

UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development - Public Consultation on revising the European Consensus on Development

Fields marked with * are mandatory.

(1) Introduction

The year 2015 was a strategic milestone for global governance, poverty eradication and sustainable development. It marked the target date of the UN Millennium Development Goals and a point to reflect on the progress made to date and the challenges ahead in addressing their unfinished business. 2015 also saw a series of landmark international summits and conferences over the course of the year (the [Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030](#), the [Addis Ababa Action Agenda](#), the [2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development](#) and the COP 21 [Paris Agreement](#) under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change) which have collectively re-cast the way the international community, including the EU, will work to achieve sustainable development and poverty eradication for many years.

Importantly, and in contrast to the Millennium Development Goals, the 2030 Agenda, including its seventeen Sustainable Development Goals, is a universal Agenda which applies to all countries. It reflects many core European values and interests and provides an international framework for tackling global challenges such as climate change. The EU response to the 2030 Agenda is moving ahead in a range of ways:

- Firstly, as part of EU efforts to implement the 2030 Agenda, the [Commission Work Programme for 2016](#) announces an initiative on the next steps for a sustainable European future which will explain how the EU contributes to reaching the Sustainable Development Goals and map out the internal and external aspects of EU policies contributing to the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals.
- Secondly, the High Representative will present the [EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy](#) that is expected to steer the different EU external policies contributing to the global vision of a more stable, prosperous and secure world. It should set out the strategic direction for the full range of EU external action, and as such will help guide EU implementation of the 2030 Agenda in external action.
- Thirdly, the EU will review its development cooperation policy. Existing leading policy documents (including the [2005 European Consensus on Development](#) and the [2011 Agenda for Change](#)) are currently framed around the Millennium Development Goals and need to adapt to incorporate the 2030 Agenda. Given its direct relevance to the EU's overall relations with developing countries, this review will be carried out in full consistency with the ongoing work on the future of the partnership between the EU and the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, under a post-[Cotonou](#) framework.

Views from this consultation will be used to inform the way forward on the initiatives above and in particular the revision of the European Consensus on Development and other external aspects of 2030 Agenda implementation. The consultation seeks your views on **how development policy, in the context of EU external action as foreseen by the Lisbon Treaty**, should respond to the range of landmark 2015 summits and conferences, and also to the rapid changes happening in the world.

Replies can include views which could apply only to the EU institutions and also to both the EU and its Member States – it would be helpful to clarify this in your response. This open public consultation will run for 12 weeks from 30 May 2016 to 21 August 2016. A brief summary and analysis of all consultation contributions will be published by November 2016 and all individual contributions will also be made available on the consultation website (unless respondents ask for their contributions not to be published).

(2) Information on respondents

- * 2.1 Received contributions may be published on the Commission's website, with the identity of the contributor. Please state your preference with regard to the publication of your contribution.

Please note that regardless of the option chosen, your contribution may be subject to a request for access to documents under [Regulation 1049/2001](#) on public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents. In such cases, the request will be assessed against the conditions set out in the Regulation and in accordance with applicable [data protection rules](#).

- I do not agree that my contribution will be published at all
- My contribution may be published but should be kept anonymous; I declare that none of it is subject to copyright restrictions that prevent publication
- My contribution may be published under the name indicated; I declare that none of it is subject to copyright restrictions that prevent publication

- * 2.2 Are you registered in the EU's Transparency Register?

Please note: Organisations, networks, platforms or self-employed individuals engaged in activities aimed at influencing the EU decision making process are expected to register in the transparency Register. During the analysis of replies to a consultation, contributions from respondents who choose not to register will be treated as individual contributions (unless the contributors are recognised as representative stakeholders through Treaty provisions, European Social Dialogue, Art. 154-155 TFEU).

- Yes
- No

- * 2.2.1 If yes, what is your registration number?

5189768701-12

- * 2.3 Name (entity or individual in their personal capacity)

ACT Alliance Advocacy to the European Union

2.5 What type of stakeholder are you?

- Government institution / Public administration
- University / Academic organisation
- Civil society (including Non-Governmental Organisation, specialised policy organisation, think tank)
- International organisation
- Private sector or private company
- Citizen/private individual
- Other

2.6 Please specify

ACT Alliance advocacy to the EU is a network of European Development NGOs

* 2.7 What is your place of residence (if you are answering as a private individual) or where are the headquarters of your organisation situated (if you are answering on behalf of an organisation)?

- In one of the 28 EU Member States
- Other

2.8 Please specify

Brussels, Belgium

(3) Context: why a change is needed

The EU and its Member States are determined to implement the 2030 Agenda through internal and external actions as well as contribute to the successful implementation of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, given the strong interlinkages. In this context, our policies, should take into account changing global conditions and trends, to ensure that they remain fit-for-purpose across the time-horizon to 2030.

The global landscape has changed significantly compared to the time of adoption of the Millennium Development Goals. While much has been achieved, with more than one billion people having been lifted out of extreme poverty since 1990, great challenges remain and new ones are emerging. At global level, more than 800 million people still live on less than USD 1.25 a day. The world is witnessing multiple conflicts and security tensions, complex humanitarian and global health crises, deteriorations of human rights, environmental degradation, resource scarcity, urbanisation and migration. Migration flows across the world will continue to have important impacts, and present both a risk and an opportunity. The EU needs to address global security challenges, including tackling the root causes of conflict and instability and countering violent extremism. Climate change can continue to amplify problems and can severely undermine progress. Important changes include demographic trends, a new distribution of wealth and power between and within countries, the continuing globalisation of economies and value chains, an evolving geography of poverty and a proliferation of actors working on development. Projections also suggest important challenges are ahead (for example, continuing unprecedented urbanisation, and other demographic challenges including ageing societies for some and the potential for a demographic dividend for others). Continued attention will be given to a democratic, stable and prosperous neighbourhood. A revision to EU development policy should take into account these trends (including anticipating those that will remain central in future) whilst retaining a core focus on eradicating poverty and finishing the job started by the Millennium Development Goals.

Finally, the EU Consensus needs also to adapt to the Lisbon Treaty, which provides for all external action policies to work within the frameworks and pursue the principles of objectives of Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union. In particular, coherence between the different parts of EU external action and between external and internal policies is crucial.

The EU will need to address these new global challenges, many of which require coordinated policy action at the national, regional and global levels. The 2030 Agenda provides a framework which can guide us in doing so.

3.1 There is a range of key global trends (e.g. changing geography and depth of poverty; challenges related to climate change, political, economic, social, demographic, security, environmental or technological) which will influence the future of development and the implementation of the 2030 Agenda. Which of these do you think is the most important?

Global trends and challenges are closely interlinked and it is difficult and could be counter-productive to single out any of them as the most important one. With its 17 goals, Agenda 2030 illustrates very well these inter-connections and the necessity to address all challenges in a comprehensive and universal way.

However, growing inequality between and within countries is one of the most important global trend driving both global poverty and environmental destruction that will have a major impact on the implementation of Agenda 2030. Exclusion and discrimination, created and aggravated by unequal power balances, are the main drivers of poverty, inequality and violence. Reducing inequality is central to all development efforts worldwide. Inequality is not just a problem of income and wealth distribution but also a structural problem of who holds the power, who has access to social services, natural and economic resources, water, land, energy, judiciary etc., who has the possibilities and can make the choices to develop his or her capabilities, and who participates in the social, economic political sphere. Reducing inequality is crucial for all human rights and for reaching the overall goal of the Agenda 2030 that is to leave no one behind.

By all of its measures, it is indisputable that global inequality remains extremely high, and by some measures (e.g. wealth concentration), it is increasing. A simple comparison of average income levels in the richest and poorest countries gives a blunt picture - in 2015, the GDP per capita (adjusted for Purchasing Power Parity) has been estimated to be over \$146,000 (International Dollars) in Qatar compared with just \$640 in the Central African Republic.

The now well-known figures around wealth concentration are the most extreme - the recent World Wealth Report predicts that the wealth of High Net-Worth Individuals will exceed \$100 trillion (USD) by 2025 - at a time when there are still more than 700 million people living on less than \$1.90 a day . These monetary measures of poverty must of course be complemented by the analysis of overlapping deprivations including education and health. The multi-dimensional analysis reveals the interdependency of income and wealth, education and health status, which leads to a permanent continuation of the status quo as illustrated in the Human Development Index and other multi-dimensional measures of deprivation.

Deepening inequality has also provided an impetus to challenge economic access issues for women. Female workforce participation rates are still not progressing fast enough and many fiscal regimes work against the participation of women in the workplace. Women and girls are consistently discriminated against and exploited in economic activity. Additionally, women are often excluded from decision-making processes that concern their own affairs. High levels of inequality are often linked with the rise in crime, violence, in particular against women, and political and social instability and undermine the very fabric of society which represents a high risk for human security and a ground for extremism and radicalism.

Achieving equity in a resources constrained world experiencing climate change should have dramatic implications for the lifestyles of the wealthy and the aspiring middle classes in all countries, as well as for development models in developed and poorer countries. This is a governance challenge. In many developing countries, the role and influence of the elite, both political and economic, has for decades exacerbated an imbalance in governance structures. At a global level, poor nations are still under-represented and marginalised by the richer ones at the table of negotiations. The global and local power

imbalances at play have allowed a small number of rich countries, wealthy elites and transnational companies to determine the economic system which rules the world and which in turn deepens and widens the gaps between the haves and the have nots - be they between countries or within any given country.

There is an urgent need to find new development pathways which would ensure democratic governance, environmental sustainability and reverse ecological destruction and climate change, while managing to provide, now and in the future, a decent livelihood and well-being for all. This should be the guiding objective of the EU development policy in the framework of Agenda 2030.

3.2 How should EU policies, and development policy in particular, better harness the opportunities and minimise the negative aspects of the trend you identified in the previous question?

Approaching the SDGs from a global equity perspective, means taking Goal 10 - reduced inequalities - seriously and producing a clear action plan for its implementation. It also means reporting appropriately on some of the other global commitments which are embedded in the framework, with regard to existing agreements, principles and human rights, including extra-territorial obligations. Looking to the future, we will need to see much clearer target by target reporting against the SDGs in order to ensure accountability, and to use an explicit global equity lens, in order that this framework remain relevant to the pressing challenges of our time.

Reducing inequalities at international and national level is not possible without challenging the dominant narrative of 'economic growth at all costs' and without putting the economy at the service of the people and the objectives of human and social development in respect of planetary boundaries. Reducing inequalities also requires improving both the supply and the demand sides of democratic governance and focusing on the interaction between institutions and citizens in constructing and implementing public policies, including development policy. Putting citizens at the centre, as members of states and societies, is critical for moving beyond the traditional state-civil society divide that characterises many countries with high inequality level.

The added value of the 'leave no one behind' principle of Agenda 2030 will be in its immediate application, and in particular the setting of 'stepping-stone' equity targets. Applying the 'leave no one behind' principle to the goal on gender equality will also be essential if we are to understand more fully how gender intersects with other inequalities. 'Leave no one behind' is an agenda for all governments. The EU and its member states should commit themselves to combat social exclusion and address the needs of the most marginalised within their borders. More equitable and sustainable societies and models of production and consumption in the EU will be beneficial to all

in Europe and in developing countries (more on EU responsibilities in questions 4.6 and 5.5).

At national level, policy measures which have a high potential to address inequalities in an effective way include:

- social protection programmes and investments in essential services, allowing for a guaranteed regular income during the full life-cycle and ensuring access to social services for all, and signifying social solidarity (ILO recommendation 202 on social protection floors);
- more accessible skills training and improved basic education to provide people with a sufficient basis on which to build advanced vocational knowledge;
- progressive taxation on income and wealth and better redistributive measures to reduce inequalities between socio-economic groups and regions;
- proactive government policies in favour of MSMEs and small scale farmers and provision of accessible developmental credit for productive purposes, specifically to allow people to set up and grow resilient small and micro businesses;
- labour market policies in favour of youth and women employment, decent work and the introduction of a decent national minimum wage and a comprehensive social security system;
- financial, research and technological support in favour of small-scale agriculture and local food markets and securing access to land, water and natural resources of small-scale farmers and indigenous communities;
- responsible and sustainable management of natural resources, proper taxation of extractive industries and curbing of illicit financial flows;
- investing in disaster risk reduction and building resilience at community level, including through climate change adaptation;
- effective legislation, budgeting and public services making sure that no one is left behind and that gender equality is realised (more on gender equality in question 4.6);
- supporting the CSOs space and role in the development, monitoring, evaluation and implementation of social protection systems and other policies and measures aiming at reducing inequality;
- putting in place an inclusive system of monitoring and reporting on public policies and budgets through the use of disaggregated data that put in evidence all dimensions of poverty, inequality and discrimination.

Also important is to take into account the assets accessible for people living in poverty to allow them to be resilient to shocks. Assets are not simply resources that people use to build livelihoods; more importantly, they provide people with the basis from which they are able to effect change, and to successfully cope with insecurities. Thus, the access and acquisition of assets is not a passive act, but one that creates agency, and is linked to the empowerment of individuals and communities to confront powers and negotiate with existing institutions.

(4) Priorities for our future action: what we need to do

Implementation of the 2030 Agenda will require sustained EU efforts to promote a more just world, including a strong focus on the need to address gender equality and women's empowerment. Peace, inclusiveness, equality and good governance including democracy, accountability, rule of law, human rights and non-discrimination will need particular emphasis. The 2030 Agenda also requires recognition of the close interconnectedness between poverty, social issues, economic transformation, climate change and environmental issues.

To achieve poverty eradication, EU development policy will need to take into account key demographic and environmental trends, including challenges related to climate change, and concentrate effort on least developed countries and fragile states. The EU will also need to strengthen our approach to fragility and conflict, fostering resilience and security (as an increasing proportion of the world's poor are expected to live in fragile and conflict affected states) and to protect global public goods and to maintain our resource base as the prerequisite for sustainable growth. Peace and security, including security sector reform, will have to be addressed also through our development policy, as will the risks and opportunities related to migration flows. Tackling social and economic inequalities (both within and between countries) is a crucial element of the 2030 Agenda as is addressing environmental degradation and climate change. Job creation will be an important challenge in which the private sector has to play an active role. Finishing the job of the Millennium Development Goals requires identifying and reaching those people throughout the world who are still not benefitting from progress to ensure that no one is left behind.

To achieve lasting results, EU development policy will need to foster transformation and promote inclusive and sustainable growth. Drivers of inclusive sustainable growth, such as human development, renewable energy, sustainable agriculture and fisheries, and healthy and resilient oceans should be an important part of our efforts to implement the new Agenda as will efforts aimed at tackling hunger and under-nutrition. Implementation of the 2030 Agenda will require a multi-dimensional, integrated approach to human development. Implementation will also require us to address vectors of change, such as sustainable urban development and relevant use of information and communication technology. Our development policy will have to engage and identify new ways of partnering with the business in order to achieve sustainable and inclusive growth, industrialisation and innovation. Implementation of the 2030 Agenda will also require cooperation with partner countries and regions on science, technology and innovation. In all aspects of our external action, the EU will need to ensure that our approaches, including development cooperation, are conducive to achieving the 2030 Agenda's Sustainable Development Goals and that the EU intensifies efforts to promote pursue coherence between our policies and our internal and external action.

4.1 How can the EU better address the links between achieving the Sustainable Development Goals, the Paris Agreement on climate change and addressing other global sustainable development challenges?

The commitments made in New-York and Paris are diverse and interlinked.

Efforts must therefore be made to maximize synergies between these different policy areas and to turn policy coherence for sustainable development into reality by ensuring that the responsibility to implement these agendas are shared by the EU institutions and governments as a whole and that an overarching strategy, covering both internal and external policies is adopted by the EU for the implementation of the SDGs.

One of the main aims of the negotiations leading up to the adoption of the 2030 Agenda was to develop a comprehensive, ambitious and integrated framework, such that all 3 dimensions of sustainable development are represented, preferably within each goal area and are linked to each other across the framework. It will be critical to measure and ensure that progress in one area of the framework does not undermine progress elsewhere in the framework in any way. This means that how a target is reached is as important as that it is reached and that it is important to make sure that financial support in one area is not done at the expense of the others.

Keeping global warming below 1.5°C is key to achieve all of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals; there will be less adverse climate change impacts harming the poor on agriculture, food security, access to water and productivity losses. It will push innovation for zero emissions and climate-resilient infrastructures and cities, accelerate the shift to sustainable production and consumption and help to build quality health and education systems and avoid climate-triggered conflicts. Finally, to achieve the SDGs, all states will have to rapidly shift to 100% sustainable renewable energy for all by mid-century and industrialised countries to massively scale-up climate action and financial support to poor countries.

The EU has a huge responsibility as a major historical carbon emitter and is still a major polluter and emitter. It must play a critical role as the world's biggest donor and a leading economic area by courageously increasing its transition to a low carbon society. There is an urgent need to put the Paris Agreement into action and to reassess all policies in the light of the 1.5°C goal.

A new EU strategy could be an important triggering opportunity to increase efforts and to lead all European countries to adjust their climate plans as an essential pre-requisite to achieve the SDGs.

At the national level, there is a need for integrated cross-ministerial efforts to make sure that climate and development goals are not traded off against each other. The use of climate-sensitive indicators at the national level in many different sectors can also facilitate integration of the two objectives.

In brief, the EU needs to:

- Transit from an unsustainable production and consumption model to a sustainable use of natural resources; this involves in particular agricultural production and food consumption models, and this must address supply and demand side in order to reduce European carbon and environmental footprint, and attaining targets to diminish it;
- Engage firmly and urgently in an ambitious circular economy and in phasing out inefficient fossil-fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful

consumption by removing market distortions (target 12.C);

- Make sure that the industrial agriculture and farming sector contribute to efforts to reduce emissions and move towards a sustainable food and farming system;
- Accept that the EU and its member states have a differentiated responsibility as rich countries both in terms of mitigation and finance and reflect it in all EU legislation (target 13.a)
- Regulate its financial markets to ensure European investment (DFI, FDI) adheres to binding human rights obligation and contributes to move towards a sustainable and low carbon economy, and respect of human rights. Bonding rules must be imposed on investors to make that happen. Public and private investments must be redirected accordingly to the 17 SDGs and 1.5°C goal.
- Reject rather than promote false solutions to climate change that entail high risks for local communities' access and control over natural resources such as land. So-called "climate smart agriculture" is a vague concept that is easily used to green-wash agricultural practices that will harm future food production, particularly industrial agriculture practices. Currently there are no meaningful climate, environmental or social criteria for what can be called 'climate smart agriculture.' The term is used by the GACSA platform that brings powerful agribusiness in the driving seat of promoting technological fixes that disempower and often disown smallholders and fail to deliver on resilience and biodiversity. The result of this could well be an increase of agricultural emissions and vulnerability of farmers and food systems. The EU should not support such false solutions either politically or financially.

4.2 How should the EU strengthen the balanced integration of the economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable development in its internal and external policies, and in particular in its development policy?

The EU should focus on promoting the social and environmental dimensions while better regulating the economic dimension and preventing the economic dimension harms the two other dimensions. In other words, the EU should put the economy at the service of the people and not vice-versa.

A sustainable economy is one that is viable and socially equitable, inclusive, paying particular attention to women's and other vulnerable groups' participation, resilient to shocks and stresses, ensuring future-oriented livelihoods, and that brings benefits to all. It is also an economy that is environmentally sustainable, and does not undermine the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.

The economy is a subsystem of the ecology and society, not the other way around. Mainstream economics are dysfunctional because they start from the premise that societies and ecosystems must adapt to the market economy, whereas the goal should be to serve the well-being of communities and ecosystems, not to accumulate capital or when it does accumulate capital,

such capital should be in greater democratic, regulatory and normative stewardship of the society / community.

The quest for sustainable communities, means that the 3 pillars have to work in synergy. But for several decades, the dominant rise of the economic pillar has eclipsed the goal of social equity and environmental sustainability. This is reflected, for example, in the discussion about the green economy. To achieve a more balanced development process, it is of utmost importance to reduce inequalities in all their forms (see question 3.2), to invest in human resources, to re-balance power relations so that everyone in society has a voice and can defend their interests and rights, including to decent work and payment, and to promote sustainable production models based on agro-ecology, the protection of environment, strict standards and norms to limit pollution and carbon emissions, waste limitation and management, renewable energy and energy savings, small-scale and local production when it better fits environment and social objectives, internalisation of social and environmental costs, etc. ...

There are still systemic factors that create a continual cycle of vulnerability because the prevailing economic system is aspirational to most developing countries, and offers huge incentives for wealth capture. Endemic corruption in many developing country administrations incentivises 'rent' or wealth seeking amongst public officials and there is often a self-interest in maintaining the status quo. Improvements in democratic governance are a pre-requisite to a more balanced development model and probably have the most powerful long lasting effect on the lives of people living in poverty in developing countries but can be the hardest to bring about.

The EU should pay more attention to the governance dimension that permeates all policy areas of sustainable development, whether it be decision-making in international fora, trade agreements between the EU and a third country, reducing illicit financial flows and corruption (target 16.4), supporting civil society to defend human rights and democracy at home or selecting indicators and reporting on them in a transparent and accountable way. The EU should not assume that institutions in third countries work well but face reality of where things go wrong and where HR violations and land grabs are likely to happen because of lack of governance in favour of HR and SDGs. Currently, EU trade policy makes it difficult to go beyond perverse effects: for example, in the case of land grabbing and HR violations in Cambodia associated with sugar exports to the EU under the EBA. The EU needs to reflect on what it can do to effectively ensure that trade policies have no negative impacts and can be corrected and that remedies are provided to affected populations. In particular, more meaningful and timely impact assessments, centred on impacts on human rights and livelihoods of affected populations should be undertaken.

The political will to incorporate all three dimensions of sustainable development and democratic governance in all policies going forward, together with the principles that would guide this, should be set out in an overarching EU implementation strategy for the 2030 Agenda. The Commission must be clear that the strategy covers both internal and external policies

and the role of the Member States as well as that of the EU institutions. Attention should most particularly be paid to all policies of an economic or financial bearing.

4.3 What are the main changes you would like to see in the EU's development policy framework?

The EU consensus on development and the Cotonou agreement provide a good policy framework for the fight against poverty but will need to be reviewed so that they are geared to realising Agenda 2030. With their principled vision and wide-range cooperation agenda including important cross-cutting issues, the Consensus on Development and the Cotonou Agreement can easily be adapted and upgraded to become the back bone of EU's contribution to the realisation of Agenda 2030 in developing countries.

The Agenda for Change, on the contrary, contradicts in many ways the integrated and universal approach of Agenda 2030 and should be abandoned. By focusing EU cooperation on the objective of sustainable growth (measured through GDP), the Agenda for Change narrowed down the objectives of the Consensus, missed the objective of poverty reduction, focused EU cooperation on a limited number of sectors and modalities and put too much expectations on private sector. Moreover in full contradiction with the universality of Agenda 2030 it led to the phasing out of EU cooperation in a number of countries which are home to the majority of world's poor population and characterized by high inequality rates.

In the same way, the very few references to development policy in the new EU Global Strategy are deeply concerning, especially when it is said that 'development policy should serve EU interests in a more flexible way' and that 'EU Development funds should catalyse strategic investments through public-private partnerships, driving sustainable growth, job creation, and skills and technological transfers.' This approach will not provide the right political framework for achieving the 2030 sustainable development agenda.

We consider that the existing consensus on development proposes a good and balanced policy framework and that its spirit, principles and objectives should be maintained in the future. Aligning the text of the consensus with Agenda 2030 and other recent international agreements on development effectiveness will necessitate to give more prominence to:

- A human rights approach to development that should permeate all policy areas
- The fight against inequalities, including gender inequality, and the 'leave no one behind' principle
- Investing in human resources by stepping up efforts in the areas of education, social protection, knowledge sharing, culture and exchange, citizens' participation and rebuilding broken links in societies, gender

equality, social inclusion and non-discrimination, etc.

- Building resilience at community level which includes climate change adaptation, conflict prevention, disaster preparedness, social protection floors, pro-poor non-discriminatory public services and budgets, ...
- Addressing unfair and unsustainable systems of production and consumption in all sectors including agriculture and food systems and putting the economy at the service of the people
- Addressing climate change and environmental degradation and promoting low carbon development and responsible and sustainable use of natural resources
- A clear and action oriented commitment to the implementation of the development effectiveness principles
- Using ODA as a catalyst for domestic resources mobilisation and a game changer in the fight against poverty and inequalities, including in MICs
- A commitment to improve and protect the political space and enabling environment for civil society in the EU and in developing countries through the implementation of the EC communication on CS adopted in 2012 and the EU Action Plan on HR and Democracy; this must include special attention to HR defenders involved in land struggles alongside rural communities.
- Strengthening the institutional and executive framework for the realisation of Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development and for implementing Common but Differentiated Responsibility in the area of global public goods, including climate change.

Revised in that way, the EU Consensus on Development would provide a good policy framework for the contribution of EU development policy to the SDGs, provided it is embedded in a broader overarching strategy that combines internal and external policies in a coherent way and is supported by strong political will.

4.4 In which areas highlighted above would you expect to see greater consistency between development policy and other areas of the EU external action in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda?

Policy consistency and coherence in all areas of external and internal policy will be essential for the realisation of Agenda 2030 and for the change of paradigm necessary to put the economy at the service of the people in full respect of planetary boundaries.

As consistency with security and migration policies, two essential elements of EU foreign policy and external action are already discussed in question 4.7 and 4.8, we will focus here on the necessity for more consistency with international trade and investment policy and on the external impacts of EU agricultural policy.

With increasing pressure on natural resources, increasing exposure to competition on land, water, increasing loss of agricultural biodiversity, the right to food and other human rights related to land and natural resources management that are fundamental to smallholder family farmers are at risk. The new EU/European Development Consensus should qualify and provide criteria on what is good investment, and ensure this is coherent with EU commitments under a set of treaties, for example, the International Treaty on Genetic Plant Resources for Food and Agriculture which guarantees respect of farmers' rights.

Trade policies should enshrine the right to development and the right to food in WTO rules and EU bilateral trade agreements in order to prevent adverse negative impacts of trade obligations to development. As stipulated in the EC Communication on Trade for All (2015), the EU should take account of the economic realities of partner countries and not frustrate their structural efforts of increasing food production capacity and empowerment of smallholders.

The EU should refrain from offensive agricultural food export interests that harm the food production capacity of smallholders and market development in developing countries and should identify hidden subsidies and work towards true pricing in international fora to promote the internalisation of negative social and environmental externalities.

EU trade policies must include instruments and ways of enforcing EU human rights obligations as part of its EU trade and investment deals; the details of those measures and instruments should be defined in Human Rights Impact Assessments that inform the negotiations prior to their conclusion.

More support and research needs to go into agro-ecological farming practices, supporting the synergies provided when it comes to build on traditional /existing knowledge, preserve or foster agrobiodiversity, empower smallholders and improve their livelihoods, work towards regenerating natural resources and nutritious healthy diets and food.

(see also question 7.1 on monitoring SDG 15)

4.5 In which areas does the EU have greatest value-added as a development partner (e.g. which aspects of its development policy, dialogue or implementation arrangements or in which category of countries)?

In theory, the added-value of EU as a development partner lies in the fact that it is a major donor, that it is present in almost all countries through its Delegations and that its cooperation with developing countries takes place in the framework of political partnerships and agreements based on the respect of human rights and central values and principles and covering a wide range of policies. Moreover, the EU is committed to a number of international agreements and conventions that set the principles and standards that should govern effective development cooperation. The EU consensus on development and the EU-ACP Cotonou partnership agreement provide the right policy guidance in terms of objectives, principles and cross-cutting issues and the Lisbon Treaty foresees that Policy Coherence for Development should be implemented across EU policies having an impact on developing countries. The EU has the capacity to strategically link its leverage in various policy areas (development, trade, investment, climate and energy, external relations) in order to foster the conditions that are necessary for the SDGs to be achieved such as rule of law, enabling domestic legal framework for CSOs participation/participatory democracy and gender equality in particular.

EU's added value as a development partner depends on the respect of these values, principles and conventions, but this is not always observed in practice, in particular in the area of policy coherence for sustainable development, in meeting development effectiveness standards and in the choice of cooperation priorities.

At implementation level, EU has greatest added value in:

- The support to the multiple roles of civil society in all partner countries and the country roadmaps for engagement with CS;
- The rights based approach to development, EU Action plan on human rights and democracy, HR country strategies, the EIDHR and support to civil society actions in the area of human rights and specific support to human rights defenders;
- The Gender Action Plan and commitment to mainstream gender equality in development cooperation.
- Its capacity to provide substantial level of concessional finance in the long run and to provide general and sectoral budget support while at the same time maintaining the possibility to support small-scale actions through specific instruments and programmes;
- The range of cooperation instruments and modalities at its disposal to adapt to context and capacities of partner countries, in particular, the combination of geographic and thematic cooperation instruments that allows a more flexible cooperation with a broader range of actors;
- The deconcentration of development cooperation programming and management at country level (although in terms of programming headquarters are often too prescriptive);
- The commitment to coordinate with other EU donors, to promote

division of labour and joint programming at country level and to align EC aid with partner country development plans;

However, since the adoption of the Agenda for Change and more recently in the context of the EU response to refugees and migrants' crisis and the new EU Global Strategy, we observed a shift in EU development policies and there is a high risk of erosion of EU added value due to the following trends and decisions:

- Shift in EU development priorities from human and social development, food security and environment protection to growth and business, security and migration.
- Diversion of EU financial and human resources from the realization of poverty reduction and development consensus objectives in favour of the pursuit of EU economic, security and migration related interests.
- Differentiation of partner countries based on the sole criteria of GDP or on specific security and economic interest of the EU (e.g. migration partnerships).
- The consideration, clearly expressed in the new EU Global strategy that "development policy will become more flexible and aligned with our strategic priorities " and to "consider reducing the number of instruments to enhance our coherence and flexibility" which can be seen as a positive move but represents a high risk of diverting ODA for non-development purpose and for short-term and EU interests-related action with no lasting effect on poverty, inequality and development in recipient countries.
- Tendency to privilege big programmes and projects with the view of reducing the number of contracts and administrative work (linked to staff reduction in HQ and in EU delegations) with a consequence on the range of actors involved in EU development cooperation and the type and scale of projects supported.
- Tendency to privilege certain modalities, in particular the blending of grants with non-concessional finance and with private finance and to create new cooperation modalities, such as trust funds, with a lack of transparency and accountability and without assessing their impact on development outcomes.

4.6 How can the EU refine its development policy to better address inequalities – including gender inequality – in the context of the implementation of the 2030 Agenda?

(For inequalities in general, see also question 3.2.);

The EU can have a huge impact on reducing inequality at a global and in-country level by implementing the principle of common but differentiated responsibility to the full in the management of global public goods, including climate change, and in accessing global commons and by enhancing its ODA budget and focusing it on measures and programmes that contribute to close the gaps, leave no one behind, realise gender equality and improve democratic governance. It will also require action at policy and legislative

level in favour of policy coherence for sustainable development (see question 5.5).

The Agenda 2030 with its stand-alone goal on gender equality and the integration of gender considerations in many other areas provides an excellent framework for the integration of gender equality and women's rights in development. It is of paramount importance that the EU meets these ambitions through the adequate commitment of financial, human and political resources and by directly supporting women's rights organisations and other civil society organisations that advocate in favour of gender equality and non-discrimination of people with different sexual or gender identities by way of supporting LGBTI rights. It is also essential to promote and facilitate the full engagement of men and boys for gender equality and to work on positive masculinities.

In line with Agenda 2030 gender equality and women's and girls' rights must be integrated throughout the policies, with specific commitments in all development areas. Mainstreaming must be coupled with targeted actions based on context specific, systematic analysis and appropriate programming and budget, as well as policy dialogue. The EU has committed to put gender equality at the centre of its development cooperation notably through the Gender Action Plan 2016-2020. It must now not only align its action in this regard with the 2030 Agenda but also aim higher if it wants to be recognized as a true leader on gender equality.

In its development policy, the EU should pay special attention to the following sectors and areas of work as key drivers of gender equality:

Women's empowerment and agency: The denial of women's independent agency in many places has a huge impact on all areas of gender equality. In particular, many women still struggle for access to economic assets such as decent work, fair income, credit and land. Women predominate precarious low-wage roles, while they are at the same time carrying the majority of unpaid caring familial or communal responsibilities, often with little or no social security. This double burden is often institutionalized in discriminatory laws and practices impacting all areas of women's lives and livelihoods, including but not limited to, inheritance rights, marriage contracts and other systems that deny the independent agency of every person.

Women's political empowerment: The fact remains that only 22 per cent of parliamentarians globally are women, and women hold far fewer positions of power than men. Increases in numbers alone will not lead to meaningful participation of women within decision-making structures. Social, religious and cultural norms that limit women's effective participation, including within the household, need to be progressively challenged. Quota may be helpful temporary measures, but must be accompanied by wider efforts to achieve sustainable change. These include capacity-building for female candidates of all ages, empowerment of young women, knowledge-sharing and alliance building.

Ending gender based violence: This reality is recognized by Beijing Action Agenda, the Sustainable Development Goals and in Security Council resolution

1325, which should be followed up by committed action by states. However, implementation will require legislation and effective use of legal frameworks, sufficient financial investment in both prevention and response, and a focus on challenging harmful social and cultural norms which perpetuate violence.

Universal Maternal Health and Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights: Maternal health and population trends must remain core sustainable development priorities. No reduction in the number of maternal deaths will be achieved without fulfilment of comprehensive sexual and reproductive health rights. Goal 5 Target 6 of the Sustainable Development Goals advances this dialogue greatly, but progressive action is now required. Social services, such as women's health and health education, should primarily be the responsibility of the state, and thus service delivery programmes should not be delegated to profit seeking enterprise. Public sector funds, therefore, should be expanded for these programs around the world.

National fiscal policy and domestic resource mobilization should also promote gender equality through the use of progressive direct taxation, social protection and gender-budgeting.

4.7 How can the EU development policy make a stronger contribution to the security of people? How can EU development policy contribute to addressing the root causes of conflict and fragility and contribute to security and resilience in all the countries where we work?

ACT Alliance EU's concept of security goes beyond traditional state-based security and includes that human rights are met, human dignity is respected, natural resources are protected, people are protected from avoidable harm, and peace with justice is established.

Human Security, as defined in the UN GA resolution 66/290 adopted in September 2012, provides a good basis for that rights based approach to security challenges.

All EU external policies should be subject to an analysis of their impact on those deemed vulnerable according to a holistic human security concept. EU actions in fragile context ultimately have to be oriented towards overcoming the root causes of poverty, creating social justice, stabilising and building democratic and well-functioning states, containing violence in general and gender-based violence in particular, and the necessity to create a culture of peaceful conflict transformation within and between societies. It is of utmost importance to support civil society initiatives in this regard and to promote civilian conflict transformation. In situation where civil society is at risk, the EU is expected to use the full range of its diplomatic and financial instruments to make sure that human rights defenders are protected and CSOs are in the position to play their role as actors of development, reconciliation and conflict prevention.

Moreover, all EU foreign policies must integrate a clear women's rights perspective, including by implementing the "UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and subsequent resolutions on Women, Peace and Security", which aim to strengthen women's participation as actors for peace and security, and seek to eliminate the widespread use of gender-based and sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict situations.

There should be no further erosion of the civilian character of development cooperation and ODA through the inclusion of military or quasi-military expenditures or the channelling of aid through military actors. Development projects implemented with or through military-dominated structures aim to achieve fast results but are often poorly executed, inappropriate and do not have sufficient community involvement to make them sustainable. There is little evidence this approach is generating stability and human security and, in some cases, military involvement in development activities is, paradoxically, putting lives further at risk.

Under the current EU external relations instruments framework, it is perfectly possible to work effectively towards sustainable peace and security by making use of the political and civilian potential for conflict prevention and transformation or security sector reform. Civilian action, and civil society efforts and capacities in the area of human rights, human security and humanitarian aid should be strengthened. Humanitarian aid and relief efforts should strictly respect the civilian character of ODA and the humanitarian law and principles (humanitarian imperative, impartiality, independence and neutrality) and should never be used to pursue particular security interests.

Importantly there is an urgent need for the EU to invest more (political and financial) resources in conflict prevention and react with early action on early warning systems for both conflicts and natural disasters. Currently the EU often reacts too late, which leads to more suffering and requires more funding in terms of humanitarian and development response than prevention and building resilience does. Therefore we also see a big role for the EU on the political side, to ensure the wins of development cooperation are not lost.

The EU should also address its responsibility in conflict-prone areas by regulating conflict sensitive corporate responsibility of EU based national and transnational companies exploiting natural and mining resources and by strengthening the European Code of Conduct on Arms Exports and the delivery and post-delivery controls of EU arms exports as foreseen in the current text of the consensus.

A clear lesson to be drawn from interventions in post-conflict situations and fragile states, is that a long-term, substantial commitment is required and that regional approaches and strategies have to be established in consultation with all actors concerned.

4.8 How can a revised Consensus on Development better harness the opportunities presented by migration, minimise the negative aspects of irregular migration on the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and better address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement?

Migration has many drivers; people may be on the move in search of new livelihood opportunities, an education or to reunite with family, while conflict and violence, human rights violations, climate change, poverty and unemployment can all trigger migration and forced displacement.

Any cooperation policy or programme in the area of migration and development should take into consideration this complex and multi-faceted reality, be evidence and needs-based, and ensure that the benefits of migration are maximised and the risks are mitigated.

A considerable shift in mind-set is required, starting with the view that no human being is illegal and that all are entitled to protection from exploitation, irrespective of their status. Voluntary migration is arguably one of the ways in which communities respond to global inequality and springs from a common desire to improve one's own and family life chances. Globally, migration is commonly regarded to have a net positive impact on global equality; often migration will result in remittances and it can lead to the development of skills that are then reinvested back into a country. The importance of migration to economies, to development, and to addressing inequality, thus needs much greater recognition. Alongside this, greater attention must be paid to the ways in which migrants are often left behind in terms of access to rights and entitlements.

An estimated 65.3 million people have been forcibly displaced from their homes. Of that number, 21.3 million are registered refugees and there are likely to be hundreds of thousands more who are unregistered. One estimate is that, in 2015 alone, 27.8 million people were forcibly displaced from their homes, while remaining within their national boundaries, as a result of conflict, violence and disasters. The EU must set the right example by implementing and respecting the international conventions relating to refugees, IDPs and other people on the move and to choose a rights-based system to manage migration, based on a viable long-term strategic vision. Simply financing refugee-hosting countries is not sufficient: it does not absolve the EU or its member states of the responsibility to host fair and equitable numbers of refugees. Nor does it absolve them of the responsibility to adhere to international laws, conventions and treaties.

In terms of financing, donors including the EU must refrain from placing any conditions, based on migration-control indicators, in the allocation of development or humanitarian aid to third countries. Aid is a tool to fight poverty and inequality, not to manage migration. It is of utmost concern to see in the 2017 draft EU budget that humanitarian aid is attributed the role of indirectly reducing migration flows - as indicated in the draft budget justifications. It is a misuse of aid and undermines the credibility of the

EU as a humanitarian donor.

Fighting against irregular migration like smuggling and trafficking in human beings is not actually a development dimension of migration, neither is readmission or involuntary return.

People forced to flee conflict, violence and chronic poverty must be given protection, but greater effort must be put into reducing the reasons behind they need to flee. Displacement as a result of land grabs, competition for resources or environmental factors, including climate change, must be addressed, including through the implementation of the 2030 Agenda . Both illegal and legal flows of arms that prolong conflicts must be addressed and warring parties must be held to account for violations of international law.

Development dimensions need to become integral part of national and regional migration policies. This means increased awareness for labour mobility, development of comprehensive integration policies and legal and practical means to improve the situation of migrants and their rights. Also, racism and xenophobia need to be effectively addressed and attention must be given to specific gender issues, such as employment in domestic settings where workers are particularly vulnerable to exploitation and abuse, and the social impacts on families left behind. Ensuring effective migration governance and respect of the human rights of migrants is core responsibility of countries of origin, transit and destination. The EU development consensus needs to envisage supporting partner countries of the EU as well as member states in enabling safe and legal migration, improving protection and support of diaspora engagement.

Well managed migration and human mobility are recognized in Agenda 2030 as potential development enablers. The nexus between migration and development is one of the thematic priorities of the EU Global Approach to Migration and Mobility and needs to be integrated into the revised EU Consensus on Development and as a priority under the EU commitment for Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development.

(5) Means of implementation: how do we get there?

The principle of universality underpinning the 2030 Agenda will require a differentiated approach to engagement with countries at all levels of development. Official Development Assistance will continue to play an important role in the overall financing mix for those countries most in need (particularly the Least Developed Countries). The EU and its Member States should continue to progress towards achieving their commitments. However, in all countries our development cooperation will need to take account of other sources of finance, including by leveraging other (non-Official Development Assistance) sources of finance for poverty eradication and sustainable development. The delivery of the 2030 Agenda means that our work helping countries raise their own resources (domestic resource mobilisation), the provision of aid for trade, blending* and partnering with the private sector should be priority areas of focus. The Addis Ababa Action Agenda, an integral part of the 2030 Agenda, provides a framework for our efforts, including for our work supporting the right enabling policy environment for sustainable development in our partner countries. The implementation of the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement on climate change under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change should be closely coordinated given the strong interlinkages. Engagement with middle income countries, notably the emerging economies, will be important to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, considering the role they can play in promoting global public goods, what they can achieve within their respective countries on poverty eradication and sustainable development, and the example they can set within their regions as well as their role in regional processes. Here differentiated partnerships can play an important role (examples include different forms of political, economic, and financial investment as well as cooperation in science, technology and innovation). Specific attention and focus should also be given to Least Developed Countries, as acknowledged by the Addis Ababa Action Agenda.

The EU's implementation of the 2030 Agenda provides an opportunity for enhancing consistency between the different areas of the EU's external action and between these and other EU policies (as outlined in the Lisbon Treaty and in [EU's Comprehensive Approach to external conflict and crises](#)). The EU will continue to pursue [Policy Coherence for Development](#) as a key contribution to the collective effort towards broader policy coherence for sustainable development. In our external action, the EU needs to consider how we can use all policies, tools, instruments at our disposal coherently in line with the integrated nature of the 2030 Agenda.

* Combining EU grants with loans or with equity from other public and private financiers with a view to leveraging additional resources.

5.1 How can EU policies, and EU development policy in particular, help to mobilise and maximise the impact of the increasing variety of sustainable development finance, including in particular from the private sector?

EU focus should be on mobilizing other financing sources for development and climate change by promoting tax justice, combating illicit financial flows including tax dodging by transnational companies, improving the international financial cooperation and the global economic governance, including in the area of debt relief and ensuring that private sector financial contributions focus on sustainability and human rights criteria. More work and commitment

aiming at concrete and lasting financial outcomes is also needed in the area of innovative sources of finance such as the financial transaction tax, carbon taxes and more efficient cap and trade systems and through the elimination and reconversion of fossil-fuel subsidies. Underpinning all this, strong, democratic ownership by the people in developed and developing countries over their own development and financing policies must be guaranteed.

We recognize that there is an important role for the private sector in development, and that engaging both the public and the private sectors will be critical to meet the financing needs of the SDGs. Public engagement with the private sector should be backed by strong principles and criteria to ensure that engagement effectively contributes to sustainable development and poverty eradication and reduces inequality. Indeed, using public finance to leverage private finance has various systemic risks associated with 'socialising risk and privatising gain'.

The DAC's reform process offers an opportunity to develop rigorous and demanding criteria and standards to better regulate the use of aid in private sector investments, and to ensure that development motivations are not undermined by commercial motivations, or the interests of DAC members seeking to use ODA to support their own private sector. Together with CONCORD, we support NGOs' recommendation to the DAC on this important process.

Mobilising and maximising the impact of sustainable development finance and private finance should be at the core of EU efforts in favour of Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development. More than a simple leveraging issue, it is primarily an issue of political will and political and legal incentives and rules. The EU can maximise the impact of foreign direct investments (FDI) on sustainable development by using investment chapters in trade deals or investment agreements to promote and improve regulation of the conduct of European firms in their overseas markets, and vice versa, foreign firms in European markets.

Indeed, while there is a proliferation of guidelines which are all non-enforceable, the EU has not made substantial efforts to reconcile the trade and business agenda with human rights and to enforce the implementation of the UN Guiding principles on Business and Human rights.

ACT Alliance EU is concerned that current Bilateral Investment Treaties allow TNCs to claim a dispute if a change in policy or law will cause the loss of future earnings, while conversely they do not permit governments to take actions against TNCs. This leads to social upheaval and environmental damage and can be very detrimental to achieving rights based sustainable development. This situation allows TNCs to externalise the environmental and social impacts of their activities and leaves citizens affected by their activities without a voice and no possibility of recourse through proper complaint mechanisms.

Only companies that behave in an accountable and transparent way in the social dimension; in particular (though this cannot be a comprehensive list), in the area of taxation, financial reporting, anti-corruption, compliance with the OECD guidelines for Multi-National Enterprises and in compliance

with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) as well as the FAO Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security or the forthcoming UN Committee on Food Security guidelines on Responsible Agricultural Investment should be able to use any dispute settlement mechanism provided for in future EU investment treaties and ultimately, these guidelines need to become legally enforceable.

Any investment agreement should promote inclusive economic development and the attainment of the SDGs by improving the right and duty of governments to regulate economic activities and actors in the broader public interest and longer term interest of future generations. It should not undermine the rights of governments and legislatures to revise and implement domestic policies and laws to regulate consumer safety, protect health and the environment, address climate change, implement the precautionary principle and positive discrimination in favour of disadvantaged groups and regions and to empower women. Moreover, through its trade and investment agreements, the EU should enhance the human rights monitoring, enforcement and grievance mechanisms in line with the UNGPs.

5.2 Given the evolving availability of other sources of finance and bearing in mind the EU's commitments on Official Development Assistance (e.g. [Council Conclusions from 26 May 2015 on "A New Global Partnership for Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development after 2015"](#), and inter alia, paragraphs 32 and 33), how and where should the EU use its Official Development Assistance strategically and to maximise its impact?

For the realisation of the SDGs, EU cooperation priorities and programmes should align with the national plans of partner countries and ODA should be directed at addressing the gaps in public financing for tackling poverty and inequalities and realising human rights through a wide range of policies and measures cross-cutting the 17 goals of Agenda 2030. Long-term impact on poverty and inequality and their underlying causes should be the primary guiding criteria for decisions on ODA budgets, their distribution and the way they are implemented. Moreover, ODA should be implemented in full adherence with the Busan Development Effectiveness Principles.

The new EU Global Strategy states that 'Development funds should catalyse strategic investments through public-private partnerships, driving sustainable growth, job creation, and skills and technological transfers'. However, a positive impact of growth-focused development cooperation and of blended finance and PPPs on reducing poverty and inequality has not been verified in all cases. The EC should apply stricter criteria when using ODA as a financial leverage and should rather focus the catalytic role of ODA in supporting democratic governance and accountability as well as transparent, fair and progressive taxation regimes, responsible management of natural resources and public finance, accountable and human rights compliant extractive industry and foreign investments so that more domestic resources

are generated and redistributed (target 17.1). In the area of private sector development, ODA support should focus on small-scale producers and farmers in developing countries and on securing an enabling environment for micro, small and medium-size enterprises (MSMEs) and ensuring their sustainability in the long-term (see question 6.2).

ODA must be allocated to developing countries on the basis of harmonised, objective and transparent criteria open to parliamentary scrutiny. Foreign and migration policy or economic and energy interests of the EU should in no way interfere with these decisions. We are opposed to the fact that ODA could be used to support expenditures relating to activities or training of military forces and we plea in favour of a clear and transparent methodology for accounting for public finance in the area of ODA and climate change separately.

ODA should be focused on countries with low record in:

- Human Development, based on Human Development Index and other indicators of well-being to be agreed upon at international level
- Poverty to be considered in 4 dimensions; economic, social, personal and political (multidimensional poverty index).
- Baseline situation with regard to the SDGs, including in the area of climate change and environment
- Inequalities of income and consumption and in access to public services, justice, employment... (GINI index, disaggregated data on education, health, access to land, political representation, etc.)
- Democratic governance and Human rights situation encompassing all rights as well as situations of exclusion and discrimination (Transparency International index, UN reports, CS reports...)
- Humanitarian situation (vulnerability to risk including climate change, crisis and post crisis situations, ...)
- Human security situation (occupation, conflict, pre and post conflict, failed state, high violence and crime rate, HR violations at large scale, populations in need of protection...)

Logically, criteria based on human development needs, inequalities and vulnerability of populations will prioritise overall funding and grant-spending in Least Developed and Low Income Countries. It does not mean however that aid to the Middle Income Countries (MICs) is not essential for the SDGs and EU poverty eradication mandate.

While agreeing with the principle of country by country differentiation in aid levels, priorities and modalities and with the fact that depending on the economic, social and political situation of each country a different set or mix of cooperation policies and instruments is necessary, we don't think that it would be wise, in the framework of Agenda 2030, to concentrate EU aid in a small number of priority countries, to abruptly stop development cooperation in certain countries or to shift from one aid modality to another in certain categories of countries on the basis of broad and generic criteria such as the GNI per inhabitant or the DAC classification of developing countries. At country level, the conditions and modalities of cooperation should be discussed with all actors concerned on the recipient side, including civil society. Top down decisions on the donor side without proper dialogue and agreement with the recipient side contradicts all Development Effectiveness

principles starting with mutual accountability and democratic ownership and have not proved to provide the expected impact on development and poverty reduction or democratic governance.

5.3 How can the EU better support partner countries in mobilising their own resources for poverty eradication and sustainable development?

There are many options for raising and strengthening domestic financing for sustainable development to help finance public services and essential common public goods, including a social protection floor and environmental protection. The main instruments are progressive redistributive measures and taxation to tackle inequality.

Alongside addressing capacity and other constraints to stronger domestic tax systems, it is also important to address tax evasion and avoidance practices of domestic enterprises, transnational companies, and wealthy individuals. Capital flight and illicit financial outflows and corruption further weaken the resource raising capacity of developing countries. Current tax regimes in many countries of the North and South still don't have the appropriate policies nor capacities to fight tax evasion (breaking the law) and tax avoidance (legal but often harmful to society and economy). In part, this is a function of weak domestic tax laws, in part it is a function of easy access to secrecy regimes (tax havens), and in part it is abuses by firms where tax laws are ambiguous (e.g., in transfer pricing). Developing countries rarely have the capacities to monitor these illicit practices and to match the legal teams of multinational firms operating in their countries.

International tax cooperation should prioritise human and sustainable development concerns and aim at fairly taxing economic activity where it takes place (addressing "base shifting" and requiring country-by-country reporting of multinational company activities), as well as automatically exchanging financial information and publicly disclosing the beneficial ownership of companies. Also, governments should collaborate to avoid offering competing tax incentives to attract investors that erode their national tax base and undermine their national budget capacity for social development ("race to the bottom" through tax competition). The OECD and G20 have begun to strengthen cooperation among their tax authorities, but the interest in ending taxpayer abuse goes beyond G20 countries and should be addressed globally at the level of the United Nations.

In order to promote more efficient cooperation in this area, as foreseen in the SDG 17 on a global Partnership, the EU should agree to certain commitments:

- Putting in place the right frameworks and standards at the EU, OECD and international levels to effectively fight tax evasion and avoidance within the EU, and globally and to prevent EU corporations to avoid taxation in developing countries (through Unitary taxation for example).

- Better inclusion of developing countries in international fora to discuss global tax reforms (UN Body; EU/ACP States Committee on tax cooperation), and promotion of their full participation in international tax governance and standard-setting through, notably, an upgraded UN tax body.
- Adopting and enforcing regulations at EU and member states level on public country by country reporting, non-financial reporting of companies, public registers of beneficial ownership, tax rulings made publicly available also to partner countries, etc.
- Automatic exchange of information between EU and LDCs/LICs without obligation of reciprocity, i.e. temporarily exemption of “reciprocal” information exchange for the poorest countries which don’t have yet the capacities to access and provide such information.
- Analysing the potential spill over effect of any new European legislative proposal through impact assessment and assisting partner countries to conduct analysis on the impact of their tax systems on economic and gender inequalities through impact assessments.
- Refraining from allocating loans and subsidies to private sector entities under investigation for tax avoidance.
- Dedicating more funds to administrative capacity-building in the area of tax administration and anti-corruption, although these efforts cannot go very far in tackling tax dodging as even countries with well-resourced tax administrations are victims of tax evasion and avoidance. In a globalized economy no country can tackle these issues on its own.
- Supporting partner countries in collecting additional development-related information through the use of disaggregated and timely data and policy-related research to guide policy decisions, as well as for supervision through democratic institutions, including parliaments.

In addition, support to the development and management of fair and progressive tax systems and good management of public resources and natural resources in developing countries including through the support to independent official auditors and the judicial system, the control of the parliament and the support for the independent monitoring by civil society is also essential to promote fair and efficient tax systems and to combat illicit financial flows.

5.4 Given the importance of middle income countries to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, what form could differentiated partnerships take?

As for any group of country, it would be hazardous and ineffective to establish one model of partnership and cooperation with Middle Income Countries as these constitute a very diverse group of countries with big differences of size, geography and environment, culture, poverty and inequality level, governance model, economic prospects and trading capacities, geopolitical situation and historical ties with Europe and its member states.

In many MICs – where three quarters of the world’s poorest live – inequality is still a major problem, that hinders both sustainable development and poverty reduction. Development cooperation guided by a rights-based approach and cross-cutting priorities such as social inclusion and cohesion, environment protection and climate change, gender equality or conflict prevention, can be a powerful catalyst for tackling inequalities and favouring structural changes and political reforms that are essential for the realisation of Agenda 2030.

ODA could be particularly effective in MICs precisely because it is relatively smaller as a percentage of government expenditure. The perennial problems of ownership and conditionality, dependency culture, absorption capacity (in terms of macroeconomic effects), are substantially absent when aid is limited in size. MICs will generally have better governance structures, institutions and oversight mechanisms, meaning that aid is more likely to have a lasting impact, for example, by playing a game changing role in reducing inequalities and extreme poverty. While aid may no longer be needed to plug a financing gap, it can be useful if targeted at certain key areas of the government’s budget which might otherwise be underfunded or neglected. In some countries these areas would include the judiciary, human rightswork and human security. In others, institutional and strategic support to social protection and social sectors such as education and health or environmental protection and the responsible management of public goods including global public goods. Also essential is to maintain the support to civil society and human rights defenders in holding the governments, local authorities and public administration accountable and defending their communities in case of human rights abuse by private and public actors. Through its action in favour of civil society space and human rights, the EU is also in a position to change the framework of incentives in which official partners operate and to modify their vision of and cooperation with civil society in achieving their objectives of sustainable development and social cohesion.

Beyond development cooperation, the partnership with Middle Income countries should include a strong commitment to Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development on both sides to be translated into fair trade and investment agreements that respect human rights and enhance development prospects for poor and vulnerable segments of the population such as small-scale farmers or women entrepreneurs, cooperation on taxation and on curbing illicit financial flows through transparent mechanisms of exchange of information and effective regulation of the corporate sector and on joined-up actions in favour of the protection and responsible management of global public goods and in favour of the implementation, monitoring and reporting on the SDGs at a regional, continental and global level.

5.5 Given experience so far in taking into account the objectives of development cooperation in the implementation of EU policies which are likely to affect developing countries (e.g. [Policy Coherence for Development: 2015 EU Report](#)), how should the EU step up its efforts to achieve Policy Coherence for Development, as a key contribution to the collective effort towards policy coherence for sustainable development? How can we help ensure that policies in developing countries, and internationally contribute coherently to sustainable development priorities?

Policy coherence for sustainable development should permeate all decisions relating to the implementation of the SDGs and of the Paris Agreement being in Europe or elsewhere. Moving from the current economic model towards more sustainable production and consumption is not possible without significant and far reaching efforts of policy coherence by the EU and other developed and emerging economies in the area of finance, investments and trade, in particular agricultural trade as well as energy and decarbonisation.

Policy coherence is also an issue of global equity and responsibility and means that the EU, its member states and other high income countries have to be ready to play a role that is commensurate to their influence, impact and capacities in reaching a number of objectives and targets of both Agenda 2030 and Paris Agreement in line with the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility.

The stepping up of PCSD must include identification and management of possible conflict of interests between different goals and policy areas, aiming at coherence with sustainable development, in particular through:

- Fairer international taxation agreements and regulations and more equitable decision-making in the realm of global tax cooperation
- Fairer trade deals and investment agreements that take full account of human rights, the environment and development needs of people living in poverty and small scale or informal producers
- Regulating private companies and multinationals so that they are more transparent and accountable on their social and environmental impact, pay fair taxes and apply UN GP on Business and HR and due diligence in all their activities and supply chains,
- Enforcing the application of norms, standards and guidelines applying to land, water, oceans and other natural resources management by all actors
- More sustainable and fairer agriculture policy, land use, fisheries and food systems that limit negative impacts on people's rights, including small scale producers, in developing countries
- Migration and asylum policies that put the rights of migrants and refugees at the core in full respect of international conventions.
- Putting the Paris Agreement on Climate Change into action and reassessing all its policies in the light of the 1.5°C goal

EU work on policy coherence in the Agenda 2030 context should also aim to ensure a stronger evidence base for PCSD, to increase political awareness of PCSD issues, and to increase political commitment towards PCSD across all policy areas. The evidence base can be built by increasing and expanding the use of ex ante and ex post impact assessments, and by ensuring they are participatory, and look effectively at the impacts of EU policies across all

sectors on environment and people living in poverty and left behind. This is often not the case so far. There is a clear need for regular external, independent impact evaluations.

PCSD requires greater efforts also at multilateral level. Policy coherence has been often recognised in the UN processes, including Financing for Development, Agenda 2030 and the Development Cooperation Forum. So far however little improvement has been observed. Agenda 2030 recognises PCSD as a critical means of implementation, and the EU should play an active role in raising prestige and influence of key multilateral agencies that could promote PCSD, for example UNCTAD, and support efforts to establish a UN tax body. The EU should also push the PCSD agenda in the G20 as a main actor in international finance and economy.

(6) The actors: making it work together

An important feature of the new Agenda is that all governments, developed and developing, will need to work with a wide range of stakeholders (including the private sector, civil society and research institutions) to improve the transparency and inclusivity of decision-making, planning, service delivery, and monitoring and to ensure synergy and complementarity.

The EU must continue to work collaboratively with others and contribute to a coordinated approach. The Addis Ababa Action Agenda puts national plans for implementation (including associated financing and policy frameworks) at the centre. To maximise our impact, EU development policy should be based on a strategic and comprehensive strategy for each country, which also responds to the country-specific context.

Our partner countries' implementation of the 2030 Agenda will inform our overall engagement and our development cooperation dialogue with them and will help shape our support for their national efforts. The EU should also help partner countries put in place the necessary enabling policy frameworks to eradicate poverty, tackle sustainable development challenges and enhance their policy coherence.

There is a need for a renewed emphasis on the quality of development cooperation, including existing commitments on aid and development effectiveness made in Paris, Accra and Busan* and through work with the [Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation](#).

An updated EU development policy should also provide a shared vision that guides the action of the EU and Member States in development cooperation, putting forward proposals on how to further enhance coordination, complementarity and coherence between EU and Member States. Strengthening [Joint Programming](#) will be an important part of this. Improving the division of labour between the EU and its Member States in order to reduce aid fragmentation will also contribute to increased development effectiveness.

* See [Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action](#) and the [Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation](#)

6.1 How should the EU strengthen its partnerships with civil society, foundations, the business community, parliaments and local authorities and academia to support the implementation of the 2030 Agenda (including the integral Addis Ababa Action Agenda) and the Paris Agreement on climate change?

States have the primary responsibility for implementing the 2030 Agenda and will be held accountable for it. It means that all state-actors have a role to play at their respective level and in their respective prerogatives, whether national, regional or local authorities, parliaments, regulatory bodies or any institution or administration established by the state. A vibrant and active civil society is a pre-condition and an essential element of a human rights based approach to development and other key principles of Agenda 2030 and the great majority of the SDGs will be missed without civil society involvement as a key stakeholder.

Amongst civil society actors, faith-based organisations, such as ACT Alliance members who are rooted in communities and strongly committed to the realisation of sustainable development, human rights and leaving no one behind can add significant value to the realisation of the SDGs. Such FBOs work through faith leaders, communities and institutions at the local, national and global level reaching the most marginalised and vulnerable people. This web of relationships is well placed to take an integrated approach to sustainable development, and can address both root causes and impacts of poverty, conflict, injustice and unsustainable systems. Local faith institutions and their leaders are respected and trusted by individuals and communities and can therefore have an extensive reach and a positive impact on attitudes and behaviour. Faith actors are, in addition, able to serve as important and credible connectors between and within communities in fragile states and conflict settings, and can play a crucial role in building more peaceful, inclusive and sustainable societies.

At a time when CS space is shrinking in many places, including in Europe, preserving and expanding the political space for civil society in general and the operational and monitoring role of civil society in the realisation of Agenda 2030 should be at the core of future EU Development Policy and cooperation instruments. Pro-active, long-term and strong political support and concrete actions by EU institutions and member states to protect and expand civil society space and capacities to operate are needed in all areas of cooperation, foreign affairs and diplomacy at bilateral, regional and global level. It would be useful to adopt a framework for EU support to civil society space with clear objectives, indicators and monitoring tools so that the issue can be mainstreamed in all areas of work and dialogue and at all political and operational levels, including EU delegations and member states embassies.

EC communication on civil society adopted in 2012 and the EU action plan on Human Rights and Democracy provide a good basis for such a framework and for an EU partnership with CSOs in the area of sustainable development policy and practice. In order to support civil society as a key partner and stakeholder of Agenda 2030, EU and its Member States are called to :

- inform and involve CSOs at every stage of the process of designing implementation strategies and governance and accountability mechanisms, reviewing and negotiating budgets, drafting new or revising existing policies, legislative acts, instruments and programmes, and choosing the most appropriate aid delivery mechanisms and CSO funding modalities;
- ensure that the monitoring, accountability and review mechanisms at local, national, EU and global level envisage a central role for civil society and the public;

- create spaces for civil society and other stakeholders to engage in a political dialogue, both within the EU and in through its political dialogue with partner countries at bilateral and regional levels; The EU roadmaps for engagement with CSOs could play an important role in this regard.

- support cross-sectoral partnership-building between different CS actors and between them and other actors working on different but interlinked themes and at different levels from the local to the national and international, while recognising the different but complementary roles and identities of

stakeholders and ensuring people's participation;
ensure national, regional and thematic programmes support CSOs' contribution to the Agenda 2030, through adequate and predictable funding, while respecting their right of initiative and fostering a broad and diverse civil society working in the spirit of the new Agenda.
develop and implement together with all stakeholders including other relevant DGs or ministries an education and awareness-raising for global citizenship strategy (Global Citizenship Consensus).

6.2 How can the EU promote private sector investment for sustainable development?

The growing role given to business in the post-2015 development and climate change agenda has to go along with corresponding accountability mechanisms and adherence to development effectiveness principles.
Evidence is still lacking on the net impact of the contribution of the big private economic actors to development. According to the various studies, proof can be found of both positive impacts such as providing employment, research and technological development as well as negative impacts such as environmental pollution, depletion of natural resources, unfair regulation arbitrage, fiscal irresponsibility or violation of human rights. To address these potential negative impacts, the EU and its member states need to engage positively and constructively in normative efforts at global level, such as the UN Proposal for an international legal framework that regulates TNC behaviour as adopted by the Human Rights Council on 25 June 2014 (A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev.1).

In the area of cooperation with the private sector, the new consensus should give priority to supporting small-scale producers and farmers in developing countries. SMEs are critical to promoting inclusive economic development and poverty reduction and more and better designed policies and support are necessary. They include proactive government policies going beyond regulatory reform of the business environment ; local-level support policies based on local needs including in rural areas; public procurement and local content policies enshrined in legislation; improvement of value chains for the benefit of SMEs, step change in support to women-led SMEs; progressive tax policies; appropriate infrastructures, increasing the voice and influence of SMEs in policy making and curbing corruption.

When the EC, EIB or development finance institutions of Member States use ODA to support the development of the private sector or to leverage private finance, for example via blending facilities and Public-Private Partnerships (PPP), it is of utmost importance to apply strict criteria and to put in place fair, independent and transparent processes for the selection of actors and projects' and for their monitoring and impact assessment.

Cooperation with the private sector should at all times respect the UN

Guiding principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs). Moreover, the private sector has a key role to play in realising decent work and wage for all, in particular, for women and the youth, in respect of the 4 pillars of the ILO's Decent Work Agenda. The EU has to make sure that European companies are not involved in, neither directly or indirectly, and do not tolerate labour rights abuses by their subsidiaries or in their supply chain.

Access to remedy is a fundamental pillar of the UNGPs but the EU has so far given very little attention to this issue. As a matter of priority, the EU should address obstacles to access remedy and we invite the EC to undertake a thorough examination, in consultation with civil society, of existing barriers to justice in cases brought before Member State courts. This assessment should be geared towards identifying and promoting the adoption of effective measures that remove or alleviate these barriers. At the same time, the EU development agenda should set the target for all states to develop strategies, introduce appropriate policies and laws and ensure redress and compensation for human rights abuses linked to business practice, including land grabbing.

Moreover, in respect of its various policy commitments to support smallholders, the EU and its member states should consider promoting production and investment models and private sector support that prevent large-scale transfer of tenure rights to private investors, and should encourage partnerships with local tenure right holders, as per the UN VGGTs. Extending free, prior and informed consent for all affected local communities must be upheld in relevant EU instruments, including in the EIB operations and DFI supported investments.

As a prerequisite for corporate accountability, the legislative framework has to ensure and deepen transparency and accountability by all actors, including the financial sector. Large and medium-sized enterprises should be obliged to report on the financial, social and environmental impacts of their business activities. The EU directive on non-financial reporting and the more recent EC proposal on public registers of the real owners of companies and 'commercial trusts' to be included in the EU's anti-money laundering legislation, along with public country by country reporting for multinational companies are good steps in that direction. However, the proposals need to be strengthened and to cover a broader range of companies and reporting requirements.

6.3 How can the EU strengthen relations on sustainable development with other countries, international financing institutions, multilateral development banks, emerging donors and the UN system?

The EU and its member States have a leading role to play in the High Level Political Forum of Agenda 2030 and in supporting and promoting a separate (stand-alone) follow-up process of the three FFD conferences where important commitments that go beyond the SDGs' means of implementation have been adopted and require action and monitoring. They should also keep a leading role in UNFCCC to make sure that the 1.5°C target is achieved. Moreover, through their influence in the UN and the Bretton Woods institutions they are expected to support developing countries legitimate ask for strengthening their participation in global governance. In particular, the EU is expected to support the creation of a UN Tax body with balanced representation and participation of developing countries.

Implementing Agenda 2030 will also require that EU engages in UNCTAD work on investments and trade and in the WTO Doha round with a different approach giving more prominence to and setting the standards for social and environmental sustainability and for the defence and promotion of human rights and public interest.

The EIB as a public EU bank has a leading role when it comes to normative standard setting at European and member states but also at international (IFC) level. This role should be used pro-actively to promote highest standards for due diligence and safeguards to prevent land grabs (see above).

The GPEDC is also an important forum for the implementation of the SDGs in full respect of development effectiveness principle and to engage with other donors and new donors (emerging economies) and promote triangular cooperation and multi-stakeholder dialogue and partnerships.

The EU should also support the Committee on Food Security (CFS) as the leading key platform for international food governance that should not be undermined by various private sector initiated platforms.

It is also important to support the UNFSS, the UN Forum on Sustainability Standards which addresses the challenges of sustainable development impacts, and works towards supporting pro-poor sustainable development objectives, facilitating access to global markets in developing countries, and linking these concerns to internalising environmental and social costs.

6.4 How can the EU best support partner countries to develop comprehensive and inclusive national plans for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda?

For EU support in this domain to be legitimate and credible it is essential for the EU to adopt its own ambitious, inclusive and comprehensive implementation plan and to put in place accountable and inclusive mechanisms of planning and reporting at both EU and member states levels. Through its influence at UN level and in the HLPF, the EU should promote inclusive processes of programming and the establishment of good review and reporting mechanisms enforcing accountability of all actors. In this area, the EU and its Member States should lead by example and put in place inclusive mechanisms of policy analysis, planning and monitoring at national and European levels.

Moreover, it is of utmost importance for the EU to implement policy coherence for sustainable development and make sure that its own policies and cooperation facilitate the implementation of the national plans and don't impede the journey of sustainable development in developing countries.

Democratic ownership is key for sustainable development plans and in its dialogue and cooperation with partner countries, the EU should promote and support citizens' participation and involvement of civil society at all stages of planning, implementation and monitoring. The EU should be ready to support initiatives aiming at building the capacities of civil society and Parliaments to hold their governments accountable. In certain cases, it will also be helpful to strengthen capacities and resources of partner governments and public administrations in policy analysis, disaggregated data collection and in monitoring and reporting processes.

Supporting doesn't mean interfering and the EU should refrain from imposing its own priorities on partners countries or promoting one fits all models of sustainable development. The development effectiveness principle of alignment with national plans is key and the EU should be ready to accompany partner countries in their own efforts which also means that the EU and its member states must be ready to cooperate with partner countries on all SDGs as priorities and gaps will differ from one country to the other.

6.5 What are the best ways to strengthen and improve coherence, complementarity and coordination between the EU and the Member States in their support to help partner countries achieve poverty eradication and sustainable development?

Cooperation and coordination is particularly important at field level through joint analysis and joint programmes but this should take place in the framework of a good division of work otherwise there is a risk of orphan countries and sectors as all EU donors seem to follow the same trends and focus on the same priorities (private sector, migration, security, fragile states and LDCs, ...). It is important to put words into action, for example on roadmaps for the engagement with CS or joint programming.

6.6 How can EU development cooperation be as effective as possible, and how can we work with all partners to achieve this?

The Busan agreement and the GPEDC provide the framework for development effectiveness and should be the reference for all EU donors and for their partnerships with non-state actors including the private sector.

To be effective as development partners and actors, the EC and the Member states should invest more in improving coordination, harmonisation and joint programming in the context of a good division of labour and should pay particular attention to:

accountability to the people, regular and structured dialogue with CS, good analysis of situations including consultation of local stakeholders (not only ministries), predictability and good planning while maintaining flexibility, shorter gaps between planning and implementation, simpler and more transparent procedures, not imposing EU priorities in a one fits all model, being less obsessed by quantitative results and giving more attention to the process and relations between stakeholders as well as unplanned impact, learning from experience and sharing and capitalising lessons learnt and developing monitoring indicators and tools that focus on real factors of change and sustainability.

The EU should ensure that affected populations and civil society organisations are consulted and invited as rightful stakeholder into any policy-making dialogue settings, for example, when it comes to crucial seed policies and seed marketing laws at regional levels where the EU is providing development support and technical assistance. Upholding farmer's rights means and must translate into hearing and taking account of smallholders concerns and submissions on policy initiatives.

6.7 What further progress could be made in EU Joint Programming, and how could this experience be linked with other EU joined-up actions in supporting countries' delivery of the 2030 Agenda?

Joint programming should be an integral part of an overarching EU implementation strategy on Agenda 2030 and more transparent and participatory mechanisms of joint programming should be established in that view. Joint programming should be implemented in full respect of the Busan principles, in close dialogue with recipient governments and alignment with their national plans while promoting and supporting democratic ownership and the participation of all stakeholders as it should be the case for all cooperation programmes.

(7) Keeping track of progress

The EU will need to contribute to the global follow-up and review process for the 2030 Agenda. Keeping track of progress in a systematic and transparent way is essential for delivering the 2030 Agenda. The EU is actively contributing to the setting up of a Sustainable Development Goal monitoring system at global, regional and national level. Demonstrating results and impact from our efforts and the promotion of transparency will be important priorities for EU development policy, as part of a wider move to strengthen accountability, follow-up and review at all levels.

7.1 How can the EU strengthen its own use of evidence and analysis, including in the development field, to feed into its regular review on the Sustainable Development Goals to the UN?

To date, 2016 has been a year of stock-taking, establishing baselines and developing SDG implementation plans in line with the Agenda 2030 Outcome Document. Looking to the future, we will need to see much clearer target by target reporting against the SDGs in order to ensure accountability and an explicit global equity lens, in order that this framework remain relevant to the pressing challenges of our time. Examples on how a global equity lens can be implemented in reporting and monitoring are provided in a recent briefing by our member Christian Aid .

Together with CONCORD we recommend that the EU

1. Set up robust independent accountability mechanisms, report annually against their strategies and implementation plans and report at minimum every 5 years to the UN at global level (all Member States as well as the EU as a whole);
2. Monitor the whole 2030 Agenda, including its principles and means of implementation and refrain from confounding the latter with the Financing for Development (FfD) process; note that FfD goes beyond the Addis Ababa Action Agenda;
3. Include the indivisible and integrated nature of Agenda 2030 and Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development in the monitoring, accountability and review framework;
4. Strengthen existing and design new participatory processes to allow people to engage across Europe;
5. Ensure clarity over roles and responsibilities as well as total transparency when setting up multi-stakeholder partnerships;
6. Develop appropriate and ambitious indicators for all SDGs to guide reporting and against which to be held accountable.

On this last point, we recommend, for example and because of its strategic importance on securing agricultural futures and improving smallholders livelihoods, that the EC pays a special attention to putting in place good indicators and monitoring processes for SDG 15 on the sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems and more particularly on targets 15.3 : By 2030, combat desertification, restore degraded land and soil, including land affected by desertification, drought and floods, and strive to achieve a land degradation-neutral world and 15.6 : Promote fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources and promote appropriate access to such resources.

Indeed, people living in poverty and in particular small-scale farmers and fishers, and women farmers are those who depend the most on regenerating natural resources and on ecosystem functions for their livelihoods and food security. Diverse genetic resources that have been cultivated for centuries by indigenous people, by pastorals, rural farming communities, gatherers and fisher folk must be protected, and their rights to genetic resources and to exchange, use and sell farm-saved seeds, on which continued cultivation and maintaining of genetic resources depend, must be protected and enhanced.

7.2 How can the EU help to ensure the accountability of all actors involved in implementation of the 2030 Agenda, including the private sector? How can the EU encourage a strong and robust approach to the Follow Up and Review of the 2030 Agenda from all actors?

This implies incorporating and supporting participatory monitoring in the process. This adds value in 3 ways:

- 1) it adds critically important contextual information on the quality of policies, activities and service-delivery inputs, improves understanding of the link between inputs and outcomes and can lead to timely action to improve action
- 2) it gives local communities a greater sense of ownership,
- 3) it develops an indigenous accountability mechanism in the form of 'shadow reporting' to provide quality check of the data that the official system produces. Creating this kind of system will deliver crucial data for the international community and High level political forum in particular and might change the incentives of national governments to respond to domestic as well as international priorities when setting national development plans.

As detailed in question 6.2, accountability of the private sector should be strengthened through proper legislation on non-financial reporting and through adherence to all pillars of the UN guiding principles on business and Human Rights, in particular due diligence. When private sector is engaged in programmes and projects benefiting from EU development funds they should be bound to the same rules of reporting and transparency as any other development actors or stakeholder in the partnership. High standards of monitoring and reporting are also expected from development finance institutions and from the financial intermediaries they cooperate with in all areas of work related to the SDGs.

7.3 How should EU development cooperation respond to the regular reviews on progress of the partner countries towards the 2030 Agenda goals?

See response to question 6.4.

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