



Review of strategic evaluations managed by DEVCO (2000-2015)

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(2000-2015)**

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*The opinions expressed in this document represent the authors' points of view
which are not necessarily shared by the European Commission
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List of acronyms

AB	French abbr., see BS
ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States
ACT	Advocacy and Communications Group
AfDB	African Development Bank
ALA	Asia and Latin America (DCI-ALA)
AMS	Apparel Lesotho Alliance to Fight Aids
ASAL	Arid and Semi-Arid Land
ASCE	Higher authority of state control
AU	African Union
BDS	Business development services
BizClim	Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility
BS	Budget support
BSG	Budget Support Group
BTSF	Better Training for Safer Food
CA	Contribution Agreement
CAR	Central African Republic
CBI	Cross-Border Initiative
CBO	Community-based organisations
CDE	Centre for the Development of Enterprise
CDEMA	Caribbean Disaster and Emergency Management Agency
CDTF	Community Development Trust Fund
CEDEAO	Communauté économique des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest
CEMAC	Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa
CGP	Child Grant Programme
CNCS	National AIDS Council
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CPA	Cotonou Partnership Agreement
CPMR	Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Programme
CPPB	Conflict Prevention and Peace Building
CSE	Country strategy evaluation
CSO	Civil society organisation
CSP	Country strategy paper
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (OECD)
DCI	Development Co-operation Instrument
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reconstruction
DEVCO	Directorate-General for International Co-operation and Development (EuropeAid)
DFID	Department for International Development (UK government)

DG	Directorate-General
DP	Development Partner
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EAC	Eastern African Community
EBA	Everything But Arms Initiative
EC	European Community
ECHO	The European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department
ECOWAS	Economic Community Of West African States
EDF	European Development Fund
EEAS	European External Action Service
EIB	European Investment Bank
EIDHR	The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
EOM	Election Observation Mission
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
ESA	Eastern and Southern Africa
ESI	Employment and Social Inclusion
EUD	Delegation of the European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FOMUC	CEMAC multinational force
GBS	General budget support
GCCA	Global Climate Change Alliance
GDP	Gross domestic product
GEEREF	Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Fund
GEWE	Gender Equality and Women Empowerment
GFATM	Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
GIZ	German Development Agency
HDI	Human Development Index
HIPC	Highly Indebted and Poor Countries
HR	Human Rights
IBM	Integrated Border Management
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICLEI	International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives
ICPD	International Conference on Population and Development
ICT	Information and communication technology
IDB	Islamic Development Bank
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFI	International financial institution
IMF	International Monetary Fund

IMPACS	Implementation Agency for Crime and Security
JAR	Joint Annual Review
JAS	Joint Assistance Strategies
JEU	Joint Evaluation Unit
JMD	Jamaican Dollar
LDCs	Least developed countries
LRRD	Linking Relief Rehabilitation and Development
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MDTFs	Multi Donor Trust Funds
MFF	Multiannual Financial Framework
MFI	Micro-finance Institutions
MICOPAX	Mission de consolidation de la paix en Centrafrique
MMEs	Mid-Market Enterprises
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MS	Member State
MSME	Small and Micro Enterprise
MTE	Mid-Term Evaluation
NAD	Namibian Dollar
NAO	National Authorising Officer
NDMA	National Drought Management Authority
NEMA	National Environmental Management Agency
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NIP	National Indicative Programme
NSA	Non-state actors
OAS	Organization of American States
OCTs	Overseas Countries and Territories
OECD	Organisation for
OVCs	Orphans and other Vulnerable Children
PA	Public Administration
PAF	Performance Assessment Framework
PAFGA	EDF — support programme for the gum arabic sector
PAFIB	Programme d'Appui à la Filière Bovine
PAGE	Partnership for Action on Green economy
PALOP	Portuguese speaking African countries
PanAf	Pan-African Programme
PARPA	Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty
PARSET	Projet éducation V Appui à la réforme du secteur éducatif au Tchad

PCAD	UNDP's project for the collection of arms for development
PEAP	Poverty Eradication Action Plan
PEFA	Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability
PEMFA	Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability
PEMFAR	Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability Review
PEPFAR	President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
PFM	Public Finance Management
PIFS	Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat
PNDDR	National programme for disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration
PNG	Papua New Guinea
PPPs	Public-private partnership
PRBS	Poverty Reduction Budget Support
PRDs	Poverty related diseases
PRGF	Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
PRP	Poverty Reduction Programme
PRSP	Poverty reduction strategy paper
PSD	Private sector development
PSNP	Productive Safety Net Programme
PTF	Partenaire Technique et Financier
RAO	Regional Authorising Officer
RAP	Reform Action Plan
RECs	African Regional Economic Communities
RIPs	Regional Indicative Programme
ROM	Results-oriented management
RSP	Regional Strategy Paper
RuSACCO	Rural Savings and Credit Cooperatives Organizations
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SBCs	State Building Contracts
SBS	Sectoral Budget support
SIDA	French abbr., AIDS
SMEs	Small and medium-sized enterprises
SPC	Secretariat of the Pacific Community
SPS	Sanitary and Phytosanitary
SRIP	Support to Reforming Institutions Programme
SSRP	Security Sector Reform Programme
STABEX	Système de Stabilisation des Recettes d'Exportation
SUN	Scaling Up Nutrition Network
SWAp	Sector-Wide Approach

SYSMIN	System of Stabilization of Export Earnings from Mining Products
TA	Technical Assistance
TACIS	Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States
TB	Tuberculosis
TBT	Technical Barriers to Trade
TCB	Trade Capacity Building
TCF	Technical Co-operation Facility
TFPs	Technical and financial partners
ToR	Terms of Reference
TRA	Trade Related Assistance
TRC	Transformation resource centre
UEMOA	French abbr., see WAEMU
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Commission on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	The United Nations Children's Fund
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNW	United Nations Women
VIH	French abbr., see HIV
VOC	Vehicle operating costs
WAEMU	West African Economic and Monetary Union
WATSAN	Water and Sanitation
WB	World Bank
WSSSRP	Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Reform Programme
ZAMMOD	Macroeconomic Model and Simulator of Zambia

1 Executive Summary

Objectives and scope

The present study is part of a DG DEVCO and EEAS comprehensive evaluation of the Cotonou partnership agreement. It covers the geographical (country and regional), thematic and aid modalities evaluations related to ACP countries, managed by DEVCO since 2000. It is one of the four inputs contributing to the comprehensive evaluation.

The study encompasses analysis and synthesis of findings, conclusions and key lessons from the evaluations, based on a predetermined set of twelve evaluation questions (with the related Judgement Criteria) that will serve as guidance for the analysis.

Methodological issues

The reconstructed intervention logics (for the whole CPA and for each of its three pillars) have been established and the predetermined EQs and judgement criteria provided by the Evaluation Management Group have been tested.

The 111 evaluation reports provided by the management group have been classified and structured according to relevance criteria, so as to diversify the level of their consideration in the final assessments.

A number of codes corresponding to the Judgement Criteria have been created and the reports have been red extracting the text segments corresponding to the codes, including the different levels of relevance mentioned above.

A first work of synthesis has been carried out on the codified text segments. Then such synthesis has been tested and reviewed through further reading of the most relevant reports.

A second work of synthesis has been carried out to arrive at the current formulation of answers to the EQs.

The answers to the EQs have been summarised in two final products:

- The conclusions, according to the main evaluation criteria, as coming from the evaluation reports, their weighting and comparison; and
- The lessons learned, according to some main thematic areas, as identifiable in a sufficient number of reports.

Summary of the conclusions

Relevance of the CPA as from the strategic evaluations

Compared to the key CPA objectives of poverty reduction (through sustainable development) and integration into the world economy, the programmes evaluated in the strategic evaluations have appeared to be rather relevant.

In particular, **poverty reduction** is recognised as being the main focus of the different geographic and thematic programmes. It is pursued through relevant pro-poor support to macroeconomic stabilisation, improved public expenditure, social development, trade and transport, good governance and peace building policies. Ownership by the partners, a condition of the relevance of the objectives, is not always at the necessary level to ensure effective implementation.

The objective of **integration into the world economy** has been strengthened in the last decade at the regional level and in a number of economically stronger countries, and has received a significant push by the EPA strategy, although its implementation has been delayed. Its focus remains on trade growth, while the diversification of the economies and the support to competitive supply chains remains weak.

Effectiveness of CPA as evidenced by the strategic evaluations

Growth and social policies. An effective contribution in this area has been provided mainly through budget support¹ since the 1990s. Macroeconomic stabilisation and improved public financial management have been effectively supported, budgetary allocations to social sectors have been protected, and policy design and implementation in health and education have been enhanced, although much remains to be done, particularly at the institutional level.

In the last decade, however, budget support seems to have partly lost its leverage, especially in the fastest-growing countries, due to its reduced financial weight on recipients' budgets and also due to the weakening of the shared framework of priorities between the partner countries and the EU MS.

Private sector development has been fostered by macroeconomic and fiscal stabilisation and also by the improved trade regulatory systems and the reinforcement of the transport networks (particularly at the regional level), which together have contributed to the improvement of the local business environment and export opportunities. The contribution to the strengthening of private sector organisations, their direct participation in the political and economic processes, and the strengthening and diversification of the supply chains, however, is less evident.

Good governance has been pursued with mixed results. With respect to democratic governance, the support to the electoral processes has been effective in many countries. The dialogue on human rights has comprised a large share of the political dialogue over the last decade, although it seems linked to specific occasions and its general effects are rather limited and sometimes volatile. Good governance as a whole, including economic governance and commitment to the shared reform agenda, is not systematically addressed in the political dialogue. Efforts to establish comprehensive and country-tailored governance platforms as a base for local partnerships (e.g. the Governance Initiative in the 10th EDF) have not been developed.

Support to regional organisations has contributed to enhancing their capacities for trade and economic development. In the meantime, regional organisations such as the Africa Union and Western Africa have demonstrated appropriate capacity to tackle some of the most acute regional security crises. A problematic institutional framework, however, has limited the effectiveness of CPA action. An intensification of the support for regional trade and economic development should have come from the implementation of the EPAs, but the EU ability to leverage the different regional partners has partly weakened and the disparity of interests and commitment among them has remained an obstacle.

Conflict prevention, management and resolution have been effectively addressed in recent years. The capacity of the regional organisations to intervene in conflict management and peace building has been enhanced (AU, ECOWAS and others). However, some main structural weaknesses remain. Despite its credibility for its plural and rather neutral political position, EU leadership is still weak when addressing the root causes of regional conflicts and defining longer-term arrangements.

Effective support to fragile states is still a challenge, despite improved approaches over the last decade. The combination of different tools, state building and non-state actors' mobilisation, and short- and medium-term approaches has proven to be effective. The coordinating role and capacities of the local partners, including beneficiaries and EU Delegations and other DPs, as well as long-term commitment are still weak.

Impacts of CPA as evidenced by the strategic evaluations

Poverty reduction. The overall contribution to poverty reduction has been significant, via the contributions to macroeconomic stabilisation, improved PFM, trade capacity, including strengthening of the main transport networks, increased public expenditure in social sectors, etc. All such public policies and country/regional capacities strengthened by CPA have contributed to economic growth and to increased access of the poor to the basic services, thus alleviating both income and non-income poverty reduction.

¹ BS has represented about 30% of the disbursements since the early '90s and has reached peaks of 50% under the 10th EDF.

However, the contribution to inclusive growth, with an improved level of participation by the poor, and an accelerated reduction of the poverty incidence, has been weak. As expected, the CPA has not been able to influence the internal mechanisms of income distribution and the key political economy equilibria in the ACP societies. In particular, the productivity of the labour in agriculture and urban informal sector, where most employment is still concentrated, has not increased as it should have to support inclusive growth.

Equitable access to basic services. The CPA has significantly contributed to improved equitable access to basic social services (education, health, water and sanitation) and to improved living standards among the ACP populations and the poor. Over the last few decades, CPA support (combined with other BS providers) has provided a substantial share (although decreasing in recent years) of the development expenditure in the mentioned sectors in many ACP countries. Such financial support has often been complemented through policy advice and capacity development, thus accompanying the efforts by country leadership. Overall, the impact on improved equitable access to primary education, basic health services and clean water has been relatively high, although the quality of institutional change and the sustainability of the achievements remain low.

Trade flows. Over the last fifteen years, the trade flows between the ACPs and the rest of the world have increased almost at the same pace as the world trade, with Africa being a champion, second only to the Eastern Asia region. Trade growth has been a main driver for global economic growth in the ACPs. This has overturned a trend of deterioration of the ACP's position in international trade, which lasted from the '70s. The evaluations contain significant evidence on the important contribution provided by CPA to trade facilitation, including enhanced trade regulations, liberalisation and capacity in the ACP countries and the improvement of the basic transport infrastructure on the main regional axes. The key determinant of trade growth, however, is international demand, while trade facilitation plays a key role when demand is high. Indeed the diversification of the supply remains a weak feature of the ACP trade. As seen in the evaluations, this is also a weak point for CPA contribution.

Democracy and human rights. Progress was made in the 1990s, with a significant reduction in authoritarian regimes, however, progress slowed in the 2000s. A majority of so-called anocracies, or hybrid regimes with mixed democratic and authoritarian features, has been established in areas destabilised by regional and internal conflicts. CPA action in this area has increased in the last decade. The contribution to the electoral processes has been significant and widespread, and the political dialogue on HR - including associated support - has been provided on a case-by-case basis as needed with mixed results. Overall, the CPA contributions have remained rather fragmented and not yet adequately mainstreamed in the main country programme.

Peace and security. Underlying causes of conflicts and actual conflicts have multiplied in the last few decades, especially in Africa. The international community's capacity to react has improved at various levels, with considerable involvement by the regional organisations. The EU has been at the forefront of the response action. In all the conflict regions in Africa, the EU has been one of the main partners of the Africa Union (as well as of ECOWAS, CEMAC, etc.) to enhance their response capacity. The weak political and economic resilience of ACP countries, however, makes most of them vulnerable to increasing worldwide instability. Additionally, the EU has not yet put adequate partnership frameworks and capacities in place in order to tackle the root causes of conflicts, including shared understanding of and action against regional inequalities, discriminations and imbalances.

Sustainability of the achievements so far, as evidenced by the strategic evaluations

ACP economic growth and trade increase are not fully sustainable. Much of the growth recorded by ACP countries in the last few decades is linked to the increased international demand for their raw materials, including oil, gas, other minerals, cocoa and coffee, etc. The diversification of the ACP economies is still lagging. The productivity of the labour in agriculture and the urban informal sector, where most of the working forces are concentrated, is still low.

Social achievements need to be consolidated through institutional development. Evaluations show how social gains can easily be threatened if they are not supported by sustainable institutional changes. Population growth, in many cases, increases vulnerability and can threaten the sustainability of achievements, especially when the countries are affected by economic crises and conflicts.

Democratic processes are still weak and reversible. Even in more advanced cases, the emerging democracies are weak. Still do not have the support of solid middle classes, the systems of checks and balances are still unripe. Are vulnerable to the pressure of powerful groups for state capture.

The root causes of instability and conflicts have not been addressed. The world is in the middle of a complex transition. Strengthening the resilience of existing states and regions in the ACP areas is a necessary response and building solid partnerships to accelerate the consolidation of secure, democratic and competitive areas is an antidote to long-term instability and conflict.

Efficiency of the CPA as from the strategic evaluations

Ownership. The evaluations show that country and regional programmes, although tailored, are often inadequately owned by the national counterparts. The National and Regional Authorising Offices system (NAOs and RAOs) ensures, in many cases, only a formal participation of the partner countries and regions. Apart from the CPA, there is not a country/regional partnership framework based on a comprehensive shared agenda that would support in-depth political and policy dialogue.

Integration of political and policy dialogue. Policy dialogue is often delegated to lower levels, e.g. monitoring and technical negotiations related to single programmes. Policy dialogue is often unable to go beyond the technical nature of the issues, while the factors that determine the actual changes are related to the political commitment of the decision makers. This is why policy dialogue needs continuous support from and a stronger integration with political dialogue.

Flexibility of modalities, instruments and tools. The CPA allows for diversification of funding instruments and financing modalities. This multiplicity of tools should permit the design and implementation of programmes tailored to the actual needs and constraints of the different contexts. It has been found, however, that such multiplicity of tools is not always applied as efficiently as possible. Potentially complementary interventions (emergency, stabilisation and other specialised tools) are often fragmented and not sufficiently coordinated/ coherent with the whole country programmes. There are different reasons for this problematic coordination, including insufficient resources and capacities at the country level (EU Delegations and country ownership).

The regional dimension has shown to be a conducive framework to boost not only trade and economic infrastructure, but also peace and security. The coherence between the regional and national levels, however, represents an important challenge, as the regional institutions are unable to negotiate and ensure national implementation and, national governments often face specific resistances and constraints in the implementation of regional programmes. Regional partnerships, like EPAs, have been unable so far to provide adequate incentives to the weakest national partners and ensure equal benefits from integration.

Efficient management is a main concern of the strategic evaluations. Delays and various inefficiencies, mainly due to the heavy administrative procedures and the lack of staff and capacities at the level of the EU Delegations, are often mentioned in the evaluations as bottlenecks affecting the quality of the programming and implementation cycle.

Efficient monitoring and evaluation systems are in place, but the availability of data on development results is a challenge. The ROM mechanism and the strategic evaluations are the core of a system which is expected to support a continuous learning process and represents a key asset of the CPA. The existing feedback loops at all levels, including HQs and countries, however, do not seem able to ensure the expected learning outcomes.

EU added value and 3 Cs, in the framework of CPA, as evidenced by the strategic evaluations

EU added value is particularly evident in areas such as:

- major general and/or sectoral operations of budget support with actual results. The EU has accumulated much experience in budget support since the early 1990s. It is probably the most important budget support provider aside from development banks. It has established detailed guidelines and a feedback process to learn from the experience. Such added value would be even stronger if EU and member states were more effective at establishing and implementing coordinated action plans and complementary actions around budget support.
- support to regional integration and trade, including main infrastructure networks, but also peace and security and other strategic themes, is an area of strong EU added value in the

CPA framework. The potential at the regional level, including continental organisations like the AU, for strategic actions in a number of key areas for stability and growth, is not yet fully exploited.

- peace and security is another key area where the EU added value is particularly strong. The neutral identity of the EU, combined with its potential ability to represent and bring together some of the most powerful political and military partners of the ACP countries, is the key factor of the EU added value. This puts the EU at the forefront of stabilisation and peace building programmes, although in most cases the necessary initiative and leadership are not yet fully ensured by the EU.
- joint programmes with EU member states should be an area of high added value, but it is still insufficiently exploited (see below, the 3Cs).

Coherence, co-ordination and complementarity (3Cs) are an important concern for the EU in the implementation of the CPA and, especially co-ordination and complementarity with EU member states could be largely improved as shown by the evaluations.

2 Introduction

2.1 Objectives and scope of the review

In view of the approaching negotiations between the EU and its Member States and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States, DG DEVCO and EEAS are planning a **comprehensive evaluation of the current partnership agreement** in force. The present review of evaluation reports is one of four inputs contributing to this end, the other three being:

- Post Cotonou Task Force which conducts analyses contributing to shaping future EU-ACP co-operation;
- Joint Consultation Paper – Towards a new partnership between the European Union and the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries after 2020;
- A Questionnaire to all EU Delegations in ACP countries (including both past and future issues).

The **scope of the review** covers the geographical (country and regional), thematic and aid modalities evaluations related to ACP countries managed by DG DEVCO. The temporal scope is 2000 (CPA was signed) to 2015.

Apart from the general objective of the review – to provide inputs into the comprehensive evaluation of the CPA - the specific **objectives of the review** are as follows:

- Identification of qualified or rated evidence related to the achievements of the objectives as specified in the intervention logic(s) to be developed during the inception phase;
- Identification of evidence linked to the evaluation questions presented by the Evaluation Unit during the inception meeting;
- Identification of possible information gaps and suggestion how to fill them;
- Identification of broader lessons to be learned from the evaluations.

In short, the review encompasses analysis and synthesis of findings, conclusions, recommendations and key lessons from the evaluations, based on a predetermined set of evaluation questions that will serve as guidance for the analysis. The objectives of the CPA will be examined in accordance with the DAC evaluation criteria and coherence and EU added value as additional criteria.

2.2 Structure of the report

The Draft final report consists of the following elements:

- **Chapter 2** introduces the scope of the review and the report structure.
- **Chapter 3** elaborates on the adopted methodology for the review phase.
- **Chapter 4** presents the reconstructed intervention logics for the individual pillars and the overall reconstructed intervention logic.
- **Chapter 5** presents the evidence linked to the evaluation questions.
- **Chapter 6** highlights information gaps and possible ways of filling them.
- **Chapter 7** presents conclusions per DAC criteria. It sets a synthesis of the main issues addressed by the EQs.
- **Chapter 8** presents main lessons learned from the evaluations.
- Supporting material can be found in the **Annexes**, such as a categorised list of analysed evaluation reports, detailed methodology, the analysis matrix, country examples underpinning the answers to the EQs, and rated levels of evidence per JC.

3 Context and methodology of the review

3.1 Context of the review

The EU's relationship with the ACP Group of States has been governed by agreements dating back to the **Lomé convention in 1975**², aiming at supporting ACP states' efforts towards self-sustained development. The **Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA)** is mainly funded by the **European Development Fund (EDF)** which operates according to its own financial regulations. It has financial autonomy from the EU's budget and is composed of direct contributions from EU Member States.

The current CPA³ established a comprehensive partnership for economic, social and cultural development, **based on three complementary pillars**: development co-operation, economic and trade co-operation, and political dimension. With a focus on the long-term eradication of poverty, the co-operation aims to contribute to peace, security and democratic and political stability of the ACP states⁴. The parties are committed to acting together to gradually achieve the MDGs. Equality of partners and participation are key principles of the partnership and therefore political dialogue is essential for the co-operation to flourish.

As stipulated in the CPA, the contracting parties are bound to enter into **negotiations of a succeeding partnership agreement** by 31 August 2018 at the latest.⁵ In order to assure expedient preparations of the negotiations, it is important to retrieve sound **information on achievements, impacts and lessons learned** from the past agreement, which will be achieved through a comprehensive evaluation to which the results of this review will have contributed.

3.2 Review methodology

The review has been organised in four phases: 1) structuring and categorising the reports, 2) developing a coding system to help organise the reading and extracting process, 3) actual analysis of the reports and extracting of relevant data segments, and 4) synthesizing the findings.

3.2.1 Structuring the reports

Reviewing a total of 111 evaluation reports⁶ has been a challenging and time-consuming task, which called for a **systematic approach to data analysis**. The reports have been clustered in **three categories based on their relevance**, as illustrated in Table 1, for the following benefits:

1. Adding a qualitative dimension: A greater weight has been attributed to segments extracted from reports considered as highly relevant, which facilitated and sped up the analysing and synthesizing processes.
2. A quicker and more focused extraction process: Documents have been treated differently based on their category and the search of relevant pieces of information has been done with high precision.

Table 1 Categories of relevance

Category	Explanation
Category A – High relevance	Reports in the first category have a clear focus on ACP countries and present strong and direct thematic links to the EQs and JCs. They cover a period which is almost entirely after the CPA has come into force (2003). Reports in this category have been read extensively and even their annexes have been taken into account for further in-depth analysis.

² Or even back to the 1950s (the Yaounde Agreements).

³ The CPA was signed in 2000 and entered into force in 2003. It has been concluded for the period of 2000-2020. There have been two amendments already in order to adapt the partnership to new challenges and developments, e.g. climate change or regional integration (2005 in Luxembourg and 2010 in Ouagadougou).

⁴ 78 out of the 79 ACP countries are currently members of the CPA. The Republic of Cuba did not sign it.

⁵ EU (2000): The Cotonou Agreement, Article 95; 4.

⁶ The ToR provided a list of 107 reports to which were added the recently finished Evaluation of EU support to Environment and Climate Change and the Evaluation of Budget Support in Burkina Faso, both implemented by Particip. Two evaluation reports close to final, namely Transport and Chad, have been taken into account as well.

Category	Explanation
Category B – Partial relevance	<p>Reports in the second category may be of relevance in temporal, thematic or geographical terms but not in all three dimensions at the same time, or only to a lesser extent. The links between their subjects and the EQs and JCs are weaker and often indirect. Although ACP countries are covered, they neither represent the majority of the case studies, nor does the evaluation have a distinct ACP focus. Similarly, even though they cover a period during which the CPA has already entered into force, a considerable part of their evaluation period is before 2003.</p> <p>Reports in this category have been approached in the following way: First, their executive summaries and conclusions were read. This guided a streamlined reading and data extraction from the relevant volumes (and annexes, where relevant).</p>
Category C – Limited relevance	<p>Reports in the third category only focus on ACP countries to a limited extent, if at all, and their thematic emphases promise very little to no information related to the EQs and JCs. More often than not, their evaluation period was before the CPA entered into force, or in some cases, even before it was signed.</p> <p>Reports in this category have only been screened rapidly by concentrating on the conclusions and recommendations to identify key lessons that might be valid and helpful despite the limited relevance of the overall report. Information from these reports is relevant to the extent to which it helps to track the continuity between the CPA and the previous agreements.</p>

Annex 2 describes in detail our understanding and definition of relevance in the context of the evaluation reports and our approach towards the categorization of the reports based on the established relevance criteria. The annex also contains a full list of evaluation reports by category.

3.2.2 Defining clear and unambiguous codes derived from the judgement criteria

A set of codes represented the backbone of the data extraction process. These codes **guided the analysis** of the reports and helped **structure the mass of information** and establish direct links to the EQs. It has therefore been essential that these codes were well defined and were made clear to the whole team.

Answers to EQs establish findings on the contribution of interventions to pursued objectives; they are broken down into JCs, which define the individual aspects of success/failure; and indicators help identify the extent of change in qualitative and quantitative terms. In line with this logic, codes are components of the JCs that are derived from their substance. The sum of the codes builds up the entirety of the essential elements to which the evidence has been identified. This process of bringing JCs to the operational level organised the reading work.

Codes have been **derived directly from the JCs**. For example, EQ 8 seeks to identify the extent to which the CPA has contributed to the improvement of basic social infrastructure and services. The first underlying JC concentrates on the increase in the availability of health and education services. The codes for this particular JC directly target the individual components (i.e. *availability of health services* and *availability of education services*).

In order to assure the unambiguity of our codes, they were discussed extensively within the team and also shared with the RG to ensure common understanding before the actual start of the analysis. This process assured a homogenous approach to analysis.

3.2.3 Reading, extracting and analysing information

Once reports had been categorised and codes had been developed, the actual work of reading, **extracting and analysing the information** could be started. The different tasks in this phase should not be seen as totally independent from one another, but quite the contrary: they were closely interlinked and the transition from one to another was fluent. In fact, all tasks had to **run in parallel** in order to respect the foreseen calendar but also to allow for **feedback loops and continuous quality assurance**. During the process, there was close vertical interaction between the team leader and the rest of the team engaged in reading, extracting and analysing the information. A strong horizontal interaction also existed as to allow for comparison and improvement of the process of extraction and analysis.

Guided by the codes developed in the second phase of the review, the reports were read and relevant text segments were assigned to one or several corresponding codes (“coding”) with the tool MAXQDA. The analysis team worked with the software with a view to **generate a harmonised data base**, easily accessible to all and shared by all. Having a shared database of evidence from all members facilitated the follow-up tasks, especially answering the EQs. **This approach led to building a rigorous database for the final review report.**

Based on the structuring efforts made in the first phase of the review, the junior experts treated every report differently depending on the category to which it was assigned. This allowed for a **quicker and more focused extraction process** by giving the junior experts the possibility to search relevant pieces of information with higher precision.

The coded text segments in their entirety constituted the aggregated database of evidence (output of the MAXQDA extractions) which has again been **rated based on the relevance** of their original documents (a greater weight was attached to coded segments extracted from Category A reports). With this second effort of rating and restructuring, the **findings were pre-filtered and pre-analysed** for the final step of the review, and thus allowed a smoother and faster analysing and synthesising phase.

In parallel, the aggregated extractions were pre-analysed with the aim of further highlighting links to the EQs as well as to **provide a first roughly outlined draft** in order to prepare the team leader’s final synthesis and writing. This intermediate step was also useful to identify potential information gaps and to **allow for a second and more targeted review** of specific reports and/or additional documents (e.g. annexes or case studies) where necessary.

3.2.4 Final analysis of the extractions and synthesis of the findings

In the synthesis phase, the team leader analysed the restructured extractions in order to **identify links to the EQs and to the achievements of the objectives** of the CPA as depicted in the re-constructed IL. The synthesis of the findings led to answering the EQs; where this was not possible, gaps of information were identified. As a last step, broader lessons learned from the evaluations have been formulated.

This work resulted in the presented Draft Final Report. It will be discussed in the RG meeting and comments will be incorporated into the Final Report.

The contents of the final report will include:

- an executive summary,
- a review of the methodology and its implementation,
- the intervention logics (both diagrams and narratives),
- a presentation of evidence linked to the achievements of the objectives,
- a synthesis of the answers to the EQs, presenting information gaps and lessons learned from the evaluations,
- a detailed answer to each EQ, with the main sources of information.

4 Reconstructed intervention logics (IL)

The proposed IL is reconstructed on the basis of the CPA document and its evolution over time. The significant evolutions of the CPA through its different revisions are stressed below.

4.1 Evolution of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement

The EU's relationship with the ACP Group of States has been governed by agreements dating back to the Lomé convention in 1975, aimed at supporting ACP states' efforts towards self-sustained development. The Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA), signed in 2000 and revised in 2005 and 2010, is mainly funded by the European Development Fund (EDF), which operates according to its own financial regulations. It has financial autonomy from EU's budget and is composed of direct contributions from EU Member States.

The current Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) established a comprehensive partnership for economic, social and cultural development, based on three complementary pillars: political dimension, economic and trade co-operation and development co-operation. With a focus on long-term eradication of poverty, the co-operation aims at contributing to peace, security and democratic and political stability of the ACP states, with the ACP countries playing a strengthened and equal role in the international context. The parties committed themselves to acting together in order to gradually achieve the MDGs. Equality of partners and participation are key principles of the partnership and therefore political dialogue is essential for the co-operation to flourish.

Since the signing of the CPA in 2000, new priorities and urgent needs have arisen in the international context, prompting a revision of the CPA in order to adapt to and accurately reflect current priorities and needs. The amended version of the CPA was signed in Luxembourg in 2005. The fundamental acquis of the CPA was not changed. However, on the background of pressing concerns brought about by international terrorism, increased fragility and conflict situations in poor countries, global environmental threats and accompanying migratory flows, the EU committed itself even more to a development-driven agenda, including its non-aid policies. The MDGs became the targets and principles for development. The EU-ACP dialogue was made more systematic, structured and formal, with ownership and partners' equality as underlying principles. The participatory approach was strengthened by opening partnerships to non-state actors and local authorities. The political dimension was enlarged to include security issues. The added references to combating proliferation of weapons of mass destruction represented a very important commitment for the International Criminal Court and the Statute of Rome to proceed jointly in these areas.

The second (very comprehensive) revision in 2010 reflected new priorities linked to the aid effectiveness agenda (Paris, Accra), with a stronger focus on the ownership of the ACP states of the design and implementation of the development agenda and the coherence of EU policies and programmes and their alignment with long-term development strategies of the ACP states. The revised version emphasised the importance of regional integration of ACP countries including in ACP-EU relations and recognized the continental dimension of Africa, with the African Union becoming a partner in the EU-ACP relationship. The mutual dependence between sustainable development and peace and security and the necessity to address root causes of conflicts as early as possible (regarding fragile situations) were acknowledged. The necessity of joint approaches towards major challenges (e.g. food security, climate change, HIV/AIDS) was reinforced. The role of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), trade adaptation strategies and aid for trade in the light of the expiry of preferences at the end of 2007 was reaffirmed. The Cotonou agreement, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 and revised in 2005 and 2010, provides the basis for the development of the reconstructed intervention logic.

4.2 Overall intervention logic

4.2.1 Overview

The flow of effects shown in the graphic presentation of the IL highlights the causal relationship of contribution among the different levels of the IL:

- Level 1: activities (including the necessary inputs) put in place under the CPA;
- Level 2: outputs (effects to which the activities have directly contributed at different levels)⁷;
- Level 3: results (changes in the behaviour of the targeted beneficiaries⁸⁹, to which the outputs have contributed at different levels);
- Level 4: specific impacts (consolidated and sustainable changes in the status and the behaviour of the targeted beneficiaries, to which the results have contributed in different ways); and
- Level 5: global impacts (longer term changes in the quality of life corresponding to the actual goals of the CPA, to which the specific impacts have contributed at different levels).

The causal relationships of contribution may occur between specific items in the different contiguous levels. The stronger relationships, however, are systemic and occur between the levels in their complexity¹⁰. This is particularly true because the individual items in each level interact with each other. As such, it would be impossible to isolate the individual effects.

4.2.2 Intervention logic diagram

Overall, the CPA encompasses a vast array of interventions and diverse support measures and **activities** in three dimensions – political, economic and trade co-operation and development co-operation – which have built a comprehensive framework of support for the ACP countries since the 1970s.

The different clusters of activities contribute directly to generating a spectrum of **outputs**. One key aspect is the establishment of consultation mechanisms and regular and structured dialogue. Another essential aspect is the increased capacity of the ACP states: on the one hand, it concerns the capability to respond to and coordinate matters of common EU-ACP interest; on the other hand, public institutions are strengthened so as to enable them to act more democratically, transparently and accountably, managing public policies and external aid within sound and participatory frameworks. Such increased capacity enables the ACP states to address their peace and security, economic and trade, social and environmental challenges. Another key aspect is the enhanced capacity to relate and act at the regional, sub-regional and continental level in order to accelerate, strengthen and multiply the national processes.

Moving to the level of **results**, the CPA contribution is indirect as the outputs must fit and adapt to the endogenous processes and the contextual factors in order to achieve the expected results. At the national level, inclusive and equitable democratic processes and public governance will be strengthened, dynamics towards diversified and competitive market economies will be enhanced, significant steps toward equitable access to social basic services will be achieved, and more effective responses to climate change and environmental challenges will be put in place. At the international level, shared agendas and strategic alliances and joint approaches towards issues of common/global concern will emerge and the ACP countries will acquire a greater say in agenda-setting on the international stage. The regional dimension will enhance all country-level achievements and contribute to their sustainability, while allowing coping with global opportunities and threats.

⁷ Normally such effects are considered to be under the control or under the direct influence of the activities put in place.

⁸ As stated in the CPA (Art. 9), the actual targeted beneficiaries of the CPA are the 'persons', intended as the human beings and their communities (local, national, regional and continental).

⁹ Such effects are considered to be out of the sphere of control and direct influence of the activities put in place and the related outputs, but in the sphere of their indirect influence (i.e. the influence they can exercise in combination with other contextual factors).

¹⁰ For instance, under Pillar I, the activity of 'political dialogue' generates the output of 'consultation mechanisms', which influences the outcome of 'shared agendas'. But such chain of effects does not take place in isolation without a close intertwining with all the other activities and outputs, namely those that address the contents of the dialogue, the consultation mechanisms and the shared agenda.

These results, being systemic in their mutual interactions and creating synergies, are expected to drive deep structural changes in the mid- to long-term. In other words, they are expected to contribute to several **specific impacts**, provided they will be entrenched in the endogenous processes of the societies and adapted to contextual factors. Ideally, ACP countries, individually and through their networks of regional, sub-regional and continental co-operation and integration, will be enabled to build democratic societies, intertwined in economic and political relationships, characterised by accelerated and inclusive growth, being key actors in the world challenges of climate change and environmental degradation.


Ideally, this logical chain will have a **global impact** on worldwide sustainable peace and security, as well as reduce and eventually eradicate poverty, while ensuring a parity position of ACP countries in the international economic and political scene.

4.2.3 Overall assumptions

Overall, the causal relationships of contribution on which the reconstructed IL is built rely on a set of core assumptions, which transpire through the CPA and the individual interventions arising from its implementation. Such assumptions are not actually related to the features of the context, which may be more or less favourable to the implementation of the IL. Indeed, the validity of the CPA is not limited to positive external scenarios. The assumptions regard rather the attitude of the partners, their respect of the spirit of the partnership and their capacity to translate it into action. Such basic assumptions are highlighted below:

- The framework of principles and values established in the CPA, including the links between peace, security and development and the reference to human rights and fundamental freedoms will continue to be adhered to by the parties.
- Common understanding frameworks are built to address priority issues, and mechanisms to further develop them are pursued.
- Obligations under international conventions are implemented and parties cooperate with each other at all levels.
- Interest and commitment of the parties will be maintained, adapted and developed throughout the evolution of the context.
- Equality of partners and ownership of the ACP countries are respected in CPA actions' design and implementation.
- Mobilisation of key actors in ACP countries, together with governments, including Parliaments, local authorities, civil society and private sector remains a priority.
- The EU ensures enhanced and continued coherence of its multiple policies with the CPA objectives and modalities.
- Management procedures are transparent, efficient and easy to apply.
- Joint institutions are functional (effective and efficient).

Figure 1 Overall intervention logic



Source: Particip GmbH

4.3 Pillar I: Political dimension

4.3.1 Overview

The political dimension, as stated in the Partnership Agreement signed in 2000, intends to promote the consistency and relevance of ACP-EU co-operation strategies making it possible to address all issues of common interest. Article 8 of the CPA sets out the specific modalities for a regular, comprehensive, balanced and deep political dialogue aimed at strengthening co-operation and promoting an effective system of multilateralism, which would mean a greater say of ACP countries in international relations. Political dialogue is conducted in a flexible way, under either a formal or an informal framework and at the most appropriate territorial level. Regional organisations and national parliaments are also encouraged to participate.

Issues of common interest constitute the basis for co-operation and include a wide range of policies related to peace-building, conflict prevention, migration, respect for human rights, democratic principles, rule of law and good governance. Good governance, as stated in the CPA, underpins the ACP-EU Partnerships.

In 2005, the revision of the Partnership Agreement set out a more systematic and formal dialogue in relation to three key areas: human rights, democratic principles and rule of law. Through this structured approach, a more transparent and efficient political dialogue is promoted. It shall serve as a key preventive tool for situations in which one Party might deem necessary to resort to the consultation procedure foreseen in Article 96. In such situations, Annex VII of the CPA lays out detailed modalities for this dialogue, including joint identification of benchmarks and targets for human rights, democratic principles and rule of law, which are based on international standards and take into account the particular circumstances in each country.

This revision also broadened the thematic scope of co-operation, paying special attention to the subject of security and peace, where the relevant ACP regional organisations and the African Union should be fully involved. Mutual dependency between development and peace and security was recognised. The emphasis was put on conflict prevention and early responses to fragile situations. An active involvement of women in peace building and the need to address violence against women and children was acknowledged. Three security-related provisions were introduced in the CPA with regard to countering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, provisions on the Statute of the International Criminal Court, provisions on international co-operation in the fight against terrorism and illegal trafficking.

The second revision of the CPA was concluded in March 2010 and included a clearer reference to the EU's commitment to address policy coherence for development in a targeted, strategic and partnership-oriented way, as well as stating a commitment to strengthen dialogue on this issue.

The Cotonou agreement, signed on 23 June 2000 and revised in 2005 and 2010, provides the basis for the development of the reconstructed intervention logic. More concretely, Title II: the political dimension (Articles 8 to 13) as well as Annex VII, which deals with political dialogue in regards to human rights, democratic principles and rule of law have been taken into consideration.

4.3.2 Intervention logic diagram

The Pillar I contribution to the final goals of reduction and eventually eradication of poverty, sustainable peace and security worldwide and a strengthened/equal position of the ACP countries in the international relationships, is made of three specific impacts, i.e. three medium-long term expected effects, as follows:

- ACP countries being an integral part of multilateral international relations.
- Stable and democratic political environments in the ACP countries maintained and consolidated.
- Regional, sub-regional and continental co-operation for peace and security strengthened.

The intervention logic highlights the expected sequence of effects from the inputs and the activities put in place by the CPA, to the outputs and the results, so as to attain the specific impacts. Such logical chain of contribution is described below and responds to the basic assumptions identified in the introduction of the overall intervention logic (see section 4.2).

4.3.2.1 Activities

At the implementation level, the political dimension of the CPA is implemented by means of different **Activities**. Most of the activities cover different thematic areas which are deeply interrelated. One activity – the dialogue – is cross-cutting and highlights the key approach of any other CPA activity, particularly under this pillar:

- Regular engagement in a comprehensive, balanced and deep political dialogue;
- Promotion of human rights, democratisation, consolidation of rule of law and good governance;
- Support to political, institutional and legal reforms;
- Support to peace building, conflict prevention and resolution;
- Support to law enforcement, fight against terrorism and counter-measures to proliferation of weapons;
- Engaging in EU/ACP and EU/Africa migration dialogue.

4.3.2.2 Outputs

The above mentioned activities generate a number of **outputs** related to the increased capacity to address and respond in a coordinated manner to matters of common concern such as conflict and fragility situations, security threats and migration. In addition, these activities provide common ground for establishing mechanisms for consultation and strengthening democratic institutions' capacity, transparency and accountability in public administration:

- Consultation mechanisms incl. channels of communication and dialogue established;
- Democratic institutions' capacity, transparency and accountability in public administration are strengthened;
- Conflict and fragility situations addressed through preventive and comprehensive approaches;
- Compliance of public interventions with international disarmament and non-proliferation treaties boosted;
- Capacity to address new or expanding security threats increased;
- Co-operation in legal and irregular migration issues increased;
- Regional, sub-regional and continental approaches to peace, security and democratic stability enhanced.

4.3.2.3 Results


The mechanisms and capacities created as outputs of the CPA will adapt to and interact with the endogenous processes of the ACP societies and with the existing exogenous factors, and thus will contribute to the achievement of the expected **Results**. Changes will be visible in terms of established agreed priorities and shared agendas, in which the partners are committed. In the ACP societies, the democratic processes are enhanced, and the civil society advocacy as well as the role of the ACP Parliaments are strengthened. At the international level, operational strategic alliances between ACP and EU actors are in place. National and international policies increasingly include the underpinning of respect of human rights, democratic principles and rule of law. Improved responses to fragility and conflict prevention are produced. Migratory flows are jointly addressed to enhance management and control. The regional, sub-regional and continental organisations become an effective participatory tool for peace keeping and enforcing, security and democratic stability.

4.3.2.4 Specific impacts

The consolidation of such results over time and their interaction and coupling with the endogenous processes and other exogenous factors are expected to contribute to the higher level, longer term achievements synthesised in the specific impacts mentioned above.

Such specific impacts will interact with the specific impacts of the other pillars and will contribute to the final impacts.

Figure 2 Intervention logic for Pillar I: Political dimension (Articles 8 to 13)



Source: Particip GmbH

4.4 Pillar II: Trade and economic co-operation

4.4.1 Overview

The objective of the economic and trade co-operation in CPA is to increase the parity of the ACP countries in the global economy by enhancing their production, supply and trading capacity as well as their capacity to attract investments, ensuring conformity with WTO provisions. The key principles of Pillar II highlight the importance of strategic partnerships, based on a comprehensive approach and built on regional integration initiatives and differentiated responses according to the different national contexts.

The CPA establishes the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) as the key trade-related instrument. EPAs are WTO-compatible agreements, but also focus on ACP development, taking account their socio-economic circumstances and including technical support and training, as well as measures to promote knowledge transfer and strengthen public services.

In 2010, the second revision of the CPA reinforced the role of consultation mechanisms between EU and ACP in trade-related issues and included the possibility to channel resources from the multi-annual financial framework through existing or new regional financing mechanisms. Any negative effect of liberalisation has to be taken into account with a view to maintaining significant preferential access of the ACP states within the multilateral trading system as long as it is feasible. Additionally, it should be ensured that any unavoidable reduction in preferences is phased in over as long a period as possible.

The Cotonou agreement, signed on 23 June 2000 and revised in 2005 and 2010, provides the basis for the development of the reconstructed intervention logic. More concretely, Title II: economic and trade co-operation (Articles 34 to 54) has been taken into consideration.

4.4.2 Intervention logic diagram

The Pillar II contribution to the final goals of reduction and eventually eradication of poverty, sustainable peace and security worldwide and a strengthened/equal position of the ACP countries in international relationships is made of three specific impacts, i.e. three medium-long term expected effects, as follows:

- Increased share in international trade and world economy with no damage for vital areas.
- Diversified and stable economies attractive for foreign investment, with reduced dependency on specific commodities.
- Integrated regional, sub-regional and continental networks enhance goods, persons and knowledge exchange.

The intervention logic highlights the expected sequence of effects from the inputs and the activities put in place by the CPA, to the outputs and the results, so as to attain the specific impacts. Such logical chain of contribution is described below and responds to the basic assumptions identified in the introduction of the overall intervention logic (see section 4.2).

4.4.2.1 Activities

A number of **Activities** can be identified at the implementation level. These are grouped into different “clusters” according to their aim:

- Enhancing trade dialogue and supporting participation of ACP countries in multilateral trade negotiations;
- Providing aid for trade;
- Supporting regional trade and integration initiatives;
- Supporting ACP countries’ capacity to negotiate, participate, monitor and implement international agreements;
- Negotiating new WTO-compatible Economic Partnership Agreements;
- Providing assistance for infrastructure upgrading and investment promotion;
- Addressing interconnectivity of infrastructure, economic diversification and trade development measures.

4.4.2.2 Outputs

The different clusters of activities generate a number of **outputs** related to the capability of the ACP countries' economies to adapt to conditions in international trade, i.e. the ability to cope with the positive and possible negative sides of trade liberalisation. The countries should be better positioned to negotiate and implement trade agreements and common understanding and interests on trade issues (incl. at the sub-regional and regional level) should be identified.

The individual outputs are:

- Mutual understanding of trade issues fostered;
- Economic Partnership Agreements concluded and implemented;
- Regional and sub-regional trade and integration agreements boosted;
- Liberalisation process incl. reduction of trade barriers facilitated;
- Measures taken to overcome possible negative impact of liberalisation;
- ACP countries' capacity to access to EU and other markets for their products and services improved;
- ACP states' capacities to deal with new conditions in international trade enhanced;
- ACP countries' capacity to attract investments enhanced;
- Common interests of the ACP and the EU in international economic and trade co-operation identified and furthered.

4.4.2.3 Results

The outputs mentioned above will adapt to and interact with the endogenous processes of the ACP societies and the existing exogenous factors, and thus will contribute to the achievement of the expected **Results**:


- ACP countries will play a greater role in the design and implementation of trade agenda on the international stage, while maintaining their preferential treatments until they are necessary to reduce some negative effects of liberalisation.
- In addition, ACP countries' trade with the EU and the rest of the world, their level of infrastructure and their attractiveness for foreign investment will be increased.
- The start and further development of diversified economies will make ACP countries less vulnerable to the dependence upon specific commodities.
- Last but not least, regional, sub-regional and continental frameworks to establish networks of exchange for goods, persons and knowledge will be implemented and strengthened.

4.4.2.4 Specific impacts

The consolidation of such results over time, their interaction and their coupling with the endogenous processes and other exogenous factors are expected to contribute to the higher-level, longer-term achievements synthesised in the specific impacts mentioned above.

Such specific impacts will interact with the specific impacts of the other pillars to lead toward the final impacts.

Figure 3 Intervention logic for Pillar II: Economic and trade co-operation (Articles 34 to 54)



Source: Particip GmbH

4.5 Pillar III: Development co-operation

4.5.1 Overview

Overall, the Cotonou Partnership Agreement aims at contributing to reducing poverty, sustainable peace and security and a stronger position of the ACP countries in the world economic and political relationships. After the 2010 revision, progress towards the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals was incorporated as a guiding principle.

The CPA proposes an integrated approach that incorporates economic, social and human, cultural, environmental and institutional elements that must be locally owned. EU and ACP states and their partners shall work together to establish a consolidated and effective strategic framework and to measure progress towards results. The relevant support framework establishes the principle of mainstreaming into all areas of co-operation the following three horizontal or cross-cutting themes: gender equality, environmental sustainability, and institutional development and capacity building.

The Agreement puts emphasis on three focal areas for support: economic development, with a focus on private sector development and investment, macroeconomic and structural policies and reforms, and sectoral policies; social and human development, focusing on social sector policies, youth issues, and cultural development; and regional co-operation and integration.

In 2010, the second revision of the CPA recognized the importance of food security issues, equitable and sustainable distribution of water resources and the key role of fisheries in ACP countries. In the social dimension of the development co-operation, although education and health were prominent before as well, additional consideration was given to several aspects, such as recognition of tertiary education and support to safety nets. Emphasis on capacity building in support of ACP regional co-operation and integration was strengthened, including economic, conflict prevention and security issues. Current global challenges, such as climate change and state fragility were included as well.

The Cotonou agreement, signed on 23 June 2000 and revised in 2005 and 2010, provides the basis for the development of the reconstructed intervention logic. More concretely, Title I: development strategies (Articles 19 to 33), has been taken into consideration.

4.5.2 Intervention logic diagram

The Pillar III contribution to the final goals of reduction and eventually eradication of poverty, sustainable peace and security worldwide and a strengthened/equal position of the ACP countries in the international relationships is made of two specific impacts, i.e. two medium-long term expected effects, as follows:

- Inclusive sustainable growth, through economic, cultural, social and environmentally sustainable development of ACP countries; and
- Advanced and consolidated regional, sub-regional and continental co-operation and integration.

The intervention logic highlights the expected sequence of effects from the inputs and the activities put in place by the CPA, to the outputs and the results, so as to attain the specific impacts. Such logical chain of contribution is described below and responds to a number of basic assumptions identified in the introduction of the overall intervention logic (see section 0).

4.5.2.1 Activities

Different types of **Activities** can be identified at the implementation level. These are grouped into “clusters” according to their areas of intervention:

- Supporting macroeconomic and structural reforms, budgetary adjustment and fiscal reform;
- Supporting policies and reform of social infrastructure and services;
- Promoting local ownership and private sector participation in economic and social reforms;
- Supporting social dialogue, development of policies and systems of social protection and cohesion;
- Supporting policies and programmes in climate change (e.g. renewable energy sources, low-carbon technologies);

- Supporting policies and programmes in environmental protection and natural resource management;
- Supporting policies and programmes on gender equity and equality;
- Supporting efforts to develop and strengthen public administration reform and good governance in ACP countries;
- Supporting capacity development in management and co-ordination of external aid;
- Supporting regional and sub-regional dialogue, to help fix shared standards, common infrastructure and joint development tools.

4.5.2.2 Outputs

Through the cooperative work of ACP and EU actors in a number of areas of common interest, the following outputs should be generated:

- Public finance and fiscal management of ACP countries improved;
- Reinforced local, national and regional frameworks for equitable access to:
 - economic activities and productive resources;
 - basic social infrastructure and services;
- Capacity to address climate change and vulnerability and environmental management strengthened;
- Measures to ensure equitable and equal gender access taken;
- Administrative, economic and democratic governance at the local, national and regional levels enhanced;
- Space for NSA and CSO enhanced;
- Regional and sub-regional frameworks for business, social standards, and exchanges enhanced.

4.5.2.3 Results


The outputs mentioned above will adapt to and interact with the endogenous processes of the ACP societies and the existing exogenous factors, and will contribute to enabling development actors – people, enterprises, communities (local, national, regional) – to put in place new behaviours and express new dynamics (results) towards:

- The establishment of efficient and competitive market economies with a key role of private sector;
- More equitable access to the basic services and distribution of growth;
- Increased employment and food security;
- Increased control of climate-related challenges and reduction of vulnerability;
- Improved natural resource balance;
- Stronger gender equity, respect of minorities, rule of law and pluralism; and
- An effective regional dimension acting as a key multiplier.

4.5.2.4 Specific impacts

The consolidation of such results over time, their interaction and their coupling with the endogenous processes and other exogenous factors are expected to contribute to the higher-level, longer-term achievements synthesised in the specific impacts mentioned above.

Figure 4 Intervention logic for Pillar III: Development co-operation (Articles 19 to 33)



Source: Particip GmbH

5 Evidence linked to the evaluation questions

The overall intervention logic and the intervention logics for the individual pillars constitute the backbone of the review. For this review, twelve EQs have been formulated by DG DEVCO and commented on by the team. They shed light on some critical points of the intervention logics and are broken down to more concrete judgement criteria to help operationalise the actual review process. The EQs are thought-through, clear, and follow a traceable logical path. They constitute the basis for the development of codes, as in the proposed methodology. The following table presents an overview of the EQs, their coverage and attribution to the respective pillar of the CPA:

Table 2 The evaluation questions

No.	Evaluation question	Coverage	CPA Pillar
EQ 1	To what extent has policy and political dialogue at different levels (national, regional and through the joint EU-ACP institutions) facilitated the establishment of agreed priorities and shared agendas?	Policy and political dialogue	I. pillar
EQ 2	To what extent have the mechanisms mentioned in the articles 8, 96 and 97 (i.e. political dialogue, consultation procedure, appropriate measures, and suspension of the agreement) contributed to meaningful improvements in the field of the essential and fundamental elements (human rights, democratic principles, rule of law and good governance) in ACP countries?	Human rights, democracy, rule of law and good governance	
EQ 3	To what extent has the implementation of the different instruments and approaches of the CPA improved peace and security in ACP countries/regions and has enhanced their capacity to cope with crises?	Peace and security	
EQ 4	To what extent have the provisions from article 13 of the CPA contributed to meaningful improvements in addressing the structural constraints associated with the migratory flows?	Migration	
EQ 5	To what extent have EU interventions under the CPA (new trading arrangements, dialogue, co-operation programmes) fostered the smooth and gradual integration of the ACP States into the world economy and enabled the ACP states to play a full part in international trade?	Integration of ACP states into the world economy and their share in international trade	II. pillar
EQ 6	To what extent has mutual co-operation between EU and ACP countries improved the identification and furthering of common interests in international fora?	EU-ACP international economic and trade co-operation	

No.	Evaluation question	Coverage	CPA Pillar
EQ 7	To what extent has the CPA contributed to macroeconomic growth/stabilisation and institutional reforms and policies at national and regional level resulting in a favourable environment for investment and the development of the private sector?	Macroeconomic reforms, private sector and investment,	III. pillar
EQ 8	To what extent has the CPA contributed to improved coverage, quality and access to basic social infrastructure and services?	Social infrastructure and services	
EQ 9	To what extent has the CPA contributed to the attainment of substantial results on cross-cutting issues?	Cross-cutting issues	
EQ 10	To what extent has the design and implementation of EU interventions adequately delivered on poverty reduction and addressed the needs of the most vulnerable groups?	Poverty reduction and the needs of most vulnerable groups	
EQ 11	To what extent has the work of the joint institutions contributed to the results achieved by the CPA?	Joint institutions	Process
EQ 12	To what extent has the EU mix of "tools" (instruments, approaches and financing modalities) and the co-management system contributed to reaching the goals of the ACP-EU partnership?	Mix of tools	

The EQs can be linked to one or more of the five DAC evaluation criteria (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability), as well as coherence and EU added value. These linkages are illustrated in the following table.

Table 3 Coverage of the evaluation criteria by the evaluation questions

Question	Evaluation criteria						
	Relevance	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Impact	Sustainability	Coherence	EU Added value
EQ 1 on policy and political dialogue	✓	✓		✓			
EQ 2 on human rights & democratic principles	✓	✓		✓			
EQ 3 on peace & security	✓	✓				✓	✓
EQ 4 on migration	✓	✓		✓			✓
EQ 5 on international trade and world economy	✓	✓		✓		✓	
EQ 6 on regional trade co-operation	✓	✓					
EQ 7 on private sector & macroeconomic stability	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
EQ 8 on social infrastructure & services	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
EQ 9 on cross-cutting issues	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
EQ 10 on overall reduction of poverty	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓
EQ 11 on joint institutions	✓	✓	✓				
EQ 12 on mix of tools		✓	✓			✓	

The level of evidence linked to the EQs and JCs will be assigned to three categories that combine quantitative and qualitative aspects and have been defined as follows:

- *High*: Extensive and substantial information, thorough analysis on ACP countries and clear examples informing the JC occur frequently; trends can be easily identified over time.
- *Medium*: Relevant and specific information and/or less focused analysis on ACP countries and/or a number of concrete examples informing the JC occur less frequently; trends can be identified but not always confirmed.
- *Low*: Limited or no specific information on ACP countries and very few examples are available; it is not possible to establish trends over time.

Each summary per JC contains the level of evidence (defined as above), the number of reports on which the evidence is based (a purely quantitative aspect), and where possible, an evolution or trend was described. More information is to be found in 9.5.

5.1 EQ 1 – Political and policy dialogue

EQ 1	To what extent has political and policy dialogue at different levels (national, regional and through the joint EU-ACP institutions) facilitated the establishment of agreed priorities and shared agendas?
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Main sources: Evaluating co-ordination and complementarity of country strategy papers with national development priorities (2006), Thematic Evaluation of the EC support to Good Governance (2006); Thematic Evaluation of the European Commission support to respect of Human Rights and

Fundamental Freedoms (2011), Evaluation of the European Union's Trade-related Assistance in third Countries (2013), Evaluation of the European Union's Support to Private Sector Development in Third Countries (2013), Evaluation of EC aid delivery through civil society organisations. Also, diverse country/Regional evaluations (including country evaluations on Budget Support) have contributed to inform this EQ (for example Cameroon 2014 and Mozambique 2007).

5.1.1 Summary answer

This EQ addresses **the dialogue as the method of implementation of the CPA** to identify shared priorities and implement shared agendas. There is very little evidence in the evaluations on political dialogue. When mentioned, it refers mainly to essential and fundamental elements (Article 9) and not to the comprehensive political dialogue (Article 8). This is due to the fact that, until EEAS creation, DEVCO evaluations did not have the mandate to work on political issues, including dialogue¹¹.

Political dialogue, apart from specific areas such as human rights and democracy, is often referred to in Budget Support (BS) evaluations as a missing link to enhance policy dialogue, particularly when there are diverging interests between the partners, and/or political economy obstacles to the implementation of the agreed reforms¹².

Policy dialogue is widely referred to in the evaluations. Although it should be the method for programme identification, planning and monitoring, the process is sometimes weak, thus showing ownership and commitment problems that should be addressed through political dialogue. Policy dialogue is a core input of BS programmes. Especially in GBS, its strategic dimension is very ambitious, although in the last few years the financial and political leverage of GBS has decreased and the related dialogue has become more formal and less effective.

NSAs are often associated with policy dialogue and, according to the CPA, should be linked with political dialogue. The evaluations do not contain sufficient information in their participation in the political dialogue. As far as policy dialogue is concerned, such participation is not always systematic, particularly when it comes to Parliaments' and local governments' involvement in the dialogue related to significant sectoral programmes, e.g. PFM in the case of both and service delivery in the case of local governments.

No evidence on the **perception** and visibility of the CPA.

5.1.2 Answers to the judgement criteria

5.1.2.1 JC 1.1 Agreed priorities and shared agendas established and implemented

Level of evidence: High

Number of evaluations: 72

Trend: This responds to the original approach since the early stage, but it has received a completely new impetus with the revision of the Agreement in 2005 and the practice of budget support (BS) since the early 2000s.

Although the EQ 1 and this JC fall under Pillar 1, here is the most appropriate section to assess the dialogue as a whole, including both political and policy dialogue, as the key working method of the CPA, which cuts across all Pillars.

The political **dialogue** has specific venues and scheduling regulated by Article 8 of the CPA. Given its comprehensive scope, it should be addressed whenever high-level convergences, clarifications and actions are needed for the sake of the co-operation programmes. The evaluations provide very

¹¹ After the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS), the country evaluations should have included a consideration of the political dimension of the EU country level intervention. The references to such dimension, however, even in the most recent evaluations, are limited.

¹² Political dialogue is regulated by the Art. 8 of the CPA. At country and regional level it should be carried out by the relevant institutions of the two parties. It should cover "all the aims and objectives" of the CPA and "encompass cooperation strategies, including the aid effectiveness agenda, as well as global and sectoral policies". Policy dialogue is the method to manage the cooperation strategy, including programming and implementation. Political dialogue and policy dialogue should be deeply combined, as policy dialogue in the different areas should inform political dialogue and the latter should ensure the mutual commitment toward the agreed policy agendas.

little information on political dialogue, apart from the reference to political dialogue as a crucial support for policy dialogue.

On the other hand, **policy dialogue** and the related search for shared priorities of action represent the basic approach through which the co-operation between the Community and the ACP states is planned and implemented.

Political and policy dialogue are crucial for establishing **country and regional strategies** and the content of the related programmes. In a number of countries, however, the Government's comments seem to be an issue of formality rather than an opportunity for dialogue and debate (e.g. Angola, Mauritius), although it should be noted that the EC CSPs are among the most detailed¹³.

Policy dialogue in **Budget support** is the key tool for establishing shared priorities and ensuring that the financial and technical resources put in place are used accordingly (Mozambique, Uganda, Burkina Faso¹⁴ and others). However, budget support dialogue presents some weaknesses, especially in the last decade. GBS in the ACP countries seems to have partly lost its leverage and the related dialogue is more and more diluted in formal structures (e.g. Uganda, Mozambique, Burkina Faso), often including all donors, meeting a few times a year without a substantial exchange.

At the sectoral level, the quality of policy dialogue – although it remains focused on key sectoral policy issues – is often hampered due to the disputes related to the performance assessment for disbursement. “There is a conflict for the EU arising from two different roles (**auditors and partners** in dialogue) which contributes to the low level of openness of the Government for discussing performance problems and looking for shared solutions” (e.g. Tanzania).

The effectiveness of policy dialogue is dependent on the **interest of the partner countries** in the specific sectors and themes involved, but also on the political emphasis of the EU (Burundi 2014). Issues that are not specifically addressed as a key priority or are considered cross-cutting risks to be overlooked, such as (in some cases) governance, gender, environment and climate change or trade capacity building and regional standards (e.g. Angola, Guyana).

Combining **political and policy dialogue** is a prominent CPA challenge. The evaluations show cases where such combination has been strong (e.g. Uganda after 2010), but also cases where it has been weak (e.g. Burkina Faso, Haiti 2010-2014). In general, such a combination is not particularly clear and effective, as political dialogue under Article 8 does not seem to systematically address the political bottlenecks related to CPA co-operation, and some evaluations that refer to political dialogue mention areas such as justice and human rights, which are rather issues under Article 9 (e.g. Cameroon).

5.1.2.2 JC 1.2 Local authorities, national parliaments and non-state actors involved in the implementation of the partnership

Level of evidence: High

Number of evaluations: 28

Trend: In the last decade, the emphasis on the participation of Parliaments and NSAs in dialogue has become stronger.

CPA has contributed to the promotion of a conducive legal framework for **NSAs to become full-fledged development actors** and allow for a more ambitious use of the CSO aid channel. CPA support to NSAs has significantly increased in the second half of the 2000s after the adoption of the participatory agenda¹⁵. In a variety of partner countries (across the different regions), promising steps have been taken to effectively involve a **wide range of ‘non-state actors’ as well as local governments** in (sector) policy dialogue and, to a minor extent, also in political dialogue processes¹⁶. Often this has been done with the agreement of the partner country. In many cases, however,

¹³ Evaluating co-ordination and complementarity of country strategy papers with national development priorities, 2006

¹⁴ Here Burkina Faso is mentioned referring to a BS evaluation of which the final draft has been approved, but not yet published.

¹⁵ Evaluation of EC aid delivery through civil society organisations (2008).

¹⁶ Thematic evaluation of the EC support to good governance (2006).

the EU has had to exercise pressure to ensure genuine participation of other actors than central governments. In still other instances, the EU faces fierce government resistance (e.g. Ethiopia¹⁷).

Evidence from the CSP/RSP shows that the line between support for and through civil society is often blurred. Despite the huge increase in NSA support programmes, the EC approach to CSOs as an aid delivery channel still ranges from a strategic vision on the specific added value of CSOs to a purely instrumental or ephemeral consideration of CSOs, although the more recent evaluations show some significant improvements (e.g. Haiti, Jamaica) as a result of the significant guidelines, orientations and training produced by the Commission¹⁸.

There are significant examples of **NSAs participation** in the identification and design of CSPs, (e.g. Fiji, Senegal), but this is not yet a consolidated practice. In areas regarding economic policies and trade¹⁹ and/or monitoring public expenditure (e.g. Budget support) and support to good governance and anti-corruption, the role of CSOs is still behind the actual potential.

Further efforts, however, are required to improve the quality of participation of **Parliaments and local governments** in both planning and implementation. Indeed, local governments are rarely addressed as actors of dialogue. There are significant but rather isolated examples of specific support to local leadership (e.g. Haiti). There are not significant examples of accompanying measures to support the parliaments in the framework of BS.

5.1.2.3 JC 1.3 CPA²⁰ recognised and understood by the relevant authorities/interest groups at the different levels and perceived as still responding to critical needs and problems

Level of evidence: Low

Number of evaluations: 25

Trend: There is no evidence on recognition and understanding of the CPA

5.1.2.4 JC 1.4 Unintended effects have played a minor/major role in the attainment of the results

Level of evidence: Low

Number of evaluations: 2

Trend: There is no evidence on unintended effects.

5.2 EQ 2 – Human rights, democracy, rule of law and good governance

EQ 2

To what extent have the mechanisms mentioned in the articles 8, 96 and 97 (i.e. political dialogue, consultation procedure, appropriate measures, and suspension of the agreement) contributed to meaningful improvements in the field of the essential and fundamental elements (human rights, democratic principles, rule of law and good governance) in ACP countries?

Main sources: External Evaluation of Community Aid concerning positive actions in the field of Human Rights and Democracy in ACP Countries, 1995-1999 (2000), Thematic Evaluation of the EC support to Good Governance (2006), Thematic Evaluation of the European Commission support to respect of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (2011), Thematic Evaluation of Euro-

¹⁷ Thematic evaluation of the European Commission support to respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 2011.

¹⁸ It is also recognized that important efforts have been made by relevant Commission services to provide guidance to EUDs in their work with CSOs. In ACP countries this support has been translated into guidelines (1- "Guidelines for EC Delegations on the implementation of CPA provisions regarding NSA", 2003; -2 "Guidelines on Principles and Good Practices for the Participation of Non-State Actors in the development dialogues and consultations", 2004; 3- Orientation note on micro-projects funded under the EDF, 2007); seminar and exchanges on governance (Tanzania, 2006; Ethiopia, 2008) or focused specifically on CSO issues (Benin, 2007). Also facilitation of thematic networks on civil society (e.g. in West Africa) has been promoted.

¹⁹ Evaluation of the EU's trade-related assistance in third countries (2013).

²⁰ When mentioning CPA, all its instruments, tools and procedures should be included.

pean Commission Support to Justice and Security System Reform (2011). Country and/or regional reports provided additional examples (for example Angola 2009 and Timor Leste 2015).

5.2.1 Summary answer

Especially in the last decade, the CPA has strongly emphasised the issues related to **human rights, democracy and broad governance**. Recently, specific tools such as the State Building Contracts in fragile states and Sector Wide Programmes to support good governance have been put in place. Support to electoral and democratic processes has been multiplied and HR was brought into the focus of the political agenda (e.g. Timor Leste, Angola, Nigeria or Pacific region). The results, however, are mixed and a number of difficulties are identified: difficult mainstreaming in the country programmes and sometimes reluctance of partners; compartmentalisation and/or fragmentation of the interventions and tools and insufficient capacities; low political leverage of the EU and reduced financial leverage of the CPA in several countries.

Political dialogue is directly mentioned in the evaluations with a reference to dialogue on HR and Democracy (Article 9) and not to the broader political dialogue as in Article 8²¹. This broader dimension is often mentioned to highlight its weakness and difficult integration with the policy dialogue. An attempt to establish an explicit and shared good governance platform at the country level, through the Governance Initiative of the 10th EDF, has been abandoned.

Suspension. This tool is regulated by art. 96 and 97 (including consultations) and has only been used in a limited number of circumstances. It has also been shown to have some strong contraindications, although its existence and possible use is a factor of credibility for political and policy dialogue (Madagascar, but also BS evaluations in Uganda and Burkina Faso).

Several **negative effects** are associated with the use of suspension, which may be mitigated through the adoption of adapted/tailored measures.

5.2.2 Answers to the judgement criteria

5.2.2.1 JC 2.1 Improvements have been made in the field of human rights, democratic principles, rule of law and good governance

Level of evidence: Medium-high

Number of evaluations: 87

Trend: Strong focus since the late 1990s.

Over the period under consideration (2000-2015), the CPA has mixed records in the field of human rights, democratic principles, rule of law and good governance. Despite the persistence of a compartmentalised and/or fragmented approach, a lot has been done in **HR and democracy**, especially to support the electoral processes and, particularly in the last period, HR have been brought to the forefront of the political agenda (e.g. Timor Leste, Angola, Nigeria or Pacific region). In Zambia, a transparent electoral process has been supported and several successful EU EOM (Electoral Observation Missions) were deployed over the period 2005 - 2010 in Ivory Coast (2010), Sierra Leone (2007) and Timor-Leste (2002, 2007).

In regards to **broader governance** issues (economic governance, corruption and transparency, access to and equity of justice and rule of law), interventions have multiplied since the early 2000s. General budget support programmes contribute to improved PFM and budget transparency and sometimes contain other specific sectoral targets. Over the last decade, however, there has been an attempt to establish rather comprehensive thematic (or sub-sectoral) approaches. These have included sectoral and sub-sectoral strategies, funded through sectoral budget support and other projects, including capacity building and involvement of civil society and other NSAs (e.g. Rwanda and Chad security and justice programmes). Very recently, a specific tool to address comprehensive governance issues in fragile states (State Building Contract) has been shaped. Despite the priority of this theme has increased over the years, according to the evaluations, there are still no adequate reference frameworks (either global or sectoral), to ensure proper co-ordination of the various EU actions between themselves and with the MS.

²¹ See footnotes in EQ 1.

Political contexts and/or political will are important. In some cases the EU support has contributed to the improvement of HR but political/institutional crises have reversed the trend (Burundi, Ethiopia and Kenya), or actions have not followed the engagements (Madagascar, Burundi, Mozambique – especially regarding performance of justice, courts and prisons). Fragmentation and limited capacities of CSOs also limit the scope and coverage of human rights interventions.

Comprehensive support to broad governance and human rights require a strong **political leverage** that the EU does not always put in place²², despite the many instruments provided by the CPA.

There are also limits in **capacities and procedure-related bottlenecks**: for instance the rigid budget lines are not always accessible (OCTs) and limited complementarity between them further hampers their efficiency as well as not always well-adapted procedures and funding modalities.

5.2.2.2 JC 2.2 The CPA mechanisms (political dialogue, consultation procedure, appropriate measures, and suspension of the agreement, including its legally binding characteristic) have played a substantial role in the achievement of the improvements

Level of evidence: Medium

Number of evaluations: 29

Trend: Strengthened after the 2005 revision.

Political dialogue is a fundamental tool of the CPA, especially after its 2005 revision. It is regulated by art. 8 of the CPA, which highlights its large scope, with a focus on both the co-operation and aid effectiveness agenda, on the one hand, and the broader political issues ‘of mutual concern’, such as security, democracy, human rights, rule of law, etc., on the other hand. Article 8 also mentions a complex system of formal and informal multilevel political dialogue.

In practice, however, the main focus of political dialogue is still on human rights, key democratic concerns and security, whilst the **connection with the co-operation programme seems weak** (as shown by the most recent BS evaluations). Furthermore, political dialogue is **increasingly formalised**, although this trend is also visible in policy dialogue (e.g. enlargement of the scope and formalisation tend to dilute the contents and the effectiveness of policy dialogue in Uganda and Burkina Faso). Finally, the **declining leverage of the CPA co-operation** due to its reduced relative weight and the multiplication of international partners is noted in various recent evaluations (e.g. Tanzania, Uganda, Burkina).

There is little information on the application of the **Consultation procedures** envisaged by Articles 96 and 97. There have been a few cases in which the **suspension** mechanisms foreseen by CPA have been put in place and support has been partially or totally suspended. The strategic evaluations mention some cases in which the binding mechanisms are used, without clear positive impacts:

- In **Liberia**, the EC initiated formal political dialogue on the worsening human rights situation, on the violations of democratic principles and rule of law in the last years of the Taylor Presidency (2000) based on Article 96.
- **Madagascar**: in June 2010, the application of Article 96 led to the suspension and rearrangement of the country programme to mitigate any negative consequence on the poor. Indeed the suspension (although necessary for the credibility of the CPA) and the related restructuring led to a practical stop of two years with negative consequences for the most vulnerable groups and the further deterioration of the state institutions.
- **Ethiopia**: a huge political crisis in 2006 led to several European Parliament resolutions and a decision in 2006 to withhold General Budget Support in the absence of any visible sign of advancement in democratisation and good governance. Project-based support for major road construction was allowed to continue, albeit with rigorous monitoring.
- In **Ivory Coast**, the possible use of Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement was examined during the peak of the crisis but it was decided against owing to a lack of consensus among

²² Thematic evaluations on governance and human rights (2001 and 2010)

the EU MS. Finally, following the results of the 2010 presidential elections, the EU imposed sanctions against Ivorian leaders (e.g. visa bans and freezing of assets).

- Other cases include Fiji, Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Guinea, Haiti, Togo, Niger, and Zimbabwe.

The Evaluation on HR, 2001, considering the addressees of some **bold EU actions and sanctions**, suggests that these have tended to include primarily “economically weak or strategically relatively unimportant countries [...] whereas human rights violations in important countries ”are treated in a different way, as most Member States’ positions are watered down in order to agree on the lowest common denominator (particularly when one or more Member States oppose bold action due to strong national interests)”.

5.2.2.3 JC 2.3 The respect of the fundamental principles has been and still is a priority for the ACP countries

Level of evidence: Medium

Number of evaluations: 19

Trend: Increased importance after the 2010 revision.

Article 2 specifies the **fundamental principles** of: *ownership and alignment* in the respect of the essential and fundamental elements; *participation* of Parliaments, Local governments and different development actors; *dialogue and mutual accountability*; and *differentiation and regionalisation*, to ensure adaptation to the contexts and consideration of the regional dimension.

Indeed, the evaluations show that the **ownership** principle is generally at the core of the planning and execution, although in some cases it is noted that its application is rather formal (e.g. Mauritius). The evaluations also show an interesting debate among the government and DPs, especially in the framework of GBS (e.g. Uganda and not only), on whether GBS - which provides a high form of government ownership - should be linked to the respect of HR. According to the Article 2 of the CPA, this should be the case, as the text states that the ownership principle should be applied with “due regard for the essential and fundamental elements” (i.e. HR and good governance, as in Article 9).

The application of the **participation** principle, (also addressed under other EQs) is not ensured in all cases, as a principle should be. This is due to the prominence of the relationships with the central governments, which often overshadows the participation of other actors.

According to the **differentiation and regionalisation** principle the programmes should be tailored to the characteristics, capacities and regional specificities of the different countries. This happens in general terms, as shown by the positive consideration of the programmes’ relevance. The assessment of the capacities, however, is not always adequate and some important programmes (in fragile contexts and or in different budget support operations) overlook the capacity gaps and the need for capacity development.

Dialogue and mutual accountability. Some recent evaluations (e.g. budget support) show that, on key development priorities, the dialogue has partially lost its leverage and the link between policy and political dialogue is still weak.

5.2.2.4 JC 2.4 Unintended effects of the mechanisms have played a minor/major role in the attainment of the results

Level of evidence: High

Number of evaluations: 1

Trend: NA.

Partial or total suspensions of aid have had unintended effects and created additional difficulties for the most vulnerable groups. Some of such effects are emphasised by programming and implementation weaknesses (e.g. Madagascar). Others seem inevitable to ensure the respect of the CPA principles. In general, the use of partial suspension, namely of the most risky aid modalities mitigates the negative effects. In Uganda, the reduction of BS funds after some corruption scandals (2008 and 2011) has contributed to a visible deterioration of the public expenditure and results in

the social sectors, but they have also functioned as incentives to the government to reduce tax exemptions and raise the levels of tax revenues.

5.3 EQ 3 – Peace and security

EQ 3

To what extent has the implementation of the different instruments and approaches of the CPA improved peace and security in ACP countries/regions and has enhanced their capacity to cope with crises?

Main sources: Thematic Evaluation of the European Commission support to Conflict Prevention and Peace Building. Preliminary study: scoping and mapping (2009); Thematic Evaluation of European Commission Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace-building – CPPB (2011). Country evaluations: Angola 2009, Burundi 2014, Caribbean 2012, Central African Republic (CAR) 2009, Chad 2015, Democratic Republic of Congo 2014, Ethiopia 2012, Haiti 2014, Jamaica 2012, Timor-Leste 2015, Liberia 2010, Niger 2010, Republic of Congo 2012.

5.3.1 Summary answer

An **integrated and joint approach**, including a multitude of instruments, to address the root causes of conflict has been progressively promoted in the framework of CPA. However, its mainstreaming has not been a widespread practice over the past few years and most interventions are dictated by emergencies. The capacities for its implementation are still to be developed. In particular, linking release, rehabilitation and development is on a learning curve (e.g. Haiti).

Especially in recent years, the **EU has significantly contributed to conflict prevention** and peace building although the actual effects of such renewed action are not yet fully measurable and still appear marginal in the evaluations (Burundi, Haiti, Ethiopia, etc.).

The **EU added value in this area appears particularly strong**: for the level of neutrality of the EU, but also for its link with regional organisations, most of which play a significant role in Conflict prevention and peace building.

This does not imply that the **co-ordination** with the other stakeholders (EU MS and others) is facilitated, as it still is a challenge.

5.3.2 Answers to the judgement criteria

5.3.2.1 JC 3.1 Evidence of CPA contribution to sustainable improvements in peace and security for the populations of the ACP countries and regions

Level of evidence: Medium-High

Number of evaluations: 14

Trend: Since 2001 the European Commission has implemented a substantial shift in support to Conflict Prevention and Peace Building (CPPB) by developing its funding, policy framework and instruments.

Conflict prevention interventions in ACP countries have been mainly focused on **Peace consolidation and prevention of future conflict**, partly implemented through Regional and International Organisations (i.e. African Peace Facility, ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework, AU peace-keeping missions in Sudan and Somalia, CEMAC operation with multinational force -FOMUC- in CAR) and Multi Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs) for reconstruction (e.g. in Southern Sudan) and for post-crisis rehabilitation programmes (e.g. in Haiti, East DRC, Burundi and Northern Uganda).

Flexible crisis and emergency instruments have been introduced over the years including special procedures (including the emergency (and post-emergency) assistance defined in articles 72 and 73 of the CPA). While early-warning mechanisms have not always enhanced its capacity to detect and react to nascent conflicts (e.g. Central African Republic 2009, Ivory Coast); the reaction once the conflict had broken out has been often rapid, with positive effects on stabilisation.

The Commission's support contributed positively to **conflict mitigation, stabilisation, reconstruction and rehabilitation** (Liberia, Angola, Sierra Leone, CAR) through capacity building initiatives to security forces, demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of former combatants, rehabilitation of victims of conflict, law enforcement agencies and raising-awareness activities (e.g. Caribbean, Timor Leste, Burundi, Rep. of Congo). Support to the recovery of agriculture and access to

basic social services in the affected areas (e.g. Angola, Kenya) have also contributed to enhanced security and peace.

Although it seems EU support to the Security and Justice sectors (drug trafficking, organized crime and violence) in most of the reviewed countries has been appropriate, its impact has been limited/challenging due to several reasons:

1. The lack of information and quality data has usually hampered EU efforts to measure progress of its actions properly (e.g. the Caribbean region);
2. EU interventions' failure to tackle chronic violence (like in Burundi where the improvement of the capacity of security forces has helped to improve the situation but this has not translated into a global sense of security);
3. Weak alignment with other donors (e.g. East Timor).

Nevertheless, there are positive results in several countries, notably through capacity building initiatives to security forces, law enforcement agencies and awareness-raising activities (Caribbean, Timor Leste, Burundi). At the regional level, support to the implementation of regional programmes/initiatives, like the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework; the AU peacekeeping missions in Sudan and Somalia; the operation of the CEMAC multinational force (FOMUC) in the Central African Republic have been also considered important.

The Commission was also a strong **supporter of civil society organisations** around conflict management issues, mainly through international NGOs and specialised networks.

Despite increasing efforts, the **linking of short-term and long-term support was often challenged** in practice particularly on account of the lack of capacity of national and regional authorities (e.g. CAR and the FOMUC/MICOPAX, ECOWAS) along with insufficient exit strategies or premature transition from rehabilitation to development. There are cases where a LRRD approach has been promoted (e.g. Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, Angola, Haiti) with mixed results.

Individual cases also illustrate the risk of moving too rapidly towards development, both for the Commission's strategy and for the priorities of the partner governments (e.g. Liberia, Timor-Leste).

5.3.2.2 JC 3.2 Evidence of CPA contribution to improvements in conflict prevention and addressing their root causes by ACP countries

Level of evidence: Medium-High

Number of evaluations: 24

Trend: The revised Article 11 of the CPA allowed the process of Conflict Prevention and Peace Building to focus more on the root causes of conflicts and the establishment of confidence-building measures, with a view to creating lasting solutions.

Support has **generally not been geared to tackling the root causes of conflict**, but rather to mitigating their consequences or to provision of "classic" development support in a conflict context (e.g. Ethiopia, Timor Leste, Burundi). Political dialogue was used to a certain extent to address root causes, but this has not been systematic.

Insufficient formal and documented conflict analyses and monitoring frameworks have led to weak understanding of the causes of conflicts. Support to national initiatives and involvement of local populations has not been systematic.

- The EC has developed some tools and mechanisms but they remain unknown or are not widely used, including: Checklist for root causes of conflict (2001); confidential "Watch List" in constant revision; Commission's Crisis Room (2001), ARGUS rapid alert and response system (2005), Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) (2010) operated by ECHO;
- A shortage of human resources, in terms both of numbers and CPPB expertise in this complex sector, which often requires innovative and experimental approaches (e.g. Jamaica);
- Weak conflict analysis skills: although a specific guidance on a structured approach has been made available ("Resource Pack") to structure conflict analysis, the EC did only conduct formal and documented conflict analysis in a few cases (non ACP countries) while it provided support to CPPB in more than 100 conflicts. The Commission usually used ad hoc channels and analysis from other stakeholders to monitor conflict situations. However, the

Commission generally analysed the geographical dimension of the conflict and the ensuing needs of specific zones.

Support to the **Security and Justice sector** (drug trafficking, organized crime and violence) has become more frequent over the last decade. It has been often appropriate, including attempts to establish sector-wide approaches with the use of different tools, as in Rwanda (including a significant participation of NSAs). Its impact is not yet fully measurable, but it has been challenging for several reasons: lack of specific capacities in the EU delegations; information and quality data (e.g. the Caribbean region); difficulties to tackle chronic violence (e.g. Burundi); weak alignment with other donors (e.g. Timor Leste).

5.3.2.3 JC 3.3 Evidence of complementarity and synergy between CPA, the common EU foreign and security policy and the policies of EU MS (co-ordination, complementarity and coherence – 3Cs)

Level of evidence: Medium

Number of evaluations: 3

Jamaica, 2012

Conflict Prevention, 2011

Justice and security, 2011

Trend: Since the Lisbon Treaty entered into force and the EEAS were established, there has been a push toward a stronger EU political initiative in Conflict prevention and an improved co-ordination within the EU MS.

To address this JC, it should be kept in mind that the EEAS, after the Lisbon Treaty, was established in January 2011 and became fully operational in the following months. Most evaluations available regard the period pre-EEAS or the very initial EEAS period.

A coordinated approach to Conflict prevention with a shared strategy and a division of labour between the EU bodies and the EU and MS has been particularly challenging in the **pre-EEAS period**, relying rather on exchange of information than on a real co-ordination. **Common strategic frameworks and institutional instruments** were established (e.g. Joint Africa-EU Strategy on Peace and Security - 2009, Africa Peace Facility), but their implementation still reflected specific MS' priorities and difficulties of co-ordination. In the post-EEAS period, however, there are good examples of coordinated approaches in (post-) conflict situations, e.g. Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone and Rwanda.

EU institutions and the EU MS did not have a shared strategy with clear objectives, leadership and joint instruments to ensure a whole-of-EU approach. Sometimes, this uncoordinated response was due to differences in priorities and diverging positions among EU MS. Within the EU the Commission had limited leverage, apart from its financial weight, to ensure a coordinated approach with the EU MS²³.

The EC channelled half of its total financial support to CPPB through **international organisations** and in these circumstances channelling was conducive to a coordinated approach. Whenever a coordinated approach from the entire international community took place during or after a conflict or crisis, it yielded stronger impact.

5.3.2.4 JC 3.4 EU interventions provided an additional value in comparison to bilateral interventions of EU MS

Level of evidence: Medium

Number of evaluations: 4

Trend: Growing role of the Commission since the Lisbon Treaty.

Six types of value-added can be distinguished:

²³ Thematic evaluation of European Commission support to conflict prevention and peace-building (2011)

- **Less characterised “political profile”** being perceived as not tied to national interests enhances its capacities to enter into dialogue with the different parties concerned by the conflicts (e.g. Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone and Timor Leste, Nigeria).
- **EU and regional organisations** have a special relationship, as the latter see in the EU one of their most strategic and reliable partners. This becomes a strong added value, because of the growing involvement of the Regional organisations in Conflict prevention and Peace Building.
- **Reliability:** in terms of its capacity to establish long-term partnerships and its continued presence notably when others had suspended their co-operation (e.g. Ivory Coast).
- The **critical mass of its financial support** (allowing for wide geographical and sector coverage and political leverage).
- The ability to draw on a **wide range of instruments and on multi-national expertise.**
- **Long-term thematic experience** in sectors potentially impacting Conflict prevention.
- Its **credibility** in terms of promoting democracy, peace and human rights.

5.4 EQ 4 – Migration

EQ 4	To what extent have the provisions from article 13 of the CPA contributed to meaningful improvements in addressing the structural constraints associated with the migratory flows?
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Main sources: Thematic evaluations on Population (2004), Employment (2011), Human Rights (2011), Visibility (2012), Border Management (2013). Country evaluations Guyana, Mali, Nigeria, OCTs, Senegal.

5.4.1 Summary answer

Very little evidence has been found on migration issues in the Evaluations under this review. Hence, it is not possible to provide specific information under each Judgement Criterion. However, a summary answer is provided on the basis of the available information. Judgement Criteria under EQ 4 were:

- **JC 4.1** CPA contribution to fair treatment of third country nationals who reside legally in EU-MS or ACP countries;
- **JC 4.2** CPA contribution to prevention policies in the context of illegal immigration;
- **JC 4.3** CPA contribution to acceptance by EU-MS and ACP countries of return and of re-admission of any of their nationals illegally present on their respective territories;
- **JC 4.4** Unintended effects in the attainment of results;
- **JC 4.5** Complementarity and added value of EU interventions.

5.4.2 Answers to the judgement criteria

Level of evidence: Low

Trend: The concept of migration has been widened in the CPA, from focusing on regulatory frameworks (fair treatment of legal and irregular migration flows) to linking migration and development, including issues relating to diasporas, brain drain and remittances. However, those linkages between migration and development have not been fully explored.

In recent years, **migration has become an issue on the development agenda**, in particular the links between migration and development. This is reflected in the number of intergovernmental fora and policy documents that have increased in recent years.

Priorities under this sector include inter alia, remittances, diasporas as actors of home country development, circular migration and brain circulation, mitigating the adverse effect of brain drain, and **mainstreaming migration into development policy and assistance to third countries.** The CPA recognises that strategies aimed at reducing poverty, improving living and working conditions, creating employment and developing training contribute in the long term to normalising migratory flows.

Notwithstanding the increasing importance of migration, there seems to be **little concrete incorporation of these issues at the sectoral implementation level**. The EC has provided assistance aimed at addressing long-term solutions to irregular migration and forced displacement and it has contributed to several National strategies and policies on migration. However, little evidence has been found in the Evaluations on this long-term perspective and most of the information available has been mainly focused on emergency issues.

Despite this general consideration, **some positive results** can be recognised in the areas of migration, labour migration and remittances. Employment and migration are also receiving increased attention. Labour migration aspects have been integrated into programming in some countries (e.g. Mali and Niger).

Integrated Border Management (IBM) matters in which the EU support has contributed to enhancing the legal/regulatory frameworks also show positive results. However, many countries did not tend to seek a full adaptation of their legislation but limited themselves to certain aspects (e.g. Mauritania which envisages a system of migration management rather than IBM).

For interventions in ACP countries (e.g. Mauritania, Zambia), joint financing or clear task division with EU MS played a particularly prominent role. The fact that migration issues occurring at their borders directly concern certain EU MS may explain this situation.

Additionally, the need to elaborate an approach to **integrating the population into programmes in the poorest countries** (many of them ACP countries) is also suggested. In many of these countries, the pressing HIV/AIDS epidemic, plus humanitarian issues requiring interventions to help refugees and IDPs make it difficult to concentrate on population issues (which tend almost by definition to be longer term). Governments in many of these countries have typically not expressed great concern with IDP issues. However, greater co-ordination with partner countries could ensure that, where a re-orientation of country priorities is desirable, ICPD concerns are more effectively advocated in policy dialogue with governments.²⁴

5.5 EQ 5 – Integration of ACP states into the world economy and their share in international trade

EQ 5	To what extent have EU interventions under the CPA (new trading arrangements, dialogue, co-operation programmes) fostered the smooth and gradual integration of the ACP States into the world economy and enabled the ACP states to play a full part in international trade?
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Main sources: Evaluation of the European Union's Trade-related Assistance in third Countries (2013), Joint evaluation of co-ordination of trade capacity building in partner countries (2006), Evaluation of the European Union's Support to Private Sector Development in third countries (2013), Evaluation of EU support to the transport sector in Africa (2015)²⁵. Country/Regional evaluations: Caribbean 2012, Lesotho 2015, Madagascar 2015, Malawi 2011, Namibia 2001, Nigeria 2010, OCTs 2011.

5.5.1 Summary answer

The CPA is a predominant and unique comprehensive support framework of the regional integration process. Although this process is slow and complex, and – in Africa – complicated by a multiplicity of sub-regional overlapping and sometimes contradictory agreements, it advances and provides key opportunities for trade and economic development. Trade Related Assistance (TRA) as part of the larger Aid for Trade support is a key tool to support the economic integration role of the regional organisations.

EU-ACP trade has doubled between 2004 and 2014 with a light balance in favour of the ACP. ACP

²⁴ Recommendation 2 from Thematic Evaluation of Population and Development Programmes in EC External Co-operation, 2004

²⁵ This evaluation was not yet finalised at the time of the review and only a draft final version was available to the evaluation team.

trade with the rest of the world has grown even faster: ACP exports have more than doubled, while ACP imports have almost tripled²⁶. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows, according to UNCTAD data, quintupled between 2000 and 2008, but have declined or stagnated since then.

The EPAs should have been the key tool to translate the new Aid for Trade approach. Strongly anchored in the regional integration system, they should have created new opportunities for promotion of new value chains and increased diversification of trade, attraction of FDI and creation of regional infrastructure. Unfortunately the EPA process encountered a number of unforeseen (or underestimated) difficulties, such as few incentives for LDCs. The process was almost stopped (with some exceptions) during the economic crisis (2008-11) but resumed thereafter. The reopening of the EPA process over the last few years may open new prospects to the CPA in the area of trade.

5.5.2 Answers to the judgement criteria

5.5.2.1 JC 5.1 The CPA contributed to the strengthening of regional trade and integration frameworks

Level of evidence: High

Number of evaluations: 17

Trend: Support to regional integration has found new strength with the launch of EPAs in the mid-2000s

ACP countries acknowledge that regional integration benefits political stability, economic development and the provision of regional public goods²⁷. The CPA recognises the regional integration organisations as main partners for the **Economic Partnership Agreements**.

The use of Contribution Agreements in regional support since 9th EDF offered an interesting potential for a broader multi-donor policy in Trade Capacity Building (TCB). **TRA (part of Aid for Trade²⁸)** is also a key tool to support regional economic integration organisations.

CPA regional programmes focus on **common regional markets**, including policies, regulation, standards, customs' unions, institutions and infrastructure. In the ESA-IO region, for instance, standards harmonisation has been enhanced and the establishment of the EAC and SADC Customs Unions has been facilitated²⁹. The involvement of the private sector and other non-state actors is only just emerging, and remains a weak point.

The main identified **challenges** relate to the overlapping of regional organisations (Sub-Saharan Africa), combined with mixed political will (Caribbean), partly due to national protectionism, weak technical capacities and the inter-governmental nature vis-à-vis supra-national structures. Generic

²⁶ According to EU statistics, total EU-ACP trade between 2004 and 2014 has increased approximately from EUR 90 billion to EUR 176 billion, with a negative balance for the EU of EUR 5 billion. Total ACP trade in the same period with the rest of the world has increased from EUR 246 billion to more than EUR 600 billion, with a negative balance for the ACP passed from EUR 11 billion to EUR 85 billion. The global increase of ACP market share between 2003 and 2012 has been 26%, while the increase of intra-ACP trade has been 5.5%. Only in the Caribbean and the EAC areas the intra-regional trade has increased more than the extra-regional one (International Trade Centre, ACP Trade, 2014).

According to UNCTAD statistics, the intra-ACP trade grew as well, but its share of the international trade declined. It was not so for intra-African trade, of which the share on total trade remained almost the same.

²⁷ Communication "Regional Integration for Development in ACP Countries", 10th EDF.

²⁸ The 2006 WTO Aid for Trade Task Force identified six Aid for Trade categories: (1) Trade policy and regulations; (2) Trade development; (3) Trade-Related infrastructure; (4) Building productive capacity; (5) Trade-related adjustment; (6) Other trade-related needs. The first two categories above are referred to as Trade-Related Assistance. Categories 3 to 6 are referred to as the "wider Aid for Trade agenda" which includes support to economic infrastructure and productive sectors in the wide sense. The EC is a large and longstanding donor in this area (EU, Making Trade Work for Development, 2008). Its 2007 AfT strategy embraces the full WTO AfT agenda. In 2011, the EU and Member States confirmed their position as the largest provider of Aid for Trade (AfT) in the world, accounting collectively for 32% of total AfT, despite the global economic downturn. The combined annual Aid for Trade from the EU budget and those of the EU Member States reached EUR 9.5 billion in 2011 (of which EUR 2.7 billion from the EU budget). For the subset of EU Trade Related Assistance, the collective amount was nearly EUR 3 billion, o/w almost one half from the EU budget. With almost 36%, Africa is the biggest recipient of collective EU AfT (EU, Permanent mission to WTO, WebPage). These amounts do not include the policy support to trade included in budget support programmes.

²⁹ Evaluation of the EU's trade related assistance in third countries (2013) and Thematic global evaluation of the European Union's support to integrated border management and fight against organised crime (2013)

approaches without sufficient strategic analysis (i.e. linkages between integration and growth) have also undermined the process in some cases (Pacific, OCTs).

The co-ordination between **regional and national** interventions has improved over time, but it still represents a major challenge.

Particularly, the **transport sector**, driven by the EPA negotiations with the African Regional Economic Communities (RECs), has facilitated regional connectivity. Strategic changes introduced with 11th EDF dramatically reduced the resources and gave to RECs a pivotal role in programming and implementation of EU sector support albeit capacity gaps to manage and monitor projects persist.

5.5.2.2 JC 5.2 The CPA has contributed to increased ACP-EU trade and investment flows, including key infrastructure, attractiveness of FDI and promotion of PPPs in the ACP countries

Level of evidence: High

Number of evaluations: 33

Trend: Trade supported by EPAs.

The CPA has identified **TRA support packages**, tailor-made to the specific conditions, especially related to the quality infrastructure and capacity enhancement of technicians. There has been significant contribution in terms of trade policy analysis, including diagnostic studies, support to trade strategies and capacity development. Impact was achieved in better-prepared countries, and where greater dependence on EU trade increased the competitive pressure for compliance.

The Aid for Trade concept has pushed TRA to embrace trade diversification and **support to the private sector**, but the results of such enlarged scope are not yet particularly strong. There is a weak co-ordination between regional and country support strategies and the assistance has focused specific export sectors, but not the expansion and consolidation of the value chains and the related bottlenecks in the business environments³⁰.

Product diversification in ACP exports has increased, although success in increasing trade has been greater than in diversification. Support in this area has enhanced the added value of exports and promoted more innovations and research in the industries supported. CPA support in this area faced difficult economic and regulatory environments (e.g. Jamaica) and there are only a few examples of support to productive sectors that are the catalyst for more structural change in beneficiary countries due, inter alia, to the combination of trade-related support and investments in infrastructure (e.g. Kenya Northern Corridor; Core Road Network-Zambia).

In **poorer countries**, TRA has supported the stabilisation and modest expansion of trade³¹. but there is still an unfinished agenda – especially in Africa and LDCs – to assist in making trade and associated growth more inclusive by accelerating efforts aimed at diversifying economies and trade characteristics.

Impacts are mixed. Although in the last decades ACP trade has featured high rates of growth, it is noted that the limited focus both on improving the investment climate – including attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) – and trade finance has weakened the EU's contribution to changing the trade and production structure towards high productivity activities that are key drivers of sustained economic development.

5.5.2.3 JC 5.3 The CPA contributed to the conclusion of WTO-compatible Economic Partnership Programmes

Level of evidence: High

Number of evaluations: 26

Trend: EPAs are a big innovation of the mid-2000s, but remain an unfinished job

³⁰ Evaluation of the EU's trade related assistance in third countries (2013)

³¹ Ibid.

EPA strategy: EPAs aimed to develop an open, transparent and strong WTO-compatible regulatory framework for trade in goods and services. However, achievements are still limited, since EPAs are just coming out from a stagnation period (aggravated by the economic crisis) and many resources which were allocated to their implementation have not been (or are no longer) mobilised.

EPA process³²: Among ACP regions, there are several cases of mixed situations inside regional groupings:

- In the **Caribbean**, not all EU and CARIFORUM countries have ratified the agreement and only five CARIFORUM countries have started their phased customs duty reduction according to the agreement. EU funding has been critical for the EPA negotiation process, but the involvement of Non-State Actors was minimal.
- In the **Pacific**, only an interim EPA with Papua New Guinea (PNG) and Fiji was agreed upon. Many of the other countries already benefit from free access to the EU under the Everything But Arms (EBA) scheme or have only insignificant and erratic trade with the EU.
- In **Africa**³³, results are mixed and in many cases negotiations are still pending. Some countries from the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) category benefit from the “Everything but Arms” (EBA) initiative, providing unilateral duty and quota free access to the EU market; and others which are not LDCs do not benefit from the EBA. LDCs therefore see little interest in EPAs whereas non-LDCs do. Such was the case for Cameroon and Ghana (non-LDCs located in regional grouping of mostly LDCs), which therefore individually signed “interim bilateral EPA agreements” with the EU. This is however contradictory with one of the fundamental EPA objectives: regional integration.

The EPA process was launched with a strong emphasis on aid for trade and with a focus on attracting investment (infrastructure fund and other aid-for-trade related investment - e.g. ESA-IO-2008). This was deeply integrated with the Regional Integration programmes. However, the negotiations on trade regulation and standards became more important and partly **replaced the development related dialogue** at regional level (TRA-2013), thus reducing the attractiveness and increasing the concerns of the ACP parties about the whole process.

5.5.2.4 JC 5.4 Unintended effects have played a minor/major role in the attainment of the results

Level of evidence: Low

Number of evaluations: 3

Trend : NA.

As a positive ‘unintended’ effect, the Commission support in the framework of EPAs to the formulation of partner governments’ strategies aimed at promoting trade and economic integration at regional and international levels may be considered to be an indirect support to the formulation of export diversification strategies in the agricultural sector³⁴ (e.g. Ghana and the discussions on the issue of diversification around cocoa within the framework of the EPA negotiations).

Big questions are raised on the winners and losers of the regional integration processes (e.g. customs’ unions, as in the mentioned case in SADC) and the EPAs themselves. Simulation studies and adequate provisions for the identification and monitoring of such consequences exist and should be further envisaged. Modalities and mechanisms to tackle such consequences should be put in place.

³² Overview of EPA Negotiations, Updated September 2015:

http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/september/tradoc_144912.pdf

³³ In sub-Saharan Africa, there are some Interim EPAs signed in 2007/2008, which include Ghana, Cameroon and six states of the ESA region (Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Zambia and Zimbabwe). In 2014, the negotiation processes have been concluded for all sub-regions excluding Central Africa: for ECOWAS (Economic Community of West Africa States), EAC (Eastern African Community) and SADC (Southern African Development Community), the EPA documents are now under signature.

³⁴ Thematic evaluation on Agricultural commodities (2012).

5.6 EQ 6 – EU-ACP international economic and trade co-operation

EQ 6

To what extent has mutual co-operation between EU and ACP countries improved the identification and furthering of common interests in international economic and trade fora?

Main sources: Thematic Evaluation on Trade Capacity Building (2006), Thematic Evaluation on Trade-related Assistance (2013), Evaluation of the European Union's Trade-related Assistance in Third Countries (2013). Country/regional evaluations: ESA-IO 2008, Botswana 2009, Dominican Republic 2011, Caribbean 2012, Jamaica 2012, Pacific 2015.

5.6.1 Summary answer

This EQ regards the modalities of the EU support to ACP countries in the area of trade. The key instrument of EU support has been the Trade Related Assistance – TRA. Among the different TRA areas, support to trade policies and regional integration has been the most important. A strong focus was put on strengthening the role of regional organisations, of which the EU is absolutely the most important partner. In the ACP region, the ESA-IO and WA regions accounted for almost one half of the TRA channelled through regional organisations.

The CPA contribution in trade areas focuses on the identification of common interests at regional level, improving trade environment (institutions, regulation and infrastructure), enhancing the harmonisation and implementation of trade agreements and protocols. This is mainly done through TRA at both the regional and national level, and also through some budget support operations.

TRA has increasingly been aligned to partners' priorities and mainly focused on support of regional trade organisations and/or country programmes (decreasing tendency to use GBS).

In more fragile environments, the focus has been on addressing specific infrastructure bottlenecks and capacity weaknesses.

The effects of regulatory reform and capacity building have been limited by systemic bottlenecks, such as conflicting interests between members of the regional organisations, conflicts among different organisations and staff incentives.

A key weakness of the EU- and CPA-related action is the poor monitoring system and particularly its weak focus on outcomes (e.g. private sector response).

5.6.2 Answers to the judgement criteria

5.6.2.1 JC 6.1 The CPA has helped in the mutual understanding of trade issues between ACP countries and EU and the identification and implementation of common interests in international economic and trade co-operation

Level of evidence: Medium-High

Number of evaluations: 4

Trend: Stronger since the mid-2000s

Between 2004 and 2010, the EU's direct support to **Trade Related Assistance** - TRA (i.e. excluding the support channelled through budget support) has been concentrated in three main regions, with ACP ranking first (48%). Within the ACP region, 54% of TRA was allocated to Sub-Saharan African countries, 15% to Caribbean countries, and 2% to Pacific countries. The remaining 29% covered one or several ACP countries, which cannot clearly be attributed to one of the three major ACP regions. These allocations can also be intra-ACP allocations.

Areas of action: Within the ACP region, TRA was mainly devoted to the support of regional (trade) organisations and/or regional trade agreements³⁵ followed by work on business support/promotion and policy and administrative management. Compared to national organisations,

³⁵ Regarding regional integration schemes, the Eastern and Southern African region had more than 5% of the overall TRA, followed by the West African region (4%) and the Caribbean region (around 2%). Evaluation of the European Union's Trade-related Assistance in Third Countries (2013).

regional organisations played a major role as a channel in ACP countries, both for funds that were directed to specific regional programmes and for intra-ACP allocations³⁶.

Modalities: A project approach seems to be the preferred modality (with a strongly fluctuating share over the period). GBS with trade-related indicators represented 38% of the total GBS funds transferred to partner countries, a total of 27 countries out of which 21 are located in the ACP region (Zambia, Tanzania, Ghana, and Mauritius among the top five). However, increasing concerns about the effectiveness of budget support as a means of reaching the specific trade related objectives has been translated into a tendency to reduce the use of this modality.

Alignment: Most TRA project interventions were jointly elaborated, although not all relevant entities of the partner countries participated (e.g. Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana, where weak NSA participation was noted) and with slower progress than expected.

In **fragile contexts**, support has been concentrated on reducing specific supply-side constraints (less on policy, more on specific institutional and infrastructure bottlenecks) and on providing ad-hoc advice to the government according to specific demand (e.g. Ivory Coast).

Co-ordination and complementarity have been strengthened over time (e.g. joint strategies implemented in Southern Africa and Zambia). However, potential synergies between the EU and MS interventions have often not been explored – for instance in the Central African and the West African regions.

Irrespective of the degree of alignment, there are very **few examples of well-functioning M&E** systems. Assessment of the EU contribution and monitoring of the implementation of the trade regulations are weak areas. Most monitoring mechanisms have been established at the input or output level, while the outcomes (actual implementation of the new regulations, response of the private sector, including bottlenecks identified and changes in production) have not been sufficiently addressed. Even the monitoring of the trade volumes are not an adequate indicator of the effectiveness and impact of the implementation of trade policies.

5.6.2.2 JC 6.2 The CPA contributed to the improved capacity of ACP countries to negotiate and monitor international agreements

Level of evidence: Medium-High

Number of evaluations: 11

Trend: Stronger since the mid-2000s

Trade negotiation capacity: The EU has provided valuable assistance to trade negotiation capacities and has improved the capacity of public institutions involved in trade policy and facilitation, but with insufficient analysis of the context shaping the incentive frameworks for trade development, especially in more fragile environments. Notably in weaker contexts, results have often been less than anticipated (often gap analysis being inadequate in determining systemic causes of dysfunctionality). The root causes were frequently related to poor (real) staff incentives for performance, high staff rotation in ministries, and pervasive corruption. Predictably, supplying inputs (e.g. training and TA) into a partly dysfunctional system was often ineffective.

Capacity in trade policy management: The targeted focus has been on legal framework revision, technical training and equipment provision as key capacity constraints (e.g. Botswana 2009, Caribbean, Pacific). The impact of legislation revision remains to be seen in the longer term, but the groundwork for reform has been firmly established in most cases. Substantial progress has been made in terms of institutional strengthening, training and equipment. The improvement of the harmonisation and implementation of **agreements on standards**, by unblocking key capacity constraints has contributed with mixed results to implementing new protocols, framework agreements and harmonised regulations. For example, the EU has spearheaded the process of establishing regional SPS (Sanitary and Phytosanitary) and TBT (Technical Barriers to Trade) regulations, alt-

³⁶ Intra-ACP cooperation is embedded in the regional cooperation and integration framework and covers all regional operations that benefit many or all ACP States. Such operations may transcend the concept of geographic location. They fall into three main areas: global initiatives, "all-ACP" initiatives, and pan-African initiatives. Thematic Evaluation on Trade-related Assistance (2013).

though often the overlapping regional organisations in Africa and the resistance of the national systems have hampered their effectiveness (e.g. SADC/COMESA/EAC Tripartite Task Force). EPAs are expected to become a key mechanism to strengthen implementation of trade agreements and they include specific tools and provisions.

In **Africa**, a key TRA focus, indeed with mixed results, regards two levels of negotiations:

- within the regional organisations to address and conciliate the interests of the multitude of member states (**intra-regional negotiations**) to address the actual implementation of the adopted trade framework all-over the regional territory;
- and between the regional organisations (**inter-regional negotiations**), to address the problems of overlapping and contradictory regulations, ensuring absolute harmonisation. As a concrete example, the Better Training for Safer Food (BTSF) initiative contributed to significantly raising the knowledge of the EU food/feed safety control staff and of the third country participants involved in the production, delivery and inspection processes of products dedicated to exports.

5.7 EQ 7 Macroeconomic reforms, private sector and investment

EQ 7

To what extent has the CPA contributed to macroeconomic growth/stabilisation and institutional reforms and policies at national and regional level resulting in a favourable environment for investment and the development of the private sector?

Main sources: Thematic Evaluation on Trade-related Assistance (2013), Evaluation of General Budget Support (2004), Thematic Evaluation of the EC support to Good Governance (2006), Evaluation of the European Union's Support to Private Sector Development in third countries (2013), Thematic Global Evaluation of European Commission Support to agricultural commodities in ACP countries (2012), Evaluation of EU support to the transport sector in Africa (2015)³⁷ and a wide range of country evaluations, including BS country evaluations.

5.7.1 Summary answer

Since the 1990s, the main CPA contribution to economic growth in the ACP region is through budget support³⁸ and its country-level effects on macroeconomic stabilisation, improved PFM and more strategic and efficient public expenditure. Support to infrastructure (especially road networks) has been very important as well.

Private sector development has benefited from such interventions, while more direct support - aimed at the creation of an enabling environment, improving quality standards, facilitating access to finance - despite some positive examples, has been generally fragmented and weakly mainstreamed in the national strategies.

Support to agriculture has been focused on food security and commodities, while the sectoral approach including food value chains and rural development has been weak.

Governance has become a strong priority in the last decade. It is part of most budget support programmes and is addressed through sector approaches in various cases, although a still weak integration of political and policy dialogue and poor capacity development tools challenge its implementation.

The EU is the leader in support to Regional organisations and trade. The latter have contributed to economic growth, thanks to their efforts to boosting intra- and extra-regional trade³⁹, strengthening

³⁷ This evaluation was not yet finalised at the time of the review and only a draft final version was available to the evaluation team.

³⁸ According to ECDPM (*EC Budget Support: thumbs up or down? - 2005*), budget support - in the form of EDF contribution to Structural Adjustment - covered 30% of the disbursements of EDF 7th (1990) and EDF 8th (1995) and 25% of the commitments. Under the 9th EDF (2000-2007) the share of budget support has been further strengthened, while under the 10th EDF (2007-2014) it was expected to reach 50% of the programmable aid. A peak was reached in 2008, while a decreasing trend has taken place since then, with the share coming back to around 25%.

³⁹ Data on Trade (UNCTAD, *Economic Development in Africa: intra-African trade: unlocking private sector dynamism*, 2013) show that African trade has grown significantly between 1996 and 2011, faster than other regions with the exception of East-Asia. Intraregional trade has grown at high rates in absolute terms in all sub-regions, although trade with the rest of the world has grown even faster in several cases. Comparing the period 2001-2006 with the period 2007-2011,

transport networks and enhancing peace building. EPAs could be their new frontier, but their prospect is uncertain and the regional organisations show many institutional weaknesses.

EU added value is key for its perceived neutrality and multinational dimension, for its capacity to mobilise significant resources and bring together multiple actors, and for its specific competencies.

5.7.2 Answers to the judgement criteria

5.7.2.1 JC 7.1 The CPA contributed to disciplined and transparent fiscal and monetary policies in ACP countries, including control of Parliaments and CSOs

Level of evidence: High

Number of evaluations: 21

Trend: Since the mid-1990s with the participation to Structural Adjustment, then with the support to adjustment with human face, then PRSP and GBS and SBS

- Significant financial contribution to macro-economic stabilisation (mainly through Joint BS).
- Moderate contribution to enhanced capacities in macroeconomic management (compared to IMF, regional partners, etc.).
- Significant contribution to enhanced capacities in PFM (through BS dialogue and accompanying measures), including matching budget allocations and policy priorities.
- Especially in the last decade, support to PFM has embraced accountability issues, including anti-corruption.
- Direct support to CSOs and Parliament to enhance their participation in PFM-related control is not frequent in the framework of BS.

5.7.2.2 JC 7.2 The CPA contributed to the provision of timely responses, at a reasonable cost, to the challenges faced by the private sector in ACP countries, including removal of obstacles and access of formal and informal SMEs to innovative and effective financial and economic services

Level of evidence: Medium – High

Number of evaluations: 50

Trend: PSD has been a priority since the late 1990s, no significant recent changes

Indirect support to private sector via support to macroeconomic stabilisation (Budget Support), road infrastructure (specific projects) and trade (regional organisations) has been high.

CPA support to **infrastructure planning and implementation** (mainly roads, but also water supply and to a less extent energy supply) has been critical to increasing long-term competitiveness (Mozambique, Tanzania), while poor infrastructure has shown to be a key constraint to private sector development (Zambia, Madagascar, Malawi). The EU has played a leading role for the development of regional transport networks.

Support to improved **PSD environment** (e.g. country and regional programmes) has not found an adequate response and commitment at the governmental level⁴⁰; private sector institutions have not been adequately involved and supported, and the programmes do not rely on accurate analyses of the key environment bottlenecks (Jamaica, Kenya).

Direct support to enterprises, quality standards and enhanced competitiveness (though successful – e.g. Burkina Faso) had limited sustainability.

EIB investment facility for ACP countries provides relevant and effective venture capital and loans as well as capacity building to ACP financial intermediaries, through joint and coordinated programmes with other IFIs.

intraregional trade has grown faster than extra-regional trade for the CENSAD (Sahel), CEMAC, and SADC regions. It has grown slower in the other regions.

⁴⁰ Evaluation of the EU's support to private sector in third countries (2013).

Various instruments have been put in place, such as: the Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund (GEEREF), an innovative risk capital-based fund of which the EU is the founder and lead donor, the ACP/EU Microfinance Programme, of which the final evaluation is positive, the Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility (BizClim), the Centre for the Development of Enterprise (CDE), PROINVEST, etc.

Some positive experiences are present, but a **coherent approach** to be replicated and adapted region-wide is not in place.

5.7.2.3 JC 7.3 The CPA contributed to strengthening the agricultural and rural development policies with a view to enhance inclusive growth and food security

Level of evidence: High

Number of evaluations: 47

Trend: Low priority since the 1990s. Recent signs of renewed interest.

More than EUR 2.1 billion were provided from 2000-2009 in support of **agricultural commodities**, all instruments or budget lines considered: EDF, Stabex, Sugar and Banana budget lines, and others. The approach to the traditional commodity support was reviewed with a focus on production chains, risk management, diversification, integration into international trade and sustainable business. Although commodity support has benefited sector competitiveness (e.g. support to banana and sugar in the Caribbean⁴¹), it was rarely mainstreamed in comprehensive agricultural and rural development interventions.

Food security is another important area in many country programmes, but often the interventions, as in the case of the commodities, are punctual (e.g. Haiti), provide immediate benefits to their beneficiaries, but have a weak sector approach.

In terms of **sector approach**, in most BS evaluated in the past decade since the Joint GBS evaluation, agriculture and rural development rarely appear among the targeted sectors for which development indicators are established as a matter of joint monitoring and dialogue. Where such indicators appear (e.g. Zambia), government compliance with the relevant indicators is poor and dialogue on the policy factors that determine the poor performance is weak.

5.7.2.4 JC 7.4 The CPA contributed to establish of a democratic and efficient governance framework, including modernised PA, independent and effective justice

Level of evidence: High

Number of evaluations: 33

Trend: Increasingly strong priority in the last decade

Budget Support has been the main instrument to strengthen the governance reform processes. The focus has been primarily on improving public financial management, less on influencing other critical governance processes (e.g. improved public accountability and Parliamentary control; strengthening oversight bodies, etc.). In the last decade, however, such areas have become more important (including anti-corruption and fundamental principles).

Budget support is not sufficiently combined with sector-specific **complementary tools** (e.g. CSOs involvement, TA, etc.) at the central and local levels, in particular to enhance implementation capacities. In addition, the EU Delegations are not adequately equipped to address governance issues in BS-related dialogue.

A project and programme approach, under certain conditions, has shown to be effective (e.g. in Angola⁴²), but capacity development support often overlooks the actual incentive framework (weak political economy assessments - e.g. in the case of Trade Related Assistance⁴³).

⁴¹ Thematic global evaluation of European Commissions support to agricultural commodities in ACP countries (2012).

⁴² Thematic evaluation of the EC support to good governance (2006).

⁴³ Evaluation of the EU's trade-related assistance in third countries (2013).

5.7.2.5 JC 7.5 The CPA contributed to private sector and civil society organisations having a meaningful impact on preparation and implementation of policies related to economic growth and private sector development

Level of evidence: Medium

Number of evaluations: 7

Trend: In principle it has always been a priority

The Evaluation of the EU's Support to Private Sector Development in Third Countries (2013) indicates that the private sector was generally **not thoroughly consulted** when institutional and regulatory (I&R) reforms conducive to PSD were prepared and undertaken, with only limited targeting of private business.

Evidence suggests that channelling support through government departments and intermediary organisations increased the results in terms of institutional capacity building without necessarily encouraging the sustainable trickle-down effect to enterprises. **Opportunities have been missed** in terms of long-term institutional building of private sector business service organisations that would support SMEs on a more sustainable basis.

5.7.2.6 JC 7.6 The CPA contributed to strengthen the role of regional, sub-regional and continental organisations to support development standards and opportunities

Level of evidence: High

Number of evaluations: 14

Trend: In principle it has always been a priority, but relaunched with EPA

The CPA recognises the regional integration organisations as the main partners for the **Economic Partnership Agreements**, which were launched in the 2000s as the new comprehensive frameworks for the development of the ACP region (See also EQ 5).

Evidence suggests that the CPA provided important support to the ACP business development in the 9th and 10th EDF with **trade and regional integration** most often chosen as a focal sector of regional co-operation, especially in the second half of the 2000s. CPA support to improve intra- and extra-regional trade has been huge (policies and regulations - ESA-IO region) and rather effective, especially when combined with road planning and implementation (East and Western Africa), although other trade agreements (e.g. WTO negotiations or EPAs) showed slow progress.

Challenges identified refer to a) the **poor co-ordination between regional and national** support plans and implementation as a main obstacle toward effective integration (ESA-IO, CariCom, SADC, Pacific), b) the **overlapping and different capacities** of the regional organisations (ESA-IO region, SADC, Central Africa, UEMOA/CEDEAO) and c) the **involvement of the private sector and other non-state actors** which is only emerging.

Some regional organisations are particularly active in **conflict prevention and management** (ESA-IO region, ECOWAS), which is a key component of the integration and regional development process.

5.7.2.7 JC 7.7 Unintended effects have played a minor/major role in the attainment of the results

Level of evidence: High

Number of evaluations: 5

Trend: NA.

In a limited number of cases, it was found that significant amounts of budget support, not adequately supported by a mutual accountability framework, have facilitated the **use of funds in non-priority areas** (e.g. large tax exemptions in Uganda, politically driven expenditure in Burkina Faso). This has shed new light on the ground of convergence and trust on which GBS must rely.

There are some unintended effects of the **strong focus on mutual accountability** of many programmes aimed at supporting governance, when they are not aware of the complex governance systems that they need to address (e.g. in the Dominican Republic).

The concentration on national-level PFM and sector strategies, mainly determined by the use of BS and comprehensive sector programmes has resulted in **local government capacity and NSA participation** receiving insufficient attention (e.g. Uganda, Haiti). There are only a few examples where global or sectoral support is accompanied by significant support for NSA and local governments.

5.7.2.8 JC 7.8 EU interventions have been complementary and provided an additional value in comparison to bilateral interventions of EU MS

Level of evidence: High

Number of evaluations: 7

Trend: Complementarity and joint programming are particularly stressed since the 10th EDF

The **use of BS** as one of the main modalities facilitates co-ordination as this is implicit in the nature of the aid modality. BS-related co-ordination is strong with member states when they participate in BS operations and is much stronger than with other PTF.

Co-ordination mechanisms, outside the BS programmes, are numerous at the country level. In some countries, **joint programming** is in place in some sectors (e.g. Haiti) and/or specific joint programmes (many examples).

EU specific added value in comprehensive support programmes, like GBS, especially in fragile countries (e.g. Haiti) is deeply linked to the **neutrality of the EU** as a whole compared to any single member state, or to other powerful nations with hard political, economic and military interests, or also to the IFIs with their hard technical standards.

Its neutrality, its specific experience and trade competence allows the EU to play a **unique role to support regional integration**, which is perceived as a crucial development challenge especially in Africa.

The EU, despite rigorous preliminary assessments and rigorous conditionalities, is **ready to support new policy challenges** of committed governments (Haiti, Ivory Coast).

The EU has access to significant amounts of funds and can mobilise a **multitude of instruments**, including financial facilities.

5.8 EQ 8 – Social infrastructure and services

EQ 8

To what extent has the CPA contributed to improved coverage, quality and access to basic social infrastructure and services?

Main sources: Thematic evaluation of Population and Development Programmes in EC External Co-operation (2004), Thematic evaluation of the European Commission support to the health sector (2012), Thematic global evaluation of European Commission support to the education sector in partner countries (including basic and secondary education) (2010). Also, diverse country/Regional evaluations (including country evaluations on Budget Support) have contributed to inform this EQ (for example Burkina Faso 2010 and Uganda 2009, Tanzania 2013, Mozambique 2014, Uganda 2015, Burkina Faso (draft) 2016).

5.8.1 Summary answer

Since the late 1990s, CPA has supported ACP governments to shape and finance education and health policies, thus contributing to **improved strategies and increased social infrastructure and services**, with a focus on the poor.

BS (including GBS and SBS) has been a major **supporting modality**, while sectoral programmes in Education and Global funds in health have increased during the last decade.

The supported government policies have led to **improved equitable access** to the basic services, including a significant increase in the enrolment rates in primary and secondary school, improved rates of access to basic health, with positive impacts on the literacy and basic health indicators, increased access rates to clean water, etc.

The **quality** of government services has been partly overlooked, and has partly deteriorated under the pressure of the large increase in numbers.

NSAs are involved in identification and delivery of social services to a different extent and with

varying intensity, but not systematically as a consolidated government partner for service delivery. Donor **co-ordination** is facilitated by the financing modalities put in place in the area of social services (namely GBS, SBS and participation to global funds in health). There are a number of other instruments, including successfully delegated co-operation to EU MS. EU **added value** is particularly important considering its financial weight, especially in budget support and participation in global funds.

5.8.2 Answers to the judgement criteria

5.8.2.1 JC 8.1 The CPA contributed to the increase in availability of health and education services

Level of evidence : High

Number of evaluations: 47

Trend : During the first half of the 2000s, GBS has been a major source of funding, while Sectoral programmes in Education and Global funds in health have increased in the last decade.

Education

In the education sector, as for the geographical breakdown, 40% of the EC direct funding⁴⁴ went to the ACP region.

Interestingly, direct EC funding to **education**, in relative terms, represents only 3.3% of the total in ACP. The great majority of EC funds was transferred to ACP countries in the form of GBS, with education-related indicators (a total EUR 3.2 billion from 2000-2007). Out of the 37 countries that benefited from GBS with education related indicators, 35 are ACP countries⁴⁵.

Budget support has played a catalytic role⁴⁶, strengthening systems and tools to improve education sector policies, service delivery and resourcing (e.g. Zambia, Mozambique, Uganda in the 2000s, then Tanzania, Mozambique, Uganda, Burkina Faso, the Dominican Republic, and other countries). Government ownership has been high and since the late 1990s, new education policies and plans have been established and updated in the mentioned countries.

Contribution to an increase in the **availability of education services** via educational infrastructure, increased equipment, number of teachers and improved incentives and training opportunities is visible. However, new resources and inputs provided are still insufficient, as an increase in enrolment has stretched them even further.

Health

In the **health** sector, the main beneficiary of direct support was the ACP region (46%). Worldwide, direct EC support was channelled through the individual project modality (45% of total support), followed by 'Support to sector programmes, excluding sector budget support' (18%) and SBS (16%). 21% of EC funds were channelled through global trust funds, the main recipient being GFATM. The EC's indirect support referring to the health sector (i.e. GBS with health related indicators) amounted to around EUR 5 billion over the period 2002-2010. Obviously, it is not possible to estimate how much of this was actually assigned to health. This amount represents 72% of the total GBS funds transferred to partner countries during the period and concerned a total of 45 countries, out of which 39 are located in the ACP region. The weight of GBS has been significantly reduced over the last years.

The contribution to an **increase in the availability of health services** is reflected in quantitative terms (expansion, reconstruction and equipping of health facilities), mainly via the support to sectoral expenditure, and in qualitative terms (improved policies, including better human resource mobilisation, e.g. Zambia, Burkina Faso, Angola), via the EC participation in policy dialogue and other

⁴⁴ Support that targets directly and entirely the sector.

⁴⁵ Thematic global evaluation of European Commission support to the education sector in partner countries (including basic and secondary education), 2010

⁴⁶ Important to note that in the thematic evaluations and in the budget support evaluations there is a certain difference on the understanding of the effects of budget support (namely GBS) on the sectoral policies and performance. Such difference is probably due to the different methodological tools used in the two types of evaluations.

policy support. In the last decade, important funds have been channelled through the Global Fund and other global projects, to focus specific health care areas.

There is evidence of a general increase in sectoral public expenditure and the significant contribution provided, inter alia, by the EC funds and other inputs, as shown by the mentioned BS evaluations, and various country evaluations (e.g. Timor-Leste and others). The sector however remains heavily underfunded (Thematic Evaluation, 2012), the **structures are still not adequate and quality of services is generally low** (i.e. little impact on promoting essential medicine guarantees compensated by essential medicine supply through provision of basic benefit packages in a small number of settings). In general, the underfunding by the partner governments and inadequate human resources, exacerbated by the extremely high population growth in many regions, are seen as the key factors of the limited improvements.

Some **improvements in coverage of services** are indicated (infrastructure, staff) including clinics in underserved regions, either through NGO-supported projects, sector support or multi-donor GBS (e.g. Ghana).

5.8.2.2 JC 8.2 The CPA contributed to increase equitable access to health and education services

Level of evidence : High

Number of evaluations: 60

Trend: Since the early 2000s, this has been a priority.

Education

There is evidence of a **tremendous increase in access to school**, especially at the primary level, in the ACP countries in the past few decades⁴⁷ mainly due to the strengthened sectoral focus of national policies, including increased investment, reduction of fees and related increase in service delivery, together with other contextual factors (demographic and income factors, etc.). The CPA contribution to such strengthened policy is highlighted in most evaluations (namely budget support).

In terms of **equitable access**, the enrolment of girls has grown faster and investment in rural areas has been significant with strong increases of access by the poor (Zambia, Tanzania), although important differences among geographic zones persist. There is also much evidence of increased access to higher levels of education, i.e. increased progression and transition rates, in a number of countries.

In fragile states or poorly-governed states, EC's alignment to government systems may be substituted by **support to NGOs** as alternative channels both for mainstream education and pilots for new concepts, some of which have achieved impressive results, especially in regards to reducing gender disparities, enhancing learning outcomes and improving access.

Health

A key CPA concern has been increasing access and utilisation while **reducing access costs** for the poor. Budget support to countries engaged in reducing health access costs (e.g. Burkina Faso), or project financing of specific health care services through global funds, are the main tools put in place.

In terms of **equitable access**, support has been geared towards providing health care for those with special needs through basic health care provision programmes (e.g. GBS programmes with indicators related to maternal health) or contribution to global initiatives (e.g. GFATM⁴⁸, GAVI⁴⁹, polio eradication). These efforts have been successful mainly in improving maternal health (although

⁴⁷ In sub-Saharan Africa, the net enrolment ratio in primary school passed from 58% in 1999 to 78% in 2012 (gross enrolment passed from 80% to 102%), with an increase in the number of pupils enrolled from 82 million to 144 million. The ratio of female to male was 88% in 1999 and 93% in 2012. Out-of-school children were 42 million in 1999 and 29 million in 2012.

The net enrolment rate in secondary education passed from 20% in 1999 to 33% in 2012, with the female/male ratio passing from 85% to 87%.

⁴⁸ Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.

⁴⁹ Vaccine Alliance.

gaps remain between rural and urban areas) and, to a lesser extent, in increasing the utilisation of health facilities by children. This resulted in higher immunisation rates and better monitoring of growth and nutrition status. The improvement of other health outcomes has been supported as well.

Such outcomes, however, are not sustainable, as the demographic growth and the pressure of other investment priorities represent a serious threat for health financing and the sectoral performance may easily deteriorate, as shown in some cases (Uganda).

5.8.2.3 JC 8.3 The CPA contributed to the establishment of effective quality assurance systems

Level of evidence : Medium-High

Number of evaluations: 8

Trend : Stronger focus in the last decade

Despite improvements in terms of systems' capacities (e.g. Burundi, Madagascar, Namibia, Pacific), the actual impact on the **quality of education is still poor** and, despite the jump of the enrolment data, the learning targets are often not met.

In **education**, **SBS** and sector support programmes, especially in middle-income countries, have assisted partner country governments to accommodate quality improvement strategies through system-wide support. In other cases, GBS has assisted governments to meet the bare necessities for education systems' survival, including financing of teacher salaries and textbooks. Without such support, the quality of education provision would have further deteriorated, while experiencing substantial quantitative increases.

In the **health** sector, there has been a clear contribution to strengthening health policy strategy processes (i.e. policy analysis and data, national strategic health plans, performance monitoring, health indicators or sector co-ordination). Key issues related to health sector management and governance such as PFM, accountability and capacity have also been incorporated into policy dialogue in most cases. PFM at sectoral level, however, has been addressed with poor results, especially at decentralised level, where lack of capacity, political patronage and other inefficiencies weaken the system (Uganda, Burkina Faso).

5.8.2.4 JC 8.4 The CPA contributed to the integration of population issues in development strategies and policies

Level of evidence : High

Number of evaluations: 5

Trend : Unchanged

EC policy statements regarding population development have evolved (see EQ 4), in line with the ICPD⁵⁰, from concern with macroeconomic impacts of population growth to concern with individual-level reproductive health and rights⁵¹. Special attention has been given to **reproductive health (including HIV-AIDS) and family planning** but this dimension is still not fully integrated. For example, none of the CSPs under the 10th EDF have chosen Sexual Reproductive Health⁵² as a focal or prioritised sector.

⁵⁰ International Conference on Population and Development.

⁵¹ Thematic Evaluation of Population and Development Programmes in EC External Cooperation, 2004

⁵² Sexual Reproductive Health (SRH) has received the smallest share of direct EC support, amounting to only 5% or EUR 219 million of the total direct support over the period 2002-2010. Thematic evaluation of the European Commission support to the health sector, 2012.

5.8.2.5 JC 8.5 The CPA contributed to private sector and civil society organisations having a meaningful impact on preparation and implementation of policies related to social infrastructures and services

Level of evidence : High

Number of evaluations: 6

Trend : Unchanged

There is evidence of **positive contributions** made by CSOs, with the CPA support, in delivering social services to poor communities (e.g. housing, education, health, food security, water, human rights, etc.), and through different ‘gap-filling’ operations where CSOs stepped in to substitute for failing/unwilling governments.

While there is a growing trend to involve CSOs in dialogue processes organised in specific sectors (health, education, water and sanitation), the **intensity and quality of participation tends to vary** substantially, and hence it is difficult to assess the impact of actions, beyond the positive results of individual projects and/or programmes. Positive examples can be found in Uganda, Somalia, or Dominican Republic, where EC support has been particularly successful in contributing to strengthening NSAs and in developing their capacity to participate in policy dialogue with government.

5.8.2.6 JC 8.6 Unintended effects have played a minor/major role in the attainment of the results

Level of evidence : Medium

Number of evaluations: 2

Trend : NA.

As an example, education SBS and GBS in Tanzania and in Zambia show several unintended effects linked to the scale of expansion of primary and secondary education. Indeed, this expansion has affected quality with negative effects on average pass rates, although the aggregate number of secondary school pupils passing exams has increased.

Another example is the increased support for the global trust funds in health, which has improved effectiveness in addressing a number of diseases, but has weakened the health systems as such, creating imbalances and ill-coordinated interventions (Burkina Faso, Uganda, 2015, Burkina Faso - draft 2016).

5.8.2.7 JC 8.7 EU interventions have been complementary and provided an additional value in comparison to bilateral interventions of EU MS

Level of evidence : Medium

Number of evaluations: 7

Trend : Unchanged

Co-ordination by modality. The EU sectoral support provided through GBS has strengthened government ownership and donor co-ordination capacity since the early 2000s. More recent sector budget supports provide a stronger contribution to sector dialogue (e.g. health sector in Burkina Faso, draft-2015). The increased intervention through the global funds in the health sector, despite some mentioned negative consequences, has also a positive effect on donor co-ordination.

There is a good co-ordination **with the EU MS**, with some successful examples of delegated co-operation (e.g. health sector in Tanzania, delegated to Germany). There is also evidence of an increasing number of tools aimed at ensuring complementarity such as Joint Assistance Strategies (JAS), donor matrices, joint field visits or trust funds.

The EU **added value** has shown to be stronger in budget support, given the financial weight of its interventions and also its influence in the area of PFM and resource management.

An important **limiting factor** is identified in the poor sector expertise, especially in the EU delegations. The administrative workload, which hampers the response capacity, is another limiting factor.

5.9 EQ 9 Cross-cutting issues

EQ 9

To what extent has the CPA contributed to the attainment of substantial results on cross-cutting issues?

Main sources: Evaluation of EU Support to Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment (GEWE) in Partner Countries (2015), Thematic evaluation of EU support to environment and climate change in third countries (2015). Regional/country evaluations: Angola 2009, Botswana 2009, Burkina Faso 2010, Caribbean 2012, Jamaica 2012, Pacific 2015, Rep. Congo 2012, Uganda 2009)

5.9.1 Summary answer

Despite significant investment and high political commitment in the ACP region, the EU has had a weak capacity to deliver on **gender** equality and empowerment of women.

Although the information is limited, the evaluations confirm that the EU contribution to fight against **HIV/AIDS** has been generally significant, through either country programmes or international funds.

Especially since the 10th EDF, **environment** has received strong support through a multiplicity of instruments, rather adapted to the specific conditions. Implementation, however, is still weak and mainstreaming of environment sustainability into country strategies is not yet achieved, but there are significant positive examples.

Climate change is central since the introduction of the Kyoto. It became prominent on the agenda since 2009 and in view of COP21. Recently, focus has evolved from primarily curbing emissions to increasingly addressing adaptation in vulnerable countries. Effective EU participation in international programmes. Still challenges in country ownership and mainstreaming.

Gender and environmental programmes are largely executed through CSOs, although key challenges remain at the level of capacities, legal environment and fragmentation. On other cross-cutting issues (e.g. governance), the level of involvement of CSOs remains low.

Co-ordination with other donors and EU MS is good as regards climate change as it is facilitated by international programmes, while it is weak in gender and other areas.

5.9.2 Answers to the judgement criteria

5.9.2.1 JC 9.1 The CPA contributed to the integration of an effective gender sensitive approach at every level of development co-operation

Level of evidence: Medium

Number of evaluations: 50

Trend: NA.

A total of 58% of EC investment in GEWE from 2007–13 came from DCI and **a further 24% came from the EDF**. The main remaining instruments supporting GEWE-targeted interventions include: EIDHR, ENPI and the IfS. The ENPI, IfS and 'others' category comprise less than EUR 100 million each of committed values of GEWE-targeted interventions. The EIDHR leads in terms of the proportion of its overall value committed for GEWE-targeted interventions in the period, at 11%. The geographic instruments (DCI geographic, ENPI and EDF) lag behind with only 1%-2% of their combined funding dedicated to GEWE-targeted interventions (**EDF only 1%**). However, it is important to highlight that only the EDF has shown a marked increase in the amount of GEWE targeted interventions committed. Amounts committed through DCI have been erratic, while those committed through EIDHR have changed minimally.

Delivery on the **institutional commitment and leadership** of the Gender Equality and Women Empowerment (GEWE) agenda is weak. Also, there seems to be a mismatch between the EU's strong policy commitments and the organisational capacity to deliver on them.

There are also significant questions about the **quality of GEWE contributions**, as gender analysis is rarely used to inform strategy and programming, and gender-sensitive indicators are not adequately integrated in programme/project results frameworks. Despite the importance attributed to context assessments, understanding of the gender context is usually limited, which is reflected in

weak/absent country strategy objectives, programmes and dialogue. As a result, windows of opportunity may be missed.

In ACP countries, while gender has been present at the design stages, it is **difficult to track its implementation**. Gender equality and equity principles have been often declared in public policies, but they have almost never been effectively implemented through specific policies and measures (e.g. Timor–Leste, Jamaica, Pacific, Uganda, Burkina Faso). It can be noted that better results have been achieved when gender issues have been specifically addressed at the sectoral level, especially education and agriculture (e.g. Angola, Botswana, Ethiopia, Malawi).

5.9.2.2 JC 9.2 The CPA contributed to the effective fight against HIV/AIDS

Level of evidence: Low-Medium

Number of evaluations: 28

Trend: Unchanged

Information on CPA contribution to fight against HIV/AIDS is scarce but there is information on specific interventions -notably through project approach- which show **good results** on average. A large portion of EU support to fight HIV/AIDS has been channelled through annual contributions to the Global Fund (GFATM), with beneficiaries worldwide (the **EU committed** EUR 1.2 billion to the three poverty related diseases HIV/AIDS, malaria and Tuberculosis over the period 2002-2010 (GFATM)⁵³.

HIV/AIDS has been tackled, in most cases, as a cross-cutting issue mainly in specific **health sector interventions** (in some cases also in education⁵⁴, food security and infrastructure sectors). In this regard, support has been focused on the availability of and access to health services for persons living with HIV/AIDS (e.g. Rep. Congo, Angola).

In some countries, positive results have been achieved by moving forward from standalone projects, addressing specific needs of those affected by HIV/AIDS, to a more **systematic approach to social protection** (Lesotho, Angola, Botswana) combined with capacity development of national institutions. At the regional level, in the SADC region, three main programmes were of significant importance;

- Under EDF 8: Regional Support for an Expanded Response to HIV and AIDS;
- The Regional HIV/AIDS Awareness and Education Programme (Soul City) Edutainment;
- The Health and Development Innovative Consortium (HDIC) – Network of ACP Universities to strengthen National HIV/AIDS Responses.

5.9.2.3 JC 9.3 The CPA contributed to the mainstreaming of environmental sustainability into all aspects of development co-operation and support programmes and projects implemented by various actors

Level of evidence: Medium-High

Number of evaluations: 44

Trend: Environment has been more effectively mainstreamed since the 10th EDF, notably in 2 sectors (agriculture and rural development and infrastructure).

The **main beneficiary regions** of the EU support to environment were ACP countries, receiving 45% of all funds (9 ACP countries ranking among the top 20 countries receiving EU support)⁵⁵. Ten ACP countries receive 53.4% of all ACP countries' contracted amounts. A further breakdown of the ENRTP interventions in global, regional and bilateral funds shows that, while supra-regional ENRTP funding is, as expected, mostly financed by global programmes (84%), a big part of the funding in ACP countries relies on country programmes (47%)⁵⁶.

⁵³ Thematic evaluation of the European Commission support to the health sector, 2012.

⁵⁴ A considerable number of teachers are victims of AIDS every year in Botswana, Zambia and Uganda.

⁵⁵ Thematic global evaluation of the EU support to environment and climate change in third countries (2007-2013), 2015.

⁵⁶ This is partly explained by Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA) funding at country level (23% of all ACP country-level funding).

ACP countries were among the **main beneficiary regions** of the EU support to environment, receiving 45% of all funds⁵⁷ mainly at country level or through support to the ACP-EU Energy Facility and to the Sustainable Energy for All initiative (SE4ALL).

The use of **mixed instruments** has contributed to increasing the readiness and ability of the governments to implement their commitments. However, implementation is often weak, indicating that the level of prioritisation is still modest in several countries (e.g. Kenya, Ghana, Chad or Madagascar).

Some of the identified challenges relate to weak linkages between **environment and poverty reduction**, lack of a comprehensive strategy and policy dialogue (e.g. Timor-Leste) or weak coordination (e.g. Lesotho).

Positive examples in which EU contribution has been recognised include Rwanda, (the EU, together with other donors, contributed to mainstreaming environment into the Government's agenda), Malawi (where sustainable management of natural resources features prominently in both 9th and 10th EDF) or Ghana (through the strategic Environmental Assessment). In the Pacific, the EU interventions have also contributed to the strengthening of natural resource conservation.

From a thematic point of view, it is noted that environment received a lot of attention in the **agricultural commodities** projects (e.g. in the Caribbean, Cameroon, Ghana and Madagascar) and the transport sector.

5.9.2.4 JC 9.4 The CPA contributed to the strengthening of policies and implementation of support programmes to mitigate and adapt to the consequences of, and the threat posed by, climate change

Level of evidence: Medium-High

Number of evaluations: 9

Trend: Climate change, present since the 1990s, became prominent after 2009 and after 2011 was focused on facilitating the achievement of binding agreements in 2015.

A substantial amount of EU climate change funding through the **Global Climate Change Alliance** (GCCA) has been allocated to the Pacific on top of the regular EDF allocations. The activities of the Alliance have enhanced the capacity of the Pacific's climate change negotiators and helped mobilise communities in conducting vulnerability assessments, as well as making some improvements in mainstreaming climate change in national policies. However, some EU stakeholders in the Pacific region argued that the GCCA projects implemented in the region could have benefitted from greater regional consultation in the design phase.

Overall, EU policies and strategies for climate change are appropriate according to the evaluations. Specifically, EU support has contributed to the creation of an environment **conducive to** reaching global agreements, the establishment of climate financing mechanisms, building stronger knowledge, tools and approaches to address climate change issues e.g. Rwanda

However, some major **challenges** remain with regard to fragmentation of climate change strategies or understanding/political will from partners' countries (e.g. Timor-Leste). The case of Rwanda is a positive example which shows how a partner-led mainstreaming approach can be an element of success.

5.9.2.5 JC 9.5 The CPA contributed to private sector and civil society organisations having a meaningful impact on preparation and implementation of policies related to the cross-cutting issues

Level of evidence: Medium

Number of evaluations: 4

Trend: Stronger since the 10th EDF

⁵⁷ Thematic global evaluation of the EU support to environment and climate change in third countries (2007-2013), 2015.

Between 2007 and 2013, civil society organisations (CSOs) received 44% of **Gender**-targeted funding. Under the **Environment** thematic programme - ENRTP, international organisations were the most-used channel (56%), followed by CSOs (16%). Capacity-building has been largely provided through the Green Economy and Social and Environmental Entrepreneurship in Africa Programme and the Partnership for Action on Green economy (PAGE) programme: positive and sustainable results have been seen in Kenya, Ghana and Burkina Faso.

Some BS evaluations show that civil society and private sector have been engaged successfully in **monitoring public expenditure and support anti-corruption** policies in the framework of budget support programmes. Such accompanying measures have been financed by EU member states in co-ordination with the EU, but not directly financed by the EU.

Remaining **challenges** to overcome include:

- the fragmented and fluid nature of civil society in many countries, with CSOs often suffering from major legitimacy, capacity and internal governance weaknesses;
- the predominance of urban based NGOs in policy processes, as compared to the involvement of decentralised, grassroots CSOs;
- political restrictions to the action of civil society, reflected for example in control-oriented regulatory frameworks; and
- difficulty in developing new partnership arrangements.

5.9.2.6 JC 9.6 Unintended effects have played a minor/major role in the attainment of the results

Level of evidence: Low

Number of evaluations: 0

Trend: NA.

In the environment and climate change sectors, the strategy of working through leading international programmes (e.g. UNDP, WB, ICAO and ICLEI) has led to greater efficiency and reduced the danger of fragmentation. However, the EU capacity to better integrate the whole CPA agenda and the action of such international actors needs to be strengthened, to avoid incoherence and fragmentation.

5.9.2.7 JC 9.7 EU interventions have been complementary and provided an additional value in comparison to bilateral interventions of EU MS

Level of evidence: Medium

Number of evaluations: 6

Trend: NA.

The EC Services and EEAS have not systematically fostered complementarity between their **gender** related actions and those of EU Member States. Some positive examples of co-ordination exist (coordinated programming, joint vulnerability assessments, and common policy and political dialogue messages), but these are rather a result of country context and proactive leadership of key stakeholders.

On **environment**, the EU support has been coherent, coordinated and complementary to assistance provided by Member States and other donors, as well as between the thematic and geographic instruments. There is room for improvement particularly in linking the support of the thematic and geographic instruments for implementing international conventions. One clear example of synergy is that many environment-related actions are not only funded by the EU, but also receive significant financing from other donors, which reduces transaction costs, enhances delivery and capacity of funded programmes, and generates knowledge and approaches for wider application.

5.10 EQ 10 – Poverty reduction and the needs of most vulnerable groups

EQ 10

To what extent has the design and implementation of EU interventions adequately delivered on poverty reduction and addressed the needs of the most vulnerable groups?

Main sources: Joint evaluation of general budget support (2006), Thematic global evaluation of European Commission support in the sectors of ESI (employment and social inclusion) in partner countries (including vocational training) (2011), Evaluation of the European Union's Support to Private Sector Development in Third Countries (2013), Thematic evaluation of the European Commission support to the health sector (2012), Thematic global evaluation of European Commission support to the education sector in partner countries (2010) and a wide range of country evaluations, as well as BS evaluations (for example BS Mozambique 2014 and BS Uganda 2015)

5.10.1 Summary answer

The **poverty** incidence in ACP countries has been reduced over the last decades, although the present levels are still very high and extreme poverty persists in some large areas and among certain groups. The improvements in poverty reduction are mainly the consequence of economic growth (income poverty) and increased access for the poor to basic social services (non-income poverty). The CPA has contributed to strengthening the endogenous factors of growth, by supporting macroeconomic stability, PFM, trade and transport networks. And it has contributed to enhancing government policies towards strengthening equitable access to basic social services.

CPA's contribution has been weaker in supporting the **productive sectors**, namely agriculture and rural development, energy and – in general – private sector development. **Employment** support is becoming a priority in many CPA country strategies, but still the employment support strategies are linked to education and employability. They are not connected with the private sector support, namely SMEs/MMEs.

Food security at the national level has been addressed mainly through macroeconomic and institutional support, which has enabled recipient countries to develop their strategies to face structural recurrent insecurity. Specific programmes aimed at providing direct support to food-insecure communities have been put in place as well, although their strategic dimension has remained weak.

CPA's interventions in **fragile states** affected by either conflicts or other fragility factors have become a key priority. In many cases, their relevance is high, as they aim at a deep combination of state building concerns and relief-rehabilitation and development priorities. Indeed the implementation of such strategies is complex and long. The information on their outcomes is rather limited, although the main weaknesses are identified.

The CPA specific role and **added value** in such differentiated matters is diversified. Given its weight and representative capacity, CPA has a prominent role in supporting the growth factors and the equitable access to social services, especially in low income countries. CPA role has a leading function also to promote trade and transport networks.

5.10.2 Answers to the judgement criteria

5.10.2.1 JC 10.1 The CPA contributed to the overall reduction of poverty

Level of evidence: High

Number of evaluations: 59

Trend: Strong focus on poverty reduction since the mid-1990s.

Budget support evaluations⁵⁸, (and more recently Mali, Zambia, Tanzania, Uganda, Mozambique and Burkina Faso), together with a number of country strategy evaluations (e.g. Haiti) converge on concluding that significant joint BS amounts contribute to poverty reduction through two specific effects:

⁵⁸ Joint Evaluation of General Budget Support 1994–2004, 2006.

- contribution to macroeconomic stability and improved PFM policies, which create an enabling environment for trade and private sector development, thus boosting growth and income poverty reduction; and
- the contribution to increasing investment and improving policies in basic social services, which increase access to and possibly quality of the services for the poor, thus reducing non-income poverty.

Sector support, through BS programmes, mainly focused on education, health and water & sanitation compared to the productive sectors (agriculture and SMEs/MMEs), as confirmed by most BS evaluations. This limited their contribution to actual poverty reduction (Zambia, Mozambique, Burkina Faso, Uganda).

Apart from budget support, CPA has put in place other interventions to address either economic growth (**economic infrastructure**, as discussed in other sections of this study), or specific aspects of poverty, namely **food security, social protection, community development**. In this area, the EU support to Micro Projects Programme (MPP) in ACP countries merits special attention.⁵⁹

On the other hand, the role of the context and its endogenous factors and the key responsibility of the national and regional leading groups should be considered, the CPA's support being one of the contributing factors. As stated in the Zambian case, "it would be illusive to think that with relatively small amounts of aid per capita it would be possible to "make poverty history" within a few years."

Significant progress were reported in terms of poverty reduction (e.g. Rwanda, Uganda, Mozambique, Malawi and many other countries), although the incidence of poverty is still high (40% in Africa and in the other conflict affected ACP countries) and extreme poverty is hardly affected. There are also cases in which the results were lower than expected (e.g. Timor-Leste, Mali, Caribbean). In other cases, poverty reduction strategy was well designed and is starting to yield positive impacts (e.g. Tanzania in the road investment sector, Ghana).

5.10.2.2 JC 10.2 The CPA contributed to economic inclusive growth thereby reducing income poverty

Level of evidence: High

Number of evaluations: 11

Trend: Since the early 2000s, BS has had a strong focus on social sectors.

The CPA underlines the link between growth and poverty reduction, as the EU Agenda for Change spells out the "drivers of inclusive growth", mentioning equitable access to social services, enabling business environment and sustainable agriculture and energy.

There is evidence of the CPA contribution to the establishment of an enabling economic environment for growth (macroeconomic stability, PFM). But there is little evidence of comprehensive support to private sector development (improved regulatory environment, support to value chains) and sustainable agriculture (see the specific EQ 7), which ensure the highest inclusiveness of growth (agriculture productivity and non-agricultural employment). Particularly in fast growing low-income countries, the specific opportunities faced by the private sector are overlooked⁶⁰ (Zambia, Burkina Faso, Uganda, Mozambique).

In general the CPA, for objective difficulties and probably also for its nature of inter-government agreement, hardly considers the political economy implications of its support and the need of putting in place growth distribution policies, based on the access to assets and not only to services by the poor. This would mean improving investment in the rural areas (e.g. roads and water) instead of increasing tax exemptions for large enterprises (Uganda, 2015), or undertaking huge politically-driven investments (Burkina Faso, draft-2016).

⁵⁹ Evaluation of European Commission support to Micro-Project Programmes under the European Development Fund In ACP Countries, 2006.
Thematic global evaluation of EC support in the sectors of ESI (employment and social inclusion) in partner countries, 2011.

5.10.2.3 JC 10.3 The CPA contributed to reducing food insecurity and vulnerability to food crises

Level of evidence: Medium-high

Number of evaluations: 58

Trend: Food security has had a strong evolution in the 2000s.

Food security has been addressed through a **multifaceted approach**, including a foreign currency facility to channel a large part of food aid and generate counterpart funds to be used as budget support and various areas based interventions to enhance community-level resilience against climatic shocks.

The data from the thematic evaluations is rather out of date, while country evaluations provide more up-to-date information. The EU **Food Facility** has been appreciated by recipient countries, but has only partially been able to support the mainstreaming of food security into national policies. The **area-based interventions** have been conceived according to a project approach, with a low strategic consistency (Burundi, Haiti), including post conflict interventions (Liberia, Angola), where linking release, rehabilitation and development is always a challenge.

Other programmes do have a direct effect on **household level** food security. A generally effective and direct way to increase access to food stems from “aid” channelled through NGOs (e.g. Zambia or Niger), where this kind of aid seems irreplaceable, even when its effectiveness is questioned.

At the regional level, it is noted that the tendency has been to regard food security as a national concern rather than addressing opportunities for regional food security. A positive example, however, is provided by the African Trans-boundary River Basin Support programme, coordinated by SADC. Also in West Africa (and not only), the effects of the improved road networks on food security have been shown.

5.10.2.4 JC 10.4 The CPA contributed to increasing employment especially for the youth and effective social protection

Level of evidence: Medium-high

Number of evaluations: 18

Trend: Employment and social inclusion is a rather recent priority in thesecond half of the 2000s.

An overall analysis of the Indicative Programmes for all ACP countries (Employment and Social Inclusion - ESI evaluation – 2011) shows that 38% of them have at least one ESI-relevant sector as a core area of intervention: 22 countries in Africa, five in the Caribbean and three in the Pacific. These include actions on **vocational education and training, private sector development** (in Mali, Niger, Uganda, Tanzania ESI is a secondary area), and some actions at the regional level (Trade Related Assistance and institutional strengthening).

In working towards mainstreaming trade into national development strategies, the EU also promotes the inclusion of **trade-related labour market reforms** that may be needed to reap the full benefits of trade liberalisations.

Education, training and labour market needs have been judged poorly integrated in most CSPs considered. The EU seems to have isolated its attention to employment from its Private Sector Development (PSD) assistance and addressed employment mainly under education, vocational or social assistance in an effort to improve labour force employability. Employment concerns were not systematically mainstreamed in the economic reform and private sector support. Exceptions existed where a clear employment objective was included in the programme, such as the banana, rum and rice support programmes.

The contribution of the EU’s assistance to employment in the **informal sector** (access to and conditions of employment) has been limited, mainly based on project approach (e.g. Kenya, Jamaica).

5.10.2.5 JC 10.5 The CPA has contributed to tackling the roots of and to reduce fragility

Level of evidence: Medium-high

Number of evaluations: 12

Trend: Strong focus on fragility in the second half of the 2000s.

The European Consensus on Development from November 2005 set out an approach to “**addressing state fragility**” through governance reforms, rule of law, anti-corruption measures and the building of viable State institutions. It’s a holistic approach linking peace, security and development, according to the international Principles for engagement in Fragile States (OECD).

In Haiti and Burundi, there was a relevant effort to integrate different instruments and components in the country programmes to address state building and rehabilitation. In both cases, however, the results were behind the expectations as there was a **missing political link**. In Haiti, until 2013 the level of political dialogue was low as was the government’s commitment. In Burundi, it was difficult to establish an accepted ground of political dialogue and the identification of a shared agenda with the government. State Building Contracts (SBCs) have recently proved to be flexible GBS instruments for rapid support to fragile states (e.g. Mali, South Sudan, Haiti) and could be a response to such weaknesses provided that they rely on high-level political dialogue. However, their implementation is quite recent and there is no evidence in the evaluations.

Fragility under **conflict prevention** has been already addressed in EQ 2.

5.10.2.6 JC 10.6 EU interventions have been complementary and provided an additional value in comparison to bilateral interventions of EU MS

Level of evidence: Medium

Number of evaluations: 3

Trend: NA.

The EU added value is particularly strong with respect to the establishment of an **enabling environment** for economic growth. This is due to the dimension of the EU intervention, especially when significant amounts of BS are involved, and also due to the EU capacity to establish synergies with various (smaller) contributions of the EU MS (most recent BS evaluations).

With respect to **PSD, including agricultural and rural development**, the EU contribution does not show a significant added value, although it would have the potential to become a key partner in sectoral strategies. Due to its mandate, the EU has a leading role on **trade** and **regional integration**, which provide a key framework for growth and PSD.

The role of the EU in **Employment** and Social inclusion-related sectors is widely recognised.

On **fragility**, the EU has a specific added value for its neutrality (Haiti) and capacity to aggregate key development partners (Burundi).

5.10.2.7 JC 10.7 Unintended effects have played a minor/major role in the attainment of the results

Level of evidence: Medium

Number of evaluations: 1

Trend: NA.

Unintended effects of the support for growth have been limited to some cases, which were rather quickly identified, of distorted use of the resources provided by BS programmes, namely GBS, when the strategic trust between partners was deteriorated (e.g. Uganda and Burkina Faso).

In the area of fragility, interventions are complex, as they insist in very sensitive contexts where insufficient links between rehabilitation and development, and between short and longer term may introduce imbalance factors that contribute to a worsening of the situation after a first period of recovery (Burundi, Angola).

5.11 EQ 11 – Joint institutions

EQ 11

To what extent has the work of the joint institutions contributed to the results achieved by the CPA?

5.11.1 Summary answer

Evidence found on that particular EQ has not been sufficient to draft a valid answer.

5.11.2 Answers to the judgement criteria

5.11.2.1 JC 11.1 An effective flow of information between the Parties

Level of evidence: Low

Number of evaluations: 3

Trend: Activities in the field of capacity development and knowledge sharing (e.g. trainings, workshops, seminars, study visits) take place between the Parties aimed at promoting the exchange of ideas, practices and/or priorities as well as in order to get acquainted with the EC procedures. However, there is not wide evidence on this particular aspect in the Evaluations reviewed.

Article 5 of the Cotonou Agreement sets the basis for co-operation aimed at supporting operations to provide more information and create greater awareness of the basic features of ACP-EU Partnership. It also stresses the importance of encouraging partnership and building links between ACP and EU actors, and strengthening networking and exchange of expertise and experience among the actors.

Evidence on this particular aspect is very scarce in the reviewed evaluations. One could argue that this dimension, while being an important driver for good communication and understanding between the Parties, actually belongs to the internal functioning and organisation of the Cotonou Agreement and does not necessarily fall under the assessment of the concrete geographic and/or thematic interventions.

Two concrete examples of effective knowledge sharing opportunities have been identified:

- A particular and relevant example of knowledge sharing is provided by the EU/ACP Microfinance programme⁶¹, considered as part of an effort to improve the microfinance capacity and knowledge base within the Commission and ACP Secretariat. By way of example, this peer-learning event provided a powerful tool for sharing ideas between peers working in different organisations, countries and regions. The Programme's final evaluation found there had been a positive impact on Commission expertise in microfinance and stakeholders explained that interaction with centralised operations consisted mainly of exchange of information rather than enhancing synergies with country operations. On a particular note, insufficient links with centralised and regional support were observed in Jamaica (EU/ACP Microfinance Programme).
- In the framework of the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement provisions regarding Non State Actors (NSA), the EC provided support to the ACP Secretariat to produce a Manual for NSAs on the Cotonou Agreement⁶² in order to disseminate appropriate information on how NSA can benefit from and the opportunities available under the Cotonou Agreement.

5.11.2.2 JC 11.2 Effective and efficient joint institutions

No evidence has been found on this particular Judgement Criterion.

⁶¹ Evaluation of the European's Support to Private Sector Development in Third Countries (2013).

⁶² A user's guide for Non State Actors, Source: <http://ecdpm.org/publications/cotonou-agreement-users-guide-non-state-actors/>.

5.11.2.3 JC 11.3 Joint institutions contributed to increase co-ordination, complementarity and coherence between the EU and its MS

No evidence has been found on this particular Judgement Criterion.

5.11.2.4 JC 11.4 Added value of the joint ACP-EU institutions as compared to regional frameworks for dialogue and co-operation within the ACP regions

No evidence has been found on this particular Judgement Criterion.

5.11.2.5 JC 11.4 Unintended effects of the functioning of the joint institutions

No evidence has been found on this particular Judgement Criterion.

5.12 EQ 12 – Mix of tools

EQ 12

To what extent has the EU mix of "tools" (instruments, approaches and financing modalities) and the co-management system contributed to reaching the goals of the ACP-EU partnership?

Main sources: Evaluating co-ordination and complementarity of country strategy papers with national development priorities (2006), Evaluation of Commission's aid delivery through development banks and EIB (2008), Evaluation of Commission's external co-operation with partner countries through the organisations of the UN family (2008), Evaluation of EC aid delivery through civil society organisations, Mid-term evaluation of the Investment Facility and EIB own resources operations in ACP countries and the OCTs and numerous thematic, regional and country evaluations (for example Haiti 2014 and Tanzania 2006, ESA-IO 2008, Health 2012, PSD 2013).

5.12.1 Summary answer

A **good combination** of a large variety of different instruments - namely budget support, sector programmes and accompanying projects, mobilisation of NSAs and specific stabilisation tools - has allowed the CPA to successfully address diversified and complex contexts. In most cases, this combination has been relevant and sometimes effective. In other cases, however, its implementation has been difficult. There is not a tool that works and others that do not, but the links between the different tools in place sometimes have worked and were successful and sometimes were not, depending upon the ownership of the recipient country and also the quality of the design.

The increasing use of **sector wide programmes** (SWAp) supported with budget support is not always complemented with specific accompanying projects and CSOs mobilisation. While there is a growing trend to involve CSOs in SWAp-related dialogue (health, education, water and sanitation), the intensity and quality of participation tends to vary substantially.

Investment facilities and various EIB interventions are effective but at risk of being marginal as they are not adequately integrated into the country strategies, while they could play a determinant role for PSD and to address the new growth expectations of many ACP countries and regions.

The Stabex and Sysmin instruments designed to help the agricultural and mining sectors were abolished by the CPA in 2000. **FLEX** mechanism streamlined the EDF and introduced a system of rolling programming, making for greater flexibility and giving the ACP States greater responsibility.

The efficiency and effectiveness of the National Authorising Officer's Support Units (**NAO** SUs) is questioned, as sometimes they play a role of filter vis à vis the policy dialogue. NAO Services have little involvement in preparing the NIPs. Services are geared to financial and administrative issues and have little or no involvement in the strategic phases. This trend has not changed over time.

5.12.2 Answers to the judgement criteria

5.12.2.1 JC 12.1 Instruments (national/regional/intra ACP) effective and efficient

Level of evidence: Medium

Number of evaluations: 20

Trend: BS has been the main instrument until the mid-2000s, but attempts to combine it with other instruments have always been present

It is impossible to make a comprehensive judgement on the **effectiveness and efficiency** of the national and regional instruments as these vary according to the national/regional and sector contexts and have evolved over time.

EU strategies at the national level have been considered mostly **relevant**, while their quality and **adaptation** to changing contexts vary considerably.

Coherence and complementarity between EC instruments show several weaknesses, internally (intra-region and intra-country) and externally (region and country). In some cases a low degree of visibility/knowledge of the regional instruments in place has been identified⁶³.

A **shift in funding** is noted in the ACP countries between the 9th and 10th EDF, from funding at the intra-ACP level⁶⁴ in the 9th EDF (2000-2007), to more funding at the regional level in the 10th EDF (2008-2013). Governance and management weaknesses at the intra-ACP level (e.g. Pro€Invest, CDE and to a lesser extent BizClim) and limited absorption capacity among regional organisations (e.g. SADC, ECOWAS)⁶⁵ have been also noted.

5.12.2.2 JC 12.2 Approaches (project approach, budget support, SWAp, joint funding) effective and efficient

Level of evidence: High

Number of evaluations: 64

Trend: Increasingly, a combination of aid modalities has been applied in the different sectors.

The combination and/or sequencing of different instruments, according to the country context, has helped maximise the effects of the support. The “**project versus budget support**” debate appears out of place, as both have their own specific features and may apply well or poorly to address different objectives⁶⁶.

Project modality can contribute to sector support if it is aligned with and uses the sector performance indicators. Also, it can be useful for innovative or pilot interventions. Some of its limiting factors are: relative isolation from the sectoral strategy, limited impact in leveraging reforms, fragmentation of critical aspects of institutional capacity-building, greater administrative burden by EDF procedures, and too many and different implementing partners with variable performance records.

Sector approach is “a marriage between government ownership and efficient sector management and well-coordinated donor funding⁶⁷”. Its advantages include global vision, flexibility, avoidance of duplication and integrated activities. The disadvantages can include high transaction costs, dominance (not leadership) by donors with specific leverage, concentration on macro-level policies and limited local participation. The sector approach has been implemented through sector budget support in most cases, but sometimes also through participation in sector trust funds or coordinated support and GBS.

⁶³Based on the Synthesis of geographical evaluations managed by the Evaluation Unit during the period 1998-2006

⁶⁴ Intra-ACP cooperation in the 10th EDF includes three groups of actions: to enhance the response of ACP against international threats and participation to related global initiatives; to facilitate ACP protection from exogenous shocks related to climate change; and to improve African capacity to address peace building. A full description of ACP instruments is provided in Annex 4

⁶⁵ Evaluation of the European Union’s Support to Private Sector Development in Third Countries (2013)

⁶⁶ Evaluation of the EU Co-operation with Timor-Leste (2015). Thematic and geographic evaluations all address the issue of combination of instruments as a relevant way to manage the programmes, which sometimes either is not put in practice as necessary, or is badly implemented.

⁶⁷ Thematic global evaluation of European Commission support to the education sector in partner countries (2010)

General budget support (GBS) has proven to be an effective modality, especially in the 2000s when it supported comprehensive poverty reduction strategies and accompanied significant inclusive growth processes (Uganda, Mozambique, Burkina Faso, others). When strategic convergence of partners, trust and financial leverage have declined, GBS has shown significant weaknesses, including formalisation and deterioration of dialogue, distorted use of funds, slow down of key sectoral reform processes. Attempts to mitigate such weaknesses through the introduction of stricter links between targets and disbursements (e.g. variable tranches) have contributed to reducing the quality of dialogue, without improving the strategic effectiveness (Tanzania). Whenever the right conditions exist, GBS is recommended (Haiti, Burkina Faso) and would benefit from complementary SWAp⁶⁸ and sectoral budget support⁶⁹, and different accompanying measures (stand-alone projects in specific cases, to open pathways into new areas of co-operation and to strengthen the capacity of actors)⁷⁰.

The EU shows a specific **added value** in providing significant amounts of budget support (both general and sectoral), for its financial capacity and its capacity to lead EU MS coalitions in different geographic areas.

5.12.2.3 JC 12.3 Financing modalities (ACP government, private sector, NSA's, multilateral organisations and EU MS) effective and efficient

Level of evidence: High

Number of evaluations: 30

Trend: Increasing use of sector-wide programmes supported with budget support.

In many cases, the most important financing modality has been from **EU to ACP governments** (e.g. education and decentralisation sectors⁷¹). There is little information on the comparative effectiveness/efficiency of the different modalities. In particular, it is impossible to say whether a modality is effective/efficient per se, without considering the context and its application.

An interesting example is provided by the case of **Haiti**, where the EU has shown that working with both NSA and the State is absolutely necessary, although not at all easy. Both modalities have shown strong effectiveness, but both have also shown to be unsustainable for multiple reasons, namely poor complementarities on both sides.

Positive contributions made by CSOs in delivering social services to poor communities (e.g. housing, education, health, food security, water, human rights, etc.) are frequent. EU support to civil society, however, is at risk of being compartmentalised, not based on strategic dialogue with national authorities and not mainstreamed in the main sector strategies.

International organisations have also been important in ACP countries, especially the United Nations system⁷². There has been a positive impact through making delivery of aid possible in challenging contexts, particularly in politically sensitive situations despite problems of efficiency and loss of visibility.

Aid delivery has also been channelled through the **EIB** (see EQ 12 JC 12.4) based on the specific banking functions (notably for providing financial instruments), and grounded in strategic EU co-operation agreements (interest rate subsidies, technical assistance, risk capital).

Regarding execution through **EU member states**, the information from the evaluations is limited, with the exception of the health sector in Tanzania (2006).

⁶⁸ Sector Wide Approach

⁶⁹ BS evaluations in Uganda and Burkina, Haiti evaluation.

⁷⁰ Evaluating co-ordination and complementarity of country strategy papers with national development priorities, 2006

⁷¹ Thematic global evaluation of European Commission support to the education sector in partner countries (2010) and Thematic global evaluation of the Commission support to decentralisation processes (2012)

⁷² 33% of EU funds channelled through UN bodies were allocated in the ACP over the period 1999-2006. Evaluation of Commission's External Cooperation with Partner Countries through the Organisations of the UN family, May 2008.

5.12.2.4 JC 12.4 Operations of the investment facility were effective and efficient

Level of evidence: High

Number of evaluations: 2

Trend: Endowment revised downwards under the 9th EDF following the setting-up of the EU Water Facility and the EU Energy Facility.

Over the period 2003-2013, endowment for IF operations through ACP EIB IF (EUR 3,587 million) contributed directly or indirectly to the Cotonou objectives of poverty reduction, integration into the world economy, and sustainable development. The portfolio was balanced between **country-specific (51%) and regional operations (49%)**⁷³.

IF operations mainly supported the financial sector, including credit lines. Energy and industry were also important areas of attention. For operations in financial services and in industry, interventions targeted the private sector. Public-sector-led operations were mainly focused on the energy sector.

The financed operations generated **positive results**, notably in terms of reinforcement of the financial viability and competitiveness of the supported enterprises, particularly in the financial sector, although their impact at the country level was minimal. However, the **lack of prioritisation strategy** and limited EIB/EC co-ordination hampered maximisation. Careful analysis of creditworthiness of operators and selection of projects, which overall favoured the efficiency of ACP/OCT operations, were applied.

5.12.2.5 JC 12.5 Additional financial support contributed to the mitigation of the adverse effects of instability of export earnings and the safeguarding the development programme jeopardised by drops in revenue

Level of evidence: Low

Number of evaluations: 2

Trend: Eligibility criteria of FLEX revised twice to allow more accessibility. Complemented since 2009 by the ad-hoc V-FLEX to address the fall out of the global financial crisis.

Support under FLEX⁷⁴ is to be provided as an additional single payment to the already existing budget support programmes, or, if necessary, through existing projects or programmes, including social safety nets (a second-best proposition)⁷⁵.

FLEX has been used in many countries, ensuring rapid responses to crises (e.g. Jamaica, in coping with reduced export earnings or Grenada). When FLEX interventions aimed at building disaster preparedness systems (Haiti), they were less effective and lacked strategic guidance.

5.12.2.6 JC 12.6 The co-management system involving national authorities in the programming and management of aid programmes has been efficient and added value compared to other EU co-operation instruments in ACP and non-ACP countries

Level of evidence: Medium

Number of evaluations: 10

Trend: Unchanged

The information available in the strategic evaluations is very limited, but a few key issues are found.

Most NAO-SUs are non-specialist but, as they play an interface role, often limit the efficiency of the line ministries in the management of aid resources and hamper the policy dialogue. Support to NAO-SUs is useful in contexts of fragility, lack of transparency, facing fundamental governance challenges (Mali, Sudan) or where the NAO system plays a pivotal role in Donor co-ordination (Li-

⁷³ Mid-Term Evaluation of the IF and EIB OR Operations In ACP/OCTs, 2010.

⁷⁴ Facility for FLuctuations in Export Earnings

beria). This begs for a differentiated approach in addressing how the NAO functions and support to it can evolve into a Capacity Development mechanism⁷⁵.

5.12.2.7 JC 12.7 Co-management promoted higher ownership by the partner Governments and increased sustainability of the actions

Level of evidence: Low

Number of evaluations: 19

Trend: Unchanged

Despite the capacity of the NAO to delegate his/her powers, the NAO-SUs mainly operate in a **centralised environment**: This may constrain line ministries to engage technically, leading to their frustration and weak ownership.

The task analysis of NAOs reveals that most of the resources for support projects are allocated to project implementation, especially financial control, but also ever more frequently to drawing up invitations to tender and administrative follow-up.

Sustainability of the system is limited. A great part of NAO-SUs are supported by EU funds and count on international expertise for management tasks which hampers the improvement of local capacities and increase the costs of the services.

5.12.2.8 JC 12.8 Current system of resource allocation allows adequate funding to be channelled to countries where it yields the highest impact

Level of evidence: Low

Number of evaluations: 5

Trend: Over the last few years, there has been a greater balance between needs and governance.

Resources under 10th EDF have been allocated through a formula that provides a balanced consideration of **needs and governance criteria**; the previous exclusive consideration of needs that overlooked both the absorption capacity and the respect of the basic principles (human rights, democracy, the rule of law and other good governance principles) was thereby corrected.

However, the important weight of the needs has ensured that fragile states are not penalised. From some member states the request of a stronger weight of the governance in the allocation of resources is supported. A study has been carried out by the Commission and EEAS, but an agreement on how to improve the allocation mechanism according to the performance has not been reached so far.

The evaluations do not provide information on this matter.

5.12.2.9 JC 12.9 The legally binding characteristic of the agreement has been (and still is) instrumental in reaching the results

No evidence has been found to inform this JC.

5.12.2.10 JC 12.10 Unintended effects of the different "tools" and the co-management system

The instruments considered are too different. Each one has specific strengths and weaknesses as highlighted above, but it is not possible to identify global unintended effects for all of them.

⁷⁵ NAO Study, mainstreaming capacity development in EU aid management (2013), EuropeAid EVA / 219 – 719.

6 Information gaps and possible ways to filling them

As stated in the methodology, a systematic approach to the analysis of data has been applied in this assessment by clustering the evaluation reports into different categories (according to their reference) and extracting the relevant information in a focused way.

The set of codes represent the backbone of the data extraction process and has guided the pre-analysis of the reports allowing for the:

- Establishment of a general overview of the level of evidence available per Judgement Criterion (JC);
- Assessment of the type of information extracted (descriptive vs analytical, qualitative vs quantitative);
- Establishment of a preliminary typology of findings per JC aggregation of information and 4-identify gaps of information.

With respect to the latter purpose, the extractions have revealed that some gaps of information exist, hindering proper analysis of some of the JCs. In an attempt to ensure that this was effectively the case, subsequent extraction exercises have been conducted and some of the most appropriate reports were also read. In some cases, this has proved useful not so much in order to obtain a higher degree of evidence, but rather to understand the lack of information. For instance, the low level of evidence on the EU support in the fight against VIH/AIDS is mainly explained by the fact that a large part of the EU contributions go through the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. As stated in the Health Evaluation, “the focus of the Evaluation is on health policy development and the choice was made to explicitly exclude EC support to poverty related diseases (PRDs), namely Malaria, Tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS from the scope of this evaluation”. In other cases, successive searching and reading efforts have confirmed the absence of information and hence the difficulty to respond to one or several JCs in a detailed manner.

Overall, wide evidence has been gathered in regards to the three Pillars of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement which makes it possible to answer to all the Evaluation Questions directly linked to the three dimensions of the CPA⁷⁶ (political, trade and development). However, it is important to note that the level of evidence within the different topics covered by Pillar may differ. For instance, while a large and detailed amount of information can be found in terms of macroeconomic stability or coverage, quality and access to basic social infrastructure and services, much less information is explicitly available on the levels of fragility in different countries and CPA contribution to their reduction. This can be explained by the fact that some of the Evaluation Questions refer to focused sectors of intervention for which tracking of performance is possible. Others, conversely, refer to less explicit sectors of action such as fragility and governance or to highly traditional transversal issues (i.e. gender, environment, climate change) for which specific information is rather fragmented and not always easy to aggregate.

Some of the most important findings as regards information gaps are as follows:

- As a general remark, it can be said that Pillars II and III are more evidence-based than Pillar I. Pillar I presents unbalanced level of evidence due to the nature of the questions under consideration. It is important to note that **very low evidence has been found in regards to migration issues (EQ4)**.
- **A very low level of evidence informs those aspects related to the institutional framework and working mechanisms of the CPA** (particularly EQ 11 and partially EQ 1 and 12). The analysis of the Evaluations reveals that most of the information available refers to the implementation of the succeeding EDF MFFs (thematically or geographically) but very little information is provided on how the partnerships and its related institutions work.
- **Quantity and quality of evidence vary within and between the Evaluation Questions.** While some of the Evaluation Questions contain a high level of information per Judgement Criterion (i.e. EQ 5 & 6) others present a less balanced assessment. This can be explained by the different scopes attributed to each Judgement Criterion and, of course, by the topic under consideration. For those questions linked to specific thematic priorities, the availabil-

⁷⁶ Particularly EQ 2-10

ity of information also depends on the geographical approach selected by the evaluation team. While in some thematic evaluations specific and relevant information about the ACP region is provided (in terms of financial breakdown, sectoral priorities, trends over the evaluation period, sources of information, etc.) others have adopted a more general worldwide approach complemented by specific study cases.

- Information about the **political aspects linked to the legally binding nature of the CPA** as well as the use of the different mechanisms in place (e.g. Article 96, suspension or sanctions) as a deterrent is almost absent and when presented it is in a rather succinct and descriptive way. This has a negative influence in the level of evidence that informs some JCs of EQ1, 2 and 12.

In 9.5 an indicative level of evidence per JC as well as additional comments on the overall perception of the information available is provided. Additionally, possible ways to enlarge or/and improve this preliminary assessment are also proposed bearing in mind the possible data collection methods and other significant documents that could be taken into account. In general, the selection of a number of case studies could provide an in-depth contextualised examination of how priorities have been established and implemented at the sectoral / geographical level. Qualitative data collection (e.g. semi-structured interviews) would help provide a deeper understanding of those “soft” aspects and processes that strictly factual information could not capture.

7 Conclusions per DAC criteria

These conclusions build on the evidence presented in the answers to the EQs and provide a synthesis according to the DAC criteria (Relevance, Effectiveness, Impact, Sustainability and Efficiency) and to the additional criteria of EU value added and 3Cs (Coherence, Co-ordination and Complementarity).

7.1 Relevance of the CPA as it appears from the strategic evaluations

The present chapter presents an overall assessment of the relevance of the CPA country, regional and thematic programmes, as it appears from the strategic evaluations, compared to the key objectives of the CPA: poverty reduction, through sustainable development, and gradual integration into the world economy.

The following was shown in the geographic evaluations (country and regional) and in the budget support evaluations:

- A strong **focus on poverty reduction**, aligned with government strategies, is recognised as an important sign of the relevance of the comprehensive CPA programmes, including pro-poor support to macroeconomic stabilisation, improved public expenditure and sectoral policies. Regarding alignment and ownership, which are conditions for the relevance of the objectives, some evaluations judge that the latter does not always correspond to the former, as the governments' commitment and actual behaviour often diverge from their stated objectives and strategies. In the case of the regions, the ownership is further weakened by the inter-government nature of the regional organisations and the trade-off between regional and national priorities.
- In recent years, there has been also a certain focus on gradual **integration into the world economy**, especially at regional level and in fast growing countries. A significant push toward this objective has come from EPAs, although their implementation has suffered delays and some complications. The relevance toward this objective, however, is still focused on trade, while the focus on the diversification of economies, including competitive supply chains is still weak.

The thematic evaluations note that:

- Relevance is particularly high for education, with its focus on poverty reduction, including universal primary education and gender equity.
- It is significant for health, with the exception for human resources development, of which the focus has been on improved access to basic health services in the poorest areas.
- It is significant for trade related assistance, including its regional dimension, with a focus on both poverty reduction and the integration in the world economy.
- It is significant for transport, where the CPA intervention has addressed some of the main obstacles to regional trade and economic development, although sometimes -due to a narrow emphasis on infrastructure construction- complementary aspects have been overlooked (including institutional setup, environmental and gender-related effects, etc.).
- In private sector development, although the objectives of the specific interventions have been relevant, their mainstreaming in the national strategies is still weak.
- Governance also shows a significant relevance for the objectives of specific interventions, but their link with the objectives of the whole country-level programmes is not adequately highlighted. In addition, governance interventions appear aligned with government, but not necessarily with non-state actors, who are also important subjects in the governance processes.
- The governance evaluations and those related to budget support underline the weak link between political dialogue on governance issues and the whole co-operation programme, which would benefit from stronger political guidance and support. Such a weak link, despite some important improvements after the establishment of the EEAS, persists in recent years due to a structural and organisational separation between political and policy dialogue in the EU delegations, limited capacities and reluctance of the partner governments.

- On conflict prevention and peace building, the CPA intervention has been generally relevant, although the investment in conflict analysis has been limited and sometimes the alignment with partner governments in conflict-prone or post-conflict contexts has been problematic.
- On gender equity, the relevance of the intervention has been generally poor. The gender equity objectives are not mainstreamed in the country strategies, specific actions remain rather isolated and political and policy dialogues do not give sufficient priority to the topic.
- Agriculture and rural development and energy-related policies also are not given a priority in proportion to their potential role for growth and poverty reduction. This is clearly shown in budget support evaluations in particular.

Verification of the assumptions. Regarding the key assumptions of the CPA (see the Logical Framework in the methodology section), there are assessments in the various EQs and in the Conclusions as well. To synthesise such assessments, the following table is established, where the assumptions are merged (where possible) and a synthetic assessments is provided.

<i>Assumptions</i>	<i>Synthetic assessment</i>
Framework of principles and values / Obligations under international conventions	It has been the focus of the political dialogue between the parties. In a limited number of cases there was breakage and use of suspension procedures.
Common understanding frameworks / Interest and commitment of the parties / Equality of partners and ownership	Alignment to partners' strategies and ownership are a basic standard, but often ownership appears rather formal. Shared frameworks of common interests and values at country and regional level, to base comprehensive political and policy dialogue, are unclear.
Mobilisation of key actors	It is pursued in most cases, although the prominence of the government-based relationships hampers its systematic and effective application.
Functional joint institutions	No data is available from the evaluations on the joint CPA institutions.
Coherence of EU policies / Transparent, efficient and easy to apply management	Coherence of EU policies is pursued. Most evaluations complain the heavy management procedures and the administrative and operational burden especially on EU Delegations.

7.2 Effectiveness of CPA as from the strategic evaluations

Growth and social policies. An effective contribution has been provided mainly through budget support since the 1990s⁷⁷. Macroeconomic stabilisation and improved public financial management have been widely supported, budgetary allocations to social sectors have been protected and policy design and implementation in health and education have been enhanced, as a consequence of the provision of budget support funds, the establishment of macro and sectoral dialogue frameworks and the execution of complementary capacity development actions.

In the last decade, however, budget support seems to have partially lost its leverage, especially in fast-growing countries, due to its reduced financial weight on recipients' budgets, among other reasons. Namely, there has been a change in priorities among both the partner countries and the EU MS. The former have shown a growing interest in foreign direct investment (FDI) and growth-related support (infrastructure), fostered also by the presence of new strong partners in the international scene (China). The latter, under the pressure of the economic crises and the related con-

⁷⁷ On the financial importance of Budget Support in the EDF (between 30% and 50% of programmable funds from the 7th to the 10th EDF, from early 1990s to 2014), see the footnote under the EQ 7, above. Here, it must be noted that budget support is one of the cooperation tools the effects of which - at least at the financial level - are not distinguishable between the various aid providers. The evaluations are therefore joint. The EU, being one of the main budget support providers and the biggest provider of budget support grants, is also one of the main contributors to its effects.

cerns of the national public opinions, have strengthened their emphasis on accountability and their preference towards modalities ensuring stricter controls on the use of funds.

Private sector development has been fostered by macroeconomic and fiscal stabilisation and also by the improved trade regulatory systems and the reinforcement of the transport networks (particularly at the regional level), which altogether have contributed to the improvement of the local business environment and export opportunities.

Contribution to the strengthening of private sector organisations, their direct participation in the political and economic processes, and to the strengthening and diversification of the supply chains, however, is less evident.

CSOs, non-state and decentralised actors have been effectively mobilised through ad hoc programmes and specific budget lines especially for relief and rehabilitation.

The consolidation and mainstreaming of the strategic role of CSOs, non-state and decentralised actors in the development processes (either as watchdogs of public expenditure, or as social service providers), however, is still a challenge.

Good governance has been pursued with mixed results. Significant effects to improve economic governance have been achieved. With respect to democratic governance, the support to the electoral processes has been effective in many countries. The dialogue on human rights has covered a large share of the political dialogue in the last decade.

Good governance as a whole, including democratic and economic governance, is not systematically addressed in the political dialogue, which seems mainly focused on elections, HR and security. An attempt to establish a comprehensive and country-tailored governance platform as a base for local partnerships (see the Governance Initiative in the 10th EDF) has been abandoned.

Regional organisations. CPA support has contributed to trade and economic development, and also to peace and security. Regional quality standards, trade regulations, trade-related international negotiations and regional infrastructure networks have been improved in the last few decades, thus improving the conditions for expansion of trade and economic growth. This has taken place in Eastern and Southern Africa, in the Indian Ocean, and partly in West Africa and the Caribbean. In addition, regional organisations, as in the case of Africa Union and Western Africa, have shown to be an appropriate dimension to tackle some of the most acute regional security crises.

A problematic institutional framework, however, has weakened the CPA action. An intensification of support for regional trade and economic development should have come from the implementation of the EPAs, but EU ability to leverage the different national partners in the regions has partly weakened as a result of reduced resources available (due to the international crisis and stronger presence of new powerful partners) as well as a result of disparity of interests, and commitment among them has remained an obstacle to successful implementation of EPAs.

Conflict prevention, management and resolution operations have increased in recent years. The capacity of the regional organisations to intervene in conflict management and peace building has been enhanced (AU, ECOWAS and others). New, flexible instruments and approaches, including post-crisis reconstruction, have been established. Although the early warning systems are still weak, the response to the outbreaks of conflicts has been often rapid, with positive effects on stabilisation. In post-crisis situations, timely and effective support has been provided for the recovery of agriculture and access to basic social services in the affected areas (Angola, Kenya, Haiti). The civil society mobilisation, particularly through specialised NGOs networks, has been a fundamental tool.

Some main structural weaknesses, however, remain. On the one hand, the EU is one of the most credible actors in terms of conflict prevention, management and resolution, especially for its plural and rather neutral political position. On the other hand, its leadership is still weak when addressing the root causes of regional conflicts and defining longer-term arrangements. Another weakness is in regards to the link between relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD). There are cases where a LRRD approach has been promoted with mixed results. Sometimes the co-ordination of the different interventions put in place (for emergency, short and longer-term interventions) is weak, due to their separate management and the limited ownership by the recipients.

Fragile states. Effective support is still a challenge, despite evident progress over the last decade. Specific tools, like V-Flex, State Building Contract (SBC - a specific form of budget support) and

others have been successfully tested in fragile countries. The combination of state building and non-state actors' mobilisation, of short- and medium-term approaches has proven to be effective.

The integration between SBC and various reconstruction interventions, however, remains a big challenge and the coordinating role of the local partners, including the EU Delegations, is not as strong as it should be. The LRRD approach is not built into the different response actions, so as they often do not integrate each other and the support to public institutions remains isolated from a number of potentially effective, but fragmented, sectoral and/or local supports. Often the security concerns overshadow economic growth priorities, especially for food agriculture and youth employment, thus failing to address the fragility causes. Short term emergencies prevail on longer term needs, including predictability.

7.3 Impacts of CPA as from the strategic evaluations

The overall contribution to poverty reduction has been significant, if one considers the direct contributions to macroeconomic stabilisation, improved PFM, trade capacity including strengthening of the main transport networks, increased public expenditure in social sectors, etc. All such public policies and country/regional capacities strengthened by CPA have contributed to economic growth and to increased access of the poor to the basic services, thus contributing to both income and non-income poverty reduction.

The contribution, instead, to an inclusive growth, with an improved level of participation of the poor and an accelerated reduction of the poverty incidence, has been weak. As probably it could have been expected, the CPA has not been able to influence the internal mechanisms of income distribution and the key political economy equilibria in the ACP societies. In particular the productivity of the labour in agriculture and urban informal sector, where most employment is still concentrated, has not increased as it should have done to support inclusive growth.

Equitable access to basic social services. The CPA has contributed to improved equitable access to basic social services (education, health, water and sanitation) and, then, to improved living standards among the ACP populations and the poor. Over the last decades, the CPA support (jointly with other international partners) has provided a substantial share (although decreasing over last years) of the development expenditure in the mentioned sectors in many ACP countries. Such financial support has often been complemented through policy advice and capacity development, thus accompanying the efforts that the country leaderships have done:

- Universal primary enrolment and gender parity in primary education have been almost achieved, with a positive impact on literacy among the youth. The quality of education, including its relationship with the employment remains an important challenge, although it is partly a consequence of the tremendous quantitative increases.
- Strong progress has been made in reducing child mortality. In maternal health, malaria and HIV/AIDS, the progress has been important as well, although the challenges remain enormous and some reversal trends are observed here and there.
- Access to safe drinking water has widely increased, although at a pace below the expectations and with a bias in favour of the urban areas.

Overall, the quality of institutional change, however, remains low. The recent sectoral evaluations tend to be highly critical on the capacity of basic services to meet the present and future needs in ACP countries.

Trade flows. The CPA has contributed to the enhanced trade flows within the ACP area and between the ACPs and the rest of the world. Over the last fifteen years, the trade flows between the ACPs and the rest of the world have increased almost at the same pace as the world trade flows⁷⁸, and trade growth has been a main drive for global economic growth in the ACPs. This has overturned a negative trend of deterioration of the position of the ACP in international trade, which lasted from the '70s. The evaluations contain significant evidence on the important contribution provid-

⁷⁸ The importance of this result is often underestimated, even in some evaluations. This result shows that ACP area has been able to participate in the extremely competitive international arena over the last fifteen years without being overwhelmed, but rather consolidating its positions. Lots of things remain to do (namely trade diversification and increased value added), but the performance so far is a good base.

ed by CPA to trade facilitation, including enhanced trade regulations, liberalisation and capacity in the ACP countries and the improvement of the basic transport infrastructure on the main regional axes.

The key determinant of trade growth, however, is international demand, while trade facilitation plays a key role when demand is high. Indeed the diversification of supply remains a weak feature of the ACP trade. And, as seen in the evaluations, this is also a weak point of the CPA contribution.

Democracy and human rights. The CPA has contributed to the reinforcement of democracy and human rights in the ACPs. The democratic process in the ACP countries, although slow and discontinuous, has progressed. Progress has been made since the 1990s, with a significant reduction of the authoritarian regimes. During the 2000s, however, the process has slowed down. A majority of so-called anocracies, or hybrid regimes with mixed democratic and authoritarian features, has been established in contexts destabilised by regional and internal conflicts. A small group of democracies has consolidated its setup. And a group of deeply authoritarian and some failed states persist. Overall, according to the E.I.U. democratic index, the democracy standards have deteriorated in almost all regions in the last decade, with Sub-Saharan Africa reporting instead some small improvements.

CPA action in this area has increased in the last decade. The contribution to the electoral processes has been significant and widespread, and the political dialogue on HR - including associated support - has been provided on a case by case basis when needed, with mixed results.

Peace and security. The CPA has contributed to peace and security stabilisation and maintenance in the ACPs. Reasons for conflicts and actual conflicts have multiplied in the last decades, especially in Africa. The capacity of reaction of the international community has improved at various levels, with a deep involvement of some regional organisations: mobilisation for peace enforcement, identification and implementation of post-conflict country emergency and rehabilitation plans, conflict prevention networks. The EU has been at the forefront in the response action, through the provision of funds, political dialogue and partners' co-ordination, institutional building, ad hoc conflict prevention and post-conflict plans. In all the conflict regions in Africa, EU has been one of the main partners of the Africa Union, and also of the ECOWAS, CEMAC, etc. to enhance their response capacity.

The weak resilience of the ACP countries, however, makes most of them vulnerable to increasing worldwide instability. And the EU has not yet put in place adequate partnership frameworks and capacities to tackle the root causes of conflicts, including shared understanding of- and action against regional inequalities, discriminations and imbalances.

7.4 Sustainability of the achievements so far, as from the strategic evaluations

Economic achievements. ACP economic growth and trade increase are not fully sustainable. Much of the growth recorded by ACP countries in the last decades is linked to the increased international demand for their raw material, including oil, gas, other minerals, cocoa and coffee, etc. As seen, such sources of growth are particularly vulnerable, while the diversification of the ACP economies is still lagging behind. The productivity of the labour in agriculture and the urban informal sector, where most of the working forces are concentrated, is still low. Some ACP countries and some DPs emphasise the new Middle Income level achieved in several cases. Indeed, the evaluations show that approaching the so-called MIC status may be a mirage that pushes country leadership to bite off more than they can chew and overlook the consequences of the instability of international markets⁷⁹.

Social achievements need to be consolidated through institutional development and quality. Evaluations show how the social gains can easily be threatened if not supported by deep institutional changes and not adequately maintained. This is happening with HIV/AIDS in many cases, but also with primary enrolment, maternal health, etc. The high rate of population growth in many cases is a strong factor of vulnerability and makes the achievements so far largely unsustainable, especially if the countries are affected by economic crises and conflicts.

⁷⁹ Uganda, but also Ghana (from a preliminary context analysis of the ongoing BS evaluation)

Democratic processes are still very weak. Even in more advanced cases, the emerging democracies are weak. There is still a lacking support of solid middle classes and the systems of checks and balances are still unripe. Some are also vulnerable to the pressure of powerful groups for state capture. Building competitive and attractive states is still a big challenge and a very long process that needs up-to-date long-term international partnerships.

The root causes of instability and conflicts have not been addressed. The world is in the middle of a complex transition, with the emergence of new regional powers, new middle classes within a number of MICs, fierce resistances to change and the clash of these emerging players with each other and with an ACP context mostly characterized by economically and institutionally weak states. As nobody knows how long this transition will take and which dimensions it will assume, conflict management strategies and tools are necessary, but not sufficient. Strengthening the resilience of the existing states and regions in the ACP areas is the key response, including long-term predictable support and consolidation of the endogenous institutional dynamics and growth factors.

7.5 Efficiency of the CPA as from the strategic evaluations

Ownership is limited in many cases. The evaluations show that country and regional programmes, although tailor-made, are not deeply owned by the national counterparts. The National and Regional Authorising Offices system (NAOs and RAOs) ensures, in many cases, only a formal participation of the partner countries and regions. Apart from the CPA, there is not a country/regional partnership framework, based on a comprehensive shared agenda that would justify in depth political and policy dialogue.

Integration of political and policy dialogue is weak. Comprehensive, high-level political dialogue (as established in Article 8) does not systematically support policy dialogue and rather tends to be compartmentalised, with a focus on human rights and security issues. Policy dialogue is often delegated to lower levels, e.g. monitoring and technical negotiations related to single programmes. Often policy dialogue is unable to go beyond the technical nature of the issues addressed, while the factors that may determine real changes and advances in reforms are related to the political commitment of the decision makers. This is why policy dialogue needs a continuous support from political dialogue. In addition, the compliance with the technical requirements of a budget support variable tranche are much less important than the mutual political understanding about, for instance, the prioritisation of pro-poor investment.

Flexibility of modalities, instruments and tools. The CPA allows a wide diversification of funding instruments (EDF, V-FLEX, IcSP, budget lines for democracy, non-state actors, public goods, and ECHO, EIB, etc.) and financing modalities (budget support, calls for tendering and proposals including governments and other actors, contributions to other UN or MS agencies, etc.). This multiplicity of tools should permit the design and implementation of programmes tailored on the actual needs and constraints of the different contexts.

It has been found, however, that such multiplicity of tools is not always applied as efficiently as it could be. For instance, in many cases, the support to non-state actors is not adequately mainstreamed in the country strategies. Potentially complementary interventions (emergency, stabilisation and other specialised tools) are often fragmented and not enough coordinated/ coherent with the whole country programmes. There are different reasons for this problematic co-ordination, among which the insufficient means and capacities at country level (EU Delegations and country ownership).

The regional dimension has shown to be a conducive framework to boost trade and economic infrastructure, but also peace and security. The coherence between regional and national level, however, represents an important challenge, since the regional institutions are unable to negotiate and ensure national implementation and, often, national governments face specific resistances and constraints to implement regional programmes. Regional partnerships, like EPAs, have been unable so far to provide adequate incentives to national partners and ensure equal benefits from integration.

Efficient management is a main concern of the strategic evaluations. Delays and various inefficiencies mainly due to the heavy administrative procedures and the lack of staff and capacities at the level of the EU Delegations are often mentioned in the evaluations as bottlenecks affecting the quality of the programming and implementation cycle.

Efficient monitoring and evaluation systems are in place. The ROM mechanism and the strategic evaluations are the core of a system which is expected to feed a continuous learning process and represents a key asset of the CPA. Data on development results, however, are not easily available, as they would require specific arrangements and research programmes with the partner countries. This represents a recurrent challenge for many strategic evaluations. The existing feedback loops at all levels, including HQs and countries, do not seem able to ensure the expected learning outcomes.

7.6 EU value added and 3 Cs, in the framework of CPA, as from the strategic evaluations

EU value added is particularly evident in areas such as:

- Major general and/or sectoral operations of budget support with actual results. EU has accumulated a strong experience in budget support since the early 1990s, when it started to support structural adjustment with a focus on protection of the most vulnerable groups. It is probably the most important budget support provider aside from development banks⁸⁰, in terms of grants disbursed, number of years of experience, and variety of geographic contexts. It has established detailed guidelines and a feedback process to learn from the experience. The EU value added is also shown by the frequent cases where EU leads potential clusters of budget support programmes with the participation of several EU member states. The financing capacity, a neutral identity to facilitate policy and political dialogue, the long-term experience of EU and its presence equally distributed in the different regions form the basis of the EU value added in budget support operations. Such value added would be even stronger, if EU and member states were stronger to establish and implement coordinated action plans and complementary actions around budget support.
- Support to regional integration and trade, including main infrastructure networks, but also other strategic themes, is an area of strong EU value added in the CPA framework. The rather unique experience of the EU with regional organisations, its specific competence in trade matters and its neutral identity - which allows dealing with diversified groups of states - are the basis of this value added. The potential of the regional level, including continental organisations like the AU, for strategic actions in a number of key areas for stability and growth is not yet fully exploited. The institutional setup and the capacities of the regional organisations are weak and problematic and the regional partnership frameworks are still fragile. The regional organisations are still considered by some ACP countries as occasions for sharing various benefits (employment, participation in projects, etc.), rather than opportunities for development, as shown also by the proliferation and overlapping of the regional institutions.
- Peace and security is another key area where the EU value added is particularly strong. The neutral identity of the EU, combined with its potential ability to represent and bring together some of the most powerful political and military partners of the ACP countries, is the key factor of the EU value added. This puts the EU at forefront of the stabilisation and peace building programmes, although in most cases the actual initiative and leadership are not yet ensured by the EU.
- Joint programmes with EU member states should be an area of high value added, but it is still insufficiently exploited (see below, the 3Cs).

Coherence, co-ordination and complementarity (3Cs) are an important concern for the EU in the implementation of the CPA and, especially co-ordination and complementarity with EU member states could be largely improved as shown by the evaluations:

- Coherence regards the internal coherence of the EU development policies, their coherence with the partners' policies, and their coherence with the other EU policies. Apart from the

⁸⁰ Compared to the Development Banks, some important differences should be highlighted: (i) EU funds are grants and not credits as in the case of the Banks; and (ii) the political risk taken by a political institution like the EU, in addition to the financial one, when deciding a BS operation, is not comparable to the financial risk of the Banks. In other words, for the Development Banks and IMF policy lending is part of their mandate, while for the EU and other bilateral agencies budget support is a political choice.

first two areas, which have been addressed elsewhere, the evaluations provide significant information on the third area. This is the case of combining development co-operation programmes, including EDF and other instruments, with - for instance - humanitarian and emergency interventions through ECHO, or EIB investment, or new trade agreements, etc. The evaluations show that the ex-ante coherence among the different policies may be high, but the capacity of generating actual synergies and avoiding trade-off relies on the leading role of the country development actors (government and civil society), including their negotiation capacities (e.g. new trade agreements for poor countries). In different fragile contexts, such capacity has shown to be weak. The use of instruments such as the State Building Contract (ad hoc budget support) may facilitate government ownership and coherent implementation of a diversified range of policies, if there is a focus on enabling country capacities and not just on technical compliance with specific conditions.

- Co-ordination and complementarities between the EU and its member states are improving, but need further development. According to the specific joint evaluation carried out on this subject (EU/DFID 2006), efforts should be intensified “at local embassy or delegation level to enter into an open and *true* dialogue with the partner Government and other donors”. Since 2006, a lot of progress has been made in this respect, although in the more recent evaluations joint programming is not particularly emphasised. Ad hoc mechanisms are now in place in most countries and joint assessments and approaches are carried out, but in the strategic evaluations there are still few examples of systematic joint programming, as there are limited examples of delegated co-operation. Good examples of complementarity are found in some budget support evaluations, where EU provides a bulk of GBS and member states finance complementary smaller sectoral budget support and/or specific accompanying measures for capacity building in focal areas. In fragile contexts, also complementarities are mentioned as significant.

8 Main lessons learned from the evaluations

A lesson is a conclusion that can be applied to subsequent cycles of the same intervention or to other interventions. Lessons learned are an important aspect of any evaluation since they can provide a wide range of benefits for future interventions. They have a formative purpose (what works and what does not), as well as informative one, thus facilitating relevant information that can help foster possible synergies and complementarities as well as a more enabling environment.

Identifying key lessons in order to improve current and future strategies and programmes of the EU is often stated as one of the main objectives declared in the Evaluations. However, lessons learned are not specifically identified in a systematic way. As an example, the Synthesis of geographical evaluations managed by the Evaluation Unit during the period 1998-2006 states that, out of 44 evaluation reports, only two identify lessons learned (Tanzania 2006 and Sierra Leone 2006). Moreover, in the Sierra Leone report, a paragraph is titled “lessons learned”, though the content cannot properly be defined as such.

Bearing in mind the high number of Evaluations reviewed and their wide thematic and geographic scope, it is important to note that the relevant lessons presented below are a broad generalisation, which can limit the appropriateness of all of them to any country or specific sector of intervention. Nevertheless, they have been selected on the basis of their relevance in response to the general interest.

The above-mentioned Evaluation⁸¹ has yielded important and relevant information to the present assessment.⁸² Additional lessons or amendments have been included to update, complement or introduce new topics of interest identified in the present review.

Lessons learned have been grouped into different clusters:

- European Commission Strategy,
- Thematic coverage,
- Cross-cutting issues,
- Implementation,
- Implementing partner.

Table 4 *Main lessons learned identified in the Evaluations*

<i>Dimension</i>	<i>Main lessons learned</i>
European Commission strategy	
European Commission strategy	<p>Commission’s country strategies in changing contexts vary considerably. Some reports assess them positively, whereas others highlight insufficient links between the proposed strategies and in- depth analyses of the specific characteristics of the country or region, and also weak policy dialogue at regional level. Due to the increasing focus on national coherence the importance of improving co-ordination with the other donors and to embed intervention within a national framework is deemed necessary.</p> <p>As far as intervention logic is concerned, the analysis does not address with adequacy the potential contribution of projects to the achievement of strategic goals and the complementarities between intervention levels. Complementarities between national and regional strategies are not referred to and there is no check on coherence with other EU policies.</p> <p>Main recommendations include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Need to increase the level of dialogue to improve adaptation, ownership and leadership by the partners. At the country level, partnerships need

⁸¹ Synthesis of geographical evaluations managed by the Evaluation Unit during the period 1998-2006 (2008)

⁸² A summary of the main Conclusions and Recommendations of the 44 Evaluations analysed was elaborated. The geographic evaluations assessed at that time were heavily focused on the ACP group. This is why the choice of this summary is considered as appropriate as a basis of analysis.

<i>Dimension</i>	<i>Main lessons learned</i>
	<p>to be based on a comprehensive and shared governance framework, possibly embracing state and non-state representatives, promoted and supported by high level political dialogue, to establish and monitor the programming priorities and implementation. Poor integration of governance frameworks has proven to be a main constraint to programme effectiveness. EU should associate local representatives of MS in the political dialogue for the establishment and monitoring of the country partnership, ensuring a closer link between political and policy dialogue.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthened coherence between Commission instruments should be improved internally (intra-region and intra-country) and externally (region and country) including the Commission's development strategies and the wider range of EU policies; • Adoption of response strategies for foreseeable trends related to regional integration schemes and trade policy; • Socio-economic disparities between the member countries of regional organisations should be clearly stated in strategic documents. This would favour synergy between regional and national development approaches. • Given the high variety of stakeholders, and the conflicting relations that they could have with each other, it is important to assess the institutional landscape, to assess actors' capabilities and dispatch functions according to actors' skills.
Thematic coverage	
Human rights, democracy and rule of law	<p>Promotion and protection of human rights and democracy have showed better impact when the EC has smartly positioned itself (with Member States and other actors) in the different contexts to push forward realistic human rights agendas, skilfully using its political clout, leverage capacity and different instruments. The tendency to marginalise human rights can limit the results. Political contexts and/or political will are important.</p>
Private sector	<p>Significant experiences have been implemented in the areas of trade regulatory systems, credit to SMEs/MMEs, microcredit schemes, and innovative instruments, such as blending financing but attempts to support public institutions to deal with private sector promotion or direct support to private sector organisations and their participation in the political and economic processes have shown to be weak.</p>
Trade	<p>The signing of the Cotonou Agreement (2000) marked a fundamental change in the direction of trade relationships between the EU and ACP countries. The EPAs aimed to develop an open, transparent and strong regulatory framework for goods, and also for trade in services. Such Agreements should have been the key tool to translate the new Aid for Trade approach but unforeseen or underestimated difficulties such as the little incentives for the LDCs limited their achievement.</p>
Public finance and macroeconomic framework	<p>Interventions are considered as relevant and generally effective despite weaknesses in programme design. There are some key unintended effects of the strong focus on mutual accountability of most programmes aimed at supporting governance, when they are not aware on the complex governance systems that they need to address. Capacity and PFM at local government level are key issues. In practice, however, the concentration on national level PFM and sector strategies, mainly determined by budget support and comprehensive sector programmes has resulted in local govern-</p>

<i>Dimension</i>	<i>Main lessons learned</i>
	ment capacity and Non State Actors participation receiving insufficient attention. There is a danger also in sector approaches leading to vertical programmes that neglect requirements for horizontal coherence at local government level.
Governance	The decision to address this issue is not always related to the importance of the problem in the country. Evaluations recommend strengthening and mainstreaming comprehensive support to governance, including economic governance (macroeconomic, public finance, transparency and accountability), sector reforms with a focus on growth-related and pro-poor sectors, rule of law, human rights and democracy, gender equity, environment and climate change concerns which would inform the content of the partnerships and the joint action programmes at the country level, according to the specific context priorities. EC support for improved local governance and accountability has been most effective when support was comprehensive in scope and related to broader institutional aspects regarding processes of planning and budgeting or area-based programmes of significant size.
Food security	The EU long-term interventions within the sector, supporting capacity and institutional building, are of high relevance but more difficult to track. Direct aid is often given in the form of projects that, directly or indirectly, aim to increase food production and improve marketing. In such cases, support channelled through NGOs to increase access to food, even if questioned in terms of effectiveness, has been considered as irreplaceable in many cases. The EU Food Facility has been appreciated by recipient countries, but has only partially been able to support the mainstreaming of food security into national policies.
Transport	Interventions have contributed to economic growth, social development and regional integration but their sustainability is at risk because of a lack of ownership and limited capacity to ensure maintenance. Strengthening of the regional dimension of the infrastructural network is considered highly relevant.
Social sectors (mainly education and health)	<p>EC support has been mainly channelled through financial transfers to the government budgets (SBS and GBS) and related dialogue and technical support to improve resource allocation and public financial management, and – especially in the case of SBS – strengthen sectoral capacities for planning and implementation.</p> <p>This has enabled the recipient governments to increase investment in the basic public services for infrastructure and human resource development. In most places where feasible, the EC has opted for either SBS or GBS, which has enabled it to work in partnership with domestic stakeholders and other BS providers on addressing issues related to access, equity and policy-based resource allocation. However, such interventions have provided insufficient attention to the quality of the services and their actual outcomes. CPA contribution, in this area, has been weak, and the challenge increasingly present in the Evaluations underlines the need to minimise unbalanced support in order to progress especially on the quality.</p>
Fragility	Support has been efficient when an overall approach, sensitive to the countries' specific aspects of fragility, is promoted by systematising reflection of the principle of "do not harm", further integrating EU regional co-operation within the national co-operation and paying considerable attention to reinforcing national capacities. The discussion on the LRRD process as well as on disaster preparedness strategies has increased in importance in the last years although fragmented sectoral/local supports prevail over a more inte-

<i>Dimension</i>	<i>Main lessons learned</i>
	grated approach.
Regional integration	The EU has made strong contributions to the fostering of regional integration processes, albeit with variations due to the diverse (and sometimes overlapping) interests of the regional organisations. While regional strategies and operations are well conceived, the enhancement of coherence between RSP/RIP and CSP/NIP is understood as a key factor in facilitating the EU's regional support.
Cross-cutting issues	
Gender	Gender has not been generally mainstreamed. It can be noted that better results have been achieved when gender issues have been specifically addressed at sectoral level focusing, for example, on capacity building amongst stakeholders and on the establishment of monitoring mechanisms to differentiate impact on poor women and men with the aim that all interventions equally benefit and empower poor women and men. The practices and experiences of MSs provide useful lessons that could be applied by the EC.
Environment	Environment has been more effectively mainstreamed from 2007 than in earlier periods, notably in two sectors (agriculture and rural development and infrastructure). However, the large number of policies and communications makes difficult to establish the required positions and information. Over the last few years, useful and quality mainstreaming guidelines and tools have been promoted resulting in a significant step forward increasing the mainstreaming capacity in EUDs.
Climate change	Climate Change policies have recently evolved from focusing primarily on curbing emissions to increasingly addressing adaptation in vulnerable countries in the framework of the external dimension of Europe 2020 targets and the Agenda for Change. EU-supported interventions in increasing knowledge and developing capacity appear to be partner-owned and demand-led, and they are thus likely to lead to capacities that are made use of in practice.
Implementation	
Aid delivery mechanisms	Budget support and sector policy dialogue are acknowledged as enablers for governments' ownership and accountability although a partial loss of leverage experienced over the last decade. Stand-alone projects are often considered to be insufficiently linked to strategic priorities and to policy dialogue and/or limited for ownership, flexibility or capacity building in the recipient institutions. However, coherence and complementarity between instruments is generally understood as a source of flexibility. When budget support is recommended, complementarity with SWAs and stand-alone projects in specific cases (opening pathways into new areas of co-operation, strengthening the capacity of actors, and paving the way towards sectoral budget support) is encouraged. Furthermore, adequate measures to enhance the recipient's capacities, including the contribution of civil society, and feeding the dialogue through adequate information (data) and skills (TA) need to be ensured.
Donor co-ordination and complementarity	Despite weak co-ordination between donors, complementarity is observed mainly at sectoral level. Focus on the 3 Cs (Coherence, Complementarity and co-ordination) is more responsive when is included in all strategy or project document. Joint programming and/or delegated co-operation modalities have not provided yet with sufficient evidence-based information.

<i>Dimension</i>	<i>Main lessons learned</i>
	Complementarities with between EU Budget Support (when the EU has a strong value added) and accompanying measures from MS in sectors where they have a comparative advantage could be further explored.
Implementing partner	
National institutions	<p>In many cases it is recognised that weak capacities of the national counterparts institutions (especially National Authorising Officers and their Support Units) can limit ownership and true sustainability. A key challenge shared by many ACP countries is NAO-SUs which are largely considered to be non-specialist entities on an interface role, thus often limiting the efficiency of the line ministries in the management of aid resources allocated to their sector, and constraining the technical (policy) dialogue.</p> <p>The use of budget support and sector policy dialogue is regarded as the translation of the EU's confidence in the Government's own systems, organisation and policies by providing additional resources for the implementation of the Governments' development plans.</p>
Civil society	Experience shows that there are several aspects of critical importance: 1) starting from the specific context and involving CSOs since the stage of negotiation and subscription of the country level partnerships; 2) understanding "who is who" in civil society; 3) managing the politics' of using the CSO channel (particularly in hostile environments); 4) adopting a participatory approach to programming CSO support; and 5) combining diverse engagement strategies in close co-operation with stakeholders, integrating as much as possible central and local governments, state and civil society institutions with a focus on complementarities and synergies.
International organisations	Support to IOs has been emphasized in cases where aid delivery would otherwise have been difficult.

9 Annexes

9.1 Annex 1: List of evaluation reports reviewed

A total amount of 111 evaluation reports was reviewed. The ToR provided a list of 107 reports to which were added the recently finished *Evaluation of EU support to Environment and Climate Change* and the *Evaluation of Budget Support in Burkina Faso*, both implemented by Particip. Two evaluation reports close to final, namely Transport and Chad, have been taken into account as well. The following table provides a complete list of the reviewed reports:

Table 5 List of evaluation reports reviewed

<i>Evaluation title</i>	<i>Year</i>
Thematic Evaluations and evaluations of aid modalities	
Evaluation de la coopération Nord-Sud en matière de lutte contre l'expansion de l'épidémie du VIH/SIDA et aide aux politiques et programmes démographiques dans les pays en développement	2000
Evaluation of EC Food Aid Security Policy, Food Aid Management and Programmes in support of Food Security	2000
External evaluation of community aid concerning positive actions in the field of human rights and democracy in the ACP countries	2000
Evaluation of voter education in the context of EU electoral support	2001
Synthesis report on EC activities in the field of human rights, democracy and good governance	2001
Evaluation de la coopération de la communauté européenne en matière d'appui institutionnel aux Ordonnateurs Nationaux et Régionaux du Fonds Européen de Développement	2002
Evaluation of EC support to the education sector in ACP countries	2002
Evaluation of the EC co-operation with ACP/ALA/MED countries in the health sector	2002
Evaluation of the relationship between country programmes and fisheries agreements	2002
Evaluation des actions de réhabilitation et de reconstruction financées par la Communauté européenne dans les pays ACP/ALA/MED/TACIS	2003
Joint evaluation of external support to basic education in developing countries	2003
Thematic evaluation of the integration of gender in EC development co-operation with third countries	2003
Evaluation of the EC interventions in the transport sector in third countries	2004
Evaluation of the environment and forest regulations	2004
Evaluation of trade-related assistance by the European Commission in third countries	2004
Thematic evaluation of food-aid policy and food-aid management and special operations in support of food security	2004
Thematic evaluation of population and development oriented programmes in EC external co-operation	2004
Evaluation of European Community support to private sector development in third countries	2005
Evaluating co-ordination and complementarity of country strategy papers with national development priorities	2006
Evaluation of European Commission support to micro-project programmes under the EDF in ACP countries	2006

<i>Evaluation title</i>	<i>Year</i>
Joint evaluation of co-ordination of trade capacity building in partner countries	2006
Joint evaluation of general budget support	2006
Thematic evaluation of the EC support to good governance	2006
Thematic evaluation of the water and sanitation sector	2006
Evaluation of the Commission support for statistics in third countries	2007
Evaluation thématique développement rural et agricole	2007
Evaluation of Commission's aid delivery through development banks and EIB	2008
Evaluation of Commission's external co-operation with partner countries through the organisations of the UN family	2008
Evaluation of EC aid delivery through civil society organisations	2008
Evaluation of EC support to partner countries in the area of energy	2008
Synthesis of the geographical evaluations managed by the Evaluation Unit during the period 1998-2006	2008
Thematic evaluation of European Commission support to conflict prevention and peace-building	2009
Mid-term evaluation of the Investment Facility and EIB own resources operations in ACP countries and the OCTs	2010
Thematic global evaluation of European Commission support to the education sector in partner countries (including basic and secondary education)	2010
Evaluation conjointe des opérations d'aide budgétaire au Mali	2011
Study on legal instruments and lessons learned from evaluations managed by the Joint Evaluation Unit	2011
Thematic evaluation of European Commission support to conflict prevention and peace-building	2011
Thematic evaluation of European Commission support to justice and security system reform	2011
Thematic evaluation of the European Commission support to respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms (including solidarity with victims of repression)	2011
Thematic global evaluation of European Commission support in the sectors of ESI (employment and social inclusion) in partner countries (including vocational training)	2011
Evaluation methodology and baseline study of the EC technical co-operation support	2012
Evaluation of Commission's co-operation with the Council of Europe	2012
Evaluation of visibility of EU external action	2012
Thematic evaluation of the European Commission support to the health sector	2012
Thematic global evaluation of European Commissions support to agricultural commodities in ACP countries	2012
Thematic global evaluation of the Commission support to decentralisation processes	2012
Evaluation of the EU's support to private sector in third countries	2013
Evaluation of the EU's trade-related assistance in third countries	2013
Joint evaluation of budget support to Tanzania	2013
Thematic global evaluation of the European Union's support to integrated border management and fight against organised crime	2013

<i>Evaluation title</i>	<i>Year</i>
Independent evaluation of budget support in Mozambique	2014
Evaluation de l'appui budgétaire au Burkina Faso*	2015
Evaluation of EU support to gender equality and women's empowerment in partner countries	2015
Evaluation of EU support to the transport sector in Africa*	2015
Joint evaluation of budget support to Uganda	2015
Thematic evaluation of the EU support to environment and climate change in third countries*	2015
Geographic evaluations	
Ghana	2005
CBI in Southern and Eastern Africa	2000
PALOP	2001
Caribbean	2005 & 2012
Benin	2005
Mali	2006
Rwanda	2006
Mauritius, Seychelles and Comoros	2006
West Africa	2008
Central African Republic	2009
Chad	2009 & 2015*
Tanzania	2006
Central Africa	2006
SADC	2007
Eastern and Southern Africa, Indian Ocean	2008
Guyana	2008
Pacific	2007 & 2015
Senegal	2010
Djibouti	2012
Botswana	2009
Burkina Faso	2001 & 2010
Liberia	2010
Nigeria	2010
OCTs	2011
Niger	2010
Mozambique	2000 & 2007
Namibia	2001 & 2009
Uganda	2001 & 2009
Republic of Congo	2012
Angola	2009
Dominican Republic	2000 & 2011
Zambia	2012

<i>Evaluation title</i>	<i>Year</i>
Jamaica	2006 & 2012
Madagascar	2015
Malawi	2003 & 2011
Caribbean 2	2003-2010
Burundi	2014
Cameroon	2014
Democratic Republic of Congo	2014
Timor Leste	2015
Ethiopia	2004 & 2012
Haiti	2014
Kenya	2014
Lesotho	2004 & 2015
Togo	2014

** Evaluation was not originally included in the ToR and has been added later to the list.*

9.2 Annex 2: In-depth methodology – understanding and defining the relevance of evaluation reports

Definition of relevance

When assessing the relevance of reports, their **geographical and thematic focus** as well as their **evaluation periods** needs to be considered. These elements will feed into three dimensions of relevance, which can eventually be aggregated to form a conclusive value of overall relevance.

Temporal relevance

The 111 evaluation reports present an extreme spread of evaluation periods, ranging from the *Evaluation of the Cross-Border Initiative (CBI) regional economic integration programme in Southern and Eastern Africa* – covering a period from 1990 to 1999 – to the *Evaluation of Budget Support in Burkina Faso* which covers a period from 2009 to 2014.

It is important to note that the CPA came into effect in 2003, and thus **reports from evaluations which covered a period from 2003+n onwards will be more relevant** than earlier reports. In order to establish a ranking of the various evaluations with regards to their temporal relevance, the following approach was applied:

As a first step, covered years during which the CPA agreement was already in force and their share of the total evaluation period for each individual report were calculated. The year 2003 was still counted as pre-CPA, since it can be assumed that the actual implementation of the agreement required some additional time for transitioning from the previous Lomé Conventions. In a second step, each report was scored based on the share of covered CPA years in its evaluation period:

- 1 point was attributed, if the CPA was in force during more than two thirds of the evaluation period;
- 0.5 points were attributed, if the CPA was in force during more than one third, but less than two thirds of the evaluation period;
- and 0 points were attributed, if the CPA was in force during less than one third of the evaluation period.

The following table shows the evaluation period, the share of years during which the CPA was in force and the temporal relevance score attributed to the individual reports.

Table 6 Temporal relevance of evaluation reports

Short evaluation title	Evaluation period	Share of CPA years	Relevance score
Thematic Evaluations and evaluations of aid modalities			
Food aid & security 1	1997-1999	0.0%	0
Human rights & democracy in ACP	1995-2000	0.0%	0
HIV/AIDS and demographic programmes	1997-1999	0.0%	0
Voter education in the context of electoral support	1992-2001	0.0%	0
Human rights, democracy and good governance	1995-2001	0.0%	0
Appui institutionnel aux ordonnateurs nationaux et régionaux	1995-2000	0.0%	0
Education in ACP countries	1993-2000	0.0%	0
Fisheries	1996-2002	0.0%	0
Health in ACP/ALA/MED	1995-2000	0.0%	0
Actions de réhabilitation et de construction	1996-2002	0.0%	0
Integration/ mainstreaming of gender in development co-operation	1995-2001	0.0%	0
Basic education	1990-2002	0.0%	0

<i>Short evaluation title</i>	<i>Evaluation period</i>	<i>Share of CPA years</i>	<i>Relevance score</i>
Food aid & security 2	1997-2002	0.0%	0
Population programmes	1994-2002	0.0%	0
Trade related assistance 1	1996-2003	0.0%	0
Transport	1995-2001	0.0%	0
Private sector development	1994-2003	0.0%	0
Micro projects in ACP countries	1998-2003	0.0%	0
EC support to good governance	1994-2004	9.1%	0
Joint donor evaluation of GBS	1994-2004	9.1%	0
Water and sanitation	1995-2004	10.0%	0
Rural development	1995-2005	18.2%	0
Environment and forest regulations	2000-2004	20.0%	0
Statistical support in third countries	1996-2005	20.0%	0
Energy	1996-2006	27.3%	0
Synthesis of geographical evaluations	1998-2006	33.3%	0
Aid delivery through development banks and EIB	1999-2006	37.5%	0.5
Co-operation through organisations of the UN	1999-2006	37.5%	0.5
Complementarity of CSP and national development priorities	2000-2006	42.9%	0.5
Aid channelled through Civil Society Organisations	2000-2006	42.9%	0.5
Trade capacity building	2001-2006	50.0%	0.5
Education (basic & secondary)	2000-2007	50.0%	0.5
Employment and social inclusion	1999-2008	50.0%	0.5
Agricultural commodities in ACP countries	2000-2009	60.0%	0.5
Decentralisation processes	2000-2009	60.0%	0.5
Conflict prevention and peace building 1	2001-2008	62.5%	0.5
Respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms	2000-2010	63.6%	0.5
Evaluation methodology and baseline study of the EC technical co-operation support	2000-2010	63.6%	0.5
Evaluation of the EU co-operation with the Council of Europe	2000-2010	63.6%	0.5
Justice and security systems reforms	2001-2009	66.7%	0.5
Conflict prevention and peace building 2	2001-2010	70.0%	1
Health	2001-2010	70.0%	1
Support to integrated border management and fight against organised crime	2002-2010	77.8%	1
BS Mali	2003-2009	85.7%	1
MTE of the investment facility	2003-2009	85.7%	1

<i>Short evaluation title</i>	<i>Evaluation period</i>	<i>Share of CPA years</i>	<i>Relevance score</i>
Study on legal instruments and lessons learned from evaluations	2007-2010	100.0%	1
Visibility of EU external action	2005-2010	100.0%	1
BS Tanzania	2006-2012	100.0%	1
Support to private sector development	2004-2010	100.0%	1
Trade related assistance 2	2004-2010	100.0%	1
BS Mozambique	2005-2012	100.0%	1
BS Burkina Faso	2009-2014	100.0%	1
BS Uganda	2004-2013	100.0%	1
Environment	2007-2013	100.0%	1
Gender	2007-2013	100.0%	1
Transport in Africa	2005-2013	100.0%	1
Geographic evaluations			
Ghana	1996-2002	0.0%	0
CBI in Southern and Eastern Africa	1990-1999	0.0%	0
PALOP	1992-1999	0.0%	0
Caribbean 1	1996-2002	0.0%	0
Benin	1995-2004	10.0%	0
Mali	1995-2004	10.0%	0
Rwanda	1995-2005	18.2%	0
Mauritius, Seychelles and Comoros	1996-2005	20.0%	0
West Africa	1996-2006	27.3%	0
Central Afr. Rep.	1996-2007	33.3%	0
Tanzania	2000-2005	33.3%	0
Central Africa	1996-2007	33.3%	0
SADC	1996-2007	33.3%	0
Eastern and Southern Africa, Indian Ocean	1996-2007	33.3%	0
Guyana	1997-2007	36.4%	0.5
Pacific 1	1997-2007	36.4%	0.5
Senegal	1996-2008	38.5%	0.5
Djibouti	1996-2010	46.7%	0.5
Botswana	1999-2008	50.0%	0.5
Burkina Faso	1999-2008	50.0%	0.5
Liberia	1999-2008	50.0%	0.5
Nigeria	1999-2008	50.0%	0.5
OCTs	1999-2009	54.5%	0.5

<i>Short evaluation title</i>	<i>Evaluation period</i>	<i>Share of CPA years</i>	<i>Relevance score</i>
Niger	2000-2008	55.6%	0.5
Mozambique	2001-2007	57.1%	0.5
Namibia	2001-2007	57.1%	0.5
Uganda	2001-2007	57.1%	0.5
Congo Rep.	2000-2009	60.0%	0.5
Angola	2002-2007	66.7%	0.5
Dominican Rep.	2001-2009	66.7%	0.5
Zambia	2001-2010	70.0%	1
Jamaica	2002-2009	75.0%	1
Madagascar	2002-2013	83.3%	1
Malawi	2003-2010	87.5%	1
Caribbean 2	2003-2010	87.5%	1
Burundi	2005-2011	100.0%	1
Cameroon	2007-2012	100.0%	1
Chad	2008-2014	100.0%	1
Congo Dem. Rep.	2008-2013	100.0%	1
Timor Leste	2008-2013	100.0%	1
Ethiopia	2004-2008	100.0%	1
Haiti	2008-2012	100.0%	1
Kenya	2006-2012	100.0%	1
Lesotho	2008-2013	100.0%	1
Togo	2007-2013	100.0%	1
Pacific 2	2006-2012	100.0%	1

Thematic relevance

The thematic relevance of the evaluations is constituted by the **potential information their reports are likely to feed into the established EQs**. Particip has contributed to 41 of the evaluation reports and the team is therefore familiar with their content; others were briefly screened to get an impression of their relevance. Some evaluations directly match the particular thematic priority of one or even several EQs and are therefore considered as highly relevant, whereas others can only be linked to the EQs in an indirect way, e.g. via cross-cutting issues. Based on that, the following scores have been attributed:

- 1 point was attributed, if the report directly matches the thematic priority of at least one EQ;
- 0.5 points were attributed, if the report is linked indirectly to at least one EQ's thematic priority, for example via cross-cutting issues;
- and 0 points were attributed, if there is no plausible link between any EQ's thematic priority and the report's subject⁸³.

⁸³ In fact, 0 points were never attributed, since all reports were considered (indirectly) relevant for at least one EQ.

Considering that **geographical evaluations** typically do not have one single thematic subject but a set of several thematic priorities, all of them were considered to be equally relevant for the EQs. They **have hence not been scored in this dimension**.

The following table shows the EQs directly and indirectly linked to the thematic evaluations and the thematic relevance score attributed to the individual reports.

Table 7 Thematic relevance of evaluation reports

<i>Short evaluation title</i>	<i>Direct links</i>	<i>Indirect links</i>	<i>Relevance score</i>
Actions de réhabilitation et de construction		EQ 3	0.5
Aid delivery through development banks and EIB		EQ 12	0.5
Appui institutionnel aux ordonnateurs nationaux et régionaux		EQ 1, EQ 5, EQ 6, EQ 12	0.5
Complementarity of CSP and national development priorities		EQ 1, EQ 12	0.5
Co-operation through organisations of the UN		EQ 12	0.5
Decentralisation processes		EQ 2, EQ 3	0.5
Energy		EQ 9	0.5
Evaluation methodology and baseline study of the EC technical co-operation support		EQ 12	0.5
Evaluation of the EU co-operation with the Council of Europe		EQ 12	0.5
Fisheries		EQ 7, EQ 10	0.5
Food aid & security 1		EQ 3, EQ 10	0.5
Food aid & security 2		EQ 3, EQ 10	0.5
Micro projects in ACP countries		EQ 12	0.5
Statistical support in third countries		EQ 5, EQ 6, EQ 7, EQ 8, EQ 9, EQ 10	0.5
Synthesis of geographical evaluations		EQ 2, EQ 5, EQ 7, EQ 8, EQ 9, EQ 12	0.5
Transport		EQ 5, EQ 6, EQ 7	0.5
Visibility of EU external action		EQ 12	0.5
Water and sanitation		EQ 8, EQ 9, EQ 10	0.5
Agricultural commodities in ACP countries	EQ 6	EQ 5	1
Aid channelled through Civil Society Organisations	EQ 8, EQ 9, EQ 10		1
Basic education	EQ 8, EQ 10		1
BS Burkina Faso	EQ 7, EQ 12		1
BS Mali	EQ 7, EQ 12		1
BS Mozambique	EQ 7, EQ		1

<i>Short evaluation title</i>	<i>Direct links</i>	<i>Indirect links</i>	<i>Relevance score</i>
	12		
BS Tanzania	EQ 7, EQ 12		1
BS Uganda	EQ 7, EQ 12		1
Conflict prevention and peace building 1	EQ 3		1
Conflict prevention and peace building 2	EQ 3		1
EC support to good governance	EQ 2		1
Education (basic & secondary)	EQ 8, EQ 10		1
Education in ACP countries	EQ 8, EQ 10		1
Employment and social inclusion	EQ 10	EQ 7	1
Environment	EQ 9		1
Environment and forest regulations	EQ 9		1
Gender	EQ 9	EQ 10	1
Health	EQ 8, EQ 10		1
Health in ACP/ALA/MED	EQ 8, EQ 10		1
Human rights & democracy in ACP	EQ 2		1
Human rights, democracy and good governance	EQ 2		1
Integration/ mainstreaming of gender in development co-operation	EQ 9	EQ 10	1
Joint donor evaluation of GBS	EQ 7, EQ 12		1
Justice and security systems reforms	EQ 3	EQ 2	1
MTE of the investment facility	EQ 7		1
Population programmes	EQ 8, EQ 10	EQ 4	1
Private sector development	EQ 7		1
Respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms	EQ 2		1
Rural development	EQ 7	EQ 10	1
Study on legal instruments and lessons learned from evaluations	EQ 12		1
Support to integrated border management and fight against organised crime	EQ 3	EQ 4	1
Support to private sector development	EQ 7		1
Trade capacity building	EQ 5, EQ 6		1
Trade related assistance 1	EQ 5, EQ 6		1
Trade related assistance 2	EQ 5, EQ		1

<i>Short evaluation title</i>	<i>Direct links</i>	<i>Indirect links</i>	<i>Relevance score</i>
	6		
Transport in Africa	EQ 5, EQ 10	EQ 7, EQ 8, EQ 12	1
HIV/AIDS and demographic programmes	EQ 9		1
Voter education in the context of electoral support	EQ 2		1

Geographical relevance

In most cases, thematic evaluations are set up as worldwide evaluations of a specific sector or aid modality. As a consequence, the **geographical relevance of these evaluation reports is defined by their country case studies and field visits**. In order to rank the reports, the case studies⁸⁴ in ACP countries were counted and the following scores attributed:

- 1 point was attributed, if the report contained case studies on more than two ACP countries;
- 0.5 points were attributed, if the report contained case studies on maximum two ACP countries;
- and 0 points were attributed, if the report did not contain any case study on ACP countries at all.

2 was identified as the **statistical median** for the number of case studies on ACP countries and therefore was used as a reference for the scoring.

Several thematic evaluations have a **direct focus on ACP** countries and hence received an additional bonus point in order to highlight their specific geographical relevance. **Geographical evaluations** however, are considered highly relevant per definition and therefore **have not been scored in this dimension**.

The following table shows the number of case studies on ACP countries and the geographical relevance score attributed to the individual reports.

Table 8 Geographical relevance of evaluation reports

<i>Short evaluation title</i>	<i>Number of case studies on ACP countries</i>	<i>Relevance score</i>
Actions de réhabilitation et de construction	0	0
Basic education	0	0
Conflict prevention and peace building 1	0	0
Evaluation methodology and baseline study of the EC technical co-operation support	0	0
Evaluation of the EU co-operation with the Council of Europe	0	0
Human rights, democracy and good governance	0	0
Study on legal instruments and lessons learned from evaluations managed by JEU	0	0
Synthesis of geographical evaluations	0	0
Transport	0	0
Voter education in the context of electoral support	0	0
Aid delivery through development banks and EIB	1	0.5

⁸⁴ In addition to field visits, several evaluations also feature desk based case studies. It was decided to only count case studies where a distinct report (e.g. country note, case study report) has been produced, regardless of whether this report was based on a field visit or only on desk work.

<i>Short evaluation title</i>	<i>Number of case studies on ACP countries</i>	<i>Relevance score</i>
Co-operation through organisations of the UN	1	0.5
Integration/ mainstreaming of gender in development co-operation	1	0.5
Population programmes	1	0.5
Private sector development	1	0.5
Respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms	1	0.5
Rural development	1	0.5
Support to integrated border management and fight against organised crime	1	0.5
Aid channelled through Civil Society Organisations	2	0.5
Complementarity of CSP and national development priorities	2	0.5
Employment and social inclusion	2	0.5
Food aid & security 2	2	0.5
Trade related assistance 1	2	0.5
Visibility of EU external action	2	0.5
EC support to good governance	3	1
Education (basic & secondary)	3	1
Energy	3	1
Food aid & security 1	3	1
Justice and security systems reforms	3	1
Water and sanitation	3	1
Conflict prevention and peace building 2	4	1
Environment	4	1
Environment and forest regulations	4	1
Fisheries	4	1
Joint donor evaluation of GBS	4	1
Statistical support in third countries	4	1
Support to private sector development	4	1
Trade related assistance 2	4	1
HIV/AIDS and demographic programmes	4	1
Decentralisation processes	5	1
Gender	5	1
Health	5	1
Health in ACP/ALA/MED	5	1
BS Burkina Faso	1	1.5
BS Mali	1	1.5
BS Mozambique	1	1.5
BS Tanzania	1	1.5
BS Uganda	1	1.5
Trade capacity building	1	1.5

<i>Short evaluation title</i>	<i>Number of case studies on ACP countries</i>	<i>Relevance score</i>
Micro projects in ACP countries	2	1.5
MTE of the investment facility	3	2
Education in ACP countries	5	2
Appui institutionnel aux ordonnateurs nationaux et régionaux	7	2
Agricultural commodities in ACP countries	8	2
Human rights & democracy in ACP	8	2
Transport in Africa	8	2

Aggregation of the three dimensions to establish an overall relevance

Once the three dimensions of relevance are identified, the next step is to aggregate them to create an **overall relevance value** which can be used to categorise the reports.

With regards to the **geographical evaluations**, aggregation is not an issue: given that they are all considered equally relevant from a geographical and thematic point of view, the temporal dimension is the only variable that constitutes their relevance, which – as a consequence – ranges from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 1 point.

With regards to the **thematic evaluations**, all three dimensions of relevance were considered to be equally important. Therefore, their overall relevance is constituted by simply adding up the dimensional scores and thus ranges from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 4 points

The report categories based on the overall relevance

Since the relevance of geographical and thematic evaluations is measured differently, the approaches to categorise the reports based on their relevance have to differ as well.

As mentioned above, the relevance of **geographical evaluations** is simply determined by their temporal relevance which is expressed in three different scores – 0, 0.5 and 1. Naturally, each of these levels corresponds to one category:

- reports with a temporal relevance score of 1 are assigned to Category A;
- reports with a temporal relevance score of 0.5 are assigned to Category B;
- and reports with a temporal relevance score of 0 are assigned to Category C.

The relevance of **thematic evaluations** on the other hand ranges from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 4 points and as a consequence no natural classification imposes itself. The statistical median of the overall relevance is 2 and similar to the approach used to determine the geographical relevance (see above), reports will be categorised based on that:

- reports with an overall relevance score of 3 or higher are assigned to Category A (above the statistical median);
- reports with an overall relevance score between 1.5 and 2.5 are assigned to Category B (around the statistical median);
- and reports with an overall relevance score of 1 or lower are assigned to Category C (below the statistical median).

Table 9 shows the overall relevance score and the categories assigned to the individual reports. For the few countries where multiple Country Strategy Evaluations (CSEs) are available and part of the review, only the most recent one was scored. The older evaluation reports were directly assigned to Category C as they were considered of very limited temporal relevance and thus do not appear in the various relevance tables shown in this report.⁸⁵

⁸⁵ This applies to the following CSEs: Burkina Faso (2001), Chad (2009), Dominican Republic (2000), Ethiopia (2004), Lesotho (2004), Malawi (2003), Mozambique (2000), Namibia (2001) and Uganda (2001).

Table 9 Overall relevance and assigned category

<i>Short evaluation title</i>	<i>Overall relevance score</i>	<i>Assigned category</i>
Thematic Evaluations and evaluations of aid modalities		
MTE of the investment facility	4	A
Transport in Africa	4	A
Agricultural commodities in ACP countries	3.5	A
BS Burkina Faso	3.5	A
BS Mali	3.5	A
BS Mozambique	3.5	A
BS Tanzania	3.5	A
BS Uganda	3.5	A
Conflict prevention and peace building 2	3	A
Education in ACP countries	3	A
Environment	3	A
Gender	3	A
Health	3	A
Human rights & democracy in ACP	3	A
Support to private sector development	3	A
Trade capacity building	3	A
Trade related assistance 2	3	A
Appui institutionnel aux ordonnateurs nationaux et régionaux	2.5	B
Education (basic & secondary)	2.5	B
Justice and security systems reforms	2.5	B
Support to integrated border management and fight against organised crime	2.5	B
Aid channelled through Civil Society Organisations	2	B
Decentralisation processes	2	B
EC support to good governance	2	B
Employment and social inclusion	2	B
Environment and forest regulations	2	B
Health in ACP/ALA/MED	2	B
Joint donor evaluation of GBS	2	B
Micro projects in ACP countries	2	B
Respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms	2	B
Study on legal instruments and lessons learned from evaluations managed by JEU	2	B
HIV/AIDS and demographic programmes	2	B
Visibility of EU external action	2	B
Aid delivery through development banks and EIB	1.5	B
Complementarity of CSP and national development priorities	1.5	B
Conflict prevention and peace building 1	1.5	B
Co-operation through organisations of the UN	1.5	B

<i>Short evaluation title</i>	<i>Overall relevance score</i>	<i>Assigned category</i>
Energy	1.5	B
Fisheries	1.5	B
Food aid & security 1	1.5	B
Integration/ mainstreaming of gender in development co-operation	1.5	B
Population programmes	1.5	B
Private sector development	1.5	B
Rural development	1.5	B
Statistical support in third countries	1.5	B
Trade related assistance 1	1.5	B
Water and sanitation	1.5	B
Basic education	1	C
Evaluation methodology and baseline study of the EC technical co-operation support	1	C
Evaluation of the EU co-operation with the Council of Europe	1	C
Food aid & security 2	1	C
Human rights, democracy and good governance	1	C
Voter education in the context of electoral support	1	C
Actions de réhabilitation et de construction	0.5	C
Synthesis of geographical evaluations	0.5	C
Transport	0.5	C
Geographic evaluations		
Burundi	1	A
Cameroon	1	A
Caribbean 2	1	A
Chad	1	A
Congo Dem. Rep.	1	A
Timor Leste	1	A
Ethiopia	1	A
Haiti	1	A
Jamaica	1	A
Kenya	1	A
Lesotho	1	A
Madagascar	1	A
Malawi	1	A
Pacific 2	1	A
Togo	1	A
Zambia	1	A
Angola	0.5	B
Botswana	0.5	B

<i>Short evaluation title</i>	<i>Overall relevance score</i>	<i>Assigned category</i>
Burkina Faso	0.5	B
Congo Rep.	0.5	B
Djibouti	0.5	B
Dominican Rep.	0.5	B
Guyana	0.5	B
Liberia	0.5	B
Mozambique	0.5	B
Namibia	0.5	B
Niger	0.5	B
Nigeria	0.5	B
OCTs	0.5	B
Pacific 1	0.5	B
Senegal	0.5	B
Uganda	0.5	B
Benin	0	C
Caribbean 1	0	C
CBI in Southern and Eastern Africa	0	C
Central Afr. Rep.	0	C
Central Africa	0	C
Eastern and Southern Africa, Indian Ocean	0	C
Ghana	0	C
Mali	0	C
Mauritius, Seychelles and Comoros	0	C
PALOP	0	C
Rwanda	0	C
SADC	0	C
Tanzania	0	C
West Africa	0	C

In total, out of 111 evaluation reports, 29,7% are assigned to Category A, 40,5% to Category B and 29,7% (including the older CSEs where available) to Category C.

9.3 Annex 3: Analysis matrix

EQ 1 – Political dialogue

EQ 1	To what extent has political dialogue at different levels (national, regional and through the joint EU-ACP institutions) facilitated the establishment of agreed priorities and shared agendas?
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<i>Judgement criteria</i>		<i>Associated codes</i>	<i>Definition of codes</i>
JC 1.1	Agreed priorities and shared agendas established and implemented	Establishment of agreed priorities and shared agendas at different levels (via political dialogue)	Information on concertation and co-ordination at different levels (via political dialogue) Example: Common strategy/roadmap on X developed
		Implementation of agreed priorities and shared agendas	Priorities and agendas issued from political dialogue are actually implemented (or not) Example: Common strategy/roadmap on X applied
JC 1.2	Local authorities, national parliaments and non-state actors involved in the implementation of the partnership	Involvement of local authorities, national parliaments and non-state actors in implementation efforts under the CPA	Information on ownership, participation and consultation of actors in implementation Example: National parliament is actively involved in the negotiations of an EPA
JC 1.3	CPA recognized and understood by the relevant authorities/interest groups and perceived as still responding to critical needs and problems	Recognition of the CPA	Statements made by relevant authorities/interest groups on the relevance, pertinence and responsiveness of the CPA , its individual aspects and EDF interventions
		Understanding of the CPA	
		Perceived relevance of the CPA	
JC 1.4	Unintended effects have played a minor/major role in the attainment of the results	Unintended effects of political dialogue	Information on unforeseen effects and results of a project or strategy Example: strategy has led to an improvement in X even though X was not (primarily) targeted/has impacted negatively

EQ 2 – Human rights, democracy, rule of law and good governance

EQ 2 To what extent have the mechanisms mentioned in the articles 8, 96 and 97 (i.e. political dialogue, consultation procedure, appropriate measures, and suspension of the agreement) contributed to meaningful improvements in the field of the essential and fundamental elements (human rights, democratic principles, rule of law and good governance) in ACP countries?

<i>Judgement criteria</i>		<i>Associated codes</i>	<i>Definition of codes</i>
JC 2.1	Improvements have been made in the field of human rights, democratic principles, rule of law and good governance	Human rights	Information on state and evolution of Example: Abolition of death penalty, transparency reforms, acceptance of electoral results
		Democratic principles	
		Rule of law	
		Good governance	
JC 2.2	The CPA mechanisms (political dialogue, consultation procedure, appropriate measures, and suspension of the agreement, including its legally binding characteristic) have played a substantial role in the achievement of the improvements	Political dialogue	Information on use of mechanisms in the context of essential and fundamental elements and their effects Example: Political dialogue on human rights situation led to abolition of the death penalty in X
		Consultation procedures	
		Appropriate measures	
		Suspension of the agreement/Use of Article 96 as deterrent	
		Impact of the legally binding characteristic of the agreement	
JC 2.3	The respect of the fundamental principles has been and still is a priority for the ACP countries	Evidence of respect of fundamental principles	Information on the extent to which fundamental principles have been actually applied or respected Example: Human rights are considered and respected in national policies
JC 2.4	Unintended effects of the mechanisms have played a minor/major role in the attainment of the results	Unintended effects of the mechanisms in the field of human rights, democracy, rule of law and good governance	Information on unforeseen effects and results of a project or strategy Example: strategy has led to an improvement in X even though X was not (primarily) targeted

EQ 3 – Peace and security

EQ 3 To what extent has the implementation of the different instruments and approaches of the CPA improved peace and security in ACP countries/regions and has enhanced their capacity to cope with crises?

<i>Judgement criteria</i>		<i>Associated codes</i>	<i>Definition of codes/possible keywords</i>
JC 3.1	Evidence of CPA contribution to sustainable improvements in peace and security for the populations of the ACP countries and regions	Peace	Information on peacebuilding and peacekeeping efforts Example: Active diplomatic efforts
		Security situation	Information on state and evolution of the security situation, esp. concerning crime and trafficking
JC 3.2	Evidence of CPA contribution to improvements in conflict prevention and addressing their root causes by ACP countries	Conflict prevention & resolution	Information on efforts to resolve current conflicts and to concretely organize their aftermath. Conflict transformation.
		Root causes	Information on root-causes of (potential) conflicts being identified and addressed. Early responses. Example: Addressing inequalities in the distribution of resources
JC 3.3	Evidence of complementarity and synergy between CPA, the common EU foreign and security policy and the policies of EU MS (co-ordination, complementarity and coherence – 3Cs)	Co-ordination, complementarity and coherence of EU interventions with bilateral interventions from EU-MS in the field of peace and security	Information on whether other interventions in the field are known/recognized , whether synergies are exploited and how Example: close co-operation with EU MS intervention in the field of conflict prevention
JC 3.4	EU interventions provided an additional value in comparison to bilateral interventions of EU MS	Added value of EU interventions to bilateral interventions from EU-MS in the field of peace and security	Information on the differences, special characteristics and advantages of EU interventions on the top of bilateral ones. Example: A joint EU-level intervention in crisis X complemented a bilateral intervention (by a state Y)

EQ 4 – Migration

EQ 4 To what extent have the provisions from article 13 of the CPA contributed to meaningful improvements in addressing the structural constraints associated with the migratory flows?

<i>Judgement criteria</i>		<i>Associated codes</i>	<i>Definition of codes/possible keywords</i>
JC 4.1	The CPA contributed to the fair treatment of third country nationals who reside legally on the territories of EU MS and ACP countries	Treatment of legal third country residents in EU-MS or ACP countries	Information on situation and evolution thereof Example: Immigrants' access to the labour market is established or facilitated
JC 4.2	The CPA contributed to the establishment of prevention policies in the context of illegal immigration	Prevention policies in the context of illegal immigration	Information on existing and planned prevention policies Example: Signature of readmission treaties, border control/management policies adopted
JC 4.3	The CPA has contributed to the acceptance by MS of the EU and ACP countries of the return of and the readmission of any of their nationals who were illegally present on their respective territories	Return and readmission of illegal immigrants to/by their home countries	Information on numbers and how return and readmission are carried out Example: Country A has accepted the return of x citizens
JC 4.4	Unintended effects have played a minor/major role in the attainment of the results	Unintended effects in the field of migration	Information on unforeseen effects and results of a project or strategy Example: strategy has led to an improvement in X even though X was not (primarily) targeted OR a strategy has led to a deterioration of Y at the same time when X was improved
JC 4.5	EU interventions have been complementary and provided an additional value in comparison to bilateral interventions of EU MS	Complementarity and added value of EU interventions with/to bilateral interventions from EU-MS in the field of migration	Information on whether other interventions in the field are known/recognized , whether synergies are exploited and how Example: EU has made a top up / overtook and broadened an intervention originally pursued by a EU MS in a poverty/conflict-related area

EQ 5 – Integration of ACP states into the world economy and their share in international trade

EQ 5 To what extent have EU interventions under the CPA (new trading arrangements, dialogue, co-operation programmes) fostered the smooth and gradual integration of the ACP States into the world economy and enabled the ACP states to play a full part in international trade?

<i>Judgement criteria</i>		<i>Associated codes</i>	<i>Definition of codes/possible keywords</i>
JC 5.1	The CPA contributed to the conclusion of WTO-compatible Economic Partnership Programmes	Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA)	Information on negotiations, signature, implementation and monitoring of EPAs as well as their content ; additional information on standards and the harmonization of procedures in preparation of the EPA negotiations
JC 5.2	The CPA contributed to the strengthening of regional trade and integration frameworks	Regional integration & trade	Information on to what extent regional integration initiatives take place and how they are furthered; ad-hoc and enduring ones; information on regional trade flows Example: A new sub-regional initiative emerged around a common interest; export rates within the region
JC 5.3	The CPA has contributed to increased ACP-EU trade and investment flows, including key infrastructure, attractiveness of FDI and promotion of PPPs in the ACP countries	ACP-EU trade and investment flows	Information on the volume and standards of trade and investment flows on ACP-EU level
JC 5.4	Unintended effects in the attainment of results	Unintended effects of trade and regional integration	Information on unforeseen effects and results of a project or strategy Example: strategy has led to an improvement in X even though X was not (primarily) targeted OR strategy has led to a deterioration of Y at the same time when X was improved

EQ 6 – EU-ACP international economic and trade co-operation

EQ 6 To what extent has mutual co-operation between EU and ACP countries improved the identification and furthering of common interests in international fora⁸⁶?

<i>Judgement criteria</i>		<i>Associated codes</i>	<i>Definition of codes/possible keywords</i>
JC 6.1	The CPA has helped in the mutual understanding of trade issues between ACP countries and EU and the identification and implementation of common interests in international fora	Identification, agreement on and further development of common economic and trade interests between EU and ACP	Information on the results of co-operation and exchange between EU and ACP and on the extent to which identified common interests have been further developed and have led to beneficial activities Example: A declaration of a common economic interest: EU needs imports from ACP in commodity A and ACP is interested in exporting it
JC 6.2	The CPA contributed to the improved capacity of ACP countries to negotiate and monitor international agreements	Building negotiation, implementation and monitoring capacities	Information on capacity building activities, participation of ACP countries in negotiations and international fora and on the respect and follow-up of international agreements Example: a success story of state Y or a sub-region or the whole ACP with regard to negotiation/implementation/monitoring of a new agreement or one that was previously struggling

⁸⁶ See as well question 11 (Joint ACP-EC Ministerial Trade Committee)

EQ 7 – Macroeconomic reforms, private sector and investment

EQ 7 To what extent has the CPA contributed to macroeconomic growth/stabilisation and institutional reforms and policies at national and regional level resulting in a favourable environment for investment and the development of the private sector?

<i>Judgement criteria</i>		<i>Associated codes</i>	<i>Definition of codes/possible keywords</i>
JC 7.1	The CPA contributed to disciplined and transparent fiscal and monetary policies in ACP countries, including control of Parliaments and CSOs	Fiscal and monetary policies	Information on the current fiscal and monetary situation and planned reforms of the underlying policies Example: any kind of economic structural reforms
JC 7.2	The CPA contributed to the provision of timely responses, at a reasonable cost, to the challenges faced by the private sector in ACP countries, including removal of obstacles and access of formal and informal SMEs to innovative and effective financial and economic services	Challenges faced by the private sector	Information on the identification of challenges Example: Challenges linked to access o EU market, any other tariff or non-tariff barriers (quotas, licenses, export subsidies, business environment in the country, etc.)
		Responses to private sector's challenges	Information on the kind of strategies and activities used and how they are carried out Example: Lifting of the above mentioned examples
JC 7.3	The CPA contributed to strengthening the agricultural and rural development policies with a view to enhance inclusive growth and food security	Agriculture and rural development	Information on results of activities to strengthen the agricultural sector and the development of rural areas
		Inclusive growth	Information on the extent to which poor/vulnerable groups profited from growth and improvements in agriculture/rural development
		Food security	Information on results of activities undertaken to improve food security
JC 7.4	The CPA contributed to establish of a democratic and efficient governance framework, including modernised PA, independent and effective justice	Efficient governance incl. public accountability and independent and effective justice	Information on activities undertaken to address governance reforms and on their results Example: Budget support has promoted reforms that led to increased transparency and accountability

<i>Judgement criteria</i>		<i>Associated codes</i>	<i>Definition of codes/possible keywords</i>
JC 7.5	The CPA contributed to private sector and civil society organisations having a meaningful impact on preparation and implementation of policies related to economic growth and private sector development	Private sector's impact on policies related economic growth and private sector development	Information on scope and ways of private actors' influence and on what has been done to increase it Example: regular consultations and meetings between government and private actors on related topics
		CSOs' impact on policies related to economic growth and private sector development	Information on scope and ways of CSOs' influence and on what has been done to increase it Example: regular consultations and meetings between government and CSOs on related topics
JC 7.6	The CPA contributed to strengthen the role of regional, sub-regional and continental organisations to support development standards and opportunities	Regional, sub-regional and continental organisations	Information on how international organisations can support development standards and what has been done to strengthen their role
JC 7.7	Unintended effects have played a minor/major role in the attainment of the results	Unintended effects in the field of macroeconomic reform/stability and private sector development	Information on unforeseen effects and results of a project or strategy Example: strategy has led to an improvement in X even though X was not (primarily) targeted OR a strategy has led to a deterioration of Y at the same time when X was improved
JC 7.8	EU interventions have been complementary and provided an additional value in comparison to bilateral interventions of EU MS	Complementarity and added value of EU interventions with/to bilateral interventions from EU-MS in the field of macroeconomic reforms and private sector development	Information on whether other interventions in the field are known/recognized , whether synergies are exploited and how Example: EU has made a top up / overtook and broadened an intervention originally pursued by a EU MS in the field of macroeconomic reforms and private sector development

EQ 8 – Social infrastructure and services

EQ 8 To what extent has the CPA contributed to improved coverage, quality and access to basic social infrastructure and services?

<i>Judgement criteria</i>		<i>Associated codes</i>	<i>Definition of codes/possible keywords</i>
JC 8.1	The CPA contributed to the increase in availability of health and education services	Availability of health services	Information on what exactly is available in terms of quantity and quality Examples: number of hospitals, information on hospital equipment.
		Availability of education services	Information on what exactly is available in terms of quantity and quality Examples: number of schools, information on school equipment, distance to schools.
JC 8.2	The CPA contributed to the increase equitable access to health and education services	Accessibility of health services	Information on where and to whom services are made available Example: distance to hospitals, costs of treatment
		Accessibility of education services	Information on where and to whom services are made available Example: distance to schools, enrolment costs, programmes to support enrolment of girls
JC 8.3	The CPA contributed to the establishment of effective quality assurance systems	Establishment of a quality assurance system in the health sector	Information on which QA or monitoring measures are in place and what kind of help was provided to establish them Example: Information about a system that assures quality standard of hospitals (or their accreditation), or a system that tracks hospitals' performance, etc.
		Establishment of a quality assurance system in the education sector	Information on which QA or monitoring measures are in place and what help was provided to establish them Example: Information about a system that assures quality of teaching programmes (or schools' accreditation) or a system that tracks numbers of students, etc.

<i>Judgement criteria</i>		<i>Associated codes</i>	<i>Definition of codes/possible keywords</i>
JC 8.4	The CPA contributed to the integration of population issues in development strategies and policies	Integration of population issues in development strategies and policies	Reference made to demographic change in the context of development strategies and policies Example: demographic change plays a role in a country's poverty reduction plan
JC 8.5	The CPA contributed to private sector and civil society organisations having a meaningful impact on preparation and implementation of policies related to social infrastructures and services	Private sector's impact on policies related to social infrastructure and services	Information on scope and ways of private actors' influence and on what has been done to increase it Example: regular consultations and meetings between government and private actors on related topics
		CSOs' impact on policies related to social infrastructure and services	Information on scope and ways of CSOs' influence and on what has been done to increase it Example: regular consultations and meetings between government and CSOs on related topics
JC 8.6	Unintended effects have played a minor/major role in the attainment of the results	Unintended effects in the field of social infrastructure and services	Information on unforeseen effects and results of a project or strategy Example: strategy has led to an improvement in X even though X was not (primarily) targeted OR a strategy has led to a deterioration of Y at the same time when X was improved
JC 8.7	EU interventions have been complementary and provided an additional value in comparison to bilateral interventions of EU MS	Complementarity and added value of EU interventions with/to bilateral interventions from EU-MS related to social infrastructure and services	Information on whether other interventions in the field are known/recognized , whether synergies are exploited and how Example: EU has made a top up / overtook and broadened an intervention originally pursued by a EU MS related to social infrastructure and services

EQ 9 – Cross-cutting issues

EQ 9 To what extent has the CPA contributed to the attainment of substantial results on cross-cutting issues?

<i>Judgement criteria</i>		<i>Associated codes</i>	<i>Definition of codes/possible keywords</i>
JC 9.1	The CPA contributed to the integration of an effective gender sensitive approach at every level of development co-operation	Gender mainstreaming in development co-operation	Information on gender mainstreaming efforts and their results Example: Stronger involvement of women in peace-building programmes
JC 9.2	The CPA contributed to the effective fight against HIV/AIDS	Fight against HIV/AIDS	Information on situation, developments as well as activities and strategies used to fight HIV/AIDS Example: Changes in trends in HIV/AIDS rates thanks to programme X in province Y (prevention or cure)
JC 9.3	The CPA contributed to the mainstreaming of environmental sustainability into all aspects of development co-operation and support programmes and projects implemented by various actors	Mainstreaming of environmental sustainability	Information on existing environmental laws or standards and the extent to which they are integrated in other sectors' programmes Example: Use of Strategic Environmental Assessments and Environmental Impact Assessments in project planning
JC 9.4	The CPA contributed to the strengthening of policies and implementation of support programmes to mitigate and adapt to the consequences of, and the threat posed by, climate change	Climate change mitigation and adaptation	Information on strategies and policies in place or in development Example: A new environmental law/ a support programme/ an ad-hoc measure adopted and implemented;
JC 9.5	The CPA contributed to private sector and civil society organisations having a meaningful impact on preparation and implementation of policies related to the cross-cutting issues	Private sector impact on policies related to cross-cutting issues	Information on scope and ways of private actors' influence and on what has been done to increase it Example: regular consultations and meetings between government and private actors on related topics
		CSOs' impact on policies related to cross-cutting issues	Information on scope and ways of CSOs' influence and on what has been done to increase it Example: regular consultations and meetings be-

<i>Judgement criteria</i>		<i>Associated codes</i>	<i>Definition of codes/possible keywords</i>
			tween government and CSOs on related topics
JC 9.6	Unintended effects have played a minor/major role in the attainment of the results	Unintended effects on cross-cutting issues	Information on unforeseen effects and results of a project or strategy Example: strategy has led to an improvement in X even though X was not (primarily) targeted OR a strategy has led to a deterioration of Y at the same time when X was improved
JC 9.7	EU interventions have been complementary and provided an additional value in comparison to bilateral interventions of EU MS	Complementarity and added value of EU interventions with/to bilateral interventions from EU-MS on cross-cutting issues	Information on whether other interventions in the field are known/recognized , whether synergies are exploited and how Example: EU has made a top up / overtook and broadened an intervention originally pursued by a EU MS on cross-cutting issues

EQ 10 – Poverty reduction and the needs of most vulnerable groups

EQ 10 To what extent has the design and implementation of EU interventions adequately delivered on poverty reduction and addressed the needs of the most vulnerable groups?

<i>Judgement criteria</i>		<i>Associated codes</i>	<i>Definition of codes/possible keywords</i>
JC 10.1	The CPA contributed to the overall reduction of poverty	Overall reduction of poverty	Information on efforts to reduce poverty and on the general poverty situation
JC 10.2	The CPA contributed to economic inclusive growth thereby reducing income poverty	Inclusive economic growth	Information on the extent to which poor/vulnerable groups profited from growth and on the level of income poverty
JC 10.3	The CPA contributed to reducing food insecurity and vulnerability to food crises	Food security	Information on results of activities undertaken to improve food security
		Vulnerability to crises	Information on the capacity to cope with crises
JC 10.4	The CPA contributed to increasing employment especially for the youth and effective social protection	Employment incentive measures	Information on targeted strategies, policies and activities aiming to increase (youth) employment rates
		Effective social protection	Information on targeted strategies, policies and activities Example: Safety nets for the most vulnerable
JC 10.5	The CPA has contributed in tackling the roots of and reduce fragility	Fragility	Information on how causes of fragility were identified and addressed
JC 10.6	EU interventions have been complementary and provided an additional value in comparison to bilateral interventions of EU MS	Complementarity and added value of EU interventions with/to bilateral interventions from EU-MS on inclusion of vulnerable groups	Information on whether other interventions in the field are known/recognized , whether synergies are exploited and how Example: EU has made a top up / overtook and broadened an intervention originally pursued by a EU MS on inclusion of vulnerable groups
JC 10.7	Unintended effects have played a minor/major role in the attainment of the results	Unintended effects on situation of vulnerable groups	Information on unforeseen effects and results of a project or strategy Example: strategy has led to an improvement in X even though X was not (primarily) targeted OR a strategy has led to a deterioration of Y at the same time when X was improved

EQ 11 – Joint institutions

EQ 11 To what extent has the work of the joint institutions⁸⁷ contributed to the results achieved by the CPA?

<i>Judgement criteria</i>		<i>Associated codes</i>	<i>Definition of codes/possible keywords</i>
JC 11.1	An effective flow of information between the Parties	Flow of information between parties	Information on exchange of information between parties and to what extent joint institutions have influenced it
JC 11.2	Effective and efficient joint institutions	Effectiveness of joint institutions	Information on how well the joint institutions assumed their functions and fulfilled the expectations put in them
		Efficiency of joint institutions	
JC 11.3	Joint institutions contributed to increase co-ordination, complementarity and coherence between the EU and its MS	Co-ordination, complementarity and coherence between EU and its MS	Information on co-ordination, complementarity and coherence of EU and EU-MS efforts and to what extent joint institutions have influenced it Example: A mention of a coordinated approach, of a EU intervention complementing an existing bilateral (EU MS) intervention
JC 11.4	Added value of the joint ACP-EU institutions as compared to regional frameworks for dialogue and co-operation within the ACP regions	Added value of joint ACP-EU institutions	Information on the differences, special characteristics and advantages of Joint ACP-EU institutions, namely Council of Ministers, the Committee of Ambassadors and the Joint Parliamentary Assembly Example: Evidence that one of the institutions contributed to an achievement.
JC 11.5	Unintended effects of the functioning of the joint institutions	Unintended effects of joint institutions	Information on unforeseen effects of the joint institutions Example: Enhanced capacity building support for national parliaments as a result of advocacy work of the Joint Parliamentary Assembly

⁸⁷ Council of Ministers (including Joint ACP-EC Ministerial Trade Committee), Committee of Ambassadors, Joint Parliamentary Assembly

EQ 12 – Mix of tools

EQ 12 To what extent has the EU mix of "tools" (instruments, approaches and financing modalities) and the co-management system contributed to reaching the goals of the ACP-EU partnership?

	<i>Judgement criteria</i>	<i>Associated codes</i>	<i>Definition of codes/possible keywords</i>
JC 12.1	Instruments (national/regional/intra ACP) effective and efficient	National/regional/intra-ACP instruments	At which level is a programme best addressed – is it the national level (NAO), the regional level (RAO) or the ACP level ?
JC 12.2	Modalities (project approach, budget support, SWAp, joint funding) effective and efficient	Modalities (project approach, budget support, SWAp, joint funding)	Information on which modalities have been used and to what effect Example: Search for the approaches in the brackets
JC 12.3	Financing channels (ACP government, private sector, non-state actors, multilateral organisations and EU MS) effective and efficient	Financing channel of ACP governments, private sector enterprises, CSOs, multilateral organisations and EU MS	Information on which financing channel have been used and to what effect Example: You need to find information about the channels in the brackets having implemented a programme.
JC 12.4	Operations of the investment facility were effective and efficient	Investment facility and its operations	Information on what the investment facility has done and how it has been done Example: Successes and failures of Investment facility and its operations
JC 12.5	Additional financial support contributed to the mitigation of the adverse effects of instability of export earnings and the safeguarding the development programme jeopardised by drops in revenue	Additional support linked to safeguarding development programmes affected by drops in revenue	Evidence about additional support that helped secure funding for national development programmes that have been affected by drops in revenue caused by instability of export earnings due to volatile world market prices, e.g. banana. This is about FLEX.
JC 12.6	The co-management system involving national authorities in the programming and management of aid programmes has been efficient and added value compared to other EU co-operation instruments in ACP and non-ACP countries	Co-management system involving national authorities in programming and management of programmes	Information on the extent of national authorities' involvement and the added value thereof. Have NAOs and RAOs an added value? Example:
JC 12.7	Co-management promoted higher ownership by the partner Governments and increased sustain-	Ownership through co-management	Information on extent of ownership, potential limits and impact of co-management

	<i>Judgement criteria</i>	<i>Associated codes</i>	<i>Definition of codes/possible keywords</i>
	ability of the actions		Example:
		Sustainability of actions through co-management	Information on enabling and constraining factors of sustainability and the impact of co-management on them Example:
JC 12.8	Current system of resource allocation allows adequate funding to be channelled to countries where it yields the highest impact	Effectiveness and efficiency of the system of resource allocation	Information on the system used, on the adequateness of funding provided and on the extent to which funding was provided to countries where it yields the highest impact Example:
JC 12.9	The legally binding characteristic of the agreement has been (and still is) instrumental in reaching the results	Impact of the legally binding characteristic	Evidence that the fact that CPA is binding helped achieved a result (compared to the situation when CPA would be only a declaration)
JC 12.10	Unintended effects of the different "tools" and the co-management system	Unintended effects of tools and the co-management system	Information on unforeseen effects of a tool. Tools are those under JC1-3, resource allocation, co-management binding characteristic Example:

9.4 Annex 4: Selected country examples for evaluation questions

Table 10 Selected country examples for EQ 1

Angola	The development partners Government of Angola and EC do not completely share a common interest in the political dialogue on governance. In several sectors sector policies are ready, prepared with the support of the EC, but are not enacted. At central level, the political process is still top-down and issues of transparency and accountability are not considered as a priority, whereas several experiences at local level have promoted accountability of municipal administrations and provincial governments and led to good results in terms of functionality of the administrations. The EC's decision to focus governance interventions at provincial and municipal levels provided an opportunity to support the decentralisation process. As non-State actors (NSAs) are considered important partners for project implementation, policy dialogue and decentralisation, the strengthening of their capacities has been an important contribution and has mobilised several NGOs to act on governance issues.
Botswana	There are different levels of dialogue with the Government of Botswana (GoB), mainly: political dialogue at diplomatic level, dialogue on governance, and sector dialogue on education and training as the focal sector of development co-operation, and on Public Financial Management (PFM). Political dialogue is the high level dialogue at diplomatic level. The contents of this dialogue is not always open to the public but it seems sure from reports that questions of the rights of ethnic minorities in Botswana and the death penalty are on the agenda. It is interesting to mention that the question of the rights of ethnic minorities is directly linked to the aspect of poverty reduction since these groups are highly concerned by poverty.
BS Tanzania	Budget Support in Tanzania "There is a conflict for the EU arising from two different roles (auditors and partners in dialogue) which contributes to the low level of openness from Govt in discussing performance problems and looking for shared solutions".
Dominican Republic	Policy dialogue mechanisms have not been effective but informal dialogue processes have clearly been a critical component of a number of EC activities in the competitiveness, trade, Bi-National Commission, Non-State Actors (NSA) and other dossiers.
Guyana	Even if the situation has improved, the political dialogue between the GoG and donors focuses on the implementation of the interventions rather than on strategic issues. The Government-donor policy dialogue in Guyana is limited. Even if the Commission is increasingly involved in supporting the Government's overall policy through the provision of budget support, the GoG-Commission policy dialogue remains narrow. Indeed, although the authorities show considerable interest in following at regular intervals the implementation details of each donor's portfolio, these meetings are bilateral and mainly review progress in implementing donor projects. They do not provide the opportunity to discuss strategic or policy issues. Even in the thematic or sectoral groups, and unless the Ministry leading the group is actively pursuing implementation of a reform programme involving close donor participation (such as in the health sector), the discussions mainly focus on sharing of information rather than on policy or strategy issues. The principal drawback of this lack of policy discussion and co-operation at the early stages of programming is that there is no common diagnosis of needs and no common identification of the priority areas that require support. The PRSP is the reference document for all parties involved but lacks the longer term prioritisation of issues that need to be tackled: if everything is urgent, there is the risk that efforts are dispersed and that their effectiveness and impact remain very limited.

Human rights	In order to be effective, important changes are needed in the way political dialogues are prepared and conducted. The way forward is to adopt a much more decentralised, inclusive, iterative and result-oriented formats that match the local context and optimally use the potential of the EU's new institutional framework 'post Lisbon'.
Nigeria	EC support to institutional and economic reform has contributed to the effectiveness of the policy dialogue. Under the 9th EDF, the EC devoted substantial efforts and funding to supporting institutional and economic reform. This has contributed to the effectiveness of the policy dialogue, as demonstrated by concrete achievements at different levels: at Federal level, EC support contributed to Government reforms and policies, including PFM, public procurement, tax reforms and the Fiscal Responsibility Law. At State level, the numerous activities of SRIP in PFM management, including seminars and study tours targeting high-ranking officials, have contributed to policy dialogue. PFM improvement has been much higher at Federal and State levels than at local level where almost no progress was achieved. Possible future support provided to LGAs might impact on the role that these institutions now have in the country, helping them to become more autonomous and effective in delivering services and increasing their capacity to give voice to citizens in the local policy-making processes. The substantial EC efforts and funding under the 9th EDF to support institutional and economic reform has contributed to the effectiveness of the policy dialogue. The experience has been one of major reforms in some areas at Federal level (such as PFM, debt management and fiscal management), limited reform in some States, but little progress at Local Government level. By contributing to the promotion of Fiscal Responsibility and Public Procurement legislation SRIP-I and SRIP-II had a significant positive impact on the business environment and the service delivery system at national and State levels. Nevertheless, the results within focus sector 2 represent a mixed picture and the linkage between the expressed reform objectives and the reduction of poverty is rather indirect. Part of the reason is the poor performance in focus sector 1, WATSAN, which should have been the main beneficiary of the focus sector 2 reforms. While the non-focal micro project programmes targeted the poor communities of the Niger Delta, the link to poverty was not so clear in the support to institutional and economic reform (in other words the key was 'reform' rather than 'poverty').
Pacific	<p>The Cotonou Agreement makes the reduction and eventual eradication of poverty the central concern of the partnership between the Commission and ACP States. It cannot be said that the Commission's Regional Strategies for the Pacific or Commission regional interventions are consistently oriented in this way.</p> <p>The limited scope for policy dialogue at national level is a critical element hampering ownership and sustainability". Nevertheless, some improvements have been registered in the sector reform agenda by developing links with line ministries.</p>
Senegal	<p>The role of NSAs in the formulation of development strategies is actually recognized and displayed as a priority in the EC Strategy Papers. Senegalese NSA made contributions through working groups around topics related to sectors of concentration (good governance, transport, sanitation, budget support, trade, culture, NSAs). A tripartite dialogue (NSA, DUE, MEF) was progressively put in place. NSAs are generally dissatisfied with their involvement in policy dialogue due to: (i) a loss of momentum in the NSA consultation between the 9th and 10th EDF; (ii) the confinement of the field of consultation of NSAs excluding in particular the implementation of strategies and sectoral issues; (iii) and low consideration of proposals NSA by decision makers.</p> <p>For the EC, this inscription has resulted, firstly, in the effective involvement of Senegalese NSAs in the development and implementation of its co-operation strategy (9th and 10th EDF) and, hand by the implementation of NSA capacity</p>

	building programs that have contributed to a marked improvement NSA capacity to participate in development strategies. However, the capacity of NSAs to substantially influence the political dialogue is neutralized by the frame and the current modalities of participation”.
Them- Civil Society	Political dialogue is generally seen as an important tool to protect and expand the scope for CSO participation. The questionnaire reveals that a huge majority (67,5 per cent) of surveyed Delegations consider that the EC has efficiently and effectively used the political and policy dialogue with a variety of stakeholders in order to integrate the CSO channel in its overall co-operation. However, the questionnaire analysis does not provide much information on the qualitative aspects of dialogue: Evidence from the CSO focus group meeting and from the field (e.g. Peru, Cambodia, Eritrea and Egypt) suggests that the effectiveness of political dialogue might not be as rosy as suggested by survey respondents. While the EU is perceived as an important political actor in the governance field, CSOs feel it could do more and better to stand by their cause (especially when there are open conflicts with the government). CSOs also increasingly expect the EC to manifest an explicit political engagement when it comes to defending and protecting the CSOs they support -in particular those working in the human rights field or in sensitive advocacy work. This institutional set-up does also not create a conducive environment to promote strategic partnerships (between the EC and CSOs and between CSOs themselves) based on common objectives and joint responsibilities for achieving results and impacts. The Cotonou Agreement, signed in 2000, was the first major EC/EU policy document, which legally enshrined participation as a fundamental principle of development co-operation for ACP countries. This meant that CSOs were no longer regarded as mere beneficiaries or implementing agencies of EC-funded projects (reflecting a primarily instrumental approach to civil society), but as key actors in the overall development process, with specific roles and added value (reflecting a political approach to civil society). This revised mandate towards CSOs amounted to a paradigm shift in EC approaches towards civil society with major implications on ways and means to use the CSO channel. The evaluation period (2000-2006) largely coincides with the formal adoption of the participatory development agenda by the EC. The overall statistical analysis carried out by the evaluation team shows how important, also in quantitative terms, the co-operation through CSOs is being possible to draw some trends: over the period 2000-2006, and a clear increase of CSO channeling can be observed. In terms of geographic distribution of funds, the ACP region ranks first.
Them- Justice and Security	There is evidence that policy dialogue was used by the Commission in the majority of its interventions to assist in their design and implementation. This dialogue was mainly with national authorities, with much less effort made to solicit the views of Non-State Actors. § The CSP/RSP review shows that when the Commission supported a JSSR process, policy dialogue was generally carried out with state actors. Policy dialogue with Non State Actors was less frequently mentioned in the CSPs/RSPs. § In most of the interventions analysed, reference was made to political dialogue that was carried out primarily with national authorities, reflecting the fact that in most cases state security or justice ministries and agencies were the target of Commission interventions. In several cases, however, including Rwanda (Rule of Law) and Chad (Prison Oversight), civil society actors were key to implementation and were included in dialogue. § The field missions confirmed the Commission’s willingness to carry out with the partner governments a policy dialogue aimed at ensuring ownership of the reforms. In all of the countries visited, there were regular talks between the Commission and the Government on justice and security issues. However, this dialogue may in some countries have been difficult or failed to ensure ownership of the reforms. The very long and bureaucratic Commission project formulation and approval process often worked against national ownership. Although this process commonly ex-

	tended up to 18 months, the relevant national authorities were not always given much time to scrutinise drafts. When eventually a Decision was made the situation on the ground had often changed and it was difficult to adapt projects and in this way secure buy-in by local actors.
Them-Border Management Evaluation	The EU has not paid sufficient attention to the long-term dimension of its support. This has led to the sustainability of the benefits of the assistance provided being generally weak and at best inconsistent. There is a need to have high level, political dialogue at all stages of support, not just to ensure governmental and ministerial level support for the reforms and development but also the sustainability of what takes place once the intervention is over. When active EUD and EU HQ support has been given place in this context this has invariably been reflected in greater local ownership.
Them-Complementarity	The EC funds and their contribution to alignment, co-ordination and complementarity. It seems that shifts in aid modalities towards Budget Support (BS) and Sector Wide Approaches (SWAs) have also importantly contributed to improved alignment, co-ordination and complementarity, amongst others through the set up and development of Aid Partner Groups (APGs) and Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) processes in the partner country. The principal driving force for these processes has been the partner countries' aim at increased autonomy and self-reliance, and the principal restraining force has been the donor countries' fear for misuse or mismanagement of funds. New avenues for further consolidation of these processes should be – expansion of their use from primarily focussed on BS to all aid modalities; – expansion of their use from well-functioning LDCs to broader groups of LDCs; – permanent institutional setting of the APGs within the partner countries; – building on real decentralisation and delegation of competencies to partner country level, and on alignment and co-ordination agreements achieved locally.
Them-Decentralisation	EC support to decentralisation in third partner countries has successfully increased its alignment with partner country policies and priorities. However, the EC has not promoted decentralisation reform policies very proactively, and EC policy advocacy for decentralisation support has generally been modest – possibly too modest. The increase is linked not only to greater consideration of country needs and increased policy dialogue, but also to the shift towards greater use of more "joint" aid modalities (i.e. sector support, basket funds, trust funds and SBS) that go hand in hand with the development of sector plans, and thus give a clearer articulation of priorities by partner governments. These positive findings on alignment are partly a result of EC general commitments to the aid harmonisation agenda (the Paris Declaration) as well as the increasing number of explicit decentralisation reform strategies in partner countries. However, there are still a significant number of cases where decentralisation is supported through "bottom-up" approaches, with less direct country alignment. This is mainly in cases where national decentralisation reform strategies or related local government sector strategies are not in place.
Them-Gender	There is evidence, from answers to the questionnaire survey, that in some third countries policy dialogue is taking place on gender. 37% of the 59 Delegations responding to the survey indicate that there was dialogue with line Ministries concerning gender in key sectors during formulation of the Country Strategy Paper, and 32% indicate that there was at the same time consultation with national gender bodies, including civil society organisations. 30 The respondent from the Guyana Delegation notes that "the real work concerning gender issues is done through policy dialogue with national counterparts (ministerial and technical)". And in Uganda, where the EC is giving much support through sector-wide approaches or general budget support, the respondent notes that "Government policy when it comes to gender issues is what needs to be, and is being, influenced. This is the case in the health and education sector... which have in particular

	<p>been sensitised to the importance of improved access to resources and services.” These initiatives suggest a positive trend, as the desk study found no evidence of any specific actions taken at headquarters level during the period 1995-2001 to build capacity in Delegations for policy dialogue on gender with Government and civil society. Nor has any evidence been found of an explicit approach to ensuring the integration of gender issues into policy formulation and decision-making at other levels, although gender staff (Gender Desks and sometimes Gender Focal Points) have certainly been consulted in the processes of formulating policies. At country level there have been some initiatives, such as the IGED/GIGED approach developed in Guinea Conakry and Madagascar (see Box 1, section 3.1.3.2.3), which is an example of how support can be provided to Delegations to engage in policy dialogue on gender.</p>
<p>Them-Trade Related Assistance</p>	<p>Policy dialogue is not focused on trade issues, owing partly to the fact that trade responsibilities and capacities are fragmented, both in the Delegations and in the partner countries. In countries where there is no Integrated Framework, little use has been made of policy dialogue to integrate trade issues into PRSPs or domestic policy documents. Policy dialogue has also not been used to raise the partner’s awareness of the potential of trade in combating poverty and promoting development. As an illustration, in Moldova the policy advice project is assisting the government with the preparation of the PRSP but so far has not attempting to promote the trade aspects of the strategy. On the other hand, at regional level - especially in the ACP region and to a certain extent Latin America - TRA interventions shape the regional strategies and the Commission’s vision in terms of regional integration. This vision is one of open regionalism, that is regional integration as a step towards integration into world trade and the MTS and as a way of accruing “non-traditional benefits” such as increased credibility of policies agreed between several partners, improvement in the conduct of trade policies, additional incentives for trade reforms, and so on. This strategy is based on European experience and comparative advantages in the area of regional integration, which gives the Commission natural leadership among donors in this area. The vision is shared with the partner countries or regions (as evidenced by the Cotonou agreement) owing to the attractiveness of the European integration model which is viewed as a success story (in terms of stability, democracy, peace-keeping, economic prosperity) both by the European Commission and many partner countries and regions (the extreme case of this is West Africa with the WAEMU).</p>

Table 11 Selected country examples for EQ 2

<p>Angola</p>	<p>For long periods, political dialogue has been irregular. As a part of the political dialogue, governance issues (such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights, participation, decentralisation and transparency of Public Finance Management) were discussed, but there have been no tangible consequences. The political dialogue has lost impetus in recent years but efforts are being made to revitalise it.</p>
<p>Burkina Faso</p>	<p>The European Commission has taken the issue of good governance into account, both through a specific programme and through its discussions and methods (in-depth dialogue on general and sector-based policies). It has injected impetus and introduced a mechanism which needs to be strengthened to consolidate basic knowledge in terms of governance.</p>
<p>Burundi</p>	<p>Gouvernance démocratique : le faible alignement des objectifs combiné à une approche insuffisamment politique induisent un impact limité des interventions Des réalisations significatives ont été produites par les DPE pour soutenir le renforcement des capacités aux niveaux parlementaire et judiciaire. En revanche, il n’y a pas eu de progrès en matière de cadre d’action de la société civile et des médias, ni d’indépendance de la justice, ni d’accès des plus vulnérables à la justice. Le contexte n’empêche pas la production des réalisations, mais il limite leur</p>

	<p>traduction en résultats et en impacts. Ainsi, les indicateurs techniques (efficacité du gouvernement ou des services judiciaires) progressent sur la période, mais tous les autres indicateurs (redevabilité des institutions, participation, droits de l'homme, stabilité politique et absence de violence) présentent une progression jusqu'à 2010-2011, puis une régression.</p> <p>Malgré la mise en place d'institutions issues d'élections validées par la communauté internationale (2005 et 2010), ni l'analyse documentaire ni la mission ne peuvent conclure à un État de droit renforcé (pluralisme politique, demande de redevabilité, redevabilité des institutions, séparation des pouvoirs, respect des droits humains, justice et sécurité...). La dynamique positive amorcée lors de la transition s'est enrayée, ou comme le résume un rapport de human rights Watch, « le saut qualitatif attendu ne s'est pas produit ». Le renforcement de certaines commissions parlementaires est utile, mais son impact est limité par un monopartisme de fait (contrôle à 76% du Parlement par le parti majoritaire). De même, le renforcement des capacités des médias est limité par les pressions visant certains médias et journalistes et plus récemment une législation répressive. De la même façon, l'instrumentalisation par l'exécutif constitue la contrainte majeure d'une justice impartiale et équitable, un constat reconnu par le Ministère de la Justice lui-même. Ce constat fait écho à l'évaluation de GutwaraNeza (2013), programme qui a « mis l'accent sur le renforcement des capacités opérationnelles de la justice de proximité plutôt que sur la résolution des contraintes structurelles à la prestation des services de ces juridictions ». Ces blocages politiques ont été insuffisamment pris en compte par les DPE, mais nous n'avons pas d'éléments pour soutenir qu'ils aient contribué à ces blocages.</p>
Djibouti	The EC has failed to assert itself as a strategic partner vis-à-vis the GoD or Civil Society. The political dialogue has been relatively ineffective and aid programmes have not been developed to strengthen either governance or civil society.
Dominican Republic	The EC is not systematically mainstreaming governance improvement and corruption elimination into its interventions, and then following up with adequate monitoring systems.
Ethiopia	The fear of development staff that too much focus on human rights will complicate the relations with partner countries and hamper the smooth delivery and disbursement of aid . This dilemma can be found in many aid-dependent countries, particularly those ones with a poor track record on human rights. Ethiopia is a case in point: the EU and the donor community seek to provide basic support to the large group of poor people, while keeping good relations with the Ethiopian government for security and stability reasons. In such a situation, human rights tend to be considered as a separate component of the international co-operation agenda and often put at a lower rank for fear to compromise relations with the government and the implementation of the main development programmes to the poor.
Haiti	L'UE a contribué de façon significative à la promotion de la gouvernance démocratique par le biais du renforcement des collectivités territoriales et des acteurs non-étatiques, notamment des organisations communautaires de base. Au niveau central, l'appui n'a pas encore pu donner une contribution significative au processus d'élaboration du cadre et des dispositifs nécessaires pour la mise en œuvre d'un processus de décentralisation durable. Cette conclusion est principalement basée sur la QE5. Le renforcement de la gouvernance démocratique et de la décentralisation constituent des processus institutionnels clés et irréversibles auxquels les PTF les plus importants, y compris l'UE, se sont efforcés de contribuer par des appuis au niveau central et local. Au niveau central, l'appui a concerné en premier lieu l'appui au développement d'un cadre global et de dispositifs légaux et opérationnels ; au niveau local, l'appui s'est surtout traduit par des initiatives de renforcement des collectivités territoriales (CT) devant leur permettre d'utiliser pleinement les compétences qui leur sont attribuées. Au ni-

	<p>veau central, les actions clés d'appui de l'UE ont dû faire face à d'importants blocages institutionnels et politiques. Ainsi, les effets de la contribution de l'UE sont jusqu'à maintenant restés modestes et, dès lors, trop restreints pour pouvoir soutenir la dynamique créée dans un nombre important de CT. Les actions au niveau local, notamment financées via la ligne thématique AL&ANE, ont pu surmonter les contraintes substantielles liées aux fragilités politiques par l'adoption de démarches participatives et inclusives qui souvent ont jeté les premières bases d'une bonne pratique de gouvernance locale. Dans certains cas cependant, le manque de co-ordination entre le grand nombre d'acteurs présents sur le terrain a constitué une menace importante au développement de processus démocratiques locaux. A travers ces projets, de multiples formes d'appui ont été fournies et elles ont, dans de nombreux cas, donné une contribution tangible à la gouvernance démocratique des CT, notamment à l'émergence de communes de plus en plus fortes, agissant parfois en plateforme, ce qui leur a permis d'influencer certains processus au niveau national. Cependant, le manque d'accès des CT à des ressources financières (notamment aux fonds d'investissement devant provenir du niveau central) tout comme la dépendance des structures communales (CT comme OCB) aux appuis techniques et organisationnels d'acteurs externes constituent un frein réel au maintien du dynamisme local. Finalement, les acquis de ces dernières années au niveau local (auxquels l'UE a contribué) ont clairement mis en marche un changement de paradigme en matière de gouvernance locale dans la mesure où les autorités communales et organisations de la société civile, belligérants d'hier, se considèrent désormais davantage comme des partenaires dans la promotion du développement local.</p>
Jamaica	<p>There are important human rights concerns in Jamaica which include extra-judicial killings committed by members of the security forces, poor prison and jail conditions, inadequate levels of prosecution of police suspected of involvement in crimes, an overburdened judicial system, frequent lengthy delays in trials, trafficking of persons and violence against suspected or known homosexuals. The GoJ Security and Judicial Reforms supported by the EU tackled most of these concerns. Other EU complementary interventions financed by thematic and geographical instruments contribute to deal with the HR situation. Other HR concerns which do not involve EU support such as poor prison and jail conditions, still need to be reformed. However, Jamaica has taken steps to improve the conditions in prisons. Also the 2010 Universal Periodic Review (UPR) 86 process in Jamaica recognised the progress made in HR areas in the country. The most prominent issues at stake remain the signature to the Convention against Torture and the death penalty. The EU has a Local Implementation Strategy for the Caribbean States in relation to the death penalty that deals with the issue on a long-term basis.</p>
Kenya	<p>EU support to NSAs and local government authorities contributed to strengthening NSAs' influence on governance reform activities and to a more responsive government. The EU has supported NSAs' institutional, organisational and technical capacity through grants and technical advice, which has strengthened their ability to influence governance reform activities. The EU has, moreover, supported local government authorities with improving their engagement with local communities, which has increased their responsiveness and accountability. Overall, these results have contributed to improved democratic governance in Kenya.</p>
Lesotho	<p>The support to the Transformation resource Centre (TRC) to advocate for a Human Rights Commission has been partially successful and good progress has been made, although this has taken longer than envisaged. The final legislation is not yet in place but the idea has gained traction. Similarly progress has been made as part of justice sector reforms, and the EU has been proactively supporting legal sector reforms. Other legislation supported in part through NSA concerns social protection and decentralisation. Overall the avenue of support for</p>

	reforms has therefore been promising although initiatives typically take time to bear fruit.
Madagascar	The impacts of EU interventions in favour of taking greater account of the principle of the rule of law and strengthening of democracy prove to be few and weak durable. However, in the promotion of local governance, the support provided by the EU have had lasting impacts, including strengthening common capabilities to lead the development of their territories. In addition, EU support has enabled capacity building of civil society organisations in terms of citizen intervention and implementation of development actions without, however, achieve significant impacts on the improving the legal and political governance of the country.
Malawi	EC support to Rule of Law consisted of two apparently complementary components: justice and civic education, which in practice had little in common in terms of synergies during implementation. EC support to civic and voter education activities through NICE has been significant such that after some years of such support NICE is recognised as playing a pivotal role in the decentralisation process. Support to the justice sector has been problematic: targeting too many institutions, capacity shortfalls and difficulties with EC procedures.
Nigeria	<p>While neither support for the consolidation of democracy (and its deepening through increased participation of the poor in the political processes), nor support for increased respect for human rights in focus forepart of the strategy foci, these objectives are nevertheless essential for the co-operation as well as for the overall framework for relations between the EU and Nigeria. Hence, considerable support for their materialisation has been provided through budget line projects as well through EDF funds for election support. Democratic governance in Nigeria is being developed on the background of a challenge from the polity's "rentier-state" nature, in which the rulers "do not need the population" since the abundant availability of oil funds reduces the need for raising domestic incomes through taxation. Hence, the corresponding need for creating social consensus through the provision of welfare services (or favours to the "clients" as known from other co-operation States) may also turn out to be reduced. In this way, wealth and poverty may co-exist in ways, which the political system is not able to reconcile, with a risk of conflicts as in the Niger Delta Region.</p> <p>Findings:</p> <p>EC support has contributed to increased democratic participation of the poorer parts of the population (election support from EDF funds for the conduct of the 2007 elections and facilitation of fielding of EU election observers). While it has not been possible to find evidence for increased participation of the poor in the elections, there are indications that the pre-election education increased not only the level of voting by women, including that in the Muslim parts of Nigeria, but also their more general participation in the political processes. The formal political processes do not seem to represent the poorer part of the population very explicitly. Against this background, the CSOs can be said to represent the political opposition and the "political mobilisation" of the poorer social strata. Through its support to CSOs from EDF funds and budget lines, the EC has contributed to their political representation. The measures included support for the role of civil society in the "control-from-below" mechanisms in focal sectors, in particular under the SRIP project in focal sector 2. This support has provided some contribution to increased democratic participation by the poorer parts of the population, particularly in the budgetary processes.</p> <p>EC support has contributed to the enhancement of the rule of law: support for the respect for human rights, including the rule of law and some support for the media, has mainly taken place through budget line projects. However, beyond the output level, which is covered by project monitoring and reporting, the outcomes, sustainability and impact of this support appeared not to be well known. While the CSP for the 9th EDF mentions a planned EC-supported Nigeria Foundation for</p>

	<p>Human Rights, the possible plans for such an institution appear to have escaped the institutional EC memory, both in Abuja and in Brussels. The EDF-funded support to the EFCC has contributed to the fight against corruption and hence has enhanced the rule of law in this field, apparently resulting in a consequently increased level of the esteem in which the judiciary is held. Rule-of-law-related projects are accorded higher priority within the 10th EDF.</p>
Pacific	<p>Commission strategy documents broadly make commitments to human rights and conflict prevention in the framework of the Lomé Convention and Cotonou Agreement. In the EDF 9 RIP the Commission noted the commitment of the regional countries on these issues in the Biketawa Declaration. The strategy for EDF 9 mentions four common elements in conflict in the last twenty years: 'ethnic differences; land disputes; disparity of economic opportunities; and a lack of confidence in the government's ability to resolve differences fairly or satisfactorily.' The issue is not taken into account as a cross-cutting issue in the design or implementation of regional programmes. Only one specific intervention on this issue has been implemented at regional level through non-programmable funds: 'Transforming our Communities through Good Government'. It was signed in 2003 for implementation by USP and has been limited in size and scope. The issue is more evident at national level. The intensity of the Commission response varies depending on the political situation of each country. Fiji, Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea have polarised attention on this issue. Fiji has benefited from several projects on human rights and conflict prevention. It was also selected by the Commission as a focus country for the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) for the period 2002-2004.</p>
Timor-Leste	<p>Human rights do not feature prominently as a crosscutting concern in EU interventions. Although there are no major human rights issues, there is an important nexus between human rights, women's rights, conflict & peace, and democratic governance. The role of NGOs as guardians of human rights is irrefutable. Impunity for gross human rights violations (including gender-based violence) committed during the Indonesian occupation is an unresolved issue and a major factor potentially undermining long-term stability. Civil Society Organisations are calling for an end to the culture of impunity as a sine qua non for a sustainable foundation for peace, human rights, women's rights and state-building in Timor-Leste. Essential in view of the conflict transformation agenda is the issue of land rights. The EU supports interventions addressing the land rights issue; EU Co-operation however failed to link the land rights issue to the overall strategy with the agricultural sector, missing the opportunity to achieve significant impacts at a broader level.</p> <p>On the other hand, the EU did contribute to strengthening mechanisms that help promote democracy, more effective rule of law, transparency, and accountability of the State to its citizens, although the support was highly State-centred. The efficiency and effectiveness of this support could have been better if a more dedicated strategy on how to work in a more comprehensive way in the area of governance and rule of law had been formulated. Opportunities for more effective involvement through policy dialogue in critical governance areas, for instance by bringing together UNDP and Portuguese co-operation (both funded by the EU) for a dialogue with Government about a more strategic involvement on governance, have been missed.</p>
Togo	<p>Continuing and reinforcing support for democratic governance is recommended, in particular as regards elections, national reconciliation, justice and support for civil society. To do this, the EU should make an effort to reinforce its political dialogue in these areas. It must also verify that the factors of success of this support exist, particularly, appropriation and active support by the government. It should also promote closer association of civil society.</p>

Uganda	<p>The EU contributed to a more responsive government, but sustainability and impact are not guaranteed.</p> <p>Overall, budget support has contributed significantly over the years to the quality of governance institutions and accountability. Governance indicators have improved across a number of areas, especially in the earlier years of the evaluation period and on the upstream side of the accountability chain. Also, budget support and related policy dialogue, directly and indirectly, helped strengthen some key governance and accountability institutions such as the Auditor General's office and Inspector General's office as well as their relative importance within the government institutions. However, progress is especially lacking regarding downstream of the accountability chain e.g. following up on upstream decisions, enforcement of prosecution, and recovery of funds.</p>
Zambia	<p>The EU support contributed to the fact that the September 2011 national electoral process was transparent and well organised. The "Statement of Preliminary Findings" on the 20 September 2011 General Elections in Zambia by the EU Election Observation Mission to Zambia summarily concluded as follows: "A generally well administered election day and a highly competitive campaign despite the absence of a level playing field". Some critical aspects and challenges mentioned in the Mission's statement refer to (i) reforms of key aspects of the electoral framework for future elections; (ii) a few failings in voting and counting of ballots; (iii) unequal access to resources, meaning that there was not a level playing field for campaigning; and (iv) the failure of the State-owned media to meet even their minimal obligations as public service media, as key programmes such as news bulletins lacked any degree of balance in their coverage (I-6.4.1).</p>

Table 12 Selected country examples for EQ 3

Angola	<p>Positive assessment of the contribution made by the Commission's support (emergency relief, food aid and food security, re-integration and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons, and de-mining operations) in terms of consolidation of the peace process, including the importance of governance interventions.</p> <p>Although some limitations were identified both in the identification of strategic lines and in their implementation, EC interventions were relevant to GoA's objectives and helped address important social problems and poverty determinants that the GoA highlighted in the <i>Estratégia de Combate à Pobreza</i> (Strategy to Combat Poverty) and of <i>Programa Geral de Governo 2005-2006</i> (extended to 2008) Major Findings supporting the judgement EC focal and non-focal areas of support coincided with the priorities set out in the strategic documents of GoA and contributed to tackling the main problems identified in them. Sectors covered by the EC interventions were of outstanding relevance since recovery of productive capacity in agriculture, and availability and access to basic social services, were basic pre-conditions for consolidation of the peace process. Interventions in DRR and related activities were highly important as a basis for resettlement of former combatants and the strategic choice made by the EC, to serve as well the needs of former combatants as of those belonging to the receiving communities who are both vulnerable groups has contributed to completion of DRR interventions and reduction of potential conflicts. The adoption of the LRRD approach increased the relevance of EC support by ensuring coverage of areas specifically related to different intervention phases while taking account of future development needs as well as logistical, operational and organisational co-ordination of support during successive phases. More critically, it has to be highlighted that the GoA, although welcoming EC interventions, has not always agreed completely on the EC's political priorities and has failed to see the utility of political dialogue, as certain areas are regarded as strictly internal matters. A negative element, which has affected the EC intervention, is that several projects or programme reviews highlighted relatively low quality and weak logical frameworks. During the early phases, this could most probably be ascribed to the emergency conditions and multi - sector</p>
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	characteristics, which entail involvement of a high number of partners in the process using different PCM modalities.
Burundi	<p>In the area of security issues, significant contribution to professionalising defence and police forces, but insufficient to guarantee security. The programme results of the demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants, and of police and army reforms are generally good. Although the police still have some structural weaknesses (weak internal control, a command that still needs to be unified and insufficient material resources), these positive results are correlated with better army and police performance. It is also worth noting that while Burundi has encountered six episodes of mass violence between 1965 and 2003, this has not occurred over the 2005-2011 period. The transition towards peace is happening. However, it is undermined by the lack of change in the structural causes of the Burundi conflict (extreme poverty, extreme concentration of political and economic power, systemic social exclusion). There are also new and growing risks: increased domestic political tension, the potential spread of regional instability, youth radicalisation.</p> <p>The structural causes of fragility known but insufficiently integrated into bilateral strategies. Country strategies rarely show identification or recognition of structural causes of conflict or, prospectively, risks and opportunities that arise. Only the events of the conflict are investigated. Development Partners have no system for monitoring the potential impact of interventions they fund or the structural causes of the conflict.</p>
Caribbean	<p>EU interventions contributed to increased public awareness in the fight against crime and illegal trafficking through behaviour modification, production of manuals and CDs, "edutainment" and other measures. It is, however, difficult to effectively assess the results of EU interventions in the absence of appropriate studies to determine actual consumption levels or whether beneficiaries have been effectively using the training or other deliverables. Some sharing of information among Drug Councils was effected which contributed to better programmes for demand reduction. EU interventions complemented other major donors, notably the OAS, UNODC, DfID and the USAID in both demand and supply reduction initiatives in the trafficking of illegal drugs from/through the Caribbean. While EU programmes undoubtedly contributed to reduced demand and supply, the precise/overall contribution to increasing regional effectiveness in the fight against drug abuse and related crime is difficult to properly assess.</p>
Central African Republic	<p>FOMUC and MICOPAX, financed through the African Peace Facility, had a stabilising effect on certain parts of the country, notably by creating security conditions under which the population could conduct social and economic activities. Interviewees and evaluation reports explicitly mentioned that during EDF 8 & 9 the Commission did not anticipate the crisis. In Ivory Coast, despite several signs since the early 1990s, the EDF 9 CSP initially did not aim to address a conflict situation.</p>
Chad	<p>The global approach "peace – security – development," implemented by the EU, especially at the beginning (in response to conflicts in the east of the country) and the end (facing the rise of extremist and terrorist movements) of the evaluated period. However, the effectiveness of this approach has been limited by i) a sufficiently thorough analysis of the factors of fragility and conflict sources, ii) the very low commitment of the Chadian government in reforming the security sector; iii) the difficulty in establishing an intense and fruitful sectorial dialogue in most sectors of co-operation and iv) a lack of continuity between some aspects of the actions of the Instrument contributing to stability and peace (CPSI) and programming EDF.</p>
DRC	<p>By supporting different types of interventions, implemented successively or jointly, the EC has contributed significantly to the restoration of peace and the prevention of new conflicts. Support to the consolidation of the rule of law, focused on justice</p>

	<p>sector, had so far more limited effects. The EC support to the process of consolidation of peace and conflict prevention has helped, despite the absence of an explicit strategy LRRD, with significant advances in disarmament, strengthening security and dialogue between the former belligerents. The combination of several interventions (disarmament, reintegration of combatants, rehabilitation of victims, health, reconstruction of NR1, food security) has had an undeniably positive impact on peace-building.</p> <p>Indeed, supporting the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of former combatants and rehabilitation of victims of conflict, these interventions have significantly improved security conditions and gradually created a climate of peace in the country. The war has effectively ceased and peace is a fact that is not in question. However, DDR and weapons collection through the PNDDR and PCAD are not exhaustive, which could be a factor of increasing insecurity if the climate were to deteriorate in the future.</p>
Ethiopia	<p>Despite a comprehensive analysis of the desirable involvement of the EU in contributing to addressing the root causes of conflict with the government, this approach was eventually limited to the indirect effects on poverty and inequities expected from the usual EU sector approach. The lack of demand from the government in this respect was a driving factor in this change. Nor did the EU contribute to reducing external tensions, as its support for conflict prevention at regional level initiatives (CPMR) only started in 2009.</p> <p>An alternative approach was to handle conflict prevention through EU regional programmes. Regional programming (2002-2007) effectively integrated conflict prevention as part of a non-focal sector and supported the African Union Organization in the Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Programme (CPMR) in the ESA region (9 ACP RSA 027, EUR 10 million) with seminars, workshops, capacity-building activities and studies which have either already taken place or have been launched to support IGAD's Peace & Security Strategy in the Horn of Africa.</p>
Ivory Coast	<p>The support to the election process can also be considered a key contribution; indeed the Commission was one of the main funders of this process, which allowed the organisation of elections that were considered transparent by the international community and therefore allowed the international community to take a clear position on the election results.</p>
Jamaica	<p>The EC support to the Security and Justice Sector reforms of the GoJ is particularly relevant since it deals with crucial and topical issues for the human and economic development of the country. Under its CSP 2007-2013, the EC chose to address the problem of rising insecurity, crime and violence mainly through a Security Sector Reform Programme (SSRP – EUR 33 million). This programme stressed the support to the reform of the Jamaica Constabulary Force (e.g. institutional strengthening of the Police) and a broad range of accompanying measures in the justice and social sectors. This is appropriate since security, social issues and justice are closely interconnected. In designing the SSRP, the EC based its strategic response on a study of existing documents and research, and undertook broad consultation with the NSA and other stakeholders to ensure that it was going to deal with the “root causes” and target key causes and beneficiaries. Structural constraints of the issues are directly addressed by the SSRP while social issues and root causes of violence are dealt with through other instruments, notably the Poverty Reduction Programme (PRP I & II). In addition, some relevant projects financed under thematic instruments, notably EIDHR, complete the strategy.</p>
Liberia	<p>The Commission's contribution to the DDRR process through a UN Trust Fund helped to stabilise the post-conflict situation “by signalling the availability of post-war livelihoods opportunities and by helping to jump-start the return of IDPs and refugees”.</p>

Niger	The most visible results were institutional. In most sectors, but particularly in the fields of health and food crisis management, the sector management structures have been recognized as marking significant progress compared to the past, allowing both improved dialogue between the government and the TFPs (especially the DPEs involved) and a better capacity to adapt to current events (food security). § On a decentralised level, the institutional support given to public structures and local NGOs such as tontines managed by women (MMD) is also appreciated and often mentioned as having effectively contributed to the development of the institutions that have benefited from them. § In the context of increasing pressure on land, the support provided to draw up a rural code and put in place land commissions has been a major step in limiting conflict. § In education however, institutional support was proportionally weaker and had limited results, particularly because of lack of co-operation. This also applies to public finance management.
Republic of Congo	L'appui de la CE au processus de consolidation de la paix et de prévention des conflits a contribué, malgré l'absence d'une stratégie explicite LRRD, à des avancées significatives en matière de désarmement, de renforcement de la sécurité et de dialogue entre les ex belligérants. Dans le département du Pool, la combinaison de plusieurs interventions (désarmement, réintégration des combattants, réhabilitation des victimes, santé, reconstruction de la RN1, sécurité alimentaire) a eu des effets positifs indéniables sur la consolidation de la paix dans cette zone. Les interventions de la CE ont contribué à sortir du conflit armé et à accompagner la paix en RC. En effet, en appuyant les programmes de démobilisation, de désarmement et de réinsertion des ex-combattants ou de réhabilitation des victimes des conflits, ces interventions ont sensiblement amélioré les conditions de sécurité et progressivement instauré un climat de paix dans le pays. La guerre a effectivement cessé et la paix est un fait qui n'est pas mis en cause. Toutefois, le processus de DDR et la collecte des armes au travers du PNDDR et du PCAD n'ont pas été exhaustifs, ce qui pourrait constituer un facteur d'augmentation de l'insécurité si le climat venait à se dégrader dans l'avenir.
Sierra Leone	Evidence of a positive contribution from the International Community, including the Commission, in the immediate consolidation of the peace phase (including through the PCBS). In particular, the Commission's support did help the government in its efforts towards creating a functioning bureaucracy and macro-economic stability which contributed positively to stability, peace and rehabilitation in the immediate post-war phase.
Tchad	The global approach "peace – security – development," implemented by the EU , especially at the beginning (in response to conflicts in the east of the country) and the end (facing the rise of extremist and terrorist movements) of the evaluated period. However, the effectiveness of this approach has been limited by i) a sufficiently thorough analysis of the factors of fragility and conflict sources , ii) the very low commitment of the Chadian government in reforming the security sector ; iii) the difficulty in establishing an intense and fruitful sectoral dialogue in most sectors of co-operation and iv) a lack of continuity between some aspects of the actions of the Instrument contributing to stability and peace (CPSI) and programming EDF.
Timor-Leste	The EU has made some contributions to peace and security, which have contributed to stabilising the country. However, the EU did not strategically address key factors underpinning long-term instability in Timor-Leste more fundamentally, which was a major gap in the EU's strategy. Interventions were few, mainly project related, not strategically connected and missed opportunities to address long-term root causes undermining peace and stability, including impunity for crimes committed during the Indonesian occupation.

Table 13 Country examples for EQ 4

Mali	In the area of migration, one project was being implemented by UNDP as part of the Joint UNDP-EU Migration and Development Initiative (JMDI) and another (to do with the transfer of diaspora knowledge) was part of the Migration and Information Management Centre (CIGEM). The UN-EU relationship was found to not be strategic in Mali and rather based on ad-hoc agreements to channel funds through the UN. In the area of migration moreover, UNDP does not have a specific added value. Both projects respected the EU's visibility requirements but were generally perceived as UNDP programmes. This was also a finding of the JMDI evaluation report, which noted that whereas the visibility of the projects in country was high, the EU's visibility was low.
Nigeria	The value added of EC-activities in relation to European bilateral co-operation is visible. According to the ECD, EC value added arises from the EC not being tied to particular national interests in, for example, energy supply or migration, thus enabling the EC, more than the MS, to support Nigeria in such essential but politically sensitive areas as the census, the election cycle or the promotion of peace and stability in the Niger Delta area. In this context, any EC added value that materialises may not consist so much in coordinating and facilitating co-operation as in "reminding" EU Member States of the development needs of Nigeria and in maintaining the focus of co-operation with Nigeria on poverty orientation. However, according to interviews with MS local representatives, only limited added value from the EC co-operation was evident, owing to what they saw as limited communication from ECD and the latter's less than perfect performance. They did not share the argument about the EC having proved better at coping with politically sensitive areas, being quite sceptical about the implementation of the support for the CENSUS-Initiative and for the elections, and also to some extent about the support for the EFCC. The ECD found that such statements did not reflect the general position of the MS community in Nigeria. The evaluation team found that the potential EC added value in highlighting the poverty focus of co-operation with Nigeria and in addressing politically-sensitive issues remains important, since such issues might otherwise be side-lined by the EU Member States' pursuit of their bilateral interests. Regarding specific development issues relating to the fight against poverty and for the MDGs, no EC value added to EU Member States' support has materialised. One finding regarding regional co-operation was that, although the EC brings specific experience and large resources to regional support, there was little or no evidence that such added value has yet materialised. In a similar way it was found that, as regards the micro project programmes, the EC's contribution to improving rural livelihoods adds value to the support provided by the EU Member States.
OCTs	As regards the coherence between EU support to the OCTs and other EU policies (e.g. migration, trade, fisheries, environment-climate change, and Arctic policy), the evaluation found that in these policies, the Member State normally retains the constitutional authority to act on behalf of the OCT. No cases were found where EU policies, as also implemented by the Member State/OCT, were not coherent with EU support to the OCTs. Irregular migration, for example, is a Member State responsibility, which in certain zones demands a major input from the Member State in halting and repatriating illegal immigrants.
Border Management	EU support brought added value of experience, solutions, best practices and lessons learned from all MS, even when not all MS were represented in a particular intervention. EU support acted as a link between partner countries and much of the resources of the combined MS, allowing beneficiaries to access a vast pool of experience, 'know how' and information. Having by now operated the Customs Union and Schengen successfully for nearly two decades, the EU could demonstrate benefits to mobility and trade of improved cross border facilitation and at the same time show how law enforcement and protection of society can be ensured in less strict regimes. In this context, the experience of the EU is unique

	<p>and was acknowledged with respect by beneficiaries. EU support to IBM and OC has made a contribution in the 'normalisation' and stabilisation of regions where political and ethnic tensions were predominant. The neutral stance of EU development projects combined with the technical nature of the concept of IBM allowed genuine, constructive and lasting progress to be made, especially in areas related to improved border infrastructure, demarcation and security. Although the achievements in the facilitation of trade and migration areas were less noticeable, EU support has had a beneficial effect in terms of improved use of IT, advanced information, selective controls and relations with business. Capacity building is one of the main challenges ahead, where EU support in the modernising and reform of out-dated, inefficient and on occasions, corrupt practices will be vital.</p>
<p>Senegal</p>	<p>Concernant les migrations, le rapport CPD insiste sur l'équilibre à rechercher en matière de migration. En particulier, il développe « le défi politique consistant à proposer de véritables possibilités de migration et de mobilité aux ressortissants des pays en développement ». Cet enjeu est d'autant plus important que le nombre de migrants sénégalais (350.000 environ en 2005 selon les Nations Unies), en baisse entre 1995 et 2000 (-1,5%) est en augmentation entre 2000 et 2005 (+1,8%). Sous couvert de cohérence des politiques pour le développement, l'OCDE encourage les pays d'accueil à envisager leur politique migratoire à travers le prisme du développement, mais les politiques des Etats membres visent souvent à restreindre l'immigration. Pourtant, l'articulation entre migrations et développement demeure, à long terme, ambivalente, c'est à dire que les actions de développement peuvent avoir des effets contradictoires (positifs ou négatifs) sur l'ampleur des processus migratoires suivant leur nature et le contexte d'origine des régions concernées 155 . Les acteurs sénégalais font part de critiques assimilant, d'une part, la sécurisation des frontières de l'espace Schengen à une politique migratoire et, d'autre part, l'Agence Frontex à la Commission européenne. Malgré le Pacte européen sur la migration et l'asile adopté en 2008, les compétences communautaires en matière de politique migratoire demeurent très fragmentées, les Etats-membres gardant des compétences fondamentales, notamment dans les critères de migration de travail. Les ONG de la Société civile (Coordination Sud et REPAOC – Réseau des plateformes d'Afrique de l'ouest et du Centre - par exemple) s'inquiètent de l'absence de véritable politique européenne en matière de migration 156 mais aussi de l'instrumentalisation croissante des financements de l'APD à des fins de contrôle des flux migratoires. De fait, de nombreuses interventions de développement peuvent s'inscrire, à court terme, dans un objectif de contribution à la baisse de la migration clandestine, surtout depuis la crise de 2006, en fournissant des emplois aux jeunes (programmes HIMO). Mais si de nombreuses initiatives se mettent en place, certains acteurs considèrent qu'il y aurait « manque de complémentarité » entre les interventions mises en œuvre au Sénégal à partir de ressources budgétaires hors FED (B7-667, RRM et programme thématique migration et asile) autour des question migratoires et la stratégie globale de coopération entre la CE et le Sénégal ; ce qui, avec la faible co-ordination entre les différentes autorités sénégalaises impliquées (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Ministère des Sénégalais à l'étranger et Ministère de l'Intérieur) demeurerait une faiblesse limitant l'impact des programmes.</p>
<p>Guyana</p>	<p>Interventions in training are however called into question in view of the absence of a national policy on migration of the workforce which is needed to address the brain drain problem faced by Guyana. The real challenge as far as Commission interventions in the private sector are concerned is sustainability. In spite of a strong national political commitment to PSD enhancement in Guyana, Commission interventions either fail to become sustainable owing to a lack of private sector investment and participation, or seriously risk being unsustainable owing to a lack of institutional development.</p>

Table 14 Selected country examples for EQ 5

Caribbean	The EPA took four years to be negotiated (2004-2007). The final agreement was signed in October 2008 by 13 Caribbean states, with Guyana and Haiti following shortly after. To date not all EU and CARIFORUM countries have ratified the agreement and only five CARIFORUM countries have started their phased customs duty reduction according to the agreement. EU funding has been critical for the EPA negotiation process, but the involvement of Non-State Actors was minimum. The CRNM/OTN work plan included the active participation of private sector in trade negotiations. However, their participation was limited to certain working groups and several seminars delivered to engage them in discussions. Only those countries whose private sectors could afford to dedicate resources to follow the negotiations and to travel as part of their national delegations to the negotiating round, did have a full and active participation. Other Non-State Actors felt they were not engaged in a meaningful way, although they attended a few working groups and seminars. Also information was not shared properly at national or regional level in spite of the number of seminars or bulletins produced. As an example, in Dominican republic, EPA implementation was made possible under 9th EDF in a context of reduced RIP amounts as a result of difficulties encountered by the Caricom's Secretariat. As a result, DR was among the first ACP countries to effectively start an EPA implementation and there have been some overlapping activities with risks of duplication. Although there are some improvements, EC specific contribution and results' sustainability are hard to track because of weak M&E setups, with very often missing baseline data. Overall, EC support is output based (outsourcing provided) and capacity development remains a challenge, but it is worth noting that, in the DR experience, EPA has been used as a leverage instrument to improve the economic and trade enabling environment.
DRC	La contribution de la CE à la diversification de l'économie congolaise et à son intégration dans l'environnement économique régional a été modeste. Cela concerne à la fois les grands axes routiers à vocation régionale, les infrastructures et services de transport et, enfin, les politiques commerciales.
Lesotho	Despite their limitations, some currently available co-operation instruments could be used by the EU to reinforce its regional approach with the specific objective of stimulating sustainable development in the country: recognition of Lesotho's specific interests in the South Africa-EU Strategic Partnership, development of trilateral co-operation with South Africa under the Dialogue Facility, and the use of the Pan-African Programme (PanAf) (2014-2017) for funding of cross-cutting issues of mutual benefit are some of the ways that could benefit Lesotho and South Africa's closer integration and thus Lesotho's development. The EU's operating modalities proved to severely curtail the potential for a future wider response to Lesotho's challenges: the EU, partly through Protocol 3 of the Cotonou Agreement, (i) introduced differentiated access to regional programmes, (ii) elaborated different trade agreements and (iii) negotiated different Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) for Lesotho and South Africa, thus limiting its scope of action for supporting Lesotho's regional and world integration.
Madagascar	EU support has helped improve the positioning of some Malagasy products (shrimp, cloves, pepper) on export markets because of an improvement in the quality of these. However, the ability of Madagascar to defend its interests in regional bodies (SADC, IOC, AFOA) and in bilateral or multilateral trade negotiations is limited. Mobilization, throughout the period by the Malagasy government regional funds that would have further support the regional integration process has been low, EU support in this area have not led significant changes.
Malawi	Overall, EC support to capacity building in trade negotiations and related reforms has delivered less than expected results and has not to any significant degree complemented support to regional integration.

Namibia	<p>The design of EC supported trade-related programmes and programme components took up priority issues for regional integration and trade, including also possible conflicts between EU trade-related interests and EC development objectives. At the same time, many programmes, underestimated the threat posed by administrative weaknesses and political sensitivities for successful programme implementation. Trade-related EC assistance yielded direct and in-direct benefits for the rural poor and enhanced the sustainability of a subset of EC-supported income generating projects by supporting the development of marketing structures for supported products, such as community based tourism. Regarding NTRIP, widespread solicitation of technical inputs and feedback had ensured programme ownership at substantive or “technical” level, but failed to garner sufficient political ownership and support. As a result, NTRIP’s design would have allowed versatile support in building core trade-related capacities, independent of regional integration initiatives, but the programme remained vulnerable to political dynamics.</p>
Nigeria	<p>There is a lack of complementarity and coherence between regional and national 9th EDF programmes. The recent Evaluation of EC Regional Co-operation to West Africa (May 2008) explicitly formulated a main recommendation that, “The EC must increase both the complementarity and the coherence between its regional and national programmes. In addition, the EC must carry out a complete review of operational strategies and existing plans for its support to the region (both countries and regional integration bodies) in order to ensure that the planned strategies and actions (including institutional development) will produce the results necessary for attainment of the integration objectives at all levels”. This holds particularly true for Nigeria. Nigeria’s commitment to the ongoing Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations is pivotal for the region. Over the past decade Nigeria has renewed and strengthened her commitment to, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and thus to the EPA negotiations with the EU (which are established ECOWAS policy). However, ECOWAS has certain flaws that inhibit negotiation, such as the lack of organisational resources, serious institutional and organisational problems, regional political instability, lack of diversified economies, and arguably some distrust between Anglophone and Francophone countries. The EPA negotiations do not appear to enjoy high political priority in Nigeria; some members of government, press and civil society continue to inveigh against EPA and progress has also been delayed by unilateral trade restrictions. There has been some reduction in such trade restrictions, import and export bans and high tariffs but many remain in place. There is thus little evidence to show increasing shares of ECOWAS or WAEMU (West African Economic and Monetary Union – UEMOA in French) countries in Nigerian exports or imports. But this is exactly where the focus has to be, and EC support is positively engaged. Such support will also contribute to increasing co-operation and harmonisation between the two regional organisations (ECOWAS and WAEMU) which, with different Member States and history, still remain more apart than increasingly integrated, an objective, which for the benefit of the region has to be achieved sooner rather than later. The EC support positively encourages harmonisation. Border controls and procedures are gradually improving as a result of the EC support (through provision of EC support for information and communication technology [ICT] for trade facilitation and regional transportation, which includes provision of ‘one-stop’ border posts). However, ECOWAS and WAEMU have different speeds for regional convergence and there are continuing doubts about the motivation of those regional organisations to prioritise their mutual policies for regional integration, economic and monetary union, free movement of people and goods and improved border controls. One of the major constraints of these regional programmes has been that the regional co-operation organisation has been the party requesting assistance for developing new border facilities or technical assistance to introduce new regimes, rather than this being specifically requested by the implementing parties such as the border organisations. The result is that the imple-</p>

	menting parties have sometimes not fully ‘bought into’ the proposed development and, in some cases, they were not even consulted. The result is difficulties in translating the co-operation bodies’ concept into physical infrastructure or modern operating practices on the ground.
OCTs	EU interventions and trade initiatives contributed only indirectly to strengthen regional integration through the policy dialogue platforms created by shifting to sector budget support. The objective of EU port projects was more to secure or enhance existing levels of service and security than to support economic diversification through improved accessibility. OCTs interest in regional economic ties and institutional co-operation is growing though for most of them neighbouring countries are still seen as competitors with lower costs of production and limited prospects for developing OCTs’ niche markets. The EU trade preference regime did not constitute a sufficient incentive for counterbalancing OCTs’ economic diversification constraints.
Pacific	Under the 9th and 10th EDF the objective was to conclude a regional EPA with Pacific ACP countries but only an interim EPA with Papua New Guinea (PNG) and Fiji could be agreed. Other Pacific ACP countries did not join the EPA. The main reasons are the fact that many already benefit from free access to the EU under the Everything But Arms (EBA) scheme or have only insignificant and erratic trade with the EU. PNG is the largest PACP trade partner of the EU and has benefited from the EPA especially regarding commodities (palm oil, copper, sugar, copra and fish) that can enter the EU free of duty and quotas. In addition the global sourcing derogation ⁸⁸ to the rules of origin has created a major incentive for the development of on-shore canneries and fish processing plants.
Zambia	Trade remains highly concentrated on mineral products and has poor national trade policies and the interventions reflect domestic priorities but have not been directed to reform such trade policies. Projects have mainly been addressing private sector development and export promotion. They helped identify the main constraints to trade, but – due to the absence of a TRA focus – they could not induce systemic reforms of trade policy or trade institutions.

Table 15 Selected country examples for EQ 6

Botswana	While direct support via the regional programmes has been limited as the SADC principle is that the support is multi-country and at least three countries should benefit, there has been some much-appreciated support to training on economic integration and to participation in trade-related negotiations. The support is however generally more indirect as the support to SADC helps provide model laws and regulations and so forth, and each country then has to adopt them itself.
Caribbean	There is clear evidence that support relating to the trade negotiations (in particular support to the CRNM/OTN) made available capacity which is now helping the region to deal with the next steps in the commitments and further pending negotiations. However, the EU has not succeeded in improving significantly the capacity of the CCS in formulation and implementation of the EU regional strategy. Programming has been hampered by lack of staff in the CARIFORUM Directorate. Implementation was difficult due to slow staff recruitment at the start, not enough people in project management and procurement, too many small tenders and almost no large international tenders. The slow pace of activities of EDF 9 is also due to a governance issue: all decisions of the CCS require consensus between all CARIFORUM member states, hence the slow pace of policy adoption and implementation of the EU regional strategy. Programming has been hampered by lack of staff in the CARIFORUM Directorate. Implementation was difficult due to

⁸⁸ Provided the products are processed in the Pacific ACP area, they can come from any vessel independently from its specific flag.

	<p>slow staff recruitment at the start, not enough people in project management and procurement, too many small tenders and almost no large international tenders. The slow pace of activities of EDF 9 is also due to a governance issue: all decisions of the CCS require consensus between all CARIFORUM member states, hence the slow pace of policy adoption and implementation.</p>
Dominican Republic	<p>EC support to the enabling framework has been successful in well-targeted interventions concerning trade and market opportunities in a diversified manner in specific sectors, mainly through product quality, SMEs and Competition improved frameworks. Less evident are the results to be obtained from a more comprehensive support to capacity development in entities related to the National Systemic Competitiveness Plan beginning to take place. Improvements in the overall conditions of trade do not compensate for inherent weaknesses in competitiveness. Fiscal policy and trade conditions and regulation are evolving (improving the overall business climate) and this is perceived as improving innovation and productivity, but there is much room for improvement. External trade policy being one main driver and benchmarking, regional integration benefits are tackled now from the EPA perspective. The ambitious competitiveness agenda still in its planning stage does not have a clear capacity development implementation strategy towards selected clusters and its related entities. The EDF 10 EPA implementing Programme is expected to address capacity building in customs, SPS, TBT, services, Competition Policy, fiscal reform, etc. However, there are limited resources available for the CARIFORUM EPA implementing unit (EUR 1.1 million). This unit is to undertake important actions such as to guide and support the national implementing units or its equivalent in functions, implement regional actions, coordinate on the CARIFORUM side the work of the CARIFORUM member states have already identified areas for immediate support in services, support to private sector and communications, which are not covered by the present EDF 10 EPA implementing fiche or any current funding available. EPA national units, already funded by DfID/Cartfund (like Antigua, Dominica, Grenada), will receive support under the EDF 10 EPA programme.</p>
Jamaica	<p>Many private and public institutions concerned with EPA negotiations and implementation have been reinforced by EC interventions through the 8th EDF TDP, the 9th EDF PSDP and related ACP programmes. The support was even more direct through regional programmes, in particular the 9th EDF Caribbean Integration Support Programme (CISP) and its component of support to the CRNM/OTN. The main institutions reinforced in their capacity for the stated purpose were the following: Ø Jamaica Manufacturers' Association (JMA); Ø Jamaica Trade and Invest (JAMPRO); Ø Jamaica Exporters' Association (JEA); Ø Ministry of Industry, Investment & Commerce (MolIC); Ø Private Sector Organization of Jamaica (PSOJ); Ø Jamaica Chamber of Commerce (JCC); Ø Jamaica Business Development Corporation (JBDC). However, EPA opportunities were not specifically targeted by the PSDP in its studies and direct support to IOs or firms. Some BSOs also considered that private-sector involvement in EPA discussions and negotiations of the private sector was not sufficient, with the most active parts being led by diplomats or academics. An EPA Implementation Unit was set up within the PIOJ. Capacity development to operationalize the EPA is a key objective of the 10th EDF through the CARIFORUM-EU EPA Adjustment and Capacity Building Programme. Following a modification of the corresponding CSP/NIP (2008-2013), the EPA programme has been scaled down from EUR 11.25 million to EUR 2.25 million and refocused solely on institutional strengthening issues for implementing the trade agreement. Most resources to support the negotiations came through the eight ACP TPS (and a subcomponent of the 9th EDF CISP), dedicated to support the negotiation process itself, including training. However, the Jamaican private sector argues the capacity (human resource and financial) to follow up the negotiation process closely enough was somehow insufficient. There is still a request for further assistance for the private sector to fully under-</p>

	stand the EPA and its implications; this will be provided through the CARIFORUM-EU EPA Adjustment and Capacity Building Programme of the 10th EDF.
Pacific	The EU support for regional economic integration has been conducted through the regional programme and it was the main focal sector in both RIPs covering this evaluation period. The focus was the institutional strengthening of regional and national institutions in order to help them prepare and negotiate regional trade arrangements and build up their capacity to implement and monitor the reforms needed to comply with these arrangements with a view to maximising their benefits. Three groups of organisations have been targeted: 1°) The two regional institutions with central responsibilities for fostering the regional economic integration; the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS) was the main channel for coordinating and organising the policy dialogue and trade negotiations, whereas the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) was instrumental in implementing regional projects with in-country activities in support of private sector development and trade facilitation. Both institutions benefitted from contribution agreements. This decision was appropriate given the absorption constraints at national level, but it nevertheless limited the results at the national level and weakened sustainability. There were two main challenges to national-level impact: (i) the evolving complexity of the regional context and (ii) the lack of conditionality clauses in the contribution agreements between the EU and the regional organisations.
SADC / COMESA / EAC Tripartite Task Force	Established with EU support, it has been working towards the harmonisation of the trade regulation among the three regional organisations. The Regional Integration Support Programme – RISP1 supported the harmonisation in Common Tariff Nomenclature (CTN) and statistics, and RISP2 contributed to the design and adjustment of policies and regulations related to COMESA FTA and Customs Union – i.e. Standardisation, Accreditation, Metrology and Conformity Assessment (SAMCA). Particularly with regard to COMESA, the EU has addressed key challenges relating to, for example, standards harmonisation, transport and transit challenges through the development of new regulation, training and institutional development, as well as the development of monitoring mechanisms and the COMESA adjustment fund.

Table 16 Selected country examples for EQ 7

Burkina Faso	<p>Budget support has contributed to the reform and strengthening of PFM, but the effects on the efficiency and transparency of public spending has been limited. The PFM reform programme of Burkina Faso has enjoyed significant BS, a rich sector dialogue and a number of complementary capacity building measures (including through civil society). Thus, the government has managed to maintain its leadership position and its "champion" in the sector. However, in most cases (the measures taken in the expenditure circuit making exceptional office), ongoing reforms do not translate into a capacity building and empowerment of stakeholders at central and local level. In addition, the PFM reform is but one element of response to the efficiency and effectiveness of public expenditure, the sectoral approach to POSEF failed to take sufficient account of the problems transversal, and for some, more political. These issues relate in particular to political interference in the selection of investment projects and bad practices in the management and monitoring of public procurement at the sector and local authorities. In addition, the weakened GBS dialogue has not helped to address these issues at a general level.</p> <p>The country (characterized by a chronic deficit in the overall fiscal balance financed by external funds) achieved a relative overall decrease in the deficit in the last years. However, the effects of the food crisis of 2011, conflicts in northern Mali and the organisation of legislative and municipal elections aggravated the deficit in the budget balance between 2011 and 2012. According to the WB (2009), because</p>
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of delays in decentralization, the country also faces the limitations of a model of centralized management of the expenditure. This model is characterized by (i) higher operating costs of central government as well as business costs of providing superior services to regional averages; (ii) a centralization of decision-making that leads to taking into account local specificities partial and needs, (iii) administrative complexity in the execution of expenditure. **The implementation of the CSLP was an opportunity to increase public spending, especially on social sectors, allowing the country to improve the level of some of its social indicators.** On the fiscal side, it is important to note that the 2000s were also years of tax resource mobilization effort. Against all expectations, the increase in tax revenues was accompanied by a relaxation of fiscal discipline that manifests itself mainly through expenditures that are not aligned with the annual budget. The evaluation also notes a certain politicization of public spending (interference in the prioritization of investments, changes in budget running, implementation of unplanned activities..). As a result, the relaxation of fiscal discipline concerns both current expenditures as investments: there has been a significant increase in the wage bill and significant investments were made while they were not programmed into the MTEF and even less at SCADD. This relaxation is the product of two interconnected and complementary factors: first, the rise of social discontent against high prices, increasing the number of poor and corruption (and on the other hand, the attempt to build a popular consensus around the political design change of the constitutional law.

There has been progress in terms of transparency of budgetary information and institutional support of the fight against corruption (sites where budgetary data are published and PFM transparency code adopted in 2013). The budget formulation process, however, still remains to be improved. In terms of the fight against corruption, the strengthening the Court of Audit is an important step, but its operation is still hampered by institutional problems (blocking of the Constitutional Court in particular on the status of judges) and a lack of means. The establishment of the Higher authority of state control (ASCE) is also a step forward, but the authority does not have the autonomy nor the capacity to conduct investigations and seize police bodies and justice. Through BS a very close dialogue with the GoB has been carried out in this area, generally at sectoral level and, at higher level, through Troika, notably on issues relating to the fight against corruption and the new Mining Code. The results were mixed, as the GoB has formal or partial concessions but never really showed the will to fully engage on this issue and to find practical and effective solutions to the problems addressed. Thus, the map of the suspension of AB disbursements, despite a largely coordinated approach by the key PTF AB operating in this area – was not sufficient. The adoption of the anti-corruption law by the transitional government, however, shows that the efforts of donors have not been in vain and have helped to establish the important changes of premises.

At sectoral level, most departments have well-developed sectoral strategies, but their programming tools – entered a second phase of reforms from 2010 – are not yet in place. It is in 2010 that the actions of improvement and consolidation of programming instruments began, leading in 2012, to the adoption of an implementation strategy paper programme budget. Since then, a growing number of ministries and institutions (41 in 2014) were able to benefit from support for the development of their programme budgets. However, in practice, the implementation of the programme budget is far from certain at the sector level. The training programme set up in 2012 has not achieved its objectives and the capacity of ministries to truly master this programming tool remains low, so their planning efforts and developing results-based policies do not found in their budgeting practices. On public procurement it is quite remarkable that the government has responded to some recommendations of the first stakeholder forum of public procurement in 2011. A first generation of reforms had led to the 2008 decree establishing the separation of the control functions and regulating the management of public markets (in accordance with the WAEMU guidelines). The PEFA indicator PI-19 "competitive bidding, opti-

	mal use of resources and control procurement" received a score "B" in PEFA 2010 and 2013, against C in 2007. This score indicates, among others, the existence of a legal and regulatory framework generally satisfactory and use of procurement methods of using markets to competition. The adoption of the transparency code in WAEMU PFM by the National Assembly in March 2013 is an important step which requires the GOB to respond to information requests made by the public.
Chad	EU support has helped improve the efficiency of public financial management. During the period under review, macroeconomic performance indicators, especially the economy's growth rates have fluctuated significantly linked to those of oil revenues and also to changes agricultural production, heavily dependent on weather conditions. In April 2015, after a long process, the World Bank and the IMF considered that Chad met the requirements for reaching the completion point of the initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC). The relative flexibility demonstrated by the Bretton Woods institutions in the assessment of these conditions is explained by several factors: i) Chad was the last country having reached the decision point (in 2001) and has not yet reached the completion point; ii) some criteria, defined in 2001, proved to be obsolete; iii) some member states of the EU, including France, considered necessary to enable Chad to obtain debt relief 106 in a context of budgetary difficulties in particular the country's commitment in the fight against Boko Haram ; iv) the announcement by the EU to the instruction of budget support in 2015 in Chad. The EU's previous support has also played an important role in the achievement of triggers through the support provided to improving the public expenditure chain, construction of paved roads and investment in the sector of 107 village water. Despite this progress, the economic outlook remains worrying: dependence vis-à-vis the oil sector economy remains strong and oil prices, which fell by nearly 50% between April and December 2014, should remain at a low level in 2015, or even 2016. This difficult economic situation, compounded by an increase in military spending, combines the structural weaknesses of PFM (particularly the low level of the tax burden) to result in the final period to deteriorated fiscal position.
Haiti	While all the donors' resources were channelled through the inefficient Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC) in 2010, and the Preval government – with hundreds of dead among its staff – did not have a cent to clean the roads from the debris of the earthquake, EC decided to provide budget support to the government and allowed the recovery of its activities and investment.
DRC	By combining political dialogue at high level, close co-ordination with the other PTF and supported by the EDF for debt arrears of the RC in respect of the EIB, the EC has played a significant role in improvement of the macroeconomic framework of the country, thus contributing to the process that allowed the RC to reach the completion point of the initiative "highly Indebted Poor Countries" (HIPC). However, the implementation of commitments made by the RC in the management of public finances and the business climate is barely engaged.
Ethiopia	Farmers' access to credit has increased over recent years, particularly in connection with household packages of farm inputs (e.g. seeds, fertiliser) or farm assets (e.g. animals, tools) provided under the Government-funded Food Security Programme. The EU did not find ways of gearing a significant share of its resources to those issues, apart from the Support for Agricultural Marketing Development (EUR 10 million). Yet there are still many farmers, particularly women farmers, who lack access to formal credit. Some typical deficiencies in the design and management of the credit schemes (inflexibility of packages provided on credit, lack of technical support services, capacity and institutional constraints in credit management, lack of dependable and effective revolving fund arrangements), which limit the effectiveness (loss of opportunities and growth potential), efficiency (low repayment rates) and sustainability (dependence on continued subsidies and re-

	<p>newed budget allocations) of the rural credit supply system remain. PSNP participation generally facilitated access to credit from informal as well as formal sources. In the new PSNP phase, credit supply through micro-finance institutions (MFI) and Rural Savings and Credit Cooperatives Organizations (RuSACCO) is explicitly linked to PSNP, albeit still without donor funding.</p>
Guyana	<p>The budget support programme seems to have missed a major opportunity to put PFM at the forefront of GoG policy by designing a programme that could have helped both to lay the foundations for improved public expenditure planning and to encourage the GoG to take the driver's seat in a global and prioritised PFM reform programme. First, the six-monthly reviews relied almost exclusively on a review of the various donor-driven PFM improvements, ignoring the wider picture and giving no attention to the wider objectives of budget support in terms of improvement of social conditions and reduction of poverty levels in Guyana. Whilst it is crucial to monitor the soundness of the fiscal systems that manage the financial aid provided, it is equally crucial to verify that Budget allocations and realisations respect the policy and strategy priorities laid out in the PRSP, both by sector and, within each priority sector, by priority programme or activity. This type of qualitative budget analysis has not been undertaken in Guyana since 1999. Second, the impact on PFM improvement of the TA and the use of PFM indicators has so far been very limited. Without central pressure for engaging in a medium term budgeting exercise, the MTEF models that were developed under the Commission-funded TA were neither appropriated nor used by the respective ministries whilst the fiscal projections model could not be used due to limitations in staff availability.</p>
Jamaica	<p>The EC has played a key role with its DRGEP programme. The provision of budget support has contributed to macro-economic stability and better PFM performance. DRGEP acted as an effective fore-runner for subsequent IMF and other IFI support for macroeconomic management. Many of the performance measures and benchmarks have retained their validity and relevance in the subsequent macroeconomic related policy engagement. This has resulted in a variety of reforms and a much clearer and more rigorous policy framework in 2010. It also resulted in amendments to the Financial Administration and Audit Act and corresponding regulation for the better and more transparent management of the macro-economic and PFM domains. The EC'S support of PFM was well justified. The 2007 PEFA showed relatively good scores in many areas; however it identified poor results for expenditure management. Jamaica has been slow to adopt an Integrated Financial Management Accounting System, although a process of expenditure management improvements is now on-going. A PEFA envisaged for 2011 has been deferred by one year. The pace of PFM reforms has accelerated since the 2007 PEFA assessment with the passing of fiscal responsibility legislation which should generate substantial improvements in budget management and governance. A comprehensive review of public procurement has also been undertaken. It is widely acknowledged by IDPs (WB, IDB, IMF) that there has been good progress in some key areas of PFM; the perception of many respondents in the field is that many of these improvements are bearing fruit after the end of the evaluation period, e.g. since the end of 2009, although the structural steps were put in place during the period under evaluation. The EC has actively supported improvements to PFM, both through its macroeconomic policy dialogue and by adopting specific conditions in its budget support, e.g. under the DRGEP programme. The EC support has extended to steps taken to improve PFM and accountability as part of sectoral programmes. Considerable effort has been put into containing liabilities in public sector entities that are outside central Government such as the Road Fund which has caused concern amongst donors and IFI. Fiduciary risks remained significant and the EC continued its support to improve on them. The National Integrity Action Forum may help address corruption concerns along with technical and security measures that are also supported in that sector. Whilst many of these improvements have been recent, the 2007 JAR highlights extensive technical participation in preparation of</p>

strengthening measures. Under SERP III debt management and budget management TA was provided. In addition, the 2007 PEFA study funded and contracted by the EC was successfully completed with participation of all major donors. The MTF, developed with EC support, was approved by Cabinet in 2004 and has become the prime strategic planning source. The support of the Commission played a vital catalytic role in supporting the MTF in its early days. The MTF has been mainstreamed in the country making it a crucial strategic plan. The past three to four years (encompassing the latter part of the period under evaluation and subsequent events) has demonstrated a joined-up, coherent and responsive approach to the adverse external macro-economic environment and the GoJ's efforts to respond to that evolving situation. The EC has played a key role in addressing the macroeconomic challenges faced by Jamaica. For example, the Commission supported the GoJ's measures to dispose of loss-making state enterprises (for example in the sugar sector and Air Jamaica). It has also supported a successful debt exchange (JDX); helped to reduce the interest rate burden; provided a supporting role in actions that underpinned the Jamaican dollar and improved Jamaica's credit-worthiness, thereby playing a vital role in response to the international credit crisis. It has played an important role in strengthening the Jamaica's resilience to external shocks by, for example helping to put in place more robust governance arrangements. Support has also been given to ensure that dossiers in support of budget support releases should be as strong as possible. Generally, the EC's budget support has been an important contribution to stability and releases in recent years have demonstrated improving predictability. The EC has shown willingness to de-commit funds where necessary, where progress has been unsatisfactory (as with PSDP and with the transport sector support). Finally, consistency and coherence can be identified in the EC's policy dialogue, linking issues of macro-economic management, sectoral reform and public finance management.

There is a small but important body of evidence to support a finding that third parties (other than the EU and the GoJ) have perceived the EC support to the MTF as being worthwhile or critical. For example, the WB CAS for 2010-13 indirectly recognises the EC as an "IDP"; and the Bank of Jamaica's 2010 4th Quarterly Report identifies the role of the EC in building confidence through the debt exchange process.

The overarching purpose of EC co-operation under the 9th EDF and the PSDP was therefore to improve the competitiveness of the Medium, Small and Micro Enterprise (MSME) sector, specifically by increasing access to enhanced business development services. Under the PSDP, small and micro enterprises benefitted from an average of JMD 1.5 million while medium enterprises received grants of JMD 2.8 million on average. Both the approval and utilisation rates increased significantly in the 2008-2009 period compared to the earlier period 2006-2007. Approximately 94% of projects financed were directed at increasing efficiencies through re-tooling, product/service development, MIS development, marketing and promotion. The EC's response to this situation was to enable the granting of funds to SMEs to adapt. The adoption of new technologies was particularly targeted at small enterprises and related to increased use of production-oriented information technology, in the form of both hardware and software. Records show that grant support to business entities has been island-wide and across all sectors, with the majority of support provided to the priority sectors of agriculture, including agribusiness, the creative industries, tourism and services. 80% of the beneficiaries of grants and business development services (BDS) were micro and small entities. Community-based Organisations (CBO) in particular were provided with very favourable grants of 90%/10% and these entities served to increase the emphasis on areas such as small community projects, women-led businesses, the fashion industry, beauty products and, to a lesser extent, good governance, better business practices and greater access to corporate finance. Through the PSDP some 100 loans 118 were facilitated in order to address the challenge of the access to corporate financing in order to help business expansion. The Development Bank of Ja-

	<p>maica greatly contributed in 2009 by providing 50% credit guarantee through their network of financial institutions. In this way, one of the objectives of the PSDP, namely the access to corporate finance, was addressed.</p>
<p>Kenya</p>	<p>Opinions and conclusions of a number of studies and evaluations differ as regards the extent to which the performance of Kenya's PFM system has improved during the period 2006- 2012. Overall, it is noted that the EU made a modest positive contribution to PFM reforms, although the PFM Reform Programme supported by the EU was not very successful. The EU-funded macro-economic support programme consisted of GBS and funding of the SRPFM. The EU support could have contributed to improved performance of Kenya's PFM system via (i) the GBS disbursement conditions, (ii) the PFM policy dialogue and (iii) the financial support provided to the SRPFM. Its design was weak although it provided a workable framework for donor support. Its implementation is also considered as weak due to insufficient high level political support, a weak PFM Reform Secretariat, a complicated set-up of the donor support, absence of an effective monitoring system and a weak PFM policy dialogue during most of the time. Despite the problems with the PFM Reform Programme itself, relevant PFM reforms have been implemented and continue to be implemented, thanks to drivers of change within a number of institutions responsible for PFM.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. There was a clear relationship between the PFM disbursement conditions of the first fixed tranche and the on-going and planned PFM reforms at the time the PRBS was prepared and launched in 2004/2005. It is plausible that there has been mutual influence. 2. There has been an active PFM policy dialogue in the period 2004-2006 when the PRBS-II was being prepared and the SRPFM was being formulated. During those years, the DPs – including the EU – have contributed to designing a new comprehensive PFM policy, which has contributed to improving the performance of the PFM system. 3. The performance of the SRPFM in terms of guiding and coordinating a comprehensive PFM reform programme has not really lived up to its expectations. There were not only design weaknesses, but also a weak institutional set-up and leadership and last but not least a complicated and inefficient set-up of donor support to the SRPFM. The EU contribution to the external funding of the SRPFM just exceeded 10% in terms of actual expenditures. As the use of the EU funding was not earmarked for specific purposes or activities, the overall conclusions as regards the contribution of the EU support to improvement of Kenya's PFM system via the SRPFM are the same as those presented here above for all external funding and are thus not so positive.
<p>Lesotho</p>	<p>The implementation of BS in was triggered by the macro-fiscal framework (sudden temporary deterioration in Lesotho's otherwise structurally sound fiscal position). It took insufficient account of the weaknesses of public administration which jeopardised the successful implementation of public policy, and thus of BS, as well as the effectiveness and sustainability of BS's accompanying technical assistance support in PFM.BS and PFM reform Regarding PFM, DPs involved in BS (WB, AfDB, EU) as well as the other donors present on the ground (DFID, Irish Aid, GTZ) played a crucial role in facilitating the design, implementation and monitoring of Lesotho's PFM reform programme in the mid 2000s. However, progress in PFM was very slow, with different diagnostic studies (WB PEMFAR in 2006, PEFA 2009 and 2012 and PFM technical IMF missions since 2010) and the authorities attesting to the continued difficulties experienced despite important support having been provided by donors in developing new systems (IFMIS), providing new tools (MEFF, MTEF) and training staff. The PFM reforms were expected to be completed in 2011 instead of which, progress was slow and, in some areas, PFM slid backwards. A new PFM Reform Action Plan (PFM-RAP) foresees reform activities</p>

to span at least up to 2017. However, considering that the IRSC has been dormant since 2012, that this RAP has been prepared by a TA, and that forthcoming elections are likely to effect changes in the MoF direction, it is questionable whether the PFM-RAP will receive the adequate political backing to be implemented. Two effects of BS on public spending can be distinguished. Firstly, regarding funding flows, as shown above, BS was very timely in cushioning the impact of the 2008/09 economic crisis on public expenditure and increased the GoL's margin of budgetary manoeuvre at a difficult time (even though drastic expenditure curtailing measures still had to be taken to accommodate the sharp fall of SACU revenues). Secondly, regarding the improvement of GoL's management capacity and the quality of its spending, the BS and associated TA efforts focused primarily on improving the accounting and expenditure information system (IFMIS) to facilitate the monitoring of expenditure allocations and executions but paid little attention to the quality of spending. GoL's accountability did not improve either over the period. Even though there has been impressive progress in catching up on the production of yearly accounts and their submission to Parliament, the capacity of the latter to scrutinise the accounts has remained feeble: closing accounts have routinely been looked at but the quality of spending and the budget allocations according to policy priorities have not been analysed for lack of capacities. Fiscal decentralisation requires tight management of fiduciary risks but delays have occurred in disbursement of funding by the GoL, and with the withdrawal of World Bank and GIZ support there is less external scrutiny of the safeguards to be managed in this high-risk PFM environment. Decentralisation is challenging to implement in any environment: the very slow pace of progress in the 18 years since the legislation in Lesotho was passed in 1997 reflects the impediments faced.

Madagascar

Budget support provided by the EU during 2002-2008 contributed to the harmonization of external aid and the increase in state revenue. It also promoted major reforms in favour of the improvement of the macroeconomic framework and the efficiency of the management of public finances. These were partially interrupted by the 2009 crisis. In the field of Tax revenues the IMF has calculated that between 2009 and 2013, the tax burden rate has averaged 10%, a level that remains very weak internationally. The imbalance of public finances was contained but significant arrears were accumulated by the State during the period 2009-2013. Growth of the Malagasy economy has been driven by foreign direct investment made mainly in the mining sector. They have in particular attracted significant foreign exchange inflows which allowed a significant improvement in the balance of external payments. Monetary policy helped to contain inflation, (27% in 2004 to 10.8% in 2006 and 8.2% in 2007). At the end of 2008, economic prospects were good. Between 2009-2013 the country experienced a deep economic crisis under the double impact of the global financial and economic crisis and the political crisis in Madagascar since 2009. The combination of these events led to a collapse in domestic demand and exports (especially tourism). The growth in mining output did not offset the decline in activity recorded in agriculture and services. The significant efforts to maintain a macroeconomic framework "stable" have caused particularly severe budget restrictions. These austerity policies have helped to aggravate the poverty rate in the population. According to the World Bank, virtually all of the population (96%) and live on less than USD 2 / day in 2013.

With the adoption in 2004 of an ambitious reform for a results-based management, significant efforts have been made to improve public financial management (PFM). TFP supported this reform with the mobilization of expertise, development of guidelines and coordinating the implementation of training by the Ministry of Finance. But the pace of implementation has been too fast, or without a well sequenced accompaniment and the scope of the reform has been limited, the major players have not been fully involved in the process. The dialogue conducted in the context of budget support has also encouraged other reforms in public financial management, such as that applicable to checks on the execution of public spend-

ing. However, PEFA 2008 still highlighted the weaknesses of such controls, which affect the reliability of the entire system. Between 2009-2013, although previously decided reforms have not been challenged, the transition period was not conducive to multiannual programming or capacity controls. In this difficult context, the efforts made at the technical level to continue the implementation of certain reforms are noteworthy, including: clarifying the budgetary guidelines; deconcentration of financial services with opening of secondary perceptions and corporate treasuries in the ministries of Health and Education; phasing out of accounts in commercial banks in derogation from the principle of single treasury and used without compliance with the principles of public finance and procedures. Finally, the Communication on the use of public funds has been strengthened.

Improved planning and budgeting process With the adoption of MAP in 2008, the budgeting exercise in public spending has evolved to reflect the new strategic areas while developing medium-term expenditure frameworks (MTEF) in order to reflect the priorities of the budget based on anticipated resources. In this context, donors have mobilized their institutional support as part of their projects, and these supports were juxtaposed, with no real structure. On the other hand, the sectoral variation of the reform process has faced the fact that the financial programming format was poorly adapted to sectoral activities (especially in the sectors of health and education), which made the artificial exercise. When the programming framework was reviewed, the implications of the crisis in terms of budget cuts came wearing a setback to efforts. Gradually, the budgeting process has disconnected from that of the programming of activities. Also, the self-assessment conducted in 2013 by the Ministry of Finance and Budget, with technical support from the World Bank, further underlines some notable rigidities that hinder the efficiency and predictability of budgetary expenditure, in particular: constraints for persistence consolidation of various deposit accounts; difficult to assess the level of internal debt constituted including government arrears; lack of consistency in the information on the exact composition of the staff of state officials.

Malawi	A heavily donor-dependant country, with DPs' Aid representing 20% of the GDP, the EC disbursements within its three BS programmes (PRBS I-III) brought, in synergy with the funds released by other BS donors, a critical mass that strongly supported the country's efforts for securing its international reserves and implementing its poverty reduction strategy. This external and internal stabilisation could be achieved in a context of improved co-operation with the GoM and a policy dialogue structured by the CABS group under the Joint Framework for budget support co-operation and the Performance Assessment Framework, both designed after the resumption of BS flows in 2004. On the contrary the 2003/2004 Budget support suspension that followed the late completion of IMF PRGF review worsened the country's financial situation with debt and associated interest charges rising and pro-poor expenditures decreasing simultaneously. Even though referred to as a "programme" in the three consecutive EC PRBS financing agreements, budget support remains an aid modality whose substantial financial leverage was still limited to the combination of disbursements and monitoring of PAF indicators. In particular, it cannot by itself mitigate risks arising from external shocks or deterioration in the policy dialogue. In a context of deterioration of the terms of trade following the fall of tobacco sales since early 2011 the IMF ECF programme with Malawi being finally declared "off-track" on June 20th after the failed completion of the second review due in April this year is likely to create an additional financial shock as most budget support disbursements within the CABS groups are likely to be suspended.
Mozambique	EC support has permitted the strengthening of key institutions involved in agricultural development and food security and has thus contributed to create the basis for a more efficient service provision of these institutions. PROAGRI I has concentrated mainly on institutional reforms. Thus, the evaluation of rural development (2006) concluded "If the PROAGRI has had a clear impact on ministerial reform,

capacity development and institutional strengthening, it is widely recognised that its impact on agriculture production and rural economic growth has been rather weak”.

PROAGRI II, which is focusing more on production, is only recently under implementation and thus it is too early for conclusions. Several evaluation studies report a local improvement of agricultural production and poverty situation where “outsourced” projects are under implementation. Means of EC support to the agricultural sector and food security sector have been coherent. The support to PROAGRI and to the FS sector have been appropriate, considering that the participation in a SWAp is the only possibility for entering in policy dialogue and influencing Government’s policies in the medium and long term. Some general improvement of rural poverty indicators and expanding of rural economy can be observed, however, it seems impossible to relate this improvement directly with PROAGRI activities; it seems more related to the general growth of Mozambican economy in the post-war period and to the improvement of overall macro-economic conditions than to the donor support to PROAGRI. The EC support to the agricultural and FS is coherent and appropriate. Supporting Government-owned programmes and investing primarily in institutional strengthening is a precondition for a better sector performance in future. Thus, direct effects on rural poverty indicators can be expected only in the medium term, once institutional reforms show their first results.

Pacific

The new draft Aid for Trade Strategy 2013-2017, which benefitted from higher involvement of the stakeholders than the previous strategy, is shifting the focus from support to institution-building to two priorities: trade infrastructure and productive trade capacity, thus responding better to the needs and concerns expressed by trade and private sector operators.

However, EU support for regional economic integration insufficiently addressed key barriers to private sector growth in the region:

An inadequate business environment and poor regulatory framework proved to be major impediments to the expansion of the private sector in the Pacific region. These were not chiefly addressed by EU programmes. § Access to finance is a key constraint to Pacific countries as elsewhere. Additional difficulties are the small size and the remoteness of many enterprises and thus the reluctance of the financial intermediaries to provide them with credit in view of the cost of assessing and managing the risks. Moreover, in many countries property remains collective at community level which creates a difficulty when enterprises are asked to provide collaterals to obtain a credit. Current EU support to enterprises does not sufficiently address these issues. The financial crisis of 2008 has further reduced the capacity and the willingness of the banking sector to extend credit to enterprises, particularly to SMEs. However, there are signs of improvements over the last years as indicated in the latest Doing Business Report of the World Bank for 2014: Palau, Solomon Islands, Marshall Islands and PNG are among the economies advancing the most towards the frontier in getting credit over the past 5 years; Palau, Tonga and Fiji recorded sensible improvements gaining respectively 99, 27 and 16 positions in the ranking for this indicator. It remains that improving access to finance, in particular the legal and regulatory constraints, was not sufficiently addressed by the EU projects, in part due to insufficient consultation of private sector operators and assessment of their needs. Whereas the institutions and the experts which implement the private sector development programmes have generally a fair perception of these constraints from their contacts with the economic operators, they are primarily occupied with the implementation of their projects and do not have sufficient leverage to promote an enabling financial environment. Regional institutions, e.g. the Chambers of commerce, lobbying for the interest of the private sector are insufficiently recognised and consulted and/or have insufficient means. § Whereas regional economic integration, economic growth, development and diversification of trade, are paramount objectives of EU regional economic integration programmes and the PICs themselves, the information to monitor progress in these areas was

	insufficient.
Tanzania	Credit to the private sector has increased from an average of less than 6% of GDP in 2002 to over 18% of GDP in 2010 (MoF, 2011). In part this is because, in recent years, the Government has restrained its own borrowing from domestic banks in order to make more financial resources available to the private sector. However despite the upward trend of domestic credit to private sector, it remains low compared to other developing countries.
Tchad	EU support has helped improve the efficiency of public financial management. During the period under review, macroeconomic performance indicators, especially the economy's growth rates have fluctuated significantly linked to those of oil revenues and also to changes agricultural production, heavily dependent on weather conditions. In April 2015, after a long process, the World Bank and the IMF considered that Chad met the requirements for reaching the completion point of the initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC). The relative flexibility demonstrated by the Bretton Woods institutions in the assessment of these conditions is explained by several factors: i) Chad was the last country having reached the decision point (in 2001) and has not yet reached the completion point; ii) some criteria, defined in 2001, proved to be obsolete; iii) some member states of the EU, including France, considered necessary to enable Chad to obtain debt relief 106 in a context of budgetary difficulties in particular the country's commitment in the fight against Boko Haram ; iv) the announcement by the EU to the instruction of budget support in 2015 in Chad. The EU's previous support has also played an important role in the achievement of triggers through the support provided to improving the public expenditure chain, construction of paved roads and investment in the sector of 107 village water. Despite this progress, the economic outlook remains worrying: dependence vis-à-vis the oil sector economy remains strong and oil prices, which fell by nearly 50% between April and December 2014, should remain at a low level in 2015, or even 2016. This difficult economic situation, compounded by an increase in military spending, combines the structural weaknesses of PFM (particularly the low level of the tax burden) to result in the final period to deteriorated fiscal position.
Timor Leste	PFM reform has progressed in the MoF to such a level of professional performance that the EU (following the example of Australia) decided in 2013 to change its support to direct budget assistance, starting in 2014. Government ownership of this reform is high which allows the EU to feed into the reform process of the Ministry of Finance more effectively, although the Ministry's mechanisms for engaging with sector ministries are weak which makes it difficult to create synergies for reform. Interviews conducted for this evaluation and monitoring reports confirm that these findings largely hold true today, although further advances were noted in the areas supported by the EU. As an example, the World Bank – Independent Evaluation Group stated in 2011 that “Timor-Leste has made very significant progress (between 200 and 2010) in setting up a system of fiscal and public financial management. The stable macroeconomic environment and the improved budget execution in recent years are evidence of this progress. The basic institutions for fiscal and public financial management have been set up and are functioning. Fiscal policy in general and expenditure policy in particular are now planned and with increasing focus on public service delivery. These policies are better grounded, using more reliable estimates of the macroeconomic aggregates and the needs of the population.”
Uganda	The Government has presented significant legislative PFM reform to deal with some of the structural weaknesses including lack of credibility, integrity, and predictability of the budget. If such reforms are legislated and implemented they will result in a major improvement in PFM systems and performance in the country. On a more concrete note, the Pro-poor budget allocations, as identified in the PAF, grew rapidly in the first years after the set-up of the PAF, more than tripling in real

terms from 1997/98 to 2002/03 but from that moment onwards, a slowdown in pro-poor allocations gradually started and was then precipitated by an increase in the allocation for productive sectors and defence expenditures that sometimes exceeded the approved budget. A commitment to reduce the deficit without sufficiently raising domestic revenues meant that there were relatively less funds available to finance key priorities, and policy trade-offs between pro-poor and productive sector expenditure became more acute. The decline in BS funds in recent years combined with the failure of BS partners to help GoU in increasing revenue and improving the efficiency of public expenditure at sectoral and local level have weakened the positive effects of BS on pro-poor expenditure, both quantitatively and qualitatively. That said, overall, BS contributions to allocative and operation efficiency of public expenditure have been significant. If not weakened in the way described above, BS would have been irreplaceable as shown in the first years of the PAF. Relying solely on investment projects would have not helped to the same extent in putting in place a national strategy in the early 2000s, with strong ownership and important results obtained in education, health, water and PFM reforms. In the last years, it is possible that earmarked sectoral support and projects would have contributed better to pro-poor expenditure, although they would not have helped in building a financial management and monitoring system suitable to ensure the long-term sustainability of such expenditures.

Zambia

Governance and Public Finance Management (PFM) progressively became the major EU strategic concerns, unexpectedly so considering the relatively good performance in both respects during the first half of the reference period. The EU contribution in dialogue on public financial management issues was however a driver of PFM reforms. The whole new administrative set-up, both PFM and indeed sector-wise, remained extremely susceptible to external political pressure and demonstrated only limited regulatory autonomy, if indeed any at all, as promoted by the EU. The EU has been consistent in supporting capacity building activities in the areas of public finance management with a view to enhancing domestic accountability and also strengthening the role of civil society in budget execution. Over recent years, PFM reforms have progressed, albeit at a slow pace. This is demonstrated by the PEFA 2008, finalised in February 2009, which indicated positive trends since the first PEFA of 2005. A major achievement of capacity building in PFM by the EU is the revision of the budget management cycle in 2009, which has been an obstacle to effective budget management in Zambia for the decades. The ongoing PFM reforms have accelerated since 2009, with a number of concrete policy decisions, which have positive implications for budget execution such as capital projects. In addition, the EU have also been advocating successfully for increased capacity building in government procurement, although capacity building is still required at ministerial level.

However, a coherent and harmonised approach to Capacity Development, under which a formalised co-ordination and dialogue process on TA activities could be established, is lacking in the EU strategic response.

Fiscal discipline was only very indirectly addressed by PEMFA, which merely targeted systems and procedures. The issue was therefore mostly a matter related to GBS and highlevel policy dialogue. Although limited, the EU contribution to improving fiscal discipline through PEMFA was achieved by promoting resource optimisation during planning, establishing macro-economic modelling as a method of forecasting fiscal resources and promoting the evaluation of alternative policies (ZAMMOD).

Table 17 Selected examples for education (EQ 8)

Availability of education services	
School structures	Educational structures, schools and classroom construction. Increased, particularly classrooms of low quality material (<i>Mozambique</i>).

	EU's support has contributed to improved infrastructure in target areas (construction/ rehabilitation of schools and class room (<i>Haiti</i>). School infrastructure In primary education (<i>Burundi</i>).
Equipment, books etc.	Equipment, books/ student. Decreased – has not kept pace with the growth of enrolments (<i>Mozambique</i>). EU's support has contributed to equipment provision – still lack of teacher material, particularly in remote areas (<i>Haiti</i>). School kits and a large number of textbooks to primary basic schools distributed (<i>Haiti</i>). Improvement in teaching materials available incl. books and teaching guides (<i>Burundi</i>).
Higher education	Establishment of an online regional education resource centre to encourage best practice, knowledge and dissemination (<i>Pacific</i>). Expand facilities of Gaborone Vocational College, Automotive Training School (<i>Botswana</i>).
Increased capacity/ capabilities (quality)	Capacity building: strengthened ICT competencies, higher education (<i>Caribbean</i>). Teacher trainings for teacher at primary and secondary levels (<i>Mozambique, Tanzania, Burundi, Burkina Faso</i>). Capacity building at regional level (<i>Pacific</i>). Teacher training at public and non-public schools but limited results due to deep structural problems (<i>Haiti</i>). Qualification of teachers in secondary schools increased significantly (<i>Burundi</i>). Institutional capacity building with limited success (technical assistance; scholarships). Improved capacity for higher education – partly successful (<i>Education in ACP</i>). Notable results in institutional capacity building within MoE (<i>Uganda, Burkina Faso</i>). Regional support and training to national institutions (e.g. workshops) but not yet possible to assess whether this has resulted in increased competence (<i>Pacific</i>).
Pupil-teacher-ratio (quality)	Decreased. Contributed to enhanced quality (<i>Mozambique</i>). Still high pupil-teacher ratio with major disparities between provinces (<i>Tanzania</i>). Increase in staff of 30% in 2006-10 (<i>Burundi</i>).
General	Across the sectors (Education, Health etc.) there is evidence of EC value added (<i>Angola</i>).
Access to education services	
Physical access	Major infrastructure (roads) improvement. Has improved access to education for children. Access for the most disadvantaged groups addressed only very slightly (<i>Haiti</i>). Decrease in distance travelled by the primary students public (<i>Burundi</i>).
Access for children (primary)	Enrolment rates in primary education increased significantly (<i>Mozambique, Tanzania</i>). Schooling has generally improved significantly in recent years – Still remains one of the lowest worldwide (<i>Haiti</i>). Limited improvements at national level of educational access (<i>Pacific</i>). Important increase in primary school enrolment (<i>Burundi</i>). Sharp decline in net enrolment rates – MoE budget decrease (<i>Madagascar</i>).
Access for children	Enrollment rates in secondary education increased (<i>Mozambique, Tanzania</i>).

(secondary)	Enrolment in technical/ vocational secondary education doubled (<i>Burundi</i>).
Access higher education	Improved access for women, the disabled and un-/semi-skilled (<i>Botswana</i>).
Access – geographic aspect	Progress of student access across the country but still important disparities by provinces (<i>Mozambique</i>). Inequalities remain high between rural and urban areas (<i>Tanzania</i>). School access remains weak and uneven in geographical terms (<i>Haiti</i>).
Access within the system	Progression-rates decreased – those not progressing are increasingly dropping out of the education system (<i>Mozambique</i>). Significant differences between progression at country level (<i>Pacific</i>). Transition-rates, increased – same as progression rates (<i>Tanzania, Haiti</i>). Repeat rates are high (<i>Burundi</i>).
Indirect contributions to availability and accessibility of education services	
National Poverty Reduction Programmes	Education as a priority sector. Highest share of budget for education. Significant impact (<i>Mozambique, Tanzania</i>).
Policy change	Significant policy change (e.g. abolition of school fees) has contributed to improvements in education provision (<i>Mozambique, Tanzania</i>). EU provision of school fees subsidies – to degree (<i>Haiti</i>). Significant policy change: cost-sharing scheme in higher education and the creation of the Higher Education Student's Loan Board (<i>Tanzania</i>). Introduction of free primary school in 2005 (<i>Burundi</i>).
Budget support	GBS played a significant role (<i>Mozambique</i>). Sector Budget Support in New Caledonia showed positive results (<i>Pacific</i>). Funding sector strategies which have resulted in significant improvements in access, although the reduction of BS in the second half of the evaluation period has not been able to compensate the decline of the sector government expenditure. The contribution of BS dialogue has been moderate: it has been unable to help protect the expenditure levels, improve the efficiency of expenditure and enhance government actions on quality (<i>Uganda</i>). Many of the new entrants into secondary schools represent the first generation of their families, who have ever had access to this level of education, and the level of parental education is in Tanzania (as in most of the world) a principal determinant of education outcomes. On the other hand, parental educational levels are less important at the primary level: here, Government's efforts to increase the Pupil Teacher Ratio, particularly in rural and underserved areas are a primary causal factor in the increase in pass rates at primary level. Signs that system expansion is straining the limits of financial and human resources are also reported, including its impact upon quality. Not only has it proven difficult to generate an adequate level of trained primary and secondary teachers and to ensure their balanced deployment across rural and urban areas, the level of capitation grants disbursed to primary schools, to cover requirements for non-salary inputs, has also fallen.
Other	Focus on reinforcement of regional institutions (<i>Pacific</i>).
Quality assurance and monitoring system in the field of education	
Pacific	The EU supported the development of M&E systems within its education programming in but it was not successful. The intention was to set up M&E systems at national and regional levels. All MoEs collect data on the educational system

	e.g. enrolments and staffing, but not properly analysed.
Madagascar	The EU budget support aimed at strengthening M&E of public structures in charge of education services, but due to lack of suitable institutional support it was not carried out as planned. Institutional capacity at central level is acceptable, and they produce statistics considered sufficiently credible and detailed monitoring of PARP.
Dominican Republic	Not well-defined indicators to measure the degree of achievement of results.
Burkina Faso	M&E system, including training, was planned to be created, but did not materialize.
Zambia	MoE carries out six monthly reviews and has a complex set of indicators. However, monitoring was difficult because of insufficient mechanisms and weak capacity in the Directorate of Planning.
Uganda	The best example of performance monitoring. Donors finance a large stake of the education sector and it made it possible for performance reviews to be central to the partnership. The model has important implications for national and local capacity development in terms of enhancing transparency, dialogue and management.
Burkina Faso	Monitoring performance not much supported MoE. There is an old performance monitoring system initiated within the framework of the structural adjustment programme, but it has several limitations.
Zambia	It is considered controversial to measure performance the education sector due to important budgetary support. With EC budget support to education, the only indicator being monitored is overall discretionary public expenditure in the social sectors.
Participation of NSA	From the findings, it appears that, in Uganda, EC GBS support has contributed to enhancing the participation of civil society in general governance and policy planning processes. The CSE 2009 and the ECA report stated that EC support has been particularly successful in contributing to strengthening NSAs and in developing their capacity to participate in policy dialogue with government. The EC support in Uganda also enabled NSAs to acquire increased access to national and international financing, and thus to play a major role in service delivery (<i>Uganda</i>). EC GBS support has in some cases (such as Ghana and Mozambique) led to significant progress in participation of civil society (<i>Ghana and Mozambique</i>). The EC successfully supported initiatives contributing to involving NSAs in policy dialogue and education service delivery (<i>Dominican Republic</i>).

Table 18 Selected examples for health (EQ 8)

Availability of health services	
Physical Structures	Moderate contribution to infrastructure .e.g. expanding, reconstructing and equipping primary health facilities (<i>Health in ACP</i>). Notable results in terms of improved health and service availability (<i>Zambia</i>).
Number of health workers	Increasing the availability of health workers (<i>Burkina Faso</i>).
Strengthened capacity	Increased qualified personnel (<i>Burkina Faso</i>). Evidence of capacity building, but less evidence of improvements (<i>Health</i>). Improved capacities for health services management and delivery (<i>Timor Leste</i>).
Increased	Strengthening the service offering in the field of reproductive health (<i>Burkina Fa-</i>

services	so). Development of medical centre with surgical unit (<i>Burkina Faso</i>).
Quality	Issue with proper treatment of patients due to high demand – children in difficult circumstances and AIDS patients (<i>Burundi</i>). Malfunctions in the quality of basic services (<i>Madagascar</i>). Improvements in health care quality – in fragile states (<i>Health</i>).
Availability of medicine	Not much impact on promoting essential medicine guarantees (<i>Health</i>). Projects typically embarked on provision of equipment and medicines, along with extensive training of staff and community mobilisers. This transition project was a success since in many provinces government services steadily improved (<i>Angola</i>).
General	Across the sectors (Education, Health etc) there is evidence of EC value added. Availability of health services have been improved (<i>Angola</i>). An important indirect support for subsidised or free services is EC support for the Global Fund, which provides services such as ARV therapy and TB testing / treatment in heavily AIDS affected countries. It is also acknowledged that attrition and absenteeism are major problems. In some countries (e.g. Zambia), the EC financed health worker retention schemes. They were implemented under the Human Resources for Health Strategic Plan adopted in 2006. EC sector budget support contributed significantly to financing retention schemes. Moreover, Zambia is the only ACP country for which hard evidence related to absenteeism and the EC response was found. EC participation in various initiatives related to provision of global public goods for health, some related to pharmaceuticals and implemented under DG Research framework programmes, was relevant to needs and coherent with the EC's role as a supranational organisation. Overall, the sustainability of interventions, together with lasting inequities between rural and urban populations, remains a challenge.
Physical structures	Fiji School of Medicine Human Resource Development Project: construction completed. It is the main regional institution for the training of health personnel (<i>Pacific, Fiji</i>). EC support to the rehabilitation of the health system contributed to new specialised services e.g. physical rehabilitation (<i>Angola</i>).
Strengthened capacity	Training in health provided but lack of data on e.g. participants and level of satisfaction with training results, or of performance improvements (<i>Pacific</i>). EC support has strengthened health systems with support for capacity building as part of wider efforts to reform health systems (<i>Population</i>).
Access to health services	
Geographic access	Improved accessibility to health centres/clinics; still differences between geographic areas (<i>Burkina Faso</i>). Improved accessibility of basic social services (<i>Madagascar</i>). Significant impact on access to health via infrastructure (<i>Health</i>).
Target access related	Increased access in rural areas/poor households – maternal health (<i>Burkina Faso</i>). Decrease in births attended by skilled personnel (<i>Madagascar</i>). Increased access to health care limited except in specific geographical areas – disadvantaged parts in some countries (<i>Health</i>). Improved access maternal health (<i>Health</i>). Certain increased utilisation of health facilities by children (<i>Health</i>). Increased utilization of health facilities (<i>Zambia</i>).

	<p>Implementation of the Programme of Action with focus on sexual/ reproductive health and the right to choose the number and timing of births made possible by equitable access to family planning (<i>Population</i>).</p> <p>EC support has strengthened access to health services (<i>Angola</i>).</p> <p>Access to health services have been improved (<i>Angola</i>).</p> <p>Nearly 70% of the population is theoretically exempt from fees in the compulsory National Health Insurance System; in fact, exempt populations are often denied care, but it is agreed that children, the elderly and pregnant women effectively benefit from exemptions. GBS in Ghana may have helped create fiscal space for these exemptions (<i>Ghana</i>).</p>
Quality assurance and monitoring system in the health sector	
Madagascar	The EU budget support aimed at strengthening M&E of public structures in charge of health services, but due to lack of suitable institutional support it was not carried out as planned. The sectoral performance indicators in the PARP are not consistent with monitoring and evaluation processes supported by the EU. The M&E capacity is very low.
Involvement of NSA	
Ethiopia	An interesting case is found in Ethiopia, where the Promoting Basic Services (PBS) programme was set up to decentralise the provision of basic services to lower tiers of government after the suspension of direct budget support in 2005. CSOs were involved in this innovative scheme through monitoring and accountability checks of the PBS grants on the field. For this purpose, a civil society fund was set up by the EC to channel aid to CSOs. The PBS is particularly active in sectors like health and education, where CSOs are invited to directly participate in the budgetary process and to the monitoring of service delivery. In other cases, NGO-implemented projects were especially effective in providing health care in rural areas, isolated regions or areas affected by conflict. Interestingly, evidence suggests that traditional service provision approaches (financing clinics or supporting community health workers) tended to take precedence over innovative interventions such as non-traditional outreach services (e.g. use of mobile telephone networks for community health workers or putting in place an adequate emergency referral and transport system). However, training of community workers was a key feature of many NGO-implemented projects.
General	Most of direct EU Support to Maternal, New-born and Child Health (MNCH) is channelled through individual projects ⁸⁹ and implemented by specialised NGOs or multilateral organisations ⁹⁰ . However, MNCH is often also integrated in primary health care programmes, funded under big sector interventions (e.g. Provision of Basic Health Care Services or Sector Budget Support) or GBS programmes (e.g. Ghana or Burkina Faso), which usually include performance-related indicators (i.e. Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel). Through these sector interventions, the EC has certainly provided additional support for the improvement of maternal health, resources, although not directly quantifiable.

Table 19 Selected country examples on gender (EQ 9)

Angola	When gender issues have been specifically addressed (e.g. in DDDR), the EC has significantly contributed to the economic empowerment of women but the condition of women has not been addressed in all its aspects. Although the EC response as set out in the CSP is limited to analysis of gender issues in the context of support to civil society, EC support has targeted gender issues more sub-
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⁸⁹ 35% of SRH funds go to the ACP region and usually have a regional approach (e.g. ACP programme “Sexual and Reproductive Health EC/ACP/UNFPRA/IPPF Joint Programme”).

⁹⁰ Thematic evaluation of the European Commission support to the health sector, 2012.

	<p>stantially than other cross-cutting issues as most EC project interventions throughout the evaluation period have targeted vulnerable populations (of which women constitute the majority). An important example is given by the DRR project “Socio-economic reintegration assistance to vulnerable groups”, in which the choice to target women and children was made on the grounds that assessments of the needs of combatant populations had downplayed the needs of women and children whereas in the receiving communities the poorest among the poor were in fact women (particularly widows). Results were attained in terms of reduction of economic disparities and, to a lesser extent, in terms of improved women’s participation in civic activities such as the Municipal Fora, but no data were available on cultural issues. Besides this, no other reliable evidence was found that EC interventions actually contributed to reduction of gender disparities despite significant targeting of the issue in project interventions.</p>
Botswana	<p>EC support has helped maintain and improve the already high degree of gender equality at all levels of the education and training system. In all other areas supported by the EC, gender issues are addressed in planning documents, often with special attention to gender equity issues; but even so impact is less evident than in the education and training sector. Apart from the focal sector programmes under EDF 8, environmental aspects are less consistently addressed than gender issues.</p>
Burundi	<p>The country strategies of the DPEs have given little consideration to gender, with the exception of the Netherlands and the UK. The implementation of the programmes does not reflect an approach that is systematically gender-specific. In this sense, DPE goals are less ambitious than those of the government, which has enshrined the principle of gender equality in the Constitution and has set gender quotas.</p>
Chad	<p>Cross-cutting issues have been taken into account very unevenly in the formulation and implementation of projects. Gender has obtained greater attention than the other dimensions (human rights, HIV / AIDS, environmental sustainability). Several initiatives have been undertaken to take better account of gender in M&E of certain projects. But at present, the effects of these projects on equality between men and women are not known.</p> <p>Some projects under the EDF have led to a strengthening of the role of women in the field of labour recognition (PAFIB) and women in the political sphere (PARSET). However, other projects have led their activities ignoring the constraints specific to women (water programme of the 9th EDF which implements participatory methods without take into account the situation of women to set schedules, venues and meeting arrangements), or by contradicting the interests of women (the case of PAFGA where some operators have encouraged men to go pick gum while that this activity is traditionally reserved for women) at the end of the period under evaluation, with the increasing attention given to the issue of Nutrition (SUN ACP and initiatives supported by the EU), women are at the forefront as beneficiaries of the actions and especially actresses changes that will improve food and nutrition security.</p>
Ethiopia	<p>EU concerns on gender mainstreaming were built into the design of GoE’s PSNP and related food security programmes. They are fully integrated into programme implementation, particularly for food-cash for work projects in which concrete steps are taken to allow an equitable share for women’s participation.</p>
Jamaica	<p>Gender appears to have been treated in a rather ad-hoc manner in EC support to Jamaica: a) at a strategic level it is positive to note that Support for Security and Justice sector should have positive gender impacts, because of the high incidence of violent crime against women, including domestic violence and sexual offences; b) some sectoral initiatives are also gender positive such as grants paid to support vulnerable female retrenched sugar workers; c) elements of support to civil socie-</p>

	ty and other non-state actors benefits women, and/or women-led community groups.
Madagascar	Crosscutting issues (gender, environment, HIV-AIDS) were unevenly and often insufficiently taken into account in the design and implementation of the different interventions. During the period 2002-2008, although PARP was not designed as a tool likely to generate impacts over gender or the environmental dimensions it was nevertheless included through the definition of the indicators. For gender, disaggregated indicators were tracked in education, and through those related to maternal health.
Malawi	Promotion of gender has under the 10th EDF been elevated as a non-focal sector with support to the government's commitment to reducing gender inequalities in accessing productive resources, development opportunities and decision-making. Support focuses on capacity building amongst stakeholders and on the establishment of monitoring mechanisms to differentiate impact on poor women and men with the aim that all interventions equally benefit and empower poor women and men. Coverage of gender issues is weakest in terms of mainstreaming with sector policies and strategies making little or no reference to gender issues (although interventions on rural roads have made much more of an effort to address gender issues including employment of women in rural road works).
Mozambique	EC interventions have not 'mainstreamed' cross-cutting issues or articulated strategies for mainstreaming although some sector interventions have taken gender and environmental issues into account. Without actually identifying capacity development as a cross-cutting issue, EC support to capacity development across all focal and non-focal sectors comes closest to mainstreaming. Most EC supported interventions have a major component of capacity development even though there is little attempt to coordinate such efforts between sectors or link HRD or institutional support methodologies in different locations.
Namibia	Formal mainstreaming of environment and gender has not always guaranteed due attention to the issues during implementation. EC interventions in the sector of rural development have mainstreamed gender issues and the environment adequately at least in project design. The RPRP guidelines for DDDA grant applicants clearly reflect the Namibian government's Environmental Assessment Policy of 1995 and define that DDDA projects "must be economically viable and mainstream sound environmental, HIV-AIDS, and gender related practices". Despite formal mainstreaming, the extent of involvement of women in the respective interventions varies, also depending on the primary focus of activities. As regards environmental mainstreaming, one of the two projects not considering this aspect in detail was financed under 7th EDF while the other one is an infrastructure project which was supposed to include regular environmental assessment.
Nigeria	As regards crosscutting issues, the best results have appeared in relation to gender equality. It is a general finding that the EC-supported interventions took gender-related issues into due consideration both at the strategic level and during programme design and implementation. Gender considerations have been integrated into the EC co-operation culture. For aspects of the co-operation relating to governance and civil society, there appears to be a consequent positive impact in enhanced gender equality in line with the general finding of a high degree of gender equality in the NGO community. Most micro projects affected the life of women positively. Gender training was conducted for the staff and MPP6-implementing CSOs in 2006. In MPP9, "Capacity-building of communities on crosscutting issues like Gender Equality, HIV/AIDS and Environment" is among the measures likely to be selected for grant assistance.
Pacific	Gender considerations have often been included in the design of EU interventions. There is little evidence in the project documentation on the effects of equitable gender access to education institutions. the gender mainstreaming ap-

	<p>proach, while applied across regional programming, was not yielding a sufficient focus on gender equality, particularly in thematic areas such as climate change.</p> <p>The EU's Pacific dialogue over the evaluation period also made space for inclusion of CCIs in the dialogue process, but the EU regional programming itself struggled to integrate CCIs, concerns being raised most notably regarding gender equality (although it should be noted that the concerns about gender integration were considered in detail during the consultation procedure for the 11th EDF, with consequent commitments to supporting gender integration during the 2014-2020 period).</p>
Timor-Leste	<p>Despite a gender equality and women's empowerment perspective integrated into the EU CSP, there is not a country-specific gender equality strategy. In spite of policy frameworks emphasizing the centrality of gender equality, due to a combination of lack of specific gender capacity and lack of commitment, EU support to gender equality in Timor-Leste is limited. Additionally, it is noted that there have been opportunities for the Women-Peace-Security agenda. The EU has contributed to the promotion of the agenda on Women, Peace and Security through supporting the UNW/UNDP/EU programme and five Civil Society projects. However, EU support has not strengthened any of the key national institutions in support of women's empowerment. EU support to '1325' was limited in terms of non-financial support, lacking initiatives to develop the theme throughout the development strategy or to establish linkages and complementarities, resulting in limited ownership and visibility. This is a missed opportunity.</p>
Uganda	<p>Gender equality and equity principles have been often declared in BS performance assessment frameworks and in government sectoral policies. But they have almost never been effectively implemented through specific policies and measures, while BS dialogue has been unable to support their prioritisation. Below the surface of some basic indicators of gender parity, major gender inequities remain. While limited, some progress has been made with regard to gender mainstreaming, as evidenced by the introduction of the Gender in Education Policy in 2008, of the Water and Sanitation Gender Strategy in 2010 as well as the streamlining of gender within all new guidelines in the water and sanitation sector. That said, while some efforts to promote the mainstreaming of gender activities have been registered in all three sectors, these have been limited. Overall number of staff knowledgeable in gender remains low, key decision makers demonstrate little interest in gender aspects and, as a result, attitudes and behaviour are still not gender-oriented.</p>

Table 20 Selected country examples on HIV/AIDS (EQ 9)

Angola	<p>Overall HIV/AIDS-specific results have not been (quantifiably) produced, but the sectoral implications of HIV/AIDS have been addressed and several ECHO projects had awareness-raising components. This choice has been continued in sector interventions by EDF projects but there is little evidence of population awareness increasing despite an increase in the populations targeted by HIV/AIDS prevention. Major Findings supporting the judgement Angola is not characterised by the high level of HIV/AIDS prevalence found in other Sub-Saharan African countries. This is mainly due to the fact that during the war communications with surrounding countries were reduced.</p> <p>The national response is based on the National Strategic Plan for Sexually Transmitted Diseases and HIV/AIDS elaborated for the period 2003-2008. HIV/AIDS is one of the priority areas of the ECP, but with no direct EC contribution. The low level of awareness is a further element of risk (e.g. 70% of youths in the country do not use condoms) and there is no evidence of any improvement so far. 85 At strategic level the EC response strategy as set out in the CSP includes reference to additional funds which may be made available from the HIV/AIDS thematic intervention in the framework of the thematic Budget Line 'Investing in People'. During</p>
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	<p>examination of a sample of EC sector support interventions for evidence of inclusion of HIV/AIDS as a cross-cutting issue, it was found that several ECHO interventions had HIV/AIDS awareness raising components, which contributed to avoiding the spread of the infection during the early relief and recovery phases. However, there was little or no reference to HIV/AIDS in EC project documentation as a cross-cutting issue except for rather specific health sector interventions, which had HIV/AIDS as a component (although some food security and infrastructure sector interventions do mention HIV/AIDS in project documents).</p>
Botswana	<p>HIV/AIDS is threatening achievement of the objectives of the co-operation strategy in many respects (e.g. human resources development). Substantial investment by the GoB and other donors persuaded the EC to refrain from developing its own programmes with a national scope. Instead, the EC concentrated on mainstreaming HIV/AIDS in all its interventions and supported programmes at regional level. In fact, the EC is active in strengthening the response strategies through improved co-ordination and more emphasis on prevention (e.g. in co-operation with a new World Bank project to combat HIV/AIDS).</p>
Burkina Faso	<p>As for HIV, the government granted such importance that all projects implemented had to bring a total and free assistance to all patients within their area of operation, because of its negative impact on all sectors of development. It is in this sense that the European Union is a historic partner of Burkina Faso. Its major funding is through a contribution to the Global Fund to fight against HIV/AIDS. Also in 2005, two new contracts were co-financed by the EU for projects in the health sector that have been implemented by NGOs. With the involvement at the highest institutional level by the Head of State, all development sectors (health, education, transport, energy, culture, etc.), religious communities, etc. were invited to set up committees of action against HIV/AIDS and the EU has helped to mobilize many partners to support the fight against the spread of the pandemic.</p>
Chad	<p>HIV / AIDS has not been the subject of specific actions in the EU-Chad co-operation portfolio during the period evaluated, especially in road projects or the 10th EDF health project.</p>
Chad	<p>HIV / AIDS has not been the subject of specific actions in the EU-Chad co-operation portfolio during the period evaluated, especially in road projects or the 10th EDF health project.</p>
Ethiopia	<p>There are few specific crosscutting interventions for HIV/AIDS and gender, the former already being over-funded (?).</p>
Jamaica	<p>EC programming documents refer to the incidence of HIV/AIDS, and the response strategy at sector level includes some activities related to HIV/AIDS. In addition the EUD has been monitoring support for the response to HIV/AIDS provided indirectly. The EUD is contributing to a regional HIV/AIDS initiative.</p>
Lesotho	<p>One of the highest profile service delivery activities has been support to ALAFA, a public-private partnership formed to provide HIV/AIDS treatment and care services to garment workers in Lesotho. An estimated 43% of these workers are HIV positive, very high, even for a country with the second highest rate of per capita infections in the world. This programme worked with the collaboration of factory operators to provide in situ consultations, HIV testing and treatment 43. The factory contributions were typically the consulting rooms and time-off from work for employees to attend clinics. EU support followed initial funding from DFID, and was complemented by a grant from GIZ.</p>
Madagascar	<p>The EU interventions in the fight against HIV / AIDS are carried out mainly in the context of its contribution to the Global Fund for the fight against HIV Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM). The EU participates in this respect the Board of Directors of the Country Co-ordination Mechanism in Madagascar, which allows it to assess the relevance and effectiveness of actions undertaken in this area. However, in</p>

	Madagascar, the Global Fund's activities are specifically intended for the fight against malaria and tuberculosis in a context where the prevalence of HIV/AIDS is less present than in the rest of the sub-region.
Malawi	Support to fight HIV/AIDS is specifically provided for as a non-focal sector as it is envisioned that this will be mainstreamed into all interventions. The EC has been a major contributor to the Global Fund to combat HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria. HIV/AIDS is also addressed at sectoral level enhanced by support to the Malawi Blood Transfusion Service. Coverage of HIV/AIDS is probably the best mainstreamed issue with consideration at all stages in the project cycle and sensitisation efforts during the course of works (with intermittent publicity campaigns along major routes).
Mozambique	<p>At the time of the development of the current CSP & NIP it was noted that the EC neither has a comparative advantage nor a telling past experience in health or HIV/AIDS. On the other hand, it was recognised that both fields remain high priority areas. In the context of concentrating the EC support on a few focal areas, it was agreed to streamline interventions in the health or HIV/AIDS sector, though without creating a gap in terms of funding. It was, therefore, proposed to support health and HIV/AIDS as a non-focal area under the 9th EDF. Between 10% and 15% of the funds, or about EUR 39 million, would be used for the non-focal areas, of which approximately EUR 25 million for health and HIV/AIDS under the 9th EDF (and EUR 50 million under 8th EDF and 9th EDF together). The EC support in health and HIV/AIDS was to be implemented within the framework of the National Health Strategic Plan and the National Action Plan to fight HIV/AIDS. In accordance with the new national health strategy, the EC support would move towards a sector-wide approach and budget support. Support to the already existing basket funding mechanism for medicines was specifically mentioned, but also to other common funds that at that time were being developed by MISAU in the context of the SWAp. Similarly, support in the field of HIV/AIDS would focus on a multi-sector approach, and in particular on participating in the budget support mechanisms that were being developed at the National AIDS Council (CNCS). No specific performance indicators were defined for the EC support in health and HIV/AIDS, but the health and HIV/AIDS indicators of the PARPA were adopted. The 8th EDF, operation (with a value of EUR 25-30 million) was to complete the on-going infrastructure projects in Zambezia province, as part of an exit strategy, to continue ongoing HIV/AIDS prevention and care interventions and to support the development of the health SWAp with particular emphasis on capacity development at central and provincial levels. The CSP & NIP recognised the weaknesses of the government in ensuring a correct management of the budget support and emphasised the need for institutional strengthening. An assumption was that for the duration of the NIP transparent procedures would be developed and accountability improved.</p> <p>Mainstreaming HIV/AIDS can never be a substitute for a specific HIV/AIDS support. Mainstreaming of HIV/AIDS in EC projects appears to be correctly done but mainstreaming in sector-wide EC support appears to be more difficult. EC is currently contributing to the fight against HIV/AIDS by attempting to mainstream it in its other support. For example, road infrastructure projects have to include activities to sensitise and educate road construction workers on HIV/AIDS. This appears to be correctly done, although the question can be asked if the sensitisation of road construction workers is best achieved by mainstreaming it in a particular construction project or by developing workplace-based policies and strategies. Mainstreaming HIV/AIDS in sector-specific budget support, such as in the agricultural sector, is more difficult. The Ministry of Agriculture is mainstreaming HIV/AIDS in its activities, but there was little indication that EC support plays an important role in it. Although mainstreaming HIV/AIDS remains important, it can never be a substitute for a specific HIV/AIDS support</p>
Namibia	EC support to strengthen HIV and AIDS related organisational capacity through

	<p>the HRCD at national, regional and local levels has likely made a positive contribution towards the overall decrease in the HIV prevalence rate from 2004 to 2008. Overall, however, capacity challenges in the host institutions, i.e. in MoE's HAMU and the NPC meant that EC technical inputs could not be used optimally by these organisations and have therefore often constrained the effectiveness of this type of support. A formalistic interpretation of HIV and AIDS mainstreaming among some of the EC's implementing partners, including those of the DDDAs, have also affected the effectiveness of EC support in this area. Nationwide, Global Fund and PEPFAR are main contributors to the overall national response to HIV in Namibia; directly-financed EC projects make locally confined contributions. The EC contributed to improving the quality of life of those infected and affected by HIV/AIDS, primarily through its contributions to the Global Fund, directly funded projects and support the HIV sub-programme under ETSIP.</p>
Pacific	<p>In the Pacific region, over the same period, the Global Fund provided a total commitment of USD 57 million in seven grants tackling HIV/AIDS.</p>
Rep. Congo	<p>L'intégration de la lutte contre le VIH/Sida dans le système de soins. Les interventions de la CE ont permis, de manière concomitante, de mettre en place une centrale autonome d'achat et de distribution de médicaments essentiels et de consommables pharmaceutiques sous forme générique ; la fonctionnalité de cette centrale reste cependant très insuffisante. Les principaux projets de la CE n'ont pas eu une implication directe dans la prise en charge des principales maladies liées à la pauvreté : VIH/SIDA, malaria, tuberculose. L'identification et la prise en compte des dimensions transversales n'ont pas fait l'objet d'une prise en charge particulière dans le cadre des projets de la CE. on observe également une amélioration de la couverture sanitaire, de la prise en charge du VIH/Sida.</p>

Table 21 Selected country examples on environment and climate change (EQ 9)

Angola	<p>EC interventions have only marginally contributed to a reduction in environmental risks and problems such as population growth, seawater and fresh water pollution and scarcity, oil-related environmental pollution and deforestation. Pressure to remedy environmental shortcomings is mainly donor-driven. Despite a plethora of environmental legislation, enforcement and regulation has been virtually non-existent. The national environmental agenda was updated recently and a national environmental action plan is now being prepared although this seems to be mainly donor -driven. However, legislation enforcement and institutional capacity is rudimentary, as this issue remains low on GoA agendas and GoA still does not view environmental issues as of high priority.</p>
Chad	<p>The cross-cutting dimensions are taken into account very unevenly in the formulation and implementation of projects.</p> <p>For Projects specifically addressing environmental issues, the inclusion of environmental sustainability has been low and the factors of fragility and objectives are not established very precisely.</p>
Timor Leste	<p>Environment (together with gender) represents critical priorities for the Timor-Leste population. Specific actions addressed environmental issues, but, in this case too, the absence of strategic vision, a piecemeal approach, and a lack of engagement in policy dialogue all served to limit opportunities for contributing to long-term impacts.</p> <p>Climate change is a concept not well understood by national stakeholders, including Government, institutions and final beneficiaries and does not rank high amongst national priorities. However, Climate Change is the only cross-cutting issue for which substantial financial resources are available for its promotion.</p>
Ethiopia	<p>Crosscutting issues mainstreamed into government systems but environmental regulations and safeguards have still to be fully implemented locally.</p>

Jamaica	<p>EC support has shown high regard for the environment in Jamaica. 9 and 10EDF addressed environmental policies but 10 EDF refers to it from a more holistic perspective taking into account climate change. Not evidence of significant impact of environmental actions but in the cases related to the private sector.</p> <p>The Climate Change Initiative demonstrates that under the 10th EDF, support has been given to addressing critical national, regional and global concerns. Climate change is a particular concern in Jamaica due to its vulnerability to flooding and hurricanes. Both the 9th and 10th EDF refer to environmental policies and protection. However the level of analysis is greater in the 10th EDF as a more holistic perspective is adopted taking account of issues such as climate change that have become prominent during the evaluation period. The climate change initiative is also an important step forward under the latter. However, it was not able to provide evidence that thematic initiatives such as EIDHR or the Climate Change Facility were used as strategic levers to support the EC's overall developmental priorities in the country.</p>
Kenya	<p>Climate changes have also been addressed through the various EU interventions in the ASAL areas with the introduction of more drought resistant crops (sorghum, grass and fodder crops) and setting up small scale agricultural production schemes for supplementary feed for livestock. The National Drought Management Authority (NDMA), supported by the EU, and the National Environmental Management Agency (NEMA) are promoting rural households to take more environmental measures, which would result in increasing resilience in case of adverse weather conditions (droughts). The NDMA has also set up an early warning system. However, the actual outcomes of the activities of the NDMA and NEMA are not yet clear.</p>
Lesotho	<p>EC contributed to improved environmental protection but its effect was limited to better sector co-ordination</p>
Madagascar	<p>EU support did not continue its remarkable efforts undertaken during the previous EDF on mainstreaming crosscutting issues. But the environmental dimension was fully taking into account notably to meet internal EU standards and not to comply with the national regulatory framework. The environmental dimension explicitly appears in the formulation of projects in two cases. The direct results of projects funded by the EU in terms of growth and management of vegetation cover and carbon sequestration, thus helping to protect the environment, are numerous.</p> <p>However, support to the productive sugar sector have not yet addressed the issues of pressing environmental impacts</p>
Malawi	<p>Environmental (and social) issues are considered at design/planning stage, at least for major works, although implementation of mitigation measures can be variable.</p>
Nigeria	<p>Environment was streamlined in micro projects, but only generically in the WATSAN sector. In regional co-operation cross-border, environmental management issues have been implemented in the agricultural productive sectors as well as in a regional approach to natural resource management. Thus, the environmental impact of the EC interventions was limited, reflecting its relatively low priority in most of the co-operation sectors. The 10th EDF aims to focus more directly on enhancing livelihoods in this Region.</p>
OCTs	<p>Despite the recognition to the importance of the environment, the reality of climate change and the importance of disaster preparedness, only few concrete results of the EU-OCT co-operation were found in this field thus far, while prospects for future impact from recently started interventions are promising. With targeted EU support some of the OCTs may develop centres of excellence in their regions or amongst the OCTs, related to climate change, renewable energy and environment issues. OCTs should be supported in developing centres of excellence capable of creating and disseminating knowledge, in particular with respect to climate change</p>

	and environment issues that apply to their regions. Centres of excellence could be shared between different OCTs, thus promoting their co-operation.
Pacific	<p>As regards programming realities, the integration of cross-cutting issues has been most visible in respect of environmental sustainability. Indeed EU regional programming has increasingly focused on environmental sustainability and climate change since the 2010 Joint Initiative launched by Commissioner Piebalgs and the Secretary-General of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat. In addition to the allocations from the second focal area of the 10th EDF, the EU has committed EUR 38.3 million from the EU's Global Climate Change Alliance and EUR 20 million from the intra-ACP disaster facility for disaster preparedness and resilience. Aside from the particular case of environmental sustainability in the second focal sector, there is evidence to suggest that integration of other cross-cutting issues across the regional projects was rather limited. The evaluation desk phase analysed 18 interventions out of the total of 22 regional projects in the evaluation inventory. Of those 18, eight projects include CCI in the logframe. Of the eight, four include environmental sustainability in the objectives, but each of those fall within the 2nd focal area of the 10th EDF, namely sustainable management of natural resources (including fisheries). The remaining four include environmental sustainability and gender equality in the indicators or activities. Hence, EU support has contributed to the region's capacity to sustainably manage natural resources and manage disaster risks.</p> <p>EU interventions have also made a positive contribution to the strengthening of natural resource conservation and helped maintain the provision of essential ecosystems, even if this objective was often an indirect rather than primary target.</p> <p>The specific objectives of EU programmes were aimed at strengthening government capacity for policy enhancement, roadmaps, co-ordination and implementation of their national climate change strategy and natural resources management. Numerous national and regional workshops have been held to develop appropriate guidelines, suitable policies and provision of relevant information to key stakeholders.</p> <p>The EU interventions aimed at strengthening the conservation of natural resources and maintaining the provision of essential ecosystems, although this objective was often an indirect rather than primary target. While it is not possible to establish a firm causal link between the interventions and improvements in conservation of natural resources and sustainable natural resources management, field interviews and programme monitoring reports indicate a positive contribution from the Commission's efforts.</p> <p>The activities of the Global Climate Change Alliance have enhanced the capacity of the Pacific's climate change negotiators and helped mobilise communities in conducting vulnerability assessments, as well as making some improvements to the mainstreaming of climate change in national policies. The specific objectives of EU programmes were aimed at strengthening government capacity for policy enhancement, roadmaps, co-ordination and implementation of their national climate change strategy and natural resources management. Numerous national and regional workshops have been held to develop appropriate guidelines, suitable policies and provision of relevant information to key stakeholders.</p>

Table 22 Selected country examples for EQ 10

Angola & Burundi	Some ill-conceived and -implemented interventions in rural areas (opening the seed market to private businesses; investing in infrastructure without adequate maintenance provisions) generated negative feedbacks for the family farms and their food security in the affected areas. In Angola, though in the framework of a relevant strategy, some implementation weaknesses have generated problems in the LRRD-related interventions.
Burkina Fa-	Poverty:

so	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Poverty in 2014 declined moderately since 2009 (the poverty rate increased from 43.9% to 40.1% which has not translated into a significant improvement in living standards of the population; There are high inequalities; 75% of the population lives in rural areas where the incidence of poverty remains high. The number of people living below the national poverty line corresponded to 55%. <p>Strategies/activities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Adopted a development approach with the main purpose to reduce poverty (2000s). Development of a strategy for accelerated growth and sustainable development (SCADD) adopted in 2010.
Caribbean	<p>Poverty:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Significant level of poverty in CARICOM countries, despite the middle level per capita income that has been achieved; A high proportion of poverty and great inequalities of wealth and income <p>Strategies/activities:</p> <p><i>No evidence</i></p>
Ethiopia	<p>Poverty:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Problem of chronic food insecurity. Extreme poverty is however pervasive in Ethiopia. The most recent household income survey in 2005 indicated that about 38.7% of the population was below the poverty line. PSNP has prevented the target group of poor and food-insecure rural populations from falling behind and has helped them keep pace with recent agricultural developments. <p>Strategies/activities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The EU has concentrated the bulk of its assistance in the food security and rural development sector. With the PSNP, launched in 2005, an important step was made in the long overdue policy shift from the previously applied emergency food aid approaches to more development-oriented food security programmes. Strategies/activities PSNP helped the target group of poor and food insecure households to keep up with this. Strategies/activities: the EU was particularly effective in fighting poverty by aligning its support on government policies and programmes through budget support (global, sectoral, targeted). VOC savings relating to road condition, always regarded as the main DP contribution to poverty reduction. Mismatch between rising VOC and relatively stable tariffs. The EU was involved in the design of the approach underlying PSNP, and improvements through several policy dialogue. EU contribution to rehabilitating and maintaining regional roads. The EU contributed to PSNP transfers which helped beneficiary households maintain minimum consumption levels and overcome critical periods.
Jamaica	<p>Poverty:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Positive trends can be observed in relation to AMS and SFA contributions in alleviating the consequences of external and domestic reforms within the rural areas of the parishes targeted. <p>Strategies/activities:</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The EU's overall response to poverty has been addressed through direct engagement in focal sectors and through the indirect support to non-focal sectors.
Kenya	<p>Poverty:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The proportion of people below the poverty line is reported to be reduced from 52% in 2000 to 46% in 2006. Need to access of communities to rural infrastructure, in particular schools. Small farm households. Access to markets and services and empowering rural communities. <p>Strategies/activities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The EU's community development support, being part of the agricultural and rural development focal sector, was provided through the Community Development Trust Fund (CDTF). EU's long term and consistent support to agriculture. Community Development Programmes has been funded by the EU through the Community Development Trust Fund (CDTF).
Lesotho	<p>Needs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> HIV/AIDS epidemic, epidemic primarily to address the needs of children orphaned as a result. <p>Strategies/activities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The EU's strategic response was to concentrate support on (i) Support to orphans and vulnerable children (OVCs). Continuation/ upscaling of the Child Grant Programme (CGP), a pilot project of support to OVCs; The EU adopted an approach (based on non- contributory safety nets). The EU successfully moved from a standalone initiative addressing OVC to the support for the inception of a national social protection strategy and system where the EU (through UNICEF).
Liberia	<p>Needs :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reintegration Programme for Returnees and Displaced People and its Local Community Development. <p>Strategies/activities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Refocus its efforts to channel assistance to the most severely marginalised groups of the Liberian population. The goal has to be, as before, to help reduce the socio-economic disadvantage of these population groups. In many ways, the EU's portfolio between 1999 and 2008 had been made up of programmes that were designed to channel assistance to the most socio-economically marginalised Liberians. However, because of the many shortcomings of EU assistance, support has reached only a much smaller share and a different segment of Liberia's population than had originally been intended.
Madagascar	<p>Poverty:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Madagascar ranked 151st out of 186 countries by the UNDP in 2012, according to the Human Development Index (HDI). Over 92% of the population currently lives on less than USD 2 a day in Madagascar. <p>Strategies/activities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> EU co-operation has contributed to improving living conditions of vulnerable populations, at least in the intervention areas. These positive results concern access to health and education, food security and nutrition, access to water and sanitation, access to markets and the situation of detainees in prisons.

	<p>However, whatever the sector, sustainability of results is weak.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The EU's interventions contributed to strengthening food security and improving living conditions in the areas of intervention, thereby reducing poverty.
Mozambique	<p>Poverty:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mozambique has experienced high and sustained growth during the evaluation period at an average rate of 7.3%, but its progress in poverty reduction has been less impressive. • High rates of poverty, poor health indicators and high rates of illiteracy, and 'indicators of access to education and health services show a poor situation even by comparison with other less developed countries (2004). • A rate of pro-poor growth lower than the growth rate in the mean indicates that the poor have benefited less from growth than the non-poor. This is the case for 5 provinces. • Many sectors experienced good growth, including agriculture; good agricultural growth in aggregate has not been enough for poverty reduction. <p>Strategies/activities: <i>No evidence</i></p>
Namibia	<p>Poverty:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Persisting social and economic disparities between rich and poor <p>Strategies/activities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EU supported projects have provided additional income sources in rural areas, albeit on a limited scale and without affecting the fundamental income disparity between rural and urban areas. Members of the poorest 25% of all households still only earn NAD 1,600 per year, a mere one percent of the per capita income of the richest two percent of Namibians. Rural areas have seen improvements in access to safe water, credit and extension services, all with contributions of EU-financed interventions or, in the case of water, by means of the successful provision of sector-budget support to the Ministry of Agriculture. Progress in the rehabilitation and construction of rural feeder roads was slower in comparison. Formal mainstreaming of environment and gender has not always guaranteed due attention to the issues during implementation.
Tanzania	<p>Poverty:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The impressive growth performance has not unfortunately translated into a corresponding rate of poverty reduction. • Significant improvements were made in non-income poverty. From 2000 to 2011, Tanzania's Human Development Index increased from 0.364 to 0.466. • People living in poverty decreased from 35.6% of the population in 2001 to 33.3% in 2007. <p>Strategies/activities: <i>No evidence</i></p>
Timor-Leste	<p>Poverty:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Poverty being strongly related to access, and rural roads being perceived by the population as the first development priority for Timor Leste. <p>Strategies/activities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The two rural road projects are the only projects scoring a full A for "impact" prospects" in ROM reports. • Directly addressed poverty and its causes through improvements in socioeconomic conditions, reduced isolation, improved services or new jobs.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EU Co-operation support for rural development and health sectors, with the exception of interventions for improving rural roads, has not significantly affected national poverty levels.
Uganda	<p>Strategies/activities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In 1998, the government introduced Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) framework as the Government's overarching policy planning framework; In 2010, the Government developed an ambitious new vision, aiming to achieve middle-income status within 30 years.
Zambia	<p>Poverty:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Economic growth helped urban poverty fall by a third between 1996 and 2006. • Zambia is therefore seriously off-track on MDG 1 (Poverty). Around 60% of Zambians live in poverty with a third unable to meet even basic food needs, and inequality remains very high. <p>Strategies/activities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EU support on poverty alleviation, particularly through GBS, contributed to a positive performance.

Table 23 Selected country examples for EQ 12

<p>ACP Instruments</p>	<p>In accordance with the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement, the EU implements programmes at national, regional and intra-ACP levels in the context of its co-operation with ACP countries and OCTs through different instruments:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • At National level, on the basis of the national indicative programmes (NIPs) of the ACP States in accordance with Articles 1 to 5 of Annex IV to the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement. • At regional level, on the basis of the regional indicative programmes (RIPs) of support for regional and inter-regional co-operation and integration of ACP States in accordance with Articles 6 to 11 of Annex IV to the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement; • OCTs, on the basis of single programming documents. • Intra-ACP and inter-regional co-operation involving many or all of the ACP States, in accordance with Articles 12 to 14 of Annex IV to the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement. This envelope may include structural support to institutions and bodies created under the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement. This envelope shall cover assistance for the operating expenditure of the ACP Secretariat. The Intra-ACP programme is the cornerstone of broader co-operation between the European Union and the ACP group of States. • Loans from the EIB's own resources and operations managed by the EIB (Investment Facility operations). <p>Some of the relevant specific intra-ACP programmes highlighted in the Evaluations assessed are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility (PSEEF), also known as BizClim, created in 2004 with the objective to support ACP Governments and Private Sector Institutions to undertake their respective roles in policy formulation and implementation in areas that are important for the enabling environment of the private sector; • PROINVEST, launched in 2002, with the aim of promoting investment and technology flows to enterprises operating within key sectors in ACP countries through support to Intermediary Organisations (and professional associations) and through the development of north-south and south-south inter-enterprise partnerships; • CDE (Centre for the Development of Enterprise), an ACP/EU joint Institution created in the framework of the Cotonou Agreement with a view to ensuring the development of professional ACP enterprises operating in the private sector; • TradeCom Facility, which provides expertise in trade related matters, mainly to design and implement national trade strategies; • The EU/ACP Microfinance Framework Programme, launched in 2005 and entirely dedicated to microfinance. It aims at supporting the development of sustainable micro-finance institutions (MFIs), promoting MFIs rating and strengthening of MFI information systems, and enhancing transparency and efficiency in ACP
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		<p>microfinance markets;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The ACP Multilateral Trading System Programme, to assist ACP countries in reforming and improving their negotiation capacity, implementing multilateral trade agreements, and integrating trade into the development process of ACP countries.
Botswana	<i>Focus on a single sector and shifting to BS have increased efficiency</i>	<p>Focusing on a single sector for development co-operation as well as shifting to budget support as the main instrument of aid delivery has led to an increase in the efficiency of EC assistance. Policy dialogue has increased. In addition programme support has been supplied in a relatively efficient way with appropriate financial means and adequate TA, albeit with some delays in programme implementation and longer programme durations than originally planned. During the last ten years, EC co-operation with Botswana has switched from project and programme support with integrated long-term TA (EDF 7 and 8) to a mix of programme support and Sector Budget Support accompanied by policy dialogue and the use of short term consultancies from the TCF (during EDF 9). More than 80% of the support is channelled through SBS. This evolution is in line with the Paris Declaration and improvements in aid delivery could be observed in many aspects. The programme approach is still used under EDF 9 (support to NSA and MoLG) and will be used under EDF 10 (support to CS). In most cases, projects started more or less on time. Delays of up to six months are still acceptable. Only few programmes from the regional budget started with a longer delay. Problems have been observed with the duration of some programmes. It seems either that implementation times have been underestimated or that unforeseen problems have occurred. There were some delays in disbursements (SYSMIN-funds, budget support) and the supply of TA (for example GTC, Tax administration reform, NSA). At programme level, programmes with a strong construction component (training centres Francistown and Gaborone) delays have been caused by problems with contractors and by construction deficiencies. In Francistown, even today, deficiencies are visible and new ones are starting to show (since there is no maintenance plan or person responsible for maintenance).</p>
Burkina Faso	<i>Adequate mix of modalities</i>	<p>The EU co-operation has been implemented through budget aid and project aid. These two tools are complementary as project aid compensates for the poor transparency in the resource management of general budget aid, due to the absence of sector-based programming. However, as a result of disbursement delays and the approval of the necessary resources for implementation of the actions, there is a negative influence on the realisation of desired results in several sectors, such as culture or rural development. General budget support (GBS) provided by the EC has enabled the EC to adopt the role of leader, with a positive knock-on effect on the other technical and financial partners (TFPs) and on the reforms undertaken by the government. GBS provided by the EC has contributed to improving the quality of policy dialogue between the government and its partners. The incentive mechanisms implemented within this framework, in particular monitoring indicators, have played an important role in maintaining pressure on the government, encouraging it to improve public finance management and the performance of the social sectors.</p>
Caribbean	<i>Contribution Agreements, although promoted ownership</i>	<p>Under EDF 9, the aid modality of a Contribution Agreement (CA) was supposed to increase ownership and reduce transaction costs. But the lack of provision of a start-up phase slowed down implementation instead of reducing transaction costs. For EDF 10, the institutional assessment concluded in 2010 that the conditions were</p>

	<i>and lower transaction costs brought significant delays</i>	not yet in place for the implementation of the EPA support programme under this modality. The third institutional assessment confirmed that the CCS is far from offering satisfactory standards at least for internal control standards and procurement. A 2011 mission of the Court of Auditors confirms that CCS is not eligible for contribution agreements and a fortiori for budget support. The CCS remains a partner for the main donors like EU, UK or Canada, but donors tend now to prefer implement their programmes through other regional or international organisations. However, several other implementers chosen by the EU were also far from delivering the expected results, like the Caribbean Disaster and Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA), the Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS) or the World Bank, for CKLN.
Dominican Republic	<i>BS and SBS have lessened the administrative and management burdens but a more accountable relationship is needed</i>	The decision to use General Budget Support and Sector Budget Support as key implementation mechanisms has lessened the administrative and management burdens of the Government of the Dominican Republic but the conditions that the EC established for disbursement (fixed and variable tranches) have not been specific enough to form the backbone of a mutually accountable relationship based on meeting established performance targets and dialogue. The last country-level evaluation recommended that the EC focus more and seek greater impact; its response was not significantly reduce scope but to transfer the responsibility for performance to its country partner through a change in modality from projects to budget support (both sector and general), a strategy requested by the country. The choices of modalities have enabled the EC to disburse most of its planned funds in support of the strategic objectives set out in the various Country Strategy Papers; however, a causal relationship between the modalities chosen and the effective execution of strategic objectives cannot yet be concluded. It therefore cannot be shown empirically and definitively that the most appropriate modality was chosen for the objective(s). Based on an examination of the process through which the choice of modality and instrument (or combination) is made, this evaluation concludes that the EC effectively examined alternatives and then selected the modality mix that would meet stated objectives while taking the context and capacity constraints of both the EC and the GoDR into account. In implementing its strategies the EC tended not to complement its programming with rigorous risk analyses and management that are necessary components of accountability frameworks in complex environments categorised by poor entry-level data. Analysis showed that the efforts made were neither rigorous nor comprehensive, forcing the EC to be reductionist in its approaches and reactionary in terms of managing foreseen or unforeseen disruptive events.
Haiti		BS has allowed the government to survive and provide essential services after the earthquake and NSA support has ensured the local rehabilitation of basic infrastructure and human beings.
Investment Facility		Based on the CPA, the Investment Facility managed by the EIB was launched in 2003 for a period of 20 years, replacing the former risk- capital funds of the Member States of the EU. The EIB operates in ACP countries under co-operation agreements centred on the reduction and eventual eradication of poverty; sustainable development; and progressive integration of the ACP economies into the world economy. This partnership envisages the establishment of Investment Facilities (IF) so as to promote private sector development. In addition to this Investment Facility, the EIB supplements the EU's aid with its own resources (OR) and operates on a broadly self-financing basis, funding its operations by borrowing on capital markets and covering them with a specific

		<p>guarantee from EU Member States.</p> <p>It intervenes through three main mechanisms: 1- direct funding of large industrial projects; 2- support to local financial intermediaries in the form of quasi-equity or guarantees to strengthen and deepen the domestic financial and capital market; 3- allocation to local financial institutions of credit lines intended for the provision of credit to medium and small enterprises, or for the development of micro-credit systems.</p>
Jamaica	<p><i>Budget support (General or sectoral) as the preferred modality: appropriate and in accordance with the capacity of GoK partners.</i></p>	<p>Co-operation Modalities and Funding Budget Support (General or Sectoral) is the preferred instrument of co-operation under the 9th EDF and the programming instructions strengthened this message for the 10th EDF. Consequently, the use of project modalities is now the exception, requiring appropriate justification and approval. This has led to a progressive shift from the classical project approach to the budget support approach. The share of EU funds disbursed as budget support in Jamaica has increased from 17% in 2007 to 63% in 2009 and to 80% in 2010. The budget support modality has been used to allocate funds that the EC made available via the Accompanying Measures for Sugar Protocol Countries (AMS). Between 2006 and 2010 more than EUR 82 million was made available for the restructuring of the sugar industry. Jamaica received an allocation of EUR 17 million under the FLEX mechanism in 2009 to compensate for the losses experienced in country's export revenues. The money, disbursed in the course of 2010, was allocated as an additional fixed tranche under the DRGEP general budget support programme. The 2009 Joint Annual Review (JAR) indicates good performance in terms of disbursement across key areas of the programme.</p> <p>In most cases the instruments selected have been appropriate for their intended purpose and were selected in accordance with the capacity of GoJ partners. However some programmes, particularly in the early part of the evaluation period, under-estimated the time needed to achieve actions and results. This proved to be an issue in the PSDP and the transport sector. DRGEP has proved to be an extremely effective instrument. DRGEP addressed many key issues (such as the heavy burden placed by state enterprises on the economy) and the need for structural reforms to address these challenges, including privatisation of the sugar sector and Air Jamaica. The EC has been innovative in ensuring that the modalities and instruments were appropriate in obtaining outputs and outcomes.</p> <p>The recent use of budget support has been different in Jamaica to in most ACP countries. There has been considerable focus on linking variable tranche funding to specific process deliverables (such as completion of privatisation measures in the sugar sector). Sector authorities, such as the Ministry of Justice, have commented very favourably on this approach, noting that it has helped to ensure that things get done and adding momentum to processes that were already within their work-plan.</p>
Kenya	<p><i>Optimistic planning of the CSPs reflecting on an optimistic planned aid modality mix</i></p>	<p>The optimistic planning of the CSPs is strongly reflected in the planned aid modality mix that consisted primarily of budget support, both GBS and SBS. EU's optimism is illustrated by the fact that the EU was the only donor providing GBS. The EU – and the other donors – were taken by surprise by the post-election violence early 2008. The disbursement of the second tranche of the PRBS two days after the election was very unfortunate and could have been avoided with a more prudent approach. From 2008 onwards the EU became more risk aware. This is well reflected in (i) the increased attention paid to governance issues and (ii) the change of the aid modal-</p>

		<p>ity mix under the 10th EDF. However, the EU's risk mitigation strategies are still not very well developed, despite improved governance analysis and more attention paid to the political dialogue</p> <p>The shift to project aid increased the challenges to establish coherence between the various EU supported interventions. There are some scattered examples of good coherence, notably in the support to the Arid and Semi-Arid Land (ASAL) areas and in the response to the 2007 elections and the preparation of the 2013 elections through the political dialogue. However, in general, there is a lack of coherence both within and among sectors, which limits the value added of the EU. The explanatory factors behind this limited coherence are on the one hand the large number of sectors the EU is active in with a large number of different funding instruments, and on the other hand the specificities of the Kenyan context. Problematic donor co-ordination and the fact that Kenya is not a very aid-dependent country are explanatory factors that are related to the Kenyan context.</p>
Lesotho	<p><i>Mix of funding and implementation modalities although synergies could have been strengthened</i></p>	<p>The use of different funding instruments and implementation modalities has been implemented via BS and projects funded from the EDF, three thematic budget lines and EIDHR, and via policy dialogue and, since 2010, political dialogue, with the authorities. Regional programmes are not considered here since Lesotho did not benefit individually. Overall, during the period, the EDF was the largest source of funding for Lesotho (98.1% of total contracted) with thematic budget lines (DCI) remaining relatively modest. More than half of the total contracted amounts concerned general or SBS; work contracts (in the water sector), programme estimates and projects each represented just over 10% of contracted amounts.</p> <p>In both social protection and water sector support, mixes of funding and implementation modalities were used to good effect even if they were not applied in a joint up manner and synergies for more effective support could have been greater. No evidence pointed towards a relative greater efficiency and effectiveness of one or another funding instrument or implementation modality, the co-operation results being more significantly determined by the overall context for aid effectiveness. These general conditions were found particularly critical for the success of BS. As a result, it was found that, over the period, the project approach worked best to deliver results to the population but also created work overload for the EUD and could not contribute to reinforcing government systems and processes.</p>
Madagascar	<p><i>Mix of modalities showing mixed results</i></p>	<p>The wide range of financial instruments mobilized represents a priori an asset to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of actions. The case of the "Rural Development and Food Security" sector shows that the EU has responded with some efficiency to the needs identified in this area by using the resources available from each instrument (EDF, thematic lines, STABEX). In several sectors, between 2009 and 2012, the use of thematic lines to finance NSA enabled in the context of suspended EDF funding, to ensure, at least, the continuity of the delivery of certain services to vulnerable populations. Budget support (AB) by the EU and other partners in 2002 to 2008 contributed significantly to the structuring of a strategic dialogue between the donors and the government and promoted better alignment of external aid on national policies developed. However, the efficiency and effectiveness of such support were limited by insufficient updating of the environmental scan during the preparation of new financing, a lack of co-ordination among the donors in technical assistance and insufficient involvement sector ministries in defining objectives and indicators.</p>

		The adequacy of the implementation arrangements to achieve the strategic objectives and local capacities presents a mixed picture. Partnerships functioned properly during the first period. For both periods, the evaluations have been used to prepare the design of subsequent sectoral interventions. However, shortcomings in the management of public finances, which had intensified in 2008, illustrate the difficulty encountered by the EU to react sufficiently upstream where such problems start to manifest.
Malawi	<i>Aid modalities had very variable impacts on efficiency of implementation</i>	The choice of aid modalities has had very variable impacts on efficiency of implementation of the support of the Commission of the EU. Some of its modalities contributed positively to implementation progress as measured by rate of disbursement and effectiveness, i.e. especially budget support. However, also other modalities contributed positively to implementation progress, such as basket funding, contribution and administration agreements. At least some of the perceived benefit appears to accrue from avoidance of constantly changing procedural complications of the Commission of the EU. Other modalities were impediments to implementation progress; especially programme estimates and EDF procurement procedures. That being said there is a widely diversified set of modalities in use in Malawi but there has been little consideration or risk analysis of capacity needs necessary to implement these various modalities: Some of which are highly demanding administratively of the EU Delegation and implementer. It has been assumed (often wrongly) that implementers have adequate capacity with no accompanying consideration of contingent mitigation measures. The result is that implementation progress has been delayed (or worse) and technical specialists in the EU Delegation (and National Authorising Offices) are spending long periods of time resolving administrative and procurement issues to the detriment of their core functions. Against this background there is little monitoring of performance of modalities (e.g. the Joint Annual Report).
Mozambique	<i>BS is considered a successful case of donor-government collaboration</i>	GBS in Mozambique can be considered a successful case of donor-government collaboration. Without GBS, the Mozambican economy would not have achieved such high levels of macro-economic growth and stability and good results on strengthening the planning and budgeting systems and public finance management in general. Furthermore, GBS has permitted a significant increase in the proportion of the public expenditure subject to the national budget and has strengthened the governmental systems. It would not have been possible to achieve the same or similar results under a project approach and without donor harmonisation and permanent dialogue with the GoM. Thus it can be concluded that EC's macro-economic budget support strategy delivered good levels of efficiency, effectiveness and impact compared to other possible support measures; it is doubtful whether the same results would have been achieved by using other forms or support measures
Mozambique	<i>Budget support considered fundamentally successful</i>	Budget Support has been fundamentally successful. It has made possible a major expansion in education provision, whilst also supporting economic growth and macroeconomic stability and facilitating steady improvements in the quality of public financial management and, to a lesser extent, in governance.. These are major achievements, which fully justify the risks, which have been taken in providing Budget Support. Annual predictability of budget support is significantly better compared with the two other aid modalities (Basket funds and Projects). Actual disbursements of Budget Support have generally been close to 100% of the planned disbursements, averaging 116% over the 8- year period since 2004 This can be attributed largely to the success of the procedures es-

		<p>established in the MoU for estimating and reporting on the planned Budget Support.</p> <p>By contrast, the equivalent procedures for other modalities are less established and not so uniformly respected by the various providers of projects and common basket funding. Moreover, resource persons from both government and DPs agreed that the room for applying disbursement conditionalities with projects and common basket funds is greater. For these modalities, the variation in predictability has been more significant and disbursements have usually been less than projected. This is particularly the case for projects, which averaged disbursements of 56% of projections during the evaluation period with a considerable variance around this mean. Basket fund disbursements were more stable, but also averaged significantly below Budget Support (79% versus 116%), as a percentage of projections.</p>
NAO Support Units		<p>The CPA establishes as a premise to rely on the capacity of the Government to integrate EU financial and technical support into its own plans (at national and sector level) and aid management in its institutions.</p> <p>The role of the National Authorising Officer (NAO) is to represent the ACP state in all the operations financed through the EDF supported by a NAO Support Unit (NAO SUs). A key challenge shared by many ACP countries is NAO-SUs are largely considered to be low capacity entities.</p>
Niger	<i>BG has had a modest impact</i>	<p>By setting disbursement criteria in terms of increased spending and performance in social sectors, budget support only modestly contributed to reorienting public spending towards these sectors 172. While it cannot be formally established, it is likely that these budget increases contributed to the impact described lower in terms of meeting MDGs. The causal link between these two events remains difficult to establish. Budget support also made it possible to pay a large number of late salaries. This made it possible to partially limit the handicaps stemming from the weakness of Niger in the context of programme implementation. Moreover, institutional support for budget aid, and the pressure of conditions for mobilising it, contributed to improving the technical and financial capabilities of the State. There is true improvement in public financial management (up-to-date national economic accounts; progress in terms of statistics, etc.) but it remains far below expectations, due mostly to difficulties in establishing institutional support for the Ministry of Finance.</p> <p>Although the quality of dialogue during the period under review made great progress at the level of policy design, the relationship remains more difficult at the level of their implementation. Budget aid has not really made headway and its relative weight in total aid has even gone down. Although efforts were made to integrate it in coherent policies, and although the sectoral approach using extrabudgetary funds is trying to gain ground in several sectors, projects remain the instrument of choice. The discontinuous nature of DPE contributions thus remains the rule. The health sector and the crisis prevention system are two areas for which the partnership was established on a more continuous basis, thanks to the use by some DPEs of extrabudgetary common funds in support of a true sectoral or thematic policy. Education was also on the same track but the dialogue broke off suddenly when fraud was discovered. Nonetheless, in these three areas, the continuity of interventions does not lead to sustainable effects as they are understood here, because dependence on aid remains huge, both at the financial and the technical level.</p>

<p>Nigeria</p>	<p><i>Mix of intervention adequate to the context</i></p>	<p>Overall the mix of interventions has been adequate and has taken into consideration the constraints imposed by the size of the country, the level of development of the relations between Nigeria and the EC and particular conditions prevailing in the different sectors of intervention. Some changes from initial decisions have nevertheless sometimes slowed down implementation. Chosen delivery mechanisms From the outset, the mix of interventions was of an indirect nature: the focal sectors had to support each other through complex interventions, rather than directly focusing on service delivery and results for the benefit of the poor. This was the case with SRIP and WSSSRP. Subsequent addition of several non-focal interventions has strained the management resources of both the ECD and its counterparts and led to an overall reduction of efficiency in terms of aid delivery and programme implementation. A simpler and more robust approach would have been preferable. Budget support having been discarded, the mode of implementation was the project approach, which was able to deliver results in respect of strategy implementation, albeit at a slow pace due to bottlenecks arising from procedural problems and deficient interplay between ECD, NPC and the ministries. Management of risk Regarding the first CSP risk factor, “wastage and misappropriation of EDF funds”, the ECD admits that it is impossible to avoid misuse of funds. However, the risk management procedures applied have adequately prevented significant misuse of funds, but at the cost of such procedures slowing down implementation. As regards the second CSP risk factor “failing to contribute to a real improvement in Nigeria’s management of its own funds”, the EC support has contributed to some improvement in Nigeria’s management of its own funds at Federal and State levels but not significantly at local and community levels.</p> <p>The EC is conscious that risk management should be a top priority under the 10th EDF. A precondition is the setting-up of an adequate MER system, harmonised with other donors; this will allow monitoring of achievements in terms of delays incurred and results achieved.</p>
<p>Stabex & FLEX</p>		<p>In Burundi, STABEX Fund allowed to improve certain access roads and rehabilitate industrial tools of state agencies before privatization. Jamaica benefited from two Stabex Transfers to compensate for export losses for the years 1999 and 2000. While the “1999 Stabex Transfer” was granted to Jamaica in July 2000 to partly compensate for losses in the export of fresh bananas to the EU market, the “2000 Stabex Transfer” (EUR 2.9 million) was used by the Eastern Jamaica Agricultural Support Project (EJASP), a rural poverty reduction project covering four traditional banana growing parishes in the Eastern part of the country. In Madagascar, for some agricultural sectors benefiting from STABEX funds (lychee, clove, pepper), improved product quality has been guaranteed without being able to quantify the consequences on the income of the main stakeholders in these sectors.</p> <p>In 2009 the European Commission (EC) approved the first financing decisions in favour of thirteen African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, which are to benefit from a total of EUR 215 million under the EUR 500 million <i>ad hoc</i> Vulnerability-FLEX mechanism (V-FLEX)⁹¹.</p> <p>As one of the 28 measures recommended by the EC in its communication "Supporting developing countries in</p>

⁹¹ Facility for FLuctuations in Export Earnings

		<p>coping with the crisis", V-FLEX has been conceived as a "global safety net" aimed at helping the most vulnerable ACP countries safeguard social spending in a context of deteriorated fiscal balances.</p>
<p>Tanzania</p>	<p><i>Budget funding several changes</i></p> <p><i>Support facilitated important</i></p>	<p>In terms of the economic and sectoral composition of spending, there is evidence that Budget Support funding facilitated several important changes. The primary contribution of Budget Support has been to assist in scaling up funding within the priority sectors. Yet, the complementary inputs of Budget Support, which might have helped to generate a greater impact, have functioned less effectively. Budget Support has supported the creation of an effective structure for dialogue, based upon the definition of policy targets and a framework of annual monitoring but the contributions of the Budget Support partners to this framework have not served to generate an open, strategic and problem-focused dialogue. In addition, complementary inputs for technical assistance and capacity building have been limited and the potential wider effects of Budget Support on aid effectiveness have not been exploited</p> <p>Neither project funding nor common basket funding could have achieved these same results with the same degree of efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability. In particular, due to the following factors:</p> <p>The funding provided through Budget Support of some USD 650 million per annum would have been equivalent to some 200 additional project and Common Basket Fund operations, disbursing USD 3-5 million each per annum. The additional transaction costs of opting for alternative modalities would therefore have been prohibitive; It would have been difficult for GoT to utilise such operations to finance recruitment of additional teachers or to provide non-salary recurrent cost funding;</p> <p>Historical data suggests that the predictability of annual disbursements from projects and of Common Basket Fund operations would have been some 20-25% below that achieved for Budget Support and with a much higher annual volatility;</p> <p>The sustainability of this incremental project funding would have been difficult to ensure, whereas over time Budget Support funding is being replaced with domestic revenue, using the same planning and budgeting procedures and hence ensuring sustainability;</p> <p>Finally, while the space for policy dialogue afforded by Budget Support has not been used to its fullest advantage in Tanzania, it has served to generate certain improvements in the design and implementation of policies and strategies, which could not have been generated by the more limited spaces for dialogue offered by project and CBF arrangements.</p> <p>There were significant deficiencies in the relevance of the initial Budget Support "package", which were exacerbated rather than improved through the changes made after 2007. The 2005 Budget Support evaluation showed that there were policy and institutional problems present in 2005, which were likely to reduce the effectiveness of the Government's poverty reduction strategy and the ability of the Government to achieve fast implementation of PFM and other reforms. Yet, the Budget Support package was largely limited to financial resources, with inadequate attention to the additional inputs, which might have helped to address these policy and institutional problems. Capacity building inputs, provided through or in conjunction with Budget Support, were very limited. The</p>

		<p>nature of policy dialogue was focused excessively on disbursement indicators and was never truly geared to constructive, problem solving policy dialogue. Moreover, its structure required DPs to combine the roles of “auditors” and “partners in dialogue”, which inevitably undermined the quality of exchanges on policy issues. The Budget Support design changes introduced from 2007 served to further undermine the quality of dialogue, reducing further the extent of Government ownership, increasing transaction costs, reducing the quality of the PAF as a performance assessment tool, and moving further away from constructive, problem-solving dialogue. Whilst the DPs’ concerns over the disappointing HBS results and over the response to the EPA and Richmond scandals were legitimate, the changes in the Budget Support design which they prompted served only to deepen feelings of distrust and to move further away from a constructive policy dialogue</p> <p>Stakeholders from Government and from the BSG agree that in the absence of Budget Support the same level of consistent Government commitment to PFM reform would not have been achieved. The fact that this commitment to reform has not achieved more substantial and widespread improvements to the PFM system may be in large part attributed to the difficulties of implementing “second generation” reforms (involving roll-out and consolidation rather than simple design and initiation), in a context of relatively weak human resource capacities and institutional structures.</p>
Tchad	<i>Sectoral approach insufficient</i>	<p>Although variable from one sector to another, complementarity between the instruments is generally performed satisfactorily. The synergies between Regional Co-operation (10th EDF) and national co-operation were absent, with one notable exception in the road infrastructure sector. Whatever the structure in charge of project implementation (national administration, NGOs, IOs, agency of a Member State), registering projects in a sectoral approach (including sectoral policies when they are sufficiently consistent) is insufficient. This is particularly marked in the case of NGOs (distribution of funding between multiple operators without consultation framework capitalization or device) and in the case of OI (which, in general, involve little in the sectoral dialogue). Chronic work overload of staff in COT result of the structure of co-operation portfolio (many projects themselves comprising many contracts) and the multiplicity of problems encountered in the implementation. Therefore, the availability of project managers to get involved in the preparation, co-ordination and monitoring of the sectoral dialogue is limited.</p>
Timor-Leste	<i>Project approach as the main modality but other modalities under consideration to ensure greater ownership and effectiveness</i>	<p>Project approach was the main aid modality throughout the 10th EDF, out of a limited number of options. Modalities were not adjusted to the context and their use needed strengthening on aspects of alignment, ownership, participation, mutual accountability and management by results.</p> <p>Project aid: Project aid was relevant in the context of the co-operation with Timor-Leste, out of a limited menu of options. But the effectiveness of project-based co-operation was limited by the fragmented and non-strategic use of projects, the lack of capacity to use the project aid modality to leverage sector level changes and reforms, and also by the lack of active engagement in policy dialogue. Projects were perceived by most stakeholders as slow, burdened by heavy procedures and performing poorly. In some case projects proved effective when well embedded within national institutions, owned by Government, responsive to sector strategies, or accompanied by policy dialogue at different levels (as experience from the roads sector shows). The quality of project design was</p>

		<p>often inadequate.</p> <p>Introduction of budget support: the introduction of BS as of 2013 generated differing views on its effectiveness and relevance for achieving changes. Non-earmarked BS has limited relevance to Timor Leste, given rising oil revenues and the consequent lack of financial deficits in the national budget. With the exception of the Ministry of Finance, Government systems – in particular at the sector level – are not yet robust enough to allow effective management of such support. BS could eventually find a strategic use in promoting reforms in particular sectors or for themes which are so far difficult to fund from domestic resources. Its effective use implies a capacity for dialogue and mutual engagement in the interests of reform, which has yet to be developed.</p> <p>Innovative approach: in an effort to enhance the effectiveness of the Co-operation, the EU tested the use of “symmetric contracts” (i.e: stipulation of similar services for different districts) with GIZ and CICL for extension services support under RDP4. The system had limitations due to the different work culture and procedures of the two organisations, which then negatively affected harmonization and limited influence and leverage vis-à-vis the Ministry of Agriculture. Moreover increasing oil revenues and the need for better sector development and policy reform are arguments for supporting the rationale for broadening the spectrum of aid modalities to include, for example, Sector Wide Approaches, sector investment programmes, Sector Budget Support (SBS) and Blending. Over the evaluation period the EU Co-operation has been partially adjusted to this new reality, for instance through its contribution to the World Bank Trust Fund for Health and the introduction of support to the Ministry of Finance for PFM as from 2014 (although preparations started in 2013).</p>
Zambia	<p><i>Mix of EU aid instruments, approaches and financing modalities well-adjusted to sector specific factors</i></p>	<p>The mix of EU aid instruments, approaches and financing modalities has generally been well adjusted to sector specific factors, adapting over the period in line with the changing context. The EU’s combined GBS and health SBS contributed to substantial budgetary increases and improved services, with increased utilization of health facilities. The EU’s specific focus on human resources management reform gave a strong forward thrust to its successful implementation and allowed addressing of the issue of persistent staff attrition in the context of an imposed staff employment freeze. Especially under the budget support programmes (GBS and SBS), the EU has striven to establish a balance between interventions supporting policy formulation and interventions improving policy implementation. However, whereas traditionally CP-government dialogue concentrated more on implementation issues, this changed with the overall switch to more budget support with over-concentration on policy dialogue and policy formulation issues, to the detriment of working with the government to address crucial implementation issues and bottlenecks.</p> <p>Zambia pioneered "basket funding" with its cooperating partners as early as 1993, and a Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp) involved partners in pooling resources programmed in accordance with GRZ budgetary allocations.</p>

9.5 Annex 5: Level of evidence, number of evaluations and additional sources of information by JC

The table below presents the level of evidence linked to the EQs and JCs, the number of evaluations which fed into the respective JCs and comments on the overall perception of the information available as well as possible ways to enlarge and/or improve this preliminary assessment by providing additional data collection methods. The number of reports presents only a quantitative aspect, i.e. it is possible that a high number of evaluations provide a low level of evidence and vice versa.

The three levels of evidence combine quantitative and qualitative aspects and have been defined as follows:

- *High*: Extensive and substantial information, thorough analysis on ACP countries and clear examples informing the JC occur with a high incidence; trends can be easily identified over time.
- *Medium*: Relevant and specific information and/or less focused analysis on ACP countries and/or a number of concrete examples informing the JC occur with a lower incidence; trends can be identified but not always confirmed.
- *Low*: Limited or no specific information on ACP countries and very few examples are available; it is not possible to establish trends over time.

The column “Evaluations” refers to the number of evaluations which provided relevant information for the respective JC. One single evaluation consists of several individual reports or documents (e.g. main report, subsequent volumes, annexes etc.).

Table 24 Analysis of level of evidence and number of evaluations by JC and suggested additional data collection methods

Judgement criteria		Number of evaluations	Level of evidence			Comments on possible additional data collection methods/Suggestions
			High	Medium	Low	
EQ 1	Political dialogue					
JC 1.1	Agreed priorities and shared agendas established and implemented	72	✓			Political and policy dialogue play a key role in the implementation of the CPA. Due to its holistic and transversal scope it is recommended to include qualitative methods of data collection (e.g. semi-structured interviews) in order to obtain a deeper analysis of the different mechanisms in place and the intended and unintended implications associated to dialogue mainly with regard to the definition of priorities and their effective implementation.
JC 1.2	Local authorities, national parliaments and non-state actors involved in the implementation of the partnership	28	✓			
JC 1.3	CPA recognized and understood by the relevant authorities/interest groups at the different levels and perceived as still responding to critical needs and problems	25			✓	
JC 1.4	Unintended effects have played a minor/major role in the attainment of the results	2			✓	

Judgement criteria		Number of evaluations	Level of evidence			Comments on possible additional data collection methods/Suggestions
			High	Medium	Low	
EQ 2	Human rights, democracy, rule of law and good governance					
JC 2.1	Improvements have been made in the field of human rights, democratic principles, rule of law and good governance	87	✓			Despite there is wide evidence available on CPA contribution to these issues at country/sectoral implementation level EQ 2 relates to very complex mechanisms that vary depending on the context. Evidence of the respect of fundamental principles is limited at least in an explicit way. Also, CPA contribution to governance covers a wide range of issues related to the “soft” aspects of the partnerships (political dialogue, legally binding conditions, use of Art 96) as well as to national/regional accountability mechanisms, linked to transparency and democracy. Hence, qualitative methods of data collection (e.g. semi-structured interviews) would hopefully allow for a better understanding of the effective application of these principles and its consequences. Similarly, the analysis of additional sources of information especially coming from academic research (e.g. ECDPM – Political Dialogue on human rights under Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement – 2014) would be useful to have specific information on the assessment and perception of the effective improvements made. Finally, the selection of particular cases (positive and negative expe-
JC 2.2	The CPA mechanisms (political dialogue, consultation procedure, appropriate measures, and suspension of the agreement, including its legally binding characteristic) have played a substantial role in the achievement of the improvements	29		✓		
JC 2.3	The respect of the fundamental principles has been and still is a priority for the ACP countries	19		✓		
JC 2.4	Unintended effects of the mechanisms have played a minor/major role in the attainment of the results	1	✓	✓		

Judgement criteria		Number of evaluations	Level of evidence			Comments on possible additional data collection methods/Suggestions
			High	Medium	Low	
						riences) could provide useful information on how fundamental principles are mainstreamed over time and across sectors.
EQ 3	Peace and security					
JC 3.1	Evidence of CPA contribution to sustainable improvements in peace and security for the populations of the ACP countries and regions	14	✓	✓		Due to the increasing attention to CPPB there is significant evidence on specific CPA contributions to a number of countries (e.g. Angola, Timor-Leste, CAR, Sierra Leone or Liberia) implemented through many Regional Organisations. The analysis of a number of case studies would be useful to assess effective co-ordination 1-between regional and national levels, 2-EU MSs/EU and 3-EEAS/EC-EuropeAid.
JC 3.2	Evidence of CPA contribution to improvements in conflict prevention and addressing their root causes by ACP countries	24	✓	✓		
JC 3.3	Evidence of complementarity and synergy between CPA, the common EU foreign and security policy and the policies of EU MS (co-ordination, complementarity and coherence – 3Cs)	3		✓		
JC 3.4	EU interventions provided an additional value in comparison to bilateral interventions of EU MS	4		✓		
EQ 4	Migration					
JC 4.1	The CPA contributed to the fair treatment of third country nationals who reside legally on the territories of EU MS and ACP countries	4			✓	The assessment of the Evaluations has provided very low evidence on CPA contribution to Migration issues. Further research combined with the identification of concrete examples and consultations is recommended.
JC 4.2	The CPA contributed to the establishment of prevention policies in the context of illegal immigration	6			✓	
JC 4.3	The CPA has contributed to the acceptance by MS of the EU and ACP countries of the return of and the readmission of any of their nationals who were illegally present on their respective territories	2			✓	
JC 4.4	Unintended effects have played a minor/major role in the attainment of the results	2			✓	
JC 4.5	EU interventions have been complementary and provided an additional value in comparison to bilateral interventions of EU	4			✓	

Judgement criteria		Number of evaluations	Level of evidence			Comments on possible additional data collection methods/Suggestions
			High	Medium	Low	
	MS					
EQ 5	Integration of ACP states into the world economy and their share in international trade					
JC 5.1	The CPA contributed to the strengthening of regional trade and integration frameworks	17	✓			EQ 5 and EQ 6 are interlinked. Trade Related Assistance has provided a big contribution in terms of trade policy analysis, including diagnostic studies, support to trade strategies and capacity development. Trade-related issues are considered at both sectoral and geographic level and thus evidence is high. Analysis of effectiveness of CPA contribution to coordinated/harmonised support would be useful mainly through the selection of case studies. Analysis could be focused on effective co-ordination of 1-regional/national support; 2- between the regional organisations (inter-regional negotiations) and 3-EU/EU MSs.
JC 5.2	The CPA has contributed to increased ACP-EU trade and investment flows, including key infrastructure, attractiveness of FDI and promotion of PPPs in the ACP countries	33	✓			
JC 5.3	The CPA contributed to the conclusion of WTO-compatible Economic Partnership Programmes	26	✓			
JC 5.4	Unintended effects have played a minor/major role in the attainment of the results	3			✓	
EQ 6	EU-ACP international economic and trade co-operation					
JC 6.1	The CPA has helped in the mutual understanding of trade issues between ACP countries and EU and the identification and implementation of common interests in international fora	4	✓	✓		
JC 6.2	The CPA contributed to the improved capacity of ACP countries to negotiate and monitor international agreements	11	✓	✓		
EQ 7	Macroeconomic reforms, private sector and investment					
JC 7.1	The CPA contributed to disciplined and transparent fiscal and monetary policies in ACP countries, including control of Parliaments and CSOs	21	✓			Overall, there is a high level of evidence on macroeconomic growth/stabilisation and institutional reforms and policies at national level. Information on regional support is however less available and more fragmented. The analysis could be further enriched via consultation (e.g. questionnaire to EUDs and relevant services in EC/EuropeAid at central
JC 7.2	The CPA contributed to the provision of timely responses, at a reasonable cost, to the challenges faced by the private sector in ACP countries, including removal of obstacles and access of formal and informal SMEs to innovative and effective financial and economic services	50	✓	✓		
JC 7.3	The CPA contributed to strengthening the agricultural and rural development policies with a view to enhance inclusive	47	✓			

Judgement criteria		Number of evaluations	Level of evidence			Comments on possible additional data collection methods/Suggestions
			High	Medium	Low	
	growth and food security					level as well as semi-structured interviews to NAOs) in order to confirm the revealed findings and identify particular experiences to be disseminated. A selection of case studies could combine country and regional dimensions and different implementing partners.
JC 7.4	The CPA contributed to establish of a democratic and efficient governance framework, including modernised PA, independent and effective justice	33	✓			
JC 7.5	The CPA contributed to private sector and civil society organisations having a meaningful impact on preparation and implementation of policies related to economic growth and private sector development	7		✓		
JC 7.6	The CPA contributed to strengthen the role of regional, sub-regional and continental organisation to support development standards and opportunities	14	✓			
JC 7.7	Unintended effects have played a minor/major role in the attainment of the results	5	✓			
JC 7.8	EU interventions have been complementary and provided an additional value in comparison to bilateral interventions of EU MS	7	✓			
EQ 8	Social infrastructure and services					
JC 8.1	The CPA contributed to the increase in availability of health and education services	47	✓			As for EQ 7, evidence on CPA contribution to enhance the access to education and health services is high. The analysis could be further enriched via consultation (e.g. questionnaire to EUDs and relevant services in EC/EuropeAid at central level as well as semi-structured interviews to NAOs) in order to confirm the revealed findings and identify particular experiences to be disseminated.
JC 8.2	The CPA contributed to the increase equitable access to health and education services	60	✓			
JC 8.3	The CPA contributed to the establishment of effective quality assurance systems	8	✓	✓		
JC 8.4	The CPA contributed to the integration of population issues in development strategies and policies	5	✓			
JC 8.5	The CPA contributed to private sector and civil society organisations having a meaningful impact on preparation and implementation of policies related to social infrastructures and services	6	✓			
JC 8.6	Unintended effects have played a minor/major role in the at-	2		✓		

Judgement criteria		Number of evaluations	Level of evidence			Comments on possible additional data collection methods/Suggestions
			High	Medium	Low	
	ainment of the results					
JC 8.7	EU interventions have been complementary and provided an additional value in comparison to bilateral interventions of EU MS	7		✓		
EQ 9	Cross-cutting issues					
JC 9.1	The CPA contributed to the integration of an effective gender sensitive approach at every level of development co-operation	50		✓		EQ 9 covers a wide-range of crosscutting issues. Hence, the level of evidence is mixed. Thematic evaluations provide a good basis of analysis and, to a lesser extent, specific information on ACP countries. However, it is possible to already anticipate some important trends and key experiences that could be further analysed through case studies. Regarding information gaps, these are particularly present in the field of effective fight against HIV/AIDS, mainly due to the fact that this sub-sector is not covered by the thematic Evaluation on Health and contributions go to a large extent through the Global Fund. Again, analysis could be further enriched via consultation (e.g. questionnaire to EUDs and relevant services in EC/EuropeAid at central level (geographic and thematic units) as well as semi-structured interviews to NAOs and implementing partners) in order to confirm the revealed findings and identify particular experiences to be disseminated.
JC 9.2	The CPA contributed to the effective fight against HIV/AIDS	28		✓	✓	
JC 9.3	The CPA contributed to the mainstreaming of environmental sustainability into all aspects of development co-operation and support programmes and projects implemented by various actors	44	✓	✓		
JC 9.4	The CPA contributed to the strengthening of policies and implementation of support programmes to mitigate and adapt to the consequences of, and the threat posed by, climate change	9	✓	✓		
JC 9.5	The CPA contributed to private sector and civil society organisations having a meaningful impact on preparation and implementation of policies related to the cross-cutting issues	4		✓		
JC 9.6	Unintended effects have played a minor/major role in the attainment of the results	0			✓	
JC 9.7	EU interventions have been complementary and provided an additional value in comparison to bilateral interventions of EU MS	6		✓		

Judgement criteria		Number of evaluations	Level of evidence			Comments on possible additional data collection methods/Suggestions
			High	Medium	Low	
EQ 10	Poverty reduction and the needs of most vulnerable groups					
JC 10.1	The CPA contributed to the overall reduction of poverty and addressed the needs of the most vulnerable groups	59	✓			EQ 10 is a challenging question in terms of analysis. Poverty reduction features prominently in all EU policy strategies. Hence, there is wide evidence on the poverty-related principles and objectives in the Evaluations. However, measurement of poverty reduction in terms of outputs, outcomes and impact becomes a more difficult task. This is partly due to its long-term nature, but also to its intrinsic correlation with economic growth, which tends to be focused on specific aspects related to macroeconomics, PFM and policies conducive to economic growth. Further specific analysis would be useful, particularly to assess from different perspectives (e.g. PFM and macroeconomic indicators combined with governance and human development related indicators) how poverty reduction has been effectively reduced. This could be done on a basis of a selected sample of case studies including, especially, fragile states.
JC 10.2	The CPA contributed to economic inclusive growth thereby reducing income poverty	11	✓			
JC 10.3	The CPA contributed to reducing food insecurity and vulnerability to food crises	58	✓	✓		
JC 10.4	The CPA contributed to increasing employment especially for the youth and effective social protection	18	✓	✓		
JC 10.5	The CPA has contributed in tackling the roots of and reduce fragility	12	✓	✓		
JC 10.6	EU interventions have been complementary and provided an additional value in comparison to bilateral interventions of EU MS	3		✓		
JC 10.7	Unintended effects have played a minor/major role in the attainment of the results	1		✓		
EQ 11	Joint institutions					
JC 11.1	An effective flow of information between the Parties	3			✓	EQ 11 presents very low level of evidence. As suggested in the report, this dimension is of key importance to bet-

Judgement criteria		Number of evaluations	Level of evidence			Comments on possible additional data collection methods/Suggestions
			High	Medium	Low	
JC 11.2	Effective and efficient joint institutions	6			✓	ter understand how implementation of CPA works in practice. However, the lack of information prevents from proposing concluding remarks. The functioning of the Joint Institutions is considered to be rather an internal dimension of the CPA and hence its assessment does not explicitly falls under the scope of the concrete geographic and/or thematic interventions. It is recommended to include qualitative methods of data collection (e.g. semi-structured interviews with relevant stakeholders involved in the work of the Joint Institutions) in order to obtain a deeper analysis of the different mechanisms in place and their effectiveness.
JC 11.3	Joint institutions contributed to increase co-ordination, complementarity and coherence between the EU and its MS	9			✓	
JC 11.4	Added value of the joint ACP-EU institutions as compared to regional frameworks for dialogue and co-operation within the ACP regions	2			✓	
JC 11.5	Unintended effects of the functioning of the joint institutions	2			✓	
EQ 12	Mix of tools					
JC 12.1	Instruments (national/regional/intra ACP) effective and efficient	20		✓		A high level of evidence has been found regarding EU “tools” and implementation mechanisms. This is mainly due to the fact that, in line with the aid effectiveness principles, the assessment of the appropriateness of the EU support is a key factor to evaluate how ownership and sustainability are being ensured. However, it is also important to note that information about the co-management system extracted from the Evaluations mainly relate to how and why specific imple-
JC 12.2	Approaches (project approach, budget support, SWAp, joint funding) effective and efficient	64	✓			
JC 12.3	Financing modalities (ACP government, private sector, NSA's, multilateral organisations and EU MS) effective and efficient	30	✓			
JC 12.4	Operations of the investment facility were effective and efficient	2	✓			
JC 12.5	Additional financial support contributed to the mitigation of the adverse effects of instability of export earnings and the safeguarding the development programme jeopardised by drops in revenue	2			✓	

Judgement criteria		Number of evaluations	Level of evidence			Comments on possible additional data collection methods/Suggestions
			High	Medium	Low	
JC 12.6	The co-management system involving national authorities in the programming and management of aid programmes has been efficient and added value compared to other EU cooperation instruments in ACP and non-ACP countries	10		✓		mentation modalities (notably budget support and sector support approaches) have been put in place as a tool conducive to ownership. Very low evidence has been found on the specific ACP co-management system and their implications at national/regional level. There is one Evaluation of the EC institutional support to NAO in the framework of the CPA, but it dates from 2002. Similarly, information on the legally binding nature of the instrument is non-existent. The NAO Study Mainstreaming Capacity Development in EU aid management (2013) ⁹² could provide a good baseline for further research on this specific dimension.
JC 12.7	Co-management promoted higher ownership by the partner Governments and increased sustainability of the actions	19			✓	
JC 12.8	Current system of resource allocation allows adequate funding to be channelled to countries where it yields the highest impact	5			✓	
JC 12.9	The legally binding characteristic of the agreement has been (and still is) instrumental in reaching the results	0			✓	
JC 12.10	Unintended effects of the different "tools" and the co-management system	6		✓		

⁹² Support to Quality Monitoring Systems and Methodologies of Projects and Programmes of External Assistance financed by the European Community (SQ2M Project) EuropeAid/127731/C/SER/Multi; EVA/129719. GFA-IDOM Consortium. The study was based on two separate phases. The first phase analysed a survey conducted in September 2012 which focused on Support Units to National Authorizing Officers of the European Development Fund (NAO SUs). In a second phase, EuropeAid sought to provide a basis for recommendations and draw good practices. For such a purpose, a review of Action Fiches prepared for the programming Phase 2014/2020 was performed. In addition, 5 case studies were performed from June 2014 to January 2015 in Sierra Leone, Georgia, Honduras, Jamaica and Djibouti. Each drew on structured meetings based on a specific questionnaire developing EU's 5 Quality Criteria for Technical Cooperation. The missions also served to formulate recommendations for the country NAO SU and to support the EU Delegation in the context of their support to the NAO system.