



European  
Commission



# Evaluation of the EU's Cooperation with the Eastern Africa, Southern Africa and Indian Ocean region (2008-2015)

## Final Report

### Volume I – Main Report

September 2017

International  
Cooperation and  
Development

*Evaluation carried out on behalf of  
the European Commission*



*This report has been prepared by*



---

Consortium of  
ADE, PEM Consult and IRAM  
Consortium leader: ADE s.a  
Contact person: Edwin Clerckx  
Edwin.Clerckx@ade.eu

**Contract No COM 2015/Lot 1  
N° 2016/373852**

**This evaluation was commissioned by  
the Evaluation Unit of the  
Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development –  
(European Commission)**

*The opinions expressed in this document represent the authors' point of view,  
which are not necessarily shared by the European Commission  
or by the authorities of the concerned countries.*

**ADE SA**  
Rue de Clairvaux 40, Bte 101  
1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium)  
+32 10 45 45 10  
[ade@ade.eu](mailto:ade@ade.eu)  
[www.ade.eu](http://www.ade.eu)

*Evaluation team members having contributed to this report:*

*Dr. Eric Buhl-Nielsen (Team Leader)*

*Mrs. Victoria De Bauw*

*Mrs. Juana de Catheu*

*Mrs. Catherine Makokera*

*Mr. Kris B. Prasada Rao*

*Ms. Andrea Spear*

*Mr. Vincent Coppens*

*Mrs. Portia Poulsen (peer reviewer)*

*The evaluation is being managed by  
the DG DEVCO Evaluation Unit.*

*Cover pictures:*

*EU, Regional Integration*

*EU, Critical Maritime Routes Programme in the Indian Ocean*

*Eric Buhl-Nielsen, Mauritius, The harvest from six hours of fishing*

# Table of contents

---

## LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## RÉSUMÉ

<b>1. INTRODUCTION .....</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1 OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE .....	1
1.2 STRUCTURE OF THE DRAFT FINAL REPORT .....	1
<b>2. CONTEXT.....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>3. OUTLINE OF THE METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH.....</b>	<b>5</b>
3.1 OVERALL APPROACH AND PROCESS .....	5
<b>4. ANSWERS TO THE EVALUATION QUESTIONS.....</b>	<b>8</b>
EQ 1: STRATEGIC RELEVANCE .....	8
EQ 2 REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION .....	17
EQ 3 REGIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE: PROGRESS ON REGIONAL INTERCONNECTIVITY .....	30
EQ 4 REGIONAL PEACE, SECURITY AND STABILITY.....	36
EQ 5 REGIONAL NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT .....	44
EQ 6. COHERENCE, COMPLEMENTARITY AND COORDINATION .....	52
EQ 7 EFFICIENCY .....	66
EQ 8 REGIONAL INTEGRATION PROSPECTS .....	73
<b>5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .....</b>	<b>81</b>
5.1 CONCLUSIONS .....	81
5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS.....	94
5.3 SECTOR-SPECIFIC ACTIONS.....	97
<b>APPENDIX A: EVALUATION MATRIX .....</b>	<b>99</b>
<b>APPENDIX B BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT .....</b>	<b>123</b>
1. CHALLENGING CONTEXT .....	123
2. THE MANDATES AND PRIORITIES OF THE DMROS .....	124
3. EU PROGRAMMING IN EA-SA-IO REGION: 2008 TO PRESENT .....	126
4. FINANCIAL COMMITMENT BY DMRO MEMBER STATES.....	132
<b>APPENDIX C. CASE STUDIES .....</b>	<b>135</b>
CASE STUDY 1: RISM.....	135
CASE STUDY 2: TRANSPORT CORRIDOR APPROACH TO TRADE FACILITATION IN EAST AFRICA .....	142
CASE STUDY 3: THE EU'S REGIONAL ELECTORAL COOPERATION .....	145
CASE STUDY 4: JOINT REGIONAL FISHERIES MONITORING, CONTROL AND SURVEILLANCE .....	146

**LIST OF TABLES**

Table 1 – Instances of EU regional contribution to democracy.....	41
Table 2 – Instances of EU regional contribution to peace and security.....	42
Table 3 – Main EU financial instruments and Trust Funds that are likely to affect EASAIIO.....	53
Table 4 – Summary of coherence of EU regional cooperation at different levels.....	62
Table 5 – Growth in member state funding .....	133
Table 6 – Proportion of funding from DMRO Member States for core budget.....	133
Table 7 – Estimated proportion of funding for programmatic expenditures by DMRO Member States .....	134

**LIST OF FIGURES**

Figure 1 – Intervention Logic	6
Figure 2 – Evaluation tools	7
Figure 3 – Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean Regional Organisations	123
Figure 4 – Location Map of the Northern Corridor	144

**ANNEXES IN VOLUME II**

ANNEX 1: TERMS OF REFERENCE

ANNEX 2: INVENTORY

ANNEX 3: METHODOLOGY

ANNEX 4: ANSWERS TO THE EQS

ANNEX 5: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

ANNEX 6: SURVEY RESULTS

ANNEX 7: LIST OF PERSONS MET

ANNEX 8: BIBLIOGRAPHY

# List of acronyms and abbreviations

---

AfDB	African Development Bank
ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
APF	African Peace Facility
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
AU	African Union
AUC	African Union Community
AU-IBAR	African Union Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources
BMP	Biology Management Programme
CBC	COMESA Business Council
CEPGL	Communauté économique des Pays des Grands Lacs
CFTA	Continental Free Trade Area
CMISBM	Coastal, Marine and Island Specific Biodiversity management
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CSO	Civil society organisation
CVE	Common Vulnerability and Exposure
DBSA	Development Bank of Southern Africa
DEVCO	European Commission Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development
DFID	Department For International Development (UK's Development Agency)
DG	Directorate General
DMRO	Duly Mandated Regional Organisation
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EA	Eastern Africa
EABC	East Africa Business Council
EAC	East African Community
EAMR	External Assistance Management Report
EA-SA-IO	Eastern Africa Southern Africa Indian Ocean
EC	European Commission
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECDPM	European Centre for Development Policy Management
EDF	European Development Fund
EEAS	European External Action Service
EIDHR	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
EQ	Evaluation Question
ESA	Eastern and Southern Africa
EU	European Union
EUD	European Union Delegation
EUSR	EU Special Representatives
FTA	Free Trade Area or Free Trade Agreement

GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German agency for international cooperation)
HLG	High Level Group
HQ	Headquarters/head office
ICGLR	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
IcSP/IfS	The Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace
ICT	Information and Communication Technologies
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IO	Indian Ocean
IOC	Indian Ocean Commission
IOTC	Indian Ocean Tuna Commission
IRCC	Inter-Regional Coordinating Committee
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
JAES	Joint Africa-EU Strategy
JC	Judgement Criteria
LDC	Least Developed Countries
MASE	Regional Maritime Security Programme
MCS	Monitoring, control and surveillance
MIP	Multiannual Indicative Programme
MS	Member State
MSME	Micro and Small and Medium Enterprises
MTR	Midterm Review
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIP	National Indicative Programme
NRM	Natural Resources Management
NTB	Non-Tariff Barriers
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD/DAC	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development – Development Assistance Committee
PCD	Policy Coherence for Development
PIDA	Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa
PMR	Progress Monitoring Report
PPDF	Project Preparation Development Fund
PRSP	Plan Regional Surveillance des Pêches (also Poverty Reduction Strategic Plans - UN)
PSD	Public Sector Development
REC	Regional Economic Community
REIS	Regional Economic Integration Support programme (SADC)
RIIP	Regional Integration Implementation Plan
RIP	Regional Indicative Plan
RISDP	Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan
RISM	Regional Integration Support Mechanism
RISP	Regional Integration Strategy Paper
RO	Regional Organisation
ROM	Results-Oriented Monitoring
RPIHSSP	Regional Political Integration and Human Security Support Programme



RSP	Regional Strategy Paper
SA	Southern Africa
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADC/ICP	SADC International Cooperating Partners
SMEs	Small and medium-sized enterprises
SPS	Sanitary and phytosanitary
SWIO	South Western Indian Ocean
SWIOFC	South West Indian Ocean Fisheries Commission
TBT	Technical Barriers to Trade
TF	Trade Facilitation
TFTA	Tripartite Free Trade Area
TMEA	Trade Mark East Africa
TRF	Trade-Related Facility
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WCO	World Customs Organisation
WTO	World Trade Organisation
WWF	World Wide Fund



# Executive Summary

---

## Purpose, context and scope of the evaluation

This evaluation of the EU's cooperation with the Eastern Africa, Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean region (EA-SA-IO) aims to:

- Provide an overall and independent assessment of the past and current cooperation.
- Identify lessons learned and make recommendations to inform current and future cooperation strategy and delivery.

The context and scope of the evaluation includes EU support through the EDF 10 and 11 Regional Indicative Programmes (RIPs) during 2008-2015, taking into account the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), the cooperation framework and other official commitments. Geographically, the scope is the five EA-SA-IO Duly Mandated Regional Organisations (DMROs) (COMESA, EAC, IGAD, IOC, and SADC), and their 25 Member States eligible for EDF support. Total EU funding allocated through the RIPs exceeds € 2.6 billion.

## Methodology and challenges

The evaluation is based on the methodological guidelines developed by the European Commission's Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO), in particular the Evaluation Unit. It was conducted in four main phases during June 2016-July 2017: inception, desk, field and synthesis. The evaluation was managed by the Evaluation Unit, incorporating all relevant EU services in a Reference Group that oversaw the process. Eight evaluation questions were formulated in a structured process based on analysis of EU policy frameworks and reconstruction of the EU's intended intervention logic related to regional cooperation in EA-SA-IO. An inventory of EU support for regional cooperation was prepared and evaluation questions, judgement criteria and indicators were defined to guide data collection and analysis. Field visits were made to 10 countries including those hosting DMROs. The evaluation used a combination of tools and techniques for primary and secondary data collection, including an online survey of 27 EU delegations and a number of other stakeholders, analysis of regional and country strategy papers, literature review, meta-analysis of evaluations/audits, and interviews with stakeholders. The stakeholders consulted included beneficiaries and users of the interventions, implementing organisations, national partners, EU delegations, International Finance Institutions, the EC and civil society organisations.

The main challenges related firstly to the wide scope of intervention across 25 countries, five DMROs and three priority areas (regional economic integration, peace and security, natural resources management) and secondly to the fact that many of the EDF 11 interventions, which reflected the new strategy of cooperation following a mid-term review (2011) were not yet implemented.

## Conclusions

**EU support to the EA-SA-IO region has been carried out in a highly complex and challenging context that has been further complicated by the absence of an African-led rationalisation of the regional architecture. (Conclusion 1)** This dynamic context has placed great demands on both EUDs and DMROs, in terms of managing risk on the one hand, and

finding the right degree of flexibility to respond to change on the other. The absence of an African-led rationalisation of the regional architecture has made it difficult to anchor interventions in a stable longer-term vision.

**The underlying assumptions and political economy affecting the progress of regional integration and the likely effectiveness of external support were not fully examined or challenged (Conclusion 2).** A deeper political economy analysis was not available to challenge and test core assumptions and other factors influencing regional integration, e.g. 1) the linkage between DMRO goals and priorities and the member states' actual priorities and needs; 2) the gap between member states' rhetoric about ambitious regional integration and their actual commitment in practice; 3) the compliance and incentive environment at both DMRO and member state level; 4) the involvement of civil society and the private sector in advocacy, priority setting and programme design; 5) the balance of interests between weaker and stronger member states; and 6) historical and identity-based conflicts and divisions that cut across national and regional boundaries.

**EU regional support was aligned and relevant to the regional integration agenda, but partners' commitment and capacity were overestimated particularly in EDF 10 (Conclusion 3).** This led to overambitious allocations and timeframes, and contributed to EDF 10's underperformance. The ambitious plans of the DMROs and member states have not been matched by their capacity and commitment in practice. While EU support was implemented in good faith, carefully planned and undertaken in close consultation with partners, risks of harmful effects existed in terms of over-supporting DMROs, creating dependency, and overloading the regional agenda with project activities. These effects were recognised in the EDF 10 midterm review and addressed in the follow-up to that review, as well as in the new modalities of EDF 11. The revisions stopped short of introducing the radically new approach that might have been indicated if in-depth needs assessments, organisational and strategic analyses, and consultations had been performed, including at the Pan-African level.

**The EDF 11 adjustments and approach heeded lessons from the past and generally headed in the right direction; however, weaknesses have emerged that have implications for potential programme impact and sustainability (Conclusion 4).** The EDF 11 RIP recognised the need for a strong dual regional/national approach and for a stronger private sector role, and responded to the recommendations of earlier evaluations and the midterm reviews. However, in some areas there was a tendency to try to solve too many problems at once. In addition, the proliferation of EU instruments and programmes across the region has caused confusion. The sequence of completing most national programmes (NIPs) before the regional programme (RIPs) diluted the desired NIP/RIP interaction. The tightening of NIP focal areas shifted most trade and private sector development activities to the RIP – which has complicated regional/national coordination and in some cases worked against the application of subsidiarity, particularly in activities related to private sector development and sustainable capacity building.

**EU regional cooperation had clear value added, although its potential was far from fulfilled (Conclusion 5).** The EU regional cooperation in EA-SA-IO had clear value added compared to its other cooperation (global, country) and to other development partners, including EU member states. It provided more stable and sizeable funding and was less project-based overall. It brought to bear a range of modalities and management modes, on top of structured political and policy dialogue (within the framework of policy coherence for development and a comprehensive approach to development, peace and security). Moreover, the EU was in a good position to harmonise its interventions with EU member states, being guided by a common political agenda. The EU cooperation also supported through bring to bear the EU integration experience.

**Dialogue focused on disbursement rather than on strategic and operational matters (Conclusion 6).** Dialogue between the EU and the DMROs has mainly focused on the implementation of the EU cooperation programme – focusing more on management of EU assistance and increasing the level of disbursement than on strategic matters. Political dialogue tended to focus on establishing good relations rather than raising contentious issues. Strategically, this could well have been the right approach. But it meant that an opportunity was lost to discuss the assumptions and the persistent gaps in member state domestication of regional agreements. The combination of political and policy dialogue was not brought to a high-enough level to realise the diplomatic and political opportunities foreseen by the EEAS as a result of the scale of the programme.

**Important results were obtained in all priority areas, although progress towards reaching objectives and level of sustainability varies (Conclusion 7).** The results highlighted in this section were of a regional nature and contributed to overall EU objectives in the areas of regional economic integration, peace and security, and natural resource management. These examples and the detailed findings in the report underscore the potential of EU regional support to deliver results in areas where national and continental processes cannot. The combination of support to the three priority areas was well balanced in the EDF 10 and 11 RIPs. Important results achieved with a clear contribution from EU regional programmes included:

- Regional economic integration: trade - improvements and tangible results were observed in trade facilitation, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, technical regulations and regional standards, non-tariff barriers, competition policy, trade finance and macro-economic management including for example the support provide to the SADC Integrated Regional Electronic Settlement System (SIRESS, 2013), adopted by banks in nine countries.
- Regional economic integration: infrastructure - support was provided to both hard and soft infrastructure interventions, which ensured well-balanced interventions. For example, EU support to infrastructure development along transport corridors in East Africa contributed to improved trade facilitation in the EAC.
- Democracy, peace and security - EU regional cooperation contributed to enhancing capacity for credible elections, early warning and response, and peace support operations. For example, in IGAD, the adoption of a Protocol on Democracy, Governance, and Elections; Election Code of Conduct; and Guidelines for Election Observers; election observation missions in South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda and Djibouti
- Natural resources management - EU support contributed to improving NRM governance and management, especially in relation to fisheries, for example managing regionally important natural resources (e.g. by promoting joint patrolling of fisheries) within IOC.

**Member state compliance and domestication of regional agreements are a driving factor in achieving regional integration objectives, but progress has been disappointing (Conclusion 8).** Systems for monitoring and enforcing member state compliance in the EA-SA-IO region have not been effective, and overall progress has been weak. Issues influencing the pace of domestication include political leadership, the ‘demand’ for regional integration from the private sector, the clarity and simplicity of the obligations, and sectoral/interest group sensitivities, among others. It remains to be seen if EDF 11’s stronger focus on a dual-pronged regional/national approach will help to address this issue more comprehensively.

**The efficiency of the DMROs and the efficiency of EU support to regional integration were low (Conclusion 9).** Although results have been achieved, resources were not used as efficiently as they could have been. Generally, the funds allocated for infrastructure have been relatively efficiently used, taking advantage of the tried and tested procedures of blending. However, the resources have not been as efficiently used for other areas of regional economic integration, peace

and security and natural resource management. The key factors are: i) DMRO capacity to absorb and manage the funds; and ii) the internal rules and procedures of the EU, which the implementing agencies have not found easy to use. These factors were realised by all involved, and both budget support and contribution agreements have been used where relevant to increase efficiency, although they were not able to address the challenges for all situations. Contribution agreements (through COMESA and later also with SADC) have shown that they can have a potentially important and constructive effect, although not without challenges. This is because the DMROs' own systems were not necessarily agile or well implemented in practice, and national partners (countries ineligible for budget support) were obliged to use unfamiliar DMRO systems.

**There was policy coherence for development (PCD) across the EU and with the policies of EU member states and other development partners, but at the operational level synergies varied, with some instances of duplication (Conclusion 10).** In the absence of African efforts to rationalise the regional architecture and delineate the core functions for the DMROs, the EU had a tendency to contribute to too many regional organisations/initiatives with too many membership overlaps, doing too many things in isolation. For example, Burundi and Rwanda belong to COMESA, EAC, ECCAS, ICGLR and CEPGL, all supported by EU at some stage, and all these organisations/initiatives are active in peace and security. Nevertheless, the efforts and approaches of Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) have been broadly successful: no significant policy inconsistency was found in regional cooperation under EDF 10 and 11. However, on the operational front, synchronisation and synergies with other EU instruments and policies varied for both EDF 10 and EDF 11. Where analysis was done of the challenges facing regional integration it was often not widely shared (e.g. six separate assessments of IGAD's managerial and financial management capacities were carried out in 2016 by different actors).

**Despite years of institutional strengthening, DMRO sustainability remains fragile (Conclusion 11).** Despite much support for institutional strengthening, the DMROs' *raison d'être* and sustainability are still fragile. The challenge lies as much with member states and donors as with the DMROs themselves. The regional and continental context has moved on, yet DMRO institutional set-ups have not adapted adequately to changing times and expectations. Member state funding is not sufficient to ensure DMROs' sustainability in their present form. Institutional memory is thin, given the large turnover and preponderance of donor-funded project staff, even in some core functions. Stakeholders at all levels expressed the opinion that rationalisation was necessary, with more focus on DMRO functions that are in line with their core mandates of harmonising policies, implementing Council decisions, monitoring domestication by member states and providing secretariat support services.

**The attention given to crosscutting issues, including gender, was uneven (Conclusion 12).** Crosscutting issues were covered at the programming level and by some of the interventions (e.g. the support for cross border trade paid specific attention to improving the conditions for women traders). But the attention was not even. For peace and security, except for SADC, gender issues were not central in regionally funded project documents on democracy, peace and security; and they were not central in implementation and reporting either. This contrasts with EU actions outside of RIP-funded projects, and indeed outside of EDF projects, which often have an important gender dimension. Environmental sustainability was significantly mainstreamed into the support for infrastructure development. The evaluation team did not come across any significant negative environmental impacts emanating from the regional support to EA-SA-IO.

## Recommendations

The core recommendations are set out below. The proposed actions and responsible parties are further outlined in the main report.

**Recommendation #1 - Further develop regional partnerships beyond the DMROs in areas where such collaboration can potentially achieve regional goals more effectively.** In areas that go beyond the DMRO role of facilitating regional solutions and where the DMROs are not the natural partners, applying the subsidiarity principle and entrusting implementation to specialist regional organisations has shown to be effective (e.g. regional power pools, corridor authorities, AFRITAC).

**Recommendation #2 – Focus support to DMROs on core business and on reducing external dependency.** Support to activities beyond the DMROs' core role tends to dilute their *raison d'être* and sustainability. DMROs will be stronger when their programmes and donor support refocus on their core business i.e. promoting the right policy settings and offering the regional solutions and support to underpin them. Developing and publicising exit strategies for all programmes will focus attention and encourage action on sustainability issues.

**Recommendation #3 - Strengthen regional/national coherence making better use of current and new analysis in order to improve the impact of regional interventions.** Coherence can be improved by better defining the divisions between and regional and national programming, and addressing weaknesses in EUD-to-EUD communications and coordination mechanisms. This should be supported by analysis on political economy to help further focus on the areas of assistance that are likely to yield results.

**Recommendation #4 - Engage more actively with non-state actors in future phases of regional support.** Non-state actors, particularly the private sector, are important drivers for regional integration. The additionality of EU's contribution has been high when engaging with non-state actors.

**Recommendation #5 - Sharpen the political and policy dialogue.** The EU's overall strategic interest in regional integration is not sufficiently operationalised at the level of political or policy dialogue and can seem ambiguous to external parties.

**Recommendation #6 - Strengthen the reporting and results focus.** The focus in EDF 10 was on monitoring disbursements rather than results, and although the EDF 11 results framework is stronger than that of EDF 10, there is a risk that the practice may continue.

**Recommendation #7 - Support an African-led rationalisation of the regional architecture and DMROs' mandates.** Regional integration and the effectiveness of EU support for regional integration is hindered by overlapping DMRO memberships and concurrent initiatives related to the African Union, regional and continental trade and other agreements, and EPAs. There are opportunities to streamline the regional integration architecture and bring mandates closer to member state aspirations and level of commitment, but it is vital that this be an African-led initiative.

# Résumé

---

## Objectif, contexte et portée de l'évaluation

La présente évaluation de la coopération de l'UE avec l'Afrique orientale, l'Afrique australe et la région de l'Océan Indien (AO-AA-OI) vise à :

- fournir une évaluation globale et indépendante de la coopération passée et actuelle ;
- identifier les leçons apprises et formuler des recommandations pour éclairer la stratégie de coopération actuelle et future ainsi que sa mise en œuvre.

Le contexte et la portée de l'évaluation comprennent le soutien de l'UE par l'intermédiaire des programmes indicatifs régionaux (PIR) des 10<sup>e</sup> et 11<sup>e</sup> FED (Fonds Européen de Développement) au cours de la période 2008-2015, en tenant compte des accords de partenariat économique (APE), du cadre de coopération et des autres engagements officiels. Géographiquement, le champ d'application est celui des cinq organisations régionales dûment mandatées (ORDM) (COMESA, CAE, IGAD, COI et CDAA) et leurs 25 États membres éligibles au soutien du FED. Le financement communautaire total alloué par l'intermédiaire des PIR dépasse 2,6 milliards d'euros.

## Méthodologie et défis

L'évaluation est fondée sur les orientations méthodologiques élaborées par la Direction Générale pour la Coopération internationale et le développement (DG DEVCO) de la Commission européenne, en particulier par l'Unité évaluation. Elle s'est déroulée en quatre phases principales entre juin 2016 et juillet 2017 : lancement, étude documentaire, visites de terrain et synthèse. L'évaluation a été gérée par l'Unité évaluation, qui a intégré tous les services concernés de l'UE dans un groupe de référence chargé de superviser le processus. Huit questions d'évaluation ont été formulées dans le cadre d'un processus structuré fondé sur l'analyse des cadres politiques de l'UE et la reconstruction de la logique d'intervention de l'UE liée à la coopération régionale dans les régions AO-AA-OI. Un inventaire du soutien de l'UE à la coopération régionale a été établi et des questions d'évaluation, des critères de jugement et des indicateurs ont été définis pour guider la collecte et l'analyse des données. Des visites sur le terrain ont été effectuées dans 10 pays, y compris ceux qui accueillent les ORDM. L'évaluation a utilisé une combinaison d'outils et de techniques pour la collecte de données primaires et secondaires, y compris une enquête en ligne auprès de 27 délégations de l'UE et d'autres parties prenantes, une analyse des documents stratégiques régionaux et nationaux, une analyse documentaire, une méta-analyse des évaluations/audits et des entretiens avec les parties prenantes. Les parties prenantes consultées comprenaient les bénéficiaires et les acteurs des interventions, les organisations chargées de la mise en œuvre, les partenaires nationaux, les délégations de l'UE, les institutions financières internationales, la CE et les organisations de la société civile.

Les principaux défis concernaient, d'une part, le large champ d'intervention de 25 pays, cinq ORDM et trois domaines prioritaires (intégration économique régionale, paix et sécurité, gestion des ressources naturelles) et, d'autre part, le fait que bon nombre des interventions du 11<sup>e</sup> FED, qui reflétaient la nouvelle stratégie de coopération à la suite d'un examen à mi-parcours (2011), n'avaient pas encore été mises en œuvre.



## Conclusions

**Le soutien de l'UE à la région AO-AA-OI s'est déroulé dans un contexte extrêmement complexe et difficile, compliqué par l'absence d'une rationalisation de l'architecture régionale sous une égide africaine (Conclusion 1).** Ce contexte dynamique a imposé de grandes exigences aux délégations de l'Union Européenne (DUE) et aux ORDM, en termes de gestion des risques d'une part, et d'autre part pour trouver le degré de flexibilité nécessaire pour répondre au changement. L'absence d'une rationalisation de l'architecture régionale sous une égide africaine a rendu difficile l'ancrage des interventions dans une vision stable à long terme.

**Les hypothèses sous-jacentes et l'économie politique qui influent sur les progrès de l'intégration régionale et l'efficacité probable de l'aide extérieure n'ont pas été pleinement examinées ou remises en question (Conclusion 2).** On ne disposait pas d'une analyse approfondie de l'économie politique pour remettre en question et tester les hypothèses de base et d'autres facteurs influençant l'intégration régionale, p.ex. 1) le lien entre les objectifs et les priorités des ORDM, d'une part, et les priorités et les besoins réels des États membres, d'autre part 2) l'écart entre la rhétorique des États membres sur une intégration régionale ambitieuse et leur engagement concret dans la pratique ; 3) l'environnement de mise en conformité et d'incitation à la fois au niveau des ORDM et des États membres ; 4) l'implication de la société civile et du secteur privé dans le travail de plaidoyer, d'établissement des priorités et de conception des programmes ; 5) l'équilibre des intérêts entre États membres plus ou moins puissants ; 6) les conflits et divisions historiques et identitaires qui transcendent les frontières nationales et régionales.

**Le soutien régional de l'UE a été aligné et adapté à l'agenda de l'intégration régionale, mais l'engagement et les capacités des partenaires ont été surestimés, en particulier dans le 10<sup>e</sup> FED (Conclusion 3).** Cela a conduit à des allocations et des délais trop ambitieux, ce qui a contribué à la sous-performance du 10<sup>e</sup> FED. Les plans ambitieux des ORDM et des États membres n'ont pas été assortis à leurs capacités et leurs engagements dans la pratique. Bien que le soutien de l'UE ait été mis en œuvre de bonne foi, soigneusement planifié et entrepris en étroite consultation avec les partenaires, il y avait des risques d'effets néfastes en termes de soutien trop important aux ORDM, de dépendance et de surcharge de l'agenda régional en activités. Ces effets ont été reconnus dans l'évaluation à mi-parcours du 10<sup>e</sup> FED et pris en compte dans le suivi de cette évaluation, ainsi que dans les nouvelles modalités du 11<sup>e</sup> FED. Les révisions n'ont pas permis d'introduire l'approche radicalement nouvelle qui aurait pu être indiquée si des évaluations approfondies des besoins, des analyses organisationnelles et stratégiques et des consultations avaient été menées, y compris au niveau panafricain.

**Les ajustements et l'approche du 11<sup>e</sup> FED ont tenu compte des enseignements tirés du passé et, d'une manière générale, ont été orientés dans la bonne direction ; toutefois, des faiblesses ont été relevées. Celles-ci ont des implications sur l'impact et la durabilité des programmes potentiels (Conclusion 4).** Le PIR du 11<sup>e</sup> FED a reconnu la nécessité d'une approche duale régionale et nationale forte et d'un rôle renforcé du secteur privé. Il a également répondu aux recommandations des précédentes évaluations et des évaluations à mi-parcours. Cependant, dans certains domaines, la tendance a été d'essayer de résoudre trop de problèmes à la fois. En outre, la prolifération des instruments et des programmes de l'UE dans la région a semé la confusion. Le fait de conclure la programmation des programmes nationaux (PIN) avant le programme régional (PIR) a réduit l'interaction PIN/PIR souhaitée. La concentration des secteurs d'intervention prioritaires du PIN a déplacé la plupart des activités de développement du commerce et du secteur privé vers le PIR, ce qui a compliqué la coordination régionale et nationale et, dans certains cas, a empêché l'application du principe de subsidiarité, en particulier dans les activités liées au développement du secteur privé et au renforcement durable des capacités.

**La coopération régionale de l'UE a clairement apporté une valeur ajoutée, même si son potentiel est loin d'avoir été pleinement exploité (Conclusion 5).** La coopération régionale de l'UE dans la région AO-AA-OI a clairement apporté une valeur ajoutée par rapport à ses autres activités de coopération (mondiale, nationale) et à d'autres partenaires de développement, y compris les États membres. Elle a fourni un financement plus stable et plus important, et était globalement moins axée sur les projets. Elle a également fait appel à un éventail de modalités et de modes de gestion, en plus d'un dialogue politique et sur les politiques structuré dans une optique de cohérence des politiques pour le développement et d'une approche globale pour le développement, la paix et la sécurité. En outre, l'UE était en bonne position pour harmoniser ses interventions avec les États membres de l'UE, car elle était guidée par un agenda politique commun. Enfin, la coopération régionale de l'UE a apporté l'expérience de l'intégration européenne.

**Un dialogue axé sur le déboursement plutôt que sur les questions stratégiques et opérationnelles (Conclusion 6).** Le dialogue entre l'UE et les ORDM s'est principalement axé sur la mise en œuvre du programme de coopération de l'UE, en se concentrant davantage sur la gestion de l'aide de l'UE et sur l'augmentation du niveau des déboursements que sur les questions stratégiques. Le dialogue politique a eu tendance à privilégier l'établissement de bonnes relations plutôt que de soulever des questions litigieuses. Stratégiquement, cela aurait bien pu être la bonne approche. Mais cela signifie que l'occasion a été perdue de discuter des hypothèses et des lacunes persistantes dans la domestication des accords régionaux par les États membres. La combinaison du dialogue politique et du dialogue sur les politiques n'a pas été portée à un niveau suffisamment élevé pour concrétiser les opportunités diplomatiques et politiques prévues par le SEAE au vu de l'ampleur du programme.

**Des résultats importants ont été obtenus dans tous les domaines prioritaires, même si les progrès accomplis dans la réalisation des objectifs et le niveau de durabilité varient (Conclusion 7).** Les résultats mis en évidence dans cette section étaient de nature régionale et ont contribué à la réalisation des objectifs généraux de l'UE dans les domaines de l'intégration économique régionale, de la paix et de la sécurité et de la gestion des ressources naturelles. Ces exemples, ainsi que les constats détaillés du rapport soulignent le potentiel du soutien régional de l'UE pour obtenir des résultats dans des domaines où les processus nationaux et continentaux ne le peuvent pas. La combinaison d'un soutien aux trois domaines prioritaires a été bien équilibrée dans les PIR des 10<sup>e</sup> et 11<sup>e</sup> FED. Parmi les résultats importants obtenus grâce à une contribution des programmes régionaux de l'UE figurent notamment :

- Intégration économique régionale : commerce - des améliorations et des résultats tangibles ont été observés dans les domaines de la facilitation des échanges, des mesures sanitaires et phytosanitaires, des règlements techniques et des normes régionales, des barrières non tarifaires, des politiques de concurrence, du financement du commerce et de la gestion macroéconomique, y compris par exemple le soutien apporté au Système régional intégré de règlement électronique de la CDAA (SIRESS, 2013), adopté par les banques dans neuf pays.
- Intégration économique régionale : infrastructures - un soutien a été apporté aux interventions dans le domaine des infrastructures tant physiques que non physiques, ce qui a permis d'aboutir à des interventions bien conçues. Par exemple, le soutien de l'UE au développement des infrastructures le long des corridors de transport en Afrique de l'Est a contribué à améliorer la facilitation du commerce dans la CAE.

- Démocratie, paix et sécurité - La coopération régionale de l'UE a contribué à renforcer les capacités en matière d'élections crédibles, d'alerte rapide et de réaction, et d'opérations de soutien à la paix. Par exemple, dans l'IGAD, l'adoption d'un protocole sur la démocratie, la gouvernance et les élections ; le Code de conduite des élections ; les Directives à l'intention des observateurs électoraux ; les missions d'observation électorale au Sud-Soudan, au Soudan, en Ouganda et à Djibouti.
- Gestion des ressources naturelles - Le soutien de l'UE a contribué à améliorer la gouvernance et la gestion des ressources naturelles, en particulier en ce qui concerne la pêche, par exemple la gestion des ressources naturelles d'importance régionale (par exemple en encourageant les patrouilles conjointes des pêcheries) au sein de la COI.

**Le respect des accords régionaux par les États membres et l'adaptation de ces accords au niveau national sont un facteur déterminant dans la réalisation des objectifs d'intégration régionale, mais les progrès ont été décevants (Conclusion 8).** Les systèmes de supervision et de mise en conformité des États membres dans la région AO-AA-OI n'ont pas été efficaces et les progrès ont été globalement faibles. Les facteurs qui influent sur le rythme de domestication sont notamment le leadership politique, la « demande » d'intégration régionale de la part du secteur privé, la clarté et la simplicité des obligations et les sensibilités sectorielles/des groupes d'intérêt. Il reste à voir si l'accent plus fort mis par le 11<sup>e</sup> FED sur une approche régionale et nationale permettra de traiter cette problématique de manière plus globale.

**L'efficacité des ORDM et l'efficacité du soutien de l'UE à l'intégration régionale ont été faibles (Conclusion 9).** Bien que des résultats aient été obtenus, les ressources n'ont pas été utilisées avec autant d'efficacité qu'elles n'auraient pu l'être. D'une manière générale, les fonds alloués aux infrastructures ont été utilisés de manière relativement efficace, en tirant parti des procédures éprouvées de financement mixte. Toutefois, les ressources n'ont pas été utilisées avec autant d'efficacité dans d'autres domaines comme l'intégration économique régionale, la paix et la sécurité et la gestion des ressources naturelles. Les facteurs clés sont : i) la capacité des ORDM à absorber et gérer les fonds; et ii) les règles et procédures internes de l'UE, que les agences de mise en œuvre n'ont pas trouvées faciles à utiliser. Ces facteurs ont été pris en compte par toutes les parties concernées, et tant l'appui budgétaire que les accords de contribution ont été utilisés, le cas échéant, pour accroître l'efficacité, bien qu'ils n'aient pas toujours été en mesure de relever les défis. Les accords de contribution (par l'intermédiaire du COMESA et plus tard également avec la CDAA) ont montré qu'ils peuvent avoir un effet potentiellement important et constructif, bien que non sans difficultés. Cela s'explique par le fait que les systèmes propres aux ORDM n'étaient pas nécessairement agiles ou bien mis en œuvre dans la pratique et que les partenaires nationaux (pays non éligibles au soutien budgétaire) étaient obligés d'utiliser des systèmes ORDM avec lesquels ils étaient peu familiers.

**Il y a eu une cohérence des politiques pour le développement (CPD) dans toute l'UE et avec les politiques des États membres de l'UE et d'autres partenaires au développement, mais les synergies au niveau opérationnel ont varié, avec quelques exemples de doublons (Conclusion 10).** En l'absence d'efforts des contreparties africaines pour rationaliser l'architecture régionale et délimiter les fonctions essentielles des ORDM, l'UE a eu tendance à contribuer à un trop grand nombre d'organisations/initiatives régionales avec un trop grand nombre de chevauchements de membres, faisant trop de choses isolément. Par exemple, le Burundi et le Rwanda appartiennent au COMESA, à la CAE, à la CEEAC, à la CIRGL et au CEPGL, tous soutenus par l'UE à un moment donné, et toutes ces organisations/initiatives sont actives dans le domaine de la paix et de la sécurité. Néanmoins, les efforts et les approches de cohérence des politiques pour le développement (CPD) ont été globalement couronnés de succès : aucune incohérence significative n'a été constatée dans la coopération régionale au titre des 10<sup>e</sup> et 11<sup>e</sup> FED.

Toutefois, sur le plan opérationnel, la synchronisation et les synergies avec d'autres instruments et politiques de l'UE ont varié pour le 10<sup>e</sup> et le 11<sup>e</sup> FED. L'analyse des défis de l'intégration régionale, lorsqu'elle a été faite, n'a souvent pas été partagée (par exemple, six évaluations distinctes des capacités de gestion et de gestion financière de l'IGAD ont été réalisées en 2016 par différents acteurs).

**Malgré des années de renforcement institutionnel, la durabilité des ORDM reste fragile (Conclusion 11).** En dépit d'un soutien important au renforcement institutionnel, la raison d'être et la durabilité des ORDM sont encore fragiles. Le défi réside autant dans les Etats membres et les bailleurs de fonds que dans les ORDM elles-mêmes. Le contexte régional et continental a évolué, mais les structures institutionnelles des ORDM ne se sont pas suffisamment adaptées à l'évolution des temps et des attentes. Le financement des États membres n'est pas suffisant pour assurer la pérennité des ORDM sous leur forme actuelle. La mémoire institutionnelle est limitée, étant donné la forte rotation du personnel et la prépondérance d'équipes de projets financés par les donateurs, même dans certaines fonctions essentielles. Les parties prenantes à tous les niveaux ont exprimé l'opinion qu'une rationalisation était nécessaire, en mettant davantage l'accent sur les fonctions des ORDM qui sont conformes à leurs mandats fondamentaux d'harmonisation des politiques, de mise en œuvre des décisions des Conseils respectifs, de suivi de l'adaptation des accords par les États membres, et de fourniture de services administratifs d'appui.

**L'attention accordée aux questions transversales, y compris le genre, a été inégale (Conclusion 12).** Les questions transversales ont été abordées au niveau de la programmation et par certaines des interventions (par exemple, le soutien au commerce transfrontalier a accordé une attention particulière à l'amélioration des conditions des femmes commerçantes). Mais l'attention n'était pas égale. Pour ce qui est de la paix et de la sécurité, à l'exception de la CDAA, les questions d'égalité des sexes n'étaient pas au centre des documents de projet sur la démocratie, la paix et la sécurité financés par les régions. Ces questions n'étaient pas non plus centrales dans la mise en œuvre des projets et le suivi. Cela contraste avec les actions de l'UE en dehors des projets financés par le PIR, et même en dehors des projets du FED, qui ont souvent une dimension de genre importante. La viabilité environnementale a été largement intégrée dans le soutien au développement des infrastructures. L'équipe d'évaluation n'a relevé aucun impact environnemental négatif significatif découlant du soutien régional à l'AO-AA-OI.

## Recommandations

Les principales recommandations sont présentées ci-après. Les mesures proposées et les parties responsables sont décrites plus en détail dans le rapport principal.

**Recommandation n° 1 - Poursuivre l'établissement de partenariats régionaux au-delà des ORDM dans les domaines où une telle collaboration pourrait permettre d'atteindre plus efficacement les objectifs régionaux.** Dans les domaines qui vont au-delà du rôle des ORDM en tant que facilitateur de solutions régionales et où les ORDM ne sont pas des partenaires naturels, l'application du principe de subsidiarité et la mise en œuvre confiée à des organisations régionales spécialisées se sont révélées efficaces (par exemple, les groupements régionaux d'électricité, les autorités des corridors, AFRITAC).

**Recommandation n° 2 – Concentrer l'assistance aux ORDM sur l'activité de base et la réduction de la dépendance externe.** L'appui aux activités qui sortent du cadre du rôle central des ORDM tend à diluer leur raison d'être et leur viabilité. Les ORDM seront plus solides lorsque leurs programmes et l'appui des donateurs se recentreront sur leurs activités de base, c'est-à-dire la promotion de politiques appropriées et l'offre de solutions régionales et d'un soutien pour les étayer. L'élaboration et la publication de stratégies de sortie pour tous les programmes attireront l'attention et encourageront l'action sur les questions de durabilité.

**Recommandation n° 3 - Renforcer la cohérence régionale et nationale en tirant un meilleur parti des analyses actuelles et nouvelles afin d'améliorer l'impact des interventions régionales.** Il est possible d'améliorer la cohérence en définissant mieux les divisions entre la programmation régionale et nationale et en remédiant aux faiblesses des mécanismes de communication et de coordination entre les DUE dans ce domaine. Cela devrait s'appuyer sur une analyse de l'économie politique pour mieux cibler les domaines d'assistance susceptibles de produire des résultats.

**Recommandation n° 4 - S'engager plus activement avec les acteurs non étatiques dans les phases futures de l'appui régional.** Les acteurs non étatiques, en particulier le secteur privé, sont des moteurs importants de l'intégration régionale. L'additionnalité de la contribution de l'UE a été élevée lorsqu'il s'est agi de traiter avec des acteurs non étatiques.

**Recommandation n° 5 - Affiner le dialogue politique et sur les politiques.** L'intérêt stratégique global de l'UE pour l'intégration régionale n'est pas suffisamment concrétisé au niveau du dialogue politique ou sur les politiques et peut sembler ambigu aux parties extérieures.

**Recommandation n° 6 - Renforcer l'accent sur le rapportage et les résultats.** Le 10<sup>e</sup> FED mettait l'accent sur le suivi des déboursements plutôt que sur les résultats, et bien que le cadre de résultats du 11<sup>e</sup> FED soit plus solide que celui du 10<sup>e</sup> FED, il existe un risque que cette pratique se poursuive.

**Recommandation n° 7 - Soutenir une rationalisation de l'architecture régionale et des mandats des ORDM sous l'égide de l'Afrique.** L'intégration régionale et l'efficacité du soutien de l'UE à l'intégration régionale sont entravées par le chevauchement des adhésions aux ORDM et des initiatives simultanées liées à l'Union africaine, au commerce régional et continental et à d'autres accords, ainsi qu'aux APE. Il existe des possibilités de rationaliser l'architecture d'intégration régionale et de rapprocher les mandats des aspirations et du niveau d'engagement des États membres, mais il est essentiel que cette initiative soit dirigée par les Africains.

# 1. Introduction

---

The Evaluation Unit of the European Commission's Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO) has commissioned ADE/PEM to conduct an independent evaluation of the European Union's cooperation with the region of Eastern Africa, Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean (EA-SA-IO). The purpose of this Report is to present the answers to the evaluation questions (EQs) and also the evaluation's conclusions and recommendations.

## 1.1 Objectives and scope

As stated in the terms of reference the generic purpose of the Evaluation is:

- to provide an independent assessment of the past and current cooperation
- to identify lessons learned and make recommendations to inform current and future cooperation strategy and delivery.

The evaluation scope consists of the following dimensions:

- *Geographic and institutional scope:* the five Duly Mandated Regional Organisations (DMROs) of the Eastern Africa, Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean region (COMESA, EAC, IGAD, IOC, and SADC), and its 29 Members States
- *Temporal scope:* 2008-2015
- *Legal scope*

The overall engagement with the EA-SA-IO region is taken into account including the Economic Partnership Agreements, the cooperation framework and other official commitments. The scope includes the financing instruments Development Cooperation Instruments, EDF, IcSP, thematic programmes, investing in people, environment, sustainable management of natural resources, migration/asylum, non-state actors, local authorities, food security, etc.

## 1.2 Structure of the Draft Final Report

- Executive Summary
- Introduction summarising the objectives, scope and structure of the evaluation.
- Chapter 2 presents the **context** of the EA-SA-IO region supplemented by appendix B.
- Chapter 3 outlines the **general methodological approach** supplemented by annex 3 in volume 2.
- Chapter 4 presents the **answers to the Evaluations Questions**.
- Chapter 5 presents the general **conclusions and recommendations** of the evaluation.

Appendix A of Volume 1 provides the Evaluation Matrix which shows the findings, the sources of information and the quality of evidence. Appendix B provides additional information on the context and Appendix C presents detail on case studies. The report also contains a separate volume with the following annexes: Annex 1: Terms of Reference; Annex 2: Inventory; Annex 3: Methodology; Annex 4: Answers to the Evaluation Questions; Annex 5: Survey Questionnaire; Annex 6: Survey Results; Annex 7: List of People Met; Annex 8: Bibliography.



## 2. Context

---

This section, complemented by appendix B, provides background and context for the main findings and conclusions of the evaluation.

### **Challenging context**

The EU's regional cooperation in the EA-SA-IO region centres around five Duly-Mandated Regional Organisations (DMROs) with 29 member states (MS), of which 25 are ACP members with considerable membership overlaps across the DMROs. The broad developmental challenges faced by the EA-SA-IO region are similar to those faced by Africa as a whole. They include undiversified markets with low value addition, overdependence on raw material exports, low levels of effective trade and economic integration, inadequate infrastructure, regional food insecurity, conflicts and political instability. At different stages of democratisation and economic integration, parts of the region face significant peace, security and stability challenges. Trafficking and migration are increasing, and in many areas sustainable management of natural resources and climate change pose both risks and opportunities.

The respective countries and sub-regions differ significantly in terms of exposure to and management of these challenges. Each DMRO and its member states operate in a dynamic socio-economic environment, often with rapid transformation taking place in terms of political change, globalisation and the influence of new technologies. Keeping abreast of the evolving realities on the ground and reflecting these in programming, implementation and monitoring is as vital as it is challenging. In such a dynamic context, risk management becomes part of daily business, and assumptions must be subject to regular reality checks. The DMROs' respective mandates and priorities are summarised in Annex B.

### **EU programming in the EA-SA-IO region: 2008 to 2015**

EU regional support under EDF 10 and 11 has focused on three priority areas, broadly aligned with the DMROs' priorities: (1) regional economic integration; (2) peace, security and regional stability; and (3) regional natural resources management. This focus was tightened under EDF 11. A midterm review of EDF 10's RIPs found that among others the focal areas were too broad, and actions and priorities were not clearly defined. The main recommendations of the EDF 10 MTR focused on efficiency, effectiveness, reality checks, motivation and subsidiarity. In response, EDF 11 introduced a number of changes, including a more pragmatic configuration, with a single regional agreement covering both SADC and ESA-IO; direct access by REC MS for activities where the subsidiarity principle indicated that national action was more likely to be successful than regional action; and a performance reserve to allow funds to be directed to where they were being best used. A key element in EDF 11, arising from the EDF 10 MTR, was a stronger recognition that a dual-pronged approach is necessary to achieve strategic goals. This involves both support for regional solutions (e.g. regional trade agreements, regional standards, and regional interconnectivity) and support for national-level commitment and compliance. EDF 11 also placed stronger emphasis on private sector involvement; this is a laudable goal, but its advancement is encountering some challenges.

### **Financial commitment by DMRO member states**

There has been a steady growth in member state commitments to four of the five DMROs. Apart from EAC, the annual compound growth in commitments was between 4% and 9%. At a rate of 10% annual growth the commitment would double in less than eight years. EAC data from annual reports is only available at a two-year interval and shows just a minor increase in commitment.



There is no discernible trend in the ratio of internal (member state funding) to external (donor funding). Whereas the internal funding is on a steady and gradually increasing trend, external funding varies considerably from year to year. Most likely this is due to large (probably multi-year) donor funded projects. Over a number of years the proportion of funding from member states has been relatively high (at least from an “on-budgeting of the core budget” perspective) ranging from 95% to 49%, apart from IGAD, which is not surprising given its member states’ economies. For IOC, France (through Reunion) provides 40% of the member state contributions. However, the relatively high proportion of core budget funding by member states does not take account of two factors: i) the programmatic budget is overwhelming financed by donors at most DMROs, ii) the core budget may not be financing all the core functions, meaning that the programmatic or external funding (in-kind or direct) is in effect contributing to the core functions (e.g. if staff paid for by a donor programme are undertaking core functions or if programmatic funding is used for conferences and travel related to core functions).

## 3. Outline of the methodological approach

### 3.1 Overall approach and process

The methodology for this evaluation followed **DG DEVCO's methodological guidelines** for regional and other complex evaluations, which is itself based on the OECD-DAC approach. It also took account of good practices developed by ADE for strategic evaluations and notably for regional-level evaluations. The evaluation process followed a well-defined sequential approach from inception, to desk study, to field verification, to synthesis and with regular meetings with a reference group composed of relevant services from the DG DEVCO and the EEAS) to present and discuss progress and findings. A wide range of other stakeholders have been consulted during the exercise, including implementing partners and civil society organisations. Details on the methodological approach are provided in Annex C and in more detail in the dedicated Volume II.


#### Evaluation Questions (EQs)

Based on a theory of change and intervention-logic, eight evaluation questions as shown below were agreed at inception in discussion with the reference group:

<b>EQ1 Strategic relevance</b>	To what extent was the EA-SA-IO regional programme (EDF 10/11) - as a whole - well informed and strategic in its response to partner organisations'/ countries' needs and priorities and to the EU's own strategic priorities?
<b>EQ2 Regional Economic integration</b>	To what extent has EU regional-level support in Eastern and Southern Africa and IO since 2008 facilitated progress towards regional market development/ integration?
<b>EQ3 Regional infrastructure</b>	To what extent has regional-level EU support since 2008 contributed to improved regional trade-related infrastructure connectivity in Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean states?
<b>EQ4 Regional peace, security and stability</b>	To what extent has regional-level EU support contributed to improved democratic governance, peace and security, and better management of migration – thereby contributing to a stable and peaceful region?
<b>EQ5 Regional natural resources management</b>	Environmental governance – has regional-level EU support contributed to improved regional cooperation and harmonisation among Indian Ocean island states, and thereby led to more sustainable management of the region's biodiversity and fisheries?
<b>EQ6 Coordination, complementary and coherence.</b>	To what extent have EU interventions been complementary with those of member states, coordinated with those of the other development partners, and coherent both with other EU actions in the region and with EU policies beyond development cooperation?
<b>EQ7 Efficiency</b>	To what extent has the EU contributed to leveraging DMRO member states' funding and to improving DMROs' operational management?
<b>EQ8 Regional integration prospects</b>	To what extent has the EU support enabled the DMROs and their partners' member states at national level to better realise regional policy objectives?

These questions are mapped on the intervention-logic below:

**Figure 1 – Intervention Logic**




Source: ADE

2 Sector / priority area EQs

**Evaluation tools**

The team relied on a set of tools to collect and analyse data for the different levels of analysis. They are briefly listed in the figure below, with a visual indication of the breadth and depth of the scope each of them cover. The combination of these tools enabled the team to collect all the required information at the level of the indicators, and to triangulate the information from different sources with a view to validate (or invalidate) the judgment criteria.

Figure 2 – Evaluation tools



Of the total 41 programmes, the evaluation sample subjected 31 to desk study. Details on the interventions selected are provided in Volume II. The evaluation team visited 10 countries, including the five hosting DMROs (see figure 2).

### Challenges and limitations

The evaluation team faced a number of challenges and limitations, mainly related to: access to data; the width and diversity of the scope of the actions, which were very different in different DMROs; the short time span of implementation given the long-term ambitions of the programme; and significant change between EDF 10 and 11. As described in Annex C, the methodological approach aimed to mitigate these challenges as much as possible.

## 4. Answers to the Evaluation Questions

This section presents the main findings on the EU's cooperation with the EA-SA-IO Region and is organised by Evaluation Questions (EQs) and Judgement Criteria (JC). Further details on the evidence supporting key JCs are presented in Annex 4.

### EQ 1: Strategic Relevance

**To what extent was the EA-SA-IO regional programme (EDF 10/11) - as a whole - well informed and strategic in its response to partner organisations'/ countries' needs and priorities and to the EU's own strategic priorities?**

#### Answer to the Evaluation Question

##### Summary:

EDF formulation could have benefited from more rigorous strategic thinking and pragmatic bottom-up input, which in turn could have yielded useful reality checks and more realistic assumptions.

While EDF 10 and 11 were both well informed, the programmes could have been more strategic. Analysis in some critical areas (e.g. complex regional dynamics regarding EPAs and common markets; key regional integration drivers; DMRO capacity) tended to be superficial and thus may have missed crucial signals regarding realities on the ground. Important issues in terms of continental, regional and national priorities were mentioned but were not analysed in sufficient depth. Nor did the RSPs challenge the programmes' underlying assumptions, some of which have proved to be on weak foundations, therefore affecting overall effectiveness.

While EDF 10 and 11 reflected EU strategic interests, these may merit a review in the EA-SA-IO context, given the evolving EU membership, ACP relationships, Pan-African issues, and regional and global dynamics.

EDF 11 responds to issues raised in midterm reviews and other analyses with new approaches to address DMRO capacity, national ownership, coordination, coherence and subsidiarity. The approaches have the potential to deliver better regional integration results, but they will need to focus tightly on key integration and implementation matters.

**EDF 10 and 11 were both well informed, but analysis in some critical areas** (e.g. regional dynamics; key regional integration drivers; DMRO capacity) **tended to be superficial and thus may have missed important signals regarding realities on the ground.** In EDF 10, for example, the strategies were in principle well aligned with EU strategic priorities (as they were in EDF 11), but as EDF 10 progressed, the EU's priorities (e.g. comprehensive EPAs, support for common markets) gave way to 'best efforts' (e.g. goods-only EPAs, common markets on the back burner). As EQ 8 comments: "... multiple and overlapping membership of the DMROs, low levels of ownership by member countries, and a lack of strategic clarity in the objectives of the regional organisations... made it difficult for EU support to be fully effective (and) for the DMROs and members to benefit from the EU's unique experience and knowledge of regional integration processes (and challenges)." (JC 1.1)

**The strategies (RSPs and staff papers) mentioned all the important issues in terms of continental, regional and national priorities, but they did not appear to analyse them in sufficient depth.** For example, while the regional support aligned with documented DMRO plans and priorities, the papers did not contain rigorous analyses of DMRO capacity to absorb and implement (e.g., no recent in-depth organisational audits). In addition, the strategies could have tested more thoroughly the linkages between the stated DMRO priorities and the member states' actual priorities and needs. Indeed, the strategies did not appear to challenge the programmes' underlying assumptions, some of which - particularly in the case of EDF 10 - proved to be on weak

foundations and therefore affected overall effectiveness - e.g. regional and national desire for EPAs, national desire for customs unions, national commitment/capacity to implement regional deals, DMRO capacity to absorb funding and deliver programmes, DMRO and national capacity to deliver national uptake of regional policies and agreements, etc. (JC 1.1)

A major assumption is that “EPAs will drive national and regional harmonisation of trade and good governance policies”. It is useful to note here that the WTO Agreements form the basis of FTAs and EPAs and that most of the countries in the three regions are longstanding WTO members. In theory, therefore, much of the basic harmonisation sought in the main WTO Agreements should already be in place. In practice, however, WTO Trade Policy Reviews indicate that few members in the region are meeting their outstanding obligations (Zambia and Malawi, 2016; SACU 2015; EAC 2012). If implementation of globally accepted trade rules continues to lag, despite hefty donor support over more than a decade, then this may be an issue that goes beyond the capacity of the EPAs and EU regional programmes to drive change. That, plus the ongoing difficulties in monitoring and following up on ‘domestication’, indicate that the critical issue of ‘mainstreaming’ protocols, policies and good practices has not been taken up in a holistic way among donors, DMROs and REC member states. (JC 1.3, 2.1)

While EDF 10 and 11 reflected EU strategic interests, as commonly perceived, a number of interlocutors believed that these interests merit a ‘strategic rethink’, given the evolving EU membership, ACP relationships, Pan-African issues, and regional and global dynamics. (JC 1.1)

**Regional/national policy and programme coherence remains a challenge.** The challenges of attaining coherence between the EU’s EA-SA-IO regional and national support strategies and programmes are highlighted in evaluation and other reports dating back nearly a decade. Part of the problem relates to EU internal management, communications and coordination, including between and among Brussels Head Offices, EUDs responsible for RECs, and country EUDs.

**EDF 11 has responded to midterm reviews and the *Agenda for Change 2011*** in devising new approaches to longstanding issues linked to ownership, capacity to absorb, coherence and subsidiarity (e.g. regional envelopes, direct access, major focus on infrastructure, the aim to achieve greater coherence between regional and national programmes, etc). These have the potential to deliver better regional integration results than in the past, but they will need to focus more tightly on key integration and implementation matters. (JC 1.3)

**The EU’s comparative advantages in supporting regional cooperation are reflected in the strategies and recognised in the region:** stable and sizeable funding, a range of modalities and management modes, structured political and policy dialogue, and ability to harmonise interventions with EU member states. Field interviews indicated that the EU had not taken full advantage of the opportunity to share its experience and expertise on critical integration issues. (JC 1.3)

**JC 1.1 “The EU EA-SA-IO strategies/programmes were based on relevant, solid and credible evidence and assumptions regarding the regions’ needs and priorities.”**

**The needs assessments were relevant and the main underlying principles/assumptions were logical and well based. However, a number of the overarching assumptions were taken for granted when they should not have been.** For example, the EA-IO EDF 10 risk assessment, para. 173, states: “At the level of implementation, the main risk relates to the available capacities (in-country, at RO and EC service level) to absorb the resources made available through the regional programme, and to achieve the expected results in a timely fashion. This risk can be managed within the EDF 10 RSP/RIP itself, through significant efforts to develop managerial,

financial and technical capacities in the different ROs, allowing them to efficiently assume further implementation responsibilities, as well as by reinforcing the intra-regional coordination structures, in particular, by strengthening the institutional and technical capacities of the IRCC to play the extended role”. (Vol 2, Indicators 1.1.1, 1.1.4, 1.3.1)

### Box 1 – Analysis of Assumptions, EDF 10 and EDF 11

#### An Analysis of the Basic Assumptions

The action agendas relating to the strategic objectives and intervention priorities of both EDF 10 and 11 have been based largely on the following principles/rationale and assumptions:

1. Improved capacity and systems will lead to stronger institutional and trade performance.
2. Transparent, accessible laws, rules, practices, systems and data will reduce corruption and improve governance.
3. EPAs can be a tool to promote regional harmonisation of legal frameworks and good practices.
4. Well-connected regional infrastructure networks (transport, power, telecommunications, water, quality assurance facilities, etc) will facilitate market integration.

#### An Analysis of the Overarching Assumptions

1. Institutions will put the capacity building and knowledge acquired to good use.
2. Governments will honour regional and global commitments.
3. IRCC (EDF 9-10) was the right mechanism to promote horizontal (and in some cases vertical) harmonisation.
4. ACP members want EPAs and understand the benefits of globally accepted trade rules.
5. DMROs and national governments will ensure that regional infrastructure is maintained and kept up to date.

In this case, the risk was correct, but the assumption that the institutional strengthening support would lead automatically to the desired outcomes was not borne out. The DMROs’ and IRCC’s capacity to deliver was overestimated. A more critical analysis of Overarching Assumptions’ 1-3 would have revealed the weaknesses in the approach. EDF 11 has responded to a number of such issues (e.g. taking a more realistic approach to DMRO capacity and replacing the IRCC with a tighter coordination mechanism, the High-Level Group). But, as one interlocutor asked, “There were consultations on needs, but were there real needs assessment for institutional capacity building?” In short, there has not been enough work on the overarching assumption.

**EDF 10 (SADC/ESA-IO) reflected continental, regional and national regional integration strategies and priorities, but more as the lofty political aims they still were in 2007 rather than the complex implementation issues they represented.** EDF 10 pledged considerable support for advancing the regions’ customs union agendas, and for concluding comprehensive EPAs with SADC, EAC and ESA countries. EPAs, however, were already under considerable pressure in 2007. EDF 10 mentions briefly the problems, but expresses optimism that full comprehensive EPAs would be signed by SADC, EAC and ESA parties between end-2008 and mid-2009 (as per ministers and senior officials’ undertakings) and therefore ploughed ahead on the EPA agenda. Reality checks soon set in on both regional integration and EPA fronts. REC members’ enthusiasm for customs unions/common markets had dissipated and the EPAs that were finally signed off in 2012-2014 were far from comprehensive (in both substance and membership). DMROs, the main vehicle for EDF 10 programmes, were hard-pressed to absorb the funds. EDF 10 was reprogrammed, but more in a reactive and stop-gap fashion than in a strategic way, (e.g., recentralisation of funds; partial transfer of unspent monies to other programmes such as infrastructure; extension of some DMRO programme timeframes, e.g. RISM, RISP). (I-1.1.1, 1.1.2)

**EDF 11 aims for greater efficiency and focus** as per the *Agenda for Change* and the EDF 10 MTR, **but it too has fallen short of addressing implementation complexities.** The *Agenda for Change* called for a sharp focus on areas that could deliver real impact. EDF 11’s menu is indeed more

focused and easier to navigate. That said, comments from the field supported the team's findings that while EDF 11 provided greater focus in some areas, it was still not sharp enough in others: "EDF 10 was very broad. EDF 11 was to be much more focused, and it does focus very much on economic integration in our region. However, that too is broad and maybe even a bit too macro-oriented, given the stronger focus on countries and private sectors."

Another EUD officer queried, "The ESA-IO EDF 10 Midterm Review recommended reducing outlays; so why did they double under EDF 11?" This issue was echoed by the local manager of an EU programme at one of the DMROs: "Do we really need that amount of money? So much goes to ad hoc workshops, missions, etc. Activities are often invented to fit the money, especially the unspent money. Efficiency should not be about spending all the money, but rather about getting value for money. The real aim should be: the more results you get, the more money you are likely to attract." Indeed, subjecting DMROs to 'pay for performance' was suggested by more than one donor. With REC member states supplying just 20-40% of their DMROs' overall spending and donors 60-80%, questions arise about member states' commitment to regional integration/other core agendas, and whether the level of donor support was 'overkill', encouraging free-riding, complacency and inefficiency, as well as inadequate attention to core business. Another telling remark was: "For them, it is normal that we pay for everything. This raises accountability issues. If they did it with their own money, it would be a lot cheaper. They could actually achieve more with their own money. And they would be more accountable to their constituents."

Implementing the EDF 11 RIP has not been easy. Formulating projects several years after the RIP was written, while trying to focus on pressing priorities and manage expectations is a demanding task. For example, "The EAC wanted support for everything related to customs unions and common market protocols. The EU preferred to reinforce the Secretariat Directorates for specific issues (e.g. customs union protocols)". Another challenge has been to interpret what the authors of the RIP were thinking. "In the EDF 11 RIP, Brussels wanted to describe in detail what they wanted to do, imposing the projects and even the project titles, but leaving a big void and not much attention to value added or lessons learned." A case in point is regional value chains, where neither regional EUDs nor DMROs have the in-house competences to deal with the largely private sector issues that go beyond the DMRO role of facilitating the regional solutions related to a conducive enabling environment. Applying the subsidiarity principle by delegating implementation to specialist organisations can be a good solution if the issues are well defined in terms of their regional/national nexus, and if effective results-oriented monitoring mechanisms are in place. The EU Trade Facilitation Programme, p. 22, for example, specifies that COMESA will delegate the implementation of the SPS activities to the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation and the implementation of the TBT activities to the Danish Technological Institute. This approach implies greater EUD and DMRO management and supervision responsibilities than are considered in the RIP. (I-1.2.2, I-2.3.3)

**The RSPs/RIPs were inadequate in understanding regional dynamics and in targeting the areas that could produce visible progress (the drivers) and the areas that could impede the desired progress (the barriers).** The strategies touched on continental and regional strategies and priorities, but did not explain in depth how the EDF 10 and 11 programmes related to them in a practical sense (i.e. in terms of achieving mutual goals). Nor did the EDF analysis delve deeply enough into the national connections (including political will or national champions) or the interests and respective roles of the end users (mostly business). An in-depth scrutiny of key partners' ability and capacity to deliver sustainable change was also lacking. Thus the 'impact chain' analysis was unfinished. (I-1.1.1, JC 1.3)



**EDF 11 addresses lessons learned and recommendations of midterm reviews of EDF 10 and the *Agenda for Change*. It may not have benefitted from enough critical analysis of key issues such as ownership, capacity to absorb and deliver, and capacity building.** Neither the EDFs (10/11) nor the midterm reviews explored regional or national ‘ownership’ issues sufficiently. This critical success factor has been underplayed to the detriment of the programmes. Various documents state that the EDFs were preceded by exhaustive consultations, as per EDF programming guidelines, and that DMROs signed off on them. Documents from DMROs attest to their role in formulating RISP, RISM, TRF, REIS and other instruments for delivering the programmes under EDF 9 and 10. However, other sources point to ‘supply-driven’ programming (e.g. European Court of Auditors). Reports on EDF 10 show that DMROs later took forward certain areas more in line with their (sometimes not well defined) priorities, leaving others on the back burner, including some EU priorities. COMESA’s shift of RISP funds for EPA to cluster projects (which later failed) is a case in point.

*Ownership:* The DMROs were consulted on the formulation of both the EDF 10 and 11 RIPs and signed off on them at the end of the process. DMROs were expected to consult their member states through their internal mechanisms and reflect MS views in the feedback to the EU. ECDPM’s 2015 *Analysis of EDF 11 Programming* stated: “In many countries, initial programming proposals based on in-country consultations were superseded by HQ choices. Although EDF 11 is closely aligned with national development plans, there is evidence that a top-down approach to programming has led to a significant erosion of key aid and development effectiveness principles, in particular country ownership.” While this quote refers to national rather than regional programmes, the top-down approach also occurred at the EDF 11 RIP design stage. (I-1.1.2, 1.1.3, I-1.3.3 for this whole section)

Feedback on ownership in the field interviews was mixed, as programming was still underway and DMRO staff were in a state of flux. COMESA directors said they were satisfied about ownership of both EDF 10 and 11. While not deeply involved in the formulation of EDF 11, they had participated actively in prioritising activities for inclusion in the programming. The COMESA Secretary-General was less satisfied, given that COMESA’s regional funding role was reduced considerably under EDF 11, a process that started under EDF 10 following the MTR.

At the EAC, customs and infrastructure staff said they had been consulted on EDF 11 programming, but major staff turnover has impeded EUD-EAC Secretariat interaction, as has the ‘tyranny of distance’ (EAC is in Arusha, while the EUD is in Dar-Es-Salaam).

EUD ownership of the RIP and its programmes is just as important as partner/beneficiary ownership, given the shared accountability for use of EU taxpayers’ funds. Under EDF 11, it is even more important that both country and regional EUDs are involved, because both will have implementation responsibilities. A number of related issues emerged in field interviews. According to one EUD Head of Cooperation, “We were consulted on EDF 11, and some of our views were taken on board. It was a serious exercise. Generally, however, EUD ownership of the RIP is not high. This is partly because heavy workloads keep people from participating in formulation. In addition, we don’t have staff with a regional mandate, so when we receive a request for input or comments, it is seen as an additional task, and sometimes it is not clear who should respond.” Others raised the need for clearly designated regional focal points in each EUD and annual sectoral meetings for the national and regional technical staff. “We need to inculcate the understanding that ‘regional’ is not ‘additional’.”

Information flows and communications were another area signalled for improvement, not only for regional-to-national EUD linkages, but for all EUDs and Brussels. A number of national EUD

officers said they did not know what was happening with regional programming, even though the country offices were to have a role in implementation. “For example, EUD Tanzania is hosting a soft infrastructure programming conference in Dar es Salaam this week; we don’t understand what it is all about. And the conference is only for EUD staff at DMRO posts.” Some Heads of Cooperation noted that there was insufficient formalisation of coordination and communications among EUDs, including information channels. Examples of successful communication (e.g. from the EUD regional team in Gaborone to other SADC country EUDs) were largely ad hoc and due to the actions of individual officers. “If this is formalised, then the resources will be dedicated and accountability will be established.”

*DMRO Capacity: Capacity to absorb and ability to manage major change* remain big challenges at the DMROs. Neither COMESA nor EAC appeared to have sufficiently qualified core staff on board to deal with the priorities listed under EDF 11. For those projects that were to be managed internally (versus delegated to third parties), the DMROs were counting on contracting short-term experts as in the past. While short-term experts are important for certain projects, they cannot replace the need for a core base of sustainable in-house expertise on key issues. For example, in COMESA the monitoring and evaluation expertise was largely in the form of project staff (e.g. some projects had an officer in charge of M&E; they left when the projects finished). The official M&E Unit was an absentee person with no contract. The Agriculture and Industry Division, with a large set of mandates, had few if any competent non-project staff (several COMESA Member State officials mentioned this). In EAC, fully half of the professional staff was to turn over during 2016-2018, as they reached the 10-year service limit. In SADC, the work on political cooperation remains at the heart of the DMRO agenda, but under EDF 10 it was implemented with a large team (approximately 17 technical advisors). SADC’s restructuring of its Secretariat could impact on EDF 11 focus areas such as industrialisation. (I-2.1.4)

### Box 2 – Developing a Core Skills Base at COMESA

#### Absorbing Project Staff at COMESA

The EU sought to address the core skills issue in part by requiring COMESA to absorb a certain number of project staff in key areas. Under EDF 10, RISPs 2 and 3 were financing internal audit, information technology (IT), finance and other staff, with the understanding that many of these would eventually be absorbed into the regular budget. Seven officers were absorbed in 2014 when RISP 2 ended. Other positions were given bridging contracts. In 2017 COMESA is seeing if it can absorb these as well - mostly 15 public relations, human resources, IT and finance professional support staff - some from RISP 2, some from RISP 3. However, it has budget constraints. RISP also funded 2 statisticians and one administrative assistant during 2005-2015. One is now on regular budget. The others are paid by AfDB.

Source: COMESA interviews, reports

#### JC 1.2 The regional strategies/programmes were aligned with European Union’s interests, policies and strategies.

**EDF 10 and 11 RSPs/RIPs highlighted alignment with EU interests, policies and strategies, but they would have benefited from rigorous analysis on how to advance the EU’s strategic interests.** In an interview, an EU member reflected: “We have ‘assumed’ since the 90s that we are the key donor partner for regional integration in Africa. We haven’t really studied in depth the best way, processes or methods to *advance our strategic interests* most effectively, bilaterally, regionally or continentally.” A senior EUD officer agreed. “The overall aim of peace and stability is definitely a strategic interest, particularly given recent political and economic problems stemming from instability. However, the traditional basis for the EDFs: the Cotonou Agreement and ACP linkages, are no longer as relevant as in the past. Perhaps EU strategic interests in the EA-SA-IO region should undergo a rethink.” (I-1.2.2)

With Africa on its doorstep, the EU has a clear interest in seeing a stable continent providing growth and jobs, reducing conflict, and enhancing trading and investment opportunities. Among others, EU strategic interests include EU investor interests. The continental-regional-national (and EPA) links relating to key investor interests could have been addressed more efficiently, including through better coordination with donors and international organisations. (I-1.2.1)

**Given that the Cotonou Partnership is the cornerstone of the EDFs, it is not clear if its ongoing reviews and evolution are sparking new thinking on engagement with the EA-SA-IO region.** For example, it does not appear that the EU and its EPA partners in Africa have considered the lessons learned from the Caribbean EPA evaluation and five-year review - especially on managing expectations, delivering common regional positions and implementing a comprehensive EPA (which is what the EU would like its Africa EPAs to be). (I-1.3.2)

Some interlocutors suggested it might be worthwhile to assess if a comprehensive EU agreement with an eventual comprehensive Tripartite FTA would be easier and more efficient than trying to turn the existing three EPAs into comprehensive agreements. There are pros and cons for both approaches, and much will depend on the current EPA parties' willingness to go onto the next stage of negotiations, which would cover issues that are crucial for trade and business development (services, investment, competition policy, transparency, etc). EQ 2 considers these issues in more depth. (I-1.2.1, 2.1.1.)

**Crosscutting issues are covered specifically in the RSPs and RIPs, and follow *Agenda for Change* principles in EDF 11.** However, it is not clear to what extent guidelines have been implemented in practice or how effective the monitoring mechanisms are. Regarding EDF 10, RISP 2 supported the formulation of COMESA's Gender Mainstreaming Policy and its Action Plan until 2014. RISM has supported national implementation of FEMCOM. COMESA reported that interaction on gender issues with the EUD in Lusaka under EDF 10 was smooth, especially with the gender-mainstreaming officer at the EUD who worked directly with the COMESA Secretariat. For EDF 11, the COMESA gender unit was consulted on planning, including regarding the programme on women crossborder traders (EQ 2). In IGAD and EAC, gender officers suggested that the EU might further emphasise gender-sensitive programme design, implementation and monitoring in its regional support. SADC has a well-developed gender protocol, although the latest amendments set back some aspects with the removal of time bound targets, and the EU has provided support for NGOs tracking progress in implementation (e.g., Gender Protocol Barometer). (I-1.2.3)

**JC 1.3 Efforts and resources have been targeted at where they are needed the most and could have the greatest impact in terms of achieving the desired results: greater regional integration and cooperation, and stronger regional structures.**

This JC responds in particular to the *Agenda for Change* 2011, which calls on the EU to focus its efforts where it can have the greatest impact. The overarching objective of the EU strategy is a "stable, peaceful, prosperous EA-SA-IO Region". Programmes accordingly aim for the following long-term impacts: professional, well-run, member-supported regional integration bodies; stronger, deeper regional integration contributing to sustainable economic and trade development and 'decent' job creation; diversified economies; a competitive private sector; and progressive poverty alleviation.

An analysis of the driving factors influencing achievement of these long-term impacts (box below) shows that the basic assumptions (the ones underlying the EDFs) do not adequately deal with political will or with international and regional pressure, advocacy and support. (I-1.3.1)

### Box 3 – Impact Drivers

#### Drivers of Long-Term Desired Impacts

- Political will (OA\* 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) (*ie, not covered in EDF basic assumptions*)
- Rule of law (BA\*2, OA2)
- Good governance (BA2, OA2)
- Predictable, rule-based market access in a critical mass of member countries giving regional integration visible priority (BA2, OA1, 2)
- Regional interconnectivity (BA1, 2, 4, OA1, 2, 3, 4, 5)
- Well-coordinated international and regional pressure, advocacy and support (*ie, not covered in EDF BA*)
- Access to resources (finance, skills, partners, technology, services) (BA 1, OA1; BA2, OA2; BA4, OA4)

\*BA=Basic Assumption; OA= Overarching Assumption. See JC 1.1 for more information.

**Achieving stronger regional-national policy and programme coherence remains a challenge.** All the evaluations and reviews - and EDF RSPs/RIPs - since 2008 have struggled with this and the related impact issues. The ESA EDF 9 evaluation recommended: continued use of the IRCC to improve regional harmonisation and convergence, strengthening the DMROs, greater use of Contribution Agreements, facilitating infrastructure project preparation and investment, and enhancing donor coordination. The EDF 10 midterm reviews, as summarised in the EDF 11 RIP, highlighted poor targeting and prioritising of focal areas (especially for ESA-IO); too much assistance directed at DMRO Secretariats, given their limited capacity; and overly complicated implementation modalities. The European Court of Auditors' 2010 report called on the Commission to improve the coherence between its regional strategy and national strategies by 'mainstreaming' regional integration in all its support activities at national level and by seeking more systematic complementarity between its support activities at the two levels. The 2008 ESA-IO evaluation also called for this, as well as for greater coherence with African Union strategies.

A first response was to strengthen the IRCC. That proved untenable, with poor accountability and little to show in terms of regional cooperation/coordination impact after years of support.

EDF 11, three years in the making, sought to create a critical mass of support, simplify the cooperation approach and enhance impact through:

- A single regional agreement with a High-Level Group mechanism to coordinate across the DMROs, but otherwise relying on DMROs and their member state mechanisms for coordination and programming within the respective regions.
- Provision of (the long-requested) subregional envelopes, as well as cross-regional envelopes and an envelope for financing infrastructure under blending, with a performance reserve to direct funds to where they were being put to best use.
- Direct access by DMRO member states for activities where the subsidiarity principle indicated that national actions were more likely to be successful than regional ones.

EDF 11, in effect, responded more forcefully than its predecessors to several evaluations' recommendations that a dual-pronged approach was required for greater impact. Such an approach involves both regional solutions, e.g. regional trade agreements, regional standards, regional interconnectivity, and national-level commitment and compliance. The WTO Trade Policy Review of EAC in 2013 also concluded that regional integration and trade development would not happen unless a parallel track was pursued more actively.

“EDF 11 does allow us to focus more on some of the real constraints such as non-tariff barriers, trade facilitation, border issues, etc,” said a EUD regional programming officer. “These have both regional and national connotations, and will require closer coordination than in the past.” Indeed,

given the considerable donor activities in trade facilitation, value chains and resilience, coordination at national and regional, and even global, levels leaves a lot to be desired.

Coherence and efficiency go hand in hand. “Some EU regional initiatives do not add up to a coherent whole, lacking synergies with the national level. Or they do not consider efficiencies such as transaction time and cost of channelling funds from the EU to the DMROs, to countries. Sometimes it would be more efficient and effective to have a larger national envelope.” This view was expressed by a number of EUDs, national governments and implementers. A number suggested that the RIP-NIP programming cycle needed to be better aligned, so that the NIPs can align with the RIP regional priorities. All agreed that the drawn-out EDF programming process needed to be tightened in the interest of efficiency and coherence. (I-1.2.2)

**Ensuring measurable improvements in national compliance is challenging when reliable baselines and monitoring systems are weak.** National transposition of regional policies and commitments is an important aim of the EU strategy and a crucial pillar of regional integration. A number of documents from the Court of Auditors and EUDs - including in 2016 - referred to the need to improve national and regional statistics and data collection to facilitate monitoring of, for example, the transposition of regional-to-national commitments in a range of areas. The response to the 2010 Auditors report said the IRCC was meant to do this and had been tasked to prepare a state of play on national transposition, but had not done so because the ROs decided to do this themselves, and hadn’t progressed due to the ‘sensitivity of the issue’. The response mentioned an internal note by EU Heads of Delegation (16 Jan. 2012) regarding the ESA/IO MTR, which stated *inter alia* “The weakness of the monitoring and evaluation instruments (despite the funds available to reinforce them) do not allow us to have a clear view of the situation”. This vital issue has been on the table for some time. (I-1.1.1, 1.3.1, 1.3.2, 1.3.3)

EU and other (e.g. World Bank, GIZ) funding has supported development of M&E capacities in DMROs but, as explained in JC 1.1, these tend to be fragmented (e.g. project-based) and unsustainable. In COMESA, for example, the M&E Unit exists on paper only; the officer reportedly assigned has no contract. To date, the organisation has depended primarily on project M&E staff (including an EU-RISP officer and the RISM unit). Both COMESA and EUD officers emphasised the urgent need for a proper M&E function in order to monitor policy domestication and support strategic planning and other key areas. The EUD said the EDF 11 €7m allocation for COMESA capacity-building had a M&E component. COMESA officials said they wanted M&E to be member-funded, but that member states wanted to put it off until 2018.

#### Box 4 – RISP 3 Support for Domestication

##### RISP 3 contributes to COMESA transposition monitoring pilot in 2016-17

The COMESA Legal Division, with RISP 3 funding, has commenced a pilot for systematic, evidence-based monitoring of transposition of COMESA protocols, decisions and agreements. The Division conducted an internal review in 2016 to document the legal instruments and their relevance (many documents had disappeared in the 2011 fire). It then devised a methodology for a pilot compliance verification initiative in four countries in 2016 (Malawi, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Swaziland). In addition to determining compliance status (a good baseline for future monitoring), the exercise led to a recommendation to develop ‘how-to’ guidelines to help member states pursue domestication. The audits are continuing in 2017, though some member states have resisted participation.

Source: Interview, COMESA, January 2017

**The EU has a strong comparative advantage, but its potential remains unfulfilled.** The EU regional integration model, along with the lessons it has learned, and is learning, can be valuable for other regions pursuing a similar path. Africa has longstanding aspirations towards a unified continental market, through the building blocks of the RECs. The AU and the RECs generally welcome the EU’s support, as an ally with a similar vision.

As mentioned in the introduction to this EQ, the EU's comparative advantages in regional cooperation are well documented in the strategies and recognised in the EA-SA-IO region: more stable and sizeable funding, a range of modalities and management modes, structured political and policy dialogue, and a good position to harmonise its interventions with that of EU member states. The 2008 Evaluation of the ESA-IO strategy (p. 62) noted: "The EU has a strong comparative advantage at regional level that builds on its regional know-how, on the importance of its regional programme envelopes..., and on its strong institutional mandate on trade issues. Nevertheless, because of organisational and staffing impediments, not all the potential for EU value added is fulfilled". (I-1.3.2)

Analyses of EDF 10 and 11 did not reveal how far the EU has applied its own experience in securing national adoption of EU policies and commitments, or to what extent it has engaged member states to assist in such an endeavour ('domestication' being a longstanding EDF priority). Field interviews documented some successes in applying EU expertise and highlighted strong demand for mentoring and other support on the 'how to's' of regional integration, especially in areas relating to Member State compliance with regional directives. (I-1.3.2, I-1.3.3)

### Box 5 – Marshalling EU Experience and Expertise

#### Examples and Ideas for Sharing EU Experience and Expertise

A number of interlocutors shared examples and suggestions on how the EU could contribute at the practical level:

- "EU Eurostat had experts fly in four years ago - very helpful to demystify statistics issues and to show how to deal with Balance of Payments and National Account issues. Quick response. Eurostat paid. Helped advance EAC negotiations on monetary union."
- The Tanzania EUD EAMR 2015 stated: "At regional level, support from DG DEVCO may be needed to help the EUD in its effort to develop a more results-oriented approach in the cooperation programmes with EAC. In the economic integration sector, DG DEVCO could facilitate the involvement of other EC DGs (for example, trade) in order to be able to share our European experience and expertise, to the benefit of the integration of the EAC region."
- AFRITAC East advised that it had been applying EU expertise and lessons learned as much as possible in its support to the EAC and its member states on harmonising financial sector regulation and supervision and other areas related to monetary convergence.
- GIZ is funding in 2017 a study-visit to Europe for Central Bank Governors (or possibly only senior officials, for political reasons) to learn about the EU transition to monetary union and the role of national Central Banks in the process.
- The EAC Secretariat would like the EUD to invite EU technical experts to share the EU's experience and lessons learned on Value-Added Tax and other tax issues, as well as on the transition to monetary union.
- COMESA Legal Division would like the EU to facilitate mentoring and experience sharing with EU competition authorities and agencies overseeing Member State compliance with EU directives.

Source: Field interviews; EAMR 2015

## EQ 2 Regional Economic Integration

**To what extent has EU regional-level support in Eastern and Southern Africa and IO since 2008 facilitated progress towards regional market development/integration?**

### Answer to the Evaluation Question

#### Summary:

Overall, the EDF 10 and 11 priorities are relevant to regional market development and EU regional support is facilitating progress towards regional market development and integration to a reasonable extent in key areas. For example, EU support for sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS)- and technical regulation/standards (TBT)-related rules, good practices, institutions and quality

infrastructure is crucial for trade development and regional market integration. This combined with EU support for enhancing transport infrastructure and improving crossborder trade efficiency is enhancing the potential for higher, more diversified regional trade flows in the longer run.

Nonetheless, a pillar of the regional integration process: national uptake and enforcement of regional policies and rules, remains relatively weak and uncharted. EU support has improved DMRO capacity in terms of financial and governance systems, and the RISM and RISP programmes have helped to promote a stronger focus on transposition of regional protocols, decisions and other agreements. Mechanisms introduced under EDF 10 to promote national compliance have helped focus attention on this issue at both Secretariat and national level. However, a number of persistent problems have affected the ability to deliver results; these include unpolitical will, vested interests, DMRO and member state capacity, members' trust in DMROs and in each other, weak monitoring and enforcement systems, and inadequate donor coordination at the regional level. EDF 11 has the potential to address these issues more forcefully, if - among other things - it can make DMROs more capable and respected service providers in the eyes of their constituents and create stronger regional-national linkages. EPAs may also offer an opportunity to address key harmonisation and implementation issues, many of which are embedded in global trade commitments and in broader TFTA/CFTA/common market visions. This is possibly an area where EU and its Member States can make a difference if they work closely together, given mutual economic interests.

Services sector development is a major factor in trade growth and diversification; it has long been an EDF priority, but like EU regional support for statistics development, EU regional support for services trade development under EDF 10 was not clearly documented. EDF 11 programming to date indicates that COMESA may benefit from stronger support for services trade activities.

EU regional support since 2008 has had a strong focus on improving the regional business and trading environment and this support has benefitted micro and small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) - although the large number of donors makes attribution difficult. EU support for value chains could benefit from better targeting, better coordination among donors, and more well considered 'placement' institutionally. Business competitiveness could also benefit from new strategic partnerships by donors, including with regional business networks which have the potential to become more active advocates on competitiveness and other business issues.

**EU regional support is facilitating progress towards regional market development and integration to a reasonable extent in key areas.** Crucial areas for market development include trade facilitation, sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS), technical regulations and regional standards (TBT), nontariff barriers (NTBs), services trade, statistics and competition policy. (The other major area, infrastructure, is covered in EQ 3.) When EU national support in these and SME-related areas is added to the equation, the potential contribution to the region's market development becomes palpable.

Due to fairly long-term donor support at both the regional and national levels, a foundation is being developed in the areas of SPS, TBT, NTBs, trade facilitation and competition policy. Experience indicates that this type of work needs to continue systematically, with a strong focus on adequate quality infrastructure and effective enforcement of compliance at both the regional and national level, which is still a big challenge. This more traditional trade agenda is now being

complemented by support for regional activities in the areas of finance and investment under EDF 10, as well as industrial development under EDF 11, particularly in SADC and the EAC.

Interviews suggested that more attention is needed in the areas of statistics, services sector and services trade development, and SME export readiness (e.g. ability to meet quality, volume, pricing and other requirements). While there are regional elements to all of these (see ‘regional solutions’ below), most of this type of work is national. Therefore, coherence in regional and national programming, and donor coordination, is important.

EDF 11 has responded to numerous evaluations’ recommendations for stronger attention to regional/national coherence. For regional integration, such an approach requires closer links between the two pillars of regional solutions and national compliance.

#### **Regional Trade Solutions:**

- Regional trade agreements and the resulting regionally agreed policy/regulatory regimes
- Regional standards
- Regional accreditation, testing and conformity assessment facilities (e.g. regional reference laboratories)
- Mutual recognition agreements
- Regional connectivity (road, rail, aviation; energy; information and communications technology; finance)
- Regional monitoring mechanisms, including reliable statistics systems
- Oversight, enforcement and convening mechanisms (e.g. professional Secretariat and/or other institutions).

**National uptake and enforcement of regional policies and rules remain relatively weak and uncharted.** Converting regional solutions into national development tools requires systematic encouragement and enforcement. This, in turn, requires robust monitoring systems, including reliable data that are accepted by the member states as useful tools for tracking regional development. The DMROs have been struggling with this for years, and to date no ‘one-size-fits-all’ system has emerged. The EU’s €111m Regional Integration Support Mechanism (RISM) for ESA-IO countries has resulted in stronger national attention to implementation of regional agreements, but with all the competing priorities, this must be constantly reinforced. See RISM Case Study in Annex C. (JC 1.1, JC 1.3, JC 2.1, I-2.1.2, 2.1.4).

**The priorities listed in EDF 10 and 11 have been relevant to regional market development, but the EU’s private sector development aims under EDF 11 are not totally clear.** EDF 10’s regional integration programmes focused heavily on institutional strengthening, mainly of DMROs; development and vertical harmonisation of regional policy and regulatory frameworks; trade and transport facilitation; and negotiation and implementation of trade arrangements (e.g. EPAs, Customs Unions, TFTA). Considerable work was done despite the capacity, readiness and other problems described in EQ 1. EDF 11 continues to focus on these issues (Box 6 below), while adding new approaches in several areas in an effort to overcome or bypass the lingering problems. These approaches, evident in initial programming [e.g. COMESA’s ‘trade facilitation’ package (Box 10, 11) and SADC’s business environment and industrialisation programmes (Box 14)], are to include more DMRO delegation of regional activities to third parties, more direct access by REC member states to regional funding, and greater engagement with the private sector. (JC 1.1, JC 2.1, I.2.1.4)

#### **Box 6 – EDF 11 Regional Integration-Related Priorities by DMRO**

##### **Cross-regional and overall priorities:**

- Implementation of the EU-East and Southern Africa (ESA) interim EPA.
- Enhance institutional capacity of DMROs.
- Deliver at national level trade-related assistance and support to private sector.
- Improved connectivity and efficiency and resilience of regional infrastructure networks (blending facility)



- Improve the strategic and regulatory framework of regional infrastructure networks.
- COMESA:**
- Reduced cost of crossborder trade through removal of internal barriers in line with Tripartite Agreement.
  - Increased private sector participation in regional and global value chains, through improved investment/business climate and enhanced competitiveness and productive/innovation capacity.
  - Enhanced capacity of the COMESA Secretariat and member states, including the private sector, to deepen regional integration.
- EAC:**
- Foster the implementation of the EAC Common Market as well as monitoring the Customs Union and Common Market Protocols.
  - Develop EAC industries and private sector, and facilitate trade.
- IGAD:**
- Reduce barriers to free movement of persons in the IGAD region.
- IOC:**
- Competitiveness and business facilitation.
- SADC:**
- Consolidation of the SADC FTA and implementation of the SADC-EU EPA.
  - Support for industrialisation and the productive sectors.
  - Support to intra-SADC investment and FDI through improving the business and investment environment.
- Source: 11th EDF Regional Indicative Programmes; Discussion Paper No. 192 [www.ecdpm.org/dp192](http://www.ecdpm.org/dp192)

*...but the EU's private sector development aims under EDF 11 are not totally clear.*

Under EDF 11, private sector development work moved from NIPs to the RIP, with more focus on clusters and regional value chains in specific sectors. Box 6 above underlines private sector-related priorities for all the DMROs, and industry-related ones for the Tripartite DMROs (COMESA, EAC, SADC). Since programming is still ongoing, the evaluators were not able to ascertain how the new private sector focus might work in practice, though the Action Documents for COMESA and SADC described below shed some light. The Crossborder Traders Programme, for example, offered more specific engagement in line with the EU Commission Communication (2014) 263: *A Stronger Role of the Private Sector in Achieving Inclusive and Sustainable Growth in Developing Countries*. (JC 2.2, 2.3, I-2.1.4, I-2.2.2, 1.2.3.2)

### **Box 7 – Evolution of Private Sector Development Support in RIPs and NIPs**

A strong and engaged private sector is one of the key drivers of successful regional economic integration. In the context of the EA-SA-IO region, this needs to be understood in terms of the nature of the private sector itself. For example, there are significant levels of informal business activity, and the vast majority of formal firms are small enterprises. In some countries, only a handful of firms are involved in exporting goods and services. Private sector organisations such as chambers of commerce exist in all the countries in the region, but they tend to be constrained by a lack of funding, limited capacity to engage on policy issues and, in some instances, no platforms for regular interaction with government.

A review of selected NIPs in the EA-SA-IO region under EDF 10 and 11 (2008 to present) shows that interventions related to private sector development (PSD) have been included in different ways in different countries. In Ethiopia, for example, PSD has been a crosscutting issue in both EDF 10 and 11. In Zambia, EDF 10 supported a PSD strategy with resources linked to EPA implementation, and EDF 11 referred to facilitating public-private partnerships in the energy sector. Nonetheless, PSD has not been a singular priority in any of the NIPs considered. It is often part of other areas such as development of agriculture exporters or improvement of infrastructure. Under EDF 11, PSD was largely transferred from national to regional programmes.

PSD has also been pursued at the ACP level with a number of flagship programmes such as Bizclim, Proinvest and Centre for the Development of Enterprise (CDE). The 2013 Evaluation of EU Support to Private Sector Development found little coordination among bilateral, regional and ACP programmes for PSD (Executive Summary, p.III). A detailed examination of these is outside of the scope of this evaluation, but it is telling that the ACP programmes were not mentioned in interviews, except in Botswana. Business Botswana has received support

from CDE, and this had an indirect impact on the ability of the organisation to participate in regional activities, including in its role as the Secretariat for the SADC Private Sector Forum.

PSD requires a strong understanding by designers and implementers of the specific requirements and operations of firms and industries. The further one moves from the grassroots level, the more difficult this is to achieve and the more inefficiencies emerge in the support mechanisms. Therefore, there are limitations to the nature of regional interventions for PSD beyond those that seek to improve the overall business climate for all operators. The RIPs seem to defy this logic with their more micro-level emphasis on value chains and industrialisation.

Sources: NIPs and Country Strategy Papers for Botswana, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Rwanda, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe; EDF 10 and 11 RSPs and RIPs; PSD Evaluation, and CDE website. (I-2.1.4, 1.2.3.2)

Action documents were not available for the COMESA industry-related priorities under Regional Integration, Specific Objective 2, in the three DMRO subchapters of the RIP. Given past experience, it will be interesting to see how Objective 2 for COMESA is designed: *Increased private sector participation in regional and global value chains, through improved investment/business climate and enhanced competitiveness and productive/innovation capacity* (€10m). The RIP lists four types of support, three of which focus on the business climate and competitiveness. The other is: *Support to develop more SME clusters and business linkages...in more economic sectors and in more countries... (in the context of the COMESA Cluster Initiative and in close coordination with national initiatives)*. Such support ran into problems under RISP 3 and was terminated due to poor management. Evaluators encountered no signs that the management capacity in that area had improved. This was borne out by comments from member states: “We are trying to make the SME sector export-ready, but the unit in COMESA is not perceived in our country as competent. It does not have the right staff; they rotate; they are seconded by government and not by merit; they are not good at programme management.” As highlighted in EQ 1, several member states and donors thought DMROs should stick to policy work and regional solutions, and not get involved in projects. (I-2.2.3, JC 1.2.1.4)

Moreover, given the principle of subsidiarity underpinning EDF 11, questions arise over the competence of a DMRO to manage clusters and value chain activities.

**JC 2.1 “EU regional support has improved the capacity of the DMROs to drive horizontal and vertical harmonisation, of legal and institutional frameworks/mechanisms necessary to achieve regional and global trade-related integration goals.”**

Driving regional economic integration is no easy task, as the EU knows from long experience. Developing the right institutional framework to achieve this task is a big challenge. The three main DMROs (COMESA, EAC and SADC) are relatively young organisations, with all the teething problems that come with trying to pull together such a diverse set of regions and subregions. (EQ 1, JC 1.1)

**DMRO capacity to manage regional integration and drive domestication has improved, thanks in large part to the EU and a few other donors.** EU support, for example, has contributed to stronger DMRO financial and governance systems. Its EDF 9 and 10 Regional Integration Support Mechanism (RISM) and Regional Integration Support Programme (RISP) in ESA-IO, and the Regional Economic Integration Support (REIS) and Trade-Related Facility (TRF) in SADC have facilitated trade negotiations and promoted a stronger focus on transposition of regional protocols, decisions, etc. EDF 11 continues this focus in its institutional support priorities for COMESA (RIP p.30), EAC (p. 43) and SADC (p. 69). (I-2.1.4, RISM Case Study in Annex C.)

Annex 4 contains detailed information on the main trade negotiations in the region: Economic Partnership Agreements with the EU (EPAs), the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) and the

Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA). EDF 10 and 11, along with other EU facilities, have provided support for these negotiations, at DMRO and African Union level, and nationally. In all cases - CFTA, TFTA and EPAs - the plan is eventually to have comprehensive agreements on services, investment, intellectual property, competition policy and government procurement. This would be consistent with WTO agreements (the globally agreed rules-based legal framework and enforcement system which is the basis of all modern trade agreements). The rules and commitments in these areas play an important role in creating a conducive environment for trade and business development. However, even goods-only agreements can be challenging to implement, especially if the governments have not fully carried out their WTO obligations. And regional integration cannot be built on goods agreements alone. If domestication of goods agreements at the national level is so challenging, then implementing more comprehensive agreements will be even more so. (I-2.1.1, I.2.1.2)

### Box 8 – Trade Negotiations Capacity - COMESA, EAC and SADC

#### COMESA's Trade Negotiations Capacity

Without project staff, COMESA's core capacity to manage trade negotiations remains very limited. The EU has made a reasonable contribution over the years, funding much of the Division's work. In 2008-12, the Division had three customs officers, three nontariff barrier (NTB) officers, and others funded mainly by the EU under RISP. "In 2012, the EU decided not to pay salaries anymore. This hit COMESA hard." Now they have three regular-budget officers: director, customs and one more, plus administrative staff, and a trade officer paid by the Commonwealth Secretariat (he deals with EPA issues since 2016 when the previous EPA officer left). ACBF funds three trade policy researchers under a three-year contract that may be renewed soon; they have ended up doing research for the whole Secretariat. The Division also had some outside funding, in addition to EU RISP, for customs work (e.g. AfDB). EDF 10 did not have a budget line for the TFTA; rather, the EU-supported IRCC funded the main TFTA coordinating officer. The IRCC funding, which had been extended due to unspent funds, terminated in early 2017 and the officer left. It was not clear at the time of the mission how the COMESA Trade Division would cover the gap. They were waiting for EDF 11 to kick in, as "this time it has allowed some flexibility". Indeed, the new Trade Facilitation programme specifically mentions 'trade negotiations'.

Source: COMESA interviews, January 2017

#### EAC Trade Negotiations Capacity

Primarily other donors have supported trade negotiations: DfID, Trade Mark East Africa (funded by several donors, including EU MS), GIZ, AfDB. The EAC said that the EU had supported negotiations through RISP funding for meeting rooms, equipment, translators, interpreters, travel, etc. The EU has supported other trade-related areas more directly (trade facilitation, infrastructure and value chains). According to donors, things are improving, but the EAC has a long way to go to become capable of managing trade-related issues in a competent fashion. Both donors and EAC staff hope the institutional review, if it is implemented, will streamline the EAC bureaucracy, improve the quality of staff and fortify systems. "Much of the work at the EAC Secretariat is done by consultants, experts from member states and donor-funded advisers. Often these find themselves having to do core Secretariat work as well."

Source: EAC, donor interviews, February 2017

#### SADC Trade Negotiations Capacity

At the time of this evaluation the SADC Secretariat was experiencing significant staff turnover, including in the Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment Directorate (TIFI) responsible for trade negotiations. TIFI is expected to be reorganised, with a new division created to deal with industrial policy - separate from the trade team. This might well affect SADC's ongoing capacity in relation to trade negotiations.

Source: SADC interviews, February 2017

**Regional and national harmonisation of trade commitments remains a big challenge, due to weak political will, inadequate monitoring/enforcement systems, and overlapping memberships.** A number of persistent problems remain, including political will, vested interests, DMRO and MS capacity, MS trust in DMROs and in each other, and weak monitoring and enforcement systems. These can be dealt with - to a degree - with effective leadership and champions; competition and fair trade policies, and enforcement mechanisms; dispute settlement mechanisms; transparency requirements; reliable data; monitoring mechanisms (e.g., peer review, name and shame, etc); and 'teeth' to get action. Sometimes member states may implement

regionally agreed policies and rules on paper but not in practice, because they don't know how, or they don't have the resources, or they simply lack the motivation. (Many governments often do not consider trade to be a pressing priority.) The EU and other donors have been helping DMROs and member states to address these issues in recent years, but progress in some areas (e.g. statistics, competition, dispute settlement) has been negated to some extent by lack of progress in others (e.g. respected leadership; and monitoring and enforcement). Overlapping REC memberships make the whole exercise more complex, as most members belong to at least two RECs and have to domesticate at least two sets of rules. Regional harmonisation under the TFTA was meant to resolve some of these overlapping membership issues, but so far member states indicate this is not happening. (I-2.1.2, I-2.1.3)

#### **RISM and TRF**

During EDF 9 and 10, the €111m EU RISM programme was tailored along 'pay for performance' lines to encourage ESA-IO member states to transpose regional policies, protocols, decisions, etc. It is channelled through a Contribution Agreement with COMESA, and all 16 eligible member states have prepared Regional Integration Implementation Plans and set targets based on indicators aligned with key objectives of the COMESA Midterm Strategy. Country EUDs participate in the national coordination bodies established to plan, oversee and report on use of the funds. The Lusaka EUD is involved in reviewing plans and reports and approving disbursements. The RISP has provided related support. Similarly, the EU TRF at SADC, set up under EDF 10 in 2016, helps member states implement their commitments under the SADC Protocol on Trade and the SADC-EU EPA. EUDs review the applications. COMESA has been invited to participate in decision-making to coordinate with RISM.

#### *Monitoring progress*

A big challenge is to be able to track consistently member states' compliance with regional trade commitments. At the Tripartite level there is a monitoring mechanism for non-tariff barriers. SADC is establishing a Trade Monitoring and Compliance Mechanism for tracking the implementation of the Free Trade Area, with a specific mechanism for identifying and eliminating non-tariff barriers (with GIZ help). It also has a macroeconomic peer review system and a set of indicators linked to the Finance and Investment Protocol. COMESA has a system for monitoring tariffs, rules of origin and non-tariff measures and is implementing an online reporting and compliance facility. The COMESA Legal Division is also developing, since 2016, with the support of RISP 3 (EDF 10), a pilot system to document, track and verify member state compliance with COMESA protocols, decisions, etc. As mentioned earlier, this is a promising evidence-based trial that could close a number of data gaps and facilitate forward monitoring.

EAC has a fairly comprehensive system to monitor more comprehensive agreements - the EAC Common Market Scorecard (CMS) developed by Trademark East Africa under the Investment Climate Programme, a 2012-2017 World Bank/IFC project. The 2016 edition gave some good examples illustrating the need for tighter regional/national linkages. Among other nontariff barriers, the CMS pointed to sanitary/phytosanitary and technical measures, as well as border issues and services barriers that had already been identified for elimination in 2014, noting that some were unresolved because they required a regional solution. (EACMS 2016, pg 7, 15). It also highlighted numerous data deficiencies, including statistics and other information on trade in services and services' vital contribution to regional integration. Such data needs are common throughout the EA-SA-IO region. (I.2.2.4, I-2.2.5)

The Tanzania EUD has held discussions with the EAC Secretariat on support to improve monitoring of implementation for the EDF 11 €10m customs union protocols domestication project. "This is a subject we care about, given our own experience in the EU. The Secretariat has the power to coordinate, but it can't oblige member states to implement. Greater transparency on MS compliance status would give the Secretariat power to show who is performing and who isn't. The EAC Scorecard is a good tool, but it needs to define baselines and look at more areas. What the EAC needs is greater internal monitoring capacity overall. The East Africa Monitoring System

platform for dialogue is more or less working. Governments have to report on how they are following up Council Decisions. But it doesn't go down to the level of what is happening *de facto* - due in part to lack of private sector involvement." (I-2.1.4)

### JC 2.2 "EU support has made a measurable contribution to growth and diversification of regional flows of goods and services since 2008."

**EU support is enhancing the potential for higher, more diversified regional trade flows in a variety of ways.** EU regional support for compliance with regional and global trade commitments (tariffs, SPS, TBT, etc), better transport infrastructure, and greater border efficiency enhances competitiveness and thus contributes to export growth and diversification. As noted earlier, EDF 11 places a strong emphasis on facilitation of trade in the broad sense; this covers all the above areas and more. EU regional support for the enabling environment for regional value chains will also contribute to diversification of trade in the longer term.

#### Box 9 – Regional Integration in the EA-SA-IO Region

**The first African Regional Integration Index (ARI)** was released in 2016, charting performance of the eight RECs on Five Dimensions of Regional Integration: trade, regional infrastructure, production integration, free movement of people, and financial/macro-economic integration. This index establishes a good baseline and highlights weaknesses for attention. The main findings for the EA-SA-IO region were as follows:

- EAC is the top performing REC on regional integration overall, with higher than average scores across all dimensions except financial and macro-economic integration.
- SADC has higher than average scores for regional infrastructure, free movement of people, and financial and macro-economic integration. It scores lower on trade and productive integration.
- COMESA scores higher than average for trade and production integration, but lower on regional infrastructure, free movement of people, and financial and macro-economic integration.
- IGAD scores higher than average on regional infrastructure and productive integration, and lower on the rest.

Source: ARII, UNECA, 2016

Exports to the EU from EAC, ESA and SADC grew 30-40% during 2008-2015, maintaining generally the same mix in recent years (EAC: vegetables 60%, manufactures 10%; ESA: agriculture 44%, manufactures 28%; SADC minerals 40%, manufactures 30%). In the longer term, it will be interesting to see if the EPAs have any impact on higher value-added exports. As an EU official said, the EPAs basically consolidated the 'applied' status quo (like many trade agreements), so the immediate effects may not be notable. However, if the EU helps local companies meet EU SPS and technical requirements, value-added exports should grow. (I-2.2.1)

According to analyses, the EU's contribution to progress in trade facilitation could boost both growth and trade diversification. A 2016 WTO report on trade facilitation in Africa found that implementing the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement reforms could see sub-Saharan Africa's trade rise 22%, and reducing inland transit times by just one day could raise exports 7-10%. Moreover, a 2009 modelling study indicated that trade facilitation was key to increasing Africa's trade in manufactured goods (i.e. diversifying and adding value to output). It was particularly important for development of value chains. (I-2.2.3, Iwanow and Kirkpatrick, 2009)

**The time and cost of border clearance procedures are declining, thanks in part to EU support.** In interviews, both COMESA and the EAC Secretariats strongly lauded EU support for progress in border efficiency. The EU has been involved, along with other donors, in a variety of customs and trade facilitation projects that have contributed to improved border efficiency and better conditions for women border traders. For example, the WTO, WCO, UNCTAD, World

Bank and other organisations have been assisting Africa with trade facilitation, (customs, border efficiency, transit, administrative procedures, data exchange) for many years. The EU has funded a number of these projects, directly and indirectly (e.g. through the above institutions) regionally and nationally. Examples include the Automated System for Customs Data (ASYCUDA), one-stop border posts, border infrastructure, ICT connectivity, etc. EDF 11 reinforces such support (boxes below). (I-2.2.2, I-2.2.3)

### Box 10 – EDF 11: Trade Facilitation and Crossborder Traders Focus for COMESA

The EU recently unveiled two important EDF 11 Action Documents for COMESA: a €53m Trade Facilitation (TF) programme; and a €15m Small-Scale Crossborder Traders programme. Both are for five years ((2017-2021).

The **‘Trade Facilitation’ programme** comprises five complementary priority areas:

1. Monitoring and resolution of non-tariff barriers, €1,8m
2. Implementation of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement, €1,8m
3. Coordinated Border Management and trade and transport facilitation along selected corridors and border posts, €35m (some activities to be delegated to COMESA member states)
4. Implementation of harmonised, science-based SPS measures and technical standards (TBT), €5m (to be delegated to FAO and Danish Technical Institute, respectively)
5. Trade in Services, free movement of persons, trade negotiations and trade promotion, €4,2m

This showcases the right priorities within a broad definition of ‘trade facilitation’ (i.e. facilitating trade-related actions). Component 5, however, appears a bit too broad and possibly unwieldy - a place to put things that didn’t fit in the first four clearly defined areas, as well as activities to be run by other parts of COMESA under the Trade Division’s leadership (e.g. migration).

The **Crossborder Traders programme** also identifies five key results areas, focused specifically on small border traders, especially women:

1. Implementation of specific trade facilitation rules and instruments at selected border areas, to reduce the time and cost of crossing borders for small-scale traders (€1,7m)
2. Reduction of corruption, bribery and harassment (incl. gender-based violence) at selected border areas (€1,2m)
3. Support to Cross-Border Traders Associations (and similar business associations) to defend the interests of traders and deliver good-quality support services (€1,5m)
4. Data collection, management, dissemination and research on Informal Cross-Border Trade, to increase evidence-based trade policy-making processes at national and regional level (€1,3m)
5. Building/upgrading of border infrastructure at selected crossings (€7,7m).

A number of donors, NGOs and business associations have tackled these issues over the years, but big gaps still remain - not only as concerns women border traders, but also the whole issue of informal trade, which makes up a sizeable - undocumented - chunk of Africa’s crossborder trade. **Given the preponderance of women among small-scale border traders, one could say this is the gender mainstreaming side of the TF programme.**

The documents are well argued. The TF logframe has a welcome set of measurable baselines and targets. The Crossborder Traders logframe leaves all of that for the inception phase. Lessons learned from previous experience are in the risk tables and the texts. However, the TF stated assumptions are still a bit of a wish list (e.g. “strong political will of COMESA member states” to domesticate...). The Crossborder Traders assumptions are optimistic, but more conditioned. Interestingly, both programmes include activities for Tanzania even though it belongs to EAC, not COMESA. This is sensible since the other four EAC members belong to COMESA.

The programmes propose stronger EUD involvement, monitoring, capacity building, oversight, delegation and donor coordination to overcome longstanding problems. If better managed than in the past, these ‘performance drivers’ could make a difference. COMESA is to have mainly a coordinating and facilitating role in many areas. REC member states and country EUDs are to have an important role in implementing, but this may be news to some of them, although these two proposals have been around for some time. Field interviews earlier in the year revealed that many country EUD staff, MS Network of Analysis and even DMRO divisional staff were unaware of progress in regional programming. The programmes also seem to imply a hefty management burden for the Lusaka EUD.

Source: CRIS #RSO/FED/039-042, RSO/2017/039-043

### Box 11 – EU Support to EAC on Trade Facilitation

The EAC Secretariat said in an interview that it now had a separate financing arrangement with the EU for transport and transit facilitation. Much of EAC's work in this area has had both hard and soft components; it has been supported directly by TMEA, World Bank, African Development Bank, Japan, Germany and China. The EU has contributed primarily through the RISP and Partnership Fund to a variety of activities related to implementing the Customs Union (e.g. coordination of border management; cargo tracking; customs interfacing; customs interconnectivity; train-the-trainers; technical working groups on developing systems, intelligence cooperation, business process flows; monitoring; etc).

Regarding the 'hard' component (physical infrastructure), the EU has been involved in corridor and one-stop border post initiatives in the EAC region under EDF 10, and is supporting directly and indirectly a number of activities leading to improved border cooperation. EAC said that these and other activities have led to a more cohesive operational environment at borders, but that trust remained a challenge.

Numerous interlocutors agreed that cooperation among authorities at the border was very important for building the trust and confidence so necessary for effective regional integration and smooth trade flows. They concurred that enforcement shortcomings were a big hindrance.

Source: EAC, TMEA Interviews, February 2017

**EU support for the implementation of sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) and technical regulation/standards (TBT) rules, good practices, institutions and quality infrastructure is crucial for trade development and regional market integration.** Donors in the EA-SA-IO region have carried out considerable SPS and TBT work. The EU has been active on both levels, though attribution is sometimes difficult. The EU and its member states are the main donors to the WTO Standards and Trade Development Facility which supports COMESA and regional SPS work. The EU is a longstanding major supporter of the Nairobi-based regional African Union Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources (AU-IBAR) through the EDF, the Intra-ACP fund and other modalities. This organisation has contributed considerably to improving livestock trade prospects in the region. The EU has contributed to COMESA SPS and TBT regional work on a small scale through RISP, and directly to national implementation efforts through RISM. The COMESA Trade Division said that the EU funding had helped stakeholders gain a better common understanding of SPS and TBT issues and to speak the same language on problematic areas. At the EAC level, the EU and GIZ are considering a co-financing arrangement for work on regional harmonisation of standards. (I-2.2.4)

### Box 12 – EU SPS Project in Kenya Makes a Difference

Under the EDF 10 NIP, the EUD in Kenya has been implementing an €11m Standards and Market Access programme to help local exporters access the EU market. This has involved equipping laboratories and facilitating testing methodologies. "It is a relatively small programme with three agencies, but it is giving great results. It has excellent visibility; professional, keen and enthusiastic agencies; and a serious private sector. And it is already giving results: the EU had banned Kenyan snow peas and green beans; the project helped the companies to meet the requirements. Unfortunately it can't be extended even though it is making a difference." In EDF 11, private sector support is under the regional envelope, so this project is no longer in the national programme.

Source: Interview, February 2017

**The EU has contributed to the improvement of statistics, an important priority - and gap - in the EA-SA-IO region.** World Bank data shows that in 2004-2015, 15 of the region's countries improved their statistics capacity, while 10 went backwards. The star was Mauritius, 93 out of 100 points. Four of the five EAC countries improved their statistics capacity (Kenya slid), and all SACU members regressed. An EAC November 2016 forum attributed its improvements to the EAC Secretariat and the IMF. The EU is an important donor partner of East AFRITAC, the IMF Technical Assistance arm in East Africa, which started a fiscal data project in 2014 (and which runs many customs facilitation projects). An interview confirmed that the EU support indeed has

contributed to an improvement in both statistics capacity and revenue authorities' management capacity in the East Africa region.

**Services sector development is a major factor in trade growth and diversification.** It has long been an EDF priority on paper. However, as for SPS/TBT and statistics, it was not easy to determine the EU's regional contribution to this key area, so vital for trade development, employment creation, poverty reduction and a range of gender-related issues. Interviews and documents received during the field mission clarified that the EU had funded regional work on services, though not on a large scale. For example, it assisted a project to improve services statistics, an important inadequacy in the region, and under RISM it has supported member states in developing services schedules of commitments. EDF 11 proposed stronger support for services in COMESA; the activities listed under Component 5 of the Trade Facilitation Programme confirm this is occurring.

The COMESA Trade Division was particularly satisfied that EDF 11 had a 'budget line' for Services trade. "Neither COMESA nor the EU prioritised Services enough in the past." This is timely, as COMESA wants to conclude its own regional Services accord, and both TFTA and CFTA are poised to start Services work, though overlapping issues need to be addressed at REC and AU level. The Trade Division plans to reactivate the Services Unit, develop a team, work on commitments and implementation, enhance public awareness, and offer capacity building for business with the COMESA Business Council (CBC). A longstanding problem is the fragmented distribution of trade responsibilities in COMESA. For example, the Services Unit is still located in the Assistant Secretary-General's office, but the officer has joined SADC. The Director of the Trade Division is confident that under COMESA's Programme Approach, the various parts will collaborate. (I-2.2.5)

While the EU did not fund this project, the 2016 EAC Common Market Scorecard (CMS) provided a good sum-up of the services-related challenges facing the EAC region (it said no member states had fully complied with their services-related obligations). The other regions undoubtedly face similar challenges, so the CMS recommendations could serve as broader guidance on how to resolve a number of outstanding services-related economic integration problems. (I-2.1.2, 2.2.5)

### JC 2.3 "EU regional support has contributed to SME competitiveness."

**EU regional support has benefitted micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) - mainly through improvements to the business and trading environment.** EDF 10 and 11 prioritised support for micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs), and EDF 11 prioritises private sector support at both regional and national levels. At the national level, according to EUD interviews, the EU has chalked up some good results in SME assistance, an area where many donors are involved, making attribution difficult. Documenting EU regional support for MSMEs has been challenging because SME support is often included within the 'industrialisation' agendas of the DMROs, or embedded deep in broader programmes. RISP 2 and 3 funding was used for a COMESA cluster initiative that was terminated prematurely due to poor management. At the regional level, RISM and RISP 3 funded small SME initiatives at the national level, including export readiness and incubators and aligning Djibouti's SME policy with the COMESA MSME Policy, which the EU did not fund and which few in COMESA remember. (I-2.3.2, I-2.3.3)

EDF 11 allocated COMESA €10m to support value chains, to align SME policies horizontally/regionally, and to support the regional investment framework. In the EAC region, the EU and



GIZ are considering a co-financing agreement for work on value chains and market access. An interview in Kenya echoed a view expressed by other business organisations, REC member states and EUDs, namely that the EU SME support for five regional value chains (tourism, horticulture, agroprocessing, light industry and leather/leather products) was quite similar in COMESA and EAC, making it important to coordinate nationally “to ensure that this does not end up with SMEs competing for the same limited markets”.

### Box 13 – What is the right regional approach to help regional value chains develop?

Regional value chains are a logical stepping stone to building competitive capacity (quality, quantity, productivity, responsiveness, value for money) and attracting the international investment that would eventually facilitate entry into global value chains. The establishment of RECs and emerging regional/continental trading arrangements (TFTA, CFTA) are a step in the right direction, but so far this has had little impact on the major obstacles impeding regional value chain development.

However, the RECs are relatively young, and the **regional underpinnings to support competitiveness** are in the making, thanks to efforts to deal with regional connectivity (transport, energy, water, ICT), regional standards, high tariffs, nontariff barriers, restrictive rules of origin, and harmonised regulatory regimes (e.g., SPS, TBT, competition policy, intellectual property rights, investment attraction, transport standards, financial and fiscal policy frameworks, trade statistics, etc). **This is why regional efforts should continue to focus on promoting an environment conducive to trade and innovation.**

Regional support for the private sector should be limited to those areas where a rigorous application of the subsidiarity principle shows it would be more appropriate (e.g., well-defined support for regional business associations). The sector-based or vertical approach to industrial development through the selection of specific value chains can be particularly challenging at the regional level as it can lead to competition between member states to secure support for their own domestic industries in the selected sectors.

At the national level, the role of governments and other organisations is to deliver the conducive environment and improvements in access to technology, credit/investment, product and market information, extension services, quality infrastructure, modern logistics, export promotion, etc.

**The business environment has improved, although all three major regions continue to lag on ‘trading across borders’.** EU regional support since 2008 has had a strong focus on improving the regional business environment. The regional solutions listed at the beginning of this EQ and their transposition at national level can have an important positive impact on competitiveness. The performance indicators in the RISM case study (Annex C) highlight areas where EU regional support is contributing to an improved business environment.

The World Bank *Doing Business* report issued in 2016 showed that the EAC and SADC, as a whole, have improved in a variety of indicators in recent years. There was no breakdown for COMESA, but Sub-Saharan Africa scores showed that 14 of the 24 ACP EA-SA-IO countries covered by the rankings (not Eritrea) were above the regional average, and 10 were below it. All three regions/subregions showed some progress in starting a business, but challenges persisted in treatment of minority investors and paying taxes. Only EAC as a whole showed progress in ‘getting credit’. Both EAC and SADC showed relatively respectable levels of ‘paying taxes’. Possibly the macroeconomic support provided by AFRITAC with EU funding influenced these improvements. The EU was considering a direct cooperation modality with AFRITAC East to build on its good results. (I-2.3.1)

### Box 14 – EDF 11: Business Environment and Industrialisation Programmes for SADC

The SADC EDF 11 Action Documents for Investment and Industrialisation include a €14m programme to improve the business environment and an €18m programme to support industrialisation and productive sectors.

The **‘Investment’ project** to improve the business environment seeks to build on the EDF 10 REIS programme, aiming for the following results:

1. A conducive investment policy framework implemented in SADC member states
2. Enhanced integration of financial and capital markets
3. Enhanced financial inclusion

#### 4. Capacity to combat illicit financial flows.

These are in line with regional priorities in the Finance and Investment Protocol and support the EU's position in continental and global debates (e.g. work with the AU on illicit financial flows and G20 work on financial inclusion). EU support for integration of financial and capital markets in SADC has already contributed to some significant results, such as the SADC Integrated Regional Settlement System, SIRESS, which provide a strong base for further progress under EDF 11.

The **Industrialisation programme** seeks to contribute to the development of at least three regional sustainable value chains and value addition strategies in three product areas to be selected from within the agro-processing and pharmaceutical sectors. The expected results are:

- Result 1: value addition and regional sustainable value chains for at least three selected products in agro-processing and pharmaceutical sectors enhanced and strengthened
- Result 2: capacity and capabilities of SMEs including smallholder farmers to participate in value addition and sustainable value chains for selected products enhanced.

This programme responds directly to demand from SADC member states for increased attention to regional industrialisation (including through the proposed restructuring of the Secretariat). This is a relatively new area for the EU in SADC and the action document usefully refers to lessons learned from the experience in COMESA. The emphasis on working with the private sector, particularly SMEs, is welcome and provides concrete momentum for this SADC priority.

The action documents are clear and have indicative logframes with measurable baselines and some targets. However, the assumptions in the logframes are extremely broad. This is balanced to a certain extent with detail in the section on risks and the assumptions in the documents, which demonstrate understanding of the political economy factors influencing regional activities in investment and industrialisation. Both programmes provide useful opportunities for the EU to work closely with other cooperation partners, including the US Trade Hub (for investment) and Germany (for industrialisation). Both areas have scope for more explicit attention to gender issues (e.g. through supporting women-owned SMEs in agro-processing value chains).

Source: CRIS FED/2016/040083 (27 January 2017), FED/2017/039644.

**Regional business networks have the potential to become more active advocates on competitiveness and other business issues.** The COMESA and EAC Business Councils (CBC and EABC) and the various SADC counterparts have all benefited from donor support and have a potentially important role in regional dialogue. USAID has been the main supporter of the CBC; TMEA and GIZ have been supporting EABC; and GIZ and the African Development Bank have supported the Association of SADC Chambers of Commerce and Industry and more recently the Southern African Business Forum. While such fora need to be member-funded, more sustainable access to donor funding could assist them to realise their potential to become stronger regional advocates for business interests. In the end, businesses are a crucial partner in working toward the regional integration benefits that the EU and others are seeking (e.g. employment, wealth creation, economic stability, etc). (I-2.3.4)

While the EU has not supported the Business Councils directly in recent years, EU funding has trickled down to them for specific projects: e.g. EABC was commissioned by the EAC Secretariat for some important work on non-tariff barriers and harmonisation of standards, and SADC supported business participation in Industrialisation Week in Swaziland in August 2016.

EUDs indicated in interviews that they would be cooperating with the Business Councils more directly under EDF 11, in regional trade negotiations, the regional business visa mechanism, women in business, and possibly other areas. So far, the EDF 11 programming for COMESA includes “close cooperation with CBC” on the COMESA Business Visa. The SADC Industrialisation programme action document sets out activities to support public-private dialogue, both with industry bodies (agro-processing and pharmaceuticals) and under the umbrella of the Southern African Business Forum. (I-2.3.4)

### EQ 3 Regional Infrastructure: Progress on Regional Interconnectivity

**To what extent has regional-level EU support since 2008 contributed to improved regional trade-related infrastructure connectivity in Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean states?**

#### Overall Finding

##### Summary

Overall there was alignment between the infrastructure projects supported by EU regional interventions under EDF 10 as well as those planned for EDF 11 with those identified as priorities in continental and the regional strategies of the EA-SA-IO. However, capacity challenges remain in DMROs that have limited human and financial resources to dedicate to the promotion and monitoring of complex regional infrastructure projects where there are multiple stakeholders involved. The role definition of DMROs in promoting regional infrastructure was not shared by all stakeholders in the region and not aligned accordingly with capacities.

Overall the EU support to infrastructure has been relatively efficient once projects are identified and within the support mechanisms itself. The use of blending under EDF 11 is expected to allow the more efficient use of limited resources to support large infrastructure projects. The linkages between infrastructure development and the broader objectives of regional economic integration were recognized in EU supported interventions, specifically in relation to trade facilitation in East and Southern Africa through the transport-related projects under EDF 10. Global indicators demonstrate improved access to quality trade-related infrastructure in East Africa as well as some improvements in the time to move goods around the region and other trade facilitation indicators. The assessment of sustainability varied across the sample projects considered but overall maintenance is sufficiently highlighted in the design of the projects reviewed. The EU plays an important role through its blending approach to support soft infrastructure requirements as well as enhancing knowledge generation and analysis for regional projects.

**Overall there was alignment between the infrastructure projects supported by EU regional interventions under EDF 10 as well as those planned for EDF 11 with those identified as priorities in continental and the regional strategies of the EA-SA-IO.** The transport and energy projects supported by the EU under EDF 10 at the regional level are directly aligned with continental and regional documents setting out infrastructure priorities. Such alignment is consistent with the overall objectives of the EU at the continental level as reflected in the EU Africa Partnership on Infrastructure (Communication in 2006 on Interconnecting Africa). All the sample projects supported under EDF 10 and those currently being formulated under EDF 11 are in areas that are important for the strengthening of regional integration and the economic development of EA-SA-IO countries, in particular transport and energy infrastructure. The transport initiatives contribute to trade facilitation in the region and the energy interventions were rightly focused on generation and connectivity at the regional level. (JC3.1)

**Under EDF 10 a number of infrastructure projects were prepared and implemented with EU support and input from relevant DMROs, specifically in energy and the road transport sector where there were interventions that covered both hard infrastructure (e.g. road construction and maintenance) and soft infrastructure (e.g. one stop border posts).** These were largely clustered around corridors, such as the Northern Transport Corridor, that connected the region and thus contributed to the objective of greater regional economic integration. There were also complementary transport and energy projects at the national level in some countries (e.g. Rwanda), which contributed to the overall efficiency of regional interventions. The evaluation of EU Support to the Transport Sector in Africa 2005-2013 found that the EU had responded to the expressed needs of countries in the region. The selection of projects was undertaken in a coordinated manner with relevant DMRO Secretariats, member states and other partners, such as the African Development Bank. Regional funding in the energy sector was focused on generation and connectivity, which was complementary to national interventions, in some countries, on access to energy and distribution projects.

**Implementation was delayed by a variety of factors including capacity constraints at the DMROs.** There were challenges in some instances in both finalising the financing arrangements for projects and in the completion of hard infrastructure, such as the Mbarara-Msaka road in Uganda (EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund Monitoring Report, June 2016, p.48), under EDF 10. Implementation delays were encountered for a range of reasons, from the need to agree on the terms of the contracts (e.g. under the SADC PPDF) to political instability (e.g. in Burundi). At the level of project preparation, constraints described by some stakeholders included lack of capacity (financial and human) in DMROs, national governments and the private sector in the region. Developing 'bankable' projects remains one of the biggest challenges to infrastructure development in the EA-SA-IO region (e.g. RIP 2014-2020, p71 and SADC and COMESA interviews) and is a challenge for all development partners.

**Under EDF 11 there is greater emphasis on infrastructure projects related to energy, ICT and rail transport.** There is also a move away from hard infrastructure projects in the road transport sector, the inclusion of maritime corridors for the island states in the region and a greater use of blending as a support mechanism. The first of these shifts was described as unpopular in the Transport Evaluation and is likely to present some challenges given the continued limitations in the DMROs to implement soft infrastructure projects and the need for there to be strong coordination. The strong emphasis on blending under EDF 11 is expected to unlock complex regional infrastructure projects where the combination of grants and loans will be particularly beneficial.

**Capacity challenges remain in DMROs that have limited human and financial resources to dedicate to the promotion and monitoring of complex regional infrastructure projects where there are multiple stakeholders involved.** In most cases there are only two or three positions in each DMRO with direct responsibility for infrastructure issues. There is only one example of COMESA where there are dedicated positions for sector specialists on energy and communications infrastructure, although such expertise does exist among the staff of the infrastructure teams in both SADC and the EAC. There is additional capacity, in some instances, to guide soft infrastructure interventions e.g. customs officials in DMROs. As mentioned above, challenges exist in DMROs for coordination among different teams when there is a need to consider broader policy and regulatory issues (e.g. a corridor approach requires participation of customs, standards, infrastructure and transport officials). Similar constraints are acknowledged at the national level, where implementing agencies (e.g. the Uganda Road Fund) have limited budgets and staff available to oversee infrastructure development projects.

**Overall the EU support to infrastructure has been relatively efficient once projects are identified and within the support mechanisms itself, such as blending, seeking complementarities with national programmes and linkages between hard and soft infrastructure interventions.** The use of blending under EDF 11 is expected to allow the more efficient use of limited resources to support large infrastructure projects. Regional projects are complex in nature, however, and the involvement of DMROs can slow down processes e.g. in the setup of the SADC PPDF. One of the challenges for soft infrastructure projects under EDF 11, described by a stakeholder familiar with DMROs in the EA-SA-IO region, was the lack of coordination among the relevant divisions in the Secretariats. This can be resolved to a certain extent by a corridor approach and is something that SADC is working on (workshop held on 15 March 2017 in Gaborone). Clustering of interventions (both hard and soft infrastructure) along transport corridors provides for greater value for money from regional funds as the potential impact covers a wider area and the linkages created directly contribute to integration objectives.

**The role definition of DMROs in promoting regional infrastructure was not shared by all stakeholders in the region and accordingly not aligned with capacities.** The EU regional support for infrastructure under EDF 10 and EDF 11 has assumed that project planning and preparation will be driven by financing institutions, and that implementation will largely take place at the national level or through dedicated regional institutions (such as river basin authorities or regional power pools). The role of DMRO Secretariats under this approach is to assist in prioritising regional interventions, facilitating interactions between the countries involved and monitoring the impact in terms of the broader agenda of regional integration. EU support to the institutional capacity of DMROs (e.g. M&E systems, development of regional infrastructure plans and policies) is supportive in this regard. There is widespread support for this approach but there are examples where DMROs have been more active in project preparation (e.g. COMESA and EAC driven feasibility studies for road projects in Zimbabwe, Zambia and Rwanda with funding support from other donors). One national level official interviewed noted that such studies might not be accepted by national authorities if they were not sufficiently involved in the process driven by the DMRO.

**The linkages between infrastructure development and the broader objectives of regional economic integration were recognized in EU supported interventions, specifically in relation to trade facilitation in East and Southern Africa through the transport-related projects under EDF 10.** The shifts under EDF 11 to more support to energy and ICT projects are in line with the regional objectives of promoting industrial development in the EA-SA-IO region (something that is also reflected in the EDF 11 support to SADC and COMESA). This is most explicitly expressed at the regional level in the TFTA, where infrastructure development is one of the three pillars of the negotiations (together with industrialisation and market access). The adoption of a corridor focus by the EU regional programme in East Africa also highlights the focus on interventions that improve the connectivity of neighbouring countries with a view to increasing intra-regional trade (see case study 2 in Annex C). While the sample for this evaluation question did not include IOC projects, the projects on maritime safety as well as air and sea connectivity in this region are also in line with promoting strong linkages between infrastructure development (including softer issues such as the regulatory environment) and regional economic integration. (JC3.2)

**Global indicators demonstrate improved access to quality trade-related infrastructure in East Africa as well as some improvements in the time to move goods around the region and other trade facilitation indicators (enhanced capacity to facilitate trade).** The sample projects are largely concentrated in the East African area so a range of global indicators was considered to track changes during the review period in the business environment of the EAC. Between 2006 and 2012 there were significant gains achieved that resulted in reductions in the time to export and import by a third and a half respectively in the region. Some individual countries, like Kenya, Rwanda and Tanzania, did undertake significant reforms that saw national level improvements. At a regional level the performance in the World Bank Doing Business Index of the infrastructure/trade related indicators saw consolidation of these gains in the period up to 2015.

**The assessment of sustainability varied across the sample projects considered but overall maintenance is sufficiently highlighted in the design of the projects reviewed.** The nature of the ICT and energy sectors results in fewer concerns about ongoing maintenance as sustainability is often structured in at the outset of the feasibility assessment. Maintenance usually requires national level implementation and the role of regional institutions needs consideration in the design of both soft and hard infrastructure interventions. For example, this has been taken into account under EDF 11 in both the cross-regional projects on transport and transit as well as that on rail. For example, the former will address regulatory issues related to the harmonization of

weight limitations for trucks in the Tripartite area. The rail project is aimed at improving rail as a transport option for traded goods in the area. Both these interventions have potential implications for the maintenance of road networks by reducing the pressure placed on road infrastructure. Some of the transport sector projects reviewed specific options for financing of ongoing maintenance, such as carbon taxes and other user charges but the Transport Evaluation noted in detail the challenges in disbursing funds to ensure high quality maintenance, even when the money is available. (I-3.1.4, JC3.3)

**The EU plays an important role through its blending approach to support soft infrastructure requirements as well as enhancing knowledge generation and analysis for regional projects.**

**JC 3.1 “EU regional support has contributed to the design of feasible trade-related regional infrastructure projects aligned with continental and regional (EA-SA-IO) infrastructure development priorities”**

**EA-SA-IO DMROs have units or programmes responsible for infrastructure issues but these have limited human and financial capacity.** All EA-SA-IO DMROs have units or programmes responsible for infrastructure issues set up in their respective Secretariats. However, there are limited human and financial resources dedicated to regional infrastructure projects (1-3 people), with only a few sector specialist positions identified during the review of the literature (e.g. the COMESA Secretariat organigram includes dedicated positions on energy and telecommunications). This was confirmed during the field visits to the DMROs, where the added complication of organisational restructuring (SADC), high levels of staff turnover (SADC and EAC), and delays in recruiting staff (SADC, EAC and COMESA) also became apparent. There is some evidence in the annual reports of the DMROs that regional infrastructure project proposals were actively developed during the period under review with support and encouragement of the DMROs Secretariats, in conjunction with national government, financing agencies and other partners. This in part reflects a desire by the DMROs to carve out a strong role for themselves in the area of infrastructure development. Capacity challenges related to human and financial resources remain. For example, in the 2011-2012 report of the SADC Executive Secretary it was explicitly stated that “human and financial resources constraints” at both regional and national levels hamper the coordination of infrastructure projects in the region (p. 23). (I-3.1.1)

**The effectiveness of coordination between DMROs and with other regional organisations in the infrastructure space (such as corridor authorities, regional power pools) is variable.** For example, in the energy sector both the Southern and Eastern African Power Pools are actively involved in DMRO activities on regional regulation (soft infrastructure) and interconnector projects (hard infrastructure). EU regional support has contributed to the operational capacity of these organisations. The TFTA process does present an opportunity for sustained and regular interactions between the three DMROs involved, COMESA, SADC and the EAC, including on infrastructure development (one of the three pillars). There are concerns however that the cross-region soft infrastructure projects under EDF 11 will be dominated by the designated leading DMRO (e.g. SADC for transit and transport, EAC for rail) with little significant participation or input from the others. (I-3.1.1)

**There is a consistent recognition of the priority infrastructure projects identified by the AU and DMROs in continental and regional plans, including PIDA, in the sample project documentation.** There is clear alignment of the priority sectors for EU regional support (energy, transport and communication) with the focus areas under PIDA. All sample projects referenced continental and/or regional infrastructure strategies. For example, the Uganda roads project

(Maska Mbarara) is part of the Northern Multimodal Corridor that is an EAC and PIDA priority. (I-3.1.2) There are a number of EU supported continental initiatives that are relevant in consideration of the regional programme for the EA-SA-IO region, such as the priority infrastructure initiatives under the JAES in transport, water, energy and ICT. Under EDF 10 the EU Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund was critical in this respect and the EA-SA-IO regional programme appears to be supportive of its objectives through the alignment of priority areas (i.e. transport and energy and to a lesser extent water and communications) and the focus on creation of an enabling environment that is supportive of sustainable projects financed by the EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund. The list of hard infrastructure projects identified for the Africa Investment Facility (EDF 11) is also aligned with continental and regional priorities. A wide range of stakeholders interviewed during the field research confirmed the relevance of the EU support, in particular, to energy and transport. (I-3.1.2)

**The sample projects reviewed indicate limited engagement with the private sector in the preparation of infrastructure projects in the transport sector supported by the EU regional programme in EA.** There were some exceptions in the projects considered for financing under the SADC PPDF, where the private sector had been active in the development of proposals e.g. North-South Corridor rail project. In general, the private sector is more engaged at the level of implementation (engineering and construction services) rather than in the preparation, planning or design of the project. (I-3.1.3)

**The design of the sample projects in the transport sector highlighted the importance of maintenance of infrastructure but this usually requires national level implementation.** As mentioned above on the point of sustainability, the ongoing challenge of maintenance of infrastructure in the EA-SA-IO region is recognized in the design of the sample projects reviewed during the desk study. Maintenance remains key to sustaining the positive impact of infrastructure in terms of strengthening regional markets, particularly in the transport sector. For example, in the sample project of the Maska-Mbarara road in Uganda, maintenance was specified as a risk and mitigation strategies were included in the project design. (I-3.1.4)

### JC 3.2 “EU regional support for trade-related infrastructure has strengthened regional markets for trade in the EA-SA-IO”

**Between 2005 and 2013, it became easier to do business in the EA-SA-IO region as a whole according to the World Bank’s Doing Business Index, with significant reductions in the time to export and import in the EAC specifically during this period.** The World Bank Doing Business Index shows that SADC remains the region in Sub-Saharan Africa with the most conducive business environment and progressive improvement in the ease of trading across borders. The EAC has however been gaining some ground, with many reforms undertaken by countries such as Rwanda and Kenya. It is worth noting that between 2006 and 2012 the EAC reduced the time to export by about a third and the time to import by nearly a half. (I-3.2.1)

Trade facilitation remains constrained for many countries in the EA-SA-IO region, particularly smaller, landlocked economies. Progress has stalled since 2013 when there had been high numbers of reforms, particularly in relation to cross border trade, according to the World Bank Doing Business Index. The Logistics Performance Index tells a more positive story with notable improvements in the ranking of a number of EAC members, including Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda, between 2007 and 2016. These changes are also reflected in other indicators related to trade facilitation, such as the OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators.

**Looking specifically at the EAC (where the project sample is largely drawn from in the transport sector), the cost of trade remained relatively high overall during the period under review.** The issue of road safety was mentioned in relation to the Maska-Mbarara roads project and reports consulted for East Africa show high levels of accidents persist in the region. (I-3.2.3)

**Access to network services, particularly electricity, remains a serious concern for the private sector in the EA-SA-IO region, with little change in the generation capacity in many countries and consistently high prices.** Electricity in EA-SA-IO can cost more than double that of the global average and there are countries with less than 10% of the population having access to electricity. This has serious impacts on the economic growth and industrialization prospects of the regions, and remains a barrier to regional economic integration as a result. Energy generation is one of the priority infrastructure sectors for development in EA-SA-IO (under PIDA, Africa-EU Energy Partnership and the EU supported Sustainable Energy for All Initiative) and there have been a number of large-scale projects in some countries, such as Ethiopia, South Africa and Kenya, during the period under review. However, the overall capacity for electricity generation remains largely static. The EU has contributed regional funds to SE4ALL (SADC € 32 m and ESA-IO € 193.5 m in 2012) with a specific focus on Sub-Saharan Africa and there are some success stories in the areas of policy dialogue and capacity building of DMROs as well (Africa-EU Energy Partnership Status Report 2014). (I-3.2.2)

**JC3.3 “EU support ensured that sufficient mechanisms/structures were put in place to ensure sustainability”**

**Infrastructure projects are implemented at the level of national governments and there appears to be little direct involvement of DMROs or other regional institutions.** The role of the DMROs seems to be more strategic in terms of providing overall guidance on infrastructure priorities and also facilitating engagements where there are two or more countries involved in specific projects. The documentation reviewed for the sample projects confirmed this through reference to the DMRO regional plans but the operationalization of the projects was the responsibility of national structures or institutions. (I-3.3.1)

**Potential regional (e.g. COMESA) and national champions (e.g. Rwanda and South Africa) exist for infrastructure projects.** In East Africa, a leading role in trade-related infrastructure projects is being played by TradeMark East Africa (TMEA). It has been a critical player in supporting the corridor approach for transport infrastructure and trade facilitation (see case study). Under EDF 10 there was little specific engagement between EU regional programmes and the work of TMEA. There is potential for greater levels of cooperation under EDF 11, for example on the Great Lakes project that will be the responsibility of the EUD in Rwanda. COMESA has also shown itself to be a willing champion, particularly through its leading role in the TFTA process. At a country level, Rwanda and Uganda (as landlocked nations) demonstrate a willingness to lead in the development and implementation of regional transport infrastructure initiatives. Together with Kenya, these countries have made significant progress on a range of issues in sectors such as ICT and transport as well as on movement of people issues, through the Northern Corridor initiative. (I-3.3.2)

In SADC, the Secretariat has a dedicated resource coordinating regional transport initiatives covering both hard and soft infrastructure issues. There is a useful linkage here to the continental agenda through the current chairmanship of the Africa Transport Policy Program SSATP. South Africa is the most critically important national champion both in terms of i) its strategic approach to regional integration that emphasises the importance of mutually supportive trade negotiations and infrastructure development as well as ii) its role as PIDA champion of the North-South



Corridor. The Project Preparation Development Facility for SADC is housed at the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) in South Africa providing for potentially strong synergies.

**There are mitigating strategies and financing options for maintenance of infrastructure identified in the sample project documentation.** Constraints at the national level in terms of financial resources and human capacity are highlighted in the area of transport maintenance. The cross-region projects on soft infrastructure under EDF 11 will indirectly address issues related to maintenance of road infrastructure in the Tripartite area. (I-3.1.4 and I-3.3.3)

### Summary of selected points that are DMRO specific

DMRO	Notes
COMESA	Technical capacity in the Secretariat in the energy, ICT and transport sectors. Focus on regulatory frameworks under EDF 11 is appropriate and in line with DMRO capacity, especially in areas of energy and ICT – less clear for civil aviation.
EAC	Addition of rail as a sector for regulatory work under EDF 11 is in line with priorities of member states. Some concerns about likely participation of other DMROs in this project. Corridor approach well entrenched in the transport sector and showing results from combination of hard and soft infrastructure interventions. Many other regional institutions involved in energy sector (e.g. East African Power Pool, Nile Basin, Energie des Grands Lacs) – varying degrees of capacity and some coordination challenges.
IGAD	Sample project did not progress to implementation due to security challenges and territorial disputes in Somalia.
IOC	Limited participation in EDF 10 activities. Soft infrastructure programmes often more targeted at land-based countries e.g. in the area of trade facilitation. Greater role anticipated under EDF 11 on maritime corridors and the Meltingpot Indianoceanic Submarine System (METISS).
SADC	Limited support under EDF 10 to the Project Preparation Development Facility located at DBSA in South Africa. Projects developed in energy sector and strong participation of the Southern African Power Pool. Leading role under EDF 11 on transport and transit facilitation. Some coordination challenges in Secretariat in moving to a comprehensive corridor approach – no corridor authority for the North-South Corridor yet.

## EQ 4 Regional peace, security and stability

**To what extent has regional-level EU support contributed to improved democratic governance, peace and security, and better management of migration – thereby contributing to a stable and peaceful region?**

The rationale for this evaluation question and its coverage, as well as the list of main projects examined under it, are summarised in Annex 4/EQ 4.

### Overall finding

EU regional cooperation in EA-SA-IO on governance, peace and security was highly relevant and justified. EU-supported regional programmes on peace and security have a clear regional dimension. A regional approach to democratisation and human rights, complementary to a national approach, is also justified.

Political realities outside of its control notwithstanding (e.g. resurgence of conflicts in Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan), it has overall delivered documented outputs and contributed to some positive outcomes, e.g. increased capacity in the SADC region to conduct credible elections and to contain elections-related crises; IGAD value-added in mediation in Sudan and South Sudan; security sector reform in Somalia.

At the impact level, peace and security have not markedly improved in the region over the period considered (2008-2015). The complexity and involvement of multiple actors means that it is not meaningful or possible to attribute peace and security improvements to EU regional cooperation, nor to state that EU regional cooperation was a decisive factor in limiting any deteriorations.

But it probably was a facilitating factor, given the relative stability and sheer size of EU regional cooperation compared to both other partners' support and the DMROs' own resources. The counterfactual (no EU regional cooperation) would probably have meant much more limited progress.

This is in spite of weak efficiency, a lack of focus on results, reflected in weak dialogue and agreement on workplans; a lack of synergies with EU actions at the national level; and mixed signals sent to the AU and DMROs (e.g. shifts between AU and DMRO channels; shift to bypassing DMROs and disbursing directly to EU member states' and UN agencies). Another issue to consider is sensitivity to gender equality: it appears that gender issues are not central in regional peace, security and stability programmes.

Cooperation in this priority area lacks a needs-based focus; an overview of what the AU and each DMRO is most suited to do; a sharper focus on drivers and barriers; and a more strategic dialogue with partners.

**EU-supported regional programmes on *peace and security* have a clear regional dimension**, as peace and security are regional, and global, public goods. The absence of peace and security often has causes and manifestations that are cross-border. Half of the armed conflicts in EA-SA-IO involve more than one African country and international allies fighting insurgents. For example, M23 rebels in DR Congo and neighbouring countries were launching attacks in the east of the country before being defeated by government forces with international support in 2013. In Somalia, the federal government is fighting the Al-Shabaab militant group with allies in East Africa and beyond (Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, and Ethiopia and Sierra Leone contribute troops to AMISOM).

**A regional approach to *democratisation and human rights*, complementary to a national approach, is also justified:** if the regional dimension of democratisation and human rights may appear less obvious than for peace and security, EU-supported regional cooperation on these matters often benefit from regional standard-setting, knowledge-sharing, and peer emulation/peer pressure. This is the rationale behind many DMROs' approach to democratisation. Therefore, both peace and security, and democratisation and human rights benefit from being tackled both nationally and regionally.

**Democracy, peace and security have not markedly improved in the region over the period considered (2008-2015):**

- Theme by theme, data show that political and civil society participation has *generally* improved in EA-SA-IO, but that the space for civil society is sometimes closing (see Box 1 in Annex 4/EQ 6), and that *the quality of election processes* and *government accountability* have both deteriorated – a paradox since elections processes that lack credibility usually dampen participation. These aggregated trends mask both some major improvements, such as civil society participation in Zimbabwe; national security in Uganda; rule of law in Comoros; elections in Kenya; and equally big deteriorations, such as elections in Burundi and DRC; and rule of law and civil society in Burundi. While in some EA-SA-IO countries there has been a clear decline in the last eight years in the number of reported *deaths due to armed conflicts*, the EA-SA-IO region has over a dozen on-going conflicts, which led to over 1 300 battle-related casualties in 2016 (Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan). *Crossborder tensions* have lessened in all EA-SA-IO countries except three, and *national security* has generally improved, but *human rights* have, overall, deteriorated (Table 2 in Annex 4/EQ4).
- DMRO by DMRO, the picture is equally mixed (Table 2 in Annex 4/EQ4).
  - All indicators have improved in **SADC**, except for accountability, which has deteriorated more than anywhere else and more than the sub-Saharan African average.

- In **COMESA** countries, the picture is mixed, with national security, accountability, and human rights being of particular concern, while there is progress in political and civil society participation.
- It is not very encouraging in EAC and IGAD. Over 2008-2015, and except for accountability, which has not budged, all the main indicators of democracy, peace and security have deteriorated in **EAC**, calling for continued attention to these matters in the subregion. In **IGAD**, all the main indicators of democracy, peace and security have deteriorated except political participation. Both EAC and IGAD now include South Sudan, which has spiralled into violence two years after its independence in 2011.

Seventy-one per cent of the survey respondents could not give any examples/qualitative evidence that EU regional support had contributed to improved democratic governance (see Annex 6), which along with the lack of M&E reports on democracy, peace and security (see Bibliography), shows that there is insufficient monitoring of results. However, **this evaluation found examples of EU regional contributions both at the related output and outcome levels** (interviews, documentation), detailed under JC 4.1 and JC 4.2 and in Annex 4.

**The complexity and involvement of multiple actors means that it is not meaningful or possible to go beyond possible EU contributions and attribute outcomes to EU support.** International cooperation is only one element in the equation of democratisation, human rights, peace and security; and there are multiple forms of international cooperation in these areas, including multiple EU instruments supporting different parts of a very complex architecture for democracy, peace and security, namely:

- Subnational, national, regional and global trends trump the role of development cooperation in democracy, peace and security.
- Beside the EU's, regional support to democratisation, human rights, peace and security includes significant support from the US, the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and EU member states (notably Germany, Denmark, Norway, Austria, and the Netherlands), the UN, China, and Switzerland.
- Only a fragment of EU cooperation on peace, security and stability matters in EA-SA-IO is regional (details in Annex 4/EQ4).
- Furthermore, overlapping regional memberships, poor coordination among DMROs, and discrepancies in national implementation of regional decisions all make direct attribution of positive outcomes to EU regional support difficult.

**But the relative stability** (over the years if not year-in) **and the sheer size of EU regional cooperation compared to both other partners' support and the DMROs' own resources mean that the counterfactual (no EU regional cooperation) would probably mean much more limited progress in producing the outputs** (policies, strategies, plans, and capacities) observed over 2008-2015. As an example, the EU is the main donor to IGAD, and has supported projects representing 27% of IGAD's budget (2009-2012). It is also important to note that the EU's regional cooperation in democracy, peace and security has focused, much more than other development partners, on core support and capacity development rather than narrower projects. This has given DMROs leeway and ownership (conceptually if not financially) that other development partners have not.

**Turning now to the efficiency of EU regional cooperation in democratic governance, peace and security, there is room for improvement.** Progress towards these goals is usually not linear: there are multiple pathways to successful outcomes; and it is hard to say which is the most cost-effective. But it is worth underlining that the EU is overall less results-oriented than other development partners, and its regional cooperation would therefore appear as less efficient

compared to other development partners in terms of (for example) how many judges were trained, or regional standards domesticated.

- At portfolio level, an overall lack of synergies of EU regional cooperation with efforts at the national level (see EQ 6 and Annex 4/EQ 6); overlapping regional memberships and mandates; and poor coordination across DMROs and with the AU have hampered efficiency. There is little evidence that EU regional cooperation has amounted to more than the sum of individual projects. Efforts were sometimes made to ensure synergies across DMROs (e.g. joint COMESA-EAC-IGAD electoral observation mission in Kenya, 2013; MASE programme for all DMROs) but could have been more systematic (e.g. five parallel regional organisations/initiatives in the Burundi crisis). However, coordination across DMROs seems to have improved under EDF 11, and coordination with the AU is better than across DMROs (see EQ 6 and Annex 4/EQ 6).
- At programme level, efficiency suffers from a lack of focus on expected results, which are not translated into quantified targets. This is reflected in weak dialogue and agreement on workplans. The lack of prioritisation by DMROs is more due to the fact that DMROs can engage in activities independently of needs expressed by their member states than to a deficiency in DMRO planning capacities. Monitoring is irregular and incomplete, especially at the outcome level, and therefore cannot serve as a management tool. For example, there is only one Results Orientated Monitoring (ROM) report for the whole democratic governance, human rights, peace, and security theme, and this ROM highlights that output quality and potential impact are not captured by project monitoring.
- At an administrative level, EU systems, cultures and behaviours help the EU meet its fiduciary responsibilities, but does not empower staff to deliver more and better with the limited resources. In particular, some regional EUDs seem understaffed with regards to the responsibilities: *“Looking at regional staffing is telling of the lack of importance given to regional matters. We are too ambitious, with too many countries and too many issues”* (MN 143). The EU is usually slower to disburse than EU member states (but on par or faster, according to DMRO staff, with the USAID and the World Bank, where these are DMRO partners).
- As for sustainability, it seems to be greater in democratic governance, peace and security than in other sectors. With the possible exception of democratic governance in EAC (poor sustainability of the Regional Political Integration and Human Security Support Programme results), the processes put in place under EDF 10 were by and large still in place by the time of the evaluation, and sometimes other development partners joined in co-funding (e.g. Norway on anti-piracy).

**Another issue to consider is the regional cooperation’s sensitivity to gender equality: except for SADC, gender issues are not central** in in RIP-funded project documents on democracy, peace and security; and they were not central in implementation and reporting either (see Table 7 in Annex 4/EQ6). This is corroborated by interviews with Gender Officers in EAC and IGAD. This is in contrast with EU actions outside of RIP-funded projects, and indeed outside of EDF projects, which often have an important gender dimension.

#### JC 4.1 “EU regional cooperation contributed to enhancing democratic governance in the region”

**EU regional support in matters of democratic governance is mainly geared toward strengthening the capacity of DMRO Secretariats** to perform their mandates in this area. The overall goal is to build ownership and political commitment to democratic governance across the regions, using regional organisations as influencers in matters of democratic governance (EAC Electoral Support Project Action Document 2014; Support to SADC Regional Political Cooperation; Joint Progress Report on cooperation between SADC and EU, 2011). The immediate

objective is to enhance their roles as potential catalysts of democratic governance (e.g. ability to develop a robust observation methodology and deploy election observation missions; a regional roster of electoral observers and trained experts to be mobilised by DMRO member states; etc.).

**At the output level, based on field visits to ten EUDs and available documents, there are specific instances of EU regional support contributing to policies, strategies and plans conducive to democratisation and human rights (i4.1.1) and to enhanced capacity and engagement of regional organisations, government institutions, civil society and communities in matters of democratic governance (i4.1.2):** see Table 1.

**At the outcome level, beyond these outputs, and given the three factors detailed above (predominance of drivers of peace and security over the role of development cooperation, the fact that the EU is only one of several donors to Africa and RIP funding a sliver compared to overall EU support, and complex institution AU/DMRO setup), it is hard to attribute outcomes to EU regional support specifically—one can only safely say the EU has contributed to improved democracy in the SADC region. (i4.1.3)**

**Table 1 – Instances of EU regional contribution to democracy**

	At the output level: attribution	At the outcome level: contribution	Trend 2008-2015 in the DMRO area regarding democratic governance
C O M E S A	COMESA has established a network of civil society and private sector organizations through a process of accreditation to the COMESA Programme on Peace and Security; and a COMESA Inter-Parliamentary Forum (COMESA annual report 2014).	<i>NA – Stakeholders across the continent question whether COMESA should be involved in peace and security at all but rather focus on economic integration (interviews, e.g. MN132).</i>	<b>MEDIUM PROGRESS</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Trends in accountability, and human rights being of particular concern, while there is progress in political and civil society participation.</li> </ul>
E A C	Creation of the Democracy and Election Unit of the EAC Secretariat; the EAC Forum of Electoral Commissions; the adoption of the EAC Principles of Election Observation and Evaluation; the development of a draft EAC Protocol on Good Governance. Quarterly political dialogue with political parties, media, youth, women, academia, civil society and professional organisations, on democratic governance, transparency, and accountability. Structured engagement with youth through the launch of the EAC Youth Ambassadors' Platform.	<i>NA – a lack of political will on the part of the top leadership of some EAC member states on democracy matters is a limitation (interviews MN141, MN145).</i>	<b>POOR PROGRESS</b> Over 2008-2015, and except for accountability, which has not budged, all the main indicators of democracy have deteriorated in EAC, calling for continued attention to these matters in the subregion.
I G A D	Adoption of a Protocol on Democracy, Governance, and Elections; an IGAD Election Code of Conduct; and IGAD Guidelines for Election Observers. IGAD election observation missions (e.g. South Sudan, 2011; Sudan, 2015; Uganda 2016; Djibouti 2016). IGAD engaged with NGOs and civil society on issues of democratic governance, parliaments and female participation and representation in politics.	<i>NA – a lack of political will on the part IGAD member states on democracy matters is a major limitation (interviews; Freedom of Information, n.d.). Election Observer Missions, however, are an entry point, and one of the most effective ways to influence the behaviour of candidates, parties, and electoral management bodies (Carothers, 1997).</i>	<b>MEDIUM PROGRESS</b> In IGAD, All the main democracy indicators have deteriorated except political participation. Notable improvements EA-SA-IO-wide include elections in Kenya and Somalia; deteriorations include civil war in South Sudan.
S A D C	The key results of the SADC Regional Political cooperation programme have been: (i) revised principles for electoral observation, introducing post-electoral reviews, long-term observation, and extending composition from just officials to include parliamentarians and National Security Agencies); (ii) training of 140 mediators now part of a SADC and AU pool including non-officials; (iii) strategies and mechanisms to prevent human trafficking; (iv) a disaster reduction preparedness strategy. These results have the potential to be “transformational” (interviews).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>EDF 10 activities that relate to democracy in SADC countries have contributed to increasing the SADC region’s capacity to conduct credible elections, both through the 2011 established SADC Electoral Advisory Council, and through the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Directorate of the Secretariat (interviews; Joint Progress Report on cooperation between SADC and EU, 2011). SADC demonstrated its ability to contain elections-related crises, e.g. in Zimbabwe (2011 political crisis), Madagascar (2009-2011 political crisis), Lesotho (2014), and Tanzania (2015).</li> </ul>	<b>GOOD PROGRESS</b> All indicators have improved in SADC, except for accountability, which has deteriorated more than anywhere else and more than the sub-Saharan African average. Notable improvements EA-SA-IO-wide include civil society participation in Zimbabwe. Notable deteriorations EA-SA-IO-wide include elections in DRC.

Note: this is a condensed version of a fuller table in Annex 4. Sources: see fuller table in Annex 4.

In Table 1 above, one of the results area that is usually recognised as good practice is electoral support. Case 3: The EU’s Regional Electoral Cooperation in Annex 4 provides details on the objectives, change observed, explanatory factors, and lessons learned from EU regional electoral cooperation.

### JC 4.2 “EU regional cooperation contributed to improved peace and security”

At the output level, there are discrete areas where policies, strategies and plans conducive to peace and security (i4.2.1), and enhanced capacity and engagement of regional organisations, government institutions, civil society and communities (i4.2.2) can be attributed, directly or indirectly, to EU regional support: see Table 2.

Beyond these outputs, it is hard to attribute outcomes to EU regional support specifically given the predominance of local drivers of peace and security, the complex institution setup and other support (EU and non-EU). **One can only safely say the EU has contributed to peace and security in IGAD, and to some extent in EAC and SADC (i4.2.3).** IGAD, in particular has demonstrated success in mediation and peace support operations (see Table 5 in Annex 4/EQ4).

**Table 2 – Instances of EU regional contribution to peace and security**

	At the output level	At the outcome level	Trend 2008-2015 in the DMRO area regarding peace and security
COMESA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ COMESA has established a network of civil society and private sector organizations through a process of accreditation to the COMESA Programme on Peace and Security.</li> <li>➤ COMESA supports transnational cooperation through its <i>Trade for Peace</i> Project</li> <li>➤ Progress in Anti Money Laundering/Combating Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT), with COMESA using recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force as the standard. Sensitisation of reporting entities in 8/10 countries reaching over 400 stakeholders; training of analysts from Financial Intelligence Units in 9/10 countries to improve the analysis of Suspicious Transaction Reports received.</li> </ul>	N/A	<p><b>MEDIUM PROGRESS</b></p> <p>Lesser cross-border tensions, but deteriorated national security overall.</p> <p>Notable improvements across the EA-SA-IO region include national security in Uganda.</p> <p>Notable deteriorations across the EA-SA-IO region include rule of law and civil society in Burundi.</p>
EAC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ With EU support, the EAC has established EACWARN, an early warning system that systematically engages with other DMROs' early warning systems and is fully connected to the AU's Continental Early Warning System via an online portal.</li> <li>➤ EAC has involved civil society through the ongoing Inter-Burundian Dialogue, which is currently the main existing mechanism to negotiate a way out of the Burundi crisis. EU support has enabled EAC to engage CSOs and the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) in the development of the EAC conflict prevention and management Mechanism.</li> <li>➤ Development of the EAC Protocol on Peace and Security; updating the EAC Regional Strategy for Peace and Security to include Maritime security; interventions in Human Trafficking; Cyber Crime; Genocide and Genocide ideology; and Environmental crime</li> <li>➤ Coordination of National Counter-Terrorism Agencies and development of the EAC Cooperation Agreement on Countering terrorism.</li> <li>➤ Development and establishment of 14 Centres of Excellence in the Policing function among the 5 Partner States of EAC; development of Policing Human Rights Standard Operating Procedures.</li> </ul>	<p>Thanks to EU support, (i) EACWARN provides EAC member states a forum of consultation and cooperation for conflict prevention, management and resolution; (ii) an EAC Peace Facility mobilises necessary resources to support the implementation of peace and security interventions; (iii) a Mediation Support Standing Group comprising Partner States officials and EAC Staff has been trained in mediation skills; (iv) an EAC <i>Panel of Eminent Persons (PEP)</i> was setup in 2012 and has been active in Burundi since the beginning of 2015, jointly with COMESA Elders.</p> <p>EAC facilitation convened the inter-Burundian dialogue in Arusha in February 2017, although Government boycotted the talks. While the conflict in Burundi has not begun to find a solution, it has not led to mass violence either.</p>	<p><b>POOR PROGRESS</b></p> <p>No lessening of cross-border tensions, and deteriorated national security overall. Civil war in South Sudan from 2013.</p>
IGAD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ IGAD's Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism's (CEWARN) provides sensitive information and analysis to policy makers. CEWARN supported the mediation process in South Sudan; it also helped address pastoral conflicts in cooperation with local peace committees and the use of the CEWARN <i>Rapid Response Fund</i>.</li> <li>➤ IGAD established a <i>Mediation Support Unit</i> in 2014, which is composed of one mediation expert, involved in mediation efforts in South Sudan.</li> </ul>	<p>With EU support, IGAD has demonstrated its value-added, e.g. mediation in Sudan and South Sudan; security sector reform in Somalia; deployment of an IGAD Monitoring and Verification Mechanism in South Sudan to assess the compliance with the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement; deployment of an IGAD Peace and Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM) that paved the way for AMISOM.</p>	<p><b>MEDIUM PROGRESS</b></p> <p>Lesser cross-border tensions, but deteriorated national security overall.</p> <p>Civil war in South Sudan from 2013.</p>



	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Election observation missions (e.g. South Sudan, 2011; Sudan, 2015; Uganda 2016; Djibouti 2016).</li> <li>➤ IGAD agreed important policies and standards in maritime security (IGAD 2030 Integrated Maritime Strategy; 2016 Djibouti Declaration on Maritime Safety and Security for EA-SA-IO or “Djibouti Code of Conduct”). Implementation is just starting but is on track.</li> <li>➤ IGAD also plays a leadership role in maritime security (overall coordination of the EU-supported MASE programme), tackling both at-sea and inland enablers of transnational crime and piracy.</li> </ul>	<p>IGAD engaged with NGOs and civil society in the region, on issues of democratic governance including female participation and representation in politics.</p> <p>Increased capacity of criminal justice systems in Kenya, Seychelles and Mauritius in maritime security matters</p>	
S A D C	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Thanks to EU regional cooperation and particularly the APSA Support Programmes, SADC established a regional early warning system; a regional peacekeeping centre; and the SADC Standby Force, to be part of the African Standby Force. The SADC Standby Force was deployed in DR Congo as part of the UN mission.</li> <li>➤ The SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security, responsible for promoting peace and security in the region, has mediation capacities, including the recently established Mediation Support Unit and a Panel of Elders to act as SADC mediators (interviews, Swedish Defence Research Agency Freedom of Information, 2015)</li> <li>➤ In SADC, “thanks to the EU support, the SADC NGO Council has provided a monitoring of the national implementation of regional political commitments” (2013 Botswana EAMR)</li> </ul>	<p>The SADC Standby Force defeated the M23 rebel group in DR Congo, paving the way for the 2013 peace agreement with M23.</p>	<p><b>GOOD PROGRESS</b> Lesser cross-border tensions, and improved national security overall.</p>
E A S A I O	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ On maritime security, the MASE start-up project contributed to increasing the capacity of national criminal justice systems in Kenya, Seychelles and Mauritius to prosecute piracy offences, for example: training for police on handovers of suspected pirates and Anti-Money Laundering; procurement for police of biometric equipment to support the establishment of the Regional Anti-Piracy Prosecution and Investigation Coordination Centre; essential trial support including funding for defence lawyers; development of the Somali Maritime Resource and Security Strategy (2013 final narrative report, MASE start-up project)</li> </ul>	N/A	N/A

Note: this is a condensed version of a fuller table in Annex 4. Sources: see fuller table in Annex 4.

### **The counterfactual (no EU regional cooperation) would probably mean much more limited progress.**

A particular feature of EU regional cooperation on peace and security is that most capacity development programmes were implemented predominantly through APF (see Table 4 in Annex 4/EQ6). Trying to isolate RIP funding for peace and security from APF funding is difficult given how they have been used interchangeably (if not in harmony: see EQ6), and DMRO stakeholders interviewed have not been capable of distinguishing them.

If taking RIP and APF funding together, then, the relative stability and sheer size of this combined regional cooperation (compared to both other partners’ support and the DMROs’ own resources) mean that the counterfactual (no EU regional cooperation) would probably mean much more limited progress in producing the sort of outputs and outcomes listed in Table 2 above.



### Summary of selected points that are DMRO specific

COMESA	With EU support, COMESA deployed some well-respected election observation missions over the period (JC4.1) and demonstrated some tangible results in maritime security and combating related illicit financial flows (JC4.2)
EAC	All the main indicators of both democracy and peace and security have deteriorated in EAC, calling for continued attention to these matters in the subregion. Efforts in mediation have not always been successful (JC4.1) (JC4.2).
IGAD	IGAD promoted democratization, including through election observation missions and engagement with NGOs and civil society in the region, on issues of democratic governance, parliaments and female participation and representation in politics (JC4.1) Perhaps more than other RECs but on equal footing with the AUC, IGAD has proven its value-added in mediation; and has played a role in the restoration of stability in Somalia at several critical junctures; in paving the way with its peace operation before AMISOM (JC4.2)
IOC	IOC was not the main mediation actor but had some involvement in the resolution of the Madagascar crisis (JC4.1). IOC has put some of the elements in place to implementation of the Programme to Promote Regional Maritime Security in Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean (JC4.2)
SADC	SADC's role in political cooperation is considered as one of its most crucial functions by SADC member states. SADC has demonstrated its ability to contain (if not resolve) crises, e.g. in Zimbabwe (2011), Madagascar (2009-2011), and Lesotho (2014). All political governance indicators have improved in SADC—except for accountability, which has deteriorated more than in other RECs and more than the sub-Saharan African average (JC4.1) (JC4.2)

## EQ 5 Regional Natural Resource Management

**Environmental governance – has regional-level EU support contributed to improved regional cooperation and harmonisation among Indian Ocean island states, and thereby led to more sustainable management of the region's important natural resources?**

### Summary

Initiatives under the EU's regional NRM programmes had often, but not always, a clear regional dimension and tackled challenges that could not be handled effectively at the national level. EU's engagement has strengthened the process of moving towards enhanced regional cooperation vis-à-vis managing regionally important natural resources, but while significant results were achieved in relation to regional cooperation and policy harmonisation in relation to fisheries, results were more modest vis-à-vis other aspects of ecosystem management. EU support contributed to improved governance and increased private sector and community participation in the natural resource management, especially vis-à-vis fisheries at the sub-national level. Environmental and socio-economic improvements were also mainly achieved vis-à-vis selected fisheries (especially at the local level), while other impacts on ecosystem management and biodiversity were more limited. Institutional and individual capacities were enhanced, but the impact on programme management capacities was modest. Moreover, the achievement of the intended results as well as sustainability was significantly hampered by delays and gaps, and the results achieved are for the most part unsustainable, except when involving private sector and communities and immediate economic benefits were created.

The major reasons behind the overall more significant results in fisheries compared to other aspects of ecosystem management were threefold. Firstly, EU's support for fisheries was consistently provided, whereas other NRM processes, such as biodiversity, have not been supported with the same degree of a long-term engagement and continuity was disrupted by prolonged gap periods. Secondly, some of the non-fishery programmes had design shortcomings; the programme strategies were sometimes, but not always, conducive to achieving the intended objectives. Lastly, the more direct and easily understood economic benefits of improved fisheries management was conducive for REC and stakeholder ownership, whereas the economic importance of e.g. biodiversity as a global good is less easily appreciated. This issue appears also to have affected the prioritisation of the EU's areas support, and EU's global commitment under the UN convention on Biodiversity (CBD) of doubling its funding for biodiversity is unlikely to be met in the region.

The regional NRM programmes were generally gender sensitive.

**Initiatives under EU's regional NRM programmes often, but not always, had a clear regional dimension and tackled challenges that could not be handled effectively at the national level.** The programmes to various degrees focused on regional and transboundary issues, such as: a) regional policy formulation and harmonisation of national policies, and b) cooperation on the management of transboundary natural resources (e.g. fish stocks, ecosystems), and c) sharing of knowledge and experiences. A notable example is the support for joint regional fisheries surveillance in the South West Indian Ocean (SWIO) (see case study 4). Nonetheless, the programmes also engaged at the national and sub-national levels, often in relation to the management of shared resources. In several cases, local level piloting did not concern transboundary resources, but aimed at generating best practices relevant to more than one country. Moreover, tangible benefits at the national level was central to ensuring stakeholder engagement; where such benefits were not visible, stakeholder ownership and sustainability was low, e.g. in the case of the regional coral reef network supported by ISLANDS and CMISBM/Biodiversité (IOC).

**Significant changes were achieved under EDF 10 in relation to regional cooperation and policy harmonisation, especially in relation to fisheries.** A number of results were achieved by SmartFish in the SWIO in relation to: a) strengthening regional institutional and policy frameworks, b) promoting harmonisation of national policies with regional, and c) improving fisheries management and enforcement through inter-state cooperation (see case study 4). ISLANDS and CMISBM made a contribution towards improving regional biodiversity frameworks, notably through the establishment of the Coral Reef Facility for the SWIO. BMP facilitated the adoption of an IGAD regional biodiversity policy and the drafting of transboundary management plans for selected landscapes. As such, EU support to some extent contributed towards enhanced regional integration in the NRM sector.

**EU support contributed to improved governance and increased private sector and community participation in natural resource management, especially vis-à-vis fisheries at the sub-national level.** EU's regional programmes promoted public-private/community co-management of protected areas and fish stocks. SmartFish also engaged in improving selected value chains, such as mud-crabs in Madagascar. SmartFish achieved particularly good results in terms of engaging the private sector. Moreover, the programmes engaged in improving environmental monitoring and access to data, as well as enhancing public and decision-maker awareness, which contributed towards enabling informed decision-making and transparency. SmartFish improved monitoring, control and surveillance, although sanctioning can still be improved and the intensity of regional surveillance was significantly reduced compared to the support provided under EDF 9.

**Environmental and socio-economic improvements were achieved vis-à-vis selected fisheries, especially at the local level, but other impacts on ecosystem management and biodiversity are more limited.** SmartFish led to a number of tangible environmental and economic impacts in project sites, such as: a) reduced pressure on, and recovery of, specific fish stocks; b) reduction in illegal and destructive fishing practices; and c) improved production, reduced post-harvest losses, and enhanced profits. However, tangible impacts vis-à-vis biodiversity management and sustainable livelihoods have so far been limited under CMISBM and BMP due to major implementation gaps and delays, e.g. CMISBM implementation started in mid-2015, although designed in 2011, and the implementation of NGO pilot projects commenced in 2017.

**EU's engagement has strengthened the process of moving towards enhanced regional cooperation and integration vis-à-vis governing and managing regionally important natural resources, in particular in relation to fisheries.** EU has provided financial resources for regional programmes that enhanced regional capacities, policy frameworks and mechanisms vis-à-vis sustainable management of important natural resources. However, EU's contribution is more

than the provision of financial resources. Overall, the regional programmes are responding to the needs and priorities of the region; here EU has played an important role in bringing in international expertise, analysing the context, identifying capacity gaps, and developing strategies for the way forward, often building on the results of previous EU programmes. EU has also carried out oversight of programme implementation. The support has gone hand-in-hand with measures to enhance trade and the access of EA-SA-IO countries to the European market, such as EPAs and Fishery Partnership Agreements (FPAs).

**Institutional and individual capacities were enhanced at all levels, but the impact on process management capacity was modest.** A major contribution of the NRM programmes was enhanced institutional and individual capacities of regional entities, government institutions, private sector, and communities. Environmental and fisheries monitoring and data management capacities were enhanced through trainings and equipment. Planning and policy-making capacities were strengthened with tools and knowledge. Fisheries enforcement capacities were enhanced through trainings and facilitation of enhanced interstate cooperation. Capacities of producers were enhanced vis-à-vis improving product quality and livelihoods diversification, and community and local authority capacities were enhanced in relation to sustainable natural resource management. Youth and children attained knowledge and some skills through educational activities. National climate change negotiation skills were strengthened by ISLANDS in preparation for the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change COP21 in Paris (2015). Regional institutional frameworks were to some extent strengthened, e.g. with the strengthening of regional fisheries authorities and commissions and the establishment of a regional artisanal fishers' federation. However, due to the heavy reliance on external consultants, the strengthening of process and programme planning and management capacities was limited.

**The regional NRM programmes were generally gender sensitive,** a number of activities specifically targeted women. For example, SmartFish and ISLAND both aimed at improving women's livelihoods; female fish traders and processors were trained in hygiene and value addition (improving product quality), and processing of fish by-products. The Bimbini Women Association in Comoros is engaging in couture, handicrafts and improved stoves. Women (and children) were also targeted through awareness raising on the nutritional and health benefits of fish consumption.

**The achievement of the intended results as well as sustainability was significantly hampered by delays and gaps caused by inefficiencies.** CMISBM and BMP have experienced major delays, which has hampered the achievement of results and sustainability. For example, the implementation of NGO pilot projects under CMISBM only commenced in 2017, due to long delays in the call for proposals process. The call for proposals under ENERGIES was similarly affected. Moreover, CMISBM was affected by a prolonged period without a programme manager, due to difficulties in finding a replacement which fulfilled the ToR criteria. Design shortcomings also affected the achievement of results; ISLANDS II was initially overcomplicated with 14 flagship projects, so the focus was subsequently narrowed, e.g. with the transfer of most NRM activities to CMISBM. The pilot site selection under BMP was not appropriate, insecurity was a major obstacle to implementation in two of the three sites, whereas remoteness was an obstacle in the third site. The complexity of EU procedures and difficulties with their application was another cause of delays affecting all programmes. BMP was affected by a freeze on disbursements to IGAD in 2015 due to ineligible expenses under other EU funded programmes. Moreover, initiatives under ISLANDS and CMISBM suffered from prolonged gaps in support from one phase to the next due to lengthy programme preparation processes; which meant e.g. the coral reef network went dormant and had to be reactivated. SmartFish appears to be the only NRM programme which was not significantly hampered by the above inefficiencies, even if still affected. (see also EQ 7 on efficiency)

**The results achieved are for the most part unsustainable, a notable exception being SmartFish pilot actions involving the private sector and communities.** There was often an overdependence on external assistance and insufficient involvement of RECs and national stakeholders in activity planning and implementation. Overall, insufficient attention was paid during implementation to ensuring an institutional home for the processes initiated and results achieved and that the partners have the financial means for continuation. For example, no financial mechanism has been put in place for continued joint fisheries surveillance (see case study 4). Stakeholder ownership is sometimes, but not always, sufficiently strong. Nonetheless, SmartFish actions involving the private sector and communities are often sustainable and being replicated, due to the immediate economic gains and the simplicity of the approaches. For fisheries and climate change/resilience, there is good continuity in the EU support with new EDF 11 regional programmes continuing the support for the processes supported by SmartFish and ISLANDS. However, there is very little continuity in the support provided for biodiversity and thus a high risk that processes initiated will not lead to the intended impacts and the results will not be sustained.

**The programme strategies were sometimes, but not always, conducive to achieving the intended outcomes and objectives.** The value chains approach and engagement of the private sector and communities of SmartFish was highly effective and led to more sustainable fisheries management and improved incomes. However, funds were spread thinly over several countries (SmartFish) and a wide range of initiatives (e.g. ISLANDS), and often regional capacity and system development was not sufficiently linked to strengthening the national level (to ensure that the skills imparted were put to use and that national actions would feed into the regional processes), e.g. in the case of regional coral reef monitoring. Moreover, with the exception of SmartFish, the regional programmes suffered from a lack of longer term strategy to ensure sustained change.

**EU's global commitment under the Convention on Biological Diversity of doubling its funding for biodiversity is unlikely to be met in the EA-SA-IO region.** The regional funding for biodiversity in EA-SA-IO has increased slightly from € 29 m under EDF 10 to € 30 m under EDF 11. Moreover, Biodiversity is generally not a focal area for bilateral support for the EA-SA-IO countries, also reflecting that biodiversity is not a high priority for EA-SA-IO governments. Hence, the geographic funding for EA-SA-IO is not contributing to meeting the commitment made by EU in 2012 under the Convention on Biological Diversity of doubling its funding for biodiversity. While this commitment was made at the global level, it should be kept in mind that the EA-SA-IO region arguably has the most iconic megafauna in the world and contains a number of biodiversity hotspots. Meeting the commitment in the EA-SA-IO region would entirely depend on a major increase in biodiversity funding under the environment and climate change priority area of the “*Programme on Global Public Goods and Challenges*” programme.

**JC 5.1 “EU support contributed to the establishment of a regional policy and institutional framework, which is conducive for regional cooperation and management of natural resources”**

**Regional and transboundary coordination and cooperation mechanisms on ecosystems and fisheries were in some, but not all cases, successfully strengthened or established.** An important element of the programmes was the strengthening of regional institutions and/or establishing new mechanisms for coordination and cooperation on biodiversity and fisheries. However, the extent to which these endeavours have led to tangible results varies. The IOC Coral Reef Facility was successfully re-activated with technical and financial support from ISLANDS; a major factor being the proactive leadership provided by Réunion. But, the establishment of the Western Indian Ocean Conservation Trust Fund was hampered by insufficient engagement of the lead country, the Seychelles, until 2016. SmartFish strengthened existing regional structures, incl.

SWIOFC (South West Indian Ocean Fisheries Commission), IOTC (Indian Ocean Tuna Commission), and LVFO (Lake Victoria Fisheries Organisation), with trainings and pilot actions targeting the control of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing and promoting shared fisheries (authorities and fishing community) management. Moreover, SmartFish made significant contributions (capacity development, meetings) to enhanced regional cooperation in relation to IOC, IOTC and LVFO, e.g. around monitoring, control and surveillance (see case study 4). Efforts under BMP to set up transboundary cooperation mechanisms for three landscapes in the Horn of Africa has moved slowly, while draft management plans have been prepared for all three; in two landscapes, progress was significantly limited by insecurity. It is too early to assess the setting up of the intended biodiversity policy harmonisation mechanism by CMISBM. (I-5.1.1, I-5.3.1, 5.4.1)

**EU's regional support has to a certain extent helped with improving and harmonising regional and national policies and the strategic framework.** Some regional/sub-regional policies have been put in place with technical inputs from the EU for policy analysis and drafting. A regional IGAD biodiversity policy was adopted in 2016 with support from BMP. CMISBM is supporting the development of regional protocols on invasive species and endangered sharks and rays for the SWIO, regional policies on invasive species and megafauna, and regional integrated coastal zone management legislation. It is not feasible to establish an overarching EA-SA-IO regional fisheries strategy due to diverging national interests, so SmartFish has instead promoted the reaching of a common ground between the various sub-regional strategies of the RECs, and also supported the improvement of the IOC regional strategy for fisheries and aquaculture, the draft EAC aquaculture strategy and action plan, the SWIO tuna strategy, the Lake Victoria Nile perch strategy, the Lake Tanganyika action plan and draft aquaculture protocol, and fish standards for EAC and SADC. The regional programmes also aim at harmonising national policies with regional frameworks. CMISBM will support the drafting of the Environment Code in Madagascar. ISLANDS has not engaged directly in national policy, but tools provided were used for the drafting of Madagascar's National Development Plan's axis on natural capital and disaster management. SmartFish carried out assessments of national policies in 20 countries and supported the development of fisheries governance strategies in Madagascar and Zanzibar, and the harmonisation of fishery policies and strategies related to Lake Tanganyika. BMP assessed national policies as an input to the regional IGAD biodiversity policy. (I-5.1.1, I-5.1.2)

### JC 5.2 "EU support contributed to enhancing the knowledge base on ecosystem management"

**Environmental monitoring and data access was to a certain extent improved.** Monitoring and improved access to data to inform decision-making was central to the regional programmes, through studies, training, and provision of equipment. BMP (IGAD) contributed to the establishment of a regional on-line information system fed by national databases with common indicators. CMISBM and ISLANDS (IOC) contribute to improving biodiversity monitoring and regional data sharing in line with the Convention on Biodiversity and the Nairobi Convention by establishing the Regional Coral Reef Observatory and revitalising the Coral Reef Monitoring Network (but the website is no longer functional). CMISBM also supports the establishment of regional and national databases on terrestrial plants. A climate change observatory intended under ISLANDS was temporally suspended due to insufficient leadership from the Seychelles until 2016. SmartFish engaged in enhancing fisheries monitoring, e.g. of small pelagics in Tanzania-Zanzibar, publication of governance information (licenses, concessions, fees, fines), establishment of economic intelligence units (albeit with modest results), a website with fisheries data for the IOC region, and piloting a post-harvest loss assessment system. (I-5.2.2, I-5.2.3, I-5.3.1, I-5.4.2)

**New knowledge and tools on ecosystems and fisheries were made available.** SmartFish carried out several studies, e.g. on economic and social contributions of fisheries (incl. food security), artisanal fishery value chains and post-harvest losses, and the impact of inland fisheries on fish stocks. ISLANDS (IOC) carried out analyses on issues related to coral reef management and ecosystem services provided by coral reefs in the light of climate change. A draft atlas on coral reefs in the IOC region was elaborated, but never finalised due to insufficient consideration to sensitivities related to conflicting territorial claims. A manual on coral reef monitoring was also developed. Moreover, ISLANDS and CMISBM carried out assessments on ecosystems natural capital accounting. BMP (IGAD) enhanced the knowledge of ecological, physical, social and economic features in its pilot transboundary landscapes. Education, information and knowledge tools were developed and some studies and publications were made under CMISBM. (I-5.2.1)

**EU support contributed to enhancing the awareness on sustainable development, ecosystems and fisheries, from environmental and socio-economic perspectives.** All four sample projects engaged in awareness raising, targeting a broad range of audiences, including policy-makers, local authorities, communities (incl. fishermen's wives and children), youth, producers and traders (incl. women small-scale processors), and consumers (incl. women and children). Civil society was significantly involved in this, a significant proportion of the awareness-raising was implemented by NGOs. Women fish traders and processors were sensitised on hygiene and value addition, and women and children were made aware of the nutritional and health benefits of fish consumption. Both SmartFish and ISLANDS targeted youth on environmental conservation and sustainable use of natural resources, notable examples are ISLANDS' support for eco-school establishment and for the Inspired Generations (IG) programme. A broad range of activities were implemented, such as articles, radio and TV programmes, videos, public events, puppet shows, courses and programmes at schools and universities, giving the eco-schools a good visibility. Some of these activities reached a large number of people, ISLANDS phase II sensitised more than 13,000 people on sustainable development, and SmartFish trained 17,000 pupils in Madagascar on integrated rice farming-aquaculture (IOC). Low awareness and skills among decision-makers at all levels remain a challenge, but EU support did contribute to an enhanced awareness. (I-5.2.4, I-5.3.2)

**Networking and sharing of experiences on ecosystem management seems somewhat modest.** Overall, the sharing of information and experiences in the region is limited and opportunities for mutual learning are thus lost. EU supported programmes aimed at addressing this gap, but seemingly with limited results. One of the purposes of the Coral Reef Network created under ISLANDS and supported by CMISBM was to promote sharing of experiences and skills transfer (IOC). SmartFish provided opportunities for sharing, such as sub-regional workshops and trade events, and facilitated the creation of regional networks (on post-harvest losses, and fish technology and safety). BMP promoted sharing between IGAD member states and stakeholders through online tools (but the contribution to enhanced networking appears modest). CMISBM is aiming at creating biodiversity thematic centres for sharing. (I-5.2.3)

### JC 5.3 "EU support contributed to enhancing environmental governance"

**Enforcement in selected fisheries was significantly improved.** SmartFish achieved good results in monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS), and enabled: a) joint patrolling and coordination of MCS in Lake Victoria, b) joint regional patrolling in the SWIO, where the sharing of equipment enabled the patrolling of areas previously not reached, c) improved regional vessels monitoring and data exchange on tuna fisheries (although sanctioning and monitoring of landings and transshipment still needs improving), and d) improved compliance with the IOTC resolution (see case study 4). The joint patrolling mainly took place under the Plan Regional Surveillance des

Pêches (PRSP) project under EDF 9; under SmartFish, the intensity of joint patrolling was lower due to a reduced EU allocation and an increased demand for contributions from the SWIO States. SmartFish provided financing for rental of vessels and planes and fuel, and training for national inspectors. Regulation and enforcement was also improved at the national level, in particular in relation to combatting blast fishing in Tanzania, and community-based regulation and enforcement in Lake Malawi and of spiny lobster fisheries in Madagascar. (I-5.3.1)

**Private sector and communities were involved through public-private partnerships, co-management in pilot sites and value chain approaches; generating viable models for replication.** ISLANDS (IOC) involved private sector and communities through public-private partnerships in a number of pilot actions; such as ecotourism and payment for ecosystem services (to generate funds for catchment rehabilitation) in three protected areas in Rodrigues/Mauritius, Seychelles, and Comoros. SmartFish enabled community-based co-management of artisanal fisheries of octopus (Rodrigues/Mauritius, Pemba/Tanzania), spiny lobster (St Luce/Madagascar), sea cucumber (Seychelles), kapenta (Lake Kariba) and Nile perch (Lake Victoria), through awareness raising, training, and facilitating the development of plans and bylaws. ISLANDS mobilised the private sector in risk insurance and reducing food waste. SmartFish engaged the private sector through a value chains approach: a) direct inputs were provided to improve processing and marketing of octopus products (Rodrigues/Mauritius) and Lake Victoria fish by-products (Uganda), and b) mud-crab value chains were made more efficient and post-harvest losses reduced through the introduction of better handling techniques and equipment (Madagascar). Moreover, SmartFish facilitated the establishment of the first SWIO regional federation of artisanal fishers. BMP (IGAD) promoted community and private sector involvement in ecosystem co-management and conservation in three landscapes, but seemingly with limited progress in part due to delays and issues related to the pilot area selection (e.g. insecurity or remoteness). CMISBM (IOC) has launched a call for proposal schemes, which had community-level capacity development as one objective, but implementation has not started yet, although a community-based pilot on octopus fisheries management was implemented in Mauritius. Some activities specifically aimed at improving women's livelihoods and thereby empowered them economically, e.g. SmartFish supported Ugandan women processors and traders in value addition and improving product quality and processing of fish by-products. ISLANDS supported the Bimbini Women Association (Comoros) in engaging in selling couture, handicrafts and improved stoves. (I-5.3.2, I-5.3.3)

**Tangible environmental and economic impacts were achieved, particularly in relation to fisheries at the local level.** SmartFish led to tangible impacts in specific project sites. Economic impacts include: a) improved and increased production of octopus, mud-crabs and spiny lobster, b) reduced post-harvest losses of mud-crabs, and c) increased profits from fisheries (octopus, mud crab, Nile perch, kapenta), estimated to significantly outweigh the costs of SmartFish. Environmental impacts include: a) reduced pressure of lagoon fisheries in Mauritius as a result of introducing co-management, aquaculture and alternative livelihoods, b) improved composition of tuna by-catches (due to improved monitoring control and surveillance, see case study 4), c) reduced blast fishing and use of destructive fishing equipment in Tanzania (by strengthening surveillance capacities), d) recovery of fish stocks in Lake Victoria (due to improved monitoring, control and surveillance), e) recovery of octopus stock in Rodrigues Island, Mauritius, and f) recovery of spiny lobster stocks in St. Luce, Madagascar. Tangible impacts vis-à-vis biodiversity management and derived incomes has been limited in the case of BMP (IGAD) due to implementation delays and programme design issues (e.g. pilot site selection not being fully appropriate), and it is premature to expect tangible results from CMISBM (IOC) although a pilot on voluntary temporary closure of octopus fisheries in Mauritius reportedly led to increased catches. (I-5.3.1, I-5.3.3)

**JC 5.4 “Sufficient mechanisms were put in place to ensure sustainability”**

**The engagement and ownership of stakeholders varied and the management capacity of RECs/DMROs and national governments was not adequately enhanced to ensure post-project continuation.** All programmes in the sample relied heavily on external technical assistance. Considering the capacity constraints of the DMROs, this made good sense and facilitated the achievement of results, as was particularly evident for SmartFish but also for ISLANDS (IOC). However, the flipside was insufficient stakeholder ownership and capacity to assume a leadership role; as DMRO staff and national governments were often not sufficiently involved in project planning and implementation. Nonetheless, there were cases of good stakeholder participation; ISLANDS had a good degree of participation and institutional strengthening, e.g. in relation to the platforms established, which were each led by a country – the leadership of Réunion provided for the Coral Reef Facility was a major factor behind its success. But even for ISLANDS some activities suffered from inadequate response from the participating countries, one reason being a modest level of demonstrable benefits at the country level. Similarly, the country ownership of CMISBM (IOC) was low, one reason being a low level of engagement and low visibility at the national level – e.g. when capacity building was provided on coral reef monitoring, but no support was provided for the actual use of the skills imparted at the national level. SmartFish was successful in terms of engaging the private sector, communities, and NGOs in pilot activities (see below), but otherwise the anchorage at regional and government institutions was weak, and the DMROs, regional fisheries bodies and national governments are generally not sufficiently capacitated to continue implementation and service provision without external support, e.g. in the case of the joint fisheries surveillance in the SWIO (see case study 4). (I-5.4.1, I-5.4.2, I-5.4.3)

**RECs and national governments do not have the financial resources needed to continue processes and the enhanced service provision after programme completion.** Regional and national institutions (e.g. fisheries bodies) lack the financial capacity to provide services at the same level as the EU funded programmes, and they depend to an extent on irregular project funding. Maintenance and upscaling of the new services will be a challenge for the countries, especially the LDCs. Insufficient attention has been paid to financial sustainability; partners have rarely provided cash contributions, an exception being Réunion’s contribution to the Coral Reef Facility (Réunion is ineligible for DEVCO funding). It is unlikely that national fisheries departments will continue SmartFish activities, as evidenced by the reduced intensity in joint surveillance from PRSP to SmartFish as a direct result of reduced EU funding. IOC and IGAD are to a large extent financially donor-dependent so the ability to continue promoting cooperation on NRM depends on continued donor support, and IGAD has no provisions for ensuring continuation of the processes initiated under BMP. On the positive side, good partnerships have been established and some processes will be continued under other projects, e.g. The Nature Conservancy is implementing two regional initiatives developed/strengthened under ISLANDS I. (I-5.4.2, JC-3.1, I-5.3.1)

**The community co-management and private-sector models tested by SmartFish have shown a good degree of sustainability and replication.** The value-chain approach taken by SmartFish was simple and profitable for the private sector and thus led to good results in terms of post-project continuation. Similarly, the approach to community co-management of fisheries was simple and there has been a good degree of replication by governments and communities, often with financial support from IOC, but also spontaneously – although upscaling to national level is a challenge. Indeed, sustainability and replication is mainly achieved by initiatives, which have provided immediate economic benefits for the private sector and communities. The models applied thus show good prospects of sustainability and SmartFish has shown that simple models can be cost-effective entry points to improving fisheries management. (I-5.4.1, I-5.4.2, I-5.3.3)



**There is good continuity in EU's regional support for fisheries, but there is a lack of continuity in relation to biodiversity – where continuity is lacking, significant impact and sustainability is unlikely to happen.** The continuity has been very good in relation to fisheries and this is the area where the most convincing results have been achieved. Support for other NRM themes has been significantly affected by gap periods. The good results achieved under SmartFish are linked to the fact that EU has provided continuous support to fisheries management in SWIO, going further back than PRSP (EDF 9); and with the two planned EDF 11 programmes on marine fisheries (cross-regional) and inland fisheries in the Victoria Basin (EAC), there is a good degree of continuity, which can help strengthen results achieved and move towards sustainability. In the case of ISLANDS II, further support for IOC is envisaged under EDF 11 for disaster management and climate change, providing an opportunity to enhance results in ISLANDS II's core area of engagement and move towards sustainability. Conversely, the BMP support for biodiversity and livelihoods in three transboundary landscapes does not benefit from such continuity; BMP was a new initiative, and no biodiversity support is planned for IGAD under EDF 11. The envisaged allocation under the cross-regional programme on wildlife for the biodiversity management component is modest and covers numerous landscapes. Moreover, none of the implementing partners have a long-established presence in the landscapes, but were engaged specifically to implement BMP. Hence, no funding is secured for the implementation of the management plans developed, leaving little scope for real impact or sustainability. Similarly, for CMISBM, there is no planned continuation. The regional coral reef network went into hiatus due to gaps in EU support before ISLANDS I and again before CMISBM, this is likely to occur again after CMISBM. (I-5.4.2)

#### Summary of selected points that are DMRO-specific

DMRO	Notes (JC)
COMESA	No NRM support.
EAC	No NRM support under EDF 10. SmartFish supported the Lake Victoria Fisheries Organisation. EDF 11 programmes: a) integrated water resources management, and b) inland fisheries.
IGAD	EDF 10 programmes: BMP and Inland WRM (Inland Water Resources Management). EDF 11: the Trust Fund for the IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI), incl NRM, focusing on four selected transboundary areas.
IOC	EDF 10 programmes: SmartFish, ISLANDS, CMISBM, and ENERGIES. EDF 11 programmes: a) climate change and disaster management, and b) food security.
SADC	EDF 10 programme: environmental monitoring, a small part of the pan-African Monitoring for environment and Security in Africa (MESA) under AU. EDF 11 programmes: food security and the SADC regional agricultural policy.

## EQ 6. Coherence, complementarity and coordination

**To what extent have EU interventions been coherent with other EU actions in the region and with EU policies beyond development cooperation, complementary with those of member states, and coordinated with those of the other development partners?**

### Answer for the evaluation question

#### Summary:

Policy coherence for development (PCD) has special importance for the EU, given the wide range of policies and instruments it has and employs to promote development and its mandate to build complementarity with member states. With regards to regional cooperation in the three areas of trade, peace and security, and natural resource management, there is no manifest policy incoherence across the EU nor between the regional development policies of the EU and that of other development partners, including member states. This is thanks to (i) special efforts to improve PCD within the EU, especially since the Lisbon Treaty (e.g. efforts to bring development

and CFSP approaches and instruments together with the creation of EEAS); (ii) to the design and implementation of the RIPs that include efforts to minimise negative spillovers in trade and fisheries; and (iii) to generally satisfactory coordination with other development partners regarding support to DMROs. In peace and security, the coherence of policies for peace and security has long been the object of specific EU attention, as reflected in the EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises (EEAS and EC, 2013), complemented by the EU Global Strategy, 2016.

However, at the operational level, the EA-SA-IO RIP lacked synchronisation and synergies with other instruments and actions, both in the realm of development cooperation and beyond (trade, infrastructure, peace, security, democracy and natural resource management). There would be both more efficiency and more impact if better synchronisation and synergies were realised.

**→ There is no manifest incoherence across EU policies and with policies of EU Members States and other development partners, but there is limited synchronisation and synergies.**

**Policy coherence for development (PCD) has special importance for the EU**, given the wide range of policies and instruments it has and employs to promote development (Table 3 below), and its mandate to build complementarity with member states. This evaluation considers PCD with regards to regional cooperation in the three areas of trade, peace and security, and natural resource management. Policies considered for this evaluation included WTO Agreements, the Cotonou Agreement, various ACP accords, the 'Everything but Arms' (EBA) trade preferences for LDCs, the Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP and GSP+) for developing countries, Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with ACP countries, the EU's *Agenda for Change 2011*, the 2013 Communication "A Decent Life for All"; the 2013 Council Conclusions on EU Support for Sustainable Change in Transition Societies; the 2013 EU Approach to Resilience, the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and their successor, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the Aid for Trade agenda; in peace and security the 2008 EU Approach to Implement UN Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security; the 2008 Report on Implementation of a European Security Strategy, 2008 the EC/EU HR Paper and Climate Change and Security, the 2009 Concept on Strengthening EU mediation and Dialogue capacities, the 2012 Council Conclusions on Common Security and Defence Policy, the 2012 Council Conclusions on Conflict Prevention, the 2013 joint EC/EU HR Comprehensive Approach to Conflict and Crises, the 2015 Global Strategy, the 2011 Council Conclusions on the Horn of Africa, the 2013 Council Conclusions on the Great Lakes Region; in Migration the 2015 European Agenda on Migration and 2016 New Partnership Framework with third countries under it; in Development the 2012 Agenda for Change; and in fisheries, the Common Fisheries Policy and Fisheries Partnership Agreements with individual EA-SA-IO states.

**Table 3 – Main EU financial instruments and Trust Funds that are likely to affect EASAI0**

Type of instrument	Name of instrument (managing entity in brackets)	Comments
Geographic	EDF 1. Country-level Multi-annual Indicative Programmes 2. Regional Indicative Programmes (the focus of this evaluation)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Outside EU budget</li> <li>– All spending under geographic programmes should be ODA-eligible.</li> </ul>

Type of instrument	Name of instrument (managing entity in brackets)	Comments
	The continental Intra-ACP Programme; includes the African Peace Facility, which has no ODA requirement	
Geographic and thematic	DCI (DEVCO) 1. Country Programmes 2. Global Public Goods and Challenges 3. Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities 4. Pan-African Programme 5. ENRTP ((Environment and Sustainable Management of Natural Resources, including Energy Thematic Programme)	All spending under geographic programmes, and at least 90 per cent of the Pan-African Programme, should be ODA-eligible.
Thematic	1. EIDHR (DEVCO)	At least 95 per cent for thematic programmes should be ODA-eligible. IcSP: No ODA requirement.
	2. IcSP (FPI/DEVCO)	
	3. Horizon 2020	
	4. EU Food Facility	
	5. EU Electoral Observation Missions (FPI)	
Humanitarian	Humanitarian aid instrument (ECHO)	
Common Foreign and Security Policy	CFSP/CSDP (FPI)	Current CSDP missions include: EU NAVFOR Somalia; EUCAP Somalia; and EUTM Somalia. Completed missions and operations include EUAVSEC South Sudan; ARTEMIS/DRC; EUPOL RD CONGO; EUSEC RD CONGO; EUFOR RD Congo NB: This evaluation and therefore this list only includes matters that concern eastern DR Congo – DR Congo as a whole is part of the ongoing evaluation of EU regional cooperation with Central Africa. NB: CSP is also carried out and supported by EU Special Representatives (EUSRs- such as the EUSR for the Horn; the EUSR for the Great Lakes.
Lending	EIB external lending Macrofinancial Assistance	
EU Trust Funds	EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa	Three windows: Sahel/Chad; North; Horn) Funded from the EU budget and the European Development Fund (EDF), to be complemented by contributions from EU Member States and other donors

**Some EU member states support regional organisations but often with more limited funding than the EU and they focus on specific issues and projects**, whereas the EU's support is often core support and often spans four sectors or more per regional organisation. Moreover, there are mechanisms to ensure the complementarity of regional programming with that of member states and coordination with other development partners. Most of these mechanisms are at DMRO level, and the EU's coordination role (with EU member states) is usually viewed

positively, although the approach is far from being one of joint programming (i.e. joint objectives, joint approaches, and concerted programming).

**Within the realm of development cooperation, there is no manifest incoherence between the objectives of the RIPs and the objectives of other EU actions, nor between the regional cooperation of the EU and the regional cooperation of other development partners, including member states<sup>1</sup>.** This is thanks to (i) special efforts to improve PCD within the EU, especially since the Lisbon Treaty; (ii) to the design and implementation of the RIPs that include efforts to minimise negative spillovers in trade and fisheries; and (iii) to generally satisfactory coordination with other development partners at DMRO level. In peace and security, the coherence of policies for peace and security has long been the object of specific EU attention, as reflected in the EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises (EEAS and EC, 2013), complemented by the EU Global Strategy, 2016.

**However, on the operational front, the EA-SA-IO RIP lacked synchronisation and synergies with other EU instruments and policies; and there is little coordination with other development partners at the operational level.** Examples abound of similar issues being addressed in the same country by several instruments, and more often than not, EUDs do not have a bird's eye view of all the EU-funded programmes and projects in the relevant region or country—nor of those of EU member states and other development partners. This leads not only to inefficiencies and high transaction costs, but also is a key limitation for the EU to translate its massive investment in regional cooperation and in Africa more generally into policy influence and transformative impact. In regional cooperation, the EU punches much below its financial weight.

**The evaluation found more consensus across the EU and consulted EU member states<sup>2</sup> than originally apparent on “principles of engagement” with the AU, DMROs, regional initiatives, and partner countries in EA-SA-IO.** It could be summarised as follows:

- (i) Some regional matters are better handled by crossborder initiatives involving two or more concerned partner countries that demonstrate enough political will and capacity to promote regional public goods (a needs-based, bottom-up approach);
- (ii) Only rarely are regional organisations well placed to be operationally involved in responding to regional challenges; (iii) these crossborder initiatives should take place within the policy framework and policy coordination of DMROs or the AU (as relevant<sup>3</sup>);
- (iii) Support to the AU and support to DMROs are complementary to each other but should be more predictable and more focused. It is wasteful to fund several organisations doing the same thing in the same place, and to fund actions in themes they have no mandate, positive track record or expertise in.

There is less consensus on whether DMROs should do anything more than policy making and monitoring: concerned countries brought together under concrete regional initiatives could be in charge of operational coordination in many cases (subsidiarity principle).

**There is value added in addressing challenges of trade, infrastructure, peace, security, democracy and natural resource management at the regional level but there would be more impact if synergies were realised.** The AU's capacity for policy coordination and for domestication of these policies is limited, some DMROs have on some issues been effective

<sup>1</sup> It should be note that there are a number of theoretical questions regarding the coherence of development and migration policies (development may in fact stimulate illegal migration when legal migration is difficult, issues of brain drain and remittances...) but it was too early to draw any conclusions on practical examples of policy incoherence arising from the growing migration agenda.

<sup>2</sup> Consulted EU member states included Denmark, France, Germany, Norway, Sweden, and the UK.

<sup>3</sup> DMROs have less geographical reach but sometimes more influence on behaviours, e.g. in electoral matters.

“building blocks” of the AU (e.g. SADC), and some regional initiatives outside of DMROs are proving successful, not the least because they are both need-based and opportunity-driven (e.g. ICLGR on natural resources). However, a participatory mapping of which regional organisation or initiative is best placed to do what, and within that universe which development partner is supporting what, would go a long way to achieve the kind of structural transformation regional cooperation hopes to achieve.

**JC 6.1 “The EU’s regional cooperation was coherent with other European Union policies, strategies and programmes impacting the EA-SA-IO region”**

**The EU has and employs a wide range of instruments to promote development.** In a typical EA-SA-IO country, there is a need to manage in a mutually supportive way a range of strategies and over ten financial instruments (see Table 1 in Annex 4/EQ6 for a list of instruments and policies relevant to EA-SA-IO and Box 1 in Annex 4/EQ6 for a list of EU initiatives in the Horn of Africa). In addition, a subset of EA-SA-IO countries is under *several* RIPs (e.g. nine countries in SADC under EDF 10; DR Congo under EDF 11). To further complicate the picture, the traditional regional approach, based on the AU and DMROs as “building blocks” of the AU, is being challenged by a “new regionalism” (Vircoulon, 2017), that builds on “coalitions of the willing” rather than the DMRO country groupings. This new regionalism is explicit in the 2016 Global Strategy: “*regional organisations do not address all relevant dynamics, and some reflect existing cleavages. We will therefore also act flexibly to help bridge divides and support regional players in delivering concrete results.*” This new regionalism can be found in the EU Trust Fund for Africa, which has three windows that do not correspond to DMRO country groupings; the ICGLR; the TKZ project in energy infrastructure, the Khartoum process on migration. Support to regional organisations (traditional regionalism) and support to regional initiatives outside of the latter (new regionalism) are not necessarily contradictory unless the relationship is clear, which is not always the case. (i6.1.1)

**In making use of its multiple instruments, the EU has devoted increased attention to improving PCD and there is no manifest incoherence across EU policies.** The 2007 Lisbon Treaty commits the EU to ensure coherence of all EU policies with EU development objectives, and has helped progress PCD by creating the post of EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) - European Commission Vice-President (VP), ensuring that the EU representative also has access to EU instruments. Heads of Delegations are responsible for ensuring policy coherence for development at their level. Moreover, the European Parliament has a standing Rapporteur for policy coherence for development. New EU initiatives and policies are assessed for the impact they may have on development before approval, using inter-service consultations and consulting with partner countries. Box 15 below and box 4 in Annex 4/EQ6 provide highlights on PCD in security and migration respectively.

**Box 15 – Increased attention to policy coherence in peace and security matters**

In peace and security matters, lack of coherence can easily lead to no results at all — or even do harm. And a lack of progress in one area — be it political, security, economic or social — risks reversing the whole transition process. For example, in Niger, improving livelihoods in the short term was a condition for restoring security, and at the same time security was needed to improve livelihoods.

The coherence of policies for peace and security has long been the object of specific EU attention, as reflected in the EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises (EEAS and EC, 2013), which sets out several practical steps in carrying out a comprehensive approach: (i) develop a shared analysis, (ii) define a common strategic vision, (iii) focus on crisis prevention, (iv) mobilise the various strengths and capacities of the EU, (v) commit to the long term, (vi) link policies and internal and external actions, (vii) make better use of EU Delegations and (viii) work in partnership with other international and regional actors.

The 2015 “European Agenda on Security” calls for a “more joined-up inter-agency and cross-sectorial approach.” The 2015 “European Agenda on Migration” spells out what such a “joined-up approach” means in tackling the refugee and migration crisis.

The meaning and scope of the “comprehensive approach” has been expanded recently (EU Global Strategy, 2016), with:

- The resilience agenda and the SDGs clearly underpinning the EU’s approach
- Explicit links made between humanitarian, development, migration and peacebuilding actions
- Clearer distinction of the different stages of the conflict cycle (prevention, response, stabilization, and avoidance of premature disengagement) and
- Clearer levels of EU engagement (local, national, regional and global), with emphasis on the regional and international partnerships required
- Promotion of more joined-up approaches e.g. joint analysis, joint risk assessment, multi-year programming.

Since the Lisbon Treaty, there have been serious efforts to bring development and CFSP approaches and instruments together with the creation of EEAS. This is leading, over time, to common standards with regards to the EU’s role in the security and development nexus. For example, through joint conflict analysis across DEVCO and EEAS, feeding regional and bilateral programmes including in 2016 the strategy to support special measures for Sudan.

In the Horn of Africa, the EU together with its Member States is the first contributor to development cooperation in the Horn of Africa, through a wide range of initiatives and instruments. Under EDF10, €645m were provided to regional organisations and initiatives (planning, early warning and response, resilience...), and €2bn to individual IGAD Member States. This is on top of €1.2bn assistance (since 2004) to peace support operations in Somalia, €760m in humanitarian assistance, support to migration-related projects; EUNAVFOR Atalanta counter piracy and EUCAP NESTOR for training national maritime security and law enforcement forces; and the co-chairing of the Horn group of Global Counter-Terrorism Forum.

At the continental level, the EU also supports the AU’s Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and the AU Border Programme.

At the cross-regional level, the EU supports the Critical Maritime Routes Programme (MARSIC) based in Yemen.

This means there are a lot of EU interventions, all with different goals, principles of engagement and timelines, managed either by the EUDs or from Brussels. A Strategic Review led to the three EU CSDP missions and operations (EUTM SOMALIA, EUNAVFOR ATALANTA and EUCAP Nestor) to “*realign their actions in order to ensure as comprehensive an EU effort in the region as possible.*” An approach to transition from Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions to other forms of EU engagement and notably development ones, is being piloted in Somalia.

**PCD for the EU remains a work in progress**, but as far as the RIPs are concerned there are no obvious instances of policy incoherence among EU policies (trade, development, security, politics, human trafficking, counterterrorism, maritime policy). Quite the reverse - RIP design and implementation include efforts to minimise negative spillovers into trade and fisheries.

In trade-related areas, as explained in EQ 1 and 2, the main policy underpinnings are found in the WTO Agreements, the Cotonou Agreement, various ACP accords, the ‘Everything but Arms’ (EBA) trade preferences for LDCs, the Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP and GSP+) for developing countries, Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with ACP countries, the EU’s *Agenda for Change 2011*, the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and their successor, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the Aid for Trade agenda, etc. Virtually all of these have both trade and development (poverty reduction) aims, and are becoming internally consistent in this sense. Added to these are initiatives focusing on governance and security, such as Extractive Industries Transparency, and ‘conflict diamonds’/‘conflict minerals’. In line with the MDGs and SDGs and EU policies, issues such as labour standards, human rights, sustainable environment are becoming more common in EU programmes and agreements, such as EPAs. In May 2016, in its conclusions on ‘The EU and Responsible Global Value Chains’, the Council of Europe called upon the Commission and member states to continue work on PCD, seeking synergies among development cooperation, environmental policy and trade tools. The EU Council and Commission are also recognising the important role that the private sector can and should play in the trade-and-development context.<sup>4</sup> Some examples of PCD in practice (e.g. on SPS-and-trade-and-development) can be found in EQ 2 in the paragraphs just after Box 11.

Nonetheless, although policy coherence may exist on paper, problems can arise in practice if all stakeholders are not on the same wavelength. Examples are provided in EQ 1, paragraph 3, and JC 1.3 and 2.1, among others.

In the area of fisheries, the EU’s main fisheries policies and initiatives that affect EASAIIO countries are the Common Fisheries Policy and Fisheries Partnership Agreements with individual EA-SA-IO states. They promote development in EASAIIO by providing financial and technical support in exchange for fishing right. SmartFish has been supportive of the objectives in the 2014 reform of Common Fisheries Policy to secure fish stocks and the livelihoods of fishing communities by countering unsustainable and illegal practices and overfishing. SmartFish has for example engaged in (i) strengthening monitoring, control and surveillance, (ii) piloting community co-management of coastal fisheries resources, and (iii) reducing losses and improving production, processing and value addition of fish products.

**However, the EA-SA-IO RIP lacked synchronisation and synergies with other instruments and policies.** This is particularly apparent at country level, where multiple instruments pile up without a clear sense of which should work together and how. There is slightly more clarity at the continental and global levels, if only because the sheer number of relevant instruments narrows the further one leaves the country level, but the uniting vision under which EU regional support is provided has also lost some clarity: while the EDF 10 RIPs were clearly against the framework of the African Union and other continent-wide initiatives such as the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), EDF 11 RIPs are conceived more as a juxtaposition of DMRO-specific programmes. The following section considers in turn (i) RIP coherence with country-level actions (focusing on

<sup>4</sup> Council Conclusions, 27 Nov. 2015 on EU's trade and investment policy 14708/15; Council Conclusions 12 December 2014 on "A stronger role of the private sector in development cooperation"16856/14. Council conclusions, 12 May 2016 on 'the EU and Responsible Global Value Chains'.



EDF-funded NIPs); (ii) coherence across regional organisations and initiatives; (iii) coherence with continental action; and (iv) coherence with global actions.

First, the coherence of the EU's regional cooperation coherence (in objectives, approaches and implementation) with country-level European Union policies and actions is on the whole weak. This is a major weakness in the EU's regional cooperation given that regional integration needs DMRO buy-in and needs to translate into results at the country level; and given that the DMRO member states' agendas and interests are major drivers/obstacles of regional integration.

The issues appear to be four-fold, as detailed in Annex 4/EQ6:

- MIPs were defined before the RIPS and a narrow interpretation of complementarity between national and regional programming led to sectors being chosen in a mutually exclusive way. As a result, most NIPs/MIPs include little reference to regional challenges and opportunities, and nearly one in two NIPs/MIPs do not refer to the relevant RIPS. That being said, some NIPs give due consideration to regional matters (see Annex 4/EQ6 for examples in Djibouti, Angola and Zambia).
- Information on regional issues and programmes does not flow, except when personal relationships exist. EUDs do not have a bird's eye view of all EU interventions in the specific country or region, which limits the ability to coordinate regional and country-level policy dialogue and interventions. Staffing is also an issue: *"Looking at regional staffing is telling of the lack of importance given to regional matters. We are too ambitious, with too many countries and too many issues"* (MN 143).
- Third, the EUDs receive mixed messages from Brussels on the extent to which DMRO actions should be within the AU architecture at all (*"If Panfricanism is in our interest, then the EC should clearly tell regional and national EUDs; Or are we just experimenting, giving money through the PanAf Programme to see what happens?"*, MN114).
- Fourth, and most importantly, the country-level policy dialogue does not incorporate the EU's regional priorities. This is a major weakness in the EU's regional cooperation given that regional integration needs to translate into results at the country level; and given that the DMRO member states' agendas and interests are major drivers/obstacles of regional integration. *"Coordination with EAC member countries is more important than inter-REC coordination. We should define regional integration as the priority and impose NIP being aligned with the RIP. But now, it is the reverse."* (MN139) (i6.1.1).

Second, the EU's regional cooperation across regional organisations and initiatives is medium. Inter-REC coordination is a wide subject, and should to a large extent be a matter for African leadership (MN139, MN113). This section focuses rather on whether the EU's support to different regional organisations ("traditional regionalism") and regional initiatives ("new regionalism") is coherent, and supports African efforts at better coordination:

- DMROs and other partners implementing RIP projects felt that EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) had strong potential value added, but that linkages with the regional EUSRs could be strengthened, and except for EAC, many had not been exposed to EUSR or its activities (interviews, February-April 2017).
- All but one country in EA-SA-IO are members of several EU-supported regional organisations, with some belonging to as many as four (see Table 2 in Annex4/EQ6). This, combined with the fact that DMROs have comparable mandates (see Box in the Annex "Context") means that there is a risk of duplicating support for similar initiatives meant to benefit the same countries. Beyond transaction costs, there is also a risk of built-in limit to effectiveness given that *"some regional organisations reflect existing cleavages"* (2016 Global Strategy). Moreover, not all regional organisations/initiatives perform equally well in every area of EU support (see EQ4 for examples in peace and security).



- There is a risk for support to five DMROs not amounting to more than the sum of the five parts (risk of no synergies) (i6.1.2).

Third, the EU's regional cooperation appears to have been fairly coherent with continental-level European Union policies and actions, although the AUC, DMROs, and indeed EU staff, found that the rules of engagement (how to engage with the different regional organisations and initiatives, and what should be the relationship among them) were often unclear.

- Funds for the African Peace Facility have transited through the RIPs, and funds for DMROs have been channelled both directly and indirectly through the African Peace Facility, with shifts between the two channels. The reasons are unclear to staff and African partners alike (administrative reasons or a signal for a need for better coordination?) (see EQ4 and in particular Table 5). From the AU perspective, it has complicated efforts to implement the APSA Roadmap, and it has also led to challenges for DMROs.
- The “new regionalism” is characterised by subsidiarity and pragmatism (e.g. implementation of migration projects by Austria and the International Labor Organisation in the Horn, with reference to the IGAD policy framework). Subsidiarity and pragmatism are not necessarily at the expense of the EU's important investment in the continental architecture, provided there is coordination and clarity on respective roles.
- The Pan-African Programme for 2014-2020 is meant to be “*clearly complementary to the EDF and other EU instruments as it will support the design and the implementation of security linked strategies at continental level*”, and is in part managed by the EUD to the AU. It is focused on continental support, as the name indicates, and on the five areas of the JAES, which include matters also covered by the RIPs: democratic governance, peace and security. Programme documents state: “*Through the PanAf, the EU operationalizes Policy Coherence for Development and puts into practice the principle of building synergies between EU policies and development cooperation.*” However, this evaluation did not find areas of either synergies or incoherence, as implementation has not begun in earnest (communication from DEVCO D4).
- What the AUC and DMROs, respectively, should focus on doing should in principle be decided by African leadership in Addis and not by the EU in Brussels, but the criteria for complementarity and subsidiarity agreed between the AU and RECs leave room for interpretation<sup>5</sup>; the forum for such decision is only starting to emerge (e.g. RECs are observers in the AU's Peace and Security Council); and in most cases there are not clear decisions<sup>6</sup>. In this context, the EU should strive to avoid doing harm through (i) fuelling mandate inflation and (ii) unpredictable funding, which is all the more damaging given over-dependency of both the AUC and most DMROs on EU funding: e.g. EAC's peace and security department is 100% EU-funded (MN139). (i6.1.3)

Fourth and finally, the EU's regional cooperation appears to have been fairly coherent with other European Union policies and actions at the global level, although most of the ten EUDs visited felt insufficiently informed of Brussels-managed global initiatives. The EDF 10 and 11 RSPs/RIPs highlighted alignment with EU interests, policies and strategies, but they would have benefited considerably from rigorous analysis on key issues and assumptions in the EA-SA-IO context.





<sup>5</sup> The principles of the “principles of subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantage, in order to optimise the partnership between the Union, the RECs and the Coordinating Mechanisms in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and Stability” (2008 MoU on cooperation in the area of peace and security between the AU, RECs and the coordinating mechanisms of the regional standby brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa) still leave room for interpretation, especially as the AU and RECs have a different track record across-regional themes and countries (see Table 7 in Desk Report, Volume 1).

<sup>6</sup> Trial and error will determine whether the AU or a DMRO will lead mediation in a given country. For example, negotiations around both the civil war in Sudan and the Sudan-South Sudan conflict have been under AU lead, but with strong support from Ethiopia, the IGAD Chair. IGAD has only a supporting role. This contrasts with South Sudan, where IGAD took early action and IGAD+ (IGAD plus the AU, EU, UN, US, China, UK and Norway) has established its role as lead.

- Trade: The 2013 evaluation found that “*level of coherence between EU strategies at regional level and its strategies at national level varies. Particularly in Central Africa, this type of coherence appears to be insufficient, and complementarity between a RIP and the NIPs has remained a theoretical concept, with its practical application being insufficient.*” EDF 11 responded to numerous evaluations’ recommendations for stronger attention to regional/national coherence in both programming and implementation. For regional integration, such an approach requires, in particular, closer links between the two pillars of ‘regional solutions’ and ‘national compliance’. Our evaluation found some synergies (eg, EUD involvement in RISM processes), but it also found weaknesses due to inadequate communications and engagement among global, regional and national levels. (See all of EQ 1 and the first part of EQ 2, plus Annex C).
- Private sector development: EDF 11 largely transferred EU PSD support from the NIPs to the RIP (see EQ 2, including Box 7). On paper, the RIP gave PSD some priority and aimed for more specific engagement in line with the EU Commission Communication (2014) 263: *A Stronger Role of the Private Sector in Achieving Inclusive and Sustainable Growth in Developing Countries*. However, programming was underway during the evaluation period, so it was difficult to see exactly how the actions in practice would match the Commission’s aims. However, the evaluation revealed concerns over the coherence between regional and national programming and implementation, and the respective competences. A case in point is regional value chains, where neither regional EUDs nor DMROs have the in-house competences to deal with the largely private sector issues that go beyond the DMRO role of facilitating the regional solutions related to a conducive enabling environment. Applying the subsidiarity principle by delegating implementation to specialist organisations can be a good solution if the issues are well defined in terms of their regional/national nexus, and if effective results-oriented monitoring mechanisms are in place. A shortcoming is the lack of analysis in the RIP and related documents on whether PSD and industry development should be programmed at the regional or national level. This is an important oversight. (JC 2.2, 2.3, I-2.1.4, I-2.2.2, 1.2.3.2)
- On peace, security and democracy, beyond coherence across policies (Box 15 above), evidence of coherence across instruments is sparse and not conclusive. Thematic instruments in these areas include the EIDHR and the IcSP. Interviewees highlighted the IcSP projects as being projects that did not involve EUDs sufficiently or sufficiently early, but interviewees could not provide examples of either coherence or incoherence.
- On infrastructure, the EU regional support to EA-SA-IO is clearly aligned to the broader continental agenda set out in the EU Africa Infrastructure Partnership and is also coherent with the position taken by the EU member states participating in the G20. At a global level, the G20 has consistently voiced support for more investment in African infrastructure and has most recently launched the G20 Africa Partnership, championed by Germany as the current President of the Group<sup>7</sup>.
- On NRM, no evidence was found of coordination and direct synergies between the regional support for biodiversity and climate change and the Environment and Sustainable Management of Natural Resources (ENRTP), including Energy Thematic Programme) and Global Public Goods and Challenges programme (GPGC 2014-2017), but no issues with incoherence were found. On migration, the evaluation team did not come across any GPCC-financed (Global Programme Climate Change) project in EA-SA-IO (i6.1.4).

<sup>7</sup> Fact sheet on G20 Africa Partnership available at [bmz.de/de/zentrales\\_downloadarchiv/g20/2017\\_03\\_Fact\\_Sheet\\_G20\\_Africa\\_Partnership.pdf](https://www.bmz.de/de/zentrales_downloadarchiv/g20/2017_03_Fact_Sheet_G20_Africa_Partnership.pdf).

**Table 4 – Summary of coherence of EU regional cooperation at different levels**

Coherence of EU regional cooperation...		
With the country level (NIPs)	Weak	
Across regional organisations and initiatives	Medium	
With the continental level	Fairly good	
With global programmes	Fairly good	

**Legend:** Green: good; Green/Amber (G/A): good with some areas for improvement; Red/Amber (R/A): not fully on track, some important areas for improvement; Red: off track.

**It is too early to identify the impact of EDF 11 practices** (creation of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa; the introduction of cross-regional envelopes; and the opening of country windows to tap into RIP funding) **on EU policy coherence, but an explicit articulation of the EU's principles of engagement with regional organisations, regional initiatives, and EA-SA-IO countries on regional matters would be highly beneficial.**

- Launched in 2015, the €2.5bn EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa has three windows that do not correspond to DMRO regions<sup>8</sup>, and took out large amounts from the EA-SA-IO RIPs, including 100% of the EDF 11 envelope for IGAD. Moreover, the EU Trust Fund for Africa is posing the question of policy coordination and operational coordination, as most implementers will be EU Member State agencies and UN agencies: will they be required to work under the DMRO and/or AU umbrella? The consensus among stakeholders met, whether EU, EU member states, AU, DMROs or civil society, is that AU/DMROs should at least be secured in their role of policy-setting and monitoring—there is less consensus on the role they can play in operational coordination given subsidiarity considerations and capacity issues (examples include developing project pipelines for regional transport and energy projects for blending operations and supporting SMEs in export readiness).
- On substance (i.e. on policy objectives), the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa is also leading to some lively debates, as mentioned in Box 4 in Annex 4/EQ6. Increasing policy coherence for development would entail, for example on migration, taking stock of all actions that relate to migration (basic services, livelihoods and connection to blue economy, protection of migrants, CVE), identifying synergies and having a programme approach, rather than go for a multiplicity of disconnected projects.
- As mentioned above, the evaluation did not find evidence that cross-regional envelopes led to greater fragmentation. The cross-regional envelope on maritime security, for example, led to include all DMROs in maritime security issues. The cross-regional envelope for SmartFish was implemented by IOC on behalf of all five DMROs, covering 20 countries. All DMROs were represented in the steering committee, although the level of direct engagement varied.
- There is no evidence that the opening of country windows to tap into RIP funding has enhanced or lessened coherence. Only €12m (or ten per cent of EDF 11 funding, as of December 2016, had been channelled to EA-SA-IO countries under this new modality (see Annex 4/EQ8) and these concerned (i) resilience in IGAD and (ii) the Nile Basin. This is much less than the €49m (or 60% of EDF 11 funding) that went to international organisations, which itself is double what went to DMROs.

<sup>8</sup> The Horn region in the Trust Fund for example includes IGAD countries plus Tanzania, an EAC and SADC country. This is not proving problematic with the IGAD Secretariat but was expected to be an issue with the EAC Secretariat at the time of country visits (MN142). To note also the establishment of a Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP) for refugees and host communities in the Horn of Africa (EU 2015 Policy Coherence of Development Report).

The agenda of international development is widening to include for example resilience, climate change, migration, security, and illicit flows, and the EU development cooperation agenda with it. While development concerns remains at the core of the EDF, there are some debates about

- (i) The use of official development assistance for support to large-scale peace support operations such as AMISOM (over €1bn provided by the EU since 2007);
- (ii) Whether EDF funds are flexible enough to respond to fast-evolving needs and opportunities in peace and security; and
- (iii) Whether counting support to refugees in donor countries as ODA will not, in the long run, be at the expense of development programmes in countries of origin.

The upshot of these debates will influence how EU instruments work together, and which is best suited for what.

**There is value added in addressing challenges of trade, infrastructure, peace, security, democracy and natural resource management at the regional level but there would be more impact if synchronisation and synergies were realised.** The AU's capacity for policy coordination and for domestication of agreed policies is limited, and some DMROs have on some issues been effective "building blocks" of the AU (see EQ2, EQ3, EQ4, EQ5). However, there is a need for a confirmation that the EU supports the AU's overall policy coordination role, the DMROs' policy making and monitoring roles, and more generally a clearer picture going forward of who does what on the respective mandates, strengths, and track record (on rationalisation in trade and infrastructure, see EQ3; in peace and security, see EQ4).

**JC6.2. "The EU's regional cooperation strategies (2008-2015) were complementary to EU member states' interventions and coordinated with other development partners"**

**Few EU member states have regional programmes, and there are formal and informal mechanisms to ensure the complementarity of regional programming with that of member states and coordination with other development partners.** Member states active in regional cooperation are mainly the UK, Germany, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Austria, and The Netherlands. Other development partners include chiefly the UN and development banks, with China providing small but potentially growing support (see Van 2011). The EU is perhaps the only development partner supporting such a wide range of ROs in EA-SA-IO, and is in many cases the lead funder in financial terms (see financial contributions in Annex 2), and has actions in more themes than member states (in spite of EU efforts at concentration), but EU member states can play an active role on some issues, e.g. Germany providing sustained and direct technical assistance on conflict minerals in the Great Lakes, Norway providing project support on anti-piracy, Sweden on the media in election matters; UK and Germany on security system reform. In the EAC region, for example, the EU is active on peace and security; democratic governance; economic integration; private sector; transport; and capacity development, whereas EU member states focus on a narrower set of issues (Table 12 "EU and EU Member State support to EAC" in Annex 4/EQ6).

**There are formal and informal mechanisms to ensure EU complementarity with member states and coordination with other development partners,** listed in Annex 4/EQ6. While coordination by DMROs themselves tends to be weak, donors to DMROs made concerted attempts to coordinate, and support to DMROs is overall harmonised, in terms of objectives and approaches (Table 13 "Coordination of support to DMROs in Annex 4/EQ6).

In line with the midterm reviews of the EDF 10 support to the EA-SA-IO region, this evaluation confirms that there is a convergence of objectives, and complementarities, between the regional support of the EU, EU member states and other development partners, thanks to coordination at DMRO level: while coordination by DMROs themselves tends to be weak, donors to DMROs

made concerted attempts to coordinate (interviews, survey, documentation), with the EU often playing a lead role. Support to several DMROs is provided through joint financing arrangements and/or joint partnership arrangements, which bring the EU, EU member states and other development partners together. On the infrastructure front in particular, KfW (Germany) highlighted excellent coherence in programming and co-financing with the EU. At the AU level, coordination among European actors is deemed excellent, with “*a very good coordination by the EUD*” (EU Member State, MN133). (i6.2.1, i6.2.2).

**Beyond this coordination at the policy/strategic level and the absence of incoherence, coordination varied:** in the words of one EU Member State, “*EU coordination with other development partners is ‘good enough’, especially at political/policy level, although it could be improved at operational level* (MN122). This is echoed by one survey response (EUD): “*Instead of complementarity, there is duplication due to the fact that there is no appropriate donor coordination at RECs level. RECs tend to propose the same activities to more than one donor.*” This is also echoed in the region: “*There is a bewildering number of regional initiatives supported by donors bilaterally, through the RECs and in other ways. There is very little information on them; no one has an overview. It is very difficult to coordinate and act strategically without this*” (ZIM02). In particular, there is little coordination across development partners in preparing regional strategies, notably for AfDB and the World Bank. This is particular evident in the area of peace and security. ISS (2016) find that in the area of capacity development in peace and security, the EU, NATO and the UN have largely uncoordinated activities. For example, both the UN and the EU assess APSA achievements and further needs for capacity development, together with the AU, using two different frameworks: respectively the Ten-Year Capacity-Building Programme and the Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security. As Pirozzi and Miranda (n.d.) note: “*A common process on this 61 issues would have been highly beneficial to increase the flow of information and the coordination of initiatives in support to the APSA and its components. This missed opportunity could be a lesson learned for the next revision of joint action plans.*”

There are however *some* examples of convergence and synergies at the operational level, in fisheries (see Box 16 below); as well as between SmartFish and the EPAs (e.g. SmartFish brought countries together so they could develop a shared position for EPA negotiations). On infrastructure, there was operational cooperation with the development banks of EU member states (e.g. KfW from Germany). On trade, in SADC, there is expected to be greater cooperation under EDF 11 with GIZ in design of programming and in intervention of the capacity development aspects of the regional programme. (i6.2.1, i6.2.2 and i6.2.3).

### Box 16 – Operational synergies in fisheries

In the case of SmartFish, synergies were achieved with a number other programmes (funded by the World Bank, WWF, Norad, SIDA, Danida, France, DfID, USAID, and FAO among others), for example in relation to work on fisheries management plans, where there was a connection to the South West Indian Ocean Fisheries Project (SWIOFP) and the support provided by the Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries (EAF)-Nansen project to SWIOFC (South West Indian Ocean Fisheries Commission). Another example is synergies with FAO-IGAD Fish Trade Project (FIFT) on post-harvest loss reduction activities (see SmartFish 1 MTE). But the MTE of SmartFish II find that the synergies could be further enhanced (see I-5.4.1). Besides SmartFish, the 2014 Mauritius EAMR says: “*Complementarity is also being developed between the component “Risk Transfer Mechanism for Natural Disasters” of the ISIDSMS programme and the World Bank initiative funded by the intra-ACP EDF (EUR 907,000) through the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery.*”

### Summary of selected points that are DMRO specific

DMRO	Notes (JC)
COMESA	<p>Coordination of support to COMESA and COMESA-wide programmes could have been better. The level of ambition in terms of establishing a free trade area and the even more ambitious aim of a COMESA customs union put a heavy demand on coordinated action. The member states have very different interests and for some (e.g. Mauritius) the customs union is not wanted (6.1).</p> <p>There are no conflicting objectives across EU actions, but coordination with country-level actions is both crucial (economic integration is at the centre of COMESA's mandate) and challenging (notably because of COMESA's wide and diverse membership) (6.2).</p>
EAC	<p>Coordinating support to EAC and EAC-wide programmes among development partners did not appear as a particular challenge, but coordination with development partners in EAC member states appeared as a crucial –and missing—link, e.g. on regional value chains, e.g. on consulting national EUDs and embassies as regional programmes are identified and formulated (6.1)</p> <p>There are no conflicting objectives across EU actions but there were calls to prioritise regional integration and align NIPs to these rather than define regional programmes second (6.2)</p>
IGAD	<p>Not many development partners support IGAD, but coordination across development partners is hampered by decision-making scattered over Djibouti, Addis and Nairobi (plus development partners' HQ) (6.1)</p> <p>There are no conflicting objectives across EU actions but there are conflicting messages being sent around whether EU wishes to further empower IGAD; most support will be channelled via int'l agencies, with limited scope for enhancing IGAD's management and coordination capacity (6.2)</p>
IOC	<p>Support to regional integration has been well harmonised with that of other EU member states. At the operational level, there are instances of both duplications and synergies with other development partners, e.g. fisheries (6.1)</p> <p>There are no conflicting objectives or duplications across EU actions, but rather instances of lack of synergies, e.g. with national programmes in fisheries (6.2)</p> <p>Vis-à-vis continental and other regional programmes, IOC support programmes are complementary, given that small islands matters are distinct from mainland Africa's and therefore the agendas pursued by SADC and COMESA, e.g. in transport infrastructure, natural resources, and climate change. As such, sub-regional programmes for the Indian Ocean add significant value (6.2)</p>
SADC	<p>Coordination of support to both SADC and SADC civil society is good across development partners, and the EU has been a driver of such coordination. There is room, however, to make the dialogue more strategic and move focus away from operational level (6.1)</p> <p>There are no conflicting objectives across EU actions but as elsewhere, with the EU Trade Related Facility, coordination will be needed to avoid overlap with other EU-supported regional programmes, especially given overlapping membership (6.2).</p>

## EQ 7 Efficiency

**To what extent has the EU contributed to improving DMROs capacity to operate efficiently?**

### Answer for the Evaluation Question

#### Summary

Although there have been improvements, the DMROs were/are still not able to implement in line with the funds available under EDF 10 and 11 - some of the delays are related to procedures rather than inherent inefficiency. The pillar assessments are promising for the longer-term improvement of DMRO operational capacity although the road maps for implementing the recommendations improvement are not systematically reported on and internalised. Coordination arrangements appear to be working although the follow up on decisions is not clear. In general, and across all the DMROs that use EU rules and procedures, the efficiency has been low and the rules and procedures appear to have had a negative effect on the pace and quality of work. Contribution agreements have shown that they can have a potentially important and constructive effect although not without challenges. Whilst EU cooperation support is implemented in good faith, carefully planned and undertaken in close consultation with its partners there are risks of harmful effects.

**Although there have been improvements, the DMROs were/are still not able to implement in line with the funds available under EDF 10 and 11, some of the delays are related to EU procedures rather than inherent inefficiency.** The External Action Monitoring Reports of the regional EUDs consistently note a long process of delays and hindrances in the efficient disbursement of EDF 10 funds. EDF 11 appears to be smoother at least in terms of programming. Considerable funds are being channelled via the EU trust fund (especially for IGAD), IMF and others, which is partly a response to the DMROs not being able to fully manage the resources available to them. The DMROs note the difficulty of using EU procedures, which should reduce once the pillar assessments are passed and their own procedures can be used. However, the case of SADC (and to a lesser extent COMESA) shows that this is not always the case as SADC's own procedures are also problematic and for national implementation there will be additional challenges when SADC systems are used, as has been the case for COMESA (for example when implementing the RISM in Zimbabwe through the COMESA Clearing House based in Harare)

**The pillar assessments are promising for the longer-term improvement of DMRO operational capacity although the road maps for implementing the recommendations improvement are not systematically reported on and internalised.** The pillar assessments potentially pave the way for use of DMRO systems and for strengthening these systems from within. However, although detailed roadmaps were formulated, these actions do not seem to be internalised and are not mentioned in annual reports or website information.

**The coordination arrangements appear to be working although the follow up on decisions is not clear.** The new high level group and the technical inter-DMRO consultation forum are meeting regularly and appear well attended. The minutes of meeting and interviews with involved parties reveal that the discussions are mainly on aid management issues, which is understandable at the start of the new programming cycle. The coordination arrangements have not yet lead to the type of substantial discussions that would serve to bring efficiencies to the regional programmes by optimising synergies and cross DMRO learning. There does not appear to be a systematic mechanism for recording and following up on decisions and matters arising from the meetings.

**In general, and across all the DMROs that use EU rules and procedures, the efficiency has been low and the rules and procedures appear to have had a negative effect on the pace and quality of work.** Every DMRO has had cases of ineligible expenses which in some cases have

had a crippling effect on the implementation efficiency of the cooperation. In practice, the spending organisations are not able to adhere the rules and procedures of the EU in part because they differ from their own systems and especially because there is a difference in the degree of strictness of interpretation of the rules and demand on the degree of documentation. There is a lack of compatibility between the EU systems and approaches to financial management and the operating culture of its partners.

**Contribution agreements have shown that they can have a potentially important and constructive effect although not without challenges.** Contribution agreements can lead to strengthening of the internal systems rather than obliging the DMROs (and the implementing agents) to become experts in EU (and all other donor) systems. It was noted for example that in countries that were eligible for budget support, the national agencies were able to make swift and efficient progress. However, experience has shown that whilst these positive effects of contribution can and do take place they are not without challenges because the DMROs own systems are not necessarily agile or well implemented in practice and national partners (for countries not eligible for budget support) are obliged to use unfamiliar DMRO systems. An example of where this has already started to be problematic is the RISM actions under COMESA where implementing parties such as ZIMtrade are experiencing inefficiencies in the use of these funds. The same is very likely to hold true for the Trade Related Facility under SADC where national implementing agencies will need to implement according to SADC rules and procedures that they are unfamiliar with.

**Whilst EU cooperation support is implemented in good faith, carefully planned and undertaken in close consultation with its partners there are risks of harmful effects** depending on the view of the long-term priority that should be placed on the importance of centralised secretariats as the drivers of regional integration. The scale of the EU cooperation support potentially widens the regional agenda of the secretariats beyond what they can cope with and risks fuelling the rise of regional bureaucracies without really knowing if they are helping (or how well they are helping) in regional integration. These aspects are recognised and the new modalities of EDF 11 go some way to addressing them, although stopping short of introducing a radically new approach.

**JC 7.1 “EU support has contributed to the DMROs having greater operational capacity and increasing in efficiency”**

**EU cooperation has supported a range of capacity development support programmes in all the DMROs but there is a concern that much of the capacity built will fall away when the programme employed staff leave.** EU cooperation has provided support to promote efficiency, effectiveness, accountability and monitoring and coordination of treaty provisions and policy organ decisions. This has been provided through the Technical Assistance Facility under the EDF 10 and 11. In addition, most projects have involved technical assistance teams that in principle have also been available to provide capacity development. However, in many cases (e.g. with the REIS in SADC) the technical assistance have outnumbered the core staff and there has not been sufficient absorption capacity at the DMROs and in some cases even at the member state level. There is also a growing concern that capacity will fall away when the programme employed staff leave, something which is already evident in both SADC (with the stopping of the REIS programme) and COMESA with the sudden withdrawal of support staff for RISM and other programmes and the same situation holds true in the other DMROs (e.g. in IGAD over 200 staff are temporarily provided through donor programmes). In SADC and COMESA as part of EDF 11, some staff who were initially paid for by the EU have been gradually taken over by the secretariats and this has led to a significant increase in capacity - for example in SADC some 19



staff members are being absorbed over a three year period and they are already providing additional long-term capacity within finance, administration and monitoring. However, although it is promising that additional staff originally engaged through the EU support are retained on the core budget there is a danger that the additional salary bill, if not accompanied by an increase in the budget for operational expenses, will reduce the overall efficiency and there are signs of this already happening in COMESA where the budget for operational expenses is highly constrained. (i7.1.1, i7.1.2)

**EU cooperation support has not yet led to a significantly increased operational capacity of the DMROs at least as measured by disbursement.** In COMESA, IGAD, EAC, IOC, and SADC it was noted by the EUDs that constant support from the EUD and technical assistance is needed to avoid underspending. The execution in IGAD has been particularly slow and it is noted in the EAMR (2015) “As usual in the case of programmes estimates managed by IGAD, the execution rate is very low and mainly used for administrative costs (salaries), while the main activities of the projects are under executed.”

In the case of IGAD, the EUD had to, at some stage, take over the procurement processes themselves (e.g. preparing and launching tenders) although there is now a procurement unit in place with prospects of future improvement in the capacity to disburse. There were long delays in reaching pillar assessment for SADC, which explains some of the slow disbursement in SADC especially in EDF 10. The EA-IO region benefitted from the fact that COMESA was pillar approved and could implement using contribution agreements for the benefit of all the EA-IO DMROs during EDF 10. Even so, in some cases in COMESA the projects under EDF 9 are still in execution, which indicates that EU support to capacity development has not yet been successful in raising the efficiency of operations so that disbursement matches available funds. It is important to note that the efficiency constraints are not just with the secretariat but also with national and other implementing entities. The EDF 11 approach of variable geometry and direct access has gone some way to addressing the mismatch by reducing the budget that is passed through the DMROs and placing a significant proportion of the funding through international agencies (as noted under EQ8). (i7.1.1, i7.1.2)

**The DMROs were not effective as programme implementing bodies and it is increasingly questioned to what extent this should be their role.** The DMROs are clearly not effective as programme implementing bodies. Their core staffing is generally speaking made up of secondments from the member states which whilst very often strong in technical areas of expertise are only rarely proficient as programme managers. In the case of the IOC for instance, the staffing of the secretariat is restricted to the secretary general, just 5 representatives (charge d'affaires) one from each member state and support staff. All the programme and project staff are in one form or another provided as part of project technical assistance packages. In COMESA some 80 staff were provided under EDF 10 and are now being withdrawn under EDF 11, which is resulting in much lower capacity to implement programmes. In IGAD the donor financed staff (over 200) also heavily outnumber the core staff of the institution. It could be argued that the large programmatic workload does not correspond well to the core institutional structure of the DMROs and can only be artificially sustained due to external technical assistance. (i7.1.1, i7.1.2)

**Some of the slow implementation rate observed is due to difficulty in implementing EDF procedures** (and also in the case of contribution agreements, satisfying auditors employed by the EU that internal systems were being followed). The rate of completion of programming and project preparation and also the rate of disbursement has increased during EDF 10 and also EDF 11 but with a long interruption between the two EDF cycles meaning that a trend of continuous increase is not apparent. Whilst the increases in programming and disbursement during the EDF periods

indicate that the teething problems experienced at the start were being solved, this might to some extent be a reflection of understanding the EU support requirements rather than as a true measure of increasing internal efficiency. The view of the DMROs is that slow disbursement is less due to inadequate capacity and more due to the level of documentary proof required by the EU (whether under EDF or through a contribution agreement). The DMROs point to minor infringements of the level of documentation required that have led to crippling delays as management time is diverted and implementation is halted whilst documentation for otherwise ineligible expenses has to be found. (i7.1.1, i7.1.2)

**Other channels of finance such as the African Parliamentary Union and the EU trust fund is also being used which appears to be an acceptance that the DMROs are not yet capable of managing the funds available.** 60% of the €25m funding for the migration programme is channelled through the EU trust fund under EDF 11 and this pattern holds for all EDF 11 programming so far. (i7.1.1, i7.1.2)

**Overall the coordination arrangements of EDF 11 with the high-level group and the technical inter-DMRO forum are simpler and more streamlined than before.** The technical inter-DMRO was set up to fill a gap at the operational coordination level for the RIP implementation. The new arrangement is light in that it does not set up a permanent secretariat but makes use of existing DMRO facilities. The technical meeting is especially relevant for the formulation of cross regional envelope projects. It was noted that some action documents were prepared without DMRO involvement. The technical meeting provided an opportunity to discuss the views around the use of external organisations to implement the RIPs (e.g. IMF AFRITAC) and ensure that misunderstandings did not grow. The high-level group dealt with the need to find sustainable solutions for financing of the DMROs. The DMROs also noted their concerns about the direct access principle and the danger of undermining the coordinating role of the DMROs. The action points are noted in the minutes of the technical inter-DMRO but not in a very clear way and do not appear to be followed up on systematically at the next meeting under matters arising. (i7.1.3)

**The coordination arrangements within the DMROs with their member states and between the DMROs and the international community are still weak.** The EAMR (Botswana, 2015) notes that the “SADC engagement with member states and the international community is ad hoc and without strategic vision”. And, that more attention is needed to ensure complementarity between SADC and COMESA on future and on-going trade programmes. It is moreover noted that “The main remaining obstacle is to transform the existing 'information-sharing' platforms into real coordination groups where division of labour can be tabled under SADC leadership (lack of willingness on the part of SADC for political considerations; lack of capacity on the part of some development partners to engage in policy dialogue)”. Similar observations were found in EAC and IGAD with less emphasis placed on this point for COMESA and IOC. It should also be noted that, in SADC at least, the situation is improving. (i7.1.3)

## JC 7.2 EU support has contributed to the DMROs having improving value for money and procurement practices

**The pillar assessments carried out for all the DMRO (other than IOC) were useful to benchmark financial management procedures and performance and set out roadmaps for improvement.** The systematic and independent pillar assessments provide a clear set of actions for the DMROs. The roadmaps are not used as plans for improvement and are not monitored although the recommendations are appreciated and have to some extent been taken account of. The level of performance varies in the different DMROs with only COMESA passing all the

relevant pillars. The EAMR, Botswana (2015) notes that there was only 1.25% of ineligible expenditure over a two year implementation based on an external verification mission – most of this ineligible expenditure was due to poor record keeping. Partly in response to EU concerns, SADC has engaged in a vigorous campaign to improve and change the organisational culture on all forms of record keeping. (i7.2.1)

**The pillar assessments indicated that the procurement systems and procedures are largely in place and indicate the current systems provide value for money for all the DMROs except for EAC and IGAD** where serious but not irreparable deficiencies were noted. Although the pillar assessments were discussed, shared with and based on discussions with the DMROs, as noted earlier, the roadmaps actions are not monitored or used as plans for improvement. There are signs that indicate that pillar assessments and improvements are done to satisfy EU requirements rather than being viewed as important for the organisation itself. (i7.2.2)

**There were promising signs of a cost-conscious approach across the DMROs.** Examples include getting the SADC disaster reduction strategy signed by using a side event where ministers were already gathered in Mauritius in December 2016, this saved large expenditure on travel and also reduced the potential for long delay. There were also examples in COMESA where once it became apparent that another project had already developed a suitable guideline for grading hides and skins, the RISM project instead used the funds for disseminating the guidelines and training people in its use. (i7.2.1/2)

**Overly optimistic assumptions on the demand for projects and capacity to implement negatively influenced the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the regional projects.** The factors that appear to influence the effectiveness and efficiency of projects and lead to unnecessary costs include: i) a fictional, weak or not highly justified regional element which lead to a lot of effort being expended on getting regional cooperation system to work when it is not necessarily prioritised by the member states (this appeared to be the case for example in the renewable energy projects in IOC which although there was a high demand (150 proposals received) it was difficult to justify the regional element) ; ii) over-estimating the capacity of national implementing agents leading to long delays when they do not perform; iii) an overly complicated design and/or implementation arrangement (e.g. the ISLAND project in the IOC); iv) overestimating the capacity of NGOs to respond to a call for proposals; iv) changes in the partner priorities often occurring because there had been too little consultation at project design stage and also because of disruption after elections or change in senior staff; v) difficulty in using EDF procedures (as noted elsewhere); vi) applying a one size fits all approach for all the countries (e.g. according to the Ministry of Finance and Economics the regional communication strategy on energy efficiency was a standard product of one of the projects but was not prioritised in Mauritius as the work had already largely been done, another example is insurance scheme for disasters which did not according to the Ministry of Finance and Economics fit well with the particular circumstances of Mauritius). (i7.2.1/2)

**Future improvements in efficiency and value for money will be dependent on advances on governance and on improvements in management performance.** The capacity and institutional development programmes provided by EDF 10 and 11 are appropriate, based on in-depth analysis and target the relevant areas. Long-term and sustained improvement is linked to the political economy of the regional organisations and the incentive environments. The EU pillar process contributes to a conducive incentive environment but is not enough in itself. Ultimately it is the member states that are most instrumental in the long-term in ensuring value for money from the DMROs. Whilst the programmatic expenditure continues to be heavily financed by donors the internal pressure for improvement is likely to be less. (i7.2.1/2)

**JC 7.3 EU cooperation support has been efficient in its delivery**

**In general, and across all the DMROs, the efficiency of EU support has been low.** Especially in EDF 10, disbursement was slow and did not match the budgets available. It was recognised in the transition from EDF 10 to 11 that the budgets for DMRO implementation themselves were too optimistic and in EDF 11 considerable funds have been direct to other implementing agencies than the DMROs - which will considerably lessen the mismatch. As mentioned earlier, there have been long interruptions due to problems with dealing with ineligible expenditure. The problem is not necessarily, or only, related to the EU (EDF) rules and procedures as ineligible expenditure also occurred under contribution agreements when the DMRO's own systems were used. A core problem appears to be that the level of documentation (and strictness of interpretation) required by the EU and the EU's auditors demands a level of record keeping that the DMROs and their implementing partners do not have. The view from the EUDs is that they have followed the procedures and checked for head office interpretation when in doubt. The view from the implementing agents is that the requirements of the rules and the interpretation of the rules is too uncompromising. (i7.3.1)

**In some cases the lengthy EU approval procedures have led to low cost-effectiveness as projects have been delayed beyond the point when they are still relevant.** It is very difficult to get a consensus on examples as the programme staff, the DMRO and the EUD do not necessarily agree on the extent and cause of the delays nor on the seriousness of the consequences. In some cases, delays arise because of incorrect paperwork being submitted for approval. An example of this is a call for proposals for biodiversity in one case and renewable energy in another case. For both cases, at least according to programme staff who presented a chain of correspondence to illustrate their case, the delays in paperwork led to a 2 year delay during which time the NGOs involved were no longer able to find the co-financing, the projects had been done by others or the needs had changed. The frustration over the rules and procedures undermines not just the efficiency in creating results but also, equally worrying, creates mistrust and a poor cooperation environment between the EU and the DMROs and spending organizations. (i7.3.1)

**Although training and capacity development have been provided this has in general not solved the problem, a solution has not been found and no solution is immediately evident.** Capacity is low in many of the implementing entities, especially the national entities., National and other implementing agencies are obliged to use either EU or DMRO rules or procedures that they are not familiar with and often for very small amounts (except where they are in a county which is budget support eligible and they can use their own procedures). Even with training, the resources needed to comply with the unfamiliar procedures (and make corrections) are often out of proportion with the size of the project. Other donors in general either provide support in kind or use a basket fund arrangement where the funds are in essence managed by technical assistance. (i7.3.1)

**Contribution agreements are one possible solution and this approach can have a potentially important and constructive effect although not without challenges.** Contribution agreements can lead to strengthening of the internal systems rather than obliging the DMROs (and the implementing agents) to become experts in EU (and all other donor systems). It was noted for example that in countries which were eligible for budget support, the national agencies were able to make swift and efficient progress. However experience has shown that whilst these positive effects of contribution can and do take place they are not without challenges. The first challenge is that the DMRO's own systems when pillar assessed might be found suitable in theory but when tested are not necessarily sufficiently well carried out in practice over a longer period (a bad chef with a good recipe book). A second challenge is that the DMRO's own systems that are used under

the contribution agreement are themselves not efficient and lead to slow execution that is not cost effective – and this has been experienced in SADC. A third and perhaps the most problematic challenge is that where execution is through national organisations (in countries not eligible for budget support) the implementing organisation will need to use the DMRO systems which they are often ill prepared to do. This is what is occurring for example in RISM in Zimbabwe (through the COMESA clearing house) and also what will need to happen for the TRF in SADC. (i7.3.2)

**Whilst EU cooperation support is implemented in good faith, carefully planned and undertaken in close consultation with its partners there are risks of harmful effects** depending on the long-term priority placed on the importance of centralised secretariats as the drivers of regional integration. One challenge is that the sheer scale of the EU cooperation support widens the regional agenda of the secretariats and effectively works against the prioritisation and focussing of the activities of the DMROs. There is also a risk of fuelling the rise of expensive regional bureaucracies without really knowing if they are helping (or how well they are helping) in regional integration. The concept of “regional ownership” is being misinterpreted and becomes an excuse for over channelling of funds to organisations that have little incentive or reason to resist. In supporting the secretariats, there is a risk of not enough attention being placed on the private sector, which is the stakeholder that is in reality making the most progress in regional integration. There is also a risk that the complexity of the projects and range of initiatives being undertaken can lead to overwhelming the secretariats and overload the regional integration agenda. (i7.3.3)

#### Summary of selected points that are DMRO-specific

DMRO	Notes (JC)
COMESA	COMESA is the only DMRO that is pillar compliant although SADC also benefit from contribution agreements (JC7.3) COMESA capacity is particularly vulnerable to the reduction in EU supported programme staff and inefficiency arising from this loss of capacity (JC7.2)
EAC	EAC benefits from a simpler internal coordination due to relatively few member states (JC7.2)
IGAD	IGAD, like other DMROs, has not been able to implement the foreseen level of expenditure but appears to be even weaker than the other DMROs. There was a serious cooperation crisis EU-IGAD of 2015 because of the huge amount of ineligible expenses (1,5 M €) from program estimates managed by IGAD. The different audits concluded that the total amount to be reimbursed by IGAD was 1,5 M €. This situation blocked the whole EU cooperation because the impossibility to make additional payments on the ongoing projects. Further to presentation of additional documentation, this amount was finally reduced to 800.000 €. On the other hand, the replacement of the IGAD coordinator of EU projects contributed to normalise the cooperation relationship. (JC7.2)
IOC	IOC, unlike other DMROs has little programmatic capacity <u>within its core permanent staffing</u> which makes EU support to capacity at the DMRO potentially vulnerable and inefficient (capacity at national level is not affected in this way) – it should be noted that EU is providing support to lift capacity (JC7.2) IOC has not been formally pillar assessed (JC7.2)
SADC	SADC members state contributions for programmatic expenditure is significantly higher than is the case for the other DMROs (JC7.1)
The analysis presented here (volume 1) is a synthesis of an indicator analysis that is DMRO specific where relevant (volume 2). The analysis at JC and EQ takes account of what is specific to each DMRO but aims to bring together a synthesis by structuring around the main findings rather than the DMROs in recognition that beyond DMROs, member state, private sector and civil society are also important to consider. This summary box brings out the selected points that are specific to the DMROs.	

## EQ 8 Regional integration prospects

**To what extent has the EU support enabled the DMROs and their partners at national level to better realise regional policy objectives?**

### Answer for the Evaluation Question

#### ▪ Summary

Policy dialogue was mainly focused on implementation of the EU cooperation programme. A number of longer-term fundamental issues and challenges were not yet addressed by the EU cooperation programme. Some of the issues are difficult if not impossible to address at least in the immediate term (e.g. some of those related to political economy). It was found that the engagement of non-state actors and the linkage to EPAs are promising ways forward. The new modalities of EDF 11 were based on sound analysis of earlier experience however it is still too early to tell if the modalities are working as intended. Overall, it has been and could be argued that the modalities adjust with an approach that is flawed rather than entirely restructuring the approach.

**Policy dialogue was mainly focused on implementation of the EU cooperation programme.** In general, policy dialogue does not appear to be valued by the DMROs and is focussed on management of EU assistance, increasing the level of disbursement rather than focussing on the strategic level. Capacity development also appears to focus on the implementation of the EU programme. The political dialogue has tended to focus on establishing good and cordial relations rather than bring up contentious issues. Strategically this could well be the right approach but there is also an alternative which is to use the political dialogue to bring into more open debate some of the underlying assumptions on regional integration that appear to influence the persistent gaps in member state compliance and domestication of regional agreements and between member state funding and the needs.

**There are a number of longer-term fundamental issues and challenges that are not yet addressed by the EU cooperation programme and perhaps cannot be – at least in the immediate term.** There might be a number of understandable reasons for not focussing on the longer-term fundamental issues: i) the history of slow implementation and the day to day practical realities of ensuring the EU programme is implemented is more urgent than dialogue on long-term strategic concerns; ii) the DMROs do not provide the space for a more searching dialogue, preferring to limit dialogue directly to implementation of EU supported projects; iii) the DMROs are donor dependent and see the dialogue as a means for maintaining and extending external support, iv) the issues although very important are not amenable to solution in the short to medium term and beyond the scope of both the DMRO and EU as many of the political economy based factors that influence performance are related to political realities at the member state level.

**The engagement of non-state actors and the linkage to EPAs are promising ways forward.** Member state demand, compliance and cooperation is the key to improving the regional integration. Well-informed non-state actors in civil society and the private sector are potential allies (but also potential points of resistance) in the process of integration. Demand from civil society and the private sector is likely to be the most powerful longer-term factor in securing progress and accountability. The EU cooperation programme is increasingly engaging with non-state actors e.g. EU supported SADC to map non-state actors relevant for regional activities. The process of negotiating and approving the EPAs also present a powerful opportunity to prioritise and enhance regional integration (although it should be noted that the EPAs are controversial in themselves).

**The new modalities of EDF 11 were based on sound analysis of earlier experience however it is still too early to tell if the modalities are working as intended.** So far it appears that after a slow start that the rate of programming is picking up and already some 40% of the allocation is

programmed with about 70% being implemented through direct access. Most of the direct access is through the EU trust fund and international organisations with member states accounting for 10% of the total. It is noted by many that the principles of direct access and the use of performance measures were resisted by the DMROs who feared that the regional organisations could be undermined. The DMROs also feared, as decisions were made on the basis of consensus that the new decision-making process, by involving the EUDs and national actors, would lead to chaos. This does not appear to have been the cases so far. It is also too early to tell if the new modalities have led to DMROs being better able to focus on their core tasks of policy setting, guidance and supervision rather than project management. The new modalities are focussed more on addressing bottlenecks in the EU cooperation programme than in addressing fundamental challenges and issues facing regional cooperation and integration.

**It has been and could be argued that the modalities tinker with an approach that is flawed rather than entirely restructuring the approach.** The major flaw noted is that by providing large amounts of support to the secretariats the EU cooperation inadvertently and in good faith risks to: i) advance ambition level of regional integration beyond the commitment level of the member states; ii) reduce the need for member states to commit finance to the regional organisations because the EU is doing so; iii) fuel bloated and self-interested regional bureaucracies that become inefficient programme implementers instead of addressing their core roles. The modalities whilst providing some continuity with earlier approaches do in practice address in a significant way these concerns, simply because in effect only 30% of the funds of EDF 11 (of that so far programmed) are being channelled via the secretariats. The scale of this turnaround is tantamount to a fundamental change in approach in all but name.

### JC 8.1 “The policy dialogue with the EU is leading to a clearer set of strategic regional objectives for the DMROs”

**EU policy dialogue did not engage at the strategic level** and does not appear to be valued by the DMROs. EUDs note, in all DMROs (except IOC and IGAD) that poor preparation of meetings reduces the value of the policy dialogue. It is apparent that the dialogue is not prioritised by the DMROs despite the fact that the EU is a major donor with the exception of IGAD. Policy dialogue is focussed more on the management of EU assistance than on strategic issues such as how to deal with overlapping membership of regional organisations, ensuring a realistic and prioritised agenda and fostering a coherent basis for collective action. It also appears at least for the case of IGAD, that policy dialogue on strategic issues tends to take place with other donors and with the member states rather than the DMRO. EAMR and other reports indicate that the IOC is more open and receptive to policy dialogue than before and there have been recent improvements<sup>9</sup>. Nevertheless, the controversy over ineligible expenses and what is “perceived” by the IOC as intransigent interpretation of rules has tended to dominate the dialogue. The EU is not alone in this respect and other donors such as Sweden and UK have also found it difficult to engage in policy dialogue in the past, especially with SADC. Policy dialogue needs to be brought to a higher level if the diplomatic and political opportunities foreseen by the EEAS as a result of the scale of the programme are to occur. The policy dialogue, where it has been around specific issues such as “migration”, has been more successful as in the case of dialogue with COMESA, which suggests that policy dialogue with specific and concrete agenda is likely to be more successful. (i8.1.1)

<sup>9</sup> The EUD (Mauritius) notes and evidence was provided of constructive dialogue: 1) At EU MS level: with EU Member states to discuss strategic issues during the Political Dialogue with the Government of Mauritius – last meeting on 31 May 2017; 2). At Head of Delegation and IOC Secretary General level (so far two meetings held -1 Nov 2016 and 14 Feb 2017) to discuss strategic issues. The agreement was to have three meetings per year, and this is close to being achieved 3). At technical level – both operational and financial aspects are openly discussed, including ineligible expenditure issue.

**Political dialogue was held with the DMROs but tended not to tackle contentious issues.**

There are official political dialogues with the DMROs and also with national governments where regional integration is included. However, it does not appear at least from officially available information and from interviews with DMROs and EUDs that the contentious issues of a political economy nature are identified in advance, messages and advocacy devised and the issues dealt with at the dialogue and this was generally confirmed in discussions with the EUD. The dialogue serves mostly to cement good relations and provide a favourable context and then when needed, on very particular issues such as the instability in Burundi or situation in South Sudan, the political dialogue is used to provide supportive messages to the DMROs. Political dialogue in IGAD has led to a greater appreciation of the need to avoid the financial crisis of IGAD because of the contribution arrears from member states and the need for a new Treaty in order to boost political dialogue between Secretariat and Council of Ministers as well as to deal with new problems such as migrations, climate change, maritime security. However, although there might be an under use of the political dialogue instrument, there first needs to be a clearer understanding of the underlying factors influencing regional integration and the development/design of a set of constructive and well-founded advocacy messages. (i8.1.1)

**Both EU and DMROs carried out some policy dialogue with non-state actors which was potentially valuable although links between DMROs and non-state actors were still weak.**

In the SADC region for example the EU has supported a mapping of non-state actors. A recent set of articles provides additional evidence that the DMROs and non-state actors are not yet working together as well as they could (ECDPM, Great Insights, August 2016). There is an absence of the type of rigorous consultative and advocacy design and impact analysis that is needed to effectively engage with the private sector and civil society. It is not easy to engage with non-state actors especially the private sector, which is rarely organised as a single coherent group at the regional level even in SADC which has the most developed private sector of the DMROs. The strategy of using national committees as an entry point to a multi-stakeholder dialogue has not taken off in practice. Some regional NGOs see this as a sign that the DMROs are dominated by state interests and see organised non-state actors as a threat. (i8.1.1)

**Although EU and other cooperation support has led to background studies that prioritise issues for regional integration, the DMROs are still highly ambitious and aspirational in nature.**

COMESA's Medium term strategic plan (2016-2020) with support from the EU identifies areas of intervention to speed up implementation of decisions and legal instruments. TradeMark East Africa have developed and are implementing highly prioritised, concrete and measurable actions under the umbrella of the EAC in coordination and harmony with the EU support. The EU supported a comprehensive review of the RISDP which resulted in the re-prioritisation of SADC's focus areas and programmes. The approval of the revised RISDP marked a new impetus in the development agenda of SADC and successfully identified four priority areas which are well prioritised and more attainable than the earlier strategies. The EU has supported a self-assessment and other strategic studies in IGAD to provide a basis for prioritising actions in line with capacity and financial resources. IOC like other regional organisations have developed strategies in specific areas such as connectivity, transport and energy efficiency. However, as noted by many observers, there is a tendency for member states to signal support for regional integration and agree to broad strategies even when they do not necessarily reflect a high domestic priority; the studies and analysis are not by themselves enough to lead to prioritisation of action. The presence of large donor funds for projects and programmes also makes it difficult to prioritise. (i8.1.2/3)

**Monitoring and implementation of regional strategies was generally weak.** Overall, as noted in earlier evaluation questions, there is little monitoring undertaken of the implementation of the strategies put forward by the DMROs. Monitoring tends to be better at project level where there



are specific log frames and indicators. The African Union's Minimum Integration Programme adopted in 2009, for example, identifies a number of high level priority areas to be implemented at regional and continental levels - however it is only integrated into the IGAD planning and monitoring process. Although adopted, the other DMROs do not monitor the minimum integration programme or use it as a basis for implementation. (i8.1.2/3)

**The EPA process and the development of regional and national EPA implementation plans provide an opportunity for prioritising actions.** The EPA implementation plans provided an entry point for significant trade and regional integration reforms and offer an opportunity to prioritise a set of realistic actions. As the EPAs are legally binding it places a demand on the countries involved to be well prepared and have solid analysis available to support their negotiating position as well as to be in a position to implement the agreements. However whilst this effect is positive, as noted elsewhere, it has been observed, especially in COMESA, that EPAs have also had an undermining effect on the creation of wider regional and continent wide agreements. Nevertheless, EPAs are potentially drivers of change and have the, as yet unmet, potential to provide an incentive to prioritise not only for the countries involved but for all countries as the rules of origin favour ACP countries even if they are not part of the EPA. (i8.1.2/3)

### JC 8.2 "Ownership by member countries of the DMROs and their objectives is increasing"

**Most analysis points to major gaps in the monitoring of and compliance with regional agreements.** Although the situation varies across the different DMROs, in general the level of compliance and monitoring of member state implementation is weak. A number of monitoring mechanisms have been planned (e.g. the Trade Monitoring and Compliance Mechanism of SADC) but it is not yet fully operational. The EAC market score card, the COMESA M&E systems and the African Regional Integration Index are a good start but have not yet translated into powerful tools for monitoring compliance in domesticating regional agreements and implementing agreed national actions. COMESA has linked access to RISM grants to compliance with the 21 M&E indicator system and whilst this is potentially powerful, it is quite complex in part due the number of indicators and how they are measured. There also seems to be evidence that many of the national stakeholders are unaware of the linkage between the size of grants and compliance and thus its effect as an incentive is weakened as was found in the case of Zimbabwe which has a low level of compliance. The DMROs are less powerful than the national states and are meant to carry out a secretarial function. Their role in ensuring compliance and applying sanctions depends on the strength of the collective will power of the nation states to implement agreements. One effect that was observed in Zimbabwe is that the lack of sanctions on compliance infringements has led to a situation of highly unpredictable proxy trade wars where statutory instruments are used to ban certain goods (especially between Zimbabwe and South Africa). This in turn is crippling the private sector, which is the most reliable driver of regional integration, as trucks are turned away at the border. (i8.2.1)

**Member states were slow in complying with regional agreements due to complexity, overlapping requirements and preservation of national interest.** The member states have different interests and there is no mechanism in place to support the weaker countries that might lose out to countries that have a stronger industrial or agricultural base. The current membership of the DMROs is broad and shallow whereas what seems to work better at least for compliance purposes is cooperation that is deep and cohesive (an example is the greater progress made by the EAC in establishing a common market). A number of observers have noted a tendency for member states to agree with plans and strategies that are highly ambitious and aspirational rather than take a negative stance and argue for lower ambitions. Although there is a systematic effort to ensure

coordination between COMESA and SADC when it comes to trade related measures, the issue is complex and there are still situations where the private sector in particular is not sure which compliance regime is the guiding one e.g. on the rule of origin where SADC and COMESA have different approaches. Complex and unrealistic strategies also led to a situation where no country is able to fully comply and which lessens the risk of exposure and the likely burden of having to comply. (i8.2.1)

**EU cooperation support to improving compliance became more balanced between regional and national levels.** EU capacity development support that could assist in compliance was, particularly during EDF 10, mostly aimed at the DMROs rather than at the national level which is responsible for implementation. EDF 11 is to some extent addressing this issue through direct access and by funding organisations such as AFRITAC which builds capacity (including for compliance related matters) directly at the member state level rather than through the secretariats. (i8.2.1/2)

**The DMRO engagement structures at national level were weak or absent and were not a channel for bottom-up pressure for regional integration from non-state actors.** As noted earlier, the DMROs do not have active engagement structures at national level. SADC has established the most advanced system through SADC national committees (SNCs) which in principle could provide multi-stakeholder entry points for member state engagement. However, the establishment and operationalisation of the country-level structures remains weak. Many SNCs are either dormant or dysfunctional. In IOC, the strategy of using national focal points with a lead country taking the coordination role sometimes work as in the case of Madagascar for the disaster risk reduction project but often it does not as in the case of the Western Indian Ocean Coastal Challenge project where Seychelles is the lead. The duty description of the national focal point is provided as “a one liner” (Ministry of Environment) and often based on flawed assumptions that: i) the project is the priority of the national agency; ii) the national agency can coordinate and “has the upper hand with” other ministries; iii) the national agency has the capacity and resources; iv) the national agency is able to engage with non-state actors where relevant. The chain of command is too long: it goes from EU - to- IOC - to- Ministry of Foreign Affairs - to- national agency - to- non-state actors as implementers, with the effect that “Everyone is involved and in essence nobody does it” (Ministry of Finance and Economic Development). (i8.2.2)

**The involvement of non-state actors is a promising path for increasing the accountability of the DMROs** if not to the member states then at least to the private sector and civil society that is meant to benefit. The EU and its member states assisted this process most notably in SADC but also in EAC (via support to TradeMark East Africa). There is evidence, as with the case brought by an Egyptian company against Mauritius shows that compliance is more likely to arise from pressure from the private sector than from the secretariats. (i8.2.2)

**Member states potentially derived benefits from the DMROs as noted by the interest of countries to join but their interests are different and not necessarily compatible with each other** e.g. within regional conflict in South Sudan the interests of Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda are quite different. Kenya engages with IGAD to gain benefits on issues related to security but engages with EAC to gain benefits related to economic integration. It appears that DMROs with few members and a narrower purpose are more likely to deliver tangible benefits that work in the interest of all e.g. IOC and EAC. However, an overriding effect is that in many cases the trade, transport and other benefits that could arise have not yet taken place because the systems to make them work are not functioning and the member states themselves are not in full compliance with regional agreements. There is a vicious circle where the incentive to comply is not strong enough because the benefits are not arising and the benefits are not arising because of inadequate

compliance. There is a mistaken or at least oversimplified assumption that because a country has a representative on the DMRO secretariat that it has ownership of the decisions taken. (i8.2.3)

### JC 8.3 “The new implementation modalities are having their intended effects”

**The new modalities of the EDF 11 were based on sound analysis of earlier experience however it is still too early to tell if the modalities are working as intended.** So far it appears that after a slow start that the rate of programming is picking up and already some 40% of the allocation is programmed with about 70% being implemented through direct access (10% at national level and 60% through international organisations, member states and the EU). It is noted by many that the principles of direct access and the use of performance measures were resisted by the DMROs who feared that the regional organisations could be undermined. The DMROs also feared, as decisions were made on the basis of consensus that the new decision-making process, by involving the EUDs and national actors, would lead to chaos. This does not appear to have been the case so far. It is also too early to tell if the new modalities have led to DMROs being better able to focus on their core tasks of policy setting, guidance and supervision rather than project management. The reduced funding via the DMROs will at least have lessened the pressure on having to meet high expenditure targets at the DMRO level. (i8.3.1/2)

**Direct access proved difficult where countries are ineligible for budget support** Countries that are ineligible for budget support need to comply with unfamiliar DMRO systems where there is a contribution agreement (or EU systems in case of no contribution agreement). This is difficult especially in the context of relatively small projects. In countries where there was budget support provided the operational departments noted that it was not always clear if budget support once it had been transferred to the treasury actually led to any additionality in either inputs or outputs. In the case of the Department of Trade in Mauritius the funds were not passed on to the operational units but the achievement of the indicators (compliance with COMESA indicators) allowed the release of funds to the treasury. Without it being possible to guarantee additionality of the funds provided, the release indicators and the underlying analysis of what additionality in output could be expected were not precise enough in order to follow up on whether the intended effect was achieved due to the EU support. (i8.3.1/2)

**Opportunities to work with lower level regional bodies that are specific to particular sub-regions or topics were not being optimised.** Many donors such as DFID, GIZ, USAID and the IMF work at sub-regional level and with specialised bodies that are focused on a single set of issues and who are potentially more effective in enhancing regional integration within a specific topic. GIZ for example finds that working with the Orange-Senqu river commission on shared water issues is more effective than working at the DMRO level. AFRITAC similarly works through regional bodies that are specialised in certain topics such as the Collaborative Africa Budget Reform Initiative. In the IOC region, regional cooperation on coastal zone management has been effective through direct collaboration between the national coastal zone management agencies rather than having to go through IOC or a specific regional body.

**The new modalities are designed to address the critical issues around disbursement of the EU cooperation programme and do not address some of the fundamental issues** and challenges facing regional integration or resolve internal disagreement within the DMROs. The modalities do not by themselves address the fundamental challenges facing regional integration in the EA-SA-IO region such as: overlapping membership; diverging interests; low involvement and demand from civil society and the private sector and, poor compliance and the absence of effective monitoring and sanctions. (i8.3.1/2)

**The EU support to enhancement of performance is much needed although many of the longer-term underlying issues are of a political economy rather than capacity nature.** Significant capacity development has been and is being provided to the DMROs. However, there are also capacity constraints at the national level where the regional agreements need to be implemented. The modality of direct access does to some extent assist with this as it encourages implementation at the national level. Direct access and variable geometry implemented today also combine to reduce the future implementation complexity at the DMRO level which is very likely to lead to improvement in performance of the core DMRO tasks. However, it is becoming apparent that poor performance is not just capacity related but in reality is much more affected by the willingness to integrate regionally and by underlying political economy issues. (i8.3.3)

### Summary of selected points that are DMRO specific


DMRO	Notes (JC)
COMESA	COMESA is more affected by the EPAs than the other DMROs because of the breadth of its membership and its focus on trade related integration.(JC8.1) COMESA is the only DMRO that as a compliance system linked to release of funds (RISM)(JC8.2)
EAC	Policy dialogue is more difficult because the DMRO is not in the same city as the EUD. (JC8.1) EAC score card system is one of the most advanced monitoring systems for compliance.(JC8.2)
IGAD	It is only in IGAD that the AU minimum integration plan is being taken seriously and being monitored (JC8.2)
IOC	The 5 countries in the region have historical experience of regional cooperation within specialised areas (coastal zone management) which worked without having to pass through a DMRO.(JC8.3)
SADC	Policy dialogue especially with SADC has been reported as especially difficult also by other donors. (JC8.1) The review of the SADC RISDP resulted in a higher degree of prioritisation of the DMRO agenda that was previously the case and is a promising signal for the future (and the potential value of such reviews) (JC8.2)
The analysis presented here (volume 1) is a synthesis of an indicator analysis that is DMRO specific where relevant (volume 2). The analysis at JC and EQ takes account of what is specific to each DMRO but aims to bring together a synthesis by structuring around the main findings rather than the DMROs in recognition that beyond DMROs, member state, private sector and civil society are also important to consider. This summary box brings out the selected points that are specific to the DMROs.	



## 5. Conclusions and Recommendations

### 5.1 Conclusions

The conclusions which bring together findings across the evaluation questions are grouped under: relevance; effectiveness; efficiency, sustainability, impact and added value. They are summarised below:



#### **Conclusion 1 - EU support to the EA-SA-IO region has been carried out in a highly complex and challenging context that has been further complicated by the absence of an African-led rationalisation of the regional architecture.**

The EU's five partner 'duly-mandated regional organisations' (DMROs) have challenging institutional and governance set-ups which are all the more complex due to overlapping membership and concurrent initiatives related to the African Union, regional and continental trade and other agreements, and Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). The absence of an African-led rationalisation of the regional architecture and delineation of the core functions of the DMROs has made alignment to a relevant and credible regional policy framework difficult (this point is further developed under Conclusion 3). In addition, although DMROs have made efforts to deal with the challenges of political instability, armed conflict, vested interests, high levels of corruption in some countries and, leadership instability these issues have presented significant obstacles to the achievement of EDF objectives and aid effectiveness goals.

The five sub-regions and their 25 member states eligible for EU EDF support differ significantly in terms of their exposure to, and management of, these challenges. Each operates in a dynamic

socio-economic environment – with rapid transformation often taking place. For EUDs, it has been challenging to appropriately reflect the evolving realities in programming, implementation and monitoring. “What may have been a pressing need in 2014 may not be one today – three years later – when EDF 11 is being formulated,” said one EUD officer. This dynamic context has placed great demands on both EUDs and DMROs, in terms of managing risk on the one hand, and finding the right balance between flexibility to respond to change and anchoring interventions in a stable longer-term vision on the other.

**Conclusion 2 - The underlying assumptions and political economy affecting the progress of regional integration and the likely effectiveness of external support were not fully examined or challenged.**

As noted by the midterm review of EDF 10, the original analysis and programming of EDF 10 was overly ambitious and did not take full account of the complexity and challenges of the regional dynamics mentioned above. For example, the risk assessment of EDF 10 (ESA-IO) recognised the likelihood of slow implementation due to inadequate capacity at the DMROs but assumed that “supporting managerial, financial and technical capacities” would lead to the expected results (ESA-IO RIP, p35). While the risk was correctly identified, the assumption was not borne out in practice because the institutional strengthening support did not suffice by itself. Progress was affected not just by low capacity but also by issues relating to ownership and political commitment. The EDF 11 analysis and programming responded to the midterm review findings by adjusting the intervention approach and focusing more on modalities such as direct access and variable geometry. By end-2016 this had already had a measurable effect: only 30% of EDF 11 programming to date had been channelled through the DMROs.

However, a deeper political economy analysis was not available to challenge and test core assumptions and other factors influencing regional integration, e.g.: 1) the linkage between DMRO goals and priorities and member states’ actual priorities and needs; 2) the gap between member states’ rhetoric on ambitious regional integration and their actual commitment in practice; 3) the compliance and incentive environment at both DMRO and member state level; 4) the involvement of civil society and the private sector in advocacy, priority setting and programme design); 5) the balance of interests between weaker and stronger member states and 6) historical and identity-based conflicts and divisions that cut across national and regional boundaries.

To varying degrees the EU, as well as DMROs and their member states, lacked analysis that took into account the above challenges. Because of this, it was difficult to appreciate fully the influence of these factors on the long-term objectives, the prioritisation and timescale for attaining regional integration goals in the medium term. It also meant that it was difficult to determine where and how a deeper involvement of civil society, and especially the private sector, was feasible. The absence of a deeper partner-led and partner-shared understanding of these factors has made it challenging to target support on areas where visible progress was attainable (drivers of change) and areas where external support would be strong enough to overcome impediments to change.

**Conclusion 3 - EU regional support was aligned and relevant to the regional integration agenda, but partners’ commitment and capacity were overestimated, particularly in EDF 10.** The interventions supported under both EDF 10 and 11 were aligned and traceable to key policies and plans such as the DMROs’ Medium-Term Strategies and the Tripartite agenda. The three EDF 11 priority areas (regional economic integration; peace, security and regional stability; and natural resource management) are central to regional integration and were well selected.

Complete alignment, however, has been difficult because the lofty ambitions of the DMROs and member states have not been matched in practice by their capacity and commitment. While a key aim of EU support has been to strengthen commitment and capacity, it has not been easy to do so in a context where DMRO member states have challenged the DMROs' 'added value' and have not always honoured their financial and regional integration commitments.

Overestimating partner commitment and capacity to deliver change at both the national and DMRO levels led to overambitious allocations and timeframes, and contributed to EDF 10's underperformance and subsequent adjustment. The EDF 11 response was to transfer more implementation responsibility to international and other organisations; this has led to a better balance between the level of support being provided and the capacity to implement and achieve the agreed goals of the RIP.

While EU support was implemented in good faith, carefully planned, and undertaken in close consultation with partners, risks of harmful effects existed in terms of over-supporting DMROs, creating dependency, and overloading the regional agenda with project activities. These effects were recognised in the EDF 10 midterm review and addressed in the follow-up to that review, as well as in the new modalities of EDF 11. The revisions stopped short of introducing the radically new approach that might have been indicated if in-depth needs assessments, organisational and strategic analyses, and consultations had been performed, including at the Pan-African level.

**Conclusion 4 - The EDF 11 adjustments and approach heeded lessons from the past and generally headed in the right direction; however, weaknesses have emerged that have implications for potential programme impact and sustainability.**

The EDF 11 RIP is tighter and easier to navigate than the EDF 10 RIPs. Its recognition of the need for a strong dual regional/national approach and for a stronger private sector role responded to recommendations of earlier evaluations and the midterm reviews. The somewhat lower profile given to EPAs and customs unions reflected new realities. The greater emphasis on support for industrialisation initiatives in the SADC region responded to the Tripartite agenda and SADC priorities. However, in some areas, there was a tendency to try to solve too many problems at once. In addition, the proliferation of EU instruments and programmes across the region has caused confusion.

As noted earlier, the introduction of stronger direct access and variable geometry approaches was well conceived and the EU, by channelling resources to specialised agencies, responded to inadequate DMRO capacity and other challenges faced under EDF 10. The process of negotiating these changes was not easy; it was one of the factors that led to the delay of EDF 11. The changes were not fully accepted by the DMROs, in part because they challenged vested interests. However, many of the problems foreseen by the DMROs (e.g. a breakdown in coordination) have not yet occurred and there are signs of a growing acceptance of the changes at the working level.

The NIP/RIP sequencing was problematic, especially for trade-related interventions. The NIPs were completed first, and in many cases the desired interaction between the NIPs and RIPs could not take place (other than in Madagascar). Under EDF 11, the NIPs' focal areas were tightened, and trade and private sector development activities were largely shifted to the RIP. This move has complicated the coordination of regional and national interventions and worked against the application of subsidiarity, particularly in activities related to private sector development and sustainable capacity building.

In relation to biodiversity, lack of continuity from EDF 10 to EDF 11 has challenged the achievement of sustainability and full impact of the EDF 10 investment. For example, after the



Biodiversity Management Programme (BMP) there is no biodiversity support for IGAD. As a consequence, no provisions exist for enabling the implementation of the three spatial/transboundary landscape management plans developed under BMP. While there is an EA-SA-IO cross-regional biodiversity programme under EDF 11, it does not have sufficient provision to ensure the implementation of the three landscape management plans.

In peace and security, the overall vision was to some extent clearer under EDF 10. Under EDF 11, support to DMROs is not well-linked to support to the AU, and the relationship between EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa projects and DMROs/AU is still being defined.

**Conclusion 5 - EU regional cooperation had clear value added, although its potential was far from fulfilled.**

The EU regional cooperation in EA-SA-IO had clear value added compared to its other cooperation (global, country) and to other development partners, including EU member states. It provided more stable and sizeable funding; was less project-based overall; and brought to bear a range of modalities and management modes, on top of structured political and policy dialogue, within the framework of policy coherence for development and a comprehensive approach to development, peace and security. Moreover, the EU was in a good position to harmonise its interventions with EU member states, being guided by a common political agenda; and it brought the EU integration experience.

EU regional cooperation can add more value than global, continental and country-level interventions where regional policy frameworks and processes complement and are more influential than global or continental ones. For example, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) standards and processes for due diligence for minerals from conflict zones are closer to the realities of ICGLR member states and tend to be domesticated and implemented more than global or AU standards. Another example is elections, where SADC standards and electoral observation missions tended to influence candidate and party behaviour more than global or AU standards.

However, the potential for the EU's regional cooperation to add value *vis-à-vis* other EU instruments and other development partners is far from fulfilled, given that EUDs did not have a bird's eye view of all EU interventions in the specific country or region. This has limited the ability to coordinate regional and country-level policy dialogue and interventions. Instances of "working in silos" were mentioned in all EUDs visited (except IOC), particularly with regard to insufficient coordination between regional and national EUDs.

In addition, field interviews indicated that the EU had not taken full advantage of the opportunity to share its broader experience and expertise on critical regional integration issues - an area where it is considered to have an important comparative advantage.

**Conclusion 6 - Dialogue focused on disbursement rather than on strategic and operational matters.**

Dialogue between the EU and the DMROs has mainly focused on the implementation of the EU cooperation programme. Moreover, it focused on management of EU assistance and increasing the level of disbursement rather than focusing on strategic matters (in the case of IOC, the EUD but less so the IOC found that the dialogue was well structured). EUDs (except IOC and IGAD) noted that poor preparation of meetings reduced the value of the policy dialogue. In a number of cases it was apparent that the dialogue was not prioritised or valued by the DMROs, despite the

fact that the EU was a major donor in all DMROs, controversy over ineligible expenses and what was perceived as intransigent interpretation of rules tended to distract from the dialogue. An example was in IGAD, where the Maritime Security programme was delayed by 12 months by discussions on expenses that were declared ineligible with respect to EU rules.

There have been promising developments through the support of the EU to policy dialogue with civil society for example in SADC. But in general, the dialogue engagement with civil society and private sector was weak.

Political dialogue served to cement good relations and provide a favourable context. On a few occasions, such as the instability in Burundi or South Sudan, political dialogue was constructive in supporting DMROs' difficult mediation efforts. Political dialogue tended to focus on establishing good relations rather than bringing up contentious issues. Strategically, this could well have been the right approach. But it meant that an opportunity was lost to discuss the assumptions made and what explains the persistent gaps in member state domestication of regional agreements.

The high-level political dialogue was not always translated into clear priorities for EUDs and project staff. For example, where there had been high-level political and policy dialogue, such as with IGAD on peace and security, it was not converted into clear implications for project management staff and therefore had less effect.

The combination of political and policy dialogue was not brought to a high-enough level to realise the diplomatic and political opportunities foreseen by the EEAS as a result of the scale of the programme. The political and policy dialogue did not benefit from a solid political economy analysis of opportunities and bottlenecks to increased regional cooperation and integration. This made it difficult to develop appropriate and attainable political and policy agendas. Where policy dialogue had a specific and concrete agenda, it was more influential, for example in maritime security. Besides dialogue on substantive policy issues, enhanced dialogue on organisational matters and funding remains of paramount importance in terms of bettering DMROs' management performance.

**Conclusion 7 - Important results were obtained in all priority areas, although progress towards reaching objectives and level of sustainability varies.**

The results highlighted in this section were of a regional nature and contributed to overall EU objectives in the areas of regional economic integration, peace and security, and natural resource management. These examples and the detailed findings in the report underscore the potential of EU regional support to deliver results in areas where national and continental processes cannot. The combination of support to the three priority areas also demonstrated allocative efficiency in the EDF 10 and 11 RIPs. These results were achieved with a clear contribution from EU regional programmes, sometimes with additional support from, or in cooperation with, other donors or international partners.

#### Regional Integration

**Conclusion 7a1: EU regional support is facilitating progress towards regional market development and integration to a reasonable extent in the key areas of trade facilitation, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, technical regulations and regional standards, non-tariff barriers and competition policy.**

Following are some illustrative examples of results:

- The EU-funded RISM and RISP programmes at COMESA contributed to stronger regional-national linkages and a more results-oriented focus on domestication of regional protocols.
- EU support for customs and trade facilitation projects has contributed to improved border efficiency and better conditions for women crossborder traders.
- EU support for the broader trade facilitation agenda has the potential to contribute to trade growth and diversification in the longer term.
- The SADC Integrated Regional Electronic Settlement System (SIRESS, 2013), adopted by banks in nine countries, represents a successful variable geometry approach allowing integration to deepen progressively with those countries ready to commit. It also demonstrates the value of strong private sector participation.
- EU direct and indirect support for regional (and national) sanitary and phytosanitary and technical regulation/standards initiatives are making a difference (e.g. AU-IBAR).
- The EU-supported AFRITAC East and South programmes and the SADC Macroeconomic Peer Review Mechanism have enabled member states to learn from one another, encouraged better macroeconomic performance and strengthened capacity in finance ministries and central banks.
- The strengthening of the COMESA Competition Commission has fostered greater cooperation among regional and national authorities and improved enforcement in the region.
- With EU support, SADC designed a regional poverty observatory based on a model advocated by civil society.

While a foundation has been established in these crucial areas, efforts need to continue systematically in order to consolidate the gains and achieve the longer-term objectives of open, fair and diversified regional trade contributing to sustainable economic growth and security. In other vital areas for trade development (e.g. statistics, services sector and services trade development, and SME export readiness), more attention is needed for regional solutions to underpin the overall business and trading environment. Sustainability of the regional gains to date will depend heavily on national uptake and enforcement of regional policies and rules, a key pillar of regional integration. This may require new approaches to encourage compliance, strengthen coherence in regional and national programming, involve the private sector, and secure effective regional-level donor coordination.

**Conclusion 7a2: Infrastructure support, a large component of EU regional programming in EA-SA-IO, appears to be working well and is likely to contribute to regional integration, particularly through improved energy and transport infrastructure.**

The EU's emphasis on infrastructure support was well-aligned to regional and national priorities in EA-SA-IO. The EU supported the developmental integration approach adopted by governments in the region, where infrastructure is one of three designated pillars for regional economic integration, along with market access and industrialisation. The main sectors chosen under EDFs 10 and 11 (energy and transport) contribute directly to the objective of regional integration. The instruments designed for the infrastructure activities, principally blending, were appropriate for EA-SA-IO.

Support provided to both hard and soft infrastructure interventions ensured well-balanced interventions that saw results achieved in line with the overall objective of contributing to regional economic integration. For example, EU support to infrastructure development along transport corridors in East Africa contributed to improved trade facilitation in the EAC. The support for regional power pools was important for strengthening energy markets in East and Southern Africa. At an institutional level, EU engagement in regional infrastructure projects assisted in clarifying the role of DMROs as one of promotion and monitoring of priority projects that have significant

regional impact. There was limited capacity in DMROs, but under EDF 10 the opportunity was not fully taken to complement the regional agenda by working with more technical regional organisations that are involved in the relevant sectors, such as regional power pools, transport corridor authorities and multi-country resource management initiatives (e.g. river basin commissions).

The evolution of the soft infrastructure programming from EDF 10 to EDF 11 provided for greater synergies between DMROs. The physical infrastructure projects (e.g. support to regional energy regulators) complemented the funding provided for interconnectivity projects by other donors (e.g. the African Development Bank). These developments will contribute to the ongoing sustainability of the infrastructure interventions supported by the EU at the regional level in EA-SA-IO.

### **Democracy, peace and security**

**Conclusion 7b – EU regional cooperation contributed to enhancing capacity for credible elections, early warning and response, and peace support operations – efficiency and further translation into peace and security outcomes could improve.**

Objectives - In spite of weak efficiency, a lack of focus on results, a lack of synergies with EU actions at the national level, mixed signals sent to the AU and DMROs, and insufficient attention to gender matters, the regional programmes have delivered a number of outputs in all REC regions:

- In democratic governance, these are mainly in terms of capacity development, norms and dialogue *fora*. For example (i) in SADC, the adoption of revised principles for electoral observation; training of mediators part of a SADC and AU pool; strategies and mechanisms to prevent human trafficking; (ii) in IGAD, the adoption of a Protocol on Democracy, Governance, and Elections; Election Code of Conduct; and Guidelines for Election Observers; election observation missions in South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda and Djibouti; (iii) in EAC, the creation of a Democracy and Election Unit and a Forum of Electoral Commissions; the development of Principles of Election Observation and Evaluation and draft EAC Protocol on Good Governance; and (iv) in COMESA the establishment of an Inter-Parliamentary Forum and network of civil society and private sector organizations.
- In peace and security, outputs include capacity development, norms and dialogue *fora* but also a number of operational centres and missions deployed: early warning and mediation systems, most advanced in EAC, IGAD and SADC, and are connected with each others' and with the AU's; important policies and standards in maritime security such as the "Djibouti Code of Conduct"; improved capacity of national criminal justice systems in Kenya, Seychelles and Mauritius to prosecute piracy offences; capacity development efforts led by COMESA in Anti-money laundering and terrorism financing; the setting up of the SADC Standby Force and its deployment in DR Congo as part of the UN mission. The Standby Force defeated the M23 rebel group in DR Congo, paving the way for the 2013 peace agreement with M23.

Outcomes - Political realities outside of its control notwithstanding (e.g. resurgence of conflicts in Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan), EU regional cooperation in peace, security and stability has contributed to some positive outcomes, e.g. EU regional cooperation has contributed to increased capacity in the SADC region to conduct credible elections and to contain elections-related crises, e.g. in Lesotho, Madagascar, and Tanzania; IGAD value-added in mediation in Sudan and South Sudan; security sector reform in Somalia. Crossborder tensions have diminished considerably across most of EA-SA-IO.

The complexity and involvement of multiple actors means that it is not meaningful or possible to attribute peace and security improvements to EU regional cooperation, nor to state that EU regional cooperation was a decisive factor in limiting any deteriorations.

But it was a facilitating factor in peace and security in EASAIIO, and in democratisation in the SADC region, given the relative stability and sheer size of EU regional cooperation compared to both other partners' support and the DMROs' own resources. The counterfactual (no EU regional cooperation) would probably have meant much more limited progress. For example, the 'whole of EU' contribution to fighting piracy has yielded significantly fewer pirate attacks. With EU support, IGAD has demonstrated its value-added, e.g. mediation in Sudan and South Sudan; security sector reform in Somalia; deployment of an IGAD Monitoring and Verification Mechanism in South Sudan and of an IGAD Peace and Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM) that paved the way for AMISOM. In SADC, EDF 10 activities that relate to democracy in SADC countries have contributed to increasing the SADC region's capacity to conduct credible elections, and SADC demonstrated its ability to contain elections-related crises, e.g. in Zimbabwe (2011), Madagascar (2009-2011), Lesotho (2014), and Tanzania (2015).

Sustainability - Some tangible results have been achieved, and they are likely to be sustainable provided EU funding remains stable over time and financial dependency on the EU lessens. Sustainability has been hampered in the past by unpredictable funding, leading to staff layoffs. What helped sustainability over 2008-2015 was limited reliance on external technical assistance; increasing involvement of civil society organisations, including youth organisations; increasing coordination across RECs and with the AU, such as in early warning and mediation.

Overall, a regional approach to democratisation, peace and security, complementary to a national approach, is highly relevant and justified. In spite of weak efficiency, EU regional cooperation in these matters has yielded important outputs. These outputs have sometimes translated into tangible peace and security outcomes, especially when synergies were sought and policies operationalized through training, setting up of units and processes, and missions deployed to implement these policies. In future, a more needs-based approach; an overview of what the AU and each DMRO is most suited to do; a sharper focus on drivers of/barriers to peace and security; and a more strategic dialogue with partners would not only increase efficiency but also the translation of more outputs into positive peace and security outcomes.

### **Natural resources management**

**Conclusion 7c – EU support contributed to improving NRM governance and management, especially in relation to fisheries – but the results are for the most part not sustainable yet**

Objectives -The regional programmes have partly delivered the intended objectives of EU's regional support for NRM. Tangible environmental and socio-economic improvements were achieved by SmartFish in terms of: a) reduced pressure on, and recovery of, specific fish stocks (e.g. octopus on Rodrigues island); b) reduction in illegal and destructive fishing practices (e.g. in Tanzanian waters); and c) improved production and enhanced profits (e.g. for mud-crabs in Madagascar). However, tangible impacts were mainly localised to pilot sites, although there are examples of upscaling and replication, and impacts in relation to terrestrial ecosystems were more limited. Overall, environmental degradation, loss of biodiversity, climate change and the associated negative impacts on people's lives remain major and increasing challenges in the EA-SA-IO region.

Outcomes -The regional programmes delivered tangible outcomes. Regional cooperation was to some extent enhanced vis-à-vis managing regionally important natural resources (e.g. by promoting joint patrolling of fisheries) and with regional policy development (e.g. with the adoption of an IGAD regional biodiversity policy). At the national and local levels, technical capacities of governments and stakeholders were strengthened vis-à-vis policy-making, planning, environmental monitoring, and fisheries enforcement, although process management capacities were not

significantly enhanced. Moreover, private sector and community participation was enhanced; indeed, the above-mentioned tangible environmental and economic improvements were in most cases closely associated with their involvement, SmartFish achieved particularly good results with its value chain based approach to fisheries management. Overall, the results achieved in relation to fisheries were more significant than vis-à-vis other areas of NRM; EU's support for fisheries was consistently provided, whereas other NRM processes, such as biodiversity, have not been supported with the same degree of a long-term engagement (e.g. biodiversity in IGAD was only supported under EDF10) and continuity was disrupted by prolonged gap periods (e.g. between the different phases of ISLANDS) and significant implementation delays, in part caused by difficulties in applying EU procedures and in part due to design issues. Moreover, the more direct and easily understood economic benefits of improved fisheries management was conducive for REC and stakeholder ownership, whereas the economic importance of e.g. biodiversity as a global good is less easily appreciated.

Sustainability - While good results have been achieved, they are generally not sustainable due to a combination of uneven stakeholder ownership and insufficient technical and financial capacities of national governments to ensure post project continuation. All programmes relied heavily on external technical assistance, and the regional and national institutions lack the financial capacity to provide services at the same level as the EU funded programmes, and they depend to an extent on irregular project funding, as evidenced by as evidenced by the reduced intensity in joint surveillance as a direct result of reduced EU funding. Sustainability was mainly achieved where the private sector or communities were involved (e.g. in joint management of fisheries resources or improved production) and achieved economic or livelihoods benefits and thus have a direct incentive to ensure post-project continuation. In such cases, spontaneous replication outside of project support has also taken place. The decision not to continue the processes initiated under the BMP and Biodiversité programmes in EDF11 also means that the intended results vis-à-vis biodiversity will not be fully achieved and the results that have been achieved unlikely to be sustained.

**Conclusion 8 - Member state compliance and domestication of regional agreements are a driving factor in achieving regional integration objectives, but progress has been disappointing.**

EDF 10 (particularly following the midterm review) and EDF 11 recognised that one of the driving factors in achieving regional integration was the domestication or transposition of regional laws and commitments into national systems. A number of issues influence the pace of domestication: political leadership, the 'demand' for regional integration from the private sector, the clarity and simplicity of the obligations, sectoral/interest group sensitivities, etc. In the EA-SA-IO region, systems for monitoring and enforcing member state compliance have not been effective.

Monitoring and enforcement of implementation of regional commitments in EA-SA-IO remains weak. EU support has not yet led to significant improvements, although the EDF 10 Regional Integration Support Mechanism (RISM) has had some impact on mind-sets and performance, despite its over-complexity (see RISM Case Study in Annex C). It remains to be seen if EDF 11's stronger focus on a dual-pronged regional/national approach will help to address this issue more comprehensively.

Other initiatives in some DMROs have showed signs of bearing fruit, e.g. EAC Scorecard, the Tripartite NTB Reporting, Monitoring and Eliminating Mechanism and the SADC Macroeconomic Peer Review Mechanism. Some of these processes face sustainability challenges, being largely implemented by external parties (the EAC Scorecard) and financed solely by donors

(e.g. the NTB mechanism faltered when the initial funding provided by DfID through TradeMark Southern Africa was withdrawn).

**Conclusion 9 - The efficiency of the DMROs and the efficiency of EU support to regional integration were low.**

Although results have been achieved as outlined in earlier conclusions, the resources were not used as efficiently as they could have been. Generally the funds allocated for infrastructure have been relatively efficiently used, taking advantage of the tried and tested procedures of blending. However, the resources have not been as efficiently used for other areas of regional economic integration, peace and security and natural resource management. The key factors are: i) DMRO capacity to absorb and manage the funds; and ii) the internal rules and procedures of the EU which the implementing agencies have not found easy to use. These factors were realised by all involved, and both budget support and contribution agreements have been used where relevant to increase efficiency, although they were not able to address the challenges for all situations.

Despite long-term support to capacity development, the DMROs are not yet able to absorb the disbursement levels foreseen. The pillar assessments carried out in four of the five DMROs constituted a positive process that could lead to increasing administrative efficiency, although the pillar roadmaps for pillar implementation have not always been internalised. The new intra-DMRO forum and High-Level Group arrangements have been functioning, but have not yet achieved the degree of strategic interaction intended and were distracted by the contentious issue of direct access.

The internal rules and procedures of the EU led to operational inefficiencies, particularly for implementing bodies that are new to the procedures (despite training being provided). But the issue was not only difficulty in understanding the rules, it also related to inadequate management. The ineligible expenses, although significant, was relatively small as a proportion of the overall expenditure for most DMROs but often led to a high level of disruption and a significant deterioration in the cooperation environment. Nonetheless, a laxer interpretation of the rules would quite possibly have led to a higher level of ineligible expenses.

The key issues that concerned the DMROs and partners that were ineligible for budget support, were the difficulty of applying EU rules and procedures, the strict interpretation of the rules, and the level of documentation required (for either EU or DMRO procedures). However, particularly regarding the RISM programme, some implementing agencies in member states with 'budget support status' preferred project support rather than budget support because they received the funding/assistance directly and had more control over the outputs and results that they were charged with delivering. In such cases, the implementing agencies noted that the extra time and effort spent on EU EDF procedures was worth the trouble.

Contribution agreements (through COMESA and later also with SADC) have shown that they can have a potentially important and constructive effect, although not without challenges. This is because the DMROs' own systems were not necessarily agile or well implemented in practice, and national partners (countries ineligible for budget support) were obliged to use unfamiliar DMRO systems. The COMESA RISM progress report 2016 noted a number of efficiency-related challenges. Field investigations confirmed the difficulty of using contribution agreements. As an example, an implementing agency (ZIMTrade) experienced long delays and high meeting and preparation costs in the use of RISM funds. The same is likely to hold true for the Trade-Related Facility under SADC where national implementing agencies will need to implement relatively small projects according to SADC rules and procedures that they are unfamiliar with.

**Conclusion 10 - There was policy coherence for development across the EU and with EU member states and other development partners, but at the operational level synergies varied.**

In the absence of African efforts to rationalise the regional architecture and delineate the core functions for the DMROs, the EU had a tendency to contribute to too many regional organisations/initiatives with too many membership overlaps, doing too many things in isolation. For example, Burundi and Rwanda belong to COMESA, EAC, ECCAS, ICGLR and CEPGL, all supported by EU, and all these organisations/initiatives are active in peace and security.

Nevertheless, the efforts and approaches of Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) have been broadly successful: there is no manifest policy incoherence across the EU (regional and national policies in development, infrastructure, trade, investment, fisheries, natural resource management, etc.) nor between the regional development policies of the EU and that of other development partners, including member states. This is thanks to (i) special efforts to improve PCD within the EU, especially since the Lisbon Treaty (e.g. efforts to bring development and CFSP approaches and instruments together with the creation of EEAS); (ii) to the design and implementation of the RIPs that include efforts to minimise negative spillovers in trade and fisheries; and (iii) to generally satisfactory coordination with other development partners regarding support to DMROs.

However, on the operational front, synchronisation and synergies with other EU instruments varied for both EDF 10 and EDF 11. There were positive examples in infrastructure and natural resource management (e.g. SmartFish, where coordination was especially effective), but with instances of duplication elsewhere, e.g. within the peace and security area. To some extent this was influenced by the absence of DMRO-steered coordination and the challenges of the regional integration environment. It was also influenced by the absence of a shared analysis of the challenges facing regional integration, as well as the absence of a coherent and realistic vision and pathway to attainment of that vision. An example was in IGAD, where its managerial and financial management capacities and its revised organigram (2017) were issues of prime importance to the EU, Germany and USAID (among others), yet they were not addressed in a cohesive manner by the development partners. No less than six separate assessments of IGAD's managerial and financial management capacities were carried out in 2016.

**Conclusion 11 - Despite years of institutional strengthening, DMRO sustainability remains fragile.**

Despite years of institutional strengthening, the DMROs' *raison d'être* and sustainability are still fragile. Donors are struggling to determine the right mix of assistance and weaning, and DMROs are engaging in soul searching over sustainability and alternative sources of funding. The problem lies as much with member states and donors as with the DMROs themselves. The regional and continental context has moved on, yet DMRO institutional set-ups have not adapted adequately to changing times and expectations. Member states' unity of purpose has faltered in the face of competing priorities and interests, including overlapping memberships which present strategic as well as financial challenges. Donor funding has encouraged DMROs to expand beyond their core mandates, testing their capacity and competences and contributing to disgruntled MS comments about 'overstretching', 'empire building' and poor governance. DMRO interviews revealed frustration over "member states' lack of political will to meet their commitments", yet fairly broad acceptance of the MS criticisms, with many problems attributed to lack of leadership by DMRO CEOs and Heads of State.



Financial sustainability and capacity to deliver are major challenges. Member state funding is not sufficient to ensure DMROs' sustainability in their present form. MS contribute a relatively large proportion of the core budgets, but very little of the programmatic operating budgets, which are 40-90% donor-funded (mainly by the EU and EU MS). Institutional memory is thin, given the large turnover and preponderance of donor-funded project staff, even in some core functions. To meet members' expectations, the DMROs need a core base of sustainable in-house expertise on key issues. The EU and other organisations have invested large sums in DMRO capacity building (systems and training), but they confess to being in the dark about the real capacity of the DMROs to carry out their core functions, let alone oversee donor projects. Although DMROs have undertaken institutional reviews over the years, this evaluation uncovered little evidence of strategic re-organisations.

Stakeholders at all levels expressed the opinion that rationalisation was necessary. "DMROs should be policy bodies, not project implementers." More specifically, they saw DMROs as policy, analytical and convening organisations, in line with their core mandates of harmonising policies, implementing Council decisions, monitoring domestication by member states and providing secretariat support services.

Member states said they wanted the DMROs to prove their relevance in critical areas of intervention where member states can see value. However, for the regional solutions to produce the long-awaited benefits and impact, member states must implement and enforce them, and this virtuous and self-reinforcing cycle has not yet occurred.

### **Conclusion 12 – The attention given to crosscutting issues, including gender, was uneven.**

Crosscutting issues were covered specifically in the RSPs and RIPs, but the extent to which they have been adequately considered in the programmes varied. At the institutional level, RISP 2 supported the formulation of COMESA's Gender Mainstreaming Policy and Action Plan and RISM has supported national implementation of FEMCOM. The DRMO gender officers were consulted on the planning of the support under EDF11. In IGAD and EAC, gender officers suggested that the EU might further emphasise gender-sensitive programme design, implementation and monitoring in its regional support. The EU provided some support for NGOs engaged in tracking progress in implementation of SADC's gender protocol. The NRM programmes were generally gender-sensitive, with several activities specifically aiming at empowering women and providing them with new or enhanced economic opportunities. Moreover, NRM projects also targeted children and youth *vis-à-vis* environmental awareness and sustainable use of natural resources, and health and nutrition benefits of fish consumption. Moreover, the support for crossborder trade paid specific attention to improving the conditions for women small traders. However, the investment project and industrialisation programme with SADC did not pay explicit attention to gender-related issues.

As for peace and security, except for SADC, gender issues were not central in RIP-funded project documents on democracy, peace and security; and they were not central in implementation and reporting either. This is in contrast with EU actions outside of RIP-funded projects, and indeed outside of EDF projects, which often have an important gender dimension.

Environmental sustainability was significantly mainstreamed into the support for infrastructure development. The programmes financed through blending carried out thorough environmental impact assessments, as found by the recent evaluation of EU's blending operations. In relation to trade facilitation, the support for the implementation of phyto-sanitary measures also contributed to reducing negative environmental impacts related to preventing the proliferation of pests and

invasive species. The evaluation team did not come across any significant negative environmental impacts emanating from the regional support to EA-SA-IO.

## 5.2 Recommendations

The recommendations are summarised below:

Recommendation #1	Further develop regional partnerships beyond the DMROs in areas where such collaboration can potentially achieve regional goals more effectively.
Recommendation #2	Focus support to DMROs on core business and on reducing external dependency.
Recommendation #3	Strengthen regional/national coherence, making better use of current and new analysis, in order to improve the impact of regional interventions.
Recommendation #4	Engage more actively with non-state actors in future phases of regional support.
Recommendation #5	Sharpen the political and policy dialogue.
Recommendation #6	Strengthen the reporting and results focus.
Recommendation #7	Support an African-led rationalisation of the regional architecture and DMROs' mandates.

### **Recommendation #1 - Further develop regional partnerships beyond the DMROs in areas where such collaboration can potentially achieve regional goals more effectively.**

*Rationale:* In areas that go beyond the DMRO role of facilitating regional solutions and where the DMROs are not the natural partners, applying the subsidiarity principle and entrusting implementation to specialist organisations can be an effective approach. Examples include regional power pools, corridor authorities, AU-IBAR, AFRITAC and regional business councils. Such partnerships can deliver results when the partners are recognised and respected specialist entities with a clear vision and the capacity and practical competences to deliver tailored solutions. This recommendation can be achieved through the following actions:

- 'Map' the region to ascertain which organisations are adding value and have built up a solid reputation for good management, good governance and getting results in specific areas (avoiding those that are at arm's length from end users).
- Initiate discussions with the most promising potential partners. Think strategically and 'outside the box' about how collaboration with the aforementioned could help to achieve regional goals (e.g. work with regional business councils in their advocacy for reforms and monitoring implementation of regional agreements in key areas of interest to their members).
- Work more closely with organisations that support and can apply pressure to enhance compliance with treaties and conventions and reduce corruption (e.g. WTO, WCO and UN bodies all have review mechanisms that could be used to better effect in the region).

Implementation responsibility: DEVCO/EEAS, country and regional EUDs, EU MS

### **Recommendation #2 – Focus support to DMROs on core business and on reducing external dependency.**

*Rationale:* Despite years of donor support, the DMROs' *raison d'être* and sustainability remain tenuous. They are dependent on donors for 60-80% of their expenditure and rely on project positions even for core work. Stakeholders widely believe that DMROs have overextended themselves (due largely to donor projects) and should refocus on their core business: i.e. promoting the right policy settings and offering the regional solutions and support to underpin them. This recommendation can be achieved through the following actions:

- Convene the main donor partners for each DMRO with the goal of establishing common donor positions on such issues as DMRO relevance, capacity and sustainability, exit strategies, and how to address in a cohesive way key drivers and hindrances to regional integration (e.g. political will, vested interests, governance, monitoring and enforcement of regional commitments, etc).

- Commission multi-donor and DMRO-sponsored comprehensive independent organisational audits of the DMROs to formally complement the pillar assessments and provide a clear, transparent picture of exactly what permanent skills, capabilities and competences exist, and how these match each DMRO's mandate and regional priorities.
- Continue to focus institutional support on enhancing DMRO accountability (transparency, credibility, merit-based recruiting, results-oriented reporting on use of funds, independent audits, proper M&E units, professional communications capabilities). Intensify support for effective monitoring and enforcement tools, including regional peer review mechanisms in key areas. Review the effectiveness of the support regularly, including through surveys of MS.
- Institute greater DMRO co-funding.
- Clearly define (with DMROs and other donor partners) the regional and national aspects and competences for private sector development initiatives, and locate responsibility accordingly, bearing in mind that most PSD work requires national implementation. Apply the principle of subsidiarity in all areas where it is clearly indicated. (But ensure that 'subsidiarity' is not used internally as a new way of distributing donor-funded 'largesse'.)
- Develop an EU HQ (and EU member states) demand-based mentoring network to apply more strategically EU practical experience and expertise in key areas of regional integration, peace and security, and natural resources management. Draw on the experience of EU dialogue facilities in other countries, such as South Africa.
- Develop and publicise exit strategies for all programmes. This will focus attention on sustainability issues that have been overlooked and put pressure on DMRO member states to take hard decisions.

Implementation responsibility: DEVCO, Regional EUDs, DMROs

**Recommendation #3 - Strengthen regional/national coherence, making better use of current and new analysis, in order to improve the impact of regional interventions.**

*Rationale:* EU national and regional support is focusing on the right areas overall in terms of regional integration, peace and security, and natural resources management. Better coherence between regional and country programmes and projects in terms of design, formulation and management would enhance their impact. Simplifying and reducing the complexity of future support would enhance efficiency. This recommendation can be achieved through the following actions:

- Use existing analysis on political economy and undertake new analyses as necessary to help further focus on the areas of assistance that are likely to yield results, with the aim of potentially reducing the breadth of support.
- Clearly define the divisions between regional and national programming in areas that have some regional elements but where most of the work is national [e.g. quality infrastructure (SPS/TBT), services, statistics, SME export readiness, value chains].
- Ensure that support for broad programmes (e.g. trade facilitation, infrastructure, resilience) is focused, well-defined, well targeted, well monitored, and located in the right place in DMROs and national governments, with clear coordination/communication lines between regional and country EUDs. (These areas tend to involve many players; hence, the need for effective and efficient design and management.)
- On migration, increasing policy coherence for development would entail taking stock of all actions that relate to migration (basic services, livelihoods and connection to blue economy, protection of migrants, CVE), identifying synergies and having a programme approach, rather than go for a multiplicity of disconnected projects.
- Formalise EUD-to-EUD communications and information flows, and coordination mechanisms.

- Designate regional focal points in each EUD (some have, some do not).
  - Hold annual sectoral meetings for national and regional technical staff.
  - Improve communication between technical and political officers, in order to facilitate a common understanding of the 'big picture' regionally.
  - Develop appropriate knowledge-management systems to ensure a comprehensive repository of relevant documentation.
- Consider a Regional EUD to cover all the Tripartite DMROs.

Implementation responsibility: DEVCO/EEAS, country and regional EUDs

#### **Recommendation #4 - Engage more actively with non-state actors in future phases of regional support.**

*Rationale:* Non-state actors, particularly the private sector, are important drivers for regional integration. The additionality of EU's contribution has been high when engaging with non-state actors. This recommendation can be achieved through actions such as:

- Continue and intensify policy dialogue with the DMROs and their member states on the importance of non-state actor involvement.
- Provide funding for supportive studies on how best to mobilise and improve the enabling environment for non-state actors.
- Directly support private sector and civil society apex organisations that are relevant for regional integration.
- Link regional support to country-level support for non-state actors, through EU country programmes and/or by supporting coordinated efforts by EU member state and other donors that take a leading role in supporting civil society and the private sector.

Implementation responsibility: Regional and national EUDs, DMROs

#### **Recommendation #5 - Sharpen the political and policy dialogue.**

*Rationale:* The EU's overall strategic interest is articulated in the JAES and Global Strategy, but it is not operationalised in political or policy dialogue. The overall theory of change behind the EU's regional cooperation with EA-SA-IO is increasingly complex and, as a result, the political and policy messages sent by the EU to its partners (and staff) can appear ambiguous. This recommendation can be achieved through actions such as:

- Develop a policy dialogue agenda and strategy for each partner (including DMRO member states) based on supportive studies where needed and well-coordinated with EU member states and other development partners.
- Translate the high-level political dialogue that goes on at High Representative/ Vice President, Minister and Ambassador-level into clear priorities for EU project staff, to empower them to act as a true partner to DMROs - not just as a donor.
- Build on the EU experience in regional integration and develop peer-to-peer and twinning mechanisms to deepen the partnership, share experience and transfer skills. This could be triggered by an exploratory DMRO-to-EU dialogue on which areas of EU experience might be most valuable in terms of helping DMROs achieve their objectives. .

Implementation responsibility: DEVCO/EEAS, EUD to the AU, regional and national EUDs.

#### **Recommendation #6 - Strengthen the reporting and results focus.**

*Rationale:* The focus in EDF 10 has been on monitoring disbursements rather than results, and

although the EDF 11 results framework is stronger than that of EDF 10, there is still a risk that the practice may continue. This recommendation can be achieved through actions such as:

- Continue to support DMRO and other implementation partners in developing their own results frameworks.
- Create/improve, with regional funding, an electronic overview of projects which is accessible by all EUDs.
- Consider outsourcing some aspects of monitoring until partners are able to provide the necessary reporting.

Implementation responsibility: DEVCO, regional EUDs, DMROs

### **Recommendation #7 - Support an African-led rationalisation of the regional architecture and DMROs' mandates.**

*Rationale:* Regional integration and the effectiveness of EU support for regional integration is hindered by overlapping DMRO memberships and concurrent initiatives related to the African Union, regional and continental trade and other agreements, and EPAs. There are opportunities to streamline the regional integration architecture and bring mandates closer to member state aspirations and level of commitment. The regions are different and will require a differentiated approach, especially regarding the IOC which is composed solely of island states. This recommendation can be achieved through actions such as:

- Initiate discussion with the AU and DMROs on the appetite for a radical rethink and rationalisation of regional integration, building on recent high-level reports focusing on reforms.
- Convene a high-level meeting to discuss the challenges and opportunities to rationalise the regional architecture.
- Support an African-led task force to develop options.

Implementation responsibility: DEVCO/EEAS, regional EUDs, DMROs

## **5.3 Sector-Specific Actions**

### **Regional Integration**

In addition to the recommendations above, programme effectiveness in the EA-SA-IO region as regards the regional integration elements could be improved through the following actions:

- Conduct in-depth analysis on the drivers of change and the impediments to change in EA-SA-IO regional integration, with the aim of targeting efforts more precisely on where they are most likely to deliver the desired results.
- Review EU 'strategic interests' in the EA-SA-IO region and build them into strategic planning.
- Focus capacity-building on sustainable skills development and 'learning by doing' in areas where permanent core competences are needed to deliver longer-term results (not only in DMROs, but also in other organisations involved in regional integration and market development - e.g. quality infrastructure).
- Private sector development and value chain support is best left to the country level except where it relates directly and tangibly to the regional settings required to underpin business and trade development (e.g. competition policy, intellectual property, SPS/TBT/NTBs, mutual recognition arrangements, border efficiency measures, etc).

Implementation responsibility: DEVCO/EEAS, country and regional EUDs, EU member states

### **Peace, security and stability**

EU regional cooperation with EA-SA-IO in peace, security and stability has some results to show, both at output and outcome levels, and the intervention logic is still valid overall, but cooperation in peace and security could be much more effective and efficient with a needs-based focus, underpinned by a more strategic dialogue with partners; an overview of what the AU and each DMRO is best suited to do; and a sharper focus on drivers and barriers.

- A more needs-based approach focusing on what is needed most in the subregion (what themes, what member states, what crossborder areas), entailing much more systematic engagement with national EU Delegations, and from REC Secretariats, with member states. A much more strategic, substantive and sustained dialogue on REC priorities, plans and organisation (rather than a dialogue that is primarily about funding and funding requirements).
- A mapping, to the extent possible agreed with the AU/REC leadership at the highest level, on what the AU and each REC are best placed to do, respectively, by theme/priority issues/crisis (e.g. mediation in Burundi; early warning in the Horn; electoral observation mission in DRC; etc.) but also by function (who leads the political/policy dialogue on a particular issue; who leads policy coordination on it; who implements the related projects, if not the member states themselves). For example, there are six DMROs/regional initiatives in EA-SA-IO, plus the AU, plus ECCAS and CEPGL that concern DR Congo, all with a mandate on peace and security. It is imperative that the EU and its member states have a more united approach to supporting regional organisations and initiatives so as to contribute to African efforts of rationalisation, to limit duplications, and stop funding initiatives that have no support from African member states and/or are better handled by some organisations/initiatives over others.
- A much sharper focus on the drivers of and hurdles to democratisation, human rights, peace and security (who are the big impact drivers, and how to support them; who are the main spoilers and how to engage or circumvent them).

Implementation responsibility: DEVCO/EEAS, regional EUDs, AU/DMRO leadership and member states

### **Natural resource management**

In addition to the recommendations above, programme effectiveness in the EA-SA-IO region could be improved through the following actions:

- Ensure the results and processes achieved in biodiversity in the IGAD and IOC regions are not abandoned. Further support is needed, whether from EU or other sources, to ensure that the EDF10 investment will yield real results. The cross-regional wildlife project is an important programme, but it will not be able on its own to ensure this. This recommendation is also supportive of EU's commitment made at the COP11 (Hyderabad) for the UN Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) to double its funding for biodiversity (a commitment which at the EASAIO regional level is currently not being implemented).
- Link regional initiatives with national level action – and capacity development with tangible engagement on the ground with visible results. This can for example be done through close cooperation with EU bilateral programmes or programmes by other donors.

Implementation responsibility: DEVCO/EEAS, regional EUDs, AU/DMROs leadership and member states

## Appendix A: Evaluation Matrix

This appendix presents the main evaluation findings as they emerged from each of the eight Evaluation Questions. Findings are grouped by judgement criterion and are provided at the indicator level. The tables further provide the sources of information, as well as an appreciation of the quality of the evidence for each finding – according to the following scale: “Weak”; “Indicative but not conclusive”; “More than satisfactory”; “Strong”. Details on the findings are provided in Annex 4 (Volume II).

Ranking of Evidence	Explanation of ranking of quality of evidence
<i>Strong</i>	The finding is consistently supported by a range of evidence sources, including documentary sources, quantitative analysis and qualitative evidence (i.e. there is very good triangulation); or the evidence sources, while not comprehensive, are of high quality and reliable to draw a conclusion (e.g. strong quantitative evidence with adequate sample sizes and no major data quality or reliability issues; or a wide range of reliable qualitative sources, across which there is good triangulation).
<i>More than satisfactory</i>	There are at least two different sources of evidence with good triangulation, but the coverage of the evidence is not complete.
<i>Indicative but not conclusive</i>	There is only one evidence source of good quality, and no triangulation with their sources of evidence.
<i>Weak</i>	There is no triangulation and / or evidence is limited to a single source.



EQ 1			
To what extent was the EA-SA-IO regional programme (EDF 10 and 11) - as a whole - well informed and strategic in its response to partner organisations' / countries' needs and priorities and to the EU's own strategic priorities?			
Judgement Criteria	Summary response (indicator)	Source of information	Quality of evidence
<b>JC 1.1</b> "The EU EA-SA-IO strategies and programmes were based on relevant, solid and credible evidence and assumptions regarding the regions' needs and priorities"	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The needs assessments were relevant and the main underlying principles/assumptions were logical and well based. However, a number of the overarching assumptions were taken for granted when they should not have been.</li> <li>EDF 10 (SADC/ESA-IO) reflected continental, regional and national regional integration strategies and priorities, but more as the lofty political aims they still were in 2007 rather than responding to the <u>complex implementation issues</u> they represented.</li> <li>EDF 11 aims for greater efficiency and focus as per the <i>Agenda for Change</i> and EDF 10 MTRs, but it too has fallen short on addressing implementation complexities.</li> <li>The RSPs/RIPs were inadequate in understanding regional dynamics and in targeting the areas that could produce visible progress (the drivers) and the areas that could impede the desired progress (the barriers).</li> <li>EDF 11 addressed lessons learned and recommendations of midterm reviews (MTRs) of EDF 10 and the <i>Agenda for Change</i>. It may not have benefitted from enough critical analysis of and action on key issues such as ownership, capacity to absorb and deliver, and capacity building.</li> </ol>	<p>The following contributed to all 5 findings:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>EDF 10, EDF 11 RSPs/RIPs, staff papers, programme documents, decisions, project fiches, action documents, progress reports</li> <li>Regional Preparatory Task Force (RPTF) PPT presentations</li> <li>Joint EU-Africa Strategy</li> <li><i>Agenda for Change</i></li> <li>Cotonou Partnership and ACP-EPA documents</li> <li>DMRO/REC regional strategies and plans, annual reports</li> <li>Reviews and evaluations of EU support</li> <li>Third-party analyses</li> <li>EEAS and DG Trade interviews</li> <li><i>Survey results</i></li> <li><i>Field interviews with EUDs</i></li> <li><i>Field interviews with DMROs in Botswana (SADC), Mauritius (IOC), Tanzania (EAC), Zambia (COMESA), Djibouti (IGAD)</i></li> <li><i>Field interviews with regional/continental organisations such as AU, UNECA</i></li> <li><i>Field interviews with other donors, project implementers, including from EU MS</i></li> <li>Field interviews with government officials in DMRO MS</li> </ul>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>More than Satisfactory</li> <li>More than Satisfactory</li> <li>More than Satisfactory</li> <li>More than Satisfactory</li> <li>More than Satisfactory</li> </ol>
<b>JC 1.2</b> "The regional strategies/programmes were aligned with European Union's interests, policies and strategies"	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>EDF 10 and 11 RSPs/RIPs highlighted alignment with EU interests, policies and strategies, but they would have benefited from rigorous analysis on how to advance the EU's strategic interests.</li> <li>Given that it is the cornerstone of the EDFs, it is not clear if the ongoing reviews and evolution of the Cotonou Partnership</li> </ol>	<p>The following contributed to all 3 findings:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>EDF 10, EDF 11 RSPs/RIPs, staff papers, programme documents, decisions, project fiches, action documents, progress reports</li> <li>Joint EU-Africa Strategy</li> <li>Cotonou/ACP</li> <li>Cariforum 5-year review.</li> </ul>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>More than satisfactory</li> <li>More than Satisfactory</li> <li>Indicative but inconclusive</li> </ol>

EQ 1	To what extent was the EA-SA-IO regional programme (EDF 10 and11) - <i>as a whole</i> - well informed and strategic in its response to partner organisations' / countries' needs and priorities and to the EU's own strategic priorities?		
	<p>are sparking new thinking on engagement with the EA-SA-IO region.</p> <p>3. Generally, crosscutting issues are covered specifically in the RSPs and RIPs, following <i>Agenda for Change</i> principles in EDF 11. However, it is not clear to what extent guidelines have been implemented in practice or how effective the monitoring mechanisms are.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- EU Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, Nov 2011</li> <li>- <i>Agenda for Change</i>, 2011</li> <li>- Interviews with EU officials in Brussels</li> <li>- Analyses by third parties (e.g. ECDPM)</li> <li>- Survey results</li> <li>- Interviews with EUDs in Zambia, Tanzania, Kenya, Ethiopia</li> <li>- Interviews with DMRO gender units in Tanzania, Zambia</li> <li>- Interview with AU Gender Department.</li> </ul>	
<p><b>JC 1.3</b> Efforts and resources have been targeted at where they are needed the most and could have the greatest impact in terms of achieving the desired results: greater regional integration and cooperation, and stronger regional structures</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Achieving stronger regional-national policy and programme <u>coherence</u> remains a challenge.</li> <li>2. Ensuring measurable improvements in national compliance is challenging when reliable baselines and monitoring systems are weak.</li> <li>3. The potential for EU value added is good, but it remains unfulfilled.</li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- EDF 10, EDF 11 RSPs/RIPs, staff papers, programme documents, decisions, project fiches, action documents, progress reports</li> <li>- Logical frameworks</li> <li>- Reviews and evaluations of EU support</li> <li>- Survey</li> <li>- <i>Interviews with EUDs in Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Tanzania, Zambia</i></li> <li>- <i>Interviews with DMROs in Botswana (SADC), Mauritius (IOC), Tanzania (EAC), Zambia (COMESA), Djibouti (IGAD)</i></li> <li>- <i>Interviews with regional/ continental organisations (e.g. AU, UN)</i></li> <li>- <i>Interviews with business organisations, donors, project implementers in Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Tanzania, Zambia</i></li> <li>- Interviews with government officials in Ethiopia , Kenya, Tanzania</li> <li>- Findings of the other EQs</li> </ul>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. More than satisfactory</li> <li>2. More than Satisfactory</li> <li>3. More than satisfactory</li> </ol>

EQ 2			
To what extent has EU regional-level support in Eastern and Southern Africa and IO since 2008 facilitated progress towards regional market development/ integration?			
Judgement Criteria	Summary response (indicator)	Source of information	Quality of evidence
JC 2.1 “EU regional support has improved the capacity of the DMROs to drive horizontal and vertical harmonisation of legal and institutional frameworks and mechanisms necessary to achieve regional and global trade-related integration goals”	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Regional and national harmonisation remains a big challenge, due in part to weak political will, in part to overlapping memberships and in part to inadequate monitoring systems.</li> <li>2. Mechanisms introduced under EDF 10 to promote national compliance (e.g. RISM, TRF) have helped focus attention on this issue at both Secretariat and national level.</li> <li>3. EDF 11 aims to address these issues more forcefully, with new approaches to capacity building and regional cooperation and coordination.</li> </ol>	<p>The following contributed to all the findings under this JC:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- EDF 10, EDF 11 RSPs/RIPs, staff papers, programme documents, decisions, project fiches, action documents, progress reports, evaluations and reviews</li> <li>- EU information on EPAs and relations with the EA-SA-IO countries and DMROs</li> <li>- DEVCO programme budgeting/spending reports</li> <li>- WTO documentation (Trade Policy Reviews, Member Profiles, Trade reports)</li> <li>- World Customs Organisation (WCO) documentation</li> <li>- African Regional Integration Index (ARII), UNECA, 2016)</li> <li>- COMESA, EAC, SADC, SACU websites; COMESA Country Briefs, Annual Reports; COMESA Trade Ministers Council report, Aug. 2016; Budget Statements, Partnership Fund reports (EAC); organisation charts (COMESA, EAC)</li> <li>- East African Common Market Scorecard 2016.pdf.: TMEA</li> <li>- <i>Evaluation Survey results</i></li> <li>- <i>Interviews with EUDs in Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Tanzania, Zambia</i></li> <li>- <i>Interviews with DMROs in Botswana (SADC), Mauritius (IOC), Tanzania (EAC), Zambia (COMESA), incl RISP and RISM programme coordinators at COMESA</i></li> <li>- <i>Interviews with AU (e.g. Continental FTA Unit), UNECA</i></li> <li>- <i>Interviews with business organisations (e.g. EABC, CBC), donors (e.g. GIZ, USAID, Sweden), implementers (e.g. TMEA, AU-IBAR)</i></li> <li>- Interviews with government officials in Ethiopia (Ministry of Trade), Kenya (Treasury/National Audit Office; RISM focus group of line agencies), Tanzania (Ministry of Trade)</li> <li>- RISM and RISP Progress Reports, COMESA, December 2016</li> <li>- Midterm Evaluation of RISM Rider (2014), Evaluation of RISP 3 (2015) + interviews with evaluators</li> </ul>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. More than Satisfactory</li> <li>2. More than satisfactory</li> <li>3. More than Satisfactory</li> </ol>

EQ 2	To what extent has EU regional-level support in Eastern and Southern Africa and IO since 2008 facilitated progress towards regional market development/ integration?		
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- EDF 11 EUD/COMESA programming documents for Trade Facilitation and Crossborder Traders; EDF 10 programming documents for RISP 3 for COMESA, EAC</li> </ul>	
<p><b>JC 2.2</b> “EU support has made a measurable contribution to growth and diversification of regional flows of goods and services since 2008”</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. EU support is enhancing the potential for higher, more diversified <u>regional</u> trade flows in a variety of ways. .</li> <li>2. The time and cost of border clearance procedures are declining, thanks in part to EU support.</li> <li>3. EU support for the implementation of sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) - and technical regulation/standards (TBT)--related rules, good practices, institutions and quality infrastructure is crucial for trade development and regional market integration.</li> <li>4. Services sector development is a major factor in trade growth and diversification; it has long been an EDF priority, but the EU contribution is not well documented.</li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- EDF 10, EDF 11 RSPs/RIPs, staff papers, programme documents, decisions, project fiches, action documents, progress reports, evaluations and reviews</li> <li>- EU information on EPAs and relations with the EA-SA-IO countries and DMROs</li> <li>- EU-Region trade statistics, including EAC, SADC, ESA tradoc</li> <li>- World Trade Organisation Member Trade Profiles and trade statistics database</li> <li>- UN COMTRADE and other trade databases</li> <li>- African Regional Integration Index (ARI), UNECA, 2016</li> <li>- COMESA reports and data (e.g. COMESA Trade Ministers Council report, August 2016, Comstat, Country Briefs, annual reports)</li> <li>- EAC, SADC/SACU reports</li> <li>- World Bank Logistics Performance Index 2016</li> <li>- World Bank: Doing Business 2017, Time and Cost of Export/Import Procedures</li> <li>- OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators</li> <li>- WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement and its website</li> <li>- UNCTAD, International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) Africa reporting</li> <li>- Interviews with economists at UNECA and UNCTAD in Addis Ababa</li> <li>- Third-party analyses (e.g. Tralac, Njiwa)</li> <li>- African Development Bank reports</li> <li>- African Union reports</li> <li>- Trademark East Africa interviews: Tanzania, Kenya, Rwanda.</li> <li>- Interviews with customs, infrastructure other trade facilitation officers at COMESA, EAC, UNECA; KfW, Tanzania</li> <li>- Interviews with relevant officers at EUDs in Zambia, Tanzania, Kenya, Ethiopia; <i>Interview with EU Business Group, Tanzania</i></li> <li>- Interviews with Trade Ministries in Tanzania, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mauritius, Zimbabwe</li> <li>- Interviews with COMESA and East Africa Business Councils</li> <li>- Survey results</li> </ul>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Indicative; trade data in the region is neither consistent nor comprehensive.</li> <li>2. More than satisfactory</li> <li>3. More than satisfactory</li> <li>4. More than satisfactory</li> </ol>

EQ 2	To what extent has EU regional-level support in Eastern and Southern Africa and IO since 2008 facilitated progress towards regional market development/ integration?		
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- EDF 11 Action Documents for COMESA, April 2017: Trade Facilitation and Crossborder Traders programmes</li> <li>- COMESA, EAC RISP documents</li> </ul>	
<p><b>JC 2.3</b> “EU regional support has contributed to SME competitiveness”</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The EU has supported regional work on micro and small and medium enterprises (MSMEs), but its contribution to regional MSME frameworks is minimal. However, EDF 11 is taking more interest in this area, and in harmonising national SME policies with regional frameworks where these exist.</li> <li>2. The business environment has improved, though all three major regions lag on ‘trading across borders’. The strong focus on trade facilitation in EDF 11, among donors and in the international organisations in the wake of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement entry into force, will lead to improvements in this key indicator in coming years.</li> <li>3. Regional business networks have the potential to become more active advocates on SME competitiveness and other business issues. The EU has not contributed much to regional business networks in recent years. However, EDF 11 programming includes some welcome signs of EU-regional business council partnerships.</li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- EDF 10, EDF 11 RSPs/RIPs, staff papers, programme documents, decisions, project fiches, action documents, progress reports, evaluations and reviews</li> <li>- World Bank ‘Doing Business 2017’ Ratings</li> <li>- Regional Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise (MSME) Policy for COMESA MS (COMESA, Oct. 2013)</li> <li>- DMRO websites, annual reports</li> <li>- RISM reports, including the 2016 progress report, December 2016.</li> <li>- RISP 3 2016 progress report, December 2016; RISP 3 programmes</li> <li>- EDF 11 Trade Facilitation and Crossborder Traders Action Documents for COMESA</li> <li>- EAMR 2015 report on Tanzania EUD</li> <li>- <i>Evaluation Survey results</i></li> <li>- <i>Field interviews with EUDs in Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Tanzania, Zambia</i></li> <li>- <i>Interview with EU Business Group, Tanzania</i></li> <li>- <i>Field interviews with DMROs in Mauritius (IOC), Tanzania (EAC), Zambia (COMESA)</i></li> <li>- <i>Field interviews with COMESA Business Council, EAC Business Council, Trade Mark East Africa (TMEA)</i></li> <li>- <i>Field interviews with regional/continental organisations in Ethiopia (e.g. AU, UNECA, UNCTAD), Tanzania (e.g. AFRITAC), AU-IBAR</i></li> <li>- <i>Field interviews with GIZ, Sida, USAID</i></li> <li>- Field interviews with government officials in Ethiopia (Ministry of Trade), Kenya (Treasury and focus group of line agencies), Tanzania (Ministry of Trade)</li> </ul>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. More than satisfactory</li> <li>2. More than satisfactory</li> <li>3. More than satisfactory</li> </ol>

<b>EQ 3</b>			
<b>To what extent has regional-level EU support since 2008 contributed to improved regional trade-related infrastructure connectivity in Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean states?</b>			
<b>Judgement Criteria</b>	<b>Summary response (indicator)</b>	<b>Source of information</b>	<b>Quality of evidence</b>
<p><b>JC 3.1</b> “EU regional support has contributed to the design of feasible trade-related regional infrastructure projects aligned with continental and regional (EA-SA-IO) infrastructure development priorities”</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. EA-SA-IO DMROs have units or programmes responsible for infrastructure issues but these have limited human and financial capacity.</li> <li>2. There is a consistent recognition of the priority infrastructure projects identified by the AU and DMROs in continental and regional plans, including PIDA, in the sample project documentation.</li> <li>3. The sample projects reviewed indicate limited engagement with the private sector in the preparation of infrastructure projects in the transport sector supported by the EU regional programme in EA.</li> <li>4. The design of the sample projects in the transport sector highlighted the importance of maintenance of infrastructure but this usually requires national level implementation.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- DMRO documentation – organigrams, annual reports, strategic plans and legal texts (establishing treaties of SADC, COMESA and the EAC plus protocols on infrastructure, trade and movement of people).</li> <li>- Interviews DMROs: COMESA Infrastructure, EAC Secretariat, IOC, IGAD, SADC advisor and PPDF.</li> <li>- RIP EA-SA-IO 2014-2020, p.76.</li> <li>- Luke and Mabuza, “The Tripartite Free Trade Agreement: A milestone for Africa’s regional integration process”, International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), 23 June 2015.</li> <li>- COMESA Secretariat organigram (2015)</li> <li>- RSP and RIP EA-SA-IO 2008-2013 p.47</li> <li>- Action Fiche RISP 3</li> <li>- EAC Organisation Chart 2016</li> <li>- SADC Executive Secretary Annual Report 2011-2012, p.23</li> <li>- SADC Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan Executive Summary 2012</li> <li>- IGAD Organigram</li> <li>- IOC Organigram 2009-2015</li> </ul> </li> <li>2. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- PIDA</li> <li>- EU-Africa Partnership on Infrastructure</li> <li>- Declarations of EU-Africa summits</li> <li>- Action Fiche Maska Mbarara (2010)</li> <li>- EU Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund Monitoring Report, June 2015, p.47</li> <li>- EU Communication on Interconnecting Africa 2006</li> </ul> </li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. More than satisfactory</li> <li>2. More than satisfactory</li> <li>3. More than satisfactory</li> <li>4. More than satisfactory</li> </ol>

EQ 3	To what extent has regional-level EU support since 2008 contributed to improved regional trade-related infrastructure connectivity in Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean states?		
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- RSP and RIP EA-SA-IO 2008-2013, p.71</li> <li>- RIP 20014-2020, p.75</li> <li>- Creation of the Africa Investment Facility Action Fiche, 29 July 2015</li> <li>- Africa Investment Facility Indicative List of Priority Projects, 2016</li> <li>3.</li> <li>- Sample project documentation - Action Fiche Kigali-Gatuna (2010)</li> <li>- Action Fiche Maska Mbarara (2010), p.1.</li> <li>- Interviews in COMESA, SADC and in Rwanda</li> <li>- Evaluation of EU Support to the Transport Sector in Africa 2005-2013, June 2016</li> <li>- Monitoring report on the Mbarara-Katuna road project (2012), p.3</li> <li>- Interviews in Rwanda.</li> <li>4.</li> <li>- Action Fiche Maska Mbarara, Action Fiche Kigali-Gatuna (2010), p.7</li> <li>- RIP EA-SA-IO 2014-2020, p.74</li> <li>- Action Document for East and Southern African (EA-SA) Transport and Transit Facilitation Programme, 2016</li> <li>- Interview with EU advisor at SADC</li> <li>- Interview COMESA Infrastructure</li> <li>- Interviews in Rwanda on energy</li> <li>- Monitoring Report NCR and Monitoring Report 2011 KMR</li> </ul>	
<p><b>JC 3.2</b> “EU regional support for trade-related infrastructure has strengthened regional markets for trade in EASAI0”</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Between 2005 and 2013, it became easier to do business in the EA-SA-IO region as a whole according to the World Bank’s Doing Business Index, with significant reductions in the time to export and import in the EAC specifically during this period.</li> <li>2. Looking specifically at the EAC (where the project sample is largely drawn from in the transport sector), the cost of trade</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1.</li> <li>- World Bank Doing Business Index – Regional Reports for EAC (2017, 2013, 2010), SADC (2017, 2014)</li> <li>- TMEA website <a href="http://www.trademarka.com">www.trademarka.com</a></li> <li>- World Bank Logistics Performance Index 2017</li> <li>- OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators 2017</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Strong</li> <li>2. More than satisfactory</li> <li>3. More than satisfactory</li> </ol>



EQ 3	To what extent has regional-level EU support since 2008 contributed to improved regional trade-related infrastructure connectivity in Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean states?		
	<p>remained relatively high overall during the period under review.</p> <p>3. Access to network services, particularly electricity, remains a serious concern for the private sector in EA-SA-IO, with little change in the generation capacity in many countries and consistently high prices.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- EAC Treaty, EAC website - <a href="http://www.eac.int/sectors/immigration-and-labour">http://www.eac.int/sectors/immigration-and-labour</a></li> <li>- SADC Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons</li> <li>- COMESA Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Labour, Services, Right of Establishment and Right of Residence</li> <li>- ECDPM research on political economy of regional integration in Africa – EAC and SADC reports (2016)</li> </ul> <p>2.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- World Bank Doing Business Index - Regional Reports for EAC (2014, 2012, 2010)</li> <li>- Northern Corridor Transit and Transport</li> <li>- Coordination Authority website – <a href="http://www.ttcanc.org">www.ttcanc.org</a></li> <li>- Northern Corridor Transport Observatory – <a href="http://www.top.ttcanc.org">www.top.ttcanc.org</a></li> <li>- Northern Corridor Integration Projects – <a href="http://www.nciprojects.org">www.nciprojects.org</a></li> <li>- Interviews in Rwanda (TMEA, consultants, Government, AFDB)</li> <li>- Central Corridor Transit Transport Facilitation Agency <a href="http://centralcorridor-ttfa.org">http://centralcorridor-ttfa.org</a></li> </ul> <p>3.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- South Africa Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) research on Barriers to Business in SADC <a href="http://www.saiia.org.za/sadc-articles/sadc-business-barriers">http://www.saiia.org.za/sadc-articles/sadc-business-barriers</a></li> <li>- World Bank Doing Business Index 2016</li> <li>- SE4ALL database</li> <li>- World Bank - Africa's power infrastructure: investment, integration, efficiency by Anton Eberhard et al. (2011).</li> </ul>	



EQ 3	To what extent has regional-level EU support since 2008 contributed to improved regional trade-related infrastructure connectivity in Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean states?		
<p><b>JC 3.3</b> “EU support ensured that sufficient mechanisms/structures were put in place to ensure sustainability”</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Infrastructure projects are implemented at the level of national governments and there appears to be little direct involvement of DMROs or other regional institutions.</li> <li>2. Potential regional (e.g. COMESA) and national champions (e.g. Rwanda and South Africa) exist for infrastructure projects.</li> <li>3. There are mitigating strategies and financing options for maintenance of infrastructure identified in the sample project documentation.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- DMRO annual reports and websites for COMESA and SADC PPDF.</li> <li>- Sample project documentation including Maska Mbarara, Kigali-Gatuna</li> <li>- Interviews with DMROs in Lusaka (COMESA), Arusha (EAC), Gaborone (SADC).</li> <li>- Interviews in Rwanda (Government, EUD, AFDB, KfW) and Zimbabwe (AFDB).</li> </ul> </li> <li>2. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Sample project documentation, TMEA website – <a href="http://www.trademarka.com">www.trademarka.com</a></li> <li>- Interviews in Kenya, Tanzania and Rwanda.</li> <li>- PIDA.</li> <li>- Action Fiche on Infrastructure Investment Programme for South Africa, 2012.</li> <li>- Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) U between SADC and the DBSA, 2008. <a href="http://www.sadcppdf.org">www.sadcppdf.org</a>.</li> <li>- Interviews in Botswana (EUD and SADC) and South Africa (PPDF).</li> <li>- Interviews in Rwanda (TMEA, Government, EUD, consultants).</li> </ul> </li> <li>3. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Action Fiche Maska Mbarara</li> <li>- Monitoring Report NCR</li> <li>- Action Fiche Kigali-Gatuna (2010)</li> <li>- Monitoring Report RKGCN</li> <li>- Interview with EU Advisor at SADC</li> <li>- Monitoring report for Kigali-Gatuna project</li> <li>- Action Fiche Maska Mbarara (2010) p.7</li> </ul> </li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. More than satisfactory</li> <li>2. More than satisfactory</li> <li>3. More than satisfactory</li> </ol>

<b>EQ 4</b>			
<b>To what extent has regional-level EU support contributed to improved democratic governance, peace and security, and better management of migration – thereby contributing to a stable and peaceful region?</b>			
<b>Judgement Criteria</b>	<b>Summary response (indicator)</b>	<b>Source of information</b>	<b>Quality of evidence</b>
<b>JC 4.1</b> “EU regional cooperation contributed to enhancing democratic governance in the region”	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. EU regional support in matters of democratic governance is mainly geared toward strengthening the capacity of DMRO Secretariats to perform its respective mandates in this area</li> <li>2. At the output level, based on field visits to ten EUDs and available documents, there are specific instances of EU regional cooperation contributing to policies, strategies and plans conducive to democratisation and human rights and to enhanced capacity and engagement of regional organisations, government institutions, civil society and communities in matters of democratic governance.</li> <li>3. At the outcome level, beyond these outputs, and given the three factors detailed above (predominance of drivers of peace and security over the role of development cooperation, the fact that the EU is only one of several donors to Africa and RIP funding a sliver compared to overall EU support, and complex institution AU/DMRO setup), it is hard to attribute outcomes to EU regional support specifically—one can only safely say the EU has contributed to improved democracy in the SADC region.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Portfolio review; financial reports of democratic governance projects</li> <li>2. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Cooperation between EU and ESA – IO Region, Joint Progress Report, 2011</li> <li>- Council Recommendation on the 2009 discharge (2009/COU/0205) Mutunga, 2014; (RPIHSSP ROM report, 2012)</li> <li>- Joint Progress Report on cooperation between SADC and EU, 2011</li> <li>- RISP 2 report, 2016</li> <li>- Interviews DEVCO, EEAS, EUD to EAC, EUD to IGAD, EUD to SADC, EUD to the AU</li> </ul> </li> <li>3. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- EDF 10 MTR , 2011</li> <li>- 2013 Botswana EAMR</li> <li>- Chiroro, 2010; Election Observation Mission (EOM) reports</li> <li>- EOM statements</li> <li>- Project documents esp. RPIHSSP ROM report, 2012 and RISP 2-COMESA-EAC-IGAD-IOC end of programme report, 2016, for the period 2010-2013</li> <li>- Tanzania EAMR, 2015</li> <li>- Council Recommendation on the 2009 discharge (2009/COU/0205)</li> <li>- DMRO annual reports, 2008-2016, which were available</li> <li>- EU Annual Reports on human rights and Democracy</li> <li>- The Economist Intelligence Unit</li> <li>- Freedom House</li> <li>- Institute for Security Studies</li> <li>- International Crisis Group</li> </ul> </li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Strong</li> <li>2. More than satisfactory</li> <li>3. Weak</li> </ol>

EQ 4	To what extent has regional-level EU support contributed to improved democratic governance, peace and security, and better management of migration – thereby contributing to a stable and peaceful region?		
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- International Institute for Strategic Studies, iiss.org, Mo Ibrahim Index on African Governance, PRIO, Uppsala databases, all accessed February 2016</li> <li>- European Court of Auditors, 2009</li> <li>- International Crisis Group reports, 2008-2016</li> <li>- Interviews DEVCO, EEAS, DMROs, EUD to DMROs, EUD to the AU</li> <li>- Joint Progress Report on cooperation between EU and SADC, 2011)</li> <li>- Mutunga, 2014</li> <li>- OECD database on official development aid, accessed February 2016</li> <li>- Thematic evaluation of the EC support to respect of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 2011</li> </ul>	
<p><b>JC 4.2</b> “EU regional cooperation contributed to improved peace and security”</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. At the output level, there are discrete areas where policies, strategies and plans conducive to peace and security, and enhanced capacity and engagement of regional organisations, government institutions, civil society and communities, can be attributed, directly or indirectly, to EU regional support.</li> <li>2. Beyond these outputs, it is hard to attribute outcomes to EU regional support specifically given the predominance of local drivers of peace and security, the complex institution setup and other support (EU and non-EU). One can only safely say the EU has contributed to peace and security in IGAD, and to some extent in EAC and SADC.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- African Peace Facility Annual Reports between 2009 and 2015</li> <li>- APSA Assessments 2010-2016</li> <li>- Centre on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation and IGAD Security Program, 2012, Fighting terror through Justice.</li> <li>- Communication with EAC Secretariat</li> <li>- DMRO website, accessed February 2017</li> <li>- Draft evaluation, December 2016, MASE project</li> <li>- EAMRs Djibouti (2011-2015)</li> <li>- GIZ, 2017</li> <li>- International Crisis Group, 2012, “Implementing Peace and Security Architecture (II): Southern Africa”, Africa Report, n° 191</li> <li>- International Crisis Group, 2016, p. 10-14</li> <li>- Interviews DEVCO, EEAS, COMESA, EAC, IGAD, EUDs to COMESA, EUD to EAC, EUD to IGAD, EUD to SADC, EUD to the AU, East African Civil Society Forum, Institute for Security Studies</li> <li>- Interviews, COMESA, EUD to COMESA, IGAD, EUD to IGAD</li> </ul> </li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. More than satisfactory</li> <li>2. Weak</li> </ol>

EQ 4	To what extent has regional-level EU support contributed to improved democratic governance, peace and security, and better management of migration – thereby contributing to a stable and peaceful region?		
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Mutunga, 2014</li> <li>2.</li> <li>- EDF 10 MTR , 2011</li> <li>- 2013 Botswana EAMR</li> <li>- African Peace Facility Annual Reports between 2009 and 2015</li> <li>- APSA Assessments, 2010-2016, , which were available</li> <li>- Communication from EUD to the AU</li> <li>- Council Recommendation on the 2009 discharge (2009/COU/0205)</li> <li>- De Waal and Ibreck, 2016</li> <li>- DMRO annual reports, 2008-2016, which were available</li> <li>- Draft evaluation, December 2016, MASE project)</li> <li>- EDF10 RIPs</li> <li>- -EDF11 RIP</li> <li>- European Court of Auditors, 2009</li> <li>- -GIZ, 2016, APSA Impact Report, The state and impact of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in 2015.</li> <li>- Ibrahim Index on African Governance, 2008-2015</li> <li>- International Crisis Group reports, 2008-2016</li> <li>- Interviews DEVCO, EEAS, DMROs, EUD to DMROs, EUD to the AU</li> <li>- Joint Progress Report on cooperation between EU and SADC, 2011</li> <li>- Mutunga, 2014</li> <li>- OECD database on official development aid, accessed February 2016</li> <li>- Uppsala Conflict Database; Ibrahim Index, “Safety and Rule of Law” score, 2008-2015)</li> </ul>	

<b>EQ 5 Environmental governance – has regional-level EU support contributed to improved regional cooperation and harmonisation among Indian Ocean island states, and thereby led to more sustainable management of the region’s biodiversity and fisheries?</b>			
<b>Judgement Criteria</b>	<b>Summary response (indicator)</b>	<b>Source of information</b>	<b>Quality of evidence</b>
<b>JC 5.1</b> “EU support contributed to the establishment of a regional policy and institutional framework, which is conducive for regional cooperation and management natural resources”	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Regional and transboundary coordination and cooperation mechanisms on ecosystems and fisheries were in some, but not all cases, successfully strengthened or established.</li> <li>2. EU’s regional support has to a certain extent helped with improving and harmonising regional and national policies and the strategic framework.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <u>Interviews</u>: DEVCO staff in Brussels and EUDs, DMRO staff, programme staff, national stakeholders (government and non-government). <u>Programme documentation (sample programmes)</u>: actions fiches, programme estimates, progress and final reports, ROM reports, evaluation reports meeting reports.</li> <li>2. <u>Interviews</u>: DEVCO staff in Brussels and EUDs, DMRO staff, programme staff, national stakeholders (government and non-government). <u>Programme documentation (sample programmes)</u>: actions fiches, programme estimates, progress and final reports, ROM reports, evaluation reports, meeting reports.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. More than satisfactory</li> <li>2. Strong</li> </ol>
<b>JC 5.2</b> “EU support contributed to enhancing the knowledge base on ecosystem management”	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Environmental monitoring and data access was to a certain extent improved.</li> <li>2. New knowledge and tools on ecosystems and fisheries were made available.</li> <li>3. EU support contributed to enhancing the awareness on sustainable development, ecosystems and fisheries, from environmental and socio-economic perspectives.</li> <li>4. Networking and sharing of experiences on ecosystem management seems somewhat modest.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <u>Interviews</u>: DMRO staff, programme staff, national stakeholders (government and non-government). <u>Programme documentation (sample programmes)</u>: actions fiches, programme estimates, progress and final reports, ROM reports, evaluation reports, workshop reports, meeting reports, mission reports, publications. <u>Other documents</u>: IOC annual reports.</li> <li>2. <u>Interviews</u>: DMRO staff, programme staff, national stakeholders (government and non-government). <u>Programme documentation (sample programmes)</u>: actions fiches, progress and final reports, ROM reports, evaluation reports, meeting reports, mission reports, publications. <u>Other documents</u>: IOC annual reports.</li> <li>3. <u>Interviews</u>: DMRO staff, programme staff and consultants, national stakeholders (government). <u>Programme documentation (sample programmes)</u>: actions fiches, final reports, ROM reports, evaluation reports, workshop reports.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. More than satisfactory</li> <li>2. Strong</li> <li>3. More than satisfactory</li> <li>4. Satisfactory</li> </ol>

EQ 5	Environmental governance – has regional-level EU support contributed to improved regional cooperation and harmonisation among Indian Ocean island states, and thereby led to more sustainable management of the region’s biodiversity and fisheries?		
		4. Interviews: DMRO staff, programme staff, national stakeholders (government and non-government). Programme documentation (sample programmes): actions fiches, progress and final reports, ROM reports, evaluation reports, workshop reports. Other documents: IOC annual reports.	
JC 5.3 “EU support contributed to enhancing environmental governance”	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Enforcement in selected fisheries was significantly improved.</li> <li>2. Private sector and communities were involved through public-private partnerships, co-management in pilot sites and value chain approaches; generating viable models for replication.</li> <li>3. Tangible environmental and economic impacts were achieved, particularly in relation to fisheries at the local level.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <u>Interviews</u>: DEVCO staff in Brussels and EUDs, DMRO staff, programme staff, national stakeholders (government). <u>Programme documentation (sample programmes)</u>: progress and final reports, ROM reports, evaluation reports, workshop reports, EU-EASAI0 country agreements. <u>Other documents</u>: EAMRs.</li> <li>2. <u>Interviews</u>: DEVCO staff in Brussels and EUDs, DMRO staff, programme staff and consultants, implementing partners, national stakeholders (government and non-government), other donors and international organisations. <u>Programme documentation (sample programmes)</u>: actions fiches, programme estimates, progress and final reports, ROM reports, evaluation reports, workshop reports. <u>Other documents</u>: MIP 2014-2017.</li> <li>3. <u>Interviews</u>: DEVCO staff in Brussels and EUDs, DMRO staff, programme staff and consultants, implementing partners, national stakeholders (government and non-government), other donors and international organisations. <u>Programme documentation (sample programmes)</u>: actions fiches, programme estimates, progress and final reports, ROM reports, evaluation reports, workshop reports, EU-EASAI0 country agreements. <u>Other documents</u>: EAMRs, MIP 2014-2017.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Strong</li> <li>2. Strong</li> <li>3. Strong</li> </ol>
JC 5.4 “Sufficient mechanisms were put	1. The engagement and ownership of stakeholders varied and the management capacity of RECs/DMROs and national	1. <u>Interviews</u> : DEVCO staff in Brussels and EUDs, DMRO staff, programme staff, implementing	1. More than satisfactory

EQ 5	Environmental governance – has regional-level EU support contributed to improved regional cooperation and harmonisation among Indian Ocean island states, and thereby led to more sustainable management of the region’s biodiversity and fisheries?		
in place to ensure sustainability”	<p>governments was generally not adequately enhanced to ensure post-project continuation.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2. RECs and national governments do not have the financial resources needed to continue processes and the enhanced service provision after programme completion.</li> <li>3. The community co-management and private-sector models tested by SmartFish have shown a good degree of sustainability and replication.</li> <li>4. There is good continuity in EU’s regional support for fisheries, but there is a lack of continuity in relation to biodiversity – where continuity is lacking, significant impact and sustainability is unlikely to happen.</li> </ol>	<p>partners, national stakeholders (government and non-government). <u>Programme documentation (sample programmes)</u>: actions fiches, progress and final reports, ROM reports, evaluation reports. <u>Other documents</u>: MIP 2014-2017.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2. <u>Interviews</u>: EUD staff, DMRO staff, programme staff, national stakeholders (government and non-government). <u>Programme documentation (sample programmes)</u>: ROM reports, evaluation reports. <u>Other documents</u>: MIP 2014-2017.</li> <li>3. <u>Interviews</u>: DEVCO staff in Brussels and EUDs, DMRO staff, programme staff, implementing partners, national stakeholders (government and non-government). <u>Programme documentation (sample programmes)</u>: actions fiches, progress and final reports, ROM reports, evaluation reports. <u>Other documents</u>: MIP 2014-2017.</li> <li>4. <u>Interviews</u>: EUD staff, DMRO staff, programme staff, national stakeholders (government and non-government). <u>Programme documentation (sample programmes)</u>: ROM reports, evaluation reports. <u>Other documents</u>: MIP 2014-2017.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2. More than satisfactory</li> <li>3. Strong</li> <li>4. Strong</li> </ol>

EQ 6	To what extent have EU interventions been complementary with those of member states, coordinated with those of the other development partners, and coherent both with other EU actions in the region and with EU policies beyond development cooperation?		
Judgement Criteria	Summary response (indicator)	Source of information	Quality of evidence
<p><b>JC 6.1</b> “The EU’s regional cooperation was coherent with other European Union policies, strategies and programmes impacting the EA-SA-IO region”</p>	<p>1. The coherence of the EU’s regional cooperation coherence (in objectives, approaches and implementation) with <i>country-level</i> European Union policies and actions is on the whole <i>weak</i>. The EU’s regional cooperation <i>across regional organisations and initiatives</i> is <i>medium</i>.</p> <p>2. The EU’s regional cooperation appears to have been fairly <b>coherent</b> with <i>continental-level</i> European Union policies and actions The EU’s regional cooperation appears to have been fairly coherent with other European Union policies and actions at the <i>global level</i></p>	<p>1.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) Annual Report, 2016</li> <li>- EU 2015 “European Agenda on Security”</li> <li>- EU 2015 “European Agenda on Migration”</li> <li>- EU Global Strategy, 2016</li> <li>- European Court of Auditors (2009),</li> <li>- EU website accessed April 2017</li> <li>- De Waal and Ibreck, 2016</li> <li>- MIPs, RIPs, MTR (2012),</li> <li>- Mamaty et al. (2012)</li> <li>- Vircoulon, 2017</li> <li>- SADC Joint Review (2011)</li> <li>- Interviews DEVCO, COMESA, EAC, IGAD, EUDs to COMESA, EUD to EAC, EUD to IGAD, EUD to SADC, EUD to the AU, online survey</li> <li>- 2012 MTR</li> <li>- 2016 EU Global Strategy</li> <li>- APSA Assessment reports 2010-2016</li> <li>- APSA Assessment reports 2010-2016</li> <li>- DMRO mandates</li> <li>- ECDPM (2016)</li> <li>- IGAD, EUD to SADC, EUD to the AU</li> <li>- Kagame Report “The Imperative to Strengthen our Union” (2016)</li> <li>- Kempin and Scheler (2016)</li> <li>- Mengistu 2015</li> <li>- Online survey</li> </ul> <p>2.</p>	<p>1. More than satisfactory</p> <p>2. Indicative but not conclusive</p>



EQ 6	To what extent have EU interventions been complementary with those of member states, coordinated with those of the other development partners, and coherent both with other EU actions in the region and with EU policies beyond development cooperation?		
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Interviews COMESA, EAC, IGAD, EUD to COMESA, EUD to EAC, EUD to IGAD, EUD to SADC, EUD to the AU 2008 MoU on cooperation in the area of peace and security between the AU, RECs and the coordinating mechanisms of the regional standby brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa</li> <li>- Kagame report 2016</li> <li>- RIPs</li> <li>- ADE-PEM, draft manuscript, February 2017</li> <li>- DEVCO Thematic evaluations 2008-2017 incl. EU 2013 Thematic Evaluation on Trade</li> <li>- ESA-IO MTR, 2012</li> <li>- EU Africa Infrastructure Partnership</li> <li>- G20 Africa Partnership</li> <li>- Global Goods MIP 2014-2017</li> <li>- Interviews EUD to EAC, EUD to IGAD, EUD to AU</li> <li>- Landel Mills, draft manuscript, February 2017</li> </ul>	
<p><b>JC 6.2</b> “The EU’s regional cooperation strategies (2008-2015) were complementary to EU MS’ interventions and coordinated with other development partners”</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>3. Few EU member states have regional programmes, and there are formal and informal mechanisms to ensure the complementarity of regional programming with that of member states and coordination with other development partners.</li> <li>4. There are formal and informal mechanisms to ensure EU complementarity with member states and coordination with other development partners.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Interviews COMESA, EAC, IGAD, IOC, SADC, EUD to COMESA, EUD to EAC and Tanzania, EUD to IGAD, EUD to IOC, EUD to SADC, EUD to Kenya, IOC, EUD to Madagascar, EUD to Zimbabwe, EU MS in Ethiopia, Tanzania and Djibouti, UNECA Ethiopia, KfW, IMF in Ethiopia</li> <li>- EAMR Mauritius, 2014</li> <li>- ESA-IO MTR, 2012;</li> <li>- Mamaty et al., 2012</li> <li>- MASE final evaluation, draft 2016</li> </ul> </li> <li>2. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- EAMR Mauritius, 2014</li> <li>- ESA-IO MTR, 2012</li> <li>- Mamaty et al., 2012</li> <li>- MASE final evaluation, draft 2016</li> </ul> </li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Strong</li> <li>2. Indicative but not conclusive</li> </ol>

EQ 6	To what extent have EU interventions been complementary with those of member states, coordinated with those of the other development partners, and coherent both with other EU actions in the region and with EU policies beyond development cooperation?		
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Interviews, COMESA and EUD to COMESA, EUD to Zimbabwe</li> <li>- Interviews EAC, EUD to EAC and Tanzania, EUD to Kenya</li> <li>- Interviews IGAD, EUD to IGAD and Djibouti, EUD to Kenya, EUD to AU</li> <li>- Interviews IOC, EUD to IOC, EUD to Madagascar</li> <li>- Interviews SADC, EUD to SADC, EUD to Zimbabwe</li> <li>- Interviews with EUD Kigali, KfW, African Development Bank</li> <li>- Online survey</li> <li>- ISS (2016)</li> <li>- Pirozzi and Miranda (n.d.)</li> </ul>	

<b>EQ 7</b>			
<b>To what extent has the EU contributed to leveraging DMRO member states' funding and to improving DMROs' operational management?</b>			
<b>Judgement Criteria</b>	<b>Summary response (indicator)</b>	<b>Source of information</b>	<b>Quality of evidence</b>
<b>JC 7.1</b> "EU support has contributed to the DMROs having greater operational capacity and increasing in efficiency"	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. EU cooperation has supported a range of capacity development support programmes in all the DMROs but there is a concern that much of the capacity built will fall away when the programme employed staff leave. (i7.1.1, i7.1.2)</li> <li>2. EU cooperation support has not yet led to a significantly increased operational capacity of the DMROs at least as measured by disbursement. (i7.1.1, i7.1.2)</li> <li>3. The DMROs were not effective as programme implementing bodies and it is increasingly questioned to what extent this should be its role. (i7.1.1, i7.1.2)</li> <li>4. Some of slow implementation rate observed is due to difficulty in implementing EDF procedures(i7.1.1, i7.1.2, 7.3.1)</li> <li>5. Other channels of finance such as the African Parliamentary Union and the EU trust fund is also being used which appears to be an acceptance that the DMROs are not yet capable of managing the funds available. (i7.1.1, i7.1.2)</li> <li>6. Overall the coordination arrangements of the EDF 11 with the high-level group and the technical inter-DMRO forum are simpler and more streamlined than before.(i7.1.3)</li> <li>7. The coordination arrangements within the DMROs with its MS and between the DMROs and the international community are still weak. (i7.1.3)</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. EDF 10, 11 action documents : EUD/DMRO programme staff interviews</li> <li>2. EU and DMRO Financial records on disbursement</li> <li>3. EU and DMRO Financial records on disbursement; EUD/DMRO staff interviews</li> <li>4. EU and DMRO Financial records on disbursement</li> <li>5. EDF 11 programming budget (end 2016)</li> <li>6. HLG and forum minutes of meeting and interviews with EUD/DMR</li> <li>7. EAMR HLG and forum minutes of meeting and interviews with EUD/DMRO</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. More than satisfactory</li> <li>2. More than satisfactory</li> <li>3. More than satisfactory</li> <li>4. Indicative but not conclusive</li> <li>5. Indicative but not conclusive</li> <li>6. More than satisfactory</li> <li>7. More than satisfactory</li> </ol>
<b>JC 7.2</b> "EU support has contributed to the DMROs having improving value for money and procurement practices"	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The pillar assessments carried out for all the DMRO (other than IOC) were useful to benchmark financial management procedures and performance and set out roadmaps for improvement. (i7.2.1)</li> <li>2. The pillar assessments indicated that the procurement systems and procedures are largely in place and indicate the current systems provide value for money for all the DMROs except for EAC and IGAD(i7.2.2)</li> <li>3. There were promising signs of a cost-conscious approach across the DMROs. (i7.2.1/2)</li> <li>4. Overly optimistic assumptions on the demand for projects and capacity to implement negatively influenced the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the regional projects. (i7.2.1/2)</li> <li>5. Future improvements in efficiency and value for money will be dependent on advances on governance and on improvements in management performance. (i7.2.1/2)</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Pillar assessment reports</li> <li>2. Pillar assessment reports</li> <li>3. EUD/DMRO interviews and examples of documented cost saving actions in several DMROs</li> <li>4. Interviews with implementation and programme staff in several DMROs</li> <li>5. Interviews with EUDs and DMROs</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. More than satisfactory</li> <li>2. More than satisfactory</li> <li>3. More than satisfactory</li> <li>4. More than satisfactory</li> <li>5. More than satisfactory</li> </ol>

EQ 7	To what extent has the EU contributed to leveraging DMRO member states' funding and to improving DMROs' operational management?		
<p><b>JC 7.3</b> EU cooperation support has been efficient in its delivery</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. In general, and across all the DMROs, the efficiency of EU support has been low. (i7.3.1)</li> <li>2. In some cases the lengthy EU approval procedures have led to very low cost-effectiveness as projects have been delayed beyond the point when they are still relevant. (i7.3.1)</li> <li>3. Although training and capacity development have been provided this has in general not solved the problem, a solution has not been found and no solution is immediately evident. (i7.3.1)</li> <li>4. Contribution agreements are one possible solution and this approach can have a potentially important and constructive effect although not without challenges. (i7.3.2)</li> <li>5. Whilst EU cooperation support is implemented in good faith, carefully planned and undertaken in close consultation with its partners there are risks of harmful effects (i7.3.3)</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Disbursement records, EAMR reports, Interviews with EUDs. DMROs and implementation agencies</li> <li>2. Records of project delays</li> <li>3. Disbursement records, interviews with DMRO (finance and admin)/ EUD staff</li> <li>4. SADC/COMESA administration and finance staff and EUDs</li> <li>5. Interviews with DMROs, EUDs, GIZ/DfID/USAID/World Bank</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. More than satisfactory</li> <li>2. More than satisfactory</li> <li>3. More than satisfactory</li> <li>4. More than satisfactory</li> <li>5. More than satisfactory</li> </ol>

<b>EQ 8</b>			
<b>To what extent has the EU support enabled the DMROs and their partners at national level to better realise regional policy objectives?</b>			
<b>Judgement Criteria</b>	<b>Summary response (indicator)</b>	<b>Source of information</b>	<b>Quality of evidence</b>
<b>JC 8.1</b> “The policy dialogue with the EU is leading to a clearer set of strategic regional objectives for the DMROs”	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. EU policy dialogue did not engage at the strategic level (i8.1.1)</li> <li>2. Political dialogue was held with the DMROs but tended not to tackle contentious issues. (i8.1.1)</li> <li>3. Both EU and DMROs carried out some policy dialogue with non-state actors which was potentially valuable although links between DMROs and non-state actors were still weak. (i8.1.1)</li> <li>4. Although EU and other cooperation support has led to background studies that prioritise issues for regional integration, the DMROs are still highly ambitious and aspirational in nature. (i8.1.2/3)</li> <li>5. Monitoring and implementation of regional strategies was generally weak. (i8.1.2/3)</li> <li>6. The EPA process and the development of regional and national EPA implementation plans provide an opportunity for prioritising actions. (i8.1.2/3)</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. HLG minutes of meeting, EAMR reports</li> <li>2. EAMR reports, interviews with EUDs/DMROs</li> <li>3. Interviews with NGO forums, EAMR reports</li> <li>4. EUD survey, ECDPM (2016), interviews with EUDs/DMROs</li> <li>5. DMRO annual reports and monitoring systems</li> <li>6. EUDs/DMROs, HLG briefing papers (June 2016)</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. More than satisfactory</li> <li>2. More than satisfactory</li> <li>3. More than satisfactory</li> <li>4. More than satisfactory</li> <li>5. More than satisfactory</li> <li>6. More than satisfactory</li> </ol>
<b>JC 8.2</b> “Ownership by member countries of the DMROs and their objectives is increasing”	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Most analysis points to major gaps in the monitoring of and compliance with regional agreements. (i8.2.1)</li> <li>2. MS were slow in complying with regional agreements due to complexity, overlapping requirements and preservation of national interest. (i8.2.1)</li> <li>3. EU cooperation support to improving compliance became more balanced between regional and national levels. (i8.2.1/2)</li> <li>4. The DMRO engagement structures at national level were weak or absent and were not a channel for bottom-up pressure for regional integration from non-state actors. (i8.2.2)</li> <li>5. The involvement of non-state actors is a promising path for increasing the accountability of the DMROs(i8.2.2)</li> <li>6. MS potentially derived benefits from the DMROs as noted by the interest of countries to join but interests are different and not necessarily compatible with each other (i8.2.3)</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. DMRO specific reports on compliance e.g. EAC common scorecard; Interviews EUD/DMROs; UNCTAD policy brief July 2015</li> <li>2. Interviews with DMROs, EUDs</li> <li>3. Interviews with AFRITAC, EUDs, DMROs</li> <li>4. SADC NGO forum interviews and analysis, Interviews DMROs/EUDs</li> <li>5. SADC NGO forum interviews and analysis, Interviews DMROs/EUDs</li> <li>6. Makame, 2012 research, EAC common score card 2014/2016</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. More than satisfactory</li> <li>2. More than satisfactory</li> <li>3. More than satisfactory</li> <li>4. More than satisfactory</li> <li>5. Indicative but not conclusive</li> <li>6. More than satisfactory</li> </ol>

<p><b>JC 8.3</b> “The new implementation modalities are having their intended effects”</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The new modalities of the EDF 11 were based on sound analysis of earlier experience however it is still too early to tell if the modalities are working as intended. (i8.3.1/2)</li> <li>2. Direct access proved difficult where countries are ineligible for budget support (i8.3.1/2)</li> <li>3. Opportunities to work with lower level regional bodies that are specific to particular sub-regions or topics were not being optimised. (i8.3.1/2)</li> <li>4. The new modalities are designed to address the critical issues around disbursement of the EU cooperation programme and do not address some of the fundamental issues (i8.3.1/2)</li> <li>5. The EU support to enhancement of performance is much needed although many of the longer term underlying issues are of a political economy rather than capacity nature. (i8.3.3)</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. EDF10 Mid Term reviews; disbursement records</li> <li>2. Interviews with DMROs, implementing agencies, COMESA clearing house</li> <li>3. Interviews with EUDs, GIZ/USAID/DfID/ World Bank</li> <li>4. Interviews EUDs, DMROs, ECDPM discussion paper 192, June 2016</li> <li>5. Interviews with DMROs and donors (USAID, GIZ, DfID, World Bank)</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Indicative but not conclusive</li> <li>2. Indicative but not conclusive</li> <li>3. Indicative but not conclusive</li> <li>4. Indicative but not conclusive</li> <li>5. Indicative but not conclusive</li> </ol>
--	--	--	--



## Appendix B Background and context

---

The overarching objective of EU support the EA-SA-IO region is a “Stable, peaceful, prosperous EA-SA-IO Region”. It is widely acknowledged that economic integration featuring open and fair markets is among the key success factors for achieving stability, peace and prosperity. The European Union’s establishment had similar aims and a similar politico-philosophical basis. Despite recent challenges (financial crisis, Brexit, migration, growing populism), the EU has largely achieved stability, peace and some prosperity. The EU model, along with the lessons it has learned - and is learning - can be valuable for other regions pursuing a similar path. Africa has longstanding aspirations towards a unified continental market, through the building blocks of the regional economic communities. Hence, the Eastern and Southern African regions that embarked on common-market paths embraced EU support, even as some have since diverged from that path.

The Cotonou Partnership Agreement of 2000, as revised in 2005 and 2010, is the cornerstone of the EU’s EA-SA-IO regional strategy. This Partnership between the European Union (EU) and the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP) forms the basis of a 20-year (2000-2020) political, trade and sustainable development agenda centred, *inter alia*, around helping ACP members integrate into the global economy.


### 1. Challenging context

The EU’s regional cooperation in the EA-SA-IO region centres around five Duly-Mandated Regional Organisations (DMROs) with 29 member states, of which 25 are ACP members (see Box 1 below). Figure 1 below shows a map of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) respective territories, illustrating the considerable membership overlaps. The broad developmental challenges faced by the EA-SA-IO region are similar to those faced by Africa as a whole. They include undiversified markets with low value addition, overdependence on raw material exports, low levels of effective trade and economic integration, inadequate infrastructure, regional food insecurity, conflicts and political instability. At different stages of democratisation and economic integration, parts of the region face significant peace, security and stability challenges. Trafficking and migration are increasing, and in many areas sustainable management of natural resources and climate change pose both risks and opportunities.

The various countries and sub-regions differ significantly in terms of the exposure to and management of these challenges. Each DMRO and its member states operate in a dynamic socio-economic environment – with often rapid transformation taking place in terms of political change, globalisation effects and the influence of new technologies. Keeping abreast of the evolving realities on the ground and reflecting these appropriately in programming, implementation and monitoring is as vital as it is challenging. In such a dynamic context, risk management becomes part of daily business and assumptions must be subject to regular reality checks.

### Figure 3 – Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean Regional Organisations





Note: South Sudan joined EAC in 2016, with a 3-year transition period to align its legal system. Source: DEVCO.

### Box 17 – Members of DMROs in EA-SA-IO

(Note: ACP member in **bold**; member of more than one DMRO in **bold underlined**)

Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA): **Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.**

East African Community (EAC): **Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda** (Tanzania is the only non-COMESA member). South Sudan joined the EAC in 2016, with a 3-year transition period.

Southern African Development Community (SADC): **Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia** and **Zimbabwe**

Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD): **Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda**, South Sudan (ACP observer) and **Sudan**.

Indian Ocean Commission (IOC): **Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Réunion (France) and Seychelles.**

Source: DMRO and EU websites

## 2. The mandates and priorities of the DMROs

The mandates and priorities as set out in the respective treaties/strategies are summarised in box 2 with a focus on where the DMRO is given a mandate to follow up and monitor on implementation of agreements.

**Box 18 – The Five DMROs’ Mandates/Priorities**

<b>DMRO</b>	<b>Mandate as set out in the respective treaties</b>
<b>COMESA</b>	<p>COMESA’s mandate focuses heavily on economic and trade development. Even its focus on peace and security has economic development underpinnings. In 1994 the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa was established, replacing the preferential trade area that had existed since 1981. The first step toward a common market was agreement on a free-trade area (FTA). To date, the FTA has been ratified by 14 (2016) of the 19 member states. The customs union is progressing slowly and a common market remains a distant dream. The main obstacles are political will, vested interests, capacity to implement and enforce regional commitments, and persistent nontariff barriers.</p> <p>The COMESA Treaty sets out 11 main responsibilities for the Secretariat. According to Article 173 of the Treaty, member states agree that the implementation of the provisions of this Treaty shall be prioritised on the basis of comprehensive and measurable programmes with clear implementation targets and effective evaluation mechanisms. It states: ‘the Secretariat shall be responsible for following up and monitoring the implementation by the member states of the provisions of this Treaty and the regulations made, directives issued, recommendations made and decisions taken and opinions delivered by the Council’.</p>
<b>EAC</b>	<p>The EAC, established in 1999, focuses on the ultimate aim of ‘political federation’, the fourth step after Customs Union, Common Market and Monetary Union. It is founded on three pillars: common foreign and security policies (it has a Defence Pact and is active in anti-trafficking), good governance (including gender mainstreaming and partnerships with the private sector and civil society), and effective implementation of the stages of regional integration (the latter focusing increasingly on conformity and compliance). The EAC Customs Union was established in 2005 and the Common Market Protocol went into effect in mid-2010. Implementation is progressing slowly, due to issues related to political will/commitment, vested interests, conflicts, and capacity. Article 71 of the EAC Treaty outlines some 14 key responsibilities of the Secretariat including: coordination and harmonisation of the policies and strategies relating to the development of the Community through the Coordination Committee and, implementation of the decisions of the Summit and the Council.</p>
<b>SADC</b>	<p>SADC’s mandate is to promote and achieve equitable and sustainable development through increased regional integration. Its action agenda focuses on trade-related issues, infrastructure, industrialisation, food security, natural resources management, environment, gender and health. The SADC free-trade area was established in 2008. Its full implementation has been problematic due to the continued proliferation of nontariff barriers, derogations from some members on tariff commitments and the reluctance of key members to join the FTA (Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo). The South African Customs Union (SACU) comprises a subset of SADC members (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland). SACU has a common external tariff and has adopted a common trade policy since the arrangement was renegotiated in 2002. The revenue-sharing formula at the heart of SACU is contentious and is seen as a challenge to a SADC customs union (a process that has stalled). Article 14 of the Treaty list 6 key areas that the Secretariat is responsible for including: implementation of decisions of the Summit and of the Council and coordination and harmonisation among member states of policies and strategies. See also: PER vol.15 n.2 Potchefstroom Aug. 2012: The role of sadc institutions in implementing sadc treaty provisions dealing with regional integration by A Saurombe, <a href="http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S1727-37812012000200017">http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S1727-37812012000200017</a></p>
<b>IOC</b>	<p>IOC’s mandate is to strengthen the relationship and solidarity of the Indian Ocean islands with the aim of enhancing sustainable development, regional cooperation and advocacy for Small Island Developing States. IOC’s key priorities for the period 2013-2015 are political stability, regional competitiveness, blue and green growth, sustainable development and climate change, connectivity, food security, and culture and media. It provides a framework for its member states to conduct external collective actions of integration and cooperation with the Eastern and Southern Africa region, the African continent (AU), the South (South-South collaboration) and the rest of the world, and with multilateral institutions and various donors.</p> <p>While taking care to respect the principles of coordination, complementarity and subsidiarity, the IOC plays a supporting role in fields where its members need more specific support and where other regional organizations insufficiently consider island specificity. Its ambition is to increase the impact of its interventions, focusing on initiatives that produce tangible results.</p>
<b>IGAD</b>	<p>IGAD’s mandate under its 2016-2020 Strategy is to assist and complement the efforts of its member states through increased cooperation on three strategic pillars: management of natural resources,</p>

economic integration, and peace and security. The strategy, awaiting a formal treaty, outlines 10 main areas of responsibility for IGAD including “Harmonise policies with regard to trade, customs, transport, communications, agriculture, and natural resources and environment”.
--

### 3. EU programming in EA-SA-IO region: 2008 to present

EU regional support under EDF 10 and 11 has focused on three priority areas, broadly aligned with the DMROs’ priorities as set out above: (1) regional economic integration; (2) peace, security and regional stability; and (3) regional natural resources management. This focus was tightened under EDF 11.

**Midterm reviews** in 2011 of the EDF 10 RIPs for ESA-IO (€645m for COMESA, EAC, IOC, IGAD) and SADC (€116m) formed the basis of EDF 11 programming. The main findings were as follows.

1. The focal areas were too broad, and actions and priorities were not clearly identified.
2. Assistance targeted mainly DMRO Secretariats, which had limited technical capacity.
3. Implementation modalities were complicated and added a burden in terms of the preparation and implementation of regional programmes.
4. Regional programmes did not make as much progress as intended in facilitating domestication at national level, due to a range of challenges.
  - multiple and overlapping memberships
  - limited incorporation of regional agreements into national law/practice, and limited compliance
  - persistence of barriers to crossborder flows of goods, services and people
  - principle of subsidiarity between regional and national levels overlooked or misunderstood
  - absence of effective mechanisms for organising, implementing, directing, monitoring and revising (in short, managing) regional integration, regionally and nationally.
  - absence of effective mechanism to link the EU’s regional and national-level political/policy dialogues.

**The main recommendations of the midterm reviews focused on efficiency, effectiveness, reality checks, motivation and subsidiarity:**

- Explore concrete ways to support the EPA and Tripartite processes.
- Encourage new leveraging/blending arrangements and investment in infrastructure.
- Carry out programming jointly with DMROS and national authorities in consultation with the private sector and civil society to better identify the real obstacles to regional integration at the national level and to fine tune the focal axes of interventions.
- When relevant, projects should be implemented and monitored by national authorities.
- EDF 11 RIP should maintain flexibility to adapt to evolving needs while maintaining focus on key fields of action/programmes, to ensure concentration of effort.
- Consider the implications of emerging priorities such as the Tripartite FTA and the EU Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa on the operational configuration for the ESA-IO region.
- Assess the possibility of each DMRO having its own programme.
- Encourage DMROs to design programmes to motivate their member states to undertake reforms to enhance regional integration.

**In response, EDF 11 introduced a number of changes in the approach.** The RIP was signed off by the EU and the DMRO CEOs in June 2015 after more than two years of concentrated work. The main changes were:

- a more pragmatic configuration, with a single regional agreement covering both SADC and the ESA-IO regions
- a single High-Level Group (HLG) mechanism for EU-DMRO coordination (but ‘otherwise relying on DMRO and member state mechanisms for coordination and programming within the respective regions’). This replaced the Inter-Regional Coordination Committee (IRCC), which had existed since 2005.
- sub-regional envelopes for each DMRO (as per its requests)
- direct access by REC member states for activities where the subsidiarity principle indicated that national action was more likely to be successful than regional action
- an envelope for cross-regional priorities that are not specific to a particular REC
- an envelope for financing infrastructure under blending with the option for other modalities as well.
- performance reserve to allow funds to be directed to where they were best being used.

A key element in EDF 11, arising from the MTRs, is a stronger recognition that **a dual-pronged approach is necessary to achieve strategic goals**. This involves both support for regional solutions (e.g. regional trade agreements, regional standards, regional interconnectivity) and support for national-level commitment and compliance. EDF 11 also places stronger emphasis on private sector involvement; this is a laudable goal, but activation is encountering some challenges. While the focus has indeed tightened on paper and the EDF 11 RIP is much easier to navigate, an in-depth examination, backed up by interviews, reveals that within the tighter focal areas, the EU is still trying to address possibly too many of Africa’s problems.

**Box 19 – Example of Changes in Priority Areas between EDF 10 and EDF 11**

<b>EA-IO-SA EDF 11</b> (€1332m) <b>Priority areas</b>	<b>Sub-area (RIP Chapter 2)</b>
<b>Peace, security and regional stability</b> (12%)	1.1 DMRO institutional capacity
	1.2 Electoral observation and conflict mediation
	1.3 Democratisation, good governance, rule of law, human rights
	1.4 Cross border issues (refugees, migration, trafficking, maritime security, terrorism, border management)
<b>Regional economic integration</b> (62%)	2.1 DMRO institutional capacity
	2.2 National-level trade-related assistance and support to private sector
	2.3 Regional infrastructure networks (investments)
	2.4 Strategy and regulatory frameworks for regional infrastructure
<b>Regional NRM</b> (13%)	3.1 Regional drought resilience
	3.2 Regional natural resource management

<b>ESA-IO EDF 10</b> (€645m) <b>Priority areas</b>	<b>Sub-Area (RIP Chapter 6)</b>
<b>Regional economic integration (including NRM)</b> (85%)	1.1 Trade-related assistance and capacity building
	1.2 Alleviation of economic/fiscal adjustments
	1.3 Private sector development: regional level support for enabling environment; support for business institutions
	1.4 Removal of supply-side constraints (infrastructure-related plans, etc)
	1.5 Land and water resources management to enhance agriculture and food production
	1.6 Marine resources management
	1.7 Natural resources and environmental management
<b>Political integration</b> (10%)	2.1 Conflict prevention, peace and security (Pan-African architecture)
	2.2 Post-conflict reconstruction
	2.3 Dialogue on governance and security

<b>SADC EDF 10</b> (€116m) <b>Priority areas</b>	<b>Sub-Area (RIP Chapter 6)</b>
<b>Regional economic integration</b> (80%)	1.1 Trade integration (key trade issues)
	1.2 Structural reforms, competitiveness
	1.3 Infrastructure policy and project development
	1.4 Food security, Agriculture Information Management System development
	1.5 Capacity development, institutional strengthening
<b>Political integration</b> (15%)	2.1 Democratic governance
	2.2 Regional pillar of Pan-African architecture for peace and security
	2.3 Disaster management

**Box 20 – Example of change in Specific Objectives for Regional Economic Integration, EDF 10 and EDF 11**

Specific Objectives of EDF 10 ESA-IO RSP/RIP	Specific Objectives of EDF 11 EA-SA-IO RIP
<p>The specific objectives of EDF 10's (EA-IO) economic integration pillar (Chapter 5) were to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- support the implementation and consolidation of existing customs unions and free-trade areas</li> <li>- support the regions' efforts to move towards common markets and monetary unions with integrated rules and standards, free movement of production factors, competition policy and macroeconomic convergence</li> <li>- strengthen development and implementation of regional trade arrangements in goods and services, EPAs, WTO</li> <li>- assist countries liberalising their trade regimes to make necessary adjustments and cover any revenue losses</li> <li>- reduce the cost of doing business by addressing supply-side constraints, including physical infrastructure</li> <li>- ensure sustainable management of natural resources</li> <li>- develop sustainable regional energy policies.</li> </ul>	<p>The specific objectives of EDF 11's economic integration pillar were to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- enhance institutional capacity of DMROs to advance regional integration and EPAs, improve monitoring systems, harmonise integration agendas, diversify funding sources; support inter-DMRO policy coordination/dialogue, incl. Tripartite process;</li> <li>- deliver national-level trade-related assistance and private sector support (market integration, EPAs, business and trading environment)</li> <li>- connect regional infrastructure networks ('missing links', interconnectivity among transport, energy, telecommunications networks)</li> <li>- improve the strategic and regulatory frameworks for regional infrastructure networks.</li> </ul> <p><i>Comment:</i> The scope for national-level and private sector support was broadened. National resource management became a priority on its own.</p>
<p><b>SADC 2010 RIP</b>, Chapter 5: The Regional Economic Integration programme objectives are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- to support the implementation and consolidation of the existing CU and FTAs, to support the move towards a SADC CU;</li> <li>- to support the region's efforts to move towards a Common Market and a Monetary Union with integrated rules and standards, free movement of factors of production (goods, services, labour, capital), competition policy, and macroeconomic convergence</li> <li>- to strengthen the development and implementation of regional trade arrangements in goods and services, EPAs, and multilateral trade arrangements, specifically WTO;</li> <li>- to provide support to those countries liberalising their trade regimes to enable them to make the necessary economic adjustments and address possible short-term revenue losses;</li> <li>- to reduce the cost of doing business by removing supply-side constraints, including improvement of regional economic infrastructures;</li> <li>- to ensure food security and to ensure that it provides a basis for the livelihood of the people.</li> </ul>	<p>Of the €834m allocated for these activities (62% of the total RIP), €600m were for the last two objectives: infrastructure, much of which is carried out at the national level. Hence, most of the economic integration part of the RIP may have national implementation implications. Effective communication and coordination among regional and country EUDs and HQ will be very important.</p>

### Box 21 – Example of change in Specific Objectives for peace, security and stability, EDF 10 and 11

Specific Objectives of EDF 10 ESA-IO RSP/RIPs	Specific Objectives of EDF 11 EA-SA-IO RIP
<p>The overall objective of EDF 10 (EA-IO) in peace, security and stability was to assure peace and security and provide a framework for balanced development through higher levels of regional cooperation, including deeper political integration, as many conflicts in the region have a regional dimension.</p> <p>The specific objectives were:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b><u>Support for the regional pillar of the pan-African architecture for conflict prevention, peace and security.</u></b></li> <li>- <b><u>Support for post-conflict reconstruction</u></b></li> <li>- Launching of structured dialogue with regional partners on governance and security.</li> </ul>	<p>The overall objective of EDF 11 (EA-SA-IO) in peace, security and stability was to foster peace and stability, prevent and manage conflict, and address security threats through support to regional governance and cooperation for peace and stability. The specific objectives were to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support capacity development of DMROs to strengthen their role as political/peace and security pillars in the region;</li> <li>• Support election observation and conflict mediation;</li> <li>• Support regional projects promoting democratisation, good governance, rule of law, human rights;</li> <li>• Support regional projects addressing cross-border issues such as refugees, mixed migration flows, human trafficking and smuggling, radicalisation and terrorism, maritime security, as well as border management.</li> </ul>
<p>The overall objective of EDF 10 (SADC) in peace, security and stability was to ensure democracy, peace and security, in a framework for balanced development, by means of higher levels of regional political cooperation. The purpose was to support the regional pillar of the Pan-African architecture for conflict prevention, peace and security and associated policies.</p>	

### Box 22 – Example of change in specific objectives for Natural Resource Management, EDF 10 and 11

Specific Objectives of EDF 10 ESA-IO RSP/RIP	Specific Objectives of EDF 11 EA-SA-IO RIP
<p>The <b>NRM-related</b> specific objectives of EDF 10's EA-IO economic integration pillar (Chapter 5) were to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>ensure the sustainable management</b> of the natural resources of the region as a core asset for the livelihood systems of the people and to ensure that it provides a basis for sustainable economic growth and food security;</li> <li>- <b>develop sustainable energy policies</b> based on improved access to sustainable energy services and regional electricity markets integration,</li> </ul>	<p>The specific objectives of EDF 11's NRM priority were to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>Improve drought resilience at regional level</b>, by strengthening regional strategies and operational tools, such as: information systems, market regulation, food supply systems, food stock systems, value chains, disaster risk reduction, early warning systems, and trans-boundary disease control.</li> <li>- <b>Support natural resource management of regional importance:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Water management</li> <li>• Biodiversity conservation</li> <li>• Wildlife conservation and the fight against wildlife crime</li> <li>• Sustainable agriculture, including crops, livestock and aquaculture</li> <li>• Sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources</li> <li>• Sustainable management of mineral resources, including a strengthened regional coordination.</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p><i>Comment:</i> NRM was not a separate priority under EDF 10 RSPs and RIPs, although they supported a number of large NRM programmes. Hence, the NRM objectives are more comprehensively framed in the EDF11 RIP.</p>
<p><b>SADC 2010 RIP</b>, Chapter 5: The Regional Economic Integration Programme objectives <b>related to NRM</b> are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- to ensure food security and to ensure that it provides a basis for the livelihood of the people.</li> </ul>	

**Box 23 – EDF 11: Regional Economic Integration-Related Priorities by DMRO****Cross-regional**

- Implementation of the EU-East and Southern Africa interim EPA.
- Enhance institutional capacity of DMROs.
- Deliver at national level trade-related assistance and support to private sector.
- Improved connectivity and efficiency and resilience of regional infrastructure networks (blending facility)
- Improve the strategic and regulatory framework of regional infrastructure networks.

**COMESA**

- Reduced cost of cross-border trade through removal of internal barriers in line with Tripartite Agreement.
- Increased private sector participation in regional and global value chains, through improved investment/business climate and enhanced competitiveness and productive/innovation capacity.
- Enhanced capacity of the COMESA Secretariat and member states, including the private sector, to deepen regional integration.

**EAC**

- Foster the implementation of the EAC Common Market as well as monitoring the Customs Union and Common Market Protocols.
- Develop EAC industries and private sector, and facilitate trade.

**IGAD**

- Reduce barriers to free movement of persons in the IGAD region.

**IOC**

- Competitiveness and business facilitation.

**SADC**

- Consolidation of the SADC FTA and Implementation of the SADC-EU EPA.
- Support for industrialisation and the productive sectors.
- Support to intra-SADC investment and Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) through improving the business and investment environment.

Source: EDF 11 Regional Indicative Programmes; Discussion Paper No. 192 [www.ecdpm.org/dp192](http://www.ecdpm.org/dp192)

**Box 24 – EDF 11: Peace and Security-Related Priorities by DMRO****Cross-regional**

- Assist regional organisations of the Great Lakes region, countries of the region when acting together, and civil society actors in implementing the international commitments on security and regional stability, including commitments and benchmarks under the *Addis Ababa Peace Security and Cooperation Framework* (notably the *Plan of Action for the Implementation of Regional Benchmarks* in which ICGLR and SADC are especially strongly implicated) and other relevant international documents.
- Contribute to improved management of the mixed migratory flows, including by building capacity and providing protection and development for refugees, internally displaced persons and other vulnerable migrants, thereby diminishing the negative impact of migration in the region and optimising the contribution of refugees, internally displaced people and migrants to local economies, and so contributing to development.
- Contribute to enhanced maritime security and safety in the EA-SA- IO region, by assisting in building sustainable capacity in coastal states and also in the judiciary, legal, and police areas, by balancing support at country level and at regional level as capacity at national level is required to control crime in the maritime domain, while regional activities can enhance efforts by promoting coordination in selected areas.

**EAC**



- Promote democratic governance in the EAC region in line with the *EAC Protocol on Good Governance* and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance
- Combat terrorism, cross-border and transnational organised crime (including human trafficking, migrant smuggling, as well as trafficking of small arms and light weapons, wildlife and narcotics) in the EAC region

**IGAD**

- Strengthen conflict early warning and response mechanisms
- Improve mediation and preventive diplomacy
- Counter existing, evolving and emerging trans-national security threats

**IOC:** Enhance political stability and democratic governance in the IOC Region

**SADC**

- Strengthen the infrastructure for peace, security and regional stability
- Promote regional stability through increased respect for rule of law and enhanced public security.

Source: EDF 11 Regional Indicative Programme

**Box 25 – EDF 11: Regional Natural Resource-Related Priorities by DMRO****Cross-regional**

- Transboundary water management
- The contribution of sustainable fisheries to the blue economy
- Wildlife conservation

**COMESA**

- *No NRM priorities*

**EAC**

- Support the integrated management and development of the shared water and fishery resources of the Lake Victoria Basin

**IGAD**

- Enhance resilience of (agro-) pastoralist populations
- Promote sustainable ecosystem rehabilitation and management of natural resources

**IOC**

- Address specific vulnerabilities of island states – climate change and disaster risk management
- Regional food security programme

**SADC**

- Operationalise SADC's Regional Agricultural Policy to contribute to achieving sustainable food and nutrition security in order to achieve sustainable access to safe, adequate and affordable food

Source: 11th EDF Regional Indicative Programmes; Discussion Paper No. 192 [www.ecdpm.org/dp192](http://www.ecdpm.org/dp192)

**4. Financial commitment by DMRO Member States**

There has been a steady growth in member state commitments to 4 of the 5 DMROs. Apart from EAC, the annual year by year compound growth in commitments has between 4% and 9% per year. At a rate of 10% annual growth the commitment would double in less than 8 years (see table 5 below). EAC data from annual reports is only available over a 2 year interval and shows just a minor increase in commitment.

**Table 5 – Growth in member state funding**

DMRO	Compound annual growth rate of member state funding	Notes (annual report years)
COMESA	9%	2008-to 2015
EAC	1%	2012/13 to 2013/14
IGAD	4%	2009 to 2016
IOC	7%	2009 to 2015
SADC	5%	2007/8 to 2014/2015

There is no discernible trend in the ratio of internal (member state funding) to external (donor funding). Whereas the internal funding is on a steady and gradually increasing trend (see table 6), external funding varies considerably from year to year. Most likely this is due to large (probably multi-year) donor funded projects.

Table 2 below shows the different levels of internal to external funding over the years for which data is available (according to DMRO annual reports). It is evident from these sources that over a number of years the proportion of funding from member states has been relatively high (at least from an “on-budgeting core budget” perspective) apart from IGAD which is not surprising given the economy of its member states. For IOC, France (through Reunion) provides 40% of the member state contributions.

**Table 6 – Proportion of funding from DMRO Member States for core budget (as reported in annual reports)**

DMRO	Proportion of funding from member states for Core budget	Trend	Notes (annual report years)
COMESA	95%	No trend, varies between 86% and 98%	2008-to 2015
EAC	60%	No trend, varies between 59% and 61%	2012/13 to 2013/14
IGAD	22%	No trend, varies between 11% and 37%	2009 to 2016
IOC	65%	No trend, varies between 54% and 75%	2009 to 2015
SADC	49%	No trend, varies between 35% and 64%	2007/8 to 2014/2015
Average	58%		

However, the relatively high proportion of funding of the core budget by member states does not take account of two factors:

1. The programmatic budget, which is overwhelming financed by donors at most DMROs
2. The fact that the core budget may not be financing all the core functions, meaning that the programmatic or external funding (in-kind or direct) is in effect contributing to the core functions (e.g. if staff paid for by a donor programme are undertaking core functions or if programmatic funding is used for conferences and travel related to core functions)

Table 7 below shows an estimate based on best available figures of the proportion of funding for programmatic expenditures by DMRO member states.

**Table 7 – Estimated proportion of funding for programmatic expenditures by DMRO Member States**

DMRO	Proportion of funding from member states for programmatic budget	Trend	Notes (annual report years)	Typical core budget (USD m)	Typical programme budget (USD m)	ratio of core to programme budget
COMESA	<10%	Consistent trend (amounts of external donor programmatic expenditure vary from USD 30 million to USD 60 million)	2009-2013	14	30 to 60	1:4
IGAD	<10%	Consistent trend (amounts of external donor programmatic expenditure vary but in 2016 was approximately USD 30 million)	2012-2016	6	30	1:5
IOC	<10%	consistent trend reported as consistent over last 3 years, about USD 15 million of programmatic funding per year	2012-2016	1	15	1:15
SADC	Varies between 10 -35%	Trend from 11% to 34%, so apparently an increasing degree of Member state funding	2015 and 2016 (average for 2 years)	25	35	1:1
Note data on EAC not available						

## Appendix C. Case Studies

This appendix presents four case studies developed by the evaluation team.

### Case Study 1: RISM

**Sum-Up:** The Regional Integration Support Mechanism (RISM) has allocated €111m since 2007 to help COMESA and its overlapping EAC MS adjust to and implement regional integration programmes. RISM started out in 2007 as a revenue-loss compensation instrument. It evolved in 2012 into a pilot programme based on the logic of providing an incentive to governments to honour regional commitments, by tying disbursements to progress in meeting agreed targets based on indicators reflecting key COMESA and EAC agreements and strategies.

#### 1. Objective and expected results of the initiative

The dependency of many countries on tariffs and other trade charges as a source of revenue reduces ability and motivation to implement trade liberalisation and regional economic integration. The **Regional Integration Support Mechanism (RISM)** was established at the end of EDF 9 in November 2007 under a Contribution Agreement for **€78m**, operationalising the COMESA Adjustment Facility (CAF - one of two windows in the COMESA Fund Protocol for Cooperation, Compensation and Development set up in 2002 but dormant for lack of funds).

<b>Overall Objective</b>	To support the economic integration process of the ESA-IO region through the consolidation of the COMESA free trade area and implementation of COMESA and EAC customs unions and common markets.
<b>Specific Objective</b>	To support Member Countries to participate fully in the COMESA, EAC and Tripartite free trade areas, and the COMESA and EAC customs unions and common markets, with minimum disruption to public expenditure commitments, as well as enabling them to implement reform programmes in the context of regional integration.
<b>Expected Result(s)</b>	A substantive contribution to the effective transposition and implementation of COMESA/EAC Regional Integration policies, regulations and programmes ('regional integration commitments') at the national level. (The Action Fiche further specified “, in the free trade area, the customs union, resolution of non-tariff barriers, harmonised standards, trade in services, investment and competition policies, transport and trade facilitation policies’. It also sought improvements in national planning and budgeting systems, inter-institutional coordination on trade/regional integration, and COMESA M&E capacity”.)

Source: RISM Consolidation, July 2014, and Addendum, 2015; Action Fiche 2012/024-191, 3.1, 3.2, p.3

COMESA has 19 MS: Burundi, Comoros, DR Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. All except Eritrea, Egypt and Libya may participate in RISM. Four belong to the EAC (Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda).

RISM provided adjustment support to Burundi and Rwanda (€12.7m and €22.6m, respectively in 2009/10) when they joined the EAC Customs Union. They were the only

countries to benefit from RISM until **mid-2012** when RISM's scope was broadened through a 24-month Rider responding to recommendations of the EDF 9 MTR. By then most COMESA members had joined the FTA and EAC members had joined the Customs Union, and there was little demand for revenue compensation. Of the €42,7m remaining in the fund in 2012, €5m were set aside for revenue-loss compensation. The rest was to go for project support to underpin national implementation of COMESA and EAC regional integration commitments and instruments. (Since the €5m set for revenue losses remained unused at December 2013, an amendment in 2014 incorporated it into the project support facility and the revenue-loss provision was removed.)

For EDF 10, the EU further refined RISM ('RISM Consolidation') to provide funding predictability over 36 months, taking account of the step-by-step approach needed to 'anchor and entrench reforms'. EDF 10 committed an additional €33,4m. In 2014, the RISM Rider merged with the RISM Consolidation programme.


Pay for performance: The reformulated RISM was designed to reward MS for progress on transposition and implementation of regional agreements. To apply for RISM support, MS had to prepare a Regional Integration Implementation Plan (RIIP) outlining the strategy for implementing outstanding commitments against a set of performance indicators aligned with the COMESA Medium-Term Strategy. Disbursements were to be tied to the Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) and its 18 indicators (21 since a 2013 revision) based on specific targets and variable geometry (Action Fiche RISM/2012/024/191, p. 3).

Objective aligned to COMESA Strategy	Performance Indicators (2013-14 substantive revisions/additions in blue)
National monitoring & reporting mechanisms	1. National Inter-Ministerial Coordinating Committees officially constituted and operational
	2. Selected regionally agreed harmonised statistical clusters (frameworks) to produce national statistics implemented
Consolidation of free trade area (FTA)	3. Implementation of the COMESA Free Trade Area
	4. At least <del>30%</del> 70% of reported Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) resolved by Member State per year
	5. Number of COMESA and/or EAC Harmonised Standards adopted by each Member State per year
Removal of barriers to trade and business	6. Key elements of the Simplified Trade Regime (STR) implemented (comment: to facilitate small-scale crossborder trade activities)
	7. Reduction in number of documents to export a consignment (as per Ease Of Doing Business (EODB) framework)
	8. Reduction in number of documents to import a consignment (as per EODB framework)
Operationalising the Customs Unions	9. Common Tariff Nomenclature (CTN) domesticated by MS
	10. Customs Management Regulations (CMR) adopted at national level
	11. Final schedule of commitments in 7 (previously 4) key priority Services submitted to & confirmed by COMESA (financial services, communications, transport and tourism + energy, business, and construction and related engineering services)
Launch of the Common Market	12. Provisions of the protocol on gradual relaxation and eventual elimination of visas implemented
Common Competition Policy	13. Competition regulations adopted at national level
	14. COMESA Common Investment Area Agreement (CCIA) signed and ratified

Objective aligned to COMESA Strategy	Performance Indicators (2013-14 substantive revisions/additions in blue)
Improved business and investment enabling environment	15. Double Taxation Agreements (DTAs) negotiated, signed, ratified at national level
Transport Facilitation	16. Harmonised Road Transport Charges (HRTC) implemented
	17. Harmonised Axle Load Limits (ALL) & <del>Overload Control certificate</del> implemented
	18. COMESA Harmonised Vehicle Dimensions (HVD) implemented
	19. COMESA Carrier Licence (CCL) implemented
	20. COMESA Yellow card adopted and used where applicable
	21. Air transport liberalisation in compliance with COMESA Legal Notice #2 of 1999

\* The two areas removed from the previous list were Common External Tariff implementation and notification of the Sensitive List. Source: RISM Action Fiche 2012, COMESA Secretary General letter to EU 2013; RISM Consolidation Addendum 2015.

### How RISM Works



Source: RISM Unit, COMESA, from RISM Consolidation Contribution Agreement, 2014

**Budget versus project support:** Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Rwanda and Seychelles are eligible for budget support, according to an EU letter to COMESA dated 10 October 2016. (Under the RISM scheme, they may opt for project support). The rest receive project support: Burundi, Comoros Djibouti, DR Congo, Malawi, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. Budget support beneficiaries are subject to fewer requirements in terms

of linking funding to performance, but they, like the others, must submit annual performance monitoring reports (PMRs). As the Mauritius Trade Department and the Kenyan Treasury explained, Treasury does not pass on to line agencies RISM funds as such; rather, the line agencies' achievement of the targets/ indicators detailed in the PMR allows COMESA to release the following year's RISM allocation to Treasury.

Under EDF 9, €73,4m (of the €78m allocation) was approved under five 'calls' for submissions in 2009-2014. Of this, €67,9m has been disbursed (92,5%), according to COMESA's Dec. 2016 RISM Progress Report and subsequent updates to May 2017. The EDF 9 RISM timeframe has been extended to December 2017.

Under EDF 10 (2015, 2016) two calls have led to disbursements of €5,3m (36% of the €14,7m approved). A third call for €16,8m is scheduled for July 2017. The EDF 10 RISM timeframe has been extended to December 2019.

**RISM 'Calls' for Submissions, 2008 -2016; Status at May 2017**

EDF 9: RISM 2008-2012: €78m

**Calls 1 & 2:** 2009, 2010: **€35.3m** disbursed to Burundi (€12.7m) and Rwanda (€22.6m)

EDF 9: 'RISM Rider', Nov. 2012-Dec. 2014: covered what was left of the €78m, ie, €42,7m.

*Rider extended to December 2017 on case by case basis, upon approval of a justifiable request by December 2016.*

**Call 3: 2012:** €9 748 052. 100% disbursed.

RIIPs approved for Burundi, Comoros, Kenya, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe

**Call 4: 2013:** €16 374 660. €14 741 253 disbursed (90%).

RIIPs approved for DRC, Djibouti, Malawi, Swaziland. Progress monitoring reports (PMRs) for Call 3 (2012) approved for Burundi, Comoros, Kenya, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

**Call 5: 2014:** €11 981 130. €8 071 207 disbursed (67%), mostly extensions to Calls 3-4. Deadline extended to mid-2017.

RIIPs approved for newcomers: Ethiopia, Madagascar, Sudan. PMRs for Call 4 (2013) approved for Burundi, Comoros, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda and Zambia.

**Total EDF 9 disbursements: €35.3m** disbursed in Calls 1-2 and **€32,6m** disbursed in Calls 3-5 = **€67,9m** of the €73,4m approved for disbursement to MS.

**Note:** 94% of the EU RISM Consolidation allocation goes to project/budget support; 6% is for administrative and contingency purposes.

EDF 10: 'RISM Consolidation': July 2014-Dec.2016: €33,4m (additional allocation) **Timeframe extended to Dec. 2019.**

**Call 6: 2015:** €9 020 419. €4 550 411 disbursed (50%).

PMRs for Call 5 (2014) approved for Burundi, Comoros, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Uganda and Zambia.

**Call 7: mid-2016.** €13m initially allocated, but just **€5 672 820 approved for disbursement** due to low attainment of 2015 targets (42%). (Call 6 funds were only to be programmed in early 2017, per 2016 Progress Report.) To April 2017, **€747 907 disbursed (13%)**. PMRs for Call 6 (2015) were submitted by 15 countries:

Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, D.R Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

The following 10 have been approved to receive all or part of its Annual Nominal Allocations: Comoros, DRC, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda and Zambia.

**Call 8: July 2017: €16 770 764.**

Sources: RISM Action Fiche 2012, RISM Consolidation Contribution Agreement 2014, RISM Progress Report 2016, COMESA Country Briefs 2016; EUD and COMESA updates, mid-May 2017.

## 2. Significant changes

### General institutional improvements:

- “The RISM programme has been instrumental for fostering stronger linkages between regional decisions and national frameworks in COMESA,” wrote COMESA’s Secretary-General to DEVCO D in May 2014.
- Clearer, more visible focus on COMESA and EAC regional economic integration commitments (including because MS were able to use RISM funds for publicity campaigns on COMESA/EAC and regional integration benefits).
- Mind-set changes regarding results-oriented planning and performance due to focus on setting targets linked to specific commitments and to the ‘pay for performance’ approach.
- National Inter-Ministerial Coordinating Committees (organised by MoFs/MoTs) have enhanced interagency interaction, and facilitated opportunities for agencies to work together in other matters such as trade negotiations.
- EUD involvement at both regional and national level helps ensure complementarity between RISM and other regional and national programmes.
- Stronger technical ties between MS and the COMESA Secretariat.
- MS capacity to develop performance-based project proposals and plans is improving.
- Responsiveness of the COMAid RISM Unit to questions from MS has led to the Unit becoming a contact point for broader COMESA-related queries.
- Improved internal collaboration and coordination within the COMESA Secretariat. The RISM Grant Management Task Force, with relevant divisions, meets or liaises regularly to review the projects.
- Improved Secretariat and MS understanding of political and technical challenges of implementing the regional integration agenda.
- RISM Advisory Committee, a ‘subcommittee’ of the COMESA Fund Ministerial Committee, serves as a ‘peer review mechanism’ for reviewing and approving MS applications for RISM support, and for monitoring progress against commitments.
- SADC is invited to participate in RISM committees and COMESA in SADC’s Trade-Related Facility. SADC has not come to meetings but has visited COMESA to exchange experiences and project documents. Both Secretariats share experience with the overlapping MS, and encourage them to assign responsibility for RISM/TRF projects to the same national division. This has to some extent minimised duplication. The EAC Secretariat is also invited to participate in assessment and technical meetings. (Tanzania uses the SADC TRF, as it is the only EAC MS that does not belong to COMESA. RISM sought to allow Tanzania to participate, but Tanzania would have had to contribute to the COMESA Fund in order to qualify.)



#### Performance against major indicators:

- Regarding the 21 indicators, the RISM annual progress report inexplicably does not report on this, so it is difficult to assess overall gains. However, interviews revealed that most participants have national coordinating committees, 16 of 19 COMESA members have ratified the FTA, most now have NTB reporting mechanisms, the number of harmonised standards adopted is rising, trade procedures are being streamlined, the Customs Management Regulation (CMR) is almost fully adopted, Common Tariff Nomenclature (CTN) domestication is progressing, competition policy harmonisation is advancing, and the various road transport indicators are being progressively adopted. Progress on the statistics, services, investment, visas, and border procedures is slow (no progress for COMESA Common Investment Area agreement (CCIA) and visas). EDF 11 addresses all of these areas. See JC 2.1 in Annex 4 for customs union statistics.

### **3. Explanatory factors**

The indicators reflected well documented Member State commitments and aspirations. Reforms were already underway in many of the areas. The coordinating committees and higher visibility increased pressure to perform. The EUD in Lusaka has played an active role, looking at indicators, reviewing progress reports, participating in planning. The country EUDs participate in the NIMCCs, review project design for complementarity with NIPs.

### **4. Influence of EU support on the changes**

EU support, i.e. fully funding the RISM programme, has been instrumental in delivering the improvements listed above and in strengthening regional-national linkages in terms of key harmonisation and domestication issues. The EU's flexibility in extending the timeframes for use of the funding has been appreciated by the Secretariat and MS (interviews, January-February 2017). Kenya said that the EU's approval of budget support in late 2015 placed the RIIP on Kenya's budget agenda and this has helped increase accountability and awareness across government.

### **5. Alternative explanations**

RISM funding complements other EU and donor support and COMESA Member State spending. In a number of cases (especially under budget support), RISM may not have been the primary source of funds. However, MS still had to perform well against the targets and indicators in order for Treasury to receive the allocated funds.

### **6. Challenges and lessons learned**

#### Issues raised in assessment and interviews:

- Overestimation of national ability to programme and implement, and underestimation of the complex, onerous process led to several extensions. Undisbursed EDF 9 and 10 funds will be used throughout EDF 11, so further RISM funding may be unlikely, especially since EDF 11 covers many of the target areas.
- Annual nominal allocations pose a challenge as they demand a continuous cycle of programming funds.
- Verifiable, up-to-date baseline data and quantifiable monitoring indicators and evidence sources need to be quite clear, and agreed upfront with both the beneficiaries and the reviewers in order to inform expectations.

- For years, the EU has been raising the issue of the quality of MS reporting and verification tools. This problem has led to delays in disbursement.
- Diversion into clusters, incubators and other such schemes tends to fragment the use of the rather limited funds and takes the eye off compliance issues in project-support countries.
- Diversification of COMESA Adjustment Facility funding and longer-term sustainability of the facility remains a big issue. A Sustainability Strategy has been in the making for some time.

Issues raised in ROM 2015/MTR 2014:

- Tight ‘pay for progress’ timeframes and complex procedures have contributed to poor performance: the ROM and MTR suggested instituting a time-bound ‘milestone’ system in country/sector reform roadmaps and targets, and disbursing against progress in meeting the agreed milestones and timeframes. RISM Consolidation could accommodate such changes given its ‘variable geometry’ approach and the fact that the project documents already mention such an approach.
- Annual ‘calls’ have both pros and cons. The reviews suggested they might be too frequent since complex procedures and delays in disbursements leave little time after all the paperwork to implement and show results by the PMR is due at the next call. The other side of the coin is that annual calls instil discipline with the requirement to report on progress in order to receive the annual nominal allocations.

## **7. Suggestions for future consideration**

- The RISM indicators were last updated in 2013-2014, so it may be opportune to: (1) take a new look at them and the evidence used to measure performance, and (2) recalibrate each country’s baseline to reflect progress to date; this will facilitate performance targeting and measuring.
- Reporting guidelines may also benefit from a revision, to avoid vague or overstated claims, and to fortify credibility, accountability and honesty.
- Involving the private sector from the beginning (e.g. in designing national roadmaps to implement regional directives) can lead to more practical, results-oriented programmes.
- Any future RISM or RISM-like mechanism may wish to consider a more efficient disbursement process. Both MS and national EUDs say the present ‘arms-length’ EU-to-COMESA-to-MS disbursement process is inefficient. COMESA MS interviewed said they would prefer direct disbursement by EUDs.
- Interviews and document analysis revealed confusion between RISM and RISP use at national level. Any future programme may wish to clarify at all levels how ‘complementary’ programmes will be used.

*Sources:* Interviews, Action Fiche 2012/024-19, RISM Consolidation, Addendum 2015, 2016 Progress Report

## **Case Study 2: Transport Corridor Approach to Trade Facilitation in East Africa**

**Overall objective:** To strengthen trade facilitation in East Africa along key transport routes linking ports with landlocked countries.

Intra-regional trade remains relatively low in Africa at approximately 16% in 2014 (African Economic Outlook 2016). Among the challenges are limited connecting physical infrastructure (ports, road and rail) and inefficient 'soft' infrastructure, such as a lack of harmonised regulations and standards as well as out-dated customs procedures. These all contribute to high transport costs, particularly for landlocked countries.

According to the World Bank, the development of transport corridors:

- is one of the direct ways to bring about regional economic integration.
- helps prioritise the development of infrastructure.
- enables the design of appropriate interventions to facilitate trade.
- provides a framework for collaboration between countries as well as the public and private sectors.

Under the RIP for EASAIIO (2014-2020), the transport sector support of the EU aims to contribute to strategic and sustainable corridor development (p.72).

### **1. The significant change**

The East African Community (EAC) member states have embraced the transport corridor approach as a way to pursue infrastructure priorities and trade facilitation in the region. There are two main corridors: Northern Corridor from the port of Mombasa in Kenya to the Eastern DRC (including Uganda, South Sudan, Rwanda and Burundi) and the Central Corridor from the port of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania to the Eastern DRC (via Rwanda and Burundi). Both of these corridors have established agencies that are tasked with promoting the use of the corridors and the coordination of infrastructure along the routes. The corridors are governed by Transport Ministers from the member states. There is no formal institutional link between the EAC, COMESA and the corridor authorities even though there is regular interaction and cooperation.

In part as a result of the corridor approach in East Africa, supported by the EU, there have been the following changes. These are due to a range of factors including more deliberate interventions to improve both hard and soft infrastructure along transport corridors.

- Gaps in the quality of road infrastructure along the corridors have become easier to identify. Resources have been prioritised for those sections of the corridor that require upgrading in order to improve the overall efficiency of the corridor e.g. the Kampala - Mbarara bypass road in Uganda and the Kigali-Gatuna road supported by the EU.
- Improved trade facilitation indicators for Kenya, Rwanda and Burundi between 2012 and 2015 according to the OECD (see Figure 1 above) in areas such as coordinated border management.

- Consistent improvement in the Logistics Performance Index by Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda between 2007 and 2016 (see Figures 2-4 above) including in relation to infrastructure and timeliness.
- According to the World Bank Doing Business Index between 2006 and 2012 the EAC reduced the time to export by about a third and the time to import by nearly a half.
- TMEA reports that there have been 10 non-tariff barriers resolved, 83 product standards harmonised and a reduction of 40 customs declarations in the EAC ([www.trademarkea.com](http://www.trademarkea.com) - accessed April 2017).

## 2. Explanatory factors for the change

The corridors have received high level political support and buy-in from the member states, which has helped to sustain and energise the regional efforts. This is evidenced in the prioritisation of infrastructure projects along the corridors in national development plans, starting at the ports of Mombasa and Dar es Salaam.

The concept of the Northern Corridor has been expanded beyond transport and trade issues by Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda (and to a certain extent South Sudan) through the Northern Corridor Integration Projects initiative of Heads of State. There are 16 projects in a wide range of areas that have been identified for fast tracking under this initiative. The success that has been achieved to date (e.g. in movement of people, reduction of telecommunications costs) is attributed in part to the direct involvement of Heads of State.

Influence of EU support – EU has consistently supported infrastructure (both hard and soft) in East Africa under the regional programmes. While there was not a deliberate focus along specific corridors, there were a number of infrastructure projects under EDF 10 that incorporated support for both the Northern and Central Corridors, including through the EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund (e.g. Eastern Africa Transport Corridor project in 2011) and the soft infrastructure interventions with the EAC and COMESA. These included funding for road rehabilitation as well as electricity interconnector projects (energy is a priority area for the Northern Corridor Integration Project). The planning for EDF 11 cross-region projects in the areas of rail and transport and transit has taken a more explicit corridor approach. This has the potential to address the importance of alignment between physical and soft infrastructure interventions along transport corridors.

## 3. Alternative explanations

The transport corridor approach has been driven by international development partners, such as the World Bank and Trade Mark East Africa (TMEA), in the region. There are synergies between the activities of these other partners and the EU regional programme. For example, the EU is one of the few partners that provides support for both physical infrastructure and soft infrastructure (such as the harmonisation of regulations along a corridor). It has resources available at the national and regional level; for the work of the EAC and COMESA Secretariats; and in support of relevant non-state actors such as the private sector. This broad based, integrated programming fits well with the corridor approach as it does not just focus on one aspect of trade facilitation but supports a range of interventions that are needed to ensure the more efficient use of the transport corridor.


TMEA has tended to focus on one stop border posts and port projects that are complementary to the EU regional programme.

#### 4. Lessons learned


The use of a transport corridor (such as the Northern Corridor) to focus activities and regional interventions is well conceived. It provides a measurable geographical construct that tends to be based upon existing economic linkages, including intra-regional trade routes and linkages to global value chains through ports. Funding to transport corridor authorities can be mutually supportive of broader programmes with DMROs. The additional technical capacity in such organisations can contribute to stronger implementation of regional objectives given the limited human and financial resources of the DMROs themselves. The Northern Corridor Integration Projects illustrates the value of high-level political support for regional economic integration.

**Figure 4 – Location Map of the Northern Corridor**

Figure 1: Location Map of the Northern Corridor



Legend:

- |   |              |   |                   |
|---|--------------|---|-------------------|
|  | Road Network |  | Railways Networks |
|  | Pipelines    |  | Inland Waterways  |

<http://www.ttcanc.org/images/map.jpg>

## Case Study 3: The EU's Regional Electoral Cooperation

### 1. Overall objective

The EU has been and is one of the leading global actors in supporting fair and credible elections worldwide through (i) electoral assistance and (ii) electoral observation. At the regional level, this includes support to DMROs to promote DMRO-wide electoral standards, and any country-level electoral support, when they involve cross-border cooperation. (Table 1 provides a list of main projects in regional electoral cooperation, which are on top of support to the AU and the African Governance Architecture, electoral expert missions and observation missions funded by the EIDHR and listed in the EQ6 Data Annex).

The theory of change underpinning *regional* electoral support, specifically, is that countries from same DMRO act as peers and therefore have more influence than far-away countries and institutions with very different histories, traditions, interests and values. In other words, supporting DMROs in electoral matters has value-added compared to country-level, global-level, and AU-level electoral support.

### 2. Significant change observed

#### At the results level:

1. EU support, whether to electoral assistance and electoral observation is country-specific but often take place in and refer to DMRO-wide processes and standards. For example EU electoral support in Zambia contributed to a national electoral process that was transparent and well organized.
2. The €9.4m Support to SADC Regional Political cooperation developed the capacities of the EAC Secretariat and established the EAC Forum of Electoral Commissions.
3. The €3.8m Regional Political Integration and Human Security Support Programme (RPIHSSP) paved the way for the development of regional policies and initiation of strategies leading to the adoption of the EAC Principles of Election Observation and Evaluation; the validation of policy documents and discussion of regional standards, in particular the Draft Protocol on Good Governance (RPIHSSP ROM report, 2012).
4. RISP led to “recommendations on the EAC political integration; recommendations for the EAC Election Observer Missions; recommendations for good governance; and an EAC mechanism for assessing corruption proposed so as to enhance ethic and integrity” (RISP 2 report, 2016).

At the outcome and impact levels: Fair and credible elections can be attributed to a large number of factors, not least the legislation in place, the capacity of electoral management bodies and the behaviour of the candidates and their parties, and it would be impossible to isolate the specific contribution of the EU vis-à-vis other development partners and most importantly the domestic factors at play in each country of EASAI0. Moreover, attributing impact in areas (such as free and fair elections) where the underlying processes are complex and non-linear, and there is no counterfactual, is fraught with risk.

It can, however, be said that there is plausible EU contribution to fairer and more credible elections in EASAI0:

- Taking EASAI0 DMRO by DMRO, they all have improved electoral management bodies, protected from political interference, and able to make public reports available before and after a national election. A closer look reveals a lack of progress in the independence in IGAD's

EMBs, but all subindicators for all DMROs are otherwise travelling in the right direction (Global Integrity, 2008-2016).

- Voter turnout has increased in most countries of the region.
- As for whether the elections themselves were credible, there was improvement in all regions except EAC (negative) and IGAD (negligible) (see Table 2 above, “Free and fair elections” column).

Stakeholders interviewed (DMROs, DMRO Member States, CSOs) found that EU electoral support has clearly contributed to this overall progress—crediting not only electoral support programmes but also other instruments, support to civil society, and political dialogue. In Zimbabwe, there was “*clear recognition from some sections of civil society of the positive role that EU assistance has played in voter education and in supporting local observer groups during elections*” (Chiroro, 2010).

## **Case study 4: Joint Regional Fisheries Monitoring, Control and Surveillance**

### **1. Overall objective**

To improve the enforcement of fisheries rules and regulations in the South West Indian Ocean (SWIO). SWIO has economically important tuna resources, but tuna stocks are threatened by over-exploitation and SWIO countries are missing out on revenues due to illegal fishing. Moreover, by-catches are a threat to sharks, turtles and cetaceans due to unsustainable practices. The large pelagic species migrate across borders and the commercial ocean fishing is dominated by international vessels, and effective protection and enforcement thus requires coordinated action at the regional level.

### **2. The significant change**

SWIO countries (Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Kenya, Mozambique, and Zanzibar/Tanzania) have engaged in joint monitoring, control, and surveillance (MCS) of their exclusive economic zones. Surveillance has consistently improved, but should be more aligned with national MCS mechanisms, and enforcement and sanctioning can still be improved.

Joint ocean patrolling (boat and air) and inspection of fishing vessels. The regionalisation of assets enabled deployment to zones previously impossible to patrol. Two vessels (from Thailand and Sri Lanka) were seized for illegal fisheries and the owners were fined; another vessel was fined for not being compliant with the IOTC (Indian Ocean Tuna Commission) resolution. Many missions did not yield specific results, but may have had a deterring effect. A regional observer pool has been established. However, the joint patrolling is not financially sustainable and dependent on donor support. The intensity of regional patrolling has gone down from EDF9 to EDF10, but joint sea and air missions are also planned for 2017-2018 with assets provided by the participating countries. An evaluation of the surveillance programme found that the annual days of surveillance that emphasis should rather be on improving the intelligence and control, which would also help targeting the patrolling better. Nonetheless, tuna is a resource fished by international fleets (incl. EU vessels), and the IOC MS are only getting 10% of the catch value of tuna, the main commercial fishery, and Comoros is not benefitting at all. Hence, there is a need to ensure that MCS costs are recovered from the countries and companies benefitting from the tuna fisheries (e.g. through licensing fees).

Themis, a regional vessel monitoring system has been put in place allowing the countries to monitor vessels in all IOC waters and the countries exchange data on industrial tuna fishing vessels; the

Terra Exchange Protocol for regional vessel monitoring was signed by the five IOC countries, but is yet to be signed by the participating mainland African countries. Monitoring of landings and transshipment still to be improved.

Moreover, the countries have improved their IOTC (Indian Ocean Tuna Commission) submission, reporting and resolution compliance scores, which is evidence of improved management of tuna and tuna-like species.

### **3. Explanatory factors for the change**

It was recognised by the SWIO countries that they as small island states (some of which are SIDS) and LDCs had insufficient capacity to sufficiently patrol their vast marine exclusive economic zones individually to prevent illegal fishing practices and that pooling of resources would be an effective means of enhancing the surveillance capacity, e.g. not all countries have the capacity to engage in aerial patrolling. The rental of assets also provided an economic incentive for the countries to engage in joint patrolling, e.g. Malagasy vessels were rented for most joint missions as they were cheaper to use than vessels from other countries; this also allowed the Government of Madagascar to recover some of the costs of keeping a fleet. Similarly, the access to subsidies from the EU provided an important incentive to engage in joint patrolling. The shared commitments made under the IOTC resolution and the facilitation by IOC and IOTC also stimulated the commitment to collective action.

### **4. Influence of EU support**

EU has consistently supported the development of the joint regional MCS. The process was initiated by the PRSP (Programme Régional de Surveillance des Pêches – EDF9) and support was continued under SmartFish (EUR 2 million). Moreover, DG Mare co-funded the regional action plan for surveillance and control. SmartFish provided support for different key elements, for example: SmartFish II established agreements in 2013 for joint patrolling with Comoros, Seychelles, Madagascar, Mauritius, Kenya and Zanzibar. Direct grants were provided from EU to the competent national authorities. However, the level of funding from SmartFish was significantly lower than the funding from PRSP and the demand for SWIO country co-funding increased, which led to the decreased intensity in patrolling.

The Themis vessels monitoring system and the StarFISH information exchange database were established with support from SmartFish and PRSP.

Staff from national authorities were trained as regional observers, who can work outside the national exclusive economic zone. SmartFish supported IOTC in engaging regional observers and assigning trainers to Member States to help them complete the information to be submitted to IOTC.

### **5. Alternative explanations**

EU support played a catalytic and instrumental role in the establishment of joint patrolling and monitoring, and this process would not have taken off without EU support. Other international institutions, e.g. the World Bank and WWF, are also providing considerable support to IOTC, SWIOFC (the South West Indian Ocean Fisheries Commission) and its member states in improving the management of fish and marine resources in SWIO, including tuna fisheries. However, only EU has engaged in supporting joint regional patrolling. Nonetheless, there are synergies between SmartFish and WWF's regional tuna programme (with co-funding from e.g. France, Sweden and UK), e.g. WWF's emerging work on establishing a regional SWIOFC MCS centre. Similarly, synergies are achieved with the World Bank's SWIOFish programme which since



2015 has supported the establishing of regional minimum terms and conditions for access to tuna fishery.

## **6. Lesson learned**

It is a challenge to ensure that regional enforcement mechanisms put in place become sustainable, unless it is ensured that an effect system for revenue collection is established.



<http://commissionoceanindien.org/activites/smartfish/presse-press/surveillance-regionale-des-peches/>