



Evaluation of the European Union's cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (2007-2014)

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*The opinions expressed in this document represent the authors' point of view
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Cover page picture:

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*"By forming Community Organisations to work as a team we are achieving higher
levels of productivity and success. " Hayatullah Khan – President, Pattankot One*

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
List of Acronyms

3Cs	Coordination, Complementarity and Coherence
AKRSP	Aga Khan Rural Support Programme
AsDB	Asian Development Bank
BIO	Business Intermediate Organisation
BS	Budget Support
CAPRI	Counter terrorism Associated Prosecution Reform Initiative
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CCBLE	Civilian Capacity Building for Law Enforcement
CCP	Competition Commission of Pakistan
CDLD	Community Driven Local Development
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (of OECD)
DCI	Development Cooperation Instrument
DEVCO	European Commission Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DG	Directorate General
EAD	Economic Affairs Division
ECHO	European Commission Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection
ECP	Election Commission of Pakistan
EEAS	European External Action Service
EIB	European Investment Bank
EIDHR	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
EOM	Election Observation Mission
EQ	Evaluation Question
EU	European Union
EUD	European Union Delegation
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FSP	Fragile States Principles
GIZ	German Agency for International Cooperation
GoKP	Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
GoP	Government of Pakistan
GSP	General System of Preferences
HACCP	Hazard Analysis at Critical Control Points
HQ	Headquarters
HRD	Human resources Development
ICG	International Crisis Group
IDEA	Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IFS	Instrument for Stability
IO	International Organisation
IP3	Improving Parliamentary Performance
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
IPO	Intellectual Property Organisation

ITC	International Trade Centre
JC	Judgement Criteria
KP / KPK	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
KP-DGCD	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa District Governance and Community Development Programme
KP GGDC	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Good Governance and Development Contract
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MN	Meeting Notes
MP	Member of Parliament
MS	Member State
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NQF	National Quality Framework
NRSP	National Rural Sector Programme
NWFP	North-West Frontier Province (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa)
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PEACE	Programme for Economic Advancement and Community Empowerment
PFM	Public Financial Management
PITAD	Pakistan Institute for Trade and Development
PPD	Public Private Dialogue
PTC	Parent Teacher Council
RAHA	Sustainable rural development in the Refugee Affected and Hosting Areas of Pakistan
RG	Reference Group
RSP	Rural Support Programme
RSPN	Rural Support Programmes Network
SBS	Sector Budget Support
SERP	Support to Electoral Reform in Pakistan
SPS	Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary measures
SRSP	Sarhad Rural Support Programme
STRIVE	Strengthening Resilience to Violence and Extremism
TA	Technical Assistance
TBT	Technical Barriers to Trade
TRTA	Trade Related Technical Assistance
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training
TVETA	Technical Education & Vocational Training Authority
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
USA	United States of America
WINS	Women and Infant Nutrition in Sindh
WIPO	World Intellectual Property Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization

Maps of Pakistan





Executive summary

Purpose

The European Union (EU) has commissioned ADE to conduct a **strategic evaluation of its cooperation with Pakistan over the period 2007-2014**. The objectives were to provide an overall independent assessment of the EU's past and current cooperation and to identify key lessons and recommendations for improving future strategy and delivery and for feeding into a possible joint programming exercise. **The evaluation mainly focused on the extent to which the EU cooperation strategy, its implementation mechanisms and aid modalities (including budget support at provincial level) were an appropriate response to the challenges faced by Pakistan**, and taking into account the evolution of the country context over the period, including devolution. The evaluation focused on the main sectors of EU cooperation with Pakistan in view of assessing their contribution to the EU cooperation objectives: **rural development, education, technical and vocational training, democratisation, human rights, rule of law, and trade**. The transversal issues of gender and environment have also been taken into account.

Context

Pakistan is a **lower middle-income country** (GDP/capita US\$1330 in 2014) with a population of **185 million inhabitants** in 2014 as per the World Bank and a high population growth rate (1.7% per year over the evaluation period). It is affected by several factors of fragility including conflicts with both domestic and sub-regional roots and frequent natural disasters. It is a federal

parliamentary republic engaged since 1999 in a process of **devolution** of power, autonomy and funds in favour of the provinces, cemented by the 18th Constitutional Amendment (2010). The economy is dominated by services and agriculture; trade is limited by the lack of export diversification and of regional trade. Low human development indicators undermine labour productivity and economic growth. Women, children, minorities and the poor are particularly vulnerable to human rights violations. During the evaluation period the Government strategy has been framed by two Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and focused on broad based economic growth, improvement of governance, investment in human capital and protection of the poor and the vulnerable.

The EU-Pakistan Cooperation Agreement of 2004 is the legal and political basis for current cooperation and has been reinforced by the 2012 EU-Pakistan 5-Year Engagement Plan. **Over the period 2007-2014 EU commitments specific to Pakistan reached over € 520 million** delivered through different channels: the government (30%), NGOs (31%), UN agencies (17%), EU Member States (10%), private sector actors and international financial institutions. Over 75% of EU cooperation contracted amounts were allocated to three priority areas: rural development (33%), education (28%), democratisation, human rights and security (15%). In addition, the EU provided humanitarian aid, which is however outside the scope of this study.

Methodology

The evaluation was conducted in line with the methodological guidance of the

European Commission Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development Evaluation Unit. The process has been followed by a Reference Group consisting of representatives of a range of EU services, with the Embassy of Pakistan in Brussels as observer. The approach involved the collection and processing of both qualitative and quantitative data. More than **350 documents** and data sources were for instance studied and over **150 actors** were interviewed in Brussels and in Pakistan. In-depth analysis was conducted on a selection of 21 projects, representing 73% of the total EU commitments. In addition to the usual challenges of country evaluations, security issues and limited budget for field visits constrained the evaluation and in particular the organisation of focus groups with final beneficiaries.

Overall assessment

In Pakistan, the EU is a medium-sized development partner. The EU-Pakistan 5 year Engagement Plan (2012) following the 2004 Cooperation Agreement created a favourable frame for EU-Pakistan cooperation with a constructive platform for the exchange of views on both progress and issues of concern regarding a broad range of areas such as political dialogue, security and counter-terrorism, human rights, migration, trade and development cooperation. The focal sectors of EU cooperation have been aligned on these fields.

The findings of the present evaluation as well as the periodic reviews of the Plan allow to conclude that progress has been made towards the Plan's aim to achieve "a strategic relationship" and "a partnership for peace and development rooted in shared values, principles and commitments". In particular, actions in the fields of rural development, education (including TVET), human rights and democratisation have seized opportunities presented by Pakistan's return to democracy since 2008, contributed to respond to acute needs, and promoted

gender equality, downwards accountability, democracy and good governance. Economic links have been strengthened with the adoption of the GSP+ trade regime. These achievements remain work in progress and need to be pursued.

The EU's soft approach allowed it to be appreciated as a "neutral" partner by national stakeholders, and its combination of financial and significant non-financial cooperation (notably through the high level political and strategic dialogue held in EU-Pakistan Joint Commission) to "punch above its weight". The EU addressed important needs the response to which was crucial to achieve its objectives of poverty reduction and growth built on stability, social cohesion and the rule of law. The continuity of support to selected sectors, the complementarity and potential synergies between these sectors, the pragmatic use of modalities and management modes and the assimilation of lessons learned made the EU strategy highly relevant and aligned to government policies.

Efficiency has been variable and faced important obstacles. Limited government buy-in in some cases; limited institutional and management capacities of some implementing agencies and beneficiaries; shocks (e.g. natural disasters and conflicts); internal changes (e.g. devolution); and overstretched human resources on the EU side, delayed several interventions, but in general intended activities were implemented and most expected outputs delivered.

Modalities and management modes proved important to achieve results. A central finding of this evaluation is that the EU did not sufficiently work with the grain of Pakistani society: by investing more in identifying promoters of democracy, inclusion and social cohesion; by identifying initiatives that already carry ownership and commitment by national authorities and/or local civil society.

Another central finding is that a key factor of success lied in the convergence of, on the one hand, a bottom-up approach leading to social mobilisation of citizens and economic operators for better governmental services and institutions, and, on the other hand, a top-down approach that improves the coverage, quality of and equitable access to front line public services. Supporting the first notably through local NGOs of the Rural Support Programme, and the second one with sector budget support and/or complementary institutional technical assistance, proved a promising approach.

While this desired convergence has only taken place in a limited way, the implementation of the EU strategy has paved the way ahead: progress has been realised in the functioning of institutions, the formulation of policies, the improved governance and management of the social and economic sectors supported, the mobilisation of community-based organisations, and the improved offer of education services. Visible outcomes for final beneficiaries have not materialised much yet. This is due to the fact that many interventions are still on-going, and that that they were not sufficiently involving users of supported institutions, such as citizens and economic operators.

Conclusions

The evaluation drew specific conclusions across 3 clusters covering strategy, sector related support and transversal issues.

Conclusions on the overall EU strategy and implementation modalities

The evaluation concluded that, notwithstanding that it is only a medium-sized development partner in Pakistan, the EU could establish itself as a **more central and effective partner** by working with existing, endogenous development initiatives and local drivers of change (government and/or civil society). Its cooperation strategies and programmes

have by and large aimed to **transform the complex and self-reinforcing dynamics** at play during the evaluation period. Its interventions **contributed to institutional improvements and reforms**. However, **although institutional improvements and reforms are observed, political economy analysis has not sufficiently identified the drivers and incentives for progress** needed for ensuring that reforms really contribute to the expected global impacts of poverty reduction, inclusive growth and stability (C1, C2).

The EU support has targeted the most deprived geographic areas and those affected by external shocks and also the most vulnerable groups of population. The approach combined coherently different types of interventions, aiming at ensuring a continuum between humanitarian aid, managed by the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO), and development, managed by the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO), and has sought to exploit potential for synergies and learning between interventions in the rural development, trade and human right sectors (C3, C4).

Sector budget support (SBS) was used to support provincial reform strategies in Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in the fields of education and rural development. This proved **relevant and timely given the decentralisation process** which devolved the full responsibility of key social sector policies to the provinces. It was also **highly risky and faced numerous challenges**: (i) the incomplete decentralisation process implied that institutional and management capacities in the provinces and the lower tiers were still in the making; (ii) severe weaknesses of the Public Financial Management systems required, and continue to require, important institutional strengthening at

federal, provincial and sub-provincial levels; and (iii) it put enormous pressure on the scarce resources of the EU Delegation and it had to cope with a lack of understanding of the modality by the partner governments. To address these difficulties and mitigate the risks, **SBS was provided in a very pragmatic way; eligibility was fragile but provision of SBS allowed to improve it.** Overall, SBS, provided with other development partners¹, created a **space for technical dialogue and capacity strengthening** that proved at least as important as the fiscal space it offered. In fragile and conflict-affected regions it further **allowed governments to use more flexibly the aid resources** (C5, C6).

The diversity of instruments and modalities deployed by the EU allowed it to fine tune its support to the specific needs it wanted to address, but there have been **missed opportunities for instance in establishing closer linkages between political/policy dialogues and projects in the field of democratic governance.** Moreover insufficient match between the characteristics required by specific interventions and the profile of the **implementing partners proved a severe constraint** (case of the RAHA programme) in the achievement of the results of some projects (C7, C8).

Sector related conclusions

In the **rural development** sector the EU approach was relevant and contributed to improve community empowerment. The added value in terms of democratisation, downwards accountability, state-citizen trust rebuilt and youth engagement cannot be firmly evidenced. Nevertheless there are signs of progress in the materialisation of these higher aspirations when the programmes' design and implementation led to greater involvement, organisation,

motivation and sense of responsibility of the citizens (case of the PEACE programme) (C9, C10).

In the **education sector** the provision of sector budget support has produced visible results in terms of consolidation of provincial education sector reforms plans and management of the sector service delivery but budget execution remains extremely weak and results in terms of education indicators remain modest or negative. In the **TVET sector** the support provided highly needed institutional strengthening but achieved limited or no results in terms of employability. The main explanatory factor is a bias in the offer of services that favoured social demands (by the applicants) rather than economic demands (by the market) (C11, C12).

In the sector **democratisation, human rights and rule of law** the evaluation concludes that the EU has contributed to progress of democracy notably through its electoral observation missions. Tying in human rights to the GSP+ status has created a level of engagement with the Government such that the EU could in all likelihood mitigate the deterioration of human rights through its high-level political dialogue. In all these areas solid foundations for further engagement have been laid down (C12, C14).

In the **trade** sector continuous support over a period of 12 years has contributed to important institutional strengthening, but benefits in terms of trade expansion and diversification are not yet visible (C15).

Conclusions on cross-cutting issues

The EU mainstreamed **gender** into the design and implementation of its programmes with significant results but no evidence of spill over beyond the beneficiary communities.

¹ Notably DfID, AusAid and the World Bank.

Environment, natural resources and climate change were factored in several local development programmes which benefitted the communities in which they were implemented but their effects are unlikely to have a more global impact in absence of fundamental reforms (C17, C18).

strategy on critical drivers of change identified (R16. Based on C14; Importance: high; Priority: high).

Recommendations

This section presents a selection of the recommendations stemming from the above conclusion. It mentions their importance² and degree of priority³.

In view of increasing effectiveness continue to address the demand & supply sides of sector policies, and accordingly select the mix of modalities and implementation partners. Promote a converging bottom-up and top down approach for the governance and delivery of public services. On the demand side strengthen citizens (students, producers, farmers, local communities) in terms of advocacy, empowerment, organisational and professional capacities; on the supply side, promote good governance and support enabling environment (policies, budget) for public service delivery, including when possible with sector budget support (R4 and R9. Based on C7, C8; Importance: high; Priority: medium).

Update the logic of intervention in human rights / rule of law. The European External Action Service and the European Commission Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development to conduct shared analysis to better understand drivers of change and spoilers, at domestic and regional/global levels. They should focus the EU's

² High, medium of low according to their critical character for achieving EU development objectives

³ High: they are necessary for structuring future cooperation or they are a prerequisite for implementation of other recommendations; Medium: they are needed to improve efficiency and/or effectiveness of specific interventions

Conduct upstream work on security / rule of law policies and norms. EU Delegation and the European External Action Service to deepen the policy and political dialogue on security and human rights (focusing on a limited number of core human rights) by conducting technical work on policies and norms, with support from the European Commission Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development HQ (R18. Based on C14; Importance: high; Priority: High).

Sector Reform Contracts/Budget Support at provincial level must address the need to develop a policy dialogue on provincial tax reform. It is important to improve financial sustainability of sector provincial policies and to reduce provinces' dependency on intergovernmental transfers and external aid. (R6. Based on C5, Importance high, Priority: medium).

In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa consider how best to consolidate and ensure further development of achievements of past and on-going EU support to rural development. EU support contributed to important achievements, e.g. in terms of successful support to women community organizations, in terms of policy and governance of the sector, but they are still fragile and may need continued external support to become sustainable. It is therefore essential that if phasing out from this province is envisaged, it takes place only if the effort will be pursued with alternative support (R8. Based on C9, C10; Importance: high; Priority: high).

Promote further devolution and improvement of PFM at provincial lower tiers level (R11. Based on C5, C11; Importance: high; Priority: high).

Continue support to TVET but adopt a systemic, more market-oriented approach (R14. Based on C12; Importance: high; Priority: medium).

Combine skills gap analysis with value chain analysis and development, and privilege outreach of TVET support in areas where value chain development is implemented (R15. Based on C15; Importance: Medium; Priority: medium).

In the trade sector if further institutional building is provided make sure it is focused on the previously identified needs of the potential “clients” of services by the targeted institutions (R22. Based on C15; Importance: high; Priority: medium).

Finally a number of recommendations insist on the importance to capitalise on past lessons and to ensure continued use of achievements (R1, R8, and R20).

Executive summary (in Urdu)

جامع خلاصہ

یورپی یونین نے 2007-14ء کے دوران (اے ڈی ای) ADE کو پاکستان کے ساتھ تعاون کی حکمت عملی کی جانچ پڑتال کا اختیار دیا۔ اس کا خاص مقصد یہ تھا کہ یورپی یونین کے موجودہ اور سابقہ پاکستان تعاون کی مجموعی طور پر آوازنہ تشخیص کی جائے۔ اس مقصد کو مد نظر رکھتے ہوئے اس جانچ پڑتال کے دوران زیادہ تر توجہ کا مرکز یہ رہا کہ یورپی یونین مجموعی طور پر کس حد تک امداد کا طریقہ کار (شامل صوبائی سطح پر بجٹ کا تخمینہ) اور اس پر عمل درآمد کی ترکیب و ترتیب پاکستان کو درپیش مختلف چیلنجوں کیلئے مناسب جواب تھا یا نہیں۔ خاص طور پر پاکستان کے اندر اختیارات کی منتقلی کی تازک صورت حال کو مد نظر رکھتے ہوئے اس جانچ پڑتال میں زیادہ تر دیہی ترقی، تعلیم، جمہوری حکمرانی، قانون کی حکمرانی اور تجارت کے شعبے تھے۔ تاکہ یورپی یونین کے تعاون کے مقاصد کے تناظر میں ان شعبوں میں اعانت کا اندازہ لگایا جاسکے۔ اس میں جنس اور ماحول کے قاطع مسائل کو سپورٹ کرنے کیلئے بھی شامل کر لیا گیا ہے۔

سیاق و سباق

پاکستان کا شمار نچلے درمیانی آمدنی والے ممالک میں ہوتا ہے عالمی بینک کے مطابق 2014ء میں جی ڈی پی صرف 1330 ڈالر اور آبادی 185 ملین نفوس پر مشتمل تھی اور آبادی کی بھروسہ کی شرح 1.7 فی صد فی سال تجزیہ کے دورانیہ میں رہی تھی۔ اس پر خرابی کے بہت سارے عوامل اثر انداز ہوتے ہیں جن میں سرحدی تنازعات، دہشت گردی کے درپیش مسائل اور بار بار قدرتی آفات کا آنا شامل ہیں۔ یہ ایک وفاقی پارلیمانی جمہوری ملک ہے جو 1999ء تا 2010ء کی 18 ویں آئینی ترمیم کے تحت منتقلی اقتدار کے عمل، خود مختاری اور صوبوں کے حق میں فنڈز کی منتقلی کے عمل سے گزر رہا ہے۔ اس کی معیشت میں خدمات اور زراعت کا شعبہ غالب ہے۔ جبکہ تجارت محدود پیمانے پر ہوتی ہے جسکی وجہ کم برآمدت اور علاقائی تجارت کی عدم موجودگی ہے۔ کم انسانی ترقی کے اشارے کمزور لیبر، پیداوار، معاشی ترقی میں عورتوں، بچوں اور نسلی اقلیتوں کو انسانی حقوق کی خلاف ورزیوں کے خدشات لاحق ہیں۔

جانچ پڑتال کے دوران گورنمنٹ کی حکمت عملی دو دستاویز کے تناظر میں بنائی گئی جو کہ غربت کی کمی کیلئے حکمت عملی کے متعلق تھیں اور انکی توجہ کا مرکز وسیع الہیاد، معاشی ترقی، حکومتی بہتری، انسانی بہتری میں سرمایہ کاری، غریبوں اور خطرے سے دوچار افراد کا تحفظ تھا۔ 2006ء کا یورپی یونین - پاکستان تعاون کا معاہدہ قانونی اور سیاسی طور پر موجودہ تعاون کی بنیاد ہے اور اس پر دو بارہ مہلہ آمد 2012ء کے یورپی یونین پاکستان پانچ سالہ منصوبہ بندی کے تحت کیا گیا ہے۔ 2007ء تا 2014ء کے دوران یورپی یونین کی طرف سے پاکستان کیلئے مخصوص امداد 520 ملین تک پہنچی تھی۔ جو کہ مختلف طرح کے اداروں کے ذریعے حکومت 30 فیصد، این جی او کے ذریعے 31 فیصد، اقوام متحدہ کے اداروں کے ذریعے 17 فیصد، یورپی یونین کی ریاستوں کے ذریعے 10 فیصد، اور باقی نجی شعبے کے ذریعے اور بین الاقوامی مالی اداروں کے توسط سے امداد دی گئی۔ 75 فیصد سے زائد یورپی یونین کی مالی امداد تین ترجیحی شعبوں دیہی ترقی 33 فیصد، تعلیم 28 فیصد، جمہوریت انسانی حقوق اور سیکورٹی کو 15 فیصد دی گئی۔ اس کے علاوہ یورپی یونین نے جو انسانی امداد فراہم کی وہ اصل میں اس تحقیق کے دائرہ کار سے باہر ہے۔

طریقہ کار

یہ تشخیص یورپی یونین کی کمیشن ڈائریکٹوریٹ جنرل برائے انٹرنیشنل تعاون و ترقی کے جانچ پڑتال یونٹ کی رہنمائی اور طریقہ کار کے مطابق کی گئی۔ طریقہ کار کی بیرونی ایک حوالہ جاتی گروہ جو کہ مختلف یورپی خدمات اور برسلز میں موجود پاکستانی سفارت خانے کے نمائندوں پر مشتمل تھا۔ مواد کو جمع کرنے اور اس پر مہلہ آمد کے لیے توسیعی اور عددی طریقہ کار شامل تھا۔ برعکس حوالہ جاتی معلومات اور جانچ پڑتال کو ایک مشروط بنیاد فراہم کرنے کے لیے تین سو پچاس سے زائد کا تعداد اور ماحول کے ماخذ کا مطالعہ کیا گیا۔ ایک سو پچاس سے زائد عامل (یورپی یونین سٹاف پاکستانی وفاقی اور صوبائی عہدیداروں، لاگو کرنے والے شراکت دار منصوبوں کے ماہرین، سول سوسائٹی اور ڈونرز سے بذریعہ انٹرویو برسلز اسلام آباد

کراچی پشاور اور لاہور میں مشورہ کیا گیا۔ بغور جائزہ 21 منتخب شدہ منصوبہ جات پر کیا گیا جو کہ یورپی یونین کے کھل معاہدوں کا 73% ہے۔ ملکی جانچ پڑتال کی عام مشکلات کے علاوہ (مخصوص علاقہ جات تک رسائی کی پابندی، سکیورٹی مسائل، فیلڈ وزٹ کیلئے محدود بجٹ نے جانچ پڑتال کے عمل کو روکا اور خاص طور پر حتمی مستفید ہونے والے خاص گروپوں کو منظم کرنے کی اجازت نہ دی۔

مجموعی تشخیص

پاکستان میں یورپین یونین ایک درمیانے درجہ کا ترقیاتی حصہ دار ہے جہاں مشکل اور تیزی سے بدلتے ہوئے جغرافیائی حالات اور قدرتی آفات اس کو مزید گھمبیر بنا رہے ہیں۔ پاکستان میں جہاں جغرافیائی حالات تیزی سے بدل رہے ہیں اور قدرتی آفات مزید مشکلات پیدا کر رہی ہیں۔ یورپین یونین وہاں ایک درمیانے درجے کا حصہ دار ہے۔ یورپی یونین۔ پاکستان کا پانچ سالہ تعاون پلان، یورپی یونین اور پاکستان کے درمیان تعاون کا معاہدہ مثلاً سیاسی مکالمہ، سکیورٹی، کاؤنٹر ڈیٹھ گروڈی، انسانی حقوق، نقل مکانی، تجارت اور ترقیاتی، تعاون جیسے مسائل پر تبادلہ خیال کیا جاسکتا ہے۔ یورپی یونین کے تعاون کے منصوبے میں دیئے گئے ترجیحی شعبہ جات اس کے ساتھ مطابقت رکھتے ہیں۔ موجودہ ایجوکیشن اور وقتاً فوقتاً کئے گئے منصوبے کے جائزے سے نتیجہ اخذ کرنے میں مدد دیتے ہیں کہ منصوبہ کے مقاصد حاصل کرنے کی طرف ترقی ہوئی ہے۔ منصوبہ کے مقاصد جیسے سڑک ٹیک تعلقات اور شراکت برائے امن و ترقی جو کہ مشرک اقدار و اصول اور کمنٹس پر مبنی ہوگی۔ یورپی یونین کے تعاون کیلئے اہم شعبوں کو ان فیلڈز سے منسلک کر دیا گیا ہے۔

خصوصاً دیہی ترقی، تعلیم (بشمول TVET)، انسانی حقوق اور جمہوری عمل کے حوالے سے لیے گئے اقدامات میں 2008ء میں پاکستان کو دوبارہ جمہوریت کے راستے پر گامزن ہونے میں مدد دی اور صنفی برابری، چٹائی سطح پر احتساب، جمہوریت، اچھی حکمرانی کو بھی ترقی دی۔ جی ایس پی ٹیس نظام کو اختیار کرنے سے معاشی تعلقات مضبوط ہوئے ہیں۔ ان کامیابیوں کا عمل بھی جاری ہے اور اسکو جاری رکھنے کی ضرورت ہے۔ یورپی یونین کی معاشی مدد کو سیاسی طور پر اہم غیر معاشی مدد کے ساتھ ملانے کے عمل کو قومی ادارے ایک غیر جانبدار ترقیاتی پارٹنر کے طور پر سہاوتے ہیں۔ جس کی وجہ سے یورپی یونین کی جانب سے فراہم کی جانے والی مدد سے بھی زیادہ موثر سمجھا جاتا ہے۔ یورپی یونین نے باہمی تعاون میں دیئے گئے مقاصد جیسے غربت میں کمی اور ترقی جو کہ استحکام سماجی ہم آہنگی اور قانون کی حکمرانی پر مبنی ہوا اس کو حاصل کرنے میں بڑی مدد کی ہے۔

یورپی یونین کے سافٹ طریقہ کار نے قومی اسٹیک ہولڈرز کو "غیر جانبدار" پارٹنرز کے طور پر جانا اور مجموعی طور پر مالی اور اہم غیر مالی تعاون (خاص طور پر اعلیٰ سطحی سیاسی اور سڑک ٹیک ڈائیلاگ کے ذریعے جو یورپی یونین اور پاکستان کے مشرک کمیٹیشن کے درمیان منعقد ہوا) جو کہ ایسے ہی ہے جیسے اپنی حیثیت سے بڑے کے ساتھ خود کو مقابلے کیلئے پایا جائے۔ یورپی یونین کے مقاصد کے حصول کے لیے یہ اہم تھا کہ غربت میں کمی ہو اور ترقی و استحکام، سماجی ہم آہنگی اور قانون کی حکمرانی کی بنیاد پر منتخب شعبوں کی تعمیر کی جائے۔ منتخب شعبہ جات کیلئے مکمل تعاون کا تسلسل اور تکمیل، طریقہ کار اور انتظام کے طریقوں کے عملی استعمال سے متعلق یورپی یونین کی حکمت عملی کو وضع کیا اور ان کو حکوتی پاسیوں سے منسلک کر دیا گیا۔

کارکردگی متغیر رہی اور اسے کئی رکاوٹوں کا سامنا کر پڑا۔ بعض صورتوں میں حکوتی غیر رضامندی، محدود شعبہ جاتی اور انتظامی صلاحیت اور کچھ عملی نفاذ کر نیوالے اداروں اور مستفید ہونے والوں (مثلاً قدرتی آفات اور تازہ عات) ، اندرونی تبدیلیوں (جیسے اختیارات کی منتقلی) اور یورپی یونین کی طرف سے حثیت سے بڑھ کر انسانی وسائل کا استعمال، کئی کاموں کے نفاذ میں تاخیر وغیرہ۔ لیکن عام طور پر مطلوبہ سرگرمیوں کو نافذ کیا گیا اور سب سے زیادہ متوقع نتائج حاصل کئے گئے۔ یورپی یونین کا طریقہ کار اور انتظامات نتائج کے حصول کیلئے بہت اہم ثابت ہوئے۔ اس تشخیص کی ایک مرکزی دریافت یہ ہے کہ یورپی یونین نے پاکستانی سوسائٹی کے مختلف کارپردازوں کے ساتھ ناکافی کام کیا۔ جمہوریت

کیلئے کام کرنے والوں کی شناخت اور سماجی ہم آہنگی کیلئے کام کرنے والوں کی شمولیت اور ایسے پہلے کرنے والوں کی شناخت پر زیادہ زور دیا گیا جیسے کہ قومی حکام اور مقامی سول سوسائٹی جو کہ اسکوا پنانے کا عزم کئے ہوئے تھے۔

منتخب شعبہ جات میں مدد کو جاری رکھنا اور ان ٹیکلز میں ہم آہنگی کو بڑھانا اور عملی طریقہ کار اور انتظامی معاملات اور کام سے مسلسل سیکھنے کے عمل کے یورپی یونین حکمت عملی کو بہت اہم اور گورنمنٹ پالیسی کے ساتھ متعلقہ بنایا ہے۔ کارکردگی بہت ساری اہم رکاوٹوں کی وجہ سے ناہموار رہی ہے۔ حکومت پاکستان کی طرف سے محدود آمدگی، محدود اداراتی اور انتظامی صلاحیت، قدرتی آفات، اندرونی تبدیلیاں (انتقال اقتدار) اور یورپی یونین کے اندر انسانی وسائل کی کمی کے ترقیاتی اقدامات میں تاخیر کا موجب بنی لیکن پھر بھی طے شدہ ترقیاتی اقدامات کئے گئے اور متوقع مقاصد بھی حاصل ہوئے۔ جو انتظامی معاملات اور طریقہ کار و مقاصد حاصل کرنے کے لیے بہت اہم ثابت ہوئے۔ اس رپورٹ کی مرکزی دریافت یہ ہے کہ یورپی یونین کو پاکستانی سوسائٹی کے جزویات کے ساتھ کام کرنا چاہیے۔ جمہوریت کو ترقی دینے والے عوامل کو شناخت کرنے، سماجی ہم آہنگی اور اسے عوامل کی شناخت جس کو مقامی سول سوسائٹی اور قومی حکمران طبقے پہلے ہی اپنا چکے ہوں پر زیادہ خرچ کرنا چاہیے۔

دوسرا مرکزی نتیجہ یہ ہے کامیابی کا دار و مدار نیچے سے اوپر (مقامی Bottom-up) حکمت عملی جو عوام اور کاروباری طبقہ کو بہتر حکومتی اداروں اور خدمات کے حوالے سے سماجی بیداری پیدا کرنا اور دوسری طرف اوپر سے نیچے (Top-Down) کی طرف بنیادی خدمات کی فراہمی، کوائفی اور رسائی کو بہتر بنانے پر توجہ دینا چاہیے۔ چیلنی طرح کی مدد جو مقامی رول سپورٹ کی طرح کی این جی اووز (NGOs) اور دوسری طرح کی مدد جو بھٹ سپورٹ اور اداروں کی تحقیقی مدد کی طور پر دی گئی یہ ایک بہتر طریقہ کار ثابت ہوئی۔ جبکہ مطلوبہ جھکاؤ بہت ہی محدود انداز میں ہوا ہے لیکن یورپی یونین کی حکمت عملی کے نفاذ کو آگے بڑھانے کی راہ ہموار ہو گئی ہے۔ اداروں کے کام کاج، پالیسیوں کی تشکیل، سماجی اور معاشی شعبہ جات کی ترقی اور کمیونٹی کی بنیاد پر تنظیموں کو متحرک اور تعلیم کی خدمات کو بہتر کیا گیا ہے۔ لیکن حتیٰ مستفید ہونے والے لوگوں کیلئے ابھی بہت کچھ کرنا باقی ہے۔ کیونکہ وہ ان اداروں کے صارفین نہ تھے اور نہ ہی شہری، اور نہ اقتصادیات چلانے والا طبقہ۔ یہ اس لیے بھی ہے کہ بہت سارے اقدامات ابھی جاری ہیں اور وہ مقامی سطح پر اسے اداروں اور اقدامات کو بہتر کر سکتے ہوں۔

اخذ شدہ نتائج

اس تحقیق نے تین کھسٹرز جو حکمت عملی، شعبہ جاتی امانت، اور قاطع مسائل سے نتائج اخذ کئے ہیں۔

مجموعی طور پر یورپی یونین کی حکمت عملی اور طریقہ کار پر عمل کے نتائج

مجموعی طور پر یورپی یونین کی حکمت عملی اور عمل کے طریقہ کار پر نتائج تحقیق یہ ہے کہ باوجود اس کے کہ یورپی یونین پاکستان میں صرف ایک درمیانے درجے کی ترقیاتی پارٹنر ہے لیکن اگر مقامی ترقیاتی اقدامات اور مقامی تبدیلی کے عوامل (گورنمنٹ اور سول سوسائٹی) کے ساتھ مل کر کام کرے تو اپنے آپ کو مرکزی پارٹنر بھی بنا سکتا ہے۔ اس کے تعاون کی حکمت عملی اور پروگرام کا بڑا مقصد ایک پیچیدہ اور خود کار حرکیات کو تحقیق کی مدد کے دوران تبدیل کرنا تھا۔ اس کے اقدامات نے اداروں کی بہتری اور تبدیلی میں اہم کردار ادا کیا۔ تاہم، اداروں کی بہتری اور اصلاحات کا مشاہدہ کیا جا رہا ہے اگرچہ سیاسی معاشیات کے محرکات کا تجزیہ نہ کافی تھا جو مراعات کی وجہ سے غربت میں کمی، مجموعی ترقی اور استحکام کیلئے ضروریات کی نشاندہی نہیں کرتا۔ تاہم سیاسی و معاشی تجزیہ بہت حد تک تبدیلی کے عوامل اور محرکات پوری طرح نہیں جانے گئے جو کہ ضروری تھا کہ تبدیلیاں غربت کی کمی، ترقی اور استحکام جیسے مطلوبہ مقاصد حاصل کرنے میں مدد کر سکیں۔ (C1, C2)

یورپی یونین نے سب سے زیادہ محروم جغرافیائی علاقوں، بیرونی خطرات سے دوچار اور آبادی کے سب سے کمزور گروپس کو اپنی حمایت کیلئے منتخب کیا۔ نقطہ نظر یہ تھا کہ انسانی امداد اور ترقی کو لا کر استعمال کرتے ہوئے مختلف قسم کے طریقے اپنانے تاکہ وہی ترقی، تجارت اور انسانی حقوق کے شعبوں میں ممکن تعاون اور علم سے سیکھے اور فائدہ اٹھانے کی کوشش کی ہے۔ (C3, C4)

سکیٹر بجٹ سپورٹ (SBS) سندھ اور خیبر پختونخواہ میں صوبائی اصلاحات کی حکمت عملی کی حمایت کرنے کے لیے استعمال کیا گیا ہے۔ اسے وقت میں جب صوبوں کو بنیادی، سماجی شعبے کی پالیسیوں کی مکمل ذمہ داری منتقل کی جارہی ہے یہ عمل بہت مفید اور بروقت ثابت ہوا ہے۔ یہ عمل انتہائی پرخطر تھا اور اس میں بے شمار چیلنجز کا سامنا بھی تھا۔ مکمل اقتدار کی منتقلی کا عمل کا مطلب ادارہ جاتی اور انتظامی صلاحیتوں کا چھٹی سطح پر کمزور حوام، معاشی حکومتی مالی و اداراتی کمزوری کا تقاضا تھا اور تقاضا یہ ہے کہ وفاقی، صوبائی اور مقامی اداروں کو مضبوط کیا جاتا اور اس میں یورپی یونین کے قلیل وسائل پر باؤ ڈالا اور اسکے ساتھ یورپی یونین کو پائزہ حکومتوں کی طرف سے طریقہ کار کی سمجھ کی جیسی مشکلات سے بھی نبھانا تھا۔ ان مشکلات کو حل کرنے کیلئے اور خطرات کو کم کرنے کیلئے سیکٹر بجٹ سپورٹ کا استعمال بہت ہی عملی انداز میں کیا گیا۔ اہلیت نازک تھی لیکن سیکٹر بجٹ کی فراہمی نے اسکو بہتر کرنے میں مدد دی۔ مجموعی طور پر سیکٹر بجٹ سپورٹ دوسرے ترقیاتی پارٹنرز کے ساتھ مل کر فراہم کی گئی جس سے تکنیکی مذاکرات پر گفتگو کی گنجائش پیدا ہوئی اور اس نے حکومتوں کو نازک اور تنازعات سے متاثر علاقوں میں امداد کے وسائل کو استعمال کرنے میں چلک پیدا کی۔ (C5, C6)

یورپی یونین نے مختلف طریقہ کار اور حکمت عملی استعمال کرتے ہوئے اپنی مدد کو ضروریات کے ساتھ منسلک کرنے کیلئے استعمال کیا جن کو یہ پورا کرنا چاہتا تھا لیکن اس میں کچھ مواقع ضائع بھی ہوئے۔ مثلاً جمہوری سکرانی کے میدان میں سیاسی اور پالیسی ڈائیاگ کے قریبی روابط کے قیام کے سلسلے میں۔ اس کے علاوہ مخصوص اقدامات اور عملدرآمد کرنا والے پارٹنرز، کی کافی مطابقت کچھ پراجیکٹ کے نتائج حاصل کرنے میں شدید رکاوٹ ثابت ہوئی (مثلاً راجا پروگرام) (C7, C8)

سکیٹر کے متعلق اخذ شدہ نتائج

دیگر ترقی کے شعبہ میں یورپی یونین کا طریقہ کار مناسب تھا اور کیونکہ کو با اختیار بنانے میں اس نے اہم کردار ادا کیا۔ اور جمہوریت نیچے سطح کے احتساب کا عمل اور ریاست اشرفی کے اعتماد کی دوبارہ تعمیر، جوانوں کی شمولیت کے بارے میں زیادہ شواہد نہیں ملے، لیکن ان اعلیٰ اہلیتوں کے ذائزین اور عملدرآمد میں تنظیم، تحریک اور شہریوں میں ذمہ داری کے احساس کو بڑھانے میں مدد دی۔ (مثلاً راجا پروگرام) (C9, C10)

تعلیم کے شعبے میں بجٹ سپورٹ کی فراہمی صوبائی تعلیم کے شعبہ میں اصلاحات کی منصوبہ بندی اور شعبہ جاتی خدمات کی فراہمی کو بہتر کیا لیکن بجٹ کو نافذ کرنے کے عمل میں شدید کمزوری کی وجہ سے شعبہ تعلیم میں ترقیاتی اشاریے (Indicators) نہایت معمولی یا منفی رہے۔ TVET سیکٹر میں فراہم کی گئی امداد نے اداروں کو مضبوط کرنے میں مدد دی لیکن روزگار پیدا کرنے میں محدود یا کوئی نتائج حاصل نہیں کئے اس کی بڑی وجہ لوگوں کا سماجی مطالبات کی طرف زیادہ رجحان یا متبادل معاشی مطالبات (مارکیٹ) کا ہونا تھا۔ (C11, C12)

جمہوری عمل کی ترقی میں خصوصاً انتخابی مشاہداتی مشن کے ذریعے جمہوریت کی ترقی کیلئے اہم کردار ادا کیا۔ شاہد اسکی وجہ سے انسانی حقوق کی ترقی کے عمل کو سیاسی ڈائیاگ کے ذریعے کم کرنے میں مدد ملی ہے۔ اور اس کو جی ایس پلس (GSP Plus) کے عمل کے ساتھ جوڑنے سے گورنمنٹ کے خاص لیول کے ساتھ منسلک ہونے میں مدد ملی ہے ان تمام شعبوں میں مدد شراکت کیلئے ٹھوس بنیادیں فراہم کر دی ہیں۔ اور گورنمنٹ نے اس بات کے امکانات بڑھا دیئے ہیں کہ یورپی یونین اعلیٰ سطح پر سیاسی مذاکرات کے ذریعے

نوٹ:

World Bank, AusAid, Dfd نامی سرپر،

-1

انسانی حقوق کی کمی کو کم کر سکتی ہے اور اس نے حکومت کے ساتھ ایک خاص سطح تک مشغول ہو کر ان تمام علاقوں میں مزید سازگار اقدامات کیلئے ٹھوس بیادیں فراہم کر دی ہیں۔ (C12, C14)

تجارت کے شعبے میں 12 سال کے عرصے میں اداروں کی مضبوطی میں کردار ادا کیا ہے۔ لیکن تجارت میں توسیع اور تنوع کے لحاظ سے فوائد ابھی تک نظر نہیں آ رہے۔ (C15, C16)

کام کے دوران پیش آنے والے دوسرے مسائل کے نتائج

یورپی یونین نے صنف کو پروگرام کے ذریعے اور عملدرآمد میں شامل کر دیا ہے اور اسکے اچھے نتائج مدد ہوئے ہیں لیکن اس کے اثرات مستفید ہونیوالی کمیونٹی کے علاوہ پھیلاؤ کے شواہد نہیں ملے۔ ماحولیات، قدرتی وسائل اور موسمیاتی تبدیلیاں بہت سے مقامی ترقیاتی پروگرامز کا حصہ بنائی گئی ہے جن سے مستفید ہونیوالی کمیونٹی نے فائدہ اٹھایا ہے لیکن جب تک بنیادی اصلاحات نہ کی گئی ان کے عالمی سطح پر اثرات ہونے کے امکان نہیں۔ (C17, C18)

سفارشات

یہ سیکشن مندرجہ بالا نتائج سے اخذ کی گئی منتخب سفارشات کو پیش کرنا ہے اس میں ان کی اہمیت اور ترجیح کا ذکر کیا گیا ہے۔

☆ شعبہ جاتی پالیسیوں کی مانگ اور سپلائی پر توجہ کی ضرورت ہے اور اس کے مطابق طریقہ کار اور عملدرآمد کے شراکت داروں کو منتخب کرنے کا عمل جاری رکھا جائے۔ اوپر سے نیچے اور نیچے سے اوپر کی ترقیاتی اہلیتوں کو ترقی دی جائے تاکہ بہتر حکومتی خدمات اور ترسیل کو موثر بنایا جاسکے۔ آبادی میں (طلبہ، کسان، اور مقامی کمیونٹیز) کی تحریقی، تنظیمی اور پیشہ وارانہ صلاحیتوں کو مضبوط بنایا جائے اور سپلائی کی طرف سے فراہمی سے عوامی خدمات کی ترسیل کو بہتر بنانے کیلئے جب بھی ممکن ہو سیکٹر بجٹ سپورٹ (SBS) کے ذریعے اچھی حکمرانی اور سازگار ماحول (پالیسی، بجٹ) بنانے کے لیے مدد فراہم کی جائے۔

C7, C8 -R4 & R9
کی بنیاد پر اہمیت: اعلیٰ
ترجیح: اوسط

☆ انسانی حقوق کی سر بلندی اور قانون کی حکمرانی کو منطق کے ذریعے بہتر کرنے کی ضرورت ہے۔ یورپی بیرونی ایکشن سروں اور یورپی کمیشن ڈائریکٹوریٹ جزل برائے انٹرنیشنل تعاون و ترقی کو چاہیے کہ کنگلی، علاقائی اور عالمی سطح پر بہتری اور تبدیلی لانے کیلئے مشترکہ طور پر تجزیہ کرے اور تبدیلی لانے والے عوامل کی نشاندہی کرے۔ اور یورپی یونین حکمت عملی واضح کرنے کے لیے ان پر توجہ مرکوز کرے۔

C14 - R16
کی بنیاد پر اہمیت: اعلیٰ
ترجیح: اعلیٰ

نوٹ:

1. اعلیٰ، پیچیدہ مسائل: یورپی یونین کے ترقیاتی مقاصد کو حاصل کرنے کیلئے اعلیٰ کردار کے مطابق پیچیدہ، پیچیدہ اور پیچیدہ مسائل کو حل کرنے کے لیے اعلیٰ کرنے میں اس کے کردار ہے۔
2. اعلیٰ: یہ اعلیٰ کا قانون کے نظام فراہم کیلئے ضروری ہے یا دیگر سفارشات عملدرآمد کے لیے اعلیٰ شراہ ہے۔
3. درمیانہ: یہ خصوصیات اقدامات کی کارکردگی اور اپنی جانچ و نظر سے کیلئے ضرورت ہے۔

☆ سکیورٹی اور قانون کی سھرائی کی پالیسیوں اور قوانین پر کام کیا جائے۔ یورپی یونین کو اختیارات سونپنا اور EEAS کو انسانی حقوق اور سلامتی پر پالیسی اور سیاسی ڈائلاگ میں گہرائی پیدا کرنے کے لیے پالیسیوں اور معیار پر تھکنے کا کام سے اعداد کے ذریعے چند انسانی حقوق پر نوچہ دیں اور اس کام کے لیے DEVCO HQ سے مدد لی جائے۔

C14 - R18
کی بنیاد پر
اہمیت: اعلیٰ
ترجیح: اعلیٰ

☆ سیکٹر اصلاحات معاہدے اور بجٹ سپورٹ صوبائی سطح پر صوبائی ٹیکس اصلاحات پر ایک پالیسی ڈائلاگ کی ضرورت کو ترک نہیں کر سکتا۔

C5 - R6
کی بنیاد پر
اہمیت: اعلیٰ
ترجیح: اوسط

☆ خیر بختونخواہ میں ماضی کی اور جاری وہی ترقی کو مربوط اور بہتر بنانے کے لیے یورپی یونین کی حمایت کو جاری رکھنے پر غور کیا جائے۔ یورپی یونین کی سپورٹ نے اہم کامیابیوں میں کردار ادا کیا ہے۔ جیسا کہ عورتوں کی کیوٹی تنظیموں کی کامیاب حمایت لیکن یہ تنظیمیں آج بھی کمزور ہیں اور انکو پائیدار بنانے کیلئے بیرونی حمایت کی ضرورت ہو سکتی ہے۔ اس لیے یہ ضروری ہے کہ اس صوبے سے باہر آنے کا سوچا جا رہا ہے تو اس امر کو یقینی بنایا جائے کہ ان تنظیموں کو جاری رکھنے کیلئے کوئی متبادل ضمانت موجود ہے۔

C10 ,C9 - R8
کی بنیاد پر
اہمیت: اعلیٰ
ترجیح: اعلیٰ

☆ اقتدار کی چلی سطح پر منتقلی اور صوبے کی چلی سطح پر PFM میں بہتری کو فروغ دیں۔

C11 ,C5 - R11
کی بنیاد پر
اہمیت: اعلیٰ
ترجیح: اعلیٰ

☆ TVET کی حمایت جاری رکھیں لیکن مارکیٹ کی بنیاد پر طریقہ کار کو بنیاد بنائے۔

C12 - R14
کی بنیاد پر
اہمیت: اعلیٰ
ترجیح: اوسط

☆ جن علاقوں میں ویٹیوں چین کی ترقی کا پروگرام چل رہا ہے وہاں ویٹیو چین تجربے کو مہارت کے خلاء کے تجربے کے TVET پروگرام کو بنایا جائے۔

C15 - R15
کی بنیاد پر
اہمیت: اوسط
ترجیح: اوسط

☆ تجارت کے شعبے میں اگرا داروں کی مزید مضبوطی کیلئے ان کی معاونت ضروریات کی نشاندہی کی بنیاد پر خدمات کی فراہمی کے لیے کلائنٹس پر توجہ مرکوز کی جائے۔

C15 - R22
کی بنیاد پر
اہمیت: اعلیٰ
ترجیح: اوسط

☆ آخر میں سفارشات کی ایک بڑی تعداد ماضی سے سیکھے گئے سبق کی روشنی میں فائدہ اٹھانے اور کامیابیوں کے تسلسل کو جاری رکھنے ہوئے انکو یقینی بنانے کی اہمیت پر
اصرار کرتی ہیں۔

(R1 , R8 & R20)

1. Context of the Evaluation and Methodology

The Evaluation Unit of the European Commission's Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO) has commissioned ADE to conduct the Evaluation of European Union (EU) cooperation with Pakistan.

The purpose of the report is to present the findings and the responses to the ten Evaluation Questions (Chapter 2), the overall conclusions (Chapter 3) and recommendations (Chapter 4).

This study has been managed by DG DEVCO's Evaluation Unit, with the support of a Reference Group (RG) composed of different EU services and to which the Embassy of Pakistan to the EU has an observer role.

The present document is the final report. It takes account of comments received on the versions dated respectively 5th and 26th February 2016 from the evaluation's Reference Group; from discussions on recommendations during a series of workshops with EU services in March 2016; and from comments received during a seminar in Islamabad on 9th June 2016 to which more than 25 representatives from a variety of organisations participated.

The annexes to the present report outline the evidence papers (Annexes A1 to A13) and project information (Annexes B1 to B3) on which findings are based, as well as the evaluation design and methodology followed (Annexes C1 to C6).

1.1 Objectives and scope

This evaluation has a **double purpose**:

1. It aims at providing an overall independent assessment of the EU's past and current cooperation with Pakistan.
2. It should allow, on this basis, to identify key lessons and recommendations for improving future strategy and delivery in the country.

The scope of the evaluation covers the following dimensions:

Table 1: Scope of the evaluation

Time	The evaluation covers the period 2007-2014 .
Thematic	This strategic, country-level evaluation, aims primarily at assessing the overall approach of the EU engagement in Pakistan. Doing so, it focuses in particular on the following sectors and themes: rural development; education, technical and vocational training and education (TVET); democratisation; human rights and rule of law; and trade .
Geographic	The evaluation focuses on bilateral cooperation with Pakistan . ⁴ It covers hereby EU cooperation at federal, provincial and district level.
Institutional	The evaluation focuses on DG DEVCO cooperation. It also covers EEAS cooperation in so far as it relates to development cooperation in Pakistan. ⁵
Legal	The evaluation covers all official commitments that concern the overall engagement with Pakistan and all financial instruments relevant to Pakistan.
Methodological	The evaluation covers all five OECD-DAC evaluation criteria, as well as the other criteria and issues of the 3Cs, coherence and EU value added .

1.2 EU cooperation strategy and portfolio

The EU's **2007-2013 Country Strategy Paper (CSP)** defines its cooperation strategy over most of the evaluation period. The overall aims of EU cooperation in Pakistan are to fight poverty and help Pakistan follow a sustainable growth path. The CSP underlines that "this will only succeed if growth is founded on political stability, social cohesion, creation of productive and decent work opportunities, human and social development, the rule of law and diversification of economic activity". When the European Parliament ratified the Cooperation Agreement in 2004 it also suggested that the Commission place particular emphasis on progress in the fields of democratisation and human rights.

The 2007-2013 CSP for Pakistan provides for the following strategic areas of EU intervention:

- Focal Areas:
 - Focal Area 1: Rural Development and Natural resources Management in NWFP and Baluchistan;
 - Focal Area 2: Education and Human Resources Development;
- Non-focal Intervention Areas:
 - Trade development and economic cooperation

⁴ It also addresses the complementarity and coherence of bilateral aid with regional cooperation, which has been evaluated separately (Strategic evaluation of the EU cooperation with Asia 2007-2012).

⁵ It also addresses the interaction of DEVCO's strategy and interventions with those of ECHO, other DGs, the EIB and EU Member States in Pakistan.

- Democratisation and Human Rights;
- Support to Non-State Actors and Thematic Budget Lines;
- Counter-terrorism and Security.


The **Mid-Term Review** of the CSP (2010) confirmed the two focal areas, while it adjusted slightly the non-focal sectors by reorganising them in two: (i) Governance and Human Rights; and (ii) Trade cooperation.

The EU-Pakistan **Multi-Annual Indicative Programme (MIP) 2014-2020** reorganises these sectors somewhat for the next programming period, by organising the cooperation around three 'key sectors': i) rural development, ii) education and iii) good governance, human rights and rule of law. There is hence, beyond slight reorganisation, consistency and continuity of EU support in nearly the same focal and non-focal sectors over the evaluation period and the current programming period. Exception hereby is trade, with EU support ending in 2016/2017, partially and indirectly replaced by a programme relating to labour rights in the private sector.

The main expected results from the EU's cooperation during the evaluation period are shown in the form of a summarised effects diagram (see Figure 3 at the end of this section). Details on the rationale for EU engagement in Pakistan, on the EU cooperation strategies, and on its intervention logic / theory of change in each sector are provided in Annex C3.


Over the period 2007-2014, the EU commitments of development cooperation specific to Pakistan reached over 520 million euros, of which approximately 290 million euros (56%) had been paid in April 2015. Sector budget support programmes deployed to uphold rural development and education programmes led to peaks in aid in 2011, 2012 and 2014. The bulk of the funding (74%) came from the geographic budget line DCI-Asia, but a variety of other EU legal and financial instruments were also mobilised, of which the Instrument for Stability (12%) stand out. EU aid was furthermore delivered through different types of implementation partners, notably the Government (30%), NGOs (31%), UN agencies (17%) and EU Member States (10%), and to a lesser extent private sector actors and international financial institutions. The EU also provided humanitarian aid through DG ECHO. This does not represent a usual distribution of aid channels, reason for which the choice of modalities and implementing partners is investigated in depth in EQ8 below.

Figure 1: Evolution of EU's funding to Pakistan (contracted amounts), 2007-2014



EU projects and programmes covered a wide range of thematic areas, which distribution in terms of contracted amounts largely reflect the EU's priority areas, with over 75% of the EU cooperation contracted amounts going to the three main areas of cooperation: rural development (33%), education (28%), and democratisation, human rights and security (15%). Nevertheless, in terms of disbursements, the rural development represented about half of those in the field of education (56 M€ vs. 97 M€), which is mainly due to the fact that nearly the total amount of resources allocated to the rural development sector over the period comes from one large (80 M€) but recent programme that was hardly disbursed at the end of the evaluation period. Details on the inventory and typology of the EU cooperation portfolio are provided in Annex B1.


Figure 2: Contracted amounts in Pakistan by sector of cooperation, 2007-2014



(1) Including Reconstruction Relief and Rehabilitation, Water and sanitation, productive sector development and Health.

Source: ADE analysis, based on EuropeAid database (Data Warehouse), April 2015. Total contracted includes all the contracts related to Pakistan over the period 2007-2014, from commitments specific to Pakistan and commitments that are not country specific.

Figure 3: Effects diagram –EU strategy overall



Source: ADE

1.3 Methodology

The methodological approach for the evaluation is summarised hereafter. It is detailed in Annex C2, which is complemented by the annexes C3 to C6 (EQs, list of persons met, and bibliography).


1.3.1 Overall approach and process

The methodological approach for this evaluation follows DG DEVCO's methodological guidelines for country-level evaluations, which is itself based on the OECD/DAC approach. It also takes account of recent developments promoted by DG DEVCO's Evaluation Unit, and good practices developed by ADE for strategic evaluations and notably for country-level evaluations. It applies a theory-based non-experimental design, using a reconstructed intervention logic analysis to consolidate all the most relevant elements of EU cooperation in a single framework that links rationale to strategy, projects and results (this is close to theory of change analysis). An evaluation framework consisting of evaluation questions (EQs), judgement criteria (JC) and indicators structures data collection and verification. The analytical framework applies essentially 'contribution analysis' principles. In terms of evaluation tools, the evaluators conducted documentary study of more than 350 documents (EU and national policies and strategies, project documentation, grey literature, etc.); conducted statistical and data analysis (e.g. at EU portfolio or sector level); and collected through open or semi-structured interviews the views of EU, national authorities, civil society, implementing partners, other donors, etc. – more than 150 persons in total. On this basis, the extent to which judgment criteria are validated is being assessed, and synthesised answers to the EQs are then provided. From the answers to the EQs, a set of Conclusions (and of Recommendations at a later stage) is derived.

The evaluation process follows a well-defined sequential approach. The phases with the main activities, deliverables, and meetings with the Reference Group (RG) are presented in the figure below.

The evaluation has started at the end of January 2015 and should be completed soon after the presentation and discussion seminar with a variety of stakeholders planned in Islamabad in May 2016. The evaluation team conducted country visits in March 2015 (one-week preliminary visit) and in November 2015 (main mission, one week). A series of phone interviews and in-country interviews by Pakistan-based team members were further conducted at other moments in time.

Figure 4: Evaluation process



1.3.2 Evaluation Questions

The evaluation has been structured around a set of ten Evaluation Questions (EQs), which reflect the main objectives of EU cooperation with Pakistan and the evaluation criteria and key issues to be examined in DG DEVCO evaluations. Each EQ is further structured in judgement criteria (JC) and indicators.

The answers to the Evaluations Questions are provided in the next section. We provide hereby the main argumentation along the lines of the judgement criteria. The underlying evidence is provided in the evidence papers (Annexes A1 to A13) and in project data and information (summarised in Annexes B1 to B3). These evidence papers also indicate the quality of the evidence collected for each indicator.

Table 2: Set of Evaluation Questions

EQ1	Overall Strategy	To what extent did the EU cooperation strategy respond to development priorities and challenges of the country?
EQ2	Rural Development	To what extent has the EU facilitated community empowerment and contributed to community driven development, in KP and Baluchistan?
EQ3	Education	To what extent has the EU support to the education sector (non TVET) contributed to improve service delivery, quality and equitable access to education in the provinces Sindh and KP?
EQ4	TVET	To what extent has the EU contributed to improve TVET service delivery, and skills and employability of trained students?
EQ5	Democratisation	To what extent did the EU contribute to strengthen the democratisation process in Pakistan?
EQ6	Human Rights /Rule of law	To what extent did the EU contribute to the protection and promotion of human rights, the improvement of justice, and to security and counter-terrorism?
EQ7	Trade	To what extent has EU cooperation support to trade contributed to increasing trade and investment flows with the EU and South Asia?
EQ8	Aid modalities	To what extent did the mix of aid modalities and the selection of implementing partners facilitate achievement of expected cooperation results?
EQ9	Visibility	What has been the visibility and perception of the EU in its pursuit of development cooperation objectives?
EQ10	Coordination & complementarity	To what extent have EU interventions been complementary with those of other MS and coordinated with those of the other donors

Source: ADE

The figure on the next page aims at providing a synthetic overview of the judgement criteria for all ten Evaluation Questions.

Figure 5: Overview of judgement criteria for all Evaluation Questions

EQ1 EU cooperation strategy : response to development priorities and challenges	1.1 Analysis of priorities and challenges	1.2 Portfolio addressed priorities & challenges	1.3 Suitable geographic & institutional selection	1.4 Lessons of analyses taken into account	1.5 Coherence with other EU policies			
EQ2 Rural Development: community empowerment and community-driven development	2.1 Analysis of needs and challenges	2.2 Interventions implemented as planned	2.3 Contribution to mobilisation of CBOs	2.4 CBOs developed & maintained local infrastructure	2.5 Access to public services improved			
EQ3 Education: improved service delivery, quality and equitable access	3.1 Analysis of needs, challenges & gov policies	3.2 Design of BS programmes favoured outcomes	3.3 Coherence between national and regional support	3.4 SBS implemented as planned	3.5 Education policies improved by SBS	3.6 Offer and quality of education improved	3.7 Equitable access to education improved	
EQ4 TVET: improved service delivery, skills and employability	4.1 Analysis of needs and challenges	4.2 Interventions implemented as planned	4.3 TVET reform strengthened and implemented	4.4 Offer, quality & distribution of TVET services improved	4.5 Employability of workers increased			
EQ5 Democratisation process strengthened	5.1 Analysis of needs and challenges	5.2 Interventions implemented as planned	5.3 More credible & inclusive elections	5.4 Parliament: law-making, oversight & representation				
EQ6 Human Rights / Rule of Law: human rights, justice, security and counter-terrorism	6.1 Analysis of needs and challenges	6.2 Interventions implemented as planned	6.3 Gov. capacity to address HR issues increased	6.4 CSOs empowered to defend HR	6.5 Justice and police services strengthened in the respect of HR	6.6 Access to justice increased	6.7 Public confidence in the rule of law increased	6.8 Resilience against terrorism strengthened
EQ7 Trade: increasing trade and investment flows with the EU and South Asia	7.1 Analysis of needs and challenges	7.2 Interventions implemented as planned	7.3 Business Intern. Organisations strengthened	7.4 Barriers to trade reduced	7.5 Investment & trade with EU & South Asia increased			
EQ8 Aid modalities mix and selection of implementing partners	8.1 Rationale based on sound analysis	8.2 EU organisation adapted & expertise mobilised	8.3 Chosen aid modalities facilitated results achievement					
EQ9 Visibility and perception of the EU in its pursuit of development cooperation objectives	9.1 EU visible to stakeholders	9.2 EU perceived as important contributor						
EQ10 Complementary with EU MS and coordination with other donors	10.1 Complementarity with MS strategies	10.2 Coordination with other donors						

Source: ADE

2. Answers to the Evaluation Questions

2.1 EQ1 Overall Strategy

The question assesses the relevance of the strategic choices underlying the selection of sectors that shaped the cooperation with Pakistan over the evaluation period.

The question concentrates on five aspects: (i) the analyses conducted to identify the development priorities and challenges in the partner country; the rationale underlying the selection (ii) of the focal and non-focal areas of interventions and (iii) of the level of intervention (federal/provincial); (iv) the inclusion at project level of the main lessons of the analysis conducted; and (v) coherence with EU policies in other fields affecting Pakistan.

The evidence on which the response to this question is based is detailed in the dedicated Annex A4.

EQ1	To what extent did the EU cooperation strategy respond to development priorities and challenges of the country?
<p>Summary of response:</p> <p>EU cooperation strategies and programmes addressed a wide range of challenges, which often were key drivers of fragility, and by and large reflected GoP priorities. The EU's response sought to transform the complex and self-reinforcing dynamics at play in Pakistan. It did so by focusing on four main areas that are central to these dynamics, and also development priorities in their own right.⁶ Overall, EU programming choices relied on sound context analyses, were conflict- and fragility-sensitive, and reflected a relevant and well justified selection of geographic zones of intervention and institutional levels. EU cooperation became more systemic and strategic over time, with stronger ties to political and policy dialogue. However, the EU paid too little attention to what constitutes the main challenges to constructive state-society relations, notably different groups' interests and incentives. It worked insufficiently, for instance, on greater transparency to citizens on service delivery; increased citizen engagement; and government accountability.</p>	

JC 1.1 "The EU has based its cooperation on sound analyses of the development priorities and challenges of the country"

Several EU context analyses underpinned the EU cooperation strategy with Pakistan. These analyses were of consistent quality, reflected learning over time, and incorporated inputs from state and non-state actors in Pakistan (I-1.1.1, I-1.1.2 & I-1.1.6). However they did not include mitigation measures, which is regrettable since many risks

⁶ (i) rural development and natural resources management; (ii) education and human resources development; (iii) human rights and good governance; and (iv) trade cooperation, plus (v) some anti-money laundering activities (2007-2010) and (vi) counter-terrorism and security activities (2007-2013)

can be better mitigated at the strategic, rather than project, level. At project level, risks were systematically identified in project documents, along with mitigation measures. Beyond security risks, a recurrent risk identified was the lack of ownership/the absence of political will – for which mitigation measures were only sometimes satisfactory. More generally, risks to outputs were usually well identified, but risks to outcomes and impact rarely (I-1.1.1).

EU analyses have by and large reflected several of the OECD’s 10 Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States (I-1.1.3). Although Pakistan has not signed the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States agreed at Busan, and is not a member of the g7+ group, it remains relevant to analyse the EU’s cooperation strategy with the country in the light of the OECD Principles. EU analyses have rightly “taken context as the starting point” (principle #1), factored in crisis prevention (principle #4) and non-discrimination (principle #6). However, when it comes to “focusing on statebuilding as the central objective” (principle #3), strategies and project documents rightly emphasised capacity development but paid little attention to what constitutes the main challenges to constructive state-society relations, notably different groups’ interests and incentives. This hampered for instance the translation of reforms and capacity-building of intermediaries (national institutions, MPs, etc.) into tangible improvements for the target populations. These issues are the object of a dedicated Fragility Note provided in Annex A2. The table below summarises how the EU cooperation with Pakistan has broadly conformed with the 10 Fragile States Principles (FSPs).

Table 3: EU development cooperation with Pakistan and the FSPs

<p>1. <u>Take context as the starting point</u></p>	<p>Relatively satisfactory EU context analysis the evaluation team has had access to is of consistent quality, reflects learning over time, and incorporates inputs from national reformers in government and civil society. However, project documents often continue to present issues as being mainly issues of capacity, rather than of interests and incentives.</p>
<p>2. <u>Ensure all activities do no harm</u></p>	<p>Relatively satisfactory The EU does not have a system in place to ensure its cooperation “does no harm”. However, most non-EU interviewees and third party analysts do not consider that EU cooperation may be doing harm.</p>
<p>3. <u>Focus on statebuilding as the central objective</u> <i>NB: Consistent with OECD definitions, statebuilding is understood as not just strengthening the executive but of all branches of government, federal and provincial, and fostering more constructive state-society relations and social cohesion.</i></p>	<p>Relatively satisfactory EU cooperation with Pakistan emphasises capacity development at all levels (executive branch of the central and provincial governments but also the legislative and the judiciary, and increasingly women and youth). Support to rural development via community mobilisation should be highlighted in this respect. Support to focal areas (rural development and education) and to justice tends to channel aid through government. However, there is scope for much more direct and systematic support to <i>Government accountability to citizens</i>, through public information and means of citizen feedback (for example in the work of Parliament, of government in education and justice). Moreover, areas where development partners (including the EU) support initiatives that benefit from GoP support and commitments</p>

	remain scarce.
4. <u>Prioritise prevention</u>	<p>Relatively satisfactory</p> <p>The EU supports community-level ability to manage conflicts peacefully, notably via its rural development project and access to justice projects (which, by the way, could be connected), and to fighting violent extremism, notably via its law enforcement projects and access to justice projects but also through its wider portfolio (education, rural development). The EU has also provided humanitarian aid through DG ECHO, including for early warning/early response mechanisms with relation to natural disasters. In its areas of support (both thematic and geographic), it is plausible that without EU support, combined with that of other development partners, Pakistan would be more prone to crisis, and less resilient to it.</p>
5. <u>Recognise the links between political, security and development objectives</u>	<p>Relatively satisfactory</p> <p>There is evidence of a whole-of-EU approach (involvement of ECHO, multiple DGs, EEAS, Parliament) and that the EU treats the political, security, economic and social spheres as inter-dependent (e.g. GSP+ status hinging on ratification of labour conventions). The overall intervention logic (i.e. what results are expected and how) is sometimes alluded to in strategies, programme documents and interviews: better population access to and trust in basic social services, especially in crisis-prone rural areas, will contribute to stability, which in turn will benefit economic and social development. These “links between political, security and development objectives” made at the strategic level were sometimes operationalized in practice, especially between security and development (besides trade and human rights, for which there is evidence) – see JC 1.5 below.</p> <p>It should be noted, however, that job creation and greater government accountability are not (yet) seen as central to this intervention logic. More specific attention to these issues could mean trade dialogue focused on job creation, measurement thereof, and a more systematic focus on government accountability re. services supported by the EU. This would include better control of corruption, which in spite of a timid improvement remains high and perceived as such by citizens (Transparency International database, accessed 2015).</p>
6. <u>Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies</u>	<p>Satisfactory</p> <p>EU cooperation with Pakistan emphasises gender equity, social inclusion and human rights. These are part of long-term strategies to prevent fragility. Measures to promote the voice and participation of women and youth are sensible, although it is too early to say if they are effective.</p>
7. <u>Align with local priorities in different ways and in different contexts</u>	<p>Satisfactory</p> <p>There is evidence of EU consultations and cooperation with a wide range of national stakeholders, and the identification of opportunities for partial alignment at the sector level. Support to focal areas (rural development and education) and to justice tends to channel aid through government, including sector budget support. Documentation shows the projects to be closely aligned with government policy and strategies; there is less evidence of civil society, or community consultation at design stage.</p> <p>While EU cooperation in human rights and elections is mostly channelled through NGOs and multilateral organisations, and Government is increasingly reticent to this approach, this approach support checks and balances and democratic dialogue. Care could have been given more to ensure simultaneous</p>


	support to Government and civil society does not pit one against the other, but rather helps civil society carry out informed and constructive advocacy and services.
8. <u>Agree on practical co-ordination mechanisms between international actors</u>	Satisfactory Although there can be an inflation of coordination <i>fora</i> and there is no formal division of labour (thematic or geographic), the EU takes a pragmatic approach to coordination, and it seems to be working. There is some evidence of upstream and shared analysis; shared strategies; coordination of political engagement – for example through the Friends of Democratic Pakistan forum—and coordination at the sector and sometimes provincial level. Nevertheless, in some instances implementing partners in the same sector may still harmonise their approach and standards, such as organisations working in the area of access to justice in the provinces of KP and Punjab.
9. <u>Act fast... but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance</u>	Satisfactory The continuity of the EU support to selected sectors and its alignment on government policies favoured a long-term vision and relations with national actors. In addition, assistance to Pakistan seems to have taken advantage of windows of opportunity with the return to civilian rule in 2008 (it grew steadily over the years, peaking in 2011). However, it has been rather volatile, with an aid shock every year since 2011 (decrease in ODA per capital year-to-year exceed 15%), which can be potentially destabilising.
10. <u>Avoid pockets of exclusion</u>	Relatively satisfactory Although the choice of provinces and target groups is not always explicit, it makes a lot of sense through interviews: KP and South Punjab for their instability, current and potential; Sindh for education as it is left behind by other development partners; etc. The EU has remained engaged in provinces where it has invested considerable efforts and resources to build relationships and trust. The EU could, however, have multiplied its social impact by analysing how each programme impacts on vulnerable groups specifically, and creates social cohesion across communities.

Source: ADE

JC 1.2 “The composition of the portfolio of cooperation addressed the priorities and challenges identified and adapted to their evolution”

The EU cooperation strategy addressed a wide range of challenges, which often were key drivers of fragility and by and large reflected GoP priorities (I-1.2.2 & I.1.2.3). It focused on four cooperation areas: (i) rural development and natural resources management; (ii) education and human resources development; (iii) human rights and good governance; and (iv) trade cooperation) covering challenges in the security, political, social, economic and environmental spheres. Specifically, the EU aimed to address the challenges of human rights violations, checks and balances and the rule of law, human capital, poverty and to some extent disenfranchisement in the border provinces, gender equality, civil society support for democracy and human rights, growth, and natural disasters (see below figure).

Figure 6: Drivers of fragility and areas of direct EU intervention



Sources: ADE, based on BTI (2008-2014), Cordesman and Vira (2010), Paul (2012), Fair (2014), Lievin (2015), and interviews

Areas of direct EU interventions

Over time, the EU’s response became more systemic and strategic (I-1.2.1). The EU has engaged in areas that are critical, where it could have specific value and entry points. While projects were initially focused on selected actors, mainly technical in nature and stop-and-go, they progressively became more tied to political and policy dialogue and balanced between support at federal and provincial levels. Besides, the EU seized opportunities, such as the dialogue on trade to improve exchanges on labour issues and other human rights (notably through the GSP+). However, the EU insufficiently worked on greater transparency to citizens on service delivery, increased citizen engagement and GoP

accountability, which limited potential benefits of the support to the populations notably in the field of democratisation. The analyses and strategy weren't also fully clear on how relationships between poverty and security play out specifically, and what that entailed for EU engagement. Moreover, if emergency needs were addressed by ECHO, which ensured early warning/response mechanisms, coordination between DEVCO and ECHO remained limited during most of the period, in particular at programming level. This improved however at the end of the period, for instance on the WINS and IPC programmes⁷ (I-1.2.7).

As for migration, which became high on the EU's agenda in 2015, it was not really considered a high priority issue by the EU during the evaluation period 2007-2014; it has hence not been the object of extensive analysis, attention and activities by the EU. Nevertheless, emigration, notably of skilled people, is a large-scale phenomenon in Pakistan. Migration from rural areas is another issue, which the EU addressed (directly and indirectly) through a variety of cooperation projects and programmes in rural areas. There is currently a reflection on-going at the EU on how to increase the coherence between development programmes and emigration.

JC 1.3 “The selection of the intervention geographic zones and institutional levels (federal/provinces/district) was best suited to achieve expected cooperation results”

The selection of geographic zones of intervention and institutional levels was generally relevant and well justified. It aimed to respond to needs, to seize opportunities, and to cover the gaps left by other development partners (I-1.3.2). For instance, with policy developments being increasingly in the purview of provincial governments, the shift of emphasis to the provincial levels proved adequate, if still timid. In addition, the EU often targeted its effort on rural populations, where poverty was particularly acute. Donor mapping was used therefore, sometimes funded by the EU at sector level (e.g. on support to countering violent extremism). Mapping was however seldom detailed at the province level (I-1.3.1).

JC 1.4 “The projects and programmes took account of the main lessons of the analyses conducted”

EU programming choices reflected continuity and learning-by-doing (I-1.4.1). They showed a commitment to staying engaged while introducing new areas of thematic focus (anti-money laundering activities for 2007-2010 and counter-terrorism and security activities for 2007-2013), flexibility as to geographic engagement (not only in NWFP and Balochistan) and deeper and more strategic dialogue on policies. They also factored into lessons learnt from past cooperation, and in particular the need to (i) nurture high-level political commitment; (ii) deepen policy dialogue; and (iii) support implementation in districts. However, at project level, with the exception of budget support programmes, few risk analyses or references to lessons learned from other programmes were found – this

⁷ Women and Infant Nutrition in Sindh (WINS); Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC)

may have impeded to take necessary mitigation measures or to learn from experience, for instance in terms of ownership on Pakistani side.

JC 1.5 “There is no incoherence between EU development cooperation policies and EU policies in other fields affecting Pakistan”

By and large, the evaluation found no incoherence between EU development cooperation policies and EU policies in other fields affecting Pakistan. On the contrary, there was an active search of coherence between different domains of interventions. The relationship between trade and human rights emerged for instance as an interesting case where GSP+ provided trade benefits to the textile industry and raised awareness to comply with international legislation on human rights and working conditions. GSP+ used as a political instrument fed into the EU’s political dialogue on human rights, and hence proved to be a complementary instrument (I-1.5.3). Additionally, EU’s support to the trade sector was a coherent complement to the local development activities undertaken under the rural development programmes, insofar as it aimed at promoting employment opportunities for local qualified workers in a geographically isolated area. (I-1.5.1).

Regarding **links between security and development, the evaluation finds that the EU has a human rights-based compliant approach to counter-terrorism, i.e. rule of law is central to both preventing and addressing terrorism. However, beyond the lack of incoherence, the EU did not fully adopt a systemic approach.** The EU focused for instance on one agency, whereas it may have been more impactful to support several and collaboration between them, for example between Parliament (re. legislative loopholes), law enforcement, and community-level development initiatives (see EQ6). In addition, the EU established links between security and development at the strategic level, but documentation provides no evidence of linkages actively made within and between interventions. In Pakistan, the government response is skewed towards a security-first response to security challenges: the 2010 EU Conclusions of the Mid-Term Review of the Country Strategy Paper for Pakistan (2007-13) states that a big challenge for the government is to strike a balance between stability objectives and social issues. Stability cannot come from security alone and stems from social and economic issues too (EC, 2007, Towards an EU response to Situations of Fragility): while security is a precondition of stability, the drivers of fragility must at some point be addressed too (highly unequal access to services, extreme poverty, discrimination and human rights violations, group grievances...). In any country – but especially in Pakistan where there is a security-first response – it is crucial that not only human rights/the rule of law but also tangible development results and improved service delivery (notably in security, justice and education) are brought into fight against terrorism (see Fragility Note). The EU addressed this through its cooperation portfolio and in its policy dialogue, at to some extent in individual programmes (e.g. rural development programmes, TVET, Rule-of-Law programmes).

2.2 EQ2 Rural development

The support of the EU to Rural Development and Natural Resources Management has been a focal area and absorbed more than 33% of the resources contracted during the evaluation period. It consisted in three large programmes, each using different modalities:

- The Sustainable Rural Development Programme in the Refugee Affected and Hosting Areas of Pakistan (RAHA, €40m) implemented through a contribution agreement with the UN Agencies UNDP/UNHCR. The programme was targeted on 103 Union Councils of KP and focused on small scale physical infrastructures, community mobilisation and local government.
- The Programme for Economic Advancement and Community Empowerment (PEACE, €40m), implemented in partnership with the NGO SARHAD Rural Support Programme through a grant contract. It supported initiatives from community based organisations for physical infrastructures and the building of social capital through a three tiered approach consisting in 1° setting up Community Based Organisations, i.e. local interests groups for shared economic/social activities, 2° the networking of these into Village Organisations, and 3° on top of the hierarchy Local Support Organisations that can stimulate and relay local development activities of their members and also act as a counterpart to local government.
- Whereas the two previous programmes addressed the demand of public services by rural communities, the KP District Governance and Community Development Programme (KP DGCD, €80m) widened the scope of the previous approach to address also the supply side. It is implemented through budget support (€64m), technical assistance to support the provincial and local authorities (€8.6m) and a grant component (€7.5) to contribute to the mobilisation of communities.

A Balochistan Community Development Programme (€7m) has also been provided by the EU but is not included in the list of intervention selected for deeper analysis in this evaluation.

This evaluation question covers the rationale underlying the design of interventions, the implementation through different modalities and the extent to which expected results have been achieved. As the BS support programme is still in an initial phase only its design and first steps are analysed.

This section provides an overview of the findings the underlying evidence of which is spelled out in annex A5 which includes an overview of the sector and detailed findings for each indicator and judgment criterion.

EQ2

To what extent has the EU facilitated community empowerment and contributed to community driven development, in KP and Balochistan?

Summary of response:

The three major interventions have duly taken into account the context of fragility. Although the 10 OECD principles of engagement in fragile situations were not referred to in the programming documents, they were taken into account in the identification and programming of the interventions. The rural development and natural resources management area, which remained focal through the two MIPs covered by this evaluation, addressed needs of utmost importance to contribute to the overall objectives of the EU: improvement of households livelihoods in rural areas, increased community driven development and social cohesion and stability, including in refugee affected and refugee hosting areas. The interventions were also in line with the government priorities expressed in the key policy documents (among which, Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, Medium Term development framework) and also in the analyses of the Pakistan situation by donors, NGOs and academics.

The EU approach focused on social mobilization and community empowerment making the poor and vulnerable (with a particular attention to women) actors of their own development. The importance of restoring/improving the environment and natural resources issues was duly taken into account in the formulation of the interventions. The regions of intervention selected were those bordering Afghanistan which had been affected by conflicts, refugees and also natural disasters.

Whereas the relevance of the proposed interventions was not questionable the appropriateness of the design of the three programmes varied; this was largely due to the different implementation modalities, described in the introductory paragraphs to this section. The RAHA programme suffered from a lack of targeting and an absence of strategic management by the implementing agencies UNDP/UNHCR. The implementation of the PEACE programme by the NGO SRSP followed the participatory guidelines of the three-tiered social mobilization approach developed by the Rural Support Programme Network and based on more than 30 years experience. The introduction of BS and complementary institutional technical assistance under the KP DGCD programme permitted to complement the previous approach focused on the demand side of local public services by strengthening the supply side.

The results were influenced by the implementation modalities: the RAHA programme realised a multitude of micro-projects but with a lack of strategic focus that does not permit to assess the extent to which they contributed to the expected results, there is no doubt that the multiplication of local roads, water and sanitation small infrastructure, small solar energy units, etc. benefitted and were appropriated by the local communities.

The approach followed by the PEACE programme benefited greatly from the partnership with the SARHAD Rural Support Programme. The long experience of the RSPs and the dedication of the partner NGO, already a militant actor in the field and therefore more involved with and committed to the communities it supports, has contributed to an ownership of the three tier social mobilisation process and the formation of Local Support Organisations which are a key element of sustainability and future expansion of the activities.

Overall there is enough ground to conclude that EU support to the sector made a difference for the people in the areas targeted, at least in three fields: (i) provision of a multitude of micro infrastructure projects that have an impact on people's life even if they are not always relevant to objective of local empowerment, (ii) effective social mobilisation and formation of responsible and viable local development institutions, particularly in the context of the partnership with the RSPs, and (iii) mobilisation of women in the development process. The introduction of BS to address also the

supply side of local public services should allow to strengthen the whole process of local development through the convergence of local demands and responsible management, and governmental responses. It has already contributed to improvements in policy making public finance management and it is a factor of sustainability insofar as it favours the mainstreaming of local development through the budget and the institutions of the province.

JC 2.1 “The design of the three large interventions and the selection of the provinces have been based on an analysis of the needs and challenges, and adapted to the evolving context”

The rural development programmes have been the object of long preparation processes involving, analyses, exchanges with actors already involved in the sector and with the federal and provincial authorities in view of identifying the needs, the modalities and the areas of intervention. (I-2.1.1)

Taking place in a context of obvious fragility (conflict affected areas, natural disasters, weak local institutions), the design of the EU interventions did not explicitly refer to the 10 OECD principles of engagement in fragile states, but the analysis of the programming documents shows that they have been taken into account. For example, particular attention has been devoted to principle 1, the context as a starting point (refugees, community needs, disaster risk management), principle 2 (to avoid negative effect on poor sections of the populations if refugees get better access to services), (I-2.1.2). Risks have been assessed and taken into account within the design of the programmes and monitored during implementation (I-2.1.3, I-2.1.4, I-2.1.5). For the KP-DGCD the Risk management framework has been applied. Risks of corruption and fraud have been addressed through the monitoring of the KP government PFM reform programme. (I-2.1.4 and I-2.1.5)

The three EU projects were located in the two provinces bordering Afghanistan: Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. These provinces include remote tribal areas and were severely impacted over the last thirty years by militancy, insurgency and affects of civil war in Afghanistan.

By enhancing community ownership of infrastructure developments and by increasing the responsiveness and linkages between government service providers and communities, the three projects aimed at restoring citizens trust and contribute to stability of the areas where they operate. Documentation shows the projects to be closely aligned with government policy and strategies. From the identification stage a dialogue has taken place with the federal Government (EAD and SAFRON) and with the provincial Governments of Balochistan and KP. This dialogue related to the organisation of the support, the sector wide approach, the possible use of BS and the provincial policies. Information collected directly from stakeholders confirms the importance of the rural development programmes to address poverty and stability issues (I-2.1.6).

The projects are characterised by a continuity in the pursuit of the objectives and a gradual learning process and adaptation to the evolving context.

According to the documents consulted and the stakeholders' interviews, the two programmes RAHA and PEACE are considered as important and relevant contributions to address poverty, and also stability issues in the rural areas. These interventions were appropriate and there is a demand to continue them. However, the RAHA programme, although regarded as highly relevant and fully aligned on government priorities, suffered from severe flaws in its design and implementation. Its approach, characterised by a multitude of small projects in several thousand local communities, lacked strategic focus, and the implementation agencies proved unable to correct this default and to manage properly such a complex scheme.

The inclusion in the PEACE programme of the approach developed by the RSPs over the last 30 years and the relationship established by the EU with the RSPN was highly appreciated (I-2.1.9). This comprehensive approach broadly followed the participatory guidelines of the Rural Support Programme Network⁸, which is widely recognized by the Government, donors and civil society as the most effective approach to rural development in Pakistan at present⁹.

Completing this approach with budget support to provincial government to develop their capacity of response enabled the KP-DGCD programme to address also the supply side of public services in rural areas. But severe constraints had to be overcome: insufficient and uncertain financial transfers from central government to provinces, lack of understanding by the provincial government of the BS modality, weak institutional capacities and public finance management. These constraints were duly identified and addressed by the inputs provided through the KP-DGCD by the BS combined with the complementary technical assistance in support to local authorities. However, there is a long process before they are overcome (I-2.1.10, I-2.1.11)

JC 2.2 “The interventions have been implemented according to plan and achieved their expected results”

The RAHA programme implemented by UNDP/UNHCR under a contribution agreement was very weak in terms of strategic management of the activities and in terms of financial monitoring of the individual projects. Joint UNDP-UNHCR implementation was problematic: the agencies report to different Ministries, have different calendar years, different mandates (developmental/ humanitarian) and work with different partners, UNDP through government line agencies and UNHCR through humanitarian partners, many of whom identified as weak. (I-2.1.9) Reports and data provided by the implementing include impressive figures regarding the numbers of communities organised, training delivered, infrastructure rehabilitated or developed. Unfortunately these data lack coherence and are not reliable. Nevertheless, a multitude of activities have been undertaken and micro-project realised at local level. The logframe of the programme lacked a strategic

⁸ The approach is described in Annex A5, under JC-2.1.1

⁹ NRSP is currently supported by 18 international donors as well as Government of Pakistan and Provinces of Sindh, Balochistan and Punjab. It is active in all 4 provinces, in 61 districts and currently assisting over 2.6 million poor households, through a network of some 173,304 community organisations. <http://nrsp.org.pk> accessed 24.09.15.

dimension in the sense that it was entirely based on activities, including at the level of the verifiable indicators. Even taking into account the imperfection of the data reported by the implementing agencies there is abundant evidence that most planned activities have been conducted and that in several cases the targets were exceeded. In some occurrences this is explained by the fact that the targets were set at unrealistically low levels (for instance, the target number for organised communities; see I-2.2.3). The absence of strategic management makes it difficult to assess the degree of achievement of the expected results of the programme. However, this programme delivered a high number of micro-projects which have been beneficial to the communities. (I-2.2.1, I-2.2.2).

Under this programme, however, guidance and decisions tended to be made by the implementing agency; this was less favourable to the mobilisation and empowerment of the communities. The PEACE programme, implemented by the Sarhad Rural Support Programme NGO, was much more anchored into the local communities to which Sarhad has a long-term commitment. As a consequence implementation has been slower but appropriation and empowerment are stronger and more sustainable (see 2.3 hereunder). (I-2.2.3)

The formulation and identification of the BS programme KP-DGCD started in April 2012 and the Financing Agreement was signed in November 2013, a delay due to uncertainties regarding the macroeconomic and public policy eligibility conditions. The disbursement of the first tranche initially planned for January-March 2014, was only requested by the Government in November 2014 and, after analysis by the EUD, approved in March 2015. This means that the possible outcomes of the BS component of the KP-DGCD programme are beyond the scope of this evaluation. Nevertheless, some results can already be observed:

- The fiscal space has been widened; although it may not be crucial in an environment characterised by a low execution of the budget and notoriously weak mobilisation of domestic revenue, it helped the budget management because the BS funds are more predictable and secure than the intergovernmental transfers.
- The policy framework needed to support LSOs was particularly weak. The introduction in 2012 in KP of the CDLD Policy, developed with the support of the EU, both delayed the start of the BS programme but improved the conditions under which it would be implemented by clarifying the policy options and means. (I-2.2.9)

JC 2.3 “The EU contributed to the mobilisation of Community based organisations”

There are convergent sources mentioning that thousands of community based organisations have been formed in districts of operation in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in the context of the activities of the EU supported programmes.

Number of CBOs, VO and LO formed under the RAHA and PEACE programmes¹⁰ :

Formed by:	CBO			VO			LSO
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Total
RAHA	na	na	3 005	na	na	238	16
PEACE	3 630	1 629	5 259	402	161	563	6
<i>Sources</i>							
<i>RAHA: External Evaluation of the RAHA Programme, vol.I Main Report December 2015</i>							
<i>PEACE: EU Fourth Interim Technical Implementation Report August 2014-March 2015-final. Annex III, List of all CBOs, VOs and Los formed under the PEACE programme.</i>							

There is clear evidence from the two projects operational in December 2014, that the number of CBOs and village level organisations has been increased. In the case of PEACE, more than 4,000 new CBOs established (I-2.2.7), representing over 83,000 men and women and federated to form 389 village organisations (ibid). Despite working in religiously charged areas, women's participation in activities has been high, with the formation of 1,215 women's CBOs servicing 24,000 women members. In the case of RAHA there is some lack of clarity in figures, but formation of some 3,005 new CBOs is cited (I-2.2.2), covering 21% of the population living in the 103 targeted Union Councils. These increases have largely been on the scale planned in each project, with higher targets reached by RAHA in number of CBOs (150%). However, there is some question as to the suitability of targets given. (I-2.2.3). All projects have found federation of CBOs into village and then Local Support Organisations more challenging. (I-2.3.1, I-2.3.2)

Reports of RSPs suggest that PEACE has developed a low cost social mobilisation that is sustainable. It is based on the identification and training of Community Resources Persons in doing social mobilisation and has proved successful because through them the impulse for social mobilisation comes from within the community (I-2.3.1).

To assess the maturity and the viability of the community organisations under the EU-SRSP PEACE Program, an evaluation was conducted in 2014 based on an adaptation of the Institutional and Organisational Assessment model¹¹. Its main results (see summary table at end of this section) can be summarised as follows:

- 51% of Men Community Organisations (MCO) and 45% of Women Community Organisations (WCO) of the sample are considered as excellent (i.e. institutionally independent) or good (i.e. institutionally developed) on the criteria of organisational motivation, organisation performance and organisational capacity.
- The programme could achieve the formation of a number of Local Support Organisations. This is a factor favourable to moving from project based organisations to sustainable ones
- A high degree of mobilisation of WCO; this is regarded by the authors of the study as "a miracle keeping in view local socio-cultural context of Malakand Division".

¹⁰ Cf. Annex A5, indicators I-2.2.3 and I-2.2.7. Note also that the figures are provided by the implementing agencies and, as indicated in the annexes, severe reservations must be made regarding the quality and consistency of the data reported for the RAHA programme.

¹¹ SRSP. *An assessment of Institutional Development of Men and Women Community Organisations under EU-SRSP PEACE Programme in Malakand Division, KP*, Novembre 2014. The methodology and the coverage of the survey as well as its main results are summarised under I-2.3.1 of Annex A5 of the present evaluation.

- Observed impacts in terms of local employment and strengthened livelihood.
- Development of good relationships at regional and district levels with government line agencies and important stakeholders.

Summary of results of the Institutional and Organisation assessment model applied to the PEACE Programme				
Area of investigation	MCO	WCO	Both	Remarks (from the authors of the study)
1. Organisational motivation				
Awareness of goals and objectives: % of CO updating regularly their annual development plans and sharing it with SRSP and other development agencies	10%	12%		
Leadership/democracy: % of CO holding regular elections or inculcated democratic values.	18%	18%		Leadership reasonably fair in distributing benefits among members, but need to improve engaging all members in planning local development interventions
% leadership of CO continuing on basis of one time election	72%	69%	72%	
% of CBOs that ensured excellent or good participation in identification and planning	71%	71%	71%	Greater proportion of WCOs (46%) than MCOs (33%) achieving excellent participation
Proportion of CO leadership that involved and engaged members and took collective decisions			By and large half of the CO (Men & women)	Suggest that leadership, to a considerable level, is sensitized on "downward accountability".
% of CO leadership which dominates but distributed benefits fairly among members	24%	23%	24%	
% of CO that are part of VO	25%	34%		
% of CO that have taken practical steps to mainstream women in development process			27%	
2 Organisation performance				
% of CO that have held 8 or more meetings in one year	21%	9%		Issues discussed: infrastructure, generating employment opportunities, education, health of women/children, technical/employable skills. Less meetings but higher participation rate in WCO than in MCO
Financial capital developed at local level, average savings in PKR	8 700	5 800		
Inclusiveness: % of WCO that ensured participation of a maximum of poor members in their CBO		57%		
3. Organisational capacity				
Proportion of CO that were able to show their proceedings registers, attendance records, bank receipts or activity records			Nearly half CO	A key aspect of institutional capacity
% of office bearers (president & managers) having received managerial training			62%	
Proportion of CO that have efficiently managed 4 to 6 interventions			20%	The study assessed the programme half way through its life. At this stage it concentrated on MHP and CPI. In its second half it plans to invest in micro interventions at community and household levels; it is expected that these CO will score high in terms of management.
Proportion of CO that have efficiently managed 1 to 3 interventions			80%	
Overall institutional assessment				
% of CO considered as "institutionally independent" (= excellent)	6%	4%		
% of CO considered as "institutionally developed" (= good)	45%	41%		
MCO = Men Community Organisations; WCO = Women Community Organisations.				

JC 2.4 “The CBOs supported by the programmes have developed and maintained local infrastructure and mechanisms, which are used by local communities and improved their livelihood”

RAHA and PEACE have contributed to the development of impressive numbers of local infrastructures in areas like micro hydro-power plants, health and education facilities, irrigation systems, drinking water supply, sanitation, etc. (I-2.4.1)

Community Physical Infrastructure implemented

	Target	Achieved
RAHA	1000	1398
PEACE initiated as of March 2015	771	415
completed as of March 2015		267

Sources

RAHA: Final Evaluation, 2015, vol. I Main Report and vol. II: Annexes

PEACE: Eu 4th Interim Technical Implementation Report, 2015

These infrastructure were used by the local communities and constituted an improvement to their living conditions. This can be evidenced by both the progress reports of the implementing agencies and the monitoring and evaluation reports. However, the approaches differ: RAHA has deliberately adopted a strategy consisting in developing a multitude of micro-projects in response to the demands of the local communities. Beyond the council level there are no eligibility criteria to ensure that the initiatives funded are contributing to the overall goals of the programme (including democracy and stabilisation). All demands emanating from the village or the communities are regarded as eligible. This ensured a very good ownership: “Whatever the community wishes, RAHA tries to give it”¹²

As it was accompanied with just the minimal training to set up the new projects but not to ensure their continued management the sustainability is at risk.

For example, under RAHA approximately 80% of the population of the 3 targeted Union Councils of Chaghi now have access to piped clean drinking water, whereas before intervention none of the households in these Councils had access. (I-2.2.3 Result area 3). Under RAHA livelihood training for some 4,210 individuals (140% target) has led to about half of trainees now employed, or operating their own private businesses, reducing the population living below the poverty line by approximately 1% (I-2.2.3, result area 2). Similarly, under the PEACE programme, 78 micro-hydro projects have been initiated, generating just over 6 megawatts of electricity, providing power to some 27,000 households (I-2.2.7, result area 2).

The approach of PEACE has been more strategic, and it implied a much longer accompaniment of the local communities to let them acquire the capacity to manage the projects throughout their whole life. Under PEACE, MOU have been signed with the

¹² RAHA , Final Evaluation Report, 2015.

provincial education and health departments to rehabilitation facilities. So far¹³ at least 100 schemes have been initiated in these sectors. Regarding community based infrastructure the focus has been on consolidation rather than on expansion 315 schemes have been initiated, benefitting some 570,000 people, (I-2.2.7 result area 3).

The quality of the maintenance and sustainability varies according to the degree of engagement of the local mobilisation (I-2.4.2) but also with the training approach adopted). Regarding the latter the PEACE programme has put more emphasis on ensuring sustainable operations and effective maintenance of the infrastructure projects.

JC 2.5 “The EU support contributed to improve communities’ access to public services in the targeted areas”

The development of community based organisations and the numerous local infrastructures achieved in areas such as local roads, bridge, water and sanitation, irrigation, rehabilitation/upgrading of schools, communications, etc. implies that the access to public facilities and the services they render to the communities have been significantly improved by the supporting programmes. Also, assistance in registration (without registration documents people cannot access any services in Pakistan), has potentially helped some 1,126 out of 2,152 individuals identified as unregistered from RAHA target communities (52% of 80% target) access services (I-2.2.3, result area 4.). Further, the development of women master trainers under the SRSP-PEACE programme (some 196 to date) has enabled the establishment of 129 adult literacy centres, which have already produced some 1,300 graduates (form 5 month course). With functional literacy and numeracy skills these women are enabled to deal more confidently with public service officials. With further enterprise development and leadership training women are being encouraged to participate and take charge of development in their area (I-2.2.7, result area 4.). However, no direct evidence could be collected on possible improvement of access to disadvantaged groups to, for example, education, health, justice. There are, however, cases were reported where community mobilisation strengthened the communities to exert pressure and to voice more effectively their demands (I-2.5.1). Moreover, as indicated by focus groups interviewed in the context of the 2014 assessment of the SRSP Peace programme, empowerment of local communities enables them to voice more successfully their needs, to resolve local issues and to get support for new projects (I-2.5.2).

¹³ Source: PEACE, 4th Interim Technical Implementation Report, March 2014-August 2015.

2.3 EQ3 Education

The education sector is justifiably regarded by the Government of Pakistan and by the EU as one of the most important sectors to promote human development and achieve MDG goals. It was a focal sector during the whole evaluation period and will remain in the next MIP. The EU has provided substantial support to the education system in view of assisting its reform in terms of institutional and public finance governance, quality of and access to services, with particular attention for basic education. Coupled with capacity development components, this support has been essentially provided through budget support at a decentralised level and in a multi-donor environment. It has also promoted the development of sector wide approaches in the concerned provinces.

The evidence on which the response to this question is based is detailed in the dedicated Annex A6. Additional information on the fiscal decentralisation context and the related challenges in which these interventions have been framed and implemented may be found in annexes A3.

EQ3

To what extent has the EU support to the education sector contributed to improve service delivery, quality and equitable access to education in the provinces Sindh and KP?

Summary of response:

EU interventions through BS programmes and capacity development activities have aimed at supporting the provincial governments in their endeavours to address key challenges in education. Such supports have been timely as the provinces inherited under the devolution process from major responsibilities for the planning and implementation of education policy and needed to embark on comprehensive, relevant and credible sector reform programmes. However, several issues have presented serious challenges to these EU interventions and their expected impact on service delivery: weak institutional and financial management capacities at provincial and districts levels, uncertainties and confusions around devolved administrative and financial responsibilities at decentralised level, high reliance of provincial budgets on federal transfers, as well as a specific fragility and security context in the concerned provinces coupled with a rapid demographic growth.

The EU Sector budget support programmes in the Sindh and KP provinces together with other donor interventions have contributed to mobilise political and financial support in favour of allocating additional resources to human development to progressively improved sector planning, budget execution and institutional strengthening. EU approach has aimed at accompanying the provincial governments in setting sector development building blocks in place to favour in the medium term the required transformations of the education system at provincial and local level.

With a pragmatic approach, the EU has first designed capacity building to support the provinces' education policy making and specific sub-sector reform design and process

such as the promotion of merit-based teacher recruitment policy, school consolidation process, quality of teaching and learning process through teacher education development as well as greater community involvement in school management. Capacity building has also focused on strengthening provincial and district budgeting, financial management and sector information monitoring practises.

It is difficult to assess the effective fiscal space provided by EU interventions at a time provinces have benefited from increased federal transfers under the 7th National Finance Commission Award while facing absorptive capacity problems and low level of non-salary budget execution. Pakistan's education expenditures as percentage of GDP have progressively increased from 1.9% in 2011/12 to 2.4% in 2014/15 and the size of provincial education budget has increased consistently over the same period (e.g. + 50% in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). Nevertheless the capacities of provinces to execute their education budget has been and remain severely constrained by weak capacities and inefficient PFM procedures as well as low budget credibility due to regular within-year budget adjustments by the executives. In addition, the share of salaries approaching 80% of total education sector expenditures in Sindh and KP provinces has considerably limited the margin of manoeuvre in terms of fiscal space for non-salary current and development expenditures at provincial level.

In the province of Sindh, the non-salary current and development education expenditure allocations budgeted for the fiscal years 2012/13 and 2013/14 were finally executed at 44% and 41% respectively. These levels of budget execution were even weaker when considering the sole primary and secondary education sub-sectors. By comparison, EU BS annual disbursement in the Sindh province during 2013/14 were less than Rs 1 billion compare to a total annual budget allocation of Rs 40 billion and effective annual expenditures (budget execution) of Rs 24 billion in these two subsectors.

However, based on the key performance indicators and conditions of donors' programmes, sector policy dialogue and financial supports of all concerned donors (EU, DFID, World Bank) have focused on promoting public spending for critical reform process and critical public expenditure programmes to meet day-to-day expenses of the education department and schools as well as to improve quality: teaching and learning materials, repair and maintenance of schools, provisions of basic facilities, girl stipends or vouchers for low-cost private schools. In response, concerned provincial governments have progressively included these considerations that were at the core of their education sector plans in their budget planning process. Budget allocations for core non-salary operating and development expenditures, while still representing a low share of provincial education budget and characterised by unsteady pattern across provinces, have been progressively increased such as in KP where budget allocations for non-salary current and development expenditures were increased by 100% and 35% respectively between 2011/2012 and 2013/14. Budget allocations to improve quality of teaching and learning outcome in public schools were increased between 2011 and 2014 by more than 100% and 50% respectively in the Sindh and KP provinces. Except in the case of school rehabilitation, free textbook distribution and girl stipends public expenditure programmes, progress was generally unsatisfactory concerning the effective budget execution of key non salary expenditures where EU BS could not have a meaningful impact so far. As an

example, operational requirements for teacher training programmes were mainly met through donor's projects funding.

It is nonetheless reasonable to assume that EU interventions, together with others donors' interventions (DFID, World Bank, GIZ...) in the provinces of Sindh and KP have contributed to further promote the provincial authorities' ownership of education sector reform plans. While EU financial contributions could not make a difference taking into account the size of the provincial budgets and the magnitude of the financial needs to improve key educational indicators, EU budget support programmes have provided an entry point to promote a policy dialogue with the provincial authorities on education policies and has been instrumental in assisting these authorities in improving and implementing their reform action plans. EU Budget Support programme's objectives have been so far relevant with the country's twin challenge of improving access to education and quality of public service delivery at provincial and district levels though EU BS and policy dialogue (together with others donors) could not make a dent in addressing the low level of execution of the required public expenditure programmes.

EU sector BS to the provincial authorities could not materialised so far in genuine improvement of education service delivery, quality and equitable access due to the required long term maturing of education reforms, a difficult sector political economic context as well as an unfavourable demographic trend. In addition the rapid population growth, still above 2% per annum during the evaluation period, has contributed to dilute the benefits of any public and private interventions in the sector while the country has faced several other tremendous challenges that impede genuine and rapid positive impacts on key educational indicators related to Millennium Development and Education For All Goals: the magnitude of illiteracy, the budgetary constraints, the weak governance at provincial and districts levels, the conservative cultural environment in the rural areas as well as well the recurrent militancy and natural disasters situations in the provinces where EU intervened.

Improvement and sustainability of public service delivery in terms of equitable access and quality will require a deeper level of institutionalisation of supported reforms and capacity development. Impacts on educational outcomes still need time to emerge. It will demand further consolidation of the political, administrative and fiscal decentralisation process at provincial and lower levels, the clarification of responsibilities at the different tiers, the improvement of sector monitoring information system and the strengthening of local government's institutional and administrative capacities to deliver.

The sustainability and impacts of provincial education reform process will also depend on the capacity of the federal and provincial authorities to improve the country fiscal space to ensure adequate and predictable funding for the education sector. Landmark progress in tax reform and budget credibility as well as greater predictability of federal intergovernmental transfers under the next National Finance Commission Awards will be instrumental in that regard.

JC 3.1 “The identification of the interventions has been based on an analysis of the needs and challenges and an alignment on the government policies”

The identification and formulation process of the first Sector BS Programmes have required extensive analysis of key sector needs and challenges (I-3.1.1) concerning the country commitments towards MDG and Education For All objectives. It has also provided an analysis of the policy, institutional and financial environment of the education sector at provincial level (I-3.1.2) in order to place these EU interventions in a sector wide approach. The choice of the BS modality was made with a flexible approach with regards to the eligibility criteria assessment for sector policy support programmes, the need to promoting alignment and coordination in the sector and the objective to developing policy dialogue and providing technical and financial support to emerging provincial education sector policy and reform plans.

The choice of the Sindh and NWFP (future KP) provinces derived from a mix of considerations related to the political and socio-economic situation of these two provinces prone to fragility and crisis situations, the opportunity to capitalise and complement on existing donors interventions as well as the will to support the progressive devolution process that has transferred education responsibilities to the provinces following the 18th Constitutional Amendment passed in 2010 (I-3.1.1). While adding to the complexity and risks associated with supporting policy implementation and PFM systems at provincial level, the design phase of these interventions has provided an important entry point for the EU to engage into policy dialogue on education sector policy and PFM reform process with provincial authorities (I-3.1.4) and better understand the needs and challenges of provincial education sectors and policies. If these endeavors have been acknowledged during the QSG, questions were raised concerning the maturity of the provincial sector policy (together with the overall fragile macroeconomic context) to ensure eligibility to and feasibility of BS modality. The proposed frontloading of the capacity development and technical assistance component were expected to provide an answer to this reserve and a way to consolidate the provincial sector policies and reform plans while promoting a full alignment of EU interventions on these policies.

JC 3.2 “The design of the BS programmes favoured the achievement of the expected results”

The EU has designed its first BS programmes with a strong focus on strengthening provincial policy making process and institutional capacities in the education sector.

The formulation of the first Education SBS in the Sindh and KP Provinces has been challenging as the local political and administrative situation was evolving along an ongoing devolution process under the 18th amendment of the Constitution and the corresponding transfer of educational policy responsibilities from the federal to the provincial governments whilst the latter remained financially dependent (close to 90%) from federal intergovernmental financial transfers under the 7th NFC Award. Issues related to weak capacities and risks of corruption at provincial level for the two provinces including the specific fragility and security situation in KP have made the formulation process

complicated. The situation of post-conflict rehabilitation in Malakand (KPK) has particularly influenced the design of the first EU BS programme in this province with a more flexible approach in terms of conditions and performance assessment. Lack of predictability of funds has been initially compensated with the additionality and “earmarking” of part of the EU BS for the budgets of the provinces to finance specific public expenditures programmes (I-3.2.2) related to school rehabilitation and construction.

The fully-fledged education sector approach was also still in the making at the time of the formulation (I-3.2.1, I-3.2.2). As it was clearly acknowledged during the formulation process that the Governments of Sindh and KP had weak planning capacities and donor co-ordination systems, the capacity building components was sequenced at the beginning of the EU BS programme (I-3.2.5) in order to support the design of provincial education reform policy and actions plan frameworks that were a key prerequisite to the smooth implementation of BS programmes and the release of the first instalments.

In this context, BS programmes have proposed a mixed of indicators aiming at consolidating the sector institutional and operational policy frameworks at provincial level. The proposed comprehensive performance assessment framework of the EU BS programmes, has focused on strategic issues at the core of the required improvements in the sector human resource, institutional and public financial governance at provincial and district levels and to address key weaknesses in providing access of the population to quality primary and secondary education services. The number of indicators has been progressively streamlined from 12 to less than 10. They have been discussed with the provincial governments and the others donors involved based on the nascent provincial education sector plan to ensure ownership. Baselines and targets were set taking into account the mix of process and output/outcome nature of the selected indicators. Sources of information including third party verifications were planned to monitor the programmes’ performance. The programmes’ indicators were relevant with the main education challenges faced by the provinces and the needed sector policy consolidation and implementation process. Due to daunting challenges, a relevant sequencing of the indicators was observed to accompany the formulation and implementation of the different sub-components of the education policy moving progressively from purely process to outcome-orientated indicators. These indicators have structured the content of the policy dialogue between the donors and the provincial governments and accompanied the latter in its endeavours in implementing education policy measures and reforms in the following areas: (a) PFM in the sector (policy medium-term budgeting, public procurement practises, budgetary execution...), (b) education governance and management (school consolidation, community mobilisation, human resource management and monitoring and evaluation), (c) access to schooling (school rehabilitation, stipend policy, textbook distribution) and (d) quality of education and student learning outcome (curriculum implementation framework, teacher training policy). Satisfactory progress have been observed for a majority of these indicators though progress have been slowed down by weak institutional capacities and complex environment at provincial and districts levels.

The EU has designed its BS programmes to allow flexibility in its performance assessment: quasi floating fixed tranches, a mix of time bound and non-time bound indicators as well as a broader aggregate scoring methodology for the instalments that set a minimum threshold

of number of fulfilled targets to allow full disbursement even when not all indicators' targets were achieved. However, each indicator having an equal weight for the performance assessment scoring governing the release of each instalments, it has been difficult to assess the prioritisation of each indicators and its related policy action or outcome.

For example, one area where the provincial government has under-performed concerned the lack of progress in the budget execution of current non-salary and development expenditures which was nevertheless instrumental for an effective implementation of the provincial government education policy measures supported by the EU BS programmes and the achievement of the expected results. Due to the lack of updated "drill-down" diagnostics on public expenditure management weaknesses (public expenditure reviews, public expenditure tracking surveys) at provincial and districts levels, these programmes have missed the opportunity to place at the core of the policy dialogue these PFM issues and include in the programmes specific PFM indicators that could have better addressed key factors behind the low level budget execution of current non-salary and development expenditures and the overall lack of budget credibility.

JC 3.3 "The EU national and regional interventions in education in Pakistan have been coherent"

No particular risks of incoherence have been noticed between EU national and regional interventions in the education sector (I-3.3.1). SBS programmes focused on the primary and secondary education sectors whereas the Erasmus Mundus programme concerned the higher/tertiary education sector and the international cooperation capacities of Pakistani universities. These interventions have been implemented without being particularly linked to each other and the related programme documents do not establish specific links between their respective objectives and implementation processes.

The sector wide approach supported by the EU SBS interventions at provincial level has essentially concerned the basic/elementary and secondary education sectors. However it is reasonable to consider that the contribution of these SBS interventions aiming at improving and streamlining sector resources management (human resources, public finances, institutional and teaching capacities) and the quality and equity of the education service delivery can only prepare a favourable ground for the reforms to be promoted in the tertiary education sector, the latter facing similar challenges in terms of quality, access, and institutional and financial governance.

JC 3.4 "The SBS interventions have been implemented according to plan"

Frequent delays have been observed in the disbursement of Budget Support funds, due initially to the required familiarisation of the national authorities with the modality, then to the late or incomplete Government disbursement requests and the EC validation internal procedures (I-3.4.1). However, all planned instalments of on-going programmes were finally disbursed due to the floating dimension of the first BS's programmes instalments (with non-time bound indicators related to policy framework or reform adoption process) and the design of flexible scoring methodology for each instalment using aggregated performance categories or threshold of number indicator' targets to be fulfilled. Full

disbursement of the concerned tranches were then feasible even if not all expected performances were achieved. This approach has tried to maximise the predictability of the amount of BS funds to be transferred during each fiscal year while promoting and rewarding the policy reform orientations of the provincial government.

Efforts have also been made to frontload institutional capacity building activities and assistance (I-3.4.1) as requested during the formulation process that were instrumental to support the provincial authorities to progress toward the programmes objectives. These activities have been implemented at the onset of the first programmes in Sindh and KPK in order to support the provincial government in the design of their education reforms actions plans that was a key prerequisite for the eligibility criteria assessment on public policy. These activities have also supported the provincial governments to make progress in the implementation of the different sub-components of their education policies and reforms that related directly with the indicators' targets of the EU BS programme. This technical assistance has facilitated the progressive implementation of new and streamlined public procurement procedures, the development of MTEF at district level, the strengthening of education sector management at district level and the implementation of sector performance review systems through operating sector-wide monitoring system through surveys and other data collection process (e.g. annual school census...).

The EU has also adopted a flexible and pragmatic approach in the design of the Budget Support tranches with regular amendments to the Financing Agreements of Budget Support programmes in order to take into account (1) the required alignment of policy matrix with the pace of governments' policy and reforms process and the continuing requirement of alignment of performance assessment frameworks and harmonisation of donors' interventions, (2) the complex and evolving federal and provincial institutional, political and fragile environment (i.e. on-going decentralisation process, elections, emerging security and recurrent natural disasters).

However, in some cases, harmonisation process with other donors using programmatic approach (DFID, World Bank) that allowed more flexibility in terms of annual amendment of indicators' targets has been challenging for the EU. The coexistence of a DFID large capacity development and technical assistance intervention with a more modest EU TA component under the BS programme in KP province have made the coordination process more complex with sometimes negative or disruptive impacts on the policy dialogue with the provincial authorities and the predictability of the EU BS implementation.

JC 3.5 “The BS interventions have permitted to improve the formulation and implementation of the education policies in the beneficiary provinces”

The formulation and implementation of education sector policy and reform action plans have been at the core of the SBS interventions in Sindh and KP particularly through capacity development activities (I-3.5.5). The development of the education policy framework was not only captured through the eligibility criteria and the policy dialogue (I-3.5.1) on sector public policy but also under specific process indicators of the programme related to specific sub-components of the provincial education policies (I-3.5.2).

When the first SBS started, education sector policy was still a shared responsibility between the federal and provincial level (I-3.5.1). EU support to policy formulation and implementation focused on improving and streamlining existing reforms and actions (I-3.5.2) with regards to specific components of the education sector management policy at provincial, district and sub-district level: strengthening education sector planning and budgeting, improving efficiency and quality of school rehabilitation and consolidation action plans, streamlining of teacher recruitment and training policy, free textbook and girl stipend delivery services, and development of education management information systems. These first BS interventions were targeted to specific actions that have allowed the financing of specific flood-related crisis interventions, school public rehabilitation works and free delivery of textbook and girl stipends at sub-district level (I-3.5.3).

Following the 18th amendment and the full transfer of responsibility to the provinces, the SBS have supported the development of formal and comprehensive provincial education sector development policy and reform action plans. Capacity building/TA components of the EU BS programme have been instrumental in that regards (I-3.5.5) particularly in the Sindh Province where EU TA implemented by the British Council has supported the Reform Support Unit of the provincial Education and Literacy Department in finalising an integrated education policy and sector reform framework. In KP the EU TA has supported the teachers' training and curriculum development policy of the provincial education department through the financing and delivery of in service teacher training programme.

EU BS funds were intended to provide fiscal space for the provinces to finance key reform processes and expenditure programmes (I-3.5.3, I 3.5.4). While being additional to the federal transfers, the EU funds were fully fungible at provincial level and represented a limited share of the total education sector budget. However, these interventions together with others donors' financial supports have progressively contributed to improve provincial education budget planning and increase of budget allocations (I-3.5.2) to the sector including for non-salary operating and development expenditures. This has also progressively materialised in better thought still weak levels of budget execution of key non-salary current expenditures that were at the core of the policy dialogue of the donors with the provincial authorities (delivery of teaching and learning materials, repair and maintenance of schools, provisions of basic facilities, financing of incentive programmes such as girl stipends or vouchers for student enrolment in low-cost private schools). Attribution to these donors' interventions, including the EU, should nevertheless be minimised as the concerned provinces were benefiting at that time from a strong increase of transfers from the federal fiscal resources under the 7th NFC Award.

However the related EU BS programme's KPI on budget execution has regularly unperformed with extremely low level of actual development expenditures. Despite the observed commitment of the provincial government to increase the share of the provincial budget dedicated to the education sector, the mobilisation of a genuine fiscal space has been severely constrained by several factors: more than 85% of sector public expenditure earmarked to wages, unpredictability of actual federal transfers during the fiscal year, weak budget credibility and tax collection at provincial level, limited absorption capacity due to weak administrative and financial management capacities at provincial and district levels... This general situation has provided the provincial governments with a tiny margin

of manoeuvre to improve its budget execution while facing unexpected post-crisis and natural disasters situations.

JC 3.6 “The EU contributed to improved offer and quality of education services in the provinces and districts supported”

EU BS together with other donor interventions have contributed to mobilise political support in favour of allocating additional resources to human development, improved sector planning, budget execution and institutional strengthening. Key public expenditures programmes have been supported with regards to school consolidation process (under terms of partnerships that have increased the numbers of school rehabilitated), free textbooks distribution, improvement of schooling conditions (delivery of basic facilities to rural schools) (I-3.6.1). BS has also contributed to the adoption of a merit-based teacher recruitment policy and the updating of teacher education development and training policy based on the 2007 competence-based and student-centred curriculum (I-3.6.4). These developments can be considered as a key step toward a progressive improvement of the quality of new teachers hired and the teachers’ training effectiveness and quality (I-3.6.5).

Finally, EU BS programmes have supported the progressive development, training and operationalisation of the School Management Committees and/or Parent Teacher Councils (PTC) in an increasing number of schools as well as the first stages to strengthen management capacities at district and sub-district education offices.

In doing so, the EU BS have contributed to support the provincial governments in answering the needs in the education public sector to further decentralise and strengthen policy, planning and financial management at district and municipal level, improve the overall quality education at school level and promote greater accountability and transparency. Increasing participation of parents and local community in the education activities at district level is expected to contribute to address key sector challenges such as teacher absenteeism and equity in access to school while promoting greater accountability (I-3.6.2).

While contribution of BS programmes have been limited with regards to the need to increase the availability of teachers in schools, the supported streamlining process for teacher recruitment and deployment policy with a focus on reducing the number of vacant teacher positions and preparing the ground to provide the districts with further discretion on recruitment is assumed to lay the ground for an improved public service delivery.

However, EU interventions, centred so far on institutional reforms aimed at improving delivery and efficiencies in the education sector, have not yet contributed to sufficient improvement of education service delivery and quality to lead to concrete results in performance on educational/learning outcomes as witnessed by the evolution of key education-related MDG indicators between 2007 and 2013. Failure to address weaknesses in education budget execution mentioned above have also contribute to this lack of improvements.

JC 3.7 “The EU contributed to improve equitable access (reduce gender and regional disparities) to basic and secondary education”

Both SBS in Sindh and KP have indirectly contributed to promote the conditions for improving education sector gender balance in Pakistan (I-3.7.1), by supporting the strengthening and financing of public expenditure programmes related to differentiated stipend policy, school consolidation and rehabilitation process in rural area, improvement of basic facilities and school environment, merit-based teacher recruitment policies as well as involvement of parent and local community in schools management. These issues have been at the core of some of the key performance indicators attached to the EU BS programmes together with others donor programmes and have also been part of the capacity development activities of these EU interventions (third party verification and recommendations on a stipend reform strategy). However, trends in gender gap and other equity access related indicators during the evaluation period do not provide evidence that EU support has made a dent so far. But it can be expected that EU support contributed to consolidate the ground for future positive impacts.

2.4 EQ4 Technical and Vocational Education and Training

The EU TVET programmes are meant to support the National Skills Strategy prepared and published in 2009 to address the severe weaknesses in the Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) sector organisation, the quality of its services and the low stream of students enrolled.

The EU support has been provided through two TVET programmes, characterised by a two-pronged approach similar to that used in other sectors. On the one hand, it aimed at strengthening the organisation and the quality of the training offered by the TVET system through the first component of the TVET I programme (€20m over the period 2012-2017) and the TVET II programme (€43m over the period 2012-2016, of which €26m was provided by the EU). On the other hand, it aimed at extending the outreach of TVET through the second component of TVET I. The modalities of intervention have been broken down accordingly: institutional strengthening support in the two programmes implemented via a Delegation Agreement with GIZ, whereas the outreach aspects of TVET I have been the object of six grant contracts with NGOs. The two programmes are run in parallel¹⁴.

This section provides an overview of the findings related to this question. The evidence underlying the findings is spelled out in annex A7 which includes an overview of the TVET sector and detailed findings for each indicator and judgment criterion. The two TVET programmes were still on-going at the time of the present evaluation and available information is largely relying on the mid-term reviews, therefore changes may have occurred affecting some findings.

EQ4

To what extent has the EU contributed to improve TVET service delivery, and skills and employability of trained students?

Summary of response:

The grant contracts implemented by NGO to outreach the TVET system conducted their prescribed activities and delivered their outputs. They produced valuable results in terms of strengthening of the TVET institutions, provision of training and improved curricula. No important effects on employment and earnings have been noted. This is attributed to an insufficient analysis and transfer of skills in needs on the markets and a bias in favour of the social demand of skills, as opposed to the economic demand.

The institutional building components contributed to significant improvements of the TVET system (quality of trainers, diversification of skills training offered, development of curricula, etc.) and its outreach, particularly to remote areas and for vulnerable categories.

The sector, nevertheless, remained characterized by severe weaknesses in terms of management and bureaucracy and by an overall approach that tends to be biased towards a response to the applicants' demands for skills rather than to the real market needs. Although employability of trainees has improved, results in terms of employment or improved earnings are not recorded and have not materialized as yet.

¹⁴ It the reason for the existence of two programmes for one intervention are historical and explained in section 1.4 of annex A7.

JC 4.1 “EU support to TVET has been based on an analysis of the needs and challenges, and adapted to the evolving context”

EU support to the sector has been based on the national analyses and diagnostic of the needs of the sector and supported the National Skills Strategy formulated by the Government. It has therefore been fully aligned on the Government policy. In addition baseline studies have been conducted within each project. A common weakness of these studies is that they focused on established formal sector enterprises and not sufficiently on micro-enterprises and ignored the informal sector. The focus of the EU programmes on disadvantaged groups was coherent with the overall objectives of the EU in this sector which included quality and outreach of skill training provision predominantly in rural areas, and gender equality in the selection of trainees and provision of training. (I-4.1.1)

Initially only one TVET programme was envisaged without support to the federal level. It appeared quickly that weaknesses of the managerial structures of the TVET organisations in Pakistan had been underestimated. Therefore, to adapt to this context and given the guiding role and the institutional weaknesses of the National Vocational and Educational Training Commission (NATVEC) a second complementary programme, TVET II, was offered and implemented with the first one. (I.4.1.2)

Risk analysis at programming stage remained relatively limited and general; implementing partners conducted more specific risk analyses and identified possible mitigation measures. Corruption and fraud does not appear in the documents suggesting that implying that this particular category of risk was not regarded as a major potential obstacle for the implementation of TVET projects. (I-4.1.3, 4)

GoP-EU policy dialogue took place at programming stage and contributed to identifying the needs and designing the programmes in conformity with the National Skills Strategy. During implementation the dialogue was pursued through the steering committee but the focus was rather put on implementation issues than on policies. Stakeholders from the private sector pointed to a bias towards pedagogic training rather than effective transfer of skills. (I-4.2.5, 6, 7)

JC 4.2 “The interventions have been implemented according to plan and produced their expected results”

The launching of the TVET projects was delayed by various severe difficulties: poor quality of ILO (initially envisaged as implementing agency) proposal, no or late release of funds by the international partners cofinancing the projects, weak governance structures, unclear government policies and ill-defined responsibilities within national and provincial TVET agencies. Moreover, the floods of 2010 imposed a reallocation of the funds which were made available one year later. (I-4.2.1)

Once the projects were launched, different situations occurred: with few exceptions NGO managed projects faced important delays in their start phase due to internal organisation weaknesses, lack of skilled staff and difficulty to recruit coordinators. Moreover, the support through the two large projects was very complex and there has been no

coordinated methodology across the 6 NGOs. Activities in support of the TVET institutions were also delayed by high turnover of staff and bureaucratic constraints. (I-4.2.2)

Notwithstanding these initial difficulties, all projects¹⁵ broadly conducted all their activities and delivered important and positive outputs notably in terms of supply of TVET services, in particular:

- Community awareness programmes to raise interest in the value of vocational training and applications for training.
- Training of Trainers in new programmes and upgraded programmes.
- TVET institutions delivering a range of short-term training programmes for thousands of marginalized students.
- Training for people with disabilities.

The projects did not conduct systematic tracing studies; surveys of satisfaction of trainees have been done by some implementing NGOs reflect that the trainees were satisfied with the quality of the services. However, there is no evidence of significant improvement in the employment or earnings of the beneficiaries of the programme. The reasons mentioned in the evaluations and by the interviewees being an approach insufficiently based on an analysis of the demand of skills by the market and the transfer of these skills. The supply of TVET services has been biased in favour of the social demand (the skills the students of TVET services would like to acquire) rather than the demand of skills by the market and the transfer of these skills. No in depth analysis of skills in demand had been conducted. (I-4.2.3 and I-4.2.4).

JC 4.3 “The EU has contributed to strengthen and implement reform of the TVET sector, including strengthening of TEVTAs”

This objective has been pursued through component 1 (Capacity building of TVETAs and Training Providers) of the TVET I programme and the three components of TVET II (1: Governance; 2 NQF and HRD; 3: Efficient and innovative training) aimed to strengthen the reform of the sector.

The Mid Term Reviews of the project highlight significant results achieved by the projects, which were still on-going.

- Enhanced awareness about the importance of a well-functioning TVET system and identification of the key elements for reforming the system.
- Foundations laid for improved governance with a focus on the establishment of sound TVET governance structures, accreditation programmes, communication strategies all favouring transparency and accountability.
- Valuable contributions to improve the TVET sector policy and planning.
- Strengthening of status, organisation and management practices of TVETAs (e.g. strengthening of provincial TVETAs, introduction of biometrics to reduce absenteeism, development of MIS...).
- Improvement in the offer and diversification of courses.

¹⁵ Under this indicator we sum up the main results achieved by the 6 NGO grant contracts under the TVET I programme. The institutional building component of TVET I and TVET II will be discussed under JC4.3

- Improvement in the quality of TVET services due to better teacher training and better monitoring of teachers (reduction of absenteeism, recruitment on merit).
 - Development of a skills strategy providing directions for the selection of curricula and training programmes to develop.
- (I-4.3.1 and I-4.3.2)

Notwithstanding these positive achievements the overall performance of the TVET system remained insufficient. The quality of skills available remains deficient according to employers and graduates. Moreover, there is a mismatch between skills demanded and skills available notably due to a lack of focus of the TVET institutions on the types of skills needed to ensure employability of the trainees.

JC 4.4 and JC 4.5 “The EU has contributed to improved offer, quality and distribution of TVET services at federal and provincial levels, and to employability of workers

EU support directly contributed to progress in the offer and quality of TVET services. Outreach has been extended geographically as well as to marginalised groups and more vulnerable populations. Measures of the degree of achievement of the targets assigned to the programmes regarding the inclusion of women, disabled persons, demonstrate that an effort has definitively been made to address these populations (cf. I-4.4.3) However, at the time of the mid-term evaluation these objectives were still only partially achieved but the programmes were still ongoing. In terms of quality, the EU support contributed to a better prioritisation of the skills targeted, to an increase in the number of skills for which training was offered and to the introduction of competency based training.

Attempts to measure the employability of students receiving TVET have been scant or even inexistent (no tracing studies e.g.). There are clear indications, from the MTR, published studies and surveys of a subsisting mismatch between the offer of TVET services and market demands. The previous JCs show that the potential employability of TVET beneficiaries has improved (improved training, improved curricula, better coverage) but there is no visible indication as yet that this translated into them finding a job or improving their earnings. This rather negative outcome must be interpreted in taking into account that of the two TVET programmes only the 6 grant contracts of TVET I were directly providing TVET training and did not produce important results in terms of employability, whereas TVET II was entirely devoted to reforming the system and as such could not directly and immediately contribute to employability of TVET trainees.

Finally it must be reminded that support to TVET is still largely work in progress. A future TVET III programme is currently under preparation that will focus on key remaining institutional issues: the weaknesses of the apex body NAVTTC, the improvement of the relationship between NAVTTC and the provinces, the building of links with private sector.

2.5 EQ5 Democratisation

This evaluation question covers EU support to democratic governance, defined as institutions and procedures through which (i) citizens can express preferences about alternative policies and leaders; (ii) the executive's exercise of power is constrained by checks and balances, and (iii) civil liberties for all citizens are protected. It covers EU-Pakistan political and policy dialogue and several EU programmes (ranging from €2m to €6m) in the areas of electoral support, support to Parliament, access to justice and peace, law enforcement etc.

The evidence on which the response to this question is based is detailed in the dedicated Annex A8. Additional information may be found in annexes B2 and B3 on specific projects, and in the fragility note (Annex A2).

EQ5	To what extent did the EU contribute to strengthen the democratisation process in Pakistan?
<p>Summary of response:</p> <p>The EU developed a sensible approach to democratisation, which was informed by a number of analyses of consistent quality. It focused on promoting both democracy and democrats. The EU supported for instance the whole electoral cycle over the evaluation period (with general elections in 2008 and 2013), including electoral reform, support through the ECP, civil society, and Parliament. Moreover, the EU has a systemic view and influence on the whole system, is better placed than some other development partners to promote democratisation and human rights thanks to the EU being perceived as “an all-weather friend”, “a peacebuilder” and an important partner for Pakistani growth and jobs, and has played to its strengths. However, what could have been better developed are (i) a clearly articulated holistic EU approach in the field; (ii) specific attention to incentives, challenges, and national ownership; and linked to this (iii) a clear intervention logic articulating how the envisaged support to Parliament will indeed lead to better parliamentary performance (especially oversight and law-making).</p> <p>Although not more peaceful, Pakistan is more democratic in 2014 than in 2007. Whereas EU projects were implemented with mixed success and it is hard to establish the EU contribution overall, stakeholders attribute positive outcomes to EU cooperation in terms of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) EU electoral observation mission (EOM); (ii) domestic electoral observation; (iii) foundation work for future electoral reforms; (iv) relationships built for continued parliamentary action; (v) the EU’s special role in promoting core values. 	

JC 5.1 “EU support to the democratisation process has been based on an analysis of the needs and challenges”

The EU informed its strategy and programmes in the field of democratisation on a number of analysis, which it conducted, funded or consulted.¹⁶ EU analyses that were available to the team demonstrate consistent quality, are informed by what appears to be sustained policy dialogue, by consultation of stakeholders, and are explicit about the issues and actors EU programmes aim to address and engage – more so than other development partners’ analyses that are publicly available. They tend however to be technical and do not always spell out the assumptions underlying the intervention logic (see I-5.1.1 and other indicators under JC5.1).

Pakistan’s challenges are many-fold and deep-rooted. **The EU developed a sensible approach to democratisation.** It focused on promoting both democracy and democrats. Its support wasn’t for instance limited to the Electoral Commission of Pakistan (ECP) or election day but, rather, supported the whole electoral cycle, including electoral reform, through the ECP, civil society, and Parliament. Moreover, its involvement in many areas and at many levels (subregional, federal, provincial, district), also gives the EU a systemic view and influence on the whole system. The EU is further better placed than other development partners to promote democratisation and human rights (thanks to the EU being perceived as “an all-weather friend”, “a peacebuilder” and an important partner for Pakistani growth and jobs, which themselves may slow down unrest) and has played to its strengths, for example by supporting civil society and engaging in structured, multi-sector policy dialogue. **However, what could have been better developed are (i) a clear and holistic EU approach in the field; (ii) assessment of risks with regard to national ownership and incentives and challenges; and linked to this (iii) a clear intervention logic underlying its support.** For instance with regard to parliamentary performance, what are the main binding constraints on greater capacity and assertiveness of National Assembly and Senate members, and what can EU support do about them (see in particular I-5.1.8)?

JC 5.2 “The interventions have been implemented according to plan”

In terms of project outputs, the record is decidedly mixed, when performance is recorded (IP3; Supporting Electoral Reforms in Pakistan (SERP) project (2012-2014), co-funded with DFID). The IP3 project’s effectiveness and impact are rated as problematic (C, Monitoring report, 2013). As for SERP, it did not produce many of its intended outputs (mainly related to building the capacity of the Electoral Commission of Pakistan) because of other short-term needs (“firefighting”) that took priority¹⁷. Moreover, nearly all implementing partners spontaneously highlighted numerous delays in obtaining non-objections, which impeded operations (the EU, on its part, states that delays were mainly due to delays on the part of the government¹ and implementing partners not submitting documentation to standard).

¹⁶ These include for instance a joint 2009-2010 post-crisis needs assessment (following the Pakistan government’s 2009 military offensive to drive militants from FATA and KP); project identification and formulation reports; analysis produced by several projects; analysis in M&E reports; internal EU analyses; and analyses conducted by others actors.

¹⁷ Notably pre-election concerns, such as the preparation of electoral rolls, preventing a focus on longer-term initiatives such as finalization of legislation, preparing for local elections, media outreach and restructuring of the Electoral Commission (Collective for Social Science Research, 2014, Impact Evaluation of DFIDs Electoral Programmes in Pakistan; DFID Annual Review, 2012).

JC 5.3 “The EU has contributed to promote more credible and inclusive elections in Pakistan”

Pakistan has an improved record in terms of credible and inclusive elections, political rights and political participation, which allows analysts to state that, although not more peaceful, Pakistan is more democratic in 2014 than in 2007.

It is hard to establish a direct EU contribution to the democratic process in Pakistan, given that (i) EU institutions are only the seventh largest donor in the area of democratisation and (ii) the mixed record of EU projects in terms of producing their expected outputs (see above). However, on the basis of interviews and available data, there are clear areas where stakeholders attribute positive outcomes to EU cooperation: EU electoral observation, domestic electoral observation, and foundation work for future electoral reforms. The Evaluation of the EU's Electoral Support of Pakistan (2009-2014) finds that “collectively, projects contributed towards improved registration for women, inroads towards gender mainstreaming in the ECP's organisation and processes, enfranchising IDPs and generally integrating human rights wherever possible in the reform driven or promoted.”¹⁸

Moreover, some interviews point to the EU's special role to play in promoting core values, a multi-track, “soft” approach (dialogue rather than conditionalities), and a better track record (compared to some other partners) in the area of democratisation. Overall, EU projects in electoral support have produced results well beyond election day, and contributed to laying the foundations for high impact over time, with the electoral reform and higher engagement of the Election Commission of Pakistan.

JC 5.4 “The EU has contributed to improve the three main strands of parliamentary action: law-making, oversight and representation”

On many accounts Parliament performance has improved: two successful rounds of elections, the return to civilian rule, and the 18th Amendment to Pakistan's Constitution, which reduces the powers of the president in favour of the parliament and prime minister.

However, many issues remain: there is still a backlog of over a hundred bills pending in the National Assembly; there were issues of mandate between parliament and the judiciary; budgets could be and were changed in-year by the executive without parliamentary approval; committees, which “should be the lifeblood of a legislature” (ICG, 2013), had been largely dormant until 2008, and were not yet functional.¹⁹

It is too early to say whether EU support has had a direct and sustainable impact. Nevertheless, the EU has built trust with some senior members of Parliament (MPs) and should stay the course when it comes to supporting specific Committees. It has also provided support in the three main strands of parliamentary action, which is most relevant: law making; oversight; and representation. However, the EU did not address the *incentives* (and not only *capacities*) of MPs – this affects the chances for tangible benefits of a strengthened Parliament.

¹⁸ Details from results of this evaluation and from project evaluations are provided in I-5.3.1

¹⁹ Sources: Freedom House, 2014; Bertelsmann Institute, 2014; International Crisis Group, 2013; International IDEA, 2014; Human Rights Watch, 2014; US Department of State, 2014.

2.6 EQ6 Human rights / Rule of law

The question assesses the relevance and the effectiveness of EU support to human rights/the rule of law, including EU support to justice, security and counter-terrorism. It covers EU-Pakistan political and policy dialogue, and several EU programmes (ranging from €1.8m to €15m) that targeted the areas of justice, human rights, security and counter-terrorism.

The evidence on which the response to this question is based is detailed in the dedicated Annex A9. Additional information may be found in annexes B2 and B3 on specific projects, and in the fragility note (Annex A2).

EQ6	To what extent did the EU contribute to the protection and promotion of human rights, the improvement of justice, and to security and counter-terrorism?
<p>Summary of response:</p> <p>EU's approach to support to human rights and security in Pakistan has been appropriate. It relied on in-depth analysis context analysis and was informed by high-level policy dialogue. While early projects relied heavily on the assumption of "enough" political will from both Pakistani state and society, and that capacity was the main binding constraint on a better human rights and security record, over time the political dialogue and tying in of GSP+ status has led to the a higher level of engagement with Government.</p> <p>The performance record of the project portfolio has been mixed at output level, and there were notable gaps in terms of monitoring. Albeit the delays encountered, the projects monitored showed a positive contribution to the increase of the Government/CSOs capacity to address/promote human rights issues.</p> <p>But these changes have not yet translated into a better human rights situation. The 2007-2014 period showed more democracy and political participation but less peace and fewer civil liberties (see data in Fragility note):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Pakistan has returned to civilian rule and democratic institutions have improved: the judiciary, civil society and the media were able to assert some autonomy from the executive (re-instatement of Chief Justice Chaudhry in 2009); the 18th Amendment to Pakistan's Constitution reduces the powers of the president in favour of the parliament and prime minister, and devolves a large share of federal resources and responsibilities to the four provinces; emblematic pieces of legislation were introduced and debated (e.g. Hindu marriage registration at federal level; violence against women in Punjab). 2008 is often described by Pakistan watchers as the year Pakistan returned to democracy, at least formally (Jonas et al., 2013²⁰), with the end of military rule, or the beginning of "a long march to democracy" (Fruman, 2011²¹). ▪ On the other hand, there are self-reinforcing dynamics of continued poverty affecting 	

²⁰ Wolff, Jonas, Hans-Joachim Spanger, and Hans-Jürgen Puhle. *The comparative international politics of democracy promotion*. Vol. 23. Routledge, 2013.

²¹ Fruman, Sheila. *Will the long march to democracy in Pakistan finally succeed?*. US Institute of Peace, 2011.

particular groups and districts and the lesser-constitutional status in areas like FATA and PATA (Siddique, 2012²²); grievances (culminating in secessionism and terrorism); and a heavy-handed state response that leads to civilian casualties and a further deterioration of state-society relations. There was a first surge in violent extremism, culminating in 2300 civilian casualties in 2009, then a second surge with over 3,000 civilian casualties in both 2012 and 2013. By 2013, they were still extrajudicial and targeted killings, disappearances, torture, lack of rule of law (including lack of due process, poor implementation and enforcement of laws, and frequent mob violence and vigilante justice), and sectarian violence—which continued unabated, leading to the federal government lifting the moratorium on the death penalty.

In this context, EU support has not led to increased (i) access to justice, (ii) public confidence in the rule of law or (iii) capacity to strengthen resilience against terrorism. But it is plausible to say that the EU has prevented a worse degradation. The EU has maintained dialogue on human rights and human-rights compliant counter-terrorism measures, and has been building leverage in this dialogue via GSP+. Moreover, the access-to-justice programmes have started in earnest in 2014, and therefore results in 2015 could only have been limited.

JC 6.1 “EU support to human rights has been based on an analysis of the needs and challenges, and adapted to the evolving context”

EU support to human rights has generally been informed by in-depth analysis, in particular standalone analyses of the human rights and security situation undertaken or commissioned by the EU, on top of the descriptions in the EU Annual Reports on Human Rights and the MIPs, and analyses produced by third parties (human rights NGOs, including the reputable Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, academics, etc.) (I-6.1.1). Moreover, some programme documents at project level (e.g. Citizen Justice and Peace in KP, Civilian capacity building for law enforcement (CCBLE) and STRIVE) contain some in-depth analysis of needs, dynamics and opportunities with regards to human rights. However, for two of the projects examined, the analysis of needs was relatively light: the Access to Justice in Punjab project provides a rather quick analysis of the human rights context; the CAPRI project documentation provide an overview of terrorism and counter-terrorism measures, but does not specify why highly targeted and technical support to forensics was seen as more critical than, for example, wider police reform nor what synergies were envisaged with previous (e.g. the €12m CCBLE project, ended in 2012) or present projects running in parallel (e.g. the €5m STRIVE project on countering violent extremism and radicalisation) (I-6.1.2).

Except for STRIVE, risks to project deliverables were systematically identified in project documents, along with mitigation measures that were often appropriate, but risks to impact seldom (I-6.1.3 & I-6.1.4). Several project documents include human rights violations as a risk to projects (e.g. Access to Justice in Punjab and Citizen Justice in KP), but the team could not find standalone assessments of risks to human rights (e.g. scenario planning or “drivers of change” analysis). In the case of the Access to Justice in

²² Siddique, Osama, *The Other Pakistan: Special Laws, Diminished Citizenship and the Gathering Storm* (December 5, 2012).

Punjab project, appropriate mitigation measures were identified (e.g. through training of the media on drawbacks of justice implemented by Islamist extremists and sensitization of the general public through legal awareness campaigns), but these measures were taken too locally and too recently to have any measurable effect.

EU support to human rights has also been informed by high-level policy dialogue (I-6.1.5). An increasingly strategic and integrated policy dialogue took place with the government on human rights. It has involved, on the GoP side, the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and line ministries (notably “Interior and Narcotics Control”, “Law, Justice Law and Human Rights”), and on the EU side, both the headquarters and the Delegation. It has taken place around/in the EC-Pakistan Joint Commission (since 2007); “Friends of Democratic Pakistan” (FoDP) meetings (since 2008); EU-Pakistan summits (since 2009); the EU-Pakistan 5-year Engagement Plan; the EU-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue (since 2012); the 2012 EU Counter-Terrorism/Security Strategy on Pakistan; the EU granting GSP+ status to Pakistan (2013) and linking it to human rights; and the preparation of the 2014-2020 MIP and the EU-Pakistan Cooperation Agreement. However, the connection between political instruments (policy dialogue, joint action plans) and cooperation projects were made only at times, except in the area of electoral support, where projects made inroads directly thanks to electoral observation missions (see EQ5).

This high-level policy dialogue may not seem very effective, if looking at outcomes: the human rights situation in general (besides political participation, which has improved) has deteriorated. However, this EU dialogue has probably prevented a further degradation: without it, there would have been little HR dialogue with other development partners; meaning both less transparency on GoP policies and initiatives with regards to HR; and less exposure to ideas, ways and means to promote and protect HR.

Stakeholders, included ultimate beneficiaries, **were often consulted** in the early phases of the design of the projects to ensure the appropriateness of the intervention to the needs and the contextual challenges (I-6.1.6, I-6.1.7 & I-6.1.8).

From 2014, it has become increasingly difficult to launch new human rights projects due to reservations made by Pakistan on the choice of implementation modalities: GoP expressed a clear preference for budget support.

JC 6.2 “The interventions have been implemented according to plan”

In terms of project outputs, the record was mixed, when performance is documented, and there were notable gaps in monitoring. For the three (out of six projects) that were monitored and/or evaluated, the performance record was mixed at output level (I-6.2.2 & I-6.2.3):

- for CCBLE, the evaluation notes “some positive and concrete contributions” but with varying degrees of success across the five components of the project;
- for CAPRI, a number of outputs were delivered (e.g. trainings), and others were on track to be delivered although the fragmented institutional landscape -with limited relations between PFSA, the police, prosecutors and judges- might threaten a smooth project implementation; and

- for Combating Abusive Child Labour II project, available monitoring reports generally graded effectiveness as 'good'.

These three projects encountered administrative delays (e.g. signing of Pakistan-EU MoU on CCBLE; procurement of equipment for civilian capacity building of law enforcement agencies in Pakistan) or delays due to the time needed in Pakistan to pass legislation (e.g. the NACTA Act, for CCBLE) (I-6.2.1.).

There is no available data to date on whether outputs or outcomes have been delivered for three projects, of which implementation started in 2014 or later (Citizens Justice and Peace in KP; Access to Justice in Punjab; and STRIVE) (I-6.2.2 & I-6.2.3).

JC 6.3 “The EU has contributed to increase the capacity of the Government of Pakistan to address human rights issues, in particular for the vulnerable groups, and to fulfil its international human rights obligations”

EU support, through extensive work on capacities and engagement in policy dialogue with the federal government, contributed to support Government capacity to promote human rights issues and to fulfil its international human rights obligations (I-6.3.1). For instance, the Provincial Counter-Terrorism Capability in KP and Punjab developed with the support of the CCBLE component. Similarly, stakeholders met pointed to positive results in the areas of forensics and prosecution, but also deplored that too much has been done on training and not enough to “think and act politically” and on more structural issues (e.g. policies and rules, for which progress can be less tangible).

These changes have not yet translated into a better human rights situation, with the state of human rights being no better in 2014 compared to 2007 (Fragile States Index 2007-2014; Freedom House 2007-2014) (I-6.3.1). HCHR finds for instance that “the Government’s performance in fulfilling its commitments during the 2012-2013 Universal Periodic Review (UPR) at the mid-cycle period has been far from satisfactory. Out of 69 accepted recommendations reviewed, 39 recommendations -a majority- have not been implemented at all; 30 recommendations have only been partially implemented; and not a single recommendation has been implemented in full.”²³

Whilst the contribution of EU funded activities to the achievement of identified changes is uncertain, **several EU and Pakistani interviewees expressed the view that without EU support the situation might have been worse** (I-6.3.2).

JC 6.4 “The EU has contributed to empowering and enabling civil society organisations to defend human rights, in particular for the vulnerable groups”

Pakistan is often cited as having one of the most robust civil societies in the developing world, with over 100,000 CSOs operating across the country (I-6.4.1). The literature shows that their capacity improved over the years.

²³ Oral Statement of HRC in the General Debate under Agenda Item 6, the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), June 2015.

The capacity of CSOs supported by the EU to promote and protect human rights has improved, but not the one of other CSOs, or at least not significantly, because of increasing challenges to their day-to-day operations (I-6.4.2). The 2015 report on the implementation of the 5-year plan notes “human rights defenders run significant risks in carrying out their work with a lack of proper mechanisms in place to protect them and their organizations”. Moreover, most NGOs have not received a MoU that allows them to formally operate in Pakistan. Another issue frequently cited that constrain the capacity of CSOs to promote and protect human rights concerns the obtention of visas for project personnel.

JC 6.5 “The EU has contributed to strengthen the effectiveness of the police and the judiciary in delivering high-quality services to all citizens while respecting human rights”

There was no improvement in the effectiveness of the police and judiciary services in delivering high-quality services to all citizens while respecting human rights between 2007 and 2014. As far as police is concerned, the 2015 report on the implementation of the 5-year plan indicates that “the police and security forces” continue to be a source of violence and abuses” (I-6.5.1). Regarding judiciary services, the same report indicates that “court officials are often the victims of threats and intimidation and corruption and political interference in the judicial process is prevalent. (I-6.5.2).”

So far, the scope of EU operations has not enabled improvements in the police and judiciary services to take place. EU support to the police was solely focused on forensics and EU support to the judiciary mainly consisted in an audit of the court management system in Punjab (I-6.5.1 and I-6.5.2). Besides, as several analysts find and interviewees emphasised, strengthening capacity will not by itself improve the justice and security substantially, unless work is done on rules and incentives, notably for cross-department and cross-agency collaboration (I-6.5.3). A lot of EU efforts focused on strengthening capacity and hinged on the assumption that capacity was the main binding constraint -or the only workable constraint- on better security and justice. However, shortfalls in law enforcement capacity and related government services as a result of lack of political will are key to explain the meagre progresses in this area.

JC 6.6 “The EU has increased access to justice, in particular for the vulnerable groups”

During the period, there was no increased access to justice. The 2015 report on the implementation of the 5-year Plan notes that “access to justice is severely restricted by a massive backlog of cases in the civilian courts, inadequate training of judges, lawyers and police personnel, as well as lack of education and awareness of rights by the general public.” (I-6.6.1).

Overall, there is little tangible evidence yet of EU contribution to increased access to justice. The access-to-justice programmes have started in earnest in 2014 or later. Within the framework of the support of the Punjab Access to Justice project, paralegals (“legal empowerment officers”) have been deployed in communities in three districts and

South Punjab. There are signs of increased access to paralegals, particularly for women. Moreover, vulnerable groups increasingly had recourse to alternative and traditional dispute resolution: while not devoid of flaws (e.g. women can never present their case directly at *jirga*), stakeholders interviewed continue to find it a fair enough and effective process, especially when decisions are translated into court orders (for enforcement) (I-6.6.1 and I-6.6.2).

JC 6.7 “The EU has contributed to increase public confidence in the rule of law”

The six projects concerned did not aim to increase public confidence in the rule of law (except for the Access to Justice in Punjab project, which specifically emphasises public information). But increased public confidence is a generally acceptable proxy of increased capacity and improved services. Public confidence in the rule of law has not increased in Pakistan (I-6.7.1), nor is there evidence of EU operations having increased public confidence in the rule of law (I-6.7.2), except in the area of electoral process, for which interviews showed a clear EU contribution (see EQ5).

JC 6.8 “The EU has contributed to increase State, media and civil society’s capacity to strengthen resilience against terrorism”

State and society’s resilience against terrorism have not notably increased. State efforts to fight terrorism still demonstrated some results: the offensive to take back the Swat valley in 2009 was successful, and total casualties related to terrorism have diminished between 2007-2014, including for civilians and security forces respectively (while terrorists/insurgents killed have grown slightly) (I-6.8.1). However, government counter terrorism offensives have also involved pre-emptive strikes that caused civilian deaths and led to massive displacements (over 1.5 million in 2009; over one million in North Waziristan in 2014). Besides, civil society and the media working to strengthen resilience against extremism improved their capacity and demonstrated some success, but were also constrained in their day-to-day operations (I-6.8.2).

Available project evaluations and progress reports provide some evidence of EU operations having increased state, media and civil society capacity to strengthen resilience against terrorism in some specific areas: under the Forensics component of CAPRI (with the caveats mentioned under JC-6.2); the development of positive media-police relations on counter-terrorism issues and some improved provincial capacities in KP and Punjab under CCBLE (I-6.8.3). Moreover, it could be argued that the EU’s high-level policy dialogue and broad cooperation portfolio (support to education and rural development in particular) and specific support to law enforcement/criminal justice (mainly in Punjab, starting in KP) have prevented a further deterioration (as developed under JC 6.1). However, external factors constraining the EU’s CT efforts have to be borne in mind, such as its subsidiary role compared to bilateral development partners. Interviews have also revealed that sensitive projects that have been driven by Brussels with insufficient preparation and dialogue with national counterparts have tended, not surprisingly, to stall at implementation stage (e.g. STRIVE).

2.7 EQ7 Trade

The support of the EU to the trade sector has been inscribed in the Cooperation Agreement between Pakistan and the EU and the Five Years Engagement Plan of 2012. It is a non-focal sector of the EU cooperation with Pakistan with large trade related technical assistance bilateral programmes²⁴, completed by a few regional studies on trade needs assessments. Besides this financial cooperation, non-financial cooperation has maintained a continuous dialogue between the Pakistani authorities and the EU. In this context important exceptional and temporary (November 2012 – November 2013) tariff concessions over 75 categories of products were granted to Pakistan, and Pakistan benefitted from GSP+ status in 2014.

This section covers the analysis of the rationale and the modalities of interventions in this sector and the main results achieved. It provides an overview of the findings the underlying evidence of which is spelled out in annex A10 which includes an overview of the trade sector and detailed findings for each indicator and judgment criterion.

EQ7

To what extent has EU cooperation support to trade contributed to increasing trade and investment flows with the EU and South Asia?

Summary of response:

The EU trade support has taken place in a deteriorating Pakistan trade context marked by an unfavourable environment due to poor sector governance and insecurity. EU support to the sector has been relevant, responding to the needs and aligned on government priorities. It was characterised by the continuity and the coherence of mutually supporting trade programmes and non-financial cooperation. The TRTA programmes have contributed to the strengthening of key trade institutions in the areas of trade policy and trade quality infrastructure, and in parallel targeted private sector development. Non-financial cooperation has offered a formal framework for a dialogue on mutual EU-Pakistan trade interest and on the benefits of the GSP+ regime to which Pakistan accessed in 2014. Institutional improvements, in particular in the area of SPS, and the benefits of concessional tariffs and GSP+ have contributed to a growth of exports to the EU, although likely due in part to a displacement of trade with other countries. Over the period the trade balance with the EU became positive in favour of Pakistan. However, no important progresses are observed in terms of regional trade or export diversification and the dramatic deterioration of foreign investment is not reversed. Governance and security issues remain major obstacles.

²⁴ See annexes B1 for an inventory of activities in the trade sector and B2 for a synopsis of the main TRTA projects.

JC 7.1 “The design of the TRTA interventions has been based on an analysis of the needs and challenges and an alignment on the government policies.”

The two programmes conducted during the evaluation period, TRTA II and TRTA III are inscribed in the continuity of TRTA I implemented previously. Together, the three TRTA programmes formed a consistent support to trade development and addressed institutional strengthening (focused on trade policy and trade quality infrastructure) and private sector development.

Needs assessments studies have been conducted and the programmes proposed by the EU have been based on a clear diagnostic and the identification of essential needs in the areas of required TRTA to meet the WTO requirements. The programmes have been mostly articulated on institutional building but support has also been provided to strengthen the private sector capacity to trade, particularly under TRTA III. The strategy in this sector has been consistently pursued from 2004 and lessons from previous interventions have been passed into the successive programmes. (I-7.1.1, I-7.1.2)

Risk analyses have been conducted at various stages of the programme. In the programming stage for TRTA II, but during implementation risk analysis and monitoring have been limited. In the case of TRTA III the risk analyses and identification of mitigating measures have been conducted by the parties contracted to implement the programme. Risks of corruption and fraud are not mentioned in any of these analyses which can imply that this was not perceived as a major issue for these programmes. (I-7.1.3)

Documentary sources and interviews acknowledge that the TRTA programmes have been properly aligned on the objectives of the government policies and in line with those of the EU. The selection of the implementing partners was logical: UNIDO guided by the nature of the activities and objectives pursued and the criteria duly justified: presence in the field, skills in the specialised For TRTA II, UN agencies or bodies (UNIDO, ITC, WIPO) specialised TRTA III, in addition to its relevance for the trade sector, is a coherent complement to the local development activities undertaken under the rural development programmes, insofar as it aims at promoting employment opportunities for local qualified workers in a geographically isolated area. (I-7.1.4, 5, 6)

The policy dialogue with the government on trade issues and on the identification of EU support has been regular and constructive. It was conducted through two channels: the trade technical sub-group created by the Joint Commission under the Cooperation Agreement and directly between the Delegation or the implementing agencies of the programmes and stakeholders. Information collected by the evaluation confirms that the dialogue led to an alignment on the government policies. However, interviews with some stakeholders point to a bias in favour of discussions with institutional authorities and less with the private sector actors. It appear also that the dialogue faced constraints linked to reluctance of the Government to engage into discussion of structural economic reforms and limitations of human resources on the Delegation side. (I-7.1.7, 8).

JC 7.2 “The interventions have been implemented according to plan and have produced their intended results”

Implementation of TRTA II and TRTA III has been satisfactory. Activities, have been duly conducted by the implementing agencies and the outputs (training, capacity strengthening, professional transfer of know how) appreciated by the targeted groups. Outcomes of TRTA II are visible in terms of improved performance of targeted institutions and companies. The following are significant examples:

- The upgrading and strengthening of PITAD the trained modules of which are now accredited by WTO with the result that PITAD is used by the Government of Pakistan to train the staff of the Ministry of Commerce, the trade diplomats and asked by the private sector (Chambers of Commerce), and foreign government (Nepal, Afghanistan) to provide specialised training.
- A national Private Public Dialogue has been initiated on GSP+ (on compliance and potential benefits).
- Key trade institutions among which IPO, CCP have been reorganised with the result that their performance is improved (as evidenced, for instance by the reduction in the time for releasing patents and licences).
- SPS and metrology services have been improved (accreditation and testing) leading to reopening access to EU market for export products.
- Productivity increased in the horticulture sector as a result of introduction of best practices (HACCP, etc.)

These progresses translate into increased productivity, better compliance with international SPS regulation, reduction of testing costs, reduction of costs associated with search oriented tasks for managing and preparing trademarks or patents. Representatives of the partner authorities confirmed the reports of the implementing agencies. However, representatives of the private sector and exporters as well as some representatives of the public sector reveal an “institutional” bias, with an excessive focus on responding to the needs of the institution and insufficient concern for those of their private sector “clients”. As a result private sector operators are insufficiently aware of the benefits they could get from using more quality infrastructure, for example. There are also mixed views about the results in terms of trade strategy formulation and the impact on it of the improved public private dialogue (PPD). The sustainability of the outcomes will depend on the financial viability of the institutions supported by the TRTA programmes and the use of their services. Regarding governmental institutions like TDAP and CCP they are funded from budget resources and there is no indication of a policy inflexion leading an insufficient financing. Semi governmental bodies like PITAD benefit from budget resources and charge part of their costs for the services they provide, there are indication that their services are in growing demand by the Government and governments of the region. The testing laboratories are partly cost recovering and although there is a clear trend that their revenue are rising the evaluation has no information on the proportion of costs recovered. Their sustainability will very much influenced by the demand for their services by the producers and exporters.

Whereas TRTA II targeted mainly the trade institutions, the TRTA III programme, implemented in parallel, operated at a more microeconomic level. It aimed at upgrading the value chain of promising sectors (leather and gems) and focused on developing the capacity

of rural populations (with a specific attention for women) to engage into productive activities and/or to improve their professional capacity. The first results of these programmes are very positive. The component implemented by the AKRSP, adopting the principles of social mobilisation of the RSPN (see section on rural development) has succeeded in creating new professional opportunities for skilled young people and women in a particularly remote region. The component implemented by PITCO has led to an identification and awareness of the weak points of the Pakistan leather value chain and a mobilisation of the actors of the sectors to combine their efforts to address them. It is worth noting that these two components of TRTAIII are leading to a diversification of production, and potentially exports, although on a very small scale. The strong appropriation of the programme by the beneficiaries and their implication in its implementation create favourable conditions for the sustainability of the results. (I-7.2.1, 2, 3, 4).

JC 7.3 “EU support contributed to strengthen the capacity of the Business Intermediate Organisations at federal, provincial and local levels”

This JC concerns exclusively the programme TRTA III, which supported Business Intermediary Organisations (BIOs) and individual firms.

No real outcome can be observed as yet due to the early stage of advancement of the programme. However, the first progress reports shows that the project is likely to induce behavioural changes such as improved management skills and undertaking of new activities as a result of improved awareness. Indeed, the way the beneficiaries have been selected, the kind of service provided by the project, and the interest and commitment of the participants are promising. BIOs, which are key beneficiaries of this project, have been professionally selected by the implementing organisation on the basis of their knowledge of their sectors.

JC 7.4 “The EU support contributed to the reduction of barriers to trade”

The EU supported institutions have improved their management and their capability to deal with Technical Barriers to Trade (TBTs), in particular in the area of Sanitary and Phyto Sanitary (SPS) requirements. For example, access to EU markets for fish could be reopened with Pakistani companies satisfying the requirement of the EU Food and Veterinary Office.

Moreover, the non-financial cooperation played an important role in offering, through the technical trade sub-groups preparing the Joint Commission under the Cooperation Agreement, a technical and political platform to discuss issues related to TBTs.

JC 7.5 “As a result of EU support Pakistan investment and trade with EU and South Asia increased”

There has been no significant expansion of Pakistan total trade during the evaluation period. The openness of Pakistan has been reduced, as well as its participation in the

international division of labour (share of manufacture products in trade has declined). Regional integration in South Asia is among the lowest in the world and foreign direct investment has dramatically dropped.


Against this negative background, trade with the EU shows a specific pattern. The EU was during the whole period and remains the main export market for Pakistan. Pakistan exports to the EU, mainly textile products, have been boosted since 2012 by the tariff concessions granted on humanitarian grounds after the floods of 2012 and continued under the GSP+ regime granted to Pakistan. Exports of fish have also increased as a result of Pakistan's renewed capacity to meet the EU SPS requirements.

EU support to trade, both through (i) the programmes that strengthened key trade institutions and the performance of selected operators and (ii) the concessions granted, enabled Pakistan to develop and maintain an important trade relationship with the EU. However, this remains limited to traditional export sectors and implied some trade displacement. Trade diversification remained extremely limited. In this regard, the efforts conducted under TRTA III, which aim at upgrading the value chain, are offering interesting prospects.

2.8 EQ8 Aid modalities

The EU delivered most of its aid through four instruments (DCI-Asia, Instrument for Stability (IFS) and two thematic budget lines), which represent 95% of the total contracted amounts. The geographic instrument DCI-Asia, comprising mostly bilateral programmable aid (MIP), was the largest source of funding for Pakistan (73% of the total contracted). All other sources remained relatively modest, except for the Instrument for Stability (12%), focusing on conflict prevention and strengthening of the rule of law, and the thematic DCI-Food (8%), specific to food security. Regarding the implementation channels, almost a third of the aid was contracted with the Government. Aid implemented by the UN (mainly UNDP and UNIDO), IFIs, EU MS and NGOs represented together 61%. Delegation agreements were used with EU MS, IFIs and the UN agencies. NGOs benefited from grants. Service contracts with private sector organisations totaled 8% (see below figure).²⁵

Figure 7: EU funding sources and EU implementation modalities in Pakistan over 2007-2014, €m



(1) Including DCI-ENV (1,9 M€), DCI-HUM (1,4 M€), MIGR (0,9 M€).

(2) EU Member States, including UK, GIZ and AFD

Source: ADE analysis, based on EuropeAid database (Data Warehouse), April 2015. Total contracted includes all the contracts related to Pakistan over the period 2007-2014, from commitments specific to Pakistan and commitments that are not country specific

This question assesses the reasons underlying the choice behind the various options taken, as well as their respective merits in terms of efficiency and effectiveness of implementation. It focuses on (i) the rationale behind the choices made by the EU; (ii) the appropriateness of the EU organization and expertise mobilised to manage the interventions; and (iii) the extent to which aid modalities and partners selection facilitated the achievement of results.

This section provides an overview of the findings on aid modalities emerging from the evaluation. The underlying evidence is spelled out in annex A11 that includes an overview

²⁵ As a matter of comparison, this distribution is the following for 2015: NGOs 27%, BS 25%, UN 17%, INGOs 11%, EU MS agencies 7% and IFI (WB) 5% (Source: EU).

of instruments and aid modalities used in Pakistan and detailed findings for each indicator and judgment criterion.

EQ8 **To what extent did the mix of aid modalities and the selection of implementing partners facilitate achievement of expected cooperation results?**

Summary of response:

Overall, EU choices concerning aid modalities and partners selection were pragmatic and opportunistic. They were typically based on a sound analysis (albeit more challenging for the BS eligibility criteria assessments at sub national level), adapted to a context marked by a number of political, social and security challenges, and driven by the need to make the EU support flexible. The rationale behind the adoption of aid modalities took account of risks, with the lack of ownership/the absence of political will being a major one. However, mitigation measures were only sometimes satisfactory. Joint efforts were also made to seize opportunities to ensure a strong complementarity between financial instruments across the sectors of intervention. Finally, the continuity of support in rural development, education and trade led to gradual improvement of aid modalities and partners selection. In response to the decentralisation and devolution process, the EU adopted a flexible approach, allowing BS at provincial level, with positive effects. BS operations were often accompanied by capacity development interventions for provincial and district administrations and direct support to the local communities. The selection of implementing partners ranging from international agencies to national or local NGOs has also been justified on the basis of comparative advantages, reputation, experience in the concerned sectors, knowledge of the country's regions context and previous or on-going involvement with provincial and local authorities or communities. But some implementing partners, in particular CSOs, lacked capacities to properly manage EU programmes.

The implementation of the cooperation programme was heavily slowed down in the early period especially due to difficult security conditions and severe human resources constraints. The situation progressively improved as of end 2012/2013, and the earlier backlog related to delays in contracting of the MIP 2007-2010 was cleared. Monitoring and evaluation systems at project level often showed weaknesses. For the projects monitored (about half of the projects reviewed), the performance was generally positively rated.

The EU's cooperation in Pakistan proved more effective in the sectors where the EU ensured convergence of two approaches: a bottom-up approach leading to social mobilisation and demand for better governmental services and institutions, and a top-down approach that achieves sustainable improvement in the coverage and quality of front line public services delivery, through active involvement of local communities and economic actors. This was for instance the case in rural development and trade. On the one hand, the EU supported a bottom-up approach to raise local empowerment and social mobilisation at community and economic operators' level. This was best done when implemented by large local NGOs belonging to the Rural Support Programme Network. On the other hand, the EU supported official institutions to raise their governance and institutional capacity to help with the formulation and implementation of public policies that respond to local or market needs. This aspect was supported with BS and technical assistance projects.

JC 8.1 “The rationale for adopting a modality (contribution agreement, grant contract, sector budget support) and financial instrument, and for selecting the implementing partner(s) is based on a sound analysis which duly explains why it is considered most conducive to achieving expected results”

Overall, the selection of financial instruments and aid modalities was based on a sound analysis and generally adapted to the country context (I-8.1.1). It was primarily driven by the need to make the EU support flexible and adaptable to a context marked by a number of political, social and security challenges. It also aimed to fit the evolving structural and institutional reform process, with corresponding capacity constraints emerging at provincial level. This was especially the case for Budget Support operations. For the 21 projects under review, the implementation arrangements selected were generally judged as being appropriate: they typically (i) fitted the context, (ii) were well owned, (iii) showed a clear link towards results and (iv) were coordinated with other donors. Moreover, the rationale behind the adoption of aid modalities took account of risks, with the lack of ownership/the absence of political will being a major one. For instance, issues related to weak capacities and risks of corruption at provincial level for the two provinces including the specific fragility and security situation in KP were acknowledged and complicated the formulation process of the first Education SBS. However, mitigation measures envisaged at project level were only sometimes satisfactory (I-8.1.4). In addition, joint efforts were made to seize opportunities to ensure a strong complementarity between financial instruments across the sectors of intervention (I-8.1.2). For instance, in the case of BS programmes, complementarities between BS financial input and TA/capacity building have been addressed in each programme as well as with other modalities such as grant allocations to CSOs (e.g. KP DGCD Programme). Finally, the continuity of support in rural development, education and trade led to gradual improvement of aid modalities and partners selection.

However, **BS eligibility analysis was more challenging in the context of interventions at subnational level, in particular on macroeconomic and PFM aspects** (I-8.1.7). While macroeconomic vulnerabilities and PFM weaknesses were acknowledged (e.g. on low tax to GDP ratio, public debt dynamics, credibility of the budget and absence of a PFM reform strategy at federal level and of a sound one at provincial level), eligibility was confirmed because there was a vision that the system could improve, especially in light of the strong level of qualification and motivation of the administration. Policy dialogue was envisaged as mitigating measure. Besides, one should note that the comprehensiveness and quality of the BS eligibility analysis positively evolved over the time and were aligned with the EU budget support guidelines.

Besides, **towards the very end of the period, the EUD stressed that the decisions on the choice of aid modalities were not sufficiently well anchored in ground realities** (I-8.1.1). The political economy of the sectors was insufficiently taken into account and the assessment of the level of EU leverage and results sought by the intervention not sufficiently realistic. The EUD particularly insisted on the fact that Pakistan was not ready for BS in the human rights field.

The choice of implementing partners was generally pragmatic (I-8.1.5). It took account of the local and technical knowledge and experience of the implementing partners and of transaction costs, while ensuring adherence to procedures. For instance, in the trade sector, the strong presence and work experience of UNIDO in Pakistan as well as procedural reasons have determined the choice of the implementing partner for the Trade Related Technical Assistance project TRTA II. In the democracy and governance sector, for the project “Citizen Justice and Peace Programme in KP”, the proposed joint management with UNDP was presented as an asset due to the Agency’s extensive work experience with the KP authorities. For the TVET II project, a delegation agreement with GTZ was envisaged according to its substantial knowledge and experience of the TVET sector (with GTZ active since 1960), its technical capacity to support the sector at federal level, its active role in donor coordination in the field of education and the fact that GTZ had a project office in Peshawar and FATA.

JC 8.2 “The EU could adapt its organisation and/or mobilise the qualified expertise to manage the interventions in an evolving country context”

The EUD faced severe human resources constraints, particularly until end 2012 (I-8.2.1). It remained under-staffed until end 2012 whilst the financial envelope for cooperation considerably increased since 2007. High turnover rendered the situation even more difficult. Besides, sectoral expertise was limited while training remained insufficient, particularly for the newly recruited contractual agents. This has negatively influenced the ability of the EUD to conduct a proper policy dialogue with national and provincial authorities, whereas this was much needed in the context of an increasing number of BS operations. Staff shortage was partly compensated with useful back-up support provided by headquarters, especially during the formulation stage of complex BS operations. Besides, the formulation of BS programmes has systematically earmarked funds for the provision of capacity building as well as expertise for monitoring and evaluation to assist the EUD in the technical and analytical monitoring of these programmes, including the comprehensive assessment of general and specific conditions. This contracted expertise has been instrumental to support the preparation of the EUD BS disbursement dossiers for the HQ as well as to inform the EUD policy dialogue. Constraints on human resources were progressively relieved, with the EUD being fully staffed end 2013 and in 2014. In addition, the EUD was able to recourse when necessary to qualified external staff.

The EU adapted its aid modalities to fit the evolution of the country context. In response to the decentralisation and devolution process from the federal to the provincial level, the EU adopted a flexible approach, allowing BS at provincial level (I-8.2.2). Reflecting the need to strengthen the financial and institutional capacities of the provincial governments and administrations, BS has increasingly been used since 2011 and this showed positive effects (e.g. capacity strengthening, establishment of a strategic policy dialogue). BS operations were often accompanied by capacity development interventions for provincial and district administrations and direct support to the local communities implemented either through contribution agreements with experienced partners having comparative advantage (solid administrative capacity, substantial knowledge and experience in the country for the concerned sectors and provinces (e.g. UNDP, GTZ), services contracts (e.g. British Council in the Sindh education sector) or delegation agreements (GIZ in the KP education sector). For instance, the €80 million Khyber Pakhtunkhwa District Governance and Community Development Programme included i) € 7.5 million

support to involve civil society organisations to facilitate the mobilisation of rural communities, including preparation of quality proposals for district government financing, as well as remaining engaged in the follow-up and decision-making processes; and ii) € 8.5 million of technical cooperation to support capacity development of the administration and reinforcement of government audit control.

Some implementing partners, in particular CSOs, lacked capacities to properly manage EU programmes (I-8.2.1). They notably experienced difficulties in complying with EU procedures and requirements. In the case of the EIDHR CBSS 2012, additional assistance was granted in the form of a consultant expert in EU procurement and financial management processes to compensate. This was extremely beneficial: the leader of the consortium of NGOs improved its ability to monitor and report on financial aspects.

Monitoring and evaluation systems at project level often showed weaknesses. For the projects monitored, the performance was generally positively rated (I-8.2.3). The logframes of the projects under review generally did not include proper information to monitor results (e.g. no baseline or no target value to be reached set). For BS programmes, policy matrices and results frameworks constituted adequate frameworks to monitor results. About half of the projects (10 out of 21) were monitored at least one time. The situation varied across sectors, with most projects in the democracy and governance area not having been monitored. The performance of the projects that were monitored was rated as 'good' or 'very good' in most cases. The benchmark of 'at least 70% of ROM reports giving a very good or good performance rating' was met during the period 2010-2013.

JC 8.3 “During implementation the chosen aid modalities, instruments and partners facilitated the achievement of the expected results”

The implementation of the cooperation programme, which was heavily slowed down in the early period due to difficult security conditions, advanced in full cruising speed from 2013 onwards (I-8.3.1). The earlier backlog related to delays in contracting of the MIP 2007-2010 has progressively been cleared, and the contracting and start-up of the following programmes was progressing satisfactory as of 2013. At project level, the ten monitored projects typically show a good efficiency (I-8.3.2). Several programmes (e.g. CACL-II, Access to Justice project, IP3, TVET I) however experienced implementation delays, mostly owing to the following reasons: security concerns, weaknesses in the institutional capacities of the governments, insufficient skills in the expertise mobilised, and inefficiencies in the internal organization of implementing partners. In order to adapt to the implementation delays of BS programmes, the EU was flexible in the assessment of conditions and performance and provided riders to adapt the operational provisions of the programmes. Besides, the flexible approach to the conception of BS tranches (“floating tranche”) and the extension period of execution of the related programmes and its complementary capacity building component have allowed BS programmes to be implemented in full without important level of de-commitment on BS annual instalments.

The achievement of intended results was facilitated when three conditions for partner's selection were met: (i) knowledge of the local reality, (ii) technical capacity, and (iii) management capacity, including with respect to EU procedures (I-8.3.3). International NGOs and the private sector were the ones showing the strongest technical and management capacities. The GoP, the UN and large local NGOs proved to be strong partners when considering the knowledge of the local context. National NGOs the EU worked with were actively engaged in the country and the concerned provinces and benefited from established reputation in terms of previous or ongoing community empowerment and driven approaches, advocacy works or impartial stand for monitoring of electoral process.

The EU's cooperation in Pakistan proved more effective in the sectors where the EU ensured combined convergence of two approaches: a bottom-up approach leading to social mobilisation and demand for better governmental services and institutions, and a top-down approach that achieves sustainable improvement in the coverage and quality of front line public services delivery, through active involvement of local communities and economic actors. This was for instance the case in rural development and trade. On the one hand, the EU supported a bottom-up approach to raise local empowerment and social mobilisation at community and economic operators' level. This was best done when implemented by large local NGOs belonging to the Rural Support Programme Network. On the other hand, the EU supported official institutions to raise their governance and institutional capacity to help with the formulation and implementation of public policies that respond to local or market needs. This aspect was supported with BS and technical assistance projects.

2.9 EQ9 Visibility

This question addresses the perception of the EU in the country. The evaluation period has indeed seen significant changes relating to the politics, policies, institutions and implementation modalities of (i) the EU, (ii) the Member States, and (iii) the Pakistani authorities, and the relationship between those parties, as well as externalities such as the security situation or the overall political, economic and social situation.

The question concentrates on (i) EU visibility actions and their effects on key stakeholders in the country; and (ii) stakeholders' perceptions of the EU in its pursuit of development cooperation objectives.

The evidence on which the response to this question is based is detailed in the dedicated Annex A12.

EQ9

What has been the visibility and perception of the EU in its pursuit of development cooperation objectives?

Summary of response:

The EUD took visibility seriously though these efforts did not materialize in the adoption of a formal communication strategy or in a shared view of the audiences to be targeted. Visibility actions implemented remained below initial expectations due to a combination of factors: limited human and financial resources, limited staff capacity, and the security situation posing difficulties. A range of visibility actions was implemented, mostly to disseminate information on EU projects. Data on the effects of these actions on EU visibility is scarce. Internal documents show a positive trend in overall EU visibility, starting from a low point in 2008. At project level, the effects of the actions implemented on EU visibility were not properly measured due to the absence of well-defined indicators and a reporting focused at activity-level that did not assess for each action or each group of actions the success achieved by them. Some projects still gave high visibility to the EU (e.g. EU EOM in 2008) though this was not linked to the implementation of specific visibility actions. For projects implemented through international organizations or EU MS, EU visibility generally remained relatively low. The awareness of IOs of EU guidelines on visibility and reporting was uneven across partners. EU MS (and in particular the UK and Germany) - who had more financial and human resources than the EU to lead visibility actions - tended to promote bilateral visibility before EU's one.

Key stakeholders in Pakistan generally considered the EU a rather neutral and credible partner. The overall opinion of Pakistanis on the EU slightly improved during the period, from 45% of unfavorable opinion during 2007-2011 to 22% in 2013, as reflected by data from the Pew Research Center. However, the EU has not done sufficiently to boost its visibility. This resulted in an under-exploited potential to pass on EU political and economic messages.

JC 9.1 “EU cooperation has been visible to key stakeholders in Pakistan”

The EU Delegation paid due attention to visibility issues. Attempts to formulate a specific communication strategy for promoting EU activities in Pakistan were made in 2008 and 2013, but they did not materialize with the formal adoption of such a strategy (I-9.1.1). In 2008, the EUD financed in 2008 a Visibility study²⁶ that presents an assessment of the current the situation as regards EU communication and visibility in the country and an outline for a visibility strategy. In 2013, the EUD undertook a stocktaking and forward-looking visibility exercise within the framework of the preparation of the 2013 EU Delegation’s Information & Communication Annual Report. It defined its communication objectives for 2014 with a view to ‘increase awareness about the EU in general’. Moreover, as a part of these efforts, the EU identified at times the audiences to be targeted, but this was not systematic and there was no shared view on the stakeholders to be targeted, which spanned a wide variety of actors (media representatives, civil society organisations, business representatives, government officials, development partners, the population at large, EU taxpayers, etc.) (I-9.1.2). Similarly, at project level, generic contractual clauses to ensure that the projects will be subject to the appropriate communication and information measures as well as budget provisions to finance visibility actions were generally foreseen (I-9.1.3 & I-9.1.4). These budget provisions were comprised between 0,2% and 4% of the total budget of the project for the 21 projects examined in depth.

Visibility actions were implemented, in particular to disseminate information on EU projects (I-9.1.3). They generally included conferences, workshops, information sessions, launch events, web sites, press releases, brochures, newsletters, and other promotional materials. In terms of communication channels, the EUD actively used the Facebook page, Twitter account created in May 2013 and the official webpage of the EUD in Pakistan. Interviewees met stressed that the Facebook and Twitter accounts have been well followed, notably due to daily actions to post and feed in stories. This enabled the visibility of EU projects to increase towards the end of the period.

Visibility actions implemented remained below initial expectations due to a combination of factors: limited human and financial resources, limited staff capacity and attention given to visibility, and the security situation posing difficulties (I-9.1.3).

- The EUD has had a Press and Information Officer (PIO) in charge of the overall communication and visibility actions throughout the period. The duties of the PIO were not limited to visibility, but also included Public Relations. Results were however below expectations. A professional communication consultant was contracted for two years (starting in 2013) by the rural development section in order to enhance EU’s visibility. The appointment of a part-time communication officer in April 2015 as focal point in the operations sections of the EU Delegation improved the human resources situation.
- Project managers also dealt with visibility in their daily work. They fed the Facebook, Twitter and official EUD webpages and are responsible to make sure that actions are visible. Whilst sensitised to the importance of visibility, they have not all received media

²⁶ Particip for the EU, *Visibility - Study on the image of and the level of awareness, perception, knowledge, and attitude towards EC activities in Pakistan*, 2008

training. Moreover, attention given to visibility varied across project managers. They are supposed to prepare yearly planning for projects communication activities, but so far this has been lacking.

- Various visibility opportunities could not be seized due to institutional aspects. With local staff and contract agents not being authorized to give feedback to the press, and the HoD being the one to speak on behalf of the EUD, chances for seizing visibility opportunities have been reduced.
- Throughout the period, the EUD had restricted budget, which prevented it from increasing EU's visibility, and among others from implementing the recommendations of the 2008 visibility study.
- Visibility actions were frequently reduced outside big cities and in sensitive regions or cancelled due to the difficult security situation throughout the entire period.

Data on the effects of these actions on EU visibility is scarce (I-9.1.6). Internal documents show a positive trend in overall EU visibility, starting from a low point in 2008. At project level, the effects of the actions implemented on EU visibility were not properly measured due to the absence of well-defined indicators and a reporting focused at activity-level that did not assess for each action or each group of actions the success achieved by them. For instance, only some relatively loose indicators have been mentioned (e.g. comparison of “before and after activities” scenarios to judge the involvement of partners). Some projects still gave high visibility to the EU (e.g. EU EOM in 2008) though this was not linked to the implementation of specific visibility actions.

For projects implemented through international organizations or EU MS, EU visibility generally remained relatively low (I-9.1.5). In Pakistan, a substantial proportion of EU projects has been implemented through international organizations. The terms and conditions of EU/UN or EU/WB cooperation are set in specific framework agreements, which include provisions for visibility. These agreements indicate that visibility activities should reflect the multi-party nature of multi-donor agreements, and also highlight partnership with the EC. EU visibility in projects implemented through international organisations was generally low. The EU often had to ensure more coverage through successful branding. Besides, the awareness of IOs of EU guidelines on visibility and reporting was uneven across partners throughout the period. Various interviewees underlined the general downplaying of EU visibility by the UN (UNICEF being an exception). EU MS (and in particular the UK and Germany) - who had more financial and human resources than the EU to lead visibility actions - tended to promote bilateral visibility before EU's one.

The EU has under-exploited its potential to pass on its economic and political messages. The EU has not done sufficiently to boost its visibility. In the early period, the EU has done very little to become visible in the Pakistan media and society. Towards the end of the period, the EU recognises it ‘has a political space to fill in Pakistan that goes beyond press and information activities’²⁷.

²⁷ Source: EU, *EU Delegation's Information & Communication Annual Report, 2013*

JC 9.2 “National actors and key stakeholders perceived the EU development cooperation as an important contribution to fighting poverty and helping Pakistan following a sustainable growth path”

The EU kept the image of a rather neutral and credible partner towards key stakeholders in Pakistan. In the early period, the EU was not really well known but tended to have a neutral image. The overall opinion of Pakistanis on the EU slightly improved during the period, from 45% of unfavorable opinion during 2007-2011 to 22% in 2013, as reflected by the polling data from the 2015 spring survey organized by the Pew Research Center. Interviews held in the field also showed that the EU had a neutral image but that it was not always very well known. Still, actors involved in certain areas perceived the EU as an actor having contributed to improvements in their field, notably in the area of human rights and the rule of law (see EQ6).

2.10 EQ10 **Coordination and complementarity**

This transversal question addresses key issues identified by the EU as part of the '3Cs', notably complementarity of EU interventions with those of EU Member States (MS) and coordination with other development partners. It addresses one of the 10 OECD FSP principles, namely "Principle 8: Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors". While aiming at drawing overall findings, it also focuses on complementary and coordination in the sectors covered in the previous EQs.

The evidence on which the response to this question is based is detailed in the dedicated Annex A13.

Note: The value added of EU interventions to those of the MS and the coherence of EU activities in Pakistan are addressed under EQ1.

EQ10	To what extent have EU interventions been complementary with those of other MS and coordinated with those of the other donors?
<p>Summary of response:</p> <p>In the absence of a formal division of labour, the EU and its member states aimed at achieving complementarity of their interventions by (i) regular contacts at strategy and sector levels through both formal and informal mechanisms and (ii) efforts to concentrate aid according to comparative advantages was adopted. General coordination in the EU monthly meetings proved effective while coordination at sector level showed a mixed picture across sectors.</p> <p>Overall aid remained quite fragmented in a volatile and changing aid landscape, with non-traditional donors progressively occupying a more significant place. At national level, donor coordination remained rather weak and was done on an ad hoc basis, notably due to an insufficient involvement of national authorities. The devolution process made coordination more complex, with the federal level remaining in charge in addition to the provinces. Donor coordination tended to rather take place at provincial level, with a varying picture across sectors and provinces. The strongest coordination was witnessed in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. Donor coordination was effective in education (both in the KP and Sindh provinces), TVET, PFM and on political reforms. The degree of coordination was overall satisfactory for the programmes implemented through international organisations (e.g. MDTF for the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, FATA and Balochistan).</p> <p>The EU had an active role in coordination, both with EU MS and like-minded donors, in particular in donor coordination groups at sector level (e.g. education), in the policy dialogue held within the framework of the MDTF, and in donors' actions concerning human rights and elections.</p>	

JC 10.1 “The EU cooperation strategy is complementary with that of the MS”

In the absence of formal division of labour, the EU and its MS were pragmatic in terms of complementarity (I-10.1.1). There was no overarching strategy established and implemented during the period to ensure complementarity of the EU strategy with that of EU Members States. A discussion among the EU Heads of Mission on a potential Joint Programming for 2016 emanated from an initiative of the EU and Germany in 2013. But no concrete follow-up emerged after that, notably due to the fact that the UK - the largest contributor to development aid - did not express interest to participate. Besides, EU MS expressed diverging views on Joint Programming: some showed enthusiasm for a Joint Programming Framework and a corresponding Joint Programming matrix, while others perceived Joint Programming as a “loss of time” and a project difficult to believe in, as it encompasses highly political issues and divergent priorities. Towards the end of the period, the EU and its MS were preparing their own cooperation multi-annual frameworks. Instead, cooperation between the EU and its MS at policy and programme level was based on regular contacts through the monthly meetings of the EU Development Counsellors and at sector level through both formal and informal mechanisms. Efforts were also made to concentrate aid activities of each MS in the areas/regions of their respective comparative advantage. The EU thus often left the lead to more important development partners in specific sectors. For instance, in the education sector in KP, the support to education reform was implemented in close collaboration with UK and Australia through a strong DFID lead joint bi-monthly dialogue mechanism with the GoP.

General coordination in the monthly meetings proved effective while coordination at sector level showed a mixed picture across sectors (I-10.1.2). The monthly meetings emerged as an effective discussion platform on what each Member State is doing in the country. They were also considered as a way to meet with others with whom some do not have common operations. Moreover, the cooperation fiches, coming out of the monthly meetings and established for each Member State, were considered useful for visibility reasons and as a baseline for potential coordination in implementing tasks. Overall, the role played by the EU in promoting the circulation of information was recognized as a very positive contribution. At sector level, successes were registered in the education and rural development sectors while challenges were encountered to coordinate work in the TVET sector.

JC 10.2 “The elaboration of the EU cooperation strategy and its implementation have been the object of a close coordination with the other development partners”

Concerning other development partners, aid generally remained quite fragmented. While the EU often aligned its inputs on the ones of like-minded donors - such as the United Kingdom, Germany, the USA or the World Bank – and tended to focus on areas where it has had a stronger comparative advantage, there was still ample scope for improved donor coordination towards the end of the period. The EU had in particular some points of divergence with the policy objectives and implementing methods of some partners (e.g. Japan, the AsDB, the Arab donors (Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates) and the Islamic Development Bank) (I-10.2.3). These differences were the result of various reasons (I-10.2.4):

- (i) differing geographical and political priorities: each donor, bilateral and multilateral, had its own strategic priorities and incentives framework, and generally tended to decide rather unilaterally the areas and the organisations and programmes to be funded. Besides, security considerations were important criteria to decide whether and where intervening.
- (ii) different types of implementing partners and financing modalities: some development partners always worked through federal government partnerships (e.g. Japan, World Bank), while others used instead local and international NGOs, private sector companies or local and international implementing partners (GIZ, KFW, UN). In addition, not all development partners agreed to participate in co-financing mechanisms such as the MDTF (e.g. Japan, France).
- (iii) weaknesses in government leadership in coordinating donors.

At national level, some coordination mechanisms emerged under the auspices of the GoP (EAD), but donor coordination remained rather weak and was mostly done on an ad hoc basis (I-10.2.1). This is partly linked to the fact that the Government was generally not active in coordinating donors. Useful exchange of information and policy dialogue still took place in the various international forums promoting aid effectiveness, for instance:

- The Pakistan Development Forum (PDF), the more broad-based and all-inclusive discussion forum convened on an annual basis to share the government's priorities, initiatives, and plans with its development partners;
- The Foreign Assistance Policy Framework (FAPF) that outlines the government's priorities with respect to aid modalities, areas of support, and division of labor; and
- The D-10 meetings organised infrequently by the EAD and which served as a joint Government-Partners Aid Effectiveness Steering Committee.
- The Friends of Democratic Pakistan group (FODP) that is a forum for policy dialogue and strategic discussion between the GoP and development partners to extend support to the GoP in its efforts to consolidate democracy, social and economic development in Pakistan.

But with an insufficient involvement of national authorities, the situation remained largely deficient and mostly left to donors among themselves.

Donor coordination rather took place at provincial level (I-10.2.1). With the devolution of powers to provinces in 2011, the different provincial governments got increasingly involved in donor coordination. The situation varied across provinces and sectors. The strongest coordination was witnessed in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. Donor coordination was effective in education (both in the KP and Sindh provinces), TVET, PFM and on political reforms. For instance:

- All active donors (including DfID, USAID, the EU, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Australia Aid, GTZ, the World Bank, JICA, CIDA and Norway) aligned assistance to the education sector reform plan approved by the government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, behind the United Kingdom as lead donor. United Kingdom, Australian Aid and the EU adopted a common performance assessment framework.
- The EU and the WB have supported the GoP education sector programme in Sindh in a coordinated and complementary way since 2007. They organized Joint Review Missions of the Sindh Education Plan Support Programme. In addition, coordination

with USAID took place at project level, with USAID and the EU financing education management systems in different districts.

- In the case of TVET, a Donor Working Group, set up by the National Vocational and Technical Training Commission and meeting once or twice a year, has been quite effective in harmonising donor interventions. There has been a progressive shift in the focus of coordination, moving more towards provinces and with a higher participation from the private sector.
- On public finance management, donor coordination was already common practice for a core donor group (World Bank, AsDB, DfID, and EU) and progress was made during the period. In the absence of concerted coordination led by the Government, donors exchanged information on a bilateral basis and met on a regular bi-monthly basis in a working group chaired by the World Bank.
- On political reforms, the EU worked closely with the UK, the USA, Japan and China on the institutional reform for FATA, in line with the constitutional change (18th Amendment) devolving powers to provinces.

For the programmes implemented through international organisations, the degree of coordination was generally satisfactory (I-10.2.1). For instance, the MDTF for the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, FATA and Balochistan - administered by the World Bank and supported by eleven development partners - was recognised as an important instrument to bring donors together with the provincial and federal governments. But the MDTF mechanism has also had its challenges: the government could not always adequately control the implementation process in the different provinces; and the fact that the MDTF envelope was directed to different provinces led to strong competition between the beneficiaries. Moreover, WB-EU coordination in the planning of the Sindh governance reform programme resulted in a good division of tasks: the EU support focused on capacity building in PFM within the Department of Finance, while the World Bank took in charge other aspects including taxation, procurement and roll out of possible investments across the districts.

The EU had an active role in coordination. It had a leading role in donor coordination groups at sector level (e.g. education), was actively involved in the policy dialogue held within the framework of the MDTF, and led donors' actions concerning human rights and elections (I-10.2.2).

- The EU led the donor roundtable in Sindh in 2004 to formulate the Sindh's Education Sector Plan and since then remained an important member of the Sindh Education Donors Group. With not many development partners working on education in Sindh, EU work was considered of paramount importance and its lead was acknowledged.
- Through the MDTF, the Delegation has been involved in policy dialogue between donors and the provinces of KP, Balochistan and FATA. But EU MS requested that the EU takes a more central role in the preparation of the MDTF round II (2016) and more importance in the MDTF in sharing the Advisory Committee.
- The EU was coordination leader on human rights issues with the EU Human Rights Working Group and on the response to death penalty, as well as on the electoral process, where the EU performed three successive EU Election Observation Missions (2002, 2008 and 2013).

3 Conclusions

This chapter presents the evaluators' overall assessment of the EU's cooperation with Pakistan over the period 2007-2014, followed by their series of conclusions.

3.1 Overall assessment

In Pakistan, the EU is a medium-sized development partner. The EU-Pakistan 5 year Engagement Plan (2012) following the 2004 Cooperation Agreement created a favourable frame for EU-Pakistan cooperation with a constructive platform for the exchange of views on both progress and issues of concern regarding a broad range of areas such as political dialogue, security and counter-terrorism, human rights, migration, trade and development cooperation. The focal sectors of EU cooperation have been aligned on these fields.

The findings of the present evaluation as well as the periodic reviews of the Plan allow to conclude that progress has been made towards the Plan's aim to achieve "a strategic relationship" and "a partnership for peace and development rooted in shared values, principles and commitments". In particular, actions in the fields of rural development, education (including TVET), human rights and democratisation have seized opportunities presented by Pakistan's return to democracy since 2008, contributed to respond to acute needs, and promoted gender equality, downwards accountability, democracy and good governance. Economic links have been strengthened with the adoption of the GSP+ trade regime. These achievements remain work in progress and need to be pursued.

The EU's soft approach allowed it to be appreciated as a "neutral" partner by national stakeholders, and its combination of financial and significant non-financial cooperation (notably through the high level political and strategic dialogue held in EU-Pakistan Joint Commission) to "punch above its weight". The EU addressed important needs the response to which was crucial to achieve its objectives of poverty reduction and growth built on stability, social cohesion and the rule of law. The continuity of support to selected sectors, the complementarity and potential synergies between these sectors, the pragmatic use of modalities and management modes and the assimilation of lessons learned made the EU strategy highly relevant and aligned to government policies.

Efficiency has been variable and faced important obstacles. Limited government buy-in in some cases; limited institutional and management capacities of some implementing agencies and beneficiaries; shocks (e.g. natural disasters and conflicts); internal changes (e.g. devolution); and overstretched human resources on the EU side, delayed several interventions, but in general intended activities were implemented and most expected outputs delivered.

Modalities and management modes proved important to achieve results. A central finding of this evaluation is that the EU did not sufficiently work with the grain of Pakistani society: by investing more in identifying promoters of democracy, inclusion and social

cohesion; by identifying initiatives that already carry ownership and commitment by national authorities and/or local civil society. Another central finding is that a key factor of success lied in the convergence of, on the one hand, a bottom-up approach leading to social mobilisation of citizens and economic operators for better governmental services and institutions, and, on the other hand, a top-down approach that improves the coverage, quality of and equitable access to front line public services. Supporting the first notably through local NGOs of the Rural Support Programme, and the second one with sector budget support and/or complementary institutional technical assistance, proved a promising approach.

While this desired convergence has only taken place in a limited way, the implementation of the EU strategy has paved the way ahead: progress has been realised in the functioning of institutions, the formulation of policies, the improved governance and management of the social and economic sectors supported, the mobilisation of community-based organisations, and the improved offer of education services. If visible outcomes for final beneficiaries have not materialised much yet, this is due to the fact that many interventions are still on-going, and that they could better target those initiatives that are locally-driven and involve the users of the supported institutions more directly, so that the latter become more responsive to the needs and demands of citizens and economic operators.

3.2 Conclusions

The conclusions are presented in a succinct form, with reference to the evaluation questions on which they are based. They are grouped in three clusters, shown in the table below:

Table 4: Overview of Conclusions

Overall Strategy and Modalities	
C1	Positioning of EU
C2	Overall intervention logic
C3	Reactivity to exogenous shocks
C4	Coherence
C5, C6	Budget Support at provincial level
C7, C8	Instruments, modalities and implementation modes
Sector-related Conclusions	
C9, C10	Rural Development
C11, C12	Education / TVET
C13	Democratisation
C14	Human Rights / Rule of Law
C15, C16	Trade
Conclusions on Transversal Issues	
C17	Gender
C18	Environment

Source:

ADE

Conclusions - Overall strategy

Positioning of EU

C1. The EU is a medium-sized development partner, but a significant donor. It could establish itself as a central partner by working with existing, endogenous development initiatives and local drivers of change (government and/or civil society). Its combination of (limited) financial support and (politically significant) non-financial support enabled it to punch above its weight. It inscribed its cooperation in the government's coordination mechanisms, which are still in the making at federal and provincial levels. In the absence of a formal division of labour and of joint programming, its choice of sectors and provinces took duly account of (key) other development partners' cooperation. The EU was appreciated for its soft approach and 'neutrality'. But the lack of effective communication during the period hampered its visibility.

Based on EQ1, EQ9 and EQ10

Overall intervention logic

C2. The EU cooperation strategies and programmes have by and large aimed to transform the complex and self-reinforcing dynamics at play during the evaluation period:

- The Intervention logic based on sound context analysis and addressed key development challenges and threats to stability over the evaluation period.
- The selection of the focal sector was appropriate in view of needs of the population and the government policies.
- The selection of geographical areas of interventions was justified in view of the needs, the relative size of the EU among the development partners in Pakistan, division of labour, and opportunities.
- There has been an effective combination of financial and non-financial cooperation.
- The continuity of the support (continuation through time of support to the same focal sectors, continuity of interventions within the sectors) allowed for a gradual integration of lessons learned and favoured deepening and consolidation of results.

Although institutional improvements and reforms are observed, political economy analysis has not sufficiently identified the drivers and incentives for progress needed for ensuring that reforms really contribute to the expected global impacts of poverty reduction, inclusive growth and stability.

Based on EQ1

Reactivity to exogenous shocks

C3. During the evaluation period, Pakistan has been affected by severe shocks (refugees, insecurity/conflict, flood). The EU response has favoured a continuum from humanitarian aid to development.

The EU has, whenever it was feasible, directed its programmed development aid to areas and populations most affected by those shocks. It has done so in parallel and in coherence with specific (DG ECHO) humanitarian and urgency instruments, and without disrupting the logic of its main cooperation programme. It has hereby favoured a continuum from humanitarian aid to development.

Based on EQs 1 to EQ4, and EQ6

Coherence

C4. The EU has sought to exploit potential for synergies and learning between interventions in the rural development, trade, and human rights sectors.

This relates for instance to labour and human rights dialogue as part of the GSP+ process, or the upgrading of promising value chains in rural areas.

Based on EQs 1 to 7

Budget support at provincial level

C5. Providing sector budget support (SBS) at the provincial level was relevant and timely given the decentralisation process which devolved during the evaluation period the full responsibility of key social sector policies to the provinces.

The use of the budget support modality at provincial level in this context entailed a number of challenges for both the EU and the beneficiary governments:

- The incomplete decentralisation process – although political responsibilities have been transferred to the provinces, their financial dependency from the federal government remain important with more than 80% of their resources coming from federal transfers. With delays in the implementation of local government Acts, devolution of administrative and financial responsibilities to lower tiers of the provinces – where institutional and management capacities still need to be strengthened - was still in the making.
- Lack of predictability of intergovernmental transfers during the fiscal year and weak budget credibility as the Constitution allows the Executive to amend budget priorities without prior approval of the Parliament.
- Weaknesses of the PFM systems capacities at federal, provincial and district levels, such as insufficient translation of policies into the budgets and poor credibility of budgetary execution and allocation of resources.
- Lack of understanding of the budget support modality by the partner governments at the beginning of the evaluation period but progressively addressed through a favourable learning curve from the Pakistani authorities.

- Enormous pressure put on the scarce human resources of the EUD faced with a new paradigm.

The EU has tried and continues to address these issues by strengthening its policy dialogue and with the provision of an important support to the PFM Reform of the Federal and Sindh governments. The start of the project since 2014 provided a valuable entry point to extend the policy dialogue carried out at provincial level to the federal level and address important macroeconomic issues related to tax reform, macroeconomic stability, coordination of federal and provincial fiscal policies as well as overall credibility of the budget management, which are instrumental for fiscal sustainability of public policy at provincial level.

Notwithstanding these difficulties and limitations, the use of SBS contributed to a series of achievements:

- It contributed, together with other financial donors to promote a fiscal space for the provinces. The advantage was important more in terms of predictability and security of the BS funds, contribution to a progressive prioritisation of budget execution on key non-salary current and development expenditures than in terms of additional financial resources, given the low rate of execution of the provincial development budgets;
- It supported the policy-making process and proved an important platform for a policy dialogue on policy issues in the sectors;
- It allowed an important capacity-strengthening component directly hooked on the policies supported by the SBS, e.g. teacher recruitment and education policy and in-service training, education management reform at district level, education monitoring systems;
- In fragile and conflict-affected regions the SBS allowed a flexible use of budgetary resources, as by the nature of the instrument it is not tied to specific activities.

Based on EQ2, EQ3, EQ8 and Annex A3

C6. The use of sector budget support (SBS) to support provincial reform strategies in specific sectors in Sindh and KP was relevant but highly risky given the fragile and changing political and administrative environment. SBS was implemented in a very pragmatic way. At the beginning there has been flexible assessment of eligibility criteria, which would probably have led to the non-eligibility of SBS in the context of the 2012 BS guidelines. However, this was justifiable, and to large extent successful, in an attempt to use SBS to improve policy formulation and to serve as an entry point for capacity building interventions to improve PFM and governance. Assessment of eligibility criteria has been further improved during the evaluation period, especially for the support sector public policy. The value of SBS was more the technical dialogue and capacity strengthening it allowed than the fiscal space it generated, although the latter was not completely absent. SBS have tried through key performance indicators linked to core required institutional reforms and other transformative policy measures as well as key public expenditures programmes to path the way for improvement of service delivery and quality outcomes at provincial level.

Based on EQ2, EQ3 and EQ8

Instruments, modalities, and implementation modes

C7. The diversity of instruments (MIP, RIP, specific budget lines...), modalities (BS, TA, projects, pool funds) and approaches (LRRD) deployed by the EU has allowed to fine tune its support to the specificities of the needs it wanted to address.

However, there have been missed opportunities in terms of ‘connecting the dots’ in the field of democratic governance, for instance in establishing closer linkages between political/policy dialogue and projects.

Based on EQs 1, 2, 7 and 8

C8. The EU has used and combined diverse modalities to implement its projects. Insufficient match between the characteristics required by an intervention and those of the implementing partner proved a severe constraint in the achievement of the results of some projects.

The EU has used a number of modalities and management modes (BS, projects, contribution agreements with UN agencies, delegation agreement with MS agencies, and grant agreements with NGOs).

This variety constitutes an advantage because it offers flexibility, permits to overcome some constraints of resources in the Delegation, and allows to meet a variety of situations. The strong and weak points of the various modalities and implementation modes are analysed in main report (EQ8) and the annexes of this evaluation. In sum:

- Four characteristics for implementing partners are important:
 1. Presence in the field and knowledge of the local reality are essential for programmes that need an important deployment on the ground. *Potential “good” partners are mainly UN agencies with large territorial presence , large national NGOs, International NGOs;*
 2. Technical capacity/knowledge of the subject is central for capacity strengthening. *Potential “good” partners are mainly “technical” UN bodies (ITC, WIPO, UNIDO...), private sector companies;*
 3. Management capacity, including understanding of EU procedures is important for swift implementation of projects. *Potential “good” partners are mainly private sector companies, some international NGOs;*
 4. Capacity to implement policy reforms or to induce/advocate for policy changes. *Potential “good” partners are mainly governments, advocacy NGOs.*

The implementation modalities selected for the interventions of the EU were generally coherent with the above typology but it appeared that in several cases the implementation agency met one or some of the criteria but not on others. For instance, some UN agencies had a good presence in the field but weak managerial capacity and insufficient response to EU reporting demands. The RAHA programme implemented by UNDP/UNHCR being such an example, moreover the specific characteristics of both agencies made them an inadequate combination for joint implementation.

- Combining modalities to support the same sector is a factor of success (e.g. supporting local communities through programmes implemented by national NGOs and in parallel supporting governments with BS, or upgrading specific product value chains with NGOs and strengthening with TA the certification agencies). This evaluation shows that there has

been a learning process allowing the EU to gradually improve its selection and combination of implementing partners).

Based on EQs 1, 2, 7 and 8

Sector-related Conclusions

Rural development

C9. The EU approach to support the rural development sector was relevant and contributed to improve community empowerment.

The selection of rural development as focal sector was fully justified. Immense needs in this area, in the provinces where EU intervened but also in others.

The two pronged approach proved commendable and took advantage of experience gained by the long standing rural sector program network. It consisted, on the one hand, in supporting the creation of community-based organisations and their mobilisation into village organisations and the federation of these into local support organisations (LSO) capable of receiving applying for and managing subsidies/funding,. On the other hand it aimed at strengthening the provincial and local government capacity to develop a policy addressing the needs and responding the demands of these LSOs.

Interesting and commendable convergence has been organised with the support to trade and private sector through trade programme TRTA III.

Visible results have achieved - the process of networking of community-based organisations into village organisations and those into local support organisations is well engaged and there is evidence that a significant proportion of local support organisations which have been set up are well performing and are viable institutional constructions.

Based on EQ 2 (and EQ1)

C10. The added value of the EU rural development programmes in terms of democratisation, downwards accountability, state-citizen trust rebuilt, youth engagement, etc. cannot be firmly evidenced. Nevertheless, there are signs of progress in the materialisation of these higher aspirations when the programmes' design and implementation led to greater involvement, organisational motivation and sense of responsibility of the citizens.

There was clear intent expressed in all rural development programme design documents to positively impact on democratisation, to increase downward accountability and to contribute to rebuilding state-citizen trust. Some project results clearly point to increased citizen participation and downward accountability within the community organisations created and supported.²⁸ Such achievements are dependent on key design and implementation factors. These include implementation by skilled and experienced staff in areas in which they have had long and

²⁸ For the PEACE project for instance: 71% of CBOs ensured good or excellent participation of members during identification and planning stages, with a greater number of women's COs (46% versus 33%) achieving excellent participation. The findings of the PEACE Assessment of Institutional Development of Men and Women CO also found that "nearly half of the COs (men and women) by and large involved and engaged members and took collective decisions", with a further 25% ensuring largely equitable distribution of benefits.

successful associations. In the case of one programme (PEACE), although there is little documentation on state-citizen trust, there is evidence of significant presence of democracy and downward accountability within community organisations, although little relating to what happens on federation into village organisations and to local support organisations.

In contrast poor design and severe implementation, monitoring and accounting shortfalls within another project (RAHA) undermined achievements in the higher level aspects, although undoubtedly the multitude of micro realisations were a response to demands expressed by the local communities and were appropriated by them. But given the absence of more strategic management and deeper engagement into the process of building sustainable communities it is questionable whether these achievements contributed to build state-citizen trust, increasing downward accountability and fostering democratisation.

Based on EQ 2 (and EQ1)

Education/ TVET

C11. The provincial budget support approach to the sector was appropriate to support policy at the level of responsibility of its formulation and implementation

- Support has produced visible results in terms of consolidation of provincial education sector reform plans and management of the sector service delivery (merit-based recruitment and monitoring of teachers, school consolidation process and teacher education policy). But EU support could not yet address the issues of weak budget execution in key non-salary sector public expenditure programmes and inefficiency of PFM. Results in terms of education indicators remain modest or negative and linkage to EU support difficult to establish. Strong focus on required institutional reforms and management capacities still need to be fully institutionalised before leading to positive results in terms of sustainable improved service delivery quality and access, and educational/learning outcomes.
- Selection of provinces of intervention and type of support concerted with other donors (EU in Sindh with joint policy dialogue and monitoring with World Bank support; not in Punjab in view of dominant presence of DfID; BS in KP but no support to PFM because it is taken up by DfID, etc).
- Strong PFM programme articulated on provincial (Sindh) and federal level already allowed improvements of the sector PFM.

Based on EQ3, EQ4 and EQ10

C12. Support to the TVET provided highly needed institutional strengthening, improved training and curricula, but achieved limited or no results in terms of employability:

- Bias in favour of social demands (demands of skills by the applicants) rather than market demands (demands of skills by the market).
- Absence of study identifying the skills in need.

Based on EQ3, EQ4 and EQ10

Democratisation

C13. There is some evidence that the EU has contributed to progress of democracy in Pakistan in several areas, and has laid down foundations for further engagement.

- Although not more peaceful, Pakistan is more democratic in 2014 than in 2007.
- It is hard to establish the EU contribution to this improvement (including for issues of implementation), but stakeholders attribute positive outcomes to EU cooperation in several areas, most notably electoral observation (EU and domestic); and foundation work for future electoral reforms.
- There have been considerable learning and improvement over the period under review: in particular, EU support became more systemic; more strategic and tied to political and policy dialogue; and balanced between support to federal and provincial levels.
- The EU being perceived as neutral compared to other development partners has been an advantage and has resulted in trust being built with important stakeholders (e.g. in Parliament and in provincial governments).

Based on EQ5 (and EQ9) and Annex A2 (Fragility Note)

Human Rights / Rule of Law

C14. Despite limited visible progress outside democratisation as yet, the EU has probably mitigated the degradation of the human rights and security situation; and has laid down solid foundations for further engagement.

- The 2007-2014 period could be summarised as “more democracy and political participation but less peace and less civil liberties”, with a degradation of the human rights and rule of law situation. On the one hand, Pakistan has returned to civilian rule; democratic institutions have improved; the judiciary, civil society and the media were able to assert some autonomy from the executive, and the 18th Amendment reduces the powers of the president in favour of the parliament and prime minister, and devolves resources and responsibilities to the provinces. On the other hand, there were self-reinforcing dynamics of continued poverty affecting particular groups and districts and grievances (culminating in secessionism and terrorism). Civilian casualties from terrorism reached a peak of over 3,000 in both 2012 and 2013. By 2013, they were still extrajudicial and targeted killings, disappearances, torture, lack of rule of law (including lack of due process, poor implementation and enforcement of laws, and frequent mob violence and vigilante justice), and sectarian violence—which continued unabated, leading to GoP lifting the moratorium on the death penalty.
- In terms of EU project outputs, the record is mediocre, when performance is documented (there are unusually large gaps in monitoring), and their underlying logic of intervention shaky: projects relied heavily on the assumption of “enough” political will from both Pakistani state and society, and that capacity was the main binding constraint on a better human rights and security record.
- However, over time the political dialogue and tying in of GSP+ status has led to the right level of engagement with Government. Combined with projects, they seem to have established the EU as a trusted partner. This is of key importance given the degraded security and human rights situation: at least, the EU is maintaining dialogue on human rights and a human rights approach to counter-terrorism; and is building leverage in this dialogue via GSP+.

Based on EQ5 and Annex A2 (Fragility Note)

Trade

C15. EU continuous support to the trade sector over a period of 12 years has contributed to important realisations but benefits in terms of trade expansion and diversification are not yet clearly visible.

The valuable and appreciated EU support to the sector has focused successfully on upgrading a number of important trade infrastructure (notably in the field of sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures, accreditation, etc.) and trade-related institutions (e.g. institutions needed to to understand and comply with WTO regulations, Competition Commission, etc.). Whereas these improvements are necessary for engagement in international trade, the benefits to the trade operators remain limited and no notable progress can be observed in terms of trade expansion, export diversification or regional integration.

Over the period of the evaluation the trade and investment context has deteriorated due notably to security issues and regional conflicts. This factor is not sufficient to explain the absence of progress. In terms of ease and cost of doing business the relative position of Pakistan has deteriorated (regulatory framework, power and gas shortages) and the national trade strategy (and its support by the EU) addressed institutional and organisational matters more than on how to improve the performance of the private sector and exporters.

The more recent TRTA III programme, using lessons learned in the rural development sectors, addresses a number of deficiencies of previous interventions and paves the way for results in terms of diversification and improved local capacity to develop productive activities, although at a microeconomic level.

Based on EQ 7 and the Context note on the trade sector in Annex A10

C16. Combination of financial and non-financial cooperation (notably GSP+) contributed to important increase of trade to the EU, although mitigated by trade displacement.

Over the evaluation period total Pakistan exports of goods have experienced a modest increase in dollar terms but in % of GDP they have declined.

Based on EQ 7 and the Context note on the trade sector in Annex A10

Conclusions on Transversal Issues

Gender

C17. The EU mainstreamed gender into the design and implementation of its programmes with significant results but no evidence of spill over beyond the beneficiary communities.

- The appalling status of women is a major issue in Pakistan and is recognised as such by the government, which has created institutions and formulated policies to address it.
- The importance of gender is also recognised by the EU and factored into all its programmes. Moreover, some of them have specifically focused on the gender issue (e.g. violence against women, education of girls, women's access to justice).
- The gender dimension is taken into account in variable ways according to the nature of the programmes. In programmes aimed at strengthening institutions, where it was relevant, attention has been paid to the capacity of the supported institutions to address their services to women. In programmes targeting directly the populations an effort has been made to include the participation of women both as beneficiaries and providers of all activities. Reports of the implementation agencies show that inclusion of women in the activities has really been an objective and has materialised in a large participation of women. The Partnership with the Rural Support Programmes Network proved the most fruitful in terms of empowerment of women as evidenced by the results of the PEACE and TRTA III programmes for instance.
- Based on the previous point EU interventions had favourable effects on women belonging to the targeted beneficiaries of the programmes. The question of the contribution of the EU to the situation of women in Pakistan is less evident to answer. The documents and the interviews converge in highlighting that EU programmes have contributed to
 - An increased awareness of the gender issues including in the discussions of the local communities.
 - A confirmation of the extremely important role of women as actors of development. In terms of inclusiveness, for example, a survey of community organisations supported by the PEACE programme in Malakand reports that 75% of women community organisations (compared to 60% for men organisations) have a participation of more than 50% poor members.

Nevertheless, national and provincial indicators do not demonstrate significant progress in terms of evolution of violence against women, higher enrolment and literacy rates, or improved employability. Given the relative small size of the EU interventions it is unlikely that their results could translate into global figures for such a large and diverse country as Pakistan, but it is more than likely that the EU contribution was a significant input into behavioral changes which will require further efforts to materialize into society changes.

Based on the Fragility Note (Annex A3), on EQ2, EQ3, EQ4, EQ7, and the context sections of the evidence papers relating to these EQs (Annexes A5, A6, A7 and A10)

Environment

C18. The EU has taken due consideration of environment, natural resources management and climate change, with visible results in the areas and communities targeted. A more global impact of these actions is less likely in absence of fundamental reforms.

- Deterioration of the environment is severe in Pakistan and constitutes a costly impediment to development as well as an additional factor of deprivation for vulnerable and poor communities. Government institutions and policies have been set up to support sustainable development and also to meet international obligations.
- The EU has initiated a number of programmes factoring in the environmental dimension and with components addressing natural resources, environmental protection and climate change. In addition to the development cooperation programmes of the MIP, ECHO interventions (early warning systems, early recovery) addressed environmental issues.
- The EU programmes, in particular the activities aiming at rural development and empowerment of local communities, produced a large number of small scale projects favourable to the conservation and protection of natural resources, a safer environment and climate change mitigation. This has been achieved through investment in sanitation, safe water, renewable energy, protection of soils, improvement of local irrigation mechanisms, etc. In the trade sector, support and training have been provided to encourage environment-friendly production practices, with changes of behaviour observed among the beneficiaries.
- These efforts have been beneficial to the communities where they were undertaken and are likely to be sustainable as they responded to demands of these communities who also contributed to their implementation. However, they are unlikely to have a global impact on the environmental deterioration in Pakistan for two reasons: 1° their small scale and small critical mass compared to the extent of the problem at the level of the country; and, 2°, more important, because addressing environment issues effectively in Pakistan would require fundamental structural reforms in areas such as taxation, application of the polluter-payer principle, and land reform. The reluctance of the Government of Pakistan to engage into a dialogue on these issues with the development partners has not allowed the EU to go beyond its valuable but limited support to this important issue.

Based on the Fragility Note (Annex A3), EQ2, EQ7, and the context sections relating to EQ2 and EQ7 (Annexes A5 and A10)

4 Recommendations

This chapter presents the evaluators' recommendations to EU headquarter services and Delegations.

The recommendations are based on the analysis and conclusions presented in the previous chapters and are formulated with the view to improve the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of the EU's cooperation programme with Pakistan. They are structured around clusters reflecting overall strategic considerations and sector-specific recommendations, as illustrated in the figure hereunder:

Overall strategy and modalities		Importance	Priority
R1	Capitalise on past lessons and achievements in in making strategic programming choices	High	High
R2	Refine the EU's overall logic of intervention	High	High
R3	Further strengthen the capacity of adaptation to external shocks	Medium	Medium
R4	Continue to address demand & supply sides of sector policies, and select accordingly the mix of modalities and implementation partners	High	Medium
R5	Further mainstream gender and environment at all levels	High	Medium
R6	Sector Budget Support at provincial level must address the need to develop a policy dialogue on provincial tax reform	High	Medium
R7	Sector Budget Support should focus more on improving overall budget credibility and accountability at federal and provincial levels	High	Medium
Rural Development			
R8	In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa consider how best to consolidate and ensure further development of achievements of past and on-going EU support to rural development (RD)	High	High
R9	Pursue support to RD in Baluchistan with the view of moving from support to the demand side to a two-pronged approach including also the supply side.	High	High
R10	Design of possible EU support to RD in other provinces should take into account key lessons from the past	High	High
Education & TVET			
R11	Promote further devolution and improvement of PFM at provincial's lower tiers level	High	High
R12	In future sector budget support programmes focus on education quality and learning outcomes (beyond institutional reforms)	High	Medium
R13	Promote further local accountability and governance system in education	Medium	Medium
R14	Continue support to TVET but adopt a systemic approach more market oriented	High	Medium
R15	Combine skills gap analysis with value chain analysis and	Medium	Medium

	development and privilege outreach of TVET support in areas where value chain development is implemented		
Democratisation, Human Rights and Rule of Law		Importance	Priority
R16	Update the logic of intervention in democratisation/human rights/rule of law	High	High
R17	Emphasise government communication and accountability to citizens	Medium	Medium
R18	Conduct upstream work on security / rule of law policies and norms	High	High
R19	Increase the coherence of EU support to democratisation/human rights/rule of law	Medium	Medium
Trade			
R20	Ensure sustainable and continued use of past achievements	High	Medium
R21	Use Pakistan strengthened trade related institutions to conduct necessary studies in view of preparing a trade strategy for the next three years	High	High
R22	If further institutional building is provided make sure it is focused on the needs of the potential “clients” of the institutions supported.	High	Medium
R23	Maximise trade enhancing contributions of non-trade interventions	Medium	Medium

Source: ADE

The recommendations aim at being practical. Their importance is ranked (high, medium or low) according to their critical character for achieving EU development objectives. Their degree of priority is also assessed as high if they are necessary for structuring the future cooperation effort or if their implementation is a prerequisite for implementation of other recommendations; and as medium if they are needed to improve efficiency and/or effectiveness of specific interventions.

4.1 Recommendations on the overall strategy and modalities

R1. Capitalise on past lessons and achievements in making strategic programming choices			
<i>Why?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Notwithstanding the medium size of EU cooperation in Pakistan, it could achieve positive results including in difficult sectors and regions and in politically sensitive areas. ▪ Factors favouring that situation: continuity of efforts, alignment on national policies, neutral approach, combination of financial & non-financial support, attempts to address roots of problems, and more pressing needs. ▪ This also favoured EU visibility and a positive image. 		
<i>Purpose</i>	Ensure deepening and viability of past achievements		
<i>Proposed actions</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Bank on achievements, experience and lessons learned, in particular in pursuing efforts in the same focal sectors. ▪ Ensure sustainability of EU of past achievements, in particular in continuing and deepening in the same region. ▪ If replicating in another region: ensure that sustainability can be guaranteed in regions where EU stops intervening (because needs decline or because of take-up by another donor). 		
<i>Importance</i>	High	<i>Basis</i>	C1 and C2
<i>Priority</i>	High		

R2. Refine the EU's overall logic of intervention			
<i>Why?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Changing environment and dynamics require regular adaptation of the cooperation's global intervention logic. This relates for instance to the implementation of the country's decentralization process; increasing security issues; the increasingly challenging issue of migration; the changing involvement of other partners; etc. ▪ EU analyses show consistent quality, but could be improved, for instance in terms of underlying assumptions; risk mitigation measures; linkages between outputs and expected outcomes; or drivers and incentives. ▪ The EU's multiannual indicative programme 2014-2020 has recently been approved, with new sector and geographic allocations. 		
<i>Purpose</i>	Clarify how the EU intends to see expected progress happen		
<i>Proposed actions</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Conduct political economy analyses at the level of sectors, programmes or cycles of aid, for better identification of stakeholders' drivers & incentives for progress (who, what, why, how). Consult therefore also civil society. These analyses should take account of drivers/incentives and provide risk mitigation measures in programming; project design; and political and policy dialogue. Resources should be made available to enable solid studies. ▪ Refine the EU's logic of intervention, at country and provincial levels. 		

	<p>Further integrate in the EU's strategy & activities government accountability, State-society relations, social cohesion, and job creation.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Clarify linkages of its development cooperation programme with security and migration agendas. ▪ Clarify the rationale of the overall cooperation programme (choice of sectors and provinces, consolidation or phasing out, modalities, etc.) and clarify the links underlying current/future programming and desired operational changes. ▪ It is plausible that EU support to education, rural development, justice and trade contributed to stemming radicalism and violent extremism. Possibly conduct a study on how these relationships play out and what the evidence entails for EU engagement. ▪ Strengthen project M&E including on outcomes for target populations. 		
<i>Importance</i>	High	<i>Basis</i>	C2
<i>Priority</i>	High		

R3. Further strengthen the capacity of adaptation to external shocks

<i>Why?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The EU has been reactive to exogenous shocks in both humanitarian aid and development cooperation. ▪ EU actions in both fields were conducted in parallel and in coherence, without disrupting the logic of the development cooperation programme. 		
<i>Purpose</i>	To strengthen the resilience to shocks through closer linkages between humanitarian aid and development cooperation		
<i>Proposed actions</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Further anticipate and plan possible complementarities between urgent humanitarian reaction and on-going development interventions. Reinforce ties between DEVCO and ECHO, notably in nutrition, education and rural development. Consider also complementarities on civil protection and on internally displaced persons (IDPs). ▪ Coordinate and exchange information more closely between DEVCO and ECHO, at both programming and project levels. This relates notably to issues of nutrition and refugees in support to rural development (to be addressed in programmes and in policy and political dialogues), and to budget support and other activities in the field of rural development through the Rural Sector Programmes (RSPs) in KP, for example in the area of Gilgit Baltistan Chitra. ▪ The intention to start a Joint Humanitarian and Development Framework (JHDF) between ECHO and DEVCO is an interesting step in this perspective. 		
<i>Importance</i>	Medium	<i>Basis</i>	C3
<i>Priority</i>	Medium		

R4. Continue to address demand and supply sides of sector policies, and select accordingly the mix of modalities and implementation partners			
<i>Why?</i>	<p>The two-pronged approach proved appropriate to promote more efficient service delivery to the population. On the one hand, it supports the final beneficiaries of public policies and services in improving their skills and managerial capacities and in addressing their demands for improved public services. On the other hand, it support the public authorities in improving their capacity to understand and respond to these demands.</p> <p>The evaluation shows that this has been a promising approach in various sectors but it requires a careful mix of modalities and selection of implementing partners. Regarding the latter the evaluation shows that efficient and effective implementation requires that the implementing partners have specific characteristics that differ according to the type of intervention. The correct match between partner's characteristics and type of intervention is crucial for the performance of the projects.</p>		
<i>Purpose</i>	To improve efficiency and effectiveness of sector support		
<i>Proposed actions</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Promote a converging bottom-up and top-down approaches for efficient public services governance and delivery. Assess at design stage the best sequence of support of the various elements of demand and supply sides and identify the required qualities from the implementation agencies for each component. Inform this assessment with a comprehensive analysis of the institutional context, including at decentralised and local levels. ▪ <i>On the demand side:</i> Strengthen population (students, producers, farmers...) in terms of advocacy, empowerment, organisational and professional capacities. ▪ <i>On the supply side:</i> Promote good governance and support enabling environment (policies, budget...) for public services delivery, economic activities and responsiveness to the demand of the population. ▪ When selecting implementing partners ensure that they meet as many as possible of the key characteristics (listed in C8) that are the most important for the type of project they will have to manage. 		
<i>Importance</i>	High	<i>Basis</i>	C7, C8
<i>Priority</i>	Medium		

R5. Further mainstream gender and environment at all levels			
<i>Why?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Gender and environment were effectively mainstreamed in EU programmes. ▪ The government is aware of the importance of these issues, and makes genuine effort to address them. ▪ Progress on Gender requires to address the mindset: EU programmes have contributed to it but needs further gigantic efforts. ▪ Progress on Environment faces major constraints in the absence of fundamental structural reforms. 		

<i>Purpose</i>	To further promote and support behavioural changes in these cross cutting areas		
<i>Proposed actions</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ DEVCO to further mainstream gender & environment in all cooperation activities. EEAS to also address gender & environment in policy and political dialogues. ▪ <i>Gender + Environment:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Support civil society advocacy. ○ Privilege women community-based organisations in local community empowerment. ○ Promote awareness and incentives for government accountability. ○ Support mainstreaming and monitoring of these issues at all levels (national/provincial/district/local governments). ▪ <i>Gender:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Continue promoting priority focus on gender issues in national / provincial sector policies (education, RD, justice...). ○ Continue supporting behavioural changes in cooperation programmes, based on sound analysis of drivers and incentives. ▪ <i>Environment:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Continue to seize any opportunity for addressing environmental issues in financial and non-financial cooperation (e.g. in fiscal policy and regulatory framework). ○ Duly consider climate change in disaster risk management. The more so that it can be easily factored in into these activities as it consists essentially of mitigation and adaptation. 		
<i>Importance</i>	High	<i>Basis</i>	C17 and C18
<i>Priority</i>	Medium		

R6. Sector Budget Support at provincial level must address the need to develop a policy dialogue on provincial tax reform.

<i>Why?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Improved domestic resource mobilisation at federal and provincial is key to provide the required fiscal space for the financing of public service delivery and ensure fiscal sustainability of devolved functions (e.g. education, rural development...). ▪ Under-performance of the country tax reform during the 7th NFC Award. ▪ At provincial level, there is a considerable margin of manoeuvre for enhancing tax revenues (general sale tax on services, property tax, income tax on agriculture). ▪ Optimising provincial tax basis can contribute to reduce strong provincial fiscal dependence on federal intergovernmental transfers and reduce overall fiscal risks related to the devolution process.
<i>Purpose</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ To improve financial sustainability of sector provincial policies and reforms and reduce provinces' dependency on intergovernmental transfers

	and external aid.		
<i>Proposed actions</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Engage in policy dialogue on provincial tax reform in the framework of EU Sector Reform Contract. Use the € 15 M EU PFM TA project with Federal and Sindh province as key entry point. 		
<i>Importance</i>	High	<i>Basis</i>	C5
<i>Priority</i>	Medium		

R7. Sector Budget Support should focus more on improving overall budget credibility and accountability at federal and provincial levels and on strengthening PFM capacities at sub-provincial levels.

<i>Why?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Constitution allows the Executive to amend in-year budget appropriations and priorities without prior approval from Parliament (at federal and provincial levels). Lack of budget credibility undermines public policy implementation and overall public accountability. Need to ensure more transparent and predictable formula-based intergovernmental fiscal transfers between provincial and lower tiers' level. Need further consolidate and deepen the operational aspects of the devolution/decentralisation process at provincial level. 		
<i>Purpose</i>	Improve budget credibility and transparency of funding including at sub-provincial level.		
<i>Proposed actions</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Conduct the dialogue on eligibility criteria and provincial PFM reform process at both the federal and provincial levels in view of the close technical linkages. Follow closely the process of re-establishment of Provincial Finance Commission Awards. Inform PFM policy dialogue with drill down diagnostic tools (PER, PETS, PEFA) on effective level of provincial budget execution and efficiency of public expenditures. Strengthen PFM capacities at district and local government levels to accompany the decentralization/devolution process at sub-provincial and lower tier levels. Consider the support/strengthening of budget analysis capacities in the provincial/local assemblies. Use the €15M EU PFM TA project as key entry point. 		
<i>Importance</i>	High	<i>Basis</i>	C5 and C6
<i>Priority</i>	Medium		

4.2 Recommendations on Rural Development

R8. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa consider how best to consolidate and ensure further development of achievements of past and on-going EU support to rural development (RD)			
<i>Why?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ RD has been and remains relevant focal sector with a long EU investment in KP; the two programmes RAHA & PEACE are ended or near end; KP-DGCD is ongoing. ▪ EU support contributed to important achievements, e.g. in terms of successful support to women community organizations, in terms of policy and governance of the sector, but they are still fragile and may need continued external support to become sustainable. It is therefore essential that if a phasing out from this province is envisaged it takes place only if there is a guarantee that the effort can be pursued with alternative support. 		
<i>Purpose</i>	To ensure consolidation and sustainability of achievements of past EU RD support in KP.		
<i>Proposed actions</i>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> i. Continue on-going support to/through KP Government with SBS + TA. ii. Focus on improving local government's capacity to respond to needs of local communities (may require drill down studies, PER, PETS, to better understand the functioning of key governance mechanisms at district/local level). Strengthen linkages with elected local governments. iii. Ensure institutional vertical (provincial <- -> local) and horizontal (across sectors) coordination mechanisms. iv. Continue the two-pronged approach but check if EU support is still needed on the demand side. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▸ Pursue effort on the supply side: BS + TA to develop KP Gov. capacity to respond to the demands of local communities. ▸ Demand side: pursue three tiered social mobilisation approach; check if EU support still necessary, or if RSPs and existing LOs can go ahead without further support. 		
<i>Importance</i>	High	<i>Basis</i>	C9 and C10
<i>Priority</i>	High		

R9. Pursue support to RD in Balochistan with the view of moving from support to the demand side to a two-pronged approach including also the supply side.			
<i>Why?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Region with acute needs in terms of community development. ▪ Numerous factors of fragility at work. ▪ Experience with KP shows that prerequisites are needed. ▪ PFM at local level needs strengthening. 		
<i>Purpose</i>	To strengthen provincial policy capacity to respond to demands and needs of local communities		

<i>Proposed actions</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ To continue support to the demand side adopting the RSPs approach (demand side). ▪ To engage into an in depth policy dialogue with Baloch. Gov. on policy reforms and administrative responsibilities in order to identify clear steps required before engaging into SBS (supply side). ▪ To provide strong institutional TA (PFM, policy formulation/ implementation) and drill down studies (PER, PETS). 		
<i>Importance</i>	High	<i>Basis</i>	C9 and C10
<i>Priority</i>	High		

R10. Design of possible EU support to RD in other provinces should take into account key lessons from the past

<i>Why?</i>	EU experience in KP and Baluchistan with various modalities and implementation partners provides useful lessons for intervening in other provinces.		
<i>Purpose</i>	Replicate factor of success of rural development sector projects		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Aim at combining support to the demand side and the supply side (more important and politically easier, but technically more complex, as local governments are elected). ▪ On the demand side adopt the three tiered social mobilisation approach and privilege partners from the RSPN. ▪ On the supply side strengthen government (TA) and, if risks allow, support its policy with SBS or SWAP. ▪ Be cautious with BS (eligibility criteria, matrix of conditions, attention to PFM an institutional responsibilities at federal, provincial and lower tier levels). ▪ Design programmes so that they remain manageable (cf. difficulties with Raha). ▪ Ensure regular production of sufficient and reliable data (type, quality and quantity) to allow monitoring progress. 		
<i>Importance</i>	High	<i>Basis</i>	C9 and C10
<i>Priority</i>	High		

4.3 Recommendations on Education & TVET

R11. Promote further devolution and improvement of PFM at provincial lower-tiers level			
<i>Why?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Strong re-concentration of education policy management at provincial level. ▪ Local elections providing favourable prospects to deepen devolution process to decentralise responsibilities to districts and local bodies. ▪ Persistence of downstream institutional constraint and key weaknesses in public financial and administrative management at decentralised local level that result in low budget execution of non-salary current & development expenditures as well as poor quality service delivery. 		
<i>Purpose</i>	Promote the operationalisation of a multi-level sector governance and ensure sufficient capacity to improve the financing and delivery of front-line education services at all administrative levels.		
<i>Proposed actions</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Keep decentralisation process and local governance at the heart of EU policy dialogue with provincial/districts/local authorities. ▪ Inform the EU policy dialogue with provincial authorities through political economy analysis of the education sector and the financing and analysis of drill down PFM diagnostic tools such as education public expenditure review and public expenditure tracking surveys. ▪ Promote financial and administrative management capacity development of district and lower government administrations. ▪ Promote involvement of districts and local education institutions to planning and budgeting process. ▪ Consider under Sector Reform Contract the design of Key Performance Indicators on provincial education budget credibility and PFM at sub-provincial levels including district and school level budget planning process, execution and reporting. 		
<i>Importance</i>	High	<i>Basis</i>	C5 and C11
<i>Priority</i>	High		

R12. In future sector budget support programmes focus on education quality and learning outcomes (beyond institutional reforms)			
<i>Why?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ While there is a need to pursue and consolidate institutional, governance and financial management reforms in the education sector, as well as to promote better access, persistent problems remain with regard to poor learning outcomes that have so far impeded any positive impacts on key educational MDG and EFA goals. 		
<i>Purpose</i>	Improve the quality and effectiveness of related public service delivery system		
<i>Proposed actions</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Assist the administration to develop an education balanced scorecard approach for its policy planning and monitoring at provincial and districts 		

	<p>levels. Include in it elements to monitor both access and participation, as well as quality of education, as both are mutually supporting.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Pursue the consolidation of education information system at provincial and lower levels for planning and regular monitoring purpose. ▪ Promote policy responsiveness (continuous teacher professional development...) to monitored results. ▪ Provision of capacity building for districts, sub-districts administration and local governments. ▪ Secure proper financing for key non salary public expenditure programmes aimed at improving standard of schooling system. ▪ Consider under Sector Reform Contract to moving progressively from institutional reform-centred key performance indicators to education access, quality and learning outcome-centred indicators. 		
<i>Importance</i>	High	<i>Basis</i>	C11
<i>Priority</i>	Medium		

R13. Promote further local accountability and governance systems in education

<i>Why?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ In the wake of the devolution process and the perspective of progressive setting up of functional local government apparatus, education services need to be more responsive, accountable & closer to population. While local authorities/administrations can have an added value to better understand local priorities and promote accountability, institutional and management capacities are still weak. ▪ It is important to reduce the re-centralisation at provincial level by making local authorities an effective component of a local multi-actor public education system.
<i>Purpose</i>	Strengthen capacity, responsibility and accountability of local authorities/administrations in the area of educational public services.
<i>Proposed actions</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Promote stronger local government systems and accountability. ▪ Improve education budget reporting (more detailed classifications) on local budget flows. ▪ Strengthen oversight capacities of the provincial and local assemblies. ▪ Improve access of local authorities and civil society to public management capacity training. ▪ Pursue user and civil society empowerment (capacity development) such as parent teacher councils / school management committees while addressing minimum requirements for such approaches to be effective (e.g. avoidance of capture by local elites). Synergies with local empowerment efforts conducted via the rural development programmes should be exploited. ▪ Increase consideration for demand side. ▪ Capacity development activities for districts/sub-district administration, civil society and provincial/local assemblies. ▪ Review educational institutional, administrative and financial mandates of provincial and local governments lower tiers levels.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Consider the reestablishment of province finance Commission Award under the local governed Acts to promote transparent and predictable formula-based fiscal transfers at provincial level. ▪ Envisage to including in EU Sector Reform Contracts' policy dialogue these issues. 		
<i>Importance</i>	Medium	<i>Basis</i>	C5 and C11
<i>Priority</i>	Medium		

R14. Continue support to TVET but adopt a systemic approach more market oriented

<i>Why?</i>	<p>Support to TVET remains justified on several grounds: there is a national policy and a demand (NSS, government policy), TVET is an important mean of improving the skills of the manpower and, therefore, productivity and competitiveness, together with employability. This potentially leads to higher employment and living standards, major objectives of EU cooperation. Moreover, support to TVET is complementary with other interventions (RD, Education, Trade/PSD).</p> <p>However, ongoing support addressed commendably, but through a complicate design involving two parallel projects, institutional strengthening and outreach and it suffered from an insufficient market orientation leading to a bias in favour of social demand rather than market demand.</p>		
<i>Purpose</i>	Improve efficiency and effectiveness of support to TVET		
<i>Proposed actions</i>	<p>Improve the systemic approach to VET</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Assist the VET system to adopt a less theoretical approach and to involve as much as possible the private sector including in work on curricula, transfers of skills and options for work-based learning. ▪ Align outreach and institutional strengthening on labour market demands and opportunities (including demands by micro-enterprises and informal sector). ▪ Consider the possibility of including career counselling among the services offered by the TVET system. ▪ As a significant demand for skilled people comes from abroad, the TVET system should also identify the needs of this particular segment of the market. ▪ Design simpler projects and if outreach components are implemented by several NGOs impose a standard approach to baseline studies in selected districts. ▪ For outreach, if several NGOs are implementing: impose a standard approach to baseline studies in selected districts. 		
<i>Importance</i>	High	<i>Basis</i>	C12
<i>Priority</i>	Medium		

R15. Combine skills gap analysis with value chain analysis and development and privilege outreach of TVET support in areas where value chain development is implemented

<i>Why?</i>	<p>There is considerable potential when skills gap analysis is coupled to value chain analysis and development.</p> <p>Therefore, there is a case for generating synergies in combining, when possible, support to TVET with interventions aiming at value chains development.</p>		
<i>Purpose</i>	Improve effectiveness of TVET support		
<i>Proposed actions</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ As value chains extend beyond the primary production stages it is important to consider also the needs for human capital development downstream the stages of direct intervention. ▪ Privilege outreach of TVET in areas where EU is also supporting value chain development, for instance through rural development programmes and trade related activities. 		
<i>Importance</i>	Medium	<i>Basis</i>	C15
<i>Priority</i>	Medium		

4.4 Recommendations on Democratisation, Human Rights and Rule of Law

R16. Update the logic of intervention in democratisation/human rights/rule of law			
<i>Why?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The EU currently focuses on capacities. Some institutions do function better, but progress remains modest in terms of better laws and norms, and better practices. ▪ Invest in finer analysis of what and who are the drivers of change. Identify and support initiatives that already have the support of local government and/or civil society. 		
<i>Purpose</i>	Build the EU's logic of intervention around drivers of change and incentives – work more with the grain of Pakistani democrats and human rights activists.		
<i>Proposed actions</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ EEAS and DEVCO could jointly analyse the drivers of change and spoilers in Pakistan today, at local, federal, regional and global levels. ▪ The Delegation could map out local initiatives that already have the support of local government and/or civil society. ▪ The EU's strategy on democratization, human rights and rule of law could be refocused on the drivers of change and local initiatives identified, boosting ownership and effectiveness. 		
<i>Importance</i>	High	<i>Basis</i>	C14
<i>Priority</i>	High		

R17. Emphasise government communication and accountability to citizens			
<i>Why?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Citizen awareness, perception, and demand for government performance are crucial in ongoing transition, for (i) direct incentives to government actors to perform better, and (ii) more constructive state-society relations (rather than groups feeling left behind by government, e.g. Swat Valley). ▪ Increased communication would also benefit EU visibility. 		
<i>Purpose</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Foster more citizen information and participation, which would over time lead to more government accountability and more constructive state-society relations. ▪ Improve results, by understanding government actors' incentives (and not only strengthening their capacities). ▪ Increase EU visibility. 		
<i>Proposed actions</i>	Support government services (executive, legislative and judiciary, local and federal) in communicating on services offered and their improved performance, which is generally in their interest too.		
<i>Importance</i>	Medium	<i>Basis</i>	C2, C13, C14
<i>Priority</i>	Medium		

R18. Conduct upstream work on security / rule of law policies and norms

<i>Why?</i>	EU support is provided mainly downstream on delivery of services, but little effects can be observed so far in terms of improved security and access to justice. However, enough relationships have been established and trust created for the EU to work with Government upstream on policies and norms (where there are opportunities to do so).		
<i>Purpose</i>	Capitalise on trust and government's acceptance of EU dialogue		
<i>Proposed actions</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ EUD and EEAS to deepen the policy and political dialogue on security and human rights by technical work on policies and norms (opportunistically), with support from DEVCO HQ. ▪ Work opportunistically, where there is already support of local government and/or civil society, rather than focus on issues that are currently intractable. 		
<i>Importance</i>	High	<i>Basis</i>	C14
<i>Priority</i>	High		

R19. Increase the coherence of EU support to democratisation/human rights/rule of law

<i>Why?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The EU is engaged at multiple levels and on multiple fronts in the field of democratisation, human rights and rule of law. This provides a systemic view and multiple entry points, but does not always favour synergies and connecting the dots. There is scope for increased coherence and therefore effectiveness. 		
<i>Purpose</i>	Increase the coherence of EU support in these areas		
<i>Proposed actions</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Identify and exploit synergies between projects and non-project activities ▪ Identify and exploit synergies between democracy/human rights/rule of law projects and broader development projects (e.g. between access to justice and the rural development; e.g. to help Government counter violent extremism). ▪ Identify and exploit synergies between different (federal, provincial, and sub-provincial) levels ▪ Investigate if/which/where development activities are the most effective in supporting democratization etc. ▪ Further the EU's systemic approach by supporting inter-agency cooperation, rather than supporting agencies individually. ▪ Consider for instance one or more team retreat(s) with EUD and HQ staff on these issues. 		
<i>Importance</i>	Medium	<i>Basis</i>	C10, C13, C14
<i>Priority</i>	Medium		

4.5 Recommendations on Trade

R20. Ensure sustainable and continued use of past achievements			
<i>Why?</i>	<p>Trade was not a focal sector and may not remain an intervention sector in the future MIP.</p> <p>A continuous support has been provided to the sector over the last 12 years and it has led to a number of achievements in terms of institutional strengthening, trade infrastructure (e.g. testing and accrediting laboratories) It is important that these realisations are maintained and their potential benefits for the trade operators are maximised.</p>		
<i>Purpose</i>	Ensure use and sustainability of strengthened institutions		
<i>Proposed actions</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Use the policy dialogue and non-financial cooperation to follow up on progress achieved with EU Support (trade infrastructure, IPO, CCP, compliance with WTO rules...) and their use to stimulate trade and investment with EU. ▪ When applicable use Pakistani trade institutions to conduct surveys, studies, training relevant for designing interventions in other areas (e.g. TVET, agriculture, ...) 		
<i>Importance</i>	High	<i>Basis</i>	C15
<i>Priority</i>	Medium		

R21. Use Pakistan strengthened trade related institutions to conduct necessary studies in view of preparing a trade strategy for the next three years			
<i>Why?</i>	<p>Substantial support has been provided by the EU over a long period. It has concentrated, successfully, on improving and upgrading important trade institutions. However, results in terms of trade expansion and diversification remain disappointing, among other reasons because the benefits of the institution building efforts have not sufficiently been directed to and perceived and used by the private sector operators. A strengthening of the trade strategy to address this issue is therefore necessary.</p>		
<i>Purpose</i>	Ensure that past support to the trade sector, notably in terms of institution building, contributes to improved trade expansion and diversification		
<i>Proposed actions</i>	Use capacities built under previous programmes to prepare a trade strategy for the next 3 to 5 years that is targeted on measuring and improving trade performance. This could take the form of studies and surveys conducted by public or semi-public institutions with substantial involvement of end users.		
<i>Importance</i>	High	<i>Basis</i>	C15
<i>Priority</i>	High		

R22. If further institution building is provided make sure it is focused on the needs of potential “clients” of the institutions supported			
<i>Why?</i>	Evaluation shows that perception of institutional strengthening (in trade) is: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Useful according to supported institutions and their staff. ▪ Insufficiently oriented to the needs of the users according to operators. Academic studies and surveys also show that there is an insufficient awareness of the trade operators on the need to use the services of the trade institutions (e.g. testing and accreditation). 		
<i>Purpose</i>	Improve effectiveness of institution building		
<i>Proposed actions</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Conduct studies to identify the potential users of the institutions strengthened. ▪ Consult users about the services they expect from the supported institutions. ▪ Promote awareness of the importance of using these services. 		
<i>Importance</i>	High	<i>Basis</i>	C15
<i>Priority</i>	Medium		

R23. Maximise trade enhancing contributions of non-trade interventions			
<i>Why?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Trade might not remain a sector of intervention in the next cooperation cycle. ▪ However, it can be effectively supported through interventions in other sectors. 		
<i>Purpose</i>	Strengthen the synergies among interventions		
<i>Proposed actions</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ To look for synergies with trade in non-trade intervention sectors For example: ▪ In activities aimed at upgrading the value chain make sure that business intermediary organisation are aware of the existing trade/PSD infrastructure and help their clients to use them. ▪ In supporting human rights, gender, environment, organise information and training sessions of entrepreneurs/trade operators to show them the economic benefits of production practices respectful of these issues. 		
<i>Importance</i>	Medium	<i>Basis</i>	C15
<i>Priority</i>	Medium		