

## **UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development - Public Consultation on revising the European Consensus on Development**

Fields marked with \* are mandatory.

### **(1) Introduction**

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The year 2015 was a strategic milestone for global governance, poverty eradication and sustainable development. It marked the target date of the UN Millennium Development Goals and a point to reflect on the progress made to date and the challenges ahead in addressing their unfinished business. 2015 also saw a series of landmark international summits and conferences over the course of the year (the [Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030](#), the [Addis Ababa Action Agenda](#), the [2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development](#) and the COP 21 [Paris Agreement](#) under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change) which have collectively re-cast the way the international community, including the EU, will work to achieve sustainable development and poverty eradication for many years.

Importantly, and in contrast to the Millennium Development Goals, the 2030 Agenda, including its seventeen Sustainable Development Goals, is a universal Agenda which applies to all countries. It reflects many core European values and interests and provides an international framework for tackling global challenges such as climate change. The EU response to the 2030 Agenda is moving ahead in a range of ways:

- Firstly, as part of EU efforts to implement the 2030 Agenda, the [Commission Work Programme for 2016](#) announces an initiative on the next steps for a sustainable European future which will explain how the EU contributes to reaching the Sustainable Development Goals and map out the internal and external aspects of EU policies contributing to the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals.
- Secondly, the High Representative will present the [EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy](#) that is expected to steer the different EU external policies contributing to the global vision of a more stable, prosperous and secure world. It should set out the strategic direction for the full range of EU external action, and as such will help guide EU implementation of the 2030 Agenda in external action.
- Thirdly, the EU will review its development cooperation policy. Existing leading policy documents (including the [2005 European Consensus on Development](#) and the [2011 Agenda for Change](#)) are currently framed around the Millennium Development Goals and need to adapt to incorporate the 2030 Agenda. Given its direct relevance to the EU's overall relations with developing countries, this review will be carried out in full consistency with the ongoing work on the future of the partnership between the EU and the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, under a post-[Cotonou](#) framework.

Views from this consultation will be used to inform the way forward on the initiatives above and in particular the revision of the European Consensus on Development and other external aspects of 2030 Agenda implementation. The consultation seeks your views on **how development policy, in the context of EU external action as foreseen by the Lisbon Treaty**, should respond to the range of landmark 2015 summits and conferences, and also to the rapid changes happening in the world.

Replies can include views which could apply only to the EU institutions and also to both the EU and its Member States – it would be helpful to clarify this in your response. This open public consultation will run for 12 weeks from 30 May 2016 to 21 August 2016. A brief summary and analysis of all consultation contributions will be published by November 2016 and all individual contributions will also be made available on the consultation website (unless respondents ask for their contributions not to be published).

## (2) Information on respondents

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- \* 2.1 Received contributions may be published on the Commission's website, with the identity of the contributor. Please state your preference with regard to the publication of your contribution.

Please note that regardless of the option chosen, your contribution may be subject to a request for access to documents under [Regulation 1049/2001](#) on public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents. In such cases, the request will be assessed against the conditions set out in the Regulation and in accordance with applicable [data protection rules](#).

- I do not agree that my contribution will be published at all
- My contribution may be published but should be kept anonymous; I declare that none of it is subject to copyright restrictions that prevent publication
- My contribution may be published under the name indicated; I declare that none of it is subject to copyright restrictions that prevent publication

- \* 2.2 Are you registered in the EU's Transparency Register?

Please note: Organisations, networks, platforms or self-employed individuals engaged in activities aimed at influencing the EU decision making process are expected to register in the transparency Register. During the analysis of replies to a consultation, contributions from respondents who choose not to register will be treated as individual contributions (unless the contributors are recognised as representative stakeholders through Treaty provisions, European Social Dialogue, Art. 154-155 TFEU).

- Yes
- No

- \* 2.2.1 If yes, what is your registration number?

049228115944-64

- \* 2.3 Name (entity or individual in their personal capacity)

Overseas Development Institute

2.5 What type of stakeholder are you?

- Government institution / Public administration
- University / Academic organisation
- Civil society (including Non-Governmental Organisation, specialised policy organisation, think tank)
- International organisation
- Private sector or private company
- Citizen/private individual
- Other

2.6 Please specify

Think tank

\* 2.7 What is your place of residence (if you are answering as a private individual) or where are the headquarters of your organisation situated (if you are answering on behalf of an organisation)?

- In one of the 28 EU Member States
- Other

2.8 Please specify

(3) Context: why a change is needed

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The EU and its Member States are determined to implement the 2030 Agenda through internal and external actions as well as contribute to the successful implementation of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, given the strong interlinkages. In this context, our policies, should take into account changing global conditions and trends, to ensure that they remain fit-for-purpose across the time-horizon to 2030.

The global landscape has changed significantly compared to the time of adoption of the Millennium Development Goals. While much has been achieved, with more than one billion people having been lifted out of extreme poverty since 1990, great challenges remain and new ones are emerging. At global level, more than 800 million people still live on less than USD 1.25 a day. The world is witnessing multiple conflicts and security tensions, complex humanitarian and global health crises, deteriorations of human rights, environmental degradation, resource scarcity, urbanisation and migration. Migration flows across the world will continue to have important impacts, and present both a risk and an opportunity. The EU needs to address global security challenges, including tackling the root causes of conflict and instability and countering violent extremism. Climate change can continue to amplify problems and can severely undermine progress. Important changes include demographic trends, a new distribution of wealth and power between and within countries, the continuing globalisation of economies and value chains, an evolving geography of poverty and a proliferation of actors working on development. Projections also suggest important challenges are ahead (for example, continuing unprecedented urbanisation, and other demographic challenges including ageing societies for some and the potential for a demographic dividend for others). Continued attention will be given to a democratic, stable and prosperous neighbourhood. A revision to EU development policy should take into account these trends (including anticipating those that will remain central in future) whilst retaining a core focus on eradicating poverty and finishing the job started by the Millennium Development Goals.

Finally, the EU Consensus needs also to adapt to the Lisbon Treaty, which provides for all external action policies to work within the frameworks and pursue the principles of objectives of Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union. In particular, coherence between the different parts of EU external action and between external and internal policies is crucial.

The EU will need to address these new global challenges, many of which require coordinated policy action at the national, regional and global levels. The 2030 Agenda provides a framework which can guide us in doing so.

### 3.1 There is a range of key global trends (e.g. changing geography and depth of poverty; challenges related to climate change, political, economic, social, demographic, security, environmental or technological) which will influence the future of development and the implementation of the 2030 Agenda. Which of these do you think is the most important?

This submission by experts from the Overseas Development Institute responds to the European Commission's consultation on the revision of the European Consensus on Development. Propositions and evidence have been drawn from ODI's latest research and expert opinions. It is not a comprehensive synthesis of ODI research on the topics, nor does it represent an agreed position of ODI.

For questions about this submission or further information please contact David Watson: d.watson@odi.org.uk

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The international development landscape has changed dramatically since the turn of the century.

In 2015, a new global development agenda was launched through the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), alongside international commitments on financing development and climate change. Policy objectives have increased and the number of development actors continues to multiply. The sweep of the new policy agenda poses challenges for the EU's role vis-a-vie other development players. It will need to deal with the concurrent demands of a changing global context, a broader and more complex development agenda and increasing domestic pressures within Member States.

The revision of the European Consensus on Development needs to ensure the EU is prepared and resilient for the future agenda.

This means thinking hard about: its priorities; its comparative advantage in an increasingly competitive and crowded marketplace; how to make the most strategic and effective use of the multilateral system; how to develop the right partnerships; and how to reflect country need and demand in future strategies.


One of its priorities should be making progress in fragile states. That is where the challenges are greatest to leave no one behind.

The geography of poverty has changed. Most of the world's poor now live in just two regions: South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. Within the next few years, the large majority will live in Sub-Saharan Africa alone. Poverty will be concentrated in countries affected by conflict and fragility. Conflict and insecurity have surged in both scale and complexity, resulting in unprecedented levels of humanitarian need. At the same time, protracted crises have lengthened and broadened the level of humanitarian interventions.

This amplifies the longstanding call to better integrate development and humanitarian assistance. Silos need to be genuinely broken down by eliminating the divides between constituencies and better coordinating financial instruments, while preserving space for independent humanitarian action in conflict.

Traditional approaches to development have been found wanting. The EU must do development differently, embracing innovative and politically smart ways to tackle development problems, through deeper knowledge of country context and engagement with local actors. It must build new skills, delivery capabilities and partnerships, and introduce new incentives and systems.

3.2 How should EU policies, and development policy in particular, better harness the opportunities and minimise the negative aspects of the trend you identified in the previous question?



(4) Priorities for our future action: what we need to do

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Implementation of the 2030 Agenda will require sustained EU efforts to promote a more just world, including a strong focus on the need to address gender equality and women's empowerment. Peace, inclusiveness, equality and good governance including democracy, accountability, rule of law, human rights and non-discrimination will need particular emphasis. The 2030 Agenda also requires recognition of the close interconnectedness between poverty, social issues, economic transformation, climate change and environmental issues.

To achieve poverty eradication, EU development policy will need to take into account key demographic and environmental trends, including challenges related to climate change, and concentrate effort on least developed countries and fragile states. The EU will also need to strengthen our approach to fragility and conflict, fostering resilience and security (as an increasing proportion of the world's poor are expected to live in fragile and conflict affected states) and to protect global public goods and to maintain our resource base as the prerequisite for sustainable growth. Peace and security, including security sector reform, will have to be addressed also through our development policy, as will the risks and opportunities related to migration flows. Tackling social and economic inequalities (both within and between countries) is a crucial element of the 2030 Agenda as is addressing environmental degradation and climate change. Job creation will be an important challenge in which the private sector has to play an active role. Finishing the job of the Millennium Development Goals requires identifying and reaching those people throughout the world who are still not benefitting from progress to ensure that no one is left behind.

To achieve lasting results, EU development policy will need to foster transformation and promote inclusive and sustainable growth. Drivers of inclusive sustainable growth, such as human development, renewable energy, sustainable agriculture and fisheries, and healthy and resilient oceans should be an important part of our efforts to implement the new Agenda as will efforts aimed at tackling hunger and under-nutrition. Implementation of the 2030 Agenda will require a multi-dimensional, integrated approach to human development. Implementation will also require us to address vectors of change, such as sustainable urban development and relevant use of information and communication technology. Our development policy will have to engage and identify new ways of partnering with the business in order to achieve sustainable and inclusive growth, industrialisation and innovation. Implementation of the 2030 Agenda will also require cooperation with partner countries and regions on science, technology and innovation. In all aspects of our external action, the EU will need to ensure that our approaches, including development cooperation, are conducive to achieving the 2030 Agenda's Sustainable Development Goals and that the EU intensifies efforts to promote pursue coherence between our policies and our internal and external action.

#### 4.1 How can the EU better address the links between achieving the Sustainable Development Goals, the Paris Agreement on climate change and addressing other global sustainable development challenges?

The revision of the European Consensus on development should give higher priority to achieving low-carbon development in developing countries, including greenhouse gas emission avoidance and reduction, rather than just adaptation.

The EU should support developing country governments to develop and implement their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). This should form part of conversations between EU Delegations and governments. The NDC and SDG strategies should be coordinated.

The EU should redirect more of its development funding for energy towards Low Income Countries, which currently only receive around 10% of the pot. There is currently little evidence about whether this development funding is consistent with climate change objectives. This should be assessed.

The EU and its Member States' NDCs should include the rapid phase out of subsidies to fossil fuel production and consumption.

For further information please see:

Bast, E., Doukas, A., Pickard, S., Van Der Burg, L., Whitley, S. (November 2015) "Empty promises: G20 subsidies to oil, gas and coal production" ODI Report

<https://www.odi.org/publications/10058-empty-promises-g20-subsidies-oil-gas-and-coal-production>

#### 4.2 How should the EU strengthen the balanced integration of the economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable development in its internal and external policies, and in particular in its development policy?

### 4.3 What are the main changes you would like to see in the EU's development policy framework?

By 2030 extreme poverty will increasingly be concentrated in fragile states. Fragile states must be a priority in the revision of the European Consensus if the world is to stand any chance of leaving no one behind.

Fragile and conflict affected states currently receive less aid per poor person than non-fragile states. This should be remedied through the external financial instruments.

Progress in fragile states requires a shift in the approach to development programming towards more problem driven iterative adaptation rather than rigid blueprints for reform. This will require courage in the new Consensus; courage to take risks, fail and learn from practical problem solving. This needs political leadership.

The incentive structure for European development cooperation needs to change accordingly. Achieving long term progress should take precedence over short term results and reform programmes need to be more flexible.

Multidisciplinary teams and new kinds of partnerships will be needed to achieve progress.

For further information please see:

Gavas, M., Hackenesch, C., Koch, S., Mackie, J., Maxwell, S. (January 2016) "The European Union's Global Strategy: sustainable development and EU external action" European Think Tanks Group Report  
<https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/10226.pdf>

Davies, F., Gavas, M., McKechnie, A. (April 2013) "European Union development cooperation in fragile states: challenges and opportunities" ODI Report  
<https://www.odi.org/publications/7456-european-union-eu-development-cooperation-fragile-states>

4.4 In which areas highlighted above would you expect to see greater consistency between development policy and other areas of the EU external action in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda?

The revision of the Consensus on Development should eliminate the cultural, architecture and financing divides that exist between the development and humanitarian constituencies across Europe, starting with DEVCO and ECHO.

The EU should respond to crises with the right tools for the job, regardless of where they reside in the budget or which DG. This means more flexibility between DEVCO and ECHO and creating positive incentives for collective action, while preserving the space for independent humanitarian action in conflict.

There should be better alignment of the SDGs and the outcomes of the WHS. This includes more explicitly recognising the links between vulnerability, risk, crisis and development, particularly in fragile states, and encouraging a stronger and earlier role for development actors in crisis contexts.


Resilience should be reframed as a development concern, funded from development budget lines and implemented by development specialists, with humanitarian actors in support. This should go hand in hand with a significant investment in preventative action and building resilience to avoid riskier and more costly crisis response.

The Grand Bargain commitments by donors and aid implementers should be incorporated into the new European Consensus on Development.


For further information please see:

Bennett, C., Foley, M., Pantuliano, S. (April 2016) "Time to let go: Remaking humanitarian action for the modern era" ODI Report  
<https://www.odi.org/hpg/remake-aid/>


4.5 In which areas does the EU have greatest value-added as a development partner (e.g. which aspects of its development policy, dialogue or implementation arrangements or in which category of countries)?



4.6 How can the EU refine its development policy to better address inequalities – including gender inequality – in the context of the implementation of the 2030 Agenda?



4.7 How can the EU development policy make a stronger contribution to the security of people? How can EU development policy contribute to addressing the root causes of conflict and fragility and contribute to security and resilience in all the countries where we work?



#### 4.8 How can a revised Consensus on Development better harness the opportunities presented by migration, minimise the negative aspects of irregular migration on the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and better address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement?

The EU needs to better manage and more effectively respond to the current migration crisis in Europe. In 2015, 3,899 migrants died trying to reach Europe (Missing Migrants Project, 2015). Many more have sustained physical injuries and psychological trauma, and have spent a fortune in the process of getting here.

The EU should make journeys safer and act now to minimise the appalling humanitarian and economic consequences of policies that aim to deter migration.

This could be done through: expanding legal channels of migration to allow people to travel directly from one country to the next, removing much of the precariousness from their journey; implementing humanitarian visas, which would permit asylum seekers to travel legally to Europe in whatever way they can afford; and expanding search-and-rescue missions in the Mediterranean.

The migration crisis is undoubtedly a regional one, and must be dealt with as such. Therefore, the EU needs to create a faster, fairer EU-wide asylum system. An effective regional response means: investing in a better functioning, EU-wide asylum processing system through increased resources and paying closer attention to the realities of migration; strengthening the EU's arbitration role - failures to examine asylum claims rigorously must be highlighted and addressed; and reforming the Dublin Regulation by incorporating the principles of regional solidarity and fair sharing, including reconsidering the first-country-of-arrival rule.

The EU should be making the most of migration and capitalising on its positive impacts. This includes: publicly communicating its social and economic benefits; encouraging circular migration; and investing in economic integration programmes for new arrivals.

For further information please see:

Hagen-Zanker, J., Mallett, R. (February 2016) "Journeys to Europe: the role of policy in migrant decision-making" ODI Report

<https://www.odi.org/publications/10317-journeys-europe-role-policy-migrant-decision-making>

## (5) Means of implementation: how do we get there?

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The principle of universality underpinning the 2030 Agenda will require a differentiated approach to engagement with countries at all levels of development. Official Development Assistance will continue to play an important role in the overall financing mix for those countries most in need (particularly the Least Developed Countries). The EU and its Member States should continue to progress towards achieving their commitments. However, in all countries our development cooperation will need to take account of other sources of finance, including by leveraging other (non-Official Development Assistance) sources of finance for poverty eradication and sustainable development. The delivery of the 2030 Agenda means that our work helping countries raise their own resources (domestic resource mobilisation), the provision of aid for trade, blending\* and partnering with the private sector should be priority areas of focus. The Addis Ababa Action Agenda, an integral part of the 2030 Agenda, provides a framework for our efforts, including for our work supporting the right enabling policy environment for sustainable development in our partner countries. The implementation of the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement on climate change under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change should be closely coordinated given the strong interlinkages. Engagement with middle income countries, notably the emerging economies, will be important to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, considering the role they can play in promoting global public goods, what they can achieve within their respective countries on poverty eradication and sustainable development, and the example they can set within their regions as well as their role in regional processes. Here differentiated partnerships can play an important role (examples include different forms of political, economic, and financial investment as well as cooperation in science, technology and innovation). Specific attention and focus should also be given to Least Developed Countries, as acknowledged by the Addis Ababa Action Agenda.

The EU's implementation of the 2030 Agenda provides an opportunity for enhancing consistency between the different areas of the EU's external action and between these and other EU policies (as outlined in the Lisbon Treaty and in [EU's Comprehensive Approach to external conflict and crises](#)). The EU will continue to pursue [Policy Coherence for Development](#) as a key contribution to the collective effort towards broader policy coherence for sustainable development. In our external action, the EU needs to consider how we can use all policies, tools, instruments at our disposal coherently in line with the integrated nature of the 2030 Agenda.

\* Combining EU grants with loans or with equity from other public and private financiers with a view to leveraging additional resources.

## 5.1 How can EU policies, and EU development policy in particular, help to mobilise and maximise the impact of the increasing variety of sustainable development finance, including in particular from the private sector?

Blending is an important way of maximising the impact of EU development funds by catalysing private investment.

The EU should demonstrate greater transparency of funds deployed through blending. This is key to demonstrating additionality. For example, the Commission could publish the ex-ante development-impact justification for each investment that receives funds from the Blending Platform, the reasons why deals could not get done without those funds, and make ex-post evaluations easy to find and match with ex-ante information.

The EU should work with the Development Finance Institutions. The DFIs can act as channels for these funds and drive hard bargains, only handing out soft money when they are satisfied it is needed.

The EU should champion experimentation and risk-taking. For example by running business plan competitions to allocate lots of grants to lots of small entrepreneurs.

Investing in project preparation and early-stage work is key. At later stages, the EU should use transparent and competitive procurement processes to locate investors or contractors.

The EU should consider funding infrastructure that complements the private sector rather than trying to directly fund private enterprise. For example build energy storage facilities, networks designed for use by solar or wind generators, or help with big water management projects.

For further information please see:

Carter, P. (November 2015) "Why subsidise the private sector? What donors are trying to achieve, and what success looks like" ODI Report  
<https://www.odi.org/publications/10064-why-subsidise-private-sector-what-donors-are-trying-achieve-and-what-success-looks>

5.2 Given the evolving availability of other sources of finance and bearing in mind the EU's commitments on Official Development Assistance (e.g. [Council Conclusions from 26 May 2015 on "A New Global Partnership for Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development after 2015"](#), and inter alia, paragraphs 32 and 33), how and where should the EU use its Official Development Assistance strategically and to maximise its impact?

5.3 How can the EU better support partner countries in mobilising their own resources for poverty eradication and sustainable development?

5.4 Given the importance of middle income countries to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, what form could differentiated partnerships take?

There are opportunities available to the EU for strengthening its engagement in Middle Income Countries (MICs) at three levels of analysis: country, bilateral and global/regional.

The EU should, at the country level:

- Target investments on sectors/sub-sectors which are under-funded (e.g. social sectors);
- Provide high-quality, demand-led technical assistance;
- Partner with NGOs to develop civil society and bolster service delivery.

At the bilateral level:

- Engage in development diplomacy to influence agendas and build the EU's soft power.

At the global/regional level:

- Invest in triangular cooperation to support the role of MICs as development partners in third countries;
- Co-finance under-provided global/regional public goods.

The most important source of funding to MICs in the medium term is expected to be concessional multilateral loans, closely followed by grants from DAC members, concessional loans from non-DAC members and lastly concessional loans from DAC members.

There are a number of reasons why grants remain relevant and desirable vehicles for engaging in MICs. Grants can be versatile enough to work across the heterogeneity within the MIC category. Grants can be directly applied to address pockets of poverty within MICs, or through MICs to achieve poverty reduction goals within poorer third countries. Donors can indirectly work through MICs to improve the prospects for neighbouring LICs to access finance through triangular cooperation and global/regional public goods. These dual roles of grant-based investment parallel the dual roles that MICs have as both recipients and providers of development assistance.

In addition, countries can easily slip between MIC and LIC status. ODA can both militate against such regression and be on standby when such movement occurs. There has been a high level of regression from MIC status in the past, with Cameroon, Georgia, Indonesia, Honduras and Yemen all having experienced movement from LMIC to LIC. Of 26 countries that graduated from LIC to MIC between 2001 and 2011, at least 18 relapsed to LIC status. Fluctuating global macroeconomic conditions means that ODA should be expected to play a role within MICs over the medium term at least.

Targeted, policy-oriented assistance from donors is likely to grow in importance in MICs. However, aid recipients raise concerns about technical assistance, including its high cost, its tendency to be supply-driven, its focus on the short-term impacts and its poor suitability to country circumstances. As the EU is no doubt aware, countries tend to favour modalities that provide alignment and flexibility, with budget support and sector budget support ranked as top modalities, followed by project-interventions and technical assistance.

5.5 Given experience so far in taking into account the objectives of development cooperation in the implementation of EU policies which are likely to affect developing countries (e.g. [Policy Coherence for Development: 2015 EU Report](#)), how should the EU step up its efforts to achieve Policy Coherence for Development, as a key contribution to the collective effort towards policy coherence for sustainable development? How can we help ensure that policies in developing countries, and internationally contribute coherently to sustainable development priorities?

The new Consensus should ensure greater coherence with EU trade policy.

The EU already grants generous trade preferences to developing countries but it needs now to work with developing countries to increase their utilisation of these preferences through capacity building, the provision of tools and building expertise. For example the EU could provide support to local business associations so that their exporters can obtain the necessary paperwork to comply with rules of origin procedures. In addition, simplifying and increasing flexibility in the application of rules of origin should be seen as the next key improvement in the Everything but Arms (EBA) program.

Internally the EU needs to increase coordination with private EU businesses to ensure that private standards do not act as an additional barrier to developing countries.

The EU should be more active in providing preferential access to imports of services to LDCs in sectors and provision modes that can have a development effect.

Finance and investment to build the productive capacity of private firms in developing countries should be increased and directed towards sectors, countries and instruments that can provide the best results.

Support for productive and trade development such as agriculture and infrastructure should be increased. Specifically, the EU could facilitate the development of regional infrastructure that helped to develop new sectors, allowing the formation of regional value chains, and facilitating the trade of landlocked countries.

The TTIP provides an opportunity to cooperate internationally on development and the deal should seek to include mechanisms for the exchange of experiences.

For further information please see:

Basnett, Y., Keane, J., te Velde, D. W. (2014) "10 priorities for the EU Trade Commissioner" ODI Report  
<https://www.odi.org/publications/8837-10-priorities-eu-trade-commissioner>

Massa, I., Mendez-Parra, M. and te Velde, D W. (2016) "The macro-economic effects of development finance institutions in sub-Saharan Africa" ODI Report - forthcoming. Summary available here P.9:  
[https://issuu.com/merkurgrafisk/docs/norfund\\_virksomhetsrapport\\_2016\\_bla](https://issuu.com/merkurgrafisk/docs/norfund_virksomhetsrapport_2016_bla)

## (6) The actors: making it work together

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An important feature of the new Agenda is that all governments, developed and developing, will need to work with a wide range of stakeholders (including the private sector, civil society and research institutions) to improve the transparency and inclusivity of decision-making, planning, service delivery, and monitoring and to ensure synergy and complementarity.

The EU must continue to work collaboratively with others and contribute to a coordinated approach. The Addis Ababa Action Agenda puts national plans for implementation (including associated financing and policy frameworks) at the centre. To maximise our impact, EU development policy should be based on a strategic and comprehensive strategy for each country, which also responds to the country-specific context.


Our partner countries' implementation of the 2030 Agenda will inform our overall engagement and our development cooperation dialogue with them and will help shape our support for their national efforts. The EU should also help partner countries put in place the necessary enabling policy frameworks to eradicate poverty, tackle sustainable development challenges and enhance their policy coherence.

There is a need for a renewed emphasis on the quality of development cooperation, including existing commitments on aid and development effectiveness made in Paris, Accra and Busan\* and through work with the [Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation](#).


An updated EU development policy should also provide a shared vision that guides the action of the EU and Member States in development cooperation, putting forward proposals on how to further enhance coordination, complementarity and coherence between EU and Member States. Strengthening [Joint Programming](#) will be an important part of this. Improving the division of labour between the EU and its Member States in order to reduce aid fragmentation will also contribute to increased development effectiveness.

\* See [Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action](#) and the [Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation](#)


6.1 How should the EU strengthen its partnerships with civil society, foundations, the business community, parliaments and local authorities and academia to support the implementation of the 2030 Agenda (including the integral Addis Ababa Action Agenda) and the Paris Agreement on climate change?




6.2 How can the EU promote private sector investment for sustainable development?



6.3 How can the EU strengthen relations on sustainable development with other countries, international financing institutions, multilateral development banks, emerging donors and the UN system?



6.4 How can the EU best support partner countries to develop comprehensive and inclusive national plans for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda?



6.5 What are the best ways to strengthen and improve coherence, complementarity and coordination between the EU and the Member States in their support to help partner countries achieve poverty eradication and sustainable development?

6.6 How can EU development cooperation be as effective as possible, and how can we work with all partners to achieve this?


6.7 What further progress could be made in EU Joint Programming, and how could this experience be linked with other EU joined-up actions in supporting countries' delivery of the 2030 Agenda?

## (7) Keeping track of progress


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The EU will need to contribute to the global follow-up and review process for the 2030 Agenda. Keeping track of progress in a systematic and transparent way is essential for delivering the 2030 Agenda. The EU is actively contributing to the setting up of a Sustainable Development Goal monitoring system at global, regional and national level. Demonstrating results and impact from our efforts and the promotion of transparency will be important priorities for EU development policy, as part of a wider move to strengthen accountability, follow-up and review at all levels.


7.1 How can the EU strengthen its own use of evidence and analysis, including in the development field, to feed into its regular review on the Sustainable Development Goals to the UN?



7.2 How can the EU help to ensure the accountability of all actors involved in implementation of the 2030 Agenda, including the private sector? How can the EU encourage a strong and robust approach to the Follow Up and Review of the 2030 Agenda from all actors?



7.3 How should EU development cooperation respond to the regular reviews on progress of the partner countries towards the 2030 Agenda goals?



## Contact

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