



Review of strategic evaluations managed by DEVCO to assess the European Consensus on Development

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European Consensus on Development**

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List of acronyms

AA	Association Agreement
ACP	African, Caribbean, Pacific
AFTA	ASEAN Free Trade Agreement
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEM	Asia-Europe Meeting
AU	African Union
AUP	African Union Programme
BS	Budget Support
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CAR	Central African Republic
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CEDEAO	Communauté Économique des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (Economic Community of West African States)
CEMAC	Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale (Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa)
CPA	Cotonou Partnership Agreement
CPPB	Conflict Prevention and Peace-building
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSP	Country Strategy Paper
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (of the OECD)
DG DEVCO	Directorate-General for International Co-operation and Development
DRC	Democratic Republic Congo
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EAC	East African Community
EBA	Everything But Arms
ECHO	Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECR	European Co-ordinated Response
EDF	European Development Fund
EEAS	European External Action Service
EIB	European Investment Bank
EN	European Neighbourhood
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
ENPARD	European Neighbourhood Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development
ENPI	European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument
EOM	Electoral Observation Mission
EPA	European Partnership Agreement

EQ	Evaluation Question
ERCC	Emergency Response Co-ordination Centre
ESA-IO	Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean
ESI	Employment and Social Inclusion
EU	European Union
EUD	European Union Delegation
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FLEGT	Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade
FOMUC	Force Multinationale de la CEMAC (Multinational Force of CEMAC)
FTA	Free Trade Area
GBS	General Budget Support
GCCA	Global Climate Change Alliance
GESI	Gender Equality and Social Inclusion
GEWE	Gender Equality and Women Empowerment
GFATM	Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
GSP	General System of Preferences
HR	Human rights
IBM	International Border Management
ICPD	International Conference on Population and Development
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IFIs	International Financial Instruments
IL	Intervention Logic
IMF	International Monetary fund
IO	International Organisation
IPR	Intellectual Property Rights
JC	Judgement Criterion
JSSR	Justice and Security Reform Process
LAO PDR	Lao People's Democratic Republic
LDC	Least Developed Countries
LIC	Low Income Countries
LRRD	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MEDA	Mésures d'accompagnement financières et techniques (Finance and Technical Support Measures for the Union for the Mediterranean)
MFF	Multiannual Financial Framework
MIC	Middle Income Countries
MICOPAX	La Mission de consolidation de la paix en Centrafrique

MFI	Multilateral Financial Institutions
MMEs	Mid-market enterprises
MS	Member State
MTEF	Medium-Term Expenditure Framework
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NIP	National Indicative Programme
NSAs	Non-State Actors
OCHA	UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OCTs	Overseas Countries and Territories
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PA	Public Administration
PEFA	Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability
PFM	Public Finance Management
PPPs	Public-Private Partnerships
PSD	Private Sector Development
RRM-IfS	Rapid Reaction Mechanisms – Instrument for Stability
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SBCs	State Building Contracts
SBS	Sector Budget Support
SEA	Strategic Environment Assessments
SICA	Central American Integration System
SMEs	Small and Medium-sized Enterprises
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TA	Technical Assistance
TACIS	Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States
TAIEX	Technical Assistance and Information Exchange instrument
TRA	Trade-Related Assistance
TVET	Technical and Vocational Educational Training
UEMOA	Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (Economic and Monetary Union of West Africa)
UMC	Upper-Middle-income Countries
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WB	World Bank
WTO	World Trade Organisation

1 Executive summary

Objectives and scope

This review of the strategic evaluations carried out on behalf of the European Commission's Directorate-General for International Co-operation and Development (DG DEVCO) is part of a DG DEVCO and European External Action Service (EEAS) exercise aimed at updating the European Consensus on Development (established in 2006 and complemented by the Agenda for Change in 2010), as part of the work to implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

The scope of the review covers a selection of 148 thematic and geographic (country and regional) evaluations managed by DG DEVCO, including the 111 evaluations covered under an earlier Review carried out (early 2016) in the context of the process post-Cotonou, the Agreement signed by the European Union and the African, Caribbean, Pacific (ACP) group of states in 2000..

The specific objectives of this review are:

- Identification of evidence related to the achievement of the objectives, according to specific evaluation questions;
- Synthesis of evidence related to the standard evaluation criteria;
- Identification of possible information gaps and suggestions on how to fill them;
- Identification of broader lessons to be learned by the evaluations.

Methodological issues

The reconstructed intervention logic (IL) for the Consensus has been established, including the identification of key assumptions for its implementation, and relevant Evaluation Questions (EQs) and Judgement Criteria (JCs) have been validated with the Reference Group.

The 148 evaluation reports provided by the Commission have been classified and structured according to relevance criteria, so as to diversify the level of their consideration in the final assessments. A number of codes corresponding to the JCs have been created, and the reports have been read to extract the text segments corresponding to the codes, including the different levels of relevance mentioned above. The 111 reports already considered under the previously mentioned Cotonou review have not been re-analysed, but the evidence extracted has been used in the synthesis.

A first work of synthesis has been carried out on the codified text segments. Such synthesis has then been tested and reviewed through further reading of the most relevant reports. A second work of synthesis has been carried out to arrive at the current formulation of answers to the EQs.

The answers to the EQs have been summarised in the conclusions – according to the main evaluation criteria – on the basis of the evaluation reports, their weighting and comparison. The key assumptions have been verified.

Summary of the conclusions

Relevance of the EU intervention

Most geographic evaluations confirm the relevance of the EU country and regional strategies towards the EU key objectives and the partners' priorities (alignment), the country specific contexts and their evolution.

The general relevance of the programmes, however, is often undermined by weak analytical backgrounds, weak or partial ownership by partner governments, and a limited involvement of non-state actors (NSAs), particularly in the identification and prioritisation phase. In many cases, the evaluations find that the governments, despite the agreements, are not fully committed to the reforms envisaged by the EU support programmes. At regional level, national priorities conflict with, or take precedence over, the regional ones. The dialogue framework including the financial and political leverage – recently also in the case of significant joint General Budget Support (GBS) – does not always seem able to address such weaknesses. With respect to the NSAs, their support is not systematically sought when dealing with national policy processes.

Beyond such general remarks, the strategic evaluations highlight strengths and weaknesses of the relevance at thematic level.

Effectiveness of the EU development action, as evidenced by the strategic evaluations

Growth and social policies. An effective contribution in this area has been provided mainly through budget support since the 1990s. Macroeconomic stabilisation and improved public financial management have been effectively supported, budgetary allocations to social sectors have been protected, and policy design and implementation in health, education, water supply and food security have been enhanced – although much remains to be done, particularly at institutional level.

In the last decade, however, budget support seems to have partly lost its leverage – especially in some ACP fast-growing countries – because of its reduced financial weight on recipients' budgets, and also due to the weakening of the shared framework of priorities between the partner countries and the EU Member States (MS).

Support to regional organisations and trade. The EU has contributed to enhancing regional organisations' capacities for trade and economic development. In addition, regional organisations such as the African Union and ECOWAS have been involved in tackling some of the most acute regional security crises. A problematic institutional framework, however, has limited the effectiveness of EU action.

Support to regional and international trade (enhanced trade regulations, liberalisation and capacity, and the improvement of basic transport infrastructure on the main regional axes) has contributed to enhancing trade capacities and opportunities. European Partnership Agreements (EPAs) in the ACP countries, and free trade agreements in the rest of the world, have been launched and are being consolidated. However, the EU's ability to leverage the different partners has met a number of obstacles, and the disparity of interests and commitment is still a challenge.

Private sector development has been fostered by macroeconomic and fiscal stabilisation, and also by the improved trade regulatory systems and the reinforcement of the transport networks (particularly at the regional level in Africa). Together, these have contributed to the improvement of the local business environment and export opportunities. However, the contribution to the strengthening of private sector organisations, the competitiveness and diversification of supply chains of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and employment policies driven by the private sector has been weak.

Civil society organisations (CSOs), non-state and decentralised actors have been effectively mobilised through ad hoc programmes and specific budget lines, especially for relief and rehabilitation has increased. However, the consolidation and mainstreaming of the strategic role of CSOs, non-state and decentralised actors in the development processes – including the identification of the country priorities and the association to the main programmes – is still a challenge.

Good governance has been pursued with new means and increased determination. With respect to democratic governance, the support to the electoral processes has been effective in many countries, and the dialogue on human rights has been intensified. New tools, such as the State Building Contracts (SBCs), have been put in place to mainstream good governance into the national strategies, particularly in fragile countries, and new sectoral support programmes have been launched in the areas of justice and security, budget transparency, and the fight against corruption. However, good governance as a whole, including economic governance and general progress in the shared reform agenda, is not an area of particularly high commitment of the partner governments, and it is not systematically addressed in the political dialogue.

Conflict prevention, management and resolution. Since the Lisbon Treaty entered into force in 2009 and the European External Action Service (EEAS) was formally launched in 2011, there has been a reinforced EU political initiative in the conflict prevention and peace-building (CPPB) area, including larger and more effective development co-operation actions, in co-ordination with EU MS and regional state and non-state actors. The majority of the interventions, however, are still emergency-driven and the EU leadership is still weak when addressing the root causes of regional conflicts and defining longer-term arrangements.

Environmental sustainability and adaptation to climate change. The EU plays an advanced role in international programmes and has developed effective tools to enhance policies and actions in partner countries through the Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA). The use of mixed instruments has contributed to increasing the readiness and ability of the governments to implement their strategies. EU support has contributed to the creation of an environment conducive to reaching global agreements, the establishment of climate change financing mechanisms, and developing stronger knowledge, tools and approaches. However, the level of prioritisation is still modest, especially for environment policies, and the adoption of improved legal frameworks is difficult in several countries. On climate change, some major challenges remain with regard to fragmentation of strategies or understanding and political will in partner countries.

Impacts of the EU development action as evidenced by the strategic evaluations

Poverty reduction. The overall contribution to poverty reduction, especially in ACP countries, has been significant, via the contributions to macroeconomic stabilisation, improved public finance management (PFM), trade frameworks, including strengthening of the main transport networks, increased public expenditure in social sectors, etc. All such public policies and country/regional capacities strengthened by, among other things, the EU development co-operation have contributed to economic growth and increased access of the poor to the basic services, thus alleviating both income and non-income poverty reduction.

However, the contribution to inclusive growth, with increased levels of participation by the poor, accelerated reduction of the poverty incidence and reduction of inequalities has been weak. In particular, the productivity of the labour in agriculture and SMEs' competitiveness, with their impact on employment of poor people, have not increased as they should have to support inclusive growth.

Equitable access to basic services. The EU development co-operation has significantly contributed to improved equitable access to basic social services (education, health, water and sanitation), and to improved living standards for the poor, in ACP and in other intervention areas. Over the last few decades, EU budget support (combined with other budget support providers) has provided a substantial share (although decreasing in recent years) of the development expenditure in the mentioned sectors in many ACP countries. Such financial support has often been complemented by policy advice and capacity development, thus accompanying the efforts of country leadership. Overall, the impact on improved equitable access to primary education, basic health services and clean water has been relatively high, although the quality of institutional change and the sustainability of the achievements remain low.

Trade flows. Trade facilitation action of the EU development co-operation has accompanied and supported the tremendous increase of the worldwide trade flows that has taken place in the last decade, despite a significant contraction in 2009. This is particularly evident in Africa, where the deterioration of the continent's share in international trade has been halted. Trade growth has been a main driver for global economic growth in the ACPs. The key determinants of trade growth, however, are international demand and supply, while trade facilitation plays a key role when demand is high and supply is competitive. Indeed, the diversification of the supply remains a weak feature of the ACP trade, and a weak point of the EU contribution.

Democracy, human rights and good governance. EU support has contributed to the reinforcement of democracy and human rights in the ACPs. The democratic process in ACP countries, although slow and lacking continuity, has progressed. Overall, there has generally been progress in economic governance and electoral processes, but results in the area of human rights are fragmented, unstable and compartmentalised. In judiciary and security reform, results are conditioned by the political commitment of the partners. There are also positive examples of successful EU support in complex transition processes, such as in Latin America (Bolivia, Columbia); in European Neighbourhood (EN) East, where countries willing to lay the bases of modern, democratic states find in the EU the most solid partner; or in EN South, where countries willing to rebuild/ strengthen their path towards a competitive and inclusive society benefit from of a multitude of instruments provided by the EU support.

Peace and security. EU support, especially in the last decade, has contributed to peace and security stabilisation and maintenance worldwide. The results of such renewed action are not yet fully

measurable and still appear only marginally in the evaluations available (for example, Burundi, Haiti, Ethiopia, Colombia, Georgia, Palestine, Bolivia). In the ACP countries, particularly in Africa, the EU has contributed to an enhanced capacity of reaction of the international community, with a deep involvement of some regional organisations, and effective mobilisation for peace enforcement, post-conflict country emergency and rehabilitation, conflict prevention networks. In non-ACP countries, there are also good examples of effective CPPB action – namely, in Bolivia, and in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The factors and the effects of the conflicts have been successfully mitigated, but their root causes have not been addressed adequately, including regional inequalities, political discriminations and imbalances. This would have required – in cases such as the West Bank and Gaza Strip – a stronger EU political initiative.

Sustainability of the achievements so far, as evidenced by the strategic evaluations

Economic achievements. Economic growth and increased trade, especially for poor countries in conflict-prone environments, are not fully sustainable. Indeed, the diversification of the poor economies is still lagging behind. The productivity of labour in agriculture and the competitiveness of SMEs is still low. Structural changes – involving agriculture and rural development, value chains and employment policies, and sustainable energy supply – are badly needed.

Social achievements need to be consolidated through institutional development and enhanced quality. Evaluations show how social gains can easily be threatened if not supported by deep institutional changes and if not adequately maintained (e.g. HIV/AIDS, primary school enrolment, maternal health). The high rate of population growth and weak institutional capacity in many cases are strong factors of vulnerability and make the achievements so far largely unsustainable, especially if the countries are affected by economic crises and conflicts. On the other hand, competitive businesses need up-to-date secondary and tertiary education and vocational training systems to match skills demand and supply.

Democratic processes are still very weak. The support of solid middle classes is lacking and the systems of checks and balances are still unripe, which makes them vulnerable to the pressure of powerful groups for state capture. Building competitive and attractive states is still a major challenge, involving a very long process that requires up-to-date long-term international partnerships.

The root causes of instability and conflicts have not been addressed. Strengthening the resilience of the existing states and regions is a key response, requiring long-term predictable support and consolidation of the endogenous institutional dynamics and growth factors.

Gender equality and women empowerment. Despite the high priority and the means put in place in this area, the EU contribution to possible positive impacts must be considered weak.

Efficiency of the EU development action, as evidenced by strategic evaluations

Ownership is limited in many cases, despite a significant alignment and various efforts to ensure partners' appropriation and leadership. The evaluations show that country and regional programmes, although tailor-made, often are not adequately owned, or they are not owned in their entirety. This is both a cause and a consequence of weak comprehensive frameworks of political and policy dialogue to ensure high levels of mutual accountability in programme execution. Exceptions are represented by GBS in ACPs until the late 2000s and other comprehensive political and/or economic agreements – for example in South Africa, and some European Neighbourhood and Latin American countries.

Integration of political and policy dialogue is weak. Comprehensive, high-level political dialogue does not systematically support policy dialogue and rather tends to be compartmentalised, with a focus on human rights and security issues. Policy dialogue is often delegated to lower levels – for example, monitoring and technical negotiations related to single programmes, or single conditionalities in the case of budget support (BS). Policy dialogue is often unable to go beyond the technical nature of the issues addressed, while the factors that may determine real changes and advances in reforms are related to the political commitment of the decision-makers.

Flexibility of modalities, instruments and tools. The EU development support allows a wide diversification of funding instruments and financing modalities. This multiplicity of tools should permit the design and implementation of programmes tailored to the actual needs and constraints of the

different contexts. It has been found, however, that the multiplicity of tools is not always applied as efficiently as it could be. For instance, in many cases, the support to non-state actors is not adequately mainstreamed in the country strategies. Potentially complementary interventions are often fragmented and not sufficiently co-ordinated, coherent and synergic within the whole country programmes. Among the various reasons for this problematic co-ordination are insufficient means and capacities at country level (EU Delegations and country ownership).

The regional dimension has proved to be a framework conducive to boosting not only trade and economic infrastructure, but also peace and security. The synergies between regional and national level, however, represent an important challenge. Regional institutions are unable to negotiate and ensure national implementation, and national governments often face specific resistance and constraints to implementing regional programmes.

Efficient management is a main concern of the strategic evaluations. Delays and various inefficiencies – mainly due to the heavy administrative procedures and the lack of staff and capacities at the level of the EU Delegations (e.g. health, security) – are often mentioned in the evaluations as bottlenecks affecting the quality of the programming and implementation cycle.

Efficient monitoring and evaluation systems are in place. The ROM mechanism and the strategic evaluations are the core of a system that is expected to feed a continuous learning process and represents a key asset of the EU development co-operation. Data on development results, however, is not readily available, as they would require specific arrangements and research programmes with the partner countries. The existing feedback loops at all levels – including HQs and countries – do not seem able to ensure the expected learning outcomes.

EU added value and the 3Cs (Co-ordination, Complementarity, Coherence)

Beyond the sectors (trade and regional co-operation) where the EU has a specific mandate and a high added value, the latter is related to some key features of the EU development policy, namely: a political profile that does not reflect narrow and traditional economic and political national interests; the critical mass of the financial aid; the worldwide presence; the potential for bringing together and co-ordinating some of the strongest international donors. Such added value shows itself in support to sensitive and complex reform processes (European Neighbourhood, Latin America), to address delicate conflict prevention and peace-building contexts (West Africa), to support comprehensive and/or sectoral development strategies (ACP, through budget support), and to contribute to global initiatives in areas such as environment and health. The EU added value has demonstrated all its potential when co-ordination and complementarities with EU-MS and other donors have been high. This has improved a lot in the last decade, but joint programming is still at an initial stage. There are also areas where the EU could better draw on its own diversified and advanced experience (stronger co-ordination among the Commission's DGs), and areas where it provides the bulk of the development assistance, but its political role is not proportional to the level of its support (e.g. Palestine).

2 Introduction

2.1 Objectives and scope of the review

The EU is committed to implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, both internally and externally, through three strands of work:

- An overarching communication, “Next steps for a sustainable European future”, on the internal and external implementation of Sustainable Development Goals – SDGs (Commission Work Programme for 2016);
- A strategic approach – with a global vision for a more stable, prosperous and secure world – that is being developed in the EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy;
- An update of the EU development co-operation policy.

This review of strategic evaluations contributes to the latter section above. More specifically, according to the Terms of Reference, *“the main objective is to review the results of EU development co-operation since the adoption of the European Consensus in view of its revision. The Review shall contribute to assessing to what extent the EU development co-operation has integrated principles, values and commitments of the European Consensus and achieved its objectives.”*

The EU’s development co-operation policy has been shaped by the European Consensus for Development (hereinafter, referred to as “the Consensus”) since 2006 and complemented by the Agenda for Change (2011). The revision of the European Consensus on Development aims to reflect the 2030 Agenda on sustainable development and other international agreements, and to respond to the changed international environment and widely-acknowledged challenges – such as migration, demographic trends, and unequal distribution of wealth, but also to recent trends in the geography of poverty and the proliferation of actors working in development.

The **scope of the review** covers a selection of 145 thematic and geographic (country and regional) evaluations managed by DG DEVCO, including the 111 evaluations covered under an earlier review carried out in the context of the post-Cotonou process (hereinafter referred to as “the Cotonou Review”). The temporal scope is 2006 (when the Consensus was signed) to 2016.

The specific **objectives of the review** are:

- Identification of evidence related to the achievements of the objectives;
- Identification of evidence linked to the evaluation questions;
- Identification of possible information gaps and suggestions on how to fill them;
- Identification of broader lessons to be learned from the evaluations.

The review consists of analysis and synthesis of findings and lessons from reports, based on evaluation questions, guided by the Better Regulation Evaluation criteria and impact and sustainability.

2.2 Structure of the report

The Final Report consists of the following elements:

- **Chapter 1** is the executive summary.
- **Chapter 2** introduces objectives and the scope of the review and the report structure.
- **Chapter 3** elaborates on the methodology.
- **Chapter 4** describes the reconstructed intervention logic.
- **Chapter 5** presents evidence linked to the evaluation questions.
- **Chapter 6** draws conclusions, as per Development Assistance Committee (DAC) criteria.
- **Chapter 7** highlights main information gaps and lessons learned from the evaluations.
- **Annex 9.1** provides the list of analysed evaluation reports.
- **Annex 9.2** consists of the final evaluation matrix.

3 Methodology of the review

This review builds on the evidence gathered from 145 strategic evaluation reports, of which 111 were screened for the Cotonou review and the remainder read for the Consensus review. The list of reports (see Annex 9.1) covers evaluations conducted from 2007 to 2016, covering different periods starting from 1991. As the Consensus was adopted in 2006, reports covering periods before 2007 were used only as counterfactuals.

The review was organised in four phases:

1. Structuring the reports:

Table 1 Categories of relevance

Category	Explanation
Reports covering periods after 2007 – high relevance	Reports of this category were read extensively , and even their annexes were taken into account for further in-depth analysis.
Reports covering periods before 2007 – may be useful as counterfactuals	Reports in this category were screened rapidly by concentrating on the conclusions and recommendations to identify key lessons that might be valid and helpful. Information from these reports is relevant to the extent to which it helps to track continuity or relevant changes between the Consensus and the periods before.

2. Defining Evaluation Questions and Judgement Criteria

Detailed evaluation questions (EQs), including judgement criteria (JCs), were identified, discussed and validated with the counterpart, before establishing criteria for reading and classification of the reports.

3. Defining clear and unambiguous codes derived from the JCs

The individual JCs served a purpose of also being codes (see Box 1). This was done in order to organise and structure the reading work (see below).

4. Reading, extracting and analysing information

The reports were read and relevant segments assigned to one or several corresponding codes with the tool MAXQDA. The tool is used to help organise and structure the actual reading process.

Box 1 Features and advantages of the software tool MAXQDA

MAXQDA is a software tool for professional qualitative and quantitative content analysis, which Particip uses to systematically scrutinise and interpret textual and other data gathered in evaluation research. It facilitates handling large document sets, and it recognises all main document formats (Word, pdf, Excel). Documentary evidence is analysed based on user-defined code systems (keywords, indicators, or – as in this case – the whole JCs). Segments of texts are then selected and coded. Multiple and overlapping coding of document segments is possible, and the size of coded segments as well. While coded segments (pieces of evidence) can be readily exported in full or for selected codes only into text, Excel or HTML formats, coded segments remain part of the documents, and can be browsed and viewed in their original context. This is important for the purpose of contextualising – for example, quotes. Often used functions also include a lexical search (search for words and phrases within documents or retrieved segments).

Having a shared database of evidence facilitates the follow-up tasks, especially answering the EQs.

5. Final analysis of the extracted elements and synthesis of the findings

The analysis consisted of **identifying links to the EQs and to the achievements of the objectives** of the Consensus, as depicted in the reconstructed IL. The synthesis of the findings leads to answering the EQs, indicating gaps of information and broader lessons learned.

4 Reconstructed intervention logic

The European Consensus for Development is a policy statement made jointly by the Council, the Commission and the Parliament in 2006. It outlines a common vision in development co-operation, and sets out principles on which the co-operation is based at both the “Community”¹ and Member States levels (part I). It also identifies thematic areas of co-operation and modalities for programming and implementation for the EU institutions (part II). The proposed IL is reconstructed on the basis of the Consensus. The narrative part describes the evolution – namely, of part II – reflected in the Agenda for Change.

Given the nature of the Consensus as a policy statement, the IL responds to specific features (Figure 1):

- Column 1 synthesises the standard first levels of an IL (inputs, activities and outputs) in a single initial level, where the areas and type of co-operation actions identified by the Consensus are synthesised.
- Column 2 includes the principles and underlying values stressed by the Consensus, to which the interventions (Column 1) must respond. This is a way to reflect in the IL the complex architecture of principles and values that inspires the Consensus.
- Column 3 includes the expected results – that is, the short-medium term changes induced by the interventions (Column 1) implemented according to the principles (Column 2), through their interaction with the context in the situations addressed².
- Column 4 includes the impacts – that is, consolidated and sustainable changes in the mid-to long term to be brought about by complex interactions of results and contexts.

There are systemic relationships between the individual levels – namely, between Columns 1 and 2 on one side, and Column 3 and then 4. At each level, single items interact with the others, and it is impossible to isolate individual effects. The relationships between the levels are causal relationships of **contribution** – that is, they are not isolated from the outside environment but interact with external factors that need to be considered.

4.1 The narrative

On the one hand, the Consensus encompasses a vast array of interventions and diverse support measures and activities in several thematic areas. On the other hand, it emphasises the underlying principles of co-operation that are the departure points of each action aimed at increasing effectiveness of delivered aid.

The Consensus’ approach in part II defines EU institutions’ action in terms of **support to thematic areas** and **mainstreaming of individual aspects** across the thematic areas. The areas encompass: trade and regional integration; environment and sustainable management of natural resources; infrastructure, communications and transport; rural development; territorial planning; agriculture and food security; governance; democracy; human rights and support for economic and institutional reforms; conflict prevention and fragility; and human development. Horizontally, the EU provides technical assistance for capacity development. The aspects that the Consensus aims to mainstream are

- Democracy, good governance, human rights, the rights of children and indigenous people.
- Gender equality.
- Environmental sustainability.
- HIV/AIDS.

The Consensus devotes considerable space to the **principles of co-operation**; these are aimed at guiding every action and, if they are followed through, aid delivery should be effective. This is why they are an integral part of the IL, as they specify the very nature of the co-operation actions.

¹ After the Lisbon Treaty (2007), ‘EU’ should be used instead of ‘Community’

² Such effects are considered to be out of the sphere of control and direct influence of the activities put in place and the related outputs, but in the sphere of their indirect influence (i.e. the influence they can exercise in combination with other contextual factors).

The rationale could be described in the following way:

The EU and its Member States are committed to achieving results that contribute to poverty eradication. It commits to prioritising support to least developed and low income countries. The sharing of common fundamental values underlies development efforts. Partner countries have responsibility for their own development, and thus have ownership of EU support programmes. The EU maintains an in-depth political dialogue with the state and non-state actors, acts with them in partnership, and aligns its support to partner country systems. Every partner country has different needs and the EU differentiates its support accordingly. This includes selection of an appropriate mix of tools, channels and modalities, which ensures adequate coherence, including the coherence with the multitude of EU development and non-development policies that may affect them.

The EU complements bilateral support of Member States and concentrates its interventions in areas where it can make most difference and offer an added value. On the world stage, the EU strives to increase its share of development efforts. However, it is not the only actor in this field, and hence co-ordinates and harmonises its efforts with other bilateral and multilateral donors to contribute to effective multilateralism.

When support is implemented in the identified thematic areas, following the above described principles, the ideal outcome is that it will bring about a number of complex changes in quality of institutional environment, functioning of a society, and lives of people. The individual interventions interact with each other systemically; the contribution of the Consensus is indirect, as there are endogenous processes and context factors that condition the effects. The expected **results** look as follows:

Partner countries are integrated into a more open, fair, equitable and rules-based multilateral trading system, and are better protected against external economic shocks. They manage natural resources in a more sustainable way, and the impact of natural disasters is better controlled; a transport network is developed in a sustainable way; rural development is enhanced so as to tackle rural poverty and improve food security. Societies of partner countries are governed by better functioning and more transparent and democratic institutions, where rule of law and human rights are better guaranteed. Public services and social infrastructure allow for a more equal access to better quality basic healthcare and primary education. Gender equality is promoted, and equality of human beings is protected by law. In situations of fragility, viable and functioning institutions are reconstructed so that illegal and violent actions cannot persist for long. Last but not least, partner countries have the capacity to absorb and administer aid funds, and use them for their benefit.

These results, being systemic in their mutual interactions and creating synergies, are expected to drive deep structural changes in the mid- to long term. In other words, they are expected to contribute to **impacts**, provided that they become entrenched in the endogenous processes of the societies and are adapted to the contextual factors. Ideally, this logical chain impacts on a reduction of poverty in all its multi-dimensional aspects, the world becomes more democratic, peaceful, prosperous and equitable, and the society moves close to the overall goal of sustainable development – understood as inclusive growth, cultural, social and environmental development.

The causal relationships of contribution on which the reconstructed IL is built rely on a set of core assumptions, which transpire through the Consensus and the individual interventions arising from its implementation. Such assumptions are not actually related to the features of the context, which may be more or less favourable to the implementation of the IL; they relate to the engagement of the partners, their respect of the spirit of the partnership, and their capacity to translate it into action. Many of the principles mentioned above might be considered assumptions that condition the quality of co-operation³. Apart from them, these basic **assumptions** can be added:

- The framework of principles and values established in the Consensus – including the links between peace, security and development, and the reference to human rights and fundamental freedoms – will continue to be adhered to by the parties.

³ In the proposed scheme, they are part of the IL so as to focus on their evaluation.

- Interest and commitment of the parties will be maintained, adapted and developed throughout the evolution of the context.
- Mobilisation of key actors – that is, governments, parliaments, local authorities and civil society – in partner countries will be continuous.

4.2 Increasing the impact of EU development policy: the Agenda for Change

The Agenda for Change (hereinafter referred to as “the Agenda”) is a 2011 Commission Communication with the primary objective of increasing the impact of EU development policy. The Agenda was adopted after the Lisbon Treaty, which had anchored development policy within EU external action. The creation of the post of the High Representative / Vice President, assisted by the European External Action Service, gave the EU development policy a new impetus. The Agenda refers to the Consensus common objectives, values and principles (part I), and updates part II by prioritising democratic governance and inclusive and sustainable growth for human development, and the three principles of differentiation, concentration and co-ordinated EU action. It goes into more detail about the Consensus’ objectives and specifies and broadens the list of principles. It strengthens commitment to joint programming (= co-ordinated EU action) and introduces the link between general budget support, good governance and political dialogue. New aspects are the references to young people, blending and loans, and aid for trade. A new emphasis is put on policy coherence for development.

Table 2 *The Consensus and the Agenda: Summary of contents and pursued changes*

<i>Part I: The European Community Development Vision</i>	<i>Part II: The European Community Development Policy</i>
<p>Common objectives</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Overarching objective: eradication of poverty • Sustainable development, including good governance, human rights, political, economic, social and environmental aspects • Coherent with UN priorities • Promote policy coherence for development 	<p>The particular role and comparative advantages of the Community</p>
<p>Multidimensional aspects of poverty eradication</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The core dimensions of poverty include economic, human, political, socio-cultural and protective capabilities 	<p>A differentiated approach, depending on contexts and needs</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Differentiation in the implementation of co-operation • Objective and transparent criteria for resource allocation
<p>Common values</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EU partnership and dialogue with partner countries will promote common values of: respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, peace, democracy, good governance, gender equality, rule of law, solidarity and justice • Effective multilateralism, whereby all the world's nations share responsibility for development 	<p>Responding to the needs of partner countries</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The principle of concentration, while maintaining flexibility • Areas for Community Action <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Trade and regional integration ○ Environment and sustainable management of natural resources ○ Infrastructure, communications and transport ○ Water and energy ○ Rural development, territorial planning, agriculture and food security ○ Governance, democracy, human rights and support for economic and institutional reforms ○ Conflict prevention and fragile states ○ Human development ○ Gender equality ○ Environmental sustainability ○ HIV/AIDS
<p>Common principles</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ownership, partnership • An in-depth political dialogue • Participation of civil society • Gender equality • Addressing state fragility 	
<p>Delivering more and better aid</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increasing financial resources • More effective aid • Co-ordination and complementarity 	<p>Range of modalities based on needs and performance</p>

<i>Part I: The European Community Development Vision</i>	<i>Part II: The European Community Development Policy</i>
Policy coherence for development (PCD)	Progress in management reforms
Development, a contribution to addressing global challenges	Monitoring and evaluation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lessons from evaluation of 2000 Development Policy Statement • Monitoring future implementation
<i>Agenda for Change: key changes pursued for part II of the Consensus</i>	
EU focus on countries where it can have the greatest impact	
Concentrate in support of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Human rights, democracy and other key elements of good governance • Inclusive and sustainable growth for human development 	
Increased effectiveness through: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Differentiated development partnerships • Co-ordinated EU action • Improved Policy Coherence for Development (chapter 1) and improved coherence among EU policies (chapter 6) 	

Source: *Particip*

The Agenda puts forward some quantified objectives, such as the concentration of EU activities in each country on a maximum of three sectors, and continued support for social inclusion and human development through at least 20% of EU aid.

All Consensus principles of co-operation were reaffirmed by the Agenda. Apart from them, the Agenda mentions the possibility of stricter conditionality in situations where a partner country loosens its commitment to human rights and democracy. Mutual accountability for results is also highlighted.


The principle of differentiation is specified in more detail: EU development assistance should be allocated according to country needs, capacities, commitments and performance on the one hand, and according to potential EU impact and leveraging effect.

The thematic areas of co-operation mentioned in the Consensus are still valid in the Agenda. New elements include innovative financial mechanisms, such as blending grants, loans and other risk-sharing mechanisms to catalyse public-private partnerships (PPPs) and private investment on the one hand, and exploring aid for trade activities on the other.

Last but not least, the issue of co-ordinated EU action is elaborated in the Agenda as “joint programming”. It highlights the need for joint multi-annual programming documents and cross-country sectoral division of labour that would be accompanied by a common framework for measuring and communicating results.

In sum, it can be concluded that both the Consensus and the Agenda represent the backbone of the EU development policy and provide a comprehensive guidance to deliver effective assistance. Even if both documents contain principles of a fundamental nature and thematic areas that remain valid throughout the time, the questions to be answered relate to: whether this basis needs to be updated, given the evolving challenges the world’s societies face today; whether they are in line with new strategies being developed (such as the Sustainable Development Goals, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, EU Global Strategy); and whether there is a need for a reform or reformulation of the co-operation from the parties to them.

Figure 1 European Consensus for Development: Intervention logic



Source: Particip

5 Evaluation questions

Twelve EQs have been elaborated. The following table presents an overview of them and their coverage:

Table 3 Evaluation questions

No.	Evaluation question	Focus of the EQ
EQ 1	To what extent has EU action added value and been coordinated with and complementary to that of the Member States?	EU added value and coordination and complementarity
EQ 2	To what extent has EU action contributed to improving coherence and Policy Coherence for Development?	EU coherence and policy coherence for development
EQ 3	To what extent has EU action promoted the Aid Effectiveness agenda, including ownership and partnership?	Aid effectiveness agenda

No.	Evaluation question	Thematic coverage
EQ 4	To what extent has the design and implementation of EU interventions adequately delivered on poverty reduction and addressed the needs of the most vulnerable groups?	Poverty and vulnerable groups
EQ 5	To what extent has EU action enabled the partner countries to play a full part in international trade and fostered regional integration?	International trade and regional integration
EQ 6	To what extent has EU action contributed to improved coverage, quality and access to basic social infrastructure and services (health, education, social protection)?	Social infrastructure and services
EQ 7	To what extent has EU action contributed to private sector development and the development of productive sectors in partner countries, such as agriculture, energy, and infrastructure?	Private sector development and productive sectors
EQ 8	To what extent has EU action contributed to strengthening environmentally-sustainable development and adapting to climate change?	Environmental sustainability and climate change
EQ 9	To what extent has EU action contributed to the promotion of human rights, democracy, rule of law and good governance, including the participation of civil society in partner countries' development?	Human rights, democracy, rule of law and good governance
EQ 10	To what extent has the implementation of different instruments and approaches improved peace and security in developing countries/regions and has enhanced their capacity to cope with crises, in particular in fragile states?	Peace, security and fragility
EQ 11	To what extent has the EU promoted gender equality?	Gender equality

The final evaluation matrix is to be found in Annex 9.2

Table 4 Links between the EQs and the intervention logic

Aspects of the intervention logic	Evaluation questions
Thematic aspects	
Trade and regional integration	EQ 6
Environment and sustainable management of natural resources	EQ 8
Infrastructure, communications and transport	EQ5, 7
Rural development, territorial planning, agriculture and food security	EQ 4, 7
Governance, democracy, human rights and support for economic and institu-	EQ 7, 9

<i>Aspects of the intervention logic</i>	<i>Evaluation questions</i>
tional reforms	
Conflict prevention and fragility	EQ 4, 10
Human development and social cohesion	EQ 4, 6
Horizontal aspects	
Gender equality	EQ 11
Capacity development in aid management	EQ 9
Involvement of non-state actors	EQ 6, 7, 9
Key principles	
Ownership and partnership	EQ 3
Co-ordination, complementarity and value added	EQ 1
Policy Coherence for Development and coherence among EU policies	EQ 2

The reconstructed IL identified a list of assumptions that condition the fulfilment of the Consensus objectives. Such assumptions are considered under all EQs, as possible factors that have allowed/hampered the attainment of the various objectives. Common principles and shared values, apart from some of them being explicitly covered by separate EQs (1-3), are covered by all the thematic and cross-cutting EQs.

Additionally, the EQs are linked to one or more of the five DAC evaluation criteria (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, sustainability), as well as coherence and EU added value. These linkages are illustrated in the following table.

Table 5 Coverage of the evaluation criteria by the evaluation questions

<i>Evaluation question</i>	<i>Evaluation criteria</i>						
	<i>Relevance</i>	<i>Effectiveness</i>	<i>Efficiency</i>	<i>Impact</i>	<i>Sustainability</i>	<i>Coherence</i>	<i>EU added value</i>
EQ 1 on EU added value and co-ordination and complementarity							✓
EQ 2 EU coherence and policy coherence for development	✓	✓				✓	✓
EQ 3 on aid effectiveness agenda		✓	✓			✓	
EQ 4 on poverty and vulnerable groups	✓	✓		✓	✓		
EQ 5 on international trade and regional integration	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓
EQ 6 on social infrastructure and services	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
EQ 7 on private sector development and productive sectors	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
EQ 8 on environmental sustainability and climate change	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Evaluation question	Evaluation criteria						
	Relevance	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Impact	Sustainability	Coherence	EU added value
EQ 9 human rights, democracy, rule of law and good governance	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
EQ 10 on peace, security and fragility	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
EQ 11 on gender equality	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓

The answers to the individual EQs follow.

5.1 EQ 1 – EU added value and co-ordination and complementarity

EQ 1	To what extent has EU action added value and been co-ordinated with and complementary to that of the Member States?
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Main sources: Thematic global evaluation of the European Union's support to integrated border management and fight against organised crime (2013), Thematic evaluation of the European Commission support to the health sector (2012). Country and/or regional reports provided additional examples.

5.1.1 Summary answer

EU added value is clearly assessed in most strategic evaluations. More than to specific sectors (such as trade and regional co-operation), it is related to some key features of the EU development policy: the soft political profile, which does not reflect narrow and traditional national interests; the critical mass of the financial aid; the worldwide presence; the potential for bringing together and co-ordinating some of the strongest international donors. Such added value shows itself in support to sensitive complex reform processes (ENI, Latin America), to address delicate conflict prevention and peace building (CPPB) contexts (West Africa), to support comprehensive and/or sectoral development strategies (ACP, through budget support), to contribute to global initiatives in, for example, environment and health. It has been particularly strong in areas where the EU has a specific mandate and/or know-how, such as trade and regional integration.

The EU added value has demonstrated all its potential when co-ordination and complementarities with EU-MS and other donors have been high. This has improved a lot in the last decade. Joint programming with the MS has started to become a reality in many areas, and there are a number of examples of successful co-ordination and complementarities (e.g. some BS programmes in ACP, some CPPB interventions). The results, however, are still weak. They are hampered by political factors, the need for visibility of the different actors, and lack of institutional strength and capacities.

5.1.2 JC 11 – Evidence of additional value resulting from the EU intervention(s), compared to what could be achieved by Member States at the national and/or regional levels

The EU added value stems primarily from the political role, the financial weight and the worldwide presence of the EU, rather than from sector-specific considerations – apart from trade and regional integration.

It is particularly high in the neighbouring regions, as the EU represents for many of the countries a key political partner and the main reference to build modern and progressive societies (ENPI-2013). In addition, its capacity to propose advanced assistance and standards from a range of member states, without a narrow national approach, is very much appreciated (IBM-2013, Health-2012, and BS in South Africa-2013).

In Latin America, the EU has been able to support sensitive reform processes, keeping a neutral profile and representing an effective global partnership opportunity for countries, such as Bolivia and Colombia, engaged in complex political processes: rural development in coca production areas in Bolivia, and reconciliation in Colombia (e.g. Bolivia-2014, Colombia-2012). The same applies to most conflict prevention and peace building contexts (CPPB-2011, and more recent country evaluations).

In many contexts, the EU added value manifests itself in a significant contribution to co-ordination and leadership of EU MS and other donors. This is the case in Palestine (Palestine-2014), where EU support to global governance has been fundamental for 20 years, or in several global initiatives, as in environment (Environment-2015), and health (Health-2012), where the EU political and financial weight matters.

Especially in the ACP countries, budget support is one of the main modalities through which EU leadership and co-ordination are manifested. This is due to the specific capacity accumulated by EU in the use of this modality (since the early 1980s), to the financial amounts and the multiplicity of geographic contexts involved, and to the co-ordination and leading role that significant budget support operations may ensure at general (GBS) and sectoral level (SBS), as shown by most BS evaluations in ACP. Sometimes, EU BS programmes lead clusters of operations with the participation of EU-MS, who may provide specific BS operations and/or various accompanying measures (BS in Burkina Faso-2016). In this framework, the EU has developed a specific capacity to support PFM reform and evaluate public expenditure – through its participation in public expenditure and financial accountability (PEFA).

Finally, there are sectors and thematic areas where the EU has a specific experience and/or specific capacities that ensure its comparative advantage.. One is trade and regional integration, where the EU has a specific mandate from its MS and has developed specific assistance strategies and tools, being one of the largest – and often the largest – sectoral donor (Trade Related Assistance-2013). It has also contributed to co-ordinating and establishing common MS positions, as illustrated by the cases of Bangladesh and Ukraine in the previously mentioned trade-related assistance (TRA) evaluation. Another area is peace and security, where the EU has a range of added values that include: political profile not linked to specific national interests, which facilitates building confidence and dialogue; long-term reliability; critical mass of financial support and wide range of instruments; and credibility in promoting democracy and peace.

Despite its evidence, the EU added value in many areas of the development co-operation is often not exploited to the extent it could be, due to a number of factors. The lack of ownership and political commitment by the partner countries is highlighted, among others, in the Palestine evaluation, but also in some EN-related evaluations, and represents the main weakness of the regional interventions. A stronger connection between the EU's influential action and the European businesses and CSOs could have further strengthened the EU added value, according to the Environment-2015 and other evaluations. Weak co-ordination and insufficient joint programming between the EU and its MS jeopardises the full exploitation of EU added value, as shown in Jordan-2015 and Yemen-2015.

5.1.3 JC 12 – Co-ordination and complementarity with the MS and other donors' action

The EU has gained an increasingly important role in fostering co-ordination mechanisms. It has supported government efforts aimed at improving harmonisation and alignment, but in fact the existence of donor consultation and co-ordination mechanisms is yet to translate into effective sharing of information and policy analysis, truly co-ordinated programming processes, and progress in terms of harmonisation. There is little evidence of synergies between the interventions of the EU and those of other EU MS, and only a few examples of co-ordination between various interventions – mostly related to complementarities among interventions (Ecuador-2012, reference to the achievements in the indicators dealing with harmonisation, as reported in the OECD DAC Survey on the Paris Declaration, 2011).

Despite the ambition, the co-ordination mechanisms and complementarity between EU interventions and the EU MS and other donors are actually considered to be rather weak. There are clear signs that the EU makes co-ordination efforts at both the strategic (e.g. the Luxem-

burg process gathering EU, EIB, WB and IMF or the MED/ENPI Committee) and implementation levels, and the emphasis on joint programming signals greater attention to this principle. Despite the growing emphasis on joint programming since 2006, and the strong references of the Agenda for Change, the strategic evaluations do not contain significant information on joint programming, with few exceptions. Based on the information available, even in the cases where joint programming between EU and EUMS has been put in place, it is limited to some MS and/or some sectors, or it is at a very initial stage (Haiti, Timor-Leste, Bolivia). Sectoral joint programming frameworks have been established in education (e.g. Ghana, Tanzania, Uganda, and Vietnam) according to the thematic evaluation.

There are examples of shared information on programme identification and implementation, policy analysis, co-financing practices – for example, in the context of ECHO's channelling of funds through international organisations such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). In the Maldives, the EU support was well co-ordinated and complementary to other donors' programmes – in particular, the World Bank (WB) and UN agencies (e.g. the Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Project, Community Livelihoods Programme) – as the EU took a lead function in co-ordinating democratic transitions. In Yemen, all country strategy papers (CSPs) were formulated in close consultation with MS, but overall donor co-ordination remained weak, even though co-ordination of political dialogue and diplomacy has improved. Donor co-ordination mechanisms established at the strategic and implementation levels with EU MS and other donors, and the resulting involvement of EU MS in CSP/NIP formulation, improved. However, co-ordination with other donor-funded interventions has not been the general rule, except for BS. More positive examples are in Asia, where communication channels and co-ordination between EU, EU MS and other donors on one hand and complementarity and synergies between different levels and approaches on the other hand function well.

The reasons for imperfect actions include a lack of effective dialogue mechanisms, of joint key activities, of EU leadership, and of clear policy. In Colombia, harmonisation co-ordination and complementarity between the EU and MS (and other donors) was constrained by the heavy political dimension of the interventions, which did not facilitate the recognition of the specific EU added value and the related leadership by EU-MS and other donors (Colombia-2012).

5.2 EQ 2 - EU coherence and Policy Coherence for Development

EQ 2	To what extent has EU action contributed to improving coherence and Policy Coherence for Development?
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Main sources: Thematic evaluation of the European Commission support to the health sector (2012). Country and/or regional reports provided additional examples (e.g. Pacific 2007 & 2015, Colombia 2012, Nepal 2012).

5.2.1 Summary answer

Coherence among EU development actions

The coherence between regional and national programmes, and between thematic and geographic interventions, are the most important issues highlighted by the evaluations with respect to internal coherence of development actions. There are signs of significant improvements, but the main problems remain. On the regional/national trade-off, the main problems relate to the regional commitment of the national partners and the EU co-ordinated implementation. On the thematic/geographic (and/or programmable and non-programmable) trade-off, one of the main problems is the low co-ordination capacity (in terms of institutional responsibility and organisational structure) of the European Union Delegations (EUDs).

Policy Coherence for Development

With regard to the external coherence, the evaluations highlight different issues. The coherence between being a key development partner and a key political partner is not always ensured. The coherence between trade and security and development policies is generally high (especially with EPAs in ACP regions, and the EU participation in many CPPB interventions),

although some secondary effects on poor countries and human rights may be overlooked. With regard to important policies, such as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and migration, the information in the strategic evaluations is poor. The coherence between the EU intervention at global level and/or EU participation in global conventions (e.g. environment and climate change, health, fisheries) has proved to be good, although in some ACP countries the global health programmes do not strengthen the local health systems. The country and regional partnership agreements (as in the EN region, but also potentially in the EPA regions) are a strong framework to ensure coherence and also resolve possible contradictions.

5.2.2 JC 21 – Coherence of actions within the same financing instrument (e.g. regional vs national) and with other financing instruments

A recurrent issue and a frequent case of problematic coherence is the link between national and regional programmes. Complementarities are referred to by the strategy documents, but are not taken into account or are overlooked at programming level, as in the case of Egypt, and even more at the implementation level. In the case of ACP countries, regional plans and/or standards require negotiation and implementation capacities, which are not in place at regional level and do not receive adequate priority by national partners. There are also cases, as in Asia, where there is a good general level of coherence between regional and national programmes, although the quest for synergies remains weak.

A complex issue concerns the coherence among the different development programmes put in place in the same context, especially when there is the need to combine rapid responses and development interventions. In the ACP area, linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) is a challenge, especially because most emergency instruments are operated through different channels compared to the country programmes (e.g. Haiti). In non-ACP contexts, the situation is similar – for instance, in Colombia, where the relief interventions in rural areas do not allow for support for competitiveness of local agriculture. In general, coherence between thematic (budget lines and special tools) and geographic interventions remains difficult because interventions are often not designed to create synergies (e.g. Egypt, Ecuador). Positive examples exist and some improvements have been registered, especially in terms of programming (e.g. Ecuador, in the areas of economic development and environment, where regional and thematic budget lines are important). The European Co-ordinated Response (ECR) in Bolivia was a first step towards a country framework for increased coherence of the EU development programmes. This was not possible in Colombia, where a more complex emergency situation – in the conflict areas – made it very difficult to establish a coherent framework of the EU interventions. Apart from specific cases, the role of the EUDs for dialogue and actual co-ordination appears fundamental to ensuring the internal coherence of country interventions, as shown by the Bolivia and the Peru cases, although the present structure of the EUDs seems to favour compartmentalisation (Colombia-2012).

5.2.3 JC 22 –Other EU policies and international positions (e.g. agriculture, security, environment, etc.) coherent with EU policy objectives concerning development

The coherence between development policies and overall EU policies is generally judged positively in the ACP region, where the EPA strategy is supposed to strengthen the synergies, especially between development and trade policies. While the ex-ante coherence among the different policies may be high, the capacity to generate actual synergies and avoid trade-off relies on the leading role of the country development actors (government and civil society), including their negotiation capacities (e.g. measures to avoid new trade agreements having negative consequences in the poorest countries).

The coherence between the EU role on some global challenges, as in the case of environment and climate change, and the country development policies seems high in Nepal and other countries (Pacific 2007&2015). The EU's important support to global programmes in the health sector is not always coherent with the strengthening of the country and local health systems (Health-2012, BS evaluation in Uganda-2014). The development programmes are generally coherent with the EU fishery policies and protocols (Pacific 2007 and

partly 2015⁴). With regard to the agricultural commodities, the EU-CAP shift from a subsidised and controlled regime to a stronger market-based approach (2003 and 2013 reforms) – despite its strategic development coherence – has affected some important export sectors in partner countries (e.g. sugar, banana, cotton). In the short-medium term, the specific actions taken to mitigate the negative effects and to enhance new opportunities have been problematic, mainly because of the resistance to, and the costs of, restructuring the existing inefficient chains at country level – as shown in several evaluations, such as Agricultural Commodities (2012), Pacific (2014), Madagascar (2015).

The coherence between being a key development partner and a key political partner is not always ensured, as illustrated by some cases. In Palestine, there is a clear gap between the leading role of the EU in development co-operation and the political dialogue with the Palestinian Authority (PA) on governance, including the triangulation EU-PA-Israel, as most of the development bottlenecks are related to Israel's action. A similar situation, although in a diverse context, was found in Colombia, where the development partnership was highly challenging and involved sensitive political areas, but the EU political role was not fully recognised by the MS. There are contexts where various roles are split between different EU authorities – as in Georgia (EU Special Representative, EU Monitoring Mission, EU Delegation) – and where the co-ordination has been weak. Despite the positive interventions on internally displaced persons (IDPs), this has reduced the effectiveness of actions aimed at tackling the root causes of the conflicts. In Yemen, also as a consequence of the ambiguous status of the country in the EU development architecture (at the margin of ENI-South, but not included in it), actions related to security, fragility and development have rather lacked co-ordination, as has as the collaboration between DEVCO and EEAS.

There are areas, such as trade, where the EU-MS fully recognise the EU role, and where coherence and complementarities are high. This also applies to related areas such as Integrated Border Management (IBM) – especially in EN countries. In other areas, such as security, the EU has a specific role to play in close co-ordination with EU-MS and other international actors. It has been noted, however, that a stronger coherence between security and development – including human rights – should not be overlooked. For example, in Jordan, stability concerns (including Syrian refugees) have hampered policy and political dialogue on development priorities. The evaluations contain little information on the effects and the synergies of EU migration, fishery and agricultural policies on development co-operation, which are clearly a very important issue in coherence for development.

The Association Agreements (AA) in the ENI regions, supported by the EN regional policy and the related Action Plans, ensure a high degree of coherence among the different EU policies, and allow negotiations to address any possible incoherence. In Jordan and other EN countries, there has been a qualified participation of other EU DGs, which is not common in other geographic areas. In Tunisia and Morocco, the AA was a driving factor of huge reform processes in the 2000s, ensuring the coherence of the different EU interventions in view of the objective of the economic and cultural integration into the European sphere. The AA are also a positive framework for negotiation on sensitive areas, such services and agriculture. EPA should play a comparable role – at least in some areas – in the ACP regions.

In many contexts, other EU institutions, such as ECHO and EIB, operate in conjunction with EU development programmes, thus posing problems of coherence and synergies. The bulk of EIB funds in development contexts has been invested in ACP and EN countries, showing a strong coherence with the development programmes. The focus of EIB operation has been on strengthening the banking system in the recipient countries and its capacity to finance the private sector. In ACP countries, the EIB intervention has been coherent, but has not been adequately mainstreamed in the main programme. In the EN region, the quest for complementarities and synergies has been stronger. With regard to ECHO, there has been significant progress in terms of conception of the intervention and ex-ante co-ordination with EUDs,

⁴ Rather than a lack of coherence between fishery and development policies, the perception of the Pacific stakeholders of differences between DG DEVCO and DG MARE mainly relates to issues of political and policy dialogue on the fishery conservation strategies.

while the implementation shows the problems already highlighted above when discussing the coherence of the LRRD approach and/or the co-ordination between thematic and geographic interventions.

5.3 EQ 3 - Aid effectiveness agenda

EQ 3

To what extent has EU action promoted the Aid Effectiveness agenda, including ownership and partnership?

Main sources: Evaluating co-ordination and complementarity of country strategy papers with national development priorities (2006), Evaluation of Commission's aid delivery through development banks and EIB (2008), Evaluation of Commission's external co-operation with partner countries through the organisations of the UN family (2008), Evaluation of EC aid delivery through civil society organisations, Mid-term evaluation of the Investment Facility and EIB own resources operations in ACP countries and the OCTs and numerous thematic, regional and country evaluations (for ex-ample Maldives 2010, Colombia 2012, Palestine 2014 and Yemen 2015).

5.3.1 Summary answer

EU development co-operation is framed in comprehensive partnerships with recipient countries and regions, to set a shared base of principles and objectives, facilitate political dialogue, coherence and co-ordination and the multiple co-operation tools according to the contexts. The strategic evaluations often highlight the importance of such partnerships to enhance aid effectiveness. This is particularly true in the case of EN countries (e.g. Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, Georgia), where comprehensive Association Agreements have been established. Also in the ACP regions, under the general Cotonou partnership, GBS and significant SBS have represented an opportunity for comprehensive country-level partnerships supporting key country development processes during the 2000s and after (e.g. Burkina Faso, Uganda, and Mozambique). More recently, EPA should respond to similar aims. Key challenges for the effectiveness of such partnerships are the level of attractiveness of the EU as an economic, cultural and political partner, the link between political and policy dialogue, their capacity to evolve and address emerging needs (e.g. investment, security).

The level of ownership and direct involvement of the partners varies according to the level of the partnerships mentioned above, but generally it is rather low at the regional level (e.g. Central America, regional organisations in Africa, and less so in Asia), and on matters that do not represent the same level of priority between the EU and the partner government (e.g. governance). In general, civil society representatives show high levels of ownership only in the identification and implementation of their specific programmes, while their involvement in formulation and monitoring of the main programmes is weak.

The mutual commitment of the partners on the results of the development co-operation is often weak. In many cases, the dialogue addresses technical and operational issues, instead of the assessment of the core reform processes. M&E is almost absent at the regional level and is not a base for high-level dialogue at the country level. A lot of inefficiencies (e.g. procedure-related delays, management capacities at both levels) affect the aid effectiveness.

5.3.2 JC 31 – Partnership framework supporting programming, implementation and monitoring

A strong partnership framework is represented by the Association Agreements, particularly in the EN regions, despite a number of important drawbacks. This is shown in the cases of Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan and partly Egypt, where the AAs play the role of a strong incentive framework in the reform process and allow for a close link between political and policy dialogue. Such features have been particularly true during the 2000s, and have been weaker since the international economic crisis and the low growth in the EU area. In general, however, despite the previously mentioned positive dimension, the quality of the dialogue and the mutual accountability towards results are not as high as they would be expected (Morocco, Jordan, and ENPI in general).

In ACP regions, in the framework of the shared principles and objectives of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement⁵, strong country-level partnerships are established through general budget support (Uganda, Mozambique, Burkina Faso, and Tanzania). This helps build a comprehensive framework of shared key development priorities, aligned with government strategies and – in some very positive, though not frequent, cases – supported also by CSOs' mobilisation. Such partnerships worked well during the 2000s, being able to support strong reform processes and sustained growth in the mentioned countries. By the end of the decade, however, the leverage of GBS seems to have declined because of a huge increase and diversification of the development needs in the partner countries (including Foreign Direct Investment) and the emergence of new international partners.

In the EN region, as already highlighted in some fast-growing ACP countries (e.g. Uganda, Tanzania), the existing partnership frameworks focused on improving governance and strengthening social sectors, despite their financial and political relevance, may be inadequate to respond to the new economic challenges – particularly of some upper-middle income countries (e.g. tackling inequality, attracting investment⁶). Similarly, in South Africa (BS evaluation), an increased ownership and commitment of the partners seems to require an extension of the partnership to new areas – such as science and technology, and institutional architecture – to respond to the new challenges faced by the country, through horizontal enhanced exchanges with EU experiences.

Other forms of high-level partnerships have been established, combining budget support and CSOs' interventions in Latin America (namely, in Bolivia) to support complex political processes, already mentioned above, with their strengths and their limits.

An insufficient level of political dialogue and a limited understanding of the country political economy may weaken the partnerships by establishing formal and sometimes unrealistic agreements not relying on the commitment of beneficiaries – as in Yemen, or even in some recent GBS experiences (Uganda, Burkina Faso in the late 2000s). A good example of combination of political dialogue and development co-operation at regional level is provided by Asia, where a high-level political dialogue takes place in the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and in the meetings between ASEAN and the EU. Related development co-operation programmes are then set up coherently at both the regional level and bilaterally at the country level.

5.3.3 JC 32 – Actual ownership of recipients (government and NSAs)

The participation level of the government counterparts in programming and implementation has been high in various countries, and the EU has attributed a particular importance to the role of the partner countries, as shown by the evaluations in Colombia, Egypt, Maldives, Bolivia, Georgia and others. In ACP countries, however, the programmes – although tailored to countries' needs – are often inadequately owned by the national counterparts, with the exception of significant budget support, where design and negotiation directly involve core government bodies. It is difficult to combine the participation in programming and implementation of both central and decentralised actors. This is mainly because the mechanisms to ensure division of roles and co-ordination are weak or not in place – as shown, for example, by the experience of Haiti or Colombia. In such cases, calls for proposals and local projects have partly excluded the government, which didn't have the capacity to orientate and monitor the actions. In other cases (e.g. Uganda), BS-supported policies have overlooked the lack of local capacity for implementation. Civil society participation is strong in the preparation and implementation of the specific programmes (calls for proposals), as illustrated by the Colombia,

⁵ Poverty reduction/eradication through sustainable development and gradual integration of the ACP into the world economy are the key objectives of the CPA. They are supported by the fundamental principles of ownership extended to governments, parliaments, local authorities and civil society, mutual accountability, differentiation and regionalisation. The partnership relies on the respect of the essential elements regarding human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, and the fundamental element regarding good governance.

⁶ As far as attracting investment is concerned, Blending may be a suitable instrument to address the new challenges, provided its complementarity with the EU co-operation programmes is enhanced. Presently, such complementarity is rather weak, despite the already important size of the intervention (about 4% of the total payments under the 2007-14 MFF) – Blending 2016.

Bolivia and Haiti cases, but there is no information on CSO participation in the identification of the country and regional priorities and main programmes. There are also cases where a particularly weak participation is underlined, as in Yemen, where – despite a significant involvement of specific stakeholders in the execution of individual programmes – the CSP and NIP were not prepared in consultation with the national counterparts. In general, participation is higher when focused on building local systems, as illustrated by the case of science and technology, where this dimension has been weak.

Budget support, both general and sectoral, is a modality particularly suitable to ensure and build ownership, as it includes a negotiated framework of shared strategic objectives, supported by continuous policy dialogue. GBS has supported comprehensive partnerships, especially in the 2000s, as in the case of the AAs (e.g. Tunisia), or in ACP cases (e.g. Burkina Faso, Mozambique, Uganda, Tanzania). In several cases, SBS has also been used to support key government policies with a comprehensive political and economic effect (as in Bolivia, Georgia and other ENI countries, or even in South Africa). Both GBS and SBS have been supported by stronger ownership, when complemented by high-quality capacity development actions (e.g. Ecuador, Tunisia, Morocco, South Africa, Uganda, Burkina Faso, Georgia, Bolivia). In a few cases, there are positive examples of programmed complementarity between budget support and specific actions aimed at CSO mobilisation (Burkina Faso, Bolivia). SBS has supported sectoral dialogue in a framework of sector-wide approach.

Ownership of the regional programmes is low, especially in the EN and ACP regions. In Asia, the ownership of the regional programmes has been higher, with a good participation of the countries involved in programming and execution, but their availability to sustain the institutionalisation and funding of the interventions has been low. In Central America, the EU has focused on building Central American Integration System (SICA) regional institutions, in which the interest of the states was not particularly high.

5.3.4 JC 33 – Evidence related to other Aid Effectiveness criteria (e.g. commitments to results and mutual accountability, M&E systems, etc.)

The actual strategic results (in terms of outcomes and impacts of the co-operation programmes) are not always the base for dialogue and mutual commitment with the partners. This is true in ACP countries, where the strategic dialogue around the key development objectives has often become very formal, including annual meetings without significant and continuous policy exchanges on the factors affecting the actual performance and the actions needed (e.g. Uganda, Tanzania, Burkina Faso). It is true also in the EN countries, where often the dialogue becomes very technical about formal paper benchmarks (e.g. Jordan, Morocco) focusing on specific outputs and overlooking the actual institutional and policy implications of the reform processes.

In many cases, the M&E systems either are not in place, or are weak as a base for effective dialogue (Palestine, Private Sector Development, Regional evaluations).

A number of bottlenecks related to the complex management of the programmes hamper aid effectiveness as well, such as: complex modalities, and conflict and overlapping of intervention – namely, between programmable and non-programmable aid (e.g. Colombia, Philippines, Egypt, Yemen, Health).

5.4 EQ 4 - Poverty and vulnerable groups

EQ 4	To what extent has the design and implementation of EU interventions adequately delivered on poverty reduction and addressed the needs of the most vulnerable groups?
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Main sources: Joint evaluation of general budget support (2006), Thematic global evaluation of European Commission support in the sectors of ESI (employment and social inclusion) in partner countries (including vocational training) (2011), Evaluation of the European Union's Support to Private Sector Development in Third Countries (2013), Thematic evaluation of the European Commission support to the health sector (2012), Thematic global evaluation of European Commission support to the education sector in partner countries (2010), and a wide

range of country evaluations, as well as BS evaluations (e.g. Haiti 2014, Bolivia 2014, Georgia 2015 and Yemen 2015).

5.4.1 Summary answer

The **poverty** incidence in developing countries has been reduced over recent decades, although the present levels are still very high and there are large areas and groups where extreme poverty persists⁷. Inequalities have been reduced in the last decade, apart from in some large, fast-growing countries (e.g. China). Improvements in poverty reduction are mainly a consequence of economic growth (income poverty) and increased access for the poor to basic social services (non-income poverty). Many development partners have established poverty reduction strategies since the mid-1990s.

The EU has been among the first donors to support such strategies. It has contributed to strengthening the endogenous factors of growth, by supporting macroeconomic stability, PFM, trade and transport networks. And it has contributed to enhancing government policies towards strengthening equitable access to basic social services. The EU contribution has been weaker in supporting the **productive sectors** – namely, in boosting employment for the poor, in agriculture and rural development, energy, and private sector development in general. **Food security** at the national level has been addressed mainly through macroeconomic and institutional support, which has enabled recipient countries to develop their strategies to face structural recurrent insecurity. Specific programmes aimed at providing direct support to food-insecure communities have also been put in place, although their strategic dimension and sustainability have remained weak.

EU interventions in **fragile states** affected either by conflicts or other fragility factors have become a key priority. In many cases, their relevance is high, as they aim at a deep combination of state-building concerns and relief-rehabilitation and development priorities. Indeed, the implementation of such strategies is complex and long, and requires close donor co-ordination and strong partners' commitments, which are both scarce factors in such contexts. The information on their outcomes is rather limited, although the main weaknesses are identified.

5.4.2 JC 41 – EU action contributed to the overall reduction of poverty

The EU has put in place interventions to address either economic growth (**macroeconomic stabilisation**, improved **PFM** and economic **infrastructure**) or specific aspects of poverty – namely, **food security**, **social protection**, **community development** (Bolivia, Haiti, Colombia), avoiding the collapse of the state and ensuring **basic services** (Palestine).

Significant progress is reported in terms of poverty reduction (e.g. Rwanda, Uganda, Mozambique, Malawi, and many other countries), some contributing to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). For example, EU interventions in Bolivia have provided effective contributions to improving food security, safe access to water and sanitation and nutrition, while an important reduction of poverty can be confirmed in Morocco and Tunisia, although inequality and youth unemployment have risen. The co-operation in science and technology has also contributed to enhancing local initiatives for poverty reduction (e.g. South Africa), but these remain rather isolated experiences and have not been always translated into strengthened local systems. **Budget support** evaluations⁸ – including recent evaluations in Mali, Zambia, Tanzania, Uganda, Mozambique, Burkina Faso, Morocco, Tunisia and Vietnam – together with a number of country strategy evaluations (e.g. Haiti, Bolivia) converge in the conclusion that significant joint BS operations have contributed to poverty reduction through two specific effects:

⁷ According to the World Bank, poverty in the world (% of population living with less than \$1.90 – 2011/PPP a day) has shifted from 37.1% in 1990 to 12.7% in 2012. The greatest progress has been achieved in the East Asia and Pacific region, from 60.6% to 7.2%. In Latin America and the Caribbean, poverty has fallen from 17.8% to 5.6%. In Africa, the evolution has been much slower, from 56.8% to 42.7%, and with big internal differences: in Ghana in 2012, poverty incidence was 25.2%, while in RDC it was 77.2%. Poverty is particularly difficult to tackle in conflict areas.

⁸ Since the Joint Evaluation of General Budget Support 1994–2004, 2006.

- Contribution to macroeconomic stability and improved PFM policies, which create an enabling environment for trade and private sector development, thus boosting growth and income poverty reduction;
- Contribution to sustained public investment and improved policies in basic social services, which increase access to, and possibly quality of, the services for the poor, thus reducing non-income poverty.

Sector support, through BS programmes, mainly focused on education, health and water & sanitation rather than productive sectors (agriculture and SMEs/MMEs, with some exceptions, e.g. in Bolivia and Georgia), as confirmed by most available evaluations. Such limitation, especially in ACP regions, prevented many BS operations from providing a stronger contribution to inclusive growth by boosting competitiveness among smallholders and manufacturers (Zambia, Mozambique, Burkina Faso, and Uganda).

Despite the successes, the incidence of poverty is still high (e.g. 40% in Africa, over 50% of households self-assessed poverty in Philippines, and even more prominent in conflict-affected countries) and extreme poverty has hardly been affected. There are also cases in which the results were lower than expected (e.g. Timor-Leste, Mali, Caribbean). Challenges have been related to such aspects as lack of data (Georgia, overall evolution of geographic income disparities), governance issues (Philippines), limited interventions in productive sectors (Nepal), or complex political settings in which political dialogue has been weak and the corresponding actions have not always been implemented (Palestine). In other cases, the poverty reduction strategy was well designed and is starting to yield positive impacts (e.g. in the road investment sector in Tanzania, or the enhancement of the potential for economic integration in Georgia).

5.4.3 JC 42 – The EU contributed to economic inclusive growth, thereby reducing income poverty

There is evidence of effective EU support to an enabling economic environment for growth (macroeconomic stability, PFM, transport infrastructure), especially through budget support (namely GBS in ACP) and its complementary actions, and support to public investment in infrastructure. On the other hand, the EU contribution to enhancing the competitiveness of key sectors for the employment of the poor (agriculture and SMEs) has been weaker. As a consequence, the EU contribution to reducing inequalities has been less effective than the contribution to poverty reduction. Sector support to PSD, although significant, has favoured meso-level interventions through public channels, and has overlooked support to SMEs, tailored investment and innovative value chains, as well as employment promotion (PSD report 2013). Support to sustainable agriculture and rural development has been addressed only marginally in the framework of the general support to poverty reduction strategies (Mozambique, Uganda, and Burkina Faso)⁹. The sectoral interventions have generally favoured traditional export crops or specific food security actions (Agricultural Commodities, 2012), with some exceptions (Bolivia, Colombia). Employment in the private sector and an increase in agricultural productivity ensure the highest inclusiveness of growth. It must be noted that, since 2012, the Agricultural and Rural Development programmes have been extended to the EN region (ENPARD) and are having some significant effects (Georgia). Although the related information is still sparse, this might represent a new trend.

Particularly in fast-growing, low-income countries, the specific opportunities faced by the private sector are overlooked (Zambia, Burkina Faso, Uganda, and Mozambique). In some cases, despite well-functioning productive mechanisms having been put in place, evidence of improved living conditions cannot be recorded on a larger scale (Georgia and Bolivia). Furthermore, the sustainability of the effects is also challenging, especially in productive sectors where higher production rates need time to materialise (e.g. Nepal).

⁹ The strategic evaluation on rural development (2007) identifies a strong decline of the level of priority of the agricultural sector in the EU interventions, despite the recognised role of agriculture and rural development in poverty reduction. It stresses also the weak approach to rural development, still based on local projects instead of sector policy reform.

5.4.4 JC 43 – The EU contributed to reducing food insecurity and vulnerability to food crises

Food security has been addressed through a **multifaceted approach**, including budget support, a food facility for rapid response mainly managed through the UN system, and various area-based interventions with a strong mobilisation of CSOs, to enhance community-level resilience to climatic shocks and food price fluctuation.

In terms of availability of information, the EU approach to food security has not been evaluated as such since 2002¹⁰. At country level, food security interventions are considered to be highly under-evaluated (Palestine-2014¹¹, Yemen-2015). The **budget support modality** has been particularly successful in Bolivia (PASA), where it has contributed to the achievement of the relevant MDG. In other countries, it has been evaluated in the framework of the BS evaluations. The EU **Food Facility** has been appreciated by recipient countries, but has only partially been able to support the mainstreaming of food security into national policies (Nepal and Food Facility evaluation - 2012). The **area-based interventions** have been conceived according to a project approach. There has been low strategic consistency (Burundi, Haiti), including post-conflict interventions (Liberia, Angola, Colombia), where linking relief, rehabilitation and development is always a challenge (as already highlighted by the first evaluation of 2002). Positive examples of integrated and sequenced sector support can be highlighted with effective results in the short/medium term. If Bolivia can be said to be a success story, the case of Yemen also shows that, beyond the poor ownership of the whole country programme, the EU has been proactive in finding alternative solutions and ensuring positive effects on strengthening the resilience of vulnerable groups. However, despite of the above-mentioned advances, sustainability remains generally low, depending upon further commitment and willingness from the national authorities.

Other programmes do have a direct effect on **household-level** food security. A generally effective and direct way to increase access to food stems from “aid” channelled through NGOs (e.g. Zambia or Niger), where this kind of aid seems irreplaceable, even when its effectiveness is questioned.

At the regional level, it is noted that the tendency has been to regard food security as a national concern, rather than addressing opportunities for regional food security. Positive examples, however, are provided by the African Trans-boundary River Basin Support programme, co-ordinated by the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the EU support to some of the components of a regional food security institutional framework in Central America. Also in West Africa (but not only), the positive effects of the improved road networks on food security have been underscored.

5.4.5 JC 44 - EU contributed to tackling the roots of and to reducing fragility

The European Consensus on Development sets out an approach to “**addressing state fragility**” through governance reforms, rule of law, anti-corruption measures, and the building of viable state institutions. It is a holistic approach linking peace, security and development, according to the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States (OECD).

In Haiti and Burundi, there was a relevant effort to integrate different instruments and components in the country programmes to address state-building and rehabilitation. In both cases, however, the results did not match expectations as there was a **missing political link**. In Haiti, until 2013, the level of political dialogue was low, as was the government’s commitment. In Burundi, it was difficult to establish an accepted ground for political dialogue and the identification of a shared agenda with the government. In Yemen, the EU has invested substantially in resilience-enhancing interventions, but the lack of interest and commitment by the government has weakened the results and undermined the sustainability of the interventions. There is not a shared understanding and definition of the root causes of fragility. In ad-

¹⁰ In 2012, there was an evaluation of the Food Facility, which covers only one of many tools and programmes put in place.

¹¹ In Palestine, the EU developed in 2003 a food security strategy that has never been revisited and updated (Palestine-2014).

dition, despite some good practices identified, co-ordination with humanitarian actions (DG ECHO) has been limited, and an effective results-based management has not been fully implemented.

State-Building Contracts (SBCs) have recently proved to be flexible GBS instruments for rapid support to fragile states (e.g. Mali, South Sudan, Haiti) and could be a response to such weaknesses, provided that they rely on high-level political dialogue and are complemented by significant mobilisation of CSOs. However, their implementation is quite recent, so the evaluations have no evidence about their effects.

Fragility under **conflict prevention** is addressed in EQ11.

5.5 EQ 5 - International trade and regional integration

EQ 5	To what extent has EU action enabled the partner countries to play a full part in international trade and fostered regional integration?
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Main sources: Evaluation of the European Union's Trade-related Assistance in third Countries (2013), Joint evaluation of co-ordination of trade capacity building in partner countries (2006), Evaluation of the European Union's Support to Private Sector Development in third countries (2013). Country and/or regional reports provided additional examples (for example Ukraine 2010, ENPI 2013, Asia 2014, Georgia 2015 and Pacific 2007 & 2015)

5.5.1 Summary answer

EU trade and integration assistance has accompanied a process of rapid expansion of trade and investment flows in all the regions. The consequences of the international economic crisis, however, have shown the limited sustainability of such a process and the related weaknesses of the EU support. The latter – although there are positive recent signs – has partly overlooked the support to the private sector for diversification and consolidation of competitive value chains, as well as the creation of environments conducive to attracting private investment.

To support trade and integration, the EU has put in place a number of international agreements and schemes, with a view to enhancing the link between trade and development. The EPAs – in the ACP countries – are among the most advanced ones. Strongly anchored in the regional integration system, they should aim at creating new opportunities for the promotion of new value chains and increased diversification of trade, attraction of FDI, and creation of regional infrastructure. The EPA process has recently been given a new boost of acceleration, after having encountered a number of unforeseen (or underestimated) difficulties – including the limitation of the development leverage, due to the consequences of the international economic crisis (2008-11). Beyond ACP countries, support has enhanced regulatory and organisational frameworks, while supporting institutional capacity development. This has been translated in some cases into investment growth and trade integration with the EU (various FTAs), especially in the Southern Neighbourhood area.

The EU has contributed to fostering regional integration processes, albeit with mixed results. Although these processes are slow, complex, and – in Africa – complicated by a multiplicity of sub-regional overlapping and sometimes contradictory agreements, they provide key opportunities for trade and economic development. TRA, as part of the larger Aid for Trade support, is a key tool to support the economic integration role of the regional organisations.

5.5.2 JC 51 – EU contributed to the strengthening of regional trade and integration frameworks

The EU has a specific added value in this area. It has contributed to the fostering of regional integration processes, albeit with mixed results. Positive impacts can be recorded in terms of institutional capacity to harmonise legislation and regulations with international and, in some

cases, EU frameworks. TRA, as part of Aid for Trade¹², is also a key tool for supporting country participation in international trade and regional economic integration.

- In Southeast Asia, the EU has made a significant contribution to strengthening the legal and institutional settings of the **economic integration in ASEAN**. This includes technical support to the implementation of the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint, and multi-level capacity building support to the emergence/implementation of regional standards, preferential trading agreements, customs harmonisation, regional statistics, and Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). However, intra-ASEAN trade has not increased markedly, and the utilisation of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) remains low (Asia-2014).
- In Central America, the EU has supported the **Central American Integration System** (SICA), helping to develop technical tools that increased availability and access to information on trade requirements and contributed to a reduction of time and costs for exports. However, despite the improvement of the framework, the share of intra-regional trade stagnated, mainly due to low political will, lacking consensus for fundamental reforms and a low sense of ownership of the delivered solutions (Central America-2015).
- The European Neighbourhood Instrument has promoted **regional networks** as a key instrument to strengthen or support the creation of regional capacities and co-operation mechanisms in different areas. Indeed, positive changes have been observed in terms of investment growth and trade integration with the EU, notably in the South (ENPI-2013, BS in Morocco and Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan). Also in the East, EU support improved trade standards and border management, and – when the political context was favourable – promotion of FTA agreements (ENPI 2013, Georgia, Ukraine).
- ACP countries acknowledge that regional integration benefits political stability, economic development and the provision of regional public goods¹³. The CPA recognises the regional integration organisations as main partners for the **Economic Partnership Agreements**. Regional programmes in ACP countries focus on common regional markets, including policies, regulation, standards, customs' unions, institutions and infrastructure. In the Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean (ESA-IO) region, for instance, standards harmonisation has been enhanced, and the establishment of the EAC and SADC Customs Unions has been facilitated¹⁴. The involvement of the private sector and other non-state actors is only just emerging, and remains a weak point.

The main identified **challenges** relate to the overlapping of regional organisations in Sub-Saharan Africa, to mixed political will, and low national commitment – according to the various evaluations of regional programmes in Africa, Caribbean, Central America and Asia. This is partly due to national protectionism and specific priorities, weak technical capacities, and the inter-governmental nature vis-à-vis supra-national structures. Generic approaches without sufficient strategic analysis (i.e. linkages between integration and growth) have also undermined the process in some cases (e.g. Pacific, OCTs).

¹² The 2006, WTO Aid for Trade Task Force identified six Aid for Trade categories: (1) Trade policy and regulations; (2) Trade development; (3) Trade-related infrastructure; (4) Building productive capacity; (5) Trade-related adjustment; (6) Other trade-related needs. The first two categories are referred to as Trade-Related Assistance. Categories 3-6 are referred to as the “wider Aid for Trade Agenda”, which includes support to economic infrastructure and productive sectors in the wide sense. The EU is a large and longstanding donor in this area. (EU, Making Trade Work for Development, 2008) Its 2007 Aft strategy embraces the full WTO Aft Agenda. In 2011, the EU and Member States confirmed their position as the largest provider of Aft in the world, accounting collectively for 32% of total Aft, despite the global economic downturn. The combined annual Aft from the EU budget and those of the EU Member States reached €9.5 billion in 2011 (of which €2.7 billion was from the EU budget). For the subset of EU Trade-Related Assistance, the collective amount was nearly €3 billion, with almost one half from the EU budget. With almost 36%, Africa is the biggest recipient of collective EU Aft (EU, Permanent mission to WTO, WebPage). These amounts do not include the policy support to trade included in budget support programmes.

¹³ Communication “Regional Integration for Development in ACP Countries”, 10th EDF

¹⁴ Evaluation of the EU’s trade-related assistance in third countries (2013) and Thematic global evaluation of the European Union’s support to integrated border management and fight against organised crime (2013)

The co-ordination between **regional and national** interventions has improved over time, but it still represents a major challenge.

5.5.3 JC 52 – The EU contributed to increased trade and investment flows, including key infrastructure, attractiveness of FDI and promotion of PPPs

TRA support packages have been shown to be relevant and tailor-made to the specific conditions, especially in relation to infrastructure planning and capacity enhancement of technicians. There has been significant contribution in terms of trade policy analysis, including diagnostic studies, support to trade strategies, and capacity development. Impact was achieved in better-prepared countries, and where greater dependence on EU trade increased the competitive pressure for compliance.

The Aid for Trade concept has pushed TRA to embrace trade diversification and **support to the private sector**, but the results of such an enlarged scope are not yet particularly strong. There is weak co-ordination between regional and country support strategies, and the assistance has focused on specific export sectors, but not the expansion and consolidation of the value chains and the related bottlenecks in the business environments¹⁵.

Product diversification in exports has globally increased in partner countries, although success in increasing trade has been greater than in diversification. Support in this area has enhanced the value-added of exports and promoted more innovations and research in the industries supported. It faced, however, difficult economic and regulatory environments (e.g. Jamaica, Ukraine). There are only a few examples of support to productive sectors that are the catalyst for more structural change in beneficiary countries due, among other things, to the combination of trade-related support and investments in infrastructure (e.g. Kenya Northern Corridor; Core Road Network in Zambia).

In **poorer countries**, TRA has supported the stabilisation and modest expansion of trade¹⁶, but there is still an unfinished agenda – especially in Africa and LDCs – to assist in making trade and associated growth more inclusive by accelerating efforts aimed at diversifying economies and trade characteristics. In some cases, support has also been instrumental in reducing the impact of graduation from LDC status – namely, the loss of preferential market access (e.g. Maldives).

Impacts are mixed. Before the international economic crisis, trade and FDI flows featured high rates of growth in most of the partner countries. The economic crisis has highlighted some structural weaknesses, mainly related to economic governance and competitiveness of the domestic market, which limit the sustainability of the previous growth trends. The focus of EU assistance to trade and integration on economic governance and its governance-related coherence have become much stronger in the recent years. However, in the past at least, it has overlooked the creation of an environment conducive to attracting FDI (TRA-2013, ENPI, Jordan, Tunisia), and to changing the trade and production structure towards high productivity activities that are key drivers of sustained economic development.

5.5.4 JC 53 – The EU contributed to the conclusion of WTO-compatible Economic Partnership Programmes

Non-reciprocal preferential access has been granted by the EU to most developing countries via the General System of Preferences (GSP) since the early 1970s. The GSP includes the GSP General Arrangement, the GSP+¹⁷ and the *Everything But Arms* (EBA) scheme¹⁸. Special non-reciprocal schemes have, historically, been available to certain ACP countries. The EU also has in place Free Trade Agreements with a number of individual developing countries, under which exports are granted duty free access in return for preferential access for EU exports to their own market.

¹⁵ Evaluation of the EU's trade-related assistance in third countries (2013)

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ A special incentive scheme for sustainable development and good governance designed for vulnerable countries.

¹⁸ Under which all exports, except arms and ammunition, from the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) are given completely duty free access to the EU market.

Preferential access regimes provide eligible exporters with a competitive advantage over other exporters, and thereby provide scope for enhanced export performance by beneficiaries. However, the extent to which this will actually occur depends on the size of the preferential tariff margins granted and the ability of the intended beneficiaries to take advantage of the preferences offered¹⁹.

The EPA strategy aimed to develop an open, transparent and strong WTO-compatible regulatory framework for trade in goods, and services as well. However, achievements are still limited, since EPAs are just emerging from a stagnation period (aggravated by the economic crisis), and many resources that were associated with their implementation have not been mobilised yet (or any more). A closer analysis of the EPA process²⁰ enables several cases of mixed situations inside regional groupings²¹ to be identified. In general, the negotiations on trade regulation and standards became more important and partly **replaced the development-related dialogue** at regional level (TRA-2013), thus reducing the attractiveness and increasing the concerns of the ACP parties about the whole process.

Beyond the ACP area, it is generally recognised that the EU has been instrumental in supporting national/regional capacity to implement deeper integration into the international trading systems through WTO-compatible trade agreements²² and other agreements with a trade component. Support to WTO accession and negotiation has been recognised in several evaluations (e.g. Vietnam, Ukraine, Lao PDR, Moldova, Maldives, and Philippines).

Figure 2 EU preferential schemes towards developing countries

Table 1 - EU preferential schemes towards developing countries		
Preference schemes	Target countries	Time period
Lomé conventions I - IV	ACP countries	1975-2000
Cotonou/ EPA	ACP countries	2000-2020
GSP		
General Arrangement	All developing countries	1971 onwards
GSP+		2005 onwards
EBA	LDCs	2001 onwards
FTA	Individual countries	country specific

Note: FTAs are in place with the Palestinian Authority (1997), Syria (1977), Tunisia (1998), Morocco (2000), Israel (2000), Jordan (2002), Lebanon (2004), Egypt (2004), Algeria (2005), Mexico (2000), South Africa (2000) and Chile (2003), where the year in brackets indicate the year in which the agreement was implemented.

Source : European Commission (2015) : Assessment of economic benefits generated by the EU trade regimes towards developing countries, European Commission, p.23.

5.6 EQ 6 – Social infrastructure and services

EQ 6

To what extent has EU action contributed to improved coverage, quality and access to basic social infrastructure and services (health, education, social protection)?

¹⁹ Assessment of economic benefits generated by the EU Trade Regimes towards the developing countries, 2015

²⁰ Overview of EPA Negotiations, updated September 2015:

²¹ In the Caribbean, not all EU and CARIFORUM countries have ratified the agreement, and only five CARIFORUM countries have started their phased customs duty reduction according to the agreement. In the Pacific, only an interim EPA with Papua New Guinea and Fiji could be agreed. Many of the other countries already benefit from free access to the EU under the Everything But Arms (EBA) scheme, or have only insignificant and erratic trade with the EU. In Africa, results are mixed, and in many cases negotiations are still pending. Some countries from the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) category benefit from the EBA initiative, providing unilateral duty and quota free access to the EU market; others that are not LDCs don't benefit from the EBA. LDCs, therefore, see little interest in EPAs, whereas non-LDCs do.

²² More information can be found at: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/agreements/#_europa

Main sources: Thematic evaluation of Population and Development Programmes in EC External Co-operation (2004), Thematic evaluation of the European Commission support to the health sector (2012), Thematic global evaluation of European Commission support to the education sector in partner countries (including basic and secondary education) (2010). Also, diverse country/Regional evaluations (including country evaluations on Budget Support) have contributed to inform this EQ (for example Nepal 2012, Palestine 2014 and Asia 2014)

5.6.1 Summary answer

Since the late 1990s, the EU has supported partner countries to shape and finance education and health policies, thus contributing to **improved strategies and increased social infrastructure and services**, with a focus on the poor.

Budget support (including GBS and SBS) has been a major **supporting modality**, while sectoral programmes in education and global funds in health have increased during the last decade.

The supported government policies have led to **improved equitable access** to the basic services, including a tremendous increase in the enrolment rates in primary and secondary school, improved rates of access to basic health, with positive impacts on such aspects as literacy and basic health indicators, and increased access rates to clean water.

The **quality** of the government services has been partly overlooked, and partly has further deteriorated under the pressure of the high quantitative increases. In the health sector, the underfunding of the sector has generated a human resources crisis, which has assumed alarming proportions.

NSAs are involved in identification and delivery of social services to different extents and with varying intensity, but not systematically as consolidated partners for policy dialogue and service delivery.

Population issues remain weakly integrated into the development strategies.

Employment is supported either indirectly (support to macro-stabilisation and growth), or directly – mainly through support to education and Technical and Vocational Educational Training (TVET), or other tools. Integration and synergies with PSD support are weak.

EU **added value** is particularly important because of its financial weight (especially in budget support and participation in global funds) and its multifaceted experience in service delivery and employment strategies.

5.6.2 JC 61 – The EU contributed to the increase in availability of health and education services

Education

According to the thematic evaluation (Education-2010), in the period 2000-2007, €2.8 billion was spent by the EU as direct support to the overall sector, while €4 billion was spent as GBS with education-related indicators. The direct sectoral support in the period 2007-14 has increased to more than €3.2 billion. On GBS with a focus on education, disaggregate data is not available, but global GBS funds should not have decreased in the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2007-2014.

Budget support has played a catalytic role²³ overall, strengthening systems and tools to improve education sector policies, service delivery and resourcing. Government ownership has been high, and since the late 1990s new education policies and plans have been established and updated, to which EU support has been aligned. Joint initiatives with other donors are acknowledged, especially in support of advancing towards the achievement of universal primary education (MDG2) and improving access to education and completion rates. EU support has helped to establish pro-poor and gender-responsive policy frameworks favouring

²³ Important to note that in the thematic evaluations (namely, health) and in the budget support evaluations there may be a certain difference in the understanding of the effects of general budget support on the sectoral policies and performance. This difference is probably due to the different methodological tools used in the two types of evaluations. The issue has been discussed in EQ3 in the case of health.

primary, lower secondary and non-formal education, and supporting measures for education governance and institutional and financing reform (Education-2010 and BS evaluations).

Contribution to an increase in the **availability of education services** – via educational infrastructure, increased equipment, number of teachers and improved incentives and training opportunities – is visible, but less than with other donors (Education-2010).

Delivery of education services was found to have been improved where reform efforts were **integrated into a wider governance reform agenda** in the partner country (e.g. Ecuador). There is, within EU support, an emphasis on decentralisation (devolving responsibilities to local authorities, as in Indonesia, Pakistan, Tanzania, for example), and public finance management reform. The latter has been rather successful, assisting in creating favourable conditions under which budget support – be it SBS or GBS – could translate into actual improvements in service delivery in the schools (e.g. in Jordan). The decentralisation, however, has had mixed results (e.g. better in Pakistan than in Bangladesh and Niger), although a number of countries have established decentralised school management committees (e.g. Liberia, Indonesia).

Health

According to the Health thematic evaluation, over the period 2002-2010, the **EU sectoral expenditure** has been €4.1 billion as direct support to the health sector (i.e. 6% of the total expenditure)²⁴, and €5 billion as GBS with health-related indicators. The direct sectoral support in the period 2007-14 has decreased to less than €2.5 billion. On GBS with a focus on health, disaggregate data is not available, but global GBS funds should not have decreased in the MFF 2007-2014.

Direct EU support in the sector was channelled through the individual project modality (45% of total support), followed by "Support to sector programmes, excluding sector budget support" (18%) and SBS (16%); 21% of EU funds were channelled through global trust funds, the main recipient being GFATM. It is not possible to estimate precisely how much of the total GBS amount was actually assigned to health, but GBS with health indicators represents 72% of the total GBS funds transferred to partner countries during the period. The weight of GBS has been significantly reduced over recent years.

According to the health evaluation, GBS has included unrealistic objectives to support the sector, which have not facilitated the ownership, and has not contributed to increasing the sectoral resources. According to various budget support evaluations, GBS has instead contributed at least to protect sectoral allocations in education and health. SBS has been shown to be particularly suitable to support sectoral dialogue.

The EU contribution to an **increased availability of health services** has been limited by three factors: 1, under-resourcing of the health sector; 2, a human resource crisis in the sector; 3, insufficient health technical capacity in EUDs (Health-2012). Although dwarfed by the under-resourcing of the sector, the EU contribution has been significant in quantitative terms (expansion of services, reconstruction and equipping of health facilities), mainly via the support to sectoral expenditure (e.g. Timor-Leste, Yemen, and BS evaluations²⁵). It has been significant also in qualitative terms through, among other things, improved policies (e.g. Jordan, El Salvador), better human resource mobilisation (e.g. Zambia, Burkina Faso, Angola), and via the EU participation in policy dialogue, TA and other policy support (e.g. South Africa). In the last decade, important funds have been channelled through the Global Fund and other global projects, with the aim of focusing on specific healthcare areas.

The sector, however, remains heavily underfunded (Health-2012), given the tremendous increase in the demographic pressure. The **structures are still not adequate and quality of services is generally low** (i.e. little impact on promoting essential medicine guarantees, compensated by essential medicine supply through provision of basic benefit packages in a

²⁴ This figure comes from the Health-2012 evaluation, and seems compatible with the data provided by the Commission for the period 2007-2014.

²⁵ The BS evaluations show that BS has been able to protect allocations in the health sector, and when the BS amounts have declined, there has been a negative effect on health (e.g. Uganda). Such a conclusion is slightly different from that of the thematic evaluation (see also EQ3).

small number of settings). One of the main EU contributions relates to the improved PFM at general and sectoral level, including MTEF and budget programmes. The issues related to decentralised delivery have been overlooked.

Some **improvements in coverage of services** are indicated (infrastructure, staff), including clinics in underserved regions, either through NGO-supported projects, sector support or multi-donor GBS (e.g. Ghana).

There are cases where the supported measures are not included in an overall sector reform strategy (e.g. Egypt), or absorption capacity and political commitment are low (e.g. Philippines, Ukraine). In Palestine, despite the remarkably good performance of the education, health and social protection sectors, sustainability is at stake, especially in the long run. EU support to Palestine's budget is largely absorbed by the cost of salaries and wages, the amount of which fluctuates around 20% of GDP, in a politically and economically unsustainable environment (Palestine-2014).

5.6.3 JC 62 – The EU contributed to increasing equitable access to health and education services

Education

There is evidence of a **tremendous increase in access to school**, especially at the primary level, in partner countries in recent decades²⁶. This is mainly due to the strengthened sectoral focus of national policies, including increased investment, reduction of fees, and related increase in service delivery, together with other contextual factors (e.g. demographic and income factors). The EU contribution to such strengthened policy focus is highlighted in most evaluations (namely, budget support).

In terms of **equitable access**, the enrolment of girls has grown faster. Investment in rural areas has been significant, with strong increases of access by the poor (e.g. Zambia, Tanzania, Ecuador), although important differences persist between geographic zones. There is also much evidence of increased access to higher levels of education – that is, increased progression and transition rates – in a number of countries, although the EU support to higher education is considered less effective (Education-2010).

In fragile states or under poor governance quality, the EU's alignment to government systems may be substituted by **support to NGOs** as alternative channels for mainstreaming education and pilots of new concepts achieving impressive results, especially on reducing gender disparities, enhancing learning outcomes, and improving access.

In secondary education, the increase in enrolment is also impressive, including the level of gender parity (especially in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa). The EU has contributed to such results through its support to the sectoral reforms, particularly in the EN regions (Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan).

Health

A key EU objective has been increasing access and utilisation, while **reducing access costs** for the poor. Budget support to countries engaged in reducing health access costs (e.g. Burkina Faso), or project financing of specific healthcare services through global funds, are the main tools put in place.

In terms of **equitable access**, support has been geared to focusing healthcare on those with special needs, through basic healthcare provision programmes (e.g. GBS programmes with indicators related to maternal health) or contribution to global initiatives (e.g. GFATM²⁷,

²⁶ In sub-Saharan Africa, the net enrolment ratio in primary school passed from 58% in 1999 to 78% in 2012 (gross enrolment passed from 80% to 102%), with an increase in the number of pupils enrolled from 82 million to 144 million. The ratio of female to male was 88% in 1999 and 93% in 2012. Out-of-school children were 42 million in 1999 and 29 million in 2012. In Ecuador, net enrolment rates of Basic General Education (grades 1 to 10) have progressed from 91% in 2006 to 95% in 2010. Net enrolment rates in secondary education have registered a significant 5.8% increase (from 53.6% in 2008 to 59.4% in 2010). In Nepal, the primary net enrolment rate increased from 83.5% in 2003 to 94.5% in 2010, with a gender parity index of 0.98 in 2009.

Worldwide, net enrolment rates in primary education passed from 83 to 89% between 1999 and 2012. In secondary education, they passed from 52 to 66%. In tertiary education, gross enrolment ratio passed from 18 to 33%. The gender parity index in primary and secondary passed from 0.91 to 0.97.

²⁷ Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria

GAVI²⁸, polio eradication). These efforts have been successful mainly in improving maternal health (although gaps remain between rural and urban areas) and, to a lesser extent, in increasing the utilisation of health facilities by children. This resulted in higher immunisation rates, and better monitoring of the growth and nutrition status. The improvement of other health outcomes has been supported as well.

Such outcomes, however, are not sustainable, as the demographic growth and the pressure of other investment priorities represent a serious threat for health financing. The sectoral performance may easily deteriorate, as shown in some cases (e.g. Uganda).

5.6.4 JC 63 – EU contributed to the establishment of effective quality assurance systems

In general, there are insufficient results-oriented performance mechanisms (e.g. Jordan, Palestine, Maldives, Egypt, and Nepal).

Despite improvements in terms of systems' capacities (e.g. Burundi, Namibia, Ukraine, Ecuador, Pacific), the actual impact on the **quality of education is still poor** and, despite the increase in enrolment, learning targets often are not met (e.g. Zambia).

In **education, SBS** and sector support programmes, especially in middle-income countries, have assisted partner country governments to accommodate quality improvement strategies through system-wide support. However, the results have been limited, mainly due to the huge quantitative expansion of the systems (e.g. Tunisia, South Africa). In other cases, GBS has assisted governments to meet the bare necessities for education systems' survival, including the financing of textbooks and teacher salaries (e.g. Mozambique, Uganda). Without such support, the quality of education provision would have further deteriorated, while experiencing substantial quantitative increases.

According to the health thematic evaluation, quality of services is generally low as a consequence of the poor resources (both human and financial) that characterise the sector. The EU has contributed to strengthening health policy strategy processes (i.e. policy analysis and data, national strategic health plans, performance monitoring, health indicators or sector coordination). Key issues related to health sector management and governance – such as PFM, accountability and capacity – have also been incorporated into policy dialogue in most cases. PFM at sectoral level, however, has been addressed with poor results, especially at decentralised level, where lack of capacity, political patronage and other inefficiencies weaken the system.

5.6.5 JC 64 – The EU contributed to the integration of population issues in development strategies and policies

EU policy statements regarding population development have evolved, in line with the ICPD²⁹, from concern with macroeconomic impacts of population growth to concern with individual-level reproductive health and rights³⁰. Special attention has been given to **reproductive health (including HIV-AIDS) and family planning**, but this dimension is still not fully integrated. In this sense, a great part of EU support to fight HIV/AIDS has been channelled through annual contributions to the Global Fund (GFATM), with beneficiaries worldwide. The **EU committed** €1.2 billion to the three poverty-related diseases, HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis, over the period 2002-2010 (GFATM)³¹.

The need to elaborate an approach to integrating population into programmes with the poorest countries is also suggested. In many countries, the pressing HIV/AIDS epidemic and humanitarian issues requiring interventions to help refugees and IDPs make it difficult to concentrate on population issues, which tend almost by definition to be longer-term (Health evaluation). In Uganda and Burkina Faso, the BS evaluations have stressed the low priority given to population matters in the EU support strategies, and have established a link be-

²⁸ Vaccine Alliance

²⁹ International Conference on Population and Development

³⁰ Thematic Evaluation of Population and Development Programmes in EC External Co-operation, 2004

³¹ Thematic Evaluation of the European Commission Support to the Health Sector, 2012

tween this issue and the strategic weakness of the gender equality and women's empowerment approach.

5.6.6 JC 65 – The EU contributed to private sector and civil society organisations having a meaningful impact on preparation and implementation of policies related to social infrastructures and services

Many evaluations agree that the EU support to involvement of CSOs has become decidedly more effective over the last decade, both in terms of dialogue for policy preparation and monitoring and service delivery. There is evidence of **positive contributions** made by CSOs in delivering social services to poor communities (e.g. housing, education, health, food security, water, human rights), and through different “gap-filling” operations where CSOs stepped in to substitute for failing/unwilling governments. Other positive examples can be found in, for example, Somalia, Cambodia, Georgia, Peru, Bolivia, where EU support has been particularly successful in contributing to strengthening CSOs action and capacity to participate in policy dialogue and implementation in health, education, water and sanitation, but also PFM – as in Burkina Faso. The intensity and quality of participation tends to vary substantially, beyond the positive results of individual projects and/or programmes. The Education and Asia evaluations, together with many others, agree that the **systematisation and the institutionalisation** of such participation are still weak.

The situation is similar for private sector and other non-state actors. Their involvement in the main country and regional strategies (for design and implementation) is not systematic and institutionalised (Asia, PSD-2013 and 2015), apart from some specific cases where they are natural actors, such as the TVET in Egypt, or specifically- tailored programmes (e.g. Alinvest, Urbal). The Private Sector Development-2013 evaluation stresses the weak analysis and consultation that characterise EU support strategy.

5.6.7 JC 66 – The EU contributed to increasing employment, especially for the youth, and effective social protection

The European Consensus on Development marked a significant step forward for Employment and Social Inclusion (ESI), addressing relevant issues such as Human Development and Social Cohesion and Employment³². In general, it is considered that EU support was responsive and aligned with nationally-owned development strategies. It has been successful in terms of indirect support through its contribution to stabilisation and growth, in ACP but also other countries (BS evaluations in Uganda, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Burkina Faso, and Tunisia), and its positive effects on employment.

However, the objective of increasing the employability of youth – including significant support to TVET – has not been met. The TVET strategies, mainly promoted in the EN South region, are closely linked to the employment and PSD strategies, which should focus on increased competitiveness of internal markets to attract investment (e.g. Egypt, Tunisia). The frequent absence of detailed labour market analysis and weak identification of the conditions of sustainable economic growth and promotion of the private sector reveal some weaknesses of ESI-related support. In several cases illustrated by the evaluations (e.g. South Africa, Egypt), the EU has supported rather conservative government strategies aimed at the direct creation of additional employment, with limited interventions on the competitiveness of the economy.

In Latin-American countries, the explicit linkage of enhanced economic competitiveness and employment and job creation remains weak. However, attention to Social Cohesion and to Decent Work has stressed the emergence of an integrated approach combining economic development and social equity (e.g. Bolivia, Ecuador). In Asia (regional evaluation), more than elsewhere, social protection has become a key pillar. Employment and the Labour Market have been emerging more visibly in recent years and, as in other regions, they are framed in an overall strategy combining economic growth with equity and social justice.

The contribution of the EU's assistance to employment in the informal sector (access to and conditions of employment) has been limited, mainly based on a project approach (e.g. Ken-

³² Thematic global evaluation of EC support in the sectors of employment and social inclusion (ESI) in partner countries, 2011.

ya, Jamaica). Consideration of youth employment in specific or wider programmes is also rather scarce, but positive examples do exist (e.g. Bangladesh, El Salvador).

5.7 EQ 7 - Private sector development and productive sectors

EQ 7	To what extent has EU action contributed to private sector development and the development of productive sectors in partner countries, such as agriculture and infra-structure?
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Main sources: Thematic Evaluation on Trade-related Assistance (2013), Evaluation of General Budget Support (2004), Thematic Evaluation of the EC support to Good Governance (2006), Evaluation of the European Union's Support to Private Sector Development in third countries (2013), Thematic Global Evaluation of European Commission Support to agricultural commodities in ACP countries (2012), and a wide range of country evaluations, including BS country evaluations (for example Tunisia 2011, Colombia 2012, ENPI 2013 and Asia 2014)

5.7.1 Summary answer

Private sector development has indirectly benefited from support to good governance, economic stabilisation and growth, while more direct support – aimed at the creation of an enabling environment, improving quality standards, and facilitating access to finance – has been relevant. However, despite some positive examples, it has been weakly mainstreamed in the national strategies. In particular, PSD has been disconnected from employment creation and the related poverty-reduction objectives. As a consequence, “despite the financial weight and the breadth of its support”, the EU is not recognised “as a major contributor to PSD” (PSD-2013).

Support to agriculture has been focused on food security and traditional commodities, while the sectoral approach – including food value chains and rural development – has been weak. Recent experiences in the Neighbourhood region show a more comprehensive approach.

The involvement of private sector institutions and CSOs in design and implementation of economic development policies has been weak.

EU support to regional organisations has contributed in general to economic growth, thanks to their efforts aimed at boosting intra-regional and extra-regional trade³³, strengthening transport networks, and enhancing peace building (ACP). In other cases, support has been mainly recognised in terms of institutional capacity development, such as for SICA in Central America or ASEAN in Asia, for which EU support has been particularly instrumental in the emergence and implementation of regional standards and trading systems and arrangements.

5.7.2 JC 71 – The EU contributed to the provision of timely responses, at a reasonable cost, to the challenges faced by the private sector, including removal of obstacles and access of formal and informal SMEs to innovative and effective financial and economic services

EU support in the sector amounted to €2.4 billion in the period 2004-2011, with the EU being one of the biggest single donors targeting the private sector as a focal sector in a large number of country programmes (PSD-2013). It has encompassed a wide range of instruments – from GBS and sector policy support programmes (either SBS or others) to investment facilities (often in collaboration with development banks, namely EIB).

Indirect support to the private sector via the support to macroeconomic stabilisation (Budget Support), road infrastructure (specific projects) and trade (regional organisations) has

³³ Data on Trade (UNCTAD, Economic Development in Africa: intra-African trade: unlocking private sector dynamism, 2013) shows that African trade grew significantly between 1996 and 2011 – faster than other regions, with the exception of East Asia. Intraregional trade has grown at high rates in absolute terms in all sub-regions, although trade with the rest of the world has grown even faster in several cases. Comparing the period 2001-2006 with the period 2007-2011, intraregional trade grew faster than extra-regional trade for the CENSAD (Sahel), CEMAC, and SADC regions. It has grown at a slower rate in the other regions.

been high. It contributed, among other things, to reduced interest on borrowing, reduced inflation, stability of exchange rates, reduction of transport cost and trade transactional costs (Transport, BS evaluations and Regional evaluations in Africa). Infrastructure planning and implementation (mainly roads, but also water supply in ACP countries and, to a lesser extent, energy supply, such as in EN countries) has been critical to increase long-term competitiveness (e.g. Mozambique, Tanzania), while poor infrastructure has been shown to be a key constraint to private sector development (e.g. Zambia, Madagascar, Malawi). The EU has played a leading role in the development of regional transport networks (mainly in Africa) and the facilitation of regional flows of goods (also in Asia).

Support to an improved **PSD environment** (e.g. country and regional programmes) has not been met with an adequate response and commitment at governmental level³⁴ (e.g. Ukraine, Nicaragua, and others). There has been insufficient capacity to implement/finalise reforms (e.g. Jordan). Private sector institutions have not been adequately associated and supported, and the programmes were characterised by a limited scope (e.g. Ecuador). The programmes did not rely on accurate analyses of the key environment bottlenecks (e.g. El Salvador, Jamaica, and Kenya).

Direct support to enterprises for improved quality standards and enhanced competitiveness has been particularly successful when linked to access to the EU market, as in the case of the AAs and FTAs in the EN regions (e.g. Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan). However, although successful (e.g. Burkina Faso), it had a limited sustainability, especially in partner countries with high binding constraints (e.g. Palestine). The **EIB**³⁵ has put in place a number of interventions to provide venture capital and loans, alone or with other international financial instruments (IFIs). These operations were frequently combined with the provision of TA, and promoted in some cases sound practices in terms of governance (including corporate governance and corruption, fraud, anti-money laundering), although evidence of subsequent follow-up is weak.

Various instruments have been put in place, through blending facilities³⁶ and PSD regional programmes³⁷. Positive experiences are presented here and there (e.g. Colombia, particularly in the rural areas of the country with an important emphasis on environmental sustainability aspects, or Burkina Faso), but a **coherent approach** to be replicated and adapted throughout the region is not in place.

According to the thematic evaluation, the various instruments do not appear to be adequately co-ordinated and coherent. Despite its financial and political priority, the sectoral strategy appears to be too generalist and not mainstreamed at country and regional level, with the necessary synergies with the support to governance and to other sectors (e.g. employment generation and TVET). As a consequence, the EU, which is a main actor for PSD, is not recognised as such in most countries (PSD-2013).

5.7.3 JC 72 – The EU contributed to strengthening the agricultural and rural development policies, with a view to enhancing inclusive growth and food security

EU support to agricultural and rural development has targeted some areas and types of interventions: support to agricultural commodities in ACP countries; strengthening food security in ACP and other poor countries; support to agricultural enterprises and rural employment, mainly in the neighbourhood context, especially in the last period, as the European Neighbourhood Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development (ENPARD) was launched in 2012.

³⁴ Evaluation of the EU's support to private sector in third countries (2013)

³⁵ European Investment Bank

³⁶ E.g. The Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF), the Latin America Investment Facility (LAIF), the Investment Facility for Central Asia (IFCA), the Asia Investment Facility (AIF), the Caribbean Investment Facility (CIF), the Investment Facility for the Pacific (IFP) or the Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund (GEEREF). The 2016 evaluation of Blending is rather positive and shows that such facilities have been able to multiply 20 times their grant contribution, leveraging investment from IFIs and a few private actors. Such facilities have been largely used for PSD support (e.g. upgrading SMEs energy-saving systems), but also for improvement of public services (e.g. modernising public transport, improving road networks, extending sewage systems)

³⁷ E.g. ProInvest (ACP), BizClim (ACP), the EU/ACP Microfinance Programme, the ANIMA network for Mediterranean countries and subsequent 'Invest in Med' programme.

The Thematic evaluation of EU Support to **agricultural commodities** is focused on ACP countries³⁸. For the other areas and types of intervention, the sources of information are the country evaluations. The approach to the traditional commodity support was partly reviewed with a focus on increased competitiveness (through strengthened research and improved access to inputs) and risk management. In some cases, the value chains approach was adopted with good results (e.g. Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire, and Burkina Faso). Diversification was pursued when increased competitiveness was out of reach (in some cases, for sugar and bananas). Support to agricultural commodities was rarely included in comprehensive private sector and trade development strategies. Although commodity support has benefited agricultural sector competitiveness (e.g. bananas and sugar in the Caribbean³⁹), it was rarely mainstreamed in comprehensive agricultural and rural development interventions.

Food security is another important area in many country programmes. The interventions, as in the case of the commodities, are often punctual (e.g. Haiti) and create immediate benefits for their beneficiaries, but they have a weak sector approach. In Central America, the EU has facilitated the development of an important – although not yet adequately owned at national level, apart from possibly in Honduras – regional institutional framework on food security. There has been a very positive experience in Bolivia, where comprehensive support to food security – mainly through budget support – has had a successful impact on rural employment and development strategies.

The preparation of the ENPARD strategy, and now its implementation in the Neighbourhood region, seem encouraging, although it is still at an initial stage. In Georgia, the EU support to the agricultural sector – through budget support and qualified TA – was crucial to establishing an institutional framework and a strategy to put the sector at the centre of government priorities for sustainable growth and employment.

In the poor countries, the agricultural and rural development sector has been partly overlooked as a development priority, as illustrated by most BS evaluations (e.g. Mozambique, Uganda, and Tanzania). The sector rarely appears among the targeted ones for which development indicators are established as a matter of joint monitoring and dialogue. In countries where such indicators exist (e.g. Zambia), the government compliance with the relevant indicators is poor, and the related dialogue is weak.

5.7.4 JC 73 – The EU contributed to private sector and civil society organisations having a meaningful impact on preparation and implementation of policies related to economic growth and private sector development

The PSD Evaluation (2013) indicates that the private sector was generally **not thoroughly consulted** when institutional and regulatory (I&R) reforms conducive to PSD were prepared and undertaken, with only limited targeting of private business.

Evidence suggests that channelling support through government departments and intermediary organisations may have improved the results, in terms of institutional capacity building, but has not encouraged any sustainable trickle-down effect to enterprises. **Opportunities have been missed** in terms of long-term institutional building of private sector business service organisations that would support SMEs on a more sustainable basis.

Positive examples can be found in Bolivia, where CSOs have been involved in the design and implementation of the rural development interventions. In Georgia, the EU is credited with having contributed to strengthening the role of civil society in policy design and implementation.

5.7.5 JC 74 – The EU contributed to strengthening the role of regional, sub-regional and continental organisations to support development standards and opportunities

In ACP countries, important support has been provided to the ACP business development, with **trade and regional integration** most often chosen as a focal sector of regional co-

³⁸ In addition to the Evaluation of European Community's co-operation in the field of rural and agricultural development in partner countries during the period 1995-2005 this is outside the period under consideration for this assessment.

³⁹ Thematic global evaluation of European Commission support to agricultural commodities in ACP countries (2012)

operation, especially in the second half of the 2000s. CPA support to improve intra-regional and extra-regional trade has been huge (policies and regulations – ESA-IO region) and rather effective, especially when combined with road planning and implementation (East and Western Africa), although other trade agreements (e.g. WTO negotiations or EPAs) showed slow progress. Challenges identified refer to: a) the **poor co-ordination between regional and national** support plans and implementation as a main obstacle towards effective integration (ESA-IO, CARICOM, SADC and Pacific regions); b) the **overlapping and different capacities** of the regional organisations (ESA-IO, SADC, Central Africa, UEMOA/CEDEAO); c) the **involvement of the private sector and other non-state actors**, which is only at the emergent stage. Some regional organisations are particularly active in **conflict prevention and management** (ESA-IO, ECOWAS), which is a key component of the integration and regional development process.

In Asia, regional organisations⁴⁰ have benefited from targeted technical support (namely, ASEAN for the implementation of the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint). Of particular importance has been the EU support to the emergence and implementation of regional standards, preferential trading agreements, customs harmonisation, regional statistics, and Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). The EU has also contributed to regional co-ordination in health (contributing to forming a regional network of laboratories and centres for epidemiological surveillance and monitoring) and in disaster management (with the focus on information transfer and knowledge management for ASEAN to improve delivery of disaster management services). Through health interventions via the African Union Programme (AUP), the EU has supported the fight against drug resistance, while its support for medical and health system research globally has made a significant contribution to global public health. Most of the regional achievements to which the EU has contributed need further political and technical support to ensure their full appropriation and development by the different country actors (Regional Asia-2014).

In Central America, efforts have concentrated on the reform of SICA. However, many of these reforms stalled, in part due to inherent weaknesses in the institutional system and continued hesitance of SICA's Member States to develop a joint, coherent vision. Some progress has been achieved in the development of management information systems and databases – for the management of information on donor support, and for the development of a system-wide statistical system (Regional Central America-2015).

5.8 EQ 8 - Environmental sustainability and climate change

EQ 8	To what extent has EU action contributed to strengthening environmentally-sustainable development and adapting to climate change?
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Main sources: Thematic evaluation of EU support to environment and climate change in third countries (2015). Country and/or regional reports provided additional examples (for example Maldives 2010, Bolivia 2014 and Central America 2015).

5.8.1 Summary answer

EU support has contributed to ensuring an increased prominence of environment and climate change⁴¹ in national development processes, and to increasing the commitment of partner countries to global environmental and climate change governance through a multiplicity of instruments, flexible and adapted to the specific conditions. Implementation, however, is still weak, and mainstreaming of environment sustainability into the country strategies – namely, the link between environment and poverty – has not yet been achieved, although there are already significant positive examples.

Climate change has been central since the Kyoto Protocol came into force in 2005. It has become prominent on the agenda since 2009, and increasingly so in view of the agreement

⁴⁰ And the related ARF, the SAARC, and the dialogue mechanism ASEM.

⁴¹ The three main clusters of the EU intended intervention logic, in this area, are Cluster 1 (Climate change and sustainable energy); Cluster 2 (Environment for development) and Cluster 3 (Strengthening environment and climate governance). Thematic global evaluation of the EU support to environment and climate change in third countries (2007-2013), 2015

signed at the UN's COP21 conference on climate change in December 2015. Recently, focus has evolved from primarily curbing emissions to increasingly addressing adaptation in vulnerable countries. The EU plays an advanced role in international programmes, and has developed specific tools to enhance policies and actions in partner countries (GCCA). There are still challenges in country ownership and mainstreaming.

5.8.2 JC 81 – The EU contributed to the mainstreaming of environmental sustainability into all aspects of development co-operation and support programmes and projects implemented by various actors

The use of **specific tools**⁴² has contributed to increasing the readiness and ability of the governments to mainstream environment and climate change priorities into their strategies. In particular, the EU contribution to Strategic Environment Assessments (SEAs) has increased in the new MFF planning phase (2014-20), thus improving the overall relevance of the intervention. Positive influence can be noted in the strengthening of the institutional capacity and the legislative framework for environmental protection (e.g. Rwanda, Maldives, Ukraine, Jordan, El Salvador, European Neighbouring countries), improved management of natural resources (e.g. Ecuador), renewable energies (e.g. Nepal), or stimulation of investments (e.g. Bolivia). However, implementation is often weak, indicating that the level of actual mainstreaming is still modest. The adoption of improved legal frameworks is difficult in several countries (e.g. Kenya, Ghana, Chad, Yemen), and long-term impact on environmental sustainability is thus limited.

Some of the identified challenges relate to weak linkages between **environment and poverty reduction**, lack of a comprehensive strategy and policy dialogue (e.g. Timor-Leste, Jordan, Bolivia) or weak co-ordination (e.g. Lesotho). Partners' ownership needs to be strengthened, as well as their capacity, and some political economic bottlenecks need to be better considered (Environment and Climate Change-2014)

Positive examples in which the EU contribution has been recognised include Bolivia (where the EU is recognised for having promoted co-ordination, political dialogue and management for results within the sector), Colombia, Egypt, Malawi, and Rwanda – with successful mainstreaming of environmental sustainability across EU interventions and Government's agenda. In the Pacific, the EU interventions have also contributed to the strengthening of natural resource conservation.

From the thematic point of view, it is noted that environment received a lot of attention in the **agricultural commodities** projects (e.g. in the Caribbean, Cameroon, Colombia, Ghana and Madagascar), and in the transport sector.

5.8.3 JC 82 – The EU contributed to the strengthening of policies and implementation of support programmes to mitigate and adapt to the consequences of, and the threat posed by, climate change

A substantial amount of EU climate change funding through the **Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA)**⁴³ has been allocated to the Pacific region, on top of the regular EDF allocations. The activities of the Alliance have enhanced the capacity of the Pacific's climate change negotiators and have helped mobilise communities in conducting vulnerability assessments – as well as making some improvements in mainstreaming climate change in national policies. However, some EU stakeholders in the Pacific region argued that the GCCA projects implemented in the region could have benefited from greater regional consultation in the design phase. Also, the SWITCH programmes on sustainable consumption and production and the FLEGT programmes combating illegal logging through forest law enforcement, governance and trade have made a substantive contribution to enhancing the adaptation to,

⁴² The key mainstreaming tools promoted by the EU are the Country Environment Profile (CEP), the Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) and the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA).

⁴³ GCCA+ is an EU fund created in 2007 and aimed at enhancing EU-specific partnerships with the least developed countries. It now manages a fund of almost €350 million, of which three-quarters is from the EU budget and the remainder shared between some EU MS and EDF. It currently finances programmes in 38 countries and eight regions and sub-regions. It is the largest and most consolidated initiative in this area in the world.

and mitigation of, climate change, and the complementary promotion of sustainable or green growth in Asia. In Central America, EU regional co-operation has helped to better establish an integrated regional multi-sectoral approach for Disaster risk reduction (DRR) and Climate Change Emergency Response Co-ordination Centres (ERCCs), but without prompting corresponding changes in the SICA member countries.

Overall, EU policies and strategies for climate change are appropriate, according to the evaluations. Specifically, EU support has contributed to the creation of an environment **conducive to** reaching global agreements, the establishment of climate financing mechanisms (including blending, particularly to reduce the perception of risk on investment with large social benefits, but low financial profitability), building stronger knowledge, tools and approaches to address climate change issues (e.g. Rwanda).

However, some major **challenges** remain with regard to fragmentation of climate change strategies or understanding/political will from partners' countries (e.g. Timor-Leste).

5.9 EQ 9 – Human rights, democracy, rule of law and good governance

EQ 9	To what extent has EU action contributed to the promotion of human rights, democracy, rule of law and good governance, including the participation of civil society in partner countries' development?
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Main sources: External Evaluation of Community Aid concerning positive actions in the field of Human Rights and Democracy in ACP Countries, 1995-1999 (2000), Thematic Evaluation of the EC support to Good Governance (2006), Thematic Evaluation of the European Commission support to respect of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (2011), Thematic Evaluation of European Commission Support to Justice and Security System Reform (2011). Country and/or regional reports provided additional examples (for example Palestine 2014 and Jordan 2015)

5.9.1 Summary answer

The EU has strongly emphasised the issues related to **broad governance, human rights (HR) and democracy**, especially in the last decade. Human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law are also considered “essential elements” in the Cotonou Agreement, respect for which is monitored through political dialogue (Art. 8) and subject to specific procedures in case of lack of convergence between the parties (Art. 96 and 97).

Specific policy support has significantly increased in the last decade. Governance has become one of the first macro-sectors in terms of direct expenditure. GBS and SBS (including new specific tools such as the State-Building Contracts, in fragile states) have strongly supported PFM reform, and improved accountability and transparency of budget processes. SBS and projects, including capacity-building, have supported specific sector and sub-sector reforms in a number of areas, ranging from judiciary to public administration reform. Support to electoral and democratic processes has been multiplied, and HR was brought into the focus of the political agenda.

The results are mixed. PFM-related reforms have been rather successful, as has the support to electoral processes. The results in the area of HR are often fragmented and compartmentalised. In judiciary and security reform, results are conditioned by the political commitment of the partners, the limited leverage of the EU, and the difficult mainstreaming (as in the other areas). They are also affected by the quality of the strategy, which has been strongly state-centred and supply driven, with limited attention to the involvement of the non-state actors and the participation of the end-beneficiaries.

Evolution of the strategy is under way, and there are positive examples of effective comprehensive sector approaches and successful involvement of civil society.

5.9.2 JC 91 – The EU contributed to establishing a democratic and efficient governance framework, including modernised PA, transparent and efficient PFM, and balanced institutional framework.

On the **broader governance** issues (economic governance, corruption and transparency, role of parliaments, and balanced institutional setup), interventions have multiplied since the

early 2000s. GBS programmes contributed to improved PFM and budget transparency (most BS evaluations), and often contain other specific sectoral targets. Over the last decade, however, there has been an attempt to establish rather comprehensive thematic (or sub-sectoral) approaches. These have included sectoral and sub-sectoral strategies, funded through sectoral budget support and other projects, including capacity-building and involvement of civil society and other NSAs (e.g. Rwanda and Chad security and justice programmes). Important EU support actions have been carried out in the EN region, as illustrated by the 10-year support to the comprehensive reform of criminal justice in Georgia, or by the comprehensive programme to enhance good governance in Jordan, including a multitude of sub-sectors. These range from legal and judicial development to, for example, human rights, conflict prevention and decentralisation – supported by a strong focus on improved PFM and transparency. A clear trend in attaching an enhanced priority to governance issues can be seen if looked at in terms of the pre-Consensus period. The 2006 evaluation on governance stressed that the comprehensive and sectoral policy frameworks needed to be strengthened, with particular reference to partners' political commitment (towards successful reforms, and not only to comply with modern internationally-accepted procedures – e.g. Georgia), and to suitable co-ordination frameworks.

Budget Support has been the main instrument to strengthen the governance reform processes. The focus has been primarily on improving public financial management and less on influencing other critical governance processes (e.g. improved public accountability and parliamentary control; strengthening oversight bodies). In the last decade, however, such areas have become more important – including anti-corruption and fundamental principles (Human Rights-2011, Justice and SSR-2011). SBS and TA have been widely used for sector and sub-sector reform, in a framework of sectoral-wide approach (e.g. Georgia). In the EN regions, appropriate TA instruments, such as Technical Assistance and Information Exchange (TAIEX) and Twinning, have been implemented. Recently, a specific tool to address comprehensive governance issues in fragile states (State-Building Contract) has been put in place. Positive contributions can be seen in different countries such as Yemen (state-building in response to fragility, although only recently), Colombia (participative budgeting, public service delivered according to social and territorial needs), Georgia (significant improvements in PEFA, although less at strategic level), and Jordan (legislative framework to consolidate democracy). In other countries, however, support has not seen clear results due to a number of weaknesses that undermine effective processes (e.g. Palestine – absence of accountability and transparency and limited PA ownership; or Egypt – SBS implementation had no effect upon budgetary processes and budget management).

Results are weaker when budget support is not sufficiently combined with sector-specific **complementary tools** (e.g. CSOs involvement, TA) at the central and local levels, in particular to enhance implementation capacities (Governance-2006, Trade-2013). There are cases of positive involvement of CSOs to support budget transparency and monitoring and fighting against corruption (e.g. Burkina Faso). In some cases, the local environment, which constitutes a determinant factor for effective support, is not always properly assessed (e.g. in terms of incentives for change) and tends to dilute the potential effects of capacity-building initiatives (Governance-2006). In some cases, the EUDs are not adequately equipped to address governance issues in the BS-related dialogue (Governance-2006).

5.9.3 JC 92 – The EU contributed to an improvement in the field of human rights and democratic principles

Comprehensive support to broad governance and human rights require a strong **political leverage** that the EU doesn't always put in place (Human rights-2011). On **HR and Democracy**, despite the persistence of a compartmentalised and/or fragmented approach, a lot has been done, especially to support the electoral processes, and, particularly in the recent period, HR have been brought to the fore on the political agenda (e.g. Timor-Leste, Angola, Nigeria or Pacific region). Electoral processes have been supported in a number of countries (e.g. Zambia, Jordan, Maldives, Nepal) and numerous successful EU Electoral Observation Missions (EOMs) were deployed over the period.

Political contexts and/or political will are important. In some cases, the EU support has contributed to the improvement of HR (e.g. El Salvador – pioneering approach in support to pre-

venting juvenile delinquency through government plans; Georgia – improving the welfare of IDPs through BS and projects). However, political/institutional crises have reversed the trend (e.g. Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Palestine), or actions have not followed the engagements (e.g. Madagascar, Burundi, Mozambique – especially with regard to performance of justice, courts and prisons). Fragmentation and limited capacities of CSOs also limit the scope and coverage of HR interventions, although specific support has also been provided in this sense (e.g. Colombia – support to CSOs to uphold civil and political rights of IDPs for protection of lands and properties; Jordan – contribution to CSO strengthening; Ukraine – media freedom).

There are also limits in **capacities and procedure-related bottlenecks**. For instance, the rigid budget lines are not always accessible (e.g. OCTs) and limited complementarity between them further hampers their efficiency, as well as not always well-adapted procedures and funding modalities.

5.9.4 JC 93 – The EU contributed to an improvement in the field of security and justice and the rule of law

There is an increasing understanding of justice and security provision as part of wider state responses to poverty, conflict and insecurity. In this regard, EU support has contributed in many cases to enhancing institutional capacities within state security and justice bodies to deliver public services (e.g. Georgia, Colombia, Palestine, Jordan). According to the thematic evaluation, however, the overall impact on people's security and access to justice has been difficult to measure, and was limited by the weaknesses of the EU JSSR⁴⁴ strategy. The latter (in the evaluation period 2001-2009) was too supply-driven, with a strong focus on strengthening state capacities and limited attention to the citizens' needs and participation⁴⁵. According to the thematic evaluation, there is also evidence that policy dialogue was widely used, mainly with national authorities (in most cases, state security or justice ministries and agencies), and with little interest in soliciting the views of NSAs. In some cases, EU support was not adequately underpinned by local knowledge of security and justice practices and needs, or by mechanisms to monitor progress and measure results and impact.

Apart from the recent evolution of the EU strategy for Security Reform, there are additional contributions from country-level evaluations – namely, the Georgia country evaluation (case mentioned above) and the South Africa BS evaluation. The latter illustrates an interesting and rather successful experience supported by BS, based on the association of specialised CSOs with the Ministry of Justice on a programme aimed at facilitating equitable access to justice in the poorest and most remote areas.

5.10 EQ 10 – Peace, security and fragility

EQ 10

To what extent has the EU implementation of different instruments and approaches improved peace and security in developing countries/regions and has enhanced their capacity to cope with crises, particularly in fragile states?

Main sources: Thematic Evaluation of the European Commission support to Conflict Prevention and Peace Building. Preliminary study: scoping and mapping (2009); Thematic Evaluation of European Commission Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace-building – CPPB (2011). Country and/or regional reports provided additional examples (for example Asia 2014 and Georgia 2015)

5.10.1 Summary answer

The EU has become one of the strongest actors in conflict prevention and peace-building (CPPB). Between 2001 and 2010, it spent more than 10% of the DEVCO-managed budget (€7.7bn) in this area. Since the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 and the establishment of the EEAS in 2011, there has been a new push towards a stronger EU political

⁴⁴ Justice and Security Reform Process

⁴⁵ Thematic Evaluation of the European Commission Support to Justice and Security System Reform, 2011

initiative in Conflict prevention and an improved co-ordination within the EU MS. Hence, an **integrated⁴⁶ and joint approach** – including a multitude of tools to address the root causes of conflict – has been progressively promoted by the EU. However, the actual integration of the four dimensions and their mainstreaming into the national strategies has not been a widespread practice over recent years, and most interventions are dictated by emergency. The capacities for its implementation are still to be developed: in particular, identifying and working on the root causes of conflicts and linking release, rehabilitation and development.

Especially in recent years, the **EU has significantly contributed to conflict prevention** and peace-building, although the actual effects of such renewed action are not yet fully measurable and still appear only marginally in the evaluations available (e.g. Burundi, Haiti, Ethiopia, Colombia, Georgia).

The **EU value added in this area appears particularly strong** – for the level of neutrality of the EU, but also for its link with the regional organisations, most of which play a significant role in Conflict prevention and peace-building. This does not imply that the **co-ordination** with the other stakeholders (EU MS and others) is fully achieved, as it still is a challenge.

5.10.2 JC 101 – The EU contributed to a sustainable improvement of peace and security for the populations in partner countries

EU conflict prevention interventions in partner countries have been mainly focused on **Peace consolidation and prevention of future conflict**, partly implemented through regional and international organisations (i.e. African Peace Facility, ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework, AU peacekeeping missions in Sudan and Somalia, CEMAC operation with multinational force -FOMUC- in CAR), and Multi Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs) for reconstruction (e.g. in Southern Sudan) and post-crisis rehabilitation programmes (e.g. Haiti, East DRC, Burundi and Northern Uganda).

Flexible crisis and emergency instruments have been introduced over the years, including special procedures. As an example, the Rapid Reaction Mechanisms – Instrument for Stability (RRM-IfS) is widely considered as useful and swift, but its capacity to react sufficiently quickly was questioned in some cases (e.g. Bolivia, CAR, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Sierra Leone)⁴⁷. Early-warning mechanisms have not always enhanced the capacity to detect and react to nascent conflicts (e.g. Central African Republic 2009, Ivory Coast, Kyrgyz Republic 2010, Timor-Leste 2006 and 2008, or Georgia 2002 and 2008). Once the conflict has broken out, the reaction has been often rapid, with positive effects on stabilisation, and by means of a combination of instruments or adaptations to the initial strategy (e.g. Ivory Coast)⁴⁸.

The EU's support contributed positively to **conflict mitigation, stabilisation, reconstruction and rehabilitation** (e.g. Liberia, Angola, Sierra Leone, CAR) through capacity-building initiatives to security forces, demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of former combatants, rehabilitation of victims of conflict, law enforcement agencies, and raising-awareness activities (e.g. Timor-Leste, Burundi, Republic of Congo, Colombia). Support to the recovery of agriculture and to access to basic social services in the affected areas (e.g. Angola, Kenya) and promotion of legal agriculture (e.g. Colombia) have also contributed to enhancing security and peace.

Although it seems that, in most of the countries reviewed, EU support to the Security and Justice sectors (drug trafficking, organised crime and violence) has been appropriate, its impact has been limited/challenging due to several reasons:

- Lack of information and quality data has usually hampered EU efforts to measure progress of its actions properly (e.g. the Caribbean region);
- Failure of EU interventions to tackle chronic violence (such as in Burundi, where the improvement of the capacity of security forces has helped to improve the situation, but this has not translated into a global sense of security);

⁴⁶ Including: When (short- and long-term dimensions), What (development, political and other dimensions), Who (working with different organisation and actors), and Where (local, national, regional levels).

⁴⁷ Thematic Evaluation of the European Commission Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace Building, 2011

⁴⁸ Thematic Evaluation of the European Commission Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace Building, 2011

- Weak alignment with other donors/absence of a collective strategy guiding the action of the various internal EU services and instruments (e.g. East Timor, Georgia).

Nevertheless, there are positive results in various countries, notably through capacity-building initiatives to security forces, law enforcement agencies, and raising-awareness activities. In some countries, the EU has enabled innovative responses and has assisted in keeping lines of communication open between conflicting parties. This was achieved through the construction of social networks, thanks to the strengthening of CSOs and the promotion of spaces for dialogue and alliances between public and private institutions (e.g. Colombia, Georgia). At regional level, support to the implementation of regional programmes/initiatives, policy dialogue and advancement in regulatory frameworks have also been considered as important (e.g. Central America – SICA, with access to security-related information across countries and practical and hands-on security operations; EN region – on energy flows; ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework; the AU peacekeeping missions in Sudan and Somalia; the operation of the CEMAC multinational force, FOMUC, in the Central African Republic).

Strong **support to civil society organisations** around conflict management issues has been provided, mainly through international NGOs and specialised networks.

Despite increasing efforts, the **linking of short-term and long-term support was often challenged**, particularly because of the lack of capacity of national and regional authorities (e.g. CAR and the FOMUC/MICOPAX, ECOWAS), along with insufficient exit strategies or premature transition from rehabilitation to development. There are cases where the LRRD approach has been promoted (e.g. Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, Angola, Haiti) with mixed results. The use of the RRM-IfS has been increasingly evident in this approach (e.g. Lebanon, Pakistan or Nigeria).

Individual cases also illustrate the risk of moving too rapidly towards development, both for the Commission's strategy and for the priorities of the partner governments (e.g. Liberia, Timor-Leste).

5.10.3 JC 102 – The EU contributed to an improvement in conflict prevention and addressing their root causes by partner countries

Support has **generally not been geared to tackling the root causes of conflict**, but rather to mitigating their consequences or to the provision of “classic” development support in a conflict context⁴⁹ (e.g. Ethiopia, Timor-Leste, Burundi). Political dialogue was used to a certain extent to address root causes, but this has not been systematic.

Insufficient formal and documented conflict analyses and monitoring frameworks have led to weak understanding of the causes of conflicts. Support to national initiatives and involvement of local populations has not been systematic⁵⁰ (CPPB-2011).

Support to the **Security and Justice sector** (drug trafficking, organised crime and violence) has become more frequent over the last decade. It has often been appropriate, including attempts to establish sector-wide approaches with the use of different tools, as in Rwanda, Colombia, Honduras and South Africa (BS evaluation), including a significant participation of NSAs. Its impact is visible in several cases (e.g. South Africa), but not yet fully measurable in others. However, some challenges are clear: lack of specific capacities in the EU Delegations; information and quality data (e.g. the Caribbean region); difficulties in tackling chronic violence (e.g. Burundi); weak alignment with other donors (e.g. Timor-Leste).

⁴⁹ The frontier between “mitigating the impact of root causes” and “addressing root causes” is not always easy to establish. “Mitigating the impact of root causes” should be understood here as acting upon the consequences of the conflict (e.g. displaced persons, categories of people that have been empowered), which in turn might contribute to the conflict. “Addressing root causes” should be understood as working on the factors that have created the conflict (e.g. a dispute over territories, over natural resources). Often, “root causes” are not easy to identify, may have different layers, and different actors may have different interpretations of what the root causes of a conflict are. Thematic Evaluation of the European Commission Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace Building, 2011.

⁵⁰ Thematic Evaluation of the European Commission Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace Building, 2011.

Whenever a co-ordinated approach from the entire international community took place during or after a conflict or crisis, it yielded stronger impacts⁵¹. In this sense, a co-ordinated approach to Conflict prevention, with a shared strategy and a division of labour between the EU bodies and the EU and MS, has been particularly challenging in the **pre-EEAS period**, relying rather on exchange of information than on a real co-ordination. Common strategic frameworks and institutional instruments were established (e.g. Joint Africa-EU Strategy on Peace and Security - 2009, Africa Peace Facility), but their implementation still reflected specific MS priorities and difficulties of co-ordination. In the **post-EEAS period**, however, there are good examples of co-ordinated approaches in (post-) conflict situations (e.g. Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Rwanda). EU institutions and the EU MS did not have a shared strategy with clear objectives, leadership and joint instruments to ensure a whole-of-EU approach. Sometimes, this unco-ordinated response was due to differences in priorities and diverging positions among EU MS. Within the EU, the Commission had limited leverage – apart from its financial weight – to ensure a co-ordinated approach with the EU MS⁵².

5.11 EQ 11 – Gender equality

EQ 11	To what extent has the EU promoted gender equality?
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Main sources: Evaluation of EU Support to Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment (GEWE) in Partner Countries (2015). Country and/or regional reports provided additional examples (for example Maldives 2010 and Yemen 2015)

5.11.1 Summary answer

The EU Consensus on Development (2005) recognises gender equality as a goal in its own right, and identifies it as one of the five essential principles of development co-operation. The document also prescribes that EU-funded programmes include gender-equality impact assessments on a systematic basis, both in general and in relation to budget and sectoral aid.

The EU strategic documents for development are clear and explicit in identifying GEWE as a key objective, including the three prongs to take into account for implementation (specific actions; mainstreaming; political and policy dialogue). Despite some important GEWE results in terms of specific actions translating into measurable success, with respect to redressing inequalities and improving gender balance, the delivery on the institutional commitment and leadership of GEWE agenda is weak. This is compounded by limited gender analysis and scarce results-oriented monitoring systems based on relevant gender indicators.

No country, among the case studies of the thematic evaluation, has shown a coherent use of the three mentioned approaches: dialogue only occasionally focuses on GEWE issues, mainstreaming is limited to several sector cases, and specific actions aim at alleviating specific gender inequality situations without significant strategic effects.

5.11.2 JC 111 – The EU contributed to the integration of an effective gender sensitive approach at every level of development co-operation

The EC's Communication on the European Union's Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment in Development Co-operation recognises that, for gender mainstreaming to become effective, changes are needed in three areas: (a) political action; (b) development co-operation; (c) institutional capacity building. It highlights the need to better ensure that gender equality is mainstreamed within new aid modalities.

According to the thematic evaluation (2015), delivery on the **institutional commitment and leadership** of GEWE agenda is weak. There seems to be a mismatch between the EU's strong policy commitments and the organisational capacity to deliver on them, which results in limited GESI mainstreaming in programming and monitoring (e.g. Nepal, Maldives, Yemen, and most BS evaluations). Gender equality remains a challenging issue, with modest but

⁵¹ The Commission channeled half of its financial support through international organisations, allowing it to intervene in a co-ordinated manner in contexts where otherwise it would not have been present, but which also made it vulnerable to the drawbacks of the use of this aid modality (CPPB-2011)

⁵² Thematic evaluation of European Commission support to conflict prevention and peace-building (2011)

steady developments having been made. There are numerous gender-specific actions with significant impacts (e.g. Philippines, Afghanistan). However, many of these projects respond to “women-focused” actions, missing out on more transformative gender equality objectives and failing to include gender-sensitive indicators. EU intervention has failed to integrate the three approaches: specific actions; cross-cutting issues to mainstream in the main programmes; political and policy dialogue to maximise the results.

There are also significant questions about the **quality of GEWE contributions**, as gender analysis is rarely used to inform strategy and programming, and gender-sensitive indicators are not adequately integrated in programme/project results frameworks. The lack of clear, overarching country-level performance assessment frameworks (with clear gender-sensitive indicators, targets, and explicit links to programming) means that progress in addressing gender inequalities is hardly assessed. Despite the importance attributed to context assessments, understanding of the gender context is usually limited, which is reflected in weak/absent country strategy objectives, programmes and dialogue. As a result, windows of opportunity may be missed.

In general, while gender has been present at the design stages, it is **difficult to track its implementation**. Gender equality and equity principles have often been declared in public policies, but they have almost never been effectively implemented through specific policies and measures (e.g. Jamaica, Jordan, El Salvador, Pacific, Uganda). It can be noted that better results have been achieved when gender issues have been specifically addressed at the sectoral level, especially in education and agriculture (e.g. Angola, Botswana, Ethiopia, Malawi).

Good practices have been identified under Budget Support in Morocco (sex-disaggregated and gender equality performance indicators systematically used), Bolivia (gender-disaggregated targets for beneficiaries of support to micro-enterprises and SMEs) and Burkina Faso (the Donor Co-ordination Group on Gender is seen as a model of good practice, having reduced duplication of financing).

6 Conclusions per DAC criteria (first draft)

These conclusions build on the evidence presented in the answers to the EQs and provide a synthesis according to the DAC criteria (Relevance, Effectiveness, Impact, Sustainability and Efficiency). The additional EC criteria – including Added value, Coherence and Co-ordination/Complementarity – have been addressed in specific EQs, including the related synthetic answer.

6.1 Relevance of the Consensus-related actions

Most strategic evaluations stress the general relevance of the programmes towards the objectives of the Consensus – namely: poverty reduction, democracy and peace, and sustainable growth.

Despite the adoption of weak prioritisation criteria (see below on ownership), most **geographic evaluations** also confirm the relevance – although in general terms – of the EU country and regional strategies towards the partners' strategies (alignment) and the specific contexts and their evolution:

- A strong focus on poverty reduction is recognised as an important sign of the relevance of the programmes in ACP countries, but also in Asia and Latin America, including pro-poor support to macroeconomic stabilisation, improved public expenditure and sectoral policies, and improved equitable access to social infrastructure.
- Support to building stable and democratic states, based on the rule of law and inclusive and sustainable growth policies, is a key objective in EU co-operation programmes. It is shared with the national actors and pursued through general and sectoral instruments to boost the related reform processes in most countries and regions, including ENI South and East, Asia, Latin America and ACP.
- Widespread actions to address conflicts and building peace, both on an emergency and long-term basis, put the EU in a leading position worldwide in this area.
- Trade development and its inclusive consolidation through the support to regional organisations is a key priority in Africa, and also in Asia, in the ENI region through the access to the EU market, and in Latin America.
- Strategies on environmentally-sustainable development and adaptation to climate change have seen the EU become a leading actor worldwide.

The general relevance of the programmes, however, is often undermined by weak analytical backgrounds, weak or partial ownership of partner governments, and a limited involvement of NSAs, particularly in the identification and prioritisation phase⁵³. In many cases, the evaluations find that the governments, despite the agreements, are not fully committed to the reforms envisaged by the EU support programmes. At regional level, national priorities conflict with, or are given priority over, the regional ones. The dialogue framework, including the financial and political leverage (recently also in the case of significant joint GBS), do not seem always able to address such weaknesses.

The **thematic evaluations** note that:

- Relevance is particularly high for education, with its focus on poverty reduction, including universal primary education and gender equity. Support to secondary education has been important, but not sufficiently linked to TVET, which itself has not been well linked to the labour market.
- It is significant for health, with the exception of human resources development, which has been overlooked as the priority has been given to improved quantitative access to basic health services in the poorest areas.

⁵³ The evaluation on CSOs (2008) finds that "CSO participation in the elaboration of the CSP was rather limited in the various countries visited (except Somalia)". More recent country evaluations show that CSO participation, in the programming phase as well as in the implementation of core strategic programmes, is important in fragile and conflict contexts (e.g. Burundi, Colombia, Bolivia), while it is rather weak in others – namely, in association with GBS.

- It is significant for trade-related assistance, including its regional dimension, with a focus on poverty reduction and on the integration in the world economy.
- It is significant for transport, where some main obstacles to regional trade and economic development have been addressed, although sometimes – due to a narrow emphasis on infrastructure construction – complementary aspects have been overlooked (including institutional setup, environmental and gender-related effects).
- In private sector development, although the objectives of the specific interventions have been relevant, their coherent mainstreaming in the national strategies is still weak.
- Governance-specific interventions have relevant objectives, but are not adequately mainstreamed at country level. In addition, governance interventions appear aligned with government, but not necessarily with non-state actors, who are important in the governance processes.
- The governance evaluations and those related to budget support underline the weak link between political dialogue on governance issues and the whole co-operation programme, which would benefit from stronger political guidance and support. Such a weak link, despite some important improvements after the establishment of the EEAS, has persisted in recent years due to a structural and organisational separation between political and policy dialogue in the EU delegations, limited capacities, and reluctance of the partner governments.
- On conflict prevention and peace-building, the intervention has been generally relevant, although the investment in conflict analysis has been limited, and sometimes the alignment with partner governments in conflict-prone or post-conflict contexts has been problematic.
- On gender equity, the relevance of the intervention has been generally poor. The gender equity objectives are not mainstreamed in the country strategies, specific actions remain rather isolated, and political and policy dialogues do not give sufficient priority to the topic.
- Agriculture and rural development and energy-related policies also are not given a priority proportionate to their potential role for growth and poverty reduction. Most interventions, with few exceptions (ENPARD, Bolivia), are focused either on traditional export commodities or on specific food security areas.
- Environmental sustainability and adaptation to climate change is becoming a central concern in EU strategies and a prominent area of intervention, also financially. Its mainstreaming and its coherence with the whole programmes need to improve.

6.2 Effectiveness of the EU development action

Growth and social policies. A significant contribution has been provided mainly through budget support since the 1990s⁵⁴. Macroeconomic stabilisation and improved public financial management have been widely supported, budgetary allocations to social sectors have been protected, and policy design and implementation in health, education, water supply and food security have been enhanced, as a consequence of the provision of budget support funds, the establishment of macro and sectoral dialogue frameworks, and the execution of complementary capacity development actions.

In the last decade, however, general budget support seems to have partially lost its leverage in ACPs, especially in fast-growing countries, due to its reduced financial weight on recipients' budgets, among other reasons. There has also been a change in priorities among the partner countries and the EU MS. The former have shown a growing interest in foreign direct investment (FDI) and growth-related support (infrastructure), fostered also by the presence of

⁵⁴ Budget Support in EDF amounts to between 30% and 50% of programmable funds from the 7th to the 10th EDF, from early 1990s to 2014. In the late 2000s, its use has been widely extended to other countries, including the ENI regions. Here, it must be noted that budget support is one of the co-operation tools the effects of which - at least at the financial level - are not distinguishable between the various aid providers. The evaluations are therefore joint. The EU, being one of the main budget support providers and the biggest provider of budget support grants, is also one of the main contributors to its effects.

strong new partners on the international scene (China). The latter, under the pressure of the economic crises and the related concerns of national public opinion, have strengthened their emphasis on accountability and their preference towards modalities ensuring stricter controls on the use of funds.

Trade and regional integration. The EU has put in place a number of international agreements and schemes, with a view to enhancing the link between trade and development – different trade agreements worldwide, the association agreements with the EN countries, and the EPAs in the ACP countries. The latter, in particular, should have created new opportunities for promotion of new value chains and increased diversification of trade, attracted FDI and created regional infrastructure. The EPA process has recently received a new boost, after having encountered a number of unforeseen (or underestimated) difficulties – including the limitation of the development leverage, due to the consequences of the international economic crisis (2008-11). The establishment and consolidation of frameworks conducive to trade and private sector development have been supported, through TRA and effective implementation of SBS and other SPSP, to enhance institutional reforms and establish new international standards and procedures. However, the delays and institutional problems related to the launch of EPA, the international economic crisis (including the destabilisation of many Mediterranean countries), and the increased tension with Russia in the EN East region have combined to slow down the integration processes and limit the motivation and ownership of the partners

Private sector development has been fostered by macroeconomic and fiscal stabilisation, and also by the improved trade regulatory systems and the reinforcement of the transport networks (particularly at the regional level) All these together – including specific institutional and sector reforms – have contributed to the improvement of the local business environment and export opportunities. Recent experience with blending has provided further support directly through boosting private investment, and indirectly through contributing to energy and other essential infrastructure investments. However, the mainstreaming of PSD strategies into the main assistance programmes, support to SMEs' competitiveness and diversification of supply chains, private sector-driven employment policies and strengthening of private sector organisations have been weak.

CSOs, non-state and decentralised actors have been effectively mobilised through ad hoc programmes and specific budget lines, especially for relief and rehabilitation. However, the consolidation and mainstreaming of the strategic role of CSOs, non-state and decentralised actors in the development processes – including the identification of the country priorities and the association to the main programmes, either as watchdogs of public expenditure or as social service providers – is still a challenge.

Good governance has been pursued with determination. GBS and SBS (including new specific tools such as the State-Building Contract, in fragile states) have strongly supported PFM reform, and improved accountability and transparency of budget processes. SBS and projects, including capacity-building, have supported sector and sub-sector reforms in a number of areas, ranging from judiciary to public administration reform. Support to electoral and democratic processes has been multiplied, and the discussion on HR has covered a large share of the political dialogue in the last decade. However, good governance as a whole, including democratic and economic governance, is not systematically addressed in the political dialogue, which seems mainly focused on elections, HR and security. Mainstreaming (as in the other areas) is still a challenge, together with the quality of the strategy. In the past, this has been strongly state-centred and supply driven, with limited attention to the involvement of the non-state actors and the participation of the end-beneficiaries. Evolution of the strategy is under way, and there are positive examples of effective comprehensive sector approaches and successful involvement of civil society.

Conflict prevention and peace-building. The EU has become one of the strongest actors in this area. Between 2001 and 2010, it spent more than 10% of the EuropeAid managed budget in this area. Since the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of the EEAS, there has been a new push towards a stronger EU political initiative in Conflict prevention and an improved co-ordination with the EU MS. An integrated and joint approach – including a multitude of tools – to address the root causes of conflict has been progressive-

ly promoted by the EU. Mobilisation of civil society, particularly through specialised NGOs networks, has been a fundamental tool. However, its mainstreaming has not been a general practice over recent years, and most interventions are dictated by emergency. The capacities for its implementation are still to be developed – in particular, identifying and working on the root causes of conflicts and fragility, and linking release, rehabilitation and development.

Environmental sustainability and adaptation to climate change. The EU plays an advanced role in international programmes and has developed specific tools to enhance policies and actions in partner countries (GCCA). The use of mixed instruments has contributed to increasing the readiness and ability of the governments to implement their commitments (institutional capacity and legislative frameworks, improved management of natural resources, renewable energies, or stimulation of investments). A substantial amount of EU climate change funding, through the Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA), has been allocated to the Pacific region, on top of the regular EDF allocations. The activities of GCCA have enhanced the capacity of the Pacific region’s climate change negotiators and have helped, for example, to mobilise communities in conducting vulnerability assessments, and to ensure better mainstreaming of climate change in national policies. EU support has contributed to the creation of an environment conducive to reaching global agreements, the establishment of climate financing mechanisms, and building stronger knowledge, tools and approaches to address climate change issues. However, implementation of the environment strategy is often weak, indicating that the level of prioritisation is still modest and the adoption of improved legal frameworks is difficult in several countries. On climate change, some major challenges remain with regard to fragmentation of strategies or understanding/political will from partners’ countries.

6.3 Impacts of EU development action

The overall contribution to poverty reduction has been significant – especially in ACP countries – if one considers such aspects as the direct contributions to macroeconomic stabilisation, improved PFM, trade frameworks (including strengthening of the main transport networks), and increased public expenditure in social sectors.⁵⁵ All such public policies and country/regional capacities strengthened by, among other things, EU development co-operation have contributed to economic growth and to increased access of the poor to the basic services, thus contributing to income and non-income poverty reduction.

However, the contribution to **inclusive growth**, with increased levels of participation of the poor, accelerated reduction of the poverty incidence and reduction of inequalities⁵⁶, has been weaker. As probably could have been expected, the external EU support has not been able to influence the internal mechanisms of income distribution and the key political economy equilibria in the beneficiary societies. In particular, the productivity of labour in agriculture and SMEs’ competitiveness, with their impact on employment of poor people, has not increased

⁵⁵ Poverty reduction strategy papers, the HIPC and similar initiatives - by pooling donor resources and feeding government budgets for stabilisation and social development - have leveraged political processes and public investment to boost growth and poverty reduction since the mid-1990s in many ACPs. The EU has been one of the most, if not the most, important budget support provider aside from the multilateral financial institutions (MFI), considering the amounts and the geographical distribution of its programmes. Compared to the multilateral financial institutions, however, some important differences should be highlighted: (i) EU funds are grants and not credits; and (ii) the political risk taken by a political institution such as the EU, in addition to the financial one, when deciding a BS operation, is not comparable to the financial risk of the MFI. In other words, for the Development Banks and IMF policy, lending is part of their mandate, while for the EU and other bilateral agencies providing significant budget support implies the establishment of a political partnership.

⁵⁶ Data on income inequality in developing countries is rather controversial. According to an academic study (Facundo Alvaredo & Leonardo Gasparini, “Recent Trends in Inequality and Poverty in Developing Countries”, CEDLAS 2013), GINI coefficients have increased during the 1980s and 1990s (but many gaps in data should be considered over this period), while they have mainly decreased (i.e. inequalities have fallen) during the 2000s, with the exception of some fast-growing large economies (namely, China). A recent paper (Era Dabla-Norris, Kalpana Kochhar, Nujin, Suphaphiphat, Frantisek Ricka, Evridiki Tsounta, “Causes and Consequences of Income Inequality: A Global Perspective”, IMF Staff Discussion Note, 2015) highlights the link between increased share of income for the poor and the middle class, and increased growth rate in the medium term. Reducing inequalities is a key issue in sustainable and inclusive growth.

as it should have to support inclusive growth. Employment policies put in place by governments and supported by the EU (through TVET and other employment generation initiatives) have not been able to respond to the labour market demand, and millions of youths are unemployed.

Equitable access to basic social services. EU support has contributed to improved equitable access to basic social services (education, health, water and sanitation, food security), and thus, to improved living standards among the populations in poor countries. Over recent decades, EU support (jointly with other international partners) has provided a substantial share (although decreasing over recent years) of the development expenditure in the above-mentioned sectors in many ACP countries. Such financial support has often been complemented by policy advice and capacity development to enhance the efforts made by the country leaderships to achieve progress.

- Universal primary enrolment and gender parity in primary education have been almost achieved, with a positive impact on literacy among the youth. The quality of education, including its relationship with the employment, remains an important challenge, although it is partly a consequence of the tremendous quantitative increases.
- Strong progress has been made in reducing child mortality. In maternal health, malaria and HIV/AIDS, the progress has also been important, although the challenges remain enormous and some reversal trends are observed here and there.
- Access to safe drinking water has widely increased, although at a pace below the expectations and with a bias in favour of the urban areas.

However, the quality of institutional change remains low overall. The recent sectoral evaluations (especially health) tend to be highly critical of the capacity of basic services to meet the present and future needs in ACP countries.

Trade flows. The EU support has contributed to enhanced trade flows within the ACP area and between the ACP countries and the rest of the world. Over the last 10 years, the trade flows between the ACP region and the rest of the world have increased almost at the same pace as the world trade flows⁵⁷, and trade growth has been a main driver for economic growth across the ACPs. This has reversed a negative trend of deterioration of the position of the ACP in international trade, which had persisted since the 1970s. The evaluations contain significant evidence of the important contribution provided by EU support to trade facilitation, including enhanced trade regulations, liberalisation and capacity in the ACP countries, and the improvement of the basic transport infrastructure on the main regional axes.

In the other geographic areas, trade in developing countries has performed better than the world average, and the EU support (in EN regions, Asia and Central America) has assisted such expansion with capacity development, standards, legislative upgrading, and FTAs. The key determinant of trade growth, however, has been increased international demand, rather than increased competitiveness of developing economies. Trade facilitation is not sufficient: the diversification of supply, especially in poor countries, remains a weak feature and, according to the evaluations, it is also a weak point of the EU contribution.

Democracy and human rights. EU support has contributed to the reinforcement of democracy and human rights in ACP. The democratic process in ACP countries, although slow and lacking continuity, has progressed. Progress has been made since the 1990s, with a significant reduction of the authoritarian regimes. During the 2000s, however, the process slowed down. Anocracies – hybrid government regimes with a mixture of democratic and authoritarian features, and often vulnerable to political instability – have been established in the majority of countries destabilised by regional and internal conflicts. A small number of democracies have consolidated their positions, but a group of deeply authoritarian and some failed states persist. Overall, according to the Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU) democratic index, the standards of democracy have deteriorated in almost all regions in the last decade – although

⁵⁷ The importance of this result is often underestimated, even in some evaluations. This result shows that the ACP region has been able to participate in the extremely competitive international arena over the last 15 years without being overwhelmed, but rather consolidating its positions. Lots of things remain to be done (including trade diversification and increased value added), but the performance so far is a good base.

there have been some small improvements in Sub-Saharan Africa. In such a complex context, PFM and economic governance-related reforms have been rather successful, and electoral processes have been strengthened. Results in the area of human rights are often fragmented and compartmentalised. In judiciary and security reform, results are conditioned by the political commitment of the partners. There are also positive examples of successful EU support in complex transition processes: in Latin America (Bolivia, Columbia); in the EN East, where countries willing to lay the bases of modern, democratic states find in the EU the most solid partner; or in the EN South, where countries willing to rebuild/strengthen their path towards a competitive and inclusive society benefit from a multitude of instruments provided by the EU support.

Peace and security. EU support has contributed to peace and security stabilisation and maintenance worldwide, with a strong intensification in the last decade. The results of such renewed action are not yet fully measurable and still appear only marginally in the evaluations available (e.g. Burundi, Haiti, Ethiopia, Colombia, Georgia). In the ACP countries, particularly in Africa, the EU has contributed to an enhanced capacity for reaction by the international community, with a deep involvement of some regional organisations, and effective mobilisation for peace enforcement, post-conflict country emergency and rehabilitation, and conflict prevention networks. The EU has been one of the main partners of the African Union, and also of organisations such as ECOWAS and CEMAC, to enhance their response capacity. In non-ACP countries, there are also good examples of effective CPPB action – namely, in Bolivia, and in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Most of such responses have succeeded in mitigating the factors and effects of the conflicts, but they are still characterised by a mainly reactive approach. They do not focus on the root causes of the conflicts – including shared understanding of, and action against, regional inequalities, discrimination and imbalances. This would require, in cases such as the West Bank and Gaza Strip, a stronger EU political initiative.

6.4 Sustainability of the achievements so far

Economic achievements. Economic growth and trade increase, especially for the poor countries in conflict-prone environments, are not fully sustainable. Much of the growth recorded by poor countries in recent decades is linked to the increased international demand for their raw material, including oil, gas, other minerals, cocoa and coffee. As has been seen, such sources of growth are particularly vulnerable, while the diversification of the poor economies is still lagging behind. The productivity of labour in agriculture and the competitiveness of SMEs, where most of the work forces are concentrated, is still low. Structural changes – involving agriculture and rural development, competitive value chains, employment policies, and sustainable energy – are strongly needed.

Social achievements need to be consolidated through institutional development and enhanced quality. Evaluations show how social gains can easily be threatened if not supported by deep institutional changes and if not adequately maintained. This is happening with HIV/AIDS in many cases, but also in such areas as primary school enrolment and maternal health. The high rate of population growth in many cases is a strong factor of vulnerability and makes the achievements so far attained largely unsustainable, especially if the countries are affected by economic crises and conflicts. On the other hand, competitive businesses need up-to-date secondary and tertiary education and vocational training systems to match skills demand and supply.

Democratic processes are still very weak. Even in more advanced cases, the emerging democracies are weak. The support of solid middle classes is lacking, and the systems of checks and balances are still unripe, which makes them vulnerable to the pressure of powerful groups for state capture. Building competitive and attractive states is still a big challenge. It is a very long process that needs up-to-date, long-term international partnerships.

The root causes of instability and conflicts have not been addressed. The world is in the middle of a complex transition, with the emergence of new regional powers, new middle classes within a number of MICs, fierce resistances to change, and the clash of these emerging players in a context largely characterised by a lot of economically and institutionally weak states. As nobody knows how long this transition will take and which dimensions it will as-

sume, conflict management strategies and tools are necessary, but not sufficient. Strengthening the resilience of the existing states and regions in the ACP region is a key response, including long-term predictable support and consolidation of the endogenous institutional dynamics and growth factors.

Gender equality and women empowerment. Despite the high priority given and the means put in place, the EU contribution to possible positive impacts in this area must be considered weak.

6.5 Efficiency of the EU development actions

Ownership is limited in many cases. The evaluations show that country and regional programmes, although tailor-made, in many cases are not adequately owned (most regional evaluations). In other cases, they are not owned in their entirety – that is, ownership of specific process outputs, but not of the core reform objectives (e.g. quantitative increase in basic services, modernisation of PFM) – and at the different levels of the partner institutions, in terms of central v/s decentralised ownership. In most cases, the main programmes are not owned by the NSAs, which are involved in their respective dimensions. This is both a cause and a consequence of weak comprehensive frameworks for political and policy dialogue failing to ensure high levels of mutual accountability in programme execution. Exceptions are the joint GBS in ACPs until the late 2000s, and other comprehensive political and/or economic agreements – e.g. in South Africa, and in some European Neighbourhood and Latin American countries.

Integration of political and policy dialogue is weak. Comprehensive, high-level political dialogue does not systematically support policy dialogue and rather tends to be compartmentalised, with a focus on human rights and security issues. Policy dialogue is often delegated to lower levels – for example, monitoring and technical negotiations related to single programmes, or single conditionalities in the case of BS. Policy dialogue is often unable to go beyond the technical nature of the issues addressed, while the factors that may determine real changes and advances in reforms are related to the political commitment of the decision-makers. This is why policy dialogue needs continuous support from political dialogue. It should be considered that compliance with the technical requirements of a budget support variable tranche is much less important than the mutual political understanding about, for instance, the prioritisation of judiciary reform.

Flexibility of modalities, instruments and tools. The EU development support allows a wide diversification of funding instruments (EDF, DCI, ENP, with their sub-programmes, plus a number of complementary instruments, such as ECHO, EIB, etc.) and financing modalities (e.g. budget support, calls for tendering and proposals, including governments and other actors, contributions to other UN or MS agencies). This multiplicity of tools should permit the design and implementation of programmes tailored to the actual needs and constraints of the different contexts.

It has been found, however, that this multiplicity of tools is not always applied as efficiently as it could be. For instance, in many cases, the support to non-state actors is not adequately mainstreamed in the country strategies. Potentially complementary interventions (emergency, stabilisation and other specialised tools) are often fragmented and not sufficiently coordinated, coherent and synergic within the whole country programmes. There are various reasons for this problematic co-ordination, including the insufficient means and capacities at country level (EUDs and country ownership). See also the specific EQ on coherence.

The regional dimension has been shown to be a framework conducive to boost trade and economic infrastructure, but also peace and security. The synergies between regional and national level, however, represent an important challenge, since the regional institutions are unable to negotiate and ensure national implementation and national governments often face specific resistances and constraints to implementing regional programmes.

Efficient management is a main concern of the strategic evaluations. Delays and various inefficiencies, mainly due to the heavy administrative procedures and the lack of staff and capacities at the level of the EUDs (e.g. health, security), are often mentioned in the evaluations as bottlenecks affecting the quality of the programming and implementation cycle.

Efficient monitoring and evaluation systems are in place. The ROM mechanism and the strategic evaluations are the core of a system that is expected to feed a continuous learning process, and which represents a key asset of the CPA. Data on development results, however, is not easily available, as this would require specific arrangements and research programmes with the partner countries. This represents a recurrent challenge for many strategic evaluations. The existing feedback loops at all levels, including HQs and countries, do not seem able to ensure the expected learning outcomes.

6.6 EU value added and 3Cs, in the framework of the Consensus

EU added value is clearly assessed in most strategic evaluations. Beyond the sectors where EU has a specific mandate (trade and regional co-operation), the EU added value is related to some key features of the EU development policy: the soft political profile, which does not reflect narrow and traditional economic and political national interests; the critical mass of the financial aid; the worldwide presence; the potential for bringing together and co-ordinating some of the strongest international donors. Such added value manifests itself in support to sensitive complex reform processes (ENI, Latin America), in addressing delicate conflict prevention and peace building contexts (West Africa), in supporting comprehensive and/or sectoral development strategies (ACP, through budget support), and in contributing to global initiatives in areas such as environment and health. The EU added value has demonstrated its full potential when co-ordination and complementarities with EU-MS and other donors have been high. This has improved greatly in the last decade. There are areas, however, where added value could be particularly high, but its actual implementation is hampered by some clear and recurrent limitation factors. In areas where the EU could draw on its own diversified and advanced experience, such as PSD, there is sometimes little co-ordination between DEVCO and other DGs to channel EU internal expertise in development co-operation. On the other hand, when the EU addresses complex political situations, such as in Palestine and the West Bank and Gaza Strip, it provides the bulk of the development assistance, but its political role is not proportional to the level of its support.

6.7 Assessment of the IL assumptions

The IL identifies three main assumptions as essential conditions for the successful implementation of the Consensus's logical process, from inputs to impact:

- **FIRST ASSUMPTION.** The framework of principles and values established in the Consensus, including the links between peace, security and development and the reference to human rights and fundamental freedoms, will continue to be adhered to by the parties.

There is little up-to-date information in the evaluations about possible interruptions or weaknesses in the reference of the EU programmes and the related implementation to the framework of principles and values established by the Consensus. There is evidence (Human Rights and Justice and Security System Reform, 1011) that, in the last decade, the consideration of the framework of principles has increased in the EU co-operation programmes, and specific tools have been developed – for example, the State-Building Contract and the sector policy support programmes in areas such as good governance and democracy, including justice and rule of law, elections. At geographic level, there is information on Timor-Leste, Angola, Nigeria, the Pacific region, and also ENPI, Georgia, Colombia and Bolivia. In the latter three countries, the nexus mentioned in the assumption is the guidance of the EU interventions in some complex and extremely delicate situations. There are problems of mutual commitment that may arise between the EU and partner countries, as a consequence of divergent assessments and various contextual factors. These have been mentioned as the cause of some recurrent weaknesses related to limited ownership and commitment by the partners (governments and civil society), and difficulties in political and policy dialogue. In particular, weak involvement of the EU in high-level political dialogue, a weak link between political dialogue and programming, a 'ghettoisation' of the human rights and democracy action, and a weak policy framework for JSSR are mentioned (HR and JSSR cited above) as the main weaknesses related to the verification of this assumption. A further criticism expressed by strategic evaluations affects this verification, in the fields of human rights and jus-

tice and security. This relates to the fact that the analytical and strategic capabilities of the EU staff involved remain low.

- **SECOND ASSUMPTION.** Interest and commitment of the parties will be maintained, adapted and developed throughout the evolution of the context.

In most evaluations, this assumption is confirmed as a strong argument to assess the relevance of the programmes. There is particular attention by the parties to review and update the priorities in order to fit the actual context. Indeed, there are some areas where, in particular cases, the analysis of the context is considered inadequate, as mentioned above (e.g. human rights, security, but also health). This may negatively affect the design and the relevance of the programmes. There are also many areas where the actual results are not collected (through specific research and assessments) and are not available to inform and push forward the political and policy dialogue. In some recent joint budget support evaluations (e.g. Uganda, Burkina Faso, Mozambique), it appears that the BS global partnership has overlooked some key growth and development priorities and/or challenges of the partners, such as energy and agriculture, including the access to foreign direct investment. The same programmes that were very successful between the mid-1990s and 2000s (in the framework of the HIPIC, with a focus on universal primary education and primary health care) were no longer able to update and respond to the new political and economic challenges of their fast-growing partner countries. In addition, updating the strategic framework may not be sufficient, as it needs a strong ownership and commitment by the partners (governments and civil society). There are programmes that respond very well to the evolution of country priorities, but are not prioritised in government agendas, as there are situations where government ownership is not enough without a strong support from the civil society (as noted in the JSSR-2011, or – in a positive way – in BS in South Africa-2014).

- **THIRD ASSUMPTION.** Mobilisation of key actors in partner countries (i.e. governments, parliaments, local authorities and civil society) will be continuous.

This is the assumption for which the evaluations provide less positive feedbacks. Despite recent significant progress, both in terms of strategy and implementation, the EU approach is seen sometimes as state-centred, seeking the participation of CSOs and LAs only in specific programmes (e.g. direct support to communities, local development). In addition, the evaluations show also that the role of parliaments – for instance, in policy scrutiny and oversight of public expenditure – is only partially promoted. The same applies to the local authorities, for which the lack of capacity and initiative may be crucial – for instance, for the delivery of basic services.

This assessment of the assumptions should be taken into account when reading the report, and for future recommendations. It identifies two main bottlenecks to the successful implementation of the logical process of the Consensus: (1) a sometimes weak partnership framework, not adequately supported by informed and high-level political dialogue and by informed and strategic policy dialogue; (2) a limited participation in the partnership framework by some key actors – civil society, parliaments and local authorities – of the development processes beyond the governments..

7 Main information gaps

Limits of the present Synthesis

The information in the strategic evaluations is mostly qualitative. Each evaluation has its own set of investigation priorities (shown in the formulation of the EQs), which enhances the relevance of the evaluation towards its specific subject (country, region, theme), but makes the comparative analysis and the synthesis more difficult.

According to DEVCO evaluation methodology, the assessment in the EQs responds to the basic evaluation criteria, but it is not structured according to them, as this would be difficult to manage and would imply a lot of repetitions. This means that the EQs are built around the key issues addressed, and often the analyses contain a mix of relevance, effectiveness and other considerations, which may be difficult to disentangle.

In addition, until very recently, the strategic evaluations do not contain conclusions structured according to the standard evaluation criteria.

The type of synthesis carried out has been determined by these limits:

- The EQs of the Synthesis do not contain quantitative references to the number of reports supporting specific assessments or the ranking of evidence, as this would be impossible, given the previously mentioned non-comparability of the country reports and, of course, the uniqueness of most thematic reports.
- The EQs are not structured according to the standard evaluation criteria, although they contain clearly identifiable sentences on the specific evaluation criteria. Those EQs that – according to the ToR – coincide with specific evaluation criteria (1, and partly 2, 3 and 4) represent an exception, and have, of course, been addressed accordingly.
- The conclusions of the synthesis are structured according to the standard evaluation criteria. They build on the EQs and, in the case of the EQ1, almost coincide.

Given the low comparability of the reports and the impossibility of quantifying (ranking) the evidence, the Synthesis uses qualitative terms – as is done in the evaluation reports with terms such as “many”, “most”, “few”) – to identify the key features of the Consensus implementation.

Evidence

As stated in the methodology, this review builds on the evidence gathered from 145 strategic evaluation reports⁵⁸ (), of which 111 were screened for the Cotonou review and the remainder read for the Consensus review. As a logical consequence, most of the information gaps identified in the final report on Cotonou also apply to the review of the Consensus. For example, it is important to note that the level of evidence within the different EQs may differ, in the same way as it did for Cotonou. For instance, while a large and detailed amount of information can be found in terms of macroeconomic stability or coverage, quality and access to basic social infrastructure and services, much less information is explicitly available on the levels of fragility in different countries, and the EU contribution to the reduction of those levels. This can be explained by the fact that some of the EQs refer to focused sectors of intervention for which tracking of performance is possible. Others, conversely, refer to less explicit sectors of action, such as fragility and governance, or to highly-traditional transversal issues (i.e. gender, environment, climate change) for which specific information is rather fragmented and not always easy to aggregate.

Limited number of reports

More than a third of the evaluation reports specifically read for the Consensus review (13 out of 34) have been useful only as a comparative reference, because they covered periods before 2007. Even though this has allowed the evaluation team to track continuity and relevant changes between the Consensus and the period before, it has significantly reduced the number of sources for identifying actual evidence-based findings from non-ACP areas on the

⁵⁸ The reports cover the period between 2000 and 2016. Eighteen of them relate to the period before 2007 and have been considered to highlight the actual evolution after the Consensus.

Consensus period itself. Whereas this impact is negligible on sectors with a general abundance of information (for example, in terms of macroeconomic stability, or quality and access to basic social infrastructure and services), it has clearly been felt for the less explicit sectors of action, such as governance or traditional transversal issues (e.g. gender). Therefore, the difference in the level of evidence for EQs that also existed for the Cotonou review is even further accentuated in the Consensus review.

Sectoral information gaps

There are themes where the information is limited, either because of the insufficient number of recent reports, or because of limited information on specific subjects in the reports.

Food security, agriculture and rural development are relatively important areas in terms of expenditure, but they have not been evaluated for a long time, with the exception of the evaluation on internationally-traded agricultural commodities, which addresses a limited subject. The information available comes from the country evaluations and the joint budget support evaluations, and refers to the specific contexts – although the number of analyses available, especially for BS, converge to confirm some general assessments synthesised in the relevant EQs.

For *PSD, Regional Co-operation, democratic Governance (HR, Rule of Law)*, there is a general gap of information on the actual results, in terms of outcomes and impacts. In contrast, information is abundant on direct and indirect outputs, including policy and institutional changes. The evaluation reports underline that performance-based monitoring systems, particularly in these sectors, are not in place, or do not have an adequate focus on results.

In the other sectors, the information contained in the strategic evaluations is exhaustive and/or easy to complete and integrate through the use of supplementary sources.

8 Lessons learned

Some key lessons are identified in relation to the issues addressed by the EQs. These are thematic and/or sectoral conclusions that may help in shaping future responses built on the past experience, as shown in the strategic evaluations.

8.1 General lessons

On the strategies and the general approach

There are few country cases where the EU development co-operation strategy has not been assessed as being aligned with partners' strategy and/or consistent with the Consensus objectives and principles. There are, however, many cases where the mutual commitment on the objectives stated in such strategy is assessed as not adequate to ensure continuous dialogue and convergent action for effective implementation.

The lesson is that strong partnerships are needed between the EU and the key partner actors (governments, non-state and decentralised actors) to ensure ownership and mutual accountability, since the identification of the programmes and throughout their implementation. Important partnerships are found where strong comprehensive frameworks of mutual interest, supported by significant financial support and high-level dialogue, are established, such as: the association agreements, some strategic partnership agreements, and – in the ACP countries – the general budget support.

Such comprehensive partnerships, however, need to be updated – as shown especially in the joint BS evaluation – so as to respond to the new challenges faced by the partners and to keep a level of leverage proportionate to their needs and reasonable ambitions.

To strengthen the partnership framework, a full implementation of the EU added value is necessary. One of the features of the latter is the potential EU capacity to pull together the MS, ensuring multiplication of, and synergy among, the EU and MS development co-operation programmes.

Joint programming

The importance of joint programming between EU and member states is strongly stressed in the Consensus and the Agenda for Change. Indeed, it has started to be planned and partly implemented, as shown by the recent evaluations⁵⁹. There is a general consensus at country level on the opportunity of joint programming, and significant joint actions have been put in place in the last decade – including joint assessments and enhanced consultations.

The importance of a strong step forward in joint programming should be stressed as fundamental to enhancing the relevance, the value added and the leverage of the EU development co-operation. On the other hand, specific modalities may be tested, so as to manage different needs – establishing a joint programme including well-complemented actions, and addressing specific differences at the level of institutional procedures and preferences.

Multiplicity of instruments and tools, and the role of delegations

The multiplicity of financing instruments and implementation tools that characterise the EU development co-operation is a factor of flexibility and strategic diversification. However, it is also a source of complexity and sometimes of inconsistencies (e.g. weak country level coherence of programmable and non-programmable aid). A stronger co-ordination capacity at the level of the EU delegations would help overcome such a gap. The evaluations do not provide any hint on how to achieve such a strengthening, but they do highlight its importance.

8.2 Thematic and sectoral lessons

Focus on poverty reduction

Since the mid-1990s, EU development co-operation has supported country-level poverty reduction strategies, including support to PFM, macro-economic stabilisation (which has favoured growth and income poverty reduction), and access for the poor to basic services

⁵⁹ Although the relevant information in the evaluation reports is limited.

(which has reduced non-income poverty). Other complementary contributions have been important as well in, for example, the fields of trade and transport.

The EU contribution has been weaker in supporting the productive sectors – namely, to boost employment for the poor, agriculture productivity and rural development, and SMEs' competitiveness, including energy and employment policies. These areas should be given higher priority to cement the close link established by the Consensus between poverty reduction and sustainable development, including reducing inequalities.

Trade and regional integration

Support to trade – including facilitation of trade agreements, establishment of standards, capacity-building, consolidation of regional organisations – has been a key priority area in EU development co-operation, where the EU has shown one of the highest added values.

Some weaknesses should be addressed, however, to strengthen the effectiveness of the EU action:

- In the area of regional co-operation, especially in Africa, the added value of the regional organisations should be reinforced, and the best-performing ones should be helped to strengthen their specific capacities and institutional setup (EPAs are an instrument in such a perspective, but also the role of some regional organisation in such areas as conflict prevention and peace-building).
- Trade rules contribute to facilitating trade for competitive economies. Trade support should be combined with support to a competitive private sector in poor countries, including promotion of export diversification and innovative supply chains.

Health and education

Support for access to primary education and basic health services for the poor has been one of the most successful contributions of the EU development co-operation to poverty reduction. The focus has been put on quantitative increase, to support governments' strategies under the constraints of relatively poor means and the huge pressure of population growth. Such a quantitative approach, however, is at risk of failure – for example, the generation of further problems as a result of increased youth unemployment.

There is an urgent need to focus on sound sectoral policies and human resource development in the social sectors – for example, social protection systems, reforms of secondary education (including the involvement of the private sector), the upgrading of health and education staff, improved sectoral management, and civil society participation. Comprehensive medium-term reforms suitable to the different country contexts have to be put in place, and the EU has a variety of national models that could inspire analysis of the alternatives and the strategic options.

Good governance

Support to good governance has increased in terms of country prioritisation and share in the global allocations. It appears, however, to be still fragmented under specific actions, especially when democratic governance (e.g. respect of human rights, the rule of law) is involved. In the area of economic governance, improvement of PFM is well established as a central priority in the development co-operation programmes. It is owned by partners and is mainstreamed at sectoral level, but transparency, the fight against corruption, the strengthened role of the oversight bodies and the parliaments, and participation of CS in the budgeting process are still weak in many countries.

Apart from the sectoral dialogue on the individual programmes, in most ACP and other countries where there are not specific agreements (e.g. association), the governance objectives of the development co-operation are not systematically monitored and addressed through the high-level political dialogue. This is despite the fact that the EU has put in place a number of high-level tools and procedures to analyse and monitor the governance reform (such as the risk management framework associated to budget support, and carried out jointly with MS).

Establishing an explicit shared set of governance priorities and objectives – as set out in the agreed development co-operation strategy and programmes – to be systematically monitored

and discussed at high level between the parties would help decompartmentalise and increase effectiveness of the related support policies.

Environment and climate change

The EU is one of the most dynamic actors worldwide in promoting stronger prioritisation of environment and climate change in national agendas and governments' commitments, particularly since 2009 and in view of the COP21 agreement. It is particularly active at multinational level and has developed the Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA) as a specific instrument.

As the focus is on country-level adaptation to climate change and adoption of comprehensive natural resource management strategies, the key issue is country ownership and mainstreaming of the environment and climate change priorities into national strategies. This is a priority of GCCA, although it remains an difficult challenge, especially for environment.

Peace and security

Through its development co-operation, the EU is a prominent actor in conflict prevention and peace building (CPPB). A clear "integrated" approach has been established to take into account the various factors of the crises and the different dimensions of the intervention. Funds have increased a lot in the last decade, reaching about 10% of the DEVCO managed budget. The EU has a particular added value in this area, for its specific soft-power and somewhat neutral profile, and for its potential to pull together the EU member states.

The actual interventions, however, are still dominated by emergency, and medium-term actions on the root causes of conflicts should be strengthened. The political initiative of the EU that should substantiate its potential co-ordination role with regard to the member states should also be strengthened.

Participation of non-state and decentralised actors

Participation of non-state and decentralised actors in the development co-operation programmes has been given a higher priority in the last decade. It has been mainly concentrated, however, in specific areas, such as local development, relief and rehabilitation, and it has not been mainstreamed in the main programmes (although in the 2014-20 MFF there are changes in that direction). According to the evaluations, country programmes have remained mainly focused on central governments, especially in terms of identification of the country strategies and involvement in the main programmes (e.g. complementary participation to budget support, budget scrutiny, key sectoral programmes in justice and security, social service delivery). However, this should not overshadow important good practices in such fields.

Experience shows that there are several aspects of critical importance: 1) starting from the specific context and involving CSOs from the stage of negotiation and conclusion of the country level partnerships; 2) understanding "who is who" in civil society; 3) managing the politics of using the CSO channel (particularly in hostile environments); 4) adopting a participatory approach to programming CSO support; 5) combining diverse engagement strategies in close co-operation with stakeholders, integrating as much as possible central and local governments, state and civil society institutions, with a focus on complementarities and synergies. Co-ordination at delegation level to ensure adequate integration of the different instruments and funding envelopes should be strengthened.

Gender equality

Gender equality and women's empowerment issues are strongly prioritised in the Consensus and there are some important GEWE results in specific actions, with measurable success related to redressing inequalities and improving gender balance. The delivery on the institutional commitment and leadership of the GEWE agenda, however, is weak, and this is compounded by limited gender analysis and scarcity of results-oriented monitoring systems based on relevant gender indicators.

The lesson is that a special focus on the practical capacity (human resources, methods and tools) of the EU development co-operation to address GEWE priorities in planning and implementation is needed to raise the delivery of the GEWE agenda to the high level of priority given to it.

9 Annexes

9.1 Annex 1: List of evaluation reports analysed for the review

The following tables shows the evaluation reports analysed for the review on the Cotonou Partnership Agreement and the review of the European Consensus for Development.

Table 6 List of evaluation reports analysed for the Cotonou review

<i>Evaluation title</i>	<i>Year</i>
Thematic Evaluations and evaluations of aid modalities	
Evaluation de la coopération Nord-Sud en matière de lutte contre l'expansion de l'épidémie du VIH/SIDA et aide aux politiques et programmes démographiques dans les pays en développement	2000
Evaluation of EC Food Aid Security Policy, Food Aid Management and Programmes in support of Food Security	2000
External evaluation of community aid concerning positive actions in the field of human rights and democracy in the ACP countries	2000
Evaluation of voter education in the context of EU electoral support	2001
Synthesis report on EC activities in the field of human rights, democracy and good governance	2001
Evaluation de la coopération de la communauté européenne en matière d'appui institutionnel aux Ordonnateurs Nationaux et Régionaux du Fonds Européen de Développement	2002
Evaluation of EC support to the education sector in ACP countries	2002
Evaluation of the EC cooperation with ACP/ALA/MED countries in the health sector	2002
Evaluation of the relationship between country programmes and fisheries agreements	2002
Evaluation des actions de réhabilitation et de reconstruction financées par la Communauté européenne dans les pays ACP/ALA/MED/TACIS	2003
Joint evaluation of external support to basic education in developing countries	2003
Thematic evaluation of the integration of gender in EC development co-operation with third countries	2003
Evaluation of the EC interventions in the transport sector in third countries	2004
Evaluation of the environment and forest regulations	2004
Evaluation of trade-related assistance by the European Commission in third countries	2004
Thematic evaluation of food-aid policy and food-aid management and special operations in support of food security	2004
Thematic evaluation of population and development oriented programmes in EC external co-operation	2004
Evaluation of European Community support to private sector development in third countries	2005
Evaluating co-ordination and complementarity of country strategy papers with national development priorities	2006
Evaluation of European Commission support to micro-project programmes under the EDF in ACP countries	2006
Joint evaluation of co-ordination of trade capacity building in partner countries	2006
Joint evaluation of general budget support	2006
Thematic evaluation of the EC support to good governance	2006
Thematic evaluation of the water and sanitation sector	2006
Evaluation of the Commission support for statistics in third countries	2007
Evaluation thématique développement rural et agricole	2007
Evaluation of Commission's aid delivery through development banks and EIB	2008
Evaluation of Commission's external co-operation with partner countries through the organisations of the UN family	2008

<i>Evaluation title</i>	<i>Year</i>
Evaluation of EC aid delivery through civil society organisations	2008
Evaluation of EC support to partner countries in the area of energy	2008
Synthesis of the geographical evaluations managed by the Evaluation Unit during the period 1998-2006	2008
Thematic evaluation of European Commission support to conflict prevention and peace-building	2009
Mid-term evaluation of the Investment Facility and EIB own resources operations in ACP countries and the OCTs	2010
Thematic global evaluation of European Commission support to the education sector in partner countries (including basic and secondary education)	2010
Evaluation conjointe des opérations d'aide budgétaire au Mali	2011
Study on legal instruments and lessons learned from evaluations managed by the Joint Evaluation Unit	2011
Thematic evaluation of European Commission support to conflict prevention and peace-building	2011
Thematic evaluation of European Commission support to justice and security system reform	2011
Thematic evaluation of the European Commission support to respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms (including solidarity with victims of repression)	2011
Thematic global evaluation of European Commission support in the sectors of ESI (employment and social inclusion) in partner countries (including vocational training)	2011
Evaluation methodology and baseline study of the EC technical co-operation support	2012
Evaluation of Commission's co-operation with the Council of Europe	2012
Evaluation of visibility of EU external action	2012
Thematic evaluation of the European Commission support to the health sector	2012
Thematic global evaluation of European Commissions support to agricultural commodities in ACP countries	2012
Thematic global evaluation of the Commission support to decentralisation processes	2012
Evaluation of the EU's support to private sector in third countries	2013
Evaluation of the EU's trade-related assistance in third countries	2013
Joint evaluation of budget support to Tanzania	2013
Thematic global evaluation of the European Union's support to integrated border management and fight against organised crime	2013
Independent evaluation of budget support in Mozambique	2014
Evaluation de l'appui budgétaire au Burkina Faso*	2015
Evaluation of EU support to gender equality and women's empowerment in partner countries	2015
Evaluation of EU support to the transport sector in Africa*	2015
Joint evaluation of budget support to Uganda	2015
Thematic evaluation of the EU support to environment and climate change in third countries*	2015
Geographic evaluations	
Ghana	2005
CBI in Southern and Eastern Africa	2000
PALOP	2001
Caribbean	2005 & 2012
Benin	2005
Mali	2006
Rwanda	2006
Mauritius, Seychelles and Comoros	2006

<i>Evaluation title</i>	<i>Year</i>
West Africa	2008
Central African Republic	2009
Chad	2009 & 2015*
Tanzania	2006
Central Africa	2006
SADC	2007
Eastern and Southern Africa, Indian Ocean	2008
Guyana	2008
Pacific	2007 & 2015
Senegal	2010
Djibouti	2012
Botswana	2009
Burkina Faso	2001 & 2010
Liberia	2010
Nigeria	2010
OCTs	2011
Niger	2010
Mozambique	2000 & 2007
Namibia	2001 & 2009
Uganda	2001 & 2009
Republic of Congo	2012
Angola	2009
Dominican Republic	2000 & 2011
Zambia	2012
Jamaica	2006 & 2012
Madagascar	2015
Malawi	2003 & 2011
Caribbean 2	2003-2010
Burundi	2014
Cameroon	2014
Democratic Republic of Congo	2014
Timor-Leste	2015
Ethiopia	2004 & 2012
Haiti	2014
Kenya	2014
Lesotho	2004 & 2015
Togo	2014

Table 7 Additional evaluation reports analysed for the European Consensus for Development

<i>Short evaluation title</i>	<i>Evaluation period</i>	<i>Publication year</i>
Strategic evaluation of the EU co-operation with Moldova ⁶⁰	2000-2006	2007
Strategic evaluation of the EU co-operation with Jordan*	1996-2006	2007
Strategic evaluation of the EU co-operation with India*	1991-2005	2007
Strategic evaluation of the EU regional co-operation in Central America*	1996-2006	2007
Strategic evaluation of EU Co-operation with China*	1998-2006	2007
Synthesis of geographical evaluations*		2008
Strategic evaluation of the EU co-operation with Malaysia*	1997-2007	2009
Strategic evaluation of the EU co-operation with the LAO PDR*	2000-2006	2009
Evaluation of the Council regulation N°2698/2000 (MEDA II) and its implementation*	2000-2006	2009
Strategic evaluation of the EU co-operation with Nicaragua*	1998-2006	2009
Strategic evaluation of the EU co-operation with Vietnam*	1996-2008	2009
Strategic evaluation of the EU co-operation with Thailand*	1997-2007	2009
Strategic evaluation of the EU co-operation with ASEAN Region*	2000-2007	2009
Strategic evaluation of the EU co-operation with Egypt	1998-2008	2010
Strategic evaluation of the EU co-operation with Ukraine	2002-2009	2010
Strategic evaluation of the EU co-operation with Maldives	1999-2009	2010
Strategic evaluation of the EU co-operation with El Salvador	1998-2008	2010
Strategic evaluation of the EU co-operation with the Philippines	2002-2009	2011
Strategic evaluation of the EU co-operation with Tunisia	1995-2008	2011
Strategic evaluation of the EU co-operation with Colombia	2002-2011	2012
Strategic evaluation of the EU co-operation with Ecuador	2003-2010	2012
Strategic evaluation of the EU co-operation with Honduras	2002-2010	2012
Strategic evaluation of the EU co-operation with Nepal	2002-2010	2012
Strategic evaluation of the EU co-operation with East and South ENPI regions	2004-2010	2013
Strategic evaluation of EU Co-operation with Bolivia	2007-2013	2007&2014
Strategic evaluation of the EU co-operation with the occupied Palestinian Territory and support to the Palestinian people	2008-2013	2014
Strategic evaluation of the EU co-operation with Asia	2007-2012	2014
Strategic evaluation of the EU co-operation with Georgia	2007-2013	2015
Strategic evaluation of the EU's Co-operation with Central America	2007-2013	2015
Strategic evaluation of the EU co-operation with Yemen	2002-2012	2015
Strategic evaluation of the EU co-operation with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan	2007-2013	2015
Strategic evaluation of EU support to the transport sector in Africa	2005-2013	2016
Strategic evaluation of EU support to Research and Innovation for development in partner countries	2007-2013	2016
Blending evaluation	2007-2014	2016

⁶⁰ Evaluation reports with an “*” have been useful as counterfactuals.

9.2 Annex 2: Final evaluation matrix

EQ1	To what extent has EU action added value and been co-ordinated and complementary to that of the Member States?
JC11	Evidence of additional value resulting from the EU intervention(s), compared to what could be achieved by Member States at national and/or regional levels.
JC12	Co-ordination and complementarity with the MS and other donors' action.
EQ2	To what extent has EU action contributed to improve coherence and policy coherence for development?
JC 21	Coherence within the same financing instrument (e.g. regional vs national) and with other financing instruments.
JC22	Wider EU policies and international positions (e.g. agriculture, security, environment, etc.) coherent with EU policy objectives concerning development.
EQ3	To what extent has EU action promoted the Aid Effectiveness Agenda, including ownership and partnership?
JC31	Partnership framework supporting programming, implementation and monitoring.
JC32	Actual ownership of recipients (governments and NSAs)
JC33	Evidence related to other Aid Effectiveness criteria (e.g. commitment to results, mutual accountability, etc.)
EQ4	To what extent has the design and implementation of EU interventions adequately delivered on poverty reduction and addressed the needs of the most vulnerable groups?
JC41	EU contributed to the overall reduction of poverty
JC42	EU contributed to economic inclusive growth thereby reducing income poverty
JC43	EU contributed to reducing food insecurity and vulnerability to food crises
JC44	EU contributed to tackling the roots of and to reducing fragility
EQ5	To what extent has EU action enabled the partner countries to play a full part in international trade and fostered regional integration?
JC51	EU contributed to the strengthening of regional trade and integration frameworks
JC52	EU contributed to increased trade and investment flows, including key infrastructure, attractiveness of FDI and promotion of PPPs
JC53	EU contributed to the conclusion of WTO-compatible Economic Partnership Programmes
EQ6	To what extent has EU action contributed to improved coverage, quality and access to basic social infrastructure and services (health, education, social protection)?
JC61	EU contributed to the increase in availability of health and education services
JC62	EU contributed to increase equitable access to health and education services
JC63	EU contributed to the establishment of effective quality assurance systems

JC64	EU contributed to the integration of population issues in development strategies and policies
JC65	EU contributed to private sector and civil society organisations having a meaningful impact on preparation and implementation of policies related to social infrastructures and services
JC66	EU contributed to increasing employment especially for the youth and effective social protection
EQ7	To what extent has EU action contributed to private sector development and the development of productive sectors in partner countries, such as agriculture, energy, and infrastructure?
JC71	EU contributed to the provision of timely responses, at a reasonable cost, to the challenges faced by the private sector, including removal of obstacles and access of formal and informal SMEs to innovative and effective financial and economic services
JC72	EU contributed to strengthening the agricultural and rural development policies with a view to enhance inclusive growth and food security
JC73	EU contributed to private sector and civil society organisations having a meaningful impact on preparation and implementation of policies related to economic growth and private sector development
JC74	EU contributed to strengthening the role of regional, sub-regional & continental organisations to support development standards and opportunities
EQ8	To what extent has EU action contributed to strengthening environmentally-sustainable development and adapting to climate change?
JC81	EU contributed to the mainstreaming of environmental sustainability into all aspects of development co-operation and support programmes and projects implemented by various actors
JC82	EU contributed to the strengthening of policies and implementation of support programmes to mitigate and adapt to the consequences of, and the threat posed by, climate change
EQ9	To what extent has EU action contributed to the promotion of human rights, democracy, rule of law and good governance, including the participation of civil society in partner countries' development?
JC91	EU contributed to establishing of a democratic and efficient governance framework, including modernised PA, independent and effective justice as well as transparent and efficient PFM (old JC81)
JC92	EU contributed to an improvement in the field of human rights, democratic principles (originally one JC split into two)
JC93	EU contributed to an improvement in the field of rule of law and good governance
EQ10	To what extent has the implementation of different instruments and approaches improved peace and security in developing countries/regions and has enhanced their capacity to cope with crises in particular in fragile states?
JC101	EU contributed to a sustainable improvement of peace and security for the populations in partner countries
JC102	EU contributed to an improvement in conflict prevention and addressing their root causes by partner countries
EQ11	To what extent has the EU promoted gender equality?
JC111	EU contributed to the integration of an effective gender sensitive approach at every level of development co-operation

