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*The opinions expressed in this document represent the authors' point of view  
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# Annex A. Terms of Reference

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## 1. MANDATE AND OBJECTIVES

Systematic and timely evaluation of its programmes, activities, instruments, legislation and non-spending activities is a priority<sup>1</sup> of the European Commission<sup>2</sup>, in order to demonstrate accountability and to promote lesson learning to improve policy and practice<sup>3</sup>.

The **Evaluation of EU joint programming process of development cooperation (2011-2015)** is part of the evaluation programme as approved by the Commissioner for Development, and agreed by the Commissioners for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood, and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

The main objectives of this evaluation are:

- to provide the relevant external co-operation services of the European Union (EU) and the wider public with an **overall independent assessment** of the subject area;
- to identify key lessons and to produce recommendations to improve current and inform future joint programming process.

## 2 EVALUATION RATIONALE

The justification for this evaluation derives from:

- The political commitments for joint programming which recommend it as an important area for evaluation;
- The 2015 work programme of the Evaluation Unit within DG DEVCO which includes an evaluation of Joint Programming. It has been requested by the main stakeholders within DG DEVCO and EEAS to have it launched in 2015 in order to have its results by 2016 to be used for the reviews (ad hoc and midterm) of EU programming. It will feed into the Mid-term review of the Union's instruments for financing external actions planned for 2017<sup>4</sup>;
- The legal base – Article 12 of the Common Implementing Regulation (CIR) 2014 which asks the Commission to “evaluate the impact and effectiveness of its sectoral policies and actions and the effectiveness of programming, where appropriate by means of independent external evaluations”.

## 3. EVALUATION USERS

The evaluation should serve policy decision-making and programming management purposes and feed into the Mid-term review of the current programming. This requires addressing the principal concerns of the management in DG DEVCO, EEAS, DG NEAR and the Member States and the EU Delegations and the Member States’ embassies in the countries covered by this exercise which are the main users. The evaluation should also generate results of interest to the European Parliament, the Council as well as the governments and civil society in partner countries.

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<sup>1</sup> EU Financial Regulation (Art 27); Regulation (EC) No 1905/2000; Regulation (EC) No 1889/2006; Regulation (EC) No 1638/2006; Regulation (EC) No 1717/2006; Council Regulation (EC) No 215/2008.

<sup>2</sup> SEC(2007)213 “Responding to Strategic Needs: Reinforcing the use of evaluation”

<sup>3</sup> COM (2011) 637 final "Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change"

<sup>4</sup> <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2014:077:0095:0108:EN:PDF> (Article 17)

## 4. BACKGROUND

### Context of joint programming (JP)

Joint Programming of external assistance has been a longstanding commitment from the EU institutions and the EU Member States (MS) in the framework of the international aid and development effectiveness agenda.

The EU and MS have adopted earlier frameworks for Joint Programming and expressed commitment to move forward on Joint Programming of their external assistance to partner countries (Council Conclusions 2004, 2006, 2007, 2009 and 2010 – see Annex 1 for further details).

Commitments on Joint Programming at Council Conclusions level were laid down in the EU Common Position for the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan in 2011<sup>5</sup>. In a two page annex the Joint Programming framework includes its context, scope and principles. Joint Programming was further enshrined in the Regulations establishing the Development Cooperation Instrument<sup>6</sup> and the European Neighbourhood Instrument<sup>7</sup> under the general budget of the Union, the European Development Fund and their related programming instructions.

According to the EU Common Position, Joint Programming is a process whereby the EU and MS (and other interested donors and partners) take strategic decisions based on a comprehensive and shared view of donors' support to a given partner country. EU Joint programming therefore refers to the joint planning of development cooperation by the EU development partners working in a partner country<sup>8</sup>.

Its core elements are:

- Joint analysis of and joint response to a partner country's national development strategy identifying priority sectors of intervention - together they form what is called a "joint strategy";
- In-country division of labour: who is working in which sectors;
- Indicative financial allocation per sector and donor.

The joint analysis and joint response are primarily developed at partner country level by EU delegation and EU Member States' representatives in the country. They are ideally aligned on a partner country's national development strategy and are synchronised to the partner country's strategy and programming cycles.

The timing of the Joint Programming should be synchronised: the joint strategy should match the timing of the partner country's national plan so that the DPs are planning at the same time and for the same period as the government and can therefore be more responsive to national needs. Joint programming documents can replace bilateral programming documents if their quality meets the requirements respectively set by EU and MS involved.

<sup>5</sup> "EU Common Position for the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness" (Busan, 2011) – *European Union strengthening Joint Multi-annual Programming*: [https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/126060.pdf](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/126060.pdf)  
Also reiterated in the "Council Conclusions on the EU common position for the First High Level Meeting of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (Mexico City on 15-16 April 2014)" *FOREIGN AFFAIRS Council meeting Brussels, 17 March 2014*. <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/workarea/downloadasset.aspx?id=15603>

<sup>6</sup> Regulation (EU) No 233/2014

<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2014:077:0044:0076:EN:PDF>

<sup>7</sup> Regulation (EU) No 232/2014

<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2014:077:0027:0043:EN:PDF>

<sup>8</sup> See EU Joint Programming Guidance Pack, available at: <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/minisite/eu-joint-programming-guidance-pack-2015>



Joint Programming is a common undertaking co-led by the European Commission (EuropeAid) and the European External Action Service (EEAS). In-country it is steered by EU Delegations and usually involves all EU Member States present and other like-minded donors.

Since 2012, a Joint Programming process has been agreed in more than 40 partner countries. In most countries Joint Programming is expected to start within the 2014-2020 programming period, in line with the timing of the next national development plan of the partner country. See Annex 5 for the current state of play.

## 5. DRAFT INTERVENTION LOGIC

In accordance with the provisions of Annex II to the Council conclusions on the EU Common Position for the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, Busan, November 2011, the objectives of Joint Programming were to:


- Enhance the effectiveness and coherence of EU and Member States' aid;
- Increase the impact and delivering better results;
- Reduce fragmentation;
- Increase transparency, predictability and accountability;
- Be open to all relevant development stakeholders.

The programmatic documents do not include an Intervention Logic (IL) of the joint programming process. The following intervention logic has been drawn together with the Inter-Service Steering Group (ISG)<sup>9</sup> members as a basis for further discussion and validation with the main stakeholders. The evaluation will go through the Intervention Logic and test the main assumptions made when going through the logical chain from inputs to impact.

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<sup>9</sup> See Chapter 7 for the composition of the Group

# Draft Intervention Logic of JP



The evaluation will not assess results for final beneficiaries (i.e. people from the partner countries). For some of the case study countries it will be possible to go through the Intervention Logic and test the assumptions from input to outcomes whereas for others it will stop at activities/outputs level.

## 6. SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

### 6.1 Temporal scope

The evaluation covers the period 2011-2015.

### 6.2 Geographical scope

The evaluation will cover all geographical regions, with specific case studies in order to illustrate different joint programming processes. From the countries where Joint Programming processes have started<sup>10</sup>, the following case studies have been **preliminarily identified**, taking into account availability of data, the various stages of the process reached (variety of progress) and geographical balance: Bolivia, Burundi, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Mali, Moldova, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Senegal, Uganda and Zambia. The list of the case studies will be adjusted during the inception phase.

A comparative analysis will be undertaken for case studies by assessing the situation before and after the Joint Programming process began. For the “before” a contextual assessment will be made of enabling factors that led to the JP process (for instance other coordination structures in place of previous related EU initiatives) and a baseline will be determined from when the actual JP process started. In this respect, it is suggested to also include Zambia, since it had been decided

<sup>10</sup> <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/document/joint-programming-tracker>

not to move to Joint Programming based on the argument that current processes already met the Joint Programming objectives. Assessment of this case could help to compare Joint Programming cases with a non-Joint Programming, which could provide further insight in the added value of Joint Programming.

The case studies will provide evidence on the existing spectrum regarding joint programming processes by stressing different models/levels of JP.

### 6.3 Thematic scope

The evaluation covers the **Joint Programming process**, by which one should understand the process as a whole that started with the first discussions about the possibility to undertake Joint Programming in a specific country, the decision made in this respect, the drafting and approval of the programmatic documents, the monitoring of the joint strategies and their outcomes (from the Intervention Logic above).

#### Added value

The evaluation should focus on the assessment of the **added value** of **Joint Programming** and additional benefits for the various stakeholders (Member States HQs and field staff, governments of partner countries) in comparison to bilateral programming and to other coordination mechanisms.

- **To what extent has the JP process added value to bilateral programming and to other coordination mechanisms?**

Following consultations with the members of the Inter-Service Steering Group, the following **evaluation questions and issues** have been identified to be further examined. This is an **indicative list** which will be further discussed and can be refined during the inception phase of this evaluation.

When assessing the questions, the following objectives should be addressed, in conformity with the intervention logic described in the previous chapter: (i) increased coherence of EU and MS development cooperation; (ii) increased ownership of the partner country; (iii) increased visibility of EU; (iv) reduced fragmentation; (v) reduced transaction costs; (vi) better aid predictability and transparency.

#### a. Relevance

- **To what extent the current objectives and assumptions of Joint Programming were and are still valid?** - (i.e. responding to critical needs and problems affecting the effectiveness of the development policy). It should be considered how the enabling environment for Joint Programming has changed over time at various levels (EU Institutions, Member States and partner country level) and what were the driving factors supporting and/or hindering that change.
- It should analyse the relevance for the partner country: **To what extent was the joint programming process adapted to its respective context?**

#### b. Effectiveness

- **To what extent the objectives of Joint Programming have been achieved or are in the process of being achieved?** In addition, it will be assessed what the **determining factors** were which influenced the achievement (or non-achievement). When doing so, a key element is to describe/define the assumed incentive structures and subsequently assess whether these incentive structures for Joint Programming have created stimuli for the various stakeholders. Incentives should be defined from political, institutional, organisational and individual perspectives. A particular emphasis should be put on the partner countries' role.

### c. Coherence

- **To what extent has Joint Programming been in line and responsive to the principles of development cooperation of the EU, EU Member States and other donors?**
- **To what extent has Joint Programming been in line with the EU's and Member States' interests and commitments?**

### d. Efficiency

- **How were the inputs used in order to achieve the outputs? Were resources used in the right way?** When dealing with these questions, the following aspects should be taken into account:
  - ✓ Time and resources invested in the process of Joint Programming by the headquarters (HQ) of the Commission and of the European External Action Service in Brussels, delegations and MS (desk-based and in-country support to the process in developing roadmaps, design and drafting of Joint Programming documents, Joint Programming implementation and monitoring, etc.).
  - ✓ The quality of Joint Programming outputs and process (learning curve effect).
  - ✓ Adequacy of HQs targeted Joint Programming guidance<sup>11</sup> and promotion.
  - ✓ Relationship between HQs' and decentralised levels in decision making on Joint Programming.
  - ✓ Effect on transaction costs for donors in the short- and, if possible, long-term (for instance through joint/shared analysis; sharing of workload; relationship between Joint Programming documents and bilateral programming documents; effects on donors' coordination; exit strategies: changes at field and HQ level).
  - ✓ Effect on transaction costs for partner countries.

### e. Sustainability

- **Could Joint Programming become the main programming tool and process for EU and MS cooperation and how?** What are the main factors in order to ensure this sustainability, including ownership by partner countries?

The evaluation shall provide a set of **conclusions** (based on objective, credible, reliable and valid findings) and related **recommendations** (clear enough to be translated into strategies and into operational choices, by the Commission and EEAS and should be set in the present international context and EU identified co-operation priorities).

## **7. RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF THE EVALUATION**

The evaluation lead and responsibility lie with DG DEVCO Evaluation Unit. The progress of the evaluation will be followed closely by an Inter-Service Steering Group whose principal functions will be to:

- Discuss and comment on the Terms of Reference drawn up by the DEVCO Evaluation Unit;
- Discuss draft reports produced by the evaluation team;
- Ensure the evaluation team has access to and consults all information sources and documentation on activities undertaken;
- Discuss and comment on the quality of work done by the evaluation team;

<sup>11</sup> <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/minisite/eu-joint-programming-guidance-pack-2015>

- Provide inputs to the Quality Assessment Grid;
- Provide feedback on the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation.

The group will consist of DG DEVCO Evaluation Unit (lead), the Joint Programming teams in EEAS and DG DEVCO as well as representatives from the Secretariat-General, DG NEAR and regional and thematic representatives from EEAS and DG DEVCO. Because of the joint nature of Joint Programming, this will be also a joint evaluation. Therefore, the evaluation units and/or Joint Programming experts of the MS have been invited to participate in the evaluation process. Until now, France, Italy and the Netherlands expressed their interest to be actively involved in the evaluation process.

The ISG members communicate with the evaluation team via the Evaluation manager.

All meetings with the ISG will be attended by at least the team leader and one sectoral expert member of the evaluation team. Other experts will be available by phone.

For the initial Briefing Meeting, the team leader may wish to bring further relevant members of the team.

For all meetings, the contractor shall prepare draft meeting minutes to be distributed by the Evaluation manager after their approval.

## 8. PROCESS AND DELIVERABLES

The overall technical guidance is available on the web page of the DG DEVCO Evaluation Unit under the following address: [http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/evaluation\\_guidelines/](http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/evaluation_guidelines/)

The Better Regulation Guidelines and toolbox are available at: [http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/guidelines/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/guidelines/index_en.htm)

The basic approach to the assignment consists of three *main phases*, which encompasses several stages. *Deliverables* in the form of reports<sup>12</sup> and slide presentations should be submitted at the end of the corresponding stages.

The table below summaries these phases:

Evaluation Phases:	Methodological Stages:	Deliverables <sup>13</sup> :
1. <u>Desk phase</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inception: Structuring of the evaluation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Slide presentation</li> <li>➤ Inception Report (<i>electronic format only</i>)</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Data collection</li> <li>• Analysis</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Desk Report (<i>electronic format only</i>)</li> </ul>
2. <u>Field phase</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Data collection</li> <li>• Verification of the hypothesis</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Slide presentation + case study notes</li> </ul>

<sup>12</sup> For each Report a draft version is to be presented. For all reports, the contractor may either accept or reject through a *response sheet* the comments provided by the Evaluation manager. In case of rejection, the contractor must justify (in writing) the reasons for rejection. When the comment is accepted, a reference to the text in the report (where the relevant change has been made) has to be included in the response sheet.

<sup>13</sup> The contractors must provide, whenever requested and in any case at the end of the evaluation, the list of all document reviewed, data collected and databases built.

Evaluation Phases:	Methodological Stages:	Deliverables <sup>13</sup> :
3. <u>Synthesis phase</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Analysis</li> <li>• Judgements</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Draft Final Report (<i>electronic format and hard copy</i>)</li> <li>➤ Final Report (<i>electronic format and hard copy</i>)</li> <li>➤ Slide presentation</li> </ul>

All reports will be written in English. Reports must be written in Arial or Times New Roman minimum 11 and 12 respectively, single spacing.

The Inception report, desk report, debriefing after the field phase and draft final report will be presented and discussed with the Inter service group, during a half day meeting in Brussels. The presence of the Team leader and of at least another key expert is required.

The ISG comments shall be taken into account in a revised version of the document or a substantiated explanation shall be provided by the Consultants and recompiled in a dedicated “Response sheet”.

### 8.1. The Desk Phase

The Desk Phase comprises two components: the Inception stage covering a presentation and the delivery of the ***Inception Report*** and a second stage which ends with the production of the ***Desk Report***.

#### Briefing in Brussels

The Desk phase will start with a 2 day Briefing for the Team Leader and the key experts in the team. The purpose of the Briefing is for the team to meet the Evaluation Manager and ISG members, to discuss the objectives of the evaluation, what is to be evaluated and to make sure that the consultants have a good understanding of expectations of the exercise (evaluation approach and process). The meetings will also include a discussion on the intervention logic and evaluation questions included in the ToR, with a view to further refining them. Initial meetings on subject matter will be held with key internal stakeholders to complete necessary information.

#### Inception Report

The purpose of the inception report is for the evaluation team to demonstrate a sound understanding of what is to be evaluated, and how the team proposes to undertake the work to deliver a robust product. The Report should be no longer than 70 pages. Additional annexes may be used if deemed necessary.

As a minimum, the Inception Report should contain the following elements:

1. An **analysis** of the context for the joint programming process (based on a review of political, policy, implementation and decision documents: Lisbon Treaty, Council Conclusions, Heads of Mission report, letters/memo’s/notes, EU DGs meetings, Technical seminars, JP Regional Workshops, JP Documents, JP Roadmaps);
2. The **reconstructed intervention logic (IL)** of the joint programming process from the draft IL presented in this ToRs. This should include both a narrative and a diagram which captures key aspects;

3. A final set of **evaluation questions**<sup>14</sup>; appropriate **judgement criteria** for each evaluation question and relevant quantitative and qualitative **indicators** for each criterion. The aim is to ensure a solid evaluation matrix to provide a rigorous evidence base with which to respond to the evaluation questions;
4. **A mapping** of the activities undertaken to support the joint programming process;
5. The **evaluation design** outlining the information/data to be collected and crucially its availability, and its sources; how the intervention logic will be used; link the data/information to each question; outline the proposed method for collecting the data, and methods of analysis for each question should be clearly described. It should also be explained why the respective methods have been chosen. Any limitations must be clearly identified;
6. **The final list of the case studies** (a minimum of 12 case studies will have to be carried out);
7. The **approach towards quality assurance** throughout the different phases of the evaluation;
8. A detailed **work plan** for the separate phases of the evaluation within an overall calendar for the whole evaluation.

### ISG Meeting on the Inception Report

A meeting will be held with the ISG in Brussels, to present (*slide presentation*) the key aspects of the Inception Report, including the evaluation design, intervention logic and the evaluation questions.

These documents will subsequently be revised as necessary to take into account any comments from the ISG and a **final version of the inception report should be submitted**. This shall be formally approved by the Evaluation Unit before initiating the desk phase.

### The Desk Report

Upon approval of the *Inception Report*, the team of consultants will proceed to prepare and present a **Desk Report**. 7 visits (with a duration of one day per visit) to EU Member States' Headquarters should be undertaken in order to conduct interviews and collect data.

The purpose of the Desk Report is to develop aspects of the approach/methods, and substantially to offer a first analysis and elements of response to the evaluation questions. The Desk Report should provide confidence that the contractors have a sound analysis, and the evaluation is progressing appropriately. The Desk Report should be no longer than 50 pages. Additional annexes may be used if deemed necessary.

The desk report should include at least the following elements:

- (1) **Country case studies** to be carried out for **12 different and representative countries** (selected in the Inception Report in order to maximise the lesson learning opportunities from the evaluation). These will be deepened during the field phase through field visits (according to specific criteria detailed in the Desk Report);
- (2) A first **analysis and first elements of response** to each evaluation question and the hypothesis and assumptions to be tested during the field phase;
- (3) Progress in the **gathering of data**. The complementary data required for analysis and for data collection during the field mission must be identified;

<sup>14</sup> Upon validation by the Evaluation Unit, the evaluation questions become contractually binding

- (4) **Methodological design**, including the evaluation design, data collection tools to be applied in the field phase, and appropriate methods to analyse the information, indicating any limitations;
- (5) A detailed **work plan for the field phase**: a list with brief descriptions of activities for in-depth analysis in the field. The Evaluators must explain their representativeness and the value added of the planned visits;
- (6) The appropriate **format for country notes**.

The contractor will present (slides presentation) and discuss the Desk Report with the ISG in a half-day meeting in Brussels. The Desk Report will be finalised on the basis of the comments received.

The Field mission can only go ahead after authorisation from the Evaluation Manager.

## 8.2 Field phase

The fieldwork shall be undertaken on the basis set out and approved in the Desk report. The work plan and schedule of the mission will be agreed in advance with the evaluation manager (in principle at least three weeks before the mission starts). If it appears necessary to substantially deviate from the agreed fieldwork approach and/or schedule (duration, number of experts, category), the contractor must obtain the approval of the Evaluation manager before any changes can be applied. The related eligible costs will be revised accordingly. At the conclusion of the field mission the contractor will make a slide presentation on the preliminary findings of the evaluation to:

- (1) the appropriate EU Delegation(s) and Member States' embassies, during a de-briefing meeting in-country;
- (2) the ISG in Brussels [half-day].

The evaluation team is expected to undertake **12 field missions with a duration of 4 days maximum per mission limited to the capital of the visited country**. The countries to be visited will be selected among the ones from the country case studies analysed during the desk phase in accordance with agreed criteria.

The team will also proceed to prepare brief **country notes**, for each of the country case studies, for delivery to the Evaluation Unit no later than ten working days after returning from the field. These notes (which will appear in annex to the final report) should be written in the **predominant working language** of the Delegation in the country concerned (*English, French or Spanish*) in line with the guidance in [Annex 2](#).

The Evaluation Team should also present a proposed **table of content and structure for the final report**, based on the structure set out in [Annex 3](#), to be agreed with the Evaluation Unit and the Inter-service Group.

## 8.3. Synthesis and Dissemination phases

### 8.3.1 The Draft Final Report

The contractor will submit the **Draft Final Report**, as per the structure set out in Annex 3. The main report should not be longer than 70 pages. In formulating the recommendations, those cases where joint programming was not fully achieved should be addressed, in line with the provisions from the DCI and ENI Regulations (Article 11 and Article 5 respectively).

The **Draft Final Report** will be discussed with the ISG in Brussels. ISG members will send their comments to the Evaluation Manager who will send consolidated comments to the contractor. The contractor will make appropriate modifications to the Draft Final Report taking into consideration comments received during meetings with the ISG.



### 8.3.2 Stakeholders' workshop

Once the Draft Final Report has been approved, a stakeholders' workshop will be organised together with the Member States in order to discuss the findings, the conclusions and the preliminary recommendations. The results of the discussion will be integrated in the revised version of the report. The contractor should prepare the Minutes of the workshop which will be then annexed to the Final Report.

### 8.3.2 The Final Report

The contractor will prepare the **Final Report** taking into account the comments received. The contractor thoroughly proof read, and copy edit as necessary.

The Final Report must be approved by the Evaluation Manager before it is printed. 5 page Executive summaries will be supplied in English and French.

The offer will be based on *50 hard copies of the **Final main report** in English and 2 hard copies with all annexes.*

The Final report will be presented in a standard model showing a photo proposed by the Contractor and approved by the contracting authority. A non-editable version on USB Stick support shall be added to each printed Final main report.

### 8.3.3 Dissemination Seminar

The final report will be presented by the team during a one day **seminar** in Brussels. The purpose of the seminar is to present the findings, the conclusions and the recommendations of the evaluation to all main stakeholders concerned. The seminar will be attended by the Evaluation Team Leader and at least one other expert.

The Evaluation Team shall prepare a presentation (Power point) for the seminar. This presentation shall be considered as a product of the evaluation in the same way as the reports and the data basis. For the seminar 70 copies of the report and 10 reports with full printed annexes have to be produced as well as 30 copies of the Executive summary in English. A non-editable version on USB Stick support shall be added to each printed Final main report. All outputs, reports or any product required for dissemination of results shall benefit from the state of the art graphic design services.

The contractor shall submit minutes of the seminar; these minutes as well as the updated slide presentation will be included as an annex of the Final Report.

The seminar logistics (room rental, catering etc.) costs are **not** to be included in the offer. However, the cost related to the presence of the experts (travel cost, per diem etc.) is to be covered by the offer.<sup>15</sup>

## 8.4 Consultation

The main stakeholders for this evaluation (non-exhaustive lists):

Member States' Stakeholders

- Evaluation services within the Member States;
- Programming services within the Member States;
- Member States' Embassies in partner countries.

<sup>15</sup> Other seminars and/or dissemination activities may be requested. In case of financial implications on the total contractual amount, such request (requests) will be formalised via a rider.

### Partner countries' Stakeholders

- Governments of the partner countries;
- International organisations present in partner countries;
- Other donors present in partner countries;
- Non-state actors.

### Stakeholders' consultation:

#### 1. Inception and desk phase

- ✓ During the inception and desk phase, the stakeholders will be consulted via phone/email/face to face discussions. The use of interviews, surveys, questionnaires and other tools will be considered and decided upon during the inception phase. Their contributions will be considered when finalising the Inception and Desk phase reports.

#### 2. Field phase

- ✓ During the field phase several partner countries (among the ones identified for the case studies) will be visited by the evaluation team. The evaluators will meet the main stakeholders in the partner countries relevant for the scope of the evaluation. Interviews, focus groups, small workshops will be organised in the field. After the conclusion of the field missions, debriefing sessions will be organised with the staff from the respective Delegations and with the members of the ISG in Brussels.

#### 3. Draft Final Report

- ✓ Once the Draft Final Report has been approved, a stakeholder workshop will be organised together with the Member States in order to discuss the findings, the conclusions and the preliminary recommendations. The Minutes of the workshop will be annexed to the Final report. The results of the discussion will be integrated in the revised version of the report.

#### 4. Dissemination

- ✓ A dissemination seminar will be organised in Brussels on the basis of the Final Report once the evaluation has been completed. The Minutes of the seminar will be annexed to the Final report.

Member States may also present the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation at national level in the framework of various events. The results of the evaluation may also be presented at local level by the EU Delegations and EU Member States' embassies.

## 9. EVALUATION TEAM

The evaluation team is expected to demonstrate experience and expertise in:

- **Development policy of the EU and of MS** as well as their programming procedures;
- **International aid and development effectiveness agenda and principles**, i.e. Paris Declaration, Accra Agenda for Action, Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (Busan), and ensuing work streams;
- **Evaluation methods and techniques in general, and in particular, methods for measuring change in complex contexts and over time, and process tracing;**
- **Evaluation in the field of external relations and development cooperation;**

- **Ability to function to a high standard** in the following languages: **English, French and Spanish**;
- The **Team Leader should have excellent communication, team co-ordination, presentation and report writing skills in English**;
- Assets: experience in Sector Programmes (Sector Budget Support, Pool Funding, and EC project procedures) and/or other joint approaches at sector/thematic level: sector analysis; sector strategies; programme design; results frameworks; sector level division of labour and complementarity; policy dialogue; joint monitoring and reporting mechanisms.

Taking into account that this evaluation covers all regions recipient of EU development aid, **expertise in the different geographic areas** to be covered should exist in the team composition.

The key skills are indicated in bold.<sup>16</sup>

The team composition should be justified, identifying the particular expertise and experience an expert has to contribute to the requirements. The team coordination provisions should be clearly described. A **breakdown of working days** per expert per phase should be provided.

The Contractor remains fully responsible for the quality of the deliverables. Any report which does not meet the required quality will be rejected.

During the evaluation of the offers, the Evaluation Unit reserves the right to interview by phone one or several members of the evaluation teams proposed.

Regarding conflict of interest, experts who have been associated in the design of joint programming strategies/documents or implementation of the joint programming process covered by this evaluation, are excluded from this assignment. Should a conflict of interest be identified in the course of the evaluation, it should be immediately reported to the evaluation manager for further analysis and appropriate measures.

The Framework Contractor must make available appropriate logistical support for the experts, including their travel and accommodation arrangements for each assignment, the secretarial support, appropriate software and communication means. The experts will be equipped with the standard equipment, such as an individual laptop, computer, mobile phones, etc. No additional cost for these items may be included in the offer.

## 10. TIMING

The Evaluation is due to start in January 2016. **Nota Bene** that the duration of this evaluation is 9 months. It is therefore expected that the evaluation team will have substantive time availability within this contract period, to ensure that meeting this time-frame is possible. As part of the methodology, the framework contractor must fill-in the timetable in the Annex 4.

## 11. OFFER FOR THE ASSIGNMENT

The financial offer will be itemised to allow the verification of the fees compliance with the framework contract terms as well as, for items under (h) to (k) of the contractual price breakdown model, whether the prices quoted correspond to the market prices. In particular, the local travel costs will be detailed and if necessary, justified in an Explanatory note. The per diems will be based on: [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/funding/about-calls-tender/procedures-and-practical-guide-prag/diems\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/funding/about-calls-tender/procedures-and-practical-guide-prag/diems_en).

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<sup>16</sup> In their absence, the 80 points threshold may not be reached.

The offer will be written in English, (font Times New Roman 12 or Arial 11), single spacing. The Total length of sections 2, 3 and 4 of the technical offer (Framework contract, Annexe 1, section 10.3. b) **should not exceed 15 pages, a CV may not exceed 4 pages.**

The methodology submitted shall not contain terms such as "if time allows", "if the budget allows", "if the data are available" etc. Should it appear that an activity foreseen in the methodology is impossible or inappropriate to be carried out due to force majeure or other reasons in the interest of the assignment, the change to the methodology as well as its financial impact must be agreed by the Evaluation manager.

### 11.1 TECHNICAL OFFERS EVALUATION CRITERIA

The offers must contain as minimum all items referred to in the Annex 1, art. 10.3.b. of the Framework contract.

The Contracting authority selects the offer with the best value for money using an 80/20 weighing between technical quality and price. The offers evaluation criteria and their respective weights are:

<b>Total score for Organisation and methodology</b>	<b>Maximum</b>
Understanding of ToR	10
Organization of tasks including timing	10
Evaluation approach, working method, analysis	25
Quality control system	5
<b>Sub Total</b>	<b>50</b>
<b>Experts/ Expertise:</b>	
Team leader	20
Other experts	30
<b>Sub Total</b>	<b>50</b>
<b>Overall total score</b>	<b>100</b>

The offer will follow the guidance set out in the Framework contract. The following additional information is also provided. The offer should **demonstrate (not simply state)**:

- (1) A clear understanding of the overall scope of what is to be evaluated, **in your own words**, and its key implications for your offer;
- (2) The relevance of the skills and experience of the proposed team for the evaluation;
- (3) The evaluation approach
  - Methodological aspects – outline of the evaluation design, and analytical methods and data collection methods proposed and justified. Particular attention should be given to how you propose to measure change over the period, and (2)how you propose to undertake process tracing;
  - Stakeholder engagement – identify the ways in which you propose to engage with stakeholders over the course of the evaluation.
- (4) Organisation
  - Set out the schedule for the evaluation;
  - Clearly identify the aspects of quality control you will provide

# Annex B. Methodological approach

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### 1.1 Overall methodological approach

The methodology for this evaluation followed **EuropeAid’s methodological guidelines** for thematic and other complex evaluations, which is itself based on the OECD/DAC approach. It takes account of recent developments promoted by DG DEVCO’s Evaluation Unit, and good practices developed by ADE for strategic evaluations. A **theory-based non-experimental design** was applied for this evaluation<sup>17</sup>, using a reconstructed intervention logic analysis to consolidate all the most relevant elements of EU cooperation in a single framework that links rationale to strategy, projects and results. This evaluation followed a rigorous approach so as to guarantee the credibility of the analysis. It was structured around a set of eight Evaluation Questions.


### 1.2 Evaluation process

This evaluation has been structured in four stages: the inception stage, the desk stage (both forming the desk phase), the field phase, and the synthesis phase. The EuropeAid Evaluation Unit was responsible for the management and the supervision of the evaluation. Its progress has been followed closely by a Reference Group (RG) consisting of representatives of all concerned services in the Commission and EEAS, under the Evaluation Unit’s supervision.

The evaluation process followed a well-defined sequential approach. The phases with the main activities, deliverables, and meetings with the RG are presented in the figure below.

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<sup>17</sup> Theory-based evaluation is an approach in which attention is paid to *theories* of policy makers, programme managers or other stakeholders, i.e. collections of assumptions, and hypotheses - empirically testable - that are logically linked together.

**Figure 1: Evaluation process**

### 1.3 Revised Intervention Logic

Based on the original Intervention Logic (IL) provided in the ToR (see Annex A), the team provided a more detailed IL where the Inputs were “unbundled” to identify better the full range of stakeholders involved. It resulted in the IL diagram (shown in volume 1, Figure 2), and an accompanying narrative presented below. The intervention logic constituted the framework for the formulation of the Evaluation Questions.

#### Presenting the Intervention Logic

##### Inputs

The full range of stakeholders involved consisted of:

- On the EU side, (i) EU headquarters staff (EU HQ), (ii) EU Delegation staff in the field (EUD); (iii) MS headquarters staff (MS HQ); (iv) MS embassy staff in the field (MS Field). In addition, the EC contracted a number of consultants to assist with the implementation of the JP process (technical assistance, TA).
- The involvement of the Partner Country Government (PCG) was in principle key, and the existence of a national development strategy (NDS) or similar instrument around which it is possible to align external aid is important.
- Other actors – non-EU development partners on the donor side, civil society and private sector on the partner country side – were not included since JP dialogue is primarily between the EU system and partner country.

##### Assumptions regarding Inputs (“A1”)

- There is continued strong political support from EU leadership to the concept and practice of Joint Programming (*political will*), and there is strong support from DEVCO, DG NEAR and EEAS management to JP implementation.

- There is sufficient staff in DEVCO, DG NEAR and EEAS so that the back-stopping and guidance services to the field are sufficient. This is a particular concern as the number of JP countries increases and EU resources may become stretched.
- The EU dedicates sufficient financial resources for JP implementation, including for contracting TA to support JP planning and implementation in the field.
- EUDs have sufficient management and staff to manage the foreseen JP with all its ramifications and uncertainties.
- Sufficient number of MS HQs are supportive and engaged so that there is a “critical mass” of EU actors that make JP meaningful as a EU joint process (*political will*).
- Sufficient number of MS embassies on the ground engage in the JP process to lend it credibility and content (*political will*).
- MS embassies have sufficient staff and skills to play their expected role in the JP process in the country in question.
- The partner country government is positive to the idea of a JP process and is at least minimally engaged and supportive of the idea and the process (*political will*).
- The partner government has a minimum national policy/priority instruments in place that allow the JP to programme resources based on explicit national priorities.

### **Consultation and Dialogue Processes**

JP is an intensive consultation, dialogue and consensus-building process from start to finish. This is at the same time one of the most vulnerable parts of the JP. The dialogue process is in part dependent on individuals and personal relations among the key actors; the time and skills they are willing or able to commit to JP; the support they feel they get from colleagues and other parties to the process; the pressure and demands they get from respective HQs to agree or negotiate particular conclusions. Because of the resource intensity and potential vulnerability of these activities, the evaluation paid attention to the consultation and dialogue experiences.

### **Assumptions regarding Consultations/Dialogue (“A2”)**

- The EUD in particular has a realistic understanding of the likely demands on staff time and possible stumbling blocks of the consultation and dialogue that JP requires.
- Those leading the consultations have the experience to facilitate dialogue that is solution-oriented and consensus-building.
- The parties enter into the dialogue processes with a good understanding of what is required and expected both on the process and results sides.
- There is recognition that JP is complicated and that mishaps may occur and hoped-for results may be delayed, without this derailing the overall process – there is sufficient patience that the parties will continue the process.

### **Activities**

Activities and Outputs constitute logical chains, as outlined in the Roadmap Guidance Note. The parties first agree the Roadmap, subsequently produce the Joint Analysis that should include principles of alignment and the priority needs to be addressed. Then donors arrive at an agreement on the division of labour draft a joint strategy which is validated at EU and MS head offices together with the financial frames by donor by area.

### Specific Activities

There are three key activities:

- The **Roadmap** is where the partners to the JP come together and both understand what the process and end results are expected to be, but also contribute to the design of how to get to the various results. The Roadmap *process* is thus as important as the *document*: identifying all the actors who wish to participate on which understanding and what they will contribute to make the JP process a success. This is thus the most open part of the JP process, and may require considerable diplomatic skills, good knowledge of the interests and constraints of the actors, and the patience to bring this all together.
- The **Joint Analysis** is the next step, which is both to provide a comprehensive, critical yet constructive picture of the situation and overarching issues facing the partner country, and thus the potential for improved development cooperation that could be envisaged for future EU support. This analysis can be in part compiled from existing work done by different members of the EU community or other credible sources; can be done by EUD and/or EU MS staff, in part with support from external consultants. At the end of the day, however, the Joint Analysis needs to be accepted and approved by the parties as the foundation stone for the Joint Strategy.
- Once the analysis is in place, the **Joint Response** is developed, providing the division of labour among the development partners as well as their funding commitments for the financial frames. This process may contain considerable negotiation, to sort out which sectors to prioritize, and the funds each donor will provide.

#### Assumptions regarding Activities (“A3”)

- All parties that are interested in participating in the JP have been identified and invited to contribute [it becomes more challenging and costly if actors enter the process later – agreements already reached may have to be re-negotiated].
- All parties to the Roadmap have the time and commitment to provide promised inputs at the appropriate points in the process.
- All donors participating in the Joint Analysis agree with what is presented as the partner country situation [this is the foundation for both the subsequent sector focus with the agreed division of labour, and the sector and financial commitments].

### Producing Outputs

The Outputs are straightforward results from the activities that have been agreed in order to produce the EU’s system’s Joint Strategy. The **Roadmap**, the **Joint Analysis** and the **Joint Response** are the three **Outputs** to be produced. Besides, the **financial frames by donor and by sector** are an important part of the harmonisation component of JP and fundamental to the Joint Response – it is the only documentable aid commitment. This is therefore included as a separate Output.

#### Assumptions regarding the Outputs (“A4”):

- The agreed Roadmap is (largely) adhered to in terms of timeline and commitments of required Inputs, requiring follow-up and leadership by the EUD.
- The political commitments by the core actors to the JP process are delivered on [the point is that “politically correct” statements are sometimes made but the actual follow-through that ensures that actors provide visible support may not happen].
- The resources available – staff and finances – are sufficient to produce the Outputs.



### Producing Intermediate Outcomes

From the production of the Outputs, the JP process is expected to generate a number of further outcomes in various steps. We propose introducing Intermediate Outcomes (IOs) to provide more coherence to the Outputs-to-Outcomes chain.

On the road to delivering Outcomes, three intermediary steps can be disentangled: (i) better coordinated EU aid; (ii) better coordinated EU voice; and (iii) better aligned EU aid. These are in fact important for understanding how the hoped-for Outcomes of JP can come about, and therefore have been included as explicit intermediary steps in the revised intervention logic.

- The division of labour should ensure that EU aid is **better coordinated** both *between* and *within* sectors: the aid is programmed based on the same set of principles.
- The JP process is about bringing actors together around common objectives and instruments. This implies an increased agreement on what is to be achieved, and how. Since the JP is EU-based and in practice led and managed by the EUD, it is natural to assume that the EU as a system is seen to have a **more coordinated voice**.
- The achievement of a **better-aligned EU aid** hinges as much on the partner country as on the EU. It is crucial that the partner has a credible and operational national development strategy upon which the parties can agree the division of labour and financial frames.

### Assumptions regarding Intermediate Outcomes (“A5”):

- EU member states channel a greater share of their funding based on the Joint Strategy.
- *Within* the priority sectors of the Joint Strategy, EU donors ensure closer cooperation of funds programming and allocations (avoiding duplication, overlaps).
- EU member states come together around a more coherent EU view to their assistance, and the EU as an actor fronts this common view.
- The partner country has a credible and operational national development strategy that the EU partners agree to use as the corner stone for their aid programming.

### Delivering Outcomes

The Outcomes are the core of what Joint Programming is meant to deliver. Five Outcomes are identified in the draft IL: (i) increased ownership, (ii) increased EU visibility, (iii) reduced aid fragmentation, (iv) reduced transaction costs, and (v) better aid predictability and transparency. The sixth outcome identified in the draft IL is covered by the intermediate outcomes presented above.

**Increased ownership:** This is defined in OECD-DAC’s summary statement of the Paris Declaration and Accra Action as “*Partner countries exercise effective leadership over their development policies and strategies and co-ordinate development actions*” while donors commit to “*Respect partner country leadership and help strengthen their capacity to exercise it*”<sup>18</sup>. The JP process requires that there is genuine partner country commitment. Understanding how partner country authorities see the JP and thus its interest in committing to it may therefore be a key issue for the evaluation to look into.

**Increased EU visibility:** While most Outcomes in the draft IL derive from the Aid Effectiveness agenda, the Visibility Outcome is based on the political dimensions of the Lisbon Treaty. It speaks to the interests of the EU as a policy making and political body and is considered an increasingly important dimension of JP. Increased visibility needs to answer both “visibility *of* whom” and “visibility *to* whom”. The first asks *who* will become more visible, and the idea is that this is not just the EU but also its member states. The second is about being seen as more important by national

<sup>18</sup> See <http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/34428351.pdf> page 3.

authorities, but also to other national actors as well as to the donor community that is not part of the JP process.

**Reduced aid fragmentation:** If the JP succeeds in programming a larger share of total EU aid, this should reduce aid fragmentation as far as EU funding is concerned. But aid fragmentation may *increase* if new actors come in and/or funding agencies that are not part of the JP process increase their aid and is not in line with the Joint Response.

**Reduced Transaction Costs:** The total costs of aid management – from initial programming to final delivery of aid-funded activities – are expected to be reduced, both on the donor and the partner country sides. On the donor side the issue is if JP can reduce total programming costs for the EU actors involved. For the partner country government, there are costs both on programming and implementation, and the latter this evaluation cannot assess. While the ToR raise the issue of short-term versus long-term transaction costs, this also is difficult to address since there is so far not sufficient evidence to know if in fact long-term programming costs may fall with successful JP.

**Better aid predictability and transparency:** This is an Outcome that can be achieved based solely on the EU system’s own decisions and actions because any improved publication of financial data with a longer time horizon will improve predictability and transparency no matter what other actors do.

#### Assumptions regarding Outcomes (“A6”):

- **Increased ownership:** This assumes a national leadership that (i) is development oriented, (ii) has programming instruments and procedures that are credible with respect to priorities and implementation, and (iii) reflects to an acceptable extent genuine needs and priorities of the country.
- **Increased EU visibility:** This assumes that the EU system is able to ensure that its member states become more visible as the EU system aid is more recognised, and that with more funding through the EU, that the EU as an actor becomes more visible.
- **Reduced aid fragmentation:** The probability of JP reducing aid fragmentation is higher the greater the share of EU assistance is of total aid.
- **Reduced transaction costs:** The assumption is that moving to JP implies some up-front investment costs but that over time there will be a savings to the EU system as a whole due to less duplication of analytical work, joint dialogue etc. The extent to which the JP process will in fact lead to these kinds of systemic gains will depend on a host of factors that this evaluation is not likely to be able to analyse in-depth, but where key actors’ impressions of possible costs and benefits can be used as a proxy.

#### Moving Towards Impact

The logic chain from Outcomes to Impacts has been given less attention since the evaluation is not asked to trace delivery all the way to ultimate beneficiaries. The team proposes two overarching Impacts that at the core of the JP process today, namely improved aid effectiveness and increased EU policy dialogue leverage.

**Increased EU aid effectiveness:** is the logical result of the various steps taken by the donors to directly address the aid effectiveness agenda, so if the first steps in the chain are delivered, this is a logical higher-level consequence.

**Increased EU political leverage:** Through JP process, the EU should gain a stronger voice in the overall aid discussion, including presumably with respect to a number of the concerns that the

EU has surrounding its financing, such as human rights, gender equality, and other issues loosely referred to as “*make Europe happen on the ground*”<sup>19</sup>.

The expected impact of the JP *process* is to increase development results.

#### Assumptions regarding Intermediate Impacts (“A7”):

- **Effectiveness of aid** rests on the preceding Outcomes truly addressing their respective effectiveness dimensions, and presumably improve over time.
- **Increased policy dialogue leverage** assumes that increased EU visibility will contribute to increased leverage, and that increased country ownership will also be a contributing factor. The assumption underlying the second linkage is that increased country ownership of the JP has come about as the partner country increasingly recognises the value of the process – and thus the donor partner who is supporting it.

## 1.4 Evaluation questions

In order to provide focus to the evaluation, eight Evaluation Questions (EQs) have been formulated during the structuring stage of the evaluation. They have been detailed with their corresponding Judgement Criteria (JC) and Indicators (I) in an evaluation matrix (see Annex E). The EQs are summarised in the table below.

**Table 1: The Evaluation questions**

<b>EQ1 Relevance</b>	To what extent did JP respond to global and country-level challenges regarding increased aid effectiveness?
<b>EQ2 Effectiveness</b>	To what extent did JP contribute to reducing aid fragmentation?
<b>EQ3 Effectiveness</b>	To what extent did JP improve aid predictability and transparency of EU and MS aid?
<b>EQ4 Ownership</b>	To what extent did JP contribute to improved leadership by the partner country of its own development priorities?
<b>EQ5 Coherence</b>	To what extent has JP contributed to increased coherence of EU and MS strategies and programming at country level?
<b>EQ6 Visibility</b>	To what extent did JP increase the visibility of EU and MS to partner country authorities and other donor partners?
<b>EQ7 Efficiency</b>	To what extent was the EU organised so as to make JP work?
<b>EQ8 Efficiency</b>	To what extent did JP reduce partner countries’ transactions costs and keep them reasonable for the EU and MS?

<sup>19</sup> See <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/document/jp-quick-guide> p. 4.

## 1.5 Evaluation tools

The team relied on a set of tools to collect and analyse data for the analysis (see table below). The combination of these tools enabled the team to collect all the required information at the level of the indicators, and to triangulate the information from different sources with a view to validate (or invalidate) the judgment criteria. The survey (see annex F) provided information from an overall geographic perspective. In-depth desk study and country visits (detailed below) provided specific information at country level. Interviews (detailed below) provided information at both general and country levels. The combination of these tools, sources, and levels of analysis contributed to the robustness of the findings and of the conclusions of the evaluation.

**Table 2: Evaluation tools for the evaluation of the JP process**

Tool	What was the tool used for?
<b>Documentary study:</b> In-depth examination of existing documents	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Provide an understanding of EU and its MS commitment in joint programming of development cooperation, through an examination of policy documents and decisions, as well as the main documents regarding Jp implementation: roadmaps, joint analysis, Heads of Mission reports, etc.</li> <li>▪ Clarify the different steps and stakeholders involved in the process of JP <i>(see bibliography in Annex C)</i></li> </ul>
<b>Interviews</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Collect views of EU staff (HQ and EU Delegations)</li> <li>▪ Collect views of MSs staff (HQ, Embassy staff)</li> <li>▪ Collect views of Partner country government officials</li> <li>▪ As relevant, collect views of other stakeholders: civil society organisations, private sector spokes persons, and other donors. Private sector and civil society, in most countries, have been not involved in the JP process (and therefore not been interviewed by the evaluation team). <i>(see list of persons met in Annex D)</i></li> </ul>
<b>Survey:</b> A structured questionnaire to collect data and opinions from a market perspective	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Systematically collect and analyse the perceptions of the involved stakeholders on the EU side (EU HQ, EUDs, MS HQ, MS Field) on a range of issues covered in the evaluation <i>(see details on the survey in annex F)</i></li> </ul>
<b>Country visits:</b> Visits of EUDs, MS (HQ and Field) and Partner countries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Verify information from oral and documentary sources</li> <li>▪ Collect additional information on JP process <i>(see below)</i></li> </ul>

## 1.6 Country visits

### Member States visits:


A total of 7 **Member State** visits have been conducted during the desk and the field phase. They have consisted in discussions with desk officers and management responsible of JP process. The key questions were likely to revolve around the degree to which the JP process was seen to fulfil their ambitions, how it harmonised with traditional bilateral relations and programming, what had been the positive and negative experiences so far, and what could explain successes and short-comings in the exercises they were familiar with.



Source: ADE

### Field missions:

The field missions consisted of **11 country visits**, conducted during the field phase, between June and September 2016. Three additional countries have been subject to desk studies. Those countries were proposed based on geographic representativity, stages of JP process reached, sufficient security on the ground to allow for country visits, and different country contexts – in particular that at least one or preferably two fragile states were included. Findings of the visits are summarized in country case studies (see from annex G to T).

**Figure 2: Field visits conducted**

(\*)Country cases subject to desk studies

Source: ADE

## 1.7 Joint Programming Process Traces

For two of the countries visited, Kenya and Palestine, the team carried out a mapping of the steps in the JP processes (see attached graphs). In both cases, the team has included the pre-cursor to the JP proper – the Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy (KJAS) process supported by the EU Fast Track Initiative on Division of Labour, and in Palestine the preparation of the EU Local Development Strategy (LDS). In the case of Kenya, the process began already back in 2009, while the LDS started up early 2011.

In the case of Kenya, JP was discussed and first discarded, because of the uncertain political situation on the ground at that time, but at the end of 2012 the EU partners agreed that a JP process should be undertaken. A Joint Cooperation Strategy document providing the principles for joint cooperation was signed in January 2014, and the actual Joint Cooperation Strategy was signed in June 2015 – a two and a half year JP process.

In Palestine, at end of 2012 the Heads of Cooperation recommended to carry out JP, which was endorsed by the Heads of Missions in February 2013. The actual Joint Response with the multi-annual financial frame was initially to be ready October 2016, later brought forward to 2017.


The two processes have been different. In Palestine detailed analytical work was undertaken at sector level, producing a total of 16 sector strategy fiches later brought together under 5 pillars and introducing a Results-Oriented Framework: these two rolling and flexible tools served to build trust and consensus of views amongst EU, MS and like-minded donors (Switzerland, Norway and EUPOL COPPS in two sectors) and provided a common basis for sector policy dialogue. The process has also always had a strong policy and political dimension and the Palestinian Authority has been involved from the beginning in the JP, and in particular in the work over the last two years 2015-2016

Kenya has had a continuous process as far as the formal JP is concerned. In Kenya the process has remained at a more strategic level and has been more focused on aid management and effectiveness concerns. The Kenyan authorities have made it clear that they do not intend to engage much with

the JP. They have, however, been involved in the parallel UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) process, but this has been explained as a function of Kenya being a member state of the UN whereas the JP is considered an EU internal exercise. The Kenyan authorities have also made it clear that they foresee continued bilateral discussions with all EU member states, both as an acknowledgement of “the facts on the ground” – Kenya is considered a strategic partner by a number of MS – but also something that is desired by the government itself.


As can be seen from the graphs, the processes are quite complex and have required both external assistance from international consultants, but have also taken a lot of the EU partners’ time on the ground. The overall timeline – 2.5 to 3.5 years from beginning to end – is also considerable, meaning that continuity and perseverance has been important to be able to come to closure on processes which in these two countries included a large number of actors: 10 MS in Kenya and 14 in Palestine (including Switzerland and Norway).

Figure A: Process Trace, Kenya JP Process





**Figure B: Process Trace, Palestine JP Process**



## 1.8 Challenges and limitations

The evaluation team faced a number of challenges and limitations. The methodological approach followed throughout the evaluation process aimed to mitigate as much as possible these challenges.

**On-going process:** there is a limited number of cases where the JP process is already completed, which made it sometimes difficult to obtain information on the JP process itself, and on certain aspects covered in the evaluation, as would have been desirable. The evaluators considered this with due respect in their analyses and reflected the solidity of argumentation in their rating of the quality of evidence.

**Tight timeframe and budget:** the budget and the overall timeframe for this evaluation was tight in light of ToR requirements regarding notably the stakeholders to meet (12 country visits to be conducted, 7 MS visits, etc.). On this basis, the evaluation approach has been very focused to the essential, in order to meet those requirements.

**Tools:** another challenge regarding the tools was for notably the difficulty in obtaining responses from the targeted interviewees of the survey (see annex F). Again, the evaluators considered this with due respect in their analyses and in the rating of the quality of evidence.

Finally, although the survey and HQ interviews allowed to collect information on-going JP processes at global level, the cases examined in-depth (country cases) are related to cases where the JP was relatively well advanced. This was well considered by the evaluators when analysing the results and providing judgment.

Given the methodological challenges, the team has focused on ensuring that the findings from the field are as robust as possible. The team has therefore carried out the collection of field information in a series of steps. A pilot country case was done at the end of May (Cambodia) that allowed for testing of the basic approach and data collection instruments (the EQs, the draft structure for the country notes). The desk study was subsequently prepared, but instead of just providing a *structure* for the country notes, as asked for in the ToR, the team prepared a complete draft country note for all 11 countries to be visited. This draft note was sent for information to the field in the remaining 10 field countries before the team arrived. The field visits for the following 8 countries were then carried out. With the experience from the field, the survey questionnaire was then finalized. Because one field case had to be dropped, the team proposed that 3 countries be included as desk studies, thus expanding the universe of case countries from the original 12 to 14. The three desk studies and the last two country reviews were then carried out concurrently with the survey. The complete draft country notes were then sent to all persons interviewed, including desk officers at EU HQ, for comments and corrections before they were finalized. Only when all country notes had been finalized did the analysis of the responses to EQs begin<sup>20</sup>. While this held back the team's start-up of the analysis, it was deemed the prudent approach to ensure as accurate and up-to-date information as possible.

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<sup>20</sup> The comments from the last desk review country were received after the others, but they did not in any way alter the content of the country note and thus did not require changes to the draft text that had been prepared.

## Annex C. Documents consulted

The following bibliography presents the list of the documents the team has received/downloaded from Capacity4Dev and additional documents used for the country case studies. The bibliography is presented by order of author (alphabetical) and then year (ascending).

### Main report Documentation

Author	Year	Title	Hyperlink to publication
<b>EU Institutions</b>			
Africa-EU Strategic Partnership	2007	The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership: a Joint Africa-EU Strategy	<a href="http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/documents/eas2007_joint_strategy_en.pdf">http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/documents/eas2007_joint_strategy_en.pdf</a>
Council of the EU	2004	Press Release 8567/04 (Presse 116) - 2577th Council meeting - External Relations - Luxembourg, 26 and 27 April 2004	<a href="http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-04-116_en.pdf">http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-04-116_en.pdf</a>
Council of the EU	2005	Press Release 14172/05 (Presse 289) - 2691st Council meeting - External Relations - Brussels, 21-22 November 2005	<a href="http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/85008.pdf">http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/85008.pdf</a>
Council of the EU	2005	Press Release 8817/05 (Presse 112) 2660th Council meeting - External Relations - Brussels, 23 and 24 May 2005	<a href="http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/87093.pdf">http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/87093.pdf</a>
Council of the EU	2006	Press Release 7939/06 (Presse 95) 723rd Council Meeting - External Relations - Luxembourg, 10-11 April 2006	<a href="http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/89219.pdf">http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/89219.pdf</a>
Council of the EU	2007	EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour in Development Policy - Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council	<a href="http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&amp;f=ST%209558%202007%20INIT">http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&amp;f=ST%209558%202007%20INIT</a>
Council of the EU	2011	Operational Framework on Aid Effectiveness – Consolidated text (18239/10)	Available <a href="#">here</a>
Council of the EU	2011	EU Common Position for the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (Busan, 29 November – 1 December 2011) - Council Conclusions - 3124th Foreign Affairs Council Meetings	<a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/126060.pdf">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/126060.pdf</a>
Council of the EU	2012	Council Conclusions 'Increasing the Impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change' - 3166th Foreign Affairs	<a href="http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/130243.pdf">http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/130243.pdf</a>

		Council meeting - Brussels, 14 May 2012	
Council of the EU	2014	Council Conclusions on the EU common position for the First High Level Meeting of the Global Partnership for effective development co-operation (Mexico City on 15-16 April 2014) – Foreign Affairs Council meeting - Brussels, 17 March 2014	Available <a href="#">here</a>
Council of the EU	2016	Council conclusions on stepping up Joint Programming	<a href="http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/05/12-conclusions-on-stepping-up-joint-programming/">http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/05/12-conclusions-on-stepping-up-joint-programming/</a>
European Commission	2004	Report of the Ad Hoc Working Party on Harmonisation - Advancing Coordination, Harmonisation and Alignment: the Contribution of the EU	<a href="http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&amp;f=ST%2014670%202004%20INIT">http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&amp;f=ST%2014670%202004%20INIT</a>
European Commission	2006	COM(2006) 87 – EU Aid: Delivering more, better and faster	<a href="https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/communication-eu-aid-delivering-more-better-and-faster-20060302_en.pdf">https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/communication-eu-aid-delivering-more-better-and-faster-20060302_en.pdf</a>
European Commission	2006	COM(2006) 88 - Increasing the impact of EU Aid: A common framework for drafting country strategy papers and joint multiannual programming	<a href="https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/communication-framework-drafting-csp-com200688-20060302_en.pdf">https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/communication-framework-drafting-csp-com200688-20060302_en.pdf</a>
European Commission	2010	The Cotonou agreement	<a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201306/20130605ATT67340/20130605ATT67340EN.pdf">http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201306/20130605ATT67340/20130605ATT67340EN.pdf</a>
European Commission	2011	COM(2011) 637 - Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change	<a href="http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/intra_acp_mobility/funding/2012/documents/agenda_for_change_en.pdf">http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/intra_acp_mobility/funding/2012/documents/agenda_for_change_en.pdf</a>
European Commission	2014	Evaluation of the European Union's cooperation with the occupied Palestinian territory and support to the Palestinian people	<a href="http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/evaluation-cooperation-ec-palestine-1327-main-report-201405_en.pdf">http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/evaluation-cooperation-ec-palestine-1327-main-report-201405_en.pdf</a>
European Commission	2014	Evaluation de la coopération de l'UE avec Haïti – Rapport final	<a href="https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/strategic-evaluation-eu-cooperation-haiti-1333-annex1-201408_fr_0.pdf">https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/strategic-evaluation-eu-cooperation-haiti-1333-annex1-201408_fr_0.pdf</a>
European Commission	2014	Evaluation de la coopération de l'UE avec Haïti – Annexe 1	<a href="https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/strategic-evaluation-eu-cooperation-haiti-1333-annex1-201408_fr_0.pdf">https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/strategic-evaluation-eu-cooperation-haiti-1333-annex1-201408_fr_0.pdf</a>
European Commission	2014	Evaluation de la coopération de l'UE avec Haïti – Annexe 2	<a href="https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/strategic-evaluation-eu-cooperation-republic-haiti-2008-2012_en">https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/strategic-evaluation-eu-cooperation-republic-haiti-2008-2012_en</a>
European Commission	2014	Evaluation de la coopération de l'UE avec le Togo – Rapport final	<a href="https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/strategic-evaluation-eu-cooperation-republic-togo-2007-2013_en">https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/strategic-evaluation-eu-cooperation-republic-togo-2007-2013_en</a>

European Commission	2015	Evaluation of EU cooperation with Yemen (2002-2012) – Final report	<a href="https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/strategic-evaluation-eu-cooperation-yemen-2002-2012_en">https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/strategic-evaluation-eu-cooperation-yemen-2002-2012_en</a>
European Commission	2016	JP technical support (TS): Session 1 – Replies by MS and EU on core elements (Ppt)	<a href="http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/event/technical-seminar-joint-programming-0">http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/event/technical-seminar-joint-programming-0</a>
European Commission	2016	JP TS: Session 2 - Replies by MS and EU on countries for substitution (Ppt)	<a href="http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/event/technical-seminar-joint-programming-0">http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/event/technical-seminar-joint-programming-0</a>
European Commission	2016	JP TS: Session 3 – Promoting and expanding Joint Programming processes (Ppt)	<a href="http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/event/technical-seminar-joint-programming-0">http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/event/technical-seminar-joint-programming-0</a>
European Commission	2016	JP TS: Session 3 – Top 10 recipients (Ppt)	<a href="http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/event/technical-seminar-joint-programming-0">http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/event/technical-seminar-joint-programming-0</a>
European Commission	2016	JP TS: Session 4 – Joint Programming and comprehensive approach (Ppt)	<a href="http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/event/technical-seminar-joint-programming-0">http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/event/technical-seminar-joint-programming-0</a>
European Commission	2016	JP TS: Summary and conclusions	<a href="http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/event/technical-seminar-joint-programming-0">http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/event/technical-seminar-joint-programming-0</a>
European Commission	2016	JP TS: Synthesis of replies and proposal	<a href="http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/event/technical-seminar-joint-programming-0">http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/event/technical-seminar-joint-programming-0</a>
European Commission	2016	JP TS: Replies MS and EU final	<a href="http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/event/technical-seminar-joint-programming-0">http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/event/technical-seminar-joint-programming-0</a>
European Commission	2016	JP TS: Joint Programming countries, state of play	<a href="http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/event/outcomes-technical-seminar-joint-programming">http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/event/outcomes-technical-seminar-joint-programming</a>
European Commission	2016	JP TS: Proposal Joint Programming newsletter (Ppt)	Unpublished
European Commission	2016	EU Joint Programming: facts and prospects	<a href="http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/development-cooperation/docs/2016_eu-joint-programming-facts-and-prospects_en.pdf">http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/development-cooperation/docs/2016_eu-joint-programming-facts-and-prospects_en.pdf</a>
European Commission and EEAS	N/A	Guidance note on the use of Conflict Analysis in support of EU external action	<a href="http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/public-fragility/document/guidance-note-conflict-analysis-support-eu-external-action">http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/public-fragility/document/guidance-note-conflict-analysis-support-eu-external-action</a>
European Commission and EEAS	2016	Cooperation Days 2016 – Joint Programming: taking it one step further (Ppt)	
European Commission and EEAS	2016	Cooperation Days 2016 – Report and core message - JP: taking it one step further sessions	

European Parliament	2013	The Cost of Non-Europe in Development Policy: Increasing coordination between EU donors	<a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/mee tdocs/2009_2014/documents/deve/dv/cone_dev_policy_/cone_dev_po licy_en.pdf">http://www.europarl.europa.eu/mee tdocs/2009_2014/documents/deve/dv/cone_dev_policy_/cone_dev_po licy_en.pdf</a>
European Parliament	2016	WORKSHOP EU Policy Coherence for Development: The challenge of sustainability	<a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/Reg Data/etudes/STUD/2016/535022/ EXPO_STU(2016)535022_EN.pdf">http://www.europarl.europa.eu/Reg Data/etudes/STUD/2016/535022/ EXPO_STU(2016)535022_EN.pdf</a>
European Parliament and Council of the EU	2014	Regulation (EU) No 232/2014 of 11 March 2014 establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument (Official Journal of the EU)	Available <a href="#">here</a>
European Parliament and Council of the EU	2014	Regulation (EU) No 233/2014 of 11 March 2014 establishing a Financing Instrument for Development Cooperation for the period 2014-2020	<a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/mee tdocs/2014_2019/documents/deve/dv/dci_reg_/dci_reg_en.pdf">http://www.europarl.europa.eu/mee tdocs/2014_2019/documents/deve/dv/dci_reg_/dci_reg_en.pdf</a>
European Union	2005	The European Consensus on Development	<a href="http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&amp;f=ST%2014820%202005%20INIT">http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&amp;f=ST%2014820%202005%20INIT</a>
European Union	2006	Financing instrument for development cooperation - DCI (2007-2013) – Summaries of EU Legislation	<a href="http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3A114173">http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3A114173</a>
European Union	2015	EU Joint programming – guidance pack 2015	<a href="http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joi nt-programming/minisite/eu-joint-programming-guidance-pack-2015">http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joi nt-programming/minisite/eu-joint-programming-guidance-pack-2015</a>
<b>Other sources</b>			
DIE	2007	Towards a division of labour in European development cooperation: operational options - Discussion Paper 6/2007	<a href="http://www.oecd.org/development/effectiveness/46859449.pdf">http://www.oecd.org/development/effectiveness/46859449.pdf</a>
DIE	2013	EU Joint Programming: Lessons from South Sudan for EU Aid Coordination - Briefing Paper 18/2013	<a href="http://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/BP_18.2013.pdf">http://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/BP_18.2013.pdf</a>
ECDPM	2012	Reprogramming EU development cooperation for 2014-2020 : Key moments for partner countries, EU delegations, member states and headquarters - Discussion Paper No. 129	<a href="http://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/DP-129-Reprogramming-EU-Development-Cooperation-2014-2020-2012.pdf">http://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/DP-129-Reprogramming-EU-Development-Cooperation-2014-2020-2012.pdf</a>
ECDPM	2013	All for one or free-for-all? Early experiences in EU joint programming – Briefing Note No. 50	<a href="http://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/BN-50-Early-Experiences-in-EU-Joint-Programming-2013.pdf">http://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/BN-50-Early-Experiences-in-EU-Joint-Programming-2013.pdf</a>
ECDPM	2015	Stepping up? Best Practice in Joint Programming and Prospects for EU joint Cooperation Strategies - Discussion Paper No. 183	<a href="http://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/DP183_ECDPM_2015_Joint_Programming_Aid_Sherriff_Galeazzi_Helly_Kokolo_Parshota_m_Gregersen.pdf">http://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/DP183_ECDPM_2015_Joint_Programming_Aid_Sherriff_Galeazzi_Helly_Kokolo_Parshota_m_Gregersen.pdf</a>
HTSPE Limited	2011	Joint Multi-annual Programming - Study on European Union donor capacity to synchronise country programming (and	Available <a href="#">here</a>

		joint programming) at the country level.	
OECD	2011	Report on Division of Labour: Addressing cross-country fragmentation of aid	<a href="http://www.oecd.org/dac/aid-architecture/49106391.pdf">http://www.oecd.org/dac/aid-architecture/49106391.pdf</a>
OECD	2011	Annex 7 - Concept and Experiences of the EU Fast Track Initiative on Division of Labour	<a href="http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/47823319.pdf">http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/47823319.pdf</a>
OECD	2014	Data by cooperation provider (excel file)	www.oecd.org
OECD	2014	Data by developing country (excel file)	www.oecd.org
<b>EU Member States Documentation</b>			
<b>Denmark</b>			
DANIDA	2013	Policy note on EU Joint Programming	<a href="http://amg.um.dk/en/~media/amg/Documents/Technical%20Guidelines/Policy%20notes%20and%20action%20plans/Policy%20Note%20on%20EU%20Joint%20Programming_October%202013.pdf">http://amg.um.dk/en/~media/amg/Documents/Technical%20Guidelines/Policy%20notes%20and%20action%20plans/Policy%20Note%20on%20EU%20Joint%20Programming_October%202013.pdf</a>
<b>France</b>			
N/A	N/A	Information sur la concentration géographique de l'aide française	<a href="http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/file/02/04/2011_-_0542/France_Country_Concentration_Plans.pdf">capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/file/02/04/2011_-_0542/France_Country_Concentration_Plans.pdf</a>
MAEDI	N/A	Présentation et premier bilan de la programmation conjointe	Unpublished
MAEDI	N/A	Lignes directrices aux postes sur l'implication de la France dans la programmation conjointe.	Unpublished
<b>Germany</b>			
BMZ	2010	Elements of German Country Concentration Strategy (Ppt)	<a href="http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/document/country-concentration-plans-germany">http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/document/country-concentration-plans-germany</a>
GTZ	N/A	Lead, Active and Passive Donors in Division of Labour Arrangements - A Note on Definitions and Some Observations of Current Practice (2nd draft)	<a href="http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/file/29/05/2012_-_1458/fti_paper_on_lead_active__passive_donors.pdf">capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/file/29/05/2012_-_1458/fti_paper_on_lead_active__passive_donors.pdf</a>
<b>Italy</b>			
N/A	N/A	Country concentration plans	<a href="http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/document/country-concentration-plans-italy">http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/document/country-concentration-plans-italy</a>
<b>Spain</b>			

MinFA and Coop	2013	Coordinacion Programacion Conjunta UE y Planificacion Bilateral MAP - Informe	capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/file/24/05/2014_-_1121/spains_jp_guidelines.pdf
N/A	N/A	Spanish Cooperation Indicative proposal for Geographic concentration	http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/document/country-concentration-plans-spain
<b>Sweden</b>			
FRIDE	2009	The champion's orphans: Honduras says goodbye to Sweden	http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/document/country-experiences-fride-exit-studies-dab29-honduras2-suecia-eng-mar091
FRIDE	2009	Silently leaving Malawi: Sweden's delegated exit	http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/document/country-experiences-fride-exit-studies-ip-malawi-version25-eng-nov091
FRIDE	2009	Swedish exist from Honduras: Devising good practices	http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/document/country-experiences-fride-exit-studies-dab29-honduras2-suecia-eng-mar091
FRIDE	2010	The Swedish exist from Vietnam: leaving painfully or normalizing bilateral relations?	http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/document/country-experiences-fride-exit-studies-ip-vietnam-version-final-eng-mar101
MFA	2014	Guidelines for results strategies within Sweden's international aid	capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/file/24/05/2014_-_1122/sweden_guidelines_for_results_strategies.pdf
<b>The Netherlands</b>			
N/A	N/A	Instructions for the revision of MASP 2014-2017 in the 15 development cooperation partner countries and the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa regional programmes	capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/file/24/05/2014_-_1116/netherlands_note_on_programming.pdf
<b>The United Kingdom</b>			
DFID	2010	Country concentration plans	http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/document/country-concentration-plans-uk
DFID	2010	Division of Labour in Rwanda (Ppt)	http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/document/dfid-presentation-dol-rwanda



## Country Notes Documentation

Author	Year	Title
<b>Bolivia</b>		
Benfield Andy	2014	EU Joint Programming Mission Report (By Consultant)
EU Delegation	N/A	Homs Report - Possibilities For Future EU Joint Programming In Bolivia
EU Delegation	N/A	Roadmap – Progress Towards Joint Programming In 2017
EU Delegation	2009	Division Of Labour Survey
EU Delegation	2010	Bolivia Joint Assistance Framework
EU Delegation	2013	Draft Roadmap To European Joint Programming In Bolivia
EU Delegation	2014	Bolivia Outcomes Report - Annex 1 – Division Of Labour Plans
EU Delegation	2014	Bolivia Outcomes Report - Annex 2 - Synchronisation
EU Delegation	2014	Bolivia Outcomes Report - Annex 3 – Drafting Calendar
EU Delegation	2014	Joint Programming In Bolivia
EU Delegation	2014	Note To European Capitals Participating In Joint Programming In Bolivia
EU Delegation	2015	Homs Report On Joint Programming In Bolivia
European Commission	N/A	European Coordinated Response For Bolivia (Draft)
JP Partners (Bolivia)	2016	Documento De Programación Conjunta Unión Europea And Suiza 2017-2020 (Borrador)

<b>Cambodia</b>		
European Centre For Development Policy Management	2015	Best Practice In Joint Programming And Prospects For EU Joint Cooperation Strategies
European Union	2012	Feasibility Study For EU Joint Programming In Cambodia
European Union	2012	Joint Opinion Of The Cambodia - EU Homs Regarding The Prospects For Joint Programming
European Union	2013	Communication To Government
European Union	2013	EU Retreat 2013 - Background Note
European Union	2013	Fragmentation Analysis Plan
European Union	2013	Joint Analysis Plan
European Union	2013	Joint EU Strategy Structure
European Union	2013	Letter To Government On JP Consultations
European Union	2013	Political Economy Analysis
European Union	2013	Roadmap For Joint Programming
European Union	2014	Background Note For CSO - EU Consultations On JP
European Union	2014	EU Remarks At Launch Of Final Joint Strategy
European Union	2014	European Development Cooperation Strategy For Cambodia 2014-2018

European Union	2014	Note On The Submission Of The Final Joint European Development Cooperation Strategy For Cambodia 2014-2018
European Union	2014	Note To HQ On Joint Strategy Consultations
European Union	2014	Note To HQ Submitting Final Joint Strategy
European Union	2014	Presentation On Joint Programming In Cambodia
European Union	2014	Report On CSO-EU Consultations On JP
European Union	2014	Report On Government - EU Consultations On JP
European Union	2014	Report On Launch Of Final Joint Strategy
European Union	2015	Country Case Study For JP In Cambodia - Regional JP Workshop In Yangon
European Union	2015	Factsheet On JP In Cambodia For Regional JP Workshop In Yangon
European Union	2015	Key Steps Of EU Roadmap
European Union	2015	Letter To Government On JP Monitoring Consultations
European Union	2016	First Monitoring Report On Implementation Of Joint Programming In Cambodia
European Union	2016	List Of Policy Briefs With Sector Leads
NGO Forum Cambodia	2010	Accountability And Managing For Results: Accountability To Whom?
ODI	2013	The Age Of Choice: Cambodia In The New Aid Landscape

OECD	2016	OECD Stats Database
Paris Declaration Monitoring Survey	2011	Paris Declaration Monitoring Survey And Cambodia Country Chapter
Royal Government Cambodia	2011	Development Effectiveness Report
Royal Government Cambodia	2013	Government Response To 2013 EU Communication To Government
Royal Government Cambodia	2013	Rectangular Strategy III
Royal Government Cambodia	2014	Cambodia: Tools For Promoting Development Effectiveness
Royal Government Cambodia	2014	Government Statement On The Joint Strategy
Royal Government Cambodia	2014	National Strategic Development Plan 2014-2018
Royal Government Cambodia	2014	Opening Remarks, Launch Of The Joint Strategy
Royal Government Cambodia	2015	Cambodian Government's Perspective On Joint European Programming
Royal Government Cambodia	2015	Effective Development Cooperation And Partnerships Report
Royal Government Cambodia	2016	Development Cooperation And Partnerships Report (Draft)
<b>Ethiopia</b>		
Addis Ababa Conference	2015	Addis Ababa Action Agenda Of The Third International Conference On Financing For Development
Benfield Andy	2010	Analysis Division Of Labour Questionnaire
EC And EEAS	2012	Note To The Attention Of Hood Ethiopia

EU Delegation	2012	Joint Cooperation Strategy For Ethiopia (Draft)
EU Delegation	2013	EU And Joint Programming In Ethiopia: Progress Report
EU Delegation	2013	Joint Cooperation Strategy For Ethiopia
EU Delegation	2013	Joint Cooperation Strategy For Ethiopia: Public Document
EU Delegation	2014	Developing Ethiopia Together
EU Delegation	2014	Development Cooperation With Ethiopia 2014-2015 (“Blue Calendar”)
EU Delegation	2014	National Indicative Programme For Ethiopia 2014-2020
EU Delegation	2014	Roadmap For EU And Joint Programming On Nutrition
EU Delegation	2015	EU Homs Report On Joint Programming In Ethiopia
EU Delegation	2016	Division Of Labour – JP In Ethiopia 2016-2020
EU Delegation	2016	Summary Of Retreat Of Hocs In Adama
EU Delegation	2016	EU Homs Report On Joint Programming In Ethiopia (Draft)
Federal Democratic Republic Of Ethiopia	2010	Growth And Transformation Plan 2010 - 2014
Gerbrandij Alex	2010	FT Division Of Labour Ethiopia – Technical Seminar
Nicholson Nigel	2014	EU And Ethiopia: An Overview Of Nutrition And The International Context

White Veronica And Al.	2016	Mission Report: JP Process Visit
White Veronica And Illan Carlos	2015	Report On Public Consultation With Stakeholders
<b>Kenya</b>		
EU Delegation	2007	Proposed Sector Presence Of KJAS Partners
EU Delegation	2013	Concept Note On JP
EU Delegation	2013	Draft Roadmap
EU Delegation	2013	Homs Report On JP In Kenya
EU Delegation	2013	Joint Cooperation Strategy For Kenya – Guiding Principles
EU Delegation	2013	Note For HQ On The State Of Play On JP
EU Delegation	2014	National Indicative Programme Kenya 2014-2020
EU Delegation	2015	Joint Cooperation Strategy In Support Of Kenya’s Medium-Term Plan 2014-2017
Global Partnership For Effective Development Cooperation	2014	Country Policy Brief – Kenya
Government Of Kenya	2007	Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy 2007-2012
N/A	2013	Post-Busan: Kenya’s Experience
Particip / Ecorys	2014	Evaluation Of The European Union’s Cooperation With Kenya
<b>Laos</b>		
BMZ	2012	High-Level Seminar On Joint Programming State Of Play Of Joint Programming In Laos

European Commission And EEAS	2012	Note On Heads Of Mission Report On Joint Programming In Laos
European Union	2012	Analysis Of The Seventh National Socio-Economic Development Plan (7th NSEDP 2011-2015)
European Union	2012	Division Of Labour Simulation For EU Donors In Lao PDR
European Union	2012	Mapping Of Present Situation - Background Document For EU Retreat
European Union	2012	EU Joint Programming In Laos – Homs’ Response
European Union	2012	Joint EU Programming Laos – State Of Play And Next Steps
European Union	2012	Joint EU Transition Strategy For LAO PDR 2014-2015 (Draft)
European Union	2012	Potential Challenges And Suggested Mitigation Strategies
European Union	2012	Template For A Joint EU Strategy For Lao PDR
European Union	2014	Joint EU Transition Strategy For LAO PDR 2014-2015
European Union	2015	Heads Of Mission Report - Joint Programming In Lao PDR
European Union	2016	European Joint Programme 2016-2020 - Laos (Draft)
European Union	2016	Report On JP Consultation Process
ODI	2016	The Age Of Choice: Lao PDR In The New Aid Landscape
Paris Declaration Monitoring Survey	2011	Paris Declaration Monitoring Survey And Laos Country Chapter

<b>Mali</b>		
Commission Européenne	2012	Note À L'attention Du Chef De Délégation Mali - Rapport Des Chefs De Mission Sur La Programmation Conjoint Au Mali
Commission Européenne	2014	Factsheet - Atelier « Programmation Conjointe » À Abidjan
Délégation De l'Union Européenne	2012	Note Chefs De Coopération UE Sur La Programmation Conjointe
Délégation De l'Union Européenne	2012	Rapport Des Chefs De Mission Sur La Programmation Conjointe
European Commission	2013	Note For The Attention Of The Head Of Delegation In Mali - Joint Programming
European Commission	2014	Présentation: Joint Programming Process In Mali
European Union	2011	Matrice Recapitulative
France	N/A	Présentation Et Premier Bilan De La Programmation Conjointe
Union Européenne	2012	Présentation : Approche Concertée Pour La Coopération Avec Le Mali, Eléments D'une Programmation Conjointe
Union Européenne	2014	Note À L'attention Des Directeurs Généraux UE Du Développement – Programmation Conjointe De L'UE au Mali 2014-2018
Union Européenne	2014	Présentation: Séminaire Régional Sur La Programmation Conjointe En Afrique De l'Ouest
Union Européenne	2014	Programmation Conjointe De L'UE au Mali 2014-2018
Union Européenne	2015	Rapport Des Chefs De Mission UE Au Mali Sur Le Processus De Programmation Conjointe UE
<b>Moldova</b>		
Council Of The EU	2015	Council Conclusions On The ENP Review
Development Partners	2015	Briefing Book



EU Delegation	N/A	Joint Analysis Focal Points
EU Delegation	2012	HOM's Report On Joint Programming In Moldova
EU Delegation	2012	Response From HQ To HOM
EU Delegation	2015	Roadmap For Joint Programming
EU Delegation	2016	European Joint Analysis: Programming In Moldova To 2020
EU Delegation	2016	Updated Roadmap For Joint Programming
EU Delegation	2016	Updated Template Proposed For Sector Joint Analysis
European Commission	2010	Coordination And Harmonisation Of Government And Partner Practices For Enhanced Effectiveness Of Foreign Assistance To The Republic Of Moldova
European Commission	2010	Information On Donor Coordination And The EU Fast Track Initiative On Division Of Labour In Moldova By The Coordination Office For Technical Cooperation Austrian Embassy Chisinau
European Commission	2012	Instructions For The Programming Of The European Neighbourhood Instrument 2014 - 2020
European Commission	2014	Programming Of The European Neighbourhood Instrument 2014-2020: Single Support Framework For EU Support To The Republic Of Moldova (2014-2017)
European Commission	2015	ENP Review
European Commission	2015	Factsheet Moldova
European Commission	2016	Joint Programming & Enhanced Regional Coordination In The Neighbourhood East
<b>Morocco</b>		

DG For Internal Policies	2015	Rapport Au Parlement UE Pour Le Comité LIBE: EU Cooperation With Third Countries In The Field Of Migration
EU Delegation	N/A	Programmation Conjointe Au Maroc - Questionnaire Du Sous-Groupe Migration
EU Delegation	2013	Rapport Des Chefs De Mission Sur La Programmation Conjointe Au Maroc
EU Delegation	2014	Evaluation Conjointe Des Opérations D'appui Budgétaire Au Maroc
EU Delegation	2015	Factsheet On JP In Morocco
EU Delegation	2015	Plan D'action De La Programmation Conjointe Au Maroc
EU Delegation	2015	Projet D'analyse Conjointe
EU Delegation	2015	Rapport Des Chefs De Mission Sur La Programmation Conjointe Au Maroc
EU Delegation	2016	Stratégie De Coopération Conjointe Européenne Au Maroc
European Commission	N/A	Correspondance Sur La Problématique De La Coordination Des Projets Soutenant La Migration Par L'OIM
European Commission	2015	Feuille De Route De L'eu Pour L'engagement Envers La Société Civile 2015 – 2017
European Commission	2016	Fonds Fiduciaire d'Urgence De L'UE - Lignes Directrices Maroc
European Commission	2016	Programmes De L'UE Dans Le Domaine De La Migration Au Maroc
European Court Of Auditors	2016	EU External Migration Spending In Southern Mediterranean And Eastern Neighbourhood Countries Until 2014
European Union	2013	The Cost Of Non-Europe In Development Policy (Annex II Case Study Morocco)

Ministère De l'Economie Et Des Finances - Direction Du Trésor Et Des Finances Extérieures	2015	Rapport D'activité 2014
UNDAF	2010	Plan Cadre Des Nations Unies Pour l'Aide Au Développement - Royaume Du Maroc (2012-2016)
UNDAF	2016	Plan Cadre Des Nations Unies Pour l'Aide Au Développement - Royaume Du Maroc (2017-2021)
United Nations	2010	Bilan Commun De Pays CCA - Royaume Du Maroc
<b>Mozambique</b>		
Embassy Of Sweden	2015	Handover Note From The Swedish Presidency Of The G19
EU And Government Of Mozambique	2015	Republic Of Mozambique National Indicative Programme 2014-2020
European Union	2008	Working Document On Sectors Of Concentration And Participation Of Donors In Working Groups
European Union	2009	Country-Level Questionnaire On The Implementation Of Division Of Labour - 2nd Monitoring Of The EU Fast Track Initiative On Division Of Labour
European Union	2009	Working Document On Donors Strategies In Mozambique At A Glance
European Union	2009	Working Document On Sectors Of Concentration And Participation Of Donors In Working Groups
European Union	2010	Accelerating The Fast Track Initiative On Division Of Labour Mozambique - EU Joint Action Plan
European Union	2013	EU Heads Of Mission Report On EU Joint Multi-Annual Programming In Mozambique
European Union	2014	Cover Note On Homs Report On Joint Programming In Mozambique
European Union	2014	EU Heads Of Mission Report On EU Joint Multi-Annual Programming In Mozambique
European Union	2015	Annex 1 Of The Commission Decision On The Annual Action Programme 2015 In Favour Of The Republic Of Mozambique To Be Financed From The 11th European Development Fund - Action Document For "Good

		Governance And Development Contract For The Republic Of Mozambique"
European Union	2015	Note From Hod On Joint Programming In Mozambique
European Union	2015	Stock Taking Of The 2014/2015 EU Hocs Meetings And Updated 2015 Workplan (Annex 2)
<b>Myanmar</b>		
Benfield Andy	2012	Myanmar Joint Programming Mission Report
European Commission	2013	Draft EU Homs Report On JP Potential
European Commission	2014	Commission Implementing Decision - Adopting A Multiannual Indicative Programme Between The European Union And Myanmar/Burma For The Period 2014-2020
European Union	N/A	Monitoring The Joint EU Development Partners' Transitional Strategy For Myanmar 2014-16
European Union	2012	Donor Programming Cycles In Myanmar
European Union	2012	Minutes Of Informal Meeting With EU MS In Brussels On 9 July
European Union	2012	Myanmar Fragmentation Map
European Union	2014	Joint EU Development Partners' Transitional Strategy For Myanmar 2014-16
European Union	2014	Multiannual Indicative Programme 2014-2020
European Union	2014	Press Release - EU Working Together For Myanmar: EU Announces Cooperative Strategy
European Union	2015	Draft Homs Report On Joint Programming In Myanmar
European Union	2015	EU Joint Programming Retreat Agenda

European Union	2015	EU Joint Programming Retreat Report
European Union	2015	Powerpoint Country Case Study, JP In Laos, For Regional JP Workshop In Yangon
European Union	2015	Fact Sheet On JP In Laos For Regional JP Workshop In Yangon
European Union	2016	Council Conclusions On EU Strategy With Myanmar/Burma
European Union	2016	High Representative And Commission Joint Communication "Elements For An EU Strategy Vis-À-Vis Myanmar/Burma: A Special Partnership For Democracy, Peace And Prosperity"
<b>Palestine</b>		
EU Delegation	2011	LDS - EU Local Strategy On Development Cooperation
EU Delegation	2012	Hoc Report - EU Heads Of Cooperation Retreat: Towards EU JP
EU Delegation	2013	EU Heads Of Cooperation Annual Retreat In The Occupied Palestinian Territories (Opt): Towards EU JP In The Opt
EU Delegation	2013	EU Local Strategy On Development Cooperation – Occupied Palestinian Territories (Opt)
EU Delegation	2013	Joint Programming – Occupied Palestinian Territories (Opt) – EU Heads Of Mission’s Progress Report
EU Delegation	2013	Joint Programming – Occupied Palestinian Territories (Opt) – EU Heads Of Mission’s Report – Feasibility Assessment
EU Delegation	2014	EU Heads Of Cooperation Annual Retreat In The Palestine
EU Delegation	2015	EU Heads Of Cooperation (Hocs) Annual Retreat In Palestine Report
EU Delegation	2015	Joint Programming – Palestine – EU Heads Of Mission’s Progress Report
EU Delegation	2016	EU Division Of Labour

European Centre For Development Policy Management	2015	Best Practice In Joint Programming And Prospects For EU Joint Cooperation Strategies - Annex III
European Commission		Evaluation Of The EU Aid Delivery Mechanism Of Delegated Cooperation 2007-2014 - Desk Study Report
European Commission	2015	Template For Country Joint Programming Factsheets - Regional Workshop On Joint Programming For Neighbourhood East And South
European Commission	2016	Guidance For The Drafting Of The Joint Response And Pillar Fiches
European Parliament	2015	Memorandum Of Understanding Between The EU And Palestine – PEGASE DFS Results-Oriented Framework: Pilot Phase - Annex 4 To The Financing Agreement
European Parliament	2015	Update On The PEGAASE DFS Result-Oriented Framework
European Union	2014	Briefing On The Local Aid Coordination Structure And The Local Aid Coordination Secretariat
IATA	2016	Trends In European Aid Flows To Palestine
N/A	2014	Sector Fiches: Agriculture, Education, Energy, Health, Justice, Local Governance, Macro-Economic Support, PFM, Private Sector, PAR, Refugees, Security, Social Protection, Water, East
OECD Statistics On CPA In Palestine		OECD Statistics On CPA In Palestine
<b>Rwanda</b>		
DFID	2010	Division Of Labour In Rwanda
EU Delegation	2013-07	Joint Response Strategy- Part II
EU Delegation	2012	Common Opinion Of EU Homs Regarding Joint Planning
EU Delegation	2013	Analysis Of National Development Plan - Part I (EDPRS II)
EU Delegation	2013	Joint Response Financial Sector- Annex

EU Delegation	2015	EU Hocs Meeting On Future EU Joint Planning
EU Delegation	2015	EU Homs Report Regarding EU Joint Planning
EU Delegation	2016	EU Hoc Correspondence On JP Planning
European Commission, EEAS	2012	Note To Hom On Report On Joint Programming In Rwanda
Government Of Rwanda	2010	Government's Proposal On Donors' Division Of Labour
Ministry Of Finance And Economic Planning	2014	Donor Performance Assessment Framework FY 2012-2013
Ministry Of Finance And Economic Planning And UNDP	2015	Country Brief - Rwanda To Meeting Of UNDP And Global Partnership For Effective Development Cooperation
Ndaruhutse John Bosco - Ministry Of Finance And Economic Planning	2011	Donor Performance Assessment Framework: Results And Lessons Learnt On Transparency And Mutual Accountability
UN Security Council	2012	Letter And Attached Report From Expert Group Concerning The DRC
<b>Sénégal</b>		
EU Delegation	2009	Donor Mapping - Senegal
EU Delegation	2013	Rapport D'avancement Sur La Programmation Conjointe
EU Delegation	2013	Rapport Des Chefs De Mission De L'Union Européenne Au Sénégal Sur La Programmation Conjointe
EU Delegation	2014	Document Conjoint De Programmation
EU Delegation	2014	Fiche Pays Sur La Programmation Conjointe
EU Delegation	2014	Note À L'Attention Des Directeurs Généraux UE Du Développement

EU Delegation	2014	Résumé Exécutif Du Document Conjoint De Programmation
EU Delegation	2014	Vers Une Programmation Conjointe – Atelier Régional Sur La Programmation Conjointe En Afrique De L'Ouest, Abidjan Juin 2014
EU Delegation	2015	Rapport Des Chefs De Mission De L'Union Européenne Au Sénégal Sur L'avancement De La Programmation Conjointe
WHITE Veronica	2013	La Programmation Conjointe – Vers Une Meilleure Efficacité De L'aide (Expérience Pays Burundi, Chad, Niger, Sénégal)
<b>Zambia</b>		
EU Delegation	2013	Zambia EU Homs Report On Joint Programming
EU Delegation	2015	Zambia EU Homs Report On Joint Programming
EU Delegation	2016	EU Cooperation And Collaboration In Zambia
EU Delegation	2016	EU Homs Mail On Joint Programming
EU Delegation	2016	EU Joint Sector Programme – Zambia - Energy/Electricity Sector
EU Delegation	2016	EU Joint Sector Programme – Zambia - Governance Sector
EU Delegation	2016	EU Joint Sector Programme – Zambia - Health Sector
EU Delegation	2016	EU Joint Sector Programme – Zambia - Malnutrition
Government Of Zambia	2011	Joint Assistance Strategy For Zambia 2011-2015 (JASZ II)
OECD	2008	3rd High Level Forum On Aid Effectiveness: Harmonisation And Division Of Labour In Zambia
OECD - BMZ/ Germany	2008	Rationalizing Aid Delivery – Partner Experiences & Perspectives – Zambia



## Annex D. Persons interviewed

This annex lists the persons spoken with by the evaluators. It is structured as follows:

- European Commission;
- External European Action Service (EEAS);
- EU Member States;
- Other actors;
- Country cases.

### European Commission

Surname, name	Unit	Function
MANZITTI Virginia	DEVCO/A2 Financing and Effectiveness	Head of sector
MOLTENI Lino	DEVCO/ A2 Financing and Effectiveness	Policy Officer - Aid Effectiveness - Relations with Member States
ARRAULT Isabelle	DEVCO/D1 Development Coordination Southern Africa & Indian Ocean	International Aid /Cooperation Officer (Mozambique)
DUCHATEAU Koen	DEVCO/D1 Development Coordination Southern Africa & Indian Ocean	International Aid/Cooperation Officer (Myanmar & Philippines)
LAZAREWICZ Natalia	DEVCO/D1 Development Coordination Southern Africa & Indian Ocean	International Aid/Cooperation Officer (Zambia)
THIJN Ingeborg	DEVCO/ D2 Development Coordination East Africa and Regional Cooperation in Eastern and Southern Africa	International Aid/Cooperation Officer (Ethiopia)
PLAS Daniel	DEVCO/D2 Development Coordination East Africa and Regional Cooperation in Eastern and Southern Africa	International Aid/Cooperation Officer (Kenya)
DEMOOR Arnaud	DEVCO/E2 Development Coordination and Regional Cooperation West Africa	International Aid/Cooperation Officer
MOLINIE Marie	DEVCO/ E2 Development Coordination and Regional Cooperation West Africa	International Aid/Cooperation Officer (Mali)
MORANTE MENDEZ Almudena	DEVCO/ E2 Development Coordination and Regional Cooperation West Africa	International Aid/Cooperation Officer (Senegal and Gambia)
BERDOS Konstantinos	DEVCO/G1 Development Coordination Latin America and Caribbean	International aid / Cooperation Officer
MENA DE LA TORE David	DEVCO/G1 Development Coordination Latin America and Caribbean	International Aid / Cooperation officer (Bolivia)

GENTILE Giulio	DEVCO/H1 Development Coordination South and South East Asia	International Aid / Cooperation Officer (Laos)
PAJNKIHAR Jasna	DEVCO/ H1 Development Coordination South and South East Asia	International aid / Cooperation Officer (Cambodia)
VAN DRIESSCHE Gerard	DEVCO/ H2 Development Coordination Central Asia, Middle East/Gulf and Pacific	International Aid/Cooperation Officer (Yemen)
CONZATO Franco	DEVCO/06 Quality and Results	Deputy Head of Unit
THIEULIN Denis	DEVCO	Former Head of Cooperation of Ethiopia
SRBOVA, Klara	NEAR/C1 Neighbourhood East	International aid/Coopération Officer, Geo-coordinator for Moldova

### External European Action Service (EEAS)

Surname, name	Organisation/Unit	Function
DIOP Saffia	EEAS Development Cooperation Coordination Division (DCCD)	Policy Officer
GOSSELINK Paulus	EEAS Development Cooperation Coordination Division (DCCD)	Development Cooperation Coordination Division
VETTER Wolfram	EEAS - VI B2 Development Cooperation Coordination	Acting Head of Division
JANSSEN Adam	EEAS Asia	International Relations Officer - Cambodia
HALL Carl-Henrik	EEAS Asia	Desk officer for Laos
MARD Jenny	EEAS Latin America	Desk Officer for Bolivia and Paraguay
FILON Rudie	EEAS Neighbourhood East	Desk Officer for Moldova and Georgia
PIRKANNIEMI Olli	EEAS Eastern Africa	Desk Officer for Kenya
BRUN Xavier	EEAS Southern Africa	Desk Officer for Zambia
SALGUEIRO Joaquim	EEAS Southern Africa	Desk Officer for Mozambique

### EU Member States

Surname, name	Organisation	Function
WESTPHAL Silke Mason	Denmark, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Senior consultant / KVA
KJELLBERG Lars	Denmark, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Senior Advisor / Development policy and Financing (EU-team)
RODRIGUEZ Ximena	France, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development	Pôle évaluation et performance, Direction des Programmes et du Réseau
TOUCHET Lorène	France, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development	Pôle politique européenne de développement/Rédactrice – programmation conjointe, plateforme européenne sur le mixage prêts-dons, modalités de mise en œuvre de l'aide européenne

STEINMETZ Philippe	Agence Française de Développement (AFD)	Regional Director for AFD offices in Cambodia and Laos
BERGHAUS Susanne	Germany, Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)	Desk Officer
TONON Daniela	Italy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation	Head of Office, Directorate General Cooperation for Development
SOŚNICKI Zdzisław	Poland, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Minister-Counsellor, Department of Development Cooperation
SÎRBU Mihai	Romania, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Second Secretary, Department for Relations with the Republic of Moldova
DELHOVO Eva	Spain, Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation	Senior Advisor, General Secretariat for International Cooperation for Development
GONZALEZ Maria Teresa	Spain, Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo (AECID)	Spanish Cooperation
LAGERHOF Helena	Sweden, Ministry for Foreign Affairs	Deputy Director, Section for Coordination of EU Development Policy, EU Department
KARLSSON Roger	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency	Desk Officer in the Department for Aid Management
GERBRANDY Alex	The Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs/ Bureau for International Cooperation	Coordinator of Cluster Effectiveness
ROOIJACKERS Marc	The Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs/ European Integration Department	Senior policy officer
NIBBERING Jan Willem	The Netherlands, Embassy in Ethiopia	Senior Policy Officer Food Security and Nutrition
KOPER Martin	The Netherlands, Embassy in Ethiopia	Deputy Head of Cooperation in Ethiopia
BASSET Sue	The United Kingdom, Department for International Development (DFID)	Head of Delivery and Results Team, DFID Europe Department
MCGILIVRAY Gavin	The United Kingdom, DFID Office in Myanmar	Head of DFID Office
BERRY Mary	The United Kingdom, DFID Office in Ethiopia	
MARZETTI Gail	The United Kingdom, DFID Office in Nepal	Head of DFID Office
HENDERSON Lynne	The United Kingdom, DFID Office in Ghana	Acting Head of DFID Ghana
SANYAHUMBI Sarah	The United Kingdom, Department for International Development (DFID)	Head of Europe Department DFID London (former Head of DFID Office in Malawi)

### Other actors

Surname, name	Organisation	Function
WHITE Veronica	VJW International	Director
O'RIORDAN Alexander	NA	Consultant Joint Programming

COURTNADGE-KOVACEVIK Katarina	NA	Consultant Joint Programming
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### Country cases

Surname Name	Organisation	Function
<b>Bolivia</b>		
ROUX Cécile	Agencia Belga de Desarrollo (CTB)	Oficial de Programas
LONGOBARDI Felice	Agencia de Cooperación Italiana	Ufficio Regionale di Cooperazione
SANCHIS SALA Africa	Agencia española de cooperación internacional para el desarrollo (AECID)	Responsable de Programas
DATUS Romann	Ambassade de France	Conseiller de coopération et d'action culturelle
BERDOS Konstantinos	DEVCO/G1 Development Coordination Latin America and Caribbean	International aid / Cooperation Officer
MENA DE LA TORE David	DEVCO/G1 Development Coordination Latin America and Caribbean	International Aid / Cooperation officer (Bolivia)
MARD Jenny	EEAS	Desk for Bolivia and Paraguay
BODENSCHATZ Thomas	Embajada de la RF de Alemania	Jefe de Cooperacion
OTTIGER Nadia	Embajada de Suiza	Jefa de Cooperacion
STUHR SVENSSON Anders	Embajada Real de Dinamarca	Consejos de Finanzas
BOSCO Rocco	EU Delegation Bolivia	Jefe de Cooperacion
TATO Sonia	EU Delegation Bolivia	Agregada Seccion Cooperacion
BROZOVICH GONZALES Dalitza	Ministerio de planificación des desarrollo, Vicministerio de Inversion publica y financiamiento externo (VIPFE)	Especialista en financiamiento Externo
JACQUET Christelle	Représentante CTB Bolivie	(JP focal point, but not met during the mission)
<b>Cambodia</b>		
GAŠPARÍKOVÁ Jana	Embassy of Czech Republic	
TURQUET Pascale	Embassy of France	
STRUBE Birgit	Embassy of Germany	
RASMUSSEN Klas	Embassy of Sweden	
PROROK Mateusz	EU Delegation	
RAMSEY Fiona	EU Delegation	
WALTER Egbert	EU Delegation	
HE Cheng Yanara	Government - Council for the Development of Cambodia (CDC)	
JUNKER Simon	Swiss Cooperation Office and Swiss Consular Agency for Cambodia	
<b>Ethiopia</b>		

SEQUEROS Francisco Carreras	EU Delegation	Head of Cooperation
TIRUWORK Moges	EU Delegation	Cooperation Officer
WHITE Veronica	EU DEVCO Expert Pool	Independent consultant
SCHWÄR Hanspeter	German Embassy	Head of Cooperation, and Head, <i>JP Natural Resources Cluster</i>
GIACOMUZZI Giulia	Italian Embassy	Head of Cooperation a.i.
PRIMROSE John	UK Embassy	Head, <i>JP Job Creation Cluster</i>
<b>Kenya</b>		
FRITSCH Remi	AFD France	Deputy Director
MANASSEH Anthea	AFD France	Programme Officer
ODERO Walter	African Development Bank	Country Economist, Kenya
RAHMAN Abdul	African Development Bank	Economist Intern
WANGECI Caroline	DFID – UK	Head, M&E
BREDAL Lars	Embassy of Denmark	Deputy Head of Mission
KORENKE David	Embassy of Germany	Junior Officer
FOLKUNGER Elisabeth	Embassy of Sweden	Development Counsellor
LAVOCKA Lucia	Embassy of the Slovak Republic	Head of Cooperation
BOUZON Julien	EU Delegation	Head of governance unit
HABERS Erik	EU Delegation	Head of Cooperation
KNUTSSON Per	Head of Resident Coordinator's Office, United Nations	Strategic Advisor
POLSELLI Federica	Italian Agency for Development Cooperation	Communications Expert
RAZZINI Paolo	Italian Agency for Development Cooperation	Technical Assistant
AKUNGA Beatrice	Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries, Govt of Kenya	Deputy Chairperson, Transformation Secretariat
MCMULLEN Patrick	Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries, Govt of Kenya	Adviser, Transformation Secretariat
ONDREJAKA Martin	Ministry of Development Cooperation, Bonn/Germany (video)	Desk Officer
KINYANJUI Jackson	Resource Mobilization Department (RMD), The Treasury, Govt of Kenya	Director
OKELLO Andre	RMD, The Treasury, Govt of Kenya	Economist
SIANBE Catherine	RMD, The Treasury, Govt of Kenya	Economist
<b>Laos</b>		
STEINMETZ Philippe	AFD Cambodia and Laos	
OLK Christian	DE	
PHALIVONG Khouanta	DG Europe and Americas, MoFA	
SIKHAO Sithong	Director of Planning, MoE	
BRUESSELER Ramon	ECCIL	

MOONVONG Khankeo	ECCIL	
GAZAGNE Fanny	Embassy of France	
FORNARI Bryan	EU Delegation	
KELLER Marie	EU Delegation	
OLIVER-CRUZ Ignacio	EU Delegation	
GILARD Olivier	Formerly AFD Cambodia and Laos	
POUILLES-DUPLAIX André	Formerly AFD Cambodia and Laos	
GENTILE Giulio	Geodesk DEVCO	
HALL Carl-Henrik	Geodesk EEAS	
JENTGEN Claude	Luxembourg	
KLEIN Aurélie	Luxembourg	
LAMMAR Thomas	Luxembourg	
THIPSOMPHANH Bangthong	Ministry of Planning and Investment, Dept. of International Cooperation	Head of Division for Europe
JAGGI Hasler Barbara	SDC	
TOONE James	UK	
<b>Mali</b>		
BACQUELAINE Myriam	Ambassade de Belgique	Cheffe du Bureau Diplomatique au Mali
DE LARA RUIZ Ana	Bureau Technique de Coopération Espagnole au Mali - Agence Espagnole pour la Coopération Internationale au Développement (AECID)	Coordinatrice Générale
SEGNANA Marion	Chef du Bureau de la Coopération Grand Duché du Luxembourg - Ambassade à Dakar	Chargée d'affaires
JENSEN Frank Rothaus	Embassy of Denmark	
GUEYMARD Yves	Embassy of France	Former head of cooperation,
SADOULET David	Embassy of France	First Secretary
MEISE Jan-Henrik	Embassy of Germany	
PALMGREN Asa	Embassy of Sweden	
THOLEN Paul	Embassy of the Netherlands	
FOFANA Mariam	EUD	Head of Cooperation
TASSIN-PELZER Cécile	EUD	Head of Cooperation
TRAORE Mamadou Namory	EUD	Consultant, mid-term review of Joint Programme
MOLINIÉ Marie	Geodesk UE	
<b>Moldova</b>		
CIOCAN Nicolae	Administration Keystone Human Services International Moldova Association	Director
BAEDINET Sacha	Ambassade de France	Interne chargé d'étude
PETIT Jérémie	Ambassade de France	First Secretary

ORIOLO Irina	Austrian Development Agency	Programme Manager education and social affairs
SCHAUMBERGER Gerhard	Austrian Development Agency	Head of Office
SOLTAN Viorel	Centre for Health Policies and Studies (PAS Centre)	Director
SANDU Veronica	CZ Embassy External consultancy for the social protection and health sectors	Expert on social protection
KLIPPERT Elizaveta	Department of Regulation and Authorisation, National Bank of Moldova	Deputy Director
SRBOVA Klara	DG NEAR – Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations	International aid/Cooperation Geo-coordinator for Moldova
VITALE Serena	DG NEAR Unit C1	
FILON Rudie	EEAS Neighbourhood	Desk for Moldova and Georgia
BEINAROVICA Olga	Embassy of Lithuania	Second Secretary
JAKAVANYTE Justina	Embassy of Latvia	Third Secretary
CREANGA Mariana	EU Delegation Moldova	Project manager
RODRIGUEZ-RUIZ Jordi	EU Delegation Moldova	
SINGH Aneil	EU Delegation Moldova	Head of Operations
TURCANU Natalia	EU Delegation Moldova	
CIOCAN Eva	EU Delegation Moldova - Agriculture and Rural Development	
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## Annex E. Evaluation Data Matrix

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This annex specifies the information sources used for answering each EQ and shows the triangulation of information. It also provides an indication of the quality of evidence at the level of each judgment criteria. The team has used the qualification presented in the table below.

**Table 3. Ranking of the Quality of evidence**

Ranking of Evidence	Explanation of ranking of quality of evidence
<b>Strong</b>	The finding is consistently supported by a range of evidence sources, including documentary sources, quantitative analysis and qualitative evidence (i.e. there is very good triangulation); or the evidence sources, while not comprehensive, are of high quality and reliable to draw a conclusion (e.g. strong quantitative evidence with adequate sample sizes and no major data quality or reliability issues; or a wide range of reliable qualitative sources, across which there is good triangulation).
<b>More than satisfactory</b>	There are at least two different sources of evidence with good triangulation, but the coverage of the evidence is not complete.
<b>Indicative but not conclusive</b>	There is only one evidence source of good quality, and no triangulation with their sources of evidence.
<b>Weak</b>	There is no triangulation and / or evidence is limited to a single source.

**EQ 1 – Relevance**

*EQ1: To what extent did JP respond to global and country-level challenges regarding increased aid effectiveness?*

The ToR asks the team to look at the extent to which the current objectives and assumptions for JP were and still remain valid. When asking the question, the ToR notes that the enabling environment has changed during this period, but also that the issue should be seen from partner countries' perspective: was and is JP relevant given the widely varying country contexts?

The first Judgment Criteria looks at how changes to the international aid effectiveness discourse are reflected in the various JP processes. The second one looks at the extent to which JP processes have addressed and adapted to the specific country contexts.



EQ 1			
Judgement Criteria	Summary response	Source of information	Quality of evidence
<b>JC 1.1: JP responded to the global aid effectiveness challenges</b>	1. In almost all countries, JP programming builds on previous aid coordination efforts, which generally included aid effectiveness concerns	<p>1. <b>Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness</b> (2005)  <b>EU HQ interviews, MS HQ interviews</b> (MS 4, 25)  <b>Field interviews</b> (in particular in Ehtiopia, Moldova, Palestine)  <b>Document review:</b>  <i>Moldova:</i> DP principles 2010, Coordination 2011  <i>Palestine:</i> EU LDS 2011, HoC 2012, LACS 2014  <i>Bolivia:</i> Draft Roadmap to Joint European Programming in Bolivia, 2013  <i>Laos:</i> Vientiane Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 2005, EU situation Mapping 2012  <i>Senegal:</i> DCP 2014  <i>Ethiopia:</i> Joint Cooperation Strategy 2013</p>	1. <b>Strong</b>
	2. Joint Programming provides important services in countries where aid coordination till now has been lacking	<p>2. <b>EU HQ interviews</b>  <b>Field interviews</b>, in particular in Asian countries (Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar) and Eastern and Southern Africa (Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Rwanda, Zambia)  <b>Document review:</b>  <i>Ethiopia's</i> Joint cooperation Strategy (2013)  <i>Palestine:</i> HOM 2013 and JP Factsheet 2015</p>	2. <b>Strong</b>

EQ 1			
	3. Aid effectiveness is usually central to the justification of the JP exercise	3. <b>EU HQ interviews</b> <b>MS HQ interviews</b> (MS 4, 25) <b>Field interviews</b> (in particular Senegal) <b>Joint programming country documents</b> (European Development Cooperation Strategy for Cambodia 2014-2018, November 2014; European Union+ Joint Cooperation Strategy for Ethiopia, January 2013; Draft Roadmap to Joint European Programming in Bolivia (EU, 2013); EU Joint Cooperation Strategy in Support of Kenya's Medium-term Plan 2014-2017, 2015; Rwanda – Joint Response Strategy, 2013; Document conjoint de programmation, signed with Government of Senegal, November 2014) Answers to <b>question 6 of the survey</b>	3. <b>Strong</b>
	4. In the NEAR region where countries have Association Agreements (AA), this sets the parameters for the JP process	4. <b>Moldova AA, 2014</b> <b>Morocco AA, 2000</b> <b>Field interviews</b> in Moldova and Morocco <b>EU HQ Interviews</b>	4. <b>Strong</b>
	5. New development challenges are slowly being included but as a function of the partner country introducing them	5. <b>Field interviews</b> (Ethiopia, Rwanda, Kenya) <b>Document:</b> <i>Kenya:</i> Arid and Semi Arid Lands programme	5. <b>More than satisfactory</b>
	6. EU's own general values are included, and new actors and mechanisms are slowly being introduced	6. <b>EU HQ interviews</b> <b>MS HQ interviews</b> (MS 18 about Ethiopia)	6. <b>Strong</b>

EQ 1			
		<p><b>Field interviews</b> (Morocco, Palestine, Bolivia, Kenya)</p> <p><b>Documents review:</b>            Council Conclusions December 2015  <i>Morocco:</i> Factsheet 2015, BS evaluation  <i>Palestine:</i> HoC report 2015; Delegation Agreements 2008-2014; HOM 2013 February; HOM 2015  <i>Kenya:</i> EUD reports 2013; JCS 2015</p>	
	7. Despite the fairly widespread JP experiences so far, the Relevance of JP as a net value-adding mechanism for addressing global aid effectiveness challenges is not really discussed or well documented	7. <b>Document review:</b> the value-added of JP is not discussed in documentation <b>Field interviews</b> (in particular Morocco) <b>MS Field Interviews</b> (MS 24)	<b>7. Strong</b>
<b>JC 1.2: JP was sensitive to the partner country's aid effectiveness challenges</b>	1. In countries reviewed, the JP and other coordination processes build on national priorities	1. <b>Document review</b> (JP country documents) <b>Field Interviews</b> (virtually all countries visited)	<b>1. Strong</b>
	2. In all countries, there is an effort to understand and accommodate the particular national political and development context, and to national programming cycle	2. <b>EU HQ interviews</b> <b>MS Field interviews</b> (Nepal) <b>Field interviews</b> (Zambia, Bolivia, Ethiopia, Kenya) <b>Document review:</b> <i>Palestine</i> : LACS 2014, LDS 2011 <i>Zambia:</i> Rwanda EUD reports 2013, 2015, 2016 <i>Ethiopia:</i> Reports from the 2016 workshop, EU nutrition roadmap <i>Kenya:</i> EUD reports 2013, JCS 2015, MTP-2) <i>Laos:</i> EU Situation Mapping 2012, Joint transition Strategy 2013	<b>2. Strong</b>

EQ 1			
	3. In all countries, there is awareness of the particular aid concerns of the authorities	3. <b>EU HQ interviews, Field interviews</b> <b>Document review:</b> <i>Palestine</i> : LACS 2014, LDS 2011 <i>Bolivia</i> : HoMs Report - Possibilities for future EU joint programming in Bolivia, 2013 <i>Laos</i> : BMZ 2012, Roadmap 2015, Analysis 7 <sup>th</sup> NSEDP 2012	3. <b>More than satisfactory</b>
	4. The understanding of national context has in some countries led the EU to focus on sector rather than national interventions, while in other cases the EU has amplified its ambition to address development and not just aid effectiveness	4. <b>Field interviews</b> (Mozambique, Rwanda, Palestine, Moldova, Morocco) <b>MS HQ interviews</b> <b>Document review:</b> <i>Zambia</i> : EU Joint Sector Papers 2016 <i>Mozambique</i> : NIP	4. <b>Strong</b>
	5. The ability to apply the partner country's situation as the basis for the JP response may be constrained by some Member States own considerations	5. <b>EU HQ interviews</b> <b>Document review:</b> <i>Bolivia</i> EU Joint Programming mission report, 2014 <i>Kenya</i> , EUD Reports 2013 <b>Field interviews</b> (in particular: Kenya, Rwanda, Senegal, Bolivia, Moldova)	5. <b>More than satisfactory</b>

## EQ 2 – Effectiveness

### EQ2: To what extent did JP contribute to reducing aid fragmentation?

Aid fragmentation, occurs when too many donors give too little aid to too many countries (OECD, 2016)<sup>21</sup> and is usually measured by the number of sectors per donor (concentration of aid) and the number of donors per sector (donor presence) but also the number and size of projects per sector. Since JP is a country-specific exercise, aid fragmentation refers to in-country issues as expressed in the Accra Agenda for Action: “We will reduce the fragmentation of aid by improving the complementarity of donors’ efforts and the division of labour among donors, including through improved allocation of resources within sectors”<sup>22</sup>.

The JP approach to reduced aid fragmentation is described as follows: JP “coordinates which sectors/ areas each (EU development partner) will work in, what the overall objectives for these sectors are, and gives provisional figures for their financing over the joint strategy period. The individual more detailed objectives, projects and programmes that each EU development partner will carry out in order to implement their contribution to the joint strategy are detailed in their own in-house programming and implementation plans (...) There will be less aid fragmentation as EU development partners plan together, cutting out gaps and overlaps. This allows each to focus on the sectors where they can add the most value while ensuring that all bases are covered under the joint strategy” (Quick Guide p. 1, 2). Division of labor is thus the main instrument for reducing aid fragmentation.

The Quick Guide focuses JP on a division of labour *between* sectors but also *within* sectors, and there are now also initiatives to move towards joint implementation. However, in the FAQs document, it is explained that “Division of labor’ simply means sharing out the work to be done in such a way as to avoid overlaps and ensure that DPs complement one another”.

<sup>21</sup> <https://www.oecd.org/dac/aid-architecture/>.

<sup>22</sup> See <http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/34428351.pdf> p. 17.

<b>EQ 2</b>			
<b>Judgement Criteria</b>	<b>Summary response</b>	<b>Source of information</b>	<b>Quality of evidence</b>
<b>JC 2.1: Extent to which the countries that have carried out JP aimed at reducing aid fragmentation</b>	1. The reduction of aid fragmentation is a main objective of JP for all stakeholders	1. <b>Council Conclusions</b> of 14 <sup>th</sup> of November 2011 (providing the EU's common position for the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid effectiveness in Busan) Answer to question 6 of the survey <b>Field interviews</b> (Rwanda, Burma)	1. <b>More than satisfactory</b>
	2. However, coordination between EU, MS and other associated like minded donors has been found a marginally more important objective of JP	2. Answer to <b>question 6 of the survey</b> <b>Field interviews</b> (Ethiopia, Rwanda, Senegal) <b>Document review:</b> <i>Morocco:</i> Draft JP doc 2016	2. <b>More than satisfactory</b>
	3. Reduced aid fragmentation was not always a major objective of EU or MS	3. <b>Field interviews</b> (Mozambique, Zambia, Morocco, Moldova)	3. <b>Indicative but not conclusive</b>
	4. Some PC were reluctant to face risks of donor withdrawal	4. <b>Field interviews</b> (Morocco, Kenya, Ethiopia, Burma)	4. <b>Indicative but not conclusive</b>
<b>JC 2.2: Extent of aid fragmentation reduction in countries that have carried out JP</b>	1. The reduction in aid fragmentation has only been observed to a (very) limited extent and has generally remained quite poorly documented	1. <b>No quantitative information available yet on aid fragmentation reduction</b> Answers to <b>question 7a and 7b of the survey</b> <b>Field interviews</b> <b>EU HQ Interviews</b> (including Latin America) <b>MS Field interviews</b> (in particular in Mozambique and Zambia)	1. <b>Strong</b>
	2. Where positive results were obtained, they had not been triggered by JP; donor budget cuts and changed aid priorities also played a role	<b>EU HQ interviews</b> <b>MS Field interviews</b> (in particular in Mozambique and Zambia)	2. <b>More than satisfactory</b>

EQ 2			
		<b>Field interviews</b> (Zambia, Rwanda)	
	3. The JP process did not, by itself, reduce overall aid fragmentation in the countries where it took place	3. <b>EU HQ interviews</b> <b>Field interviews</b> (Zambia, Rwanda, Morocco, Bolivia)	<b>3. More than satisfactory</b>
	4. Interviewees agreed that the division of labour within sectors benefited from the JP process whilst survey respondents provided a mixed signal	4. <b>EU HQ Interviews</b> <b>MS HQ Interviews</b> (MS 4, 24, 20, 9) <b>Field interviews</b> Answers to <b>question 7b in the survey</b>	<b>4. Strong</b>
<b>JC 2.3: Extent to which JP has facilitated a division of labour beyond the sharing of sector involvement</b>	1. The JP process triggered improved harmonisation, coordination and aid complementarity	1. <b>EU HQ interviews</b> (on Mali and Ethiopia in particular) <b>MS HQ interviews</b> (MS 25 about Ghana, MS 18 about Ethiopia) <b>Field interviews</b> (Kenya, Senegal, Cambodia, Palestine, Moldova, Zambia, Bolivia, Rwanda) <b>Document review:</b> <i>Bolivia:</i> EU Joint Programming mission report, 2014 <i>Myanmar:</i> 2015 EU Joint Programming Retreat Report, Joint Strategy 2014 <i>Palestine:</i> EU DOL 2016, HOM 2013 (February and November), LDS 2013 <i>Rwanda:</i> GoR presentation to DP retreat, DFID paper 2010, EUD reports	<b>1. Strong</b>
	2. However the coordination between EU programmes has at times been put under stress, even within the JP process	2. <b>MS HQ interviews</b> <b>Field interviews</b> (Morocco, Senegal) <b>Document review:</b> <i>Morocco:</i> ECA 2016, Draft JP doc 2016	<b>2. Indicative but not conclusive</b>
	3. JP has also increased the appetite for undertaking joint implementation, even if this was already undertaken previously	3. <b>Field interviews</b> (Cambodia, Kenya, Moldova, Mozambique, Palestine) Answers to <b>question 8 of the survey</b>	<b>3. More than satisfactory</b>

EQ 2			
		<p><b>Document review:</b>  <i>Bolivia:</i> Draft Joint Programming Document (June 2016)  <i>Kenya:</i> JCS 2015  <i>Palestine:</i> HOM 2013 Feb, HOM 2013, Eval DC 2016  <i>Rwanda:</i> GoR presentation to DP retreat, DFID paper 2010, EUD reports</p>	
	<p>4. Two 'innovations' introduced by JP in a couple of countries are noteworthy as they have a strong potential to contribute to improved development (rather than aid) effectiveness: the use of the JP results monitoring framework and a programming approach based on a set of overarching strategic clusters</p>	<p>4. <b>Country analysis of Cambodia, Palestine, Ethiopia</b>, based on:  <i>Ethiopia:</i> EUD Progress Reports 2013, 2015, EUD Draft Progress report 2016, Field interviews  <i>Palestine:</i> HOM 2013 Feb and Nov, LDS 2013, EU DOL 2016, interviews  <i>Cambodia:</i> Joint Strategy 2016, interviews</p>	<p>4. <b>Indicative but not conclusive</b></p>



### **EQ 3 – Effectiveness**

#### *EQ3: To what extent did JP improve aid predictability and transparency of EU and MS aid?*

Aid predictability and transparency is linked to division of labor analysed in EQ2 in the sense that division of labor “makes it easier to see what donors are doing and therefore improves transparency and predictability” (FAQs page 5). Transparency of aid flows is the provision of timely, transparent and comprehensive information of aid flows<sup>23</sup>. Predictability of aid is defined as the degree of realization of donors’ forward spending plans<sup>24</sup>.

Both concepts are also linked to synchronisation since forward planning is more useful to a government if it is synchronised with its own planning. The JP process should therefore be timed to coincide with the Government’s own planning cycle.

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<sup>23</sup> Aid transparency is part of the 2005 Paris declaration commitments, and became a time bound commitment to ‘improve the availability and public accessibility of information on development cooperation and other resources’ (see OECD, Communication note drafted by the ad hoc group for the common standard, October 2012).

<sup>24</sup> In 2007/2008, the OECD launched a survey on donor’s forward spending plans. It provides standard measuring of aid predictability by calculating the degree of realization of donors’ forward spending plans: ‘an indicator, referred to as the “predictability ratio”, was developed comparing actual CPA disbursed in a specific year to programmed CPA for the same year as reported to the OECD in earlier surveys’ (see page 15, 2014 Global Outlook on Aid, Results of the 2014 DAC Survey on Donor’s Forward Spending Plans and Prospects for Improving Aid Predictability, OECD/DAC).

EQ 3			
Judgement Criteria	Summary response	Source of information	Quality of evidence
<b>JC 3.1: Joint programming led to changes in EU/MS planning and/or financial cycles</b>	1. Synchronisation of programming and budget cycles has been achieved or is in progress	<b>1. Review of synchronization in 13 countries</b> Answers to <b>questions 11a and 11b of the survey</b> <b>MS HQ Interviews</b> (MS 6, 12, 13, 25) <b>Documents review:</b> <i>Joint programming documents Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia. Mali, Kenya and Rwanda</i> <i>JP roadmaps in Bolivia, Moldova, Morocco, Palestine, Senegal</i>	1. <b>Strong</b>
	2. There are some donor and country specific constraints to JP synchronisation with partner country cycles	<b>2. MS HQ Interviews</b> (MS 6, 12, 13, 25) <b>Head of Mission and Head of Cooperation meeting reports</b> <b>Field interviews</b> (in particular in Bolivia, Palestine, Morocco, Moldova) <b>Documents review:</b> <i>Palestine: LDS 2013, HOM 2015</i>	2. <b>More than satisfactory</b>
	3. Occurrences of replacement of bilateral programming documents by the EU JS have so far remained very limited	<b>3. Positive examples of replacement in Laos, Cambodia, Mali</b> <b>Interviews of MS representatives</b> in Senegal, Myanmar, Ghana <b>EUD interviews in Moldova</b>	3. <b>More than satisfactory</b>
<b>JC 3.2: Extent to which transparency of CPA by JP-members improved</b>	1. Transparency has been an important but a one-off benefit of JP	<b>1. Answers to questions 13a and 13b of the survey</b> <b>MS HQ interviews</b> (MS 20, 21, 24) <b>Field interviews</b> (Kenya, Ethiopia, Mali, Myanmar, Zambia) <b>Documents review:</b> <i>Bolivia: Draft JP Document (June 2016)</i>	1. <b>Strong</b>

EQ 3			
		<p><i>Cambodia:</i> Joint Strategy, 2014; Government aid portal <a href="http://cdc.khmer.biz/">http://cdc.khmer.biz/</a></p> <p><i>Kenya:</i> JCS 2015, <a href="http://e-promis.treasury.go.ke/">http://e-promis.treasury.go.ke/</a></p> <p><i>Laos:</i> Joint programme 2015, Laos Aid Management Platform accessed August 2016</p> <p><i>Mali:</i> JPD 2014</p> <p><i>Moldova:</i> EJA 2016</p> <p><i>Morocco:</i> Draft Joint Analysis 2015, Draft JP Document 2016</p> <p><i>Mozambique:</i> ODAMOZ database</p> <p><i>Rwanda:</i> Joint response document, Rwanda's Development Assistance Database <a href="https://dad.minecofin.gov.rw/#">https://dad.minecofin.gov.rw/#</a></p> <p><i>Senegal:</i> DCP 2014, HoMs report 2015</p> <p><i>Zambia:</i> EU Joint sector papers 2016, JASZ II</p> <p><i>Ethiopia:</i> EUD Progress Reports 2013, 2015</p>	
<b>JC 3.3: Extent to which predictability of CPA provided by JP-participants improved</b>	1. A medium term outlook on EU intentions per sector is part of the Joint Strategy but was often insufficiently detailed to improve predictability of EU CPA and too limited in its sector scope and coverage of financing instruments	1. <b>Review of Joint Strategies Field interviews</b> (Mozambique and Zambia, Kenya, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Mali) Answers to <b>questions 12a and 12b of the survey Documents review:</b> <i>Laos:</i> HoMs Report 2012 and 2015; Transition Strategy 2013; Joint Programme 2015)	1. <b>Strong</b>

EQ 3			
		<p><i>Mali:</i> HoMs Report 2012 and 2015, Powerpoint 2014, PowerPoint Abidjan 2015</p> <p><i>Myanmar:</i> Joint strategy 2014</p>	
	2. The main gain from JP in terms of predictability is the clarity of views on EU priorities	<p>2. Answers to <b>questions 12a, 12b, and 13 in the survey</b></p> <p><b>Field interviews</b> (with CSOs and/or PCs) in Cambodia, Moldova, Morocco, Bolivia.</p> <p><b>EU DEVCO HQ Interviews</b></p>	2. <b>Strong</b>
	3. In some cases, predictability was undermined by external factors	<p>3. <b>Field interviews</b> (Rwanda Mozambique Palestine Mali)</p> <p><b>Documents review:</b></p> <p><i>Palestine:</i> HoMs report 2015</p>	3. <b>Weak</b>

## EQ 4 – Ownership

*EQ4: To what extent did JP contribute to improved leadership by the partner country of its development priorities?*

As underlined in all aid effectiveness agreements, increased national ownership of the development agenda and process is a core objective.

While JP is an EU initiated and defined process, one of its ambitions is that the partner country will take an ever-increasing role and ultimately take it over and provide the leadership that will ensure that JP is a seamless contribution to the country's own development efforts. As stated in the EU Common Position for the Fourth High Level Forum: *“JP is led by the government wherever possible, is based on a partner country's national development strategy and is aligned to the partner country's strategy and programming cycles.”*

The EQ thus looks at how the role of the national authorities may have moved towards greater partner country leadership as a function of the JP process. This should be reflected in the degree to which the final Joint Strategy is in line with the country's own priorities.

EQ 4			
Judgement Criteria	Summary response	Source of information	Quality of evidence
<b>JC 4.1: The partner country government has played an increasingly important role in the JP</b>	1. Partner countries played a variety of roles in the JP process, but overall and despite exceptions, the evaluation found that they did not take a lead role	1. <b>EU HQ interviews</b> (about Mali, Ethiopia) <b>MS HQ interviews</b> (MS 13, 18, 24) <b>Field interviews</b> (Bolivia, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Rwanda, Senegal, Zambia, Laos, Moldova, Palestine) Answers to <b>questions 6, 14 and 18 of the survey</b> <b>Documents review:</b> <i>Bolivia:</i> Joint Programming in Bolivia, PPT presentation, 2014; EU Joint Programming mission report, 2014; HoMs Report - Possibilities for future EU joint programming in Bolivia, 2013; Draft Roadmap to Joint European Programming in Bolivia, 2013; HOMs report on Joint Programming in Bolivia, 2015 <i>Ethiopia:</i> EUD Progress report 2015, DAG Web-site <i>Kenya:</i> EUD reports 2013 <i>Mali:</i> HoMs letter 2014 <i>Morocco:</i> HOM 2013 <i>Palestine:</i> HOM 2015	1. Strong
<b>JC 4.2: JP contributed to increased alignment to partner country</b>	1. Overall, the support provided through JP was aligned to the PCs national development strategies	1. <b>Field interviews</b> (Laos, Moldova, Bolivia, Ethiopia, Palestine) <b>Interviews with partner countries' governments</b> (Bolivia, Cambodia, Kenya, Laos)	1. Strong

EQ 4			
development priorities		<p>Answers to <b>question 14 of the survey</b></p> <p><b>Document review:</b></p> <p><i>Laos:</i> Joint Programme 2015</p> <p><i>Bolivia:</i> Draft Joint Programming Document</p> <p><i>Morocco:</i> Draft Joint Programming document 2016</p> <p><i>Palestine:</i> HOC 2016</p>	
	2. Information collected does not point to a general causal link between a JP approach and (increased) alignment; in a substantial share of cases it shows the absence of such a link	<p><b>MS HQ interviews</b> (MS 13, 24)</p> <p><b>Field interviews</b> (Senegal, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Kenya, Moldova, Morocco) <b>in particular with partner countries' governments</b> (Bolivia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Zambia)</p> <p>Answers to <b>question 15 of the survey</b></p> <p>EU Common position document</p>	2. More than satisfactory

## **EQ 5 – Coherence**

*EQ5: To what extent has JP contributed to increased coherence of EU and MS strategies and programming at country level?*

The issue of coherence lies at the heart of the JP as a joint tool. Since this evaluation is country case-based, the question became focused on the extent to which the JP favoured convergence among the EU and MS regarding strategies and policies *at country level*.

Another dimension is the extent to which EU concerns and instruments other than country programmable aid (CPA) and aid effectiveness are included in the JP process.



EQ 5			
Judgement Criteria	Summary response	Source of information	Quality of evidence
<b>JC 5.1: Extent to which JP favoured convergence of objectives among EU and MS in terms of development strategies and policies at country level</b>	1. Where JP processes took place, EU and MS policy and strategy coherence was strengthened	1. <b>Field interviews across all visited countries</b> <b>MS HQ interviews</b> Answers to <b>question 6, 13, 21 of the survey</b> <b>Documents review:</b> <i>Laos:</i> Heads of Mission 2015 <i>Zambia:</i> HoM report 9 april 2016 <i>Myanmar:</i> HoMs report 2015; Retreat report 2015	1. Strong
	2. JP process increased parties' awareness of each others' strategies and policies, identified commonalities, thus providing an important foundation for increased consistency across bilateral MS and EU programmes and strategies	2. <b>Field interviews</b> (Cambodia, Kenya, Laos, Moldova, Mali, Mozambique, Ethiopia) <b>MS HQ interviews</b> Answers to <b>question 13a of the survey</b>	2. Strong
	3. JP may be contributing to greater policy coherence at country level	3. Answers to <b>questions 13a, 20 and 21 of the survey</b> <b>MS HQ interview</b> (MS 18) <b>Field interviews</b> (Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali)	3. Indicative but not conclusive
	4. The JP Roadmap is a first step towards greater coherence	4. <b>JP Guidance pack</b> <b>Field interviews</b> (Mozambique, Rwanda, Kenya) <b>Documents Review</b> <i>Kenya:</i> EUD reports 2015, 2016; <i>Ethiopia:</i> EUD reports 2015; 2016 workshop reports <i>Mozambique:</i> EUD reports 2015	4. More than satisfactory
	5. The Joint Analysis process further contributes to policy and programme coherence	5. <b>Field interviews</b> (Moldova, Morocco, Myanmar, Rwanda, Cambodia)	5. More than satisfactory

EQ 5			
		<b>Documents review:</b> <i>Morocco:</i> Draft JP doc 2016 <i>Rwanda:</i> Joint Analysis and Response documents	
6. A Joint Response in reality requires EU and MS coherence	6.	<b>JP Guidance pack</b> <b>Field interviews</b> (Cambodia, Laos, Mozambique, Rwanda, Kenya, Bolivia) <b>Documents Review</b> <i>Cambodia:</i> EUD reports 2014, European Development Cooperation Strategy 2014 <i>Kenya:</i> JCS Strategy 2013, JCS 2015; <i>Ethiopia:</i> EUD reports 2015; 2016 workshop reports <i>Bolivia:</i> JS EU+Switzerland 2016	6. Strong
7. Where the JP addressed sector issues, this has led to greater policy and strategy coherence	7.	<b>Field interviews</b> (Cambodia, Laos, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Rwanda) <b>Documents review:</b> <i>Cambodia:</i> Documentation preceding the joint strategy 2012-2014 <i>Laos:</i> HOM 2015 <i>Mali:</i> HOM report 2015, Factsheet 2014 <i>Senegal:</i> DCP 2014; HoMs report 2014 and 2015 <i>Zambia:</i> EUD reports 2015, 2016; EU Joint Sector papers 2016 <i>Ethiopia:</i> EUD Progress reports 2013, 2015; 2016 workshop reports	7. Strong
8. Credible national development strategies/plans contribute to internal EU coherence	8.	<b>Field Interviews</b> (Mozambique, Zambia, Rwanda, Ethiopia) <b>Document review:</b>	8. Strong

EQ 5			
		<p><i>Kenya:</i> JCS 2015; JCS Guiding principles 2013</p> <p><i>Rwanda:</i> EUD 2015, Rwanda Govt presentation on GPEDC II preparations</p> <p><i>Ethiopia:</i> EUD 2013 “Blue Calendar”, 2015 various reports</p>	
	<p>9. There are several factors that constitute obstacles to increased coherence: bilateralisation of aid, emergence of new donor agenda items, strategic interests of donors in a country, donor aid fragmentation, EU initiatives overriding JP decisions, donor fatigue, change in personnel.</p>	<p>9. <b>EU HQ interviews</b>  <b>MS interviews</b>  <b>Field interviews</b> (Morocco, Kenya, Moldova, Bolivia, Palestine, Rwanda, Mozambique)  <b>Documents review:</b>  “Stepping up? Best practice in Joint Programming and Prospects for EU Joint Cooperation Strategies”, ECDPM Discussion Paper No. 183, December 2015  <i>Morocco:</i> Draft Joint Analysis 2015, BS evaluation  <i>Mali:</i> HoMs report 2015</p>	<p>9. Strong</p>
<p><b>JC 5.2: Extent to which JP documents show coherence of development with other EU policies</b></p>	<p>1. JP focus has so far primarily been on country programmable aid (CPA)</p>	<p>1. <b>Field interviews</b> (Kenya, Rwanda, Zambia, Ethiopia)  <b>JP Guidance Pack</b>  <b>MS HQ Interviews</b>  <b>Documents review:</b>  <i>Kenya:</i> JCS 2015</p>	<p>1. Strong</p>
	<p>2. Inclusion of other EU policies is fairly common, but variable and context-dependent</p>	<p>2. <b>Field interviews</b> (Kenya, Rwanda, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Morocco)  <b>Documents review:</b>  <i>Cambodia:</i> Joint Strategy 2014  <i>Ethiopia:</i> Signed JCS 2013</p>	<p>2. More than satisfactory</p>

EQ 5			
		<p><i>Morocco</i>: Draft Joint Analysis 2015; Draft JP document 2016</p> <p><i>Myanmar</i>: Joint Transitional Strategy</p> <p><i>Palestine</i>: HoC 2015</p> <p><i>Zambia</i>: EUD reports 2013, 2015, 2016; EU Joint Sector papers 2016</p>	
	3. Coherence would be strengthened if complementary policies were more systematically included in the JP process.	3. <b>Field interviews</b> (Kenya, Palestine, Mozambique)	3. Indicative but not conclusive

## **EQ 6 – Visibility**

**EQ6: To what extent did JP increase the visibility of EU and MS to partner country authorities and other donor partners?**

One of the expected outcomes of joint programming is to increase the visibility of European Development Partners as a group. The EU JP Guidance Pack notes “there *should be more visibility for EU Development Partners support as a whole, with a single ‘EU brand’ of high quality aid (plus more visibility for each participating Development Partners as they are associated by everything done under the joint response strategy)*”.

Thus the question aims at examining to what extent JP enhanced the visibility of European support vis-à-vis partner country authorities and the wider donor community. It also seeks to examine to what extent joint visibility plans and actions have been implemented as part of the JP process. Last but not least, it looks at whether the visibility of Member States and the visibility of the European group have both benefitted from JP, or if one has been at the expense of the other.

EQ 6			
Judgement Criteria	Summary response	Source of information	Quality of evidence
<b>JC 6.1: JP contributed to enhance awareness of combined EU support among partner country authorities and other donors</b>	1. JP is expected to provide opportunities for the EU as a whole to be more visible	1. <b>EU HQ and field interviews</b> <b>MS HQ interviews</b> <b>Field interviews</b> (Kenya, Bolivia, Ethiopia) Answers to <b>question 6 of the survey</b> <b>Documents review:</b> Danida's 2013 policy note on joint programming; ECDPM 2015; ECDPM 2013; DIE 2007 <i>Palestine</i> : HoM report 2015 <i>Bolivia</i> : EU Joint Programming mission report, 2014	1. Strong
	2. However, visibility has been enhanced through substantive consultation processes and joint demarches rather than visibility actions per se	2. <b>EU HQ interviews</b> (about Mali and Ethiopia) <b>MS HQ interviews</b> (MS 20) <b>Field interviews with MS and EUD</b> (Bolivia, Mali, Mozambique, Cambodia, Kenya, Laos, Moldova, Palestine and Zambia) Answers to <b>questions 21 and 29 of the survey</b> <b>Documents review:</b> Joint strategy documents Capacity4dev Voices and Views, <i>Joined-up EU Approach to Development Programming</i>	2. Strong
	3. Increased financial weight and increased clout do not translate directly or easily into increased leverage. The working relations and trust built with Government	3. <b>EU HQ interviews</b> <b>MS Field interviews</b> (in Mozambique)	3. Strong

EQ 6			
	officials — and other entry points— are as important in the “influence” equation		
<b>JC 6.2: JP contributed to enhance the visibility of EU member states among partner country authorities and other donors</b>	1. There are divergent views on the contribution of JP to the visibility of individual EU MS in partner countries	<b>1. Interviews with EU MS HQ interviews</b> (MS 25, 6, 24, 21, 25) <b>Field interview</b> (Cambodia, Kenya, Rwanda, Zambia) Answers to <b>question 30 of the survey</b> <b>Documents review</b> : ECDPM (2015); ECDPM (2013); HTSPE (2011); European Parliament, <i>The Cost of Non Europe In Development Policy</i> , 2013 European Parliament, <i>Workshop EU Policy Coherence for Development: The challenge of sustainability</i> , 2016	1. More than satisfactory
	2. An important factor that determines JP’s effect on MS visibility is the manner the EU institutions and MS partnership is managed	2. <b>Field interviews with MS and EUD</b> (Mozambique, Ethiopia)	2. More than satisfactory
	3. The distribution of roles is not only conducive to more MS visibility, but also to more leverage of the EU	3. <b>Field interviews with MS and EUDs</b> (Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia)	3. More than satisfactory
	4. Only few countries distribute roles across the partnership	4. <b>MS Field</b> interviews during country visits in particular in Mozambique, Zambia, Rwanda, Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia, Mali	4. Strong

## **EQ 7 – Efficiency**

*EQ7: To what extent was the EU organised so as to make JP work?*

The success of joint programming lies among other factors in how it is institutionalized, i.e. translated into action guidelines applicable to the daily activities of EU and MS staff and partners, and integrated in the EU and MS culture and structure. This includes a clear definition of institutional roles and tasks.

The question aims at verifying whether the EU has organised joint programming so as to make it an efficient and effective process (good use of resources for benefits realised and expected). The question will look both at the institutional set-up and procedures as well as the dissemination of JP guidance among staff members at headquarter and country levels. The question tackles the inputs and activities dimensions of the Intervention Logic.



EQ 7			
Judgement Criteria	Summary response	Source of information	Quality of evidence
<b>JC 7.1: The JP institutional set-up is conducive to a successful process</b>	1. The joint programming process has in general been a “learning-by-doing” process	<p>1. <b>Field interviews</b> (Cambodia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Laos, Myanmar, Palestine, Rwanda, Zambia)</p> <p><b>Documents review:</b>            2014 JP Guidance Pack  <i>Cambodia:</i> Factsheet for the regional experience-sharing on joint programming in Yangon, April 2016  <i>Kenya:</i> EUD reports 2013  <i>Mali and Senegal:</i> Powerpoint regional seminar West Africa Abidjan, June 2014  <i>Myanmar:</i> Retrat report 2015  <i>Zambia:</i> EUD reports 2015, 2016</p> <p><b>Workshops took place in:</b>            Guatemala (for Latin America), 2014            Ethiopia (for Africa), 2014            Côte d’Ivoire (for West Africa), 2014            Belgium (for neighbourhood countries), 2015            Myanmar (for Asia), 2015            Brussels (for a global level), 2012</p>	1. Strong
	2. The process would have been benefitted from a clearer set up for JP to be more effective, but also less transaction-costs intensive	<p>2. <b>DEVCO HQ Interviews</b>  <b>MS HQ Interviews</b> (MS 4, 25)  <b>Field interviews</b> (all countries, raised issues, particular : Myanmar, Moldova, NEAR)</p>	2. More than satisfactory
	3. The understanding of institutional roles was not always clear, especially with regards to leadership and ownership of the process	<p>3. <b>Field interviews</b> with EUD and MS (Bolivia, Cambodia)            Answers to <b>question 27 of the survey</b></p>	3. More than satisfactory

<b>EQ 7</b>			
<b>JC 7.2: JP guidance was clear and well known</b>	1. EU and MS alike welcomed the indications provided in the 2015 Guidance Pack, and considered they were light enough to allow flexibility	1. <b>MS HQ interviews</b> (MS 20) <b>Field interviews</b> (Kenya, Bolivia, Ethiopia, Myanmar) Answers to <b>questions 31 and 32 of the survey</b>	1. More than satisfactory

**EQ 8 – Efficiency**

*EQ8: To what extent did JP reduce partner countries' transactions costs and keep them reasonable for the EU and MS?*

This EQ looks at the transaction costs of joint programming to partner country governments, as well as to the EU and Member States. The theory is that the use of one plan, aligned to the national strategy, underpinned by joint analysis, organised policy dialogue, and better division of labor would reduce transaction costs – with a risk, however, that making decisions is slower and more resource-intensive.

Determinants of transaction costs include the relationship with partner country governments, the latter's aid management setup and capacity, the JP guidance and other recommendations and instructions from EU, but also from each MS HQs, and the DP coordination set-up and dynamics in each country.

This EQ addresses the issue of EU and MS' time and money spent on coordinating analysis, programming, and implementation. The team will to a large extent get qualitative information and proxies. It nevertheless expects that such 'soft' data will provide a comprehensive, coherent and valid picture of the transaction costs of JP.

EQ 8			
Judgement Criteria	Summary response	Source of information	Quality of evidence
<b>JC 8.1: JP has reduced transaction costs for partner country governments</b>	1. The reduction of transaction costs is not among the top motivations for joint programming	1. Answers to <b>question 6 of the survey</b> <b>Documents review:</b> Joint Conclusions of May 2015 “Stepping up Joint Programming”	1. More than satisfactory
	2. Overall transaction costs for partner country government have not been reduced, except in some cases	2. Answers to <b>question 36 of the survey</b> <b>Field interviews</b> (Kenya, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Zambia, Myanmar, Palestine, Cambodia, Moldova)	2. More than satisfactory
	3. The transaction costs gains for partner governments depend on a number of factors: there is most transaction costs gains to be had when sectors are crowded; and when existing aid coordination (all partners and EU-only) are weak	3. Case studies (Cambodia, Bolivia, Zambia, Myanmar) <b>Documents review:</b> <i>Myanmar:</i> Heads of Mission report, 2015, on monitoring the Joint EU Development Partners’ Transitional Strategy for Myanmar 2014-16	3. Indicative but not conclusive
<b>JC 8.2: Transaction costs for the EU and EU MS relating to JP are deemed worth it</b>	1. JP tends to involve important transaction costs for EU and MS alike	1. <b>EU HQ Interviews</b> (about Mali, Senegal, Ethiopia), <b>DEVCO HQ interviews</b> <b>MS interviews</b> (MS 25, 24, 20, 13) <b>Field interviews with EUD</b> (Kenya, Rwanda, Zambia, Myanmar, Senegal, Zambia) Answers to <b>question 36 of the survey</b> <b>Document review:</b> <i>Senegal:</i> HoMs report 2015	1. Strong
	2. These costs are deemed “worth it” in many of the 14 cases surveyed, with some exceptions	2. <b>MS Field interviews</b> (MS 13) <b>Field interviews</b> (in the 14 countries, in particular Bolivia, Cambodia, Moldova, Palestine, Kenya, Laos, Mali, Senegal, Rwanda, Myanmar, Morocco)	2. Strong

EQ 8			
		<b>Documents review:</b> <i>Myanmar:</i> HoMs Report 2015 <i>Mali:</i> HoMs Report 2015 <i>Bolivia:</i> HoMs Report - Possibilities for future EU joint programming in Bolivia, 2013	
	3. Transaction costs (and perception thereof) for the EU and MS vary according to several factors:	3. <b>Field interviews</b> (Myanmar, Kenya, Morocco, Mozambique, Mali)	3. More than satisfactory



## Annex F. Survey Results

The survey is a tool for getting a more complete, objective and quantitative view on key issues surrounding the Joint Programming. It allows to systematically collect and analyse the perceptions of the involved stakeholders on the EU side on a range of issues covered in the evaluation. The target participant groups were:

- Headquarters of the EU who have been involved in JP – in DEVCO, NEAR and EEAS
- Headquarters of the Member States of the EU
- Field-based staff in the EU Delegations
- Field-based staff of the MS in all the partner countries where JP is being undertaken.

The questionnaire was closely linked to the evaluation questions. It included mostly closed questions, although also leaving space for open responses for respondents willing to clarify their response. The questionnaire has been distributed by e-mail, through the on-line survey tool SurveyMonkey. To ensure to have much responses as possible two reminders were sent two weeks later with a one-week gap between them. A third reminder was sent to respondents that started replying to the questionnaire without finishing it.

### Identification


- There were 93 respondents, with 10 of them not responding to the entire survey (therefore the rest of the analysis is mostly based on the other 83 respondents).
- The survey has been disaggregated by four categories EU HQ, MS HQ, and EU and MS staff (from Q2).

Categories	#Invitations	#Responses	# Reply rate
EU HQ	85	24	28%
MS HQ	28	9	32%
EUD	56	21	37%
MS Field	136	29	21%
<b>Total</b>	<b>305</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>27%</b>


- Reasons provided for non-responding to the questionnaire include :
  - 1) The JP process was considered by EUD HoCs not far enough along for the survey to make sense in their context.
  - 2) Many of EU HQs had not really been engaged in any dialogue on JP with the field.
  - 3) In a number of countries, the most important JP activities had taken place in the early period (2012-2014) and therefore in particular MS staff who arrived towards the tail end or after the more intensive discussions had little direct experience and therefore presumably did not feel they had much to say about JP.
  - 4) The degree of engagement by a given MS in a country also could vary considerably.
- Geographic scope covered by completed responses (from Q1)

	Asia	Africa	South America	Caribbean	Neighborhood countries
#countries in each continent	6	13	3	1	2

### Involvement of the respondent in the JP by category (Q4)




### The Joint Programming Process stage at the end of 2015 (Q5)






## Overarching question


### Main purpose(s) pursued when participating in the JP process (Q6)




NB: This graph lists purposes proposed by ascending order of main motivations




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
NB: This graph lists purposes proposed by ascending order of main motivations




NB: This graph lists purposes proposed by ascending order of main motivations

### JP and Aid fragmentation


The JP process has led to a better division of labour among the Commission/EEAS and MS across sectors (Q7)





**The JP process has led to a better division of labour among the Commission/EEAS and MS within sectors (Q7)**






**The JP process has led to joint implementation initiatives (Q8)**










**Number of donors per sector decrease? (Q9)**

Answer Options	EU HQ (24 respondents)	MS HQ (9 respondents)	EUD (21 respondents)	MS Field (29 respondents)
Yes - Due to JP	3	2	2	3
Yes - Due to other initiatives (please provide examples below)	1	0	4	4
No	3	3	9	7
I do not know	9	1	0	7
Too early	8	3	6	8


### Number of sectors per donor decrease? (Q10)




Answer Options	EU HQ (24 respondents)	MS HQ (9 respondents)	EUD (21 respondents)	MS Field (29 respondents)
Yes - Due to JP	3	2	1	2
Yes - Due to other initiatives (please provide examples below)	0	0	5	3
No	3	4	9	7
I do not know	10	1	1	9
Too early	8	2	5	8



### Aid predictability and transparency

Closer alignment of programming cycle to the one from the partner country (Q11)






### More and better information provided on current and planned country programmable aid (Q12)




### Better knowledge of the partners involved in the process about (Q13)




### JP and Partner countries ownership


#### Alignment of the JP process to national development strategies (Q14)



### A better support alignment to the partner country’s priorities thanks to JP (Q15)




### Consultations during the Joint Analysis (Q16)






### Consultations during the Joint Programming (Q17)






### Contributions of the partner country to the JP process and its deliverables (Q18)




### JP and coherence of EU and MS strategies and programming at country level

The Commission/EEAS and EU MS delivered the following elements through the JP process (Q19)








### The Commission/EEAS and EU MS have engaged in the JP process for the same reasons (Q20)




### Coherence objectives achieved through the JP process (Q21)




**HQ agreed with proposals made through the JP process at country level (sectors/issues to be covered) (Q22)**



**Development partners have been able to cover together the range of the most important sectors for the country (Q23)**




**The JP process has contributed to "make Europe happen on the ground"\* (Q24)**




(\* ) in the sense of “translating shared European values and policies on issues such as fundamental rights and good governance into action in partner countries”


**Knowledge of drawbacks for the Commission/EEAS or EU MS with respect to their participation in (a specific or not) JP process (Q25)**



**The JP process led the Commission/EEAS or EU MS to revise their initial programming (objectives, sectors, priorities, funding,...) (Q26)**




**Specific added value the Commission/EEAS has brought to the JP process (Q27)**






### Visibility of EU and MS in partner countries


The JP process has led to greater “Joint EU visibility” (single brand as EU) (Q28)



The JP process has led to greater EU visibility (Q29)




**The JP process has led to an increased visibility of your MS (Q30)**




### Institutional set-up for the JP process


#### Awareness (as of 2014-2015) of the Commission/EEAS's guidance material on JP (Q31)




#### Guidance usefulness (Q32)




### Sufficient information (Q33)




### The division of roles and responsibilities between the different partners in the JP process was sufficiently clear (Q34)



**My agency has mobilised sufficient and adequate expertise to conduct the JP process (by number of respondent) (Q34)**




**The division of roles between HQ and field offices for JP were clearly defined (by number of respondent) (Q34)**




### JP and transaction costs


#### Time devoted to the JP process compared to its (expected) benefits (overall) (Q35)



#### Reduction of transactions costs thanks to the JP process (Q36)



(\*) For instance as they had only one country analysis and response to deal with for several or all EU development partners).







**Appendix 1. Survey detailed results**



## Joint Programming Evaluation

**Q1 This questionnaire covers the JP process implemented in (please specify a country if you are field-based staff or HQ Geo Desk officers; or indicate "multiple" if you are other HQ staff):**

Answered: 83 Skipped: 0

#	Responses	Date
1	Rwanda	9/17/2016 12:01 PM
2	Multiple	9/12/2016 2:53 PM
3	Portugal	9/9/2016 4:34 PM
4	mali	9/8/2016 7:56 PM
5	Mozambique	9/8/2016 2:37 PM
6	Tanzania	9/8/2016 9:20 AM
7	Laos	9/8/2016 3:31 AM
8	Nepal	9/7/2016 11:23 AM
9	Mozambique	9/6/2016 9:07 AM
10	Kenya	9/5/2016 5:30 PM
11	Moldova	9/5/2016 10:47 AM
12	Kenya	9/1/2016 2:16 PM
13	Palestine	9/1/2016 7:42 AM
14	multiple	8/31/2016 3:41 PM
15	Kenya	8/31/2016 3:36 PM
16	Uganda	8/31/2016 1:13 PM
17	Bolivia	8/31/2016 11:42 AM
18	Mozambique	8/31/2016 8:50 AM
19	<b>Myanmar</b> Myanmar	8/31/2016 8:39 AM
20	Ethiopia	8/30/2016 1:11 PM
21	<b>country visited</b> Morocco	8/30/2016 12:29 PM
22	Geo Desk officers	8/30/2016 11:39 AM
23	Kenya	8/30/2016 10:55 AM
24	HQ Staff - multiple	8/30/2016 9:15 AM
25	Multiple - responsible for Myanmar, Cambodai and Laos	8/30/2016 4:10 AM
26	SL	8/29/2016 4:18 PM
27	Libya	8/29/2016 3:39 PM
28	multiple (HQ responsible für JP-process + field experience)	8/29/2016 3:39 PM
29	multiple	8/29/2016 12:14 PM
30	Lao PDR	8/29/2016 8:58 AM
31	Kenya	8/27/2016 9:17 AM
32	Armenia	8/26/2016 3:16 PM

## Joint Programming Evaluation

33	Moldova	8/26/2016 12:07 PM
34	Mozambique	8/26/2016 11:27 AM
35	multiple	8/24/2016 1:17 PM
36	Multiple	8/24/2016 11:14 AM
37	Georgia	8/24/2016 10:33 AM
38	Rwanda	8/23/2016 4:51 PM
39	Lebanon	8/23/2016 3:34 PM
40	Rwanda	8/23/2016 3:33 PM
41	Pakistan	8/23/2016 1:17 PM
42	Kenya	8/23/2016 11:57 AM
43	HQ	8/23/2016 10:35 AM
44	Geo Desk Officer	8/23/2016 8:55 AM
45	Yemen	8/22/2016 6:08 PM
46	jordan	8/22/2016 3:12 PM
47	Chad	8/22/2016 3:09 PM
48	Moldova	8/22/2016 2:24 PM
49	multiple	8/22/2016 11:27 AM
50	<b>country visited</b> Cambodia	8/22/2016 6:12 AM
51	HAITI	8/20/2016 6:46 PM
52	Morocco	8/19/2016 12:46 PM
53	Lebanon	8/17/2016 3:31 PM
54	multiple	8/17/2016 3:20 PM
55	<b>Myanmar</b> Myanmar	8/17/2016 6:50 AM
56	Ethiopia	8/16/2016 1:05 PM
57	HQ EU	8/16/2016 10:28 AM
58	Field-based staff	8/15/2016 3:38 PM
59	<b>Myanmar</b> Myanmar	8/15/2016 11:31 AM
60	<b>Myanmar</b> Myanmar	8/15/2016 5:12 AM
61	Laos	8/15/2016 4:32 AM
62	Field-based staff	8/14/2016 12:41 PM
63	Honduras	8/13/2016 10:32 PM
64	<b>country visited</b> Zambia	8/12/2016 8:55 AM
65	<b>country visited</b> mozambique	8/11/2016 12:36 PM
66	multiple	8/11/2016 11:03 AM
67	multiple	8/11/2016 10:48 AM
68	HQ Geo Desk	8/11/2016 10:11 AM
69	Moldova	8/11/2016 10:03 AM
70	<b>country visited</b> Kenya	8/11/2016 9:43 AM
71	HQ Geo Desk officer	8/10/2016 5:36 PM
72	Uganda	8/10/2016 3:55 PM


## Joint Programming Evaluation

73	Rwanda	8/10/2016 2:29 PM
74	multiple	8/10/2016 2:22 PM
75	Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras	8/10/2016 11:52 AM
76	HQ	8/10/2016 9:58 AM
77	multiple	8/10/2016 9:03 AM
78	<b>country visited</b> Myanmar/Burma	8/10/2016 5:50 AM
79	<b>country visited</b> Sénégal	8/9/2016 7:47 PM
80	Burkina Faso	8/9/2016 7:23 PM
81	Bolivia	8/9/2016 6:05 PM
82	Nicaragua	8/9/2016 4:46 PM
83	Armenia	8/9/2016 3:45 PM

# Joint Programming Evaluation

## Q2 You work for:

Answered: 83 Skipped: 0



Answer Choices	Responses	
EU - DEVCO HQ	10.84%	9
EU - NEAR HQ	6.02%	5
EU - EEAS HQ	12.05%	10
EU - Delegation or Representation	25.30%	21
Member State - HQ	10.84%	9
Member State - Field	34.94%	29
<b>Total</b>		<b>83</b>

# Joint Programming Evaluation

## Q3 Position:

Answered: 83 Skipped: 0

#	Responses	Date
1	Head of Cooperation	9/17/2016 12:01 PM
2	EU Coordinator	9/12/2016 2:53 PM
3	Head of Cooperation	9/9/2016 4:34 PM
4	head of cooperation	9/8/2016 7:56 PM
5	Counselor / Education	9/8/2016 2:37 PM
6	Head of Cooperation	9/8/2016 9:20 AM
7	Task Manager - Development cooperation	9/8/2016 3:31 AM
8	Head of Cooperation	9/7/2016 11:23 AM
9	Director	9/6/2016 9:07 AM
10	Head of cooperation	9/5/2016 5:30 PM
11	Political Officer	9/5/2016 10:47 AM
12	Results and Evaluation	9/1/2016 2:16 PM
13	Head of Cooperation	9/1/2016 7:42 AM
14	Head of sector geo coordinaiton unit	8/31/2016 3:41 PM
15	Head of Cooperation	8/31/2016 3:36 PM
16	Head of Cooperation	8/31/2016 1:13 PM
17	Administrator	8/31/2016 11:42 AM
18	Head of Cooperation	8/31/2016 8:50 AM
19	Country Office Director	8/31/2016 8:39 AM
20	Desk officer	8/30/2016 1:11 PM
21	HOC	8/30/2016 12:29 PM
22	geo desk for laos + cambodia (a.i.)	8/30/2016 11:39 AM
23	Geo coordinator	8/30/2016 10:55 AM
24	Desk Officer - Contract Agent	8/30/2016 9:15 AM
25	Head of Development Cooperation	8/30/2016 4:10 AM
26	HoC	8/29/2016 4:18 PM
27	Desk	8/29/2016 3:39 PM
28	Deputy Head of Division	8/29/2016 3:39 PM
29	policy officer	8/29/2016 12:14 PM
30	Counsellor	8/29/2016 8:58 AM
31	Head Field Office	8/27/2016 9:17 AM
32	Geo Desk	8/26/2016 3:16 PM
33	diplomat	8/26/2016 12:07 PM
34	Economist	8/26/2016 11:27 AM
35	policy officer	8/24/2016 1:17 PM

## Joint Programming Evaluation

36	Results, programming and transparency coordinator	8/24/2016 11:14 AM
37	Fourth secretary	8/24/2016 10:33 AM
38	Counselor Development Cooperation	8/23/2016 4:51 PM
39	Programme Manager	8/23/2016 3:34 PM
40	Horizontal	8/23/2016 3:33 PM
41	HOC	8/23/2016 1:17 PM
42	HoC	8/23/2016 11:57 AM
43	CHIEF ADVISER	8/23/2016 10:35 AM
44	Desk Officer	8/23/2016 8:55 AM
45	Head of Delegation	8/22/2016 6:08 PM
46	desk	8/22/2016 3:12 PM
47	Head of cooperation	8/22/2016 3:09 PM
48	Head of Cooperation	8/22/2016 2:24 PM
49	Attaché	8/22/2016 11:27 AM
50	Head of Cooperation	8/22/2016 6:12 AM
51	Head of cooperation	8/20/2016 6:46 PM
52	cooperation	8/19/2016 12:46 PM
53	Desk	8/17/2016 3:31 PM
54	Former HoC in Ethiopia (2009-2013)	8/17/2016 3:20 PM
55	Counsellor	8/17/2016 6:50 AM
56	Cooperation Officer	8/16/2016 1:05 PM
57	policy officer	8/16/2016 10:28 AM
58	2nd secretary	8/15/2016 3:38 PM
59	Dep Head of Mission	8/15/2016 11:31 AM
60	Deputy-Head of Embassy	8/15/2016 5:12 AM
61	Attaché	8/15/2016 4:32 AM
62	Head of Office	8/14/2016 12:41 PM
63	Head of Section	8/13/2016 10:32 PM
64	Head of Cooperation	8/12/2016 8:55 AM
65	hoc	8/11/2016 12:36 PM
66	Joint Programming EEAS Team - EEAS GLOBAL 5	8/11/2016 11:03 AM
67	Porgramming - Horizontal coordination	8/11/2016 10:48 AM
68	geo desk	8/11/2016 10:11 AM
69	Head of Office	8/11/2016 10:03 AM
70	Head of Cooperation	8/11/2016 9:43 AM
71	Geo Desk officer	8/10/2016 5:36 PM
72	Desk	8/10/2016 3:55 PM
73	Head of Development Cooperation	8/10/2016 2:29 PM
74	at the time head of geographic section	8/10/2016 2:22 PM
75	Desk Officer	8/10/2016 11:52 AM
76	Senior Policy Officer	8/10/2016 9:58 AM




## Joint Programming Evaluation

77	Geo desk and European Policy desk	8/10/2016 9:03 AM
78	Head of Cooperation	8/10/2016 5:50 AM
79	Head of Cooperation	8/9/2016 7:47 PM
80	Head of Cooperation/Unit	8/9/2016 7:23 PM
81	Program Officer	8/9/2016 6:05 PM
82	Head of cooperation	8/9/2016 4:46 PM
83	Team leader	8/9/2016 3:45 PM

# Joint Programming Evaluation

## Q4 Involved with JP process


Answered: 83 Skipped: 0



	less than a year	1-2 years	more than 2 years	Total	Weighted Average
(no label)	24.10% 20	32.53% 27	43.37% 36	83	2.19

**Q5 At the end of 2015, the Joint Programming Process in this country was at the following stage (select one option only):**


Answered: 83 Skipped: 0



Answer Choices	Responses
EU Joint Programming Roadmap agreed	16.87% 14
EU Joint Analysis in progress	16.87% 14
EU Joint Analysis completed	7.23% 6
EU Joint Response in progress	7.23% 6
EU Joint Response completed	6.02% 5
EU Joint Strategy endorsed by Commission and MS	10.84% 9
EU Joint Strategy under implementation	16.87% 14
My answers are provided for several countries	18.07% 15
<b>Total</b>	<b>83</b>

**Q6 Based on your experience please indicate what in your view was (or were) the main purpose(s) pursued by your organisation when participating in the JP process. Please qualify you response for each proposition.**

Answered: 83 Skipped: 0



	1. Main motivation	2. Secondary consideration	3. Not really the purpose	4. I do not know	Total	Weighted Average
To reduce aid fragmentation	62.65% 52	24.10% 20	9.64% 8	3.61% 3	83	1.54

## Joint Programming Evaluation

To increase aid predictability	<b>27.71%</b> 23	<b>45.78%</b> 38	<b>24.10%</b> 20	<b>2.41%</b> 2	83	2.01
To reduce aid transaction cost	<b>30.12%</b> 25	<b>40.96%</b> 34	<b>25.30%</b> 21	<b>3.61%</b> 3	83	2.02
To increase alignment with the partner countries' strategies	<b>44.58%</b> 37	<b>34.94%</b> 29	<b>16.87%</b> 14	<b>3.61%</b> 3	83	1.80
To increase country ownership	<b>16.87%</b> 14	<b>39.76%</b> 33	<b>40.96%</b> 34	<b>2.41%</b> 2	83	2.29
To improve policy dialogue between the Commission/EEAS and EU MS	<b>43.37%</b> 36	<b>38.55%</b> 32	<b>12.05%</b> 10	<b>6.02%</b> 5	83	1.81
To improve policy dialogue with the Partner Country	<b>38.55%</b> 32	<b>42.17%</b> 35	<b>16.87%</b> 14	<b>2.41%</b> 2	83	1.83
To coordinate aid better between the Commission/EEAS and EU MS	<b>79.52%</b> 66	<b>13.25%</b> 11	<b>4.82%</b> 4	<b>2.41%</b> 2	83	1.30
To make sure the Commission/EEAS and EU MS speak with one voice	<b>49.40%</b> 41	<b>36.14%</b> 30	<b>9.64%</b> 8	<b>4.82%</b> 4	83	1.70
To increase the visibility of your organization	<b>6.02%</b> 5	<b>39.76%</b> 33	<b>50.60%</b> 42	<b>3.61%</b> 3	83	2.52
To increase joint EU visibility	<b>37.35%</b> 31	<b>45.78%</b> 38	<b>14.46%</b> 12	<b>2.41%</b> 2	83	1.82
To increase EU leverage and impact	<b>61.45%</b> 51	<b>31.33%</b> 26	<b>4.82%</b> 4	<b>2.41%</b> 2	83	1.48
Other reasons	<b>6.02%</b> 5	<b>7.23%</b> 6	<b>14.46%</b> 12	<b>72.29%</b> 60	83	3.53


#	If other reasons, please specify below. Please feel also free to further explain or comment your answers.	Date
1	In Rwanda aid fragmentation had already been reduced as the country had introduced a division of labour in 2010.	9/17/2016 12:01 PM
2	Important to bridget the gap between EU joint thematic policies ( as expressed in Council Conclusions and joint action plans) and operations.	9/12/2016 2:58 PM
3	To avoid duplication.	9/9/2016 4:43 PM
4	Increase joint intervention in specific sectors	9/8/2016 3:33 AM
5	Please note that in Nepal the JP process has not advanced much. Even a clear agreement on the Roadmap is still pending (refers to the previous question).	9/7/2016 11:28 AM
6	No further comments as I was not in charge then.	8/31/2016 3:59 PM
7	.	8/31/2016 1:14 PM
8	Not involved in JP process	8/30/2016 12:33 PM
9	Please note, we are a non resident donor in Cambodia, Myanmar and Laos. We provide very modest project based funding to implementing partners - NGOs and UN agencies. We do not have the capacity to engage in the EU joint programming processes on a substantive basis. However, we receive regular communication from the Delegation on the process in each country which we highly appreciate from each country. We visit Delegation colleagues when we conduct field visits and we attend EU Delegation meetings from time to time in person or by VC on an occasional basis.	8/30/2016 4:15 AM
10	To increase EU leverage and impact is the key objective sought.	8/24/2016 1:19 PM
11	Due to the ongoing political crisis Lebanon is and will not be able to ensure country ownership in the process. Additionally a Development National Policy is missing and only few sectoral policy were developed. For the reasons above, JP added value is to be seen mainly in terms of improved coordination among donors and increase aid predictability, the latter however could be badly affected by the regional and internal instability that might require important adjustment in planned support.	8/23/2016 3:40 PM

## Joint Programming Evaluation

12	EU Joint Programming was mentioned in the European Consensus on Development (2005), in the Council Conclusions on the Operational Framework on Aid Effectiveness (2009), the Busan Forum on Aid Effectiveness (2011) and the Council Conclusions "Stepping up Joint Programming" (2016)	8/22/2016 11:27 AM
13	At the beginning of the process (2009-2010) it was about division of labour without qualifying clearly what it meant (efficiency, money savings). Then other motivations came progressively along the process when moved to joint programming, however first motivated by the EU dimension.	8/17/2016 3:27 PM
14	For the purpose of transparency and mutual accountability, and also to focus on results.	8/16/2016 1:18 PM
15	The first strategy started to develop when there were hardly any countries with an office in Myanmar. Three years later this has completely changed, but do not have the impression that any country while designing their country strategy for Myanmar ever has taken a look at the first joint strategy paper	8/15/2016 11:33 AM
16	So as to be a collaborative colleague in an exercise that was clearly important to the EU Mission in country (ie for the sake of good working relationship with the EU)	8/14/2016 12:44 PM
17	Other reasons: In many instances, the process was perceived as 'imposed by Brussels' and was initiated (or refused) just because there was yet another 'instruction' and simply not enough time or brain resources to invest in JP against competing (and more compelling) deadlines. HQ-to-EUDs communication on JP and other core horizontal issues is frequently based on the false assumption that 'across-the-board instruction notes' will be crystal clear from Fiji to Afghanistan, and we do not need tailor-made dialogue and adaptation. In addition, HQ communication tends to be centred around the work/mandate/deliverables of horizontal units without sufficient triangulation with geographic services.	8/11/2016 10:59 AM
18	NB alignment with partner country strategy is in place for all MS so was not really part of this exercise.	8/11/2016 9:43 AM
19	In the case of Myanmar, when the JP 2014-2016 was prepared, the objective of increasing country ownership was less important, as the Myanmar Government was not considered totally legitimate. There was a transition from dictatorship to democracy and for this reason the authorities were not really involved in the JP preparation process. They just participated in the strategy endorsement ceremony. For the next strategy this will be very different, as we have now a legitimate government as interlocutor, following democratic elections in the end of 2015.	8/10/2016 5:56 AM
20	Comprehensive approach.	8/9/2016 4:48 PM

### Q7 The JP process has led to a better division of labour among the Commission/EEAS and MS


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	1. Strongly agree	2. Rather agree	3. Rather disagree	4. Strongly disagree	5. No opinion	6. Too early	Total	Weighted Average
Across sectors	7.23% 6	25.30% 21	21.69% 18	8.43% 7	4.82% 4	32.53% 27	83	3.76
Within sectors	7.23% 6	36.14% 30	16.87% 14	7.23% 6	4.82% 4	27.71% 23	83	3.49

### Q8 The JP process has led to joint implementation initiatives

Answered: 83 Skipped: 0



	Yes	No	I do not know	Total	Weighted Average
Delegated cooperation	36.14% 30	34.94% 29	28.92% 24	83	1.93
Pooled funding	17.07% 14	54.88% 45	28.05% 23	82	2.11
SWAPs	7.41% 6	54.32% 44	38.27% 31	81	2.31
Other (please specify below)	12.50% 9	29.17% 21	58.33% 42	72	2.46

#	Other (please specify)	Date
1	In fact, most mechanisms were already in place before; there were no further initiatives after completing the joint response.	9/17/2016 12:01 PM
2	To date few examples but Cambodia and Kenya are cases where we start to see positive examples of joint implementation and joint follow up of the EU JP.	9/12/2016 3:09 PM
3	Joint formulation of Budget Support Joint formulation of Democracy and Human Rights Strategy Improved coordination in relation to GEWE	9/8/2016 9:23 AM
4	Too early to say. Due to the major disaster in 2015 and reluctance of one EU MS the JP file did not progress as we expected.	9/7/2016 11:29 AM
5	Pooled funding and Swaps happened but within the Framework of the G19 which included EU MS. Therefore, it is difficult to give credit to the JP process for whatever coordination work that happened when the G19 was still strong and operating (i.e. up to 2014).	9/6/2016 9:12 AM
6	The process is not yet at the stage where joint implementation has begun, but the potential is certainly there.	9/1/2016 7:46 AM
7	Mainly co-financing only - unfortunately.	8/31/2016 3:44 PM
8	Delegated cooperation only to a marginal extent for the moment	8/30/2016 12:33 PM




## Joint Programming Evaluation

9	In practise, it seems that EU JP has set out with a very comprehensible narrative and policy orientation. However, it seems that the operative consequences of the various coordination processes around JP for EU MS bilateral programmes has yet to be translated in real changes when it comes to decisions about implementation and strategic orientation of bilateral cooperation / programmes / projects.	8/29/2016 4:24 PM
10	too early	8/26/2016 12:11 PM
11	General budget support + delegated cooperation continuous to be part of the programming also after JP.	8/26/2016 11:32 AM
12	So far, MS have not showed a real interest in carrying out a JP exercins and thus have not been sufficiently proactive. JP is seen as an additional task and despite attempts to raise awereness on the possible JP benefits, EUMS are reticent to put a disposal any financial and/or expertise support to the benefit of a participatory JP. MS expects that the EUD takes the lead in the design of the JP. Such attitude might affect any division of labour/joint implementation initiatives artificially elaborated	8/23/2016 3:46 PM
13	Yemen is at war	8/22/2016 6:13 PM
14	Increased operational coordination Increased policy dialogue	8/22/2016 3:15 PM
15	there is nothing on JP in JORDAN at present. your questionnaire does not seem to allow for such a scenario	8/22/2016 3:14 PM
16	Currently no impacts yet	8/22/2016 2:28 PM
17	BE is already involved in delegated cooperation since long time (bi - multi cooperation) in order to find the best "fit - for - pupose" organisation.	8/22/2016 11:28 AM
18	Some joint implementation initiatives pre-dated joint programming strategy but are being continued	8/22/2016 6:17 AM
19	EU blue book Better EU+ coordination (better awareness that EU+ can become more influencial amongst all donors) within a given sector in order to inform donors policy dialogue with the Government: eg food security, aid effectiveness agenda	8/17/2016 3:36 PM
20	Too early to say	8/17/2016 3:34 PM
21	It is diffeult to answer this before finalizing the JP process itself.	8/16/2016 1:23 PM
22	cannot judge this from HQ. hopefully JP also led to joint identification, jount reviews and evaluations, and other forms of joint implementation.	8/16/2016 10:40 AM
23	There are several pooled initiatives in which the EU and my MS are jointly involved in my country - but these did not come about as a result of the JP process	8/14/2016 12:45 PM
24	Joint Energy Declaration specifying joint way forward with Government, EU and other partners	8/12/2016 9:04 AM
25	Transfer agreements	8/11/2016 11:01 AM
26	Joint implementation initiatives as an immediate result of the Joint Programming exercise are not really visible. One possibel reason being that development Partners continue to plan at different Timings due to largely unsynchronised committment planning (this part of the Joint Programming has so far been largely under potential despite its relevance for Joint implementation activities).	8/10/2016 10:53 AM
27	The JP process did not really translate in a better division of labour.	8/10/2016 6:01 AM
28	Joint programming has not yet been approved by the partner country. It is too early to answer this question. Previously Joint programming, joint initiatives are being implemented in Bolivia (delegated cooperation, pooled funding, swaps) so you can expect the process lead to more joint initiatives	8/9/2016 6:06 PM

### Q9 Did the number of donors per sector decrease?

Answered: 83 Skipped: 0



Answer Choices	Responses
Yes - Due to JP	12.05% 10
Yes - Due to other initiatives (please provide examples below)	10.84% 9
No	26.51% 22
I do not know	20.48% 17
Too early	30.12% 25
<b>Total</b>	<b>83</b>


#	Please also feel free to further explain or comment on your answers for questions 1 to 3.	Date
1	Due to a strong Government suggesting a maximum of three donors per sector. Division of labour started in 2010 and was further refined in 2013.	9/17/2016 12:01 PM
2	Reduction of bilateral aid programme by The Netherlands	9/8/2016 9:23 AM
3	JP allowed for the common categorization of sectors: e.g. up to recently Nutrition was not considered as a sector as such, but through JP exercise it was categorized as a sector of its own, with multi-sectoral features, but no longer under Rural Development and Sustainable Agriculture, or Health/Education.	9/8/2016 3:42 AM
4	But pooled funding happened.	9/6/2016 9:12 AM
5	Very limited progress unfortunately. But this is not the fault of the EU. MS continue doing business in an old-fashioned bilateral way and don't give room for joint work. Implementing agencies have their own business interests and are not keen to engage in joint work either.	8/31/2016 3:44 PM
6	It is too early still to conclude to an improvement in aid delivery thanks to JP. The process is still moving (too slowly) towards the elaboration of a joint response strategy.	8/30/2016 12:33 PM
7	As a non-resident donor providing small discrete project based funding (in Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos) we do not have the depth of knowledge to answer this question.	8/30/2016 4:17 AM

## Joint Programming Evaluation

8	Specifically for the EU which concentrated its programming. The Netherlands also concentrated but that was more domestically driven. And the code of conduct on division of labour also contributed.	8/24/2016 11:19 AM
9	DoL	8/23/2016 4:58 PM
10	There are active sector working grupos where these isuses are being discussed and solutions found	8/23/2016 3:40 PM
11	Reduction of the size of cooperation of some MS (Netherlands - Denmark)	8/23/2016 1:21 PM
12	very few MS in Chad, only France has a bilateral programme. the issues is not so much division of labour than joining forces	8/22/2016 3:15 PM
13	Related to European partners only : small decrease due to some EU MS leaving the country (UK, Denmark, Spain) or reaching pre-agreed sector exits (Germany on land)	8/22/2016 6:17 AM
14	I don't know what a SWAP is...	8/20/2016 6:52 PM
15	Too early when I left Ethiopia in 2013	8/17/2016 3:36 PM
16	Withdrawal of donors from the health sector de to other priorities at HQ.	8/17/2016 6:52 AM
17	It is diffeult to answer this before finalizing the JP process itself.	8/16/2016 1:23 PM
18	there was really not a joint programme in Myanmar due to the limited number at the time of writing. Completely changed situation now, and not having the ipression that anyone has taken note of the previous document	8/15/2016 11:35 AM
19	Partners will continue to decide which sectors they will support based on their own political and policy considerations. For instance, Germany, not traditionally involved in agriculture, decided to support the sector because this was the line of the new minister for development cooperation. The decision was taken AFTER the completion of the DE-Zambia country strategy. Other example: Energy is sexy. Many donors decided to move into the sector over the past 2 years.	8/12/2016 9:04 AM
20	In Namibia the number of donors is reducing because of the UMIC status of the country	8/11/2016 10:30 AM
21	DoL was not really the focus of the exercise. Some MS explicitly stated that JP should not lead to DoL.	8/11/2016 9:44 AM
22	Due to an initiative by the Government of Rwanda including all development partners.	8/10/2016 2:35 PM
23	I dealt with 3 countries dealing with JP, experiances were different	8/10/2016 2:25 PM
24	There seems to be Little correlation between the Joint Programming exercise and the (political) decisions of development Partners to enter or Exit certain sectors. Unfortunately, this constat is hard to prove as the existing Joint Programming documents do not have a "before and after" comparison with regard to (a) donor Matrix and (b) synchronization of committments. This, despite of the fact, that the "before and after" comparisons has been introduced into the "EU Guidance Package" as a recommendation to enhance transparency and accountability.	8/10/2016 10:53 AM
25	This should be seen in the context of the country: after decades of isolation, many donors came to the country and all have high ambitions for profiling themselves. In terms of aid effectiveness the donors scenario is not better than in other countries, with a 'development aid tradition'.	8/10/2016 6:01 AM
26	some MS have reduces the fragmentation of their development assistance as they recognises their lack of leverage or political stalmates in some areas of intervention	8/9/2016 7:53 PM
27	Joint programming in Bolivia is pending final approval and cover the period 2017-2020. In relation to the division of labor, which has been achieved it is that each Member State lead a sector. It reduced the number of countries in the sectors and the number of sectors per country in relation to previous years of bilateral planning, but there are still challenges facing higher concentration.	8/9/2016 6:06 PM

### Q10 Did the number of sectors per donor decrease?

Answered: 83 Skipped: 0



Answer Choices	Responses
Yes - Due to JP	9.64% 8
Yes - Due to other initiatives (please provide examples below)	9.64% 8
No	27.71% 23
I do not know	25.30% 21
Too early	27.71% 23
<b>Total</b>	<b>83</b>


#	Please also feel free to further explain or comment on your answers for questions 1 to 4.	Date
1	Due to Government initiatives suggesting maximum of three sectors per donor. This started in 2010 and was further refined in 2013.	9/17/2016 12:01 PM
2	There are indications of better coordination within sectors as a result of JP but not a decrease of donors per sector.	9/12/2016 3:09 PM
3	In part due to JP, but not always	9/8/2016 3:42 AM
4	At least not in German Development Cooperation - it is shame how all commitments to harmonization and alignment and joint EU work has been ignored and how the portfolio has further expanded.	8/31/2016 3:44 PM
5	Current trend for several EUMS to go towards 'migration/refugee crisis' related sectors (stability, security, etc.) or 'Rol sectors 9ie Trade/private sector)	8/31/2016 1:16 PM
6	Also in the view of the formulation of the EU Joint Transitional Strategy 2014-2016, Italy had started focusing on 3 priority sectors (rural development, governance and private sector development)	8/31/2016 8:47 AM
7	Limitation of number of focal areas	8/29/2016 4:34 PM
8	But also for domestic reasons. See also answer under 3. Suggestion: to analyse the Country Programmable Aid data (country matrices) of the OECD/DAC from 2007 (year of code of conduct on DoL) until the most recent data. It will provide evidence of sector concentration.	8/24/2016 11:19 AM

## Joint Programming Evaluation

9	DoL	8/23/2016 4:58 PM
10	Government of Rwanda monitors whether DPs stick to division of labor. If they are active in sectors they are not supposed to they get a bad rating in that respect in the DPAF.	8/23/2016 3:40 PM
11	see answer 3	8/22/2016 3:15 PM
12	Although in some partner countries, some MS still want to lead in multiple sectors.	8/22/2016 11:28 AM
13	I do not think so as increase in loans from European partners might have increased sectors of support	8/22/2016 6:17 AM
14	International context and internal political orientation within MSs	8/19/2016 12:54 PM
15	Too early when I left Ethiopia in 2013	8/17/2016 3:36 PM
16	Given that our Embassy is accredited to Myanmar but not based in Myanmar and that we finance two small projects only, we have little knowledge of joint programming.	8/15/2016 5:17 AM
17	Donors are concentrating their sectors of activities to increase their impact	8/13/2016 10:36 PM
18	See A3.	8/12/2016 9:04 AM
19	Same as above	8/11/2016 9:44 AM
20	Field staff is better placed to answer to question 1 and 4	8/10/2016 11:56 AM
21	See answer to section 3.	8/10/2016 10:53 AM
22	please see above. Members states keep having their bilateral agendas.	8/10/2016 6:01 AM
23	See above reply	8/9/2016 7:53 PM

**Q11 The JP process has led the following partners to closer align their programming cycle to the one from the partner country**


Answered: 83 Skipped: 0



	Strongly agree	Rather agree	Rather disagree	Strongly disagree	No opinion	Total	Weighted Average
Commission/EEAS	8.43% 7	36.14% 30	19.28% 16	14.46% 12	21.69% 18	83	3.05
Participating EU MS in general	4.82% 4	34.94% 29	26.51% 22	12.05% 10	21.69% 18	83	3.11

**Q12 The JP process has led the following partner to provide more and better information on their current and planned country programmable aid (CPA)**


Answered: 83 Skipped: 0



	Strongly agree	Rather agree	Rather disagree	Strongly disagree	No opinion	Total	Weighted Average
Commission/EEAS	20.48% 17	49.40% 41	15.66% 13	1.20% 1	13.25% 11	83	2.37
Participating EU MS in general	19.28% 16	50.60% 42	18.07% 15	0.00% 0	12.05% 10	83	2.35

### Q13 The JP process has provided better knowledge of the partners involved in that process about

Answered: 83 Skipped: 0



	Strongly agree	Rather agree	Rather disagree	Strongly disagree	No opinion	Total	Weighted Average
Cooperation priorities	31.33% 26	48.19% 40	10.84% 9	0.00% 0	9.64% 8	83	2.08
Areas of current support	30.12% 25	56.63% 47	6.02% 5	0.00% 0	7.23% 6	83	1.98
Medium-term intentions with regards to sector support	22.89% 19	53.01% 44	13.25% 11	2.41% 2	8.43% 7	83	2.20

#	Please feel free to further explain or comment on your answers for questions 1 to 3.	Date
1	In terms of providing more and better information the situations varies from country to country depending on individual Heads of Cooperation and committment from member states	9/12/2016 3:13 PM
2	In the case of Tanzania, it is not the JP process as such but more the enhanced EU coordination that has resulted in the above.	9/8/2016 9:24 AM
3	Synchronization and predictability are clear gains advantages of JP in Laos	9/8/2016 3:44 AM
4	The process of alignment of JP with national development strategies is hindered by the fact that at this point many of national strategies have already been adopted. Therefore, the process only works one-way: the EU adjusting to the existing strategies of MS.	9/5/2016 12:58 PM
5	Whether the JP process helped to further define cooperation priorities and areas of current support, the transitional situation of Myanmar didn't allow to identify medium term intentions	9/1/2016 5:25 AM
6	Again: the fact that bilateral cooperation continues in a very old-fashioned way does not mean, that the EU joint efforts should be given less support: all the contrary! We have to find better ways to overcome the bilateral business as usual and insist on EU joint work. This needs to involve HQs since colleagues in the field are most willing to do joint work.	8/31/2016 3:49 PM
7	EU MS usually used to already communicate about their sectors of intervention; but JP seems to provide a better overview on their financial commitments.	8/30/2016 6:49 PM
8	JP has helped to have a better view on MS priorities although these may change rapidly within the period of development of the JP strategy.	8/30/2016 12:35 PM




## Joint Programming Evaluation

9	It is important to also consider existing coordination and dialogue mechanisms that are already in place on the ground. In environments where sector coordination, e.g. through Joint approaches / PBAs is already good, the "added value" of coordination in the specific sector may be more limited than in countries or sectors where less formal coordination and harmonisations are taking place.	8/29/2016 4:24 PM
10	Too early to assess such elements. However the lack of EUMS interest in the exercise is not promising of any improvements	8/23/2016 3:49 PM
11	The information sharing is ad hoc and not very structured	8/23/2016 3:42 PM
12	Alignment was already quite strong before JP - this might be a reason why JP was a relatively easy exercise to embark on.	8/22/2016 6:18 AM
13	Clearly a better mutual understanding even if many EU MS colleagues were limited by their yearly programming submitted to national Parliaments and therefore rather unpredictable	8/17/2016 3:39 PM
14	Too early to say	8/17/2016 3:36 PM
15	It is true that some MS are willing to align their programming cycle with the JP ones once it is completed taking the timing into consideration.	8/16/2016 1:36 PM
16	Medium-term intentions are just that: Intentions. However, as specified earlier, policy and political priorities are often shifting over time and effective implementation may differ from the intentions.	8/12/2016 9:07 AM
17	The JP process has not taken off in Rwanda.	8/10/2016 2:39 PM
18	Again, field staff is better placed to answer these questions. As Desk Officer based in HQ from the EEAS side and in charge of 4 countries, it is rather difficult to enter into such level of details.	8/10/2016 11:57 AM
19	The donor matrix is useful. Yet, donor matrices already existed since a long time and are not an invention of Joint Programming, which should - in theory - go far beyond donor matrices.	8/10/2016 10:56 AM
20	These standard questions are not ideal, as the country context matters. This is maybe applicable to many countries but not to Myanmar.	8/10/2016 6:03 AM
21	MT intentions are going to be discussed in the context of the ongoing JP process starting in September	8/9/2016 7:55 PM

## Joint Programming Evaluation

### Q14 To what extent do you agree with the following statements: the JP process


Answered: 83 Skipped: 0



	Strongly agree	Rather agree	Rather disagree	Strongly disagree	No opinion	Total	Weighted Average
Was led by the government	1.20% 1	2.41% 2	27.71% 23	56.63% 47	12.05% 10	83	3.76
Was based on the partner country's national development strategy	22.89% 19	40.96% 34	16.87% 14	7.23% 6	12.05% 10	83	2.45

**Q15 The JP process has led the following partners to align their support more to the partner country's priorities compared to a situation without JP**


Answered: 83 Skipped: 0



	Strongly agree	Rather agree	Rather disagree	Strongly disagree	No opinion	Total	Weighted Average
TheCommission/EEAS	3.61% 3	34.94% 29	22.89% 19	8.43% 7	30.12% 25	83	3.27
The participating EU MS in general	3.61% 3	30.12% 25	26.51% 22	14.46% 12	25.30% 21	83	3.28

### Q16 During the Joint Analysis, consultations were held with

Answered: 83 Skipped: 0




	Yes	No	I do not know	Total	Weighted Average
Central/coordinating ministry level	38.55% 32	16.87% 14	44.58% 37	83	2.06
Line ministries, directorates/external departments	31.33% 26	24.10% 20	44.58% 37	83	2.13
State institutions (Parliament, Supreme Audit Institution, etc.)	13.25% 11	32.53% 27	54.22% 45	83	2.41
Local private sector/business community	22.89% 19	24.10% 20	53.01% 44	83	2.30
Local civic bodies (NGOs, labour unions, faith-based organisation, etc.)	36.14% 30	19.28% 16	44.58% 37	83	2.08

## Joint Programming Evaluation

### Q17 During the joint programming, consultations were held with

Answered: 83 Skipped: 0




	Yes	No	I do not know	Total	Weighted Average
Central/coordinating ministry level	<b>38.55%</b> 32	<b>13.25%</b> 11	<b>48.19%</b> 40	83	2.10
Line ministries, directorates/external departments	<b>32.53%</b> 27	<b>18.07%</b> 15	<b>49.40%</b> 41	83	2.17
State institutions (Parliament, Supreme Audit Institution, etc.)	<b>9.64%</b> 8	<b>27.71%</b> 23	<b>62.65%</b> 52	83	2.53
Local private sector/business community	<b>15.66%</b> 13	<b>21.69%</b> 18	<b>62.65%</b> 52	83	2.47
Local civic bodies (NGOs, labour unions, faith-based organisation, etc.)	<b>28.92%</b> 24	<b>14.46%</b> 12	<b>56.63%</b> 47	83	2.28

## Joint Programming Evaluation

### Q18 The partner country has made substantive contributions to the JP process and its deliverables

Answered: 83 Skipped: 0



	Strongly agree	Rather agree	Rather disagree	Strongly disagree	No opinion	Total	Weighted Average
(no label)	2.41% 2	14.46% 12	25.30% 21	31.33% 26	26.51% 22	83	3.65


#	Please feel free to further explain or comment on your answers for questions 1 to 5	Date
1	At the start in 2012 the Government was strongly in favour of the process and asked EU to coordinate the bilateral donors (EU plus others). During the process the Government's involvement was rather minimal. External factors like temporary halt of budget support and later reduction of BS donors may have contributed to this attitude.	9/17/2016 12:01 PM
2	The consultation process with local stakeholders and the quality by which it was conducted varies substantially between different countries.	9/12/2016 3:17 PM
3	question 5: it was not possible for political reasons (transition government after the Coup)	9/8/2016 8:05 PM
4	Questions 3 and 4 are irrelevant in the case of TZ as JP is yet to make significant progress.	9/8/2016 9:26 AM
5	JP arises a high degree of confusion and initial skepticism from Lao Government. But we adopted a proactive stance in communicating transparently during the various rounds of consultations.	9/8/2016 3:50 AM
6	Nota bene and see previous comment: We have not yet reached the stage of Joint Analysis and beyond.	9/7/2016 11:33 AM
7	1. It was not clear how and when the JA draft would be shared with Moldovan authorities. 2. The ways/degree of involvement of civil society was not explained/worked through. 3.	9/5/2016 1:03 PM
8	The Partner Country has been fairly involved. However, the level of involvement reflects once again the transition Myanmar is going through with the concurrent redefinition of its ODA architecture	9/1/2016 5:25 AM
9	I took office 6 months ago only.	8/31/2016 3:50 PM
10	Process is still at its beginning. Government and external partners have only marginally been involved. However, that said, analysis and response are fully aligned with Government's sectoral strategies.	8/30/2016 12:37 PM
11	Libya is an exception on the rule and JP has been used mainly to enhance better coordination between EU MS ongoing programmes in this conflict affected country where no valid national structures to consult with exist at this moment and where UN has the mandate to coordinate international support. The latter is a very slow and cumbersome process, therefore it was decided to start coordination at EU level. Valuable information has been exchanged and helps EU and MS to better focus interventions.	8/29/2016 3:50 PM
12	I can't judge the consequences of other MS, but alignment is no longer a big issue for the Netherlands	8/24/2016 11:23 AM

## Joint Programming Evaluation

13	Lebanon is going through a very important political national crisis (no agreement on President election) which affects any form of cooperation. Additionally Lebanon has only few sectoral policies and lack a national development policies. Joint Analysing is not progressing at the moment due to lack of engagement from EU MS to be actively part of the process.	8/23/2016 3:53 PM
14	The discussions were hardly consultations but rather providing them with information about what was going on. Question 4 does not apply: there was only a joint analysis yet never a systematic approach how to get to Joint Programming/Implementation.	8/23/2016 3:46 PM
15	As no JP, and not yet Joint analysis - difficult to answer - the right answer should have been "too early to answer"	8/23/2016 1:25 PM
16	The JP Process in Kenya was more a EU/MS internal exercise to align more with the partner government plans and priorities and to agree on where and how EU/MSs could collaborate more to reduce transaction costs and fragmentation of aid.	8/23/2016 12:08 PM
17	EU Joint Programming is a process that is influenced by lots of elements: context, region, goodwill of the partner country towards EU JP, ... . BE was involved in EU JP in different countries. In some partner countries, the Ministries were informed of the ongoing process, in other they participated. Hence, "I do not know" is a general answer. The questions (1-5) should be answered country - wise.	8/22/2016 11:29 AM
18	Consultations continued to be held as part of the normal sector level consultative /coordination processes : they were not specifically for JP purposes but part of policy dialogue so could be either qualified as yes or no (latter if specific consultations with JP label are expected)	8/22/2016 6:21 AM
19	le questionnaire ne tient pas en compte du fait que la programmation conjointe pourrait etre encore en cours donc il est impossible de répondre aux questions 3 au 4 car nous ne sommes pas arrivés à cette étape. De plus en Haïti il y a eu deux processus de JP. Un lors de la préparation du PIN 11ème FED qui n'a pas abouti et un deuxième qui est en cours mais qui n'est pas très avancé... à quel des deux processus dois je me référer pour répondre au questionnaire???? dans le doute je mettrais comme réponse : I don't know/no opinion	8/20/2016 7:00 PM
20	Joint programming was led (as instructed) as being first an EU process in order to avoid Country interference on the analytical work; the Country is not signatory of the joint strategy. However the final proposal was submitted to the coordinating ministry of the country and agreement was reached on what to make public or not (difficulty to remain frank in the analytical work while making the document public)	8/17/2016 3:44 PM
21	JP is still at an early stage	8/17/2016 3:39 PM
22	Consultations being held within the EU+MS during the Joint programming i.e., after the joint analysis consultation phase.	8/16/2016 1:48 PM
23	Consultations were and are held with all stakeholders in the context of the preparation of the Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia, as well as at the sector level when preparing sector plans. Discussions and negotiations with stakeholders do also take place during identification and formulation of projects and programmes. EU cooperation was also discussed during the formal art. 8 political dialogue. The Joint EU Zambia Framework document itself, although based on the aforementioned, was drafted by EUD and MS. Validation was done together with officials from the Ministry of Finance.	8/12/2016 9:14 AM
24	A few years ago the partner country selected three sectors for each development partner. That is the only JP action taken so far. An initiative was taken recently by the EU delegation to hold joint meetings with the Rwanda Governance Board.	8/10/2016 2:48 PM
25	I dealt with 3 countries: experiences were different. In 1 JP was government led, in 2 EC driven.	8/10/2016 2:31 PM
26	Same comment than before	8/10/2016 11:58 AM
27	Most Partner Country governments are not appropriately invited to the Joint Programming process. When they are informed about JP, they tend to see it as "another donor exercise", in the worst case leading to a "ganging up of donors" process. It is key to address the right People in the government at the right time with the right political message (present JP as an exercise that is beneficial to them, give concrete reasons why JP is interesting from the Partners (!) point of view. Clearly explain the process and make it transparent where Partner governments come in and what Level of influence they have on the process. This requires Sound preparation, clear leadership as well as a good understanding of the concrete meaning of JP (what is it, what is it not), its potential in a given Country and the Advantages for all parties involved between development Partners .This understanding is in many cases not given with lots of misunderstandings persisting with regard to what JP means and what it does not mean (for ex. JP = Budget Support???? JP = we can no longer plan ourselves?...). As a result, it is difficult to address the Partner government with a concise, coherent and convincing message....	8/10/2016 11:02 AM
28	Again, these questions do not make sense in Myanmar's context, as the Government was only involved in a very superficial way. This is not an accident, but the consequence of the opening of the country.	8/10/2016 6:06 AM
29	The national development strategy is well known and provides the framework for JP	8/9/2016 7:56 PM

### Q19 Please indicate whether the Commission/EEAS and EU MS delivered the following elements through the JP process

Answered: 83 Skipped: 0



	Yes	No	I do not know	Total	Weighted Average
Joint missions	28.92% 24	38.55% 32	32.53% 27	83	2.36
Common M&E framework	33.73% 28	40.96% 34	25.30% 21	83	2.17
Joint actions in visibility and communication	34.94% 29	37.35% 31	27.71% 23	83	2.20
Other (please specify below)	8.43% 7	21.69% 18	69.88% 58	83	3.31

#	Other (please specify)	Date
1	In Malawi there is an effort towards joint implementation and taking advantage (scaling up activities) of the value added of the different DPs. In Namibia, in the TVET sector EUD and DE have had common missions during the formulation of 11 EDF programme.	9/8/2016 8:25 PM
2	The EU Delegation has always been in the driving seat and little buy in has been possible in the last 4 years for any of the above points.	9/8/2016 9:37 AM
3	Joint missions have been held in various sectors, but will become more regular as we start to implement the JP strategy. There is a great potential for visibility and communication but this is expected to be delivered during the implementation phase.	9/8/2016 4:24 AM
4	The joint communication related to cooperation post earthquake.	9/7/2016 11:42 AM
5	The process is very much locally driven, too early for M&E framework etc.	9/1/2016 8:00 AM
6	Regular joint meetings of HoC and other levels of cooperation (very much appreciated!), production of the annual Blue Book etc.	8/31/2016 4:08 PM
7	joined programme in support of Governance	8/31/2016 1:21 PM




## Joint Programming Evaluation

8	Still too early	8/30/2016 12:45 PM
9	The reality of the process is non-existent	8/29/2016 4:44 PM
10	Not sure what is meant by "delivered the following elements": t	8/23/2016 3:55 PM
11	Operational coordination	8/22/2016 3:26 PM
12	no process yet	8/22/2016 3:16 PM
13	Because of the differences in approach in the different partner countries, it is difficult to have a generalized opinion on the whole scene. Hence, "I do not know."	8/22/2016 11:30 AM
14	Joint policy briefs for Ambassadors	8/22/2016 6:26 AM
15	voir remarques précédentes	8/20/2016 7:18 PM
16	Common M&E framework: was intended when I left. A visibility event was organised for the signing of the joint strategy.	8/17/2016 3:56 PM
17	JP is at an early stage	8/17/2016 3:45 PM
18	The JP process will design EU+Joint M&E as well as joint communication and visibility strategy at its final stage.	8/16/2016 2:05 PM
19	What is M&E ?	8/15/2016 5:27 AM
20	Where partners work together on joint programmes, joint missions do take place. In addition, joint visibility and diplomacy events are organised from time to time.	8/12/2016 9:25 AM
21	Joint meetings with GoR represented by the Rwanda Governance Board.	8/10/2016 2:58 PM
22	Common M&E Framework is key and should be harmonized (template) for all countries to ensure comparability / benchmarking.	8/10/2016 11:11 AM
23	There are some of the joint elements above, but this is only done in a limited way to the JP process.	8/10/2016 6:17 AM
24	It has not yet begun but is expected in the joint strategy having joint missions, a common strategy for monitoring and tracking, and communication and visibility	8/9/2016 6:06 PM

## Q20 The Commission/EEAS and EU MS have engaged in the JP process for the same reasons

Answered: 83 Skipped: 0



	Strongly agree	Rather agree	Rather disagree	Strongly disagree	No opinion	Total	Weighted Average
(no label)	6.02% 5	45.78% 38	27.71% 23	6.02% 5	14.46% 12	83	2.77

#	Please feel free to further explain or comment on your answer	Date
1	While EEAS/Commission have a strong interest in a joint strategy and joint implementation for MS the process was more towards better coordination. The element of a joint strategy was not the prime objective of some MS.	9/17/2016 12:01 PM
2	Difficult to assess, in some cases JP has been initiated because teh EUD has been instructed and MS wish to exert a stronger influence over the overall programming process . The main rationale for JP seems to differ and the process has been based to a large extent on trial and error.	9/12/2016 3:38 PM
3	This applies to capital level! In-country views are not necessarily in line with capital orientations.	9/8/2016 9:37 AM
4	Clearly not all players have the same set of motivations for joining JP, bearing in mind that JP participants constitutes a diverse group (with large/small bilateral cooperation programmes, without bilateral but regional programmes, without coopeation programmes, without resident mission in country). While all benefit from the main added value of the JP approach (increased alignment, synchronization, country ownership, reduction in transaction costs, predictability...) others have intentions to gain in terms of leveraging their bilateral relations, visibility, additional funds through delegated cooperation, increased presence in terms of sectors being covered...	9/8/2016 4:24 AM
5	It should be noted that despite ministerial agreement at HQ, at field level not all EU MS are interested in JP.	9/7/2016 11:42 AM
6	Overall, both MS and the Commission undertook the JP process to promote the division of labour and enhance aid effectiveness	9/1/2016 5:26 AM
7	But there seems to be competition as well ... especially at the level of implementing agencies who do not want to loose their "market shares".	8/31/2016 4:08 PM
8	divergence amongst EUMS	8/31/2016 1:21 PM
9	Much of the interest in MS in particular at country level (as opposed to HQ), lies in the opportunit to access delegated cooperation through the JP process. For the EU it is ratehr a matter of ccoordination and aid effectiveness.	8/30/2016 12:45 PM
10	The rare MS present are not interested	8/29/2016 4:44 PM


## Joint Programming Evaluation

11	It feels that, sometimes, the EU / delegation on the ground has engaged in EU JP because it was kindly asked and obliged by their HQ, but did not really believed or saw a lot of added value in the process as such. This clearly has some impact and entails possible limitations regarding what to achieve and how to make the JP process "succesful" regarding the aims it sets and set out to achieve. The same applies to the level of EU MS, where it seems important to have a "critical mass" to be able to pull into the same directions and to really use EU JP to make a (positive) difference in the way everyone works (and cooperates) in the respective partner country.	8/29/2016 4:26 PM
12	The way forward to start a "coordination platform" has been decided in Tunis in December 2015 with a view to enhance coordination of ongoing action with a perspective of working closer together in the future, once a proper government in place.	8/29/2016 3:56 PM
13	Depends on the member state. Most member states have - a few who prioritise a national agenda over that of the EU have not, or rather, see JP as a way of primarily imposing a national agenda on the EU through the back door.	8/24/2016 1:28 PM
14	But amongst MS quite different. Some for political reason, some for aid effectiveness reasons, some for belief in EU reasons and others only in an opportunistic way	8/24/2016 11:28 AM
15	EEAS has a political interest to have a JP document, however while the EC has more an operational approach. Since the JP is not a binding document, EUMS have not showed any particular interest and they remain focus on their own programming cycle and documents	8/23/2016 4:22 PM
16	Clearly the MS have instructions from their HQs that can differ from those coming from EU HQ, so while the actors on the ground which you refer to may have similar reasons, their actions were not similar since instructions were different.	8/23/2016 3:55 PM
17	have not engaged yet	8/22/2016 3:16 PM
18	EU Joint Programming was mentioned in the European Consensus on Development (2005), in the Council Conclusions on the Operational Framework on Aid Effectiveness (2009), the Busan Forum on Aid Effectiveness (2011) and the Council Conclusions "Stepping up Joint Programming" (2016).	8/22/2016 11:30 AM
19	La recherché de ressources supplémentaires était une raison qui a poussé les EM a aller vers le JP	8/20/2016 7:18 PM
20	Build and strengthen the EU dimension. Was explicite in our working sessions when preparing the joint strategy. Now associated countries had different views (Norway): likely to better leverage in a difficult country for policy dialogue.	8/17/2016 3:56 PM
21	Very little appetite from MS for JP in country	8/17/2016 3:45 PM
22	There is certainly a need for more cooperation and coherence. But there's clearly a resistance from some EU MS who want to preserve a degree of (national) visibility, which is fair enough.	8/15/2016 5:27 AM
23	The same reasons are to improve the impact of the EU cooperation. But EU MS have also engaged to know better the opportunities for delegated cooperation.	8/13/2016 10:45 PM
24	Commission/EEAS have pushed for deepening EU collaboration/coordination beyond the JASZ processes. Not all MS were initially keen to follow (some claimed aid effectiveness is dead). This has now changed and this has lead to a joint analysis and definition ofs scope for further collaboration.	8/12/2016 9:25 AM
25	No agreement among the EU MS on the need for JP.	8/10/2016 2:58 PM
26	Difficult to provide an answer encompassing the reality of 4 countries and field staff is better placed to assess the situation.	8/10/2016 12:05 PM
27	For Commission/EEAS visibility of Commission seems to be of high priority. For larger EU MS effectiveness of aid seems to be at the heart of the initiative. For smaller EU MS visibility and influence is likewise important.	8/10/2016 11:11 AM
28	It is not so easy to perceive the motivations of MS. Words do not always have the same meaning for everybody	8/9/2016 8:04 PM
29	First because it was mandatory and second because of the leverage effect of the EU	8/9/2016 7:35 PM

# Joint Programming Evaluation

## Q21 The JP process has resulted in


Answered: 83 Skipped: 0



	Strongly agree	Rather agree	Rather disagree	Strongly disagree	No opinion	Total	Weighted Average
stronger convergence of development objectives among the Commission/EEAS and EU MS	6.02% 5	53.01% 44	12.05% 10	8.43% 7	20.48% 17	83	2.84
the Commission/EEAS and EU MS speaking more with a common voice	8.43% 7	45.78% 38	21.69% 18	6.02% 5	18.07% 15	83	2.80
greater coherence across Commission/EEAS and EU MS policies (migration, trade, human rights, etc.)	4.82% 4	34.94% 29	30.12% 25	4.82% 4	25.30% 21	83	3.11
greater EU leverage and impact	6.02% 5	40.96% 34	16.87% 14	3.61% 3	32.53% 27	83	3.16

**Q22 HQ agreed with proposals made through the JP process at country level (sectors/issues to be covered)**


Answered: 83 Skipped: 0



	Strongly agree	Rather agree	Rather disagree	Strongly disagree	No opinion	Total	Weighted Average
the Commission/EEAS	14.46% 12	31.33% 26	8.43% 7	0.00% 0	45.78% 38	83	3.31
the participating EU MS in general	13.25% 11	39.76% 33	8.43% 7	2.41% 2	36.14% 30	83	3.08

**Q23 Thanks to the JP process Development partners have been able to cover together the range of the most important sectors for the country**


Answered: 83 Skipped: 0



	Strongly agree	Rather agree	Rather disagree	Strongly disagree	No opinion	Total	Weighted Average
(no label)	12.05% 10	34.94% 29	19.28% 16	8.43% 7	25.30% 21	83	3.00

## Q24 The JP process has contributed to "make Europe happen on the ground" (\*)

Answered: 83 Skipped: 0



	Strongly agree	Rather agree	Rather disagree	Strongly disagree	No opinion	Total	Weighted Average
(no label)	9.64% 8	32.53% 27	25.30% 21	9.64% 8	22.89% 19	83	3.04

#	(*) in the sense of "translating shared European values and policies on issues such as fundamental rights and good governance into action in partner countries" Please feel free to further comment on your answer	Date
1	As there was already a good coordination structure and a division of labour in place before, the JP process has generally not led to an improvement of the situation. Europe happens on the ground as before.	9/17/2016 12:01 PM
2	The engagement of HQs in terms of monitoring and endorsing decisions made in the JP process has been limited, mainly because HQs view the JP as non-binding as opposed to MS own strategies.	9/12/2016 3:38 PM
3	See previous comment. Too early to say.	9/7/2016 11:42 AM
4	It is still early to assess the impact of the JP on the ground.	9/5/2016 1:15 PM
5	It is still a challenge to fully translate European values on the ground, especially given the Myanmar current context	9/1/2016 5:26 AM
6	Yes, but much more can and should be done! We have to overcome the old fashioned way of doing development cooperation and the fragmentation of EU cooperation agencies. We should first merge development cooperation agencies and efforts and second involve other sector ministries to effectively deliver global policies and achieve the SDGs.	8/31/2016 4:08 PM
7	Specific Uganda case: there was a strong Budget Support dialogue framework, the need to have a JP for increased policy leverage didn't exist at the time JP really delivered on Governance only Since refugee crisis, new divergences/trends appeared from EUMS side 9and higher politisation/centralisation of sectors choices)	8/31/2016 1:21 PM
8	We are far from there yet. The process is still too much in its early stages to have led to any of the results expected above.	8/30/2016 12:45 PM
9	HQ has a tendency to push the JP process for the sake to tick a box without assessing the difficulties at local level and inefficient use of financial and human resources. JP might have a great added value only in case there are conditions in place for a real participatory approach and national policies to which JP should be aligned to.	8/23/2016 4:22 PM
10	The JP process has never been visible and coherent enough to lead to such structured results.	8/23/2016 3:55 PM
11	Not yet JP!	8/23/2016 1:28 PM
12	Objectives of EU Joint Programming are commendatory and Belgium will do its utmost to achieve. Anyhow, it has to be repeated that synchronization of programming cycles is at the moment difficult due to several reasons: policy review, budgetary restrictions, ongoing commitments that have to be fulfilled, ... .	8/22/2016 11:30 AM


## Joint Programming Evaluation

13	For Q5: answer relates more to EU partners : we are not big players in infrastructure but this is covered by other DPs and was the case before JP started	8/22/2016 6:26 AM
14	Again it is too early to assess those results	8/17/2016 3:45 PM
15	I personally strongly agree on all the points raised in questions 1 - 6 at the end of the process . However, it is difficult for me to say so before finalizing the process.	8/16/2016 2:05 PM
16	The present JP in this country is essentially an assembly of the individual MSs' own plans.	8/14/2016 12:52 PM
17	Re point 5, yes, this was done through the JASZ process. Re 6, Europe is happening more on the ground but this is more due to the joint economic diplomacy efforts and joint communication and visibility activities outside the scope of JP.	8/12/2016 9:25 AM
18	Question 5: very difficult to be aware in HQ and from the EEAS side of all the sectors in which EU MS are involved in every country...field staff is better placed to answer.	8/10/2016 12:05 PM
19	More Europe happens thanks to the work of the EU delegation, to the role of the EU in the aid effectiveness fora, but not due to JP process. Again, the specific context of Myanmar and the way that the JP was prepared should be taken into account. This questionnaire seems highly theoretical.	8/10/2016 6:17 AM



**Q25 Do you have knowledge of drawbacks for the Commission/EEAS or EU MS with respect to their participation in (a specific or not) JP process?**

Answered: 83 Skipped: 0



	Yes	No	Total	Weighted Average
(no label)	36.14% 30	63.86% 53	83	1.64


#	If Yes, please briefly explain	Date
1	Finding consensus has in some cases limited the freedom of MS and Commission/EEAS to pursue own priorities. Since the JP process is to such a large extent dependent on individual commitments of HOCs and HoMs the process have come to a halt in countries when there is a change of staff/key players. JP does not have the institutional foundation to ensure continuity and sustainability.	9/12/2016 3:38 PM
2	in some instances EU MS have generally more flexible procedures that EU can't follow. Hence the importance to be allowed to start the process bottom up	9/8/2016 8:25 PM
3	I can provide more insight under separate email. eric.beaume@ec.europa.eu	9/8/2016 9:37 AM
4	It requires a high investment at first, but should pay off. In the case of replacement of MIP by JP, the requirements are far stricter than for most bilateral strategies of MS, hence involving a more demanding process altogether. It creates a high degree of confusion for the beneficiary Government, as there are usually various programming processes being handled simultaneously (but at different stages). Also, it raises the concern in the eyes of the beneficiary Government that JP may be at the expense of bilateral cooperation.	9/8/2016 4:24 AM
5	It should be noted that despite ministerial agreement at HQ, at field level not all EU MS are interested in JP which effectively blocked progress given the small number of EU MS present.	9/7/2016 11:42 AM
6	As already stated the JP in Mozambique is still in progress. Thus it is difficult to comment on its results.	9/6/2016 9:17 AM
7	1. In order to conduct such an extensive exercise EU Del needs to assign a permanent team of experts who will take a lead. This should speed up the coordination and delivery processes. 2. The coordination of one document (JA) among so many actors is a difficult task in itself timewise but also with regard to content and terminology. 3. The MS Embassies do not necessarily have enough human resources to commit to the task (JA). 4. The division of tasks according to the expertise of each MS was a good idea but still some MS got to work on issues they are not thoroughly familiar with. 5. Gender mainstreaming exercise was not very helpful in that the contracted experts eventually relied on MS expertise because MS have more knowledge of the situation on the ground. 6. Gender mainstreaming should have been done at the same time as the main draft, not afterwards.	9/5/2016 1:15 PM
8	German BMZ continues to work in an old-fashioned, bilateral way and does not really care about EU JP.	8/31/2016 4:08 PM

## Joint Programming Evaluation

9	In some countries, EU Delegations could better communicate/ share information on the process' different steps and outcomes with EU Member States during the process.	8/30/2016 7:00 PM
10	Difficult for all to "drop" sectors	8/30/2016 1:17 PM
11	The main drawback is the time and energy used to rein in MS with widely different objectives and instruments with little output and result.	8/30/2016 12:45 PM
12	The rare MS present are not interested	8/29/2016 4:44 PM
13	- lack of interest from EU MS: JP is not legally binding and thus stakeholders do not see the added value of an additional document to be prepared in the definition of political/cooperation priorities. - lack of established format make that longer discussions take place before even a format could be agreed - lack of understanding of the added value of the process - lack of tailored technical support to guide the process and ability to mobilize long term expertise. - lack of dedicated human resources/financial means. In-country offices do not have often necessary human resources to dedicate to the JP exercise.	8/23/2016 4:22 PM
14	Long and cumbersome process (including non EU countries), yet only meager result.	8/23/2016 3:55 PM
15	Not yet JP!	8/23/2016 1:28 PM
16	One MS (UK) not on board.	8/23/2016 9:06 AM
17	Not possible in a war situation	8/22/2016 6:30 PM
18	The national context in developing and transition countries is essential in Joint Programming: for ex. instability and crisis situations in partner countries may have a positive (Mali) or negative (Burundi) difference in EU Joint Programming process.	8/22/2016 11:30 AM
19	The process requires Human resources in country that can take on the extra work related to JP	8/22/2016 6:26 AM
20	partner countries reluctant ('ganging up' of donors) fear of losing the bilateral relationship	8/16/2016 10:46 AM
21	As I said, there a need to preserve a certain degree of (national) visibility for the EUMS, if you want them on board.	8/15/2016 5:27 AM
22	Government's reluctance towards MS joining the EU JP based on fear that good and longstanding bilateral relations and cooperation, officialised with the Government, might be replaced by EU JP	8/15/2016 4:47 AM
23	Most MSs are answerable and accountable to their HQs in priority to the Commission.	8/14/2016 12:52 PM
24	AAP and 3-annual programming for EC only as a must kicked in late and irritated the process.	8/11/2016 10:13 AM
25	A very time consuming exercise. A cost benefit analysis would be useful.	8/11/2016 9:44 AM
26	The process is highly time consuming. Input and output (in terms of concrete improvements with regard to aid effectiveness, reduced aid fragmentation, higher influence in policy dialogue etc.) are not in a healthy relation, leading to a phenomenon of increasing "fatigue".	8/10/2016 11:11 AM
27	This process is very time consuming and has not really been tested. Reaching a common understanding is a long process.	8/9/2016 8:04 PM
28	Poor expertise provided by HQ. Revision of the national development strategy. A failed military coup.	8/9/2016 7:35 PM

## Q26 Has the JP process led the Commission/EEAS or EU MS to revise their initial programming (objectives, sectors, priorities, funding,...)?

Answered: 83 Skipped: 0



	Yes	No	I do not know	Total	Weighted Average
(no label)	18.07% 15	39.76% 33	42.17% 35	83	2.24


#	If Yes, please feel free to explain	Date
1	As the JP process was in line with the EEAS/Commission process there was no need for a revision.	9/17/2016 12:01 PM
2	Maybe more adaptation than revision.	9/12/2016 3:38 PM
3	it was prepared at the same time	9/8/2016 8:08 PM
4	In the case of Laos JP has replaced the MIP, so there has not been a clear	9/8/2016 4:24 AM
5	Too early to say.	9/7/2016 11:42 AM
6	Too early	9/1/2016 8:00 AM
7	As far as Italy was concerned, its priorities were reflected into the JP	9/1/2016 5:26 AM
8	Decision makers in HQ don't care much about partner country priorities and the EU JP. Things would be much better if decision-making would be delegated to the field.	8/31/2016 4:08 PM
9	Not yet.	8/30/2016 1:17 PM
10	Too early	8/29/2016 3:56 PM
11	For the EU yes, but for the Netherlands rather limited. For other MS I don't know	8/24/2016 11:28 AM
12	Not yet JP!	8/23/2016 1:28 PM
13	AFD adopted a longer perspective	8/22/2016 3:26 PM
14		8/22/2016 6:26 AM
15	pas encore	8/20/2016 7:18 PM
16	Limited but was the case for Austria before I left.	8/17/2016 3:56 PM
17	Too early	8/17/2016 3:45 PM
18	In our case there is a possibility of light review of the NIP.	8/16/2016 2:05 PM

## Joint Programming Evaluation

19	Not yet, but this should happen, looking jointly at the objectives to be achieved ... maybe during a second JP period	8/15/2016 4:47 AM
20	No, because irrespective of the JP process, the Delegation always fully shares and discusses the draft EU programming documents with MS.	8/12/2016 9:25 AM
21	Maybe. In a second JP phase this could become more prominent. The level of knowledge of each others portfolio was low so first objective was harmonisation, trust building.	8/11/2016 9:44 AM
22	In reality, objectives, sectors, priorities and funding are based on (independent) political decisions by the Commission/EEAS and EU MS.	8/10/2016 11:11 AM
23	But priorities also change a lot in commission Management. One day culture is out, then it is in. Migration is the top priority today, a couple of years ago it was resilience. Etc	8/9/2016 8:04 PM
24	No initial programming yet.	8/9/2016 3:58 PM

**Q27 Please select those items that you consider as a specific added value that the Commission/EEAS has brought to the JP process**

Answered: 83 Skipped: 0



	Yes	No	No opinion	Total	Weighted Average
Knowledge of the JP processes	79.52% 66	7.23% 6	13.25% 11	83	1.34

## Joint Programming Evaluation

Provision of an external technical assistant to facilitate the process	<b>62.65%</b> 52	<b>12.05%</b> 10	<b>25.30%</b> 21	83	1.63
Presence of a local office (EUD)	<b>71.08%</b> 59	<b>8.43%</b> 7	<b>20.48%</b> 17	83	1.49
Its relation with the partner country authorities	<b>42.17%</b> 35	<b>22.89%</b> 19	<b>34.94%</b> 29	83	1.93
Providing a common voice on behalf of EU MS and Commission/EEAS	<b>55.42%</b> 46	<b>20.48%</b> 17	<b>24.10%</b> 20	83	1.69
Improved coordination between different EU MS	<b>0.00%</b> 0	<b>0.00%</b> 0	<b>0.00%</b> 0	0	0.00
Role to promote coherence of EU MS policies	<b>57.83%</b> 48	<b>20.48%</b> 17	<b>21.69%</b> 18	83	1.64
Capacity to intervene flexibly in political sensitive situations	<b>27.71%</b> 23	<b>31.33%</b> 26	<b>40.96%</b> 34	83	2.13
Critical mass of its own support	<b>50.60%</b> 42	<b>19.28%</b> 16	<b>30.12%</b> 25	83	1.80
Role as a coordinator and facilitator of Commission/EEAS and EU MS activities	<b>69.88%</b> 58	<b>12.05%</b> 10	<b>18.07%</b> 15	83	1.48
Its relation with other stakeholders in the country	<b>45.78%</b> 38	<b>27.71%</b> 23	<b>26.51%</b> 22	83	1.81
No added value	<b>2.41%</b> 2	<b>51.81%</b> 43	<b>45.78%</b> 38	83	2.43
I do not know	<b>1.20%</b> 1	<b>30.12%</b> 25	<b>68.67%</b> 57	83	2.67
Other	<b>3.61%</b> 3	<b>15.66%</b> 13	<b>80.72%</b> 67	83	2.77


#	If Other, please specify. Please also feel free to further explain or comment on your answers for questions 1 to 9.	Date
1	Maybe it is more the MS that bring value by extending relations with other stakeholders in the country.	9/12/2016 3:38 PM
2	Although the EUD may act as a convener/facilitator in the process, it is not always an easy task as the EUD is also part of the JP and in fact has fully integrated its bilateral programme in it. Therefore the help of an external facilitator is key.	9/8/2016 4:24 AM
3	Regular joint meetings of HoC and other levels of cooperation (very much appreciated!), production of the annual Blue Book etc.	8/31/2016 4:08 PM
4	In Morocco the weight of the EU compared with MS is severely unbalanced, hence most MS expect that the EU does "all the job" ...	8/30/2016 12:45 PM
5	The question as such is difficult to answer. Many of the items mentioned above under 9 clearly are items that are and should be a "specific added value" that the commission can bring to the process. However, the answers provided above should not indicate that this has always been the case and has been done to the fullest extend possible. A strong role of the EUC on the ground seems incremental to move the process forward and orient it into the right direction. The Commission on the ground would need to allocate ressources that are experienced with the EU JP processes and are willing/selected to invest time and ressources of the Delegation to really move the "exercise" forward. At the same time, it seems important to consider the EU JP exercise as more than this a "bureaucratic exercise", but as a genuine political process that enables the EU and its MS to jointly deliver in a better, more effective and coherent way. Any type of TA - whichs might seem important to many EU MS engaging on the ground - can have a catalytic effect for the JP; however, interpreting JP as a technical exercise does not do justice to the Initial and overall goal. This means that as much as "technical" support for the process is important, reducing the exercise to ticking boxes, writing papers and producing documents will not be enough to make the process successful. It rather seems important to reduce the heavy workload of the JP and reanimate the political nucleus of the initial idea: Reduce fragmentation, improve coherence amongs EU MS - and speak with one voice and be visible as a strong, joint ally to the EUs partner countries.	8/29/2016 4:26 PM

## Joint Programming Evaluation

6	Leadership of EU Delegation is key. Head of Delegation and Head of Cooperation key players. In future also sector specialists if joint implementation would be a key additional objective.	8/24/2016 11:28 AM
7	Short term Technical assistance was deployed, however the support provided was too general and not tailored to the country (programming in fragile context). Despite the fact that Lebanon does not offer the minimum conditions for an efficient and sustainable JP exercise (political instability, absence of national development policies and weak EUMS interest to programme on the long-term) the EU insists to put forward the preparation of the JP. Such approach drain financial and human resources that could be used in more effective way while waiting for improved conditions for a successful JP exercise	8/23/2016 4:22 PM
8	Not yet JP!	8/23/2016 1:28 PM
9	Difficult to generalize as partner countries differ from each other.	8/22/2016 11:30 AM
10	Flexible framework for the JP process giving room for initiative for the initial instructions (was in 2011 or 2012; very short one and indeed excellent one)	8/17/2016 3:56 PM
11	Theoretically all of the above but JP is yet at an early stage	8/17/2016 3:45 PM
12	But this is not due to the JP process but due to the fact that the EU DEL is holding regularly Development Counsellors meeting anyway. Therefore difficult to answer these questions and statements	8/15/2016 11:43 AM
13	All partners have added value. As JP is council driven all partners assumed an equal role. Although the EU provided the TA, the exercise was lead by all in taking turns in chairing meetings and drafting sessions.	8/11/2016 9:44 AM
14	Same comment than before	8/10/2016 12:05 PM
15	Delegations should take on much more leadership in guiding the process. In many countries, Delegation leaders do neither properly understand the JP concept nor do they necessarily promote it ("Brussels wants us to do this, we dont believe in it, but then we do something....")	8/10/2016 11:11 AM

**Q28 The JP process has led to greater „Joint EU visibility“ (single brand as EU)**

Answered: 83 Skipped: 0




	Strongly agree	Rather agree	Rather disagree	Strongly disagree	No opinion	Total	Weighted Average
To national authorities	9.64% 8	33.73% 28	20.48% 17	10.84% 9	25.30% 21	83	3.08
To other donors	8.43% 7	34.94% 29	22.89% 19	9.64% 8	24.10% 20	83	3.06
To other stakeholders in the country	6.02% 5	26.51% 22	28.92% 24	10.84% 9	27.71% 23	83	3.28



### Q29 The JP process has led to greater EU visibility


Answered: 83 Skipped: 0



	Strongly agree	Rather agree	Rather disagree	Strongly disagree	No opinion	Total	Weighted Average
To MS	0.00% 0	0.00% 0	0.00% 0	0.00% 0	0.00% 0	0	0.00
To national authorities	8.43% 7	36.14% 30	15.66% 13	7.23% 6	32.53% 27	83	3.19
To other donors	7.23% 6	36.14% 30	22.89% 19	7.23% 6	26.51% 22	83	3.10
To other stakeholders in the country	2.41% 2	32.53% 27	24.10% 20	8.43% 7	32.53% 27	83	3.36

**Q30 The JP process has led to an increased visibility of your MS (please indicate N/A if you are not representing a MS)**

Answered: 83 Skipped: 0



	Strongly agree	Rather agree	Rather disagree	Strongly disagree	No opinion	N/A	Total	Weighted Average
To the EU Commission	0.00% 0	0.00% 0	0.00% 0	0.00% 0	0.00% 0	0.00% 0	0	0.00
To the national authorities	1.20% 1	15.66% 13	21.69% 18	8.43% 7	8.43% 7	44.58% 37	83	3.13
To other donors	2.41% 2	15.66% 13	20.48% 17	7.23% 6	10.84% 9	43.37% 36	83	3.15
To other stakeholders in the country	1.20% 1	8.43% 7	25.30% 21	8.43% 7	12.05% 10	44.58% 37	83	3.39


#	Please feel free to further explain or comment on your answers for questions 1 to 3.	Date
1	For question 8.1 and - it is an ongoing process, but will very likely result in a solid single brand as EU and greater EU visibility. For question 8.3 - yes, in the sense that through the JP consultation process the respective MS have increased dissemination of their programmes.	9/8/2016 4:28 AM
2	In our case, the fact that we use mostly loans as a modality (vs grants) has made it more difficult to integrate in the EU MS group, as far as JP is concerned.	9/6/2016 9:20 AM
3	An EU single brand is still to be developed. However the JP increased overall EU visibility.	9/1/2016 5:26 AM
4	It should not be the purpose of the JP to increase visibility of individual MS. As long as we aim for visibility we are don't harmonize and align. But harmonization and alignment is needed to achieve results.	8/31/2016 4:11 PM
5	Too early to say	8/30/2016 12:45 PM
6	too early to assess these points	8/23/2016 4:22 PM
7	There has been little info on JP outside the EU partners on the ground so far ad Question 1 and 2: JP respectively Joint Analysis was an exercise of EU and other DPs. Therefor questionable whether it has raised EUs visibility.	8/23/2016 4:01 PM

## Joint Programming Evaluation

8	EU Joint Programming is giving increased visibility to COM and some larger EU Member States. The exercise could create opportunities which attract the interest of European donor countries outside EU.	8/22/2016 11:31 AM
9	Too early to say	8/17/2016 3:45 PM
10	Not related tot he JP process but more to the central rol of the EU delegation here in country. But they work mostly for the EU del an not so much for the members states	8/15/2016 11:44 AM

**Q31 To what extent were you aware (as of 2014-2015) of the Commission/EEAS's guidance material on JP:**


Answered: 83 Skipped: 0



	I was not aware of its existence	I was aware of its existence but had not really read it or only superficially	I have used the guidance	Total	Weighted Average
(no label)	10.84% 9	38.55% 32	50.60% 42	83	2.40

### Q32 Did you find this guidance useful

Answered: 83 Skipped: 0




	Very useful	Rather useful	Rather not useful	Not at all useful	No opinion	Total	Weighted Average
(no label)	14.46% 12	53.01% 44	4.82% 4	0.00% 0	27.71% 23	83	2.73

# Joint Programming Evaluation

## Q33 Were you sufficiently informed on


Answered: 83 Skipped: 0



	Yes	No	No opinion	Total	Weighted Average
the reasons why to undertake JP and/or the objectives pursued when you started	86.75% 72	7.23% 6	6.02% 5	83	1.19
how to conduct the JP process when you started	53.01% 44	33.73% 28	13.25% 11	83	1.60

### Q34 To what extent do you agree with the following statements:

Answered: 83 Skipped: 0



	Strongly agree	Rather agree	Rather disagree	Strongly disagree	No opinion	Total	Weighted Average
The division of roles between HQ and field offices of my agency for JP were clearly defined	15.66% 13	34.94% 29	27.71% 23	6.02% 5	15.66% 13	83	2.71
My agency has mobilised sufficient and adequate expertise (specialised staff, consultants, etc.) to conduct the JP process	12.05% 10	34.94% 29	26.51% 22	6.02% 5	20.48% 17	83	2.88
The division of roles and responsibilities between the different partners in the JP process was sufficiently clear	8.43% 7	34.94% 29	30.12% 25	7.23% 6	19.28% 16	83	2.94

#	Please feel free to further explain or comment on your answers for questions 1 to 4. If you have suggestions to improve the guidance feel free to add them!	Date
1	Teh division aof roles and responsibilities becomes clearer along the way as you engagen in teh JP process. It is a learning and trust building exercise.	9/12/2016 3:44 PM
2	Although there was a push for replacing the MIP by the JP, its feasibility was not clear until the very end the process.	9/8/2016 4:32 AM
3	Not all field level offices of MS seem to follow up on ministerial JP agreements.	9/7/2016 11:48 AM
4	My HQ didn't show an interest in the JP in Mozambique.	9/6/2016 9:31 AM
5	HQ are not sufficiently involved and committed. We do all we can at country level ... but we cannot do much as main decisions are still taken by HQ.	8/31/2016 4:13 PM
6	[I was in another delegation - Palestine - during the period mentioned]	8/31/2016 1:23 PM
7	In principle, the "expertise" to guide the MS on the ground through the process should be mobilised by the EU on the ground. At the same time, it seems that it guidance within the MS's system on HQ-level is also incremental to provide guidance, assurance and encouragement to engage in the EU JP process as well as have a system of quality assurance within each MS. The latter has been in place for our HQ "backstopping" system. The "guidance" mentioned above was very elaborate and helped to standardize the system. At the same time, it seemed like a very sophisticated, but also overly complex system that has been set in place and might have been perceived as rather acadmedical for some backgrounds and circumstances.	8/29/2016 4:26 PM
8	The EUD took a clear leader role - the others largley followed with little of own resources put into it. At the same time: is it up to MS to send consultants each??!	8/23/2016 4:03 PM
9	Potential and best role of the partner country varies	8/23/2016 12:15 PM


## Joint Programming Evaluation

10	*1 very badly drafted. there is no right answer. please rephrase. add I am aware, not used yet	8/22/2016 3:17 PM
11	Important political issue for BE. Staff members in Embassies are completely informed of the ongoing process.	8/22/2016 11:31 AM
12	le guidance reste un document technique (theorique) qu'il faut savoir adapter aux différentes réalités elle ne tient pas en compte d'aspects importants comme par exemple le manque systematique de synchronisation des cycle de programmation entre les differents acteurs...	8/20/2016 7:24 PM
13	I'm referring to the situation before I left Ethiopia in 2013. Role of HQs was not clear and we innovated (adoption locally after bilateral consultations field office/HQ for EC and EU MS part of the process)	8/17/2016 4:00 PM
14	I was involved in JP during 2010-12	8/10/2016 2:39 PM
15	NB I used the JP guidance material in a previous post in a Delegation as DEVCO staff. My replies are based on this experience and not the current one as Desk Officer in EEAS.	8/10/2016 12:07 PM
16	JP represents a lot of work for a a Cooperation sections whic is overloaded with many tasks. Some services in the Commission and EEAS do not give the right priority to this JP. In Myanmar this was a burden mainly for the Cooperation section.	8/10/2016 6:20 AM
17	The joint analysis was carried out without involvement or even knowledge of the EEAS HQ.	8/9/2016 4:02 PM



**Q35 Time devoted to the JP process compared to its (expected) benefits (overall) was**


Answered: 83 Skipped: 0



	reasonable	heavy but worth the effort	too heavy	No opinion	Total	Weighted Average
(no label)	24.10% 20	30.12% 25	26.51% 22	19.28% 16	83	2.41

### Q36 To what extent do you agree with the following statements:

Answered: 83 Skipped: 0



	Strongly agree	Rather agree	Rather disagree	Strongly disagree	No opinion	Total	Weighted Average
The JP process reduced the transaction cost for the partner country authorities (*)	2.41% 2	13.25% 11	27.71% 23	10.84% 9	45.78% 38	83	3.84
The JP process reduced the transaction cost for the partners (Commission/EEAS and EU MS)	3.61% 3	15.66% 13	20.48% 17	15.66% 13	44.58% 37	83	3.82

#	(*) For instance as they had only one country analysis and response to deal with for several or all EU development partners). If you strongly disagree or rather disagree, please explain	Date
1	No 2 - too early to make a conclusion on reduced transaction costs.	9/12/2016 3:47 PM
2	For question 10.2 - ultimately yes, it will reduce transaction costs, but during the process of putting together the strategy it does increase transaction costs	9/8/2016 4:36 AM
3	Too early to say for q2.	9/7/2016 11:49 AM
4	In spite of the JP, Myanmar Authorities still tend to deal bilaterally with each MS	9/1/2016 5:26 AM
5	Again: this is not the fault of the EU JP, but of our governments who - unfortunately - insist on bilateral ways of working.	8/31/2016 4:15 PM
6	too heavy according to EUMS in Uganda (as I was not there, I cannot judge further)	8/31/2016 1:25 PM
7	Too early to conclude on this	8/30/2016 1:10 PM
8	The rare MS present in SL have their own agenda and deal with different entities of the government. The EUD has a privileged channel through the national authorising officer (minister of finance)	8/29/2016 4:49 PM

## Joint Programming Evaluation

9	<p>Increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of development cooperation is our joint responsibility both vis-à-vis our partner countries and our respective tax payers. In order to act more efficient and increase the impact of our work, the EU and its member states need to continue their efforts to act in an always more coherent and coordinated manner. EU JP has been conceptualised to make a contribution to increase coordination among MS and EU MS at country Level, to reduce fragmentation of aid, lower transaction costs for partner countries and support the harmonization of different approaches at country level. Since 2011, we have seen progress and made positive steps regarding the “Joint Programming” of our cooperation as EU and EU MS. However, the theoretically anticipated contribution of EU JP to more effectiveness and efficiency needs to prove its real value in practice and needs to stand a critical examination. It is hard to answer the two questions mentioned above, as, among other things, we need to evaluate JP’s current contribution to an improved “division of labor” between EU MS first. The results and recommendations of this evaluation will be an important and good basis to make an interim assessment and draw critical conclusions which will allow us to work on – as appropriate and suggested by the independent findings – possible or necessary adjustments to both the process and the requirements for the “product”. From what we currently feel, it seems rather important to further consider ways of reducing transaction costs for participation EU MS in the process and make sure that EU JP is not considered or pursued as a merely “bureaucratic exercise”, but that it can prove its ability to deliver a real added value on the aforementioned goals.</p>	8/29/2016 4:26 PM
10	<p>I think this is the wrong question. Of course it will take extra time of people to start this process. Question is whether benefits outweigh the costs. I would say yes. And if Joint Programming and bilateral programming get further integrated costs will go down, and benefits will further increase.</p>	8/24/2016 11:32 AM
11	<p>A lot of talk and little implementation. Lack of interest on side of GoR as well as of most DPs . For most DPs aid effectiveness is not an issue anymore.</p>	8/23/2016 4:06 PM
12	<p>Not yet JP!</p>	8/23/2016 1:29 PM
13	<p>Partner country still has individual implementation plans to deal with. EU and MS have benefitted from sharing analysis and tasks.</p>	8/22/2016 6:29 AM
14	<p>Too early to say</p>	8/17/2016 3:47 PM
15	<p>transaction costs are high during the initial phase of JP..</p>	8/16/2016 10:48 AM
16	<p>This is work in progress. There certainly is potential that JP reduces transaction costs for both government as well as partners but it will take more time to make that happen. Government is for political reasons not overly keen to put all MS and EC in one basket and have a single dialogue.</p>	8/11/2016 9:47 AM

## Joint Programming Evaluation

### Q37 What do you see as the major advantages/positive effects of JP (list two or three)

Answered: 71 Skipped: 12

#	Responses	Date
1	Working (analysing and responding) together, regular information exchange among JP partners	9/17/2016 12:01 PM
2	Building trust among EU actors, alignment and the potential of increased coherence and effectiveness	9/12/2016 3:52 PM
3	1) Donor coordination to avoid aid fragmentation and duplication 2) to improve leadership of partner country	9/9/2016 5:11 PM
4	coordination, leverage	9/8/2016 8:28 PM
5	division of labor, visibility, coordination	9/8/2016 8:11 PM
6	Nutrition and food security received more importance, strengthened dialogue between the EUD and MS	9/8/2016 2:59 PM
7	Increased coordination amongst EUD and MS; capacity of doing more in depth collective analysis of policies; joint implementation in certain sectors	9/8/2016 4:50 AM
8	Visibility, Leverage and Coordination will improve if done well.	9/7/2016 11:52 AM
9	Ideally, better coordination and complementarity.	9/6/2016 9:34 AM
10	More knowledge of other MS programs, effort to become more visible	9/5/2016 5:43 PM
11	Promoting real cooperation and partnership between all involved; helping address key policy issues in the context.	9/1/2016 8:06 AM
12	Division of Labour, Alignment with Hosting Country's priorities	9/1/2016 5:26 AM
13	Reduction of transaction costs, reduction of fragmentation, improvement of partner orientation.	8/31/2016 4:18 PM
14	Open a constructive discussion among donors and avoid overlaps	8/31/2016 4:09 PM
15	Policy leverage (one voice), covering more sectors in a coordinated manner as a group	8/31/2016 1:26 PM
16	increased coordination of donors	8/31/2016 11:52 AM
17	Possible reduction of aid fragmentation, possible reduction of transaction cost for the partner country (unfortunately for the member states involved, the opposite seems to be the case)	8/31/2016 9:13 AM
18	aid effectiveness; joint EU visibility	8/30/2016 7:03 PM
19	Increase aid efficiency	8/30/2016 1:19 PM
20	Better coordination and division of labour, greater influence in policy dialogue, projection of EU as one	8/30/2016 1:12 PM
21	EU visibility	8/30/2016 4:23 AM
22	A supposed common voice for a stronger political dialogue.	8/29/2016 4:52 PM
23	united the EU and its MS to increase their voice and visibility and a more and more challenging global environment (remain relevant united!); the potential to reduce fragmentation and move coordination beyond lip-service but show concrete results (more delegated cooperation; decisions to move out of sectors and share load/work....)	8/29/2016 4:26 PM
24	More visibility for the EU and better coordination on the ground	8/29/2016 3:59 PM
25	EU-led process in which partner country's involvement was rather limited.	8/29/2016 9:20 AM
26	Better alignment to country priorities and coordination	8/27/2016 9:31 AM
27	only joint analysis finalized - useful document	8/26/2016 12:25 PM
28	Better visibility for the EU, better division of labor between MS,	8/24/2016 2:13 PM
29	coherence strategy impact	8/24/2016 1:33 PM
30	Better understanding and coordination amongst EU donors including division of labour; potential of one voice and higher political impact; cooperation between EEAS and DEVCO	8/24/2016 11:34 AM

## Joint Programming Evaluation

31	Better alignment to country systems and priorities	8/23/2016 5:15 PM
32	1) Division of labour 2) alignment to national policies 3) predicatibility	8/23/2016 4:31 PM
33	(i) Joint analysis is a good paper (ii) JA included other DPs	8/23/2016 4:09 PM
34	better efficiency - visibility - dialogue with partner country and coordination with EUMS	8/23/2016 1:31 PM
35	information sharing, common visibility, expected reduced fragmentation	8/23/2016 12:16 PM
36	division of labour, lowering of transaction costs	8/23/2016 9:11 AM
37	Not applicable to Yemen today	8/22/2016 6:33 PM
38	joint visibility, opportunity to increase collaboration	8/22/2016 3:30 PM
39	one programming document and big envelopes	8/22/2016 3:18 PM
40	common dialogue	8/22/2016 2:41 PM
41	division of labour, larger impact, aid efficiency	8/22/2016 11:33 AM
42	Better internal European coordination, shared principles for implementation of our programmes sch as human rights based approach, gender etc, leverage in getting dialogue with partner Government after the 1st year JP progress report in current context of no Government - Donor consultations since 2012	8/22/2016 6:33 AM
43	coherence, division du travail, optimisation des ressources	8/20/2016 7:31 PM
44	information sharing and a minimum of coordination	8/19/2016 1:03 PM
45	EU visibility, common EU understanding about what to achieve in the concerned country	8/17/2016 4:03 PM
46	Align EU interventions and increase the leverage of EU policy dialogue	8/17/2016 3:50 PM
47	Working more together and not just meetings	8/17/2016 6:57 AM
48	Effective use of development aid without duplication and effectively addresses the challenges of the 3rd country in question.	8/16/2016 2:21 PM
49	EU leverage and impact, better aid and in the end reduced transaction costs	8/16/2016 10:51 AM
50	more coordinated assistance, comprehensive study of the country areas	8/15/2016 3:51 PM
51	joint analysis and knowledge sharing	8/15/2016 11:46 AM
52	coherence between EU and EU MS' action; better visibility for the EU; better visibility for small donor EU MS	8/15/2016 5:31 AM
53	more echange of information, discussions on sector interventions, joint projects	8/15/2016 4:52 AM
54	I see practically no benefit from the EU MSs endeavouring to produce a joint strategy (a) independently of wider in-country donor co-ordination efforts, and (b) given the primacy of MSs' HQs over the Commission in realtion to what MSs' Field Offices do.	8/14/2016 12:57 PM
55	information sharing and coherence between EU and MS	8/13/2016 10:49 PM
56	EU to sepak with one voice on key policy areas that are supported by concrete action. Clearer idea about comparative advantage of EU and partners in the various intervention sectors.	8/12/2016 9:30 AM
57	increased political leverage/visibility for EU development partners. Increased predicatibility for partner country	8/11/2016 11:14 AM
58	political/visibility dimension; work with all EUMS (no need to be donor for contributing to analysis); critical mass of aid	8/11/2016 11:11 AM
59	common perception and strengthened relations	8/11/2016 10:17 AM
60	Closer working together, better interal EU alignment of initiatives, more joint programmes.	8/11/2016 9:51 AM
61	EU visibility, EU common voice	8/10/2016 5:45 PM
62	Better co-ordination with member States	8/10/2016 4:00 PM
63	Less fragmentation and reduced transaction costs for both sides.	8/10/2016 3:03 PM
64	alignement to national policies, division of labour, sharing of info and real policy dialogue between those involved in order to better understand each others views	8/10/2016 2:42 PM
65	Development partners talk to each other	8/10/2016 11:15 AM
66	JP is an important step for fulfilling our obligations and engagements on international decisions and standards for development cooperation	8/10/2016 9:32 AM

## Joint Programming Evaluation

67	Dialogue with MS, valuable objectives, vehicle for dialogue with the government (especially for the NEXT JP strategy).	8/10/2016 6:24 AM
68	A more unified approach to the beneficiary country, a better understanding of what MS are doing, a clearer picture of their financial commitments	8/9/2016 8:09 PM
69	EU as one; Strong leverage effect	8/9/2016 7:39 PM
70	Single EU	8/9/2016 4:58 PM
71	Create a basis for common political messages, increase coherence between policy messages and financial support	8/9/2016 4:06 PM

## Joint Programming Evaluation

### Q38 What do you see as having been the greatest challenges/problems facing JP (list two or three)

Answered: 70 Skipped: 13

#	Responses	Date
1	Getting the funding table together over the years (too many changes, unpredictabilities), Implementation (making it workable)	9/17/2016 12:01 PM
2	Lack of clarity of the process, too dependent on individuals and the unclear commitment from MS HQs and EU Delegations	9/12/2016 3:52 PM
3	1) MS interpret JP differently 2) MS prefer continuing with their bilateral programming	9/9/2016 5:11 PM
4	flexibility of procedures	9/8/2016 8:28 PM
5	workload, implementation, monitoring	9/8/2016 8:11 PM
6	It was difficult to even achieve joint analysis	9/8/2016 2:59 PM
7	Lack of appreciation by some MS locally that this is not a Brussels led exercise. Demonstrating added value of JP compared to other coordination fora. Personalities resisting JP. JP initially too focussed on 'aid'	9/8/2016 9:40 AM
8	At first JP creates confusion for beneficiary Government, which then evolves into various forms of suspicions/skepticism	9/8/2016 4:50 AM
9	Synchronisation of aid cycles/timing (both with MS and the beneficiary country).	9/7/2016 11:52 AM
10	Each MS wanting to be visible, each MS wanting to promote its own industry (companies and expertise), the diversity of tools	9/6/2016 9:34 AM
11	Time constraints, bilateral policies of MS	9/5/2016 5:43 PM
12	Very large thematic territory to cover, now the most important challenge is to ensure that the JP will not just be the sum total of MS/EU strategies but that it actually leads to adjustments and modifications in the interest of the JP.	9/1/2016 8:06 AM
13	Paradigm shift from off-budget towards on budget support: being able to speak with one voice	9/1/2016 5:26 AM
14	MS continue doing old-fashioned bilateral ways of working and will continue to do so unless EU HQ pressures for change and unless decision making powers are moved to the field offices.	8/31/2016 4:18 PM
15	multiple bureaucracies and endless processes	8/31/2016 4:09 PM
16	changes in policy trends in respective EUMS home countries	8/31/2016 1:26 PM
17	role of different parts of EU institutions in EP process	8/31/2016 11:52 AM
18	Reduction of visibility of the individual member states, additional administrative burden for member states	8/31/2016 9:13 AM
19	long process; sometimes difficulty to see the short-term outcomes	8/30/2016 7:03 PM
20	Donors do not want to "drop" sectors of cooperation	8/30/2016 1:19 PM
21	MS accepting to give up part of their sovereign decision making	8/30/2016 1:12 PM
22	Can be overly bureaucratic	8/30/2016 4:23 AM
23	The former colonial power has its own agenda and no interest in JP despite official declarations.	8/29/2016 4:52 PM
24	still awaiting the results of the evaluation, but: rather heavy, sometimes bureaucratic exercise with limited operational consequences on bilateral (an EU) implementation on the ground	8/29/2016 4:26 PM
25	Lack of transparency of EU MS planning and programming	8/29/2016 3:59 PM
26	Monitoring of the implementation.	8/29/2016 9:20 AM
27	Heavy workload and different budget cycles	8/27/2016 9:31 AM
28	no clear information how to do JP after analysis was finalized	8/26/2016 12:25 PM

## Joint Programming Evaluation

29	MS have not yet endorsed the idea of substituting their national strategy papers on partner countries with joint documents. The process of creating joint papers is cumbersome. The different legislation and procedures for providing ODA poses a challenge for the smooth transition to joint EU strategy papers.	8/24/2016 2:13 PM
30	unclear of process, lack of structure	8/24/2016 1:33 PM
31	Integrated of bilateral and joint programming; A sustainable and structural commitment and investment of the EU Delegations (including the proper incentives for them)	8/24/2016 11:34 AM
32	Speak with one voice	8/23/2016 5:15 PM
33	1) Lack of interest from EUMS and national government 2) lack of expertise at country level	8/23/2016 4:31 PM
34	(i) Takes too much time, (ii) does not provide much identifiable value-added - there are already many coordination mechanisms in place, (iii) focuses too much on overall strategic issues when real solutions are at sector/ programme level	8/23/2016 4:09 PM
35	Probably workload	8/23/2016 1:31 PM
36	follow up of implementation	8/23/2016 12:16 PM
37	very labour intensive, seen as additional work load	8/23/2016 9:11 AM
38	Not applicable to Yemen today	8/22/2016 6:33 PM
39	Only one MS with a bilateral programme; this programme is relatively limited => scope for JP itself limited	8/22/2016 3:30 PM
40	not yet started yet	8/22/2016 3:18 PM
41	to coordinate with EU Delegation	8/22/2016 2:41 PM
42	difficult synchronisation process of programming cycles, division of labour	8/22/2016 11:33 AM
43	Requires staff resources as process is important, needs individuals in country who facilitate information sharing and really invest in coordination, as loan portfolios increase in European aid predictability of sectors might become more challenging	8/22/2016 6:33 AM
44	cycle de programmation différents, manque de ressources des EM et donc la participation au JP vise à récupérer des ressources plus qu'à augmenter l'impact de la coopération	8/20/2016 7:31 PM
45	lack of a clear achievable objective	8/19/2016 1:03 PM
46	different size of portfolio within EU MS (how not to hurt very small contributors); bringing partner country on board afterward	8/17/2016 4:03 PM
47	MS lack of willingness and resources in country	8/17/2016 3:50 PM
48	Different priorities, EU not really interested in MS	8/17/2016 6:57 AM
49	Though we are not yet there but I believe the Division of Labour; replacing the JP by individual country strategy paper might be the challenge	8/16/2016 2:21 PM
50	role of MS: disconnect between MS HQ and their field offices/embassies	8/16/2016 10:51 AM
51	time pressure, MS capacity	8/15/2016 3:51 PM
52	that nobody uses the final document and nobody aligns its country strategy papers with it plus that not all countries have ODA in the form that is useful for the JP	8/15/2016 11:46 AM
53	convincing the government of its added value, while not allowing them to countersign	8/15/2016 4:52 AM
54	See point 1	8/14/2016 12:57 PM
55	Time constraints in EU Delegation	8/13/2016 10:49 PM
56	Discord between the tunes sung by MS Capitals when they speak with Brussels and when they speak with their local offices.	8/12/2016 9:30 AM
57	workload at initial stages + flexible concept may lead to misunderstanding	8/11/2016 11:14 AM
58	accommodate EUMS visibility needs and concerns	8/11/2016 11:11 AM
59	The critical mass of people who see the downside of this most useful effort. Being critical to something useful is always easier than doing something useful.	8/11/2016 10:17 AM
60	MS buy in, not overly keen to get under one flag, government lukewarm to enter into a single dialogue	8/11/2016 9:51 AM



## Joint Programming Evaluation

61	Alignment with partner countries priorities	8/10/2016 5:45 PM
62	Lack of agreement among the EU MS on the need for JP	8/10/2016 3:03 PM
63	difficulty to harmonise cycles, unwillingness to give up one's "traditional" sectors	8/10/2016 2:42 PM
64	Political commitment from high level to aid effectiveness and joint EU initiatives (both Commission and EU Member States), too many countries at the same time, insufficient guidance from Commission (Delegations, Headquarter)	8/10/2016 11:15 AM
65	On the ground, the process is heavily dependant on the drive of individuals (EUD and MS), it often stopped on its track when such individuals left the country. The authorities of partner countries have sometimes difficulties in seeing or accepting the benefits of the processus, and go on playing one donor against the other, or they see JP as an European exercise they are not really part of.	8/10/2016 9:32 AM
66	the exercise is driven by hq, having an ideal image of the contry context and not aware of the workload that this represents to Delegations.	8/10/2016 6:24 AM
67	Very time consuming in relation to the benefits. With replacement this might change as the joint programming becomes normal programming	8/9/2016 8:09 PM
68	Poor EU institution reputation; Cohabitation with other cooperation fora within each country	8/9/2016 7:39 PM
69	National ownership	8/9/2016 4:58 PM
70	For the EEAS/HQ, lack of communication with the field office	8/9/2016 4:06 PM

## Joint Programming Evaluation

### Q39 Any recommendation?

Answered: 42 Skipped: 41

#	Responses	Date
1	There have to be mechanisms to regular review the document so that it continues as a process	9/17/2016 12:01 PM
2	A stronger institutional commitment and building on and sharing good practices	9/12/2016 3:52 PM
3	more assistance from HQ	9/8/2016 8:11 PM
4	The process is too long	9/8/2016 2:59 PM
5	Use the October Kampala seminaqr in teh most effective way possible	9/8/2016 9:40 AM
6	JP process should continue to be locally lead - soft guidance from HQ is welcome. JP should be further promoted/showcased in the development effectiveness arena, this will help sensitize beneficiary governments	9/8/2016 4:50 AM
7	JP documents need to replace other programming documents. Otherwise it increases transaction costs without real benefits. Once ministeral agreements are acheived field offices should follow up.	9/7/2016 11:52 AM
8	HQ implication (political support) is a condition for success.	9/6/2016 9:34 AM
9	Let us continue with joint work and try to overcome the traditional bilateral way of working.	8/31/2016 4:18 PM
10	no	8/31/2016 4:09 PM
11	Take into account specific situations in-country, there is no one size fits all in this	8/31/2016 9:13 AM
12	need for better communication by local EU Delegation on JP's added value for different stakeholders; move forward with joint implementation	8/30/2016 7:03 PM
13	EU general public awareness - so MS feel pressure from within on advantages of joint programming	8/30/2016 1:19 PM
14	The process needs greater external support to be able to lead to conclusions faster.	8/30/2016 1:12 PM
15	Forget about JP in fragile countries where not interest is demonstrated among the rare MS present.	8/29/2016 4:52 PM
16	consider it less a bureacratic exercise, but (re)make the process more political in order to increase political buy-in at HQ level	8/29/2016 4:26 PM
17	The guiding materials for JP could be more elaborated, to explain better the process and to provide on overview of the proces.	8/24/2016 2:13 PM
18	keep going	8/24/2016 1:33 PM
19	not for the moment	8/23/2016 5:15 PM
20	1) To sensitise EUMS not only in Europe but most important at Country Level 2) HQ to develop a standard format of JP to be agreed with EU MS 3) to provide a pool of experts able to carry out sectoral need analysis 4) to set financial resources	8/23/2016 4:31 PM
21	either go for it full-heartedly or do not do it at all.	8/23/2016 4:09 PM
22	More push from HQ on the EUMS to make them consider JP as a priority	8/23/2016 1:31 PM
23	processes should be kept light and up to country officies to see what suits best the country context	8/23/2016 12:16 PM
24	momentum has faded, needs to be reinstalled	8/23/2016 9:11 AM
25	Not applicable to Yemen today	8/22/2016 6:33 PM
26	head of cooperation to be more committed with his task	8/22/2016 2:41 PM
27	more transparancy about ongoing engagements	8/22/2016 11:33 AM
28	Process was successfull as was designed in country without a top-down template : this allowed to adapt to circumstances in a best effort appraoch which will surely evolve	8/22/2016 6:33 AM

## Joint Programming Evaluation

29	Il faut clarifier au niveau de Bruxelles (Conseil?) les responsabilités et obligations en matière de JP. Jusqu'à quand il reste un processus "fortement encouragé" mais as obligatoire, il y aura toujours une bonne raison pour ne pas le faire. Il faut que les EM soit aussi obbligé a rentrer dans cette dynamque à partir des capitales qui doivent se mettre d'accord avec Bruxelles pour un cyle et processus de programmation commun sous la coordination de l'acteur qui a plus de capacité sur place (donc en générale la CE, mais il pourrait tranquillement s'agir d'une agence d'un EM si elle en a les capacité); Last but not least, les ressources doivent suivre. Il n'est pas possible de repondre à des requête du siège de plus en plus nombreuse dans un contexte de reduction du personnel et des ressources en générale.	8/20/2016 7:31 PM
30	keep instructions basic and simple; don't over expect	8/17/2016 4:03 PM
31	To better explore the obstacles to JP	8/17/2016 3:50 PM
32	Better and more interest from EU to work with MS and to coordinate and act for increased transparency. EU is pereceived as a competing bilateral donor	8/17/2016 6:57 AM
33	JP should be declared as the corporate model for all MS	8/16/2016 10:51 AM
34	outcome based planning	8/15/2016 4:52 AM
35	That the EU abandons trying to put together a joint programme - and instead devotes its efforts to trying to secure better coordination and division of labour of all donors in each country, including the EU acting as a dnor and each MS	8/14/2016 12:57 PM
36	do not straight-jacket JP; listen more carefully to EUD experiences and their own interpretations of how to make JP happen	8/11/2016 11:11 AM
37	A positive approach to drag MS along in programming works in my opinion well.	8/11/2016 10:17 AM
38	When we started JP there was no guidance whatsoever. This has certainly improved. More drive from EU capitals is needed to make real changes. MS embassies position does not always reflect that of capitals. Prepare common brief for partner partner countries what JP is and what the benefits are.	8/11/2016 9:51 AM
39	Slim down the process, focus on few countries, monitor and prove concrete results (input - output!!!)	8/10/2016 11:15 AM
40	JP is beginning to get polluted by the European policies to fight illegal migrations. It should stay an instrument of development cooperation.	8/10/2016 9:32 AM
41	Get into the real world and adapt ambitions to reality on the ground.	8/10/2016 6:24 AM
42	Keep a political momentum at country level	8/9/2016 7:39 PM



**Appendix 2. Questionnaire**



## 1. Instructions

Dear colleague,

ADE has been contracted by the European Commission to evaluate the "EU's Joint Programming process of Development cooperation for the period 2011-2015". We would appreciate if you would please answer this survey as this will be an important source for our findings and recommendations.

This survey is being sent to:

- 1) all EU Delegations involved in JP, for their experience with JP in these countries;
- 2) EU Member States field staff in a selection of 11 countries(\*), for their experience with JP in these countries;
- 3) HQ staff in the EU Institutions (DEVCO, NEAR, and EEAS): geographic Desk officers (for their JP experience in the countries they are in charge of) and other relevant staff (for their overall experience with JP);
- 4) HQ staff of all EU Member States, for their overall experience with JP.

The survey results will help the team to better understand how Joint Programming was designed and implemented, and with what results, so as to draw lessons for improving the joint programming process.

We would be grateful to receive your reply by 23 August 2016.

It should take you about 20 minutes to respond to the survey. You can save your responses anytime.

Please note that:

- For all the questions, you have a proposed set of answers. However, you always have the possibility to further develop your answer and provide comments in a dedicated box.
- Your input is anonymous. No names of individuals or Member State will be mentioned. All information will be kept strictly confidential to the evaluation team.

If you have any questions relating to the questionnaire, or wish to receive a PDF copy of your responses, please contact the e-survey manager, Ms Ritha Sukadi Mata, at this e-mail address: [ritha.sukadimata@ade.eu](mailto:ritha.sukadimata@ade.eu)

On behalf of the evaluation team, we would like to thank you for your collaboration.

(\*) Bolivia, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Mozambique, Kenya, Zambia, Rwanda, Morocco, Moldova, Palestine

## 2. Identification

\* 1. This questionnaire covers the JP process implemented in (please specify a country if you are field-based staff or HQ Geo Desk officers; or indicate "multiple" if you are other HQ staff):

\* 2. You work for:

\* 3. Position:

\* 4. Involved with JP process

less than a year

1-2 years

more than 2 years

\* 5. At the end of 2015, the Joint Programming Process in this country was at the following stage (select one option only):

- EU Joint Programming Roadmap agreed
- EU Joint Analysis in progress
- EU Joint Analysis completed
- EU Joint Response in progress
- EU Joint Response completed
- EU Joint Strategy endorsed by Commission and MS
- EU Joint Strategy under implementation
- My answers are provided for several countries



### 3. Overarching question

\* 1.

Based on your experience please indicate what in your view was (or were) the main purpose(s) pursued by your organisation when participating in the JP process. Please qualify your response for each proposition.

	1. Main motivation	2. Secondary consideration	3. Not really the purpose	4. I do not know
To reduce aid fragmentation	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
To increase aid predictability	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
To reduce aid transaction cost	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
To increase alignment with the partner countries' strategies	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
To increase country ownership	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
To improve policy dialogue between the Commission/EEAS and EU MS	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
To improve policy dialogue with the Partner Country	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
To coordinate aid better between the Commission/EEAS and EU MS	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
To make sure the Commission/EEAS and EU MS speak with one voice	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
To increase the visibility of your organization	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
To increase joint EU visibility	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
To increase EU leverage and impact	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Other reasons	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

If other reasons, please specify below. Please feel also free to further explain or comment your answers.

## 4. JP and aid fragmentation

\* 1.

The JP process has led to a better division of labour among the Commission/EEAS and MS

	1. Strongly agree	2. Rather agree	3. Rather disagree	4. Strongly disagree	5. No opinion	6. Too early
Across sectors	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Within sectors	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

\* 2. The JP process has led to joint implementation initiatives

	Yes	No	I do not know
Delegated cooperation	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Pooled funding	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
SWAPs	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Other (please specify below)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Other (please specify)

\* 3.

Did the number of donors per sector decrease?

Please also feel free to further explain or comment on your answers for questions 1 to 3.

\* 4.

Did the number of sectors per donor decrease?

Please also feel free to further explain or comment on your answers for questions 1 to 4.

## 5. JP and aid predictability and transparency

\* 1.

The JP process has led the following partners to closer align their programming cycle to the one from the partner country

	Strongly agree	Rather agree	Rather disagree	Strongly disagree	No opinion
<b>Commission/EEAS</b>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
<b>Participating EU MS in general</b>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

\* 2.

The JP process has led the following partner to provide more and better information on their current and planned country programmable aid (CPA)

	Strongly agree	Rather agree	Rather disagree	Strongly disagree	No opinion
<b>Commission/EEAS</b>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
<b>Participating EU MS in general</b>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

\* 3.

The JP process has provided better knowledge of the partners involved in that process about

	Strongly agree	Rather agree	Rather disagree	Strongly disagree	No opinion
<b>Cooperation priorities</b>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
<b>Areas of current support</b>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
<b>Medium-term intentions with regards to sector support</b>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Please feel free to further explain or comment on your answers for questions 1 to 3.

## 6. JP and partner country ownership of its own development programming

\* 1.

To what extent do you agree with the following statements: the JP process

	Strongly agree	Rather agree	Rather disagree	Strongly disagree	No opinion
Was led by the government	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Was based on the partner country's national development strategy	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

\* 2.

The JP process has led the following partners to align their support more to the partner country's priorities compared to a situation without JP

	Strongly agree	Rather agree	Rather disagree	Strongly disagree	No opinion
The Commission/EEAS	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The participating EU MS in general	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

\* 3. During the Joint Analysis, consultations were held with

	Yes	No	I do not know
Central/coordinating ministry level	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Line ministries, directorates/external departments	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
State institutions (Parliament, Supreme Audit Institution, etc.)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Local private sector/business community	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Local civic bodies (NGOs, labour unions, faith-based organisation, etc.)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

\* 4. During the joint programming, consultations were held with

	Yes	No	I do not know
Central/coordinating ministry level	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Line ministries, directorates/external departments	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
State institutions (Parliament, Supreme Audit Institution, etc.)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Local private sector/business community	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Local civic bodies (NGOs, labour unions, faith-based organisation, etc.)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

\* 5. The partner country has made substantive contributions to the JP process and its deliverables

Strongly agree	Rather agree	Rather disagree	Strongly disagree	No opinion
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Please feel free to further explain or comment on your answers for questions 1 to 5

## 7. JP and coherence of EU and MS strategies and programming at country level

\* 1. Please indicate whether the Commission/EEAS and EU MS delivered the following elements through the JP process

	Yes	No	I do not know
Joint missions	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Common M&E framework	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Joint actions in visibility and communication	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Other (please specify below)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Other (please specify)

\* 2. The Commission/EEAS and EU MS have engaged in the JP process for the same reasons

Strongly agree	Rather agree	Rather disagree	Strongly disagree	No opinion
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Please feel free to further explain or comment on your answer

\* 3. The JP process has resulted in

	Strongly agree	Rather agree	Rather disagree	Strongly disagree	No opinion
stronger convergence of development objectives among the Commission/EEAS and EU MS	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
the Commission/EEAS and EU MS speaking more with a common voice	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
greater coherence across Commission/EEAS and EU MS policies (migration, trade, human rights, etc.)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
greater EU leverage and impact	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

\* 4. HQ agreed with proposals made through the JP process at country level (sectors/issues to be covered)

	Strongly agree	Rather agree	Rather disagree	Strongly disagree	No opinion
the Commission/EEAS	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
the participating EU MS in general	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

\* 5. Thanks to the JP process Development partners have been able to cover together the range of the most important sectors for the country

Strongly agree	Rather agree	Rather disagree	Strongly disagree	No opinion
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

\* 6. The JP process has contributed to "make Europe happen on the ground" (\*)

Strongly agree	Rather agree	Rather disagree	Strongly disagree	No opinion
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

(\*) in the sense of "translating shared European values and policies on issues such as fundamental rights and good governance into action in partner countries"

Please feel free to further comment on your answer



\* 7. Do you have knowledge of drawbacks for the Commission/EEAS or EU MS with respect to their participation in (a specific or not) JP process?

Yes

No

If Yes, please briefly explain

\* 8. Has the JP process led the Commission/EEAS or EU MS to revise their initial programming (objectives, sectors, priorities, funding,...)?

Yes

No

I do not know

If Yes, please feel free to explain

\* 9. Please select those items that you consider as a specific added value that the Commission/EEAS has brought to the JP process

	Yes	No	No opinion
Knowledge of the JP processes	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Provision of an external technical assistant to facilitate the process	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Presence of a local office (EUD)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Its relation with the partner country authorities	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Providing a common voice on behalf of EU MS and Commission/EEAS	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Role to promote coherence of EU MS policies	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Capacity to intervene flexibly in political sensitive situations	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Critical mass of its own support	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Role as a coordinator and facilitator of Commission/EEAS and EU MS activities	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Its relation with other stakeholders in the country	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
No added value	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I do not know	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Other	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

If Other, please specify. Please also feel free to further explain or comment on your answers for questions 1 to 9.

## 8. Visibility of EU and MS in partner countries

\* 1. The JP process has led to greater „Joint EU visibility“ (single brand as EU)

	Strongly agree	Rather agree	Rather disagree	Strongly disagree	No opinion
To national authorities	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
To other donors	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
To other stakeholders in the country	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

\* 2. The JP process has led to greater EU visibility

	Strongly agree	Rather agree	Rather disagree	Strongly disagree	No opinion
To national authorities	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
To other donors	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
To other stakeholders in the country	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

\* 3. The JP process has led to an increased visibility of your MS (please indicate N/A if you are not representing a MS)

	Strongly agree	Rather agree	Rather disagree	Strongly disagree	No opinion	N/A
To the national authorities	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
To other donors	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
To other stakeholders in the country	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Please feel free to further explain or comment on your answers for questions 1 to 3.

## 9. Institutional set-up for the JP process

\* 1. To what extent were you aware (as of 2014-2015) of the Commission/EEAS's guidance material on JP:

I was not aware of its existence	I was aware of its existence but had not really read it or only superficially	I have used the guidance
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

\* 2. Did you find this guidance useful

Very useful	Rather useful	Rather not useful	Not at all useful	No opinion
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

\* 3. Were you sufficiently informed on

	Yes	No	No opinion
the reasons why to undertake JP and/or the objectives pursued when you started	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
how to conduct the JP process when you started	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

\* 4. To what extent do you agree with the following statements:

Strongly agree

Rather agree

Rather disagree

Strongly disagree

No opinion

The division of roles between HQ and field offices of my agency for JP were clearly defined

My agency has mobilised sufficient and adequate expertise (specialised staff, consultants, etc.) to conduct the JP process

The division of roles and responsibilities between the different partners in the JP process was sufficiently clear

Please feel free to further explain or comment on your answers for questions 1 to 4. If you have suggestions to improve the guidance feel free to add them!

## 10. JP and transaction costs

\* 1. Time devoted to the JP process compared to its (expected) benefits (overall) was

reasonable	heavy but worth the effort	too heavy	No opinion
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

\* 2. To what extent do you agree with the following statements:

	Strongly agree	Rather agree	Rather disagree	Strongly disagree	No opinion
The JP process reduced the transaction cost for the partner country authorities (*)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The JP process reduced the transaction cost for the partners (Commission/EEAS and EU MS)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

(\*) For instance as they had only one country analysis and response to deal with for several or all EU development partners). If you strongly disagree or rather disagree, please explain

## 11. General observations (optional)

1. What do you see as the major advantages/positive effects of JP (list two or three)

2. What do you see as having been the greatest challenges/problems facing JP (list two or three)

3. Any recommendation?

## 12. Conclusion

This survey is now finalised.

We would like to thank you for your time and participation to this survey. The results will be integrated in the Final Report which will be available in the following months at [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/node/80199\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/node/80199_en)

Best regards,

The Evaluation Team

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# Annex G. Country Note BOLIVIA

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## 1. The Joint Programming Process in Bolivia<sup>25</sup>

**EU Joint Programming in Bolivia is taking place in a context of changing aid priorities.** Some donors are planning to exit the country but uncertainty is high since decisions can be reversed due to domestic policy changes. Belgium will end its cooperation with Bolivia by 2019. Sweden was initially planning to cease bilateral cooperation with Bolivia prior to 2017, but then the decision was reversed. Denmark will close its embassy in July 2017 (its programmes will continue until end of 2018). France continues its cooperation mainly through the credits that are/will be provided by AFD (entered in Bolivia in 2015). These evolutions and uncertainties raise the question about the respect of the commitments taken in the framework of EU Joint Programming. Current participants to JP are Germany, Denmark, Spain, France, Italy, Sweden, Belgium, United Kingdom, Switzerland and the EU.

**The level of coordination among donors in Bolivia is perceived to be good.** In 2014, 23 donors were represented in the country, including 9 EU Member States<sup>26</sup> and the UN. The coordination among Member States on the ground is considered to be very good. In the framework of the GruS (*Grupo de Socios para el desarrollo de Bolivia*), the main donors' co-ordination body in Bolivia, gathering the heads of all 23 co-operation agencies in the country, the EU is considered to be the most important and coherent block, giving significant influence in discussions of key issues. At EU level, Heads of Missions as well as Heads of Cooperation also reunite and exchange information that are more relevant for their day-to-day work. Neither the GruS, nor the forum of HoMs and HoCs are decision-making forum per se (as opposed to JP, which gives a bit more in-depth to existing coordination mechanisms, for instance through reflexions on where additional synergies could be found among donors' activities).

**The JP process in the country has had a good start. Bolivia is among the 20 countries with a joint strategy (phase 3).** The existing positive coordination among development partners has led EU and Member States to agree in 2010 to a Joint Assistance Framework (JAF), spelling out their commitments for Aid Efficiency. It was followed in 2011 by the signature of the Joint Assistance Framework (JAF), and in 2012 by the European Coordinated Response (ECR). Consultations with EU institutions and Member States at HQ level was also instrumental to smooth the way towards Joint Programming, by having prior agreement. Discussion within the EU+ group (Switzerland is included) have led to the drafting of an EU Joint Programming document (JPD), of which the final version is not available yet (see hereafter). The process is led by the EU.

**The government has been involved in the process, to ensure alignment and ownership.** There have been for instance meetings with the Ministry of Planning (mainly at the Deputy Minister level, but also with the Minister), to validate partial drafts of the joint programming document. It was also agreed with the government to wait for the publication of the national development plan

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<sup>25</sup> Sources: World Bank on line DataBank of World Development Indicators (May 2016); ECDPM, Best practice in Joint Programming and Prospects for EU Joint Cooperation Strategies, ECDPM Discussion Paper No. 183, December 2015; EU, HoMs Report - Possibilities for future EU joint programming in Bolivia, 2013 ; EU, HOMs report on Joint Programming in Bolivia, 2015; EU, Draft European Coordinated Response for Bolivia, 2012; EU, Joint Programming in Bolivia, PPT presentation, 2014; Supplemented with information collected from interviews with EU staff (HQ and in Bolivia) and MS staff (in Bolivia).

<sup>26</sup> Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom

(*Plan Quiquenal de Desarrollo Integral para Vivir Bien 2016-2020*) before finalizing the Joint Programming document (JPD). The plan was issued in March 2016, and the JPD is aligned to it.

**The JP should be ready by 2017. It will however not replace the country strategy of the EU and its MS, but rather accompany them by providing a common framework. The substitution is expected by 2020.** The ECR contained a commitment by all partners to move to full joint programming (i.e. replacing bilateral programming by JP) from 2017, using the period 2013-2016 to synchronise their cycles with the Bolivian Government's planning cycle. The process has been slowdown due to several factors, including delays in the approval of the national development plan and discussions among JP partners that required clarifications/approval from the HQ and capitals. As a result, from the EU perspective, the priority for the period 2017-2020 is on the approval of the new MIP (2017-2020), as the previous one ends by 2016 (the standard 7-year MIP has been divided in two in order to accommodate the new government programming cycle). The JPD 2017-2020 (ready to be signed by the partners by end of June 2016) will be provided in the annexes of the MIP. It provides a clear picture of who is doing what (no division of labor), and an indication on the amounts to be allocated per sector of cooperation (not per donor). The full substitution of the MIP by the JPD is expected to be achieved in 2020. EU MS will be free to replace their bilatereal documents by the JPD.

## **2. EQ1: To what extent did JP respond to global and country-level challenges regarding increased aid effectiveness?**

### *JC 1.1: JP responded to the global aid effectiveness challenges*

**There is evidence of a willingness for JP to respond to aid effectiveness challenges.** Available documents such as HoMs reports and the Roadmap<sup>27</sup> refer to a common vision for European aid. In addition, the ECR provides a general framework for all EU donors, notably on their vision of development challenges in Bolivia. The (draft) JP document clearly refers to aid effectiveness principles, and indicate to which extent JP is contributing to respond to aid effectiveness challenges (although the issue of reducing the number of sectors of intervention comes from Busan and other aid-efficiency process than from JP, cf. EQ2). The objectives and commitments for JP among EU and MS are mainly shared, although there are differences among partners: some are pushing for replacing bilateral programming documents by a JP document, whereas others are more reluctant.

### *JC 1.2: The JP process was sensitive to the partner country's context*

**The JP process was sensitive to the country's context.** JP was perceived to be appropriate in the context of Bolivia (some countries are leaving, which gives an incentive to those remaining to have a clear overview of who is doing what, and what are the areas that may be left empty). Depending on their situation (whether there are leaving the country or not, whether their HQ has a clear position to defend on JP or not, etc.) MS have (actively) contributed to the JP process. The HoM report contains a common analysis of Bolivia and its development challenges. It also provides a forward-look shared by the JP partners. The proposal of sectors to be covered in the coming years has derived from this common analysis. Furthermore, as highlighted in the previous section, the JP process has been flexible regarding the context, as it has to be in standby until the approval of the national development plan.

<sup>27</sup> Draft Roadmap to Joint European Programming in Bolivia (EU, 2013)

### 3. EQ2: To what extent did JP contribute to reducing aid fragmentation?

#### *JC 2.1: Aid fragmentation has been reduced due to the JP process*

It is too early to state whether JP has contributed to reducing aid fragmentation as the JP has not been implemented yet. However, no level of funding per sector for each donor, neither the number of interventions are available yet. The section “Overview of past and present donor cooperation, complementarity and consistency” of the ECR provides the history of EU donors’ presence in the country, in terms of amounts and sectors covered. The ECR also ensures that no important sector is neglected, and that there is a good balance of donors across the main strands of the “Agenda for Change” - governance, social sectors and productive sectors. The Annex 1 of the Outcomes report as well as the (draft) JP document provide a table with sectors of intervention per donor, as foreseen with the Joint programming. However, the (draft) JP document does not provide yet the level of funding per donor per sector, neither an indicative number of interventions.

#### *JC 2.2: The JP has facilitated a division of labour beyond the sharing of sector involvement*

The JP process has provided a mapping of the interventions. This should be useful for the forthcoming discussion on the division of labor. The JP process has contributed to reach a consensus among partners on sectors’ definition and terminology. Discussions on the DoL have not taken place yet. The 2020 new phase of JP is expected to lead to a real DoL, with discussions among the JP partners remaining in Bolivia on who will work in which sector (with an implication on what other partners will do). The current JP document only provides a picture of who is doing what. This is perceived as a real added-value of the process by the partners. It is expected to be helpful for the next steps. A leader (in charge of coordinating the sector for JP partners, and being the EU voice in that sector) has been identified. Preventing new comers in a given sector is not part of sector leaders’ mandate.

The JP process has not led to a limitation of the number of donors per sectors, neither of the number of sectors covered per donor. Regarding the number of donors per sector, Joint Programming was not useful to direct the work of any Member State. MS were already used to their own areas/sectors of activities and continued to work in these areas. For the sectors of intervention, the limited flexibility of the field (as the decision on the sectors is made by the HQs, or shared between the HQs and the field) have been mentioned by interviewees. A MS has for instance mentioned that they try to operate in the same sectors in all their countries of intervention. This has nothing to do with JP. For the sectors in which they have been for longtime, MS mentioned that there were no good reasons to leave them due to JP, given the accumulated experience.

#### *JC 2.3: The countries that have carried out JP aimed at reducing aid fragmentation*

Too early for Bolivia.

#### **4. EQ3: To what extent did JP improve aid predictability and transparency of EU and MS aid?**

##### *JC3.1: Joint programming led to changes in EU/MS planning and/or financial cycles*

**There is limited evidence that JP led to changes in EU/MS planning and financial cycles.** Despite the fact that a consensus has been reached among donors in terms of synchronization of planning cycles, and that an alignment strategy is provided for donors to be able to move forward full JP in 2017, EU and MS strategies are not align yet, and will not be by 2017. This could notably be explained by the way things are managed in each country (for instance, some countries need government decisions to change their programming). From EU perspective, it is however worth mentioning that the standard 7-year MIP has been divided in two in order to accommodate the new government programming cycle. The previous MIP therefore ends by 2016, and the next one will by 2020. Several Member States would be programming their future co-operation around 2016. EU and MS programming should therefore finish in approximately the same time (by 2020). However, the situation is not harmonized among all the MS, and interviewees have mentioned that changing or reviewing the programming cycle was not a priority for certain MS governments.

##### *JC3.2 Predictability of CPA provided by JP-participants improved*

**The JP document allows having the predictability of the three years ahead of all the European partners.** According to interviewees, this was perceived as a high improvement. In the case of the EU, regional and thematic lines are not taken into account for the JP. For the MS, the issue of including loans (or not) has been raised during the process (cf. EQ 7).

##### *JC 3.3: Transparency of CPA provided by JP-participants improved*

**There is no evidence that transparency of aid have improved through JP in Bolivia.** Interviews conducted at the HQ level revealed that EU's allocations to Bolivia was not related to the JP process which was more a matter of sharing priorities and work than impacting the budget. Furthermore, most of EU support to Bolivia is done through budget support, which predictability is not related to the JP process. The JP document gives an indication on what the EU (and its MS) is doing in Bolivia, who is working in which sector, and what are the amounts committed per sector. It doesn't tell about the commitment of each MS per sector of intervention.

#### **5. EQ4: To what extent did JP contribute to improved leadership by the partner country of its development priorities?**

##### *JC 4.1: The partner country government has played an increasingly important role in the JP*

**The government has been involved and has had a participative role in the JP process.** The government has been involved both politically and technically in the process. Politically, as part of the strategic group, in charge of defining the strategy, with the main sectors, etc. And technically, through its participation to the working group in charge of drafting the JP document. A representant of the VIPFE has been participating to all the technical meetings (working group) since the beginning of the process. This person has therefore been involved in the drafting of the JP document and has been in charge of transmitting the document to the Ministry in charge of cooperation, for revisions. It has been mentioned by interviewees that it was the 1st time for the

government to be intensively involved in the programming exercise of international cooperation. The government considered that it was important and relevant to be included in the process, especially because, as organ of planification and regulation, it has a good overview of the needs, and where they are located.

*JC 4.2: JP contributed to increased alignment to partner country development priorities*

The draft JPD is aligned with GoB's priorities for development cooperation, and its alignment to the related national development plan was a priority for JP partners. However, alignment with partner country's national priorities were already a concern for EU and EU MS before JP. The draft JPD is aligned with government priorities provided in the "Patriotic Agenda 2025". In order to ensure alignment with national policies, it was agreed with the government to wait for the approval of the national plan related to this Patriotic agenda before finalizing the draft JPD (which partly caused the delay observed in the process as the plan has been released only in March 2016 instead of end 2015). Although alignment with partner country's national priorities were already a concern for EU and EU MS before JP, it is expected by the partners that JP serves as a guarantee for donors' interventions to stay aligned with national policies.

**6. EQ5: To what extent has JP contributed to increased coherence of EU and MS strategies and programming at country level?**

*JC 5.1: JP favoured convergence of objectives among EU and MS in terms of development strategies and policies at country level*

There are indication that JP favoured the convergence of objectives among EU and MS strategies. Interviewees have mentioned that, through the JP process, a lot has been done in harmonizing EU and MS views at the strategic level. The process has contributed to increase awareness on the strategies of each other. Furthermore, the JP provides a useful tool to favour convergence among EU and MS, as it has resulted in having the partners using a common framework to build their strategies for their own (next) programming cycle.

*JC 5.2: JP documents show coherence of development cooperation with other EU policies*

Bolivia benefits from the preferential access that the EU grants under the EU's Generalised Scheme of Preferences, including through the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance, known as the Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+). No incoherence with the JP document has been identified.

**7. EQ6: To what extent did JP increase the visibility of EU and MS to partner country authorities and other donor partners?**

*JC 6.1: JP contributed to enhance awareness of EU support among partner country authorities and other donors*

So far there is no visibility consequences of JP as implementation has not started yet. In any case, the visibility strategy still need to be clarified. In the JP document there is something about using the same implementation methodology and doing joint missions, and this by itself

should contribute to the visibility to the work jointly done (joint missions have already been conducted, perceived as very successful experiences). At the present stage, visibility events are foreseen to communicate on JP. There are also intentions to put in place a joint communication on EU and MS interventions in Bolivia. These initiatives still need to be developed and put in place. Furthermore, the overall visibility strategy around JP during the implementation, and how it should be articulated to the existing EU visibility strategy still need to be clarified to JP partners. The JP process has however already contributed to increase GoB's awareness of EU support, through its participation to the overall process.

***JC 6.2: JP contributed to enhance the visibility of EU member states among partner country authorities and other donors***

**Enhancing the visibility was not a priority of interviewed MS.** The implementation of the JP document has not yet started. The associated impact on the visibility of EU member states can not therefore be assessed yet. Nevertheless, according to interviewed EU MS, increasing visibility was not among their priorities, although it has been reported as being one of the reasons to continue bilateral programming and not replacing it by a JP document. There are also expectations in terms of advocacy (reinforcing the EU voice among bigger donors), as JP should increase the visibility of EU “as a group”.

**8. EQ7: To what extent was the EU organised so as to make JP work?**

***JC 7.1: The JP institutional set-up is conducive to a successful process***

**Institutional set-up is has been conducive to the success of JP process in Bolivia, although the process started before clear institutional guidance was made available.** The guidance pack provides indications on the overall JP process, which has been welcomed by JP partners. It is also clear to the partners that the process is led in the field, while HQ has a validating role. However, when it comes at EU HQ level, the role of each EU body is perceived to not be clear enough. Furthermore, the independence of the field staff varies across partners and, according to interviewees, the flexibility given to the field in terms of JP is overcome by the final decision being in the hands of the HQs. It has take sometime to EU and MS HQs to take position on some of the topics discussed during the JP process (e.g. including credits or not), which has contributed to the overall delay of the process.

**The need to keep the process flexible has also been expressed.** Institutional guidance is indeed sometimes perceived to have high expectations compared to what is feasible on the field.

***JC 7.2: JP guidance was clear and well known***

**The JP process is perceived to be a “learning-by-doing” process which is clearer now, thanks notably to the availability of guidance material.** The guidance pack indeed provides information on what should be achieved at each stage of the process. At the beginning of the process in Bolivia, such guidance was not available yet. It was mentioned that there still have confusion on the steps and on the documents related to JP, and no training modules on JP exists. Furthermore, according to interviewed JP partners, the TA (JP consultant) provided by the EU at the beginning of the process is one of the elements that has contributed to the success of the overall process.

**Besides guidance material, instructions from HQs regarding JP have not always been clear and have sometimes changed over the period.** In the case of the EU for instance, the replacing role of the JP document over the MIP has been revised over the period, and the format of the JP Document as well. Regarding MS, some have received clear instructions at early stages (in favour of JP), whereas others have not.

## **9. EQ8: To what extent did JP reduce partner countries' transactions costs and keep them reasonable for the EU and MS?**

### *JC 8.1: JP has reduced transaction costs for partner country governments*

**The implementation of the JP document has not yet started in Bolivia so the associated transaction costs can not yet be assessed. Nevertheless, the JP process has been perceived positively by the Government in terms of results expected in relation with time costs.** From line ministries perspective, the process has been worth investing time and other resources, as:

- the resulting JP document is clearly aligned to the development priorities of the government. The process has been considered as enriching in terms of concentrating resources and reaching objectives of the *Plan de Desarrollo*.
- It has allowed the government to have a clear overview of the overall EU support in Bolivia and get access to more information compared to other existing information sharing platforms.

The transaction costs will be measured once the JP is implemented, but there were already positive reactions from Government about the having a single document which provide a clear overview of the overall EU support in Bolivia, with a strong alignment to its national plan of development.

### *JC 8.2: Transaction costs for the EU and MS relating to JP are deemed worth it in light of expected benefits*

**Although the implementation of the JP document has not started yet, potential sources of efficiency gains are already being observed.** According to interviewees, the mapping (“who is doing what”) that is now available to all the donors thanks to the JP process is already a tool for improved efficiency, as it should contribute to avoid (or at least limit) overlaps of interventions. It also allows any donors to identify easily who operate in its sectors of concentration, with the possibility to implement joint interventions or delegated cooperation. Furthermore, at least one MS has been using the sectoral fiches (summary of the sector, including main country policies and indicators) prepared by JP partners, to prepare its bilateral programming document. Furthermore, measures are being taken to avoid that the JP process does not result in an over-complicated bureaucracy (for instance in terms of duplicating sectoral group meetings, through JP but also GrUS coordination organism).

In the view of reaching expected efficiency gains, the stakeholders involved in the process judged as a positive contribution the increased consultations and the overall time spent in the process despite the related extra work. Efficiency gains cannot however be fully assessed as the implementation has not started yet.





# Annex H. Country Note Cambodia

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## 1. The Joint Programming Process in Cambodia

**A long history of close coordination.** European development partners in Cambodia adopted an *EU Road Map for Increased Aid Effectiveness* as early as 2006, and established a European Development Counsellors Group in 2006-2007. The 2008 EU Code of Conduct on Division of Labour was implemented in Cambodia in 2008, to enhance the complementarity of European-funded programmes and reduce transaction costs related to programming and implementing aid programmes and projects<sup>28</sup>. At the time, European leads were designated to lead the dialogue with both Government and the wider development community in three sectors<sup>29</sup>. Besides these, there were other development coordination mechanisms in place among European partners (EU Development Counsellors meetings, monthly EU Human Rights Group meeting, annual development cooperation retreats, etc.). These helped establish joint positions on development policy issues, particularly from 2012.

**A locally-initiated process.** While Cambodia was not originally foreseen by headquarters as one of the pilot countries for joint programming, the EU Heads of Mission retreat in Cambodia in March 2012 pointed out that joint programming would bring clear benefits: the European voice would be more effective as one, especially in a fast-changing aid landscape. Heads of Missions therefore mandated the EU Development Counsellors to prepare a feasibility study. The EU Delegation led the exercise, involving European partners. Based on the feasibility study, the Heads of Mission formally requested from the EU (EEAS and DEVCO) that Cambodia be considered as a pilot country<sup>30</sup> (September 2012). Headquarters approved (March 2013) and a Development Counsellors retreat the same month launched the joint programming process. They agreed a roadmap and an outline of the future EU Joint Strategy d. In May 2013, the Heads of Missions informed the Council for Development of Cambodia (CDC)<sup>31</sup> about the joint programming process, and requested its “endorsement and support”. Government formally expressed its support in June 2013.

**A process that took Cambodia’s context and national plans as the starting point.** Thereafter, the Czech Republic, the EU Delegation, Germany, Finland, France, Ireland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK jointly prepared a political economy analysis of Cambodia (June-August 2013) and the drafting of the Joint European Development Cooperation Strategy 2014-2018 started, based on national priorities<sup>32</sup>. With the first draft of the EU Joint Strategy produced in October 2013, the EU Delegation requested help from the CDC to lead Government

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<sup>28</sup> See European Union statement on Division of Labour delivered at the 2nd Cambodia Development Cooperation Forum, Phnom Penh 4-5. December 2008 ([http://www.cdc-crdb.gov.kh/cdc/second\\_cdcf/session7/eu\\_statement\\_eng.htm](http://www.cdc-crdb.gov.kh/cdc/second_cdcf/session7/eu_statement_eng.htm)) and the EU position paper on DoL delivered at the same event ([http://www.cdc-crdb.gov.kh/cdc/second\\_cdcf/session7/eu\\_position\\_paper.htm](http://www.cdc-crdb.gov.kh/cdc/second_cdcf/session7/eu_position_paper.htm))

<sup>29</sup> Health, education and decentralisation & deconcentration. By 2016, European leads were identified for 25 sectors.

<sup>30</sup> EU Ambassador sent a letter on behalf of EU HoMs to Mr Budura, Director Asia-Pacific at EEAS and Mr Meganck, Director, DEVCO/H (13 september 2012)

<sup>31</sup> The CDC is Government’s main coordinating body with responsibility for overall policy leadership on ODA mobilisation and management.

<sup>32</sup> Originally, the Joint Strategy was to be based on the National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP) 2014-2018. However, with continuous delays in the NSDP preparations, the Heads of Mission agreed to proceed with the drafting of the Joint Strategy based on the Government’s Rectangular Strategy Phase III (September 2013), which is a key national strategic socio-economic platform, on which the NSDP (promulgated in July 2014) would be based.

consultations on the draft Strategy. While consultations were initially delayed<sup>33</sup>, they took place with the private sector, civil society representatives, and Government, and were “very productive” (EU Head of Delegation).

**Headquarters endorsement.** All European partners involved have been sharing the draft versions of the document with their respective headquarters, and submitted the final Joint Strategy to their capitals for official endorsement in May 2014. Spain was withdrawing from Cambodia and decided to pull out of the Joint Programming process but Italy (with impetus from the Bangkok embassy) joined: in the end, Joint Strategies signatories are the Czech Republic, the EU, Ireland, Italy, France, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. The final document was shared with Government in October 2014, formally launched in November 2014 and disseminated publicly in several languages for both transparency and visibility.

**From joint analysis to joint implementation and joint monitoring and evaluation.** The 2014 EU Development Counsellors’ annual retreat focused on finalising the Joint Strategy, which was further discussed and endorsed (pending the inclusion of some additional comments) at the annual Heads of Mission retreat in April 2014. HoMs also agreed to increase coordination with the Development Counsellors to better promote Joint Strategy priorities at both technical and political levels. The modalities to implement the agreed division of labour and carry out monitoring and evaluation jointly were further discussed at subsequent Development Counsellors meetings in 2015. This makes the Joint Programming process in Cambodia the most advanced in the world (ECDPM, 2015). The first monitoring report was discussed with Government (at a high-level, inter-ministerial event) and civil society in April 2016.

## Preliminary Findings

**Even if joint programming was launched in a context of already close cooperation across European partners, its value-added to pre-existing arrangements is clear** (source: interviews, May 2016; documents in the bibliography):

- **For European partners**, it included on top of (i) the joint products themselves (Joint Analysis, the Joint Strategy, and a Joint Results Framework), (ii) deepened trust within the European group (“process is as useful of the product”<sup>34</sup>); (iii) better information on and understanding of respective individual programmes, approaches and instruments; (iv) identifying the potential for joint implementation; (v) simple guidance and rules to lead to a resource-efficient division of labour across (and to some extent within) sectors; (vi) joint analytical work (e.g. the political economy analysis) providing a sound foundation for a common vision and common objectives; (vii) improved policy dialogue between European partners and with national counterparts, leveraging one European voice and values
- **For Government**, the value-added of joint programming was most tangible in that (i) it “built on the collective learning and experience”; (ii) was “evidence-based and highly consultative”; (iii) a clear contribution to better alignment of development resources with national priorities and jointly monitoring the impact of collective efforts; and (iv) a clear contribution to stronger country systems and better aid predictability (interviews, May 2016, and Royal Government of Cambodia, 2015). Moreover, joint programming did not bring a reduction of European aid, as some developing countries may fear: in fact, the latter increased by 13% between 2001 and

<sup>33</sup> It was initially agreed that the consultation meeting will be held in January 2014 and chaired by the CDC. However, due to unrest in December 2013-January 2014 (trade unions’ and opposition protests) and the resulting tensions, the HoMs decided to postpone the consultations until after the EU-Cambodia Joint Committee (March 2014).

<sup>34</sup> Factsheet on Cambodia for the regional workshop on Joint Programming for Asia, April 2015

2014 (OECD statistics). Joint Programming in Cambodia was careful to not leave some sectors or themes orphaned, although leaving sectors has taken place subsequently<sup>35</sup>.

- **Close coordination would have happened with or without joint programming, but joint programming made it deeper** (joint implementation and monitoring) **and more systematic** (political and policy dialogue; division of labour; less dependent on personalities).

## **2. EQ1: To what extent did JP respond to country-level challenges regarding increased aid effectiveness?**

**Joint programming in Cambodia was sensitive to the partner country's aid effectiveness challenges.** These included (generally, not specific regarding European partners) a poor use of country systems; a high-level of corruption in spite of some islands of integrity in the public sector and the 2010 Anti-Corruption Law; and a slow transition to new sources of development finance, bringing new opportunities but also uncertainties. With regards to European partners specifically, there was room for improvement<sup>36</sup>, and joint programming was seen as a way to improve the effectiveness of European aid, and more generally “increase EU political coherence and development effectiveness, greater EU influence vis-à-vis Royal Government of Cambodia and other donors, and value for money”<sup>37</sup>, especially as many opportunities presented themselves to improve aid effectiveness.

**Joint programming in Cambodia seized several opportunities** to improve aid effectiveness, notably (i) good pre-existing coordination and division of labour; (ii) good timing as European partners' programming cycle was ending when Government's was going to start; (iii) a small number of European partners; (iv) personalities that were conducive to collegial work, with no one partner over-dominating the process; (v) small or shrinking European partners<sup>38</sup> that saw the value of joint programming to keep a voice in policy dialogue and some visibility; (vi) relative openness of Government to joint programming, especially once it was observed that it was not, in theory or practice, at the detriment of better alignment nor of harmonisation beyond the European partnership. Non-European partners were not hostile to the joint programming process and did not oppose it<sup>39</sup>.

**The Joint Programming process has taken into account European partners' incentives and constraints in Cambodia.** Interviews and documentation indicate there was clarity about terminology and expectations of the process both from the start, and throughout. For example, there were thorough discussion and agreement on the scope of the Joint Strategy, deciding to include only what European embassies and the EU Delegation had a good measure of control on, and therefore excluding regional and thematic funds. As for smaller development partners, the process offered them a way to keep a seat at the table, notably thanks to the larger partners (Germany, the EU, France) being highly consultative and not over-bearing. Finally, as a non-EU

<sup>35</sup> Germany phased out from the land sector. Moreover, some member states withdrew from Cambodia, including Finland (leaving the land sector as well) and Denmark (leaving judicial reform). These two areas suffer from a lack of entry points for effective engagement.

<sup>36</sup> The Paris Declaration Monitoring Survey, 2011, indicates that in 2010, the UK and EU institutions were the worst performers in terms of disbursements being short of government budget figures. In 2010, the EU coordinated only 11% of its technical cooperation with country programmes, and this figure fell to nil for the UK and Sweden. In 2010, only 14% of EU aid was programme-based, and this figure fell to nil for Spain and Sweden.

<sup>37</sup> Joint opinion of the EU Heads of Mission regarding the prospects for joint programming, September 2012.

<sup>38</sup> Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Spain and the UK all recorded gross disbursements of less than US\$5m in 2014.

<sup>39</sup> For example, the EU was formally elected lead on donor coordination for all development partners. And European partners can be leads both among the European group and for development partners, representing not only all European partners, but also all development partners in policy dialogue with Government (case, for example, of Germany in Land and Public Administrative Reform).

member, Switzerland found that Joint Programming delivered enough value for reasonable transaction costs, and common enough values and objectives, to join the process.

**Joint programming has to some extent provided a more comprehensive analytical and informational foundation for European development cooperation.** In Cambodia in 2011, there were already a number of coordination mechanisms<sup>40</sup>, including among European partners, and a good measure of aid transparency through the use of Cambodia ODA database. Where joint programming has had the most value added is in the areas of joined-up analysis (which is not the same as analysis shared after completion) and joint positions in political and policy dialogue, including in complex areas/areas where policy coherence needs special attention (e.g. (e.g. human rights; civil society engagement; food security).

### **3. EQ2: To what extent did JP contribute to reducing aid fragmentation?**

**The Joint Strategy identifies a division of labour** showing which EU DPs will work in which sectors/areas with what level of funding, who would be the lead partner, and who would be active partners. There is also some division of labour within sector, notably in governance reforms and administration<sup>41</sup>. There are instances of delegated cooperation arrangements (e.g. the EU delegating PFM support to Sweden); EU and Sweden delegating Subnational Democratic Development (SNDD) support to Germany; joint funding (e.g. Germany and Switzerland on rural development; Sweden, the EU and UNICEF co-funding a Capacity Development Partnership Fund), and of joint implementation arrangements (e.g. there were several joint missions, notably with regards to Subnational Democratic Development, education, land, fisheries, PFM and provincial-level dialogue with CSOs). EU and European partners can of course chose to engage in new sectors and fund new projects outside of what is outlined in the Joint Strategy, but so far, the spirit of the Joint Strategy has been respected: non-emergency aid has by and large been implemented in line with the agreed division of labour.

**Aid fragmentation (“too little aid from too many donors in too many sectors”) has been slightly reduced due to joint programming.** Judging from disbursements, European partners were present in all subsectors in 2011, and all but two in 2014 (trade policies and regulations; general budget support). Adding the number of EU DPs in each subsector, the total was 119 in 2011, but 106 in 2015 (a slight decrease) (Table 1). That this picture has not changed drastically was on purpose: “the Joint Strategy recognised the division of labour that already existed. It was a success factor that we did not turn this upside down” (interviews, May 2016). Moreover, joint programming took place just as several DPs were withdrawing (e.g. Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Spain and the UK), which had already led to less fragmentation.

Beyond these qualitative terms (EU DP presence by theme or sector) and variation in EU DP’s total funding to Cambodia, EU DP have also shifted their funding by sector. Taking all JP parties as a whole, the biggest increases were in agriculture and water, and the biggest decreases in health and population. These variations are important (change of 30% or more), and in the case of agriculture multiplied by six.

<sup>40</sup> These included the Government-Donor Coordination Committee meeting three times per year to promote dialogue and review progress; the Cambodia Development Co-operation Forum meeting every 18 months to review progress and agree new targets for national development priorities. At the technical level, there were technical working groups in 19 sector and thematic areas for ongoing dialogue.

<sup>41</sup> There was no formal DoL by province, and there is no province that is development partners interviewed identify as neglected.

**Table 1. European partners in Cambodia, 2005-2014 gross disbursements, constant US\$)**

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	
Switzerland	<u>5,244</u>	<u>4,141</u>	<u>5,386</u>	<u>4,734</u>	<u>3,725</u>	<u>3,474</u>	<u>7,284</u>	<u>6,018</u>	<u>9,76</u>	<u>13,392</u>	63,158
Austria	<u>0,056</u>	<u>0,024</u>	„	<u>0,207</u>	<u>0,012</u>	<u>0,04</u>	<u>0,596</u>	<u>0,757</u>	<u>0,041</u>	<u>0,092</u>	1,825
Belgium	<u>14,141</u>	<u>14,349</u>	<u>11,186</u>	<u>16,455</u>	<u>9,535</u>	<u>14,639</u>	<u>7,615</u>	<u>5,656</u>	<u>4,05</u>	<u>4,849</u>	102,475
Czech Republic	„	„	„	„	„	„	<u>0,863</u>	<u>0,905</u>	<u>1,116</u>	<u>1,108</u>	3,992
Denmark	<u>8,287</u>	<u>28,473</u>	<u>11,316</u>	<u>10,59</u>	<u>13,587</u>	<u>19,259</u>	<u>9,696</u>	<u>8,252</u>	<u>1,455</u>	<u>0,409</u>	111,324
Finland	„	<u>3,92</u>	<u>5,219</u>	<u>5,519</u>	<u>8,286</u>	<u>4,468</u>	<u>3,15</u>	<u>3,932</u>	<u>4,615</u>	<u>2,268</u>	41,377
France	<u>29,157</u>	<u>33,102</u>	<u>36,337</u>	<u>33,397</u>	<u>29,75</u>	<u>28,445</u>	<u>26,051</u>	<u>32,747</u>	<u>25,014</u>	<u>66,343</u>	340,343
Germany	<u>29,784</u>	<u>32,755</u>	<u>40,199</u>	<u>33,995</u>	<u>38,801</u>	<u>44,058</u>	<u>49,547</u>	<u>49,73</u>	<u>41,614</u>	<u>57,365</u>	417,848
Greece	„	„	<u>0,008</u>	<u>0,024</u>	<u>0,016</u>	„	„	„	<u>0,015</u>	<u>0,015</u>	0,078
Ireland	<u>1,117</u>	<u>4,226</u>	<u>3,13</u>	<u>3,614</u>	<u>2,37</u>	<u>3,189</u>	<u>2,898</u>	<u>0,672</u>	<u>0,7</u>	<u>0,666</u>	22,582
Italy	<u>2,361</u>	<u>0,153</u>	<u>4,197</u>	<u>2,139</u>	<u>0,856</u>	<u>0,36</u>	<u>1,446</u>	<u>0,466</u>	<u>1,212</u>	<u>0,345</u>	13,535
Luxembourg	<u>0,189</u>	<u>0,263</u>	<u>0,147</u>	<u>0,369</u>	<u>1,218</u>	<u>0,491</u>	<u>0,209</u>	<u>0,352</u>	<u>0,265</u>	<u>0,487</u>	3,99
Netherlands	<u>9,667</u>	<u>2,35</u>	<u>0,176</u>	<u>1,805</u>	<u>0,078</u>	<u>1,31</u>	<u>0,252</u>	<u>0,549</u>	<u>0,014</u>	„	16,201
Poland	„	„	„	„	„	„	„	„	<u>0,014</u>	<u>0,024</u>	0,038
Portugal	„	<u>0,027</u>	„	„	„	„	„	„	„	<u>0,001</u>	0,028
Slovak Republic	„	„	„	„	„	„	„	„	<u>0,038</u>	<u>0,027</u>	0,065
Slovenia	„	„	„	„	„	„	„	„	„	„	0
Spain	<u>0,761</u>	<u>2,212</u>	<u>8,446</u>	<u>10,926</u>	<u>24,467</u>	<u>23,166</u>	<u>20,227</u>	<u>19,381</u>	<u>5,32</u>	<u>0,26</u>	115,166
Sweden	<u>17,131</u>	<u>20,882</u>	<u>19,75</u>	<u>17,019</u>	<u>28,194</u>	<u>26,068</u>	<u>28,031</u>	<u>36,525</u>	<u>38,998</u>	<u>39,296</u>	271,894
United Kingdom	<u>24,872</u>	<u>24,091</u>	<u>23,54</u>	<u>31,306</u>	<u>38,683</u>	<u>29,822</u>	<u>6,909</u>	<u>24,882</u>	<u>18,348</u>	<u>3,18</u>	225,633
EU Institutions	<u>24,398</u>	<u>33,709</u>	<u>47,058</u>	<u>36,619</u>	<u>43,176</u>	<u>28,57</u>	<u>51,847</u>	<u>43,652</u>	<u>30,792</u>	<u>55,115</u>	394,936
TOTAL	167,165	204,677	216,095	208,718	242,754	227,359	216,621	234,476	183,381	245,242	

**Foremost among all 55 countries where there is a joint programming process, European partners have also committed to joint monitoring and reporting.** Monitoring of the Joint Strategy is done jointly by European partners every two years. It is based on existing national statistical and monitoring systems and data at both the national and sub-national level. Aligning the Joint Strategy results framework to the Government results framework helps strengthen national capacity and systems, but also allows for a higher level of political dialogue with Government, e.g. in PFM. A notable success is the high-level strategic dialogue surrounding the presentation of the first annual report (April 2016), bringing together all ministries save one, especially as there were no occasions for such Development Partner-Government dialogue since 2012, except around the launch of the Joint Strategy in 2014.

Indeed, beyond improved aid effectiveness, **joint programming in Cambodia demonstrates clear value-added in having strengthened trust among European partners and lead to division of labour at the political and policy levels:** investment in joint analysis (including on a collective theory of change) has led to a common vision and objectives, with common messages to Government. This is increasingly important as sources of development finance diversify<sup>42</sup>. On this note, it is worth noting that outside of joint programming, there have been initiatives such as the “Group of Five” (World Bank, Asian Development Bank, JICA, KOICA and Agence française de Développement) on development banks (concessional and non-concessional funding): while AfD loans (30% of the Joint Strategy total) are included in the perimeter of the Joint Strategy in Cambodia, it will be worthwhile exploring whether Joint Programming in Cambodia and elsewhere should limit itself to ODA or extend beyond.

**Table 2. European partner presence by sector**

	# European partners present	
	2011	2015
110: I.1. Education	11	15
120: I.2. Health	12	12
130: I.3. Population Pol./Progr. & Reproductive Health	9	4
140: I.4. Water Supply & Sanitation	7	4
150: I.5. Government & Civil Society	14	12
160: I.6. Other Social Infrastructure & Services	9	12
210: II.1. Transport & Storage	4	2
220: II.2. Communications	1	1
230: II.3. Energy	4	5
240: II.4. Banking & Financial Services	6	5
250: II.5. Business & Other Services	2	1
311: III.1.a. Agriculture	8	8
312: III.1.b. Forestry	1	3
313: III.1.c. Fishing	2	1
321: III.2.a. Industry	2	1
323: III.2.c. Construction	1	1
331: III.3.a. Trade Policies & Regulations	1	-
410: IV.1. General Environment Protection	6	7
430: IV.2. Other Multisector	10	8
510: VI.1. General Budget Support	1	-
520: VI.2. Dev. Food Aid/Food Security Ass.	1	1
700: VIII. Humanitarian Aid	7	3
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>119</b>	<b>106</b>

Source: OECD database, accessed May 2016. Areas considered important in Cambodia (e.g. support to civil society; support to ASEAN; social and labour standards in the garment sector...) but subsectors in OECD statistics are not visible in this table.

<sup>42</sup> While traditional development assistance (concessional and from DAC donors) remains important in Cambodia, and will continue to play a key role in poverty reduction in future, non-concessional sources of development finance are important (FDI, Chinese cooperation) and growing. Aid fragmentation and predictability will continue to matter hugely, but in an increasingly diverse development finance landscape, it is likely that sharing analysis and policy objectives across development partners and with Government is more critical to development impact.

#### **4. EQ3: Effectiveness: To what extent did JP improve aid predictability and transparency of European aid?**

**European partners adapted their programming cycle to fit with that of the partner country.** That was made easier by the coincidental synchronisation of most European cycles with the Government planning cycle. Moreover, new EC Programming Guidelines stipulated that, the EC's Country Strategy Papers can be of different duration in different countries, which allowed the EU to also synchronise its cycle.

**Predictability of aid provided by European partners is mixed.** *Annual* predictability improved dramatically for European partners for which data are available, i.e. Belgium, Denmark and Spain (Global Partnership survey, 2014), and Government data indicates that annual predictability improved for EU and Germany; but declined for France and Sweden (Government's 2015 Effective Development Cooperation and Partnerships Report, 2015). In the case of France, this decline is probably attributable to the growth of Agence française de Développement loans, which are by nature more demand- and opportunity-driven, and less predictable. As for *medium-term* predictability, the EU, CZ, FR, and SE all have three-year or more forward spending plans and DE a two-year cycle (Government's 2015 Effective development Cooperation and Partnerships Report, 2015). There is no earlier data to compare medium-term predictability over time, although reporting through the Government ODA database and Joint Programming are clearly changing standards and behaviours change for the better.

**Transparency of aid provided by European partners was and remains high.** Although there is no country-comparable data, Cambodia is at the forefront of public information by partner country on grant aid and concessional lending. The Joint Strategy provides details of EU and MS current and planned support (value, sector and sometimes subsector allocations, leads, active partners).

#### **5. EQ 4: Ownership: To what extent did JP contribute to improved leadership by the partner country of its development priorities?**

**Government has long displayed strong leadership, and accordingly played an important role in the Joint Programming process** (including line ministries), which laid the foundations for further sector dialogue. Government was consulted extensively, and has therefore contributed directly to the Joint Strategy, but it is first and foremost the reverse: the Joint Strategy aligns to national priorities (notably the 2013 Rectangular Strategy), and the Results Framework agreed among European partners builds on Government-formulated Joint Monitoring Indicators. The joint programming process has therefore helped increased European partners' alignment to national development priorities, and Government views on the matter are very positive (Royal Government of Cambodia, 2015, "Cambodian Government's perspective on joint European programming"; interviews, May 2016).

**The joint programming process shifted European partners' funding towards the national development priorities only marginally.** European partners' funding was already aligned to national priorities even before joint programming begun. The Joint Strategy priorities are governance; agriculture; infrastructure; private sector development and employment; and capacity building and human resources. Among these, top sectors in terms of financing (2014-2018) are education, governance and agriculture. Cambodia's priorities are "Growth, Employment, Equity and Efficiency" (Royal Government's Rectangular Strategy, 2013; and Royal Government's,

National Strategic Development Plan 2014-2018, 2014). More than in sector allocations, the shift has been in modalities, promoting the use of country system and support to national policies.

## **6. EQ 5: Coherence: To what extent has joint programming contributed to increased coherence of European partners' strategies and programmes at country level?**

**Joint Programming favoured convergence of objectives among European partners in terms of development strategies and policies at country level and sector level.** As noted above, joint analysis, joint positions reflected in eight policy papers and a common human-rights-based approach, and joint *démarches* (through sector leads) were of special value, especially in a context of more diverse sources of development finance. Specifically, joint programming helped European partners identify the synergies between three ambitious reforms (PFM, Public Administration Reform, and Subnational Democratic Development) and led, over time, to the Supreme National Economic Council formally connecting these three processes.

**The Joint Strategy demonstrates that special attention was given to the issue of coherence across policies** affecting the country's development results. It mentions regional and thematic (incl. climate change) funds; Everything but Arms granting duty-free, quota-free access except for arms; GSP+ (making the link between trade and human rights, labour, environment); and support to EITI and FLEGT. In practice, joint programming has also been conducive to a multisector approach to issues, involving multiple sector leads – such as nutrition, where multiple policies collide (agriculture, rural development, land management, trade...). Beyond Development Counsellors, policy coherence benefits from the implication of Heads of Mission, particularly on making links (synergies and avoidance of incoherence) between development cooperation, trade, and human rights. Private sector development benefits from joined up approaches, with European ambassadors being actively engaged in, for example, European Chamber of Commerce events. However, the Joint Strategy also notes that the regional and thematic funds that have a direct bearing on development results in Cambodia are outside the scope of the Joint Strategy. A Member State remarked that “EU regional and global programmes really need to be much better coordinated among them and with country programmes (e.g. in textiles), but we never see the people in charge. EUDs need more information from HQ and human resources for that. This is crucial for more political coherence and synergies” (interviews, May 2016). One prominent civil society organization remarked that Everything but Arms was a good idea but ineffective in practice as Brussels requires the human rights violations be noted by the UN or another international body, which has not happened yet.

## **7. EQ 6: Visibility: To what extent did JP increase the visibility of EU and MS to partner country authorities and other donor partners?**

**Communication strategies and actions around joint programming** consisted mainly in the consultations around joint programming, its launch, the joint monitoring report, all high-level – as well as the joint *démarches* based on agreed policy positions. There were also joint visibility actions, e.g. related to European partners' initiatives relating to climate change (2015), but found to be disproportionately time-consuming. This, overall, resulted in enhancing the visibility of EU institutions and their funds, but awareness of government officials and other development partners of the magnitude and use of EU funds committed under the EU joint response was already high.



**Joint programming also contributed to enhance the visibility of European partners among Cambodian authorities and other development partners.** There is a perception that European partners' assistance is significant, both substantively (especially as sector/theme leads<sup>43</sup>) and financially. Smaller donors benefitted in particular from being part of the country's second largest development partner group in terms of grants: "Especially when China and global funds are rising, it's better to say "we represent \$120m" than \$12m."

## **8. EQ 7: Efficiency: To what extent was the EU organised so as to make joint programming work?**

**The joint programming institutional set-up was conducive to a successful process. It was not too heavy and let the process be locally and pragmatically led,** with trust being built gradually but surely (*vis-à-vis* both European partners and Government), and value-added demonstrated along the way. As mentioned above, Cambodia was not originally foreseen by headquarters as one of the pilot countries for joint programming, but the EU Heads of Mission found that joint programming would bring clear benefits, and invested in a feasibility study, eventually making the case for it. When launched, at first, it appeared very time-consuming, but after six months of joint work, both European partners and Government were convinced of the value-added. It is seen as a plus to stakeholders interviewed that the joint programming guidance, produced by EU headquarters in 2014, was not available then (even though it is light): it reinforced the notion that this could be an *à la carte* process, suiting European partners' needs. Joint programming being locally led also helped Switzerland, as a non-EU member, get on board. Moreover, the use of the services of a long-term consultant (hired locally by the EU Delegation), on top of support from headquarters and headquarters-hired consultants, was mentioned by all stakeholders as a factor of success<sup>44</sup>. Finally, the process demonstrated an active learning approach to identifying success factors for improved joint programming in Cambodia and in other countries (e.g. regional experience-sharing event in Yangon, April 2016, co-organised by Germany and the EU; a mid-term evaluation in 2016 will assess the impact of the Joint Strategy and recommend necessary adjustments).

## **9. EQ 8: Efficiency: To what extent did JP reduce partner countries' transactions costs and keep them reasonable for the EU and MS?**

**Joint programming has reduced transaction costs for partner country governments.** In spite of initial fears, Government officials are satisfied with time costs for the joint programming process compared with results expected/ attained and previous programming experiences.

**Transaction costs for the EU and MS relating to joint programming were kept reasonable in light of expected benefits.** Both EU and MS headquarters are satisfied with time costs for JP processes compared with results expected/ attained and previous programming experiences (interviews, May 2016). Both EU and MS staff in Cambodia are satisfied with time costs for joint programming compared with results expected/ attained and previous programming experiences: they do think the process was time-consuming, especially around the annual monitoring, but that

<sup>43</sup> E.g. Germany in rural development and on land; France in water and sanitation and in energy; Sweden in human rights; Switzerland on gender.

<sup>44</sup> The consultant (i) spent time that European partners and the EUD staff did not have managing the process, from the strategic to the more practical, from holding the pen on common policy briefs to drafting meeting agendas and minutes; (ii) she serviced and was seen as servicing the whole European partners group, and thereby facilitated common positions, prepared the ground for meetings, and delivered for all partners, big or small.

“every hour spent on it was worth it”, as it allowed for trust-building, joint analysis, joint strategizing, and more effective political and policy dialogue (interviews, May 2016).

## 10. Lessons Learned and Conclusions

1. **The joint programming process in Cambodia was a success, in both process (trust created, knowledge shared) and products (joint analysis, joint strategy, joint policy messages, joint monitoring).** Benefits were most visible in political and policy dialogue, while aid effectiveness gains to be expected were and are modest. An additional benefit is the ability to create opportunities for high-level dialogue with Government, and to bring different Government ministries together. Joint programming results in European development cooperation being more than the sum of its parts, and further coherence and impact could be expected with greater integration of the regional and thematic funds managed by EU headquarters.
2. **Factors of success have been numerous, which means the Cambodian experience is replicable, but not everywhere:** a long history of close coordination and division of labour; several EU DPs withdrawing from Cambodia, leaving a manageable number of EU DPs with no over-dominance of one EU DP; external facilitation; shared values and pre-existing common understanding of the context (reflected in joint political economy analysis); clarity about terminology and expectations of the process; a locally-led, trust-building process; the ability to respond to different partners’ needs and pace; auspicious timing (end of EU DPs’ programming cycle while Government’s was about to start); explicit alignment with national priorities, conducive to national ownership and positive response by Government, and providing common ground for pragmatic results framework; constructive working relations with non-EU donors.
3. **The future of Joint Programming in Cambodia could well be to stay the course** and not change what appears to be a winning formula, striking the right balance between the time invested and the benefits reaped; having just the right degree of formality as to not overburden staff on the ground, yet be sustainable when embassy and EU Delegation staff change; and focused on the right (strategic) level, especially given that there may be a move towards more sector budget support by the EU.

Save for Sweden, the option of replacing bilateral strategies with the joint strategy is not met with enthusiasm on the ground: European stakeholders see value in replacement, and agree that it can be done (“when there is a will there is a way”); but they feel that the bureaucracy involved will distract from the substantive discussions (recalling that joint analysis, strategising, and joint messaging are more important benefits than aid concentration and aid predictability) and that the additional benefits would not be worth the effort. All members would still reserve the right to engage in programmes and sectors in addition to those indicated in the joint strategy. Several member states would still have to prepare a separate paper reiterating their country’s objectives and sectors, and identifying their preferred modalities. Several members see more benefits in retaining operational flexibility than in making operational (as opposed to strategic) commitments.

There are, however, two areas where joint programming could multiply impact:

- in making sure that joint programming remains a stepping stone, and not a replacement, for harmonization among *all* DPs; and specifically that development banks are increasingly part of the conversation;
- in making sure that aligning to Government policies does not limit the scope of the Joint Strategy, and ensuring greater integration, at least strategically, of regional and thematic funds, especially those of the EU.

# Annex I. Country Note Ethiopia

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## 1. The Joint Programming Process in Ethiopia

**Early Division of Labour (DoL) mapping.** With the adoption of the EU's Fast Track Initiative (FTI) on DoL in 2007, Ethiopia began to explore the possibilities for improving the DoL. In 2010, the European Commission contracted a consultant to work with the larger Donor Assistance Group (DAG) to map the situation. A comprehensive questionnaire was answered by 18 donors, including the EU and 10 MS plus the African Development Bank, the World Bank, UNDP, and non-EU bilateral donors: Canada, Japan, Norway and the US. The results were presented in the form of charts showing donor engagement across 17 sectors, including intensity of engagement, importance of the engagement in the various sectors, how the donors saw their own comparative advantage, and visions they had concerning their future engagement.

**Using the DoL Work.** Building on the DoL mapping, the HoCs meeting in February 2010 agreed to develop a Joint Response Strategy (JCS) with a clearer DoL during the fall of 2010. An Action Plan was agreed at the end of March, a retreat was held with the 13 EU donors plus Norway towards the end of April 2010. In May, a technical seminar was organised in preparation of the results of the national elections that same month and thus a new Government, but also the Government's new poverty reduction strategy, "Growth and Transformation Plan 2010/2011-2014/2015" (GTP). The Action Plan promoted greater consistency between individual country strategies while the JCS proposed more DoL at sector level and increased use of joint funding mechanisms such as pooled funding and reconsidering continuing budget support. The Retreat suggested a focus on four sectors, with different donors accepting to take a lead role, but in general noting the need for donors to reduce the number of sectors they were in since the DAC classifiers showed the EU+ community was involved in 38 sectors. The April Retreat therefore ended up, among other things, with some messages for their respective HQs: (i) HQs needed to support their field offices in promoting an improved DoL; (ii) when doing this work, it was important that Ethiopia's own definitions of sectors were used – donors should stop imposing own sector definitions; (iii) the process had to be locally driven – the Joint Response and improved DoL should be based on the GTP; (iv) there needed to be flexibility in aid modalities, as improved DoL was more than just an exit from a number of sectors.

**The EU's 2013 Joint Cooperation Strategy (JCS) for Ethiopia.** The actual development of an operational response to the GTP took more time than originally envisaged. During 2011, a draft JCS by the EU plus Norway ("EU+") was produced for approval by the respective HQs. In 2010, these donors together provided USD 1.1 billion in aid, equivalent to nearly 30% of all ODA, thus representing a major share of the country's grant aid. While the final document was shared with the Government of Ethiopia (GoE), it was not formally endorsed by it. The JCS provided a solid and open analysis of the situation in the country, pointing to the impressive economic growth and improvements in core social indicators, while also noting the challenges in the fields of governance, democracy and climate change. The JCS then identified seven areas for EU+ attention: (i) governance; (ii) regional economic integration; (iii) economic and private sector development; (iv) human and social development; (v) sustainable agriculture and food security; (vi) gender; (vii) environment and climate change plus two cross-cutting issues: capacity building and quality data with improved monitoring and evaluation. It then identifies 5 aid effectiveness dimensions that will be monitored for JCS performance: (i) alignment; (ii) harmonisation and use of country systems; (iii) managing for results; (iv) predictability and mutual accountability; and (v) DoL, where Annex 2 shows the timeline till 2018 for alignment of programming cycles. The JCS was signed on 27 January 2013 by 20 MS, the EU and Norway.

### Aid Coordination Architecture in Ethiopia

The Development Assistance Group (**DAG**) was established in 2001 to coordinate donor activities, enhance harmonisation of donor practices, facilitate coordinated donor dialogue, ensure information sharing, broaden engagement with regional state authorities and non-state actors and to support the implementation of national development programmes. The DAG has now 29 bilateral and multilateral development agencies providing development co-operation to Ethiopia, including new donors like India, Israel, Korea and Turkey – see [www.dagethiopia.org](http://www.dagethiopia.org).

The DAG Pooled Fund supports the pursuit and monitoring of the aid effectiveness agenda in line with global commitments made most recently in the Mexico High-Level Communiqué (2014), the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (2011); the Accra Agenda for Action (2008); and the Paris Declaration (2005).

The DAG structure includes the DAG Heads of Agency (**HoA**), Executive Committee (**ExCom**), technical working groups, and Secretariat. The HoA meet monthly to discuss issues relevant to the development agenda in the country. The DAG ExCom meets just prior to this and has nine donor members, both multilateral and bilateral – EU MS and non-EU donors.

Four technical working groups operate directly under DAG: (i) the GTP Working Group (**WG**), which consists of Monitoring and Evaluation, Macro-economic, and Public Financial Management subgroups; (ii) Governance Technical WG which consists of the Civil Society and Justice, Safety, and Conflict subgroups; (iii) Donor Group on Gender Equality; (iv) Private Sector Development and Trade WG. In addition there are 10 sector WGs that fall under the auspices of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED)-chaired Effective Development Co-operation Task Force.

The DAG secretariat provides technical assistance and facilitates support to the DAG, HoA, ExCom and WGs. The Secretariat also provides advisory support to the National Planning Commission and to MoFED, and project management support for the project. MoFED manages the country's Aid Management Platform that records donor support and future funding (*consultants have not been able to access this since password-protected*). GoE also publishes "Profiles of Development Partners", where the last version, from July 2015, covers 41 donors over the period 2009-2013, using OECD aid data broken down by main sectors of support.

Each year, partners and Government are to come together for 1-2 days to review progress of the GTP and discuss topics at the High-Level Forum (**HLF**). Past HLF topics include private sector development, export promotion and trade logistics. For the Government, predictability, particularly multi-year predictability, alignment with national priorities, and the use of country systems, are key priorities. For development partners, sector policy dialogue, managing for results and strengthening mutual accountability are key concerns.

**Developing JP in Ethiopia.** At the time of the JCS, there were 20 MS in Ethiopia, of which 12 had bilateral development programmes. The appropriateness of a Joint Programming process was thus recognised and supported, not least of all because for most of these, Ethiopia is a focus country, and thus important in terms of being able to deliver documentable results and point to collaborative arrangements to improve own deliveries. GoE was also concerned that aid effectiveness be improved, and had been an active participant at the Busan High-Level meeting where JP had been presented, and was an eager proponent of the Development Effectiveness agenda adopted at the Busan meeting. At the same time, there had been no budget support or formal good governance contracts since 2005, so it was seen as an opportunity for the parties to meet and agree a shared agenda based on the GTP. The JCS therefore made explicit a shared, long-term vision for Ethiopia-EU+ cooperation and the commitment to introduce progressively Joint Programming by 2016. It was to be used as a reference document by EU+ partners while preparing their bilateral programmes, and some MS had stated they would use the JCS in place of their own strategy papers as their primary strategy document. However, even early on short-comings in actual practice were noted: *"While the consensus on JP is reflected in the EU+ JCS, it is not so apparent from EU+ actions that this consensus is fully applied in synchronisation and alignment. As example of shortfalls, priority sector choices in bilateral strategies have ... not been inspired by JCS principles but by HQ guidelines. Typical cases of HQ pressure are also the strategy periods not fully consistent with the GTP"* (EUD progress report, November 2013).


**EU's National Indicative Programme (NIP) for Ethiopia 2014-2020.** Regarding the EDF-11 resources, the NIP 2014-2020 programming advanced the mid-term review to 2016 so that the first NIP phase would conclude at the end of GTP. This would allow for synchronisation and eventually alignment of the second NIP period with the expected GTP2 2015/16-2020/21. In fact, the NIP notes that *“The NIP is coherent with the EU+ (EU, Member States and Norway) Joint Cooperation Strategy adopted in January 2013, In its joint response to the GTP, the EU+ commits itself to improve the impact and effectiveness of EU+ development assistance through improved alignment, harmonisation, managing for results (common results framework), predictability and mutual accountability. In doing so, the NIP is also coherent with the 'European Consensus for Development' and the EU 'Agenda for Change', including its ambition to increase the impact of EU development assistance”* (NIP for Ethiopia 2014-2020, p. 5).

**Challenges to JP implementation.** In the 2013 report, the EUD flagged a number of issues it saw could pose obstacles to smooth JP implementation. The most noticeable one was that some MS were not taking their commitments in the JCS seriously – or rather, their HQs did not seem to support a serious JCS implementation. The major problem was synchronisation due to the different budget cycle architectures in different MS, but also the willingness to adjust cycles to coincide with the expected GRP II as of 2016 – that is, providing the kind of flexibility that the EU had shown by essentially breaking the NIP cycle into two parts compatible with the GTPs. Another problem was the Aid Management Platform, AMP, that the GoE had established for managing aid data. The AMP was very incomplete, had problematic sector definitions, and the interface was complicated. The programming for the GTP2 period was unclear, especially in terms of possible new priorities that the donors would have to adjust to, and if they were not given time to plan ahead, this would make alignment and synchronisation more difficult. The EU would like to be ahead of the game, thinking upstream and aligning the EU+ inputs – funding, innovation and expertise – but for this to happen more knowledge was required early on. Finally, the desirability of a common results framework was noted, yet the GTP had 800 indicators, the DAG was focusing on 70, and the NIP had 20 – so paring this down to a joint and manageable framework was required.

**Progress in implementing JP.** The JCS in January 2013 was one of the first JP deliverables to be formally agreed and signed. During that same year, Austria, Italy and Ireland used the JCS as the basis for or in place of their respective bilateral strategy papers, and for the first time, the EU did not prepare a country strategy paper for EDF-11 and instead declared to be fully aligned with the national development strategy. Austria, Italy, Spain, Poland and UK had programming cycles terminating in 2015 and were to synchronise with GTP2, France extended its own cycle from 2013 to 2015 for the same reason, while the Netherlands and the EU noted their intention to review their cooperation strategies in Ethiopia by 2016 in order to allow full synchronisation. For this latter exercise, Austria, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland, France and Spain wished to participate in the 2016 review process, and perhaps the UK as well.

**Focusing on Strategic Sectors.** Because there was limited experience with moving a large agenda forward, it was decided to focus on three pilot areas to see how the donor community could address the aid effectiveness agenda in practical terms. **Nutrition** was selected as one, due to its importance to the social development agenda. A carefully developed roadmap was prepared during late 2013/early 2014 with a plan of action to address core issues, along with monitoring and reporting schedules (see graph next page). The experience was seen as positive: the first step of producing a solid situation analysis was done during the second half of 2015 and presented early 2016. The role of the EUD in mobilising EU+ partners was decisive for mainstreaming nutrition around the actions and policies of the Ministry of Agriculture. The nutrition expertise of the EU (EC Nutrition Advisory Service, NAS), thus acted as a shared resource for the EU+ community. Similar approaches have been followed in the two other sector, **health** and **green sector**, the latter including environment, biodiversity, natural resource management and climate change. This has been followed by joint actions in the fields of **migration, resilience** and **gender**.

Figure 1: Nutrition sector roadmap



**Joint Programming in 2016.** During 2016, the EU+ partners moved ahead with the JP process. In April, a retreat was held to discuss the lessons from Senegal; reflect on how to engage more strategically with GoE; and agree on JP priority sectors and the way forward. Regarding Senegal, the seminar noted the importance of the Political Economy Analysis in order to assess the potential for change and leverage of the JP exercise; the importance to engage government from the outset of the JP process, where in Senegal the engagement was based on analysis of sectoral policies; the need to identify lead donors and establish a roadmap to contribute to the sustainability of the process; and the importance of building on successful joint experiences in the country (i.e. nutrition, gender, resilience...in Ethiopia). The group looked at how JP could function within the larger DAG coordination structure, including how to engage with the GoE, given that EU+ is providing USD 1 billion/year yet this is a declining share of total funding available. The conclusion was that EU+ need to identify the value-added of JP, in part basing on EU common values, but also on supporting strategic *clusters*, where 3 were agreed to: (i) **Job creation** including private sector, migration, skills development and urbanisation; (ii) **Natural resources**, including food security, resilience, land management and sustainable energy; and (iii) **Governance**, including social accountability, civil society and participation. **Gender** and **nutrition** were agreed to as cross-cutting issues. For all five fields a lead donor was identified, and there have been initial meetings by the working groups in all five fields. The ambition of having a JP document in place by summer 2016 has not been realised, in part because of the more complicated political situation on the ground, making the EU consider postponing the programming cycle somewhat, but also because of the Migration Compact (see below). – There have been some moves towards joint action, and in particular the EU began delegated cooperation with some MS using EDF funds, though there have been only minimal flows in the opposite direction.

**Joint Programming and the Migration Compact.** The new Partnership Framework with Ethiopia under the European Agenda on Migration (*Migration Compact*) that was decided in Brussels over the summer of 2016 will shape the next steps in the JP process. EU instructions indicate that JP should be compliant with this framework and the foreseen NIP review will be done with the objective of replacing it by an EU+ JP aligned with the Migration Compact.

*Findings and conclusions on process*

- Ethiopia was early in approving JP documents, signing up over 20 actors in an EU+ Joint Cooperation Strategy in January 2013, based on a careful analysis of the country situation with regards to economic and social development while noting governance challenges.
- Implementation of the JCS has been very uneven across MS, where some MS have been pro-active in applying the JCS for own documents and restructuring their budget cycle to the GoE's GTP. For others, it is clear that bilateral decisions at HQ level drive the decisions, independent of JCS commitments.
- The move towards more joint action based on **pilot sectors** in 2014 is seen as positive, where EU+ have identified areas that are of common interest and where there has been clear value-added to bringing in expertise that the larger group has benefited from. This approach is being taken further with the decision in 2016 to concentrate the JP on three overarching **clusters**.
- The GoE has a somewhat mixed response to the JP, where it initially feared donor "ganging up" but subsequently has seen the benefits of increased predictability, joint action, and common approaches. It still sees the more broad-based aid architecture with the DAG at the top as the basic coordination design.
- The recent EU decision regarding the Migration Compact adds a layer of complexity to a process that was already struggling to become "slim" and as simple as possible. There may be an argument for analysing this experience to identify lessons regarding the consequences of the emergence of new agendas at central level that JP – as a co-managed and field-delegated processes – is supposed to respond to.

## **2. EQ1: To what extent did JP respond to global and country-level challenges regarding increased aid effectiveness?**

### *JC 1.1: JP responded to the global aid effectiveness challenges*

**Ethiopia has ensured that the international aid agenda drives local discussions.** Ethiopia is active in the international discussions on aid and development effectiveness, and developed its "Growth and Transformation Plan 2011-2015" (GTP) based on the MDGs plus the climate change considerations that were becoming more obvious in the Ethiopian case. As the aid agenda has evolved from **aid** to **development** effectiveness after the Busan High-Level Meeting, this has been reflected in the country's subsequent GTP2, which was made available in English during the summer of 2016.

**The JCS based on GTP.** The Joint Cooperation Strategy (JCS) document of 2013 was based on the GTP, following its priorities and those parts of the international aid effectiveness agenda that were reflected in it. The JCS was thus largely in line with the aid effectiveness agenda that lay behind the JP presentation to the Busan meeting, but had not moved on to the larger development effectiveness concerns proposed at Busan, since the GTP had been prepared previous to this. The JCS was thus in line with the international aid effectiveness agenda as far as this was identified in Ethiopia's own strategic plans.

### *JC 1.2: The JP process was sensitive to partner country's aid effectiveness challenges*

**JP documents based on Ethiopia's priorities.** The JCS was based on an analysis of Ethiopia's achievements in the spheres of economic and social development, and then looked at the GTP in light of the country's forward plans and the GTP's approach to applying its external support. The subsequent round of JP documents, which were to be prepared based on the GTP2 as of 2016, were being discussed in terms of identifying strategic areas for EU+ support, though these JP documents are not yet finalised. The 2013 JCS was clearly sensitive to the priorities and concerns expressed in the GTP, but also was clear on the EU values regarding gender, democracy, human

rights, and it reviewed Ethiopia's stated priorities also in light of these. The JCS noted the GoE's concern that the donors use country systems and procedures more, but where the JCS voices some scepticism regarding the wisdom in uncritically relying on these systems, since they are not necessarily well understood and there is hence little knowledge about their fiduciary integrity and quality control. The JCS document is thus a fairly balanced view of the strengths and challenges of Ethiopia's development and aid effectiveness issues.

**With the Migration Compact, the 2016 JP process suddenly more challenging.** The JP documents prepared have basically had general aid effectiveness concerns as the international guideline, but they have first and foremost focused on the specific issues on the ground that needed to be addressed. With the Migration Compact designed by the EU in 2016 and for which Ethiopia is one of five pilot countries, focus has shifted to an overarching concern defined more at EU level than at country level. This means that the JP documents that were to be produced in 2016 now may have to address a different set of parameters. The extent to which these will be internalised and made Ethiopia-specific and –relevant remains to be seen, though this is clearly an intention by the EU.

### **3. EQ2: To what extent did JP contribute to reducing aid fragmentation?**

#### *JC 2.1: Aid fragmentation has been reduced in countries that have carried out JP*

**No reliable statistics on aid fragmentation.** The Aid Management Platform which is managed by GoE's Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED) should in principle be able to show the extent to which aid fragmentation has changed/ been reduced. Several factors make this difficult. The first is that poor data quality and missing data mean that the database does not provide a good picture of the degree of fragmentation: there is not full information on what most donors in fact have provided of financial assistance over time. The second is that the number of donors in Ethiopia has been increasing quite rapidly as emergent donors like China, India, South Korea and others are now entering the country, and the more recent donors tend to be less diligent about providing data and updating them.

**The understanding of aid fragmentation may not be helpful.** The EU cannot be held accountable for overall aid fragmentation, since the possible increase in fragmentation that may result from an increase in number of donors is beyond EU+ control. But the GoE, when it presented the GTP2, claimed that it had taken into consideration all major donors' aid, making it clear that it wanted all signed commitments to be honoured and therefore did not want a DoL restructuring of existing commitments. Furthermore, when discussing the EU+ response to the GTP2, one principle agreed to by the parties was that the JP would include all assistance, in part to avoid "orphan sectors", and not just focus on "priority sectors" for the EU+ community. In a table summarising the expected EU+ DoL during the GTP2 period, the EU itself is noted as engaged in 16 of the 19 GTP2 sectors. This also makes it difficult to compare the GTP and GTP2 periods in terms of aid fragmentation since the sectors are different and in both periods some "sectors" comprise several distinct areas of action. Using aid fragmentation measures based on the various national development plans' sector definitions thus will make it difficult to track actual degrees of fragmentation. At the end of the day, this does not seem to be a major concern to the GoE, which appears to have accommodated the various bilateral programmes in existence, and in fact is quite insistent that there should be no re-programming of aid during signed agreement periods, because this would undermine predictability.



### *JC 2.2: The JP has facilitated a division of labour beyond the sharing of sector involvement*

**The JP has developed a strategic approach to DoL.** One of the discussions during the JP process has been to ensure that the JP provides value-added to the aid coordination mechanisms and results already in place – that it does not simply duplicate what the larger DAG community is already putting in place. The approach that has been found to address this is a focus on three **strategic clusters**: Job Creation, Natural Resource Management, Governance. These are broad-based but critical concerns, where the EU+ approach is helping actors to collaborate across traditional administrative boundaries to address overarching problems. Whereas in a number of countries the JP has facilitated more collaboration *within* sectors, in the case of Ethiopia the JP has in fact contributed to a more holistic and strategic approach, moving *beyond* classic administrative sectors.

### *JC 2.3: The countries that have carried out JP aimed at reducing aid fragmentation*

**The GoE in practice does not appear very concerned about aid fragmentation.** Within the context of the DAG, GoE has emphasised multi-annual predictability of external assistance, alignment with national priorities, and the use of country systems. Aid fragmentation does not seem to be a major concern, as the GoE seems to believe they have the capacity to handle this, as reflected in their insistence on donors not moving away from signed commitments in the bilateral agreements. While there have been some major mapping exercises addressing DoL, notably in 2010, this had the objective of being used to reduce aid fragmentation, but as actual implementation has been spotty at best, it appears the authorities have shrugged this off and focused instead on improving the actual knowledge of the amounts and sources of funding they can count on for their priority programmes.

## **4. EQ3: To what extent did JP improve aid predictability and transparency of EU and MS aid?**

### *JC 3.1: Joint programming led to changes in EU/MS planning and/or financial cycles*

**The JCS had a clear approach to alignment and synchronisation but implementation has been spotty.** The JCS had a clear strategy and action plan for improving alignment of MS programming and budget cycles during the period from the time the JCS was signed till the new GTP2 was expected to be ready, three years later. Annex 1 to the JCS has Alignment as the first of the aid effectiveness priorities, and Annex 2 showed how the programming cycles were expected to be modified to accommodate GTP2. In the document itself the first countries that had committed to this realignment were listed, and other countries that had indicated they would try to align with the GTP2 cycle were also named. In subsequent JP Progress Reports (2015, 2016), the EUD is quite clear in its disappointments regarding how little had in fact been achieved, noting that this was due to bilateral HQs providing guidance that was not based on the joint commitments of the signed JCS.

### *JC 3.2: Predictability of CPA provided by JP-participants improved*

**The JCS was a strategy that did not contain operational commitments.** While the JCS was signed by 22 parties to the agreement, the document is an overarching strategy but without specific commitments as far as sector or financial contributions are concerned. These issues were to be addressed in the more complete JP documents to be produced in 2016, but which so far have not

been finalised. What has happened, however, is that the work in the pilot sectors of nutrition and natural resources management has moved ahead, with a considerable number of EU+ donors involved and with their funding perhaps becoming more “locked into” these fields as a result of this.

**JP as a contribution to predictability negligible.** It is unclear how much of the JP sector funding can be attributed to the JP, however, since most of the funding is agreed to through the bilateral agreements signed with GoE directly. The bilateral programmes have continued to be signed throughout the period, and where the GoE has been quite insistent that signed agreements be honoured, so that re-programming due for example to JP is directly discouraged. The GoE has therefore insisted on predictability as a function of bilateral discussions rather than through a larger programming framework such as JP.

### *JC 3.3: Transparency of CPA provided by JP-members improved*

**There is increased interest and willingness for aid transparency, but operationally through the GoE’s own Aid Management Platform (AMP).** MoFED has established the AMP as its “one stop shop” for aid data purposes – both historical disbursements, but also forward looking commitments. The AMP is supported through the pooled funding that donors provide to the larger DAG structure. UNDP provides technical support for the AMP, as part of a global effort to strengthen aid data management. The results so far, according to the JP Progress Reports, are disappointing, with data neither complete nor well structured in terms of sectors or contributions to GoE’s GTP. Accessibility – the user interface – is a problem, making the usefulness of the database for Government and donors alike questionable. There is no suggestion of producing donor-led and –managed aid data efforts, however, as it is recognised that focus should be on improving AMP and not of continuing a parallel donor effort. There is therefore no real change to improvement of aid transparency due to JP.

## **5. EQ4: To what extent did JP contribute to improved leadership by the partner country of its development priorities?**

### *JC 4.1: The partner country government has played an increasingly important role in the JP*

**GoE has largely had a “hands off” policy as far as JP is concerned.** GoE was kept fully informed and in principle accepted the JP exercise when it started up in 2011/2012. But the basic attitude as recorded by the EUD was one of “go ahead as long as you do not bother us” – that is, GoE looked upon JP as an internal EU exercise for which the authorities did not want to have to spend own capacities. Once the JSC was finalised and signed, the Government was informed and provided a copy of the document, though it was not asked to provide any kind of formal endorsement. The GoE has therefore not been directly involved in the JP process, though the Government GTPs have been guiding for the contents and structure of JP deliverables.

### *JC 4.2: JP contributed to increased alignment to partner country development priorities*

**The JP process has contributed to considerable agreement regarding how EU+ should respond to the GoE’s Growth and Transition Plans.** While there is little in the way of attributable alignment of MS programmes and budget cycles to the GTP and GTP2, as noted above, there is no doubt that there has been a lot of collective thinking that has allowed the EU+

to agree on a joint cooperation strategy that has laid the foundations for future re-alignment. This is being pursued with the pilot sectors agreed in 2014 and the continued work on the JP strategic clusters as of 2016. While practical results remain scarce in terms of formal decisions, there is no doubt that there is considerable agreement on issues like the focus on strategic clusters, more collaboration on programmes and projects within the pilot sectors and hopefully in the clusters, and sharing of information and willingness to engage in longer-term joint strategic thinking.

## **6. EQ5: To what extent has JP contributed to increased coherence of EU and MS strategies and programming at country level?**

### *JC 5.1: JP favoured convergence of objectives among EU and MS in terms of development strategies and policies at country level*

**The JCS reflects a common view on the GTP arrived at through the JP process.** The JCS provides an agreed statement about how 22 donors to Ethiopia see its strategic development plan, the GTP, and how they intend to support it. This provides a common platform for action which has not been in place prior to the JCS, as the DAG is a looser information sharing body rather than a body set up to foment coherence and agreement on key choices.

**The subsequent JP steps have developed this coherence further.** The choice of pilot sectors and two years later the agreement to structure the JP around three clusters has forged a level of operational agreement both on what are the key challenges but also how to work jointly to address them that the EU community has not previously exhibited. There are still serious challenges to operationalizing these agreements, but in terms of general strategic and programming thinking JP has clearly facilitated an increased agreement among the EU+ actors.

### *JC 5.2: JP documents show coherence of development cooperation with other EU policies*

**The JCS addresses a number of EU policies relevant to Ethiopia.** The JCS contains a broad political analysis of the situation in Ethiopia, including some of the opportunities foregone in the GTP as the GTP does not, for example, address Ethiopia's regional roles and potentials. On the other hand, the JCS notes the opening up to private sector engagement, pointing to the *EU Business Forum* established in 2011 as an example of this. The JCS notes the increasing importance and relevance of the EU's 'European Consensus for Development' and 'Agenda for Change' that go beyond simply CPA. It refers to the continued support through existing joint instruments "*such as the Civil Society Support Programme, the Civil Society Fund and the Social Accountability component of the PBS ... and ... EU joint activities such as the Human Rights Country Strategy*", and it intends to support peace and stability through "*support to regional transport infrastructure development, energy markets, trade facilitation, as well as political dialogue. The EU will also support long term solutions ... for cross border conflicts and regional water management. The EU recognises and supports the strategic role of Ethiopia in regional institutions, such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development*" (JCS, pp. 2-3). The EU+ intends to support economic and private sector development using Article 8 economic dialogue, trade related instruments, supporting Ethiopia's WTO accession process, and help get a results-oriented monitoring framework in place to strengthen joint programme and social accountability.

## **7. EQ6: To what extent did JP increase the visibility of EU and MS to partner country authorities and other donor partners?**

### *JC 6.1: JP contributed to enhance awareness of EU support among partner country authorities and other donors*

The signed JCS has been shared with the national authorities and used as a basis for further dialogue. While the GoE never formally signed or endorsed the JCS, it was kept informed of its development. The EU also put together a major information brochure once the JCS was signed that presented the EU+ community with all the MS and their bilateral programmes as part of the total presentation (“EU-Ethiopia Cooperation – Developing Ethiopia Together”, Addis Ababa 2014). In its subsequent “Blue Calendar”, the EU provided an overview of the EU+ support foreseen through presentations done by month in a calendar covering September 2014-December 2015. The EU has also been active in the DAG system, so the other parties to the DAG have been kept informed of the JP process. The fact that the EU MS are active in the various sector working groups under the DAG also mean that the EU+ community is reaching out to the other donors in the DAG system, partly to inform but also to coordinate an avoid overlaps and duplication of efforts, and information sharing about the JP is an important part of this. – What the net effects of this has been in terms of increased visibility is, however, something the team has not been able to verify since Ethiopia is a desk-study country and thus no donors outside the EU have been spoken with, nor officials from GoE.

### *JC 6.2: JP contributed to enhance the visibility of EU member states among partner country authorities and other donors*

The JP process has probably contributed to some enhanced visibility of MS. The EU Delegation, in its formal products, has underlined the *joint* nature of the JP, through the signed JCS in 2013 and the EU-Ethiopia Cooperation pamphlet and Blue Calendar of 2014. To what extent this has had any practical visibility implications for some or any of the MS is not possible for the evaluation team to establish, though it is likely that the efforts to show the importance of the EU+ community as an important contributor to total grants aid is probably noted by many and thus also the importance of the MS as a group. Whether it has provided any particular visibility for individual MS as part of their own visibility work is not known.

## **8. EQ7: To what extent was the EU organised so as to make JP work?**

### *JC 7.1: The JP institutional set-up is conducive to a successful process*

The JP process had to rely on the formal JP instruments. The JP began early in Ethiopia so the actors had to base the work on the general policies for JP and then adapt to the context on the ground. While the work on the JCS progressed, there was a clear impression on the ground that a number of MS HQs were not very active in supporting the process, despite the formal commitments made. The institutional set-up was thus seen as uneven regarding the MS HQ contributions, and an earlier and clearer policy of practical JP support would have been helpful. This lack of clarity of how strong MS HQ support actually is, is perhaps felt particularly acutely in the case of Ethiopia because there are so many MS active on the ground, and the delays and uncertainties from a few can hamper the process substantially – and evidently has.

**Learning from others has been good but relatively weak and unstructured.** The Ethiopia process has benefited from other JP processes in several ways: (i) through a regional workshop organised in Addis in 2014, and where the country was able to present its own experiences to representatives from a number of other countries engaged in JP, for critical discussion, (ii) through learning from the Senegal experience at its own internal workshop in Adama in 2016, (iii) through the support from the pool of JP consultants provided by DEVCO. The value-added of the latter is viewed somewhat differently, as expectations clearly have varied, but overall has provided further insights into how various questions that arise during the JP process can be handled.

### *JC 7.2: JP guidance was clear and well known*

**The JP process in Ethiopia began before the 2014 guidance pack was available.** The Guidance Pack is known, and actors note that it would have been highly valuable if it had been available when the process was started up in Ethiopia. The degree to which actors want more specific guidelines varies – while some want to have the JP process as flexible and locally adapted and nimble as possible, others would like to have clearer expectations regarding what should be contained in key JP deliverables.

## **9. EQ8: To what extent did JP reduce partner countries' transactions costs and keep them reasonable for the EU and MS?**

### *JC 8.1: JP has reduced transaction costs for partner country governments*

**The national authorities have not been involved in the JP process nor so far had any direct benefits from it.** The GoE has so far preferred to be informed about but not directly involved with the JP process. It has therefore not had any direct costs attributable to the process. On the other hand, the JP process has not so far delivered specific results that have provided attributable savings to the national authorities either. However, since the JP has not yet produced a final programme with implementable proposals, it is still too early to make an assessment.

**The pilot sectors point to potential savings.** In the three pilot sectors, the nutrition sector has come the farthest, carrying out a complete situation assessment that was published early 2016. This will serve as the foundation for programming the interventions among the 14 donors that have signed up to this joint pilot. The programming is expected to lead to both identifying joint actions, but also to provide parameters for those interventions that individual MS will continue managing as bilateral interventions. This process may therefore prove to be useful to national authorities, since the nutrition pilot cuts across a number of administrative fields on the government side while mobilising substantial resources for a coherent support to the country's nutritional problems. This approach should reduce coordination costs on the government side, since a lot of the strategic thinking has been identified through the situation analysis, but also because it is providing a more comprehensive and presumably seamless funding programme around priority intervention sectors. This thinking it is hoped/expected may generate even greater savings for the three broader clusters agreed to at the April 2016 workshop, since again there will be a broader cross-sectoral/cross-ministerial structure to the thinking and the subsequent funding to address larger problems rather than just finance activities in a sector. While this remains speculative, it will be interesting for the JP partners to track the process and see if indeed transaction costs of planning and managing such a wider strategic approach generates identifiable savings.

*JC 8.2: Transaction costs for the EU and MS relating to JP are deemed worth it in light of expected benefits*

The JP has produced some important deliverables that partners spoken with largely consider worth the effort. The first, and so far, most significant deliverable, was the Joint Cooperation Strategy, a general policy paper that noted how the Government's GTP will be the basic foundation for donor support. The work surrounding its production was considerable, taking over a full year to reach the signature stage, but where it succeeded in bringing 22 actors around the table for strategic discussions about how to structure continued development cooperation with Ethiopia. In order to implement this strategy, the parties then agreed to begin with three pilot sectors, where nutrition has come the farthest, and from there agreed to focus attention on three clusters driven by an overarching issue to resolve, such as job creation. While the experience regarding the three pilots, in particular on nutrition, has been seen as positive, it may have something to do with one actor taking the lead and shouldering most of the costs, the other partners being able to "come along for the ride". Once the clusters had been agreed to, in two of the three clusters two working group meetings have taken place so far, and attendance at the second meeting was considerably lower than at the first – the willingness to prioritise the necessary time turned out to be variable. Parties see that there are differing degrees of commitment to the JP among the MS, which means that for the MS that are willing to invest what it takes to make the JP work, the burden sharing begins to look skewed, which may over time reduce also the willingness among the more committed: there appears a problem of "free riders" that may challenge the sustainability of the process, particularly if it takes time and/or is suddenly forced to change course, as the Migration Compact might lead it to.

# Annex J. Country Note Kenya

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## 1. The Joint Programming Process in Kenya

**Division of Labour (DoL) in Kenya.** With the adoption of the EU's Fast Track Initiative (FTI) on DoL in 2007, support to practical implementation was provided through lead donors in the partner countries that wanted to join. In Kenya, Denmark took the lead on the FTI process in 2009, supporting a donor mapping exercise that updated the one carried out a couple of years earlier in connection with the Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy (KJAS, see below). The EU Heads of Cooperation (HoCs) meetings throughout 2010 paid considerable attention to the exercise, including trying to broaden the coverage by reaching out to donors not included in the KJAS, with the purpose of ensuring that the EU support would not simply address EUD and MS. Focus was on rationalising DoL based on an understanding of transaction costs involved, with a workshop in September 2010 was to help put together a plan of action using a database developed by consultants. Improvements to DoL were a topic through much of 2011, but with little actual progress seen. Poor capacity and lack of commitment by the Government of Kenya (GoK) were seen as important factors that explained the limited progress achieved.

**JP process in Kenya.** Towards the end of 2012, the possibility of piloting JP in Kenya was seen as positive, partly to address the scarcity of results from the DoL efforts, but primarily because the timing was seen as favourable. Elections were to be held early 2013 so a new government might be interested in forging new relations with donors. A number of MS had put their aid on hold after the unrest following the contested elections in December 2007, so resources were available for programming. Kenya was to produce a new medium term plan 2013-2017 (MTP-2) in line with the *Kenya Vision 2030*, so it was expected that Kenya would present a development programme that donors could align with. The idea was thus that the EU community could develop a Joint Analysis (JA) and Joint Response (JR) to a Kenyan MTP. The JR would include a revamped DoL with financial commitments, with a gradual synchronisation of funding cycles with the MTP for preparation, implementation and evaluation of donor support.

**The Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy (KJAS) as a backdrop.** Kenya developed its first Medium Term Plan (MTP-1) for the period 2008-2012, and in that connection the KJAS covering the period 2007-2012 was elaborated. A mapping exercise included all major donors, including development banks and the UN, and applied the 13 sectors used in MTP-1. Some were very broad, such as Democratic Governance or Private Sector Development. Donor roles noted included Lead/Chair, active donors, silent/delegated partnership, or phasing out, since a better DoL was a central concern. Some sectors were further refined, where Democratic Governance ended up with nine sub-groups, including Public Service Reform, Parliament, Statistics and M&E. *Implementing* KJAS was less successful, for several reasons. The large number of groups led to very different levels of commitment and resources, where in governance fields there could be many donors but not much financing. Furthermore, the support for developing KJAS had largely come from the donor community – the commitment by GoK was seen as wanting, with uneven support from different ministries. A review of KJAS in 2009 (Gerrishon Ikiara, actual document not found) pointed to few improvements, including in DoL, so by the time the EU JP was proposed, the KJAS was no longer a “live” document since there was little activity and virtually no results (there are, however, differing views on the extent to which weaknesses in KJAS are due to lack of capacity, lack of political support, lack of coordination to ensure systemic gains – see the text box below which refers to a number of steps taken and gains supposedly made over time).

### Aid Management in Kenya

With the KJAS, some attempts at improving aid coordination took place during the years 2006-07 with some achievements in sectors such as transport and PFM, where good policy dialogues were in place. With the political unrest and uncertainty in 2008, momentum was lost, and the 2009 review confirmed the lack of progress and commitment (EU evaluation 2014, p. 49).

At the end of 2009, a revamped aid management architecture was put in place, now under the general heading of Aid Effectiveness Kenya – see <http://www.aideffectiveness.go.ke/>. The Development Partnership Forum, DPF, was established as the highest-level coordination body. The DPF was to be a bi-annual high-level forum for policy dialogue between the GoK and its development partners at ambassador level, chaired by H.E. the Deputy President. Over the last years, the frequency of meetings has fallen.

Below the DPF is the Government Consultative Group (GCG) and the Development Partners (DP) Consultative Group (DCG). The GCG was constituted in September 2010 and is to focus on internal coordination across central and line ministries on aid effectiveness and provide guidance to DPs on issues of harmonisation, alignment and coordination. It is aimed at strengthening ownership and participation of senior government officials in the country's Government-DP dialogue and implementation of aid effectiveness goals. The DCG, on the other hand, has been in place since 2004, is to meet monthly to discuss and take decisions regarding their external financing. It is normally attended by heads of agencies/ missions, thus often at ambassador level.

Alongside these two bodies is the main coordination body, the Aid Effectiveness Group (AEG) with its Sector Working Groups. This is a more technical group at the level of heads of agencies/ cooperation on the DP side and senior technical staff from GoK. They meet at the Treasury, sometimes with participation by CSOs, private sector and Parliament, co-chaired by Treasury and one donor representative on a rotational basis. The AEG is to reduce transaction costs to GoK and DPs by streamlining systems of delivering aid, standardizing procedures, eliminating duplication, managing for development results and upholding mutual accountability. Because the number of Sector Working Groups was growing, reaching around 20, the AEG carried out a review of the structure and agreed a reduction in groups to nine (a tenth on Defence is not active).

The AEG is serviced by a small Aid Effectiveness Secretariat in the Treasury, which is currently also responsible for preparing for the Second High-Level Meeting of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) that will take place at the end of November 2016 in Nairobi.

The Cabinet on 2 December 2014 approved the Kenya External Resources Policy (KERP), which is to govern the mobilisation of external resources and their use in country, based on signed agreements with the international community on ODA based on closer harmonisation, alignment, and coordination, which evidently then supplants the KJAS as the formal aid policy [*actual KERP document not found*].

Linked to the aid coordination efforts is the electronic Project Management Information System, e-PROMIS, an open-access database that supposedly shows detailed donor data by sector and project – see <http://e-promis.treasury.go.ke/> [*the web-site is difficult to access*].

The main results in the field of aid coordination since Busan are therefore claimed to be the following (report to GPEDC Secretariat October 2014):

- Domestication of the Busan Outcomes in a Mutual Accountability Framework, although with slow progress in implementation
- Finalization of the Kenya External Resources Policy to Cabinet for approval [*not seen*]
- Inclusiveness of DPs, CSOs and private sector in the development of MTP-2, 2013-2017
- Integration of the Aid Effectiveness principles in MTP-2I
- More structured dialogue between GoK and DPs on issues of mutual concern geared towards accelerating the implementation of the development agenda
- The preparation of the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), 2014-2018, aligned to the government fiscal year and based on the UN "Delivering as One" principles.

**2013 a hectic year for JP.** The JP process began in earnest in March 2013, with all EU MS on the ground actively involved, supported by a series of three consultancy missions. Towards the end of September, a workshop was held to bring together what were agreed to be the five core dimensions of the JP approach: (i) DoL; (ii) use of country systems; (iii) joint communication and visibility; (iv) role of GoK; (v) joint monitoring. The latter was to include annual meetings to review performance



against the Mutual Accountability Framework that had been agreed at the AEG in 2012 (see text box). This included tracking defragmentation of aid, where one finding was that changing DoL among sectors/donors would have to be gradual as individual MS re-programmed their aid, but that DoL *within* sectors, including reducing number of projects, was easier to achieve and more likely to produce results. Non-EU donors were to be invited, given the potential for greater gains from the JP. It was also seen that the inclusion of new sectors allowed for better DoL as donors could programme their resources “from scratch” in these areas. At the same time, the political tensions between GoK and some donors due to the International Criminal Court process against Kenyan political leaders created stumbling blocks to commitment by GoK to the process. But by the end of 2013, a set of guiding principles for a Joint Cooperation Strategy was signed by 17 MS, EU and the European Investment Bank (EIB).

**From Principles to Joint Cooperation Strategy (JCS).** In 2015, the EU along with nine MS and the EIB agreed to the *EU Joint Cooperation Strategy in Support of Kenya’s Medium-term Plan 2013-2017*. It is a full-fledged JP document consisting of a Joint Analysis with a Joint Response that includes an indicative allocation of EUR 3.3 billion for the four-year period across four priority areas. It is a strategy that has been discussed and endorsed by GoK, with a focus on reducing transaction costs for both parties, particularly over the medium term, in part by emphasizing increasing alignment with GoK priorities and cycles. It contains basic values and principles agreed by the parties regarding focus on poverty reduction, respect for human rights, democracy and gender equality. It points to closer collaboration through modalities such as basket funds, delegated cooperation and blending. It shows the participation of the MS across the four areas and their sub-fields, the increasing use of country systems and in particular joint reporting and implementation, increased DoL, and other steps that will be taken to strengthen the support to the MTP-2 in the four areas.

**The National Indicative Programme (NIP) 2014-2020.** The programming of the 11<sup>th</sup> EDF in the form of the NIP signed on 19 June 2014 was put in place before the larger JCS had been finalised. It thus only contains a general reference to the JP. It notes that the EU DPs have embarked on a JP and that this work is expected to lead to task teams identifying joint implementation in 7 sectors. But the EDF funds are allocated without specific links to the JP and an EU joint cooperation strategy.

**The UNDAF 2014-2018.** The UN agencies recently presented their UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2014-2018 under the *Delivering as One* program. This contains a common budget, implementation arrangements and a programme-area based results framework for performance monitoring, thus structurally quite similar to the EU’s Joint Response document. The UNDAF process had a strong GoK participation, with the final document presented at State House, largely as a nod to the fact that Kenya as a state is a member of the UN. The EU JP, on the other hand, is so far not seen or accepted as a unified or unifying process of the EU community. The GoK still deals with each bilateral MS individually and in fact is quite open about not wishing to treat the EU as a joined-up community but instead “prefers to keep all options open”, meaning that the EU community’s objective of using the JP as a means for establishing a more coherent dialogue with the authorities is not happening.

#### Findings and conclusions on process

- *Kenya was early in developing a joint assistance strategy, the KJAS, in 2007, but lost traction during the political problems in 2008 and never achieved much in core fields like improved DoL. A restructured aid coordination architecture has been in place since 2009, with a Development Partners Forum as the apex, with GoK and DP coordinating bodies at policy level, a joint Aid Effectiveness Group at technical level with a number of sector working groups attached.*

- *The EU community identified JP as an appropriate programming process given the political and country context of early 2013, embarked on a structured and comprehensive exercise that led to a set of guiding principles for a Joint Cooperation Strategy end 2013, followed by the comprehensive JCS in 2015.*
- *The Strategy contains a joint analysis, joint response in the form of four focus areas and indicative financial allocations; a discussion on communication and visibility; how to improve use of country systems; and the comprehensive monitoring and reporting that is expected to be carried out.*
- *Because the Strategy was developed and approved after the NIP 2014-2020 had been signed, EDF and some EIB resources were programmed without the benefit of the JCS being in place, but there is also no reference to the Mutual Accountability Framework or other coordination mechanisms.*

## **2. EQ1: To what extent did JP respond to global and country-level challenges regarding increased aid effectiveness?**

### *JC 1.1: JP responded to the global aid effectiveness challenges*

**The EU's Joint Cooperation Strategy (JCS) reflects the strengths and challenges of JP:** The JCS signed 2015 contains a Joint Analysis (JA) based on Kenya's second Medium-Term Plan (MTP-2), the Joint Response (JR) with a DoL and funding table, which thus has been cleared by all HQs as well as the EU MS on the ground. However, as Kenya remains an important aid partner for many MS, many continue to do most of their programming bilaterally, so there is less attention to aid effectiveness issues than the joint decisions behind the establishment of JP would have led one to believe. This is also true of the EU: The NIP was developed outside the JP and the recent EUR 1.8 billion migration fund also is not inside the JP process.

Where new aid effectiveness challenges are taken on board is when Kenya itself takes a stand, such as with climate change and the most affected areas: the donor community does then respond in a collective fashion

### *JC 1.2: The JP process was sensitive to partner country's aid effectiveness challenges*

**The JCS responds fully to Kenya's MTP-2:** The JCS is structured around Kenya's MTP-2 and thus fully aligned with that, including the attention Kenya has given to arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL) due to climate change challenges. But the JP, as a EU-centric exercise, does not address GoK's concerns about new donors, lending instruments, non-traditional sources (foundations, global funds, blending), so the value-added of JP in the larger picture is unclear.

There is considerable budget cycle synchronisation by MS, but this is more due to bilateral decisions than to the JP as a process, though this issue has of course come up as part of the JP deliberations. A key concern of GoK, namely increased use of national systems, is not happening, however, since there is still considerable concern on the side of the donors regarding the integrity and fiduciary controls in the financial system.

### 3. EQ2: To what extent did JP contribute to reducing aid fragmentation?

*JC 2.1: Aid fragmentation has been reduced in countries that have carried out JP*

**JP cannot so far point to any reduction in aid fragmentation despite this being an explicit objective.** The JCS documents a very high degree of fragmentation of the EU donors' aid, with over 380 projects/ programmes funded in 2013, and each of the 10 EU donors on average being active in 11 of the 26 sectors recorded – 42% of the sectors. In the Joint Response, each EU donor is expected to be active on average in “only” 7.6 sectors – but this in fact represents 50% of the more limited 15 sectors now being used. The figure is in any case way above the JP ambition of 2-3 sectors per donor. The donors note, however, that since these documents were approved, very few have initiated a new budget cycle, and it is only when this takes place that such a restructuring of the portfolio is possible. The feeling is thus that it is too early to assess the extent to which the JP will contribute to aid fragmentation.

*JC 2.2: The JP has facilitated a division of labour beyond the sharing of sector involvement*

**The JCS wants to move beyond joint programming to aspects of joint implementation.** The JCS points towards joint actions, from planning, programming and implementation to reporting. It refers to use of common frameworks for monitoring and evaluation, joint financing tools and implementation modalities and in general promotes collective action for results.

Implementation of the intentions of the JCS has not yet begun, so the extent to which there have been real improvements in DoL and other fields remains to be seen.

*JC 2.3: The countries that have carried out JP aimed at reducing aid fragmentation*

**While JP was to contribute to reducing aid fragmentation, no data on this exists yet.** The formal JP process was concluded about a year ago with the adoption of the JCS. While it contains language about reducing aid fragmentation and the need for monitoring this, there are no specific indicators identified though the DoL table provides one useful baseline.

The financing community *outside* the EU may be increasing and becoming more heterogeneous over time, so the direction that *overall* aid fragmentation is trending is not clear.

### 4. EQ3: To what extent did JP improve aid predictability and transparency of EU and MS aid?

*JC 3.1: Joint programming led to changes in EU/MS planning and/or financial cycles*

**MS budget cycles are largely in line with MTP-2.** There is a considerable degree of synchronisation of EU+MS budget cycles with the MTP-2, not due to the JP but because donor funding was held back during the uncertain political situation, which has largely been addressed with the MTP-2 and its links to the *Vision 2030* strategic plan

### *JC 3.2: Predictability of CPA provided by JP-participants improved*

**The JCS contains a full-period funding table.** In the Joint Response section of the JCS, the document provides one table that shows financial commitments by donor by year, and a second one showing the same commitments, in the aggregate, by donor across the four areas of concentration. GoK therefore can see how much is committed (i) to each area, (ii) to each year, (iii) how much each donor is committing to a given area over the full period. The funding is not, however, locked in by each donor for each sector by year, so there is flexibility for the parties to agree optimal funding allocations over time.

### *JC 3.3: Transparency of CPA provided by JP-members improved*

**Aid transparency is not much changed.** The data provided on EU+MS disbursements and planned funding are quite aggregate and do not represent a discernible improvement in transparency. However, since the data have been discussed with and approved by MS HQs, they represent a level of commitment which probably has not existed previously in such joint documents, and since the JCS is an easily accessible document, this has also made transparency somewhat better.

Kenya has its own database on-line that supposedly provides detailed historical data [*though it has not been possible to access this to verify*]. A number of international transparency initiatives generate more detailed information on historical disbursement than national statistics

## **5. EQ4: To what extent did JP contribute to improved leadership by the partner country of its development priorities?**

### *JC 4.1: The partner country government has played an increasingly important role in the JP*

**GoK has provided some building blocks but not contributed to the building:** The MTP-2 provides the fundamental parameters for the JCS, so in that sense the GoK has played the determining role for the JP. But it has not been directly involved or engaged or contributed to the JP. At the same time, while GoK has formally supported JP, it has continued to accept that the MS come and discuss their bilateral programs with them directly, and has in this way not encouraged or supported the JP as a process and as a coordination mechanism

### *JC 4.2: JP contributed to increased alignment to partner country development priorities*

**Actual alignment shifts seem to be taking place.** GoK has programmed its own resources through the MTP-2. With the JCS aligning with the MTP-2 and the MS budgeting cycles largely being in line with the MTP-2 cycle, as shown in the JCS Annex III, there has in fact been a major re-alignment to GoK priorities. This appears to be a major improvement compared with the picture that emerged from the review of KJAS five years earlier.

## **6. EQ5: To what extent has JP contributed to increased coherence of EU and MS strategies and programming at country level?**

*JC 5.1: JP favoured convergence of objectives among EU and MS in terms of development strategies and policies at country level*

The JCS reflects a high degree of consensus within the EU community. The process leading up to the JCS made the EU+MS come together for policy and programme discussions that promoted greater consistency and thus convergence around the MTP-2 that the MS, EU and EIB signed up to. There was thus full political consensus on the ground on carrying out a JP process, and the core dimensions that the JP should include. The further work to produce the JCS among the donor MS has generated operational consensus among the parties regarding the priority areas to support, which actions within the four areas to concentrate on, and how much in terms of funding should be allocated across the four priority areas – a degree of agreement that no previous instrument has come close to provide.

Whether this was a cost-effective process is a different matter, where different actors have differing views, depending on what they believe they as a donor got out of the exercise.

*JC 5.2: JP documents show coherence of development cooperation with other EU policies*

There is inclusion of fundamental EU values but not to other EU policies in the JCS. The JCS is explicitly based on core EU values, such as respect for human rights, democracy, gender equality, rule of law. But the JCS as such does not include other EU community instruments or policies – it is focused on addressing the need for greater aid effectiveness of the locally programmable resources only.

## **7. EQ6: To what extent did JP increase the visibility of EU and MS to partner country authorities and other donor partners?**

*JC 6.1: JP contributed to enhance awareness of EU support among partner country authorities and other donors*

The JCS addresses visibility explicitly as an issue. The JCS is well-known among the core stakeholders in the Treasury, and ought to be familiar to the parties to the DPF, though the extent is not known. In its Annex II, the JCS points to the need for a communications and visibility strategy, where the focus is on producing joint events, products and processes, so the strategy is to address the needs of the EU as a system and actor, but also those of its constituent components, the MS. The extent to which this will in fact provide greater visibility remains to be seen. But the foundations for a more conscious, structured, resourced intervention to address the visibility concerns have been provided and thus are more likely to be achieved. But a common EU visibility strategy is now being elaborated.

The EU has not, however, been able to get the political attention that the UNDAF got, though the latter only provides about one third of the resources that are programmed in the JCS.

Not all MS are equally interested in the visibility strategy, partly because they do not need it, partly because they have a somewhat different set of messages they are promoting. Another point mentioned by several is that the EU is seen to be more supportive of making MS visible through the larger strategy than some MS are in also promoting the EU in connection with their activities.

*JC 6.2: JP contributed to enhance the visibility of EU member states among partner country authorities and other donors*

**The JP has so far provided minimal visibility for MS:** The JCS document has the flags of the nine MS on the cover, and that seems to be the visibility that the JP has provided so far. Since there have been no major launch events, the JP has presumably not enhanced MS visibility. Most MS visibility, however, is through their work in the sector working groups, where their role is already well established.

A couple of interviews raised the question to what extent the JP was in fact to “make MS visible” as this was not seen as an objective – it was to promote “EU as one”, and that trying to promote MS as also individual donor actors might work against this larger agenda.

**8. EQ7: To what extent was the EU organised so as to make JP work?**

*JC 7.1: The JP institutional set-up is conducive to a successful process*

**JP institutional set-up was conducive:** The overall set-up is seen as positive though the extent to which a JP process is successful is going to be determined by the specific context on the ground.

*JC 7.2: JP guidance was clear and well known*

**JP guidance was not in place when the JP process was implemented in Kenya:** The JP process was largely run by the EU actors on the ground, so the JCS was designed and written by the JP partners, with support from consultants contracted and paid by the EUD. The Guidance documents thus appeared after the core documents had been produced, but would have been highly useful if they had been available earlier.

The EUD funded the consultancies and related costs, which came out of the general operating budget, so the EUD has had to shoulder the overall costs of the exercise. This uneven burden sharing is thus an issue. But the consultancy services were seen as worth the cost as they provided valuable assistance to a complex process that many MS were not familiar with.

**9. EQ8: To what extent did JP reduce partner countries’ transactions costs and keep them reasonable for the EU and MS?**

*JC 8.1: JP has reduced transaction costs for partner country governments*

**JP costs are small but largely additional.** The transaction costs of EU+MS aid programming do not seem to have been reduced – the JCS in fact representing a net addition to the RMD workload, though a minimal one, so till now this is a negligible issue.

*JC 8.2: Transaction costs for the EU and MS relating to JP are deemed worth it in light of expected benefits*

**The JP costs and benefits are skewed in their distribution:** Most MS HQ have minimal direct costs related to the JCS and the same goes for EU HQ.

Most costs are in the field, where the EUD ends up with the lion's share of the costs, both time use and direct expenditures (consultancies, workshops). There may also be some political costs as some MS feel they are being forced to spend time on a non-critical task and the EUD gets the brunt of this reaction. This comes about because the signals from MS HQs are at times mixed regarding the attention that should be paid to the JP, while embassies continue to have to handle the normal workload when it comes to their bilateral programmes.

What is clear is that the EUD ends up having to take on the lion's share of the transaction costs of implementing the JP process. This is seen as not being in line with the intention of the JP, since JP was a collective decision by the Council and thus there ought to be a more balanced cost-sharing.

The expected benefits remain fairly theoretical and not yet documentable so a cost-benefit calculus cannot be carried out.






# Annex K. Country Note Laos

## 1. The Joint Programming Process in Laos

Laos had a fast-changing development assistance landscape over the evaluation period (2011-2015). In 2010, the top 10 development partners to Laos included five European development partners year (in decreasing order, Germany, EU, Switzerland, France, and Luxembourg) with a combined US\$89m in ODA. Aid from the EU and member states has grown from USD269m in 2011 to USD312m in 2014 (disbursements, Graph 1) and is due to continue to grow. The 2014 Joint Strategy represents €87m/year (€175/2 years), whereas the 2015 Joint Programme represents €104m/year (€524m/5 years) (indicative amounts).

Thailand, China and Vietnam assistance, along with their trade and investment, has also been important. China cooperation in particular has grown rapidly in recent years and may have surpassed that of Japan, the largest DAC donor to Laos. In addition, Laos is transiting to LMIC status, and development finance beyond ODA flows has increased, from 11% to 48% of total external development finance between 2002 and 2013 (ODI, 2016). In this fast-changing context, and given repeated European commitments to greater development effectiveness (Paris Declaration, Accra Agenda for Action, Busan Partnership), European partners felt necessary to reflect on their specific value-added in Laos' development, and make their support more cost-effective and focused on tangible results (interviews, May 2016).

**Graph 1. Disbursements from the EU and member states (USD mill, 2011-2014)**



**An opportunity to make European cooperation more effective promoted by European partners locally:** Foreseen as a partner country with high potential for JP (HTSPE, 2011), Laos is part of a second wave of JP countries and European DPs were therefore able to capitalise on past experience. Early in 2012, European DPs engaged in multilevel discussions on JP. Brought together in workshops and the Annual EU Development Counsellors Retreat, they first mapped out EU assistance to identify common priorities, then established a roadmap to formulate a joint EU strategy that would build on existing achievements (e.g. an EU coordination structure established; an EU roadmap for higher impact aid). The objectives, as stated then, were to enhance EU aid effectiveness and to contribute to sustainable economic development, poverty and inequality reduction in Laos.

**A phased, synchronized process:** On the proposition of the European Heads of Mission (HoMs) in Laos, EU headquarters (EEAS and DEVCO) agreed in March 2012 that JP in Laos should be conducted in phases, working on a transitional strategy first, then aligning to the government development plan starting in 2016. HoMs requested and obtained procedural flexibility for that,

and this Transition Strategy, based on a joint assessment of the country situation, was adopted in May 2013.

To prepare the full-fledged Joint Programme document, the EU Delegation consulted with Government, civil society, the private sector, and non-EU donors widely, both formally and informally, throughout. The main forum for development cooperation, the Round Table Process, was used to discuss benefits expected from JP. Sector Working Meetings platforms were used to discuss division of labour both with Government and among European partners. By December 2015, this led to a European Joint Programme for Laos 2016-2020, which is rigorously and fully aligned to the 8<sup>th</sup> National Socio-Economic Development Plan (NSEDP) as well as with sector strategies and results frameworks (where they exist). It includes a division of labour and indicative financial projections. It was signed by all European partners, including three non-resident member states and one non-EU member: European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. In June 2016, after one year of uncertainty as to the feasibility of substitution, the Joint Programme was approved in lieu of a bilateral MIP, making Laos the first country in this case.

The process is found to be “steadily improving coordination at the national level, monitored and implemented through monthly development counsellors meetings” (Heads of Mission report, 2015, confirmed by interviews, August 2016). As of August 2016, the EUD was testing with Government options for the Joint Programme launch and rollout—to ensure transparency about the approach and the concretisation of its promises (improved aid effectiveness and improved policy dialogue, leading to greater development impact).

**A positive but cautious engagement from the Lao PDR Government:** Government (central and line ministries) played their part in the extensive consultations that underpinned the development of the Joint Programme. Informative and consultative meetings ahead of the JP drafting underlined that Government perceived JP as reassuring at a time of pressure on European budgets, and Government confirmed “liking having one programme document for all European partners” but there were ongoing concerns about (i) European cooperation channelling assistance through NGOs “that are not even registered and do not share information on what they are doing”, and (ii) whether the JP approach would be “at the expense of bilateral relations”: We don’t want to see a big change, we want to maintain bilateral relations as previously. If EU controls all EU members, we are not happy (interviews, August 2016).

Overall, the JP process was sound, organized along a clear roadmap and with a good level of European partner engagement. The development of the Transition Strategy allowed stakeholders to prepare the ground for the 2016-2020 Joint Programme. Alignment to the national NSEDP cycles and priorities and the donor cycle synchronization that was achieved in Laos are conducive to coordination both with Government and across European partners. The process has contributed to a detailed understanding of partners’ levels of engagement, enhancing predictability and transparency through better communication among European partners as well as with Government. The Joint Programme and existing coordination mechanisms form a robust foundation for a clearer, possibly more strategic, more predictable, and more cost-effective engagement.

The Joint Programme also raises the profile of the European group, although how this will translate into greater development impact will require building trust with the Government of Laos on the issue of JP, and therefore demonstration of early wins in some key sectors and continuous exchange among European partners on promising entry points.

*Findings and conclusions on process*

- *Bearing in mind the recent character of Joint Programming in Laos, the line of enquiry is as much “Are things being done in a way that are conducive to delivering these benefits”? than “Has Joint Programming delivered the expected policy dialogue and aid effectiveness benefits.”*

## **2. EQ 1: To what extent did JP respond to global and country-level challenges regarding increased aid effectiveness?**

**Aid effectiveness conditions, the fast-changing development landscape and a challenging governance context meant Joint Programming was highly relevant to Laos.** Aid fragmentation and duplication were identified as central concerns in Laos with, among European partners, little joint analysis, low levels of aid using programme-based approaches, and variable year-in predictability (Paris Declaration Monitoring Survey, 2011) and relatively small shares of EU contributions provided through co-financed programs (10% in 2010, EU HoMs report 2012). Beyond aid effectiveness, the fast-changing development landscape and a challenging governance context meant JP (joint analysis, joint messaging, closer coordination, joint implementation/fund-pooling, and an enhanced profile for the European group) presented high potential benefits in terms of increased development effectiveness. Country conditions were also conducive to realising this potential: the country was not subject to geopolitical or commercial tugs of war found in some other countries; there are few European partners; and JP can build on a history of “excellent coordination” (Member States interviews, August 2016).

**How JP was done was also relevant to context.** First, as detailed above, JP started with a comprehensive investment in analysis in order to have an informed foundation for its activities.

Second, difficult issues were not set aside. Third, to ensure Government buy-in of the strategy, and besides aligning to national priorities, DPs have emphasised dialogue throughout the process.

## **3. EQ 2: To what extent did JP contribute to reducing aid fragmentation?**

**Joint Programming formalised the previously tacit division of labour by sector,** with detailed estimates of financing contribution by actor and by sector. Existing sector coordination platforms and mechanisms should in all likelihood constitute privileged channels for the coordination of the Joint Programme, about to be rolled out. European partners have also committed to harmonize their programming through a joint results framework based on monitoring indicators included in the 8<sup>th</sup> NSEDP and EU common M&E tools (modalities to report against this framework have not yet been defined). Within each sector, a European “sector convener” will be identified to take the lead in sector coordination and policy dialogue with responsible ministries. There is limited information on division of labour within each sector, but this level of detail may best be left out of the document and worked out in sector groups.

**There is a slight reduction in fragmentation** although there is a lack of comparable data year to year. Early joint sector mapping exercises led to an overview of areas of concentration (e.g. in governance), and partners’ respective comparative advantage (e.g. in rural development, education, health and private sector development). These findings and further discussions among European partners are reflected in the JP choice of sectors. Division of labour is not agreed in a vacuum: it also had to take into account national priorities, and this led to some compromise (i.e. engaging in new sectors with limited experience, and withdrawing from old sectors).

The JP clusters implementation in seven “priority sectors” based on their existing comparative advantage and engagement in policy dialogue, including governance as a central sector, agriculture, education and health as traditional sector, private sector development, nutrition and natural resource management to support Laos’ achievement of uncompleted MDGs and future evolution from LDC status.

Using GoL sector classification, in 2013, European DPs were present in a total of ten sectors, a number that was brought down to seven in 2015. In 2013, each sector had 3.7 European partners on average, whereas by 2015, this number was brought down to a three, which is what joint programming aims for (JP Guidance, 2015), and was also an objective in the 2007 EU Code of Conduct on Division of Labour in Development Policy. As for sectors covered by each European partner, it ranges between one (Finland, Ireland, UK) and six (France) and averages 2.8, which is not far from what the same Code of Conduct called for, and is less than the average of 4.7 in 2013.

**On top of a slight reduction in aid fragmentation, the JP process has also led to some joint implementation**, for example an UE-CH-DE joint programme on governance, with close synergies with the ongoing legal sector support the EU funds with FR and in coordination with the FR and LU governance programmes; or the Northern Upland Development Programme co-financed by the EU, France, Switzerland and Germany; or in TVET in the tourism sector. As for many things, may not directly attributable to JP as a formal process, but clearly attributable to the spirit/principles that underpin it: “JP is not the entry point for a joint approach, nor the result, but is a central component, if we did not have it, we would not have a joint approach” (Interviews, August 2016). Regarding delegated cooperation, most member states interviewed found that there should be flexibility, but that the selection EU intervention sectors should build on EU MS/partners comparative advantages.

#### **4. EQ 3: To what extent did JP improve aid predictability and transparency of European aid?**

**Joint Programming has improved aid transparency and predictability.** The development of shared objectives aligned to the national development plan; sector concentration; and provisional division of labour all contribute to clarifying EU engagement in Laos. The JP details the available programming resources, how they are programmed and (in the case of the EU) an estimate of when they will be made available between 2016 and 2020. Further, European DPs engage in regular dialogue with government authorities, non-EU donors, civil society and the private sector, to ensure a transparent and well-informed process. However, gains in aid transparency and predictability will have to be confirmed over time (data is missing, Global Partnership, Lao DPR Monitoring Profile, 2016). There is no clear data documenting medium-term predictability for each European DP, for example.

#### **5. EQ 4: To what extent did JP contribute to improved leadership by the partner country of its development priorities?**

**The JP aligns very clearly to partner country priorities.** European partners have synchronized their strategy cycle to the partner programmatic cycle using national development plans as a basis for delimiting common objectives. The elaboration of a Transition Strategy facilitated further the development of a reference framework for the EU, EU Member States, and the government (HoMs, 2012). The Joint Programme is rigorously aligned to Government NSEDP priorities, even if approaches on some issues may differ. This alignment holds true at the sector level as well: each sector lead had to check that all DPs, the concerned line ministries, civil society organisations and the private sector were adequately consulted and informed. The choice to use as far as possible

the 8<sup>th</sup> NSEDP indicators as a preferred framework to measure progress demonstrates further commitment to align with national priorities.

**Beyond this alignment to the national cycle, Government remains cautious about embracing the European JP approach.** EU DPs committed in the Transition Strategy to enhance the structures and processes for policy dialogue and coordination by strengthening the capacity of the Ministry of Planning and Investment (the key Government aid and development coordination body), as well as by providing support for the Round Table Process. The use of the NSEDP's and other cooperation platforms increased Government openness to the JP process and strengthened long-standing partnerships, complemented by informal discussions, but these clear efforts to engage GoL does not ensure its full commitment (interviews, May-August 2016). As elsewhere, trust will have to be built, by taking onboard GoL concerns and providing safeguards against these concerns turning out to be founded; and by demonstration effects/quick wins in sectors and on issues that are of greatest mutual interest (for GoL and European partners). Government concerns cannot be ignored so this is an important area to continue efforts. One should also note that several European partners have raised the importance of the bilateral relation with Government, and expressed the view that joint messaging should be jointly prepared but not, of course, be monopolised by any of them.

## **6. EQ 5: To what extent has JP contributed to increased coherence of EU and MS strategies and programming at country level?**

**The JP process demonstrated a fair level of consensus among EU members about their values, objectives, approaches and messages to be used at country level.** Joint analysis delivered value, especially for newer and probably non-resident DPs, and helped formulate the joint approach. European partners worked closely at improving their coordination at national level through monthly development counsellors meetings. At sector level, regular working meetings were organised for sector leads and Development Counsellors to discuss approaches and align views. The system of sector conveners was seen as a way to ensure that each European partner plays to its strengths, as well as to ensure JP accommodates Member States' agenda as well as that of EU institutions (Interviews, May 2016).

There is a shared assessment that an enhanced European profile does not translate directly or easily into influence—although one member state finds that European partners already “have much more weight in the policy coordination process”. Interviews confirmed appetite across the board for further joint strategizing and joint messaging, although this is primarily managed at HoMs level, and perhaps not on every issue, and for sharing instances of successful entry points/dialogue with Government counterparts. Some issues require involvement of HoMs, and it may be useful to include non-EU members that are part of the Joint Programme when matters of development cooperation are discussed.

**The Joint Transition Strategy 2013 and the Joint Programme 2015 do not include regional and thematic programmes,** such as actions related to Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT)<sup>45</sup> but the Joint Transition Strategy was shared with all relevant Directorates General in the EC; and interviewees did not identify major areas of policy incoherence that Joint Programming could remedy (interviews, August 2016). Further, several European partners mentioned a joint approach to a regional programme (basket fund to support the Mekong River Commission).

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<sup>45</sup> Because of MIP replacement, the Joint Programme makes reference to regional programmes that relate to EU focal sectors only.

## **7. EQ 6: To what extent did JP increase the visibility of EU and MS to partner country authorities and other donor partners?**

The JP should in all likelihood increase the visibility of the European group as one partner and promoting European values. The consultative process (both formal and informal) with government, civil society and private sector actors despite a low level of participation of the latter, allowed the EU to be perceived as one coherent voice. Further, Laos is the first country where the JP is substituting the EU's bilateral country strategy: this replacement was officialised in June 2016 for the EU Multi-Annual Indicative Programme, and replacing the German bilateral strategy is ongoing. Such substitution makes the Joint Programme a central reference, which would be difficult to shelf, even if there was massive staff turnover (in some other countries, the behaviour change among European partners is tangible, but the joint strategy is not legally binding for anyone, and could be “forgotten” should all JP champions leave the country at the same time).

However, enhanced profile does not translate directly or easily into influence, especially when there are important and not unreasonable GoL concerns about JP. Until sufficient trust is built through demonstration effects/quick wins, it is unclear how the resulting enhanced profile (a “Eurobrand”) will translate into development impact. European partners have diverse views on what to do with the enhanced profile—but there is consensus that it will be important to build trust and progress joint programming step by step.

## **8. EQ 7: To what extent was the EU organised so as to make JP work?**

At local level, the process was found to belong somewhere between “reasonable” and “heavy”, but all found the process to be “worth it”. MS interviewed highlighted that the EUD was able to provide inclusive and consensual steering to the process, and to iron out some differences of opinion that emerged. It had an extra degree of complexity because of the MIP replacement, but EUD adopted a pragmatic approach that ensured this was an inclusive and participatory process. The JP guidance from HQ was appropriately light, and there is consensus in Laos that it should remain so. For areas requiring guidance, the preference from European DPs is to turn to other countries where JP implementation is more advanced, specifically Cambodia. Moreover, like in Cambodia, they see value in using the services of a consultant servicing the whole group (rather than EU staff), to move implementation of the JP forward and act as external facilitator among all EU partners. Finally, European partners interviewed expressed satisfaction with the process of continually informing their HQs, which prepared the ground for the one-round (and successful) HQ-level clearance of the Joint Programme.

However, the EUD felt that it was “in a limbo” re. possibility of substituting the MIP by the JP document, while EU HQ was exploring its feasibility. This forced the EUD to consider and prepare for several scenarios, all against the time pressure of getting a MIP approved for 2016-2020.

Overall, the JP process has benefited from clear, light guidelines, although the experience of being first to replace the MIP with a Joint Programme came at a cost.

## **9. EQ 8: To what extent did JP reduce partner countries' transactions costs and keep them reasonable for the EU and MS?**

Based on available data, the JP process is perceived as considered between “reasonable” (MS) and “heavy” (EUD) but in the end “worth it”. The joint analysis exercises were based

on existing and ongoing analysis rather than involving new analysis, and used statistical data available from Government. Most of the roadmap deadlines have been met in a timely manner and the consultation process allowed discussion with all interested stakeholders. Several member states raised that JP makes sector coordination less resource-intensive: “We don’t need to follow up NRM if we know DE will.”

Aiming for replacing the MIP, the Joint Programme had to be drafted in compliance with EU requirements for a MIP, a heavier process than for usual joint programmes.

Over time, JP is expected to reduce both partner country and European DPs’ transaction costs considering that all stakeholders benefitted from access to common country analysis, identified or soon-to-be interlocutors for the group, and a financial allocation timetable aligned to the national programmatic cycle.

Overall, the JP process has been conducted in a timely and inclusive manner. Transaction costs have ranged from “reasonable” to “heavy” but were deemed “worth it”.

## 10. Lessons Learned and Conclusions

The joint programming process so far (2012-2016) has been sound, and the Joint Programme itself is a robust foundation for a clearer, more predictable and more cost-effective engagement. But for it to lead to development results, it also has to lead to more effective policy dialogue, and the enhanced profile of European development cooperation does not translate directly or easily into influence. Joint Programming will have to deliver tangible results in areas of common (GoL and European) concern to demonstrate its value to GoL. Joint programming is a building block, not an impediment, to closer harmonisation across all DPs, especially when non-EU partners are important and gaining in importance, yet work with different approaches.

Lessons learned from the Lao experience so far include:

- The process should continue to remain locally led, with light guidance that capitalizes on the experience, and needs more backstopping from HQ in the case of MIP replacement.
- As the Laos case demonstrates, replacement is feasible and in all likelihood will directly contribute to an enhanced profile for the European group, but should be considered on a case-by-case basis: in some contexts, such as fast-evolving transitions, a strategy rather than a programme may be better suited.
- On the issue of visibility, a clear message from Laos is that soft influence for development results is the goal, not visibility *per se*.
- As elsewhere, JP should not be at the expense of bilateral channels, which should remain open and active, but messages are pre-discussed.
- European partners that are not Member States but participate in JP could usefully be invited to relevant high-level discussions on joint strategising and joint messaging.
- The delimitation of joint objectives, sector-based division of labour, synchronisation with partner country’s cycle, and financial projections contributed to better predictability and transparency.





# Annex L. Country Note Mali

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## 1. The Joint Programming Process in MALI

**An enabling environment for Joint Programming:** Since 2007, the Government of Mali (GoM) and development partners – both European and not— have jointly developed two successive country assistance strategies (*Stratégie conjointe d'Assistance Pays* for 2008-2011 or SCAP I; and *Stratégie conjointe d'Assistance Pays* 2012-2017 or SCAP II) to better support GoM in implementing its plans.<sup>46</sup> The SCAPs aimed to build a collective response to Mali's development challenges, based on a common vision of the country situation, concerted programming, and coherent financing. In addition to well-developed aid coordination mechanisms (Aid Harmonisation Secretariat; Technical and Financial Partners pools; Thematic groups...), European partners have a long experience of forms of joint programming and joint monitoring in Mali. Moreover, the number of European partners present in 2011, when joint programming (JP) efforts started, was manageable: besides the EU, eight Member States had bilateral programmes (France, Germany, Sweden, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Denmark and Belgium). They represent half of all ODA disbursements to Mali over 2011-2014, besides large missions with a security focus such as the French Barkhane mission, the EU Training Mission (EUTM), and troop and financial contributions to UN peacekeeping mission MINUSMA.

**A process initiated by Heads of Mission in 2012 but difficult to synchronize with existing programme cycles.** Building on a positive experience with aid coordination, the idea of formally launching a joint programming process in Mali emerged from 2009 (DoL matrix, 2011; HoMs report, 2012; *Approche concertée*, 2012). A first concrete proposal was discussed in February 2012.<sup>47</sup> It was agreed that, to foster greater consensus on priorities and a division of labour, joint programming was to be anchored in the national poverty reduction strategy 2012-2017 and the SCAP II 2012-2017 (HoMs note, 2012).

A first challenge was to synchronize the joint programming process with the multiple programme cycles existing in Mali.<sup>48</sup> Moreover, just as a process was defined based on an analysis of all cycles, programming and evaluation exercises in the pipeline, the 2012 coup and crisis interrupted the joint programming process (HoMs note and report, 2012).

**The crisis presented an opportunity for an in-depth rethink of aid effectiveness in Mali:** Shortly after EU HoMs in Bamako submitted a positive assessment on the relevance of JP in Mali (letter to EU HQs, 2013), the process was put on hold due to the 2012 coup. The coup revealed the fragility of society, of state-society relations, and of the state apparatus – but also the lack of reliability of previous context assessments and analyses. In a changed political landscape and a volatile security situation, joint programming was considered by development partners as an opportunity to re-evaluate the country's priorities and modes of engagement, and forge stronger coordination among EU MS and between EU and GoM (HQ response 2012; HQ letter 2013; HoMs report 2015): fragility makes joint programming more difficult but also more useful. In 2013, the JP process was reoriented to build on Mali's transition Road Map, which included (i) a post-coup support phase; (ii) a transition phase; and (iii) the re-establishment of constitutional

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<sup>46</sup> Notably the poverty reduction strategy (CSCR, 2012-17), the post-coup *Programme of Action* (PAG, 2013-18), the *Plan pour la Relance Durable du Mali* (PRED, 2013-14); the strategic framework for economic recovery and sustainable development (CREDD, 2016-2018), as well as the 2015 Accord for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali.

<sup>47</sup> Technical seminar in Brussels bringing together Member States, and EU (EEAS and DEVCO) representatives.

<sup>48</sup> The national poverty reduction strategy cycle for 2012-2017 and sector cycles did not correspond to each other (for example, the Education Investment Program ends in 2013) nor with the cycle foreseen in SCAP II.

order and resumption of general and sector support. It was further recommended to align the joint programme to national strategies, including more recent ones such as the CREDD.

**A detailed document rooted in detailed analysis but lacking government inputs and more regular updates.** In 2013, a draft joint programme for Mali was prepared, based on a joint, in-depth analysis of the situation that led to the coup and emerged from it (“*Sortie de la crise*”, unpublished). Heads of cooperation approved a draft “Joint EU Programming in Mali, 2014-18” detailing priorities and division of labour by October 2014, and after HQ consultation, Heads of Mission approved it in January 2015 (EU, Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Sweden).

The GoM was officially informed of the document at a late stage, in January 2015, and to this day has not expressed endorsement or support. The lack of GoM involvement so far can be understood given the crisis context, but has also been identified as a challenge (HoMs report 2015). In addition, there is “an urgent need to update or re-validate” the document. In spite of the fast-evolving context, the analysis, principles of engagement, or division of labour have not been updated since the original document was produced end 2014.

**A midterm review of the Joint Programme is planned for the end of 2016** with the aim of updating and extending the JP document until 2020. A joint ex-post evaluation is already foreseen in the JP Document (PowerPoint 2014). So far there is no information regarding a joint monitoring system, beyond a list of selected indicators, and several Member States HQs still require reports on country-by-country performance.

The following findings are based on a desk review of documentation and on phone interviews (no field mission) and does not include GoM views.

## **2. EQ1: To what extent did JP respond to country-level challenges regarding increased aid effectiveness?**

**Joint programming in Mali was sensitive to partner country’s aid effectiveness challenges.** Mali was already considered an example of good aid coordination among PTFs (development partners). GoM-PTF cooperation was structured around the Aid Harmonisation Secretariat, “thematic groups” and a “technical pool”, that allow constant dialogue between the GoM, PTFs and civil society organisations. Joint programming emerged in the framework of SCAP I (2008-2011) to foster greater harmonisation at both the analysis and operational levels, but the multiple programme cycles existing in Mali were first identified as a potential challenge to the JP process (HoMs report 2012).

However, the March 2012 coup in Mali challenged the country’s aid architecture and effectiveness. It revealed a relatively flawed analysis of the country’s risks and situation (*Approche concertée*, 2012). Recognising that fragility made joint programming more challenging but also more useful, European development partners invested in a joint analysis of the transition priorities, agreed a three-phased transition roadmap, and total suspension of aid was avoided. Emergency aid clusters were created to maintain humanitarian aid, and support to civil society. Member States conducted assessments, project by project, to determine new priorities. HoMs reflected on the added value of European joint programming and new modes of aid governance that would be better aligned with citizens’ needs, including the need to restore trust in public institutions.

**The final document thus includes a comprehensive analysis of the challenges the country faces** for 2014-2018, as well as of the situation in each sector. It clearly sets out three areas of concentration (“structural reforms”; infrastructure and the productive sector; the social sector) and provides information on the division of labour and financial projections.

However, the process has not yet proved to be “a motor for donor-wide coordination in the SCAP” (PowerPoint “Joint Programming Process in Mali”, 2014; interviews, September 2016), although there are not so many non-European PTFs (mainly the US, World Bank, Canada, the African Development Bank, and Switzerland). Moreover, European PTF views diverge on whether post-coup cooperation is really different from pre-coup, or just “business as usual” given each PTFs’ systems and interests. On this note, a Member State called for clearer messages from her HQ: “we get mixed message from our HQ, and a wide range of interest in joint programming here in Mali, it’s very unsettling. There’s a need for a real discussion in Brussels on what we really want joint programming to be: a clearer theory of change and measurable behaviour change or ‘une usine à gaz’ (a bloated system)”. Another Member State finds that HQ pressure to spend and “plant the flag” trumps joint programming by far.

### **3. EQ2: To what extent did JP contribute to reducing aid fragmentation?**

**The Joint Programme identifies a clear division of labour between and within priority intervention areas**, based on expected results, indicators to measure achievements and a clear identification of contributing partners. While it mainly compiles prior plans (sectors and budgets) of both the EU and Member States, some interviews indicated it helped concentrate European partners’ efforts on three complementary areas of intervention: “structural reforms”; infrastructure and the productive sector; and social sectors. Moreover, the number of European partners by sector in the Joint Programme is, in fact, lower than those indicated in the 2011 division of labour matrix.<sup>49</sup>

Disbursement data by sector (2012-2014) shows that there has been little concentration: for example, the top three European partners (EU, France, and Germany) are in more sectors in 2014 than in 2012 (OECD Credit Reporting Sector classification and database, accessed September 2015). This should not be taken at face value and interpreted as a negative trend, as this reflects for example the EU entering the education sector, which had been identified as an orphaned sector. Moreover, the number of partners active in each sector may matter more than the number of partners by sector (e.g. in local development and irrigation/agriculture), and there are good examples of delegated cooperation. Finally, a midterm review (2016) is meant to ensure greater rationalization.

### **4. EQ3: Effectiveness: To what extent did JP improve aid predictability and transparency of European aid?**

**Earlier forms of European joint programming existed in Mali, but the formal process from 2012 allowed European aid to be more predictable and transparent, notably on sector division of labour.** With a €1.7bn portfolio, the Joint Programme in Mali covers the period 2014-2018 and constitute an important component of the larger SCAP II (2012-2017). It offers a more precise view of sector policies and approaches than the Joint Assistance Strategy (DoL Matrix), and more clarity on financial planning, (PowerPoint 2014; JDP 2014; HoMs 2015).

**However, in spite of intentions, the Joint Programme does not yet constitute a common programming framework replacing bilateral strategies – except for Germany.<sup>50</sup>** The joint programming process favoured some convergence of objectives, common analysis and a division

<sup>49</sup> In the Joint Programme, European partners range between two and eight per subsector. For example, the 2014 Joint Programme indicates two partners for the subsector “environment and natural resources”, when the 2011 DoL matrix indicated five.

<sup>50</sup> As in several other countries, Germany’s bilateral strategy consists of the Joint Programme with a chapeau detailing German modalities.

of labour, but did not lower the burden of strategic planning for each individual European partner. For example, interviewees found that there is little European coordination before wider, all-PTFs coordination meetings; that joint demarches are few and far between; and that European joint programming is too detailed-oriented when it should be “more focused, more strategic, and more political” (interviews, 2016). They further underlined the challenges of high staff turnover and an uncertain context that demanded constant readjustments and a heavy workload. Division of labour has not always been respected in practice: “we have it as a point of reference but it has zero influence on anyone’s project identification” – in part because of the fast-evolving context, and in part because of the reflex to identify and formulate programmes together is not there. The trend seems to be towards less predictability: whereas all nine European partners had forward expenditures plans in 2014, only one had one (the EC) for 2016 (Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation database, accessed September 2016). Several member states pointed out that a shorter but “live” document (“a nimble, annual two-pager”) would pack more value than the current 88-page Joint Programme document.

**Moreover, the synchronisation of European cycles among them and with the existing national programming cycle remains problematic.** As mentioned, the cycle programmed in the national poverty reduction strategy for 2012-2017 does not correspond to those within sectors, nor with the larger cycle foreseen in the framework of the GoM-led SCAP II (2016-18). The larger framework (SCAP II) has been finally chosen as a basis to identify common objectives and a clear division of labour between EU partners, but the timing of programme identification, formulation and implementation remain the responsibility of each Member State, and has remained uncoordinated. To this day, six out of 16 cycles (all PTFs) have yet to be synchronized, and this lack of progress is attributed to a mix of budget, bureaucratic and political reasons at HQs (*Plan d’action de la SCAP*, July 2016; interviews, August 2016). The 2016 Joint Mid-term review could be the opportunity of further synchronizing programming cycles (PowerPoint 2014; HoMs report 2015) but, for example, the midterm review of the 11<sup>th</sup> EDF has not started, so synchronization of the NIP (2014-20) and Joint Programming (2014-18) is unlikely. Synchronisation across European PTFs and with Government would make joint identification, formulation and implementation much easier, especially in a fragile context where events may require revisiting rationales and theories of change.

## **5. EQ 4: To what extent did JP contribute to improved leadership by the partner country of its development priorities?**

**The Joint Programme built on post-coup Government plans.** The Government elected after the coup complemented the national development and poverty reduction strategy adopted in 2011 with two national plans for economic growth and poverty reduction.<sup>51</sup> European partners took the opportunity to reorient their common strategy to better respond to the country’s emerging priorities (*Approche concertée*, 2012; HoMs letter 2014; PowerPoint Abidjan 2014). As such, the Joint Programme objectives are aligned to those of Government, such as the promotion of sustainable and inclusive growth, state reform, national reconciliation, security and poverty reduction.

**Despite these aligned priorities, GoM had a relatively marginalized role in the joint programming process.** The Joint Programme has not been formally discussed with Government but only shared at a late stage, in 2015. HoMs acknowledged that the JP process would have benefit from Government inputs earlier on, even though the political crisis and security issues had constrained dialogue. They encouraged increased political dialogue with Government in the implementation and monitoring phases (Factsheet, 2014; France *bilan*, no date; HoMs report,

<sup>51</sup> The *Plan pour la Relance durable du Mali* (PRED 2013-2014) and the *Plan d’Action gouvernemental* (PAG) 2013-2018.

2015). The 2016 midterm review of the Joint Programme is an opportunity to further engage with Government. European partners emphasised that joint programming in Mali should be first and foremost a process that delivers opportunities for dialogue and joint vision – among European partners as well as with national stakeholders, and influencing the UN and non-European partners in the process.

## **6. EQ 5: To what extent has joint programming contributed to increased coherence of EU and MS strategies and programming at country level?**

HoMs considered that JP was a way to increase the coherence of EU and MS strategies in Mali and it has, to some extent, succeeded in harmonising views about priorities and division of labour in a context of political uncertainty and policy reorientation. EU Delegation leadership, joint analysis exercises and intra-European dialogue contributed to improve communication and sharing of information among MS, including at the HoMs and HoCs level. While large Member States did not find great value in joint analysis, all the smaller ones said to have hugely benefitted. The JP Document is viewed as a “complementary and compatible” framework with bilateral programming (HoMs report, 2015). At the exception of Belgium, which was already developing its bilateral strategy, for most European partners, joint programming has proven useful to identify core sector priorities and align strategic objectives (HoMs report, 2015). JP has for example revealed that education was an orphan sector, which has therefore been integrated into JP with the EU as lead.

Looking beyond aid, several Member States raised the issue of migration and security policies, and felt that inter-HQ consultations and coordination was not sufficient to ensure basic coherence. They called for European dialogue in the field that would consider these issues, even though they are programmed from HQ: “joint programming needs to be reality-driven, not domestic politics-driven”. Two member states felt that European joint programming was generally too technical and not sufficiently geared towards have a more effective political dialogue with Government.

## **7. EQ 6: To what extent did JP increase the visibility of EU and MS to partner country authorities and other donor partners?**

JP process has not contributed to significantly increase European visibility. Both MS and EU visibility were already considerable: bilateral relations were the most visible ones to GoM, and the EU’s visibility had increased with EUCAP Sahel, EUTM and AGIR. What has not increased is the visibility of European partners as a group, especially when Member States HQs continue to emphasise MS visibility (“put on the flag”). The 2015 HoMs report and the French *Premier Bilan de la Programmation conjointe* (no date), noted that transparency and visibility need to be improved, including vis-à-vis other development partners, for which the lack of an outreach strategy and any communiqué, press conference or other communication activity (as of September 2016) might have led to the perception that JP is in parallel to SCAP rather than as a contribution to SCAP. However, there have been several European joint *démarches*, usually under the EU banner (interviews, 2016), and this may lead to increased leverage. The EU’s provision of budget support is also an important avenue for policy dialogue for all, even if Member States do not provide it themselves. As such, it could be a potent tool.

## **8. EQ 7: To what extent was the EU organised so as to make joint programming work?**

The JP formulation process in Mali was efficient and flexible enough to overcome the challenges linked to political uncertainty and instability. To measure interest and the potential for JP in Mali, guidelines were provided to draft a basic JP Document (EUHQ letter, 2013). Several European PTFs found that the guidelines from HQ have not been sufficient, leading to the preparation of both a National Indicative Programme (NIP) and a joint programme, not to mention the gender action plan, civil society roadmap, human rights roadmap, and trade roadmap, when the JP could have been considered as a NIP, integrating principles and considerations on gender, civil society, human rights and trade.

A consultant was hired early on to interact permanently with development partners and support joint programming (HoMs report 2012), and two external consultants prepared the draft Joint Programme in 2014, on which Member States provided comments. The availability of consultants, supported by Member States (Denmark, Germany) and the EU, lowered the burden on European PTFs.

## **9. EQ 8: To what extent did JP reduce partner countries' transactions costs and keep them reasonable for the EU and MS?**

Transaction costs for JP were considered quite high, and some found it “not worth it”. Two external consultants were contracted (funded by Denmark with the support of the EUD) to elaborate a JP document based on the structure and requirements of a NIP, however giving due space for individual contributions to the joint strategy, objectives, indicators and financial planning (PowerPoint 2014). However, interviews revealed that the process was found time-intensive and “not worth it” especially in view of the good coordination taking place within the SCAP process. HoMs underline that the JP process in Mali has not been sufficiently institutionalised at the level of EU and Member State representations. Staff turnover and uncertain political context constrained cooperation efforts. Constant readjustments were required, leading to work overload. For the JP to be adopted as a single reference framework of action, HoMs encouraged light administrative and bureaucratic transactions (HoMs report 2015).

## **10. Lessons Learned and Conclusions**

The joint programme (2014-2018) document is of very high quality, especially in terms of the quality of context analysis, both general and sector of concentration by sector of concentration; of the values and principles common to the European group; collective objectives by sector; and in how it details European partners' engagement by sector and by region. The document is more precise than most other joint programme documents. Moreover, the relation with the all-partners SCAP process (including the US, World Bank, Canada, etc.) is spelled out: the European joint programme is meant as a contribution to the all-partners coordination.

However,

- While objectives by sector are clear, related activities are detailed: interviewees feel that this level of detail (higher than joint programming documents in most other countries) may not be relevant to the fast-changing context, and has not been followed in the main.
- Implementation has been found wanting: while the on-going crisis may explain that European partners have favoured flexibility, there is no evidence that they have acted in a more joined-up fashion. Programming cycles, programme identification and formulation remain disjointed, even among like-minded donors. Interviewees found there was duplication with coordination being achieved across all development partners, such as

through the SCAP II process (2016-18). There is no evidence of appetite for replacing bilateral strategies (whether Member States or the EU's) with the Joint Programme.

- There is “an urgent need to update or re-validate” the joint analysis that underpinned the 2014-18 Joint Programme, an area that has been recognized as having had great value-added (interviews, August-September 2016), as well as European partners’ presence by sector and region.





# Annex M. Country Note Moldova<sup>52, 53</sup>

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## 1. The Joint Programming Process in Moldova

When Joint Programming (JP) was first talked about in 2011, the EUD+MS were quite reluctant to engage in the JP exercise. Nothing much happened until 2015 when the JP process took off. Initially, the reluctance towards JP was mainly due to the overbearing weight of EU institutions in the Official Development Assistance (ODA) landscape (more than 90% of EU funding in Moldova), the newly (2010) established ODA coordination mechanisms<sup>54</sup> and Joint Assistance Strategy (with WB and UN participation) and the fact that the three Member States (MS) operating in Moldova were already using joint implementation arrangements. It thus seemed to the EUD and MS that there would be little value added for them in pursuing JP. The renewal of interest in the JP process in 2015 was due to a change of the initial conditions (increased number of MS and of their financial weight in total EU ODA, disappointment with existing coordination mechanisms) and triggered by a better understanding by the MS of the aims of JP through a JP workshop attended by some of the MS field-based staff.

In 2015, preliminary discussions about JP took place and a roadmap was designed. The EUD, 12 MS and three like minded donors<sup>55</sup> jointly prepared a Joint Analysis (JA) which is expected to be endorsed by Heads of Mission (HOMs) in July 2016; a Joint Response (JR) is scheduled for end 2017. The JP's next steps include the preparation of the JR. The roadmap (July 2015, updated in June 2016) foresees its first outline in October 2016, with adoption of the Joint Strategy (JS) in September 2017 and the alignment of all EU assistance programmes to this JS by end 2017.

The JA, spanning the 13 sectors of the Association Agreement (AA), was led by different MS/EUD and was facilitated by the EU Delegation (EUD). Other donors, partner institutions and numerous CSO have contributed to the JA exercise. The JP Unit in Brussels and its external expert provided guidance during the process and assistance in reviewing chapters and drafting the introduction. EEAS was not yet involved. The JA built upon the Briefing Book, a World Bank led initiative, which contained 30 policy notes prepared by EUD, SE, UN, WB, USAID and CH in 2015. The JA preparation process was led by different MS for each sector and was highly consultative, involving a wide spectrum of sector stakeholders and Development Partners (DPs). The EEAS, important actor with DGNEAR in the programming of neighbourhood development cooperation in link with the political guidance of the association agenda, has so far not been involved in the JP process and the political section of the EUD has not been an active participant either. DGNEAR has been kept in the loop and has been consulted at times to provide comments on the JA or guidance on the process.

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<sup>52</sup> Please note that the EU in this note designates both the EU Commission (DGNEAR and other relevant DGs) and European External Action Services (EEAS) and the Member States (MS) whereas EUD is used to design the European Union Delegation only. When we refer to EU+, we mean the EU plus like minded countries, including in the case of Moldova, the non-EU countries closely involved in the EU Joint Analysis process such as Switzerland, Turkey and Liechtenstein.

<sup>53</sup> The reader is referred to Annex A, which presents the data grid containing information collected at desk and field levels.

<sup>54</sup> In 2010, a set of Development Partnership Principles with the country's DPs had been agreed with the Government and a Joint Partnership Council and sector coordination councils were established to improve development policy and assistance coordination.

<sup>55</sup> The 8 MS are: SE, DE, FR, CZ, AT, RO, PL and UK who each took the lead for a sector/chapter of the JA and were assisted by each other as well by Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary and Slovakia. The three like minded donors were Switzerland, Liechtenstein and Turkey.

## **2. EQ1: To what extent did JP respond to global and country-level challenges regarding increased aid effectiveness?**

### *JC 1.1: Extent to which JP responded to the global aid effectiveness challenges*

The main driving force for the JP process in Moldova has been the Association Agreement (AA); principles of aid effectiveness or the new international commitments towards the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were only secondary considerations. Moldova and the EU signed the AA in 2014 and the 13 chapters of the AA form the backbone of the JP exercise in Moldova. The link between the AA objectives and the more traditional poverty reduction goals of development cooperation are mentioned in the introduction to the JA, but otherwise the JA's sectors and priorities are those of the 13 chapters of the AA.

Since the launch of the process in 2015, the EUD's and MS's commitment to the JP process has been strong but has most recently (July 2016) shown strains due to unexpected timing constraints imposed on the programming calendar. Commitment shown during the preparation of the JA has been very strong, even though uneven: some MS were very actively involved in the JA, others far less whilst the EUD played the role of facilitator without being overbearing. The resulting JA provides a complete and shared analysis of 13 sectors that reflects a shared understanding of challenges, objectives and priorities. There is concern, however, that MS commitment to and trust in the process will be jeopardised by the recent instructions from Brussels to bring the EU programming (Single Support Framework - SSF) forward by one year; this request came as a response to the new cooperation priorities<sup>56</sup> set out in the December 2015 Council Conclusions following the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) review. MS felt that producing an outline of programming priorities by October 2016 as required by Brussels will not allow them to discuss programming priorities in sufficient depth and to consult with their respective home offices about possible priorities and Division of Labour (DoL). They fear that a rushed process will lead to a SSF with priorities decided by the Commission, not taking account the MS's programming choices; MS are keen to continue the JP process led by the field and to participate in the setting of Commission priorities.

### *JC 1.2: Degree of sensitivity of the JP process to the partner country's context*

In its JP process, the EU showed great sensitivity to Moldova's context by overcoming the challenges of tumultuous political times and by making the JP process very inclusive. The adoption of the AA as the JP's only frame of reference has allowed the EU to overcome the limitations of a weak national policy framework, especially at a time of frequent Government changes, to strengthen cohesiveness of MS around a common understanding of the context and sector objectives and to delimitate areas of support to a reduced number of sector priorities. The very extensive and inclusive consultation process undertaken within each sector/theme in preparation of the JA has further ensured that all stakeholders, whether from the local civic bodies or from the Government and state institutions, understood the on-going JP process and participated actively in it by contributing their ideas and understanding of the local context (including at grassroots level), its challenges, its priorities.

The process has so far been very valuable for all parties involved. MS were asked to volunteer to lead the JA for each chapter; this ensured their active participation in the process. For them, the main driving forces of the JP process included: increased involvement in the decisions and

<sup>56</sup> New priorities set out after the ENP review include: the promotion of good governance, democracy, rule of law and human rights, investment in economic modernisation (particularly youth, education and employment), connectivity, energy security and climate action. ENP will also be strengthened on security, regular and irregular migration, and regional issues.

monitoring of EU Commission activities in Moldova; acting jointly and thus benefiting from each other's expertise and knowledge (including from MS not active in development cooperation but having good relations with the Government and/or other valuable knowledge to bring to the group); having a more strategic interaction with the Government, and; being able to work together towards common medium term objectives for Moldova. Incidentally, all MS appreciated the additional information made available through the process on other MS' activities, intentions, challenges, etc. The line ministry interviewed attested to some initial frustrations with the limited scope of AA priorities (compared to overall sector priorities) but welcomed the possibility offered to be involved in the process and have its contribution valued. The same is true for the CSOs who highly valued the opportunity to contribute to the JA (and only regretted the fact that not all CSOs could be involved in the exercise).

### **3. EQ2: To what extent did JP contribute to reducing aid fragmentation?**

#### *JC 2.1: Reduction of aid fragmentation in countries that have carried out JP*

**No evidence was found that aid fragmentation has been or will be affected by JP in Moldova.** The JA shows, for many of the 13 sectors concerned, the involvement of MS in 2014: in 2014 there was a proliferation of (often small) projects that could potentially benefit from aid harmonisation, DoL and better coordination to reduce their number. For example, sectors such as governance, education or health showed an abundance of projects (respectively 277, 192 and 184) of which a vast majority were EU stand alone projects (funded by 8 MS and the EUD).

**However, aid effectiveness is likely to benefit from JP.** As the JA follows the 13 chapters of the AA, there will inevitably be some spreading of the support over the different sectors; within the sectors, given the important and non prioritised number of areas identified in the JA as requiring support, there is also a risk of a high number of interventions. Aid fragmentation as measured by the number of projects/sector, the number of donors/sector or the number of sectors/donor is thus unlikely to be reduced through the JP. Despite this, it is likely that the JA, by clearly identifying the problems to be tackled and the objectives pursued in each sector, and the increased awareness of what each other is doing, will contribute to make EU aid more complementary and more aligned to the same objectives thus increasing EU aid effectiveness. A couple of MS also mentioned that they may undertake delegated cooperation under the JR.

#### *JC 2.2: The extent to which JP has facilitated the division of labour beyond the sharing of sector involvement*

**The EU Commission is willing to concentrate on a limited number of medium and long term priorities; MS are less categorical.** Even for the EUD, actual cooperation efforts will be driven by not only the JA and the association agenda, which is currently under discussion, but also by the priorities set in the Council Conclusions (see footnote 5 above). The MS wish very much to be part of the priorities' setting, i.e. to undertake a genuine joint programming where all EU aid is considered as a package so that DoL can be used to respond to jointly defined priorities. Whether this will be jeopardised by the shortened timetable and the new ENP priorities remains to be seen.

### *JC 2.3: Extent to which the countries that have carried out JP aimed at reducing aid fragmentation*

As mentioned above, the main focus of the JP in Moldova is the AA, not aid fragmentation. Indeed aid fragmentation is not seen as a problem in Moldova (despite the great number of projects on-going per sector/donor) as MS consider that they are sufficiently well coordinated to be complementary and avoid gaps and/or duplications.

## **4. EQ3: To what extent did JP improve aid predictability and transparency of EU and MS aid?**

### *JC 3.1: Changes in EU/MS planning and/or financial cycles following JP*

There have been no plans in Moldova to synchronise EU planning cycles with the Government or with each other. Two issues are important in this respect: (i) the synchronisation of the programming cycle with the association agenda and (ii) the synchronisation of the programming cycle with the need for a new SFF for 2017-2020. The need to synchronise the JP goes beyond the alignment to the Government's planning cycle: it also involves synchronisation with the political agenda and synchronisation with the Commission's own programming agenda (the two being normally interdependent and totally aligned). As the latter has been affected but the new programming instructions for the Single Support Framework 2017-2020 (see above JC 1.1) and the discussion of political priorities under the AA is led by the EEAS, which so far has not been involved in the JP process, it remains to be seen how the programming priorities will be decided. As mentioned, MS are wary that the JP will be jeopardised by the Commission's own programming needs and only one MS is currently envisaging substituting the JP to its own national programming documents.

### *JC 3.2 and 3.3: Predictability and transparency of CPA provided by JP participants*

Likewise to aid fragmentation, there is no documentary evidence that predictability and transparency have improved through the JP; however, JP has provided improved knowledge of the medium term concerns of the EU. Taking account of the fact that the JP process in Moldova has not yet reached the JR stage, the predictability and transparency of CPA provided by the EUD and MS has been improved only in so far as the JA process firstly has provided MS with a better understanding of each others' interests and priorities, even possibly future intentions of support, and secondly, it has provided all stakeholders with a clear view of the medium term priorities of the EU family in each of the 13 sectors.

## **5. EQ4: To what extent did JP contribute to improved leadership by the partner country of its development priorities?**

### *JC 4.1: Role of the partner country government in the JP*

The inclusiveness of the JP process so far in Moldova has ensured very good Government and CSO participation: they have, many for the first time, been involved in the programming process and have been able to contribute effectively to the JA chapters. In 2010, the signature of the Development Partners (DPs) Co-ordination and harmonisation development partnership principles launched the set up a formal way for DPs and Government to work together. Sector Development Councils were formed for each sector: they functioned

relatively well in some sectors, in others they were more a forum for information sharing (presenting DP projects) than for strategic discussions. The EUD and MS who took charge of developing specific chapters of the JA were often also sector leads in these Councils and used them to gain buy-in and participation from the national stakeholders into the JP process. National stakeholders concerned by the 13 sectors, including line ministries, public agencies, state institutions and local civil organisations, have been consulted during the JA, either through meetings or/and through the circulation of draft chapters for comments. According to several national stakeholders, their participation was very fruitful as they were listened to, did contribute to the drafting and felt involved (often for the first time) in the programming exercise. More generally, the discussions around the JA allowed a more strategic sector dialogue to take place.

#### *JC 4.2: JP's role in increasing alignment to partner country development priorities*

**The EU JR has not yet been developed for Moldova but it will follow closely the AA priorities.** Increased alignment to Government priorities has not been an objective of JP in the face of a weak national policy framework and recent Government instability. In fact, rather than aligning to Government priorities, the tone of the JA is rather prescriptive, pointing out reforms and improvements required to be undertaken by Government in the medium term. Likewise to the Briefing Book produced by donors in 2015, it shows sector challenges and priorities for Government action but limited to those areas and sectors relevant to the AA; that is also where the EU action is most likely to be directed to in the medium term.

## **6. EQ5: To what extent has JP contributed to increased coherence of EU and MS strategies and programming at country level?**

#### *JC 5.1: The extent to which JP favoured convergence of objectives among EU and MS in terms of development strategies and policies at country level*

**The JA process has substantially reinforced EUD and MS' shared understanding of sector challenges and priorities. The exercise is seen as a political statement, gaining EU adherence to a set of shared objectives: to the extent that it was not already so, the JP process thus increased coherence of EU's development strategies and policies.** The JA built upon the work undertaken in the Briefing Book, including the analysis of key issues and challenges and the proposal of immediate, short term and medium term reform measures in 30 sectors/areas. Widely used by most DPs as a basis for policy dialogue with their Moldovan counterparts, the Briefing Book was thus already the result of a convergence of DPs views about the problems in Moldova and the reforms required to address them. The JA deepened this process of convergence of views by adding a more political layer, that of the AA. The JA preparation and endorsement process was characterised by extensive consultations, discussions, workshops, exchanges of comments on draft papers, etc., which led the EU partners to work together and agree, for each sector, on the challenges, priorities and objectives to be attained, all within the framework of priorities set in the AA. The convergence of views so obtained has been highlighted as an important value added of the process by all interviewees and some of them mentioned that the document will be used to guide their own programming. The process has not yet led to further joint initiatives but a few MS expressed their desire that the JP should lead to joint monitoring and continued strategic discussions at sector level.

*JC 5.2: The extent to which JP documents show coherence of development cooperation with other EU policies*

The JR for Moldova has not yet been developed. The JA is narrowly structured on the 13 chapters of the AA where coherence of EU policies is addressed. The AA considers the full array of other EU policies such as the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTA) negotiations, visa liberalisation, mobility partnership, aviation agreement, etc. However, these are not specifically addressed in the JA. What is addressed in the JA is the extent to which Moldova complies, in each sector, with the AA requirements and what is still missing so that programming can be directed towards those areas where it can effectively contribute to the reform process.

**7. EQ6: To what extent did JP increase the visibility of EU and MS to partner country authorities and other donor partners?**

*JC 6.1: The extent to which JP contributed to enhance awareness of EU support among partner country authorities and other donors*

Although there was no JP communication strategy as such, the preparation of the JA unanimously enhanced the stakeholders' awareness of EU support in Moldova. The JA preparation process with its intensive sector consultations enhanced and sometimes even uncovered the awareness of the EU's support at sector level.

*JC 6.2: The extent to which JP contributed to enhance the visibility of EU member states among partner country authorities and other donors*

The JA process so far has strongly enhanced the EU's visibility in Moldova, to the extent that several partners expressed the intention to make use of the EU's views as leverage for pushing through important reforms. Each of the stakeholders consulted during the field mission attested to the fact that the JA raised the profile of the EU within Government circles, CSOs and other donors. Some stakeholders, amongst MS, CSO and Government institutions, expected that the common EU positions would help them to lobby for important reforms in some sectors; similarly the JA, similarly to the Briefing Book before it, could become the new reference document for all stakeholders in policy dialogue, sector consultations etc. There was an expectation that the strong positions will be reflected in the JR and that a monitoring framework will be developed to go alongside the JP to keep the process dynamic and useful.

Incidentally, the JA also enhanced the EU-internal visibility by increasing the knowledge of the MS participating in the exercise of what other MS and the EU were doing in each sector, what type of constraints they met, how they approached sector development, etc.

**8. EQ7: To what extent was the EU organised so as to make JP work?**

*JC 7.1: The extent to which the JP institutional set-up was conducive to a successful process*

The JP process has replicated at field level the flexibility offered by the general JP guidance (see below) but suffered from the absence of process design. The approach to JP in Moldova has been largely unstructured, without a clear methodological, organisational and institutional framework. The process was talked about in 2012 but didn't take off (see introduction) until a few

MS attended a JP workshop in Brussels at the end of 2014. Another workshop was organised in Moldova in January 2015. Creating sufficient interest, trust and understanding of the process took another 6 months. In July 2015 an EU JP roadmap was finally endorsed by the HOMs. A division of labour for the undertaking of the JA was decided at end 2015 but took more account of willingness to undertake the task than of capacities and analytical requirements. A format for presenting the sector analysis in each chapter was proposed in April 2016. Whilst the different phases of the process were relatively clear in the roadmap, there was no clarity and guidance on the process itself: total freedom was left to each sector lead on how to do the work, the extent of participation of other MS in the analysis, the depth of analysis, the organisation of the work (including the consultation process), the sequencing of the work, etc.<sup>57</sup>. As a result, the outcome of the exercise was very variable from one sector to the next.

**In addition to the lack of process design, a lack of clarity of the broader institutional roles of DGNEAR, EEAS and EUD has also been noted and may potentially jeopardise the legitimacy of the process.** The JP process is meant to be led by the field offices but at the same time the EUD should receive information from the EEAS about the programming priorities that flow from the political dialogue (at committee and sub committee levels); however, so far the EEAS or the political officer in the EUD have not been involved in the process. The coherence between the JR that will be elaborated by the EUD/MS based on the JA, and the subsequent programming instructions handed down from HQ is not ensured, even though the JA has been undertaken by EUD/MS in the field within the confines of the AA framework. To illustrate this point, the recent instructions from HQ to bring the programming forward by one year to take account of changed priorities following the Nov 2011 ENP review, appear to undermine the process at local level where programming was foreseen to be undertaken over July 2016-July 2017 for 2018-2021.

**Communications between MS Head offices and field offices in matters of JP were also unclear.** Some MS recognised they received no clear instructions from HQ to participate in the JP, and none had been alerted to the Dec 2015 Council Conclusions that affect the programming time table for 2016/17.

### *JC 7.2: The extent to which JP guidance was clear and well known*

**Despite the JP guidance pack produced by HQ and the two workshops held to explain the JP, there was still considerable uncertainty over the process and its outcomes.** As seen above, the JA process had no guidance except a roadmap (with main deliverables), and, some 4 months into the process, the formats to be used for the joint sector analysis. Interviewed MS expressed their frustrations with the absence of guidance and of process design; they also expressed uneasiness as to how the JR process was going to unfold, taking account of the new calendar set by the Commission.

**In the absence of guidance, flexibility and pragmatism characterised the JA process.** Different sector leads took responsibility of different chapters of the JA and applied their own working and consultation methods to the exercise. Sometimes sub-leads were used if the sector warranted a division into sub sectors (such as health and social protection for example). For each sector/sub-sector a working group was formed of interested MS and the group developed the JA for their sector; extensive consultations were then held with Development Council members either after a first sector analysis had been drafted or even before the drafting. In any case, all stakeholders were consulted at one time or another for submitting comments to the draft analysis.

<sup>57</sup> To note that some MS hired external consultants to assist in the analysis, others did an in-house job, others did a collaborative sharing of the analysis within the sector group of MS, some divided the work up in chunks (by sub-sector for example) and collated later, etc. All configurations were possible.

The lack of systemic approach to the sector analysis led the different chapters of the resulting JA to show some incoherencies and uneven depth and scope of analysis. However, it enabled extensive discussions amongst MS (sharing of views and finding solutions together), greater ownership of the process and its outputs by the MS involved, and adaptation of the JA process to each sector's specificities. It however also raised discussions about the desirability of rewriting parts of the JA at the end to compensate for the lack of a uniform product.

**External expertise was used in support of the process but overwhelmingly, the process drew upon the combined expertise and experience of the MS, EUD, like minded participating donors, CSO, government institutions and other DPs.** External expertise was provided by the JP HQ unit for supporting the overall process and some technical assistance was provided by some MS for sector or thematic analysis. However, the richness of the final product is above all reflecting the very inclusive, consultative and consensual process where each stakeholder has had one or several opportunities to contribute to the analysis.

## **9. EQ8: To what extent did JP reduce partner countries' transactions costs and keep them reasonable for the EU and MS?**

### *JC 8.1: Extent to which JP has reduced transaction costs for partner country governments*

The actual programming process has not yet started in Moldova so the associated transaction costs can not yet be assessed. However, during the JA, the interest of the Government, measured by the comments received to the successive drafts of the JA and their participation in meetings, has been important. The few Government officials interviewed attested to their very positive experience of the consultation process for the JA. They were grateful to be able to express their views on the considered sectors and to reiterate sector priorities above and beyond what is being considered under the AA. The Government also provided extensive comments on the drafts of the documents produced by the EU for their JA. Typically the transaction costs will be measured once the JP is implemented but there were already positive reactions from Government and CSO about the designation of EU sector leads representing the wider EU family in sector dialogue.

### *JC 8.2: Extent to which transaction costs for the EU and MS relating to JP are deemed worth it in light of expected benefits*

EUD and MS transaction costs are equally difficult to measure but all MS overwhelmingly expressed the personal and institutional value of the process even though for some MS the costs and efforts provided were much higher than initially anticipated for such an exercise: for all MS the benefits by far outweighed the costs. This was not necessarily shared by the few EUD officers involved in the process for whom the JP was an extra charge of work difficult to accommodate in their already full workload. For all, MS and EUD alike, transaction costs were raised by the lack of clarity of the process which led to a trial and error approach that could have been avoided.



# Annex N. Country Note Morocco<sup>58, 59</sup>

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## 1. The Joint Programming Process in Morocco

Joint Programming (JP) was first launched in 2012 but didn't gather much traction from the MS. A second attempt at kick-starting the JP process was made in 2015 with the aim to implement a JP by 2016. The process started with the simultaneous drafting of both a joint analysis (JA) and a joint response (JR) in some sectors but has been stalled with the freezing of EU-Morocco relations from December 2015 to May 2016. The intention is for the process to continue and to deliver a JP document by end 2017. The first reference to JP in Morocco dated from 2013 (a Head of Mission - HOM report on JP potential in Morocco); it followed up on a process of EU-MS discussions started in 2012 (with DEVCO support). However, reportedly due to the reluctance of some MS to the idea of JP, the process didn't take off. In 2015, with the assistance of the JP expert from HQ, the initial roadmap designed in 2013 was revised with the aim of having a JP document in 2016. This time, with a change of staff in some MS, the process found better purchase amongst MS but it should be recognised that, overall, EUD and MS interest in the process has remained lukewarm. A gradual JP approach was intended, with JA and JR for five pilot sectors first<sup>60</sup>; so far only one theme (migration) has been advanced to any degree. The low level of enthusiasm for JP and the freezing of EU-Morocco relations over Dec 2015-May 2016 have grounded the JP process to a halt. Whereas the EU was intending to use the JP as its main programming document as from 2017 onwards, this is now no longer possible, neither desired by the EUD since elections are due to take place in October 2016. It is hoped that the JP process can be rekindled at the end of 2016. The work already undertaken so far includes the mapping, in July 2015, of each of the JP donor interventions per sector (FR, ES, DE, BE, DK, IT and UK plus CH and the banks AFD, KfW and EIB) and the skeleton of a first draft JA circulated in September 2015 for comments; they will need to be updated. The existing embryonic draft of a JP document will need to be completed taking account of national priorities.

So far, the partner government, other donors and other national actors (CSOs, private sector, ...) have not been involved in the JP process as it has not yet reached a stage where a joint analysis and response can be shared and discussed. Similarly, the EU's roadmap for the CSO ('la feuille de route') has been validated by MS but not yet discussed with CSOs. The JP document is in an embryonic state, with only the context and a draft of the water & sanitation and the migration chapters written: other sector analyses are not yet completed or are only very partially drafted. The joint implementation of the EU's initiative for CSO is seen by the EUD and MS as a stepping stone towards JP but has not so far been followed by any concrete initiatives.

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<sup>58</sup> Please note that the EU in this note designs both the EU Commission (DGNEAR and other relevant DGs) and European External Action Services (EEAS) and the Member States (MS) whereas EUD is used to design the European Union Delegation only. When we refer to EU+, we mean the EU plus like minded countries, including in the case of Morocco only Switzerland.

<sup>59</sup> The reader is referred to Annex A, which presents the data grid containing information collected at desk and field levels.

<sup>60</sup> These five sectors were: Water and sanitation, migration, health, professional training and women's rights

## 2. EQ1: To what extent did JP respond to global and country-level challenges regarding increased aid effectiveness?

### *JC 1.1: Extent to which JP responded to the global aid effectiveness challenges*

The extent to which aid effectiveness challenges have or will be addressed in the JP is not yet clear as the JP process has stalled midway and the draft analysis has only been completed for one theme (migration). The JP took place in a wider context of mixed aid effectiveness: harmonised and coordinated in sectors benefiting from budget support and bank loans, other sectors remained uncoordinated with very fragmented aid and poor knowledge about aid flows. Despite the existence of formal ODA coordination structures in the form meetings led by line ministries in some sectors, these have not always been functional and all DPs interviewed attested to the weakness of coordination mechanisms. Sector policy dialogue and joined approaches in programme preparation and monitoring have been strongest in sectors supported by budget support (mainly health and education in the past). Concerning project support, the meetings have been more about information and to a lesser extent about coordination, with aid being mostly coordinated bilaterally between the donor and the relevant line ministry and dialogue being limited to operational project-related aspects rather than strategic policy orientations.

Donor-donor coordination has been mainly through 8 thematic working groups, initially set-up by the EU and gradually opened to other DPs and Moroccan authorities. This donor-donor coordination had also been of mixed quality, often realised on an ad hoc basis to address a specific issue when it arose. Indeed most, but not all (for example Spain), of the aid to Morocco stemmed from political and economic (trade and investment) considerations where donors had little incentive to share information or align with others. However, the European banks (EIB, KfW, AFD) reportedly cooperated very well including with the EU through the use of the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF).

Attempts to launch a geographical information system of ODA in 2012 (co-funded by AECID, Spain) have not delivered: the system needs to be updated and knowledge about aid distribution in Morocco is patchy. An extensive donor mapping of existing and programmed sector supports (EU+MS+EIB) was done in 2015 in the context of the JP.

### *JC 1.2: Degree of sensitivity of the JP process to the partner country's context*

The country context is analysed in the draft JP document at the global level (economic, political, governance and aid context) and at the level of the five sectors chosen for piloting the PC, the latter analysis still in progress. The tone of the analysis is mostly non controversial, stating progress in the various areas. Important to note for JP are the fact that Morocco is a LMIC non dependent on foreign aid and the lack of overarching national development policy. Overall, the analysis at global level is descriptive: slightly more critical positions are taken only on civil society and human rights where some important challenges are highlighted. The sector analyses have not yet been completed; the section on migration is the most advanced.

Highlighted in the JA is the fact that Morocco being a LMIC, its ODA landscape was dominated by loans (to which pluri-annual programming doesn't apply). Grants weighed less than loans in total ODA and ODA itself represented only a very small share (2%) of Morocco's budget resources. Three quarters of EU ODA at least were in the form of loans, the remainder in grants, of which around 60% was budget support. According to MS interviewed, a large proportion of their ODA is tied aid. The other important feature of development aid in Morocco is that it is

based on sectoral rather than a national policy since there are a number of sector and thematic ‘vertical’ policies without, however, a clear vision of priorities between them. These sector policies and the priorities of the Association Agreement are therefore the basis for aid programming, including for JP, which was planned to cover 5 sectors on a pilot basis.

**The particularities of Morocco’s context for aid explain to some extent the lack of dynamism of the JP process; most importantly, aid effectiveness issues are not at the forefront of most EU donors’ ambitions or concerns, which are more driven by political and commercial considerations.** This is not the case for Spain, which concentrated its aid in a reduced number of priority sectors, thus aligning to aid effectiveness principles that it actively supports. Many arguments linked to Morocco’s aid profile can be advanced to explain the lack of enthusiasm for JP: more loans than grants and thus more non programmable than programmable aid, the large weight of the EU Commission funding in total EU grant funding, the large weight of France – then Germany – in total EU funding (loans plus grants) making for a rather unbalanced set of donors who cannot speak to each other on an equal footing, etc. In addition the Government itself is using the diversity of donors to its advantage (different sectors of interest, different financial modalities that can be combined according to needs, different donor cycles, etc.) and is reluctant for donors to adopt JP unless it concerns additional funding. However, more important than these arguments is the fact that in Morocco, bilateral aid is often tied and driven by political and commercial agendas, quite different from a development perspective: MS, with the exception of one or two, see themselves as competing against each other and are simply not very interested in working together on JP.

### **3. EQ2: To what extent did JP contribute to reducing aid fragmentation?**

#### *JC 2.1: Reduction of aid fragmentation in countries that have carried out JP*

**It is too early in the JP process to assess whether reduced aid fragmentation will be a result of JP in Morocco; its potential will be limited by the facts that neither the Government nor most MS are in favour and that the JP will concern only five sectors in first instance.** The evolution of aid patterns in Morocco is not well documented but as shown above a majority of aid has been provided by only three donors, the Commission, France and Germany. Spain becomes a big donor if grants only are considered. The matrix established in the context of JP in 2015 shows that EU aid was not well concentrated: grouped in three broad themes, EU Commission aid spanned about 10 sectors and that of France about 8-10 sectors. MS with smaller portfolios limited their support to 3-6 sectors. Whilst there is thus ample scope for reducing aid fragmentation, this is not desired by the Government, whom prefers maintaining a wider range of donors in each sector in order to combine their features in a complementary manner; it is not desired either by MS who wish to maintain projects in areas that are linked to their political and commercial interests. Under the JP process, only five sectors where EU DPs believe they can work together have been proposed for joint programming. This is only a sub-set of all EU+MS areas of intervention and thus also limits the potential scope of reducing aid fragmentation as a direct result of JP to these 5 areas.

#### *JC 2.2: The extent to which JP has facilitated the division of labour beyond the sharing of sector involvement*

**There has been no division of labour yet, even in sectors where EU discussions have taken place. Within sectors, weak coordination has also led to support overlap.** The JP process so far has not given any indications that it will lead to improved division of labour (DoL) or go beyond

that to delegated cooperation or other forms of cooperation between MS even though one MS has expressed the desire for more delegated cooperation under a JP framework. So far, even in sectors concerned by JP, where EU consultations and discussions have taken place to prepare the JA and JR, a proliferation of projects has been noted, with duplications and overlaps (water and sanitation, social/INDH, migration) and no clear actions to address these issues. The sector of migration has been particularly prone to project proliferation: many MS initiated diverse projects to support the sector for political and visibility reasons and various EU budget lines also financed 25 projects at the same time, which provoked a plea for better internal coordination from the EUD. The case of migration illustrates that when particular sectors and/or issues come into the (political) limelight, donors tend to want to support the sector, whether or not other similar initiatives are already on-going.

### *JC 2.3: Extent to which the countries that have carried out JP aimed at reducing aid fragmentation*

**As shown above, there has been no great appetite for reduced aid fragmentation in Morocco.** The Government itself prefers managing its donors according to its needs and their particularities, most MS are driven by political and commercial incentives which do not accommodate aid effectiveness principles and the EU Commission itself might have wished for reduced aid fragmentation but is also grappling with its own in-house aid coordination problems.

## **4. EQ3: To what extent did JP improve aid predictability and transparency of EU and MS aid?**

### *JC 3.1: Changes in EU/MS planning and/or financial cycles following JP*

**The process of JP has been halted for more than 6 months and this has also affected any potential synchronisation of planning cycles.** Since the JP didn't progress as anticipated, individual participating MS have just gone ahead and continued their own programming process regardless even though some such as Spain are in principle in favour of synchronisation. The Commission, which is the only donor identified that was willing to take the JP document as the overarching programming document for its next Single Support Framework, has been not only affected by the lack of progress on the JP but also by the lack of guidelines for programming priorities since political discussions with Morocco had still not been resumed in July 2016. The intention there was to wait till the next October 2016 elections to resume programming based on the new Government's programme.

### *JC 3.2 and 3.3: Predictability and transparency of CPA provided by JP-participants*

**There has been no improvement of aid predictability as yet linked to the JP, mainly because the process hasn't advanced sufficiently.**

**A detailed donor mapping was produced in 2015 in the context of JP preparation providing the status quo and existing commitments per donor, for all sectors and sub-sectors and per project including the committed amounts when known. However, this has had little effect upon improved predictability of overall EU aid.** The donor mapping for EU, MS and EIB was the result of important efforts towards both greater transparency and predictability of EU aid. However, the transparency of EU aid is still relative: whilst CSO appreciated the increased knowledge of sectors of EU interventions, it was also noted that when donors identify new projects, they still undertake door-to-door donor visits to ensure a minimum of coherence of their

projects with the planned projects of the other donors. Efforts towards JP, transparency and coordination were thus insufficient to ensure greater aid effectiveness. As far as predictability of EU aid is concerned, this is of course difficult when more than 75% of it is provided in the form of loans (AFD, KfW and EIB mainly, some EBRD not counted therein): although broad intervention sectors might be indicated in each bank's strategy for the country, amounts and specific projects are the result of Government demands and are not programmable.

## **5. EQ4: To what extent did JP contribute to improved leadership by the partner country of its development priorities?**

### *JC 4.1: Role of the partner country government in the JP*

In 2013 the Government of Morocco was made aware of the JP process and expressed its reticence to a process seen as an impediment to active aid management: the Moroccan Government appreciates the diversity of donors, of instruments, of conditions, of sectors of interest and manages this to suit its own priorities and constraints. The Government would not want to lose this potential for flexibility with pre-determined choices of sectors of intervention as would be imposed by a JP. The Government appreciates JP if limited to additional EU funding.

### *JC 4.2: JP's role in increasing alignment to partner country development priorities*

The JP process was insufficiently advanced to have had any effect on donor's alignment to Government priorities – which are only defined at sector level - but was expected to contribute to improved Government leadership by adopting a sector wide approach which would reduce sector fragmentation in Morocco. The JP process, due to the fact that it increases coherence in participating donors' strategic approach to sector support, should contribute to reduce the sector fragmentation present in many Moroccan sectors (such as water for example). This expected result should thus contribute to improved leadership by the GoM of its development priorities by focusing strategic thinking at a higher level (sector and multi-sector level instead of the current sub-sector level). Indeed as noted above, there is no national development strategy in Morocco to align to, only sector strategies which are often partial (sub sector strategies).

## **6. EQ5: To what extent has JP contributed to increased coherence of EU and MS strategies and programming at country level?**

### *JC 5.1: The extent to which JP favoured convergence of objectives among EU and MS in terms of development strategies and policies at country level*

It is expected, on the basis of the work done so far on the Joint Analysis, the embryonic JP and the CSO roadmap, that the JP will demonstrate a strong convergence of EU and MS objectives. The draft JP is still very tentative but already shows that for the two sectors where a joint analysis has been drafted (water and sanitation and migration), an effort has been made to (i) establish common approaches and identify common concerns and common understanding of the sector priorities and linkages to other sectors and policies; (ii) research complementarities between the EU+MS and other DP supports; (iii) identify common objectives and desired sector results, and (iv) identify common areas for policy dialogue. However, as seen above, this coherence was still largely theoretical as it did not yet lead to greater coordination of actions or an improved division of labour as yet.

*JC 5.2: The extent to which JP documents show coherence of development cooperation with other EU policies*

Both the joint analysis and the draft response show the very strong linkages between the development cooperation agenda and other policies but coherence is put at risk with the multiplication of non coordinated projects. The JP is built on the Association Agreement and shows the strong linkages with the trade agreements, fisheries agreement, migration and security discussions, environment and climate change, humanitarian aid, etc. However, whilst the policy coherence is ensured in principle, the presence of non coordinated projects from different policy tools/budget lines may potentially undermine this coherence.

**7. EQ6: To what extent did JP increase the visibility of EU and MS to partner country authorities and other donor partners?**

*JC 6.1: The extent to which JP contributed to enhance awareness of EU support among partner country authorities and other donors*

There is no evidence as yet that the JP has changed anything in terms of awareness among the Moroccan authorities and the other donors. As mentioned, the JP process has hardly been started and no consultations outside the EU family have yet taken place. The CSO roadmap could change awareness amongst CSO but has not yet been discussed.

*JC 6.2: The extent to which JP contributed to enhance the visibility of EU member states among partner country authorities and other donors*

There is no evidence as yet that the JP has enhanced the EU MS's visibility among the Moroccan authorities and the other donors but more importantly, in a highly politicised aid landscape, each MS has – and wants to keep - its own visibility. The lack of progress on EU visibility is again explained by the fact that the JP process is in the beginning stages, where the partner country and other donors have not yet been consulted. More importantly, it should be noted that where aid is highly politicised and competitive, the room for a joint EU visibility is reduced: each MS has national interests and sometimes conflicts of interest with other MS and wants to keep its own profile distinct from that of others.

**8. EQ7: To what extent was the EU organised so as to make JP work?**

*JC 7.1: The extent to which the JP institutional set-up was conducive to a successful process*

The JP process has been challenging and suffered from its own lack of process design, later compounded by the temporary suspension of the process altogether. The institutional set-up of the process has been largely unsuccessful: the process was steered by the EUD with some assistance from the HQ external consultant but didn't have a clear champion, a clear set of objectives, a clear organisation and set of rules to reach the objectives (despite the earlier agreement on a JP roadmap). The process was a step-by-step approach, which, in a context of little interest by MS, quickly lost its leadership, steering, dynamism and strategic dimensions: it became a technical exercise undertaken by more junior staff before halting altogether when EU-Morocco relations were suspended. Three groups led by MS or the EUD were initially formed to perform

the analysis of 5 sectors but only one group became really functional and the analysis in the sectors was not a joint analysis, rather a compilation of different pieces of work. Attendance of the groups was poor.

*JC 7.2: The extent to which JP guidance was clear and well known*

**The guidance from EUD to MS was unclear; the guidance from HQ to the EUD was very weak and the little there was, was not aligned to the JP requirements for a field led exercise.** As stated above, the EUD did not provide sufficient drive and leadership to pull a set of reluctant MS into an exercise that was rather directionless and unstructured. At the same time, the roles and responsibilities of the different EU players (EUD, DGNEAR, EEAS) in the JP process was also unclear, thus also not helping the steering of the process. Whilst the JP is foremost to be led by the field offices whilst EEAS and DGNEAR give directions based on the AA priorities, this couldn't be done because of the political stalemate; however, whilst HQ was thus not at all involved in the JP process, it still gave the EUD singular ad hoc instructions on future programmes to be undertaken as if JP didn't exist.

**9. EQ8: To what extent did JP reduce partner countries' transactions costs and keep them reasonable for the EU and MS?**

*JC 8.1: Extent to which JP has reduced transaction costs for partner country governments*

**Transaction costs for the Government are unlikely to be reduced should the JP come to fruition; indeed JP is considered by the government as an additional, rather than a substituting process.** The Government is not in favour of negotiating its aid program with the EU family as one entity: as stated above it prefers to keep aid negotiations at a bilateral level and if a JP materialises, this would thus be seen as additional transactions costs to the Government.

*JC 8.2: Extent to which transaction costs for the EU and MS relating to JP are deemed worth it in light of expected benefits*

**Expected benefits from the JP process being few, the related transaction costs, even though small for the moment, were felt to be unnecessary.** So far, costs of the JP have been very limited as there have been few high level meetings (Head of mission or Head of Cooperation) and staff involved in sector/thematic meetings have often been junior staff, sent more to listen than to participate in sector analysis. Nevertheless, since the JP process is seen as additional to the usual workload and is not expected to be used to substitute to own programming or even to provide an overall programming framework, any costs linked to the process are felt to be additional. So far the only initiative where analysis has led to a joint statement of any kind is the CSO roadmap and there participating donors felt that a lot of effort had been put in for no results since the roadmap has not led to any practical implementation.





# Annex O. Country Note Mozambique

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## 1. The Joint Programming Process in Mozambique

The JP process had a solid foundation from the work on Fast Track Initiative (FTI). The EU community carried out a thorough review of its FTI towards the end of 2009, using a standard questionnaire. This contained an analysis of the FTI process, an analysis of sector presence and other relevant aspects addressing the Division of Labour (DoL) agenda. Questions covered the extent to which transaction costs had been diminished (“Don’t know”), if the quality of sector policy dialogue had improved (“Yes”), if aid allocation had become more rational across sectors (“Don’t know”), leading to an overall assessment of the process having provided “Small” aid system and MDG achievements.

**Sector concentration maps prepared.** At the end of 2008 and again 2009, a mapping of 23 key donors including all major EU actors, development banks and UN system was done across 14 fields, showing sectors of concentration, planned exits etc. The mapping contained data on each donor’s strategy/funding cycle, average annual financial commitments, number of technical staff, and description of silent partnerships and delegated cooperation. This mapping has in subsequent years been done as part of the general budget support (GBS) group’s work as the central coordinating body on the side of the donor community.

**The EU’s Joint Action Plan.** In a note of March 2010, the Delegation presented a Joint Action Plan in response to the Council conclusions on an Operational Framework on Aid Effectiveness (Brussels 17 Nov 2009). It addressed three subjects: (i) DoL, (ii) use of country systems, and (iii) technical cooperation for enhanced capacity development. It addressed over-crowded and orphan sectors, comparative advantages of the donors, sector cooperation, working groups, how to reduce transaction costs, stimulate more joint analytical work, and streamline the assistance to technical cooperation. At the same time, it was noted that dialogue with the Government of Mozambique (GoM) was patchy, but assumed this in part was due to the fact that the GoM’s cooperation strategy still had not been approved<sup>61</sup>.

**Task Force on Working Groups and DoL.** In the same 2010 document, the Delegation noted that the GBS group included all the 14 EU MS and the EUD, and its work was structured around Mozambique’s own poverty reduction strategy (*Plano de Acção para Redução da Pobreza*, PARP<sup>62</sup>). The Government furthermore has an aid database, ODAMOZ, where all donors are to enter their aid budgets, so transparency and predictability was improving<sup>63</sup>. The Task Force on Working Groups and DoL was responsible for the annual mapping exercise, and the Delegation stated that one could now see an increasing division of labour, including with non-EU donors. At the same time, however, the number of working groups and embassy staff involved was increasing. This was in fact the reason for the Task Force: the 2010 mapping done by Sweden as head of the GBS, had listed over 50 working groups. While not all were active or had a lead donor, they were listed due

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<sup>61</sup> Mozambique approved its International Cooperation Policy document later in 2010, where it had aligned it with the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, including a Post-Busan Action Plan.

<sup>62</sup> The most recent PARP is PARP III approved in May 2011, covering the period 2011-2014, which was extended by the Government till the end of 2015. A new National Development Strategy (*Estratégia Nacional de Desenvolvimento*, ENDE, 2015-2035), approved by GoM in 2014, is the overarching development framework within which the country’s five-year plans, PARPs, sector plans and annual social and economic plans (*Plano Económico e Social*, PES) are prepared and monitored.

<sup>63</sup> ODAMOZ was not operational for an 18-month period, and only recently re-activated with the responsibility now with the re-structured Ministry of Economics and Finance. The database contains almost no data for the years 2015 and 2016.

to at least two donors having expressed a need for a working group in that field. This pointed to the need for simplifying and reducing the number of coordination bodies.

**Simplifying aid coordination.** In an EU HoMs report of February 2013, it was noted that donor coordination remained complex. In the period following, the EU and other donors argued for a simplification, among other things by having the GBS focus on budget support and not continue handling general donor coordination. As the number of budget support donors had fallen, it also seemed appropriate that the GBS concentrate on its own substantive tasks. This was agreed to, with a restructuring of the aid coordination architecture as of 2015. While there is a Development Partners Group that organises meetings for heads of missions, this does not address operational matters and aid coordination as GBS did, so a number of actors feel a link is missing. This became apparent with the recent fiscal crisis: while the “old” GBS group looked at all aid, USD 2-2.5 billion/year, actual budget support is only USD 250-400 mill/yr, so when discussing the macro-picture the GBS group was only addressing 15-25% of total flows. The GBS chair therefore had to convene *all* the donors to discuss the situation, reflecting this “vacuum at the top” – which the GoM has shown no interest in filling.

**Preparing for JP.** When the EU put forward the JP concept, GoM expressed support, in particular for the idea of better alignment of budget cycles and closer links to national development strategies. The EUD decided that it would begin JP with the *willing and able* MS, and use the Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) of PARP III as the performance monitoring tool. The EU prepared a revised action plan based on producing a joint analysis and response, though not being too ambitious. The existing working groups would be used for sector DoL, and to identify indicative financial support, where there was the intention of also including the European Investment Bank (EIB) and its loans.

**Basing JP on the NIP.** The EU community subsequently agreed that the NIP for the 11<sup>th</sup> EDF, submitted in 2014, contained an analysis that could serve also the JP. The Joint Response would also be based on the NIP, though it would only be partial since the NIP focused on two areas, *Good Governance and Development* and *Rural Development*. It therefore did not have the full strategic approach that was expected of a standard JP. At the same time, the EU community would put in place structures and processes for a more full-scale JP, with a Roadmap for the JP process and dialogue with other national actors: Parliament, employer organisations, civil society, etc.

**Pursuing JP on a partial basis:** The JP process has been pursued in that there are now EU focal points by sector, a mapping of EU support, and JP is a topic at HoCs meetings. But there is still little *Joint Programming*. Most MS continue to prepare their country programmes as bilateral processes, so coordination is more in the form of *information sharing* after agreements are reached.

#### Findings and conclusions on process

- *Foundations for JP were in place in the sense that there was a good mapping of donor engagement; the aid coordination structure was comprehensive; GoM in principle supported JP and its objectives.*
- *However, Mozambique remains a “donor darling” and thus of political importance to many donors, so many MS continue their bilateral programming with little formal coordination with the EU. The decision was therefore taken to undertake a JP with “the able and willing” MS, and concentrate on a few sectors rather than a comprehensive strategic exercise.*
- *At the same time, there is considerable information available, there are examples of silent partnerships, delegated cooperation – but largely at sector level, not as a function of the JP.*
- *The main challenge is perceived to be lack of political support from some MS HQs. If and when authority is delegated to the field with instructions to actively support and engage in JP, it is felt this can be accommodated quickly, given history, capacity, structures and processes in place.*

## 2. EQ1: To what extent did JP respond to global and country-level challenges regarding increased aid effectiveness?

### *JC 1.1: JP responded to the global aid effectiveness challenges*

**The focus on a limited agenda has meant that there is no inclusion of new aid effectiveness challenges:** The process in Mozambique has been pragmatic and focused and thus has not tried to take on new agenda items beyond the original aid effectiveness concerns.

**Main challenge has been lack of clear and explicit JP support from MS HQs:** The degree to which MS at HQ level supports JP varies, which means that the ability of the EU as a system to move ahead has been hampered. A key reason is that Mozambique remains an important bilateral aid partner for many MS and HQs prefer to maintain the historic bilateral links.

**Bilateralisation of aid creates obstacles:** Furthermore, as bilateral agendas – commercial, political – become more important, these concerns are beginning to override collective action approaches such as JP, creating challenges for systemic responses.

### *JC 1.2: The JP process was sensitive to the partner country's aid effectiveness challenges*

**Donor aid is based on Mozambique's poverty reduction strategy:** The donor community, and thus the JP, has Mozambique's poverty reduction strategy and other national planning instruments as the foundations for all aid.

**The need for JP at this moment is being raised as an issue:** The major reason why JP is implemented only on a limited scale is the already complex and comprehensive aid coordination architecture in place – the space and need for a more comprehensive approach within the EU community was seen as limited. The JP is in this sense sensitive to national context. Furthermore, while there are arguments for JP, the situation in Mozambique is changing quickly and in a direction seen as increasingly problematic, which raises questions about the advisability of a comprehensive exercise like JP.

## 3. EQ2: To what extent did JP contribute to reducing aid fragmentation?

### *JC 2.1: Aid fragmentation has been reduced in countries that have carried out JP*


**No Joint Analysis for JP so far:** The situation analysis is taken from the NIP, so this has not affected the aid fragmentation dynamics in any way.

**No Joint Response so no reduction in aid fragmentation:** While quite comprehensive donor mappings have been done, there is no clear indication that this has led to any reduction in aid fragmentation. Since the JP process has not come to the point of producing a Joint Response it has not led to any such changes to the aid picture. The improvements to aid fragmentation that have taken place are mostly due to bilateral aid budget cuts and changing aid priorities coming from respective capitals – that is, from unilateral decisions, not from collective actions like JP.

The two indicators of aid fragmentation (donors per sector and sectors per donor) underwent an opposing evolution between the 2009-2011 period and 2014. While the average number of sectors per European donor (EU and MS) has slightly increased from 13.04 to 13.64, the amount of


European donors per sector has declined, from 8.46 in 2009-2011 to 7.96 in 2014. The two figures below illustrate that no clear trend in aid reduction can be found.

**Figure 1: EU Presence per sector**



Source: OECD database, accessed in December 2016

**Figure 2: Number of sectors per EU donor**



Source: OECD database, accessed in December 2016

### *JC 2.2: The JP has facilitated a division of labour beyond the sharing of sector involvement*

**The JP is too limited to have any DoL consequences:** The focus on two sectors for the JP means most EU+MS aid not included and thus not leading to any substantive DoL analysis or discussion.

**While delegated cooperation exists, it may be dropping off:** There are examples of delegated cooperation but which are results of either sector or direct trust relations, not of the JP – but at the same time the factors working against such arrangements seem to be growing.

### *JC 2.3: The countries that have carried out JP aimed at reducing aid fragmentation*

**Traditional donors want to reduce aid fragmentation:** The traditional donor community including EU+MS actors have participated in and contributed to donor mapping exercises, among other things with a view to identify and eventually address aid fragmentation. Within the EU, the monthly HoCs meetings have been important for sharing information and plans regarding their aid programs and thus sensitised the member states to what other EU members are or intend to do. This is recognized as useful and has reduced the chances of overlaps, duplication and other inefficiencies. While this information sharing has been supported and to some extent justified by JP, the JP process *per se* was not required for this kind of information sharing to take place – though without the encouragement and push regarding JP it may not have happened.

**New sources of development finance may be fragmenting the aid picture, however:** There appears to be a rapid rise in the number, kinds and levels of financial sources for development finance outside traditional donors that are not part of any coordination mechanism and may be driving a fragmentation process.

## **4. EQ3: To what extent did JP improve aid predictability and transparency of EU and MS aid?**

### *JC 3.1: Joint programming led to changes in EU/MS planning and/or financial cycles*

**There were no cases of MS budget cycle synchronisation:** Budget cycles are largely determined at HQ level and thus cannot be changed at field level. For some the key issue is *policy alignment* not *budget cycle synchronisation*, and the two are not necessarily linked. Since JP only covers two sectors, no synchronisation due to JP has in any case taken place.

### *JC 3.2: Predictability of CPA provided by JP-participants improved*

**There has been no increase in predictability and perhaps a drop in commitment to this agenda item:** The only JP-relevant programming was the NIP, using standard criteria, but several actors concerned that changes in context, trust levels, reduces willingness to provide more long-term (predictable) aid commitments.

### *JC 3.3: Transparency of CPA provided by JP-members improved*

**Slight improvement to aid transparency but not JP provided:** The EU-supported aid database ODAMOZ contains some data but far from sufficient to give a good picture of donor aid, and while some donors are now publishing own aid according to IATI and/or PWYF standards, it is

difficult to aggregate to recipient country level so transparency not much better, and none of this due to JP.

**Partner country data suffer from same underlying faulty reporting:** Since partner country data come from ODAMOZ, overall transparency may be somewhat better but far from satisfactory, largely due to donors not providing the data inputs required.

## **5. EQ4: To what extent did JP contribute to improved leadership by the partner country of its development priorities?**

*JC 4.1: The partner country government has played an increasingly important role in the JP*

**There is so far no contents discussion with GoM on JP:** There has been no real dialogue with GoM on JP issues since the process itself is so incipient.

*JC 4.2: JP contributed to increased alignment to partner country development priorities*

**Alignment has improved over a long period of time:** There is a long history of alignment to country priorities in Mozambique but JP has not really made a difference so far in this respect. But since the EU tailored its support to *Rural Development* in a way that is meant to complement and support the assistance already provided by the EU MS engaged in the sector, EU support has become better aligned. It is expected/hoped that the closer dialogue that such sector discussions engender will over time influence approaches and generate joint insights and findings – but till now there are no identifiable changes, and definitely not that can be attributed to JP.

## **6. EQ5: To what extent has JP contributed to increased coherence of EU and MS strategies and programming at country level?**

*JC 5.1: JP favoured convergence of objectives among EU and MS in terms of development strategies and policies at country level*

**JP discussions have reconfirmed shared values more than harmonised objectives:** The JP process has provided the EU partners validation of common values and foundations for aid, but since little JP programming has happened there is no documentable *convergence*.

**Sector collaborations point towards harmonization:** In the JP sectors, there has been practical collaborations that point towards greater harmonization of approaches and policies but also identifies why MS policy shifts may throw up roadblocks on the road to closer objectives.

*JC 5.2: JP documents show coherence of development cooperation with other EU policies*

**There is so far no indication of other EU policies being part of the JP discussions.** Given the sector attention of JP there has been no real scope for taking on board other EU policies.

## **7. EQ6: To what extent did JP increase the visibility of EU and MS to partner country authorities and other donor partners?**

*JC 6.1: JP contributed to enhance awareness of EU support among partner country authorities and other donors*

**GoM is aware of the JP and the EUD central role:** There is so far no communication strategy around the JP, and there is no indication that JP as a process has heightened the EU community's visibility vis-a-vis the GoM or other donor partners

**Donors may be aware of JP through sector groups:** As far as the donor community is concerned, the only increased visibility appears to be in the working group on Rural Development.

*JC 6.2: JP contributed to enhance the visibility of EU member states among partner country authorities and other donors*

**There is no additional MS visibility due to JP:** All indications are that JP per se has not changed the visibility of any MS at any level.

## **8. EQ7: To what extent was the EU organised so as to make JP work?**

*JC 7.1: The JP institutional set-up is conducive to a successful process*

**The formal set-up is known and actual support has been positive:** The formal structure and process for JP is well known and understood.

*JC 7.2: JP guidance was clear and well known*

**General guidance and support has been appropriate:** Overall the guidance is known, the use of consultants and regional workshops has been constructive and useful, so short-comings have not been due to problems regarding the overarching information and guidance.

## **9. EQ8: To what extent did JP reduce partner countries' transactions costs and keep them reasonable for the EU and MS?**

*JC 8.1: JP has reduced transaction costs for partner country governments*

**No GoM transaction costs from JP till now:** There have been no actual transaction cost consequences – increases or reductions – to GoM of the limited JP so far.

*JC 8.2: Transaction costs for the EU and MS relating to JP are deemed worth it in light of expected benefits*

**Transaction costs at HQ level nil while in field seen as high:** There has been minimal of JP transaction costs so far at HQ level. At field level, most of the costs have fallen on the EUD – which sees this as unfortunate since JP is a shared responsibility – but both EUD and MS feel frustrated at limited progress and considerable time use. A main reason there has not been more

of a JP process is that a number of MS feel that the JP would come as an additional cost in terms of programming while benefits would be meagre. The collaborative arrangements seen as the most useful are the ones at sector level, and these are already in place, are more inclusive as they are not EU-focused, and have a history with some continuity that they do not want to lose, so energy is focused on these existing mechanisms.



# Annex P. Country Note Myanmar

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## 1. The Joint Programming Process in Myanmar

Myanmar has embarked on a process of democratisation since 2011. While eliminating trade and economic sanctions (with the exception of the arms embargo), the European Union and Member States have been increasing their engagement with Myanmar with various and evolving aid modalities (from contracts with civil society and large multi-donor trust funds to proposed budget support), and some of them are in direct dialogue with Government.

In 2013, the EU and Member States agreed a Comprehensive Framework<sup>64</sup> covering political, social and economic aspects of the transition process. It established that Member States and EU Institutions would join forces to design programmes of assistance, echoing the Council Conclusions of April 2013<sup>65</sup>. The same year, an EU-Myanmar Task Force was set up to bring together the tools and instruments the EU has at its disposal to support democratisation and economic reforms.

Thereafter, 13 Member States and the EU agreed a “**Joint EU Development Partners’ Transitional Strategy**” for Myanmar (2014-2016). It was designed locally and in accordance with the findings of a Political Economy Analysis commissioned jointly by Member States and the EU (February 2013). This strategy includes a joint analysis of context and risks; lessons learned from past cooperation; an articulation of the EU approach, based on a set of values and concentration of support in six areas (as per the 2013 Comprehensive Framework); and transparency on who is doing what, with indicative financial projections (five sectors and four cross-cutting issues).

The **Joint Transitional Strategy was set for the 2014-2016 period** in order to allow the subsequent strategy to take into account the outcome of the general elections (programmed for late 2015) and the new Government’s priorities and planning cycle. In November 2015, competitive and credible elections took place with the victory of the National League for Democracy (NLD); on 1 February 2016 the new parliament was inaugurated and in March 2016, NLD’s Htin Kyaw became the first civilian president since 1962; and in April, Aung San Suu Kyi assumed the newly created role post of State Counsellor. She is also Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister in the President's Office. Shortly thereafter, in June 2016, the EU High Representative and the Commission presented the Council and the European Parliament with a Joint Communication “Elements for an EU strategy vis-à-vis Myanmar/Burma: A Special Partnership for Democracy, Peace and Prosperity”<sup>66</sup>. The same month, the Council adopted a set of “Council conclusions on EU strategy with Myanmar/Burma”<sup>67</sup>. As of August 2016, new Government policies were expected on development goals and development cooperation modalities.

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<sup>64</sup> [https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/138272.pdf](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/138272.pdf)

<sup>65</sup> The Council Conclusions stated: "The Council encourages relevant authorities in Member States and EU institutions to proceed without delay to joint programming of development aid for Myanmar/Burma while respecting the existing harmonisation efforts."

<sup>66</sup> <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016JC0024&from=EN>

<sup>67</sup> <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10482-2016-INIT/en/pdf>

## **Findings**

- Bearing the fast-evolving and phased context of Myanmar, and the recent character of both engagement of many European partners and of Joint Programming itself, the line of enquiry is less “Has Joint Programming delivered the expected policy dialogue and aid effectiveness benefits”; and more “Are things being done in a way that are conducive to delivering these benefits”?

## **2. EQ1: To what extent did JP respond to global and country-level challenges regarding increased aid effectiveness?**

In 2014 (year the Joint Transitional Strategy came into effect), **Myanmar presented both challenging conditions and high potential for joint programming.** The challenging conditions included

- Myanmar’s long period of isolation, which meant that development interventions took place traditionally without the Government’s participation, in the absence of a national development strategy and policies, and with scarce information on development indicators. Except for the Framework for Economic and Social Reforms (FESR) 2012-15 and some sector plans (notably in health), there was not much to align to.
- The sheer number of development partners in Myanmar: 45 partners, of which 16 European partners (based on effective disbursements, 2014). Many of them engaged recently and did not have a local representation or a clear idea of its engagement when joint programming started (2012). There were no aid coordination mechanisms up to 2011, with the notable exception of MDTFs, which worked well.

**At the same time, this context meant that Joint Programming had high potential benefits:**

- Myanmar was (and is) in a fast-evolving political and economic transition, with acute human development, peacebuilding and statebuilding challenges: this entails high value added from development partners pooling information, sharing analysis, conducting joined up analysis, and having a shared intervention logic to focus on “what is a priority when everything is a priority”.
- The development context was fast changing too, with vigorous engagement from traditional and non-traditional donors alike, and new sources of development finance. In this diverse development landscape, European partners undoubtedly represent an important voice (based on OECD data on disbursements, they represent more than Japan, the first donor to Myanmar), able to influence development policies.
- Finally, European cooperation has room for improved aid effectiveness: out of 17 European DPs, 11 provided 1% or less than the total European disbursement (2012).

## **3. EQ2: To what extent did JP contribute to reducing aid fragmentation?**


**European cooperation in a fragmented aid landscape.** The political and economic reforms that began in Myanmar in 2011 along with the gradual suspension of economic sanctions led to a more complex and fragmented aid landscape: many existing development partners increased their assistance while new development partners began to enter the country, creating a proliferation of projects, programmes, missions and studies. This has imposed considerable transaction costs on a Government that was already facing important capacity challenges. Government officials had little experience in dialogue and in managing development partners and aid flows, while development partners operating in the country had not been used to receiving guidance from Government. As

part of the Joint Strategy process, 14 European partners agreed to concentrate resources in six areas (peace building, governance, rural development, health, education, trade and private sector development) and four crosscutting issues (human rights, support to civil society, environment, cultural cooperation). There was some rationalisation: for instance, the EU focused its support away from health and towards the education sector, due to the strong presence of some Member States in health. Several Member States recognised that, “at least, we don’t duplicate (each others’ interventions)”, but because of their own planning, the Joint Strategy “was mostly a cut and paste of individual strategies”.

**However, so far, aid effectiveness gains are modest in terms of reduced aid fragmentation.**

In 2012, each sector had an average of 5.1 DPs, ranging between two (water; rural development) and 11 (governance). By 2014, this figure went up to 5.6, ranging between 1 (communications) and 12 (governance) (disbursements, based on OECD Credit Reporting System classification). This is not so far from the maximum of five aimed for in the 2007 EU Code of Conduct on Division of Labour. But it still represents an increase rather than a decrease. In fact, the ambitions of Joint Strategy may<sup>68</sup> have not been very high with regards to aid concentration: it had planned for 7.5 DPs on average to be in each sector/theme, and Member States have not stayed within these parameters either (HoMs report, 2015; interviews, 2016). The same increasing trend can be observed when comparing the average number of DP per sector from 2009-2011 with the 2014 figure.


**Figure 1: European Partners presence per sector**



Source: OECD database, accessed in December 2016. The sectors considered here are the ones defined in OECD statistics.

What is more, the Joint Strategy includes six areas and four crosscutting issues, which is more than the three sectors of concentration the 2007 EU Code of Conduct called for in principle. Between 2009 and 2011, EU donors were active on average in 5.4 sectors. In 2014, that figure had increased to 7.3 sectors, far from the objective of the EU Code of Conduct.

<sup>68</sup> Sector/theme classification in the Transitional Strategy differs from the CRS classification.

**Figure 2: Number of sectors per EU and MS donor**

Source: OECD database, accessed in December 2016.

**Moreover, the Joint Strategy has not led to much behaviour change.** Interviewees cited numerous examples of European partners developing new programs without bringing it up early enough in a coordination meeting (sharing early enough would mean scope for joint analysis and joint approaches rather than an addition of projects). Generally, European partners found they know each other better but that the strategic dialogue is still lacking: in spite of the Comprehensive Framework and now the 2016 Myanmar Strategy, they found there is no shared theory of change yet (“we have no common values, no common views, and no common image”). European partners also showed limited appetite for synchronization, wondering if it would be worth it (other countries’ experience show that synchronization makes joint fact-finding, joint analysis and joint planning much easier). No European partner, including the EU (MIP 2014-2020) has replaced its bilateral strategy with the Joint Strategy nor is the Joint Strategy a central reference in the bilateral dialogue with Government that each EUDP continues to hold (interviews, 2016).

**There are, however, positive examples of joint approaches,** notably cofunding and joint implementation (e.g. reproductive health; support to civil society; peace support); some joint messaging to national counterparts on gender, civil society, and human rights; and people interviewed have expressed satisfaction with, for example the experience with the Joint Peace Fund (example mentioned most times). Most interviewees noted that a more joined-up European approach does not exclude better harmonisation across all DPs; in fact, the first should contribute to the second.

#### **4. EQ3: To what extent did JP improve aid predictability and transparency of EU and MS aid?**

**Introducing parameters for aid transparency and predictability.** As interviews point out, there was not a “clear picture” of how aid structures worked in practice before joint programming started in Myanmar (interview, January 2016): up until 2011, the majority of aid to Myanmar was in fact provided outside of Government structures and systems with development partners working on a relatively *ad hoc* basis. Communication and coordination between agencies were limited, with no single coordination structure bringing DPs together, no system of sector working groups, and no comprehensive aid information management system. By 2016, there was a well-functioning aid

management system (mohinga.info), and DP coordination mechanisms were much improved, but some of the 17 sector working groups were still not meeting, and Government participates in few.

**Against this background, the Joint Strategy brings welcome details on the indicative programming resources by sector**, for most European partners (some were still defining their areas of focus when the Strategy was being prepared). As elsewhere, the Joint Transitional Strategy only provides indicative estimates, and actual disbursements can end up being well above or below the indicative estimates – as may be required, especially in a transition context.

## **5. EQ4: To what extent did JP contribute to improved leadership by the partner country of its development priorities?**

The Joint Transitional Strategy process took place in the wider context of Myanmar's re-engagement with the international community and renewed cooperation with development partners – when development priorities were not articulated beyond the FESR and some sector policies. In January 2013, Government convened the first Myanmar Development Cooperation Forum, which brought together a wide range of senior officials from both traditional and emerging development partners to discuss the ongoing reforms and how they could be best supported. The Forum concluded with the Nay Pyi Taw Accord for Effective Development Cooperation. European partners then put forward a Joint Response with specific commitments on how the EU and Member States will support implementation of the Accord. Prolonging discussions with Government, the EU adopted the Comprehensive Framework for the European Union's policy and support to Myanmar in July 2013, which served as a basis for the Joint Strategy. Alignment to national priorities could probably not have been deeper under the circumstances, except through extensive consultations including civil society.

**As of August 2016, development partners were expecting a comprehensive national development plan from the new government, as well as the articulation of preferred aid coordination modalities.** Until this happens, and in order to align to national priorities and foster national leadership over the country's development, European partners are postponing work on the next Joint Strategy, although the structure and lead drafters are agreed. This is appreciated by Government (interview, Ministry of Planning and Finance, 2016), and is in line with the European Heads of Mission statement (2015 report): "EU development partners have agreed to explore approaches to increase joint programming from 2016, after national elections have taken place, a new Government has been formed, and a new national development plan has been launched."

## **6. EQ5: To what extent has JP contributed to increased coherence of EU and MS strategies and programming at country level?**

**Across the EU and Member States, the Joint Strategy process has ensured basic coherence.** Several meetings, workshops, and retreats have been organized to discuss common views. This approach was reflected in the joint EU Response agreed for the Myanmar Development Cooperation Forum in January 2013. As pointed out during a Heads of Mission retreat in September 2015, coordination between the EU Delegation and the EU Member States active in Myanmar has been improving.

However, early in the process, European partners lacked sufficient communication and coordination structures such as sector working groups to discuss potential common objectives and division of labour, and in some cases the contours of each partner's engagement were still being defined. Moreover, decision-making was not always decentralized to the EU and Member States on the ground, because of reasons including the high political attention surrounding Myanmar;

pressure to spend; the recent nature of many partners' engagement and, in some cases, for Myanmar *not* being a priority country (17 European partners are present in Myanmar although Myanmar is not a priority country for the bilateral cooperation of several, e.g. Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, and the Netherlands). Finally, Member States representations have very different staffing capacities. As a result, the influence that the strategy has had over its signatories' bilateral work remains limited (Retreat report, 2015; interviews, 2016). That being said, interviews in August 2016 confirmed appetite across the board for joint strategizing and increased coherence as a priority – whereas joint messaging was supported only by half, and detailed division of labour (DoL) remained secondary for most.

**Among EU policies, interviews did not reveal obvious areas of policy incoherence**, even if, as elsewhere, many thematic and regional programmes are not within the scope of the Joint Transitional Strategy. One Member State made a call to include private sector development and trade in EU Development Counsellors' meetings: "The Thai and Chinese will not wait for us to do our policy work, they are just coming in, and will make decisions that are irreversible."

## **7. EQ6: To what extent did JP increase the visibility of EU and MS to partner country authorities and other donor partners?**

**It is still too early to gauge the extent to which the Transitional Strategy process made the EU and individual partners more visible**, but European partners in Myanmar formulated joint statements at the 2015 Myanmar Development Cooperation Forum and Head of Missions perceive the process as raising Europe's visibility as a coherent actor (Retreat Report 2015), as well as the visibility of smaller European partners (interviews, August 2016). Interviews showed that, while European stakeholders appreciate the idea of an increased European profile ("We all want the EU to shine"), there is little clarity as to what this increased profile would be used for, i.e. to influence what and whom. It is still early days, however: many partners have not yet established direct dialogue with Government, and the new Government has yet to define how it wants to interact with the international community.

## **8. EQ7: To what extent was the EU organised so as to make JP work?**

**Guidance from headquarters and the institutional set up at HQ was deemed clear, except for the role of EEAS specifically:** several interviewees stressed the need to know what kind of contribution and support to expect from EEAS (this was also mirrored in Member States, who found it hard to invest in joint programming when their own Ambassador was not supportive or ambiguous about joint programming: "the real driver is Ambassador's interest").

**The local process in Myanmar has been perceived as time consuming and not always efficient**, especially given other, all-partners coordination process, also time consuming. Extensive back-and-forth consultations between field offices and headquarters in Europe were an additional factor (a burden not mentioned in other Asian countries surveyed). Moreover, stakeholders point out that many Member States lacked sufficient capacity at the country level to substantially engage in joint programming. The question remains whether Member States would have more capacity to do so in future. However, there are hopes that the coordination process will be streamlined in future, especially if Government confirms the plans for a high-level Development Aid Coordination Unit (DACU). This could help make joint programming more efficient.

## **9. EQ8: To what extent did JP reduce partner countries' transactions costs and keep them reasonable for the EU and MS?**

The JP process has not increased or reduced transactions costs for Government, as direct engagement has been limited so far. However, as most European partners maintained bilateral strategies outside of prior European coordination, the reduction in transaction costs would in all probability be less than expected (Heads of Mission Report, 2015; interviews, 2016).












As for the EUD and Member States, most find there is scope for more efficiency, but that greater Government clarity in future on development priorities and aid coordination will help joint programming: there will be more concrete opportunities to position themselves vis-à-vis Government preferences, for joint messaging, and possibly joint implementation.

## **10. Lessons Learned and Conclusions**

In conclusion, joint programming's relevance to context is clear, even if conditions in Myanmar make it challenging. There are some gains (realised or on track to) in terms of transparency; predictability; internal EU coherence; and visibility. Gains are very modest when it comes to aid fragmentation and efficiency.

However, and without being too prospective, the next phase should provide greater clarity with regards to national development priorities and preferences in relation to aid coordination and aid modalities. It could significantly open up space for more tangible gains: joint programming would be more than ever relevant; there could be scope for reduced aid fragmentation in line with national priorities; increased predictability and transparency in line with national priorities; and increased coherence to meet Government's developmental agenda. The development landscape is likely to be ever more complex, with even more development partners and even more diverse sources of development finance. In the next phase, Joint Programme may have value in new areas.

But for alignment to happen for increased visibility to turn into influence on issues critical to development outcomes, and for greater efficiency, there is a need for a more strategic dialogue than currently the case and clearer support from headquarters for both the EU and Member States. For example, which Member States are ready to put a place a "sector lead system" that allows a designated European partner to speak on behalf of the group (both with Government and in the all-partners coordination meetings), thus freeing up time currently taken up by multiple coordination processes? Some find that if a non-European partner leads well on a particular sector, then there is no need to appoint a European partner to lead: "We have to be apart of the wider aid architecture". Another issue is the need to prepare for scenarios where Government delays announcement of its priorities (at least three Member States were already progressing their new strategies as of August 2016), or the priorities are not prioritized, or development cooperation is managed at the project level, or Government priorities do not correspond to priority areas/areas where European partners have a value added (as one Member State said: "We will not move out of agriculture because we have clear value- added in at least two subsector issues").

	So far	Next phase (potential)
Q1. Relevance to context		
Q2a. Effectiveness (reduced aid fragmentation)		
Q2b. Effectiveness (predictability, transparency)		
Q3. Alignment and national ownership	N.A.	To address
Q4. Coherence with MS and within EU		
Q6. Visibility / influence of EU and MS as a group and individually	 **	To address
Q7a. Efficiency (clear EU guidance from HQ and proper EU setup)		To address
Q7b. Efficiency (transaction costs for EU, MS, partner country)		To address

\*Perception of stakeholders

\*\* Clear results but not enough elements to attribute to JP

### The experience in Myanmar also holds lessons learned for Joint Programming elsewhere:

1. Joint Programming is the result of a joint approach, and contributes to a joint approach, but is not the beginning or the end. Therefore, there is a need to reflect on how Joint Programming is expected to contribute, in concrete terms, to increased development impact (and, in the case of Myanmar or other transitions, to a successful transition), especially when other development partners are important actors that cannot be ignored. What are the incentives for Member States, when they are already co-strategising and co-implementing with non-European partners?
2. Most potential value in fast-changing contexts such as Myanmar could be at two levels:
  - Strategic, as there is a critical path towards development and stability: interventions have to be in line with priorities; take into account the actions of other development partners, including non-traditional ones; and take into account all the parameters that will influence development and stability: aid is likely to be only one part of the equation.
  - Sector level: this is where joint approaches, joint funding, joint implementation, and delegated cooperation could provide the most tangible results, and serve as a demonstration of the value of joint programming.
  - Anything in the middle may be of less value compared to costs, given the need for continued flexibility in fast-changing contexts.
3. Joint Programming should continue to remain locally led, with light guidance that capitalizes on the experience. Dedicated human resources are needed.



# Annex Q. Country Note Palestine<sup>69,70,71</sup>

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## 1. The Joint Programming Process in Palestine

The Joint Programming (JP) process in Palestine has taken place in the context of a pre-existing development partners (DPs) coordination structure but also of important prior achievements in aid effectiveness by the Office of the European Union Representative (EUREP), EU Member States (MS) and like-minded DPs. In Palestine, the aid coordination structure took the form of four strategic groups and 19 Sector Working Groups (SWGs) led by the Palestinian Authority (PA) and co-chaired by the lead DP in each sector, many of which have been EUREP or MS. In mid-2016, the structure was being revised (report forthcoming) to enhance its effectiveness as findings pointed towards great variation in the functionality of SWGs between sectors and rather poor overall aid coordination. In the meantime, informal ‘shadow’ SWGs (open only to DPs) were set up to palliate to some extent the failings of the formal SWGs and facilitate inter DP coordination at sector level.

Within this overall aid coordination context, EUREP’s first efforts to improve EU coordination were prompted by the ‘EU Code of Conduct on Division of Labour - DoL and complementarity’ in a complex and volatile environment of DP overcrowding (22 EU MS present, 10-15 active in cooperation). With the view to increase aid effectiveness, coherence and sustainability, EUREP developed, in 2011, an ‘EU Local Strategy on Development Cooperation’ (EU LDS); EU Heads of cooperation (HoCs) were consulted and the LDS was endorsed by EU Heads of Mission (HoMs) in October 2011. The EU LDS was a first attempt to increase aid effectiveness and bring together EU political objectives and development cooperation instruments<sup>72</sup>. It outlined the EU response in support of the Palestinian National Development Plan 2011-2013 (PNDP 2011-13) and, for each of the sectors of involvement of the European Commission and/or MS, sector strategy fiches were developed in alignment to the PNDP (January 2012). With hindsight, this process has been described by interviewees as being a EUREP rather than an EU process. EU MS were consulted but did not actively participate in the process and none of them used the EU LDS.

**Following many discussions on JP during 2012 between EUREP and HQ, then between EUREP and MS, a decisive step towards the process was taken in February 2013 when HOMs endorsed a Joint View on the feasibility of JP in Palestine: ‘EU HoMs agree that the EU’s political objectives can and should be further advanced by convergence of development cooperation and, over time, by Joint Programming’.** Amongst discussions to update the EU LDS and the sector strategy fiches, a core EU MS group thus expressed strong interest for moving forward on JP. In October 2013, Switzerland and Norway joined the group as like-minded interested DPs<sup>73</sup>. A JP roadmap towards a gradual EU JP for Palestine in support of the PNDP 2014-2016 was defined, initially

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<sup>69</sup> The name Palestine is now used by the EU with the following footnote: "This designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the MS on this issue".

<sup>70</sup> In this note, the EU designs both the EU Commission (DG DEVCO, DG NEAR and other relevant DGs) and the European External Action Services (EEAS) and the Member States (MS) whereas EUREP is used to design the European Union Representative Office only. When we refer to EU+, we mean the EU plus like minded countries, including in the case of Palestine, Norway and Switzerland.

<sup>71</sup> Please see Annex A, which presents the data grid containing information collected at desk and field levels.

<sup>72</sup> See EU LDS October 2011, summary: ‘This Strategy outlines the political and operational framework conditions for operating in the oPt, (...) It constitutes a guiding reference for EU development cooperation in line with good principles of aid effectiveness in fragile states by bringing together EU political objectives and development cooperation instruments.’

<sup>73</sup> To be noted that EUPOL COPPS is closely associated with the process in the justice and security sectors.

aiming for a JP to be produced by end 2013 on the basis of a revised EU LDS, then (October 2013) readjusted in light of existing challenges to 2017. Between 2014 and 2016 the EU LDS approach with its 16 sector fiches evolved to a more focused and results-oriented JP approach based on 5 strategic pillars; in June 2016 good progress had been booked on the EU core principles chapter and on the Joint Analysis (JA); a Joint Response (JR) and the 5 strategic pillars was being formulated.

**The main tools used for JP during the early steps were the sector strategy fiche, complemented later by the Results-Oriented Framework (ROF): these rolling and flexible tools served to build trust and consensus of views amongst EU+ and provided a common basis for sector policy dialogue.** The gradual, step-by-step approach called for an initial piloting phase for JP in two sectors over 2014-2016, to be extended later to more sectors. The main piloting tool was the review of previous strategy fiches in two sectors (justice, led by NL; and local governance, led by DK) integrating both a joint analysis and a joint response. Based on the DoL agreed under the EU LDS, each sector had an EU lead, a group of active DPs and jointly agreed roles and responsibilities. The year 2013 started a cycle of many EU+ meetings, working on the joint sector strategy fiches (rapidly extended from the initial 2 to all 16 sectors) and also on areas of special interest such as East Jerusalem and refugees. This collaborative work enabled the building of consensus and trust amongst the EU+ supporting the sector/area through discussions and agreement on common objectives, key sector issues/challenges to be addressed and responses to these challenges.

In this respect, it is important to note that the JP process has always been seen as a process where shared views and consistency between the political and policy goals of EU MS were to be pursued: the sector fiches were one of the means to agree on important reform priorities and to discuss these with the PA. Another tool developed in the context of JP to enhance policy dialogue with the PA was the Results-Oriented Framework (ROF), launched in 2015, initially for 6 sectors<sup>74</sup>. Formally agreed with the PA, it enabled progress to be assessed in a number of critical areas on a quarterly basis within a 9-monthly - then later a yearly - framework of targeted reform results. Based on its success as a policy dialogue tool, the ROF was then integrated into the JP as an important tool to monitor short term progress within the pillars' wider logical framework spanning 4 years. The streamlining of the 16 sector fiches during 2016 into five pillar fiches did thus not only increase focus but also result-orientation of the JP.

**The process of JP has been the shared responsibility of EUREP + MS with a lead role of the EUREP on the overall process and lead roles for different MS in each sector. The EUREP's political section has not been involved.** The JP process has been undertaken under EUREP's overall guidance with full and active participation of twelve MS and of two like-minded donors in developing the pillar fiches and involvement of the other MS through information sharing. According to the study of best practices in JP undertaken by ECDPM in 2015, (i) the participatory approach and working with a 'coalition of the willing' has been fruitful, keeping the process dynamic, and (ii) the JP process benefited from the hands-off approach by HQ that allowed EU+MS in the field to shape the process. However, the political section and the EEAS in HQ have not (yet) been part of the process.

**The PA have been very involved in all stages but more intensely in the last 2 years (2015, 2016) when the JP has been prepared in parallel to the PA's own National Policy Agenda 2017-2022 (NPA).** Discussions with the PA took place in the past to align the LDS and the PA's PNDP, but the synchronisation of the PA and JP cycles and the internal restructuring of the PA

<sup>74</sup> The ROF concerns the following 6 sectors : macroeconomics, public finance management (PFM), public administration reform (PAR), social protection, education and health.

have allowed a stronger and more fruitful consultation to take place since 2015. The EU+ has had an opportunity to comment on the PA's matrix of strategic priorities before the new national policy document (the NPA) was being finalised and this has also enabled the JP to shape its 5 pillar fiches accordingly even though the full comprehensive NPA was not yet available.

## **2. EQ1: To what extent did JP respond to global and country-level challenges regarding increased aid effectiveness?**

### *JC 1.1: Extent to which JP responded to the global aid effectiveness challenges*

**As indicated in the introduction, JP took place in a context where EU+MS strategic coordination was already well advanced.** Aid effectiveness was actively promoted by the EUREP from 2011 onwards with the elaboration of the EU LDS and sector strategy fiches in alignment to the PA's PNDP 2011-13. The launching of the JP process in 2013 could thus build on a solid basis of EU DoL and strategy already addressing aid effectiveness challenges.

### *JC 1.2: Degree of sensitivity of the JP process to the partner country's context*

**The political and geographic context in Palestine is extremely complex and difficult and joint multi-annual programming in such a volatile, fragmented and institutionally weak environment is a real challenge.** However, there is no doubt from the consulted documentation and interviews that all MS, like-minded countries (Switzerland and Norway) and EUPOL COPPS embraced the JP opportunity to work together. The JP aims for more than aid effectiveness since, in the words of the EUREP, it also addresses the political dimension by aiming to 'affirm and defend the shared vision of European actors in Palestine and ensure the convergence between the development work and the political objectives of the EU'. This approach is a direct response to a context where 'development' has been stalled for many years, and where, in the words of one MS, 'the JP should be a channel to express, from a development practitioner's point of view, what the real challenges are, which are highly political'. The JP process has thus taken full account of the country context and is responding to it.

**The JP process has also been adapted to the constraints of individual MS who do not all share the same political views.** The JP has offered the opportunity to develop a common strategic analysis but, for the moment, has left great flexibility to each MS to use the JP as it sees fit. Although the participating MS are very much in favour of the process, their positions vis-à-vis a full substitution of the JP to their own programming is still very cautious. The response to the Joint Analysis has not yet been fully developed, but the 16 sector strategy fiches/now 5 pillar fiches go a long way in expressing the positions and intents of the EU+.

**The JP process so far might have been more about strategic thinking than about programming.** The JP process has not just offered a basis for more comprehensive information about the situation in the country, but has enabled EU+ to have a better understanding of each other's (political and developmental) positions, priorities and constraints.

### **3. EQ2: To what extent did JP contribute to reducing aid fragmentation?**

#### *JC 2.1: Extent of aid fragmentation reduction in countries that have carried out JP*

**There is no evidence as yet that aid fragmentation will be reduced as a consequence of JP although better complementarity of aid is expected.** Preliminary evidence suggests that over time, the number of areas of support has remained unchanged in Palestine: out of 23 sectors/areas (grouped into 5 cluster Pillars) in which the PA has developed sector strategies, 19 are supported by DPs, unchanged between the 2011-2013 and the 2014-2016 development plans. However, more detailed data would be required to underpin any conclusions at global and sector level. Indeed, many interviewees mentioned that improved coordination at sector level linked to the EU+ initiatives had led to better complementarity, even of non-EU interventions.

**Most importantly, the JP process has ensured that EU+ worked together towards a joint understanding of sector challenges, a common vision of the objectives under each of the 5 pillar fiches and a common response to this analysis, thus laying the grounds for increased complementarity and DoL.** Based on the experience of having first elaborated, then updated the 16 sector strategy fiches related to the PNDP, the 5 pillar fiches followed a logical framework type approach where pillar objectives, specific (sector) objectives and expected results are identified with regards to the overarching goal of a two state solution and improving the viability of a Palestinian state (including improving the social and economic situation) and with regards to NPA framework. The pillar fiches would thus be aligned to the priorities indicated in the NPA matrix but with flexibility for adapting if necessary once the fully comprehensive NPA is published (expected end 2016). The pillar fiches would also include a snapshot of the existing DP coordination and policy dialogue priorities, of the PA's financial and policy commitments and an overall risk assessment of the sector/s within the pillar. This whole process of elaborating the pillar fiches has thus built a common approach within EU+ going well beyond the reduction of aid fragmentation: the JP has undoubtedly created incentives for EU+ to work towards a common goal with a common approach and understanding, thus contributing to reduce aid fragmentation even if this is not (yet?) measurable in the aid statistics.

#### *JC 2.2: The extent to which JP has facilitated a division of labour beyond the sharing of sector involvement*

**In Palestine DPs have a history of closely working together on specific issues and programmes.** There are currently various common funding mechanisms and pool funding with participation of EU+ and also other DPs as well as Joint Financing Agreements; in addition there are common frameworks for intervention in several sectors/issues. Within the EU+ group, the period 2008-2014 counted 9 delegation agreements and 10 transfer agreements. In 2013, when launching the EU JP, MS committed to continue using pooled technical assistance, delegated cooperation, co-financing and national systems and to develop an EU Joint approach in a number of focal sectors (then 16, now joined under 5 pillars). This commonness of approach, the use of delegated cooperation, of joint programmes and joint sector frameworks for intervention, are well developed in Palestine and are very effective tools for reducing aid fragmentation.

#### *JC 2.3: The countries that have carried out JP aimed at reducing aid fragmentation*

**Whereas reduction of aid fragmentation was a primary concern of the EU LDS in 2011, it was not the main driver for JP. By developing tools such as the ROF and the Pillar fiches, and through more regular consultations with the PA, the JP contributes nevertheless to**

**reduced aid fragmentation and increased aid effectiveness.** The EU LDS was developed in 2011 with aid fragmentation as a major objective. It responded to the PA's concern that funding had not been aligned to the PA's priorities (in 2012 the PA found 60% of funding to be directed at justice and security, leaving 'orphan sectors' such as private sector development). Subsequently, in the HoCs Retreat of October 2015, one of the main three challenges of developing the EU JP document was stated as the division of labour (how to ensure that some sectors are not overcrowded or orphans). In June 2016, the JR has not yet been developed but the work of elaborating the pillar fiches and the JA has already ensured that aid complementarity and synergies will contribute to the reduction of aid fragmentation, even if not by its traditional measure (number of DPs per sector and number of sectors per DP).

#### **4. EQ3: To what extent did JP improve aid predictability and transparency of EU and MS aid?**

##### *JC 3.1: Changes in EU/MS planning and/or financial cycles*

In a volatile environment, multi-annual programming is very difficult and many DPs have annual planning cycles. The PA's preparation of the NPA 2017-2022, which, in July 2016, was in its last stages of finalisation, provided the perfect chance to synchronise the Joint Strategy (JS) with the PA's cycle. The challenge to make progress on drafting the JS and to keep it sufficiently flexible to adapt to the final version of the PA's NPA, has been compounded by the need for EUREP to prepare the outline of its 2017-20 programming document by October 2016. Many DPs, including the European Commission, have adopted an annual planning horizon. Lengthening the programming cycle and synchronising it between the different DPs is thus a challenge, but is expected to be gradually obtained by 2017 and is in any case not seen as an obstacle to JP by EU+. In July 2016, EUREP confirmed that an outline of the JS would be needed by October 2016 to fit in with its own programming cycle. The EUREP will substitute its bilateral programming document with the European JS, adding the 'EUREP' specific dimension.

**The very highly politicised context in Palestine means that most MS will not relinquish their own bilateral programming:** the JP document will probably be an umbrella document for all with additional bilateral strategies for each of the EU+. In June 2016, two MS indicated they would substitute if the JS is of good quality but feared that by rushing the preparation of the JR to comply with the EUREP's programming calendar might undermine the document's quality.

##### *JC 3.2: Predictability of CPA provided by JP-participants*

Similarly to aid fragmentation, JP has not (yet) led to an improvement in the traditional quantitative measurement of aid predictability but more to an improvement in the planning horizon enabling a clearer view of programming priorities. The absence of multiannual programming and the instability of the country make Country Programmable Aid (CPA) very unpredictable. The JP's added value in this respect is that it offers a clear perspective of the areas that are deemed important to the EU+ and that will thus most probably be supported and monitored closely in the medium term (next 4 years). The JR has not yet been finalised in June 2016 so no information was available on planned CPA flows.

### *JC 3.3: Transparency of CPA provided by JP-members*

There is no vision yet on this aspect, except that each EU+'s knowledge about each other's priorities, constraints and objectives has become much greater due to the joint analysis and the preparation of pillar fiches, the development of joint principles and drafting of the Joint Response. Prior to the preparation of the 5 pillar fiches on which MS and EUREP have worked closely together, MS and EUREP had already worked on updating the sector strategy fiches (2014), thus gaining a thorough understanding of what is done by each DP, why, how and what the constraints are for each DP working in a sector. If the JP also brought some increased knowledge about amounts spent or committed per DP per sector per year through the mapping of interventions, it foremost brought improved transparency about the drivers, priorities and constraints of each DP in each sector. In that sense, transparency has been improved by increasing the knowledge of each other's aid and aligning their positions.

## **5. EQ4: To what extent did JP contribute to improved leadership by the partner country of its development priorities?**

### *JC 4.1: Role of the partner country government in the JP*

Although discussions between the EU and the PA took place for the preparation of the EU LDS, they became more regular and strategic with the use of the results oriented framework and the preparation of the JS and pillar fiches. The PA was consulted during the elaboration of the EU LDS and has been involved right from the start of the JP process through invitations to attend HoCs JP meetings, annual retreats and workshops. Relations between the PA and EU+ intensified at sector and Prime Minister's Office (PMO) levels through (i) the use of the ROF in the 6 pilot sectors since 2014 and (ii) more recently, in 2016, the preparation of the JS and pillar fiches.

### *JC 4.2: JP's role in increasing alignment to partner country development priorities*

Developments since 2016 point towards an increased alignment to the PA's development priorities. Since April 2016, the EU+ have worked hand-in-hand with the PA's PMO and the line ministries to develop the JP document. The synchronisation of the two processes, the JP and the NPA formulations, presented a unique opportunity to exchange views on priorities and cross-fertilise ideas and priorities. However, the JP is under pressure to deliver an outline of the JS by October 2016 whilst the NPA's finalisation has been slightly delayed and will most probably only take place end of 2016. This has provoked concern amongst MS that the consultation process about the JS would be rushed, undermine the quality of the document and thus jeopardise its use by MS as an umbrella or substitute document for their own programming.

## **6. EQ5: To what extent has JP contributed to increased coherence of EU and MS strategies and programming at country level?**

### *JC 5.1: The extent to which JP favoured convergence of objectives among EU and MS in terms of development strategies and policies at country level*

All consulted documents and field interviews show that the convergence of views at strategic level has been the JP's main business in Palestine. This convergence is the JP's main result, even if not yet achieved at operational level amongst EU+ in all JP sectors. Convergence of

views is captured both in the ROFs (in the 6 sectors where it has been used) and enhanced in the pillar fiches through the logical framework approach where EU+ had to agree on all elements of the analysis and response: as seen above, this concerns not only a common understanding of the sector challenges but also an agreement on the sector's objectives, specific objectives and results, as well as agreement on the manner to treat the cross-cutting issues in analysis and response. As will be seen below, this seeking of convergence has represented a major effort but has been found to be the greatest value added of the process so far.

*JC 5.2: The extent to which JP documents show coherence of development cooperation with other EU policies*

**The JP process' particularity in Palestine is that it has a double purpose since it seeks strong convergence between the political views and the cooperation package, i.e. ensuring that cooperation priorities are totally aligned to political priorities.** As stated above, the political dimension of the JP process is essential in Palestine and the JP documents and interviews have shown that this political-development cooperation coherence is at the centre of EU+ preoccupations. However, it might become more difficult to maintain this coherence when the JP process moves from JA to JS as not all MS are aligned in their political positions vis-à-vis Palestine. It also remains to be seen whether the political-development convergence found at field level can withstand the pressures of head offices to direct politics and cooperation into one direction or another. Finally, whilst the most innovative and potentially far reaching feature of the JR will be this 'new narrative' about the required alignment of political and developmental views, it also remains to be seen how this will be translated into practical actions.

In terms of other policies, and despite Palestine being a fragile state, the Linking Relief and Rehabilitation Development (LRRD) concept has not found good footing in Palestine's context of political and geographic vulnerabilities and chronic crisis; in the EU LDS of 2011, the concept of LRRD was deemed not to be applicable in Palestine because of the continuous crisis situation.

**7. EQ6: To what extent did JP increase the visibility of EU and MS to partner country authorities and other DPs?**

*JC 6.1: The extent to which JP contributed to enhance awareness of EU support among partner country authorities and other DPs*

**Awareness of EU+ support is already well established.** No specific communication strategy has been included in the JP to make the PA and other DPs aware of the volume of EU funding; however, in a small territory such as Palestine for which ODA data are available and where many donors operate within a relatively tight knit community, the awareness of what is being done by the different DPs in each sector is not an issue. Awareness of the EU+ support is helped by at least two other factors: (i) in some fields (social protection, Public Administration, security, ...) EU+ are by far the largest donors so they are well known amongst DPs and by the PA, and (ii) since 2014 the ROFs have been used as monitoring tools to discuss progress in reforms in 6 sectors with the line ministries on quarterly basis and the EU is thus well known in these sectors.

*JC 6.2: The extent to which JP contributed to enhance the visibility of EU member states among partner country authorities and other DPs*

**The JP has enhanced the visibility of the MS and of the EU as EU+ among partner countries and other DPs.** All the work done around the JP has been collaborative and the MS as

well as EUREP are all taking active part in the JP. The structure of the process, where a lead is designated for each pillar and sector leads are also designated when there are several sectors under one pillar, allows each lead donor to speak on behalf of the entire EU+ group. This enhances both the MS's visibility and that of EU+. The sharing of the drafts of the JP's pillar analysis with the line ministries (in those sectors where such preliminary meetings and consultations have taken place) has also provided an opportunity for both the EU+ and the MS' visibility to be raised at sector level. The higher level strategic meetings with the PMO have also contributed to ensure that the EU+ is seen as speaking with one voice whilst also ensuring that individual MS who lead a sector or a cross-cutting issue are recognised in their leadership role.



## 8. EQ7: To what extent was the EU organised so as to make JP work?

### *JC 7.1: The extent to which the JP institutional set-up is conducive to a successful process*

The JP in Palestine has followed a pragmatic, flexible and step-by-step approach where due attention was paid to building consensus and trust: participating MS have been in the driver's seat under the overall guidance and support of the EUREP. The process, its steps, tools and outputs have been well documented. Good adherence to the JP was firstly ensured by the clear positioning of respective head offices in favour of the JP: even if not all MS were active participants, they have all been kept abreast of the process through the HoC and HoM meetings. Institutionally the process has been in the hands of the HoCs who discussed, prepared, analysed, etc. and produced key documents (roadmap, draft analysis, draft chapter on principles) that were then discussed and endorsed by the HoMs. The extent to which the HoCs' work also involved other technical staff in each field office is uncertain as it appeared that technical staff in some MS offices were not fully aware of the on-going JP process; in EUREP, all technical staff has been involved and been thoroughly briefed about the process.

The process has been highly consensual with many meetings and consultations to build understanding of each other's positions and objectives and agree on common views. The process has been steered by EUREP producing clear formats for documents, issuing explanatory notes and organising workshops to accompany the process. Clear roles were attributed to the different participants. Whilst EUREP drove the process, it remained flexible, non prescriptive and thus gained a lot of adherence. Each sector/pillar group was given room for manoeuvre to conduct the analysis and consultations according to specific needs and preferences. The resulting chapters on each pillar analysis (to be annexed to the JS) might thus be uneven in approach even if using a same template, but this diversity also guarantees a high degree of ownership by the sector groups.

**The success of the JP process will also be measured by the extent to which the process is delivering, then implementing, a 'home grown' product.** Fears have been expressed by MS and EUREP that the product resulting from the consensus amongst local offices will be less enthusiastically accepted by respective head offices who may have their own priorities or who may not agree with the tight link between the development cooperation and political agendas. In this respect, considering the political content of the JP in Palestine and the usual role of the DGNEAR and EEAS in EU Commission programming, it is surprising that the political officer in the EUREP and the EEAS at headquarters have not yet been actively involved in the process.

### *JC 7.2: The extent to which the JP guidance was clear and well known*

**Extensive guidance was provided by EUREP with one member of staff dedicated to the JP process and a very intense involvement of the HoC and of other technical staff in their respective areas.** The facilitation role taken by EUREP in the process has been instrumental in the excellent buy-in from MS and like-minded donors. The EUREP changed its approach from a more prescriptive/directive approach at first under the EU LDS (2011) to a much more flexible, step by step approach with the JP, nevertheless closely guiding and nurturing the process by explanatory meetings and notes, workshops, developing document templates, etc. as seen above.

**Additional guidance from EUREP and/or HQ could have been provided, notably for sector policy dialogue, stakeholder consultations and the elaboration of logical frameworks and result indicators.** Despite having been involved in the sectors with projects, MS/EUREP staff did not all have the skills to undertaken strategic policy dialogue with the sector ministries;

when and how to perform stakeholder consultations when working on preparing the pillar fiches and the JS was not clear and could have benefited from a formalised engagement strategy for the JP process. Similarly, where the PA was still in the process of building its own capacities in policy monitoring, the choice of meaningful result indicators for the logical framework and for the ROF was not necessarily within the grasp of the sector groups working on the pillar fiches.

### **EQ8: To what extent did JP reduce PC's transactions costs and keep them reasonable for the EU and MS?**

#### *JC 8.1: Extent to which JP has reduced transaction costs for PC governments*

Even though the Joint Strategy had not yet, in June 2016, been finalised, let alone implemented, signs of reduced transaction costs for the PA were already visible. The EUREP and each MS that is sector lead have become representatives of EUREP+22MS and communication channels for EU+. Even more so than previously, the work undertaken for the pillar fiches has enabled EU+ donors to align their views in each sector concerned and thus to pass a coherent and consistent message to the line ministries during the SWG or other bilateral meetings. At the highest level of Government, the EU+ are also seen as one entity: communications from the Prime Minister's Office to the EUREP have been conveyed by the EUREP to all MS and the EU+ has provided one joint response again through the EUREP, for example in the context of NPA consultations.

#### *JC 8.2: Extent to which transaction costs for the EU and MS relating to JP are deemed worth it in light of expected benefits*

**Although the transaction costs for the EUREP and MS have been (and continues to be) considerable, the exercise has been found overwhelmingly worthwhile.** Transaction costs were not measured but are huge: the fact that the JP process is consensual rather than directive in a context of many participating MS, has meant that numerous meetings have been necessary to align MS on a common view. The preparation of the pillar fiches has taken considerable capacities, time and efforts from participating MS (even with the pre-existing sector fiches). However, all MS except one were unanimous in their defence of the process and the appreciation of its results. At EUREP level, guiding the exercise with a light hand required a lot of time and diplomacy; apart from considerable time investment from the HoC, the EUREP's aid coordinator has been involved full time in the exercise to facilitate the JP process. In MS, capacities have also been strained but the exercise has been strongly supported at the highest levels (HoCs and HoMs). The working together, the learning from each other's expertise, knowledge, understanding and strengths, have been clear rewards for the efforts invested.

# Annex R. Country Note Rwanda

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## 1. The Joint Programming Process in Rwanda

**The JP process built on the Fast Track Initiative (FTI).** The FTI on the Division of Labour (DoL) commenced in 2008 with DFID as lead facilitator and the EU as supporting. It involved a number of non-EU actors, including the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the UN, CIDA. The second process in September 2009 included a donor mapping exercise with identification of sector leads, donor self-assessments, and initial steps towards reprogramming but where the sector definitions were not agreed to by the Government of Rwanda (GoR).

**GoR takes over the process.** GoR subsequently presented its Strategic Options Paper (SOP) based on the *Accra Agenda for Action* and EU aid effectiveness concerns. The GoR analysis showed that the average donor had projects in six sectors driven by own priorities leading to over-funding in “soft” sectors (social, governance etc.) with a lack of resources for investments in productive sectors. This represented an imbalance compared with GoR’s Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS). GoR therefore used the FTI and own analysis to identify donor mandates, expertise and preferences; flexibility regarding aid modalities; and thus potential for sector concentration, delegated cooperation, silent partnerships and pooled funding. The objective was to reduce transaction costs through streamlined donor relations, fewer missions, better coordinated policy dialogue, better financial management and reporting with increased reliance on national systems and instruments, reduction in donor overhead by reducing the number of sector staff each embassy required. A concrete proposal by donor was elaborated, presented and discussed and largely agreed with donors during the course of 2010. The challenge for the donors was to get respective HQs to agree to issues like changes to sector involvement, and this seemed particularly problematic for non-EU donors (US, Japan, UN). The Government appreciated the EU community’s constructive approach and relied on EU DoL policy as foundational for its own approach. The then-Ministry of Economics and Finance produced the *Rwanda Aid Policy Manual of Procedures* (September 2011) that remains the operational document for aid coordination in the country.

**Rwanda as a JP pilot country.** In January 2012, the EU called for pilot countries to implement JP. In a response of March 2012, a note from the EU Delegation in Kigali reflecting the common opinion of EU HoMs, stated that HoMs and HoCs over the period November 2011-February 2012 had concluded that the conditions for JP in Rwanda seemed good. The note in particular pointed out that GoR played an active role leading up to the Busan conference November 2011; was very supportive of JP and the EU initiative; had put JP on the agenda for the Development Partners Coordination Group (DPCG) retreat scheduled for March 2012; and had effective donor coordination in place with advanced DoL implemented. The EUD therefore suggested a process of providing an analysis of GoR’s upcoming EDPRS II with a joint response and using more joint missions to discuss common planning and financial commitments. The note pointed out that different modalities were still being used – budget support, sector wide approaches, basket funds, projects – where a key challenge was seen to be the different programming cycles by the MS. This presented some challenges for increasing budget cycle synchronisation.

**A JP response to EDPRS II.** Building on the results from the first EDPRS, the GoR in June 2013 presented its EDPRS II covering the five fiscal years 2013-2017. The seven EU donors in Rwanda – Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, the UK and the EU – invited in interested bilateral donors – Japan, South Korea, Switzerland and the US – to prepare a Joint Analysis of this programme. The basic conclusion was that the EDPRS II constituted a credible development programme around which the donor community would provide its assistance, though

concerns regarding government accountability, respect for human rights and the space for civil society were flagged. Once that has been finalized, the group then produced a Joint Response, again in line with the JP approach, whereby the 11 donors were able to present the authorities with one consolidated response. The donors chose to structure it according to the 14 sector working groups plus gender and regional integration as cross-cutting issues rather than the EDPRS thematic areas, since the working groups provide the structure for the actual interaction between GoR and its development partners. The Joint Response included a table that showed the engagement of the 11 donors plus the European Investment Bank across the 14 sectors, including degree of engagement (active; phasing out; silent partner). The probable funding available was only provided for the two first fiscal years – a total of around USD 660-690/mill per year – since a number of the partners could not commit or provide indicate frames further ahead than this.

#### Aid Coordination Architecture in Rwanda.

GoR has taken a strong lead in managing aid, beginning with the 2008 DoL agreement with partners which it sees is being implemented: the average number of sectors/donor is now 3.5, with donors providing at least 70% of their aid to the 3 most important sectors. The aid coordination structure consists of a series of development forums, sector working groups, mutual accountability principles based on clear guiding documents (see <http://www.devpartners.gov.rw> ).

The Development Partners Coordination Group (DPCG) is composed of GoR Permanent Secretaries, heads of bilateral and multilateral donor agencies, representatives of civil society and private sector. The objectives are to serve as a forum for dialogue in the coordination of development aid to Rwanda; monitor the implementation of EDPRS II; harmonize the DPs' programmes, projects, and budget support; and review progress by donors as against international commitments (Paris 2005, Accra 2008, Busan 2011). The major event is the annual retreat where among other things the Development Partners Assessment Framework (DPAF) is presented and discussed (see below).

GoR's Development Assistance Database, DAD (see <https://dad.minecofin.gov.rw/#>), provides full information on external resources. Rwanda tested the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) database for compatibility with DAD – basically DAD has greater granularity and accuracy. DAD is also linked to Rwanda's IFMIS and used for the annual DPAF assessment. The intention is to expand DAD towards addressing the larger Development Effectiveness agenda, in part by including new actors – foundations, international NGOs – but also by extending the DPAF to encompass trade, taxation, public-private partnerships, direct foreign investment etc., including strengthen the collaboration with the Rwandan Private Sector Federation and other private sector actors.

GoR intends to improve the mutual accountability framework by having robust indicators for the 2030 SDGs that will include issues that cannot be addressed nationally but requires regional/global action, so that it has a comprehensive approach to monitoring national development that includes all partners.

**JP implementation.** A HoCs note of June 2015 provides a summary and update on actual implementation of the Joint Strategy. The finalised strategy was handed over to the Government in December 2013 and presented at the annual DPCG retreat in February 2014, where the general approach of planning around existing structures (the sector working groups) and priorities (the EDPRS II) was appreciated. Implementation has come up against some challenges, however, which the note points to. Some donors were experiencing cut-backs in aid levels and/or could not provide longer-term commitments. Some ministries were less committed to sector wide approaches so aid fragmentation persisted. Most donors had still not synchronised their programming cycles with the EDPRS cycle so the re-alignment of financing was not taking place as hoped for. There were different aid modalities still in use so the support in a given sector was still difficult to oversee and manage, as well as differing monitoring frameworks where in particular project monitoring often did not rely on sector frameworks – though there were also examples of joined-up monitoring frameworks across modalities and donors. Joint *implementation* was thus seen as challenging, though this is clearly the direction in which both the donors and Rwanda would like to move. A consultancy to help the EU community address some of these challenges was foreseen, where the main issues were to harmonize budget cycles, further develop DoL across sectors, and promote joint implementation. Some MS expected more support from their respective HQs on

matters such as budget cycle synchronisation since that cannot be decided at field level. More recently signals to some MS from their HQs are to pay more attention to specific bilateral agendas (“bilateralisation”) and with less commitment to collective action concerns of aid effectiveness and harmonisation.

**Budget support and aid coordination.** Because Rwanda was seen as managing its macro-economy and budget well, there was important general budget support (GBS) provided. With the publication of the UN Security Council Report on the involvement of GoR in the Eastern DRC (UN SC S/2012/843 of 15 Nov 2012), several MS cut their GBS, reducing GBS as an important aid tool in Rwanda. This meant the GBS working group also largely ceased to function. The GoR view was that since the donors were not interested in providing untied/general support, there was no need to discuss overall policies since aid was now directed towards specific sectors or issues. This issue has of course influenced the overall atmosphere for aid coordination, reducing the attention GoR is willing to provide and the questions it is interested in discussing.

**Development Partners Assistance Framework (DPAF).** The GoR developed its DPAF to rate donor performance each year as of 2010 (see <http://www.devpartners.gov.rw/index.php?id=25>). It is presented at the annual DPCG retreat early in the year, where the individual donors are rated on a set of 15 criteria along five dimensions (plus a sixth dimension with seven indicators for donors providing GBS) across the last three years. The tables show planned and actual disbursements, then provide a “traffic light” rating on each criterion with the quantitative data included showing the basis for the ratings. Because the tables cover three years, it is possible to see changes over time. The most recent DPAF is the one from March 2014 covering the 2012/2013 budget year.

**Questions regarding the optimal JP process.** Over the last year, the discussions within the EU community regarding JP has touched on a number of more principled issues concerning what the JP ought to be or can be. One question is if the JP should be more strategic in its approach. Recent studies such as an IMF mission point to a slowing down in the economy, and the question is therefore if the JP should not simply accept the EDPRS as a given, but look at the larger picture of whether the structure and priority of the authorities to address core objectives like poverty reduction and job creation should be reviewed. There is the issue of how to address more policy and political dimensions such as governance, where approaches of the EDPRS may not be the ones the EU would prefer, and thus a need for the EU “to speak with one voice”. There are questions of moving more aggressively towards joint implementation, using fully joined-up tools such as trust funds where there is *one* administrator and thus one set of financial and results management tools and systems applied. And there are looser collaborative approaches that require less investment in terms of time but also are less likely to generate much in terms of joint action and benefits. These issues appear still to be on the table to be addressed.

**Questions about the JP in Rwanda.** Another set of questions has also been posed, which is the extent to which JP serves a purpose in Rwanda today. The traditional grants donors such as the EU tend to come to the table with some basic objectives – values – for their assistance, sometimes referred to as “making EU happen on the ground”. Other donors and development partners do not necessarily share this agenda (though officially it is fully compatible with the SDGs). Credit institutions have a different view on Rwanda, and in particular see Rwanda’s budget and economic performance as very solid compared with most other countries in the region. New donors also come with somewhat different agendas, and even EU MS now are pushing for more commercial priorities, whether trade of goods and services, private investment, taxation issues, intellectual property rights – issues for which JP is not seen as a good instrument since some MS prefer to pursue these bilaterally. With CPA constituting a decreasing share of total resource flows and relations, it becomes costly to those actors who feel the pressures of the competition on these other arenas to then have to invest in a tool that was designed for what is now considered a “sunset industry”.

Findings and conclusions on process

- *Rwanda has taken a strong lead in donor coordination by having a clear national development plan, EDPRS II, in place; a strong and functional donor coordination mechanism with annual Development Partner retreats between Government officials and donor representatives active sector working groups; active dialogue with the donor community and at the overall level a strong desire to ensure more rational aid use, including joint implementation. This is driven by a focus on reducing transaction costs for both parties.*
- *The EU community responded by mobilizing a JP process, which included all 7 EU donors plus the EIB, but also 4 non-EU donors. With the publication of EDPRS II, the partner group produced a Joint Analysis that concluded that the EDPRS constituted a credible foundation for support. It subsequently produced a Joint Strategy structured on the 14 sector working groups plus cross-cutting issues, as the foundation for its financial support.*
- *Actual implementation has faced a series of challenges, such as continuation of different aid modalities, lack of consistency by ministries in supporting joint action, lack of synchronisation of donor budget cycles. The larger concern that has more recently emerged is the apparent drop in commitments to aid effectiveness and harmonisation as bilateral agendas come to the fore.*
- *More importantly, discussions are coming up regarding the nature of the JP process in the context of Rwanda. Should a JP be more strategic and willing to challenge the defined frameworks for national development if the donors do not think they provide the optimal approach? How and when can the EU “talk with one voice”? Should the JP partners try to move towards joint implementation and consider fully joined-up tools such as trust funds, or move to more open collaborative schemes – or a mix, depending on the particular dimension? Or has JP largely played out its role, and the international community should move on to the more current agenda based on commercial and self-interested concerns? Coordination is very costly so some would like to focus those resources at the level where they generate value added, which is seen to be at sector not macro level.*

## **2. EQ1: To what extent did JP respond to global and country-level challenges regarding increased aid effectiveness?**

### *JC 1.1: JP responded to the global aid effectiveness challenges*

**The aid effectiveness agenda is supported yet also challenged, leaving JP in a dilemma:** The JP process has led the EU community to discuss the various approaches to aid coordination on the ground, and thus identified areas of agreement that they can build on. But it also uncovered areas of policy differences between the MS, and these differences appear to be increasing as various donor nations are making aid a more integrated part of their overall foreign political and economic policy.

The ability of the EU as a community to respond to aid effectiveness challenges seems thus to be pulled in opposite directions, with final result unclear.

### *JC 1.2: The JP process was sensitive to the partner country’s aid effectiveness challenges*

**Donor aid is based on Rwanda’s EDPRS II.** The EU community generally embraced Rwanda’s development agenda as documented in its EDPRS II and its aid coordination directions. The EU invited in non-EU donors to the JP process so that there was only one analysis and one response to the EDPRS II. But at the same time, a number of MS have continued applying their own budgeting cycles and aid modalities, evidently largely due to their HQ decisions, and this has limited the EU system’s ability to fully adjust to the EDPRS II’s time horizon and priorities.

Whether GoR likes this level of coordination on the donor side is debatable. Some donors believe GoR prefers to manage the coordination directly and in particular through the sector working groups. The JP process with its Joint Analysis and Joint Response is viewed somewhat askance


### 3. EQ2: To what extent did JP contribute to reducing aid fragmentation?

#### *JC 2.1: Aid fragmentation has been reduced in countries that have carried out JP*

**Rwanda has promoted reduction in aid fragmentation and EU has supported this.** Aid fragmentation has been reduced, for several reasons: (i) the Government has pushed a 2008 agreement with donors on DoL such that a number of donors have restructured their portfolio and concentrated on fewer sectors for direct engagement, (ii) some donors are pulling out or reducing their aid, which will most likely lead to a reduction in aid fragmentation.

Reduction in aid fragmentation is therefore primarily a function of GoR actions and changes to bilateral funding – the Joint Response has simply recorded the consequences: Belgium is documented as actively engaged in 3 sectors, silent partner in 2 and leaving a sixth sector, whereas five years earlier it was engaged in 8 sectors. Some donors, notably the UK, are still quite spread, however. Analysis of the OECD data on sectors per donor confirms a decreasing trend between the 2009-2011 period and 2014, from 7.6 to 6.4 sectors of activity per donor on average. The figure below illustrates that trend.


**Figure 1: Number of sectors per EU and MS donor**



Source: OECD Database, accessed in December 2016<sup>75</sup>

However, the average number of European Partners present in each OECD sector has slightly increased, from 5.5 on the period 2009-2011, to 5.86 in 2014.

<sup>75</sup> The difference in the number of sectors per donor between the graph and the text (in particular for Belgium) comes from a different definition of the sector between the Joint response and the OECD database.

**Figure 2: European Partners presence per sector**

Source: OECD Database, accessed in December 2016

### *JC 2.2: The JP has facilitated a division of labour beyond the sharing of sector involvement*

**Sector collaboration has been improved through the JP process:** The JP has led to better mutual understanding among the donors regarding their priorities and engagements, and the Joint Strategy documents the various forms of engagement donors foresee by sector.

### *JC 2.3: The countries that have carried out JP aimed at reducing aid fragmentation JP has facilitated*

**Aid fragmentation reduced but not due to JP:** There has been a clear focus on addressing aid fragmentation by both GoR and the donor community, but where the overwhelming influence has been GoR's DoL agreement from around 2008. The EU has supported this and the Joint Response continues to address this. However, there may be processes outside the JP, for example from investors and emerging donors, that have not been identified and which may increase aid fragmentation in some sectors.

## **4. EQ3: To what extent did JP improve aid predictability and transparency of EU and MS aid?**

### *JC 3.1: Joint programming led to changes in EU/MS planning and/or financial cycles*

**The EU budgeting follows the EDPRS II cycle, others do not.** While the EU programming coincided with the EDPRS II cycle, other EU MS have so far not synchronised their planning or financial cycles to the EDPRS.



Several MS noted that in fact they were experiencing more bilateralisation of their aid due to a number of policy and political concerns becoming more pronounced: issues with Rwanda's engagement in DRC; increased focus on commercial dimensions of the relationship and thus less on aid effectiveness but rather the bilateral returns to aid, so their aid is being “harmonised” with their internal policy and programming cycles rather than those of the partner country.

### *JC 3.2: Predictability of CPA provided by JP-participants improved*

**The aid constraints on several MS have reduced predictability.** The Joint Response provides an overview of the EU, six MS and the four bilaterals noted above support broken down by year across the five-year period 2014-2018, so this provides a more comprehensive picture of likely funding available from this group of donors.

But since several donors face aid cut-backs and the uncertainty which follows from this, the predictability of EU funding in terms of volume and time horizon is seen by some to have decreased. One clear improvement is that the Joint Response provides the available information in one joint document so in this sense the totality is presumably somewhat better.

### *JC 3.3: Transparency of CPA provided by JP-members improved*

**Aid transparency facing the same challenges as CPA predictability.** The Joint Strategy is a succinct document – the Analysis is 11 pages, largely reviewing Rwanda's EDPRS II, while the Joint Response is 9 pages plus two pages of financial information. There is no historical overview of EU + MS financial support, so there is no analysis of levels and trends to the EU community's contributions, so JP has not improved transparency except for making clear how the EU sees Rwanda's own EDPRS II. The one big advantage is the single-source document for this information. Rwanda itself has a “good practice” Development Assistance Database on-line that provides the historical data.

## **5. EQ4: To what extent did JP contribute to improved leadership by the partner country of its development priorities?**

### *JC 4.1: The partner country government has played an increasingly important role in the JP*

**GoR is fully in charge of its development process.** GoR has defined the key parameters for the JP through the EDPRS II and Rwanda's aid coordination architecture, despite the GoR itself not being directly involved in the JP process as such. This has therefore been a determinant role from the start, and not influenced or changed over the course of the JP.

### *JC 4.2: JP contributed to increased alignment to partner country development priorities*

**Actual changes to alignment unclear.** Because the EU community has used the EDPRS at the starting point for its JP documents, it has at a minimum led to more *explicit* alignment whether or not this has meant a *substantive* shift.

## **6. EQ5: To what extent has JP contributed to increased coherence of EU and MS strategies and programming at country level?**

### *JC 5.1: JP favoured convergence of objectives among EU and MS in terms of development strategies and policies at country level*

The EU community has used the EDPRS II to produce joint documents. The EU community produced both its Joint Analysis and Response around the EDPRS II. This served to clarify the situations of individual MS while ensuring a more coherent response from the EU community as such.

The Government asked that the donor community organise itself into three groups: (i) the UN family; (ii) lending institutions; (iii) bilateral grant donors. For this reason, the JP process thus took on-board the four non-EU bilateral donors noted, which has helped to bring greater coherence into the larger bilateral aid community.

### *JC 5.2: JP documents show coherence of development cooperation with other EU policies*

**There is so far no indication of other EU policies being part of the JP discussions.** There is no indication that other EU policies have been considered – the focus has been exclusively on the Rwanda’s policies and priorities. This has presumably also been necessary since four non-EU donors were involved in the process who would probably not wish to take on board EU-specific issues and policies.

One of GoR’s concerns was that donors were focusing too large a share of their resources on “soft sectors” that follow from typical donor concerns – social sectors, governance, PFM – whereas the Government wanted more investments in infrastructure and technology. GoR has therefore deliberately wanted to steer donors towards own priorities and definitely not include “extraneous” issues in the response documents.

## **7. EQ6: To what extent did JP increase the visibility of EU and MS to partner country authorities and other donor partners?**

### *JC 6.1: JP contributed to enhance awareness of EU support among partner country authorities and other donors*

**The JP process has most likely improved visibility.** The JP process has definitely made the EU more visible vis-a-vis other donor partners, and through the formal presentation of the JP at the 2014 DPCG retreat also with GoR. This has undoubtedly been strengthened by the fact that the JP deliverables have been visible, concrete, constructive inputs to the international community’s response to GoR’s request for financial support.

### *JC 6.2: JP contributed to enhance the visibility of EU member states among partner country authorities and other donors*

**The sector working groups are the key instruments for bilateral visibility.** The MS are a very visible part of the Joint Response, and given that the international community in Rwanda is limited, it is reasonable to assume that the MS role has been clear, at least among non-EU donors.

The awareness among GoR officials is not known, but again the MS active in given sectors are presumably known to the sector ministries, with their promised contributions noted in the Joint Response

## **8. EQ7: To what extent was the EU organised so as to make JP work?**

*JC 7.1: The JP institutional set-up is conducive to a successful process*

**The JP institutional set-up has had little bearing on the JP process in Rwanda:** The overall institutional set-up for Joint Programming within the EU has provided the key parameters for the exercise, and are well known and understood. The actual JP process in Rwanda has largely been determined by that country's own development program and priorities, however, so those global settings have not had much impact on the specific process on the ground.

*JC 7.2: JP guidance was clear and well known*

**The EUD is fully aware of JP guidance.** The Guidance Pack [of 2014] was not yet available when the JP exercise as such was developed in Rwanda, but since it was a fairly limited exercise it followed a fairly pragmatic approach based on the JP policies that already were in place. These were reasonably clear and well-known, but the actual JP process was primarily shaped by country context.

## **9. EQ8: To what extent did JP reduce partner countries' transactions costs and keep them reasonable for the EU and MS?**

*JC 8.1: JP has reduced transaction costs for partner country governments*

**Government transaction costs probably nil:** The JP as such does not seem to have incurred any transaction costs to GoR but may have reduced some coordination costs as the JP has provided a compendium of donor support across sectors that have probably reduced some aid management.

*JC 8.2: Transaction costs for the EU and MS relating to JP are deemed worth it in light of expected benefits*

**Most transaction costs fell on EUD:** The costs to EU HQ were negligible so the JP has probably been a net positive as seen from Brussels. The costs to MS HQs have also been largely nil, but there has been a concern that JP in the field is distracting from management of own programmes and thus is seen as carrying an opportunity cost some MS HQs do not like.

In the field, it is the EUD that has assumed most of the costs, and while some MS have been positive, other MS see JP as a net cost since it provides little value added at the level of their interventions.



# Annex S. Country Note SENEGAL (FR)

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## 1. La programmation conjointe au Sénégal<sup>76</sup>

**La programmation conjointe au Sénégal s'inscrit dans un contexte de forte fragmentation de l'aide.** Le Sénégal compte une cinquantaine de partenaires de développement, présents dans plusieurs secteurs et ayant recours à différentes modalités. Le montant de l'aide pays programmable (APP) octroyée par l'Union Européenne et les états membres au Sénégal sur la période 2010-2014 s'est élevée à près de 1,65 milliards €, soit près de 40% de l'APP total reçue par le pays, faisant de l'UE le principal bailleur au Sénégal. Sur les 14 EM représentés au Sénégal, sept Etats membres (Allemagne, France, Belgique, Espagne, Italie, le Luxembourg, et les Pays-Bas) sont actifs dans la coopération au développement avec le Sénégal. Seuls six Etats Membres (EM) et la DUE sont potentiellement en position de programmation conjointe. La programmation conjointe est en effet sans objet pour la coopération des Pays Bas qui met en œuvre un plan de sortie<sup>77</sup>.

**Les mécanismes de coordinations de l'aide proviennent essentiellement des donateurs.** La coordination générale est assurée par le G50, reprenant l'ensemble des donateurs actifs au Sénégal. Il est assisté par le G12 pour les tâches de synthèses et d'harmonisation. Le Groupe Europe, présidée par la DUE, rassemble les chefs de coopération de la DUE et des Etats membres de l'UE présents dans le pays, ainsi que la Banque Européenne d'Investissement. Ils y échangent des informations relatives à leurs programmes respectifs de coopération, pour une meilleure coordination des interventions. Ils ont également mis en place des accords de coopérations déléguées.

**Etapas préliminaires à la programmation conjointe.** Le point de départ du processus date de 2010, avec l'élaboration d'une première cartographie des interventions (conjointement avec USAID et le Canada). Cette cartographie a été mise à jour en 2012. Elle a révélé une forte fragmentation de l'aide européenne et des concentrations sectorielles inégales (chaque partenaire européen était en moyenne présent dans plus de 7 secteurs). En préparation de la programmation du 11ème FED, les EM et l'UE ont réalisé également en 2012 une analyse conjointe de la stratégie sénégalaise de développement et des principales politiques sectorielles. Les partenaires européens se sont ensuite engagés, depuis 2013, sur la voie d'une programmation conjointe de leurs différents programmes bilatéraux de coopération. La synchronisation des différents cycles de programmation constituant un prérequis pour le processus de programmation conjointe, les partenaires qui étaient en phase de programmation en 2013 ont décidé de synchroniser leur cycle d'une programmation avec le terme de la stratégie nationale mise en œuvre par les autorités sénégalaises (la Stratégie nationale de développement économique – SNDES – refondue dans le Plan Sénégal Emergent ou PSE en 2014). L'actuelle SNDES court jusqu'en 2017, permettant ainsi une programmation conjointe à partir de 2018. Concernant l'UE et le 11ème FED, la programmation sera faite en deux phases, avec un premier programme indicatif national (PIN) établi pour la période 2014 – 2017.

**L'ambition est de parvenir à une réelle programmation conjointe en 2018, dans le but de renforcer la coordination entre les états membres, la cohérence, les complémentarités et**

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<sup>76</sup> Sources : Rapport des Chefs de Mission au Sénégal sur la programmation conjointe, 2013 ; Rapport des chefs de Mission au Sénégal sur l'avancement de la programmation conjointe, 2013 ; Cover Note HoMs to EU DGs, 2014 ; EU, Joint Programming in Senegal, PPT présentation, 2014 ; Interviews du personnel de l'UE (excepté le Desk géographique Sénégal - DG DEVCO) et des Etats membres au Sénégal ; <http://stats.oecd.org>

<sup>77</sup> En 2010, les Pays-Bas ont décidé d'arrêter leur coopération bilatérale avec le Sénégal. Les dernières interventions ont eu lieu durant la période 2013-2015, via des fonds délégués. Cependant les Pays Bas ont participé à la coordination sur les questions d'environnement, leur secteur prioritaire d'intervention et ont signé le document conjoint de programmation car étaient encore actifs pendant la période couverte par la première phase de la programmation.

**L'impact global des interventions de l'UE.** En attendant la programmation conjointe à partir de 2018, les partenaires européens ont décidé d'élaborer un document conjoint de programmation (DCP). Il a été adopté en 2014 et signé par toutes les parties prenantes, y inclus la BEI et l'Ordonnateur National. Ce DCP décrit les secteurs d'intervention (11 secteurs et thématiques transversales), les objectifs sectoriels prioritaires et indicateurs de résultat, ainsi que les montants indicatifs alloués par secteur et donateur pour la période 2014 – 2017, ce qui permet de respecter le prérequis de la PC quant à la synchronisation des programmations bilatérales. Le DCP recense également les engagements de l'UE et des EM assurant la continuation du processus.<sup>78</sup>

**L'implication du gouvernement s'est intensifiée le long du processus.** Le Sénégal a connu un changement de gouvernement en avril 2012. Le plan stratégique national, Plan Sénégal Emergent, a été élaboré par le gouvernement entrant et au pouvoir à ce jour. A travers le DCP, le gouvernement s'est engagé à supporter le processus en révisant sa politique nationale en 2017 et en organisant une consultation jointe avec l'ensemble des partenaires UE sur leur programmation.

**Cette première étape a renforcé le dialogue et la coordination entre les partenaires européens.** On observe déjà des bénéfices en termes notamment d'échange d'information et de coordination sur des objectifs prioritaires sectoriels. Plusieurs autres gains sont attendus mais à cet égard, de multiples défis ont été identifiés concernant par exemple les incertitudes quant à la capacité à aboutir à un document allant au-delà d'une simple juxtaposition des programmes européens.

## **2. EQ1 : Dans quelle mesure la programmation conjointe a-t-elle répondu aux défis de l'amélioration de l'efficacité de l'aide à l'échelle globale et nationale ?**

### *JC 1.1 : La programmation conjointe a répondu aux défis globaux de l'efficacité de l'aide*

**L'exercice de la programmation conjointe menée jusqu'alors au Sénégal s'inscrit dans une optique de répondre aux défis de l'efficacité.** Le DCP mentionne notamment que l'UE et les EM œuvrent pour une mise en cohérence des différents objectifs en matière de coopération, dans le but d'accroître l'efficacité de l'aide. Cependant, au-delà de l'objectif poursuivi du renforcement de l'efficacité de l'aide européenne par une meilleure complémentarité et cohérence des interventions, il a été mentionné par des partenaires européens interviewés que la véritable valeur ajoutée de la programmation conjointe était sa dimension politique car elle fait davantage ressortir la voix de l'UE et des EM au Sénégal (il s'agit à travers la programmation conjointe de renforcer la voix de l'UE notamment dans le dialogue sectoriel avec le pays partenaire). Par ailleurs, il est à noter que seul un nombre limité d'EM est favorable à un remplacement des coopérations bilatérales par la programmation conjointe.

### *JC 1.2 : Le processus de la PC a tenu compte du contexte du pays*

**Le processus de programmation conjointe a su tenir compte du contexte du pays.** Dans un environnement d'aide fragmentée et de coordination relativement limitée entre les bailleurs<sup>79</sup>, la programmation conjointe est accueillie favorablement par les EM (bénéfices informationnelles sur

<sup>78</sup> Pour ce faire, il établit une « feuille de route » avec des étapes visant un renforcement de la coordination entre européens, dans la perspective d'une véritable programmation conjointe pour la phase 2018-2020.

<sup>79</sup> La coordination thématique/sectorielle des membres du G50 se fait à travers 18 groupes thématiques aux résultats variables. Seuls certains de ces groupes ont des échanges réguliers avec le gouvernement.

la présence et activités d'autres bailleurs) et par le gouvernement (nécessité d'un interlocuteur unique européen). Le processus s'est ainsi adapté au contexte en déterminant les secteurs d'interventions en collaboration étroite avec le gouvernement et en alignant le document au plan de développement national.

Parmi les éléments en faveur de la programmation conjointe au Sénégal mentionnés par les partenaires européens l'on retrouve notamment : l'analyse conjointe qui permet une vue d'ensemble des activités des autres EM dans un but d'information, de maximiser l'expertise des EM mais aussi de rendre l'aide plus efficace, ainsi que les futures retombées au niveau opérationnel. Les contraintes relevées sont notamment les réticences et difficultés à synchroniser les différents cycles de programmation pour permettre un alignement (des efforts sont cependant faits pour y arriver dans la 2<sup>ème</sup> phase du processus actuellement en cours), et la longueur de l'exercice (néanmoins jugé nécessaire).

### **3. EQ2: Dans quelle mesure la PC a contribué à réduire la fragmentation de l'aide ?**

*JC 2.1 : La fragmentation de l'aide a été réduite grâce au processus de la programmation conjointe*

**Il n'est pas encore possible d'associer une possible réduction de la fragmentation de l'aide à la programmation conjointe mais des efforts sont fournis pour une meilleure cohérence de l'intervention.** Les différentes interviews indiquent que la réduction de la fragmentation de l'aide n'était pas l'objectif poursuivi par les parties prenantes pour l'élaboration du DCP. Par ailleurs, il n'est pas prévu que les programmations bilatérales disparaissent en 2018. Cependant, une certaine cohérence des interventions est recherchée. Le DCP fait état de l'activité des EM et de l'UE dans chaque zone géographique et sectorielle, indiquant les montants, les projets futurs et en cours. Ces informations sont jugées utiles par les EM dans la conception de leurs programmes futurs.

*JC 2.2 : La programmation conjointe a facilité la division du travail au-delà du simple partage des secteurs*

**L'exercice de la division du travail n'a pas encore débuté.** En raison des différents cycles de programmation, la première phase (ayant abouti au DCP) a consisté en un mapping des interventions des partenaires européens, chacun continuant d'opérer dans ses secteurs d'intervention. Lors de l'élaboration du DCP un premier travail portant sur la désignation des secteurs prioritaires, et la définition des objectifs et indicateurs pour chaque secteur a été mené par les partenaires. Le processus a conduit à un DCP dont les engagements, notamment de rationalisation à 3 secteurs, devraient permettre d'aboutir à une division du travail effective dans la seconde phase.

**Une véritable division du travail entre les partenaires pourrait s'avérer difficile à mettre en œuvre.** Il ressort notamment des interviews que dans la pratique, le choix des secteurs d'interventions est d'avantage guidés par des considérations d'ordre historiques et stratégiques propres à chaque partenaire, que par ce qu'il pourrait découler des discussions dans le cadre de la programmation conjointe au Sénégal. A ce stade du processus, seuls quelques EM ont réduits le nombre de leurs secteurs d'intervention sans que cela ne puisse être systématiquement attribué au processus de programmation conjointe en cours. Par ailleurs, certains partenaires ont plaidés pour

une division du travail (et le choix de chef de file) basée sur l'expertise accumulée par les partenaires, et non sur l'engagement financier apporté par chacun des partenaires.

*JC 2.3 : Les pays ayant effectué la PC ont visé la réduction de la fragmentation de l'aide*

**La réduction de la fragmentation de l'aide n'est pas le principal objectif poursuivi par les parties prenantes au PC au Sénégal :** Pour l'UE, c'est l'aspect politique qui compte. Le gouvernement n'attache pas non plus d'importance à la réduction de la fragmentation de l'aide, il recherche des conditions de négociations plus pratiques. Les EM ne cherchent pas à remplacer leurs PB par la PC. Leur volonté de participer découle des bénéfices du point de vue informationnel et stratégique pour leurs propres interventions bilatérales.

**4. EQ3: Dans quelle mesure la PC a amélioré la prévisibilité et la transparence de l'aide européenne et des EM ?**

*JC3.1 : La programmation conjointe a conduit à la synchronisation des cycles de programmations et budgétaires*

Des engagements ont été pris pour permettre une complète synchronisation des cycles de **programmation en 2018**, laissant à chaque participant la possibilité de terminer les cycles déjà engagés. Actuellement, l'UE et plusieurs EM ont déjà assuré une synchronisation effective de leurs cycles pour 2018. Les autres EM se sont engagés à prendre les dispositions nécessaires (même s'il apparaît déjà que tous n'ont pas respecté cet engagement).

*JC 3.2 et JC 3.3 : Amélioration de la prévisibilité et de la transparence de l'aide des participants à la programmation conjointe*

Des éléments témoignent d'une **amélioration de la prévisibilité et de la transparence de de l'aide**. Le DCP décrit les montants alloués par secteur et par bailleur jusqu'en 2017. Tous les partenaires ont mis en avant l'utilité des informations fournies par l'exercice de collaboration au sein du processus de programmation conjointe. Dans le cadre de l'élaboration de son rapport annuel comptable sur l'aide au développement reçue au Sénégal, le gouvernement apprécie également l'accès à l'information relative aux montants alloués par l'UE et les EM aux différents secteurs au travers d'un seul document (plutôt que de recourir à l'information auprès de chaque donateur individuellement, ce qui parfois a contribué aux retards enregistrés dans la finalisation et la publication du rapport).

**5. EQ4: Dans quelle mesure la PC a amélioré le leadership du pays sur ses priorités de développement ?**

*JC 4.1 : Le gouvernement a joué un rôle croissant dans la programmation conjointe*

L'implication du gouvernement a été limitée durant la 1<sup>ère</sup> phase de processus de **programmation conjointe ayant aboutie au DCP. Elle tend à se renforcer dans la 2<sup>nde</sup> phase, en vue de la programmation conjointe de 2018**. Durant la première phase, la contribution gouvernementale s'est cantonnée à l'identification des secteurs prioritaires et à l'alignement des objectifs avec la stratégie nationale. Des représentants étaient présents lors de la présentation finale du document pour sa validation. Tous les participants à la PC ont relevé cette faible implication



comme une carence de la 1<sup>ère</sup> phase. Le gouvernement a manifesté son souhait d'être partie intégrante du processus. Ainsi, la nouvelle feuille de route en vue de la 2<sup>nd</sup>e phase accorde une plus grande place au gouvernement autant sur les discussions relatives au contenu du document, à la méthodologie, la division du travail, que sur la rédaction du futur document.

*JC 4.2 : La programmation conjointe a renforcé l'alignement aux priorités de développements nationales*

**L'alignement aux priorités nationales de développement a toujours été présent au sein des coopérations et se retrouve également dans la PC.** L'approche en deux phases de l'exercice de la programmation conjointe témoigne de l'alignement au PSE. Sur ce point, la plus-value de la programmation conjointe est de poser formellement l'importance attribuée à l'alignement. Le gouvernement confirme ce point et apprécie également l'alignement aux procédures nationales entrepris par un état membre.

**6. EQ5: Dans quelle mesure la PC a-t-elle contribué à renforcer la cohérence des stratégies et des programmations entre les EM et l'UE à l'échelle du pays ?**

*JC 5.1 : La programmation conjointe a favorisé la convergence des objectifs stratégiques et politiques de développement entre l'UE et les EM à l'échelle du pays*

Des éléments attestent de la convergence des objectifs entre l'UE et les EM par la programmation conjointe. Les EM voient dans l'analyse conjointe menée un contexte favorable à l'identification d'une stratégie européenne commune à la problématique du développement. Des efforts ont été menés pour arriver à la définition commune d'objectifs et indicateurs sectoriels entre les EM et l'UE, comme en témoigne le DCP. Les EM perçoivent l'intérêt de les intégrer à leurs programmes bilatéraux.

*JC 5.2 : Les documents de la programmation conjointe témoignent de la cohérence entre la coopération au développement et les autres politiques européennes*

Le Sénégal fait partie du système de préférences généralisées de l'UE et bénéficie de taux préférentiels en matière d'importations. Aucun élément n'indique une incohérence de la programmation conjointe avec d'autres politiques européennes.

**7. EQ6: Dans quelle mesure la programmation conjointe a-t-elle accru la visibilité de l'UE et des EM envers les autres bailleurs de fond et les autorités locales ?**

*JC 6.1 : La programmation conjointe a contribué à accroître la reconnaissance du soutien de l'UE parmi les autres bailleurs et autorités des pays partenaires*

Le stade actuel du processus ne permet pas d'apprécier l'impact de la programmation conjointe sur la visibilité réelle de l'UE mais la volonté et la nécessité de renforcer cette visibilité est présente. Il est attendu de la programmation conjointe de renforcer le poids politique de l'UE (une seule voix européenne, plus forte) et de consolider sa visibilité. Le DCP

mentionne des éléments permettant d'assurer la visibilité de l'UE vis-à-vis des autres bailleurs (montants totaux, outils de communication,...). Le gouvernement valorise l'initiative de la programmation conjointe européenne dans un environnement où l'aide au développement, importante au Sénégal, s'effectue principalement par des coopérations bilatérales. Il a également été mentionné la faiblesse des EM à constituer un réel bloc européen jusqu'alors.

*JC 6.2 : La programmation conjointe a contribué à améliorer la visibilité des états membres de l'UE parmi les autres bailleurs et autorités des pays partenaires*

**L'amélioration de la visibilité n'est pas un objectif recherché par les EM à travers la programmation conjointe.** Il ressort notamment des interviews que la plupart des EM interrogés bénéficient déjà d'une importante visibilité au Sénégal et voient plutôt un potentiel négatif de la programmation conjointe sur celle-ci (la programmation conjointe leur porterait préjudice). Ce constat constitue d'ailleurs la principale raison donnée à la poursuite des programmations bilatérales<sup>80</sup>. Seul un EM voit en la programmation conjointe une opportunité d'améliorer sa visibilité, du fait notamment de son faible poids dans la coopération.

**8. EQ7: Dans quelle mesure l'UE était-elle organisée pour que la PC soit mise en œuvre avec succès ?**

*JC 7.1 : Le cadre institutionnel de la programmation conjointe était propice à la réussite du processus*

**Il ressort des interviews que le cadre institutionnel n'a pas constitué un support solide au bon déroulement du processus de la programmation au Sénégal.** Les interviewés rapportent ainsi un manque d'information entre leurs sièges respectifs et le terrain, et un manque de précision méthodologique, ceci entraînant des positions hésitantes et changeantes des sièges. Les décisions de participation au processus de la PC et celles relatives à la méthodologie ont principalement émané du terrain. Cette instabilité institutionnelle a parfois entraîné des frictions, rendant relativement laborieux le début du processus d'élaboration du DCP. Au niveau de l'UE, malgré l'importance de la dimension politique liée à la programmation conjointe, il apparaît que le SEAE n'a pas participé au processus.

*JC 7.2 : Les directives de la programmation conjointe étaient claires et connues de tous*

**Selon les partenaires interviewés, les directives reçues au début du processus n'étaient pas claires.** Il ressort ainsi que du fait de l'absence de directives claires du siège au démarrage, la mission de consultance qui a eu lieu au début du processus a été perçue comme étant peu utile. Les initiatives du siège qui ont succédé ont été utiles et informatives pour la bonne continuité du processus (notamment la mission de consultance au début de la 2<sup>ème</sup> phase).

<sup>80</sup> La volonté politique de garder un dialogue bilatéral direct avec le Gouvernement a également été évoqué par les partenaires interviewés.

## **9. EQ8: Dans quelle mesure la PC a-t-elle pu réduire les coûts de transactions des pays partenaires et les maintenir à un niveau raisonnable pour l'UE et les EM ?**

*JC 8.1 : La programmation conjointe a réduit les coûts de transactions pour les gouvernements des pays partenaires*

Etant donné que la PC n'a pas encore été mise en œuvre, il n'est pas possible de statuer sur la baisse des coûts de transactions lié au processus. Le gouvernement anticipe une baisse des coûts de négociation mais souligne le caractère chronophage de l'établissement de la programmation conjointe.

*JC 8.2 : Les coûts de transactions relatives à la programmation conjointe sont raisonnables pour l'UE et les EM, compte tenu des avantages attendus*

La programmation conjointe n'a pas encore été exécuté mais les coûts de transactions apparaissent assez importants pour des résultats moyennement satisfaisants. Les efforts de participation et de contribution durant les discussions ont été appréciés et jugés nécessaires par les EM et la DUE. Toutefois, beaucoup déplorent la lenteur des discussions et le non-respect des engagements qui auraient permis d'avoir des impacts réels et d'aboutir à une programmation conjointe plus effective. Certains partenaires ont émis des craintes que la 2<sup>ème</sup> phase soit sujette aux mêmes défis.



# Annex T. Country Note Zambia

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## 1. The Joint Programming Process in Zambia

**Zambia began its formal donor coordination efforts 20 years ago.** Zambia introduced sector-wide approaches (SWAps) in the 1990s, followed by a DAC-supported pilot on *Harmonisation in Practice* with 6 Northern European donors in 2003. The year after, the *Wider Harmonisation in Practice* was agreed with an expanded group of bilateral donors, the EC, the UN and the World Bank. After the Paris Agenda on Aid Effectiveness was adopted in 2005, Zambia developed its **Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia, JASZ**. This was signed by 16 donors in April 2007. It centred on sector coordination and division of labour (DoL) based on a donor mapping, which had shown an uneven attention by the donors across the 17 sectors of Zambia's **Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP)**. While “donor darlings” like governance, education and health had 9-10 donors each, others like environment, science and technology and social protection were under-funded. JASZ focused on reducing transaction costs by realigning DoL among donors, reducing over-crowding in the more popular sectors and trying to distribute attention more evenly across FNDP priorities.

**Lessons from the first two years of JASZ.** In connection with the Third High-level meeting on Aid Effectiveness in Accra in September 2008, lessons from JASZ were presented. The main gains were (i) improved coordination among the donors, (ii) streamlined communication with government, (iii) reduced transaction costs, especially for government as they could now deal with donor focal points rather than all donors on various issues. However, the approach assumes more or less equally strong and qualified leads on both the government and donor side in all sectors, something that was not true and created challenges. Donor reluctance to leave sectors and lack of willingness to channel through other partners was reducing the hoped-for coordination benefits, and donor withdrawal itself was often problematic, causing disjuncture and disruptions in the sector. The ability of a given donor to shift sector or roles within sector (from active to silent partner, for example) was often not for the field to decide but determined by general policy at HQ. This caused considerable delays and transition costs. The importance of individuals was clear – processes could come to a halt when a key person changed, and this was particularly a problem on the donor side due to high staff rotation. New lending institutions and emerging donors like China, India, Brazil posed challenges to this DoL process. The DoL across sectors based on the FNDP priorities remained a problem with donors reluctant to move into certain sectors. Finally, as Zambia's economy improved and ODA became a decreasing share of the budget, the time and attention given by GRZ to donor coordination declined.

**JASZ II and JP.** When Brussels in December 2012 asked whether it would be feasible and useful to pilot JP in Zambia, HoMs in February 2013 responded that JASZ II (2011-2015) provided for good donor coordination, joint analysis, common response and good DoL. Most MS were not prepared to align their budget cycles but were willing to strengthen informal DoL to increase synergies, avoid duplication and reduce transaction costs. Sectors of interest were energy and private sector development with many actors and where large and complex investments are foreseen, and where non-EU actors are important. Zambia's progress towards becoming a lower middle-income economy (LMIC) also meant grant aid was decreasing in importance.

**EU stakeholder views as of 2016.** The EU community reviewed its analysis of the potential for JP early 2015, partly in response to the expiry of the MDG process, partly in response to the presidential by-election January 2015 with the death of President Michael Sata. The conclusions were basically the same, and largely reiterated in April 2016. The EU community will continue advancing coordination and DoL on a pragmatic basis, focusing on the seven sectors where they

are engaged, looking at how leverage can be exercised and visibility enhanced. The Delegation and MS recently prepared sector papers for all seven sectors in preparation for the Seventh NDP (NDP-7), with a workshop early June 2016 finalising these for discussion with GRZ. These seven sector papers have a consistent structure, presenting the EU joint sector objectives, an overview of which EU actors are involved, their expected financial commitments, expected results, intervention summary and scope for enhanced collaboration. The EU developed a Letter of Intent in the energy sector that allowed non-EU actors to join in a sector-wide programme, and this approach may be used also in other sectors. The HoCs will prepare a roadmap for the process ahead (NDP-7 + JASZ III), and will meet quarterly to discuss synergies between political and development cooperation issues. Actors note that the change in political leadership has made GRZ more engaged with the donors, not least of all because the continuous fall in copper prices since the top reached about five years ago means that concessional lending and grant aid has become a more urgent matter for the authorities.

#### Findings and conclusions on process

- *Zambia produces comprehensive National Development Plans (NDPs). Based on these, donor coordination is addressed in Joint Assistance Strategies for Zambia (JASZ) that provides for division of labour (DoL) and reduction in transaction costs as core parameters. The current JASZ II (2011-2015) is to be replaced by a JASZ III for the coming period.*
- *The EU community has seen this country-led aid effectiveness structure as sufficient and that a distinct JP process would not be helpful. Instead, EU and MS will continue their sector coordination including using Letters of Intent for signing up a broad body of funding agencies in a given sector, providing sector analyses and essentially supporting a “JP process from below” that is sector- and needs-driven.*

## **2. EQ1: To what extent did JP respond to global and country-level challenges regarding increased aid effectiveness?**

### *JC 1.1: JP responded to the global aid effectiveness challenges*

**JP in Zambia scaled down to sectors only.** Since the JP process in Zambia is largely sector based with pragmatic and scaled-to-results efforts, there has been acceptance if not overt support for the JP activities in Zambia from the various HQs, but with no changes to budget cycles and own programming approaches

### *JC 1.2: The JP process was sensitive to the partner country's aid effectiveness challenges*

**The JP work so far is based on expected Zambian NDP:** The EU has not undertaken a standard JP but instead focused at sector level because it was felt that Zambia's own NDPs and JASZs address the aid coordination issues well enough. The upcoming NDP-7 is expected to be based on the SDGs as adapted to the Zambian context, so the JP sector work is expected to align to this

### 3. EQ2: To what extent did JP contribute to reducing aid fragmentation?

*JC 2.1: Aid fragmentation has been reduced in countries that have carried out JP*


**JASZ has had reduction in aid fragmentation as a priority concern.** Aid fragmentation has been attempted addressed by Zambia in its JAZs so to the extent policy papers have affected aid fragmentation, it is due to these and not JP. The JP work at sector level has, however, documented which EU actors are or intend to be engaged in the core sectors of EU attention, so may have some effects over time.

*JC 2.2: The JP has facilitated a division of labour beyond the sharing of sector involvement*


**The JP sector work is expected to contribute to better DoL but as of now too early to tell.** The increased support to JP at sector level has led to a more coherent response by the EU community that may now carry over to more general DoL concerns, though so far with no concrete results. Innovative instruments like Letter of Intent may pave the way for various forms of sector involvement.

**While intention is to reduce aid fragmentation, overall dynamic not clear:** Reducing aid fragmentation has been a concern of the JASZs and supported by the EU community, but there may be processes that push towards increased aid fragmentation due to new actors and funding instruments, especially in sectors that attract grants, credits as well as private investments. However, an analysis of the OECD/DAC database on amounts disbursed per donors per sector seems to reveal a positive trend in division of labour: from the 2009-2011 period to 2014, both the average number of European Partners per OECD sector and the average number of sector per EU MS have decreased. Sectors per donor decreased from 9.01 to 6.38 while donors per sector went from 5.22 to 4.24. This trend is illustrated in the two graphs below.

**Figure 1: European Partners presence per sector**



Source: OECD database, accessed in December 2016.

**Figure 2: Number of sectors per EU and MS donor**

Source: OECD database, accessed in December 2016.

#### **4. EQ3: To what extent did JP improve aid predictability and transparency of EU and MS aid?**

*JC 3.1: Joint programming led to changes in EU/MS planning and/or financial cycles*

**No changes to budget cycle synchronisation:** There are no documented moves towards budget cycle synchronisation.

*JC 3.2: Predictability of CPA provided by JP-participants improved*

**There are some improvements to aid predictability.** The seven sector strategy papers include the available information regarding EU donor commitments by donor in each sector.

*JC 3.3: Transparency of CPA provided by JP-members improved*

**Aid transparency facing the same challenges as CPA predictability.** There is no real improvement in CPA disbursement data by the EU community.

#### **5. EQ4: To what extent did JP contribute to improved leadership by the partner country of its development priorities?**

*JC 4.1: The partner country government has played an increasingly important role in the JP*

**Since the JP process is only incipient and sector based, GRZ is not involved.** The GRZ has so far not been involved in any of the preparatory discussions of the sector JP work.



*JC 4.2: JP contributed to increased alignment to partner country development priorities*

The sector JP work is intended to ensure alignment with NDP-7. GRZ is to present NDP-7 during the fall of 2016, and the seven sector studies are meant to contribute to the contents of this but also ensure EU community alignment with GRZ priorities. So far this is something that will happen in the future so no alignment can for the time be attributed to JP.

**6. EQ5: To what extent has JP contributed to increased coherence of EU and MS strategies and programming at country level?**

*JC 5.1: JP favoured convergence of objectives among EU and MS in terms of development strategies and policies at country level*

The sector work has strengthened convergence among the EU actors. There has been convergence in the seven sectors that have produced the strategic papers.

*JC 5.2: JP documents show coherence of development cooperation with other EU policies*

There is so far no indication of other EU policies being part of the JP process. There is no mention in documentation seen and conversations held that other EU policies are being brought into for example the sector Letters of Intent or the sector studies.

**7. EQ6: To what extent did JP increase the visibility of EU and MS to partner country authorities and other donor partners?**

*JC 6.1: JP contributed to enhance awareness of EU support among partner country authorities and other donors*

JP is only known among other donor partners in EU priority sectors. There has been no formal JP process yet so national authorities have not been formally informed. Other actors in the energy sector are aware of the Letter of Intent and the larger JP process. The EU intends to use the sector studies to highlight the EU's community's joint efforts, however, once the dialogue around NDP-7 can begin.

*JC 6.2: JP contributed to enhance the visibility of EU member states among partner country authorities and other donors*

The sector focus is key to bilateral visibility. The EU's focus on seven sectors with its work in producing sector papers led by different MS is likely to provide the various MS with greater visibility vis-a-vis national authorities and the other actors in the sector. So far there is only limited awareness among some of the donor partners

## **8. EQ7: To what extent was the EU organised so as to make JP work?**

*JC 7.1: The JP institutional set-up is conducive to a successful process*

**The institutional set-up was known but not really relevant to the JP decisions in Zambia:** The decisions regarding the JP structure and process in Zambia were based on an analysis of what was a pragmatic and realistic approach and not dependent on the general institutional set-up.

*JC 7.2: JP guidance was clear and well known*

**The EU community is fully aware of JP guidance.** The JP guidance was well known but not really relevant for the decisions and process decided on in Zambia

## **9. EQ8: To what extent did JP reduce partner countries' transactions costs and keep them reasonable for the EU and MS?**

*JC 8.1: JP has reduced transaction costs for partner country governments*

**Little engagement of GRZ in the JP so far so no transaction costs.** No transaction costs have been incurred on the GRZ side of JP so far.

*JC 8.2: Transaction costs for the EU and MS relating to JP are deemed worth it in light of expected benefits*

**The only costs have been in the field, which have been held to a minimum:** The “JP light” process has so far only meant time costs to the EU community on the ground, which has scaled the efforts to expected results.