



Evaluation of the European Union's Regional Development Cooperation with Latin America (2009-2017)

Final report

Volume 3

May 2019

Evaluation carried out on behalf of the European Commission



ECORYS



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The opinions expressed in this document represent the authors' points of view
which are not necessarily shared by the European Commission or by the authorities
of the countries involved.

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Annex 2: List of persons interviewed

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<i>Last Name</i>	<i>First name(s)</i>	<i>Organisation</i>	<i>Unit / Position</i>
European Commission			
Bello	Tanith	DG DEVCO	C6 - Sust. Energy & Climate Change
Butkeviciene	Jolita	DG DEVCO	G Latin America and Caribbean (Director)
Castro Benito	Bruno	DG EAC	C3 International Cooperation (Latin America)
Dal Borgo	Antonio	DG DEVCO	G2 - Regional operations LAC
Doelle	Patrick	(previously) DG DEVCO	(previously) G2 - Regional operations LAC
Ghyoot	Catherine	DG DEVCO	G2 - Regional operations LAC
Gosparini	Paola	DG DEVCO	G2 - Regional operations LAC
Herrero Romeu	Anna	DG DEVCO	G2 - Regional operations LAC
Litvine	Marc	DG DEVCO	G2 - Regional operations LAC Head of Sector
Lueticken	Florian	DG DEVCO	A1 Head of Sector (previously G2)
Martinez	Sofia	DG DEVCO	C6 - Sust. Energy & Climate Change
Marx	Veronique	DG DEVCO	G2 - Regional operations LAC
Pilger	Horst	DG DEVCO	G2 - Regional operations LAC Head of Sector External relations
Poussieltgue	Jerome	DG DEVCO	G2 - Regional operations LAC
Rogès	Laure	DG DEVCO	G2 - Regional operations LAC
Salinas	Claudio	DG DEVCO	G2 - Regional operations LAC Head of Sector – relations with graduated countries and blending
Samaniego Moffre	Luis	DG RTD	C2 - International Cooperation North America, LAC
Thieulin	Denis	DG DEVCO	G2 - Regional operations LAC Deputy Head of Unit
Ulvila	Ismo	DG CLIMA	Desk Officer for climate finance and LAC region
Velasco	Paz	(previously) DG DEVCO	(previously) G2 - Regional operations LAC
EU others			
Aguero	Susana	EUD Chile	Project Manager
Deprez	Nona	FPI	FPI 4 Partnership Instrument
Fanti	Manfredo	EEAS	AMERICAS 4 Regional
Sillano	Laurent	EUD Nicaragua	Head of Cooperation
Tamm	Jacob	EEAS	AMERICAS 4 Regional
Zufiaur	José María	ESEC, European Economic and Social Council	Rapporteur
Other			
Abramo	Lais	ECLAC (CEPAL)	Social Division Director
Álvarez Carrascal	Jorge Luis	Universidad Cartagena de Indias, Colombia	Euro LA partnership in natural Risk mitigation and protection of the Cultural Heritage (ELARCH)

<i>Last Name</i>	<i>First name(s)</i>	<i>Organisation</i>	<i>Unit / Position</i>
Amado	Héctor	Universidad Galileo, Guatemala	Educación Superior Virtual Inclusiva – América Latina (ESVI-AL)
Bayés Puig	Sara	FIIAPP	Public Administration and Social Affairs/Department of Public Technical Assistance
Benegas	Laura	CATIE	Project Coordinator (WATERCLIMA)
Bernard	Alain	OIEAU	Project Coordinator Eco Cuencas
Borland	Rose	IOM	TL EU-CELAC migration project
Boyer	Rémi	OIEAU	Technical Advisor Eco Cuencas
Campoverde	Oswaldo	WATERCLIMA LAC	(previously) coordinator and technical adviser of Aguas Sin Fronteras
Canessa	Roberto	EUROCLIMA Secretariat	Team Leader (EUROCLIMA+)
Chiodi	Francesco	IILA	Social Protection EUROsociAL
Dascal	Guillermo	EUROCLIMA Secretariat	Expert in Climate Change and Environment
González	Sonia	FIIAPP	EUROsociAL
Grau	Ulrike	Universidad Autónoma de Chapingo, Mexico	EULALinks
Grosjean	Olivier	IOM	Project Advisor EU-CELAC Migration
Karremans	Jan	EUROCLIMA Secretariat	Team Leader (EUROCLIMA I and II)
Keating	Tamara	IOM	(previously) Project Manager EU-CELAC Migration
Lombardo	Miguel Angel	FIIAPP	South South Facility Administrator
Martelli	Peggy	FIIAPP	EUROsociAL
Merlot	Léon	AGRECO	
Ruiz Fernandez	Ana Rosa	Instituto Tecnológico de Costa Rica	EQUALITY – Fortalecimiento del liderazgo femenino en las IES latinoamericanas y la sociedad
Salvador Llivina	Teresa	FIIAPP	COPOLAD Director
Santomé	Juan Manuel	FIIAPP	Director EUROsociAL
Schnettler	Berta	Universidad de la Frontera, Chile	MUNDUS LINDO
Schoenecker	Philipp	GIZ	Advisor EUROCLIMA+
Simon	Samuel	IOM	Programme Analyst
Soletto	Ignacio	FIIAPP	EUROsociAL
Suarez	Federico	FIIAPP	EU-CELAC Project on Migration

Annex 3: List of documents consulted

1 Strategic documents

- Bologna Declaration of 19 June 1999: Joint declaration of the European Ministers of Education
- Brazil Declaration, +30 Cartagena, A Framework for Cooperation and Regional Solidarity to Strengthen the International Protection of Refugees, Displaced and Stateless Persons in Latin America and the Caribbean
- CELAC (2013): Declaración Final I Cumbre de la Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños
- CELAC (2014): Declaración Final II Cumbre de la Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños
- CELAC (2015): Declaración Final III Cumbre de la Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños
- CELAC (2016): Declaración Final IV Cumbre de la Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños
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- CELAC-EU Academic and Knowledge Summit (2017): San Salvador Declaration
- Council of the European Union (2010): EU-LAC Summit, Madrid Action Plan 2010-2012, "Towards a new stage in the bi-regional partnership: innovation and technology for sustainable development and social inclusion"
- Council of the European Union (2013): EU-CELAC Action Plan 2013-2015
- Council of the European Union (2015): Action Plan EU-CELAC Summit 2015, 10-11 June
- Council of the European Union (2016): Council conclusions on European climate diplomacy after COP21
- Council, Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, the Commission and European Parliament (2016): Joint Statement: The New European Consensus on Development "Our World, Our Dignity, Our Future"
- EU (2006): The European Union, Latin America and the Caribbean: a strategic partnership
- EU (2007): Latin America Regional Programming Document 2007-2013
- EU (2009): COM (2009) 495 'The European Union and Latin America: Global Players in Partnership'
- EU (2010): Annex 4 to the AAP 2010, Thematic Programme for "Cooperation with Third Countries in the areas of Migration and Asylum"
- EU (2010): Partners in development: European Union - Latin America Development Cooperation Guide
- EU (2011): Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change
- EU (2012). EU Drugs Strategy (2013-20). Official Journal of the European Union.
- EU (2014): Multiannual Indicative Regional Programme for Latin America 2014-2020
- EU (2014): Official Journal of the European Union, Volume 57, 15 March 2014, Regulation (EU) No 233/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation for the period 2014-2020.
- EU (2014): Partnership Instrument, First Multi-annual Indicative Programme for the period 2014-2017.
- EU (2014): Programming Thematic Programmes and Instruments, Programme on Global Public Goods and Challenges 2014-2020
- EU (2015): Annex 1 of the Commission Implementing Decision on the Regional Facility for International Cooperation and Partnership, Action Document for the Regional Facility for International Cooperation and Partnership
- EU (2015): Commission Implementing Decision on the Regional Facility for International Cooperation and Partnership, Action Document for the Regional Facility for International Cooperation and Partnership
- EU (2015): EU-CELAC Political Declaration 'A partnership for the next generation'

- EU (2015): EU-CELAC Summit 2015, Brussels Declaration 'Shaping our common future: working together for prosperous, cohesive and sustainable societies for our citizens'
- EU (2015): Higher education cooperation between the European Union, Latin America and the Caribbean. Academic cooperation and mobility: bringing the two regions closer
- EU (2016): EU Higher Education Policy Dialogues First meeting EHEA Advisory Group, Paris
- EU (2017): EU-CELAC Joint Initiative on Research and Innovation (JIRI) Sixth Senior Official Meeting on Science and Technology 14 March 2017, Brussels, Belgium. Joint Communiqué
- European Parliament (2006): Decision No 1982/2006/EC of the Council of 18 December 2006 concerning the Seventh Framework Programme of the European Community for Research, Technological Development and Demonstration Activities (2007-2013).
- European Parliament (2012): A new European Union Development Cooperation Policy with Latin America
- European Parliament (2017): Report on EU political relations with Latin America (2017/2027(INI)) Committee on Foreign Affairs, 20.7.2017.
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- Latin America and Caribbean-European Union Summit (2008): Lima Declaration, Addressing our people's priorities together.

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- EU (2012): Thematic Study on the common problems and challenges in the integrated management of water resources and coasts in the context of climate change in Latin America
- EU (2015) Final Evaluation of "Strengthening the dialogue and cooperation between the European Union and Latin America and the Caribbean to establish management models on migration and development policies". Final Report
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- EU (2017): Evaluation of the EU Development Cooperation Support to Higher Education in Partner Countries (2007-2014), Final Report.
- EU (2017): External Evaluation of the Development Cooperation Instrument (2014 – mid 2017). Vol I - Final Report
- EU (2017): External Evaluation of the Partnership Instrument (2014 – mid 2017) Final Report.

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3.1 Security-development nexus

3.1.1 COPOLAD

- COPOLAD Consortium, ECB (2016): COPOLAD II Executive Summary
- EU (2014): Action Document for COPOLAD II (2016-2020)
- EU (2015): COPOLAD I (2010-2014) Final Evaluation

EU (2018): COPOLAD II ROM report

3.1.2 EL PAcCTO

EU (2016): Action Document for Continental programme on Rule of Law and Security-Development nexus

FIIAPP: Project Fiche EL PAcCTO, Assistance Programme against Transnational Organised Crime. Retrieved from http://www.fiiapp.org/en/proyectos_fiiapp/el-paccto/#ancla-contenido-proyectos

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EU (2008): Basis for structuring the EU-LAC Dialogue on Migration

EU (2012): EU-CELAC Migration Project Interim Report

EU (2015): Final Evaluation of "Strengthening the dialogue and cooperation between the European Union and Latin America and the Caribbean to establish management models on migration and development policies". Final Report

IOM: European Union – Latin America and the Caribbean Structured and Comprehensive Bi-regional Dialogue on Migration. Retrieved from <https://www.iom.int/european-union-latin-america-and-caribbean-structured-and-comprehensive-bi-regional-dialogue>

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UNODC (2012): Plataforma Web para el Intercambio de Información PRELAC

UNODC (2012): Independent project evaluation of the Prevention of the diversion of drugs precursors in the Latin American and the Caribbean Region, PRELAC

3.2 Environment and climate change

3.2.1 EUROCLIMA

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EU (2009): EUROCLIMA I initiative Action Fiche

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EU (2012): EUROCLIMA II initiative Action Fiche

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EU (2015): Commission Implementing Decision of 08.12.2015 on the Annual Action Programme 2015 – part III – and Annual Action Programme 2016 – part II – in favour of the Latin American region (EUROCLIMA+)

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EU (2016): Commission Implementing Decision of 13.12.2016 (EUROCLIMA+)

EU (2017): EUROCLIMA II Final Report 24/03/2014-30/06/2017 (draft)

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Thematic Study Book n° 5: Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions in urban areas: successful tools and experiences - Methodological Guide

Thematic Study Book n° 6: *Experiencias Latinoamericanas y Europeas en adaptación y mitigación con beneficios adicionales*

Thematic Study Book n° 10: Climate finance and NDCs in Latin America: A guide to facilitating access to international sources.

3.2.2 EUROSOLAR

EUROSOLAR Factsheet

EU (2014): Ex-post Evaluation of the EUROSOLAR programme

3.2.3 LAIF

EU (2014): Action Fiche for the LAIF blending facility

EU (2015): Operational report on LAIF 2013-2014

EU (2018): LAIF – Intermediate findings and recommendations

EU (2018): LAIF – State of play at the end of 2017

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EU webpage: Latin America - RALCEA - Network of knowledge centres in the water sector, retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/latin-america/ralcea_en

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EU (2009): RALCEA Action Fiche

EU (2010): Administrative arrangement RALCEA project

EU (2014): RALCEA logical framework

EU (2014): RALCEA Final presentation

EU (2012-2014): RALCEA ROM reports

EU (2015): RALCEA, Latin American Network of Knowledge Centres in the Water Sector, Final Report

3.2.5 WATERCLIMA-LAC

EU (2012): QSG checklist for WATERCLIMA-LAC

EU (2012): WATERCLIMA-LAC Action Fiche

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WATERCLIMA-LAC (2015): Presentation of the Agua Sin Fronteras project

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3.3.1 EUROsociAL

EC (2009): EUROsociAL II Action Fiche

EU (2011): EUROsociAL I Final Evaluation

EU (2014): EUROsociAL II Mid-Term Evaluation

EU (2015): Action Document for EUROsociAL+

EU (2016): EUROsociAL II Final Evaluation

FIIAPP (2016): Brochure EUROsociAL, Supporting policies, connecting institutions, working for social cohesion. Euro/Latin-American Dialogue on Public Policies.

Lázaro, B. (2015): *Estudio comparado sobre institucionalización de la evaluación en Europa y en América Latina*. Comparative study on the institutionalization of evaluation in Europe and Latin America. Estudio nº15. EUROsociAL

López, S. & Paéz M. (2016): *Qué hemos aprendido de los intercambios Sur-Sur en América Latina en el marco de EUROsociAL*. What have we learned from the South-South exchanges in Latin America within the framework of EUROsociAL. Estudios nº 21.

Sanahuja, J. A., EU-CELAC relations and the social cohesion: Balance and Future Perspectives. EUROsociAL.

3.3.2 URBAL

EU (2011): URBAL III Mid-Term Evaluation

EU (2014): URBAL III Final Evaluation

3.4 Inclusive growth

3.4.1 AL INVEST

EU (2012): Midterm evaluation of AL INVEST IV

CAINCO (2013): AL INVEST IV informe descriptivo final

EU (2014): AL Invest IV Final Evaluation

CAINCO (2017): AL-INVEST 5.0 Annual report for 2016

ECLAC (2017): AL-INVEST 5.0 Annual report for 2016

ECLAC (2018): AL-INVEST 5.0 Annual report for 2017

EU (2018): AL-INVEST 5.0 State of affairs as of April 2018

EU (2018): ROM report on AL-INVEST 5.0

3.4.2 ELAN

EU (2013): ELAN Action Document

EU (2018): ROM report on ELAN

TECNALIA (2018): 3rd ELAN Network interim narrative report

EU (2018): ELAN network State of affairs as of April 2018

3.4.3 @lis

EU (2011): Mid-term Evaluation of the "Alliance for the Information Society 2" - @LIS 2 programme

EU (2008): @lis PROGRAMME – Evaluación Final

3.4.4 Interconnectivity

EI (2016): Action Document for the Interconnectivity in Latin America

3.5 Higher education

3.5.1 ALFA

Action Fiche ALFA III: Regional Programme for HE in Latin America; Guidelines for grant applicants, p. 5

EC (2010): ALFA III Mid-Term Evaluation

3.5.2 ERASMUS

Erasmus Mundus Association (2017): Erasmus Mundus Graduate Impact Survey 2017

EU (2009): Erasmus Mundus 2009-2013 Programme Guide

EU (2012): Interim Evaluation of Erasmus Mundus II (2009-2013)

EU (2014): Erasmus Mundus Action 2 Scholarship Holders' Impact Survey. Results

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EU (2018): EU-CELAC Academic Cooperation through Erasmus+: opportunities for Latin America and the Caribbean (Factsheet)

4 Papers/Reports

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AMERIPOL (2013): Situational Analysis of Drug Trafficking A Police Point of View.

ILO (2016): Labour migration in Latin America and the Caribbean – Diagnosis, Strategy, and ILO's Work in the Region

IOM (2012): Migratory routes and Dynamics between Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries and between LAC and the European Union

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UNODC (2017): World Drugs Report 2017

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WB, Chioda L. (2016): Stop the Violence in Latin America: A Look at Prevention from Cradle to Adulthood

4.2 Environment and climate change

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EU (2014): Experiences of the European Union Regional Development Cooperation with Latin America on climate change, renewable energies and water

FAO (2010): Global Forest Resources Assessment

Norton Rose Fulbright (2017): Renewable Energy in Latin America

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OECD (2018): Biodiversity, Land Use and Ecosystems – What's happening 2017-2018 and beyond

UNEP (2010): State of Biodiversity in Latin America and the Caribbean

UNFCCC (2015): The UNFCCC NAMA Registry, Facilitating design and implementation of mitigation actions in developing countries

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4.3 Social equity

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Jacob, S., Speer, S. & Furubo, J-E, (2015): The institutionalization of evaluation matters: Updating the International Atlas of Evaluation 10 years later". Evaluation 2015, Vol. 21(1) pp 6–31.

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WB and IDB (2006): *Hacia la institucionalización de los sistemas de monitoreo y evaluación en América Latina y el Caribe*. Towards the institutionalization of monitoring and evaluation systems in Latin America and the Caribbean.

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IMF (2017): Trade development in LA&C (cr1766)

OECD (2016) Policy note on LA - Reviving investment

Sequa (2013): Briefing paper on the Nucleus Approach.

WB (2018): Global Economic Prospects - LA&C analysis

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4.5 Higher education

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4.6 Other

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5.1 Security-development nexus

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Migration Policy Institute (2016): Protecting the Forcibly Displaced: Latin America's Evolving Refugee and Asylum Framework, retrieved from <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/protecting-forcibly-displaced-latin-america%e2%80%99s-evolving-refugee-and-asylum-framework>

Migration Policy Institute (2018): Amid Record Numbers of Arrivals, Chile Turns Rightward on Immigration, retrieved from <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/amid-record-numbers-arrivals-chile-turns-rightward-immigration>

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5.2 Environment and climate change

Conferencia de Directores Iberoamericanos del agua (CODIA): website <http://codia.info/quienes-somos>

EU webpage: 14 new projects approved under the FPI - information on funding of energy efficiency and RE in Argentina (27/05/2016), retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/fpi/announcements/news/20160527_1_en.htm

EU JRC website: AQUAKNOW website, various consultations, <https://aquaknow.jrc.ec.europa.eu/>

EEAS: (26/10/2016) EU-CELAC relations retrieved from https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/13042/EU-CELAC%20relations

UNEP: European Commission and UNEP strengthen regional cooperation on climate change in LAC, retrieved from <https://www.unenvironment.org/news-and-stories/press-release/european-commission-and-unep-strengthen-regional-cooperation-climate>

WATERCLIMA websites for: Agua Sin Fronteras & Eco Cuencas project on the Fondo Regional del Agua, <http://www.foragua.org/>, <http://para-agua.net/component/k2/item/674-fondo-regional-del-agua-forasan-chira-piura>

EUROCLIMA+ webpage: various consultations on focal points, calls for proposals, fact sheets on components

5.3 Social equity

ADELANTE homepage: <http://www.adelante-i.eu/>

ECLAC webpage: Gender Equality Observatory for Latin America and the Caribbean, retrieved from <https://oig.cepal.org/en>

EUROsociAL information system: sia.EUROsociAL-ii.eu

5.4 Inclusive growth

AL-INVEST 5.0 webpage: <https://www.alinvest5.org/>

CEPAL Euromipyme project website: <https://www.cepal.org/es/proyectos/euromipyme>

SEQUA website: <https://www.sequa.de/>

5.5 Other

ECLAC webpage: Gender Equality Observatory for Latin America and the Caribbean, retrieved from <https://oig.cepal.org/en>

EU: New contracts signed on South-South cooperation with Chile, Argentina and Uruguay, under a programme totalling €13M. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/new-contracts-signed-south-south-cooperation-chile-argentina-and-uruguay-under_en

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EU: Trade negotiations and agreements, <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/negotiations-and-agreements/>

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Annex 4: Evaluation matrix

The table below section shows how the evaluation questions are linked to the evaluation criteria and is followed by the detailed final evaluation matrix.

Table 1 Overview of evaluation questions and criteria

Cluster	Evaluation question	Main evaluation criteria covered
Design and implementation	EQ1 on strategic directions : To what extent has the EU development cooperation responded in a flexible way to the regional policy priorities and to the partner countries' needs while being in line with the overall EU external action policy framework?	Relevance, Efficiency, Added Value, Coherence, Coordination and Complementarity
	EQ2 on implementation approaches : To what extent were the implementation approaches adopted appropriate to pursue the development cooperation's objectives while creating synergies with other EU support and with the actions of EU Member States and other donors?	
Results of the EU support	EQ3 on the security-development nexus : To what extent has EU support contributed to the strengthening of the region's responses to peace and security challenges?	Effectiveness, Impact and Sustainability
	EQ4 on environment and climate change : To what extent has EU support contributed to the strengthening of the joint regional and global responses to climate change and environmental challenges?	
	EQ5 on social equity : To what extent has EU support contributed to the strengthening of social equity?	
	EQ6 on inclusive growth : To what extent has EU support contributed to the strengthening of regional competitiveness?	
	EQ7 on higher education : To what extent has EU support contributed to the strengthening of the EU-LA bi-regional higher education area?	

1 EQ 1 - Strategic directions

EQ 1	To what extent has the EU development cooperation responded in a flexible way to the regional policy priorities and to the partner countries' needs while being in line with the overall EU external action policy framework?
JC11	EU support responded to the needs and challenges of the region, and was coherent with the policy framework of LA partner governments and organisations
I-111	Existence of an analysis of needs and challenges in the EU programming documents
I-112	Degree to which EU programming documents have taken cross-cutting issues into account (especially gender and vulnerability)
I-113	Degree to which LA partners (including government and civil society) have been <u>involved</u> in the design of the development cooperation strategy
I-114	Correspondence of the EU support's objectives with the <u>strategic objectives</u> of LA partners, especially at regional level
I-115	Degree to which the EU has effectively adapted cooperation in the <u>context of crisis</u> (including political crisis such as in the case of Venezuela and Brazil)
I-116	Degree to which EU regional programmes have supported or responded to the <u>graduation</u> process
JC12	EU support and EU-LA high-level dialogue , especially in the context of the EU-CELAC strategic partnership, reinforced each other

I-121	Degree to which regional programme support has created a conducive environment for an <u>informed high-level dialogue</u>
I-122	Degree to which high-level dialogue has created <u>ownership</u> and commitment to the regional programme interventions
I-123	Degree to which high-level dialogue has contributed to ensuring a relevant <u>focus and orientation of regional interventions</u>
JC13	EU support was coherent with the broader EU external action policy framework
I-131	Perceived importance (by EU and LA actors) of regional level <u>development cooperation</u> in overall EU-LA relations (including evolution since 2009)
I-132	Degree of integration of the <u>principles</u> set out in the overall EU development cooperation policy framework (as spelled out, among other policy documents, in the Agenda for Change and the European Consensus) in the EU regional cooperation strategy
I-133	Degree of coherence of EU support with the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development (SDGs)

2 EQ 2 - Implementation approaches

EQ 2	<i>To what extent were the implementation approaches adopted appropriate to pursue the development cooperation's objectives while creating synergies with other EU support and with the actions of EU Member States and other donors?</i>
JC21	EU support has been designed to maximise the value-added stemming from a regional, transboundary or cross-border approach
I-211	Regional-level interventions addressed <u>transboundary</u> issues
I-212	Regional-level interventions and approaches adopted focus on <u>creating opportunities for cross-country coordination, sharing and learning</u> (including through triangular cooperation)
JC22	EU regional-level support complemented and reinforced bilateral and regional/sub-regional EU-LA cooperation
I-221	Degree of synergies with the <u>bilateral (country level)</u> component of EU-LA cooperation, including evidence that regional interventions provided knowledge, innovative approaches and frameworks, which were taken advantage of by country actions
I-222	Degree of complementarity and coherence of regional-level support with in individual sectors, i.e. security, social equity, environment, growth, higher education/science & technology
JC23	EU support through the DCI budget lines complemented and reinforced other EU financing instruments (including IfS/lcSP, thematic budget lines and the Partnership instrument)
I-231	Degree of synergies with the regional or sub-regional support provided through <u>other EU financing instruments/budget lines</u>
I-232	Degree of synergies with the regional or sub-regional support provided through <u>the Partnership Instrument</u>
I-233	Degree of complementarity achieved between financing instruments to ensure continuity in the cooperation with LA <u>countries exiting from ODA</u> (i.e. "graduated" countries)
JC24	EU support and the actions of EU MS and other donors complemented and reinforced each other
I-241	Degree of <u>coordination and synergies</u> between EU support and the actions of EU MS's and other donors
I-242	Degree of added value of the EU (subsidiarity principle)
JC25	Approaches (including modes of delivery and implementing partners) used were appropriate to implement the regional cooperation strategy in a timely and cost-effective manner while enhancing learning
I-251	Degree of adequacy of the modalities used (including calls for proposals, delegated agreements, grants with/without a sub-granting mechanism) to achieve the objectives of the strategy in a timely and cost-effective manner
I-252	Degree of adequacy of the choice of implementing partners (including EU MS institutions, UN bodies, Private Sector, Other) to achieve the objectives of the strategy in a timely and cost-effective manner
I-253	Evidence of advantages of blending as compared to the non-blending of traditional programmes
I-254	Evidence of sound monitoring and learning mechanisms in place to improve the design EU regional-level support and disseminate useful data and lessons among LA partners

3 EQ 3 - Security-development nexus

EQ 3	<i>To what extent has EU support contributed to the strengthening of the region's responses to peace and security challenges?</i>
JC31	EU support contributed to fostering EU-LA policy exchanges and institutional networking , including opportunities for pursuing joint actions in global fora, in the areas of drugs, transnational organised crime and migration
I-311	Number and quality of EU-LA <u>dialogue platforms</u> established in the area of <u>migration</u> (incl. frequency of exchange through these platforms)
I-312	Number and quality of EU-LA <u>dialogue platforms</u> established in the area of <u>drugs</u> and transnational organised crime (incl. frequency of exchange through these platforms)
I-313	Degree to which the supported platforms have created <u>opportunities for policy exchanges</u> , sharing of information and networking (between the two regions) <u>beyond these platforms</u>
I-314	Number of <u>joint tools, models, actions</u> (e.g. joint manuals and diagnostics in the area of migration management) developed by EU and LA partners
JC32	EU support contributed to creating sustainable opportunities for intra-regional cooperation, sharing and learning in the areas of drugs, transnational organised crime and migration
I-321	Number of EU supported initiatives (e.g. regional conferences) promoting South-South <u>exchange</u> of experience and good practices in the areas of drugs, transnational organised crime and migration (and level of participation)
I-322	Existence and degree of sustainability of <u>regional networks / institutional coordination structure</u> (including entities such as drugs observatories) established / supported through EU regional interventions
I-323	Number (and quality) of <u>joint tools, models, actions</u> developed by LA partners in the area of migration and the fight against transnational organised crime (including platforms to share information and data in these areas)
I-324	Degree of <u>legal and policy harmonisation</u> within the region in the area of migration and security
JC33	EU support contributed to the strengthening of legal, policy and institutional environment in LA countries in the areas of drugs, transnational organised crime and migration, in line with regional best practices and international (including EU) standards
I-331	(Policy) Evidence of strengthened <u>policy formulation</u> processes in the area of security and migration, including increased <u>analytical underpinning</u> (e.g. better understanding of the root causes of irregular migration, adequate use of available data on drugs and transnational organised crime)
I-332	(Policy) Evidence of an active role played by <u>civil society</u> in policy formulation
I-333	(Policy) Policies related to migration and security integrate a <u>gender equality approach</u> and respond to particular <u>needs of vulnerable/marginalised groups</u> (including children)
I-334	(Policy) Existence and implementation of <u>reintegration policies</u> for migrants returning to their communities of origin, including information on employment and investment opportunities
I-335	(Institutional) Degree of integration of <u>EU and international standards and regional best practices</u> in tools, models, actions developed for policy implementation (including development of strategies to achieve positive combined effects related to migration, mobility and development)
I-336	(Institutional) Perceived effectiveness (by stakeholders involved) of <u>capacity development approaches</u> supported (e.g. train-the-trainers, casework) in the law enforcement area

JC34	Positive results have been achieved in curbing demand and supply of drugs and reducing perceptions of insecurity and impunity
I-341	Citizen <u>perceptions of insecurity or impunity</u> , and regarding the police and criminal justice sectors (UNDP Human Development report)
I-342	UNODC data on <u>supply and demand of drugs</u> in LA

4 EQ 4 - Environment and climate change

EQ 4	<i>To what extent has EU support contributed to the strengthening of the joint regional and global responses to climate change and environmental challenges</i>
JC41	EU support contributed to fostering EU-LA policy exchanges and institutional networking , including opportunities for pursuing joint actions on global challenges, in the areas of environment and climate change
I-411	Number and quality of <u>EU-LA dialogue platforms</u> established in the area of <u>climate change</u> (incl. frequency of exchange through these platforms)
I-412	Degree to which the supported platforms have created <u>opportunities for policy exchanges</u> as well as improved communication, information exchange and networking (between the two regions) <u>beyond these platforms</u>
I-413	Number of <u>joint tools, models, actions</u> developed by EU and LA partners
I-414	Evidence on increased awareness among LA partners on the benefits of using voluntary partnership agreements to enhance forest governance and develop international trade in verified <u>legal timber exports</u>
JC42	EU support contributed to creating sustainable opportunities for intra-regional cooperation, sharing and learning in the areas of climate change and biodiversity conservation
I-421	Number of EU supported initiatives (e.g. regional conferences) <u>promoting South-South exchange of experience and good practices</u>
I-422	Existence and degree of sustainability of <u>regional networks / institutional coordination structures</u> (especially on climate change and biodiversity conservation) established / supported through EU regional interventions
I-423	Number (and quality) of <u>joint tools, models, actions</u> developed by LA partners
I-424	Number of tools, models, actions receiving <u>long-term funding commitments from LA partners</u>
JC43	EU support contributed to the strengthening of legal, policy and institutional environment in LA countries at the national and sub national levels in the areas of environment and climate change, in line with regional best practices and international (including EU) standards
I-431	(Policy) Evidence of strengthened <u>policy/strategy formulation</u> processes, including increased <u>analytical underpinning</u>
I-432	(Policy) Evidence of an active role played by <u>civil society</u> and private sector in policy formulation
I-433	(Policy) Environmental/Climate change policies integrate a <u>gender equality approach</u> and respond to particular <u>needs of marginalised groups</u> (including vulnerable farming communities and indigenous peoples where relevant)
I-434	(Institutional) Evidence of increased capacity to mobilise <u>climate finance</u> (national and international) to advance adaptation and mitigation strategies

I-435	(Institutional) Number of countries that are in the process of establishing a sound <u>governance framework</u> to ensure the protection and use of biodiversity remains sustainable
I-436	(Institutional) Degree of integration of <u>EU and international standards and regional best practices</u> in tools, models, actions developed for policy implementation
JC44	Positive results have been achieved in reducing the loss of biological diversity and curbing greenhouse gas emissions at the regional/sub regional and national levels
I-441	(Environment/biodiversity) Evolution in biodiversity loss (Convention on Biological Diveristy/Aichi Targets)
I-442	(Environment/biodiversity) Number of hectares of protected areas with management plans in operation
I-443	(Climate change) Number of specific mitigation or adaptation actions (e.g. Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions) implemented and degree of implementation

5 EQ 5 - Social equity

EQ 5	<i>To what extent has EU support contributed to the strengthening of social equity?</i>
JC51	EU support contributed to fostering EU-LA policy exchanges and institutional networking in the areas of social and fiscal policies
I-511	Number and quality of EU-LA <u>dialogue platforms</u> established in the area of <u>social policies</u> (incl. frequency of exchange through these platforms)
I-512	Number and quality of EU-LA <u>dialogue platforms</u> established in the area of <u>fiscal policies</u> : taxation / domestic revenue mobilisation and public finance management (incl. frequency of exchange through these platforms)
I-513	Degree to which the supported platforms have created <u>opportunities for policy exchanges</u> , sharing of information and networking (between the two regions) <u>beyond these platforms</u>
JC52	EU support contributed to creating sustainable opportunities for intra-regional cooperation, sharing and learning in the areas of social and fiscal policies
I-521	Number of EU supported initiatives (e.g. regional conferences) <u>promoting South-South exchange</u> of experience and good practices in the area of social and fiscal policies ((taxation / domestic revenue mobilisation and public finance management)
I-522	Existence and degree of sustainability of <u>regional networks / institutional coordination structure</u> established or supported through EU regional interventions
I-523	Existence of <u>legal and policy harmonisation</u> within the region in the area of social and fiscal policies
JC53	EU support contributed to the strengthening of legal, policy and institutional environment in LA countries in the areas of social and fiscal policies in line with regional best practices and international (including EU) standards
I-531	(Policy) Evidence of strengthened social <u>policy/strategy formulation</u> processes, including increased <u>analytical underpinning</u>
I-532	(Policy) Policies related to social protection integrate a <u>gender equality approach</u> and respond to particular <u>needs of marginalised groups</u>
I-533	(Policy) Evidence of increased participation of <u>social partners</u> and representatives of organised <u>civil society</u> in social policy processes (including through institutions like Economic and Social Councils)
I-534	(Policy/Institutional) PEFA indicators on Transparency and Policy-based budgeting, and evidence of allocative efficiency of social expenditure

I-535	(Institutional) Evidence of strengthened <u>institutional practices</u> in the area of social policies (including inter-institutional coordination)
I-536	(Institutional) Evidence of <u>monitoring and evaluation systems</u> developed in the LA public administrations
JC54	Positive results have been achieved in increasing fiscal equity and improving social policies
I-541	Key indicators in <u>social protection</u> in LA countries: coverage, uptake, benefits
I-542	<u>Tax collection</u> rates of Latin American countries compared to OECD members' average

6 EQ 6 - Inclusive growth

EQ 6	<i>To what extent has EU support contributed to the strengthening of regional competitiveness and the private sector?</i>
JC61	EU support contributed to fostering EU-LA policy exchanges and institutional networking in the areas of business, trade and investment, and regional integration
I-611	Number and quality of EU-LA <u>dialogue platforms</u> established in the area of <u>trade and private sector development</u> (incl. frequency of exchange through these platforms)
I-612	Degree to which the supported platforms have created <u>opportunities for policy exchanges</u> , sharing of information and networking (between the two regions) <u>beyond these platforms</u>
JC62	EU support contributed to creating sustainable opportunities for intra-regional cooperation, sharing and learning in the areas of business, trade and investment, and regional integration
I-621	Number of EU supported initiatives (e.g. regional conferences) promoting <u>South-South exchange</u> of experience and good practices in the area of investment and business climate
I-622	Existence and degree of sustainability of <u>regional networks / institutional coordination structure</u> established or supported through EU regional interventions
I-623	Degree of <u>legal and policy harmonisation</u> within the region
JC63	EU support contributed to the strengthening of legal, policy and institutional environment in LA countries in the areas of business, trade and investment, and regional integration, in line with regional best practices and international (including EU) standards
I-631	(Policy) Evidence of strengthened social <u>policy/strategy formulation</u> processes, including increased <u>analytical underpinning</u>
I-632	(Policy) Evidence of an active role played by <u>the private sector</u> in policy formulation
JC64	Positive results have been achieved in modernising MSMEs and developing low-emission infrastructure
I-641	Increased competitiveness of Latin American MSME
I-642	Increased number of MSMEs making use of low-emission, climate resilient and environmentally sustainable investments

7 EQ 7 - Higher education


EQ 7	To what extent has EU support contributed to the strengthening of the EU-LA bi-regional higher education area?
JC71	EU support contributed to fostering policy exchanges and institutional networking across Latin America and with the EU in the area of higher education
I-711	Number and quality of EU-LA <u>dialogue platforms</u> established in the area of <u>higher education</u> (incl. frequency of exchange through these platforms)
I-712	Degree to which the supported platforms have created <u>opportunities for sharing of information and networking</u> (between the two regions) <u>beyond these platforms</u> (incl. existence of thematic networks on issues of mutual interest established to facilitate exchanges between EU and LA universities and research centres/networks as well as between private and public sector institutions)
I-713	Increase in the number and scope of <u>regional and bi-regional university partnerships and related collaborative research</u> networks
JC72	EU support contributed to the strengthening of higher education policy frameworks and governance systems in LA countries, including in terms of labour market integration, in line with regional best practices and international (including EU) standards
I-721	Number and scope of policy reforms aligned with international consensus on <u>good practice and EU-supported standards</u>
I-722	EU-supported progress on <u>regional harmonisation and standardisation</u> of higher education
I-723	Number and scope of agreements on <u>mutual recognition of qualifications</u> within Latin America and in EU-LA relations
I-724	Degree to which higher education policies and governance are directed to <u>labour market needs and social inclusion</u>
JC73	EU support contributed to increased ability of graduates to find professional positions corresponding to their qualification levels
I-731	Level of <u>student and staff mobility</u> across Latin America and between the EU and Latin America
I-732	Evidence on institutionalised opportunities for students to gain <u>practical experiences</u> (apprenticeships, internships)
I-733	Evidence of relative match of higher education learning outcomes with qualifications required by the <u>labour market</u>
I-734	<u>Employment rate</u> of graduates having participated in exchange programmes compared to non-participants
I-735	Existence of EU-supported mechanisms for <u>interchange between universities and public and private sector</u> production and services-providing organisations
JC74	Positive results have been achieved in increasing knowledge of EU and Latin America scientific and technological communities
I-741	Evidence of improved uptake and dissemination of <u>research results</u> for innovation in particular for MSMEs
I-742	Number of <u>joint or collaborative degree programmes</u> established in EU-LA relations
I-743	Evidence of improved <u>knowledge</u> on problems and consequences of climate change including vulnerability and risk assessment, biodiversity loss and environment issues

Annex 5: Details on the inventory of EU - funded interventions

1 Description of the approach taken for the inventory

The figure below depicts the general approach followed to map the EU support during the evaluation period.

Figure 1 Overview of the approach to the inventory



* In accordance with the Evaluation Unit, it was decided that decisions from as early as 2007 should be included if their implementation stretches into the evaluation period.

1.1 Step 1: Extraction of relevant interventions

The inventory is based on a list generated via CRIS/DataWarehouse (DWH)¹. Initially, all interventions containing the regional code for LA and being implemented between 2009-2017 were extracted. For this purpose, interventions with decision year prior to 2009 were also included. In accordance with the Evaluation Unit it was decided that decisions from 2007 on should be included if their implementation stretched into the evaluation period, as these are covered by the RSP 2007-2013.

1.2 Step 2: Verification and selection

The next step consisted of identifying interventions which fall within the scope of this evaluation. The evaluation focuses on the regional EU development cooperation in LA, i.e. interventions active in all 18 countries² covered by this evaluation, or “continental” LA. In contrast, bilateral, multi-country³ and sub-regional programmes will only be looked at from a complementarity/coherence perspective. Programmes in continental LA are financed by the geographic DCI, but also by the thematic DCI as well as IFS, ICI+ and PP-AP.

1.3 Step 3: Refining inventory

In a third step, the existing inventory was enhanced based on information from the ToR, information received from relevant stakeholders during the inception phase and also information collected via first document reviews. This included information on the financial data for Erasmus + (which cannot be found on CRIS as it is managed by EACEA).

¹ DWH code: EDFO02A.

² Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela.

³ Covering multiple, but not all 18 Latin American countries.

1.4 Step 4: Categorisation

In line with the ToR, the selected interventions were categorised along the main areas of the EU's development cooperation with LA during the evaluation period:

- Security and Peace;
- Social equity;
- Inclusive growth;
- Environment and climate change;
- Higher education.

Furthermore, two additional categories were introduced:

- Blending (covering LAIF 2009 and 2014);
- Various (including programmes not fitting in any category as well as support measures).

1.5 Step 5: Analysis

Based on the categorised inventory of EU support, an analysis of the financial information has been carried out.

2 List of regional interventions within the focus of the evaluation

The following list provides detailed information on all interventions which fall within the scope of the evaluation. They are ordered by thematic area. In addition to the intervention title, the decision year, implementation period (start & end year) as well as financial information – where available – are provided.

Table 2 List of regional interventions within the focus of the evaluation

Short name	Intervention title	Decision year	Financing instrument	Start year	End year	EC reference	Committed amount (EUR)	Contracted amount (EUR)	Paid amount (EUR)
Environment and climate change									
EURO-SOLAR	Programa Euro-Solar	2006	DCI-LA	2007	2013	LA/2006/017-223	27.819.570,00	27.605.312,97	27.605.312,97
RALCEA	RALCEA - Network of knowledge centres in the water sector	2009	PP-AP	2010	2015	PP-AP/2009/021-910	1.950.000,00	1.950.000,00	1.908.147,00
EUROCLIMA I	EUROCLIMA I - Regional Environment / Climate Change programme in Latin America	2010	DCI-LA	2010	2014	LA/2010/021-126	4.511.250,00	4.425.750,00	4.425.750,00
EUROCLIMA II	EUROCLIMA II - Regional Environment / Climate Change programme in Latin America	2012	DCI-LA	2014	2017	LA/2012/024-258	10.501.172,62	10.501.172,62	9.740.006,04
EUROCLIMA +	EUROCLIMA + - Regional Environment / Climate Change programme in Latin America	2016	DCI-LA	2016	2021	LA/2016/038-621	80.000.000,00	39.717.000,00	13.412.321,00
WATERCLIMA	WATERCLIMA - Regional Project of Watershed and Coastal Management in the Context of Climate Change	2013	DCI-ENV	2014	2018	ENV/2013/024-464	7.000.000,00	7.000.000,00	5.995.059,25
Social equity									
URB-AL III	URB-AL III - Regional Programme in support to Social Cohesion Local Processes	2007	DCI-LA	2008	2013	LA/2007/019-157	46.095.124,86	46.095.124,86	46.095.124,86
EUROSociAL II	EUROSociAL II	2010	DCI-LA	2010	2016	LA/2010/021-542	40.000.000,00	40.000.000,00	39.777.573,00
EUROSociAL +	EUROSociAL +	2015	DCI-LA	2016	2021	LA/2015/037-821	32.000.000,00	32.000.000,00	6.300.000,00

Short name	Intervention title	Decision year	Financing instrument	Start year	End year	EC reference	Committed amount (EUR)	Contracted amount (EUR)	Paid amount (EUR)
Security-development nexus									
COPOLAD	COPOLAD - The LA and EU Programme of Cooperation in Antidrug Policies	2010	DCI-LA	2010	2015	LA/2010/021-556	6.579.860,82	6.579.786,74	5.921.808,00
COPOLAD II	COPOLAD II -- Cooperation Programme between Latin America, the Caribbean and the European Union on Drugs Policies	2014	DCI-LA	2015	2020	LA/2014/037-563	10.000.000,00	9.956.741,60	4.188.590,37
EL PAcCTO	EL PAcCTO: Programa de asistencia Europa-Latinoamérica contra el crimen transnacional organizado: por el Estado de Derecho y la seguridad ciudadana	2016	DCI-LA	2017	2022	LA/2016/038-721	23.000.000,00	23.000.000,00	5.468.084,41
EU-CELAC MIGR	EU-CELAC Project on Migration	2010	DCI-MIGR	2011	2015	MIGR/2010/259-532	2.863.645,97	2.863.646,00	2.863.646,00
PRELAC	PRELAC I+II - Prevention of the diversion of drugs precursors in the Latin American and Caribbean region	2008/2011	IFS	2009	2016	IFS/2008/170-366, IFS/2012/286-049		4.933.266,20	4.933.266,20
AMERIPOL	Strengthening cooperation of law enforcement, judicial and prosecuting authorities in Latin America and the Caribbean	2008/2009	IFS	2009	2017	IFS/2009/228-688, IFS/2010/258-971		3.993.937,23	3.479.968,11
GAFISUD	GAFISUD I, II, III - Supporting anti-money laundering and financial crime initiatives in Latin America	2009/2011/2013	IFS	2010	2018	IFS/2009/228-069, IFS/2011/278-299, IFS/2014/346-193		2.718.896,31	2.618.896,31
Inclusive growth									
AL-INVEST IV	AL-INVEST IV	2007	DCI-LA	2008	2013	LA/2007/019-165	48.786.606,98	48.786.606,98	48.786.606,98
AL-INVEST V	AL-INVEST V	2014	DCI-LA	2015	2020	LA/2014/032-650	27.150.800,00	27.150.800,00	8.206.289,20

Short name	Intervention title	Decision year	Financing instrument	Start year	End year	EC reference	Committed amount (EUR)	Contracted amount (EUR)	Paid amount (EUR)
@LIS II	@lis2 : Alliance for the Information Society (Phase II)	2008	DCI-LA	2008	2014	LA/2008/019-842	21.779.578,22	21.779.578,22	21.779.578,22
Interconnectivity	Interconnectivity in Latin America	2016	DCI-LA	2016	2019	LA/2016/038-142	8.000.000,00	8.000.000,00	6.770.733,00
ELAN	ELAN - European and Latin American Business Services and Innovation Network	2013	ICI+	2015	2018	ICI+/2013/024-846	10.752.212,80	10.752.212,80	8.742.912,49
Higher education									
ALFA III	ALFA III	2007/2010	DCI-LA	2008	2015	LA/2007/019-189, LA/2010/021-526	65.767.827,93	64.717.770,43	64.112.609,14
Erasmus Mundus - DCI	Erasmus Mundus II Action 2 Strand 1– Partnerships with Latin America (financed through DCI-LA)	2008/2011/2012/2013	DCI-LA			LA/2008/019-841, LA/2011/023-032, LA/2012/023-893, LA/2013/024-807	95.600.000,00	81.600.000,00	
Erasmus Mundus - ICI+	Erasmus Mundus II Action 2 Strand 1– Partnerships with Latin America (financed through ICI+)	2012/2013	ICI+			ICI+/2012/024-257, ICI+/2013/024-848	11.000.000,00	6.000.000,00	
Erasmus+	Erasmus+ Action 1 (Mobility) and Action 2 (Capacity building)	2014	DCI-LA				93.000.000,00	93.000.000,00 ⁴	
Blending									
LAIF 2009	Latin America Investment Facility 2009 - LAIF	2009	DCI-LA	2010	2025	LA/2009/021-734	179.750.000,00	179.725.565,29	142.716.825,69
LAIF 2014	Latin American Investment Facility 2014 - LAIF	2014	DCI-LA	2015	2033	LA/2014/037-570	154.818.000,00	131.551.773,00	24.842.921,00
DCI ENV contribution to LAIF	Contribution of ENRTP to the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF) and the Latin America Investment Facility (LAIF) specifically for the Climate Change Windows of the facilities	2011	DCI-ENV	2012	2013	DCI-ENV 2011/023-403	17.300.000,00	17.300.000,00	15.800.000,00

⁴ For Erasmus +, no information was available on how much of the committed budget has actually been contracted by now. In order to make a financial analysis of the inventory, the figure from the committed budget has been used.

Short name	Intervention title	Decision year	Financing instrument	Start year	End year	EC reference	Committed amount (EUR)	Contracted amount (EUR)	Paid amount (EUR)
Various									
LATCI - DCI	Latin American Technical Cooperation Instrument" (LATCI) 2009-2014 - DCI	2009/2011/2013	DCI-LA	2009	2019	LA/2009/021-563, LA/2011/022-517, LA/2013/024-890	25.525.185,66	25.367.594,81	24.555.151,24
LATCI - ICI+	Latin American Technical Cooperation Instrument" (LATCI) 2012-2013 - ICI+	2012	ICI+	2013	2013	ICI+/2012/024-088	149.284,00	149.284,00	149.284,00
Support measures 2015-2017	Support measures for Latin America regional (continental) activities - 2015-2017	2014/2016	DCI-LA	2015	2020	LA/2014/037-792, LA/2016/039-404	4.512.000,00	3.501.725,63	2.578.943,75
Mutual understanding	Promoting mutual awareness, understanding and cooperation between the EU and Latin America	2007	DCI-LA	2008	2013	LA/2007/019-164	800.000,00	767.513,00	690.762,00
Regional Facility	Regional Facility for International Cooperation and Partnership	2015	DCI-LA	2016	2020	LA/2015/038-106	12.000.000,00	11.663.464,57	4.748.179,00
EU-LAC foundation	European Union - Latin America and Caribbean Foundation	2012	ICI+	2012	2015	ICI+/2012/023-498	4.099.763,85	4.099.763,85	4.099.763,85
LA food security programme	Fortaleciendo la influencia en la gobernanza sobre seguridad alimentaria de las principales redes de pequeños/as productores/as de América Latina	2011	DCI-FOOD	2013	2017	FOOD/2013/322-439		2.500.000,00	2.153.782,00

Annex 6: Intervention logic

The intervention logic (IL) for the EU support to LA 2009-2017 is mainly draws on the RSP 2007-2013 and the MIP 2014-2020. Analysis and recommendations will be based on those programming documents on development cooperation and their complementarity with other external actions.

The former strategy identified the following three priority strategic focal sectors: a) social cohesion reduction of poverty, inequalities and exclusion; b) regional integration; and c) investing in people and increasing mutual understanding. After the 2010 mid-term review, these goals were slightly revised in the RIP 2011-2013: a) social and territorial cohesion; b) regional integration and economic cooperation; and c) mutual understanding/higher education. The MIP 2014-2014 prioritised a) the security-development nexus; b) good governance, accountability and social equity; c) inclusive and sustainable growth for human development; and d) environmental sustainability and climate change.

While the strategic focus of EU-LA cooperation has been subject to revisions and amendments during the course of the evaluation period (for example less explicit emphasis on regional integration during the later period as compared to earlier years), the overall direction and general objectives of EU support have remained largely unchanged. Therefore, while still taking note of the different nuances in the RSP and MIP, the reconstructed IL reflects the overall strategic orientation during the entire evaluation period. The strategic cooperation framework is complemented by Association Agreements, Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and other agreements with groups of countries in the region. Of particular importance are high level dialogues and especially the EU-LAC Summit process. The Declaration and Action Plan adopted within this context constitute a jointly agreed strategy between the two sides.

Taken the entire strategic framework into consideration, the IL is built on the premises that:

- The EU and LA enjoy privileged relations and are natural partners, linked by strong historical, cultural and economic ties;
- regional-level support complements bilateral and sub-regional development cooperation;
- the regional-level support focuses on actions for which a regional approach to the design and delivery of EU cooperation demonstrates added value in a holistic way (e.g. beyond individual sectors);
- regional-level support addresses challenges common to several or all countries in the region, and/or relates to cross-border phenomena, in order to foster shared solutions and ownership on the part of the countries of the region;
- regional-level support is directly or indirectly contributing to the strengthening of regional cooperation between LA countries and regional integration;
- leverage effects to address the challenges which are key for the achievement of the development goals of the Agenda for Change exist particularly at the regional level.
- regional-level cooperation provides support in the process of “graduation”.


The diagram below presents a synthetic overview of the intervention logic along the different levels of a results chain (inputs, outputs, intermediate outcomes, outcomes, impact):

- At the input level, the evaluation mainly covers DCI-funded regional interventions, including technical assistance, the facilitation of peer-to-peer exchanges and triangular cooperation, and mechanisms such as blending (based on the experience of the Latin America Investment Facility/LAIF). Triangular cooperation gives justice to the fact that international development cooperation is increasingly shaped by partner countries’ own initiatives as well as their financial and technical contributions. The bi-regional policy dialogue on development issues, as mandated by the EU-LAC Action Plan, constitutes a crucial non-funding input. It gains importance as agenda setter and to validate the development cooperation programme. The evaluation recognises other approaches that feed into the IL, such as, first, development cooperation at country-level and sub-regional level and, second, interventions contributing to cooperation with the wider region, i.e. those financed by the Partnership Instrument and other specific actions of EU line DGs (e.g. RTD, Trade). However, the evaluation only explicitly considers them for the analysis of the overall coherence and complementarity of the EU regional-level support. The same applies for the cooperation programmes of EU Member States and other donors.
- This set of inputs is expected to generate outputs in four areas: increased policy exchanges, networking and exchanges of best practise both in bi-regional EU-LA relations and with regards to intra-regional relations in LA; increased investments in key infrastructure sectors (transport, energy, ICT, etc.); and increased joint actions in the areas of scientific research and higher education as well as on global challenges such as climate change, drugs and multilateralism.

- It is assumed that these outputs will contribute to several intermediate outcomes across all sectors, particularly a strengthened legal, policy and institutional environment in key reform areas; more regional and bi-regional opportunities for trade, investment, job creation; advancements in the fields of scientific research and higher education; as well as strengthened regional and bi-regional responses to global challenges with a special emphasis on drugs and climate change. These results are seen as stepping stones to achieve – at the higher level of outcomes – clearly visible region-wide advances in responding to global challenges and with regards to good governance, social and fiscal equity; regional and bi-regional trade, competitiveness and job creation; the protection of natural resources and adaptation to climate change; as well as the creation of a EU-LA “knowledge and higher education” area.
- If achieved, these overarching development outcomes are presumed to strongly contribute to building democratic, peaceful, prosperous and inclusive societies at the level of states. The simultaneous impact at the global level would be the transformation of the international system based on multilateralism, mutual understanding and international convergence on key challenges. Both are expected to be the foundations to achieve the highest-level development impact: sustainable growth and poverty reduction.

The EQs and their JCs address different levels of the IL as reflected in the figure below.

Figure 2 Simplified intervention logic diagram



Note: In the "Inputs" column, the boxes with dotted lines illustrate EU-LA cooperation activities which don't fall in the main scope of the evaluation but are closely related with the EU-LA continental cooperation and will be taken into account in the analysis as contextual elements.

Annex 7: E-survey Report

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1 Overall purpose and structure of the questionnaire

The objective of the survey was to collect and analyse the opinions and feedback of EUD staff involved in the EU's regional level development cooperation in Latin America. More precisely, the survey covered all countries in which regional-level cooperation projects are implemented.

The questionnaire featured eight sections. The first section identified the country the Delegation covers and the regional cooperation sectors in which the Delegation is involved in. The other sections aimed to gather information on the relevance of this form of cooperation and its pertinence vis-à-vis policy dialogue, blending facilities, engagement with countries in graduation process, coordination with other forms of cooperation, as well as assessing its visibility and identifying lessons learnt. While the survey questions related to different aspects tackled by the evaluation matrix, the questionnaire did not aim to mirror the complete spectrum of the matrix but to provide additional views on key elements, drawn from opinions of EUD staff.

2 Respondents

The survey aimed to collect one response per country, for a total of 18 responses. In some cases, the Cooperation Section of one EUD manages multiple countries. As a result these EUDs were asked to complete several responses, corresponding to the countries the EUD's Cooperation Section in question is covering. This was the case for the EUD in Nicaragua, whose Cooperation Section covers Nicaragua, as well as Costa Rica and Panama; and the EUD in Brazil, whose Cooperation Section covers Brazil, as well as Venezuela, Uruguay, Chile and Argentina. The survey has collected responses from all 18 countries that were targeted.

3 Overview of responses

Most questions asked respondents to assign a score (from 1 to 5, with 1 = "Not at all" and 5 = "Great extent"). For each question, a chart shows the full spectre of responses while the text underneath presents the share of positive responses – positive responses being defined as score 4 and 5⁵.


Where relevant, each question was followed by a box in which respondents could explain the answer provided or provide any complementary information they deemed relevant. Filling in such boxes was optional. In order to facilitate the analysis of the survey in the next version, qualitative country responses have already been categorised according to their graduation status.

3.1 Relevance

3.1.1 Q1 Needs and challenges

Question 1: Based on your experience, to what extent has EU's regional-level development cooperation addressed important needs and challenges of the region?

Figure 3 Q1 Needs and challenges – Overview of responses



The share of positive answers⁶ for Q1 is of 72%.

⁵ Scores 1-2 and 3 are considered negative and neutral responses, respectively.

⁶ Positive responses are defined as score 4 and 5, on a scale from 1 to 5


Table 3 Q1 – List of most important needs and challenges addressed

Graduation Status	Country	List of most important needs and challenges addressed
Graduated	Brazil	Security (including migration), Environmental issues (including Climate change) and Higher education
	Venezuela	Strengthening small and medium enterprises with AL-INVEST and improve some local Universities with ALBAN and Erasmus
	Argentina	Governance, Climate Change and Security
	Chile	Climate change and environment, human inclusive development, and democratic governance
	Uruguay	Inequalities - social cohesion Climate Change Good Governance
	Mexico	Regional integration ; Common global challenges ; Sharing practices and expertise.
	Costa Rica	social issues, environment, security
Not graduated	Bolivia	Common fight against organized crime. Environment and climate change. Support to SME
	Honduras	Regional integration, climate change, employment
	Nicaragua	Quality and relevance of higher education. Best practices in climate change. Support to the mainstreaming of gender in social policies.
	Paraguay	Social cohesion, environment and climate change, private sector development
	El Salvador	social sector development, economic development, citizen security challenge
	Guatemala	Forest protection Malnutrition Social Cohesion Border Conflicts (Belize - Guatemala)
	Cuba	climate change, disasters, justice
Phasing out	Ecuador	renewable energy, small and medium enterprise development, tax collection
	Colombia	Institutional strengthening, peacebuilding and public policies
	Peru	migration, climate change, fight against drugs and organized crime

3.1.2 Q2 Flexibility to political and socio-economic evolution

Question 2: Based on your experience, to what extent has the EU been able to adjust its regional-level development cooperation to respond to major political and socio-economic changes in Latin America in the last decade?

Figure 4 Q2 Flexibility to political and socio-economic evolution – Overview of responses



The share of positive answers for Q2 is of 71%.

Table 4 Q2 Flexibility to political and socio-economic evolution – Qualitative assessments


Grad Status	Country	Flexibility to political and socio-economic evolution – Qualitative assessments
Graduated	Brazil	The main issues targeted by most of the Political agendas at country and regional level have been covered by EU Regional Cooperation
	Argentina	I believe the EU has been quick to respond to the needs. What's been harder is to promote political coherence and stability on Latin American partners
	Uruguay	Regional programmes have evolved taking into account regional challenges and local demands.
	Mexico	Excellent instruments to accompany countries in transition, from funds to expertise transfers.
	Costa Rica	Adjustment in course since the last 2/3 years with an ongoing reflection on how to deal with transitions to higher incomes, after a moment of fase-out and less accompaniment to LA with the adoption of the latest MYFF
Not graduated	Nicaragua	Focal sectors are relevant and implementation modalities of most programmes flexible enough to be demand-driven.
	Guatemala	With flexibility and taking into consideration the challenges of the region.
	Cuba	limited volume/ leverage, low level discussions, often de-linked from bilateral cooperation
Phasing out	Ecuador	The development cooperation moved from project to technical assistance which is the most appropriate implementation modality considering the political and social economic changes of the last decade
	Colombia	The approach continues to be demand based, which is important but not enough. There is a lack of strategic planning and thinking among local institutions. Demands are not always articulated to meet the countries cross-institutional priorities. Each institution requests what they think is important. There needs to be also a more important effort in increasing articulation among programmes.
	Peru	The effectiveness of regional programmes also depends on the active involvement of delegations in regional programmes. Yet, not all regional programmes have allowed for close coordination with delegations. coordination

3.2 Policy Dialogue

3.2.1 Q3 Policy dialogue at different levels

Question 3: Based on your experience, to what extent has EU's regional-level development cooperation helped enhance policy dialogue at the different levels specified below?

Figure 5 Q3 Policy dialogue at different levels – Overview of responses



The share of positive answers for Q3 is:

- 53% for intra-regional dialogue (among LA countries)
- 40% for inter-regional dialogue (between LA countries and the EU)

- 22% for international dialogue, with EU and LA countries/region supporting joint positions
- 6% for bilateral dialogue (between one country and the EU)


Table 5 Q3 Policy dialogue at different levels – Qualitative assessments

Graduation Status	Country	Policy dialogue at different levels – Qualitative assessments
Graduated	Brazil	Bilateral and Intra-regional dialogue has been clearly strengthened via the regional cooperation; Intra-regional dialogue too (a good example is EUROsociAL) but the dialogue with Europe still is a challenge, in particular in relation to the development of joint positions (it has been improved but I doubt that this improvement has been made due to the Regional cooperation)
	Venezuela	EU-LA relationships have improved with permanent and constructive relationships and exchanges
	Argentina	There is dialogue, the issue in my opinion is the lack of binding result oriented outcomes
	Chile	Regional level development cooperation enables a closer conversation between the country and the EU and among Latin American countries since the programme design usually promotes dialogue among the programme members and individually with each of them. However, inter-regional dialogue and international dialogue is more complex to be achieved considering the current regional development cooperation. The diversity between countries in the same region, or between other regions makes it difficult to tailor the programmes to address needs and reach consensus through policy dialogue.
	Uruguay	When the country received bilateral cooperation, bilateral dialogue was focused on those identified cooperation sectors that may have been in line with the regional programmes or not. There was always the concern of creating synergies with them if they added value to the bilateral programmes. It seems that the programmes contributed more to the other levels of dialogue.
	Mexico	There is a lot potential un terms of dialogue but still for lack of ressources and other priorities (finalisation of bilateral programmes), this potential has not been worked enough. As we are in a process of reactivating/strengthening dialogues in various sectors covered by regional initiatives, potential might be fully used in a near future. Links (synergies and coordination) with specific bilateral programmes are strengthened.
	Not graduated	Bolivia
Nicaragua		In the case of Nicaragua, bilateral political dialogue is scant.
Paraguay		Mixed results, also because topics don't necessarily coincide
El Salvador		A weak exchange of information between Delegation and regional programmes prevented to have cross fertilisation between the initiatives. I see more results for the regional policy dialogue (including political dialogue) and of course to continue and build new regional cooperation programmes
Guatemala		Policy dialogue in Guatemala is difficult. The State although small is complex and bureaucratic. Their lack of leadership on the development agenda makes the dialogue fragmented and less efficient. The regional cooperation is not well understood by the host country.
Cuba		limited volume and de-linked from bilateral planned cooperation, besides lack of bi-directional flows (absent cooperation from LA to the EU)
Phasing out	Ecuador	The regional programmes provide high level assistance to governments but it remains mostly at the technical level.
	Colombia	The focus on bilateral cooperation including budget support and thematic instruments leaves less room for regional programmes to play a role in policy dialogue. We have adopted important measures to increase articulation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Presidential Agency for Cooperation in order to have a more strategic approach and therefore use these regional programmes for policy dialogue in a more consistent way.
	Peru	Regional programmes have not systematically been set up to facilitate a bilateral dialogue, as implementation agencies often coordinate directly with national ministries. regional programmes may have played a bigger role in intra- or inter-regional dialogue.

3.2.2 Q4 Policy dialogue in different thematic areas

Question 4: Based on your experience, to what extent has EU's regional-level development cooperation helped enhance policy dialogue in the thematic areas specified below?

Figure 6 Q4 Policy dialogue in different thematic areas – Overview of responses



*Blending refers to the Latin American Investment Facility, which covers multiple thematic areas

The share of positive answers for Q4 is:

- 31% for Social sectors
- 27% for Higher education
- 24% for Environment and climate change
- 20% for Sustainable and inclusive growth
- 13% for Peace and Security (incl. migration)
- 11% for Trade
- 9% for Blending instrument

Table 6 Q4 Policy dialogue in different thematic areas – Qualitative assessments


Graduation Status	Country	Policy dialogue in different thematic areas – Qualitative assessments
Graduated	Brazil	Through projects such as COPOLAD, AMERIPOL or EL PACCTO, the EU is perceived as a new partner in the region. Concerning Blending and Trade, the existing projects (AL-Invest, ELAN or LAIF) are neither well promoted nor perceived at country level.
	Venezuela	The support given by the programmes improved and supported the identified areas.
	Argentina	There is potential for political dialogue and the use of cooperation tools such as the ones benefitting from regional cooperation could be a valuable ally.
	Chile	Environment and climate change are gaining more importance, and countries are participating more actively in policy dialogue in this regards. Higher education, social sectors and sustainable growth have been addressed at the policy dialogue tables more frequently. This could be the result of the maturity of the regional-level development cooperation on these areas, and the regional needs. Blending and financial instruments need more understanding from the countries in order to get the better use of it.
	Uruguay	At regional level the programmes have contributed to enhance policy dialogue in these areas with all the countries. Not necessarily between the EU and the country at local level.
	Costa Rica	Q1: Paccto&Mieux (although relatively recent). Q2: EUROCLIMA positive experience in CR. Q4 EUROSociAL excellent perception from mnational stakeholders. Blending: too recent to assess. Trade and growth, unsure about impact - this is dealt with by our regi

Graduation Status	Country	Policy dialogue in different thematic areas – Qualitative assessments
Not graduated	Bolivia	Regional programmes have somewhat enhanced dialogue in those sectors where the DEL was already present with a bilateral envelop. Their impact in other sector (without a bilateral present) was felt but limited.
	Nicaragua	Blending makes possible joining development banks in large-scale investment programmes which are a good entry point for dialogue.
	Guatemala	The intervention on the Belize-Guatemala buffer zone is the most known and appreciated by our Guatemalan partners. The COOP 21 had great impact on the forest protection and agriculture sectors. The Association Agreement with Central America plays a central role on the development of trade in the region.
	Cuba	as above. Better use of thematic platform Mieux for migration dialogues
Phasing out	Colombia	The lack of strategic choice of demands coming from institutions reduces the capacity for these programmes to actually enhance policy dialogue.
	Peru	EUROSociAL, Copolad and EL PACCTO ensure regular involvement of delegations in their implementation, and hence, can be used as a leverage in policy dialogues. This has been less so in other regional programmes.

3.2.3 Q5 EU contribution to improve national policies

Question 5: To what extent has the EU's regional-level development cooperation contributed to improve national policies?

Figure 7 Q5 EU contribution to improve national policies – Overview of responses



The share of positive answers for Q5 is of 40%.

Table 7 Q5 EU contribution to improve national policies – Qualitative assessments

Graduation Status	Country	EU contribution to improve national policies – Qualitative assessments
Graduated	Brazil	The impact in policy development is clear, with results in terms of production of new laws and basic legislation (regulations) facilitating the practical implementation of higher level legislation.
	Venezuela	EU-Venezuela relationships are low and standard.
	Argentina	When local Governments are committed to global goals, EU's cooperation tools can be used to promote reforms linking national policies to global goals. In Argentina we have some examples of that.
	Uruguay	Based on the comments received from the different key actors at local level. They appreciate very much this kind of cooperation where they learn with peers. One example is the contribution of EUROSociAL to the improvement of the Tax administration (education of tax payers, assistance to tax payers).
	Mexico	Specifically in social sectors
	Costa Rica	Affirmative for EUROSociAL, unsure about other impacts.
Not graduated	Bolivia	There was an impact on very specific policies in very specific sectors, but not a generalized impact.
	Nicaragua	Inputs are provided (in particular social policies and climate change) but not enough policy dialogue is possible.
	Paraguay	The evaluation is an average. While some programmes contribute to a great extent, others don't.
	El Salvador	It depends of the sector but clearly regional programmes contributed to improve national policy in social and security sectors
	Guatemala	Public policies in Guatemala are weak and badly financed. Our impact is very limited. Budget Support is very difficult to implement because of that.
Phasing out	Ecuador	The contributions to improve national policies came mostly from national programme (not regional)


Graduation Status	Country	EU contribution to improve national policies – Qualitative assessments
	Colombia	In most cases, EU's regional-level programmes have been important to improve national policies. There is a need however to have some monitoring tools to assess the way in which such policies are actually having an impact in development goals and priorities.
	Peru	The impact of regional programmes differs significantly. EUROsociAL may have had the highest impact.

3.3 Graduation

3.3.1 Q6 Engagement with countries in graduation process through regional cooperation

Question 6: In your view, has the EU appropriately used regional-level development cooperation to engage with countries in the process of graduation?

Figure 8 Q6 Engagement with countries in graduation process – Overview of responses



The share of positive answers for Q6 is 10%.

Table 8 Q6 Engagement with countries in graduation process – Qualitative assessments


Graduation Status	Country	Engagement with countries in graduation process – Qualitative assessments
Graduated	Brazil	Regional cooperation in graduated countries needs to be better engaged with the Delegations. Decisions on priorities, implementation tools and reporting should be adapted to the needs of Graduated countries and the EU actions in those countries. Excessive centralisation in project development is still the rule.
	Venezuela	Venezuela is a country graduated for the EU, however the process of graduation is not real due to many difficulties and internal deterioration. The EU accompanies this difficult process of graduation well without being graduated.
	Argentina	I have serious doubts whether the EU had intended to use regional cooperation as a "phasing out" or "phasing over" tool but it has nevertheless allowed us to continue cooperation activities with these countries.
	Chile	I cannot provide comments on countries in the process of graduation since Chile is already graduated and phased out from development cooperation in accordance with the OECD-DAC definition. However, the regional-level development cooperation has supported sustainable development (aligned to Agenda 2030) and helped the country to comply with local and international commitments. Additionally, Chile has also played a significant role in the region through south-south cooperation. (Note: Even though considered a upper middle income country, Chile is a very unequal country which means that the needs and priorities throughout the regions are different and diverse).
	Uruguay	Regional programmes contribute to key challenges that almost all the countries of the region face regardless of their level of development such as: inequalities, fight against drug trafficking, insecurity, climate change. What is missing is a specific country strategy paper that would better highlight the relation between the country needs and challenges and the contribution these programmes may offer (also in the framework of the political and trade relations).
	Mexico	Potential is clear to the EUD but need to be fully used (see comments on HR-when countries has been upgraded DEVCO cut resources from one day to another, EUD with less resources put the priority on management of global and individual financing commitment vs regional programmes managed by HQs)
	Costa Rica	Until recently no. Currently reflections ongoing and renewed engagement, with a potential to solid engagement over coming years.
Not graduated	Bolivia	The EU is in a process to improve the impact of regional programmes in countries in the process of graduation. More can be done.

Graduation Status	Country	Engagement with countries in graduation process – Qualitative assessments
	Cuba	the very term graduation reflects the Eurocentric view of our relations and undermines true cooperation in both directions with other countries
Phasing out	Ecuador	The contributions to support graduation came mostly from national programme (not regional): Strengthening institutional capacity through PEFA, Decentralization Process, tax collection.
	Colombia	Not yet. We were indeed in the process of phasing out from EU bilateral development cooperation. However our MIP was extended until 2020. In addition, the EU Trust Fund for Peace was set to support peace implementation measures. Our regional programmes have been successful in offering complementary support to key policies linked to the consolidation of peace and development in the country.
	Peru	As stated before, the impact of regional programmes not only depends on the quality of the experts but also on the active involvement of delegations in identifying demand, participation in visibility events etc. Not all programmes have been set up to allow delegation participation; furthermore, minimum staffing levels at the delegation are required to ensure follow-up.

3.3.2 Q7 Comparative advantage to engagement with countries in the graduation process

Question 7: In your view, has EU regional-level development cooperation had comparative advantages (compared to other EU financing instruments and forms of cooperation) to engage with countries in the process of graduation?

Figure 9 Q7 Comparative advantage – Overview of responses



The share of positive answers for Q7 is 58%.

Table 9 Q7 Comparative advantage – Qualitative assessments

Graduation status	Country	Comparative advantage – Qualitative assessments
Graduated	Brazil	Regional cooperation is a big opportunity for the EU in Graduated countries. it can facilitate the engagement with partner countries at "equal level", opening better policy dialogue channels, etc. However, EU Delegations in Graduated countries in the region are clearly understaffed, and with just one person in each country there is a material impossibility to follow properly all regional cooperation projects.
	Argentina	It definitely has, but it was never used in that sense. Only after the graduation, it occurred to the EU it could be used that way.
	Uruguay	Advantages: - as it is concentrated in specific - predefined sectors may offer specialised technical assistance for follow up (that at country level the Delegations may not have). - based on annual plans, may adapt to changing needs. - working at regional level, concentrated in common challenges may create economies of scale, demonstration effect, contributing to more efficiency. Disadvantages: - Difficult to identify the specific results these programmes want to achieve. For example, EUROsociAL +, which are the specific expected results in the area of governance at regional level and with regard to the different development levels of the countries?. How are we going to demonstrate that globally we contributed to this result? In gender which are the specific expected results and targets? How relevant are these programmes to the needs and constraints for the sustainability of the development process of the graduated countries?
	Costa Rica	Potential to triangulate with other countries, South-South exchange of practices.
Not graduated	Honduras	There're wider challenges that require wider solutions.
	El Salvador	In the case of El Salvador, a possible use of the facility for graduated countries would help to better frame our future cooperation who have the ambition to change its development level.

Graduation status	Country	Comparative advantage – Qualitative assessments
	Guatemala	It does have the potential to replace the traditional bilateral cooperation with graduated countries. I have worked in countries which are not graduated (El Salvador and Guatemala).
Phasing out	Colombia	Regional programmes tend to be more flexible and allowed us to provide technical assistance and European expertise to influence key policies and sectorial needs. They have the capacity to nourish a permanent policy dialogue with institutions.
	Peru	Key challenges in higher middle income countries include: governance improving public administration/governance, tackling pockets of poverty and enhancing international coordination in areas of common interest such as climate change, fight against drugs and organized crime and migration. This generally translates into smaller more targeted actions, closely aligned with the policy dialogue of the delegation. Some actions can be classified as ODA, others will be driven by common and/or EU interest. Regional programmes are definitely part of the answer, but can only be effective as far as they allow close alignment with the EU policy dialogue with the country. The advantages of regional programmes from a delegation point of view are: quickly mobilizing regional/European expertise, no administrative burden (i.e. no administrative project management). Yet, in the course of the policy dialogue, different specific needs/opportunities may emerge, which cannot be addressed with regional programmes only. It would be highly useful to maintain a limited envelope of "support measures" which can mobilize technical assistance missions (e.g. an OECD review), logistical support for events (on topics such as press freedom, circular economy, gender-based violence, ...) and funds for the visibility of EU actions. - can quickly mobilize regional/European expertise. Score: mixed - off-load part of the administrative management to an external agency, leaving delegation staff focus on policy dialogue. Score: Strong

3.3.3 Q8 Missed opportunities

Question 8: Have there been any missed opportunities with regards to using regional development cooperation to enhance EU cooperation with countries in the process of graduation?

Table 10 Q8 Missed opportunities – Qualitative assessments


Graduation status	Country	Missed opportunities – Qualitative assessments
Graduated	Brazil	The missed opportunities occur on "daily bases". Each activity organised by Regional cooperation in a country points-out, generally, to key issues and to key decision making persons at Ministries. However, the Delegations do not have the staff to follow-up on those issues, is just impossible with the current human resources policy in Latin America; losing opportunities very often, leaving the role of the EU representation to "external" implementing partners (UN agencies, MS agencies, National bodies.) that very often do not know the EU country priorities and, moreover, are not prepared nor allowed to represent the EU. In many occasions even the EU visibility has not been properly used.
	Argentina	In the case of Argentina, perhaps not, because with the previous administration the relation was very sporadic.
	Chile	Regional development cooperation can be of great help in the process of graduation if: 1. They learn from previous experiences and updates their designs accordingly 2. They respect and know the local contexts (things cannot be rushed based on external needs if greater governmental involvement is required) 3. They interact, communicate and coordinate themselves (internally) with the DEU timely and promptly, highlighting main objectives, activities and interests in order to come up with a common narrative that is aligned with the country's national strategy.
	Costa Rica	Too early to assess. Those experiences are recent.
Phasing out	Ecuador	For the future, it would be useful to design a specific regional programme on trade.
	Colombia	In a way yes. Because of the everyday priorities and urgencies, little attention has been given to the opportunities offered by regional programmes to complement development actions taking place under different aid modalities. That has changed and we are now increasing articulation and strategic approach for programmes to be functional to our goals.

Graduation status	Country	Synergies – Qualitative assessments
	Nicaragua	Articulation with DCI is good, especially when regional projects are devolved to delegations (e.g. blending). In Central America, the Association Agreement is supported by the sub-regional programme, more than the regional one.
	El Salvador	Although perfectible some actions from regional cooperation strengthened our bilateral policy dialogue (social and economic sectors).
	Guatemala	On bilateral malnutrition programmes there have been this nexus. Also with trade due to the AA.
	Cuba	very limited, often the delegation not informed/involved
Phasing out	Ecuador	GPGC is managed by UN and the information doesn't flow in an adequate manner.
	Colombia	Since most of the priorities set by the country are all linked to the search and consolidation of peace, both bilateral cooperation and regional-level programmes were contributing to these objectives.
	Peru	The delegation plays an important role in this.

3.4.2 Q10 Coordination

Question 10: Based on your experience, to what extent has EU's regional-level development cooperation been coordinated with other levels/forms of cooperation?

Figure 11 Q10 Coordination – Overview of responses



The share of positive answers for Q10 is:

- 53% for EU Bilateral cooperation (DCI)
- 33% for Partnership Instrument (PI)
- 22% for Actions by other DGs (TRADE, ECHO, RTD, etc.)
- 10% for Actions of EU Member States
- 0% for Actions of non-EU countries and other development partners

Table 12 Q10 Coordination – Qualitative assessments


Graduation status	Country	Coordination – Qualitative assessments
Graduated	Brazil	In Brazil the coordination with other actors could be improved.
	Panama	We are coordinating as much as possible but the means do not match needs.
	Venezuela	Very low.
	Argentina	The process is still ongoing and very much dependant on the will and commitment of Delegations. It would be good if coordination was also attempted from HQ.
	Chile	Coordination requires time and resources. Locally, DUE are more and more constrained due to staff reduction.

Graduation status	Country	Coordination – Qualitative assessments
Not graduated	Bolivia	Again, good experiences with DCI and PI, variable experience with other DGs (good with ECHO, less with others). NO evidence of coordination b/w regional programmes and EU MS (at least until very recently, cf. EUROCLIMA +) or non EU countries.
	Paraguay	Few member states active in Paraguay
	Guatemala	As explained before, the bilateral cooperation has connected with the regional level especially on malnutrition. The cooperation given by other Member States is hard to evaluate in this context.
Phasing out	Colombia	That level of coordination hasn't been included in our management of regional programmes. There has been some coordination with other levels of cooperation but it has been perhaps a collateral result rather than a motivated one.

3.4.3 Q11 Added value by sectors

Question 11: Based on your experience, to what extent has there been added value of the regional approach (as compared to bilateral approaches) in the thematic areas specified below?

Figure 12 Q11 Added value by sectors – Overview of responses



*Blending refers to the Latin American Investment Facility, which covers multiple thematic areas

The share of positive answers for Q11 is:

- 57% for Peace and Security (incl. migration)
- 50% for Environment and climate change
- 44% for Social sectors
- 33% for Higher education
- 31% for Sustainable and inclusive growth
- 22% for Blending instrument
- 20% for Trade

Table 13 Q11 Added value by sectors – Qualitative assessments

Graduation Status	Country	Added value by sectors – Qualitative assessments
Graduated	Brazil	Blending and Trade in Brazil should be better followed and strengthened. Peace and security is very welcomed by the State officials and Higher education by Universities and students.
	Argentina	The regional approach in a Latin American context is positive because it promotes transparency, harmonisation and integration. It must nevertheless take deeply into account the different bilateral contexts, since they will individually, be the ones responsible for regional success.


Graduation Status	Country	Added value by sectors – Qualitative assessments
	Uruguay	Up to now, the bilateral approach offered a more strategic approach based on the priorities identified at bilateral level. Nevertheless, considering the reality of the ODA, the regional approach will be the only possible in the future. In any event, each approach has its specificities, thus difficult (irrelevant) to compare added value to a specific policy.
	Costa Rica	Blending too early to assess in case of CR. On other topics clear added value perceived.
Not graduated	Nicaragua	As regards blending, the instrument does have significant added value. This is particularly true of blending projects devolved to Delegations (or projects the monitoring of which relies on delegations). We have no evidence of the relevance of regional blending projects.
	El Salvador	Regional approach support concretely the country dialogs in these areas. Difficult to know to what extent.
	Cuba	Lack of appropriation and de-link from bilateral cooperation
Phasing out	Ecuador	These are exactly the areas where a regional approach can give a plus. However regional implementation can improve.
	Colombia	There has been added value, but the priorities continue to be around bilateral approaches. I believe that as we leave behind a bilateral approach as a result of this phase-out period, more a more attention will be given to regional-level programmes and instruments.

3.5 Blending

3.5.1 Q12 EUD involvement in LAIF projects

Question 12: To what extent has your Delegation been involved in projects funded by the Latin American Investment Facility (LAIF)?

Figure 13 Q12 EUD involvement in LAIF projects – Overview of responses




The share of positive answers for Q12 is 44%.

3.5.2 Q13 LAIF achievements

Question 13: Based on your experience, to what extent have LAIF projects achieved the following?

Figure 14 Q13 LAIF achievements – Overview of responses



The share of positive answers for Q13 is:

- 40% for Address important needs and challenges in the region
- 36% for Added value to bilateral EU cooperation
- 36% for Strengthen the partnership between European and LA financial institutions
- 23% for Improved service delivery in the targeted outcome areas
- 13% for Strengthen partnership between EU and graduated countries

Table 14 Q13 LAIF achievements – Qualitative assessments

Graduation status	Country	LAIF achievements – Qualitative assessments
Graduated	Brazil	LAIF is still a challenge in Brazil.
	Panama	No bilateral LAIF project in Panama, but regional ones do operate in the country.
	Venezuela	No LAIF project was carried out in Venezuela.
	Argentina	The process is still ongoing and very much dependant on the will and commitment of Delegations. The involvement of other EU non-Commission or EEAS brings in extra layers of complexity
	Chile	In Chile, there is only one LAIF project. This started in 2014 and has not finished yet for different issues. Now, the context differs from when it started. A new analysis is necessary to determine how to make the better use of this instrument.
	Uruguay	The country has made little use of this facility. We were led to understand that in other countries the Facility has contributed to increased investment in key public service sectors.
	Mexico	LAIF has been managed centrally and EUD's involvement and appropriation suffered from that. It seems that some measures are under discussion for improving the situation.
	Costa Rica	LAIF is an important tool for graduated countries, and gives the EU leverage and added value in country. Service delivery targets too early to assess for CR but potentially very positive.

Graduation status	Country	LAIF achievements – Qualitative assessments
Not graduated	Bolivia	Infrastructure, energy, water and environment are surely regional challenges, so in this sense LAIF has addressed them. Also, it has pushed for more partnership between EU and LA IF, although I can see that are mostly the same few to be always involved in the operations (BID, AECID, CAF, AFD). It added value to the bilateral cooperation thanks to bringing additional money and making the Del part of bigger projects from which it would be usually excluded. As for services, is still early to say.
	Nicaragua	Blending projects are an essential tool in Nicaragua, and a very effective one.
	Paraguay	Replies given from a Paraguayan perspective, where the very limited LAIF intervention is not complementary; the general opinion differs highly.
	El Salvador	El Salvador benefited from 2 LAIF projects which encountered large implementation delays but produced good result at sector level (hydroelectricity, Rural roads).
	Guatemala	LAIF is not an option in Guatemala. All loans have to be approved by the parliament. The current configuration of the parliament in Guatemala makes it virtually impossible to pass loans, hence LAIF is impracticable.
	Cuba	limited volumes, unplanned cooperation, limited -EU involvement in follow up, limited leverage
Phasing out	Ecuador	Too early in the implementation process to correctly estimate achievements.
	Colombia	LAIF projects have addressed important challenges in Colombia. Nevertheless complementarity with bilateral cooperation is not always solid. Delegations should be involved in a more proactive way in all the stages of the Project Cycle Management, from identification to evaluation.

3.5.3 Q14 LAIF strengths and weaknesses

Question 14: Based on your experience, can you identify strengths and weaknesses of LAIF projects?

Table 15 Q14 LAIF strengths and weaknesses – Qualitative assessments


Graduation status	Country	Strengths	Weaknesses
Graduated	Brazil	Flexibility	Unclear objectives
	Panama	Mobilization of loans	Lack of involvement of EU Delegation when signing contracts
	Argentina	political leverage	unknown commitment and prioritisation assumed by financial institutions
Not graduated	Bolivia	Additional funds for key areas	LAIF as a "project taker" rather than a "project maker"
	Honduras	-	Coordination and timing with banks
	Nicaragua	Partnering with IFIs; holding a dialogue with the ministry of finance.	To few eligible IFIs; should be open to IADB and CABEL.
	Paraguay	Potential to mobilize private sector funds	Additionality
	El Salvador	to help moving other funds	-
	Guatemala	leverage and mobilisation of resources for big infrastructure projects	Adds to the debt burden of the country
	Cuba	TA-driven investments	slow implementation, lack of sector policy dialogue, weak reporting from development banks..
Phasing out	Ecuador	it promotes member states joint initiatives	Coordination between Del and FIs
	Peru	Leverage EU visibility and impact	Peru has a very cautious approach to contracting additional external debt

3.6 Visibility

3.6.1 Q15 Awareness

Question 15: Based on your experience, to what extent is the partner country aware of the EU's regional development cooperation?

Figure 15 Q15 Awareness – Overview of responses



The share of positive answers for Q15 is 35%.


Table 16 Q15 Awareness – Qualitative assessments

Graduation status	Country	Awareness – Qualitative assessments
Graduated	Brazil	Brazil recognises the EU as a Political and Trade partner, but even though the situation has been recently improved, there are still difficulties to accept the EU as a real cooperation partner.
	Venezuela	Regional programmes are known in some sectors of interest.
	Argentina	The process is still ongoing and very much dependant on the will and commitment of Delegations. In the Argentinean case, the serious lack of resources does have a negative impact in terms of visibility.
	Chile	On March 11th, a new government took office. We are in the process of socializing what the EU is and how the cooperation works. There is still a high lack of knowledge about the EU among officials in general. This reach out needs to be done at a country level.
	Uruguay	Some institutional actors are aware, not the "partner country".
	Costa Rica	CR is proactively engaged with regional cooperation - with a networks of focal points in most institutions of relevance to the programmes.
Not graduated	Bolivia	Knowledge of regional programme is directly proportional to the effort of the Delegation. If the Delegation is not involved by HQs and does not socialize the regional programmes, knowledge in partner country is close to zero.
	Nicaragua	The distinction of our different programmes (national, sub-regional, regional, thematic, FPI...) is extremely confusing. Partner countries should be spared this complication. If they see us as one EU with the Delegation as its interlocutor, all the better.
	El Salvador	It is only very recently that we try to communicate and give visibility to this kind of cooperation, largely unknown at national level.
	Guatemala	Guatemala is not dependent on foreign aid. Although it continues to be a very unequal country, the elites resist change and the modernization that cooperation brings. In that sense, and as explained earlier, the State is very unaware of the regional cooperation in general.
	Cuba	Visibility material and social networks, especially EUROCLIMA and EUROsocial
Phasing out	Colombia	The dialogue with institutions has shown that regional programmes are well known by local institutions.

3.6.2 Q16 Value of regional cooperation

Question 16: Based on your experience, to what extent does the partner country value the EU's regional development cooperation?

Figure 16 Q16 Value of regional cooperation – Overview of responses



The share of positive answers for Q16 is 53%.

Table 17 Q16 Value of regional cooperation – Qualitative assessments

Graduation status	Country	Value of regional cooperation – Qualitative assessments
Graduated	Brazil	Those institutions and agencies involved with the EU in development cooperation have a very positive perception of our work. However, there is a big lack of awareness about what we do in general, and those not involved do not show a particular interest in it.
	Argentina	The partner country values regional cooperation, although there is undoubtedly potential for greater recognition.
	Chile	Those who have worked with the EU value regional development cooperation at a great extent (i.e. Erasmus, and EUROsociAL). As described in the previous question, the new government comes from the private sector and has less experience working with the EU. In other words, that requires a lot of effort from the Delegation on top of the regional programmes' communication and missions to the country.
	Uruguay	Key institutional actors are aware and value the EU regional cooperation. They value the opportunity it offers of learning between peers in areas of mutual interest, and, in some cases they value the opportunity to implement pilot projects.
	Costa Rica	Highly valued, although country is somewhat frustrated of depending on regional instruments after phase out of bilateral envelope.
Not graduated	Bolivia	Mixed value depending on to which extent the regional programme addresses the immediate needs of the government.
	Nicaragua	See above. Partner country value EU cooperation, not necessarily regional cooperation.
	El Salvador	The government don't have a global view of the regional cooperation.
	Guatemala	There is very little recognition of our regional cooperation.
	Cuba	Those involved (civil servants of middle-level) value exposure to other countries, travelling, networking. This does not necessarily represent "the country"
Phasing out	Ecuador	Government is very much involved in all regional programmes.
	Colombia	They see regional programmes as a window for concrete technical support that does not require complex procedures. They struggle however with identification fiches. It is important to increase accompaniment to institutions filling current templates.

3.7 Lessons learnt

3.7.1 Q17 Success factors

Question 17: Based on your experience, what have been the main success factors for EU's regional-level development cooperation?

Table 18 Q17 List of main success factors

Graduation status	Country	Success Factor 1	Success Factor 2
Graduated	Brazil	Flexibility	Demand driven approach
	Venezuela	The cooperation between Universities	The existence of real political dialogue with the government
	Argentina	The ability to address concrete policy issues and deploy technical support	The willingness to use local expertise towards regional issues
	Chile	Target a topic that is of main interest for most of the region (i.e. climate change)	Partner with other organizations which have a better understanding of the regional dynamics (i.e. ECLAC)
	Uruguay	Demand driven approach	Concentration on specific sectors
	Mexico	Supporting public policies in strategic areas/sectors	A complementary and essential tool to build and feed (content) sectoral dialogues
	Costa Rica	potential for south south exchange	highly valued TA (in part EUROsocial)
Not graduated	Bolivia	Strong coordination with the Delegation	Capacity to listen and respond to the needs of the countries
	Honduras	Flexibility	-
	Nicaragua	Being demand driven.	Paving the way for the exchange of best practices between LA countries.
	Paraguay	Experience sharing and work at EU-LA and LA-LA peer level	Promotion of concrete intra LA regional cooperation
	El Salvador	Regional activities support national prioritise for the country regional agenda	At sector level a strong coordination with the EU Delegation in the country
Phasing out	Ecuador	The regional focus gives more effectiveness	Synergies between actors
	Colombia	Flexibility	Opportunities to provide technical and European expertise
	Peru	foster intra-regional links	mobilize regional experience

3.7.2 Q18 Hindering factors

Question 18: Based on your experience, what have been the main hindering factors for EU's regional-level development cooperation?

Table 19 Q18 List of main hindering factors

Graduation status	Country	Hindering Factor 1	Hindering Factor 2
Graduated	Brazil	De-concentration of the implementation to third agencies	Limited involvement of Delegations in the development of actions/priorities
	Venezuela	Little relationship and coordination with the competent governmental entities	disappearance of business relationships
	Argentina	The territorial implementation extension	The development disparities between countries
	Chile	Not to include Delegation in a clearer manner in the local interactions.	Not to consider country's context when scheduling activities or events in order to comply with other interests or commitments. Nonetheless, that has improved.
	Uruguay	Difficult to relate all the activities carried out with concrete specific results at regional level and country level.	-

Graduation status	Country	Hindering Factor 1	Hindering Factor 2
	Mexico	coordination and exchange of information with Companies managing the programmes could be improved (not the majority of the cases)	To be able to fully take advantage of the potential of this programmes, EUDEL needs sufficient HR (coordinating and pushing for more synergies with a huge numbers of actors -authorities, civil society, private sector is time consuming)
	Costa Rica	complexity of certain programmes (e.g. EUROCLIMA)	-
Not graduated	Bolivia	Fragmentation of activities	Multiple lines of communication, by-passing Delegations
	Honduras	Coordination with bilateral level	-
	Nicaragua	Some projects are too complex (EUROCLIMA) and too demanding in terms of presence in meetings.	Lack of eligible IFIs for blending.
	Paraguay	Competition for funds between countries (Calls for Proposals), leaving 'weak' behind	In cases lack of focus on policy, privileging 'projects'
	El Salvador	Though it is nearly impossible for a regional project to coordinate with all the delegations and not indispensable in sectors where there is no bilateral cooperation, it is necessary to deeply coordinate EU supports in common sectors	-
	Cuba	Lack of ownership	Delink from bilat coop
Phasing out	Ecuador	Designed with a regional focus and then implemented with a national interest	-
	Colombia	Lack of articulation	Lack of strategic planning to better identify demands.
	Peru	Regional projects are sometimes managed as parallel/independent projects, run by Member State Agencies, independent from the delegation's work	Low staffing levels at delegations

3.7.3 Suggestions

Question 19: If you have any suggestions of improvement for EU's regional-level development cooperation or any other remarks, please share them below.

Table 20 Q19 List of suggestions

Graduation status	Country	Suggestions
Graduated	Brazil	Delegations should be strengthened to properly follow-up Regional Cooperation. It offers a number of interesting opportunities to better engage in policy dialogue with the countries but we just do not have people/resources (and we pay others to do it on our behalf).
	Venezuela	Exchange and active political dialogue
	Argentina	Allow for sub-regional programmes addressing global issues enshrined in the SDG's, combining strong bilateral (in-country) and regional (multi-country) components.
	Chile	Regional level development cooperation will be attractive for the countries as long as they address needs that are relevant for the country. To establish that relation and understand what the country needs, the Delegation's work is key. And in order to do this work, time and resources are needed at a country level too.
	Uruguay	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - define 5 to 10 specific "results" of each programme that are to be achieved at regional level, with measurable targets. - allow interventions that may need to buy equipment. - improve the relation between the DCI regional programmes and PI programmes.

<i>Graduation status</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Suggestions</i>
Not graduated	Nicaragua	Streamline implementation modalities: assess performance of past programmes and draw lessons in terms of implementation modalities. Avoid creating trademarks with a visibility competing with the EU's. Expand the number of eligible IFIs for LAIF.
	Cuba	change approach of "graduation", ensure bidirectional flows of knowledge exchange, increase ownership through LA regional organizations.
Phasing out	Ecuador	More coordination with DEL, especially with call of proposals.
	Colombia	It is important to strengthen a strategic approach for all regional programmes. Identifications of demands should not be only "notes taking" in a meeting in which several institutions suggest what they believe are key actions. It is necessary to include technical assistance to help institutions to identify cross-cutting strategic demands in which they all feel winners.
	Peru	Over the past few years significant efforts have been undertaken to improve coordination of regional programmes with delegations. These efforts should continue throughout all regional (and global) programmes. On the other hand, their impact and visibility on the ground also depends on the delegation's capacity (i.e. staffing levels) to be able to take advantage of the opportunities offered by regional programmes and to effectively integrate them in the policy dialogue and wider strategic objectives of each delegation.

Annex 8: Field mission notes

This annex presents the notes of the field missions conducted by the team between July and September 2018 in seven LA countries (Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Peru). The country selection reflected a number of considerations, including:

- Sub-regional coverage: two Central American and five South American countries;
- Sector coverage: countries relevant for the respective sectors;
- Graduation from EU bilateral development cooperation: countries at several stages of the graduation process (two not graduated, three phasing out and two graduated);
- Political and security situation: we initially planned a field visit in Nicaragua as the country is an important player in many regional interventions. However, the political situation in the country made such a visit impossible.

The field visits were complemented by phone interviews to cover specific issues in various countries. The table below gives an overview of both field visits and phone interviews conducted by country and EQ / subject area.

Table 21 Overview of data collection efforts in LA countries

Sub-region	Country	Graduation status (DCI)	Type of activities	Strategic directions	Implementation approaches	Inclusive Growth	Security-development	HE & T&Sc	Env & CC	Social equity
Central America	Costa Rica	Graduated	Visit + phone					phone		
	El Salvador	Not graduated	Visit + phone							
	Guatemala	Not graduated	Phone					phone		
	Nicaragua	Not graduated	Phone	phone	phone					
	Mexico	Graduated	Phone					phone		
	Panama	Graduated	Phone							
South America	Bolivia	Not graduated	Visit + Phone							
	Brazil	Graduated	Visit + phone							
	Chile	Graduated	Phone					phone		phone
	Colombia	Phasing out	Visit + phone					phone		
	Ecuador	Phasing out	Visit + phone							
	Peru	Phasing out	Visit + phone							
Total				8	8	2	3	6	3	2

Field mission note – Bolivia

Period of the field mission	29 July to 5 August 2018
Evaluation Team Member(s)	Carlos Rivera
Thematic focus	Inclusive growth
Main programmes covered	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • AL-INVEST IV • AL-INVEST 5.0
Stakeholders interviewed (The full list of persons interviewed is provided in Section 3)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EUD staff • Other development partners • Government officials • Business organisations • Implementing partners

1 Introduction

1.1 Context

Table 1 *Bolivia general indicators*

<i>Indicator</i>	<i>Value</i>
GDP per capita (current USD)	3,394 (2017)
Human Development Index	0.69 (2018)
Population (million)	11.1 (2017)
Graduation (DCI financing)	Not graduated
ODA disbursed in 2009 and 2016 (in million USD) ⁷	651.6 (2009); 698.6 (2016)

Sources: World Bank data, UNDP HDR, EC DEVCO Country Page, OECD Stat

Since 2009, Bolivia has undergone a process of important political and social reform, accompanied by solid economic growth. Extreme poverty has dropped from 37% in 2005 to 17% in 2014, moving from a low-income economy to a lower/middle-income one. Its main economic activities include agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, and manufacturing goods such as textiles, clothing, refined metals, and refined petroleum/gas. Bolivia is very wealthy in minerals, especially tin, and has the second largest natural gas reserves in South America. However, Bolivia still faces considerable development challenges mainly linked to the high inequality in income distribution, institutional capacities and the pressure on natural resources.⁸

Table 2 *Bolivia sector specific indicators*

<i>Indicator</i>	<i>Value</i>	
Inclusive and sustainable growth		
Ease of Doing Business Rank	150/181 (2009)	152/190 (2017)
Informal employment (% of total non-agricultural employment)	77.7 (2009)	77.8 (2017)
Bribery incidence (% of firms experiencing at least one bribe payment request)	10.7 (2010)	9.1 (2017)
Firms using banks to finance investment (% of firms)	27.8 (2010)	37.0 (2017)

Sources: World Development Indicators

⁷ 2015 constant prices

⁸ [EC DEVCO country page](#)

The persistence of low productivity growth and high levels of informality in the economy continue to be outstanding challenges for Bolivia's future growth and poverty reduction prospects. Between 2003 and 2013, the country's productivity growth was close to the modest LAC regional median, and far below top performers such as Uruguay, Panama, the Dominican Republic, and Peru. This is so despite efforts to facilitate access to credit – including through public banks – and the support to productive initiatives, particularly to SME. The lack of increases in productivity is particularly serious in non-extractive sectors. The lack of modern and efficient irrigation infrastructure and comprehensive institutional framework for water resources management limit agriculture productivity. Yet agriculture has a critical role for employment and income gains, particularly for indigenous groups, given that at least 30 percent of the total labour force and 75 percent of the rural labour force still depend directly or indirectly on agriculture for its livelihoods. Bolivia is also constrained by a high level of labour informality, which restricts demand for higher skilled jobs. But the demographic dividend, rapid urbanization and expansion of education means that the labour market in the future will put a premium on better skills to fill higher quality jobs.⁹

1.2 EU support to inclusive growth

1.2.1 Bilateral cooperation

Table 3 EU bilateral cooperation MIP allocations for Bolivia

Financing cycle & Cooperation sector	Value (EUR million)
EU bilateral cooperation MIP 2007-13	252
Generating economic opportunities for decent work in micro-enterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)	90
Fight against illicit drug production and trafficking	85
Water management	74
EU bilateral cooperation MIPs 2014-16 and 2017-20	281
Justice sector reform and fight against corruption	20
Fight against illicit drugs	130
Integrated water resource management	115.4
Support measures	15.6

In the **MIP 2007-2013**, the EU cooperation focused on three main areas, amongst which **SME support**, with the following specific objectives:

- strengthening the productive sector comprising micro-enterprises and SMEs,
- improving the institutional framework in order to increase their productivity and competitiveness, which will lead to better market access and integration with the purpose of creating decent and sustainable work.

In the **MIP 2014-2016** and **MIP 2017-2020** the EU cooperation focused on three main areas, with no focus on inclusive growth sector.

This choice has been made on the basis of the Bolivian agenda 2025 which sets out the long term development vision of the country and in coordination with EU Member States and other donors. In addition, the Delegation, the EU Member States and Switzerland have developed in collaboration with the Bolivian Government the European Joint Strategy for Bolivia. Bilateral cooperation strategies are directly linked to the Joint Strategy allowing for a greater harmonization and complementarity. EU interventions are also drawn up within the broader context of EU external policies, notably the Agenda for Change and the EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, as well as the 2030 horizon and the international commitments on climate change.¹⁰

1.2.2 Regional cooperation

Regarding the inclusive growth sector, Bolivia has been an active participant in AL-INVEST and hosts the AL-INVEST 5.0 consortium leader CAINCO (based in Santa Cruz).

⁹ WB 2015 Bolivia Country Partnership Framework

¹⁰ [EC DEVCO country page](#)

2 Main findings of the field phase mission

2.1 Key observations

- Stakeholders provided a positive assessment on the efforts of AL-INVEST 5.0 on the development of business organisations' services in the country and on the overall usefulness of the regional programme. (JC63)
- AL-INVEST 5.0 runs in parallel to bilateral EU interventions in Bolivia with limited synergies and mechanisms to ensure cross-fertilization between the two levels. (JC22)
- Despite good consistency between EU regional programmes and EU Member States interventions (which, in some cases such as Denmark, explicitly mention objectives of inclusive growth and, in other cases such as Germany and Belgium, embrace large actions – e.g. in the area of rural development – closely related to this topic), there was limited coordination during project implementation. It is worth mentioning that in Bolivia several EU MS have already ended or are in the process of phasing out their cooperation (e.g. Belgium, Denmark). (JC24)
- Several stakeholders reported difficulties in the AL-INVEST 5.0 monitoring, including delays and duplication between the two components of the programme. CAINCO, which is leading the core component of the programme, has a monitoring system for the day-to-day management, while Euromipyme developed a separate results/impact monitoring system. (JC25)
- The Euromipyme component (and ECLAC's role in AL-INVEST 5.0) is not well understood by the various actors in Bolivia. There is a general lack of knowledge about the products of the component and the planned role of ECLAC in AL-INVEST. (EC62)
- While AL-INVEST 5.0 is based on a concept of productivity, many interviewed stakeholders put an emphasis on business development aspects. It is unclear how the different understandings of the programme's focus will affect its results. (JC63)

2.2 Transversal aspects

- In Bolivia the triangular cooperation is stagnant. It is necessary to apply new schemes and innovative mechanisms to encourage this kind of cooperation in this country. (JC11)
- There is general consistency between EU regional cooperation, bilateral cooperation and the actions of other EU DGs. However, in practice the coordination of activities between the various DGs (DEVCO and DG Trade for example) remains a challenge. (JC13)
- EUD staff was reduced, meaning that the remaining staff members now cover wider subject areas. (JC22)
- No synergies between the PI and the regional cooperation programmes in the sector of inclusive growth could be found in Bolivia. (JC23)
- More studies and information on the effects of graduation are needed in the case of Bolivia. This includes information on new modalities to be used after graduation. Local stakeholders were particularly interested to learn more about the use of blending. (JC23)
- Synergies between EU/MS and EU/other donors: In Bolivia, the synergies between these actors and regional support are limited. Regarding bilateral cooperation, there are strong synergies. A European Joint Strategy has been even elaborated jointly with the EUMS, Switzerland and the Bolivian Government (JC24)
- There are complaints about the call for proposals procedure of AL-INVEST 5.0, which implies heavy administrative requirements for the coordinator as well as the participating organizations and MSMEs. This includes reporting and difficulties in the presentation of bank guarantees that rejects many good candidates. (JC25)
- AL-INVEST 5.0 has shown difficulties with the monitoring system. It has delays and design problems that have limited its use and scope. There are two parallel monitoring systems, one in CAINCO for the day-to-day management of the project, and another in charge of the Euromipyme component of AL-INVEST 5.0. (JC25)
- Competitive funds have been used differently in AL-INVEST IV and AL-INVEST 5.0. In the former, the competitive funds were only a dedicated financing instrument of projects, while the latter has established a mechanism for the creation of a network through cascading grants. (JC25)

2.3 Examples of success stories

- Under AL-INVEST IV, each implementing consortium (RA, CAN and MCV) was in charge of actions supporting the MSMEs, including enhancing dialogue with public institutions. This contributed to the development of decree-laws to support MSMEs in Bolivia and other countries (Guatemala, El Salvador, Ecuador). AL-INVEST 5.0 is perceived by stakeholders as being more focused on the development of business services to MSMEs. (JC63)
- Some interviewees highlighted the positive contributions of Euromipyme (implemented by ECLAC) and the core component of AL-INVEST 5.0 (implemented by CAINCO) to the development of meeting spaces for LA institutional stakeholders and representatives of the EU, EU Member States and multilateral organizations, to exchange on MSME development. This was achieved through different types of activities: AL-INVEST annual meetings, academy, workshops, as well as seminars and conferences. However, the specific outcomes of these processes are hard to pin down and there is not much evidence that cooperation between public and private institutions has actually increased as a result of these meetings. In addition, triangular cooperation in the area of inclusive growth in the region is very limited despite the good results of the few cases that exist. (JC61 and 62)
- Stakeholders agree that AL-INVEST IV and AL-INVEST 5.0 have helped to address important institutional challenges of the business support sector in Bolivia. For example, the promotion of the Business Nucleus approach by AL-INVEST 5.0 has allowed consolidation of the services at specific institutions, many of which are specialized in providing such services (for example, CAINCO and CADEX). The approach has also helped increase the geographic coverage of business support activities in regions that were not considered in AL-INVEST IV (for example Cochabamba and Oruro). (JC64)

2.4 Details on some challenges faced by the EU regional programmes

- Compared to AL-INVEST IV, it appears that AL-INVEST 5.0 has prioritized the dialogue among private sector organisations. This new approach reduces the creation of synergies and collaboration opportunities with other projects, especially with the bilateral projects. (JC61)
- Euromipyme has worked on improving the policy framework to support MSMEs in the region and has carried out a series of specific technical assistance projects upon request of organisations like SERCOTEC in Chile, INEC in Ecuador, or the Ministry of Production in Argentina. However, this support is very specific and narrow, thus it is unlikely to generate major impacts at the level of the region as a whole. (JC 64)
- Public institutions expressed their interest in increasing initiatives of triangular cooperation with countries of Central America or the Caribbean in the areas of legal, policy and institutional environment, but highlighted that too little has been done in this area so far. (JC62)
- Euromipyme should help promote public policies supporting MSMEs, coordinate regional events on this topic and provide support to the AL-INVEST 5.0 monitoring system (through a proposal of results and impact indicators and surveys among beneficiary companies for the establishment of a baseline and T2 measurements). However, the role of Euromipyme and ECLAC (which is implementing Euromipyme) is not widely understood by stakeholders in Bolivia. (JC62)
- Euromipyme has carried out the identification of possible areas of bi-regional cooperation, supported the organisation of meetings between LA and European authorities (the main EU-CELAC Summit was suspended in 2017), and the preparation of a summary document of proposals to be validated. But overall, few activities have been carried out to achieve the result 4 of Euromipyme, which consists in promoting a cooperation agreement between EU and LA on specific and relevant topics for MSME development. (JC61)
- One of the challenges faced by the Bolivian MSMEs and the region in general is the creation and dynamisation of support networks; which is made difficult by geographical challenges (travel distances and times). (JC64)

3 List of persons interviewed

<i>Organisation</i>	<i>Name and position</i>
EU Delegation in Bolivia	
	Meritxell Gimenez Calvo (Head of Cooperation) Sergio Marinelli (Political Affairs and commercial issues) Franco Mendizabal (AL-INVEST 5.0 Focal Point)
Other development partners	
AECID	Francisco Sancho (Head of Mission) Oscar Muñoz Alcalá (Social Cohesion Programmes)
DANIDA	Allan Heldbjerg (Chief of Unit)
CTB Bolivia (Belgian TA)	Patrick Gaudissart (Head of Cooperation) Manuel Quiroga (Programme Officer)
GIZ	Elisabeth Girrbaach (Resident Director)
Italian Cooperation	Angelo Benincasa (Head of Unit)
Swiss Cooperation	Nadia Ottiger (Head of Unit)
Sweden Embassy	Arturo J. Beltrán (Programme Manager)
BID	Javier Beverinotti (Senior Country Specialist)
PNUD	Mauricio Ramirez Villegas (Resident Coordinator) Olivia Malmqvist (Coordination Specialist) Belen Zamora Anton (Programme Analyst)
Government	
Ministry of Productive Development and Plural Economy	René Fernando Peñarrieta Loria (Deputy Ministry of Internal Commerce and Export) Marcelo Holguin (Export Specialist and PROEX Ex-coordinator)
Vice Ministry of Finance and Public Credit	Sergio Cusicanqui (Deputy Minister) Juan Omar Velasco (Public Policy Unit)
Vice Ministry of Public Investment and External Financing	Jose Ureña Fernandez (Chief of External Financing Unit) Luis Ochoa Chavarría (specialist of the Vice-Ministry) Dalitza Brozovich (specialist of the Vice-Ministry)
National Tax Service	Juana Jimenez (Executive President) Ruth Vaspineiro (Programme Manager) Jorge Johns (Specialist)
CSOs / think tanks	
National Chamber of Commerce	Marco Antonio Salinas (President) Gustavo Jauregui Gonzales (General Manager) Lorenzo Catalá Subieta (Project Manager)
Industry National Chamber	Fernando Hinojosa Garcia (General Manager) Carmen Rocha (Project Administrative Manager)
Universidad Mayor de San Andrés	Dr. Waldo Albarraci Sanchez (Rector) Fernando Sanabria Camacho (Planning and Coordination Chief) Nelly Valda (International Relation Chief) Daniel Acosta (Programme Coordinator)
CADEX	Martín Salces López (General Manager) Sonia Contza (Specialist) Leonardo Huguies (Specialist)
CAINCO	Julio Silva (Manager of Institutional Development) Daniela Parada (General Project Manager) Bernardo Llobet (Project Monitoring Specialist)
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung	Ivan Velásquez (National Coordinator)
INESAD (Advanced Development Studies Institute)	Carlos Gustavo Machicado (Head of Unit)
Euromipyme CEPAL (Phone interview)	Giovanni Stumpo (General Coordinator) Marco Dini (Specialist responsible for public-private dialogue)

Field mission note – Brazil

Period of the field mission	4 to 11 September 2018
Evaluation Team Member(s)	Jörn Dosch
Thematic focus	Higher Education
Main programmes covered	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Erasmus+ • Erasmus Mundus • Alfa III
Stakeholders interviewed (The full list of persons interviewed is provided in Section 3)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EUD staff • Other development partners • Government officials (Ministry of External Relations, Ministry of Education, Secretariat of Higher Education, Ministry of Science, Technology, Innovation and Communications and Ministry of Health), • Universities (Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Fluminense Federal University, and São Paulo State University)

1 Introduction

1.1 Context

Table 1 *Brazil general indicators*

<i>Indicator</i>	<i>Value</i>
GDP per capita (current USD)	9,821 (2017)
Human Development Index	0.76 (2018)
Population (million)	209.3 (2017)
Graduation (DCI financing)	Fully graduated from bilateral cooperation under the DCI
ODA disbursed in 2009 and 2016 (in million USD) ¹¹	322.9 (2009); 687.4 (2016)

Sources: World Bank data, UNDP HDR, EC DEVCO Country Page, OECD Stat

Brazil's economic and social progress between 2003 and 2014 lifted 29 million people out of poverty and inequality dropped significantly. However, the rate of reduction of poverty and inequality appears to have stagnated since 2015.

Brazil is currently going through a deep recession. The economic crisis, as a result of the fall in commodity prices and an inability to make the necessary policy adjustments, - coupled with the political crisis faced by the country - has contributed to undermining the confidence of consumers and investors.

Brazil's medium-term outlook will depend on the success of the current adjustments and the enactment of growth-enhancing reforms. Raising productivity and competitiveness is the main challenge for the country to achieve higher growth in the medium-term. With the recession of growth drivers over the past decade — credit-fuelled consumption, labour expansion and the commodity boom — growth will need to be based on higher investment and productivity gains.

Despite the achievements in poverty reduction over the last decade, inequality remains at high levels. After achieving universal coverage in primary education, Brazil is now struggling to improve the quality and outcomes of the system, especially at the lower and upper secondary levels.¹²

¹¹ 2015 constant prices

¹² [World Bank country overview](#)

Table 2 *Brazil sector specific indicators*

<i>Indicator</i>	<i>Value</i>	
School enrolment, tertiary (female)	42.2 (2009)	59.3 (2015)
School enrolment, tertiary (male)	31.9 (2009)	42.2 (2015)
Pupil-teacher ratio, tertiary	17.9 (2009)	19.3 (2015)
Number of joint or collaborative degree programmes established	10 EMMCs, 3 EMJDs (2009)	17 EMJMDs (2017)

Sources: World Bank WDI, EACEA website

In the Brazilian Higher Education System, much of the formation of graduates now takes place in private institutions, whose quality is variable. The Brazilian Higher Education Census of 2013 reported that the higher education sector had grown to 7.3 million students, including three-quarters at private institutions. Tertiary education features high dropout and repetition rates, which are the main drivers behind Brazil's high costs per graduate in higher education. Public spending in the tertiary education system tends to benefit the non-poor. At around R\$20,000, spending on tertiary education per student in Brazil is roughly four times higher than spending on general education. However, only few of the poorest have access to tertiary education, although enrolment rates have been increasing in lower-income quintiles between 2007 and 2013. Moreover, the increase of the private sector share in the higher education system in Brazil has been concentrated in the intermediate income levels. Access to public universities is highly selective and competitive and students from poor backgrounds are often disadvantaged in admissions tests because they went to less well performing secondary schools. The poorest among them are also priced out of private provision.¹³

1.2 EU support to higher education

1.2.1 Bilateral cooperation

Table 3 *EU bilateral cooperation MIP allocations for Brazil*

<i>Financing cycle & Cooperation sector</i>	<i>Value (in EUR million)</i>
EU bilateral cooperation MIP 2007-13	61
Higher education programme	30.5
Promoting the environmental dimension of sustainable development	18.3
Facility to support sectoral dialogues	9.15
EU bilateral cooperation MIP 2014-20	Fully graduated from bilateral cooperation under the DCI

In the MIP 2007-2013, the EU cooperation focused on three main areas, amongst which *Enhancing bilateral relations*, with the following specific objectives

- Improve the sectoral dialogues between the EU and Brazil on themes of mutual interest.
- Expand cooperation and exchanges between relevant European and Brazilian institutions and civil society organisations.
- **Strengthen links between EU and Brazilian academia.**
- Enhance mutual awareness between EU and Brazilian institutions and societies.

Due to its economic performance, Brazil is considered as a "graduated" country and therefore it is not eligible for bilateral cooperation under the EU financial exercise 2014-2020. However, Brazil will remain eligible to participate in regional and thematic programmes, which provides an opportunity to re-define together new forms of EU-Brazil cooperation¹⁴

¹³ World Bank 2016 Systematic Country Diagnostic

¹⁴ [EC DEVCO country page](#)

1.2.2 Regional cooperation

Brazil is the top beneficiary of EU support to higher education in LA (ALFA III, Erasmus Mundus, Erasmus+). The University of São Paulo is involved in a total of nine Erasmus Mundus Joint Master Degrees (EMJMD) with European universities, the highest number of all universities in LA. Brazil is also one of two LA countries which have a bi-regional policy dialogue in higher education with the EU (the other is Mexico).

2 Main findings of the field phase mission

2.1 Key observations

- DEVCO funding has mainly supported higher education (HE) in Brazil (both through the regional and particularly bilateral envelope). Cooperation in the area of Science and Technology (S&T) in Brazil has been mainly funded by other DGs. In order to identify synergies, the country note also takes the actions of other DGs into account.
- Both EU and Brazilian government stakeholders agreed that it would be difficult and might not be useful to restrict an evaluation of EU-LA cooperation in the field of HE/S&T to development cooperation, as the latter played only a very small part for a graduated country like Brazil.
- EU cooperation in the S&T sector in Brazil is a good example for mutually reinforcing linkages between regional and bilateral support, between policy dialogue and programme/project support and between state and non-state stakeholders (HEI, research institutes, private sector). (JC12, JC22)
- Erasmus Mundus substantially contributed to the internationalisation of universities. In the cases of smaller universities, international offices were created as the result of Erasmus Mundus projects. The knowledge transfer, the capacity-building and the resulting professionalisation that has taken place as a direct effect of collaboration within networks is seen as one of the most substantial and valuable result of EM-projects. (JC71)
- Through Erasmus Mundus/Erasmus+ and FP7/H2020 the number and scope of regional and bi-regional partnerships and networks have increased. Over the evaluation period, a substantial diversification of the Brazilian involvement has taken place. Whereas about a decade ago only the leading universities benefitted from EU-funded programmes, a large number of universities across the country are now involved. However, exact figures are unavailable. (JC71)
- As compared to Erasmus Mundus, Erasmus+ has reduced the opportunity for LA universities to cooperate due to changed requirements for participation. Intra-regional network-building is no longer a main objective. Brazilian universities perceive this as a disadvantage. (JC71)
- Bilateral sector dialogues with the EU are by far more important to Brazilian government stakeholders than policy dialogues within the EU-LAC framework. Brazil is committed to intra-regional cooperation in general and CELAC in particular, but stakeholders pointed to a lack of concrete, tangible results of EU-CELAC dialogues in HE and S&T. (JC71)
- Many stakeholders noted that the EU-LA Common Higher Education/Research Area had gained importance as an umbrella for a range of bilateral and multilateral activities, without, however, providing substantial value added to cooperation in HE. (JC71)
- As a result of the graduation process, Brazilian participants in EU-supported programmes have to source their own funding. The discontinuation of EU funding combined with budgetary cuts in Brazil greatly reduced access to research funding. However, the situation is currently improving as the result of several agreements between the EU and Brazilian government agencies at the federal and state level that provide a stable and institutionalised framework for research funding and can be considered an effective strategy towards transforming the previous donor-recipient relationship into a partnership between equals against the backdrop of graduation. (JC11, JC23)
- Intra-regional cooperation in HE is a challenge for Brazil. While HEI stakeholders pointed out that Brazilian universities needed more foreign students to increase internationalisation, a lack of harmonisation and standardisation of HE in LA and difficulties in the recognition of foreign degrees and degree components in Brazil constitute hurdles. Government stakeholders pointed out that the intra-regionalisation of HE should start with Mercosur (and not with CELAC which is considered too big) where countries have undertaken initiatives that integrate the field of higher education through agreements and partnerships between universities, associations,

academic institutions and organisations. Interviewees expressed hope that the new EU-Mercosur agreement, which is currently under negotiation, could also provide a framework for HE cooperation between the two entities. (JC72)

2.2 Transversal elements

- None of the interviewed stakeholders with knowledge of the RIP/MIP (a very small number) had a specific view on the scope and quality of the needs analysis. However, in HE and particularly S&T extensive exchanges (through policy dialogues and direct contact between EU and Brazilian stakeholders) have taken place on mutual needs and joint interests. (JC11)
- Gender and disadvantaged/vulnerable groups as cross-cutting issues are mainstreamed into HE programmes (Erasmus Mundus/Erasmus+) (JC11)
- The involvement of Brazilian non-state stakeholders in consultative processes with the EU has increased during the evaluation period. Interviewees of the non-state sector generally thought that there was sufficient opportunity for consultation. However, this applies mainly to bilateral cooperation. (JC11)
- According to all Brazilian stakeholders interviewed, CELAC does not and cannot play the role as a regional coordinating body and agenda setter. There is a strong perception within GoB that a strong motivation for the founding of CELAC was to create a counterpart for the EU in its relations with Latin America. CELAC is not a priority for Brazil and some stakeholders thought that the inclusion of Caribbean countries made it even more complicated for member states to coordinate their interests. As a continental-size state, Brazil clearly prefers to conduct its relations with the EU through bilateral means and/or within the minilateral framework of Mercosur. There is a widespread view that Brazil would like to put more emphasis on Mercosur and less on CELAC particularly in view of a new EU-Mercosur agreement which is currently under negotiation. (JC11)
- The Brazilian crisis coincided with the process towards graduation, resulting in a need for adjustment. HEI and research institutions were no longer eligible for EU research funding and had to apply for the funding of their share of joint project with EU partners from Brazilian government funding agencies. However, budgetary cuts meant State funding for research was reduced. Subsequently, Brazilian participation in EU projects dropped. While several stakeholders reported that fact, figures on the changes in Brazilian participation are not available. Since 2015 the situation has generally improved as result of several bilateral framework agreements between the EU and Brazilian government agencies. (JC11)
- The strengthening of regional cooperation was a marginal activity for the EUD before 2014. Graduation changed this focus and is mainly linked to the CELAC framework. Bilateral and regional cooperation exist in parallel and there are no strong and mutually reinforcing links between the two approaches. A EU development counsellors meeting at the EUD, which the consultants attended, revealed a lack of a unified EU-MS position on graduations and strategies related to it. (JC11)
- There is no evidence for active thinking between DEVCO and EAAS about coordination at the regional level. (JC13)
- Generally, intra-regional cooperation is not a priority for Brazil, particularly with regards to LAC. All government stakeholders mentioned that MERCOSUR (and until recently UNASUR for health-related projects, involving the Brazilian agency Fiocruz under the Ministry of Health) was clearly more relevant for Brazil than CELAC which is seen as a somewhat artificial organisation mainly created for the purpose of EU-LA cooperation. New EU Mercosur agreement would be a suitable framework for HE/S&T cooperation. (JC21)
- Brazilian stakeholders agree that challenges affecting LA in general (diseases such as the Zika virus, HIV/Aids, climate change and infrastructure development were often mentioned as examples) required regional research. On the other hand, there is clear preference for bilateral or minilateral cooperation in the context of Mercosur. (JC21)
- Synergies existed before graduation, for example in the field of higher education (JC22)
- Synergies exist in the support of various DGs for Science & Technology and EUD highlighted strong synergies between FPI and DCI in the social equity sector. (JC23)
- As outlined elsewhere, Brazil participates in a broad range of programmes funded by other DGs under regional and global funding. As a result of graduation, Brazilian participants in EU-

supported programmes have to source their own funding. The discontinuation of EU funding combined with budgetary cuts in Brazil greatly reduced access to research funding. However, the situation is currently improving as the result of several agreements between the EU and Brazilian government agencies at the federal and state level that provide a stable and institutionalised framework for research funding and can be considered an effective strategy towards transforming the previous donor-recipient relationship into a partnership between equals against the backdrop of graduation. (JC23)

- There is no cooperation/coordination and thus no synergies between EU and MS support at the regional level. (JC24)
- The calls for proposal approach is not seen as a problem or challenge as Brazilian stakeholders are perceived as being sufficiently competitive to secure grant funding. (JC25)
- An assessment of the outcomes of EU support to HE/S&T is limited as the government does not monitor or evaluate the results and effects of programmes and projects even though they are co-funded by Brazil. Beyond anecdotal evidence no systematic assessment of the effectiveness of the impact of the support on higher education/research institutions and individual researchers is available. Government stakeholders highlighted the autonomous status of universities as the main reason for a lack of evaluation. (JC25)

2.3 Examples of success stories

- The dividing line between success stories and challenges is not clear-cut. Positive developments clearly exist but they all face certain challenges. Likewise, existing challenges have provided opportunities for closer cooperation.
- DEVCO funding contributes to the support to HE (Erasmus+) but is not a factor in the EU-LA cooperation on S&T. Generally, S&T as a sector is a good example for mutually reinforcing linkages between regional and bilateral support, between policy dialogue and programme/project support and between state and non-state stakeholders (HEI, research institutes, private sector). (JC71)
- Erasmus Mundus substantially contributed to the internationalisation of universities. In the cases of smaller universities, international offices were only created as the result of Erasmus Mundus projects. The knowledge transfer, the capacity-building and the resulting professionalisation that has taken place as a direct effect of collaboration within networks is seen as one of the most substantial and valuable impact of EM-projects. (JC71)
- The ICT sector in particular brings together (bilateral) policy dialogue and programme support under Horizon 2020. Overall, under H2020 the EU has invested EUR 50m in Brazil to-date and involved around 100 organisations. ICT has been an important focal point characterised by clear alignment between research priorities of the EU and Brazil. The joint research and innovation activities carried out by Brazil and Europe under Horizon 2020 constitute an important foundation of the ongoing cooperation in ICT. The EU-Brazil ICT Dialogue (under the EU-Brazil Sectoral Dialogues Support Facility) provides the framework for ICT cooperation and joint research particularly with regards to agenda setting and alignment of interests/priorities. There have been several joint EU-Brazilian calls for projects under Horizon 2020, focusing for example on joint work on 5G and Cloud Computing (under the 4th call 2016). (JC71)
- The EU-Brazil Sector Dialogues Support Facility - a cooperation instrument established in 2007 which aims at reinforcing the strategic partnership between the EU and Brazil at technical and political level - is jointly coordinated by the Management Secretariat of the Brazilian Ministry of Planning, Development and Management (MP), the EUD in Brasilia and the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE). Although interviewees at the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Science, Technology, Innovation and Communications regretted the fact that they did not have the opportunity for a direct dialogue with the EU, they nevertheless described the Sector Dialogues as a major success factor in the positive development of EU-Brazil cooperation on S&T. (JC71)
- It needs to be stressed that the bilateral Sector Dialogues are by far more important to Brazilian government stakeholders than policy dialogues within the EU-LAC framework. Brazil is committed to intra-regional cooperation in general and CELAC in particular, but stakeholders pointed to a lack of concrete, tangible results of EU-CELAC dialogues in HE and S&T. One high-ranking interviewee described the Common Higher Education Area as “aspirational” rather than an initiative that has been continuously implemented. Stakeholders largely agreed that the

Common HE Area had gained importance as an umbrella for a range of bilateral and multilateral activities, without, however, providing substantial value added to cooperation in HE. (JC71)

- One of the most prominent examples of successful EU-Brazil S&T cooperation, which has also a regional dimension, is the deployment of the transatlantic sub-marine cable linking the EU (Portugal) and Brazil (EllaLink). EllaLink is expected to be ready for service in 2020. The EU invests around €25 million in the new fibre-optic infrastructure via the Building Europe Link to Latin America (BELLA) project, which was put forward by European research network DANTE and its Latin American counterpart RedCLARA. This will result in a much-needed capacity boost, supporting data traffic between Europe, Brazil and South America. It responds to the increased interconnection between the economies of EU and LA but also the cooperation between research and educational institutions from both regions. That was also a result of the previous DEVCO-funded regional programme Alliance for Information Society (@LIS), a EU programme aiming at the promotion of the information society and fighting the digital divide in Latin America. (JC71)
- All interviewees agreed that both through Erasmus Mundus/Erasmus+ and FP7/H2020 number and scope of regional and bi-regional partnerships and networks have increased. Over the evaluation period, a substantial diversification of the Brazilian involvement has taken place. While some ten years ago only the large Brazilian HEI participated in EU-funded programmes, Erasmus Mundus resulted in the inclusion of “some very small universities”, according to one interviewee. Another interviewee with excellent knowledge of the internationalisation of Brazilian universities said that by now all of the country’s universities had benefitted from EU programme support either through Alfa III/Erasmus Mundus, or FP7/ H2020 or both. However, neither the government nor organisations/associations representing Brazilian universities have data showing the exact level and scope of Brazilian participation. (JC71)
- Interviewees with decades—long deep knowledge of EU funded projects in Brazil, stated that many networks originally established under Erasmus Mundus or the Framework Programmes (partly going back as far as FP 5) have continued to exist long after the original funding came to a close and successfully applied for new grants. However, other interviewees stated that while individual researchers continued to work together the degree of institutional sustainability was rather low. Once people leave the networks often also discontinue. (JC71)
- Joint Brazilian-EU calls are seen as the best way forward for S&T cooperation as it assures that funding is aligned with Brazilian research and development priorities. An often mentioned good example for this approach is the currently open common “Globalstars Brazil call” by seven European funding agencies (DLR in Germany, FFG in Austria, bpiFrance in France, CDTI in Spain, RVO in the Netherlands, Vlaio in Belgium and SERI in Switzerland) and three Brazilian agencies (FINEP, FAPESP and EMBRAPII). Globalstars is an initiative of the EUREKA Network, an inter-governmental organisation founded in 1985, of which the European Commission is a member. EUREKA promotes and supports market-oriented international R&D&I project generation and there are close links and synergies with Horizon 2020. (JC71)
- Stakeholders unanimously agreed that EU support to HE through Alfa III and Erasmus Mundus had greatly contributed to regional network-building among HEI in Latin America. This would not have happened – at least not in the same way – without EU support. (JC71)
- A good example for a strong intra-regional component in EU-LA cooperation is the project European Union - Latin American Research and Innovation NETWORKS (EULARINET), originally funded under FP7. EULARINET has not only strengthened bi-regional dialogue on S&T between EU MS, Associated States and LA countries at policy, programme and institutional (research and industry entities) level (promoted the joint identification, establishment, implementation and monitoring of mutual interest priorities of future work programmes; jointly defined S&T cooperation policies; and stimulated and supported the participation of LA countries in FP7) but also contributed to close collaboration among Brazil (represented by CNPq), Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Mexico, Nicaragua and Colombia. (JC71)
- All stakeholders agreed that EU-funded programmes (in particular mobility programmes) have positively affected the career prospects and employability of beneficiaries. However, there is no data available on employability. Neither do surveys of participants of mobility programmes exist. (JC73)
- EU support was instrumental in the internationalisation of the federal state agency FINEP (Funding Authority for Studies and Projects) which promotes Brazil's economic and social development through public funding for Science, Technology and Innovation at companies,

universities, technological institutes and other public or private institutions. Only five years ago FINEP was not involved in any notable international cooperation. Since then the agency has rapidly internationalised, first through agreements with agencies of several EU MS which then led to the involvement of FINEP in major EU initiatives such as EUREKA. (JC72)

- According to a widespread view, Erasmus Mundus substantially contributed to the better integration of – and possibilities for - students from vulnerable and disadvantaged backgrounds. Every Erasmus Mundus project had to have a certain number of beneficiaries (Target Group/TG 3) who were considered vulnerable due to social or political reasons (for example candidates having a refugee status or asylum beneficiaries). Brazilian universities were among those who successfully lobbied for the inclusion also of students belonging to national or ethnic minorities and this who live in particularly remote areas with difficult access to education into TG3. That way, students who would otherwise not have the opportunity to participate in mobility programmes, were given the opportunity to study abroad. This, in turn, greatly improved their overall situation and employment/career prospects. (JC72)

2.4 Details on some challenges faced by the EU regional programmes

- Nine different DGs are involved in the implementation of Horizon 2020.¹⁵ The budget is implemented by 22 different bodies, some of which channel resources from other funding bodies (other EU, national, regional, and/or private funds) and so act as a secondary source of funds. This complex structure of direct and indirect funding is the heritage of the multiplicity of instruments, partnerships and agencies created over past decades. The cascade of funding from the managing DGs to the beneficiaries of the EU funds therefore follows various routes that are not always easy for the final beneficiaries who perform the research and innovation activities (researchers, research institutes, private companies) to identify and track. If the sector is extended to also include support to HE and DEVCO is added to the equation, the number of involved DGs stands at ten. Both EU and government stakeholders agreed that it would be difficult and might not be useful to restrict an evaluation of EU-LA cooperation in the field of HE/S&T to development cooperation, as the latter played only a very small part and was neglectable for a graduated country like Brazil. However, this was not always the case. According to the EUD, until 2013 50% of the development cooperation under the bilateral envelope was spent on HE. (JC71)
- Individual Brazilian researchers are eligible for EU funding under all Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions, which are part of Horizon 2020. The Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES), a federal government agency under the Ministry of Education, responsible for quality assurance in postgraduate courses in Brazil, expressed interest in launching joint calls under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions which is not possible due to the bottom-up nature of the programme. Instead, CAPES was encouraged to explore the Administrative Arrangement on the mechanisms to support the EU – Brazil cooperation in research and innovation activities, signed in May 2018 by the Directorate-General for Research and Innovation of the European Commission, the Brazilian National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq), the Brazilian Funding Agency for Studies and Projects (FINEP) and the Brazilian National Council of State Funding Agencies (CONFAP). (JC71)
- Apart from potential opportunities under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions, unlike previous framework programmes, under Horizon 2020 due to the “non-automatic funding” principle which applies to emerging economies, Brazilian entities are no longer automatically eligible for EU funding. This means that for many collaborative projects Brazilian participants have to source their own funding. In the majority of cases these funds are provided by the State Foundations for Research Support (FAPS), National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq), Brazilian National Research and Education Network (RNP), Funding Agency for Studies and Projects (FINEP) or the Ministry of Science Technology, Innovations and Communications (MCTIC). Several stakeholders said that the discontinuation of EU funding combined with budgetary cuts in Brazil had greatly reduced access to research funding. (JC71)

¹⁵ DG Research and Innovation (DG RTD), DG Communications Networks, Content and Technology (DG CONNECT), DG Education and Culture (DG EAC), DG Energy (DG ENER), DG Internal Markets, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (DG GROWTH), DG Mobility and Transport (DG MOVE), DG Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME), DG Agriculture and Rural Development (DG AGRI), and the Joint Research Centre (JRC)

- However, the situation has improved as the result of several agreements between the EU and Brazilian government agencies at the federal and state level that provide a stable and institutionalised framework for research funding and can be considered an effective strategy towards transforming the previous donor-recipient relationship into a partnership between equals against the backdrop of graduation. The first scheme was established by the Research Foundation of the State of São Paulo (FAPESP) in 2015, following an umbrella agreement that had been signed with the Brazilian National Council of State Funding Agencies (CONFAP). Similar schemes were later established by the other States. Furthermore, the Brazilian National Council of State Funding Agencies (CONFAP) signed an "ERC Implementing Arrangement" aiming to encourage the best Brazilian scientists to join research teams funded by the European Research Council (ERC). Under this arrangement, Brazilian researchers can undertake short or long term research visits, in Europe, and collaborate with ERC-funded teams, conducting frontier research across Europe. In 2018, ERC, CONFAP, CNPq launched a call to support researchers from Brazil to pursue research collaborations with principal investigators (project leaders) already supported through EU-funded European Research Council (ERC) grants. (JC71)
- Intra-regional cooperation in HE is a challenge for Brazil. On the one hand, HEI stakeholders pointed out that Brazilian universities needed more foreign students to increase internationalisation. Most of these students are from other LA countries. For example, at the Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP), currently Brazil's highest ranking university, 25% of students are foreign, mainly from the Andean countries. Some stakeholders saw the exchange with universities in smaller LA countries as an important contribution to South-South cooperation. On the other hand, due to the lack of harmonisation and standardisation of HE in Latin America, the mutual recognition of courses and degrees is not straightforward. Foreign degrees have to be re-validated by Brazilian public universities – due to the autonomy of universities each university applies their own rules and standards to the recognition of foreign degrees. It is not uncommon for recognition/re-validation process to take more than a year. Problems in the recognition of European degrees are related to the different duration and thus incompatibility of Bachelor and Master degrees. The EU has pushed for the full recognition of European degrees but in the absence of standardisation rules, the matter remains unresolved. (JC71)
- All government stakeholders agreed that the intra-regionalisation of HE should start with Mercosur where - through the Education Sector of Mercosur (ESM) initiative - countries have undertaken initiatives that integrate the field of higher education through agreements and partnerships between universities, associations, academic institutions and organisations. Interviewees expressed hope that the new EU-Mercosur agreement, which is currently under negotiation, could also provide a framework for HE cooperation between the two entities. (JC71)
- The problem regarding the recognition of foreign degrees and credits gained at foreign universities remains a main challenge for Brazil and keeps restricting the effects of student mobility. Brazil's own mobility programme "Science Without Borders" (which was supported through complementary actions by the EU and MS) is a case in point. Between 2011 and 2015 the programme had sent about 100,000 Brazilian students for studies abroad.¹⁶ However, according to authoritative estimates only about one third of credits points achieved by Brazilian students abroad were later recognised by their home universities. (JC72)
- Related to the last point under success stories: Despite the successes regarding TG3, interviewees stressed the challenge of balancing the need to accept TG3 students with the necessity to maintain high academic standards as TG3 often did not meet the high qualification criteria set for Erasmus Mundus participants. (JC72)

¹⁶ "A dramatic change in political and economic fortunes in Brazil – including the impeachment of President Rousseff and a significant weakening of the Brazilian real – put the programme under pressure in 2015 and new scholarships were suspended late that year" (<http://monitor.icef.com/2017/04/brazil-shutting-science-without-borders/>)

3 List of persons interviewed

<i>Organisation</i>	<i>Name and position</i>
EUD	
EUD Brasilia	Claudia Gintersdorfer, Acting Head of Delegation
	Thierry Dudermel, Head of Cooperation
	Maria Rosa Sabbatelli, Head of FPI sector
	Carlos Oliveira, Head of CNECT sector
	Asier Santillan, Deputy Head of Cooperation, former focal point for LAIF
	Pilar Blanco Rodriguez, Cooperation Sector (coordination of the HUB, current focal point for LAIF)
	Denise Verdade, Cooperation Sector (coordination of CSO thematic line)
	Maria Cristina Araujo von Holstein Rathlou, Focal point for Erasmus+, coordination of local authorities thematic line
	Ana Almeida, Focal point for gender, coordination of human rights and democracy budget line.
	Cecile Merle, Political Section (Human Rights)
Other development partners	
EU Member States Embassies	The consultants attended the EU Member States cooperation counsellors meeting on 5 Sep 2018 with the presence of the Embassies of Portugal, Germany, Sweden, Luxemburg, Croatia, Bulgaria, Denmark and France.
Government	
Ministry of Education	Andrea Carvalho Vieira, General Coordinator for International Programmes
Ministry of Education	Jussara Pereira Prado, Coordinator of Partnerships with Europe
Ministry of Education, Cabinet of Ministers	Maria Auriana P. Diniz, Assessoria International
Ministry of Education, Cabinet of Ministers	Gabriel Dizner, International Affairs Office
Ministry of Education, Secretariat of Higher Education	Norai Romeu Rocco, Head of International Affairs
Ministry of Science, Technology, Innovation and Communications	Caroline Heidrich Seibert, Head of Division, International Cooperation
Ministry of Science, Technology, Innovation and Communications, National Council for Scientific and Technological Development	Lelio Fellows Filho, General Coordinator, International Cooperation
Ministry of Science, Technology, Innovation and Communications, National Council for Scientific and Technological Development	Paulo Cesar Siqueria, General Coordinator, International Cooperation
Ministry of External Relations	Ambassador Benedicto Fonseca Filho, Director, Department of Scientific and Technological Themes
FINEP	Julio Cesar Imenes de Medeiros, Head, Department of International Cooperation
Ministry of Health, FIOCRUZ Centre for Global Health	Alvaro Hideyoshi Matida, International Cooperation
CSOs / think tanks/ Higher Education Institutions	
Associação Brasileira das Instituições de Pesquisa Tecnológica e Inovação (ABIPT)	Arij Mohamad Radwam Omar Chabrawi, Project manager, IBCOBRA (Horizon 2020)
University of São Paulo	Prof. Moacyr Martucci Junior, Former Brazilian Coordinator for EU-funded programmes under Horizon 2020, ERC and ICT (via skype)
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ)	Nádia Comerlato, Director, International Affairs Office

Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ)	Paulo Roberto Alves, Administrative head, International Affairs Office
Fluminense Federal University (UFF)	Vitor Alevato do Amaral, Head of International Relations, former Director, International Affairs Office, at UFRJ
São Paulo State University (UNSEP)	Prof. José Celso Freire Junior, Director of International Affairs, former head of Brazilian Association for International Education (FAUBAI) (via skype)
DAAD	Dr. Martina Schulze, Director of DAAD country office and the German Centre for Research and Innovation - São Paulo (DWIH-SP)

Field mission note – Colombia

Period of the field mission	21 July to 28 July 2018
Evaluation Team Member(s)	Sergio Uribe, Carlos Rivera
Thematic focus	Inclusive growth, security-development nexus
Main programmes covered	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • AL-INVEST IV • AL-INVEST 5.0 • ELAN • COPOLAD • AMERIPOL
Stakeholders interviewed (The full list of persons interviewed is provided in Section 3)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EUD staff • Other development partners • Government officials • Business organisations • Regional organisations

1 Introduction

1.1 Context

Table 1 Colombia general indicators

Indicator	Value
GDP per capita (current USD)	6,302 (2017)
Human Development Index	0.75 (2018)
Population (million)	49.1 (2017)
Graduation (DCI financing)	Still some bilateral allocations in current MFF
ODA disbursed in 2009 and 2016 (in million USD) ¹⁷	1,070.1 (2009); 1,105.8 (2016)

Sources: World Bank data, UNDP HDR, EC DEVCO Country Page, OECD Stat

During the last decade, Colombia achieved significant progress in reducing poverty, although social imbalances and gaps between urban and rural areas still exist. A weak State presence in some parts of the national territory - related to the large socio-economic disparities and the presence of illegal activities - constitute a factor of instability. Moreover, Colombia suffered from the domestic armed conflict with guerrilla groups and its ramifications with organised crime (notably in remote rural areas) which has been a major obstacle for development and security in the country. After four years of up-and-down negotiations, the Colombian government and rebel FARC guerrillas signed a peace agreement in November 2016.

As an upper middle-income country, Colombia should in principle have graduated from bilateral cooperation under the DCI. However, in December 2013, the EP, the EC and the Council decided to make an exception and continue EU cooperation with Colombia for a phase-out period 2014-2017.¹⁸

After more than half a century of civil war and the rise and fall of drug trafficking empires, Colombia has made huge strides in improving its security situation in recent years. However, it remains affected by guerrilla rebels and criminal networks involved in an extensive range of activities including the growth of crops for illicit use, drug production and trafficking, arms trafficking, money laundering, extortion and illegal mining. Insurgencies, multiple former right-wing paramilitary groups and several smaller drug trafficking organizations alternately work in concert or fight against each other for control over what remains the most important production, depot, storage and embarkation points for illicit drugs and

¹⁷ 2015 constant prices

¹⁸ [EC DEVCO country page](#)

numerous other contraband. The most powerful of these groups are dissidents of the now-demobilized FARC and the still-active ELN rebel groups, as well as criminal hybrid groups known as the BACRIM such as the Rastrojos, the Oficina de Envigado and the Urabeños.

Table 2 Colombia sector specific indicators (Security and Peace)

<i>Indicator</i>	<i>Value</i>	
Security and Peace		
Proportion of women subjected to physical and/or sexual violence in the last 12 months (% of women age 15-49)	37.4 (2010)	-
Intentional homicides (per 100,000 people)	34.8 (2009)	25.5 (2016)
Global illicit cultivation of coca bush (hectares)	73,000 (2009)	96,000 (2015)
Drug seizure cocaine-type (kg)	273,885 (2009)	298,647 (2015)
Net migration	-143,000 (2007)	-147,000 (2017)

Source: World Development Indicators

Over the last decade, Colombia has gone through a massive judicial overhaul as it moved from the inquisitorial to the accusatory system, aided by the Justice Sector Reform Programme (JSRP) directed by the United States Department of Justice. A 2017 report by the Center for Studies on Impunity and Justice found that Colombia has one of the worst impunity records in the world. Despite a raft of reforms and investments, including financial and logistical aid from the United States, Colombia's prisons are overcrowded and crumbling.¹⁹

Table 2 Colombia sector specific indicators (Inclusive and sustainable growth)

<i>Indicator</i>	<i>Value</i>	
Inclusive and sustainable growth		
Ease of Doing Business Rank	40/181 (2009)	55/190 (2017)
Informal employment (% of total non-agricultural employment)	62.3 (2010)	55.8 (2017)
Bribery incidence (% of firms experiencing at least one bribe payment request)	2.2 (2010)	-
Firms using banks to finance investment (% of firms)	35.0 (2010)	-

Source: World Development Indicators

Micro, Small & Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) represent an important part of the Colombian economy, although they are not well documented in official statistics. The true size of the market is understated due to informality. The National System for the Support and Promotion of MSMEs was responsible for articulating public policy toward MSMEs and comprised of a series of public and private actors, financial and non-financial entities, and various programmes, laws and procedures. Law 590 of 2000 established the Council of Microfirms and the Council of Small and Medium Firms, which helped define, formulate and implement public policies related to SME promotion in the last two decades.

One of the key actors in the area of MSME development is the Chamber of Commerce of Bogotá that represents the Colombian International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). It is the chair of the ICC National Committee Colombia and the voice of Colombian Entrepreneurs in many countries. ANALDEX, the National Association of Foreign Trade, is another key player in this area. Founded in 1971, it aims to encourage and strengthen national export activity, promote the image of Colombia abroad, and support the design and implementation of short export policies, medium and long term. ANALDEX advises

¹⁹ InSight Crime: <https://www.insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/colombia/>

directly entrepreneurs on export strategies and encourages export culture and competitiveness through workshops.²⁰

Among public institutions, it is worth mentioning the Directorate for MSMEs at the Ministry of Industry and Commerce (Dirección de MIPYMES - Viceministerio de Desarrollo Empresarial del Ministerio de Comercio, Industria y Turismo). The Directorate's main role is to promote policies, plans and financial and non-financial programmes for the development of MSMEs as well as to facilitate communication between MSMEs of the country and providers of business development services. The Colombian Fund for the Modernization and Technological Development of the Micro, Small and Medium Firms (Fondo Colombiano de Modernización y Desarrollo Tecnológico de las Micro, Pequeñas y Medianas Empresas - FOMIPYME) has also been a major public initiative to support SMEs in Colombia.

1.2 EU support to inclusive growth and the security development nexus

1.2.1 Bilateral cooperation

Table 3 *EU bilateral cooperation MIP allocations for Colombia*

<i>Financing cycle & Cooperation sector</i>	<i>Value (EUR million)</i>
EU bilateral cooperation MIP 2007-13	160
Peace and stability	70%
Role of law	20%
Productivity, competitiveness and trade:	10%
EU bilateral cooperation MIP 2014-17	67
Local development and institution building	80%
Sustainable trade and investment	15%
Support measures	5%

The 2007-2013 CSP focused on three areas.

- **Peace and stability**, with the following specific objectives:
 - Consolidation of peace actions, building institutional capacity and sustainable development in several regions of the country, in particular those where the actions for peace and local development financed by the EC between 2002 and 2006 are concentrated.
 - Integral local development with a multi-dimensional approach, building institutional capacity, support for basic infrastructure, culture of legality and social and human development to encourage job creation at local level and alternative development in areas where illicit crops are cultivated.
 - Support for the stabilisation of the socio-economic situation of people, communities and victims of the armed conflict, included displaced people and victims of mines and weapons left behind after hostilities.
- **Rule of law**, with the following specific objectives:
 - Increasing the response capacity of the legal and policing system and judicial cooperation between the two, in particular at local level, in line with national policy.
 - Improving the capacity of the State to strengthening its dialogue with the Colombian population in matters of human rights and of citizen participation.
 - Contributing to the development of social dialogue, in particular between employees and employers.
- **Productivity, competitiveness and trade**, with the following specific objectives:
 - Increasing the competitiveness and capacities of economic operators.
 - Helping to market goods produced in Colombia nationally and internationally.
 - Providing outlets for products emanating from alternative development areas where production projects are set up to combat illicit crops.

²⁰ <http://www.analdex.org/>

The 2014-2017 MIP focuses on two main areas, amongst which **sustainable trade and investment**, with the following specific objectives:

- Mainstream sustainable development in the design and implementation of trade-related policies and regulations
- Enhance **SME adaptation** to new market conditions and opportunities, including by reducing the informal economy and enhancing their competitiveness and access to innovation

1.2.2 Regional cooperation

The country has been an active participant interventions relevant for the sector, including the migration project (trainings, workshops, Pilot Projects), COPOLAD and EL PAcCTO. Colombia also hosts the AMERIPOL secretariat.

Several national institutions active in the area of MSME development (e.g. ANALDEX or the Ministry of Commerce and Industry) have also been involved in the implementation of EU-funded regional programmes in the area of inclusive growth, especially AL-INVEST and ELAN. The country was a case study country of a recent comparative analysis carried out by ECLAC in the context of Euromipyme (a component of AL-INVEST 5.0).

2 Main findings of the field phase mission

2.1 Key observations

- In the security-development nexus, EU support contributed to the institutionalisation of AMERIPOL, which has started in 2007 as forum for police forces to share experience on law enforcement issues with yearly meetings and now features a permanent executive secretariat and rotating presidency. It is worth highlighting that Colombia hosts AMERIPOL secretariat. (JC32)
- COPOLAD has also helped establishing and developing the Network of Drug Observatories (NDOs) and early warning systems in which Colombia actively participates. PRELAC and COPOLAD have raised awareness on the illegal use of chemical precursors that has led the Colombian government to establish strategic partnerships with unions, the private sector, chambers of commerce, chemical interest group associations, and customs in order to address the issue of precursor diversion from legal markets. (JC32, JC33)
- There is dissatisfaction among Colombian stakeholders with regards to lack of consultation during design of interventions / lack of take up of suggestions made during the design when consulted, especially in the security-development nexus, especially with regards to EL PAcCTO. (JC21)
- In Colombia, ELAN has been perceived as a success. The number of partners in the programme has steadily increased, achieving successful transfers and closing of business between stakeholders from LA and EU countries. (JC61)
- While AL-INVEST is perceived as useful, its implementation requirements (heavy CfP process, tough selection process) represent a barrier according to stakeholders consulted. Also, the type of support it proposes is also not always in line with what many MSMEs in an advanced economy like Colombia require. (JC63, JC25)

2.2 Transversal aspects

- The importance of the regional cooperation programmes of the European Union was highlighted, taking into account the opportunity they generate for the exchange of experiences and for the promotion of scenarios of inter and intra-regional collaboration. However, it is important that within the framework of these programmes, actions are designed to meet strategic goals, related to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The above, in order to overcome a focus on the execution of activities, which allows contributing to clear objectives in the medium and long term. (JC13, JC21)
- Government stakeholders highlighted that to promote the effectiveness of the programmes, it is important that the process of identification of demands be carried out in coordination with the Foreign Ministries, the Cooperation Agencies and the Delegations of the European Union. When cooperation projects are formulated directly with the entities, they may run the risk of not responding to the country's strategic priorities. (JC11)

- Discussions of the cooperation context do not extend to detailed analyses of the positive and negative dynamics in the political economy of the respective sectors. Because of the new situation in Colombia, new studies are needed to clearly identify the needs for inclusive growth in the different regions of the country. From the field work it is clear that, in the future, when formulating these strategic documents, the EU should seek consultation with experts outside of the EU so that their assessment better includes regional and sub-regional perspectives. (JC11)
- Most projects do not take key aspects of a gender-sensitive approach into account: direct intervention in the design phase with the formulation of "ad hoc" monitoring indicators, training of institutional actors and awareness-raising activities and systematic political approach. (JC11)
- The perception of institutions is that there is no concrete effort to address needs and challenges, this observation was exacerbated by an episode cited by multiple agencies where different institutions gathered and agreed on the main national priorities of cooperation under the framework of EL PAcCTO, but this effort was not taken into account in the design or implementation of the programme. (JC11)
- For some stakeholders consulted, there is a lack of clarity regarding the sources of financing (DEVCO or EEAS) and a lack of understanding of the implications of specific requirements when projects are being executed. (JC13)
- Interviews show a good level of consistency between EU development cooperation managed by DEVCO and the actions of other EU DGs, especially DG TRADE. This is facilitated by the fact that the EUD focal point for regional cooperation in the EUD also covers trade issues. In the field of drugs, given the institutional set up within the EU, the EU delegations tend to favour their commitments with DEVCO. Their relationship with other activities such as IcSP is limited. (JC13)
- AMERIPOL highlighted the relevance of its development of the Police Information System (SIPA) which eventually will act as complementary to Interpol and EUROPOL addressing region-specific issues on which Interpol might fall short. On a related issue, REFCO has played a key role on AMERIPOL's work, since it allows intelligence sharing through country prosecutors that wasn't possible due to the lack of legal personality and intelligence sharing agreements, in a way that AMERIPOL avoids challenging the law. (JC21)
- The few existing cases of synergies with other EU financing instruments are not the result of a systematic approach. (JC23)
- Coordination among the EU Cooperation and the member states, as well as with other donors, is limited. Information exchange mostly takes place within the GruC (Group of cooperating partners Colombia). (JC24)

2.3 Examples of success stories

- Colombian organisations have participated in eight AL-INVEST 5.0 projects at the regional level, leading five of them. This has supported regional exchanges on important themes for Colombia such as the improvement of associativity, business capacities, strengthening of cluster and local economic development. (JC62)
- According to the Colombian agencies interviewed, there are some South-South cooperation experiences in Colombia:
 - Entrepreneurship and business development project in Mesoamerica (EDEM). EDEM is oriented towards the improvement of policies, strategies and tools for entrepreneurship and innovation; as well as the strengthening of the capacities of the Chambers of Commerce in their attention to MSMEs, in search of greater competitiveness. The consortium leader is APC Colombia and the beneficiaries are Business Chambers and institutions from Belize, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic. (JC62)
- Colombian stakeholders indicated that AL-INVEST IV helped promote the coordination with public institutions and legislation to improve the business environment of MSMEs. (JC63)
- In Colombia, AL-INVEST 5.0 is implementing a project to improve the association of MSMEs in the region of the Atlantic (Colombian Caribbean), managed by the Chamber of Commerce of Barranquilla. This project has a gender focus, empowering female owners of these productive

units (around 35%), as well as successfully consolidating productive chains of the health sectors, agro-industrial inputs and furniture of the region. (JC64)

- In the framework of ELAN, dialogues have been promoted among private sector, public and research institutions, generating a network based on the Triple Helix. This Triple Helix network composed of intermediary organisations that support SMEs in the development of TBBOs between EU and LAC. Public sector institutions play a key role as drivers of the innovation ecosystem in their territories and owners of programmes and policies that support the generation of business opportunities (for example COLCIENCIAS, Innpulsa Colombia, MINTIC, etc.). (JC61)
- In the framework of ELAN, Tecnia Colombia and TNO, both KTBOs (knowledge and technology based organisations), have joined their technological expertise and knowledge to tackle the challenges Colombia faces in the fields of water treatment, energy and recycling. This is generating technology transfers and dynamics not considered from the beginning. (JC61)
- COPOLAD had a positive impact in the establishing and development of the National Drug Observatory and early warning systems in Colombia. (JC33)
- COPOLAD supported the Precursor Control Office at the Justice Ministry when opening of 25 legal cases regarding illicit use of chemical precursors in Colombia. It also cooperated in the development of practical guides on the final disposition of precursors and information analysis on new synthetic drugs and the diversion of its precursors. (JC33)
- PRELAC and COPOLAD have raised awareness on the illegal use of chemical precursors which has led the Colombian government to establish strategic partnerships with unions, the private sector, chambers of commerce, chemical interest group associations, and customs in order to address the issue of precursor diversion from legal markets. (JC33)
- Despite the limitations identified on CRIMJUST's activities, the LA partners see this framework as a bridge to facilitate communications amongst beneficiaries and most importantly with other regions so as to establish strategic partnerships to address illicit drug-related issues. An example is the cooperation of Colombia with African countries to address money-laundering issues. (JC32)
- AMERIPOL, the police community of the Americas, was established in 2007 during a meeting of LAC police officials in Colombia. It was initially conceived as a forum for police forces to share experience on law enforcement issues with yearly meetings and was subsequently institutionalised with an executive secretariat in Bogota and a rotating Presidency. The EU supported AMERIPOL with two projects under the IfS and currently through the EL PAcCTO project. During the first phase of the AMERIPOL-EU project, the organization began to develop the information system; improve prosecutors and law enforcement agencies' capacity to carry out complex investigations at a regional and trans-regional level with this began the centralization of information and coordination of law enforcement activities. (JC31)
- The main success of AMERIPOL was the signing of the Buenos Aires agreement (Aug. 1, 2018) and the Information System of South American Police Forces (with the Spanish acronym of SIPA). Approval of the national governments to the Buenos Aires Agreement is still pending. (JC31)
- AMERIPOL has undergone several transformations since its creation in 2009 initially it was an informal forum to discuss law enforcement challenges in the region. Later it became evident that it would be necessary to create a police information system as a complement to law enforcement agencies. Success in this case can be seen via the progressive change in the institutional mission of the organization. EU influence was welcomed evident since one of the key issues behind the creation of AMERIPOL was a Latin American agency free from excessive influence from the US government. The objective of creating a regional law enforcement agency that will complement INTERPOL and EUROPOL's fights against organized crime will require additional EU expertise as well as funding to consolidate the organisation. (JC31)

2.4 Details on some challenges faced by the EU regional programmes

- Colombian representatives of ELAN projects have pointed out that, although SME support programmes exist in both Europe and Latin American countries, these initiatives are not connected and do not allow connections. The organisations wish to establish joint activities, but they face many impediments both administratively and legally. (JC61)

- Interviewees pointed out that, in the area of sustainable and inclusive growth, many regional programmes are carrying out activities that are similar to the bilateral programmes. This makes it difficult to differentiate the added value of regional cooperation and clearly differentiate it from bilateral cooperation, since the particular aspects of the first one are often not emphasized. (JC61)
- Colombia, like other countries in the region, face different challenges and contexts that require specialization to strengthen MSMEs. Private sector stakeholders interviewed pointed out that a large part of AL-INVEST 5.0 targets building relatively basic skills. This does not correspond to needs of most of the Colombian companies, which require more sophisticated support. (JC64)
- In Colombia, the AL-INVEST 5.0 monitoring system has encountered difficulties and delays. The beneficiary survey was not completed in time to establish the baseline in the beneficiary companies (the firms have indicated that the survey was very long and requested too much sensitive information, which the companies did not fill in). This makes it very difficult to measure the impacts on the companies of AL-INVEST 5.0. (JC64)
- In the security sector, some stakeholders mentioned that the peace process might have negatively affected the drug demand reduction effort. Additionally, local legislation banned aerial eradication and the use of certain herbicides. These factors have worked against EU-supported efforts to curtail supply of cocaine. (JC34)
- The AMERIPOL secretariat was very active in the first phase of the AMERIPOL-EU project, but the second phase was marked by differences between the implementing agency, the TL and the executive secretariat. This might be in part due to changes in leadership and the fact that currently both the executive secretary and the president of AMERIPOL are currently not based in Colombia. (JC32)
- Regional programmes and projects lacked consultation during design and implementation phases which makes it difficult to establish complementarity and favour regional dynamics. There's a lack of clarity regarding the sources of financing (DEVCO or EEAS) and no understanding of the implications of this when projects are being executed. (JC32)

3 List of persons interviewed

Organisation	Name and position
EUD	
Colombia's EU Delegation	Francisco Garcia Garcia (Head of Cooperation) Javier Jaramillo Sanmiguel (Trade Officer and ELAN Focal Point) Manuel Fernandez Quiles (Cooperation Assistant) Ricardo Contreras (Regional Projects Focal Point) Yamil Abdala Mesa (AL-INVEST 5.0 Focal Point) Tito Contreras—Cooperation official
Other development partners	
UNODC	Carlos Perez—National Project Officer PROJUST Diego Quintero—Coordinator Crime Prevention Leonardo Correa—Coordinator project SIMCI
PNUD	Inka Mattila (Deputy Country Director) Ramiro Lopez Ghuio (Strategic Development Unit Technician)
AECID	Carlos Cavanillas Alonso (Head of Mission)
WB	Jasmin Chakeri (Programme Lider)
BID	Ramiro Lopéz Guio (Operational Chief)
CAF	Miguel Arango (Productive Development Senior Specialist) Marta Castillo (Sustainability Direction and Climate Change Executive) Camilo Rojas (Sustainability Direction and Climate Change Executive) Felix Bergel (Institutional Resources Director CAF Peru, by skype) Luis Calle (Senior Executive CAF Peru, by skype) Gloria Gamero (Senior Executive CAF Peru, by skype)
PNUD	Inka Mattila (Deputy Country Director) Ramiro Lopez Ghuio (Strategic Development Unit Technician)
LA regional organisations	
AMERIPOL	Colonel Carlos Currea—Unit Chief Colombia
Government	
Ministry of Justice and Law	Carlos Medina—Viceminister Luz Amparo Chamorro—Sub-Directora de Control y Fiscalización de Sustancias Químicas y Estupefacientes Jenny Fagua—Encargada área de Reducción de Demanda—Dirección de Política de Drogas Daniel Cruz Cárdena—Director Asuntos Internacionales Jorge Delgado—Asuntos Internacionales
National Planning Office (Dirección Nacional de Planeación—DNP)	Luis Francisco Pachón—Asesor del Grupo de Convivencia y Seguridad Ciudadana Laura Ospina—Dirección de Justicia, Seguridad y Gobierno Camilo Andrés Erazo—Subdirector de Seguridad y Defensa
Tax and Customs Office (Dirección de Impuestos y Aduanas—DIAN)	Andrea Liliana Torres—Jefe Dirección de Cultura Tributaria Karen Carrillo—Facilitador III Sandra Galvis—Gestor IP
Presidential Agency of Cooperation (Agencia Presidencial para la Cooperación—APC)	Angélica Acosta—Dirección de Demanda- Israel, Reino Unido, Holanda, Finlandia, Irlanda, Reino Unido (Inglaterra, Gales, Irlanda del Norte), Finlandia, Países Bajos (Holanda, Aruba, Curazao) Cielo Chamorro—Dirección de Demanda-UE Marlen Espitia—Dirección de Demanda-Organismos Multilaterales
Foreign Affairs Ministry	Jorge Ricardo Torres Rueda (Head of Unit) Monica Andrea Peña Araujo (EU Cooperation Focal Point), Tercer Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores Diana Medina Cetina —Asesor Paula Bejarano Mahecha—Asesor Ana María Cristancho—Primer Secretario Relaciones Exteriores

Organisation	Name and position
Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Commerce	Jorge Maduid (Business Advisor) Gustavo Velez (Competitiveness Office Advisor) Jorge Andres Madrid (Entrepreneurship and Innovation Advisor)
Deputy Ministry of Business Development (VDE)	Monica Baracaldo (Deputy Minister's Advisor) Claudia Sepulveda (Deputy Minister's Accounting Advisor)
National Planning Department (DNP)	Juan Sebastian Robledo Botero (Innovation and Private Sector Development Director) Camilo Rivera Pérez (Productivity, Internationalization and Competition Office) Oscar Salazar Rojas (Innovation and Private Sector Development Specialist) Adriana Montoya (DNP Adviser) Juana Salcedo (Innovation and Private Sector Development Specialist) Olga Luisa Mancayo (Innovation and Private Sector Development Specialist) Lina Mejia Quiñonez (DNP Specialist) Natalia Burgos (Productivity, Internationalization and Competition Specialist) German David Romero (Productivity, Internationalization and Competition Specialist) Maria Angélica Bernal (DNP Specialist)
High Counseling for the Private Sector and Competitiveness, Presidency of the Republic	Fernando Henao Velasco (Competitiveness and Innovation Director) Jose Linarias (Competitiveness Specialist) Eliano Rodriguez (Competitiveness Specialist)
CSOs / think tanks / business organisations	
Bogotá's Chamber of Commerce	Adriana Patricia Lopez Ramos (International Relations Vice Presidency Advisor) María Angélica Osorio Charry (International Relations Vice Presidency technician)
COLCIENCIAS	Maria Carmela Julio (Internacionalization Officer) Libardo Andrés Gutierrez Mengual (European Affairs Officer) Henry Alterio (Specialist)
Innpulsa	Victor Galindo (Business Specialist) Andres Acero (Innovation Coordinator)
ANALDEX	Alvaro Perreira (AL-INVEST IV and AL-INVEST 5.0 Focal Point)
Fundación Tecnalía Colombia	Brigitte Mayorga Jaimes (General Director) Daniel Alejandro Garavito Higuera (Business Developer)
TECNNOVA (Medellin)	Liliana Galves (Coordination Chief, by phone)
TECNALIA Research & Innovation (Bilbao, Spain)	Maika Gorostidi (Head of ELAN Network)

Field mission note – Costa Rica

Period of the field mission	6 to 10 August 2018
Evaluation Team Member(s)	Ana Femenia, Warren Olding
Thematic focus	Social equity; environment and climate change
Main programmes covered	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EUROCLIMA, EUROCLIMA+ • WATERCLIMA • RALCEA • EUROsocial
Stakeholders interviewed (The full list of persons interviewed is provided in Section 3)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EUD staff • Other development partners • Government officials • Regional organisations • Civil society organisations

1 Introduction

1.1 Context

Costa Rica is considered a development success story in many respects. Being now an upper/middle-income country, it has experienced steady economic growth over the last 25 years. Although it still maintains a large agricultural sector, Costa Rica managed to expand its economy to strong technology and tourism industries.²¹ Thanks to the country's commitment to social inclusion and the enhancement of human development, Costa Rica is considered to be one of the countries with the best human development performance – see also table below.

Table 1 *Costa Rica general indicators*

<i>Indicator</i>	<i>Value</i>
GDP per capita	11,631 (2017)
Human Development Index	0.79
Population (million)	4.9 (2017)
Graduation (DCI financing)	Fully graduated from bilateral cooperation under the DCI
ODA disbursed in 2009 and 2016 (in million USD) ²²	85.7 (2009), 97.4 (2016)

Sources: World Bank data, UNDP HDR, EU DG DEVCO Country Page, OECD Stats

For the above reasons, Costa Rica has "graduated" from EU cooperation under the financial exercise 2014-2020. It is therefore no longer eligible for receiving EU bi-lateral assistance. However, Costa Rica continues benefitting from the EU thematic lines, the regional programmes for Latin America and from the sub-regional programme for Central America.²³

²¹ Source: EC DEVCO country page: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/countries/costa-rica_en

²² 2015 constant prices

²³ Source: EC DEVCO country page: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/countries/costa-rica_en

Table 2 *Costa Rica sector specific indicators (environment and climate change)*

<i>Indicator</i>	<i>Value</i>	
Environment and climate change		
Terrestrial protected areas (% of total land area)	-	27.6 (2017)
Marine protected areas (% of territorial waters)	-	0.8 (2017)
Forest area (% of land area)	50.6 (2009)	54.0 (2017)

Sources: UNODC data, World Development Indicators

Costa Rica is regarded as a world leader in conservation and has made significant achievements in reforestation. Over the last 30 years, forest cover has increased from 26 percent to over 50 percent through the use of economic incentives for conservation (under the 1996 Forest Law and its Payments for Environmental Services framework). It has also been active in seeking to mitigate climate change through a number of innovative initiatives, such as establishment of the domestic carbon market. These achievements have proven critical to Costa Rica's development strategy, given the country's recognition as an international ecotourism destination.²⁴

Table 2 *Costa Rica sector specific indicators (social equity)*

<i>Indicator</i>	<i>Value</i>	
Social equity		
GINI Index	50.6 (2009)	51.1 (2018)
Coverage of social protection and labour programmes (% of population)	73 (2009)	67 (2015)
Adequacy of social protection and labour programmes (% of total welfare of beneficiary households)	38 (2008)	29 (2015)
Total tax revenue as % of GDP	21.0 (2010)	22.2 (2016)

Sources: UNODC data, World Development Indicators, Government of Costa Rica

In the mid-1950s, Costa Rica introduced measures that helped define the Costa Rican Social Compact, including (i) abolition of the army and reliance on a police force to maintain order; (ii) establishment of a professional civil service; (iii) enactment of basic welfare legislation; and (iv) guaranteed public education for all. Subsequent governments have continued to prioritize the social welfare and development of the Costa Rican people. The Social Compact has achieved many successes, particularly in the delivery of universal services. Costa Rica's trademark universal and integrated health care system, managed by the Costa Rican Social Security Administration (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, CCSS) has provided access to health care to its entire population, including the poor and bottom percent. As a result, life expectancy at birth improved from 61.6 years in 1960 to 79.7 years in 2012, similar to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) average of 80.7 years. The country has also invested heavily in education, nearly reaching the 2010 spending targets of eight percent of GDP. The literacy rate for adults 15 years old and above is almost universal (97 percent), and the share of adults 25 years and above who had no formal education has declined from 21.2 percent in 1950 to 3.4 percent today.²⁵

²⁴ World Bank 2015 Country Partnership Framework for Costa Rica

²⁵ World Bank 2015 Country Partnership Framework for Costa Rica

1.2 EU support to social equity and environment

1.2.1 Bilateral cooperation

Table 3 EU bilateral cooperation MIP allocations for Costa Rica

Financing cycle & Cooperation sector	Value
EU bilateral cooperation MIP 2007-13	34 mio EUR
Social Cohesion	75%
Regional integration	25%
EU bilateral cooperation MIP 2014-20	Costa Rica has "graduated" from bilateral cooperation

In the CSP 2007-2013, the EU cooperation focused on two main areas, amongst which **social cohesion**, with the following specific objectives²⁶:

- Improvements in public policies in order to improve social indicators. Particular attention was paid to building the capacity of local social services in the areas of health, education, employment and the environment. Planned activities focused on the most economically marginalised regions where the most disadvantaged groups live (poverty rates higher than the national average), and in particular immigrant communities.
- Strengthening of social policies and of the capacities of local authorities relating to welfare, provided fiscal reform and decentralisation of welfare responsibilities. Accordingly, measures included training and local-authority capacity building relating to resource management, involving the principles of good governance, equal treatment, transparency, including accountability and the need to follow good practice regarding public procurement, the introduction of auditing system and reports and central level. These measures contributed thus to the fight against corruption.

Environment and climate change did not figure among the focal sectors for bilateral cooperation. Costa Rica is not eligible for bilateral cooperation under the EU financial exercise 2014-2020.

1.2.2 Regional cooperation

Costa Rica has been strongly involved in interventions in the social equity sector, particularly EUROsociAL. It also played a role as transferring country sharing knowledge and good practices with the other countries of the region.

With regards to the environment sector, Costa Rica is the first country to establish an official multi-institutional committee to manage programmes such as EUROCLIMA vis-a-vis UNFCCC/NDC commitments.

2 Main findings of the field phase mission

2.1 Key observations

- South-South cooperation is a priority now at the Foreign Affairs Ministry with several joint commissions with other LA countries. There are currently 119 South-South projects. MS like Germany and Spain and the EU through Adelante are supporting Triangular cooperation. There is a project to create the national Cooperation for Development Agency in CR -apparently delayed for the need to reach a difficult agreement between Foreign Affairs Ministry and MIDEPLAN. Nevertheless the Agency will most probably be soon created since it will be a positive movement towards CR entry in the OECD. EUROsociAL has been very helpful in supporting South-South cooperation while EUROCLIMA presented severe challenges. (JC42, JC52)
- The current definition of "graduation" applied by the EU appears inadequate in the case of Costa Rica since it does not take into account the country's current capacity to meet the SDGs and, in the case of climate change, the NDCs. (JC11)
- EU regional programmes are not fully aligned with sub-regional policies and interventions relating to E&CC in Central America; in particular, SICA already has a number of policies

²⁶ EU Costa Rica Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013

relating to E&CC (ERCC, ECADERT, ERAS, etc.) which are not fully reflected in the design/implementation of EU regional programmes. (JC11)

- Stakeholders based in Costa Rica are not sufficiently informed on EU regional programmes. (JC11)
- Synergies with other donors' programmes and projects in the sub-region remain limited. (JC24)
- According to interviewees, AL Invest, COPOLAD, and LAIF do not coordinate with External Relations Ministries. This is a reality that some stakeholders regret. (JC21)
- Other DGs are active in CR. Examples include: cooperation of DG Connect and the Space Agency, involvement of DG Regio and MIDEPLAN in the Regional Development Plan through EUROsociAL, cooperation of DG Trade with the ILO on labour law compliance, and activities by the EU aviation safety agency. (JC23)
- Gender and good governance should be further integrated into CfPs and selected projects of EU regional programmes such as EUROCLIMA+. (JC11)
- EU regional cooperation needs to communicate clearly and effectively key findings, lessons and good practices that demonstrate the economic and social benefits of conserving and sustainably using natural resources and how adaptation to climate change can contribute to meeting NDC targets. (JC44)
- Compared with other sector platforms (CIAT, AIDDEF, OAS, etc.) the EU cooperation provided high quality expertise through European consultants and civil servants. The sector institutional meetings, as well as the *peer to peer* exchange of experiences involving Europeans and Latin Americans were very successful and highly appreciated by national stakeholders. (JC41)
- Social equity in Costa Rica has benefited from evaluation of public policies conducted by MIDEPLAN. There is an effort at this moment by MIDEPLAN to inform the new authorities about the recommendations of the recent evaluations conducted about the different policies. (JC53)
- More needs to be done in order to improve intra-regional cooperation within the equity sector. The EU focal point at the External Relations minister in Costa Rica suggested to create a network of EU Cooperation Focal points at the External Relations Ministries. This way they could meet and look for further synergies. (JC52)

2.2 Transversal elements

- Interviewees stated needs assessments are not updated at the time of implementation and therefore are often out of date with latest political/economic developments. There was consensus that needs assessments are not designed to provide the information needed to facilitate S-S/triangular cooperation. In addition, deadlines are too short to assess needs in neighbouring countries prior to proposing projects involving more than one country. (JC11)
- Clear efforts were found in the gender perspective. Indigenous groups however did not receive specific attention; they represent about 2% of the total population. Specific attention is now given to Afroamericans when designing/implementing programmes. (JC11)
- Non-state stakeholders had a very weak involvement not only in the design of programmes but in its implementation as well. Non-state actors and civil society in general lost a lot of space after graduation. EUROsociAL did not reach civil society since it worked with public institutions. According to Foreign Affairs Ministry and other stakeholders there is a lot of room for improvement in this regard. CR is the first country to sign a National Pact for the SDGs. This involves all state powers (Executive, Legislative and Judicial). There is a common agenda for all actors. Therefore synergies need also to be found with civil society and non-state actors. (JC11)
- But it is not clear how far EU regional cooperation is aligned with the sub-regional agenda (SICA Agenda) and its five priorities that includes managing risk (including climate change). Thus although EUROCLIMA+ has increased its alignment by defining 6 thematic themes on basis of the regional priorities of the national focal points (NFPs) it is not clear how far it is aligned to the Regional strategy for Climate Change in Central America adopted by SICA/CCAD (2011). (JC11)
- Refugees and migration from the Nicaragua and Venezuela crises are having an effect on public spending as they have rights to health care and education. Also, cooperation with Nicaragua continues in a stalemate due to the Nicaragua government's opposition to resolve

the Rio San Juan crisis. The Latin American Network of Public Policies for Regional Development lead by Brazil experienced some delays at certain points due to the internal political crisis. (JC11)

- Costa Rica is very much interested in offering cooperation. However, they consider that triangular cooperation already existed before graduation. Nevertheless South-South cooperation is a priority now at the Foreign Affairs Ministry with several joint commissions with other LA countries. There are currently 119 South-South projects. MS like Germany and Spain are supporting Triangular cooperation. (JC11)
- EU-LA dialogue has facilitated more informed discussion (including on OECD needs). For example, high level meetings have facilitated interchange on key points such as the perception of what is the transition to “graduation” and other cooperation opportunities. However, CR is still learning how to develop its dialogue in accessing other facilities and incorporating key actors such as civil society and private sector (including linkages with other EU instruments). A contradiction has been found with the fact that the EU-Central America Cooperation Agreement has not been ratified yet by four EU MS. The EU-CA joint commission has been without activity for the last three years. (JC12)
- The EU’s focus on middle income status means it has linked graduation to implementing a sustainable development agenda. In addition, there are too many actors to plan effectively who is doing what. This is not aided by the adoption of rigid vertical themes in which the conditionality is too heavy and reduces effectiveness and potential impact, which are difficult to monitor and evaluate due to a high number of activities. There is consensus on the need for a simpler and flexible approach in line with its institutional capacity and clearer information on how to measure the achievement of SDGs. (JC13)
- No one interviewed was able to confirm they know about the PI or other instruments associated with other DGs. Indeed, interviewees agreed more needs to be done to ensure institutions such as MIDEPLAN is aware of these different instruments and the programmes they are supporting with the private sector, civil society, etc. (JC23)
- Graduation in CR is an unwelcome term that is not linked to indicators on sustainable development. Bilateral cooperation is only maintained in Education Alternative funding instruments are still not widely understood. (JC23)
- Interviewees stated there is a need to ensure the CfPs are coordinated with EU regional initiatives to reduce the scope for overlaps. For example, the horizontal activities of EUROCLIMA+ should ensure the design process of project proposals have the funding and time needed to ensure reduce this risk. (JC25)
- The CfPs suit EU procedures and objective of disbursement of funds. However, this is criticised on the grounds: a) some of the CfPs for EUROCLIMA+ have taken longer than planned (Biodiversity, water and risk management sectors; b) deadlines are counterproductive in that they are not long enough to promote bilateral/sub regional/regional cooperation; c) short-term projects can mobilise action, but cannot sustain the reform process (such as development of policy dialogue and synergies between institutions and/or countries; cost effectiveness of projects and CfPs is not clearly understood as it is not communicated by regional programmes such as EUROCLIMA from Brussels. (JC25)
- Despite the disadvantages of working with SICA, it is obvious that social equity needs to be also addressed through the regional integration processes and institutions. Issues related with violence prevention security for women, migration, employment, fight against poverty etc. could find better solutions if addressed at a subregion level. Some of those issues could also benefit from a transborder approach. (JC25)
- Regional programmes such as RALCEA, WATERCLIMA and EUROCLIMA+ have not learnt from other more effective regional programmes such as EUROsocial that a more flexible demand-driven approach can be more productive and stimulate greater ownership than implementation mechanisms that are largely defined and managed from Brussels. (JC25)

2.3 Examples of success stories

- EUROCLIMA regional workshops LA countries have helped to enhance regional networking platforms. For example, in the agriculture sector IICA’s Working Groups (based in Costa Rica) have enhanced dialogue on developing a common approach to addressing the loss of agrobiodiversity and in the production of resistant varieties of rice, coffee, etc. to both abiotic

and biotic stresses. This stimulated a participatory process leading to the elaboration of the Strategy for Sustainable Agriculture adapted to climate change for the SICA region (2018-2030). In another example, EUROCLIMA has been instrumental in supporting the development of the MOVELATAM platform. This facilitated elaboration of the Regional Report on Electric Transport, (2017) and through the CfP for Urban Mobility it has helped CR enhance S-S cooperation opportunities by associating with larger countries from South America (such as Brazil and Chile) to establish the economies of scale it needs to enter into electric transport market. (JC42)

- Interviewees from the government of Costa Rica confirmed EUROCLIMA+ has been supportive in enhancing LA countries to participate as region in the UNFCCC COPs such as COP20 in Lima and facilitating the expansion of S-S and Technological Cooperation for Climate Action and Sustainable Development (to be developed further in Uruguay on 20 Aug 2018). Interviewees from the water sector, also confirmed RALCEA was instrumental in the identification and mapping of key actors in watersheds which was then applied in specific case studies (such as in Panama). Although the RALCEA network was abandoned approximately a year after closure of the programme (2015) participants from CR stated they maintain ad hoc contact with homologues in advanced countries in the region such and continue to apply certain aspects of the programme. For example, interviewees from MINAE confirmed they identify problems and the causes of bad watershed management associated with privately owned hydro-dams and provide guidance on how to reduce them. (JC42)
- Interviews with the government of Costa Rica and IICA confirmed EUROCLIMA has helped bring technical expertise together to advance legal and policy reforms relating to CC in Central America. For example, IICA (based in Costa Rica), the Ministries for Agriculture, Environment and Foreign Affairs have participated in the elaboration of assessments concerning the agriculture and livestock in the NDCs and contributed to IICA elaborating the above-mentioned strategy for sustainable agriculture adapted to climate change in the SICA region and which is helping the majority of countries in AL (excludes ALBA countries such as Venezuela and Nicaragua) to integrate adaptation to climate change in their own national policies (such as Costa Rica and Argentina). (JC43)
- The added value of EU regional programmes centres on their capacity to bring together a wide range of (technical) stakeholders in the region, through which a number of platforms have grown to facilitate dialogue (such as in the urban mobility and energy efficiency sectors). For the government of Costa Rica this is highly important as it offers the country an opportunity to exploit economies of scale in areas such as electric bus transport that would not be viable at the bilateral level. (JC42)
- Implementation and improvements of the national evaluation system. The Ministry of National Planning and Economic Policy (MIDEPLAN) of Costa Rica, as the governing body of the National Planning System (SNP) and the National Evaluation System (SINE), began a process in 2010 to promote the evaluation of public interventions in the country. The previous Administration, within the framework of the National Development Plan 2015-2018, approved a National Assessment Agenda, which reflects the commitment of the Executive Branch in the evaluation of strategic operations. Mechanisms and procedures have been established to account for the institutionalization of the evaluation, including an official register of evaluations, and the carrying out of impact evaluations. At the regional level, an Inter-institutional Working Group for the Evaluation of Public Policies as well as for budget-planning approaches has been set up with the EUROsociAL support²⁷, composed of representatives from Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay. (JC53)
- In fiscal education policy and important achievement was the conformation of the Subdirectorate of Education and Culture, inside the Ministry of Finance. With EUROsociAL support this unit succeeded to have a properly trained work team, the elaboration of didactic guides for primary and secondary, the development and implementation of training programmes for educators and for officials of the Ministry of Finance, construction of a game room in the Children's Museum, the development of a website and videogames, as well as the implementation of the Tax Assistance Centers. EUROsociAL supported this process by covering the costs of exchanges and visits of civil servants to Argentina, Brasil and El Salvador to learn from their experiences. The programme also funded technical assistance for the above

²⁷ Studies, guidelines and publications have been supported by EUROsociAL.”

mentioned activities and products²⁸. Besides, there was an important agreement between the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Education, in such a way that it was possible to obtain the approval and inclusion of tax education topics, within the study programmes, in Civic, in Social Studies and in Education for Everyday Life, by the Council of Higher Education. The nuclei of fiscal support conformed by university students have been able to grant support and advice to citizens that required it, such as small entrepreneurs. According to the interviews the EU support was crucial since it allowed learning from other countries' experiences. (JC53)

- Costa Rica is a member of the Global Forum on Transparency and the Exchange of information for tax purposes since 2010. In 2015, Costa Rica obtained a "partially fulfilled" rating and a "non-fulfilled" rating in some particular aspects. The aspects mentioned were incorporated as motions in the Bill to fight against tax fraud. International standards require compliance with three requirements: The existence of data and its records; Access to these data by the Government; and the subscription of information exchange instruments. The MH of Costa Rica requested the support of EUROsociAL to learn about international best practices on how tax administrations collect, or access the information of the final beneficiaries of legal entities; Best practices to guarantee the good use of the information of the taxpayers; and recommendations on computer security in tax administrations. European expertise from the Netherlands and Spain was brought by the programme. The Finance Committee of the Legislative Assembly reached an agreement (April 6, 2016) to approve the Register of Shareholders, which is one of the measures incorporated in the bill for the fight against tax fraud. The bill to improve the fight against tax fraud was approved in December 2016²⁹. As a follow up last April 2018 was approved the Regulation of the Registry of Transparency and Final Beneficiaries³⁰. (JC53)
- In the justice sector, several initiatives contributing to increase social equity were developed under EUROsociAL with the participation of several countries and with different level of success: Quality improvement of the overall justice services for the most vulnerable population; protection of victims and witnesses; integral attention to women deprived of their liberty and their dependents through an institutional network involving NGOs, and private entities implying job offers for women under those circumstances -very relevant for gender equality-; elimination of barriers to access to justice for the population with hearing and psychosocial disabilities. EU contribution focused on expertise (hiring consultants), promoting exchange of experiences and good practices. (JC54)
- An important programme was supported by EUROsociAL and Adelante: "Programa de Justicia Restaurativa y mecanismos alternativos de solución de conflictos (MASC)", "Programme for restorative Justice and alternative mechanisms of conflict resolution"; It has contributed to better solve criminal conflicts in particular for the young population, increasing social equity by involving the local community, victims and offending persons in the solution. The EU contribution was particularly significant in order to strengthen inter-institutionalization and cooperation among different powers (Legislative, executive and judicial) through the Social Presidential Council. The policy was approved and still exists, the Law for restorative Justice has been recently signed by Carlos Alvarado President and several protocols have been designed for its implementation. (JC53)
- In the employment sector, EU contribution supported the programme EMPLEATE and helped the General Directorate of Employment (at the Ministry of Labour) to increase a systemic approach to job search and to the Employment Agency. For example conducting inspections for employment in order to count on objective data and forecasts. Other strategic recommendations by the programme were not feasible, like the implementation of a digital platform for public services for employment. This was due to the lack of resources at ministerial level. Intra-regional cooperation, with Argentina, Colombia, Peru or Guatemala was relevant. (JC53)
- Regarding prevention of gender-based violence, several protocols were designed to strengthen coordination between public defenders and Police. Achievements were found in the recovery

²⁸ "Dirección de Servicio al Contribuyente, Subdirección de Educación y Cultura Fiscal. Detalle de aportes de EUROsociAL", 2018.

²⁹ Ley para mejorar la lucha contra el fraude fiscal, published in the Official Journal "La Gaceta" on 20th December 2016.

³⁰ Reglamento del Registro de Transparencia y Beneficios fiscales, published in the Official Journal "La Gaceta" on 23rd April 2018.

of gender-based violence offenders. Local Committees of Immediate Attention and Follow-up were developed with EU support. Another important achievement has been the Design and implementation of an inter-institutional strategy and a plan for the dissemination of rights for migrant women victims of violence. (JC53)

2.4 Details on some challenges faced by the EU regional programmes

- Interviewees in CR believe EUROCLIMA+ is too sector-focused, which reduces the scope for more integrated approaches to combatting the effects of CC that centre on establishing sustainable development. At the sector level EUROCLIMA+ deals with the region primarily through its NFPs, which means limited or no dialogue has been developed at the first level in its main components. This reduces the opportunities for EUROCLIMA+ to identify the gaps concerning main actors at both municipal and national levels (i.e. gaps in articulation with decision-makers at both levels). Some interviewees believe this approach means policy exchanges and networking may be difficult to sustain over the long-term especially considering cross-sector dialogue will need to improve within the new National System for CC if it is to support effective implementation of Costa Rica's national strategy to 2050. For example, more needs to be done to develop policy coherence in key sectors such as agriculture and environment where, on the one hand, the Ministry of Environment and Energy has adopted a new policy on "Sustainable Production and Consumption" (in line with the Forum of Environment Ministers/UNEP Agenda) and, on the other, the Ministry of Agriculture has adopted a separate policy entitled "Sustainable Agriculture Adapted to Climate Change" (in line with the IICA Strategy). (JC43)
- Interviewees from the government of Costa Rica and IICA believe policy exchange at the EU-CELAC level has improved dialogue on CC at the regional level. However, there is consensus far more needs to be done to ensure the dialogue foment multi-sector dialogue. For example, IICA's Councils of Ministers for Central and South America (CAC and CAS) need to improve dialogue with the Forum for Environment Ministers. Interviewees in Costa Rica confirmed this could be done by ensuring relevant CfPs under EUROCLIMA+ (such as for Resilient Agriculture) actively support: a) such multi-sector dialogue to implement the SDGs in line with existing strategies that support such dialogue (such as ECADERT, ERAS and ERCC in Central America); b) strengthen sub regional institutions such as CCAD (Central America), OASAT/SBSTA (in South America); and c) promote the case for Agriculture developing its own institutional infrastructure to implement the Paris Agreement/NDCs (i.e. establish a subsidiary organism for Agriculture that has a regional office in Latin America). However, to do this EUROCLIMA+ will need to establish a working relationship with SICA as well as with CAN and MERCOSUR. (JC41)
- Regional programmes such as EUROCLIMA+ don't have the communication strategies in place to encourage countries to cooperate in areas of mutual interest. Currently there are challenges in communicating clearly and effectively: a) the growing economic costs of flooding and droughts due to CC/El Niño phenomenon; b) policy gaps, such as those mentioned above for agriculture, or relating to specific gaps such as the need for IPCC to agree on figures relating to emissions from agro-diverse practices that by retaining humic and fulvic acids and reduce CO₂ emissions (and thus support countries committed to decarbonisation); c) the need for coordinating mechanisms that address the reduction of these costs not only through coordinated policy reforms but through coordinated actions (the National System of CR could be supported to show how this could be done); d) what is being done and achieved through current bilateral cooperation programmes and projects and ensuring relevant programmes and projects are presented/discussed in regional events (to support the identification of good practices and lessons learned). (JC41)
- There was a high level of agreement among interviewees from government and MS in Costa Rica that more needs to be done to: a) strengthen intra-regional cooperation by working with the relevant secretariats at the sub-regional level to ensure policy coherence is adequate to support and advance intra-regional cooperation; and b) ensure effective articulation is developed and maintained with decision-makers to enhance the ownership and alignment of regional programmes and projects; c) ensure there is a mechanism in place to coordinate regional, sub-regional and national agendas and enhance the participatory process at all levels including the subnational level. (JC42)

- To bring about a wider process of legal, policy and institutional reforms regional programmes such as EUROCLIMA+ need to ensure a mechanism is in place (such as the National System being established in Costa Rica) to ensure what is agreed in regional workshops involves all key stakeholders (civil society, private sector, unions, academic research institutes, bilateral projects, etc.) and developed into an agenda that can be presented to decision-makers. To be effective and sustainable, these agendas need to advocate the importance of developing a coordinated multi-sector approach to policy reform, which also promotes greater linkages between adaptation and mitigation (for example concerning energy efficiency and urban mobility). To support this process EUROCLIMA+ could support Research Centres, doctorate students, etc. conduct research where there are gaps, such as: a) in the formulae needed to clarify emissions relating to different agricultural practices; b) concerning the development of water laws in those countries where there is no such law (Chile, Guatemala, etc.); c) developing greater understanding among indigenous groups as to their cultural views on water which has a direct bearing on rights (i.e. water is life and therefore has rights that must be respected). (JC43)
- Costa Rica has made progress in addressing environmental degradation and climate change, but generally regional programmes have not done enough to: a) evaluate the performance and results of LA countries own policies, strategies and action plans; b) provide fiscal incentives to widen RE (which in CR is not a priority due to the dominance of the public sector in the generation of hydro-electric power); and c) promote a coordinate multi-sectoral approach to environmental governance (in Costa Rica there are land conflicts between sectors and water quantity and quality is not managed at the watershed level; rather by conservation areas). (JC44)
- Despite the pressure from the EU to work in the framework of regional or sub-regional integration, this has been very complicated. There is no single regional body that addresses issues of social equity, and those that exist at the sub-regional level, such as SICA, have faced several challenges. CR for example is very critical towards the SICA institutions from a political point of view. The selection of SISCA (Sistema Integración Social Centroamericana) as a partner of EUROsociAL has been criticized -for inefficiency and ineffectiveness- due to its institutional weakness. It is not clear what the direction of CELAC is in the region. Some progress has been made in the framework of the OAS (Organization of American States) or MESOAMERICA. But at the programme level it has not been possible to go beyond the establishment of cordial collaboration relations. Stakeholders from sector institutions however acknowledge the need to address issues related to social policies -migration, gender and domestic violence, public security, drugs, employment creation, etc.- at regional and sub-regional level. (JC52)
- In the field of taxation, cooperation in the framework of SICA (Central American Economic Integration System) has been very difficult due to the lack of legal security perceived in other countries. From the Costa Rican point of view, there is a lack of solid fiscal institutions in the rest of the subcontinent. (JC52)
- More needs to be done in order to improve intra-regional cooperation within the equity sector. The EU focal point at the External Relations minister in Costa Rica suggested to create a network of UE Cooperation Focal points at the External Relations Ministries. This way they could meet and look for further synergies. (JC52)
- In gender equality EUROsociAL supported the design of a Plan against violence against women under SICA, in the framework of COMMCA (Consejo de Ministras de la Mujer de Centroamérica y República Dominicana). However COMMCA lacks real political power and according to interviewees the plan was signed by the ministers but there was no follow-up. (JC53)
- There is no coordination or standardization of policies at regional level on social equity. Several exceptions can be found, for instance under the Security Convention in SICA. Trans-border Binational Plans for Security Prevention have been developed between Costa Rica and Panama. However, EU cooperation has not reached these frameworks since it has not focused on trans-border cooperation in the case of equity sector. (JC52)
- Greater results in legal and policy frameworks have been limited by some factors. In the fiscal area, it has not been possible to contribute to advancing fiscal pacts (among several stakeholders) because the EU (and EUROsociAL programme) considered that this belongs to the scope of State sovereignty. This clearly poses challenges to cooperation. Further work needs to be done with all the actors that are necessary, for example political parties (other than

the government) and socio-economic actors. The EU contribution has been limited to the modernization of tax administrations. Even so, the majority of advances have been made through South-South cooperation where, for example, countries such as Uruguay or Peru have exercised leadership in this area. (JC53)

- Deadlines for some of the projects involved in the justice sector under EUROsociAL were very short. Project design and terms of references were not always clear thus limiting the effectiveness of the interventions. (JC53)
- EU support was given to institutional entities, in some cases very much linked to the Presidencies of the Republic: Like in the case of the REDCUID (linked to President Laura Chinchilla, 2010-2014) and the Social Presidential Council (linked to the President Solís, 2014-2018). In both cases, once the administration changed programmes and initiatives not only lost momentum and political support but were to some degree “neglected” by the new administrations. This raised the issue of the need to support initiatives that involve other stakeholders and public and private entities who will contribute to the sustainability of the social interventions. (JC53)
- In the fiscal area, despite the important support of EUROsociAL, the situation remains very complicated in CR. In fact, the lack of a solution to the fiscal deterioration is one of the main obstacles to the country's entry into the OECD. Recent efforts to increase tax collection have not helped reduce the budget deficit. As a result, central government debt has shot up from less than 25% of GDP in 2008 to 49% in 2017. (JC53)
- In Employment government stakeholders mentioned that they do not reach social partners and other entities like private partners with EU support. They do work with the ILO on a more tripartite approach (meaning involving social partners and government) under issues related to employment and migration. The need to work at a sub-regional (in Central America) level was also underlined by interviewees. (JC53)
- For the Justice subsector, according to the EUROsociAL final evaluation those cases where results are considered lower than expected (16%), are related to ‘socio professional integration of incarcerated persons’, mainly due to an ambiguous political positioning of the Programme’s proposal in the respective countries. For example, in Costa Rica there are legislation barriers that limit the integration of incarcerated persons, which the Programme has not overcome since its approach has been carried out in this case at a technical level. (JC53)
- Challenges remain in the field of cooperation with other partners, stakeholders and civil society. In justice Public Defenders would like to collaborate with private companies through public-private partnerships. This is important to overcome an assistance approach and to allow employment generation. (JC53)
- In gender equality broader results could have been achieved through wider involvement of civil society stakeholders, few NGOs could be involved but always invited by the government thus diminishing the independence of their interventions. EUROsociAL provided high-quality technical expertise but did not sufficiently contribute to stakeholders’ involvement. INAMU acknowledged the fact that EU Cooperation has lost influence on civil society organisations after graduation. (JC54)

3 List of persons interviewed

<i>Organisation</i>	<i>Name and position</i>
EUD	
EUD Costa Rica	Birgit Vleughels Head of Cooperation
Other Development partners	
International Labour Organization (ILO)	Leonardo Neves Ferreira Deputy Director
Inter-American Development Bank	David Ruiz, Responsables de Cooperaciones Técnicas y del Consejo de Sociedad Civil 2208-6934 Ernest William, Especialista del Fondo Multilateral de Inversiones (FOMIN)
Inter-American Development Bank	Silvia Ortiz, Responsable Agua y Saneamiento Mauro Nalesso Coordinador de HydroBID (en Washington DC, par skype)
AECID	Jesús Molina Vázquez, Coordinador General.
GIZ	Sandra Spies, Directora Programa Cambio Climático
GIZ	Araya Ramirez Kathia, Director del proyecto Mi transporte
Government & Public Institutions	
Ministerio Relaciones Exteriores	Carmen Claramunt Garro Dtora. Adjunta Cooperación Internacional
Ministerio Relaciones Exteriores	Manuela Ureña, Focal Point European Union
Ministerio Relaciones Exteriores	Tatiana Vargas, Focal Point European Union (Deputy)
Ministerio Relaciones Exteriores	Leticia Zamora, Climate Change focal point
Ministerio Relaciones Exteriores	Bernardina Arias (Coop. Sur Sur)
Ministerio de Hacienda Dirección General de Tributación	Maribel Zúñiga Cambroneru Directora de Relaciones Tributarias Interinstitucionales 506-2-522903 z114unigacm@hacienda.go.cr
Ministerio de Planificación Nacional y Política Económica MIDEPLAN	Sasskia Rodriguez Steichen (Directora Coop. Internacional)
Ministerio de Planificación Nacional y Política Económica MIDEPLAN	Jeannina Gutiérrez Ugarte, Coordinadora Cooperación Multilateral Cooperación Internacional Tel. +506 2202-8580
Ministerio de Planificación Nacional y Política Económica MIDEPLAN	Nazareth Porras Quirós Focal Point UE
Ministerio de Seguridad Pública	Luis Aguilar Calvo, Jefe Unidad Cooperación Internacional
Ministerio de Seguridad Pública	Raúl Alberto Morales , Coordinador Nacional del Programa contra la Violencia Intrafamiliar
Ministerio de Seguridad Pública	Franklin Ruiz Director de Programas Policiales Preventivos.
Ministerio de Planificación Nacional y Política Económica MIDEPLAN	Muñoz Bonilla Milagros Directora Planificación Regional <milagro@mideplan.go.cr>
Red Nacional de Cuido y Desarrollo Infantil Ministerio de Bienestar Social y Familia - Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social (IMAS)	Keneth Araya Andrade, Director Ejecutivo, Secretaría Técnica, REDCUDI Gobierno de Costa Rica
Ministerio Público	Eugenia Salazar Fiscalía Especializada contra la violencia de género Fiscal Adjunta
Ministerio Público	Diana Montero Montero, Directora, Defensa Pública
Ministerio Público	Erick Núñez Rodríguez, Sub Director, Defensa Pública
Ministerio Público	Mario Serrano Zamora, Defensa Pública
Ministerio Público	Yamura Valenciano Jiménez, Defensa Pública
Ministerio Público	Laura Monge Cantero, jefa, Oficina de Asesoría Técnica y Relaciones Internacionales (OATRI), Fiscalía General
Ministerio Público, Fiscalía General	María Natalia Villalta Hidalgo, Fiscal, OATRI, Fiscalía General

Organisation	Name and position
Ministerio Público	Jovanna Calderón Altamirano, Coordinadora, Proyecto Justicia Restaurativa
Ministerio Público, Poder Judicial	Sara Catillo, Comisión Nacional para el Mejoramiento del Acceso a la Justicia (CONAMAJ)
Ministerio Público, Poder Judicial	Melissa Benavides Víquez, Coordinadora, Unidad de Acceso a la Justicia
Ministerio Público	Zahira Chavarría Garita, Oficina de Cooperación y Relaciones Internacionales, (OCRI).
Ministerio Público	Karen Leiva Chavarría, jefa a.i., Oficina de Cooperación y Relaciones Internacionales (OCRI)
Ministerio de Planificación Nacional y Política Económica MIDEPLAN	Florita Azofeifa Directora Área Evaluación y Seguimiento
INAMU Instituto Nacional de la Mujer	Karla Gamboa Unidad de Relaciones Internacionales y Cooperación 25278412)
INAMU Instituto Nacional de la Mujer	Saskia Salas, Directora del Área Especializada de Información
INAMU Instituto Nacional de la Mujer	Xiomara Castro, SubDirectora del Área Especializada de Información
INAMU Instituto Nacional de la Mujer	Ana Victoria Naranjo, Secretaría Técnica de la PIEG
Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social (IMAS)	Licda. Gabriela Prado, gprado@imas.go.cr Licdo. Jose Miguel Salas
Viceministerio de Paz Dirección General de Promoción de la Paz y Convivencia Ciudadana (DIGEPAZ),	Julio Solís Director Dirección General de Promoción de la Paz y Convivencia Ciudadana (DIGEPAZ)
Viceministerio de Gobernación y Policía	Víctor Barrantes Marín Viceministro
Viceministerio de Gobernación y Policía	Marleen Mora , Asistente Ministro 2234-1360
Ministerio de Trabajo/ Servicio nacional de Empleo	Guillermo Zúñiga, Director Nacional de Empleo Público
Ministerio de Trabajo/ Servicio nacional de Empleo	Ana Lucía Blanco, Asesora de Asuntos Internacionales
Ministerio de Trabajo/ Servicio nacional de Empleo	Edrei Cabezas, funcionario de la dirección nacional de empleo.
Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados	Oscar Izquierdo, Director Cooperación Internacional Seidy Leitón Calderón, Asistente tecnico al Director de operacion
Instituto de Innovación y Transferencia Tecnológica Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería	Renato Jimenez Zúñiga, Director Técnico del INTA-MAG
Ministerio de Agricultura	Roberto Flores, Secretaria Ejecutiva de Planificación Sectorial Agropecuaria (SEPSA del MAG) en la Unidad de Planificación para el Desarrollo. Area de Política y Agropecuaria y Rural.
Ministerio de Agricultura	Nora Orias, Coordinadora de Género
Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y Energía (MINAE)	Andrea Meza Murillo, Directora Dirección Cambio Climático. NFP for EUROCLIMA
Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y Energía (MINAE)	Patricia Campos, Directora Adjunta Dirección Cambio Climático/ Asistente Grettel Reyes
Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y Energía (MINAE)	José Miguel Zeledón, Director de la Dirección de Aguas. Lleva WATERCLIMA
Ministerio de Planificación Nacional y Política Económica (MIDEPLAN)	Hugo Murillo Castro, Cooperación Multilateral
Ministerio de Planificación Nacional y Política Económica (MIDEPLAN)	Jeannina Gutierrez Ugarte, Coordinadora Cooperación Multilateral. Punto Nacional Focal. También asistirá Nazareth Porras 506 8826 7415.
Ministerio de Planificación Nacional y Política Económica (MIDEPLAN)	Sasskia Rogriguez Steichen , Directora Área de Cooperación Internacional
Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación (SINAC)	Lesbia Sevilla, Jefe de la oficina de cooperación y Técnica y Financiera
CSOs / think tanks	
Fundación Parque de la Libertad	Gilbert Montero de NAF

<i>Organisation</i>	<i>Name and position</i>
Fundación Parque de la Libertad	Laura Pacheco de EMPLEATE
Fundación GEOS	Ana Isabel García
CEFEMINA	Ana Carcedo
LA Regional Organisations	
Centro Agronómico Tropical de Investigación y Enseñanza (CATIE)	Laura Benegas, Responsable de WATERCLIMA (ZONAS COSTERAS).
Consejo Agropecuario Centroamericano (CAC)	Ligia Córdoba, Secretaría Ejecutiva del CAC
Instituto Interamericano de Cooperación para la Agricultura IICA	Laura Meza, Especialista Principal Resiliencia y Gestión de Riesgos Agrícolas EUROCLIMA I & II/ Kattia Fajardo, especialista en adaptación al cambio climático. Harold Gamboa Coordinador Unidad Ejecutora Regional de PROCAGICA
Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA)	Ronny Cascante, Ex Coordinador de Proyecto EUROCLIMA en IICA
Red Centroamericana de Instituciones de Ingeniería (REDICA)	Liliana Arrieta , Secretaria Ejecutiva

Field mission note – Ecuador

Period of the field mission	4-11 July 2018
Evaluation Team Member(s)	Warren Olding
Thematic focus	Environment and climate change
Main programmes covered	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EUROCLIMA, EUROCLIMA+ • WATERCLIMA • RALCEA
Stakeholders interviewed (The full list of persons interviewed is provided in Section 3)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EUD staff • Other development partners • Government officials • Implementing partners in Loja

1 Introduction

1.1 Context

With a population of approximately 16.2 million, Ecuador is the most densely populated country in South America and is classified as an upper middle-income country. Ecuador has been one of the fastest growing economies in Latin America in recent years, which has directly reduced poverty and inequality levels and has increased the middle class.

However, significant challenges remain in terms of sustainability of these achievements and in ensuring sustainable, inclusive growth. While the national average poverty rate has decreased to 22.5% in 2014, another part of the population is still vulnerable to falling again below the poverty line.³¹

Table 1 Ecuador general indicators

<i>Indicator</i>	<i>Value</i>
GDP per capita (in current USD)	6,199 (2017)
Human Development Index	0.75 (2018)
Population (million)	16.6 (2017)
Graduation (DCI financing)	Still some bilateral allocations in current MFF
ODA disbursed in 2009 and 2016 (in million USD) ³²	187.6 (2009), 241.8 (2016)

Sources: World Bank data, UNDP HDR, EU DG DEVCO Country Page, OECD Stats

As an upper middle-income country, Ecuador should in principle graduate from the EU's bilateral cooperation under the DCI. However in December 2013, the European Commission, the European Council and the European Parliament decided to make an exception and continue cooperation with Ecuador for a phase-out period 2014-2017.³³

Table 2 Ecuador sector specific indicators

<i>Indicator</i>	<i>Value</i>	
Environment		
Terrestrial protected areas (% of total land area)	-	27.6 (2017)
Marine protected areas (% of territorial waters)	-	0.8 (2017)
Forest area (% of land area)	50.6 (2009)	54.0 (2017)

Source: World Development Indicators

³¹ https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/countries/ecuador_en

³² 2015 constant prices

³³ https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/countries/ecuador_en

Ecuador is the 11th most biodiverse nation in the world and the country with the highest biodiversity per square kilometer, making it one of the world's 17 "mega diverse" nations. Biodiversity conservation in Ecuador is not only driven by the potential economic benefits, it is also intrinsically linked to the country's Indigenous Peoples, whose knowledge of sustainable management practices singles them out as particularly important stakeholders in the stewardship of the country's fragile ecosystems. This has been reflected in the design of the country's National Biodiversity Strategy 2015-2030, which aims to unlock the productive, industrial and commercial potential of biodiversity, and mobilize biodiversity as a key factor in the change of the productive matrix. As a result, Ecuador has invested heavily in the National System of Protected Areas (Sistema Nacional de Áreas Protegidas – SNAP), establishing 14 new protected areas in a five-year period between 2007 and 2012. Realizing the productive potential of its natural capital, Ecuador has intensified its efforts to strengthen the institutional framework for environmental sustainability. Ecuador is the first country in the world that has a constitution that establishes the inalienable rights of nature to exist, maintain and regenerate (in Articles 71-74). In addition, the Ecuadorian Constitution incorporates the right of its population to live in a healthy environment and to petition on behalf of nature, or Pacha Mama, for the conservation of environmental and biological resources, the restoration of degraded natural areas, and the mitigation of climate change by limiting greenhouse gas emissions, deforestation, and air pollution (in Article 414). Since the ratification of the new Constitution in 2008, the country has implemented wide ranging changes in its national policy framework to address environmental concerns, such as the Plan Nacional para el Buen Vivir 2013-2017 (National Plan of Good Living) promotes environmental sustainability related to water, pollution, consumption patterns, and the Estrategia Nacional de Cambio Climático 2012-2025 (National Climate Change Strategy).³⁴

1.2 EU support to environment and climate change

1.2.1 Bilateral cooperation

Table 3 EU bilateral cooperation MIP allocations for Ecuador

<i>Financing cycle & Cooperation sector</i>	<i>Value (in EUR million)</i>
EU bilateral cooperation MIP 2007-13	140,6
Contributing to increased government social investment – Education	75,2
Generating sustainable economic opportunities and promoting regional integration	65,4
EU bilateral cooperation MIP 2014-20	67
Support to sustainable and inclusive growth at the local level	53,6
Fostering sustainable trade	10,0
Support measures	3,4

The CSP 2007-2013 and the MIP 2014-2020 did not focus on environment and climate change.

The EUD is currently in the identification phase of the AAP 2019. The new programme will focus on circular economy in partnership with the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of the Production and Commerce.

1.2.2 Regional cooperation

Ecuador was strongly involved in EU interventions in the area of environment and climate change. This includes EUROCLIMA and transboundary WATERCLIMA activities with Peru and Ecuador.

2 Main findings of the field phase mission

2.1 Key observations

- EU regional cooperation has been successful in bringing together government and non-state actors in Ecuador and at the regional level. (JC42)

³⁴ World Bank 2018 Ecuador Systematic Country Diagnosis

- WATERCLIMA contributed in advancing significant policy developments in the water sector in Ecuador, in particular a shift to more integrated management approaches to water resources and formal agreements with Peru in 2017 to set up binational commissions to manage all 9 transboundary river basins. This has benefited from the triangular cooperation developed between Ecuador, Peru and EU countries, which is ongoing despite the end of the programme in 2017. (JC43)
- Interviewees who have participated in CfPs in Ecuador confirmed that not enough has been done to ensure the CfPs move away from supporting short-term pilot projects that encourage regional programmes to operate largely in isolation of each other and promote bilateral, sub-regional or regional projects that build on lessons learned and good practices from EU regional cooperation. This is not aided by the absence of a national mechanism designed to coordinate EU regional programmes and stimulate synergies between them and/or with other donor initiatives based on regular information exchange and dialogue. (JC25)
- EUROCLIMA national focal points (NFPs) in Ecuador confirmed they have participated more directly in the programme since 2016, in particular citing participation in identifying the six priority themes of EUROCLIMA+ and since 2018 in the preselection process of project proposals to be submitted to the EUROCLIMA+ secretariat in Brussels. However, there is consensus that the Commission should ensure the CfPs provide more space for national priorities to be addressed (such as development of the Interinstitutional Committee for CC (CICC), or support in the application of the NDCs) and that budget ceilings of EUR 300,000 per project are relaxed. (JC25)
- Synergies between EU regional and bi-lateral programmes in Ecuador are not being clearly identified in the design phase and updated at the start of EU regional programmes to ensure they capture main findings, lessons learned and good practices and promote formal synergies with other donors and international organisations. (JC22)
- All interviewees in Ecuador confirmed more needs to be done to ensure the communications used by regional programmes are supported by a dedicated communication strategy. (JC25)

2.2 Transversal elements

- The EUDs play little or no role in needs assessments of regional programmes. The general understanding from the EUD is that the needs assessments were found to be satisfactory, but not enough attention is given to: a) learning from regional interventions such as DIPECHO; b) integrating needs where relevant and pertinent so that needs are not addressed through sector-based approaches (which goes against the view that climate change should be cross-cutting through different sectors that are related, for example, water, agriculture and health, risk/resilience). The field visit to Loja confirmed EUROCLIMA+ has not identified lessons and good practices from regional programmes such as WATERCLIMA, which has made significant contributions in developing good working relations with Piura Regional Government on water resources management and aiding SENAGUA reform the current legal and regulatory framework on water (to include a water tariff for users of water services using Peru as a model and OIEAU from France to support the legal reforms). (JC11)
- The collapse of UNASUR and ALBA in which ex-President Correa until 2017 was a leading figure has had an effect on cooperation. For example, the financial crisis has reduced institutional capacity and increased dependency on foreign aid. This is reducing the opportunities for government staff to participate in external events run by EUROCLIMA+ (JC11)
- The graduation process is on-going, but generally the term is not well understood, beyond the fact the country will not have access to bilateral funding. In this sense there is a need for the country to know what is working as a result of graduation in countries such as Chile, Costa Rica or Uruguay. The country has on-going SS cooperation agreements (especially with UNASUR), but the political and financial crisis since 2016 has limited the expansion of triangular cooperation through UNASUR. However, WATERCLIMA was found to have been instrumental in forging triangular cooperation with Peru and France, but it is too early to identify such cooperation is expanding through EUROCLIMA+ where the tendency has been to fund a large number of small projects at the national level (such as CfPs for Forests-Biodiversity and Resilient Agriculture). (JC11)
- Regional programmes such as WATERCLIMA, EUROSOLAR and EUROCLIMA+ have strengthened ownership and commitments such as the agreement between Ecuador and Peru

to work together on water resources management in all 9 transboundary river basins (2017). However, EUD is not engaged in supporting this process and the Ministry of Environment is considered to be a weak ministry to lead such processes. (JC12)

- The evaluation was unable to identify conclusive evidence that the DEVCO EEAS, MS and other donors are able to coordinate formally given the EUDs have a limited role in regional cooperation and do not have direct access to the NFPs (EUROCLIMA+), or to key representatives of other DGs. There is a feeling that EEAS needs to improve its coordination with DEVCO and vice versa. (JC13)
- Ecuador is still in the transition phase to graduation, but initial findings are that it is not prepared for “graduated” status which will mean more reliance on S-S and triangular cooperation for which it is not institutionally equipped to develop, fund and manage, despite its middle-income status. (JC23)
- The only concrete synergies identified were those established by WATERCLIMA (ECOCUENCAS and ASF projects) in which French institutions have and continue to provide a supporting role. However, synergies between these projects were not encouraged and supported with a specific budget provision. Synergies were not identified with MS bilateral programmes (AECID, GiZ). This is despite the fact GiZ has projects in Loja. AECID stated synergies have not been formalised with EUROCLIMA+ concerning its ARAUCLIMA programme (coordinated from its office in Costa Rica), or through the CODIA for water (Conferencia de Directores Iberoamericanos del Agua). The general view is that more is needed to engage bilateral representatives of MS agencies present in the region in order to enhance the quality of dialogue and facilitate synergies to be identified. This could be done through webinars, skype and other virtual means rather than by attendance at regional meetings of EUROCLIMA+ (except in specific cases). (JC24)
- There is currently a lack of mapping of donors and projects (currently being done by the EUD) to support informed decision-making with the government and non-state actors on the CfPs. This is not aided by the distance between the secretariat for EUROCLIMA+ in Brussels and LA region, which makes coordination more difficult. (JC25)
- Monitoring of results, lessons learned and good practices in regional programmes remains weak. Some interviewees stated this is not aided by ineffective communication (i.e. lack of a strategy directed at different audiences). There was an understanding that the EUROCLIMA+ secretariat is preparing such a strategy, but that this is almost one year behind schedule. The evaluation also found no ex-post monitoring of: a) the success stories of EUROSOLAR-funded projects in Ecuador (91 communities in 7 provinces); b) the advances in terms of legislation reform on connecting isolated communities (aided by the EUROSOLAR initiative); c) the GHG emissions saved as a result of regional interventions relating to RE and reforestation; d) improved access and management of water resources in the Catamayo-Chira and Macara-Piura watersheds. (JC25)
- EUROCLIMA+ has engaged the NFPs more proactively in areas such as the selection of the six priority themes to receive EU funding and, since 2018, in managing the preselection of project proposals to be submitted to the programme’s secretariat, based on national priorities. This has reduced the number of pre-selected projects submitted to Brussels and the time needed to conclude the project selection process. (JC25)
- There was unanimity among interviewees in Ecuador that CfP deadlines are too short to allow formal dialogue to take place to identify projects of a bi-national, tri-national, sub-regional or regional nature during design phase of project proposals. This situation forces countries to propose projects of national interest (designed to capture regional funds rather than stimulate regional processes). (JC25)
- The EUD in Ecuador stated regional interventions do not provide adequate communication and follow-up of policy developments involving EU funded projects under regional and bilateral cooperation to help promote a learning process that supports informed decision-making at all levels in the region (JC25)
- There was consensus that adaptation and mitigation are regularly understood as two separate themes that merit different approaches, which interviewees consider needs to be addressed through improved communication and through the CfPs (JC25)

2.3 Examples of success stories

- WATERCLIMA facilitated policy exchanges on water resources management between Ecuador, Peru and EU countries leading to a new era of triangular cooperation where EU countries can be contacted at any time to provide TA. (JC42)
- NFPs in Ecuador stated EUROCLIMA+ has been successful in engaging UNEP in developing institutional networking (particularly among the ministries of environment, or equivalent) in the region. This has supported the development of the agenda for the Forum of Ministers of Environment in Latin America and Caribbean based on three pillars of activity: electric transport, development of the Global Environment Assembly to support policy and legal reforms relating to the environment and ecosystem-based adaptation designed to promote the cost-benefits of using nature to support adaptation rather than implementing public works). (JC42)
- WATERCLIMA successfully contributed to improving relations and cooperation between Ecuador and Peru through funding of two transboundary projects in which TA was provided from EU countries (France and Italy) to enhance Ecuador's access to good practices concerning the water sector in Peru. Interviews with the Prefecture of Loja, SENAGUA and OIEAU confirmed triangular cooperation continues to date although this is mainly at the project level rather than cross-cutting both projects at the same time. (JC42)
- EUROCLIMA: Ministry of Environment stated regional workshops have aided the coming together of technicians from the region to establish platforms that have facilitated information exchange and networking covering the six main themes of the programme. In some cases, networking to interchange technical information and lessons learnt continues in an informal way via social media such as Facebook and Whatsapp and webinars. This appears to be particularly successful in areas such as urban mobility where a set of countries have demonstrated an interest to work together on developing electric bus routes (includes Ecuador, Peru, Chile, Uruguay and Costa Rica). (JC42)
- Regional cooperation has opened up more platforms than those listed in the desk report. WATERCLIMA projects have been particularly successful in maintaining their networks established with specialised institutions in the EU and in the case of ECOCUENCAS and ASF Ecuadorean counterparts maintain the platforms established with Peru and EU partners to advance talks on improving water resources management in transboundary areas in line with the bilateral agreement to establish binational commissions in all 9 shared river basins crossing the Ecuadorean border into Peru. (JC42)
- Interviews in the Ministry of Environment confirmed EUROCLIMA+ has successfully established regional platforms in all 6 thematic areas of operations. NFPs and other stakeholders interviewed stated these platforms have been created/consolidated through regional events and are often maintained through informal channels, such as social media, between interested parties. In some cases, these platforms will continue beyond EUROCLIMA+ because they are operated through international organisations (such as UNEP for electric transport), but in other cases more needs to be done to continue the platforms following closure of EUROCLIMA+ (for example, on water, biodiversity, or energy efficiency). (JC42)
- EUROSOLAR (to 2014): was instrumental in encouraging the Ministry of Electricity and Renewable Energy (MEER), to bring about the following changes:
 - Adoption of a Plan of Action for the Rural Electrification Programme in Isolated Areas (2013-2019), funded partly by IADB. According to MEER the programme builds on weaknesses identified in the EUROSOLAR programme such as the need to employ private companies to install the solar power units in isolated communities and train trainers on operation of the installations, including the recovery of energy tariffs to support maintenance of micro-networks. MEER confirmed this has also helped increase coordination and cooperation with the Ministries of Education and Health (initiated under EUROSOLAR) as well as government institutions responsible for telecommunications; (JC43)
 - Reform of the national policy on rural electrification, supported by the adoption of the Law on Public Service in the Electric Power Sector (2015), which officially supports the promotion of solar energy in isolated community buildings and schools. According to interviewees from MEER the policy has incorporated lessons learned from the EUROSOLAR programme, such as the need to for all units to be sealed to prevent insect infestations; (JC43)

- Elaboration of the normative framework for the above-mentioned Law, which is expected to gain presidential approval before the end of 2018, will facilitate further revisions of the national policy on rural electrification. (JC43)
- WATERCLIMA (to 2017):
 - SENAGUA has secured a Ministerial commitment to apply the water resources management developed in Loja under the ECOCUENCAS project (moves away from a water use policy to one with an integrated water resources management focus supported by water tariffs that will support developments in the watersheds) and which will be endorsed by a Presidential Decree before the end of 2018; (JC43)
 - ECOCUENCAS and ASF projects were instrumental in stimulating S-S cooperation between the water authorities of Peru (ANA) and Ecuador (SENAGUA) and the Prefecture of Loja with the Regional Governor of Piura Department respectively concerning developing improved collection of water tariffs applied in Peru (and application of a water tariff in Ecuador based on lessons learned from ANA/Peru) and advancing integrated water resources management in transboundary watersheds supported by creation of the Direction for Watersheds and Biodiversity within the Prefecture of Loja in 2017. (JC42)
 - Also in 2017 the Foreign Ministers of Ecuador and Peru signed an official agreement to set up bi-national commissions to manage water resources in all 9 shared river basins. In March 2018 the first meeting took place on setting up the bi-national commissions. Watershed management plan currently being identified for the integrated management of water resources in the transboundary watershed of the River Zarumilla (completion expected in September 2018), designed to be a model for other shared watersheds. (JC42)
- WATERCLIMA has successfully demonstrated that triangular cooperation is cost-efficient (provides TA at low cost in comparison to employing the private sector or using bilateral aid) and cost-effective (produces significant results at low cost). Indeed, this approach suggests expansion of twinning into Latin America should be seriously considered by DEVCO. (JC41)

2.4 Details on some challenges faced by the EU regional programmes

- Interviewees in Ecuador confirmed EU-CELAC dialogue should do more to clarify the regional approaches to be implemented in LA countries and how they are to be managed, ensuring greater understanding of Ecuador's national priorities in E&CC, as well as programmes of other key donors operating in the region to support greater coherence to these priorities and their relationship with the SDGs, which could be addressed, for example, through the GEF dialogue. (JC41)
- EU-LA regional policy exchanges now by-passes CAN following the decision to remove the environment division in 2015. (JC41)
- A majority of interviewees in Ecuador stated sustaining intra-regional cooperation remains highly challenging following the closure of regional programmes. This is not aided by the lack of clarity on the resources needed to stimulate such cooperation during the implementation of the programmes (excludes ad hoc participation in regional workshops) and beyond their closure. For example, RALCEA was abandoned within a year of closure in 2014 due to the lack of a formal mechanism and budget in place to continue its agenda following closure. (JC42)
- NFPs confirmed EUROCLIMA has funding in place to support regional workshops and meetings, but there is no formal mechanism in place to manage a regional agenda and implement decisions in coordination with national mechanisms such as the CICC in Ecuador. (JC42)
- The promotion and management of sub-regional policies relating to environmental and CC objectives in the Andean Community of Nations has been highly challenging since in the decision in 2015 to close the environment division of CAN. (JC42)
- Stakeholders interviewed in Ecuador agreed unanimously that more needs to be done to engage the private sector in supporting mitigation and adaptation efforts at the sector level. However, taking into account both SENAGUA and the MEER learned lessons from WATERCLIMA and EUROSOLAR concerning the lack of private sector involvement in the project implementation (such as concerning the installation of the solar power kits, or in the collection of user tariffs) indicates there is significant scope for increasing private sector participation to promote S-S and triangular cooperation with the EU and its MS. (JC42)

- There was consensus from stakeholders interviewed in Ecuador that gender equality can and should cross-cut all CfPs more explicitly, in particular where women are most proactive, such as in resilient food production where rural women are often the main knowledge holders. (JC43)
- A majority of interviewees were in agreement that EU regional programmes need to generate longer-term partnerships with LA in order to strengthen and sustain S-S/triangular cooperation and reduce the current fragmentation of EU aid that supports a large number of short-term projects that are generally pilot in nature and implemented in isolation of each other. (JC42)
- Law enforcement remains a major barrier to securing the effective application of environmental laws and policies in the area of environment and climate change. (JC43)
- Currently there is no legal framework in place that supports dedicated to land use management at the watershed level. This makes it highly challenging to achieve effective adaptation in the water, ecosystems and resilient food components of EUROCLIMA+. (JC43)
- The NFPs for EUROCLIMA+ are based in the Ministry of Environment. This is a relatively young ministry that has limited political clout and resources to ensure other ministries are held to account on meeting the NDCs (once they are finalised in 2018) and fully integrate climate change into their policies, strategies and actions plans. (JC43)

3 List of persons interviewed

<i>Organisation</i>	<i>Name and position</i>
Quito	
EU Delegation to Ecuador	Pedro Ponce (Task Manager for WATERCLIMA, RACEA, EUROCLIMA)
FAO	John Pressing (Resident representative) David Suarez - climate change and agrobiodiversity
GIZ	María Cristina Marçayata, Programa Aumento de la resiliencia frente al cambio climático a través de la protección y el uso sostenible de ecosistemas frágiles - ProCamBío II
AECID / LAIF	Mario Fanjul y Rafael Ruipérez Responsables de Proyectos y Programas.
OIEAU, France/Ecuador	Rémi Boyer
SENAGUA/RALCEA & WATERCLIMA, Quito	Luís Arturo Cevallos, Jorge Acosta (Director Valoración Socio-económica) y Mariana Yumbay (Subsecretaria de articulación/cooperación) responsible for WATERCLIMA/RALCEA
Ministerio de Ambiente	María Victoria Chiriboga (NFP political) Subsecretaría de Cambio Climático Andrés Mogro (NFP technical - adaptation)
Ministerio de Electricidad y Energía Renovable	Fabian Toscano & Edison Chicaiza
Loja	
Secretariat for Water Resources (SENAGUA) / ECOCUENCAS	José Serrano, subsecretario Puyango-Catamayo SENAGUA Kelvin Guayanay Floress, Technical Director for Water Resources
Prefectura de Loja	Oswaldo Campoverde, (ex Director ASF/WATERCLIMA), Director Cuencas y Agrobiodiversidad en la Prefectura de Loja
Provincial government of Loja (ASF and ECOCUECAS)	Rafael Dávila Eguez, Prefect, Loja Province Rita Salazar, Director for International Cooperation, Loja Provincial Council
Prefectura de Loja	Patricio Romero, Technical expert ASF, Division for Watersheds & Biodiversity
Field visits in Loja (ASF)	Francisco Jaramillo (Alcalde de Quilanga y presidente de la plataforma binacional para sub cuenca rio Macara) Helmer Castillo (Jefe Unidad de Gestión Protección Medio Ambiente y coordinador técnico de la plataforma ASF); Fernando Villalta Vaca (Consejal, municipalidad de Macara).

Field mission note – El Salvador

Period of the field mission	11 to 18 August 2018
Evaluation Team Member(s)	Susan Soux
Thematic focus	Peace & Security
Main programmes covered	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EL PAcCTO • EU-CELAC migration project
Stakeholders interviewed (The full list of persons interviewed is provided in Section 3)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EUD staff • Other development partners • Government officials (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Justice, Supreme Court, Anti-Drug Commission, National Police) • SICA • Migration Observatory at the Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas

1 Introduction

1.1 Context

Table 1 *El Salvador general indicators*

<i>Indicator</i>	<i>Value</i>
GDP per capita (in current USD)	3,889 (2017)
Human Development Index	0.67 (2018)
Population (million)	6.6 (2017)
Graduation (DCI financing)	n/a
ODA disbursed in 2009 and 2016 (in million USD) ³⁵	250.8 (2009); 128.8 (2016)

Sources: World Bank data, UNDP HDR, EC DEVCO Country Page, OECD Stat

El Salvador has made significant progress in reducing poverty through the implementation of social policies especially in the areas of health and education. However, the country still faces several social, economic and security related challenges. Over the last 15 years, El Salvador has experienced modest economic growth with low levels of productivity, employment creation and investment. Progress has been made on democracy and the human rights situation but the country's political system and state institutions remain fragile. El Salvador is signatory of the EU-Central America Association Agreement, a comprehensive free trade agreement with the EU with a strong focus on development cooperation.³⁶

Crime and violence plague El Salvador, which ranks in the top five countries worldwide for homicide rates. The economic costs of violence are estimated at around 11 percent of GDP, including public and private security costs, material losses, and health costs. In 2010, crime overtook economic issues as the number one problem in the country according to perception surveys. El Salvador's violence is rooted in, among other things, the history of Civil War, the rise of gangs (maras, which were originally formed among migrants in the U.S. who were then deported back to El Salvador), and an increase in drug trafficking through Central America.³⁷

³⁵ 2015 constant prices

³⁶ [EC DEVCO country page](#)

³⁷ World Bank 2015 Country Partnership Framework for El Salvador

Table 2 *El Salvador sector specific indicators*

Indicator	Value	
Security and peace		
Proportion of women subjected to physical and/or sexual violence in the last 12 months (% of women age 15-49)	7.7 (2008)	-
Intentional homicides (per 100,000 people)	71.4 (2009)	82.2 (2016)
Drug seizure cocaine-type (kg)	445 (2009)	3,060 (2015)
Net migration	-285,671 (2007)	-202,694 (2017)

Sources: World Development Indicators, UNODC data

Migration issues have reached crisis proportions in El Salvador as gangs force the population to move within the national territory or to flee the country. As US borders close and policy tightens against immigration many people are now heading south to Costa Rica or Panama. The whole Northern Triangle is suffering insecurity due to gang violence. The country is anticipating many Salvadorans to be returned from the USA next year as a programme facilitating residence in the USA is being discontinued. It is unclear how the country will deal with this situation.

1.2 EU support to the development-security nexus

1.2.1 Bilateral cooperation

Table 3 *EU bilateral cooperation MIP allocations for El Salvador*

Financing cycle & Cooperation sector	Value (in EUR million)
EU bilateral cooperation MIP 2007-13	121
Fostering social cohesion and human security	84.7
Economic growth, regional integration and trade	36.3
EU bilateral cooperation MIP 2014-20	149
Social protection	83
Growth, Jobs and Private Sector Engagement	61
Support measures	5

The CSP 2007-2013, the EU cooperation focused on two main areas, including social cohesion and **human security**, where the EC planned to encourage:

- Access to basic services (health and water & sanitation)
- Quality of the education system and vocational education and specialised technical training

In the MIP 2014-2020, the EU cooperation focused, among others, on youth and social inclusion, with the following specific objectives³⁸:

- To support the widening of initiatives to **prevent social violence** and promote productive rehabilitation, while consolidating institutional and local capacities for working with young people.
- To support the implementation of inclusive and equitable public policies, mainly geared to young and vulnerable population groups.

1.2.2 Regional cooperation

El Salvador participated in the EU-CELAC migration project and is an active participant in COPOLAD, EL PAcCTO, and EUROsociAL³⁹. The country also hosts the general secretariat of the Central American Integration System (SICA).

³⁸ EU El Salvador MIP 2014-2020

³⁹ The EUROsociAL good governance pillar works with security institutions in El Salvador

2 Main findings of the field phase mission

2.1 Key observations

- Awareness of the migration project was very low among stakeholders in El Salvador. (JC33)
- El Salvador is now the Protempore President of CELAC and supports the reconvening of the Dialogue on Migration. Stakeholders view these dialogues as important. The projects initiated by the dialogues, such as the migration project, support a political dialogue with needed information – information that helps discussion, debate and decision-making. El Salvador is also participating in the recently established Dialogue on Citizen Security. (JC31)
- The EL PACCTO project is perceived as valuable, well-organized and offering good expertise. The sharing of experience, best practices and different ideas is valued, as is harmonization of laws, norms and practices that this project attempts to facilitate. The consultation process was appreciated and should be broadened. Although the project objectives fall within the framework of ESCA the Democratic Security Directorate of SICA is not involved in the discussions or activities of the project. (JC32)
- Coordination within EL PACCTO (among the three pillars) and between EL PACCTO and other institutions, especially SICA, remains a challenge. (JC33)
- Interviewees see a regional approach as fundamental for addressing criminality and security issues - crime has no borders and the lack of coordination between States and institutions facilitates crime. However, there is a need for regional projects to include national / local realities, and acknowledge different legal and security concepts. There is also need for greater coordination with sub-regional and bi-lateral programming. Best practices should be learned from one project to another (The joint operations of CASAC could be adapted to the EL PACCTO project). It was noted that SICA/ESCA has been side-lined by EL PACCTO and is not aware of the new IBM project about to begin even though the SEFRO (also a border management project) has just finalized its work in Central America. (JC21)

2.2 Transversal elements

- The EL PACCTO project has defined 5 cross-cutting themes that are being incorporated into the project agenda. (Cybercrime, gender, corruption, money laundering and human rights). It is too soon to evaluate to what extent they will be cross-cutting, however in El Salvador it was mentioned that gender should be a stronger focus due to the extreme violence with which increasing numbers of women are being murdered, and corruption also needs a greater attention. (JC11)
- It was pointed out that “internal complexities” exist within CELAC that created difficulties in reaching consensus on key issues relating to migration. LA or CELAC, it was repeated, does not have a unified political position and this does complicate EU cooperation with the region. The Association agreement between the EU and Central America has strengthened the cooperation between these two regions and facilitates synergies between all levels of cooperation, including the security sector. (JC21)
- In Central America synergies exist within the security sector within the framework of SICA-ESCA with bi-lateral, sub-regional and regional programmes and funding instruments (DCI / IFS). Security programmes are all coordinated within the framework and objectives of the Central America Strategy (ESCA). EU has an Association Agreement with CA. That being said, the Democratic Security Director indicated he knew nothing of the new EU Regional project on Integrated Border Management (IBM) to be launched shortly. SICA terminated an EU funded border management project (SEFRO) in 2017 but he was not informed that the new IBM project is forthcoming. They know about and are anxious to work with ICRIME. (JC23)
- In Central America EU/MS cooperation in the security sector falls clearly within the Central American Security Strategy (ESCA); however EL PACCTO (although it is definitely within the framework of ESCA objectives) is not coordinating with SICA - ESCA. There was an initial contact but since then, according to Democratic Security directorate (SICA), they heard nothing more until they requested a copy of the diagnostic that was done. The project management is coordinating directly with Project Focal Points in each country but not with SICA officials. They say they know nothing about what is happening and would like to be included. The EU has been a member of the Group of Friends of ESCA since the Groups beginning in 2011; therefore

in coordination with other donors. However this Group of Friends has weakened over the past years and there are now efforts being made to revive it. (JC24)

- The National Police (PNC) was very supportive of the regional approach to security and crime fighting, pointing out that “crime has no borders” so it is necessary to coordinate at all levels – national, sub-regional and regional – “if not criminals take advantage”. (JC21)
- Informants indicated that although international experts are valuable to hear and work with, local experts should not be underestimated; they should also be included in the project programmes. Foreign experts do not always understand the local reality so the inclusion of local experts would improve the presentations. They can also be used to identify how and when international experiences could be adapted and adopted in national contexts. It was clearly stated that there “exist studies, diagnostics and experts – however we must construct our own solutions and policies”. (JC25)

2.3 Examples of success stories

While it is still too early to measure results of **the EL PAcCTO project, it is received very positively** in El Salvador. All individuals interviewed spoke highly of the project, highlighting that it deals with the whole justice system chain – from the crime (police), treatment of the crime (judicial system - prosecutors, judges) to imprisonment of the criminal (penitentiary system) in its approach to combatting organized transnational crime. They mentioned that the project is very well organized; the speakers are interesting and of high calibre, the consultation with the participating institutions has been positive and the opportunity to share information, ideas and best practices is fundamental to fighting transnational crime. (JC33)

At an international level **the EL PAcCTO project has created valuable spaces for learning, discussion, debate and exchange** of information. The following topics were identified and praised as valuable: cross border cooperation, penitentiary intelligence, recuperation of assets, alternative measures to imprisonment, police and customs cooperation, and corruption. It has been mentioned that these international encounters bring people together across borders and help develop trust, which is fundamental to international cooperation. (JC32)

CASAC was an EU funded sub-regional project targeting control of small arms that terminated in 2017. The PNC mentioned that the international joint operations (ORCA I – IV) conducted by CASAC with the police forces and other judicial institutions proved very successful in developing skills, knowledge and trust, which permitted greatly improved communication and coordination among the Central American agencies. They recommend that EL PAcCTO undertake this type of joint operation. (JC33)

2.4 Details on some challenges faced by the EU regional programmes

Few stakeholders in El Salvador were aware of the Migration project. Some interviewees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs remembered it and knew that someone had attended a workshop in Bogotá and as a result of that workshop Colombia offered some technical assistance to El Salvador. The Observatory on Migration at the University (UCA) has publications from this time period, some by IOM, and one ‘*Migración, Desarrollo y Derechos Humanos – la articulación como base para transformar la realidad social en América Latina y el Caribe*’ (2015) - is authored by the same person that authored the project publications on Migration Routes. This publication is also financed by the EU but gives no reference to the project. It is unclear whether these were intentional synergies. (JC33)

Officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that **migration and security are sensitive** topics and LAC countries are challenged to find agreement on these issues. Europe has experience that CELAC can learn from. Individuals that were familiar with the Dialogue on Migration mentioned that it had been “paused” due to complexities within the CELAC forum and Europe’s shifting focus to the crisis in the Mediterranean. CELAC has no common political position although there are convergences on migration and security issues. They are fully supportive of the Dialogue on Migration being reactivated and they are anxious that the ‘Compendium’ - a Statistical Directory on Migration be undertaken as there are on-going needs and more concrete data on migration is necessary. El Salvador is currently the Pro tempore President of CELAC. They believe these projects that support the Dialogues generate information and enrich the Dialogues - they are essential for providing the Dialogue with concrete data/evidence that allows them to make political decisions. (JC32)

Interviewees call for a **stronger focus on gender** when addressing security and crime. Although the crosscutting themes include gender and corruption, greater focus on gender is needed as female participation in criminality is growing, and increasing numbers of extremely violent murders of women have become an urgent problem in the country. Also corruption needs a stronger focus – “corruption

facilitates crime". The three former Presidents of El Salvador have, or are, being investigated for corruption. (JC33)

Interviewees indicated that there is **insufficient communication between the pillars of EL PAcCTO** in El Salvador. Participants of one of the three pillars do not know what is happening in the other pillars. The institutions in El Salvador, normally, do not communicate or coordinate well with each other and that has not changed with the project. According to interviewees, a coordination unit should be established for the project so that each pillar has a global vision of the project. As was pointed out in one of the interviews, "transnational organized crime makes States rethink their systems to be able to respond internationally but that also means that internal systems must be strengthened". EL PAcCTO can help governments achieve this and a coordination unit at the national level would facilitate interinstitutional collaboration. The Technical Unit of the Justice sector offered to take on this role. (JC33)

There are also challenges with regards to the **coordination between EL PAcCTO and SICA**. The objectives of the EL PAcCTO project fall within the framework of the Central American Security Strategy (ESCA) championed by the Central American Integration System (SICA), but the project is not **coordinating** plans and activities with the Democratic Security Directorate of SICA and they would like to be included. As a sub-regional organization with a security strategy that is supported by the EU it is felt that SICA should have a role in the project. It was also reported that "here exist studies, diagnostics – however we must construct our own policies". (JC33)

It was also expressed that there should be space in the EL PAcCTO project agenda for each country to present **country-specific experiences**. El Salvador has faced a serious problem with gangs that threaten national security and various people indicated that this experience should be shared so it can be learned from. "Organized crime is not synonymous to gangs and violence also is not monopoly of gangs", stated one informant. El Salvador's experience if shared could prevent the rise of gangs in other countries. They see the political turmoil in both Venezuela and Nicaragua as fertile ground for gangs to establish themselves. (JC32)

3 List of persons interviewed

<i>Organisation</i>	<i>Name and position</i>
EUD	
EUD –El Salvador	Yolanda Cativo - Gestora de Proyectos.
EUD –El Salvador	Pierre-Yves Baulain - Primer Secretario.
Other development partners	
AECID	Natalia Otamendi Vallet - Responsable de Programas de Cooperación
OIM	Claudia Isabel Lara Orozco – Coordinador de Proyectos.
Government	
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores	Jose María Mejía - Técnico-Dirección de Cooperación Multilateral y Regional, Dirección General de Cooperación para el Desarrollo, Viceministerio de Cooperación para el Desarrollo.
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores	Karla Alas - Técnica-Cooperación Multilateral y Regional Dirección General de Cooperación para el Desarrollo Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Viceministerio de Cooperación para el Desarrollo.
Policía Nacional Civil	Cmdo. Daniel de Jesús Martínez Hernández, Jefe de la Unidad de Cooperación Internacional de la PNC.
Policía Nacional Civil	Com. Jose Oswaldo Guerra Martínez, Jefe Sec. Técnica – Punto Focal EL PACCTO.
Unidad Técnica Ejecutiva del Sector de Justicia	Licda. Kenia Elizabeth Melgar de Palacios Directora General.
Unidad Técnica Ejecutiva del Sector de Justicia	Fernando A Palma - Asistente de la Dirección General.
Unidad Técnica Ejecutiva del Sector de Justicia	Jorge Alberto Martínez, Director de Planificación y Fortalecimiento Institucional y Punto Focal EL PACCTO.
Unidad Técnica Ejecutiva del Sector de Justicia	Carolina Monterrosa Subdirectora de Planificación y Fortalecimiento Institucional.
Fiscalía General de la República - Unidad Especializada Contra el Crimen Organizada	Lic. Walter Ruiz – Punto Focal EL PACCTO.
Corte Suprema de la Justicia	Magistrada Doris Luz Rivas Galindo – Punto Focal EL PACCTO.
Ministerio de Justicia y Seguridad Pública - Dirección de Centros Penales	Orlando Elías Molina Ríos - Sub director Centro Penales
Ministerio de Justicia y Seguridad Pública - Dirección de Centros Penales	Hector Antonio Zaldaña Domínguez - Jefe de Operaciones
Ministerio de Justicia y Seguridad Pública - Dirección de Centros Penales	Concepción de la Paz Rodríguez de Hernández - Secretaria General
Ministerio de Justicia y Seguridad Pública - Dirección de Centros Penales	Daniela Hernández - Jefa de la Unidad de Planificación
Comisión Nacional Anti-Drogas	Cmdo. Andrés Alexander Ramírez Medrano - Director Ejecutivo
Comisión Nacional Anti-Drogas	Alma Cecilia Escobar de Mena - Coordinadora del Observatorio
Comisión Nacional Anti-Drogas	Carmen Batres de Gracias - Coordinadora Área de Control
Comisión Nacional Anti-Drogas	Sandra Georgina Lazo de Gómez - Coordinadora Área Legal
Comisión Nacional Anti-Drogas	Luis Antonio Torres - Coordinador Área de Tratamiento
Viceministerio de Salvadoreños en el Exterior	Yesenia Lozana - Asistente del Ministro
LA regional organisations	
SICA - ESCA	Hefer E. Morataya Arriaga - Director de Seguridad Democrática,
SICA - ESCA	Shanida Jaen Viluce - Técnica Especialista en Seguridad Regional
CSOs / think tanks	
Observatorio sobre Migración - Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Canas	Dr. Mauricio Gaborit - Jefe Dept. de Psicología y Salud Pública, UCA

Field mission note – Peru

Period of the field missions	12 to 24 July 2018 and 4 to 11 August 2018
Evaluation Team Member(s)	Susan Soux, Warren Olding
Thematic focus	Security-development nexus; environment and climate change
Main programmes covered	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EUROCLIMA, EUROCLIMA+ • WATERCLIMA • RALCEA • EUROSOLAR • EL PAcCTO • EU-CELAC migration project
Stakeholders interviewed (The full list of persons interviewed is provided in Section 3)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EUD staff • Other development partners • Government officials (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Interior, National Commission for Development and Life without Drugs, Ministry of the Environment, Ministry of Energy and Mines, National Water Authority, National Service for Protected Areas, etc.) • Regional organisations • Local implementing partners in Piura and Puno

1 Introduction

1.1 Context

Table 1 Peru general indicators

Indicator	Value
GDP per capita	6,572 (2017)
Human Development Index	0.75 (2018)
Population (million)	32.2
Graduation (DCI financing)	Still some bilateral allocations in current MFF
ODA disbursed in 2009 and 2016 (in million USD) ⁴⁰	412.7 (2009); 326.9 (2016)

Sources: World Bank data, UNDP HDR, EC DEVCO Country Page, OECD Stat

Peru has grown on an accelerated path over the last decade and it is classified as a high/middle-income country. Although the main social indicators show positive progress, Peru still faces a number of substantial social and regional disparities. While the national average poverty rate has decreased to 22.7% in 2014, it still reaches up to 50% in rural areas, especially in the Andean highlands and the Amazon region. A weak presence and institutional capacity of the state to deliver social and economic policies in large parts of the national territory is considered to be a major reason for persistent poverty and inequality. As an upper/middle-income country, Peru should in principle "graduate" from EU bilateral cooperation under the DCI. However in December 2013, the European Commission, the

⁴⁰ 2015 constant prices

European Council and the European Parliament decided to make an exception and continue cooperation with Peru for a phase-out period 2014-2017.⁴¹

Table 2 Peru sector specific indicators (security and peace)

Indicator	Value	
Security and peace		
Proportion of women subjected to physical and/or sexual violence in the last 12 months (% of women age 15-49)	12.9 (2012)	-
Intentional homicides (per 100,000 people)	5.4 (2011)	7.7 (2016)
Global illicit cultivation of coca bush (hectares)	59,900 (2009)	43,900 (2016)
Drug Seizure cocaine-type (kg)	20,657 1,030 tons (leaf) (2009)	51,147 (2017)
Net migration	-489,999 (2007)	-179,540 (2017)

Sources: World Development Indicators, UNODC

The deepening political, economic, and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela has led to the mass movement of people across the region. The number of Venezuelans entering Peru quintupled over a eight-month period: from 100,000 in March 2018 to nearly 350,000 in early June and 506,000 in October. As the exodus expands, the humanitarian needs of migrants grow more urgent.⁴²

Citizen security has worsened significantly, making it a main concern for Peruvians. As crime incidence has increased in recent years, people's concerns have shifted dramatically from unemployment towards the lack of security. Peruvian authorities have also become more concerned about the country's increasing crime rate, and have implemented drastic measures, including states of emergency in certain high-crime Regions such as Callao and certain provinces in Ancash. Nevertheless, reports of crimes continue to rise, including widespread extortion from construction companies, local businesses, and even private schools.⁴³

Coca production continues to be an important part of the economy in many regions. Despite decades of eradication efforts, Peru's illegal drug industry is still large, especially in the central and southern Selva regions. Peru is the second largest producer of coca leaves and other coca products, after Colombia. According to the UNODC's Report on Coca Monitoring, the extension of coca growing fields decreased from about 60,000 hectares in 2009 to about 43,900 hectares in 2016.⁴⁴

Table 2 Peru sector specific indicators (environment and climate change)

Indicator	Value	
Environment and climate change		
Terrestrial protected areas (% of total land area)	-	21.3 (2015)
Marine protected areas (% of territorial waters)	-	0.5 (2015)
Forest area (% of land area)	58.6 (2009)	57.8 (2015)

Source: World Development Indicators

Peru's environmental performance must be analysed from the viewpoint of a middle-income country that is experiencing significant economic growth based on the exploitation of renewable and nonrenewable natural resources such as fisheries, metal mining and hydrocarbons. Along with its great wealth of mineral deposits, the country has abundant water resources (although distribution is uneven)

⁴¹ [EC DEVCO country page](#)

⁴² <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/south-american-migration-crisis-venezuelan-outflows-test-neighbors-hospitality>

⁴³ World Bank 2017 Systematic Country Diagnostic

⁴⁴ World Bank 2017 Systematic Country Diagnostic

and a broad biodiversity that places it among the world's leading megadiverse countries. It has the second largest forested area in Latin America, abounds in ecosystems, species and genetic resources and has a rich cultural heritage. Over the last decade the country's environmental institutions have been strengthened through the adoption of the General Environment Act of 2005 and subsequent creation of the Ministry of the Environment (MINAM), the Peruvian National Protected Areas Service (SERNANP) and the Agency for Environmental Assessment and Enforcement (OEFA) in 2008. Also to be noted is the establishment of the National Service of Environmental Certification for Sustainable Investments (SENACE) in 2012.⁴⁵

1.2 EU support to environment and the security-development nexus

1.2.1 Bilateral cooperation

Table 3 EU bilateral cooperation MIP allocations for Peru

<i>Financing cycle & Cooperation sector</i>	<i>Value (in EUR million)</i>
EU bilateral cooperation MIP 2007-13	135
Governance	27
Migration, social cohesion and employment	108
EU bilateral cooperation MIP 2014-20	66
Inclusive development at local level	52.8
Sustainable trade and investment	9.9
Support Measures	3.3

The CSP 2007-2013 and the MIP 2014-2020 did not specifically focus on environment and climate change or the security-development nexus.

1.2.2 Regional cooperation

Peru has been an important participant in regional interventions in the security sector, including the migration project (Migration Profiles, Pilot Project, capacity building), COPOLAD and EL PAcCTO. The country has also been strongly involved in environment and CC interventions, especially EUROCLIMA and WATERCLIMA/RALCEA. This includes two transboundary activities with Ecuador which are of particular interest to the regional nature of the evaluation.

2 Main findings of the field phase mission

2.1 Key observations

- The support of the migration project was positively received and the Migration Profile, and the Pilot Project on returnees have positively influenced legislation in Peru, most notably in the case of the 'Ley de Retornos and the Ley de Reinserción Económica y Social para el Migrante Retornado' (JC33)
- Interviewees spoke of the need to work with and strengthen sub-regional organizations such as CAN, MERCOSUR and the Pacific Alliance (UNASUR is basically dysfunctional). These organizations permit the integration and harmonization of migration norms and practices. However it was pointed out that at the moment the capacity of CAN has diminished; countries are not ratifying CAN proposals and it has recently cut budgets and lay off staff. (JC32)
- EL PAcCTO is perceived as a valuable project addressing key GoP concerns in the area of security and crime. (JC33)
- The major challenges identified with EL PAcCTO relate to the structure and the lack of a coordinating unit between the 3 pillars of the project, reinforcing internal Peruvian problems of poor communication, coordination and collaboration. (JC33)
- EU regional cooperation has been instrumental in bringing together government and non-state actors in Peru to exchange information and discuss potential agreements on environmental and climate change priorities with other countries in the region. However, this has mainly been

⁴⁵ OECD 2017 Environmental Performance Review Peru

limited to the technical experts and there is no formal mechanism in place to manage an agreed agenda designed to win the support of decision-makers. This has contributed to reducing the effectiveness of EU regional cooperation and the sustainability of key actions. (JC43)

- WATERCLIMA has contributed to significant policy developments, based on triangular cooperation between Peru, Ecuador and France. Most important examples are i/ a milestone agreement between Ecuador and Peru in 2017 to establish bi-national river basin commissions in all 9 main river basins shared between the two countries; ii/ the development of integrated water resources management in Peru to support more efficient approaches to water use. (JC43)
- Through EUROSOLAR, 130 solar-powered kits in remote areas of Peru were installed. The lessons of the intervention helped the government in reviewing its energy policy expanding the solar modules (covering up to 200,000 isolated communities) with funding from IADB. (JC43)
- EU regional cooperation has not been adequately coordinated to ensure the programmes do not operate in isolation of each other. (JC22)
- Synergies between EU regional and bi-lateral programmes are not being clearly identified in the design phase and updated at the start of EU regional programmes. (JC22)
- The regional programmes are not supported by a dedicated communication strategy to capture and analyse data from each programme/country. For example, EUROCLIMA+ has not launched a communication strategy so far. (JC25)

2.2 Transversal elements

- The private sector has not been adequately engaged and/or the incentives provided to ensure it becomes an important driver of change. Participation and empowerment of civil society has increased, but the evaluation found this is poorly coordinated between programmes and as a result there are risks of overlaps and duplications. (JC11)
- There is evidence to suggest the political crises do have a hidden effect on the effectiveness and sustainability of the EU's regional cooperation. For example, in Peru the recent political and judicial crises are causing: a) increasing difficulties to deliver important reforms (not aided by a political system that constantly puts the executive against the legislative); b) a growing sense that even if reforms are passed they cannot be implemented due to the lack of an independent judiciary coupled with a growing culture of corruption; c) persistent economic and social inequality; d) renewed staff rotation that constantly restricts institutional memory. (JC11)
- The MREE believes that CELAC must work together on migration issues and it is important that the dialogue be reactivated, however both CELAC countries and the EU must define the agenda together. It must also be recognized that internal lack of consensus in CELAC is part of what caused the Migration Dialogue to breakdown previously, and the exclusion of the LAC countries in the design of the project is what jeopardised ownership of the project in LAC. (JC12)
- Interviews with EUD, EU Member States and UN agencies (UNDP) confirmed no synergies exist with their bi-lateral programmes in Peru. For example, AECID has worked in the Catamayo-Chira watershed until 2013 supporting production of the land use, management and development plan for the shared watershed), but was unaware of the ASF and ECOCUENCA projects. Likewise, GIZ has supported adaptation in Piura for many years, which includes the installation of the early warning system for flooding in the river Piura catchment, but was not aware that EUROCLIMA+ will finance an EWS in the Catamayo-Chira river basin. Finland has also supported the installation of hydro-meteorological stations in this watershed to 2017. (JC24)
- The current approach on calls for proposals under EUROCLIMA+ was considered to be improving in that: a) it places more emphasis on the NFPs to launch the calls in the country and preselect the projects deemed to be priorities in line with national policy; b) the pre-selection process has reduced the number of projects submitted to the EUROCLIMA+ secretariat for evaluation and selection (which was not the case in the first calls). However, majority of interviews confirmed there are still issues to be resolved to ensure they EU regional cooperation becomes more effective: 1) the calls are conducted in a short space of time which reinforces the national focus of most proposals (there is not enough time to enter into dialogue with other countries to promote regional projects bringing together 2 or more countries); 2) the calls have generally helped to fragment available funding around short-term projects of two years; 3) there is no clarity whether there will be a second Call to consolidate the two-year projects, which has

contributed to funding of pilot initiatives (which is not supportive of implementing key laws, in particular application of the regulatory framework for the new Law on Climate Change (2017), which is currently being finalised. A key problem with the calls for proposals of the EUROCLIMA is the lack of involvement of the Delegation. This limits the scope to exploit synergies with other bilateral and regional EU programmes. (JC25)

- The general finding from the interviewees is that the programmes may have run for some time (such as EUROCLIMA since 2009), but in its first phase it was limited to networking, raising awareness, studies and research while EUROCLIMA+ finances one-off CfPs that only promote the submission of short-term projects of up to 2 years. This is considered counterproductive to developing and in particular sustaining key actions and consolidating triangular cooperation with the EU. (JC25)
- The evaluation also found no monitoring of: a) the success stories of EUROSOLAR-funded projects which are still working in all but one of the 10 installations visited in Piura and Puno (i.e. since 2011); b) the advances in terms of legislation reform which have come about in the RE sector which has been aided by EUROSOLAR contributions; c) the GHG emissions saved as a result of the EUROSOLAR installations, or reforestation under WATERCLIMA-funded projects and which is continuing in the Catamayo-Chira watershed in Loja-Piura (municipalities now run the tree nurseries cultivating between 100,000 to 300,000 seedlings including native varieties). The Migration project had interim and final evaluations while progress and information from the project was also presented at intervals to the Dialogue on Migration. (JC25)
- Interviewees in Peru confirmed the EU does not have adequate mechanisms in place to ensure it is learning from the regional programmes (including post closure with partners) on its results, lessons, good practices, etc. to ensure project proposals are coordinated and built on informed decision-making during the design phase of project proposals in CfPs (i.e. from the bilateral EU-funded programmes under the MIP, other regional programmes (both those within the same sector and from other related sectors such as EUROsociAL or Civil Society which are of direct interest to EUROCLIMA+) from other DGs, in particular DG CLIMA, and from the MS/other main donors. (JC25)
- Interviewees who have participated in CfPs in Peru under the EUROCLIMA initiative stated the CfPs are not providing a list of projects selected/not selected, nor a summary of the reasons for selection. As a result, there is reduced scope for each country to learn about each other's proposals or establish dialogue where there may be mutual interest (even where projects have not been selected for funding). (JC25)
- Interviewees responsible for the implementation of regional programmes stated they are expected to start implementation almost immediately without an adequate inception phase and that this helps to cause delays in implementation. In response interviewees generally advocated the need for an inception phase prior to implementation to carry out preparatory work, update baseline data and targets, develop the monitoring systems and communication strategy, etc. (JC25)

2.3 Examples of success stories

- Through WATERCLIMA, the EU successfully contributed to improving bilateral cooperation between Ecuador and Peru through two transboundary projects in which TA was provided from France and Italy and this continues to date. This was instrumental in bringing about significant policy changes at the bilateral level (contrary to initial findings in 4.2.1 JC 21 in Desk report). However, it did lack political leverage beyond the bilateral level due to design and funding weaknesses; In other projects no intra-regional cooperation was identified as the projects operated exclusively in one country (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia). (JC42)
- WATERCLIMA (to 2017): ECOCUENCAS and ASF projects were instrumental in stimulating S-S cooperation between the water authorities of Peru (ANA) and Ecuador (SENAGUA) and the Prefecture of Loja with the Regional Governor of Piura Department respectively concerning:
 - defining water uses and rights and clarifying the distribution of water tariffs to support improvements in water management and greater efficiency in water use (transfer of new irrigation technologies, education campaigns on saving water, applying polluter pays principle, etc.); (JC42)

- advancing integrated water resources management in transboundary watersheds. In 2017 the Foreign Ministers of Ecuador and Peru signed an official agreement to set up bi-national commissions to manage water resources in all 9 shared river basins. In March 2018, a first meeting took place on setting up the bi-national commissions. Watershed management plan currently being identified for the integrated management of water resources in the transboundary watershed of the River Zarumilla (supported by UNDP), designed to be a model for other shared watersheds; (JC42)
- Regional government of Piura confirmed ASF also facilitated S-S cooperation in the form of transferring autochthonous technologies from Ecuador to Peru (in particular “*albarradas*” a system of water collection ponds which seep into the upper aquifer and which resurfaces further down the watershed to be collected in reservoirs for irrigation). (JC42)
- EUROSOLAR (to 2014): all-but-one solar module was still providing energy and internet services to the 10 schools visited in Piura and Puno. the successful installation of 130 solar-powered kits in remote areas of Peru provided important lessons which enabled the Ministry of Energy and Mining (MEM) to review its energy policy, contributing to the following developments:
 - reform of the normative framework for energy (2012) supported by a Plan of Action for universal access to energy in which expansion of solar energy kits was included for isolated communities; (JC43)
 - Plan of Action is supported by IADB to fund the Mass Solar Energy Programme (Programa Masivo Fotovoltaico - PMF) using private companies (15 year contracts) to install and charge an energy tariff (not applied in EUROSOLAR) to ensure maintenance of up to 200,000 solar modules in isolated rural schools (similar to EUROSOLAR), but expanded to include health centres and housing. This has helped increase coordination and cooperation with the Ministries of Education and Health (initiated under EUROSOLAR). (JC43)
- Interviewees believe EUROCLIMA has contributed to developing EU-CELAC dialogue on climate change, especially in the run up to and since the Paris Agreement in 2015, which led to the decision to integrate adaptation and mitigation to climate change in the EU-CELAC Action Plan as a priority objective from 2015. Interviewees from ECLAC (interviewed by Skype from Peru) also confirmed that they have increased their institutional capacity on addressing climate change (within its sustainable development division). (JC41)
- In Peru the Intersectorial Roundtable for Migration Management (*Mesa de Trabajo Intersectorial para la Gestión Migratoria – MTIGM*) had been functioning since the early 2000s. The migration project supported the work of the roundtable through publications and played an important role in opening the forum for members from the civil society. IOM, since 2013, sits on the forum and provided a link with the project. (JC33)
- Through the migration project, the EU helped consolidate on-going work of Peruvian institutions in the area of migration and supported legislative processes:
 - Peru is one of the four countries for which the migration project produced a Migration Profile (MP). It provides statistics on Peruvian immigration, emigration, labour migration, irregular migration, remittances, legal framework, and national and local migration policies. The Peruvian profile has been used by the MTIGM as a main policy tool. Use by the MTIGM ensures that the relevant national institutions and civil society organizations, the members of the MTIGM, have a common understanding of the concepts and information. This document has been used in the formulation of policy and legislation. (JC33)
 - The EU implemented a pilot project on reinsertion of Peruvian returnees. It produced the first ever profile of returnees, providing details on who was returning, what professional status they had and where they had come from; and identifying challenges, especially related to the job market. Although the time allotted to this PP was considered very short, the profile attained has been used by the MTPE as a tool for improving reintegration into the labour market and for developing employment programmes for returning Peruvians. This was the first time Peru looked at migration as a labour opportunity. (JC33)
 - The MP and the Profile of Returnees provided data and stimulus to develop the ‘Ley de Retornos (Ley N°30001, *Ley de Reinserción Económica y Social para el Migrante Retornado*, 2013) and the project supported the work of Peru with the member States of the Andean Community (CAN) in adopting a migration instrument (CAN decision 545)

aimed at enabling mobility of workers from CAN member states (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru). (JC33)

- INEI (National Institute for Statistics and Information Technology) worked closely with the migration project and turned out to be instrumental in Peru developing a policy for returnees and a labour policy, which facilitates dealing with the high numbers of Venezuelans arriving today – many of which are Peruvians returning from Venezuela. INEI also produces the on-going studies, reports and publications that constitute the national database for migration issues. It has cited the project publications in various of its studies. (JC33)
- While it is too early to identify results of the EL PACCTO project, national stakeholders have a positive view of its activities. At an international level the project has created valuable spaces for learning, discussion, debate and exchange of information. The workshops were perceived to be of high calibre and important. They cover topics from cross border cooperation, penitentiary intelligence, recuperation of assets, alternative measures to imprisonment, police and customs cooperation, and corruption. It has been mentioned that these international encounters bring people together across borders and help develop trust, which is fundamental to international cooperation. (JC32)

2.4 Details on some challenges faced by the EU regional programmes

- Regional programmes do not benefit from systematic mapping of EU, MS and other donor interventions to support and guide the formal development of synergies from the design phase. This restricts the opportunities to develop coordinated strategies to support the meeting of the SDGs. (JC43)
- Interviews in Peru indicate regional programmes such as RALCEA, WATERCLIMA and EUROSOLAR had a limited impact on EU-LA policy exchanges. The evaluation found this was not aided by their strong country focus, and a lack of continuation and/or ex-post monitoring of their impact beyond a year of their closure. (JC41)
- Interviewees in Peru believe the role of the EUD in supporting intra-regional cooperation (including instruments of other DGs) has not been adequately defined and the communication channels used do not provide adequate information on what regional programmes are doing, achieving, learning etc. The main exception is when regional events take place in Peru. In these cases EUD has access to information, technical expertise, etc. (JC42)
- Interviewees in Peru and from the region (ECLAC and UNEP) confirmed regional programmes have facilitated dialogue between the main stakeholders in the region, but in the majority of cases this has not translated into support for regional, sub-regional or bilateral projects. Instead, support for mainly national projects prevails and this is not aided by the fact CfPs do not allocated sufficient time and resources to facilitate sub-regional or regional initiatives to be identified among interested parties;
- Interviewees in Peru stated the design and implementation of regional programmes do not do enough to strengthen the linkages between technicians and decision-makers to ensure key proposals/priorities agreed at the regional workshops are formally adopted and supported with national resources. This has contributed to placing high dependency on EU funding, which is not sustainable. (JC43)
- Interviewees in Peru were unanimous concerning the lack of adequate communication and follow-up of policy developments involving EU funded projects to help promote a learning process that supports informed decision-making in the region. (JC42)
- Interviewees from Peru agreed more needs to be done to identify and apply the linkages that exist between adaptation and mitigation, which are generally interpreted in Peru as two separate initiatives that remain largely isolated from each other in sector policy developments when they should be inextricably linked (i.e. adaptation can contribute to mitigation of GHGs and vice versa). (JC43)
- Interviewees from the MS and other donors stated donor/project mapping needs to be developed and updated annually (preferably within the Peruvian Agency for International cooperation (APCI) to facilitate a more coordinated approach to the development of the policy and institutional environment in Peru and the Andean Region/Region. (JC41)

- Peru is currently facing serious issues: The economic and political situation in Venezuela has escalated, leading to massive immigration to other countries in the region, including Peru. As a consequence, UNHCR opened two new offices in Peru. (JC34)
- A common element expressed by many stakeholders was the crisis level of widespread corruption confronting the entire Region - corruption that facilitates criminal behaviour and requires both national and international responses. The regional model allows crime to be confronted jointly but must more clearly include the specific characteristics of each country such as their different criminal codes, concepts of security, their experiences and the lessons they might have for others. There should be greater space in regional projects for countries with specific challenges to present these to the broader group, as lessons learned, best practices, and models to be used for prevention – how to prevent the same patterns of criminality developing in other countries. (JC33)
- The structure of the EL PAcCTO project, which is organised in pillars for each subsector, appears to emphasize the divisions between the security and justice institutions of the country as there is little communication between the different pillars. Institutional networking within Peru is problematic and informants pointed out that the institutions of the justice system communicate very poorly; there is little trust and little collaboration among them. While the identification of Focal Points improved communication between similar institutions at the regional level, the pillar structure seems to maintain the separation of the institutions within the respective countries rather than strengthening interinstitutionality. Many informants pointed out that the creation of a coordinating unit might resolve this issue. Meanwhile, it has been agreed that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will take up this coordination role (JC33)

3 List of persons interviewed

<i>Organisation</i>	<i>Name and position</i>
Lima	
EUD	
DUE - Peru	Emmanuel Hondrat, Agregado Cooperación y Desarrollo Tatiana Garcia (EUROCLIMA & WATERCLIMA/RALCEA) Marie-Paule Neuville (Agregada de Cooperación y Desarrollo - Sección de Cooperación) José Luis Arteaga (Sociedad Civil)
Other development partners	
AECID	Jose Luis Pimentel Bolanos - Coordinador General, Oficina Técnica de Cooperación, Embajada de España, Angel Pacheco, Manuel Ruiz
IOM	Jose Ivan Davalos – Jefe de Mision Rogelio Quintero – Coordinador de Proyectos
UNDP	Jorge Alvarez, James Leslie (UNDP-Climate Change)
GIZ	Hannes Hotz (GiZ-SERNAMP)
Government	
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Eliana Beraun – Directora de International Cooperation Roxana Castro de Bollig – Minister; Director of Protection and Assistance to Nationals Miguel F. Cordova Cuba – Consejero Subdirector de Proteccion a Colectividades Nacionales Luis Canales Cardenas – Bilateral Cooperation Eduan Diaz Diaz – Oficial Superior Policia Nacional de Peru – Director de Asuntos Internacionales
Ministerio de Trabajo	Diana Angeles-Santander – Directora de Migracion Laboral, Ministerio de Trabajo y Promocion de Empleo Mauricio Dulanto Quijano
Ministerio del Interior	Juan Carlos Portocarrero Zamora – Director General, Direccion General Contra el Crimen Organizado. Punto Focal – EL PAcCTO
Poder Judicial	Maria Antonietta Delgado Menendez - Jefe de la Oficina de Cooperación Técnica Internacional Vivian Weiner Brandes - Asesora de la Oficina de Cooperación Técnica Internacional Elizabet Arteaga Sanchez - Asesora Legal de la Oficina de Cooperación Técnica Internacional Dra. Susana Ynes Casteneda Otsu – Jueza Superior, Coordinadora Nacional del Sistema Especializado en Delitos de Corrupcion, Punto Focal – EL PAcCTO Karol Zea, assistant to the Judge
Fiscalia de la Nacion	D. Aldo Leon Secretario General del Ministerio Publico Edgar Antonio Peralta Lino, Abogado – Asesor del Despacho de la Fiscalia de la Nacion, Ministerio Publico de la Nacion
INPE - Instituto Nacional Penitenciario	Dra. Delia Atuncar Iribari - Asesor Legal INPE Asesor INPE Hector Rojas Pomar – Asesor Consejo Nacional Penitenciario
National Commission for Development and Life without Drugs	Paola Diana Reyes Parra, Deputy Director of Global Affairs

Organisation	Name and position
APCI/EU regional Cooperation	Luis Canales, Soledad Bernuy Morales, Nancy Magaly Silva Sebastián
Ministerio de Medio Ambiente, Nat Focal points for EUROCLIMA	Rosa Morales Saravia (NFP political), DG for CC and Desertification, Silvia Cristina Rodríguez Valladares (NFP technical) & Jessica Huertas Campoverde (MINAM)
Subsecretaría de Patrimonio Natural (National Directorate for Biodiversity)	Tulio Medina (Directorate for Biodiversity)
MEM	Jorge Suarez Dirección General Energía Renovable - EUROSOLAR
ANA (National Water Authority)	Adolfo Toledo & Hanny Quispe, Unidad de Planificación de Recursos Hídricos
National Service for Protected Areas (SERNANP)	Pedro Gamboa, Director SERNAMP; Carlos Felipe Sanchez (Manejo de Recursos)
CSOs / think tanks	
Peru	
CHS Capital Humano y Social	Ricardo Valdez Cavassa – Director Ejecutivo
Defensoria del Pueblo	Sonia Cavalie Apac - Jefa de Area de la Adjuntia para los Derechos Humanos y las Personas con Discapacidad
	Percy Cecilio Castillo Torres – Adjunto para los Derechos Humanos y las Personas con Discapacidad
INEI – Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática	Dr Anibal Sanchez Aguilar – Subjefe INEI
Observatorio for Territorial Development, Universidad Católica Sede Sapientiae	Guido Maggi – President
Piura	
Field visits in Jilili District border area of Piura	Lorezo Salazar and Jilili municipal mayor
Regional Government of Piura	Reynaldo Hilbck Guzmán Ronald Ruiz, Director General de Recursos Naturales del Gob Reg. de Piura; Sara Vega; Francisco Varillas, Ing Luis Gallo Minguillo Dirección Regional de Energía y Minas (DREM-Piura) y el Secretario Técnico del Consejo de Recursos Hídricos Ing. Fausto Ascencio
IRAGER (local partner ECOCUENCAS)	Carlos Cabrejos, Director
ASF	Lorenzo Salazar
Juliaca/Puno	
Visita a instalaciones de modulos de energía renovable en Toranipata, Los Uros (EUROSOLAR)	Yvan Horna (Ministerio de Energía y Minas) y Sra. Dina Díaz Sucari, Directora de la escuela Toranipata
Visita a instalaciones de modulos de energía renovable en la Isla de Amantani (EUROSOLAR)	Yvan Horna (Ministerio de Energía y Minas) y Sres Gil Quilli Yapurazi y Madeleine de la Riva
LatinCrop / biodiversity Puno	Sr Alipio Canahua