and challenges	4.2 Interventions implemented as planned	4.3 TVET reform strengthened and implemented	4.4 Offer, quality & distribution of TVET services improved	4.5 Employability of workers increased			
<b>EQ5 Democratisation process strengthened</b>	5.1 Analysis of needs and challenges	5.2 Interventions implemented as planned	5.3 More credible & inclusive elections	5.4 Parliament: law-making, oversight & representation				
<b>EQ6 Human Rights / Rule of Law: human rights, justice, security and counter-terrorism</b>	6.1 Analysis of needs and challenges	6.2 Interventions implemented as planned	6.3 Gov. capacity to address HR issues increased	6.4 CSOs empowered to defend HR	6.5 Justice and polices services strengthened in the respect of HR	6.6 Access to justice increased	6.7 Public confidence in the rule of law increased	6.8 Resilience against terrorism strengthened
<b>EQ7 Trade: increasing trade and investment flows with the EU and South Asia</b>	7.1 Analysis of needs and challenges	7.2 Interventions implemented as planned	7.3 Business Intern. Organisations strengthened	7.4 Barriers to trade reduced	7.5 Investment & trade with EU & South Asia increased			
<b>EQ8 Aid modalities mix and selection of implementing partners</b>	8.1 Rationale based on sound analysis	8.2 EU organisation adapted & expertise mobilised	8.3 Chosen aid modalities facilitated results achievement					
<b>EQ9 Visibility and perception of the EU in its pursuit of development cooperation objectives</b>	9.1 EU visible to stakeholders	9.2 EU perceived as important contributor						
<b>EQ10 Complementary with EU MS and coordination with other donors</b>	10.1 Complementarity with MS strategies	10.2 Coordination with other donors						

Source: ADE

## 2.3 Methodological approach per Evaluation Question

### A. Overall approach

During the inception phase, the team identified potential sources of information and described in detail the methodological approach envisaged for answering each question. These approaches were largely adopted during the desk study, field and synthesis phases, with slight modifications where needed. The responses to the EQs (in the main report) and the evidence papers (Annexes A1 to A13) specify the sources and show the triangulation of information.

### B. Quality of evidence

The evidence papers per EQ (Annexes A4 to A13) also provide an indication of the quality of evidence at the level of each indicator. The team has used therefore the qualification presented in the table below.

**Table 4. Ranking of the Quality of evidence**

Ranking of Evidence	Explanation of ranking of quality of evidence
<b>Strong</b>	The finding is consistently supported by a range of evidence sources, including documentary sources, quantitative analysis and qualitative evidence (i.e. there is very good triangulation); or the evidence sources, while not comprehensive, are of high quality and reliable to draw a conclusion (e.g. strong quantitative evidence with adequate sample sizes and no major data quality or reliability issues; or a wide range of reliable qualitative sources, across which there is good triangulation).
<b>More than satisfactory</b>	There are at least two different sources of evidence with good triangulation, but the coverage of the evidence is not complete.
<b>Indicative but not conclusive</b>	There is only one evidence source of good quality, and no triangulation with their sources of evidence.
<b>Weak</b>	There is no triangulation and / or evidence is limited to a single source.

Source: ITAD

The evaluation team's assessment of the quality of the evidence at the level of the indicators is provided in the table below. In order to assess the quality of evidence at the level of the judgement criteria, a (non-weighted) average of the marks per indicator of the JC is computed. This is explained further on the next page.

**Table 5: Assessment of the Quality of evidence per Indicator, JC and EQ**

**Quality of evidence by JC (aggregation from Indicators in annexes)**  
 Legend: 4: strong  
 3: More than satisfactory  
 2: Indicative but not conclusive  
 1: Weak  
 For the JC, we used the following average scoring:  
 Strong > 3  
 More than satisfactory: > 2 and <= 3  
 Indicative but non conclusive: > 1 and <= 2  
 Weak <= 1

	EQ1	EQ2	EQ3	EQ4	EQ5	EQ6	EQ7	EQ8	EQ9	EQ10
JC 11	<b>3,1</b>	<b>JC 21 3,8</b>	<b>JC 31 3,6</b>	<b>JC 41 3,0</b>	<b>JC 51 3,5</b>	<b>JC 61 2,9</b>	<b>JC 71 3,4</b>	<b>JC 81 3,4</b>	<b>JC 91 3,2</b>	<b>JC 101 3,5</b>
I-111	3	I-211 4	I-311 4	I-411 4	I-511 3	I-611 3	I-711 4	I-811 4	I-911 4	I-1011 3
I-112	3	I-212 4	I-312 4	I-412 4	I-512 4	I-612 3	I-712 4	I-812 3	I-912 3	I-1012 4
I-113	3	I-213 4	I-313 4	I-413 3	I-513 4	I-613 3	I-713 4	I-813 2	I-913 3	<b>JC 102 3,5</b>
I-114	4	I-214 4	I-314 3	I-414 3	I-514 4	I-614 3	I-714 4	I-814 3	I-914 4	I-1021 4
I-115	3	I-215 4	I-315 3	I-415 3	I-515 4	I-615 3	I-715 3	I-815 4	I-915 2	I-1022 4
I-116	3	I-216 4	<b>JC 32 3,2</b>	I-416 2	I-516 3	I-616 3	I-716 2	I-816 4	I-916 3	I-1023 3
I-117	3	I-217 4	I-321 4	I-417 2	I-517 3	I-617 3	I-717 3	I-817 4	<b>JC 92 4,0</b>	I-1024 3
JC 12	<b>2,9</b>	I-218 3	I-322 4	I-418 3	I-518 3	I-618 3	I-718 3	<b>JC 82 3,7</b>	I-921 4	
I-121	3	I-219 3	I-323 3	<b>JC 42 3,0</b>	<b>JC 52 2,3</b>	I-619 2	<b>JC 72 3,8</b>	I-821 4		
I-122	3	I-2110 na	I-324 2	I-421 2	I-521 2	<b>JC 62 2,3</b>	I-721 4	I-822 3		
I-123	3	I-2111 na	I-325 3	I-422 3	I-522 2	I-621 2	I-722 3	I-823 4		
I-124	3	<b>JC 22 3,3</b>	<b>JC 33 3,3</b>	I-423 4	I-523 2	I-622 2	I-723 4	<b>JC 83 3,0</b>		
I-125	3	I-2.21/2	I-331 3	I-424 1	I-524 3	I-623 2	I-724 4	I-831 3		
I-126	2	I-2.25/2	<b>JC 34 3</b>	<b>JC 43 2,7</b>	<b>JC 53 3,0</b>	I-624 3	<b>JC 73 1,7</b>	I-832 3		
I-127	3	I-2.29/2	I-341/1	I-431 3	I-531 3	<b>JC 63 2,5</b>	I-731 2	I-833 3		
JC 13	<b>2,8</b>	<b>JC 23 2,3</b>	<b>JC 35 2,6</b>	I-432 3	I-532 3	I-631 3	I-732 2			
I-131	3	I-2.31 3	I-351 3	I-433 2	<b>JC 54 1,7</b>	I-632 2	I-733 1			
I-132	3	I-2.32 2	I-352 3	<b>JC 44 1,7</b>	I-541 1	<b>JC 64 3,0</b>	<b>JC 74 3,3</b>			
I-133	2	I-2.33 2	I-353 2	I-441 2	I-542 1	I-641 3	I-741 3			
I-134	3	<b>JC 24 2,2</b>	I-354 2	I-442 2	I-543 3	I-642 3	I-742 3			
JC 14	<b>2,5</b>	I-2.41 3	I-355 3	I-443 2	I-544 1	<b>JC 65 1,7</b>	I-743 4			
I-141	3	I-2.42 2	I-356 3	I-444 1	I-545 N/A	I-651 1	<b>JC 75 4</b>			
I-142	2	I-2.43 2	I-357 3	<b>JC 45 1,5</b>		I-652 1	I-751 4			
JC 15	<b>2,7</b>	I-2.44 3	I-358 2	I-451 2		I-653 3	I-752 4			
I-151	3	I-2.45 1	I-359 2	I-452 1		<b>JC 66 3,0</b>				
I-152	2	<b>JC 25 1,5</b>	I-3510 3			I-661 3				
I-153	3	I-2.51 2	<b>JC 36 2,333</b>			I-662 3				
		I-2.52 1	I-361 3			<b>JC 67 2,0</b>				
			I-362 2			I-671 3				
			I-363 2			I-672 1				
			I-364 4			<b>JC 68 3,0</b>				
			I-365 2			I-681 3				
			I-366 1			I-682 3				
			<b>JC-37 1,75</b>			I-683 3				
			I-371 3							
			I-372 2							
			I-373 1							
			I-374 1							

Source: ADE

### 3 Evaluation tools

The team has used a set of evaluation tools to collect and analyse data. The evaluators essentially conducted **documentary study** of more than 350 documents (EU and national policies and strategies, project documentation, grey literature, etc.); conducted **statistical and data analysis** (e.g. at EU portfolio and sector level); and collected through open or

semi-structured **interviews** the views of EU services, national authorities, civil society, implementing partners, other donors, etc. – more than 150 persons in total. The evidence papers (Annexes A1 to A13) show the tools used per EQ. The documents consulted are listed in the bibliography in Annex C6, and the persons met in Annex C5.

The combination of these tools has enabled the team to collect all the required information at the level of the indicators, and to triangulate and analyse the information from different sources with a view to validate (or invalidate) the judgment criteria, and to provide summary answers to the EQs.

#### **4 Selection of projects for in-depth study**

The answers to the EQs are based on **overall analysis** (general documentary study, portfolio analysis, interviews, etc.) as well as on **in-depth analysis of a selection** of interventions. This in-depth study allows the team to better understand the cooperation through concrete cases, and to provide clear examples to enrich and illustrate answers to the evaluation questions.

The selection of projects aims at covering most important projects in the key sectors to be examined, and at covering a variety of parameters to be addressed in this evaluation (e.g. aid modalities):

- **Sectors:** The selection covers a large share of each sector to be evaluated, as shown in the small table below. It includes the largest and main projects in each of them, in particular in rural development, education/TVET, and trade. In the field of governance there are a multitude of smaller projects covering a wide range of subsectors. It would obviously be difficult with available resources to cover all of them in depth. We have therefore included in the selection for in-depth study eight projects in this field (n°10 to 18), which cover different subsectors. The team necessarily examined a broader set of interventions, albeit in less details;
- **Modalities:** The selections covers a wide range of modalities, incl. budget support, joint management with international organisations, delegated management to EU MS, etc.;
- **Instruments:** The selections covers a wide range of financial instruments, such as ASIE, DCI-ASIE, Instrument for Stability, Rapid Reaction Mechanism, and EIDHR.
- **Sizes:** The selection covers a wide array of sizes, from large (80 €m) to relatively small (0,15 €m) projects;
- **Period:** The selection covers contracts spread on the entire evaluation period 2007-2014. It includes two contracts which decision dates go back to the earlier programming period (up to 2005);
- **Closed and on-going projects:** The selection includes closed projects, for which results and possibly impact should be observable. It also includes on-going or recent projects, for which we may examine preliminary results or the relevance of the design according to latest practices or context changes.

**Table 6. Coverage of the sectors by the selection of projects for in-depth study**

Sectors covered by the EQs	Selection (contracted)	% of total sector
1. Rural Development	€ 158 m	91%
2. Education	€ 146 m	100%
3. Democratic Governance	€ 49 m	63%
4. PFM	€ 12 m	86%
5. Trade	€ 15 m	99%

Source: ADE

**Table 7. Selection of interventions for in-depth study**

#	Title	Implementation years	EU Allocation	EU Commitments	EU Disbursements, (09/2015)	CRIS Decision #
<b>1. Rural Development</b>						
1	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa District Governance and Community Development Programme ( <b>KP-DGCD</b> )	2013-2018	€ 80 M	€ 78.6 M	€ 13.9 M	DCI-ASIE/2012/023-634 and DCI-ASIE/2012/024-349
2	Sustainable rural development in the refugee-affected and hosting areas of Pakistan ( <b>RAHA</b> )	2009-2013	€ 40 M	€ 39.5 M	€ 38.9 M	DCI-ASIE/2009/021-577
3	Programme for Economic Advancement and Community Empowerment ( <b>PEACE</b> )	2012-2016	€ 40 M	€ 40.0 M	€ 15.9 M	DCI-ASIE/2008/019-974 / and DCI-ASIE/2009/021-581
<b>2. Education and TVET</b>						
4	Sindh Education Plan Support Programme ( <b>SESP</b> )	2007-2011	€ 37.5 M	€ 37.5 M	€ 37.5 M	ASIE/2005/017-667
5	Sindh Education Sector Support Programme ( <b>SESSP</b> )	2012-2017	€ 30 M	€ 29.5 M	€ 11.4 M	DCI-ASIE/2011/023-009
6	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Education Sector Reform Program ( <b>KP-ESRP</b> )	2009-2013	€ 34.6 M	€ 34.6 M	€ 34.6 M	DCI-ASIE/2007/018-465
7	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Education Sector Plan Support Programme ( <b>KP-ESPSP</b> )	2014-2018	€ 40 M	-	-	DCI-ASIE/2013/024-616
8	Support to the Technical and Vocational Education and Training Sector in Pakistan ( <b>TVET</b> )	2012-2017	€ 19.5 M	€ 19.2 M	€ 13.9 M	DCI-ASIE/2008/019-952
9	Supporting TVET Reform in Pakistan ( <b>TVET II</b> )	2011-2016	€ 26 M	€ 25.5 M	€ 19.7 M	DCI-ASIE/2009/021-329
<b>3. Democratisation and human rights / rule of law</b>						
10	Improving Parliamentary Performance ( <b>IP3</b> )	2012-2014	€ 6.6 M	€ 5.8 M	€ 2.8 M	DCI-ASIE/2009/021-157
11	Long Term Election Observation and Oversight in Pakistan ( <b>LTEOOP</b> )	2012-2014	€ 2.5 M	€ 2.5 M	€ 2.3 M	IFS-RRM/2012/023-688 (contract 284-456)
12	Support Electoral reforms in Pakistan	2009-2011	€ 2.1 M	€ 2.1 M	€ 2.1 M	TBD (contract 224-115)
13	Citizens Justice and Peace Programme in KP	2012-2016	€ 14 M	€ 9.5 M	€ 0.1 M	DCI-ASIE/2013/024-662
14	Access to Justice for Poor and Vulnerable Groups through Support of Legal and Civil Society Organisations and the Judiciary in Punjab	2014-2017	€ 8 M	€ 7.5 M	€ 3.0 M	DCI-ASIE/2009/019-192
15	Civilian capacity building for law enforcement in Pakistan ( <b>CCBLE</b> )	2010-2011	€ 14.7 M	€ 14.7 M	€ 14.7 M	IFS-RRM/2009/022-083
16	Enhancing support for ending violence and discrimination against women	2009-2012	€ 43.6 M	€ 0.15 M	€ 1.5 M	EIDHR/2008/019-719
17	Combating abusive child labour II ( <b>CACL-II</b> )	2008-2013	€ 5 M	€ 4.9 M	€ 4.6 M	ASIE/2005/017-640
18	Counter terrorism associated prosecution reform initiative ( <b>CAPRI</b> )	2012-2015	€ 1.8 M	€ 1.8 M	€ 1.2 M	IFS-RRM/2012/023-136 (contract 298204)

#	Title	Implementation years	EU Allocation	EU Commitments	EU Disbursements, (04/2015)	CRIS Decision #
<b>4. PFM</b>						
19	Public Financial Management Support Programme for Pakistan ( <b>PFM-SPP</b> )	2014-2019	€ 15 M	€ 11.7 M	€ 3.1 M	DCI-ASIE/2012/023-505
<b>5. Trade</b>						
20	Trade Related Technical Assistance Programme ( <b>TRTA II</b> )	2009-2017	€ 11.5	€ 11.0 M	€ 9.9 M	DCI-ASIE/2008/019-792
21	Trade Related Technical Assistance, Private Sector Development Programme Phase III ( <b>TRTA/PSD III</b> )	2011-2015	€ 4.3 M	€ 4.1 M	€ 2.7 M	DCI-ASIE/2010/022-378

Source: ADE

## 5 Country visits and organisations met

### *Country visits*

Evaluation team members conducted a preliminary one-week visit to Pakistan (Islamabad and Peshawar) in March 2015, during which it met with the EU Delegation and several other national and international stakeholders.

The evaluation team conducted the main country mission over 23-30 November 2015. It enabled them to meet with a variety of stakeholders in Islamabad, Karachi, Peshawar, and Lahore. In a few cases even when it proved impossible to meet a key resource person outside Islamabad the team could invite that person to Islamabad or take advantage of his or her passage in the city.

Pakistani team members could further conduct in-country interviews at other moments in time, leveraging on their presence in the country.

The team leader will finally present the main findings and recommendations of this evaluation at a seminar in Islamabad planned in spring 2016.

### *Organisations interviewed*

Over the course of this evaluation, the evaluators have collected the views of more than 150 persons. A large majority of these persons were met face-to-face, in Brussels and in Pakistan; some of them based elsewhere were interviewed by phone.

We provide in the list below an overview of the main organisations which representatives we were able to meet during the process. The list of individuals interviewed is presented in Annex C5.

- **EU:**
  - EU Delegation to Pakistan
  - ECHO Regional office, Islamabad
  - DEVCO, ECHO, EEAS, DG TRADE headquarters
- **Governmental authorities /institutions:**
  - Pakistan Mission to the EU, Economic Minister

- National Assembly Secretary, Islamabad
- Special Secretary to Chief Minister, KP
- Member of the National Assembly Islamabad (Chairman of Policy Council PTI)
- Punjab Public Prosecution Department
- Additional Chief Secretary, KP
- National Project Director, CDLD
- CDLD Team, KP
- Deputy Secretary and Director, Local Government School, KP
- Elementary & Secondary Education Department of KP Province
- TEVTA, KP
- Reform Support Unit, Department of Education, Sindh
- Ministry of Federal Education and Professional Training, Islamabad
- National Vocational and Technical Training Commission (NAVTTTC), Islamabad
- Economic Affairs Division, Joint Secretary
- Trade and Development Authority of Pakistan
- PITAD Pakistan Institute for Trade and Development
- National Commission for Government Reforms, Secretary
- Director General Special Development Unit, Planning & Development Unit, KP
- **Implementing partners (in addition to those listed above under governmental authorities / institutions)**
  - British Council (Improving Parliamentary Performance, IP3)
  - Trust for Democratic Accountability/Free and Fair Elections Network (TDEA/FAFEN),
  - UNDP
  - Encourage the Human Development (EHD)
  - Adam Smith International (DfID IP)
  - International Trade Centre, UNIDO
  - AKRSP, SRSP, AKDN
- **Civil society organisations (in addition to those listed above under implementing partners or to individuals met)**
  - Law and Policy Research Network (LPRN), Open Society Foundations
  - Rice Exporters Association of Pakistan
- **Development partners**
  - EU Member States: UK, Germany, France
  - GIZ (EU IP), DFID, British Council (EU IP)
  - Other bilateral: USAID, Japan
  - Multilateral: World Bank, UNDP, ADB, UNHCR
- **Projects experts for:**
  - Sindh Education Sector Support Programme
  - PFM Support Programme for Pakistan
  - DfID TA Team, KP
  - DFID TA Team for Education, KP
  - Access to Justice (Punjab team);
  - IP3 team;
  - CAPRI Team (British High Commission - Forensic)
  - RAHA team (UNDP)



- TRTA II and III (PITCO TL, ITC)
- USAID-Pakistan Regional Economic Integration Activity

## 6 Challenges and limits

This evaluation has faced a number of **typical challenges for country-level evaluations** for DG DEVCO, relating notably to the *width and diversity of the scope, institutional memory, quality and availability of monitoring of indicators at project and strategy level, evaluation of budget support, changes in the Reference Group members following this evaluation and diverging opinions and expectations among them*. Given the requirement and complexity of a country-level evaluation for DG DEVCO, the available *budget* allowed for a mission of 10 days for the 6 main experts; it enabled the team to meet a number of stakeholders but not as many as would ideally have been the case. These different challenges pose difficulties in particular in terms of the quality of the available information, the depth of the analysis, and the complexity of the process. Nevertheless, the evaluation team built an evaluation methodology and fine-tuned the process with a view to addressing these challenges as much as possible. The team managed for instance to meet a variety of parties at EU headquarters, during the mission, through telephone interviews thereafter, and in additional workshops with different EU services on the recommendations at the end of the evaluation (planned for February 2016). The evidence papers (Annexes A1 to A13) show the different sources used for each piece of analysis (documents, statistics, interviews, etc.), and provide indications on the quality of the evidence for each indicator. The evaluation team further includes two national experts, in rural development and education, who make sure that all findings are based on sound understanding of the Pakistani context. In addition, a renowned Pakistani expert, Dr. Osama Siddique<sup>3</sup>, has reviewed in this same perspective the report sections on democratisation, human rights and rule of law.

A specific challenge for this evaluation was that of **access** to certain zones and even the country, and **security** of work to be conducted in Pakistan. Access is restricted to certain zones, and it is not straightforward to obtain no objection certificates (NOCs) – e.g. rural areas such as the Malakand district in KP couldn't be visited. It was hence difficult to meet local actors and end beneficiaries of several projects. Certain team members couldn't also get a visa to travel to the country on time: the preliminary mission needed to be postponed twice, and the international rural development expert had eventually to cancel her participation to the field mission when she was informed the day before departure that she would not get her visa. Facilitation of the team's access to stakeholders didn't prove easy either. Moreover, owing to the security situation at the time of the missions, national and international experts could travel to Peshawar in March 2015, but only national experts could go to Peshawar in November 2015. Nevertheless, the team organised to address as much as possible these constraints. The national rural development expert covered this sector during the field mission, with distant support of his international counterpart. The team managed to conduct face-to-face interviews in Islamabad, Karachi, Lahore, and Peshawar. The team could also meet with people from rural areas which could travel to Peshawar and Islamabad. This was further complemented by additional phone interviews and documentary review.

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<sup>3</sup> [http://www.lprn.org.pk/?page\\_id=697](http://www.lprn.org.pk/?page_id=697)

## Annex C3 : Intervention logic

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### Acronyms

BCDP	Balochistan Community Development Programme
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSP	Country Strategy Paper
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (of OECD)
DCI	Development Cooperation Instrument
EC	European Commission
EIDHR	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
EU	European Union
GoP	Government of Pakistan
GSP	General System of Preferences
HR	Human Rights
IFS	Instrument for Stability
KP	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
KP-DGCD	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa District Governance and Community Development Programme
LRRD	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MIP	Multi-annual Indicative Programme
MTDF	Mid-Term Development Framework
NWFP	North-West Frontier Province (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa)
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PEACE	Programme for Economic Advancement and Community Empowerment
RAHA	Sustainable rural development in the Refugee Affected and Hosting Areas of Pakistan
RSPN	Rural Support Programmes Network
TA	Technical Assistance
TRTA	Trade Related Technical Assistance
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training

## 1. Rationale

The rationale for EU's cooperation with Pakistan flows, historically, from the EU's legal commitments to cooperate with developing countries and to support their efforts towards poverty eradication, inclusive and sustainable growth and their gradual integration into the world economy. Pakistan's current relations with the EU are also in large measure influenced by its important role as a partner in the fight against terrorism, given its location in a region which is of crucial interest to the EU and its security (CSP, p15).

As per the 2007-2013 CSP, the overall aims of EU cooperation in Pakistan are to **fight poverty** and help Pakistan follow a sustainable growth path. The EU aims to combine support for achieving the MDGs with helping Pakistan to perform economically. The CSP underlines (p.19) that "this will only succeed if growth is founded on political stability, social cohesion, creation of productive and decent work opportunities, human and social development, the rule of law and diversification of economic activity".

When the European Parliament ratified the Cooperation Agreement in 2004 it also suggested that the Commission place particular emphasis on progress in the fields of **democratisation and human rights**. The Cooperation Agreement contains a clause on respect for human rights and democratic principles. Pakistan has been since a number of years a focus country under the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights.

EC programmes in Pakistan are designed to contribute towards these objectives in line with the targets set out by the Pakistan Government in its five-year Medium-Term Development Framework and its Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper.

## 2. EU Country Strategy

The 2007-2013 CSP for Pakistan provides for the following strategic areas of EU intervention:

- Focal Areas:
  - Focal Area 1: Rural Development and Natural resources Management in NWFP and Baluchistan;
  - Focal Area 2: Education and Human Resources Development;
- Non-focal Intervention Areas:
  - Trade development and economic cooperation
  - Democratisation and Human Rights;
  - Support to Non-State Actors and Thematic Budget Lines;
  - Counter-terrorism and Security.

The Mid-Term Review of the CSP confirmed the two focal areas, while it adjusted slightly the non-focal sectors by reorganising them in two: (i) Governance and Human Rights; and (ii) Trade cooperation.

The EU-Pakistan Multi-Annual Indicative Programme (MIP) 2014-2020 reorganises these sectors somewhat for the next programming period, by organising the cooperation around three 'key sectors': i) rural development, ii) education and iii) good governance, human rights and rule of law. "In this way, there is consistency and thus a continuation of EU support in nearly the same focal sectors as in the previous programming period in order to achieve even better results and higher value of EU aid." (MIP, p8).

## 3. Detailed Intervention logic

In this section, we consider the manner in which this engagement was proposed to be undertaken during the evaluation period (proposed inputs/activities) and the causeways which were expected to prompt the desired development changes (expected outputs, outcomes and impact). Clarifying this 'intervention logic' is useful first for having a sound understanding of the EU strategy, and second, and in particular, for defining evaluation questions and judgment criteria in a theory-based evaluation approach.

The intervention logic of the EU is presented in the effects diagrams which follow. They reflect our understanding of the logic of the EU's cooperation strategy with Pakistan. We have primarily drawn them from programming documents, notably the Country Strategy Paper and multi-indicative programmes (MIPs). We have complemented this by interviews with EU staff and by logical deduction, when there was a need to make explicit those elements which were implicit in the documentation.

We have produced effects diagram for the main areas of cooperation on which this evaluation will focus. We list them here, and present each of them thereafter:

- Rural development and natural resources management in KP (formerly NWFP) and Baluchistan (focal area 1);
- Education and human resources development, including TVET (focal area 2);

- Democratisation, human rights and security, including support to non-state actors and counter-terrorism;
- Trade;
- Finally, an overall intervention logic synthesising main expected results in all sectors.

The figures present effects diagram of the expected causeways of EU support from inputs to the different levels of results. They also include key narrative elements of the rationale of the EU's intervention in that sector and of the sector context. Moreover, they show assumptions relating to external factors which have an influence of possible materialisation of expected results along the causal chain. The diagrammes for the two sectors in which budget support has been provided (rural development and education) have been adapted slightly so as to better integrate the specificities of evaluating this modality (e.g. in the education sector in which BS has been provided during the evaluation period: distinction between direct and induced outputs as per the OECD-DAC methodology for evaluating budget support).

Figure 1 - Effects diagram – Focal Area 1: Rural development and Natural Resources Management in KP and Baluchistan





Figure 2 - Effects diagram –Education and Human resources development



Source: ADE

Figure 3 - Effects diagram – Democratisation, human rights and security






Figure 4 - Effects diagram – Trade





Figure 5 - Effects diagram –EU strategy overall



Source: ADE



## Annex C4: Evaluation questions

### EQ1 Overall cooperation strategy

<b>EQ1</b>	<b>To what extent did the EU cooperation strategy respond to development priorities and challenges of the country?</b>
<b>JC-1.1</b>	<b>The EU has based its cooperation on sound analyses of the development priorities and challenges of the country</b>
I-1.1.1	Existence of reports and documents demonstrating the recourse to analyses of the needs and priorities of Pakistan (populations, institutions, etc.)
I-1.1.2	Existence of conflict and/or fragility analyses (conducted or used), including on regional aspects of stability
I-1.1.3	Compliance of the conflict and/or fragility analyses with related EU policies and international best practices (notably the OECD's 10 principles and Busan's New Deal)
I-1.1.4	Existence and periodicity of risk analyses (conducted and used)
I-1.1.5	Existence of specific assessment of environmental issues and issues faced by vulnerable or socially excluded groups (notably women, children and ethnic minorities)
I-1.1.6	Consultation of stakeholders (government, civil society, other donors) and integration of their views in these analyses
I-1.1.7	Views of the stakeholders and other development partners on the relevance of the EU interventions to address the needs
<b>JC-1.2</b>	<b>The composition of the portfolio of cooperation addressed the priorities and challenges identified and adapted to their evolution.</b>
I-1.2.1	Existence of a clear and realist roadmap / action plan addressing the priorities identified
I-1.2.2	The areas of intervention selected addressed the priorities identified in the analyses.
I-1.2.3	The areas of intervention selected are aligned on the GoP priorities.
I-1.2.4	The selection of programmes takes into account the risk analyses.
I-1.2.5	The interventions under the national and regional programmes have been designed and implemented to as to be complementary and mutually supportive.
I-1.2.6	The selection of programmes was coordinated with those of other donors, in particular EU MS.
I-1.2.7	The portfolio of cooperation activities was complementary with those of other DGs (ECHO and Trade in particular) and the EIB.
<b>JC-1.3</b>	<b>The selection of the intervention geographic zones and institutional levels (federal/provinces/district) was best suited to achieve expected cooperation results.</b>
I-1.3.1	Existence of mapping of EU and other donors' activities

I-1.3.2	Existence of analytical justification underlying the selection of zones/levels
I-1.3.3	Degree to which migration issues are addressed in the selection of zones/levels
I-1.3.4	Partners' and stakeholders views on the appropriateness of proposed zones/levels
<b>JC-1.4</b>	<b>The projects and programmes took account of the main lessons of the analyses conducted.</b>
I-1.4.1	References in the programme documents and financial agreements to the main lessons of context, conflict, fragility and risk analyses.
I-1.4.2	Stakeholders views on the inclusion of lessons from context, conflict, fragility and risk analyses in the projects and programmes.
<b>JC-1.5</b>	<b>There is no incoherence between EU development cooperation policies and EU policies in other fields affecting Pakistan</b>
I-1.5.1	Absence of incoherence between the EU's development cooperation strategy & interventions in Pakistan and EU policies in the fields of stability, security and counter-terrorism
I-1.5.2	Absence of incoherence between the EU's development cooperation strategy & interventions in Pakistan and EU policies in the field of migration
I-1.5.3	Absence of incoherence between the EU's development cooperation strategy & interventions in Pakistan and EU policies in other fields

## EQ2 Rural development

<b>EQ2</b>	<b>To what extent has the EU facilitated community empowerment and contributed to community driven development, in KP and Baluchistan?</b>
<b>JC-2.1</b>	<b>The design of the three large interventions and the selection of the provinces have been based on an analysis of the needs and challenges, and adapted to the evolving context.</b>
I-2.1.1	Existence of underlying analyses to identify which and whose needs to address and the regions of intervention.
I-2.1.2	Reference in these analyses to the 10 OECD principles of engagement in fragile states
I-2.1.3	References to these analyses in the programming documents
I-2.1.4	Existence of risk assessment studies, including risks of corruption and frauds.
I-2.1.5	Proposals of risk mitigating measures in the programming documents.
I-2.1.6	Documents, minutes and meetings, demonstrating the existence of a policy dialogue with the governments and the alignment on their policies.
I-2.1.7	Existence of documentation (internal notes, minutes of meetings, etc.) demonstrating that stakeholders have been consulted and their views taken into account (or reasons for not taking them into account) on the appropriateness of the intervention to the needs and the contextual challenges.
I-2.1.8	Review of those who were consulted and of the selection process. Are they representative of the groups and minorities targeted by the interventions?
I-2.1.9	Opinions of stakeholders (national and provincial authorities, EU staff, beneficiaries, other donors....) on the appropriateness of the intervention to the needs and the contextual challenges.
I-2.1.10	Existence of a diagnostic analysis of the partner government's institutional capacity to use properly the BS to implement its policy.
I-2.1.11	Existence and nature of complementary capacity building assistance offered to improve the use of the SBS by the partner government.
<b>JC-2.2</b>	<b>The interventions have been implemented according to plan.</b>
I-2.2.1 to 4	For contribution agreements: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ documents showing that the funds were transferred in time to the implementing multilateral organisation;</li> <li>▪ monitoring reports showing that the multilateral organisation conducted the agreed activities ;</li> <li>▪ reports from the multilateral organisation on the progress and the outputs of the intervention;</li> <li>▪ opinion of the partner's authorities and of final beneficiaries.</li> </ul>
I-2.2.5 to 8	For grant contracts: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ documents showing that the funds were transferred in time to the contracted NGO;</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ monitoring reports showing that the contracted NGOs conducted the agreed activities ;</li> <li>▪ existence of reports from the NGO on the progress and the outputs of the intervention;</li> <li>▪ opinion of the partner's authorities and of final beneficiaries.</li> </ul>
I-2.2.9 to 17	<p>For BS interventions,</p> <p>1° Funds</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ documentary evidence of the release of the first tranche(s) and/or reasons for delays</li> </ul> <p>2° Policy dialogue</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ documentary evidence of the existence, contents and frequency of the policy dialogue (meeting notes, minutes, opinions of participants) and importance attached by the Government to the dialogue process;</li> <li>▪ policy dialogue is conducted at appropriate government level;</li> </ul> <p>3° Conditions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ number, clarity of the conditions and related indicators;</li> <li>▪ the indicators reflect the policy objectives and/or point to core issues in the sector; opinion of the partner government on their realism, their clarity and their feasibility;</li> <li>▪ disaggregation of the indicators by gender and other characteristics;</li> <li>▪ opinion of the EU staff on their realism, their clarity and their feasibility</li> </ul> <p>4° Capacity building</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ documentary evidence of preliminary identification, with the partner, of capacity constraints;</li> <li>▪ provision of resources by the EU within the BS contract or via complementary TA, or by other donors in the context of a coordinated effort, to strengthen capacities crucial for the successful implementation of the intervention.</li> </ul>

<b>JC-2.3</b>	<b>The EU contributed to the mobilisation of Community based organisations</b>
I-2.3.1	Evidence of increase in the number of CBOs, village organisations, initiatives involving refugees etc.. set up
I-2.3.2	Evidence of training and capacity building offered to these CBOs etc.. by the implementing partners
I-2.3.3	Evidence from existing evaluations, other documentations and interviews with stakeholders on the importance of EU funded activities for the observed improvements.
<b>JC-2.4</b>	<b>The CBOs supported by the programmes have developed and maintained local infrastructure and mechanisms, which are used by local communities and improved their livelihood.</b>
I-2.4.1	Quantity and type of local infrastructure built by CBOs
I-2.4.2	Evidence of maintenance of these infrastructure
I-2.4.3	Evidence of the use of these infrastructure by local communities
I-2.4.4	Evidence from existing evaluations, other documentations and interviews with stakeholders that living standards have improved in supported local communities (e.g. reduction in the cost of, and/or improvement of the access of local communities to the services provided by the local infrastructure and mechanisms that have been set up).
I-2.4.5	Evidence from existing evaluations, other documentations and interviews with stakeholders on the importance of EU funded activities for the observed improvements
<b>JC-2.5</b>	<b>The EU support contributed to improve communities' access to public services in the targeted areas</b>
I-2.5.1	Evidence of favourable evolution of the indicators for the sector
I-2.5.2	Opinions of stakeholders (as available in existing evaluations, other documentations and interviews with stakeholders) on the evolution of the conditions of access to public services.



### EQ3 Education

<b>EQ3</b>	<b>To what extent has the EU support to the education sector (non TVET) contributed to improve service delivery, quality and equitable access to education in the provinces Sindh and KP?</b>
<b>JC-3.1</b>	<b>The identification of the interventions has been based on an analysis of the needs and challenges and an alignment on the government policies.</b>
I-3.1.1	Existence of underlying analyses to identify which and whose needs to address and the regions of intervention, including with relation to gender and other social barriers to accessing education.
I-3.2.2	Evidence of thorough analysis of the partner' sector policy in the area of intervention (particularly in the case of BS; verification of the relevance and credibility of the supported policy)
I-3.1.3	References to these analyses in the programming documents.
I-3.1.4	Documents, minutes and meetings, demonstrating the existence of a policy dialogue with the government and the alignment on its policies.
I-3.1.5	Opinions of stakeholders (national and provincial authorities, EU staff, beneficiaries, other donors....) on the appropriateness of the intervention to the needs and the contextual challenges.
<b>JC-3.2</b>	<b>The design of the BS programmes favoured the achievement of the expected results.</b>
I-3.2.1	Documents and analysis justifying:
I-3.2.2	▪ the amounts of SBS funding
I-3.2.3	▪ the conditions of disbursement
I-3.2.4	▪ the design of the tranches and the calendar of disbursements
I-3.2.5	▪ the policy dialogue framework
	▪ the proposed support to capacity building
<b>JC-3.3</b>	<b>The EU national and regional interventions in education in Pakistan have been coherent</b>
I-3.3.1	Evidence in documents, reports, evaluations and interviews showing the coherence of the EU national and regional (Erasmus Mundus) interventions in the sector.
<b>JC-3.4</b>	<b>The SBS interventions have been implemented according to plan.</b>
I-3.4.1 to 13	Analysis of the delivery of the 4 categories of inputs and direct outputs 1° Funds <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ documentary evidence of the transfer of funds from the EU to the Central Bank of Pakistan, then to the federal government account and then to the government account of the province;</li> <li>▪ delays incurred between these different transfers;</li> <li>▪ verification that these transfers took into account the budgetary calendar or the partner;</li> </ul> 2° Policy dialogue

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ documentary evidence of the existence, contents and frequency of the policy dialogue (meeting notes, minutes, opinions of participants);</li> <li>▪ opinions of the participants on the contribution of the policy dialogue</li> </ul> <p>3° Conditions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ number, clarity of the conditions and related indicators;</li> <li>▪ coherence of the indicators with the programme objectives and key issues;</li> <li>▪ time consistency of the indicators and their targeted values;</li> <li>▪ disaggregation of the indicators by gender and other characteristics;</li> <li>▪ opinion of the partner government on their realism, their clarity and their feasibility;</li> <li>▪ opinion of the EU staff on their realism, their clarity and their feasibility</li> </ul> <p>4° Capacity building</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ documentary evidence of preliminary identification, with the partner, of capacity constraints;</li> <li>▪ provision of resources by the EU within the BS contract or via complementary TA, or by other donors in the context of a coordinated effort, to strengthen capacities crucial for the successful implementation of the intervention.</li> </ul>
<b>JC-3.5</b>	<b>The BS interventions have permitted to improve the formulation and implementation of the education policies in the beneficiary provinces</b>
I-3.5.1	Evidence that the policy dialogue is conducted at appropriate level (i.e. involving people who have an influence political, technical, etc. on the decisions made in the sector)
I-3.5.2	Verification that issues raised in the dialogue have been subsequently followed by concrete actions
I-3.5.3	Increased financial resources available for the sector in the provincial budget
I-3.5.4	Increased financial resources (from provinces to district and for education)
I-3.5.5	Increased capacity and pro-active strategies to address education issues
I-3.5.6	Evidence that the government policy remains supportive of intended objectives of the BS programme
I-3.5.7	Progress in the delivery of the sector outputs
I-3.5.8	Evidence of contribution of BS through TA and policy dialogue to the building of an evidence base allowing to follow up the implementation and results of the policies
I-3.5.9	Minutes and other documents demonstrating the existence of a dialogue on the key policy issues pertaining to the sector.
I-3.5.10	Conclusions of IMF and other donor studies on the evolution of the financial and administrative governance of the sector.
<b>JC-3.6</b>	<b>The EU contributed to improved offer and quality of education services in the provinces and districts supported.</b>
I-3.6.1	Degree of realisation of the verifiable indicators of outcomes provided in the matrices of conditions of the different SBS projects as assessed in the disbursement files.

I-3.6.2	Verification that the indicators mentioned under I-2.7.1 are disaggregated in line with the population targeted by the intervention (e.g. gender, ethnic minority, social group, etc.)
I-3.6.3	Evolution of PRSP indicators for the sector
I-3.6.4	Evolution of curricula
I-3.6.5	Existing evidence (evaluations, studies) of the effectiveness of the Government policy at provincial and district levels (positive links between output and outcomes in the sector)
I.3.6.6	Conclusions of technical and academic studies on the progress in the sector and its governance.
<b>JC-3.7</b>	<b>The EU contributed to improve equitable access (reduce gender and regional disparities) to basic and secondary education.</b>
I-3.7.1	Degree of realisation of the verifiable indicators of outcomes provided in the Financing Agreements or matrices of conditions (BS) as estimated in the monitoring/evaluation reports or in the disbursement files.
I-3.7.2	Evolution of PRSP indicators for the sector
I-3.7.3	Conclusions of technical and academic studies on the evolution access conditions to and use of education services.

**EQ4 TVET**

<b>EQ4</b>	<b>To what extent has the EU contributed to improve TVET service delivery, and skills and employability of trained students?</b>
<b>JC-4.1</b>	<b>EU support to TVET has been based on an analysis of the needs and challenges, and adapted to the evolving context.</b>
I-4.1.1	Existence of underlying analyses to identify which and whose needs to address and the regions of intervention.
I-4.1.2	References to these analyses in the programming documents
I-4.1.3	Existence of risk assessment studies, including risks of corruption and frauds
I-4.1.4	Proposals of risk mitigating measures in the programming documents
I-4.1.5	Documents, minutes and meetings, demonstrating the existence of a policy dialogue with the government and the alignment on its policies
I-4.1.6	Existence of documentation (internal notes, minutes of meetings, etc.) demonstrating that stakeholders have been consulted and their views taken into account (or reasons for not taking them into account) on the appropriateness of the intervention to the needs and the contextual challenges.
I-4.1.7	Review of those who were consulted and of the selection process. Adequacy with the groups targeted by the interventions.
I-4.1.8	Opinions of key stakeholders (EU staff, NAVTTC, TEVTAs, implementing agencies, teachers/trainers and students, other donors) on the appropriateness of the intervention to the needs and the contextual challenges.
<b>JC-4.2</b>	<b>The interventions have been implemented according to plan.</b>
I-4.2.1	Documents showing that the funds were transferred in time to the implementing partners
I-4.2.2	Monitoring reports showing that the implementing partners conducted the agreed activities
I-4.2.3	Reports from the implementing partners on the progress and the outputs of the intervention
I-4.2.4	Opinions of key stakeholders on the factors influencing the implementation of interventions
<b>JC-4.3</b>	<b>The EU has contributed to strengthen and implement reform of the TVET sector, including strengthening of TEVTAs</b>
I-4.3.1	Evidence of progress in the strengthening and implementation of TVET reform (identification of concrete changes)
I-4.3.2	Evidence of increased capacity of TEVTAs (identification of concrete changes)
I-4.3.3	Evidence from existing evaluations, other documentation and interviews with stakeholders on the importance of the EU-funded activities for the achievement of the identified changes

<b>JC-4.4</b>	<b>The EU has contributed to improved offer, quality and distribution of TVET services at federal and provincial levels</b>
I-4.4.1	Evidence of progress in the offer of TVET services at federal and provincial levels
I-4.4.2	Evidence of progress in the quality of TVET services at federal and provincial levels
I-4.4.3	Evidence of progress in the distribution of TVET services at federal and provincial levels, disaggregated in line with the population targeted by the intervention (e.g. gender, ethnic minority, social group, etc.)
I-4.4.4	Evidence from existing evaluations, other documentation and interviews with stakeholders on the importance of the EU-funded activities for the improvements in the offer, quality and distribution of TVET services
<b>JC-4.5</b>	<b>The EU has contributed to employability of workers</b>
I-4.5.1	Evidence of (increased) employability of TVET graduates at federal and provincial levels, disaggregated in line with the population targeted by the intervention (e.g. gender, ethnic minority, social group, etc.)
I-4.5.2	Evidence from existing evaluations, other documentation and interviews with stakeholders on the importance of the EU-funded activities for such increased employability

## EQ5 Democratisation

<b>EQ5</b>	<b>To what extent did the EU contribute to strengthen the democratisation process in Pakistan?</b>
<b>JC-5.1</b>	<b>EU support to the democratisation process has been based on an analysis of needs and challenges, and adapted to the evolving context</b>
I-5.1.1	Existence of underlying analyses to identify which and whose needs to address and the regions of intervention, including of vulnerable groups (such as ethnic minorities)
I-5.1.2	References to these analyses in the programming documents
I-5.1.3	Existence of risk assessment studies, including risks of corruption and frauds
I-5.1.4	Proposals of risk mitigating measures in the programming documents
I-5.1.5	Documents, minutes and meetings, demonstrating the existence of a policy dialogue with the government
I-5.1.6	Existence of documentation (internal notes, minutes of meetings, etc.) demonstrating that stakeholders have been consulted and their views taken into account (or reasons for not taking them into account) on the appropriateness of the intervention to the needs and the contextual challenges.
I-5.1.7	Review of those who were consulted and of the selection process. Are they representative of the groups targeted by the interventions?
I-5.1.8	Opinions of key stakeholders (e.g. staff from EU, implementing partners, CSOs, other donors, government, parliament, beneficiaries and community leaders) on the appropriateness of the intervention to the needs and the contextual challenges
<b>JC-5.2</b>	<b>The interventions have been implemented according to plan</b>
I-5.2.1	Documents showing that the funds were transferred in time to the implementing partners
I-5.2.2	Monitoring reports showing that the implementing partners conducted the agreed activities
I-5.2.3	Reports from the implementing partners on the progress and the outputs of the intervention
I-5.2.4	Opinions of key stakeholders, including beneficiaries
<b>JC-5.3</b>	<b>The EU has contributed to promote more credible and inclusive elections in Pakistan</b>
I-5.3.1	Evidence of increased credibility and inclusiveness of elections (in documentation from electoral observation missions, projects' M&E reports and other types of documents, and interviews with stakeholders)
I-5.3.2	Evidence from existing evaluations, other documentation and interviews with stakeholders on the importance of the EU-funded activities for identified improvements

<b>JC-5.4</b>	<b>The EU has contributed to improve the three main strands of parliamentary action: law-making, oversight and representation</b>
I-5.4.1	Evidence of improved law-making, notably at the federal level
I-5.4.2	Evidence of improved parliamentary oversight, notably at the federal level
I-5.4.3	Evidence of improved representation of diverse population groups, incl. minorities, notably at the federal parliament
I-5.4.4	Evidence from existing evaluations, other documentation and interviews with stakeholders (including beneficiaries) on the importance of the EU-funded activities for identified improvements
I-5.4.5	Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International) - trend

## EQ6 Human rights / Rule of law

<b>EQ6</b>	<b>To what extent did the EU contribute to the protection and promotion of human rights, the improvement of justice, and to security and counter-terrorism?</b>
<b>JC-6.1</b>	<b>EU support to human rights has been based on an analysis of the needs and challenges, and adapted to the evolving context</b>
I-6.1.1	Existence of underlying analyses to identify which and whose needs to address and the regions of intervention
I-6.1.2	References to these analyses in the programming documents
I-6.1.3	Existence of risk assessment studies, including risks of corruption and frauds
I-6.1.4	Proposals of risk mitigating measures in the programming documents
I-6.1.5	Documents, minutes and meetings, demonstrating the existence of a policy dialogue with the government
I-6.1.6	Existence of documentation (internal notes, minutes of meetings, etc.) demonstrating that stakeholders have been consulted and their views taken into account (or reasons for not taking them into account) on the appropriateness of the intervention to the needs and the contextual challenges.
I-6.1.7	Review of those who were consulted and of the selection process. Are they representative of the groups targeted by the interventions?
I-6.1.8	Opinions of key stakeholders (EU staff, implementing partners, CSOs, other donors) on the appropriateness of the intervention to the needs and the contextual challenges
I-6.1.9	See I-1.2.7: Absence of incoherence between EU development cooperation and EU approach to stability and security
<b>JC-6.2</b>	<b>The interventions have been implemented according to plan</b>
I-6.2.1	Documents showing that the funds were transferred in time to the implementing partners
I-6.2.2	Monitoring reports showing that the implementing partners conducted the agreed activities
I-6.2.3	Reports from the implementing partners on the progress and the outputs of the intervention
I-6.2.4	Opinions of key stakeholders
<b>JC-6.3</b>	<b>The EU has contributed to increase the capacity of the Government of Pakistan to address human rights issues, in particular for the vulnerable groups, and to fulfil its international human rights obligations</b>
I-6.3.1	Evidence of increased Government capacity to address human rights issues, in particular for vulnerable groups, and to fulfil its international human rights obligations (identification of concrete changes)



I-6.3.2	Evidence from existing evaluations, other documentation and interviews with stakeholders on the importance of the EU-funded activities for the achievement of the identified changes
<b>JC-6.4</b>	<b>The EU has contributed to empowering and enabling civil society organisations to defend human rights, in particular for the vulnerable groups</b>
I-6.4.1	Evidence of civil society organisations defending actively and forcefully human rights, in particular for the vulnerable groups
I-6.4.2	Evidence from existing evaluations, other documentation and interviews with stakeholders on the importance of the EU-funded activities for empowering and enabling civil society organisations to defend human rights
<b>JC-6.5</b>	<b>The EU has contributed to strengthen the effectiveness of the police and the judiciary in delivering high-quality services to all citizens while respecting human rights</b>
I-6.5.1	Evidence of improved police services to all citizens while respecting human rights (identification of concrete changes)
I-6.5.2	Evidence of improved judiciary services to all citizens while respecting human rights (identification of concrete changes)
I-6.5.3	Evidence from existing evaluations, other documentation and interviews with stakeholders on the importance of the EU-funded activities for improving police and judiciary services
<b>JC-6.6</b>	<b>The EU has increased access to justice, in particular for the vulnerable groups</b>
I-6.6.1	Evidence of increased access to justice, in particular for the vulnerable groups
I-6.6.2	Evidence from existing evaluations, other documentation and interviews with stakeholders on the importance of the EU-funded activities for increased access to justice
<b>JC-6.7</b>	<b>The EU has contributed to increase public confidence in the rule of law</b>
I-6.7.1	Evidence of increased public confidence in the rule of law, in particular for the target groups
I-6.7.2	Evidence from existing evaluations, other documentation and interviews with stakeholders on the importance of the EU-funded activities for increased public confidence in the rule of law
<b>JC-6.8</b>	<b>The EU has contributed to increase State, media and civil society's capacity to strengthen resilience against terrorism</b>
I-6.8.1	Evidence of increased capacity and accountability of national authorities and justice in relation to counter-terrorism
I-6.8.2	Evidence of increased media and civil society's capacity of strengthening resilience against extremism and violence
I-6.8.3	Evidence from existing evaluations, other documentation and interviews with stakeholders on the importance of the EU-funded activities for increased State, media and civil society capacity to strengthen resilience against terrorism

## EQ7 Trade

<b>EQ7</b>	<b>To what extent has EU cooperation support to trade contributed to increasing trade and investment flows with the EU and South Asia?</b>
<b>JC-7.1</b>	<b>The design of the TRTA interventions has been based on an analysis of the needs and challenges and an alignment on the government policies.</b>
I-7.1.1	Existence of underlying analyses to identify which and whose needs to address and the regions of intervention.
I-7.1.2	References to these analyses in the programming documents.
I-7.1.3	Existence of risk assessment studies, including risks of corruption and frauds.
I-7.1.4	Proposals of risk mitigating measures in the programming documents.
I-7.1.5	Existence of documentation (internal notes, minutes of meetings, etc.) demonstrating that stakeholders have been consulted and their views taken into account (or reasons for not taking them into account) on the appropriateness of the intervention to the needs and the contextual challenges.
I-7.1.6	Review of those who were consulted and of the selection process. Are they representative of the groups targeted by the interventions?
I-7.1.7	Documents, minutes and meetings, demonstrating the existence of a policy dialogue with the government and the alignment on its policies.
I-7.1.8	Opinions of stakeholders (national and provincial authorities, EU staff, beneficiaries, other donors....) on the appropriateness of the intervention to the needs and the contextual challenges.
<b>JC-7.2</b>	<b>The interventions have been implemented according to plan.</b>
I-7.2.1 to 5	<p>For contribution agreements:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ documents showing that the funds were transferred in time to the implementing multilateral organisation;</li> <li>▪ monitoring reports showing that the multilateral organisation conducted the agreed activities ;</li> <li>▪ reports from the multilateral organisation on the progress and the outputs of the intervention;</li> <li>▪ evaluation reports</li> <li>▪ opinions of the partner's authorities and of final beneficiaries.</li> </ul>
I-7.2.6 to 10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ monitoring reports showing that the contractors conducted the agreed activities ;</li> <li>▪ existence of reports from the contractors on the progress and the outputs of the intervention;</li> <li>▪ evaluation reports;</li> <li>▪ opinions of the partner's authorities and of final beneficiaries.</li> </ul>

<b>JC-7.3</b>	<b>EU support contributed to strengthen the capacity of the Business Intermediate Organisation at federal, provincial and local levels</b>
I-7.3.1	Identification of supported BIOs and nature of support provided by the EU
I-7.3.2	Changes in staff skill, procedures, organisation and functional setup.
I-7.3.3	Evidence from existing evaluations, studies, other documentation and interviews with stakeholders on the links between the results observed and the EU support.
<b>JC-7.4</b>	<b>The EU support contributed to the reduction of barriers to trade</b>
I-7.4.1	Evolution of Doing Business in Pakistan indicators relative to barriers to trade.
I-7.4.2	Conclusions of WTO and studies on the barriers to trade
I-7.4.3	Evidence from existing evaluations, studies, other documentation and interviews with stakeholders on the links between the reduction of barriers to trade and EU support in this respect.
<b>JC-7.5</b>	<b>As a result of EU support Pakistan investment and trade with EU and South Asia increased</b>
I-7.5.1	Evolution of trade and foreign investment flows between Pakistan, the rest of the world and the EU and South Asia.
I-2.5.2	Evidence from existing evaluations, studies, other documentation and interviews with stakeholders on the links between increase in investment and trade with EU and South Asia, and EU support in this area.

## EQ8 Aid modalities

<b>EQ8</b>	<b>To what extent did the mix of aid modalities and the selection of implementing partners facilitate achievement of expected cooperation results?</b>
<b>JC-8.1</b>	<b>The rationale for adopting a modality (contribution agreement, grant contract, sector budget support) and financial instrument, and for selecting the implementing partner(s) is based on a sound analysis which duly explains why it is considered most conducive to achieving expected results</b>
I-8.1.1	Existence of analyses, shared with EU MS and possibly other donors, that the proposed modality and financial instrument are well suited to achieve intended results (including an analysis of the BS eligibility criteria);
I-8.1.2	Existence of analyses showing that complementarities between modalities/instruments have been sought;
I-8.1.3	Existence of documents, minutes of meetings... providing evidence of dialogue with the Government and partners to select a mutually agreed modality;
I-8.1.4	Existence of analysis of the risks and benefits involved in the use of a particular modality/instrument at the federal, provincial, or district level;
I-8.1.5	Existence of analyses of the risks and benefits involved in working with a particular partner
I-8.1.6	Existence of analysis on the availability of appropriate resources to manage the interventions, in particular at the EU Delegation;
I-8.1.7	For the BS projects, analyses showing the compliance with the eligibility criteria of BS interventions.
<b>JC-8.2</b>	<b>The EU could adapt its organisation and/or mobilise the qualified expertise to manage the interventions in an evolving country context.</b>
I-8.2.1	Availability of staff in EU Delegation and HQ with capacity to conduct a policy dialogue with the government and the implementing partners in the sectors and at the levels of intervention (federal, provincial, district)
I-8.2.2	Flexibility of the procedural arrangements with the implementing partners
I-8.2.3	Quality and quantity of information allowing to monitor partner activities and assess results
<b>JC-8.3</b>	<b>During implementation the chosen aid modalities, instruments and partners facilitated the achievement of the expected results.</b>
I-8.3.1	Respect of the initial implementation agenda and/or reasons for adaptations or slippages
I-8.3.2	Disbursement ratios
I-8.3.3	Implementation difficulties for the different types of partners, modalities, and instruments, as reported by the implementing partners, EU staff and beneficiaries

## **EQ9 Visibility**

<b>EQ9</b>	<b>What has been the visibility and perception of the EU in its pursuit of development cooperation objectives?</b>
<b>JC-9.1</b>	<b>EU cooperation has been visible to key stakeholders in Pakistan</b>
I-9.1.1	Existence of a sound overall EU visibility strategy
I-9.1.2	Design and set-up of clear and effective EU communication strategies targeting key stakeholders in Pakistan (notably within governments and civil society)
I-9.1.3	Type of actions and magnitude of resources envisaged to ensure visibility in Pakistan
I-9.1.4	Inclusion of visibility clauses in EU-funded project/programme contracts
I-9.1.5	Agreements/actions with other donors, notably EU MS, with a view to favour EU visibility
I-9.1.6	Effects of these visibility actions on EU visibility vis-à-vis key stakeholders in Pakistan
<b>JC-9.2</b>	<b>National actors and key stakeholders perceived the EU development cooperation as an important contribution to fighting poverty and helping Pakistan following a sustainable growth path.</b>
J-9.2.1	Stakeholders' perceptions (and evolution) on the benefits and weaknesses of EU development cooperation

## **EQ10 Coordination and complementarity**

<b>EQ10</b>	<b>To what extent have EU interventions been complementary with those of other MS and coordinated with those of the other donors</b>
<b>JC-10.1</b>	<b>The EU cooperation strategy is complementary with that of the MS</b>
J-10.1.1	Existence of formal and informal mechanisms to ensure complementarity of the EU strategy and its implementation with that of the MS.
J-10.1.2	Evidence of the effectiveness of these mechanisms, and results so far of the joint programming with the MS (in particular the joint programming for the period 2016-2020).
<b>JC-10.2</b>	<b>The elaboration of the EU cooperation strategy and its implementation have been the object of a close coordination with the other development partners</b>
I-10.2.1	Existence of formal and informal coordination mechanisms between the development partners and the EU.
I-10.2.2	Initiatives and role of the EU in setting up and animating these coordination mechanisms;
I-10.2.3	Degree of convergences between the EU cooperation strategy and that of the other development partners.
I-10.2.4	Reasons for the possible differences between the EU cooperation strategy and that of the other development partners (e.g. divergence of views regarding the appropriate response to needs, absence of information on mutual activities, ...)



## Annex C5: List of persons met

This annex details the persons met by the evaluators in person or interviewed by phone during the evaluation process.

#	Surname, name	Organisation	Function
1	Aftab, Syed	Government of Sindh - Sindh Education Reform Project II (SERP)	Financial Reporting Officer
2	Afzal, Fatimah	DFID	Private Sector Development Adviser - Technical lead for the vocational skills programme of DFID in Pakistan.
3	Agha, Hammad Uwais	Planning and Development Department, KP	Additional Chief Secretary
4	Agha, Rabiya Javeri	Trade and Development Authority of Pakistan (TDAP)	Secretary
5	Ahad, Syed Abdul	Trust for Democratic Education and Accountability (TDEA) / FAFEN	Manager Public Outreach, Advocacy and Communications
6	Ahmed, Nazir	KP Technical Education & Vocational Training Authority (TEVTA)	M&E specialist
7	Ainuddin, Saadia	EU Delegation to Pakistan	Human Resources Development
8	Alam, Qaisar	Elementary & Secondary Education Department of KP	Additional Secretary
9	Ali, Hashmat	Elementary & Secondary Education Department of KP	Senior Planning Officer
10	Amprou, Jacky	AFD	Country Director for Pakistan
11	Anwer, Saima	DFID	Education Adviser, Pakistan
12	Ashraf, Imran	EU Delegation to Pakistan	Development Advisor
13	Atif, Zeshan Rauf	Sarhad Rural Support programme (SRSP)	Programme Manager - Planning, Monitoring, Evaluation and Research
14	Atif, Shahzad Memon	Sarhad Rural Support Programme (SRSP)	M&E - Accountant
15	Awad-Gladewitz, Dagmar	GIZ	Principal Advisor Basic Education Program
16	Azam, Idrees	Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	Education Department - Chief Planning Officer
17	Babar, Ayesha	EU Delegation to Pakistan	Press and PR officer
18	Barr, Ashley	Independent expert	Punjab Access to Justice Project - Lead Expert
19	Bashir, Nadeem	Adam Smith International	Former Team leader, DfID project, KP
20	Bazin, Benoist	EU Delegation to Pakistan	Previous Head of Rural Development Section. (Now at EU Delegation to Ghana)



21	Beg, Ghulam Amin	Aga Khan Rural Support Programme (AKRSP)	Institutional Development/Youth Development
22	Bhatti, Muhammad Siddique	EU Delegation to Pakistan	Education Advisor
23	Bhatti, Zubair K.	World Bank	Senior Public Sector Specialist
24	Boelen, Martijn	EU Delegation to Pakistan	Head of Finance & Contract
25	Bokhari, Syed Adeela	National Vocational & Technical Training Commission (NAVTTTC), Pakistan	Director General (Accreditation & Certification)
26	Brajard Vom Stein, Nathalie	DEVCO 03 Budget Support and Public Finance Management	Team Leader – Budget Support
27	Bremson, Francis	Independent expert	Punjab Access to Justice Project - Sr Judicial Expert (in charge of component 2)
28	Brogi, Luigi	EU Delegation to Pakistan	Crisis Prevention and Peacebuilding
29	Brooks, Lynn	British Council	British Council (Education and Society), Project Manager for IP3
30	Brownawell, Kevin	USAID	Deputy Mission Director for Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)
31	Bruns, Hans-Ludwig	GIZ	TVET Reform Support Programme - Programme Coordinator
32	Bugby-Smith, Donna	Independent expert	Team Leader, Improving Parliamentary Performance in Pakistan (IP3)
33	Butcher, Dylan	British High Commission	EU Liaison Forensic
34	Castella, Christina	Ernst & Young Advisory France	Senior manager
35	Cautain, Jean-François	EU Delegation to Pakistan	Ambassador-Designate of the European Union
36	Cheema, Zulfiqar Ahmad	National Vocational & Technical Training Commission (NAVTTTC), Pakistan	Executive Director
37	Chudzikiewicz, Marta	Transtec s. a.	Evaluation Manager
38	Cholst, Anthony	World Bank	Operations Advisor
39	Clear, Anne	ECHO Asia, Latin America, Caribbean, Pacific	Team Leader - Head of Sector Humanitarian Aid for South-Western Asia
40	Costandache, Ioan-Adrian	DEVCO 04 Evaluation Unit	Evaluation Manager
41	Deschoenmaecker, Eric	DEVCO H1 Desk Pakistan	Desk Officer - Geo-coordinator for India/Pakistan
42	Dokter, Annemie	EEAS	Counterterrorism expert in CT unit
43	Dr Sohail, Safdar A.	Pakistan Mission to the EU	Economic Minister
44	Dr. Masroor	Sindh Technical Education & Vocational Training Authority (STEVTA)	Director Academics
45	El Ghuff, Danuta	EU Delegation to Pakistan	First Secretary, Programme Manager - Elections and Democratisation
46	Faulkner, Jon	Adam Smith International	Country Director, Pakistan

47	Fawad, Hassan	Pakistan Institute of Trade and Development (PITAD)	Deputy Director
48	Fiaz, Shahid	Trust for Democratic Education and Accountability (TDEA) / FAFEN	Chief Executive Officer
49	François, Bernard	EU Delegation to Pakistan	Head of Cooperation
50	Gerbresi, Filberto	UNHCR	Senior Technical Advisor
51	Ghafoor, Asaf	Pakistan Institute of Trade and Development (PITAD)	Director General
52	Gobbi, Donatella	DEVCO – Migration, Employment, Inequalities	TVET
53	Goire, Joelle	Transtec s. a.	Technical Expert Public Health
54	Gray, John	Independent expert	PFM Support Programme for Pakistan (PFM-SPP) - Team Leader
55	Groeneveld, Maria	EU Delegation to Pakistan	Education and Human Resources Development
56	Gul, Naeem	ECHO Regional Office Islamabad	Programme assistant
57	Hanif, Khalid	Intracen	TRTA-II Programme - Programme Officer for the Component-1 (Trade Policy Capacity Building)
58	Hartka, Stephen	Ernst & Young Advisory France	Government and Public Sector Consultant
59	Hasmat, Ali	Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	Education Department - Senior Planning Officer
60	Hashmi, Munaza	EHD (Encourage the Human Development)	Executive Director
61	Hashmi, Syed Shamoan	National Assembly of Pakistan	Joint Secretary
62	Heerschap, Jean-Paul	DEVCO - Migration, Employment, Inequalities	International Aid / Cooperation Officer
63	Herbertson, Judith	DFID	Deputy Head and Head of Basic Services Group, Pakistan
64	Hildeman, Anneli	DEVCO 03 - Budget Support and Public Finance Management	Policy Officer
65	Hoste, Amaury	EU Delegation to Pakistan	Head of Rural Development and Economic Co-operation
66	Hussain, Rana	British Council	Sindh Education Sector Support Programme (SESSP) - Senior Advisor Quality Education
67	Iftakhar, Husnain	EU Delegation to Pakistan	Political, trade and political section - Senior Economist/Trade Officer
68	Imdadullah, Maqsood	Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	Deputy Reforms Coordinator EU TA for RMU for Malakand Project
69	Imtiaz Ayub, Mohammad	Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	Additional Secretary Finance, and Reforms Coordinator for Reforms Management Unit (RMU)
70	Iqbal, Hassan	Ministry of Federal Education and Professional Training	Secretary

71	Israr, Muhammad	KPK Chief Minister's Secretariat	Special Secretary to Chief Minister, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
72	Jatoi, Liaquat Zahid	Education and Literacy Department	Reform Support Unit, Education and Literacy Department - Portfolio manager
73	Javed, Liaquat	KP Community Driven Local Development Programme	Senior PFM Specialist
74	Julin, Andreas	DG TRADE	Policy Coordinator, South/South-East Asia
75	Kaeser, Steffen	UNIDO	Unit Chief, Quality, Standards and Conformity Unit, Trade Capacity Building Branch
76	Karim, Iqbal	ECHO Regional Office Islamabad	Programme assistant
77	Kawasaki, Mitsuyoshi	JICA	Chief Representative, Pakistan
78	Kazim, Imran	Elementary & Secondary Education Department of KP	Planning Officer
79	Khan, Farrah Azeem	Independent expert	Punjab Access to Justice Project - Senior Legal and Judicial Affairs Communication Expert (in charge of component 3)
80	Khan, Mohammad Owais	USAID	Regional Trade and Policy Advisor - USAID-Pakistan Regional Economic Integration Activity
81	Khan, Muhammad Aurahgzaib	UNIDO	Sector Expert, Horticulture & SPS compliance
82	Knop, Almut Anita	German Embassy to Pakistan	First Secretary
83	Kofoed, Anne	EU Delegation to Pakistan	Head of Governance and Education Co-operation
84	Kvetova, Lenka	DEVCO 07 Fragility and Resilience	
85	Latif, Azfal	Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	Education Department, Secretary
86	Leruth, Luc	DEVCO 03 - Budget Support and Public Finance Management	Policy Officer
87	Liepach, Werner E.	Asian Development Bank (AsDB)	Country Director, Pakistan
88	Lipton, John	Independent expert	Punjab Access to Justice Project - Team Leader
89	Lorenzoni, Marco	Transtec s. a.	Head of Evaluation Unit
90	Lodhi, Adnan Younis	Ministry of Commerce, Islamabad	Deputy Secretary
91	Makki, Kaleem	Sindh Technical Education and Vocational Training Authority (STEVTA)	Managing Director
92	Malhi, Choudhry Hamid	Basmati Growers Association	President of Basmati Growers Association. CEO, Livestock Farmers & Breeders Association
93	Malik, Abdul	Aga Khan Rural Support Programme (AKRSP)	General Manager

94	Malik, Usman H.	PITCO Pvt. Ltd.	TRTA III - Power Plant Engineering and Design Team Leader
95	Marenne, Enora	DEVCO - South and South East Asia	Geo-coordinator Pakistan / International Aid/Cooperation Officer
96	Mihalcea, Maria-Alexandra	DEVCO B1 Human Rights, Gender, Democratic Governance	Quality Management Officer
97	Misericocchi, Giacomo	EU Delegation to Pakistan	Rural Development and Local Governance officer
98	Mohammadullah, Mr.	KP Technical Education & Vocational Training Authority (TEVTA)	Director (Accounts and Finance)
99	Moy, Manuela	ECHO Regional Office Islamabad	Protection Focal point - Technical Assistant
100	Niklasson, Tomas	EEAS	Deputy Head of Division - Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka & the Maldives
101	Nilsson, Joakim	ECHO Evaluation Unit	Evaluation Officer – Head of Evaluation Sector
102	O'Dea, John	ECHO Regional Office Islamabad	Nutrition Focal point – Technical Assistant
103	Olechnowicz, Joanna	ECHO - Policy and Implementation Frameworks	Evaluation Assistant
104	Orakzai, Tahir	KP Technical Education & Vocational Training Authority (TEVTA)	Managing Director
105	Pachehu, Mr.	Ministry of Education of Pakistan	Additional Chief Secretary
106	Palacios Valdecantos, María	ECHO HQ, Humanitarian Aid Desk for Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan	Cooperation Assistant
107	Passingham, Steve	DEVCO B4 Education	Policy Desk Officer
108	Payne, John	British High Commission	Regional Business Director, Development Contracts
109	Pedersen, Jesper	DEVCO	Head of Sector - Instrument for Stability, Global and Trans-regional Threats
110	Poinsot, Aurélie	DEVCO 04 Evaluation Unit	Evaluation Manager
111	Qadir, Ahmed	Competition Commission of Pakistan	Director General
112	Qaiser, Alam	Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	Education Department - Additional Secretary (DOE)
113	Quazilbash, Ali Abbas	UNIDO	TRTA II Programme - Officer in charge
114	Qureshi, Sabina	Economic Affairs Division, Islamabad	Joint Secretary
115	Rafique, Tariq	National Commission for Government Reforms	Prime Minister's Secretariat - Secretary/Director General
116	Rashid, Arshad	EU Delegation to Pakistan	Rural Development and Local Governance
117	Rashid, Sabeen	EU Delegation to Pakistan	Security Officer

118	Rehman, Said	Local Government, KP - Community Driven Local Development (CDLD)	CDLD Director and Deputy Secretary / Local Government School, Director
119	Rehman, Yasmeen	National Assembly	Seasoned parliamentarian - Strategic advisor to IP3
120	Rein, Conrad	DEVCO H1	Co-desk Afghanistan & Pakistan
121	Rijnders, Frank	EU Delegation to Pakistan	Public Financial Management
123	Rivzi, Muddassir	Trust for Democratic Education and Accountability (TDEA) / FAFEN	Head of Programs
124	Rizzi, Michele	EU Delegation to Pakistan	Economic Cooperation & Trade Coordination
125	Roshan, Ara	EU Delegation to Pakistan	Development Advisor, Trade and Economic Cooperation
126	Rousselle, Olivier	ECHO Regional Office, Islamabad	Head of Regional Office
127	Saifi, Urooj	UNDP	RAHA Coordinator
128	Seher, Nazia	JICA	Education and TVET - Programme Officer
129	Shah, Sajjad Ali	KP Technical Education & Vocational Training Authority (TEVTA)	Director (Admin and HR)
130	Shah, Amjad Ali	Trust for Democratic Education and Accountability (TDEA) / FAFEN	Senior Director of Finance
131	Shah, Syed Ali Murtaza	Punjab Public Prosecution Department	Secretary
132	Shah, Nadia	Sarhad Rural Support Programme (SRSP)	Programme Manager - Education
133	Siddique, Osama	Law and Policy Research Network (LPRN)	Executive Director
134	Simion Anea	DEVCO C6 Sustainable Energy & Climate Change	
135	Simmons, Ian	British High Commission	Head of Counter terrorism Associated Prosecution Reform Initiative (CAPRI) Programme
136	Sorensen, Johan	EU Delegation to Pakistan	Head of the Political, Trade and Communication Section
137	Stravinskas, Tomas	EU Delegation to Pakistan	Development Advisor, Rule of Law & Peace Building
138	Svilenov, Tsvetomir	DEVCO B1	Programme Manager – Good Governance
139	Tariq, Muhammad Zeeshan	British Council	Chief Advisor, Sindh Education Sector Support Programme (SESSP)
140	Teale, Lotta	Open Society Foundations	Project manager for global legal empowerment
141	Ul Haq, Inaam	World Bank	Program leader and Health specialist HNP/SACPK
142	Ul Islam, Badar	UNIDO	Programme Officer, SME & Export Development

143	Ul Mulk, Masood	Sarhad Rural Support Programme (SRSP)	CEO
144	Umar, Asad	National Assembly of Pakistan	Member of the National Assembly Islamabad / Chairman of Policy Council PTI (Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf)
145	Uquali, Faisal Ahmed	Government of Sindh	Chief Program Manager, Reform Support Unit, Education and Literacy Department,
146	Valanzuolo, Bruno	UNIDO	TRTA II Programme - Chief Technical Advisor-CTA
147	Vandendorpe, Florence	DEVCO Governance, Democracy, Gender and Human Rights	Policy Officer in charge with Electoral Assistance
148	Vanhout, Ann	EEAS	Political officer – Pakistan Desk
149	Vienings, Tracy	UNDP Pakistan	Deputy Country Director - Programmes
150	Waine, Lale	ECHO B5	
151	Waqar, Ahmed	Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	Monitoring Officer
152	Watt, John	Transtec s. a.	Team leader of the ECHO Pakistan Evaluation
153	Weiss, Daniel	ECHO - Humanitarian Aid Desk for Afghanistan/Pakistan	International Aid / Cooperation Assistant
154	Wetterqvist, Ingrid	EEAS	Senior adviser democracy support / Policy officer democracy
155	Williams, Andy	Counter terrorism Associated Prosecution Reform Initiative (CAPRI)	CAPRI - Torchlight
156	Yazdani, Rehmat	ECHO Regional Office Islamabad	Regional Programme Assistant, in charge of Food Assistance
157	Zimmer, Lina	Transtec s. a.	Evaluation Manager



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<b>Migration</b>			
Gazdar Haris	2003	"A review of migration issues in Pakistan"	<a href="http://www.eldis.org/vfile/upload/1/document/0903/Dhaka_CP_4.pdf">http://www.eldis.org/vfile/upload/1/document/0903/Dhaka_CP_4.pdf</a>
International Centre for Migration Policy Development	2013	"Budapest Process - A Slik Route Partnership for Migration - Pakistan Migration Country Report"	<a href="http://www.eldis.org/vfile/upload/1/document/0903/Dhaka_CP_4.pdf">http://www.eldis.org/vfile/upload/1/document/0903/Dhaka_CP_4.pdf</a>
UNHCR	2013	"Displacement - The New 21st Century Challenge - Global Trends 2012"	<a href="http://unhcr.org/globaltrendsjune2013/UNHCR%20GLOBAL%20TRENDS%202012_V05.pdf">http://unhcr.org/globaltrendsjune2013/UNHCR%20GLOBAL%20TRENDS%202012_V05.pdf</a>
<b>Visibility</b>			
EEAS	2005	"EU Visibility Guidelines for external actions"	<a href="https://www.sfzp.cz/soubor-ke-stazeni/6/2014-europeaid_guidelines_en.pdf">https://www.sfzp.cz/soubor-ke-stazeni/6/2014-europeaid_guidelines_en.pdf</a>
EEAS	2010	"Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Actions"	<a href="https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/communication_and_visibility_manual_en_0.pdf">https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/communication_and_visibility_manual_en_0.pdf</a>
EU Delegation to Pakistan	2008	"Visibility Study on the image of and the level of awareness, perception, knowledge, and attitude towards EC activities in Pakistan - Final report"	EU Delegation to Pakistan

EU Delegation to Pakistan	2013	"EU Delegation's Information and Communication Annual report (2013) & Forward Planning (2014)"	EU Delegation to Pakistan
<b>External Assistance Management Report</b>			
EEAS	2008	"EAMR - Annex D – Success stories 2007"	EEAS
EEAS	2008	"EAMR 2008/1 – Final report"	EEAS
EEAS	2009	"EAMR 2009/1 – Final report"	EEAS
EEAS	2010	"EAMR 2010/1 – Executive summary"	EEAS
EEAS	2010	"EAMR 2010/1 – Final report and Annexes A, C1 and D"	EEAS
EEAS	2011	"EAMR 2010/2 – Final report and Annexes A, C1 and D"	EEAS
EEAS	2012	"EAMR – 01/01/2011 - 31/12/2011 – Final report"	EEAS
EEAS	2013	"EAMR – 01/01/2012 - 31/12/2012 – Final report"	EEAS
EEAS	2014	"EAMR – 01/01/2013 - 31/12/2013 – Final report"	EEAS
EEAS	2015	"EAMR – 01/01/2014 - 31/12/2014 – Final report"	EEAS
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Ashden/Sarhad Rural Support Programme (SRSP)	2015	"Ashden Award Winner - Winner case study summary - Sarhad Rural Support Programme (SRSP)"	<a href="http://www.srsp.org.pk/srsp-main/index.php/evaluations-and-publications/ashden-award-winner">http://www.srsp.org.pk/srsp-main/index.php/evaluations-and-publications/ashden-award-winner</a>
Government of Pakistan	2012	"National Climate Change Policy"	<a href="http://www.mocc.gov.pk/gop/index.php?q=aHR0cDovLzE5Mi4xNjguNzAuMTM2L21vY2xjL3VzZXJmaWxlczEvZmlsZS9Nb2NsYy9Qb2xpY3kvTmF0aW9uYWw1MjBDdGltYXRlJTtwQ2hhbmdlJTlwUG9saWN5JTtwb2YlMjBQYWtpc3RhbUyMCgyKS5wZGY%3D">http://www.mocc.gov.pk/gop/index.php?q=aHR0cDovLzE5Mi4xNjguNzAuMTM2L21vY2xjL3VzZXJmaWxlczEvZmlsZS9Nb2NsYy9Qb2xpY3kvTmF0aW9uYWw1MjBDdGltYXRlJTtwQ2hhbmdlJTlwUG9saWN5JTtwb2YlMjBQYWtpc3RhbUyMCgyKS5wZGY%3D</a>
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)	2008	"Country Programme Evaluation - Islamic Republic of Pakistan"	<a href="http://www.ifad.org/evaluation/public_html/eksyst/doc/profile/pi/pakistan.htm">http://www.ifad.org/evaluation/public_html/eksyst/doc/profile/pi/pakistan.htm</a>
OXFAM	2015	"Resilience in Pakistan: Evaluation of enhancing food security and resilience of small scale farmers. Effectiveness Review Series 2013-14"	<a href="http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/resilience-in-pakistan-evaluation-of-enhancing-food-security-and-resilience-of-344180">http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/resilience-in-pakistan-evaluation-of-enhancing-food-security-and-resilience-of-344180</a>
Rural Support Programmes Network (RSPN) / Sindh Rural Support Organisation (SRSO)	2011	"A Review of the Union Council Based Poverty Reduction Programme"	<a href="http://www.sroso.org.pk/reports/im_ast/a-review-of-the-union-council-based-poverty-reduction-programme-2011.pdf">http://www.sroso.org.pk/reports/im_ast/a-review-of-the-union-council-based-poverty-reduction-programme-2011.pdf</a>
Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI)	1998	"Rural Water Supply Scheme Sustainability in Pakistan: A Comparative Institutional Analysis SDPI"	<a href="https://www.sdpi.org/publications/files/M3.pdf">https://www.sdpi.org/publications/files/M3.pdf</a>
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)	2015	Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) database	<a href="http://www.nama-database.org/index.php/Pakistan">http://www.nama-database.org/index.php/Pakistan</a>
The World Bank	2002	"The Next Ascent: An Evaluation of the Aga Khan Rural Support Program"	<a href="http://ieg.worldbank.org/Data/reports/precis_226_aga_khan.pdf">http://ieg.worldbank.org/Data/reports/precis_226_aga_khan.pdf</a>

The World Bank	2015	"Project Performance Assessment Report - India - Ten Million Women and Counting"	<a href="http://ieg.worldbank.org/Data/reports/India_Andhra_Pradesh_PPAR.pdf">http://ieg.worldbank.org/Data/reports/India_Andhra_Pradesh_PPAR.pdf</a>
National Rural Sector Programme (NRSP), Ghaffar Paras	2014	20th annual progress report 2013-2014. "Managing scale"	
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Rural Support Programmes Network (RSPN)	2010	Assessing the impact of RSPs Social Mobilisation in Pakistan	
<b>Khyber Pakhtunkhwa - District Governance and Community Development (KP-DGCD)</b>			
European Commission / Government of Pakistan	2013	"KP-DGCD Programme - Financing agreement between the European Commission and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan"	European Commission
European Commission / Government of Pakistan	2013	"KP-DGCD Programme - Financing agreement - Annex 1 - Action fiche"	European Commission
European Commission / Government of Pakistan	2013	"KP-DGCD Programme - Financing agreement - Annex 2 - Terms of reference"	European Commission
European Commission	2014	"KP-DGCD Programme - Inception Report"	European Commission
European Commission	2014	"KP-DGCD Programme - Monthly Report - October, November, December 2014"	European Commission
European Commission	2014	"KP-DGCD Programme - Aide mémoire - Assessment of fulfilment of General Conditions"	European Commission
European Commission	2014	"KP-DGCD Programme - Assessing Public Sector Policy Eligibility"	European Commission
European Commission	2014	"KP-DGCD Programme - Macroeconomic Eligibility Assessment"	European Commission

European Commission	2015	"KP-DGCD Programme - Annual Monitoring report - PFM Eligibility assessment"	European Commission
European Commission	2015	"KP-DGCD Programme - Eligibility assessment of Transparency and Oversight of the Budget"	European Commission
European Commission	2015	"KP-DGCD Programme - Country Risk Management Framework"	European Commission
European Commission	2015	"KP-DGCD Programme - Monthly Report - January to March 2015"	European Commission
European Union Delegation to Pakistan	2015	"KP-DGCD Programme - Disbursement Decision - Sector Reform Contract"	European Commission
Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	2011	"Integrated Public Financial Management Strategy"	Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	2013	"Community-driven local development. A governance framework"	<a href="http://lgkp.gov.pk/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Community-driven-local-development-GoKP-2013.pdf">http://lgkp.gov.pk/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Community-driven-local-development-GoKP-2013.pdf</a>
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Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	2013	"Budget Strategy Paper (2013-16)"	<a href="http://www.financekpp.gov.pk/FD/attachments/article/8/Budget%20Strategy%20Paper%202013-14.pdf">http://www.financekpp.gov.pk/FD/attachments/article/8/Budget%20Strategy%20Paper%202013-14.pdf</a>
Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	2013	"White Paper (2013-2014)"	<a href="http://www.youthpolicy.org/library/wp-content/uploads/library/Pakistan_Khyber_Pakhtunkhwa_2013_2014_Budget_eng.pdf">http://www.youthpolicy.org/library/wp-content/uploads/library/Pakistan_Khyber_Pakhtunkhwa_2013_2014_Budget_eng.pdf</a>
Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	2013	"Right to information act, 2013"	Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	2013	"Annual Development Programme - 2013-2014"	Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	2013	"Budget Estimates for Service Delivery - 2013-2016"	Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	2014	"Integrated Development Strategy - 2014-2018"	<a href="http://lgkp.gov.pk/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Integrated-Development-Strategy.pdf">http://lgkp.gov.pk/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Integrated-Development-Strategy.pdf</a>
Government of Pakistan	2014	"KP-DGCD Programme - Request for disbursement of funds"	European Commission
Government of Pakistan	2014	"KP-DGCD Programme - Note to the Request for disbursement of"	European Commission

		funds - Eligibility Criteria assessment carried out by Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa"	
Oxford Policy Management	2014	"System Design Document for the CDLD Management Information System"	Oxford Policy Management
Oxford Policy Management	2014	"Training Manual for Users of CDLD Management Information System"	Oxford Policy Management
<b>Sustainable Rural Development in the Refugee-Affected and Hosting Areas of Pakistan (RAHA)</b>			
European Commission	2010	"RAHA - Financing agreement between the European Commission and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan"	European Commission
European Commission	2012	"RAHA - Monitoring report - 2012"	European Commission
European Commission	2013	"RAHA - Monitoring report - 2013"	European Commission
European Commission / United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	2011	"European Commission Contribution Agreement with the United Nations Development Programme"	European Commission
European Commission / United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	2011	"European Commission Contribution Agreement with the United Nations Development Programme - Annex I - Description of the action"	European Commission
European Commission / United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	2011	"European Commission Contribution Agreement with the United Nations Development Programme - Attachment 1 to Annex I - Logical Framework"	European Commission
European Commission / United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	2011	"European Commission Contribution Agreement with the United Nations Development Programme - Annex II - General Conditions"	European Commission

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European Commission / United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	2011	"European Commission Contribution Agreement with the United Nations Development Programme - Annex IV - Financial identification form"	European Commission
European Commission / United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	2011	"European Commission Contribution Agreement with the United Nations Development Programme - Annex IV - Legal Entity form"	European Commission
European Commission / United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	2011	"European Commission Contribution Agreement with the United Nations Development Programme - Explanatory Note"	European Commission
German Agency for Cooperation Development (GIZ)	2011	"RAHA Retreat Report: 17th and 18th November, 2011 - PC Bhurban"	European Commission
Government of Pakistan	2013	"Coordination Mechanisms and Internal Procedures - A study on the operational set up of the RAHA programme"	Government of Pakistan
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	2011	"RAHA Review Mission report April, 2011"	UNDP
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	2012	"RAHA Retreat Report: 5th and 6th July, 2012 - Islamabad"	UNDP
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	2014	"RAHA - MTR Recommendations and Progress Update - February 18, 2014"	European Commission
United Nations Development	2012	"Annual Progress Report - July 2011 - June 2012"	<a href="http://www.pk.undp.org/content/dam/pakistan/docs/CPRU/RAHA%20Docs/">http://www.pk.undp.org/content/dam/pakistan/docs/CPRU/RAHA%20Docs/</a>

Programme (UNDP)			UNDP-PK-CPRU-RahaAPR-2011-12.pdf
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	2013	"RAHA - Mid-Term Review"	UNDP
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	2011	"RAHA - Review Mission Report"	UNDP
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	2013	"Annual Progress Report - July 2012 - November 2013"	UNDP
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	2015	"Annual Progress Report - December 2013 - December 2014"	UNDP
European Commission	2015	"External evaluation of the Sustainable Rural Development in the Refugee Affected and Hosting Areas of Pakistan Programme "	
European Commission	2015	"External evaluation of the Sustainable Rural Development in the Refugee Affected and Hosting Areas of Pakistan Programme " - Annexes	
<b>Programme for Economic Advancement and Community Empowerment (PEACE)</b>			
European Commission	2012	"PEACE - Grant contract with SARHAD"	European Commission
European Commission	2012	"PEACE - Grant contract - Annex I - Description of the action"	European Commission
European Commission	2012	"PEACE - Grant contract - Annex II - General conditions"	European Commission
European Commission	2012	"PEACE - Grant contract - Annex III - Budget for the action"	European Commission
European Commission	2013	"PEACE - 1st Interim report - 1st October 2012 to 31st July 2013"	European Commission
European Commission	2013	"PEACE - Monitoring report - 2013"	European Commission
European Commission	2014	"PEACE - 2nd Interim report - August 2013 - February 2014"	European Commission
European Commission	2014	"PEACE - 3rd Interim report - March 2014 - July 2014"	European Commission



European Commission / Sarhad Rural Support Programme	2014	An assessment of Institutional Development of Men and Women Community Organizations under EU-SRSP PEACE Programme in Malakand Division, KP	European Commission
Shoaib Sultan Khan	2014	Note for Record - European Union PEACE Programme	
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Canada International Development Agency (CIDA)	2010	"Tip Sheets on Education in Emergencies, Conflict, Post-conflict, and Fragile States"	<a href="http://publications.gc.ca/site/fra/375747/publication.html">http://publications.gc.ca/site/fra/375747/publication.html</a>
Department For International Development (DFID) / United States Agency for International Development (USAID)	2005	"Options and Recommendations for Education Sector. Budget Support in Pakistan"	<a href="http://www.cfr.org/content/thinktank/ue/report_dbs_in_pakistan.pdf">http://www.cfr.org/content/thinktank/ue/report_dbs_in_pakistan.pdf</a>
Global Education cluster	2011	"Education cluster in Pakistan. Lessons learned: Flood response"	<a href="http://www.ineesite.org/uploads/files/resources/Final_Lessons_Learned_Review_Pakistan.pdf">http://www.ineesite.org/uploads/files/resources/Final_Lessons_Learned_Review_Pakistan.pdf</a>
Government of Pakistan	2015	"National Education Management Information System Pakistan"	<a href="http://www.uis.unesco.org/StatisticalCapacityBuilding/Workshop%20Documents/Education%20workshop%20dox/2014%20ESWA%20Bangkok/presentations/country%20presentations/14_PakistanNEMIS.pdf">http://www.uis.unesco.org/StatisticalCapacityBuilding/Workshop%20Documents/Education%20workshop%20dox/2014%20ESWA%20Bangkok/presentations/country%20presentations/14_PakistanNEMIS.pdf</a>
International Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE)	2011	"INEE Guiding Principles on Integrating Conflict Sensitivity in Education Policy and Programming in Conflict-Affected and Fragile Contexts"	<a href="http://toolkit.ineesite.org/toolkit/INEEcms/uploads/1150/INEE_Guiding_principles_A3_English%5B1%5D.pdf">http://toolkit.ineesite.org/toolkit/INEEcms/uploads/1150/INEE_Guiding_principles_A3_English%5B1%5D.pdf</a>
International Crisis Group (ICG)	2004	"Pakistan: Reforming the Education sector"	<a href="http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/pakistan/084-pakistan-reforming-the-education-sector.aspx">http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/pakistan/084-pakistan-reforming-the-education-sector.aspx</a>

International Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE)	2011	"Reflection tool for Designing and implementing conflict sensitive education programmes in conflict-affected and fragile contexts"	<a href="http://toolkit.ineesite.org/toolkit/INEEcms/uploads/1150/INEE_Reflection_Tool_English_interactive[1].pdf">http://toolkit.ineesite.org/toolkit/INEEcms/uploads/1150/INEE_Reflection_Tool_English_interactive[1].pdf</a>
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<i>The Economist</i>	2015	"Low-cost private schools. Learning unleashed"	<a href="http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21660063-where-governments-are-failing-provide-youngsters-decent-education-private-sector">http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21660063-where-governments-are-failing-provide-youngsters-decent-education-private-sector</a>
UNICEF	2014	"Conflict Analysis Summary. Pakistan"	UNICEF
World Food Programme	2015	"Pakistan Education Atlas 2015"	<a href="https://www.wfp.org/content/pakistan-education-atlas-2015">https://www.wfp.org/content/pakistan-education-atlas-2015</a>
Reliance Services, Islamabad	2012	Online Public Poll on Technical and Vocational Education Training (TVET) in Pakistan	
European Commission	2013	TVET and Skills Development in EU Development Cooperation	
<b>Sindh Education Plan Support Programme (SEPSP)</b>			
European Commission	2006	"SEPSP - Financing agreement"	European Commission
European Commission	2007	"SER-TA - Start up Work Plan"	European Commission
European Commission	2008	"SER-TA - Annual report 2007 and Annual Work Plan 2008"	European Commission
European Commission	2008	"SER-TA - Progress report 2007"	European Commission
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European Commission	2009	"SER-TA - Input plan 2009"	European Commission
European Commission	2009	"External Monitoring of SERP - 4th February - 18th February 2009 - Mission report"	European Commission
European Commission	2010	"SER-TA - Progress report 2009"	European Commission
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Government of Sindh	2014	"Sindh Education Sector Plan - 2014-2018"	<a href="http://www.globalpartnership.org/content/education-sector-plan-2014-2018-sindh-province-pakistan">http://www.globalpartnership.org/content/education-sector-plan-2014-2018-sindh-province-pakistan</a>
Government of Sindh	2008	"Budget analysis - 2008-2009"	Government of Sindh
World Bank / European Commission	2008	"Aide-mémoire SERP - Joint mission World Bank/European Commission - May 1-10, 2008"	European Commission
<b>Sindh Education Sector Support Programme (SESSP)</b>			
European Commission	2010	"SESSP - Identification fiche"	European Commission
European Commission	2010	"SESSP - Identification fiche - Annexes"	European Commission
European Commission	2012	"SESSP - Action fiche"	European Commission
European Commission	2012	"SESSP - Financing Agreement"	European Commission
European Commission	2012	"SESSP - Financing Agreement - Annex I - General conditions"	European Commission
European Commission	2013	"SESSP - Financing Agreement - Annex II - Technical and Administrative Provisions"	European Commission
European Commission	2013	"SESSP - Financing Agreement - Request for Amendment"	European Commission
European Commission	2013	"SESSP - Financing Agreement - Approval to Amendment"	European Commission
European Commission	2014	"SESSP - Financing Agreement - Amendment n°2"	European Commission
European Commission	2015	"SESSP - Disbursement decision"	European Commission
European Commission	2015	"SESSP - Disbursement decision - Annex 2 - Progress/Compliance report"	European Commission
European Commission	2014	"SESSP - Disbursement decision - Annex 3 - Aide Memoire"	European Commission
European Commission	2015	"SESSP - Disbursement decision - Annex 5 - Assessing Public Sector Policy Eligibility"	European Commission
European Commission	2015	"SESSP - Disbursement decision - Annex 6 - Macroeconomic Eligibility Assessment"	European Commission

European Commission	2015	"SESSP - Disbursement decision - Annex 8 - Eligibility assessment of Transparency and Oversight of the Budget "	European Commission
European Commission	2013	"SESSP - Technical and Policy Advisor - Final report"	European Commission
<b>Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Education Sector Reform Programme (KP-ESRP)</b>			
European Commission / Government of Pakistan	2008	"KP - ESRP - Financing Agreement"	European Commission
European Commission / Government of Pakistan	2009	"KP - ESRP - Financing Agreement - Addendum 1, 2, 3"	European Commission
European Commission	2008	"KP - ESRP - Action fiche"	European Commission
European Commission	2008	"KP - ESRP - Identification fiche"	European Commission
European Commission	2007	"Annual Action programme for Development Cooperation Instrument"	European Commission
European Commission	2010	"KP - ESRP - Revised Action fiche"	European Commission
European Commission	2011	"KP - ESRP -Delegation agreement with GIZ"	European Commission
European Commission	2011	"KP - ESRP -Delegation agreement with GIZ - Annex II - General conditions"	European Commission
European Commission	2012	"KP - ESRP -Final report"	European Commission
European Commission	2012	"Qualitative research study of education in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa"	European Commission
GIZ	2011	"KP - ESRP -Description of the action"	European Commission
Government of North-West Frontier Province	2009	"Education Sector Plan 2007-08 to 2015-16 (Draft)"	Government of North-West Frontier Province
Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	2006	"Education Sector 5-Year Plan - Draft"	Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	2012	"Education Sector Plan 2010-2015"	Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
<b>Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Education Sector Plan Support Programme (KP-ESPSP)</b>			
European Commission / Government of Pakistan	2013	"KP-ESPSP - Financing Agreement"	European Commission
European Commission	2013	"KP-ESPSP - Identification fiche"	European Commission
European Commission	2013	"KP-ESPSP - Action Fiche"	European Commission

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<b>General documentation</b>			
Government of Pakistan	2009	"The National Skills Strategy - 2009-2013"	<a href="http://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/upload/Pakistan/Pakistan_National_Skills_Strategy_2009-2013.pdf">http://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/upload/Pakistan/Pakistan_National_Skills_Strategy_2009-2013.pdf</a>
Government of Pakistan	2013	"Labour Force Survey - 2012-2013"	<a href="http://www.pbs.gov.pk/content/labour-force-survey-2012-13-annual-report">http://www.pbs.gov.pk/content/labour-force-survey-2012-13-annual-report</a>
British Council	2015	"Skill Disconnect in Sindh"	
Tushar Agrawal, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research (IGIDR)	2013	"Vocational education and training programs (VET): An Asian perspective"	Asia-Pacific Journal of Cooperative Education, 2013, 14(1), 15-26
<b>Support to the Technical and Vocational Education and Training Sector in Pakistan (TVET I)</b>			
European Commission / ACTED	2012	"TVET 1 - Grant contract with ACTED"	European Commission
European Commission / CARE	2012	"TVET 1 - Grant contract with CARE"	European Commission
European Commission /	2012	"TVET 1 - Grant contract with Concern Worldwide"	European Commission

Concern Worldwide			
European Commission GIZ	/	2012	"TVET I - Delegation Agreement with GIZ"
European Commission GIZ	/	2012	"TVET I - Delegation Agreement with GIZ - Annex 1 - Description of the action"
European Commission GIZ	/	2012	"TVET I - Delegation Agreement with GIZ - Annex 2 - General conditions"
European Commission GIZ	/	2012	"TVET I - Delegation Agreement with GIZ - Annex 3 - Budget"
European Commission GIZ	/	2012	"TVET I - Delegation Agreement with GIZ - Annex 4 - Central exclusion database"
European Commission GIZ	/	2012	"TVET I - Delegation Agreement with GIZ - Annex 5 - Communication of information"
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European Commission / Government of Pakistan	/	2009	"TVET I - Financing Agreement"
European Commission / Government of Pakistan	/	2012	"TVET I - Financing Agreement - Logical Framework"
European Commission / Government of Pakistan	/	2012	"TVET I - Financing Agreement - Addendum 1"
European Commission / Oxfam	/	2012	"TVET 1 - Grant contract with Oxfam"
European Commission / Plan International UK	/	2012	"TVET 1 - Grant contract with Plan International UK"
European Commission / TUSDEC	/	2012	"TVET 1 - Grant contract with TUSDEC"

European Commission	2013	"TVET I - Monitoring report - July 2013 - On ACTED"	European Commission
European Commission	2013	"TVET I - Monitoring report - July 2013 - On CARE"	European Commission
European Commission	2013	"TVET I - Monitoring report - July 2013 - On Concern"	European Commission
European Commission	2013	"TVET I - Monitoring report - July 2013 - On OXFAM"	European Commission
European Commission	2013	"TVET I - Monitoring report - July 2013 - On Plan International"	European Commission
European Commission	2013	"TVET I - Monitoring report - July 2013 - On TUSDEC"	European Commission
European Commission	2014	"TVET I - Mid-Term review - Final report"	European Commission
<b>Support to the Technical and Vocational Education and Training Sector in Pakistan (TVET II)</b>			
European Commission / Government of Pakistan	2010	"TVET II - Financing Agreement"	European Commission
European Commission / Government of Pakistan	2010	"TVET II - Financing Agreement - Annex 1 - General conditions"	European Commission
European Commission / Government of Pakistan	2012	"TVET II - Financing Agreement - Addendum 1"	European Commission
European Commission / GIZ	2011	"TVET II - Delegation Agreement with GIZ"	European Commission
European Commission	2012	"TVET II - Inception report"	European Commission
European Commission	2013	"TVET II - Monitoring report - 2012"	European Commission
European Commission	2013	"TVET II - Progress report - 1st April 2012 to 31st March 2013"	European Commission
European Commission	2014	"TVET II - Mid-Term Review"	European Commission
European Commission	2014	"TVET II - Progress report - 1st April 2013 to 31st March 2014"	European Commission

## Democracy & Governance

General documentation			
Abbasi M. Nadia - Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)	2009	"The EU and Democracy Building in Pakistan"	<a href="http://www.idea.int/resources/analysis/loader.cfm?csmodule=security/getfile&amp;pageid=37937">http://www.idea.int/resources/analysis/loader.cfm?csmodule=security/getfile&amp;pageid=37937</a>
Aziz, Mazhar	2007	<i>Military control in Pakistan: The parallel state</i> , Routledge	Routledge
Blair Graeme, Fair C. Christine, Malhotra Neil, Shapira N. Jacob	2013	"Poverty and Support for Militant Politics: Evidence from Pakistan", <i>American Journal of Political Science</i> , Vol.57, No. 1, January 2013, Pp. 30– 48	<i>American Journal of Political Science</i>
Chappell Gareth	2009	"Pakistan: What role for the European Union? Comments on how Brussels could counteract a 'very radical threat indeed'", SWP Working Paper	SWP
Cohen P., Stephen	2011	"The Future of Pakistan", The Brookings Institution	<a href="http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2010/9/bellagio%20conference%20papers/01_pakistan_cohen.pdf">http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2010/9/bellagio%20conference%20papers/01_pakistan_cohen.pdf</a>
Council of the European Union	2010	"EU-Pakistan readmission agreement"	<a href="http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&amp;f=ST%2014416%202010%20INIT">http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&amp;f=ST%2014416%202010%20INIT</a>
Danida	2015	"Lessons learned from Danish and other international efforts on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) in development contexts"	<a href="http://um.dk/da/~media/UM/Danish-site/Documents/Udenrigspolitik/Fred-sikkerhed-og-retsorden/201503StudyCVE.pdf">http://um.dk/da/~media/UM/Danish-site/Documents/Udenrigspolitik/Fred-sikkerhed-og-retsorden/201503StudyCVE.pdf</a>
Easterly William	2001	"The Political Economy of Growth Without Development: A Case Study of Pakistan"	<a href="https://williameasterly.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/9_-easterly_thepoliticalconomyofgrowthwithoutdevelopmentpakistan.pdf">https://williameasterly.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/9_-easterly_thepoliticalconomyofgrowthwithoutdevelopmentpakistan.pdf</a>
European Commission	2011	"Strategic evaluation of the EU support to the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms (2000-2010)"	<a href="https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/strategic-evaluation-eu-support-respect-human-rights-and-fundamental-freedoms-2000-2010_en">https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/strategic-evaluation-eu-support-respect-human-rights-and-fundamental-freedoms-2000-2010_en</a>
Fair C. Christine.	2014	<i>Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War</i> , Oxford University Press	Oxford University Press



Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)	2009	"Democracy in development. Global consultations on the EU's role in democracy building"	<a href="http://www.idea.int/resources/analysis/upload/eupp_june_report.pdf">http://www.idea.int/resources/analysis/upload/eupp_june_report.pdf</a>
Khan, Feisal	2007	"Corruption and the Decline of the State in Pakistan." <i>Asian Journal of Political Science</i> 15, no. 2 (2007): 219-247.	<i>Asian Journal of Political Science</i>
Krasner D. Stephen	2012	"Talking Tough to Pakistan. How to End Islamabad's Defiance", <i>Foreign Affairs</i>	<i>Foreign Affairs</i>
Markey Daniel	2007	"A False choice in Pakistan", <i>The New York Times</i>	<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/cfr/world/20070701faessay_v86n4_markey.html?pagewanted=all&amp;r=0">http://www.nytimes.com/cfr/world/20070701faessay_v86n4_markey.html?pagewanted=all&amp;r=0</a>
Paul, Thazha Varkey	2014	<i>The warrior state: Pakistan in the contemporary world</i> , Oxford University Press	Oxford University Press
Shad Riaz, Muhammad	2014	"An Assessment of Opportunities for the EU's enhanced engagement with Pakistan", <i>Journal of European studies</i>	<a href="http://www.asceku.com.pk/journals/2014_2/8._m._riaz_shad.pdf">http://www.asceku.com.pk/journals/2014_2/8._m._riaz_shad.pdf</a>
Vira Varun and Cordesman H. Anthony	2011	"Pakistan: Violence vs. Stability. A National Net Assessment"	<a href="http://csis.org/publication/pakistan-violence-vs-stability">http://csis.org/publication/pakistan-violence-vs-stability</a>
Siddique, Osama	2012	"The Other Pakistan: Special Laws, Diminished Citizenship and the Gathering Storm"	Diminished Citizenship and the Gathering Storm
Siddique, Osama	2013	Pakistan's experience with formal law: an alien justice	Cambridge University Press
Siddique, Osama	2015	"The Judicialization of Politics in Pakistan"	Unstable Constitutionalism: Law and Politics in South Asia
Mysbah Balagamwala; Haris Gazdar	2014	Impact Evaluation of DFIDs Electoral Programmes in Pakistan	Collective for Social Science Research
Muhammad Rafique	2016	Pakistan's International Human Rights Commitments: Challenges Ahead	<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/pakistans-international-human-rights-commitments-ahead-rafique?forceNoSplash=true">https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/pakistans-international-human-rights-commitments-ahead-rafique?forceNoSplash=true</a>
<b>Improving Parliamentary Performance</b>			
European Commission/Government of Pakistan	2010	"Financing agreement between the European Union and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan"	European Commission

European Commission/Government of Pakistan	2014	"Addendum to Financing agreement between the European Union and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan"	European Commission
European Commission/BCRC	2012	"Service contract with BCRC"	European Commission
European Commission/BCRC	2013	"Improving Parliamentary Performance - Monitoring report - 2013"	European Commission
<b>Long Term Election Observation and Oversight in Pakistan</b>			
European Commission/TDEA-FAFEN	2012	"Grant contract with TDEA-FAFEN"	European Commission
European Commission/TDEA-FAFEN	2012	"Addendum to Grant contract with TDEA-FAFEN"	European Commission
<b>Support Electoral reforms in Pakistan</b>			
Democracy Reporting International (DRI)	2010	"Inception mission report"	European Commission
Democracy Reporting International (DRI)	2010	"Interim financial report, 2009-2010"	European Commission
Democracy Reporting International (DRI)	2010	"Interim narrative report, December 2009- August 2010"	European Commission
Democracy Reporting International (DRI)	2010	"Monthly progress report - March 2010 to December 2010 "	European Commission
Democracy Reporting International (DRI)	2011	"Interim financial report 2010-2011"	European Commission
Democracy Reporting International (DRI)	2011	"Interim narrative report, September 2010 - January 2011"	European Commission

Democracy Reporting International (DRI)	2011	"Monthly progress report - January 2011 to October 2011"	European Commission
European Commission/DRI	2009	"Grant contract with DRI"	European Commission
<b>Enhancing support for ending violence and discrimination against women</b>			
CAVISH	2010	"Progress updates January - December 2010"	European Commission
CAVISH	2011	"Progress updates January - June 2011"	European Commission
European Commission/CAVISH	2009	"Grant contract with CAVISH"	European Commission
<b>Citizens Justice and Peace Programme in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (CJP)</b>			
European Commission	2013	"Identification of EU Rule of Law programme 2013 - Final report"	European Commission
European Commission	2013	"CJP Programme in KP - Identification fiche"	European Commission
European Commission / Government of Pakistan	2014	"CJP Programme in KP - Financing agreement"	European Commission
European Commission / Government of Pakistan	2014	"CJP Programme in KP - Annex 2 (Technical & Administrative Provisions)"	European Commission
European Commission / United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	2014	"CJP Programme in KP - Contribution agreement with UNDP"	European Commission
<b>Civilian Capacity Building for Law Enforcement in Pakistan (CCBLE)</b>			
European Commission	2010	"CCBLE - Inception report"	European Commission
European Commission	2010	"CCBLE - Terms of reference"	European Commission

European Commissions/G IZ	2010	"CCBLE - 1st Interim report"	European Commission
European Commissions/G IZ	2011	"CCBLE - 2d Interim report"	European Commission
European Commissions/G IZ	2011	"CCBLE - 3rd Interim report"	European Commission
European Commission	2012	"CCBLE - Contribution agreement with UNOPS - Final report"	European Commission
European Commission	2011	"CCBLE - Draft final report"	European Commission
European Commission	2012	"CCBLE - Ex-post Evaluation - Final report"	European Commission
<b>Access to Justice in Punjab</b>			
European Commission / Government of Pakistan	2010	"Access to Justice in Punjab - Financing Agreement"	European Commission
European Commission / Government of Pakistan	2010	"Access to Justice in Punjab - Financing Agreement - Annex 1 - General conditions"	European Commission
European Commission / Government of Pakistan	2013	"Access to Justice in Punjab - Financing Agreement - Annex 1 - Addendum 1"	European Commission
European Commission / GDSI	2013	"Access to Justice in Punjab - Service contract with GDSI"	European Commission
European Commission	2014	"Access to Justice in Punjab - Reports - October 2014 - November 2014 - December 2014 "	European Commission
European Commission	2015	"Access to Justice in Punjab - Report - February 2015 - February 2015"	European Commission
<b>Combating abusive child labour II</b>			
European Commission / Government of Pakistan	2006	"Financing agreement between the European Union and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan"	European Commission

European Commission / Government of Pakistan	2008	"Addendum n°1 Financing agreement between the European Union and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan"	European Commission
European Commission / Government of Pakistan	2013	"Addendum n°2 Financing agreement between the European Union and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan"	European Commission
European Commission / ILO	2008	"Contribution agreement with ILO"	European Commission
European Commission	2009	"Monitoring report - 2009"	European Commission
European Commission	2010	"Monitoring report - 2010"	European Commission
European Commission	2011	"Mid-Term Review"	European Commission
European Commission	2012	"Monitoring report - 2012"	European Commission
<b>Counter Terrorism Associated Prosecution Reform Initiative (CAPRI)</b>			
European Commission/Foreign & Commonwealth Office	2012	"Service contract with Foreign & Commonwealth Office"	European Commission
European Commission/Foreign & Commonwealth Office	2013	"Addendum n°1 to Service contract with Foreign & Commonwealth Office"	European Commission
European Commission/Foreign & Commonwealth Office	2014	"Addendum n°2 to Service contract with Foreign & Commonwealth Office"	European Commission
European Commission	2014	"Monitoring report - 2014"	European Commission

## Public Financial Management

<b>General documentation</b>			
European Commission	2012	"Formulation Mission: Public Financial Management in Pakistan"	European Commission
Government of Pakistan	2012	"Public Financial Management and Accountability Assessment"	Government of Pakistan
Government of Sindh	2013	"Public Financial Management and Accountability Assessment - Pakistan Sindh Province"	Government of Pakistan
Government of Sindh	2014	"Public Financial Management Reform Strategy - 2014/15 - 2019/20"	fdsindh.gov.pk/site/userfiles/PFM.pdf
<b>Public Financial Management Support Programme for Pakistan - PFM SPP</b>			
European Commission	2012	"PMF-SPP - Project identification fiche"	European Commission
European Commission	2012	"PMF-SPP - Identification mission - June 2012"	European Commission
European Commission	2012	"PMF-SPP - Formulation mission - Sept 2012"	European Commission
European Commission / Government of Pakistan	2013	"PMF-SPP - Financing Agreement"	European Commission
European Commission / Government of Pakistan	2014	"PMF-SPP - Financing Agreement - Addendum 1"	European Commission
European Commission	2014	"PMF-SPP - Service contract with Oxford Policy Management"	European Commission

## Trade

General documentation			
Asian Development Bank	2015	"Asian Development Bank & Pakistan - Fact Sheet"	<a href="http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/27786/pak.pdf">http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/27786/pak.pdf</a>
Commonwealth Secretariat	2014	"Commonwealth Trade Policy Discussion Papers. India-Pakistan Economic Co-operation: Implications for Regional Integration in South Asia"	<a href="http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/5js7vpw3gpxp.pdf?expires=1437641789&amp;id=id&amp;accname=guest&amp;checksum=F1BEB2B1D306349B3A30E7F9751DAD4E">http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/5js7vpw3gpxp.pdf?expires=1437641789&amp;id=id&amp;accname=guest&amp;checksum=F1BEB2B1D306349B3A30E7F9751DAD4E</a>
European Commission	2009	"Trade Fact Sheet - Aid for Trade"	<a href="http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/october/tradoc_140837.pdf">http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/october/tradoc_140837.pdf</a>
European Commission	2013	"EU-Pakistan: New Opportunities for Trade and Investment"	<a href="http://www.eas.europa.eu/delegations/pakistan/documents/press_corner/20131205_02_trabro_en.pdf">http://www.eas.europa.eu/delegations/pakistan/documents/press_corner/20131205_02_trabro_en.pdf</a>
European Commission	2015	"Trade for all. Towards a more responsible trade and investment policy"	<a href="http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/october/tradoc_153846.pdf">http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/october/tradoc_153846.pdf</a>
European Commission / ITC / UNIDO / WIPO	2015	"TRTA I, Bridging, II & Extension Phases 12 years of EUD-TRTA Collaboration Programmes – Overview"	European Commission
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) / World Trade Organization (WTO)	2015	"Aid for Trade at a glance - Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Pakistan - 2015"	<a href="https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/a4t_e/profiles_e/pak_e.pdf">https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/a4t_e/profiles_e/pak_e.pdf</a>
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) / World Trade Organization (WTO)	2015	"Aid for Trade at a glance - 2015"	<a href="http://www.oecd.org/trade/aid-for-trade-at-a-glance-22234411.htm">http://www.oecd.org/trade/aid-for-trade-at-a-glance-22234411.htm</a>
Raham Selim and De Prabir	2014	"India–Pakistan Economic Co-operation: Implications for Regional Integration in South Asia"	<i>Commonwealth Trade Policy Discussion Papers</i> 2014/05.

Shah S.M.H. , Sajid A. and Ali S.M		"The impact of technical barrier to trade on Pakistan textile industry"	<i>Pakistan Journal of Science</i> (vol. 66, 2 Jun 2014)
United States Agency for International Development (USAID)	2014	"Pakistan Trade Project - Midterm Performance Evaluation Report"	<a href="http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00JWV1.pdf">http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00JWV1.pdf</a>
The World Bank	2015	"Doing Business 2015 - Going Beyond Efficiency - Economy Profile 2015 - Pakistan"	<a href="http://francais.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreconomies/~media/giawb/doing%20business/documents/profiles/country/PAK.pdf">http://francais.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreconomies/~media/giawb/doing%20business/documents/profiles/country/PAK.pdf</a>
World Trade Organization (WTO)	2007	"Trade Policy Review - Pakistan - Secretariat Report"	<a href="https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language=E&amp;CatalogueIdList=132402,130388,130387,85724,61099,73755,33100,49503&amp;CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=4&amp;FullTextSearch=">https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language=E&amp;CatalogueIdList=132402,130388,130387,85724,61099,73755,33100,49503&amp;CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=4&amp;FullTextSearch=</a>
World Trade Organization (WTO)	2007	"Trade Policy Review - Pakistan - Government Report"	<a href="https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language=E&amp;CatalogueIdList=132402,130388,130387,85724,61099,73755,33100,49503&amp;CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=5&amp;FullTextSearch=">https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language=E&amp;CatalogueIdList=132402,130388,130387,85724,61099,73755,33100,49503&amp;CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=5&amp;FullTextSearch=</a>
World Trade Organization (WTO)	2015	"Trade Policy Review - Pakistan - Secretariat Report"	<a href="https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/s311_e.pdf">https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/s311_e.pdf</a>
World Trade Organization (WTO)	2015	"Trade Policy Review - Pakistan - Government Report"	<a href="https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/g311_e.pdf">https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/g311_e.pdf</a>
Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Commerce	2009	"Strategic Trade Policy Framework 2009-2012"	Ministry of Commerce
Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Commerce	2012	"Strategic Trade Policy Framework 2012-2015"	Ministry of Commerce
Makhdoom Muhammad Amin Fahim, Senior Minister and Minister for Commerce	2013	"Strategic Trade Policy Framework 2012-2015", speech by Makhdoom Muhammad Amin Fahim, Senior Minister and Minister for Commerce, 31st January 2013	Ministry of Commerce
Rashid Amjad, Ejaz Ghani,	2012	Export Barriers in Pakistan: Results from a Firm-Level Survey	The Lahore Journal of Economics



Musleh ud Din, Tariq Mahmood			
Ernesto Sanchez-Triana, Ernesto, Dan Biller, Ljaz Nabi, Leonard Ortolano, Ghzal Dezfuli, Javaid Afzal, Santiago Enriquez	2014	Revitalizing growth in Pakistan: Trade, Infrastructure, and Environmental Performance	World Bank
<b>Trade Related Technical Assistance Programme II (TRTA II)</b>			
ADE	2012	"TRTA II -Need assessment - Final report"	ADE
Ecorys	2012	"TRTA II - Mid-term evaluation report"	Ecorys
European Commission / ITC / UNIDO / WIPO	2007	"TRTA I - Final report"	European Commission
European Commission / ITC / UNIDO / WIPO	2007	"TRTA I - Final report - Components 1, 2 and 3"	European Commission
European Commission / ITC / UNIDO / WIPO	2008	"TRTA II - Action fiche"	European Commission
European Commission / ITC / UNIDO / WIPO	2008	"TRTA II - Annual action programme"	European Commission
European Commission / ITC / UNIDO / WIPO	2008	"TRTA II - Budgetary Impact Statement"	European Commission
European Commission / ITC / UNIDO / WIPO	2008	"TRTA II - Commission Decision"	European Commission
European Commission/Go vernment of Pakistan	2009	"TRTA II - Financing agreement"	European Commission

European Commission/Government of Pakistan	2009	"TRTA II - Action fiche n°4"	European Commission
European Commission/Government of Pakistan	2014	"TRTA II - Financing agreement - Addendum 1"	European Commission
European Commission	2014	"TRTA II Programme: Assessment of Performance of Accredited Laboratories in Pakistan & Gains to Export Sector, A preliminary Study"	European Commission
European Commission / United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)	2009	"TRTA II - Contribution agreement"	European Commission
European Commission / United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)	2009	"TRTA II - Contribution agreement - Annex 1 to 3"	European Commission
European Commission / United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)	2009	"TRTA II - Contribution agreement - Explanatory note and Addendum 1"	European Commission
European Commission / United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)	2014	"TRTA II - Progress report - April 2013 - March 2014"	European Commission
European Commission / United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)	2014	"TRTA II - Progress report - April 2014 - October 2014"	European Commission

United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)	2010	"TRTA II - Inception report"	European Commission
Bruno Valanzuolo	2015	"12 years of the TRTA Programme - Overview"	
<b>Trade Related Technical Assistance Programme - Private Sector Development (TRTA-PSD III)</b>			
ADE	2012	"Value Chain Analysis of the Gems Jewellery and Leather Sector in Pakistan - Final report"	ADE
AKSRP	2014	"Gilgit-Baltistan, The Jewel of Pakistan: Developing a Sustainable Value Chain for Gems and Jewellery Sector in Northern Pakistan, Interim Narrative Report, June 2013 – May 2014"	AKSRP
AKSRP	2014	"Gender checklist and strategy for EU funded Gilgit-Baltistan, The Jewel of Pakistan: Project Gender and Social Development Section."	AKSRP
AKSRP	2014	"Communication Strategy for Gilgit-Baltistan, The Jewel of Pakistan."	AKSRP
AKSRP	2014	"EU funded Gilgit-Baltistan: The Jewel of Pakistan, Developing a Sustainable Value Chain for Gems and Jewellery Sector in GBC, Institutional Development Strategy."	AKSRP
European Commission	2015	"Pakistan Leather Competitiveness Improvement Programme (PLCIP), Yearly Progress Report February 2014-February 2015."	European Commission
European Commission / Government of Pakistan	2011	"TRTA PSD III - Financing agreement"	European Commission
European Commission / Government of Pakistan	2011	"TRTA PSD III - Financing agreement - Annex 2"	European Commission
European Commission / Government of Pakistan	2013	"TRTA PSD III - Financing agreement - Addendum 1"	European Commission

European Commission / PITCO	2013	"TRTA PSD III - Grant contract with PITCO - Special conditions"	European Commission
European Commission / PITCO	2013	"TRTA PSD III - Grant contract with PITCO - Annex 1"	European Commission
European Commission / PITCO	2013	"TRTA PSD III - Grant contract with PITCO - Annex 2"	European Commission
European Commission / PITCO	2013	"TRTA PSD III - Grant contract with PITCO - Annex 3"	European Commission
European Commission / PITCO	2013	"TRTA PSD III - Grant contract with PITCO - Annex 4"	European Commission
European Commission / PITCO	2013	"TRTA PSD III - Grant contract with PITCO - Annex 5"	European Commission
European Commission / AKRSP	2013	"TRTA PSD III - Grant contract with AKRSP - Special conditions"	European Commission
European Commission / AKRSP	2013	"TRTA PSD III - Grant contract with AKRSP - Annex 1 - Description of the action"	European Commission
European Commission / AKRSP	2013	"TRTA PSD III - Grant contract with AKRSP - Annex 3 - Budget"	European Commission
European Commission / AKRSP	2013	"TRTA PSD III - Grant contract with AKRSP - Annex 3 - Budget"	European Commission



# **Annex D1: Programme**

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## Seminar

### Evaluation of EU co-operation with the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 2007-2014

Presentation of the Draft Final Report  
**MARRIOTT HOTEL – Kohinoor meeting room**  
**9<sup>th</sup> June 2016**



Time	Welcome
9:00 - 9:30	Arrival of participants and registration
9:30 - 9:45	Welcome Mr. J.F. Cautain, EU Ambassador to Pakistan
9:45 - 10:00	Welcome Mr. Tariq Bajwa, Secretary EAD, Government of Pakistan
10:00-11:00	Presentation of the evaluation: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Purpose and process</li><li>• Evaluation Conclusions</li></ul> M. Tanguy de Biolley, Team Leader, ADE
11:00 - 11:45	Questions and Comments
11:45 - 12:00	Break
12:00- 13:00	Presentation: Evaluation - Recommendations M. Tanguy de Biolley, Team Leader, ADE
13:00 - 13:45	Questions and Comments
13:45 - 14:00	Concluding Remarks by the EU Ambassador to Pakistan
14:00 - 15:00	(Lunch)





## **Annex D2: PowerPoint<sup>®</sup> Presentation**





# Evaluation of the European Union's Cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 2007-2014



## Presentation and Discussion of the Draft Final Report

Seminar in Islamabad,  
9<sup>th</sup> June 2016

This document is designed as support to the oral presentation and is not intended to be used separately. Any wording is kept short by necessity and will be nuanced orally and in the report.


## Agenda

- Introduction
- Overview of EU cooperation
- Conclusions
- Recommendations

## Objectives and scope

Subject	<b>Evaluation of EU cooperation with Pakistan 2007-2014</b> → Country-level evaluation → Part of the EU's multi-annual evaluation programme
Purpose	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• To provide an <b>overall independent assessment</b> of the EU's past and current cooperation;</li><li>• To identify <b>key lessons</b> and to produce recommendations to improve current and inform future choices on co-operation strategy &amp; delivery</li></ul>
Scope	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <i>Temporal:</i> <b>2007-2014</b></li><li>• <i>Institutional:</i> Overall EU engagement with Pakistan</li><li>• <i>Thematic:</i> Mainly <b>focal sectors of cooperation</b></li><li>• <i>Legal:</i> All relevant EU financing instruments; bilateral cooperation</li></ul>

## A structured process and a rigorous methodological approach




- Methodological framework
  - Reconstruction of the EU's intervention logic
  - Definition of a set of Evaluation Questions, judgment criteria and indicators
  - 'Contribution analysis' analytical framework
- Evaluation tools
  - Processing & analysis of **sector, macroeconomic and budgetary data**
  - Examination of **> 350 documents**:
    - EU and national policies & strategies, grey literature (donors, civil society...), etc.
    - Project documentation for selection of 21 projects
  - Interviews of **>150 actors in Pakistan** (Islamabad, Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar) + EU:
    - EU, federal and provincial authorities, implementing partners, projects' experts, civil society, other donors...
  - Analytical Notes

## Agenda

- Introduction
- **Overview of EU cooperation**
- Conclusions
- Recommendations

## EU (2%) and EU MS (14%) represented a significant share of development partners' aid

Country Programmable Aid:  
disbursements to Pakistan  
2007-2013,  
in constant prices  
(2012 M US\$)




Source: ADE, based on OECD database (OECD. DAC. Stat), April 2015



7

## The EU contracted 521 M€ over 2007-2014




Source: ADE, based on EuropeAid database (Data Warehouse), April 2015.



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## The EU channelled its aid through a variety of implementing partners



(1) EU Member States, including UK, Germany, France  
(2) Source: ADE analysis, based on EuropeAid database (Data Warehouse), April 2015.



## Agenda

- Introduction
- Overview of EU cooperation
- **Conclusions**
- Recommendations



## Overall assessment

- Highly relevant strategic positioning for a medium size development partner (but significant donor):
  - Benefitted from dialogue under the 5Y Engagement Plan and covered its priority areas
  - Relevant sectors/fields, alignment on national policy objectives, soft approach, financial & non-financial support, « neutral » image
  - Sustained focus on relatively few but self-reinforcing areas
- Promising mutually-supporting approaches :
  - Demand / Bottom-up: community empowerment (via NGOs, UN...)
  - Supply / Top-down: gov. & public systems strengthening (via BS + TA)
- Efficiency constrained by difficult external, internal and EU contexts, but outputs generally delivered
- Desired impacts not yet much materialised;
  - Still, the EU strategy contributed to paving the way
  - Progress made towards the aim to « achieve a strategic relationship »

## Conclusions

Conclusions - Overall strategy	
C1	Positioning of EU
C2	Overall intervention logic
C3	Reactivity to exogenous shocks
C4	Coherence
C5, C6	Budget support at provincial level
C7, C8	Instruments, modalities and approaches
Sector-related Conclusions	
C9, C10	Rural Development sector
C11, C12	Education (non TVET and TVET)
C13, C14	Democratisation, Human Rights and Rule of Law
C15, C16	Trade
Conclusions on cross cutting issues	
C17, C18	Gender and environment

## Conclusions

Conclusions - Overall strategy	
C1	<b>Positioning of EU</b>
C2	Overall intervention logic
C3	
C4	
C5, C6	The EU medium-sized provider of funds could establish itself as central partner:
C7, C8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Limited financial support combined with politically significant non financial cooperation</li> </ul>
C9, C10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cooperation inscribed in the government coordination mechanisms</li> </ul>
C11, C12	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Selection of provinces and sectors took account of other development partners' cooperation</li> </ul>
C13, C14	
C15, C16	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Visibility limited hampered by lack of effective communication strategy</li> </ul>
C17, C18	

## Conclusions

Conclusions - Overall strategy	
C1	Positioning of EU
C2	<b>Overall intervention logic</b>
C3	
C4	
C5, C6	The EU cooperation strategies and programmes have by and large aimed to transform the complex and self-reinforcing dynamics at play during the evaluation period:
C7, C8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Intervention logic based on sound context analyses;</li> </ul>
C9, C10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Appropriate selection of focal sectors;</li> </ul>
C11, C12	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Selection of geographical areas justified;</li> </ul>
C13, C14	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Effective combination of fin. &amp; non-fin. cooperation;</li> </ul>
C15, C16	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Continuity of support and integration of lessons.</li> </ul>
C17, C18	Although institutional improvements and reforms are observed, political economy analysis has not sufficiently identified the drivers and incentives for progress.

## Conclusions

Conclusions - Overall strategy	
C1	Positioning of EU
C2	Overall intervention logic
<b>C3</b>	<b>Reactivity to exogenous shocks</b>
C4	Coherence
C5, C6	
C7, C8	Pakistan has been affected by several exogenous shocks during the evaluation period... <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ DEVCO directed aid to most affected areas &amp; populations.</li> <li>▪ In parallel and in coherence with ECHO, without disrupting the logic of DEVCO cooperation programme.</li> <li>▪ This favoured continuum humanitarian → development.</li> </ul>
C9, C10	
C11, C12	
C13, C14	
C15, C16	
C17, C18	Gender and environment

## Conclusions

Conclusions - Overall strategy	
C1	Positioning of EU
C2	Overall intervention logic
C3	Reactivity to exogenous shocks
<b>C4</b>	<b>Coherence</b>
C5, C6	
C7, C8	The EU has actively exploited potential for synergies and learning between interventions in the rural development, trade, and human rights sectors. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ E.g. labour and human rights dialogue as part of GSP+</li> <li>▪ E.g. upgrading of promising value chains in rural areas</li> </ul>
C9, C10	
C11, C12	
C13, C14	
C15, C16	
Conclusions on cross cutting issues	
C17, C18	Gender and environment

## Conclusions

Conclusions - Overall strategy	
C1	Positioning of EU
C2	Overall intervention logic
C3	Reactivity to exogenous shocks
C4	Coherence
<b>C5, C6</b>	<b>Budget support at provincial level</b>
C7	SBS at provincial level was relevant and timely:
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ High risks but high potential benefits</li> <li>▪ Accompanied by institution-building</li> <li>▪ Achievements:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Fiscal space (reliability &amp; predictability of funds)</li> <li>▪ Platform for policy dialogue and support to policy-making process</li> <li>▪ Capacity strengthening linked to sector policies, including sector PFM</li> </ul> </li> <li>▪ Lessons:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Demanding for EUD</li> <li>▪ Support needed at provincial + federal levels</li> <li>▪ Major challenge: the district land lower tiers levels</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
C8	



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## Conclusions

Conclusions - Overall strategy	
C1	Positioning of EU
C2	Overall intervention logic
C3	Reactivity to exogenous shocks
C4	Coherence
C5, C6	Budget support at provincial level
<b>C7, C8</b>	<b>Instruments, modalities and approaches</b>

Diversity of instruments and modalities permitted to address specific needs. However, missed opportunities in 'connecting the dots' in democratic governance.

Implementing partners/modalities generally selected to meet 4 criteria:

- Field presence → UN development/humanitarian agencies, national NGOs, iNGOs
- Knowledge of subject → UN "technical" bodies, private sector
- Management capacity, knowledge EU procedures → priv.sector, iNGOs
- Capacity to implement policy reforms/induce changes: Governments, NGOs

→ Frequent cases where implementing partner satisfied only 1 or 2 criteria: Combining modalities/implementation partners in the same sector = factor of success

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## Conclusions

Conclusions - Overall strategy	
C1	Positioning of EU
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C4	Coherence
C5, C6	Budget support at provincial level
C7, C8	Instruments, modalities and approaches
Sector-related Conclusions	
C9, C10	Rural Development sector
C11, C12	Education (non TVET and TVET)
C13, C14	Democratisation, Human Rights and Rule of Law
C15, C16	Trade
Conclusions on cross cutting issues	
C17, C18	Gender and environment

## Conclusions

Sector-related Conclusions	
<b>C9, C10</b>	<b>Rural Development sector</b>
C11, C12	Education (TVET and non TVET)
C13, C14	Democratisation, Human Rights and Rule of Law
C15, C16	Trade
C17, C18	Gender and environment

- Fully justified and relevant selection as a focal sector throughout the whole period
- Two-pronged approach to improve local communities livelihood
  - Demand side : three-tiered social mobilisation CBO→VO→LSO
  - Supply side: SBS to provincial and local governments + institutional strengthening
- Synergies with Trade (value chains) & TVET
- Visible results achieved: small infrastructures; women community organisations; mature LSO

## Conclusions

Sector-related Conclusions	
C9 , C10	Rural Development sector
<b>C11</b>	<b>Education (non TVET)</b>
<p>Provincial SBS appropriate to support provincial education policy</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Selection of provinces of intervention and type of support concerted with other donors</li> <li>▪ Visible results: Provincial sector reform plans + sector governance</li> <li>▪ Modest results in terms of service delivery quality and access, and educational/learning outcomes</li> <li>▪ Strong PFM programme on provincial (Sindh) and federal levels already allowed improvements of sector PFM</li> </ul>	

## Conclusions

Sector-related Conclusions	
C9 , C10	Rural Development sector
C11	Education (non TVET)
<b>C12</b>	<b>Education (TVET)</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Increased outreach; improved training and curricula</li> <li>▪ Difficult institutional strengthening</li> <li>▪ Limited or no results in terms of employability (bias in favour of social vs. market demands; absence of study identifying the skills in need).</li> </ul>	

## Conclusions

Sector-related Conclusions	
C9 , C10	Rural Development sector
C11, C12	Education (TVET and non TVET)
<b>C13</b>	<b>Democratisation</b>

EU provided support to democracy in Pakistan in several areas – it laid down foundations for further engagement.

- Pakistan is not more peaceful but more democratic in 2014 vs. 2007
- Hard to establish EU contribution to this, but stakeholders attribute positive outcomes to EU cooperation in several areas
  - electoral observation + foundation for future electoral reforms
- Considerable learning and improvement in EU support :
  - became more systemic and strategic;
  - tied to political & policy dialogue;
  - balanced between federal-provincial levels.
- Perceived EU neutrality key to building confidence

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## Conclusions

Sector-related Conclusions	
C9 , C10	Rural Development sector
C11, C12	Education (TVET and non TVET)
C13	Democratisation
<b>C14</b>	<b>Human Rights and Rule of Law</b>

Few tangible progress yet, but EU may have mitigated deterioration of human rights situation; and has laid down solid foundations for further engagement.

- 2007-2014 period =
  - more democracy, more political participation
  - critical security situation, less civil liberties, and deterioration of human rights and rule of law
- Mediocre EU project outputs record (when performance documented)
- Intervention logic focused on capacity constraint (duly addressed), but based on an assumption of political will (not verified in practice)
- GSP+ allowed EU to build leverage and trust in its dialogue with the Government → important to address human rights issues in deteriorating security and human rights context

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## Conclusions

Sector-related Conclusions	
C9 , C10	Rural Development sector
C11, C12	Education (TVET and non TVET)
C13	Democratisation
C14	Human Rights and Rule of Law
<b>C15, C16</b>	<b>Trade</b>

C17

In a deteriorating trade context, the EU has contributed to the upgrading of a number of important trade infrastructure and trade-related institutions. However, benefits in terms of trade diversification are not yet visible.

- Valuable and appreciated EU support
- Institution building not clearly beneficial for end users (trade operators)
- No notable progress in trade diversification nor regional trade
- TRTA III programme, using lessons from RD sector, paves the way for results in production and trade diversification

Combination of fin.+ non-fin. cooperation (notably GSP+) contributed to important increase of trade to EU, although mitigated by trade displacement.

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## Conclusions

Conclusions - Overall strategy	
C1	<p>The EU mainstreamed gender into the design and implementation of its programmes with significant results but no evidence of spill over beyond the beneficiary communities.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Gender issues recognised and factored in EU programmes.</li> <li>▪ Gender dimension adapted to the nature of the programmes                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Support to the capacity of institutions to address their services to women/girls</li> <li>▪ Targeting &amp; involvement of women as beneficiaries and actors of local development programmes</li> </ul> </li> <li>▪ Large participation of women observed</li> <li>▪ EU contributed to increased awareness of gender issues at local level</li> <li>▪ However, little effect on global-level gender issue in Pakistan</li> </ul>
C2	
C3	
C4	
C5	
C6	
C7	
C8	
C9	
C10	
Conclusions on cross cutting issues	
<b>C17, C18</b>	<b>Gender and environment</b>



## Conclusions

Conclusions	
C1	Position
C2	Overall
C3	Reactive
C4	Coherence
C5, C6	Budget
C7, C8	Instruments
C9, C10	Rural Development
C11, C12	Education
C13, C14	Democracy
C15, C16	Trade
Conclusions on cross cutting issues	
C17, C18	Gender and environment

- Many small-scale EU projects addressed environmental issues:
  - WASH, renewal energy, local irrigation...
  - Environment-friendly production practices
- Emergency environmental issues addressed by ECHO
  - Benefits to local communities
- But unlikely significant effect on Pakistan's environment situation
  - Insufficient critical mass given size of country
  - Absence of fundamental reforms, and reluctance of Government to engage policy dialogue in this area

## Agenda

- Introduction
- Overview of EU cooperation
- Conclusions
- **Recommendations**
  - Overall strategy and modalities
  - Sector related recommendations

## Recommendations on overall strategy and modalities

### R1: Capitalise on past lessons and achievements in making strategic programming choices

What do we recommend?

- ▶ Bank on achievements, experience and lessons learned, in particular in pursuing efforts in the same focal sectors
- ▶ Ensure sustainability of past achievements, in particular in continuing and deepening in the same region;
- ▶ If replicating in another region: ensure that sustainability can be guaranteed in regions where EU stops intervening (no more needs or take up by other development partner or government).

Purpose:

To ensure deepening and viability of past achievements

Importance: high  
Priority: high

## R2: Refine the EU's overall intervention logic

What do we recommend?

- ▶ Conduct in-depth political economy analyses at levels of sectors, programmes and cycles of aid **to better identify stakeholders' drivers and incentives for progress.**
- ▶ Refine the EU's overall intervention logic, at country and provincial levels
  - Clarify linkages with security and migration agendas
  - Clarify rationale (of sectors & provinces, consolidation or phasing out, modalities, etc.) and links underlying current & future programming and desired operational changes

Purpose:

To clarify how expected progress would happen

Importance: high  
Priority: high



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## R3: Further strengthen the capacity of adaptation to external shocks

What do we recommend?

- ▶ Further anticipate and plan possible complementarities between urgent humanitarian reaction and on-going development interventions
- ▶ Coordinate and exchange information (at programming and projects levels) more closely between DEVO and ECHO notably in nutrition, education and rural development.
- ▶ Joint Humanitarian and Development Framework is highly commendable

Purpose:

To strengthen the resilience to shocks through closer linkages between humanitarian aid and development cooperation

Importance: medium  
Priority: medium



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## R4: Continue to address demand & supply sides of sector policies, and select accordingly the mix of modalities and implementation partners

### What do we recommend?

- ▶ Promote a converging bottom-up and top-down approaches for efficient public services governance and delivery
  - Demand side → strengthen population (students, producers, farmers, etc.) in terms of advocacy, empowerment, organizational and professional capacities
  - Supply side → promote good governance and support enabling environment (policies, budget, etc.) for public services delivery, economic activities and responsiveness to the demand of the population
- ▶ Select accordingly modalities and implementing partners

### Purpose

To improve efficiency and effectiveness of sector support

Importance: high  
Priority: medium



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## R5: Further mainstream gender and environment at all levels

### What do we recommend?

- ▶ Support civil society advocacy
- ▶ Continue to privilege women CBOs in local community empowerment
- ▶ Promote awareness and incentives for government accountability
- ▶ Support mainstreaming and monitoring of these issues at all levels (national/provincial/district/local governments)
- ▶ Continue to seize any opportunity for addressing gender and environmental issues in financial and non-financial cooperation (e.g. education, RD, justice, fiscal policy and regulatory framework)

### Purpose:

To further promote and support behavioural changes in these cross cutting areas

Importance: high  
Priority: medium



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## R6: Sector Budget Support (SBS) at provincial level cannot omit the need for a policy dialogue on provincial tax reforms

### What do we recommend?

- ▶ Use the framework of the EU Budget Support to engage in policy dialogue on provincial tax reform.
- ▶ Use the macroeconomic eligibility criteria to maintain an informed policy dialogue with federal authorities on national tax reforms & collection, NFC Awards & predictability of intergovernmental transfers.
- ▶ Use the € 15 M EU PFM TA project with Federal and Sindh province as key entry point.

### Purpose

To improve financial sustainability of sector provincial policies

Importance: high  
Priority: medium

## R7: SBS should focus more on improving overall budget credibility and accountability at federal and provincial levels

### What do we recommend?

- ▶ Conduct the dialogue on eligibility criteria and provincial PFM reform process both at the federal and provincial levels in view of the close technical linkages
- ▶ Inform PFM policy dialogue with deepening diagnostic tools (PER, PETS, PEFA)
- ▶ Strengthen PFM capacities at district and local and lower tier levels . government levels to accompany the decentralization/devolution process at sub-provincial and lower tiers levels
- ▶ Consider supporting budget analysis capacities in provincial/local assemblies

Purpose: Improve budget credibility

Importance: high  
Priority: medium

## Recommendations on Rural Development

### R8: In KP consider how best to consolidate and ensure further development of achievements of past and on-going EU support to RD sector

What do we recommend?

- i. Continue on-going support to/through KP Government with SBS + TA
- ii. Focus on improving local governments capacity to respond to needs of local communities (may require deepening studies, PER,PETS) Strengthen linkages with elected local governments.
- iii. Ensure institutional vertical (provincial <- -> local) and horizontal (across sectors) coordination mechanisms.
- iv. Continue the two-pronged approach (Demand & supply sides )but check if EU support is still needed on the demand side. .

**Purpose:** To ensure sustainability of achievements of EU support to RD.

Importance: high  
Priority: high

## R9: Pursue support to RD in Balochistan with the view of moving from support to the demand side to a two-pronged approach including also the supply side.

### What do we recommend?

- ▶ To continue support to the demand side adopting the RSPN approach (demand side)
- ▶ To engage into an in depth policy dialogue with Baloch. Gov. on policy reforms and administrative responsibilities in order to identify clear steps required before engaging into SBS (supply side).
- ▶ To provide strong institutional TA (PFM, policy formulation/ implementation) and in-depth studies (PER, PETS).

**Purpose:** To strengthen provincial capacity to address demands & needs of local communities.

Importance: high  
Priority: high



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## R10: Design of possible EU support to RD in other provinces should take into account key lessons from the past

### What do we recommend?

- ▶ Aim at combining support to the demand side and the supply side
- ▶ On the demand side adopt the three tiered social mobilisation approach and privilege partners from the RSPN.
- ▶ On the supply side strengthen government (TA) and, if risks allow, support its policy with SBS or SWAP.
- ▶ Be cautious with BS (eligibility criteria, matrix of conditions, attention to PFM on institutional responsibilities at federal, provincial and lower tier levels).
- ▶ Ensure regular production of sufficient and reliable data (type, quality and quantity) to allow monitoring progress.

### Purpose

- ▶ Replicate factors of success of RD programmes in other provinces

Importance: high  
Priority: high



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## Recommendations on Education and TVET

### R11: Promote further devolution and improvement of PFM at provincial lower tiers level

#### What do we recommend?

- ▶ Keep decentralisation process and local governance at the heart of the policy dialogue
- ▶ Inform policy dialogue with political economy analysis of education sector
- ▶ Conduct drill down PFM diagnostic studies of the sector
- ▶ Strengthen PFM and management capacities at sub-provincial level
- ▶ Consider key performance indicators on sector budget credibility at sub-provincial level (including district and schools)

#### Purpose:

- ▶ To Ensure sufficient capacity to improve delivery of education services at all administrative levels

Importance: high  
Priority: high



## R12: In future Sector Budget Support focus on education quality and learning outcomes (beyond institutional reforms)

### What do we recommend?

- ▶ Assist the administration to develop an education balanced scorecard approach at provincial and districts levels
- ▶ More gradually from reform centred KPI to indicators on access, quality and learning outcomes.
- ▶ Pursue the consolidation of education information system and provide capacity strengthening at provincial and lower levels.
- ▶ Promote policy responsiveness (continuous teacher professional development...) to monitored results.

**Purpose:** To improve quality and effectiveness of delivery system

Importance: high  
Priority: medium



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## R13: Promote further local accountability and governance system in education

### What do we recommend?

- ▶ Promote stronger local government systems and accountability
- ▶ Improve education budget reporting (more detailed classifications on local budget flows)
- ▶ Strengthen oversight capacities of the provincial/local assemblies
- ▶ Improve access of local authorities and civil society to public management capacity training
- ▶ Pursue user empowerment

### Purpose:

To strengthen capacity, responsibility and accountability of local authorities/administrations

Importance: high  
Priority: medium



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## R14: Continue support to TVET but adopt a systemic approach more market oriented

### What do we recommend?

- ▶ Improve a systemic approach to TVET
- ▶ Involve as much as possible private sector (including curricula, transfers of skills, options for work-based learning)
- ▶ Align outreach and institutional strengthening on labour market demands (including micro and informal)
- ▶ Identify skills needed by Pakistani working abroad

### Purpose

To improve efficiency approach to baseline studies in selected districts

Importance: high  
Priority: medium



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## R15: Combine skills gap analysis with value chain analysis and development

### What do we recommend?

- ▶ Privilege outreach of TVET in areas where EU is also supporting value chain development, e.g. through rural development projects or TRTA.
- ▶ Consider needs for human capital development downstream the stages of direct interventions.

### Purpose:

To improve effectiveness of TVET support

Importance: medium  
Priority: medium



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## Recommendations on Democratisation, Human Rights and Rule of Law

### R16: Update the logic of intervention in democratisation human rights / rule of law

#### What do we recommend?

- ▶ Joint EEAS and DEVCO analyses the drivers and obstacles to progress in Pakistan today, at local, federal, regional and global levels
- ▶ Map out local initiatives that already have the support of local government and/or civil society.
- ▶ Refocus the EU's strategy on democratization, human rights and rule of law on the drivers of progress and local initiatives identified, boosting ownership and effectiveness.

#### Purpose

Built EU intervention logic around drivers and incentives for progress

Importance: high  
Priority: high

## R17: Emphasise government communication and accountability to citizens

### What do we recommend?

Support government services (executive, legislative and judiciary, local and federal) in communicating on services offered and their improved performance.

### Purposes

- ▶ To foster more citizens information and participation → leads to more government accountability and state-citizens trust.
- ▶ Improve results
- ▶ Increase EU visibility

Importance: medium  
Priority: medium

## R18: Conduct upstream work on security / rule of law policies and norms

### What do we recommend?

- ▶ EUD and EEAS to deepen the policy and political dialogue on security and human rights by technical work on policies and norms (opportunistically), with support from DEVCO HQ.
- ▶ Work opportunistically, where there is already support of local government and/or civil society, rather than focus on issues that are currently intractable.

### Purpose

Capitalise on trust and government's acceptance of EU dialogue

Importance: high  
Priority: high

## R19: Increase the coherence of EU support to democratisation and human rights/rule of law

### What do we recommend?

- ▶ Identify and exploit synergies
  - between projects and non-project activities
  - between democracy/human rights/rule of law projects and broader development projects,
- ▶ investigate which/where development activities are the most effective in supporting democratisation/HR
- ▶ Adopt a more systemic approach by supporting inter-agency cooperation, rather than supporting agencies individually.
- ▶ Possibly consider one or more team retreat(s) with EUD and HQ staff on these issues

**Purpose:** To increase coherence of EU support in this field

Importance: medium  
Priority: medium



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## Recommendations on Trade

## R20: Ensure sustainable and continued use of past achievements

### What do we recommend?

- ▶ Use the policy dialogue and non financial cooperation to follow up on progress achieved with EU Support (trade infrastructure, IPO, CCP, compliance with WTO rules...) and their use to stimulate trade and investment with EU.
- ▶ When applicable use Pakistani trade institutions to conduct surveys, studies, training relevant for designing interventions in other areas (e.g. TVET, agriculture, ...)

### Purpose

To ensure use and sustainability of strengthened institutions

Importance: high  
Priority: medium

## R21: Use Pakistan strengthened trade related institutions to conduct necessary studies in view of preparing a trade strategy for the next three years

### What do we recommend?

- ▶ Use capacities built under previous programmes to prepare a trade strategy for the next 3 to 5 years
- ▶ Target the strategy on measuring and improving trade performance.
- ▶ Base it on studies and surveys conducted by public or semi public institutions with substantial involvement of end users.

### Purpose:

To ensure that past support to the sector's institutions contributes to a strategy more tailored to private sector needs.

Importance: high  
Priority: high

## R22: If further institutional building is provided make sure it is focused on the needs of the potential “clients” of the institutions supported.

### What do we recommend?

- ▶ Studies identifying the potential users of the institutions strengthened
- ▶ Consultation of these users about the services they expect from the supported institutions.
- ▶ Increase awareness by advocating importance of using these services

### Purpose

Improve effectiveness of institution building

Importance: high  
Priority: medium

## R23: Maximise trade enhancing contributions of non trade interventions

### What do we recommend?

To look for synergies with trade in non trade intervention sectors

For example:

- ▶ in activities aimed at upgrading the value chain at local level make sure that business intermediary organisations are aware of the existing trade/PSD infrastructure and help their clients to use them;
- ▶ in supporting human rights, gender, environment, organise information and training sessions of entrepreneurs/trade operators to show them the economic benefits of production practices respectful of these issues.

### Purpose:

To strengthen synergies among interventions

Importance: medium  
Priority: medium

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# Annex D3: Minutes of the seminar on Evaluation of EU co-operation with the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 2007-2014

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Venue: Marriott Hotel, Islamabad

Agenda: see Annex D1

Participants: see Annex D4

## **1 Welcome address by Mr. J.F. Cautain, EU Ambassador to Pakistan**

The ambassador reminded the objective of the day: to present results of the country evaluation.

The evaluation is important for the EU:

- for accountability,
  - To taxpayer, to show impact and results of external assistance. External assistance is viewed positively by EU populations.
  - Transparency: this has been an inclusive evaluation. The seminar is an opportunity to discuss what went well, what went not so well.
- for taking lessons from past experience and avoid repeating mistakes. It is hoped that this will be beneficial to all partners.

## **2 Welcome address by Mr. Tariq Bajwa, Secretary EAD, Government of Pakistan**

This seminar will be an opportunity to share and discuss the findings of the evaluation on the outcomes, processes and results of development efforts and projects.

Since 1991, EU and Pakistan have worked together. Focus has been continuous on a few important areas: rural development and natural resources management, trade and development, education and human resources.

Now the Government and the EU are engaged in the implementation of the 2014 - 20 MIP, after the signature of a MoU signed on 15 December 15, detailing the implementation modalities.

This seminar offers a last occasion to comment on the draft report. It is a means to an end. The purpose is not looking at history of things, but looking at what has worked and not worked to draw lessons to improve future actions. The Secretary insists that the participants



come with candid views. The evaluation and the discussion of its findings should ensure that Pakistan gets the best value from the EU cooperation.

### **3 Presentation of the evaluation by Mr. Tanguy de Biolley, Team Leader, ADE: purpose, process and conclusions of the evaluation**

See Annex D2.

### **4 Questions and comments on the presentation**

The following questions and comments were raised by participants to the seminar. Responses were provided by the evaluation team and the EU, and the government when addressed to them.

#### **Question to Government on trade:**

What are the efforts to diversify the export base? Is there any initiative from the Government in this direction? The documents of the Ministry of Commerce do not elaborate on exports diversification.

*Answer from Government:* exports diversification depends on industrialisation. Industry is little diversified in Pakistan compared to the neighbouring countries. Many factors play, notably foreign direct investments, hampered by security issues. There is hope that diversification will take place in the future.

#### **Question on budget support**

What is the view of the evaluations on the share of budget support in the total EU aid portfolio in Pakistan? Is it adequate?

*Answer from Team leader:* The evaluators have no particular view on a desirable share of BS in an aid portfolio. What matters is that when BS is used it is because it is the best adapted modality for the problem addressed. In the case of Pakistan, the BS programmes were entirely justified since the EU wanted to support and accompany government (provincial) reform policies. In that case BS, provided eligibility conditions are met, risks duly assessed and the BS programme monitored, is entirely relevant.

#### **Discussion around the conclusion on TVET**

To remedy the limited results of the TVET programmes so far, should not we recommend: 1° the provision of career counselling by the TVET agencies; it proved a positive experience in other countries and permits to limit the perverse consequences of the social bias in the provision of TVET; 2° a greater involvement of the private sector in the TVET?

*Answer:* in our recommendations we do insist on the importance of a greater involvement of the private sector, in terms on identification of the market demands, improvement of curricula, and provision of training, particularly transfer of professional skills through on the job training... We did not think about career counselling but it is a good idea and, with our TVET expert, we will consider to include it in our recommendation on TVET.

*Intervention of a participant:* The National Vocational and Educational Training Commission is introducing a number of improvements in its activities

- Encouraging a demand driven approach, i.e. privileging the provision of TVET in response to the demands of the market.
- Programmes to select and associate the best of the best institutions
- Involvement of the industries, via the Chambers of Commerce, to provide jobs to the graduates from TVET institutes.
- Association of the private sector.

What is lacking is the offer of training by the industry.

*Intervention by the EU:* The evaluation covers the situation up to 2014. Since have happened since, and new programme is more focused on demand driven training.

## **Discussion on coordination**

What do the consultant recommend regarding coordination?

*Answer:* no particular recommendation of coordination. EU has played the game of organising its cooperation within the coordination framework of the EAD and coordination has improved over time.

- EU will continue to improve cooperation with EAD.
- Coordination is also active at provincial level
- Joint Programming is an orientation given by the European Council and EU will move in that direction. As a first step a mapping of the activities of EU MS and EU Commission is currently being conducted and will be followed by a retreat to analyse the next steps to work more closely.

## **Discussion on continuum humanitarian-development**

Did DEVCO bank on the results of ECHO activities?

There is a need to improve links ECHO-DEVCO and to pursue progress towards the Joint Humanitarian Development Framework.

Already nutrition is an excellent example of continuum with the introduction in the future MIP of a nutrition programme by DEVCO. Point reinforced by Bernard François of the EUD: the fact that DEVCO and ECHO have been intervening together in the same province (Sindh on Nutrition) also permitted to attract other donors (ADB, WB).

## **5 Presentation by Mr. Tanguy de Biolley, Team Leader, ADE: recommendations of the evaluation**

See Annex D2.

## **6 Questions and comments on the recommendations**

### **Comment on human rights**

- A participant mentioned her satisfaction in noting that several recommendation highlighted the importance of links between federal and provincial levels (notably in PFM reforms). She suggested that in R19 we recommend also to take this into account in implementing human right/rule of law interventions.

### **Comment on coordination and supply/demand approach**

- Currently much is done by different development partners on supply and demand side approach at local level. Some work deeply and only on the demand side, some on both, some are willing to develop a supply side approach. All this is done in different places and on a different scale. There is a need to have a good coverage of what is being done, for instance in KP.
- *Comment by a participant:* This is important for instance with regards to local infrastructure and government infrastructure.
- Bernard François (EUD) added as an example: to ensure good complementarity between the different levels, the EU is including in its Baluchistan RD programme the provision of training to 11 000 newly elected people who are not yet aware of their new responsibilities.

### **Comments on continuum humanitarian-development**

- It is important that social protection and Disaster Risk Management (DRM) are included into development and humanitarian activities.
- Under the high speed reaction mechanism the EU will link these dimensions with education so as to enhance the continuity between rapid interventions and development.
- Linking DRM, resilience, rehabilitation is also a growing objective of other donors: Asian Development Bank, Japan.
- EU could develop appropriate interventions in favour of people displaced; after the earthquake in Chitral the EU immediately told the authorities that its rural development programme had the possibility to release funds for small urgently required realisations.
- One participant suggested to include climate change under R5. It is important for DRM and it can be factored in many interventions since it consists in mitigation and adaptation.
- Indeed Pakistan has a green strategy.

## Comments on the recommendations on trade

- Contrarily to what is recommended in R20 the EU will not include a new TRTA programme in the next MIP but is considering diverse ways to continue in the sector:
  - A growth programme under the rural development sector, that would not be limited to improving livelihood, as was the case with previous RD programmes, but would aim at economic development and in particular employability through entrepreneurship.
  - Another possibility would be to use non-bilateral financing.
- R21: the involvement of the private sector in the formulation of a trade strategy is an important recommendation that EAD acknowledges.
- “Are there EU interventions at the trade policy level?”
  - *Answer:* no, but GSP+ offers the possibility to open that avenue. However, a consultant, recently contracted to evaluate GSP+ could not get his visa.
  - The EU tried to enter into a dialogue on trade policy but that the response of the authorities was lukewarm.
  - GSP+ is a large umbrella that should allow to cover a dialogue on trade policy.

## 7 Concluding Remarks by the EU Ambassador to Pakistan

- On coordination: a platform on coordination where Government would explain its vision to all partners and discussion would be useful.
- Joint programming is in infant stage here but it is important (cf. example of Cambodia) to offer a vision of what one is doing.
- Policy dialogue: despite a relatively modest amount of funding, the EU is nonetheless able to have a meaningful dialogue with the government (e.g. in education)
- Need to work on more coherence: e.g. GSP+ on TVET, on private sector.
- Good success has been achieved in terms of linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) in the Sindh province.



## Annex D4: List of participants

Name	Organisation
Abbeni Masood	WFP
Akhtar Iqbal	AKRSP
Anjum Assad	Economic Affairs Division
Anne Kofoed	EU Delegation to Pakistan
Ara Roshan	EU Delegation to Pakistan
Bernard Francois	EU Delegation to Pakistan
Bhatti Siddique	EU Delegation to Pakistan
Faisal Naseem	Economic Affairs Division
Farral Norem	Economic Affairs Division
Imran Ashraf	EU Delegation to Pakistan
Ingrid Christensen	ILO
Jean-François Cautain	EU Delegation to Pakistan
Martijn Boelen	EU Delegation to Pakistan
Mehar Ghawas	Germany Embassy
Nadir Gul	BRSP
Naeem Siddiqui	NAVITC
Nargis Khan	PHF
Olivier Huynh Van	France Embassy
Olivier Rousselle	EU - ECHO Regional Office, Islamabad
Rashid Arshad	EU Delegation to Pakistan
Saad Gilani	ILO
Saadia Ainuddin	EU Delegation to Pakistan
Sadia Rahman	British Council
Sajida Chan	UNHCR
Shandana Aurangzeb	UNICEF
Stefano Gatto	EU Delegation to Pakistan
Stephen Taylor	ACF
Tanguy De Biolley	ADE
Tariq Bajwa	Economic Affairs Division
Thomas Prasthofer	Austrian Embassy
Tracy Viennings	UNDP
Representative	Hungary Embassy