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**Mid-Term Evaluation of EU Support to Niger Delta Support Program
in Five Niger Delta States in Nigeria
Component 3 (Water and Sanitation)**

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The views expressed herein are those of the consultants and therefore in no way reflect the official opinion of the Commission

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AfDB	African Development Bank
AK-RUWATSAN	Akwa Ibom Rural Water and Sanitation Agency
AKWCL	Akwa Ibom Water Company Limited
BoQ	Bill of Quantities
BORBDA	Benin Owena River Basin Development Authority
BYWB	Bayelsa State Water Board
CBO	Community-Based Organisation
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CLTS	Community–Led Total Sanitation
CNP	Competitive Negotiated Procedure
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSO	Chief Security Officer
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (of OECD)
DSUWB	Delta State Urban Water Board
EC	European Commission
EDF	European Development Fund
EDUWB	Edo State Urban Water Board
EHC	Environmental Health Club
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
Eoi	Expression of Interest
EU	European Union
FA	Financing Agreement
FMWR	Federal Ministry of Water Resources
FPIND	Foundation for Partnership Initiatives in Niger Delta
HIF	Hygiene Improvement Framework
HoD	Head of Department
HoS	Head of Service
HQ	Headquarters
HR	Human Resource
ICT	Information Communication Technology
IEE	Initial Environmental Examination
IT	Information Technology
IPE	Institutional Policy Expert
IWRM	Integrated Water Resources Management
KE	Key Expert
LAM	Local Area Mechanic
LFM	Logical Framework Matrix
LGA	Local Government Area
LIP	Local Investment Plan
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MBH	Motorised Borehole
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MEWR	Ministry of Energy and Water Resources
MIS	Management Information System
MNBP	Federal Ministry of Budget and National Planning
MNDA	Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSD	Ministry of Special Duties
MTE	Mid-Term Evaluation
NAO	National Authorising Officer
NDDC	Niger Delta Development Commission
NDSP	Niger Delta Support Programme

NEWSAN	Society for Water and Sanitation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NPC	National Planning Commission
NUWSRP	National Urban Water Sector Reform Project
O&M	Operation and Maintenance
ODF	Open Defecation Free
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OVI	Objectively Verifiable Indicator
PCA	Programme Cooperation Agreement
PE	Programme Estimates
PfD	Partners for Development
PIA	Programme Implementing Agency
PIU	Project Implementation Unit
PMU	Project Management Unit
PRA	Programme Recipient Agency
PPP	Public Private Partnership
PRS	Planning Research Statistics
PTA	Parents and Teachers Association
RBDA	River Basin Development Authorities/Boards
ROM	Results Oriented Monitoring
RSSTOWA	Rivers State Small Town Water Agency
RUWASSA	Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Agency
SWG	State Working Group
TAP	Technical Administrative Procedures
TAT	Technical Assistance Team
ToR	Terms of Reference
ToT	Training of Trainers
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UWS	Urban Water Supply
UWSS	Urban Water Supply Scheme
VLOM	Village Level Operation and Maintenance
WASH	Water Sanitation and Hygiene
WASHCOM	WASH Committee
WASHIMS	Water Sanitation and Hygiene Information Management System
WATSAN	Water and Sanitation
WB	World Bank
WCA	Water Consumers Association
WG	Working Group
WP	Water Point
WSE	Water and Sanitation Expert
WSP	Water Safety Plan
WSS	Water Supply System
WSSSRP	Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Reform Programme

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

A Mid-Term Evaluation of EU Support to Niger Delta Support Programme in Five Niger Delta States in Nigeria Component 3 (Water and Sanitation) was undertaken from 4 July to 16 August 2016. The main findings, conclusions, recommendations and lesson learned are presented below.

FINDINGS

EU Delegation and National Authorising Office

Several findings are jointly relevant to the EU Delegation and the NAO and should be considered for future programmes.

FINDING
The MTE was not conducted at the appropriate time (about a year late)
Inadequate sector policy and institutional framework, and weak sector institutions reflect the central power within the State and are not actually constraints <i>per se</i>
The Formulation seems to have been a rather hasty mix of aspirations that had not been fully explored with the beneficiary stakeholders
The addition of the fifth State, Akwa Ibom, was added to the Programme without compensatory adjustments to the overall budget
Delays in signing agreements and releasing funds was entirely foreseeable and should have been flagged in the Programme Risk Assessment
There were some clear deadlines by which some States would lose their Programme option, yet, despite clear exceedance of the deadlines, no action was taken
It is not clear what the point was of the National Project Steering Committee. It met only twice and made recommendations on matters over which it had little or no authority
There have been at least two monitoring missions yet actions have not been fully implemented
There is insufficient genuine ownership of the Programme by EUD, NAO or the States

TAT-URBAN/SMALL TOWNS SUB-COMPONENT

Relevance

The relevance of the Programme is high on poverty and on the existing state of the WASH in small towns, although the target states in the Delta are not worse off than the other states in Nigeria. However, the low functionality of urban and small town water supply systems, combined with the poor water quality in the Delta, caused both by natural causes (salt intrusion) and also human made contamination (oil and over

population) adds to the relevance. Especially relevant, are the high number of conflicts within the States. The need for community communication and cooperation between conflicting communities to improve the water situation is maybe the strongest relevance for the Niger Delta Support Programme.

Efficiency

In general, the social component of the Urban/Small Town Sub-Component was executed with appropriate methodologies. The process of self-selection was undertaken with transparency and could reduce conflicts and not cause them. Drilling deep boreholes is not the cheapest way to obtain water, but justified in areas where the surface water is contaminated such as in the Delta states. The software component of the Small Town component is also done well, though there should have been more attention for the sanitation aspect. The Willingness-to-Pay study is well done, though appeared rather late (2015). The first priority in improving the urban/small town water companies is ensuring a legal enabling environment (water laws and policies). The emphasis on this by the Technical Assistance Team is well appreciated.

Effectiveness

The main concern on effectiveness is the delay on construction work for the Urban/Small Town Sub-Component. The progress in the development of water policies is good, though the law development has been suspended in two States. The performance of the urban and small town water agencies is still very poor and are hardly capable to provide any potable water. The support to the Water Consumers Associations (WCA) makes good progress, although Operations and Maintenance (O & M) training has not yet started.

Impact

The positive impact on violence and conflicts is confirmed in one Local Government Area and it is possible that the inter community co-operation will lead to less conflicts in due course. The overall impact of the Programme is somewhat low, due to the lack of any construction activity. The impact on health in small towns will be even less, where no WASH activities have been undertaken. It should be noted that many (cluster of) communities are seen as small towns for water, though categorised as rural for sanitation.

There is also no impact on the private sector yet.

Sustainability

The WCAs are well trained in social issues, though are awaiting for technical training. Like the WASHCOMs, the WCAs rely on aftercare for a long time to ensure their stability and the discipline in collecting and managing the revenues for (long term) O & M. Unfortunately, the small town or urban water agencies are very weak and unlikely be able to provide much assistance and the capacity of the WASH Units to support is not yet assured. The Small Town water supply systems are dependent on a steady chain of spare parts and on a reliable aftersales services. The WCAs are likely capable to manage the smaller systems, though the larger ones need external assistance which is neither available in the existing state agencies nor in the private sector, due to lack of interest.

UNICEF-RURAL SUB-COMPONENT

Relevance

The relevance of the Programme is high on poverty and on the existing state of the WASH in rural areas, although the target states in the Delta are not worse off than other states in Nigeria. However, the low functionality of rural water supply systems, combined with the poor water quality in the Delta, caused both by natural causes (salt intrusion) and also human made contamination (oil and over population) adds to the relevance. Especially relevant, are the high number of conflicts within the States. The need for community communication and cooperation between conflicting communities to improve the water situation is perhaps the strongest relevance for the NDSP.

Efficiency

In general, the social component of Rural Sub-Component were executed with appropriate methodologies. The process of self-selection was undertaken in a transparent way and could reduce conflicts. Drilling deep boreholes is not the cheapest way to obtain water, though justified in areas where the surface water is contaminated such as in the Delta states. The software component for the component was executed appropriately. Community-Led Total Sanitation (CLTS) is an acknowledged approach, and the creation of WASHCOMs to emphasise ownership and cooperation with other communities, for example through the Federation of WASHCOMs. The training materials are of good quality, though the O&M training is not yet done. The approach to work through the local WASH Units and cooperation with local NGOs will strengthen the local implementation capacity.

Effectiveness

The main concern on effectiveness is the delay on construction work for the Rural Sub-Component. The progress of the communities in achieving Open Defecation Free (ODF) status by means of the CLTS methodology is reasonable, though official verification as an ODF community lags behind. The latrine construction progress is also reasonable, though very variable. The WASHCOMs appear to be well trained and motivated, though are a bit slow in collecting funds for O & M. However this could be explained by the limited construction activities. The WASH Units are well equipped and trained, though after many years still have not achieved the official status as "Department"¹

Impact

The positive impact on violence and conflicts is confirmed in one Local Government Area (LGA) and it is possible that the inter-community co-operation will lead to less conflicts in due course. The overall impact of the Programme is very low due to limited construction activities. There are possibly some positive effects on health, though certainly at this stage, cannot be quantified. The impact on the local private sector could have been improved if the Programme had invested in the training of local artisans in latrine construction. The local environment will benefit from the disappearance of open defaecation in the communities and no negative impact is to be expected from this sub-component.

¹ This should change soon with the endorsement by the National Council of Water Resources on the establishment of WASH Departments in all LGAs

Sustainability

Although the MTE has a positive view of the social component of the rural WASH activities, the sustainability of this might be challenging. People may remember the health message, though could relax on the ODF discipline during the course of the time. Likewise, the motivation of the WASHCOMs and capacity to collect the necessary revenues for long term maintenance could disappear due to internal or external circumstances. The WASH Units (and it is hoped the Community Development Associations) are in the best position to provide the necessary aftercare and motivation to both the ODF villages and WASHCOMs. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that the WASH Units will remain active after Programme closure. The communities are technically capable to carry out the routine O&M, though long term maintenance, especially for solar power systems depends on a good local supply and service network.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

EU Delegation and National Authorising Office

Several conclusions and recommendations are jointly relevant to the EU Delegation and the NAO and should be considered for future programmes.

FINDING	CONCLUSION	RECOMMENDATION
The MTE was not conducted at the appropriate time (about a year late)	There is a reason that the review (evaluation according to the ToR) is called "mid-term" – so there is sufficient time for its recommendations to take effect	The planned times for Mid Term Evaluations (Reviews) should be respected for optimum benefit
Inadequate sector policy and institutional framework, and weak sector institutions reflect the central power within the State and are not actually constraints <i>per se</i>	Of course, the lack of funding is not a reason to wait to improve institutions though it is on the critical path. Currently, there is no evidence of this sustained funding in any of the five Niger Delta States. Programmers need to recognise that there is only so much that a programme is able to accomplish. Over-complex programmes such as this should focus more deeply in a single State that really understands the Programme basis and really wants to support it	Be more selective in the scope of an intervention and in its geographical location and choose a serious partner and beneficiary State that really has the desire for change and the enabling Programme it is being offered
The Formulation seems to have been a rather hasty mix of aspirations that had not been fully explored with the beneficiary stakeholders	Programmers did not spend sufficient, thoughtful time with beneficiary stakeholders both to really grasp the needs and also, critically, the constraints that the Programme would have to address	Be more critical and challenging of assumptions and test potential programme operational modalities more thoroughly, and most of all be prepared to stop and re-design
The addition of the fifth State, Akwa Ibom, was added to the Programme without compensatory adjustments to the overall budget	Programmers potentially compromised the ability of the Programme to deliver the required results and outcomes	The addition of the fifth State and the associated budgetary increase should have been made in parallel and if the funds were not available then the fifth State should have been withdrawn, particularly as it

FINDING	CONCLUSION	RECOMMENDATION
		seems to have been an afterthought and never part of the original programming
Delays in signing agreements and releasing funds was entirely foreseeable and should have been flagged in the Programme Risk Assessment	It was inevitable that the Programme would be waiting for agreements to be signed and funds to be transferred and appropriate steps should have been designed into the formulation	Programmers should have not started the Programme until all agreements had been signed and full funding transferred. After one year, the Programme should have been put on hold pending MoU signing and release of funds
There were some clear deadlines by which some States would lose their Programme option, yet, despite clear exceedance of the deadlines, no action was taken	There is a belief that there “will always be an extension”. No State believed that the Programme would be stopped and the creation of “deadlines” therefore was meaningless and had no impact	Given that no State, other than Delta State, has provided any of its counterpart funds the Programme should be wound down in those non-contributing States. This should be managed through a formal Exit Strategy. There are some funds available, untied to counterpart funds, and could be used to deliver some benefits at community level. This should be an integral part of the Exit Strategy. It is noted that Delta State has already started to push back its next contribution date from the end of September to the end of October 2016. It is not recommended to accept this, the State should provide the rest of the funds in full by 30 September 2016
It is not clear what the point was of the National Project Steering Committee. It met only twice and made recommendations on matters over which it had little or no authority	There is no point in establishing committees for the sake of it, especially since the absence of the third annual meeting seemed to make no difference to the Programme	Consider if this committee really warrants the time and costs, given its (lack of) ability to add value to the Programme. It should be noted that no Programme can be steered by a committee that meets annually
There have been at least two monitoring missions	Not all actions from the missions have been achieved	All monitoring missions should have clear action parties and timescales for completion
There is insufficient genuine ownership of the Programme by EUD, NAO or the States	Genuine ownership needs to be restored or reinforced	All parties in the State together with EUD and NAO to brainstorm a particular common interest such as future implementation of the water law and how to professionalise all parties

TAT-URBAN/SMALL TOWNS SUB-COMPONENT

RELEVANCE

FINDING	CONCLUSION	RECOMMENDATION
<p>The relevance of the Programme is high on poverty and on the existing state of the WASH in small towns, although the target states in the Delta are not worse off than other states in Nigeria.</p> <p>However, the low functionality of urban and small town water supply systems, combined with the poor water quality in the Delta, caused both by natural causes (salt intrusion) and also human made contamination (oil and over population) adds to the relevance. Especially relevant, are the high number of conflicts within the States. The need for community communication and cooperation between conflicting communities to improve the water situation is maybe the strongest relevance for the NDSP.</p>	<p>The WASH situation and level of poverty in the five states is not worse than in the other states of Nigeria, but the vulnerability of the aquifers and the long history of conflicts adds to the relevance of the Programme.</p> <p>The institutions responsible for urban and small towns WASH were at the start of NDSP are in no position to deliver any services on urban/Small Town and urban WASH. This renders water sector reform and the strengthening of the responsible institutions highly relevant.</p> <p>The relevance between improved water and sanitation and conflict reduction is not made clear.</p>	<p>In needs assessments the link between the causes of conflicts and WSS should be made clear.</p>

EFFICIENCY

FINDING	CONCLUSION	RECOMMENDATION
<p>In general, the social component of the small town component was executed with appropriate methodologies. The process of self-selection was undertaken with transparency and could reduce conflicts and not cause them.</p> <p>Drilling deep boreholes is not the cheapest way to obtain water, though justified in areas where the surface water is contaminated, such as in the Delta states.</p> <p>The software component of the small town component is also done well, but there should have been more attention to the sanitation. The Willingness-to-Pay Study is well done, but appeared a bit late (2015).</p> <p>The first priority in improving the urban/small town water companies is ensuring a legal enabling environment (water laws and policies). The emphasis on this by the Technical Assistance Team is well appreciated.</p>	<p>The definition of small towns based on number of inhabitants (between 5000 and 20.000 persons) is not always applicable for water supply system projects. Some so-called Small Towns were observed to be rural whilst others looked urban.</p> <p>NDSP took logical steps to create a WCA; starting with sensitisation meetings, followed by election of WCA executive, endorsement from traditional leaders, registration with LGA and opening of a bank account and household registrations. However the last step, the implementation of O & M training manual, is still awaiting the start of construction. Hygiene promotions and sanitation should have had more attention, given some "small towns" were rural communities.</p> <p>Good use of NGOs in the water sector to get the message spread and ensure willingness to pay.</p>	<p>The indicator "population density" might be more practical for the presently used number of inhabitants. In all cases, the definitions should be flexible and could also include the present or proposed water supply systems.</p> <p>Proceed with the approach, but include some of the "rural" small towns in the rural WASH component.</p>

EFFECTIVENESS

FINDING	CONCLUSION	RECOMMENDATION
<p>The main concern on effectiveness is the delay on construction work for the Urban/Small Town Sub-Component.</p>	<p>The construction activities are still awaiting the counterpart funding, though the strengthening of the WCAs makes good progress.</p>	<p>The social component of the WASH in the urban areas should proceed as planned. The construction should start as soon as the counterpart funds arrive.</p>
<p>The progress in the development of water policies is good, though the law development still has to start in two States. The performance of the urban and small town water agencies is still very poor and is hardly capable to provide any potable water. The support to the WCAs makes good progress, although O & M training has not yet started</p>	<p>The water agencies perform very poorly and will be in no position to provide sufficient and clean water for the communities.</p> <p>Until the water sector reform has been completed and implemented, all cooperation with the agencies will lead to nowhere.</p>	<p>Concentrate on sector reform rather than support these agencies.</p>

IMPACT

FINDING	CONCLUSION	RECOMMENDATION
<p>The positive impact on violence and conflicts is confirmed in one LGA and it is possible that inter-community co-operation will lead to less conflicts in due course. The overall impact of the Programme is very low, due to lack of any construction activity. Impact on health in small towns will be even less, since there are no WASH activities yet in small towns. There is also no impact on the private sector yet.</p>	<p>Apart from some minor hygiene promotion activities, nothing has been done in the Small Towns, not covered by UNICEF for sanitation, hence no impact on health etc could be expected.</p>	<p>Proceed, and possibly expand the current activities on hygiene promotion.</p>

SUSTAINABILITY

FINDING	CONCLUSION	RECOMMENDATION
<p>WCAs are well trained in social issues, though are still waiting for technical training. Like the WASHCOMs, the WCAs rely on aftercare for a long time to ensure their stability and the discipline in collecting and managing the revenues for (long term) O&M. Unfortunately, the small town or urban water agencies are very weak and unlikely be able to provide much assistance.</p>	<p>The WCAs should have the technical capacity to carry out routine O&M on the WSS provided that the O & M training will be successfully concluded. However the flow of spare parts for HP and specialist maintenance of solar system will be a challenge due to the proposed large-scale tender procedures of the EU, which</p>	<p>Explore the possibility of long time service contracts with reliable technical service providers, especially for solar powered WSS but also for diesel WSS.</p> <p>Tenders for work should be done at the lowest possible level to ensure participation of local suppliers.</p>

FINDING	CONCLUSION	RECOMMENDATION
<p>The Small Town WSS are dependent on a steady chain of spare parts and on a reliable after sales services. The WCA are likely capable to manage the smaller systems, though the larger ones need external assistance which is neither available in the existing state agencies not in the private sector.</p>	<p>excludes local suppliers and hence endangers steady flow of SP and after sales services.</p>	
	<p>On the short and maybe medium term, well-organised WCAs should be capable to collect sufficient funds for O & M.</p> <p>However, keeping the long term discipline to ensure adequate for serious repairs, especially for the solar systems and in remote areas, is challenging.</p>	<p>Although the present collection systems in rural WSS is reasonably successful, banking in remote areas is difficult because banks are far apart.</p> <p>See for example Goal Uganda's) experiments with phone banking², where WASHCOMs can transfer water revenues to a bank account. This account is restricted to transfer money to a number of suppliers or service providers. This system makes life easier for everyone and reduces the risks of abuse. The system is still under development, though could be an interesting innovation for Nigeria With a cell phone coverage of 89 % (baseline survey) individual contributions are easy to manage.</p>
	<p>Despite the good intentions and the appropriate methodology in the creation and strengthening of the WCAs, the Small Town WSS face the same problem regarding the sustainability of the rural WSS. With some support the WCAs probably could probably manage the smaller and simpler WSS, though the WCA do not have the capacity to repair/maintain more complicated WSSs themselves or to contract out these services. The Small Town and Urban water supply institutions are still not in a position to provide assistance or to manage the more complicated WSS and there is no experience with Public Private Partnerships taking over this role.</p>	<p>Explore the capacities of the local private sector to provide service or manage the (especially the larger ones) Small Town WSSs.</p>

² GOAL Uganda Country Strategic Plan 2012-2016

UNICEF-RURAL SUB-COMPONENT

RELEVANCE

FINDING	CONCLUSION	RECOMMENDATION
<p>The relevance of the Programme is high on poverty and on the existing state of the WASH in rural areas, although the target states in the Delta are not worse off than other states in Nigeria.</p> <p>However, the low functionality of rural water supply systems, combined with the poor water quality in the Delta, caused both by natural causes (salt intrusion) and also human made contamination (oil and over population) adds to the relevance.</p> <p>Especially relevant, are the high number of conflicts within the States. The need for community communication and cooperation between conflicting communities to improve the water situation is maybe the strongest relevance for the NDSP.</p>	<p>The WASH situation and level of poverty in the five states is not worse than in the other states of Nigeria, though the vulnerability of the aquifers and the long history of conflicts adds to the relevance of the Programme.</p> <p>The institutions responsible for rural WASH were at the start of NDSP in no position to deliver any services on rural WASH. This renders water sector reform and the strengthening of the responsible institutions highly relevant.</p> <p>The relevance between improved water and sanitation and conflict reduction is not made clear.</p>	<p>In needs assessments the link should have been made clear how the social component of WASH projects could reduce conflicts</p>

EFFICIENCY

FINDING	CONCLUSION	RECOMMENDATION
<p>In general, the social component of Rural Sub-Component was executed with appropriate methodologies. The process of self-selection was transparent and could reduce conflicts and not cause them. Drilling deep boreholes is not the cheapest way to get water, though justified where the surface water is contaminated such as in the Delta states. The software component for the component was appropriate. CLTS is an acknowledged technology, and the creation of WASHCOMs and emphasis on ownership and cooperation with other communities, for example through the Federation of WASHCOMs is appropriate. Training materials are of good quality, though O&M training is not yet done. The approach to work through the local WASH Units and cooperate with local NGOs will enhance local implementation ability.</p>	<p>The self-selection process and the efforts to create a dialogue among stakeholder are well appreciated since they could have an important impact on conflict resolution.</p>	<p>Proceed with the applied approach and involve as many local representatives of the local scene as possible.</p>
	<p>Other than some delay in the certification of CLTS communities, the software component of WASH component is doing well.</p> <p>The collection of the 5% O & M funds could have been better; the maximum amount collected is 15%, though is completely understandable given the failure of the promised schemes to appear.</p> <p>The methodology to involve other NGOs and to create WASHCOMs has contributed to the success of the social component e.g. WASH clinics.</p>	<p>Proceed with the applied approach and continue to strengthen the local NGOs and community-based organisations, such as the WASHCOMs.</p>

EFFECTIVENESS

FINDING	CONCLUSION	RECOMMENDATION
<p>The main concern on effectiveness is the delay on construction work for the Rural Sub-Component. The progress of the communities in achieving Open Defecation Free (ODF) status by means of the Community-Led Total Sanitation (CLTS) methodology is reasonable, though the official verification as an ODF community lags behind. The latrine construction progress is also reasonable, though very variable.</p> <p>The WASHCOMs appear to be well trained and motivated, though are slow in collecting funds for Operations & Maintenance (O & M). The WASH Units are well equipped and trained, though after many years still have not achieved the official status as "Department"</p>	<p>With the exception of the school latrine construction and some projects in the Delta and Rivers state, little has been achieved on WASH construction in the States.</p> <p>The software component makes much more progress and most CLTS targets (with the exception of Bayelsa State) are expected to be achieved at the end of the Programme.</p> <p>The establishment of the WASHCOMS is also running well and the WASH Units have been strengthened.</p>	<p>The social component of the WASH in the rural areas should proceed as planned. The construction should start as soon as the counterpart funds arrive.</p>

IMPACT

FINDING	CONCLUSION	RECOMMENDATION
<p>The positive impact on violence and conflicts is confirmed in one LGA and it is possible that the inter-community co-operation will lead to less conflicts in due course.</p> <p>Overall impact of the Programme is very low due to the lack of any construction activity. There are possibly some positive effects on health, though certainly at this stage, cannot be quantified.</p> <p>Impact on the local private sector could have been better if the Programme had invested in the training of local artisans in latrine construction. The local environment will benefit from the disappearance of open defaecation in the communities and no negative impact is to be expected from this sub-component.</p>	<p>To date, the overall social impact of the NDSP is still low although the health situation in the rural communities might have improved due to the success of the CLTS approach.</p> <p>There is anecdotal evidence for improved health with the beneficiaries, though it is too early to find it in health statistics.</p> <p>The impact on the workload of women and the school attendance of girls is still very small, if at all.</p> <p>Studies and guidelines have been prepared on conflict prevention and training has been provided, though it is not clear what the actual effect is. The manual developed is good quality, though it is yet to be fully implemented.</p>	<p>Proceed with the current activities on CLTS, school sanitation and WSS</p> <p>Concerted efforts by RUWASSA are required to step down the training to WASHCOMs using the conflict manual developed.</p>

SUSTAINABILITY

FINDING	CONCLUSION	RECOMMENDATION
<p>The WCAs are well trained in social issues, though are still awaiting for technical training.</p> <p>Like the WASHCOMs, the WCAs rely on aftercare for a long time to ensure their stability and the discipline in collecting and managing the revenues for (long term) O&M. Unfortunately, the small town or urban water agencies are very weak and unlikely be able to provide much assistance.</p> <p>The Small Town WSS are dependent on a steady chain of spare parts and on a reliable after sales services. The WCA are likely capable to manage the smaller systems, but the larger ones need external assistance which is neither available in the existing state agencies not in the private sector.</p>	<p>Experience suggests that the hygiene health messages will register for some time, though the discipline to keep villages ODF will need some periodic encouragement.</p> <p>The WASH Units (and the Community Development Associations) are the only organisations which could provide aftercare, provided that they have the means to continue after the closure of NDSP.</p>	<p>Prepare strategy for continuing support to the ODF and not yet ODF villages after Programme closure.</p>
	<p>WASHCOMs should have the technical capacity to carry out routine O&M on the WSS, provided that the O & M training will be successfully concluded.</p>	<p>Explore the possibility of long time service contracts with reliable technical service providers, especially for solar powered WSS and also for diesel WSS.</p>
	<p>In the short and maybe medium term, well-organised WASHCOMs should be capable to collect sufficient funds for O & M.</p> <p>However, keeping the long term discipline to ensure adequate for serious repairs is, especially for the solar systems and in remote areas, challenging.</p>	<p>Although the present collection systems in rural WSS is reasonably successful, banking in remote areas is difficult because banks are far apart. Goal Uganda experiments phone banking, where WASHCOMs can transfer water revenues to a bank account. This account is restricted to transfer money to a number of suppliers or service providers. This system make life easier for everyone and reduced the risks of abuse. The system is still under development, though it could be an interesting innovation for Nigeria With a cell phone coverage of 89 % (baseline survey) individual contributions are easy to manage.</p>

LESSONS LEARNED

EU Delegation and National Authorizing Office

Several lessons are jointly relevant to the EU Delegation and the NAO and should be learned for future programmes.

- Conduct Mid Term (Evaluations) Reviews at the appropriate time;
- Recognise real reasons for inadequate sector policy, framework, and institutions;
- Fully explore potential formulations with beneficiary stakeholders;
- Do not add significantly to finalised formulation without compensatory adjustments to the overall budget;
- Do not commence programmes or project until all agreements are signed and any counterpart funds released;
- If stating deadlines for certain commitments, always follow through on the consequence of non-compliance;
- Do not create steering committees unless they have the potential to add value;
- Ensure actions from monitoring missions are fully implemented; and
- Ensure sufficient genuine ownership of the Programme by all parties.

TAT-Urban/Small Towns Sub-Component

- Adaptation of an appropriated water policy and law should precede any physical construction activities on urban and small town water supply agencies;
- Tendering on works and equipment of water supply systems should be done as close as possible to the end user;
- Exploring public-private cooperation should be very high on the agenda especially for operations and maintenance of schemes;
- Support to Water Consumer Associations (including technical training) without a clear possibility of physical implementation will endanger future programmes;
- Provide periodically, adequate training to sector institutions on O & M and cost recovery strategies;
- Ensure there is a proper aftercare strategy at project closure; and
- Ensure there is a realistic exit strategy emerging, involving all concerned.

UNICEF-Rural Sub-Component

- Include as selection criteria, community's capacity to operate and maintain chosen scheme;
- Tendering on works and equipment of water supply systems should be done as close as possible to the end user;
- Support to WASHCOMs without a clear possibility of physical implementation will endanger future programmes;
- WASH Units must be upgraded to Departments, with project activities in State annual budgets;
- Ensure there is a proper after care strategy at project closure;
- Sustainability in rural water supply systems is THE most critical issue – need to be more innovative;
- Explore root causes of relapse for different localities on ODF; and
- Ensure there is a realistic exit strategy emerging, involving all concerned.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Assignment Objectives, Results and Outcomes

To avoid confusion, the term Mid Term Evaluation (MTE) has been used throughout this report as it was used originally in the ToR. Evaluations are typically used at the end of a project or programme (PCM Guidelines, 2004). A Mid-Term Review is typically used to identify mid-term changes etc. Indeed, a Mid-Term Review rather than Evaluation was foreseen in the Financing Agreement.

To be effective in its recommendations, the MTE should be conducted around the mid-term of the Programme which, in this case, should have been around April 2015. The reasons given for the delay were that the initial time planned for the MTE was overtaken by:

- *Evaluation of the UNICEF Component of NDSP by EU Court of Auditors (February 2014); and the*
- *Results-Oriented Monitoring of Niger Delta Support Programme (NDSP) (December 2015)*

HEADLINE:

Much of the effectiveness of the MTE was lost by being too late in the Programme...

It is unlikely that an audit which takes place more than a year before a potential MTE could be responsible especially since the Court of Auditors Audit Report has never been made available even after two years to either the EU Delegation or UNICEF.

It is similarly unlikely that a ROM which took place in December 2015, seven months or more after the period when the MTE should have been concluded should have had any effect on the timing of the MTE.

1. The **Overall Objective** of this Mid-Term Evaluation (MTE) is to provide decision makers in the Ministry of Budget and National Planning (MBNP) and the five participating State Ministries of Water Resources or equivalents in the Water Supply and Sanitation Component (Component 3) of the Niger Delta Support Programme (NDSP) and the Delegation of the European Union with sufficient information to make an informed judgement about the performance of the NDSP (Component 3) (for both the UNICEF-Rural and TAT-Urban/Small Towns components), as it concerns relevance, efficiency and effectiveness and eventual sustainability.
2. In addition, the assignment is to comment on any required changes to Programme design and scope (e.g. the objectives, expected results, financing, implementing and management arrangements, duration, etc) for an enhanced and successful implementation for the remaining period of the Programme.
3. The **Specific Objective** is to deliver an assessment and recommendations/conclusions on the following issues:
 - Extent to which the NDSP (Component 3) remains consistent with, and supportive of, the policy and programme framework within which it is placed;
 - Stakeholders' participation in the implementation of the programme, and the level of local ownership;
 - Programme performance with respect to efficiency (input delivery, cost control and activity management) and effectiveness (delivery of outputs and progress towards achieving the specific objective or purpose). Also to compare progress made so far with what was planned, and to assess the possible impact of the programme to date;
 - Project management and coordination arrangements, especially the embedment of the Technical Assistance Team (TAT) within the government service structure, and the sub-granting

arrangement between UNICEF Headquarters in Abuja and the State-level Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Agencies (RUWASSAs or RUWATSANs);

- Extent to which timely and appropriate decisions are being made to support effective implementation and problem resolution for the two components of the NDSP (Component 3),
- Quality of operational annual work plans and extent of their implementation by UNICEF, RUWASSAs and the States' Programme Implementing Agencies (PIAs) for each of the Programme components, budgeting and risk management;
- Quality and frequency of information management and reporting, especially of the financial and technical reporting arrangement between States' RUWASSAs and the UNICEFs Zonal and National Offices. Also to assess the quality and effectiveness of reporting for each of the Programme components;
- Extent to which stakeholders in the States are kept adequately informed of project activities (including the beneficiaries/target group in LGAs and communities);
- Extent and quality of data collected, their analysis, application (use) by programme implementers, and the extent to which data are disaggregated by gender and disseminated; and
- Extent of monitoring by stakeholders and the use of monitoring information to improve implementation.

4. The **Expected Results** of the MTE are clear recommendations for any required changes/modification to Programme design, scope (including objectives, management arrangements, TAT composition, validity of the logical framework, objectively verifiable indicators and assumptions etc) in order to support effective implementation and the delivery of sustainable programme outcomes.
5. The recommendations are to distinguish between UNICEF-Rural and TAT-Urban/Small Towns implementation components.

1.2 Assignment Methodology, Work Plan and Itinerary

6. The full Methodology, Work Plan and Itinerary is provided in Annex 4.7

Operational and Methodological Challenges

7. Among the risks that were anticipated:

RISKS	MITIGATION
With the large number of stakeholders, there is a risk that key stakeholders may have several tasks concurrently and not be available as arranged <i>NOTE: this already occurred during Inception period</i>	As much advance planning as possible was done and the order of the State visits optimised to facilitate availability, in conjunction with the States <i>NOTE: experience suggests that there needs to be an acceptance that not everyone will be available, even if they agree to meetings in the first place</i>
Despite best endeavours, promised documents are not available until the end of the mission	All Project documents were requested in good time <i>NOTE: many requests went unanswered for several days</i>
Planned meetings will not take place with the designated persons	The MTE Team was as flexible as possible to facilitate last minute changes of stakeholders as other external events unfold <i>NOTE: inevitably some more extreme cases could not be accommodated</i>
With the increasing civil agitation and unrest in the Niger Delta region, there could be incidences of threats and disturbance to the team causing delay to smooth implementation of the mission	Suitable security outfits to be with the team throughout the entire field work to ensure safety of the entire team In situations where there is critical security reported in areas to be visited, the team should make alternative arrangement with the stakeholders to have meetings in a safe environment

RISKS	MITIGATION
	NOTE: <i>ToR required that the team only travel to States and/or LGAs following the security clearance of the Delegation's Regional Security Officer. The team did not receive any direct advice, and requested a weekly security update prior to travelling to the next state. No updates were received during the entire mission.</i>
Ongoing strike action by various sections of civil society and their representatives in respect of the prices of fuel and staples is anticipated	The MTE Team was flexible as possible to facilitate last minute changes as external events unfold NOTE: <i>a contingency plan was in place if the aviation fuel shortage impacted the return by air to Abuja (an on-time arrival to Abuja was achieved)</i>
Withholding of relevant information subject to "clearance" by various parties	All instances of "rent-seeking" will be documented in a side letter to the MTE Report NOTE: <i>no such instances were encountered</i>

8. A key assumption was that there would be a genuine commitment to the MTE by all key stakeholders. This commitment was encouraged during the preparation of the State Visits by ensuring that all key stakeholders were involved in the itinerary planning. The commitment to the MTE was variable, there were several "no-shows" during the mission and extensive delays to many scheduled meetings, entailing re-scheduling or cancellation. It is estimated time lost due to general time-keeping issues due to third parties amounted to one to two days during the 32-day mission.

1.3 Programme Background and Context

9. Nigeria is a federation of 36 States and a Federal Capital Territory, is home to 167 million people of whom the majority has insufficient water (63 million people) and sanitation (109 million). The access to safe water and sanitation is lowest in rural areas and small towns (less than 20,000 inhabitants).
10. A common refrain, repeated in the Formulation, is that the main institutional constraints in the water sector, are both inadequate sector policy and institutional framework, and weak sector institutions. Yet it is inevitable for this to be the case when decision-making and budgetary power is centralised within the State. Inadequate sector policy and institutional framework, and weak sector institutions reflect the central power within the State, and are not core constraints *per se*.
11. For instance, even if one had well-structured institutions with defined, non-overlapping functions, career pathways, job descriptions, staff appraisals, well-appointed offices and facilities and all the other elements of a strong institution, yet there was no money to carry out the tasks or to pay staff, then the outcome would be the same as in the current situation.
12. Consequently, attempts to improve policy and the institutional framework and institutions, whilst technically achievable, will only go so far since the implementing aspect will require ongoing funding by the State. That is the core constraint to improvement in the water and sanitation sector, not weak policy, institutional framework or institutions but core, sustained funding. Of course, the lack of funding is not a reason to wait to improve institutions but it is on the critical path. Currently, there is no evidence of this sustained funding in any of the five Niger Delta States.

HEADLINE:

Core constraint to improvement in the water and sanitation sector is sustained funding...

13. Within in the framework of the 10th European Development Fund Country Strategy Paper/National Indicative Programme, the Niger Delta Support Programme (NDSP) aims to address institutional challenges in the water sector in five³ states in the Niger River delta. Other related programmes in the water sector are the EU-funded second phase of the Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Reform Programme (WSSSRP II) in six EU focal States. The WSSSRP II is being implemented simultaneously with the NDSP and shares the same Federal Project Steering Committee. Other EDF programmes in the water sector include the *Micro Project Programme* in poor communities in the nine oil-producing States in the Niger Delta. This programme which has about a quarter of these micro-projects in the water supply and sanitation sector, is implemented closely with the NDSP programme, and mainly concerns the involvement of civil society organisations in Programme implementation.
14. In addition to these programmes, international NGOs (WaterAid and Concern Universal, both of UK) have received funding from EU, UNICEF and others to implement water supply and sanitation actions in urban, small towns and rural communities.

WATERAID	FROM	TO
Sustainable Total Sanitation	June 2012	June 2017
HSBC Water Project	April 2012	December 2016
Stanley Johnson Project	April 2014	March 2016

15. There are several other large-scale, donor-funded water and sanitation projects in Nigeria, some of which (in contradiction to what is stated in the ToR) are in the NDSP states.

DFID	FROM	TO
Sanitation, Hygiene and Water in Nigeria (SHAWN 2) is a €96.5 M in six States (Bauchi, Benue, Jigawa, Kaduna, Katsina, and Zamfara)	March 2014	December 2018
USAID		
Sustainable Water and Sanitation in Africa Project which covered Rivers State supporting water policy and law of which some aspects have been taken forward through NDSP (3)	Completed in 2015	
US \$2 M partnership with Coca-Cola to provide improved WASH access to some 150,000 beneficiaries in rural areas in Cross River and Abia States	2016	2019
A WASH Coordination Project (name not available)	Under procurement	
An Urban WASH Reform Project (name not available)	Under procurement	
WORLD BANK		
3 rd National Urban Water Sector Reform Project (NUWSRP III) in Bayelsa State (water supply)	2016	2020
3 rd National Urban Water Sector Reform Project (NUWSRP III) in Rivers State (together with AfDB)	2016	2020
NUWSRP III in Bayelsa State (one of the nine participating states) to be made "finance ready" and focuses on sector level and urban water supply level (does not include	2016	2020

³ The Financing Agreement (signed February 2012) called for the NDSP (3) to be in four core states Bayelsa, Edo, Delta and Rivers. This was later updated with the addition of Akwa Ibom State by means of a rider.

sanitation) and in Rivers State with a new water network in Port Harcourt		
Technical assistance on urban sanitation in Rivers/Port Harcourt (coordinated with AfDB activities)	2017	2019
Community and Social Development Project is ongoing in Akwa Ibom State. The Agency in charge was established by Law on January 1, 2009 to anchor the Programme in the State. The World Bank commenced full collaboration with the Agency on 1 March, 2012. The Project Objective is to “sustainably increase access of the poor people to improved social and natural resources infrastructure services.”	2015	2019

16. Other donors contacted for information on any WASH interventions were: the African Development Bank, Agence Française Développement and the Japan International Cooperation Agency.

17. The total component cost is estimated at EUR 64,950,000 of which EUR 56 million are to be financed from the 10th CSP/NIP Nigeria (ACP–EU Partnership Agreement), EUR 8,350,000 as contributions from state and local governments and benefiting communities, and EUR 600,000 co-financing by UNICEF under the Contribution Agreement.

HEADLINE:

Addition of the fifth state, without associated funding, diluted available funds and undermined the Programme to deliver the required results and outcomes...

18. The Formulation (April 2011) called for four states to be involved. The Financing Agreement was signed by the EUD in February 2012 yet a mere three months later a Rider was requested (May 2012) adding an additional State. A further five months elapsed before the Federal Government then signed the Financing Agreement.

19. When the fifth state, Akwa Ibom, was added to the Programme, a letter from the EUD to the NAO proposed a Rider and noted that the local contribution (that is, from the States) would likely need to be increased from EUR 8 350 000 to EUR 10 437 500 and that of UNICEF from 600 000 to EUR 750 000. Although a letter from the Delegation proposed that the NAO request this increase, this did not happen. The reason is not known despite seeking clarification. Consequently, the addition of the fifth state served to dilute the available funds for this component. Given that the original budget was for four states and not five, this undermined the capacity right at the beginning of the Programme to deliver the required results and outcomes.

1.4 Programme Formulation

20. The Programme intended to address poverty and conflict issues in the selected States. Conflict is considered to be one of Nigeria’s most severe security concerns as instability in the Niger Delta threatens the economic and political stability of the whole country and has been ongoing for at least twenty years.

21. The causes of the conflict are linked to the misuse of funds allocated to the State Governments, widespread corruption, over-centralisation of decision-making powers and the control of revenues, widespread environmental degradation resulting from uncontrolled and unregulated oil and gas extraction, and high levels of local unemployment, particularly youth unemployment. These causes are well known and documented.

22. For this reason, the Programme included the means to improve planning, programming and budgeting at State level, linking this to the public financial management framework of a parallel World Bank project aimed at dealing with state employment and expenditure activities in each state.

However, there has been relatively little collaboration between the Programme and the World Bank despite efforts by the Programme.

23. The Programme was an extension of the experience and methods adopted by the Water Supplies and Sanitation Sector Reform Programme (WSSSRP) implemented in six focal states since 2005. The institutional and sector reform components aspects of the WSSSRP, which are its main purpose, have experienced severe difficulties in a national system where there is no comprehensive development plan setting out national reform processes, where the new Water Law is not yet enacted, and where the national water policy and strategy are not yet approved.
24. The basic principle in the design of Programme implementation arrangements was to promote leadership in sector reform at State level, and to support the State institutions to enhance their management capacities to provide safe water and sanitation facilities. For this reason the body responsible for implementation of state-level activities, the State Project Steering Committee, was to be established in the Office of the Commissioner.
25. There was a slight dichotomy right at the beginning of the programming. On the one hand, the Formulation Mission was to follow the Identification Fiche (January 2011) which is normal. While on the other, it is to provide an extension of the WSSSRP. Yet the design of the components of the WSSSRP differed somewhat from the scope set out in the original Identification Fiche.
26. Notably, a proposed scoping exercise planned during a proposed six month preliminary inception phase of the programme to develop a vision and strategy for the development of the sector between the different sector agencies was deleted, as was the original implementer Agence Française Développement. Why this occurred has never really been explained properly, though it was for “*several reasons*”.
27. At a critical first stakeholder meeting during Formulation, specifically to introduce stakeholders to the Programme and its expected outcomes, representatives from the four States were absent because of “*time constraints in organising travel*”. Interestingly, the participants who were present expressed concern about how the Programme would relate to the four components of the Identification Fiche. At this stage, the EUD stated that the Programme would comprise the water and sanitation components only, and the Programme would be designed based on the experience of the WSSSRP (not the Fiche). Even in the second workshop only Delta State representatives were present.
28. With such early equivocation, general disinterest in the Programme, and the consequences of that, further challenges should have been anticipated.

HEADLINE:

At formulation, no State representatives at 1st Stakeholder Workshop and only Delta State at 2nd Stakeholder Workshop...

29. Despite the Formulation team being concerned about the risks of inadequate data at State level and the lack of their institutional knowledge in the four Niger Delta States, the Mission was advised to proceed on the understanding that there may be gaps that will have to be filled subsequently. Even at this stage, it is clear that much more fundamental issues were being ignored (such as a basic institutional human resources needs analysis). It is quite clear that State institutions, and the Local Government Areas (LGAs) even more so, lacked the basic capacity and training to participate meaningfully in the Programme which ultimately emerged. Even today, this is still apparent.

HEADLINE:

State institutions, and LGAs even more so, lacked basic capacity and training to participate meaningfully in the Programme that ultimately emerged. Even today, this is still apparent...

30. Even at this early stage (February 2011) it was recognised by all parties that counterpart funding would be essential to demonstrate the State’s commitment to the Programme. Without this local budgetary support for recurrent funding then the Programme work would be unsustainable. Interestingly, the EUD stated that the Project may be withdrawn from a State should that State not show evidence of commitment to the Project’s goals. That lack of commitment has been ongoing for three years indicating the general disinterest in the Programme. Of course, it was originally assumed by the Programme that the MoUs would be signed before the TAT component of the Programme mobilised.
31. It is all the more surprising then, given the delays in signing the Financing Agreement (MoU) by the Federal Government, and then individual MoUs by the States and the evident lack of counterpart funds, despite years of reassurances that they would be paid, that the Programme has not been withdrawn sooner. Indeed, the issue of ultimatum without that being enacted simply contributes to the widely held view, that the Programme will not be withdrawn and that it can simply be extended. This latter perspective was commonly encountered during the MTE Mission.

32. There is a sense that even from formulation, this Programme was compromised:

- Formulation team came to base the formulation using a fiche and a preliminary design and then had to change to base it on WSSSRP;
- There had been preliminary discussions with the governments of Bayelsa and Rivers States in October 2010 by EUD, and a more in-depth analysis was to take place during Formulation yet this did not happen, since only a “rapid assessment” had to be conducted due to time constraints, leading to a weak formulation;
- Formulation had insufficient access to State representatives;
- Formulation seems to have laboured under a lack of State documentation; and
- Formulation and Implementation were undertaken by the same consulting company (SAFEGE) which, even if not explicitly contrary to Framework and PRAG rules, meant that the Programme during the Inception phase of the implementation period was not sufficiently critiqued.

HEADLINE:
Formulation essentially compromised from the beginning...

33. It should be noted that even though SAFEGE was not involved in the preparation of the Terms of Reference for the implementation of NDSP Component 3, it did undertake the formulation and so would have a far more profound appreciation of the Programme than any competing bidder.

34. In essence, it would seem that the Programme had weaknesses from the outset and that the usual mechanisms that could have rectified that were bypassed. That so many red flags should be evident, so early on in a Programme, should have alerted both EUD and NAO, taken together there is a clear fatal flaw.



1.5 Programme Description and Overview

35. The Programme itself began on 29 October 2012. UNICEF began on 10 December, 2012 and the TAT on 1 July 2013. The Programme initially had a duration of five years from 29 October 2012.
36. The general objective of the Niger Delta Support Programme (NDSP) is to mitigate the conflict in the Niger Delta by addressing the main causes of unrest and violence: bad governance, (youth) unemployment, and poor delivery of basic services.

37. The Specific Objectives of the Water and Sanitation Component of the NDSP are:

- To improve policy, institutional, legal and financial framework in the water and sanitation sector;
- To support urban and small towns sector institutions to deliver sustainable water supply services; and
- To support rural water sector institutions to deliver sustainable water supply and sanitation services.

38. The NAO is the Contracting Authority for the first two objectives with SAFEGE (the Technical Assistance Team, TAT) assisting the States who are implementing the Programme. The third objective, dealing with water and sanitation in rural areas, is implemented by UNICEF. The Programme covers the States of Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Delta, Edo and Rivers. It targets the urban (more than 20 000 population) environment and small towns (5 000 to 20 000 population) areas, with a focus on the latter located in two pilot Local Government Areas (LGAs) in each State, while UNICEF is implementing in the rural areas of the same LGAs.

39. Some key features of Component 3 (a) and (b):

- The TAT will support the States in developing their own plans;
- The pilot LGAs have been self-selected in a nominally transparent manner;
- The benefitting communities have also been self-selected on criteria based on commitment to sustainability as much as on the actual needs in their communities; and
- The choice of the technical alternatives will be undertaken by the benefitting Water Consumers Associations.

40. The Programme is decentralised in as much as the TAT is in each of the five States and is embedded in the Ministry of Water Resources, or the equivalent Ministry responsible for water supply and sanitation. Specific work plans have been developed in each States with the support of the TAT, and are communicated to each State Steering Committee.

41. Some key features of Component 3 (c):

- UNICEF has an extensive, existing network which it can draw on to accomplish its work;
- It is using tried and trusted methods to implement it tasks; and
- Key elements of sustainability are built into the work; local Operations and Maintenance (O & M) funds and area mechanics.

42. It should be noted that the level of sustainability is probably over-estimated. It is clear that neither solar nor diesel-driven boreholes are easily serviceable by local communities. The six months retention for a contractor installing these systems is inappropriate. Six months is unnecessary to know if a system works or not, and it is far too short for warranties for the main components. Warranties for solar panels should be 10 years (manufacturing warranty) and 25 years linear performance warranty (a possible reduction of up to 20% over 25 years) for inverters, ten years and batteries, two to five years.

43. It is not clear who holds these warranties and the procedure for exercising these rights. In practice, it is anticipated that for solar installations, they will fail at some point and become “non-functional” and join the dozens of other non-functional systems that litter the States. It is foreseen that communities will never be able to keep these solar systems functioning due to their lack of communications, logistics and capacity.

HEADLINE:

The level of achievable sustainability is probably over-estimated...

Only the State could do this, and it is evident that the State will not be able to be in such a position by the time the systems could be anticipated to fail.

44. A National Project Steering⁴ Committee was established with participation by high-level States officials, TAT, UNICEF and NGO/CSOs. This committee is supposed to meet annually. It was aware of the issues surrounding the Programme to the extent that in 2014, one year after the commencement of the Programme the following concerns were raised:

- There was still no commitment of Federal/state executive and legislature on the review and approval of respective National and State Water Bills;
- There was still inadequate budgetary provisions for WASH Units in LGAs because they were yet to be transformed into Departments;
- There was still no implementation of 70%:30% cost sharing as required by the Financing Agreement, because there was still difficulty in States securing the 30% counterpart funds even though there was provision in the 2014 budget;
- There was still delay in approval of National Monitoring and Evaluation Framework for Water Sector;
- There were still delays with signing of MoUs (only Edo State had signed);
- EU Delegation lack of provision of vehicles;
- Weak demonstration of commitment from States;
- Poor communication and coordination between rural and urban/small towns components;
- Various management and coordination issues:
 - Lack of office accommodation in Bayelsa and Delta States
 - Reluctance of all five States to provide additional financial support to State Working Group Programme Estimate fund
 - Lack of clarity on strategy for implementation of works cost sharing
 - Delays by EU bureaucracy in approvals is affecting key milestones activities
 - Non provision of project vehicles for States officials is affecting supervision at the LGAs
 - Delays in replenishment of Programme Estimates

HEADLINE:

National Project Steering Committee was fully aware of the situation concerning States' commitments and the timescales...

45. Such a catalogue of outstanding issues should have raised a red flag and warranted decisive, remedial and urgent action by both the EU Delegation and the NAO.

46. On a brighter note, despite the above, the Committee noted that:

- Tender dossiers for all priority works in Urban and Small Towns had been prepared and submitted to NAO and EUD;
- Self-selection and validation had been accomplished in all 46 beneficiary Small Towns in all the beneficiary LGAs;
- Formation and foundation training of Water Consumers Associations (WCAs) had been implemented in all the relevant Small Towns;
- Support to effective community management was ongoing in all the States; and
- Design of water supply schemes for all benefitting small towns had started in all of the States.

HEADLINE:

National Project Steering Committee recognised Programme achievements to date...

⁴ Perhaps "strategy" rather than "steering" would better reflect its context

47. The Committee made several recommendations, though most lacked a designated action party and timescale for effecting those recommendations. Some actions have still to be accomplished some two years on, notably the payment of counterpart funds and improved communication by NAO/EUD with the States.

HEADLINE:

National Project Steering Committee recommendations largely ignored...

48. There was no National Project Steering Committee meeting in 2015.

1.6 Programme Organisation and Management

49. Under Partially Decentralised Management, the design of the Programme involves principally three layers of institutions at the Federal, State (five states) and Local Government Area (LGA) levels. The office of the National Authorising Officer (NAO) is assisted by a Technical Assistance Team (TAT) which is implementing the two main Programme objectives of a) to improve policy, institutional, legal and financial framework in the water and sanitation sector and b) to support urban and small towns' sector institutions to deliver sustainable water supply services.

50. The overall technical assistance comprises ten experts, with an Institutional Policy Expert (IPE) and Water and Sanitation Expert (WSE) embedded in the five participating State Ministries of Water Resources or state equivalent e.g. Water Board in Bayelsa. There are also five long term Community Mobilisation Experts (CMEs) and a number of short term Non-Key Experts. Of the five participating states, Rivers State serves as the headquarters for the TAT where the team leader doubles as the IPE, the State being centrally located for easy coordination with the other four States.

51. The Financing Agreement calls for the implementation of project activities to be coordinated in each State by a number of State counterpart staff who will combine with the State Technical Unit to form a State Project Coordination Unit with the Commissioner of the State Ministry responsible for Water Resources exercising the political responsibility for project implementation. In practice the "State Project Coordination Unit" has become the State Working Group (SWG) and is for the whole management of the Programme on behalf of the Project Implementation Agencies/Project Recipient Agencies. For the policy work a separate working group has been established in each State (except Rivers State) including representatives of the SWG, and extended to other stakeholders.

HEADLINE:

State Working Group meets regularly and is generally committed to the Programme...

52. The Director of Planning in the Ministry has been appointed as the State Project Director to supervise Programme implementation. Counterpart staff are senior officials of management level seconded from various State Ministries and Agencies including, Ministry of Water Resources, Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Agency and State Water Board. Counterpart staff should be paid by their parent Ministry or Agency. The SWG is the link through which state ministries and agencies will benefit from Programme activities and meets frequently (even weekly).

53. In each of the states, the Commissioner for Water Resources has been established and chairs a State Project Steering Committee comprising representatives of Project Coordinating Units; Ministries of Local Government, Finance, Women's Affairs, State Planning Commission, Chairmen of participating LGAs and CSOs. The EU and UNICEF can be present as observers, though their attendance has been sporadic, despite this committee not meeting regularly.

HEADLINE:

State Project Steering Committee does not meet regularly...

54. Under Joint Management with a Contribution Agreement, UNICEF is implementing activities to meet the third Component objective to support rural water sector institutions to deliver sustainable water supply and sanitation services. This objective is targeted at Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Agencies (RUWASSA) and Water Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) Departments/Units in the LGAs to enable them to provide sustainable support for the implementation of rural water supply, sanitation and hygiene services in the States.
55. UNICEF has engaged the services of a WASH Specialist (International) and a WASH Specialist (national) at the Federal Level at UNICEF HQ in Abuja, to coordinate the Programme. The Field Office of Rivers State oversees Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa and Rivers states, while the Field Office in Ondo State oversees Delta and Edo states. The LGA consultants are based at the LGA level in the LGA WASH Departments/Units and WASH Committees (WASHCOMs) at the community level.
56. The Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Component of the Programme will interface with the Urban and Small Towns Component for activities related to a) baseline studies; b) Environmental Impact Assessment; and c) the establishment of a State-level integrated monitoring and evaluation system (M&E) which will be integrated with the Federal M&E system. This has been the case for the baseline studies and the monitoring and evaluation system development.
57. The monitoring and evaluation system has been developed at Community and State Levels and a strategy described (May 2016). It is understood that the indicators have been agreed between the three EU “water” projects, UNICEF and the FMWR. The M & E Framework Plan is under preparation and should be finalised after the baseline surveys are completed. The baseline surveys are pending the release of programme estimates though should not be done too early before the Works so it will serve to measure the outcome/impact of the Programme rather than capture changes not attributable to the Programme.
58. A national Framework for Monitoring and Evaluation of the Water Supply and Sanitation Sector was developed for the Federal Ministry of Water Resources (FMWR) in 2001. It was then subjected to an extended period of review with the recommended way forward only codified in 2004, and reviewed under the EU-WSSSRP 1 programme in 2010-2011. The review continued under WSSSRP 2 with the framework trialled in the six programme states of Anambra, Cross River, Jigawa, Kano, Osun and Yobe. At the same time, FMWR also took steps to trial the framework in Imo State.
59. At the National Council for Water (May 2016) it was agreed that the framework be expanded to cover all areas of water resources and not just WASH. A review to commence this is to happen in September and October 2016. Although outside the remit of this MTE, lessons learned from elsewhere would caution this “integrated” approach since it will prove too difficult to manage given the (lack of) maturity of State institutions.
60. In addition, rural sanitation and sustainable hygiene practice is implemented by UNICEF through Community-Led Total Sanitation (CLTS).
61. Implementation of the Programme on focused in two self-selected Local Government Areas in the five states. TAT and UNICEF have regularly produced six-monthly Interim, and Annual reports respectively of their activities in the urban, small town and rural water supply, sanitation and hygiene in LGAs and rural communities.

HEADLINE:
Good TAT and UNICEF cooperation...

General Supplies

62. The SWGs had certain requests at the beginning of the Programme, for: vehicles, mobile test kits, geophysical and hydrogeological equipment, generators and general office equipment (computers, public address systems, projectors, etc). These needs were then formulated by the Programme.
63. There are five lots in the general supplies tender:
- Vehicles
 - Geophysical and hydrogeological equipment
 - Minor laboratory equipment
 - Generators and inverters
 - Data Centres (hardware and software)
64. There are to be two vehicles for each State, for the general purpose of the Programme Implementing Agencies and the Programme Receiving Agencies with priority for the Programme activities. The State has the responsibility for deciding how to share their usage. The same is applicable to the generator and inverters.
65. The laboratory equipment consists of mobile kits to be used by the Water Boards in line with the policy implementation, a framework of which being prepared by TAT (no draft available yet). This also applies to the hydrogeological equipment. The Data Centres were introduced by the Programme and followed the recognition that any form of asset management was absent, to the extent that Water Boards were unaware of what they had to manage. Then the concept of these Data Centres was later extended to M&E and customer management.
66. There were five generators for the State and two for TAT, and five inverters for the State and three for TAT. State and TAT specifications were slightly different for both items because of proposed estimated loads for both user categories. The contracting authority is the NAO, and delivery is to the respective States. It is not clear who holds the warranties for these items which may have implications for sustainability.
67. The data centres require a strategy for implementation so that there is compatibility and no legacy issues. The UNICEF WASHIMS was developed locally for FMWR. The Ministry is supposed to manage it after the end of the Programme. An Exit Strategy should advise how this is to be achieved.
68. Given that the supplies will be unlikely to be delivered much before the Programme concludes, the question arises of who will be mentoring the States for the use of these data centres. This should be elaborated in the Programme *Exit Strategy*.

HEADLINE:
Need for a Programme Exit Strategy...

“Quick Wins”

69. An early concept was the so-called "quick wins", i.e. € 100 000 for each State (not directly linked to the self-selected LGAs). This was a laudable idea because many of the so-called non-functional boreholes of existing urban schemes require very small repairs or modest rehabilitation. Tender documents for about ten repairs/rehabilitations per State, were prepared using the appropriate PRAG rules and would have enabled quite small contractors to do the work which would support the general objective of the NDSP which is to mitigate the conflict in the Niger Delta by addressing the main causes of unrest and violence through encouraging youth unemployment and improved delivery of basic services.

70. In addition to it being clear that each work should be solely funded by EU or NAO, there was some discussion concerning rehabilitation/repair of non-functioning water schemes in urban areas. Tender dossiers had been prepared by the TAT with the understanding that such works would be funded 100% by the EU, as part of its overall EUR 12 M contribution, assuming that the contribution of the States on the remaining works would achieve the required 70:30 sharing agreement overall. These works are also subject to the 70:30 costs sharing arrangements, as within each and every tendering process.

71. It is understood that these tender documents were refused initially due to the EUD requirement for a single procurement. After suitable aggregation, it is understood that this “quick win” procurement still did not have support of the EUD, who initially suggested it, largely because at that time the state MoUs had not been signed, and counterpart funds would be unlikely to come for these small works. It was then decided to merge these small urban works into the procurement for the small towns. The non-materialisation of this “quick win” approach has resonated within the States and done some reputational damage to the EUD.

HEADLINE:

Sadly, “Quick Wins” did not materialise and left some legacy of mistrust of EUD at State level...

1.7 Programme Objectives, Results and Outcomes

Objective 3 (a)

To improve policy, institutional, legal and financial framework in the water and sanitation sector

72. Under this objective, activities and results are to be directed at supporting the State to develop and implement water and sanitation sector policies, strategies and legislation to facilitate the re-organisation and institutional capacity strengthening of sector agencies to deliver improved and sustainable water supply and sanitation services.

73. Other expected results under the Programme objective are to secure adequate budget for sector institutions to fulfil their mandates; develop strategies for private sector participation (including civil society organisations) in water supply and sanitation services delivery; adopt Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) principles in water resources management as well as institutionalising regular sector monitoring and review by stakeholders in the States.

Objective 3 (b)

To support urban and small towns’ sector institutions to deliver sustainable water supply services

74. To achieve this objective, State water supply and sanitation institutions responsible for urban areas and small towns (semi-urban towns) will be assisted to improve their management and financial viability; increase access to safe drinking water in urban and in small towns, as well as develop and implement strategy for community-management of water supply facilities in small towns.

Objective 3 (c)

To support rural water sector institutions to deliver sustainable water supply and sanitation services

75. This objective will be implemented by UNICEF in rural communities under a joint management approach. UNICEF will implement activities targeted at the RUWASSAs and WASH Departments/units in the LGAs to enable them provide sustainable support for the implementation of rural water supply,

sanitation and hygiene services in the States. This Sub-Component will interface with the Urban and Small Towns Sub-Component for activities related to (i) Baseline study; (ii) Environmental impact assessment (EIA); (iii) the establishment of a State-level integrated monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system, which will be integrated with Federal level M&E system.

76. It is not clear that there has been any collaboration with respect to EIAs, though there has been some scoping for an SEA. It is usual for a single ToR to be developed for an SEA which is in two parts the scoping and then the SEA itself. For an unknown reason, two different ToRs will be developed which is unnecessary.

77. UNICEF will also construct new water supply facilities and rehabilitate existing, though non-functioning ones, with the aim of increasing access to safe water supply in rural communities in participating LGAs.

78. The status of the current progress is provided overleaf for each Objective by State. With the obvious exception of those results requiring the lodging of counterpart funds, the progress made in both the Urban/Small Towns and Rural Sub-Components is generally very impressive.

HEADLINE:
Generally, the progress is impressive...

79. The Results Oriented Monitoring (ROM) Mission in November 2015 made recommendations to revise the Urban/Small Towns Sub-Component logframe, as did the Programme's own M & E activity, particularly to reflect disaggregation by gender. In fact this disaggregation is already done by the Programme, even though not reflected in the original logframe.

80. A revised logframe for the Urban/Small Towns Sub-Component has been developed (draft) and is provided in Annex 4.5 with the following features:

- Some lines have been moved from one group to another;
- Several items added to enhance potential sustainability;
- Some could be part of a potential Exit Strategy;
- Some elements of the Exit Strategy are taking place within the current contract, some of them go beyond;
- Some activities are linked to the delivery of the data centres, which is estimated mid-2017 and support for the running of the data centres should be until the end of the warranty period, i.e. mid-2018; and
- Supervision of works is included.

81. The logframe for the Rural Sub-Component is adequate for the current task and is not revised.

Status of Objective 3 (a) by State

Required Results	Akwa Ibom	Bayelsa	Delta	Edo	Rivers
State water and sanitation sector policy, strategies and legislation are produced, approved by the relevant authorities and implemented	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Draft Sector Policy produced (not yet approved) Draft Law produced (under review by legal experts in Policy Committee) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Policy approved by the Steering Committee and the three senatorial districts State water and sanitation sector policy, strategies and legislation are developed Policy document has been reproduced and distributed to relevant authorities Policy currently at the State Executive Council for approval Action plan for the implementation of the policy developed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sector Policy produced and approved Draft Law produced and forwarded to the State House of Assembly 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Draft WASH Sector Policy produced and submitted to State Executive Council and awaiting approval Urban Water and Sanitation Draft Bill, Small Town and Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Bill produced, reviewed and submitted to Council. House of Assembly Members, House Committee on Water notified 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Policy and law pre-existing Strategy for reviving the policy/law implementation is under preparation. No draft available yet. I have asked to get the latest reports on the current activities
Sector institutions are structured in accordance with the State water law	Sector institutions not yet structured in accordance with water law but awareness has been created	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sector institutions have been restructured in the policy ~ not yet implemented State Project Steering Committee has been established comprising line ministries Capacity of the State ministry has been developed in the preparation of annual work plan ~ not yet put in practice at ministry level 	Sector institutions are being structured in accordance with the provisions in the water law subject to its enactment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Edo Water Regulatory Commission will be established with passage of the Bill Sector institutions have been sensitised to the coming changes based on the incoming Water Supply and Sanitation law 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Regulatory body is in place and operating slowly Urban and Small Towns water institutions PHWC and RSSTOWA are in place, with management coming from the private sector law

Required Results	Akwa Ibom	Bayelsa	Delta	Edo	Rivers
Budget for sector institutions to fulfil their mandate is secured	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Apart from payment of salary and supply of diesel, State releases no other money Budget is almost nil Refurbished schemes handled by Ministry 	Support is provided to the State MoWR in preparing and applying sector annual budget in line with the Mid Term Expenditure Framework	Budgets for sector institutions are prepared and releases partially secured	Sector Budget officials have had initial MTEF training	Budget/MTEF - preparing ToRs for an expert to assist, but the scarcity of State money is not encouraging
Integrated Water Resources Management principles in water resources management are embedded in policies and legislation and are implemented	IWRM principles are embedded in the policy not implemented	IWRM principles are embedded in the policy not implemented	IWRM principles are embedded in the policy	IWRM principles are embedded in the policy, Edo IWRM committee inaugurated and operational	Current Policy and Law is poor in terms of IWRM, it was decided that improvement of that aspect was less urgent compared to the already difficult implementation of the existing policy/law
Strategy for Private Sector Participation (PPP) in the water supply and sanitation services delivery is developed and implemented	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Addressed in policy Strategy yet to be developed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strategy in the water sector is developed but not yet implemented by the sector Regular consultations, advocacy and sensitisation at all levels to promote participation and ownership 	Private Sector Participation is addressed in the policy and immediate invention strategy for selected aspects of water supply services developed and implemented	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Addressed in the policy Proposals discussed with State Government and piloting strategy being formulated with the PPP office 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Included in the policy implementation framework under preparation Prepared various alternative models to be applied according to various sizes/situation of Small Towns
Regular water supply and sanitation sector monitoring and review is institutionalised in States	Not yet	Not yet	Not yet	Not yet	M&E Framework under preparation and is derived from existing national M&E Framework (already used by a number of States although not officially approved)
Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) are involved in policy definition, services delivery and overview of sector performance	Issue of CSOs addressed in the policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CSOs/NGOs identified and involved in the programme at all levels Were actively involved in policy development but not yet in services delivery and overview of sector performance 	Civil Society Organisations are involved in policy definition and sector coordination	Role of CSOs/NGOs addressed in the policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CSOs/NGOs involved in policy Some NGOs/CSOs are influential in service delivery No new forum set up – prefer to use existing

Required Results	Akwa Ibom	Bayelsa	Delta	Edo	Rivers
Research/studies in environmental degradation, political economy, gender, civil society/private sector and water	Studies carried out on: political economy, water quality and scoping study on environmental degradation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Research/studies on Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) and Political Economy Analysis Reform Champions identified, performing active advocacy and sensitisation at high level TOR on gender available 	Studies carried out on political economy, water quality and scoping study on environmental degradation, development plan for state water agencies	Studies carried out on: political economy, water quality and scoping study on environmental degradation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Political Economy Conflict resolution In progress – SEA, gender; economic models alternatives Water quality Management, social and training modules for WCAs, PIA/PRAs

Status of Objective 3 (b) by State

Required Results	Akwa Ibom	Bayelsa	Delta	Edo	Rivers
Management and financial viability of State Urban Water Institutions (Water Boards or Corporations) are improved	Preparation of Performance Improvement Plan and Training Needs Analysis for water board	Not yet	Plans developed for effective management and financial viability awaits Implementation	Preparation of Performance Improvement Plan and Training Needs Analysis for water board	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Financial viability: no significant revenue yet Urban Water Board not supported by Programme (WB, AfDB) RSSTOWA slowly active, waiting for budget
Access to safe water supply in urban and small (semi-urban) towns is increased	Two schemes – Ifa Atai and Idu, all at Uyo have been rehabilitated	Not yet	Not increased	Design of ten small town schemes completed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Service delivery : no significant improvement yet
Strategy for community-management of water supply facilities in small towns is developed and implemented	Strategy has been developed and training is being carried out	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Water Consumers Associations (WCAs) have been formed, registered and trained. Federation of Water Consumers Associations comprising whole of Opokuma Kingdom has been formed and is active at LGA level 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strategy for community-management of water supply facilities in small towns has been developed and training is being carried out 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Procurement of Sector Database tool in progress Strategy developed and training on social development and O&M ongoing WCA development manuals to be produced and used for templates Willingness to Pay survey completed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Works in the small towns selected Demand driven design completed, with tender documents No work yet due to absence of counterpart funds

Status of Objective 3 (c) by State

Required Results	Akwa Ibom	Bayelsa	Delta	Edo	Rivers
LGA WASH Units upgraded as Departments and strengthened to implement rural water supply sanitation programmes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Guidelines for creation of WASH Units developed and shared RUWASSA established by law WASH Units established LGA by-laws passed for creation of WASH Units and are receiving budgeted funds Plans advanced to create LGA WASH Departments in all 774 LGAs of the federation Ten training events conducted (CLTS, WSP, HWTS, Arc-GIS, Hygiene Promotion, Construction Supervision and Management, Training of WASHCOMs, etc) Plan for Institutional capacity of RUWASSA and LGA is underway – plan for 2016 DRR action plan prepared and materials pre-positioned DRR training is also planned for 2016 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Bill for establishment of Bayelsa RUWASSA by Law awaiting approval and submission to the State House of Assembly for legislative action Guidelines for creation of WASH Units developed and shared WASH Units strengthened and functional across two focal LGAs - Brass and Kolokuma/Opokuma Institutional capacity of RUWASSA and LGA assessed WASH Profiles and Local Investment Plans developed for the two focal LGAs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Draft guideline developed to be finalised State WASH policy developed and presented to State Governor State Water Bill drafted and before the State House of Assembly for passage Establishment of WASH Depts. at the LGA level contained in the State WASH policy WASH units established in the two project LGAs Budget line available for Dept. of Environment where WASH is a Unit No specific budget line for WASH in place and occasional release of Imprest funds to WASH Units by LGA Authority Institutional assessment carried out and identified gaps being bridged through training of personnel and provision of equipment 	Amendment of the sixth edition of Unified Local Govt. Scheme of service undertaken	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Advocacy and sensitisation for creation of WASH Dept. carried out Also awaiting approval of the scheme of service for the creation of the WASH Department by the Federal Council on establishment for adoption and implementation at state level WASH Units already established and functional Training conducted on CLTS, HWTS, Arc-GIS, WASHIMS, Hygiene Promotion, Construction Supervision and Management, Training of WASHCOMs, etc. DRR action plan prepared awaits implementation Institutional capacity of RUWASSA and LGA planned to be conducted in 2016 Draft Capacity Needs Action Plan developed Equipment, vehicle and various training carried out

Required Results	Akwa Ibom	Bayelsa	Delta	Edo	Rivers
Increased access to safe and sustainable water supply services in rural communities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Nsit Atai and Obot Akara LGAs self-selected Procurement training conducted Tender dossier for construction of water and sanitation facilities compiled, awaiting counterpart funding (CF) Consultant hired to assist/guide state through the procurement process IEE study conducted NAO and EUD conducted a monitoring visit WASHCOMs formed and trained in all 136 project communities Advocacy at all levels for CF conducted Harmonised procurement guideline developed and circulated Procurement Dossier ready awaiting release of CF WASH Profiles and LIPs developed Feasibility study conducted 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Brass, Kolokuma/Opokuma LGAs self-selected IEE studies conducted across the focal LGAs NAO/EUD/UNICEF advocacy/monitoring 89 WASHCOMs trained Quality of household water sources in 60 communities sustained through adoption and implementation of Household Water Treatment and Storage Capacities of 24 government staff (18 M, 6 F) from focal LGAs built on water supply, water quality (WQ) monitoring & surveillance, household water treatment to drive WQ in communities Procurement dossier completed for 16 water facilities in communities and schools/health centres 104 Bio Sand filtration Unit deployed across focal LGAs providing additional access to safe drinking water at the household level to 1,030 people (616 M and 514 F) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Two LGAs self-selected through a keenly contested, transparent selection process IEE carried out with findings being used to guide location of new water facilities Rehabilitation of 25 dysfunctional water facilities carried out in two LGAs restoring access to improved water to 42,690 people (20,210 M; 22479 F) Functionality assessment of non-functional in LGAs with tender dossier for the rehabilitation of 49 finalised and ready for tendering Tender dossier for the construction of 49 new motorised BHs (MBHs) concluded and waiting for the release of CF to enable tendering WASHCOMs established in 159 communities Regular programme planning/implementation meetings Community members actively raising funds and opening bank accounts for their 5% O & M contribution 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Rehabilitation of 25 MBHs carried out restoring access to 12,000 people Tender dossier for rehabilitation of additional 47 MBHs developed and 49 new schemes pending CF Creation of small town and rural water supply and sanitation agency (submitted to House of Assembly) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Opobo Nkoro and Akuku Toru LGAs self-selected IEE study conducted NAO and EUD monitoring visit WASHCOMs formed and trained in all 88 project communities WASH Profiles and LIPs Three solar powered water schemes with treatment plants completed Training conducted on CLTS, WSP, HWTS, Arc-GIS, Hygiene Promotion, Construction supervision and Management, Training of WASHCOMs, etc. DRR action plan prepared and materials pre-positioned

Required Results	Akwa Ibom	Bayelsa	Delta	Edo	Rivers
Enhanced access to improved sanitation and hygiene promotion services in small towns and rural communities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> LGA CLTS Action Plans developed and agreed by stakeholders Road Map to ODF by 2025 developed 136 communities triggered 43 communities claiming ODF Plans finalised to train on new ODF protocol and certification Selection of VHP completed and training planned for 8-13 August 2016 EHCs established in 58 primary schools Group Hand washing being practiced in 28 primary schools using Tippy-Taps 20 compartment toilets built in two schools 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> LGA wide ODF plans developed and in use CLTS ongoing 89 communities triggered, being monitored to attain ODF; eight claiming ODF; eight claiming ODF ODF Road maps 3310 (1622 M; 1688 F) have access to safe excreta disposal systems with improved latrines constructed Capacities of 39 WASH officers (30 focal LGAs, 2 NGOs, 1 state and 2 LGA WASH consultants and 4 RUWASSA officers) enhanced on CLTS facilitation and implementation 245 women and children in nine health centres KOLGA and 826 people in six towns in Brass were reached with hygiene messages 7533 people (4388 F and 3148 M) reached with hygiene messages Additional 1302 people (695 M, 607 F) pupils, teachers and community members sensitised on the importance of hand washing at critical times 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> LGA –Wide ODF plans representing 11.1% with 39 communities claiming ODF while 16 have been certified Community Dialogue developed and being applied for following up triggered communities for quick ODF attainment ODF road map developed and to be finalised for Governor endorsement HIF yet to be implemented WASH package to be implemented due to non-release of CF 29 EHCs established and supporting positive behaviour change in schools Tippy taps installed in 62 public primary schools enhancing 17,009 pupils (4,215 M and 8,294 F) to practice safe hand washing. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2,689 improved latrine constructed providing access to 31,803 (13,358 M and 18,445 F) ODF claimed in 39 communities with 16 communities ODF certified LGA-Wide ODF plan developed and being implemented Community dialogue pattern and being used for following up CLTS in the triggered communities for quick ODF attainment 1,655 practicing safe hand washing at household level 25 EHCs established 589 (280 M and 309 F) supporting positive behaviour in school 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> LGA CLTS action plans developed and agreed by stakeholders ODF attainment Road Map developed 88 communities triggered for CLTS implementation 10 communities claiming ODF STGS inaugurated and trained on ODF certification protocol Three communities declared and certified ODF EHCs established in 32 primary schools Group hand washing practiced in 28 primary schools using Tippy-Taps Two compartment ECO San toilets built in two communities in Opobo Nkoro LGA

Required Results	Akwa Ibom	Bayelsa	Delta	Edo	Rivers
Institutionalised dialogue among stakeholders strengthening social bonding and contributing to the mitigation of conflict	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Project Coordinating Committees established in two LGAs Conflict Profiling and Mitigation and training conducted for State/LGA officials Two LGA and one state Federation of WASHCOM established and supporting CLTS and other activities Five CSOs engaged and participating in project implementation Three WASH clinics held WASH Communication strategy developed for LGAs and State 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Project LGAs have established Federation of WASHCOMS and are supporting communities 89 WASHCOMs trained on community management skills, project management for project sustainability and up scaling WASH Communication Strategy developed for State and the focal LGAs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> LGA Project Coordination Forum established in focal LGAs Six (5 M; 1 F) WASH staff (two State, Four LGAs trained in conflict sensitivity and resolution WASH programming resulting in development and implementation of the plan in 14 conflict-prone communities Federation of WASHCOMs established and registered in focal LGAs Etsoko West LGA held quiz competitions for 25 schools for cross learning purposes WASH clinics held on quarterly basis providing opportunity for WASHCOMs carry out peer reviews of programme activities Materials distributed to WASH Units and being used in communities for WASHCOM training and triggering of communities on CLTS approach 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Project Coordinating Committees established in focal LGAs Conflict Profiling and Mitigation and training conducted for State/LGA officials# Two LGA Federation of WASHCOM established and are supporting implementation of CLTS and other activities Six CSOs engaged and are participating in implementation at State and LGA level# Two WASH clinics held at ward level WASH Communication strategy developed for LGAs and State WASH Communication Strategy developed for LGAs and State Group hand washing stations constructed and in use in public primary schools Capacities of about teachers and SBMC members enhanced on proper implementation of Life Skills-Based Hygiene Education School EHCs established in public primary schools

Required Results	Akwa Ibom	Bayelsa	Delta	Edo	Rivers
State level monitoring and evaluation framework, linked with the national M&E framework	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Baseline studies conducted in focal LGAs • M&E framework developed for LGA and state and linked with National M&E system • Three M&E training conducted • Water Functionality Tracking System established • WASHIMS developed and deployed with LGA WASH Units updating progress on a monthly basis • M&E data form basis of planning and budgeting in focal LGAs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • WASHIMS) in use in focal LGAs and State RUWASSA. Programme inputs, outputs, outcomes and impacts are tracked for effective planning and resource management • State level participants, (52 M; 62 F) have full knowledge of the National M&E framework for harmonised WASH sector implementation • M&E Framework has been developed for evidence-based planning and budgeting 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • WASHIMS functional at the State and LGA levels and data regularly updated • Proposal for the development of the State WASH M & E submitted to UNICEF for funding support • State WASH Coordination Forum established • No report so far published. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • WASHIMS operational in the focal LGA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Baseline studies conducted in focal LGAs • M&E framework developed for LGA and state and linked with National M&E system • Three M&E training conducted • Water Functionality Tracking System established • WASHIMS developed and deployed with LGA WASH Units updating progress on a monthly basis • M&E data form basis of planning and budgeting in focal LGAs

1.8 Programme Monitoring

82. Two significant monitoring and/or evaluations have been undertaken prior to this MTE:

- Joint EU/NAO/UNICEF Monitoring Mission January 2014; and
- Results Oriented Monitoring (ROM) Mission in November 2015.

83. Surprisingly, the MTE Mission was not made aware of the Joint EU/NAO/UNICEF Monitoring Mission or provided with its findings, until the MTE Team found out about this by chance during its work in the States. The monitoring mission visited Akwa Ibom and Bayelsa States. Only the EUD attended Akwa Ibom and in Bayelsa State NAO, EU and UNICEF (local staff rather than national) were in attendance.

84. Some headlines are extracted and enhanced since some still resonate with findings during this current evaluation:

- TAT-Urban/Small Towns and UNICEF-Rural components were exhorted to collaborate more and this seems to be the case at the community level, though the Joint EU Monitoring team itself could have done more since it included UNICEF and not TAT;
- UNICEF-Rural Component should carry out WASH activities in both small towns and rural communities with TAT providing necessary support, though it is unclear what that “necessary support” is;
- The "Quick-Wins" championed by the EU Joint Monitoring just seems to have brought more EUD reputational damage through lack of implementation;
- The EU Joint Monitoring expressed concern about the security issue preventing the TAT team leader acquitting his role fully (e.g. at community level). This should have been considered at formulation. The suggestion of a deputy team leader was not appropriate though an IPE Expert based in Rivers (as in other States) would have been much more useful; and
- EU Joint Monitoring commented on the lack of EU visibility though that was a good thing since the deliberate low key nature of the TAT work has managed to limit the reputational damage caused by EU Delegation bureaucracy.

HEADLINE:

Some findings from January 2014 have been dealt with whilst others still resonate...

85. Some headlines from the ROM are also extracted and enhanced since some still resonate with findings during this current evaluation:

- The ROM noted that a lack of trust in the Programme is developing among the State authorities, citing difficulties in releasing the Programme Estimate funding, and wondering that if that is so difficult what about more complex and larger disbursements, such as Works *per se*?
- There is a risk that unless the Works materialise, the Programme will have created significant mistrust;
- NAO could have done much more to push through the MoU signing and subsequent release of counterpart funds, as could the EUD;
- Programme concept of embedding in, and supporting, State institutions is appropriate though requires significant time, and the delays of MoUs and counterpart funding have effectively undermined the

HEADLINE:

Some findings from November 2015 have been dealt with whilst others still resonate...

potential for this to work, whilst there is still a clear lack of real ownership by the States (perhaps less so for Delta State);

- The TAT team is to be congratulated on its policy work;
- The weak relationship between the EUD and the NAO is clear and unresolved;
- There is insufficient focus on the Programme critical path; the continued lack of counterpart funding;
- Lack of responsiveness of EUD and NAO certainly does not assist good relations or effective management;
- Whilst it is clear that there is a sense that TAT still has to “do for” rather than “support” the institutions, it should be recognised that this is a necessary stage in transition which is likely to take years to fully transform; and
- The need for an IPE in Rivers State was much less than for other States, since the policy and law were already in place, however the implementation of this policy and law still warranted the presence of an IPE (which would have released more coordination time available for the team leader).

1.9 Programme Counterpart Funds

86. The concept of counterpart funds was partly to draw in the States into a long term commitment to continue to deliver basics services after the Programme has closed. To the extent that this has largely not happened would suggest that this is not an appropriate way to do that. The concept was also partly to cost-share the construction of water supply facilities.

87. Firstly, the Federal Government was to sign the Financing Agreement with the EU Delegation, and then individual States would signed MoUs with the Federal Government.

EU signed Financing Agreement 20 February 2012			Federal Government signed 29 October 2012		
State	<i>signed MoU</i>	<i>witnessed</i>		<i>Signed MoU</i>	<i>witnessed</i>
Akwa Ibom	6 November 2014	06 February 2015		6 November 2014	6 November 2014
Bayelsa	10 February 2015	11 February 2015		6 November 2014	6 November 2014
Delta	22 January 2015	22 January 2015		6 November 2014	6 November 2014
Edo	26 March 2014	unwitnessed		9 April 2014	unwitnessed
Rivers	26 January 2015	26 January 2015		6 November 2014	6 November 2014

88. The long delay after the signing of the Financing Agreement appeared to be more about protocol rather than substance – who should sign first, the NAO or the State Governors. After several months, the NAO signed first and after that it still took months for Governors to sign. For some States, the Governors simply did not sign and their representatives did.

89. With the exception of Edo State (which signed in March 2014, though both signatories were unwitnessed) a full two years lapsed between the Federal Government signing the Financing Agreement and then beginning to sign the State MoUs, with most MoUs only being signed in the first three months of 2015, and with that of Akwa Ibom being subsequently unwitnessed for three months. This was quite foreseeable and should have been flagged in the Programme Risk Assessment.



90. According to the Financing Agreement, the States are to contribute 30% of the investment costs for water schemes in ten small towns, and rural water works in two pilot LGAs, plus a few urban water schemes or rehabilitations. This 30% was to be approximately NGN 400 M. Of this, NGN 200 M would be allocated to the Urban/Small Towns Sub-Component and NGN 200 M the Rural Sub-Component. Although not in the Financing Agreement, apparently it was understood that no tenders would be launched prior to this threshold being reached.
91. The idea was that the State would lodge NGN 400 M into an Imprest account which would amount to approximately 30% of the total construction costs. The EU would provide the larger 70%. The monies would not be merged, rather, two lots A and B would be used as a device to separate the EU-funded works (production, storage and main trunk mains) and the State-funded works (distributions networks, ancillary works and urban repair/rehabilitation). Both lots would be subject to EU procurement rules.
92. It is not clear that the States authorities really understand the timeframe involved in the procurement process, which could take up to seven or eight months (plus any time for EUD to assess and approve the tender dossiers). The obligation for releasing the counterpart funds before the start of the procurement process was a sound condition, in the sense that there is a concern that the works would not be completed if the counterpart funds failed to materialise. This was actually avoided by creating the two-lot approach whereby the EU-funded works were effectively standalone. However, although there was little risk to EU funds there was (and is) a substantial risk that counterpart funds never materialise and it was just the EU that was funding the works. On that basis, it could have begun the works three years ago.
93. The States believe that counterpart funds could be provided in instalments and as soon these started to be deposited then the EU 70% could begin to flow. Originally, that was not considered by the EUD but now that stance has been relaxed. Had it been the case earlier, it could have precipitated smaller procurements which would have been more beneficial to the local economy. One argument against this is that such smaller procurements would be more difficult to manage regarding payments to contactors for work done. An argument against smaller procurement is the extra resources that the EUD would need to process and manage the procurement.
94. This should have been thought through at formulation. On the whole, it was a poorly thought-through concept.
95. The Programme is effectively stalled pending the release of these funds. Despite copious assurances and repetitive statements of commitment to the Programme by Governors, Honourable Commissioners, Permanent Secretaries, LGA Chairmen, and traditional leaders, no funds have been forthcoming, except for a partial release by Delta State in 2015 and then a release of most of the balance by the same State at the end of July 2016, to be completed by end September 2016 (though at the time of MTE conclusion, the State had slipped the date to October 2016).
96. There were recently two High Level Communiqués, one dated 20 April 2016 and one dated 30 June 2016.

The April Communiqué clearly stated, and was signed off by the five States, that:

- If 50% of the counterpart funds was not released by the States by 31 May 2016, then the project would be stopped in non-complying States; and
- If the remaining 50% had not been paid by 30 September 2016 then the funds would be re-allocated to performing states.

HEADLINE:

High Level Communiqué largely ineffective...

97. Should States not deposit their funds and there is a reallocation of EU monies to States that do, it is not clear how that would work as the Financing Agreement is silent on this.

98. Delta State made over some of its contribution in December 2015 to the amount of NGN 200 M. This did not trigger any EU-funded construction because the NAO preferred to allocate this to UNICEF which was able to procure faster than EU. Late July 2016, Delta paid a further NGN 100 M. Being 75% this is still below the threshold of NGN 400 M. Until recently, the EUD had maintained that 100% of the counterpart funds must be made over in order to trigger the EU-funded construction works.

99. It is now assumed that of the NGN 300 M, NGN 200 M is for Urban/Small Towns and the remaining NGN 100 M is for the Rural component, with the final NGN 100 M (for Rural) coming by the end of September 2016. Very recently Delta State has sought to delay that final transfer by one month until the end of October 2016.

100. The June Communiqué from the meeting which was only attended by two of the NDSP States (Akwa Ibom and Delta) stressed that the counterpart funds should be paid by 25 July 2016, again, supposedly, to avoid the loss of the EU grant.

101. At some stage after the April Communiqué, the EUD clarified that this phasing of counterpart funds could only be attributed to the UNICEF/Rural Sub Component. For the EU-funded Urban/Small Towns Sub Component it had to be the 100%. EUD later further clarified that this High Level meeting was to encourage the States to deposit their counterpart contributions both for the Urban/Small Towns and Rural Sub Components. Consequently, with only one state making its contribution (still less than 100% contribution so far) the manner or amount of counterpart funds released should not matter, as much as the absolute amount in the State account. This equivocation is so that the Programme could record some achievement in the area of service delivery before the final date of contracting (presently D + 4, October 2017). Even now, the EUD seeks an approval a further 12 month extension (D + 5, October 2018) so that further funds could be released.

102. The States were each made aware by the Programme of the need for the counterpart funds and how these would trigger substantial works in their States. They were advised that detailed design for these works had already been undertaken by TAT in close collaboration with the relevant State Ministry and the beneficiaries, and the corresponding tender documents had been submitted to NAO. Each State was advised of the designs, their NGN value and

HEADLINE:

States were fully aware of their commitments and the timescales...

that 70 % of which was being funded as a grant by EU, with 30 % to be funded by the State. They were also advised that there will be two separate lots, one for the works funded under the 70 % from EU and one for the works under the State 30 % contribution, though these two lots would be tendered in a single process following EU procurement rules. Finally, States were advised that their 30% counterpart funding could not be separated from the 70 % EU contribution and that the whole local contribution must be guaranteed before the procurement process was launched.

103. The States were advised that according to the Financing Agreement, the deadline for signing all works contracts was 29 October, 2015. Of course, the typical duration of such procurement process is from seven to eight months, so even this deadline was no longer tenable. Consequently, NAO requested EU for an extension of the deadline. This was granted to D +4. To date, with the exception of Delta, no State has demonstrated any interest.

104. At the time of the conclusion of the MTE Mission, on 16 August 2016, no other State (other than Delta) had complied with either communiqué, even partially.

105. The TAT has pushed to move ahead with whatever counterpart funds are available for self-sufficient schemes/rehabilitation, and in the 70/30 cost ratio, recognising that this would allow smaller local contractors to be qualified, assisting in local economic development and regional stability. Of course, Programme timescales would still need to be respected. The thinking is that each State could prove its commitment by releasing immediately the counterpart funds corresponding to at least one small town (from NGN 15 - 30 M depending on the specific size of the small town). The deadline for the last release would correspond to the latest possible deadline for signing contracts according to EU rules, after which the remaining works would be dropped.

HEADLINE:
Revising conditionality undermines the concept of counterpart funding...

106. It is thought that going ahead with such phasing of counterpart funds would greatly encourage States for further release, though the MTE is more sceptical of such an outcome.

107. The logic is that even if the further counterpart funds do not materialise then at least some of the works would have been accomplished. This of course is sound and practical whilst undermining and laying bare the concept of counterpart funding *per se*. At first, the EUD stance was that the 100% of counterpart funds should be deposited prior to any EU-funded works. During the April High Level Communique this was diluted so that 50% of counterpart funds would trigger some works. Albeit this was later nuanced so that it only applied to the Rural Sub Component. Now, even some of the EU-funded works may progress without 100% release of the counterpart funds. These changes in position merely make the next time more difficult or, more likely, unachievable.

108. Until recently, the EUD maintained that it should be 100% release as the trigger for the works noting that the Financing Agreement was signed some years ago and it is up to the NAO to ensure that the agreement is implemented accordingly. The EUD clearly maintained that if States are not paying their counterpart contribution, the EU will not be able to agree to the launch of the calls for tender and will not be able to co-finance. This was communicated during the meeting with State representatives in April 2016.

109. Until recently, the EUD was considering a launch of only one tender (< EUR 300 000) with a possibility to do more (in Delta State) should an extension be granted (D + 5). That would have

meant tendering for one small town, despite that Delta State has provided most of its counterpart funds for the ten towns (plus 50% for the Rural Sub Component). Far from incentivising Delta State to produce the remaining funds, it was hardly likely to encourage the other States.

So, the idea was to have only one tender dossier with two Lots:

- Lot A for a contract under 70% EU funding; and
- Lot B for a contract under 30% State payment.

110. The total cost for both Lots would have to be less than EUR 300 000 so that the Competitive Negotiated Procedure (CNP) could be followed.

111. However, following further exchanges, the current position with reference to Delta State is understood to be:

- That there is no possibility of splitting the tender dossier for Delta State into six separate tenders to allow launching under the EU CNP in time to award contracts before the expiry of D +4 on 29 October 2016;
- There is potential failure for the Programme as the process would result in 12 different contracts which would be very difficult to manage at all levels: EUD, NAO and the State;
- If only one tender (amounting to less than EUR 300 000) is launched and awarded before the end of the current D + 4 there could be civil disturbance at State level;
- A single procurement for all ten small towns provided Delta State releases the rest of the counterpart funds (NGN 100 M) before 29 October, 2016; and
- A written commitment from the Delta State would be needed for EUD to request the one year extension to October 2017 (D + 5).

112. For UNICEF, given the Delta contribution (NGN 300 M) is 50% Urban/Small Town and 50% Rural, to authorise procurement, only a “reasonable” contribution is necessary and then the tendered works will simply match the level of contribution. The expected counterpart contribution for each State for the Rural Sub-Component was approximately NGN 142 M.

1.10 Programme Estimates

Programme Estimates

113. The issue of programme estimates (PE) has been a constant concern throughout the five States. Indeed, it is usually one of the first concerns raised by State PIAs and tends to cloud further discussion. It may be beneficial in future to provide PIAs with ToRs that are linked with TAT ToRs for better consistency and ownership.

114. A PE is a document containing a work programme to be implemented by the partner country. It is drawn up by that partner country and endorsed by the EUD. The PE complements the corresponding Financing Agreement. Besides the activities to be implemented, PEs also include financial provisions (in particular a budget and a financing plan), the human and material resources necessary for the implementation of the activities, the procedures to be followed by the partner country and further technical and administrative implementing arrangements.

115. Although the first PE (PE 1) was approved, only 50% of this was disbursed. The reasons for this partial disbursement are not entirely clear from the perspective of the States since they believe that they complied with all requirements (the approval would seem to support this). Reasons given were that there were queries (the States argue these were generally answered immediately); there were “ineligible costs” (clarification was sought on the precise nature of these); and the lack of a verification auditor delayed matters⁵.
116. Even if a verification auditor was not available to the EUD, appropriate steps should have been taken to ensure smooth running of the Programme. If it was the TAT or UNICEF that argued that something could not be achieved, it would be expected that they would deal with that, so that it had no appreciable impact on the Programme.
117. One example of an issue with approval of a PE was where it was expected by the EUD that once a State official had arrived at an LGA then they could no longer claim for mileage, despite the considerable distances that are involved in some cases in moving from one Programme community to the next, within a single LGA.
118. It was decided to release the PE 2 quarterly. Yet only 20% has been released to date. It has been noted that PE 2 was finishing in three States (Akwa Ibo, Delta and Edo) and was just extended before expiry. The remaining two expire at the end of September 2016.
119. The manner in which the PE process had been handled tends to suggest an apparent lack of commitment to the Programme by EUD, and this tends to resonate throughout the Programme.

1.11 Programme Timeline

120. The States could have released the counterpart funds immediately after signing their MoUs. No other trigger was necessary although the normal practice in public finance should have been to have a proper line in the budget. Although there may have been a budget line in both 2014 and 2015, this was not solely for the NDSP.
121. The Financing Agreement states that the funds should be released (or guaranteed by bank) before the procurement process was launched.
122. The Programme should have recognised that the delay in counterpart fund release was inevitable since State authorities generally adopt crisis management and wait until delays accumulate so much that only critical issues are dealt with. The longevity of the Programme meant that this criticality had to wait some years to accumulate. Even now most States believe they can still wait.
123. Based on the Financing Agreement coming into force in October 2012, the original deadline Programme deadline was October 2015 (D + 3) which was extended to October 2016 (D + 4) which is no longer tenable, and so a further extension to October 2017 will be needed (D + 5). It is understood that such an extension is being requested. The mistake would be to lobby further for the four States to release their funds.

⁵ In such cases, Contracts and Finance in the Delegation should step in to maintain Programme momentum

124. That Delta State has released some of its funds could be used as evidence to request a D + 5. Usually, a request for D + 5 should be made three months before the expiry of D + 4 which was 29 July 2016. Whilst a D + 5 is appropriate to deliver the Programme benefits for Delta State, it would not be worth the resources to encourage releases from other States. This would make the Programme exit very unpredictable. If D + 5 is granted the tenders should be launched and approved by January 2017.

1.12 Programme Exit Strategy

125. Given that the Programme was supposed to close in October 2017 there should be an emerging Exit Strategy by now. Currently there is not, though there has been some dialogue with the Ministry of the Niger Delta States about future organisation of and support to their own water supply schemes (and by inference those of the Programme).

HEADLINE:

Currently there is no Programme Exit strategy...

126. An Exit Strategy needs well-managed exit processes, some investment (human, technical and financial), to respond to the current needs, and have a system in place that allows, in this case, EUD/NAO to learn. The strategy also needs to optimise the value of sharing and to ensure (any) good practice from the Programme could be built on by others.

127. The following questions be addressed to guide the formulation of the Exit Strategy:

- What should the strategy achieve? (What are the objectives?)
- What strategy do you propose for the exit of this Programme?
- What will be the overall criteria and indicators for exiting?
- What exit activities (as different from Programme activities) need to be implemented to meet the exit criteria of the Exit Strategy and to achieve the objectives?
- Specify who (identify partners, stakeholders....) should do what exit activity and when
- What are benchmarks for measuring the implementation and results of each exit activity?
- Decide who should monitor each benchmark and when to monitor them
- Develop the budget for the Exit Strategy (and include the costs for each exit activity, and for monitoring; and
- Document all the above in a coherent Exit Strategy, anchored in the Programme and its benefits.

128. In particular, the management of the Data Centres requires a strategy for implementation so that there is compatibility and no legacy issues. The UNICEF WASHIMS is a database for inventory and M & E of rural water and sanitation facilities and includes real-time tracking of water facilities and allows performance comparison. This was developed locally for FMWR. The Ministry is supposed to manage it after the end of the Programme. An Exit Strategy should advise how this is to be achieved. Given that the supplies will be unlikely to be delivered much before the Programme concludes, the question arises of who will be mentoring the States for the use of these data centres. This should be elaborated in the Programme Exit Strategy.

129. As part of the Exit Strategy, it needs to be considered what can be done with the four non-complying States so at least their communities get some benefits of the Programme. It is known and documented that many water schemes are non-functional, or not operating at their optimal

capacity. Discussions at LGA level suggests often, minor repair or maintenance would be enough to get these systems into a functioning state to deliver water.

130. It was also apparent during LGA discussions that communities do not expect the local authorities to fix the problems and are ready to pay for the repair or maintenance for getting water. The communities do not have the capacity to repair or maintain these themselves or to contract out these services.

131. There is always a suspicion that funds will be misused, however the above foresees very local contractors working for their local fellow communities which should ensure that they would feel more responsible to deliver an effective job than contractors coming from another part of the country, or a different ethnic group. This would also promote some level of sustainability which the current Programme arrangements do not.

132. The Programme could assist, as part of its Exit Strategy, to:

- Identify in each of the LGAs of the four States a community where only maintenance or small repair is necessary to improve the water service delivery, where the concept is well understood and where there is willingness to proceed;
- Support the relevant Water Consumer Associations, ensuring bank accounts are existing and the elected management structure is still robust, perhaps with refresher training for collecting and managing funds;
- Training the WCAs to contract out services of artisans or small contractors, with provision of some standard contracts;
- Preparing the bill of quantities for the works to be done; and
- Mentoring the WCAs and communities on the whole process, including the supervision of the works.

133. The above would require the full time involvement of the Water and Sanitation Experts and the Community Mobilisation Experts.

134. Since no contract for supplies or works would have to be funded by Programme funds *per se*, this work would be independent of any D + 4 or +5. As it would deal only with existing schemes needing only maintenance or small repair, the value for money in terms of service delivery would be very high. It would also assist in salvaging some EUD reputation.

135. Since there are some parallels with the CLTS for sanitation, prospects for success are reasonable. This would also satisfy an NDSP aim at promoting peace in the Niger Delta through economic development with which, interestingly, the current Programme is not consistent, in terms of procurement.

136. Regarding the source of funds for the above, there is some EUR 4.6+ M residing in the Service Contract.

137. To enhance the minimal sustainability of the Programme, the following activities could be built into the Exit Strategy:

- Dissemination and implementation the small works as described above;
- Further steps in implementation of the water policies, including the professionalising of the water boards and making further steps towards their switch to utilities. This would include also support to asset management and developing the concept of customer management and satisfaction, merit-based promotions and other incentives;
- Supporting PIA/PRA's for implementing the M & E and management information system;
- Developing further the Political Economy Assessment together with the reform process initiated in 2015 and introducing change management techniques;
- Mentoring the States in the use of the Data Centres;
- Continuing effort to implement water and sanitation policies. This would require full time Institutional Policy Experts including in Rivers State;
- Reducing the presence of the existing Team Leader by a progressive handover to one or more Deputy Team Leaders (capacity building of national experts and potentially adding more sustainability);
- This may mean that the Exit Strategy will need to be longer than the current end of the Programme; and
- The UNICEF/Rural Sub-Component could simply continue with its current programme and gradually exit the four States and concentrate on the Delta State where counterpart funds for the Rural Sub-Component have been received.

138. The ToR posed some specific questions. Although they are addressed throughout this report, for ease of reference, the comments are provided below.

SPECIFIC QUESTIONS POSED IN THE TOR	OVERVIEW
Extent to which the NDSP (Component 3) remains consistent with, and supportive of, the policy and programme framework within which it is placed	<i>Given that so many are without clean safe water or appropriate sanitation, it is clear that the NDSP (3) remains consistent with, and supportive of, the policy and programme framework within which it is placed</i>
Stakeholders' participation in the implementation of the programme, and the level of local ownership	<i>Participation and ownership is directly proportional to the level of Programme implementation. It is likely that more of both will occur as soon as counterpart funds are released and proper implementation proceeds (e.g. timely release of programme estimates) Contrary to this, the communities themselves have already demonstrated a level of commitment and ownership that far exceeds any other party in this Programme, and have demonstrated this by accumulating counterpart funds, at least partially if not wholly</i>
Programme performance with respect to efficiency (input delivery, cost control and activity management) and effectiveness (delivery of outputs and progress towards achieving the specific objective or purpose). Also to compare progress made so far with what was planned, and to assess the possible impact of the programme to date	<i>The main constraint to improvement in the water and sanitation sector was the non-availability of counterpart funds. To a lesser degree, the non-availability of full PE funds together with the weak policy, institutional framework or institutions negatively influenced the Programme performance</i>
Project management and coordination arrangements, especially the embedment of the Technical Assistance Team (TAT) within the government service structure, and the sub-	<i>Project management arrangements at State level have been generally sound. The embedding of the TAT has generally been effective, though the Rivers TAT should have had an IPE (not the team leader who has sufficient tasks already). The Contribution Agreement has worked quite well, though</i>

SPECIFIC QUESTIONS POSED IN THE TOR	OVERVIEW
granting arrangement between UNICEF Headquarters in Abuja and the State-level Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Agencies (RUWASSAs or RUWATSANs)	<p><i>the sustainability aspect leaves much to be desired, as described elsewhere.</i></p> <p><i>The level of commitment and support by the EUD and NAO is not so apparent and certainly more risk assessment concerning the likely challenges of the Programme should have been undertaken by both parties</i></p>
Extent to which timely and appropriate decisions are being made to support effective implementation and problem resolution for the two components of the NDSP (Component 3)	<p><i>Generally speaking, the level of project management expertise within the EUD and the NAO in respect of this Component is limited. Several “red flags” should have warranted much more concern and effort in order to resolve persistent problems. Resulting directly from this lack of project control, there is now contagion and it is considered that, other than Delta State, counterpart funds will not be released in the near future.</i></p> <p><i>There have been three “ultimatums”⁶ that funds would be withdrawn or re-allocated, and deadlines have always been ignored. Despite, relatively low (and deliberately so) visibility, the EUD will suffer reputational damage although there is an equal share of accountability with the NAO</i></p>
Quality of operational annual work plans and extent of their implementation by UNICEF, RUWASSAs and the States’ Programme Implementing Agencies (PIAs) for each of the Programme components, budgeting and risk management	<p><i>Apart from the lack of any construction work due to the non-availability of counterpart funds, the implementation followed the annual work plans in the social components for both the Small Towns and Rural Sub-Components</i></p>
Quality and frequency of information management and reporting, especially of the financial and technical reporting arrangement between States’ RUWASSAs and the UNICEFs Zonal and National Offices. Also to assess the quality and effectiveness of reporting for each of the Programme components	<p><i>Basic WASH indicators covering the three thematic areas of water supply, sanitation and hygiene and WASH in schools are collected and analysed using WASHIMS. These indicators include types of water facilities, date of construction, abstraction system, reticulation, type of pump installed, number of communities triggered, number of new latrines constructed, number of community dialogue organised, hygiene promotion, number of ODF communities etc. All these indicators are collected at the community level and at school level</i></p>
Extent to which stakeholders in the States are kept adequately informed of project activities (including the beneficiaries/target group in LGAs and communities)	<p><i>The extent to which stakeholders are aware of the Programme is not uniform, though sometimes one senses that stakeholders say they are not aware of the Programme merely to avert further questions</i></p>
Extent and quality of data collected, their analysis, application (use) by programme implementers, and the extent to which data are disaggregated by gender and disseminated	<p><i>UNICEF collected all relevant indicators on the progress of rural WASH in their national WASHIMS database.</i></p> <p><i>The Small Towns WCAs have some data disaggregated by gender and are conscious of a need to be gender balanced.</i></p>
Extent of monitoring by stakeholders and the use of monitoring information to improve implementation	<p><i>To ensure full implementation of the Programme, a total of 15 States and LGA WASH Consultants (3 per state: one in RUWASSA and one in each LGA WASH Unit) have been recruited to RUWASSAs and Project LGAs to facilitate planning, implementation and delivery of the Programme. All consultants are fully functional and are supervised directly by UNICEF WASH specialists in the relevant field offices.</i></p>

⁶ “ultimatums” may not be the most appropriate tactic

2. FINDINGS

2.1 EU Delegation and National Authorising Office

139. Several findings are jointly relevant to the EU Delegation and the NAO and should be considered for future programmes.

- The MTE was not conducted at the appropriate time (about a year late);
- Inadequate sector policy and institutional framework, and weak sector institutions reflect the central power within the State and are not actually constraints *per se*;
- The Formulation seems to have been a rather hasty mix of aspirations that had not been fully explored with the beneficiary stakeholders;
- The addition of the fifth State, Akwa Ibom, was added to the Programme without compensatory adjustments to the overall budget;
- Delays in signing agreements and releasing funds was entirely foreseeable and should have been flagged in the Programme Risk Assessment;
- There were some clear deadlines by which some States would lose their Programme option, yet, despite clear exceedance of the deadlines, no action was taken;
- It is not clear what the point was of the National Project Steering⁷ Committee. It met only twice and made recommendations on matters over which it had little or no authority;
- There have been at least two monitoring missions yet the actions have not been fully implemented; and
- There is insufficient genuine ownership of the Programme by EUD, NAO or the States⁸.

2.2 General Relevance

Relevance to the National Context on Poverty

140. The UNICEF baseline study concluded: "*Using key household features, like the nature of dwelling unit and access to basic facilities 59% of the households fell within poor to very poor households*". This is about the national average of 61 %. There is also a wide variation in poverty levels between the states. According to the UNICEF Baseline survey the percentages of households (HH) that are classified as "very poor" ranges from 1 % in Isoko South (Delta) to 28 % in the Obot Akara LGA (Akwa Ibom).

Relevance to the National Context on Access to Water

141. When comparing the data on access to improved water sources of the LGA with the Joint Monitoring Programme (JMP) data of 2012, (JMP, 2012) the relevance of the programme on water supply appears to be high. In the LGAs an average of 21% of the HHs (UNICEF Baseline Survey, undated) have access to improved water supply across the project LGAs. Due to the increase of the population and deterioration of the (mainly state) WPs the current access could decrease to 19 % in 2017. This is far below the values of the JMP report on the national averages of safe water coverage (43 % (rural) 74 (urban) of the HH with having access to improved water

⁷ Perhaps "strategy" rather than "steering" would be more appropriate

⁸ For example, even important correspondence to EUD and NAO may go unanswered for several months

sources. However this 43 % could be an over-estimation, since JMP data do not take the actual functionality of the WPs into account (see below).

142. The low functionality of the water points is of concern. According to the baselines survey, and 65 % of the all water points, including the privately-owned ones, are not working. Since private water points are generally better managed than government-owned water points, it is plausible that the functionality of the public water points is much lower than the average of 65 %.

Relevance to the National Context on Sanitation

143. According to the UNICEF baseline study a total 54% of the households across the project LGAs had latrines but only 45% of the households have improved latrines. This is above the national data on sanitation of 27% (rural) 50 % (urban) of the HH with access to improved sanitation.

144. The situation on hygiene leaves to be desired, only 50% of households with latrines have hand washing facilities close to their latrine. Previous to the Programme (minutes) the communities had some hygiene promotion, but none of the communities in the selected LGAs experienced any CLTS promotion activities.

Geographical Relevance

145. The Niger Delta Region is mostly a flat, low-lying swampy basin, criss-crossed by a network of rivers and creeks and is prone to flooding and to the intrusion of salt water in deep aquifers. Due to the effects of climate change these effects might worsen in the coming decades. Added to this is the expected increase in contamination of the shallow aquifers by growing population and the poorly-regulated oil industry.

146. In this context easy solutions for water supply (for example shallow wells) which could be financed on local level are scarce and deep and expensive drilling is necessary. This is an additional factor contributing to the Programme sustainability.

Relevance on Conflict Reduction

147. UNICEF (2016) carried out a conflict profile survey in the NDSP states. The main sources of conflicts are disputes about (illegal) oil revenues and ownership of land and, to a much lesser degree, conflicts on water. Nevertheless the Programme is indirect relevant, by improving the living standards of the local population and by the need of community communication and cooperation to ensure sustainable water supplies. However this conflict study was only completed halfway the Programme (Feb 2016) and did not made a direct relation between improved water supply and the reduction of conflicts.

2.3 TAT Urban/Small Towns Sub-Component

RELEVANCE

148. The Small Towns in the NDSP target states are not in a position to improve their water supply. Virtually none of the responsible water agencies is capable to deliver sufficient quantities of water (Annex 4.6, Table 9). Worse, the complete lack of an enabling legal background (except in the River State) prevents any improvement in the governance of the urban and small town water agencies.

EFFICIENCY

Selection Process of the Targets LGAs and other Stakeholders

149. The (self) selection process as described in reports is executed in an adequate and transparent way based on the following criteria: Good governance; willingness to reform; accountability; vulnerability, and demonstration of commitment and readiness by potential beneficiaries to participate in the Programme. The selection process was done in a public event (documented and minuted) and officially-approved by the authorities. This all ensured transparency and ownership by the LGAs and reduced the risks of jealousy from those who were not selected.

150. Indirectly, the Programme approach on improvement of WASH services involves much discussion with the beneficiaries and with both the formal and informal authorities (natural leaders). This is a promising way to institutionalise the dialogue among stakeholders which could lead to a strengthening of the social bonding and finally could contribute to the resolution of conflict situations.

Division of the Rural and Small Towns Sub-Component

151. The fundamental basis of classifying community to either be rural or small town is its population size. In the light of this, therefore, communities with population of 1-4000 are considered rural, while 5000 - 20000 are small towns. Based on summary of finding of baseline survey conducted for ten participating LGAs of all the five States, 65 % of communities are rural, while the remaining are considered nucleated or small towns.

152. Improved water supply source in rural intervention, is in most cases about simple to use technology such as lined protected hand dug well and, in rare cases, motorised (solar/diesel) boreholes with batteries of stand taps; while for small towns, it is normally higher technology including motorised (solar/diesel) with distance reticulation to points of collection (taps, kiosks).

153. The differences in approach for WASH intervention in rural and small towns can be considered as follows:

- Easy to sensitise and secure buy-in of beneficiaries with rural than small towns, this could be as a result of diverse ethnic heterogeneity in small towns;
- CLTS more adaptable for rural than small towns;
- High technology schemes for small towns, and lower ones for rural; and
- Easier to raise funds in small towns due to high economic activities than in rural.

154. The classification between rural and small towns looks straightforward (and is in the national policy), but on the ground, the difference is less clear cut. Communities with several small water supply system (WSS) could be classified as "rural community" while an identical village with one large WSS could be defined as "Small Town". When visiting the LGAs, the difference was not clear since small towns and rural both looked "rural". It is suggested that other factors, for example, population density, should also be included in the selection process, rather than just the number of inhabitants.

Applied Technology in Water Supply and Latrine Construction

155. With the rainfall encountered in a river delta region, water resources should not be problematic. In river deltas, the sub-surface generally consists of layers of alternate clay and sand where permeable aquifers are generally easy to find. However the water quality might be poor and finding potable water might be challenging. In this densely-populated region with unprotected sanitation facilities, the top aquifers are likely to be contaminated. This can be aggravated by the frequent spill from oil wells and pipelines and the acid rain caused by the flaring of the natural gas. Hence the construction of boreholes tapping deep aquifers is an adequate choice in view of the contaminated surface water in this densely-populated area. In some situations, poor water quality of shallow water requires drilling down 300 m.

156. The commonly used pour-flush latrines are only moderately practical in the areas with high water tables. Better would have been ECOSAN toilets, though the present models are still too expensive to be used a private facility.

Quality of the Approach on the Software Component

157. For small town intervention, strategy used is to first mobilise critical stakeholders such as chiefs and other community development/religious leaders and inform them of the need for the towns to have safe water supply, adequate sanitation and practice good hygiene. These stakeholders will then sensitise their people and facilitate them to establish WCAs. WCAs will subsequently be trained on various aspects of programme intervention, and encouraged to open bank account for collection and deposit of O & M fees. They become community management institution for all water supply and sanitation schemes.

Water Consumer Association

158. Water Consumer Associations were formed with support of the Sub-Component in all Programme-participating LGAs. Many of the WCAs have so far opened bank accounts to remit 5% of their O & M project counterpart funds. The WCAs are responsible for the counterpart contribution: 5 % of the total construction costs is seed money for O & M. The WCAs are registered with their respective LGAs, and have constitutions that describe duties such as sensitisation of communities on sanitation and hygiene, fund-raising for O & M of water supply and sanitation schemes, and construction of household latrines. The average number of executive members of the committee is 10 of whom about 35% are women (Annex 4.6 Table 5). The contribution of O & M funds is reasonable with some communities having made their 100% contributions (average in LGAs is between 5 and 59%, Table 5).

Participation of NGOs

159. Several NGOs participated in complementing the development effort of NDSP-WS with SWG and TAT transparently and mirroring the following activities:

- Conduct of Willingness to Pay Survey (in participatory Small Towns)
- Participated in setting up process of State Reform Champions
- Actively involved in validation process of NDSP-developed Community Based Management of Water Supply Schemes Manual

- Actively involved in stepping down and training of the Water Consumer Association executives with the Community-Based Management of Water Supply Schemes Manual

Quality of the Approach on Urban Water Supply System

160. Due to the (very) weak management of the urban WSS companies/boards the capacity to maintain the existing WSS is negligible and hence any investment in new schemes is not sustainable. The construction of new or the rehabilitation of existing one might serve political purposes, though will not result in long term improvement of the urban water situation.

Quality of Training Manuals and Studies

161. Out of all NDSP publications a selection has been assessed on quality: A Willingness-To-Pay study was carried out in all States in 2015. The example which was reviewed was undertaken by the Bayelsa State team. This study is a thorough research on the willingness-to-pay in Bayelsa State. However these publications, nearly at the end of the NDSP, are too late to influence the overall approach.

Strategy on Improving Services of the Water Supply Companies

162. Water sector reform is equally relevant since one of the core requirements for a properly-managed water supply company/board is a sound legal basis. Any support to water supply system agencies without sector reform would almost certainly result in a failure. Only Rivers State had a recent policy in place at the start of NDSP.

EFFECTIVENESS

Progress on Water Reform

163. The development of water policy documents in four states (Rivers State already had a recent water policy) made good progress in the Delta State and Edo State, taking into account that with the exception of Delta State, (which had a very first draft), no State had undertaken any activities in this. The drafting of the water law has halted in Akwa Ibom and Bayelsa States. In Akwa Ibom State due to lack of (PE) funds and in Bayelsa State the continuation is awaiting the extension of the contract of the legal expert⁹ (see table 8).

Performance of Urban Water Agencies

164. All small towns (if they exist) and urban water agencies perform at a very low level or do not perform all. In important indicators on their performance such as revenue collection, number of staff relative to the number of collections¹⁰ show a very poor performance (see Annex 4.6, Part II and Annex 4.6, Table 9). Some water agencies have virtually no own income because revenues

⁹ In Akwa Ibom State, the policy presentation to the senatorial districts is stopped by lack of PE. The preparation of the Law requires the Programme legal NKE to go to Uyo, but requires approval of an extension of services by EUD. In Bayelsa State the law is also awaiting this extension

¹⁰ As an example, the urban water supply board has 530 staff members yet only 200 connections

go directly to the state. For all important decisions, the board is dependent on the approval of the Governor. There is frequent damage to main water pipes due to road construction works and the treatment plants are out of operation due to lack of maintenance. The management has no insight into the water losses, because the system is not metered. Consumers are charged a flat and very low rate of 1000 NGN/month etc. The performance report (EU, TAT Sub-activity-UWSS, March 2015)) made the following key observations:

"Based on the performance assessment carried out in November/December 2014 in the 5 NDSP states the following conclusion can be drawn: All of the public utilities are performing far below standards as can be noted from the following key observations (also Annex 4.6, Table 9 and Part II):

- *Very low coverage*
- *Very low level of services (only few hours supply per day)*
- *Inadequate budgets available for operations*
- *Absence of Maintenance, resulting in fast deteriorating assets.*
- *Over staffed utilities given the small amount of active connections"*

Progress on Construction

165. The construction activities have not started yet, though all small towns and urban construction designs and tender dossiers are completed and were submitted to the EU and NAO in March 2015.

Progress on Sanitation Activities

166. Unlike in the rural areas UNICEF does not fund hygiene promotion in small towns. However, the UNICEF-trained State and LGA Officers implement some hygiene promotion activities in the Small Towns, though do not reach, systematically, all target small towns of the NDSP (Annex 4.6 Table 5). These activities do not include the CLTS approach (except in the LGA Ndokwa West).

Progress on Water Consumer Associations

167. Like their rural colleagues, the WCAs appear to be committed and competent. They should be able to carry out the maintenance duties on the simple WSS, however they have not received the O & M training (will be done in conjunction with the construction activities and are reasonably successful in collecting O & M funds. (To date they collected O&M funds ranging from 0 % Ovia South West (Edo State) to 15 % in Isoko South (Delta State). More information in Annex 4.6, Table 2.

168. Despite their commitments the WCAs are most probably not able to manage the more complicated WSS (see discussion in the section sustainability).

Stakeholder Satisfaction

169. All designs were developed in cooperation with the beneficiaries they were given the choice between solar and diesel and in some rural communities. At the meetings, the WCAs expressed

their satisfaction with the chosen design. Since none of the construction activities has been realised yet, it is unclear what the final opinion of the water users will be.

Harmful Social Side Effects

170. Harmful side effects from the project activities such as improved sanitation and the (planned) repair and construction of new water facilities are unlikely, although some owners of private borehole might experience a reduction of income.

Conflict Resolution

171. Community mobilisers have been trained to be trainers by an expert, though they have not yet disseminated that training among the communities¹¹. Hence there is no impact yet.

IMPACT

On Health, Workload of Women, School Attendance for Girls

172. UNICEF did not have a mandate on URBAN WASH activities and hence did not carry out CLTS or other hygiene promotion activities. The WASH Units did some minor hygiene promotion (Annex 4.6, Table 10) and in one LGA (Ndokwa West) also carried out CLTS (see Annex 4.6 Table 5). The social impacts will be negligible.

On the Environment

173. It is unlikely that this Programme will have any serious negative impact in these Small Towns because the proposed groundwater abstractions only happen on a small scale and the boreholes are spread throughout the LGAs.

On conflicts

174. As with the Rural Sub-Component, it is plausible that an improved water and sanitation could reduce the possibilities of water-related conflicts, but it is impossible to estimate the impact of the Programme on the violence without an in depth survey. To date, there is probably not yet any impact, because the community mobilisers of the Small Town Sub-Component received training only recently¹² and did not carry out conflict-mediation activities.

On the Local Private Sector

175. As pointed out above, the EU tendering procedures do not encourage any involvement of the local private sector and the economic impact will be limited to local sub-contracting and, once the system is running, to maintenance of the WSS.

¹¹ Personal communication by the TAT Team Leader

¹² Personal communication by the NDSP

SUSTAINABILITY

Capacity of the WCAs to maintain the Water Supply System Structures

Management and Motivation

176. Similar to the WASHCOMs, communities through WCAs were actively involved in the designs of the WSS and expressed their satisfaction (Annex 4.4, Minutes of Meetings with WASHCOMs and WCAs) and the establishment of the WCAs is nearing its final stage. All the steps from sensitisation to registration have been completed. Also the WCAs received an endorsement from the traditional leader and the executive members were elected. This process ensured ownership of their facilities. The formal handover of the facilities to the communities will be done after the completion of the works.

Technical Capacity

177. The O & M training to the WCAs will start as soon as the construction phase is in progress. Although this component could not be assessed, the training manual is instructive and it is plausible that the WCA after the training could be technically capable of carrying out routine O & M, although the very late start of the training will not help.

178. The management of the more complicated WSS will be beyond the capacities of the WCAs and there is no back up. At present the Small Town water agencies cannot even maintain their own systems (Annex 4.6, Table 6, 8 and 9) and will not be in a position to take on the responsibilities of additional WSS.

179. The involvement of the private sector is low and restricted to contractors in construction and repair of the WSS. There are no examples in the NDSP states where a private firm manages or owns a medium-sized WSS (more than one borehole with a small reticulation system). Although the yet-to-be-approved water policies¹³ leave the opportunity for private operators to manage WSS, neither the private sector nor the Small Town water agencies has any experience with this. Similarly, with the rural WSS, the tendering procedures of the EU might complicate the O & M of the WSS.

180. In summary, the state agencies are not competent to manage, and private operators do not exist. So, the WCAs will face challenges to obtain after-sales service from remote suppliers.

Financial Capacity

181. The TAT carried out Willingness-to-Pay surveys in all the Small Towns. One of the studies (Bayelsa, 2015) was reviewed and it is concluded that the methodology is of good quality. The findings of that survey show that 82% of the respondents are willing to pay for water supply from the proposed EU-NDSP water facility. Furthermore, interviews with the members of the WCAs (Annex 4.4, Minutes of Meeting with WCAs) revealed that the present costs of water range between 15 and 20 NGN at the private WSS, an amount that was affordable for the population. The collection of the O & M funds was reasonable and all beneficiaries, except the very poor, contributed to the O & M funds, albeit not yet very much (Annex 4.6, Table 5). This however can be explained by the lack of any progress in construction of the WSS.

¹³ River State has a water policy since 2012

182. In the short and maybe medium term, well-organised WCAs should be capable to collect sufficient funds for O & M. The calculated O & M costs of the small town schemes up to 3 NGN/20 litre (should also apply to the rural schemes) are well below the expected contribution of the beneficiaries (up to 5 NGN/15 litre (TAT, January 2016, Draft Willingness to Pay Study). Like the rural WSS, and probably even more challenging is the capacity of the WCAs to collect and manage funds for major repairs and replacement of components (submersible pumps, inverter, generator and so on).

183. Despite the support that the WASH Units may provide, there is no convincing technical aftercare support available for the WCAs. This is especially a concern for the larger schemes which cannot be properly managed by the WCAs. Some of the better organised Small Town water companies (for example SSTOWA in Rivers State) might feel ownership for the larger schemes (small WSS are supposed to be managed by the WCA), though some of the poorly organised WSS companies/boards (for example in Edo State) are unable to even manage their own WSS, let alone take responsibility for new ones.

184. Despite the good intentions and the appropriate methodology in the creation and strengthening of the WCAs, the Small Town WSSs face the same problematic nature regarding the sustainability of the rural WSS. In addition, there are challenges due to the (relative) complexity of some of the systems and the lack of any functioning organisation which could ensure technical aftercare.

2.4 UNICEF-Rural Sub-Component

RELEVANCE

185. At the start of NDSP the rural water agencies (WASH Units and if existed, the RUWASSAs) were in no position to improve the local WASH situation. UNICEFs assessment (annex of the Contribution Agreement between UNICEF and the EUD) is clear: *"Currently, only two of the five States have fully established RUWASSAs, backed by law. In some of the States, the rural water supply and sanitation agencies are operating as Project Units under the State Ministries of Energy and Water Resources. The setting up of corresponding structures at the LGA level has not been fully implemented. None of the local government areas in the project States has transformed its LGA WASH Unit into a WASH Department"*.

186. On financial capacity: *Less than 40% of the LGAs Water supply budgets are implemented while only about 55% of sanitation budgets are implemented.*

187. On institutional capacity: *There are inadequate professional staffs to match the services delivery responsibilities of the local government. Key WASH skills were found to be lacking in most local governments and there were gaps between the recognition of the need for evidence-based planning and the current planning practices across the LGAs"*

EFFICIENCY

Quality Support in Upgrading and Strengthening the Rural WASH Agencies (WASH Units)

188. The WASH units are strengthened by UNICEF through the state RUWASSAs to implement the Rural Sub-Component of the NDSP in communities through Water Sanitation and Hygiene Committees (WASHCOMs). Key areas of support to the units by UNICEF include; provision of office equipment (computers, printers, cameras), vehicles and capacity building/training in the areas of CLTS approaches, hygiene promotion, advocacy and awareness creation, facilitation skills, construction of appropriate latrines and O & M of water supply schemes. Based on the progress on the soft part of the WASH programme, it could be concluded that the performance of the WASH Units is quite successful, both on achieving its targets (Annex 4.6, Table 1, 2 and 3) and in applying the appropriate methodology.

Creation of WASHCOM

189. LGA WASH Units with support of UNICEF, facilitated establishment of WASHCOMs in communities of focal LGAs, and were sensitised and trained in areas of; CLTS approaches, hygiene promotion, latrine construction, fund-raising and O & M of water and sanitation schemes. They were also facilitated to open their various bank accounts and generate funds to contribute to the 5% of the construction costs. Of these 5% counterpart contribution 3% is remitted by the community as part of capital contribution (this forms part of the money the State uses for payment of retention fee to the contractor) and the other 2% is left with the community as seed money for O & M. The committees are registered with their respective LGAs, and have constitutions describing duties such as sensitisation of communities on sanitation and hygiene, fund-raising for O & M of water supply and sanitation schemes, and construction of household latrines. The average number of executive members of the committee is 10 of whom about 30 - 50 % are women (Annex 4.6, Table 2).

NGO contribution

190. In the rural component NGOs are engaged either informally or formally to further support State level programme intervention. One of the identified, is NEWSAN, registered in Nigeria in 2012. It is a Non Profit Nigerian Civil Society Network dedicated to the provision of safe water, sanitation and hygiene education to the poorest people of Nigeria. It is a network of over 300 civil society organisations in Nigeria which advocates for pro-poor policies in the WASH sector, and work with member organisations to manage low cost, sustainable projects. On state level NEWSAN is involved, while on LGA level community-based organisations (CBO) cooperate. These organisations are involved in both components of the Programme and carry out advocacy on CLTS/gender issues/peace building. They are a member of the steering committee and coordinate in all states in NDSP; they do capacity building to NGO/CBOs (Training of Trainers). They received a EUR 50 000 grant for this. To do these activities, NEWSAN is pleased with the cooperation with NDSP. Because of the strong ties with the local government the organisations expect to continue after the closure of the NDSP.

Quality of the Approach on Rural Water

191. Taking into account the long history of failed water projects (the communities mentioned the large number of non-functioning state WSS, (Annex 4.4 Minutes of Meetings with LGAs and TAT) the approach of the UNICEF/NDSP to focus on sensitisation and on creating a sense of ownership and responsibility for the O & M is well appreciated. At meetings, the LGAs yielded a strong commitment by the WASHCOMs to maintain the proposed structures, despite the long wait for the construction activity to begin.
192. The (expressed) willingness to pay for water services is high (see section *Sustainability*) which is remarkable given the Niger Delta political context and understanding of role and responsibilities of Government to provide basic services including water services; On the other hand, the actual contribution to the O & M fund is still modest.
193. The technical quality of the WSS is as far as can be assessed from the designs is good (NDSP TAT Design Report Jan 2015) The WASH Units mentioned several cases where the installation of hand pumps would technically be most appropriate, but local communities preferred motorised boreholes, because this fitted their social status¹⁴.

Quality of the Approach on Rural Sanitation

194. The UNICEF WASH approach in the rural areas to reduce open defaecation (CLTS) is a well-tested standard approach which is applied in many African countries. Most UN agencies, donors and NGOs apply this methodology in their projects. This approach is also successfully applied in the rural areas of the target LGAs. The CLTS approach starts with a first sensitisation on the effects of open defaecation on health, continue with encouraging the local population to start building their own latrines (without subsidy) until the community claims that it Open Defaecation Free. After verification by the WASH Unit, the community will be officially certified ODF.
195. The CLTS approach makes reasonable progress (Annex 4.6, Table 1), although the verification process is lagging somewhat behind due to the introduction of new verification guidelines. This might have been done for good reasons, but more delay could discourage the waiting ODF communities.
196. The Programme-organised WASH clinic, is a meeting normally arranged at ward/community level to discuss and/or diagnose how Programme implementation is faring, challenges encountered and how to move forward. The meeting includes the presence of WASHCOMs executive, community members including traditional/faith/community leaders. Critical decisions are taken and actions plan developed for implementation and follow up.

School WASH and Environmental Health Clubs

197. School teachers were trained on how to facilitate establishment of Environmental Health Clubs (EHCs) in schools. Some school students are nominated to form the club, with main responsibilities of ensuring that toilets, water points and school environment are kept clean at

¹⁴ Personal communication by the UNICEF WASH consultant

all times. Hand washing facilities (tippy-taps) and activities are also provided and observed respectively.

Quality of Training Manuals and Studies

198. Out of all NDSP publications a selection has been assessed on quality:

- UNICEF 2015 a community-led Water Safety Plan and the PowerPoint Summary of the Plan. This manual presents instructive information in a logical way on how to achieve safe water supply and household handling of water; and
- UNICEF 2016 Manual for O & M maintenance of mechanised rural water system is instructive and includes important issues such as costs analysis.

EFFECTIVENESS

Progress on Rural Construction

199. The construction of school latrines makes reasonable progress, though shows much variation. The progress in construction ranges from 0 to 100 % (Annex 4.6, Table 3). The construction has not yet started in the states, with the exception of Delta state. In Delta State, counterpart funds have recently arrived and UNICEF has now started the construction of water supply systems.

Progress on the WASHCOM Technical Training

200. Implementation of O & M manual is yet to commence and will start as soon as the construction is in progress. An exception is the Delta State which started construction (and training).

Progress on Rural Sanitation Activities

201. The Rural Sub-Component makes reasonable to good progress on sanitation applying the CLTS methodology. The WASHCOMs are satisfied with the programme approach (minutes) and most villages have been triggered (Annex 4.6, Table 1). The success of ODF in the communities once triggered is variable, Bayelsa scores low with only 7 - 12 % ODF, while in the Nsit Atai LGA (Akwa Ibom) 100% of the triggered villages is (self-claimed) ODF. The certification process lags behind this due to the introduction of new verification procedures (the maximum % of triggered villages that are officially ODF is only 8 % to date). Once the constraint with the verification process is resolved, the process should accelerate. It is likely that most, though not all, UNICEF targets (Bayelsa for example) on ODF will be achieved by the end of the programme.

202. The UNICEF targets on CLTS in most of the LGAs (with the exception of the Bayelsa LGAs) will largely be achieved by the end of the Programme. The process in Bayelsa is slow because the high water table and the frequent floods do not create an enabling environment for latrine construction.

Progress on the Status of the WASH Units

203. To date, none of the ten WASH Units has been converted to a WASH Department. However according to UNICEF the process is in an advanced state: communication from UNICEF Abuja:

"Processes towards amendment of LGA Scheme of service to incorporate the WASH departments is at an advanced stage of ratification. The proposal has been reviewed and adopted by all stakeholders in the WASH Sector. The officer of the Head of Service had conducted job evaluation and upheld the need for the established of the department. Memo of the establishment of WASH departments was recently approved by the National Council on Water Resources. The proposal is now awaiting final ratification by the National Council on Establishment"

"Capacities of government Staff have been enhanced through various targeted training programmes and other capacity development activities such as provision of automobiles, solar-based power supply systems, computers and other accessories"

204. Other than the official registration as a department, the strengthening of the WASH Units runs satisfactorily. They are all equipped with necessary tools are able to carry out M&E, including the use of the UNICEF database system, WASHIMS. The average senior staff strength of these units is about nine with about 30% women. However as explained in section sustainability, it is doubtful if the WASH Units will remain active without the support of UNICEF.

Progress on the Creation of WASHCOMs

205. For now, the WASHCOMs appear to be committed and competent. They should be able to carry out the maintenance duties, however they have not received the O & M training (will be done in conjunction with the construction activities) and are better motivated to collect the O & M funds than their rural colleagues (to date they collected O & M funds range from 5 % Nsit Atai (Akwa Ibom) to 59 % in Isoko South (Delta State). More information in Annex 4.6, Table 5, despite no WSS construction activities to be seen.

IMPACT

On Health

206. There is only anecdotal evidence (meetings with WASHCOMs) of health improvements of the local population. With the CLTS programme still in progress (Annex 4.6, Table 1) and without an improved water supply the decrease in water-related diseases at this stage is probably only minor, if at all. As an example, the impact study of completed project (UNICEF Aug 2014) did not yield clear results on the impact of health of the WASH programme, although there were indications of some improvement on rate of diarrhoea in children.

On the Private Sector

207. The training of local artisans in the technical and commercial aspects of latrine construction was not a part of the NDSP. This is unfortunate, because the training of local artisans on these issues might have been beneficial for both the local economy and the local sanitation status. Latrine

construction is not a part of the CLTS methodology, but skilled and entrepreneurial artisans could have been encouraged the (relatively) well-to-do households to take another step on the sanitation ladder. Local sanitation will benefit once improved latrines are seen as a kind of status symbol by the population.

208. The economic impact of WSS construction is expected to be negligible due to the EU tendency to issue one single tender for all WSS construction (see discussion in Section on Sustainability). The maintenance of the WSS might provide some work for the area mechanics and local workshops.

On the Workload of Women

209. Without any progress in access to improved water supply, it is unlikely that the Programme has yet any reduction of the working load of women. After completion, the Programme might reduce the workload of women, but this will be difficult to quantify without specific surveys.

On the Environment

210. The use of latrines instead of open defaecation will contribute to a cleaner environment in the communities. It is unlikely that this Programme will have any serious negative impact on the rural environment, since the proposed groundwater abstractions only happen on a small scale and the boreholes are spread throughout the LGAs.

On School Attendance of Girls

211. The school latrine construction activities are still very much in progress (51 % achieved, Annex 4.6, Table 3) and hence it is not possible to assess the impact of NDSP on the school attendance of girls.

On Conflicts

212. It is plausible that an improved water and sanitation might reduce the possibilities of water-related conflicts, but it is impossible to estimate the impact of the Programme on the violence without an in-depth survey to compare the recent situation with the conflict profiles. But even without improved water and sanitation, the involvement of the communities, represented by the WASHCOMs, could lead to better understanding among the communities. There is already one recorded case of a successful conflict mediation between two communities of Igbe and Ogbo in Ndokwa West LGA of Delta State due to the NDSP Urban/Small Town Sub-Component.

Unplanned Impacts

213. As far as known, the NDSP did not have any other impact either positive or negative in rural areas.

SUSTAINABILITY

Sustainability of the ODF Status

214. Experience suggests that the message that poor WASH causes diseases will resonate initially though the discipline to keep villages ODF needs periodic reinforcement and encouragement (PLAN 2013). Another factor influencing the sustainability of the ODF message is the driver of change in CLTS. In this respect the conclusion of UNICEF 2014 is relevant: "*Most important sustainability issue it seems, however, is that a water intervention is conditional to ODF certification. It is not impossible that, if the program would withdraw, sanitation and ODF status may become less interesting, as water was an important driver of change*". Actually in this respect, the late or non-achievement of the water and sanitation targets may be helpful. In the NDSP water and sanitation is definitively not a driver of change. So, the status is positive for now, though in long term the ODF discipline depends on the capacity of the WASH Units and how WASHCOM activities could be institutionalised to keep the message alive, which is less certain (see section *Sustainability of the WASH Units*).

Technical Sustainability of Rural Construction

215. Due to the non-release of counterpart funds, no construction other than school latrines has been completed. The quality of the two inspected school latrines is variable, the latrine of the primary school Obonoma at Akuku-Toru LGA (Rivers State) was made of corrugated iron and will last not very long. The other one at the Ekiregbesi in Isoko South LGA (Delta State) is made of concrete and is of good quality. The household (HH) latrines were made by the beneficiaries themselves and in some areas these will not last long due to the high water table and the occurrence of flooding. Flood-resistant latrines or latrines adapted to high groundwater table (ECOSAN) are probably too expensive for the HH budget.

Capacity of the WASHCOM to maintain the Water Supply Scheme Structures

Management and Motivation

216. Interviews with the WASHCOMs confirmed that they were actively involved in the designs of the water supply schemes (WSS) (Annex 4.4, Minutes of Meetings with WASHCOMs) received an endorsement from the traditional leader and the executive members were elected. This process ensured ownership of their facilities. However, the facilities are not yet officially handed over to communities, due to the delay in construction work.

217. According to the WASHCOMs (Annex 4.4 Minutes of Meetings with WASHCOMs) all beneficiaries, except the very poor, contributed to the operations and maintenance (O & M) funds, albeit not yet very much (0 to 15%, Annex 6 Table 2). This however can be explained by the lack of any progress in construction of the WSS.

218. The active participation of women is good with 33% to 50% (Annex X table 2) in the WASHCOM being female. They are usually in charge of water affairs enhancing the motivation to continue. The creation of a WASHCOM Federation is another boost to their stability.

219. The WASHCOMs appear to be well organised and highly motivated to date. However the sustainability of WASHCOMs in the longer term is an issue everywhere in Africa (Rijsdijk, 2013).

The experiences are that even motivated user groups could become inactive due to the departure of key persons, internal conflicts, natural disaster such as floods etc. during the course of the time. In this case the support of the WASH Units and Community Development Associations is critical.

Technical Capacity

220. The O & M manuals (TAT, 2016) are instructive and probably suitable for the WASHCOM/WCA, though the training sessions in O & M have not yet started (except in the Delta State, see Annex 4.4, Minutes of Meetings with LGA staff). Also the training of more advanced local technicians (area mechanics) that is foreseen in the Programme, has yet to begin.

221. During interviews with the WASHCOM and WCA (Annex 4.4 Minutes of Meetings with WASHCOM and WCA members) the members mentioned that there were sufficient diesel mechanics and plumbers in the LGA who could maintain and carry out simple repairs of diesel-powered water supply systems. For more advanced repairs and special parts, the WASHCOM/WCA might be dependent on the suppliers. If these are within or close to the State, this might not be problematic. However, remote suppliers will have neither the capacity nor the interest to deliver the necessary spare parts or provide technical assistance after the warranty period has expired.

222. Solar-powered systems do not need much maintenance, though once broken, repair might be a challenge. The electronic parts of solar systems cannot be repaired at LGA level and hence are dependent on specialist service providers or the supplier. In addition, electronic parts are costly (see also Section Financial Capacity).

223. For the motorised WSS, the tendering procedures of the EU might complicate the above. The single tender approach for all works as applied in this Programme might be cost efficient, but it constrains sustainability, because only large (inter) national suppliers might participate. As outlined above, WSS are vulnerable to proper maintenance and need a steady flow of spare parts, especially for solar systems. Hence, WASHCOMs (and WCAs) in charge of maintaining WSS need reliable and service-oriented suppliers as close as possible to the communities. Local WASHCOMs (and WCAs) do not have the power to remind far away suppliers of their obligations and may not know where to get specialist spare parts.

224. The alternative, a number of small tenders at State level might be more time consuming, but could result in more involvement of local suppliers. This could ease the access to spare parts and specialist technicians in solar cell technology.

Financial Capacity

225. On financial issues, the motivation to collect the required O & M funds is moderate (highest amount collected is only 15 % of the required O & M costs), probably because everyone is waiting for the construction to start. (Annex 4.6, Table 2). UNICEF did not carry out willingness to pay surveys, but all the interviewed WASHCOMs mentioned that payment for water was not problematic, because the expected water price of the proposed systems (10 - 15 NGN/20 litre) was in line with the present costs (20 NGN/20 litre at private WSS). Calculations made in the Design Report (NDSP TAT Design Report Jan 2015) reveal that the proposed water fee is sufficient to cover the O & M costs. All WASHCOMs made arrangements to collect O & M costs for when the system is running. Some LGAs will demand a flat fee from the household, others

will charge water per jerry can of 20 litre at water kiosks. Most WASHCOMs have bank accounts (Annex 4.6, Table 2), though in some LGAs, the communities are too distant from commercial banks.

226. Despite the proper arrangements, the collection of sufficient funds for long term maintenance could be a problem. Even with a stable WASHCOM, organising and keeping funds during many years is challenging as it requires much discipline. In this respect, diesel-powered WSS are easier to manage than solar-powered WSS, because the water users understand that fuel is not free. Solar-powered WSS do not need revenues for a long time, though high repair costs could arise suddenly when parts break down, are damaged or are stolen.

Sustainability of WASH Units and RUWASSA (or equivalent)

227. One of the critical conditions for long term sustainability is the continuation of M & E and support to the communities at the end of the Programme. In the rural areas of the Programme this should be the tasks of the WASH Units and the Community Development Associations.

228. At present the WASH Units appear to be capable, both in staff capacity and equipment to carry out its duties. However the position of the WASH Units is vulnerable since they are dependent on the LGA priorities. Staff could be transferred or seconded to other units any time.

229. WASH Departments might be a little more resilient because they are more independent and have own staff and budget. The conversion of WASH Units to WASH Departments is in progress, though the process is very slow. Although the WASH Units already existed at the start of the Programme¹⁵ none of these is a formal department to date. There is a concern that the assets of the present WASH Units such as car, motorcycles, office equipment etc could be transferred to other units once the NDSP is closed. In addition, the present financial position of the LGAs is not encouraging. Some staff have not been paid for about six months. The sustainability of RUWASSAs might be better because all but one (Edo State) have a formal position in the local government.

230. As with all state institutions, the effectiveness depends on government funds which are scarce these days.

2.5 Integrated Water Resource Management

231. The Edo State Integrated Water Resources Management Committee is organised in conjunction with Benin-Owena River Basin Development Authority, an agency of the Federal Ministry of Water Resources with the support of the NDSP and had its first meeting in March 2015. The NDSP provides support to the committee, though does not take the lead in order to ensure continuation after the end of the Programme.

232. The first and very important achievement of this WRMC is the cooperation of all relevant water users such as ministries of Health; Agriculture; Environment; Budget and Planning; Urban and Housing; Women and Social Development; NGOs; Water users association; borehole drilling association and others. The WRMC started with a working group which has developed into a committee.

¹⁵ Transfer of River State WASH Unit to a WASH Department was already in progress at the start of NDSP, though not completed to date

233. The committee provides advice on the development of surface and groundwater resources for industrial, domestic and agricultural use to the federal and state Ministries of Water Resources. There is not yet a water resources master plan in the delta and none of the other states in the delta have similar committees. Concluding, the achievements are still modest, but eventually this could result in a basin-wide management plan. However the question arises if the IWRM activities are within the present Programme, which is focussed on potable water and safe sanitation. IWRM is very complicated, involved many stakeholders and extends beyond the NDSP target states.

2.6 *Lessons Learned*

EU Delegation and National Authorising Office

234. Several lessons are jointly relevant to the EU Delegation and the NAO and should be learned for future programmes.

- Conduct Mid Term (Evaluations) Reviews at the appropriate time;
- Recognise real reasons for inadequate sector policy, framework, and institutions;
- Fully explore potential formulations with beneficiary stakeholders;
- Do not add significantly to finalised formulation without compensatory adjustments to the overall budget;
- Do not commence programmes or project until all agreements are signed and any counterpart funds released;
- If stating deadlines for certain commitments, always follow through on the consequence of non-compliance;
- Do not create steering committees unless they have the potential to add value;
- Ensure actions from monitoring missions are fully implemented; and
- Ensure sufficient genuine ownership of the Programme by all parties.

TAT-Urban/Small Towns Sub-Component

- Adaptation of an appropriated water policy and law should precede any physical construction activities on urban and small town water supply agencies;
- Tendering on works and equipment of water supply systems should be done as close as possible to the end user;
- Exploring public-private cooperation should be very high on the agenda especially for operations and maintenance of schemes;
- Support to Water Consumer Associations (including technical training) without a clear possibility of physical implementation will endanger future programmes;
- Provide periodically, adequate training to sector institutions on O & M and cost recovery strategies;
- Ensure there is a proper after care strategy at project closure; and
- Ensure there is a realistic exit strategy emerging involving all concerned.

UNICEF-Rural Sub-Component

- Include as selection criteria, community's capacity to operate and maintain chosen scheme;
- Tendering on works and equipment of water supply systems should be done as close as possible to the end user;
- Ensure tenders are decentralised to allow for local participation;
- Support to WASHCOMs without a clear possibility of physical implementation will endanger future programmes;
- WASH Units must be upgraded to Departments, with project activities in State annual budgets;
- Ensure there is a proper after care strategy at project closure
- Sustainability in rural water supply systems is THE most critical issue – need to be more innovative;
- Explore root causes of relapse for different localities on ODF; and
- Ensure there is a realistic exit strategy emerging involving all concerned.

3. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

3.1 EU Delegation and National Authorising Office

235. Several conclusions and recommendations are jointly relevant to the EU Delegation and the NAO and should be considered for future programmes.

CONCLUSION	RECOMMENDATION
<p>There is a reason that the review (evaluation according to the ToR) is called “mid-term” – so there is sufficient time for its recommendations to take effect</p>	<p>The planned times for Mid Term Reviews should be respected for optimum benefit</p>
<p>Of course, the lack of funding is not a reason to wait to improve institutions but it is on the critical path.</p> <p>Currently, there is no evidence of this sustained funding in any of the five Niger Delta States.</p> <p>Programmers need to recognise that there is only so much that a programme is able to accomplish. Over-complex programmes such as this should focus more deeply in a single State that really understands the Programme basis and really wants to support it</p>	<p>Be more selective in the scope of an intervention and in its geographical location and choose a serious partner and beneficiary State that really has the desire for change and the enabling Programme it is being offered</p>
<p>Programmers did not spend sufficient, thoughtful time with beneficiary stakeholders both to really grasp the needs and also, critically, the constraints that the Programme would have to address</p>	<p>Be more critical and challenging of assumptions and test potential programme operational modalities more thoroughly and, crucially, be prepared to stop and re-design</p>
<p>Programmers potentially compromised the ability of the Programme to deliver the required results and outcomes</p>	<p>The addition of the fifth State and the associated budgetary increase should have been made in parallel and if the funds were not available then the fifth State should have been withdrawn, particularly as it seems to have been an afterthought and never part of the original programming</p>
<p>It was inevitable that the Programme would be waiting for agreements to be signed and funds to be transferred and appropriate steps should have been designed into the formulation</p>	<p>Programmers should have not started the Programme until all agreements had been signed and full funding transferred. After one year, the Programme should have been put on hold pending MoU signing and release of funds</p>
<p>There is a belief that there “will always be an extension”. No State believed the Programme would be stopped and the creation of “deadlines” therefore was meaningless and had no impact</p>	<p>Given that no State, other than Delta State, has provided any of its counterpart funds the Programme should be wound down in the non-contributing States. This should be managed through a formal Exit Strategy.</p>

CONCLUSION	RECOMMENDATION
There is a belief that there “will always be an extension”. No State believed the Programme would be stopped and the creation of “deadlines” therefore was meaningless and had no impact	There are some funds available, untied to counterpart funds that could be used to deliver some benefits at community level. This should be an integral part of the Exit Strategy. It is noted that Delta State has already started to push back its next contribution date from the end of September to the end of October 2016. This should not be accepted. The State should provide the balance in full by 30 September 2016
There is no point in establishing committees for the sake of it, especially since the absence of the third annual meeting seemed to make no difference to the Programme	Consider if this committee really warrants the time and costs, given its (lack of) ability to add value to the Programme. It should be noted that no Programme can be steered by a committee that meets annually
Not all actions from the missions have been achieved	All monitoring missions should have clear action parties and timescales for completion
Genuine ownership needs to be restored or reinforced	All parties in the State together with EUD and NAO to brainstorm a particular common interest such as future implementation of the water law and how to professionalise all parties

3.2 TAT-Urban/Small Towns Sub-Component

RELEVANCE

FINDING	CONCLUSION	RECOMMENDATION
<p>The relevance of the Programme is high on poverty and on the existing state of the WASH in small towns, although the target states in the Delta are not worse off than other states in Nigeria.</p> <p>However, the low functionality of urban and small town water supply systems, combined with the poor water quality in the Delta, caused both by natural causes (salt intrusion) and also human made contamination (oil and over population) adds to the relevance.</p> <p>Especially relevant, are the high number of conflicts within the States. The need for community communication and cooperation between conflicting communities to improve water situation is maybe the strongest relevance for NDSP.</p>	<p>The WASH situation and level of poverty in the five states is not worse than in the other states of Nigeria, but the vulnerability of the aquifers and the long history of conflicts adds to the relevance of the Programme.</p> <p>The institutions responsible for urban and small towns WASH were at the start of NDSP are in no position to deliver any services on urban/Small Town and urban WASH. This renders water sector reform and the strengthening of the responsible institutions highly relevant.</p> <p>The relevance between improved water and sanitation and conflict reduction is not made clear.</p>	<p>In needs assessments the link between the causes of conflicts and WSS should be made clear.</p>

EFFICIENCY

FINDING	CONCLUSION	RECOMMENDATION
<p>In general, the social component of the small town component was executed with appropriate methodologies. The process of self-selection was undertaken with transparency and could reduce conflicts and not cause them.</p> <p>Drilling deep boreholes is not the cheapest way to obtain water, though justified in areas where the surface water is contaminated, such as in the Delta states.</p> <p>The software component of the small town component is also done well, but there should have been more attention to the sanitation. The Willingness-to-Pay Study is well done, but appeared a bit late (2015).</p> <p>The first priority in improving the urban/small town water companies is ensuring a legal enabling environment (water laws and policies). The emphasis on this by the Technical Assistance Team is well appreciated.</p>	<p>The definition of small towns based on number of inhabitants (between 5000 and 20.000 persons) is not always applicable for water supply system projects. Some so-called Small Towns were observed to be rural whilst others looked urban.</p> <p>NDSP took logical steps to create a WCA; starting with sensitisation meetings, followed by election of WCA executive, endorsement from traditional leaders, registration with LGA and opening of a bank account and household registrations. However the last step, the implementation of O & M training manual, is still awaiting the start of construction. Hygiene promotions and sanitation should have had more attention, given some "small towns" were rural communities.</p> <p>Good use of NGOs in the water sector to get the message spread and ensure willingness to pay.</p>	<p>The indicator "population density" might be more practical for the presently used number of inhabitants. In all cases, the definitions should be flexible and could also include the present or proposed water supply systems.</p>
		<p>Proceed with the approach, but include some of the "rural" small towns in the rural WASH component.</p>

EFFECTIVENESS

FINDING	CONCLUSION	RECOMMENDATION
<p>The main concern on effectiveness is the delay on construction work for the Urban/Small Town Sub-Component.</p>	<p>The construction activities are still awaiting the counterpart funding, though the strengthening of the WCAs makes good progress.</p>	<p>The social component of the WASH in the urban areas should proceed as planned. The construction should start as soon as the counterpart funds arrive.</p>
<p>The progress in the development of water policies is good, though the law development still has to start in two States. The performance of the urban and small town water agencies is still very poor and is hardly capable to provide any potable water. The support to the WCAs makes good progress, although O & M training has not yet started</p>	<p>The water agencies perform very poorly and will be in no position to provide sufficient and clean water for the communities.</p> <p>Until the water sector reform has been completed and implemented, all cooperation with the agencies will lead to nowhere.</p>	<p>Concentrate on sector reform rather than support these agencies.</p>

IMPACT

FINDING	CONCLUSION	RECOMMENDATION
<p>The positive impact on violence and conflicts is confirmed in one LGA and it is possible that inter-community co-operation will lead to less conflicts in due course. The overall impact of the Programme is very low, due to lack of any construction activity. Impact on health in small towns will be even less, since there are no WASH activities yet in small towns. There is also no impact on the private sector yet.</p>	<p>Apart from some minor hygiene promotion activities, nothing has been done in the Small Towns, not covered by UNICEF for sanitation, hence no impact on health etc could be expected.</p>	<p>Proceed, and possibly expand the current activities on hygiene promotion.</p>

SUSTAINABILITY

FINDING	CONCLUSION	RECOMMENDATION
<p>WCAs are well trained in social issues, though are still waiting for technical training. Like the WASHCOMs, the WCAs rely on aftercare for a long time to ensure their stability and the discipline in collecting and managing the revenues for (long term) O&M. Unfortunately, the small town or urban water agencies are very weak and unlikely be able to provide much assistance.</p> <p>The Small Town WSS are dependent on a steady chain of spare parts and on a reliable after sales services. The WCA are likely capable to manage the smaller systems, though the larger ones need external assistance which is neither available in the existing state agencies not in the private sector.</p>	<p>The WCAs should have the technical capacity to carry out routine O&M on the WSS provided that the O & M training will be successfully concluded. However the flow of spare parts for HP and specialist maintenance of solar system will be a challenge due to the proposed large-scale tender procedures of the EU, which excludes local suppliers and hence endangers steady flow of SP and after sales services.</p> <p>On the short and maybe medium term, well-organised WCAs should be capable to collect sufficient funds for O & M.</p> <p>However, keeping the long term discipline to ensure adequate for serious repairs, especially for the solar systems and in remote areas, is challenging.</p>	<p>Explore the possibility of long time service contracts with reliable technical service providers, especially for solar powered WSS but also for diesel WSS.</p> <p>Tenders for work should be done at the lowest possible level to ensure participation of local suppliers.</p>
		<p>Although the present collection systems in rural WSS is reasonably successful, banking in remote areas is difficult because banks are far apart. See for example Goal Uganda's) experiments with phone banking¹⁶, where WASHCOMs can transfer water revenues to a bank account. This account is restricted to transfer money to a number of suppliers or service providers. This system makes life easier for everyone and reduces the risks of abuse. The system is still under development, though could be an interesting innovation for Nigeria With a cell phone coverage of 89 % (baseline survey) individual contributions are easy to manage.</p>

¹⁶ GOAL Uganda Country Strategic Plan 2012-2016

FINDING	CONCLUSION	RECOMMENDATION
	<p>Despite the good intentions and the appropriate methodology in the creation and strengthening of the WCAs, the Small Town WSS face the same problem regarding the sustainability of the rural WSS. With some support the WCAs probably could probably manage the smaller and simpler WSS, though the WCA do not have the capacity to repair/maintain more complicated WSSs themselves or to contract out these services. The Small Town and Urban water supply institutions are still not in a position to provide assistance or to manage the more complicated WSS and there is no experience with Public Private Partnerships taking over this role.</p>	<p>Explore the capacities of the local private sector to provide service or manage the (especially the larger ones) Small Town WSSs.</p>

3.3 UNICEF-Rural Sub-Component

RELEVANCE

FINDING	CONCLUSION	RECOMMENDATION
<p>The relevance of the Programme is high on poverty and on the existing state of the WASH in rural areas, although the target states in the Delta are not worse off than other states in Nigeria.</p> <p>However, the low functionality of rural water supply systems, combined with the poor water quality in the Delta, caused both by natural causes (salt intrusion) and also human made contamination (oil and over population) adds to the relevance.</p> <p>Especially relevant, are the high number of conflicts within the States. The need for community communication and cooperation between conflicting communities to improve the water situation is maybe the strongest relevance for the NDSP.</p>	<p>The WASH situation and level of poverty in the five states is not worse than in the other states of Nigeria, though the vulnerability of the aquifers and the long history of conflicts adds to the relevance of the Programme.</p> <p>The institutions responsible for rural WASH were at the start of NDSP in no position to deliver any services on rural WASH. This renders water sector reform and the strengthening of the responsible institutions highly relevant.</p> <p>The relevance between improved water and sanitation and conflict reduction is not made clear.</p>	<p>In needs assessments the link should have been made clear how the social component of WASH projects could reduce conflicts</p>

EFFICIENCY

FINDING	CONCLUSION	RECOMMENDATION
<p>In general, the social component of Rural Sub-Component was executed with appropriate methodologies. The process of self-selection was transparent and could reduce conflicts and not cause them. Drilling deep boreholes is not the cheapest way to get water, though justified where the surface water is contaminated such as in the Delta states. The software component for the component was appropriate. CLTS is an acknowledged technology, and the creation of WASHCOMs and emphasis on ownership and cooperation with other communities, for example through the Federation of WASHCOMs is appropriate. Training materials are of good quality, though O&M training is not yet done. The approach to work through the local WASH Units and cooperate with local NGOs will enhance local implementation ability.</p>	<p>The self-selection process and the efforts to create a dialogue among stakeholder are well appreciated since they could have an important impact on conflict resolution.</p>	<p>Proceed with the applied approach and involve as many local representatives of the local scene as possible.</p>
	<p>Other than some delay in the certification of CLTS communities, the software component of WASH component is doing well.</p> <p>The collection of the 5% O & M funds could have been better; the maximum amount collected is 15%, though is completely understandable given the failure of the promised schemes to appear.</p> <p>The methodology to involve other NGOs and to create WASHCOMs has contributed to the success of the social component e.g. WASH clinics.</p>	<p>Proceed with the applied approach and continue to strengthen the local NGOs and community-based organisations, such as the WASHCOMS.</p>

EFFECTIVENESS

FINDING	CONCLUSION	RECOMMENDATION
<p>The main concern on effectiveness is the delay on construction work for the Rural Sub-Component. The progress of the communities in achieving Open Defecation Free (ODF) status by means of the Community-Led Total Sanitation (CLTS) methodology is reasonable, though the official verification as an ODF community lags behind. The latrine construction progress is also reasonable, though very variable.</p> <p>The WASHCOMs appear to be well trained and motivated, though are slow in collecting funds for Operations & Maintenance (O & M). The WASH Units are well equipped and trained, though after many years still have not achieved the official status as "Department"</p>	<p>With the exception of the school latrine construction and some projects in the Delta and Rivers state, little has been achieved on WASH construction in the States.</p> <p>The software component makes much more progress and most CLTS targets (with the exception of Bayelsa State) are expected to be achieved at the end of the Programme.</p> <p>The establishment of the WASHCOMS is also running well and the WASH Units have been strengthened.</p>	<p>The social component of the WASH in the rural areas should proceed as planned. The construction should start as soon as the counterpart funds arrive.</p>

IMPACT

FINDING	CONCLUSION	RECOMMENDATION
<p>The positive impact on violence and conflicts is confirmed in one LGA and it is possible that the inter-community co-operation will lead to less conflicts in due course.</p> <p>Overall impact of the Programme is very low due to the lack of any construction activity. There are possibly some positive effects on health, though certainly at this stage, cannot be quantified.</p> <p>Impact on the local private sector could have been better if the Programme had invested in the training of local artisans in latrine construction. The local environment will benefit from the disappearance of open defaecation in the communities and no negative impact is to be expected from this sub-component.</p>	<p>To date, the overall social impact of the NDSP is still low although the health situation in the rural communities might have improved due to the success of the CLTS approach.</p> <p>There is anecdotic evidence for improved health with the beneficiaries, though it is too early to find it in health statistics.</p> <p>The impact on the workload of women and the school attendance of girls is still very small, if at all.</p>	<p>Proceed with the current activities on CLTS, school sanitation and WSS</p>
	<p>Studies and guidelines have been prepared on conflict prevention and training has been provided, though it is not clear what the actual effect is. The manual developed is good quality, though it is yet to be fully implemented.</p>	<p>Concerted efforts by RUWASSA are required to step down the training to WASHCOMs using the conflict manual developed.</p>

SUSTAINABILITY

FINDING	CONCLUSION	RECOMMENDATION
<p>The WCAs are well trained in social issues, though are still awaiting for technical training.</p> <p>Like the WASHCOMs, the WCAs rely on aftercare for a long time to ensure their stability and the discipline in collecting and managing the revenues for (long term) O&M. Unfortunately, the small town or urban water agencies are very weak and unlikely be able to provide much assistance.</p> <p>The Small Town WSS are dependent on a steady chain of spare parts and on a reliable after sales services. The WCA are likely capable to manage the smaller systems, but the larger ones need external assistance which is neither available in the existing state agencies nor in the private sector.</p>	<p>Experience suggests that the hygiene health messages will register for some time, though the discipline to keep villages ODF will need some periodic encouragement.</p> <p>The WASH Units (and the Community Development Associations) are the only organisations which could provide aftercare, provided that they have the means to continue after the closure of NDSP.</p>	<p>Prepare strategy for continuing support to the ODF and not yet ODF villages after Programme closure.</p>
	<p>WASHCOMs should have the technical capacity to carry out routine O&M on the WSS, provided that the O & M training will be successfully concluded.</p>	<p>Explore the possibility of long time service contracts with reliable technical service providers, especially for solar powered WSS and also for diesel WSS.</p>
	<p>In the short and maybe medium term, well-organised WASHCOMs should be capable to collect</p>	<p>Although the present collection systems in rural WSS is reasonably successful, banking in remote areas</p>

FINDING	CONCLUSION	RECOMMENDATION
	<p>sufficient funds for O & M.</p> <p>However, keeping the long term discipline to ensure adequate for serious repairs is, especially for the solar systems and in remote areas, challenging.</p>	<p>is difficult because banks are far apart. Goal Uganda experiments phone banking, where WASHCOMs can transfer water revenues to a bank account. This account is restricted to transfer money to a number of suppliers or service providers. This system make life easier for everyone and reduced the risks of abuse. The system is still under development, though it could be an interesting innovation for Nigeria With a cell phone coverage of 89 % (baseline survey) individual contributions are easy to manage.</p>

3.4 Integrated Water Resource Management

CONCLUSION	RECOMMENDATION
<p>The IWRM activities are appreciated, but are still in an early stage and confined to just Edo State which renders the entire exercise not very effective. IWRM is only useful if done in a comprehensive basin-wide scale because it involves many stakeholders and requires in depth knowledge of a wide range of issues such as social and physical geography of the river basin, the legal system, agriculture etc.</p>	<p>It is recommended to carry out IWRM activities as a separate long term programme on river-basin scale and not on State level (as it done now) or on Federal level and not as a side show in WS programmes such as NDSP.</p>

4. ANNEXES

4.1 FINDINGS ASSESSMENT

The tables below are used to consolidate overall findings. Assumed understanding of the definition is clarified with a brief definition. In addition, a limited number of sub-criteria, which highlight the aspects of the DAC criterion that are considered important in reviewing these interventions are also used.

Each criterion was graded, though it should be recognised that scores might lead to an oversimplification of a complex reality, with complex problems related to a given context. The questions that are provided under each sub-criterion have an indicative meaning: they clarify the meaning of each sub-criterion.

The grading used is as follows:

Score	Qualitative	Interpretation
A	Very Good	Highly satisfactory, largely above average and potentially a reference for good practice. Recommendations focus on the need to capitalise on these good practices
B	Good	Satisfactory, with room for improvement. Recommendations are useful, though not vital
C	Problems	Issues which need to be addressed, otherwise the overall performance of the intervention may be negatively affected. Necessary improvements however do not require major revisions of the intervention's strategy
D	Serious Deficiencies	Issues so serious that if not addressed, they can lead to failure of the intervention. Major adjustments and revision of the intervention strategy are necessary

Relevance

RELEVANCE: <i>The extent to which a development intervention conforms to the needs and priorities of target groups and the policies of recipient countries and donors</i>				
Clarification: Relevance addresses the needs of the intervention. It analyses the intervention in relation to the problems and needs of the beneficiaries, and their priorities. Furthermore, relevance analyses the consistency of the intervention with the policies of the partner and donor country Relevance appreciates the value and usefulness of the intervention, as perceived by the key stakeholders, the extent to which the "response" of the intervention is technically adequate to meet those needs and priorities, and the extent to which the intervention is a response to a real need of the beneficiary				
Overall Assessment	A	B	C	D
	✓			

The Specific Objectives of the Water and Sanitation Component of the NDSP are:

- To improve policy, institutional, legal and financial framework in the water and sanitation sector;
- To support urban and small towns sector institutions to deliver sustainable water supply services; and
- To support rural water sector institutions to deliver sustainable water supply and sanitation services.

These Objectives are highly relevant to the targeted State institutions, and to the urban, small towns and rural requirements.

ANALYSIS SUB-CRITERIA

Response to the beneficiaries' problems, needs and priorities	A	B	C	D
			✓	
<p>Is the intervention aligned with the problems, needs and priorities of beneficiaries?</p> <p>Is the intervention strategy an adequate answer to the needs and to the reality/living conditions of beneficiaries?</p>				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Programme was aligned with the problems, needs and priorities of beneficiaries in the targeted urban/small towns and rural communities. However, the design of the Programme strategy was largely dependent on (a) the State signing an MoU with the Federal Government and (b) subsequently releasing an agreed amount of counterpart funding. Delays in both were foreseeable and thus the underlying strategy was therefore flawed; • The WASH situation and level of poverty in the five states is not worse than in the other states of Nigeria, but the vulnerability of the aquifers and the long history of conflicts adds to the relevance of the Programme; and • The relevance between improved water and sanitation and conflict reduction is not made clear. 				
Consistency with partner priorities and policies	A	B	C	D
		✓		
<p>Is the intervention aligned with priorities and policies of the partner government at all levels (national and local)?</p> <p>Is it consistent with an approach that promotes complementarity with other actors working on the same subject?</p>				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Programme was aligned with priorities and policies of the partner government at all levels (national and local) to a certain extent. That many State employees associated with the Programme had not been paid by the State for some time meant that these priorities were undermined somewhat. The Programme was well aligned with programmes of other donors, though it is not clear if lessons are being learned; and • The institutions responsible for urban and small towns WASH were at the start of NDSP are in no position to deliver any services on urban/Small Town and urban WASH. This renders water sector reform and the strengthening of the responsible institutions highly relevant. 				
Consistency with donor priorities and policies	A	B	C	D
		✓		
<p>Is the intervention aligned with the relevant policies of the European Union?</p>				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Programme is well aligned with the EU Country Strategy Paper and the identified needs and priorities were part of a wider programme addressing the mitigation of the conflict in the Niger Delta by addressing the main causes of unrest and violence: bad governance, (youth) unemployment, and poor delivery of basic services. 				

Efficiency

EFFICIENCY: *Efficiency measures the results - qualitative and quantitative – in relation to the inputs. It is an economic term which is used to assess the extent to which aid uses the least costly resources possible in order to achieve the desired results. This generally requires comparing alternative approaches to achieving the same outputs, to see whether the most efficient process has been adopted*

Clarification:

Efficiency looks at the transformation efficiency of the intervention: how are inputs transformed into outputs (delivery of goods and services). Efficiency looks at this ratio as compared to alternatives: with the output as a given, were there alternative approaches that would have required fewer resources without reducing the quality and quantity of the results?

Could more of the same result have been produced with the same resources by using an alternative approach?

Efficiency also looks at the 'on time' implementation of activities: (Inputs on time?) where activities implemented as planned (on time) and consequently, outputs delivered on time?

Efficiency also looks at the delivery and quality of products and services and the partner contribution/involvement.

Overall Assessment	A	B	C	D
			✓	

- Programmers did not spend sufficient, thoughtful time with beneficiary stakeholders both to really grasp the needs and also, critically, the constraints that the programme would have to address;
- The Programme was poorly formulated from the outset and the usual mechanisms that could have been rectified that were bypassed. That so many red flags should be evident so early on in the programme that should have alerted both EUD and NAO, taken together which indicates a clear fatal flaw;
- Formulation essentially compromised from the beginning as it had insufficient access to State representatives and seem to have laboured under a lack of state documentation; and
- The definition of small towns based on number of inhabitants (between 5000 and 20.000 persons) is not always applicable for water supply system projects. Some so-called Small Towns were observed to be rural whilst others looked urban.

ANALYSIS SUB-CRITERIA

Inputs have been managed with reasonable regard for efficiency?	A	B	C	D
			✓	
<p>With the output as a given, were there alternative approaches that would have required fewer resources without reducing the quality and quantity of the results? Has the intervention been managed in a cost-efficient way, optimising the quality and quantity of</p>				

<p>outputs? The ratio input-output is good?</p>				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The core constraint to improvement in the water and sanitation sector, sustained funding but also weak policy, institutional framework or institutions; Addition of the fifth state, without associated funding, diluted available funds and undermined the Programme to deliver the required results and outcomes; NDSP took logical steps to create community-based organisations (WASHCOMs / WCAs; starting with sensitisation meetings, followed by election of WCA executive, endorsement from traditional leader, registration with LGA and opening of a bank account and household registrations. However the last step, the implementation of O & M training manual is still awaiting the start of construction. Hygiene promotions and sanitation should have had more attention, given some “small towns” were rural communities; and Good use of NGOs in the water sector to get the message spread and ensure willingness to pay. 				
How well are outputs achieved?	A	B	C	D
			✓	
<p>All outputs delivered or likely to be delivered as scheduled (implying also the on-time implementation of activities)?</p> <p>In case of delays, have appropriate measures been taken? On time?</p> <p>Are all outputs of good quality (responding to pre-defined quality criteria whenever possible)?</p> <p>In case of problems with quality, or the follow-up of quality, have corrective measures been taken?</p>				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There were some clear deadlines by which some States would lose their programme option, yet, despite clear exceedance of the deadlines, no action was taken; and Delays in signing agreements and releasing funds was entirely foreseeable and should have been flagged in the Programme Risk Assessment. 				
How well is the Partner contribution working?	A	B	C	D
				✓
<p>Is the partner contributing (financial/material/human resources) as planned?</p>				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Only Delta State made over some of its contribution in December 2014 to the amount of NGN 200 M. Whilst this was not sufficient to trigger any EU-funded construction, it did allow UNICEF to proceed. Late July 2016, Delta paid a further NGN 100 M. This is still below the threshold NGN 400 M. The EUD had maintained that 100% of the counterpart funds must be made over in order to trigger the EU-funded construction works. These works would target the small towns. Both lots would be subject to EU procurement rules; Whilst the April Communiqué focussed more on releasing counterpart funds per se rather than which works would be triggered by that, it is understood that this would only trigger the Rural Sub-Component works; Even at the early stage (February 2011) it was recognised by all parties that counterpart funding would be essential to demonstrate the State’s commitment to the Programme. Without this local budgetary support for recurrent funding then the Programme work would be unsustainable. Interestingly, the EUD stated that the Project may be withdrawn from a State should that State not show evidence of commitment to the Project’s goals. That lack of commitment has been ongoing for three years indicating the general disinterest in the Programme; and The June Communiqué (the meeting was only attended by two of the NDSP States, Akwa Ibom and Delta) stressed that the counterpart funds should be 50% paid by 25 July 2016, 				

again to avoid the loss of the EU grant.				
Efficiency of execution modalities?	A	B	C	D
		✓		
<p>Are the execution modalities fostering an efficient use of the means of the intervention?</p> <p>Are the execution modalities organised in such a way that they convert inputs into outputs in an economical way?</p>				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tender dossiers for all priority works in Urban and Small Towns had been prepared and submitted to NPC and EUD despite the non- full release of the PEs; • Self-selection and validation had been accomplished in all 46 beneficiary Small Towns in all the beneficiary LGAs; and • Formation and foundation training of Water Consumers Associations (WCAs) had been implemented in all the relevant Small Towns. 				

Effectiveness

EFFECTIVENESS: The extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance				
Clarification:				
<p>Effectiveness looks at the use of outputs and the likely achievement of the intervention's outcome. It considers not only the achievement of the outcome, but also reviews the relevance of the outputs: are outputs (products and services) being used as planned? Are they contributing to the achievement of the outcome as planned in the intervention strategy (is the intervention delivering the right outputs?)?</p> <p>The evaluation of these aspects gives a more complete idea of the effectiveness of interventions.</p>				
Overall Assessment	A	B	C	D
			✓	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Design of water supply schemes for all benefitting small towns had started in all of the States; • UNICEF provided technical support to RUWASSA at State level and WASH Units/department at LGA levels and provided trainings in safe water supply, adequate sanitation and good hygiene practices. They supported establishment and training of WASHCOMS at community levels, and Federation of WASHCOMS which also exist at LGA levels; • The state WASH policies were finalised in Edo and Delta and drafted in Akwa Ibom and Bayelsa States. UNICEF has been advocating for the speedy approval and dissemination of the policy documents. Rivers and Akwa Ibom State Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Agency (RUWASSA) were fully established by law and Delta State has a functioning RUWASSA which is yet to be backed by law. The bill for creation of RUWAHA (Rural Water and Hygiene Agency) in Edo State has been dropped in favour of a new agency established namely, Edo State Small Town and Rural Water Supply & Sanitation Agency (STRUWASA). The Bayelsa RUWASSA is under review with the executive arm of Government. The ten project LGAs have WASH Units; • All the five implementing states have established and maintained Community Led Total Sanitation (CLTS) databases and uploaded the information into Water Sanitation Hygiene 				

Information Monitoring System (WASHIMS) at the Local Government Area (LGA) levels. WASH Units at the ten LGA were equipped with solar systems to ensure un-interrupted power supply for office work and online real time information sharing and reporting; and

- The water agencies perform very poorly and will be in no position to provide sufficient and clean water for the communities. Until the water sector reform has been completed and implemented all cooperation with the agencies will lead nowhere.

ANALYSIS SUB-CRITERIA

To what extent are outputs being used and do they contribute to the outcome?	A	B	C	D
			✓	
<p>All target groups have access to the outputs available so far? All target groups are using outputs as planned?</p> <p>Any factors that prevent the use of outputs? The use of the available outputs is contributing to the outcome as planned?</p>				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The limited release of counterpart funds by the state governments and communities has significantly delayed the implementation of activities especially construction of WASH facilities; Weak commitment of LGA WASH Unit staff and incessant strikes by LGA workers due to non-payment of salaries are constraining the implementation of the Programme; In the riverine LGAs, accessibility is by boat which increases the average cost of transportation. Water table is very high (less than 2 m) making latrine construction difficult and very expensive. Indigenes make use of pier latrines located at the bank of the river. A study on riverine areas is being planned in early 2016 to better understand the challenges and possible solutions. 				
As presently implemented what is the likelihood of the outcome to be achieved?	A	B	C	D
				✓
<p>Achievement in terms of coverage and quality?</p> <p>Intervention adapted its strategy to changes in the context (assumptions and risks) whenever necessary in order to attain the outcome?</p> <p>Negative effects mitigated? Any unplanned positive effects? Contributions of these positive effects to the results of the intervention?</p>				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The States were advised that according to the Financing Agreement, the deadline for signing all works contracts was 29 October, 2015. Of course, the typical duration of such procurement process is from seven to eight months and with the works themselves taking as much as 12 months, this deadline was no longer tenable. Consequently, NPC requested EU for an extension of the deadline. With the exception of Delta, no State indicated any interest; Currently, the EUD is agreeing to the launch only one tender (< EUR 300 000) with a possibility to do more (in Delta) should an extension be granted (D + 5); The construction activities are still awaiting the counterpart funds but the strengthening of the community-based organisations makes good progress. 				

Impact

IMPACT: Positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended				
Clarification:				
<p>Impact has several interpretations: the likely contribution to the intervention's Impact level (the General Objective of the logical framework). The result at impact level is – exceptions might exist - a result of the strategic framework of partner government. Impact in this sense focuses thus on whether the intervention contributes to the strategic result the partner government intends to achieve. It addresses the link between the outcome and impact level of the results framework.</p> <p>Also, it needs to address the entire range of effects brought about through by the intervention that occur in the longer term. These effects could be foreseen and unforeseen, and might affect people, organisations, societies and the physical environment outside the initially intended group of people or organisations. It differs from the effectiveness criterion in the sense that impact provides a corrective to the "narrow" preoccupation with the realisation of the results as stated in the results framework, and turns to target group and other stakeholders to find out if and how the intervention has affected their situation, positively or negatively.</p> <p>Impact answers as such the question if the intervention "was worth it" – by addressing the contribution to the higher result at the impact level, as well as the significant consequences of an intervention, negative as well as positive, which aren't necessarily related to the "impact level" of the results framework.</p>				
Overall Assessment	A	B	C	D
		✓		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The three-star approach to WASH was adopted in Nigeria with the aim of promoting incremental improvements in WASH facilities and hygiene practices in schools. The group activity designed to reinforce good hygiene behaviour with emphasis on sustained behavioural change in schools; • Basic WASH indicator covering the three thematic areas of water supply, sanitation and hygiene and WASH in schools are collected and analysed using WASHIMS. These indicators include types of water facilities, date of construction, abstraction system, reticulation, type of pump installed, number of communities triggered, number of new latrines constructed, number of community dialogue organised, hygiene promotion, number of ODF communities etc. All these indicators are collected at the community level and at school level; and • To date there is little impact, other than some anecdotal improvement in health; and • The local environment might be cleaner, thanks to ODF, but no other impact on the environment is to be expected. 				

ANALYSIS SUB-CRITERIA

	A	B	C	D
What are the direct prospects of the intervention at the Impact level?		✓		
<p>Which changes at impact level are apparent or likely to become apparent?</p> <p>To what extent can the changes at impact level be identified and measured and attributed to the intervention?</p> <p>What do beneficiaries and other stakeholders affected by the intervention perceive as effects of the intervention on themselves?</p> <p>Will the intervention contribute to the partner countries objectives, as targeted in the results framework at impact level? Are any external factors likely to jeopardise the contribution to the partner results?</p>				

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CLTS approach has greatly achieved sustained behaviour change in mainly rural people by a process of "triggering" leading to spontaneous and long-term abandonment of open defaecation practices; • Formation and foundation training of Water Consumers Associations (WCAs) had been implemented in all the relevant Small Towns; • The EU Joint Monitoring expressed concern about the security issue preventing the TAT team leader acquitting his role fully (e.g. at community level). This should have been considered at formulation. The suggestion of a deputy team leader was not appropriate though an IPE Expert based in Rivers (as in other States) would have been much more useful; • EU Joint Monitoring commented on the lack of EU visibility though that was a good thing since the deliberate low key nature of the TAT work has managed the reputational damage caused by EU Delegation bureaucracy; and • The TAT team is to be congratulated on its policy work. 				
Are there/will there be unintended positive or negative effects of the intervention on the intended beneficiaries or on non-intended individuals and groups	A	B	C	D
			✓	
<p>Have there been/will there be any unplanned positive or negative effects (i.e. environmental, social, cultural, gender and economic) on the intended beneficiaries or on non-intended individuals and groups? How do these affect the intended results at output – outcome and impact level?</p> <p>In case of negative effects, did the intervention take timely measures for mitigating those? What was the result?</p>				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The "Quick-Wins" championed by the EU Joint Monitoring just seems to have brought more EUD reputational damage through lack of implementation; • The ROM noted that a lack of thrust in the Programme is developing among the State authorities, citing difficulties in releasing the Programme Estimate funding, and wondering that if that is so difficult what about more complex and larger disbursements; • There is a risk that unless the works materialise, the Programme will have created significant mistrust; • Lack of responsiveness of EUD and NPC/NAO certainly does not assist good relations or effective management; and • No unintended effects are expected at this stage. 				

Sustainability

<p>SUSTAINABILITY: The continuation of benefits from a development intervention after major development assistance has been completed. The probability of continued long-term benefits. The resilience to risk of the net benefit flows over time</p>
<p>Clarification:</p> <p>In the context of the review process, sustainability is the likelihood that the results and benefits of the intervention will be maintained at appropriate level and during a reasonable time after the closure of the intervention. In the context of the reviews, it is the potential for being sustainable that is assessed, and thus the likelihood that the impact will be lasting.</p> <p>Different factors are related to sustainability, such as the embedding of the intervention in the strategic framework of the partner country, partner ownership and participation in the formulation and implementation, the integration of the intervention in the institutional and cultural context, the appropriateness of technologies regarding the specificities of the partner country, the influence of environmental factors on the intervention and the impact of the intervention on the environment, the partner country's capacities to maintain the results financially, the governance of the partner institution, the appropriateness of the exit strategy. This list is not exhaustive.</p>

Overall Assessment	A	B	C	D
				✓
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Capacity building training of the states of Project directors and members of SWG staff would help with planning activities in their various agencies and help plan for sustained development in the water sector; Many of the WCAs and WASHCOMS have so far opened bank accounts to remit 5-59% (WCAs) and 2-15% (WASHCOMs) of their O&M project counterpart funds and have constitution upon which they operate with main duties such as sensitisation and ownership concepts embedded to encourage continuous sustainability long after the closure of the NDSP Programme. The stability however of the community-based organisations in the longer term is questionable; and Despite the good approaches the assets will not be sustainable without a good after care programme, which is far from assured in NDSP 				

ANALYSIS SUB-CRITERIA

Financial / economic viability?	A	B	C	D
				✓
<p>Do partners have the financial capacity to maintain the benefits from the intervention when donor support has been withdrawn? Is there a financial/economic phase-out strategy, that if so, is likely to be implemented?</p> <p>Are beneficiaries/partner institution able to afford maintenance or replacement of the services /goods/infrastructure introduced by the intervention? Are the results/benefits affordable for the beneficiaries at the end of the intervention?</p>				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Water Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) units exist in all ten focal LGAs of the Niger Delta and there has been the review to harmonise local government service scheme to provide for establishment of WASH departments at LGA level. Draft reviewed document is awaiting adoption/ approval by the national council on establishment. Once it is concluded, the units can then be legally upgraded to full departments and can access budget allocations from government to financially empower its activities in the service delivery at the community level; The willingness to pay in most communities visited to a great extent will guaranty availability and replenishment of funds for further operation and maintenance works and by extension the sustainability of schemes; In the short and maybe medium term, well-organised WASHCOMs should be capable to collect sufficient funds for O & M. However, keeping the long term discipline to ensure adequate for serious repairs is, especially for the solar systems and in remote areas, challenging; and There are serious concern about the technical capacity of the community-based organisations as well as the required flow of spare parts to keep the systems running. 				
Are requirements of local ownership satisfied and will it continue after the end of the intervention?	A	B	C	D
		✓		
<p>Have partner and local stakeholders been involved in the planning and implementation process?</p> <p>To what extent are beneficiaries involved in decision making regarding the benefits of the intervention?</p> <p>Is the intervention consistent with an approach that supports partner government ownership?</p>				

What is the likelihood that beneficiaries will continue to make use of outputs and outcomes?

Do the beneficiaries have plans to continue delivering the stream of benefits and if so, are they likely to materialise?

- Some communities e.g. in Oliogo community (Ndokwa West LGA) and five small towns in Estako LGA have been used to self - driven projects long before the NDSP Programme. With training given by the NDSP in O&M of water facilities, fund raising and sensitization of communities to build toilets and keeping their environment clean they are confident they will be in better position to maintain new their water projects; and
- The project strategy both in rural and ST ensured ownership among the community-based organisations.

What is the level of sustainable policy support provided?	A	B	C	D										
		✓												
<p>What support has been provided from the relevant national, sectoral (and eventually local) policies, as well as from budgetary policies? How far is this influencing positively or negatively the intervention? Are the current policies likely to continue after the intervention has finished?</p> <p>If relevant, what input is the intervention able to give at policy level? To what extent do experiences and lessons learned on the ground feed into the policy agenda? Do changes in policies and priorities affect the intervention? How well is the intervention adapting to these changes?</p>														
<p>The five States are having relevant National and Local WSS policies at different stages indicated:</p> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 20%;">AKWA IBOM</td> <td> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The reviewed WASH Policy (Final Draft) document was deliberated upon by the Policy Drafting Committee on 23rd February 2016. Timelines were drawn out for the finalization of this but lack of PE has prevented its materialization </td> </tr> <tr> <td>BAYELSA</td> <td> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Bayelsa State Water and Sanitation policy has been drafted; seeking approval from State executive council, and to also translate into law for implementation PSP strategy in the water sector is developed but not yet implemented by the sector </td> </tr> <tr> <td>DELTA</td> <td> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> WASH policy drafted and approved by Delta State Executive Council and Draft water law still being worked on by State Ministry PPP arrangement in Delta State has been put in place to develop the water industry </td> </tr> <tr> <td>EDO</td> <td> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The final version of the draft of the WSS policy has been sent by the Commissioner MEWR to the Edo State Executive Council and is still awaiting approval. Deliberations by EXCO still had not taken place as at the end of June 2016 The final draft Edo State water bill covering urban water supply and waste water management forwarded to the Ministry of Justice for final vetting has still not been returned to the ED MEWR as at the end of June 2016 The passage of the Bill into law will be facilitated by a retreat with the House of Assembly house committee on water in the state. This activity is expected to take place in the month of August 2016. The postponement has been due to delays in obtaining the final draft of the Urban Water Supply Bill </td> </tr> <tr> <td>RIVERS</td> <td> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Rivers State is warming up for continuation of support for the full implementation of their policy and law by NDSP following the end of RUWASA, under Activity 3, UWSS agencies development plans Rivers State RUWASSA is fully established by the 2010 water law WASH Policy developed with implementation strategy The Focal project LGAs in Rivers state have established LGA Federation of WASHCOMS and are supporting communities in the implementation of WASH activities </td> </tr> </table> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Policies and Laws will positively influence the service delivering implementation in the water and sanitation sector and enhance good budgetary planning, however these are not yet approved by the state government 					AKWA IBOM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The reviewed WASH Policy (Final Draft) document was deliberated upon by the Policy Drafting Committee on 23rd February 2016. Timelines were drawn out for the finalization of this but lack of PE has prevented its materialization 	BAYELSA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Bayelsa State Water and Sanitation policy has been drafted; seeking approval from State executive council, and to also translate into law for implementation PSP strategy in the water sector is developed but not yet implemented by the sector 	DELTA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> WASH policy drafted and approved by Delta State Executive Council and Draft water law still being worked on by State Ministry PPP arrangement in Delta State has been put in place to develop the water industry 	EDO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The final version of the draft of the WSS policy has been sent by the Commissioner MEWR to the Edo State Executive Council and is still awaiting approval. Deliberations by EXCO still had not taken place as at the end of June 2016 The final draft Edo State water bill covering urban water supply and waste water management forwarded to the Ministry of Justice for final vetting has still not been returned to the ED MEWR as at the end of June 2016 The passage of the Bill into law will be facilitated by a retreat with the House of Assembly house committee on water in the state. This activity is expected to take place in the month of August 2016. The postponement has been due to delays in obtaining the final draft of the Urban Water Supply Bill 	RIVERS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Rivers State is warming up for continuation of support for the full implementation of their policy and law by NDSP following the end of RUWASA, under Activity 3, UWSS agencies development plans Rivers State RUWASSA is fully established by the 2010 water law WASH Policy developed with implementation strategy The Focal project LGAs in Rivers state have established LGA Federation of WASHCOMS and are supporting communities in the implementation of WASH activities
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Is governance supporting the potential sustainability of benefits and outcomes?	A	B	C	D										
			✓											
<p>How well is the intervention embedded in institutional structures that are likely to survive beyond the lifespan of the intervention? Is the institutional anchorage contributing to the sustainability of the intervention? Is the mandate of the implementing organisation compatible with the role that it is expected to play?</p> <p>Are the relevant partner institution(s) characterized by governance capacities, including effective management and organisation that enable sustainability of the benefits and outcome?</p> <p>If a new institution had to be created, how far have good relationships with existing institutions been established?</p>														

How likely is it that it will be capable of continuing the flow of benefits after the end of the intervention?				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The concept of counterpart funds was partly to draw in the States into a long term commitment to continue to deliver basics services after the Programme has closed. To the extent that this has largely not happened would suggest that this is not an appropriate way to do that. The concept was also partly to cost-share the construction of water supply facilities; The training received from the NDSP Programme is well aligned with priorities and policies of the FGN at all levels and it is likely to have meaningful impact after the life span of the Programme. The present capacity of ST water agencies is far too low to have any meaningful effect on the sustainability; and The present capacity of the WASH Units though good, is not assured in the long term. 				
To what extent are conditions met for capacity development be able to contribute to sustainable development results?	A	B	C	D
			✓	
<p>Did an assessment of the capacities take place at the start of the implementation? Are partner institutions being properly supported in their development and in their task to continue to deliver the intervention's benefits and outcomes after the end of the intervention? Are other relevant stakeholders supported in their development in order to continue to deliver the intervention's benefits and outcomes after the end of the intervention?</p> <p>Will adequate levels of suitable and qualified human resources be available to continue the intervention's benefits and outcomes after the end of the intervention's implementation phase?</p> <p>Is the capacity development approach of the intervention carried out in a way that prepares the partner institutions and beneficiaries to maintain the benefits and results of the intervention after the closure of the intervention? Have they properly been prepared for taking over, technically, financially and managerially?</p>				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Given that so many are without clean safe water or appropriate sanitation, it is clear that the NDSP (3) remains consistent with, and supportive of, the policy and programme framework within which it is placed; Participation and ownership is directly proportional to the level of programme implementation. It is likely that more of both will occur as soon as counterpart funds are released and proper implementation proceeds (e.g. timely release of programme estimates). Contrary to this, the communities themselves demonstrate a level of commitment and ownership that far exceeds any other party in this Programme, and have demonstrated this by accumulating counterpart funds, at least partially if not wholly; and All conditions fulfilled, but in the present time frame, there is not enough time to consolidate these assets 				
Socio-cultural sustainability	A	B	C	D
		✓		
<p>Is the intervention aligned with local perceptions of needs and of ways of producing and sharing benefits?</p> <p>If the intervention sought to bring changes in respect with local power-structures, beliefs, status systems, how well is the intervention strategy based on an analysis of such factors, including beneficiary participation in implementation?</p> <p>How well is the quality of relations between the intervention team and the local communities?</p>				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The extent to which stakeholders are aware of the Programme is not uniform, though the meetings with the stakeholders yielded a good understanding of the Programme. 				


Cross-Cutting Issues

GENDER
<p>Were practical and strategic gender interests adequately considered in the intervention strategy? And did gender receive substantial attention in the planning of the intervention?</p> <p>Has gender been mainstreamed during the implementation? Are results being delivered in a gender-equitable manner as planned, and have adjustments been made in the case this was needed? Is data collected disaggregated by sex, and has action been taken to address inequalities and shortfalls?</p> <p>Is capacity being built within the intervention structure and among stakeholders to ensure gender equality achievements can be maintained after the end of the intervention?</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In most WASH Units visited there was an average of 30 -40% females as members of staff; • For the election of executive members of the WCAs and WASHCOMs the nominated person with highest number of votes is considered for the position he/she is nominated. In most cases, positions of treasurers are assigned to women; • The executive members of the WCAs and WASHCOMs was about 40% female on average; and • There is a general awareness and attempt to imbibe the culture of having a good percentage of women being involved in the implementation of water and sanitation activities.

ENVIRONMENT
<p>Have environmental constraints and opportunities been considered adequately in the intervention strategy?</p> <p>Did environmental mainstreaming receive substantial attention in the planning of the intervention?</p> <p>Are good environmental practices followed in the intervention?</p> <p>Does the intervention respect traditional, successful environmental practices?</p> <p>Has environmental damage been caused or likely be caused by the intervention? What kind of environmental impact mitigation measures have been taken?</p> <p>Is the achievement of the intervention's results likely to generate increased pressure on fragile ecosystems and scarce natural resources?</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There was a Strategic Environmental Assessment Scoping Report (SEA) which did preliminary identification of the content of the environmental and social baseline in the five participating States of the Niger Delta is crucial in order to determine the likely significant impacts arising from implementation of the Water and Sanitation Component (3) of NDSP; • Field visits and consultations within the project States, considered the following environmental and social components: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Biodiversity (Flora and Fauna) - Population and Human Health

- Soil
- Water
- Air and Climate
- The Niger Delta Region has a high biodiversity of plants and animals unique to it. The five NDSP States are located in four distinct ecological zones namely:
 - Mangrove Forest and Coastal Vegetation (Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Delta, Edo and Rivers)
 - Freshwater Swamp Forest (Bayelsa, Delta, Edo, and Rivers)
 - Lowland Rain Forest (Akwa Ibom, Delta, Edo and Rivers)
 - Derived Savannah (Edo)

Figure below shows the major ecological zones in the NDSP States



- The SEA considered if available designated ecological sites, protected forest reserves and species were found in the NDSP States. The Ecological designations and datasets considered for the baseline environment for the SEA include: Ramsar Sites, International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and World Conservation Monitoring Centre as a means of making mitigation measures for any likely environmental impact;
- The following were also considered in the SEA : Geology and Soil, Surface Water and Groundwater, Air and Climate, Cultural Heritage; and
- Environmental mainstreaming received substantial attention in the planning of the intervention where relevant stakeholders were identified at the state, LGAs and community levels, from the stakeholder matrix document developed for the NDSP for each state. Subsequently, meetings were scheduled with the relevant stakeholders for consultation.

RESULTS ORIENTED STEERING

Is the intervention analysing its progress towards the outcome and its likely contribution to the impact level at least annually?

Is the intervention making use of the recommendations of backstopping missions?

Is the intervention using progress information to report to the steering committee and to propose decisions needed to re-orient the intervention at strategic level, in case needed?

<p>Is the steering committee steering the intervention on strategic level?</p> <p>Is the intervention implementing decisions taken by the steering committee?</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In practice the “State Project Coordination Unit” has become the State Working Group (SWG) and is for the whole management of the Programme on behalf of the Project Implementation Agencies/Project Recipient Agencies for monitoring the implementation of activities. • The Programme is decentralised in as much as the TAT is in each of the five States and embedded in the Ministry of Water Resources, or the equivalent Ministry responsible for water supply and sanitation. Specific work plans have been developed in each States with the support of the TAT, and are communicated to each State Steering Committee. • The basic principle in the design of the Project’s implementation arrangements was to promote leadership in sector reform at State level, and to support the State institutions to enhance their management capacities to provide safe water and sanitation facilities. For this reason the body responsible for implementation of state-level activities, the State Project Steering Committee, was to be established in the Office of the Commissioner. • It is however not clear what the point was of the National Project Steering Committee. It met only twice and made recommendations on matters over which it had little or no authority

<p>MONITORING</p>
<p>Is the baseline report complete and are monitoring data collected as foreseen?</p> <p>Is the intervention results framework of good quality?</p> <p>Is the outcome achievable at the end of the intervention?</p> <p>Is the operational monitoring tool up to date?</p> <p>Is the intervention regularly meeting with the RR on the progress of the intervention? Is reporting upwards done following the “management by exception” principle?</p> <p>In case needed, has the results framework been adapted after the annual results reporting exercises? If this has been the case, does the report clearly sets out why modifications were needed? And do the minutes of the steering committee confirms the decision for modification?</p> <p>Is the results framework reflecting the intervention strategy and is it able to measure the progress towards the results, as well as the results achievement on outcome level? And the achievement of the results at output level? Is there a need to change aspects of the results framework at this stage?</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNICEF has established a State level monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system linked to the national M&E system on Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Information System (WASHIMS) developed, regularly updated and ongoing discussion with Federal Government to hand over; • This is a central database system, data entered at the LGA by the M&E officer monitored by the M&E officer at state and maintained centrally at the Federal level by the database administrator; • The system has good quality data, disseminated by gender with qualified staff at the LGAs modern equipment such as computers and modem; and • The system gives information for decision in terms of accelerating activities, utilisation for donor reports and mid and annual review, providing evidence within advocacy meeting. This is good for intervention for analysing its progress towards the outcome and its likely contribution to the impact level at least annually.