

**"FICHE CONTRADICTOIRE"**  
**EVALUATION OF EU COOPERATION WITH THE EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA AND INDIAN OCEAN REGIONS 2008-2015**  
*(For full details of the recommendations please refer to the Main Report)*

<i>Recommendations</i>	<i>Responses of Services</i>	<i>Follow-up (one year later)</i>
<b>EU Headquarters</b>		
<p><b>Recommendation #1 – Further develop regional partnerships beyond the DMROs in areas where such collaboration can potentially achieve regional goals more effectively.</b></p> <p><i>Rationale:</i> In areas that go beyond the DMRO role of facilitating regional solutions and where the DMROs are not the natural partners, applying the subsidiarity principle and entrusting implementation to specialist organisations can be an effective approach. Examples include regional power pools, corridor authorities, AU-IBAR, AFRITAC and regional business councils. Such partnerships can deliver results when the partners are recognised and respected specialist entities with a clear vision and the capacity and practical competences to deliver tailored solutions. This recommendation can be achieved through the following actions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ ‘Map’ the region to ascertain which organisations are adding value and have built up a solid reputation for good management, good governance and getting results in specific areas (avoiding those that are at arm’s length from end users).</li> <li>▪ Initiate discussions with the most promising potential partners. Think strategically and ‘outside the box’ about how collaboration with the aforementioned could help to achieve regional goals (e.g. work with regional business councils in their advocacy for reforms and monitoring implementation of regional agreements in key areas of interest to their members).</li> <li>▪ Work more closely with organisations that support and can apply pressure to enhance compliance with treaties and conventions and reduce corruption (e.g. WTO, WCO and UN bodies all have review mechanisms that could be used to better effect in the region)</li> </ul> <p><u>Implementation responsibility:</u> DEVCO/EEAS, country and regional EUDs, EU MS</p>	<p>Agreed:</p> <p>Sector specific organisations of the region itself, such as the Nile Basin Initiative, International Conference for the Great Lakes Region, Eastern Africa Power Pool, Southern Africa Power Pool and others, are systematically involved in implementation in their areas of expertise and competence, though not necessarily for the administration of funds. Their capacities are assessed on a case by case basis during identification and formulation of projects. As such, the development of regional partnerships beyond DMROs is an ongoing and continuous process.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Mapping of African regional organisations, beyond DMROs, is available (e.g. by ECPDM) and will be further developed and used as a basis for EDF purposes, acknowledging that capacities and governance are constantly evolving.</li> <li>▪ Discussions and capacity assessments take place on a case by case basis during identification and formulation of projects.</li> <li>▪ Implementing partners are defined on the basis of their relevance to the objectives of the project and may include international organisations such as UN bodies, in conformity with the principle of "direct access" of the 11<sup>th</sup> EDF RIP, the appropriateness of which will be assessed for the next programming cycle.</li> </ul>	

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<p><b>Recommendation #2 – Focus support to DMROs on core business and on reducing external dependency.</b></p> <p><i>Rationale:</i> Despite years of donor support, the DMROs' <i>raison d'être</i> and sustainability remain tenuous. They are dependent on donors for 60-80% of their expenditure and rely on project positions even for core work. Stakeholders widely believe that DMROs have overextended themselves (due largely to donor projects) and should refocus on their core business: i.e. promoting the right policy settings and offering the regional solutions and support to underpin them. This recommendation can be achieved through the following actions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Convene the main donor partners for each DMRO with the goal of establishing common donor positions on such issues as DMRO relevance, capacity and sustainability, exit strategies, and how to address in a cohesive way key drivers and hindrances to regional integration (e.g. political will, vested interests, governance, monitoring and enforcement of regional commitments, etc).</li> <li>▪ Commission multi-donor and DMRO-sponsored comprehensive independent organisational audits of the DMROs to formally complement the pillar assessments and provide a clear, transparent picture of exactly what permanent skills, capabilities and competences exist, and how these match each DMRO's mandate and regional priorities.</li> <li>▪ Continue to focus institutional support on enhancing DMRO accountability (transparency, credibility, merit-based recruiting, results-oriented reporting on use of funds, independent audits, proper M&amp;E units, professional communications capabilities). Intensify support for effective monitoring and enforcement tools, including regional peer review mechanisms in key areas. Review the effectiveness of the support regularly, including through surveys of MS.</li> <li>▪ Institute greater DMRO co-funding.</li> <li>▪ Clearly define (with DMROs and other donor partners) the regional and national aspects and competences for private sector development initiatives, and locate responsibility accordingly, bearing in mind that most PSD work requires national implementation. Apply the principle of subsidiarity in all areas where it is clearly indicated. (But ensure that 'subsidiarity' is not used internally as a new way of distributing donor-funded 'largesse'.)</li> </ul>	<p>Agreed:</p> <p>All DMROs count with allocations for institutional capacity development, which include support for developing mechanisms of resource mobilisation and financial sustainability. COMESA, SADC, IGAD and EAC have gone through a pillar assessment and follow-up measures are in place.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ COM will continue to engage with the existing donor groups or 'friends of ' groups for all DMROs and support their effectiveness where needed.</li> <li>▪ An organisational audit of IGAD has been realised and has been the basis for a restructuring exercise and for the definition of donor support to institutional capacity. SADC is going through a comprehensive restructuring, supported by the RIP. COMESA plans an institutional audit under the 11<sup>th</sup> EDF allocation for capacity development.</li> <li>▪ Institutional support has been defined for IGAD, IOC and SADC and is ongoing, covering the mentioned issues. For EAC and COMESA support to institutional development is merged with projects supporting regional economic integration formulated under the present RIP.</li> <li>▪ The issue of DMRO co-funding will be proposed for inclusion in the agenda of the regular meetings of the High Level Group (HLG).</li> <li>▪ Trade and private sector development are considered in the context of regional cooperation as aspects of regional economic integration. Programmes have been formulated with interventions both at regional and at national level. This approach will continue under the External Investment Plan, pillars 2 (technical assistance) and 3 (investment climate) and further</li> </ul>	

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<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Develop an EU HQ (and EU member states) demand-based mentoring network to apply more strategically EU practical experience and expertise in key areas of regional integration, peace and security, and natural resources management. Draw on the experience of EU dialogue facilities in other countries, such as South Africa.</li> <li>▪ Develop and publicise exit strategies for all programmes. This will focus attention on sustainability issues that have been overlooked and put pressure on DMRO member states to take hard decisions.</li> </ul> <p><u>Implementation responsibility:</u> DEVCO/EEAS, country and regional EUDs, EU MS</p>	<p>fine-tuning will also take place in the next programming cycle starting 2020.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ In the context of the HLG, DMROs' needs and expectations with regard to a "mentoring network" will be assessed and a follow-up defined.</li> <li>▪ The integration of exit strategies in projects and programmes will be mainstreamed through the Quality Review process (QSG). Action Documents, containing the relevant exit strategy, are publicised when decided.</li> </ul>	
<p><b>Recommendation #3 - Strengthen regional/national coherence, making better use of current and new analysis, in order to improve the impact of regional interventions.</b></p> <p><i>Rationale:</i> EU national and regional support is focusing on the right areas overall in terms of regional integration, peace and security, and natural resources management. Better coherence between regional and country programmes and projects in terms of design, formulation and management would enhance their impact. Simplifying and reducing the complexity of future support would enhance efficiency. This recommendation can be achieved through the following actions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Use existing analysis on political economy and undertake new analyses as necessary to help further focus on the areas of assistance that are likely to yield results, with the aim of potentially reducing the breadth of support.</li> <li>▪ Clearly define the divisions between regional and national programming in areas that have some regional elements but where most of the work is national [e.g. quality infrastructure (SPS/TBT), services, statistics, SME export readiness, value chains].</li> <li>▪ Ensure that support for broad programmes (e.g. trade facilitation, infrastructure, resilience) is focused, well-defined, well targeted, well monitored, and located in the right place in DMROs and national governments, with clear coordination/communication lines between regional and country EUDs. (These areas tend to involve many players; hence, the need for effective and efficient design and management.)</li> <li>▪ On migration, increasing policy coherence for development would entail</li> </ul>	<p>Partially agreed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Admittedly national / regional coherence should be further improved. Frequent and stronger coordination between the NAOs and the RAO should be encouraged. In particular, COM will assess how to include regional integration in "article 8" political dialogues with partner countries so as to encourage more commitment to resourcing of regional organisations and ownership of their agendas.</li> <li>▪ In the context of the next programming cycle, political economy analysis can be strengthened and used to shore the definition of focal areas of support and scope and type of intervention.</li> <li>▪ Strengthening of the regional/ national linkages is foreseen in the different capacity building projects under the 11<sup>th</sup> EDF RIP. Coherence between national and regional programmes will be further enhanced in the context of the next programming cycle.</li> <li>▪ The governance structure of complex programmes is designed so as to ensure correct involvement of all relevant stakeholders, ensuring appropriate information sharing and decision making. The appropriateness of this aspect will be verified in</li> </ul>	

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<p>taking stock of all actions that relate to migration (basic services, livelihoods and connection to blue economy, protection of migrants, CVE), identifying synergies and having a programme approach, rather than go for a multiplicity of disconnected projects.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Formalise EUD-to-EUD communications and information flows, and coordination mechanisms. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Designate regional focal points in each EUD (some have, some do not).</li> <li>- Hold annual sectoral meetings for national and regional technical staff.</li> <li>- Improve communication between technical and political officers, in order to facilitate a common understanding of the ‘big picture’ regionally.</li> <li>- Develop appropriate knowledge-management systems to ensure a comprehensive repository of relevant documentation.</li> </ul> </li> <li>▪ Consider a Regional EUD to cover all the Tripartite DMROs.</li> </ul> <p><u>Implementation responsibility:</u> DEVCO/EEAS, country and regional EUDs</p>	<p>the mid-term evaluations of the projects under the 11<sup>th</sup> EDF RIP.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The Commission has revised and improved its approach to programming. In particular, under the current Annual Action programming, a comprehensive approach enhances links between migration policy priorities, programming, financing instruments and implementation modalities to ensure coherence and complementarity in all actions.</li> <li>▪ COM will take steps to ensure all concerned delegations have a focal point for regional integration issues.</li> <li>▪ Sector meetings with national and regional staff are a normal part of coordination of external action.</li> <li>▪ Information sharing between Political and Operations sections will be further emphasised.</li> <li>▪ A dedicated page on the Capacity for Development webpage exists and can be further developed as a repository for relevant documentation.</li> <li>▪ In view of quality policy and political dialogue with each of the DMROs, the presence of an EU delegation at the regional organisations' HQ is an important advantage. In addition, the tripartite is a temporary process, due to be overtaken by the CFTA process. Therefore a single EUD covering the three DMROs is not being considered.</li> </ul>	
<p><b>Recommendation #4 - Engage more actively with non-state actors in future phases of regional support.</b></p> <p><i>Rationale:</i> Non-state actors, particularly the private sector, are important drivers for regional integration. The additionality of EU’s contribution has been high when engaging with non-state actors. This recommendation can be achieved through actions such as:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Continue and intensify policy dialogue with the DMROs and their</li> </ul>	<p>Agreed:</p> <p>Involvement of NSAs, including private sector, in programme definition and implementation is being mainstreamed in the present programming period though it remains a delicate issue of contend with the DMROs.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Therefore it will be on the agenda of the policy</li> </ul>	

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<p>member states on the importance of non-state actor involvement.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Provide funding for supportive studies on how best to mobilise and improve the enabling environment for non-state actors.</li> <li>▪ Directly support private sector and civil society apex organisations that are relevant for regional integration.</li> <li>▪ Link regional support to country-level support for non-state actors, through EU country programmes and/or by supporting coordinated efforts by EU member state and other donors that take a leading role in supporting civil society and the private sector.</li> </ul> <p><u>Implementation responsibility:</u> Regional and national EUDs, DMROs</p>	<p>dialogue in the context of the HLG.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Under the 11<sup>th</sup> EDF RIP such initiatives have already been taken, in particular for the SADC region. They can be completed in the remaining years of the present programming period, possibly with funds of the Technical Cooperation Facility.</li> <li>▪ Non-state actors are being involved in implementation of in particular cross-regional programmes (e.g. Nile Basin Initiative, Okavango commission, wildlife conservation organisations, Lake Victoria Fisheries Organisation, etc.). This practice will continue for the remainder of the programming period. Also business support organisations are being involved in the 11<sup>th</sup> EDF RIP, e.g. Cross-Border Trade Associations and similar in the COMESA region, SADC national committees including business organisations and CSOs for policy development, networks of chambers of commerce of the Indian Ocean region, and others. This approach will continue under the External Investment Plan, pillars 2 (technical assistance) and 3 (investment climate). Under the latter the Sustainable Business for Africa platform is particularly relevant for enhancing a structured dialogue with the private sector.</li> <li>▪ During identification of individual projects, complementarity with national level interventions of the EU and other donors is systematically analysed and developed.</li> </ul>	
<p><b>Recommendation #5 - Sharpen the political and policy dialogue.</b></p> <p><i>Rationale:</i> The EU's overall strategic interest is articulated in the JAES and Global Strategy, but it is not operationalised in political or policy dialogue. The overall theory of change behind the EU's regional cooperation with EA-SA-IO is increasingly complex and, as a result, the political and policy messages sent by the EU to its partners (and staff) can appear ambiguous.</p>	<p>Agreed:</p> <p>Political dialogue with regional organisations already takes place on a number of issues on a regular basis (with EAC on Burundi, with SADC on the Great Lakes, with IGAD on border management and transnational threats etc.). EU-SADC ministerial</p>	

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<p>This recommendation can be achieved through actions such as:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Develop a policy dialogue agenda and strategy for each partner (including DMRO member states) based on supportive studies where needed and well-coordinated with EU member states and other development partners.</li> <li>▪ Translate the high-level political dialogue that goes on at High Representative/ Vice President, Minister and Ambassador-level into clear priorities for EU project staff, to empower them to act as a true partner to DMROs - not just as a donor.</li> <li>▪ Build on the EU experience in regional integration and develop peer-to-peer and twinning mechanisms to deepen the partnership, share experience and transfer skills. This could be triggered by an exploratory DMRO-to-EU dialogue on which areas of EU experience might be most valuable in terms of helping DMROs achieve their objectives. .</li> </ul> <p><u>Implementation responsibility</u>: DEVCO/EEAS, EUD to the AU, regional and national EUDs.</p>	<p>meetings are organised on an annual basis.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The HLG in its meeting of 6 October 2017 agreed to design a format for further strengthening policy and political dialogue individually with each DMRO and, depending on the topic, jointly with the 5 DMROs. This should be decided upon in the next HLG meeting scheduled for Q3 2018.</li> <li>▪ Peer-to-peer and twinning mechanisms can be integrated in the above-mentioned "mentoring framework" for which in the context of the HLG DMROs' needs and expectations will be assessed and a follow-up defined, in complementarity with already ongoing initiatives.</li> </ul>	
<p><b>Recommendation #6 - Strengthen the reporting and results focus.</b></p> <p><i>Rationale</i>: The focus in EDF 10 has been on monitoring disbursements rather than results, and although the EDF 11 results framework is stronger than that of EDF 10, there is still a risk that the practice may continue. This recommendation can be achieved through actions such as:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Continue to support DMRO and other implementation partners in developing their own results frameworks.</li> <li>▪ Create/improve, with regional funding, an electronic overview of projects which is accessible by all EUDs.</li> <li>▪ Consider outsourcing some aspects of monitoring until partners are able to provide the necessary reporting.</li> </ul> <p><u>Implementation responsibility</u>: DEVCO, regional EUDs, DMROs</p>	<p>Agreed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Support to strengthening DMROs' monitoring capacities is being considered in the foreseen capacity development projects available to each DMRO. This is an ongoing process that will continue in the near future.</li> <li>▪ On Capacity for Development a group on regional integration in EA-SA-IO has been created and includes a repository of projects decided under the 11<sup>th</sup> EDF RIP.</li> <li>▪ Action Documents on projects and programmes include a dedicated section on monitoring. Therefore each project has its monitoring framework with indicators, baseline and target values.</li> </ul>	

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<p><b>Recommendation #7 - Support an African-led rationalisation of the regional architecture and DMROs' mandates.</b></p> <p><i>Rationale:</i> Regional integration and the effectiveness of EU support for regional integration is hindered by overlapping DMRO memberships and concurrent initiatives related to the African Union, regional and continental trade and other agreements, and EPAs. There are opportunities to streamline the regional integration architecture and bring mandates closer to member state aspirations and level of commitment. The regions are different and will require a differentiated approach, especially regarding the IOC which is composed solely of island states. This recommendation can be achieved through actions such as:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Initiate discussion with the AU and DMROs on the appetite for a radical rethink and rationalisation of regional integration, building on recent high-level reports focusing on reforms.</li> <li>▪ Convene a high-level meeting to discuss the challenges and opportunities to rationalise the regional architecture.</li> <li>▪ Support an African-led task force to develop options.</li> </ul> <p><u>Implementation responsibility:</u> DEVCO/EEAS, regional EUDs, DMROs</p>	<p>Partially agreed:</p> <p>The EU is supportive of African-led harmonisation efforts such as the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA), and will continue to advocate for further and deeper rationalisation. This is in line with the EU's strategic support to the process following the Kagame report: there is a need to strengthen and clarify the system of interaction between the continental and regional levels, in line with the principles of subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantage (as per Art. IV of the 2008 MoU on Peace and Security signed by the AU, RECs and RMs).</p> <p>The issue of overlapping memberships was latest discussed with Eastern Africa DMROs in the Djibouti regional seminar of May 2017, though without concrete conclusions.</p> <p>The extent and pace of further rationalisation is entirely dependent on the political will of the member countries.</p> <p>Moreover, it should be considered at pan-African level which is outside the scope of this evaluation and its follow-up.</p>	
<p><b>Sector-Specific Actions: Regional Integration</b></p> <p>In addition to the recommendations above, programme effectiveness in the EA-SA-IO region as regards the regional integration elements could be improved through the following actions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Conduct in-depth analysis on the drivers of change and the impediments to change in EA-SA-IO regional integration, with the aim of targeting efforts more precisely on where they are most likely to deliver the desired results.</li> <li>▪ Review EU 'strategic interests' in the EA-SA-IO region and build them into strategic planning.</li> <li>▪ Focus capacity-building on sustainable skills development and 'learning by doing' in areas where permanent core competences are needed to deliver longer-term results (not only in DMROs, but also in other organisations involved in regional integration and market development -</li> </ul>	<p>Agreed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The identification of projects and programmes includes a stakeholder analysis including elements of political economy analysis. This aspect can be emphasised in the quality review process.</li> <li>▪ The Mid-Term Review is taking into account the EU's strategic interests, in particular in relation with the evolving priorities of security and job creation. In addition, the next programming cycle will also allow for capturing the strategic interests in the medium term planning.</li> <li>▪ Skills development will be threaded throughout the different economic integration programmes during formulation. Key players in this field, other</li> </ul>	

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<p>e.g. quality infrastructure).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Private sector development and value chain support is best left to the country level except where it relates directly and tangibly to the regional settings required to underpin business and trade development (e.g. competition policy, intellectual property, SPS/TBT/NTBs, mutual recognition arrangements, border efficiency measures, etc).</li> </ul> <p><u>Implementation responsibility</u>: DEVCO/EEAS, country and regional EUDs, EU Member States</p>	<p>than the DMROs, are also being targeted by capacity development interventions, such as business organisations and CSO platforms.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>For actions of PSD and value chain support variable geometry is applied, entrusting formulation and implementation to the most appropriate level. For instance, support to EPA implementation is implemented at national level, while integration issues such as harmonisation of standards or networking of business organisations is coordinated at regional level.</li> </ul>	
<p><b>Sector-Specific Actions: Peace, security and stability</b></p> <p>EU regional cooperation with EA-SA-IO in peace, security and stability has some results to show, both at output and outcome levels, and the intervention logic is still valid overall, but cooperation in peace and security could be much more effective and efficient with a needs-based focus, underpinned by a more strategic dialogue with partners; an overview of what the AU and each DMRO is best suited to do; and a sharper focus on drivers and barriers.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>More needs-based approach focusing on what is needed most in the sub-region (what themes, what member states, what crossborder areas), entailing much more systematic engagement with national EU Delegations, and from REC Secretariats, with member states. A much more strategic, substantive and sustained dialogue on REC priorities, plans and organisation (rather than a dialogue that is primarily about funding and funding requirements).</li> <li>A mapping, to the extent possible agreed with the AU/REC leadership at the highest level, on what the AU and each REC are best placed to do, respectively, by theme/priority issues/crisis (e.g. mediation in Burundi; early warning in the Horn; electoral observation mission in DRC; etc.) but also by function (who leads the political/policy dialogue on a particular issue; who leads policy coordination on it; who implements the related projects, if not the member states themselves). For example, there are six DMROs/regional initiatives in EA-SA-IO, plus the AU, plus ECCAS and CEPGL that concern DR Congo, all with a mandate on peace and security. It is imperative that the EU and its member states have a more united approach to supporting regional organisations and</li> </ul>	<p>Partially agreed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>There is indeed a need to enhance the rationalisation of EU support to DMROs in the field of peace, security and stability. However it is important to be realistic about the complexity of peace and security architecture in sub-Saharan Africa. The EU always acts in support of the African Union and the lead regional organisations in a particular situation, as in the case of Burundi, South Sudan or the Great Lakes.</li> <li>In the strengthened policy dialogue of the HLG, the Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) will be maintained as an agenda item so as to ensure continued alignment to DMRO priorities and needs. The issue is already at the heart of the policy dialogue with IGAD. A needs assessment and mapping of complementary actions has been performed with SADC and EAC in the preparatory work for the comprehensive RIP sub-regional programmes in this field.</li> <li>APSA has a layered structure with specific responsibilities at AU and REC level, to which EDF support has to be aligned.</li> </ul>	



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<p>initiatives so as to avoid contributing to African efforts at rationalisation, to limit duplications, and stop funding initiatives that have no support from African member states and/or are better handled by some organisations/initiatives over others.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ A much sharper focus on the drivers of and hurdles to democratisation, human rights, peace and security (who are the big impact drivers, and how to support them; who are the main spoilers and how to engage or circumvent them).</li> </ul> <p><u>Implementation responsibility:</u> DEVCO/EEAS, regional EUDs, AU/DMRO leadership and member states</p>		
<p><b>Sector-Specific Actions: Natural resource management</b></p> <p>In addition to the recommendations above, programme effectiveness in the EA-SA-IO region could be improved through the following actions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Ensure the results and processes achieved in biodiversity in the IGAD and IOC regions are not abandoned. Further support is needed, whether from EU or other sources, to ensure that the EDF10 investment will yield real results. The cross-regional wildlife project is an important programme, but it will not be able on its own to ensure this. This recommendation is also supportive of EU's commitment made at the COP11 (Hyderabad) for the UN Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) to double its funding for biodiversity (a commitment which at the EA-SA-IO regional level is currently not being implemented).</li> <li>▪ Link regional initiatives with national level action – and capacity development with tangible engagement on the ground with visible results. This can for example be done through close cooperation with EU bilateral programmes or programmes by other donors.</li> </ul> <p><u>Implementation responsibility:</u> DEVCO/EEAS, regional EUDs, AU/DMROs leadership and member states</p>	<p>Agreed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The sustainability of the actions achieved under the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF biodiversity project in the Indian Ocean region, will to the extent possible be factored in the IOC sub-regional allocation for mitigation of and adaptation to climate change effects and disaster risk reduction. This consideration will be taken up in the formulation process of this new programme.</li> <li>▪ For each project or programme under development complementarity and synergies are to be sought and developed. This aspect will be closely scrutinised during the quality review process so as to ensure full relevance of proposed actions.</li> </ul>	