

UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development - Public Consultation on revising the European Consensus on Development

Fields marked with * are mandatory.

(1) Introduction

The year 2015 was a strategic milestone for global governance, poverty eradication and sustainable development. It marked the target date of the UN Millennium Development Goals and a point to reflect on the progress made to date and the challenges ahead in addressing their unfinished business. 2015 also saw a series of landmark international summits and conferences over the course of the year (the [Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030](#), the [Addis Ababa Action Agenda](#), the [2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development](#) and the COP 21 [Paris Agreement](#) under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change) which have collectively re-cast the way the international community, including the EU, will work to achieve sustainable development and poverty eradication for many years.

Importantly, and in contrast to the Millennium Development Goals, the 2030 Agenda, including its seventeen Sustainable Development Goals, is a universal Agenda which applies to all countries. It reflects many core European values and interests and provides an international framework for tackling global challenges such as climate change. The EU response to the 2030 Agenda is moving ahead in a range of ways:

- Firstly, as part of EU efforts to implement the 2030 Agenda, the [Commission Work Programme for 2016](#) announces an initiative on the next steps for a sustainable European future which will explain how the EU contributes to reaching the Sustainable Development Goals and map out the internal and external aspects of EU policies contributing to the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals.
- Secondly, the High Representative will present the [EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy](#) that is expected to steer the different EU external policies contributing to the global vision of a more stable, prosperous and secure world. It should set out the strategic direction for the full range of EU external action, and as such will help guide EU implementation of the 2030 Agenda in external action.
- Thirdly, the EU will review its development cooperation policy. Existing leading policy documents (including the [2005 European Consensus on Development](#) and the [2011 Agenda for Change](#)) are currently framed around the Millennium Development Goals and need to adapt to incorporate the 2030 Agenda. Given its direct relevance to the EU's overall relations with developing countries, this review will be carried out in full consistency with the ongoing work on the future of the partnership between the EU and the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, under a post-[Cotonou](#) framework.

Views from this consultation will be used to inform the way forward on the initiatives above and in particular the revision of the European Consensus on Development and other external aspects of 2030 Agenda implementation. The consultation seeks your views on **how development policy, in the context of EU external action as foreseen by the Lisbon Treaty**, should respond to the range of landmark 2015 summits and conferences, and also to the rapid changes happening in the world.

Replies can include views which could apply only to the EU institutions and also to both the EU and its Member States – it would be helpful to clarify this in your response. This open public consultation will run for 12 weeks from 30 May 2016 to 21 August 2016. A brief summary and analysis of all consultation contributions will be published by November 2016 and all individual contributions will also be made available on the consultation website (unless respondents ask for their contributions not to be published).

(2) Information on respondents

- * 2.1 Received contributions may be published on the Commission's website, with the identity of the contributor. Please state your preference with regard to the publication of your contribution.

Please note that regardless of the option chosen, your contribution may be subject to a request for access to documents under [Regulation 1049/2001](#) on public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents. In such cases, the request will be assessed against the conditions set out in the Regulation and in accordance with applicable [data protection rules](#).

- I do not agree that my contribution will be published at all
- My contribution may be published but should be kept anonymous; I declare that none of it is subject to copyright restrictions that prevent publication
- My contribution may be published under the name indicated; I declare that none of it is subject to copyright restrictions that prevent publication

- * 2.2 Are you registered in the EU's Transparency Register?

Please note: Organisations, networks, platforms or self-employed individuals engaged in activities aimed at influencing the EU decision making process are expected to register in the transparency Register. During the analysis of replies to a consultation, contributions from respondents who choose not to register will be treated as individual contributions (unless the contributors are recognised as representative stakeholders through Treaty provisions, European Social Dialogue, Art. 154-155 TFEU).

- Yes
- No

- * 2.2.1 If yes, what is your registration number?

55888811123-49

- * 2.3 Name (entity or individual in their personal capacity)

Climate Action Network Europe

2.5 What type of stakeholder are you?

- Government institution / Public administration
- University / Academic organisation
- Civil society (including Non-Governmental Organisation, specialised policy organisation, think tank)
- International organisation
- Private sector or private company
- Citizen/private individual
- Other

2.6 Please specify

Network of NGOs

* 2.7 What is your place of residence (if you are answering as a private individual) or where are the headquarters of your organisation situated (if you are answering on behalf of an organisation)?

- In one of the 28 EU Member States
- Other

2.8 Please specify

Belgium

(3) Context: why a change is needed

The EU and its Member States are determined to implement the 2030 Agenda through internal and external actions as well as contribute to the successful implementation of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, given the strong interlinkages. In this context, our policies, should take into account changing global conditions and trends, to ensure that they remain fit-for-purpose across the time-horizon to 2030.

The global landscape has changed significantly compared to the time of adoption of the Millennium Development Goals. While much has been achieved, with more than one billion people having been lifted out of extreme poverty since 1990, great challenges remain and new ones are emerging. At global level, more than 800 million people still live on less than USD 1.25 a day. The world is witnessing multiple conflicts and security tensions, complex humanitarian and global health crises, deteriorations of human rights, environmental degradation, resource scarcity, urbanisation and migration. Migration flows across the world will continue to have important impacts, and present both a risk and an opportunity. The EU needs to address global security challenges, including tackling the root causes of conflict and instability and countering violent extremism. Climate change can continue to amplify problems and can severely undermine progress. Important changes include demographic trends, a new distribution of wealth and power between and within countries, the continuing globalisation of economies and value chains, an evolving geography of poverty and a proliferation of actors working on development. Projections also suggest important challenges are ahead (for example, continuing unprecedented urbanisation, and other demographic challenges including ageing societies for some and the potential for a demographic dividend for others). Continued attention will be given to a democratic, stable and prosperous neighbourhood. A revision to EU development policy should take into account these trends (including anticipating those that will remain central in future) whilst retaining a core focus on eradicating poverty and finishing the job started by the Millennium Development Goals.

Finally, the EU Consensus needs also to adapt to the Lisbon Treaty, which provides for all external action policies to work within the frameworks and pursue the principles of objectives of Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union. In particular, coherence between the different parts of EU external action and between external and internal policies is crucial.

The EU will need to address these new global challenges, many of which require coordinated policy action at the national, regional and global levels. The 2030 Agenda provides a framework which can guide us in doing so.

3.1 There is a range of key global trends (e.g. changing geography and depth of poverty; challenges related to climate change, political, economic, social, demographic, security, environmental or technological) which will influence the future of development and the implementation of the 2030 Agenda. Which of these do you think is the most important?

Addressing any one challenge must facilitate mutual solutions that progress towards the objectives of the Agenda 2030. Mutual solutions are achieved when the pathway to fulfilling any one outcome aligns with other outcomes. A narrow prioritisation of any one or more issues does not reflect the interlinked and interconnected nature and challenges of contemporary and globalised societies. If mutual solutions are not achieved then development gains will be short-lived. Mutual solutions build resilience and improve resource efficiency and maximise impact investment. For example, UNDP has highlighted that many of Latin America's development gains made over the past few decades are at risk of rolling back as a result of emergent gaps in public policy. These policies are failing to absorb the challenges of economic slowdown, demographic shifts and climate change. However an interconnected approach could respond to economic slowdown with growth in low carbon industries, providing high-quality decentralised jobs responding to youth unemployment prompted by demographic shifts as well as helping to mitigate climate change.

The World Economic Forum (WEF) global risks report put failures in climate change adaptation and mitigation as the most impactful global risk facing the world in the years to come. Whilst we reiterate that development approaches must be intersectional and generate numerous co-benefits, we particularly highlight the need to find solutions which address the threat multiplier that is climate change. Climate change cuts across all sectors and is transboundary; if we do not address the causes and impacts of climate change, the associated challenges across other sectors will increase exponentially.

European and international exposure to climate risk is not being adequately responded to, not least in an interconnected world where the EU's neighbours are highly vulnerable to climate change. Additionally the differences in climate exposure are not currently reflected in EU budget allocations. For example analysis (e.g. SEI, EEA) shows that, Southern European countries have much higher exposure to first order (direct e.g. flood, drought), second order (systemic e.g food, supply chain) and third order (political e.g. migration) climate risks compared with Northern European countries. Having agreed to numerous re-enforcing commitments, the EU should work in a comprehensive manner to address the wide array of challenges without specifically prioritising one over another.

3.2 How should EU policies, and development policy in particular, better harness the opportunities and minimise the negative aspects of the trend you identified in the previous question?

On all aspects and challenges related to sustainable development, it will be important drive efforts through various political actors, institutions, policies and agreements. The inter-related nature of sustainable development will require stronger and more fluid coordination and communication between ministries and specialists that focus in particular on cross-cutting issues such as gender equality, human rights and climate change.

On climate change specifically, there is definitely a need for stronger policy coherence across the EU and its policies - the principle of policy coherence for development should incorporate climate change and sustainability. Doing so will limit the consequence of domestic policies and international agreements in other sectors (eg. Trade, finance, energy) undermining global and regional efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and build resilient infrastructure. Stronger political leadership and technical understanding across EU decision-making bodies will be necessary to properly incorporate climate change and sustainable development into respective policy areas.

As a means to help address the numerous risks posed by climate change, conditionality of EU funds to insure investments which limit temperature rise and build resilience to plausible climate scenarios would help to ensure EU domestic development is climate resilient. If the EU budget shrinks, as the consequence of Brexit amongst other forces, the efficiency of the budget and importance of strategic allocation of resources will grow. Given that climate stability is needed to provide bedrock for growth and social cohesion the budget will need to be used strategically to maintain European conditions for prosperity. Other functions such as European Union Solidarity Fund should also be stress-tested against climate risk. As climate impacts increase the funds ability to be fit for purpose in a 1.5°C, 2°C, 3°C, 4°C world will be called into question.

In regard to the EU's overseas development cooperation, policies and plans will need to be designed in a way that has an added value for both developing countries and for global efforts to tackle climate change. We note the need for ongoing learning to achieve best practice in meeting development needs whilst also mitigating and adapting to climate change, but EU cooperation must champion these measures and enable innovation. For example, climate change mitigation stress tests of existing and future development projects to ensure that they meet the Paris Agreement to limit global average temperature rise to 1.5°C. Climate resilience stress tests will also be important - to safeguard sectors and communities against climate change impacts. Degrees of warming and resulting climate impacts will not be uniform across the planet and resilience up to 4°C of warming alongside contingency plans for 6°C, will reflect best practice in climate risk management. Additional financial support, capacity-building and technology transfer will also be necessary to bring about an added value to the EU's cooperation with developing countries.

There will need to be extensive restructuring of the European Neighbourhood Policy's current environment and climate change activities, EIB lending policies and the GCCA+, in order to align them with limiting average global temperature rise to 1.5°C.

Additionally, the EU's engagement with other international bodies, including the G20 and the UN can multiply EU influence in the development agenda. The EU's recently released Global Strategy demonstrates an uptick in the EU's commitment to ensuring global institutions keep pace with global change and serve in the public interest. The UN is already struggling to accommodate the rise in climate impacts – perhaps most notable in the strain placed upon the humanitarian system. UN support for the implementation of Sendai, Agenda 2030 and the Paris Agreement will require a number of reforms that integrate operational climate risks and develop best practice approaches as a means to pursue international objectives. This would also aid the EU's and other countries learning of best-practice development in a changing climate. A similar approach could also be applied within the G20 to safeguard the financial system against systemic climate risks including losses, stranded assets and damages related to climate change.

(4) Priorities for our future action: what we need to do

Implementation of the 2030 Agenda will require sustained EU efforts to promote a more just world, including a strong focus on the need to address gender equality and women's empowerment. Peace, inclusiveness, equality and good governance including democracy, accountability, rule of law, human rights and non-discrimination will need particular emphasis. The 2030 Agenda also requires recognition of the close interconnectedness between poverty, social issues, economic transformation, climate change and environmental issues.

To achieve poverty eradication, EU development policy will need to take into account key demographic and environmental trends, including challenges related to climate change, and concentrate effort on least developed countries and fragile states. The EU will also need to strengthen our approach to fragility and conflict, fostering resilience and security (as an increasing proportion of the world's poor are expected to live in fragile and conflict affected states) and to protect global public goods and to maintain our resource base as the prerequisite for sustainable growth. Peace and security, including security sector reform, will have to be addressed also through our development policy, as will the risks and opportunities related to migration flows. Tackling social and economic inequalities (both within and between countries) is a crucial element of the 2030 Agenda as is addressing environmental degradation and climate change. Job creation will be an important challenge in which the private sector has to play an active role. Finishing the job of the Millennium Development Goals requires identifying and reaching those people throughout the world who are still not benefitting from progress to ensure that no one is left behind.

To achieve lasting results, EU development policy will need to foster transformation and promote inclusive and sustainable growth. Drivers of inclusive sustainable growth, such as human development, renewable energy, sustainable agriculture and fisheries, and healthy and resilient oceans should be an important part of our efforts to implement the new Agenda as will efforts aimed at tackling hunger and under-nutrition. Implementation of the 2030 Agenda will require a multi-dimensional, integrated approach to human development. Implementation will also require us to address vectors of change, such as sustainable urban development and relevant use of information and communication technology. Our development policy will have to engage and identify new ways of partnering with the business in order to achieve sustainable and inclusive growth, industrialisation and innovation. Implementation of the 2030 Agenda will also require cooperation with partner countries and regions on science, technology and innovation. In all aspects of our external action, the EU will need to ensure that our approaches, including development cooperation, are conducive to achieving the 2030 Agenda's Sustainable Development Goals and that the EU intensifies efforts to promote pursue coherence between our policies and our internal and external action.

4.1 How can the EU better address the links between achieving the Sustainable Development Goals, the Paris Agreement on climate change and addressing other global sustainable development challenges?

Agenda 2030 and the Paris Agreement on climate change demonstrate a refined approach to how our economies operate, adding much needed to value to global public goods and services.

The Paris Agreement stipulates a number of decisive objectives that should

better shape and realise development policy: the goal to limit global temperature rise by 1.5°C, the requirement that our economies need to be at net zero carbon emissions by the middle of the century, as well as a global goal on adaptation that should enhance adaptive capacity, reduce vulnerability to climate change impacts and contingency plan for the worst impacts of climate loss and damage. Achieving these objectives means wide-scale changes for current and future development and economic policies in order to align themselves with the requirements set out in the Paris Agreement.

The pathway of sustainable development in Agenda 2030 has laid down the foundations for better alignment between our development and climate objectives; it will be through the local, national and international implementation of the Agenda that policy-makers will need to operationalise these agreements. Building on that, the EU should also incorporate climate action into the principle of Policy Coherence for Development. Doing so will help guarantee the use of climate change indicators as part of the further integration of development and climate objectives.

Key considerations for strengthening links include the following [some of which apply to the EU and its partner countries]:

- The tools and mechanisms held by all EU institutions - consistent with the diversity of sectors covered by the sustainable development goals - should be resilient to increases in temperature and delineated responsibility inside each institution should be allocated to better understand the climate risks and consequent mitigation and adaptation measures required to maintain resilience.
- Humanitarian planning and response should be resilient to an increase in climate related disasters
- Development projects that reflect adaptation needs and the global adaptation goal should be elevated and become mainstream activities, particularly in vulnerable regions and countries.
- Energy - equitable access to safe renewable energy, by-passing the development of fossil fuel projects, and instead eliminating barriers to technology in renewable energy and energy efficiency.
- The role of cities in reducing GHG emissions, catalysing sustainable transport, spatial planning that reduces risks of climate impacts.
- Industrialisation must be kept in check to ensure that global temperature rise is a clear marker for industrial activities, particularly natural resource extraction and consumption. The concept of the Circular Economy endorsed by the EU must be rapidly implemented, both in domestic policies and through development assistance to third and developing countries.
- Support UN reform to integrate climate risk into operations and so ensure the UN can fulfil its mission to maintain peace, rights and security.
- Embrace low carbon resilient investments in stabilisation programmes in unstable regions in the neighbourhood to secure longevity of gains e.g. respond to youth employment, decentralised and disperse benefits, resilience to cascade risks.
- Phase out environmentally harmful subsidies, including fossil fuel

subsidies - a process which will free up additional funds for key social and environmental services within EU Member States.

4.2 How should the EU strengthen the balanced integration of the economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable development in its internal and external policies, and in particular in its development policy?

Internal:

Agenda 2030 sets a stronger imperative for the EU to address multidimensional challenges for sustainable development in a more comprehensive way. Strong political leadership and will is needed from both EU institutions and European Member States to make sustainable development an integral aspect of all policies and decisions. At a substantive level, key considerations need to be taken into account when designing and applying internal policies.

For example, making a meaningful and just transition away from fossil fuel dependent economies; take case studies from countries where implementing more stringent environmental policies have been introduced [for example, closure of coal mines]. Use these case studies to identify which methods worked well and which didn't. Assess the wider social and economic impacts to prevent potential shocks to communities that have been heavily reliant on industry that cannot exist in 1.5°C world.

In-depth analysis and trials on the co-benefits of the three-way integration across the sectors - for example, a renewable energy scheme (subsidised by the gov) that provides specialised training and employment for labour forces in regions and demographics that suffer high levels of unemployment. Assess the positive and negative impacts of such initiatives and schemes towards the delivery of development objectives. Further improvements regarding sustainable consumption and production should be pursued, including a better awareness within institutions and across the public about the EU's consumption patterns and their internal and external impacts.

Internal & External:

Our current levels of inequality across the EU, and outside its borders display that current economic structures benefit few and leave many behind. Climate change and environmental degradation are also symptomatic of those same structures and trends. Not just linked to human well-being and lifting people out of poverty, stronger regulation and accountability of financial actors will prove beneficial to the environment and climate action efforts. Environmental and Social Governance (ESG) provides a decent building block to bring about more coherence across economic objectives with those of the social and environmental sectors.

In the coming years climate impacts will worsen disproportionately across the EU member-states and strategic budget allocations will be required to

maintain EU cohesion. If unaddressed the disproportionate impacts of climate in Southern European countries could cause significant tensions with Northern European neighbours. What is more Southern European countries are expected to feel the cascade and transnational climate impacts felt by their neighbours in North Africa and the near East

External:

Investing in external low carbon climate resilience which produces mutual development benefits reduces threats to the EU's peace and security as well as alleviating pressure on the EU's international crisis response mechanisms. It also helps open up external markets for EU investment and growth.

Financial flows and investments are instrumental for developing sustainable infrastructure and services. Many decisions and plans related to finance require ambitious development policy that prioritises a balanced approach to the environmental, social and economic objectives of Agenda 2030, and which integrates the objectives of the Paris Agreement on climate change.

European financial decisions, as well as the role of European development banks, have the opportunity to lead the way in driving support and investments towards strengthen climate resilience whilst meeting development needs. Europe's investment entities have a development mandate, and part of that development mandate is tackling climate change and its impacts.

Mitigation support and capacity-building - in thorough consultation with local communities and stakeholders - will be crucial to meeting key development and economic objectives: including job creation, access to affordable and clean energy, expansion of sustainable public transport and energy efficient infrastructure.

Resilience and adaptation support that prevents wide-scale damage to local and indigenous livelihoods, and the displacement or forced movement of communities due to negative climate impacts. Adaptation should also be seen as a long-term investment for our economies, particularly for related sectors that contribute to social and economic stability in developing countries; fisheries, agriculture, access to potable water and sanitation, energy, and infrastructure.

4.3 What are the main changes you would like to see in the EU's development policy framework?

Answer:

Primarily, the EU's development policy should strengthen the link between EU domestic activities and their impacts on third countries. The EU is tasked with helping to create the conditions for prosperity for its citizens. In our interconnected world this requires upholding peace, rights and security both internally and externally. Efforts to address international challenges should be re-enforced by domestic agreements, commitments and targets where policies have more strengthened outward-looking approaches.

The following areas are key avenues to ensure consistency between domestic and international commitments:

- Systemic and comprehensive integration of international climate change and development objectives into other key policy areas across the EU, as a means to achieve the SDGs both in the EU and internationally. The EU's development policy could introduce a specific (governance) pillar that liaises and monitors the progress of policy coherence across other sectors, including agriculture, energy and security to ensure that they become aligned with international agreements and objectives.
- Stress-testing of EU investments against climate scenarios to facilitate low carbon resilient investment and ongoing learning process of best practice approaches
- The EU's sustainable consumption & production policy should include a specific commitment to address the EU's unsustainable consumption patterns; this can be pursued through the EU's Circular Economy framework;
- Natural resource management, building on the commitment to enhance development within planetary boundaries
- Operationalising the EU's acknowledgement to look beyond Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to broader measures of progress including social, human and natural capital, as cited in the SDGs and Addis Ababa Action Agenda. The EU should work with actors in the UN, and actors such as the OECD to develop alternative measures of progress beyond economic growth and GDP
- Ring-fencing ODA and public finance for climate action to prioritise its use for the most vulnerable communities and people in developing countries.
- Humanitarian planning and financing consistent with climate scenarios
- Influencing EU third party actors including UN institutions, multilateral development banks, G7, G20, OECD and the private sector
- Public-private partnerships which prioritise low carbon resilient development and embrace the rapid growth of low carbon resilient trade and investment

4.4 In which areas highlighted above would you expect to see greater consistency between development policy and other areas of the EU external action in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda?

Natural Resource consumption: Greater consistency can be achieved through applying robust standards and regulation on the EU's natural resource consumption, including that of greenhouse gas emissions. The EU also needs to achieve better consistency in its trade policies and agreements with third countries, capacity support and technology transfer. Although the EU has made progress in addressing its domestic carbon production, it is not taking into full consideration its net carbon consumption. This means that while the EU is reducing its own greenhouse gas emissions, it is rather importing carbon emissions from third countries through goods, materials and services; the same problem exists for other natural resources and materials, as well as agriculture products. The EU needs to use the upcoming Consensus on Development to better align how these internal consumption patterns and lifestyles can reduce as much as possible the relative burdens being placed on third and developing countries.

Humanitarian response: sustainable low carbon resilient development takes a preventative approach which lessens the burdens on humanitarian crisis response. Humanitarian action should work in continuum with sustainable development approaches to create sustained stability after immediate crisis responses and mitigate against the current pattern of prolonged crisis. Humanitarian tools and mechanisms should also be stress-tested against climate scenarios to ensure that adequate and appropriate resources can be mobilised.

Foreign policy: embrace Agenda 2030 as a means to building and strengthening relationships with partners which enables their prosperity and creates opportunities for European collaboration. Leverage EU influence in international fora including the G7, G20, OECD, UN institutions and multilateral development banks to foster policies which enable sustainable low carbon resilient development.

Climate diplomacy: the EU has held a sustained commitment to climate leadership over the last 2 decades. Climate has consistently offered the EU a productive interface to collaborate with partners for mutual benefit and fostered relationships which have extended far beyond the climate sphere. Climate diplomacy should expand beyond a focus on the UNFCCC and productively signal toward delivering Agenda 2030 as a means to achieving adaptation and loss & damage objectives set under the Paris Agreement.

Migration: existing migration policy is struggling to keep pace with the ongoing global refugee crisis. Future approaches should be future proof, encompass future climate impact scenarios and in turn prompt investment in sustainable development as a form of preventative action. At present many short-term arrangements in response to the refugee crisis will struggle to withstand climate stresses. For example, the Jordan government estimates that 1.5 million Syrian refugees are living within its borders. Simultaneously Jordan is facing escalating water scarcity challenges which are projected to increase under climate change. If these challenges are not addressed Jordan will be unable to support the people within its borders - refugees or otherwise - then they may well be forced to move to other locations.

Trade and investment: development and climate diplomacy engagement have fostered diplomatic relationships which have brokered best practice trade and investment from EU companies. To support EU companies to pivot to low carbon resilient investments consistent with sustainability objectives and future growth opportunities.

Security and defence: sustainable development investments can be targeted at areas which threaten European security as a means of stabilisation and defence. Trajectories for climate impacts should be incorporated in security and defence planning given the evidence that climate stresses create fertile ground for conflict. Additionally the EU can support member-states, as well as neighbourhood partners, to ensure their respective security and defence strategies account for threats posed by climate security and/or insufficiencies in sustainable development which also create conditions for conflict.

Energy Union: both internal and external Energy Union policy should respond to the Paris Agreement target to decarbonise our economies and reach net zero emissions by the middle of the century. Additionally this energy infrastructure should be resilient to future climate scenarios.

4.5 In which areas does the EU have greatest value-added as a development partner (e.g. which aspects of its development policy, dialogue or implementation arrangements or in which category of countries)?

It has been encouraging to see the EU's value for accountability and transparency, as well as the promotion of legally binding policies such as Policy Coherence for Development and its 2030 climate target to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 40% below 1990 levels.

The EU is showing itself to be a strong partner and has shown on numerous occasions its support for vulnerable developing countries. It has set a benchmark for coherence which it can build on to make sure that the SDGs will be as successful as possible, both within the EU and outside it.

The EU can also demonstrate its added value through financial and non-financial means of implementation. That includes transfer and support of access to technologies, reducing financial and market barriers for wider deployment of low-carbon technologies in developing countries, supporting capacity-building that is locally and nationally owned by partner countries, and continuing regular consultation regarding its policies with third countries.

The EU also has a consistent reputation for setting effective norms of social and environmental governance in international institutions. The EU can work with partners in international institutions including the UN, OECD, G7, G20 as well as multilateral development banks (including the EIB and EBRD) to help facilitate the most expedient policies for delivering Agenda 2030 compatible with climate resilience.

The EEAS, together with a number of other Directorate Generals (Energy, ECFIN, DEVCO, FISMA, CLIMA) should pursue a number of initiatives that will provide an added value to the EU's external development policy.

Some concrete examples are set out below:

An "electricity interconnection and storage strategy" with the neighbouring countries. This strategy will inform future domestic needs and effectively manage Europe's and neighbours' infrastructure and investment choices. The focus on power export needs to be balanced with the need for more regional electricity market integration (South-South and East-East) which will improve the investment environment and energy security of the Southern and Eastern neighbours more dramatically in the short term.

A "clean industry and technology diplomatic strategy" for engagement with neighbouring countries. This should focus on cost reductions and job creation through energy demand management, development of local supply chains, open trade and coordinated research and innovation. Political dialogues and regional activities should include commitments to deliver clean power trading, annual uptakes of energy efficiency savings in buildings and industry, projects for electric vehicles and clean public transport, and commissioning studies for establishing Low Carbon Zones as driver of sustainable industrial development.

A Strategic Investment Plan for a Sustainable Neighbourhood based on a similar structure as the European Fund for Strategic Investment. What is needed to stabilise Europe's neighbours is a regional effort on the scale of the Marshall Plan that will invest in resilient infrastructure, sustainable energy, communication, education and health. The fund should pool funding from the EIB, EBRD and contributions from national investment and development banks, and acts as a guarantee to support long-term, high value investment. The next Multiannual Financial Framework (post 2020) should include a earmarking of the EU budget within the Global Europe area specifically for the new fund. Such a fund can include a review of plans and proposals from renewable energy imports from Southern Mediterranean countries.

4.6 How can the EU refine its development policy to better address inequalities – including gender inequality – in the context of the implementation of the 2030 Agenda?

The EU's development policy can embark on consistent and transparent consultation and participation of local communities that face systemic poverty and inequality, as well as those who do not always benefit from EU development cooperation.

The EU can specifically strengthen local and national efforts in partner countries to enhance public participation, access to information and access to justice if and when it is necessary. The EU should also exercise as stringently as possible due diligence, particularly where EU support/actors /institutions and EU private actors are involved.

Inequitable access to natural resources and safe, clean energy is one of the most pressing barriers to poverty alleviation. The impacts posed by climate change will worsen the existing challenges surrounding access to resources – drought, land degradation and sea level rise are just some of the multipliers of poverty and inequality. It is essential that the EU's development policy protects and preserves these natural resources so that they can serve as reliable and consistent contributors to local communities, including households that chiefly rely on women for support, maintenance and provision.

Infrastructure also lies at a nexus with inequality and resilience. The UN's annual sustainable development report found that quality infrastructure reduces inequality and builds resilience. However, it also found that political priorities do not tend to embrace this nexus and poor communities are often burdened with poor quality infrastructure which exacerbates their challenges. The report also recognises there isn't enough research on extreme and sustained weather impacts on infrastructure. The EU has an opportunity to ensure its investments and priorities embrace mutual solutions by investing in high quality low carbon resilient infrastructure which addresses inequality and whilst building resilience to climate change.

4.7 How can the EU development policy make a stronger contribution to the security of people? How can EU development policy contribute to addressing the root causes of conflict and fragility and contribute to security and resilience in all the countries where we work?

Climate change is one of the root causes of conflict and fragility. It is therefore imperative that the EU increases domestic action to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions. Mitigating climate change is the first step that we need to take if we are to avoid the most dangerous effects of climate change.

However, we have already begun to change the climate and it will be essential to prioritise adaptation and resilience in vulnerable regions so that the impacts of a changing climate are as minimal as possible. Many developing

countries are already exposed to impacts such as severe drought, resource scarcity and sea level rise which directly compromise the security of people in these places. Such impacts of climate change will drastically change how people in countries all over the world access essential natural resources and services, and increase the incidents of migration in order to access basic resources and alleviate food crises. Additionally it is increasingly recognised that climate impacts can prompt cascade impacts and the other crises can be exacerbated by climate impacts. Climate as a compound risk encompasses a deadly cocktail of factors causing fragility and conflict.

The EU must deliver strengthened security through early adaptation action and guarantee safe access to basic public goods and services, including energy. It must guarantee consistent support - research, consultation, technology and capacity - to affected countries and governments that are at risk of exacerbated fragility.

The EU must also contingency plan for the worst climate impacts alongside investing in climate mitigation and adaptation action. In this way management of crises, if the worst is realised, can be more orderly and by better understanding the implications of the worst impacts renewed urgency can be given to mitigation and adaptation action.

If the EU wants to succeed in staving off disorder in its neighbours and prevent future mass displacement of people, European leaders need to recognise and address the interlinkages between climate change, economic development, and security. Because the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region faces disproportionate challenges from climate change, investment and development strategies must directly address key vulnerabilities and focus on sustainable growth and jobs. In order to better address these vulnerabilities, the EU should evaluate and upgrade its cooperation with these countries via current multilateral structures such as the Union for Mediterranean and the Barcelona Convention.

There is an opportunity to focus the EU's financial and economic support to help put the EU's neighbours and partners on a more stable and sustainable development paths. It includes integrating energy markets, deploying clean energy sources, and managing a rising energy demand. This will also help improve EU energy security and manage climate risk, and will create economic opportunities for European industries.

Electricity demand in the MENA region is expected to increase at 6% per year by 2030. The region has also one of the highest potentials for solar and wind energy in the world. Concentrated solar power plants could generate 100 times the combined electricity consumption of MENA and Europe together; and with a wind speed of over 7 meters/second on the Atlantic and Red Sea coasts and some parts of the Sahara Desert, large-scale wind farms would already breach the threshold for economic feasibility. Importantly, the lowest wind and PV prices are now to be found in MENA countries. Long-term prices for onshore wind in Egypt and for solar in Jordan are up to half the prices for projects in Germany.

4.8 How can a revised Consensus on Development better harness the opportunities presented by migration, minimise the negative aspects of irregular migration on the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and better address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement?

In the 2014 Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), scientists affirmed the links between climate change and displacement of populations as well as the importance of voluntary migration as an adaptation strategy.

Harnessing opportunities:

The 2030 Agenda aims to address the root causes of environmental degradation, poverty and inequality and includes targets on climate change, desertification and disaster risk reduction.

It offers guidance for best practice investment in future fit livelihoods. The EU and member states should harness the vision spelt out in Agenda 2030 to create the opportunities for education, health, employment, participation etc which can help resettle refugee communities in EU member states.

Providing skills training and consequent employment in low carbon resilient sectors will create better, stronger and more resilient European societies and equip refugee populations with skills with long-term demand. This has particular resonance for the young refugee populations – the most prevalent demographic – which may not yet developed working skill sets before being forced to flee their homes.

Minimising negative aspects: the Agenda 2030 should be a joint venture between refugee and member state populations, all working to build a safer, stronger and more prosperous Europe. Providing training and employment to refugee and domestic populations will aid integration. Youth employment for refugee and domestic populations is an ongoing challenge in Europe. Investing in low carbon resilient skills and employment will produce the capacities to transform Europe's climate resilience. In line with the Paris Agreement, the EU should support adaptation to the adverse impacts of climate change and foster climate resilience through its development cooperation programmes and take steps to shift public and private financial flows which are consistent with the goal to limit global temperature rise to 1.50C.

The EU should continue to provide its fair share of financial resources towards the agreed goal of 100 billion USD by 2020 and establish a road map to that end. Climate change poses additional hurdles towards achieving sustainable development and additional burdens on many vulnerable developing countries. Thus, while maximising the synergies between climate actions and development on the ground, climate finance should not displace existing ODA commitments but we would expect to see a simultaneous increase of both climate related public finance and non-climate related ODA, with consistent and transparent reporting measures in place.

Better addressing the root causes of irregular migration: the EU should contingency plan for different migration scenarios at different levels of warming. These scenarios should account for first order (direct e.g. drought), second order (systemic e.g. supply chain, famine) and third order

(political e.g. conflict) impacts at temperature scenarios of 1.5C - 6C. This planning can give guidance to identifying where investment in sustainable low carbon resilience is best targeted to mitigate against irregular migration scenarios. It will also prepare the EU to better understand where migration is probable and so allocate resources to best facilitate the integration of new populations across Europe.

As recognised in the Council Conclusions on climate diplomacy (15 February 2016), climate change is a multifaceted threat to food security, resource availability, water, energy and health and may be a contributing factor to migration. Thus the EU should provide practical support for mitigation and adaptation policies and locally-driven, participatory solutions and should maximise use of climate vulnerability assessments in collaboration with partner countries. All elements identified for climate diplomacy action by the Council in 2016 should be pursued and reviewed on an annual basis.

(5) Means of implementation: how do we get there?

The principle of universality underpinning the 2030 Agenda will require a differentiated approach to engagement with countries at all levels of development. Official Development Assistance will continue to play an important role in the overall financing mix for those countries most in need (particularly the Least Developed Countries). The EU and its Member States should continue to progress towards achieving their commitments. However, in all countries our development cooperation will need to take account of other sources of finance, including by leveraging other (non-Official Development Assistance) sources of finance for poverty eradication and sustainable development. The delivery of the 2030 Agenda means that our work helping countries raise their own resources (domestic resource mobilisation), the provision of aid for trade, blending* and partnering with the private sector should be priority areas of focus. The Addis Ababa Action Agenda, an integral part of the 2030 Agenda, provides a framework for our efforts, including for our work supporting the right enabling policy environment for sustainable development in our partner countries. The implementation of the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement on climate change under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change should be closely coordinated given the strong interlinkages. Engagement with middle income countries, notably the emerging economies, will be important to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, considering the role they can play in promoting global public goods, what they can achieve within their respective countries on poverty eradication and sustainable development, and the example they can set within their regions as well as their role in regional processes. Here differentiated partnerships can play an important role (examples include different forms of political, economic, and financial investment as well as cooperation in science, technology and innovation). Specific attention and focus should also be given to Least Developed Countries, as acknowledged by the Addis Ababa Action Agenda.

The EU's implementation of the 2030 Agenda provides an opportunity for enhancing consistency between the different areas of the EU's external action and between these and other EU policies (as outlined in the Lisbon Treaty and in [EU's Comprehensive Approach to external conflict and crises](#)). The EU will continue to pursue [Policy Coherence for Development](#) as a key contribution to the collective effort towards broader policy coherence for sustainable development. In our external action, the EU needs to consider how we can use all policies, tools, instruments at our disposal coherently in line with the integrated nature of the 2030 Agenda.

* Combining EU grants with loans or with equity from other public and private financiers with a view to leveraging additional resources.

5.1 How can EU policies, and EU development policy in particular, help to mobilise and maximise the impact of the increasing variety of sustainable development finance, including in particular from the private sector?

From the outset, it is important that EU policies reassert the key role of public finance, and that private finance is supplementary to it and leveraged by it. Government policy and public finance lead and drive global efforts to address climate change and enhance sustainable development. Public finance and governmental policies are therefore critical to send the right signals to the private sectors on where to invest and unlock financial flows by reducing perceived risks associated to low carbon and climate resilient investments through for example risk sharing mechanisms and coherent policy frameworks. More structured dialogue and cooperation should be established with actors from the finance and insurance sector which are beginning to increase their focus on climate change challenges and opportunities for their sectors. The EU's development policy, along with national policies, should steer and set parameters for the private sector through robust and clear-cut legislation, policy frameworks and regulation, and requirements for international best practice transparency measures. These elements of private finance not only has a positive climate effect but also does no harm, preferably delivering positive developmental co-benefits in the process.

5.2 Given the evolving availability of other sources of finance and bearing in mind the EU's commitments on Official Development Assistance (e.g. [Council Conclusions from 26 May 2015 on "A New Global Partnership for Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development after 2015"](#)), and inter alia, paragraphs 32 and 33), how and where should the EU use its Official Development Assistance strategically and to maximise its impact?

The EU recommitments to the 0.7 % ODA/GNI target was a necessary and welcome step towards consistent support reaching some of the most vulnerable people in developing countries. However, it is worrying that the EU seems to make its ODA commitments, especially the timeline for implementing these, contingent on others delivering "their fair share". This quid pro quo approach greatly endangers the ability of the global community to deliver on the new sustainable development framework, and risks perpetuating a situation of inadequate financing.

In addition, CAN Europe notes with concern that while many EU Member States have not yet reached their ODA targets, it is being used to meet their climate finance commitments. Agenda 2030 demonstrates that in practice climate and development approaches and thus financing will be blended to a great extent. However, given it is abundantly clear that climate change poses additional burdens on sustainable development, it thus requires additional support for countries facing the worst impacts and signals that 0.7% ODA/GNI will be inadequate to tackle this task.

In order to maximise the effectiveness of ODA in both climate and development action, safeguards should be put in place to ensure that non-climate aid is not displaced by growing levels of climate finance. Instead, both levels of climate related ODA and non-climate ODA should grow. The European Commission should propose an interim approach to measure climate finance that ensures the growth of overall resources for developing countries, by committing to the simultaneous increase of both net ODA (total ODA less climate related ODA) as well as climate related ODA. Such an approach should appreciate that development finance needs to be climate proofed, with close integration of climate and development objectives across funds.

ODA (both climate and non-climate related) serves an important purpose in protecting people, livelihoods and sectors which would not benefit from private sector finance and which have limited potential to raise domestic resources. It should therefore continue to be used to support the most crucial needs of and efforts which may lack the interest and investments from private and other sources of finance. For example, climate change adaptation, protecting biodiversity, and targeting disaster risk reduction.

5.3 How can the EU better support partner countries in mobilising their own resources for poverty eradication and sustainable development?

The EU can build on the outcomes from the Addis Ababa Action Agenda regarding action on fiscal reforms and tax in order to mobilize public money to eradicate poverty and enhance sustainable development.

Key actions include improving transparency, and a cooperative and fair tax environment, including international cooperation to tackle illicit financial flows.

Corporate tax dodging costs developing countries \$100 billion every year largely due to lack of international cooperation and true global governance in the area. The EU can support partner countries to strengthen the capacity of tax administration and national tax systems, and promote good governance in the tax area, both at the national and international level. This requires the establishment of an intergovernmental committee on tax cooperation, under auspices of the UN as proposed by UNSG Ban Ki Moon.

5.4 Given the importance of middle income countries to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, what form could differentiated partnerships take?

Middle Income Countries (MICs) will be essential in driving global low-carbon and sustainable development. MICs are becoming some of the largest consumers of natural resources, including raw materials, energy, water and food. They also hold enormous potential to expand deployment and use of green energy, low-carbon and climate resilient infrastructure, and to shape their financial institutions to promote climate change and sustainable development objectives.

But there is a wide variation of development and institutional capacity across these countries. They still face great challenges of poverty, inequality, environmental degradation and climate change impacts. It should not be taken for granted that MICs are all the same.

With that said, it is important to incite Agenda 2030's principle of universality, as well as the national contributions submitted by Parties to the UNFCCC under the Paris Agreement, in order to ensure ambitious and fair implementation of the agreed global goals and targets.

Differentiated Partnerships can be facilitated through a number of initiatives and agreements established through the UN, bi-lateral agreements, and international fora such as the G20. For example, through the UNFCCC, the Nationally Determined Contributions of Parties serve an impetus to stimulate greater growth in renewable energy and energy efficiency across large economies. Growth in these sectors can be supported by exchanges of good practices and specific expertise depending on the priorities, needs and circumstances of the MIC in question.

5.5 Given experience so far in taking into account the objectives of development cooperation in the implementation of EU policies which are likely to affect developing countries (e.g. [Policy Coherence for Development: 2015 EU Report](#)), how should the EU step up its efforts to achieve Policy Coherence for Development, as a key contribution to the collective effort towards policy coherence for sustainable development? How can we help ensure that policies in developing countries, and internationally contribute coherently to sustainable development priorities?

Implementation of sustainable development and climate action falls across numerous policy files in the EU; it is therefore essential that other relevant policy sectors and practitioners are invested in the principle of policy coherence for sustainable development. Although DG DEVCO is invested in PCD, it is not yet fully clear that all sectors of the EU are incorporating the 2015 EU Report on PCD, the outcome of Agenda 2030 or indeed the Paris Agreement.

Increasing awareness and normalising the integration of sustainable development and climate action across all EU files should be in the work program of the European Commission Vice-Presidents.

It will be necessary to have a more robust framework of implementation that results in all policy areas measuring their decisions and actions against sustainable development and climate action principles and needs. The European Commission should propose such an overarching framework that expands accountability measures to other sectors and which uses as ex-ante and ex-post impact assessments on policies and their potential impacts on territories and communities outside the EU. It could also include expert committees – which consult with third parties – to make recommendations for better aligning policies with sustainable development.

Policy Coherence for Development should also be expanded to include sustainability – Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development – as part of the EU’s efforts towards achieving an effective balance between economic development and environmental protection. It will also further demonstrate that these two objectives are not at odds, and are in fact mutually beneficial for the EU, its Member States and third countries.

(6) The actors: making it work together

An important feature of the new Agenda is that all governments, developed and developing, will need to work with a wide range of stakeholders (including the private sector, civil society and research institutions) to improve the transparency and inclusivity of decision-making, planning, service delivery, and monitoring and to ensure synergy and complementarity.

The EU must continue to work collaboratively with others and contribute to a coordinated approach. The Addis Ababa Action Agenda puts national plans for implementation (including associated financing and policy frameworks) at the centre. To maximise our impact, EU development policy should be based on a strategic and comprehensive strategy for each country, which also responds to the country-specific context.

Our partner countries' implementation of the 2030 Agenda will inform our overall engagement and our development cooperation dialogue with them and will help shape our support for their national efforts. The EU should also help partner countries put in place the necessary enabling policy frameworks to eradicate poverty, tackle sustainable development challenges and enhance their policy coherence.

There is a need for a renewed emphasis on the quality of development cooperation, including existing commitments on aid and development effectiveness made in Paris, Accra and Busan* and through work with the [Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation](#).

An updated EU development policy should also provide a shared vision that guides the action of the EU and Member States in development cooperation, putting forward proposals on how to further enhance coordination, complementarity and coherence between EU and Member States. Strengthening [Joint Programming](#) will be an important part of this. Improving the division of labour between the EU and its Member States in order to reduce aid fragmentation will also contribute to increased development effectiveness.

* See [Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action](#) and the [Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation](#)

6.1 How should the EU strengthen its partnerships with civil society, foundations, the business community, parliaments and local authorities and academia to support the implementation of the 2030 Agenda (including the integral Addis Ababa Action Agenda) and the Paris Agreement on climate change?

Both within the EU and through its partnerships and diplomacy efforts, there needs to be continued elevation of public participation in decision-making processes. Such participation includes regular consultation with aforementioned stakeholders, access to information, adequate time and space for input from stakeholders, and targeted outreach to groups that for one reason or another are traditionally excluded from decision-making processes. In the past, civil society has cited concerns over limited representation and participation of concerned stakeholders in debates related to sustainable development; for example, trade and finance. Without timely and reliable information about relevant processes, coupled with limited capacity among civil society organisations, it is very difficult to effectively influence policy debates that will either directly or indirectly impact on the EU's development policy.

6.2 How can the EU promote private sector investment for sustainable development?

Private sector investments must represent additional benefits to sustainable development objectives, whilst also endeavouring to limit any negative impacts on affected communities and people.

Private investments should therefore be driven by public policy and regulation. The EU needs to establish and set down long-term legislation and robust policy frameworks that direct investments towards activities that are in line with transitioning to a renewable low-carbon economy and sustainable development criteria. This is the single most important factor when seeking to promote private sector investments and ensuring that the private sector is contributing and not working against these criteria.

6.3 How can the EU strengthen relations on sustainable development with other countries, international financing institutions, multilateral development banks, emerging donors and the UN system?

In the run up to the adoption of Agenda 2030, the EU laid out the key trends and changes that need to be made through the SDGs. One of the most effective ways to strengthen relations with third parties is to demonstrate how the EU plans to fulfil its commitments to sustainable development and climate action. As soon as possible, the EU needs to pursue thorough, transparent and accountable implementation of Agenda 2030, and ratify the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. The EU's implementation plans should set out clear pathways towards meeting its ODA and climate finance commitments, and increasing its efforts to limit global temperature rise to 1.5°C. In working with IFIs and MDBs, the EU can support efforts to draw up more robust policies to shift financial flows and investments away from large-scale activities that are damaging people and environments inside and outside the EU.

The UN is enveloped in a cycle of managing interconnected and prolonged crises. The UN's peace and security apparatus are struggling to keep pace. In tandem long-term emergent global risks are escalating – demographic shifts, mass urbanization, political instability, widening inequality and not least of all, climate impacts. The EU should support the UN to strike a balance between responding to short-term crises and building long-term resilience to impending global risks. Given the severity and pernicious nature of climate change, the UN's climate resilience is a core criterion in assessing the viability of all future UN operations.

UN implementation will be key to maintaining credibility in the Agenda 2030, Paris Agreement and the UN itself. At present the UN does not have sufficient tools or governance arrangements to deliver on these agreements. To maintain the UN's relevance the EU will need to support it to become resilient to climate risks. The UN's operations will need to become compatible with a changing climate. This will mean building resilience to first order (direct e.g. flood, drought), second order (systemic e.g. water, supply chain, food) and third order (political e.g. conflict) impacts of climate change. It will also mean halting investment in practices which exacerbate climate change and instead making infrastructure decisions which favour low carbon investments which capitalise on synergies to address other global challenges such as youth unemployment and energy access.

The EU should support a call for UN reform which allocates responsibility within each UN institution and agency for managing climate risk. In this way each institution can stress-test its operations against climate scenarios to understand the challenges and opportunities they face and be accountable to managing them. These reforms constitute the first steps to making the UN fit for purpose to delivering the Agenda 2030 and Paris Agreement. Additionally the EU should encourage the new Secretary General to mobilise the power of the Security Council to elevate impending global climate concerns such as the cascade consequences of breaching global tipping points.

6.4 How can the EU best support partner countries to develop comprehensive and inclusive national plans for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda?

The development of national plans for implementation depend on a number of complementary elements which should help drive country ownership and accountability, as well as strengthened partnerships between the EU and its partner countries:

Financial Means of Implementation:

The development of comprehensive and inclusive plans in partner countries will be highly dependent on consistent financial support from the EU, particularly in the early stages of implementing Agenda 2030 and preparing climate action plans. The EU needs to secure adequate, predictable and transparent financial support for meeting existing and recently adopted commitments on climate and sustainable development action. That includes clarity on funding sources for the implementation of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, and advancing efforts to operationalise new and alternative sources of public finance. Effective action and implementation on the ground also requires greater clarity on the relationship between climate and development financing, as well as the commitment to ensure that non-climate specific ODA is climate smart.

Non-financial Means of Implementation:

Capacity building and human resources support will be essential for both development as well as implementation, monitoring and reporting of Agenda 2030 objectives. The EU should support capacity development that is driven by local and country ownership and that is integrated across all relevant ministries and competencies (following the principle of Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development).

The EU should strengthen technology transfer through, for example the new Technology Facilitation Mechanism, and reduce trade and market barriers for developing countries to better access renewable energy technologies at fair rates.

Challenging current systems that undermine national efforts to advance sustainable development:

The EU needs to support and promote efforts to tackle systemic challenges such as the current economic paradigm which is not fit for purpose to achieve the objectives set out in Agenda 2030 and the Paris Agreement. Promoting and implementing a stronger governance structure that oversees the activities of financial institutions, private actors, and practitioners will be essential to ensure that the efforts of financial and non-financial MOI are not undermined by other structures or systems.

Other key systemic issues that need to be addressed include: integration of developing countries into global value chains and greater transparency on trade policy making, including public debate and parliamentary oversight.

6.5 What are the best ways to strengthen and improve coherence, complementarity and coordination between the EU and the Member States in their support to help partner countries achieve poverty eradication and sustainable development?

There should be a system of regular consultation in partner countries, both with the respective national and ministerial competencies, with EU delegations and embassies located in partner countries, and civil society stakeholders. EU and Member State external action can benefit from initiatives such as Joint Programming, but this must be monitored closely in order to avoid inconsistencies, and instead promote complementarity of varying expertise and specialisation.

Common reporting requirements on financial support for developing countries can also facilitate better oversight of how finance is used across sectors, and identify where there may be gaps in assistance, misuse of financing, and exchange of effectiveness measures between donors, recipients and sectors.

6.6 How can EU development cooperation be as effective as possible, and how can we work with all partners to achieve this?

Realisation and integration of development objectives and principles across other policy areas will be important to ensure that development cooperation is as effective as possible. As mentioned previously, stronger political endorsement and leadership on sustainable development and climate action will be necessary to make related actions effective. The EU has a track record for supporting strong accountability and measures to revise its policies; it should build on that to maintain active engagement with international processes and bodies (such as High Level Political Forum), and to maintain regular, inclusive and thorough consultation with civil society.

The EU should also do regular checks on whether its development cooperation is meeting the principles to which it has already signed up through Agenda 2030 and the Paris Agreement.

6.7 What further progress could be made in EU Joint Programming, and how could this experience be linked with other EU joined-up actions in supporting countries' delivery of the 2030 Agenda?

The EU Joint Programming sets out a positive effort to achieve better coherence and effectiveness between the EU and Member States' development cooperation. The EU should use regular reviews of these programmes and joined-up actions to identify where priorities can be better aligned between donor countries, recipient sectors, and affected stakeholders. This approach can enable the learning process required to deliver climate compatible development. Much of the work under Agenda 2030 will require new and innovative approaches which may only arise in implementation. Harnessing this process to support learning and innovation will only strengthen EU agenda 2030 implementation. Given that the Joint Programming was initiated after the Busan meeting of development partners in 2011, it will need to be amended in order to further meet the goals and targets of Agenda 2030, including development and aid effectiveness.

(7) Keeping track of progress

The EU will need to contribute to the global follow-up and review process for the 2030 Agenda. Keeping track of progress in a systematic and transparent way is essential for delivering the 2030 Agenda. The EU is actively contributing to the setting up of a Sustainable Development Goal monitoring system at global, regional and national level. Demonstrating results and impact from our efforts and the promotion of transparency will be important priorities for EU development policy, as part of a wider move to strengthen accountability, follow-up and review at all levels.

7.1 How can the EU strengthen its own use of evidence and analysis, including in the development field, to feed into its regular review on the Sustainable Development Goals to the UN?

The EU should continue to pursue concrete monitoring and accountability measures as means to report to the UN on its progress – such an approach should be used to formally include input from non-State actors, including civil society organisations, research institutes and academic actors. Key methods to strengthen its use of evidence and analysis include further inclusion of the research, analysis and data collection done by these non-State actors. This should include collecting case study examples of the EU’s development cooperation in action, both addressing potential negative impacts as well as measuring the EU’s efforts against the objectives of the SDGs.

The EU has the opportunity to demonstrate best practice climate compatible development and share learning at the science-policy-implementation interface. Current approaches to infrastructure investment do not adequately integrate climate risk assessment into project planning. Developments in climate services to better inform decision-making and investment choices would better support EU and international objectives in achieving sustainable development. This approach could equally apply to other sectors including food, water, disaster reduction and humanitarian response. At present even adaptation action is not adequately integrating known science about the consequences of warming in future probable climate scenarios and so is resulting in maladaptation. Given the member-state and EU expertise in climate science the EU will be well placed to share climate services approaches as well as raw climate risk data as a contribution to the UN reporting process for Agenda 2030 implementation.

7.2 How can the EU help to ensure the accountability of all actors involved in implementation of the 2030 Agenda, including the private sector? How can the EU encourage a strong and robust approach to the Follow Up and Review of the 2030 Agenda from all actors?

differentiated responsibility. Although the State should be the main duty-bearer, it should also seek to apply, as much as possible, due diligence and accountability to all actors.

The private sector represents a wide variety of stakeholders, large and small, with varying capacities and influence; many important private sector actors are small-scale businesses and cooperatives that will be essential to the implementation of Agenda 2030, including through their adaptation to a changing climate and more intensive development in some countries. It is therefore important to adopt an approach that differentiates between large-scale corporations and smaller scale businesses. In regard to large companies, it is essential that they are required to do internal assessments of their operations; similar to our suggestion on policy coherence, larger companies should measure their policies, activities and impacts against the objectives set out in the SDGs.

Citizens and communities that are negatively impacted by the operations of private companies – for example through pollution to local environment, violation of human rights, or maltreatment in the workplace – should have access to advice, information and support as a means to address grievances. The EU is well placed to put in place more robust regulation of private companies, including on non-financial reporting and through compliance with all pillars of the UN guiding principles on business and Human Rights, in particular due diligence. Further to legislative frameworks, support to public awareness and education on the role of the private sector is highly beneficial, not least to use the reputation of many private actors as a means to ensure good practice.

Follow up and Review in the EU should be driven by open and transparent stock-takes of progress. Each stock-take should occur no less than every five years and they should facilitate civil society participation and contributions.

7.3 How should EU development cooperation respond to the regular reviews on progress of the partner countries towards the 2030 Agenda goals?

The EU should use the reviews on partner country progress as a means to identify where gaps still exist in terms of capacity, support and guidance. Each partner country will come up against different challenges, and the extent to which the EU can address those challenges will vary. Regular dialogue and consultation, both with partner countries, but also with respective civil society should help to indicate further needs.

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