



European
Commission



Independent Evaluation of the European Union's Cooperation with Afghanistan (2007-2016)

Final Report – Volume 2 Evaluation Matrix *June 2018*

*Evaluation carried out on behalf of
the European Commission*



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Contract No 2015/369112 Version 1

**This evaluation was commissioned by
the Evaluation Unit of the
Directorate General for Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid (European Commission)**

***The opinions expressed in this document represent the authors' points of view
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concerned countries***

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EQ1. Has the EU's assistance to Afghanistan corresponded to the need in Afghanistan in light of the evolving country context, and the EU's own political priorities?

JC-11	Have the EU strategies remained relevant and been responsive to the operating context in Afghanistan?		
	Indicators	Sources of information	Quality of evidence ¹
I-111	Whether the strategies have adapted to changes in priorities and policies of the GoIRA as they relate to the four focal sectors		
	<p>Summary: EU support is closely aligned with the priorities and policies of the GoIRA. This alignment arises from regular ongoing policy dialogue with the GoIRA and close coordination and involvement in strategy formulation such as the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF). The alignment of EU support with the priorities of the GoIRA has been particularly clear following the TMAF, in which it was agreed that international donors would align 80% of aid with the National Priority Programmes of the Afghan government. In addition, 50% of development assistance was to be channelled through the national budget of the Afghan Government. Review of available documentation suggests that the EU is on track to fulfilling this commitment. Less clear was whether the EU strategies adapted in response to changes in policies and priorities outside of these key policy documents. Limited evidence was viewed documenting interim changes in GoIRA strategies. For this reason, the assessment regarding the level of adaptation of EU strategies to GoIRA priorities and policies is less strong.</p>		
	<p>General</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EU strategies demonstrated adaptability to GoIRA priorities and policies, following a request by the GoIRA that donors align funding with national programmes, shifting from project to programme mode. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The EU was largely aligned with this approach through support to national programmes. For example, in 2012 the EU committed EUR 20 M for a new EU support programme based on the priorities identified in the NPP, the 'Justice Services Delivery Project'. In the development of the project, the EU worked closely with the World Bank and justice Institutions to ensure it aligned with the NPP. • The MIP 2011-2013 demonstrated adaptation to GoIRA policies. The GoIRA identified concern with the imbalance in aid funding arising in response to some bilateral donors aligning development assistance with their military presence. In line with the principles of the 'Kabul Process', EU funding for 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CSP 2007-2013 • MIP 2011-2013 • MIP 2014-2020 	<p>Satisfactory, evidence identifies alignment with GoIRA policies, but evidence of adaptation to changes is limited</p>

¹ Strong, satisfactory, Indicative

	<p>national priority programmes was provided without any conditions regarding geographic location.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The guiding principles of EU assistance during the evaluation period was to utilise GoIRA structures where feasible in implementing programmes, and providing continued support to existing national programmes. This is consistent with the Afghan approach to build greater ownership of the development process. • The CSP 2007-2013 recognised the importance of delivering a wider development effort to responding to counter-narcotics needs. This included rural livelihoods and rule of law programming. This was aligned with the Afghan approach, which viewed counter-narcotics as a cross-cutting issue in the ANDS. • The EU was actively involved in setting up the structures that would ensure the delivery of TMAF commitments and had a fixed represented on the Technical and Steering Committees for implementation of the TMAF. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • European Union, Afghanistan- State of Play, 2012² • Afghan National Development Strategy, 2008 • EAMR 2012 	
	<p>Agriculture and Rural Development</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Under the CSP 2007-2013, the EC channelled a significant level of resources into sub-national programmes targeting the East and North-East provinces. In particular, this addressed counter-narcotics efforts. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ The ANDS identified agriculture as a priority for the North-East region. • The identified objective for EU support under the Agriculture & Rural Development sector in the MIP 2014-2020 was to continue to improve food and nutrition security as well as rural livelihoods and employment. This included the sustainable management of natural resources; reduce dependence of farmer households on income from poppy; and help build institutional capacity. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Food security and sustainability were identified at the most important tasks under the sector in the Self-Reliance Through Mutual Accountability Framework (SMAF). • The MIP 2011-2013 reinforced key action areas arising from the Kabul Conference which included new national programmes in rural development, agriculture and governance. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CSP 2007-2013 • MIP 2014-2020 • Self-Reliance through Mutual Accountability Framework, 2015 • MIP 2011-2013 • MIP 2007-2010 	<p>Satisfactory – <i>the strategies are clear as is the continuity and policy changes in the sector, but evidence of adaption to change is limited</i></p>

² http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/afghanistan/documents/page_content/eu_afghanistan_state_of_play_0712_en.pdf

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EU aimed at implementing through government agencies as much as possible, including by supporting the implementation of existing national programmes – and from 2011 onwards EU support was directed towards National Priority Programmes (NPPs) established under ANDS. • EU support was to a large and growing extent directed to multi-donor trust funds (mainly ARTF), thereby supporting two GoIRA priorities: provision of “on-budget” support, and provision of support for GoIRA recurring costs. (see I-412) 		
	<p>Health</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The CSP 2007-2013 identified that EU support would be directed towards assisting Afghanistan to achieve a reduction in maternal and child mortality rates. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Reducing infant and maternal mortality were identified as a major outcome in the ANDS. • EU support outlined under the MIP 2014-2020 was aimed at improvement and the expansion of basic health care delivery services; nutrition; and strengthening the government's capacity. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ This aligned with the strategic objective for the health and nutrition sector outline in the ANDS, to improve the health and nutrition of the people of Afghanistan through quality health care service provision and the promotion of healthy life styles. ○ Efforts to achieve the MDGs for health were identified in the Towards Mutual Accountability Framework and Area 4 of the Self-Reliance through Mutual Accountability Framework focussed on ensuring citizens' development rights. Capacity building for health was included as one of the national priority programmes. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CSP 2007-2013 • MIP 2014-2020 • Self-Reliance through Mutual Accountability Framework, 2015 • Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework, 2012 • Interviews 202, 207 & 208 	<p><i>Strong - evidence is clear in outlining alignment with GoIRA priorities, and supporting shifts in GoIRA policies.</i></p>
	<p>Democratisation and Accountability</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Democratisation and Accountability was identified as a new focal sector in the MIP 2014-2020. This signalled the importance of legitimate, accountable and resilient institutions, reflective of Afghanistan's Transformation Decade (2015-2024) announced by the GoIRA. • EC interventions under the CSP 2007-2013 supported GoIRA to pursue reforms in local governance, assisting elections, public administration reform, and empowering local communities by focussing on provincial and district levels of administration. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CSP 2007-2013 • Afghan National Development Strategy, 2008 • European Union for Strategy 	<p><i>Strong, evidence is clear in outlining alignment with GoIRA priorities, and supporting shifts in GoIRA policies.</i></p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ EC supported the Afghanistan Sub-National Governance Programme (ASGP) that sought to build the capacity of sub-national governance structures. ○ EC support was also directed towards stimulating revenue collection by the GoIRA. Improving public financial management was a need identified by the GoIRA in the ANDS. ○ Training of civil servants at the sub-national level was identified as an important element of the public administration reform process in the MIP 2011-2013. ● These priorities were in line with those of the GoIRA: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) refers to The Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG), which was responsible for the overall coordination of local governance and to which all provincial governors would report on the progress of the implementation of the ANDS. ○ The Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF) referred to the 2010 Sub-national Governance policy. ○ Area 2 of the Self-Reliance through Mutual Accountability Framework, focussed on implementing reforms in the areas of civil service, sub-national governance, and professionalising administration to ensure effective governance. ● Reducing corruption and increasing accountability to improve service delivery and budget administration capabilities of the GoIRA were key features of EC strategies during the period under review. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ EC contributed funds to programmes including ASGP, Municipal Governance Support Programme and the 2010 Parliamentary Elections, which all build the capacity of governance structures to reduce corruption. ○ This aligned with the approach of the GoIRA, to contribute to reducing levels of corruption. ○ The EU’s political advocacy emphasising anti-corruption has been well-regarded by the government, partners and other donors. ● Effective elections was a key deliverable under the TMAF and received strong attention during 2013 as the most important Afghan project in the period of 	<p>Afghanistan 2014-2016</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● MIP 2011-2013 ● Self-Reliance through Mutual Accountability Framework, 2015 ● Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework, 2012 ● EAMR 2013 ● Interviews 401 and 410 	
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	transition. The EU was actively involved in several aspects of Afghan electoral reform.		
	<p>Police and Rule of Law</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CSP 2007-2013 approached Policing and Rule of Law under the ‘Governance’ focal sector. The EC Response Strategy outlined in this document was aligned with the policies outlined by the GoIRA in the Afghanistan Compact and the ANDS. Specifically: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ EC support was directed towards strengthening the capacity, efficacy and integrity of the justice system. This was based on GoIRA’s “Justice for All” initiative. ○ Additional EC support was directed towards the ANP, particularly through the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA). • Under MIP 2007-2010, EU funding to the ANP was almost exclusively directed towards funding ANP salaries. In 2009, the EU reaffirmed this commitment, identifying financial support to the running costs of the ANP as a priority to ensure it became fiscally sustainable. The fiscal sustainability of the ANP was an identified priority for the GoIRA in the ANDS. • Subsequent EU funding under the MIP 2011-2013 was directed towards reform in police services and improving the quality of the police force. This focus on quality was also identified as a priority under the MIP 2014-2020. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ MIP 2014-2020 expected to see improvements in the performance and capacity of the ANP as a civilian police force. However, in reality, EU support for ANP reform has been almost exclusively for paying salaries and only recently toward payroll management. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CSP 2007-2013 • Strengthening EU Action in Afghanistan and Pakistan- Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions, 2009 • Afghanistan National Development Strategy, 2008 • Interviews 401 and 420 	<p>Satisfactory, <i>the evidence is appropriate to indicate alignment, however limited evidence indicating strategy was responsive to change.</i></p>
	<p>Regional Cooperation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EU support to the Local Integration of Vulnerable and Excluded Uprooted People (LIVE-UP) project demonstrated adaptation to the changing priorities of the GoIRA. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ President Ghani emphasised urbanisation as a driver of economic and social development, which encompasses the inclusivity of cities for marginalised groups. Ghani further signalled commitment to assisting uprooted Afghans in his inaugural speech in 2014 when he declared that the term ‘IDP’ should be ‘removed from the Afghan vocabulary’ within two years. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inception Report Local Integration of Vulnerable and Excluded Uprooted People (LIVE-UP) 2015 	<p>Satisfactory, <i>the evidence indicates that the LIVE-UP programme has responded to changing priorities of the GoIRA, but based only on an inception report</i></p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ LIVE-UP capitalises on this political support and project activities can be integrated with government initiatives such as the development of the Urban National Priority Program. 		
I-112	Extent to which any changes in the strategies were appropriate with respect to the context		
	<p>Summary: At the strategy level, EU support was appropriate to the context in Afghanistan and cognisant of challenges and pressures associated with operating in Afghanistan. This was strengthened by the alignment between EU and GoIRA strategies. Generally, the EU strategic focus has been consistent during the period under evaluation, across the focal sectors. Where strategies shifted, this was in response to the operating context. In the health sector, strategy shifted in response to increased capacity within the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH). In the governance sector, strategy shifted in response to external factors such as an overall shift in military strategy. EU strategy on policing has consistently favoured an aim of “civilianising” the Afghan National Police and the Ministry of Interior, but this has not been achieved because the police have been given a major role in counter-insurgency. Space has opened up recently to transition the police to a more civilian role.</p>		
	<p>General</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The CSP 2007-2013 promoted a concentration of support to specific sectors in contrast to the previous approach that promoted involvement in a wide range of sectors. This was supported by a shift from an immediate post-crisis environment to longer-term development support, which was more conducive to a greater division of responsibilities amongst donors. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CSP 2007-2013 • MIP 2011-2013 	Indicative, <i>the example is strong. However, only provides one example.</i>
	<p>Agriculture and Rural Development</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There has been a high degree of continuity in the strategic focus for the A&RD sector: support for the North-East (basin management and irrigation), livestock development, horticulture development, support for ARTF (e.g. NSP) – all areas of continued importance in Afghanistan, where the majority of the population is rural and depending on agriculture and livestock. • There has been an increased emphasis on providing support on-budget and implemented through GoIRA (e.g. MAIL, MRRD, Ministry of Energy and Water (MEW)) through trust funds and contribution agreements with international organisations, reflecting GoIRA-donor agreements. (see I-412) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CSP 2007-2013 • MIP 2014-2020 • MIP 2011-2013 • MIP 2007-2010 • Afghanistan National Development Strategy, 2008 	Satisfactory – <i>the strategies are clear as is the continuity in the sector.</i>
	<p>Health</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EC support in the health sector has adjusted to the changing context, as the capacity of the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) has developed. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Support initially went directly to 10 provinces, providing the Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS) in coordination with the other main 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CSP 2007-2013 • Afghanistan Joint Health Sector Review, 2015 	Strong – <i>the inputs to the sector were based on experience and</i>

	<p>donors, the World Bank and the US. This support was extended to include the Essential Package of Hospital Services (EPHS) and support to build the capacity of the ministry.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ A transition period included an EC led assessment of the health sector involvement in an assessment of the implementing processes used by the different donors and evaluations of EC inputs to individual areas, including mental health, disability and prison health. The EU played a lead role during this period in the development of the support programme that followed. ○ A shift to providing support through the ARTF and to a programme of capacity building led by the MoPH, through the System Enhancing for Health Actions in Transition (SEHAT). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● BPHS/EPHS Implementers Comparison Study, 2013 ● Evaluation of Prison Health Services Policy Reform, 2012 ● SEHAT Aide Memoires, 2014 & 2015 ● Interviews 202, 207 & 208 	<p><i>reviews undertaken.</i></p>
	<p>Police and Rule of Law</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● EC support to the ANP evolved during the period under review from a principal focus on funding ANP salaries, to support to the reform of police services. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ EU funding under CSP 2007-2013 was almost exclusively used for paying police salaries and operational costs. ○ Support under MIP 2011-2013 was linked to pursuing reforms in police services. It was acknowledged that future EU support would continue to provide resources for salaries and operational costs, but that this would need to be linked to the reform agenda. ○ The MIP 2014-2020 removed any reference of funding salaries. Instead the strategy acknowledged ‘consistent anecdotal evidence’ regarding wide-spread corruption within the ANP. ○ A large part of EU’s support for capacity-building has been focused on supporting the MOI in managing the payroll. ● The MIP 2014-2020 recognised that the transformation of the ANP into a civilian police force had been hampered by the counter-insurgency efforts. This transformation had been advocated by the EU. This shift in the EU’s strategic support to the ANP could be based on the recognition that a normal civilian policing institution is critical in the areas behind the frontlines that are controlled by the military, requiring greater investment in reforming the ANP than funding it, including in the 2014-2016 EU Strategy. There is growing consensus among multiple actors including donors, military actors and the GoIRA that the ANP should shift to civilian policing and have more of a community policing role. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● CSP 2007-2013 ● MIP 2011-2013 ● MIP 2014-2020 ● EU Strategy for Afghanistan 2014-2016 ● Interviews 401 and 420 	<p><i>Satisfactory, evidence from documents and interviews suggests EU strategies were responsive to the context, but lacking external views.</i></p>

	<p>Democratisation and Accountability</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Slow progress on civil service reform and overall institutional weakness in Afghanistan in the 2000s produced a climate ripe for pervasive corruption. This negatively impacted the public perceptions of the government’s legitimacy <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ MIP 2011-2013 emphasised strengthening local governance structures and increased the focus on reform and institution building. This was intended to strengthen the resilience of these institutions to corruption. This was appropriate considering the context. • The GoIRA increased focus on anti-corruption measures in the period following the collapse of the Kabul Bank in 2010, in which nearly USD\$900 M was lost from fraudulent and corrupt activities conducted by bank executives who were reported to have funnelled funds to political elites. In the period following the collapse, EU strategies appear to have been somewhat responsive to this by seeking opportunities to support new GoIRA initiatives. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The MIP 2011-2013 identified addressing corruption in the government as a goal of the governance sector. However the expected outputs in relation to this were limited. ○ The 2014-2020 MIP placed greater emphasis on anti-corruption efforts, specifically undertaking to work closely with other stakeholders, including anti-corruption bodies, in ensuring funds were used for the intended purposes and in an accountable manner. • Although no new projects were funded to specifically combat corruption, the EU has been vocal in its emphasis on anti-corruption and is seen as a leader in anti-corruption. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MIP 2011-2013 • 3106th European Union Council Meeting, 2011 • EU Statement to the UN on Afghanistan, 2011³ • MIP 2011-2013 • Interviews 401, 420, 425 • MIP 2014-2020 	<p><i>Strong, evidence from documents and interviews suggests EU strategies were responsive to the priorities of the GoIRA.</i></p>
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³ <http://eu-un.europa.eu/eu-statement-%C2%96-united-nations-security-council-situation-in-afghanistan/>

	<p>Regional cooperation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • At the political level, the EU has increasingly emphasised a regional approach to challenges involving peace. In particular, the Brussels Conference emphasized the nexus of peace, security and development, and the importance of regional cooperation. This approach is beginning to be reflected in budgets and is expected to increase. • EU strategy regarding refugees and migration under the CSP 2007-2013 adapted to changes in the operating context by shifting a focus from one of responding to an immediate humanitarian crisis to one tackling the more long-term development and migratory challenges of displaced persons. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The focus under the MIP 2011-2013 on handling seasonal migratory flows develops this shift from humanitarian to development responses. ○ The shift in EU focus to long-term development and migration challenges is reflected in the adoption and funding of the Special Measure on Improving Reintegration of returnees in Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan and Special Measure addressing migration and forced displacement challenges in Asia and Middle East. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interview 421 • CSP 2007-2013 • MIP 2011- 2013 • MIP 2014-2020 • Action Document for Improving reintegration of returnees in Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan • Action document for addressing migration and forced displacement challenges in Asia and Middle East. 	<p>Satisfactory, <i>evidence suggests EU strategies were responsive to the change in context, but lacking external view.</i></p>
	<p>Public Administration Reform</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In the transition from the CSP 2007-2013 to the EU Strategy for Afghanistan 2014-2016 and the MIP 2014-2020, the EU's support for public administration reform evolved. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Despite €1.8 billion of support to PAR from 2002-2011 from the EU alone, donor engagement was unable to build sustainable institutional capacity on the level required to manage the increasing challenges of transition, with EU projects demonstrating failures that were consistent with overall challenges in the sector. The attempted approach to PAR was found to be poor, with little evidence of a consistent strategy. ○ Lessons learned led to a shift in delivery of PAR support primarily to the World Bank-administered Capacity Building for Results (CBR) Project, which launched in early 2012. ○ Funded on-budget through the ARTF, the CBR was intended to rationalize all major development partner assistance for PAR into one operation in order to reduce independent donor interventions, increase government ownership, and provide a mechanism through which to 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluation of the PAR Process in Afghanistan, 2011 • CBR Project Document, 2011 	<p>Satisfactory, <i>based on an external view but lacking EU strategy documents</i></p>

	draw capacity into the core service in a manner that provides more institutional sustainability.		
JC-12	Have the EU interventions remained relevant and been responsive to the operating context in Afghanistan?		
I-121	Whether the interventions have adapted to changes in priorities and policies of the GoIRA as they relate to the four focal sectors		
	<p>Summary: At the intervention level, EU support demonstrated adaptation to GoIRA policies and priorities. A major example was providing on-budget support and support for recurring GoIRA costs. Examples in the agriculture sector include the shift of P-ARBP from service contracts with an international firm to a contribution agreement with ADB. Within the health sector, support transitioned to disseminating funds centrally through the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), in line with GoIRA priorities for support to be channelled through the trust funds. This contributed to the MoPH to decide on capacity building needs and priorities through SEHAT. In addition, adaptation to interventions within the governance sector regarding electoral fraud saw the EU-funded Support to Credible and Transparent Elections Phase 2 (ELECT II) pursue a focus on strengthening voter fraud mitigation measures as well as capacity-building of the IEC.</p>		
	<p>General</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> EU support to public financial management has been directed at improving the capacity of the GoIRA to manage its own financial security. The State Building Contract (SBC) will enable the GoIRA to finance its own strategic development priorities and policies, increasing government capacity to become more self-reliant and to pursue its policy priorities. This flexible approach will also enable the GoIRA to respond to emerging needs. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> State Building Contract, Action Document Afghanistan, Annex 1, 2016 	<p>Indicative — <i>premature to assess whether the programme was adaptive and flexible in practice.</i></p>
	<p>Agriculture and Rural Development</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> EU support was to a growing extent directed to the ARTF multi-donor trust fund and contribution agreements with international organisations, thereby responding to two GoIRA priorities (ANDS, NPPs) and donor commitments (TMAF): provision of on-budget” support, and provision of support for GoIRA recurring costs. For example, P-ARBP has shifted from service contracts with an international firm to a contribution agreement with ADB, but this transition had challenges and there was thus a gap period, which was partly covered with a bridging grant. (see I-111, I-112, I-412) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Documents listed under I-111, I-112, I-412 CRIS NSP III Aide Memoire, Implementation Support Mission 2016 Interview 021 	<p>Strong – <i>finding clear from several sources and inventory</i></p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The NSP III was amended in 2015 to include a new maintenance cash grants (MCG) scheme to disburse funds to CDCs. 6.6 million paid for labour days were generated. The MCG scheme was designed to be a public works scheme resulting in infrastructure in rural areas, demonstrating to rural populations the GoA's ability to deliver services as well as generate short-term employment to provide food security. 		
	<p>Health</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> EC interventions in the health sector have adapted as the priorities and the capacity of the MoPH both nationally and in the province has developed. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Support was initially provided to 10 provinces, in coordination with the other main donors, the World Bank and the US. Support was initially for the BPHS and was then extended to include the EPHS as the demand for services grew. The EC led assessment of the health sector as a whole, working closely with the MoPH to consider what priorities should be included and where there was a need for further policy reform. EC support shifted to providing funds centrally through the ARTF and to enabling the MoPH to decide on capacity building needs and priorities through SEHAT. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CSP 2007-2013 MIP 2011-2013 Afghanistan Joint Health Sector Review, 2015 SEHAT Aide Memoires, 2014 & 2015 Interviews 202, 207 & 208 	<p>Strong – <i>finding clear from several sources, inventory and interviews</i></p>
	<p>Democratisation and Accountability</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> EC interventions under this focal sector adapted to the GoIRA's increased focus on anti-corruption efforts, particularly in relation to allegations of voter fraud. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ELECT II supported the Independent Electoral Complaints Commission (IECC) to implement sanctions against those responsible for electoral fraud or malpractice. A focus of ELECT II technical assistance was to strengthen electoral fraud mitigation. The GoIRA prioritised holding transparent elections and the EU-supported intervention ELECT II promoted this. ELECT II was scheduled to run until the end of 2015, parliamentary elections have been delayed and the intervention has therefore not had a direct elections support role. Since this time ELECT II entered a Project Initiation Plan (PIP) to help GoIRA to introduce reforms to the electoral systems. The PIP period was extended into March 2017. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CSP 2007-2013 Afghanistan Sub-National Governance Programme (ASGP) phase II. Evaluation commissioned by Sida, 2014 Afghanistan National Development Strategy, 2008 Interview 402 	<p>Strong, <i>based on multiple sources</i></p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ELECT II successfully increased capacity of the Independent Election Commission, demonstrated by a decrease of international advisors from 476 in 2004-2005 to 57 in 2017. Over the last 18 months, staffing has been reduced to 3 international personnel while maintaining capacity-building support to IEC. • An agreement for ELECT III was reportedly signed in 2015, even though agreement is lacking on what the programme should do. Project stakeholders suggest this is a good strategy to communicate ongoing EU commitment to electoral reform and elections, but is programmatically irrelevant to UNDP's operations. 		
	<p>Police and Rule of Law</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A transition process set out by GoIRA led to revise programming for LOTFA, which may transfer further management to the government. The LOTFA transition is intended to fully hand over payroll functions to the GoIRA and to develop national capacity. The LOTFA team has been adjusted to carry out the new responsibilities. • Under LOTFA, EU support to the ANP shifted towards police capacity building for payroll management rather than only paying salaries. This aligned with the GoIRA approach to assume funding responsibilities. Further detail regarding EU support to the ANP see I-111. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EAMR 2015 • The EU Action Plan for Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2009 • Afghanistan National Development Strategy, 2008 • Support to Payroll Management MOIA and Police Development, Quarter Progress Report (LOTFA) July-Sept. 2015 • Interview 401 and 420 	<p>Satisfactory, <i>evidence based on multiple sources suggests EU strategies were responsive to the priorities of the GoIRA, but an external view is lacking</i></p>
	<p>Regional Cooperation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Local Integration of Vulnerable and Excluded Uprooted People (LIVE-UP) project was impacted and responsive to changes to GoIRA priorities. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ There was considerable resistance among government partners to the concept of local integration as a durable solution, who considered Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) a security threat. The LIVE-UP project responded by sensitising government partners to the tangible positive outcomes, including increased taxation revenue. ○ President Ghani emphasised urbanisation as a driver of economic and social development, which encompasses the inclusivity of cities for marginalised groups. Ghani further signalled commitment to assisting uprooted Afghans in his inaugural speech in 2014 when he declared 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inception Report Local Integration of Vulnerable and Excluded Uprooted People (LIVE-UP) 2015 	<p>Strong, <i>although based on one source, the evidence clearly indicates that the project responded to government concerns</i></p>

	<p>that the term 'IDP' should be 'removed from the Afghan vocabulary' within two years.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ LIVE-UP capitalises on this political support and project activities can be integrated with government initiatives such as the development of the Urban National Priority Program. 		
I-122	Evidence of adopting changes to the interventions arising from developments in the political, security and development context or as required by partners		
	Summary: EU-supported interventions presented mixed results in relation to the suitability of the programming to the operating context. The LOTFA programme adapted to the changing military context. Changes were made to the intervention in response. In contrast, in the governance sector, limited political will for devolution affected the implementation of the AGSP programme. Lessons learned were applied to development and implementation of the LoGo programme.		
	<p>General</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The deteriorating security situation had a significant impact on EU-supported interventions. Those in direct management such as technical cooperation and construction, and those carried out by NGOs were particularly affected. Interventions adapted to the changing context by either delaying deliverables until a more appropriate time, or the re-location or removal of foreign staff. In addition, the mobility of foreign staff was restricted to Kabul. • The security and economic impact of the international military drawdown was significant. This resulted in intensified insurgency leading to large scale displacement and casualties, and reduction in GDP growth. This was a direct result of economic activity linked to the international military presence and the electoral impasse. EU support to strengthening public financial management was an example of interventions that were responsive to the context. • ARTF has shown a good degree of flexibility to adapt to changes, including to the increasing insecurity in the operating context. Development of a supervision strategy in 2014 to map options and introduce flexibility to ensure supervision in a difficult security context. See I-433. • The shift to indirect management of programmes, to reduce management tasks for the EUD, was in response to the security restrictions that made it impossible for EUD to monitor implementation on the ground (see I-412). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EAMR 2012 • State Building Contract, Action Document Afghanistan, Annex 1, 2016 • ARTF, Mid-year Report: December 22, 2013 to June 21, 2014 • I-433 • EAMR 2015 • EAMR 2014 • I-412I • Interview 404 	<p>Satisfactory — <i>demonstrates impact of the worsening security situation on programmes.</i></p>
	<p>Agriculture and Rural Development</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A number of activities in the Panj-Amu River basin Project were affected by delays caused by external factors that included growing levels of insecurity in the project areas (especially, but not only, causing delays in field activities) - a 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Progress Reports, 2010-2013 • I-111 • I-112 	<p>Satisfactory – <i>consistently reported by project and</i></p>

	<p>notable example is the fall of Kunduz in 2015. However, this did not have a major impact on the overall results delivery.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • See I-111, I-112, I-412. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • I-412 • Interviews 008, 016 	<p><i>stakeholders, but no independent view.</i></p>
	<p>Health</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The evaluation of EU funded support to Prison Health Services Policy Reform concludes that transferring prison health to the MoPH has been successful, although the support did not include a MoU with the Ministry of Justice. • A comparison of the processes used by the EU, USAID and the World Bank in their implementation of the BPHS and EPHS concludes that USAID was better able to supervise health facilities and NGOs through the use of provincial advisers, while the EC supervision was carried out from the capital. • Some activities under the National Area Based Development Programme could not be implemented due to worsening insecurity. (See I-421) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluation of Prison Health Services Policy Reform, 2012 • BPHS/EPHS Implementers Comparison Study, 2013 • NABDP, Final Report for EU, 2013 • NABDP, Final Report, 2013 for EU • NABDP Annual Reports, 2010-2011 • I-421 • Interviews 202, 207 & 208 	<p><i>Strong – finding clear from several sources, inventory and interviews</i></p>
	<p>Police and Rule of Law</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EC-funding to LOTFA appeared to adapt to the needs as required by donor partners: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ An evaluation of LOTFA Phase VI identified a concern that the ANP had been too focused on counter insurgency actions and not directed towards civilian policing. This may have been reflective not only of the infancy of the ANP, but the security context. Phase VII of LOTFA allowed for following the direction of civilian policing, which was encouraged by donors including the EC. • The Fight Against Trafficking programme appeared to adapt to the operating context: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The programme consisted of four components which related to the established priorities of the parties, being GoIRA and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). However, an EU-funded 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Organisational Capacity Assessment MoIA, Recommendations Design LOTFA Phase VII, 2014 • MR-139161.02, ROM 13 March 2011 • Mid-Term Review, 2012 • Fight Against Trafficking Final Report, 2015 	<p><i>Satisfactory, program documents suggest changes were adopted in several programmes but evidence for two of the programmes is limited</i></p>

	<p>review found that the components were not necessarily tailor-made to Afghanistan, and as a result the complementarity of the programme to the local context was not sufficiently assured.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ In response, the programme was completely restructured ahead of the second project phase, and the programme was extended for one additional year. A final evaluation report found that the relationship between partners and the EU was constructive, and that the project was implemented overall despite the challenging environment. ● The Justice Service Delivery Project (JSDP) was responsive to contextual changes by design: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The project sought to mitigate the impact of the transition process, which evolved regularly. ● The JSDP adapted programming to respond to low levels of success in rule of law reforms at the level of rural communities by concentrating on service delivery that made social and governance changes palatable to rural inhabitants. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● World Bank Emergency Project Paper, Justice Service Delivery project, 2012 	
	<p>Democratisation and Accountability</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The EU-funded ASGP may not have been appropriate to the operating context in Afghanistan because it was hampered by a lack of political will to move a process of devolution forward. This negatively impacted on the progress of the intervention. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Changes were made in the design of the new LoGo programme, including at the request of a primary partner, IDLG. The focus was changed from increasing service delivery to making the service delivery more accountable. Additionally, pilot district municipalities were supported with block grants. ● Changes were made to the ASGP, in conjunction with the partners, based on EU reviews. ASGP increased its focus on support to government institutions and stopped the implementation of outputs relating to promotion of civil society engagement and conflict-sensitive land management. The decision to reduce these outputs was taken after consideration of the ASGP’s comparative advantages to maximize the programme’s efficiency and to avoid duplication of efforts with other organizations. ● Changes were made to ASGP implementation after the partner suggested that it should move to a National Implementation Modality (NIM). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Afghanistan Sub-National Governance Programme (ASGP) phase II. Evaluation commissioned by Sida, 2014 ● MR-105241.03, ROM, 2010 ● UNDP Review of Afghan Sub-national Governance 2009 ● UNDP Local Governance Project Document 2015 	<p><i>Strong, multiple sources including interviews suggest changes were made as a result of requests by partners and changes in the context</i></p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The scope of ASGP was probably too broad as it covered almost every province; LoGo, which came out of ASGP, adapted by employing geographical and thematic alignment that focuses on key issues in specific locations, rather than a holistic approach. LoGo also shifted away from ASGP’s focus on institutional development towards specific areas such as budget support and service delivery support. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews 419 and 424 	
	<p>Regional Cooperation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> EU support to regional cooperation was a non-focal sector of CSP 2007-2013 and MIP 2011-2013. EU-supported programs in this non-focal sector responded to changes in the operating context: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The increasing security threat along Afghanistan’s northern borders, and a requirement to facilitate maximum coordination between border agencies and donors, saw the adaptation of the EU-supported Border Management in Badakhshan (BOMBAF), to the Border Management in Northern Afghanistan (BOMNAF) intervention. The expansion included the border region with Uzbekistan, from 2010. In October 2015, Kunduz fell to the Taliban. The security situation around Kunduz negatively affected a BOMNAF mission in December 2015, but any EU reaction to the incident at a strategic level is unknown. There were changes to BOMNAF in response to partner requirements to avoid duplication of efforts, and due to challenges presented by security, geographical and administrative issues. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Changes included extension of the contract duration, changes to construction targets and budget reallocation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> EU-Afghanistan State of Play July 2012 EU Border Management in northern Afghanistan (BOMNAF) project Document, 2010 Mazar-e-Sharif, Back-To-Office Report, December 2015 BOMNAF Final Project Report, 2015 	<p>Satisfactory, based on multiple sources, it appears that the intervention responded to changes in the operating context with respect to security and political developments. Lacking updated information.</p>
JC-13	Extent to which the strategies and interventions have adapted to remain relevant to the evolving political priorities and commitments of the EU		
I-131	The extent to which EU’s strategy was consistent with overall donor-government agreements to which the EU was a party, such as the Afghan National Development Strategies and the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework.		
	<p>Summary: There is evidence across all four focal sectors that EU strategy as outlined in the CSPs and MIPs was aligned with the key overall donor-government agreements, in particular the Afghan National Development Strategy; Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework; and Self-Reliance Through Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF). EU strategy documents clearly articulated alignment with donor-government frameworks.</p>		
	General information:		

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The EUD actively participated in and contributed to the drafting of sector strategies under the ANDS framework, especially rural development, health, social protection and justice. • The MTR of the 2007-2013 CSP confirmed that the existing focal sectors remained priorities for the GoIRA and were in line with ANDS. This was confirmed with the GoIRA at the time of the Kabul Conference, where there was a general satisfaction with the EU programme. MIP 2011-2013 remained in alignment with these priorities, recognising the needs to better contribute to strengthening local governance mechanisms across the programmes. • In 2011, the EUD conducted a reflection process within the context of the International Contact Group on Afghanistan and Pakistan on a long term vision for the development of Afghanistan. This informed the drafting of the CSP 2014-2020. • The EUD was actively involved in setting up structures that would ensure the delivery of the TMAF commitments. Under the MIP 2014-2020, EUR 22M of funding was set aside for incentive allocation within the context of the TMAF. At the Tokyo Conference, the EU (among other donors) reconfirmed its commitment to align 80% of aid with the NPPs and channelling at least 50% of its development assistance through the national budget of the GoIRA. • The CSP 2007-2013 made high-level reference to applying the principles of the Paris Declaration in the implementation of the CSP. The MIP 2007-2010 acknowledged that the timing for the finalization of the MIP, which occurred prior to the completion of the ANDS, was in contradiction with the Paris Declaration. To address this, the EU pursued close cooperation with the GoIRA during its work on the ANDS to ensure the documents aligned. • Afghanistan is a pilot country under the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States. The proposed focal sectors under the MIP 2014-2020 aligned with the five peacebuilding and state building goals of legitimate politics, security, justice, economic foundations and revenues and services. <p>See I-412 and I-312.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EAMR 2007 • EAMR 2008 • EAMR 2009 • MIP 2011-2013 • EAMR 2011 • EAMR 2012 • MIP 2014-2020 • I-412 • I-312 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness • CSP 2007-2013 • MIP 2007-2010 • I-132 • MIP 2014-2020 	<p>Strong— <i>evidence is based on EU strategy.</i></p> <p>Strong — <i>the global donor agreements have been recognised in EU strategy</i></p>
	<p>Agriculture and Rural Development</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • See I-111, I-112, I-412. 		
	<p>Health</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • See I-111, I-112, I-412. 		

	<p>Democratisation and Accountability</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EU support to sub-national governance reform was prioritised in the CSP 2007-2013 and MIP 2014-2020. This was aligned with the Public Administration Reform Process (PAR) component of the ANDS under the Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights sector, contributing to the National Priority Programme (NPP) for Local Governance. The NPP focused on governance through Provincial Governors’ Offices (PGO), District Governors’ Offices (DGOs) and municipalities. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The ASGP is one of the six programs through which the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) delivered against the NPP on budget reform, administrative reform and capacity development at the subnational level. • Good governance was identified in the TMAF as the foundation of every component of Afghanistan’s prospects for growth, self-reliance, development and peace, and underpinned all the Government’s institutional, functional and service delivery goals. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The TMAF identified the strengthening of public institutions as a priority, which was also identified in the CSP 2007-2013 under public administration reform. • Efforts to reduce corruption was also a consistent theme between EU-supported activities and government-donor frameworks. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Area 2 of the SMAF (Anti-corruption, Governance, Rule of Law and human rights), identified fighting the underlying drivers of corruption following the policy of “zero tolerance” as a priority. ○ Under the MIP 2014-2020, anti-corruption was covered under the Democratisation and Accountability sector, and as a cross-cutting issue, particularly as it concerned the management of public finances. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CSP 2007-2013 • MIP 2014-2020 • GoIRA, Governance Cluster, National Priority Program Local Governance, 2012 • Self-Reliance Through Mutual Accountability Framework (SMAF), 2015 • Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF), 2012 	<p><i>Strong, documents give clear indication that EU strategy regarding sub-national governance was aligned with donor-government agreements</i></p>
	<p>Regional Cooperation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regional cooperation was identified as a principle of cooperation in the Afghanistan Compact, a cross-cutting issue in the Afghan National Development Strategy and a key area of the Towards Self-Reliance vision. • EC-strategy aligned with this priority with regional cooperation identified as a non-focal sector of the CSP 2007-2013. The MIP 2014-2020 specifically mentioned regional cooperation in relation to the EU-funded Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process. The Istanbul Process is the only regional political process 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Afghanistan Compact, 2006 • Afghan National Development Strategy, 2008 • Towards Self-Reliance, Strategic Vision for the 	<p><i>Strong, evidence identifies that EU strategies regarding regional cooperation were aligned with key overall donor-</i></p>

	featuring Afghanistan and its near neighbours in the lead. It addresses regional cooperation as an important element for shifting political focus away from conflict, towards encouraging trade and transit.	Transformation Decade 2012 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CSP 2007-2013 • MIP 2014-2020 	<i>government agreements.</i>
I-132	Evidence that changes to the strategy and interventions as a result of policy changes at the EU level were based on sound analysis to match political priorities to intervention opportunities		
	Summary: Limited evidence was identified to link significant changes at the EU policy level with significant changes in EU support to Afghanistan. One partial exception concerns EU support to the migration agenda, but this EU policy focus appears to have had only limited impact on programming during the evaluation period.		
	General Information <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The MIP 2011-2013 maintained the same sectoral focuses on rural development, governance and rule of law, and health as outlined in the CSP 2007-2013. The justification for this ongoing focus was relevant to the context and needs of the GoIRA. The decision to incorporate the non-focal sectors of mine action and social protection into rural development and health, and maintain support for regional cooperation as a non-focal sector aligned with the division of labour at the EU level. The MIP 2014-2020 again removed mine action from the rural development sector. Achieving better aid alignment is a focus of the EU and this shift is justified for this reason. • The wider EU policy environment did have some impact on the strategy towards Afghanistan cooperation. In the CSP 2007-2013 this principally concerned trade and drugs policies, with the activities outlined in the CSP aligned with broader EU efforts on demand reduction. • The MIP 2011-2013 outlined a shift in the EU approach, which was underlined by the London and Kabul conferences in 2010 and promoted GoIRA taking the lead in development, governance and security. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ This followed a period in which EU assistance was provided in a relative vacuum, absent needs assessments. Under the MIP 2011-2013 EU technical assistance was designed in line with the EU Backbone Strategy on Technical Cooperation. ○ The 2009 EU Action Plan emphasised Afghan ownership for development initiatives, with support from the international community. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MIP 2011-2013 • CSP 2007-2013 • MIP 2014-2020 	<i>Satisfactory, limited analysis in the MIP 2014-2020 impacts on ability to make final assessment</i>

	<p>This was to build confidence within the Afghan community for the government. This was in line with EU strategy, and that of the international community and GoIRA to promote sustainable development in Afghanistan.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EU strategy under the 2009 Action Plan reinforced efforts in strengthening Afghan capacity. While capacity building was also a theme in the CSP 2007-2013, this increased focus from 2009 showed the commitment to promoting government ownership. • Afghanistan is a pilot country under the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States. The proposed focal sectors under the MIP 2014-2020 aligned with the five peacebuilding and state building goals of legitimate politics, security, justice, economic foundations and revenues and services. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2009 EU Action Plan • I-131 • MIP 2014-2020 	
	<p>Agriculture and Rural Development</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The strategic focus of EU support in the agricultural sectors has been consistent during the period under evaluation. The move towards increased use of trust funds and contribution agreements (see I-111, I-112, I-121, I-412) is in line with EU's strategy for support for Afghanistan and Pakistan, "Strengthening EU Action in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2009": "...the EU should move away from individual project support and channel its efforts through the national Agriculture Development Framework which provides an overarching plan for development in the sector." 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthening EU Action in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2009 • MIP 2014-2020 • MIP 2011-2013 • MIP 2007-2010 • CRIS 	<p>Strong – <i>the picture from several policies and the inventory is quite clear</i></p>
	<p>Health</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The strategic focus of EU support in the health sector has been consistent during the period under evaluation. In the support to the health sector there was increased use of trust funds and contribution agreements and a shift towards giving the MoPH a greater role in leading the direction of support provided, with support provided through short-term external expertise (see I-111, I-112, I-121). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MIP 2014-2020 • MIP 2011-2013 • MIP 2007-2010 • Interviews 202, 207 & 208 	<p>Strong – <i>finding clear from several sources, inventory and interviews</i></p>
	<p>Democratisation and Accountability</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Generally, EU policy in the democratisation and accountability sector was consistent across the review period, with slight changes. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ The 2009 EU Action Plan placed greater emphasis on sub-national governance, concentrating efforts to strengthen state capacity to promote good governance, human rights and efficient public 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthening EU Action in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2009 	<p>Satisfactory, <i>available evidence points towards sound analysis, but only limited examples.</i></p>

	<p>administration. This was supported by analysis that weak local government structures were a major obstacle to development.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The MIP 2014-2020 emphasised informal scrutiny and oversight by the media and civil society, which appeared to be a shift in previous EU strategies. It can be surmised that this was based on increased detection of large-scale corruption and fraud activities within Afghan government institutions and associated with EU-funded programmes. However, there was limited analysis in the MIP 2014-2020 to explain this shift. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> MIP 2014-2020 	
	<p>Police and Rule of Law</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The CSP 2007-2013 emphasised a shift in priorities to police and justice reform at a national level, an approach that continued during the intervention period. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> This was based on the analysis that a lack of governance and the absence of any rule of law were critical factors for stability and reconstruction. Increased instability and insurgent activity in Afghanistan during the intervention period, and lack of concrete progress on these factors, underscored this analysis. Under the 2009 Action Plan, EU policies were focused on strengthening the rule of law, including through assisting in the building of a civilian police force. The Action Plan identified LOTFA as one of the main tools of the EU in leveraging necessary reforms in the police. This analysis aligned with the EU approach to promote a civilian police force, in contrast to other donors who were promoting a counter-insurgency role. Ongoing EU support to LOTFA enabled this position of influence regarding the direction of the Afghan National Police. Under the 2014-2020 MIP Police and Rule of Law, and Democratisation and Accountability were identified as individual focal sectors attracting EU funding. There was no accompanying analysis in the MIP 2014-2020 to explain this division, although logic suggests it was a sound decision. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CSP 2007-2013 MIP 2011-2013 Interview 420 Strengthening EU Action in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2009 	<p>Satisfactory, <i>available evidence points towards sound analysis, but only limited examples</i></p>
	<p>Migration</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Under the CSP 2007-2013, the EU strategy outlined a shift in approach from a focus on responding to an immediate humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, to one promoting returns. This aligned with the EU Afghanistan Returns Plan that facilitated the flow of Afghan returnees back from EU countries. In response to the migration crisis in Europe in 2015, migration became a primary policy focus for the EU in 2016 and into 2017. This was demonstrated 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CSP 2007-2013 Interview 004 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 	<p>Satisfactory, <i>sound analysis in the CSP, analysis appears absent in the MIP 2014-2020.</i></p>

	by the EU committing to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Although migration was not discussed at the Brussels Conference in 2016, and instead talks were held outside the parameters of the conference, the EU subsequently funded the Special Measure on Improving Reintegration of Returnees	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Action Document for Improving Reintegration of Returnees in Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan 	
JC-14	Extent to which the strategies and interventions have adapted to remain relevant to the evolving migration situation impacting Afghanistan		
I-141	The degree to which EU assistance has been directed to addressing identified root causes of migration		
	<p>Summary: As outlined above, development assistance has largely proceeded unaffected by the evolving migration crisis in Europe. EU continued to provide support to returnees and refugees throughout the course of the evaluation period, principally through the regional cooperation non-focal sector. The EU’s support was adapted in response to the ‘transition’, which encompassed the 2014 presidential elections and gradual draw-down of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) troops. The Annual Action Plan 2014 prioritised the continuation of return and reintegration assistance, strengthened information management (including IDP tracking), support to and advocacy for the upgrading and development of areas with a high number of returnees and IDPs, durable solutions for protracted IDP caseloads, legal assistance with a focus on land and property issues.</p>		
	<p>General</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The EU provided support to internally displaced persons, providing extensive input towards the development of the first National IDP Policy. The primary means for delivering assistance was through the Aid to Uprooted People (Asia Regional Strategy 2014-2020). See I-622 Insecurity, unemployment and weak government are three of the key drivers of migration from Afghanistan. EU support in Afghanistan contributes to programmes with identified outcomes of increasing employment, improving security, and strengthening and promoting good governance. The CSP 2007-2013 directly addressed the Afghan refugee situation, indicating that the emphasis had shifted from a humanitarian response towards tackling long-term development and migration challenges of a displaced population. EU strategies would incorporate this approach under regional and cross-border cooperation initiatives. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The MIP 2011-2013 explored the motivations for cross-border migration as a cross-cutting theme. There was no specific reference to undertaking activities specifically to address the root causes of migration. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> EAMR 2009 EAMR 2012 EAMR 2013 I-622 A Survey of the Afghan People, The Asia Foundation, 2016 CSP 2007-2013 MIP 2011-2013 MIP 2014-2020 	<p>Indicative, <i>absence of a causal link to ceasing migration.</i></p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Migration as a theme, or concept, did not appear in the MIP 2014-2020. ○ The ongoing mid-term review of the MIP 2014-2020 recognises the link between security, development and migration, and proposes a combination of dedicated measures addressing the immediate needs of the migratory populations with measures to support sustainable (re)integration and address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement under the focal sectors. ● There is limited evidence of a causal link between development programming and reduction in outwards migration levels. There is some evidence that very poor countries becoming richer generate more outward migration. There is little empirical evidence and few attempts to link specific types of development projects to particular changes to migration patterns. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Michael A. Clemens, Does Development Reduce Migration? IZA Discussion Paper No. 8592, October 2014 	
	<p>Agriculture and Rural Development</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● EU-funded interventions, improved the skills of Afghan nationals in agricultural practices and promoted livelihoods opportunities. These interventions under the agriculture and rural development focal sector promoted opportunities to increase income levels for Afghan beneficiaries and increase employment opportunities. (see JC21) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● EQ2, JC21, I-212, I-213 	<p>Strong. <i>EC-funded interventions under this focal sector addressed unemployment a root cause of migration.</i></p>
	<p>Health</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Throughout the period of EC support, the health sector has been impacted by difficulties in deploying and retaining health staff in remote areas, with the result of an unbalanced deployment of capacity. Efforts have been made to address these issues through the contracts for the BPHS and EPHS. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Afghanistan Joint Health Sector Review, 2015 ● Interviews 202, 205, 207 & 208 	<p>Strong – <i>Where the support in the health sector has been impacted, efforts have been made to mitigate.</i></p>
	<p>Democratisation and Accountability</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● EU-funded interventions under this focal sector focused on promoting good governance. The effectiveness of these interventions is outlined in EQ2, JC23. Despite the progress made towards improving governance in Afghanistan, the progress made is not sufficient to identify a direct causal link to reduced migration. ● Under this sector, EU-funding was also directed towards job creation. ASGP has retained a focus on job creation and has offered classroom and on-the-job training, so that by 2009, close to 2,000 civil servants had been trained. The 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● MR105241.02, 2009 	<p>Indicative as it is too soon to assess the impact of interventions on migration)</p>

	programme reportedly did not address the major brain drain of talented and capable workers from rural areas either going abroad (Iran or Pakistan) or to Kabul. This reportedly left the provinces and districts with insufficient qualified personnel to adequately absorb this programme in the field.		
	<p>Police and Rule of Law</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> As outlined under EQ2, JC23, I-233, EU-funded interventions were directed at improving the security situation and promoting the rule of law in Afghanistan. Increased insurgent activity and instability in the country negatively impacted this progress. During the period under evaluation, the country transformed from a post-crisis setting, to a fragile country. While this produced some change in the security environment, it is not possible to assess that EU-funded activities to reduce levels of insecurity had sufficient impact to reduce the levels of outwards migration motivated by the security situation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> European Commission-Afghanistan State of Play 2012 Final Evaluation LOTFA V 	Indicative as it is too soon to assess the impact of interventions on migration
I-142	The extent to which EU interventions responded to changing flows and policy interests in the drivers of migration, in particular from 2015 onwards		
	<p>Summary</p> <p>There is no evidence to suggest that EU interventions were adapted to address the drivers of migration. Programmes related to migration, principally under the AUP, continued supporting IDPs, returnees and refugees. Existing programmes with indirect connections to addressing root causes also continued in a similar vein (see I-141). Increased capacity within Afghanistan to integrate returnees was a priority of the Brussels Conference 2016; a regional programme to improve reintegration was subsequently funded. Programmes such as the Local Integration of Vulnerable and Excluded Uprooted People (LIVE-UP) retained the pre-established objectives, set prior to the increase in EU political attention to migration. However, since 2016 there have been major initiatives developed that are more directly aimed at the drivers of migration.</p>		

	<p>Regional Cooperation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The objective of the EU-supported project Local Integration of Vulnerable and Excluded Uprooted People (LIVE-UP) was to improve the living conditions of uprooted Afghans (IDPs and returnees) and their host communities. This directly addressed the EU policy interests in migration insofar as it directly targeted returnees and promoted durable solutions. In line with the outcomes of the Brussels Conference in 2016, LIVE-UP focused on increasing capacity within Afghanistan to integrate returnees. • LIVE-UP worked with government partners to demonstrate the feasibility of local integration as an alternative to the traditional approach to displacement. By promoting the results of the project, it may alter the way GoIRA responds to displacement. The pursuit of integration options could also decrease the likelihood that IDPs would re-migrate. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ LIVE-UP has increased the security of tenure for IDPs and returnees living in marginal peri-urban areas in Kabul, Herat and Jalalabad ○ Reinvigorated interest and participation in the Housing, Land and Property Rights Task Force which intervened in planned evictions of IDPs. ○ The progress made in mainstreaming local integration points towards a long-term sustainable response to managing IDPs. ○ One positive trend is that local partners are proposing their own plans for integration • See I-132 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inception Report Local Integration of Vulnerable and Excluded Uprooted People (LIVE-UP) 2015 • Annual Report LIVE-UP, UN Habitat, 2015 • Interview 405 • I-132 	<p><i>Indicative.</i> The evidence is satisfactory regarding progress, however it is too soon to understand the impact the project has on intention to migrate.</p>
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EQ2. To what extent has the EU support contributed to improving institutional capacity, policy frameworks and service delivery in the four sectors (governance, rule of law, health and agriculture and rural development)?

JC-21	EU support has contributed to tangible results/improvements in agriculture & rural development sector		
	Indicators	Sources of information	Quality of evidence
I-211	Contribution of EU support to policy reform and improved policy frameworks and sector development planning in the A&RD sector		
	<p>Summary: EU support for the institutional level in 2007-2016 focused on capacity development and enhancing service delivery in line with GoIRA's policies and priorities. Institutional reform was promoted in relation to: a) supporting the rolling out of an integrated basin management approach, and b) embedding the provision of certain agricultural services in MAIL and transferring other services to the private sector with MAIL assuming a regulatory role (animal health, horticulture, seed sector). AHDPII supported the drafting of acts and regulations related to animal health and veterinary services, many of which have been adopted recently, and PHDP II influenced the "Law of Agricultural Seeds Regulations – Revised Draft July 2013". Moreover, P-ARBP contributed in the Panj Amu Basin to facilitating the registration of water user associations under the 2009 Water Law, as well as the process of setting up basin management institutions and thereby translating the visions of moving towards integrated water resources management and basin management as per the stipulations in the Water Law and Water Sector Policy.</p> <p>Planning and implementation was influenced at the local level, with support for the updating of 202 Annual District Development Plans under NABDP and with NSP (ARTF funded) supporting elections and capacity-development for tens of thousands of CDCs (Community Development Councils) across the countries. P-ARBP enhanced the capacity vis-à-vis basin management for MEW at both central and provincial levels and the Panj Amu River Basin Agency and its Sub-basin Agencies, as well as the capacities of local (e.g. community) institutions.</p> <p>Good results were achieved in terms of enhancing the capacity for service delivery, although capacity constraints remain a major challenge and progress has generally been slow, e.g. at MAIL, which has also been affected by staff turnover and prolonged periods with unfilled senior- and top-level positions. For example, AHDPII strengthened the veterinary governance system as evidenced by improved disease monitoring/detection and vaccination and disease prevention campaigns (brucellosis, rabies). An important element of enhancing service delivery was the focus on promoting public-private partnerships, e.g. with outsourcing to private veterinary health care providers/field units (AHDPII), enhanced involvement of ANNGO (Afghan National Nursery Grower's Association) in the certification/regulation of horticulture planting materials, and Afghanistan National Horticulture Development Organization (ANHDO) managing PHD Centres (Perennial Horticulture Development Centres) on behalf of MAIL. Overall, this strategy has worked well with clear improvements in capacities and functionality, albeit with constraints that remain to be addressed.</p>		

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Transition Project (2014-16, extended till 2018): The Transition Project supports the transfer of the service functions established/enhanced by previous programmes in relation to animal health (AHDP, AHDPII), horticulture (PHDP, PHDPII, HPS), the seed sector (SAIMSS) and statistics to MAIL – and to enable MAIL to regulate private sector provision of services established by these programmes. The Transition Project did a feasibility study of the MAIL services units as an input to deciding which services to embed in MAIL and which ones to privatise. • Overall, the MAIL reform and capacity enhancement process is moving slow, one reason being staff turnover at the senior level and prolonged periods of senior- and top-level positions being unfilled. The Transition Project has thus been extended for 2 years. Progress and capacities vary significantly among the directorates supported. • The Transition Project has prepared a draft concept for institutional reform of Agricultural Research, as an input to the larger reform process MAIL has embarked on. • FARM (2016-2018): the GIZ implemented FARM project is supports MAIL vis-à-vis agricultural extension. • Seed Sector support: EU support to the seed sector has supported the implementation of the seed sector law, seed regulation and the establishment of the seed secretariat. More than 100 private seed companies have been established in Afghanistan. • EUD was one of the first donors to support MRRD in its reform agenda, with an EUR 5mill grant. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interviews 009, 012, 015, 021, 026 • PHDPII ROM 2014 • PHDPII MTE, 2015 • Transition Project ROM, 2016 	<p><i>Strong Evidence provided by several stakeholders and confirmed by programme documentation</i></p>
	<p>AHDPII (Animal Health Development Programme II):</p>		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Supported the DAH (Directorate of Animal Health) of MAIL (Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock) in the development of the Veterinary Act – which is essential for WTO membership. Also supported the drafting of: Veterinary Professionals and Para-Professionals Act; Veterinary Medicine and Biological Substances Act; Procedures and Directives to enforce Regulations; National Veterinary Laboratory Strategic Plan; Regulations for the Import and Export Control of Products of Animal Origin. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Overview of Animal Health and Veterinary Public Health Act • ROM 2014 • Final Report 2016 • Transition Project ROM, 2016 • Interviews 009, 012 	<p><i>Strong Confirmed by external views and multiple document and interview sources</i></p>

However, the draft acts were not adopted by project completion seemingly in part due to limited prioritisation by DAH/MAIL (although acts were signed by the Minister of MAIL at the final stages of approval at the Ministry of Justice by 2015), and the obsolete 1998 Veterinary Medicine Law was still in force. Several acts have since been passed by Parliament under the Transition Project including the Animal Health Law/Veterinary Act (2017), but a few still remain.

- A scheme of information collection and laboratory analysis implemented by AHDPII in 19 provinces, with data collection outsourced to private sector VFUs (veterinary field units, piloted in 6 provinces); 16 selected diseases (e.g. rabies) are permanently monitored. More VFUs have been supported and established under other programmes, see I-612). The system is fully privatised; some, but not all, VFUs are well functioning and financially profitable.
- TA played a key role in strengthening the national veterinary governance system and strongly promoted compliance with international standards.
- Enhanced DAH capacity to provide veterinary services under the SMCS (Sanitary Mandate Contract Scheme): diagnostic laboratories, epidemiology, monitoring/surveillance, licensing, veterinary public health and food safety. SMCS is based on outsourcing to privately owned Veterinary Field Units (VFUs). Enhanced capacity of DAH for early detection has led to a vaccination campaign on brucellosis and the prevention of rabies, thereby impacted on animal health. In particular, a sophisticated and functional Central Veterinary Diagnostic and Research Laboratory was established at MAIL with co-funding from AHDPII. However, the capacity of MAIL/DAH remains low, especially at the provincial level. 21 basic provincial labs were equipped under ADHP and ADHPPII. Staff were trained and all labs are still functional. However, the maintenance of the central lab is expensive for MAIL and the possibility of privatising it and selling services are being considered.

- ROM 2014
- Final Report 2016

Strong
Confirmed by external view

- ROM 2014

Satisfactory
Confirmed by external view

- ROM 2014
- Final Report 2016
- Interviews 009, 012, 026

Strong
Confirmed by external view, interviews and lab visit

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Enhanced DAH capacity to regulate delivery of veterinary services by private and community-based animal health care providers (VFUs). However, due to the full privatisation, DAH does not have a single clinic, and find that one clinic should be retained with DAH for extension and training purposes. 		
	<p>HPS (Horticulture Private Sector Development Project)/Support to the Development of Agriculture Private Sector: Perennial Horticulture:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The EU-Funded Perennial Horticulture Development Project (PHDP/PHDP II) (2010-2015) supported institutional development of MAIL vis-à-vis horticulture. EU's Agriculture Support Programme support aimed at: a) transition of the horticulture public services to MAIL under the "Transition Project", b) strengthening the horticulture private sector and ensuring functioning public-private partnership with support for private institutions, notably ANHDO and ANNGO. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ROM 2014 Quarterly Report Q1-2017 MTE, 2015 Interviews 009, 013 	<p>Strong <i>This is the objective of PHDP and confirmed by external view</i> Strong <i>Confirmed by external view and project documentation is available</i></p>
	<p>PHDP II (Support to Afghan Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation & Livestock to Contribute to Strengthen the Planting Material and Horticulture Industry):</p>		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Public-private partnership. Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) between the MAIL and ANHDO and ANMG in 2012, where MAIL authorises: a) ANHDO to manage PHD Centres, and b) the regulatory system for planting material with ANNGO playing a key role. A key part of the regulatory scheme with ANNGO and Nursery Growers Associations (NGAs) for the multiplication of plant material incorporated into the "Law of Agricultural Seeds Regulations – Revised Draft July 2013". ANNGO has assumed responsibility and ownership for enforcing the regulatory system. ANHDO capacity improved and ANHDO is able to manage PHD Centres – albeit with some managerial constraints. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Final evaluation, 2015 Interview 009, 013, 014 	<p>Strong <i>Confirmed by external view and interviews</i></p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ANNGO was established in as an independent organisation in 2012, with EU support. ANNGO now supports 30 NGAs in 26 provinces, assisting around 1000 producers. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 	
	<p>P-ARBP (Panj – Amu River Basin Programme):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Amu River Basin Project (ARBP) and P-ARBP have ensured that MEW staff is better equipped to manage their responsibilities with increased technical engineering (e.g. on integrated basin management, and design of hydraulic infrastructure) and management experience (e.g. on project management) at central and provincial levels (Kunduz, Tahkar) • KRBP, ARBP and P-ARBP have supported the elaboration and implementation of the 2009 Water Law and the Water Sector Policy, e.g. by supporting the establishment and capacitation of 98 water user associations (WUAs) and the establishment of basin management institutions. • P-ARBP supported the development of the WUA Regulations and Basin Procedures. • Basin and sub-basin strategic plans developed and endorsed by MEW. • Land and water management planning tools have been improved/introduced. • Enhanced capacity of local institutions on basin management and conflict resolution. • Contributed through advocacy to progress in the registration of WUAs under the 2009 Water Law, 98 WUAs have been registered. However, the rolling out of the water law in Afghanistan has been affected by disagreements between MEW and MAIL on their mandates vis-a-vis irrigation water and the role of WUAs vs irrigation committees, and issue that is still not resolved. Nonetheless, P-ARBP and its predecessors have contributed to decentralising water management and making it more participatory. • Upper catchment community NRM associations wre established, but there registration was a challenge, due to insufficient engagement by MAIL. • Responsibilities gradually transferred by TA to Panj Amu River Basin Agency and its Sub-basin Agencies. • Established upper catchment management committees. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • External Evaluation, 2016 • Evaluation and Future Elaboration of the Water Sub-Sector Strategy Development, 2011 • Interviews 016, 020 • 8th progress report, Apr-Sep 2013 • Interviews 008, 016, 020, 029 	<p>Strong <i>Confirmed by external views and a few interviews</i></p> <p>Strong - <i>Confirmed by detailed info in progress report, and validated in interviews</i></p>

	<p>ARTF (Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Overall, the main focus of ARTF is infrastructure construction and rehabilitation. • NSP is the flagship programme of ARTF • NSP I, II and III established elected CDCs (Community Development Councils) in more than 35,000 communities; the CDCs were supported in elaborating community development plans which identified priority infrastructure projects. Of these, 10,000 received block grants from NSP twice, and the rest only once; those with two block grants have had two rounds of elections, whereas the rest have only had one. The CDCs will with the Citizen's Charter be the main entry point for all development projects and other local councils will be under the umbrella of CDCs. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ARTF External Review 2012 • Interviews 009, 011, 021 	<p>Strong <i>Confirmed by external view and interviews</i></p>
	<p>NABDP (National Area Based Development Programme):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NABDP district planning results directly derived from EU funds: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 45 District Development Assemblies (DDAs) in 18 provinces re-elected and their District Development Plans (DDPs) were renewed ○ Annual District Development Plans (ADDP) updated for 202 DDAs in 24 provinces ○ Capacities were enhanced through training of 54 DDAs – e.g. vis-à-vis conflict resolution, planning and project implementation, and disaster risk reduction – in 2013 DDAs solved 3330 conflicts (e.g. land, family, irrigation water disputes) ○ 84 DDAs received establishment grants and monthly stipends for organisational and physical capacity support • 2012 Presidential Decree and 2013 MRRD policy specify that District Coordination Councils are the local governance bodies (in response to a previous situation with multiple structures set up by different ministries, programmes, donors). It was anticipated that the DDAs would be converted into DDCs, but this did not happen. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Final report, 2013 • Interview 017 	<p>Satisfactory <i>Quantitative info in progress report broken down to EU funding and other sources and the current situation confirmed by an interview</i></p>

I-212	Evidence of rural households having adopted improved agricultural practices		
	<p>Summary: EU supported actions promoted improved agricultural practices. As a result of HPS and PHDP II, the production of certified quality horticultural planting materials by nursery growers increased and thereby enhancing their availability to orchard growers; and the demand for certified material is high with 1000's of orchards planted with certified materials. P-ARBP infrastructure has increased the area under irrigation, and at the same time, P-ARBP has trained community institutions and farmers in improved practices via-à-vis water management and crop production, as well as improved management of upper catchment pastures and woodland; significant yield increases are being reported by the P-ARBP implementing partners. Similarly, NSP III (ARTF funded) has increased the areas under irrigation by 147,018 hectares; NABDP has also increased the area under irrigation, albeit at a much smaller scale.</p>		
	<p>HPS (Horticulture Private Sector Development Project)/ Support to the Development of Agriculture Private Sector: Perennial Horticulture:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • HPS provides specialised technical support to nurseries and the production of ornamental plants. • Support provided to horticultural research (e.g. 6 pomology laboratories in the PHD centres) and breeding programmes is of major value, as the PHD centres under MAIL are the only ones in country carrying out such research (e.g. the almond register, apricot registers (still to be published), testing of 10 late flowering almond breeding lines. • 10 citrus varieties/breeding lines are being screened in trials. • The project has led to increased availability and enhanced quality of certified fruit tree and citrus saplings for producers (approx. 3mill certified saplings annually), thereby contributing to increased yields and more valuable fruits produced and increased profits for the producers. Neighbouring countries do not have a sapling certification system, so there is a potential for future exports. • Some gaps are posing a challenge: 80% of the certified saplings are purchased by the NHLP (National Horticulture and Livestock Project, ARTF) and late payment by NHLP hampers the purchase of inputs needed by nursery growers. ANNGO is not financially sustainable, e.g. its field managers are funded by HPS. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ROM 2014 • MTE, 2015 • Quarterly Report Q1-2017 • Interviews 013, 014 	<p><i>Satisfactory Confirmed by external views, and updated information obtained, but reporting was output focused</i></p>
	<p>PHDP II (Support to Afghan Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation & Livestock to Contribute to Strengthen the Planting Material and Horticulture Industry):</p>		

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A functional certification-like system (not officially endorsed) with ANNGO with the main elements for the horticulture sector leading to an increased number of quality tree saplings on the market. The system was voluntarily implemented by 1000 nursery owners who are members of ANNGO’s 26 NGAs (nursery grower associations). • Increased the amount and diversity of quality planting material • Established the National Collection (NC) for securing/maintaining germplasm (Initiated under PHDP I), incl. a digital database. • Enhanced the functioning of 6 PDH centres: equipped pomology laboratories, trained laboratory staff, planted demonstration orchards. • 69 Mother Stock Nurseries (MSN) for different fruits established for NGAs. • Quality and healthy plant material is provided to the nursery industry. The number of mother stock nurseries has grown (71 in 2015) and the material is now reaching beyond the 22 provinces directly covered by PHDP II support. The amount of certified planting material produced by nurseries has increased. • A market demand by orchard growers, rural development NGOs for certified saplings has been created, compared to prior the widespread use of uncertified material. Hence, the risk of dissemination of poorly performing plant material has been reduced. Certified saplings fetch higher prices. • 1000’s of orchards are now planted with certified quality material giving higher yields, better quality and higher incomes. • The certification scheme is unique in the region and gives Afghanistan a commercial market advantage. • Continuity in EU support with 2 phases of PHDP has been an important factor for success. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Final evaluation, 2015 • HPS ROM 2014 • Interviews 013, 014 • Final evaluation, 2015 • Final report, 2016 • Interviews 013, 014 	<p>Strong <i>Confirmed by external views and updated info from interviews</i></p> <p>Strong <i>Confirmed by external view and information is up-to-date</i></p>
	<p>P-ARBP (Panj – Amu River Basin Programme):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Amu River Basin Project (ARBP) has ensured that: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Water flows through project site canals ○ Functional water user associations have been formed ○ Improved land management practices are implemented by communities in upper catchments 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • External Evaluation, 2016 • and Future Elaboration of the Water Sub-Sector Strategy Development, 2011 • Interviews 016, 020 	<p>Strong <i>Confirmed by external views, and interviews</i></p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 82 Water user associations and 249 water user groups established and capacitated by international NGOs (AKF, Concern, LML, Mercy Corps, AfghanAid, Solidarités) to promoted improved operation and maintenance. • The irrigated cropping area was increased. • Agricultural productivity (significantly increased yields, in some places 2 annual harvests achieved, decline in pests) has been increased through the introduction of improved practices. • Introduction of practices for improved upper catchment resources management to increase biomass and reduce erosion in selected sub-catchments. Regenerated and improved productivity of degraded pastures and woodlands (108,217 ha under rehabilitation /protection). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 8th progress report, Apr-Sep 2013 	<p>Satisfactory <i>The progress report provides some quantitative data, but there is no external view</i></p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Irrigation infrastructure constructed and rehabilitated: headworks, main canal, small canals. This has allowed for an expansion of the irrigated area. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 8th progress report, Apr-Sep 2013 • Improvement of Yatim Tepa Irrigation Canal in Lower Panj Sub-Basin: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ ROM 2014 ○ Progress reports • Interviews 016, 020 	<p>Strong <i>Progress report provides clear info, and confirmed by documentation for the Yatim Tepa canal incl. external view</i></p>
	<p>ARTF (Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EU support for ARTF was soft earmarked for: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ AREDP (Afghanistan rural Enterprise Development Program), NSP III, NERAP (National Emergency Rural Access Project) – 2010 • The National Horticulture and Livestock Project (NHLP) – 2015 • NERAP was a road construction and rehabilitation project under NRAP (National Rural Access Project), thereby creating temporary employment for communities. The roads constructed improved the access of rural communities. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contract no DCI.ASIE/2010/258-415 • Administration agreement, CRIS No. 2015/372-092 • Interview • Interview 022 	<p>Strong <i>Confirmed by signed EU-WB agreements and an interview.</i> Strong <i>The focus of NERAP is clear.</i></p>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NSP III results (by Sep 2015): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 10,037 km road constructed/rehabilitated ○ 3.7 million people provided with access to improved water sources (23,057 improved community water points constructed) ○ 8.6 MW of power generated ○ +147,018 hectares of land brought under irrigation or provided with irrigation and drainage services ○ 1,514 classrooms built ○ Sub-projects provided +28 million days of short term employment (skilled and unskilled) • 83% (536) of sampled communities have access to services: irrigation, power, transport, water supply and other facilities. Beneficiaries spend less money on power, spend less time fetching water, transport times were reduced, absence from work was reduced by better proximity to health clinics, high enrolment increased yields due to irrigation (11% increase for wheat), waterborne diseases were reduced, • NSP I-II-III (by Sep 2015): 34,800 CDCs have implemented +88,000 community level schemes. • Paid skilled and unskilled workers an estimated \$450 million for 60 million labour days. • NSP is the flagship programme of ARTF • By mid-2012, NSP had reached almost 30,000 communities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • WB Implementation Status & Results Report, Sep 2015 • NSP Phase III Financial and Economic Analysis, 2014 • WB Implementation Status & Results Report, Sep 2015 • ARTF External Review 2012 	<p>Satisfactory <i>Quantitative data provided by a credible source (WB) But a comprehensive, up-to-date overview of the outcomes and impacts of ARTF and the different programmes not available</i></p> <p>Satisfactory <i>Quantitative data provided by a credible source (WB) But a comprehensive, up-to-date overview of the outcomes and impacts of ARTF and the different programmes not available</i></p> <p>Satisfactory <i>Supported by external view, but data is from 2012</i></p>
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	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> An impact evaluation in 2013 found that the NSP did not have significant impacts on agricultural production, and that the medium-term condition of the infrastructure was low, but the methodology and findings of the evaluation were disputed by national stakeholders. Many actors see NSP as one of the most successful development programmes in Afghanistan. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> NSP Impact Evaluation, 2013 CIDA Evaluation, 2015 Peer reviews of 2013 NSP Impact Evaluation, 2015 Norad Evaluation, 2016 Interview 021 	Indicative – <i>evaluation findings are disputed</i>
	NABDP (National Area Based Development Programme):		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> NABDP support/results with co-funding from EU: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 560 hectares of land provided with irrigation by 2013 – benefitting 32,470 households (227,289 people) 204 hectares of land benefiting from flood/natural hazard protection by 2013 – benefitting 70,810 households (495,672 people) NABDP results directly benefitting households through 237 rural infrastructure projects funded by EU (24 fully funded by EU, 214 co-funded by EU): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 263,448 households (1,844,100 people) provided with access to clean drinking water (28,933 households/202,531 people), roads and markets (101,181 households/712,681 people) by 2013. 16,180 households (113,263 people) provided with access to electricity from 70 micro-hydropower (below 100KW), 18 biogas plants and 1 power line by 2013. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interview 017 Final report, 2013 Final report, 2013 	<p>Satisfactory <i>Quantitative info in progress report, but detailed data on the current situation not available</i></p> <p>Satisfactory <i>Quantitative info in progress report broken down to EU funding and other sources, but detailed data on the current situation not available</i></p>
I-213	Evidence of rural households engaging in new or enhanced rural enterprises (on- and off-farm)		

	<p>Summary: As described under I-211, EU support has promoted public-private partnerships and thereby stimulated private sector development. HPS and PHDP II strengthened private sector umbrella organisations (ANHDO and ANNGO), albeit with significant challenges remaining related to their financial sustainability. HPS, PHDP II and AHDPII also created enhanced rural business opportunities for nursery growers and veterinary service providers. Moreover, HPS support also helped with establishing market linkages for producer groups, notably evidenced by exports of cherries (to Dubai) and grapes. PHDP II enabled the export of small quantities of certified saplings (to Tajikistan, Pakistan, India); the certification scheme is unique in the region and is a market advantage for Afghanistan. AREDP (funded by ARTF) helped 106 SMEs with the development of business plans, and created 2293 loans and saving groups with 28,051 members (e.g. mobilising AFS 22.71 mill in savings and AFS 10.17 mill in loans for 68 members in 2010-2011).</p>		
	<p>HPS (Horticulture Private Sector Development Project)/Support to the Development of Agriculture Private Sector: Perennial Horticulture:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • HPS is a continuation of PHDP/PHDP II. It seeks to strengthen ANHDO by strengthening its organisational structure. • ANNGO Manual of Procedures for ANNGO regulatory system prepared. • ANNGO bylaws revised so commercial nurseries can now also become members. There has been some reluctance toward the implementation, but some big entities have become members. The issue is still under discussion. The primary member base is small nursery growers, but some large companies have become members in the last couple of years. • More attention and work needed vis-à-vis building institutional capacity of project partners (e.g. ANNGO) and forming public-private partnerships. • Ownership in ANHDO is a challenge, project staff incl. field managers for the 25 NGAs (nursery growth associations) not ANHDO members, but project employed. • Poor financial sustainability of ANHDO and ANNGO, high costs and dependent on EU funding, and little has been done to make them sustainable, e.g. by selling services to their members. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ROM 2014 • MTE, 2015 • Quarterly Report Q1 2017 • Interviews 013, 014 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ROM 2014 • MTE, 2015 • Quarterly Report Q1 2017 • 	<p>Strong <i>Confirmed by external views and updated info from interviews</i></p> <p>Strong <i>Confirmed by external views</i></p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The project involves local producers, traders and processors in establishing improved value chains for domestic and international markets (e.g. citrus in Jalalabad). 11 groups (531 members) of fruit producers and processors formed, trained and provided with input kits for improving the quality of their products (grapes, raisins, cherries, apricots, apples, prunes). Producer groups linked to traders (4 MoUs), cherries purchased in bulk and exported to Dubai. Cherries also purchased by Finest Supermarkets. 1.8 MT of grapes also purchased by a trader from a producer group and exported. Forecasts predict a capacity of 20,000 tons/year produced on 1.500 ha new citrus orchards with improved varieties. HPS and PHDP II contributed to reviving a citrus industry that had been decimated. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ROM 2014 MTE, 2015 Quarterly Report Q1 2017 Interview 013 	<p>Strong <i>Quantitative data available, and supported by external views</i></p>
	<p><u>PHDP II (Support to Afghan Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation & Livestock to Contribute to Strengthen the Planting Material and Horticulture Industry):</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> PHDP/PHDP II supported the development of private sector organizations, Afghanistan National Horticulture Development Organization (ANHDO) and the Afghanistan National Nursery Growers' Association (ANNGO). Nursery growers organised through ANNGO, voluntarily adhere to the regulatory system produced healthy and true-to-type fruit tree saplings for the Afghan market, and in sold 2015 a small number of certified saplings to India, Pakistan, and Tajikistan. ANNGO governance and management was strengthened 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Final evaluation, 2015 HPS ROM 2014 HPS MTE, 2015 	<p>Strong <i>Confirmed by external views</i></p>
	<p>ARTF /Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund):</p>		

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • AREDP: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Established 2293 saving groups with 28,051 members mobilizing savings worth AFS 22.71 mill and provided loans worth AFS 10.17 mill for 68 members in 2010-2011. Over 30,000 loans provided. ○ 1,500 enterprise groups created (63% female membership) and 600 small and medium enterprises (SMEs) supported ○ 10 village savings and loan associations formed. In total, AFS 289 mill have been saved by communities under AREDP. ○ Developed business plans for 106 SMEs ○ Employment opportunities created for around 100,000 rural entrepreneurs (64% female). IDPs, returnees, koochies, people with disabilities have been provided with employment opportunities. • NSP: provided communities with infrastructure, in particular electricity (e.g. solar panels) but also rural roads and access to water, e.g. for irrigation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implementation Support Mission, November 26 – December 5, 2011 Aide Memoire • http://projects.worldbank.org/P110407/af-rural-enterprise-development-program?lang=en • Interview 009, 019 	<p>Satisfactory</p> <p><i>Quantitative data from 2011, combined with data obtained from interviews</i></p>
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<p>JC-22</p>	<p>EU support has contributed to tangible results/improvements in the health sector</p>		
<p>I-221</p>	<p>Contribution of EU support to policy reform and improved policy frameworks and sector development planning in the health sector</p>		
	<p>Summary: EU support has made a contribution to policy reform and improved policy frameworks, both in its coordinated approach with other donors and in taking a lead on specific areas, such as prison health, mental health and disability. There is clear evidence of improved sector development planning through the consistently improved access to and utilisation of health services across the country and the capacity of the Ministry of Public Health’s (MoPH) capacity to take on increasing responsibilities for oversight from donors. Donors have worked in a coordinated manner, first to develop efficient and effective approaches to delivering in the health sector and then to ensure that the MoPH has the capacity and the ability to take on the stewardship role for the country as a whole. At the same time, recent assessments highlight the continuing limitations of the MoPH, showing that, while support has contributed to the development of policies, the MoPH’s ability to oversee implementation of these policies lags behind. Donors support continues to build MoPH’s stewardship role both to develop policy and to build capacity to implement and oversee.</p> <p>The picture is mixed with regard to the capacity of the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH), in part due to an initially uncoordinated approach to donor support and in part despite the support provided. Assessments of the EU’s direct support show a mixed picture: an assessment of support to Prison Health Services Policy Reform, concludes that transferring prison health from the Ministry of Justice to the MoPH has worked; assessments of overall support to the Ministry conclude that, in 2008 a contribution has been made to the functioning of the Ministry, although sustainability depends on continued support, and in 2013 that has contributed to the development of policies, but the MoPH’s ability to oversee implementation lags behind.</p>		
	<p>Health Sector Support – BPHS, EPHS, from 2014 SEHAT (207290, 315426, 318785, 369067)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A comparison between EU, World Bank and USAID contracting approaches in the health sector aimed to identify the differences between the approaches used by the donors to contracting out, using both a qualitative assessment of practices and procedures and a quantitative assessment of cost and relative cost efficiency. The conclusions of this study directly informed the development of the contracting out approach for the country as a whole, providing the basis for the MoPH’s approach in taking forward its stewardship role, overseeing the provision of basic and hospital services provided by NGOs in the main part. • The EU played an active role in developing the System Enhancing for Health Actions in Transition (SEHAT) Programme, which is part of the ARTF and is led by the MoPH with the aim of continuing to build the stewardship capacity of the Ministry and system development. The MoPH now oversees the contracting out process for the delivery of the 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • BPHS/EPHS Implementers Comparison Study, 2013 • SEHAT Aide Memoires, 2014 & 2015 • Interviews 202, 207 & 208 	<p><i>Strong – Confirmed by external view, with the current status confirmed through interviews.</i></p>

	<p>BPHS and EPHS and carries out the direct oversight of the contracts and oversees the monitoring and assessment of health delivery, reporting to the donors.</p>		
	<p>Support to the Ministry of Public Health (287107, 231519)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EC support to the MoPH has contributed to the functioning of the MoPH and to the implementation of basic health services, but sustainability depends on continued donor support. The major achievements have been: enhanced capacity of the MoPH for national health planning and to the stewardship role, through grants and contract management capacity; and, training of large numbers of health workers. Support has contributed to the development of national policies, such as the Strategic Plan for the Ministry, although the MoPH’s capacity to ensure their implementation lags behind. The project has contributed to building the capacity of the Ministry to plan and to contract, but the overall impact remains unclear, with issues around dependency on external expertise, difficulties in keeping capacity once built, as many staff leave, and the lack of an exit strategy for the EU in order to ensure particularly financial sustainability. • The BPHS and EPHS coverage, access, expansion and quality standards have been institutionally strengthened by the donors (including the EU) supporting the Grant Contract Management Unit (GCMU), Hospital Department, and Policy and Planning. The EU has supported public health areas, such as prison and mental health, where its leadership and positioning have influenced other donors and the MoPH to incorporate funds and assistance to the basic health delivery packages and institutional recognition within the Ministry (Prison Health, Mental Health and Disability). The EU has also supported Health Financing and Aid Coordination, <i>“with increasing attention and sophistication due to the steadily improvement of the staff skills, capabilities and training (SWAp, Costing Exercises, training support to the staff, etc.). However, the project should have been better designed to support authorities, inside the MoPH, with their implementation and at least partial institutionalisation of the products or processes developed”</i>. • EU support provided an international expert in 2010, who worked with the Mental Health Department to develop the National Mental Health Strategy that was approved by the MoPH in 2011. EU support also played a role in establishing the Disability Rehabilitation Unit and the Disability Rehabilitation Strategy in 2011. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ROM (MR 204420.01), 2008 & ROM (MR 146305.01), 2013 • Afghanistan Joint Health Sector Review, 2015 • Evaluation of the Current Health Sector Support Programme • Evaluation of Prison Health Services 	<p>Strong – <i>Confirmed by external view, with the current status confirmed through interviews.</i></p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Overall, transferring prison health from the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) to the MoPH has worked, having gone smoothly and having been successfully taken over. The remaining problems were due to the lack of a MoU between the MoJ and MoPH (which has now been put in place) and cultural differences, which need to be resolved. 	<p>Policy Reform, 2012</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews 202, 207 & 208 	
<p>I-222</p>	<p>Evidence of the strengthened public health care through increased access to basic and hospital health services at the provincial level</p>		
<p>Summary: As a result of support from the EU, USAID and the World Bank, there have been significant improvements in both access to and utilisation of health services across Afghanistan. A range of evidence shows significant improvements in the availability of health facilities (accessibility and presence of female health workers) and in the quality of the health service provision (such as the assessment of patients and the advice given), with the Balanced Scorecard Reporting in 2015 and 2016 showing that these improvements have at least been maintained across all of the provinces across the country. There have been significant improvements in the utilisation of these health services in important areas, such as skilled antenatal care and skilled birth attendance: in 2003, the proportion of women receiving skilled antenatal care was 5%, while the Afghanistan Health Survey showed that in 2015 this proportion was 61.2%; similarly, the proportion of women delivering used skilled birth attendants in 2003 was 6%, while in 2015 this proportion was 58.1%. EU support made a direct contribution to these improvements in Nangarhar Province up to 2010-2011, with reporting at the time suggesting a link between female health workers, number of safe deliveries and reduced maternal and child mortality and morbidity and greater vaccination coverage.</p> <p>At the same time, there are caveats about the success and sustainability of these improvements. Until 2010-2011 the EU provided direct support both to provinces and to NGOs, with the latter in particular failing to demonstrate effective models of provision with a subsequent impact on sustainability. Both of the two sample projects delivered by NGOs were judged to have achieved their outputs and provided support to their intended beneficiaries, support to street children to encourage them to attend formal education and support to women and their children in prison. However, in the case of support to street children the services developed were not taken up by government and so were not sustained, while the support to women and their children in prison continues through continued donor support.</p> <p>In terms of the uptake of some health services, specifically the use of contraceptives by women, while there were initial improvements, these have not been maintained: the BPHS/EPHS Implementers Comparison Study shows figures for the contraceptive prevalence rate, of 5% in 2003, 16% in 2007, and 22% in 2010, while the Afghanistan Health Survey for 2015 estimated that 16.3% of women reported having used a modern method of contraception. Finally, there are concerns about sustainability, particularly linked to the utilization of services and to the sustainability of capacity in the health sector. With regard to the use of health services, in Nangarhar Province there were issues around the increasing over-utilization of the hospital and increased number of emergency and casualty</p>			

	cases, with patients bypassing the primary level health facilities and self-referring. The result of this is the use of limited resources for ordinary care, compromising the quality of health services.		
	<p>Health Sector Support – BPHS, EPHS, from 2014 SEHAT (207290, 315426, 318785, 369067)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EU support has resulted in improvements in health access and utilisation from 2003 to 2007: significant increases in the number of health facilities with qualified female staff, from 25% in 2002 to 76% in 2007. However, challenges remain with up to 40% of the population having no access to public health services and with high spending by up to 73% of the population on health. • EU support in Nangarhar Province has resulted in improvements in action to and utilisation of health services: 40% of deliveries attended by a skilled health worker, immunization coverage for pregnant women up from 46% to 83%, 81% of health facilities staffed with at least one female health worker. • There appears to be a link between female health workers, number of safe deliveries and reduced maternal and child mortality and morbidity and greater vaccination coverage. At the same time, there are institutional problems, including recruiting and retaining female staff and with drug supplies. • Increasing over-utilization of the hospital and increased number of emergency and casualty cases: patients bypass the primary level health facilities and self-refer. This results in the use of limited resources for ordinary care, compromising the quality of health services. • There have been considerable health service improvements from 2003 to 2010: skilled antenatal care, 5% in 2003, 32% in 2007, 60% in 2010; skilled birth attendance, 6% in 2003, 19% in 2007, 34% in 2010; contraceptive prevalence rate, 5% in 2003, 16% in 2007, 22% in 2010 (Afghanistan Mortality Survey, 2010). • In regards to the key health indicators: <i>58.1% of women delivering used skilled birth attendants. By contrast, an estimated 16.3% of women reported having used a modern method of contraception. Among the ever-married women ages 12-49 years with a live</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ROM (MR 104420.01), 2008 • BPHS Nangarhar Province Final Report, 2011 • ROM (136904.01), 2010 • EPHS Nangarhar Province Final Report, 2013 • BPHS/EPHS Implementers Comparison Study, 2012 • Afghanistan Health Survey 2015, 2016 	<p>Strong – <i>Confirmed by external view and interviews.</i></p>

	<p><i>birth in two years before the current survey, 61.2% received at least one antenatal visit from a skilled provider – a doctor, nurse, or midwife.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Overall the 2015 national BSC results demonstrated overall progress in the health sector with nearly two thirds (12 out of 23) of indicators showing an increase of minimum five percent meeting the lower and upper benchmarks. • Overall, the 2016 national BSC results demonstrated overall progress in the health sector with over two thirds (13 out of 23) of indices showing an increase of minimum five percent meeting the upper benchmarks. On the other hand, comparing the upper benchmarks with those of 2015, there were notable declines nationally for the overall client satisfaction and perceived quality of care, revised health worker satisfaction, health worker motivation, revised staff training index, and laboratory functionality index. Overall, there are significant variations in levels of performance and changes in performance across provinces and domains of the BSC. • Improvements in Management Systems Indicators (use of management information systems, financial systems and health facility management functionality): <i>2015, the national median score was 79.5 this year, which is not much different from the score in 2012/13 when it was 82.9. The national median score this year is, however, slightly higher than the one reported in 2011/12 (75.1); 2016, the national median score was 84.0 percent versus 79.5 percent last year. The trend over time shows some, though not impressive improvement. Proportion of provinces meeting the lower benchmark was 85.3%, up from 76.5 % in 2015. Over time, the trend improved slightly.</i> • A recent policy brief by the World Bank confirms many of these trends: <i>According to United Nations (UN) estimates, maternal mortality rates (MMR) declined from 1100 to 396 deaths per 100,000 live births from 2000 to 2015 (Alkema et al, 2016), and under 5 child mortality rates (U5MR) reduced 34 percent (from 137 to 91 deaths per 1000 live births) while newborn mortality rates (NMR) dropped 32 percent (from 53 to 36 deaths per 1000 live births) (You et al, 2016). Improvements achieved in health outcomes compare very favorably with improvements achieved by comparators. Afghanistan has achieved larger improvements in key maternal and child health outcomes than regional comparators (Figure 2) including Pakistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (KPK).</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • BPHS BSC Report, 2015 • BPHS BSC Report, 2016 • BPHS BSC Report, 2015 & 2016 • The Afghanistan Health Services Study, 2017 • Interviews 202, 207 & 208 	
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	<p>Child Rights Consortium (167669)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Beneficiaries were 19,000 street and working children around the country. • Project provided day care centres and facilities for street and working children, reaching 24,727 children and supporting 11,000 children into public schools. However, the services provided by NGOs are no longer functioning and models developed have not been taken up by GoIRA. • The project outputs were not sustained by either the consortium partners or local government. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Final Narrative Report, 2013 • ROM (MR 146321.01) 2013 • Interview 204 	<p>Strong – <i>Limited external perspective confirmed by interview.</i></p>
	<p>Medica Mondiale (169593)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 4,190 women and 179 children were supported with direct services, the provision of legal and social services and of counselling to women and their children in prison. Furthermore, 9,498 women and 1,303 men as well as 362 school students were reached through awareness raising sessions. 40 prison wardens and more than 100 social and religious key actors were trained. • Medica Afghanistan continues to provide the services developed in the project with resources from a number of donors and from limited private funding. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Final Narrative Report, 2013 • Lessons learned report, 2013 • Interview 206 	<p>Strong – <i>External perspectives confirmed by interview.</i></p>

JC-23	EU support has contributed to tangible results/improvements in the governance sectors (D&A, P&RoL)		
I-231	D&A sector: Evidence of increased oversight of state institutions by civil society and oversight bodies		
	<p>Summary The sample reviewed produced limited evidence of EU support resulting in improved oversight of state institutions by civil society or oversight bodies. There appears to have been limited engagement with civil society organisations in the sample projects.⁴</p> <p>EU activities supported the work of independent bodies, such as the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), supported by the Enhancing Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow (ELECT) programme, and the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG). However, these were neither civil society organisations, nor provided any oversight mechanism to government activities. Further, they appeared to be influenced to some degree by government bodies, which could affect their independence.</p>		
	<p>Afghanistan Sub-National Governance Programme (ASGP):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) is one of the key implementers of the EU-funded ASGP. The IDLG implements its mandate by developing good local governance entities with just and democratic processes at the local level. However, the IDLG remains accountable to the President with minimal oversight by the legislature. Appointments to the IDLG have reflected political allegiances. Sub-national governance is also reportedly challenged by corrupt and nepotistic practices, with reports that rent-seeking occurs at available opportunities. This undermines the limited legitimacy of authorities in the rural areas. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Afghanistan Sub-national Governance Programme (ASGP) Project Synopsis, ROM301132, 2007 Afghanistan Sub-national Governance Programme (ASGP) phase II. Evaluation commission by Sida, 2014 	<p><i>Indicative.</i> This is the report of an evaluation into the sub-national governance programme. Results are dated.</p>
	<p>Support to Credible and Transparent Elections- ELECT II</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> While not directly connected to oversight of state institutions by oversight bodies or civil society, EU support to ELECT II directly improved the capacities of the Independent Election Commission (IEC) to perform its mandate. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> UNDP Report for the European Union Delegation 	<p><i>Satisfactory.</i> The evidence supports strengthened IEC,</p>

⁴ EAMR01A.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ EU support comprised sustainable assistance to the IEC through capacity development and knowledge management. A strengthened IEC increases the potential for democratic, transparent elections into the future. ○ Through EC support, ELECT II assisted the IEC to reform the Electoral law, strengthening the regulations surrounding the electoral process and included the creation of the Regulation on Vote Counting. ○ Elect II sharpened internal oversight mechanisms on operational-management issues, including supervision of funds handled by the IEC. • The capacity of voters to execute an oversight role over the government is unclear given the results of the 2014 election marginalised the popular vote. • The EU's advocacy for a patient, peaceful resolution to the 2014 election was an important contribution to international support for the post-election negotiations. 	<p>to Afghanistan, ELECT II, 2014</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNDP, Annual Progress Report for ELECT II, 2014 • UNDP, Final Evaluation of ELECT II, 2015 • Interview 402 	<p>not necessarily an oversight body.</p>
	<p>Municipal Governance Support Programme (MGSP)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Under the MGSP, support is directed towards increasing the legitimacy and functioning of Municipal Advisory Boards (MABs), interim municipal councils helping to improve the transparency and relevance of municipal operations for citizens. The focus of the MGSP has been on engaging MABs in oversight, to monitor service delivery projects. The MABs presents an opportunity for civic engagement and citizen participation in municipal affairs. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ As the programme was only recently established, progress is ongoing. After one year, progress had been made on social mobilisation and sensitisation through community mapping and Strategic Municipal Action Planning. ○ The direction of EU funding in this project is unclear, though indications are that MGSP will likely be extended. and appears to be principally directed towards improving data and information for urban planning, policy making and municipal governance. This includes the development and implementation of EU visibility campaigns. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Annual Report, MGSP, 2016 • Municipal Governance Support Programme, Grant Application, 2015 • Interview 420 	<p><i>Indicative</i> as it is too soon to measure impact of the intervention, and direction of EU funding has not yet been confirmed.</p>
	<p>Local Governance Project- Afghanistan (LoGo Afghanistan)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Under LoGo, one output is aimed at improving civil society's capacity for oversight of local governance. Project documents indicate that in 2016, a national CSO received a Grant to support local CSOs, and a series of consultation meetings have been conducted with civil society organisations to understand the context and identify the challenges of CSOs for their oversight role of service delivery. A 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • LoGo 3rd Quarterly Progress Report, 2016 • Interview 420 and 424 	<p><i>Indicative.</i> It is too soon to measure impact of the intervention.</p>

	platform has been established for engagement with civil society, but there is little evidence of significant results so far.		
I-232	D&A sector: Evidence of improved public sector budgeting and management		
	Summary EU support has contributed to improved public sector budgeting and management at the output level, and the results vary with respect to sustainability at the outcome level. Support was principally delivered by way of capacity building and service delivery. There was limited evidence of policy development.		
	<p>General</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • For its general level of development, Afghanistan has a relatively advanced Public Financial Management (PFM) system. Improvements in PFM include increased on-budget expenditures from USD 303 M in 2002 to USD 4.9 B in 2012. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ In 2013, all on-budget funds were channelled into the main revenue funds of the GoIRA to be managed through its regular systems of disbursements and financial control. See I-413. ○ Improvements in tax collection remain necessary and there is too much discretion by officials over the tax payers, owing to the lack of uniformity in the applied rules on the issuance of tax clearance certificates. ○ All GoIRA entities, including provincial budgetary agencies and the Kabul municipality, are covered by financial audit, with SAO's audit coverage at least 75% of public revenue and expenditures. • The EU-supported Public Financial Management Roadmap II (PFMR-II), which covers 2016-2020, promotes improved financial management of public resources. The EU-supported State Building Contract (SBC) will provide GoIRA with additional fiscal space to finance its own strategic development priorities and policies, and will support the transition to improved democratic governance. The SBC focus relevant to governance is on public sector reform and the fight against corruption; basic service delivery; and public financial management. Further EU support for PFM reform is in the pipeline. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Annex III, Public Financial Management, 2016 • Annex I of Annex III, Public Financial Management, 2016 • I-413 	<p><i>Satisfactory</i> – based on programme documents and supported by external review</p>
	<p>Afghanistan Sub-National Governance Programme:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The ASGP was instrumental in supporting the IDLG to develop its capacity. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ This included the establishment of the Capacity Building Unit (CBU), and a capacity building programme for the staff of the Afghanistan Stabilization Programme. In 2009, all 364 district governors had received training on good 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Afghanistan Sub-National Governance Programme, UNDP-prepared First Report for the 	<p><i>Strong</i>- Multiple sources available.</p>

	<p>governance, 34 provincial liaison offices had been established and 1,590 civil servants received training in management, IT and English.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ In 2010 ASGP assistance established the IARSC Project Management Unit that was considered positive progress towards national ownership of the ongoing process of public administration reform in sub-national governance. ○ ASGP also supported the IDLG in policy design and development which resulted in Cabinet approval of the Sub-national Governance Policy in 2010, which was a significant milestone in policy development. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The effectiveness of the ASGP activities in improving public sector management was noted at the output level, but improvement at the outcome level was less clear. This could be because of a lack of political commitment to devolution. This was particularly apparent with rural sub-national governments, to which there was no financial devolution, and services to them were implemented through deconcentrated units from the respective line ministries. Another limitation is that ASGP was too overstretched geographically. ● EU-support to ASGP contributed to improve public sector budgeting practices. ASGP focused on the development of municipal financial management and control systems. ASGP documented municipal accounting practices in the Mazari Sharif municipality; established quarterly revenue targets in 9 municipalities to upgrade municipal capacity for revenue administration; and saw increased revenue across five municipalities in 2009 from 18% (Jawzjan) to 70%(Sari Pul). 	<p>European Commission, 2010</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Afghanistan Sub-National Governance Programme (ASGP) phase II. Evaluation commissioned by Sida, 2014 ● Afghanistan Sub-National Governance Program, UNDP Afghanistan, Annual Report 2009 ● Interview 424 	
	<p>Local Governance Project-Afghanistan (LoGo)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Technical support and training was provided to the IDLG under the Local Governance Project (LoGo). <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ In all 34 provinces, LoGo implemented bottom-up planning which opened spaces for communities' participation, and helped identifying local needs and solutions in areas such as social services, governance and security. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Swiss Cooperation Office, Afghanistan, Review of LoGo ● UNDP 3rd Quarterly 	<p><i>Indicative.</i> The information is from an overview and progress reports, but external evaluations and views are not available.</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> LoGo aimed to improve the capacities of 34 Provincial Councils, particularly in overseeing provincial service delivery, and contributed to the introduction of revenue planning in 40 municipalities. 	Progress of LoGo, 2016	
	<p>Support to Public Administration Reform (PAR) in Afghanistan</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> There was little evidence of a consistent strategy to reform, and EU support (and that of other international donors) had been largely ineffective. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Despite significant injections of donor aid, capacity building needs remained great and management remained inadequate. Reform of Pay and Grading, a major element of reform, had not produced the expected results. As a result, the lead agency the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC), has lost some credibility. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evaluation of Public Administration Reform Process, EU-funded evaluation, 2012 	<i>Satisfactory.</i> However, this is only from an evaluation as program materials were not available.
	<p>Municipal Governance Support Programme (MGSP)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The MGSP is focused on assisting municipalities to increase their human and institutional capacities to collect and spend revenues in a transparent, accountable and inclusive manner. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The programme trains and mentors municipal staff in finance and revenue management to support the Municipal Advisory Boards. After the first year, data models for municipal tax collection and registering of businesses had been established, all 5 provinces had conducted municipal finance self-assessments and tax collection targets had been established. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Annual Report, MGSP, 2016 Municipal Governance Support Programme, Grant Application, 2015 	<i>Satisfactory,</i> progress is limited due to implementation period.
I-233	P&RoL sector: Evidence of increased effectiveness of Afghan National Police in civilian policing and promoting respect for human rights		
	<p>Summary</p> <p>There is limited evidence to suggest that EU support to the Afghan National Police (ANP) strengthened their capacities to engage in civilian policing. This outcome, advocated for by the EU, was hampered by the ANP's involvement in counter-insurgency activities and resisted by the sheer inertia of changing policing norms in Afghanistan. Reporting suggests there was a lack of consensus among international donors concerning the ANP's civilian policing mandate. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to conclude that support for salaries in the ANP mitigated some of the risk of collapse or even predatory behaviour by police officers.</p>		
	Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan Phases V-VII		<i>Satisfactory- based on multiple sources,</i>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EU support to LOTFA V was principally directed towards addressing remuneration of ANP and Central Prisons Department (CPD) staff. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Under the CSP 2007-2013, EU funding was almost exclusively used for paying police salaries and operational costs. ○ Under the MIP 2011-2013 funding expanded to support police reform efforts, however allowed for the payment of police salaries where it was linked to the reform agenda. ○ GoIRA has not yet assumed responsibility for payroll management. • In 2012, the EU funds were available to promote police community partnerships for enhanced local security. The police-e-mardumi project was based on democratic policing best practices and in 2012, the Community Policing Secretariat was launched with a mandate to develop a national community policing policy. • This suggests that the EU actively supported the ANP to transition into a civilian police force. However, this did not achieve much impact, given the international community has continued to prioritise the ANP's contribution to counter-insurgency. • The MIP 2014-2020 also suggested that the transformation of the ANP into a civilian policing unit had been hampered by the involvement in the counter-insurgency efforts. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ An EU-funded evaluation of LOTFA V and VII reported that because of this, ANP capacities did not truly develop 'blue and Civilian Policing'. ○ EU funding under LOTFA V and VI did not increase the effectiveness of ANP in civilian policing. Despite EU advocacy for the force's alignment with this outcome, the lack of consensus from international donors impacted on this outcome. ○ There is growing consensus among EU donors and other stakeholders (GoIRA, CSTC-A) in favour of the civilianisation of the ANP. The key change has been in the overall military strategy, not in the ANP or MOI. • A public survey conducted in 2012 regarding attitudes to the police conveyed a mixed result. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Over 90% of people in Kabul indicated they trusted the police; in Southern and Eastern provinces this figure fell to less than 50%. 60% of respondents across the country said they would report crimes and incidents to the police. ○ Given investment has principally focused on Kabul, this suggests that EU support has been positive in improving public perceptions of the police. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CSP 2007-2013 • MIP 2014-2020 • Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation with Afghanistan 2001-2011 • Evaluation of the LOTFA Phase V Report, UNDP-funded, 2012 • Interview 420 • EU Contribution Agreement to LOTFA 2011-2012 • Annual Progress Report 2012 (LOTFA VI) • Lessons Learned, LOTFA 	<p><i>though the documentation is dated.</i></p>
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	<ul style="list-style-type: none">○ An increase in anecdotal evidence of wide-spread corruption within the ANP, recorded in the MIP 2014-2020, would likely impact these figures. Increased corruption would negatively impact on the capacity of the ANP to promote human rights.	Pillar 2, Phase VI, EU-funded, 2014.	
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
EQ3. Has EUD's capacity and management been appropriate for ensuring efficient and effective aid delivery in Afghanistan?

JC-31	Is the EU capacity sufficient to supervise and manage EU support?		
	Indicators	Sources of information	Quality of evidence
I-311	The level and sufficiency of the EUD involvement in supervising, monitoring and engaging in dialogue on the implementation of projects (e.g. considering the security situation, 2012 staff relocation, restricted movement, frequent rest and recuperation outside Afghanistan (R&R) for staff, staff turnover)		
	<p>Summary: Recruiting and keeping sufficient staff has been a severe problem for the EUD throughout most of the period of the evaluation. From 2007 to 2013, the delegation faced difficulties in finding international staff to come and work in Afghanistan and in getting experienced staff to remain, with severe impacts on both the capacity of the staff and on the workloads of those staff who do remain. The declining security situation from 2007 onwards has impacted on the ability of the delegation to implement and particularly to monitor the projects in the portfolio. In 2012, the security situation became so hazardous that all DEVCO staff were temporarily relocated to Brussels, a situation that lasted for the whole year and continued to have effects into 2013. While the situation has improved to a certain extent, the difficulties in recruiting and keeping experienced staff continue.</p> <p>It is only from 2013 onwards that the EUD was able to report more positively on the situation and focus on the contribution that the EUD had been able to make. From 2014 the significant efforts that were made to streamline the portfolio and to utilise modalities that reduced the pressure on EUD staff began to pay off. In both years, over 70% of the portfolio was implemented through indirect management, noting a direct link to the increased capacity of the EUD to be able to engage in both sector coordination and policy dialogue.</p>		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Management Reports for 2007 to 2013 focus on the staffing problems that the delegation faced including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ recruiting and retaining expatriate staff in Kabul; ○ high staff turnover and the relative lack of experience of the expatriate staff who are recruited; ○ high levels of overtime that the staff have to undertake in order to maintain the programme. • The Management Reports from 2007 report the deterioration of the security situation in the country, with an increasing number of incidents reported, limitations of access and travel in the country and the resulting adaptations to the supervision and monitoring of programmes and projects. In 2012 the continued deterioration led to the temporary relocation of all DEVCO staff to Brussels, a situation that lasted for the whole year. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EAMR 2007 • EAMR 2008 • EAMR 2009 • EAMR 2010 • EAMR 2011 • EAMR 2012 • EAMR 2013 • EAMR 2013 • EAMR 2014 • EAMR 2015 	<p>Strong – <i>The perspective of the EAMRs is confirmed through interviews with government partners, donor partners and EUD staff.</i></p>

- The Management Reports from 2013 report a less staff constraint issues, due in part to some improvements to the security situation, but in the main due to changes in the way in which the portfolio is managed, with a greater use of trust funds and a reduction in the number of contracts. This led to an increased capacity to engage in coordination and policy dialogue. This in turn led to the EUD being able to set out clearly for the first time the roles of the delegation from 2014.
- The Management Reports for 2014 and 2015 report on the increasing proportion (over 72% in 2014 and 75% in 2015) of the portfolio going through major trust funds and, as a result, the increased capacity and contributions to high level policy dialogue.
- Analysis of CRIS data shows: a decrease in the number of new contracts signed each year, from a peak of 90 contracts in 2010 to 56 in 2015 and 40 in 2016; and a steady decline in the total number of contracts managed from a peak of 335 in 2012 to 132 in 2016
- The EUD commissions private firms to carry out ROM and evaluations, as they do not have the same level of security restrictions and can go to the provinces. However, security issues have affected the movement of the firms carrying out ROMs, so that they have had to carry out desk reviews in the main. In places where security is poor, the international consultants rely on information from local colleagues.

- CRIS
- Interviews 010, 201, 202, 207, 208, 209, 211, 213, 215

Figure 311a: Number of new contracts signed



	<p>Figure 311b: Number of ongoing contracts</p> <table border="1"> <caption>Data for Figure 311b: Number of ongoing contracts</caption> <thead> <tr> <th>Year</th> <th>Contracts issued before 2007</th> <th>Contracts issued after 2007</th> <th>Total</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>2007</td> <td>100</td> <td>10</td> <td>110</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2008</td> <td>150</td> <td>30</td> <td>180</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2009</td> <td>150</td> <td>100</td> <td>250</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2010</td> <td>130</td> <td>180</td> <td>310</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2011</td> <td>90</td> <td>240</td> <td>330</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2012</td> <td>50</td> <td>290</td> <td>340</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2013</td> <td>10</td> <td>260</td> <td>270</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2014</td> <td>0</td> <td>230</td> <td>230</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2015</td> <td>0</td> <td>180</td> <td>180</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2016</td> <td>0</td> <td>140</td> <td>140</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Year	Contracts issued before 2007	Contracts issued after 2007	Total	2007	100	10	110	2008	150	30	180	2009	150	100	250	2010	130	180	310	2011	90	240	330	2012	50	290	340	2013	10	260	270	2014	0	230	230	2015	0	180	180	2016	0	140	140		
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2016	0	140	140																																												
	<p>A&RD:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The EUD staff have not always been adequately responsive to questions from implementing partners, e.g. on how to apply of the complex EU rules and procedures - with long response times and insufficient answers. The EUD has in engaged proactively in project steering committees to help overcome challenges and as a mediator to bring stakeholders together. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews 013, 020 	<p>Indicative – <i>evidence is from a small number of interviews.</i></p>																																												
<p>I-312</p>	<p>The level and sufficiency of the EUD involvement in cooperation with EU MS and other donors in monitoring and engaging in dialogue on the implementation of ARTF and LOTFA</p> <p>Summary: Whilst taking note of the capacity restrictions of staffing and security issues (see i-311 above), from 2007 to 2013 the EUD was able to make contributions to both coordination efforts and policy dialogue, many of which contribute to the implementation of trust funds. At the same time, there was mixed capacity to be able to respond effectively to call for greater contributions to and greater quality of contributions to policy dialogue and coordination, the latter particularly with regard to trust funds.</p> <p>Efforts were made to address issue initially identified in 2010 that the portfolio remained too dispersed, while the volume of direct contracting was too heavy to fully exploit the (limited) potential in policy dialogue and donor coordination. These efforts were particularly strong in the health and agriculture and rural development portfolios, where a carefully thought through strategy was used to substantially rationalise and streamline what is described as overly complex portfolios, in close coordination with the relevant ministries. This resulted</p>																																														

	<p>in 2013, in support to the health sector with a shift from direct centralised management to joint-management with the WB, with financial support channelled on-budget through the ARTF in support of the MoPH's (owned) SEHAT Programme. The move of P-ARBP to a contribution agreement with ADB has given EU an observer status at the AITF Steering Committee and thus a platform to engage in the AITF-related dialogue with GoIRA and AITF donors (I-611).</p> <p>The results of this reorganisation of the portfolio were realised in 2014 and 2015, with a significant contribution by the EUD to the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF), which established the agenda for donor-government policy dialogue on urgent governance reforms and to the negotiations of the framework indicators in 2015.</p>		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Management Reports for 2007 to 2013 report generally on the contributions made to donor coordination, particularly to the trust funds (ARTF, LOTFA and CNTF), and set out where contributions were made to policy dialogue. At the same time, note is made of the limitations to these inputs, such as in the 2008 report: <i>“Unfortunately, in many areas where more could be done, the Delegation is again limited by its constraints in recruiting of especially policy oriented staff and therefore confined to the second league of those donors just following what has been decided by others based on clearly different policy agenda”</i>. As is noted in the 2009 report: <i>“the portfolio of the Delegation remains probably too wide and the contractual workload too heavy to fully exploit the potential in policy dialogue and donor coordination”</i>. The Management Reports for 2014 and 2015 report on the increasing proportion (over 72% in 2014 and 75% in 2015) of the portfolio going through major trust funds and, as a result, the increased capacity and contributions to high level policy dialogue. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> EAMR 2007 EAMR 2008 EAMR 2009 EAMR 2010 EAMR 2011 EAMR 2012 EAMR 2013 EAMR 2014 EAMR 2015 Interviews 201, 202, 207, 208, 209, 211, 213, 215 	<p>Strong – <i>The perspective of the EAMRs is confirmed through interviews with government partners, donor partners and EUD staff.</i></p>
	<p><u>Health - ARTF</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Management Reports between 2011 and 2013 provide a commentary on the process of rationalising and streamlining, what is described as an <i>“overly complex health portfolio”</i> in close coordination with the Ministry of Public Health. This included: <i>“ensuring uninterrupted provision of health care to over 5 million people”</i>; and, <i>“consolidating the disparate technical support activities for MoPH into one single major, demand-driven contract designed in close cooperation with MoPH”</i>. The Management Reports for 2013 reports on the result of this rationalisation, with greater coordination with the major donors and a programme of support with the MoPH at it centre: <i>“a transition from direct centralised management to EU to joint-management with the WB, whereby financial support is channelled on-budget through the ARTF in support of the MoPH's (owned) SEHAT Programme”</i>. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> EAMR 2011 EAMR 2013 Interviews 202, 207, 211 	<p>Strong – <i>Supported by evidence presented for JC22</i></p>
	<p><u>Agriculture and Rural Development – ARTF</u></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interview 021 	<p>Indicative – <i>evidence is from a</i></p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>EU engaged proactively with NSP. E.g. when MRRD proposed a reform strategy, EU was the first donor to support it, with EUR 5mill.</u> 		<i>small number of interviews.</i>
I-313	Value added of the use of flexible procedures by the EUD		
	Summary: Flexible procedures have allowed the EUD to respond more quickly in crisis situations and to avoid lengthy procurement in situations where there were only few qualified services providers. However, in the first years in 2007-2016, the flexible procedures were widely used but full justification had not always been provided. In later years their use was reduced, although there are no figures available from the EUD to support this.		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The flexible procedures have allowed the EUD to do direct local contracting in crisis situations, e.g. where: a) there was a need to respond quickly, or b) there was not enough qualified providers to undergo a meaningful competitive tendering procedure. • The use of flexible procedures has to be justified each time, so the EUD prefers not to use them. • Previously, they were used far more frequently, but their use in Afghanistan and elsewhere was not always supported with sufficient justification and evidence (according to a global EU internal audit). • There was no evidence available from the EUD on the overall use of flexible procedures. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interviews 005, 216 	<i>Indicative – single source and no data or documentation available on the use of flexible procedures</i>
JC-32	Has there been sufficient experience and capacity in the EUD to engage in effective policy dialogue?		
I-321	Use of monitoring analysis, evaluation findings and other forms of commissioned research as the basis for policy dialogue		
	Summary: In the health, rule of law and democracy & accountability sectors the EUD commissioned evaluations and reviews of significant existing support to assess progress made in these programmes and to identify recommendations for taking further support forward. There are a number of examples in all of the sectors where elements of these recommendations have been taken forward, with clear and direct link between the results of these assessments and policy dialogue.		
	General information: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • While EAMRs from 2007 to 2015 make frequent references to the inputs made of policy dialogues in all sectors, there is no evidence in this general reporting that the inputs to policy dialogue are based on monitoring analysis, evaluation findings and other forms of commissioned research. The EAMRs from 2007 to 2011 do refer to monitoring carried out through ROMs and to evaluations undertaken during the reporting period, but do not make the link between the results of these assessments and policy dialogue. • There is evidence from interviews with EUD staff that there are links between commissioned research and evaluations and inputs into policy dialogue – see examples for sectors below. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EAMRs 2007-2015 • Interviews 009, 202, 207, 208, 211 	<i>Strong – evidence from documentation backed up by interviews with EUD staff.</i>

	<p>Agriculture and Rural Development</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Examples of EUD commissioned research include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ A review of the Seed Sector was commissioned by the EUD in 2012. ○ An evaluation of the technical, economic and financial feasibility and sustainability of producing animal health vaccines at the Animal Health Vaccine Production Laboratory, was commissioned by the EUD in 2011. • Research was also commissioned by ARTF/the World Bank, including and Agriculture Sector Review in 2014. ARTF has a Research and Analysis Program. • The Afghanistan Living Condition Survey (ALCS, previously known as NRVA) conducted by the Central Statistics Organization (CSO) is the most comprehensive and updated single source of socio-economic statistics on Afghanistan and thus assists GoIRA and development partners in making informed decisions in development planning and policy-making. It collects and analyses data, e.g. in relation to poverty, food security, labour, livelihoods. It is based on a household survey among on average 21,000 households/+150,000 individuals across all provinces of. It captures seasonal variations The survey has being funded by the EU since 2005. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Technical Review of the Seed Sector in Afghanistan, 2012 • Evaluation of the technical, economic and financial feasibility and long term sustainability of producing animal health vaccines at AVPL, 2011 • ARTF website Agriculture Sector Review, 2014 • Interview 009 	<p>Satisfactory – <i>the reports clearly show that the EUD has commission important research, but less detail is available on how it has been used in policy dialogue</i></p>
	<p>Health</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Afghanistan Joint Health Sector Review was commissioned by the EU and was used to influence the development of subsequent EU funding of the health sector, working with other donors through the ARTF and providing joint support to the System Enhancing for Health Actions in Transition (SEHAT) Programme, which is led by the MoPH with the aim of continuing to build the stewardship capacity of the Ministry and system development. • Interviews show reviews and evaluations were commissioned by the EUD in a strategic way in order to influence the development of sector policy and implementation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Afghanistan Joint Health Sector Review, 2015 • SEHAT Aide Memoires, 2014 & 2015 • Interviews 202, 207, 208, 211 	<p>Strong – <i>Evidence in documentation backed up by interviews of EUD staff, donors and government.</i></p>
	<p>Rule of Law</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The EU commissioned an evaluation of LOTFA phases V and VI. This was used to identify recommendations regarding the design of phase VII of LOTFA. Elements of these recommendations, including to separate the payroll actions from the police capacity development actions are reflected in LOTFA programme documents. Documents do not indicate that the changes were based on EU recommendations. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Increased donor interest in capacity building since the end of LOTFA V and VI may also have contributed to the separation of payroll actions from capacity development. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Organisational Capacity Assessment MoIA, Recommendations Design LOTFA VII, 2014 • Annex I, Addendum to LOTFA Program 	<p><i>Indicative — no documents available to understand policy association.</i></p>

		Document, Phase VI, 2015	
	<p>Democracy and Accountability</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Evaluation of the Public Administration Reform Process in Afghanistan was commissioned by the EU and presents recommendations for future programme design. However, available documents do not make the link between the results of this assessments and policy dialogue. 	Evaluation of the Public Administration Reform Process in Afghanistan, 2011	<i>Indicative</i> — no documents available to understand policy association.
I-322	The level and sufficiency of EUD involvement in policy dialogue in the four sectors		
	<p>Summary: Issues with staffing had an impact on the EUD's ability to manage what was a large and complex portfolio. This affected the capacity of the EUD to engage effectively in coordination with other donors, and particularly member states, monitoring of the portfolio and policy dialogue. From 2013 onwards the situation improved due to changes in the way that the portfolio was managed (see I-311) and the EUD played active role in policy dialogue, something that is emphasised in management reports, which set out both the contributions made and the active role as a partner in policy dialogue across the four sectors. This view is backed up by both government and other donors. The EUD also began to look forward, setting out the key 'outward facing' roles that the EU can and should play, including, leading and actively contributing to the policy dialogue with the government, particularly in the EU focal sectors, and taking a lead role in aid effectiveness, for example through the Brussels conference in 2016.</p>		
	<p>General information:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Management Reports for 2007 to 2013 report on the impact of what is described as "a fragmented contractual approach", on the capacity of the delegation to engage in areas such as sector dialogue, donor coordination, policy developments, and programme. The Management Reports from 2013 highlight the levels of contributions made both as an active donor in the main sectors and as a partner in policy dialogue in the Agriculture and Rural Development clusters, Subnational Governance, Health, Human Rights, particularly and women's rights. This increased focus is further highlighted as the report from 2014 begin to turn to defining the EUD staff roles in policy dialogue: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> In 2014 - Lead and activity contribute to the policy dialogue with the government, particularly in the EU focal sectors. In 2015 - Lead and actively contribute to the policy dialogue with the government, particularly in the EU focal sectors. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> EAMR 2010 EAMR 2012 EAMR 2014 EAMR 2015 	<p>Strong – <i>The perspective of the EAMRs is confirmed through interviews with government partners, donor partners and EUD staff.</i></p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Brussels conference of 2016 was a significant EU-led policy and political dialogue engagement, which led to some important results, such as agreement on the SMAF indicators – see also I-611 and I-623. • ARTF was a central platform for policy dialogue in the sector and the reduction of the number of contracts and projects in the portfolio enhanced the ability of the EUD to use ARTF to engage and assume a central role in donor-GoIRA dialogue (see I-412, I-611). However, the dialogue in the ARTF Strategy Group tends to be more focused on programmatic/operational discussions rather than policy and impact – and there not room for the EUD to go the same level and details as in bilateral EU-GoIRA discussions. Nonetheless, ARTF is giving leverage to EUD visa-vis engaging in dialogue with GoIRA on specific reforms. • The State-Building Contract (SBC) budget support (see I-413) provides EU with a valuable entry point for strategic policy dialogue with the Ministry of Finance. Moreover, whereas programme support means that dialogue is often centred on programme implementation and contractual matters, the SBC is anticipated to enable a more strategic and political focus in the dialogue. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interviews 010, 011, 027 	<p>Satisfactory – confirmed by interviews, but no documents capture this new development</p>
	<p>Agriculture and Rural Development</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The EUD engaged proactively throughout the period in A&RD policy dialogue, and emerged in 2012 and onwards as a lead/coordinating donor. • However, the security-related restrictions of movement of EUD (international) staff pose an obstacle towards meeting MAIL/GoIRA regularly. • Examples of EU dialogue contributions include : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Participation in a GoIRA-donor working group developing a proposal on maintaining ARTF’s role as main provider of and fiduciary agent on operating budget support, and strengthening it as a policy dialogue platform. (2008) ○ The EUD contributed to the preparation of “EU common messages” from the EU and MS. (2009) ○ MAIL and the EUD jointly prepared a concept note on the development of a services and input provision framework through a value chain approach. MAIL and the EUD prepared a sector consultation process for developing a new NPP, NPP2 (see bullet below). This led to the drafting of the Identification Fiche for the Agricultural Support Programme 2013-15, leading to the FARM programme with components implemented under ARTF and by 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EAMR 2008 • EAMR 2009 • EAMR 2011 • EAMR 2012 • EAMR 2013 • EAMR 2014 • Interviews 009, 011, 012, 021, 026, 027 • I-211 	<p>Strong – The information from the EAMRs is supported by a number of interviews</p>

	<p>GIZ (see bullet below). The EUD initiated negotiations on facilitating the handover of responsibilities to MAIL, which is currently supported by the Transition Project (see I-211). (2011)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ EU supported MAIL’s policy dialogues on the development of a) the National Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary Mandate, and b) the National Plan on Rangeland Management. (2011) ○ Dialogue with MRRD and donors was significantly enhanced in 2011 with an EUD rural development task manager; dialogues focused on change management in MRRD and the use of research funds incl. crisis at AREU (Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit). (2011) ○ The EUD initiated a strategic discussion on the future of rural development programmes in Afghanistan. (2011) ○ Under EUD-led coordination, donors and A&RD ministries reached consensus on NPPs that had not yet been endorsed. NPPs related to agriculture and rural development were brought under a largely consistent strategy on opening of for a potential of enhanced sector coordination. (2012) ○ The EUD mobilised donors and ministries (incl. MAIL, MRRD, MoF) in the agricultural cluster to support an Afghan-led initiative for an agricultural NPP, NPP2 . The EUD thus played a lead role in overcoming initial resistance and bringing MAIL and MRRD together under NPP2. (2012). EU has since 2016 provided EUR 100mill in funding for the FARM project (Fund for Agricultural and Rural Market Development) to support NPP2 implementation, of which EUR 80mill are channelled to the ARTF National Livestock and Horticulture Programme (NLHP) and EU20mill are provided as a service contract with GIZ and implemented with MAIL. However, a remaining gap in the NPPs for the A&RD sectors appears to be the absence of livestock-related components. ○ The EUD had a continuous dialogue with GoIRA regarding enhanced GoIRA donor coordination, a programmatic approach, and moving towards SWAp. (2014) ○ More recently, the EUD has engaged in dialogue on private sector development and job creation, e.g. in the A&RD working group. 		
	<p>Health</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Health Sector Review records that: <i>“The EU has supported public health areas, such as prison and mental health, where its leadership and positioning have influenced</i> 		<p><i>Strong – The perspective of the EAMRs is</i></p>

	<p><i>other donors and the MoPH to incorporate funds and assistance to the basic health delivery packages and institutional recognition within the Ministry (Prison Health, Mental Health and Disability). The EU has also supported Health Financing and Aid Coordination with increasing attention and sophistication due to the steadily improvement of the staff skills, capabilities and training (SWAp, Costing Exercises, training support to the staff, etc.)”.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The views set out in the Health Sector Review are backed up by the views of the MoPH and other donors. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Afghanistan Joint Health Sector Review, 2015 Interviews 202, 207, 208, 211 	<p><i>confirmed through interviews with government partners, donor partners and EUD staff.</i></p>
	<p>Rule of Law</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The EU was active in the finalisation of the Justice National Priority Programme, a key process of policy dialogue in the sector, and the inclusion of the programme into the ARTF. EU involvement in policy debates in the rule of law sector was affected by resourcing. In 2012, capacity restraints arising from relocation produced a slowing down in EU involvement in policy dialogue. The EUD engaged actively in furthering dialogue between MRRD, IDLG, UNDP and the World Bank to improve the interlinkages between local governance and local development. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> EAMR 2012 EAMR 2013 EAMR 2012 	<p>Satisfactory – <i>The perspective of the EAMRs needs to be confirmed through interviews with government partners, donor partners and EUD staff.</i></p> <p>Indicative – <i>only EUD perspective available</i></p>
	<p>Democracy and Accountability</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The EU was involved in policy dialogue concerning Afghan Electoral reform, and has played an active role in policy discussions on sub-national governance issues, including under the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Fund, Area 4. This included efforts to address the fragmented gap between governance and service delivery, as it concerned sub-national governance. The EU actively contributed to the sub-national policy preparation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> EAMR 2012 EAMR 2013 EAMR 2009 	<p>Satisfactory – <i>The perspective of the EAMRs needs to be confirmed through interviews with government partners, donor partners and EUD staff.</i></p>

EQ4. Are EU's aid modalities and channels appropriate for ensuring efficient aid delivery in Afghanistan?

JC-41	Was the chosen mix of modalities based on a clear strategy and analysis?		
	Indicators	Sources of information	Quality of evidence
I-411	Risk assessments made at sector, programme and project levels.		
	Summary: Brief risk assessments are provided in the MIPs. However, only in the MIP 2014-2020 were mitigation measures outlined but without a clear link to the choice of modalities. Risk identification/assessment, monitoring and mitigation is captured comprehensively under JC72.		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Risks and mitigation measures are not assessed in relation to aid modality choices in the strategies. There is no assessment of programmatic/modality related risk in the CSP 2007-2013. The MIPs for 2007-2013 contain brief statements of risk and conditions for support to each sector, incl. non-focal sectors. The risks identified mainly relate to GoIRA commitment, security. For A&RD risks are also identified concerning climate change, weather patterns and poppy cultivation benefitting from irrigation investments. For the governance sector resistance to reform within and outside GoIRA institutions is identified other than mentioning that support can be transferred from one priority area to another in the MIP. The MIP 2014-2020 has more detail on risk. It mentions the same risks as above, but also considers corruption, low levels of capacity and difficulties in recruiting and retaining qualified staff, low absorption capacity and insufficient coordination, overall reduction of international assistance. Risk mitigation options are briefly mentioned, but none are related to the choice of aid modalities. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CSP 2007-2013 MIP 2007-2010 MIP 2011-2013 MIP2014-2020 	Strong – <i>the findings are specific for the documents</i>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> At sector and programme level risk and assumptions are also assessed – with a standard “risk and assumptions” section in identification fiches and action fiches: common risks include: insecurity, corruption, elite capture, and difficulties in recruiting qualified personnel 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> All available action Fiches Identification Fiches for the four focal sectors 	Strong – <i>the findings are specific for the documents</i>
I-412	Use of clear criteria for the choices made on aid channels and modalities		
	Summary: EU support has during the period under evaluation been streamlined significantly with a general move towards fewer and larger contracts, and significantly increasing the share of support provided as indirect management and to multi-donor trust funds (ARTF, LOTFA),		

<p>albeit with "soft earmarking" of a significant proportion of the support. A noticeable example is P-ARB, which in 2009-2012 was implemented as a series of service contracts and grant agreements, but P-ARBP II is implemented through a contribution agreement with ADB. The advantages of this are related to: a) greater alignment with development partners' agreements with GoIRA and commitments towards supporting national priorities (NPPs) providing most support on-budget and contributing to GoIRA's recurrent budget (although EU stopped providing support for the recurrent budget); b) moving towards budget support readiness and SWAp (in the Health and A&RD sectors, but not in the D&A and P&RoL sectors); c) facilitating donor coordination and policy dialogue; d) ensuring that a certain level of monitoring of implementation on the ground can take place in a high-risk context by using the systems and capacities of multilateral institutions (the World Bank, UNDP, ADB); and e) reducing the administrative and oversight burden on the EUD and releasing much-needed staff resources for a more strategic engagement with GoIRA and other development partners. However, due to various challenges, the transition from P-ARBP services contracts and grant agreements to the ADB contribution agreement created a two-year delay of P-ARBPII, which led to a hiatus in implementation and a loss of momentum, which was only partly mitigated with a bridging service contract. A State-Building Contract (SBC) was signed in 2016; this will be the first budget support provided by EU to GoIRA. A concern shared of some stakeholders in GoIRA and civil society is that on-budget funding tends to be less flexible and procurement is more time consuming than for off-budget funding, which in turn can negatively affect project delivery; another concern is the insufficient capacity of GoIRA to absorb the funding made available.</p>																								
<p>General information:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> During the period under evaluation, EU support has moved from a project approach comprising multiple contracts with many under direct management to fewer, larger contracts which are mainly under indirect management. In 2015, 75% of the support was under indirect management (in 2014 it was 72%). <p>Figure 412a: Number of contracts signed</p> <table border="1"> <caption>Data for Figure 412a: Number of contracts signed</caption> <thead> <tr> <th>Year</th> <th>Number of contracts signed</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr><td>2007</td><td>8</td></tr> <tr><td>2008</td><td>28</td></tr> <tr><td>2009</td><td>85</td></tr> <tr><td>2010</td><td>90</td></tr> <tr><td>2011</td><td>70</td></tr> <tr><td>2012</td><td>68</td></tr> <tr><td>2013</td><td>60</td></tr> <tr><td>2014</td><td>50</td></tr> <tr><td>2015</td><td>55</td></tr> <tr><td>2016</td><td>40</td></tr> </tbody> </table>	Year	Number of contracts signed	2007	8	2008	28	2009	85	2010	90	2011	70	2012	68	2013	60	2014	50	2015	55	2016	40	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CRIS EAMR 2015 EAMR 2014 	<p>Strong – <i>quantitative data available</i></p>
Year	Number of contracts signed																							
2007	8																							
2008	28																							
2009	85																							
2010	90																							
2011	70																							
2012	68																							
2013	60																							
2014	50																							
2015	55																							
2016	40																							

Figure 412b: Number of ongoing contracts





Figure 412c: Average value of contracts signed



- While EU provided significant support for multi-donor trust funds (ARTF, LOTFA) already prior to the period under evaluation, the proportion of EU’s support through these was increased significantly, it corresponded in 2015 to 71-74% of the support

- CSP 2007-2014
- CSP 2003-2006
- MIP 2014-2020

Strong –
quantitative data available

provided EU compared to 56.5% in 2014 and 40% in 2007-2012.

Figure 412d: Mix of contract types signed




Table 412a: Contracted amount by Trust fund and focal sector, 2007-2017 (EUR)

	LOTFA	ARTF	Total trust funds	Total no-trust funds	Total
Agriculture & rural development		99,750,000	99,750,000	359,481,216	459,231,216
Health		163,000,000	163,000,000	171,966,204	334,966,204
Democratisation & accountability		164,750,000	164,750,000	240,438,577	405,188,577
Police & rule of law	400,468,329	79,750,000	480,218,329	33,716,986	513,935,315
TOTAL	400,468,329	507,250,000	907,718,329	805,602,983	1,713,321,311

- A significant proportion of the support for trust funds was “soft earmarked”, e.g. in 2007 EUR 26mil were “preferred” for NSP (National Solidary Program – EUR15mill) and NRAP (National Rural Access Program), whereas EUR 35m were “un-preferred”.

- CRIS
- EAMR 2015
- EAMR 2014
- EAMR 2012
- EAMR 2011
- EAMR 2009
- EAMR 2008
- EAMR 2007

- CRIS

- Administration Agreement (No.TF050576) CRIS No 2015/372-092, 2015

Strong – quantitative data available

Strong – quantitative data available

- | | | |
|---|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Up till end 2008, EU had provided at total of EUR 61mill “preferenced” and EUR 187mill “un-preferenced” for ARTF. • In 2010, preference was made for support to AREDP (Afghanistan Rural Enterprise Development Program), NERAP (National Emergency Rural Assess Program – the main project under NRAP), and NSP III. • In 2015, preference was made for the National Horticulture and Livestock Project (NHLP). • In 2014, preference was made for support to the SEHAT (System Enhancement for Health Action in Transition) Project. • Under the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) Phase VI, EU contributions were directed to certain pillars. These related to supporting the Ministry of Interior (MoI) to meet its police remuneration expenditures (Pillar 1), capacity development and institutional reform of the MoI (Pillar 2), and community policing (Pillar 3). Within these pillars, funding was further linked to achieving specific outputs. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Administration Agreement DCI-ASIE/2010/258-415, (No.TF050576) Annex I, 2010 • Administration Agreement DCI-ASIE/2015/369067 (No.TF050576) • EAMR 2008 • EAMR 2007 • Interview 005 • LOTFA, Annex I to EU Contribution Agreement Description of Action: EU Funding Proposal, (Dec 2011 - Dec 2012) | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The developments are done in response to the guiding principles for EU support in Afghanistan are to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Move towards budget support (ARTF is providing support on-budget and also funds for the GoIRA running budget through its Recurrent Cost Window, although EU stopped providing support for the recurrent budget) – EU’s preferred modality globally ○ Move towards SWAp – Sector-wide Approaches ○ Align to the Paris Declaration (2005), the Afghanistan Compact (2006), the Kabul Conference/Process (2010), the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF – 2012), especially: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Provide support which is mainly on-budget – Donors are committed to provide at least 50% of its support on-budget. ▪ Support GoIRA’s National Priority Programmes (NPPs – 2010) and the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS – 2008-2013). Donors are committed to align 80% of their funding with the NPPs. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CSP 2007-2013 • CSP 2003-2006 • MIP 2014-2020 • MIP 2011-2013 • MIP 2007-2010 • EAMR 2013 • EAMR 2012 • EAMR 2011 | <p>Strong – <i>uniformly confirmed by strategies and EUD reporting</i></p> |

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Projects under indirect management implemented by international organisations (e.g. UN agencies) were chosen to utilise their technical expertise (e.g. UNODC), mandate (e.g. UNHCR) and outreach across the country (e.g. UNDP). • The move towards indirect management is a means to reduce the management tasks for the EUD, which is faced with: staff constraints and difficulties with recruiting and retaining qualified staff, and security restrictions which makes it impossible for the EUD to monitor implementation on the ground. • The changes have released EUD staff resources to better engage in policy dialogue and coordination (see JC32, JC61, EQ6) • The trust fund managers (World Bank, ADB, UNDP) and UN agencies have systems and capacities in place, which allow them to monitor implementation on the ground – thereby reducing the risk of corruption and elite capture (see EQ7). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interview 005 • JC32 • JC61 • EQ6 • EQ7 • EAMR 2015 • EAMR 2014 	<p>Strong – <i>triangulated by a number of sources</i></p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The trust funds are seen by the EUD as a key means for: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Providing on-budget support for GoIRA's recurrent budget, as there is a major gap between taxes/revenue generation and the funding necessary to for GoIRA to meet its obligation and provide adequate services to the Afghan population – ARTF has been crucial for payment of GoIRA salaries (in 2007, revenue collection was only 4.5% of the GDP covering less than 50% of the operating budget – in 2014 donors funded 65% of the core budget). However, EU stopped providing funds for the recurrent budget. ○ Supporting and strengthening GoIRA, using national systems and providing on-budget support until GoIRA is ready to receive direct funding/budget support (see I-412). The trust funds are a step towards budget support. ○ Ensuring donor coordination (see JC61) – the trust funds are a step towards SWAp. ○ Ensuring alignment with GoIRA priorities and supporting NPP implementation. ○ Engaging in policy dialogue (see JC32) ○ Reducing fragmentation, overlaps and transaction costs emanating from having multiple projects supported by different donors. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CSP 2007-2013 • CSP 2003-2006 • MIP 2014-2020 • MIP 2011-2013 • MIP 2007-2010 • EAMR 2014 • I-412 • JC32 • JC61 • Interview 005 	<p>Strong – <i>uniformly confirmed by strategies and EUD reporting</i></p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The EUD is pursuing and assessing readiness for SWAp and budget support in especially in the Health sector, but also in the A&RD sector. But for the D&A and P&RoL sectors, this is currently not being considered. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CSP 2007-2013 • MIP 2014-2020 • EAMR 2015 	<p>Strong – <i>uniformly confirmed by</i></p>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State-Building Contract (SBC): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ An EUR 200mill financing agreement has been entered with GoIRA in 2016 for budget support for two years. ○ The main objective is good governance, and gender and reproductive/maternal/child health are other major objectives. ○ The first tranche has not been disbursed yet. <p>Challenges:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Move to on-budget from off-budget: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ GoIRA financial systems and procurement procedures are complicated and processing takes a long time. On-budget funding hence tends to be less flexible and procurement is more time consuming than for off-budget funding, which in turn can negatively affect project and service delivery. Hence, there has been some resistance within GoIRA institutions towards moving on-budget. ○ The Transition Project is providing some support to MAIL to assist the move from off-budget projects to on-budget programmes. ○ GoIRA has insufficient capacity to absorb and spend all the funding made available with significant amounts of unspent funds being returned to the donors. Government spending has slowed down, in 2016 50-60% of the GoIRA development budget were spent, by mid 2017 on 17% were spent. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interviews 002, 005 • Financing Agreement No ACA/2016/38207: Afghanistan - State Building Contract, financed under the Development Cooperation Instrument for the Annual Action Programme 2016 • Action Document Afghanistan - State Building Contract, CRIS number: ACA 2016/38207 • EAMR 2015 • Interviews 004, 005 • Interview 011, 012, 013, 015, 016, 017, 020, 021, 023, 025, 026, 027, 028, 032 	<p><i>strategies and EUD reporting</i> Strong – <i>the financing agreement is in place</i></p> <p>Satisfactory – <i>views expressed in a number of interviews</i></p>
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
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Civil society fears that the move to on-budget support will mean there is less funding available for NGO projects – however, NGOs are currently engaged in service delivery and doing services that should ultimately be provided by GoIRA (then it has the capacity to do so and ability to reach all areas). But, another worry of civil society role is that their advocacy and as a watchdog is at risk, as it can only be supported off-budget without any Government control. ○ The risk of duplication is lower with on-budget than off-budget projects, on-budget is more easily coordinated. Moreover, the move to on-budget can enhance GoIRA ownership and helps build GoIRA capacity and systems, and on-budget support is aligned with GoIRA goals, which is not always the case for off-budget projects. NSP had a setup with MoF which allowed for a faster processing of its on-budget funds, allowing for quick disbursement of funds to communities. ○ Off-budget is useful for working with civil society and for pursuing quick outcomes. Off-budget can also be used to support on-budget operations, e.g. with targeted capacity development, TA, or studies. ● Concentration of support in larger contracts: Some stakeholders express a concern that the concentration on large contract with large implementers increase the transaction/administration costs; large international entities have considerable security costs, whereas small local entities can operate with much lower security costs. Smaller investments are in the view of some also more effective at delivering tangible results or impacts (and possibly also innovation). 																								
<p>A&RD: Figure 412e: Number of contracts signed: A&RD</p>  <table border="1"> <caption>Data for Figure 412e: Number of contracts signed: A&RD</caption> <thead> <tr> <th>Year</th> <th>Number of Contracts</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr><td>2007</td><td>0</td></tr> <tr><td>2008</td><td>6</td></tr> <tr><td>2009</td><td>12</td></tr> <tr><td>2010</td><td>24</td></tr> <tr><td>2011</td><td>14</td></tr> <tr><td>2012</td><td>30</td></tr> <tr><td>2013</td><td>12</td></tr> <tr><td>2014</td><td>11</td></tr> <tr><td>2015</td><td>16</td></tr> <tr><td>2016</td><td>12</td></tr> </tbody> </table>	Year	Number of Contracts	2007	0	2008	6	2009	12	2010	24	2011	14	2012	30	2013	12	2014	11	2015	16	2016	12	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● CRIS 	<p>Strong – <i>objective and quantitative evidence provided by CRIS</i></p>
Year	Number of Contracts																							
2007	0																							
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2013	12																							
2014	11																							
2015	16																							
2016	12																							

Figure 412f: Average value of contract signed: A&RD





Figure 412g: Mix of contract types signed: A&RD



- In 2014, four options for support for the A&RD sector were considered:
 1. A new programme under ARTF (indirect management with the World Bank)
 2. Support for ongoing ARTF programmes (indirect management with the World Bank)
 3. A new on-budget programme jointly developed with IFAD or GIZ
 4. A new EU Trust Fund supporting NSP on agriculture
- The 2nd option was chosen (EUR 80mill support for ongoing ARTF programmes indirect management with the World Bank) – with a non-binding preference given to the National Horticulture and Livestock Project (NHLP), one reason being that EU trusts funds (option 4) were at the time a new modality still under development in EU HQ. Moreover, EUR20mill are provided as a service contract with GIZ and implemented with MAIL (option 3). FARM has been under implementation since 2016.

- Standalone Project Identification Fiche, DCI-ASIE/2014/036-745, EU support to Agriculture and Rural Development in Afghanistan, 2014
- FARM formulation mission report, 2014
- EU-World Bank Administration agreement, ARTF, 2015
- CRIS
- Interviews 002, 009, 011

Strong – *objective, quantitative and specific evidence*

Figure 412h: Number of contracts signed: Health






Figure 412i: Average value of contract signed: Health



- CRIS

Strong – objective and quantitative evidence provided by CRIS

Figure 412j: Mix of contract types signed: Health



- Throughout the process of rationalising the health portfolio, there have been discussions with GoIRA re. preparing for a SWAp:
 - Since 2010, the EU has been interested in supporting a SWAp process with the MoPH, providing specific TA support to the relevant unit.
 - A roadmap for the Health SWAp was agreed in 2012.

- In 2015 it is reported that a fully-fledged SWAp is still far in the future. Nevertheless, there has been progress: *a Coordination Structure has been developed, with a Steering Committee, three sub-committees and a number of Technical Working Groups to deal with specific issues. Also, MoPH and partners have signed the Partnership Agreement in 2013, where the basic principles of collaboration and the responsibilities assumed by signatories are agreed.*

- EAMRs, 2011 & 2012
- Evaluation of the Current Health Sector Support Programme, 2012
- Afghanistan Joint Health Sector Review, 2015
- EAMRs, 2011 & 2012
- Evaluation of the Current Health Sector Support Programme, 2012
- Afghanistan Joint Health Sector Review, 2015
-

Strong – *objective, quantitative and specific evidence*

Strong – *objective, quantitative and specific evidence*

D&A and P&RoL:

Figure 412k: Number of contracts signed: Governance






Figure 412l: Average value of contract signed: Governance



- CRIS

Strong – *objective and quantitative evidence provided by CRIS*

Figure 412m: Mix of contract types signed: Governance



- EC support to LOTFA was complemented by support to other projects, but there is no analysis to reflect the process behind decisions to provide the majority of funding to LOTFA, as opposed to through other modalities or programmes.
- LOTFA was considered to be developing into an effective tool for initiating and supporting policy dialogue on police reform with the Ministry of Interior (MOI)
- As one of the largest contributors to LOTFA, EU gets a significant stance in discussions in Afghanistan over police strategy and reforms.
- Under the Support to Credible and transparent Elections (ELECT II), funding modalities shifted from the UNDP direct implementation modality (DIM, implemented by UNDP) to a hybrid national implementation modality (NIM, implemented by GoIRA)-DIM system. The subsequent corruption identified within the Independent Election Commission (IEC), in which IEC staff siphoned funds and were implicated in fraud involving money from the project, may not have arisen under a DIM modality as there would have been fewer opportunities to forge receipts. UNDP has indicated that ELECT will go back to DIM. (see I-423, I-424, I-713)

- Action Fiche for LOTFA Phase V, 2009
- Activity Group: Police Reform, 2009
- Annex 1, Identification Fiche for LOTFA Phase V, 2009
- Addendum to LOTFA Project Document-Phase VI extension for the EU Contribution, 2015
- I-424, I-423, I-713
- UNDP ELECT II Final Evaluation, 2015

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNDP, Response Letter seeking clarification on ELECT II implementation modality, 2013 • ELECT 11 Annual Report, 2014 • Interview 402 	
	<p>Blending:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Blending (mixing development assistance grants with other financing sources, such as loans from IFIs and mobilising private sector resources) is currently not being used in Afghanistan, but early discussions are taking place on using blending as a means to provide access to finance to support private sector development (mainly agri-business), job creation and improve the import-export balance and stimulate economic growth. The Ministry of Finance has also requested that the EU consider applying other kinds of financing in Afghanistan, such as financing SMEs. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interviews 027, 030, 426 	<p>Satisfactory – <i>blending discussions are at a very early stage with little documentation produced and the direction is not fully clear yet.</i></p>
I-413	<p>The choice to provide future budget support to Afghanistan is based on a sound analysis and confirming that EU's four budget support eligibility criteria (<i>policies and reforms, stable macro-economic framework, public financial management, transparency and oversight of the budget</i>) are in place</p>		
	<p>Summary: With the decision to provide budget support for GoIRA through the State-Building Contract (SBC), the EUD duly carried out assessments of the four budget support eligibility criteria (policies and reforms, stable macro-economic framework, public financial management, transparency and oversight of the budget), based on the 2013 PEFA and 2015 OBI – the EUD assessment generally confirming budget support readiness, and some of the tranches are conditioned by the achievement of agreed milestones. Moreover, disbursements are subject to the fulfilment of conditions related to each of the four criteria. The EU already has experience with providing on-budget support and using GoIRA systems for implementation, financial management and procurement from the trust funds and programmes with international agencies. However, corruption remains endemic in Afghanistan with a global ranking of 169 of 176 countries in 2016 – so there is still considerable risk associated with the provision of budget support and use of GoIRA financial management systems, as evidenced by the LOTFA corruption case (see EQ7). Nonetheless, the experience so far is that GoIRA is strongly committed to the SBC.</p>		
	<p>State-Building Contract:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The SBC Steering Group co-chaired by MoF and the EUD will oversee implementation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Financing Agreement No ACA/2016/38207: Afghanistan - State 	<p>Satisfactory – <i>the assessments were made available to the evaluation, but</i></p>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implementing partners (GoIRA will establish a permanent technical and financial monitoring system for SBC and prepare annual progress reports. The EUD may undertake additional monitoring and commission audits. An indicative list of results indicators has been prepared. • The 200mill SBC is provided through a combination of fixed tranches and variable tranches; the latter depends on the achievement of agreed targets vis-à-vis established results indicators. The first tranche of EUR 100mill has been disbursed. The second disbursement will comprise a EUR 60mill fixed tranche and a EUR 40mill variable tranche, with ERU 10mill attached to each of the four indicators. • Four conditions vis-à-vis EU's budget support eligibility criteria are to be met for disbursements: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ <u>Public policy</u>: Satisfactory progress in the definition and implementation of development policies, specifically the new Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework (ANPDF), relevant revised National Priority Programmes (NPPs) and the updated 'Self-Reliance through Mutual Accountability Framework' (SMAF). ○ <u>Macro-economic framework</u>: Maintenance of stability-oriented macroeconomic policies. ○ <u>PFM</u>: Satisfactory progress in the implementation of the public financial management reforms as defined in the PFM Roadmap II reform programme. ○ <u>Transparency and oversight of budget</u>: Satisfactory progress with regard to the public availability of timely, comprehensive and sound budgetary information. • Assessments have been elaborated by the EUD on the four budget support criteria: a) public policy eligibility, b) macro-economic eligibility, c) transparency, d) budget oversight and PFM (based on the 2013 PEFA and 2015 OBI assessments). Assessment carried out by the EUD and DEVCO found that GoIRA was adequately compliant on all four criteria. • There is wide acknowledgement that there is risk associated with providing budget support for GoIRA, but that signs so far are positive. • The rationale behind the SBC is to enhance GoIRA's fund management capacity and make the national systems work better. • EU is in parallel to the SBC preparing a new grant to the World Bank under the ARTF on PFM, as a means to mitigate the risk associated with the SBC. • The SBC is a high priority for GoIRA, so the responsiveness is very good. 	<p>Building Contract, financed under the Development Cooperation Instrument for the Annual Action Programme 2016</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Action Document Afghanistan - State Building Contract, CRIS number: ACA 2016/38207 • Interview 005 • EUD • EAMR 2015 • EAMR 2014 • EAMR 2013 • Interviews 010, 011, 025, 029 	<p><i>there is not yet any documentation on the SBC performance.</i></p>
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<p>EU experience with on-budget support and GoIRA systems, including support for budget support readiness:</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ARTF and NABDP Documentation in general • LOTFA Phase VI, Annex 3, Roles and Responsibilities • LOTFA Phase VI, Annex I, Project Management and Governance Arrangements • ARTF Incentive Program Administrator's Technical Reviews 2010, 2012, 2013, 2015, 2016 • ARTF Progressive Report, Jun-Sept 2012 • ARTF, Mid-year Report: December 22, 2013 to June 21, 2014 • ARTF, Annual Report 1392, 2013 • ARTF Annual Report 1389: March 2010 – March 2, 2011 • Interview 005 • Final Evaluation, ASGP I, 2011 • JC23 • Interview 027 	<p>Strong – <i>the systems used by the programmes is substantially documented</i></p> <p>Strong – <i>assessments presented in several documents</i></p> <p>Satisfactory — <i>evidence is clear</i></p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is already experience with using GoIRA systems – e.g. ARTF, LOTFA, and NABDP funding is channelled through GoIRA with requirements of using international financial standards and external audits on the funds. • LOTFA is implemented as per UNDP's National Implementation Modality (NIM) with GoIRA being responsible for the implementation of the project. 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ARTF is subsidising GoIRA's budget through the Recurrent Cost window – although EU stopped providing support for this. Part of the Incentive Program under this window is the Structural Benchmark Scheme, which aims at strengthening public sector governance, e.g. vis-à-vis PFM and institutional reforms. ARTF carries out performance assessments vis-à-vis the structural benchmarks agreed upon. • ARTF is monitoring relevant parameters, e.g. in relation to PFM and the macro-fiscal policy framework 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Under the governance sector EU supported interventions focused on strengthening the budgeting capacities of the public sector. In particular, support to the Afghan Sub-national Governance Programme (ASGP) was channelled to regional teams to develop the capacities of sub-national and local governance bodies by strengthening their budgeting skills. It was expected that strengthening these skills would lead to 		

	<p>improved service delivery and good governance at the sub-national level. Progress was achieved at the capacity building level, but there was less progress in service delivery (see JC23).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The support provided for MAIL through the Transition Programme is aiming at enhancing the capacity of MAIL to be part of budget support operations. No sector budget support is currently planned for the A&RD sector, but may be included in the next MIP. 		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> SMAF incentive mechanism: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> EU is providing EUR 120mill as budget support through the SMAF incentive mechanism. The funds are channelled through the World Bank/ARTF ad-hoc window. The support is an incentive mechanism linked to achievement by GoIRA of 15 SMAF indicators, i.e. EUR 8mill per indicator (2015-16 indicators, new support planned for 2017-18 indicators). However, SGD-related indicators are not yet included since GoIRA does not have sufficient baselines and indicator data for the SDGs. The first tranche was disbursed in early 2017 – only EUR 36mill we disbursed out of the planned 40mill, since the gender indicator had not been not fully achieved. GoIRA appreciates incentive-based mechanisms as they push for reform. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews 011, 025, 027 	<p>Strong – <i>the support is visible in CRIS.</i></p>
	<p>SWAp readiness:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> In 2015 a detailed assessment of the health sector was carried out, including an assessment of SWAp readiness: <i>a fully-fledged SWAp is still far in the future. The lack of a comprehensive AOP and the fragmentation and limitations of the execution and accounting systems in practice impede reaching an agreement about the system's priorities - those that should be financed - between MoPH and partners. Similarly, the absence of an agreed monitoring framework whose indicators are calculated periodically reflecting the performance of the most relevant programs and systems, limits the adoption of evidence-based decisions.</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Afghanistan Joint Health Sector Review, 2015 	<p>Strong – <i>objective, quantitative and specific evidence</i></p>
	<p>GoIRA performance:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> GoIRA has made progress vis-à-vis the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) assessment and the Open Budget Index (OBI) with considerable movement in the rankings, which are scored out of 100. 2008: 8, 2010: 21, 2012: 59, 2015: 42. This initial upwards trajectory was reversed in recent years, with the score reflecting that GoIRA provides the public with limited budget 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> MIP 2014-2020 MIP 2011-2013 MIP 2007-2010 Open Budget Index rankings, Afghanistan 	<p>Indicative – <i>detailed information is lacking and the sources of the information are not indicated</i></p>

	<p>information. This is a result of GoIRA reducing the comprehensiveness of the Executive’s Budget Proposal and not producing a Mid-Year Review.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Government monitoring of public enterprises is very weak. Internal audit units in ministries are weak and there is limited follow up of audit recommendations. Tax collection mechanisms, will and compliance continue to require major improvements. • Corruption cases with few judicial or political responses demonstrate that budget processes and oversight are weak in practice. The Corruption Perceptions Index, which scores countries on how corrupt their public sectors are seen to be, scored Afghanistan 15/100 in 2016, with a global ranking of 169 of 176 countries. This reflected improvement from previous figures: 2014, 12/100 and 172 out of 174 countries, with 2012 recorded results of 8/100, and 174th globally. • Afghanistan is reportedly at the level of middle income countries on most dimensions of public expenditure and financial accountability. However, analysis of public financial management and associated corruption is consistently reported A positive progress by those involved in delivering technical assistance (e.g. ARTF), while those analysing public perceptions and politics show major deficiencies in results and oversight (e.g. Kabul Bank). • There has been an improvement in budget execution rates starting from a low base and the government continues to struggle to implement its available resources, with a development budget execution rate of less than 50% in recent years. • At the technical level, the evidence available indicates that there is heavy reliance on assessments and evaluations organised by the ARTF. Indeed, the rules applying to contributions to the ARTF place significant restrictions on donors conducting their own in-depth evaluations of progress. There is no evidence available so far that the EU has contributed an independent exercise to assess issues related to the budget support eligibility criteria. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Corruption Perceptions Index, Transparency International • ARTF External Review, 2012 • EQ1, I-112 • Emergency Project Paper, Proposed ARTF Grant, Capacity Building for Results Facility, 2011 • ARTF Incentive Program, MOU, 2012-2014 • 1396 National Draft Budget Review, Equality for Peace and Democracy 	
<p>JC-42</p>	<p>Has the use of projects been appropriate and a conducive modality?</p>		
<p>I-421</p>	<p>Implementation timeliness of sample projects in the four sectors</p>		
	<p>Summary: There is significant variation in the timeliness of implementation. Some projects were largely on time and meeting their targets. Others were significantly delayed: some did not meet their targets, while some were extended and thereby enabled to meet their targets. Overall, the vast majority of programmes were extended by 0.5-2 years compared to the initial closing date. Mostly, the major reasons behind delays were not the implementing partners’ (contractors, grant recipients) performance, but rather design shortcomings, issues</p>		

related to the GoIRA counterpart (i.e. capacity constraints, cumbersome procedures or insufficient ownership), or external factors (mainly insecurity).																																																																			
<p>General information:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The vast majority of EU funded programmes were extended, typically by 0.5-2. <p>Table 421a: proportion of contracts extended and duration of extension</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Extension range (years)*</th> <th>No of contracts extended**</th> <th>% of contracts extended</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr><td>0.0</td><td>19</td><td>3.8</td></tr> <tr><td>0.5</td><td>126</td><td>25.0</td></tr> <tr><td>1.0</td><td>187</td><td>37.1</td></tr> <tr><td>1.5</td><td>87</td><td>17.3</td></tr> <tr><td>2.0</td><td>53</td><td>10.5</td></tr> <tr><td>2.5</td><td>19</td><td>3.8</td></tr> <tr><td>3.0</td><td>7</td><td>1.4</td></tr> <tr><td>3.5</td><td>1</td><td>0.2</td></tr> <tr><td>4.5</td><td>3</td><td>0.6</td></tr> <tr><td>5.0+</td><td>2</td><td>0.4</td></tr> <tr><td>TOTAL</td><td>504</td><td>100.0</td></tr> </tbody> </table> <p><i>* difference between closing data and end date, ** contracts signed in 2007-2015</i></p>				Extension range (years)*	No of contracts extended**	% of contracts extended	0.0	19	3.8	0.5	126	25.0	1.0	187	37.1	1.5	87	17.3	2.0	53	10.5	2.5	19	3.8	3.0	7	1.4	3.5	1	0.2	4.5	3	0.6	5.0+	2	0.4	TOTAL	504	100.0	CRIS		Strong – <i>objective and quantitative evidence provided by CRIS</i>																									
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	<p>AHDPII (Animal Health Development Programme II):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Service contract with Landell Mills • Most planned activities/outputs were delivered by project completion (Dec 2015, one year extension), although one component was cancelled (see I-423). • The AHDPII experienced some delay in implementation. In June 2014 (90% of the implementation period), spending as at 71%. The main reason for the delays appear to be DAH (Dept of Animal Health) capacity constraints and staff shortages. The design had not taken fully into account the experience from AHDP re. this, nor the lengthy process or approving new legislation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Final Report for EU, 2016 • ROM 2014 • Interviews 009, 012 	<p>Strong – <i>the information at project completion is not from an external source, but confirmed by interviews</i></p>
	<p>HPS (Horticulture Private Sector Development Project)/Support to the Development of Agriculture Private Sector: Perennial Horticulture:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Grant for ANHDO • Implementation was slow and spending low. By June 2014 (50% of year 1) 17 % of the annual budget had been spent. By June 2015, 37% of the implementation time had elapsed, and 21% of the funds had disbursed. • Some good results were achieved under most components, but several outputs were outstanding, especially under the adaptive research component, with a high likelihood of a significant degree of achieving the objectives. • Reasons for slow implementation included: a) a weak logframe, which did not provide adequate guidance – the logframe was revised; and b) issues related to programme management 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mid-Term Evaluation, 2015 • ROM 2014 • Revised logframe, 2015 • Interviews 013, 014 	<p>Strong – <i>independent views, and up-to-date info from interviews</i></p>
	<p>PHDP II (Support to Afghan Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation & Livestock to Contribute to Strengthen the Planting Material and Horticulture Industry):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Service contract with Agroconsulting SPA • The project had a smooth start, one reason being a short overlap period with the previous phase (PHDP). • Implementation was on time and fully in line with the implementation plan. Resources were made available on time and the foreseen outputs delivered. The purpose was achieved within the project's original 52 months. • The project was extended by 9 months, not due to delays, but due to a) an identified need for additional support caused by a fragile institutional and socio-economic context and b) to support the transition of horticultural schemes to MAIL under the EU Transition Project. The budget was increased from approx. EUR 6.1mill to approx. EUR 6.9mill 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ROM 2013 • Final Evaluation, 2015 • Interviews 013, 014 	<p>Strong – <i>external view</i></p> <p>Strong – <i>external view at project completion</i></p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> By April 2015, approx. 88% of the time had elapsed and approx. 88% the budget had been spent. Disbursements were evenly spread across fees and expenses. 		
	<p>P-ARBP (Panj – Amu River Basin Programme):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> P-ARBP I service contract with Landell Mills. A number of P-ARBP I activities was affected by delays; major factors behind the delays were outside the control of the programme: a) a significant and seemingly growing level of insecurity in the project areas (especially, but not only, affecting field activities); b) finalisation of the institutional reforms framework for basin management took time; c) absence of legislation for water user associations; d) unclear division of mandates for MEW and MAIL; e) seasonal floods (affecting infrastructure rehabilitation); and f) withdrawal of one NGO. Once the institutional reforms framework was in place, implementation of institutional and capacity developed moved faster. The TA team proactively addressed bottleneck affecting implementation such as lobbying for a resolution of the mandate ambiguity between MEW and MAIL. A no-cost extension was granted. Overall, activities were executed in a timely manner. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> External Evaluation, 2016 Progress Reports, 2010-2013 Evaluation and Future Elaboration of the Water Sub-Sector Strategy Development, 2011 ROM 2014: Improvement of Yatim Tapa Irrigation Canal in Lower Panj Sub-Basin Interviews 016, 020 	<p>Strong – , <i>independent views, consistently reported by project and confirmed by interviews</i></p>
	<p>NABDP (National Area Based Development Programme):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Contribution agreement with UNDP Some targets were exceeded, some were met, others were not fully achieved. Some activities could not be implemented due to worsening insecurity. Delayed Fund instalments delayed some activities in 2012, e.g. due to a) insufficient inter-departmental coordination, b) as a result of moving to on-budget funding with MRRD in 2012, and c) lengthy Ministry of Finance approval procedures. Slow procurement due to complicated GoIRA procedures created delays, sometimes by a full year. Funding shortages delayed the start of new projects. Lack of availability of qualified companies and technical expertise delayed some activities – e.g. in relation to renewable energy (micro hydropower, biogas). Seasonal floods in 2010 damaged infrastructure constructed. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Final Report for EU, 2013 Final Report, 2013 for EU Annual Reports, 2010-2011 Quarterly Report, 1-3rd quarter 2012 Interview 017 	<p>Satisfactory – <i>clearly recorded in progress report and confirmed by interview, but no external view available</i></p>

Health:								
Table 421c: Timeliness of sample projects (excluding trust funds): Health								
Partner/contract type	Number of sample projects							
	General timeliness		Delay reason					
	No/minor delays	Major delays /targets not achieved	Design	Implementer/TA: grant recipient/contractor	GoIRA partner	External factors		
Int'l NGO/grant	3		1	1				
Nat'l NGO/grant								
Int'l firm/service contract		1			1	1		
Nat'l firm/works contract								
Int'l org/contribution agreement								
Total number of projects	3	1	1	1	1	1		
Health Sector Support – BPHS, EPHS (207290, 315426) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NGO grants for Healthnet International • BPHS and EPHS Nangahar – most of the activities were on time and the ones that have been delayed were expected to be carried out in the near future. • During the transition period from direct contracting to indirect management (2011-2014), disbursements were maintained effectively 							<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ROM 2009 • EAMRs, 2011-2014 • Interview 202 	Indicative – <i>the documentation available does not cover the individual contracts</i>
Support to the Ministry of Public Health (287107, 231519) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Service agreements with Epos Health Management GMBH, Agence Europeenne Pour Le Developpement et la Sante SCRL • Some targets were met, others were missed, due in the main to the lack of reorganisation in the MoPH 							<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ROMs 2007, 2008, 2010 & 2013 • Interview 202 	Satisfactory – <i>variation in source availability among projects</i>
Child Rights Consortium (167669) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NGO Grant for Terre des Hommes • Most of the outcomes were produced, although with delays due to the relative complexity of the consortium organisation. 							<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Progress Reports and Final Report, 2009-2013 • ROM 2013 • Interview 204 	Satisfactory – <i>variation in source availability among projects</i>

	<p>Medica Mondiale (169593)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Grant for Medica Mondiale Most of the outcomes were produced, with few delays. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Progress Reports and Final Report, 2009-2013 Interview 206 	<p>Satisfactory – <i>variation in source availability among projects</i></p>																																																													
	<p>Governance (D&A, P&RoL) Table 421d: Timeliness of sample projects (excluding trust funds): Governance</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="241 427 1391 963"> <thead> <tr> <th rowspan="3">Partner/contract type</th> <th colspan="6">Number of sample projects</th> </tr> <tr> <th colspan="2">General timeliness</th> <th colspan="4">Delay reason</th> </tr> <tr> <th>No/min or delays</th> <th>Major delays /targets not achieved</th> <th>Design</th> <th>Implementer/TA: grant recipient/contractor</th> <th>GoIRA partner</th> <th>External factors</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Int'l NGO/grant</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Nat'l NGO/grant</td> <td></td> <td>1</td> <td></td> <td>1</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Int'l firm/service contract</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Nat'l firm/works contract</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Int'l org/contribution agreement</td> <td>3</td> <td>1</td> <td>1</td> <td>1</td> <td></td> <td>2</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Total number of projects</td> <td>3</td> <td>2</td> <td>1</td> <td>2</td> <td></td> <td>2</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Partner/contract type	Number of sample projects						General timeliness		Delay reason				No/min or delays	Major delays /targets not achieved	Design	Implementer/TA: grant recipient/contractor	GoIRA partner	External factors	Int'l NGO/grant							Nat'l NGO/grant		1		1			Int'l firm/service contract							Nat'l firm/works contract							Int'l org/contribution agreement	3	1	1	1		2	Total number of projects	3	2	1	2		2	<p>All documents listed below</p>	<p>Satisfactory – <i>variation in source availability among projects</i></p>
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	<p>D&A:</p>																																																															
	<p>Afghan Subnational Governance Programme (ASGP)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Contribution agreement with UNDP The rate of progress made on ASGP I was insufficient to deliver the goals set out for that phase. ASGP failed to provide sufficient high-quality technical assistance to ensure achievement of the agreed outcomes for the programme as a whole. The lack of a single agreed work plan to direct activity and facilitate reporting and tracking of progress resulted in slower and less effective delivery. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Final Evaluation of ASGP 	<p>Satisfactory — <i>clearly recorded in evaluation documents</i></p>																																																													

	<p>Support to Credible and Transparent Elections – ELECT II</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contribution agreement with UNDP • ELECT II was working towards a concrete timeframe to deliver electoral support to the presidential elections. The IEC was prepared and capable of managing the elections. • Electoral operations diverted resources from achieving against some indicators. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNDP Elect II Program Document, 2011 • UNDP Final Evaluation of Elect II, 2015 	Indicative – <i>not based on an external review</i>
	<p>Municipal Governance Support Programme (MGSP)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contribution agreement with UN-Habitat • The program experienced a reduced delivery rate in the first year of implementation (2016) due to the harmonisation of the procedures with the USAID funded project Kabul Strengthening Municipal Programme (K-SMNP). MGSP reached its critical stage in the implementation process and technical capacities are in place to compensate for the delay. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MGSP Annual Report, 2016 	Satisfactory – <i>evidence provides an indication of progress at the early stage.</i>
	<p>Local Governance Project – Afghanistan (LoGo Afghanistan)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contribution agreement with UNDP • Within the third quarter of implementation in 2016, the majority of activities and outputs had been advanced. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • LoGo, Quarter 3 Report, 2016 	Indicative – <i>data is required from the Annual Report</i>
	P&RoL:		
	<p>Fight Against Trafficking from/to Afghanistan</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Grant to GIZ • The project was considerably lagging behind schedule in 2011. This was because partnership agreements between GTZ and component leaders were signed late. The Operative Coordinator was only deployed in mid-2010 and in 2011 there was no Technical Coordinator, as Italy and Guardia di Finanza (GdF), initially involved in the intervention, dropped out and did not provide an expert. • Significant operational challenges impacted on the implementation of technical components. • The project was completely restructured in 2011 ahead of its 2nd project phase. • Because of delays, the project was granted a one year extension until the end of 2014. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ROM 2011 • Fight Against Trafficking from Afghanistan Final Report, 2015 	Satisfactory – <i>based on ROM assessments and final report</i>
I-422	Strength of results (impact and outcome) monitoring carried out by implementing partners of sample projects in the four sectors		
	Summary: Most of the sample programmes has established results indicators at outcome/impact level. However, these were often not monitored sufficiently. Especially in the A&RD sector but also in the governance sector, there was a tendency to focus monitoring on outputs and activities, whereas results monitoring was usually carried out in the health sector.		

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<p>Table 422a: Results (outcome, impact) monitoring of sample projects (excluding trust funds): A&RD</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th rowspan="3">Partner/contract type</th> <th colspan="4">Number of sample projects</th> </tr> <tr> <th colspan="2">Results indicators and targets</th> <th colspan="2">Results monitoring and reporting</th> </tr> <tr> <th>Established</th> <th>Insufficient/absent</th> <th>Sufficiently carried out</th> <th>Insufficient/absent</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Int'l NGO/grant</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Nat'l NGO/grant</td> <td>1</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Int'l firm/service contract</td> <td>3</td> <td></td> <td>1</td> <td>2</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Nat'l firm/works contract</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Int'l org/Contribution agreement</td> <td></td> <td>1</td> <td></td> <td>1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Total number of projects</td> <td>4</td> <td>1</td> <td>1</td> <td>4</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>					Partner/contract type	Number of sample projects				Results indicators and targets		Results monitoring and reporting		Established	Insufficient/absent	Sufficiently carried out	Insufficient/absent	Int'l NGO/grant					Nat'l NGO/grant	1			1	Int'l firm/service contract	3		1	2	Nat'l firm/works contract					Int'l org/Contribution agreement		1		1	Total number of projects	4	1	1	4	All documents listed below	Satisfactory – variation in source availability among projects
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Total number of projects	4	1	1	4																																													
<p>AHDPII (Animal Health Development Programme II):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Service contract with Landell Mills • All indicators in the logframe from project purpose and downwards were systematically reported on in final report and quarterly and monthly progress reports – often in a narrative/qualitative manner due to the nature of the results and indicators. 					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Final Report, 2016 • All progress reports (quarterly and monthly) 	Strong – the finding relates directly to the several reports available.																																											
<p>HPS (Horticulture Private Sector Development Project)/Support to the Development of Agriculture Private Sector: Perennial Horticulture:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Grant for ANHDO • The original logframe lacked SMART and objectively verifiable indicators for the objectives, and indicators at the results level were not always appropriate. A revised logframe with such indicators was introduced (albeit with a number of the indicators being output rather than outcome oriented) in Dec 2015. Progress reporting was insufficient. The indicators, and especially their milestones were revised in 2017; the revision also helped the project focusing its scope. 					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mid-Term Evaluation, 2015 • Interim Narrative Report 2015 • Revised logframe, 2015 • Interview 013 	Strong – the evidence is clear-																																											
<p>PHDP II (Support to Afghan Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation & Livestock to Contribute to Strengthen the Planting Material and Horticulture Industry):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Service contract with Agroconsulting SPA 					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Final Evaluation, 2015 	Strong – the findings relate																																											

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Indicators were SMART and available at outcome/results level, but some capacity indicators were vague and some were thus difficult to measure. Progress reports were made regularly (detailed 6-monthly and brief monthly). However, reporting on the indicators is not evident. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Logframe Final report, 2016 Progress reports 2012-2014 	<i>directly to the several reports available, and an external view is available</i>																																											
	<p>P-ARBP (Panj – Amu River Basin Programme):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> P-ARBP I service contract with Landell Mills P-ARBP phase 1, Indicators were established at all levels and reported in progress reports – however, indicators at the objective level only scheduled to be measured at project completion 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Log frame Progress Reports, 2010-2013 	<p>Strong – <i>the finding relates directly to the several reports available.</i></p>																																											
	<p>NABDP (National Area Based Development Programme):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Contribution agreement with UNDP All indicators in the results framework from project objective and downwards were reported on in final report and some also in annual reports. However, the indicators were mainly activity/output related; they only to a limited extent captured outcomes and they did not capture impacts. There was no post sub-project monitoring of impact. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Final Report, 2013 for EU Annual Reports, 2010-2011 Quarterly Report, 1-3rd quarter 2012 Interview 017 	<p>Strong – <i>the finding relates directly to the several reports available.</i></p>																																											
	<p>Health:</p>																																													
	<p>Table 422b: Results (outcome, impact) monitoring of sample projects (excluding trust funds): Health</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="241 979 1391 1394"> <thead> <tr> <th rowspan="3">Partner/contract type</th> <th colspan="4">Number of sample projects</th> </tr> <tr> <th colspan="2">Results indicators and targets</th> <th colspan="2">Results monitoring and reporting</th> </tr> <tr> <th>Established</th> <th>Insufficient/absent</th> <th>Sufficiently carried out</th> <th>Insufficient/absent</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Int'l NGO/grant</td> <td>3</td> <td></td> <td>3</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Nat-l NGO/grant</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Int'l firm/service contract</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Nat'l firm/works contract</td> <td></td> <td>1</td> <td></td> <td>1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Int'l org/contribution agreement</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Total number of projects</td> <td>3</td> <td>1</td> <td>3</td> <td>1</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Partner/contract type	Number of sample projects				Results indicators and targets		Results monitoring and reporting		Established	Insufficient/absent	Sufficiently carried out	Insufficient/absent	Int'l NGO/grant	3		3		Nat-l NGO/grant					Int'l firm/service contract					Nat'l firm/works contract		1		1	Int'l org/contribution agreement					Total number of projects	3	1	3	1	<p>All documents listed below</p>	<p>Satisfactory – <i>variation in source availability among projects</i></p>
Partner/contract type	Number of sample projects																																													
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Total number of projects	3	1	3	1																																										

	<p>Health Sector Support – BPHS, EPHS, (207290, 315426)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NGO grants for Healthnet International • Reporting for the BPHS and EPHS was clearly structured around a set of clear deliverables, with targets for outcomes and external assessments of results in terms of health indicators. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ROM 2009 • Interview 202 	<p>Satisfactory – <i>variation in source availability among projects</i></p>																		
	<p>Support to the Ministry of Public Health (287107, 231519)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Service agreements with Epos Health Management GMBH, Agence Europeenne Pour Le Developpement et la Sante SCRL • In 2007-2010, support to the MoPH was marked by a lack of coordination between donors, with one effect being a lack of clarity about the overall objectives of support. • While, at the start of the transition period in 2011, there was a sense that support was delivering against agreed objectives, an assessment in 2013 concludes that, proper indicators for assessing success are lacking, with the logframe being a list of activities. • Regular monitoring was carried out against the agreed indicators and was supported by regular ROMs. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ROMs 2007, 2008, 2010 & 2013 • Evaluation of the Current Health Sector Support Programme, 2012 • Interview 202 	<p>Satisfactory – <i>variation in source availability among projects</i></p>																		
	<p>Child Rights Consortium (167669)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NGO Grant for Terre des Hommes • Much of the reporting was at the activity level, although attempts were made to report on outcomes and, to a certain extent results. The ROM assessed progress against the outputs and outcomes, using evidence collected by the project. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Progress Reports and Final Report, 2009-2013 • ROM 2013 • Interview 204 	<p>Satisfactory – <i>variation in source availability among projects</i></p>																		
	<p>Medica Mondiale (169593)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Grant for Medica Mondiale • There was regular reporting against the project activities, but insufficient monitoring and reporting against the outputs and outcomes. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Progress Reports and Final Report, 2009-2013 • Interview 206 	<p>Satisfactory – <i>variation in source availability among projects</i></p>																		
	<p><u>Governance (D&A, P&RoL)</u></p> <p><i>Table 422c: Results (outcome, impact) monitoring of sample projects (excluding trust funds): Governance</i></p> <table border="1" data-bbox="241 1262 1382 1420"> <thead> <tr> <th rowspan="3">Partner/contract type</th> <th colspan="4">Number of sample projects</th> </tr> <tr> <th colspan="2">Results indicators and targets</th> <th colspan="2">Results monitoring and reporting</th> </tr> <tr> <th>Established</th> <th>Insufficient/absent</th> <th>Sufficiently carried out</th> <th>Insufficient/absent</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Partner/contract type	Number of sample projects				Results indicators and targets		Results monitoring and reporting		Established	Insufficient/absent	Sufficiently carried out	Insufficient/absent						<p>All documents listed below</p>	<p>Satisfactory – <i>variation in source availability among projects</i></p>
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Int'l NGO/grant		1		1																													
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Int'l org/contribution agreement	2	2	2	2																													
Total number of projects	2	3	2	3																													
	D&A:																																
	<p>Afghanistan Subnational Governance Programme (ASGP)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contribution agreement with UNDP • The lack of a clear, definitive work plan under the ASGP resulted in the reporting mechanisms being inadequate to monitor progress. Greater emphasis was given to the quantity of reporting that to its quality or utility. • The monitoring and evaluation system was initially weak/ non-existent; it was set up only after a mid-term evaluation recommended and more or less coincided with the end of the project. In addition, a baseline study had not been done in 2/3 of the provinces. • An approved Annual Work Plan did not guide the first year of ASGP implementation until the middle of the second quarter because ASGP was primarily engaged in establishing its physical office and recruiting its core staff during the first two quarters. • Subsequent programme documents identified Programme Outcome Indicators at the Component level, of which there were three programmatic components: Policy Development, Capacity Development and Democratic Development. The Results-Based Management tool was used in preparing the workplan. This was to represent a shift in emphasis from a focus on management by activity completion to management centred on achieving results at the outcome level. • The weekly, monthly, quarterly and annual reports are not helpful in tracking progress in implementation. They do not do not capture progress on outcomes, only reflect progress at the activity or output level. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Final Evaluation of ASGP I, 2011 • ASGP Programme Implementation Plan, 2008 • ROM 2010 • Annual Report 2010 • Annual Report 2009 • Q 3 Report, 2009 	<p>Satisfactory – based on an end of project evaluation</p>																														
	<p>Support to Credible and Transparent Elections- ELECT II</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contribution agreement with UNDP • The Outcome indicators were sound. There was no evidence to indicate outcomes were monitored during Annual or Quarterly Reports. Results were measured at the Output level. Some indicators at the output level were not necessarily monitored in 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ELECT II revised Project Document, 2012 	<p>Indicative – annual results monitoring is adequate, the regularity of</p>																														

	<p>line with the indicator. Examples include targets outlining 'effective implementation' while results only measured the act of implementation.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reporting on the progress of ELECT II comprises the annual project cycle supported by a Monitoring Plan, monthly or fortnightly IEC/ELECT II project reporting, internal weekly reporting to track activities and progress. An Issue Log, Risk Log and Lessons Learnt Logs were also expected. Quarterly progress reports were produced. A review of the ELECT II program recommended the IEC be supported to develop capacities in monitoring its own activities. It is unclear if this occurred as there is currently no ELECT III. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ELECT II Annual report, 2014 ELECT II, Mid-Term Review Phase A Report, 2013 ELECT II, Quarterly Report II, 2013 	<p><i>monthly reporting is unclear</i></p>
	<p>Municipal Governance Support Programme (MGSP)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Contribution agreement with UN-Habitat Indicators were established at all levels and were SMART. Results monitoring in the Annual Report was clear and aligned with the indicators. Results reports are issued quarterly and all project objectives were expected to be completed by the planned closure date in 2018. The ROM report found that indicators adequately measured objectives and results, ad that monitoring done so far has been done well. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> MGSP Grant Application Form, 2014 MGSP Annual Report, 2016 ROM 2017 	<p><i>Satisfactory – variation in source availability</i></p>
	<p>Local Governance Project- Afghanistan (LoGo Afghanistan)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Contribution agreement with UNDP No evidence was found documenting Outcome indicators for LoGO. These were therefore not recorded in programme reporting documents. While the Output indicators were in place for the commencement of the project, the baseline, and targets do not appear to have been established until late in the first year of implementation. Following completion, they were detailed and SMART. Important indicators such as accountability and transparency were barely defined The baseline data was incorrectly summarized and voided of meanings. As a result, reported data, including result monitoring for Q3 of the project, is lacking in detail, incomplete or misrepresented./ Actual Results provided on all outputs, no information provided for rectifying off-target results. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> UNDP, LoGo Project Document, 2015 Revised Baselines and Targets, 2016 LoGo Quarter 3 Report, 2016 ROM 2017 	<p><i>Satisfactory – Variation in source availability</i></p>
	<p><u>P&RoL:</u></p>		
	<p>Fight Against Trafficking from/to Afghanistan</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Grant to GIZ The indicators at the output level were sound, but not result-related. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Grant Application Form, FaT, 2008 Mid-Term Review Report, 2012 	<p><i>Strong – variation in source availability</i></p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> GIZ produced regular narrative and financial reports, but described monitoring of project implementation to be ‘challenging’ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fight against Trafficking From/To Afghanistan Final Report, 2015 	
I-423	Project management arrangements and their responsiveness to needs and emerging issues		
	<p>Summary: There are significant differences in the management and implementation arrangements, as well as the management performance and responsive of the programmes. A common denominator is that attention was given to the inclusion and to the extent possible, leadership by national counterparts, as evidenced by the general trend for UNDP the recipient of several contribution agreements) to increasingly implement through its national implementation modality (NIM), where GoIRA is responsible for implementation, and reduced use of its direct implementation modality (DIM), where programme management and implementation is handled by UNDP.</p> <p>In many cases, the project management arrangements for the sample programmes have been appropriate and been able to respond to emerging issues and needs. There is no clear pattern in terms of arrangements that worked better than other. However, a challenge was that project staff were generally not retained after project completion. The performance has depended on specificities of the individual programme, and has to a large extent been shaped by capacities and ownership by GoIRA partners, which in particular appears to have affected agricultural projects – one example being AHDPII (Animal Health Development Programme II), where the Steering Committee did not meet, activities were delayed, and one component was cancelled due to little progress.</p>		
	A&RD:		
	<p><u>AHDPII (Animal Health Development Programme II):</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The programme management arrangements were in principle appropriate, but the Project Steering Committee did not meet, seemingly due to insufficient prioritisation from MAIL/DAH, a prolonged period with key leadership positions in MAIL not been filled, incl. the position as DAH Director, and insufficient interaction between the project team and the MAIL senior level. The achievement of the intended outcomes was hampered by a combination of insufficient capacity and staff shortages and insufficient prioritisation by MAIL/DAH. For example, draft polices had not been approved at project completion, and the revised organigram and staffing plan had not been implemented. The Component supporting the Veterinary Science Faculty was dropped due to limited progress. After project completion, the documents and files were reportedly not transferred by the consultants to DAH/MAIL. Project equipment had not been registered in the DAH/MAIL system and was lost after completion. Project staff was contracted and 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Final Report 2016 ROM 2014 EQ2 Interviews 009, 012, 015 	<p>Satisfactory – <i>the findings are generally clear and verified by the ROM, but the finding regarding prioritisation should be triangulated</i></p>

	<p>not on the tashkeel and thus not retained by DAH after completion, so capacities were lost. The involvement of DAH in the Transition Project was somewhat limited and has not fully ensured sustainability of AHDPII results, at least in part due to capacity constraints at DAH and extended periods with the Director position at DAH being vacant.</p>		
	<p>HPS (Horticulture Private Sector Development Project)/Support to the Development of Agriculture Private Sector: Perennial Horticulture:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Overall programme management was adequate but with room for improvement, as evidenced by the slow implementation. (see I-421) • The ANHDO programme management team comprised a TL, deputy TL, 4 component managers. • The programme management team also comprised the TA for the EU funded PHDP II project, as HPS builds on PHDP results and there were synergies between the programmes. The role was not clearly defined but in practice the advisory added value and also provided management backup. • The programme management team produced several tangible outputs ensured continuity from PHDP 1, identified suitable stakeholders, and carried out important technical analyses. • Project funds were generally adequately managed. • Inputs and human resources are made available in time. • The certification scheme component was well managed – but the adaptive research component was lacking sufficient expert support. • However, some team members were overly hands-on and top-down at the detriment of ownership. • The flexibility to identify and implement additional activities was insufficient. • A Coordination Committee comprising the programme management team and observers (e.g. ANHDO, PHDPII advisers, the coordinator of the HVP project) was established and met frequently. • The Steering Committee (SC) met every 6 months and was well-functioning. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ROM 2014 • Mid-Term Evaluation, 2015 • ROM 2014 <p>Mid-Term Evaluation, 2015</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mid-Term Evaluation, 2015 	<p>Satisfactory – <i>independent views, but no recent information</i></p> <p>Satisfactory – <i>independent views, but no recent information</i></p> <p>Satisfactory – <i>independent view, but no recent information</i></p> <p>Satisfactory – <i>independent view,</i></p>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The SC was adjusted to oversee not only HPS, but also the “sister project” HVP. This flexibility was appropriate, but the important role of ANNGO was not considered – but ANDHO was subsequently given an observer status at the SC. • The SC provided strategic guidance and engaged in solving critical issues – e.g. advising ANHDO to follow procurement rules and that their Board of Directors should not interfere in day-to-day implementation of both HPS and HVP). • The SC has played a role beyond its mandate, it has also functioned informally as broader platform for coordination of sector stakeholders. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interviews 009, 013, 014 	<p><i>but no recent information</i></p>
<p>PHDP II (Support to Afghan Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation & Livestock to Contribute to Strengthen the Planting Material and Horticulture Industry):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project management was carried out in close consultation with key stakeholders: MAIL directorates and the Horticulture Department, ANHDO, ANNGO, the Perennial Horticulture Development (PHD) Centres and the Plant Biotechnology Laboratory (PBTL). • The contractor/TA and EUD were flexible and the project adapted to emerging issues: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ EU granted a project extension and a budget increase (see I-421) to ensure adequate support. ○ Advisory was provided in accordance with emerging needs ○ When EU decided to go “on-budget” with direct MAIL management, the TA supported the process. The programme approach was changed with the project extension from the contractor from service provision to a sole focus on TA and capacity building to facilitate a gradual takeover by MAIL. ○ Initial budget shortages could be addressed due to EUD flexibility – e.g. with the provision of a new grant project “<i>Support to Afghanistan Private Sector Horticultural Development Transition</i>” for the transition of the management of the National Fruit Collection and 5 PHD Centres to ANHDO. The TA engaged from 2012 in supporting the transition of horticultural services to MAIL – e.g. by preparing a concept paper for the transition, raising awareness in MAIL about the roles of the public and private sectors, providing feedback on strategic documents, contributing to an assessment of MAIL directorates. In 2014, the TA assisted the EU Transition Project with the inception report preparation. In 2015, the TA engaged in a gap analysis to identify TA needs. In 2016, the TA prepared an action plan for the transition. 	<p>Final Evaluation, 2015</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Final Evaluation, 2015 • Final Report 2016 • ROM 2013 	<p>Strong – <i>external view at project completion</i></p> <p>Strong – <i>external views, incl. at project completion</i></p>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The TA promoted with MAIL and the Transition Project that ANHDO could help with facilitation the transition process (laying the ground for the HPS project). ● MAIL commitment and engagement was uneven, which affected implementation, e.g.: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ MAIL was supposed to host an ANHDO office, but took a long time to offer a plot of land, and the plot offered was unsuitable, it did not have the necessary infrastructure and was in an insecure location. ○ The TA and staff trained by the project who were in the process of identifying TA needs were side-lined and MAIL was as a result unable to articulate and justify to EU the TA needs for the transition process. 	<p>Final Evaluation, 2015</p>	<p>Strong – <i>external view at project completion</i></p>
<p>P-ARBP (Panj – Amu River Basin Programme):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● P-ARBP I comprised a combination of a service agreement with and international consulting firm for project management and TA, service contracts with NGOs for community mobilisation and group formation, and works contracts with Afghan companies for infrastructure construction. ● P-ARBP II is a contribution agreement with ADB, who in turn is responsible for contracting implementing partners. ● The P-ARBP I team engaged proactively in lobbying for the resolution of the mandate ambiguity and the promotion of an agreement between MEW and MAIL. ● The steering committee was not very effective due to the mandate issues between MEW and MAIL, this has in turn affected the strategic direction given to the project. ● The P-ARBP I TA team made technically appropriate decisions, when tackling issues and delays in infrastructure projects. ● The P-ARBP I TA was adequately supervising works and overall programme management was good. ● The management setup was not entirely sufficient for magnitude for the project, incl. the large number of construction contracts. ● Security issues caused delays, but did not have a significant impact on programme delivery, implementation was in general timely. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● External Evaluation, 2016 ● Evaluation and Future Elaboration of the Water Sub-Sector Strategy Development, 2011 ● Interviews 016, 020 ● 7th progress report, Oct 2012-Mar 2013 ● ROM 2014: Improvement of Yatim Tepa Irrigation Canal in Lower Panj Sub-Basin ● Interview 016, 020 	<p>Strong – <i>external views and recent information form interviews</i></p> <p>Indicative – <i>limited information and no evaluation at mid-term or completion available</i></p> <p>Indicative – <i>information only available for one case</i></p>

	<p>NABDP (National Area Based Development Programme):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The programme was implemented by UNDP, but under its National Implementation Modality (NIM), where MRRD systems were leading implementation and most procurement was done through GoIRA systems and procedures. However, NABDP was mainly off-budget, on-budget was piloted, but the lengthy process and bureaucracy created challenges. NABDP collaborated closely with communities and local authorities. DDAs identified the projects to be implemented, and projects were increasingly contracted to CDCs/DDAs to enhance participation. DIAG (Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups) was responsible for the natural resources management component, but had significant problems with monitoring and reporting. NABDP staff were recruited as project staff, they were not from the tashkeel. MRRD has only few tashkeel staff and with better salaries, it is more easy to attract qualified staff with project contracts. Moreover, it is more complicated to establish tashkeel positions. NABDP engaged in supporting the development of the micro-hydropower sector to mitigate the insufficient availability of qualified companies. As a mitigation measure regional coordination meetings were held in three regions where partner organisations coordination and also shared information regarding DIAG's projects (form joint field monitoring). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Annual Report, 2010 Interview 017 <p>Final Report for EU, 2013</p>	<p>Indicative – <i>clear information in progress reports, but no external view available on performance and appropriateness of management arrangement</i></p> <p>Indicative – <i>no info available on how private sector was strengthened</i></p>
	<p>Health:</p>		
	<p>Health Sector Support – BPHS, EPHS, (207290, 315426)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> NGO grants for Healthnet International The EU is picked out amongst the main donors to the health sector for the effective management of support provided. The project was managed effectively in a difficult context and was responsive to emerging issues. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> BPHS/EPHS Implementers Comparison Study, 2012 ROM 2010 Interview 202 	<p>Satisfactory – <i>evidence provides insight into management structure</i></p>
	<p>Support to the Ministry of Public Health (287107, 231519)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Service agreements with Epos Health Management GMBH, Agence Europeenne Pour Le Developpement et la Sante SCRL 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ROMs 2007, 2008, 2010 & 2013 Interview 202 	<p>Satisfactory – <i>evidence provides insight into</i></p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Concerns were raised throughout the support to the MoPH about the difficulties in management arrangements, with issues around specific individuals having to take on heavy workloads and frequent delays in implementation. 		<i>management structure</i>
	<p>Child Rights Consortium (167669)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> NGO grant for Terre des Hommes The complexity of the project and the consortium approach to implementation absorbed a great deal of time and energy. While the project activities were delivered effectively, these required considerable management time. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Progress Reports and Final Report, 2009-2013 ROM 2013 Interview 204 	Satisfactory – <i>evidence provides insight into management structure</i>
	D&A:		
	<p>Afghan Subnational Governance Programme (ASGP)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Contribution agreement with UNDP In the initial phase, ASGP was implemented under UNDP's DIM (direct implementation modality) – direct implementation by UNDP. UNDP, as the direct implementer, had legal, financial and quality control over all aspects of the project. sub-national and regional levels. The process ensured government participation at all stages. It moved to NIM (national implementation modality) with implementation done by GoIRA at the recommendation of IDLG. The Project Board sets the overall direction for ASGP. The EUD is a member of the Project Board, which maintains GoIRA ownership over programme activities. The role of the Project Executive Group (PEG) in approving and steering the programmes was clearly defined, but in practice, the role of the PEG was often neglected and marginalised. The Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) took an increasing role in this respect, which side-lined the ASGP implementation team, UNDP, and donors. Programme decisions were undertaken by IDLG. The lack of a single agreed work plan resulted in slower and less effective delivery and delays in identifying issues that needed to be addressed. The reporting produced failed to identify issues sufficiently early to enable mitigation action to be put in place. ASGP adopted a variety of reporting instruments, including weekly, monthly, quarterly and annual reports. The pressure from UNDP on ASGP management to deliver frequent reports diverted effort away from delivering project outputs as capacity and resources within the government for reporting were lacking. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> UNDP, ASGP, Description of the Action, 2008 ASGP Programme Implementation Plan, 2008-2011 Final Evaluation of the ASGP, 2011 Interview 419 	Strong – <i>evidence from multiple sources provides good insight into the management of the project.</i>

	<p>Support to Credible and Transparent Elections- ELECT II</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contribution agreement with UNDP • The default mechanisms for UNDP election support projects is DIM (direct implementation modality). In 2012, ELECT II undertook a hybrid version of NIM (national implementation modality) and DIM, as both on-budget and off-budget. At least \$ 24 M was allocated to The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) for them to administer. Under the broader arrangement, it remains responsible for certain activities, but the funds flowed through the Ministry of Finance. In off-budget NIM, the IEC is responsible for the same activities and the corresponding funds. • IEC staff had siphoned funds under NIM and were implicated in fraud involving money from the project (see I-424, I-713). • Management is based on a three-tier structure involving the Project Board; the ELECT I Technical Working Group and the ELEEECT II donor group: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The Project Board provides the decision-making forum and Steering Committee, involves donors, IEC and UNDP and meets quarterly ○ The Technical Working Group provides the technical discussion forum, comprises donors, IEC, UNDP and UNAMA, and meets monthly or as required. ○ The Donor meeting provides a discussion forum for project related issues between ELECT and its international partners, includes donors, UNDP and UNAMA and meets monthly, or as required. • Operational and reputational issues arose during 2014. The management of these issues, which addressed voter registration, boundary delimitation and the integrity of the IEC, were responsive and proportionate 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNDP Final Evaluation, 2015 • UNDP, Response Letter seeking clarification on ELECT II implementation modality, 2013 • I-713 • I-424 • ELECT 11 Annual Report, 2014 	<p>Satisfactory – <i>evidence from several documents provides insight into management structure</i></p>
	<p>Municipal Governance Support Programme (MGSP)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contribution agreement with UN-Habitat • UN-Habitat is the only organisation involved in direct implementation of the action and provides overall project management. • The Project Steering Committee has overall responsibility for the Project. Members include UN-Habitat, IDLG, the target Municipalities and the EUD. The regularity with which the Committee meets is unclear and was not reported against in the Annual Report. • National management staff comprises a National Project Manager and the target Municipalities Provincial managers. Team leaders lead the day-to-day implementation. 	<p>Annual Report, 2016</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MGSP Grant Application Form, 2014 • ROM 2017 	<p><i>Satisfactory-evidence provides good indication</i></p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Quarterly joint supervision and monitoring field visits including EU and UN-Habitat, municipalities and other partners to supervise and monitor sub-contracted projects were anticipated. There is no evidence that these occurred with EU participation. The ROM found the organizational structure to be fully adequate. MSGP is scaling up implementation to cancel out delays. 		
	<p>Local Governance Project – Afghanistan (LoGo Afghanistan)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Contribution agreement with UNDP The project is nationally implemented by the IDLG. The LoGo project works with institutions under the Subnational Governance and Local Development Programme, including the IDLG, Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Finance and Civil Society. IDLG serves as a main coordinating body and national and provincial levels and facilitates project implementation for provinces. The Provincial Governor leads at the provincial level. The Project Board, comprised of UNDP, IDLG, GoIRA representatives, donors and civil society comprises part of the management structure, and is supported by a Project Management Committee. So far, Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Economy are reported to be absent from Project Board Meetings. There are significant risks with the management capacity based in Kabul. Management is very Kabul-centered. When UNDP could not find competent staff in the province, it subcontracted to AHEAD. AHEAD identified major concerns with the state of partners at the subnational level, but these concerns do not appear to have altered the project plan. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> UNDP, LoGo Project Document, 2015 ROM 2017 	<p><i>Satisfactory</i> – evidence provides good indication</p>
	<p>PRoL:</p>		
	<p>Fight Against Trafficking from/to Afghanistan</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Grant to GIZ The project is coordinated by Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ – now GIZ) and in addition to project management, GTZ was responsible for communication and reporting towards the EC, and communication with external stakeholders. GTZ supported the project partners with administrative, technical, logistical or financial issues. The project was initially implemented under the supervision of a Project Steering Committee consisting of the project partners (the Guardia di Finanza, the BKA, UNODC and INTERPOL). After a slow start to implementation, and as a result of the ROM 2011, ECO-DOCCU was added as a full implementation partner. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Grant Application Form, FaT, 2008 FAT Final Report, 2015 	<p><i>Satisfactory</i> – though based primarily on one source, a final report, evidence provides good indication</p>

I-424	<p>Appropriateness of partner selection: results they have achieved (EQ2), their long-term expertise in the theme/topic covered, and their presence/representation in project areas – assessment of sample projects implemented by different types of partners (e.g. international organisations, NGOs, private contractors, local institutions) and under different types of contract procedures (e.g. when supported with grants, service contracts, contribution agreements, works, supply)</p>		
	<p>Summary: The overall picture is that the partner selected for implementation and TA were generally appropriate. The TA provided by international consulting firms under service contracts was generally of a high quality (although recruitment of qualified experts was at times a challenge due to the security situation in Afghanistan). NGO grant recipients and private contractor were selected through competitive bidding processes, taking their experience into consideration – in the case of Medica Mondiale, the team was also selected on the basis of their presence in the project area. Financial resources were usually managed transparently and efficiently. International partners (firms, NGOs, international organisations) usually managed projects well. There have been management weaknesses in UNDP in relation to the Afghan Subnational Governance Programme (ASGP) and the micro-hydropower component of the NABPD. UNDP projects with LOTFA and ELECT also involved fraud.</p> <p>Some issues were experienced with otherwise well-selected national partners: a) in HPS (Horticulture Private Sector Development Project, ANHDO's board of directors interfered in day-to-day management and procurement rules were not followed, although this issue has since been rectified; and b) in ELECT II (election support), staff of the Independent Election Commission embezzled project funding.</p>		
	<p><u>A&RD:</u></p>		
	<p><u>AHDPII (Animal Health Development Programme II):</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The project was implemented as a service contract with a private company (Landell Mills) – direct management by EUD. • A highly-qualified TA team was provided by the contractor, but the key/long-term international expert positions (and thereby continuity) were affected by staff turnover. 	<p>CRIS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ROM 2014 • Final Report, 2016 	<p>Strong – <i>quantitative data</i> Strong – <i>external view and quantitative information available</i></p>
	<p><u>HPS (Horticulture Private Sector Development Project)/Support to the Development of Agriculture Private Sector: Perennial Horticulture:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The project was implemented as a grant for a national NGO (ANHDO) – direct management by EUD. • The grant/project aimed at both a) enhancing the project management capacity of ANHDO, and b) promoting its role as interlocutor between the public and private sectors. Hence, ANHDO had a dual role as contractor for project implementation and as key actor/stakeholder in the horticulture sector. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CRIS • Mid-Term Evaluation, 2015 • PHDP II Final Evaluation, 2015 • Interview 013 	<p>Strong – <i>quantitative data</i> Satisfactory – <i>independent views and updated info from interview</i></p>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Governance issues in the ANHDO Board of Directors and unclear organisational structure affected project implementation, i.e.: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Procurement rules were not followed in relation to administrative costs. ANDHO in response to this and other issues revised their bylaws (see I-713) ○ The Board interfered in day-to-day project management, but measures were eventually taken and the issue was solved (see I-713) 		
<p>PHDP II (Support to Afghan Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation & Livestock to Contribute to Strengthen the Planting Material and Horticulture Industry):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The project was implemented as a service contract with a private company (Agriconsulting SPA) – direct management by EUD. • The project was well managed by the contractor/TA. Resources were managed transparently. The use of funds and technical expertise was efficient (e.g. compared to PHDP I) and produced the planned outputs. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CRIS • Final Evaluation, 2015 	<p>Strong – <i>quantitative data</i> Strong – <i>external view at project completion</i></p>
<p>P-ARBP (Panj – Amu River Basin Programme):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The second phase of P-ARBP was implemented as a financing with an international organization (ADB) – indirect management. • The first phase of P-ARBP was implemented under several contracts: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Service contracts with a private company (Landell Mills) – direct management by EUD. ○ Grants for international NGOs (Afghanaid, Concern Worldwide) – direct management by EUD. ○ Work contracts with Afghan construction companies – direct management by EUD. • The predecessor ARBP (Amu River Basin Programme – 2007-2011), was implemented under similar conditions as P-ARBP phase 1 (service contract with Cardno Agrisystems Ltd./Mott MacDonald). • Overall, the contractor managed P-ARBP I well in a difficult context. • A qualified team was in general in place (see I-423), although to insecurity, recruitment of qualified experts was a challenge. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CRIS • Evaluation and Future Elaboration of the Water Sub-Sector Strategy Development, 2011 • External Evaluation, 2016 • Progress Reports, 2010-2013 • Evaluation and Future Elaboration of the Water Sub- 	<p>Strong – <i>quantitative data</i></p> <p>Satisfactory – External view available. The somewhat <i>limited information in reports has been supplemented and</i></p>

		Sector Strategy Development, 2011 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews 016, 020 	<i>confirmed by interviews</i>
	NABDP (National Area Based Development Programme): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The project was implemented as a contribution agreement with an international organization (UNDP) – indirect management. EU support was a contribution to a multi-donor (incl. EU MS) project that had started in 2004. EU provided funding from 2008 (the evaluation sample covers support provided in 2010-2013). The micro-hydropower component of NABDP did not deliver the intended results and EU closed the contract. The project was implemented as a grant for an international NGO (Mercy Corps Europe) – direct management by EUD. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CRIS Final Report for EU, 2013 Annual Reports 2004-2011 Final report for EU, 2013 Interview 009 CRIS 	Satisfactory – <i>quantitative data, but the documentation does not capture the issues with the micro-hydropower component</i> Strong – <i>quantitative data</i>
	Health:		
	Health Sector Support – BPHS, EPHS, (207290, 315426) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Support to the BPHS and EPHS between 2007-2014 was implemented through direct contracting with NGOs – direct management by EUD. The selection of partners was made, and continues to be made, through a regular bidding process, against a clear delivery framework. The contracts of some partners were extended in response to their performance. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> BPHS/EPHS Implementers Comparison Study, 2012 ROM 2009 Interview 202 	Satisfactory – <i>evidence provides insight into management structure</i>
	Support to the Ministry of Public Health (287107, 231519) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Support to the MOPH between 2007-2014 was provided through service agreements with Epos Health Management GMBH, Agence Europeenne Pour Le Developpement et la Sante SCRL – direct management by EUD. The assessments made generally find that the partners were effective in delivering their outputs, despite problems in recruiting and maintaining both international and national consultants. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ROMs 2007, 2008, 2010 & 2013 Interview 202 	Satisfactory – <i>evidence provides insight into management structure</i>
	Child Rights Consortium (167669) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The project was implemented as a grant contract by a consortium of three NGOs – indirect management. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Progress Reports and Final Report, 2009-2013 ROM 2013 Interview 204 	Satisfactory – <i>evidence provides insight into management structure</i>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The consortium bid for the project on the basis of their experience and presence in the region and the area of work. While there were some tensions between the partners, the project was effectively delivered. 		
	<p>Medica Mondiale (169593)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The project was implemented as a grant contract by an international NGO, working in partnership with a local NGO – direct management by EUD. The partners bid for the project on the basis of their experience and presence in the region and the area of work. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Progress Reports and Final Report, 2009-2013 Interview 206 	Satisfactory – <i>evidence provides insight into management structure</i>
	D&A:		
	<p>Afghan Subnational Governance Programme (ASGP)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The project was implemented as a contribution agreement with an international organization (UNDP), indirect management. UNDP was found to be weak in relation to management of ASGP. Criticisms included micro management; reactive and ever changing priorities; over-emphasis on centralised and delayed decision making; inability to hire staff; and delayed procurement and complicate procedures. The UNDP lacked clear, consistent and supportive direction. The ASGP programme suffered from poor programme and project design and implementation, frequent leadership changes, failure to adhere to the agreed programme governance structure and design. The partnership arrangements were fraught with difficulties and it was not possible to quantify the tangible contributions of the IDLG other than the appointment of Letter of Authority staff, and to social policy documentation and enabling legislation. IDGL came to lead the partnership as a senior partner, in line with the shift from direct implementation by UNDP to national implementation by GoIRA. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Final Evaluation of ASGP 	Strong – <i>although based on one source, the review detailed acceptable evidence of the quality of UNDP management under the ASGP</i>
	<p>IEU-EAT Afghanistan 2010 Parliamentary Elections</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The project was implemented as a service with a private company (ICON-INSTITUT PUBLIC SECTOR GMBH) – direct management by EUD. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CRIS 	Indicative – <i>no information available on the performance of the partner</i>
	<p>Support to Credible and Transparent Elections- ELECT II</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The project was implemented as a contribution agreement with an international organization (UNDP) – indirect management. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> UNDP, Response Letter seeking clarification on ELECT II 	Satisfactory - <i>based on multiple sources of information though</i>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNDP has strong global expertise in elections support, and is the only partner available in Afghanistan for the provision of electoral assistance on a scale in line with the EU's strategy. • The design required partnerships with the Independent Election Commission (IEC). • The IEC was the implementing partner. Under the NIM as both on- and off-budget support. • IEC staff had siphoned funds and were implicated in fraud involving money from the project. (I-423, I-713) • Oversight and control mechanisms were established around the operational aspects of the IEC by ELECT II. UNDP has annual internal audits of ELECT II conducted by the UNDP Office of Audit and Investigation. • As the national body responsible for election, the IEC was an indispensable partner. Its staff included people with technical expertise but oversight was the responsibility of people who appear to have prioritised partisan concerns over their technical responsibilities. 	<p>implementation modality, 2013</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNDP, ELECT II Revised Project Document, 2013 • UNDP ELECT II Evaluation, 2015 • I-713, I-423 • Action Fiche Elections, 2013 • Annex 1 to Financing Agreement 037-322, technical and Administrative Provisions • Interview 402 	<p><i>an external view is lacking</i></p>
	<p>Municipal Governance Support Programme (MGSP)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The project was implemented as a contribution agreement with an international organisation (UN-Habitat) — indirect management. • Despite delays and an underspent budget, the quality of Habitat's work appears to be high. Habitat has a reputation of being community-oriented and delivering in the field. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CRIS • MGSP Annual Report, 2016 • ROM 2017 • Interview 419 	<p><i>Strong – based on multiple sources of information</i></p>
	<p>Local Governance Project- Afghanistan (LoGo Afghanistan)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The project was implemented as a contribution agreement with an international organization (UNDP) under the National Implementation Modality. • The project is implemented by the Independent Directorate for Local Governance IDLG. The transition to a national implementation appears to have increased government ownership of the project. • IDLG is described as a very engaged partner. However, phenomenal capacity problems remain and have been documented. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNDP Project Document LoGO, 2015 • Final Evaluation of the ASGP, 2011 • ROM 2017 • Interview 403 	<p><i>Strong – based on multiple sources of information</i></p>

	PRoL:		
	Fight Against Trafficking from/to Afghanistan <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The project was implemented as a grant to an EU MS bilateral institution (GTZ, now GIZ) — direct management. Partner institutions included the German Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI), Federal Foreign Office (AA); Bundeskriminalamt (BKA); Italian Guardia di Finanza (GdF); United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL). The project was initially implemented under the supervision of a Project Steering Committee consisting of the project partners (the Guardia di Finanza, the BKA, UNODC and INTERPOL). After a slow start to implementation, and as a result of the ROM 2011, ECO-DOCCU was added as a full implementation partner and lead of Component 1. An external MTR notes that ECO-DOCCU lacked the appropriate recognition acceptance as a key actor in the region. However, the change appears to have resulted in successful implementation of activities. The project was extended for one year to assure project implementation and ending. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CRIS Grant Application Form, FaT, 2008 MTR FaT, 2013 FaT Final Report, 2015 	<i>Satisfactory</i> – Reports gave a good indication but an external view is lacking
JC-43	Has the use of trust funds been appropriate and a conducive modality?		
I-431	Implementation timeliness of ARTF and LOTFA approval procedures and implementation of sample projects		
	<p>Summary: ARTF and LOTFA are large trust funds financing several programmes, and in the case of ARTF across several sectors, incl. the three EU focal sectors. As such, there is difference in the performance and timeliness between funded programmes, between locations, and between years. Nonetheless, the overall timeliness of the ARTF programmes co-funded by EU has mostly been good, such as AREDP, MISFA, NSP, NRAP, and SEHAT. However, some internal factors have caused delays, i.e. cumbersome procurement processes, major delays in disbursements of CDC block grants from Ministry of Finance (MoF) under NSP and delays in payment of contractors under NRAP. Similarly, LOTFA implementation has been negatively affected by weaknesses in GoIRA and MOIA administration, but the payment of ANP salaries was timely. External factors have also caused delays in ARTF and LOTFA programme implementation, i.e. insecurity and bad weather (e.g. heavy snowfall) – factors, which affect all programmes in Afghanistan.</p>		
	ARTF (Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund):		

- | | | |
|---|--|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Overall, performance and progress of ARTF and the programmes it funds has been satisfactory, albeit with variation among the programmes as well as from year to year. Good results have been achieved, e.g. in relation to public finance management, health, education. Examples: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ AREDP: Savings groups' sub-component performed well in 2010 but SME development component performed poorly. Overall, AREDP achieved good results. AREDP had low disbursement rates due to design shortcomings, but after the TMR it was restructured and gained momentum. ○ MISFA achieved good results (2008). ○ NSP performance was generally satisfactory (2015) and good results achieved (2008, 2012). ARTF grant disbursements for NSP have remained consistently high (93%) (2015). However, there were significant backlogs of uncompleted work from NSP I and NSP II that was transferred to NSP III (2012). | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ARTF External Review, 2012 • ARTF External Review, 2008 • ARTF, Annual Report 1392, 2013 • ARTF, Aide Memoire, Implementation Support Mission, 2011 • Synthesis report, World Bank Implementation Support Mission (NSP, AREDP), 2011 • Interview 019 • ARTF External Review, 2012 • ARTF External Review, 2008 • World Bank, NSP Implementation Status and Results Report, 2015 • NSP Quarterly Progress Reports 1391, 2012 | <p>Strong – evidence provided by multiple sources, incl. independent views</p> <p>Strong – evidence provided by multiple sources, incl. independent views</p> |
|---|--|---|

- NRAP delivery has in some years been on target but in other years below target (2011) – in 2012 the progress was moderately satisfactory. The NERAP programme under NRAP was far behind targets (2011) and the closing date end 2010 was extended. But NRAP performance was satisfactory and targets met in 2011 and moderately satisfactory in 2013. Overall, NRAP has generally met, and in recent years often exceeded, its targets.

Health Sector Support – from 2014 SEHAT (318785, 369067)

- During the transition period (2011-2014), disbursements were maintained effectively
- The SEHAT project continues to disburse fairly quickly, with delays in some components made up for with timeliness in others.
- Implementation progress has been affected by some external factors which have caused delays or cancelled activities, such as:
 - Insecurity
 - Weather (long winter, heavy snowfall, rains)

- NRAP Mid-term Review, 2012
- NRAP 2nd and 3rd Quarterly Progress Reports 1390, 2011
- NRAP Annual Report 1394, 2015-2016
- NRAP Annual Report 1389, 2010-2011
- NRAP 2nd and 3rd and 4th Quarterly Progress Report 1388, 2009-2010
- ARTF, Annual Report 1392, 2013
- ARTF, Aide Memoire, Implementation Support Mission, 2011
- Interview 022
- EAMRs, 2011-2014
- SEHAT MTR, 2016
- NRAP 2nd and 3rd Quarterly Progress Reports 1390, 2011
- NRAP 2nd and 3rd and 4th Quarterly Progress Report 1388, 2009-2010

Strong – evidence provided by multiple sources

Strong – insecurity and harsh weather are well known factors in Afghanistan

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Some internal factors have also affecting implementation and caused delays, such as: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cumbersome procurement processes delaying disbursements. Delays in payments has been the main complaint made by NGOs implementing the BPHS. Major delays in disbursements of CDC block grants from Ministry of Finance (MoF) under NSP (2012) Delays in payment of contractor bills under NRAP (2011) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> NSP Quarterly Progress Reports 1391, 2012 ARTF, Mid-year Report: December 22, 2013 to June 21, 2014 NSP Quarterly Progress Reports 1391, 2012 NRAP 2nd and 3rd Quarterly Progress Reports 1390, 2011 Interviews 202, 208, 211 	<p><i>Strong – evidence provided by a number of sources</i></p>
	<p>Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> LOTFA is not really a trust fund. It is more like a basket election fund, in this case allowing donors to use ODA money to fulfil their pledges regarding security force sustainment in Afghanistan. The primary focus of LOTFA budgeting was directed towards police remuneration. Progress in the achievement of this output was made in a timely fashion with payments occurring to schedule, and in the adoption of electronic payment mechanisms. Under Phase V, LOTFA had attained 99.4% coverage of police under the Electronic Payroll System (EPS), with Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) mechanisms reaching 80% penetration. GoIRA is making slow progress in assuming responsibility for the payment of uniformed police and corrections officers. APPS is reported to be coming online but lack of capacity remains a significant challenge. Political issues remain unresolved, creating blockages preventing reform in civil service development. Donors and UNDP have not managed the financing of LOTFA well. At the end of 2016, LOTFA had a residual \$400-600 million. This is enough to provide police salaries in 2017 and still have several hundred million left, even before donors provide their 2017 contributions. Progress concerning the number of female recruits was also timely. However, while the number of recruits exceeded target— 482 new female recruits were identified 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evaluation of LOTFA Phase V, 2012 LOTFA Annual Progress Report, 2014 LOTFA Annual Report, 2012 LOTFA Quarter 2 Report, 2009 Evaluation of LOTFA Phase V, 2012 EU LOTFA Incentive Contribution Letter, 2016 EU LOTFA Incentive Final Evaluation Report Interview 401 	<p><i>Satisfactory— multiple sources including external views</i></p>

	<p>against a target of 209 — there was a loss of 172 arising from attrition. While the approach demonstrated timeliness, it perhaps was not adequate for sustainable growth.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Delays arose under LOTFA Phase V regarding the payment of salaries for Central Prison Directorate (CPD) staff. Delays in the provision of funds required for salary transfers arose largely because of issues within the GoIRA, including the earmarked status for salary remuneration of uniformed CPD personnel. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> No progress was made on two targets (no.1 – establishment of interlinkage of EPS, AHRIMS and Tashkil, and no.2 – follow up to recommendations of Mol report concerning police cooperation) despite a one-year extension of the deadline for implementation. 		
<p>I-432</p>	<p>Strength of results monitoring carried out by the ARTF and LOTFA management units</p>		
	<p>Summary: The monitoring of both LOTFA and ARTF was generally more focused on activities and outputs, while outcome and impact monitoring has been scarcer, e.g. for the A&RD and D&A sectors – while outcome tracking was done consistently in the Health sector under ARTF, e.g. with the development of Health Sector reporting with balance scorecard reporting based on health survey data. Progress is reported on at the overall country and sectoral level, vis-à-vis social, economic and GoIRA capacity indicators but the direct link to ARTF and its projects is not made. Monitoring and data access constrained by insecurity. Nonetheless, in recent years some selected programme-specific outcome and impact indicators are reported on, e.g. for NSP.</p>		
	<p>ARTF (Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ARTF outputs are presented in the progress reports for both ARTF overall and for ARTF funded programmes. However, quantitative data is provided for outputs but generally not for outcomes and impact. Progress reports present a few impact case studies. Outcome tracking is only done consistently for the health sector. The third-party monitoring of NSP is output oriented. In recent years, some selected programme-specific outcome and impact indicators are reported on by the World Bank, e.g. for NSP. An external impact evaluation of NSP was carried out, but the methodology was questioned and results were rejected. So the World Bank carried out a Peer Review of the report. Progress is reported on at the overall country and sectoral level, vis-à-vis social, economic and GoIRA capacity indicators – but the direct link to ARTF and its projects is not specifically made. It is difficult for donors to track how their funds were spent. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ARTF External Review, 2012 ARTF External Review, 2008 ARTF, Mid-year Report: December 22, 2013 to June 21, 2014 ARTF, Annual Report 1392, 2013 ARTF Progressive Report, Jun-Sept 2012 World Bank, NSP Implementation 	<p>Strong – <i>evidence provided by multiple sources, incl. independent views</i></p>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Monitoring and supervision is difficult and data access constrained due to insecurity. This is to some extent mitigated through the use of contracting third parties (the ARTF Monitoring/Supervisory Agent), and communities (NSP's Community Participatory Monitoring) for monitoring. ARTF is relying on national partners for monitoring. Country Portfolio Performance Reviews (CPPRs) have been carried out annually since 2012. The Research and Analysis Program (RAP) was established in 2013; among its tasks is to carry out selected impact evaluations and sector reviews. <p>• <u>Health Sector Support –from 2014 SEHAT (318785, 369067):</u></p>	<p>Status and Results Report, 2015</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> NSP Quarterly Progress Reports 1391, 2012 NRAP 2nd and 3rd Quarterly Progress Reports 1390, 2011 NRAP 2nd and 3rd and 4th Quarterly Progress Report 1388, 2009-2010 NRAP Annual Report 1394, 2015-2016 NRAP Annual Report 1389, 2010-2011 ARTF, Annual Report 1392, 2013 ARTF, Mid-year Report: December 22, 2013 to June 21, 2014 ARTF Progressive Report, Jun-Sept 2012 Interview 005 NSP Quarterly Progress Reports 1391, 2012 CIDA Evaluation, 2015 Interviews 009, 021 	<p><i>Strong – evidence provided by multiple sources</i></p>
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	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The development of health sector reporting includes strengthened results monitoring, including: Balanced Scorecard Reporting, carried out by an external partner, looking at key outcomes; and, health survey data used to record results. ○ The coordinated approach to support, through the SEHAT project, has provided a clear monitoring framework, which is used effectively in regular reporting and in the mid-term review. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● <u>Support to the National Priority Programmes on ‘Efficient and Effective Governance’ and ‘Justice for All’:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Reporting on progress was reflected in the ARTF scorecards, which included Outcome indicators and associated baselines and progress. ○ There is no indication of outcome indicators being monitored. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Evaluation of the Current Health Sector Support Programme, 2012 ● SEHAT MTR, 2016 ● Interviews 202, 208, 211 ● ARTF Scorecard, 2014, 2015 ● Appendix 1, LogFrame, 2011 	<p>Indicative – <i>no progress reports are available at the programme level, only Fund level</i></p>
	<p>LOTFA:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Results monitoring of LOTFA programming was carried out through Annual Reports and Monthly Reports. Overall, monitoring was detailed and provided justification where progress was not advanced. There is a strong contrast between the detailed reporting on quantitative achievements on outputs like payroll and more limited qualitative information, such as commentary provided on achievements and roadblocks in actual reform. For example, where qualitative results were collected concerning the number of training sessions associated with building management capacity within the MOI, there were no corresponding results collected for the quality of training. The last 1.5 years have seen a slow shift towards more qualitative insights. ● The EU Final Evaluation found that no progress was made on two targets (no.1 – establishment of interlinkage of EPS, AHRIMS and Tashkil, and no.2 – follow up to recommendations of Mol report concerning police cooperation). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● LOTFA, Annex 1, 2015 ● Annual Progress Report 2012 ● Annual Progress Report 2011 ● 1 Quarter Report 2012 ● 2 Quarter Report 2012 ● EU LOTFA Incentive Final Evaluation Report ● Interview 401 	<p>Satisfactory – multiple sources of evidence</p>

<p>I-433</p>	<p>ARTF and LOTFA management arrangements and their responsiveness to needs and emerging issues</p>		
<p>Summary: Overall, ARTF management arrangements have performed well. Both GoIRA and donors are committed to ARTF, and ARTF has a central role in the delivery of on-budget support and high-level GoIRA-donor agreements – the use of national systems for delivery is a key factor behind this. Overhead/transaction costs are low, financial control mechanisms are in place, and transparency and accountability high. However, the use of GoIRA systems also comes at a cost; cumbersome procedures and capacity constraints have created delays (see I-631). The use of contractors, e.g. for technical inputs, has generally worked well. ARTF has shown a good degree of flexibility to adapt to changes, to respond to GoIRA requests, and to enhance efficiency and effectiveness; procedures have been adapted and simplified and support mechanisms established (e.g. the Operation and Maintenance Facility in 2011). Overall, the World Bank has been an effective fund manager. However, the donor involvement has not always been fully sufficient – on the other hand, the “preferencing” by donors, to some extent incl. EU, (see JC61) is undermining the trust fund principle, and enhancing rigidity/reducing flexibility. But at the same time the preferencing enables the EU support to be aligned with the MIP (Medium-term Implementation Programme).</p> <p>LOTFA is a basket fund rather than a trust fund. It has pushed money through MOI’s payroll system but has had minimal relevance to strategies for police capacity-building or policing reform. LOTFA has also shown flexibility to adapt to the context and GoIRA request, e.g. with its governance structure being changed in 2014 in response to instructions from President Ghani to accelerate the transfer of payroll functions to MOI. The compliance and effectiveness of LOTFA has been strengthened over the years. However, LOTFA has performed less well than ARTF; it has been unable to attain a multi-year planning framework, donor-commitment is not as strong as for ARTF, and there have been weaknesses in UNDP’s management. The primary example of this was the large-scale fraud detected in the Fund in 2012. LOTFA’s external audit processes reportedly did not detect the fraud (see EQ7). A further example is the residual \$400-600 million left in LOTFA in 2016 without any agreement on new activities. Further, there has been criticism concerning the political passivity of the fund, which limits its capacity to be effective when addressing rising insecurity, and instead requires close and active management (see EQ7).</p>			
<p>ARTF (Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund) – managed by the World Bank:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Overall, the ARTF management arrangements are performing well, and there is commitment from both GoIRA and donors. • ARTF is central instrument for the delivery of the 2010 London and Kabul Conferences agreement to provide 50% of donor support on-budget. • Overhead/transaction costs are low. • Transparency and accountability is high at the level of outcome reporting and Steering Committee accessibility. • Financial control mechanisms are in place and funds generally used for their intended purpose. Audit report results have improved over time and are usually unqualified 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ARTF External Review, 2012 • ARTF Progressive Report, Jun-Sept 2012 • ARTF Annual Report 1389: March 2010 – March 2, 2011 	<p>Strong – <i>evidence provided by multiple sources</i></p>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Numerous project inspections are carried by the Supervisory Agent to monitor progress and carry out quality control of physical infrastructure projects. 979 inspections were carried out in the first quarter of 1392 (2013) – 240 were for NSP and 120 for NRAP. • A central feature of ARTF is that national systems are used for delivery: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ This has ensured GoIRA ownership and ministry leadership ○ The use of government systems and procedures have also created delays (see I-432) ○ Some ARTF projects have insufficient staff capacity ○ ARTF's and the ARTF-funded programmes' steering committees are typically chaired by the Ministry of Finance, where the programmes are executed by the relevant line ministries, e.g. NRAP is executed by MRRD and the Ministry of Public Works, NSP is executed by MRRD. ○ Sub-projects (e.g. under NRAP) are initiated upon community request. ○ However, MAIL finds that the NHLP programme (EU funded through FARM) is operating "like a kingdom inside a kingdom" with insufficient involvement of, and information given to, the MAIL Directorates and insufficient coordination with other projects, incl. other EU supported projects. • Contractors are used for technical input and for construction: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Contracts have provided valuable technical services, e.g. the Monitoring/Supervisory Agent has provided capacity development and verification services. ○ However, when the NSP financial agent decided not to accept a new contract, difficulties finding a replacement resulted in a freeze of the float accounts in 2012, which significantly impacted NSP budget execution. ○ Sub-projects (e.g. under NRAP) are contracted with private firms (larger and more complex works) or with communities (small gravel roads). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NSP III, Integrated Safeguards Data Sheet, 2015 • ARTF Annual Report 1389: March 2010 – March 2, 2011 • ARTF, Annual Report 1392, 2013 • CIDA Evaluation, 2015 • ARTF External Review, 2012 • NRAP Annual Report 1394, 2015-2016 • NRAP Annual Report 1389, 2010-2011 • NRAP 2nd and 3rd Quarterly Progress Reports 1390, 2011 • Interviews 022, 026 • ARTF External Review, 2012 • NRAP Annual Report 1394, 2015-2016 • NRAP Annual Report 1389, 2010-2011 • Interview 022 	<p>Satisfactory – <i>quantitative evidence available, but only for one quarter in 2013</i> Strong – <i>evidence provided by multiple sources</i></p> <p>Strong – <i>evidence provided by a couple of sources incl and external view</i></p>
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<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ For NRAP, UNOPS was until 2015 engaged as implementation consultant providing technical support to the executing ministries. This function is now handled by MRRD, since its capacity has increased. • The World Bank is an effective fund manager with strong systems and high fiduciary standards in place. The World Bank has been pillar assessed and EU does not interfere in the procurement and monitoring. • The World Bank and its links with IDA has provided economies of scale, but some donors were previously concerned that ARTF funding decisions were driven too much by IDA choices, but this may also be due to the fact that it was easier for GoIRA to put forward ANDF activities that have already once been vetted by the World Bank for IDA funding. However, the ARTF funding is much larger than the IDA funding, and it does not seem major issue anymore. • Donor commitment to ARTF is high and donors are now quite active, but there was previously a need for a more proactive donor engagement (2012). • The donors' influence/voice in ARTF is limited compared to other trust funds. On one hand, donors find that it can be difficult to obtain information from the World Bank, but at the same time it is acknowledged that the World Bank seeks to engage donors in strategic discussions. The World Bank encourages donors to focus on strategic issues and leave technical details to the World Bank's technical teams. Another issue is that the ARTF donors are not always adequately coordinated and do not always have a common position. • The "preferencing" by donors, to some extent incl EU, (see JC61) of a significant proportion of the funding is undermining the trust fund principle, and enhancing rigidity/reducing flexibility but at the same time it allows the EU support to be aligned with the MIP (Medium-term Implementation Programme). • ARTF has shown a good degree of flexibility to adapt to changes and to respond to GoIRA requests. Several changes have been made over the years to enhance efficiency and effectiveness. Examples include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Increased use of project preparation funding under IDA and ARTF – ensuring project readiness by the time of approval and enhanced performance in the first year 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interviews 005, 009, 025 • ARTF External Review, 2012 • ARTF External Review, 2012 • ARTF External Review, 2008 • Interviews 009, 011, 027 • ARTF External Review, 2008 • ARTF, Mid-year Report: December 22, 2013 to June 21, 2014 	<p><i>Strong – evidence provided by a couple of sources incl and external view – and World Bank capacities are widely known globally</i></p> <p><i>Strong – external view and confirmed by interviews</i></p> <p><i>Strong – tangible examples of responsive changes found in different documents</i></p>
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	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The Ministry of Finance assumes overall responsibility for the project, implemented jointly with the IARCSC. ○ EU support is provided through preferenced contributions to the ARTF-funded Capacity building for Results Facility (CBR), and the Justice Service Delivery Project. (JSDP) Direct centralised managed for service related contracts. ○ The EU is part of the Steering Committee or Board of Donors for each programme. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Finance Agreement, 2011 • CRIS 	<p>Strong – <i>quantitative data</i></p>
	<p>LOTFA – Managed by UNDP:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • LOTFA allows earmarked bilateral contributions by donors to the extent that funding is in accordance with the requirements of the National Budget, provided it is agreed to in conjunction with the MOI and MOF. The key beneficiaries of LOTFA are the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and the Afghanistan National Police (ANP), which is administered by LOTFA. • Activities are delivered under the UNDP national implementation modality (NIM) and GoIRA retains responsibility. LOTFA has the following structural features: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ A Steering Committee – provides overall leadership; engages the executive stakeholders in the Fund and provides a quarterly review and management oversight mechanism ○ The Implementing Agency is the MOI, supported by a Management Support Unit (MSU), responsible for implementing LOTFA’s components. The Implementing Agency is responsible for coordinating with other government and donor interventions and drawing in Implementing Partners. ○ The fund manager (UNDP), responsible for managing the flow of funds from UN accounts to the MOF via the MSU. UNDP’s role is primarily focused on the stakeholder coordination and liaison, reviewing work plans and reports and monitoring of expenditures. • The governance structure for LOTFA was changed in December 2014. President Ghani instructed UNDP to accelerate a transition of the payroll functions to GoIRA and to develop national capacity for its efficient and accountable management. The Ten Year Vision for the delivery of citizen security and maintenance of rule of law by MOI and police challenge UNDP to improve its development partnership with GoIRA. The Support to Payroll Management Project provides for the transition of payroll management functions to MOI by December 2016. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluation of LOTFA, Phase V, 2012 • LOTFA Phase VII Annex 1, Terms of Reference, 2015 • LOTFA Phase VII, Annex 1, 2015 • JC72 • Organisational Capacity Assessment MOIA, Recommendations Design LOTFA VII, 2014 • I-723 	<p>Indicative – <i>evidence gives a good indication of management arrangements, but it is unclear the capacity of LOTFA to respond to emerging issues, such as the fraudulent activity</i></p>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The alignment with the national structure, fulfilment of on-budget commitments and national implementation are key for GoIRA leadership and increased financial responsibility. Ambiguities in the execution and compliance with the fund management modality have affected this in the past. • LOTFA has been weaker than ARTF as an implementing and governance mechanism. Donors have been less committed to LOTFA as “the” central pool for their support on these topics and UNDP’s management has proven weak in some circumstances, principally regarding the persistent fraudulent activities within the fund, identified in 2012. Further, LOTFA has been criticised as being politically passive and therefore unlikely to be able to tackle the real issues underpinning insecurity, or to improve rule of law. To address the issues required close and active management. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ There were suggestions that the fund struggled to grasp the broader political issues underpinning insecurity and instead focused on the technical issue of administrating the police force. In particular the inability to develop a multi-year planning framework due to the short-term funding horizons of donors, the limited interventions in institutional capacity building and inadequate measures to address corruption in the sector were significant constraints ○ However, in contrast to the level of ARTF engagement and reporting, donors have been more heavily involved in the details of issues that LOTFA deals with – the “trust” in trust fund has been lower in LOTFA than ARTF, so donors have more engagement in its issues, compared with the reliance on ARTF high-level reporting on programmes and challenges. (see I-723) • UNDP and LOTFA have been working on strengthening compliance and effectiveness of LOTFA as a funding mechanism, particularly since the 2012 LOTFA management review and the detection of fraudulent activity in the fund. • In 2016, donors could not agree whether the government had fulfilled the criteria agreed to allow LOTFA to be transitioned fully to government systems. Extended debate led to an extension of the deadline for transition. • UNDP has global experience and Afghanistan-specific experience of rule of law projects and trust arrangements for managing payroll. Deficiencies in the team were demonstrated by large-scale fraud. There is no evidence of strong engagement by the EU to influence personnel once specific deficiencies were identified, or as part of an effort to match UNDP human resources to the evolution of LOTFA and its increasing focus on activities other than payments processing. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluation of DANIDA’s Afghanistan Programme, 2012 • I-723 • CRIS • Explanatory note to DCI-ASIE/2014/345-056 	<p>Satisfactory — <i>evidence is from an external evaluation,</i></p> <p>Satisfactory – <i>good insight into discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of UNDP as a partner</i></p>
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<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNDP was put under scrutiny by the GoIRA and main LOTFA donors in 2014, and its performance re-evaluated. In April 2015, the GoIRA signalled it would accept the UNDP to remain in place for a further 18 months. One view is that UNDP’s capacity is an ongoing issue but no other actor was available/willing to take manage LOTFA. Given there is too much money in LOTFA, UNDP has been open to the idea of donors taking their money back. It has also presented plans to transform LOTFA into a “real” trust fund with the ability to formulate projects relevant to the security and/or justice sector more broadly. Neither has happened and this debate is ongoing. • LOTFA has sought to cover GoIRA’s police related costs, particularly in relation to recurrent costs. LOTFA has made some notable successes in ensuring an effective mechanism is in place for the reliable payment of salaries. • LOTFA has struggled to operate as a “real” trust fund in the sense of using longer-term time horizons and generating buy-in from national stakeholders. This was demonstrated by some of the persistent challenges in implementation: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The inability to attain a multi-year planning framework due to the short-term funding horizon of donors. ○ The preference of donors to focus on bilateral measures at the expense of multilateral initiatives within the sector, which divided support and funding mechanisms away from LOTFA. It was suggested that donors may resist harmonisation to maintain greater control of security-related interventions, given the wider political requirement to meet the demands of their own domestic constituencies regarding interventions in Afghanistan. ○ A lack of consensus on the strategic aspects of policing and police management and administration limit opportunities to deliver major reforms. ○ internal factors including fraudulent activity (detected in 2012); and dissonance between the narrow scope of UNDP’s role as fund administrator as listed in the Funds’ TOR, and the role listed in other management documents. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interview 423 • Evaluation of LOTFA, 2012 • Annual Progress Report 2012 • Annual Progress Report 2011 • 1 Quarter Report 2012 • 2 Quarter Report 2012 • DANIDA Evaluation of Afghanistan Programming, 2012 	<p>Indicative – <i>it is unclear the capacity of LOTFA to respond to the issue of overfunding</i></p> <p>Strong — <i>supported by annual reports and programme evaluations.</i></p> <p>Satisfactory — <i>evidence is from an external evaluation</i></p>
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	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The sustainability of the payroll management will be affected in the longer term by weaknesses in the GoIRA and MOIA public administration. The EU and UNDP have conducted micro-capacity assessments and technical needs assessments on MOIA departments supporting key public administration functions to inform subsequent institutional development under LOTFA. MOIA financial management is an intrinsic part of the Ministry of Finance road map for public financial management. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> LOTFA Annual Progress Report, 2014 LOTFA Annual Report, 2012 LOTFA Quarter 2 Report, 2009 	Indicative – <i>it is too soon to assess responsiveness</i>
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EQ5. To what extent has the EU contributed to gender equality and women’s empowerment in the four focal sectors governance, rule of law, health and agriculture / rural development?

JC-51	EU support has contributed to enhanced inclusion of GEWE in Afghan sector policies and legislation for governance, rule of law, health, and agriculture and rural development		
	Indicators	Sources of information	Quality of evidence
I-511	EU is proactively promoting GEWE in bilateral and multilateral policy dialogue with GoIRA in the four focal sectors		
	<p>Summary: Serious efforts at promoting gender equality and women’s empowerment (GEWE) in policy dialogue were only begun in 2015. There are references to a focus on women’s rights in the human rights dialogue in 2014 and 2015, although there is no detail on what this focus included. Whilst there has been a practical focus on gender in some sectors, such as support to the health sector, only the Joint Health Sector Review of 2015 makes a clear reference to the need for a strengthened focus in the support to the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH), with some evidence in the follow up programme with the submission of a gender mainstreaming proposal. In other sectors there is more of a mixed picture.</p>		
	<p>General</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The most recent delegation management reports refer to human rights dialogue with a focus on women’s rights, but do not include further details. A recent evaluation found that the EU had played an important role in championing women’s rights at the national level through political dialogue around key issues, such as the implementation of the EAW Law and the development of the National Action Plan for. The evaluation found that important elements in the success of the donor approach were a consensus on gender issues, consistent funding and: <i>EU high-level coherent and visible leadership in convening inter-donor dialogue on gender issues backed by strong programmatic gender priorities in development cooperation.</i> Interviews show that efforts have been made by the EUD to take the lead on high level issues, such as the implementation of the EAW Law and the development 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> EAMR, 2014 & 2015 Evaluation of EU Support to GEWE, 2015 Interviews 200, 201, 203, 209, 213, 215 	<p>Strong – <i>perspectives from document review backed up with more detailed evidence from interviews.</i></p>

	<p>of the National Action Plan on UNSR 1325, efforts that are appreciated by other donors. However, in the four sectors there is more mixed evidence, with examples of large programmes, such as SEHAT and NSP, where there was a clear focus on gender issues, and other programmes and projects where less or no attention was given to gender.</p>		
	<p>Agriculture and Rural Development</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The recent Gender Profile, which includes analysis of the role of Afghan women in agriculture, suggests that donor activities aimed at increasing women's economic opportunities have primarily consisted of inclusion of women-specific activities within a larger economic growth or agriculture programmes. These programmes have generally not focused on laws, policies, and institutions that support women's economic empowerment, economic security, and rights The EUD has advocated for GEWE in sector policy dialogue, and participates in the ARTF Gender working group meetings. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Afghanistan Gender Profile, 2016 Interviews 025, 027 	<p>Indicative – few sources available on active GEWE promotion in policy dialogue</p>
	<p>Health</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Afghanistan Joint Health Sector Review, commissioned by the EU, reflects gender issues throughout, including: from the analysis of health status, through understanding how gender affects access to health services, to the inclusion of gender and human rights in the MoPH's governance of the sector and the areas of concern and challenges that need to be faced in going forward, such as the continued need to raise awareness and understanding in the MoPH. The subsequent SEHAT Aide Memoire highlights the fact that the MoPH submitted a Gender Mainstreaming proposal for review in November 2015. However, the SEHAT Mid-term Review in 2016 makes no mention of this proposal. The Afghanistan Gender Profile includes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Afghanistan Joint Health Sector Review, 2015 SEHAT Aide Memoire, 2015 & MTR, 2016 Afghanistan Gender Profile, 2016 Interviews 202, 208, 211, 214 	<p>Strong – perspectives from document review backed up with more detailed evidence from interviews.</p>

	<p>sections on health and violence against women, which include some evidence of the importance of gender in the policy dialogue processes that the donors have taken forward.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews show a more consistent focus on gender in developing approaches, implementation and monitoring. 		
	<p>Policing and Rule of Law, Democracy and Accountability</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> EU strategy from 2014 was directed towards increasing the participation and representation of women in all levels of public office. The evaluation notes that the EU played an active role in addressing gender issues in legislation at the highest level, including advocacy on human rights; implementation of ERAW Law and the National Action Plan for Women (NAPWA); assisting the government in defining a Justice Sector strategy and once approved support the Justice Institutions in implementing it; and engaging with the government to ensure that the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) is functioning independently and with sufficient government funding. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Afghanistan, 2014 Evaluation of EU Support to GEWE, 2015 	<i>Indicative</i> – few sources available on active GEWE promotion in policy dialogue.
I-512	During the evaluation period, GEWE has become better reflected in Afghan legislation and policy development for all four focal sectors		
	<p>Summary: The evidence available shows a mixed picture, with some good progress in sectors such as health, where there has been a consistent focus on gender by donors over a long time frame, and more limited progress in other areas, such as rule of law with changes to legislation and the recruitment of female police officers and rural and economic development, where there have been efforts such as the inclusion of women in Community Development Councils (CDCs) and support to rural entrepreneurs and enterprises with a large proportion of women. The evidence in the Afghanistan Gender Profile provides examples of: areas in the four sectors where donors and government have worked together to ensure that gender issues are included in legislation and policy development; and, of areas in the four sectors where there is a need for more concerted and coordinated efforts to ensure that legislation and policy development better includes GEWE.</p>		
	<p>Agriculture and Rural Development</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> In general, GoIRA and donor activities aimed at increasing women's economic opportunities have 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Afghanistan Gender Profile, 2016 	<i>Indicative</i> – only one source available

	<p>primarily consisted of inclusion of women-specific activities within larger economic growth or agriculture programmes. The main efforts for increasing the focus on GEWE were through ministry-level gender policies and strategies, including the MRRD and MAIL.</p>		
	<p>Health</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There have been considerable efforts to ensure that the focus of national health policy has been on ensuring gender equality in access and utilization of health services, particularly ensuring access to maternal and childcare services. • The main effort for increasing the focus on GEWE in the sector has been the MoPH has a gender strategy (which expired in 2016. However, as is set out in the Joint Health Sector Review: <i>“It is widely accepted that gender barriers to accessing services remain. Perhaps less acknowledged but equally important is that awareness, understanding and proper action are often absent even within the MoPH, its programs and its collaborating services providers. Too often, gender and other inequalities are quickly blamed on “traditions” without giving much thought to the traditions inside the institutions”.</i> • Interview evidence shows that the focus continues to be on ensuring equality in access and utilisation of health services, with efforts continuing to ensure a continued focus on gender equality. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Afghanistan Joint Health Sector Review, 2015 • Afghanistan Gender Profile, 2016 • Interviews 202, 208, 211, 214 	<p><i>Strong – perspectives from document review backed up with more detailed evidence from interviews.</i></p>
	<p>Policing and Rule of Law</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There has been mixed success with development of legislation; while women’s legal status has improved considerably since 2001 with the introduction of laws such as Elimination of Violence against Women 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Final Evaluation of LOTFA, Phase V • Afghanistan Gender Profile, 2016 	<p><i>Indicative – few sources available</i></p>

	<p>(EVAW) law in 2009 and the Anti-Harassment regulation in 2015, there have also been setbacks, such as the introduction of the Shia Personal Status Law.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The main efforts for increasing the focus on GEWE were the development of gender strategies for the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of the Interior. 		
	<p>Democracy and Accountability</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Government policy to increase gender representation in the electoral process appears to have reversed. The 2013 Electoral Law decreased the number of reserved seats for women in Provincial Councils from 25% to 20% which resulted in a reduction from 124 (2009) to 96 (2014). The justification for this reduction is unknown. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ELECT II Report for the European Union Delegation to Afghanistan 2015 	<p><i>Indicative</i> – few sources available</p>
<p>I-513</p>	<p>During the evaluation period, EU support has contributed to increasing the capacity of GoIRA to implement, monitor and evaluate GEWE-relevant policies and legislation in the four focal sectors</p>		
	<p>Summary: Overall, the evidence shows that the efforts made to increase the capacity of government on gender equality have had mixed results. This is, in part, due to a mixed level of commitment shown by government, with some good examples, such as the MRRD and MoPH, where donors have made consistent efforts on gender, and some poor examples where there has been a lack of commitment from the start.</p> <p>While there have been considerable efforts made in the health sector, the recent Health Sector Review suggesting that gender awareness in the MoPH is still very limited, with the need for further support. There are examples where efforts have been made to increase capacity, such as: under the LOTFA programme, the Afghan National Police Women’s Association was formed, along with a Gender Mainstreaming Unit facilitated through donor support; and, the second phase of the Support to Credible and Transparent Elections (ELECT II) programme, prioritized outreach to women to broaden democratic participation in the electoral process.</p> <p>However, while there is evidence of some evidence of practical change in ministries and government agencies that have been supported by donors, it is also clear that there is the need for continued work to implement commitments on gender. While efforts have been made to increase the number of women in the ANP, there is high rate of attrition amongst those who are recruited. Other reverses are noted under for i-512, such as: the introduction of the Shia Personal Status Law; and, the change in the 2013 Electoral Law, decreasing the number of reserved seats for women in Provincial Councils from 25% to 20% which resulted in a reduction from 124 (2009) to 96 (2014).</p>		
	<p>Agriculture and Rural Development</p>		

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The EU co-funded Afghanistan Rural Enterprise Development Program (AREDP) (ARTF funded) has enabled MRRD to develop a network of savings group, which are separated by gender: <i>“By building a program that is mindful of the local socio-cultural landscape; MRRD has been able to ensure equal participation from women in the community”</i>. See I-521, I-522 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Impact of Afghanistan Rural Enterprise Development Program on Rural Women, Study Paper: April 2015 	<p>Strong – <i>a dedicated gender study on AREDP.</i></p>
<p>Health</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> For the sector as a whole, the Joint Health Sector Review concludes that: <i>“It is widely accepted that gender barriers to accessing services remain. Perhaps less acknowledged but equally important is that awareness, understanding and proper action are often absent even within the MoPH, its programmes and its collaborating services providers. Gender and other inequalities are often blamed on “traditions” without giving much thought to the traditions inside the institutions”</i>. Interviews show that, while there is an overall commitment to ensuring the inclusion of gender issues, there is still limited capacity to be able to take these commitments forward. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Afghanistan Joint Health Sector Review, 2015 Interviews 202, 208, 211, 214 	<p>Strong – <i>perspectives from document review backed up with more detailed evidence from interviews.</i></p>
<p>Policing and Rule of Law</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Government strategies with the most measurable success include increasing the number of women in the judiciary (although still short of the 30% target) and development of new legislation that protects women’s rights (see i-512). EU support contributed to an increase in the number of women in the ANP, with 482 new female recruits identified, exceeding the target of 209. However, there was a loss of 172 arising from attrition, and gains in recruits have been limited to lower ranks. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Afghanistan Gender Profile, 2016 Final Evaluation of LOTFA, Phase V Interview 401 	<p><i>Satisfactory</i> – evidence from interviews add detail to document review</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Deployment strategies were reportedly not well thought out, and complaint mechanisms remain weak. • LOTFA also saw the formation of the Afghan National Police Women’s Association with a Gender Mainstreaming Unit facilitated through donor support. Training efforts were conducted with GMU staff and training incentives were provided to female police personnel. This was complemented with gender awareness and mainstreaming programmes, for staff in the Ministry of the Interior 		
	<p>Democracy and Accountability</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The results of Government strategies to increase female participation in the electoral process was mixed. The total number of female registered candidates in 2014 was 11%, an increase from 10% in 2009, in actual terms the number dropped. There were no female candidates for the 2014 Presidential election. • The second phase of the Support to Credible and Transparent Elections (ELECT II) programme, which was EU-funded, prioritized outreach to women to broaden democratic participation in the electoral process. In the 2014 elections, 37% of the electorate who voted were women, approximately one million more than in 2010. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ELECT II Report for the European Union Delegation to Afghanistan 2015 • Final Evaluation of the ELECT II, 2015 	<p>Indicative- <i>few sources available</i></p>
<p>JC-52</p>	<p>GEWE is adequately mainstreamed into EU funded actions in governance, rule of law, health, and agriculture and rural development</p>		
<p>I-521</p>	<p>EU country and four focus sector strategies with respective key indicators are consistently referring to GEWE</p>		
	<p>Summary</p> <p>While there is consistent evidence of a commitment to mainstream gender into EU funded actions in the sectors, there is much less evidence of this commitment having been implemented. Both in overarching strategic statements and in the analysis for each of the sectors, there are clear commitments to ensuring that gender issues are fully taken into account. At the same time, most of these statements are general in nature, stating that gender as one of the cross-cutting issues should be taken into account, or in the case of the</p>		

	<p>sectoral analyses focus on specific issues, such as women forming a high proportion of casual seasonal labour in the agricultural sector. In most cases, there is little evidence that the specific gender issues identified form the basis of elements of programmatic support, for example: while in the health sector it is stated that support could include support for female managers and leaders, in the health programme support the main focus is on female health workers. As per I-522, the focus of actual support is generally on specific and limited issues, such as the recruitment of female staff in the health sector and the security sector.</p>		
	<p>General</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Gender Evaluation found an improvement in the attention generally given to gender: “<i>Gender analysis in EU country strategies and plans has improved significantly over the last 5 years. This is not least because the 2009 EU Action Plan for Afghanistan/Pakistan restated the central importance of gender issues with a national strategy, and the EU has directly targeted women as beneficiaries of development assistance and promoted women’s empowerment</i>”. • There is a notable shift in the references to GEWE in the MIPs, as the main source of evidence of mainstreaming: from a general statement about a focus on cross-cutting themes, including gender, in 2007-2010,; through more specific references in 2011-2013, with gender-specific objectives; to a specific commitment in 2014-2020, to carry out a gender analysis in 2016, to form the basis of a Gender Action Plan. • The main efforts that have been made have been by specific parts of the EUD responsible for human rights and gender equality. Efforts have been made to provide resource materials and to provide a lead role. However, other staff in the EUD have either lacked the time, being generally overburdened, or have lacked the interest to take gender issues forward. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluation of EU Support to GEWE, 2015 • MIP 2007-2010 • MIP 2011-2013 • MIP 2014-2020 • EAMR, 2015 • Interviews 200, 201 	<p>Strong – <i>documentary evidence backed by interviews that commitments made have not been consistently implemented.</i></p>
	<p>Agriculture and Rural Development</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The objectives for the sector in 2007-2010 and 2011-2013 are repeated, with a specific focus on women’s employment in agriculture. In 2014-2020, a more general statement is made about the challenge of gender mainstreaming in agriculture in Afghanistan, requiring accompanying programmatic measures in awareness raising, education and reform of the regulatory framework.” • The EUD advocates for GEWE. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MIP 2007-2010 • MIP 2011-2013 • MIP 2014-2020 • Interview 027. 	<p>Satisfactory – <i>supported by different sources of information</i></p>
	<p>Health</p>		

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The objectives for the sector in 2007-2010 and 2011-2013 are repeated, with a focus on the need for gender mainstreaming in the sector as being essential to the improvement of family health. In 2014-2020, a more specific statement is made about the need to continue with the main focus on maternal health, child health and vaccination. This focus on gender in the strategy for EU support to the health sector is carried forward consistently with a focus on gender in the programme indicators, including: the proportion of health facilities with female staff; and, the utilisation of skilled antenatal care and birth attendance. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> MIP 2007-2010 MIP 2011-2013 MIP 2014-2020 Interviews 201, 202 I-222 	Strong – <i>documentary evidence backed by interviews that commitments made have been consistently implemented.</i>
	<p>Policing and Rule of Law</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The objectives for the sector in 2007-2010 and 2011-2013 are repeated, with the need for human rights and gender issues to be mainstreamed in the justice sector as well as other public administration programmes. In 2014-2020, a more general statement is made that: <i>“An effective formal justice system will weaken the insurgent’s narrative, improve investors’ confidence and facilitate progress on advancing women’s rights.”</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> MIP 2007-2010 MIP 2011-2013 MIP 2014-2020 	<i>Satisfactory – documentary evidence but lacking evidence that commitments have been consistently implemented.</i>
	<p>Democracy and Accountability</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> For 2007-2013, see the findings for the policing and rule of law sector. In 2014-2020, a general statement is made: <i>“Cross-cutting issues to be mainstreamed in this sector are: human rights (in particular gender equality and women’s empowerment), anti-corruption, and counter-narcotics.”</i> EU Strategy in 2014 referred to increasing the participation of women voters from the 2010 elections, and advocating a quota for women in parliament. These outcomes were aligned with the Results Framework for the Support to Credible and Transparent Elections (ELECT II) which reflected gender-focused indicators. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> One example of an attempt at mainstreaming included the ELECT II Gender Advisor engaged the IEC Gender Unit and Public Outreach Focal Point to ensure mainstreamed messages were included in the IEC’s public outreach 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> MIP 2014-2020 Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Afghanistan, 2014 Project Document ELECT II, 2012 UNDP ELECT II Pre-Election Funding Period (2012-2014) Report 	<i>Satisfactory – documentary evidence but lacking additional evidence that commitments have been consistently implemented.</i>

<p>I-522</p>	<p>EU funded actions contain specific GEWE objectives and gender disaggregation of other objectives and indicators</p>		
<p>Summary: There is generally inconsistency between the programmes in the ways in which gender is included in the objectives and indicators for the programmes and hence in implementation, with some evidence that the situation has improved. In most cases there is some analysis of gender generally, with the identification of significant issues in most sectors. There are examples in the agriculture and rural development and health sectors where a focus on gender issues in national programmes did produce results. In the Policing and Rule of Law and Democracy and Accountability sectors, the focus has been on specific issues, such as the number of female police officers.</p> <p>In the agriculture and rural development sector, a focus on women’s participation was only proposed in a very limited part of the strategy. Looking in more detail at the individual elements of the programme, there are indications that the situation did improve, with: the National Solidarity Programme now specifically considering women in terms of decision-making and the provision of community grants; and, the District Development Assemblies, established by the NABDP, having a mandatory 30-40% female membership.</p> <p>In the health sector, while gender issues are a specific overall focus of the programmes, ensuring that women have access to and utilize health services, there is a more limited focus in the practical aspects of the programme on ensuring the availability of female health workers. In general, it was reported that there was a reliance on implementing partners to ensure that gender issues in objectives were taken forward and reported on in indicators.</p> <p>In the Policing and Rule of Law and Democracy and Accountability there are varying examples: the former includes the indicator: number of procedures initiated for harassment of female police officer per year; while the latter includes the general statement that the cross-cutting issues to be mainstreamed in this sector include human rights (in particular gender equality and women’s empowerment).</p>			
	<p>General</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The evaluation concludes that: <i>“Gender issues have been clearly reflected in the selection of strategic objectives and indicators at programme level. Examples were found through the inclusion of: specific conditions (with performance indicators for variable tranche disbursement) into sector programmes for the promotion of GEWE; specific conditions with indicators for the mainstreaming of gender; technical cooperation support for specific actions to promote GEWE; and, technical cooperation support for gender mainstreaming.”</i> • Interviews generally support the view that there is a mixed picture on the inclusion of gender in objectives and indicators at the programme level. While there has been some progress in raising gender issues at a national and strategic level, it has been more difficult to have these issues included at a programmatic level, with inclusion often dependent on understanding and interest of government stakeholders. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluation of EU Support to GEWE, 2015 • Interviews 200, 201 	<p>Strong – <i>perspectives from document review backed up with more detailed evidence from interviews.</i></p>
<p>Agriculture and Rural Development</p>			

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The evaluation concludes that: <i>“In certain sectors (such as agriculture) the EU Delegation has not sufficiently prioritised gender mainstreaming. This is not through lack of goodwill but an acknowledged lack of capacity and prioritisation. Under rural development a proposed activity was support to community-level development schemes and the empowerment of local communities, including women. Yet in stating that ‘gender issues should be addressed by all rural development programs funded by the Commission’, no specific indicators were flagged.”</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ARTF has in general not tracked/monitored the performance of ARTF funded programmes vis-à-vis gender equity and other crosscutting issues (as of 2012). Some programmes do collect gender-disaggregated data, incl. NSP and MISFA. NSP has quantitative targets for women, e.g. for their participation in CDCs. • The gender targeting/integration in NSP programmes has improved over time, e.g.: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ NSP is specifically considering women in terms of decision-making and the provision of community grants and addressing their concerns and using different approaches, taking regional differences into account. NSP has thus enhanced the engagement of women and in some places led to men being more open to their participation in local governance with 38% of CDC members being women in 2015. NSP established in 2011 a gender unit and a Gender Oversight Committee. ○ The enrolment of girls in schools increased by 68% in targeted communities. • The EU co-funded ARTF Afghanistan Rural Enterprise Development Program (AREDP) enabled MRRD to develop a network of savings group, which are separated by gender, thereby creating income-generating opportunities for women. AREDP has received a new phase of support for 18 months in 2016-17 and will align with the objectives of the Women’s Empowerment NPP (WENPP, led by the Ministry of Women and Social Affairs). 63% of the entrepreneurs that have benefitted from AREDP were women. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluation of EU Support to GEWE, 2015 • ARTF External Review, 2008 • ARTF External Review, 2012 • NSP III Implementation Status and Results Report, the World Bank, 2015 • Phase III Financial and Economic Analysis, 2014 • AREDP Gender impact study, 2015 • NABDP progress reports • P-ARBP External Evaluation, 2016 • P-ARBP progress reports • PHDP II Final Report, 2012 • HPS Mid-term Review, 2015 • AHDPII progress reports • Interviews 016, 017, 019 • Interviews 009, 016, 019, 021, 022, 025 http://projects.worldbank.org/P110407/af-rural-enterprise-development-program?lang=en 	<p>Satisfactory – <i>findings confirmed by documents and interviews</i></p>
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A pragmatic approach was taken to ensure female participation, e.g. in Nangarhar, the first groups formed were male, and then after 2-3 months female groups could be formed. The facilitators were always recruited in the village.

- NABDP: The established District Development Assemblies (DDAs) had a mandatory 30-40% female membership, but in conservative provinces this was difficult to ensure; the average membership was 35%. Gender sensitivity was integrated in the training provided for DDAs and gender awareness training was provided to NABDP staff. The participation of women in conservative provinces was increased through women-targeted non-infrastructure activities, such as bee-keeping and carpet weaving. NABDP had a gender unit.
- P-ARBP: Small-scale women-centred activities were implemented by the NGOs, such as bio-briquette production, kitchen gardens, vegetable production, nurseries, and chicken rearing. Several women's groups were formed, but not registered with the Ministry of Women's Affairs. Gender training was also provided, but the female participation in water user associations was overall very low. Some indicators were gender segregated.
- PHDP II and HPS: The PHDP II TA promoted gender awareness, but the project had no resources dedicated for gender-related activities and the general awareness of the economic importance of gender was generally not understood by stakeholders. ANDHO and ANGGO encouraged qualified women to apply for positions, but only received few applications. 20 women were trained in prune processing under HPS.
- AHDPII. No specific gender activities or gender mainstreaming appear to have been implemented. Only a small proportion of the women training by the project were women. Reflection of gender in progress reports is very limited.

ARTF (Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund):

- ARTF has a gender working group that meets monthly.
- NSP: 35% of the elected official in the NSP established CDCs are women. However, the rate varied significantly geographically and

	<p>some stakeholders find that insufficient rigour was applied in ensuring meaningful participation of women. Nonetheless, it is also evident that women did participate in NSP and CDCs in many places. In the Citizens' Charter, the election system requirements have been made stricter to ensure a 50% female representation and more emphasis is paid to mapping the context vis-à-vis women and adapting the gender approach to the local context.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NRAP: A gender mainstreaming policy and staff is in place. All infrastructure sub-projects have an environment and social management plan in place and its implementation is monitored. • AREDP: While no mainstreaming activities were implemented per se, 64% of the beneficiaries were reportedly women. On average, loan repayment rates were significantly better for women than men. AREDP targeted marginalised groups such as the ultra-poor, kuchis, and people with disabilities. 		
	<p>Health</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In the health sector, reducing maternal and child mortality was recognised as one of the critical aims, and a reduction of discriminatory practices against women was a general objective. Increasing the number of qualified female health workers and managers at provincial/district levels was deemed an essential indicator of results. • A comparison study of the implementation of the Basic Package of Health Services and the Essential Package of Hospital Services have a specific focus on women's health and are monitored using key indicators including: proportion of health facilities with skilled female health workers; skilled antenatal care and skilled birth attendance; and, women using modern methods of contraception. • Knowledge of gender issues has been found to be extremely limited within the MoPH HQ itself, and this shortcoming affects negatively the mainstreaming of gender-related interventions in strategic documents. • There was a reliance on implementing partners to ensure that gender issues in objectives were taken forward and reported on in indicators. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluation of EU Support to GEWE, 2015 • BPHS/EPHS Implementers Comparison Study, 2012 • Evaluation of the Current Health Sector Support Programme, 2015 • Afghanistan Health Survey 2015, 2016 • Interviews 201, 202 	<p>Strong – <i>perspectives from document review backed up with more detailed evidence from interviews.</i></p>
	<p>Policing and Rule of Law</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The focus on cross-cutting issues in the Governance sector called for the mainstreaming of gender issues in the justice and public 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluation of EU Support to GEWE, 2015 	<p><i>Indicative – limited documentation available</i></p>

	<p>administration sectors.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In terms of indicators, only the number of women employees in public administration was a measure of success. • LOTFA contained a gender-specific output – to improve gender capacity and equality in the police force. However, the means to achieve this were extremely limited and the theory about how this would occur had little relevance to the context. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • LOTFA 2nd Quarter Progress Report 2014 	
	<p>Democracy and Accountability</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increasing gender representation was a focus of the electoral process, and the number of women voters and electoral candidates was an indicator in programme results • Gender mainstreaming appeared in ELECT II's framework, including gender-specific indicators and activities. However, the evaluation team was unable to obtain documentation of the results of these efforts. • In LoGo, there was limited attention to and poor results on gender equality. One year into implementation, gender focus has been limited to generic discussion at the higher levels. Most indicators were not gender-disaggregated. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluation of EU Support to GEWE, 2015 • UNDP Elect II Pre-Election Funding Period Report • ELECT II Project Document, 2013 • LoGo ROM 2017 	<p><i>Satisfactory</i> – based on multiple documents, including external view</p>

EQ6. Has EU development cooperation been coherent and achieved synergies with the support provided by other development partners and EU's humanitarian and political engagement?

JC-61	Extent to which EU development assistance was coherent and coordinated with EU MS and other donors		
	Indicators	Sources of information	Quality of evidence
I-611	Functionality (decision-making, follow-up, results) of the various government-development partner coordination mechanisms and the role of EUD and added-value of EUD participation (at overall, sector and trust fund levels)		
	<p>Summary: Overall, Development partner (DP) coordination and GoIRA-DP coordination has improved significantly during the period under evaluation, albeit with differences between the various sectors, and a reported decline in regularity of coordination meetings in 2015-16 for some sectors. However, in relation to support for sub-national governance donor coordination remains insufficient. Moreover, security constraints have increasingly affected coordination due to movement restrictions for international donor staff. In the beginning of the period, DP support was characterised by a scattered project approach and insufficient capacity of GoIRA to coordinate them. Three elements were important for the move towards better coordination and a more programmatic approach: a) the Afghanistan National Development Strategy Prioritization and Implementation Plan (ANDS-PIP) introduced in 2010 22 National Priority Programmes (NPPs), which have led in a gradual move from a project approach towards programmatic approaches; b) the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF) has since 2012 provided a platform for GoIRA-DP coordination; and c) the large multi-donor Trust Funds (ARTF, LOTFA) have at least to some extent brought DPs together and become major platforms for coordination. With the bulk of EU funding going through the Trust Funds, they have since 2013 become the main platforms for EU for engaging in sector-level coordination. Moreover, the 5+3 and 5+3+3 structures comprising the major donors (5), important contributors to ARTF (+3) and major multilateral agencies (+3) remain important platforms for coordination. The EUD is proactively engaged in donor coordination, and especially in the leading the coordination of EU MS, incl. promoting joint EU programming (but the joint programming has only recently taken off and is still in a nascent stage, as previously not a priority in Afghanistan for EU MS). However, the capacity of the EUD to engage has varied and at times limited the capacity to engage in coordination, but has been significantly improved due to: a) the merger of the EUSR office and EC delegation into a single EUD, and b) streamlining EU's support portfolio and increasingly relying on indirect/delegated management, thereby releasing staff resources to engage more substantially in coordination and dialogue from 2013 and onwards (see I-311 and I-312).</p>		
	<u>General information:</u>		

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is a very high number of coordination fora and working groups at the overall and sector level in Afghanistan, some with the participation of GoIRA and development partners (DPs), and some which DPs only. There are currently an identified 75 different groups. Several stakeholders find there are too many coordination fora and meetings and a need to simplify this. • The most important groups at the overall level is the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) meetings, led by the Ministry of Finance (MoF) and the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) • Heads of Donor Agencies meetings, hosted by UNAMA and MoF – meets every 2 weeks. • Other important groups at the overall level are: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Special Donor Meeting (led by MoF) ○ Ambassadorial Level Meetings, hosted by Ambassadors ○ Steering and Technical Committee Meetings, led by MoF ○ Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) Strategy Group, led by the World Bank ○ TMAF 5+3 (and 5+3+3) meetings, coordinated by UNAMA. Participating DPs: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Five (major donors): EU, United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, USA ▪ Three (contributors to ARTF): Australia, Canada, Nordic+ (Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Norway) ▪ Three (multilateral agencies): World Bank, ADB, UNAMA • The new Government has restructured the coordination landscape, so there are 7 development councils (previous clusters) for sectorial coordination. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EUD working group mapping, Aug 2016 • EAMR 2015 • EAMR 2014 • EAMR 2013 • EAMR 2011 • EAMR 2009 • EAMR 2008 • Interviews 010, 011, 023, 025, 027 	<p><i>Strong – detailed list with the names and basic information for the groups available. EU engagement reflected in EAMRs and confirmed by interviews.</i></p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DP and DP-GoIRA coordination has in general over time improved significantly, albeit with differences among the sectors: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ In 2007-9, the main coordination meetings (e.g. JCMB) lacked substance in the discussions and did not provide clear guidance and oversight, and the role was reduced with the launch of ANDS (June 2008). GoIRA did not always provide sufficient leadership. UNAMA attempts to improve coordination had limited results. ○ In 2010, the Afghanistan National Development Strategy Prioritization and Implementation Plan (ANDS-PIP) introduced 22 National Priority Programmes (NPPs) to achieve greater donor coordination and alignment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EUD working group mapping, Aug 2016 • EAMR 2015 • EAMR 2014 • EAMR 2013 • EAMR 2011 • EAMR 2009 • EAMR 2008 • Ministry of Finance: Development 	<p><i>Satisfactory – the EAMRs provide a clear and substantiated picture, but only reflect the EUD perspective. Interviews have provided some more nuance</i></p>

<p>with national priorities. The NPPs have resulted in a gradual, but slow, move from a project approach towards programmatic approaches</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Since 2012, the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF) provided a further platform for GoIRA-DP meetings at various levels, although there was a need for better coordination of the DPs' funding mechanisms for improving performance ○ In 2016, the EUD reports that several coordination fora and working groups, incl. JCMB, are strong/well-functioning. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The 5+3 group is generally coordinated and having a common voice in policy dialogue, although at the programming level, they each have their own programmes. ● However, MoF has remained been concerned about a) “donor crowding” in certain sectors, and b) geographic imbalances in the donor support for the sub-national level (which has e.g. affected ARTF as a result of donor preferences). <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The EUD participated pro-actively and (sometimes with a leading role) in donor coordination, especially in 2011 and again from mid-2013 and onwards, after the EU portfolio was streamlined and increasingly relying on indirect/delegated management, thereby releasing EUD staff resources to engage (see I-311, I-312) – especially in the health sector, but also in the other EU focal sectors (agriculture & rural development, policing, justice, public administration reform, sub-national governance): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The merger of the EUSR office and EC delegation into a single EUD resulted in an increased coordination leadership capacity of the EUD in 2011. However, due to capacity constraints, this role was somewhat weakened in 2012. ○ The EUD has worked closely with other DPs to ensure a division of labour. ○ The EUD held and participated regularly in numerous consultation and coordination meetings (incl. those organised by MOF and UNAMA); advocating for EU values related to human rights, equality, democracy, and rule of law. ○ The EUD participated pro-actively in TMAF discussions, incl. the TMF 5+3 group. ○ The EUD engaged in 2007 in the drafting of sector strategies (rural development, health, social protection and justice) under the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS). 	<p>Cooperation Report, 2012</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Interviews 010, 011, 023 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● EAMR 2015 ● EAMR 2014 ● EAMR 2013 ● EAMR 2011 ● EAMR 2009 ● EAMR 2008 ● I-311 ● I-312 ● Interviews 011, 023 	<p>Satisfactory – <i>the EAMRs provide a clear and substantiated picture, but only reflect the EUD perspective Interviews have provided some more nuance</i></p>
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<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ In 2015, EUR 3mill were provided for capacity development to enhance coordination of regional cooperation activities. ○ The EU hosted the Brussels Conference in 2016, which was an important event for GoIRA-donor coordination. ● The EUD in particular emphasised and promoted coordination among EU MS, e.g.: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ EU MS Heads of Cooperation meet regularly (monthly) at the EUD (2013-present). ○ EU statements and positions were presented at JCMB and TMAF meetings, e.g. on human rights and elections. Joint political messaging improved in 2011-onwards. ○ “Joint EU Messages” reference sheets were prepared in 2009-2010 on local governance, rule of law (police and justice) and private sector development. ○ However, while the EUD since 2012 has discussed with MS embassies the idea of joint EU programming, the concept has been postponed several times and has only recently taken off. Previous attempts to engage EU MS in joint programming had little success, as many EU MS did not have an interest in this and often directed their development assistance towards the provinces, where their troops had been deployed. ○ EU MS have after the 2016 Brussels Conference on Afghanistan and the migration crisis in Europe become more open to joint programming, and example is Danida support for LOTFA being channelled through EU. Joint programming has been endorsed by the 5+3 group of major donors. EU has thus since 2016 re-engaged EU MS on joint programming with a pragmatic focus on areas of common interest, namely a) migration and displacement, and b) private sector development, in the context of the Citizen’s Charter. So far, a joint policy brief on migration has been drafted and a second policy brief on private sector development will be prepared. A joint political economy analysis with focus on migration ○ EU is planning to engage in private sector development, building on Danida, DfID, Sida and German experiences. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● EAMR 2015 ● EAMR 2013 ● EAMR 2012 ● EAMR 2011 ● EAMR 2009 ● EU+ Joint-Policy Brief on Migration Related Issues in Afghanistan. Revised draft, 29 May 2017 ● EU Joint Programming Mission Report, 18 August 2016 ● Interviews 006, 010, 011, 011, 030 	<p>Strong – <i>the EAMRs and other documents provide a clear and substantiated picture, further supported by interviews</i></p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The Trust Funds (ARTF, LOTFA, AITF) play a key role in DP coordination in general as multiple DPs channel large volumes of support to the Trust Funds. The Trust Fund governing bodies are thus central platforms for sector coordination and policy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● EAMR 2015 ● EAMR 2014 ● EAMR 2013 	<p>Strong – <i>the importance of the Trust Funds is widely known and</i></p>

	<p>dialogue. Due to the joint funding from several DPs, there is a degree of coordination between DPs, but not always adequately so.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Trust Funds ensure alignment of support with NPPs (National Priority Programmes) and on-budget provision of support. • The Trust Funds have in particular been major coordination for EU, especially from 2013 and onwards, since more than 70% of the EU funding has been channelled through the Trust Funds - with indirect/delegated management (see also I-311, I-312). EUD coordination with international organisations (especially the World Bank, ADB, UNDP) is mainly done in the Trust Fund context. • EU is a major donor to the Trust Funds. • The EUD is member of the steering committees for ARTF and LOTFA • EU does not fund AITF, but the EUD is an observer in the AITF steering committee and participates actively in the steering committee discussions, due to the funding provided to ADB for P-ARBPII implementation (which was initially planned to be provided through AITF). <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Following trust funds and monitoring their implementation is demanding, so donors have divided labour among themselves and follow meetings on each other's behalf • The EUD engaged proactively in influencing ARTF and the World Bank; this as usually done jointly/in coordination with other donors or GoIRA. In some cases, this EUD advocacy has been successful, e.g. in relation to changing the governance and in relation to monitoring. The EUD was also able to ensure that the "preferencing" of its funding was ensured, even when the EUD did not want to provide support for the GoIRA recurrent budget. In other cases, the EUD was unsuccessful in promoting its ideas, e.g. in relation to revising the agricultural programme. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EUD working group mapping, Aug 2016 • Inventory data from CRIS • ARTF External Review 2012 • Conference Report, Lessons From the Coalition, US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 2016 • I-311 • I-312 • Interviews 008, 011 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interviews 002, 005, 009, 011, 025 	<p><i>acknowledged, and the central role Trust Funds play in EU support objectively verified by CRIS</i></p> <p>Satisfactory – <i>verbal sources</i></p>
	<p>A&RD:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There are 12 working groups in the A&RD sector. The EUD finds all the mature groups to be strong/well-functioning. The most important ones appear to be: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Technical Secretariat of the Supreme Council of Land and Water ○ NSP Coordination Meetings (led by MRRD and WB) ○ Citizen Charter working group ○ Agriculture Policy Committee (APC) Meeting (led by MAIL, recently established) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EUD working group mapping, Aug 2016 • Interviews 008, 009, 026 	<p>Strong – <i>detailed list with the names and basic information for the groups available</i></p>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Agriculture Donors NPP2 Working Group (DPs only, led by EU and USAID), meeting every two months, but the meetings have in 2017 been less frequent, security being one reason ● Some groups in other clusters are also relevant of for the A&RD sector, especially: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) Strategy Group (led by the World Bank) ○ Sub-national Governance Coordination Forum ● EU and USAID are co-leading the donor coordination of the A&RD sector. EU has been a key driver and stakeholders find that EU is doing it well and that the meetings are useful, albeit some would like to see more continuity and follow-through in some of the discussions. ● NGOs are represented in the coordination, but the internal coordination in the NGO community is insufficient to allow for a strong voice. ● The EUD took in 2012 a leading role in advocating for a common A&RD strategy with on-budget funding and an implementation mechanism for NPP2 "National Comprehensive Agriculture Production and Market Development Program", this resulted in the EU co-funded Fund for Agricultural and Rural Market (FARM) Development implemented by GIZ. (see I-412). ● The coordination was previously not sufficient in relation to water, both within the donor group as well as between MAIL (Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock) and MEW (Ministry of Energy and Water) and progress on the National Water Resources and Irrigation Component was low (42% completion compared to the target). For example, MAIL and MEW followed different approaches to the organisation of farmers (MAIL irrigation associations, MEW water user associations). ● The water sector is now well coordinated and meets regularly; meetings were coordinated by ADB (before by USAID, recently moved to the World Bank) ● However, some stakeholders report a decline in regularity of government-cluster coordination meetings in 2015-16, one reason being restricted movements of international DP staff due to security concerns. ● There are tangible examples of how donor coordination has helped programme delivery, for example: a) after coordination meetings a number of projects aligned 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● EAMR 2012 ● Interviews 002, 016 ● I-412 ● Evaluation and Future Elaboration of the Water Sub-Sector Strategy Development, 2011 ● Interviews 008, 009, 015 	<p>Satisfactory – <i>confirmed by multiple sources (I-412)</i></p> <p>Strong – <i>independent view, and confirmed by interviews</i></p>
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	<p>their salary scales to the GoIRA NTACB scale, b) the Transition Project stopped providing supplies for DAH, when it was learned that FAO also provided supplies.</p>		
	<p>Health:</p>		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There are fora for coordination relevant to the health sector, under the Human Resource Development Cluster. The most important ones appear to be: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The Health Donor Coordination Forum ○ The SEHAT Tripartite Meeting ○ The Projects Steering Committee ○ The Strategic Health Coordination Committee, which is yet to meet. • Some groups in other clusters are also relevant of for the Health sector, especially: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) Strategy Group (led by the World Bank) ○ Sub-national Governance Coordination Forum • The EUD has played an active and supportive role in donor coordination in the health sector, working closely with the World Bank and USAID to develop greater coordination and ensuring that the MoPH takes the lead. Initial coordination, until 2013 was limited to ensuring coverage of the provinces and implementation of the same BPHS and then EPHS programmes. • The health sector portfolio was one of the first of the EUD sectors to be streamlined, (2011 to 2013) with an emphasis on freeing up capacity for staff to engage in coordination and policy dialogue. The immediate results of this reorganisation were that the EUD channels financial support on-budget through the ARTF and works in close coordination with the other donors (USAID, EU and WB) on the MoPH owned SEHAT Programme, providing coordinated capacity building. A new set of coordination structures was established, with: a Strategic Steering Committee, as a supreme coordination body, three subcommittees (Policy, Planning and Technical Affairs; Health Care Services Provision; Administration and Finance) and a third layer with working groups, task forces and other technical bodies. • The coordination mechanisms since 2013 are: regular coordination meeting (every two Months) between Donors (EU, DFATD Canada USAID and WB); during annual WB monitoring Mission formal dialogue is organised between MoPH, Donors and NGOs; the Health Development Partner Forum meets every 6/8 Weeks; while a Formal Policy Dialogue body between MoPH and Development Partners has not been effective, but was to be reactivated in 2016. 	<p>EUD working group mapping, Aug 2016</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EAMR 2015 • EAMR 2014 • EAMR 2013 • EAMR 2011 • EAMR 2009 • EAMR 2008 • SEHAT Aide Memoires, 2014 & 2015 • EUD working group mapping, Aug 2016 • I-312 • Interviews 202, 208, 211 	<p>Strong – <i>detailed list with the names and basic information for the groups available</i></p> <p>Strong – <i>the EAMRs provide a clear and substantiated picture, backed up by the other donor documentation in the sector and by interviews.</i></p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> While coordination continues to be generally effective, the nature of coordination has changed, with the shift to funding through the ARTF. Both government partners and donors feel that there is less direct, technical contact between them and that there is less direct information from the field about how health programmes are being implemented. 		
	<p>D&A:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> There are 15 working groups in the governance sector; 8 of which relate to the EU's Democratisation and Accountability focal sector. The EUD finds the groups to be strong/well-functioning, with the exception of the Sub-national Governance (SNG) Technical Working Group, which is classified as fair. The most important ones appear to be: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Governance Cluster Working Group (led by MoF) Sub-national Governance Coordination Forum (Co-chaired by IDLG and UNAMA, involves high level decision makers from GoIRA and donor community) Public Financial Management Roadmap (WB hosted, mostly donors with some GoIRA participation) Capacity building for results (CBR) (WB ARTF donors only) International Community Transparency and Accountability Working Group (Co-chaired by USAID and UNAMA) Some groups in other clusters are also relevant for the democratisation and accountability sector, especially: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) Strategy Group (led by the World Bank) Anti-corruption Strategy Working Group (led by the MoPH) The EUD has played a central role in coordinating bodies across the sector. EUD organised an exploratory meeting with WB, UNDP and the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) which led to the merger of three parallel programmes into the reactivation of the donor group on local governance and community development chaired by UNAMA. The EU remained involved in donor coordination regarding the Afghan Sub-national Governance Programme (ASGP). Donor coordination had not been continuous, but from 2013 increased in regularity with the establishment of regular EU and DFID working group meetings. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> EUD working group mapping, Aug 2016 EAMR 2009 EAMR 2011 EAMR 2012 EAMR 2013 Annex 3 Democratisation and Accountability to MIP 2014-2020 Annex 3 Democratisation and 	<p>Strong – <i>detailed list with the names and basic information for the groups available</i></p> <p>Satisfactory – <i>the EAMRs provide a clear picture, however the extent to which the coordination was ongoing throughout the evaluation period is unclear.</i></p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • While the inception date is unclear, the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) and UNAMA co-chair a subnational governance forum. • Coordination of subnational governance remains challenging, and the fact that there will be several donor projects (USAID, UNDP, GIZ) requires coordination. • Technical assistance to subnational governance was fragmented due to multiple donor programmes and insufficient coordination. • UNAMA coordinated a donor political forum for elections. Under ELECT II there is a project management board, two technical working groups for the Independent Election Commission (IEC) and the Independent Election Complaints Commission (IECC). 	<p>Accountability to MIP 2014-2020</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNDP Project Document, LoGO, 2015 • Annex 3 Democratisation and Accountability to MIP 2014-2020 	
	<p><u>PRoL:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There are 15 working groups in the governance sector; 7 of which relate to the EU's Police and Rule of Law focal sector. The EUD finds all the mature groups to be strong/well-functioning, except for the two IPCB working groups. The EU is 'Not Sure' of the classification of the IPCB Working Group, and finds the IPCB Sub-Group 4 to be moderate. The most important ones appear to be: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ International Police Coordination Board (IPCB) Working Group on Standard Operating procedures for Police and Prosecutors (led by Ministry of Internal Affairs) and IPCB) ○ IPCB Working Sub-Group 4 on Community Policing (Hosted by MOI, EUPOL) ○ Board of Justice Donors Working Group (BoD) (Donor Only) ○ National Working Group on the Rule of Law Indicators Study (Chaired by the MoJ) ○ Women Policy Working Group (Hosted by UNAMA and EUPOL) ○ Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) Projects Committee meeting (PCM) Group (Donor led, with AIHRC) • Some groups in other clusters are also relevant for the democratisation and accountability sector, especially: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Evidence Based Operations — Kabul Working Group ○ Women, Peace and Security Working Group (led by UN Women) ○ Anti-corruption Strategy Working Group (led by the MoPH) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EUD working group mapping, Aug 2016 	<p>Strong – <i>detailed list with the names and basic information for the groups available</i></p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In 2011 there was a lack of cooperation and coordination among donors in the BoD working group. Monthly meetings suffered from weak leadership by the permanent chair, UNAMA. Some donors were unwilling to share information or cooperate. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EAMR 2008 • EAMR 2011 • EAMR 2012 	<p>Satisfactory – <i>the EAMRs provide a clear picture but this</i></p>

	<p>Regional Cooperation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> In 2008 the EUD initiated the Informal Customs network comprising EU, US (Border Management Task Force and USAID), Canada, World Bank and UNAMA. The group met monthly. The EUD re-started discussions on the Centre for Regional Cooperation with Canada and Denmark and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is unclear whether this became a regular coordination group on regional cooperation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> EAMR 2009 EAMR 2012 	Indicative – the information available is not recent
I-612	Evidence of EU development actions and actions of other donors benefitting from each other		
	<p>Summary: In general, EU supported programmes proactively coordinated and pursued synergies with programmes funded by other donors. This was particularly pronounced for the agriculture & rural development sector, where there are several examples of synergies, where programmes divided labour, and benefitted and built on support and results from each other. A prominent example is the EU funded ADHP II (Animal Health Development Programme II) and programmes funded by the World Bank, ADB, USAID, which carried out joint activities where experts from one programme provided inputs for other programmes. Similarly, the HPS (Horticulture Private Sector Development Project) had an ADB funded sister programme with ANHDO, the HVP (Horticulture Value Chain Project), which had been developed with input from the EU funded PHDP II (Support to Afghan Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation & Livestock to Contribute to Strengthen the Planting Material and Horticulture Industry). LOTFA's coordination with other programmes improved over time, which in turn led to the achievement of synergies, for example, a UNAMA police advisor was placed in LOTFA to assist with community policing and gender initiatives. Moreover, approaches developed by one programme were in some cases upscaled or replicated by another – for example, the Sanitary Mandate Contract Scheme developed by ADHP II was expanded with co-funding from the World Bank funded National Horticulture and Livestock Project; and FAO and GoIRA provided funding for countrywide implementation of the system. In the Health sector, EU support for the prison health services reform enabled access to significant amounts of additional funds. However, ARTF funded programmes were not sufficiently coordinated with other large rural development initiatives implemented by other ministries than MRRD. Similarly, donor support for sub-national governance was fragmented and insufficiently coordinated, and thus only few synergies were attained. In the Police and Rule of Law sector, diverging views between donors hampered the potential to achieve synergies and in some cases engagements even contradicted, e.g. the EU supported the Afghan National Police to transition to a civilian police force, while US support encouraged its involvement in counter-insurgency efforts. On a more general level, the EU's advocacy on anti-corruption was considered beneficial by partners and other donors.</p>		
	A&RD:		
	<p>Overall:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> With the withdrawal of the international forces and related closure of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), bilateral donors looked for other mechanisms for delivery of rural development support. The EU, support which had no linkage to the 	Interviews 002, 009, 011	Satisfactory – <i>verbal information from different sources</i>

	military presence and PRTs and had contributed to the establishment of other mechanisms for support, such as using the CDCs (NSP).		
	<p>AHDPII (Animal Health Development Programme II):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The development of the Animal Health and Veterinary Public Health Act was jointly supported by AHDP and the USAID-funded TAHA project. TAHA ensured consistency with WTO requirements. • SMCS (Sanitary Mandate Contract Scheme – animal disease surveillance, reporting and control) developed and funded by AHDPII was expanded with co-funding from the National Horticulture and Livestock Project (NHLP – World Bank funded). FAO and GoIRA provided funding to ensure countrywide implementation of the system established by AHDPII. • AHDPII cooperated with several other projects funded by other donors (incl. IFAD, the World Bank, ADB, AFD (Agence Française de Développement), USAID, USDA (United States Department of Agriculture), FAO) to ensure coordinated approaches in the animal health sector and the AHDP team cooperated with their teams, examples include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ NHLP (National Horticulture and Livestock Project, World Bank funded) staff, provided advice for AHDP on equipment purchase for the Central Veterinary Diagnostic and Research Laboratory. ○ AMIP (ADB funded) worked with AHDP experts on the development of plans for meat inspection. ○ BAHDP (AFD funded) bee specialists cooperated with AHDP on the establishment of testing for honey quality and bee diseases. ○ ATAR (USAID funded) lawyer engaged in the finalisation of the Animal Health Act and ATAR veterinary specialist worked on AH&VPH regulations. ○ AHDP provided technical support for pilot VFUs in 6 provinces; the World Bank provided financing for the VFU establishment. ○ AHDP and the Department of Animal Health (DAH) worked with FAO to develop a Foot and Mouth Disease and small ruminants pests project which was initially implemented in 7 provinces in 2015. In 2016, FAO provided funding support for 70 VFUs to implement the SMCS in 11 new provinces including direct support to VFUs for disease reporting and sample submission and training and laboratory support costs. EU is currently funding 	<p>Overview of Animal Health and Veterinary Public Health Act</p> <p>Final Report 2016</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Final Report 2016 • Interviews 009, 012 	<p>Satisfactory – <i>the synergy is clear identified, but only in one source.</i></p> <p>Satisfactory – <i>the synergy is clear identified, but only in one source.</i></p> <p>Satisfactory – <i>the coordination clearly took place, but the synergies achieved are not always clearly captured</i></p>

	the Dutch Committee to support the VFU Secretariat and training of VFUs. IFAD has also provided support for VFUs.		
	<p>HPS (Horticulture Private Sector Development Project)/Support to the Development of Agriculture Private Sector: Perennial Horticulture:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> HPS is closely related to the AFD funded, ANHDO implemented (started in 2014) HVP (Horticulture Value Chain Project); HVP was initiated with PHDP II support and has the same components as HPS aiming at synergy effects, but with an extra component on capacity building of ANHDO. It is upscaling HPS supporting the formation of 2 nursery growers associations and a mother stock nursery in provinces not covered by HPS. It is also financing citrus tristeza virus detection and strain characterisation in support of HPS's support to citrus industry development. The joint pressure put by EU and AFD helped solving the governance issues faced by the project (see I-623). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mid Term Evaluation, 2015 Interview 013 	Satisfactory – <i>independent view, and updated info obtained through interview</i>
	<p>PHDP II (Support to Afghan Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation & Livestock to Contribute to Strengthen the Planting Material and Horticulture Industry):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Influenced FAO project on development of seed law (Law of Agricultural Seeds Regulations- Revised Draft July 2013), see I-211 Closely coordinated activities and division of tasks with: 1) Aga Khan Foundation vis-à-vis support for a plant biotechnology lab, 2) MADERA and Mercy Corps vis-à-vis support for nursery growers, NGAs (nursery growth associations) and ANNGO to streamline approaches. Promoted coordination by initiating the formation of a Horticulture Cluster Steering Committee. However, this committee was not successful in mobilising the stakeholders and was discontinued. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Final evaluation, 2015 Interview 013 	Strong – <i>independent view at completion and updated info obtained through interview</i>
	<p>P-ARBP (Panj – Amu River Basin Programme):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The move of P-ARBP from a service contract to an administration agreement with ADB is likely to strengthen the linkages and synergies with other ADB management basin management and water resource management projects, such as the Western Basin Management Programme funded by CIDA and ADB. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews 016, 029 	Satisfactory – <i>information from interviews, but also confirmed by previous evaluation team experiences in Afghanistan</i>
	ARTF (Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund):		

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ARTF is supported by a very large number of mainly bilateral donors, incl. EU MS (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom). • ARTF coordination and collaboration with rural development initiatives implemented by other line ministries than MRRD was insufficient at the beginning of the evaluation period. For example, NSP (ARTF funded) coordination between its large-scale projects and with other programmes (even with other programmes implemented by MRRD) was prior to the period under evaluation, insufficient; e.g. with NSP and NABDP having separate teams instead of having a single oversight team. Public sector capacity development programmes supported by ARTF were not well coordinated with other capacity development initiatives, e.g. different pay scales have caused some frictions. • The coordination with other major programmes and trust funds (e.g. LOTFA/UNDP, AITF/ADB) appears to have improved during the period under evaluation – UNDP and ADB are members of the ARTF Management Committee – and there is a clear division of labour between them. The World Bank is in addition to ARTF also supporting policy development and implementation through other programmes. • The NSP established elected CDCs (Community Development Councils) are being used by several other projects as an entry point for rural development and community-based assistance, e.g. some (but not all) of the NGOs that supported their formation under NSP use them as entry points for other projects, and have thus also provided continuous support for, and strengthening of, these CDCs. However, MAIL did not wish to use the CDCs as an entry point for the FARM project, since NSP support for the CDCs had an infrastructure focus; some stakeholders question this choice. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NSP mid-term evaluation, 2006 • Annual report 1392 (2012-2013) • ARTF External Evaluation 2008 • ARTF External Review 2012 • Interviews 009, 016, 026 	<p>Satisfactory – <i>the donor base is clear from the annual report, but only for one year</i></p> <p>Satisfactory – <i>independent views, but not providing much detail but interviews have supplemented with up-to-date info</i></p>
	<p>NABDP (National Area Based Development Programme):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NABDP was co-funded by multiple, mainly bilateral, donors, incl. EU MS (Denmark, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Germany). Some donors, like the EU, provided continuous support throughout the project lifetime, whereas others only provided support for a period of time. 	<p>Annual Reports 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011</p>	<p>Strong – <i>the donor base is clear from the annual reports</i></p>
	<p>Health:</p>		

	<p>Prison Health Services Policy Reform:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The EU as part of its support to the MoPH, working in general coordination with the World Bank and USAID, helped to build capacity to take on oversight of prison health services from the Ministry of Justice. The transferring prison health to the MoPH supported by the EU funded support to Prison Health Services Policy Reform was successful. The reform enabled access to much higher levels of funding through integration into the BPHS programme and access to SEHAT funding. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evaluation of Prison Health Services Policy Reform, 2012 Prison Health Services Strategy, 2015 Interviews 202, 208 	Strong – <i>independent view at completion, backed by interviews</i>
	<p>Mental Health and Disability TA Support, as part of support to the MoPH:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> An evaluation of the sector as a whole concludes that, “<i>the EU has supported public health areas where its leadership and positioning have influenced other donors and the MoPH to incorporate funds and assistance to the basic health delivery packages and institutional recognition within the Ministry (Prison Health, Mental Health and Disability)</i>”. While Prison Health is covered by a separate strategy, both mental health and disability and physical rehabilitation are part of the National Health Policy, 2015-2020, and, as such are supported by the BPHS, EPHS and SEHAT programmes, which are funded by the EU, the World Bank, USAID and Cida. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evaluation of the current Health Sector Support Programme, 2012 National Health Policy, 2015-2020 Interviews 202, 208 	Strong – <i>independent view at completion, backed by interviews</i>
	<p><u>D&A:</u></p>		
	<p>Governance:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The governance sector continued to be characterised by a complex array of interventions that at times appeared to lack synergies and focus. On a general level, the EU’s advocacy on anti-corruption was considered beneficial by partners and other stakeholders. <p>Sub-national governance:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Subnational governance remains less harmonised than other governance areas. In 2010, there was a lack of coordination between donors in the sub-national governance sector: project management in the EU-funded Afghan-Sub-national Governance Programme (ASGP) appeared to be unaware of the existence of a parallel program run by the International Organisation for Migration. In addition, there was limited or no coordination with a USAID funded programme on sub-national governance. <p>Local Governance Project – Afghanistan (LoGo):</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> EAMR 2012 EAMR 2013 Interviews 401 and 425 ROM 2010 UNDP Project Document, LoGO, 2015 	Satisfactory – based on documents and interviews

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The LoGo Project Board is co-chaired by UNDP and IDLP with membership by the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Economy and donors. Meetings are held four times per year. LoGo coordinates with other UNDP projects, and other UN Agencies for synergy. The EU is viewed as a consistent donor. The Municipal Governance Support Programme (MGSP) presented a matrix of relevant programmes which identified potential duplication and synergies with the coordination modalities. UN-Habitat implemented many coordination actions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interview 424 MGSP Grant Application Form, 2015 MGSP Annual Report 2016 	
	<p>Support to Credible and Transparent Elections Phase II (ELECT II):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The EUD promoted electoral reform through support to the UNDP-led ELECT II Programme. Donor scrutiny and the governance structure of the second phase of ELECT in June 2013 improved considerably due to intensified donor coordination of the EU with US, UK and Denmark. In 2008 the EU sought to accelerate the programming of funding for the election process by supporting DFID, and aiming towards a more autonomous set up of donor governance of the UNDP proposed basket fund. Lack of agreement from DFID prevented this from progressing. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Annex 3 Democratisation and Accountability to MIP 2014-2020 	<p>Indicative – <i>the extent to which EU sought to coordinate with other donor programmes is unclear</i></p>
	<p>PRoL:</p>		
	<p>LOTFA – Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (phases V, Vi and VII)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> LOTFA is supported by a very large number of mainly bilateral donors, incl. EU MS (Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland and the United Kingdom), Canada, Japan, and the USA. Coordination between LOTFA and other relevant programs was strengthened over the evaluation period. In 2008-2009, IPCB was granted membership of the LOTFA Steering Committee, on a reciprocal basis, leading to greater synergies between the two bodies. A cross-project collaboration forum was established among UNDP projects, particularly in gender, anti-corruption and justice. LOTFA coordinated with other UNDP funded projects in the delivery of activities, including the UNDP-Gender Equality Project (GEP), to deliver workshops for male and female police officers on the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> LOTFA Phase VI, Final Reports, Comments Matrix, 2012 LOTFA Annual Report, 2009 LOTFA Annual Report, 2011 	<p>Satisfactory – <i>evidence comes only from programme documents.</i></p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • LOTFA broadened contacts with outside-LOTFA police sector organisations, an agreement was reached for a UNAMA police advisor to be placed in LOTFA for assisting in community policing and gender initiatives. Project synergies were strengthened with the NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A) and EUPOL for capacity development projects, and with the UK's Strategic Support to Mol project. • Within the international community there were fundamentally diverging views regarding the prioritisation of reforms in the police and rule of law sector. This was evident in fragmented donor support and numerous stove-piped, bilateral programmes. It was further complicated by the militarisation of the sector, with a strong involvement of the US and UK militaries. For example, the EU actively supported the Afghan National Police to transition to a civilian police force, while US support encouraged involvement in counter-insurgency efforts. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project Identification Fiche, Support to the Justice Sector in Afghanistan, Phase II, 2011 • MIP 2014-2020 	
	<p>Fight Against Trafficking from/to Afghanistan</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The EU-support Fight Against Trafficking project was a multi-country programme covering Germany, Austria, France, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan. The importance of coordination with other donors funding similar interventions in Afghanistan was identified in programme documentation, in particular with the US and the UK, and with other large-scale EC-funded projects. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ROM 2011 	Indicative — <i>reference is made to collaboration but no examples of this occurring.</i>
	<p>Justice</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Diverging views within the international community regarding prioritisation of reforms in the justice sector is manifested in fragmented donor support and stove-piped bilateral programmes. This is complicated by the militarisation of the Rule of Law/Justice sectors, with increasing involvement of the US and UK militaries. This translates to short-term priorities linked to stabilisation and counter-insurgency strategies. This has resulted in a lack of synergy within the sector. • Support to Justice Reform is part of the EU's programme to promote governance and the rule of law in Afghanistan. It is linked to EU's contribution under LOTFA and the Public Administration Reform with the Independent Administration Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC). EU support to these separate programmes is complementary. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ID FICHE, Support to the Justice Sector in Afghanistan, Phase II, 2011 	Indicative — <i>limited documentation - it is unclear whether EU sought to improve synergies.</i>
	<p>Regional Cooperation</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • BOMNAF Project Document, 2014 	Indicative – limited sources of evidence

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Local Integration of Vulnerable and Excluded Uprooted People (LIVE-UP) programme has fostered close linkages with other programmes regarding internally displaced persons and returnees. UN-Habitat assisted with workshops coordinated by the UNHCR, and with training for programmes coordinated by the Norwegian Refugee Council and the International Rescue Committee. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> LIVE-UP Annual Report, 2015 LIVE-UP Inception Report, 2015 	<p>available; it is <i>not clear whether EU was involved in improving synergies under the LIVE-UP programme</i></p>
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<p>JC-62</p>	<p>Extent to which EU development assistance was coherent and coordinated with ECHO and EU political cooperation</p>		
<p>I-621</p>	<p>Degree of coordination between EU development assistance (in the four sectors) and ECHO humanitarian aid</p>		
	<p>Summary: The EU development assistance started in 2001 and built on the earlier interventions of ECHO. The EU development aid therefore closely worked with the humanitarian interventions, particularly in the health sector through the Essential Package for Hospital Services (EPHS) and Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS) interventions, but also in food/nutrition and LRRD (linking relief, rehabilitation, and development) and for the assistance to IDPs (internally displaced people) and refugees through the Aid to Uprooted People (AUP) programmes. However, while the intention of coordination between EU development aid and ECHO is clearly evident in the strategic documents, with the aim to promote linkages between humanitarian and development interventions and facilitate the transition from emergency to development status, the level of coordination is not clear at project level. Synergies appear limited and specific coordination mechanisms between the two EU branches are not in place; EUD-ECHO coordination was on an ad-hoc basis. Some consideration is given to health sector where the various NGOs working in the humanitarian sector specifically mention coordination with BPHS implementing partners. However, this is better explained by ECHO (e.g. final reports and HIPs) than by DEVCO.</p>		
	<p>General information:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The EU intended to a) ensure coordination between DEVCO and ECHO assistance in order to address the high vulnerability of the country, and b) support a transition from emergency to development. This effort is also highlighted by the additional fourth sector included in the MIP 2014-2020. This is allowed as an exception by the Agenda for Change, which foresees as a general rule support for a maximum of three sectors and the possibility to include an additional sector where required due to "<i>specific circumstances, such as transition from humanitarian to development assistance, or emerging security threats/conflict risks</i>". However, in practice, EUD-ECHO coordination was on an ad-hoc basis without a formalised or regular coordination mechanism in place. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CSP 2007-2013 MIP 2014-2020 Interview 018 EU strategy 2014-2016 	<p>Satisfactory – <i>the Information in documents is mainly at strategic level and planning stage. But interviews</i></p>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Council of EU identified in the EU strategy 2014-2016 coordination and adequate division of labour between EU instruments in order to ensure alignment to the needs of the Afghan people and the Government plans. This implies coordination between DEVCO and ECHO as two different actors and instruments of the EU although there is not an explicit mention to ECHO in the strategy. • Food security actions are coordinated with ECHO, which provides complementary food assistance in remote areas. In this context, increased synergies with the non-focal sector of social protection were foreseen since the social protection interventions include humanitarian operations. The coordination in food security actions is evident in EAMRs 2011-2014. • Joint efforts between ECHO and the Delegation are developed towards the achievement of resilience of the institutions and the people for sustainable growth. The EU Delegation and ECHO collaborated to maximise efforts in the areas of food security, disaster risk reduction mainstreaming and aid to uprooted people. ECHO and the EUD plan to engage EUMS in the implementation of the EU Resilience Action Plan. • LRRD (linking relief, rehabilitation, and development) has potentials in a number of sectors, therefore coordination between ECHO and DEVCO was foreseen in order to ensure a more effective support. Indeed, within the EU, regular meetings were held at both field and Brussels levels with the services of DG RELEX and DG AIDCO, to ensure that all EU interventions were coordinated. For example: <i>interservice</i> participation was established in the DG ECHO partners' consultation of 25 October 2007 to discuss proposed strategy for the ECHO Global Plan. • At implementation level, complementarity between development and humanitarian assistance was problematic since the humanitarian and development side of EU did similar interventions on the field without adequately connecting to each other. Discussion to ensure continuity between the different levels of programmes have picked up but actual coordination and establishment of potential synergy remain a challenge. This is particularly due to the fact that humanitarian aid does not build the State and governance, e.g. in health where DEVCO provided system support and ECHO did specific issues like trauma, therefore there was no specific collaboration. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MIP 2011-2013 • EAMR 2011 • EAMR 2012 • EARM 2013, • EARM 2014 • HIP 2007 • HIP 2008 • HIP 2009 • HIP 2010 • HIP 2016 • interviews 005, 018, 028 	<p><i>confirm the information</i></p>
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	<p>Agriculture and Rural Development</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> No synergies or coordination with ECHO has been identified for any of the sample programmes. The focus of sample programmes was on private sector development, livestock production, horticulture and water resources management and irrigation, areas with modest scope for synergies with ECHO. While EU is a large donor to ARTF, the proportion of ARTF's total funding coming from EU (excl. EU MS) is still modest, and given the focus of ARTF on rural infrastructure and local governance, the scope for synergies with ECHO appears limited. EU supported an LRRD programme covering the humanitarian-development assistance nexus, "Food Security Program for Linking Relief to Rehabilitation and Development in Afghanistan", which was implemented by different organisations (GIZ, Solidarités, Oxfam), but the actual links to ECHO appears somewhat limited; e.g. there is no reference to ECHO in the project evaluations, although a number of meetings were held with partners and ECHO during the planning and design phase. Overall, the coordination and information sharing between ECHO and the EUD vis-à-vis the A&RD sector has been modest. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> All available documents for sample programmes Evaluations of "Food Security Program for Linking Relief to Rehabilitation and Development" projects implemented by GIZ, Oxfam, Solidarités, 2014-2015 Interviews 009, 011, 018 	<p>Strong – numerous documents screened and the picture is clear and confirmed by interviews</p>
	<p>Health/Social protection</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> References to coordination among DEVCO operations and ECHO can be found in ECHO project documents, particularly referring to DEVCO BPHS activities and stakeholders. ECHO documents suggest that there was no overlap of activities in the health sector thanks to a good coordination with stakeholders prior to the action proposal and that tailored actions was designed to develop a very close synergy with the DEVCO BPHS programme, particularly in Kunar. Whilst efforts have been made to coordinate development assistance and humanitarian aid, these efforts have mainly come from ECHO, which has the flexibility to be able to respond to declining security and the influx of returnees. Whilst the SEHAT programme has been slower to respond, increased funding is now available to implementing NGOs, some of whom already combine both development and humanitarian funding. SEHAT funds has provided specific fund allocations for returnees and IDPs. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> MIP 2011-2013 Final report of ECHO projects: ECHO/-AS/BUD/2013/91005; ECHO/-AS/BUD/2012/91006; ECHO/AS/BUD/2014/91008; ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91013; ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91011; ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91006 Interviews 202, 205, 208 	<p>Strong – document analysis has been compared with interview data.</p>
	<p>Governance/Regional cooperation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Development interventions build on the humanitarian work done by ECHO and Aid to Uprooted People (AUP) under the EC Annual Action Programme. AUP supports the most 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CSP 2007-2013 MIP 2014-2020 	<p>Indicative – limited indication of</p>

	<p>vulnerable population groups including returnees and Internally Displaced Populations (IDPs). There are synergies with the EU-supported programme Local Integration of Vulnerable and Excluded Uprooted People (LIVE-UP) in Afghanistan. The nature of the synergies is unclear.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> In 2015, an allocation of EUR 0.5 million was decided for education in emergencies through the "Children of Peace" budget line. The action funded under this budget ran in 2016 and was coordinated with the EU funded "Aid to uprooted people" programme, which had the same focus of building resilience for children's in protracted displacement situations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> HIP 2016 	<p><i>coordination with ECHO in this sector and the nature of the synergies is unclear.</i></p>
I-622	Evidence of EU development actions (in the four sectors) and ECHO actions and benefitting from each other and avoiding duplication		
	<p>Summary: Synergies between EU development and humanitarian actions are envisaged by the strategic documents, particularly for the LRRD and AUP actions, however, there is no evidence that these intentions are pursued at the project level. ECHO appears to be paying more attention to this than DEVCO, it is in general ECHO that works around DEVCO's efforts by providing complementarity services in remote areas, namely for water, sanitation and shelter for returnees, as well as food assistance and education and health services in emergency, which represent the biggest sector covered by ECHO contributions. One reason for this trend is that ECHO's instruments are more flexible than DEVCO's and ECHO is geared towards quicker response, mobilising resources and doing short-term interventions.</p>		
	<p>General information:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The strategic documents specifically refer to Afghanistan as a "archetypal test case for building resilience and linking relief, rehabilitation, and development (LRRD) in protracted crises". Therefore, it is recognised in the documents that development interventions need to be flexible with a close humanitarian-development approach. Complementary actions are particularly identified through for thematic budget lines, such as the Aid to Uprooted People AUP, see below. However, other than highlighting the fragility situation of Afghanistan, the MIPs do not specifically refer to ECHO for complementarity actions between humanitarian and development actions, even though it is specified that the social sector includes humanitarian support for IDPs, which would suggest a demand for coordination and complementarity to enhance the effectiveness of the actions. The ECHO Humanitarian Implementation Plans (HIP) include a specific section on complementarities: "in order to ensure effective LRRD (Linking Relief Rehabilitation and Development), DG ECHO maintains very close contacts with the EC Delegation in Kabul". ECHO that works around DEVCO's efforts by providing complementarity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> MIPs 2007-2010, 2011-2013 and 2014-2010 Interviews 009, 011, 018 HIP 2010; HIPs (2007-2016) Mid-Term Review of the Country Strategy 	<p>Satisfactory – the information in documents is mainly at strategic level and planning stage. But interviews confirm the information</p>

	<p>services in remote areas, namely for water, sanitation and shelter for returnees, as well as food assistance and health services, which represent the biggest sector covered by ECHO contributions.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ECHO's instruments are more flexible than DEVCO's and ECHO is geared towards quicker response, mobilising resources and doing short-term interventions, whereas DEVCO programming and procurement procedures take time. It is thus easier for ECHO than DEVCO to reorient its engaged to align with DVCO than vice-versa. Moreover, ECHO is reactive vis-à-vis disasters and emerging needs, so it is difficult for DEVCO to factor this into its strategic planning and programming. A visible link is also not easy to establish, as DEVCO wants high visibility, whereas ECHO need a low profile, e.g. to be able to operate in areas not controlled by GoIRA. Moreover, number of EU funded projects, were jointly co-funded by other donors, making it more difficult to align support and create synergies with ECHO. 	<p>Paper for Afghanistan (2007-13)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews 011, 018 	
	<p>Agriculture and Rural Development:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> No linkages, synergies or duplication were identified in the sample projects (see I-621) Under the “Rural development” sector, particularly for food security, actions are coordinated with ECHO, which provides complementary food assistance in remote areas. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I-621 Mid-Term Review of the Country Strategy Paper for Afghanistan (2007-13) 	<p>Strong – see I-621</p>
	<p>Health/Social protection:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> No references to complementarities in the documents reviewed for the sample projects of this sector (see I-621) Specific mention of ECHO support to the health sector is in the MIP for 2011-2013: <i>ECHO provides complementary services (including water, sanitation and shelter for returnees, as well as food assistance, but not health services).</i> ECHO actions are fully aligned to DEVCO health sector actions in order to avoid duplication. DG ECHO phased out health interventions due to the increasing engagement in the sector by the EUD, the World Bank, and USAID. However, in 2012, ECHO decided to intervene again in the health sector due to the decrease in coverage of the Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS). Indeed, during 2013-2015 the health sector has received the largest amount of contributions from ECHO compared to other years of ECHO support. For nutrition, collaborations were foreseen in order to support the BPHS. An option for such collaboration was foreseen through for instance a “<i>nutritional surveys in order to</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sample project documents MIP 2014-2020 ECHO inventory data received from ECHO HIP 2012 I-621 HIP 2010 	<p>Strong– see I-621</p>

	<p><i>get some reliable data for Afghanistan within the nutrition cluster framework. Should acute malnutrition be identified, DG ECHO might intervene (if access is granted). Should it be chronic malnutrition, then the development stakeholders, including the EC delegation within the BPHS would be intervening”.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Some concerns were raised about the potential for double funding, particularly of nutrition interventions. Efforts have been made to ensure that additional resources are available to NGOs implementing the BPHS programme. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews 202, 205, 208 	
	<p>Governance/Regional cooperation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> No linkages, synergies or duplication identified in the sample projects (see I-621) Under the aid to uprooted people programme, DG DEVCO provides assistance to returning Afghan refugees and some support is also foreseen to humanitarian flights that would be complementary to DG ECHO Support. The education sector, which is not covered by the DEVCO focal sectors is supported by ECHO, even though through a small amount. In 2015, <i>“an allocation of EUR 0.5 million has been decided for education in emergencies through the "Children of Peace" budget line. The action funded under this budget will run through 2016 and is coordinated with the EU funded "Aid to uprooted people" program, both focusing on building resilience for children's in protracted displacement situations”.</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sample Project documents Action Document DCI/ASIE/2014/33805 HIP 2016 I-621 	<p>Strong– see I-621</p>
<p>I-623</p>	<p>Degree of alignment and mutual reinforcement between EU strategies and message for its development assistance and political dialogue and cooperation with Afghanistan</p>		
	<p>Summary</p> <p>In general, the alignment between the overall EU political message and the EU cooperation effort is evident at strategic level. Indeed, the EU development efforts in the country, as identified by the CSP 2007-2013 and the MIP 2014-2020 are reinforcing the overarching political commitment for stabilisation and inclusive development, which are the ultimate goal of the political commitments set out in the EU Council Plans 2009 and 2014-2016. The ongoing establishment of joint EUSR, EEAS, DEVCO, GoIRA committees under the Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development (CAPD) (a cooperation agreement – like a partnership and cooperation agreement), indicates a) that coordination was previously insufficient, and b) a commitment to improving coordination. Moreover, the ability of EEAS to engage in Afghanistan and cooperate with DEVCO and the EUD is limited due to a) no in-country presence, and b) the absence of a formalised high-level EU-Afghanistan political dialogue process. There is an increased awareness of these limits and positive signs of change, such as the <i>“Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development”</i> which will define a structure for joint committees where EEAS, EC (DEVCO and interested DGs) and GoIRA can meet on a regular basis. The EUSR function is discontinued and from August 2017, the political cooperation falls under EEAS. Coordination and cooperation between the EUSR Political Section and the DEVCO Development Section was mainly on an ad-hoc and inter-personal basis rather than fully institutionalised, although regular coordination meetings were introduced in mid 2016. While the full potential for synergies was thus not fully utilised, a notable example of synergy is</p>		

	<p>the inclusion of mining indicators in the SBC, which reinforces the EUSR Offices’ advocacy and awareness raising on illegal mining and mining regulation.</p>											
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The EU development strategies have continuously been in line with contemporary EU political engagements. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ DEVCO MIP 2007-2010 and the EU Action Plan Afghanistan and Pakistan 2009. The guiding principle underpinning the MIP 2007-2010 was the increased focus of EC assistance on the sub-national level, which was also stressed in the EU Action Plan 2009. The latter suggested indeed that the EU should concentrate its efforts on strengthening state capacity and institutions to promote good governance, human rights and efficient public administration, especially at the sub-national level. However, few areas remain uncovered by the EU Council Plan such as the social sectors and regional cooperation (see table 623a below). ○ DEVCO MIP 2014-2020 and EU Action Plan 2014-2016. The EU cooperation will cover through the MIP all areas mentioned by the EU Council Plan 2014-2016 and the alignment is also clearly mentioned in the EU cooperation strategy. ○ The Brussels conference in October 2016 reaffirmed the EU political commitment in Afghanistan in order to support the stabilisation and subsequent development of the country. The key areas identified are: fight against corruption, economic growth, poverty reduction and strengthen democratic institutions. Attention is also paid towards human rights, especially the rights of women and children, as well migration. These themes are aligned to the previous EU Council 2014-16 and the current MIP 2014-2020, see table below. It is also stated that the EU political commitment in the country is aligned to the overarching aid effectiveness principles (ownership, alignment to local systems, harmonisation/avoid duplication, results, mutual accountability) and is therefore reinforcing the overarching political cooperation commitment for stabilisation and development. <p>Table 623a: Alignment between EU development strategy and cooperation strategy</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="253 1161 1391 1353"> <thead> <tr> <th>DEVCO CSP 2007-2013</th> <th>EU Council Plan 2009</th> <th>DEVCO MIP 2014-2020</th> <th>EU Council Plan 2014-2016</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Rural development</td> <td>Promoting growth through agriculture and rural development</td> <td>Agriculture and rural development</td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table>		DEVCO CSP 2007-2013	EU Council Plan 2009	DEVCO MIP 2014-2020	EU Council Plan 2014-2016	Rural development	Promoting growth through agriculture and rural development	Agriculture and rural development		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CSP 2007-2013 • EU Council “EU Action in Afghanistan and Pakistan 2009” • MIP 2014-2020 • EU Action Plan 2014-2016 • Brussels Conference factsheet, https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/afghanistan/10740/eu-afghanistan-relations_en 	<p>Satisfactory – <i>The strategic intentions and plans are clearly defined</i></p>
DEVCO CSP 2007-2013	EU Council Plan 2009	DEVCO MIP 2014-2020	EU Council Plan 2014-2016									
Rural development	Promoting growth through agriculture and rural development	Agriculture and rural development										

	Governance	Strengthening Afghan capacity and ownership Strengthening the Rule of Law	Policing and rule of law Democratisation and accountability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Promoting peace, security and regional stability Reinforcing democracy Fostering the rule of law and respect for human rights, in particular the rights of women and children, 		
	Health		Health	Encouraging economic and human development		
	Social protection		<i>Agriculture and rural development</i>			
	Mine action					
	Regional Cooperation					
		Enhancing the effectiveness of the EU presence and activities in Afghanistan				
		Humanitarian assistance				
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Migration: EU messaging has a big focus on migration while EU Cooperation strategies (CSP 2007-16 and MIP 2014-2020) do not include migration in the main issues and focal sectors, and support is primarily provided to Afghan IDPs and refugees through regional programmes such as the AUP Afghanistan (see I-141, I-142). The lack of coordination on this issue is a concern because there is a political agreement with GoIRA on migration, which should be pursued at all levels. The political cooperation with Afghanistan is led by the EU Special Representative (EUSR), and there is thus the Political Section is led by EUSR and there is no EEAS presence at the EUD. This will change soon, as the EUSR function is discontinued, ending in August 2017 and the Political Section will be led by EEAS. This will affect the EUPol RUFOR policing mission and EUPAT engagement police cooperation, which fall 				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interview 004 EU-Afghanistan-Pakistan Council Action Plan 2009 EU-Afghanistan Council Action Plan 2014-16 I-141 I-142 Interviews 004, 011, 023, 027, 028, 032, 401, 420, 425 	Indicative – <i>the information is only at strategic level.</i>

<p>under the EUSR office. At the time of the field mission, the implementing partner for the successor police mission was unclear.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Overall, the interaction between the EUD Development Section (under DEVCO) and the EUSR office has generally been modest, and thus mainly been between the EUSR office and the Security Reform and Rule of Law Section. DEVCO carried out in 2016 an assessment (verification mission) of the DEVCO-EUSR relations, which found there were insufficient linkages between the two. This led to regular meetings between the Development Section and the EUSR office where the two teams update each other and ensure alignment, • The coordination in relation to elections works well, but coordination and cooperation between the EUSR office and the Development Section is also dependent on inter-personal relations rather than being fully institutionalised. • On anti-corruption, the EU's advocacy and political dialogue has been well-recognised by the government and other donors, even though there has been limited development funding directed explicitly at anti-corruption in recent years. • The EUSR office is leading the dialogue with GoIRA on human rights and gender, and thus also follows the dialogue and progress related to the SMAF incentive programme. The Development Section contributes to the dialogue, e.g. with programme experience. But the political dialogue does not always utilise the programmatic experience to its full potential. • An example of EUSR-DEVCO coordination and synergy is the indicators for SBC. The EUSR was engaged in political advocacy and awareness raising related to illegal mining (e.g. vis-à-vis security and economic development) and mining regulation; an area which is not covered by the development cooperation in Afghanistan. Indicators related to illegal mining and mining regulation are included in the SBC. • Institutionalised political dialogues are not established, but the EUD meets GoIRA frequently, in particular to discuss human rights issues for which a local (in-country) political dialogue is established; EEAS does not participate in this dialogue, but is informed about it. The lack of a formalised political dialogue limits the active participation of EEAS and the subsequent coordination between DEVCO and EEAS – as does the fact that EEAS does not have a permanent presence in Afghanistan. • The EC and European Union Council has recently adopted a Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development (CAPD) (a cooperation agreement – like a partnership and cooperation agreement), which will provide a structure for joint committees, which was a gap in the common strategy for Afghanistan. The possible stakeholders for such 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interview 004 • https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters- 	<p>Indicative – <i>it is too early to assess CAPD</i></p>
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	meetings would be EEAS, EC (DEVCO and interested DGs), and GoIRA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, probably at Deputy Minister level).	homepage/6311/eu-and-afghanistan-initial-cooperation-agreement-partnership-and-development_en	implementati on
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EQ7. Has the EU's assistance to Afghanistan avoided having any significant negative effects?

JC-71	Scale and intensity of significant negative effects		
	Indicators	Sources of information	Quality of evidence
I-711	Tangible examples of negative impacts affecting people		
	<p>Summary: The review of evidence did not identify tangible examples of significant negative effects caused by the EU in supporting particular interventions under the four focal sectors. To a lesser extent, we identified two instances under the governance and rule of law sectors in which EU-supported interventions may have had a negative effect on people.</p>		
	<p>Agriculture and Rural Development</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> No negative effects were identified in the programme sample, but some local cases of elite capture could have taken place. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Screening of available project documentation Screening during interviews 	<p>Satisfactory/indicative – for some programmes the document availability is good and includes evaluations, but for other programmes the documentation is more limited and external views absent. Interviews have not revealed further examples of negative impacts.</p>
	<p>Health</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> No significant negative effects were identified in the programme sample. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Screening of available project documentation Screening during interviews 	<p>Satisfactory – the document availability for the programmes is good and includes evaluations.</p>
	<p>Democratisation and Accountability</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Afghan Sub-national Governance Program (ASGP) demonstrated the potential to create tensions and conflict within local communities. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ROM 2010 	<p>Satisfactory, potential negative impacts identified by</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The intervention focused on governance across all municipalities, provinces and districts, regardless of their level of political stability and influence of warlords and informal power structures. The potential for this to create tensions and conflicts did not appear to have been considered. • The ASGP may have contributed to deepening inequalities among provinces and their capacity to respond to citizens’ needs. • 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interviews 419, 424 • Afghanistan Subnational Governance Programme (ASGP) phase II. Evaluation commissioned by SIDA, 2014 	<p>documentation and supported by interviews.</p>
	<p>Police and Rule of Law</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MIP 2014-2020 outlined EU support to improving the performance and capacity to the ANP. The oversight mechanism under which the Inspector General’s Office (IGO) in the Ministry of Interior Affairs (MOIA) reviewed complaints against the ANP was plagued by corruption. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Only 9 out of over 2,000 complaints forwarded to the IGO were forwarded for prosecution. The evaluation team was not been able to access a copy of the LOTFA report; this information comes from a media report. • Leadership within the project had facilitated and participated in corruption by not investigating allegations against the police. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ It is plausible that the level of corruption regarding police performance negatively affected citizens – either those who made reports against police performance that were not investigated; or those who perceived the system to lack justice and effectiveness and therefore saw no advantage in reporting complaints. • Female police officers may have been put in dangerous situations without proper protections or a responsive complaints mechanism. This resulted in a high attrition rate of female police officers. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MIP 2014-2020 • UN probe reportedly finds corruption in Afghan police oversight division, RT Times, 2015 • Interviews 401 and 420 	<p><i>Satisfactory</i>, negative impacts identified by different sources.</p>
<p>I-712</p>	<p>Degree to which EU interventions had significant negative effects on government ownership and accountability</p>		

	<p>Summary EU-supported interventions did contribute to producing negative effects on government ownership in the governance and rule of law sectors. No examples were identified in the health sector and significant efforts have been made to build government ownership and build government capacity to monitor and report on accountability.</p>		
	<p>General</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To the extent that government control over programming and trust fund decisions is considered a positive feature, then the EU's use of preferencing in its funding is negative. The EU has preferenced to particular programmes in the ARTF and has preferenced geographically in projects such as LoGo. The earmarking of funds provided to ARTF is a concern for GoIRA, as it goes against the principle of a trust fund, results in enhanced rigidity and reduces the measurability of ARTF and GoIRA. EU has to a significant extent contributed to this through preferencing its support. (see I-412, I-433) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The Ministry of Finance raised concerns with imbalances in resources for public funding between sectors and geographically, resulting from the high degree of preferencing by donors. However, the EU was not seen as especially bad or good in this regard. • ARTF also supported the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Some PRTs channelled some resources through local actors, intending to do so through credible bodies that represented local authority. In practice the experience is mixed, since some actors are corrupt, members of power networks that are not supportive of the Kabul government, or may not be accepted as legitimate representatives by the local populations. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EAMR 2007 • ARTF External Review, 2008 • Interview 424 • ARTF External Review, 2008 • ARTF External Review, 2012 	<p><i>Satisfactory</i> – based on external views and interview.</p>
	<p>Agriculture and Rural Development</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No negative effects were identified in the programme sample, but some local cases of elite capture could have taken place. • The focus of the interventions in the A&RD sector has been to build GoIRA capacity, and support has to a large and increasing extent been provided on-budget and implemented through government. (see I-412) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Screening of available project documentation • I-412 • I-433 • EAMR 2007 • ARTF External Review, 2012 • Interview 005 	<p><i>Strong</i> – the support modalities and central role of GoIRA in implementation is clear.</p>

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Screening during interviews 	
	<p>Health</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Significant efforts have been made to build government ownership over the evaluation period and the current health sector programme is working to build government capacity to monitor and report on accountability. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Afghanistan Joint Health Sector Review, 2015 • Evaluation of the Current Health Sector Support Programme, 2012 • Screening during interviews 	Strong – <i>confirmed by two external sources</i>
	<p>Democratisation and Accountability</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There were instances where EU-supported interventions had a negative effect on local operations, because of their presence. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The presence of multiple donors and implementing organisations working on public administration reform and sub-national governance distorted the labour market in the short/medium term. This saturation resulted in the creation of a parallel ('second') civil service with staff benefitting from multiple salary top-ups from donors. This was found not to create a favourable environment for reform because staff were less likely to promote and encourage transition to GoIRA-led processes, where they would forego the salary top-ups. • The structure of the EU-supported ASGP offered a permissive environment to strengthen non-democratic structures. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ This resulted from the lack of democratic authority over key decisions regarding budget allocations at the sub-national governance level, which rested with appointed figures at the provincial and district levels. In many cases, these positions were found to be staffed by local warlords. This risked undermining the policies of enhancing democracy and reaching the most vulnerable groups. • Earmarking of funds to particular provinces may have negatively impacted the reputation of the GoIRA by making it appear inequitable. • The overall impact and credibility of the electoral process was damaged under ELECT II because of the occurrence of fraud during the electoral operations. While 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EAMR 2011 • Afghanistan Subnational Governance Programme (ASGP) phase II. Evaluation commissioned by SIDA, 2014 • Interview 419 	<i>Satisfactory</i> , some negative effects are evident from evaluations and interviews, but the impact on government credibility is not completely unclear.

	<p>the outcome of the audit led to a peaceful transition of power, the process resulted from a politically brokered one, not a technical solution. This could have eroded the trust of the Afghan voter in Afghan democracy, and reduced the credibility of the government.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNDP Final Evaluation of ELECT II, 2015 	
	<p>Police and Rule of Law</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The governance structure of the Law and Order Trust Fund (LOTFA) project potentially contributed to ownership issues which may have negatively affected the GoIRA. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ While the LOTFA Project Coordinator reported to the Ministry of Interior Affairs (MOIA), LOTFA was not perceived as a support unit to the MOIA, and LOTFA staff considered themselves UNDP staff. This contributed to ownerships issues of LOTFA from MOIA management. Absent enhanced ownership, LOTFA would had little substantive impact on the development or performance of the MOIA. • The large amount of donor funds to MOIA under LOTFA, including EU support, likely helped enabled corruption and misappropriation of funds to occur. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Findings of corruption within the oversight mechanism established within the IGO to investigate complaints against the ANP likely had a negative effect on GoIRA accountability. ◦ In the context of allegations of widespread corruption in Afghanistan’s democratic institutions, allegations against the police oversight mechanism likely affected GoIRA’s accountability and credibility. The review team has not sighted the UNDP or LOTFA reports • The LOTFA fraud case resulted in uncertainty regarding trust levels amongst the international development community, and trust of Afghan citizens in the GoIRA and assistance providers. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lessons Learned from LOTFA Pillar 2, 2014 • UN probe reportedly finds corruption in Afghan police oversight division, RT Times, 2015 • Interview 409 • Lessons Learned, LOTFA VI, 2014 • Interview 409 	<p><i>Indicative, views of MOIA stakeholders are not represented</i></p>
<p>I-713</p>	<p>Degree to which EU assistance increased the capacity of actors doing harm</p>		
	<p>Summary Limited examples were identified in the A&RD, democratisation, and rule of law sectors that EU assistance increased the capacity of actors to do harm. No examples were identified in the health sector. However, there was a general consensus among EU, government and implementing partners that the EU’s support was contributing to a system that creates and enables corruption.</p>		

	<p>General</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EU, government and implementing partner interviewees believe that the EU's support is contributing to a system that creates and enables corruption. There are significant surpluses in most core channels of development funding in Afghanistan; the country does not lack development money, but is struggling with absorbing the money as well as the nuts and bolts of implementation. The risk is that money is wasted or diverted to corruption. • The large influx of money into Afghanistan is considered a key driver of corruption in the country. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interviews 402, 403, 409, 420 • SIGAR: Corruption in Conflict: Lessons Learned from the US Experience, Sept 2016 	<p><i>Strong – based on multiple independent views</i></p>
	<p>Agriculture and Rural Development</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • HPS (Horticulture Private Sector Development Project) is implemented through ANHDO (Afghanistan National Horticulture Development Organization), which the programme also seeks to strengthen. ANHDO has a good reputation and is an important institution in the horticulture sector, but was affected by governance issues with Board bylaws that went against democratic principles (by stipulating that only individuals with three years of prior Board experience are eligible) and internal conflicts in the Board related to power and authority over spending. ANHDO did not adhere to EU procurement rules (see I-424). The Board interfered in day-to-day HPS implementation. While the HPS Steering Committee requested ANHDO to follow procurement procedures and the board to stop interfering the situation did not improve for some time. The access to additional resources from HPS seems to have contributed to fuelling the conflict, even if the HPS Steering Committee has proactively urged that the issues are solved. The two donors in 2016 gave ANDHO a roadmap with criteria that had to be met or the grant would be cancelled. ANDHO implemented the roadmap, changed its bylaws, membership policy and organisational structure, membership was opened to new members, and a new Board of Directors was elected. (see I-424) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mid-Term Evaluation, 2015 • PHDP II Final Evaluation, 2015 • Interviews 009, 013 	<p><i>Strong – independent view, interviews have provided up-to-date information.</i></p>
	<p>Health</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Donor support to supplement the salaries of government officials and the employment of advisers in public offices on high salaries has resulted in tensions between the staff with higher salaries and staff in public offices without external support. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Screening of available project documentation • Interview 202 	<p><i>Satisfactory – the document availability for the programmes is good and includes evaluations.</i></p>
	<p>Democratisation and Accountability</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Afghanistan Subnational 	<p><i>Satisfactory, documentary</i></p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The EU-supported ASGP potentially increased the capacity of local warlords to exercise greater influence and power in their provinces. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Several governors supported by the ASGP were former warlords and strongmen. The capacity development elements of ASGP empowered these individuals, effectively strengthening and legitimising their position in a context where there is limited oversight. ○ No adjustments seem to have been made to mitigate this. • Funding to the Independent Election Commission did not increase the capacity of the staff to perpetrate the fraud that occurred, but the choice of modalities likely enabled the fraud. The activity may not have arisen under a Direct Implementation Modality (DIM) as there would have been fewer opportunities to forge receipts. (see I-412, I-423, I-424). After an audit of IEC capacity to manage funds, the activity is returning to Direct Implementation. 	<p>Governance Programme (ASGP) phase II. Evaluation commissioned by SIDA, 2014</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interview 419 and 424 • UNDP ELECT II Final Evaluation, 2015 • UNDP, Response Letter seeking clarification on ELECT II implementation modality, 2013 • I-412, I-423, I-424 • ELECT 11 Annual Report, 2014 • Interview 402 	<p>evidence supported by interviews.</p> <p><i>Strong</i> — Evidence from multiple sources, including external review, suggests that the modality approach likely enabled the fraud.</p>
	<p>Police and Rule of Law</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • During the period under evaluation, the ANP faced major corruption problems, and corruption within the ANP is “endemic”. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ A 2009 Police Perception survey identified 27% of respondents had been asked to pay a bribe, which aligned with the results of a similar United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) survey in 2010, in which 25% of respondents indicated they had been asked to pay a bribe in the previous 12 months. ○ This data represented the highest level of attempted corruption among civil service groups examined in the study. • The presence of corruption within the ANP and the MOIA was recognised by the EU prior to program commencement and many risks were apparent. However, under CSP 2007-2013, EU support to the ANP through LOTFA was 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluation of the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) Phase V: Report (UNDP), 2012 • Evaluation of LOTFA Pillar 2, 2014 	<p><i>Strong</i> - Clear from multiple sources including external views that corruption was significant, however whether corruption levels increased is unclear.</p>

	<p>directed towards funding the salaries of ANP officers. There is no evidence that the prevalence of corruption grew, but it appears that the absolute volume of funding that could be diverted was dependent on donor support.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ This support may have enabled the levels of corruption that emerged within the force during the period under evaluation. In turn, this negatively impacted on the ANP’s reputation. ○ The delivery of a “living wage” was a strong defence against corruption. As of 2014, there was no indication that the ANP wage was adequate. ANP officers had requested higher wages in response to higher cost of living. ○ ANP officers needed a realistic incentive to increase rule of law services, because their salaries only provided a disincentive. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● When donors have attempted to address issues such as reducing the number of “ghost police” or non-working, senior “officers” on the payroll, the MOI has on occasion threatened to with-hold payments from junior, working officers in retaliation. In this sense, LOTFA funding can be seen as providing patronage to powerful figures who do little in terms of policing. ● There were problems with some ANP staff receiving payments and the two main electronic systems used for payroll data in Afghanistan were flawed. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The two main systems, which were supported by EU funding, did not communicate with each other. ○ The ANP’s process for collecting attendance data, which informed payroll data, had weak controls and oversights. ○ This flawed system could facilitate corrupt behaviour in people receiving payment for days not worked. ● Corruption within the ANP significantly impacted on broader reforms, which were prioritised by the EU under the MIP 2011-2013. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Reform processes required strong management to lead capacity development, however widespread corruption diluted management capacities within the ANP. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Interview 409 ● The Afghan National Police: A Study on Corruption and Clientelism, Danny Singh, 2015 ● Interview 420, 423 ● SIGAR (Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction) Audit Report, 2015⁵ ● UN probe reportedly finds corruption in Afghan police oversight division, RT Times, 2015 	
<p>JC-72</p>	<p>Extent to which potential negative effects of the interventions were considered and addressed by implementing partners</p>		

⁵ <https://www.ssrresourcecentre.org/2015/11/03/the-afghan-national-police-a-study-on-corruption-and-clientelism/>

I-721	Comprehensiveness of risk monitoring frameworks and systems in identifying potential significant negative effects, regularity with which risks were monitored		
	<p>Summary</p> <p>Across the risk monitoring frameworks we reviewed, risk identification appeared focused on external risks impacting project performance, or internal issues which presented a risk to project performance. In the majority of risk documentation, no risks were identified to beneficiaries stemming from project activities. One notable exception is the risk management framework for the Municipal Governance Support Programme which articulated risks arising from programme implementation.</p>		
	<p>General</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The risk of negatively affecting local communities through ARTF programmes was identified in external reviews. Such risks do not appear to have been identified in actual programme documents. In 2014, the identification of operational and implementation risks was a priority for the ARTF. This was focussed on risks <u>to</u> implementation, as opposed to risks posed <u>by</u> implementation. • Within ARTF, regular financial control mechanisms are in place and funds are generally used for their intended purpose. Audit report results have improved over time and are usually unqualified. (see I-433) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ARTF External Review, 2008 • ARTF External Review, 2012 • NSP External Review, 2006 • ARTF Mid-Year Report, 2014 • ARTF, Administrators' First Technical Review, 2015 • ARTF, update on Delivery of the Reform Agenda, 2013 • ARTF Incentive Program, MOU, 2009 	<p><i>Indicative</i> — risk management frameworks do not appear to focus on risks caused by the program</p>
	<p>Agriculture and Rural Development</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Available programme documentation is in general more focused on external risk (e.g. insecurity) than potential internal risks generated by the programmes. • NABDP: all sub-projects were subject to economic and social feasibility assessments, which also helped identifying risk and potential conflict. • NSP: 3rd party monitoring was carried out and confirmed that the funding reached the village level and was spent on the agreed infrastructure sub-projects. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Screening of available project documentation • I-433 • Interviews 017, 021 	<p><i>Satisfactory</i> – programme documentation does not refer to risk monitoring, but some information was obtained in interviews</p>

	<p>Health</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Whilst the documentation for the SEHAT programme does make reference to a range of issues that could be seen as risks (political interference, internal controls), there is no specific part of the aide memoires or reporting that refer directly to risk. There is no evidence of risk analysis or of the development and implementation of mitigation measures. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Screening of available project documentation • Screening during interviews 	<p><i>Indicative – programme documentation does not refer to risks.</i></p>
	<p>Democratisation and Accountability</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The risk framework for the Municipal Governance Support Programme (MGSP) clearly identified risks arising from programme implementation and the potential for the programme to have a negative effect. Risks included the misuse of sub-project funds, and increased pressure on urban vulnerable poor. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Mitigation measures included tangible tasks and responses to monitor any negative effects. ○ Risks were monitored and updated in the Annual Report 2015-2016. • There was a potential risk in the ASGP to the independence of the sub-national governance structure: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The Provincial Council coordination in Kabul had staff appointed by the government, which should not be able to oversee the management of a democratically elected body • The potential for the AGSP to create tensions and conflict within local communities given the intervention supported governance across all municipalities, provinces and districts, regardless of their level of political stability and influence of warlords and informal power structures, was not identified in risk management frameworks nor has it been subsequently addressed or mitigated. • An element of the EU-funded ELECT programme had the potential to result in an increase in the discrimination of minority groups. concerned the potential abuse of e-Tazkera (electronic biometric identity cards) data and the lack of a data protection policy, in line with international standards. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The visible data on the card could have produced negative consequences concerning the obligation to record ethnic or religious background on the card. ○ The EU Delegation to the elections undertook to monitor the issue and raise concerns with GoIRA and international counterparts where relevant, in political dialogues and project management contexts. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Municipal Governance Support Programme, Grant Application Form, 2015 • Annual Report, 2016 • ROM 2010 • Interviews 419 and 424 • ROM 2009 	<p><i>Satisfactory, program documentation indicates risks were identified in MSGP. Interviews and documentation indicates risks were not considered in other programs.</i></p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fraud occurrence during the electoral operations under ELECT II was identified as a political risk. Risk mitigation strategies focussed on fraud deterrence and detection measures and this reduced instances of fraud from the 2009 and 2010 elections (65% less). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Action Fiche for Support for Credible and Transparent Elections, 2013 • UNDP Final Evaluation of ELECT II, 2015 	
	<p>Police and Rule of Law</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • At the programme level for LOTFA, the identified risks are high-level and do not identify corruption-related risks • The risks and likelihood of ongoing corruption within the ANP were recognised by the EU in strategy documents towards the latter stage of the evaluation period: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The MIP 2014-2020 is the only EU country strategy document acknowledging corruption within the ANP. While the document acknowledges the impact of the corruption, there is no indication that mitigation measures were identified or analysed. We do not have access to documents detailing the decision-making process within the EU to understand the considerations regarding ongoing funding. ○ One perspective is that the focus on military strategy pushed off consideration of dealing with corruption until later • No documents available suggest the EU considered the major risks of doing harm in supporting law enforcement actors when they lack effective political direction and institutional capacity for mitigating or responding to corruption, clientelism and human rights abuses. • The funding of ANP salaries was identified as an initiative to reduce corrupt behaviour by ANP staff. However, we have not identified documentation to suggest that the risk of uneven distribution of salaries arising from technical errors was recognised, and it is unclear what, if any, mitigation strategies were implemented to reduce the risk of this occurring. • A lack of well-thought out deployment strategies and a functioning complaints mechanism may have put female police officers in dangerous situations without proper protections. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ID FICHE, 2009 • ACTION FICHE 2009 • MIP 2014-2020 • CSP 2007-2013 • MIP 2011-2013 • Interview 420 • Screening of available documentation • Identification Fiche, LOTFA Phase V, 2009 • Screening of available documentation • Interviews 401 and 420 	<p><i>Satisfactory</i>, documentation indicates risks posed by implementation were not considered. This view is supported by interviews.</p>

I-722	Evidence that the potential significant negative effects identified caused adjustments to the design of interventions and were mitigated		
	Summary Limited evidence was collected for this indicator, with only a few examples identified. This is potentially because of the absence of documents in the sample provided or that adjustments were not deemed necessary or not documented.		
	General <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The ARTF adapted its approach as a result of the massive fraud detected in the Kabul Bank. The crisis of 2010/2011 put the ARTF under pressure given its role in funding the GoIRA's recurrent budget. In response to the fraudulent activity, the ARTF developed clearer guidelines for the financing of the Incentive Program, which was linked to improvements in public sector reform processes. • The financing arrangements of the State Building Contract is conditional upon the GoIRA demonstrating progress in all four eligibility criteria. These are public policies; macro-economic framework; public financial management; and transparency and oversight. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ARTF External Review, 2012 • State Building Contract, Action Document Afghanistan, 2016 	Strong – <i>independent view</i> . Satisfactory – <i>SBC indicators and efforts on PFMR-II roadmap align with lessons learned from fraud and corruption</i>
	Agriculture and Rural Development NABDP: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some infrastructure sub-projects were cancelled before implementation due to issues such as conflicts and elite capture. Examples: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Two communities were fighting over the contract to construct a 1km flood protection wall so the sub-project was cancelled. ○ Several sub-projects were identified as being driven by the personal interests of local elites or members of Parliament and were thus cancelled. • In one case a villager had agreed to provide land for a micro-hydropower facility, but after it was constructed he insisted that villagers should pay him for power; through mediation, it was agreed that the poor would have free access and other beneficiaries would pay the CDC for power. • Community disputes were mitigated by involving CDCs, DDA, district governors and/or provincial governors. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Screening of available project documentation • Interview 017 	Satisfactory/indicative – <i>for some programmes the document availability is good and includes evaluations, but for other programmes the documentation is more limited and external views absent</i>
	Health	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interviews 202, 205 	Satisfactory, based on interviews

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Changes have been made where there has been overlap with humanitarian support to ensure no double funding. 		
	<p>Democratisation and Accountability</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> An unintended negative effect of the ASGP was that the officials it targeted for capacity building, were attracted to leave their Afghan institutions and work with the UNDP. In response, the UNDP, through a Memorandum of Understanding, committed to not hiring Afghan staff from the beneficiary entities. The purpose was to mitigate against the risk of undermining the essence of the programme. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The MOU remains in place With the transition to a National Implementation Modality (NIM) under LoGo, fewer Afghan staff are moving UNDP. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ROM 2010 Interview 419 	<i>Satisfactory</i> , based on documentation and interview
	<p>Regional Cooperation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Potential negative effects of corruption and interference in implementation activities were recognised and mitigated under the Border Management in Northern Afghanistan (BOMNAF) programme. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> During 2013-2014 at least six issues were prevented and resolved by implementing an approach in which field activities were closely monitored and incidents resulted in immediate reporting to senior management. The evaluation team was unable to speak to anyone during the field study to further investigate the nature of these incidents, and whether broader changes were required to reduce the likelihood of the incidents occurring. 	Annual Project Report-BOMNAF, 2015	<i>Indicative</i> , limited documentation available.
I-723	Evidence of cases of misuse of funds, including how cases were identified and addressed		
	<p>Summary</p> <p>A review of the sample interventions identified one case of the misuse of funds in the LOTFA programme in the rule of law sector and one case of fraud involving money from ELECT II. No other cases were identified.</p>		
	<p>Agriculture and Rural Development</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> No cases of misuse were identified in the programme sample. <u>ARTE</u>: Financial control mechanisms are in place and funds generally used for their intended purpose. Audit report results have improved over time and are usually unqualified. (see I-433) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Screening of available project documentation I-433 	<i>Satisfactory/indicative – for some programmes the document availability is good and includes evaluations, but for other programmes the</i>

			<i>documentation is more limited and external views absent</i>
	Health <ul style="list-style-type: none"> No cases of misuse were identified in the programme sample. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Screening of available project documentation 	Satisfactory
	Democratisation and Accountability <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Under the Support to Credible and transparent Elections (ELECT II), funding provided to the Independent Election Commission (IEC) was siphoned by IEC staff who were implicated in fraud involving money from the project. The UNDP project office identified in one set of invoices some repeating numbers. It was referred to the office of audit and investigation, which found that the funds were being misappropriated by IEC staff. The remainder of the funds were blocked. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Additionally, the President asked the Supreme Audit Office to perform an audit, which confirmed UNDP's findings. Junior IEC staff were subsequently fired. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> UNDP ELECT II Final Evaluation, 2015 UNDP, Response Letter seeking clarification on ELECT II implementation modality, 2013 ELECT 11 Annual Report, 2014 Interview 402 	<i>Satisfactory</i> , based on documentation
	Police and Rule of Law <ul style="list-style-type: none"> In 2012, it was revealed that procurement fraud had occurred in LOTFA over a protracted period without being detected, reportedly including by UNDP's External Auditor. The fraud was reportedly conducted by UNDP service contractors and involved payments to ghost employees. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> LOTFA and the EU were aware of the presence of ghost employees in the ANP ranks in 2007. We have seen no indication that mitigation measures were employed to counter these records at that time. EU's Anti-Fraud Office reportedly investigated the fraud in October 2013. The evaluation team was unable to obtain a copy of the report. Following the fraud detection, LOTFA was redesigned to include stronger oversight mechanisms, including the creation of a dedicated fiduciary management office, more stringent monitoring and evaluation systems and increased support to the MOIA's Office of the Inspector General. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Organisational Capacity Assessment MOIA, Recommendations Design LOTFA VII, 2014 European Commission, File Note, LOTFA: final payment of last EC contribution, forthcoming contribution, 2007 	<i>Indicative</i> , it is unclear how the fraud was initially detected

JC-73	Effectiveness of the EUD's internal mechanisms and capacity to respond to negative effects effectively to negative impacts		
I-731	Evidence that the system is sufficiently flexible to respond to short-term demands and crises including corruption allegations against partner agencies		
	<p>Summary Limited evidence was identified in response to this indicator in the Health and Agriculture and Rural Development sectors, principally resulting from limited evidence of short-term crises. A few examples from the governance sectors indicate that the system is able to respond to short-term demands and crises; however, the responses were not always timely.</p>		
	<p>Agriculture and Rural Development</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> No examples of crises and corruption allegations were identified. Programmes in general had to adjust to deteriorating security. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Screening of available project documentation Screening during interviews 	<p>Satisfactory/indicative – for some programmes the document availability is good and includes evaluations, but for other programmes the documentation is more limited and external views absent</p>
	<p>Health</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> No examples of crises and corruption allegations were identified, although there were cases where recovery orders were issued after financial audits and some contracts were terminated due to poor performance. Programmes in general had to adjust to deteriorating security. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Screening of available project documentation Screening during interviews 	<p>Satisfactory</p>
	<p>Democratisation and Accountability</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Following the identification by UNDP's project office of fraud occurring in ELECT II, UNDP conducted an investigation/audit which confirmed misappropriation of funds. The remainder of the funds were blocked. ELECT III will return to the direct implementation modality (DIM). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interview 402 Elect II Evaluation Report (draft), 2015 Screening during interviews 	<p><i>Satisfactory</i> – based external view and interview</p>
	<p>Police and Rule of Law</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> EU's Anti-Fraud Office reportedly conducted an investigation in October 2013 into the fraud allegations which arose against LOTFA in 2012. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Organisational Capacity Assessment MOIA, Recommendations 	<p><i>Indicative</i> – External views absent, and it remains unclear how</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ This suggests that EU's response to the issue was appropriate, though the fraud appears to go on for some time before there was a response. The evaluation team was unable to obtain further information about the EU's response. 	Design LOTFA VII, 2014 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Screening during interviews 	the fraud was detected
I-732	Evidence that lessons were identified and incorporated into future strategies, interventions or risk monitoring.		
	Summary Sample interventions in the health, rule of law and governance sector indicate that lessons were identified, however the extent to which these lessons were incorporated into future strategies, interventions or risk monitoring is unclear.		
	Agriculture and Rural Development <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Since insecurity made it very difficult for the EUD to monitor programmes, the use of Trust Funds and contribution agreements with international organisations was increased – as these partners have a much stronger monitoring capacity than the EUD. (see I-412) • Citizens Charter: based on lessons from NSP, some changes and stricter rules have been introduced regarding CDC election processes. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Screening of available project documentation • Screening during interviews • I-412 • Interview 021 	<i>Satisfactory</i> – documents and interviews provided some information about risk monitoring.
	Health <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • An Implementers Comparison Study was undertaken in 2013, looking at the EU, USAID and the World Bank's approaches to implementing the BPHS and EPHS programmes. The study aimed to identify the differences between the approaches used by the donors to contracting out, using both a qualitative assessment of practices and procedures and a quantitative assessment of cost and relative cost efficiency. The comparison covered monitoring and reporting and auditing of contracts. The conclusions of this study were then used to inform the contracting out approach under the ARTF for the BPHS and EPHS for the country as a whole. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • BPHS/EPHS Implementers Comparison Study, 2013 • Interviews 202, 211 	<i>Strong</i> – confirmed by an external source
	Democratisation and Accountability <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The EU monitoring report for the ASGP in 2009 recommended that beneficiaries and customers participate in donor coordination sessions. Under LoGo, coordination meetings with IDLG, UNDP and donors are occurring though it is unclear with what regularity. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ROM 2009, MR-105241.02 • Interview 424 • Final ELECT II evaluation, 2015 	<i>Satisfactory</i> , based on documentation and interviews

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Review of Elect II identified that the NIM modality likely enabled misappropriation of funds. Subsequent iteration of ELECT will be implemented under a DIM modality. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interview 402 	
	<p>Police and Rule of Law</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identified lessons from the fraudulent activity that was detected within LOTFA included measures to be employed to improve oversight and accountability within LOTFA. These were directly relevant to procurement processes within LOTFA. The change in focus of EU's support to the ANP, from the payment of police salaries, towards reform, may have occurred in small part as a response to the increase in corruption within the police force. Initial programme strategy documents reflect an intervention logic that securing pay for police officers would reduce corrupt behaviour. Subsequent strategy documents distanced the approach from the payment of salaries as a sufficient tool to decrease corruption, and instead broadened the strategy towards police reform, specifically payroll capacity-building. However, it was mostly shifting donor interest in police reform that drove this change. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Organisational Capacity Assessment of the MoIA, Recommendations Design LOTFA VI, 2014 Identification Fiche LOTFA PHASE V, 2009 Interview 401, 420 	<p><i>Satisfactory</i>, based on documentation and supported by interviews</p>