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Acronyms and Abbreviations

AA	Association Agreement
AAAA	Addis Ababa Agenda for Action
AFD	Agence Française de Développement
CA	Comprehensive Approach
CC	Council Conclusion/s
CPA	Country Programmable Aid
CS	Civil Society
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DP	Development Partner
DEVCO	Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development
DoL	Division of Labour
EC	European Commission
EEAS	European External Action Service
EU	European Union
EQ	Evaluation Question
FTI	Fast Track Initiative
HLF	High Level Forum
HoC	Head of Cooperation
HoM	Head of Mission
HQ	Headquarters
IL	Intervention Logic
ISG	Inter-Services Steering Group
JA	Joint Analysis
JAS	Joint Assistance Strategy
JC	Judgment Criterion/a
JP	Joint Programming
JR	Joint Response
J(C)S	Joint (Coordination) Strategy
KfW	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau
MS	Member State/s
NDS	National Development Strategy (Plan/Policy)
NIP	National Indicative Programme
PC	Partner Country
PCG	Partner Country Government
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
TA	Technical Assistance
ToC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference
TS	Technical Seminar

Executive Summary

Objectives

This evaluation was commissioned by the Evaluation Unit of the European Commission's Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development. It evaluates the European Union's (EU) **Joint Programming process** during the period **2011-2015**. It covers all regions and countries of EU development cooperation. It aims at providing the EU and the wider public with an overall independent assessment of the Joint Programming process, and, on this basis, to provide recommendations to improve current and inform the future Joint Programming process.

Context

Joint Programming of development cooperation is a longstanding commitment by the EU and its Member States in support of the international aid and development effectiveness agenda. The EU presented a renewed commitment to Joint Programming in its **European Union Common Position**, which was a policy statement to the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan in 2011. It provides the Joint Programming framework including its context, scope and principles. Its core elements are (i) *Joint analysis of and joint response to a partner country's national development strategy identifying priority sectors of intervention* - together they form what is called a *joint strategy*; (ii) *In-country division of labour: who is working in which sectors*; and (iii) *Indicative financial allocation per sector and donor*. The joint analysis and joint response are primarily developed at partner country level by EU delegation and Member States representatives in the country. As of end of 2015, 55 countries had agreed to carry out Joint Programming, and of these 26 were seen to be far enough along that they could be included in the evaluation.

Methodological Approach

This evaluation followed the European Commission's Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development's methodological guidelines for complex evaluations. It applied an Intervention Logic (or Theory of Change) analysis to define a set of eight Evaluation Questions with Judgment Criteria and Indicators against which data were collected. Conclusions are based on the responses to the Evaluation Questions, and Recommendations in turn on these conclusions.

The team combined five tools to collect and analyse data: (i) **documentary review** of general documentation and on **14 country case studies**; (ii) **interviews** with EU and Member States headquarters, and country-level staff and stakeholders; (iii) **process tracing** in 2 country case studies; (iv) a **web-based survey** to EU and Member States headquarters and country-level staff; and (v) **visits** to seven Member States headquarters and to eleven Joint Programming implementing partner countries.

The main **challenge** of the evaluation has been the short history of the Joint Programming process. This means that there is limited evidence yet on results of the Joint Programming process. The evaluation has therefore focused on countries where Joint Programming processes were reaching a certain stage and were expected to begin producing some results.

Overall Assessment

In the vast majority of countries examined, the Joint Programming process has proven to be very valuable for the EU and Member States. It owed in particular to the closer interaction and better understanding of each donor's cooperation, and of investment in a common vision. Indeed, the production of the Joint Programming roadmap and the Joint Analysis have contributed to a clearer view amongst the EU, its Member States and some associated donors (such as Norway and Switzerland) about each other's cooperation portfolios, the drivers for cooperation and the particular cooperation strengths and limitations of each donor. This work has enabled the EU, Member States and associated donors to work closely together, to reach a consensus on the Partner Country's challenges and how to respond to them as a joined effort, even if not yet joined implementation. It has also helped to make EU and Member States aid more harmonised, working towards commonly agreed objectives and adopting commonly agreed strategic approaches. Even though this might not yet have led to improved aid effectiveness indicators (number of sectors/donor, number of donors/sector), it has led to an improved division of labour within sectors and laid the foundation for more effective aid and more effective development. The Joint Programming process has also made the participating donors more visible, both as a group (the EU and Member States' voice) and in their own right, vis-à-vis the Government, other stakeholders (where they have been consulted) and other development partners.

Beyond these achievements of the Joint Programming process, the evaluation makes several observations that should trigger further reflections on how to better use Joint Programming and how to make it deliver on its expected outcomes. Firstly, the exercise has remained very much an EU and Member States exercise, not sufficiently involving the Partner Country, whether the Government or the civil society organisations, or involving them very late in the process at a time when priorities had already been agreed. It has been argued by EU delegations and Member States staff in the field that they needed to agree amongst themselves first, before involving the Partner Country in their deliberations. Only rarely has an equilibrium been found between internal and external deliberations. This has limited the potential ownership of the Joint Programming process by the Partner Country. Secondly the Joint Programming process has rarely been able to cover all sectors of cooperation: most often the exercise was limited to those sectors where several EU and Member States were active and had common interests. Whilst this makes sense, programming jointly on a limited number of sectors constrains the impact Joint Programming can have on improving the effectiveness of collective EU and Member States' aid. As a result, Joint Programming should not be expected to contribute directly to aid effectiveness, but indirectly, through its expected results on a better EU-MS coordination. Thirdly, it is not clear to what extent the increased visibility has been used by the EU to gain more political clout. In a couple of cases Joint Programming has led to the use of the EU and Member States' voice with a political/policy purpose, without however any discernible results as yet in terms of changes of policies.

The Joint Programming process has in most cases not yet reduced transaction costs for partner country governments or the EU and Member States. In most cases, EU and MS staff surveyed indicated that they did not know (at the time) whether transaction costs were reduced, or on the contrary that transactions costs were heavy and were not reduced, notably for EU Delegations. This is confirmed by interviews in 14 countries. **Several elements suggest that those transaction costs were nevertheless often “worth it” in light of expected benefits**, as reported by EU and Member States. This is particularly the case in crowded sectors and where existing aid coordination is weak, i.e. where most potential gains lie. This should be verified in the future, notably in countries where the Joint programming process will have been fully implemented.

On the whole, the review of the country case studies thus shows that the Joint Programming exercise was worthwhile: it is starting to deliver positive results although these are so far still mostly limited to the EU family rather than benefiting the partner countries. The ambitions of Joint Programming in terms of aid effectiveness (reduced aid fragmentation, increased transparency and predictability, reduced transaction costs) have thus not as yet been realised. However, it is argued on the basis of findings in the field, that other results (better coordinated and more strategic EU aid with joint understanding, shared objectives and joint positioning) are being obtained, which are valuable contributors to better development effectiveness of European Union aid.

Conclusions

In line with the above, the evaluation draws the following main conclusions:

C1: The Joint Programming process delivers well on outputs fully managed at **field level** (Joint Programming roadmap, EU and Member States aid mapping, and joint analysis) but faces challenges on those that require **headquarters** consent or approval (joint response, financial frames).

C2: The Joint Programming process has been instrumental in increasing **coordination** between EU, Member States and other associated donors' aid, in some cases enhancing EU and Member States' **voice**. But Joint Programming has so far had little effect on **synchronising** programming with national programming cycles.

C3: Joint Programming has delivered uneven contributions to improved aid effectiveness: positive results regarding **predictability**, but limited ones concerning measures of **aid fragmentation, transparency, and transaction costs**. However, Joint Programming has boosted **EU aid complementarities and synergies** thus contributing to development effectiveness.

C4: The Joint Programming process has, in most countries, not yet led to **ownership of the process and of its results by the partner country**.

C5: Joint Programming has generally increased EU and MS **visibility** but this has not necessarily been used for increased leverage.

C6: Joint Programming as a process developed at country level works well though **roles** of EU delegations, other EU institutions, field offices and Member States' headquarters staff

could be clearer and approaches to decision making could be more consistent across these actors.

C7: JP has contributed to bringing the EU and MS on the ground closer together, with signs of increased convergence and **coherence**.

C8: Joint Programming process results primarily from the **interest and commitment** by the EU and the Member States on the ground and is helped by a favourable country context.

C9: Joint Programming support has been positive for achievements, in terms of **guidance, technical assistance, and peer-learning events**.

Recommendations

A set of main recommendations emerge from this evaluation, which can be structured in three clusters:

Improve and update the intervention logic

R1 – Improve the intervention logic for better defining the strategic purpose of Joint Programming. Clarify that the two main benefits to be expected from Joint Programming are (i) more coherent and strategic EU and Member States' aid, and (ii) joint EU-Member States positions and messages. Joint Programming may also contribute to wider objectives such as reduced aid fragmentation, increased transparency and predictability, and reduced transaction costs, but these are rather to be seen as results over time of overall better coordination.

R2 - Rethink the scope of Joint Programming, both globally and at country level. EU and Member States headquarters should update policies and guidance on Joint Programming to reflect the shift from aid to development effectiveness, and to add a political dimension (as per the Council Conclusions of 12 May 2016 on Stepping Up Joint Programming). It should also be examined to what extent there is a willingness to include, for instance, globally and regionally-programmed aid, blending, and humanitarian aid (which is not programmable by definition). At a country level, it would be useful that the EU and Member States define a common intervention logic and areas to focus on, i.e. what they most want to achieve through Joint Programming and how.

Keep Joint Programming strategic, flexible, and pragmatic

R3 - See Joint Programming as a process as well as products. *Products* can be light or comprehensive, but the *process* of exchanging information, investing in joint analysis, building trust, and arriving at a comprehensive and coherent strategic EU –Member States approach is key. Make the products and process more flexible and easily adjustable over time. Ensure frequent exchanges, at a strategic level, on how the context is evolving, on common positions and responses, and on EU common values and specific value-added.

R4 - Strengthen collaboration on the ground between the EU and Member States. Use the Joint Programming process and its common vision and response to build a more unified European community both internally and in its dealings with the partner country and external actors in general. In each country, identify the key capacities and interests of EU and Members States for Joint Programming, for seeing how they can contribute to the process. Build on strong bilateral relationships, be it from the EU or Member States.

R5 - Consolidate Joint Programming supporting services. Don't change the rules and don't make them more prescriptive: the Joint Programming Guidance Pack is good; it just needs some clarifications and/or to be further disseminated. Continue the regional and global experience-sharing – emphasizing good practices and lessons learned. Continue providing a pool of technical assistance.

Clarify and reinforce the role of all stakeholders

R6 - Ensure both political and cooperation actors are engaged throughout the process. Engage with the European External Action Service, Member States headquarters, Ambassadors, and political sections from the start. Define respective roles.

R7 - Deepen the dialogue with national stakeholders. Joint Programming has shown to provide many opportunities for strategic dialogue with national authorities and stakeholders at each milestone of the process. When there is already a well-established forum for strategic dialogue (both among development partners and with the partner country), consider how Joint Programming can bring value to it. In parallel, continue emphasising good practices in aid transparency and aid predictability.

R8 - Improve the incentives for investing in Joint Programming. Member States' embassies and field offices should discuss the benefits of Joint Programming (and its scope) with senior management at headquarters and with Ambassadors upstream. Member States should also clarify roles, including who is the go-to person or unit at headquarters for Joint Programming support. Delegation staff's (considerable) investment in Joint Programming should also be recognised in their workload and performance assessments.

Résumé

Objectifs

Cette évaluation a été commanditée par l'Unité Évaluation de la Direction générale pour la Coopération internationale et le Développement de la Commission européenne. Elle porte sur le **processus de programmation conjointe** de l'Union européenne (UE) pour la période **2011-2015** et couvre toutes les régions et tous les pays de la coopération au développement de l'UE. Elle vise à fournir à l'UE et à un public plus large une appréciation globale et indépendante du processus de Programmation conjointe et à formuler, à partir de là, des recommandations pour améliorer les processus de Programmation conjointe actuels et futurs.

Contexte

L'UE et ses États membres se sont engagés depuis longtemps dans la Programmation conjointe. Celle-ci s'inscrit dans une logique d'appui à l'agenda international en faveur de l'efficacité de l'aide et du développement. L'UE a renouvelé son engagement pour une Programmation conjointe dans sa **Position commune de l'UE**, présentée sous la forme d'une déclaration de politique au Quatrième Forum de Haut Niveau sur l'Efficacité de l'Aide qui s'est tenu à Busan en 2011. Celle-ci fournit le cadre de la Programmation conjointe, y compris en termes de contexte, de son champ d'application et de ses principes. Ses éléments fondamentaux sont (i) *une analyse commune de la stratégie de développement nationale d'un pays partenaire et une réponse commune déterminant les secteurs d'intervention prioritaires* – ensemble, elles constituent une *stratégie conjointe*; (ii) *la division du travail au niveau du pays : qui travaille dans quels secteurs* ; et (iii) *une enveloppe financière indicative par secteur et par donateur*. L'analyse et la réponse communes sont avant tout élaborées au niveau du pays partenaire par la Délégation de l'UE et les représentants des États membres dans le pays. À la fin 2015, 55 pays avaient décidé de mettre en œuvre une Programmation conjointe et 26 d'entre eux ont été considérés comme suffisamment avancés dans le processus pour être inclus dans l'évaluation.

Approche méthodologique

Cette évaluation a appliqué les lignes directrices méthodologiques de la Direction générale pour la Coopération internationale et le Développement de la Commission européenne pour les évaluations complexes. Elle est partie d'une analyse de la logique d'intervention (ou théorie du changement) et a débouché sur un ensemble de huit questions d'évaluation structurées en critères de jugement et indicateurs servant de base à la collecte de données. Les conclusions se fondent sur les réponses données aux questions d'évaluation et servent à leur tour de base aux recommandations.

L'équipe a combiné cinq outils pour collecter et analyser les données : (i) une **revue documentaire** générale et **14 études de cas au niveau pays**, (ii) une série d'**entretiens** aux sièges de l'UE et des États membres et avec le personnel et les parties prenantes dans les

pays concernés, (iii) un **traçage de processus** pour deux études de cas pays, (iv) une **enquête en ligne** s'adressant au personnel de l'UE et des États membres aux sièges et sur le terrain et (v) **des visites** auprès du siège de sept États membres et dans onze pays partenaires où la Programmation conjointe est mise en œuvre.

Le principal **défi** de l'évaluation est l'historique, à ce jour limité, du processus de Programmation conjointe. De ce fait, peu d'information est disponible sur les résultats obtenus. L'évaluation s'est dès lors centrée sur les pays où le processus était suffisamment avancé pour qu'on puisse s'attendre à observer des premiers résultats.

Appréciation globale

Dans la plupart des pays étudiés, le processus de Programmation conjointe s'est révélé très utile pour l'UE et les États membres. Il a notamment contribué à une meilleure interaction entre les différents donateurs, à une meilleure compréhension mutuelle de leur coopération et au développement d'une vision commune. Au sein de l'UE, dans ses États membres et chez certains autres bailleurs de fonds (comme la Norvège et la Suisse), la production d'une feuille de route de la Programmation conjointe et l'analyse commune ont en effet contribué à forger une image plus claire du portefeuille de coopération des uns et des autres, des moteurs de la coopération et des forces et faiblesses de chaque bailleur. Ce travail a également amené l'UE, les États membres et les bailleurs de fonds associés à collaborer étroitement et à obtenir un consensus sur les défis pour le pays partenaire et sur la manière d'y répondre à travers un effort conjoint, sans pour autant avoir déjà de mise en œuvre conjointe. Ceci a contribué à harmoniser davantage l'aide de l'UE et des États membres, à viser l'atteinte d'objectifs fixés ensemble et à adopter des approches stratégiques décidées d'un commun accord. Même si ceci n'a pas encore donné lieu à une amélioration des indicateurs d'efficacité de l'aide (nombre de secteurs par bailleurs de fonds, nombre de donateurs par secteur), ce processus a conduit à une meilleure répartition des tâches *au sein des secteurs* et a jeté les bases d'une aide et d'un développement plus efficaces. Le processus de Programmation conjointe a également augmenté la visibilité des donateurs participants, à la fois en tant que groupe (la voix de l'UE et de ses États membres) et individuellement, que ce soit vis-à-vis des gouvernements, des autres parties prenantes (là où elles ont été consultées) ou des autres partenaires du développement.

Outre ces résultats du processus de Programmation conjointe, l'évaluation fournit plusieurs observations qui invitent à une réflexion sur la manière d'en tirer meilleur parti et d'assurer que la Programmation conjointe produise les résultats attendus. Premièrement, cet exercice s'est dans une large mesure limité à l'UE et aux États membres, sans impliquer suffisamment le pays partenaire, que ce soit au travers du gouvernement ou des organisations de la société civile. Dans certains cas, il y a eu une participation assez tardive de ceux-ci, en l'occurrence lorsque les priorités avaient déjà été fixées. Les membres du personnel des Délégations de l'UE et des États membres sur le terrain ont souligné qu'il leur fallait atteindre un accord entre eux avant d'impliquer le pays partenaire dans les délibérations. Un équilibre entre débats internes et débats externes a seulement été atteint dans de rares cas. La possibilité d'une appropriation du processus de Programmation conjointe par le pays partenaire s'en est trouvée réduite. Deuxièmement, le processus de Programmation conjointe a rarement porté sur tous les secteurs de la coopération. Le plus souvent, cet exercice s'est limité aux secteurs dans lesquels plusieurs États membres et l'UE

intervenaienent et avaient des intérêts communs. Bien qu'une telle approche ait du sens, la Programmation conjointe centrée sur un nombre limité de secteurs restreint l'impact que celle-ci peut avoir sur l'amélioration de l'efficacité de l'aide conjointe de l'UE et des États membres. L'impact de la Programmation conjointe sur l'efficacité de l'aide serait plutôt le résultat d'une meilleure coordination de l'UE et des États membres au fil du temps. Et troisièmement, il n'a pas été possible de déterminer dans quelle mesure la visibilité accrue a été utilisée par les partenaires européens pour accroître leur poids politique. Dans quelques cas, la Programmation conjointe a donné lieu à l'utilisation de la voix de l'UE et de ses États membres à des fins politiques, toutefois sans résultat visible à ce stade en termes d'évolution des politiques.

Le processus de Programmation conjointe n'a, dans la plupart des cas, pas encore réduit les coûts de transaction des gouvernements partenaires, de l'UE, ou des États membres. Le plus souvent, le personnel de l'UE et des États membres ayant répondu à notre enquête indiquait ne pas (encore) savoir si les coûts de transaction avaient diminué, ou, en particulier pour les Délégations de l'UE, que ces coûts étaient élevés et n'avaient pas diminué. Ceci est confirmé par les entretiens menés dans quatorze pays. **Différents éléments suggèrent que ces coûts de transaction étaient justifiés au vu des bénéfices attendus du processus de Programmation conjointe.** Ceci a souvent été souligné par le personnel de l'UE et des États membres en réponse à l'enquête. Des réductions importantes des coûts de transaction peuvent notamment être espérées dans des secteurs où interviennent de nombreux bailleurs et où la coordination de l'aide est faible. Ceci reste toutefois à vérifier dans les années à venir, en particulier dans les pays qui auront entièrement mis en œuvre le processus de Programmation conjointe.

Dans l'ensemble, l'analyse des études de cas pays a montré que la Programmation conjointe est utile : elle commence à produire des résultats positifs, même si, pour l'instant, ces derniers bénéficient encore essentiellement aux partenaires européens plutôt qu'au pays partenaire. Les ambitions de la Programmation conjointe en termes d'efficacité de l'aide (réduction de la fragmentation de l'aide, transparence et prévisibilité accrues, diminution des coûts de transaction) ne se sont donc pas encore concrétisées. Néanmoins, les constats de terrain indiquent que d'autres résultats (coordination améliorée et aide plus stratégique de l'UE alliée à une compréhension commune, objectifs partagés et positionnement commun) sont obtenus et qu'ils constituent un apport précieux à l'amélioration de l'efficacité de l'aide de l'UE.

Conclusions

A partir des points ci-dessus, l'évaluation a tiré les principales conclusions suivantes :

C1 : Le processus de Programmation conjointe fournit bien les produits attendus au niveau du **terrain** (feuille de route de la Programmation conjointe, cartographie de l'aide de l'UE et des États membres, analyse commune), mais est confronté à des défis lorsque le consentement ou l'approbation des **sièges** (réponse commune, cadres financiers) est requis.

C2 : Le processus de Programmation conjointe a contribué à l'intensification de la **coordination** de l'aide entre l'UE, les États membres et d'autres donateurs associés,

renforçant dans certains cas la **voix** de l'UE et des États membres. Cependant, à ce jour, la Programmation conjointe a eu peu d'effets sur la **synchronisation** de la programmation avec les cycles de programmation nationaux.

C3 : La Programmation conjointe a contribué à des degrés divers à l'amélioration de l'efficacité de l'aide : résultats positifs sur le plan de la **prévisibilité**, mais limités pour les mesures relatives à la **fragmentation de l'aide, à la transparence et aux coûts de transaction**. La Programmation conjointe a néanmoins stimulé les **complémentarités et les synergies de l'aide européenne**, renforçant ainsi l'efficacité de la coopération au développement.

C4 : Dans la plupart des pays, le processus de Programmation conjointe n'a pas conduit à **l'appropriation de ce processus et de ses résultats par le pays partenaire**.

C5 : La Programmation conjointe a généralement accru la **visibilité** de l'UE et des États membres, mais ceux-ci n'ont pas nécessairement tiré parti de ce résultat pour avoir un effet levier.

C6 : La Programmation conjointe comme processus développé au niveau du pays partenaire a bien fonctionné, même si les **rôles** des membres du personnel des Délégations et des autres institutions de l'UE, ainsi que ceux des États membres sur le terrain et aux sièges mériteraient d'être précisés. Les approches en matière de prise de décision bénéficieraient par ailleurs d'une plus grande cohérence entre ces différents acteurs.

C7 : La Programmation conjointe a contribué à un rapprochement sur le terrain entre l'UE et les États membres, avec des signes de convergence et de **cohérence** accrus.

C8 : Le processus de Programmation conjointe a résulté avant tout de **l'intérêt** et de **l'engagement** de l'UE et des États membres sur le terrain et a été facilité par un contexte national favorable.

C9 : Le support à la Programmation conjointe en termes **d'orientation, d'assistance technique et de sessions d'apprentissage entre pairs** a facilité l'atteinte de résultats.

Recommandations

Cette évaluation a donné lieu à un ensemble de recommandations regroupées en trois volets:

Améliorer et actualiser la logique d'intervention

R1 – Améliorer la logique d'intervention pour mieux définir l'objectif stratégique de la Programmation conjointe. Préciser que les deux grands bénéficiaires à attendre de la Programmation conjointe sont (i) une aide de l'UE et des États membres plus cohérente et plus stratégique, et (ii) des positions et des messages communs à l'UE et aux États membres. La Programmation conjointe peut également contribuer à des objectifs plus larges tels que la réduction de la fragmentation de l'aide, une transparence et une prévisibilité accrues et la diminution des coûts de transaction, mais ces aspects doivent plutôt être perçus comme étant le résultat d'une meilleure coordination générale au fil du temps.

R2 – Repenser le champ de la Programmation conjointe, au niveau global et au niveau pays. Les sièges de l'UE et des États membres devraient mettre à jour les politiques et les lignes directrices relatives à la Programmation conjointe afin de refléter le passage de l'efficacité de

l'aide à l'efficacité du développement et pour ajouter une dimension politique (conformément aux Conclusions du Conseil du 12 mai 2016 sur le renforcement de la Programmation conjointe). Il conviendrait également d'examiner dans quelle mesure il existe une volonté d'inclure, par exemple, des aides programmées sur le plan régional et mondial, le Mixage et l'aide humanitaire (par définition non programmable). Au niveau pays, il serait utile que l'UE et les États membres définissent une logique d'intervention et des axes d'action communs, exprimant ce qu'ils souhaitent le plus réaliser par la Programmation conjointe et comment y arriver.

Faire en sorte que la Programmation conjointe demeure stratégique, flexible et pragmatique

R3 – Voir la Programmation conjointe à la fois comme un processus et comme des produits. Les *produits* peuvent être légers ou plus exhaustifs, mais le *processus* d'échange d'information, d'investissement dans l'analyse conjointe, d'établissement d'un climat de confiance et de création d'une approche stratégique cohérente et complète de l'UE et des États membres est essentiel. Il est recommandé de rendre les produits et le processus plus souples et facilement adaptables au fil du temps et d'assurer des échanges fréquents, sur le plan stratégique, sur la façon dont le contexte évolue, sur les positions et réponses communes et sur les valeurs partagées et la valeur ajoutée spécifique de l'UE.

R4 – Renforcer la collaboration sur le terrain entre l'UE et les États membres. Utiliser le processus de Programmation conjointe, ainsi que sa vision et sa réponse communes, pour construire une communauté européenne plus unie, tant sur le plan interne que dans ses relations avec les pays partenaires et les acteurs extérieurs en général. Dans chaque pays, identifier les capacités et les intérêts clés de l'UE et des États membres en matière de Programmation conjointe, afin de voir comment ils peuvent contribuer au processus. Tirer avantage de relations bilatérales fortes, que ce soit au départ de l'UE ou des États membres.

R5 – Consolider les services d'appui à la Programmation conjointe. Ne pas modifier les règles et ne pas les rendre plus normatives : la note d'orientation de la Programmation conjointe est bonne ; elle requiert simplement certains éclaircissements et/ou doit bénéficier d'une plus grande diffusion. Poursuivre l'exercice de partage d'expérience sur le plan régional et mondial – en mettant l'accent sur les bonnes pratiques et les leçons apprises. Continuer à fournir un pool d'assistance technique.

Clarifier et renforcer le rôle de toutes les parties prenantes

R6 – S'assurer que les acteurs, tant politiques que du monde de la coopération, soient impliqués tout au long du processus. Établir, dès le début, des contacts avec le Service européen pour l'action extérieure, le siège des États membres, les Ambassadeurs et les sections politiques. Bien définir les rôles de chacun.

R7 – Approfondir le dialogue avec les parties prenantes nationales. La Programmation conjointe a prouvé qu'elle était source de nombreuses occasions de dialogue stratégique avec les autorités et les parties prenantes sur le plan national, à chaque moment clé du processus. Lorsqu'un forum de dialogue stratégique est établi et opérationnel (tant entre les partenaires au développement qu'avec le pays partenaire), identifier la valeur ajoutée que peut apporter la Programmation conjointe. Simultanément, continuer à mettre en avant les bonnes pratiques en matière de transparence et de prévisibilité de l'aide.

R8 – Renforcer les incitatifs pour investir dans la Programmation conjointe. Les ambassades des États membres et les représentations sur le terrain devraient débattre des atouts de la Programmation conjointe (et de sa portée) avec les décideurs aux sièges et avec les Ambassadeurs en amont. Les États membres devraient par ailleurs préciser les rôles, notamment déterminer qui est l'unité ou la personne-ressource pour l'appui à la Programmation conjointe. L'investissement (considérable) des membres du personnel des Délégations dans la Programmation conjointe devrait également être reconnu dans l'évaluation de leur charge de travail et de leur performance.

1. Evaluation Objectives and Context

The Evaluation Unit of the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO) of the European Commission (EC) contracted ADE for conducting this evaluation of the EU's process of joint programming (JP) of development cooperation over the period 2011-2015.

1.1 Objectives and scope of the evaluation

The **object** of the evaluation is the EU Joint Programming *process*. The focus on the process of JP rather than on its development outcomes or impact for target populations is primarily due to the short history of JP.

The **main objectives** of this evaluation are:

- To provide the relevant external co-operation services of the EU and the wider public with an overall independent **assessment** of the JP process; and
- To identify key **lessons** and to produce **recommendations** to improve current and inform future joint programming process.
- The **temporal scope** of the evaluation is the period 2011-2015. The **geographic scope** covers all regions and countries of EU development cooperation. The **thematic scope** is on the **added value of JP**, particularly regarding: (i) increased coherence of EU and MS development cooperation; (ii) increased ownership by the partner country; (iii) increased visibility of EU; (iv) reduced fragmentation; (v) reduced transaction costs; and (vi) better aid predictability and transparency.

1.2 Joint Programming Background and Principles


Improving aid effectiveness for development results is a joint concern of donors and partner countries. The parties have agreed a series of principles: the *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness* (2005), the *Principles for Effective Engagement in Fragile States and Situations* (2007) and the *Accra Agenda for Action* (2008). The *Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation* (2011) focused on the partnership responsibilities, while the *Mexico Communiqué* (2014) drew attention to new concerns such as climate funding and big data that should be included in the aid effectiveness agenda¹.

Joint Programming is part of the **EU's overall engagement to improved aid and development effectiveness** (see figure 1 below). The 2000 Joint Policy Statement on Development Policy was the first attempt at establishing a division of labour in development cooperation between the Commission and MS. Further key steps included the 2005

¹ "Effectiveness" is defined as "The extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance" (DAC Revised Evaluation Glossary, 2002)

European Consensus for Development; the 2007 EU Code of Conduct on division of labour²; and the launch of the Fast Track Initiative (FTI) in 2008³.

Figure 1: EU Policy and political context for improved aid effectiveness



Joint Programming of development cooperation is a longstanding commitment by the EU and its Member States (MS) in support of the international aid and development effectiveness agenda:

- The EU and MS adopted early frameworks for JP and expressed commitment to move forward on this during the period 2004-2010 as well as the EU Consensus on Development⁴.
- JP was enshrined in the regulatory framework, notably the Regulations establishing the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) and the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) and its follow-on the European Neighbourhood Instrument, the European Development Fund (EDF) and their related programming instructions.

² This established a set of 10 guiding principles within a flexible, self-policing code shared amongst EU and MS. It relied on shared vision, development objectives and common political aspirations of the EU and MS would provide a good basis for operationalizing the DoL: see Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, EU Code of Conduct on Division of Labour in Development Policy, COM(2007) 72, February 2007.

³ The FTI supports a selected group of partner countries in the process of implementing in-country division of labour (<https://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/47823319.pdf>)

⁴ See Annex C for the various documents

- The Lisbon Treaty of 2009 provided the political impetus for further coordination and collaboration of EU and MS aid, adding the political dimension to JP and ensuring involvement of the European External Action Service (EEAS) in JP.
- The EU presented a renewed commitment to JP at Busan's High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2011, in its “**EU Common Position**”.⁵ This presents JP's objectives, scope, and principles, noting that while JP “*is not meant to be an exclusive EU process but that the EU will act as a driving force*” (op. cit., p. 13).
- This is taken further in the 2015 **JP Guidance Pack**⁶, which states that “*Joint Programming can make Europe happen on the ground, translating shared European values and policies on issues such as fundamental rights and good governance into coherent, targeted action in partner countries*”, thus giving a definite political dimension to JP in addition to the aid effectiveness dimension already present in the Fast Track Initiative and earlier initiatives such as the Joint Assistance Strategy. The Guidance Pack furthermore makes an explicit link to the Lisbon Treaty and the promise for more joint working and ‘whole-of-Europe’ approaches⁷.
- In a Council Conclusion of 12 May 2016, it is noted that “*By pursuing Joint Programming the EU and its Member States collectively contribute to implementing the policy commitments made at global and EU level*”. The aim is to consolidate and expand JP: “*Joint Programming should be promoted and strengthened, while being kept voluntary, flexible, inclusive, and tailored to the country context, and allow for the replacement of EU and Member States Programming documents with EU JP documents.... Partner country engagement, appropriation and ownership are essential for this process. JP should be led by the partner country's development strategy... The Council recognises the added value that Joint Programming can have in terms of avoiding duplication, reducing transaction costs (including for partner countries), and further strengthening EU coordination and EU visibility. This process should meet EU and Member States' requirements and should align with partner countries' development priorities*”⁸.

The main activities and objectives of the JP process, as suggested in the JP Guidance Pack, are detailed in Figure 2 below.⁹

⁵ Council of the EU, “*EU Common Position for the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness*”, 2011 (https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/126060.pdf). Annex II of these Council conclusions presents JP context, scope and principles.

⁶ <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/document/joint-programming-guidance-pack-pdf-full>

⁷ Please refer to the EU Joint Programming Guidance Pack, Quick Guide.

⁸ See European Council Conclusion 12 May 2016, “*Stepping up Joint Programming*”, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/05/12-conclusions-on-stepping-up-joint-programming/>

⁹ Details on the Intervention Logic are provided in Chapter 2 and Volume II Annex B on the Methodology.

Box 1: Key Concepts in Joint Programming


Joint Programming (JP) means the joint planning of development cooperation by the EU development partners (DPs) working in a partner country. It includes a **Roadmap**, a **Joint Analysis** (JA) of the country situation followed by a **Joint Response** (JR) setting out how EU DPs will provide support and measure progress: the **division of labour** between the participating DPs, spelling out which donor(s) will work in which sector and **indicative financial commitments** per sector from each DP for their financing over the strategy period. JA and JR together make up the **Joint Strategy** (JS).

The JS remains at **strategic** level and should avoid the details of projects and programmes that each DP will carry out. The strategy will limit itself to outlining sectors, overall objectives, indicative allocations and where possible expected results. Details of how each DP will deliver its agreed contribution to the joint strategy are instead set out in DPs' individual bilateral programming. But the JS should serve as a strategic umbrella to the DPs' bilateral programme documents¹⁰.

JP activities have been launched in fifty five countries. By the end of December 2015, 26 countries were seen to have progressed sufficiently far that it was meaningful to review their experiences for lessons regarding the JP process and approach.

¹⁰ See the JP Guidance Pack, <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/document/joint-programming-guidance-pack-pdf-full>

Figure 2: Intervention Logic for the Joint Programming Process



Source: ADE

Note: The placeholders at the bottom (A1 – A7) refer to Assumptions underlying each step in the delivery chain. These are presented in full in the Methodology in Annex B.

2. Methodology and Data Sources


This chapter presents the main features of the methodological approach we followed for this evaluation. Details are provided in the dedicated Annex B in Volume II.

2.1 Overall approach and process

The methodology for this evaluation followed EuropeAid's methodological guidelines for thematic and other complex evaluations, which is itself based on the OECD/DAC approach. The evaluation team used an Intervention Logic analysis (close to a theory of change analysis¹¹) to define a set of eight Evaluation Questions (EQs). Conclusions are based on the responses to these EQs, and recommendations on those conclusions.

This evaluation has been structured in an inception stage, a desk study stage, a field phase, and a synthesis phase (see figure below). DEVCO's Evaluation Unit was responsible for the management and the supervision of the evaluation, in collaboration with an Inter-Service Steering Group (ISG) consisting of representatives of all concerned services in the Commission and EEAS plus four MS representatives¹², under the Evaluation Unit's supervision.

Figure 3: Evaluation process



¹¹ The theory of change is 'a comprehensive description and illustration of how and why a desired change is expected to happen in a particular context' (<http://www.theoryofchange.org/what-is-theory-of-change/>)

¹² France, Belgium, Italy, and Netherlands

2.2 Intervention Logic

The Intervention Logic (IL) aims at clarifying the hierarchy of objectives pursued by the JP process, by uncovering the expected causal chain from activities to impacts. Based on the original diagram provided in the ToR (see volume II, Annex A), the team provided a more detailed IL where the Inputs were “*unbundled*” to identify better the full range of stakeholders involved. It resulted in the IL diagram (shown in figure 2 above), and an accompanying narrative provided in Annex B.

2.3 Evaluation questions

In order to provide focus to the evaluation, eight Evaluation Questions (EQs) have been formulated during the inception phase of the evaluation. They have been detailed with their corresponding Judgement Criteria and Indicators in an evaluation matrix (see Annex E).

Table 1: The Evaluation questions

EQ1 Relevance	To what extent did JP respond to global and country-level challenges regarding increased aid effectiveness?
EQ2 Effectiveness	To what extent did JP contribute to reducing aid fragmentation?
EQ3 Effectiveness	To what extent did JP improve aid predictability and transparency of EU and MS aid?
EQ4 Ownership	To what extent did JP contribute to improved leadership by the partner country of its own development priorities?
EQ5 Coherence	To what extent has JP contributed to increased coherence of EU and MS strategies and programming at country level?
EQ6 Visibility	To what extent did JP increase the visibility of EU and MS to partner country authorities and other donor partners?
EQ7 Efficiency	To what extent was the EU organised so as to make JP work?
EQ8 Efficiency	To what extent did JP reduce partner countries’ transactions costs and keep them reasonable for the EU and MS?

2.4 Evaluation tools

The team combined the following tools to collect and analyse data for the analysis: (i) **documentary study** on **general documentation** and **14 case studies**; (iii) process tracing

in 2 country case studies¹³; (iii) **interviews** with EU HQ, MS HQ, and country-level staff (EUD, MS and other donors, national authorities, etc.); (iv) a **survey** to EU HQ, MS HQ, and country-level staff (EUD and MS), with an overall response rate of 27% (83 respondents); and (v) a series of **visits to EU MS and partner countries**. Details on the tools used are provided in Volume II (Annex B “Methodology”).

2.5 Country visits

A total of **7 Member State visits** have been conducted: to Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK.¹⁴

A total of **11 partner countries** have been visited (three additional countries have been subject to desk studies only, which make up the total of 14 case studies). The countries were selected to provide an overview of JP experiences as rich as possible, looking at regional distribution, stages of JP process reached, situation of fragility, Francophone and Anglophone countries in Africa covered, and a minimum number of MS present on the ground¹⁵. Table 2 provides an overview of the 14 countries. The country case studies can be found in annexes G to T.

Figure 4: Field visits conducted



(*)Country cases subject to desk studies

Source: ADE

¹³ For Kenya and Palestine (see graphs in Annex B), the processes are quite complex and have required both external assistance from international consultants. They have also taken a lot of the EU partners' time on the ground. The overall timeline – 2.5 to 3.5 years from beginning to end – is also considerable. The processes in these two countries included a large number of actors: 10 MS in Kenya and 14 in Palestine (including Switzerland and Norway)

¹⁴ The TOR defined 7 MS HQs to visit. The team then identified a representative sample of EU MS: large (UK, France, Germany), medium (Netherlands, Belgium, Spain) and small (Denmark), ensuring that differences to basic approaches to JP and geography was covered. In addition to MS HQ visits, the team interviewed JP focal points among newer EU MS donors (Poland, Romania) as well as other active MS donors (Italy, Sweden) during a technical seminar in February 2016. In the field, the team spoke with all relevant MS donors on the ground.

¹⁵ The “JP Tracker” has been developed by the Commission to record how JP processes are progressing in all the countries that have so far elected to go ahead with JP. This is a live database that is publicly available and regularly updated, so that anybody who wants to can follow the progress both by country but also for the initiative as a whole – see <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/document/joint-programming-tracker>

2.6 Challenges and limitations

The evaluation team faced a number of challenges and limitations. These relate in particular to the fact that this is an evaluation of an on-going process; that the timeframe and budget of the evaluation were pretty tight; that obtaining a high survey response rate is often difficult; and that the in-depth case studies focused primarily on countries where the JP was relatively well advanced. The methodological approach followed throughout the evaluation process (see Annex B, volume II) aimed to acknowledge and mitigate as much as possible these challenges.

3. Responses to the EQs

This chapter presents the findings to each of the Evaluation Questions. It is divided into sub-chapters by EQ, where the structure of each sub-chapter is as follows:

- A presentation of the EQ and the rationale for its formulation.
- A summary box presenting the main findings on the EQ.
- A more detailed presentation of findings according to the Judgement Criteria.

The basic informational basis for the findings are the data on the Indicators, attached to each Judgement Criterion, as defined in the Evaluation Data Grid (Annex E), and the information by JC contained in the Country Notes (Annexes G-T). This has been supplemented with the results from the survey and interviews, where applicable (Annexes D and F)

3.1 EQ 1: Global and Country-level Challenges

To what extent did JP respond to global and country-level challenges regarding increased aid effectiveness?

The ToR asks the team to look at the extent to which the current objectives and assumptions for JP were and still remain valid. When asking the question, the ToR notes that the enabling environment has changed during this period, but also that the issue should be seen from partner countries' perspective: was and is JP relevant given the widely varying country contexts?

The first Judgment Criteria looks at how changes to the international aid effectiveness discourse are reflected in the various JP processes. The second one looks at the extent to which JP processes have addressed and adapted to the specific country contexts.

EQ 1 on Relevance - Summary

JP is in general Relevant though *degree* may vary, largely dependent on extent of pre-existing on-the-ground coordination. As aid effectiveness is seen as a concern by most actors, JP fits into a larger pattern of collaborative aid mechanisms in most countries. JP provides considerable value-added in states and situations where cooperation mechanisms are weak or not scaled to real needs and challenges. In countries with strong policy guidance – i.e., Association Agreements – these largely define the parameters/scope for the JP process.

JP is flexible enough to accommodate changing agendas. New development concerns – SDGs, climate change – are included where PCs have them as priorities in their own plans. EU's own fundamental values are a visible part of JP processes, and some new mechanisms and actors have been included. Nevertheless, **the relevance of JP in an**

agenda shifting from Aid to Development Effectiveness is seldom discussed or well-documented.

JP is sensitive to partner countries' aid effectiveness challenges, sometimes moving to sector issues, in others taking on board Development and not just Aid challenges. The delegation to the field of JP as a process is thus appropriate, though some MS' strategic interests may constrain the ability to agree to joint approaches on given issues.

JC 1.1 JP responded to the global aid effectiveness challenges

In almost all countries, JP programming builds on previous aid coordination efforts, which generally included aid effectiveness concerns. Better programming of donor resources has been a central concern in most partner countries, and was formalised as an objective with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), which is also the foundation for JP. The argument for undertaking aid coordination therefore underlies almost all coordination mechanisms, whether EU-centred (JP) or not. Governments and donors thus developed joined-up mechanisms to improve aid effectiveness, and these experiences have provided useful lessons for today's programming. From the myriad studies and evaluations of aid coordination, certain findings are common:

- In most countries, sector working groups have been established with the intention of better information sharing, avoidance of donor overlaps, better dialogue with line ministries regarding sector priorities and other benefits from sector coordination. The *performance* of sector working groups can vary within and across countries.
- In several countries, budget support led to more overarching coordination with central ministries. As budget support is big and “lumpy” where disbursements often take place conditional on the attainment of agreed targets – often harmonised with IMF or World Bank programmes – the coordination often required substantive technical work, including looking at the role that grants aid played in government budgets. This led to continuous and high-level dialogue between the parties in a number of countries, but as budget support has decreased or been discontinued over the last several years, this central dialogue has often atrophied or disappeared since PCs see little purpose in such discussions once the aid is for sectors or projects (Mozambique, Rwanda, Zambia).

Joint Programming provides important services in countries where aid coordination till now has been lacking.

- Aid effectiveness challenges are recognised as severe in so-called fragile and conflict-affected states where national authorities are weak, have little legitimacy or may suffer from poor capacity. These states are at the same time often dependent on external aid, making the need for more rational application of aid resources all the more important – Mali being a case in point among the study countries for this evaluation.
- The three Asian countries included in this study – Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar – all appear to have benefited from the introduction of JP, due to somewhat different reasons. With the political normalisation taking place in Myanmar, the country is becoming eligible for aid on a scale it has not been before, where the rapid entry of new actors and vastly greater funds makes coordination an important issue. In Cambodia and Laos, the dynamic is more a maturing of relations, where increasing trust between the actors is

opening up for more collaborative arrangements in order to ensure better application of scarce resources.

- At the other end of the scale are the traditional aid partners in Eastern and Southern Africa – Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Rwanda, Zambia – where aid coordination has evolved over a period of at least two decades, and where governments and donors have adjusted the structures over time to accommodate their changing agendas. A new mechanism emanating from a donor decision like the JP thus has to adjust and find its place within the already existing aid architecture existing on the ground, a situation that has created its own challenges as most MS have already invested in sector working groups and other coordination mechanisms that go beyond the EU community, so the time available for further aid coordination mechanisms may often be limited.

Aid effectiveness is usually central to the justification of the JP exercise. Aid effectiveness is stated as an important challenge in most JP country documents, though the description of what needs to be addressed varies from one country to another.

- In Cambodia, the document noted that the strategy has as an objective “*increasing effectiveness of our joint development efforts*” and “*will therefore also contribute to increasing the coherence and impact of our aid*”, while in Ethiopia a similar goal is presented as “*to improve the efficiency and relevance of EU+ development assistance*”.¹⁶ In Bolivia, documents such as the JP Roadmap¹⁷ and HoMs reports refer to a common vision for European aid, and the draft JP document clearly refers to aid effectiveness principles, and indicates to what extent JP is contributing to respond to aid effectiveness challenges.
- In Kenya, the justification is a little more concrete: “*(we) are committed to delivering better aid and development results through improved coordination and coherence of their cooperation strategies in the context of their aid-effectiveness commitments*”. Rwanda’s Joint Response document echoes some of these points: “*This strategy is an operational tool and is aimed at making the overall aid delivery to Rwanda more effective, coherent and sustainable*”.¹⁸ This is developed further in Senegal’s JP document which notes that a 2012 donor mapping showed that the average European donor was engaged in more than 7 sectors whereas today almost all donors support only four sector or less. Information exchange has led to better coordination at sector and operational levels¹⁹.

The survey shows that the key stakeholders on the EU side agree to varying extents that the purpose of the JP is to address the aid effectiveness agenda. Figure 4 shows that aid coordination is seen as the overwhelming rationale for JP, with over 80% agreeing that this is a main motivation. Nearly two-thirds see the reduction in aid fragmentation as a prime mover – though it is noticeable that MS HQ staff rates this much higher than field-based actors (for the breakdown of the figures by stakeholder group, see Annex F). But there are, a lot fewer who believe that increased aid predictability or reduction in transaction costs

¹⁶ In European Development Cooperation Strategy for Cambodia 2014-2018, November 2014 p. I, and European Union+ Joint Cooperation Strategy for Ethiopia, January 2013, p. 1, respectively.


¹⁷ Draft Roadmap to Joint European Programming in Bolivia (EU, 2013)

¹⁸ EU Joint Cooperation Strategy in Support of Kenya’s Medium-term Plan 2014-2017, 2015, p. 5 and Rwanda – Joint Response Strategy, 2013, p. 1, respectively.

¹⁹ Document conjoint de programmation, signed with Government of Senegal, November 2014, p. 3.

are main JP objectives, despite these being listed as important expected benefits from JP, whereas improved policy dialogue between EU and MS HQs is seen as important – an intra-EU coordination.²⁰

Figure 5: Survey responses, main motivations for JP



Source: ADE survey – see Annex F

In the NEAR region where countries have Association Agreements (AA), this dominates the JP process. In Moldova, principles of aid effectiveness or the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were secondary considerations compared with the AA that Moldova and the EU signed in 2014. The link between the AA objectives and traditional poverty reduction goals of development cooperation are mentioned in the introduction to the Joint Analysis (JA), but otherwise the JA's sectors and priorities are those of the 13 chapters of the AA. In Morocco, the two processes are almost de-linked. The AA was signed in 2000 and is moving along whereas the JP process has stalled and the draft analysis has

²⁰ See <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/>

only been completed on the theme of migration. The JP took place in a context of mixed aid coordination concerns. In sectors benefiting from budget support and bank loans activities were generally coordinated. Other sectors remained uncoordinated with very fragmented aid and poor knowledge about aid flows, yet neither government nor key donors expressed any urgency in addressing the aid effectiveness issues in a more coherent fashion through the JP.

New development challenges are slowly being included but as a function of the partner country introducing them. While the classic aid effectiveness issues are being addressed, few JP documents make references to new aid challenges. However, SDGs or the climate change agenda (COP21) are slowly being included as partner countries take them on board in their own planning processes. Climate change is perhaps the most obvious one: both Ethiopia and Rwanda have “*green transition*” or “*green sector*” as a core concern and include these as areas for donor coordination. Kenya has an Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASAL) programme, which is then likewise included in JP documents.

EU’s own general values are included, and new actors and mechanisms are slowly being introduced.

- The EU values of respect for human rights, rule of law, gender equality are included in a number of JP processes and documents. The degree to which they are operationalized in the form of performance or results frameworks or targets varies. “*Governance*” is the one most often referred to and spelled out, though gender equality is also addressed in a number of documents, though only a few countries make reference to specific gender studies and programmes.
- In many but not yet all countries, European **actors** such as financial institutions (the European Investment Bank, EIB, and bilateral development banks like France’s AfD and Germany’s KfW) are being included in the analysis and policy process if not firmly embedded in the Joint Response. The latter throws up some issues regarding to what extent loans, even on concessional terms, can be programmed in the same manner as grants funds. Whereas forecasting of sovereign loans is generally possible, this appears more difficult for non-sovereign loans. In some countries indicative allocations either by year or by sector have been included in the financial frames (i.e. Kenya).
- The new **mechanisms** that these actors rely on – project based lending, blending of grants and credits/concessional loans – also pose problems in terms of how firmly they can be presented as financial resources that a partner country can count on for their macro-planning. The experiences so far point to improved ability to accommodate these, as long as the requisite disclaimers and uncertainties are made clear²¹.

Despite the fairly wide-spread JP experiences so far, the Relevance of JP as a net value-adding mechanism for addressing global aid effectiveness challenges is not really discussed or well documented. There is a history of aid coordination attempts in virtually all countries at the time the JP was introduced, though the functioning and coverage of the existing mechanisms clearly differed across countries and also over time within countries. Yet the value added of JP is not really discussed in the documentation – the focus is on how to make the JP better. This is to some extent understandable – JP is a fairly new

²¹ One argument for including credit actors in the JP is that these provide investible resources. Parts of grants aid often remain tied, making it difficult for a PC to know what the grants figures mean in terms of net available financing.

process, and has been politically decided – the task for the field has been to implement. Yet as the subsequent sections of this chapter show, the various aspects of the JP as a mechanism and process – its internal Efficiency and Effectiveness, and expected results in terms of internal Coherence, external Visibility and spill-over to partner country Ownership – are now more clearly on the agenda, and need to be addressed.

JC 1.2 The JP process was sensitive to the partner country's aid effectiveness challenges

In countries reviewed, the JP and other coordination processes build on national priorities. All documentation points to national programming instruments as central to coordination efforts, in particular medium-term (3-5 year) national development plans or programmes, often embedded in longer-term strategies like *Kenya Vision 2030*.

- There is an increasing acceptance of the need for the EU community to align to national budgeting cycles and medium-term plans.
- From the country level reporting it can be seen that there is a growing acceptance of national programming as necessary and sometimes sufficient for addressing key aid effectiveness concerns, and in particular that many of the implementation problems lie on the donor side and thus something that the international community has to address.
- In some countries, in fact, reference is solely to the partner countries' priorities. In Zambia, the EU Joint Framework Paper does not raise aid effectiveness as one of the EU joint objectives but focuses on how the partners can contribute to Zambia's own development. In this case, that is due to the EU community not carrying out an overarching JP, but for the time being focusing on providing inputs at sector level, and thus do not address general aid effectiveness as such.

In all countries, there is an effort to understand and accommodate the particular national political and development context. In countries where Joint Analyses have been produced, they have discussed national context as fundamental for how the EU community intends to respond. There is a systematic review of the national planning documents with the intention of identifying the areas where the EU community should or can be of greatest assistance.

In all countries, there is sensitivity to the national programming cycle. All EU documents note the need to accommodate the timing of government budgeting and programming cycles. One reason is of course the country led process, which the EU is supporting. Another is the desire to ensure that EU and MS assistance is as relevant and visible as possible, and this can best be achieved if the EU community enters the programming cycle at a point in time that the authorities find most helpful.

In all countries, there is awareness of the particular aid concerns of the authorities. Different countries face different challenges. In Bolivia, a number of donors are on their way out and therefore concerns of harmonisation are moving from aid to trade issues. Myanmar is facing a complicated transition phase coupled with limited experience with the aid community, so it has concerns regarding aid relations, which is being treated in the JP. Palestine faces a particularly difficult political situation and constraints that the EU and the international community in general have to accommodate. In these and other cases, these

situations are understood and reflected in the analyses and the conclusions drawn regarding how EU community support can best be structured.

The understanding of national context has in some countries led the EU to focus on *sector* rather than national interventions. Because the situation in a given country may not at the time be conducive to a strategic national intervention, the EU community response is structured around sector interventions. In Mozambique, the focus currently is on two of the sectors highlighted in the NIP, and in Rwanda the EU has prepared sector papers as its contributions to the national development strategy.

In other cases, the EU has amplified its ambition to address *development* and not just *aid effectiveness*²². In Myanmar and Palestine, objectives focus on *peace, stability and prosperity*. In NEAR countries the Association Agreement is the principal agreement between the EU and the individual country and these agreements colour and largely determine the JP process and its deliverables (Moldova, Morocco).

The decentralisation to the field of the JP is thus appropriate. The increasing attention to local context is made possible by the decentralisation to the field of the responsibilities for JP. The fact that more MS also delegate more authority to the field gives further space for local perceptions and decisions regarding how to understand and respond to country conditions. This is a further enabler for a coherent EU analysis and response to particular context. All the various EU response documents, whether in the form of JPs or internal EU coordination efforts, underline the need to have the real situation on the ground as the starting point for designing own support. The degree to which this has succeeded may vary, though the documents from the case countries reviewed indicate serious analyses and genuine efforts at identifying the issues.

The ability to apply the partner country's situation as the basis for the JP response may be constrained by bilateral considerations. In many of the JP countries, various MS have clear strategic interests – political, economic, security – and these may constrain their ability to engage in common responses to a given issue. The severity of this constraint obviously varies, from minor trade concerns to overarching military-security dilemmas, so the total effect on the JP process may be unclear but clearly a potential bottle-neck to local consensus.

²² We are referring to standard usage: “*the shift from ‘aid effectiveness’ to ‘development effectiveness’ ... underpinned the establishment of the new Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation... The shift can be expressed more simply as a move away from concentrating on aid alone to address poverty reduction. It brings in a new focus on policy – for example trade and investment*” and other partners and sources of funding (The Guardian). See also http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/eu-approach-aid-effectiveness_en

3.2 EQ 2: JP and Aid Fragmentation

To what extent did JP contribute to reducing aid fragmentation?

Aid fragmentation, occurs when too many donors give too little aid to too many countries (OECD, 2016)²³ and is usually measured by the number of sectors per donor (concentration of aid) and the number of donors per sector (donor presence) but also the number and size of projects per sector. Since JP is a country-specific exercise, aid fragmentation refers to in-country issues as expressed in the Accra Agenda for Action: “We will reduce the fragmentation of aid by improving the complementarity of donors’ efforts and the division of labour among donors, including through improved allocation of resources within sectors”²⁴.

The JP approach to reduced aid fragmentation is described as follows: JP “coordinates which sectors/ areas each (EU development partner) will work in, what the overall objectives for these sectors are, and gives provisional figures for their financing over the joint strategy period. The individual more detailed objectives, projects and programmes that each EU development partner will carry out in order to implement their contribution to the joint strategy are detailed in their own in-house programming and implementation plans. (...) There will be less aid fragmentation as EU development partners plan together, cutting out gaps and overlaps. This allows each to focus on the sectors where they can add the most value while ensuring that all bases are covered under the joint strategy” (Quick Guide p. 1, 2). Division of labour is thus the main instrument for reducing aid fragmentation.

The Quick Guide focuses JP on a division of labour *between* sectors but also *within* sectors, and there are now also initiatives to move towards joint implementation. However, in the FAQs document, it is explained that “Division of labour’ simply means sharing out the work to be done in such a way as to avoid overlaps and ensure that DPs complement one another”.

EQ 2 on Aid fragmentation - Summary

Increasing aid effectiveness, a main driver of JP, has in practice been supplanted by development practitioners’ pragmatism: whilst JP so far led to little or no changes of aid fragmentation indicators, it improved EU donor aid coordination and coherence and led to complementarities and synergies between EU donors, which are important for development effectiveness. In countries undertaking JP, coordination, commonality of objectives and approaches and complementarity of actions were found more important than the strict requirements for aid effectiveness (fewer donors per sector, fewer sectors per donor). Improved coordination, a common understanding of sector issues, and the way to tackle them creating synergies with other interventions, were equally conducive to improved aid effectiveness and potentially more conducive to development effectiveness.

In some countries, monitoring based on a joint Results-Oriented Framework (Cambodia and Palestine) and the adoption of a ‘cluster’ approach to JP (Ethiopia and Palestine) led to a more strategic policy dialogue. The use of joint Results-

²³ <https://www.oecd.org/dac/aid-architecture/>

²⁴ See <http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/34428351.pdf> p. 17.

Oriented Frameworks for joint monitoring of results facilitated a strategic policy dialogue and stimulated partner countries' accountability for public policy implementation. In addition, proposing a wider, cross sectoral and more inclusive approach to programming through the use of sector clusters in JP (adopted in a couple of countries reviewed) also offered perspectives of a less fragmented approach to public policy making and monitoring, thus moving towards the wider, more inclusive and cross-sectoral approach favoured by the new international agendas (SDGs and AAAAA).

JC 2.1 Extent to which the countries that have carried out JP aimed at reducing aid fragmentation²⁵

Joint Programming was *inter alia* a response to the finding of increased aid fragmentation at the time of the Busan summit. Interviews in the countries visited and responses from the survey confirm that the reduction of aid fragmentation is indeed a main objective of JP for all stakeholders; however, they also show that coordination between EU, MS and other associated likeminded donors²⁶ has been found a marginally more important objective of JP. The Council Conclusions of 14th of November 2011 providing the EU's common position for the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan state that the EU will “*implement joint programming at the country level to reduce aid fragmentation and promote harmonisation*” (page 2). The reduction of aid fragmentation is thus given as one of JP's main objectives. In practice, all EUDs, MS and likeminded donors participating in JP in countries visited and all respondents to the survey (20 in EUDs and 29 in MS field) confirmed their strong adherence to this objective: as regard to the survey, depending on the category of respondents, between 55% and 89% indicated that the reduction of aid fragmentation was the main motivation if not a secondary consideration of JP (see Figure 5 above and Annex F for detailed data). However improved aid coordination between EU and MS was unanimously indicated as a slightly more important objective of JP with 55% to 95% of respondents indicating coordination as the main motivation if not a secondary consideration for JP.

Reduced aid fragmentation was not always a major objective of EU or MS; similarly some PC were reluctant to face risks of donor withdrawal. An improved division of labour between donors and sectors is necessary to reduce aid fragmentation: aid fragmentation is indeed measured by the number of donors present in a sector combined with the number of sectors supported by one donor, both having to be reduced in order for aid fragmentation to be reduced. However, neither all recipient countries nor all donors were necessarily in favour of reducing donor sector involvement: some Governments, such as those of Morocco, Kenya or Ethiopia, did not wish to rely on only a few donors per sector as they saw this as a potential risk in case of donor withdrawal. They preferred to manage each donor bilaterally and to negotiate sector involvement on a one-to-one basis even with possible risks of overlaps and duplication. Similarly, some donors in some countries had no desire to reduce the sector scope of their support, because of sector concentration decisions

²⁵ This Judgment criterion was given as JC2.3 in the EQ framework but is more logically preceding the other two JCs, which have thus been renumbered.

²⁶ In several countries, the EU Joint programming process has included also other like-minded donors (for example Switzerland and Norway in Palestine and Moldova, Turkey in Moldova).

made centrally at HQ, historical ties, strategic interests or commercial linkages that could be jeopardised by a European Division of Labour.

JC 2.2 Extent of aid fragmentation reduction in countries that have carried out JP

Measuring success of JP in reducing aid fragmentation is difficult to assess at this point. No routine monitoring of the realisation of JP strategy's commitments have been produced so far to our knowledge. Available international data from the OECD/DAC provide amounts disbursed per donor per sector per recipient country per year, thus providing time-lines of aid fragmentation indicators: number of donors/sector/country and number of sectors/donor (and number of countries/donor, not of interest in the context of this JP evaluation). Comparative statistics (average 2009-2011 compared to 2014) have been presented in the Country Notes for the 'early' JP starters (Cambodia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Rwanda and Zambia). They reveal that there was a reduction in aid fragmentation between the average performance in 2009-2011 and the performance in 2014 in Zambia. The trend however is unclear in Rwanda and Mozambique, while in Myanmar aid fragmentation appears to have increased. However, several caveats appear in the interpretation of these data. Firstly the latest available OECD data are for 2014 whilst most JP processes started implementation as from 2014: no changes could thus yet have been reflected in OECD data. A second caveat is that JP did not start in a vacuum but in an existing programmatic cycle: even if there may have been an effort in DoL with JP, this will be translated in the statistics only in a few years' time, as all on-going operations from previous programmes wind down. Another data limitation is that the sector definitions used by DAC are different and narrower than the ones used by the EU²⁷. Finally of course, any trend in data needs to be qualified by further probing as a (statistical) improvement in AF indicators might simply be linked to donors pulling out of certain sectors because of their own budget cuts or to the EU applying the aid concentration principles of the 11th EDF programming or any other reason unrelated to the JP exercise.

Aside from these data limitations, the efforts of JP participants to undertake DoL and contribute to AE are also limited, as shown, by the fact that often JP only concerns a few sectors and only concerns programmable funding for the EU.

According to available data, the reduction in aid fragmentation (as measured by the concentration of aid and donor presence) has only been observed to a (very) limited extent and has generally remained quite poorly documented. The JP process usually provided the opportunity to undertake a detailed mapping of EU aid but JP documents do not normally provide a historical trend of EU aid per sector. As previously mentioned, the process is still in its beginning and there are no historical data sets available with comparable information. More importantly, Joint Strategy implementation became effective only in a handful of countries reviewed for this evaluation and could thus not, as yet, have delivered

²⁷ To illustrate the points made, the 11th EDF programming in Ethiopia, for example, is focused on 3 sectors and the JP concerns a total of 6 pilot clusters for all participating MS: for the EU itself, the DAC measure of its presence in Ethiopia shows presence in 13 sectors. This is explained by the on-going projects in sectors from the 10th EDF, plus the reality that 3 EU sectors represent 6 DAC sectors, plus the fact that a diversity of EU financing instruments operate in Ethiopia in different sectors. The picture given by the statistics on AF is thus quite different from the efforts being made to improve AF.

results. Indeed implementing aid concentration might require substantial changes to donor presence that take time to effectuate (exit strategies would need to be deployed unless another donor was to take over the support in the same manner and with the same instruments). Findings, therefore mostly based on interviews rather than on observed hard aid data, thus point to limited results so far: only a third of countries reviewed and 25% of EUD and 34% of MS field office survey respondents agreed or strongly agreed that the JP process had led to a better division of labour among Commission and MS across sectors (see table below) whilst 30% disagreed or strongly disagreed (see Annex F).

Table 3: The JP process led to a better DoL among Commission/EEAS and MS

	Across sectors			Within sectors		
	<i>Strongly agree</i>	<i>Rather agree</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Strongly agree</i>	<i>Rather agree</i>	<i>Total</i>
EU HQ	0%	38%	38%	8%	75%	83%
MS HQ	0%	33%	33%	0%	44%	44%
EUDs	15%	10%	25%	15%	25%	40%
MS field	10%	24%	34%	7%	41%	48%
All	7%	26%	33%	9%	43%	51%

Source: Source: ADE survey – see Annex F (Questions Q7a and Q7b)

Where positive results were obtained, often they had not been triggered by JP; donor budget cuts and changed aid priorities also played a role. According to interviews held in visited countries, the limited achievements in reduced aid fragmentation documented above were not attributable to JP. Other aid rationalisation initiatives had been started well before the JP process or launched under separate initiatives (Bolivia, Mali, Laos, Cambodia, Rwanda, Mozambique, Zambia, Myanmar). The role of donor country budgetary cuts in the aid portfolio and changed aid priorities have also sometimes contributed to rationalise aid (this was the case for example in Rwanda, Cambodia, Mozambique and Bolivia). In only three countries was the JP process identified as having helped aid concentration: Mali, Laos and Cambodia.

The JP process did thus not, by itself, reduce overall aid fragmentation in the countries where it took place. Firstly, the EU JP concerned only a limited number of donors, even if their aid was often an important share of total ODA in the country: when new donors entered the scene, such as in Zambia, Kenya, Rwanda, Mozambique, Ethiopia or Cambodia, they increased aid fragmentation despite the JP donors' efforts to decrease it, at least in their own circle. Secondly, new funding instruments were also increasingly used as a growing number of countries graduate out of the 'only grants' aid category: mixed financing, credits, blending, private sector investment, make programming efforts to reduce aid fragmentation more difficult. Thirdly, JP has not necessarily been sufficiently (sector and donor) inclusive to have an important effect: in countries such as Ethiopia, Mozambique, Bolivia, Morocco or Palestine, a limited number of sectors were concerned by the JP process. In other countries (again Morocco or Moldova are good examples), MS could not easily fit in with locally decided aid allocations and were reluctant to give up their sector involvement because of specific economic and political interests or HQ centralised choices of priority sectors for all countries.

However, if the division of labour across sectors did not happen, interviewees agreed that the division of labour within sectors benefited from the JP process whilst survey respondents provided a mixed signal. According to a majority of interviewees in countries visited, the JP process led to a better division of labour among the Commission and MS within sectors. As will be seen in the next section, this was also accompanied by much improved coordination within the sectors. However, on the same issue, the survey gave more mixed results with about half of the EUD respondents and MS field respondents agreeing that there was no improvement in division of labour within sectors and the other half disagreeing (see table above).

JC 2.3 Extent to which JP has facilitated a division of labour beyond the sharing of sector involvement

The JP process triggered improved harmonisation, coordination and aid complementarity. An important step in the JP process was the joint analysis where EU, MS and associated donors jointly analysed the sectors of common interests, identified sector problems, sector objectives and defined a common approach and response to the sector's issues, guided where possible by the partner country's strategies. In almost all countries reviewed (except Myanmar), this has helped EU and MS donors to coordinate their actions better at sector level, to search for possible synergies and work together in a coherent manner towards a common goal. EUDs and MS better coordination at sector level has certainly helped making their portfolios more complementary within sectors and thus also helped to improve aid effectiveness. These findings were particularly strong in Senegal, Cambodia, and Palestine and to some extent Moldova and extended beyond the EU family in Zambia and Bolivia.

However the coordination between EU programmes has at times been put under stress, even within the JP process: migration in Morocco was cited as an example of excessive proliferation of uncoordinated projects (funded by different EU external financing instruments) even though the sector fell within those where the EUD and MS chose to work together under the JP; some sectors in Kenya and Moldova abounded with donors and hundreds of projects; and, in Myanmar, it was difficult, in a relatively new donor context, for EU donors to agree on common strategic views and translate these views in a coherent set of projects. The question is further discussed under EQ5 on coherence.


Beyond the division of labour across or within sectors, JP has also increased the appetite for undertaking joint implementation, even if this was already undertaken previously. In most countries, delegated cooperation, joint implementation, pooled Technical Assistance, co-financing of projects, etc.²⁸ have been on-going between European partners: Mali, Laos, Mozambique, Cambodia, Palestine have all experienced some forms of joint actions between EU partners. Whereas the field interviews indicated that these joint initiatives were not due to JP, the survey provides a more mixed picture. The survey shows that 36% of survey respondents found that JP led to joint implementation initiatives in the form of delegated cooperation whilst 35% found it didn't (and 29% didn't know). For the other forms of joint action, pooled funding and SWAPS, the survey respondents clearly indicated that JP had not (yet) contributed (see graph below). Amongst the country study

²⁸ E.g. Trust funds, budget support, sector budget support

cases, only in Laos and Myanmar has EU joint action been specifically ascribed to JP. However, in some of the other countries, where the JP process was less advanced, joint actions were hoped to become part of the future: several MS in Morocco and Palestine for example expressed the hope that JP would lead to more delegated cooperation and more joint implementation. These hopes were in some measure related to the harsh reality of MS's own budget cuts in their aid portfolios.

Figure 6: Extent to which the JP process led to Joint implementation initiatives

Presence of Joint Implementation initiative:



* I do not know

Source: ADE survey – see Annex F

Finally, two more ‘innovations’ introduced by JP in a couple of countries are noteworthy as they have a strong potential to contribute to improved development (rather than aid) effectiveness: the use of the JP results monitoring framework and a programming approach based on a set of overarching strategic clusters²⁹. Firstly, as recommended in the EU Joint Programming Guidance Pack, some countries have set up a common monitoring framework of results for the sectors falling under the JP. Results-oriented Frameworks (ROF) have notably been designed in Cambodia and in Palestine and have been used not only for monitoring results of country policy implementation but as a vehicle for successful high level strategic policy dialogue between the partner government and the EU extended family (Norway and Switzerland participating also in the JP process). In Palestine, the use of the ROF was tested in six sectors before being integrated into the JP process as its main monitoring and policy dialogue tool. A similar set-up for monitoring was envisaged in Laos, Mali and Kenya where joint financing tools and implementation modalities were also being referred to in the JP documents. These ROFs focused donor and partner country attention on the outcomes of policy implementation through the monitoring of development results, thus contributing to improved transparency and accountability.

²⁹ Please see Country Notes for Cambodia, Palestine and Ethiopia in Annexes H, I and Q respectively.

Secondly, it was noted that in two countries, Ethiopia and Palestine, the JP process led the EU and MS to discuss country priorities no longer along the lines of sector priorities but along the lines of strategic, more overarching, groupings of sectors ('clusters' in Ethiopia, 'pillars' in Palestine), where a limited number of sectors (3-5) were considered together because they shared similar concerns or contributed to the same objective or had other common features which made a common approach/consideration a sensible choice. This approach helped stakeholders from different sectors to work together, to consider their sector in a more strategic manner and to collaborate across administrative and institutional boundaries to address common overarching problems. This approach aimed to overcome the often fragmented manner in which public policies are designed and implemented and will prove particularly helpful in the context of the new SDGs and the Addis Ababa Agenda for Action, which both call for increased policy coherence and cross-sector integration of policy actions.

3.3 EQ 3: JP and Aid Transparency and Predictability

To what extent did JP improve EU aid predictability and transparency of EU and MS aid?

Aid predictability and transparency are linked to division of labour analysed in EQ2 in the sense that division of labour *"makes it easier to see what donors are doing and therefore improves transparency and predictability"* (FAQs of the Guidance Pack for Joint Programming, page 5). Transparency of aid flows is the provision of timely, transparent and comprehensive information of aid flows³⁰. Predictability of aid is defined as the degree of realization of donors' forward spending plans³¹.

Both concepts are also linked to synchronisation since forward planning is more useful to a government if it is synchronised with its own planning. The JP process should therefore be timed to coincide with the Government's own planning cycle.

EQ 3 on synchronisation of cycles, aid transparency and predictability - Summary

Progress in the synchronisation of the EU and MS programming cycles with each other and with that of the partner country has been slow, and the process of adoption of Joint Strategies to replace bilateral programming documents has begun but is so far still limited. Genuine obstacles have been met in trying to synchronise programming and budgeting cycles, obstacles often difficult to overcome without strong HQ support. As a result, only three cases were noted of full synchronisation of either the EU or one or several MS to the country cycle, the remaining

³⁰ Aid transparency is part of the 2005 Paris declaration commitments, and became a time bound commitment to 'impose the availability and public accessibility of information on development cooperation and other resources' (see OECD, Communication note drafted by the ad hoc group for the common standard, October 2012).

³¹ In 2007/2008, the OECD launched a survey on donor's forward spending plans. It provides standard measuring of aid predictability by calculating the degree of realization of donors' forward spending plans: 'an indicator, referred to as the "predictability ratio", was developed comparing actual CPA disbursed in a specific year to programmed CPA for the same year as reported to the OECD in earlier surveys' (see page 15, 2014 Global Outlook on Aid, Results of the 2014 DAC Survey on Donor's Forward Spending Plans and Prospects for Improving Aid Predictability, OECD/DAC).

countries showing either partial synchronisation or none at all; survey respondents expressed a better achievement rate, nevertheless still less than half agreed that some synchronisation had taken place.

Both transparency and predictability improved for EU and MS funding. The main gain has been the increased clarity of EU and MS priorities. The EU and MS aid mapping undertaken for the Joint Analysis undoubtedly increased the EU and MS aid transparency: the heavy cost of preparing such a mapping may preclude its routine updating. The Joint Responses in countries reviewed included medium term views of the overall directions and indicative amounts of EU aid: without a clear medium term commitment per sector from each of the EU donors, the improvement of EU aid predictability remained limited. In some cases, predictability was undermined by external factors. However, both exercises (JA and JR) provided a much clearer view for EU, MS, CSOs, PCs and other DPs on (i) where EU aid is being delivered, and (ii) the sector priorities for EU aid in the medium term.

JC3.1 Extent to which Joint programming led to changes in EU/MS planning and/or financial cycles

Synchronisation of programming and budget cycles has been achieved in three countries and progress has been made in another three. Out of the 14 countries reviewed, three countries achieved synchronisation (Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia): in Laos and Cambodia, the timing of the programming cycles of the Government and the European partners happened to coincide at the time JP was launched, so there was no need for interim programmes and the EU adapted the temporal scope of its Country Strategy Paper to fit with the Government's cycle. In Myanmar, JP adapted to the national programming cycle and also to the political calendar.

Kenya and Rwanda synchronised partially (the EUD or some MS programming cycles were the same as those of the national strategy, others not). In Kenya a pragmatic approach was adopted: in view of totally differing programming cycles, it was decided to undertake the next programming exercises in an "as joint as possible" fashion within the limits imposed by the differing programming cycles.

Occurrences of replacement of bilateral programming documents by the EU JS have so far remained very limited. Although there are a few positive examples (Laos, Cambodia, Mali) most countries have not yet reached a point where MS and EUDs feel comfortable substituting the joint programming document for the bilateral one. In Mali, one MS, Germany, synchronised and adopted the JP document as its main overarching programming document. In two countries (Senegal and Myanmar) interviewed MS representatives stated that their country had no intention of substituting the JP document for the bilateral one.

Willingness to synchronise has been shown in most remaining countries. In three countries (Bolivia, Moldova, Morocco), partners were in favour of synchronising cycles and made attempts to adapt the timing of their programming that have not yet paid off: in Moldova and Morocco, due to the absence of an overarching national policy document to align to, this synchronisation was between the EU and MS cycles rather than between the

EU and MS, and the Government cycles³². In another three countries full synchronisation has been scheduled for a set date in the future (Palestine 2017, Senegal 2018, Bolivia 2020). In Palestine, documents highlight the difficulties of performing multi-annual programming in a volatile environment; many DPs, including the European Commission, adopted an annual planning horizon. Despite this, synchronisation was deemed possible in Palestine by 2017. The issue of annual aid programming in some MS (Belgium, Finland, Spain, Romania, Poland, Slovenia, and Lithuania) also came up in some other countries (Bolivia, Moldova, Zambia, Mozambique) as a constraint to the multi-annual frame of JP.

Finally, for two countries no evidence was found showing that efforts had been made to adapt to the national programming cycle. In Mozambique and Zambia, reluctance to synchronise was linked to the fact that programming cycles were centrally determined at headquarters; that they were annual rather than multi-year; that MS did not want to lose flexibility in deciding aid allocations, in particular in view of rapidly changing priorities, or when aid was moving from development to more politically or commercially motivated aid.

As seen in the table below, the survey responses of both the EUD and the EU HQ to the question whether the JP process has led the EU to closer align its *programming cycle* to the PC, point in different directions. Among those who provided another response than “no view/too early”, in both cases about half stated they rather or strongly agree with the statements and half that they do not. Respondents from MS, and notably from HQ, tended to agree more. When it comes to MS partners, the picture is more contrasted: at EU and MS HQ the majority opinion was that MS had adapted their programming’s timing to reflect that of the PC (42% of EU HQ and 56% of MS HQ responded they agree that MS, aligned against 17% and 22% that they did not); however at field level both a majority of EUDs and MS field offices agreed that MS did not align (50% of EUDs and 52% of field MS against respectively 30% and 41% that thought that MS did align).

Table 4: JP has led EU and MS to closer align programming cycles to the PC

	EU alignment					MS alignment				
	<i>Strongly agree</i>	<i>Rather agree</i>	<i>Strongly /rather agree</i>	<i>Strongly /rather disagree</i>	<i>No view/ too early</i>	<i>Strongly agree</i>	<i>Rather agree</i>	<i>Strongly /rather agree</i>	<i>Strongly /rather disagree</i>	<i>No view/ too early</i>
EU HQ	8%	25%	33%	38%	29%	4%	38%	42%	17%	42%
MS HQ	0%	78%	78%	11%	11%	0%	56%	56%	22%	22%
EUDs	15%	30%	45%	40%	15%	10%	20%	30%	50%	20%
MS field	7%	34%	41%	34%	24%	3%	38%	41%	52%	7%
All	9%	35%	44%	34%	22%	5%	35%	40%	38%	22%


Source: Source: ADE survey – see Annex F (Q11a and Q11b)

³² In Morocco, Moldova and Palestine, an additional complication to synchronization between the programming cycles of the EU and the MS came from a late instruction from EU HQ to adapt EU sector priorities and programming cycle to the findings of the ENP review: this posed a challenge in terms of consensual decision making, timing of the process and synchronization, as previously agreed timetables for the programming cycle had, in at least one case, to be moved forward.

JC3.2 Extent to which transparency of CPA by JP-members improved

Transparency of EU and MS aid flows has been an important but a one-off benefit of JP. During the JP process, one of the very first steps was the undertaking of a mapping of EU aid which set out the JP members interventions by sector by amount³³. The preparation of this EU donor mapping was a very important but very time-costly exercise, usually undertaken as a one-off exercise. With this mapping, transparency on EU CPA has increased (Morocco, Palestine, Mali, Senegal, ...), even though in some countries, the marginal added value of the JP process was limited by the already existing data (for example in Mozambique, Kenya, Rwanda, Zambia). The increased knowledge this has provided MS and the EUD about their areas of support has been confirmed by 86.6% (72/83) of survey respondents. Similarly, 79.3% of survey respondents found that JP had provided them with better knowledge of areas of cooperation priorities.

Figure 7: JP has provided better knowledge of the partners involved regarding areas of cooperation priorities, areas of current support and medium-term intentions with regards to sector support



Source: ADE survey – see Annex F (Q13a and Q13b)

JC3.3 Extent to which predictability of CPA provided by JP-participants improved

A medium term outlook on EU intentions per sector is part of the Joint Strategy but was often insufficiently detailed to improve predictability of EU CPA and too limited in its sector scope and coverage of financing instruments. Similarly to the mapping of existing CPA for the Joint Analysis, a medium term outlook for EU CPA was included in the Joint Strategies; it showed in which sectors the EU partners will be active and usually indicated amounts to be allocated per sector over the medium-term by the EU family and like-minded donors involved in JP (such as, often, Switzerland and Norway). However, it

³³ Please see Annex E.

rarely provided a donor breakdown or a year breakdown and most often only covered the sectors of common interest (those included in the JP) and the CPA (to the exclusion of loans in particular). The outlook thus provided indicative ballpark figures for EU interventions rather than genuinely firm commitments of individual donors in all sectors. Nevertheless, these forward looking data provided a reasonable overview of the intentions of EU donors and their priorities over the medium term as well as CPA amounts to be expected for each sector. Interviews in all countries visited pointed to the great benefits each of the MS and the EUD experienced from this increased knowledge about each other's cooperation priorities. This was confirmed by the survey (see figure above): the majority of respondents agreed that JP led respectively the MS (71%), and the Commission/EEAS (70%) to provide more and better information on current and planned aid.

From survey results, the number of respondents who agreed that JP had improved transparency and predictability of EU and MS aid outweighed by far those who disagreed (see table below).

Table 5: The JP process has led the EU and MS to provide more and better information on current and planned CPA

	Strongly agree	Rather agree	Total
Transparency and predictability of EU			
All	21%	49%	70%
EU HQ	13%	46%	58%
MS HQ	11%	78%	89%
EUDs	45%	30%	75%
MS field	14%	55%	69%
Transparency and predictability of MS			
All	20%	51%	71%
EU HQ	21%	38%	58%
MS HQ	11%	67%	78%
EUDs	35%	45%	80%
MS field	10%	62%	72%

Source: Source: ADE survey – see Annex F (Q12a and Q12b)

The main gain from JP in terms of predictability remains, however, the clarity of views on EU priorities, rather than a clarity of medium-term commitments per donor per sector. More than three quarters of the survey respondents confirmed that the JP led MS to provide more and better information on mid-term intentions of sector support and this was also strongly supported by CSOs and/or PCs in Cambodia, Moldova and Morocco³⁴. Similarly, nearly three quarters of respondents confirmed that the increase of aid predictability was a main or secondary motivation for undertaking JP (see figures above).

In some cases, predictability was undermined by external factors. DPs budget cuts, high loan contents of aid and political uncertainties seriously undermined predictability (both time horizon and volumes) in some countries: this was the case in Rwanda (aid portfolio affected by budget cuts), in Mozambique, Palestine and Mali (political uncertainties) or in

³⁴ The benefits are indeed shared: whilst EU and MS were found to be better informed, PCs, CSOs and other DPs were also better informed thanks to JP. This was particularly clear in the cases of Cambodia, Moldova and Morocco.

LMICs where aid included a high non programmable, loan content (Morocco, other Sahel countries).

Nevertheless, the JP process helped both transparency and predictability, by providing country stakeholders more clarity of the EU and MS' medium-term interests and thus aid priorities. This has been evidenced both through in-country interviews (in particular in Cambodia, Laos, Bolivia, Moldova, Morocco, Palestine) and in the survey as seen above. The increased transparency of aid priorities and the better general understanding within the EU family of the individual partners' interests and priorities facilitated division of labour and choices of sectors of involvement: some MS were indeed quite happy to be flexible in the direction of their support (waiting to see the general EU involvement picture and then directing their support to fill gaps) where others were more stuck with sectors pre-decided by HQ priorities.

3.4 EQ 4: Partner Country Ownership and Leadership

To what extent did JP contribute to improved leadership by the partner country of its development priorities?

As underlined in aid effectiveness agreements, increased national ownership of the development agenda and process is a core objective.

While JP is an EU initiated and defined process, one of its ambitions is that the partner country takes a leadership role to ensure that JP seamlessly contributes to the country's own development efforts. As stated in the EU Common Position for the Fourth High Level Forum: "JP is led by the government wherever possible, is based on a partner country's national development strategy and is aligned to the partner country's strategy and programming cycles."

The EQ thus looks at the role of the national authorities with respect to JP. It checks two core elements in this respect: i) the role played by the partner country in the JP process, and; ii) the extent to which JP was aligned.

EQ 4 on PC ownership and leadership – Summary

Partner countries played a variety of roles in the JP process, but overall and despite exceptions, they did not take a lead role to bring forward their development priorities and did not make substantial contributions. Partner countries' roles varied from non-involvement or even refraining from JP to a more proactive role. Indeed, in a number of cases they were only involved in the JP process from a distance, because the process was not sufficiently advanced, or because they took a step back. In most of the other cases they were consulted and/or participating in the process. Despite a few exceptions, the partner countries did however not take a lead role as quite unanimously confirmed by stakeholders. Similarly, the evaluation found that partner countries had not really made substantial contributions to the JP process and its deliverables.

Support provided through JP was generally aligned to the national development strategies, but information collected does not point to a general causal link between a JP approach and (increased) alignment, and shows in a substantial share of cases the absence of such a link. Sources concur to show that support was well aligned, despite some exceptions. However, when it comes to assess to what extent JP has contributed to such alignment, results are more mixed. Some stakeholders stated that JP has contributed to alignment, but a large share also explained that JP had no impact in terms of alignment, often because support was already aligned before. Survey respondents from EUDs are notably critical in this respect. This being said it should be noted that while the EU Common position underlines the importance of JP providing aligned support, it does not define increased alignment as an objective of JP.

JC 4.1 Role of the partner country in the JP

Partner countries played a variety of roles in the JP process, but overall and despite exceptions, the evaluation found that they did not take a lead role in this respect to bring forward their development priorities.

- PC's roles in the JP process varied from *non-involvement or even refraining from JP to a more proactive role*:
 - Five of the case studies describe situations where the partner country was *not really or only from a distance involved* in the JP process. Sometimes this was because the JP was not sufficiently advanced (Zambia, Mozambique). In other cases this was due to the PC deliberately taking a step back, applying a “hands-off policy” (Ethiopia) or making a formal commitment to JP, while nevertheless continuing discussions with EU MS bilaterally (Kenya). In Morocco, for instance, interviewees explained that there was a certain reluctance from the side of the PC, the process being seen to a certain extent as an impediment, and the authorities appreciating the diversity of donors and not wanting to lose this opportunity for flexibility.
 - In most of the other cases, the PC was involved in the sense of *being consulted or participating in the process*. This was for instance clearly the case in Moldova (“very good Government and CSO participation”) or Palestine, where the case study notes that discussion with the Palestinian authorities “*became more regular and strategic with the use of the results oriented framework and the preparation of the joint strategy and pillar fiches*”. Similarly the case study for Bolivia notes that the Government “*has been involved both politically and technically in the process*”. In Senegal the involvement was limited in the first phase, but stronger afterwards. This is also confirmed by the survey conducted among EUDs, where close to half of them mention consultation during the JA with the central/coordinating ministry level (9/20), and with line ministries (8/20). Figures are lower concerning consultation during the implementation of the JP (it is only mentioned in about 5/20 cases or less³⁵).
 - There are also rather exceptional cases of a **strong role** played by the Government. The Cambodia case study notes for instance that the Government has “*displayed strong leadership and accordingly played an important role in the Joint Programming process*”.

³⁵ See annex F (Q17)

(including line ministries), which laid the foundations for further sector dialogue”. The Rwandan case is also one of strong leadership, albeit in a different sense. Indeed, the government itself was not directly involved in the JP process as such, but it has defined the key parameter for the Joint Programming through its “Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy” and its overall aid coordination architecture, providing a determinant and lasting role from the start.

- Survey results confirm the finding that overall **partner countries did not take a lead role**³⁶.
 - Indeed, survey respondents quasi unanimously stated that they rather or strongly disagree with the statement that the “*JP process was led by government*”. In fact on 82 respondents overall, 47 strongly disagree, 22 rather disagree (hence together 84%), while only 3 rather or strongly agree (with 10 no view/too early).³⁷
 - It is also interesting to note that an important share of respondents stated that “*to increase country ownership*” was not an objective of JP (34/82 or 42% overall), while 17% overall state it was. In EUDs, the results were even more striking with 12/15 or 60% stating it was not an objective, while only 2 or 10% stated it was the main motivation.
 - Similarly, donors regularly explained that the **partner countries had not really made substantial contributions to the JP process and its deliverables**. The majority (70%) of survey respondents from EUDs for instance stated that they rather (4/20) or strongly disagreed (10/20) that partner countries made such contributions.

JC 4.2 JP and alignment

Overall, the support provided through JP was aligned to the PCs national development strategies.

- This is clear from the case studies, the vast majority of which explain that support provided was well aligned. The Laos case study for instance found that “*European partners have synchronized their strategy cycle to the partner’s programmatic cycle using national development plans as a basis for delimiting common objectives (...). The Joint Programme is rigorously aligned to the Government National Economic Development Plan (...). This alignment holds true at the sector level as well ...*” Other case studies are often less explicit and detailed, but most concur to say that support was well aligned.
- Similarly, the majority of survey respondents stated that the JP process was based on PCs NDP/NDS. This was for instance the case for 75% of EUDs who strongly (7/20) or rather (8/20) agreed this was the case³⁸.
- There are some exceptions though. The case study for Moldova for instance notes that “*increased alignment to Government priorities has not been an objective of JP in the face of a weak national policy framework and recent Government instability. In fact, rather than aligning to Government*

³⁶ See annex F(respectively Q14, Q6 and Q18)

³⁷ As there is nearly a consensus we do not consider it useful to breakdown results by type of respondent.

³⁸ See annex F (Q14)

priorities, the tone of the JA is rather prescriptive, pointing out reforms and improvements required to be undertaken by Government in the medium term”.

Information collected does not point to a general causal link between a JP approach and (increased) alignment; in a substantial share of cases it shows the absence of such a link.

- Cases studies generally explain that one cannot link the alignment to the use of JP. A reason regularly invoked is that in fact there was already alignment before the JP and that JP did not really make a difference in this respect (Bolivia, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Zambia, and Mozambique). In some cases it is considered unclear to what extent JP impacted alignment or not. The case study for Rwanda notes in this respect that *“because the EU community has used the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy at the starting point for its JP documents, it has at a minimum led to more explicit alignment whether or not this has meant a substantive shift”*. The Senegal case study underlines (as confirmed by the Senegalese Government) the value-added of the joint programming in terms of formally embedding the importance given to alignment.
- Survey results are also mixed in this respect³⁹:
 - In terms of alignment with *PC priorities*, the situation is more contrasted. 70% of EUD respondents (14/20) stated they do not agree that the JP process has led EU to align more to PC priorities vs. a situation without JP, and 20% (4/20) they do. At EU HQ on the other hand, 46% (11/24) said they agree, while 13% (3/24) disagree (with 42% or 10/24) stating that it is too early or they do not know.
- Two elements should be added to the above:
 - First, while it is clear that according to the EU Common position, support provided needed, as all support, to be aligned, this same document does not depict JP as a specific tool to improve alignment;
 - Second, in addition to the critical elements noted in terms of alignment, there are also elements that allow pointing to a contribution of JP to (increased) alignment. By doing the JP exercise opportunities for intensified exchange with the national authorities were created in specific cases, which created better conditions for alignment. The Laos case study notes in this respect that *“European partners have synchronized their strategy cycle to the partner programmatic cycle using national development plans as a basis for delimiting common objectives. The elaboration of a Transition Strategy facilitated further the development of a reference framework for the EU, EU MS and the Government.”*

³⁹ See annex F (Q11)

3.5 EQ 5: Coherence of EU and MS Programming and Strategies

To what extent did JP contribute to increased coherence of EU and MS strategies and programming at country level?

The issue of coherence lies at the heart of the JP as a joint tool. Since this evaluation is country case-based, the question became focused on the extent to which the JP favoured convergence among the EU and MS regarding strategies and policies *at country level*.

Another dimension is the extent to which EU concerns and instruments other than country-programmable aid (CPA) and aid effectiveness are included in the JP process.

EQ 5 on Coherence – Summary

The JP is an enabling factor for strengthening EU + MS policy and strategy coherence. When parties agree to engage in a JP process, they design a Roadmap of meetings and deliverables including a Joint Analysis, Joint Response with financial commitments, where each step further supports partners to reach more common views and approaches. This process of increased coherence and even convergence is stronger at sector than at national level.

At the same time, several factors constitute **obstacles to increased coherence**, and some of these may be increasing in importance over time: bilateralisation of aid; emergence of new donor agendas; particular MS strategic interests; donor aid fragmentation; EU central initiatives; donor fatigue; and change in personnel on the ground.

The JP is focused on CPA, but has included other EU policies, actors and mechanisms, though on an *ad hoc* basis. The JPs have primarily addressed CPA, but have in some cases included EU-sourced credits, but largely been unsuccessful with regards to central and thematic funds since these do not contain country allocations. Other EU policies – on trade, migration, etc. – may be addressed for country-specific reasons, while general concerns – CSO support, private sector development, and human rights dialogue – are covered more *ad hoc*, but show that the potential for including them exist.

JC 5.1 Extent to which JP favoured convergence of objectives among EU and MS in terms of development strategies and policies at country level

Where JP processes took place, EU and MS policy and strategy coherence was strengthened. The 14 country cases document how the various steps in the JP process enabled a “coming together” of the members of the EU community on the ground:

- The *preparatory discussions* among the EU and MS on whether the EU community should initiate a JP process or not has often hinged on the extent to which the EU partners have or develop a common understanding of what the value-added of a JP process is likely to be. If the parties decide to go ahead with a JP process, this means a

formal commitment and thus a positive platform for working together has been established.

- This is reflected in the *survey*. 95% of EUD respondents say that better coordination of aid between the EU and MS is a main motivation for engaging in JP, over 75% of the MS Field respondents say the same, as do over 83% of EU HQ respondents. Overall, this is the purpose that by far receives the greatest support – over 80% by all those surveyed – as being the main motivation for JP (Annex F).
- According to interviews across all countries and actors, the JP process strengthened the *collaborative relations*, which enhance the incentives to finding joint solutions.

JP process increased parties' awareness of each other's strategies and policies, identified commonalities, thus providing an important foundation for increased consistency across bilateral MS and EU programmes and strategies.

- In the countries visited, the JP process generally included the foreseen steps of donor mappings, HoC meeting presentations of MS programmes, informing each other about own programmes and activities – in general providing a lot more specific and relevant information of what each EU member in fact was doing⁴⁰. This information sharing showed where programmes and thinking are overlapping and complement, and also made it clear to the parties how linkages between programmes and approaches could be strengthened and streamlined.
- The *survey* shows that 35% of the EUD respondents and over 41% of MS field respondents strongly agree that JP has provided better knowledge of partners' priorities, and a further 45% of EUD and 41% of MS field respondents rather agree (question 13a in the survey – see table 5 below). There are few dissenting voices – nobody strongly disagrees.

Good collaboration/communication between political (HoMs) and aid (HoCs) management strengthens coherence.

- Where the political dimension of the relations between the EU and the partner country are clear, such as in the Neighbourhood and enlargement regions (Association Agreement) the overarching policy agenda drives many of the aid programmes and thus promotes the coherence of funding on the ground.
- In countries where this dimension is not clearly in place, having the political and aid management come together has been observed to be helpful, where in the case of one country the experience led to a decision to have quarterly HoM/HoCs meetings “*to continue ensuring synergies between the political dialogue with the authorities and development cooperation*”⁴¹. This kind of policy-aid dialogue thus provides political signals and support for more common approaches and activities across the EU community.

⁴⁰ All country cases reported how the EU members appreciate the increased information flows and greater openness about what each one is doing and the thinking behind choices made and activities selected.

⁴¹ HoM Zambia report, 9 April 2016.

The JP Roadmap is a first step towards greater coherence.

- The *JP roadmap* is often the first deliverable in a JP process. As explained in the JP Guidance Pack⁴², it lays out a process that provides *meeting points* and *objectives* or joint deliverables that require dialogue and agreement among the JP partners, which facilitates dialogue and concurrence on the aid assistance objectives the JP is to address⁴³.
- Many roadmaps include an overview of which actors are to deliver which inputs. This has required not only an agreement on which actor was to be sector or thematic lead, but also that there was confidence that the drafts would provide a common view regarding what the EU community should support and address.

The Joint Analysis process further contributes to policy and programme coherence.

- The *Joint Analysis* work specifically moves the parties to a common understanding of the overarching issues to be addressed, and how this is to be done by the EU community as a whole. It thus sets the stage for each EU partner to state more clearly own positions and priorities, thus further assisting the actors to see where the areas of consistency are or can be strengthened.

A Joint Response documents EU and MS coherence.

- A “standard” *Joint Response* provides the common understanding of what the EU community intends to do in terms of its core support to the Partner Country. This contains a description of (at least) the priority sectors that will receive support, why, and to some extent how – the level of detail varies from one country’s document to another. This has required that the EUD and MS have been able to produce a consistent framework for the support in these areas.
- Where the partners have been able to agree the *Financial frames* – ideally funding by donor by year by sector – this has usually entailed approval from the respective HQ. This means that the underlying policies and strategy have also been found acceptable as a basis for financial commitments by the respective HQs.

Where the JP addressed sector issues, this has led to greater policy and strategy coherence.

- In Cambodia, a set of six policy papers and a common human-rights based approach was transmitted through sector leads. In Rwanda, the EU produced a set of seven sector papers as inputs to the country’s Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy, while in Mozambique the EU is focusing its NIP funding to two sectors⁴⁴. In all these cases, the sector work has fomented a more common view among the EU partners that were involved in the various processes. This has resulted in the EU as a body being able to present a more consistent approach in the fields, but also that the individual MS views and supportive programmes are more compatible with these analyses.

⁴² See <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/document/roadmaps-menu>

⁴³ The process traces for Kenya and Palestine both note the development of a Roadmap early in the process, though only Palestine has identified the Roadmap as a deliverable with a specific finish date. See Annex B, Methodology,

⁴⁴ See the Country Notes for the three countries, Annexes H, O and R, respectively.

- The processes have probably been the most thorough in Moldova and Palestine. In Moldova, the Joint Analysis preparation and endorsement process was characterised by extensive consultations, discussions, workshops, exchanges of comments on draft papers, etc., which led the EU partners to work together and agree, for each sector, on the challenges, priorities and objectives to be attained, all within the framework of priorities set in the Association Agreement. The convergence of views obtained has been highlighted as an important value added of the process by all, and some noted that the document will be used to guide their own programming. In Palestine, the pillar fiches, using the logical framework approach, meant EU+ partners had to agree on all elements of the analysis and response, so not only a common understanding of the sector challenges but also an agreement on the sector's objectives and results, as well as agreement on how to treat the cross-cutting issues in analysis and response.
- It has been easier to get coherence at sector compared with national level. This is logical, as sector issues are often more concrete and therefore easier to understand and reach agreement on. Furthermore, only those actors interested or already engaged in a given sector will work on a sector policy, so they hence have already made the strategic sector commitment and will be interested in coming to closure of what needs to be done. These donors will also often have a history in and thus an understanding of the sector, including years of working together on practical sector issues.
- When joint analysis at national level is not seen as very useful, more attention and special incentives are put into finding coherence at sector level. In Mozambique the dialogue at national level is currently not seen as very productive by the EU partners, so attention is at sector level where the actors can agree on particular interventions⁴⁵. In other countries that have initiated the process with a sector focus, such as Rwanda, the intention is nonetheless to also agree at the national/strategic level, but there is an extra incentive of finding agreement at sector level as the foundation for moving to more strategic coherence over time.

Credible national development strategies/plans contribute to internal EU coherence: it becomes logical for EU partners to coalesce around these, as the objective of a national-driven development process is important to the donor community. This can be seen in countries like Bolivia, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Rwanda and Zambia, where the JP is structuring its work around the national development plans which thus imposes a *national* perspective on all JP activities (see Annexes G, I, O, R and T respectively).

There are several factors that constitute obstacles to increased coherence, however:

- Increasing *bilateralisation of aid* is perhaps the single largest challenge for JP coherence. In some countries, explicit policies such as the Netherland's "Aid for Trade", means that individual MS have to programme their resources according to own political priorities. This makes it more complicated to engage in JP efforts, and this structural feature works against JP across countries.
- Another issue is the *(sudden) emergence of new donor agenda items*, sometimes at national level, but also across the EU, such as migration or security. These issues may require long-term strategic thinking but because they are seen differently in different MS,

⁴⁵ See the Country Notes for Mozambique, Annex O.

the ability to find common ground in a timely manner militates against careful processes like JP. This was seen by a number of stakeholders, including EU and MS representatives, in Africa in particular as an emergent structural challenge.

- Donors with *strategic interests* in a given country – long-standing trade and investment relations, political alliances, security collaboration – will obviously pursue these, which constrains the local embassy’s ability to engage in joint commitments.
- **Donor aid fragmentation:** Many donors, including the EU, programme much of their in-country resources *outside* the JP. Some funds are centrally determined, such as global programmes where country-level allocations are based on criteria and mandates globally determined. According to stakeholders interviewed, much of today’s financing is channelled through global or regional funds with particular objectives, or contracted out through framework agreements to implementers who then decide the actual allocations and programme. This fragmentation from HQ level makes it challenging for JP processes on the ground.
- **New EU initiatives may override JP decisions:** The EC on 7 June 2016 communicated the establishment of a new Partnership Framework on Migration with five countries – including Ethiopia – where all EU resources to these countries should have migration as core concern. This has been confirmed in a Council Conclusion of 28 August, thus requiring that the JP process accommodate this overriding objective. The December 2015 Council Conclusion to bring forward by a year the JP in the NEAR region following a European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) review has in a similar vein created challenges for the Moldova JP process.
- **“Donor fatigue”** is a challenge because it reduces willingness to invest the requisite time for a meaningful JP process. While the issue often comes up in conversations, it is difficult to validate its importance because it is linked to a number of factors. For some MS, the JP, as a consensus based and deliberate step-by-step process, is seen as long and cumbersome. In light of the impression that agendas change ever faster, the donor community must be able to respond flexibly, and the JP is not seen as sufficiently nimble and adjustable. The relative cost benefit of engaging in JP depends on a host of internal MS considerations that vary from one MS to another, and may vary from one JP country to another for the same MS. Unless the incentives and instructions from MS HQ are very clear on the need for full engagement, local MS offices must make own judgements on time allocation priorities. Finally, the relative importance of aid in a given MS’ total financial engagement is generally declining, raising questions about how much time to spend on this, even if it produces more coherence also for own efforts.
- Finally, because the JP process *builds* relationships and builds *on* relationships, **change in personnel** may affect the process and dynamics – both positive and negative examples were referred to in countries visited. The challenge to coherence is that institutional (donor-specific) memory and commitment is often poor, thus “lessons learned” are forgotten, and new actors enter who may therefore have somewhat different agendas they wish to pursue. This is particularly a problem in countries where the JP process started up, and then had to be put on hold for some time or restructured – such as for example Kenya and Mozambique – so that those who began the process are not all the same as the ones who are to complete it.

These obstacles to increased coherence may explain why, despite the clear indications that the different steps of the JP process have led to closer working relationships, improved mutual understanding and more coherent approaches to sector challenges, findings from the survey also point to issues where views diverge:

- When asked whether the JP process resulted in greater coherence across Commission/EEAS and MS policies, 25% of EUD respondents (5/20) stated they did, while 40% (8/20) stated they did not. Between 25 and 46% of the respondents from the other categories also stated they disagreed (*see Q21c in the table below*);
- Opinions are also quite divided on the JP process resulting in the Commission/EEAS and MS' stronger convergence of development objectives. Indeed, between 22% and 30% of respondents from EUDs, MS HQs and MS Field disagree this took place, while only 4% of EU HQ staff surveyed disagree (*see Q21a*);
- Finally, it is interesting to note that a number of respondents did not agree that the Commission/EEAQ and MS engaged in the JP process for the same reasons. Notably 55% (11/20) of EUD respondents disagreed, while 45% (9/20) agreed. Also at MS level (both in the field and at HQs opinions were quite divided in this respect). At EU HQ level, about 1/3 of respondents did not express any view on this, while half stated they agreed.

Table 6: Survey responses to issues regarding programming coherence

Q 13a: JP has provided better knowledge of the partners involved regarding areas of cooperation priorities					
Stakeholder group	Strongly agree	Rather agree	Rather disagree	Strongly disagree	No view/ too early
EU HQ	29,2 %	45,8 %	4,2 %	0,0 %	20,8 %
MS HQ	0,0 %	77,8 %	22,2 %	0,0 %	0,0 %
EUDs	35,0 %	45,0 %	15,0 %	0,0 %	5,0 %
MS field	41,4 %	41,4 %	10,3 %	0,0 %	6,9 %
Q 21a: The JP Process has resulted in: Stronger convergence of development objectives among Commission/EEAS and EU MS					
EU HQ	8,3 %	62,5 %	4,2 %	0,0 %	25,0 %
MS HQ	0,0 %	77,8 %	22,2 %	0,0 %	0,0 %
EUDs	10,0 %	35,0 %	20,0 %	10,0 %	25,0 %
MS field	3,4 %	48,3 %	10,3 %	17,2 %	20,7 %
Q 21c: The JP Process has resulted in: Greater coherence across Commission/EEAS and EU MS policies (migration, trade etc)					
EU HQ	0,0 %	45,8 %	25,0 %	0,0 %	29,2 %
MS HQ	0,0 %	44,4 %	33,3 %	0,0 %	22,2 %
EUDs	5,0 %	20,0 %	35,0 %	5,0 %	35,0 %
MS field	10,3 %	31,0 %	31,0 %	10,3 %	17,2 %

Source: Source: ADE survey – see Annex F

JC 5.2 Extent to which JP documents show coherence of development with other EU policies

JP focus has so far primarily been on country programmable aid (CPA). JP processes have largely handled what the local actors are mandated to administer on a planned basis.

- EUDs and MS embassies have so far concentrated on the *resources (CPA)* and policies that are directly delegated or devolved to the field, since this is what the actors on the ground have mandates to manage, is easiest to reach consensus on, and because these resources and policies are directed to that specific partner country.
- *Centrally/regionally managed funds* whose mandates are tied to specific policy objectives are generally not part of JP processes because there usually are no “country quotas” and thus no basis for programming the funds as seen from a given PC.
- *Credits*, which are allocated based on applications/projects, are generally not yet included though exceptions exist. The European Investment Bank (EIB), France’s AfD and Germany’s KfW participated in some countries, sometimes without specific commitments, though in the case of Kenya, the AfD and EIB annual commitments and total sector commitments for the period 2014-2017 are provided.

Inclusion of other EU policies is fairly common, variable, and context-dependent.

- In countries with Accession Agreements (AA) – Moldova and Morocco among the countries visited – it is the AA and its various provisions that set the parameters for the JP exercise. In these cases, it is therefore the general EU policies that frame the JP rather than the JP process deciding to include policy areas.
- In Palestine, the two-state solution is at the centre of EU+ preoccupations and JP. It may, however, become difficult to maintain this coherence when the JP process moves from JA to JS as not all MS are aligned in their political positions vis-à-vis Palestine. It also is unclear if political-development convergence developed at field level will hold up against MS HQ political priorities.
- Despite Palestine being a fragile state, the Linking Relief and Rehabilitation Development (LRRD) concept has however not been applied. In the EU Local Development Strategy of 2011, the concept of LRRD was deemed not to be applicable in Palestine because of the continuous crisis situation.
- In Cambodia a number of relevant issues are raised, though the Joint Strategy notes that relevant regional and thematic funds are outside the scope of the JP. In Bolivia and Senegal trade policies are given prominence, while in Ethiopia and Kenya regional dimensions of development and the instruments available are included in the JP. In Ethiopia, the Joint Cooperation Strategy (JCS) notes the increasing importance and relevance of the EU’s ‘European Consensus for Development’ and ‘Agenda for Change’ that go beyond simply CPA. It refers to the continued support through existing joint instruments “*such as the Civil Society Support Programme, the Civil Society Fund and the Social Accountability component of the PBS ... and ... EU joint activities such as the Human Rights Country Strategy*”, and it intends to support peace and stability through “*support to regional transport infrastructure development, energy markets, trade facilitation, as well as political dialogue. The EU will also support long term solutions ... for cross border conflicts and regional water management. The EU*”

recognises and supports the strategic role of Ethiopia in regional institutions, such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development” (Ethiopia JCS, pp. 2-3).

Not all complementary policies are used to strengthen the JP’s coherence function.

In some of the case countries, the EU Country Roadmap for engagement with Civil Society has been linked with the JP, but in most it has not. One reason for this is that in countries where relationships between Government and civil society is challenging, it is easier to address the support as two different activities. Some MS have particular CSO funds that are difficult to programme jointly. The support to and engagement of the private sector is generally handled outside the JP, as are the annual Human Rights (“Article 8”) discussions, which in any case result in separate reports that are not made public.

The expected convergence of the **EU’s Linking Relief and Rehabilitation Development (LRRD) with the JP process in fragile states – Mali, Myanmar and Palestine** – has not been seen.

3.6 EQ 6: Visibility of EU Development Partners due to JP

To what extent did JP increase the visibility of EU and MS to partner country authorities and other donor partners?

One of the expected outcomes of joint programming is to increase the visibility of European Development Partners as a group. The EU JP Guidance Pack notes “*there should be more visibility for EU Development Partners support as a whole, with a single ‘EU brand’ of high quality aid (plus more visibility for each participating Development Partners as they are associated by everything done under the joint response strategy)*”.

Thus the question aims at examining to what extent JP enhanced the visibility of European support vis-à-vis partner country authorities and the wider donor community. It also seeks to examine to what extent joint visibility plans and actions have been implemented as part of the JP process. Last but not least, it looks at whether the visibility of Member States and the visibility of the European group have both benefitted from JP, or if one has been at the expense of the other.

EQ 6 on Visibility –Summary

Joint Programming generally contributed to enhancing awareness of joint European support (i.e. of DEVCO/EEAS and Member States combined) among partner country authorities and other donors, but there could be greater clarity about what increased visibility intends to achieve, and from that, more joint visibility actions. Documents, interviews and the online survey all confirm that increased visibility for the EU institutions and MS as a group and individually is an objective of JP and is expected to materialise. Visibility has been enhanced through substantive consultations processes rather than visibility actions⁴⁶ *per se*. However, an increased financial weight and increased clout do not translate directly or easily into increased leverage.

JP has generally not dampened the visibility of individual Member States among partner country authorities and other donors, but its contribution to enhanced visibility has been very diverse. Documents review and interviews with EU and MS HQ highlight divergent views on the contribution of JP to the visibility of individual EU MS in partner countries. Smaller MS in particular seem to have benefitted, but some MS remain wary, especially those with a well-established presence and relationship with national stakeholders.

In many cases, what seems to determine the effect on MS visibility is the manner the EU institutions and MS partnership is conceived and managed: JP leads to increased visibility and influence when the European group as a whole is promoted, i.e. not at the detriment of MS visibility and bilateral relations, and when the partnership distributes policy dialogue roles across the partnership. After all, working relations and trust built with Government officials are as important in the “influence” equation as increased financial weight and increased joint EU clout. This points to the need to preserve and build on individual European partners’ strengths.

JC 6.1 JP contributed to enhance awareness of combined EU support among partner country authorities and other donors

JP is expected to provide opportunities for the EU as a whole to be more visible, as confirmed by different sources (documents reviewed; EU institutions and MS interviews at HQ and in the field; and the online survey): DANIDA’s 2013 Policy Note on Joint Programming indicates that “*EU JP will enhance EU’s political leverage by providing a common policy platform and thereby enabling the EU to speak with one voice*”. Other documents⁴⁷ and EU institutions and MS HQ staff interviewed also highlight the potential of JP to provide the EU more visibility and leverage and improve policy/political dialogue with partner countries. This is especially important to promote and raise a number of issues related to European values (e.g. democratic governance, human rights, gender...) and to place the EU in a

⁴⁶ “Visibility actions” are taken in the narrow sense of as actions promoting the written and visual identity of the EU: “briefings, written material, press conferences, presentations, invitations, signs, commemorative plaques and all other tools used to highlight EU participation” (EU Communication and Visibility Manual, 2010).

⁴⁷ ECDPM (2015), ECDPM (2013), DIE (2007).

position of sufficient influence to lobby for important reforms in some sectors in accordance with EU values.

The online survey (see Annex F) shows “Increasing EU leverage and impact” comes as the third most important motivation for joint programming (behind better coordination and reduced aid fragmentation) whereas “Increasing joint EU visibility” comes seventh.

This was confirmed by interviews: for many interviewees, especially in MS, visibility is not an end in itself, whereas influence is, and they would rather contribute to partner government legitimacy than promote their own visibility. There were, however, strong exceptions, especially in countries where they have a strong strategic interest and visibility at home. Particular ambassadors, too, can be driven to promote their own country’s visibility over that of the joint European visibility.

However, visibility has been enhanced through substantive consultation processes and joint démarches rather than visibility actions *per se*:

- Few joint programming processes detail their visibility strategy. An exception is Kenya, where the Joint strategy explicitly addresses visibility as an issue. It details a communication and visibility strategy that aims to increase the visibility of the EU as an actor while also being able to highlight the contributions of the individual MS.
- However, in most of the other countries surveyed, substantive consultation processes have been an important enhancer of visibility: this is the case, for example, in Cambodia, Moldova and Palestine. Joint statements and *démarches* have been the other most visible manifestation of “the EU in action”, and have taken place in most countries, although with variable frequency. In some cases (e.g. Cambodia, Palestine), joint monitoring of the joint strategy’s results – as well as communication of the latter and dialogue around the latter – have resulted in sustained visibility of the EU as a group. There are instances of other joint communication initiatives, e.g. related to European partners’ initiatives relating to climate change (2015, Cambodia).
- Fifty-six per cent of survey respondents find that JP has provided value-added in terms of providing EU and MS with a common voice, and 46% find that JP has resulted in greater EU leverage and impact (42% in terms of improving relations with partner country government; and 46% in terms of improving relations with other stakeholders in country⁴⁸).
- Visibility results vary depending on factors such as (i) whether JP implementation has started and is advanced; (ii) the inclusiveness of the process (Government; CSOs, private sector...); (iii) the visibility of the EU institutions and MS to begin with; (iv) the need to promote European visibility given the rise of non-traditional development partners and/or the shrinking role of aid in development matters; and (v) views on what added visibility is supposed to bring:
 - In Bolivia, visibility is of particular interest as aid is decreasing as a proportion of the national budget, but European visibility was already high and collaboration with the government already fluid in many sectors without much need for the EU or MS to demonstrate their unity or coherence. Similarly, in Mozambique, the country authorities also recognize the central role of the EU group as key partners and have acknowledged the potential of JP to become a key mechanism that might assist the

⁴⁸ See annex F (Q21 and Q27)

government's development agenda. Yet, it remains difficult to appreciate to what extent the JP process per se would change the Government's pre-existing perceptions of the EU role in the country, once the JP is implemented.

- By contrast, there is evidence that joint programming – notably in Cambodia, Kenya, Laos, Moldova, Palestine and Zambia – has been beneficial in raising the visibility of the EU as a coherent actor and its collective influence to partner country authorities and other development partners (Country Notes). In Moldova and Palestine, although there was no JP communication strategy as such, the JP Preparatory process with its intensive sector or high level consultations enhanced and sometimes even uncovered the awareness of the EU's support at the sector level, raised its profile within government circles and raised the profile of the MS leading discussions on sector or thematic issues on behalf of the EU. In Laos, JP furthered the use of “one European voice” in a range of sectors. According to the HoMs, when JP began in Laos “*Government discovered that together the EU and MS are a partner that delivers USD 500 million...All of a sudden the EU and MS are seen as very important partners*”.⁴⁹

Moreover, increased financial weight and increased clout do not translate directly or easily into increased leverage (Interviews at field and HQ level). **The working relations and trust built with Government officials — and other entry points— are as important in the “influence” equation.** Here too, much depended on the joint vision of European partners: in some cases, there was a clear vision of what issues the European group should try and influence, and which were the national counterparts that mattered, which led to increased European influence (e.g. Cambodia); whereas in other countries, either there was not sufficient consensus on the issues themselves, or it was too early to use the added clout in the policy dialogue (for example in Myanmar, where the policy dialogue with Government is still nascent).

JC 6.2 JP contributed to enhance the visibility of EU member states among partner country authorities and other donors

Documents review⁵⁰ and interviews with EU and MS HQ highlight divergent views on the contribution of JP to the visibility of individual EU MS in partner countries. This depends (among other factors) on the size of the particular donor's support and on the particular country context (high strategic interest and visibility at home, or not): For some MS, JP further offers opportunities to increase their bilateral visibility, role in policy dialogue and influence, especially when leading in a sector. Smaller donors generally tend to benefit from being part of JP considering the larger portfolio it represents and consequently the role the EU as “one voice” can play: “*Especially when China and global funds are rising, it's better to say “we represent \$120m” than \$12m*” (Country visits).

⁴⁹ Capacity4dev Voices and Views, *Joined-up EU Approach to Development Programming*, (<http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/article/joined-eu-approach-development-programming>)

⁵⁰ For example, ECDPM (2015); ECDPM (2013); HTSPE (2011); European Parliament, *The Cost of Non Europe In Development Policy*, 2013.

Other Member States fear losing their national visibility and power, especially those with a well-established presence and relationship with national stakeholders (Country visits). As reported from the Workshop Policy Coherence for Development (2016)⁵¹ “Some EU Member States have resisted it (JP) for material reasons: a more visible presence thanks to bilateral aid is believed to provide a more direct gateway to the country and the government, especially in countries that are growing rapidly.”

An important factor that determines JP’s effect on MS visibility is the manner the EU institutions and MS partnership is managed: JP leads to increased MS visibility and influence when the European group as a whole is promoted, i.e. not at the detriment of MS visibility and bilateral relations, and when the partnership distributes policy dialogue roles across the partnership (Country visits).

This distribution of roles is not only conducive to more MS visibility, but also to more leverage of the EU: After all, working relations and trust built with Government officials are as important in the “influence” equation as increased financial weight and increased clout of the EU Institutions + MS group, and some MS have considerable soft power – even when non-traditional providers of development cooperation growing in influence. JP leads to increased visibility and influence when this soft power is preserved, and bilateral relations remain as dynamic as before, the only difference being that messages are pre-discussed across EU partners.

In this respect, is it worth noting that only few countries distribute roles across the partnership: While it is often the EUD that delivers joint agreed messages, MS have also played that role on particular policy issues and themes. The Lisbon Treaty defines the coordinating role of the EUD, but does not prevent MS from playing such roles on specific aspects of JP (art. 208-210). For example, in Cambodia, Palestine and Moldova, different MS (in addition to the EUD) are responsible for the European policy dialogue on certain issues. Furthermore, several MS in several countries deplore the lack of a two-way street when it comes to information-sharing and consensus-building: “*the EU knows what we do, but we learn about their new initiatives through the news*”; “*the EUD does its job and informs us, but they are in the dark, as we are, about Brussels dropping new actions on them*”; “*they (the EU) voice their opinion about our proposed programmes but ignore our opinion on budget support to education*”; etc. But when the EU functions as a “true partnership” (i.e. two-way), the division of roles at the sector level have proven key instruments for MS visibility such as in Mozambique, Rwanda or Zambia.

3.7 EQ 7: EU Organisation to ensure JP Efficiency

To what extent was the EU organised so as to make JP work?

The success of joint programming lies among other factors in how it is institutionalized, i.e. translated into action guidelines applicable to the daily activities of EU and MS staff and partners, and integrated in the EU and MS culture and structure. This includes a clear definition of institutional roles and tasks.

⁵¹ European Parliament, *Workshop EU Policy Coherence for Development: The challenge of sustainability*, 2016.

The question aims at verifying whether the EU has organised joint programming so as to make it an efficient and effective process (good use of resources for benefits realised and expected). The question will look both at the institutional set-up and procedures as well as the dissemination of JP guidance among staff members at headquarter and country levels. The question tackles the inputs and activities dimensions of the Intervention Logic.

EQ 7 on Efficiency – Answer Summary Box

The JP institutional set-up was generally conducive to a successful process. Joint programming has in general been a “learning-by-doing” process both in each of the 55 countries that have to date experienced a form of joint programming, and globally, with some country-to-country exchange of experience. The process built on an active learning approach to identify success factors (country-, region-level and global experience sharing), and stakeholders state to have benefitted from it. However, and particularly when conditions were less conducive to JP, the process would have benefitted from a clearer set up and guidance, for JP to be more effective, but also less transaction-costs intensive. In particular, the understanding of institutional roles was not always clear, especially with regards to leadership and ownership of the process.

JP guidance was generally clear and well known, with some notable exceptions. The guidance is viewed as « light » and appropriately so where EU partners are already like-minded and aim for the same endgame. Such light guidance works less well when EU partners differ in their interests, approaches and objectives. But interviewees shared their wariness of too much prescriptive guidance, and favoured experience-sharing and assistance from external consultants.

Beyond the quality of JP guidance, there is a wide range of context-specific factors that shape the cost/benefit analysis, and there is a wide range of political will across European partners, including differences between HQs and the field.

JC 7.1 The JP institutional set-up is conducive to a successful process

The joint programming process has in general been a “learning-by-doing” process both in each of the 55 countries that have to date experienced a form of joint programming, and globally, with some country-to-country exchange of experience⁵², and stakeholders state to have benefitted from it (interviews). This active lesson learning was reflected in the 2015 Guidance, which incorporates good practice.

⁵² At country level, for example, a mid-term evaluation in 2016 will assess the impact of the Joint Strategy in Cambodia and the Joint Programme in Mali, and will recommend necessary adjustments. At regional level, experience-sharing events took place, for example, in Guatemala for Latin America (2014, supported by Spain), in Ethiopia for Africa (2014, supported by Belgium and the Netherlands), in Côte d’Ivoire for West Africa (2014, supported by France), in Belgium for Neighbourhood countries (2015, supported by Austria and Italy), and in Myanmar for Asia (2015, supported by Germany). At global level, there was a 2012 high-level seminar on JP in Brussels, and JP was featured at three of the four DEVCO/EEAS/NEAR Cooperation Days between 2013 and 2016. Moreover, EU HQ contracted a team of consultants to aid experience-sharing globally.

However, and particularly when conditions were less conducive to JP⁵³, the process would have benefitted from a clearer set up for JP to be more effective, but also less transaction-costs intensive (Country visits):

- In Myanmar, for example, although JP was an opportunity to foster greater dialogue among EU partners, extensive back-and-forth consultations between field offices and headquarters in Europe were resource-intensive and slowed down the process considerably (interviews). In Moldova, there was insufficient clarity about the roles of HQ in the JP process, and insufficient information flows between the EUD and EU HQ about the process. In NEAR countries more generally, the importance of EU HQ's strong and direct role in political dialogue is a factor that complicates a process that is more locally led in other countries.
- Issues that were raised in the 14 countries reviewed included: To what extent should political sections be involved, and not only or mainly development cooperation? How can better policy dialogue happen if political sections are not involved at some point? Should the focus be on what is programmable at country level? Who should speak for the group (EUD? MS? HoMs? HoCs?...)? What support from HQ is available? Can partner Governments co-sign the Joint Strategy/Programme? Should it be a strategy (e.g. Cambodia, 43 pages) or a detailed programme (e.g. Mali Joint Programme, 89 pages)? Can EUDs count on replacement and solely develop a Joint Programme or do they also have to invest in developing a NIP? Why can't the gender, civil society, human rights and trade roadmaps be developed at the same time and required consultations take place to cover all these issues? Can EUDs and MS report on the Joint Programme or must they also report on their individual bilateral strategies? What is the objective of greater visibility: who is the audience and what is the message? Etc.

In particular, the understanding of institutional roles was not always clear, especially with regards to leadership and ownership of the process. In general, the EU Delegation has taken a strong practical lead in the process. In some countries, MS have appreciated the EUD playing this role, especially, when the EUD was acting as a facilitator, with MS playing an active, substantive role. In fact, when asked what is the EUD's greatest value added on the ground with respect to JP, the EUD's role as coordinator and facilitator of JP comes first (69% respondents find there is value added, 12% find none; 18% have no opinion; online survey, 2016, Annex F). But in others, MS have complained that the EUD was not providing sufficient leadership and should be focusing on the strategic level rather than what they saw as mainly information-sharing. Yet in others, MS have complained that the EUD was pushing for JP and not always in the interest of the whole group (e.g. claims that information was flowing from MS but not from EUD to MS). Although most MS formally declared an interest in JP, many MS have by their own admission tended to free ride and participate only once JP had demonstrated some benefits, which resulted in some JP processes not taking off (Country visits, interviews).

In fact, there were selected incentives for those MS that took active part in JP: e.g. influencing others and the joint Strategy/Programme; leading and being the spokesperson on selected sectors or themes. But mixed messages from headquarters (or from ambassadors/the local

⁵³ For example, cases where there are high strategic interests and visibility at home; complex challenges requiring a comprehensive approach; many EU partners; limited convergence of views...

leadership) also shaped incentives: for example, both country and individual performance were said to be measured by disbursements more than anything else, and that time spent in joint programming was not acknowledged (as an interviewee in Mali said: “*My main concern was to disburse and keep access to the North, not to spend time coordinating in both all-DPs and EU-only processes*”). In other words, MS in the field felt that joint programming was invoked by their HQs, but not reflected in each administration’s management systems. Some even wondered if it was still their HQ’s policy.

In sum, joint programming worked best when the EUD along with two or three Member States were the champions of joint programming and moved the whole group along, with a focus on strategic issues; where there was an active consultation and learning process; when tangible benefits were demonstrated in priority sectors; when there is a recognition of each European partner’s special expertise and entry points (for example, by appointing sector leads for policy dialogue in each sector); and finally, political will and the personality and commitment of staff involved have been a central ingredient in every efficient joint programming process.

JC 7.2 JP guidance was clear and well known

The JP Guidance was issued in 2015. For the earlier joint programming processes (e.g. Cambodia and Bolivia), there was no JP guidance available. This, however, was not viewed as problematic. Conditions there were conducive to joint programming⁵⁴.

- EU and MS alike welcomed the indications provided later on in the 2015 Guidance Pack. They appreciated that they were light enough to allow flexibility to fit several possible country contexts⁵⁵ and European partners’ particular circumstances, and therefore shared ownership of the exercise. It encouraged MS to be pro-active alongside EUDs and take the lead in coordinating joint analysis, feasibility studies, and sector-level workshops. It also allowed drawing lessons from elsewhere (e.g. Laos, Palestine). The “light” guidance also helped the EU partners build trust (among European partners and *vis-a-vis* Government), and demonstrate value-added along the way. Finally, the fact that Switzerland, not an EU member, was able to formally join the process (i.e. co-sign the joint strategy or programme) in Bolivia, Cambodia and Laos is testament to the process’ flexibility and ability to deliver value for JP participants⁵⁶.

⁵⁴ The 2011 study by Benfield and O’Riordan identified Bolivia, Ghana, Haiti, Laos, Malawi, Mali, Moldova, Mozambique, Rwanda and Tanzania as having “high potential” for JP; and Cambodia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Zambia as having “some” potential for JP.

⁵⁵ Many vs. few European development partners; relative size of these EU partners; existence of a relative consensus on values, approaches and objectives; existence of other coordination mechanisms for all DPs; etc.

⁵⁶ In Palestine, Moldova, and Morocco, Switzerland and Norway also joined in joint programming discussions. In Moldova, Turkey also joined in preparations. There is no evidence that participation of these non-EU partners has lessened the visibility of the JP process or of the EU as a group, rather the contrary thanks to their active involvement in joint analysis and joint messaging.

3.8 EQ 8: JP and Transaction Costs

To what extent did JP reduce partner countries' transaction costs and keep them reasonable for EU and MS?

This EQ looks at the transaction costs of joint programming to partner country governments, as well as to the EU and Member States. The theory is that the use of one plan, aligned to the national strategy, underpinned by joint analysis, organised policy dialogue, synchronised cycles, and better division of labour would reduce transaction costs – with a risk, however, that making decisions is slower and initially *more* resource-intensive.

This EQ addresses the issue of EU and MS' time and money spent on coordinating analysis, programming, and implementation. The evaluation relies to a large extent on qualitative information and proxies, but nevertheless expects that such 'soft' data provide a comprehensive and valid picture of the transaction costs of JP.

EQ 8 on Efficiency –Summary

JP so far has not clearly reduced transaction costs for partner country governments. Many interviewees find that they don't know or it is too early to say if JP has reduced transaction costs for the partner government. But 37% of EU and MS staff surveyed who express an opinion say JP has not reduced transaction costs for the partner government. This is confirmed by interviews in 14 countries.

The transaction costs gains for partner governments depend on a number of factors: most potential gains lie in crowded sectors and where existing aid coordination is weak.

Similarly, reduction of transaction costs for the EU and MS have been reported in few cases only. In most cases, their staff consider that they don't know or that it is too early to know, or on the contrary that transactions costs did not reduce and were heavy, notably for EU Delegations. Most potential gains lied in crowded sectors and where existing aid coordination is weak, as for partner governments. A key factor favouring reduction in transaction costs for the EU and MS was a clear focus on the strategic level. Factors affecting them negatively lied notably in lack of strong decision-making at field level and fast-moving country contexts.

But transaction costs for the EU and MS relating to JP were often viewed as “worth it” in light of expected benefits. Exceptions include (i) countries where JP has not really taken off and the time spent in JP is therefore seen as a sunk cost rather than an investment; (ii) instances where lack of clarity regarding process has led to wasting time and resources; (iii) high political attention from headquarters which paradoxically slowed down the JP process as it brought a higher level of scrutiny and interactions.

JC 8.1 JP so far has not clearly reduced transaction costs for partner country governments

The reduction of transaction costs is not among the top motivations for joint programming (in the online survey – see Annex F - it comes 8th after better coordination; the reduction of aid fragmentation, increased EU leverage and impact; etc.). It nonetheless is an important motivation for MS headquarters⁵⁷; and it features explicitly as one of the goals of Joint Programming (see, most recently, the May 2015 “Stepping up Joint Programming” Joint Conclusions).

Reduction of transaction costs for partner country government have been reported in few cases only. In many cases, people met or surveyed mention that they don’t know or that it is too early to know, or consider on the contrary that transactions costs have not been reduced for the partner country.

- 46% of EU survey respondents overall state that they don’t know or it is too early to say if JP has reduced transaction costs for the partner government. But 37% of people surveyed (representing 72% of those who express an opinion) say JP has not reduced transaction costs for the partner government (whereas 15% think it has). The views are even more negative if one focuses on answers from EUDs and MS in the field.
- This is confirmed by interviews in 14 countries: only in Cambodia does a central ministry official indicate less transaction costs, and in Moldova expectations of such a reduction⁵⁸.

The transaction costs gains for partner governments depend on a number of factors: for example, there is most transaction costs gains to be had when sectors are crowded; and when existing aid coordination (all partners and EU-only) are weak.

- JP sometimes built on EU harmonisation efforts that preceded joint programming and therefore only slightly reduced transaction costs for partner country government (Interviews). This was the case in Cambodia and Bolivia, given that there were already fewer DPs, a division of labour, including sector leads, and a fair level of aid predictability and transparency. In Zambia, the JAS process, though not formally a JP process, reduced transaction costs: by realigning DoL among donors, reducing over-crowding in the more popular sectors, trying to distribute attention more evenly across Government priorities, and letting Government deal with donor focal points instead of the whole donor community (see Country Notes in Annexes).
- In Myanmar, by contrast, there was limited pre-existing coordination, and JP brought an important reduction in transaction costs for Government: “a strong and unified EU effort to act as a champion of aid effectiveness in Myanmar, supporting the establishment of coordination structures and an Aid Information Management System that cover all development partners, has very significantly reduced such transaction costs” (Heads of

⁵⁷ Forty-four per cent of survey respondents at MS headquarters found the reduction of transaction costs an important motivation for JP, significantly more than EU headquarters, EUDs, or MS in the field.

⁵⁸ Gains were possible but not manifest/not yet manifest in Kenya, Laos, Mali, Moldova, Myanmar, Palestine, Rwanda, Senegal, Zambia – many of these because JP implementation has not begun or begun very recently, several (Kenya, Laos) because Government has not been engaged and providing inputs. Data was not available for Ethiopia (see country notes).

Mission report, 2015, on monitoring the Joint EU Development Partners' Transitional Strategy for Myanmar 2014-16).

JC 8.2 Transaction costs for the EU and MS relating to JP are deemed worth it in light of expected benefits

Most JP processes start with informal consultations, sometimes a feasibility study, before it goes on to joint analysis, and sometimes joint strategy, joint implementation mechanisms, and/or joint monitoring. **At each juncture** (e.g. whether to go from joint analysis to a joint strategy; whether to go from joint strategy to joint implementation, etc.) **there is an assessment by European partners of whether transaction costs for the EU and MS relating to JP are reasonable in light of expected benefits.** For a large number of countries (20 out of 55), Heads of Missions decided not to go ahead with joint programming, for a wide variety of reasons, that sometimes included the expected benefits and the expected transactions costs involved⁵⁹, and sometimes were related to civil unrest⁶⁰. For the remaining 35 countries, most countries have not (yet) gone all the way to joint implementation and joint monitoring, but it does not mean that the benefits realised at an earlier stage were not worth the investment.

Reduction of transaction costs for the EU and MS have been reported in few cases only. In most cases, their staff consider that they don't know or that it is too early to know, or on the contrary that transactions costs were heavy, notably for EU Delegations. Forty-five per cent respondents to the survey find that they don't know or it is too early to say if JP has reduced transaction costs for the EU and Member States. But 35% of those who do express an opinion say JP has not reduced transaction costs for them (whereas 17% think it has)⁶¹. This is confirmed by interviews in the 14 country cases examined in-depth (see country notes): in all of them, the investment in JP has been heavy, especially for EUDs (more so than for MS); it has often been "*much more than expected*". The process is then reported to be bureaucratic and time-consuming (multiplication of meetings, delays in MS reaction times, competition among sector groups, discussions on draft documents, late validation from capitals, etc.).

However, these costs are deemed "worth it" in many of the 14 cases surveyed (which are at various stages of the process) – **especially where there have been tangible results at the sector level, and especially when seen as an initial investment to kick start the process (Bolivia, Cambodia, Moldova, Palestine).** The JP process was perceived a good instrument to improve communication and coordination mechanisms, increased dialogue and trust building among partners.

⁵⁹ E.g. Zambia (see Zambia Country Note) ; Rwanda where division of labour was already quite advanced (see Survey in Annex F)

⁶⁰ E.g. Burkina Faso, Egypt, Libya, South Sudan (ECPDM, 2015), Lebanon (see Survey in Annex F).

⁶¹ 16 out of 83 survey respondents agree or strongly agree that the JP process reduced the transaction cost for the partners (Commission/EEAS and EU MS). If one focuses on EUDs, 50% of EUD respondents find JP has *not* reduced transaction costs. MS in the field are not far behind, with 44% of MS respondents in the field thinking JP has not reduced transaction costs. Like for transaction costs for partner governments, headquarters (EU and MS) are less negative: there, they are 33-35% to think that JP has not reduced transaction costs for EU and MS.

There have however been exceptions:

- Countries where JP has not really taken off and the time spent in JP is therefore seen as a sunk cost rather than an investment: “*everybody invested a lot of time and effort in the exercise and then it sat on a shelf and nothing happened with it*”, and others where “*JP is costly and a distraction from managing (our) own resources and programmes.*”
- The lack of clarity regarding process is another reason for disappointment (see EQ7): for example on the need to prepare both a Joint Programme and a NIP in the event substituting the latter with the former was not possible (Laos⁶², see EQ3); and on the need to prepare a roadmap for civil society engagement; human rights; trade; and a gender action plan, when all these processes requiring consulting with similar stakeholders. In Moldova, interviewees underlined that the lack of clarity of the process at the beginning led to a “trial and error approach” that could have been avoided. In Bolivia, the JP approval process was lengthy and overwhelmingly bureaucratic.
- High political attention that paradoxically slowed down the JP process: for example in Myanmar, this meant both many actors (14 parties to the Joint Transitional Strategy) and important involvement of headquarters. Moreover, “as several EU Member States have also maintained bilateral strategies, the reduction in transaction costs achieved has so far been less than it could have. This has been compounded by the lack of an agreed national strategy and results framework that could be aligned to” (Heads of Mission report, 2015, on monitoring the Joint EU Development Partners’ Transitional Strategy for Myanmar 2014-16).

Transaction costs (and perception thereof) for the EU and MS vary according to factors that include (Country visits):

- The number of European partners present (less transaction costs when fewer; but high potential gains if sectors are too crowded)
- The quality of existing aid harmonisation (high potential gains when aid harmonisation is poor)
- High strategic interest and visibility at home (see Myanmar example above)
- Each EU partner’s set up in terms of whether decisions are decentralised at the country level and whether there is clear or ambiguous support for JP
- Each EU partner’s capacity or political commitment at the country level to follow HQ instructions (issues in Kenya, Morocco, Mozambique). To note that small partners usually have very limited staff and therefore invest a disproportionate amount of time to JP, but at the same time usually find a lot of value in learning from the coordination process, and also in being able to count on others to represent their views and generally keep them informed when they cannot attend certain meetings.
- Whether the context evolves very fast (e.g. Mali, Myanmar): this calls for frequent updates to joint analysis and joint approaches.

While some Member States find that there is a “*need to find the formula that will make transaction costs lower in the running phase*”, others point out that

⁶² European partners in Laos expressed the need for greater responsiveness from HQ regarding the possibility of replacement. They felt to have been “*left in limbo*”.

- A focus on the strategic level rather than on great level of operational detail is both cost-saving and more useful, as both the partner country context and domestic priorities and policies shift: there seems to be a consensus that operational details are best worked out in sector working groups.
- Some MS have also pointed to the fact that what matters is not how many development partners are funding a certain sector, but how many are active in it: in this regard, delegated cooperation and implementation by the same implementing agencies or CSOs can be transaction costs savers (e.g. in Palestine).
- Finally, many stakeholders called for attention to the interplay with the all-partners aid harmonization: joint programming among Europeans should not be in a vacuum but be a building block for harmonisation of aid delivery among all partners.

4. Conclusions

4.1 Overall assessment

In the vast majority of countries examined, the Joint Programming process has proven to be very valuable for the EU and Member States. It owed in particular to the closer interaction and better understanding of each donor's cooperation, and of investment in a common vision. Indeed, the production of the Joint Programming roadmap and the Joint Analysis have contributed to a clearer view amongst the EU, its Member States and some associated donors (such as Norway and Switzerland) about each other's cooperation portfolios, the drivers for cooperation and the particular cooperation strengths and limitations of each donor. This work has enabled the EU, Member States and associated donors to work closely together, to reach a consensus on the Partner Country's challenges and how to respond to them as a joined effort, even if not yet joined implementation. It has also helped to make EU and Member States aid more harmonised, working towards commonly agreed objectives and adopting commonly agreed strategic approaches. Even though this might not yet have led to improved aid effectiveness indicators (number of sectors/donor, number of donors/sector), it has led to an improved division of labour within sectors and laid the foundation for more effective aid and more effective development. The Joint Programming process has also made the participating donors more visible, both as a group (the EU and Member States' voice) and in their own right, vis-à-vis the Government, other stakeholders (where they have been consulted) and other development partners.

Beyond these achievements of the Joint Programming process, the evaluation makes several observations that should trigger further reflections on how to better use Joint Programming and how to make it deliver on its expected outcomes. Firstly, the exercise has remained very much an EU and Member States exercise, not sufficiently involving the Partner Country, whether the Government or the civil society organisations, or involving them very late in the process at a time when priorities had already been agreed. It has been argued by EU delegations and Member States staff in the field that they needed to agree amongst themselves first, before involving the Partner Country in their deliberations. Only rarely has an equilibrium been found between internal and external deliberations. This has limited the potential ownership of the Joint Programming process by the Partner Country. Secondly the Joint Programming process has rarely been able to cover all sectors of cooperation: most often the exercise was limited to those sectors where several EU and Member States were active and had common interests. Whilst this makes sense, programming jointly on a limited number of sectors constrains the impact Joint Programming can have on improving the effectiveness of collective EU and Member States' aid. As a result, Joint Programming should not be expected to contribute directly to aid effectiveness, but indirectly, through its expected results on a better EU-MS coordination. Thirdly, it is not clear to what extent the increased visibility has been used by the EU to gain more political clout. In a couple of cases Joint Programming has led to the use of the EU and Member States' voice with a political/policy purpose, without however any discernible results as yet in terms of changes of policies.

The Joint Programming process has in most cases not yet reduced transaction costs for partner country governments or the EU and Member States. In most cases, EU and MS staff surveyed indicated that they did not know (at the time) whether transaction costs were reduced, or on the contrary that transactions costs were heavy and were not reduced, notably for EU Delegations. This is confirmed by interviews in 14 countries. **Several elements suggest that those transaction costs were nevertheless often “worth it” in light of expected benefits**, as reported by EU and Member States. This is particularly the case in crowded sectors and where existing aid coordination is weak, i.e. where most potential gains lie. This should be verified in the future, notably in countries where the Joint programming process will have been fully implemented.

On the whole, the review of the country case studies thus shows that the Joint Programming exercise was worthwhile: it is starting to deliver positive results although these are so far still mostly limited to the EU family rather than benefiting the partner countries. The ambitions of Joint Programming in terms of aid effectiveness (reduced aid fragmentation, increased transparency and predictability, reduced transaction costs) have thus not as yet been realised. However, it is argued on the basis of findings in the field, that other results (better coordinated and more strategic EU aid with joint understanding, shared objectives and joint positioning) are being obtained, which are valuable contributors to better development effectiveness of European Union aid.

4.2 Conclusions

In line with the above, nine overall conclusions are presented below. They are organised along three dimensions: expected results from the JP process (along the delivery chain from outputs to outcomes); JP structure in terms of relations between key stakeholders of the JP process; and the JP process as such. For each conclusion, reference is made to the evaluation questions (and relating evaluation criteria) on which they are based.

Conclusions on JP Deliverables	
Delivering Outputs	<p>C1: The JP process delivers well on outputs fully managed at field level (JP roadmap, EU and MS aid mapping, and joint analysis) but faces challenges on those that require HQ consent or approval (Joint response, financial frames).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The Roadmaps and Joint Analyses are elaborated and agreed at field level and provided to HQs on an informational basis, allowing EUDs and MS field representatives to agree structure and contents based on local conditions and priorities. ▪ The Joint Response, where it addresses future sector focus for individual donors (EU or MS), normally requires consent by the respective HQ since it provides a signal on where that actor intends to provide support in the future.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The Joint Response, where it includes a financial frame, normally specified by donor, requires formal approval by respective HQs since it commits that donor to a disbursement level. This typically requires time to finalise. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Deliverables managed solely at field level are reasonably simple to handle and predictable in terms of delivery. The deliverables requiring HQ approval (sectors and amounts of support) are subject to each donor's policies and priorities and will therefore have to be individually negotiated, imposing uncertainty costs in terms of timeline and actual approvals. <p><i>Based on EQ1 (Relevance), EQ2 and EQ3 (both Effectiveness), EQ7 (Efficiency), Country Notes, Interviews.</i></p>
<p>Delivering Inter-mediate Outcomes</p>	<p>C2: The JP process has been instrumental in increasing EU+MS+other associated donors' aid coordination, in some cases enhancing EU+MS's voice, but JP has so far had little effect on synchronising programming with national programming cycles.</p> <p><i>The JP process has in many cases led to better coordinated aid from the EU community.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The JP process has increased mutual knowledge among EU+MS and associated donors regarding their aid to the PC, with many actors pointing to improved collaboration at implementation levels (sectors, clusters, pillars) as a result. ▪ The survey shows that over 80% of the EUD and MS Field staff agree that there is better knowledge regarding cooperation priorities and 60%-65% of those who took position on the issue believe this has so far led to convergence in development objectives. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Most EUD+MS field staff believe that the JP process is laying important foundations for better coordination of aid, though concrete results are still only emerging, in part as a function of how far along in the JP process the parties are. <p><i>JP has in some cases led to a better coordinated EU voice.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Through the production of JA and agreement on JR, EU + MS have developed consensual positions on national and sector diagnostics, objectives, approaches, which facilitated joined-up external positions, including "speaking with one voice" in national and sectoral forums. ▪ The JP process has in a number of countries led to different MS taking on lead roles in a sector, theme, also then fronting the EU+MS externally and sometimes in larger sector working groups. ▪ Once finalised, the JA or JS have been presented publicly or to the PC as the coordinated product of the EU community (sometimes extended to other non-EU donors) on the ground.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - JP provides an arena and structure for internal deliberations and production of joint deliverables that is conducive to enhanced external coordination/presentation. <p><i>JP has in most cases not yet contributed to improved synchronisation with PC country programming cycles.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ EU and MS aid take national development strategies/plans as point of departure for own resource allocations, and thus align largely with the priorities expressed in these national plans. ▪ However, so far, few EUDs and MS have succeeded in aligning their programming cycle with that of the PC even though it remains a stated objective of most JP processes. In only a few cases has the JP led the EU to re-structure its NIP to coincide with national plans and budgets, and some MS have done the same. <p>Overall evidence from the survey and field visits is that, where possible, alignment to government policies is naturally done for JP in the same manner as it is done for bilateral programming. Whilst JP has pushed towards alignment to the Government’s programming cycle, the results are as yet limited due to the fact that synchronisation of budget and programming cycles still remain largely centrally decided with each donor HQ.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Synchronisation of cycles remains a bilateral decision, so unless and until this authority is devolved to the field one should not expect the JP to become a critical instrument for alignment on national programming and budgeting cycles. <p><i>Based on EQ1 (Relevance), EQ2 and EQ3 (both Effectiveness), EQ4 (Ownership), Survey results, Country Notes, Interviews</i></p>
Delivering Outcomes	<p>C3: JP has delivered uneven contributions to improved aid effectiveness: positive results regarding predictability, but limited ones concerning traditional measures of aid fragmentation, transparency, and transaction costs. However, JP has boosted EU aid complementarities and synergies thus contributing to development effectiveness.</p> <p><i>Where JP has begun producing Joint Strategy/Joint Response (JS/JR), aid predictability has generally improved.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Predictability regarding future aid has improved in the sense that future sector commitments by the EU + MS become clearer and more long-term as JS/JR are developed and produced. JP documents thus make public where EU and MS priorities will lie in the medium term, and in completed JS/JR will include loose financial frames for medium term financial support.

- This predictability is enhanced by the joint commitment that a JP entails: the individual donor has not only made a pledge to the national authorities, but also to JP peers. In many of the countries surveyed, the JP has made EU+MS produce a better picture of where they intend to provide support, by sector, over time, thus a “one stop” information site for EU+MS support, which in most cases is an important improvement to the pre-JP situation.

JP has in most cases not been able to reduce aid fragmentation.

- For many MS, current sector involvement may be dictated by general MS policies, long historical involvement with major investments already made, important ties to national actors who depend on continued collaboration, etc. Shifts in sector commitments thus often require clearance *both* by PC and MS HQ.
- Changes to sector commitments may not be immediately possible as contractual obligations need to be completed first, or MS budget cycle does not yet permit it.
- For some PCs, aid fragmentation is less of an issue than use of national systems and aid predictability. Some PCs also believe fewer donors in a given sector may increase their vulnerability to sudden changes in donor countries’ policies and financial commitments, so there is little pressure to address the issue.

As the aid community expands and funding sources diversify, the relative importance of EU+MS aid decreases, so that importance of aid fragmentation within EU community will have less impact on overall aid fragmentation picture.

- Reduction in aid fragmentation, understood as reducing the number of sectors per donor and the number of donors present in each sector, is time consuming, often comes up against HQ policies and priorities, typically requires HQ approval, may increase PC vulnerability to donor shifts, and thus has so far not delivered significant results, is likely to continue to run up against these kinds of costs and uncertainties, though over time improvements can be expected.

However, harmonisation, coordination, complementarities and synergies have improved as a direct results of the JP process

- The JP process has enabled EU partners to closely work together, understanding each other’s aid drivers and constraints and taking these into account when programming.
- By agreeing on a sector diagnostic, sector objectives and a common approach, EU partners have achieved improved harmonisation, coordination and complementarities between their individual supports.

- In some cases, the improved division of labour and improved synergies of actions within sectors have been enhanced by common results monitoring frameworks and high level strategic policy dialogue.
 - The JP process has enhanced within sector division of labour and the achievement of complementarities and synergies between EU and MS interventions.

Where aid mapping has taken place, JP has improved aid transparency but largely as a one-off event.

- Aid transparency, understood as providing better, more comprehensive, timely, and relevant data by each donor, has generally not improved due to JP.
- Indeed, aid mapping has so far been a one-off exercise under the JP process that normally takes place over an extended period of time, thus running up against the *timeliness* requirement. JP is hence often not seen as a useful vehicle for such data as the cost of collecting and compiling aid data are considered high compared to benefits.
- **Note:** The challenge of providing better aid data is a major challenge that has led to new bodies such as International Aid Transparency Initiative, IATI, that support the production of better aid data using global standards and approaches.

JP so far has not clearly reduced transaction costs for partner country governments. Similarly, reduction of transaction costs for the EU and MS have been reported in few cases only. But transaction costs for the EU and MS were often viewed as “worth it” in light of expected benefits.

- In most countries, JP has so far neither required PC government involvement, nor provided results that the PC can use to reduce its own programming costs.
- In a few countries, PC has been involved, where the gains appear to be better information, understanding of EU+MS intentions, plans, but little that impacts on own programming.
- Overall transaction costs for partner country government have not been reduced, except in some cases
- The survey shows that about half of respondents don't know or find it too early to say if JP has reduced transaction costs for the partner governments, the EU and Member States, and that a third of them find that JP has not reduced transactions costs. But in many cases costs of JP were found to be “worth the effort” in light of (expected) benefits. This should be verified in the future, notably in countries where the Joint programming process will have been fully implemented.
- Perceived benefits and costs often depend on factors that are specific to the individual MS and/or country situation.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ In countries where EU+MS parties have moved beyond programming and begun various forms of joint implementation, actors point to efficiency gains in more coherent and more complementary activities, avoidance of overlap, etc. The net contribution of JP is unclear since much of this takes place in sector working groups that are not necessarily JP dependent. <p><i>Based on EQ2 and EQ3 (both Effectiveness), EQ6 (Visibility), EQ8 (Efficiency), Survey results, Country Notes</i></p>
Delivering Outcomes	<p>C4: The Joint Programming process has, in most countries, not yet led to ownership of the process and of its results by the partner country</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ In most countries visited, the JP process was at its beginnings (joint analysis and beginnings of joint response) and Governments and CSOs had not yet been involved in the process. Possibly because programming had not yet been started and possibly because of strong alignment to national policies, EU+MS rarely involved the country government and other stakeholders in programming consultations. ▪ Only in a couple of the countries visited, did national authorities show commitment to JP and in one case they were officially represented in the process. ▪ In most countries, national governments have however been kept informed about the JP process and have in some cases provided a formal acknowledgement of awareness but without taking any ownership to the process or its results. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - While the EU community would prefer for JP to become more country led, in most cases national authorities have not been asked to engage at this level. <p><i>Based on EQ4 (Ownership), Survey results, Country Notes</i></p>
	<p>C5: JP has generally increased EU and MS visibility but this has not necessarily been used for increased leverage.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ In several countries visited, the JP has clearly made the EU as a community more visible to national authorities, CSOs and DPs through providing a comprehensive picture and predictability of overall EU community resources. ▪ The JP process has usually led to more visibility of all members of the EU community through JP linked consultation processes with PC, other donors, CSOs and the private sector and through joint messages/speaking with one voice, thus ensuring a “win-win” visibility for the EU and MS simultaneously. MS in particular have often taken sector leads, thus speaking on behalf of the EU community.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ However, it is in most cases unclear what increased visibility and increased financial weight have led to. In a couple of countries, increased visibility and the JP process have led to a more strategic dialogue with the Government, in others this is less clear. ▪ Only a few countries have explicit visibility (and communication) strategies, so it appears that opportunities for enhanced visibility might not be fully exploited. ▪ In countries where particular MS have own strategic interests, the ability of EUD to promote increased EU+MS visibility faces challenges when larger MS do not perceive there is much to gain from enhanced visibility of the EU as a group. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The JP process has helped to enhance the visibility of both MS and the EU especially there where the process has been used to make the policy dialogue more strategic. <p><i>Based on EQ6 (Visibility), Survey results, Country Notes</i></p>
Conclusions on Structure and Relations	
The JP Structure	<p>C6: JP as a process developed at country level works well though roles of EUD, other EU institutions, field offices and EU MS' HQ staff lacked clarity, and approaches to decision making were not consistent across these actors.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ All stakeholders agree that JP as a field-based and -driven process is appropriate. ▪ When it comes to influencing and deciding on sectors and amounts of support to which EU + MS commit in their Joint Strategy, the distribution of roles is often less clear in practice. This is especially the case when the Commission and the EEAS, whom retain the ultimate validation powers over an exercise conducted at field level, do not provide clear prior programming directions ahead of the exercise. This issue is experienced as more complex in cases where there is a strong political dimension to the EU-PC relations (AA, two-state process in Palestine). ▪ The authority provided to Delegations and Embassies by the respective HQs regarding JP – what needs simply to be informed, what requires consent, what requires formal approval at what level in the decision making hierarchy – is of course determined by each actor's own laws, policies and practices. But the lack of consistency throws up a set of transaction costs that impedes success on the ground. ▪ This challenge may grow as the number of EU members who become active donors increases. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The JP in its basic structure is flexible and operational, but continuing differences in JP practices across the EU donor

	<p>community at HQ level create costs to implementation on the ground, which may also increase over time as the number of active EU+MS donors grows.</p> <p><i>Based on EQ1 (Relevance), EQ2 and EQ3 (both Effectiveness), EQ7 (Efficiency), Survey results, Country Notes, Interviews</i></p>
<p>Relations between key JP stakeholders</p>	<p>C7: JP has contributed to bringing the EU and MS on the ground closer together, with signs of increased convergence and coherence.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The JP process in all countries visited has led to increased knowledge by EU+MS of each other's programmes and strategies, better understanding of comparative advantages and sector choices, building relations and trust, and creating hereby possibilities for improved collaboration and synergies at implementation level. ▪ In several countries JP has led to increased synergies at implementation level by EU and MS programming their activities from a common perspective, and/or the EU providing more funds for delegated cooperation. <p><i>Based on EQ5 (Coherence), Survey results, Country Notes.</i></p>
<p>Conclusions on Process</p>	
<p>JP as Process</p>	<p>C8: JP process results are primarily from the interest and commitment by the EU and Member States on the ground and is helped by a favourable country context.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The major success stories have occurred when the Partner Country (PC) has been either directly supportive or at least permissive when it comes to the JP exercise. ▪ In countries where PC has shown little or no interest in the JP process, it has generally not delivered as hoped for. ▪ In one country, PC attitude to JP went from negative to positive, and permitted the JP process to evolve into a success story. ▪ In countries where MS have important interests, a significant difference has been whether they see their interests are better addressed by JP or unaffected by it. In the first case, MS have become heavily involved in JP and made important contributions. In cases where the MS believes it can pursue its interests outside JP, then JP may lose some of its credibility as a unifying and unified process. ▪ There are examples where individuals in important JP positions – typically a EUD Head of Cooperation – have provided additional energy or not prioritized JP, which has had an effect on the dynamic and results of a JP process. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Structural</i> dimensions are important for JP success: first MS strategic interests; secondly individual commitment and effort,

	<p>largely from the EUD; and thirdly the interest and support of PC authorities.</p> <p><i>Based on EQ1 (Relevance), EQ6 (Visibility), Survey results, Country Notes.</i></p>
Support to JP	<p>C9: JP support has been positive for achievements, in terms of guidance, technical assistance and peer-learning events.</p> <p><i>JP Guidance appreciated though preference to keep it to a minimum that clarifies good practices, helps avoid mistakes, misunderstandings.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Many JP processes began before the first version of the JP Guidance Pack was available in 2015. A number of those interviewed note that if the Guidance pack had been available earlier, uncertainties could have been eliminated and some mistakes perhaps reduced or avoided, so providing this kind of guidance and insights into “lessons learned” by others is helpful. ▪ At the same time it is recognised that country conditions vary enormously, from conflict-affected/conflict-torn countries to low middle-income countries moving away from being an aid recipient. JP Guidance must therefore be relevant to an extremely wide range of country contexts. ▪ Pointing to “Good practices” and “Common mistakes” that will allow actors on the ground to select relevant ideas and experiences that can improve performance and reduce probability of mistakes is therefore appreciated. ▪ Guidelines that impose constraints on what can be done and adapted locally is not desirable, and actors on the ground appreciate that both policy and guidance has so far been of this “light touch” supportive nature. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - EU+MS take a strong ownership to the JP process as they see the need to ensure that it is adapted to local context. Guidance in the form of lessons to learn from is appreciated so that the process can reduce costs and increase possibilities for success. <p><i>JP learning through peer-learning (regional events, HQ workshops etc.) appears highly appreciated.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Regional workshops have been held in Africa and Asia, and have been appreciated by participants, for (i) presenting good practice examples to learn from, (ii) sharing own experiences and discussing how to address short-comings identified. Good external facilitators were appreciated. ▪ JP focal points at MS HQs have attended several Brussels workshops, and it is clear that these events are highly appreciated and appear effective in transmitting knowledge and sharing experiences.

- Face-to-face interaction provides for a uniquely rich environment for exchanging information, building relations and thus trust, and on this basis apparently greater receptivity to appropriating lessons learned and proposals, including because it is possible to challenge and get immediate reaction and tailored/more in-depth response to uncertainties and queries. Because of the direct personal interactions, often in the informal settings on the side of the formal event, questions and responses are tailored to own-defined concern, and thus more relevant with increased learning and adoption as a stated consequence.

JP processes have benefitted from knowledgeable and listening consultants.

- In many countries, external consultants have been contracted to assist at particular points in the JP process. Such external assistance has in general been appreciated.
- Persons interviewed have made distinctions between consultants who clearly are familiar with the JP process, and those that are not, whether international or local consultants. Familiarity with JP was critical to the level of value-added provided.
- Consultants who at the same time were good listeners, and therefore on the one hand grasped local context, and on the other were good at facilitating internal EU community discussions, were considered very helpful.
 - EU+MS actors on the ground appreciate the value added of external consultants, particularly when they (i) have in-depth knowledge of JP and its myriad aspects, (ii) are able to adjust their knowledge to local conditions, and (iii) set about assisting the local actors see how they can address the issues facing their specific JP process.

Based on EQ7 (Efficiency), Survey results, Country Notes, Interviews.


4.3 Achievements reflected on the Intervention Logic

We outline below how the results expected from JP have materialised in light of the intervention logic defined at the outset of the evaluation.

- While the differentiation between the four main EU stakeholders – EU HQ, MS HQ, EUD, MS Field – was an important improvement compared with the draft IL (Annex A, ToR), the quadrangular flow of information and decisions ought to be better understood and mapped.
- The Activities and Outputs structurally remain as foreseen, though if there were time lines included, there would be some uncertainty parameters attached to the *Joint Response/Division of Labour* and *Joint Response/Financial Commitments*, as explained below.
- When it comes to the causal paths to Intermediate Outcomes, the link between approved *Financial Commitments* and *Better aligned EU aid* is tenuous, because financial commitments remain bilateral decisions that are taken largely based on HQ-determined criteria – the evaluation did not find much change to alignment due to JP. This is shown with a broken line.
- At the Outcome level, since there has been no causal path of *Better aligned EU aid* due to JP, there is subsequently also no contribution to *Increased EU visibility* or to *Increased country ownership*.
- Furthermore, it was found that *Better coordinated EU Aid* does not really contribute much to *Reduced aid fragmentation*, *Increased aid transparency*, or *Reduced aid transaction costs*, so those contribution links have been made more conditional (shown as broken lines).
- When it comes to causal paths to Intermediate Impacts, the originally suggested causal paths from *Increased aid transparency* and *Increased country ownership* to *Increased EU aid effectiveness* probably do not exist.
- Finally, the link from *Better coordinated EU voice* through *Increased EU visibility* to *Increased EU political leverage* appears more complicated than originally suggested. One thing is that to get to Political leverage, it appears that the actors are probably better off engaging in policy dialogue at the level of JP contributions to, but it is also unclear if *Increased EU visibility* makes any contribution in this causal chain.

On this basis, we propose in the Recommendations chapter (under R1) a proposal for sharpening the intervention logic.

Figure 8: How the JP Intervention Logic verified in practice



Source: ADE

5. Recommendations

This chapter presents the evaluators' recommendations emerging from the analysis and conclusions presented in the previous chapters. They are formulated with the view to improve the JP process and aim at taking account of the current cooperation context and international agenda.

We summarise the recommendations in the table below, in three clusters. We present each of them thereafter.

Table 7: Recommendations

Improve and update the intervention logic		Importance	Priority
R1	Improve the intervention logic to better define the strategic purpose of JP	High	Medium
R2	Rethink the scope of JP, both globally and at country level	High	High
Keep JP strategic, flexible, and pragmatic			
R3	See JP as a process as well as products	High	Medium
R4	Strengthen EU collaboration on the ground, building on bilateral relationships	High	High
R5	Consolidate JP supporting services	Medium	Medium
Clarify and reinforce the role of all stakeholders			
R6	Clarify roles and ensure both political and cooperation actors are engaged throughout the process	Medium	Medium
R7	Deepen the dialogue with national stakeholders	High	Medium
R8	Improve the incentives for investing in JP	High	High


Source: ADE

5.1 Improve and update the intervention logic

R1. Improve the intervention logic to better define the strategic purpose of JP	
<i>Why?</i>	This evaluation has shown that not all the causal relations in the initial/current intervention logic could be verified, and some elements appear to be missing (see conclusions C2 to C5 and explanations in the proposal below).
<i>Purpose, how and who</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Commission and EEAS to clarify and update the intervention logic (or theory of change) for JP, in consultation with EUD staff and MS HQ and field staff, reflecting the shared vision of the parties. Consider using as a basis for discussion the main elements of an improved intervention logic presented hereafter, which are inspired by findings of this evaluation, the pragmatism adopted by EU partners on the ground, and the new international agendas:

- The *desired impact* “increased EU aid effectiveness” in the initial intervention logic would be reformulated as “better EU contribution to development” to reflect the fact that aid effectiveness is an important element of development effectiveness but by no means the only one: a focus on a strategic analysis of what the EU does best given the country’s challenges and opportunities, and policy coherence, for example, may matter as much;
- Several *expected outcomes* in the initial intervention logic which relate to aid effectiveness (e.g. reduced aid fragmentation; increased transparency and predictability; reduced transaction costs) can be expected as results over time of better coordination, but not as main stepping stones between JP activities and a better EU contribution to development. **The two primary expected results from JP would rather be “better coordinated and more strategic EU-MS aid” and “joint EU-MS positions and messages”;**
- The *expected outcome* of “increased EU visibility” in the initial intervention logic would be reformulated as “joint EU-MS positions and messages”, as it was found that this matters most to the goal of increased EU and MS political leverage. Enhanced visibility on its own does not lead directly to increased political leverage;
- Some elements appear to be missing in the initial intervention logic. We suggest notably to consider a “comprehensive and coherent EU approach” as a key activity/output.

Improved intervention logic: Option for discussion



- Commission (and MS) to clarify how they expect JP to contribute over time to the key aid effectiveness principles highlighted in the white box in the diagram (increased transparency, etc.).
- Commission (and MS) to clarify who the main target beneficiaries are at the different levels (e.g. EU, MS, partner countries’ authorities and population).

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Commission to reflect updated objectives in formal texts and guidance, and to inform relevant EU and MS services on it, as well as other donors involved in JP. 		
<i>Importance</i>	High	<i>Basis</i>	C2 to C5
<i>Priority</i>	Medium		

R2. Rethink the scope of JP, both globally and at country level

<i>Why?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Most JP processes focus on grants aid, and on aid that is programmable at country level in particular. The funding issues are quickly changing, however, both as the agenda expands, moving from <i>aid</i> to <i>development effectiveness</i> – e.g. the Busan Forum, SDGs, COP21 on climate, and Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (Nairobi, 2016) – but also because sources of financing are multiplying and need to be taken on-board, as presented in the Addis Ababa Agenda for Action. The Council Conclusions of 12 May 2016 on Stepping Up Joint Programming⁶³ insist on a broader scope for JP: <i>“In line with the EU Comprehensive Approach, Joint Programming documents should evolve to include strategic issues such as migration, climate change, fragility, security and democracy. (...) Trust Fund activities should also take account of the Joint Programming dimension.”</i>
<i>Purpose</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> EU and MS <u>headquarters</u> should define more precisely the <i>overall</i> scope or perimeter of JP and how this translates into its guidance, e.g.: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> How to include political and policy dialogue How to include aid programmed globally and regionally How to include blending operations How to include humanitarian aid, which is not programmable by definition. In line with this, EU and MS (HQ and field) should define what the scope of JP would be <u>in a given country</u> and on what they want to focus. It would be useful to have an explicit intervention logic at country level: what do EU and MS most hope to achieve through JP in a country? What and who do they wish to influence as a group, and how? Focus is important for favouring a realistic and pragmatic approach, specific to the country context (existing mechanisms, DPs active and interested in JP, resources available...). JP should be focused on what EU and MS do best, is most needed, or is not well covered by others.

⁶³ See <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-8831-2016-INIT/en/pdf>

<i>How and who</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ At HQ level: Commission and EEAS (involving the Council as needed) and MS ▪ At country level: EUD and MS - both their political and cooperation services 		
<i>Importance</i>	High	<i>Basis</i>	C1, C2, C6 and C8
<i>Priority</i>	High		

5.2 Keep JP strategic, flexible, and pragmatic

R3. See JP as a process as well as products			
<i>Why?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ JP products can be light or comprehensive, but the process of exchanging information, investing in joint analysis, building trust, and arriving at a comprehensive and coherent strategic EU approach is key. ▪ The JP process has delivered a lot of value in itself (exchange of information on respective objectives, constraints and administrative culture; exchange of views on country context, areas of possible EU value added, and appropriate modalities...). ▪ There is a continuous need for it. ▪ EU and MS often find that JP is (too) time-consuming, and that there is duplication with all-DPs coordination. 		
<i>Purpose</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Make JP process and products more flexible and easily adjustable over time. ▪ Make sure there are frequent exchanges, at a strategic level, on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - how the context is evolving (shared understanding of drivers of change, spoilers, binding constraints, critical paths) - the EU's common position and response -- in terms of both diplomatic efforts and development programmes/projects. - the EU's common values and special value-added vs. other development partners ▪ Discuss whether to focus on the strategic analysis (Joint Analysis, Joint Response) and some common positions, or go in more depth and define priority sectors and division of labour. Don't spend time on information-sharing and ODA-data gathering that is done elsewhere, except to kick-start the discussion. ▪ EUD and MS should articulate what makes JP meetings distinct from and more strategic than the all-DP meetings – and set the calendar and agendas accordingly. This may in some countries include agreeing joint messages 		

	<p>for the all-DP meetings (i.e. JP is a building block of all-DP coordination), and/or to Government (political and policy dialogue).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Use existing platforms to share EU views and positions with non-EU development partners and gain adherence to common response. 		
<i>How and who</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Exchanges between EUD and MS on the critical path and key changes in the EU strategic approach may be facilitated by anyone – EUD or DPs. There is a strong rationale for involving actively MS.⁶⁴ Joint results monitoring is an effective way to anchor analysis in evidence, and to provoke dialogue. 		
<i>Importance</i>	High	<i>Basis</i>	C6 to C8
<i>Priority</i>	Medium		

R4. Strengthen EU collaboration on the ground, building on bilateral relationships

<i>Why?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The EU as a group is often seen as not sufficiently unified in its views and lacking in influence when compared with the total financial and other resources it in fact provides. EU and MS at the same time find that the JP contributes to building better relations and trust that can produce more coherence and unity in the relations to the partner countries and other members of the donor community. Because the transaction costs of the JP process have often been high, and the EU has a special obligation to coordinate such efforts in the field, it has often fallen to the EUD to shoulder most of the costs of the JP process. This has meant that MS, to varying degrees, have contributed less to the JP but thereby also been less invested and committed, which in the long run is neither sustainable nor helpful in building a more unified EU response to common challenges. At the same time, a number of MS may wield (considerable) influence or have trust and entry points to local decision making that could benefit the EU as a whole. Conversely, increasing (re-)bilateralisation of MS aid is a major challenge for JP. 		
<i>Purpose, how and who</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Use the JP process to build a more joint vision and response to country challenges (what do EU and MS want to achieve as a group - see R2) and thereby a more unified EU community both internally, and in its dealings with the partner country and external actors in general. 		

⁶⁴ They could for example take between two hours and one day, every 6 or 12 months (a high frequency may be needed in rapidly-evolving contexts).

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ In each country, identify the key capacities and interests of the EU and MS for JP to see how they can complement and provide mutual benefits through the JP process in the short to medium term. ▪ Within this process, facilitate participation by all MS, allowing them to fill various roles and responsibilities. The MS that have most interest and capacity to progress JP at a given time may help chart the course and contribute actively, alongside the EU Delegations. ▪ EU and MS should further the pragmatic ways joint implementation of the Joint Strategy (or Joint Programme, as the case may be) has taken place, e.g. through joint actions, co-funding and delegated cooperation. Joint missions with MS may also be organised. ▪ Build on best bilateral relationships, be it from the EU or MS. ▪ Deliver as much as possible joint EU+MS messages and speak with one voice, where MS should also take on the task of delivering joint messages 		
<i>Importance</i>	High	<i>Basis</i>	C1, C2 and C5
<i>Priority</i>	High		

R5. Consolidate JP supporting services

<i>Why?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ EU and MS staff still have a lot of questions on how to operationalise JP, despite the fact that guidance material, training and other supporting actions address some of those.⁶⁵ ▪ Not all messages from HQ to the field (EU and MS) are clear and some are perceived as contradictory (for example, the leeway given to formulate an EU joint response and programme accordingly on the ground, later contradicted by HQ programming decisions regarding areas and modalities of support). 		
<i>Purpose and how</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Don't change the rules and don't make them more prescriptive. The guidance pack is good. It just needs some clarifications and/or to be further disseminated to EU and MS field staff, as well as to staff in regional bureaux and MS headquarters. ▪ Continue the regional and global experience-sharing – emphasizing good practices and lessons learned. 		

⁶⁵ Examples of questions collected from field staff, notwithstanding existing guidance: “To what extent should political sections be involved, and not only or mainly development cooperation?” “Should the focus be on what is programmable at country level?” “Who should speak for the group?” “Can partner Governments co-sign the Joint Strategy/Programme?” “Should it be a strategy (e.g. Cambodia) or a detailed programme (e.g. Laos, Mali)?” “Can EUDs count on replacement or do they also have to invest in developing a NIP?” “Why can't the gender, civil society, human rights and trade roadmaps be developed at the same time?” “Can EUDs and MS report on the Joint Programme or must they also report on their individual strategies?” “What is the objective of greater visibility: (audience, message)?”

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Continue providing a pool of technical assistance. ▪ Ensure institutional memory with regard to JP exercises, in country offices and at headquarters. 		
<i>Who</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Commission and EEAS, and MS 		
<i>Importance</i>	Medium	<i>Basis</i>	C9
<i>Priority</i>	Medium		

5.3 Clarify and reinforce the role of all stakeholders

R6. Clarify roles and ensure both political and cooperation actors are engaged throughout the process			
<i>Why?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The Council Conclusions of 12 May 2016 insist on including highly political topics to JP (see R2) ▪ There was often lack of clarity on roles in the JP process between actors (notably EU, MS, and Government) and within these organisations (e.g. between HQ and field offices, or between EEAS and DEVCO). 		
<i>Purpose</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Ensure the political dimension is explicitly party to JP, along with the aid / development dimension. ▪ Continuously engage the two parties. ▪ Define respective roles, e.g. of heads of mission and heads of cooperation; and of HQ and the field. ▪ EEAS HQ to engage with MS HQ. EUD to engage with MS Ambassadors. 		
<i>How and who</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ At HQ level: Commission, EEAS, and MS ▪ At country level: EUD and MS - both their political and cooperation services 		
<i>Importance</i>	Medium	<i>Basis</i>	C1, C6, C7, and C8
<i>Priority</i>	Medium		

R7. Deepen the dialogue with national stakeholders			
<i>Why?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Alignment with national priorities is a basic condition to not undermine national ownership, but is not a sufficient condition to increase it. ▪ There are perceptions at times that JP is an internal EU-MS matter and therefore of little interest to partner countries until it translates into more effective aid. Not sufficiently engaging with national stakeholders on JP is a risky approach if JP takes a strong strategic stance, and a missed opportunity for influence. ▪ In reality, JP has shown to provide many opportunities for effective and constructive dialogue with national stakeholders: e.g. for joint analysis of context, which can lead to agreement on mutual priorities; for identification of bottlenecks; or for building alliances with champions of change. 		
<i>Purpose and how</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Consider each milestone in the JP process as an opportunity for strategic dialogue with national stakeholders (line and technical ministries; Parliament; civil society; the private sector; diaspora when applicable...). When there is already a well-established forum for strategic dialogue (both among DPs and with the national stakeholders), consider how JP can bring value to it. ▪ In parallel, continue emphasising good practices in aid transparency and aid predictability. 		
<i>Who</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Primarily heads of mission and heads of cooperation ▪ Also EU HQ and MS HQ 		
<i>Importance</i>	High	<i>Basis</i>	C4
<i>Priority</i>	Medium		

R8. Improve the incentives for investing in JP			
<i>Why?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Even when the case for at least joined-up analysis and some common positions is clear, MS get mixed messages on JP from their leadership (HQ or Ambassador) and are therefore not always encouraged to invest their time and reputation in JP. ▪ Conversely, a MS taking a lead role in parts of JP could yield considerable influence over the whole EU group and beyond. ▪ Delegation/field staff's (considerable) investment in JP is currently rarely rewarded in their performance assessment. ▪ EUD and MS staff often feel they are "on their own". 		

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ EU and MS currently have their own programming documents. 		
<i>Purpose, how and who</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ MS Embassies/field offices to discuss the benefits of JP (and its scope and focus, see R2) with the top leadership at HQ and with Ambassadors upstream (rather than to invest considerable time and then to “see where it goes”). ▪ This could enable some MS to play an active role in leading parts of JP. ▪ MS to clarify who is the go-to person/unit at HQ for support, and to clarify their role (merely advice or empowered to move process forward at HQ?). ▪ EU and MS to recognise and reward staff efforts on JP, e.g. by reflecting them in job descriptions so that this is taken into account in workload and performance assessments. ▪ EU and MS to examine to what extent JP documents may replace or integrate bilateral programming documents. 		
<i>Importance</i>	High	<i>Basis</i>	C1, C2, C7 and C8
<i>Priority</i>	High		