

**EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION EXTERNAL ACTION**  
**COUNTRY EVALUATION**

**EUROPEAN UNION COOPERATION WITH  
SOMALIA (2014-2021)**

Volume 2

May 2023



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# Evaluation of the European Union cooperation with Somalia (2014-2021)

## Final Report

The report consists of three volumes:

### VOLUME I – MAIN REPORT

1. Introduction
2. Methodological approach
3. Findings
4. Overall assessment and conclusions
5. Recommendations

### VOLUME II – ANNEXES

1. Terms of Reference
2. List of interventions
3. List of stakeholders consulted
4. List of documents consulted
5. Evaluation matrix
6. Details on methodological approach
7. Quantitative analyses
8. eSurvey analysis
9. eSurvey questionnaire
10. A review of the political, economic, social and security situation of Somalia

### VOLUME III – COMPLEMENTARY INFORMATION AT INDICATOR LEVEL

- EQ1 Responsiveness of the design
- EQ2 Appropriateness of Instruments and Modalities
- EQ3 Efficiency and Flexibility
- EQ4 Synergies with other forms of cooperation and other donors
- EQ5 Cross-cutting issues
- EQ6 Strategic outcomes
- EQ7 Broader effects (Impact and Sustainability)

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# 1 Terms of Reference

*To be inserted in pdf version*

## 2 List of interventions

### 2.1 List of bilateral interventions (including thematic budget lines)

Decision/ contract number	Intervention title	Year	Planned amount <sup>1</sup>
<b>Governance I (RoL, Security, Peace)</b>			
37616	Support to State-building and Peacebuilding Sectors - Main component	2015	52.245.797 €
T05-EUTF- HOA-SO- 46	EUTF-Enhancing security and the rule of law in Somalia	2018	42.999.370 €
23575	Support to Governance and Security Sectors - Main component	2012	36.867.134 €
417427	ICSP-Daryeel: Stabilisation Support to Fragile Areas of Somalia II	2020	15.000.000 €
23536	Support to Democratisation	2012	8.940.797 €
398964	ICSP-Stabilisation Support in Fragile Areas of Somalia	2018	8.000.000 €
358314	ICSP-Somalia Stability Fund working towards a peaceful, secure, stable Somalia	2014	5.449.513 €
421791	ICSP-Dhuusamareeb Command Centre, Support to the Return of State Services	2019	4.000.000 €
422479	ICSP-Support to peaceful elections in Somalia and Somaliland	2020	3.500.000 €
403634	ICSP-Supporting Somali Defence Institution Building (SSDIB)	2018	3.400.000 €
396581	ICSP-Somali Maritime Police Unit Development Project	2017	3.200.000 €
411110	IFS-DEFEND SOMALIA 2019	2019	3.000.000 €
374462	ICSP-Assisting the Somali Ministry of Defence to exercise effective civilian control of the Somali National Armed Forces	2015	2.078.447 €
374072	ICSP-Supporting Interim Regional Administrations through the formation of efficient, active and inclusive District Authorities	2015	1.985.862 €
415786	ICSP-Community based mine action as a means to promote peace and stability in Somalia	2019	1.800.000 €
354585	IFS-RRM-Youth employment and peacebuilding initiative	2014	1.450.614 €
358318	ICSP-Support to the Somali Security Architecture	2014	1.299.597 €
399325	ICSP-Supporting Inclusive State Formation, National Reconciliation and Political Dialogue in Somalia	2018	1.170.000 €
400717	ICSP-Fostering Inclusive Political Settlements in Federal Member States of Somalia	2018	962.615 €
412278	CSO-LA-Expanding Civic Space, Empowering Youth and Women to contribute to the governance and development processes in Somaliland	2019	878.130 €

<sup>1</sup> For EUTF interventions (see 1st column, 'Decision' equal to 'TXX-EUTF'), the planned amount was not available in the data shared by the EUD during the Inception Phase (May 2022). The amount used correspond to the 'contracted amount' to the date.



Decision/ contract number	Intervention title	Year	Planned amount <sup>1</sup>
342575	EIDHR-Support to the implementation of the two Action plans on ending child recruitment/use and killing & maiming in Somalia	2014	803.669 €
369557	EIDHR-Strengthening Partnership between civil Society organisations & the security Sector to support in ending violence against women & children (girls and boys) in south central Somalia and Puntland	2015	800.000 €
369595	CSO-LA-Increasing Women's Participation In Decision Making, Institution Building & Accountable Governance Process.	2015	800.000 €
369537	CSO-LA-CRM Phase II: Community - led local peacebuilding to strengthen state-building in Somalia	2015	800.000 €
369558	CSO-LA-Strengthening Civil Society Organisations and Public Sector engagements in Somalia (SCOPEs)	2015	797.864 €
369540	EIDHR-Strengthening the role of media and universities to hold security services to account	2015	760.684 €
370017	CSO-LA-Strengthening Civil Society engagement in political dialogue & state-building processes - Interim South West Administration & Banadir	2015	722.467 €
370904	CSO-LA-Political Accommodation and Reconciliation in Somalia	2015	720.000 €
392576	CSO-LA-Culture at the Centre: the Expansion and Consolidation of Hargeysa Cultural Centre	2017	500.000 €
420742	EIDHR-FREE – Fundamental Rights, Equality and Empowerment for Girls and Women in Puntland state of Somalia	2020	500.000 €
419964	EIDHR-Opening Civic and Democratic Space: Civil Society and Media Together	2020	500.000 €
402514	EIDHR-Justice Undertakings for Social Transformation - JUST	2018	500.000 €
392640	CSO-LA-Our Right to Know – Somali Media and Civil Society for Accountability and Social Change	2017	500.000 €
392538	CSO-LA-Participatory Peacebuilding and Development in Somalia: The Role of Women and Youth	2017	500.000 €
391763	CSO-LA-Promoting a Culture of Inclusion in Somalia	2017	499.900 €
392631	EIDHR-Strengthening CSO's role to increase access to justice and monitor human rights	2017	499.666 €
395102	EIDHR-Danyare Kalkaal (Support the Voiceless)	2018	493.159 €
392695	CSO-LA-Fostering Somaliland's Heritage: Creating links between Cultural heritage and job opportunities for Peace and Cohesion in Togdheer Region, Somaliland	2017	487.288 €
392736	CSO-LA-Supporting youth and women in Kismayo as Positive Agents of Change (PAC-Kismayo)	2017	483.228 €
392648	EIDHR-Enhancing the Role of Non-State Actors in Monitoring Human Rights Delivery within the Criminal Justice System Value Chain in Puntland	2017	476.823 €
391714	CSO-LA-Program on Enhanced Civil Society Engagement in Somalia (PRECISE)	2017	472.074 €
421285	EIDHR-Somali Electoral Governance Transparency and Accountability Project	2020	449.440 €
392685	CSO-LA-Talo Wadaag (Decision Sharing)	2017	438.868 €
374464	ICSP-Supporting the Federal Government of Somalia and Somaliland Confidence Building Process	2015	436.371 €
391765	CSO-LA-Better journalism through increased professionalism of Somali media	2017	334.600 €
377703	EEM Somalia 2016	2016	298.304 €
419635	EEM Somalia 2022	2020	281.718 €

Decision/ contract number	Intervention title	Year	Planned amount <sup>1</sup>
380243	EIDHR-Study on access to justice for children and juveniles in Somalia	2016	16.224 €
<b>Governance II (PFM/macroeconomic management and Education &amp; TVET)</b>			
T05-EUTF- HOA-SO- 59	EUTF-Somalia State-building and Resilience Contract	2018	101.494.000 €
37951	Somalia Education Sector Support Programme-SESSP	2017	48.537.236 €
37616	Support to State-building and Peacebuilding Sectors - MPF component	2015	36.500.000 €
23596	Education Sector Development Programme III (ESDP III)	2012	29.653.879 €
38756	Governance Consolidation Programme for Somalia (GOVCON)	2017	26.268.325 €
37615	Resilience Programme for Somalia - MPF component	2015	22.500.000 €
23575	Support to Governance and Security Sectors - MPF component	2012	16.000.000 €
37617	Education Sector Development Support for Regions in South and Central Somalia-ESDS	2015	10.713.875 €
393166	CSO-LA-Support to Benadir Regional Administration/Mogadishu Municipality Emergency Response services	2017	779.323 €
369559	CSO-LA-Civic Engagement in reconciliation and state formation in Southern Somalia	2015	672.993 €
393118	CSO-LA-Local Authorities and Associations of Local Authorities Supporting Local Economic Development in Somaliland and Puntland	2017	452.501 €
<b>Resilience &amp; Economic development</b>			
T05-EUTF- HOA-SO- 57	EUTF-Inclusive Local and Economic Development - ILED	2018	94.277.800 €
40766	Road Infrastructure Programme for Somalia (RIPSO)	2021	41.450.000 €
23588	Economic Development Programme for Growth and Resilience, Phase III	2012	38.337.595 €
37615	Resilience Programme for Somalia - main component	2015	34.444.059 €
23820	Infrastructure for Economic Development	2013	32.793.704 €
38035	OUTREACH - 'Partnerships for Inclusive Economic Growth'	2017	12.687.284 €
T05-EUTF- HOA-SO- 23	EUTF-RESTORE - Building Resilience in Northern Somalia	2018	8.300.000 €
429410	FOOD - PRO-ACT SOM	2021	5.000.000 €
42761	Business Incubators	2020	5.000.000 €
T05-EUTF- HOA-SO- 47	EUTF-RESTORE 2 Building Resilience in Northern Somalia	2018	4.000.000 €

Decision/ contract number	Intervention title	Year	Planned amount <sup>1</sup>
339988	GPGC - Nugal Livelihood project	2014	2.387.821 €
335462	FOOD - Land issues	2014	2.210.748 €
38853	Funding to ECHO	2016	18.949.095 €
43704	Climate-conflict	2021	6.000.000 €
T05-EUTF- HOA-SO- 03	EUTF-RE-INTEG: Enhancing Somalia's responsiveness to the management and reintegration of mixed migration flows	2017	55.000.000 €
<b>Other /Multisector</b>			
T05-EUTF- HOA-SO- 46, T05-EUTF- HOA-SO- 03, T05-EUTF- HOA-SO- 57	EUTF-Various interventions	2018	17.300.000 €
38012	Operational support (air transport) services	2015	15.281.910 €
41636	Somalia MPF - Mogadishu Incl & Sust Dvt	2020	15.000.000 €
38033	Technical and Operational support to development assistance to Somalia III	2017	8.629.368 €
T05-EUTF- HOA-SO- 56	EUTF-Operational Support (Air Transport) Services	2019	7.973.542 €
23572	Technical and Operational support to development assistance to Somalia II	2012	6.709.442 €
369547	EIDHR-Somaliland Terminating Oppression of Women and girls Programme (STOPI-II)	2015; 2020	1.295.017 €
340007	CSO-LA-Strengthening the participation of Somali Non-State Actors in decision-making on peace, security and development (Phase 3)	2014	899.869 €
371650	EIDHR-Vocal Option In Civic Engagement - Somalia (VOICES)	2016	678.851 €
326234	CSO-LA-Reviving Culture, Building Peace in Mogadishu	2014	599.936 €
326252	CSO-LA-Connecting people through Mobile Audio-Visual Outreach	2014	564.510 €
326243	CSO-LA-Culture at the Centre: A new space for cultural dialogue for Somali youth	2014	560.175 €
420664	EIDHR-Facilitating Inclusive Rights Movements' Actions in CommuniTieS to combat Sexual and Gender Based Violence (FIRM ACTS Project)	2020	500.000 €
420777	EIDHR-Accelerating Change to Abandon SGBV/ FGM	2020	458.846 €
422349	CSO-LA-Leveraging Puntland's Cultural and Sports Heritage in Enhancing Community Resilience and State-building	2020	400.000 €

Decision/ contract number	Intervention title	Year	Planned amount <sup>1</sup>
419798	CSO-LA-Berbera Cultural Centre	2020	400.000 €
429664	COVID-19 support	2020	350.000 €
415107	CSO-LA-Laasgeel site: Supporting preservation of the historical heritage site	2020	199.969 €
417514	Mid-Term Review of the Somalia State and Resilience Building Contract and Support to Debt Relief programme	2020	108.624 €
39940	EU Visib & COM	2018	100.000 €
387297	CSO-LA-GAROWE INTERNATIONAL BOOK FAIR 2017	2017	20.000 €
377502	GPGC - 2016 Gender Analysis Somalia	2016	19.999 €
338103	CSO-LA-Procurement of training venue for grant beneficiaries (local NGOs)	2014;2020	5.923 €
373165	EIDHR-Catering services for launch event and consultations on the EIDHR/CSO projects	2016	1.376 €
<b>Total</b>			<b>955.448.225,46 €</b>

## 2.2 List of regional interventions

Decision/ contract number	Intervention title	Year	Planned amount <sup>2</sup>
<b>Governance I (RoL, Security, Peace)</b>			
T05-EUTF-HOA-REG-25	Facility on Sustainable and Dignified Return and Reintegration	2016	55.000.000 €
T05-EUTF-HOA-REG-09	Better Migration Management phase I	2015	40.000.000 €
T05-EUTF-HOA-REG-36	IGAD Promoting Peace and Stability in the Horn of Africa	2017	40.000.000 €
T05-EUTF-HOA-REG-78	Better Migration Management phase II	2019	30.000.000 €
n/a	Support to Maritime Port Security and Safety in the EA-SA-IO region,	2019	28.000.000 €
n/a	Maritime security in the Red Sea Area	2019	20.000.000 €
T05-EUTF-HOA-REG-27	Regional Operation Centre in support of the Khartoum Process	2016	5.000.000 €
T05-EUTF-HOA-REG-62	Disrupting criminal trafficking and smuggling networks through increased anti-money laundering and financial investigation capacity	2018	5.000.000 €
ICSP/2020/421028	Advancing the Protection of Civilians and Stability in East Africa	2020	3.200.000 €
ICSP/2020/417129	HD COVID-19 Crisis Response: Peace-making in the face of a global pandemic	2020	2.000.000 €

<sup>2</sup> For EUTF interventions (see 1st column, 'Decision' equal to 'TXX-EUTF'), the planned amount was not available in the data gathered by the Evaluation Team during the Inception Phase (May 2022). This value corresponds to the EUTF total contribution to the Decision.

Decision/ contract number	Intervention title	Year	Planned amount <sup>2</sup>
<b>Resilience &amp; Economic development</b>			
T05-EUTF-HoA-REG-26	Collaboration in Cross-Border Areas of the Horn of Africa Region,	2016	63.500.000 €
FED/2016/39736	Pro-Resilience Action 2016 Horn of Africa	2016	51.000.000 €
RSO/FED/040-766	Somalia Regional Corridors Infrastructure Programme -SRCIP	2018	42.000.000 €
RSO/FED/038-563	Cross-Regional Wildlife Conservation in Eastern, Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean	2016	29.700.000 €
RSO/FED/039-977	Contribution of Sustainable Fisheries to the Blue Economy of the Eastern Africa, Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean region – E€OFISH programme	2018	28.000.000 €
n/a	Tackling Desert Locust Crisis in East Africa 1 & 2	2020	25.000.000 €
T05-EUTF-HOA-REG-19	Towards Free Movement and Transhumance in the IGAD region	2016	15.000.000 €
T05-EUTF-HOA-REG-20	Strengthening the ability of IGAD to promote resilience	2016	5.000.000 €
n/a	EU response to health and socio-economic impact of COVID-19 in the IGAD region	2020	60.000.000 €
T05-EUTF-HOA-REG-80	Delivering durable solutions to forced displacement in the IGAD region through the implementation of the global compact on refugees (GCR)	2019	3.000.000
<b>Other /Multisector</b>			
T05-EUTF-HoA-REG-28	Monitoring and Learning System for the EUTF Horn of Africa	2016	6.900.000 €
T05-EUTF-HoA-REG-10	Research and Evidence Facility	2015	6.600.000 €
<b>Total</b>			<b>560.900.000 €</b>

### 2.3 Sample of interventions for in-depth analysis

Decision/ contract number	Intervention title	Year	Planned amount <sup>3</sup>
<b>Governance I – Rule of Law, Security and Peace</b>			
<b>RoL / justice</b>			
23575	Support to Governance and Security Sectors - MPF component	2012	16.000.000 €
38756	Governance Consolidation Programme for Somalia (GOVCON)	2017	26.268.325 €
T05-EUTF-HOA-SO-46-03	Somalia UN Multi Partner Fund (Justice JJP)	2018	7.000.000 €
419964	<b>EIDHR</b> -Opening Civic and Democratic Space: Civil Society and Media Together	2020	500.000 €
392648	<b>EIDHR</b> -Enhancing the Role of Non-State Actors in Monitoring Human Rights Delivery within the Criminal Justice System Value Chain in Puntland	2017	476.823 €

<sup>3</sup> For EUTF interventions (see 1st column, 'Decision' equal to 'TXX-EUTF'), the planned amount was not available in the data gathered by the Evaluation Team during the Inception Phase (May 2022). This value corresponds to the EUTF total contribution to the Decision.

Decision/ number	contract	Intervention title	Year	Planned amount <sup>3</sup>
392631		EIDHR-Strengthening CSO's role to increase access to justice and monitor human rights	2017	499.666 €
369558		CSO-LA-Strengthening Civil Society Organisations and Public Sector engagements in Somalia (SCOPES)	2015	797.864 €
<b>State-building &amp; local governance</b>				
360176		Strengthening the participation of Somali Non-State Actors in decision-making on peace, security and development (Phase 4)	2015	1.498.280 €
T05.EUTF-HOA-SO-57.02		Stabilisation and Peace Dividends	2018	12.000.000 €
399325		ICSP-Supporting Inclusive State Formation, National Reconciliation and Political Dialogue in Somalia	2018	1.170.000 €
398964		ICSP-Stabilisation Support in Fragile Areas of Somalia	2018	8.000.000 €
374072		ICSP-Supporting Interim Regional Administrations through the formation of efficient, active and inclusive District Authorities	2015	1.985.862 €
417427		ICSP - Daryeel: Stabilisation Support to Fragile Areas of Somalia II	2020	15.000.000 €
370904		CSO-LA-Political Accommodation and Reconciliation in Somalia	2015	720.000 €
369559		CSO-LA-Civic Engagement in reconciliation and state formation in Southern Somalia	2015	672.993 €
<b>Security / police support</b>				
373179		Supporting the Somalia Police Force through stipends payment and reinforcing the MoIS/MoF ownership and oversight	2016	6.892.609 €
T05-EUTF-HOA-SO-46.2		Support to the Joint Police Programme (JPP)	2018	22.000.000 €
374462		ICSP-Assisting the Somali Ministry of Defence to exercise effective civilian control of the Somali National Armed Forces	2015	2.078.447 €
358318		ICSP-Support to the Somali Security Architecture	2014	1.299.597 €
369557		EIDHR-Strengthening Partnership between civil Society organisations & the security Sector to support in ending violence against women & children (girls and boys) in south central Somalia and Puntland	2015	800.000 €
<b>Governance II – PFM/macroeconomic management and Education &amp; TVET</b>				
<b>Education &amp; TVET</b>				
363523		Horumarinta Elmiga II (“Education for Empowerment through Cohesive and Harmonised System”)	2015	10.997.427 €
23596		Education Sector Development Programme III (ESDP III)	2012	29.653.879 €
37951		Somalia Education Sector Support Programme-SESSP	2017	48.537.236 €
354585		IFS-RRM-Youth employment and peacebuilding initiative	2014	1.450.614 €
369558		CSO-LA-Strengthening Civil Society Organisations and Public Sector engagements in Somalia (SCOPES)	2015	797.864 €
<b>PFM/ budget support</b>				
37616		Support to State-building and Peacebuilding Sectors – WB MPF component	2015	36.500.000 €

Decision/ number	contract	Intervention title	Year	Planned amount <sup>3</sup>
23575		Support to Governance and Security Sectors – WB MPF component	2012	16.000.000 €
392801		Support to the Federal Government of Somalia to strengthen domestic revenue generation and macroeconomic management	2017	2.000.000 €
T05-EUTF-HOA SO-59-02		Financing Agreement State and Resilience Building contract - Budget Support	2018	89.400.000 €
T05-EUTF-HOA SO-59-03		Technical Assistance to Support Budget Support Operations	2019	7.075.000 €
393118		<b>CSO-LA</b> -Local Authorities and Associations of Local Authorities Supporting Local Economic Development in Somaliland and Puntland	2017	452.501 €
374072		<b>ICSP</b> -Supporting Interim Regional Administrations through the formation of efficient, active and inclusive District Authorities	2015	1.985.862 €
<b>Resilience &amp; economic development</b>				
<b>Food security</b>				
23588		Economic Development Programme for Growth and Resilience, Phase III	2012	38.337.595 €
322970		Reinforcing Animal Health Services in Somalia (RAHS)	2013	3.862.415 €
339986		Enhancing Somali Livestock Trade (ESOLT)	2014	3.000.000 €
369103		Somaseeds - Improving the genetic quality of seeds in Somalia	2015	2.718.766 €
<b>Infrastructure</b>				
23820		Infrastructure for Economic Development	2013	32.793.704 €
353999		Sustainable Road Maintenance and Management for Economic Development	2014	13.739.004 €
379371		TVET and Higher Education for Boosting Road Infrastructure Development and Growth of Energy Services (THE BRIDGES) Project	2016	3.500.000 €
<b>Water and Land Information Management System</b>				
23588		Economic Development Programme for Growth and Resilience, Phase III	2012	38.337.595 €
313274		Somali Water and Land Information Management (SWALIM) Phase V	2013	3.000.000 €
38035		OUTREACH - 'Partnerships for Inclusive Economic Growth'	2017	12.687.284 €
401134		Integrated Land and Water Resources Management (ILWRM)	2018	3.200.000 €
<b>DCI FOOD</b>		INFORMED "Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making" supporting early warning information systems and resilience analysis	2017	n/a
<b>Fighting vulnerability</b>				
37615		Resilience Programme for Somalia - main component	2015	34.444.059 €
365551		Building Resilient Communities in Somalia	2015	11.000.000 €
366201		SomReP Consortium - Bay and Lower Shabelle Resilience & Social Protection Programme	2016	11.111.985 €

Decision/ number	contract	Intervention title	Year	Planned amount <sup>3</sup>
T05-EUTF-HOA-SO-47-02		From Surviving to Thriving - Strengthening Resilience of Vulnerable Households and Communities in Northern Somalia	2018	4.000.000 €
T05-EUTF-HOA-SO-23.02		Bosaso Spring Water Sources Development	2018	5.000.000 €
<b>DCI FOOD</b>		PRO-ACT "Pro-Resilience Action" strengthening the resilience of rural communities with a focus on water – water access, water management and efficient water use	2015	37.000.000 €
<b>IDPs, refugees &amp; returnees</b>				
T05-EUTF-HOA-SO-03-4.3		Innovative durable solutions for IDPs and returnees in Mogadishu through enhanced governance, employment and access to basic and protective services"	2020	12.000.000 €

### 2.3.1 Regional interventions

Decision/ number	contract	Intervention title	Year	Planned amount <sup>4</sup>
T05-EUTF-REG-HOA-20		Strengthening the ability of IGAD to promote resilience	2016	5.000.000
FED/2016/39736		Pro-Resilience Action 2016 Horn of Africa: EU response to food security crisis for 2016 in Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Zimbabwe	2016	51.000.000
T05-EUTF-HOA-REG-80		Delivering durable solutions to forced displacement in the IGAD region through the implementation of the global compact on refugees (GCR)	2019	3.000.000
T05-EUTF-HOA-REG-36-02		IGAD Promoting Peace and Stability in the Horn of Africa	2017	40.000.000
n/a		Strengthening Resilience to Violent Extremism (STRIVE) Horn of Africa	2014	2.000.000

<sup>4</sup> For EUTF interventions (see 1st column, 'Decision' equal to 'TXX-EUTF'), the planned amount was not available in the data gathered by the Evaluation Team during the Inception Phase (May 2022). This value corresponds to the EUTF total contribution to the Decision.



### 3 List of stakeholders consulted

The persons listed below were interviewed ahead, during and after the inception and field missions. More than one interview was carried out with several of these persons, and complementary email exchanges took place to clarify particular issues and to obtain additional project and programme documents.

Organisation	Name	Position
<b>EU Services</b>		
DG ECHO	Daniel Göhring	Desk Officer - Somalia
DG ECHO	Javier Rio Navarro	Head of Office - Somalia
DG ECHO	Sigrid Kühlke	Thematic expert safety nets/cash
DG INTPA	Lea Pascal	EUTF Deputy Manager
DG INTPA	Maria Elena Ruiz	Geo Coordinator for Somalia
DG INTPA	Tommaso Mignani	Unit F1, Desk Officer
DG INTPA	Giampiero Muci	Unit F3, Desk Officer - Sustainable Food
EEAS	Arnaud Migoux	Unit ISP.3, Strategic planner EUCAP Somalia
EEAS	Jacques Demain	Unit ISP.4, Assistance measures
EEAS	Vincent Laporte	Unit ISP.4, Policy Officer
EEAS	Charles Andrew Stuart	Desk officer - Somalia
EUCAP	Jorge Caseiro	Former Head of Operations
EUSR	David Korpela	Office Horn of Africa, Chef de Cabinet
FPI	Steven de Vriendt	Programme Manager
MPCC	Verena Plattner	Action Officer CJ3
<b>EU Delegation to Somalia</b>		
EUD	Adnan Ahmed	Coordinator Somaliland
EUD	Alessandro Pisani	Programme Manager Financial and Economic Governance (Public sector dev and social services)
EUD	Alix Wurdak	Former Programme Manager - Education
EUD	Anders Djurfeldt	Programme Manager (Resilience, Infrastructure and Productive sectors)
EUD	Anna Dmitrijewa	Programme Manager Vocational Training; Gender Focal Point (Public sector dev and social services)
EUD	Benoit Larielle	Programme Manager Private Sector Development (Public sector dev and social services)
EUD	David Monticelli	Programme Manager Environment/TEI on Green Deal (Resilience, Infrastructure and Productive sectors)
EUD	Dorian Kivumbi	Head of Cooperation
EUD	Hadrien Maillard	Team Leader, Democratic Governance & Security Sector Reform
EUD	Hjordis Ogendo	Former Team Leader Resilience, Infrastructure & Productive Sectors
EUD	Jane Rama	Programme Manager Civil Society, Culture; Media (Peacebuilding, Democratisation and SSR)
EUD	Laurianne Comard	Programme Manager Defence Sector
EUD	Luca Pagliari	Programme Manager Agriculture, Fisheries; Livestock, ILED Coordinator (Resilience, Infrastructure and Productive sectors)
EUD	Maria Groneveld	Programme Manager Elections, Constitutional Review & Parliamentary Support (Peacebuilding, Democratisation and SSR)
EUD	Mohamed Sabul	Programme Manager Education and Education Systems
EUD	Nathalia Dekeyzer	Head of Finance
EUD	Nicolas Berlanga Martinez	Former EU Ambassador and HoD Somalia
EUD	Oren Wulff	Former Dep. Head of Delegation
EUD	Susanne Martin	Former Head of Section Resilience and Infrastructures

Organisation	Name	Position
EUD	Thomas Kirchner	Former Head of Governance, Peace & Security
EUD	Tiina Intelmann	Head of Delegation EUD Somalia
EUD	Veronique Geoffroy	Programme Manager Police, Justice (Peacebuilding, Democratisation and SSR)
EUD	Vicente Selles	Former Programme Manager Stabilisation; Local Governance; ILED Coordinator (Peacebuilding, Democratisation and SSR)
EUD	Vincent de Boer	Team Leader Public Sector Development & Social Services
EUD	Alexander Borum	Advisor on Political & Security Affairs
EUD	Mohamed Haji	Programme Manager Infrastructure (water, road and energy)
<b>EU Member States</b>		
Dutch Embassy	Sudi Suleiman	Secretary of Security and Rule of Law
German Embassy	Sascha Kienzle	Deputy Ambassador for Somalia
Swedish Embassy	Sophie Omoro	Senior Programme Manager RoL
Swedish Embassy	Wacheke Michuki	Programme Manager - Human Rights and Democracy
Former Danish Embassy, now EUSR	Signe Fischer Smidt	Former Political Officer DK Embassy; now Office Horn of Africa, Political Advisor
<b>Federal Government of Somalia (FGS)</b>		
National Security Advisor (NSA)	Abdimalik Abdullahi	Technical Advisor and Advisor
Federal Police Commission	Liban Hussein	Advisor
General Audit	H.E. Mohamed M. Ali	Auditor General
Ministry of Defence	Jihan Hassan	Senior Advisor
Ministry of Education	Maria Zakaria	Director Quality Assurance
Ministry of Interior and Federalism	Mohamed Abdulkadir	Senior Policy Advisor
NAO Office Somalia	Mohammed Farah	Imprest Administrator
Office of Prime Minister	Abdighani Jama	Senior Technical Advisor
<b>Federal Member State (FMS)</b>		
Minister of Public Works, FMS Puntland	Ahmed Ciro	Minister
Minister of Public Works, FMS Puntland	Yusuf Abdinasir	Technical advisor
Ministry of Education, FMS Puntland	Mohamed Abdi Aden	TA Policy & Planning
Ministry of Education, FMS Puntland	Mohamed Ali Nur (Jubba)	Director General
Ministry of Finance, FMS Puntland	Abdel Hashi	WB project coordinator
Ministry of Finance, FMS Puntland, FMS Puntland	Mohamed Abdirahman (Dhabanacad)	Minister of Finance
Ministry of Finance, FMS Puntland	Mohamed Ali Elmi	DG of the ministry of Finance
Ministry of Finance, FMS Puntland	Omar Hassan Fiqi	Deputy Minister of Finance
Ministry of Justice, Religious affairs and Rehabilitation, FMS Puntland	Abdirahman Hassan	Director of Administration
Ministry of Justice, Religious affairs and Rehabilitation, FMS Puntland	Maryam Mohahed	DG of MOJRaR
Ministry of Justice, Religious affairs and Rehabilitation, FMS Puntland	Mohamed Abdiwahab	Director General
Ministry of Justice, Religious affairs and Rehabilitation, FMS Puntland	Mohamed Bashir	Advisor

Organisation	Name	Position
Transitional Puntland Electoral Commission-TPEC, FMS Puntland	Ubox A. Abshir	Secretary General
<b>Government of Somaliland</b>		
Ministry of Agriculture	Abdirizak Shafi Mohamed	Director of planning and Coordination
Ministry of Agriculture	Adan Sheikh Abdilahi	Director General
Ministry of Education	Abdirizak Jama Nur	Director General
Ministry of Education	Mukhtar Mohamed	Head Planning and Coordination Department
Ministry of Planning	Ahmedyasin Muhumed Hassan	Director General
Ministry of Planning	Khadar Mohamed	Advisor of NPD III (National Development Plan).
Ministry of Planning	Mohamed Mohamud Awale	ILED Focal Point and Member of NDP III Committee
Ministry of Planning	Mohamed Mahmoud	Member of NDP III committee
Ministry of Planning	Nimo Ali	Technical Team and Member of NDPIII team
Ministry of Urban Environment and Climate Change	Mohammed Yassin	Director
<b>Local Government Somaliland</b>		
Berbera Municipality	Abdi Shakur Mohamed Ciddin	Mayor of Berbera
Berbera Municipality	Abdinasir Ali Farah	Focal Point -Berbera urbanization Development (BUD) Project.
Berbera Municipality	Iman Guul	Secretary of Berbera Mayor
Berbera Municipality	Khadar Mahamoud	Director of Planning of Berbera Municipality
Berbera Municipality	Mohammed Jama Saed	Executive Director
Berbera Municipality	Suhayb Mohamed Ali	Secretary General of Municipality
Local Government Association of Somaliland (ALGASL)	Khalid Abdirahman Hersi	Executive Director
<b>International Partners</b>		
Adam Smith International	Adam Hall	Head of Education
Adam Smith International	Omar Abdullahi	Team Leader TA
Adam Smith International	Suvojit Chattopadhyay	Head of Africa
Danson	M. Dirir	Director
European Institute of Peace (EIP)	Camille Schyns	Senior Programme Officer
European Institute of Peace (EIP)	Lia Conceição	Programme Assistant
European Institute of Peace (EIP)	Michael Keating	Executive Director
FAO	Abdi-Dek Yusuf	FAO Animal Health Officer
FAO	Ahmed Mohamed Hussein	FAO Field Program coordinator of Somaliland
FAO	Ugo Leonardi	SWALIM Technical Adviser
FAO	Ezana Kassa	Coordinator Somalia
FCDO	Donato Pezzuto	Governance advisor
FCDO	Kate Kyriakides	Head Somalia Unit & Deputy Head East Africa Dept
FCDO	Sarah Montgomery	Envoy to the HoA
FCDO	Scott Macdonald	Head of Programmes
GIZ/ TVET	Kai-Uwe Steger	Project director
GIZ/ TVET	Paul Glause	Technical Coordination

Organisation	Name	Position
Global Partnership for Education	Morten Sigsgaard	Senior Programme Specialist
IGAD	Helen Tesfaye	Programme Management Officer
IOM	Daniel Norfolk	Program Manager
Max-Planck Institute	Abdulkadir Yusuf	Technical advisor
Max-Planck Institute	Jan Amilcar Schmidt	Head of Projects-Max Planck Foundation for International Peace and the Rule of Law
Particip	Johannes Ohnmacht	Consultant
Royal United Services Institute-RUSI	Martine Zeuthen	Associate Fellow in the Terrorism and Conflict programme
UNDP	Doel Mukerjee	Portfolio Manager
UNDP	Ruth Pfleiderer	Portfolio Management Specialist
UN-HABITAT	Abdihakim Osman	Joint Programme for Local Governance (UNDP) in Somaliland
UN-HABITAT	Asha Mahammen Achmed	National Programme officer
UN-HABITAT	Grace Lubaale	BUD project manager
UNOPS	Andries de la Rey Redman	Project Manager
UNOPS	Tim Lardner	Head of Somalia Office
UNSOM	Jeff Sims	Head of Mission
UNSOM	Leila Boucheboubba Brodin	Former PCVE TL UNSOM (2019-2022); current Senior SSR Officer UNSOM
USAID	Jamie Oberlander	Education Officer
USAID	Ted (Edward) Lawrence	Deputy Mission Director for USAID/Somalia
World Bank	Kristina Svensson	Country Manager
World Bank	Leonard Mutuku Matheha	PFM Lead
World Bank	Matthias Mayr	Senior Operations Officer
World Bank	Ousman Abdulshi Ali	Education Specialist
World Bank	Pedro Cedro-Infantes	Senior Economist
World Bank	Shamis Salah Musingo	Operations Officer Somalia team
<b>International NGOs</b>		
Care international	Faduma Duale	Project coordinator
Care international	Nimoo Ahmed	Education Senior Programme Officer
Finn Church Aid	Ikali Karvinen	Country Director
Life & Peace Institute	Mohammed Shale Billow	Somalia Country Programme Manager
Nordic International Support (NIS) Foundation	Jama Yasin Ibrahim	Programme & Technical Director
Nordic International Support (NIS) Foundation	Abdi Hassan Jama	Head of Office
Norwegian Refugee Council	Perrine Piton	Head of the BRCiS consortium
Saferworld	Ali Hersi	Somalia and Somaliland Country Director
Save the Children	Abdiraham Hussein	Consortium Manager Somaliland
Save the Children	Dr. Suleiman Ahmed Hassan	Director of Partnership for Education Program
Save the Children	Ibrahim Osman	Education Program Coordinator
Save the Children	Kayse Hussein Nour	Project manager of Rehabilitation

Organisation	Name	Position
Save the Children	Mohamud Hassan	Country Director Somalia
World Vision Somalia	Kevin MacKey	National Director for World Vision Somalia
<b>Local NGOs</b>		
<b>Somaliland</b>		
Hiraal Institute	Samira Gaid	Regional and Security Analyst
Human Rights Centre	Ms Khadija	Programme Office
Human Rights Centre	Naima Adam	Finance Officer
Human Rights Centre	Yasmin Omar	Director
SIDRA Institute	Salim Said	Executive Director
SOYDAVO	Abdisalam Ibrahim Duale	Director
Yovenco NGO	Shaaban Abduhlei	Programme Manager
<b>Puntland</b>		
Media Association of Puntland-MAP	Ibrahim Abdirahman Mohammed	Programme Manager
Media Association of Puntland-MAP	Mohamed Dahir	Chair
Mudan Youth	Fatxi Ali Aden	Vice Chairman
Mudan Youth	Guleid Hassan Muse	Program Manager
Mudan Youth	Hassan Abdirisq	Chair
Mudan Youth	Mohamed Kawte	Head of Youth advocacy
Mudan Youth	Mohamed Muse Ali	Member of Program team
Mudan Youth	Yahye Mohamed Bisle	Executive Director
New Access International (NAI)	Yusuf Mussa	Director
Puntland Development Research Center - PDRC	Aamina Mohamed Abdulkadir	Programme coordinator and gender researcher
Puntland Development Research Center - PDRC	Mr Abdirahman	Coordinator of EU funded Projects
Puntland Development Research Center - PDRC	Ali Farah Ali	Director
Puntland Development Research Center - PDRC	Fatima Mohamoud	Admin and Finance Manager
Puntland Non-State Actors Association-PUNSAA	Fatima Abdikarim	Finance Officer
Puntland Non-State Actors Association-PUNSAA	Faysal Qaran	Chair
Puntland Non-State Actors Association-PUNSAA	Hani Mohamed	Gender Affairs
Puntland Non-State Actors Association-PUNSAA	Mohamed	Program Manager of the EU projects
Puntland Women Lawyers Association-PUWLA	Fatxi Hersi Ali	Executive Chairman of PUWLA
Puntland Women Lawyers Association-PUWLA	Ubah Mohamoud Ali	Lawyer of PUWLA
<b>Kenya</b>		
IIDA Women's Development Organisation	Hibo Yassin	Executive Director
<b>Private Sector</b>		
Alla-Amin Engineering	Abdi Miti	Contractor
Alla-Amin Engineering	Abdimajid Maohamed Ali	Contractor
Consultant	Osman Warsame	Expert for UN-HABITAT

Organisation	Name	Position
Consultant	Mukhtar Abdirahman	Former VNG Netherlands
Consultant	Waltraud Gehrig	Senior Communications Expert, GIZ TVET project
Consultant	Khaalid Hassan	Local Government Expert

## 4 List of documents consulted

An extensive list of the documents consulted is presented below. In addition, the evaluation team has gathered and consulted project/programme level documentation for EU-funded interventions in Somalia and the Horn of Africa, including actions documents, progress and final reports, ROM reports, projects' evaluations, tranche release dossiers for budget support programme, etc. The team has also gathered EAMRs and other EU internal reporting documents.

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## 5 Evaluation Matrix

### 5.1 EQ1 Responsiveness of the design

To what extent has EU support been based on country and regional priorities and appropriately responded to population needs in Somalia?	
<i>Description/ Rationale</i>	<i>This EQ assesses the extent to which the design of the EU cooperation with Somalia has responded to, and been aligned with, the needs of the country and its population, and was based on comprehensive context and conflict analyses. The EQ also looks at the way EU support across the entire portfolio achieved consistency in its cooperation with Somalia. JC1.1 focusses on the appropriateness of the cooperation's objectives for the national development priorities and the EU's alignment with national priorities, JC1.2 examines the extent to which the EU support was tailored to the country context and JC1.3 targets the level of alignment of the EU's engagement with its regional priorities and global ambitions. This EQ mainly addresses the evaluation criteria of relevance and coherence.</i>
<b>JC1.1</b>	<b>EU-support has reflected the evolution of Somalia's national priorities and has been fully aligned to national development priorities</b>
I1.1.1	Degree of alignment of the sector focus and objectives of the strategy with government priorities
I1.1.2	Evidence that linkages are foreseen between EU support and Somalia's national priorities to achieve synergetic effects and ownership at strategy level
I1.1.3	Evidence that the formulation of the strategy and of individual interventions are underpinned by inclusive stakeholder consultation processes
<b>JC1.2</b>	<b>EU support has been tailored to the country context, including its levels of insecurity, fragility, environmental stress, and poverty</b>
I1.2.1	Evidence that regularly updated conflict analyses and other assessments (such as political economy analysis, vulnerability assessments and gender analysis) exist, are qualitatively good and are used to design the overall strategy and individual interventions
I1.2.2	Degree to which the selection of priority sectors and key interventions respond to a clear rationale, fitting with the country context
I1.2.3	Degree to which overall and sector level objectives (short-, medium- and long-term objectives) and related population needs they are expected to respond to are clearly identified
I1.2.4	Degree to which climate change and environmental degradation was taken into account in the overall sectoral objectives
<b>JC1.3</b>	<b>EU support in Somalia has been aligned with and has strengthened the EU's regional and international ambitions and global policy frameworks, also those going beyond development cooperation</b>
I1.3.1	Degree to which the EU support to Somalia promotes the EU's overall frameworks and global goals in support of peace and security, also those from non-development cooperation
I1.3.2	Degree to which the EU support to Somalia promotes the EU's goals and ambitions in the region in support of regional stability, also those from non-development cooperation
I1.3.3	Degree to which the support to Somalia promotes the application of the global climate change agenda
I1.3.4	Evidence that linkages between the bilateral and the regional level are foreseen to achieve cross-fertilisation between these two levels, also with non-development cooperation efforts

### 5.2 EQ2 Appropriateness of Instruments and Modalities

To what extent have the financing instruments and aid delivery methods used by the EU been adapted to the cooperation context and supported EU complementarities and comprehensiveness?	
<i>Description/ Rationale</i>	<i>This EQ assesses the appropriateness of the instruments and modalities applied in the cooperation for the achievement of development objectives. The assessment also includes political and policy dialogues. JC2.1 focusses on the extent to which country-level and regional-level EU support as well as supported provided by other EU financing instruments and thematic budget lines mutually complemented and reinforced each other. JC2.2 examines the appropriateness of the instruments and aid modalities (e.g. project support, budget support) to the national context and regional cooperation objectives, and JC2.3 looks at the strength and robustness of the existing frameworks and approaches for policy dialogue and performance assessments. This EQ mainly covers the evaluation criteria relevance and cooperation &amp; complementarity, while also addressing effectiveness, coherence and complementarity.</i>
<b>JC2.1</b>	<b>The EU's choice of particular modalities (projects and budget support) and channels (e.g., UN agencies, CSO, etc.) is based on sound criteria and responsive to the national context</b>
I2.1.1	Evidence that aid modalities and channels to implement the support were selected based on a thorough analysis of partner country needs and capacities, or based on the absence of a real alternative
I2.1.2	Evidence of sound analysis backing the choice to provide and suspend budget support

I2.1.3	Evidence of risk assessments made at sector, programme and project levels and mitigating measures considered and applied
I2.1.4	Degree to which the aid delivery methods and channels used have contributed to ownership by national and local stakeholders
<b>JC2.2</b>	<b>Strategic complementarities are established across financing instruments, intervention modalities, type (non-spending vs spending) of engagement and via the integrated approach, and help to reinforce bilateral and regional cooperation</b>
I2.2.1	Degree of complementary achieved between and among different financing instruments, type of modalities and type of engagement
I2.2.2	Degree to which budget support has allowed the EU to create leverage and engage with important actors or tackle issues, which would not be possible to the same extent with other forms of support
I2.2.3	Evidence that linkages between EU development cooperation support and EU's non-development support led to synergies and better development cooperation results
I2.2.4	Degree to which EU country-level support and EU regional-level support (also non-development support) complemented and reinforced each other
<b>JC2.3</b>	<b>The approaches and frameworks for policy dialogue underpinning EU-Somalia cooperation have been strengthened and address both performance assessment and broader policy issues</b>
I2.3.1	Instruments and structures to foster policy dialogue at higher policy as well as sector levels are in place, are led by the Government and are functioning (formalised and regular meeting schedules, clear agendas and mechanisms for recording decisions)
I2.3.2	Degree to which the EU has been able to engage in effective political and policy dialogue at strategic level with the FGS
I2.3.3	Evidence of improved programming/design at sector level in relation to governance, resilience and economic development due to EU engagement in policy dialogue
I2.3.4	Evidence of joint monitoring arrangements (EU; Somali Government; donors) which allow to effectively steer the implementation process, through both formal (Steering Committee) and informal exchanges at higher-level policy as well as sector levels

### 5.3 EQ3 Efficiency and Flexibility

<b>To what extent has EU support been efficient and timely, cost-effective and knowledge-based, taking into account the evolving context?</b>	
<i>Description/ Rationale</i>	<i>This EQ assesses the degree of efficiency and flexibility in the delivery of the EU country-level support and its approaches to learning and this is integrated into operations. JC3.1 looks at the EU's institutional functioning and asks whether and to what extent EU support has been provided in a cost-effective, flexible and timely fashion, and the extent to which the EU is visible through its cooperation. JC3.2 assess to what extent interventions have been monitored and evaluated, whether solutions to problems were found and integrated into the cooperation. This EQ mainly covers the evaluation criterion efficiency.</i>
<b>JC3.1</b>	<b>The EU's internal institutional set-up at headquarters, regional and country level to execute EU cooperation with Somalia is conducive to a timely, flexible and cost-effective implementation of EU support</b>
I3.1.1	Degree to which the EU has been flexible and adapted its support to address the changing (security) context in the country
I3.1.2	Disbursement rates by modalities and channel
I3.1.3	Degree to which aid delivery has been cost effective according to stakeholder perceptions
I3.1.4	Frequency of delays in implemented interventions
I3.1.5	Degree to which internal factors, including project management arrangements, influenced the efficiency of interventions
I3.1.6	Degree to which external factors outside the control of the EU influenced the efficiency of interventions
<b>JC3.2</b>	<b>The EU and its partners applied appropriate result frameworks for monitoring and evaluation, used them for learning and reviewing experiences, fed back lessons learnt into the cooperation and policy dialogue at different levels and ensured their uptake</b>
I3.2.1	Evidence that the results-frameworks adopted at overall strategy and sector levels is internally consistent, including in terms of clear sequencing between short-, medium- and long-term objectives
I3.2.2	Strength of results monitoring carried out by implementing partners
I3.2.3	Evidence that the EU has revised its strategic approaches and has adapted to changing circumstances based on lessons learnt
I3.2.4	Degree to which lessons-learnt at sector level, including interventions implemented over several years, have been considered and acted on in programming and implementation

## 5.4 EQ4 Synergies with other forms of cooperation and other donors

To what extent has EU support been complementary with other dimensions of EU external action in Somalia and has added value to the support provided by EU MS and other donors?	
<i>Description/ Rationale</i>	<i>This EQ assesses the synergies that were created and achieved between the EU support and other EU services, the interventions of other EU MS and other international development partners. JC4.1 examines whether and to what extent the EU's development cooperation could create synergies and integrated with other EU services, including DG ECHO, the EUSR and CSDP missions. JC4.2 looks at the extent to which the engagement of the EU complemented and reinforced actions by EU MS and other international partners. JC4.3 is concerned with EU visibility, but it also looks at the extent to which EU support has strengthened coordinated among key stakeholders. This EQ addresses particularly the evaluation criteria coherence, coordination &amp; complementarity and EU added value.</i>
<b>JC4.1</b>	<b>Arrangements are in place to ensure the application of the EU's integrated approach between the EU development cooperation and other EU services, including DG ECHO, the EUSR and CSDP missions</b>
I4.1.1	Evidence of joint understanding between the EU's development cooperation and other EU services about country priorities and how to respond to them
I4.1.2	Evidence of coordination mechanisms in place to ensure complementarity of analysis and joint action
I4.1.3	Degree to which the EU's development cooperation supports and complements the internal cooperation with other EU services
I4.1.4	EU development cooperation and other EU services have a clear understanding of potential areas of duplication and how to avoid them
<b>JC4.2</b>	<b>EU support and the actions of EU MS and other donors complemented and reinforced each other</b>
I4.2.1	Extent to which EU cooperation policy and analysis vis-à-vis Somalia and its situation is coherent with those of EU MS
I4.2.2	Extent to which EU cooperation policy and analysis vis-à-vis Somalia and its situation is coherent with those of non-EU donors
I4.2.3	Degree of complementarity, co-ordination and division of labour between INTPA/EEAS and EU MS, based on a joint understanding on how to respond to country priorities
I4.2.4	Degree of complementarity, co-ordination and division of labour between INTPA/EEAS and non-EU donors, based on a joint understanding on how to respond to country priorities
I4.2.5	Evidence of synergies between EU support and the actions of EU MS
I4.2.6	Evidence of synergies between EU support and the actions of non-EU donors
I4.2.7	Degree to which EU support added benefits and value to what would have resulted from action taken by the EU MS on their own
<b>JC4.3</b>	<b>EU support has strengthened coordination among key stakeholders and EU visibility in Somalia</b>
I4.3.1	Degree to which the EU's participation in coordination forums is seen by development and humanitarian partners and Government representatives as adding value vis-à-vis donor coordination and policy dialogue
I4.3.2	Evidence that EU visibility was appropriate (in terms of degree and quality) to the context in which interventions were implemented
I4.3.3	Degree to which budget support has had an effect on EU visibility
I4.3.4	Perception of the EU's functioning in Somalia among state and civil society stakeholders

## 5.5 EQ5 Cross-cutting issues

To what extent has the EU cooperation managed to mainstream cross-cutting issues relating to conflict sensitivity, gender, youth, human rights and the strengthening of CSO engagement throughout its cooperation efforts?	
<i>Description/ Rationale</i>	<i>This EQ gives justice to the importance of cross-cutting issues, how they have been mainstreamed in design and implementation and to what extent they have been relevant for achieving development priorities. JC 5.1 is devoted the mainstreaming of conflict sensitivity, JC5.2 focuses on the mainstreaming of gender, attention to youth and human rights, and JC5.3 on the attention to civil society, including vulnerable sections of society, and its strengthening across the priority sectors of the EU's support. This EQ mainly addresses relevance and effectiveness.</i>
<b>JC5.1</b>	<b>EU efforts to promote conflict sensitivity are visible and consistently embedded throughout EU interventions</b>
I5.1.1	Degree of mainstreaming across the Governance I macro-area (design and implementation)
I5.1.2	Degree of mainstreaming across the Governance II macro-area (design and implementation)
I5.1.3	Degree of mainstreaming across the Resilience and Economic Development macro-area (design and implementation)

<b>JC5.2</b>	<b>EU efforts to support gender equality and women's empowerment, youth and human rights are visible and consistently embedded throughout EU interventions</b>
I5.2.1	Degree of mainstreaming across the Governance I macro-area (design and implementation)
I5.2.2	Degree of mainstreaming across the Governance II macro-area (design and implementation)
I5.2.3	Degree of mainstreaming across the Resilience and Economic Development macro-area (design and implementation)
<b>JC5.3</b>	<b>The EU supports the engagement and strengthening of CSO and pays attention to vulnerable groups across its focal sectors</b>
I5.3.1	Degree of mainstreaming across the Governance I macro-area (design and implementation)
I5.3.2	Degree of mainstreaming across the Governance II macro-area (design and implementation)
I5.3.3	Degree of mainstreaming across the Resilience and Economic Development macro-area (design and implementation)

## 5.6 EQ6 Strategic outcomes

<b>To what extent has EU support contributed to achieving the intended strategic sector outcomes of the EU-Somalia cooperation in the main cooperation areas?</b>	
<i>Description/ Rationale</i>	<i>This EQ focusses on the main sectors supported by the EU – peace and security, state-building and rule of law, PFM and education, and economic development, including other parts of the productive sector (such as agriculture and livestock value chain development). The JC's will look respectively at normative frameworks, capacities among state and non-state actors developed, governance related outcomes, changes in service delivery and the extent to which different population groups have benefitted from EU support. The EQ mainly addresses the evaluation criterion effectiveness but also touches on impact and sustainability.</i>
<b>JC6.1</b>	<b>EU support to security, peacebuilding and preventing violent extremism has contributed to the improvement in the provision of security services and a more secure public space (macro-area Governance I – Security and Peace)</b>
I6.1.1	Degree to which institutional and human capacities, leadership and national ownership of services responsible for civilian security (police) and the prevention of violent extremism could be developed and strengthened
I6.1.2	Degree to which coverage of civilian security (police) and the provision of related services across the country has been achieved
I6.1.3	Degree to which violent extremism could be prevented and countered across the country
I6.1.4	Degree to which the provision of security services across the country could be sustained
I6.1.5	Degree to which trust could be built between security services and citizens across the country
<b>JC6.2</b>	<b>EU support to rule of law and state-building has contributed to the strengthening of the justice sector, access to justice and the strengthening of local authorities and their relations with communities and citizens (macro-area Governance I – Rule of Law)</b>
I6.2.1	Degree to which institutional and human capacities, leadership and national ownership of the justice sector could be developed and strengthened across the country
I6.2.2	Degree to which institutional and human capacities, leadership and ownership of local authorities and their relationship with communities and citizens could be developed and strengthened across the country (strengthening the social contract)
I6.2.3	Degree to which coverage of justice and access to justice services has been achieved across the country, including for women and vulnerable parts of the population
I6.2.4	Degree to which the provision of justice services across the country could be sustained
<b>JC6.3</b>	<b>EU support to public services, including PFM and education, has contributed to improved macro-finance management and the improvement of access to education and quality of services (macro-area Governance II – PFM/macro-economic management and Education/ TVET)</b>
I6.3.1	Degree to which institutional and human capacities, leadership and national ownership of the education sector (primary and secondary) could be developed and strengthened
I6.3.2	Degree to which coverage of education services (primary and secondary) and access to schools could be realised across the country, including for girls and young vulnerable groups
I6.3.3	Degree to which the provision of education services (primary and secondary) across the country could be sustained
I6.3.4	Degree to which TVET has been developed and strengthened
I6.3.5	Degree to which employability of Somali youth trained via TVET has improved
I6.3.6	Degree to which PFM and macroeconomic management has improved at federal state and local levels and trust of the international community in Somali leadership has been enhanced
I6.3.7	Degree to which the provision of budget support generated a momentum for change at macro-financial management level and achieved the expected results



<b>JC6.4</b>	<b>EU support to the productive sector has contributed to improved food security, strengthened resilience and economic improvements (macro-area Resilience and economic development)</b>
I6.4.1	Degree to which institutional and human capacities, leadership and national ownership of the agri-food sector (livestock, agriculture, fisheries) have been developed and strengthened
I6.4.2	Degree to which people's livelihoods, resilience and food security have improved
I6.4.3	Degree to which income and employment opportunities in rural communities, including for women and youth have increased
I6.4.4	Degree to which infrastructure projects (for water, roads, buildings, etc.) in support of the productive sector and communities could be developed and sustained
I6.4.5	Degree to which resilience to the impact of climate change and natural disasters has improved among the targeted rural communities
I6.4.6	Degree to which IDPs / refugees / returnees have become more resilient to shocks and stress

## 5.7 EQ7 Broader effects (Impact and Sustainability)


<b>To what extent has EU support contributed to enhanced conditions for stability, improved resilience and sustainability?</b>	
<i>Description/ Rationale</i>	<i>This EQ assesses the overall outcomes and impact of the EU's support and their sustainability. JC.7.1 examines whether and to what extent the EU contributed to enhancing the conditions for peace and stability, including the reconstruction of the state. JC7.2 focuses on the EU's contribution to shaping resilience among communities and their population. JC7.3 assesses the degree to which Somali stakeholders from the FGS and FMS have put appropriate measures in place to enhance the sustainability of the outcomes. This EQ builds on the analysis of the previous EQ and addresses mainly the evaluation criteria sustainability and impact.</i>
<b>JC7.1</b>	<b>With the contributions provided by the EU, overall peace and security have improved and the reconstruction of the state, including its governance has advanced</b>
I7.1.1	Degree to which stability and security across the country have been reduced and security has been enhanced
I7.1.2	Extent to which state-building and macro-level reforms on governance at FGS and FMS levels have been realised
I7.1.3	Extent to which Somalia's society became more inclusive
I7.1.4	Extent to which FGS and FMS became more legitimate and accountable
I7.1.5	Extent to which civil society has the capacity to hold governments at all levels accountable and performing
<b>JC7.2</b>	<b>With the contributions provided by the EU, targeted communities and their population are more resilient, less vulnerable to shocks and able to sustain their living</b>
I7.2.1	Extent to which food security for the population has been improved and is sustained
I7.2.2	Extent to which drivers threatening the resilience of targeted communities and their population, in particular for their vulnerable sections, have been overcome
I7.2.3	Degree to which resilience of the population to extreme climatic conditions at regional, national, and local levels has been improved and is sustained
I7.2.4	Extent to which the socio-economic situation of targeted communities have improved, including the situation of women, youth and vulnerable groups
I7.2.5	Extent to which the Somali economy grows and provides opportunities for employment, in particular for the young generation
<b>JC7.3</b>	<b>With the contributions provided by the EU, effects and results of development efforts are being sustained and likely to continue to yield benefits in the targeted outcome areas</b>
I7.3.1	Extent to which the effects of EU support in relation to the macro-area Governance I can be sustained long-term and contribute to a well-functioning Somali state
I7.3.2	Extent to which the effects of EU support in relation to the macro-area Governance II can be sustained long-term and contribute to a well-functioning Somali state
I7.3.3	Extent to which the effects of EU support in relation to the macro-area Resilience and Economic Development can be sustained long-term and contribute to a well-functioning Somali state

## 6 Details on methodological approach

### 6.1 Intervention logic and evaluation questions

The overall Intervention Logic (IL) (see Figure 1) visualises the reconstructed theory of change; it constitutes the backbone of the evaluation. Based on this IL, Evaluation Questions (EQs) presented in the ToR were reformulated, presented to the Interservice Reference Group (RG) and used after their approval as the principal tool guiding the investigation.

Figure 1 Intervention Logic



Source: Evaluation team – developed from multiple EU and EC overarching global, regional and country policies and frameworks.

Seven EQs have been formulated to capture the complexity of the EU's cooperation with Somalia and examine its effects. These EQs have been clustered into two broad categories: i) EQs on design and implementation of EU cooperation; and ii) EQs on the effects of EU cooperation. Each EQ is structured around a limited number of Judgement Criteria (JC) which are assessed through the analysis of specific indicators – see Annex 5.

**EQ1 Responsiveness of the design:** To what extent has EU support been based on country and regional priorities and appropriately responded to population needs in Somalia?

**EQ2 Appropriateness of Instruments and Modalities:** To what extent have the financing instruments and aid delivery methods used by the EU been adapted to the cooperation context and supported EU complementarities and comprehensiveness?

**EQ3 Efficiency and Flexibility:** To what extent has EU support been efficient and timely, cost-effective and knowledge-based, taking into account the evolving context?

**EQ4 Synergies with other forms of cooperation and other donors:** To what extent has EU support been complementary with other dimensions of EU external action in Somalia and has added value to the support provided by EU MS and other donors?

**EQ5 Cross-cutting issues:** To what extent has the EU cooperation managed to mainstream cross-cutting issues relating to conflict sensitivity, gender, youth, human rights and the strengthening of CSO engagement throughout its cooperation efforts?

**EQ6 Strategic outcomes:** To what extent has EU support contributed to achieving the intended strategic sector outcomes of the EU-Somalia cooperation in the main cooperation areas?

**EQ7 Broader effects (Impact and Sustainability):** To what extent has EU support contributed to enhanced conditions for stability, improved resilience and sustainability?

The EQs and their coverage of the DAC and EC-specific evaluation criteria, as stipulated in the ToR, are summarised in the **Error! Reference source not found.**, below.

Table 1 EQ coverage of the OECD/DAC and EC-specific evaluation criteria

EQ \ Evaluation criteria	Relevance	Efficiency	Effectiveness	Impact	Sustainability	EU added value	Coherence	Coordination & complementarity
<b>Design and implementation</b>								
<b>EQ1. Responsiveness of the design</b>	••				•		••	
<b>EQ2. Appropriateness of Instruments and Modalities</b>	••	•	•		•	•	•	••
<b>EQ3. Efficiency and Flexibility</b>		••	•	•	•			•
<b>EQ4. Synergies</b>		•	•		•	••	••	••
<b>EQ5. Cross-cutting issues</b>	••		••	•	•	•	•	
<b>Effects of the cooperation strategy</b>								
<b>EQ6. Outcomes</b>			••	•	•			
<b>EQ7. Broader effects, Impact and Sustainability</b>			•	••	••			

•• Largely covered


• Also covered

Source: Evaluation team

## 6.2 Overall approach

Figure 2 provides an overview of the three phases of the evaluation, the key tools for collecting and analysing data. They were implemented during the period January 2022 and March 2023.

Figure 2 Phases of the evaluation and key elements of the methodology



Source: Evaluation team.

**Timing:** The Inception Mission was undertaken by the team leader in March/April 2022 with visits and interviews conducted in Nairobi and Mogadishu International Airport (MIA).<sup>5</sup> The Desk Phase went from May until September 2022 and the Field Phase from October until December 2023. The Synthesis Phase ended in February 2023 with the submission of the Draft Final Evaluation Report. An Interservice Reference Group (RG)

<sup>5</sup> More recently known as the Aden Adde International Airport.

accompanied the evaluation team. Meetings with the RG to kick-off, present the methodology, get updated on progress and review the respective reports took place in January 2022 (kick-off); May 2022 (Inception Report); September 2022 (Desk Report); January 2023 (Field Report) and March (Draft Final Report). An eSurvey was conducted between the Desk Phase and the Field Phase so that its results could inform the field mission. Regular meetings with EU staff from headquarters and the EUD, and the mentioned periodic meetings with the EU's RG ensured that the utilisation focused approach proposed in the original methodology for this evaluation could be realised.

To ensure *quality control* an internal team consisting of one senior evaluation expert from Particip and one from ECDPM was mobilised to review progress, advice on methodological issues and comment on draft documents before submission.

### 6.3 Data and evidence collection and analysis

The evaluation team collected data and findings via a *mixed methods approach* based on both *quantitative and qualitative* tools and methods comprising i) semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions, ii) project document reviews (including a quantitative analysis of particular terms used across 100+ key project documents via a text-analysis tool (MAXQDA) which helped triangulate existing findings for crosscutting issues and provided some complementary observations, see Annex X), iii) review of secondary data sources, such as think tank contributions or non-EU studies on Somalia, iv) a broadly spread eSurvey sent to different types of stakeholders not working at EU headquarters or the EUD, v) quantitative (financial) analysis of OECD/DAC registered aid flows, and vi) direct observations through selected project visits.

Throughout the different phases of the study, the evaluation team ensured a *high level of data reliability* and validity of conclusions. Considering the politically very difficult and highly fragility country context in which many different narratives exist about ongoing developments, strategic priorities and delivery, and the difficulty to access reliable sources due to the inaccessibility of large parts of the country, the evaluation team gave high priority to the *triangulation of data and information collected* via checking and re-checking and the use of different methods focusing on the same key questions. The evaluation matrix' EQs, JC and indicators served as the overall *framework for data collection and analysis* which was done via a hybrid approach (online interviews and meetings combined with in-person interviews and during and in between the inception and field phase missions).

*Capturing past developments and perspectives:* As always for evaluations covering such a long period, obtaining information and data from the early years, in this case from 2012 to around 2018, always poses some challenges. The evaluation team therefore selected a number of interviewees who had worked in Somalia in the past (EU officials as well as staff from other organisations – implementing organisations as well as international partners) and interviewed local EUD staff members who work at the EUD for many years. Given the importance of this evaluation to formulate recommendations for the future EU cooperation with Somalia, the more recent years and developments were given some more attention compared to the early years.

#### 6.3.1 Inception and Desk Phase


During formulation of the evaluation matrix and after its approval, desk-based *data and information collection* from documents combined with interviews at EU headquarters level started during the Inception Phase, a process which was deepened during the inception mission of the team leader to Nairobi and Mogadishu International Airport (MIA) in March 2022. A major activity during the Inception Phase was the mapping of interventions and a statistical analysis of spending and non-spending actions of the EU for the period 2014 to 2020. Another activity was the identification and review of EU policy and strategic documents relevant for the country, for the Horn of Africa and for the EU's global engagement, with a focus on its policy vis-à-vis fragile countries. Policy and strategic documents of the FGS and Somaliland were consulted in addition.

Data collection activities were mainly carried out during the desk phase and summarised in the desk report. This included a set of hypotheses per EQ to be investigated during the field phase (November 2022). The evaluation team identified a sample of intervention per macro-area I, II and III for which multiple project documents were reviewed, including action documents, budgets, mid-term reviews, end of project reports, external project evaluations and ROMs. The sample was agreed with the EUD and the DG INTPA Somalia desk. The evaluation team reviewed and analysed in addition the findings from relevant sectoral evaluations undertaken during the evaluation period, expert papers, EU internal notes plus a pile of external expert papers and (sector) reviews on Somalia published by Somalia's international partners, such as the WB, international and local think tanks and international NGOs. The list of documents reviewed can be consulted in Annex 4. Detailed findings from the document review and from interviews were collected in a separate document (see Volume III), analysed and used for the formulation of replies to the evaluation matrix.

### 6.3.2 eSurvey

An *eSurvey* was conducted between the end of the desk phase and the start of the field phase. Results of the *eSurvey* informed the preparation of the field mission. 21 questions were sent to 352 potential respondents. Most addresses were obtained from the EU's Third-Party-Monitoring-Project which supports the EUD since 2016. Those were complemented by names and contact details which the evaluation team collected from relevant project documents, interview partners during the Inception Phase and personal contacts from previous work in and on Somalia. The objective of this *eSurvey* was to obtain views from stakeholders, only, and therefore did not invite any EU staff working at headquarters, the EUD or EU services active in Somalia. A variety of stakeholders working or having worked with EU funded projects responded as well as wider development partners were the principal respondents (see Figure 3). The response rate was 10 percent (35 respondents) which is a significant percentage for this type of qualitative survey for all organisational backgrounds. On the downside, only few staff responded from the FGS (2 respondents from the FGS responded). In terms of sectoral representation, the respondents covered all three major clusters of this evaluation, i.e., peace and security/rule of law; public finance management/education; and resilience/food security/(local)economic development. The *eSurvey* was distributed in English and Somali language. All replies received were in English.

Figure 3 Presentation of eSurvey respondents per category



Source: Particip GmbH

### 6.3.3 Field Phase

The evaluation team conducted a *hybrid field mission* during the period 15 November to 2 December 2022, but interviews in preparation of the mission were conducted as of early November and some additional interviews were conducted until the third week of December. The mission was further informed by earlier conducted interviews with EU staff members from headquarters and the EUD which took place during the desk phase. Information collected via interviews during the inception mission were also very relevant to prepare for the field mission.

The team leader his research assistant and one international team member travelled to Nairobi for this mission and two international team members conducted interviews remotely. The team leader continued the mission from Nairobi to Garowe (Puntland) and Hargeisa (Somaliland). A one-day visit to Berbera, including police escort, was included in the Somaliland visit. For logistical and safety reasons, the TL worked with one local consultant in Puntland and with another one in Somaliland.

The team leader conducted interviews at the overall/strategic level, with regard to macro-area I (governance/RoL/peacebuilding/security) and he joined interviews of the other experts to the extent possible. The lead experts for peace/security, PFM/education and resilience/economic development, respectively, conducted interviews relating to their area of expertise. Another evaluation team conducted interviews in relation to EQ5, the cross-cutting issues.

Interviews were conducted i) remotely via video conference facilities, ii) via in-country interviews (individual interviews and focal group meetings) and iii) via site visits. Evaluation team members who visited Nairobi, Somalia/ Puntland and Somaliland had to conduct a range of interviews via video because interviewees were on mission or had time constraints to meet the evaluation team in person. A visit to MIA was originally planned for the field mission but then cancelled due to the deteriorating security situation briefly before and during the field mission. Several evaluation team internal meetings were organised to exchange information on latest


findings and to ensure that all team members applied the evaluation methodology in line with the guidance provided.

The mission and interviews were organised with the assistance of the evaluation team’s Mogadishu based team member, EUD staff members and the team of Particip / Dansom based in Nairobi, plus two local consultants to assist with the mission in Puntland and Somaliland, respectively. *Names for interviewees* were collected from various sources prior and during the mission, i.e. EU headquarters, the EUD, project documents, contacts of evaluation team members and names shared by implementing partners with the evaluation team. Interviews focused on i) the so-called deep dive interventions which had been agreed between the evaluation team, the EUD and headquarters and ii) topics which were of relevance to the nature of such a strategic evaluation, for example on the broader issues like donor coordination, the constitutional problems between FGS and FMS or the regional dimensions of the EU’s engagement in Somalia. The evaluation team also interviewed EU staff and non-EU stakeholders who had worked in Somalia in the past so that information could be gathered and compared between the EU’s past and present engagement in Somalia.

As for the *interviews conducted*, all relevant stakeholder groups involved in the design and implementation of EU support to Somalia were covered, i.e. EU staff from headquarters, the EUD and other EU services (ECHO, CSDP missions, EUSR), FGS and FMS officials, international and local NGO officials, members of civil society organisations, private companies, international partners, including representatives of multilateral and bilateral organisations/ implementing partners, EU MS representatives, and beneficiaries. Perspectives from beneficiaries were collected via interviews and site visits in Puntland and Somaliland and via visits of the Somali evaluation team member in Mogadishu and its outskirts<sup>6</sup>.

The evaluation team talked to 177 persons during 108 interviews during the field phase, and an additional 18 persons during the inception phase making a total of 126 interviews conducted from different backgrounds. The below Figure 4 provides a summary of the percentage of interviewees per category.

Figure 4 Interviewees per category




Source: Particip GmbH

For all 126 interviews, meeting notes were produced, numbered and made available to all evaluation team members via the shared drive of the evaluation team. 51 persons, participated in one of the 10 focus group discussions or joined as a second person to an interview. The team leader talked to 12 persons during his visit to Puntland and to 17 persons during his visit to Somaliland (Hargeisa and Berbera).

<sup>6</sup> Detailed information on perspectives from beneficiaries for Mogadishu is forthcoming. To be included in Final Report.

The evaluation team talked twice to the EU Somalia desk office in Brussels, twice to the EUD's head of cooperation, twice to four senior EUD staff members and twice to the ECHO Somalia desk staff member at headquarters. The majority of interviewees came from Somalia or had a Somali background which helped to capture perspectives from Somalia well. 76 interviewees, working with government, local NGOs, think tanks or the private sector were from Somalia, and some 25 interviewees working with international organisations or NGOs were also from Somalia. The below Figure 5 provides a summary of the number of interviewees per category.

Figure 5 Statistical overview of persons interviewed



Source: Particip GmbH

#### 6.3.4 Complementary information collected and analysed

To complement the findings via the tools described above, *two think tank inputs* were produced by the Somali evaluation team member (a former team member of the Hiraal Institute) who wrote, together with an ECDPM team member, a political-economic analysis of Somalia and a separate reflection on the overall perception of the EU and the EU's performance by Somali stakeholders from a think tank perspective.

To support the triangulation of information received from various sources, the team collected additional quantitative data using *text mining on MAXQDA* (see Annex 7.1 for results). 123 project documents spanning across macro-areas I, II and III were collected and uploaded to MAXQDA. These project documents consisted of (mid-term/interim and final) evaluations, TPMEs, ROM reports, and progress/narrative reports. Descriptions of actions and other types of project documents that contain primarily descriptive information were not included to avoid biases (i.e., obtaining information on what projects intended to achieve rather than what was actually achieved). The team selected 67 key terms related to context analysis, Somali ownership, coordination, efficiency and learning, impact and sustainability, and cross cutting issues. MAXQDA was used to check how many times each term was mentioned in the selected documents, with the option to see the full sentence in which the word was mentioned for a deeper assessment.

This quantitative analysis mainly focuses on the following crosscutting issues: i.e. gender, youth, human rights, conflict sensitivity/do-no-harm and ownership/leadership. The quantitative data obtained for these key terms has been assessed in depth, by going through the sentences in which the term was mentioned and checking for additional keywords (such as institutional, community, training, awareness etc.) and word combinations. The team also provided complementary observations based on the results obtained for the other keywords.

These results helped the team interpret results achieved via other methodological tools, triangulate existing findings (with a focus on EQ5 findings) and complement them with additional statistical information where relevant. The team analysed the data and assessed to what extent it could be used pertinently, bearing in mind

that such a quantitative method does not allow for making the data a major source of information and findings for the evaluation.

#### **6.4 Challenges and limitations – robustness of findings**

Security posed a major challenge for the evaluation. The two missions of the evaluation took place during a period of renewed fierce fighting between forces of the FGS and Al-Shabaab (AS). During the team leader's visit to MIA in March 2022, an AS attack killed one Somali national and five foreigners inside MIA after which all compounds were closed and movement between compounds was impossible. Consequently, interviews which had been scheduled as face-to-face meetings had to be conducted via video with FGS officials and EU implementing partners who were in their offices a few miles away. Moreover, two weeks ahead of the field mission, in early November 2022, a devastating double car bombing in the Centre of Mogadishu killed over 130 people and left hundreds more injured. Movements between compounds and visits by Somali officials to MIA for interviews were substantially reduced. The resources for the evaluation did not allow to rent armoured vehicles and security personnel to undertake project visits outside MIA in Mogadishu town or even outside the capital.

The evaluation team dealt with this contextual situation creatively and deployed a hybrid mission approach as described above. Remote interviews with officials from FGS and other stakeholders based in Mogadishu and in FMS were organised with the assistance of the Somali team member. Face-to-face interviews were held with Somali stakeholders being on mission or visit to Nairobi, during the four-day visit to Garowe (Puntland) and the five-day visit to Hargeisa and Berbera (Somaliland). During the evaluation team's stay in Nairobi, a range of interviews were conducted with EUD officials and with representatives of partner organisations based in Nairobi. The evaluation team made also good use of the results of the EU funded Third Party Monitoring and Evaluation (TPME) project. In total some 141 monitoring reports have been produced since 2016 when the TPME project started. As described above, the results of this hybrid mission approach were compared and triangulated with information received via the eSurvey, external project and programme evaluations of EU-funded interventions, team-internal analysis and with secondary sources consulted for this evaluation. As such, the evaluation team is confident to have collected a reliable set of data and findings which support the conclusions and recommendations adequately.

Besides the security-imposed limitations explained above (the evaluation team had originally planned to visit MIA) there were no further deviations from the planned evaluation approach as outlined in the inception report. Covid-19 did not impede the implementation of the evaluation in any way as restrictive measures were lifted in all places visited by the time the evaluation took place.



## 7 Quantitative analyses

### 7.1 MAXQDA Analysis

#### Examining the integration of gender, youth, human rights, conflict sensitivity, Somali ownership and complementary issues in EU programmes

##### 7.1.1 Summary of findings

###### Cross cutting issues

- The statistical analysis seems to confirm that the EU projects pay a **strong attention to gender and youth, yet unbalanced**. There is a stronger emphasis on gender than to youth in project documents; and while certain documents include many references to gender and youth, others have none.
- Results suggest a **tendency to group women and youth together, equate gender with women, and a limited application of gender analysis** to inform programming. This poses a risk that EU projects do not account enough for differentiated needs and challenges based on gender and age.
- Results seem to confirm that **including women and youth** in projects was strongly emphasised but **transformative approaches rarely adopted**, in part due to a difficult context. Projects focused on training women and men and spurring institutional change, but gave less attention to changes in gender norms and behaviours at community level. Young people seemed rarely involved in project design.
- Data suggests human rights are **not fully mainstreamed** in EU projects, and treated as a **topic of intervention rather than a cross cutting issue**, in line with EQ5 findings. A structured, rights-based approach to projects is rarely mentioned, and while projects on justice, security and CSO support mention human rights consistently, they are mostly missing from projects on education-, PFM, food security and economic development.
- EU projects that include human rights appear to be often focused on training, and institutional change like policy advocacy but **community-level change and other identity factors** alongside gender (children, IDPs, detainees) appear to **merit more attention**.
- Results confirm other EQ5 findings that EU projects apply **conflict sensitivity not via an explicit systematic approach, but rather implicitly and organically** relying on NGOs familiar with implementation in conflict settings. This would explain why mentions of conflict sensitivity and do-no-harm were rare.
- Results suggest that the **EU pays attention to Somali ownership, with a higher emphasis on national**, than local- and especially FMS ownership. However, **attention to Somali leadership of projects seemed limited**, as most mentions of leadership referred to leadership training and skills.

*For the supporting statistical evidence collected with MAXQDA, see below.*

###### Complementary findings

- Results suggest that the EU puts a strong emphasis on coordination, cooperation and consultation with other stakeholders in Somalia, although some stakeholders like FGS authorities tend to receive more attention compared to FMS authorities.
- Data seems to confirm that while the EU projects emphasised cooperation with Somali authorities especially at the FGS level, they did not have a strong policy dialogue component overall.
- Results also suggest that the EU did not strongly incorporate elements of Somali society and culture like tradition and informality into its programming, which could reduce the impact of certain projects. This gap may be partly explained by the role and nature of the EU, and its limited attention to bottom-up approaches which the results also pointed to.
- The statistical analysis suggests that EU projects most often did not consider exit strategies (explicitly). This is in part explained by limited Somali resources and a volatile context that makes predictions difficult, and might be addressed by justifying why exit strategies are not included in project documents.

*For the supporting statistical evidence collected with MAXQDA, see below.*

## 7.1.2 Introduction and methodology

To complement the qualitative data obtained from conducting interviews, the team collected quantitative data using text mining on MAXQDA. **123 project documents** spanning across macro-areas I, II and III were collected and uploaded to MAXQDA. These project documents consisted of (mid-term/interim and final) evaluations, TPMEs, ROM reports, and progress/narrative reports. We did not include descriptions of actions and other types of project documents that contain primarily descriptive information, to avoid biases (i.e., obtaining information on what projects intended to achieve rather than what was actually achieved).

The team selected **67 key terms** related to context analysis, Somali ownership, coordination, efficiency and learning, impact and sustainability, and cross cutting issues. Examples of such key terms include: human rights, coherence, exit strategy, conflict-sensitive, policy dialogue, etc. MAXQDA was then used to check how many times each term was mentioned in the selected documents (for an overview of results, see Table 1 below), with the option to see the full sentence in which the word was mentioned for a deeper assessment.

This quantitative analysis mainly focuses on the following crosscutting issues: i.e. **gender, youth, human rights, conflict sensitivity/do-no-harm and ownership/leadership**. The quantitative data obtained for these key terms has been assessed in depth, by going through the sentences in which the term was mentioned and checking for additional keywords (such as institutional, community, training, awareness etc.) and word combinations. This aims to help triangulate the findings of EQ5 and provide some additional insights. This annex also contains complementary observations based on the results obtained for the other keywords.

These results are meant to assist the team with the interpretation of results achieved via other methodological tools, **triangulate existing findings** and complement them with additional statistical information where relevant. The results should be interpreted bearing in mind that such a quantitative method does not allow for making the data a major source of information and findings for the evaluation.

## 7.1.3 Detailed findings on cross-cutting issues

### 7.1.3.1 Gender and youth

The quantitative analysis denotes a **strong attention of EU projects to gender and youth**, which are mentioned respectively 1177 times (in 78/123 documents) and 1550 times (in 71/123 documents). These results should however not be overestimated, since certain project documents that mention gender and youth many times skewed the number of hits. For instance, some documents mentioned gender more than 50 times, while 45 documents out of 123 (about 36%) did not include a single mention of gender. For youth the gap is even greater: some documents mention young people more than 200 times, yet in 52 documents the term is absent. This points to an **unbalanced attention given to gender and youth** across projects.

The results also seem to confirm a **stronger emphasis on gender as opposed to youth in EU projects** as identified in the findings for EQ5, since gender and women together obtained 3292 hits versus 1550 hits for youth and young people. However, it should be noted that “women and youth” or “gender and youth” are often mentioned together (more than 230 hits together) and are mainly referred to as training recipients. Such a tendency to group women and youth together poses the risks of omitting, in programming, some of the different needs and challenges that come with gender and age differences. This in turn can affect the relevance, effectiveness and impact of programmes.

Additionally, results suggest that **gender analysis was not often conducted to inform EU projects**, which could lead to blind spots in programming (e.g., important gender-differentiated impacts of certain events/activities not taken into account). Indeed, gender analysis was only mentioned 22 times in the 123 selected documents.

The results also suggest that **the inclusion of women and young people in project activities was an important component of EU projects, in line with EQ5 findings**. Indeed, inclusion was mentioned around 80 times in documents that referred to women and youth (respectively) and tended to refer to inclusion in training and capacity building activities (training was mentioned more than 100 times respectively). Overall, there was also a **stronger focus on institutional- rather than community-level change** in the documents that mentioned gender. For instance, policies, laws and Acts were mentioned 60 times (together) and Ministry 16 times in documents that mentioned gender, whereas community was mentioned about 36 times (referring to community awareness, training etc.) and local actors like faith-based leaders, elders and clans were mentioned 16 times (together).

It seems that **transformational approaches were given less attention than inclusion and representation**, which seems to confirm our finding for EQ5. For instance, several projects promote increased youth participation in politics and the economy but young people were rarely involved in the design of programmes (only two documents that mentioned youth refer to their role in project design). **The lack of a transformational approach was most visible for gender**, and can be partly explained by a context where basic levels of women’s participation in public life are not achieved and where gender equality is a disputed concept. Looking at documents that referred to gender, the term “transform/transformativ” was only found 3 times. Projects that

aim for transformative change usually also look at behaviours and social norms, but those were only mentioned 7 and 8 times (respectively) in documents that referred to gender. Further, transformative approaches consider gender to be a relational concept that engages both women and men, however men were mentioned only 402 times in the documents, against 2115 times for women.

### 7.1.3.2 Human rights

Results for the key term human rights appear to confirm that **human rights are not fully mainstreamed in EU projects, and treated as a topic of intervention rather than a cross cutting issue**. Indeed, human rights was mentioned 355 times in the selected documents out of 123, meaning that about two-third of selected documents did not mention human rights. In addition, rights-based approaches were only 4 times in 4 documents out of 123, suggesting that many **EU projects mentioned human rights without following a structured approach to advancing human rights**.

The most frequent mentions of human rights came from projects about supporting human rights, civil society organisations (EIDHR and CSO-LA) and the justice and security sectors (MPTF reports). Also when looking only at the documents of projects that were not dedicated to human rights (i.e. not EIDHR), human rights were mentioned most in projects on **justice, security and support for CSOs**. By contrast, mentions of human rights in the economic sector, education and food security obtained respectively 16, 2 and 0 hits. This suggests, in alignment with EQ5 findings, that **projects with less obvious links to human rights, for instance education-, PFM, food security and economic development projects, largely did not integrate a human rights perspective**.

Further, projects that included human rights had a **significant focus on training/capacity building** (90 hits in 123 documents) **and institutional-level change** (policy, legal advocacy, involving Ministries etc.; mentioned 80 times together) when compared to local/community-level change (13 hits). Awareness stands somewhere in the middle, with around 50 hits. As for rights-holders, there was a stronger emphasis on women (58 hits in documents that included human rights) compared to children (25 hits), detainees/prisoners (18 hits), IDPs/refugees (13 hits) and young people (12 hits). These other factors of exclusion and human rights violations merit being taken into account more in EU projects, alongside gender.

### 7.1.3.3 Conflict sensitivity

MAXQDA results also seem to confirm the EQ5 finding that **EU projects pay some attention to conflict sensitivity but lack an explicit, systematic approach** to inform project implementation on a regular basis. While conflict is mentioned 859 times in the 123 project documents, conflict sensitivity is only mentioned 50 times in some 20 documents (especially in the World Bank MPF progress reports). Moreover, applying a do-no-harm approach is essential in conflict-sensitive (and humanitarian) programming, yet **do-no-harm was largely absent from the documents** (only mentioned 6 times, in 3 documents out of 123). These results should not necessarily be interpreted as a lack of attention to conflict sensitivity and Do No Harm. Rather, they are in line with EQ5 findings which suggest that while EU projects do not apply conflict sensitivity explicitly, their implementing partners such as NGOs are experienced with working in conflict settings and tend to apply implicit forms of conflict sensitivity in an organic way.

Aside from conflict sensitivity, among the most frequent combinations with the term “conflict” were conflict resolution (170 hits) and conflict analysis (75 hits). It is also worthy to note that in documents that mentioned conflict, there was a **much stronger emphasis on conflict resolution** (170 hits) **as opposed to peacebuilding** (29 hits), **conflict prevention** (26 hits) **and reconciliation** (18 times). This can be explained in part by the context, where Al-Shabab remains predominant in several parts of Somalia and feeds on other tensions and conflicts at community level. These results align with the EQ6.1 finding that the EU provided significant support to the capacities of security forces and to stabilisation but could have contributed more to the field of peacebuilding.

### 7.1.3.4 Ownership & leadership

In Somalia as elsewhere, ownership of projects by Somalis at different levels, and local leadership in designing and implementing them can contribute greatly to the legitimacy and sustainability of projects. This is particularly important if projects seek to influence existing social practices, for instance by promoting women’s and youth participation in politics or improving human rights awareness among public officials.

In the selected documents, ownership appears 459 times which suggests that **the EU pays attention to Somali ownership of projects, with a higher emphasis on national ownership, than local-, and especially than FMS-level ownership**. Indeed, in documents that mentioned ownership, national/FGS/government ownership received about 60 hits, local/community ownership received 32 hits, and FMS ownership received 5 hits (regional ownership is also mentioned 3 times but could refer to the supranational regional level). One of the most frequent word combinations with “ownership” is participation and ownership, which denotes an attention to involving Somali stakeholders in EU projects.

**However, the same level of attention cannot be confirmed for Somali leadership of projects** judging from the selected documents. Indeed, leadership appears 343 times in 76 documents out of 123 but in most cases refers to political leadership (used as a synonym for Somali government or political will) or leadership training, when looking at the most frequent word combinations. These results suggest that EU projects may be paying more attention to building leadership skills than ensuring Somali leadership over projects.

#### 7.1.3.5 Complementary observations:

- The statistical analysis suggests that EU projects did not have a strong policy dialogue component, overall. Policy dialogue was only mentioned 180 times in 19 documents out of 123.
- Results suggest that the EU paid attention to consulting various stakeholders when setting up projects, since consultation received 543 hits in 80 out of 123 documents. However, bottom up approaches were only mentioned 14 times in 12 documents, which does not reflect significant explicit efforts to ensure that communities and their needs are informing, and driving, EU projects.
- It is also worth noting that while the FGS was mentioned 2540 times in the selected documents, the FMS was mentioned 594 times. This suggests that the EU places a stronger focus on the federal level in its projects, but still pays a significant amount of attention to the member states level.
- The key terms “informal” and “traditional” were mentioned 113 times and 308 times in the 123 selected documents, respectively. Informality and tradition are significant aspects of Somali society, and are therefore important to conduct context analysis and implement relevant activities that will reach the population at the local level. These limited mentions suggest a stronger focus of the EU on supporting institutional, formal-level change and government actors as opposed to traditional actors. While this focus is in part justified by the role and nature of the EU, a stronger emphasis on informality and tradition might help bolster the impact of certain projects, for instance on justice and economic development at the community level.
- Results suggest that the EU places a strong emphasis on cooperation with other stakeholders in Somalia, be they Somali, other international donors or implementing partners, EU member states, etc. Indeed, coordination received 1275 hits, cooperation 596 hits and collaboration 433 hits in the selected documents. However, this statistical result does not provide information as to how this translates in practice. Moreover, the project documents pay limited attention to complementarity (35 hits, in 17/123 documents) and coherence (53 hits, 15 documents).
- Lastly, results suggest that in most cases, EU projects did not explicitly consider exit strategies. Indeed, the term exit strategy was mentioned only 28 times in 8 documents out of 123. While this is in part explained by the Somali context, where limited resources and conflicting priorities do not allow for many actions to be continued without external funding, the omission deserves to be stressed. Ensuring the sustainability of the EU’s projects and engagement is needed (also in light of the massive amount of financing going into the country) and would require thinking about potential exit strategies and their implications to be able to plan ahead. If exit strategies are not relevant or envisaged at a particular time for a project, mentioning and justifying this in the project documents would seem relevant.

**Table 1. Presence of key terms in the selected documents**

Word(s)	No. Hits	% presence in documents	No. of documents that recorded hits (out of 123)
Gender	1177	63.4	78
Disaggregated	192	38.2	47
Norms	43	17.1	21
Decision making	142	28.5	35
Power	530	52	64
Youth	1550	57.7	71
Rural	323	36.6	45
Clan	343	28.5	35
Intersection	0	0	0
Interact	21	12.2	15
Human rights	355	35.8	44
Rights-based approach	4	3.3	4
Conflict	859	60.2	74
Safety	340	43.9	54
Do no harm	6	2.4	3

Word(s)	No. Hits	% presence in documents	No. of documents that recorded hits (out of 123)
NDP	114	23.6	29
Policy dialogue	180	15.4	19
Feedback	237	58.5	72
Consultation	543	65	80
Ownership	459	57.7	71
Leadership	343	61.8	76
Lead	244	64.2	79
Community-based	96	18.7	23
Local	2565	82.1	101
District	870	53.7	66
Municipality	74	20.3	25
Informal	113	32.5	40
Traditional	308	36.6	45
Bottom up	3	1.6	2
FGS	2540	49.6	61
FMS	594	34.1	42
IRA	0	0	0
Regions	861	56.1	69
Coordination	1275	72.4	89
Collaboration	433	61	75
Cooperation	596	80.5	99
Complementarity	35	13.8	17
Coherence	53	12.2	15
Network	240	49.6	61
Platform	379	52.8	65
Forum	435	52	64
Delay	138	56.9	70
No cost extension	11	7.3	9
External evaluation	4	3.3	4
Reflection	18	10.6	13
Adapted	59	22.8	28
Participatory	165	28.5	35
Exit	66	17.9	22
Exit strategy	28	6.5	8
Continued	449	65	80
Sustained	103	31.7	39
Transformative	6	3.3	4
Conflict sensitivity	35	13	16
Conflict sensitive	6	2.4	3
Bottom-up	12	8.1	10
No-cost extension	21	7.3	9
Perception	148	30.9	38
Woman	12	6.5	8
Man	15	9.8	12
Women	2115	74.8	92
Men	402	59.3	73
Gender analysis	22	8.1	10


Word(s)	No. Hits	% presence in documents	No. of documents that recorded hits (out of 123)
Flexibility	76	22	27
Flexible	59	18.7	23
Owned	100	30.1	27
Owners	53	15.4	19
Adapting	38	17.1	21

## 7.2 Mapping and analysis of bilateral and regional spending actions

During the inception phase, the evaluation team has identified 95 country level interventions, which represent EU support for approximately EUR 955 million<sup>7</sup> in the evaluation period (2014–2021)<sup>8</sup>. In addition, the team has identified 21 regional interventions from which Somalia benefitted during the same period.<sup>9</sup> All interventions within the scope<sup>10</sup> of this evaluation are listed in Annex 1.

Figure 6 presents the evolution of the contracted amount per year of the EU support portfolio in Somalia. The graph shows a general increasing trend from 2013 to 2017, ending the period at EUR 132 million. In 2018, the size of the portfolio grew exponentially reaching an all-time high of EUR 235 million. This is explained almost entirely by the implementation of newly introduced interventions funded via the EUTF (see 'Instruments' below). After a dramatic fall in the contracted amounts in 2019, the portfolio shows signs of levelling off at the end of the evaluation period (2020-2021).

Figure 6 Overview of amounts contracted per year<sup>11</sup>



Source: contracts implemented during 2014-2021 falling in the scope of the evaluation. Data extracted from i) EUD SOM export (24.02.2022) for EUTF portfolio, and ii) CRIS export (21.02.2022) for other funding instruments, incl. EDF.

<sup>7</sup> Unless otherwise specified, financial figures of EU support mentioned in this report correspond to contracted amounts.

<sup>8</sup> Unless otherwise specified, the evaluation period from 2014 to 2021 refers to all the statistical data presented. For some interventions implemented during this period, funding agreements (decisions) were signed before 2014. In all cases, statistical analyses consider only the amounts contracted from 2014 onwards.


<sup>9</sup> The total volume of these 21 regional/multi-country interventions amounts to close to EUR 560 million. However, it is not possible to identify the exact shares from which Somalia benefitted directly. Therefore, these regional/multi-country interventions are treated separately and are not considered in the financial statistics.

<sup>10</sup> The statistics drawn from this mapping need to be read as an approximation of the allocations per macro area (Governance I, Governance II and Resilience and Economic Development). The point of departure for the mapping have been the EU's Decisions. While they generally relate to one of the macro areas in name, in reality several objectives have been pursued through such Decisions, often relating to different macro-areas and several sub-areas. The mapping takes account of this to the extent possible. When a decision was primarily relating to one sector, it was categorised under this sector. In other cases, it was registered under different headings.

<sup>11</sup> For EDF interventions, the year corresponds to the 'contract year' in the CRIS database. For EUTF interventions, the year corresponds to the 'start date of activity' in the EUD Somalia database.

Figure 7 shows the distribution of the bilateral portfolio by EU external financing instrument. The European Development Fund (EDF) is the main financial instrument used for cooperation between the EU and the Republic of Somalia representing slightly more than 50% of the total portfolio. The European Union Emergency Trust Fund (EUTF) also constitutes a considerable part of the cooperation with around 36% of the financial volume. A small proportion of the interventions are funded via EU thematic instruments/programmes, such as IcSP, DCI, EIDHR and EOM, account for about 10% of the contracted amounts.


Figure 7 Amounts contracted by EU external financing instrument



Source: Particip GmbH based on data retrieved from the CRIS database.

A clustering of the EU support per macro area (see Figure 8) reveals that half of the volume is allocated to Governance (53,0%), from which a slightly greater amount is addressing Education & TVET and PFM/macro-economic management (30,7%) – grouped under Governance II. Also, in the Governance macro-area, the remaining amount (22,3%) is spending on Rule of Law, Security and Peace – grouped under Governance I. More than a third of the overall financial volume is dedicated to Resilience and economic development (36,94%) and roughly 10% of the funding is allocated to multisector interventions or other areas, including initiatives encompassing air transport and M&E. Figure 8 shows the distribution of the amounts contracted by macro- and sub-areas.

Figure 8 Overview of amounts contracted by macro- and sub-areas



Source: Particip GmbH based on data retrieved from the CRIS database.

The implementation of EU support in Somalia is channelled mainly via international CSOs (27%) and multilateral partners, including United Nations agencies (23%) such as FAO, UNDP, UNOPS, WFP and IOM. The Government of Somalia (11%) is also an important recipient of EU funding, mainly in the context of budget support. A comparative smaller proportion is delivered through the private sector (8%) and EU-MS (4%) and local CSOs (2%). Figure 9 presents the main channels used to deliver the EU support in the country.


Almost a quarter of the portfolio is channelled through three multi-donor trust funds. These consist of the United Nations Multi-Partner Trust Fund (UN-MPTF), the World Bank Multi-Partner Fund (WB-MPF) and the African Development Bank Multi-Partner Somalia Infrastructure Fund (AfDB-SIF).<sup>12</sup> Within the evaluation period, the amounts contracted show that the WB-MPF has received up to EUR 103 million of EU funding, while the UN-MPTF around EUR 82 million (see table in Figure 9). In the annexes of the Inception Report, additional

<sup>12</sup>The three financing windows are brought together under the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF), established within the context of the Somali New Deal Compact endorsed in Brussels in September 2013.



information can be found on these multi-donor trust funds, including particular characteristics and thematic focus.

Figure 9 Overview of amounts contracted by channel



Source: Particip GmbH based on data retrieved from the CRIS database.

The project-based approach is the predominant aid modality in EU support to Somalia. The evaluation team identified very few examples of other support modalities in EU portfolio, besides the use of budget support and contributions to multi-donor trust funds. Budget support has only been provided via the EUTF for the Somalia State-building and Resilience Contract amounting to EUR 103 million<sup>13</sup> in 2018. In 2021, the EU temporarily stopped the provision of general budget support to the government, conditional to an advancement of the electoral and constitutional process in the country.

As presented in Table 2, the average size of interventions in terms of financial volumes varies across sectors. Education & TVET and PFM/macroeconomic management (Governance II) and Resilience and Economic development interventions hold, by far, a larger average volume in comparison with other macro areas. In contrast, the average size of interventions in Rule of Law, Justice, Security, Peace (Governance I) and Multisector/other is considerably smaller than the previous categories, with EUR 4,4 and 4,6 million, respectively. This is explained by a greater number of bilateral interventions present in the latter categories, many of which are small-size interventions funded via thematic lines, such as EIDHR, IcSP and CSO&LA.

Table 2 Average volume and number of bilateral and regional interventions by areas

	Governance I	Governance II	Resilience & Economic development	Multisector/ Other	Total
Average volume per bilateral intervention (million EUR)	4,4	26,7	23,5	4,6	14,8
Number of bilateral interventions	48	11	15	21	95
Number of regional interventions	10	-	9	2	21

Table 2 also shows that almost half of all regional interventions are falling thematically in the category of RoL, Justice, Security & Peace (Governance I). Although many of these interventions are known to have components related to wider institutional support. Roughly a third of the regional interventions belong to the Resilience & Economic development area, and only two can be categorised as multisector or other area.

<sup>13</sup> Total contracted amount according to the EUTF inventory to date. The action fiche of the intervention provides further information on its total coverage: "the SBRC foresees a disbursement of EUR 82.9 million over 3 years with an additional amount of EUR 10 million dedicated to the clearance of Somalia's arrears with the IMF and the African Development Bank (AfDB), and EUR14.5 million for complementary measures such as TA, verification, audit and evaluation" (p. 2).

## 8 eSurvey Analysis

### 8.1 Introduction and methodology

This eSurvey was conducted towards the end of the Desk Phase of the evaluation and results were obtained and reviewed ahead of the mission to Nairobi, Puntland and Somaliland. Before sending, it was approved by the EU Somalia desk in Brussels and the EUD's cooperation section in Nairobi. The EU's eSurvey tool was used to send 21 questions to 352 potential respondents (see questionnaire, Annex 9). Questions were split into a multiple-choice component and space to provide complementary answers in writing which was well used by the respondents. Most addresses were obtained from the EU's Third-Party-Monitoring-Project which supports the EUD since 2016. Those were complemented by names and contact details which the evaluation team collected from relevant project documents, interview partners during the Inception Phase and personal contacts from previous work in and on Somalia.

The objective of this eSurvey was to obtain views from stakeholders, only. The evaluation team did therefore not invite any EU staff working at headquarters, the EUD or EU services active in Somalia. A variety of stakeholders working or having worked with EU funded projects responded as well as wider development partners were the principal respondents. A minority, 2 respondents, were from the FGS. The response rate was 10 percent (35 respondents) which is a significant percentage for this type of qualitative survey for all organisational backgrounds except for staff from the FGS. In terms of sectoral representation, the respondents covered all three major clusters of this evaluation, i.e. peace and security/rule of law; public finance management/education; and resilience/food security/(local)economic development. Working experience of the respondents was spread nearly equally for "15 years and more"; "10 to 15 years"; and "less than 10 years". The eSurvey was distributed in English and Somali language. All replies received were in English.

### 8.2 Summary of findings

The replies received display a variety of experiences, observations and perceptions. They diverged at times substantially which should not come as a surprise considering the different sectors and the different levels of Somalia's government and society in which the EU intervenes with its funding and non-funding engagement. Replies were also formulated against the background of a country situation which – over so many years of support – has improved rather minimally and very slowly. As such, replies reflect partially expectations which an outside supporter, such as the EU, cannot fulfil but also a series of realistic replies which document the deep insight some of the respondents have about highly complex statebuilding processes.

Most respondents answered that the EU – overall – contributed "to some extent" or "to a great extent" to Somalia's development process of which between 50 to 60 percent ticked the boxes for "to some extent" and some 40 to 50 percent the boxes "to a great extent". Replies do reflect that the EU has been a crucial contributor to tackling socio-economic, humanitarian and security challenges, it has helped to build the capacity of the state and it contributed to improving the living conditions of Somali communities. Though replies also note that despite important progress made throughout the years of international assistance, provided by the EU and other partners around counterterrorism, humanitarian efforts and statebuilding, peace and stability remain elusive in Somalia.

There is recognition that the EU addressed the country's priorities and needs, but attention to the FMS and further sub-national local levels came at the expense of the EU's concentration on the FGS level. While the EU's attention to statebuilding, peace and security is noted positively, replies suggest that the justice sector remained the weakest priority of the EU's support to statebuilding so far. To identify and formulate priorities, the EU's consultation with the FGS and FMS is recognised but respondents also note that the EU does not use fact finding missions well, an answer which correlates with other replies underlying the relative limited personal exchange and presence of EU staff with different Somali stakeholders.

The EU's ability to adjust its support to Somalia's needs was overall very positively noted in relation to the Covid-19 pandemic but its adaptation to political, social and economic changes was judged as too slow, mainly due to the long-term planning and programming instruments but also due to tedious bureaucratic processes and requirements. Replies regarding the complementarity of the EU's regional support with its country-level support was mixed, partially informed by the fact that national institutions are not involved in such support provided. In terms of the EU's added value, beyond being a potent financial actor, the EU is recognised for its ability to provide predictable and long-term support, but its knowledge of the Somali context scores comparatively low which correlates with several critical observations made about the EU's split presence in Mogadishu and Nairobi, the short stay of EU staff and – as mentioned above – the limited presence on the ground, for example via field visits.

EU staff is good to work with, they are always open to discussions and work professionally, but scarce of sector-related technical (advisory) capacities. Concerning the EU's coordination record with the Somali Government and other development partners, the majority of respondents rated their experiences roughly with 50 percent fulfilled it "to a great extent" and 50 percent fulfilled it "to some extent". Though the majority of

respondents responded that the EU's participation in coordination forums contributed only "to some extent" to improved policy dialogue between the EU and the FGS. In terms of visibility, the EU's support can be noted in public but is often overshadowed by implementing actors, UN organisations as well as NGOs, who do not well credit the EU's financial support. Overall, there is scope for improvements regarding the EU's visibility in the country.


In terms of the linkages between development cooperation, support to security and peacebuilding, humanitarian aid and other non-development support areas, the EU has strengthened collaboration, coherence and complementarity across the respective mandates of the different humanitarian, development and peace actors. But one respondent mentioned that the coordination between humanitarian and development actors, including between the EU and ECHO, has sometimes been challenging. Cross-cutting issues, another feature of implementation, have been well covered across interventions. This applies for gender, vulnerability and human rights but there is scope for improvement with regard to environmental and climate change related cross-cutting issues. Respondents from civil society, however, mention that despite human rights being attended to, there is a need to hold the FGS accountable to its international commitments on preventing gross human rights violations.

Concerning sustainability, the EU is positively recognised for its efforts to build sustainable systems – for example in education but also other areas of statebuilding – and for supporting the sustainability of results achieved by civil society organisations. Reliance on short-term projects without follow-up, however, work against this and reduces the likelihood of sustainability. Overall, it remains one of the key challenges in a context of protracted crisis and respondents note that many activities on the ground could not be sustained if the EU would withdraw its support.

### 8.3 Detailed findings


#### 8.3.1 Identification

##### 1. What agency or organisation do you work for?




An equal share of the respondents work for civil society organisations (8 out of 35) or as a development partner organisation (8 out of 35). The largest share (16 out of 35) works as implementing partner of an EU project. 2 respondents work for the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), and 1 person works for "other".

**2. In what field are you working?**



An equal share of the respondents works in gender equality/women, youth participation and civic engagement (6 out of 35), and in “Education sector Resilience/ rural development/ food security/ climate change” (6 out of 35). 7 respondents out of 35 hold a position not related to a particular sector, while 5 people work in justice and rule of law. 2 people work in local development, and 4 in security and peacebuilding. 4 people work in “Other”, which includes food security and livelihoods, refugees and IDP protection, WASH, and media and civic space development. The smallest share (1 out of 35) works in support to state building/macro-economic development.

**3. Working experience/seniority**



3. Working experience	Total
10 to 15 years	14
15 years and more	11
Less than 10 years	10
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>35</b>

The majority of the respondents have a working experience of more than 10 years, with 14 respondents out of 35 having a working experience of 10 to 15 years. 10 respondents out of 35 have a lower level of seniority, with less than 10 years of experience.

### 8.3.2 Relevance

4. Based on your experience, to what extent has EU support to Somalia addressed the country's priorities and the needs of the Somali population between 2014 and 2021? Please highlight the most important priorities/needs addressed and any particular feature(s) on how they were addressed. Also mention what was not (sufficiently) addressed.

Not at all	Limited extent	Some extent	Great extent	Don't know	Total
0	1	24	10	0	<b>35</b>

Those that responded "great extent" (10 out of 35) highlighted the importance of EU support in state and peace-building processes, in the humanitarian sector, security and rule of law, and economic development. Only one respondent said the EU support addressed the country's priorities and needs to a "limited extent."

The majority of the respondents (24 out of 35) believe that between 2014 and 2021, the EU support to Somalia addressed the country's priorities and the needs of the Somali population to "some extent". According to them, areas that were not sufficiently addressed include human rights, as the EU failed to hold the FGS accountable to its international commitments on human rights, the WASH sector in which training and sustainable management were not addressed sufficiently, and governance and national/local system building. It has also been highlighted that EU projects are not long-term, and that the needs addressed did not reflect the needs on the ground, but rather the intentions of donors and implementers. However, respondents highlighted that the EU successfully supported the security sector reform, by contributing "towards the reduction of Human Rights violations targeting women and children by members of security agencies and other armed groups in Somalia [which] has contributed to the evolution and development of a new set of laws and bills, policies and structures for the promotion of the protection of women and children's rights" (Civil society organisation respondent). According to this respondent, the EU also contributed to "ensuring men and women of all ages, groupings and social classes participated in the evolving politics of Somalia that allowed for a gender equitable means of participation in elections in a sustainable manner." According to others, the EU has successfully addressed the need for a Constitutional revision.

#### Box 1 – Telling quotes from respondents – question 4

*"Legal developments through support to the Somali Federal Parliament; too little attention was paid to sub-national legislation at Federal Member State level" (Development partner organisation respondent)*

*"In both state and peace-building stages, EU support is very significant and has been addressed very well." (Implementing partner of an EU project respondent)*

*"Youth, Women and other vulnerable communities were addressed, particularly their civil and political rights. Unfortunately, the approaches (that have been) used for the projects did not reflect the needs on the ground. In addition, all the projects or most of them were not driven by the needs of the target beneficiaries. They were driven or developed based on the needs and intentions of the donors/implementors." (Civil society organisation respondent)*

*"In WASH (water research), WASH training and sustainable management was not addressed sufficiently. Health/Education was neither address sufficiently." (Development partner organisation respondent)*

*"Humanitarian, and resilience needs were to some extent addressed, but macro-economic, and infrastructure areas seem hardly addressed. The governance system, which is a foundational threshold for building resilience, was also not sufficiently supported by the EU." ("Other" respondent)*

5. Based on your experience, to what extent has EU's sector focus and strategic objectives been aligned with government priorities between 2014 and 2021? Please highlight the most important priorities/needs addressed and any particular feature(s) on how they were addressed. Also mention what was not (sufficiently) addressed.

<i>Not at all</i>	<i>Limited extent</i>	<i>Some extent</i>	<i>Great extent</i>	<i>Don't know</i>	<i>Total</i>
0	2	16	13	0	<b>31</b>

Not all the respondents (35) answered this question, which suggests that some of them did not have knowledge/information to answer this question.

16 people out of 31 said that the EU alignment with FGS priorities happens to “some extent”. Among them, one respondent highlighted that “most of the alignment seems a bit formal and not really addressing the root causes of the problems. One of the core issues is that the [Somali] government priorities and strategies are in itself suffering from a western world view and not really addressing the problems the Somalis would like to have solved” (Development partner organisation respondent). 13 people out of 31 believe the alignment of the EU with the Central Government priorities happens to a “great extent.” One of them highlighted that the priorities addressed include the continued EU support for the constitutional review process, promotion of dialogue and political engagement; inclusion of all sectors of society in political decision making; continuation of the National Reconciliation process through a continued support on federalism and reconciliation issues; migration governance. Among the priorities not sufficiently addressed there is the justice sector, which “remains the weakest arm of government” (Civil society organisation respondent), and human rights and gender. Respondents also highlighted that “legal developments [took place] through [EU] support to the Somali Federal Parliament, [but] too little attention was paid to sub-national legislation on the Federal Member State level” (Development partner organisation). The EU’s support was important for the constitutional review process and the adoption of the amended Federal Constitution, to ensure that all sectors of society were included in the dialogue and decision-making process and to promote a continuous political engagement.

#### *Box 2 – Telling quotes from respondents – question 5*

“In terms of prioritisation, the EU has supported the process of developing the state capacity according to plan. This was done by introducing the New Deal and working with NDP’s to reflect national priorities. The EU has also supported concepts and international development frameworks in relation to its work with civil society, the general public and eventually to the government, particularly in the case of Somaliland.” (Implementing partner of an EU project respondent)

“The priorities/needs addressed:


- (a) Adoption of the amended Federal Constitution: The EU continued to support for the constitutional review process as well as the promotion of dialogue and continuous political engagement.
- (b) Ensure inclusion of all sectors of society in political decision making: Supported the Government in its efforts to ensure inclusivity in political and reconciliation processes.
- (c) Agreement on a common vision of federalism and continuation of the National Reconciliation process: Continued support on federalism and reconciliation issues as well as promoting dialogue and continuous political engagement
- (d) Migration governance: The EU has enabled national authorities and institutions to facilitate safe, orderly and regular migration, and effectively address and reduce trafficking in human beings and smuggling of migrants within and from the Horn of Africa region by applying a human rights-based approach

The priorities not sufficiently addressed:

- (a) Justice sector: The justice sector remains the weakest arm of government which remains to be strengthened
- (b) Human Rights and Gender: Failure to operationalize the Sexual Offences Bill (SOB) Child Rights Bill and Female Genital Mutilation into law by October 2020 as per the MAF commitments” (Civil society organisation respondent)

“EU supports in every sector of the government institutions through capacity building and funds” (Implementing partner of an EU project respondent)

**6. Based on your experience, to what extent have the following tools and approaches been used to increase alignment and relevance of EU support in Somalia? (Other) Please specify which other tools and/or approaches have been used.**



According to the majority of the respondents (16 out of 35), consultation with the government (central/federal/local) has been used to a “great extent” by the EU as a tool in support of Somalia. The other tools have been used to “some extent” according to the majority, but 6 respondents stressed that consultations with civil society stakeholders have only been used to a “limited extent”. Among the other tools quoted, the most cited is coordination and consultation with other stakeholders and communities.

**Box 3 – Telling quotes from respondents – question 6**

*“The inclusion of youth in EU funded programs such as the CCAP Programme.” (Implementing partner of an EU project respondent)*

*“Coordination with other donors. Evaluation of the project results after two/three years for the end of the project and evaluation of implementation partners capacities, effectiveness and efficiency. Too many programmes are very costly but produces limited results.” (Development partner organisation respondent)*

*“Consultations with the local communities” (Implementing partner of an EU project respondent)*

*“Technical consultation with development actors such as UN” (Implementing partner of an EU project respondent)*

**7. Based on your experience, to what extent has the EU been able to adjust its support to Somalia to respond to changes in the political, security and socio-economic (including COVID-19) situation/context in the country between 2014 and 2021? Please explain your assessment.**

Not at all	Limited extent	Some extent	Great extent	Don't know	Total
0	4	16	12	3	<b>35</b>

The majority of the respondents agree to “some” (16 out of 35) or “great extent” (12 out of 35). In particular, according to them the EU has been able to quickly adjust to the new needs that arose after COVID-19 hit the country, and one respondent stressed that the EU “funded several projects aimed at responding to changes in the political, security and socio-economic situation” (Implementing partner of an EU project respondent). This is in line with what has been stressed in Q4, where the EU has been judged capable of addressing the country’s needs. However, adaptation to political, social and economic changes has been judged as too slow, mainly due to lack of flexibility in long-term planning and programming instruments, or not focused on the population needs.

## Box 4 – Telling quotes from respondents – question 7

*“In my experience, recent EU supports were adaptive and highly responded to changing dynamic such as Covid-19 etc.” (“Other” respondent)*

*“At the time of COVID, the EU allowed most of its projects to be adjusted to respond to the immediate needs in relation to COVID.” (Implementing partner of an EU project respondent)*

*“Response to socio-economic changes such as Covid-19 was quite good, response to political changes such as the delay in the federal election process were not well addressed” (Development partner organisation respondent)*

*“The answer of EU is generally very slow. Many selected implementation partners do not implement the project but subcontract all competencies to other partners. It is advisable that EU negotiates the project directly with the real implementer able to work in the field and deal with political and security constraints.” (Development partner organisation respondent).*

*“Much focus on Covid-19, whereas probably not key focus for Somalia. Not enough links with local population and stakeholders.” (Implementing partner of an EU project respondent)*

## 8.3.3 Approach to implementation, efficiency and added value

- 8. The EU supports Somalia also through regional initiatives and programmes in the wider Horn of Africa region. Based on your experience, to what extent has this regional support been complementary with country-level support? Please explain your assessment. How were these initiatives complementary, were there also inconsistencies/incoherence between national and regional actions?**

Not at all	Limited extent	Some extent	Great extent	Don't know	Total
2	2	14	8	9	<b>35</b>

The majority of the respondents (14 out of 35) believe that the EU regional support has been complementary with country-level support to “some extent”. Some are more optimistic on this complementarity, as they highlight that the EU regional support aligns with the Somali economic and peace development programmes, the support of human rights and gender, and migration management. Others instead, highlight that “it is unclear how regional priorities are formulated or the degree to which country level stakeholders are able to influence these” (Implementing partner of an EU project respondent), stressing that even though there is a degree of complementarity between regional and country support, national institutions are not involved. Among those that answered “limited extent” (2 out of 35), “not at all” (2 out of 35) or “don't know” (9 out of 35), the main reasons cited were lack of coordination between the EU and other actors involved in projects, lack of clear communication on the regional initiatives, poor reflection of the needs on the ground, as already stressed in Q4 and Q7.

## Box 5 – Telling quotes from respondents – question 8

*“These initiatives were highly complementary but national institutions were often not involved in these initiatives.” (“Other” respondent)*


*“In our experience, the EU has supported Somalia through regional initiatives and programmes in the Wider Horn of Africa through the Better Migration Management Programme. The overall objective is to improve migration management in the region, and in particular to curb the trafficking of human beings and the smuggling of migrants within and from the Horn. This Programme provides CSOs with a platform to share experiences and best practices which can be applied at the national level.” (Civil society organisation respondent)*

*“EU supported multiple sectors, according to our experience, EU support to CSOs and the state were in line and complimentary with Somali National Development plans and policies. For instance, in a project supporting human rights and gender, the coordination and support were going back and forth with CSOs and relevant federal and state ministries. EU was working hard to work with the state and federal ministry and ensure consistence through its programs with various government agencies.” (Development partner organisation respondent)*

*“The EU Integrated Approach is still a toddler, learning to give its first steps. Complementarity and synergies can only be achieved if we work in articulation, which means that we must define a common objective for those involved, which is not the case. EU actors define their actions, having little regard or consideration to what the other actors are doing and consultations are mostly a formality. I call this the “Project Management Trap”, where each project manager is rewarded for the success of its project, where articulating with other EU actors would require higher level of work and introduce further risks.” (Development partner organisation respondent)*



**9. Based on your experience, to what extent has the EU been able to deliver its support efficiently (cost effectiveness, timeliness) and flexibly (adapting to changes in context)? Please explain your assessment**



The majority believes that the EU has been able to deliver its support efficiently to “some extent” (16 out of 35) or “very well” (12 out of 35), and flexibly to “some extent” (13 out of 35) or “very well” (13 out of 35). The majority of the respondents stress that the EU has reacted efficiently and with flexibility to the changing environment, as already mentioned in Q7. Others highlight that the EU efficiency and flexibility depend on the project, as programme adaptation to the changing political and socio-economic situation is slow. Those who underline that the EU lacks flexibility and efficiency blame the strict procedures and management rules of projects.

*Box 6 – Telling quotes from respondents – question 9*

*“According to our experience, EU agencies were delivering the support provided to the program in an efficient manner. Amendments of under or over stated expenditures were thoroughly assessed and approved by EU. This shows how flexible and adapting programs were during their management. In addition, the response and feedback were mainly related to timeliness.” (Development partner organisation respondent)*


*“Through periodic assessment on programme activities and joint reviews with relevant authorities, EU has been able to deliver support efficiently and with a certain degree of flexibility.” (Implementing partner of an EU project respondent)*

*“Some programs were well managed and were able to deliver efficiently and flexibly, others not. Particularly such programs were not able to adapt according to the changing political environment caused by the unnecessary delays of the federal elections ...” (Development partner organisation respondent)*

*“Limited flexibility due to rigid management and regulations.” (Implementing partner of an EU project respondent)*

*“EU procedures and management is not flexible at all. Project costs are also high because of this lack of flexibility. For EU, rules are more important than results. Lack of flexibility together with selection of non-efficient / effective partners make EU interventions per se non-efficient.” (Development partner organisation respondent).*

**10. What has been the added value of the EU support to Somalia compared to EU MS (in addition to its ability to provide large amounts of funding)? (Other) Please specify other type of added value. Please explain your assessment.**



Overall, the respondents agree with the statements presented to them. The EU is judged as able to understand the political landscape and priority of the Somali government (15 out of 35 agree to a “great extent”), as being able to understand the priorities of (I)NGOs and act upon them (15 out of 35 agree to a “great extent”) and as being a reliable/predictable development partner (20 out of 35 agree to a “great extent”).

What is interesting to notice is that 21 people out of 35 agree to a “great extent” that the EU can provide long-term support compared to its MS. However, precedent answers (Q4 and Q7) highlighted that, despite the fact that the EU can provide long-term support, its projects and programmes are rather short and sometimes have little impact. Moreover, only 9 respondents out of 35 agree to a “great extent” that the EU has a solid understanding and knowledge of the Somali context.

Another added value of the EU that is cited by the respondents is the connection and interaction the EU has with the local community. The EU is also judged more coherent and less fragmented in its funding compared to MS. At the same time, however, there are risks of duplication between EU and MS programmes, and one respondent stressed that the comparison between the EU and MS depends on the programmes, as some are better managed by the EU, while others by MS. Moreover, respondents highlight that the EU “was able to mitigate misuse of resources” (Implementing partner of an EU project respondent) and was not implicated in corruption practices, which “is becoming one of the major problems in Somalia among local institutions and some development stakeholders” (Development partner organisation respondent).

**Box 7 – Telling quotes from respondents – question 10**

“The added value of EU support to Somalia compared to its MS makes funding more coherent and less fragmented, as cooperation helps cut out gaps and any overlapping. Moreover, there will be a higher impact and better value for money, as EU development partners combine their resources. Joint EU Programming can also help to raise awareness, improve public perception, and increase accountability.” (Civil society organisation respondent)

“The EU could understand the priorities of the locals and act upon them.” (Implementing partner of an EU project respondent)

“Corruption is becoming one of the major problems in Somalia among local institutions and some development stakeholders. This reality is not possible to be addressed, but the problem is increasing year by year. EU is not affected by this.” (Development partner organisation respondent)

“EU as actor can create bigger leverage as a multi-country donor (yet duplicates also as EU MS still have own programs).” (Implementing partner of an EU project respondent)

**11. Would you have any other perceptions about the EU and its staff which you would like to share?**

Respondents are overall happy with the EU staff. They underline that the EU staff have always been open to discussions, recommendations and responsive to communication. EU staff are considered competent, efficient, committed and able to work with Somali CSOs. They present a good understanding of country dynamics and show technical knowledge. However, some of the respondents highlight that given that the EU staff are based in Nairobi, it is difficult for them to maintain a presence in Mogadishu. Relationships are key to implementing projects, and the fact that the staff stay only for 3-4 years compromises the quality of the relationship and of the project, but also the quality of the understanding of the Somali context. These statements are in line with answers from Q10, as only 9 respondents out of 35 agree to a “great extent” that the EU has a solid understanding and knowledge of the Somali context.

*Box 8b– Telling quotes from respondents – question 11*

*“Generally, the EU and its staff are well received in Somalia. EU staff is well known for their professionalism and commitment to efficiently supporting Somalia.” (Development partner organisation respondent)*

*“Honestly, most of your team are competent and well represented, particularly those who work with Somaliland CSOs and your team in Nairobi.” (Civil society organisation respondent)*


*“The EU and its staff have been easy to communicate with and they were always open to discussions and recommendations on the ongoing programmes.” (Civil society organisation respondent)*

*“It is difficult for the staff to maintain a permanent presence in Mogadishu due to their base being in Nairobi (NBO) and no real support for commuting.” (Development partner organisation respondent)*

*“EU lack of good technical staff. Rarely EU enters into technical discussion with partners. Too fast staff turnover affects effectiveness of EU, since this is a key success factor. EU staff moves every 3-4 years to another country, so all the knowledge is lost.” (Development partner organisation respondent)*

**8.3.4 Coordination and EU visibility**

**12. Based on your experience, to what extent have the EU activities specified below helped to better coordinate coordination with other development partners, including Federal Government of Somalia and Federal Member State of Somalia?**



Overall, the majority of the respondents believe that to “some” and “great extent” the EU activities presented to them have helped better coordinate with other development partners. One respondent said that it was the

EU itself that firstly has been engaging with other partners/actors to better coordinate with them. Among the other activities cited by the respondents, there is also the participation of the EU in local forums and coordination meetings. However, one respondent stressed that the “EU should commit partners to enhance coordination and be part of cluster coordination meetings in each region or state to enhance complementarity and avoid duplication” (Development partner organisation respondent). Those that answered “not at all” or “limited extent” did not provide any clarification. 10 people out of 35 believe that the EU’s exchanges with Central Government of Somalia and FGS officials helped to better coordinate to a “great extent”, which is a decreased compared to Q6, in which 16 people out of 35 judged consultations between EU and government stakeholders useful for the alignment and relevance of the EU.

*Box 9 – Telling quotes from respondents – question 12*

“EU funded actions were in effective coordination with other actors including state and federal members, it is EU that was engaging these actors for coordination with all relevant institutions.” (Development partner organisation respondent)

“There is a need to strengthened synergies of projects executed in each geographical zone. FMS and FGS institutional memory is poor, needs and priorities change, as well poor transitioning between officials is often (mostly) the case. EU should commit partners to enhance coordination and be part of cluster coordination meetings in each region or state to enhance complementarity and avoid duplication.” (Development partner organisation respondent)

“EU attends all stakeholder meetings and forums.” (Implementing partner of an EU project respondent)

**13. Based on your experience, to what extent has the EU's participation in host government and/or donor coordination forums contributed to improved policy dialogue between the EU and Somali government at Federal Government of Somalia and/or Federal Government of Somalia levels?**

Not at all	Limited extent	Some extent	Great extent	Don't know	Total
0	2	22	6	5	35

The majority of the respondents (22 out of 35) agree that the EU’s participation in coordination forums has contributed to “some extent” to improved policy dialogue between the EU and Somalia Central and/or Federal government. The EU initiatives on a number of topics, such as human rights, gender and rule of law, improved policy dialogues and reviews at the Federal level. However, at times the impact of the EU on policy dialogues with the government is not felt. This is in line with answers in Q12, in which only 10 people out of 35 believe that the EU’s exchanges with Central Government of Somalia and FGS officials helped to better coordinate to a “great extent”.

*Box 10 – Telling quotes from respondents – question 13*

“EU supported initiatives in human rights, genders, rule of law and others actually contributed to policy review with federal state institutions.” (Development partner organisation respondent)

“Immensely as it gives opportunities to rectify any issue at early stage.” (Implementing partner of an EU project respondent)

“The EU has led initiatives to bring other donors together particularly EU member states, but more is needed in this regard” (Implementing partner of an EU project respondent)

“There was little impact of EU or other international partners on policy dialogs within Somalia. On the contrary these deteriorated due to the political crisis caused by the delays in the federal elections, to which the EU and other international partners could not find adequate responses....” (Development partner organisation respondent)

**14. Based on your experience, to what extent has the EU participation in technical working groups/ coordination forums contributed to improved implementation? Please explain your assessment.**

Not at all	Limited extent	Some extent	Great extent	Don't know	Total
1	1	15	15	3	35

The majority of the respondents agree to “some” (15 out of 35) and “great extent” (15 out of 35) that the EU participation in technical working groups/coordination forums contributed to improved implementation. In

particular, one respondent stresses that “through these forums, the EU gets feedback from the key stakeholders on how they coordinate and collaborate with each other and identify any gaps which need to be filled” (Civil society organisation). Another respondent highlights that the EU has good technical capacity that allows it to contribute to improved implementation. Only one respondent believes this participation contributes only to a “limited extent” to improved implementation, citing the lack of capable EU staff in technical matters.

*Box 11 – Telling quotes from respondents – question 14*


*“The EU participation in technical working groups and coordination forums has contributed towards improved implementation of actions in Somalia. Through these forums, the EU gets feedback from the key stakeholders on how well they coordinate and collaborate with each other and identify any gaps which need to be filled.” (Civil society organisation respondent)*

*“EU is the cornerstone and takes part for all technical working groups and other forums.” (Implementing partner of an EU project respondent)*

*“To my understanding, such working groups and forums provide insight into the programme implementation-challenges/opportunities.” (Implementing partner of an EU project respondent)*

*“The EU is an active member of key fora at country level.” (Implementing partner of an EU project respondent)*

**15. How would you rate the degree and quality of EU visibility as a development partner in...?  
Please specify factors that have contributed positively to, or limited EU’s visibility, and what could have been done better in your view.**



The majority of the respondents believe that the degree and quality of EU visibility as a development partner in the different situations presented range from “some” to “very high visibility”. In particular, according to the respondents, factors that positively contribute to the EU’s visibility include the “EU’s visibility guides and [their] mainstreaming into programme design, planning, implementation and monitoring and evaluation,” (“Other” respondent) the positive work relation that the EU has with the FGS, and the presence on the ground of EU representatives. This last point stands in line with Q11, in which the EU staff is considered competent and available. However, in Q11 respondents have been more critical regarding the little presence on the ground of the EU staff. However, respondents to Q10 have been more critical towards this last point, as only 9 people judged the EU capable of understanding the Somali context to a “great extent”.

One respondent, despite highlighting the “very high visibility” of the EU, stresses that the EU “is taken for granted. Other partners (e.g. Russia and China) have gotten more visibility with less investment - not so much in Somalia but in the Horn in general” (Development partner organisation respondent). Those that said the EU has “low visibility” stress the fact that the EU’s programmes are implemented by other actors, such as the UN or NGOs, which therefore gain more visibility, especially because the EU “rarely visits the project for security reasons.”

*Box 12 – Telling quotes from respondents – question 15*

*“The EU has very comprehensive visibility guidelines which need to be followed by stakeholders implementing EU funded programmes. The EU is one of Somalia’s main donors and works in tandem with the FGS. This*

*relationship has contributed positively to EU's visibility in the country.” (Civil society organisation respondent)*

*“EU's understanding of Somali context plus the competent EU representatives in their respective territories.” (Civil society organisation respondent)*

*“As most of the programs are implemented by other partners such as the UN or NGOs, most of the visibility comes from them. With the programs implemented by the UN is even OUTRAGEOUS. It is as if it is the UN that does the whole thing and the EU is incapable of showing its flag.” (Development partner organisation respondent)*

*“UN, or international institutions like AdB, etc. rarely mention the donor. EU is absent from the field; the only EU office is in Mogadishu inside the airport. EU rarely visits the project for security reasons, so there is not EU presence in Somalia de facto. EU is not able to enforce visibility.” (Development partner organisation respondent)*

### 8.3.5 Complementarity and cross-cutting issues

**16. To what extent has EU support contributed to building linkages between development cooperation, support to security and peacebuilding, humanitarian aid and other ‘non-development’ areas of cooperation? Please explain your assessment.**

<i>Not at all</i>	<i>Limited extent</i>	<i>Some extent</i>	<i>Great extent</i>	<i>Don't know</i>	<i>Total</i>
0	3	19	10	3	<b>35</b>

The majority of the respondents (19 out of 35) believe that the EU supports contributed to “some extent” to building linkages between the areas mentioned in the question. Respondents stress that the EU has positively coordinated with other actors, engaging with both Somali and international partners through its integrated approach and by facilitating coordination forums and other important platforms. EU coordination and collaboration with security, humanitarian and development actors is considered as strengthened. Others highlight that the EU has mainly been active in security and peacebuilding, and coordination between humanitarian and development actors, including between the EU and ECHO, has sometimes been challenging.

#### *Box 13 – Telling quotes from respondents – question 16*


*“The EU, together with Somali authorities and international key partners has engaged in Somalia through an integrated approach based on active diplomacy, support for political change, improving security, development assistance and humanitarian aid. The EU has strengthened collaboration, coherence and complementarity across the respective mandates of humanitarian, development and peace actors.” (Civil society organisation respondent)*

*“With EU fund facilitation of coordination forum and other important platforms.” (Implementing partner of an EU project respondent)*

*“EU and ECHO funding is difficult to link or layer due to entirely different geographical focuses, scope, timelines etc. There is also limited engagement between humanitarian and development donors to drive forward the nexus agenda.” (Implementing partner of an EU project respondent)*

*“Support in different sectors is often only poorly coordinated with other sectors in Somalia. The EU didn't do much to improve this situation...” (Development partner organisation respondent)*

**17. Based on your experience, to what extent have gender, human rights, vulnerability and environmental issues been addressed and mainstreamed through EU support in Somalia? Please explain your assessment.**



The majority of the respondents agree that the EU has addressed and mainstreamed to a “great extent” the topics mentioned in the question, as all the “thematic areas [are] cross cutting topics across EU funded programmes” (Implementing partner of an EU project respondent). It is interesting to notice that 25 people out of 35 believe that human rights have been addressed and mainstreamed through EU support to a “great extent”, but answers in Q4 and Q5 highlight that human rights have not been sufficiently addressed in the Somali government’s priorities, showing that there is a discrepancy between what the EU addresses and supports and what is implemented by the Somali government. 23 people out of 35 believe that “gender and intersectionality” have been addressed and mainstreamed to a “great extent” in the EU support to Somalia, which is in line with answers to Q4, where the EU support to the security sector reform has taken into account women’s rights.

However, according to other respondents, while human rights, including democracy and rule of law, have been hugely mainstreamed in Somali’s programming, environmental issues for example have been less addressed.

*Box 14 – Telling quotes from respondents – question 17*

*“Respect for human rights, democracy, equality and rule of law are among the European Union’s foundational values, which have been mainstreamed in programming in Somalia. However, environmental issues remain an area which remains underexplored, especially the climate change-migration- food insecurity nexus.” (Civil society organisation respondent)*

*“All EU projects give consideration to all above mentioned.” (Implementing partner of an EU project respondent)*

*“EU (and member states) is one of the donors interested in human rights, gender etc. However, the low effectiveness of some interventions undermine the impact put substantial investments into question.” (Development partner organisation respondent)*

*“In the EU programs known, all these issues have played a great role. Maybe they were even emphasised too much for the likings of many Somali actors, who at times perceived this emphasis as imposition...” (Development partner organisation respondent)*

### 8.3.6 Effects of EU support

**18. In your area of work, to what extent and how has EU support contributed to improvements in addressing Somalia’s main challenges?**

All the respondents answered this question (35).

Category	Total
Civil society organisation	8
Development partner organisation	8
Federal Government of Somalia (FGS)	2
Implementing partner of an EU project	16
Other, please specify in the box below	1
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>35</b>

According to the respondents, the EU support has addressed different challenges in Somalia, contributing to the country's improvement. The EU has been crucial in tackling socio economic, humanitarian and security challenges, it ensured a degree of stability and actively responded to the changing priority needs of government institutions and local communities. This is reflected in Q7, where the EU has been considered capable of quickly adjusting to the new needs of the Somali population. It also stands in line with Q9, where respondents highlight the efficiency and flexibility of the EU actions and responses. The EU has helped build state capacity, in particular the capacities of FGS and ministries through support on policy formulation and legislation development. Moreover, the EU has also contributed to the improvement of political participation for women, youth, and other marginalised groups, playing an important role in the introduction of gender-related policies. The EU has also contributed to improving living conditions of Somali communities, the capacities of local actors and civil society, and empowered local journalists. However, some respondents noticed that "despite important progress through years of international assistance around counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, humanitarian efforts, and state-building, peace and stability remain elusive in Somalia" (Civil society organisation respondent). Funds are considered not enough, especially in some areas like WASH, or too much spread among different sectors and actors. In some areas capability and equipment are also judged not sufficient, for example in maritime security.

#### Box 15 – Telling quotes from respondents – question 18

*"Mitigated dialogues between government and civil society organizations. Supported civil society organizations coordination and provided funds for vulnerable groups" (Civil society organisation respondent)*

*"In the Civic participation sector, the EU has greatly contributed to the improvement of wider political participation for women, youth, and other marginalized groups. The EU's funding has also played a vital role in the introduction of gender-related policies." (Civil society organisation respondent)*

*"The legal development of the country was supported through programs with the Somali Federal Parliament, which helped to improve the overall coherence and quality of legislation in Somalia." (Development partner organisation respondent)*

*"The EU has been a reliable partner in Somalia, and its support continues to be beneficial to the country to tackle (in tackling) socioeconomic/security challenges." (Implementing partner of an EU project respondent)*

*"Through funding to the different sectors especially its contribution to the security sector, rule of law, education, and all other sectors. EU has also helped to build the capacities of FGS and FMS ministries through injecting human resource and support on policy formulation." (Implementing partner of an EU project respondent)*

#### 19. What have been the most important achievements and/or shortcomings of EU support in your area of work in the country between 2014 and 2021?

One respondent did not answer this question.

Category	Total
Civil society organisation	8
Development partner organisation	8
Federal Government of Somalia (FGS)	2
Implementing partner of an EU project	16
Other, please specify in the box below	1
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>34</b>

Respondents from the civil society underline that main shortcomings include "failure to hold the FGS accountable to its international commitments on prevention of gross human rights violations" (Civil society organisation respondent) and limited fundings, as already highlighted in previous answers. Among other



shortcomings, respondents underline “the bureaucratic nature of fund management which result in unnecessarily long delays in program implementation” (Implementing partner of an EU project respondent), the short nature of some projects that do not have an actual impact, lack of synergies and the long-term unsustainability of some projects. In specific areas of work, respondents highlight shortcomings in climate change-resilient infrastructure building, food production mechanisms that can face climate change, lack of interest in water projects and their implementation.

*Box 16 – Telling quotes from respondents – question 19*

*“Shortcomings: 1) Lack of interest in water studies which are the foundation of any water project and agriculture project in a country like Somalia. 2) lack of enforcement of EU policy in water sector, basically not all the projects impacted positively on the poor people or contributed to reduce the water costs.” (Development partner organisation respondent)*

*“EU funded projects face limited funds and often lack exit strategies in enhancing sustainability of projects. Short term projects often end without having bigger impacts, thus there is a need to invest in long term programs that significantly contribute to (invest in) institutional building and capacity development.” (Development partner organisation respondent)*

*“International politics interfere with the decision of what needs to be done to empower people.” (Implementing partner of an EU project respondent)*

*“The EU has invested critically in data and analysis to inform the work of development actors. In this manner, the EU recognises the importance of key baseline information in informing decision making and in guiding project design. The EU has also taken a leading role in revisiting the traditional approach to durable solutions, hence adopting more nuanced approaches such as the tertiary city initiative. Additional investment is required in productive sectors, including productive infrastructure and climate smart production to render livelihoods more resilient to the impact of climate change.” (Implementing partner of an EU project respondent)*

**20. Briefly describe any experiences or examples where EU support has contributed to the sustainability of the results achieved in Somalia between 2014 and 2021?**

3 respondents out of 35 did not answer.

<b>Category</b>	<b>Total</b>
Civil society organisation	8
Development partner organisation	6
Federal Government of Somalia (FGS)	2
Implementing partner of an EU project	12
Other, please specify in the box below	10
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>32</b>

Respondents highlight the support of the EU to the development of a sustainable economy through new policies and reforms, to state building and institutional capacity, the sustainability of education systems, and to the sustainability of the results achieved by CSOs. An example is the support program for the Somali Federal Parliament, which consisted in training Somali lawyers on comparative public law and international standards of legislative drafting, equipping them with instruments that ensure the sustainability of the results.

Nevertheless, some respondents highlight that “ensuring sustainability is one of the key challenges” (Implementing partner of an EU project respondent). This is mainly due to the fact that if the EU was to withdraw its support, actors on the ground would not be able to solve core problems still existing. Moreover, the short nature of some EU programmes do not have actual impact and therefore do not ensure their results’ sustainability, as mentioned in Q19.

*Box 17 – Telling quotes from respondents – question 20*

*“The sustainability of the results achieved in Somalia between 2014 and 2021 include providing comprehensive support to the country in different areas such as stabilization, state building and peacebuilding, security, basic services and job creation.” (Civil society organisation respondent)*

*“Service delivery improvements through building capacity of the local government, including JPLG and ILED programmes. They have made significant impact on sustainability and increased resilience.” (Implementing partner of an EU project respondent)*

*“One of the main challenges for Somali community developments is lack of sustainability! Their work finishes with the projects but EU has contributed to CSOs existence and the sustainability of their work and the results*

achieved.” (Civil society organisation respondent)

“Nothing in Somalia is sustainable so far. If the international community was to drop out, all that was achieved would fall down. This doesn’t mean that there aren’t things that are working without our presence, but until the core Somali problems are properly addressed (starting from the political level), nothing can be sustainable.” (Development partner organisation respondent)

**21. Please use this box to record anything you would like to comment on to justify answers above or to add nuance or guide the evaluation team:**

7 respondents out of 35 answered this question.

Category	Total
Civil society organisation	0
Development partner organisation	4
EU (please specify if HQ or at the EUD)	1
Federal Government of Somalia (FGS)	2
Implementing partner of an EU project	5
Other, please specify in the box below	0
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>7</b>

One respondent highlights that the EU’s bureaucracy, long procedures, and lack of flexibility hinder the potential the EU has and its impacts. The EU is judged as “rule oriented rather than results oriented” (Development partner organisation respondent). Other respondents suggest working directly with the local institutions or actors, rather than subcontracting to INGOs or intermediate partners, so as to ensure that all the money the EU allocates to Somalia actually reaches the locals. Finally, it is also suggested to include more local society, in particular the youth and women, in the projects, especially the programming phase. These points are in line with Q6, in which 6 respondents out of 35 say that consultations with civil society stakeholders have been used to a “limited extent”.

*Box 18 – Telling quotes from respondents – question 21*

“EU has a great potential which cannot be expressed due its procedures, bureaucracy, lack of flexibility and also due to the fact that most of EU staff work like civil servants not like managers: so EU is rule oriented rather than results oriented. This adds to the partnerships with implementing partners, which are not able to move in Somalia and are obliged to subcontract the project to other stakeholders. Altogether, it reduces EU programme efficiency and effectiveness.” (Development partner organisation respondent)

“Many funds are donated for Somalia from which, about 40% reaches the end beneficiaries due to INGO operation costs. I would suggest for the EU to channel funds through the local institutions to ensure value for money, and cost-effectiveness. In addition, research are done mostly by international institutions, the conclusions of might not necessarily be close to reality.” (“Other” respondent)

## 9 eSurvey questionnaire

# Evaluation of the European Union support to Somalia (2014-2021)

Fields marked with \* are mandatory.

## 1. Introduction

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For Somali language, please select the drop-down menu 'Languages' at the top right corner of the survey.

This survey is part of the **External Evaluation of the European Union (EU) support to the Federal Republic of Somalia** for the period 2014-2021. The evaluation has been commissioned by the EU (DG INTPA) and is implemented by Particip GmbH and ECDPM. The main objective of the evaluation is to produce an independent assessment of the EU's past and current cooperation and recommendations to inform the responsible decision makers on how to improve the current and future European Union's cooperation with Somalia.

Survey responses will remain **anonymous**. Answering the survey should take around **15 to 20 minutes**. We welcome any written comments in addition to answering the multiple selection questions. Please note that this questionnaire is sent to a wide audience, including Government representatives, cooperating and implementing partners, beneficiaries, among others. The questionnaire might therefore contain questions which you are not able to respond to. In that case, feel free to select the 'Don't know' option or leave it empty.

You can pause the survey at any time by clicking the '**Save as Draft**' button at the right of each page. A link will be sent to your email address allowing you to continue the questionnaire at a later stage.

If you have any questions or comments regarding this evaluation in general, or this online survey, your **contact persons** are:

*Evaluation Team:*

Karen Ortiz Palomá, Survey Manager, E-mail: karen.ortiz-paloma@particip.de

*European Commission:*

David Domes, Evaluation Manager (DG INTPA), E-mail: David.DOMES@ec.europa.eu

If you know a person who is interested in taking the survey, but who did not receive an invitation, please feel free to approach the contact persons from the Evaluation Team indicated above.

We would appreciate to receive your replies by **Friday, 4 November 2022**.

The Evaluation Team

*Note 1: Fields marked with a red asterisk (\*) are mandatory.*

*Note 2: The main focus of the Online Survey is on EU external actions in Somalia under the responsibility of the European Commission DG INTPA. Unless specified otherwise, the term 'EU support' thus refers to these actions and does not cover the specific actions funded directly by EU Member States and other European institutions.*

## 2. Identification

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**\*1. What agency or organisation do you work for?**

*Please select one option*

- EU (please specify if HQ or at the EUD)
- Implementing partner of an EU project
- Development partner organisation
- Federal Government of Somalia (FGS)
- Federal Member State of Somalia (FMS)
- Local authorities
- Civil society organisation
- Other, please specify in the box below

**\*1.1 (Other) Please specify other organisation:**

**\*2. In what field are you working?**

*Please select one option*

- Security/ peacebuilding
- Justice and Rule of Law
- Support to state-building/ macro-economic development
- Local development/ local economic development
- Education sector Resilience/ rural development/ food security / climate change
- Gender equality/ women and youth participation, civic engagement
- Generalist/ managerial position (not related to any particular sector)
- Other, please specify in the box below

**\*2.1 (Other) Please specify other organisation:**

**\*3. Working experience / seniority:**

*Please select one option*

- Less than 10 years
- 10 to 15 years
- 15 years and more

## 3. Relevance

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4. Based on your experience, to what extent has EU support to Somalia **addressed the country's priorities and the needs of the Somali population** between 2014 and 2021?

	Not at all	Limited extent	Some extent	Great extent	Don't know
* Rating	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Please highlight the most important priorities/needs addressed and any particular feature(s) on how they were addressed. Also mention what was not (sufficiently) addressed:

5. Based on your experience, to what extent has EU's sector focus and strategic objectives been **aligned with government priorities** between 2014 and 2021?

	Not at all	Limited extent	Some extent	Great extent	Don't know
* Alignment with <b>Federal Government</b> priorities	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
* Alignment with <b>Federal Member State</b> priorities	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Please highlight the most important priorities/needs addressed and any particular feature(s) on how they were addressed. Also mention what was not (sufficiently) addressed:

6. Based on your experience, to what extent have the following **tools and approaches** been used to increase alignment and relevance of EU support in Somalia?

	Not at all	Limited extent	Some extent	Great extent	Don't know
* Consultation with government (Federal Government of Somalia / Federal Member State of Somalia) stakeholders	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
* Consultations with civil society stakeholders	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
* Fact-finding missions	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
* Political dialogue	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
* External studies and/or evaluations	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
* Other tools and/or approaches, please specify in the box below	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

\* 6.1 (Other) Please specify which other tools and/or approaches have been used:

--

7. Based on your experience, to what extent has the EU been able to adjust its support to Somalia to **respond to changes in the political, security and socio-economic** (including COVID-19) situation/context in the country between 2014 and 2021?

	Not at all	Limited extent	Some extent	Great extent	Don't know
• Rating	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Please explain your assessment:

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#### 4. Approach to implementation, efficiency and added value

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8. The EU supports Somalia also through regional initiatives and programmes in the wider Horn of Africa region. Based on your experience, to what extent has this regional support been **complementary** with country-level support?

	Not at all	Limited extent	Some extent	Great extent	Don't know
• Rating	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Please explain your assessment. How were these initiatives complementary, were there also inconsistencies/incoherence between national and regional actions?

--

9. Based on your experience, to what extent has the EU been able to deliver its support efficiently (cost effectiveness, timeliness) and flexibly (adapting to changes in context)?

	Not well enough	To a limited extent	To some extent	Very well	Don't know
• The EU been able to deliver its support <b>efficiently</b>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
• The EU been able to deliver its support <b>flexibly</b>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Please explain your assessment:

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10. What has been the **added value** of the EU support to Somalia compared to EU MS (in addition to its ability to provide large amounts of funding)?

	Not at all	Limited extent	Some extent	Great extent	Don't know
• EU was a reliable/ predictable development partner	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
• The EU can provide long-term support	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
• The EU has a solid understanding and knowledge of the Somali context	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
• The EU was able to understand the priorities of Federal Government of Somalia and Federal Member States of Somalia and act upon them	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
• The EU was able to understand the priorities of (I) NGOs and act upon them	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
• Other, please specify in the box below	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

• 10.1 (Other) Please specify other type of added value:

Please explain your assessment:

11. Would you have any **other perceptions** about the EU and its staff which you would like to share?

## 5. Coordination and EU visibility

12. Based on your experience, to what extent have the EU activities specified below helped to **better coordinate coordination with other development partners, including Federal Government of Somalia and Federal Member States of Somalia?**

	Not at all	Limited extent	Some extent	Great extent	Don't know
• EU's participation in host government and/or donor coordination forums	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
• EU's exchanges with Federal Government of Somalia and Federal Member States of Somalia officials	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
• EU's formal and informal exchanges with (I)NGOs"	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

• Joint analysis with EU member states and other donors	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
• Joint programming with EU member states and other donors	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
• EU's participation in project/ programme steering or board committees	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
• EU's contribution to, and engagement with multi-partner funds	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
• Other, please specify in the box below	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

- 12.1 (Other) Please add any other activity:

Please explain your assessment:

13. Based on your experience, to what extent has the EU's participation in host government and/or donor coordination forums contributed to **improved policy dialogue** between the EU and Somali government at Federal Government of Somalia and/or Federal Member States of Somalia levels?

	Not at all	Limited extent	Some extent	Great extent	Don't know
• Rating	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Please explain your assessment:

14. Based on your experience, to what extent has the EU participation in technical working groups/ coordination forums contributed to **improved implementation**?

	Not at all	Limited extent	Some extent	Great extent	Don't know
• Rating	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Please explain your assessment:

15. How would you rate the degree and quality of **EU visibility** as a development partner in?

Please answer each line

	No visibility	Low visibility	Some visibility	Very high visibility	Don't know



• ... individual programmes /projects	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
• ... in your overall sector of work	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
• ... in the country as a whole	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
• ... in the Horn of Africa region	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Please specify factors that have contributed positively to, or limited EU's visibility, and what could have been done better in your view:

## 6. Complementarity and cross-cutting issues

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16. To what extent has EU support contributed to **building linkages** between development cooperation, support to security and peacebuilding, humanitarian aid and other 'non-development' areas of cooperation?

	Not at all	Limited extent	Some extent	Great extent	Don't know
• Rating	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Please explain your assessment:

17. Based on your experience, to what extent have **gender, human rights, vulnerability and environmental issues** been addressed and mainstreamed through EU support in Somalia?

	Not at all	Limited extent	Some extent	Great extent	Don't know
• Human rights	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
• Gender and intersectionality	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
• Vulnerability	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
• Environmental issues	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Please explain your assessment:

## 7. Effects of EU support

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- \* 18. In your area of work, to what extent and how has EU support contributed to improvements in addressing **Somalia's main challenges**?

- \* 19. What have been the most important **achievements** and/or **shortcomings** of EU support in your area of work in the country between 2014 and 2021?

- \* 20. Briefly describe any experiences or examples where EU support has contributed to the **sustainability of the results** achieved in Somalia between 2014 and 2021?

21. Please use this box to record anything you would like to comment on to justify answers above or to add nuance or guide the evaluation team:

*Thank you for your contribution!*

## 10 A review of the political, economic, social and security situation of Somalia

### 10.1 Overview

This review is presented as background information to inform the Desk Report's analysis of the evaluation of the EU's support to Somalia for the period 2014 to 2021. It is drafted against the background of Somalia's worst drought in many decades which confronts millions of Somalis with a catastrophic situation. At the same time, the new federal government is taking control after a protracted and highly destabilising selection and election process. Meanwhile, Al-Shabaab continue to control large areas of the country and recently conducted a large-scale incursion into Ethiopia.

At independence in 1960, Somalia was "widely regarded as the **African electoral democracy most likely to succeed**".<sup>14</sup> But by 1991 the country was facing widespread conflict. Legacies of colonisation, dictatorship and conflict since 1991 have exacerbated political and clan divisions, weakened governance systems and hampered the consolidation of the central Somali state. By contrast, Somaliland and Puntland declared, respectively, independence in 1991, and autonomy within a Federal Somalia in 1998, have maintained relative stability and self-governance since.<sup>15</sup> Somaliland in particular has its own administration, elections, armed forces and currency, but is not internationally recognised.<sup>16</sup>

Table 3 Country context - Key Data

	2000	2010	2020
Land area (sq. km)	627,34	627,34	627,34
Population, total (millions)	8.87	12.04	15.89
Rural population (% of total population, rounded)	67	61	54
Life expectancy at birth, total (years, rounded)	51	54	58
Fertility rate, total (births per woman)	7.63	6.86	5.88
Number of infant deaths	44,039	49,986	46,853
GNI per capita, PPP (current international \$)	..	..	1,240
GDP per capita, PPP (current international \$)	..	..	1,246
GDP per capita growth (annual %)	..	..	-0,46
Labour force, total (millions)	1.60	2.15	2.88
Labour force participation rate for ages 15-24, total (%) (modelled ILO estimate, rounded)	16 M: 20; F: 12	18 M: 18; F: 13	16 M: 16; F: 12
Unemployment, total (% of total labour force)	19,05 M: 17; F: 23	18,96 M: 17; F: 24	19,72 M: 17; F: 25
Employment in agriculture (% of total employment) (modelled ILO estimate, rounded)	83	83	.. (2019: 80)
Personal remittances, received (% of GDP, rounded)	..	..	25
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP, rounded)	..	..	7
Starting a business: Cost (% of income per capita, rounded)	..	..	198
Control of Corruption: Estimate (ranging from -2.5 to 2.5)	-1,57	-1,74	-1,67
Government Effectiveness: Estimate (ranging from -2.5 to 2.5)	-2,19	-2,21	-2,05

<sup>14</sup> Michael Walls (2016): Sool Region: sovereign ambiguity vs a geopolitical system of nation-states? Africa Research Institute.

<sup>15</sup> Development Initiatives (2022): Supporting longer term development in crises at the nexus: Lessons from Somalia: Chapter 2 Crisis context.

<sup>16</sup> Int. Crisis Group (2021): Building on Somaliland's Successful Elections (Briefing nr 174).

	2000	2010	2020
Rule of Law: Estimate	-2,27	-2,41	-2,30
Voice and Accountability: Estimate	-1,71	-2,01	-1,80
People using at least basic sanitation services (% of population, rounded)	20	29	39
Access to electricity (% of population, rounded)	2	52	50
Cause of death, by communicable diseases and maternal, prenatal and nutrition conditions (% of total, rounded)	71	66	.. (2019: 61)

Source: World Bank, *World Development Indicators*; *Health, Nutrition and Population Statistics*; *Doing Business*; *Worldwide Governance Indicators*, accessed 4 May 2022.

## 10.2 Security

Several forms of insecurity continue to affect Somalis, including intercommunal violence over natural resources and terrorist violence by Islamist armed groups most notably **Al-Shabaab**, but also Abnaa ul-Calipha (Islamic State in Somalia).<sup>17</sup> Although substantially weakened by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)<sup>18</sup> – now rebranded as the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS)<sup>19</sup> – Al-Shabaab still controls large parts of South and Central Somalia. The group owes its resilience to its ability to collect intelligence and resources through extortion and taxes, exploit clan politics, provide alternative governance and justice systems.<sup>20</sup> Despite decades of international support,<sup>21</sup> the **Somali National Army (SNA)** remains heavily reliant on AMISOM / ATMIS and divided by clan and political loyalties.<sup>22</sup> In 2017, an estimated 17,000 out of 45,000 armed forces in Somalia served in the SNA in parallel with local, regional and sometimes externally-backed military forces.<sup>23</sup> **Piracy** has also threatened the security of coastal communities and international shipping routes, although since 2008, international counter-piracy operations (EU Operation ATALANTA, Combined Maritime Forces) have largely attenuated the threat.<sup>24</sup>

## 10.3 Politics

**Clan power sharing** underpins Somalia's fragile political settlement, and that of Somaliland. Power-sharing arrangements guarantee representation to clans at Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and Federal Member State (FMS) levels (the '4.5 formula'). And the FMSs act as something akin to clan power blocks at the national level. **Tensions between the FGS and FMS** often result in non-cooperation between levels of government.<sup>25</sup> These tensions, which have been present throughout all administrations since the adoption of the current constitution in 2012, peaked under President Farmajo and contributed to the **electoral crisis**<sup>26</sup>. This resulted in an extension of his term in office for over one year, the mobilisation of rival clan militia in Mogadishu and serious concerns about a return to civil war. The situation was also exploited by Al-Shabaab which conducted deadly attacks. On 23 March 2022, at least 48 people were killed in Hirshabelle<sup>27</sup> and more recently in Mogadishu at least 30 people were killed in a complex attack and siege on the Hayat Hotel which

<sup>17</sup> Development Initiatives (2022): Supporting longer term development in crises at the nexus: Lessons from Somalia: Chapter 2 Crisis context.

<sup>18</sup> AMISOM is a multinational peacekeeping force formed in 2007 to combat Al-Shabaab in Somalia. It includes troops from Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya and Ethiopia (and formerly Sierra Leone) and is financially backed by the US, EU and UK, notably. See AU, AMISOM Military Component, AMISOM website, accessed 6 May 2022.

<sup>19</sup> ICG (2021): Crisis Watch Digest Somalia, Special Coverage / Africa; Timothy Walker and Denys Reva (2022): Is Somali piracy finally under control? ISS Today.

<sup>20</sup> ICG (2019): Women and Al-Shabaab's Insurgency, Africa Briefing 145.

<sup>21</sup> According to 2017 estimations, international partners have spent around \$1.5 billion per year on peacekeeping, counter-insurgency and other support to the security sector in Somalia. See Development Initiatives (2022): Supporting longer term development in crises at the nexus: Lessons from Somalia: Chapter 2 Crisis context.

<sup>22</sup> ICG (2019): Women and Al-Shabaab's Insurgency, Africa Briefing 145; Colin Robinson (2021): Rising Politicization Risks Splitting Somali National Army, IPI Global Observatory.

<sup>23</sup> For instance, the Turkish-sponsored "Gorgor" commandos. See Colin Robinson (2021): Rising Politicization Risks Splitting Somali National Army, IPI Global Observatory; NYU Center on International cooperation (CIC) (2018): The Politics of Security in Somalia.

<sup>24</sup> The Combined Maritime Forces is a multinational naval coalition of 34 countries including Japan, the Republic of Korea, Pakistan, the US, the UK, Turkey etc. See UNSC (2021): The situation with respect to piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, Report of the Secretary-General.

<sup>25</sup> Development Initiatives (2022): Supporting longer term development in crises at the nexus: Lessons from Somalia: Chapter 2 Crisis context; Afyare Abdi Elmi (2021): The way out of Somalia's political impasse.


<sup>26</sup> Both presidential and legislative elections have been repeatedly delayed since 2020. See ICG (2021): Crisis Watch Digest Somalia, Special Coverage / Africa; Ilya Gridneff (2017): Al-Shabaab Strategy Shifts Toward Clans as Presidential Election Looms, IPI Global Observatory.

<sup>27</sup> ICG (2022): Crisis Watch Digest Somalia.

ended on the 21 August<sup>28</sup>. Still, political stability is somewhat improving in Somalia when viewed over the long term, with gradually stronger - but still very limited - public institutions and FGS/FMS territorial control (see map below).<sup>29</sup> Somalia also has among the highest adherence to **Islam** in the world, impacting society and politics in various ways.<sup>30</sup>

### Al-Shabab Maintains Its Hold in Somalia

Territorial control as of February 2021



Source: Political Geography Now, used in : Claire Felter, Jonathan Masters, and Mohammed Aly Sergie, *Al-Shabab Maintains Its Hold in Somalia Territorial control as of February 2021*, Council of Foreign Relations, 19 May 2021.

## 10.4 Economy

Somalia's economy, although among the bottom five in the world based on GDP per capita,<sup>31</sup> has experienced a **growth momentum** in recent years.<sup>32</sup> It is dominated by livestock and agriculture (three-fifths of the economy).<sup>33</sup> Women are active in these sectors and often the main household breadwinners.<sup>34</sup> However, youth unemployment reaches 67%,<sup>35</sup> clientelism between transnational corporations and politicians fuels corruption and stifles competition,<sup>36</sup> and the economy depends on international money transfers, particularly remittances (one-third of GDP in 2018, similarly to official development assistance/ODA).<sup>37</sup> To reduce its high debt (55%

<sup>28</sup> Omar Nor (2022): Mogadishu hotel attack: Somali forces end siege, CNN.

<sup>29</sup> See Claire Felter, Jonathan Masters, and Mohammed Aly Sergie (2021): *Al-Shabab Maintains Its Hold in Somalia Territorial control as of February 2021*, Council of Foreign Relations.

<sup>30</sup> Michael Walls, Marie-Luise Schueller and Amina-Bahja Ekman (2017): *Political Settlement in Somaliland: A gendered perspective*, UCL, The Bartlett Development Planning Unit and Progressio.

<sup>31</sup> Development Initiatives (2022): *Supporting longer term development in crises at the nexus: Lessons from Somalia: Chapter 2 Crisis context*.

<sup>32</sup> Jos Meester (2019): *Transnational Capital in Somalia*, Clingendael.

<sup>33</sup> Development Initiatives (2022): *Supporting longer term development in crises at the nexus: Lessons from Somalia: Chapter 2 Crisis context*.

<sup>34</sup> ICG (2019): *Women and Al-Shabaab's Insurgency*, Africa Briefing 145.

<sup>35</sup> IMF (2017): *Six Things to Know About Somalia's Economy*, IMF country focus.

<sup>36</sup> Jos Meester (2019): *Transnational Capital in Somalia*, Clingendael.

<sup>37</sup> Development Initiatives (2022): *Supporting longer term development in crises at the nexus: Lessons from Somalia: Chapter 2 Crisis context*.

of GDP in March 2020),<sup>38</sup> the country is working to normalise relations with the IMF through the debt-relief HIPC initiative.<sup>39</sup>

Somalia receives funding from international financial institutions, due to its **high debt levels** (55% of GDP in March 2020)<sup>40</sup> fuelled by a **structural trade deficit**,<sup>41</sup> because the country depends heavily on imports of food, fuel, construction materials and manufactured goods<sup>42</sup> - 90% of GDP in 2020, with exports at 14% and imports at 105%.<sup>43</sup> Other challenges include high informality, a poor investment climate (reinforced by political instability) and financial inclusion, high electricity costs and external factors.<sup>44</sup>

### 10.5 Natural disasters, climate change and food insecurity

Somalia is prone to **recurring droughts and floods** - a leading cause of displacement -, and extreme weather events have become more unpredictable and frequent due to **climate change**.<sup>45</sup> In 2020, flash floods displaced around half a million Somalis, following a destructive locust invasion in 2019.<sup>46</sup>

Due to the dominance of agriculture and pastoralism, Somalis' livelihoods and food security are particularly affected by natural disasters and climate change.<sup>47</sup> **The worst drought in 40 years is currently ongoing.**<sup>48</sup> Somalia is experiencing dire levels of food insecurity – **“At least 7 million people have been affected by the severe drought as of July, of whom 918,000 are displaced from their homes.”**<sup>49</sup> The conflict also drives food insecurity, and the Ukraine war has been an additional strain, since Somalia depends on Russia and Ukraine for over 90% of its wheat imports.<sup>50</sup>

### 10.6 Public services, including education

Public services remain weak and uneven in Somalia - with international and community-based actors struggling to compensate - due to the FGS's low budget, low capacity to collect domestic revenues and budget distributions skewed towards public and security sector salaries (only 4.1% of state spending went to the social sector in 2018).<sup>51</sup> **Education** is also under-funded, understaffed and of poor quality. Thus, school enrolment is exceptionally low with over half of children out of school in 2018,<sup>52</sup> while children who attend stay in school for about two years (2020 estimates).<sup>53</sup> Further, children from South Central Somalia,<sup>54</sup> nomadic pastoralist communities, unsafe areas, rural areas, with disabilities, and girls are less likely to attend and stay in school.

<sup>38</sup> African Development Bank (AfDB): Somalia Economic Outlook, accessed 6 May 2022.

<sup>39</sup> This could relieve Somalia's debt from US\$5.2 billion (end of 2018) to US\$557 million, provided the August 2022 deadline to conclude the IMF review is met. See Development Initiatives (2022): Supporting longer term development in crises at the nexus: Lessons from Somalia: Chapter 2 Crisis context.

<sup>40</sup> African Development Bank (AfDB), Somalia Economic Outlook, accessed 6 May 2022.

<sup>41</sup> IMF (2021): Somalia Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative - Request for Additional Interim Assistance, IMF Country Report No. 21/69.

<sup>42</sup> Mohamed Nur Sharif and Ali Yassin Sheikh Ali (2016): Determinants of Trade Balance in Somalia: Regression Analysis, Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development Vol.7, No.12.

<sup>43</sup> IMF (2021): Somalia Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative - Request For Additional Interim Assistance, IMF Country Report No. 21/69.

<sup>44</sup> External factors include the COVID-19 pandemic, bans on livestock exports by Gulf countries, etc. See World Bank (2021): Somalia's Economy Rebounding from 'Triple Shock', Press Release; African Development Bank (AfDB): Somalia Economic Outlook, accessed 6 May 2022.

<sup>45</sup> UNESCO and Federal Government of Somalia (2022): Education Sector Analysis: Education sector analysis: Federal Government of Somalia: assessing opportunities for rebuilding the country through education.

<sup>46</sup> Development Initiatives (2022): Supporting longer term development in crises at the nexus: Lessons from Somalia: Chapter 2 Crisis context.

<sup>47</sup> Development Initiatives (2022): Supporting longer term development in crises at the nexus: Lessons from Somalia: Chapter 2 Crisis context.

<sup>48</sup> Amenda Sperber (2021): Back from the brink? Somalia's political crisis explained. The New Humanitarian.

<sup>49</sup> OCHA (2022): Somalia: Drought response and famine prevention - Situation Report No. 9.

<sup>50</sup> Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) (2021): Somalia: Food Security and Malnutrition Snapshot AFI July - December 2021, AMN August 2021 - July 2022; FAO (2022): The importance of Ukraine and the Russian Federation for global agricultural markets and the risks associated with the current conflict, Information note, Executive Summary (update).

<sup>51</sup> Development Initiatives (2022): Supporting longer term development in crises at the nexus: Lessons from Somalia: Chapter 2 Crisis context.

<sup>52</sup> UNICEF: Education Somalia, accessed 27 April 2022; UNESCO and Federal Government of Somalia (2022): Education Sector Analysis: Education sector analysis: Federal Government of Somalia: assessing opportunities for rebuilding the country through education.

<sup>53</sup> UNESCO and Federal Government of Somalia (2022): Education Sector Analysis: Education sector analysis: Federal Government of Somalia: assessing opportunities for rebuilding the country through education.

<sup>54</sup> Global Partnership for Education: Where we work - Somalia, accessed 27 April 2022.

The EU has been a major education donor in Somalia and Somaliland but unmonitored education still dominates, leaving space for Al-Shabaab ideological influence and recruitment.<sup>55</sup>

Somalia has experienced 27,020 confirmed cases of COVID-19 since the start of the pandemic and 1,361 deaths<sup>56</sup>. These relatively low numbers may also reflect the very limited reach of formal health services and the associated challenges of recording.

### 10.7 Geopolitics and aid

Somalia's location and coastline make it a site of geopolitical importance for international and regional powers.<sup>57</sup> For the past decade, **Gulf countries and Turkey** have increased their presence in Somalia through diplomatic and political engagement (influencing elections), military and commercial bases,<sup>58</sup> support to security forces, direct budgetary support, infrastructure development, and humanitarian and development assistance.<sup>59</sup> The full extent of their contribution to Somalia is not known but reported by the FGS to be around USD 30 million for Turkey and Saudi Arabia in 2018.<sup>60</sup> **Somalia's neighbours** also follow economic and security interests in Somalia, like Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya, which contribute most troops to AMISOM to contain Al-Shabaab.<sup>61</sup> However, the use of Somalia to play proxy for regional rivalries has exacerbated internal divisions between the FGS and FMS.<sup>62</sup>

**Western powers**, in particular the US (USD 427 million), UK (USD 243 million) and EU institutions (USD 216 million) remained the top donors of ODA to Somalia in 2018-2019. Most aid came from EU institutions and EU countries together (individually, the US is the first donor).<sup>63</sup> The main goals of Western support have been to support stabilisation and statebuilding, weaken Al-Shabaab,<sup>64</sup> and in recent years, shift to long term development, resilience and support for the political transition.<sup>65</sup> The **EU** has a long-standing partnership with Somalia shaped by several strategic landmarks since 2014.<sup>66</sup> These have guided investments in statebuilding and peacebuilding (EUR 119 million), food security and resilience (€72 million) and education (EUR 60 million).<sup>67</sup> Since 2017, the additional EUR 200 million via the EU Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) has been used in continuity, although in a more integrated way. It also provided budgetary support to the FGS, but this was suspended in December 2020 due to repeated delays in the electoral process.<sup>68</sup> Support for Somalia's security was provided, especially through AMISOM/ATMIS funding, ATALANTA, two military CSDP missions (EU NAVFOR and the EU military Training Mission to Somalia) and one civilian CSDP mission on maritime security.

*For a more detailed context analysis using elements of political economy analysis, refer to Annex 10.8.*

<sup>55</sup> Alexandra Lewis and Neil Winn (2018): Understanding the Connections between the EU Global Strategy and Somali Peacebuilding Education Needs and Priorities, Global Policy, 9 (4). pp. 501-512. ISSN 1758-5880.

<sup>56</sup> WHO (2022): Somalia COVID-19 cases.

<sup>57</sup> UNESCO and Federal Government of Somalia (2022): Education Sector Analysis: Education sector analysis: Federal Government of Somalia: assessing opportunities for rebuilding the country through education; Zach Vertin (2019): Red Sea Rivalries: The Gulf, The Horn, & The New Geopolitics Of The Red Sea, Brookings Doha Center.

<sup>58</sup> Notably, Turkey is running a training facility and the port in Mogadishu, and the UAE has funded two ports in Berbera, Somaliland and Bossasso, Puntland. See Zach Vertin (2019): Red Sea Rivalries: The Gulf, The Horn, & The New Geopolitics Of The Red Sea, Brookings Doha Center.

<sup>59</sup> ICG (2018): Somalia and the Gulf Crisis, Report 260 / Africa.

<sup>60</sup> Alfonso Medinilla, Lidet Tadesse Shiferaw and Pauline Veron (2019): Think local. Governance, humanitarian aid, development and peacebuilding in Somalia.

<sup>61</sup> Tobias Hagmann (2016): Stabilization, Extraversion and Political Settlements in Somalia, Rift Valley Institute, Rift Valley Institute, United Kingdom; Alfonso Medinilla, Lidet Tadesse Shiferaw and Pauline Veron (2019): Think local. Governance, humanitarian aid, development and peacebuilding in Somalia.

<sup>62</sup> For instance, Qatar, Turkey and Ethiopia have tended to side with FGS while the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Kenya have politically and financially supported the FMS where they have interests. ICG (2018): Somalia and the Gulf Crisis, Report 260 / Africa; Selam Tadesse Demissie (2021): Kenya-Somalia dispute threatens an embattled Horn of Africa, ISS Today.

<sup>63</sup> OECD, Top Ten Donors of Gross ODA for Somalia 2018-2019, accessed 4 May 2022.

<sup>64</sup> Development Initiatives (2022): Supporting longer term development in crises at the nexus: Lessons from Somalia: Chapter 2 Crisis context.

<sup>65</sup> OECD, Top Ten Donors of Gross ODA for Somalia 2018-2019, accessed 2 May 2022; Development Initiatives (2022): Supporting longer term development in crises at the nexus: Lessons from Somalia: Chapter 2 Crisis context.

<sup>66</sup> These include in particular: the New Deal (2013-2016), the Somali Compact (2013), the National Indicative Programme (NIP) for Somalia (2014-2020), the New Partnership for Somalia (2017) and the EU Development Cooperation Strategy for Somalia (2017-2020).

<sup>67</sup> EU Commission: Somalia, accessed 3 May 2022.

<sup>68</sup> Somaliland Chronicle (2020): European Union to Cut Budgetary Support to Somali Federal Government.

## 10.8 Detailed context

### 10.8.1 Politics and security

#### 10.8.1.1 Key elements of political history

Narratives on Somalia (officially, the Federal Republic of Somalia) often focus on a recent history of “failed” statehood, violent conflict, and poverty, but since antiquity the Somali people have been part of vibrant culture with **networks of wealthy trading cities** and links across Africa and the Indian Ocean (for instance, the Adal Sultanate in 15-16th century).<sup>69</sup> At independence in 1960, Somalia was “widely regarded as the African electoral democracy most likely to succeed” due to its centuries old-tradition of consensus-based, discursive debate, and its experience with various systems of governance before colonisation.<sup>70</sup>

**Colonisation by Italy, the United Kingdom, France, and Ethiopia divided the territory** occupied by Somali people, leaving a lasting and damaging legacy. Somalia’s independence in 1960 established a state within the borders of the former Italian and British colonies, with a concept of statehood inherited from European rather than Somali traditions.<sup>71</sup> Nine years after independence, Siyaad Barre seized power through a coup. During the period 1977 to 1978 Barre launched a war against Ethiopia seeking to incorporate Somali occupied Ogaden territory in Ethiopia into Somalia. The loss of the war led to growing repression and clan polarisation as Barre sought to retain power.<sup>72</sup>

By 1991, a growing insurrection **forced Barre from power**, initiating an extended period of civil conflict and the absence of a formal central state. In the vacuum that followed Barre’s fall armed groups were unable to agree on a collective plan for Somalia. As the leaders of different forces jockeyed for positions in the militia, which were already heavily clan aligned, became even more clan based. Throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s, **conflict for territory, political control, and riches between warlords and their clan-based militias** plunged the country into chaos, economic decline and famine.<sup>73</sup>

From 1992 the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I and II) and the US-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF, or operation “Restore Hope”) attempted to protect the delivery of humanitarian aid and to support wider security. But the missions could not support durable solutions to inter-clan violence. By 1995 efforts to provide peacekeeping in Somalia were abandoned.<sup>74</sup>

The political trajectory of the northern areas diverged from what was known as south-central Somalia. In 1991 clans in the north-west declared an independent Republic of Somaliland.<sup>75</sup> And in 1998, Puntland in the north-east declared itself an autonomous state within a Federal Somalia. Both entities were created to a large degree in response to the trauma of the dominant clans in each area and a resulting desire to create something of their own where they could be safe. Since the late 1990s **Somaliland and Puntland have established relative stability and increasingly effective governance**, the rest of the country faced inter-clan political rivalry, violence, and a lack of effective formal governance.<sup>76</sup>

The rise of the Islamic Courts Union in 2005, the subsequent Ethiopian invasion, the emergence of Al-Shabaab as a major force in Somali politics and conflict, the arrival of African Union peace keepers and, in 2007, the internationally recognised Transitional Federal Government taking up residence in Mogadishu, set the scene for current dynamics.

The selection of **Mohamed Abdullahi ‘Farmajo’** as president in February 2017 was seen as bringing in a “fresh broom” who could change the dynamics of clan and personal interest that perennially paralysed Somali politics. However, by the time he left office in May 2022 his term provided an extreme example of the dynamics that can make Somali politics so challenging. In seeking to neutralise the power of the FMS, the Farmajo administration attempted to impose allied leaders at the head of each FMS. The administration was only partially successful which resulted in the most severe breakdown of federal-state relations since the adoption

<sup>69</sup> Michael Walls (2014): Statebuilding in the Somali Horn: Compromise, Competition and Representation, Africa Research Institute.

<sup>70</sup> Michael Walls (2016): Sool Region: sovereign ambiguity vs a geopolitical system of nation-states? Africa Research Institute.

<sup>71</sup> Michael Walls, Marie-Luise Schueller and Amina-Bahja Ekman (2017): Political Settlement in Somaliland: A gendered perspective, UCL, The Bartlett Development Planning Unit and Progressio.

<sup>72</sup> Michael Walls (2014): Statebuilding in the Somali Horn: Compromise, Competition and Representation, Africa Research Institute.

<sup>73</sup> Abdulqawi Yusuf (2004): Somalia’s Warlords: Feeding on a Failed State, Global Policy Forum. Cited in: Wikipedia, Somalia, accessed on 22 April 2022.

<sup>74</sup> Norrie MacQueen (2006): Peacekeeping and the International System, Routledge. Cited in: Wikipedia, Unified Task Force, accessed on 22 April 2022.

<sup>75</sup> Development Initiatives (2022): Supporting longer term development in crises at the nexus: Lessons from Somalia: Chapter 2 Crisis context

<sup>76</sup> Development Initiatives (2022): Supporting longer term development in crises at the nexus: Lessons from Somalia: Chapter 2 Crisis context



of a federal model. The failure to prepare for a one-person-one-vote election, or for a backup indirect process, initiated an extended period of political crisis and effectively (many Somali citizens say illegally) extended Farmajo's term in office by over one year. The election crisis (running from at least mid-2018 and disputes around proposals for an electoral model right through to the conclusion of the selection process that saw Hassan Sheikh emerge as President) illustrated the vulnerabilities of the current political system, where no constitutional court yet exists to adjudicate, where the norms governing political behaviour are not yet strong enough to compel political leaders to act in certain ways, and where the proper relationship between the federal and state governments is highly contested.

### 10.8.1.2 Insecurity and conflict

Since the mid-2000s, Somalia has been marked by **several forms of insecurity and violence** including: “terrorist attacks by Islamist militant groups, counter-insurgency operations, inter-clan political violence, local inter-communal violence, and organised and individual criminal violence”.<sup>77</sup> The dividing lines between types of violence are not always clear, for example a militia may be engaged in fighting against Al-Shabaab at one time, clashing with a rival clan over access to water another time, and being mobilised by political leaders from their clan to support a political position at another time.

Localised intercommunal violence manifests, for example, in conflicts between pastoralists over resources like water and access to grazing, and in cycles of revenge killings. Clan militias are well armed with access to light weapons and so-called ‘technicals’ – i.e., pick-up trucks with heavy machine guns mounted on their beds. This allows militia to be involved in communal violence but also be mobilized for political violence.

The most significant Islamist armed group is Al-Shabaab, active since 2006 and an affiliate of A-Qaeda since 2012<sup>78</sup>. Much smaller is Abnaa ul-Calipha (Islamic State in Somalia) who are estimated to number 200-300 fighters. They are mainly conduct terrorist attacks in Puntland and, since 2015, attacks against Al-Shabaab.<sup>79</sup>

**Al-Shabaab** (“the youth” in Arabic) emerged as the enforcement wing of the Union of Islamic Courts (ICU) - a coalition of Sharia courts who took control of Mogadishu in 2005 and “brought an end to the predation of feuding warlords”, supported by Somali businessmen.<sup>80</sup> However, an invasion by Ethiopia, supported by the US, defeated the Islamic Courts. In response to this invasion, Al-Shabaab became a highly effective insurgent force (separate from the remaining ICU leadership) and became the dominant force in most of south and central Somalia.<sup>81</sup> The **African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)**, was approved by the UN in February 2007, initially with troop contributions from Uganda and Burundi. AMISOM fought to gain control of, first, the airport and Presidential compound in Mogadishu and gradually more of Mogadishu and other parts of the country<sup>82</sup>. Despite initial concerns about the participation of troops from direct neighbours, AMISOM expanded. An important military role has been played by Kenya and Ethiopia. AMISOM received financial support from the US, EU, and UK<sup>83</sup>. In April 2022 AMISOM was replaced with the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) composed of the same troops but with a mandate to hand over security fully to Somali forces by 2024<sup>84</sup>. Many security analysts are sceptical that Somali forces will be ready and capable to take full control by then.

Despite AMISOM/ATMIS efforts and the slowly increasing capability of Somali government forces Al-Shabaab still control large areas of rural Somalia. Perhaps more significantly, Al-Shabaab have extensive covert presence even in government controlled urban areas where they are able to collect significant resources<sup>85</sup> - for example through extortion of businesses and travellers. The Al-Shabaab intelligence arm (Amniyat) has networks across Somalia and within government security structures.<sup>86</sup> Al-Shabaab's military success stems from their adoption of effective tactical attacks on poorly defended outposts, the use of suicide bombers, hit and run missions, or similar insurgencies. Al-Shabaab has also proved effective at **exploiting clan politics** - often siding with marginalised clans who do not see avenues in the formal systems dominated by the large clan families, exploiting clans' grievances, mediating disputes, but also intimidating certain clans through

<sup>77</sup> Development Initiatives (2022): Supporting longer term development in crises at the nexus: Lessons from Somalia: Chapter 2 Crisis context

<sup>78</sup> Onat et al. (2021): Has Al-Shabaab's allegiance pledge to al-Qaida influenced its bombing campaigns in Africa?, LSE.

<sup>79</sup> Development Initiatives (2022): Supporting longer term development in crises at the nexus: Lessons from Somalia: Chapter 2 Crisis context

<sup>80</sup> ICG (2019): Women and Al-Shabaab's Insurgency, Africa Briefing 145.

<sup>81</sup> ICG (2019): Women and Al-Shabaab's Insurgency, Africa Briefing 145.

<sup>82</sup> Peter W Mackenzie (2016): A small step toward democracy in Somalia, Africa Research Institute; ICG (2019): Women and Al-Shabaab's Insurgency, Africa Briefing 145.

<sup>83</sup> Paul D. Williams (2017): Paying for AMISOM: Are Politics and Bureaucracy Undermining the AU's Largest Peace Operation? IPI Global Observatory.

<sup>84</sup> ICG (2021): Crisis Watch: Digest Somalia, Special Coverage / Africa; Timothy Walker and Denys Reva (2022): Is Somali piracy finally under control? ISS Today.

<sup>85</sup> Hiral Institute (2018): The AS Finance System.

<sup>86</sup> ICG (2019): Women and Al-Shabaab's Insurgency, Africa Briefing 145.

killings and livestock confiscation. Al-Shabaab has gained some legitimacy by providing an **alternative and reliable governance system** by offering basic services, including permanent and mobile courts (crucially seen to be less prone to, or even free from the corruption that affects the formal system) to administer criminal and civil justice. Tactical flexibility and military capability through a relatively unified command structure have also been important in the survival of the group.<sup>87</sup> Al-Shabaab imposes strict rules on women (lesser access to public spaces, schools and decision making, strict dress codes). Its courts provide women also forms of improved physical safety by sanctioning rape and domestic violence and financial security by enforcing that divorced women get a refund of their dowry, and that widows get a share of inheritance. In addition, Al-Shabaab facilitates marriages - including by allowing men to marry women from more prominent clans which is a departure from traditional Somali custom. It is difficult to measure women's support for Al-Shabaab, but women do engage in recruitment, fundraising, intelligence gathering, smuggling weapons - but rarely suicide bombing or fighting.<sup>88</sup>

Al-Shabaab is active across Somalia, and recently launched a large scale incursion into Ethiopia<sup>89</sup> demonstrating their ability to operate across the Somali inhabited territories of the Horn. The group has been responsible for terrorist attacks in Kampala, Uganda<sup>90</sup> and Nairobi, Kenya<sup>91</sup> and has conducted regular suicide bombings of Somalia government offices, hotels, tea shops and other locations<sup>92</sup>. Al-Shabaab remains the single most significant threat to the FGS and the FMS. The collapse of the Afghan government and the return of Taliban control raised deep concern among Somali leaders to potentially face a similar situation in the future.

Despite decades of international support to the Somali security sector - in 2017 international partners were estimated to have spent around USD 1.5 billion per year on peacekeeping, counter-insurgency and other support to this sector, with major contributions from the US, EU, Turkey, UAE and UK<sup>93</sup> -, the (federal) **Somali National Army (SNA)** remains heavily reliant on ATMIS. Most units in the Somali National Army (SNA) are still divided along clan-based and political loyalties,<sup>94</sup> this was apparent during the 2021 election crisis when rival units were mobilised to protect opposition candidates, and the then President Farmajo.

The SNA has tried to grow by integrating regional forces and militias into its ranks, but some continue to operate without or even against the FGS, on top of parallel military forces with international backing (for instance, the US-sponsored "Danab" commandos, and the Turkish-sponsored "Gorgor" commandos and "Haram'aad" police unit).<sup>95</sup> Estimates of the total number of armed forces in Somalia are considered unreliable, in 2017 the World Bank estimated that only 17,000 out of 45,000 armed forces in Somalia served in the SNA.<sup>96</sup>

**Piracy** along the coast of Somalia has also been a major security challenge, although there has been no successful piracy attacks since 2017 and criminal groups have reportedly transitioned to other illegal activities.<sup>97</sup> Piracy has been strongly deterred by several international counter-piracy operations, and by measures taken by shipping companies to make themselves less vulnerable to attack.<sup>98</sup> Despite a low likelihood of future pirate attacks, international actors - including the EU - maintain their maritime security engagement. This reflects concerns around the re-emergence of piracy, but also the fact that counter-piracy operations provide a justification for countries (including the US, UK, Japan<sup>99</sup>, the EU, Italy and China) wishing to maintain a military presence, in the form of bases, naval patrols, and training missions, and assert their geopolitical importance.<sup>100</sup>

### 10.8.1.3 Political economy of Somalia

It can be easy to see Somali politics as the expression of clan, or sectarian competition, and it is true that central to Somali politics are differing perspectives on the role of Islam, and of clan in political and social life.

<sup>87</sup> ICG (2019): Women and Al-Shabaab's Insurgency, Africa Briefing 145.

<sup>88</sup> ICG (2019): Women and Al-Shabaab's Insurgency, Africa Briefing 145.

<sup>89</sup> Reuters (2022): Ethiopia forces kill 85 al Shabaab fighters near Somalia, state TV and commander say, accessed 08.02.2023.

<sup>90</sup> France 24 (2010): Somalia's Al Shabaab claim responsibility for Kampala bombings, accessed on 08.02.2023.

<sup>91</sup> ICG (2018): Al-Shabaab Five Years after Westgate: Still a Menace in East Africa, accessed on 08.02.2023.

<sup>92</sup> Hiiraan Online (2018): Committee: 587 dead in Oct 14 terror attack, accessed on 08.02.2023.

<sup>93</sup> Development Initiatives (2022): Supporting longer term development in crises at the nexus: Lessons from Somalia: Chapter 2 Crisis context.

<sup>94</sup> ICG (2019): Women and Al-Shabaab's Insurgency, Africa Briefing 145; Colin Robinson (2021): Rising Politicization Risks Splitting Somali National Army, IPI Global Observatory.

<sup>95</sup> Colin Robinson (2021): Rising Politicization Risks Splitting Somali National Army, IPI Global Observatory.

<sup>96</sup> NYU Center on International cooperation (CIC) (2018): The Politics of Security in Somalia.

<sup>97</sup> Timothy Walker and Denys Reva (2022): Is Somali piracy finally under control? ISS Today.

<sup>98</sup> Timothy Walker and Denys Reva (2022): Is Somali piracy finally under control? ISS Today.

<sup>99</sup> Julian Ryall (2018): Japan to expand Djibouti base despite decline in piracy, DW.

<sup>100</sup> Timothy Walker and Denys Reva (2022): Is Somali piracy finally under control? ISS Today.

But analysts must be wary of reducing all politics to these drivers when myriad other concerns and policy differences also, as in all political systems, play their role.

Having qualified our analysis it is nevertheless true that to understand Somalia's political economy at large one must take full account of religion and clan. The armed conflict between Al-Shabaab and their opponents is an expression of very different religious and political visions for Somalia and this conflict overshadows all other political developments in the country. The recurrent political challenges that have affected every administration since 2004 have at their core questions on the role and relative power balance within clans, and between clans. Political tensions between FGS and FMS should therefore be understood not as just the natural push and pull between levels of government but as a constitutional expression of clan rivalry. Political disputes between Presidents and Prime Ministers, within cabinets and in parliament, likewise often at core relate back to the balance of power between different clans.

**Clan power sharing underpins Somalia's political settlement** - the "4.5 formula" guarantees representation of clans at FGS and FMS levels.<sup>101</sup> At the national level 4.5 ensures that one share of MPs seats, cabinet positions and other roles are given to each of the four major clan family (Darood, Digil & Mirifle, Hawiye and Dir) and that a half share is distributed between so-called minority clans. Alternative formulas are used within FMSs reflecting their particular clan make up. The formula was adopted by the Mbgathi peace conference in 2004 as a way of ensuring that all groups would be represented in future governments. While 4.5 has provided a tolerated and utilised power sharing formula, it is strongly criticised by many. The formula cements the marginalisation of the so-called minority groups regardless of their actual population size and on political matters, it encourages the promotion of clan dynamics rather than questions of policy or ideology. The formula has moreover reinforced gender roles – when women are selected as MPs, for example, they often are drawn from less influential sub-clans and thus face a double handicap in attaining influence.

Clans also determine the federal system. While Somalia's FMS are officially geographic entities representing all the people resident within their borders, in political reality they are clan entities. The first FMS, Puntland, was established explicitly as a safe clan homeland for members of the Darood Harti sub-clans. Other FMS have not been so explicit in their clan affiliation but both the challenges within states and debates around the creation of new states are often at their core arguments around clan power and the balance between different clans.<sup>102</sup>

In Somaliland, a "dual governance" system ensures that both formal government structures and customary kinship structures coexist and that clan-based conferences are held regularly since the 1990s.<sup>103</sup> This system has been stable so far, and although on paper most elements of Somaliland politics are above or separate from clan structures, in reality clan remains a vital organising principle. The Somaliland settlement balances the interests of the dominant Isaaq clan with the support or acquiescence of other clans. However, it **risks being challenged by mounting frustrations** around the politicisation of clans, corruption and women's systematic exclusion from political decision making.<sup>104</sup> Indeed, in Somaliland, electoral candidates must be nominated by clans, and women can almost never secure such nominations (notably, due to their supposed dual clan affiliation, i.e., to their father's and their husband's clans).<sup>105</sup>

Somalia reportedly has **among the highest adherence to - largely Sunni - Islam in the world**, with religion affecting all aspects of life.<sup>106</sup> Clan provides the basis for social, cultural and political life in Somalia, as well as social laws, social security, insurance and justice. Belonging to a clan is a primary marker of identity.<sup>107</sup> Women

<sup>101</sup> According to the 4.5 power-sharing mechanism, the four predominant Somali clans (Darod, Hawiye, Dir and Digile-Mirifle) are represented in Parliament along with five minority clan groupings. See: Development Initiatives (2022): Supporting longer term development in crises at the nexus: Lessons from Somalia: Chapter 2 Crisis context; Alexandra Lewis and Neil Winn (2018): Understanding the Connections between the EU Global Strategy and Somali Peacebuilding Education Needs and Priorities, Global Policy, 9 (4). pp. 501-512. ISSN 1758-5880.

<sup>102</sup> For example, debates around the creation of South West State pitted a six region plan that would have included what is now Jubbaland against a three-region plan (the three region plan won) - for many Darood the 6 region plan would have denied the clan family a second FMS (Jubbaland) and diminished their influence nationally. Likewise, Hawiye power brokers were very keen for Galmudug to be a FMS despite it only being constituted of one and a half old regions rather than the constitutionally mandated two as this would give them parity with the Darood at the FMS level.

<sup>103</sup> Michael Walls, Marie-Luise Schueller and Amina-Bahja Ekman (2017): Political Settlement in Somaliland: A gendered perspective, UCL, The Bartlett Development Planning Unit and Progressio.

<sup>104</sup> Michael Walls, Marie-Luise Schueller and Amina-Bahja Ekman (2017): Political Settlement in Somaliland: A gendered perspective, UCL, The Bartlett Development Planning Unit and Progressio.

<sup>105</sup> Michael Walls, Marie-Luise Schueller and Amina-Bahja Ekman (2017): Political Settlement in Somaliland: A gendered perspective, UCL, The Bartlett Development Planning Unit and Progressio.

<sup>106</sup> Michael Walls, Marie-Luise Schueller and Amina-Bahja Ekman (2017): Political Settlement in Somaliland: A gendered perspective, UCL, The Bartlett Development Planning Unit and Progressio.

<sup>107</sup> There are six main clans in Somalia, the Digil, the Rahanweyn/Mirifle, the Hawiye, the Dir, the Isaaq, and the Darod. They are not distributed evenly across the territory, indeed there are less heterogeneous in Somaliland (north) than in the rest of Somalia. In Somaliland, the bilis clans (especially the Isaaq, but also the Daarood, Gadabuursi and Ciise) enjoy a

who marry become part of their husband's clan in addition to their father's. This puts them in an intermediary position which can serve as an important bridge between clans, but also means they are not fully trusted by either clan to engage in decision making.<sup>108</sup>

The fragility of Somalia's post-2007 political and security settlement was brought into sharp focus during the electoral crisis that took place in the run up to the 2022 parliamentary and presidential selection process. It pitted President Farmajo and his allies in South West State, Galmudug, Hirshabelle and the Speaker of the Lower House against all opposition candidates for president, Jubbaland, Puntland and the Speaker of the Upper House. Caught in the middle was Prime Minister Roble. It illustrated how the weakness of the constitutional and legislative framework, the absence of a constitutional court, and the lack of clarity on roles and relationships between federal and state government could combine with a challenging security situation and political manoeuvring for personal and political benefit. It did not just create obvious political tensions but also a crisis that at times threatened to launch Somalia back into full scale civil war with rival militias mobilised across Mogadishu.

The long existing tensions between the FGS and regions (today the FMS) increased over the course of the Farmajo administration. Having seen how opposition from powerful leaders in the FMS interfered with the administrations of his predecessors, the Farmajo administration took a very hands-on approach to the conduct of member state elections and successfully supported their preferred candidates in the South West, Galmudug and Hirshabelle – going so far, many allege, as to have the favourite for the South-West contest, Sheikh Mukhtar Robow, arrested. Attempts to instal allies in Puntland and Jubbaland were not successful.

This set the scene for a very acrimonious relationship between Mogadishu and the FMS. Federal and State leaders were unable to agree on an election plan, and the process which should have been concluded by February 2021 was not concluded until May 2022. While there were many technical challenges around security and the election / selection model at its core, the crisis was in essence a political dispute between the President and his allies and the opposition. Even when the selection process was completed there were “widespread allegations of vote-buying, intimidation, and fraud”.<sup>109</sup> While there is an element of personality at play and the process under a different executive may have been less contentious, there are generalisable lessons that can be taken:

- Politics in Somalia lacks an agreed upon adjudicator – be that a constitutional court or the role that the Somaliland Guurti (an upper house composed of traditional leaders) often plays. This can encourage boundary pushing by political leaders.
- Federalism, understood as a process of sharing power with lower federal entities – rather than devolving of power from the Centre to the federal level – and as a system that requires collaborative relations is not yet embedded in Somali political culture. Successive Presidents have been seen as trying to centralise authority at the expense of the FMSs<sup>110</sup> (including current President Hassan Sheikh during his first term – although he now speaks about the value of federalism and cooperation).
- In addition to technical challenges relating to security, finding an agreement on the voting systems and voter education there are powerful interests for many politicians that make them reluctant to move to one-person-one-vote elections. The variations on the clan selection model that have been used since 2012 offer ample opportunity for bargains to be struck and present a manageable size of electorate for any persuasion tactics.<sup>111</sup>

All of these factors, combined with a president who took a particularly negative view of negotiation and compromise with opponents, set the stage for the very dangerous and protracted election crisis of 2021/22.

These divisions persist because the implementation of the 2012 provisional Constitution and the process of finalising the federal model remain incomplete, hampered by **conflicting interests between clans and levels of government for the distribution of resources and political authority**.<sup>112</sup> The five FMS created by 2016

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predominant position over the “Gabooye” minorities. See Alexandra Lewis and Neil Winn (2018): Understanding the Connections between the EU Global Strategy and Somali Peacebuilding Education Needs and Priorities, *Global Policy*, 9 (4). pp. 501-512. ISSN 1758-5880; Michael Walls, Marie-Luise Schueller and Amina-Bahja Ekman (2017): Political Settlement in Somaliland: A gendered perspective, UCL, The Bartlett Development Planning Unit and Progressio.

<sup>108</sup> Michael Walls, Marie-Luise Schueller and Amina-Bahja Ekman (2017): Political Settlement in Somaliland: A gendered perspective, UCL, The Bartlett Development Planning Unit and Progressio.

<sup>109</sup> ICG (2021): Crisis Watch Digest Somalia, Special Coverage / Africa; Ilya Gridneff (2017): Al-Shabaab Strategy Shifts Toward Clans as Presidential Election Looms, IPI Global Observatory.

<sup>110</sup> Amenda Sperber (2021): Back from the brink? Somalia's political crisis explained, *The New Humanitarian*.

<sup>111</sup> Afyare Abdi Elmi (2021): The way out of Somalia's political impasse, *Aljazeera*; Amenda Sperber (2021): Back from the brink? Somalia's political crisis explained, *The New Humanitarian*.

<sup>112</sup> Development Initiatives (2022): Supporting longer term development in crises at the nexus: Lessons from Somalia: Chapter 2 Crisis context.

include South West, Hirshabelle and Galmudug, which are more supportive of the central government, and Puntland and Jubaland, which are pushing more strongly for autonomy within Somalia.<sup>113</sup>

The selection of Hassan Sheikh for his second, non-consecutive term as President in May 2022 brought to an end the immediate tensions that had been growing during the Farmajo administration. There is much hope that a seasoned politician will take a more conciliatory approach and put the FGS-FMS relationship back on track. Those hopes should of course be tempered with memories of the frequent FGS-FMS disputes during the current President's first term. But positive signals have been seen in the intention to launch further local level direct elections and commitments to regular meetings with leaders from the FMSs. The large number of cabinet appointments may help ensure widespread support but is not a guarantee of effective delivery.

Somalis navigate this political environment of overlapping sources of authority and conflicting interests between clans, fractions and regions by often entertaining a **form of ambiguity** as to where their political affiliations lie. For instance, in Sool a region claimed by both Somaliland and Puntland, locals work with both sides and administrative offices coexist. Ambiguity as a feature of Somali politics finds roots in custom and helps explain why it has been difficult to legitimise the idea of one sovereign nation state in Somalia, along with the fact that decisions are traditionally made through local-level negotiation (where representatives like village elders are present and can be held accountable, unlike in a centralised government system).<sup>114</sup>

**Al-Shabaab benefits from the recent electoral instability** in Somalia, which fuels their alternative governance model and provides opportunities for destabilisation. Indeed, on March 23rd, 2022, they attacked an election location in Hirshabelle state (killing at least 48 people) and managed to break into the heavily protected Mogadishu international airport.<sup>115</sup>

## 10.8.2 Socio-economic and environmental context

### 10.8.2.1 Economy and livelihoods

Somalia's economy is estimated to be among the bottom five in the world based on GDP per capita,<sup>116</sup> although it has experienced a **growth momentum** in recent years which could continue, carried by sustained investments from transnational entrepreneurs and "rapid urbanisation, growing use of digital technologies, planned investments in sectors such as energy, ports, education and health".<sup>117</sup> Somalia's economy is dominated by livestock and agriculture (together making up about three-fifths of the economy), fisheries, communications and energy.<sup>118</sup> Women are increasingly active in these economic sectors (livestock, agriculture, retail like the qaad trade) and are now often the primary breadwinners of the household, due to high divorce rates and men dying in conflict or falling into the qat drug addiction.<sup>119</sup> Still, women and men's labour force participation remains low and **youth unemployment** is very high (around 67%), which incentivises youth to resort to migration and join violent extremist groups like Al-Shabaab.<sup>120</sup>

Somalia's economy is also **highly reliant on international money transfers, particularly remittances** from the diaspora which accounted for about one-third of GDP in 2018 (USD 1.5 billion), similarly to official development assistance (ODA).<sup>121</sup> Remittances are most often controlled by women who are seen as more responsible household financial managers.<sup>122</sup> They are essential to people's purchasing power<sup>123</sup> and access to credit (outside the largely absent formal banking system) but disproportionately go to certain clans and

<sup>113</sup> Afyare Abdi Elmi (2021): The way out of Somalia's political impasse, Aljazeera.

<sup>114</sup> Michael Walls (2016): Sool Region: sovereign ambiguity vs a geopolitical system of nation-states? Africa Research Institute; Alexandra Lewis and Neil Winn (2018): Understanding the Connections between the EU Global Strategy and Somali Peacebuilding Education Needs and Priorities, Global Policy, 9 (4). pp. 501-512. ISSN 1758-5880.

<sup>115</sup> ICG (2022): Crisis Watch Digest Somalia.

<sup>116</sup> Development Initiatives (2022): Supporting longer term development in crises at the nexus: Lessons from Somalia: Chapter 2 Crisis context.

<sup>117</sup> Jos Meester (2019): Transnational Capital in Somalia, Clingendael; World Bank: Overview - Somalia, accessed 6 May 2022.

<sup>118</sup> Development Initiatives (2022): Supporting longer term development in crises at the nexus: Lessons from Somalia: Chapter 2 Crisis context.

<sup>119</sup> ICG (2019): Women and Al-Shabaab's Insurgency, Africa Briefing 145.

<sup>120</sup> IMF (2017): Six Things to Know About Somalia's Economy, IMF Country Focus.

<sup>121</sup> Development Initiatives (2022): Supporting longer term development in crises at the nexus: Lessons from Somalia: Chapter 2 Crisis context.

<sup>122</sup> Michael Walls (2016): Sool Region: sovereign ambiguity vs a geopolitical system of nation-states? Africa Research Institute.

<sup>123</sup> This is especially critical in a context where COVID-19, drought and the war in Ukraine are pushing the prices of basic necessities up, like wheat and oil whose price was estimated to have risen by 300% in March 2022. See Sara Jerving (2022): Ukraine crisis expected to deepen Horn of Africa's drought devastation, Devex.

regions like Puntland and Somaliland.<sup>124</sup> The COVID-19 pandemic impacted remittance flows negatively but these have recovered faster than expected.<sup>125</sup>

Somalia also receives funding from international financial institutions, due to its **high debt levels** (55% of GDP in March 2020)<sup>126</sup> fuelled by a **structural trade deficit** (its trade balance was around -90% of GDP in 2020, with exports amounting to 14% and imports 105% of GDP),<sup>127</sup> because the country depends heavily on imports of food, fuel, construction materials and manufactured goods.<sup>128</sup> The government has taken steps to normalise relations with the IMF through the debt-relief HIPC initiative, which if completed would relieve its debt from USD 5.2 billion (end of 2018) to USD 557 million according to estimations.<sup>129</sup> However, this is dependent on Somalia meeting the August 2022 (extended) deadline to conclude the IMF review.

Somalia's economy encounters other challenges, including high levels of informality, a poor investment climate (reinforced by political instability) and financial inclusion, high electricity costs and external factors (COVID-19 pandemic, bans on livestock exports by Gulf countries, etc.).<sup>130</sup> Notably, **large transnational corporations have resorted to clientelism** to assert their dominance in Somali economic markets, stifling competition and contributing to corruption of the political sphere. Therefore, international actors including the EU's efforts to support statebuilding are undermined by these interlinked economic and political interests which benefit from weak public regulations and collusion from certain public officials.<sup>131</sup>

### 10.8.2.2 Climate stressors and food security

Somalia's climate ranges from arid and semi-arid conditions in the north, to heavy rainfall in the south.<sup>132</sup> It is subject to recurring droughts - almost every four years since 1960 - and floods during the annual monsoon.<sup>133</sup> In recent years, **extreme weather events have become more unpredictable and frequent due to climate change**, and this is predicted to continue.<sup>134</sup> For instance, in 2020, flash floods displaced around half a million Somalis while in 2019, the country had been hit by the worst locust invasion in 25 years, leading to many leaving their homes after losing their crops and pastures. Therefore, natural disasters were the first cause of displacement in 2019, and most displacement took place in the South-East where Al-Shabaab is particularly active, thereby compounding other challenges.<sup>135</sup>

The country is currently experiencing another destructive **drought, reportedly the worst in 40 years**<sup>136</sup> - with three to four failed rainy seasons in a row depending on the region -, which is raising grain prices, killing livestock and will "likely leave almost half of Somali children under five acutely malnourished".<sup>137</sup> The scale of the challenge facing the country is immense. At least 7 million people have been affected by the severe drought as of July 2022, of whom 918,000 are displaced from their homes. International support is rising but remains far below what is needed. As of June 2022, UN OCHA reported that only 18% of the necessary funds had been committed<sup>138</sup>.

More broadly, the prevalence of agriculture and pastoralism, both natural-resource dependent activities, helps explain why Somalis' livelihoods and food security are particularly affected by natural disasters and climate

<sup>124</sup> Development Initiatives (2022): Supporting longer term development in crises at the nexus: Lessons from Somalia: Chapter 2 Crisis context.

<sup>125</sup> Development Initiatives (2022): Supporting longer term development in crises at the nexus: Lessons from Somalia: Chapter 2 Crisis context.

<sup>126</sup> African Development Bank (AfDB): Somalia Economic Outlook, accessed 6 May 2022.

<sup>127</sup> IMF (2021): Somalia Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative - Request For Additional Interim Assistance, IMF Country Report No. 21/69.

<sup>128</sup> Mohamed Nur Sharif and Ali Yassin Sheikh Ali (2016): Determinants of Trade Balance in Somalia: Regression Analysis, Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development, Vol.7, No.12.

<sup>129</sup> Development Initiatives (2022): Supporting longer term development in crises at the nexus: Lessons from Somalia: Chapter 2 Crisis context.

<sup>130</sup> World Bank (2021): Somalia's Economy Rebounding from 'Triple Shock', press release; African Development Bank (AfDB): Somalia Economic Outlook, accessed 6 May 2022.

<sup>131</sup> Jos Meester (2019): Transnational Capital In Somalia, Clingendael.

<sup>132</sup> UNESCO and Federal Government of Somalia: Education sector analysis: Federal Government of Somalia: assessing opportunities for rebuilding the country through education.

<sup>133</sup> Development Initiatives (2022): Supporting longer term development in crises at the nexus: Lessons from Somalia: Chapter 2 Crisis context.

<sup>134</sup> UNESCO and Federal Government of Somalia: Education sector analysis: Federal Government of Somalia: assessing opportunities for rebuilding the country through education.

<sup>135</sup> Development Initiatives (2022): Supporting longer term development in crises at the nexus: Lessons from Somalia: Chapter 2 Crisis context.

<sup>136</sup> Amenda Sperber (2021): Back from the brink? Somalia's political crisis explained, The New Humanitarian.

<sup>137</sup> Sara Jerving (2022): Ukraine crisis expected to deepen Horn of Africa's drought devastation, Devex; Oxfam (2022): As many as 28 million people across East Africa at risk of extreme hunger if rains fail again, Press release.

<sup>138</sup> OCHA (2022): Somalia Humanitarian Funding Overview (As of 02 June 2022), accessed 09 February 2023.

change.<sup>139</sup> Indeed, Somalia is currently experiencing **dire levels of food insecurity** with an estimated 3.5 million people facing acute food insecurity in 2021, and 1.2 million children under 5 acutely malnourished.

Alongside climatic stress, **conflict is a key driver of food insecurity** in Somalia.<sup>140</sup> This includes internal violence but also the recent conflict in Ukraine which has come as an additional strain, considering Somalia depends on Russia and Ukraine for over 90% (43% Russia; 48% Ukraine) of its wheat imports.<sup>141</sup>

### 10.8.2.3 Public services, including education

Somalis have a **high need for public services** due to poverty - seven out of 10 Somalis live with less than USD 1.90 per day<sup>142</sup> -, food insecurity and the effects of natural disasters, insecurity and displacement.<sup>143</sup> Women and girls face specific challenges, due to high rates of maternal mortality, child marriage, illiteracy, etc., as well as gender-based violence like rape, for which clan-based justice usually does not offer compensation to the victim but rather to male relatives.<sup>144</sup>

Despite these needs, **public services remain weak and uneven, with international and community-based actors often struggling to compensate**, which affects FGS and FMS legitimacy. For instance, Somalia's healthcare system is severely understaffed and ranks 194/195 on the Global Health Security Index.<sup>145</sup> This is partly explained by the FGS's low budget – USD 286.1 million in 2018, less than that of Somaliland alone - itself explained by a low capacity to generate revenues through taxes or the economy - in 2017, domestic revenue made up only 2.8% of GDP - and how this budget is being distributed. Indeed, a majority of it reportedly goes to public and security sector salaries, while only 4.1% of state spending went to the social sector in 2018, as opposed to 18% in Somaliland.<sup>146</sup>

**Education** has been particularly affected by conflict in Somalia, with the 1977 war against Ethiopia and especially the Somali civil war, which has led to the destruction of 75 to 90% (depending on the sources) of public schools and to severe underinvestment in the education sector.<sup>147</sup> Recent years have seen some improvements but public schools remain underfinanced, understaffed - and with about 40% of underqualified teachers<sup>148</sup> - and of low quality (overcrowded classrooms, poor sanitation facilities, poor student results). These conditions, along with physical accessibility, poverty, social norms that favour educating boys, displacement and insecurity explain why school enrolment rates are exceptionally low in Somalia.<sup>149</sup> Indeed, over half of Somalia's children are out of school (according to 2018 figures)<sup>150</sup> and retention rates are extremely low, meaning that children usually stay in school only for about two years (as reported in 2020).<sup>151</sup> Further, **access to school is inequitable**, as children from South Central Somalia (as opposed to Somaliland and Puntland, notably),<sup>152</sup> nomadic pastoralist communities, unsafe areas, rural areas, with disabilities and young girls are

<sup>139</sup> Development Initiatives (2022): Supporting longer term development in crises at the nexus: Lessons from Somalia: Chapter 2 Crisis context.

<sup>140</sup> Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) (2021): Somalia: Food Security and Malnutrition Snapshot AFI July - December 2021, AMN August 2021 - July 2022.

<sup>141</sup> FAO (2022): The importance of Ukraine and the Russian Federation for global agricultural markets and the risks associated with the current conflict, Information Note, Executive Summary (update).

<sup>142</sup> African Development Bank (AfDB): Somalia Economic Outlook, accessed 6 May 2022.

<sup>143</sup> Development Initiatives (2022): Supporting longer term development in crises at the nexus: Lessons from Somalia: Chapter 2 Crisis context.

<sup>144</sup> Michael Walls (2016): Sool Region: sovereign ambiguity vs a geopolitical system of nation-states? Africa Research Institute.

<sup>145</sup> Development Initiatives (2022): Supporting longer term development in crises at the nexus: Lessons from Somalia: Chapter 2 Crisis context.

<sup>146</sup> Development Initiatives (2022): Supporting longer term development in crises at the nexus: Lessons from Somalia: Chapter 2 Crisis context.

<sup>147</sup> UNESCO and Federal Government of Somalia: Education sector analysis: Federal Government of Somalia: assessing opportunities for rebuilding the country through education; Alexandra Lewis and Neil Winn (2018): Understanding the Connections between the EU Global Strategy and Somali Peacebuilding Education Needs and Priorities, Global Policy, 9 (4), pp. 501-512. ISSN 1758-5880.

<sup>148</sup> World Bank (2021): Girls in Somalia to Benefit from Enhanced Access to Education, Press Release.

<sup>149</sup> UNICEF: Education Somalia, accessed 27 April 2022.

<sup>150</sup> UNESCO and Federal Government of Somalia: Education sector analysis: Federal Government of Somalia: assessing opportunities for rebuilding the country through education.

<sup>151</sup> UNESCO and Federal Government of Somalia: Education sector analysis: Federal Government of Somalia: assessing opportunities for rebuilding the country through education.

<sup>152</sup> Global Partnership for Education: Where we work - Somalia, accessed 27 April 2022.

less likely to attend and stay in school.<sup>153</sup> For instance, boys had spent about 30% more time in school than girls in 2020,<sup>154</sup> and over 72% of rural women had never been to school.<sup>155</sup>

**Education is politicised** by different actors in Somalia, and even used as a physical or ideological weapon in the conflict. Indeed, Al-Shabaab has reportedly led about 300 attacks against schools and teachers (looting, abduction, killing, etc.) between 2012 and the first half of 2019.<sup>156</sup> More broadly, in a context where many children are in non-formal education or out of school, “diaspora funders, faith-based groups, private companies, private individuals, radical Islamic education actors (including Al Shabaab), Middle Eastern donors, American charitable organisations, and multiple others” **compete to deliver education, along with their values, ideologies and vision of history and conflict in Somalia** (for the EU, this has largely meant supporting peace education and “liberal values” in schools, for instance).<sup>157</sup> Strikingly, the Africa Educational Trust reported at least 17 different school curricula being taught in Somali schools in 2017, and this excludes informal education channels.<sup>158</sup> Therefore, while the EU has been a major education donor in Somalia and Somaliland, it operates in an environment where unmonitored education dominates, leaving space for actors like Al-Shabaab to use radical school curricula for recruitment.<sup>159</sup>

Further, **Western influence on schooling** has problematic implications, on the curricula - which tends to insufficiently inform students on key aspects of politics and society in Somalia like the clan system -, the language of instruction - often English -, and poses the risk that colonial traumas like that of schools being used to convert local children to Catholicism are used by Al-Shabaab to further undermine schools’ legitimacy.<sup>160</sup>

### 10.8.3 Somalia, and regional and international actors: geopolitics and aid

#### 10.8.3.1 Strategic geographic position

Somalia’s location as a gateway to the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, the Arabian sea and the Indian ocean and its over 3000 km of coastline (the longest in Africa) has made it a site of **strategic and geopolitical importance for international and regional powers seeking to extend their influence through commercial and security bases but also development and humanitarian aid**.<sup>161</sup> Somaliland borders Djibouti, where China, France, Italy, Japan, and the United States have established military bases with the aim of projecting power in the Horn, Gulf and South Asian regions.<sup>162</sup>

As a result, and facilitated by its weak governance structures, Somalia is often used to **play proxy for geopolitical tensions among international, and regional actors**. For instance, China has tried to sway Somaliland into backing out of its growing relationship with Taiwan - which has planned to establish a military base in Somaliland -, and Ethiopia and Egypt have reportedly taken their rivalry to Hargeisa by sending representatives in an attempt to secure military and economic advantages (for instance, Ethiopia receives 19% of shares from the UAE-funded Berbera port and Egypt explores the option of establishing a military presence in Somaliland).<sup>163</sup> External influences and support have been navigated and used pragmatically by Somali elites, politicians and warlords seeking to gain personal and political advantages.<sup>164</sup>

<sup>153</sup> Alexandra Lewis and Neil Winn (2018): Understanding the Connections between the EU Global Strategy and Somali Peacebuilding Education Needs and Priorities, Global Policy, 9 (4). pp. 501-512. ISSN 1758-5880.

<sup>154</sup> UNESCO and Federal Government of Somalia: Education sector analysis: Federal Government of Somalia: assessing opportunities for rebuilding the country through education.

<sup>155</sup> World Bank, Girls in Somalia to Benefit from Enhanced Access to Education, Press Release, 29 June 2021.

<sup>156</sup> UNESCO and Federal Government of Somalia: Education sector analysis: Federal Government of Somalia: assessing opportunities for rebuilding the country through education.

<sup>157</sup> Alexandra Lewis and Neil Winn (2018): Understanding the Connections between the EU Global Strategy and Somali Peacebuilding Education Needs and Priorities, Global Policy, 9 (4). pp. 501-512. ISSN 1758-5880.

<sup>158</sup> Alexandra Lewis and Neil Winn (2018): Understanding the Connections between the EU Global Strategy and Somali Peacebuilding Education Needs and Priorities, Global Policy, 9 (4). pp. 501-512. ISSN 1758-5880.

<sup>159</sup> Alexandra Lewis and Neil Winn (2018): Understanding the Connections between the EU Global Strategy and Somali Peacebuilding Education Needs and Priorities, Global Policy, 9 (4). pp. 501-512. ISSN 1758-5880.

<sup>160</sup> Alexandra Lewis and Neil Winn (2018): Understanding the Connections between the EU Global Strategy and Somali Peacebuilding Education Needs and Priorities, Global Policy, 9 (4). pp. 501-512. ISSN 1758-5880.

<sup>161</sup> UNESCO and Federal Government of Somalia: Education sector analysis: Federal Government of Somalia: assessing opportunities for rebuilding the country through education; Zach Vertin (2019): Red Sea Rivalries: The Gulf, The Horn, & The New Geopolitics Of The Red Sea, Brookings Doha Center.

<sup>162</sup> Zach Vertin (2019): Red Sea Rivalries: The Gulf, The Horn, & The New Geopolitics Of The Red Sea, Brookings Doha Center.

<sup>163</sup> Morris Kiruga (2020): Somaliland plays up its geopolitical role, courting China and Taiwan, The Africa Report; ICG (2018): Somalia and the Gulf Crisis, Report 260 / Africa.

<sup>164</sup> ICG (2018): Somalia and the Gulf Crisis, Report 260 / Africa; Guido Lafranchi (2021): Geopolitics Meets Local Politics In The Horn Of Africa, Clingendael.



### 10.8.3.2 Regional geopolitics deepen Somalia's divisions

For the past decade, **Gulf countries and Turkey have increased their presence** in Somalia through diplomatic and political engagement (backing political candidates in elections), military and commercial bases (like ports, giving access to shipping routes), support to security forces (training, funding, etc.), direct budgetary support, infrastructure development, and humanitarian and development assistance.<sup>165</sup> For instance, Turkey has its largest embassy in Mogadishu, and is running a training facility (where 200 Turkish officers are based) and the port of the capital.<sup>166</sup> Meanwhile, the UAE has funded two ports (in Berbera, Somaliland and Bossaso, Puntland).<sup>167</sup>

In addition, although the US (USD 427 million), UK (USD 243 million) and EU institutions (USD 216 million) remained the top donors of ODA to Somalia in 2018-2019,<sup>168</sup> Qatar ranked 10th (USD 33.5 million) and **Turkey, the UAE and Saudi Arabia ranked among the 30 top donors of ODA to Somalia between 2009 and 2018**. Moreover, the full extent of Turkey and Gulf countries' contribution to Somalia is not known because much goes through direct government support by "non-reporting donors", outside of the FGS's financial management information system.<sup>169</sup> Still, in 2018, the FGS reported that Turkey and Saudi Arabia contributed around USD 30 million each.<sup>170</sup> As for the UAE, its ODA disbursements have ranged from USD 30 million in 2020 to USD 103 million in 2016, as estimated by the OECD.<sup>171</sup> These flows are more targeted towards bilateral support to state authorities, infrastructure projects, and make less distinction between humanitarian and development aid as compared to support from "traditional" Western donors.<sup>172</sup>

Funding flows are also used differently among "**non-traditional**" donors, which pursue different objectives. The UAE has prioritised military support to combat piracy (largely for commercial interests) and Al-Shabaab and criticised Qatar and Turkey's engagement in Somalia for reinforcing violent extremism by supporting political Islam, which they deny.<sup>173</sup> Further, Qatar and Turkey have tended to support the FGS while the UAE and Saudi Arabia have increasingly sided with the FMS, thereby exacerbating political fault lines in Somalia, especially during Farmajo's presidency. This was apparent in 2017, when the FMS explicitly sided with the UAE against the FGS through public statements.<sup>174</sup> Indeed, FMS see Emirati support as crucial in light of the limited funding they receive from the federal level, in addition to the backing Gulf countries have provided to political candidates during elections (through campaign funds, for instance) and other commercial and security deals.<sup>175</sup>

**Somalia's neighbours** also exercise influence and interact with the country according to their economic and security interests. Notably, since 2007, soldiers from Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia and Kenya are a majority among AMISOM's troops, in large part to contain the risk of Al-Shabaab spreading across borders (Kenya has been targeted by attacks).<sup>176</sup> In recent years, Farmajo has increased cooperation with Ethiopia and Eritrea, which is reportedly training about 3000 FGS troops.<sup>177</sup>

However, **Kenya and Somalia's federal government have become rivals**, due to a long-standing dispute over maritime borders and access to offshore oil and to conflicting political interests in Jubaland, a FMS bordering Kenya and one of its key partner to combat Al-Shabaab. Indeed, the 2019 elections escalated with Ethiopia-backed FGS troops opposing Kenya-backed Jubaland troops. Following Kenya-backed Madobe's re-election as state president, Farmajo's FGS denied the results.<sup>178</sup> Tensions culminated in December 2020, with Somalia and Kenya severing diplomatic ties after Somalia complained to IGAD the latter had intervened in its internal affairs (the Djibouti-led IGAD fact finding mission's conclusion that evidence was lacking was rejected

<sup>165</sup> ICG (2018): Somalia and the Gulf Crisis, Report 260 / Africa.

<sup>166</sup> ICG (2018): Somalia and the Gulf Crisis, Report 260 / Africa.

<sup>167</sup> Zach Vertin (2019): Red Sea Rivalries: The Gulf, The Horn, & The New Geopolitics Of The Red Sea, Brookings Doha Center.

<sup>168</sup> OECD: Top Ten Donors of Gross ODA for Somalia, accessed 4 May 2022.

<sup>169</sup> Development Initiatives (2022): Supporting longer term development in crises at the nexus: Lessons from Somalia: Chapter 2 Crisis context.

<sup>170</sup> Alfonso Medinilla, Lidet Tadesse Shiferaw and Pauline Veron (2019): Think local. Governance, humanitarian aid, development and peacebuilding in Somalia.

<sup>171</sup> OECD: Aid (ODA) disbursements to Somalia 2011-2020 [DAC2a], accessed 2 May 2022.

<sup>172</sup> Development Initiatives (2022): Supporting longer term development in crises at the nexus: Lessons from Somalia: Chapter 2 Crisis context.

<sup>173</sup> ICG (2018): Somalia and the Gulf Crisis, Report 260 / Africa.

<sup>174</sup> ICG (2018): Somalia and the Gulf Crisis, Report 260 / Africa.

<sup>175</sup> Guido Lafranchi (2021): Geopolitics Meets Local Politics In The Horn Of Africa, Clingendael; Abdi Tawane and Mohamed Dubo (2019): How Gulf geopolitics are turning Somalia into a theatre of the absurd, The East African.

<sup>176</sup> Tobias Hagmann (2016): Stabilization, Extraversion and Political Settlements in Somalia, Rift Valley Institute; Alfonso Medinilla, Lidet Tadesse Shiferaw and Pauline Veron (2019): Think local. Governance, humanitarian aid, development and peacebuilding in Somalia.

<sup>177</sup> Selam Tadesse Demissie (2021): Kenya-Somalia dispute threatens an embattled Horn of Africa, ISS Today.

<sup>178</sup> Selam Tadesse Demissie (2021): Kenya-Somalia dispute threatens an embattled Horn of Africa, ISS Today.

by Farmajo, tensing relations with Djibouti).<sup>179</sup> Therefore, Somalia has been the scene of neighbourhood rivalries, contributing to hinder regional cooperation.<sup>180</sup>

### 10.8.3.3 Western donors in Somalia, including the EU

**The amount of aid to Somalia has increased significantly** from the beginning of the evaluation period, from USD 763 million in 2014 to USAD 1.221 billion in 2019 - and it has more than doubled since 2009<sup>181</sup> -, with a majority having been provided by EU institutions and EU countries when taken together (individually, the US is the first donor).<sup>182</sup> Notably, Germany, Sweden, Norway and Denmark were among the top 10 donors to the country in 2018-2019.

**The EU has a long-standing partnership with Somalia**, which has been marked by several strategic landmarks during the period 2014 to today. Notably the New Deal (2013-2016) and the Somali compact (2013) developed guiding principles for the cooperation between the two countries, which were reflected in the EU's National Indicative Programme (NIP) for Somalia (2014-2020). The NIP established statebuilding, security and stability, and poverty reduction with a focus on food security, resilience and the delivery of basic services as priority objectives. Therefore, between 2014 and 2020, the EU has spent most on statebuilding and peacebuilding (EUR119 million), followed by food security and building resilience (EUR72 million) and education (EUR 60 million).<sup>183</sup>

The following EU strategic documents (2017 New Partnership for Somalia; 2017-2020 EU Development Cooperation Strategy for Somalia) and the additional support of EUR 200 million which was provided via the EU Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) in 2017, have largely been in continuity with these objectives, aimed to be implemented in a more and more integrated manner. With regards to security, the EU's support goes back to the 2007 decision to fund AMISOM (now ATMIS, cf section 1) and has been complemented by two military CSDP missions (EU NAVFOR and the EU military Training Mission to Somalia) and one civilian CSDP mission on maritime security. However, due to repeated delays in the electoral process, in December 2020, the EU suspended the budgetary support it had been providing to the FGS under the Somalia State and Resilience Building Contract (SSRBC) project since 2017.<sup>184</sup>

Overall, the **main goals of Western support to Somalia** have been to support stabilisation and statebuilding (especially at Federal level), and weaken violent extremist groups (especially Al-Shabaab).<sup>185</sup> These goals can be linked to the protection of Western states from security threats and particularly Islamist terrorism (especially since 2001), reducing migration from Somalia to Europe, and protecting commercial interests in the Gulf of Aden.<sup>186</sup>

In recent years, Western donors have increasingly tried to move from stabilisation and humanitarian relief to **longer term development, resilience and support for the political transition**, although most bilateral ODA still went to humanitarian assistance in 2018-2019 (56%).<sup>187</sup> There has also been an increased spending on social infrastructure and services, which is the second sector receiving most ODA in Somalia.<sup>188</sup> However, it can be argued that "statebuilding has become an end in itself rather than the outcome of a more profound process of actual state formation" in Somalia, where elites have appropriated foreign resources instead of investing in state capacity and public services to legitimise the central state.<sup>189</sup> Somaliland has been presented as a counterexample which, because not recognised as a sovereign state, has had limited access to foreign assistance in its statebuilding years and thus built up its internal capacity to collect domestic revenue and ensure peace and relative political stability.<sup>190</sup> Therefore, Somaliland's political settlement was locally driven,

<sup>179</sup> Selam Tadesse Demissie (2021): Kenya-Somalia dispute threatens an embattled Horn of Africa, ISS Today.

<sup>180</sup> Selam Tadesse Demissie (2021): Kenya-Somalia dispute threatens an embattled Horn of Africa, ISS Today.

<sup>181</sup> Development Initiatives (2022): Supporting longer term development in crises at the nexus: Lessons from Somalia: Chapter 2 Crisis context.

<sup>182</sup> Alfonso Medinilla, Lidet Tadesse Shiferaw and Pauline Veron (2019): Think local. Governance, humanitarian aid, development and peacebuilding in Somalia.

<sup>183</sup> EU Commission: Somalia, accessed 3 May 2022.

<sup>184</sup> Somaliland Chronicle (2020): European Union to Cut Budgetary Support to Somali Federal Government.

<sup>185</sup> Development Initiatives (2022): Supporting longer term development in crises at the nexus: Lessons from Somalia: Chapter 2 Crisis context.

<sup>186</sup> Alexandra Lewis and Neil Winn (2018): Understanding the Connections between the EU Global Strategy and Somali Peacebuilding Education Needs and Priorities, Global Policy, 9 (4). pp. 501-512. ISSN 1758-5880.

<sup>187</sup> OECD: Top Ten Donors of Gross ODA for Somalia 2018-2019, accessed 2 May 2022; Development Initiatives (2022): Supporting longer term development in crises at the nexus: Lessons from Somalia: Chapter 2 Crisis context.

<sup>188</sup> Development Initiatives (2022): Supporting longer term development in crises at the nexus: Lessons from Somalia: Chapter 2 Crisis context.

<sup>189</sup> Tobias Hagmann (2016): Stabilization, Extraversion and Political Settlements in Somalia, Rift Valley Institute.

<sup>190</sup> Tobias Hagmann (2016): Stabilization, Extraversion and Political Settlements in Somalia, Rift Valley Institute; Sarah Phillips (2016): When less was more: external assistance and the political settlement in Somaliland, International Affairs.

whereas donors had significant influence over Somalia's political settlement and shaped elite bargains through their control of important resources.<sup>191</sup>

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<sup>191</sup> Tobias Hagmann (2016): *Stabilization, Extraversion and Political Settlements in Somalia*, Rift Valley Institute.

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Our mission is to contribute to sustainable development, the eradication of poverty, peace and the protection of human rights, through international partnerships that uphold and promote European values and interests.

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