

EuropeAid

**FINAL EVALUATION OF THE INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING
FOR THE TRANSPORT SECTOR
IN UGANDA PROJECT**

FWC SIEA 2018

Lot 2 Infrastructure, sustainable growth and jobs

EuropeAid/138778/DH/SER/Multi

Specific Contract Nr 300033087 — SIEA-2018-10312

Final Report

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Project implemented by
TRANSPORT & INFRASTRUCTURE
EXPERTISE GROUP

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
*“This evaluation is supported and guided by the European Commission and presented by TiEG.
The report does not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of the European Commission”.*

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**FWC SIEA 2018 – LOT 2: Infrastructure, Sustainable Growth &
Jobs EUROPEAID/138778/DH/SER/multi**

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Visit of the evaluation team to the UNRA regional office in Mbarara
 From left to right Eddy Bynens, ET Team Leader, Eng. Ngonzibwa Racheal, UNRA Regional Manager, Frederick Hunter, ET Transport Economist, Ms. Kutamba Doreen, UNRA Administration Assistant-Regional Office, Ben Ssebugga-Kimeze, TE back-up expert and road engineer, Eng. Abenabo Alison Twine, UNRA Assistant Branch Manager/ RME - Mbarara.

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AfDB	African Development Bank
BL	Baseline
C&V	Communication and Visibility
CAD	Computer Assisted Design
CDC	Cross-Directorate Collaboration
CISCOT	Civil Society Coalition on Transport
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CUSP	Civil Society in Uganda Support Programme
DA	District Administrator
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (of OECD)
Danida	Danish International Development Agency
DFID	Department for International Development, UK
DG INTPA	Directorate-General International Partnerships
DPs	Development Partners
DUCAR	District, urban and community access roads
EC	European Commission
EQ	Evaluation Question
ERB	Engineers Registration Board
EREP	Engineers Registration Enhancement Programme
ESIA	Environmental & Social Impact Analysis
ET	Evaluation Team
EU	European Union
EU MS	EU Member States
EUD	EU Delegation
EUR	Euro
FE	Final Evaluation
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FWC	Framework contract
GKMA	Greater Kampala Metropolitan Area
GoU	Government of Uganda
GTP	Graduate Training Programme
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
IDSS	Information and Decision Support Systems (URF)
IL	Intervention Logic
IPD	Initial Professional Development
IS	Information system
JC	Judgment Criteria
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
KE	Key Expert
LFM	Logical Framework Matrix
LNOB	Leave no-one behind
M&E	Monitoring & Evaluation
MDA	Ministry, Department and Agency
MoFPED	Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development
MoPS	Ministry of Public Service

MoWT	Ministry of Works and Transport
MS	Member States (of the EU)
MTEF	Mid-term Expenditure Framework
MTR	Mid Term Review
NAO	National Authorising Officer
NCIP	Northern Corridor Integration Projects
NDP	National Development Plan
NIP	National Indicative Programme
NITMP	National Integrated Transport Master Plan
NPA	National Planning Authority
NTC	National Technical College
NTMP	National Transport Master Plan
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PCSD	Policy Coherence for Sustainable development
PFM	Public Financial Management
PMC	Programme Management Committee
PMT	Project Management Team (of TiEG)
PSD	Private sector development
QAG	Quality Assessment Grid
RG	Reference Group
RMI	Road Maintenance Initiative
RMMoS	Road Maintenance Management & Monitoring System
ROM	Result Oriented Monitoring
SC	Steering Committee
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SEA	Strategic Environmental Assessment
TA	Technical Assistance
ToC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference
TSU	Technical Support Unit
UACE	Uganda Association of Consulting Engineers
UGX	Uganda Shilling
UIPE	Uganda Institution of Professional Engineers
UN	United Nations
UNABCEC	Uganda National Association of Building and Civil Engineering Contractors
UNRA	Uganda National Roads Authority
URC	Uganda Railways Corporation
URF	Uganda Road Fund
UTCs	Uganda Technical Colleges
WB	World bank

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Executive Summary has been prepared in a separate volume to this report.

1. INTRODUCTION

This is the Final Report of the Final Evaluation of the Institutional Capacity Building for the Transport Sector in Uganda Programme. The evaluation is implemented by TIEG and FCG Germany.

This report is a specified deliverable following on from the Intermediary Desk and Field Note, and the Draft Final Report and complies with the format specified in ToR Annex V: Structure of the Reports 3. DRAFT FINAL REPORT AND FINAL REPORT.

It is important to note that the evaluation team provided the Reference Group with an Intermediary Desk and Field Note after the field mission and received comments on that Note. The present report takes into account the comments received on that Intermediary Desk and Field Note and comments on the Draft Final Report.

The evaluation mission was implemented by the following experts: the team leader and KE1 Eddy Bynens, assisted by the back-up expert John Clifton, the KE3 Sadok Zerelli during the period leading up to the field visit, he resigned before the field visit and was replaced by the back-up expert Ben Ssebugga-Kimeze, and the KE3 Frederick Hunter Tumwebaze (summarised CVs of these experts are shown in annex 2).

2. CONTEXT OF THE EVALUATION

2.1 SECTOR CONTEXT

The Second National Development Plan (NDP II) 2015-2020¹, prioritised energy, transport, information communication technology (ICT), and water for production. These priorities continue in the recently launched NDP III (2020/21 – 2024/25) with the prioritisation of agricultural exports, manufacturing, regional and international transport connectivity, natural resources, ICT, and innovative development financing.

Road transportation is the most important means of transportation in Uganda with some 95% of freight and passenger traffic handled by road traffic. The road network in Uganda is approximately 129,469 km long although only about 4% of these roads are paved (~5,300 km). The various categories of roads are:

- National roads 22,009 km (17%),
- District roads 33,661 km (26%),
- Urban roads 9,062 km (7%),
- Community roads 64,734 km (50%).

The Government of Uganda, (GoU) wishes to move towards an adequate, reliable and efficient multimodal transport network as stipulated in NDPs II & III. Therefore, there are plans for investments and improvements in water, transport and rail sub-sector² with inter-regional trade and logistics chain regional interconnectivity also amongst the priorities whilst current efforts for transport interconnectivity focus on opening key trade routes linked with inland water transport systems. There have also been efforts by Governments of Uganda and DR. Congo to jointly develop road interconnection on their common land border on the west of Uganda with similar efforts on the northern borders of the country to connect with South Sudan

¹ The period during which the Institutional Capacity Building Transport Sector in Uganda project (subject of this final evaluation) was designed (and implemented)

² Such as planning of extension of the Standard Gauge Railway from Kenya and rehabilitation of the existing meter gauge railway

trade routes.

The GoU has invested heavily in road development to facilitate growth and productivity within other sectors but the growing need for economic and social growth continues to place a heavy burden on the transport sector to which a response is required.

The Government's commitment to the transport sector is evident in significantly increased annual budgetary allocations, from UGX 464 billion – approx. EUR 117,500,000 - (Fiscal Year (FY) 2006/07) to UGX 5.1 trillion – approx. EUR 1,290,000,000 - (FY 2021/22). Up to FY 2019/20 the transport sector accounted for a fifth of the total resource allocation, taking a major proportion of the national budget. Although this has not continued in the most recent two fiscal years, the budget to the transport sector has not suffered large budgetary cuts and is still being favoured in comparison to other sectors.

The present institutional set-up of the sector was established because of reform introduced in 2006³, focusing the Ministry of Works and Transport (MoWT) on core roles of policy formulation, regulation, oversight and strategic planning. Responsibility for the national road network was transferred to the Uganda National Roads Authority (UNRA) for the management of its delivery and maintenance.⁴

The Uganda Road Fund (URF) was established for financing of routine and periodic maintenance of public roads.

The GoU embarked on reforms aimed at improving the quality of human resources and institutional capacity in the transport sector in 2015. Furthermore, GoU initiated the formulation of a policy targeted at increasing local content of infrastructure projects to enable national personnel and increase employment opportunities.

These GoU reforms are in line with the 2014-2020 National Indicative Programme (NIP) focal sector objective of "reinforcing the sustainability of the national transport system, ensuring the necessary regulatory framework and financial means...". It is on this basis that the EU provided support for the action 'Institutional Capacity Building for the Transport Sector in Uganda'. Significant effort and resources (by Government and Development Partners (DPs)) have been invested in increasing capacities of UNRA and URF over several years to a level that inspires confidence among sector stakeholders, including private sector.

Despite the abovementioned sector reforms under the NDP II, there is pending major reform⁵ across several sectors. In the transport sector, the reforms envisage UNRA becoming a department of MoWT whilst URF sector financing responsibilities would be taken over by the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED).

Given that sector policy dialogue between DPs and GoU has for many years advocated principles of separation of 'client' (regulatory) and 'implementation' functions together with encouraging commercialisation and greater involvement of the local construction industry, securing of adequate predictable funding for sector operations and maintenance and building capacity of sector institutions to deliver their mandated responsibilities, this cabinet decision

³ With support from the World Bank (WB) and the European Union (EU)

⁴ In line with the principles of establishing UNRA under the UNRA Act of 2006, the authority is guided by the following strategic objectives: Ensure all year round safe and efficient movement of people and goods on the National Roads Network; Enhance road safety through improved design and education of the users; Optimize the quality, timeliness and cost effectiveness of the road works interventions; Improve the Private Sector Participation in service delivery; Attract, develop and retain a quality team; Use innovative and creative techniques and strategies to optimize the performance of the road system.

⁵ Cabinet decision in September 2018

in 2018 is contrary to the thrust of DP advocacy in such dialogue⁶. In the same thrust of stated government intentions is the proposal to return to the original force account/direct labour system for routine maintenance (albeit using 'plant based' rather than the original 'labour based' methodology⁷).

2.2 THE INTERVENTION

Title	Institutional Capacity Building for the Transport Sector in Uganda	
Budget	Total estimated cost: EUR 13 049 867 Total amount of EDF contribution: EUR 12 000 000 Committed (March 2022) EUR 11 223 498 Disbursed (March 2022) EUR 7 321 678 Parallel co-financing by: The Government of Uganda for an amount of EUR 1 000 000 Co-financing by potential grant beneficiaries for an indicative amount of EUR 49 867.	
CRIS and/or OPSYS number	FED/2016/039-149	
Implementation dates	Start date: 09/12/2016	End date: 09/06/2023

Overall Objective: To improve the transport sector in terms of sector governance, planning, implementation and sustainability of transport infrastructure.

Specific Objective: To improve human resources and institutional capacity in the transport sector in Uganda

Expected results:

- (a) Strengthened capacity of MoWT in gender responsive strategic planning and oversight in a multimodal transport environment, contributing to an appropriate investment-maintenance mix, climate change mitigation and building climate resilience of the sector.
- (b) Improved delivery of road development projects.
- (c) Improved operational efficiency of road maintenance.
- (d) Increased competitiveness of the local construction industry in the transport sector.

The results above are expected to be achieved through separate avenues of support with distinct implementation modalities, as detailed below.

- (i) Support to government institutions⁸ (results a - c) implemented by indirect management with the Government of Uganda through MoFPED/National Authorising Officer (NAO) of the European Development Fund (EDF). The beneficiary institutions (MoWT, UNRA and URF) are Project Managers and take responsibility for the quality of the individual component outputs.

⁶ The process of transport sector reform goes back to the RMI 'Road Maintenance Initiative' of the 90s advocated by WB and supported by sector DPs. This reform process involved phasing out historical force account/direct labour construction and maintenance organisations, identification and separation of 'client' and 'implementation' functions, introduction of some form of 'Road Board' followed by corporatisation of the 'implementation' organisation, increasing commercialisation of the works, establishment of an (autonomous) Highway Authority (Client) and Road Fund


⁷ This is a feature of the (delayed) roll-out of TSUs in DUCAR districts

⁸ TA to MoWT, TA to UNRA, TA to URF

- (ii) Support to the Local Construction Industry (result d) implemented by direct management through a service contract and grant – direct award.⁹ The Uganda Institution of Professional Engineers (UIPE) is responsible for the achievement of the component result.

2.3 INTERVENTION COMPONENTS

The evaluation will assess the performance of EU assistance in the following components:



The TA to the transport sector was applied to the four main Institutions namely Ministry of Works and Transport (MoWT), Uganda National Roads Authority (UNRA), Uganda Road Fund (URF) and Uganda Institution of Professional Engineers (UIPE). The level of funding to respective Institutions is summarised in the table below:

Institution	TA Results	Contract amount in EUR
MoWT	strengthening capacity in gender-responsive strategic planning and oversight in a multimodal transport environment contributing to an appropriate investment- maintenance mix,	3,997,000
	Climate change mitigation and building climate resilience of the sector	
UNRA	Development of well-aligned corporate strategy and business plans, supported by balances score cards for individuals and their departments	3 ,889 ,000
	Establishment of a standardized M&E Framework	
	Establishment of internal audit systems	
	Improved procurement processes	
	Improved Contract Management	
	Improved environmental and social safeguards	
	Improved operation and maintenance of axle load control infrastructure	
	Tender evaluation strengthened	
	Improved Land valuation	
	Road development and maintenance	
Improved Claims management		

⁹ The grant contract is for implementation of the Graduate Training Programme by way of development and delivery of Initial Professional Development (IPD) training

Institution	TA Results	Contract amount in EUR
	Cost estimation strengthened	
	Capacity of staff developed in all above areas	
URF	Improved operational efficiency of Road Maintenance	1,599,795
	Improved Data Management	
	Improved cost estimation	
	Improved program preparation	
	Improved Audit function over agencies	
	Improved monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) function over agencies	
	Updated Strategic and Corporate Plans	
	Updated allocation formulae	
UIPE	Increasing Relevance of UIPE to its members and partners	1,450,043
	Capacity built in young professionals	
	Increased relevance of tertiary institutions to the market demand	
	Improved human resource capacity in the engineering and construction sector	
Total EUD TA Financing	Transport Sector	10,546,758

A) Technical assistance to the Ministry of Works and Transport

The TA to the MoWT¹⁰ was aimed at strengthening capacity in gender-responsive strategic planning and oversight in a multimodal transport environment contributing to an appropriate investment- maintenance mix, climate change mitigation and building climate resilience of the sector, for a budget of EUR 3,997,000 over a period of 3 years in total.

B) TA to the Uganda National Roads Authority

The TA to UNRA¹¹ was designed to improve the delivery of road development projects through strengthening core functions of procurement, contract management and environment and social management to reduce cost overruns. The TA started in December 2017 with a total budget of EUR 3,889,000 and duration of 48 months. Expected outcomes were the development of a Corporate Strategy and business plans, a Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E) framework, internal audit systems, improved procurement and contract management processes, improved environment and social safeguards, climate resilient infrastructure drainage, and an improved operation and maintenance of axle load control infrastructure.

C) Technical Assistance to the Uganda Road Fund

Technical assistance¹² to the Uganda Road Fund (URF) started in December 2017 with a contract price of EUR 1,599,795 for a duration of 28 months. The purpose of the technical assistance to URF was to improve institutional capacity and corporate governance, resulting in improved operational efficiency of road maintenance.

D) Support to the Local Construction Industry

Despite the government's heavy investment in the transport sector, participation of the national construction industry was still identified as minimal due to inter alia, the lack of highly skilled personnel. The Uganda Institution of Professional Engineers (UIPE) had only 40% of

¹⁰ Consultancy services COWI A/S in consortium with WYG International Ltd, H.P. Gauff Ingenieur GmbH and Co.KG-JBG.

¹¹ IMC Worldwide Ltd in association with AECOM International Development Europe SL

¹² IMC Worldwide Ltd

its membership remitting their subscription fees on which it is dependent for its operations. The strengthening of the UIPE as well as support to train its graduate student and professional members is crucial to improve the institution's relevance to its members and its revenue collection. This support was pivotal to improving the national construction industry and its competitiveness.

D1: Service Contract for Support to the Local Construction Industry

TA to UIPE¹³ was appointed in December 2017 with contract duration 36 months and contract price EUR 1 341 968. By contract addenda the implementation period has been extended to August 2022 and the contract price amended to EUR 1 450 043. In line with GoU's local content initiative, the TA team is expected to provide consultancy services to the UIPE for the full range of activities necessary for enhancing the capacity of the local construction industry as well as that of the UIPE in fulfilling its mandate. The overall purpose of the TA is the increased competitiveness of the local construction industry in the transport sector. Specifically, the Consultant is expected to achieve the following results:

- Increased relevance of the UIPE to its members and partners;
- Capacity built in young professionals;
- Increased relevance of tertiary institutions' curricula to the market demand;
- Improved human resource capacity in the engineering/construction sector.

D2: Grant Contract for Implementation of the Graduate Training Program through development and delivery of industry relevant Initial Professional Development (IPD) training

The grant to UIPE focuses on the implementation of a Graduate Training Program which, through the provision of salary support for graduates and structured training and mentorship, aims to increase the uptake of graduates into the transport sector by equipping unemployed graduates with the practical skillsets necessary to succeed at the workplace.

E) Communication and Visibility

A framework contract (FWC)¹⁴ was concluded for the development and implementation of a communication and visibility plan for the project. The global objective of the FWC was to create positive visibility for the core of present sector dialogue between Government of Uganda (GoU) and Development Partners (DPs), including stakeholder understanding and acceptance of the underlying principles therein. The key thematic areas from the sector dialogue between GoU and DPs are: multimodal (and intermodal) shift in transport planning and implementation; sustainable management of existing assets through getting funds for timely and adequate maintenance (a more appropriate investment-maintenance mix); separation of regulation and implementation functions of transport sector ministries, departments, and agencies through the commercialisation concept; and local private sector participation in infrastructure projects. The end date of the contract, following several addenda, is 23 April 2022.

¹³ IMC Worldwide Ltd

¹⁴ The FWC was awarded to EURONET Consulting on 30 July 2019 for an amount of EUR 186,600 - the contract includes two experts, with minimum input of 75 working days

2.4 THE EVALUATION

Title	Final Evaluation of the Institutional Capacity Building for the Transport Sector in Uganda Project Specific Contract Nr 300033087 — SIEA-2018-10312
Type of evaluation	Final
Coverage	Institutional Capacity Building for the Transport Sector in Uganda (in its entirety)
Geographic scope	Uganda
Period to be evaluated	from 08/12/2017 to 09/06/2022

Objectives: The main objectives of this evaluation are to provide the relevant services of the European Union, the interested stakeholders and the Government of Uganda with:

- an overall independent assessment of the performance of the Institutional Capacity Building for the Transport Sector in Uganda project, paying particular attention to its different levels of results measured against its expected objectives; and the reasons underpinning such results;
- key lessons learned, conclusions and related recommendations in order to improve future interventions.

This evaluation will serve:

- to understand the performance of the intervention and the reasons behind it in order to maximise its potential to achieve the expected results during the residual implementation time and;
- to understand the performance of the intervention and the reasons behind it in order to inform the planning of the future EU interventions in the same sector.

Therefore, the evaluation shall look for evidence of why, whether and how the EU intervention has contributed to the achievement of results and seek to identify the factors driving or hindering progress.


Furthermore, the evaluation team shall consider whether gender equality and women's empowerment, environment and adaptation to climate change were mainstreamed; the relevant SDGs and their interlinkages were identified; the principle of Leave No One Behind and the rights-based approach methodology was followed in the identification/formulation documents.

2.5 RECONSTRUCTED INTERVENTION LOGIC

Intervention logics are set out in considerable detail in TOR Annex I¹⁵ for individual project components and for the project. As an aid to understanding project logic, inter-linkage and activities for all components these log frames have been reconstructed setting out activities, outputs, outcomes and impacts in a single page format for each component and for the whole project. These reconstructed log frames have been used to gain better insight into project details and to facilitate preparation of the EQ matrix presented in this report. This exercise has also highlighted the broad scope of coverage and results expected for support to UIPE (and local construction industry) and, especially, to UNRA. The reconstructed log frame for the project is presented below whilst all reconstructed log frames for project components are set out in Annex 6.

¹⁵ Intervention Logic and Logical Framework Matrices (Log frames) of the evaluated intervention

RECONSTRUCTED LOGFRAME – INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING FOR TRANSPORT SECTOR IN UGANDA (based on combination of ‘Intervention Logic’ and ‘Revised Logframe Matrix January 2020’)



FINDINGS TO EVALUATIONS QUESTIONS (EQ)

3. EQ1: RELEVANCE

EQ1: To what extent has the Transport Sector Institutional Capacity Building Programme been relevant to the needs of beneficiary institutions and organisation and aligned to national development goals (NDP II and NDP III as well as Vision 2040), National Roads Development plans and EU Cooperation objectives?

Summary

- ***The Programme is well aligned with national development policy goals;***
- ***The Programme design is based upon national and institutional needs and informed by participation of institutional counterparts;***
- ***The Programme objectives clearly reflect needs of sector institutions but less so regarding operational resources***
- ***The Programme objectives are consistent with EU international transport sector policies, guidelines and strategies and compliant with 11 EDF NIP;***
- ***The Government commitments regarding maintenance funding remain unfulfilled, sustainability unlikely to be achieved, however effectiveness of sector institutions may be enhanced;***
- ***The EU/DP policy dialogue took place but with limited effectiveness on government decisions;***
- ***Overall, the programme is highly relevant to sector needs (except the relevance of the UIPE support to wider needs of LCI is less clear).***

This programme was well aligned with and responsive to national transport sector priorities and goals and national road development programmes as regards transport sector human capacity development and strategic investment and maintenance of transport infrastructure.

3.1 RELEVANCE BASED ON JUDGEMENT CRITERIA (JC)

JC 1.1 – The Programme is responsive to national transport sector priorities and goals (as expressed in NDP, Vision 2040 and national road development plans)

This programme is well aligned with and responsive to national transport sector priorities and goals as set out in NDP2, NDP3 and Vision 2040 and national road development programmes as regards transport sector human capacity development and strategic investment and maintenance of transport infrastructure.

Programme component design was based upon analysis of national and institutional programmes and needs as regards MoWT, UNRA and URF. As regards support to LCI the withdrawal of DFID support to the 'Crossroads' programme resulted in the focus of support switching to UIPE capacity (and GTP) which in turn was expected to contribute to development of the LCI. Programme design was informed by participation of institutional counterparts (arguably more strongly expressed by UNRA and URF) and all specified programme results were signed off by the beneficiary organisations. There has also been CSO participation in programme design and implementation management (including progress monitoring) by way of CISCOT representation on the Steering Committee.

It was expected that the programme would be supported institutionally and thematically

by EUD transport sector dialogue in which EU has historically taken a leading role in Uganda. During the programme implementation period there has been reporting of such dialogue having taken place but with limited reference to the cabinet decision to reduce the number of transport sector institutions which could result in transfer of UNRA and URF to MoWT.

JC 1.2 – The Programme objectives reflect priorities and needs of UNRA, URF, UIPE and MoWT as expressed in institutional policies and strategies (including resource and capacity shortfalls)

Programme objectives clearly reflect priorities and needs of sector institutions as expressed in institutional policies and strategies (including capacity shortfalls, but less so regarding resources). Whilst support to UIPE meets UIPE institutional priorities and needs, the extent to which the needs of LCI will be directly met by this support to UIPE is less clearly stated. However, it is recognised that if competences of local engineers can be enhanced through graduate technical training, being then admitted as members of UIPE and registered by ERB, they may be more readily employed by the LCI players (such as UNRA, UNABCEC, District Local Governments, MoWT and other private sector players) and so may contribute to the growth of the LCI. The programme can thus be considered to be highly relevant to transport sector needs.

There is clear evidence of identification of institutional issues and beneficiaries being identified with qualitative rather than quantitative evidence for each programme component at this stage. Issues identified included:

- capacity of MoWT in strategic planning, policies and responsiveness to gender and environmental/climate change resilience;
- UNRA capacity in road sector management;
- URF oversight function including capacities of DUCAR DAs in maintenance management;
- performance of LCI (including UIPE capacity) and lack of professional skills;
- DP coordination and policy dialogue;
- limited involvement and engagement with civil society in sector management.

Intervention component activities are clearly linked to identified institutional issues.¹⁶ Only limited evidence is available to the evaluation on the ownership of programme activities by component institutional partners or on willingness to adapt and apply any enhanced capacities resulting from programme activities. In contrast there are reported to be positive perceptions of institutional partners regarding programme relevance in response to their institutional needs and priorities¹⁷ albeit with some reservations regarding limited interface and strengthening of MoWT operations and lack of clarity about how to maximise results of institutional support to UIPE in strengthening of LCI. Summarizing the situation for each of the programme components as regards relevance is shown below.

JC 1.3 The Project objectives were consistent with EU transport sector policies and strategies in Africa and at national level and complementary to other EU in-country interventions

The Programme objectives were fully consistent with multiple EU transport sector policies, guidelines and strategies in Africa which advocated sector approaches, multi-modality,

¹⁶ i.e. Premature deterioration of infrastructure assets, high construction costs, issues of road safety, environment, climate change, gender and social safeguards; weaknesses in planning, design, procurement, PFM, governance and project delivery; weaknesses in legal, policy and institutional frameworks, human and institutional capacities and LCI competitiveness.

¹⁷ i.e. for UNRA and URF regarding improved capacity in planning, project delivery, maintenance and sector management capability

strengthened regional approach and increasing commercialisation of sector operations and management. At national level, project objectives were compliant with 11 EDF NIP whilst not addressing all NIP sector objectives. However, highly relevant Government policy commitments regarding sector institutions and maintenance funding remain unfulfilled and sustainability aims are unlikely to be achieved given the continuing chronic maintenance funding deficits, however the effectiveness of sector institutions may be enhanced by this programme.

3.1.1 Relevance to MoWT

- I. TA support covered two phases. Phase 1 comprised the MTR of the NTMP¹⁸ (2008-2023), whilst the MTR itself finds policy objectives of NTMP/GKMA highly relevant to all transport modes it is less clear how the TA services under Phase 1 directly strengthened 'MOWT capacity in gender responsive strategic planning and oversight in a multi-modal transport environment contributing to an appropriate investment – maintenance mix, climate change mitigation and building climate resilience of the sector'.
- II. TA services, in Phase 1, do not appear to have included stakeholder participation to any great extent. Phase 2 activities were more explicitly relevant to capacity building of MoWT transport planning systems (including PPP) by greater involvement of MoWT counterparts in preparation of a national intermodal/multimodal transport strategy (including SEA).
- III. The planned absorption of UNRA and URF by MoWT have necessitated a planned revision of the organogram of the MoWT. The retention of the Planning Department in MoWT has not yet been approved by the Ministry of Public Service.

Conclusions:

- TA services deliverables were highly relevant to the Ministry of Transport in terms of overall strategic planning of the sector. Capacity Building Trainings were conducted in the Ministry in areas of Strategic Planning, Strengthening the capacity of the MoWT in gender responsive strategic planning and oversight in a multimodal transport environment including identification of policy objectives across all modes of transport covering road, rail, air, waterways, GKMA and logistics.
- The overall output achieved was the production of the National Integrated Transport Master Plan 2021-2040 which is driven by Country Vision 2040 and articulates the Transport Strategies and priorities and Action Plan and policy objectives across all modes of transport covering road, rail, air, waterways, GKMA and logistics.

Recommendation: The MoWT recommends that Future capacity training program should be more specific on strengthening particular functions and be technical training rather than short term and generic as was the case. Key programme specific objective could have been strengthened by conducting a more directly intended capacity building deliverables for strategic planning

¹⁸ Including the Master Plan for the Greater Kampala Metropolitan Area (GKMA)

3.1.2 Relevance to UNRA

Observations:

TA support is highly relevant to UNRA needs¹⁹ (although the sheer scope and range of such identified needs gives pause for thought in adequate coverage by allocated TA services) which are described in the ToR for TA support to UNRA.²⁰ However, there was reported to be generally good engagement between TA and UNRA management concerning needs assessment and deliverables.

The TA and training overall enhanced the Capacity of UNRA staff where the following was attained

- Development of a Business Plan
- Production of a standardized M&E Framework
- Establishment of internal audit systems
- Enhanced procurement processes
- Improved Contract Management
- Incorporation of environmental and social safeguards in the programs
- Improved operation and maintenance of axle load control infrastructure
- Enhanced capacity for Land valuation, Compensation mechanisms and Improved Claims management

Given the big coverage of UNRA management structures that spread across the country, it did appear as though the main concentration of TA activities were at the Headquarters and little spread to the Regional Offices.

Conclusion:

The Capacity building program was relevant and practical. It addressed very critical areas which have been deficient in UNRA in regard to Compensation, Procurement, Audits, PPPs, Contract Management and Cross cutting social issues.

Recommendation: Due to the looming restructuring and shifting of UNRA to the Ministry of Transport, there appears to be a lot of uncertainty in the Institution. High level Policy Dialogue is recommended to engage Government on this reverse policy that created the Institution with its separate mandate.

3.1.3 Relevance to URF

Observations:

TA support was highly relevant to URF institutional needs²¹. Although expected impacts of 'improved operational efficiency of road maintenance were to be facilitated by 'improved URF institutional capacity and corporate governance' (including TSUs and DUCAR DAs) the actual road maintenance operations are in the hands of UNRA (and DUCAR DAs). The TSUs were not actually physically established as appears in the terminology but

¹⁹ UNRA institutional needs were documented in 'Diagnostic Study of UNRA Transformation Draft Recommendations' Report, WB, May 2019

²⁰ i.e. specific objectives: improved delivery of road projects and development of a culture of excellence with focus on individual accountability for results in UNRA

²¹ Stated objectives include improved institutional and individual capacity and performances, sector governance, accountability

rather trainings at District level took place. Real creation of TSUs would have involved establishment and equipping the Unit for sustainability purposes. The sustainability of such program is therefore not foreseen and thus, it is observed that the stated impacts may be a 'step too far' for this URF component.

The TA to URF was Expected to Achieve the following deliverables

- i) improved capacities (both individual and organizational)
- ii) improved sector governance,
- iii) improved institutional and individual performances and accountability
- iv) improved efficiency of road maintenance
- v) Improved capacity for Monitoring and Evaluation of Road Maintenance program and improved allocation formula

However, some of the target deliverables were not attained due to some shortcomings and weaknesses in Institutional management related to;

- i) There were weaknesses in application of staff capacity building program where few top management staff benefited from the trainings while many key staff were left behind.
- ii) The support to URF was also aimed at strengthening the Technical Support Units (TSUs) which were to cover more than 100 Districts, Urban and Community Access Roads (DUCAR) Designated Agencies benefitting from the maintenance of rural roads. Only 35 DAs received minimal trainings overall.
- iii) There were also some dysfunctionalities and lack of coordination within the Board of URF and this caused some delays in approvals of TA in certain instances. This resulted in postponement of the outputs of the contract to carry out a study of Institutional and Funding Models, the acquisition of the Road Management and Monitoring System, Monitoring and Evaluation, support to Audit function and support for the Data Management.
- iv) However, some of the improved deliverables in URF were, Improved Data Management systems, Improved Cost Estimation, Updated Allocation Formula, and improved Monitoring of road maintenance funds and services,

Recommendation: URF is facing uncertainties caused by the current Government looming restructuring which intends to move URF to the Ministry of Transport. Further more URF has failed to institutionalize the 2nd Generation Road fund. A high-level Policy dialogue between Development Partners and Government is recommended towards full restoration of the URF as an Independent and fully functional Institution

3.1.4 Relevance to UIPE/ LCI

Observations:

There are undoubtedly needs of the LCI²² in Uganda but such needs are only addressed partially or indirectly by this component. Relevance of the component was high as regards

²² Such as capacity and experience deficits of local firms and engineers, difficulties in meeting pre-qualification requirements, lack of access to finance and credit, financial and project cycle management issues, poor competitiveness of local firms, quality issues

UIPE needs and the needs of graduate engineers and technicians for continuing professional development training but limited as regards the needs of the LCI. There should have been direct interventions in dealing directly with the LCI towards increasing its participation in the Road Sub-Sector Contracts. The increase in Engineers registration, GTP was relevant but it was difficult to link it with increase in participation of Local Private Sector Contractors and Consultants in the LCI.

Studies carried out in 2015 and 2016²³ noted capacity problems recommending that the DFID Crossroads programme should continue ongoing support.²⁴ Although EU discussed supporting Crossroads, DFID closed this programme (due to doubts of sustainability and exit strategy). As an alternative, this programme support component was diverted to support UIPE capacity and thus the UIPE mandate to support the LCI (and thus, indirectly, private sector competitiveness).²⁵ Expected outputs of the TA contract include multiple deliverables which are directly relevant to UIPE capacities and activities²⁶ but impact upon LCI depends upon UIPE mobilisation of expected results. However, in parallel is the Graduate Training Programme (GTP) and support to UTC training which, assuming the curriculum of such training is aligned to local construction industry needs, would be of direct relevance to the LCI in the longer term. Falling somewhere between these two support pillars in terms of relevance is the EREP – Engineers Registration Environment Programme.²⁷

Under Planned targets for UIPE, base line employability was to increase from 50% to 90% after the Graduate Training Program (GTP).

According to the progress attained, 39 potential employment organizations were engaged by UIPE which secured 146 places for graduate trainees. However, there was a drop out of graduates from the scheme leaving 96 in 35 host organisations engaged with employers, which was 80% achievement in regard to GTP.

40 of the Trainees were employed as Graduate Engineers, and overall, 60 Trainees were registered as Graduate Members of UIPE.

The following programs were undertaken and were relevant towards strengthening the competitiveness of the private sector, although the direct involvement and effectiveness of the Private sector based on these programs could not be directly linked.

- ❖ Graduate Training programmed for young professionals in engineering
- ❖ Development of training curricula for national and technical colleges
- ❖ scaling up of the Engineers Registration Enhancement Programme (EREP) to increase membership and subscriptions therein

Conclusion:

²³ Consultancy services to identify Strategic Transport Priority projects in a Multimodal Environment ARS Progetti 2015; Final Evaluation of EDF10 Capacity Building Programme, ARS Progetti, 2016

²⁴ i.e. Advocacy through the Roads Industry Council (RIC) and access to equipment through Crossroads Guarantee Fund (CGF)

²⁵ In other words, it was assumed that support to UIPE would indirectly improve private sector competitiveness and thus the LCI

²⁶ Strengthened UIPE Secretariat and branches, implementation of debt collection and recovery of arrears; follow up system of UIPE membership; establishment of business plan, customer unit, database, communications strategy, power supply connection; promotion of collaboration with international organisations and counterpart institutions (e.g. ICE, UK).

²⁷ An engineer may only legally practice in Uganda (in effect 'sign off' on designs etc) if he/she is a paid-up member of UIPE and registered with ERB. This system is akin to the UK system of 'Chartered Engineer'.

This TA activities did not fully address relevant measures meant to strengthen private sector competitiveness and clear interventions need to be carried out in regard to policy and regulatory framework, Procurement regulations and continuous training of Local Contractors and Consulting engineers.

Recommendation: There are legal and Regulatory frameworks to related to procurement regulations, Developing the technical capacity of the Private Sector to engage in competitive bidding that need to be addressed to increase the competitiveness of the LCI

4. EQ2: EFFECTIVENESS

EQ2: To what extent has the Transport Sector Institutional Capacity Building Programme achieved expected results of capacity building for MoWT, UNRA, URF and UIPE? And to what extent has the capacity building contributed to the improvement of institutional performances and public services?

SUMMARY:

- *The expected results of capacity building were largely achieved for technical issues with reporting of completed training - however, before/after assessment of individual training courses is lacking in some of the training courses;*
- *Individual beneficiary perceptions were largely positive with expressions of ownership even though participation and direct interface with TA services varied;*
- *Most training/capacity building activities were carried out by STEs – an effective approach overall;*
- *It is the local stakeholder’s opinion that local experts performed better due to their knowledge of the local context and availability. The procurement process should be revised in order to favour local expertise over international experts;*
- *Constraints to effectiveness include limited period for training and for results to be applied, Covid disruptions, high staff turnover and institutional governance issues;*
- *Evidence of improved performances by sector institutions, but not always translated into better sector service provision – there are multiple factors to be mentioned here: Capacity needs of institutions exceeded the TA coverage and resources; Institutional issues and political decisions cast a shadow on future of some institutions which affect motivation and application/adoption of some changes; Chronic maintenance funding deficits, decision to undertake maintenance by direct labour force account and plant-based methods, under-resourced and under-capacitated DUCAR districts. This constrains application of increased institutional capacities and reduces potential involvement of local contractors; Because of the volatility in the sector, it is difficult to estimate the improvement of the institutional performance and an eventual ex-post evaluation in a few years may give a more decisive answer to this question.*

4.1 Effectiveness based on Judgement Criteria

J.C 2.1 – The Expected results of project capacity building were achieved (for MoWT, UNRA, URF and UIPE) in terms of institutional and individual capacities

Expected results of capacity building (MoWT, URF, UNRA and LCI/UIPE) in terms of institutional capacities were largely achieved as regards mainly technical issues with clear reporting of training courses carried out. Before/after assessment of individual training courses is lacking in some of the training courses although individual beneficiary perceptions are reported to be largely positive with expressions of ownership even though participation and direct interface with TA services varied.²⁸ Most training and capacity building activities have been carried out by STEs and this approach has been effective overall. However, it is the local stakeholder's opinion that local experts performed better due to their knowledge of the local context and availability. The procurement process should be revised in order to favour local expertise over international experts. There have been some constraints to effectiveness including limited period for training and capacity building results to be applied, Covid disruptions, high staff turnover in sector institutions, institutional processes and governance issues (URF) and doubts about future individual and institutional roles after 2018 cabinet decision.²⁹

J.C 2.2 – Improved institutional performance and service provision

There is evidence of improved institutional performances by sector institutions, but this improved performance has not translated into commensurately better service provision. There are multiple factors in play here. Capacity needs of institutions exceed the TA coverage and resources under this programme, concentrating on selected needs (all of which were valid choices) for a relatively short time period which was also a time of Covid restrictions which restricted TA activities. Also, institutional issues and political decisions cast a shadow on the future of some institutions which affected motivation and application/adoption of some changes even though individual beneficiaries were supportive and positive about such capacity enhancements. Also, the political decision to undertake maintenance by direct labour force account plant-based methods operated by under-resourced and under-capacitated DUCAR districts constrains both effectiveness of the process and reduces potential involvement of local contractors. Chronic funding deficits for maintenance (~50% of needs) and skewed balance of construction/maintenance (~89%/11%) further reduce service provision. However, because of the volatility in the sector, it is difficult to estimate the improvement of the institutional performance and an eventual ex-post evaluation in a few years may give a more decisive answer to this question.

4.1.1 Effectiveness of TA to MoWT

The TA supported the Preparation of the National Transport Sector Master Plan which is a key Strategy document for the Sector. This will improve on the prioritization and financing mobilization for the Transport Sector Programs overall as the plan has priority policy plans for all transport modes covering road, rail, air, waterways, GKMA and logistics.

The process of the preparation has attracted a spectrum of transport sector public institutional stakeholders and the various Private Sector transport organizations hence promoting inclusivity in policy dialogue.

Through the process the capacity of the staff of MoWT who were involved in the development of the Master Plan enhanced their capacity in Planning and sector priority setting.

The Transport Master Plan 2021-2040, however did not consider the impending restructuring which is being engineered that will see the bringing on board UNRA and URF into the

²⁸ E.g. Greater participation was noted in UNRA and URF than MoWT Phase 1 (although Phase 2 participation was greater with nomination of counterparts from MoWT and other sector institutions)

²⁹ To transfer UNRA and URF to MoWT

Ministry as per the current Government proposals. It is believed that once the recommended merger of the Institutions into the Ministry is affected the priority programs will change and more activities will be included.

Conclusion: Phase 1 consisted of evaluation of NTMP/GKMA and had no overt training component except as could be inferred from the findings of the MTE (e.g., Ugandan Transport Planning was weak) and MoWT observed that Phase 1 activities only contributed to a limited extent to strengthen MoWT capacities. Phase 2 had a more overt capacity building and training potential (especially for the 33 nominated counterparts)³⁰, although the ‘headline’ output (NITMP 2021-2040) was a potential capacity building vector in recommendations for sector planning, M&E frameworks etc.

4.1.2 Effectiveness of TA to UNRA

The TA impacted on many technical programs in UNRA where most staff were trained in relevant intervention areas related with Procurement, Road network planning, compensation, Auditing and contract management. Of all the Institutions, UNRA had the best designed capacity building program under that TA.

- Development of a Business Plan
- Production of a standardized M&E Framework
- Establishment of internal audit systems
- Enhanced procurement processes
- Improved Contract Management
- Incorporation of environmental and social safeguards in the programs
- Improved operation and maintenance of axle load control infrastructure
- Enhanced capacity for Land valuation, Compensation mechanisms and Improved Claims management

The table below shows Key areas of in which capacity was enhanced in UNRA staff

³⁰ Albeit that the MTE noted a limited level of participation of MoWT staff other than in selection of partners to meet and participation in visits to maintenance and construction works

Table 2.1 Capacity Building Training Implemented in UNRA

TA Supported UNRA Training

#	Course/Training	Target Directorate	Targeted Staff - #	Status
1	Axle Load Control Strengthen capacity, improve axle load facilities	Roads & Bridges	12	Completed
2	Business Development Enhance Business Development Strategy to improve Business Development Unit	Network Planning &	1	Completed
3	Claims and Training Resolve current claims and run training for UNRA to improve their capacity to resolve claims	DLS	70	Completed
4	Climate Resilient Roads	Network Planning &	4	Completed
5	Contracts Management Improve UNRA ability to deliver projects on time to quality with reduced claims	Maintenance	115	
6	Additional training - not specifically in ToR	Roads and Bridges	22	Not done
7	Cost Estimation Improve estimation of project costs to improve budgeting, may also use in Claims analysis	Roads and Bridges	6	Complete
8	ESS Environment & Social Improve systems and manuals, train staff in improved practises including valuation natural resources	Network Planning &	10	Partially delivered
9	Internal Audit IT Implement and maintain penetration testing and vulnerability assessment tools	Internal Audit	2	Partially delivered
10	Land Acquisition Improve UNRA ability in acquiring land in	Roads and Bridges	20	Delivered
11	Monitoring & Evaluation Develop a framework that monitors UNRA	Corporate Services Management	12	Completed

#	Course/Training	Target Directorate	Targeted Staff - #	Status
	outputs and provides appropriate data to UNRA Management and Stakeholders			
12	Performance Management & BSC Enhance HR capacity to cascade PM system to UNRA	Human Resources	220	Completed
13	PPP Provide technical advice on O&M arrangement	Network Planning &	5	Completed
14	Procurement Improve departments ability to produce contract efficiently and improve governance	P	5	Completed
15	Rehabilitation Design Train specific staff in optimisation of flexible pavement design, to include field data collection, analysis and interpretation, material testing, design and HDMIV	Network Planning &	6	Completed
16	Risk Management Assist UNRA implementing a system to enable reduction of risks and ensure availability of the national road infrastructure and a crisis management plan	ED	15	Partially delivered
17	Traffic Safety Advise training in road safety audits, inspections and reviews	RIP	3	Partially delivered
18	Assist in improving end to end process (interface between Directorates) in UNRA building on work UNRA has done i.e. As Is Process	UNRA – all directorates	No estimate	Completed
19	Joint Training UNRA + Private Sector Design Consultants Supervision Consultants		100	Delivered
20	Training Private Sector To ensure improved alignment on approach between UNRA and Private Sector.	Potential Subjects (specific areas of issue e.g. swamp		Not delivered

Conclusion: UNRA in general terms had the most well structured and relevant Capacity enhancement program and training that created considerable impact in Strategic Corporate planning, Procurement management and Project implementation and Audits

4.1.3 Effectiveness of TA to URF

The TA for URF were to address the following key areas services focused on the following areas; Development of the Road maintenance monitoring digital system, Development of a system for cost estimates, Updating Indicators and parameters for the Roads Maintenance funds allocation formula, capacity development from Planning, support to TSUs and Visibility and communications strategy

The TA Final Report presents results of training and workshops undertaken by TA which totals 32 units, 24 (75%) of which were complete, 8 'on hold pending funding' (25%)³¹ although TA activities had focused on road maintenance monitoring (RMMS), annual departmental performance reviews, cost estimation systems, allocation of funds, visibility/communications with additional training in management of procurement, project cycle, business practices and accounting.

However, there were Constraints to effectiveness identified/reported to include:

- Slow institutional processes (including the very public dispute between Board and Executive)
- Covid-19 disruption
- Limited time period for changes to be effective
- High staff turnover³²
- TSU roll out delays
- Lack of morale due to failure by Government to fully implement the 2nd Generation Road Fund and the impending dissolution of URF to the Ministry of Transport.

4.2.4 Effectiveness of TA to LCI/UIPE

The main objective of the TA to UIPE was to increase the capacity and Competitiveness of the LCI in the Transport Sector. Though some of the actions were geared towards such objective, the impact of the activities was not directly contributing to the overall objective and it is therefore not easily linked. The increase in the competitiveness of the LCI is a long-term impact which cannot be measured with these short-term interventions.

There were notable results achieved by UIPE to enlisting and training more Technicians in the industry

- 30 females and 66 Male Graduates were enlisted in the GTP (The initial target was to enrol 120 unemployed Graduates (100 Graduate Engineers and 20 Technicians).
- 96 trainees are undertaking training composed of tripartite contracts between UIPE, Contracting Firms and the Trainees were signed for 30 female and 66 males (in all 15 Technicians, 3 Technologists and 78 Graduate Engineers).
- 11 UIPE GTP Supervisors have been selected, trained and deployed to monitor the Trainees.
- 60 of the Trainees have already been approved for UIPE Membership while the rest 36 are awaiting approval.
- In terms of employment, 39 contracting organisations have been identified and 146 places of placements secured.

However, it should be noted that some 52 Trainees opted out of the program for reasons

³¹ At least some training activities were suspended when the decision was taken to divert TA resources to preparation of the study of 'Institutional and Funding Models for URF'

³² Staff leave for better terms and conditions usually in the private sector so although this represents a 'loss' to URF institutional capacity, not all newly acquired skilled are necessarily 'lost' to the sector

varying from payments or other professional development. This presents a very high employee turnover rate and indicative of lack of stability and sustainability in the industry.

However, the objective of this TA was to increase competitiveness of the construction industry in the transport sector. The goals of private sector competitiveness were not vividly attained due to the nature of design of the TA activities which could not address the real issues affecting the Private Sector related with Legal and Regulatory frameworks for contracts and works procurement in the Sector, low Technical and Financial capacity of the LCI in the country to compete for Contracts and weak enforcement mechanisms of the LCI Policy.

5. EQ3: EFFICIENCY

EQ3 To what extent has the Transport Sector Institutional Capacity Building Programme design and implementation been conducive to an efficient delivery of expected results?

- **Summary**
- *EUD/NAO rapid procurement from signature of FA (Nov/Dec 2016) to commencement TA services one year later;*
- *However limited technical capacity at NAO and at the institutions being capacitated required an important involvement of the EUD in the management of the programme;*
- *Implementation suffered constraints with limited mitigation of such constraints;*
- *URF TA suffered from Administrative Order issued in June 2019, for TA to URF to urgently start a study on 'Institutional and Funding Models for URF' halting other URF TA activities (and no additional resources were provided);*
- *EUD played a consistent role in regular DP meetings throughout the implementation period;*
- *Results of TA support delivered outputs (partially) - capacity improvements supported by technical management, less so by upper management;*
- *Adequate monitoring of activities and outputs but to a lesser extent for higher level outcomes and impacts which take longer to materialize;*
- *Overall, programme did address the specified issues until 'de-railed' by Covid;*
- *All recommendations of the MTE were accepted, but not all have been implemented so far;*
- *Programme implementation modality, governance and management mechanisms were adequate;*
- *TA could address only part of capacity development needs and an even less of LCI needs.*

5.1 Evaluation to Efficiency

J.C.3.1 – Organisation, management, coordination and delivery of EC services (EUD and BXL) has facilitated project implementation and achievement of results

Organisation, management, coordination and delivery of EC services³³ has processed programme procurement from signature of FA in Nov/Dec 2016 to commencement of TA services approximately one year later (e.g., TA to URF contract signed Dec 2017; TA to MoWT commenced Phase 1 activities in January 2018) – the procurement process for TA services was short. However limited technical capacity at NAO and at the institutions being capacitated required an important involvement of the EUD in the management of the programme. From documentation scrutinised to date, implementation of some components (TA to URF, support to LCI) suffered constraints for various reasons. The extent to which EUD was able to mitigate such constraints was limited. In terms of the overall policy framework the programme support was based upon the ‘conventional’ transport sector management approach which advocated inter alia: separation of client/policy making and implementation functions, adequate funding for road maintenance ‘balance’ of capital investment and maintenance; progression towards 2nd generation road fund with ‘ring fencing’ of fuel levy revenues and appropriate levies; (semi) independent Road Agency and Road Fund; progressive commercialisation and increasing participation of LCI. However, even before the 2018 Cabinet decision there were indications that this policy framework was at risk with the importation of heavy equipment for direct labour/force account maintenance units in districts. After the decision in 2018 it was only in June 2019 that an Administrative Order was issued for TA to URF to urgently start a study on ‘Institutional and Funding Models for URF’ for which other TA activities were halted as no additional resources were provided. This reactive response to the Cabinet decision was not prompt. At the time of writing some records of sector dialogue and sector DP consultation have been scrutinised by the evaluation so it is possible to place recorded actions in the context of ‘behind the scenes’ activities. EUD played a consistent role in regular DP meetings³⁴ throughout the implementation period with also participation in the annual JTJR. A further issue of institutional governance was the public dispute between the Board and Executive Director of URF which constrained programme implementation activities in URF due to delayed decision making.

J.C 3.2 – Technical assistance provided to each project component has positively contributed to implementation and achievement of results

TA provided to each component has positively contributed to implementation and achievement of results (but not necessarily sustainability). Capacity improvements have been supported by technical management of sector institutions, less so by governance representatives at Board level. There was adequate monitoring of implementation activities and outputs but to a lesser extent as regards higher level outcomes and impacts, which take longer to materialize. On the whole TA resources were appropriate for the specified activities although there is only limited evidence of needs assessments being undertaken at design stage. However, in contrast to other components, the needs of private sector (LCI) and how the support was expected to respond to such needs, was not clearly articulated. Overall, the programme did address the specified issues reasonably efficiently until ‘de-railed’ by Covid although the programme could reasonably address only a proportion of total needs, capacity and governance issues for each sector institution. All recommendations of the MTE were accepted, but not all have been implemented so far and not all ‘lessons learned’ identified by MTE were actioned although such lessons referred more to potential future support rather than during continuing implementation. The Action document spells out the lessons learnt from 9th and 10th EDF projects namely related to: (i) Comprehensive Sector Support, (ii) Sustainability and, (iii) Policy coherence and coordination.

J.C. 3.3 – The choice of programme implementation modality, governance, management mechanisms and resources allocated have adequately addressed Ugandan sector institutional needs, capacities and constraints

³³ In this case EUD; no reference to involvement of BXL in documents scrutinised to date

³⁴ 2015, 2016 & 2017 – 5 meetings; 2018 – 6 meetings; 2019 – 0 meetings; 2020 – 2 meetings; 2021 – 1 meeting.

The choice of programme implementation modality, governance and management mechanisms allocated were an adequate response to some institutional needs, capacities and constraints in an institutional landscape as it existed at the start of 11EDF NIP although these resources and TA services as provided could address only a limited proportion of institutional capacity development needs and an even more limited proportion of LCI needs. Although the programme support was expected to, by application of programme outcomes, to lead to more effective maintenance, sector management and transport service delivery, such objectives would continue to be frustrated by chronic maintenance funding deficits (even if the programme may have contributed to more effective use of limited available resources) which were further jeopardised by the decision to transfer routine maintenance to force account/direct labour operations in (under-capacitated and under-resourced) DUCAR districts.

5.1.1 Efficiency to MoWT

Most of the Expected activities and targets were completed and in final approval stages approved. The preparation of a multimodal National Integrated Transport Master Plan 2021-2040 strategy, aiming to identify key priority programs and Strategies in the Sector is in final approval stages. Capacity Building and trainings in Strategic Planning were conducted to improve the functionality of the Transport Planning Department within MoWT.

Observations:

- i. The Ministry staff complained about lack of well-focused capacity training programs where they felt the training were done in a mundane manner like normal workshops.
- ii. Most of the Strategic priorities and action plans of the Ministry may need to be reviewed in short term, given the current looming restructuring which is planned to merge institutions of UNRA and URF into the main stream Ministry of Transport Structure.

Recommendation: It was recommended that future capacity building program should undertake training needs assessments and package relevant training program based on staff gaps and roles. Also, the training should be medium term to impart relevant skills rather than routine few days trainings that were conducted in this case.

1.1.2 Efficiency to UNRA

TA services supported UNRA capacity to provide efficient services in Contract management and procurement.

Due to the Capacity Development received by the staff of UNRA, it was noted that there is a lot of progress and improvements in many areas of UNRA operations mainly:

- Performance Management and improved corporate governance improved accountability and strengthened ability to deliver on UNRA's core mandate.
- Establishment of the standard Capacity in program monitoring and Evaluations systems
- Cost Unit estimations and Contract Management.
- Development of well aligned corporate strategy and Business score cards based on Programs, Streamlining the Internal Auditing and Accountability systems,
- Improved efficient procurement processes and Contract management systems,
- Incorporation and mainstreaming Environmental and other social safeguards,
- Improved land valuation, Compensation and Claims management

Observation:

UNRA TA program was well designed and more efficient in achieving the desired results

1.1.3 Efficiency to URF

The TA to URF achieved partly some of the expected outputs as summarized in the table below.

TA focus program	Status of achievement
Improved operational Efficiency of road maintenance program	Partially, through capacity building of 35 DAs as compared to original plan of 100 DAs that were to be reached through the establishment of 5 regional TSUs
Improving data management and Cost Estimation	Partially Achieved as the effective data bank for road maintenance was not established, this activity is dependent upon development of RMMS and completion of the study on Unit cost in the MoWT.
Improved cost estimation	Not done
Improved program preparation	Achieved
Improved Audit function and oversight over Local Government agencies	No action was done
Improved Monitoring and Evaluation over Agencies	Partially done through routine functions but there are no visible new actions due to the TA received.
Updated Strategic and Corporate Plans	Partially Achieved to some Extent due to lack of commitment by government for URF to have a second-generation road fund
Updated allocation Formula	Was partially achieved

Observations and Conclusions

- i. The TA to URF was generally not well planned and implemented partly due to procurement delays and also due to lack of top management commitment and administrative issues within the Board.
- ii. URF faced and encountered challenges in implementation of its component and the study was inconclusive due to non-commitment of the NAO – MoFPED and which failed to provide direct support in the process and which ended the provision of the funds prematurely.

- iii. Performances of URF have been partially slowed down by the institutional issues where partly MoFPED and government has failed to support the transformation of URF into a second-generation fund.
- iv. Performances have been constrained by a mixture of parameters and internal conflicts, where there has been reported disagreement between the Board and the URF TOP Management on most operational matters, which means the Board has not been functioning as is supposed to happen effectively.

Regarding URF TA: In conclusion it is evident that the TA to URF did not attain much of the desired results as planned and did not efficiently create meaningful impact.

1.1.4 Efficiency to UIPE

UIPE made effort in implementing some programs which showed significant progress and efficiency to some extent like the Increasing Relevance of UIPE to its members and partners. This included some sensitization of the program in some Regional Branches where membership improved, Increased relevance of tertiary institutions to the market demand where training programs were under taken in 5 UTCs, enhancement of the Engineers registration program and training some Technicians

Observations:

- i. The overall objective of promoting a competitive LCI in contract management was not achieved as it may be a long-term action. These results require a long-term perspective to take effect and achieve changes.
- ii. There is, as yet no clear evidence of improved effectiveness of the ERB as a result of the '*Engineers Registration Enhancement Programme*' although it is tentatively concluded that increasing numbers of trained/qualified engineering graduates are entering the LCI. However, quantification is patchy with trainee involvement in GTP having been reduced from 200 to 120 and actual achievements regarding placement of graduates in employment not clearly reported.
- iii. The assistance to UIPE lacked efficiency also in consideration of the choice of the Consultant staff, whose qualifications and profile did not match with the requirements of the assignment. Moreover, the context of UIPE offers challenges to capacity building support as "*the present mode of operation is very heavily integrated in UIPE Council and thus difficult to change*". The MTE recognizes the inefficiency of the TA. However, the MTE believes that the change of focus of the Council has to be supported by the Secretariat.
- iv. A number of concurring factors has been contributing factors which hinder progress of the TA contract where there were a lot of changes in the Technical Teams and lack of permanent and long-term structures of management at Council level which changes very often, this creates lack of ownership

General Observations and lessons learnt:

- I. Organisation, management, coordination and delivery of EC services has processed programme procurement from signature of FA in Nov/Dec 2016 to commencement of TA services approximately one year later – the procurement process for TA services

was short.

- II. There was noted limited technical capacity at NAO and at the institutions being capacitated required an important involvement of the EUD in the management of the programme. Implementation of some components suffered constraints for various reasons and the extent to which EUD was able to mitigate such constraints was limited.
- III. In terms of the overall policy framework the programme support was based upon the 'conventional' transport sector management approach³⁵ however, even before the 2018 Cabinet decision there were indications that this policy framework was at risk with the importation of heavy equipment for direct labour/force account rural road maintenance units in districts. After the decision in 2018 it was only in June 2019 that an Administrative Order was issued for TA to URF to urgently start a study on 'Institutional and Funding Models for URF' for which other URF TA activities were halted as no additional resources were provided. This reactive response to the cabinet decision was not prompt. Some records of sector dialogue and sector DP consultation have been scrutinised, so it is possible to place recorded actions in the context of 'behind the scenes' activities. EUD played a consistent role in regular DP meetings throughout the implementation period.
- IV. In these circumstances, effectively applied TA could have been expected to achieve (albeit limited) results although efficiency was impacted by Covid and other issues. However, the cabinet decision to go against a decade or more of DP advocacy and policy dialogue suggests that at least the non-technical aspects of programme support may be potentially irrelevant³⁶. Should the changed institutional setup go ahead then this would be a major failure of DP advocacy and policy dialogue to convince GoU of international practices. This might affect the efficient program delivery and general performance of the Institutions in delivery of their mandates.

General Conclusions

- I. TA provided to each component has positively contributed to implementation and achievement of results (but not necessarily sustainability). Capacity improvements have been supported by technical management of sector institutions, less so by governance representatives at Board level. There was adequate monitoring of implementation activities and outputs but to a lesser extent as regards higher level outcomes and impacts which take longer to materialize, but on the whole TA resources were appropriate for the specified activities. However, in contrast to other components, the needs of private sector (LCI) and how the support was expected to respond to such needs, was not clearly articulated. Overall, the programme did address the specified issues reasonably efficiently until 'de-railed' by Covid. All recommendations of the MTE were accepted, but not all have been implemented so far, and not all 'lessons learned'

³⁵ separation of client/policy making and implementation functions, adequate funding for road maintenance 'balance' of capital investment and maintenance; progression towards 2nd generation road fund with 'ring fencing' of fuel levy revenues and appropriate levies; (semi) independent Road Agency and Road Fund; progressive commercialisation and increasing participation of LCI

³⁶ Support to technical issues relevant to sector service delivery and management of those issues is expected to be relevant whatever the future institutional structure of the sector may be as these functions will still need to be carried out (for example for maintenance, axle load control, climate resilience issues and so on) whatever institutional arrangements are made in future. However, non-technical issues (for example governance issues related to a semi-autonomous Road Fund) will differ depending upon the nature of the body responsible for the sector function (i.e., the UNRA and URF mandates may be 'taken over' by MoWT and MOFPED respectively) but the institutional situation, mandate as legally defined and management responsibility will differ from existing structures

identified by MTE were actioned although most such lessons referred more to potential future support than during continuing implementation. The Action document spells out the lessons learnt from 9th and 10th EDF projects namely related to: (i) Comprehensive Sector Support, (ii) Sustainability and, (iii) Policy coherence and coordination.

- II. The choice of programme implementation modality, governance and management mechanisms were an adequate response to some institutional needs, capacities and constraints in an institutional landscape as it existed at the start of 11EDF NIP although these resources and TA services as provided could address only a limited proportion of institutional capacity development needs and an even more limited proportion of LCI needs. Although the programme support was expected to, by application of programme outcomes, to lead to more effective maintenance, sector management and transport sector service delivery, such objectives continue to be frustrated by chronic maintenance funding deficits (even though the programme has contributed to more effective use of limited available resources) which were further jeopardised by the decision to transfer routine maintenance to force account/direct labour operations in DUCAR districts.

6. EQ4: IMPACT

EQ4A: To what extent has the Transport Sector Institutional Capacity Building Programme contributed to opportunities for long-term changes? Has the programme contributed to unintended changes?

Summary

- ***There is increased capacity but longer-term institutional policy strengthening was not actioned as expected due to limited effective period of the programme due to Covid and proposed institutional changes 'hanging over' URF/UNRA;***
- ***It is not clear the degree to which enhanced individual capacities may be manifested in the future;***
- ***The MoWT capacity for planning/sector policy was enhanced. But there will be MoWT institutional changes if UNRA is absorbed. A new organogram is under preparation, and the Planning department is not yet approved by MoPS;***
- ***No increasing participation of national stakeholders in decision making and management - consultation mechanisms with stakeholders/ transport users exist but systems not working well. The role of the private sector is very limited;***
- ***The Stakeholders have doubts about VFM, responsibilities and results, in part due to limited communication;***
- ***Major effects arising from unexpected external events (Covid pandemic & 2018 Cabinet decision) which strongly affected implementation activities, and thus, outcomes and impacts with mitigation response being limited;***
- ***'Conventional' policy dialogue addressed most major sectoral issues but limited impacts of dialogue.***

6.1 Impact Assessment

J.C 4A 1 – Increased institutional capacity (MoWT, UNRA, URF) to define and update strategies, monitoring parameters and service provision

Increased institutional capacity has been delivered to some extent (MoWT, UNRA, URF) to

define and update strategies, monitoring provision and service provision in that individual capacities have been strengthened. However, the expected longer term institutional and policy strengthening has not been actioned to any great degree due to the relatively limited time period of the programme (curtailed also by Covid) and due to proposed sector institutional changes 'hanging over' URF and UNRA which have stifled any adoption of such changes. Similarly, under these circumstances, the degree to which enhanced individual capacities in URF and UNRA may be manifested in the future is unclear. Basically, potential longer-term impacts of the components of TA to UNRA and TA to URF are inhibited by political decisions which if actioned extend to the very basis of maintenance activities (i.e., force account/direct labour or private sector, chronic maintenance funding deficits). Policy changes, if finally carried out, represent a reversal of sector management principles which have been strongly supported by DPs in policy dialogue over more than a decade, and Uganda would thus be 'out of step' with most international practice. On the other hand, MoWT capacity has been enhanced regarding planning and sector policy (NITMP 2021-2040) although it is not clear how MoWT institutional capacity and procedures may require further amendment if UNRA is absorbed in some form.

JC 4A 2 – Increasing participation of national stakeholders in sector decision making and management

J.C 4A.3 – Unintended effects (positive and negative) identified as resulting from programme activities

There are major unintended effects arising from programme response to unexpected events which strongly affected implementation activities, and thus, outcomes and impacts of the programme although these unexpected events were external to the programme, with programme mitigation response being limited. These external events were completely different in nature i.e., the Covid pandemic (which could not reasonably have been predicted) and the Cabinet decision to end the 'independence' of UNRA and URF by absorption into MoWT and MoFPED respectively (which seems to have been a surprise to participants in sector policy dialogue although hints of such a decision go back to the 2015 'shake up' of UNRA). This latter decision had a serious 'over-shadowing' effect on future planning and sector governance activities given the future uncertainty of mandates and responsibilities. Reactive measures taken to adapt to and mitigate effects have impacted on implementation efficiency and effectiveness for all programme components resulting in only partial achievement of expected impacts.

JC 4A.4 – The Policy dialogue has addressed issues of multimodal (and intermodal) transport planning and implementation, financing for road maintenance and autonomy of sector institutions

The Policy dialogue has addressed issues of multimodal (and intermodal) transport planning and implementation, financing of road maintenance and autonomy of sector institutions and these issues have formed the basis of long term 'conventional' sector dialogue. The first of these issues can be said to have borne fruit in that the programme component (TA to MoWT) included support to establishment of a planning department in MoWT (although there are reported doubts regarding resources for continuing operation). The long-standing issue of adequacy of funding for road maintenance (and 'balance' and prioritisation of capital investment and maintenance) cannot be said to have been mitigated by prolonged dialogue as there continues to be a significant maintenance funding deficit. Linked to this issue is the decision to establish TSUs in DUCAR districts for force account/direct labour operations of maintenance thus rolling back dialogue advocacy and policies of greater commercialisation and involvement of local private sector.³⁷ Again policy dialogue appears to have been ineffective.

³⁷ Leaving aside very real doubts about capacities, experience, resources and funding in DUCAR districts to do the maintenance using Japanese and Chinese plant (with dollar-based mining costs – fuel, spares)

The issue of sector institutional landscape and autonomy of sector institutions is a less clear issue due to evolutionary institutional changes being advocated (e.g., progression from 1st generation to 2nd generation Road Funds) and despite major long-term support to UNRA and URF significant governance capacity and resourcing issues appear chronic (and arguably led to the 2015 imbroglio of suspension of WB support and the 'shake up' of UNRA).³⁸

EQ4B: To what extent has the Programme been aligned to address needs of the local construction industry and has contributed to deliberate policy actions, strengthened strategic capacities and/or recommendations to promote the local construction industry and develop the necessary tools to achieve the desired change?

Summary

- **TA to UIPE suffered from a slow start and was further hurt by COVID;**
- **The expected results were obtained late and only partially, in addition the TA was affected by the high turnover of experts;**
- **UIPE was partially strengthened but strongly increased its membership;**
- **Little evidence of impact of increased UIPE capacity on the LCI;**
- **Government should aim at building a healthy thriving local private contractors' sector;**
- **Reduced maintenance funding and late payments by government are hurting the private sector;**
- **UIPE activities improved relations between various actors in the road transport sector: UIPE, UTCs, UACE, UNABCEC.**

JC 4B.1 – Increased UIPE capacity to define and update strategies and service provision to the local construction industry resulting from evaluation of UIPE strategies and capacity

The TA to UIPE suffered from a slow start and was further hurt by COVID. The expected results were obtained late and only partially, in addition the TA was affected by the high turnover of experts.

The Inception Report was delayed by 14 months. The Team Leader in charge of the Strategic Plan left, and his replacement needed time before continuing with the Strategic Plan. The UIPE Strategic Plan developed by the Consultant was only approved by the Council recently in June 2022, a month before the end of the TA. The Business Plan was only presented on 21st July 2022 to the Council as a first draft. The implementation plan is now being worked on by the Council. As Institutional Capacity Strengthening is concerned, this was also not delivered to the full. All training meant to strengthen the Secretariat, so that the Council could delegate most of the activities, were not done by the Consultant.

At this stage there is little clear evidence of increased UIPE capacity to define and update strategies and service provision to LCI resulting from evaluation of UIPE strategies and capacity. The current UIPE Strategic Plan, Action Plan and M&E Framework are not clearly defined and results are being monitored only to a limited extent.

However more UIPE members are paying their subscriptions, and UIPE receives also revenues from the CPD training courses, adjudication, conferences, etc. UIPE also strongly increased its membership. There is no clear evidence of improved effectiveness of the ERB as a result of the 'Engineers' Registration Enhancement Programme'. The Consultant has not delivered on

³⁸ Anecdotally it has been suggested by more than one source that the 'writing was on the wall' in 2015 but that sector dialogue did not subsequently address these issues

EREP. A request for a no-cost addendum was submitted by the Consultant two days to the close of the contract (contrary to the contract conditions (Article 20 of GC) which provide for a request within at least 30 days to contract closure).

JC 4B.2 – Increased numbers of trained/qualified engineering graduates entering the national construction industry

From limited reporting information it is tentatively concluded that increasing numbers of trained/qualified engineering graduates are entering the LCI. However, available quantification is patchy with trainee involvement in GTP having been reduced from 200 to 120 so far and actual achievements regarding placement of graduates in employment being unclear.

JC 4B.3 – Project design, activities, policy dialogue and results have addressed issues of increasing national contractor and consultant involvement in transport sector construction and maintenance works contracts in Uganda

Apart from policy dialogue and advocacy, programme component design, activities and results have only peripherally addressed issues of increasing national contractor involvement in transport sector construction and maintenance works contracts in Uganda. There is recognition of the limited involvement of LCI in transport sector works and there is national legislation on proportions of contract value to be sub-contracted to national contractors. However, such provisions are not fully actioned and changes to procurement, qualification and eligibility requirements which could improve prospects for local contractor participation, are limited in scope. These issues have not been directly addressed by this programme.

The Government should aim at building a healthy thriving local private contractors' sector. The reduced maintenance funding and late payments by government are hurting the private sector. UIPE activities improved relations between various actors in the road transport sector: UIPE, UTCs, UACE, UNABCEC.

6.1.1 Impact on MoWT

The MoWT capacity has been enhanced regarding planning and sector policy although it is not clear how MoWT institutional capacity and procedures may require amendment if UNRA is absorbed in some form. The ET learned that a new organogram is under preparation, and that the Planning department is not yet approved by MoPS. The evaluation has not found evidence of increasing participation of national stakeholders in sector decision making and management. On the contrary, although consultation mechanisms with stakeholders and transport users do exist, findings indicate that these systems are not working well and that doubts exist among sector stakeholders about value for money, responsibilities and results although these doubts may be assigned, at least in part, to limited communication with road users.

Observation: The capacity building saw the Ministry Prepare a National Integrated Transport Master Plan which is a landmark strategic document for the Transport Sector. However other Capacity building components aimed at strengthening capacity of staff especially in planning was perceived as very short, not well sought out and hence creating little impact.

6.1.2 Impact on UNRA

Generally, most of TA program activities were highly of impactful nature to UNRA though true impact may be assessed after a long period of time not in the short term.

However, there were notable improvements in operations of UNRA arising out of this TA in areas of Corporate Governance and Strategic planning, claims management and

compensation, procurement management and Contracts management, and Mainstreaming of Environmental and social safeguards.

Observation: The impending abolition of UNRA to shift it as a Department in Ministry of Transport still remains as the biggest destabilising challenge to the efficient operations of the Institution. There is therefore need for high level Policy dialogue between key Development Partners and Government on this issue.

6.1.3 Impact on URF

The evaluation has not found evidence of increasing participation of national stakeholders in sector decision making and management. On the contrary, although consultation mechanisms with stakeholders and transport users do exist preliminary findings indicate that these systems are not working well and that doubts exist among sector stakeholders about URF value for money, responsibilities and results. These doubts may be assigned, at least in part, to limited communication by URF with road users. Meanwhile, a very public squabble between the URF Board and first Executive Director has reportedly resulted in reputational damage to URF which has undermined stakeholder confidence in the institution whilst also constraining decision making and consuming the time of URF technical management.

6.1.4 Impact on UIPE

The TA to UIPE suffered from a slow start and was further hurt by COVID. The expected results were obtained late and only partially, in addition the TA was affected by the high turnover of experts. At this stage there is little clear evidence of increased UIPE capacity and service provision to LCI resulting from support to UIPE strategies and capacity. The current UIPE Strategic Plan, Action Plan and M&E Framework are not clearly defined and results are being monitored only to a limited extent. However more UIPE members are paying their subscriptions, and UIPE strongly increased its membership. There is, as yet no clear evidence of improved effectiveness of the ERB as a result of the '*Engineer's Registration Enhancement Programme*' although it is tentatively concluded that increasing numbers of trained/qualified engineering graduates are entering the LCI. However, quantification is patchy with trainee involvement in GTP having been reduced from 200 to 120 and actual achievements regarding placement of graduates in employment not clearly reported.

Apart from policy dialogue and advocacy, programme component design, activities and results have only peripherally addressed issues of increasing national contractor involvement in transport sector construction and maintenance works contracts. There is recognition of the limited involvement of national contractors (and consultants) in the transport sector works market and there is national legislation on proportions of contract value to be sub-contracted to national firms. However, such provisions are not fully actioned and changes to procurement, qualification and eligibility requirements which could improve prospects for local contractor participation, have been limited in scope. These issues have not been directly addressed by this programme.

The Government should aim at building a healthy thriving local private contractors' sector. The reduced maintenance funding and late payments by government are hurting the private sector. UIPE activities improved relations between various actors in the road transport sector: UIPE, UTCs, UACE, UNABCEC.

According to the UIPE 2020-2024 Strategic Plan, it had a total membership of 4,355 (29 Fellows members, 895 Corporate Members, 6 Honorary Members, 66 Technologists, 55 Technicians, 1,125 Graduate Members and 2,179 Student Members). As at 31st August 2022, UIPE had a

total of 3,631 members excluding students.

There are 30 Fellows, 1,313 Corporate Members, 6 Honorary Members, 1,942 Graduate Members, 85 Technologists and 147 Technicians. Marketing Strategies of UIPE programs, branding, publicity plans and new information dissemination strategies has been upgraded and some effort has seen increase in membership registration especially more members are now registering from UIPE regional branches.

For instance, Mbarara branch saw an increase from 20 members to almost 150 members since 2019 to 2022. Increased UIPE influence acts in regards to improved collaboration with other key stakeholders has been initiated where UIPE has established a contact desk at UNRA to lobby for the LCI.

However not much impact is being witnessed in terms of securing more contracts due to insufficient enforcement mechanisms and lack of enforceable legal and regulatory frameworks for promoting Local Contractors and Consultants. Engineers Registration Enhancement Program (EREP) was to be put in place but it has not been well effected, there has been some increase in Membership noted over the years. A sustainable and well-structured program needs to be developed followed by the retention plan to justify benefits for members in the industry.

Observations:

- i. Some of the UIPE components of the TA were not implemented notably capacity building of UIPE secretariat staff was never implemented.
- ii. It should be noted that the increase in membership of UIPE though there was some slight increase may not be directly attributed and related with the TA impact. The main components which were to drive the process of increase in membership included UIPE registration drive process and EREP / ERB program which the TA failed to implement.

Conclusions

- I. The long-standing issue of adequacy of funding for road maintenance (and 'balance' and prioritisation of capital investment and maintenance) cannot be said to have been mitigated by prolonged dialogue as there continues to be a significant maintenance funding deficit. Linked to this issue is the instruction to establish TSUs in DUCAR districts for force account/direct labour operations of rural road maintenance thus rolling back dialogue advocacy and policies of greater commercialisation and involvement of local private sector.
- II. The evaluation did not find impact opportunities for the private sector competitiveness Component as a result of programme design and limited delivery

7. EQ5: PROGRAM SUSTAINABILITY

EQ5 To what extent will the flow of benefits for beneficiary organisations and the transport sector continue after the end of EU Cooperation support? And to what extent did the programme design and implementation mainstream policy priorities relate to: i) Gender equity and women's' empowerment; ii) Environmental impact

and adaptation to climate change; iii) Good governance (including 'leave no-one behind' and 'Rights-based Approach' (RBA)?

Summary

- ***The extent to which programme-delivered results will be institutionally sustainable will depend on the future of URF, UNRA and MoWT;***
- ***The participation of women is high in LBC in maintenance. The percentage of women in staff of the institutions is increasing. The percentage of women in GTP was limited, but it should be noted that the participation of women in the GTP is a historical problem starting from academic institutions. While the GTP strived to attract women participation, there was an inherent shortage of supply;***
- ***Programme design, activities and results have better mainstreamed coverage of ES issues and adaptation to climate change;***
- ***Sector governance considered in design, activities and results but coverage varied across programme components;***
- ***No reference to 'Rights Based Approach' and 'Leave No-one Behind' although governance principles of programme are compliant even if not explicitly articulated;***
- ***Limited effectiveness of policy dialogue may be a threat to sustainability.***

7.1 Sustainability of TA program

JC 5.1 – Programme-delivered results are likely to be institutionally sustainable

It is not entirely clear the extent to which programme-delivered results will be institutionally sustainable. Programme support has delivered better institutional capacity to manage these aspects of institutional mandate addressed by the programme whilst at higher policy level the MTR of NTMP (and Greater Kampala Metropolitan Area Master Plan) plus preparation of the NITMP 2021-2040 give a structural policy framework for the sector (not just the roads sub-sector). There are reports of adequate levels of ownership being expressed by the four beneficiary institutions although such expressions have not, apparently, always been manifested in delivery of commitments.³⁹ In terms of institutional capacities there is evidence of potential sustainability.

However, in terms of application of such institutional enhancements for wider sector sustainability goals (such as better road sector delivery and standards of maintenance) there are doubts which go beyond direct programme results.

It is suggested that funding deficits represent the single greatest threat to sustainability of transport sector source delivery in that whilst institutional capacity building can improve management of available funds and maximise effectiveness in use of said funds (together with better response to governance, environmental, social, gender and climate change issues) there is a limit to how far such enhanced capacities can realistically compensate for serious chronic resource deficits.

Finally, there is the pending Cabinet Decision to remove the (semi) autonomy of URF and UNRA by embedding these organisations' responsibilities within MoWT. This reorganisation would represent a reversal of sector institutional change initiated about 15 years ago that were advocated and supported by sector partners (especially WB). Sector partners accept that performance of sector institutions has not always met expectations in terms of technical effectiveness, governance and PFM and that some institutional reorganisation is desirable (and arguably overdue)⁴⁰ but that the existing separation of planning and control (client) functions

³⁹ e.g., TSU rollout being delayed (URF), limited axle load control activities (UNRA), delayed office facilities and staffing for planning office (MoWT) – source MTE Final Report

⁴⁰ Including URF operating as a '2nd Generation Road Fund'

(i.e., MoWT) from works execution and financing (contractor) functions [i.e., UNRA (and URF)] should be maintained. The Evaluation Team was informed that the MoWT organogram was under review and a new organogram is being proposed to accommodate URF and UNRA under the Roads Department. Policy dialogue is required at the highest level of Government so that URF and UNRA are not mainstreamed in MoFPED and MoWT.

J.C 5.2 – Programme design, activities and results have mainstreamed and contributed to gender empowerment and women’s employment

There is evidence of analysis in programme design of the need for better coverage of gender issues including promotion of gender empowerment in strategic planning and sector policies and such concerns were expressed in the ToR for TA for all components. There was thus an expectation that gender issues would be mainstreamed in programme implementation. Although there are some doubts that implementation mainstreamed gender issue⁴¹, there is a reported to be increased awareness of gender equity and the role of gender in strategic planning. Also, in terms of policy documentation produced, the NITMP 2021-2040 clearly sets out sector aspirations regarding gender empowerment. There is thus more evidential coverage of gender issues in the MoWT, UNRA and URF components than in the ‘support to LCI’ component (which has very little mention of cross-cutting issues in documentation scrutinised by the evaluation).

J.C 5.3 – Programme design, activities and results have mainstreamed and contributed to better environmental impacts and adaptation to climate change

Programme design, activities and results have better mainstreamed coverage of ES issues and adaptation to climate change. There is historical record of violation of ES standards on WB-funded road construction projects⁴² and programme design thus identified the need for better sector coverage of ES standards, climate change adaptation and climate resilience. There is evidence of inclusion of ES and climate change issues in three programme components (TA to MoWT, TA to UNRA and TA to URF), less so in the case of support to the LCI/TA to UIPE. Although more recently there has been more consistent compliance with Ugandan environmental legislation, the programme TA has provided training in better application of ES and RAP safeguards in accordance with international practices and consolidation/better mainstreaming of ES and RAP safeguards in planning, design, construction and maintenance activities. Such mainstreaming includes provision in the NITMP 2021-2040.

J.C 5.4 – Programme design, activities, policy dialogue and results have mainstreamed and contributed to better sector governance

Higher level national policy documents clearly advocate good governance across all sectors e.g., NDP3 requires good governance as an enabler of development whilst Uganda Vision 2040 refers to the need for better national governance (whilst also acknowledging challenges to this aim). Sector governance has been covered to some extent in programme design, activities and results but coverage has varied across these programme stages and across the four programme components.⁴³

Support to LCI, whilst identifying governance policy and regulatory issues to be addressed in practice such support to governance appears to be limited to better definition of responsibilities between the UIPE Secretariat and Council. Governance cannot be said to have been mainstreamed in this component.

⁴¹ Certainly, implementation reporting does not support the thesis that gender was mainstreamed

⁴² which led to suspension of WB sector support in 2015

⁴³ Noting also that in programme documentation ‘governance’ is to some extent a ‘cover-all’ term encompassing various ‘cross-cutting’ issues such as gender, environment, climate change, institutional set-up and structures and sector institutional management, PFM and accountability

Both components (TA to UNRA and TA to URF) addressed issues of governance associated with institutional capacities, although there is limited evidence to confirm mainstreaming of governance in implementation of results. Overall, considering the overall objective of the programme as set out in the Financing Agreement (and LFM) it is suggested that actual achievements regarding improved core principles of good governance – fairness, accountability, responsibility and transparency governance have not been fully delivered as expected in terms of the management of the individual sector institutions.

In terms of internal programme governance, the role of the Steering Committee was confirmed in monitoring implementation progress (rather than strategically directing implementation or problem solving) and as a forum for all programme partners.

Although there is reference to both ‘Rights Based Approach’ or ‘Leave No-one Behind’ in higher level national policy documentation there are no explicit references to either in project documentation scrutinised. However, the guiding governance principles of the programme are compliant with these approaches even if not explicitly articulated as such.

7.1.1 Sustainability on MoWT

TA to MoWT has delivered outputs (Planning Dept and NITMP 2021-2040) both of which have clear reference to principles of sector governance in prepared strategies policies and management principles⁴⁴. There are clear indications of ‘mainstreaming’ of governance in NITMP 2021-2040 but there is limited evidence of the degree to which mainstreaming of governance may be said to be applied to MoWT itself.

7.1.2 Sustainability on UNRA

TA to UNRA components addressed issues of governance associated with institutional capacities, although there is limited evidence to confirm mainstreaming of governance in implementation of results. Overall, it is suggested that actual achievements regarding improved core principles of good governance have not been delivered as expected in the individual sector institutions.

Observations: UNRA has had a challenge of National Road Maintenance funding gaps and program backlog. The Budget allocation from Government has been reducing tremendously over the years to the extent that the Institution gets almost less than 30 percent of budgeted resources annually. The Institution need to reprioritize its budgetary resources between new road developments and Periodic Maintenance.

7.1.3 Sustainability on URF

The evaluation has not found evidence of increasing participation of national stakeholders in sector decision making and management. On the contrary, although consultation mechanisms with stakeholders and transport users do exist preliminary findings indicate that these systems are not working well and that doubts exist among sector stakeholders about URF value for money, responsibilities and results. These doubts may be assigned, at least in part, to limited communication by URF with road users. Meanwhile, a very public squabble between the URF Board and first Executive Director has reportedly resulted in reputational damage to URF which has undermined stakeholder confidence in the institution whilst also constraining decision making and consuming the time of URF technical management.

⁴⁴ Core principles of good governance – harness accountability, responsibility and transparency

Observation: The Current big challenge of the URF has a big backlog of road maintenance funding caused by low budgetary allocation from Government. The sustainability of the URF programs can only be assured and guaranteed if the 2nd Generation Road Fund is operationalized. URF is actually not in full operation as the Act Establishing it.

7.1.4 Sustainability on UIPE

Support to LCI, whilst identifying governance policy and regulatory issues to be addressed in practice such support to governance appears to be limited. However, in UIPE the programme attempted to build their capacity in corporate governance.

Total revenue for UIPE including Subscription revenue and Development Partner funding stood at 1.2 bn shs in 2019 and 1.32 bn in 2020. It should be noted as reported in the 2020-2024 UIPE Strategic Plan however that the projected average annual membership subscriptions are Shs.450m. This means that more than 60% of the revenue comes from external sources which threatens the future self-sustainability of the institution and negating its visibility. More effort should be put on visibility and communication strategy to raise the profile of UIPE and market its relevance to attract more membership and self-generated revenue

UIPE may lack capacity and clear program action to sustain the program which is mainly due to high dependence of the institution on external funding (which accounts for more than 60 % of the UIPE budgetary resources originating from External donations and funding).

Observations:

There is need for the UIPE to enhance the EREP and membership scheme to raise internal generated funds for its sustainable operation. Also depending on level of organisation of the LCI, there could be some professional fees contributed through awarded contracts. In regard to the TA to UIPE and the LCI, the policy dialogue discussions have not had a lot of impact in actualising and promoting the industry.

The LCI Policy 2010 provides for the establishment of the Uganda Construction Industry Commission (UCICO) by an Act of Parliament by 2011 to promote and regulate the Construction Industry and promote the Local content of contractors. However, this action has not been achieved by the respective Ministry.

There is need to have more strong Policy Dialogue on this issue if the country is deliberate to promote a strong Private Sector in the Construction Industry. LCI 2010, Provides for establishment of Procurement Rules and regulations to be incorporated in PPDA procurement Regulations making a provision for foreign Contractors and companies to form Joint Ventures or association with local companies or sub-contract the percentage of works & services to local contractors. No action on this has been evidently recorded and enforced to that effect.

All these actions have not been realised and the Policy dialogue could put more emphasis on some of these actions for actual implementation.

Conclusions:

- i. Recent Cabinet Decision towards reducing and downsizing the number of public organizations and institutions in most sectors might require changes in transport policy and plans. It should be noted that for future sustainability of

the Sector the autonomy of UNRA and URF, and existence, will be an essential requirement for sector operation.

- ii. There is need for high level policy dialogue between key Development Partners and Government to address this critical reform using the best practices from other countries.
- iii. The Development and promotion of the Local Construction Industry is also key in promoting the Country's Private Sector for sustainable development.
- iv. There is need to have a sustained program and action legal framework to focus on gender, Environment and other social safeguards. Mainstreaming cross cutting issues of Gender equity needs to go beyond a balanced gender representation, to addressing women challenges of technical training and other social impediments that hinder effective participation of women in the Transport sector.
- v. It is expected that the programmes would be supported institutionally and thematically by EUD transport sector policy dialogue in which EU has historically taken a leading role in Uganda. During the programme implementation period such dialogue has taken place but with limited reference to the cabinet decision to reduce the number of transport sector institutions which could result in absorption of UNRA and URF by MoWT.

8. EQ6: PROGRAM VALUE ADDITION

EQ6: To what extent has EU cooperation had value added for the Transport Sector Institutional Capacity Building Programme design and implementation, compared to what could have been achieved by Member States?

Summary

- ***The EU support is long-standing - significant financing of capital investment in construction, rehabilitation and periodic maintenance;***
- ***The consistency of EU sector support is recognised by sector partners and GoU;***
- ***The EU does have a comparative advantage over some other sector DPs;***
- ***EU programmes are managed by Government through the NAO (instead of PIUs) this is appreciated by Government;***
- ***The EU participates actively in policy dialogue and brings added value to coordination of sector DPs and policy dialogue (long history of EU sector support and financial resources invested over successive EDF programming cycles)***

8.1 EU added value

There is clear identification of EU strategies, competencies, capacity, resources and experience which have been applied to support the transport sector in Uganda over decades. This long-standing support has mobilised significant financing of capital investment in construction, rehabilitation and periodic maintenance and this consistency of EU sector support is recognised by sector partners and GoU and thus there is evidence that EU support policies, strategies and

experience in Uganda have offered added value compared with most sector DPs and, arguably, all EU MS. However, no evidence has been examined of explicit consideration of optimisation of 'EU Added Value' relative to other sector partners or EU MS in programme design although complementarity, synergy, donor coordination and joint programming were discussed at design stage. However, it is concluded that EU does, in fact, have a comparative advantage over some other sector DPs and no evidence has been examined to suggest that other sector DPs would have offered more effective capacity building than EU. In particular EU programmes are managed by Government through the NAO (instead of PIUs) and this is appreciated by Government.

There is evidence that EU brings added value to both coordination of sector DPs and to policy dialogue, such added value accruing from the long history of EU sector support and the financial resources invested over successive EDF programming cycles. However, there is little evidence of consideration being specifically given to 'leveraging' such potential added value into greater effectiveness of sector support.

JC 6.1 – Clear identification of EU strategies competencies, capacities and experience contributing to 'Added Value'

There is clear evidence of EU strategies, competencies, capacity, resources and experience which have been applied to support to the transport sector in Uganda over some 30 years. This long-standing support has mobilised significant financing of capital investment in construction, rehabilitation and periodic maintenance and this consistency of EU sector support is recognised by all sector partners and GoU. However, no evidence has been examined of explicit consideration of optimisation of 'EU Added Value' relative to other sector partners or EU MS in programme design although it is provisionally concluded that EU does, in fact, have a comparative advantage over some other sector DPs. In particular EU programmes are managed by Government through the NAO (instead of PIUs) and this is appreciated by Government.

JC 6.2 - EU support policies strategies and project management offer added value compared with other sector development partners (including EU MS)

As noted in JC 6.1 above there is clear evidence that EU support policies, strategies and experience in Uganda have offered added value compared with most sector DPs and, arguably, all EU MS. However, there is no evidence of such potential 'added value' being explicitly discussed at design stage. No evidence has been examined which might suggest that any other sector DPs would have offered more effective capacity building than EU and the MTE finding that EU has not 'leveraged' added value in terms of policy dialogue or development of policy and institutional framework for transport sector institutions is not confirmed by evidence gathered to date by this evaluation. Complementarity, synergy, donor coordination and joint programming were discussed at programme design stage and there is evidence of programme activities being complementary with those of other sector DPs.

JC 6.3 – The EU brings added value to coordination of sector development partners and policy dialogue

There is evidence that EU brings added value to both coordination of sector DPs and to policy dialogue, such added value accruing from the long history of EU sector support and the financial resources invested over successive EDF programming cycles. However, there is little evidence of consideration being specifically given to 'leveraging' such potential added value into greater effectiveness of sector support.

8.1.1 Added value on MoWT

There was visible value added in the sector upon completion and preparation of National Integrated Transport Master Plan 2021-2040. This is a big milestone that will underpin the Ministry's priority planning and future prioritization of its programs. This process also adds value in terms of Stakeholder participation and interest in the planning process which is key in terms of inclusivity. This program has also enhanced the policy dialogue mechanisms in the sector in terms of joint planning and policy frameworks.

8.1.2 Added value on UNRA

The TA to UNRA had added value in most critical areas of Corporate Governance and Strategic Planning, Procurement, Accountability and Auditing functions.

8.1.3 Added value on URF

If the TA was fully implemented, the program could have added a lot of value to URF. There are however administrative gaps and unfavourable legal frameworks which still hinder full realisation of the potential for the Institution. The issue of failure by URF to realise a second-Generation Road Fund is a drawback for the Institution.

8.1.4 Added value on UIPE

- The TA has created some impact in the institution and added some value in terms of membership mobilisation and graduate training programs. However, the main objective of enhancing competitiveness of the LCI is still far from being achieved and will require deliberate legal framework and clear enforceable actions.
- One of the outputs of the TA to UIPE was the procurement of a new IT system, meant to make applications and registrations of membership easier. Improving application and registration mechanisms the new IT system was found to be relevant to the revised objective of the support to UIPE, which is: Increased relevance of UIPE to its Members and increased influence of UIPE with stakeholders. However, it was not evident how this component impact was achieved to add value.

The UIPE programme evidently added some value by developing technical capacity of Technicians and in addressing social issues of gender imbalance by training and enrolling women in the program.

Out of total 96 GTP total participants 30 were women representing 31% though Men still are predominant in this field of sciences and more efforts need to be put in place to uplift the role of women to be involved in the construction industry.

Funding for the scaling up of trainings to national technical colleges saw approximately 250 Finalists Technicians trained.

The TA provided administrative and logistical support for the integration of selected academic and professional courses into the curricula of five national technical colleges to equip graduates with employable skills. In addition, this TA promoted the advancement of the engineering profession in the LCI

In total in all the five UTCs in the country 250 Graduate Technicians received technical training in practical skills related with contract management and Construction. What is not known is how many were absorbed in the Job market.

Generally, the composition of Women trained Graduate Technicians was an average of 23% combining all the 5 UTCs which remained at lower end of the scale. There are therefore deliberate actions needed to uplift the capacity of Women in this field. Lira UTC out of 55 trainees. 7 were women – 13% were women, UTC Masindi out of 26 trainees' women were 9 – 34%, Kichwamba UTC out of 28 Trainees, 7 were women- 25%, Elgon UTC out of 35 Trainees, 8 were women- 22% and UTC Bushenyi out of 44 trainees 8 were women – 18%.

General Observation:

The Policy Dialogue mechanisms platform between the EU and the sector in place have not been very effective due to lack of implementation of agreed actions.

Recommendations:

- i. The policy dialogue mechanisms by EU and DPs should be enhanced and upscaled to high levels of governance and to be effective.
- ii. Proactive recommendations are needed to be made including key Actions and targets set with time frame including monitoring frameworks that are enforceable to enhance dialogue.
- iii. The EU and other Development Partners should use funding conditionalities as a method to enforce implementation of the key Policy Actions

9. EQ7: PROGRAM COHERENCE

EQ7: To what extent has the Transport Sector Institutional Capacity Building Programme been aligned with evolving EU MS and Development Partners' strategies and cooperation objectives?

Summary

- ***The EU support and the actions of some sector DPs complemented/ reinforced each other;***
- ***There is a high level of coordination with the remaining sector DPs;***
- ***EU commitment to DP coordination in policy dialogue and to participation in JATSR;***
- ***Joint programming, application of analysis by other DPs (such as WB and DFID);***
- ***Synergies between EU support activities and those of other DPs;***
- ***Overall, the programme has good coherence with OECD PCSD recommendations for achieving the 2030 Agenda and contributing to SDGs 5, 8, 9 & 13;***
- ***'Team Europe' approach not explicitly mobilised (as post-dates programme design) but essential features of Team Europe approach anticipated in programme design.***

9.1 Coherence

The EU support and the actions of some other sector DPs have complemented and reinforced each other, but in diminishing coherence with the EU MS due to withdrawal of some MS from the transport sector in the recent years. With the remaining sector DPs there is a high level of

coordination. The EU chairing sector DP working group meetings demonstrate the EU commitment to coordination in policy dialogue which extends to participation in the joint Annual Transport Sector Review. There is also evidence of joint programming, application of analysis undertaken by other DPs (such as WB and DFID) and synergies between EU support activities and those of other DPs. Overall, the programme exhibits good coherence with the OECD recommendations on Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development as regards development of strategic vision for achieving 2030 Agenda and contributing to SDGs 5, 8, 9 & 13 in an integrated and coherent manner.

The 'Team Europe' approach, combining resources from EU, EU MS and European agencies, institutions and IFIs has not been explicitly mobilised by the programme as this initiative post-dates programme design whilst programme response to Covid was essentially on a component-by-component basis. However, essential features of the approach (visibility, coherence, coordination joint programming) were anticipated in programme design.

J.C. 7.1 – The EU support and the actions of EU MS and other sector development partners (including European IFIs) complemented and reinforced each other

The EU support and actions of some other sector DPs have complemented and reinforced each other (except for China) and with diminishing coherence with the EU MS due to withdrawal of some MS from the transport sector in recent years. With these sector DPs there is a high level of coordination. EU chairing sector DP working group meetings demonstrates coordination in policy dialogue which extends to the joint Annual Transport Sector Review. There is also evidence of joint programming, application of analysis undertaken by other DPs (such as WB and DFID) and synergies between EU support activities and those of other DPs (but not EU MS). Programme design complies with Agenda 2030 in contributing to SDGs 5, 8, 9 and 13. Overall the programme exhibits good coherence with OECD recommendations on Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development (PCSD) as regards development of strategic vision for achieving 2030 Agenda and contributing to SDGs in an integrated and coherence manner; development of institutional mechanisms to address policy inter-actions across sectors and align actions among levels of government and, in development of tools to address domestic, transboundary impacts and policies to address SDGs.

J.C. 7.2 – 'Team Europe' approach, combining resources from EU, EU MS and European agencies institutions and IFIs has been mobilised by the project (in response to Covid and other issues)

The 'Team Europe' approach, combining resources from EU, EU MS and European agencies, institutions and IFIs has not been explicitly mobilised by the programme (in response to Covid and other issues) as this initiative post-dates programme design whilst programme response to Covid was essentially on a component-by-component basis. However, essential features of the approach (e.g., visibility, coherence, coordination joint programming) were anticipated in programme design (as discussed under J.C. 7.1 above)

In Summary:

The Transport Sector Institutional Capacity Building Programme was well intended and underpinned by legal frameworks and transport policies and well aligned with EU and Other Development Partners programs.

Future TA programs, however will need to be more directly focused on how to promote actions geared toward promotion of the Private Sector and the Local Construction Industry. This is a key element for National job creation and capacity growth in the Construction industry at large.

9.1.1 Coherence on MoWT

The TA helped the Ministry of Works to come up with Transport Master Plan document for 2022-2040. This process promoted a lot of stakeholder involvement and will improve the policy dialogue channels including EUD to higher levels of governance. However, it should be noted that overall policy dialogue to be effective will require discussing policy issues at higher levels where the Donor community engages high political levels.

Observation: There is also need for Action plan on policy issues to be implemented with clear time frames and monitoring frameworks, evidently most of the agreed policy actions have remained on paper and shelved without actual implementation being seen on the ground.

9.1.2 Coherence on UNRA

Programme deliverables included improved governance arising from improved institutional capacities including better, more transparent cost estimation techniques.

However, UNRA performance has been negatively affected by institutional governance issues especially the pending institutional restructuring and shift to Ministry of Transport.

9.1.3 Coherence on URF

Road maintenance program has remained a bit of a challenge in the sector. There is currently a backlog of maintenance which has been shelved due to limited budgetary resources and Government underfunding. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that Uganda has not created a second-generation road fund as it was envisaged. The situation will be worsened by the fact that the Government has proposed reforms aimed at abolishing the URF institution.

It's at this stage that the Development Partners need to escalate policy dialogue levels to engage the top levels of governance in the country. If need be, there would be need for some conditionalities for financing some of the programs based on Government's implementation of certain reforms.

9.1.4 Coherence to UIPE

The key actions on the LCI strategy annual Action Plan Matrix on Integrated Transport Infrastructure and Services (ITIS) need to be given priority. Need to enhance the capacity for Monitoring and Evaluation for the actions and policy directions formulated during the annual JTSR between Stakeholders, other Development Partners and the EU.

In order to promote an effective and competitive LCI, particular deliberate actions need to be addressed and implemented;

- There is urgent need to finalise the NCI Policy laws and Regulations
- Finalisation and gazetting and Accreditation of the Local Contractors Register
- There should be mechanism on annual reporting and monitoring the application and performance of the Reservation and Preferential Scheme as provided for in the PPDA Act 2021 including setting up an online Local Contractor Registration and Classification System
- Need to address weak institutional capacity of designated agencies and support Engineers at Local Government levels to register
- There is inadequate publicity of the ITIS program policy actions and therefore need to create quarterly updates and publications.
- There is also need for establishment of a LCI Apex organisation which can spearhead sustained policy dialogue and advocacy for purposely towards development of a strong private sector in the LCI.

Its apparent that there is a strong need for a well refined and structured communication Strategy on sector policy actions and strategies spearheaded by the EU in the sector.

10. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS, LESSONS LEARNT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The following table shows the DAC criteria and the additional EU criteria, and the degree to which they have been achieved by the programme.

Green shows good achievements, orange partial achievements and red an important lack of achievement.

#	Criteria
1	Relevance
2	Effectiveness
3	Efficiency
4	Sustainability
5	Impact
6	Environment
7	Gender
8	EU added value
9	Coherence
10	Visibility

The following paragraphs provide justifications for the above ratings.

10.1 Conclusions of the evaluation, organised per evaluation criterion.

I. Relevance 1 (see also EQ1):

The programme support components to UNRA, URF and MoWT were highly relevant, but outputs are likely to have only limited effect on wider sector service delivery and protection of infrastructure assets due to external issues.

The 'Support to LCI' component is not clear in how its expected outputs will address issues of competitiveness or increased access to the national road construction and maintenance market for national contractors. The issues addressed by this support are a response to genuine needs but it is suggested that these needs are no more than peripheral to more important LCI issues. It is acknowledged that complementary dialogue did take place on wider LCI issues (including PPDA reservation scheme, contract packaging and LCI service contracts) but these issues were not directly covered in the 'Support to LCI' component as such.

This conclusion is linked to the EQ1.

II. Effectiveness (see also EQ2):

The programme approach to TA to UNRA (and to a lesser extent TA to URF) was very wide in scope. Whilst all specified TA activities were in response to identified needs and capacity deficits, not all issues were of equal importance of 'value' (regarding economic/financial, social or environmental/climate change issues). Also, the sheer breadth of scope of coverage required a large number of ST inputs which in turn necessitated considerable managerial, supervisory and 'follow-up' attention by the TA Team Leader, EUD and UNRA (aggravated in the case of some ST draft outputs being of unacceptable quality).

This conclusion is linked to EQ2.

III. Efficiency 1 (see also EQ3):

There were clear differences between TA performances in the different components. These differences were not due to a single cause but rather reflected the varying institutional receptiveness to changed practices, institutional governance issues, the ability of the Team Leader and STEs and the 'approach ethic' of the different consultants. However, contractual issues were a common theme.

Monitoring of activities/outputs, on the whole, good but less so of outcomes and impacts, but this is to be expected since the latter will appear only later.

Policy dialogue and involvement of development partners with Government has been consistent and focused. It should not be concluded that contrary government stance regarding sector institutions, maintenance funding or maintenance implementation represents a failure of the dialogue itself or a lack of commitment and focus of DPs. Government has been presented with clear evidence (from multiple comparable countries) in support of DP advocacy (including study tours) which it has decided to ignore and follow a different path.

The later stages of TA to UNRA and TA to URF contracts were beset with logistical issues which left some activities incomplete and some outputs constrained. It is difficult to see how these results could have been further mitigated without longer time periods and or resources (although the late decision to divert URF TA from some ongoing activities to prepare the study on 'Institutional and Funding Models for URF' seems to have been an after-thought which attracted little ownership from sector institutions).

This conclusion is linked to EQ3.

IV. Sustainability (see also EQ5):

Government decisions to absorb UNRA and URF by MoWT already have negative effect on road sector service delivery and this deterioration is likely to accelerate.

This conclusion is linked to EQ5.

V. Impact (see also EQ4):

Monitoring frameworks for implementation activities and outputs were, on the whole, good but less so regarding outcomes and impacts, the delivery of which were subject to major assumptions (outside of the programme remit) on how it would be possible to effectively apply outputs.

This conclusion is linked to EQ4.

VI. Environment:

The programme effectively included capacity building in environmental and social safeguards, specifically in UNRA.

This conclusion is linked to EQ5.

VII. Gender:

Participation of women is particularly implemented in the road maintenance by LBCs. The GTP faced problems in reaching the expected participation because of the small number of women graduate engineers. The Government institutions are making efforts towards increasing the employment of women. Both UNRA regional offices (out of a total of five) visited by the evaluation team are headed by women.

This conclusion is linked to EQ5.

VIII. EU added value (see also EQ6):

All stakeholders appreciate EU for its long-standing support and significant financing of capital investment in construction, rehabilitation and periodic maintenance, in addition to the present capacity building programme.

This conclusion is linked to EQ6

IX. Coherence (see also EQ7):

Overall, the programme has good coherence with OECD PCSD recommendations for achieving the 2030 Agenda and contributing to SDGs 5, 8, 9 & 13, and with the EU MS and Development Partners' strategies and cooperation objectives.

This conclusion is linked to EQ7.

X. Visibility:

The engagement of the C&V FW contractor in 2019 was in response to MTE recommendations (and, to some extent a reaction to the 2018 cabinet decision). The concept was sound and had it been launched at the same time as the other TA contracts it is likely that results would have been more effective. In the event, Covid disruptions and the imminent termination of TA contracts limited the attention given to C&V by the TA consultants and reduced potential results.

This conclusion is linked to EQ7.

10.2 Lessons Learned

1. Intensive and prolonged policy dialogue is no guarantee that national government will support DP advocacy or follow international practices and experiences.
2. There is a limit to the effectiveness of capacity building of individuals and institutions if such enhanced capacities either cannot be applied, or inadequate resources are available for realistic application. Either way, expected levels of service delivery will not be achieved. In other words, capacity building may be effective in terms of outputs but not in terms of expected outcomes and impacts.
3. Given the historical experience of the Uganda road sector, it is unrealistic to expect that adequate funding for routine and periodic maintenance will be available in the short term. It is suggested that for future sector support it will be necessary to introduce some degree of conditionality for making finance available for future capital investment in infrastructure investments.

(Re) introduction of budget support has been mooted as a possible mechanism whereby disbursement of tranches would be conditional upon agreed policy or action thresholds being achieved. Whilst this incentivisation principle may be sound, it is likely that the EC standalone funding would only be adequate for relatively modest sector investments (such as back-log periodic maintenance). Given Uganda's predilection for major capital investments and with the increasing use of the 'blending' modality, consideration could be given to 'policy-based loans'. This concept, akin to budget support incentives, involves a 'Road map agreement' whereby policy/strategy commitments are linked to 'triggers' for conditional disbursement of IFI loans. Given the high values of IFI loans being made available, this approach could also leverage more highly the effectiveness of linked policy dialogue. This approach linking EU and IFIs has been carried out in several countries worldwide

4. The NAO successfully managed the formulation and procurement of the programme but lacked effective capacity to manage the large TA contracts requiring the EUD to get strongly involved in routine management.
5. The lessons learned in other countries show that efficient, effective and sustainable road maintenance requires a second-generation road fund where road users play a major role, and with an assured and increasing income. An autonomous Road Agency should be in charge of multi-year planning and multi-year maintenance contracts, with maintenance being implemented by small LBCs, medium and large local contractors.

The government support to international transport sector policies and practices is equivocal as manifested by the 2018 cabinet decision:

- a. to absorb the semi-autonomous road agencies (UNRA and URF) as ministerial departments (against international experience),
- b. to undertake rural road maintenance by direct labour/force account units (against national policies for encouragement of increased private sector involvement in sector works), and
- c. to continue the diversion of fuel levy revenues from routine maintenance, which is thus suffering chronic under-funding (contrary to economic viability calculations including whole life cycle costing).

These latter decisions are already having a negative impact on road sector service delivery and this deterioration in road conditions is likely to accelerate.

6. Generally, there were Contractual issues which affected efficient implementation of TA, for instance contracts that were fee based gave a lot of problems in implementation due to requirements for filling time sheets and monitoring and supervision of milestones, whereas Global priced/ milestone-based TA contracts were well executed and it should be perceived as the best preferred EU model of contracting in the future.

10.3 Recommendations

No.	Recommendation	To be implemented by whom?	Priority	Importance
R1	In any future capacity building of transport sector institutions focus and concentration of TA effort should be on comprehensive coverage of a limited number of 'high value' needs and issues (economic/financial, social and environmental/climate change adaptation). This recommendation is linked to conclusion 2.	EUD, MOWT, UNRA, URF, UIPE	Medium term	Medium
R2	Link financing of sector infrastructure investment to policy commitments and actioning of strategies including maintenance funding, in other words conditionalities need to be applied. This recommendation is linked to conclusion 3	EUD	Short term	High
R3	Use budget support and blending but linked to 'triggers' for conditional disbursement. This recommendation is linked to conclusion 3	EUD	Short term	High
R4	Continue support and advocacy to multi-modality (linking such financial support to financing conditionality (see recommendation above) This recommendation is linked to conclusion 3	EUD	Medium term	High
R5	Continue policy dialogue efforts and advocacy but at a higher level and monitor implementation of agreed policy actions. Given the changes being considered by government and already actioned for sector institutions and rural road maintenance methods combined with inaction on maintenance funding, it is likely that the effects of these changes will become increasingly visible during the next EU programme cycle. This recommendation is linked to conclusion 3	EUD	Short term	High
R6	If the EU wants to maintain a presence in the road sector and a role in the policy dialogue, they could take inspiration from an EU activity in Benin where the EU funded periodic road maintenance through the Road fund (for an amount of 25 million euro under the 10th EDF), and very importantly the EU included in the package Technical Assistance and annual technical and financial audits of the whole road fund budget that produced recommendations for the improvement of the Road Fund procedures. This turned out to be a successful programme. This recommendation is linked to conclusion 3 and 4.	EUD	Short term	High
R7	(Re) consider support to LCI. There have been multiple reports on LCI issues in Uganda which have clearly identified constraints to competitiveness and access to the transport sector works market and consideration could be given to addressing some of these constraints. Therefore, it would be recommended to start with a study of all the problems faced by the contractors and consultants in the road sector such as under preparation by the EU (see ToR that have been prepared by the EUD). However, government commitment to its own transport sector policies would be an essential pre-requisite (e.g., % of contract value to be sub-contracted to national firms). Therefore, it is imperative to get strong Government support to effectively build a thriving well-structured private contracting sector with many small, a large number of medium size and a small number of large local contractors. This recommendation is linked to conclusion 3 and 4.	EUD, MOWT, UNRA, URF, UIPE	Short term	High
R8	Participation of women in labour-based maintenance is actually almost 50%. Further increases in participation by women may need some more affirmative action such as for example: (i) creation of women-only teams, under a woman team leader, and giving them work where women are better than men such as spreading, tree planting or planting grass ; (ii) providing training specifically for women, and more specifically for women	UNRA	Medium term	Medium

	<p>team leaders ; (iii) having a sociologist examine the ways women participation could be increased taking into account local cultural barriers ; (iv) creating part-time jobs if this would attract more women; (v) contracting a family rather than a man, the family can then send a man or a woman ; (vii) reserve certain jobs for women or for women head of a household .</p> <p>This recommendation is linked to conclusion 7.</p>			
R9	<p>With large TA programmes the NAO may also need specialised TA to help manage the programme as the standard available expertise in the Support Unit may not be sufficiently specific. Proper future management of such TA should strengthen the NAO to be stronger and take effective role and involvement and release the EU to play its oversight role at strategic level but not for EU to do the nitty gritty monitoring as was the case. This recommendation is linked to conclusion 3.</p>	EUD, NAO	Medium term	Medium
R10	<p>The decision to use force account and equipment-based maintenance by districts lacking capacity, was a step backward and is not working. The intended absorption of UNRA and URF by MoWT is also a step backwards and Uganda stands to lose its investments in road infrastructure through insufficient maintenance over the next years. It is recommended to maintain UNRA as an autonomous road agency (eventually restructured), and to transform the URF into a second-generation road fund, and to phase out force account.</p> <p>It should be noted that the criticism of UNRA and URF by the Government, always mentions high operational costs which are due to high wage costs. However, if we look at the 2018/19 financial performance of UNRA we note that out of a total of budget released to UNRA of 2,886.4 billion UGS, the recurrent part of the budget was 98.1 billion UGS, or 3.3% which is an acceptable ratio. Similarly for URF we note that out of a total of budget released to URF 541,221 billion UGS, the recurrent part of the budget was 13,960 billion UGS, or 2.6% which is maybe on the high side for a Road Fund but we have to keep in mind that the URF disburses to a large number of agencies (maybe as much as 150) while the average road fund disburses to only a handful of agencies. Also, to take into account is that both organisations are set up to cater for all the maintenance needs, but they only received a budget for half of those needs. So, if the maintenance allocation was sufficient for the maintenance needs, the operational budget of UNRA and URF would not anymore be of concern</p> <p>This recommendation is linked to conclusion 4.</p>	GoU	Short term	High

Annex 1: Terms of reference of the final evaluation

SPECIFIC TERMS OF REFERENCE – PART A

**Final Evaluation of the Institutional Capacity Building for the Transport Sector in Uganda
Project**

FWC SIEA 2018 - LOT 2: Infrastructure, sustainable growth and jobs

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1 BACKGROUND

1.1 Relevant country and sector background

The Uganda Vision 2040 aims at transforming Uganda from its present Least Developed Country status to a competitive, upper middle income country by 2040. The vision builds mainly on the development fundamentals of infrastructure and human capital in order to be able to harness economic opportunities particularly in agriculture; minerals, oil and gas; and tourism. Accordingly, the Second National Development Plan (NDP II) 2015-2020, the period during which the capacity building project was designed, prioritised energy, *transport*, information and communication technology (ICT), and water for production. This trend continues in the recently launched NDP III (2020/21 – 2024/25) with the prioritisation of agricultural exports, manufacturing, *regional and international transport connectivity*, natural resources, ICT, and innovative development financing.

Government's commitment to the transport sector is evident in significantly increasing annual budgetary allocations, from UGX 464 billion (Fiscal Year (FY) 2006/07) to UGX 5.1 trillion (FY 2021/22). The sector until FY 2019/20 accounted for a fifth of the total resource allocation, taking the lion's share of the national budget. Although this has not been the case in the previous two fiscal years, the budget to the transport sector has not suffered large budgetary cuts – it is still prioritised in comparison to other sectors.

The present institutional set-up of the sector was established on the basis of a reform programme introduced in 2006 (with support from the World Bank (WB) and the European Union(EU)), focusing the Ministry of Works and Transport (MoWT) on its core roles of policy formulation, regulation, oversight and strategic planning. The national road network was transferred to the Uganda National Roads Authority (UNRA) for the management of its delivery and maintenance. The Uganda Road Fund (URF) was established for financing of routine and periodic maintenance of public roads.

Uganda's transport system is at present mainly road-focused, however, in order to harness the abovementioned economic opportunities, Uganda is moving towards an adequate, reliable and efficient multimodal transport network as stipulated in NDPs II & III. Therefore, there are renewed efforts for investments and improvements in the water and rail sector (such the planning of the Standard Gauge Railway from Kenya and rehabilitation of the existing meter gauge railway). In addition, the Government of Uganda (GoU) embarked on a credible initiative for reforms aimed at improving the quality of human resource and institutional capacity in the transport sector in 2015. Specifically, this led to a complete overhaul of staffing in UNRA, with new employment contracts and a widened staff base coming mainly from outside the organisation. Furthermore, Government initiated the formulation of a policy targeted at increasing local content in infrastructure projects in order to skill local personnel and increase employment opportunities.

The abovementioned GoU reforms are in line with the 2014-2020 National Indicative Programme (NIP) focal sector objective of *"reinforcing the sustainability of the national transport system, ensuring the necessary regulatory framework and financial means..."*. And it is on the basis that the EU provided support for the action 'Institutional Capacity Building for the Transport Sector in Uganda'.

In spite of the abovementioned sector reforms under the NDP II, there is a pending major reform due to a Cabinet decision in September 2018 across several sectors. Specifically, in the transport sector, the reform would have the UNRA collapsed into a department under the MoWT and have the functions of the URF mainstreamed back to the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED) and the MoWT. A great deal of effort and resources (by Government and Development Partners (DPs)) have been invested in bringing the UNRA and URF up to speed and to a level that inspires some confidence among sector stakeholders, including the private sector. In fact such a reform is against the core of DPs' policy dialogue with Government, the separation of regulatory and implementation functions through the

commercialisation concept and the sustainable management of existing assets through gazetting funds for timely and adequate maintenance.

1.2 The intervention to be evaluated¹

This evaluation covers one intervention financed by the EU in the transport sector as follows:

Title of the intervention to be evaluated	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Institutional Capacity Building for the Transport Sector in Uganda
Budget of the intervention to be evaluated	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Total estimated cost: EUR 13 049 867 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Total amount of EDF contribution: EUR 12 000 000 ➤ This action is co-financed in parallel co-financing by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The Government of Uganda for an amount of approximately EUR 1 000 000 ➤ This action is co-financed by potential grant beneficiaries for an indicative amount of EUR 49 867.
CRIS and/or OPSYS number of the intervention to be evaluated	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FED/2016/039-149
Dates of the intervention to be evaluated	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Start date: 09/12/2016 • End date: 09/06/2022

The overall objective of this intervention is to improve the transport sector in terms of sector governance, planning, implementation and sustainability of transport infrastructure. The results of the intervention are:

- (a) Strengthened capacity of the MoWT in gender responsive strategic planning and oversight in a multimodal transport environment, contributing to an appropriate investment-maintenance mix, climate change mitigation and building climate resilience of the sector;
- (b) Improved delivery of road development projects;
- (c) Improved operational efficiency of road maintenance and;
- (d) Increased competitiveness of the local construction industry in the transport sector.

The Logical Framework Matrices and the Intervention Logic are attached in annex to these Terms of Reference (ToR).

1.3 Stakeholders of the intervention

The results in section 1.2 above are being achieved through three separate avenues of support with distinct implementation modalities, as detailed in the sections below.

- (i) Support to government institutions (result a through c) is implemented by indirect management with the Government of Uganda through MoFPED/National Authorising Officer (NAO) of the European Development Fund (EDF). The beneficiary institutions (MoWT, UNRA and URF) are assigned the role of Project Manager and take responsibility for the quality of the individual component outputs.

¹ The term 'intervention' is used throughout the report as a synonym of 'project and programme'.

- (ii) Support to the local construction industry (result d) is implemented by direct management through a service contract and grant – direct award. The Uganda Institution of Professional Engineers (UIPE) is responsible for the achievement of the component result.

1.3.1 Technical Assistance to the Ministry of Works and Transport

Following an international restricted tender for consultancy services, COWI A/S in consortium with WYG International Limited and H.P. Gauff Ingenieure GmbH & Co. KG – JBG (represented by COWI A/S) was contracted by the NAO of the EDF in Uganda in December 2017 to provide a Technical Assistance (TA) team to MoWT. The main purpose of this TA is the strengthened capacity of the MoWT in gender responsive strategic planning and oversight in a multimodal transport environment, contributing to an appropriate investment-maintenance mix, climate change mitigation and building climate resilience of the sector.

The target groups for this assignment are the specialist staff employed by the MoWT, UNRA, URF, Uganda Railways Corporation, Civil Aviation Authority, and Kampala Capital City Authority.

The assignment is split into two phases:

- Phase 1 whose main output is a Mid-Term Review of the National Transport Master Plan/Greater Kampala Metropolitan Area (NTMP/GKMA) 2008-2023. This phase which commenced in late December 2017, for a period of 6 months, had a global price of EUR 756,000.
- A Conditional Phase 2 whose main outputs are:
 1. The formulation of a new intermodal/multimodal NTMP (2021 – 2040) for Uganda;
 2. Setting up of a functional transport planning office at the MoWT;
 3. Mainstreaming Strategic Environmental Assessment in MoWT's planning systems so as to enhance the integration of environmental and climate change considerations in MoWT's planning process.

The TA team for Phase 1 comprised four (04) Key Experts, namely:

- Team Leader/Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist with a time input of 125 working days
- Transport Economist/Planner with a time input of 125 working days
- Transport Engineer/Highway Specialist with a time input of 125 working days
- Environmental and Social Safeguards Specialist with a time input of 95 working days

Non-key experts for Phase 1 of this TA were expected to have a total time input of 460 working days, with 80 working days for international non-key experts and 380 working days for national (Ugandan) non-key experts. Phase 1 was successfully completed ten months after the commencement date and the Conditional Phase 2 commenced in December 2018, by administrative order issued by the Contracting Authority. Phase 2 was expected to run for a period of 24 months at a global price of EUR 3,055,000. After several addenda to the contract increasing the scope of services and thus contract amount to EUR 3,241,000 and extending the end date to 19 November 2021, the Consultant is in the final stages of the TA i.e. the completion of the NITMP reports and capacity building activities.

The TA team for Phase 2 is also composed of four (04) Key Experts, namely:

- Team Leader/Transport Economist with a time input of 440 working days
- A Transport Planner with a time input of 440 working days
- A Transport Modeller with a time input of 440 working days
- An Environmental and Social Safeguards Specialist with a time input of 180 working days

Non-key experts for Phase 2 are expected to have a total time input of 1,860 working days, with 440 working days for international non-key experts and 1,420 working days for national (Ugandan) non-key experts.

1.3.2 Technical Assistance to the Uganda National Roads Authority

A successful international restricted tender for consultancy services resulted in the recruitment of IMC Worldwide Limited in association with AECOM International Development Europe, S.L. (represented by IMC Worldwide) by the NAO of the EDF in Uganda to provide a TA team to UNRA. The contract was signed in December 2017 with a contract price of EUR 3,499,920 and duration of 36 months. The main purpose of this TA is to improve the delivery of road development projects and to develop a culture of excellence with focus on individual accountability for results in UNRA.

Specifically, the TA team is expected to achieve the following results:

- Development of well-aligned corporate strategy and business plans;
- Establishment of a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework;
- Establishment of internal audit systems;
- Improved procurement processes;
- Improved contract management;
- Improved environmental and social safeguards management;
- Climate resilient road infrastructure drainage;
- Improved operation and maintenance of axle load control infrastructure.

The target groups for this TA are the specialist staff employed by UNRA. Secondary support will be provided to key interlocutors of UNRA like the URF and MoWT in the relevant areas. Additional support will be provided to UNRA's partners or other road sector stakeholders i.e. consultants, contractors, development partners and the general public/project affected persons.

The TA team is comprised of one full time Team Leader/Institutional Capacity Building Specialist with a total time input of 660 working days. Short-term inputs are foreseen for non-key experts, to achieve the above results, further divided into three categories: Category 1, Category 2 and Category 3. Seventeen (17) non-key experts in Category 1 with a total time input of 1,220 working days; seven (07) non-key experts in Category 2 with a total time input of 550 working days and; one non-key expert in Category 3 (a Graphics Designer) with a total time input of 60 working days are foreseen. Following several addenda to the contract, the scope of services and thus contract amount were increased to EUR 3,889,000 and the end date extended to 07 December 2021. A contract amendment may be agreed to allow the completion of services.

1.3.3 Technical Assistance to the Uganda Road Fund

A successful international restricted tender for consultancy services resulted in the recruitment of IMC Worldwide Limited by the NAO of the EDF in Uganda to provide a TA team to URF. The contract was signed in early-December 2017 with a contract price of EUR 1,599,795 for a duration of 24 months.

The overall purpose of the TA is to improve the operational efficiency of road maintenance, and the Consultant is expected to achieve the following results:

- Improved data management;
- Improved cost estimation;
- Improved program preparation;
- Improved audit function over agencies;
- Improved monitoring and evaluation (M&E) function over agencies;
- Updated Strategic and Corporate Plans;
- Updated Allocation Formulae

By Administrative Order, the Terms of Reference was adapted to include furthermore:

- Study of the options for future institutional set-up of the Road Fund, with a view to transit into a second generation Road Fund;
- An action plan and consequent implementation of the action plan, after adoption of the preferred option for future institutional set-up of the Road Fund.

The target group for this technical assistance is the staff of Uganda Road Fund Secretariat and the technical staff of designated agencies and regional technical support units especially in the implementation of works using force account (and to some extent contracting), use of various systems for planning, programming and reporting.

The TA team is comprised of two (02) key staff and six (06) non-key staff whose time input was as below:

- Key staff
 1. Organisational/Systems Expert with a time input of 330 working days
 2. Senior Project Engineer/Transport Economist with a time input of 198 working days
- Non-key staff
 1. Senior Public Finance/Accounting Specialist with a time input of 65 working days
 2. Senior Information and Decision Support Systems Specialist with a time input of 77 working days
 3. System Integration Specialist with a time input of 75 working days
 4. Senior Human Resource Development Specialist with a time input of 58 working days
 5. Training Specialist with a time input of 80 working days
 6. Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist with a time input of 70 working days

The end date of the contract was extended to 07 April 2020 by addendum and the TA is in the final stages of completing the final report.

1.3.4 Support to the Local Construction Industry

The Engineers Registration Act (1969) requires engineers, intending to register to legally practice engineering in Uganda, to be members of the UIPE. Membership to the UIPE is recognized by the board as furnishing a sufficient guarantee of academic knowledge of, and practical experience in engineering. Hence the institution has an obligation to nurture and develop engineers to take on professional responsibilities in Uganda. This support to the local construction industry is implemented by direct management through a service contract and grant – direct award.

1.3.4.1 Service Contract for Support to the Local Construction Industry

In line with GoU's local content initiative, this TA is expected to strengthen the UIPE's capacity in fostering the professional growth of both its student and professional members so as to increase their competitiveness in the transport sector.

The TA contract was awarded through negotiated procedure following the cancellation of an international restricted tender procedure resulting in the recruitment of IMC Worldwide Limited by the European Union Delegation (EUD) to Uganda to provide a TA team to UIPE. The contract was signed in December 2017 with a contract price of EUR 1,341,968 and duration of 36 months.

The target group for this TA is all engineering professionals and stakeholders in the national construction industry, including students in universities and other institutions of higher learning. The overall purpose of the TA is the increased competitiveness of the local construction industry in the transport sector. Specifically, the Consultant is expected to achieve the following results:

- Increased relevance of the UIPE to its members and partners;
- Capacity built in young professionals;
- Increased relevance of tertiary institutions' curricula to the market demand;

- Improved human resource capacity in the engineering/construction sector.

The TA team is expected to provide consultancy services to the UIPE for the full range of activities necessary for enhancing the capacity of the local construction industry as well as that of the UIPE in fulfilling its mandate. These activities include, but are not be limited to, the following:

1. Institutional support to the UIPE
2. Implementation of the Graduate Traineeship Programme (GTP)
3. Scaling up of trainings to national technical colleges (NTCs) and to the public
4. Implementation of the Engineers' Registration Enhancement Programme

The TA team is comprised of four (04) key experts and non-key short term experts. The non-key experts have a total time input of 40 working days while the time input for the key experts is as follows:

- Institutional Specialist/Team Leader with 462 working days
- Branding and Communications Expert with 132 working days
- Debt Collection Expert with 132 working days
- Professional Career Development Expert with 198 working days

Following several addenda to the contract, the end date was extended to 07 April 2022. An additional contract amendment may be agreed to extend the end date to 07 June 2022 in order to allow the completion of services.

1.3.4.2 Grant Contract for Implementation of the Graduate Training Program through development and delivery of industry relevant Initial Professional Development (IPD) training

The grant to UIPE focuses on the implementation of a Graduate Training Program which, through the provision of salary support for graduates and structured training and mentorship, aims to increase the uptake of graduates into the transport sector by equipping unemployed graduates with the practical skillsets necessary to succeed at the workplace.

By creating work opportunities for unemployed graduates, the program also aims to facilitate the process where graduates fulfil the requirements for registration with UIPE and ERB as registered engineering professionals. This shall have the effect of improving overall influence and relevance of UIPE to its members, strengthening the institution and accelerating the formalization of the engineering profession.

The expected outputs from this intervention include the following:

- A total of 120 graduates (both Engineers and Technicians) successfully participating and benefiting from this Graduate Training Program using the UK Standard for Professional Engineering Competence (UKSPEC) for a year.
- A total of 15 transport sector companies (5 in 2020 and 10 in 2021) with structured IPD industrial training programmes in place
- A total of 5 employers with UIPE approved and operational Graduate Training Programs using UKSPEC
- A total of 4 new IPD face to face training modules for GTP participants offered to the public each year
- A UIPE approved IPD package available to the Transport sector employers.

The end date of the contract is 05 June 2022 although a contract amendment is foreseen to allow the successful conclusion of the grant.

1.3.5 Communication and Visibility

A framework contract was concluded with EURONET Consulting on 30 July 2019 for an amount of EUR 186,600 for the development and implementation of a communication and visibility plan for the project. The contract includes two experts, with minimum input of 75 working days, tasked with the

implementation of a communication campaign in order to create positive visibility for the core of present sector dialogue between GoU and DPs. The end date of the contract, following several addenda, is 23 April 2022.

1.3.6 Financial Overview by March 2022

EU contribution:	EUR 12,000,000.00
Committed:	EUR 11,222,498.00
Paid:	EUR 7,321,673.52

1.4 Previous internal and external monitoring (incl. ROM), evaluation and other studies undertaken

The executive summary and final report of the midterm evaluation (MTE) will be provided to the evaluation team. The major conclusions of the MTE are summarised below:

- (a) Overall positive assessment of relevance, delivery and perceived benefits for the three Institutional Components (TA to MoWT, TA to URF and TA to UNRA);
- (b) Need to improve need assessment and design;
- (c) Need for strengthening result orientation, measurability and monitoring of capacity development outcomes;
- (d) Challenges related to the Private Sector Competitiveness Component design and implementation support the rationale for a profound adjustment of the Component;
- (e) Need to strengthen focus on institutional capacity development and transformational changes; this includes a reinforced focus on sector governance and gender equity;
- (f) Reinforce ownership, commitment and broader participation with all organisations;
- (g) Need to strengthen the participatory approach in all TA services;
- (h) Need to engage in policy dialogue supporting transport sector institutional framework.

2 DESCRIPTION OF THE EVALUATION ASSIGNMENT

Type of evaluation	final
Coverage	Institutional Capacity Building for the Transport Sector in Uganda (in its entirety)
Geographic scope	Uganda
Period to be evaluated	from 08/12/2017 to 09/06/2022

2.1 Objectives of the evaluation and evaluation criteria

Systematic and timely evaluation of its programmes and activities is an established priority² of the European Commission³. The focus of evaluations is on the assessment of achievements, the **quality** and the

² COM(2013) 686 final "Strengthening the foundations of Smart Regulation – improving evaluation" - http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/docs/com_2013_686_en.pdf; EU Financial regulation (art 27); Regulation (EC) No 1905/2000; Regulation (EC) No 1889/2006; Regulation (EC) No 1638/2006; Regulation (EC) No 1717/2006; Council Regulation (EC) No 215/2008

³ SEC (2007)213 "Responding to Strategic Needs: Reinforcing the use of evaluation", http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/evaluation/docs/eval_comm_sec_2007_213_en.pdf; SWD (2015)111 "Better Regulation Guidelines", http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/guidelines/docs/swd_br_guidelines_en.pdf; COM(2017) 651 final 'Completing the Better

results⁴ of interventions in the context of an evolving cooperation policy, with an increasing emphasis on **result-oriented approaches and the contribution towards the implementation of the SDGs.⁵**

From this perspective, evaluations should **look for evidence of why, whether and how the EU intervention(s) has/have contributed to the achievement of these results** and seek to **identify the factors driving or hindering progress.**

The main objectives of this evaluation are to provide the relevant services of the European Union, the interested stakeholders and the Government of Uganda with:

- an overall independent assessment of the performance of the Institutional Capacity Building for the Transport Sector in Uganda project, paying particular attention to its different levels of results measured against its expected objectives; and the reasons underpinning such results;
- key lessons learned, conclusions and related recommendations in order to improve future interventions.

In particular, this evaluation will serve:

- to understand the performance of the intervention and the reasons behind it in order to maximise its potential to achieve the expected results during the residual implementation time and;
- to understand the performance of the intervention and the reasons behind it in order to inform the planning of the future EU interventions in the same sector.

The main users of this evaluation will be the EU Delegation to Uganda, the National Authorising Officer of the EDF, the Ministry of Works and Transport, the Uganda National Roads Authority, the Uganda Road Fund and the Uganda Institution of Professional Engineers. Additionally, other users of the evaluation will be civil society (Civil Society Coalition on Transport in Uganda), private sector institutions (Uganda Association of Consulting Engineers and Uganda National Association of Building and Civil Engineering Contractors), policy makers (Cabinet (including Ministry of Public Service), Members of Parliament, National Planning Authority) and Development Partners.

The evaluation will assess the intervention using the **six standard DAC evaluation criteria**, namely: **relevance, coherence, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability** and early signs of **impact**. In addition, the evaluation will assess the intervention through an **EU specific evaluation criterion**, which is the **EU added value**.

The **definition** of the 6 DAC + 1 EU **evaluation criteria** is contained for reference in **Annex II**.

Furthermore, the evaluation team should consider whether **gender equality and women's empowerment⁶, environment and adaptation to climate change** were mainstreamed; the relevant **SDGs and their interlinkages** were identified; the principle of **Leave No One Behind** and the **rights-based approach methodology** was followed in the identification/formulation documents and the extent to which they have been reflected in the implementation of the intervention, its governance and monitoring.

Regulation Agenda: Better solutions for better results', https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/completing-the-better-regulation-agenda-better-solutions-for-better-results_en.pdf

⁴ Reference is made to the entire results chain, covering outputs, outcomes and impacts. Cfr. Regulation (EU) No 236/2014 "Laying down common rules and procedures for the implementation of the Union's instruments for financing external action" - https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/financial_assistance/ipa/2014/236-2014_cir.pdf.

⁵ The New European Consensus on Development 'Our World, Our Dignity, Our Future', Official Journal 30th of June 2017. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:C:2017:210:TOC>

⁶ Read more on Evaluation with gender as a cross-cutting dimension by following this link: [new link to C4D to be publish](#)

2.2 Indicative Evaluation Questions

The specific EQs, as formulated below, are indicative. Following initial consultations and document analysis, and further to the finalisation/reconstruction of the Intervention Logic of the intervention to be evaluated, the evaluation team will discuss these with the Evaluation Manager⁷ and Reference Group, and propose in their Inception Report a complete and finalised set of Evaluation Questions. This will include an indication of specific judgement criteria and indicators, as well as the relevant data collection sources and tools.

Once agreed through the approval of the Inception Report, the Evaluation Questions will become contractually binding.

EQ 1 - Relevance

To what extent has the Transport Sector Institutional Capacity Building Programme been relevant to the needs of beneficiary institutions and organisations and aligned to national goals (NDP II and now NDP III) and EU Cooperation objectives?

EQ 2 - Effectiveness

To what extent has the Transport Sector Institutional Capacity Building Programme achieved results of capacity building for MoWT, UNRA, URF and UIPE? And to what extent has the capacity building contributed to the improvement of institutional performances and public services?

EQ 3 - Efficiency

To what extent has the Transport Sector Institutional Capacity Building Programme design and implementation been conducive to an efficient delivery of expected results?

EQ 4 - Impact

To what extent has the Transport Sector Institutional Capacity Building Programme contributed to opportunities for long-term changes? Has the programme contributed to unintended changes?

EQ 5 - Sustainability

To what extent will the flow of benefits for beneficiary organisations and the transport sector continue after the end of EU Cooperation support? And to what extent did the programme design and implementation mainstream policy priorities related to i) gender equity and women empowerment, ii) environmental impact and iii) good governance?

EQ 6 - Added Value

To what extent has EU Cooperation had value added for the Transport Sector Institutional Capacity Building Programme design and implementation, compared to what could have been achieved by Member States?

EQ 7 - Coherence

To what extent has the Transport Sector Institutional Capacity Building Programme been aligned with evolving EU and Development Partners' strategies and has contributed to (or contradicted) EU policy priorities?

2.3 Structuring of the evaluation and outputs

The evaluation process will be carried out in four phases and one activity:

- Inception phase
- Interim phase

⁷ The Evaluation Manager is the staff member of the Contracting Authority managing the evaluation contract. In most cases this person will be the Operational Manager of the Action(s) under evaluation.

- Desk and Field activities
- Synthesis phase
- Dissemination phase

Throughout the evaluation and following the approval of the Inception Report, if any significant deviation from the work plan could compromise the quality of the evaluation or jeopardise the completion of the specific contract within the contractual timeframe, these elements are to be immediately discussed with the Evaluation Manager and, regarding the validity of the contract, corrective measures undertaken.

2.3.1 Inception Phase

Objectives of the phase: to structure the evaluation and clarify the key issues to be addressed.

Main activities of evaluators during the Inception Phase

- Initial review of background documents (see Annex IV).
- Remote kick-off session between the EU Delegation, the Reference Group and the evaluators. Objectives of the meeting: i) to arrive at a clear and shared understanding of the scope of the evaluation, its limitations and feasibility; ii) to clarify expectations of the evaluation; iii) to illustrate the tentative methodology to be used; iv) any other relevant objectives.
- Initial interviews with key stakeholders.
- Finalisation or reconstruction of the description of the Intervention Logic/Theory of Change and its underlying assumptions. This requires an assessment of the evidence (between the hierarchy of results e.g. outputs, outcomes and impact) and the assumptions necessary for the intervention to work or prevent change from happening.
- Graphic representation of the reconstructed/finalised Intervention Logic/Theory of Change.
- Finalisation of the Evaluation Questions, based on the indicative questions contained in the Terms of Reference and on the reconstructed Intervention Logic.
- Finalisation of the evaluation methodology, including the definition of judgement criteria and indicators per Evaluation Question, the selection of data collection tools and sources. The methodology should be gender sensitive, contemplate the use of sex- and age-disaggregated data and assess if and how interventions have contributed to progress on gender equality.
- Representation of the methodological approach in an Evaluation Matrix (see Annex IV).
- Workplan of subsequent phases.
- Identification of the expected risks and limitations of the methodology, and of the envisaged mitigation measures.
- Preparation of the Inception Report; its content is described in Annex V.
- Remote presentation of the Inception Report to the Reference Group, supported by a slide presentation.
- Revision of the report (as relevant) following receipt of comments.

2.3.2 Interim Phase

This phase is entirely devoted to gathering and analysing the information required to provide preliminary answers to the EQs. Work in this phase will consist of one activity.

1. Desk and Field activities - review interviews with key stakeholders and other initial data collection using different tools such as surveys and further data collection and analysis with the aim of testing the hypotheses identified during the desk study.

2.3.2.1 Desk and field activities

Objective of the phase: to analyse the relevant secondary data and conducting primary research.

Main activities of evaluators

- Completion of in-depth analysis of relevant documents and other secondary sources, to be done systematically and to reflect the methodology as described in the Inception Report.
- Selected remote/face-to-face interviews to support the analysis of secondary data, as relevant.
- Formulation of the preliminary responses to each Evaluation Question, with analysis of their validity and limitations.
- Identification of the issues still to be covered and of the preliminary hypotheses to be tested during primary research.
- Face-to-face presentation at the EU Delegation in Kampala of the preliminary findings emerging from the desk review (incl. gaps and hypotheses to be tested in the field) to kick-off the in-country portion of this phase, supported by a slide presentation.
- Completion of primary research following the methodology described in the Inception Report.
- Guarantee of adequate contact, consultation with, and involvement of the different stakeholders, including the relevant government authorities and agencies, throughout the phase.
- Use of the most reliable and appropriate sources of information, respecting the rights of individuals to provide information in confidence, and being sensitive to the beliefs and customs of local social and cultural environments, throughout the phase.
- Preparation of the Intermediary Note; its content is described in Annex V.
- Preparation of a slide presentation of intermediate/preliminary (Desk and Field) findings and preliminary conclusions (to be tested with the Reference group).
- Face-to-face presentation of the intermediate/preliminary (Desk and Field) findings and preliminary conclusions at the EU Delegation in Kampala to the Reference Group, supported by the slide presentation.

2.3.3 Synthesis Phase

Objectives of the phase: to report on results from the evaluation (final answers to the Evaluation Questions (final findings) and formulate conclusions and recommendations).

Main activities of evaluators

- Analysis and synthesis of the evidence and data collected during the previous phases to provide a final answer to the Evaluation Questions.
- Preparation of the Draft Final Report; its content is described in Annex V.
- Face-to-face presentation of the Draft Final Report at the EU Delegation in Kampala to the Reference Group, supported by a slide presentation.
- Preparation of a response to the draft QAG (Quality Assessment Grid) formulated by the Evaluation Manager via the EVAL module⁸.
- Once the comments on the Draft Final Report are received from the Evaluation Manager, addressing those that are relevant and producing the Final Report, upload to the EVAL module; its content is described in Annex V. While potential quality issues, factual errors or methodological problems should be corrected, comments linked to diverging judgements may be either accepted or rejected. In the latter instance, the evaluators must explain the reasons in writing (free format).
- Preparation of the Executive Summary and upload to the EVAL module by using the compulsory format given in the module.
- Inclusion of an executive summary (free text format) in the Final Report (see Annex V).

⁸ All mentions to the EVAL module throughout the text in accordance with the Art.43.3 of the "Draft Framework Contract Agreement and Special Conditions" of the SIEA Framework Contract. The module EVAL will be integrated into OPSYS.

The evaluators will make sure that:

- their assessments are objective and balanced, statements are accurate and evidence-based, and recommendations realistic and clearly targeted;
- when drafting the report, they will acknowledge clearly where changes in the desired direction are known to be taking place already;
- the wording, inclusive of the abbreviations used, considers the audience as identified in Art. 2.1 above.

2.3.4 Dissemination Phase

Objective of the phase: to support the communication of the results of the evaluation. In particular:

- the performance of the intervention and the reasons behind it (including the positive and/or negative policy reforms) in order to maximise its potential to achieve the expected results during the residual implementation time and;
- the performance of the intervention and the reasons behind it in order to inform the planning of the future EU interventions (including necessary positive policy reforms) in the same sector.

The targeted audience will be:

- the main users of this evaluation such as the EU Delegation to Uganda, the National Authorising Officer of the EDF, the Ministry of Works and Transport, the Uganda National Roads Authority, the Uganda Road Fund and the Uganda Institution of Professional Engineers.
- the other users of the evaluation such as civil society (Civil Society Coalition on Transport in Uganda), private sector institutions (Uganda Association of Consulting Engineers and Uganda National Association of Building and Civil Engineering Contractors), policy makers (Cabinet (including Ministry of Public Service), Members of Parliament, National Planning Authority) and Development Partners.

Main activities of evaluators

- The evaluation team will prepare a semi-remote Stakeholders' Seminar (Dissemination Seminar) in Kampala with all users of the evaluation to present the Final Report. One day of face-to-face presence is required of – as minimum – all the evaluators. The Contractor must include the budget for a seminar of maximum 40 people in their financial offer.

References: the team should take inspiration from the ESS/INTPA work on **Dissemination of Evaluation Results** at https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/evaluation_guidelines/wiki/disseminating-evaluations; this contains an analysis of best practice in 12 international organisations and NGOs plus five 'how-to' guides on production of infographics, briefs, videos, blogs and podcasts.

2.3.5 Overview of the outputs and meetings and their timing

The synoptic table below presents an overview of the outputs to be produced by the team, the key meetings with the Reference Group (including the Evaluation Manager) as described previously, as well as their timing.

Evaluation phases	Outputs and meetings	Timing
Inception phase	• <i>Meeting: kick off</i>	• <i>Start Date</i>
	• Inception Report	• End of Inception Phase
	• Slide presentation	• End of Inception Phase

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Meeting: presentation Inception Report</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • End of Inception Phase
Interim: Desk and Field activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Meeting: presentation of preliminary findings (to be tested) emerging from the desk work</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Shortly before or at the beginning of the field missions
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intermediary note 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • End of Interim (Desk and Field) Phase
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Slide presentation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • End of Interim (Desk and Field) Phase
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Meeting: debriefing on intermediate/preliminary (Desk and Field) findings</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • End of Interim (Desk and Field) Phase
Synthesis phase	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Draft Final Report 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Within 14 days of the end of the Interim (Desk and Field) Phase</i>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Meeting: presentation of the Draft Final Report</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Within 3 days of the submission of the Draft Final Report</i>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Comments to the draft QAG 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Together with Final Report
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Final Report 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 15 days after receiving comments on Draft Final Report
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Executive summary of the Final Report 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Together with Final Report
Dissemination Phase	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stakeholders' Seminar 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Within 14 days of the approval of the Final Report</i>

2.4 Specific contract Organisation and Methodology (Technical offer)

The invited framework contractors will submit their specific contract Organisation and Methodology by using the standard SIEA template B-VII-d-i and its Annexes 1 and 2 (B-VII-d-ii).

The evaluation methodology proposed to undertake the assignment will be described in Chapter 3 (Strategy and timetable of work) of the template B-VII-d-i. Contractors will describe how their proposed methodology will address the cross-cutting issues mentioned in these Terms of Reference; it should be gender sensitive, contemplate the use of sex- and age-disaggregated data and demonstrate how interventions have contributed to progress on gender equality.

The methodology should also include (if applicable) the communication action messages, materials and management structures.

This evaluation may be impacted by difficulties in accessing the field due to security constraints or health-related issues. The to-be-selected contractor will bear the duty of ensuring that the evaluators will respect, at all times, the relevant international, national and local guidance regarding travel limitations and will exert due care in preventing the spread of diseases, avoiding any unreasonable, unnecessary risks. The specific contract Organisation and Methodology should contain a clear and detailed description of the

methods that the evaluation will use to address potential difficulties in access to the field. These may include the combination of face-to-face and remote methods of data collection, if relevant⁹.

By derogation of what is specified in the standard SIEA template B-VII-d-i, the maximum length of the specific contract Organisation and Methodology is 15 pages, written in Times New Roman 12 or Arial size 11, single interline, excluding the Framework Contractor's own annexes (maximum length of such annexes: 3 pages), additional to the annexes foreseen as part of the present specific ToRs. The timetable is not included in this limit and may be presented on an A3 page]

The methodology must include the development of one or two Evaluation Questions with relevant judgement criteria, indicators, data collection tools and methods to demonstrate the Contractor's understanding of the assignment.

2.4.1 Evaluation ethics

All evaluations must be credible and free from bias; they must respect dignity and diversity, and protect stakeholders' rights and interests. Evaluators must ensure confidentiality and anonymity of informants and be guided by professional standards and ethical and moral principles in the observation of the 'do no harm' principle. The approach of framework contractors to observe these obligations must be explicitly addressed in the specific Organisation and Methodology, and implemented by the evaluation team throughout the evaluation, including during dissemination of results.

2.5 Management and steering of the evaluation

2.5.1 At the EU level

The evaluation is managed by the Evaluation Manager of the EUD; the progress of the evaluation will be followed closely with the assistance of a Reference Group consisting of members of EU Services – EU Delegation Kampala and the NAO, MoWT, UNRA, URF and UIPE.

The main functions of the Reference Group are:

- to define and validate the Evaluation Questions;
- to facilitate contacts between the evaluation team and the EU services and external stakeholders;
- to ensure that the evaluation team has access to, and has consulted with, all relevant information sources and documents related to the intervention;
- to discuss and comment on notes and reports delivered by the evaluation team. Comments by individual group members are compiled into a single document by the Evaluation Manager and subsequently transmitted to the evaluation team;
- to assist in feedback on the findings, conclusions, lessons and recommendations from the evaluation;
- to support the development of a proper follow-up action plan after completion of the evaluation.

2.5.2 At the Contractor level

Further to the requirements set out in Article 6 of the Global Terms of Reference and in the Global Organisation and Methodology, respectively Annexes II and III of the Framework contract SIEA 2018, the contractor is responsible for the quality of the process, the evaluation design, the inputs and the outputs of the evaluation. In particular, it will:

⁹ The Framework Contractors are invited to consult the wealth of resources available through the two ESS/INTPA initiatives Evaluation in Hard-to-Reach Areas and Evaluation in Crisis: <https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/devco-ess>.

- support the Team Leader in its role, mainly from a team management perspective. In this regard, the contractor should make sure that, for each evaluation phase, specific tasks and outputs for each team member are clearly defined and understood;
- provide backstopping and quality control for the evaluation team's work throughout the assignment;
- ensure that the evaluators are adequately resourced to perform all required tasks within the time framework of the contract.

2.6 Language of the specific contract and of the reports

The language of the specific contract is to be English.

All reports will be submitted in English.

3 LOGISTICS AND TIMING

Please refer to Part B of the Terms of Reference.

3.1 Planning, including the period for notification for placement of the staff¹⁰

As part of the technical offer, the framework contractor must fill in the timetable in the Annex VI (to be finalised in the Inception Report). The 'indicative dates' are not to be formulated as fixed dates but rather as days (or weeks or months) from the beginning of the assignment (to be referenced as '0').

Sufficient forward planning is to be taken into account in order to ensure the active participation and consultation with government representatives, national/local or other stakeholders.

4 REQUIREMENTS

Please refer to Part B of the Terms of Reference.

All the costs other than costs for key experts of the evaluation team, such as the costs for the Dissemination Seminar, will be reflected in a dedicated budget provision under the chapter "Other details" of the framework contractor's financial offer.

5 REPORTS

For the list of reports, please refer to Chapter 2.3 of Part A and to Part B of the Terms of Reference.

5.1 Use of the EVAL module by the evaluators

The selected contractor will **submit all deliverables by uploading them into the EVAL Module**, an evaluation process management tool and repository of the European Commission. The selected contractor will receive access to online and offline guidance in order to operate with the module during the related specific contract validity.

5.2 Number of report copies

Apart from its submission, the approved version of the Final Report will be also provided in 10 paper copies and in electronic version (word and pdf formats on CD-ROM) at no extra cost.

¹⁰ As per Article 16.4 a) of the General Conditions of the Framework Contract SIEA

5.3 Formatting of reports

All reports will be produced using Font Arial or Times New Roman minimum letter size 11 and 12 respectively, single spacing, double sided.

NB: It must be noted that the EU Delegation reserves the right to have reports redrafted as many times as necessary to bring them to the required standard. They will be sent in Word and PDF formats.

6 MONITORING AND EVALUATION

6.1 Content of reporting

The outputs must match quality standards. The text of the reports should be illustrated, as appropriate, with maps, graphs and tables; a map of the area(s) of intervention is required (to be attached as annex).

6.2 Comments on the outputs

For each report, the Evaluation Manager will send the contractor consolidated comments received from the Reference Group or the approval of the report within 14 calendar days. The revised reports addressing the comments will be submitted within 7 calendar days from the date of receipt of the comments. The evaluation team should provide a separate document explaining how and where comments have been integrated or the reason for not integrating certain comments, if this is the case.


6.3 Assessment of the quality of the Final Report and of the Executive Summary

The quality of the draft versions of the Final Report and of the Executive Summary will be assessed by the Evaluation Manager using the online Quality Assessment Grid (QAG) in the EVAL Module (text provided in Annex VII). The Contractor is given the chance to comment on the assessments formulated by the Evaluation Manager through the EVAL module. The QAG will then be reviewed, following the submission of the final version of the Final Report and of the Executive Summary.

The compilation of the QAG will support/inform the compilation of the FWC SIEA's specific contract Performance Evaluation by the Evaluation Manager.

7 PRACTICAL INFORMATION


Please address any request for clarification and other communication to the following address:



ANNEXES TO TOR - PART A

ANNEX I: INTERVENTION LOGIC AND LOGICAL FRAMEWORK MATRICES (LOGFRAMES) OF THE EVALUATED INTERVENTION

[See Intervention Logic and six LFMs overleaf]



INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING FOR THE TRANSPORT SECTOR IN UGANDA PROJECT – REVISED LOGFRAME MATRIX - JANUARY 2020

	Results chain	Indicators ¹¹	Baselines (Ref. year – 2014/15)	Targets (Ref. year – 2020/21)	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions and risks
Overall objective: Impact	To improve the transport sector in terms of <u>sector governance</u> , <u>planning</u> , <u>implementation</u> and <u>sustainability</u> of infrastructure	(a) Score on Institutional Effectiveness Index (IEI)	(a) 3.4 out of 5 (in 2019)	(a) 4 out of 5	(a) New Scoring of IEI	
		(b) % actual progress vs. planned implementation of the NDP III	(b) 44% (mid-term evaluation of NDP II)	(b) 60% (in 2023)	(b) External assessment of performance (including ex-post evaluation)	
		(c) Percentage of the national paved roads network in fair to good condition*	(c) 80%	(c) 90%	(c) and (d) Transport Sector Annual Performance Reports	
		(d) Percentage of the national unpaved roads network in fair to good condition*	(d) 70%	(d) 80%		
		(e) Total length of road constructed /rehabilitated /maintained with EU support**	(e) 2,065 km ¹²	(e) 2,625 km ¹⁴	(e) Works Contracts & Final Completion Reports	
		(f) Funding of routine and periodic maintenance of	(f) 45% ¹³	(f) 65%		

¹¹ Mark indicators aligned with the relevant programming document mark with '**' and indicators aligned to the EU Results Framework with '*'. *

¹² Road length aggregated from 6 ACP to EDF 10 road projects

¹³ Almost all of the UNRA maintenance allocation is spent on the routine and periodic maintenance of their unpaved network only to enable them achieve targets above 70% in fair to good condition

¹⁴ Road length aggregated from 6 ACP to EDF 11 road projects (Atiak – Laropi Road, Kampala – Jinja Expressway & Kampala Southern Bypass, and DINU DUCAR)

INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING FOR THE TRANSPORT SECTOR IN UGANDA PROJECT – REVISED LOGFRAME MATRIX - JANUARY 2020

	Results chain	Indicators ¹¹	Baselines (Ref. year – 2014/15)	Targets (Ref. year – 2020/21)	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions and risks
		national roads (percentage of needs) (g) Funding of routine and periodic maintenance of DUCAR (percentage of needs)	(g) 22%	(g) 55%	(f) and (g) URF Annual Performance Report	
Specific objective	To improve the human resource and institutional capacity in the transport sector	(a) % actual progress vs. planned implementation of sector plans (b) Overall satisfaction rating for road users' experience (men and women)	(a) 35% of NTMP (2008-2023) (b) 2.55 ¹⁵	(a) 70% (b) 2.70 ⁴	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ TA Reports ▪ Sector Plans (corporate, strategic, and business plans) ▪ Sector Performance Reports ▪ External assessment of plans & performance (including final & ex-post evaluations) ▪ Road User Satisfaction Surveys 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The sustainability of Government policy to invest in the transport sector as top priority (including <u>adequate</u> and <u>predictable</u> funding for road maintenance). ▪ Increased sector commitment to plan and implement international best practices in integrated multimodal transport development.

¹⁵ On a scale from 1 (very dissatisfied) to 4 (very satisfied)

INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING FOR THE TRANSPORT SECTOR IN UGANDA PROJECT – REVISED LOGFRAME MATRIX - JANUARY 2020

	Results chain	Indicators¹¹	Baselines (Ref. year – 2014/15)	Targets (Ref. year – 2020/21)	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions and risks
Results	(a) <u>Strengthened capacity of the MoWT in gender responsive strategic planning and oversight in a multimodal transport environment, contributing to an appropriate investment-maintenance mix, <u>climate change mitigation</u> and <u>building climate resilience of the sector</u></u>	(a1) % of local (MoWT and MDAs) input into revising the NITMP model biannually (once every two years) (a2) % of relevant SDGs goals and targets in the SEA that have been included in the NITMP (a3) Extent to which transport programmes have climate resilience mapping built-in.	(a1) N/A (a2) MDGs in NTMP 2008-2023 (a3) Climate risk map exists but is not incorporated in sector programmes	(a1) 80% (2023) (a2) 80% of relevant SDGs (a3) 80% of high-risk areas prioritised	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ External assessments of planning process (including final and ex-post evaluations) ▪ SEA and NITMP ▪ External assessments of transport sector programmes (including ex-post evaluations) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Increased sector commitment to plan and implement international best practices in integrated multimodal transport development.
	(b) Improved delivery of road development projects	(b1) No. and % of departments meeting and exceeding expectations (b2) Percentage of projects completed (b2.1) On time (contract period +Extension of Time) (b2.2) Within budget (b2.3) To Specified Quality	(b1) Not established (b2.1) No data (b2.2) No data (b2.3) No data	(b1) 80% (number) (b2.1) 30% (b2.2) 30% (b2.3) 100%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Staff performance review reports ▪ UNRA Annual Performance Reports ▪ Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) reports 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Increased organisational commitment to design and implement international best practices in road development. ▪ The sustainability of Government policy to invest in the transport sector as top priority.

INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING FOR THE TRANSPORT SECTOR IN UGANDA PROJECT – REVISED LOGFRAME MATRIX - JANUARY 2020

	Results chain	Indicators¹¹	Baselines (Ref. year – 2014/15)	Targets (Ref. year – 2020/21)	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions and risks
	(c) Improved operational efficiency of road maintenance	(c) Planned works executed in FY (average percentage by value)	(c) 70%	(c) 90%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> URF Annual Performance Reports 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The sustainability of Government policy to invest in the transport sector as top priority (including <u>adequate</u> and <u>predictable</u> funding for road maintenance). Technical Support Units for URF DUCAR Agencies well established.
	(d) Increased competitiveness of the local construction industry in the transport sector	(d1) Percentage value of works/services awarded to local contractors/consultants in the transport sector (d2) Increased competitiveness measured by increased employability: (d2.1) The number of engineers registered per annum	(d1) 24% ¹⁶ (in FY 2018/19) (d2.1) 84 (d2.2) N/A	(d1) 30% (d2.1) 25% increase per annum (number) (d2.2) 300	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> UNRA Annual Performance reports ERB and UIPE reports TA Reports 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The sustainability of Government policy to invest in the transport sector as top priority (including <u>adequate</u> and <u>predictable</u> funding for road maintenance). This will determine the availability of work for the successful outcome of the GTP & UTC components.

¹⁶ Of total signed works contracts (amount UGX 2,300.7 billion), UGX 406.6 billion by threshold and UGX 162.6 billion by subcontracting was awarded to local contractors – accounting for 25%.

Of total signed consulting services contracts (amount UGX 187.6 billion), UGX 24.65 billion by threshold was awarded to local consultants – accounting for 13%.

The baseline value is calculated from the summation of both works and consulting services contracts.

**INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING FOR THE TRANSPORT SECTOR IN UGANDA PROJECT – REVISED LOGFRAME
MATRIX - JANUARY 2020**

	Results chain	Indicators¹¹	Baselines (Ref. year – 2014/15)	Targets (Ref. year – 2020/21)	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions and risks
		(d2.2) No. of trainees getting employment after completing the UTC training (d2.3) No. and % of GTP trainees getting employment after completing the GTP	(d2.3) 85% (50 number)	(d2.3) 90% (180 number)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ External assessments of transport sector programmes (including ex-post evaluations) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Continued government commitment to implement the local content policy.

Phase 2 Result Area 1: Preparation of an intermodal/multimodal transport strategy for Uganda (2021 – 2040)

	Results chain	Indicators	Baselines	Targets	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions and Risks
			(Ref. year – FY 2014/15)	(Ref. year – FY 2020/21)		
Overall Objective	(a) Improved transport sector performance and governance	(a) % actual progress vs. planned implementation of the NDP III (b) Score on institutional effectiveness index (IEI)	(a) 44% (mid-term evaluation of NDP II) (b) 3.4 out of 5 (in 2019)	(a) 60% (2023) (b) 4 out of 5	(a) External assessment of performance (including Ex-post Evaluation) (b) New Scoring of the IEI	(a) New Department for Policy & Planning set up (b) Acceptance of Methodology
Phase 2, Result 1: Preparation of an intermodal/multimodal transport strategy for Uganda (2021 – 2040).	Specific Objective	(a) % actual progress of implementation of sector plans (including NDPI II) vs. planned	(a) 35% of NTMP 2008 to 2023	(a) 70% (2021)	(a) External assessment of plans (including Final Evaluation)	(a) Increased sector commitment to plan and implement international best practices in integrated multimodal transport development
	Outcome 1	(a) Adoption of the Strategic Implementation Plan (b) Adoption of the Road Network Development Strategy and Maintenance Programme (c) Adoption of the Urban Transport Strategy and Action Plan (d) Adoption of the Railway Development and Business Plan (e) Adoption of the Inland Waterways Development and Business Plan (f) Adoption of Air Transport Development and Business Plan	(a) No. and % of programmes & objectives in NDP III aligned to the SIP (b) No. and % of Prioritised list of road projects included in the Sub Sector Plan (c) No. and % of recommendations of the Urban Transport Strategy and Action Plan included in MoWT, MoLG, MLHUD strategic plans (d) No. and % of recommendations of the Railway Development and Business Plan incorporated in URC strategic plans (e) No. and % of recommendations of the Inland Waterways Development and Business Plan included in MoWT strategic plan (f) No. and % of recommendations of the Air Transport Development and Business Plan included in CAA & UA strategic plans	(a) NDP II SIP 40% (b) NIL (RSDP was not up-to-date so was not linked to NDP II) (c) NIL (Urban Transport Strategy and Action Plan does not exist) (d) NIL (Post-concession business plan in place as of 2018) (e) NIL (Inland Waterways Development and Business Plan does not exist) (f) NIL (Entebbe International Airport development masterplan exists but overall Air Transport Development and Business Plan non-existent)	(a) (No.) 80% (2021) (b) (No.) 80% (c) (No.) 80% (d) (No.) 80% (e) (No.) 40% (f) (No.) 80%	(a) SIP (b) UNRA Plan (c) KCCA Plan (d) URC Plan (e) IW Plan (f) CAA Plan (g) External assessment of plans (including Final Evaluation)

	Results chain	Indicators	Baselines	Targets	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions and Risks
			(Ref. year – FY 2014/15)	(Ref. year – FY 2020/21)		
Outputs	(g) Adoption of validated national transport model in sector planning processes	(g) % of NDP III programmes & objectives validated by the model	(g) Current Transport planning is not linked to a national transport demand model	(g) 80% of NITMP infrastructure projects supported by modelling	(g) Transport model	(g) Agreement on one robust demand forecasting and transport network scenario.
	(h) Adoption of NITMP programmes	(h) % alignment of MDA plans to NITMP programmes	(h) 35% of NDP2 2016 to 2021 linked to NITP 2008 to 2023	(h) 80% of NITMP	(i) Programming in NDP3 and subsector plans	(j) NDP s are for 5 years, so may not include 20 year planning
	(a) NITMP linked to adopted/draft Transport Policy	(a) % of linkage to adopted/draft Transport Policy	(a) Current Transport plan not linked to policy or national planning, land use or production	(a) 100% alignment	(a) National Transport Plan is Integrated	(a) That policy accepts TA recommendation for sector integration
	(b) Capacity built in integrated transport planning	(b) Level of integration built into the NITMP	(b) Zero (NTMP 2008 – 2023)	(b) Plan is thematic and horizontally structured (COWI to come up with a scale of measurement)	(b) NITMP Structure	(b) That vertically / modally structured planning will be used at the strategic level
	(c) Validated National Transport Model understood by MoWT and sector agencies	(c) Approved model	(c) There is no strategic national transport model	(c) Model and licenses are transferred and available for use	(c) Model is operational in MoWT computers and licenses are transferred	(c) Compliance with government IT requirements
	(d) Sets of programmes in NITMP	(d) Approved sets of programmes	(d) There were no themes or programmes in NTMP 2008 - 2023	(d) NITMP contains 4 themes and 20+ programmes	(d) The NITMP	(d) MoWT accepts integrated planning
	(e) Strategic Implementation Plan FY 2021/22 – FY 2039/40	(e) Approved Strategic Implementation Plan	(e) NIL	(e) 1	(e) – (j) The SIP and Subsector Planning	(e) to (j)Approval process is with contracted time frame
	(f) Road Network Development Strategy and Maintenance Programme FY 2021/26	(f) Approved Road Network Development Strategy and Maintenance Programme	(f) NIL	(f) 1		
	(g) Urban Transport Strategy and Action Plan FY 2021/26	(g) Approved Urban Transport Strategy and Action Plan	(g) NIL	(g) 1		
	(h) Railway Development and Business Plan FY 2021/26	(h) Approved Railway Development and Business Plan	(h) NIL	(h) 1		
(i) Inland Waterways Development and Business Plan FY 2021/26	(i) Approved Inland Waterways Development and Business Plan	(i) NIL	(i) 1			
(j) Air Transport Development and Business Plan FY 2021/26	(j) Approved Air Transport Development and Business Plan	(j) NIL	(j) 1			

	Results chain	Indicators	Baselines	Targets	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions and Risks
			(Ref. year – FY 2014/15)	(Ref. year – FY 2020/21)		
	(k) National Integrated Transport Master Plan 2021-2040	(k) Approved NITMP	(k) NIL	(k) 1	(k) NITMP	(k) Approval process can be within contract period
Activities	(a) Review of transport policies	(a) Working paper on policy review	(a) No policy ¹⁷	(a) 1	(a) Working Paper recommendation included in Policy	(a) Policy will be completed
	(b) On-the-job training in integrated transport planning	(b) No. of staff trained (disaggregated by gender)	(b) NIL	(b) No. of NTLPS taskforce members = 22	(b) Level of scoring of questionnaires (c) Attendance list of MoWT staff undergoing training	(b) Active participation of MoWT to training events
	(c) Survey designs, data collection and analysis	(c) Draft report with Descriptive statistics of various current data sets	(c) National roads traffic counts & aviation passenger data existing	(c) 1	(c) Interim Report	(c) Availability of certain categories of data from MoWT and UBOS
	(d) Generate National Transport Model	(d) National Transport Model	(d) No Model	(d) Validated Model	(d) Licenced version of validated model handed to MoWT	(d) None (assuming VISUM)
	(e) Programming in the NITMP	(e) Sets of programmes produced in draft	(e) No programming in place	(e) Thematic Approach with programmes	(e) Working Paper and Interim Report	(e) None
	(f) Development of transport sector action plans	(f) Strategic Implementation Plan (SIP) produced in draft (g) Road Network Development Strategy and Maintenance Programme produced in draft (h) Urban Transport Strategy and Action Plan produced in draft (i) Railway Development and Business Plan produced in draft (j) Inland Waterways Development and Business Plan produced in draft (k) Air Transport Development and Business Plan produced in draft	(f) Strategic Implementation Plan outdated (g) Road Network Development Strategy and Maintenance Programme outdated (h) Urban Transport Strategy and Action Plan non-existent (i) Railway Development and Business Plan non-existent (but post-concession business plan developed after termination of RVR concession in 2018) (j) Inland Waterways Development and	(f) 1 (g) 1 (h) 1 (i) 1 (j) 1 (k) 1	(f) Consultant's official submission of draft plans	(f) Other parallel / overlapping activities in subsectors may influence activity

¹⁷ COWI will review the draft NTLPS (2018)

	Results chain	Indicators	Baselines	Targets	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions and Risks
			(Ref. year – FY 2014/15)	(Ref. year – FY 2020/21)		
			Business Plan non-existent (k) Entebbe International Airport development masterplan exists but overall Air Transport Development and Business Plan non-existent			

Phase 2 Result Area 2: Setting up a transport planning office

		Results chain	Indicators	Baselines	Targets	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions and risks
				(Ref. year – FY 2014/15)	(Ref. year – FY 2020/21)		
Phase 2, Result 2: Setting up a transport planning office	Specific Objective	(a) Improved performance of the transport planning office	(a) No. and % of technical and management staff with satisfactory annual appraisals (b) % of local (MoWT and MDAs) input into revising the NITMP model biannually (once every two years)	(a) N/A (b) N/A	(a) (No.) 80% (b) 80% (2023)	(a) HR Files (b) External assessments of planning process (including final and ex-post evaluations)	(a) Accuracy and method of Government Appraisal Process
	Outcome 1	(a) Improved capacity in transport policy and planning (b) Adoption of the revised Organisation Plan and Human Resource plan and set up of the MoWT transport planning office (c) Adoption of changes proposed to planning units in UNRA, URC, CAA	(a) % Alignment of capacities of personnel to revised job descriptions in the transport planning office (b) % Alignment of transport planning office functions to that recommended (c) Proportion of realignment of planning functions in UNRA, URC and CAA	(a) 45% (b) 50% (c) 50%	(a) 70% (b) 80% (c) 80%	(a) Revised Job Descriptions (b) New MoWT P&P department details submitted to MoPS (c) Sub-Sector Strategic Plans (d) External assessments of organisational processes (including ex-post evaluation)	(a) Adoption process and budget is supportive of changes (b) Increased sector commitment to plan and implement international best practices in integrated multimodal transport development
		(d) NITMP revision process adopted	(d) Revision period of 2 years for NITMP	(d) Never revised	(c) YES	(d) NITMP processes embedded (e) External assessment of NITMP revision process (including ex-post evaluation)	(d) NITMP processes are mandated in in policy
		(e) Project identification and selection process adopted	(e) Proportion of project submissions using new process	(e) NIL	(e) 65%	(e) Submitted project fiche (f) External assessments of project identification and selection processes (including final and ex-post evaluations)	(e) Adequate training in use of fiche
		(f) Use of NITMP information system for preparing of Annual Sector Performance Review Reporting	(f) Proportion of the Sector Performance Review Report prepared using information from the NITMP Information System	(f) NIL	(f) 70%	(f) Information system in place (g) External assessments of reporting process (including final and ex-post evaluations)	(f) User familiarity and experience

Outputs	(a) Training plan in place	(a) Approved Training Plan	(a) NIL	(a) 1	(a) to (i) Submitted planning	(a) to (i) Technical advisors are sensitive to local conditions and able to effectively deliver concrete outputs as well as impart their skills and expertise to counterpart staff. (b) MoWT staff will participate actively and absorb the capacity development initiatives
	(b) Implementation of the training plan	(b) % of training interventions undertaken	(b) 50%	(b) 80% (2021)		
	(c) Report on revised Organisation Plan and Human Resource Plan and set up of the MoWT transport planning office	(c) Approved Report on revised Organisation Plan and Human Resource plan and set up of the MoWT transport planning office	(c) NIL	(c) 1		
	(d) NITMP Revision Process (with Project ID and Selection Process)	(d) Approved Working Paper on Operating Procedures/Processes including for the transport planning office	(d) NIL	(d) 1		
	(e) Transport Database (Information System) and Manual	(e) Approved Working Paper on Operating Procedures/Processes including for the transport planning office	(e) NIL	(e) 1		
	(f) Capacity of MoWT and sector agencies staff built in transport planning in 6 key areas (policy & planning, traffic modelling, financial & economic analysis, project financing, SEA, M&E)	(f) Approved transport database and Manual	(f) NIL	(f) 1		
		(g) NIL	(g) 1			
		(h) NIL	(h) 1			
		(i) 40% gap in knowledge (TNA 2019)	(i) 10% gap in knowledge			
Activities	(a) Training Needs Analysis (TNA)	(a) Draft TNA Report and Plan	(a) NIL	(a) 1	(a) TNA Working Paper	(a) Level of participation in TNA survey
	(b) Review and update of organisational structure and set up of the MoWT transport planning office	(b) Report on revised organisational structure (including job descriptions) and set up of the MoWT transport planning office	(b) NIL	(b) 1	(b) Working Paper	(b) None
	(c) Review of Planning and Updating Process	(c) Draft Working Paper on Operating Procedures/Processes including and Manual for the transport planning office	(c) NIL	(c) 1	(c) Working Paper	(c) None
	(d) Creation of Transport Database and Manual	(d) Transport Database and Manual	(d) NIL	(d) 1	(d) Data Base and Manual	(d) None
	(e) Training staff in MoWT and sector agencies in transport planning (policy & planning, traffic modelling, financial & economic analysis, project financing, SEA, M&E)	(e) No. Of staff of MoWT and sector agencies trained (disaggregated by gender) in 6 key areas	(e) NIL	(e) 33	(e) Submitted Post Activity Questionnaires (f) Attendance list of MoWT staff undergoing training	(e) MoWT staff will participate actively and absorb the capacity development initiatives

Phase 2 Result Area 3: Mainstreaming Strategic Environmental Assessment in MoWT's planning systems

		Results chain	Indicators	Baselines	Targets	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions and risks
				(Ref. year – FY 2014/15)	(Ref. year – FY 2020/21)		
Phase 2, Result 3: Mainstreaming Strategic Environmental Assessment in MoWT's planning systems	Specific Objective	(a) Environmentally and socially sustainable transport sector	(a) % of relevant SDGs goals and targets in the SEA that have been included in the NITMP (b) % of transport sector's commitment to INDC CO _{2e} Targets met (c) Extent to which transport programmes have climate resilience mapping built-in.	(a) MDGs in NTMP 2008 – 2023 (b) Zero INDC in NTMP 2008 - 2023 (c) Climate risk map exists but is not incorporated in sector programmes.	(a) 80% of relevant SDGs (b) 10% of INDC CO _{2e} Targets (c) 80% of high-risk areas prioritised	(a) SEA and NITMP (b) Transport Demand Modelled emissions (c) NITMP short term planning (d) External assessment of transport sector performances (including ex-post evaluation)	(a) Scoping Approved (b) Policy change away from private cars to public transport and better planning (c) Adoption of climate change resilience building as a top priority.
	Outcome 1	(a) Strategic Environment Assessment is mainstreamed in all levels of transport planning	(a) % of SEA Sector Level Framework Recommendations applied in all transport plans and strategies.	(a) NIL	(a) 75%	(a) Transport Plans and Sub-sector Strategies (b) External assessment of transport plans and strategies (including final and ex-post evaluations)	(a) Compliance with SEA frameworks regulations by enforced by NEMA and MoWT (b) Increased MoWT commitment to plan and implement international best practices in SEA at all strategic levels
	Outputs	(a) Screening report (b) Scoping report and terms of reference for the detailed SEA (c) Capacity built in screening and scoping of plans (d) Stakeholder Mapping report drafted (Consulting 6 groups of stakeholders) (e) SEA Report (SEA Framework Recommendations contained in the NITMP; SDGs goals and targets recommended included in the NITMP; INDC CO _{2e} Targets included in the NITMP; Air, land and water)	(a) Approved screening report (b) Approved scoping report and terms of reference for the detailed SEA (c) Level of knowledge gained in screening and scoping plans (d) Approved stakeholder mapping report (e) (f) SEA Approved by MoWT	(a) NIL (b) NIL (c) (average score of entry test/preliminary knowledge on SEA)% (d) NIL (e) NIL	(a) 1 (b) 1 (c) 75% (d) 1 (e) 1	(a) Reporting (b) Reporting (c) Training Report (d) Reporting (e) MoWT official approval of NITMP (including SEA)	(a) To (f) The main assumption is that the NEMA SEA regulations are approved
	Activities	(a) Screening Process to assess preliminary environmental effects of the NITMP (b) Scoping Process to define the scope (geographical, spatial, technical),	(a) Screening report drafted (b) Scoping report and terms of reference for the detailed SEA drafted	(a) NIL (b) NIL (c) NIL (d) NIL	(a) 1 (b) 1 (c) 15 (d) 1	(a) Screening report submitted to NEMA by MoWT	(a) None (b) MoWT accepted SEA scoping

	Results chain	Indicators	Baselines	Targets	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions and risks
			(Ref. year – FY 2014/15)	(Ref. year – FY 2020/21)		
	objectives and targets of the SEA of the NITMP (c) Training of MoWT and MDA staff in screening and scoping of plans (d) Stakeholder Mapping and Consultation (e) Preparation of SEA NEMA Procedures (f) Preparation of SEA Report	(c) No. of staff trained (disaggregated by gender) (d) Stakeholder Mapping report drafted (Consulting 6 groups of stakeholders) (e) SEA NEMA Procedures drafted (f) Draft SEA report	(e) NIL (f) NIL	(e) 1 (f) 1	(b) Scoping report submitted to NEMA by MoWT (c) Training Report (d) Stakeholder analysis (e) Procedures in SEA report (f) Final SEA submitted to NEMA by MoWT	(c) MoWT staff will participate actively and absorb the capacity development initiatives in SEA (d) At least 50% stakeholders response rate (due to Responses letters from MoWT to stakeholders (COWI draft the letters)) (e) None (f) None

		Results chain	Indicators	Baselines (Ref. year – FY 2014/15)	Targets (Ref. year – end FY 2020/21)	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions and risks
Overall objective: Impact		Improved institutional capacity and corporate governance	(a) Percentage of the national paved roads network in fair to good condition	(a) 80%	(a) 90%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNRA Annual Performance Reports • Road user satisfaction surveys 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sustainability of Government policy to invest in the transport sector as top priority
			(b) Percentage of the national unpaved roads network in fair to good condition	(b) 70%	(b) 80%		
			(c) Overall satisfaction rating for road users' experience (men and women)	(c) 2.55	(c) 2.70		
Specific objective(s)	(a)	Improved delivery of road development projects	(a) Percentage of projects completed <i>(a1) On time (contract period +EOT)</i> <i>(a2) Within budget</i> <i>(a3) To Specified Quality</i>	(a) <i>(a2) No data</i> <i>(a3) No data</i> <i>(a4) No data</i>	(a) <i>(a2) 30% (1)</i> <i>(a3) 30% (1)</i> <i>(a4) 100% (1)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNRA Annual Performance Reports • Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) reports • Staff performance review reports 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sustainability of Government policy to invest in the transport sector as top priority. • Increased organisational commitment to design and implement international best practices in road development.
	(b)	Development of a culture of excellence in UNRA with focus on results	(b) No. and % of staff meeting and exceeding expectations at departmental level (c) No. and % of departments meeting and exceeding expectations	(b) Not established (c) Not established	(b) 80% (number) (c) 80% (number)		

		Results chain	Indicators	Baselines (Ref. year – FY 2014/15)	Targets (Ref. year – end FY 2020/21)	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions and risks	
Outcome 2 (Results)	(a)	Development of well-aligned business strategy and business plans;	(a) Number of Revenue generating activities on board	(a) NIL	(a) 3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNRA Annual Performance Reports • M&E reports • TA reports 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Road Authority recruits and retains staff to avoid skills turnover. • The targeted staff will participate actively and absorb the capacity development initiatives. • The technical advisers that are recruited are sensitive to local conditions and are able to impart their skills and expertise. 	
	(b)	Establishment of M&E and risk management frameworks;	(b) % achievement of results per annum (c) % of risks mitigated	(b) Not established (c) Not established	(b) 75% (c) 70%			External assessment of quality of procurement processes
	(c)	Improved systems security	(d) % of identified vulnerabilities mitigated	(d) Not established	(d) 80%			
	(d)	Improved procurement processes;	(e) Reduction in the procurement turnaround time	(e) 2 years	(e) Works 6 Months Consultancy – 8 Months and Supplies & NCONS – 3 months			
	(e)	Improved environmental and social safeguards management;	(f) Percentage of projects with 80% compliance to the contractual provisions of environment and social safeguards	(f) Less than 20% as at December 2016	(f) 80%			
	(f)	Improved cost estimation practice in UNRA	(g) No. and % of project cost estimates prepared in accordance with Approved cost estimation procedures and tools	(g) NIL	(g) 100% (number)	External assessment of quality of cost estimation processes		

		Results chain	Indicators	Baselines (Ref. year – FY 2014/15)	Targets (Ref. year – end FY 2020/21)	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions and risks
	(g)	Improved operation and maintenance of axle load control infrastructure.	(h) Average number of days per month that axle load equipment is available (i) % of axle load measurements within tolerance limits	(h) (No. of days/month as from axle load maintenance plan (current value)) (i) (% as from axle load maintenance plan (current value))	(h) (No. of days/month as from axle load maintenance plan (target value)) (i) (% as from axle load maintenance plan (target value))	External assessment of quality of axle load operations & maintenance practices	
Performance Management	Outcome 1	(a) Adoption of Performance Management at individual level	(a) % compliance to the PM process	(a) Low	(a) 80%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stakeholder matrix • Organisational Assessment report • TA reports • Performance reports • External assessment of PM processes (including final & ex-post evaluations) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Roads Authority recruits and retains staff to avoid skills turnover. • Sufficient numbers of staff recruited in each unit where increased numbers are stated. • The targeted staff will participate actively and absorb the
	Outputs	(a) BSC tools and processes established (b) Capacity of HR team & core PM champions built in the balance scorecard approach.	(a) No. and % of departments with approved Tier 3 Scorecards (b) No. and % of staff that have signed Scorecards	(b) NIL (c) NIL	(b) 90%(number r) (c) 75%(number)		
	Activities	(a) Review and update of Tier 3 (departmental level) scorecards (b) Training of HR team & core performance management (PM) champions in PM using the Balance scorecard approach.	(a) No. and % of Tier 3 (departmental level) scorecards reviewed and updated (b) No. of HR team and core PM champions trained (disaggregated by gender)	(a) None (b) 15 (5 female)	(a) 90% (number) (b) 30 (≥10 female)		

		Results chain	Indicators	Baselines (Ref. year – FY 2014/15)	Targets (Ref. year – end FY 2020/21)	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions and risks
Monitoring & Evaluation	Outcome 1	(a) Adoption of M&E framework at Directorate level (b) Results based reporting	(a) % uptake/roll out of the M&E framework at Directorate level (b) No. of M&E Directorate reports submitted in accordance with the M&E framework	(a) M&E done in the Office of the Executive Director only (b) N/A	(a) 80% (b) 7 (out of 10)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TA reports • External assessment of quality and relevance of M&E framework 	capacity development initiatives. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The technical advisers that are recruited are sensitive to local conditions and are able to impart their skills and expertise. • Budget released appropriately
	Outputs	(a) M&E system that is responsive to both internal and external stakeholder needs (b) Capacity built in results-based management	(a) Approved M&E framework (b) Level of knowledge in results-based management as determined by entry and exit knowledge tests	(a) NIL (b) (average score at entry test)%	(a) 1 (b) 80%		
	Activities	(a) Developing an M&E framework (b) Training staff (departmental staff & M&E champions) in results-based management	(a) M&E framework developed (b) No. of staff trained (disaggregated by gender)	(a) NIL (b) NIL	(a) 1 (b) 11 (2 female)		
Risk Management	Outcome 1	(a) Adoption of risk management processes at departmental level	(a) No. of departments with risk registers (b) No. of departments with updated risk registers per annum	(a) NIL (b) N/A	(a) 28 (b) 28	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Risk Registers • TA Reports • External assessment of quality of risk management processes (including final & ex-post evaluations) 	
	Outputs	(a) Business Continuity Management system comprised of a Business Continuity Plan, Emergency Response Plan and a Crisis, Disaster Recovery Plan. (b) Capacity built in ERM and BCM	(a) Approved BCM system (b) No. of staff qualified in ERM and BCM (as determined by certificates) (c) Level of knowledge in ERM and BCM as determined by entry and exit knowledge tests	(a) None (b) NIL (c) (average score at entry test)%	(a) 1 (b) 2 (male) (c) 80%		

		Results chain	Indicators	Baselines (Ref. year – FY 2014/15)	Targets (Ref. year – end FY 2020/21)	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions and risks
	Activities	(a) Development of the Business Continuity Management system (b) Training of staff in the use of the Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) system	(a) Business Continuity management system developed (b) No. of staff trained (disaggregated by gender)	(a) Not established (b) NIL	(a) 1 (b) 2 (Male)		
Business Development	Outcome 1	(a) Application of Business Process Map for the BDU (b) Implementation of the business development strategy at departmental level for agreed markets	(a) % of BDU processes aligned to the Business Process Map (b) % implementation of the marketing strategy at departmental level for agreed markets	(a) NIL (b) NIL (c)	(a) 90% (b) 50%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TA reports • Back-to-office Reports from Benchmarking trips and Training • Business Process Map of the BDU • Marketing Strategy • External assessment of quality of business development processes and marketing strategy 	
	Outputs	(a) Capacity built in Business Development (b) Business Development Strategy and Business Process Map that is clearly defines the BD path and potential in meeting its mandate.	(a) Level of knowledge in business development (as determined by entry and exit tests) (b) Approved Business Development Strategy and Business Process Map	(d) Entry test never administered (e) NIL	(c) 80% (d) 2		
	Activities	(a) Training in Business Development (b) Developing a Business Development Strategy and Business Process Map (c) Exposure of staff to International best practices in Revenue Generation	(a) No. of staff trained (disaggregated by sex) (b) Business Development Strategic Plan and Business Process Map developed (c) No. of staff exposed to International Best practices (disaggregated by gender)	(f) NIL (g) NIL (h) NIL	(e) 1 (male) (f) 2 (g) 1 (male)		

		Results chain	Indicators	Baselines (Ref. year – FY 2014/15)	Targets (Ref. year – end FY 2020/21)	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions and risks
Systems Audit	Outcome	(a) Use of PT&VA tools in the organisation	(a) Frequency of PT&VA carried in the organisation	(a) NIL	(a) Monthly	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TA Reports • External assessment of quality of PT&VA tools and procedures 	
	Outputs	(a) PT&VA tools provided (b) Capacity built in use of PT&VA tools (c) Capacity built in PT&VA	(a) PT&VA tools installed and approved (b) Level of knowledge in the use of the PT&VA tools as determined by entry and exit knowledge tests (c) No. of staff qualified in PT&VA (as determined by certificates)	(a) NIL (b) (average score at entry test)% (c) NIL	(a) 2 (b) 80% (c) 3 (male)		
	Activities	(a) Provide penetration testing and vulnerability assessment (PT&VA) tools and train staff in their use (b) Staff trained in conducting PT&VA	(a) No. of PT&VA tools introduced (b) No. of staff trained in the use of the PT&VA tools (disaggregated by gender) (c) No. of staff trained (disaggregated by gender)	(a) NIL (b) NIL (c) NIL	(a) 2 (b) 3 (male) (c) 3 (male)		
Procurement	1	a. Reduction in Evaluation timelines b. Ease of access to Procurement Information c. Reduction in Knowledge related errors in evaluation	(a) No. of working days for evaluating bids (b) Time taken to retrieve procurement information (c) % of Contract Committee approvals at first time of submission	(a) 40 works, 30 cons and 20 ncons & supplies days (b) ≥2 weeks (c) 40%	(a) 20 works, 20 cons and 10 ncons & supplies days (b) One day (c) 70%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TA reports • Minutes of the contracts committee • External assessment of quality and 	

		Results chain	Indicators	Baselines (Ref. year – FY 2014/15)	Targets (Ref. year – end FY 2020/21)	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions and risks
	Outputs	a. Bid evaluation templates and procurement process checklists b. eRecords management system c. Capacity built in the use of the document management System d. Capacity built in various Procurement Guidelines (PPDA, EU, WB) e. On-the-job training packs for each procurement guideline (PPDA, EU, WB)	(a) Approved Bid evaluation templates and procurement process checklists (b) Approved eRecords management system (c) Level of knowledge in the use of the document management System as determined by entry and exit knowledge tests (d) Level of knowledge in procurement guidelines as determined by entry and exit knowledge tests (e) Approved on-the-job training packs for each procurement guideline (PPDA, EU, WB)	(a) N/A (b) N/A (c) (average score at entry test)% (d) (average score at entry test)% (e) NIL	(a) 6 Bid Evaluation Templates (2 each for works, services, and supplies) & 6 procurement process Checklists (2 each for works, services, and supplies) (b) 1 (c) 80% (d) 35 (10 female) (e) 4	performance of procurement processes (including final & ex-post evaluations)	
	Activity	a. Development of Bid evaluation templates and checklists b. Develop an eRecords management system for all procurement documentation to match Procurement process and a guideline to scan and save documents. c. Training staff in the use of the document management System d. Training staff (across UNRA) in various	a. No. of Bid Evaluation Templates & Checklists developed b. eRecords management system for procurement developed and launched c. No. of Staff trained in the use of the document management System (disaggregated by gender) d. No. of Staff trained in various Procurement Guidelines (PPDA, EU, WB) (disaggregated by gender)	(a) No official templates for evaluation (b) Manual system for management of procurement records (c) NIL (d) NIL (e) NIL	(a) 6 Bid Evaluation Templates (2 each for works, services, and supplies) & 6 Checklists (2 each for works, services, and supplies) (b) 1 (c) 26 (16 Female) (d) 35 (10 female)		

		Results chain	Indicators	Baselines (Ref. year – FY 2014/15)	Targets (Ref. year – end FY 2020/21)	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions and risks
		Procurement Guidelines (PPDA, EU, WB) e. Development of on-the-job training packs for each procurement guideline (PPDA, EU, WB)	e. No. of on-the-job training packs for each procurement guideline (PPDA, EU, WB)		(e) 4		
Public & Private Partnerships	Outcome 1	(a) Streamlined PPP processes (for the O&M phase)	(a) No. of O&M PPP projects prepared in accordance with approved templates	(a) NIL	(a) 1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TA reports • External assessment of O&M PPP processes & quality of templates 	
	Outputs	(a) Internal O&M templates and risk analysis process (b) Capacity built in O&M PPP management	(a) Approved templates and risk analysis process for O&M PPP projects (b) Level of knowledge in O&M PPP as determined by entry and exit knowledge tests	(a) N/A (b) (average score on entry test)%	(a) 5 (b) 80%		
	Activities	(a) Develop evaluation templates for KEE O&M tender (b) Develop templates for inspection, progress, reporting (c) Develop Risk analysis process and undertake risk analysis for KEE O&M project (d) Train staff in the use of the templates (evaluation, inspection, progress, reporting) and risk analysis	(a) No. of evaluation templates for KEE O&M project developed (b) No. of templates for inspection, progress and reporting developed (c) Risk analysis report (documenting process including report on KEE project) prepared (d) No. of staff trained (disaggregated by gender)	(a) NIL (b) NIL (c) NIL (d) 1 (male)	(a) 1 (b) 3 (c) 1 (d) 5 (2 female)		

		Results chain	Indicators	Baselines (Ref. year – FY 2014/15)	Targets (Ref. year – end FY 2020/21)	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions and risks
Environment & Social Safeguards	Outcome 1 Indicators	(a) Compliance to ISO 14001 standard (b) Implementation of ESMS Communication Strategy (c) Use of RAP tools at project implementation level	(a) % of Audit recommendations implemented (b) % of target groups reached (c) % convergence of ESS audit findings to RAP implementation at project level	(a) NIL (b) NIL (c) (% in Audit report of ESS Management Systems)	(a) 60% (b) 50% (c) (Baseline value + 15%)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project progress reports • Communications Strategy • Procedures on E&SS • TA reports • External assessment of quality of ESMS tools and processes (including final & ex-post evaluations) 	(Means of verification for Land Acquisition) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TA reports • M&E reports • External
	Outputs	(a) Audit report of ESS Management Systems (b) ESMS Communication strategy (c) Tools for monitoring resettlement action plan (d) Capacity built in ESS management	(a) Approved audit report (b) Approved ESMS Communication strategy (c) Approved Monitoring Indicators for at least 5 Core thematic areas (d) No. of staff qualified in ESS management (as determined by certificates)	(a) NIL (b) NIL (c) NIL (d) NIL	(a) 1 (b) 1 (c) 5 (d) 20 (10 female)		
	Activities	(a) Undertake Audit of ESS Management Systems using ISO 14001 standard (b) Develop an Environmental and Social Management System (ESMS) Communication Strategy (c) Design monitoring indicators for evaluating Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) implementation processes (d) Train Staff in ESS Management	(a) Audit report prepared (b) ESMS Communication strategy prepared (c) Monitoring Indicators for at least 5 Core thematic areas (Stakeholder Engagement, Grievance Management, Compensation, Livelihood restoration and Assistance to Vulnerable people) (d) No. of staff trained (disaggregated by gender)	(a) NIL (b) NIL (c) NIL (d) NIL	(a) 1 (b) 1 (c) 5 (d) 20 (10 female)		

		Results chain	Indicators	Baselines (Ref. year – FY 2014/15)	Targets (Ref. year – end FY 2020/21)	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions and risks
Land Acquisition	Outcome 1 Indicators	(a) Implementation of the grievance redress mechanism (b) Improved information management system for land acquisition (c) Alignment of the land acquisition systems to the operational manual (in DNPE & DRBD)	(a) No. and % of unresolved grievances in the log (b) Time taken to retrieve land acquisition information (c) % of land acquisition processes that are aligned to the manual	(a) (number and % of unresolved grievances in log at the start of the use of the grievance redress mechanism) (b) Over 4 days (c) NIL	(a) <20% (number) (b) 1 day (c) 80%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TA reports • M&E reports • External assessment of quality of systems and processes 	
	Output Indicators	(a) Effective and efficient grievance redress mechanism (b) Recommendations for improvement of information management system for land acquisition, ROWMIS (c) Operational manual for the land acquisition and resettlement management system, LARMS (d) Capacity built in land acquisition and the use of the ROWMIS and LARMS	(a) Approved grievance redress mechanism (b) Approved report with recommended improvements to the information management system for land acquisition ROWMIS (c) Approved operational manual for the land acquisition management system, LARMS (d) Level of knowledge in land acquisition as determined by entry and exit knowledge tests	(a) NIL (b) NIL (c) NIL (d) (average score on entry test)%	(a) 1 (b) 1 (c) 1 (d) 80%		
	Activities	(a) Develop an effective and efficient grievance redress mechanism (b) Review the implementation of the information system for land	(a) Grievance redress mechanism developed (b) Information management system for land acquisition (ROWMIS) internalised	(a) Grievance log exists but there is no structured way of addressing grievances	(a) 1 (b) 1 (c) 1 (d) 14 (4 female)		

		Results chain	Indicators	Baselines (Ref. year – FY 2014/15)	Targets (Ref. year – end FY 2020/21)	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions and risks
		acquisition (ROWMIS) and advise on improvements (c) Review the manual for land acquisition and resettlement management system (LARMS) (d) Training staff in Land acquisition and the use of the ROWMIS and LARMS	(c) LARMS the operational manual for the land acquisition and resettlement management system reviewed and internalised (d) Staff trained (disaggregated by gender)	(b) NIL (c) NIL (d) NIL			
Traffic & Road Safety	Outcome 1	(a) Compliance to road safety manuals, guidelines and policy	(a) Number and percentage of projects compliant	(a) NIL	(a) 80% (number)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TA reports • UNRA performance reports • External assessment of quality of processes (including final & ex-post evaluations) 	MoWT will update all road design manuals in FY 2021/22.
	Outputs	(a) Capacity built in road safety assessments, audits (in DNPE & TRS) (b) Operational manuals and guidelines for UNRA's use (c) Risk assessment register for traffic and road safety for UNRA's use (d) Road safety enhancement program/approach/intervention for UNRA	(a) Level of knowledge in traffic and road safety assessment as determined by entry and exit knowledge tests (b) Approved Operational manual and / guidelines (c) Approved risk assessment register for traffic and road safety (d) Approved road safety enhancement program/approach/intervention	(a) (average score on entry test)% (b) NIL (c) NIL (d) NIL	(a) 80% (b) 1 (c) 1 (d) 1		
	Activities	(a) Training of staff in road safety assessments and audits (in DNPE and TRS) (b) Develop operational manual and guidelines	(a) No. of staff trained (disaggregated by gender) (b) Operational manual and guidelines developed	(a) NIL (b) NIL (c) NIL (d) NIL	(a) 5 (2 female) (b) 1 (c) 1 (d) 1		

		Results chain	Indicators	Baselines (Ref. year – FY 2014/15)	Targets (Ref. year – end FY 2020/21)	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions and risks
		(c) Develop risk assessment register for traffic and road safety (d) Develop a road safety enhancement program/approach/intervention	(c) Risk assessment register for traffic and road safety developed (d) Road safety enhancement program/approach/intervention developed				
Climate Resilient Drainage Design	Outcome 1	(a) Adoption of climate resilient drainage design in projects	(a) Number and % of projects prepared incorporating climate resilient drainage design	(a) NIL	(a) 70% (number)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TA reports • Tools and manuals • Drainage design reports • External assessment of processes and quality of tools (including final & ex-post evaluations) 	
	Outputs	(a) Climate resilient drainage design tools (b) Capacity built in climate resilient drainage design	(a) Climate resilient drainage design tools approved (b) Level of knowledge in climate resilient drainage design as determined by entry and exit knowledge tests	(a) NIL (b) 50% (c)	(a) >2 (b) 80%		
	Activities	(a) Development of Drainage design tools (b) Training in climate resilient drainage design	(a) Drainage design tools developed (c) No. of staff trained (disaggregated by gender)	(a) NIL (b) NIL	(a) >2 tools developed (b) 4 (all male)		

		Results chain	Indicators	Baselines (Ref. year – FY 2014/15)	Targets (Ref. year – end FY 2020/21)	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions and risks
Load/Rehabilitation Design	Outcome 1	(a) Improved rehabilitation design approaches in UNRA (b) Adoption of the report on proposed improvements to the pavement rehabilitation manual	(a) No. and % of rehabilitation designs which include pavement life cycle costing considerations (b) No. and % of proposed improvements included in the updated pavement rehabilitation manual	(a) NIL (b) NIL	(a) 100% (number) (b) 80% (number)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TA reports • Rehabilitation Design reports • External assessment of the rehabilitation design approaches (including final & ex-post evaluations) 	
	Outputs	(a) Capacity built in pavement rehabilitation life cycle costing (b) Report on proposed improvements to pavement rehabilitation manual	(c) Level of knowledge in pavement life cycle rehabilitation as determined by entry and exit knowledge tests (b) Approved report on proposed improvements	(a) 50% (b) NIL	(a) 80% (b) 1		
	Activities	(a) Training in Pavement Lifecycle costing (b) Review and propose improvements to the pavement rehabilitation manual	(a) No. of staff trained (disaggregated by gender) (b) Report on proposed improvements to the pavement rehabilitation manual	(a) NIL (b) NIL	(a) 5 (4 female) (b) 1		
Vehicle Control	1 Indicator	(a) Implementation of the maintenance plan for axle load equipment (b) Alignment of department procedures to SOP	(a) % Implementation of the maintenance plan for axle load equipment per annum (b) % of departmental procedures that are aligned to the SOP	(a) NIL (b) N/A	(a) 80% (b) 80%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TA reports • M&E reports • External assessment of axle load operations (and/or SOPs), 	

		Results chain	Indicators	Baselines (Ref. year – FY 2014/15)	Targets (Ref. year – end FY 2020/21)	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions and risks
	Outputs	(a) Capacity built in Axle Load Control (b) Maintenance plan for axle load equipment (c) Standard operating procedures for axle load control (d) Typical layout for axle load control facilities	(a) Level of knowledge in in axle load control as determined by entry and exit knowledge tests (b) Approved Axle Load Maintenance plan (c) Approved Axle Load SOP (d) Approved Typical layouts report	(a) 50% (b) No maintenance plan exists (c) NIL (d) NIL	(a) 80% (b) 1 (c) 1 (d) 1	maintenance plan (impact opportunities, sustainability) (including final and ex-post evaluations)	
	Activities	(a) Training in Axle Load control (b) Developing a maintenance plan for axle load equipment (c) Develop standard operating procedures (SOP) for Axle Load Control (d) Develop typical layouts for axle load control facilities	(a) No. of staff trained (disaggregated by gender) (b) Maintenance plan for axle load equipment developed (c) Standard operating procedures for axle load control developed (d) Typical layouts report for axle load control facilities	(a) NIL (b) NIL (c) NIL (d) NIL	(a) 10 (3 female) (b) 1 (c) 1 (d) 1		
Contract management and Road Development	Outcome 1	(a) Improved contract management of both road development and road maintenance projects (b) Improved monitoring of road maintenance projects	(a) No. and % of contracts managed in accordance with contractual conditions (b) Number and % of projects with complete information in the dashboard	(a) Not established (b) NIL	(a) 70%(number) (b) 80% (number)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project progress reports • TA reports • Reports generated by the system • External assessment of contract management processes (including final and ex-post evaluations) 	
	Outputs	(a) Capacity built in contract management (in DRBD & DRM) (b) Contract management dashboard (c) Capacity built in the use of the reviewed contract	(a) Level of knowledge in contract management as determined by entry and exit knowledge tests (b) Approved contract management dashboard	(a) (average score of entry test)% (b) NIL (c) (average score of entry test)%	(a) 80% (b) 1 (c) 80%		

		Results chain	Indicators	Baselines (Ref. year – FY 2014/15)	Targets (Ref. year – end FY 2020/21)	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions and risks
		management dashboard in DRM	(c) Level of knowledge in use of contract management dashboard as determined by entry and exit knowledge tests				
	Activities	(a) Training in contract management (b) Review the contract management system (dashboard) (c) Training in the use of the reviewed contract management system (dashboard)	(a) Number of staff trained in contract management (disaggregated by gender) (b) Contract management system (dashboard) reviewed (c) Number of staff trained in the use of the reviewed contract management system (dashboard) (disaggregated by gender)	(a) NIL (b) NIL (c) NIL	(a) 33 (5 female) (b) 1 (c) 50 (7 female)		
Claims Management	Outcome 1	(a) Systematic approach to assessing claims on major projects across UNRA (in DNPE, DRBD, DRM, DLS, DIA, DPD, DCS)	(a) No. and % of claims complying with the guidelines	(a) NONE	(a) 80% (number)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TA reports • Claims committee reports • External assessment of claims management processes within UNRA (including final and ex-post evaluations) 	
	Outputs	(a) Capacity built in claim assessment and resolution (in DNPE, DRBD, DRM, DLS, DIA, DPD, DCS) (b) Claims for Kampala – Northern Bypass reviewed (c) Guideline for assessing claims developed (d) Capacity of Supervision Consultants built in claims assessment and resolution	(a) Level of knowledge in claims as determined by entry and exit knowledge tests (b) Approved claims report on Kampala Northern Bypass (c) Approved guideline on managing claims (d) Level of knowledge in claims as determined by	(a) 50% (b) NIL (c) NIL (d) (average score of entry test)%	(a) 80% (b) 1 (c) 1 (d) 80%		

		Results chain	Indicators	Baselines (Ref. year – FY 2014/15)	Targets (Ref. year – end FY 2020/21)	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions and risks
			entry and exit knowledge tests				
	Activities	(a) Train UNRA staff in claims resolution (in DNPE, DRBD, DRM, DLS, DIA, DPD, DCS) (b) Review selected claims on Kampala Northern By-Pass (c) Develop approach to assessing claims on major projects to assist contract administration (d) Train Supervision Consultants in claims resolution	(a) Number of staff trained (disaggregated by gender) (b) Claims report prepared (c) Guidelines prepared (d) No. of people trained (disaggregated by gender)	(a) NIL (b) NIL (c) No structured way of assessing claims (d) NIL	(a) 50 (15 Female) (b) 1 (c) 1 (d) 25		
Cost Estimation	Outcome 1	(a) Adoption of rate build up tool and cost estimation manual (b) Improved tracking of unit costs of road construction	(a) No. and % of design projects whose cost estimates are checked with the rate build up tool per annum (b) No. and % of development projects whose cost is captured in the cost database per annum	(a) NIL (b) NIL	(a) 80% (number) (b) 80% (number)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Database created for major items • Quarterly TMT briefs • External assessment of cost estimation processes and tools (including 	<p>UNRA able to extract information from historic data that will form basis of assignment.</p> <p>Benchmarking depends on the</p>

		Results chain	Indicators	Baselines (Ref. year – FY 2014/15)	Targets (Ref. year – end FY 2020/21)	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions and risks
	Outputs	(a) Rate build up tool and cost estimation manual (b) Costs database (c) Report on Benchmarking exercise (d) Capacity built in cost estimation	(a) Rate build up tool and cost estimation manual approved (b) Costs database approved (c) Report on Benchmarking exercise approved (d) No of staff able to use the costs database and unit rate estimation tool (disaggregated by gender)	(a) NIL (b) No costs database (c) No up to date comparison of rates in the region (d) NIL	(a) 2 (b) 1 (c) 1 (d) 5 (2 female)	final and ex-post evaluation) • Guidelines prepared • TA reports	response from Road authorities outside Uganda and follow up by UNRA
	Activity Indicators	(a) Development of a rate build up tool and cost estimation manual (b) Develop a costs database (c) Benchmark rates with other countries in Sub Sahara Region (d) Staff trained in use of cost estimation tools	(a) Rate build up tool and cost estimation manual developed (b) Costs database developed (c) Report on Benchmarking exercise (d) No of staff trained (disaggregated by gender)	(a) NIL (b) No costs database (c) No up to date comparison of rates in the region (d) NIL	(a) 2 (b) 1 (c) 1 (d) 5 (2 female)		

		Results chain	Indicators	Baselines (Ref. year – 2014/15)	Targets (Ref. year – 2020/21)	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions
Overall objective:	Impact	Improved operational efficiency of road maintenance	(a) Percentage of public road network in good to fair condition	(a) 62.4%	(a) 75%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • URF Annual Performance Reports • Road User Satisfaction Survey Report 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The sustainability of Government policy to invest in the transport sector as top priority. • Study of Institutional & Funding Models proceeds to completion • Government responds to Study results with appropriate reforms. • TSUs for DUCAR agencies are progressively extended nationally • Road Fund staff will participate actively and absorb the capacity development initiatives;
			(b) Planned works executed in FY (average percentage by value)	(b) 70%	(b) 90%		
			(c) Overall satisfaction rating for road users' experience (men and women)	(c) 2.55	(c) 2.70		
Specific objective(s):		Improved institutional capacity and corporate governance of URF.	(a) Funding of routine and periodic maintenance of national roads (percentage of needs)	(a) 45%	(a) 65%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Joint Works and Transport Sector report (Annual sector performance report) • URF Annual Performance Reports 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Technical advisors are sensitive to local conditions and able to effectively deliver concrete outputs as well as impart their skills and expertise to counterpart staff. • Procurement of IMIS (AfDB funding) and RMMoS proceeds • Road management systems are available in agencies; • TA consultancy extended by at least six months to allow key
			(b) Funding of routine and periodic maintenance of DUCAR roads (percentage of needs)	(b) 22%	(b) 55%		

		Results chain	Indicators	Baselines (Ref. year – 2014/15)	Targets (Ref. year – 2020/21)	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions
Institutional Capacity	Outcome 2	(a) Improved institutional and funding model (b) Improved corporate governance within the Road Fund (c) Improved performance of DUCAR DAs in delivering road maintenance	(a) Alignment of URF's functions and roles to the approved road map (b) % of green KPIs achieved by the Board in the Corporate Plan (c) No. and % of DUCAR DAs which achieve at least 80% implementation of work plans	(a) N/A (b) N/A (c) 45 out of 112 (40%)	(a) Full alignment (b) 80% (c) 113 out of 175 (65%)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • URF Annual Performance Reports • Reports of Auditor General 	elements to be achieved.
	Outcome 1	(a) Implementation of the road map and action plan for the alternative Institutional and Funding Model (b) Acceptance of draft law and regulations and adoption of the road map by MoFPED & MoWT (c) Implementation of the board manual (d) Improved M&E function over DAs (e) Improved capacity of DUCAR DAs in planning, programming, implementation and reporting	(a) % actual progress vs. planned (b) Certificate of Financial Implication from MoFPED (c) % of board procedures that are aligned to the approved board manual (d) No. and % of M&E reports submitted by the TSUs on time (e) No. and % of DUCAR DA plans and reports submitted on time	(a) N/A (b) N/A (c) Not established (d) N/A (d) 45 out of 112 (40%)	(a) 80% (b) 1 (c) 80% (d) 40 out of 50(80%) (d) 96 out of 175 (55%)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Report on Study of Institutional and Funding Models • URF Annual Performance Reports • M&E reports • External annual performance assessment 	
	Outputs	(a) Report on alternative Institutional and Funding Model (b) Draft law approved by the Secretariat (c) Draft regulations approved by the Secretariat (d) Board manual (e) Capacity of board built in corporate governance (f) Capacity of TSUs built in supporting the URF planning & programming and M&E functions	(a) Approved report (b) Approved draft law (c) Approved draft regulations (d) Approved board manual (e) Level of knowledge in corporate governance as determined by entry and exit tests (f) Level of knowledge in planning & programming and M&E as determined by entry and exit tests	(a) N/A (b) N/A (c) N/A (d) N/A (e) Entry test never administered (f) (average score of entry test)%	(a) 1 (b) 1 (c) 1 (d) 1 (e) 80% (f) 80%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Report on Study of Institutional and Funding Models • URF Annual Performance Reports • M&E reports 	

		Results chain	Indicators	Baselines (Ref. year – 2014/15)	Targets (Ref. year – 2020/21)	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions
	Activities	(a) Study alternative Institutional and Funding Models (b) Draft legislative revisions (c) Develop regulatory and governance processes and enactments (d) Update procedures and manual for Board operations (e) Training board in corporate governance (f) Training TSUs to support the URF planning & programming and monitoring & evaluation (M&E) functions	(a) Report on Identified model (b) Draft law produced (c) Draft regulations produced (d) Draft Board manual produced (e) No. of board members trained in corporate governance (f) No. of TSUs trained (No. of TSU staff trained) (disaggregated by gender)	(a) NIL (b) N/A (c) N/A (d) N/A (e) NIL (f) N/A	(a) 1 (b) 1 (c) 1 (d) 1 (e) 7 (f) 2 TSUs (12 staff)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • URF Annual Performance Reports • Study road map and action plan • Consultant reports 	
	Outcome 2	(a) Improved departmental performance (b) Improved support to DUCAR DAs	(a) Percentage of KPIs in the Corporate Plan with green indication (b) No. and % of DUCAR DAs with support from TSUs	(a) 10% (b) 5 (3%)	(a) 60% (b) 50 (29%)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • External annual performance assessment • URF Annual Performance Reports 	
Organisational Capacity	Outcome 1	(a) Improved organisational culture and staff motivation (b) Improved staff performance (c) Recommended candidate for ED submitted to MoFPED (d) TSUs rolled out	(a) % of alignment of URF's organisational culture with its mandate as determined by external assessment (b) No. and % of technical and management staff with satisfactory annual appraisals (c) Recruitment report for New ED (d) No. of TSU contracts signed	(a) 50% to funding institution culture (b) 13 (65%) (c) N/A (Current ED's term lapsed in October 2019) (d) N/A	(a) 80% to funding institution culture (b) 16 (80%) (c) 1 (d) 2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • URF Annual Performance Reports • External assessment of organisation structure and culture 	

	Results chain	Indicators	Baselines (Ref. year – 2014/15)	Targets (Ref. year – 2020/21)	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions	
Outcome 2	Outputs	(a) Audit Report on organisational culture (b) Implementation of audit report recommendations (c) Report on the revised organisational structure (d) Implementation of revised organisational structure (e) TNA plan in place (f) Capacity built in technical and management staff following the implementation of training plan (g) Report on ED job profile, terms of reference for recruitment consultant, and program for recruitment (h) Procurement documents for TSUs	(a) NIL (b) NIL (c) NIL (d) NIL (e) NIL (f) N/A (g) NIL (h) NIL	(a) 1 (b) 60% (c) 1 (d) 80% (e) 1 (f) 24 (80%) (g) 1 (h) 2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • URF Annual Performance Reports • Consultant reports • Board reports 		
	Activities	(a) Audit organisational culture (b) Review/revise organisational structure (c) Assess training needs and develop training plan (d) Support recruitment of Executive Director (e) Support procurement of TSUs	(a) Audit Report on organisational culture (b) Report on the revised organisational structure (c) Training needs assessment (TNA) plan drafted (d) Report on ED job profile, terms of reference for recruitment consultant, and program for recruitment (e) Procurement documents prepared	(a) NIL (b) NIL (c) NIL (d) NIL (e) NIL	(a) 1 (b) 1 (c) 1 (d) 1 (e) 2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consultant reports • Board reports • URF Annual Performance Reports 	
	Outcome 2	(a) Improved secretariat performance (b) Improved allocation of maintenance funds	(a) Performance of secretariat (procedures, processes, departmental & organisational performances) as determined by external assessment (b) No. of unresolved complaints from DAs on funds allocation	(a) Never been measured (b) 175 (out of 175) in FY 2019/20	(a) 70% (b) <35 (out of 175)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • External assessments (including ex-post evaluation) • Local Government Consultative Workshop Report • URF Annual Performance Reports 	

		Results chain	Indicators	Baselines (Ref. year – 2014/15)	Targets (Ref. year – 2020/21)	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions
Management Capacity	Outcome 1	(a) Improved departmental performance within the Secretariat (b) Improved organisational performance (c) Allocation Formula operational (d) Adoption of Documented secretariat procedures (e) Improved data management	(a) No. of departments with green KPIs in the Corporate Plan (b) % of green KPIs in the Strategic Plan (c) Net % Variance of actual allocation vs. allocation by formula (d) % of secretariat operational procedures that are aligned to the approved documented procedures (e) Time taken to access information from the RMMoS, UCM and iMIS	(a) 2 (out of 5) (b) NIL (c) 40% in FY 2019/20 (d) HR, Accounting, Internal audit, M & E, Planning & programming procedures exist but secretariat operations not properly aligned to them (e) >1 week	(a) 4 (out of 6) (b) 65% (c) <20% (d) 80% (e) One day	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Published corporate and strategic plans URF Annual Performance Reports Annual audit by Internal Audit department External assessments (including ex-post evaluation) 	
	Outputs	(a) Corporate Plan FY 2019/20 – FY 2023/24 (b) Strategic Plan FY 2019/20 – FY 2023/24 (c) Capacity built in the preparation of the Corporate & Strategic Plans (d) Updated Allocation Formula (e) Capacity built in updating the allocation formula (f) Documented secretariat procedures (g) System integration plan in place (h) Capacity built in the development and implementation of the System integration plan	(a) Approved Corporate Plan (b) Approved Strategic Plan (c) % actual progress of implementation of the Corporate & Strategic Plans vs. planned (d) Approved Allocation Formula (e) Board approval of revised allocation formula (f) No. of approved documented procedures (g) Approved System integration plan (h) % actual progress of implementation of the System integration plan vs. planned	(a) NIL (b) NIL (c) 0% (d) NIL (e) Formula has been revised & approved once in 10 years since 2010 (f) NIL (g) NIL (h) 0%	(a) 1 (b) 1 (c) 8% (d) 1 (e) Revision and approval once per year (f) 8 (g) 1 (h) 40%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> URF Annual Performance Reports Submitted corporate and strategic plans Consultant reports 	

	Results chain	Indicators	Baselines (Ref. year – 2014/15)	Targets (Ref. year – 2020/21)	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions	
Technical Capacity	Activities	(a) Update Corporate Plans (b) Update Strategic Plans (c) Review and update allocation formula (d) Draft and update Secretariat procedures (e) Develop system integration plan for RMMoS, UCM and iMIS	(a) Plan produced in draft (b) Plan produced in draft (c) Revised allocation formula developed (d) No. of Technical reports (HR, Accounting, Internal audit, M & E, Planning & programming, ICT, Risk Management, Communication) on Revised procedures drafted (e) Draft Integration plan developed	(a) Corporate plan FY 2018/19 in place (b) 5 year Strategic plan (FY 2013/14 – FY 2018/19) in place (c) Complex allocation formula (d) HR, Accounting, Internal audit, M & E, Planning & programming, ICT, Risk Management, Communication manuals in place (e) NIL	(a) 1 (b) 1 (c) 1 (d) 8 (e) 1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • URF Annual Performance Reports • Submitted corporate and strategic plans • Consultant reports 	
	Outcome 2	(a) Improved program preparation and reporting from DAs (b) Improved cost estimation	(a) No. and % of DAs submitting work plans and reports on time (b) No. and % of DA cost estimates accepted at first time submission	(a) (40 out of 112) 36 % (b) (34 out of 112) 30%	(a) (88 out of 175) 50% (b) (79 out of 175) 45%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • URF Annual Performance Reports 	
	Outcome 1	(a) RMMoS operational (b) Updated UCM operational	(a) No. and % of DAs using the RMMoS for program preparation and reporting (b) No. and % of DAs using the UCM for cost estimation	(a) NIL (b) NIL	(a) (35 no.) 20% (b) (35 no.) 20%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • URF Annual Performance Reports • TA final report • TSU Progress Reports • TA training reports 	
	Outputs	(a) RMMoS that meets the acceptance test (b) Updated UCM that meets the acceptance test (c) Capacity built in the use of the RMMoS and UCM	(a) Approved RMMoS (b) Approved UCM (c) Level of knowledge in RMMoS and UCM as determined by entry and exit tests	(a) NIL (b) NIL (c) (average score of entry test)%	(a) 1 (b) 1 (c) 80%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • URF Annual Performance Reports • TA final report • TSU Progress Reports • TA training reports 	

	Results chain	Indicators	Baselines (Ref. year – 2014/15)	Targets (Ref. year – 2020/21)	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions
Activities	(a) Upgrade RMMoS design and procure software (b) Update Unit Cost Model and software (UCM). (c) Train secretariat & TSU staff in the use RMMoS and UCM;	(a) Upgraded RMMoS procured (b) Updated UCM (c) No. of Staff of URF and TSUs trained (disaggregated by gender)	(a) Non-functional system (b) Non-functional UCM (c) NIL	(a) 1 (b) 1 (c) 6 in Secretariat (1 female); 10 in TSUs (2 female)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • URF Annual Performance Reports • TA final report • TSU Progress Reports • TA training reports 	

		Results chain	Indicators	Baselines (Ref. year – FY 2014/15)	Targets (Ref. year – FY 2020/21)	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions and risks
Overall objective: Impact		Increased competitiveness of the local construction industry in the transport sector	(d) Percentage value of works/services awarded to local contractors/consultants in the transport sector	(d) 24% ¹⁸ (in FY 2018/19)	(d) 30%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Annual Sector Performance Reports • Sector Action Plan Matrix 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sustainability of Government policy to invest in the transport sector as top priority (this will determine the availability of work for the successful outcome of the GTP & UTC components)
	Specific objective(s)	Improved institutional capacity of the UIPE	(b) Increased professionalism in the local construction industry determined by: (a1) The number of engineers attaining corporate membership per annum and; (a2) The number of engineers registered per annum;	(a1) 70 (a2) 84	(a1) 30% increase per annum (number) (a2) 25% increase per annum (number)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TA reports • MET reports • ERB reports • External assessments (including final and ex-post evaluations) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased organisational commitment to design and implement international best practices in nurturing professional development.
UIPE Council Strengthening	Outcome 2	(b) Improved corporate governance over UIPE	(b) % of green KPIs achieved by the Council	(d) N/A	(d) 60%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TA reports • Annual audit reports • External assessments (including final and ex-post evaluations) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The UIPE recruits and retains staff to avoid skills turnover. • The targeted staff and beneficiaries will participate actively
	Outcome 1	(a) Adoption of the revised structure of UIPE Council (b) Adoption of the Operating manual for Council including ToR for the Committees (c) Adoption of the code of ethics for Council (d) Adoption of the code of ethics for members	(a) % alignment of Council structure, reporting lines, roles and responsibilities to the approved structure of the UIPE Council (b) % alignment of Council standard operating procedures to the approved Operating manual and ToR (c) No. and % of signed ethics declaration forms (d) No. and % of members with signed ethics declaration forms	(a) N/A (b) N/A (c) N/A (d) Not established	(a) 90% (b) 50% (c) 100% (18 number) (d) 30% (number)		

¹⁸ Of total signed works contracts (amount UGX 2,300.7 billion), UGX 406.6 billion by threshold and UGX 162.6 billion by subcontracting was awarded to local contractors – accounting for 25%.

Of total signed consulting services contracts (amount UGX 187.6 billion), UGX 24.65 billion by threshold was awarded to local consultants – accounting for 13%.

The baseline value is calculated from the summation of both works and consulting services contracts.

		Results chain	Indicators	Baselines (Ref. year – FY 2014/15)	Targets (Ref. year – FY 2020/21)	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions and risks
	Outputs	(c) Report on the revised structure of UIPE Council (including council committees) (d) Capacity built in corporate governance (e) Operating manual (including performance assessment mechanism) for Council including ToR for the Committees (f) Code of ethics for Council (g) Revised code of ethics for members	(a) Approved report on the revised structure of UIPE Council (b) Level of knowledge as determined by entry and exit assessments (c) Approved Operating manual for Council including ToR for the Committees (d) Approved code of ethics for Council (e) Approved code of ethics for members	(a) NIL (b) Average score of entry assessments (%) (c) NIL (d) NIL (e) N/A	(a) 1 (b) 80% (c) 1 (d) 1 (e) 1		and absorb the capacity development initiatives. • The technical advisers that are recruited are sensitive to local conditions and are able to impart their skills and expertise. • The availability of female graduates in the built environment to meet the 30% requirement for the GTP and UTC components.
	Activities	(c) Reviewing the current structure of UIPE Council (including council committees) (d) Training Council members in corporate governance (e) Develop terms of reference (ToR) and operating manual (including performance assessment mechanism) for the Committees and Council respectively (f) Develop code of ethics for Council (g) Review code of ethics for members	(c) Draft report on the revised structure of UIPE Council (including council committees) (d) No. of council members trained in corporate governance (disaggregated by gender) (e) Draft operating manual including draft ToR for the Committees (f) Draft code of ethics for Council (g) Drafting revised code of ethics for members	(c) NIL (d) 18 (3 female) (e) Council currently using constitution (f) NIL (g) Existing code of ethics for members	(c) 1 (d) 36 (5 female) (e) 1 (f) 1 (g) 1		
UIPE Secretariat Strengthening	Outcome 2	(a) Improved secretariat performance	(a) % of green KPIs in the Business and Strategic Plans	(c) No business plan (d) Strategic plan is not measurable	(a) 15% (business plan) (b) 10% (strategic plan)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TA reports • F&A reports • Annual audit reports • External assessments (including final and ex-post evaluations) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The targeted counterparts (BTVET, NCHE, MoES, UTCs) will support the UTC initiative and be committed to designing and implementing international best practices in vocational education.
	Outcome 1	(c) Adoption of the revised structure of UIPE Secretariat (d) Adoption of the HR manual (e) Adoption of the Code of Conduct for UIPE staff (f) Increased UIPE generated revenue (g) Improved individual performance (h) IT system operational (i) Redesigned website operational (j) UIPE adopts automated IPD and CPD credit points system	(a) % alignment of Secretariat structure (including job descriptions, PR & Advocacy Mgr. proposal, and a Business and Customer Service Unit) to the approved structure (b) % compliance of HR practices to the approved manual (c) % of UIPE staff that have signed declaration forms to uphold approved Code of Conduct (d) % of UIPE costs funded by internally generated revenue (e) No. and % of staff with satisfactory annual appraisals (f) No. of Departmental reports generated from the IT system per month (g) Uptime of the website (h) No. and % of members with verifiable IPD and CPD credits	(a) N/A (b) 40% (c) NIL (d) 60% (e) Current HR assessment is qualitative (f) N/A (g) Not established (h) N/A	(c) 90% (d) 90% (e) 100% (f) 75% (g) 80%(8 number) (h) 2 (MSM; F&A) (i) 95% (j) 100% (number)		

		Results chain	Indicators	Baselines (Ref. year – FY 2014/15)	Targets (Ref. year – FY 2020/21)	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions and risks
	Outputs	(c) Report on the revised structure of UIPE Secretariat (including job descriptions, PR & Advocacy Mgr. proposal, and a Business and Customer Service Unit) (d) Revised HR manual (e) Revised Code of Conduct for UIPE staff (f) Revised UIPE & ERB Strategic Plans (g) Business plan (including training plan) (h) Capacity built in the preparation and implementation of the strategic and business plans (including training plan) (i) Capacity built within the Secretariat (j) IT system that can link the member database to the accounting system with automated billing and online applications (k) Redesigned website that is able to allow online transactions for members like booking, payments, application for IPD/CPD training (l) Automated IPD/CPD system to facilitate members in obtaining the required IPD/CPD Credits to retain membership	(c) Approved report (d) Approved HR manual (e) Approved Code of Conduct for UIPE staff (f) Approved ERB & UIPE strategic plans (g) Approved business plan (including training plan) (h) % of actual progress of implementation vs. planned (i) Level of knowledge as determined by entry and exit tests (j) Functional IT system (k) Functional website (l) Approved automated IPD and CPD credit points systems	(a) N/A (b) N/A (c) N/A (d) Strategic plans exist but not measurable (e) NIL (f) N/A (g) Average score of entry test (%) (h) NIL (i) NIL (j) Credit point system exists but is not used	(a) 1 (b) 1 (c) 1 (d) 2 (e) 1 (f) 80% (g) 80% (h) 1 (i) 1 (j) 1		

		Results chain	Indicators	Baselines (Ref. year – FY 2014/15)	Targets (Ref. year – FY 2020/21)	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions and risks
	Activities	(c) Reviewing the current structure of UIPE Secretariat (including job descriptions and Creating a Business and Customer Service Unit) (d) Reviewing the UIPE Human Resource (HR) Manual (e) Reviewing the Code of Conduct for UIPE staff (f) Review and update of the UIPE & ERB Strategic Plans (g) Development of a Business Plan (including training plan) that is aligned to the UIPE strategic direction (h) Training of Secretariat staff (accounting & finance, performance management, business planning, customer service) (i) Prepare and implement a new IT system (j) Enhance the UIPE website (k) Automate the IPD/CPD system to facilitate members in obtaining the required IPD/CPD Credits to retain membership	(a) Draft report on the revised structure of UIPE Secretariat (including job descriptions and a Business and Customer Service Unit) (b) Draft HR manual (c) Code of Conduct for UIPE staff prepared in draft (d) Draft UIPE & ERB Strategic Plans (e) Draft business plan (including training plan) (f) No. of staff trained (disaggregated by gender) (g) IT system that can link the member database to the accounting system with automated billing and online applications (h) A redesigned website able to allow online transactions for members like booking, payments, application for IPD/CPD training (i) Automated the IPD/CPD system to facilitate members in obtaining the required IPD/CPD Credits to retain membership	(a) NIL (b) HR manual exists (c) Code of conduct exists (d) Strategic plans exist but are not measurable (e) NIL (f) N/A (g) NIL (h) Website existing but with several limitations (i) Current IPD and CDP are not automated	(a) 1 (b) 1 (c) 1 (d) 2 (e) 1 (f) 10 (7 female) (g) 1 (h) 1 (i) 1		
UIPE member services and EREP	Outcome 2	(b) Improvement in service delivery to members (c) Timely submission of the results of assessment of applications (d) Increased membership (e) Improved financial position of UIPE	(c) Rating of UIPE's services through a membership survey (d) Number of days taken to complete initial assessment of an application (e) % year-on-year increase in membership (f) % year-on-year increase in surplus	(a) 2.93 ¹⁹ (in 2018) (b) 365 days (c) 15% less students (d) (Value of 2019 surplus)	(c) >3 (d) 90 days (e) 30% less students (f) 10%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TA reports • MET reports • External assessments (including final and ex-post evaluations) 	
	Outcome 1	(c) E-learning centre operational and well managed by UIPE (d) UIPE adopts the revised member application process (e) Increased professionalism in the sector (f) Continuous use of training materials (books, manuals, presentations, CDs, videos, audio etc.) for existing and new courses (g) Adoption of approved standards for CPD	(d) % year-on-year increase in new content on the e-learning centre (e) No. and % of new membership applications assessed using this new process (f) No. of engineers admitted as corporate members (g) No. and % of training courses that make use of the developed materials (h) No. and % of UIPE CPDs that meet the approved standard	(a) N/A (b) N/A (c) N/A (d) N/A (e) N/A	(a) 20% (b) 100% (number) (c) 200 (30 female) (d) 100% (number) (e) 100%(number)		

¹⁹ Rating: 4 = very good; 3= acceptable; 2= below standard; 1 = very poor

The rating graph indicated that none of the existing services provided by UIPE are highly rated, and that all fall in a narrow band at the lower end of acceptable and the higher end of below standard (Baseline Study Report, December 2018).

		Results chain	Indicators	Baselines (Ref. year – FY 2014/15)	Targets (Ref. year – FY 2020/21)	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions and risks
	Output Indicators	(c) E-learning centre (with user manual) that provides access to resources that are useful to members (d) Validated new <u>automated and documented</u> membership application process (e) Training materials (books, manuals, presentations, CDs, videos, audio etc.) for existing and new courses (f) Standards for CPD created	(a) Functional e-learning centre with user manual (b) No. of engineers assessed using the membership application process in the EREP (disaggregated by gender) (c) Approved training materials (books, manuals, presentations, CDs, videos, audio etc.) for existing and new courses (d) Approved standards for CPD	(a) NIL (b) N/A (c) N/A (d) N/A	(a) 1 (b) 400 (50 female) (c) IPDs (review 2 and create 2 new); CPDs (review 2 and create 1 new) (d) 1 (1 for CPD)		
	Activities	(a) Create an e-learning centre (b) Implementation of Engineers' Registration Enhancement Programme (EREP) (c) Review and create all-inclusive, high quality IPDs and CPDs (d) Establish and promote an industry standard for CPD	(c) E-learning centre (with user manual) that provides access to resources that are useful to members (d) No. of engineers participating in the EREP (disaggregated by gender) (e) Training materials (books, manuals, presentations, CDs, videos, audio etc.) for existing and new courses (f) Standards for CPD created in draft	(a) NIL (b) 300 (c) Material is available but scanty (d) NIL	(a) 1 (b) 400 (50 female) (c) IPDs (review 2 and create 2 new); CPDs (review 2 and create 1 new) (d) 1 (1 for CPD)		
Market UIPE services	Outcome 2	(b) Increased UIPE membership	(a) % increase of membership per annum	(i) 15% less students	(h) 30% less students	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TA reports • MET reports • PR reports • External assessments (including final and ex-post evaluations) 	
	Outcome 1	(a) Adoption of the Branding handbook (b) Increased brand awareness (c) Increased knowledge of UIPE services	(d) % of UIPE materials and communications that are aligned to the approved Branding handbook (e) % of respondents with increased knowledge of UIPE brand as determined by perception surveys (f) % of respondents with increased knowledge of UIPE services as determined by perception surveys	(a) N/A (b) 41% ²⁰ (in 2018) (c) 60% ²¹ (in 2018)	(a) 100% (b) 70% (c) 70%		
	Outputs	(a) Branding and communication handbook and plan (b) Capacity built in the development & implementation of the communication plan (c) UIPE services marketing plan and tools (d) Capacity built in the development & implementation of the marketing plan	(a) Approved Branding and communication handbook and plan (b) % of target groups reached with the target messages according to the communication plan (c) Approved UIPE services marketing plan and tools (d) % of actual progress of implementation vs. planned	(a) N/A (b) N/A (c) N/A (d) N/A	(a) 2 (b) 80% (c) 1 plan (including tools) (d) 80%		

²⁰ 124 out of 211 respondents (59%) stated that the reasons that some members do not continue with their UIPE membership include: Membership not making a difference at the workplace, unknown membership benefits, non-recognition of some professional disciplines, better employment outside engineering, UIPE not seen to protect professionals at workplace and, UIPE activities heavily centred in Kampala (Baseline Study Report, December 2018).

²¹ 69 out of 171 respondents (40%) stated that their stand-out reason for not joining UIPE, is simply that potential members do not know enough about what UIPE has to offer (Baseline Study Report, December 2018).

		Results chain	Indicators	Baselines (Ref. year – FY 2014/15)	Targets (Ref. year – FY 2020/21)	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions and risks
	Activities	(a) Branding and communications planning (b) Develop UIPE services marketing plan and tools (c) Training staff in the use of the Branding and communication handbook and plan & development & implementation of the marketing plan	(a) Branding and communication handbook and plan (b) UIPE services marketing plan and tools (c) No. of staff trained (disaggregated by gender)	(a) NIL (b) NIL (c) NIL	(a) 2 (b) 1 plan (including tools) (c) 28 (10 from secretariat and 18 from council)		
Increase UIPE Influence	Outcome 2	(a) Improved advocacy for the local construction industry	(b) No. of Sector Working Groups (SWGs) in the local construction industry (or built environment) with <u>active</u> UIPE representation (c) No. of boards/steering committees in the local construction industry (or built environment) with <u>active</u> UIPE representation	(b) NIL (c) 12	(b) 2 (Works & Transport SWG, and one other) (c) 20	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TA reports • PR reports • SWG minutes • Sector Action Plan Matrices • External assessments (including final and ex-post evaluations) 	
	Outcome 1	(d) Implementation of the advocacy plan (e) Implementation of the partnership agreements	(d) % of actual progress of implementation vs. planned (e) % of actual progress of implementation vs. planned	(a) N/A (b) N/A	(a) 30% (b) 30%		
	Outputs	(a) Advocacy plan (b) Signed strategic partnership agreements (UNRA, training institutions, funders, etc) (c) Capacity built in advocacy	(a) Approved advocacy plan (b) No. of signed partnership agreements (c) Level of knowledge as determined by entry and exit assessments	(a) NIL (b) 5 (c) Average score of entry test (%)	(a) 1 (b) 10 (c) 80%		
	Activities	(c) Prepare UIPE advocacy plan (d) Strengthen and create strategic partnerships (e) Train advocacy champions and spokespersons	(d) Draft advocacy plan (e) No. of draft partnership agreements (f) No. of advocacy champions and spokesperson trained (disaggregated by gender)	(a) NIL (b) 5 (c) NIL	(a) 1 (b) 10 (c) 4 (2 secretariat and 2 Council)		
UIPE Financial Management System	Outcome 2	d. Improved Financial Management in UIPE for both donor funds and own funds	(d) No. of unresolved issues raised in the Management letter in regarding non-compliance to the finance policy	(a) 3	(f) NIL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TA reports • F&A reports • Annual audit reports • External assessments (including final and ex-post evaluations) 	
	Outcome 1	a. Compliance to the approved finance policy b. Accounting system operational c. Adoption of the grants manual	(a) % alignment of financial management procedures to the approved finance policy (b) No. and % of system generated reports (management, financial, donor) (c) % alignment of grant procedures to the approved manual	(a) N/A (b) NIL (c) N/A	(a) 100% (b) 100% (number) (c) 100%		
	Outputs	f. Finance Policy g. Accounting system that meets the user acceptance test h. Grants manual for management and accounting for donor funds	a. Approved Finance Policy b. Approved functional accounting system c. Approved Grants manual for management and accounting for donor funds	(b) Existing finance policy is inadequate (c) Existing accounting system is not functional (d) N/A	(b) 1 (c) 1 (d) 1		

		Results chain	Indicators	Baselines (Ref. year – FY 2014/15)	Targets (Ref. year – FY 2020/21)	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions and risks
	Activities	a. Reviewing the Finance Policy b. Install a fully functional accounting system c. Preparation of a Grants manual for management and accounting for donor funds	f. Draft finance policy g. Functional accounting system h. Draft Grants manual for management and accounting for donor funds	(a) Existing finance policy is inadequate (b) Existing accounting system is not functional (c) NIL	(a) 1 (b) 1 (c) 1		
UIPE Membership Procedures	Outcome 2	(b) Increase in UIPE membership	(b) % year-on-year increase in UIPE membership	(a) Approx. 2,000 (excluding students)	(a) 10% per year	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TA reports • MET reports • External assessments (including final and ex-post evaluations) 	
	Outcome 1	(a) UIPE adopts the approved member on-boarding process	(a) No. and % of new member applications that are admitted through the approved member on-boarding process	(a) NIL	(a) 100% (number)		
	Outputs	(a) Document highlighting the member on-boarding process (b) Capacity built in the application/use of the revised member on-boarding process	(a) Approved document highlighting the member on-boarding process (b) Level of knowledge in the application/use of the revised member on-boarding process as determined by entry and exit tests	(a) NIL (b) Average score of entry test (%)	(a) 1 (b) 80%		
	Activities	(a) Document the process by which an individual becomes a member of UIPE in the different classes	(a) Document highlighting the member on-boarding process prepared in draft (b) No. of staff trained in the revised member on-boarding process	(a) Document available but needs revision (b) 1 staff trained in existing member on-boarding process	(a) 1 (b) 5		
	Outcome 2	(a) Improved transparency, accountability and value-for-money in the procurement carried out by UIPE	(a) Number of unresolved procurement-related issues raised in the Auditor's management letter	(a) NIL	(a) NIL		
UIPE Procurement Procedures	Outcome 1	(a) Adoption of the Procurement Guidelines	(a) No. and % of procurement exercises executed in accordance with the guidelines	(a) NIL	(a) 100% (number)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TA reports • UIPE F&A reports • External assessments (including final and ex-post evaluations) 	
	Outputs	(a) Document containing UIPE's procurement guidelines (b) Capacity built in the use of the revised procurement guidelines	(a) Approved document with UIPE's procurement guidelines (b) Level of knowledge in the use of the revised procurement guidelines as determined by entry and exit tests	(a) NIL (b) Average score of entry test (%)	(a) 1 (b) 80%		

		Results chain	Indicators	Baselines (Ref. year – FY 2014/15)	Targets (Ref. year – FY 2020/21)	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions and risks
	Activities	(a) Review and revise the procurement process	(a) Documented procurement guidelines produced in draft (b) No. of staff trained in the use of the revised guidelines	(a) Current procurement process is thin, and contained in the current finance policy (b) 1	(a) 1 (b) 4		
Training at Uganda Technical Colleges (UTCs)	Outcome 2	(a) Increased accuracy of invoicing	(a) No. and % of members whose invoices are accurate	(a) To be determined during reconciliation	(a) 95% (number)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TA reports • UIPE financial reports • External assessments (including final and ex-post evaluations) 	
	Outcome 1	(a) Updated Financial and membership records	(a) % of membership affected by unresolved issues associated with a mismatch between the financial records and the members database	(a) To be determined during reconciliation	(a) <5%		
	Outputs	(a) Report with recommendations on the procedures for the reconciliation of financial records with the information in the member database (b) Reconciled financial records with member database (c) Capacity built in records management (d) Report on initial back-up of all UIPE data	(a) Approved report on recommendations on the procedures for the reconciliation of financial records with the information in the member database (b) Number of unresolved issues associated with a mismatch between the financial records and the members database (c) % implementation of report recommendations (d) Approved report on initial back-up of all UIPE data	(a) NIL (b) To be determined during reconciliation (c) N/A (d) NIL	(a) 1 (b) NIL (c) 80% (d) 1		
	Activities	(a) Provide technical assistance on the reconciliation of financial records with the information in the member database (b) Conduct the initial back-up of all UIPE data on a location and/or device provided by UIPE	(a) Report with recommendations on the procedures for the reconciliation of financial records with the information in the member database (b) No. of staff trained in reconciliation of financial records with the information in the member database (c) Back-up report (if available) from location of back-up	(a) NIL (b) NIL (c) NIL	(a) 1 (b) 1 (c) 1		
Training at Uganda Technical Colleges (UTCs)	Outcome 2	Improved training services	(a) % of members that are satisfied with UIPE's services (b) No. of tertiary institutions with optional extra-curricular training units accredited by UIPE	(a) Not established (b) NIL	(a) 70% (b) 5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TA reports • MET reports • External assessments (including final and ex-post evaluations) 	
	Outcome 1	(a) Adoption of the training manual (b) Increased competitiveness of the UTC trainees	(a) % compliance of UIPE trainings to the manual (b) No. of trainees getting employment after completing the training (150 per year)	(a) N/A (b) N/A	(a) 100% (b) 300		

		Results chain	Indicators	Baselines (Ref. year – FY 2014/15)	Targets (Ref. year – FY 2020/21)	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions and risks
Graduate Training Programme (GTP)	Output Indicators	(c) Impact assessment report of UNABCEC's training programme (d) MoUs (including training plan) with UTCs (e) Training agreements (including training plan) with UNABCEC & UACE (f) Implementation of the training plan (g) Training material (both in hard copy and video) (h) Capacity of UTC students built (i) Capacity of Trainers (UTC tutors) built (j) Training manual that specifies best practices in application of course content, modes of delivery, training outcomes, and methods of evaluation of trainees .	(a) Approved impact assessment report (b) Signed MoUs (including training plan) with UTCs (c) Signed training agreements (including training plan) with UNABCEC & UACE (d) No. of training sessions carried out (4 sessions per UTC) (e) Approved training material (both in hard copy and video) (f) Level of knowledge as determined by entry and exit tests (g) Level of knowledge/competence as determined by entry and exit tests (h) Approved training manual	(a) NIL (b) NIL (c) NIL (d) NIL (e) N/A (f) Average score of entry test (%) (g) Average score of entry test (%) (h) N/A	(a) 1 (b) 5 (c) 2 (d) 20 (e) 2 (f) 80% (g) 90% (h) 1		
	Activities	(e) Conduct an impact assessment of UNABCEC's training programme (in consultation with BTVET) (f) Prepare Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) with Uganda Technical Colleges (UTCs) (g) Prepare training agreements with UNABCEC & UACE (h) Design of training plan and materials for UTC trainings (i) Training at UTCs (j) Training of Trainers (UTC tutors) to replicate UTC trainings (k) Develop training manual	(e) Draft impact assessment report (f) No. of draft MoUs with UTCs (g) No. of draft training agreements with UNABCEC & UACE (h) Draft training plan and materials (both in hard copy and video) (i) No. of UTC students trained (4 training sessions per UTC with 25 participants per session) (disaggregated by gender) (j) No. of trainers trained (2 tutors per UTC) (k) Draft training manual	(a) NIL (b) NIL (c) NIL (d) NIL (e) N/A (f) N/A (g) NIL	(a) 1 (b) 5 (c) 2 (d) 2 (e) 500 (150 female) (f) 10 (g) 1		
	Outcome 2	(d) Improved IPD in the local construction industry	(a) No. of operationalised employer IPD programmes after EU support (b) No. of graduates in UIPE GTP after EU support (c) No. and % of GTP trainees getting employment after completing the UIPE GTP	(d) NIL (e) N/A (f) N/A	(d) 25 (e) 50 (f) 60% (30 number)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TA reports • Reports prepared by Training Officer • External assessments (including final and ex-post evaluations) 	
Outcome 1	(a) Increased competitiveness of graduates completing the GTP	(a) No. and % of GTP trainees getting employment after completing the GTP	(a) 85% (50 number)	(a) 90% (180 number)			

		Results chain	Indicators	Baselines (Ref. year – FY 2014/15)	Targets (Ref. year – FY 2020/21)	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions and risks
	Outputs	(e) UIPE IPD package for employers (f) Implementation of GTP (g) UIPE and employers' capacity built in the use of the IPD package in the GTP	(e) Approved UIPE IPD package for employers at the end of the GTP (f) No. of trainees participating in GTP (disaggregated by gender) (g) Level of competences gained by trainees as determined by knowledge/competence tests per quarter	(e) N/A (f) 59 (g) Average score of entry competence test (%)	(e) 1 (f) 200 (60 female) (g) 70%		
	Activities	(e) Establish and promote an industry standard for Initial Professional Development (IPD) (f) Select engineers, technicians and technologists eligible for placements in the various organisations for the GTP. (g) Aggressively market the GTP to employers across the transport sector	(a) Draft UIPE IPD package for employers (b) No. of signed GTP (UIPE/Trainees/Employers) agreements per annum (c) No. of signed training (UIPE/Employers) agreements per annum	(e) NIL (f) 59 (g) 27	(e) 1 (f) 100 (g) 50 ²²		

²² This is not the real target – the target is 100 graduates per annum (the assumption is 2 graduates per employer depending on availability of work)

FED/2019/411-839: Implementation of the Graduate Training Program through development and delivery of industry relevant Initial Professional Development (IPD) training – Logical Framework

	Results chain	Indicator	Baseline (value & reference year)	Target (value & reference year)	Source and mean of verification	Assumptions
Impact (Overall objective)	Increased competitiveness of the local construction industry through demand driven skills development	Number of graduate trainees enrolled and completed the program Number of graduates from the GTP program that have been fully employed in the industry	None established None established	200 (20 Graduate Engineering trainee) and 80 Technicians	GTP Training reports Tripartite employment agreements with UIPE, Trainee and the participating organisation	Timely EUD contribution for the GTP to continue Willingness of employers within the construction industry to participate Ability of the UTCs and tertiary institutions to supply the required trainees
Outcome (s) /Specific	Improved IPD in the local construction industry	% of GTP trainees getting employment after completing the GTP	50%	90%	Training reports List of employers Agreements with employers, UIPE and Trainee	Same as above
*Other Outcomes (*where relevant)	Adoption of the IPD package for employers	No. of operationalised employer IPD programmes	Not established	15 companies	(same as above)	Same as above

FED/2019/411-839: Implementation of the Graduate Training Program through development and delivery of industry relevant Initial Professional Development (IPD) training – Logical Framework

	Results chain	Indicator	Baseline (value & reference year)	Target (value & reference year)	Source and mean of verification	Assumptions
Outputs	(h) UIPE IPD package for employers (i) Implementation of GTP)	(h) Approved UIPE IPD package for employers (i) No. of trainees participating in GTP (disaggregated by gender)	(h) N/A (i) 59	(a) 1 (b) 100 (80 Male and 20 Female)	(a) IPD Package (b) Course registration docs, tripartite agreements, training reports	Same as above
Activities	(h) Establish and promote an industry standard for IPD (i) Select engineers, technicians and technologists eligible for placements in the various organisations for the GTP. (j) Aggressively market the GTP to employers across the transport sector	(a) UIPE IPD package for employers (b) No. of signed GTP (UIPE/Trainees/Employers) agreements per annum (c) No. of signed training (UIPE/Employers) agreements per annum	(h) NIL (i) 59 (j) NIL	(h) 1 (i) 100 (j) 25	(a) IPD Package for employers (b) Signed tripartite agreement between employer, UIPE and Trainee (c) Signed agreements with employers. (d) Communications Strategy, procedures on E&SS and TA reports	Timely EUD contribution for the GTP to continue Willingness of employers within the construction industry to participate Ability of the UTCs and tertiary institutions to supply the required trainees

Activity Matrix

FED/2019/411-839: Implementation of the Graduate Training Program through development and delivery of industry relevant Initial Professional Development (IPD) training – Logical Framework

<i>See annex E3d above</i>	<i>See annex e3d above</i>	<i>See annex E3d above</i>
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ANNEX II: THE EVALUATION CRITERIA

The definition and the number of the DAC evaluation criteria has changed following the release (10 December 2019) of the document “Evaluation Criteria: Adapted Definitions and Principles for Use” (DCD/DAC(2019)58/FINAL).

The evaluators will ensure that their analysis respects the new definitions of these criteria, their explanatory notes and the guidance document. These can be found at: <https://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm>

Unless otherwise specified in chapter 2.2.1, the evaluation will assess the intervention using the six standard DAC evaluation criteria and the EU added value, which is a specific EU evaluation criterion. Their short definitions are reported below:

DAC CRITERIA

- **Relevance:** the “extent to which the intervention objectives and design respond to beneficiaries’, global, country, and partner/institution needs, policies, and priorities, and continue to do so if circumstances change.”
- **Coherence:** the “compatibility of the intervention with other interventions in a country, sector or institution.”
- **Effectiveness:** the “extent to which the intervention achieved, or is expected to achieve, its objectives, and its results, including any differential results across groups.”
- **Efficiency:** the “extent to which the intervention delivers, or is likely to deliver, results in an economic and timely way.”
- **Impact:** the “extent to which the intervention has generated or is expected to generate significant positive or negative, intended or unintended, higher-level effects.”
- **Sustainability:** the “extent to which the net benefits of the intervention continue or are likely to continue.”

EU-SPECIFIC CRITERION

- **EU added value:** the extent to which the intervention brings additional benefits to what would have resulted from Member States' interventions only in the partner country. It directly stems from the principle of subsidiarity defined in the Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union (<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/7/the-principle-of-subsidiarity>).

ANNEX III: INFORMATION THAT WILL BE PROVIDED TO THE EVALUATION TEAM

The following is an indicative list of the documents that the Contracting Authority will make available to the selected evaluators shortly after the contract signature:

- Country Strategy Paper for Uganda and the National Indicative Programme for the period 2014 – 2020;
- relevant national/sector policies and plans from National and Local partners and other donors, specifically NDPs II and III;
- intervention identification study;
- intervention financing agreement and addenda;
- intervention's quarterly and six months' progress reports, and technical reports;
- intervention's mid-term evaluation report;
- guidance for gender sensitive evaluations;
- calendar and minutes of all the meetings of the Steering Committee of the intervention;
- intervention's branding requirements and selected communication & visibility tools;
- any other relevant document.

Note: The evaluation team has to identify and obtain any other document worth analysing, through independent research and during interviews with relevant informed parties and stakeholders of the intervention.

ANNEX IV: THE EVALUATION MATRIX

The evaluation matrix (hereinafter: the matrix) will accompany the whole evaluation by summarising its **methodological design (Part A**, to be filled and included in the Inception Report) and **documenting the evidence analysed** to answer each EQ (Part B)

The full matrix (parts A and B) is to be included in the following reports.

Use one set of tables (Parts A and B) for each Evaluation Question (EQ) and add or delete as many rows as needed to reflect the selected judgement criteria and indicators. Delete the guidance and the footnotes when including the matrix in the reports.

PART A – Evaluation design

EQ1: "XXX?"				
Evaluation criteria covered ²³				
Judgement criteria (JC) ²⁴	Indicators (Ind) ²⁵	Information sources		Methods / tools
		Primary	Secondary	
JC 1.1 -	I 1.1.1 -			
	I 1.1.2 -			
	I 1.1.3 -			
JC 1.2 -	I 1.2.1 -			
	I 1.2.2 -			
	I 1.2.3 -			
JC 1.3 -	I 1.3.1 -			
	I 1.3.2 -			
	I 1.3.3 -			

²³ What evaluation criterion/criteria is/are addressed by this EQ?

²⁴ Describe each selected JC and number them as illustrated in the template; the first numeric value represents the EQ the JC refers to.

²⁵ As above. The two first numeric values represent the JC the indicators refer to. The number of JC and indicators per JC as reported in the table is purely illustrative. The table is to be adapted to your specific evaluation and reflect the appropriate JCs and indicators.

PART B – Evidence log

Ind ²⁶	Baseline data ²⁷	Evidence gathered/analysed	Quality of evidence ²⁸
1.1.1			
1.1.2			
1.1.3			
1.2.1			
1.2.2			
1.3.1			

²⁶ Use the same numbering as in Part A; no need to describe the indicators.

²⁷ In case they are available. This column can also be used to record mid-term data (if available).

²⁸ Score as follows: 0 (no evidence), 1 (some evidence), 2 (sufficient evidence), 3 (conclusive evidence)

ANNEX V: STRUCTURE OF THE REPORTS

1. INCEPTION REPORT (to be delivered at the end of the Inception phase)

The format of the Inception Report is free and should have a maximum length of 20 pages excluding annexes; it must contain at least the following:

- Introduction Short description of the context of the evaluation, its objectives and focus
- Reconstructed Intervention Logic This will be based on initial analysis of secondary sources and consultation with key stakeholders
- Stakeholder map Free format; this will represent the key stakeholders of the intervention(s) under evaluation and their relations with the intervention(s)
- Finalised Evaluation Questions with Judgement criteria and indicators (Evaluation Matrix, part A) See the template
- Methodology of the evaluation This will include:
 - Overview of entire evaluation process and tools
 - Consultation strategy [as needed]
 - Case studies [as needed]
 - Approach to the following phase of the evaluation, including planning of the missions
- Analysis of risks related to the evaluation methodology and mitigation measures In tabular, free format
- Ethics rules Including, but not limited to, avoiding harm and conflict of interest, informed consents, confidentiality and awareness of local governance and regulations
- Work plan This will include a free text description of the plans and their representation in Gantt format

2. INTERMEDIARY DESK AND FIELD NOTE (to be delivered at the end of the Desk and Field phase)

The format of the Intermediary Desk and Field Note is free and should have a maximum length of 15 pages excluding annexes; it must contain at least the following:

- list of activities conducted;
- difficulties encountered and mitigation measures adopted;
- intermediate/preliminary consolidated Desk and Field findings;
- preliminary overall conclusions (to be tested with the Reference Group).

3. DRAFT FINAL REPORT AND FINAL REPORT (to be delivered at the end of the Synthesis phase)

The Draft Final and the Final Report have the same structure, format and content. They should be consistent, concise and clear and free of linguistic errors both in the original version and in their translation, if foreseen. The Final Report should not be longer than 40 pages excluding annexes. The presentation must be properly spaced, and the use of clear graphs, tables and short paragraphs is strongly recommended.

The cover page of the Final Report should carry the following text:

"This evaluation is supported and guided by the European Commission and presented by [name of consulting firm]. The report does not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of the European Commission".

The main sections of the evaluation report should be as follows:

- | | |
|---|--|
| Executive Summary | The Executive Summary is expected to highlight the evaluation purpose, the methods used, the main evaluation findings and the conclusions and recommendations. It is to be considered a "stand alone" document. |
| 1. Introduction | A description of the intervention, of the relevant country/region/sector background and of the evaluation, providing the reader with sufficient methodological explanations to gauge the credibility of the conclusions and to acknowledge limitations or weaknesses, where relevant. |
| 2. Findings | A chapter presenting the answers to the Evaluation Question headings, supported by evidence and reasoning. Findings per judgement criteria and detailed evidence per indicator are included in an annex to the Report. |
| 3. Overall assessment <i>(optional)</i> | A chapter synthesising all answers to Evaluation Questions into an overall assessment of the intervention. The detailed structure of the overall assessment should be refined during the evaluation process. The relevant chapter has to articulate all the findings, conclusions and lessons in a way that reflects their importance and facilitates the reading. The structure should not follow the Evaluation Questions, the logical framework or the evaluation criteria. |
| 4. Conclusions and Recommendations | |
| 4.1 Lessons learnt | Lessons learnt generalise findings and translate past experience into relevant knowledge that should support decision making, improve performance and promote the achievement of better results. Ideally, they should support the work of both the relevant European and partner institutions. |

4.2 Conclusions

This chapter contains the conclusions of the evaluation, organised per evaluation criterion.

In order to allow better communication of the evaluation messages that are addressed to the Commission, a table organising the conclusions by order of importance can be presented, or a paragraph or sub-chapter emphasising the three or four major conclusions organised by order of importance, while avoiding being repetitive.

4.3 Recommendations

They are intended to improve or reform the intervention in the framework of the cycle underway, or to prepare the design of a new intervention for the next cycle.

Recommendations must be clustered and prioritised, and carefully targeted to the appropriate audiences at all levels, especially within the Commission structure.

5. Annexes to the report

The report should include the following annexes:

- Terms of Reference of the evaluation;
- names of the evaluators (CVs can be shown, but summarised and limited to one page per person);
- detailed evaluation methodology including: the evaluation matrix; options taken; difficulties encountered and limitations; detail of tools and analyses;
- detailed answer by judgement criteria;
- evaluation matrix with data gathered and analysed by (EQ/JC) indicator;
- Intervention Logic/Logical Framework matrices (planned/real and improved/updated);
- relevant geographic map(s) where the intervention took place;
- list of persons/organisations consulted;
- literature and documentation consulted;
- other technical annexes (e.g. statistical analyses, tables of contents and figures, matrix of evidence, databases) as relevant.

4. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (EVAL Module)

An Executive Summary is to be prepared using the specific format foreseen in the EVAL Module. Its format will be available to evaluators at the time of the submission through EVAL of the Final Report. This is additional to the request to prepare a self-standing executive summary to be included in the Final Report (please refer to the paragraph above, detailing the content of the Final Report).

ANNEX VI: PLANNING SCHEDULE

This annex must be included by framework contractors in their specific contract Organisation and Methodology and forms an integral part of it.

Framework contractors can add as many rows and columns as needed.

The phases of the evaluation should reflect those indicated in the present Terms of Reference.

		Indicative Duration in working days ²⁹		
Activity	Location	Team Leader	Evaluator	Indicative Dates
Inception phase: total days				
•				
•				
Desk phase: total days				
•				
•				
Field phase: total days				
•				
•				
Synthesis phase: total days				
•				
•				
Dissemination phase: total days				
•				
•				
TOTAL working days (maximum)				

²⁹ Add one column per each evaluator

ANNEX VII: EVAL QUALITY ASSESSMENT GRID

The quality of the Final Report will be assessed by the Evaluation Manager (following the submission of the draft Report and Executive Summary) using the following quality assessment grid, which is included **in the EVAL Module**; the grid will be shared with the evaluation team, who will be able to include their comments.

Intervention (Project/Programme) evaluation – Quality Assessment Grid Final Report

Evaluation data			
Evaluation title			
Evaluation managed by		Type of evaluation	
Ref. of the evaluation contract		EVAL ref.	
Evaluation budget			
EUD/Unit in charge		Evaluation Manager	
Evaluation dates	Start:		End:
Date of draft final report		Date of Response of the Services	
Comments			
Project data			
Main project evaluated			
CRIS/OPSYS # of evaluated project(s)			
DAC Sector			
Contractor's details			
Evaluation Team Leader		Evaluation Contractor	
Evaluation expert(s)			

Legend: scores and their meaning

Very satisfactory: criterion entirely fulfilled in a clear and appropriate way

Satisfactory: criterion fulfilled

Unsatisfactory: criterion partly fulfilled

Very unsatisfactory: criterion mostly not fulfilled or absent

The evaluation report is assessed as follows

1. Clarity of the report

This criterion analyses the extent to which both the Executive Summary and the Final Report:

- are easily readable, understandable and accessible to the relevant target readers;
- highlight the key messages;
- have various chapters and annexes well balanced in length;
- contain relevant graphs, tables and charts facilitating understanding;
- contain a list of acronyms (only the Report);
- avoid unnecessary duplications;
- have been language checked for unclear formulations, misspelling and grammar errors.
- The Executive Summary is an appropriate summary of the full report and is a free-standing document.



Strengths	Weaknesses	Score
Contractor's comments	Contractor's comments	

2. Reliability of data and robustness of evidence

This criterion analyses the extent to which:

- data/evidence was gathered as defined in the methodology;
- the report considers, when relevant, evidence from EU and/or other partners' relevant studies, monitoring reports and/or evaluations;
- the report contains a clear description of the limitations of the evidence, the risks of bias and the mitigating measures.





Strengths	Weaknesses	Score
Contractor's comments	Contractor's comments	

3. Validity of Findings

This criterion analyses the extent to which:

- findings derive from the evidence gathered;
- findings address all selected evaluation criteria;
- findings result from an appropriate triangulation of different, clearly identified sources;
- when assessing the effect of the EU intervention, the findings describe and explain the most relevant cause/effect links between outputs, outcomes and impacts;
- the analysis of evidence is comprehensive and takes into consideration contextual and external factors.



Strengths	Weaknesses	Score
Contractor's comments	Contractor's comments	
4. Validity of conclusions		
<p>This criterion analyses the extent to which:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> conclusions are logically linked to the findings, and go beyond them to provide a comprehensive analysis; conclusions appropriately address the selected evaluation criteria and all the Evaluation Questions, including the relevant cross-cutting dimensions; conclusions take into consideration the various stakeholder groups of the evaluation; conclusions are coherent and balanced (i.e. they present a credible picture of both strengths and weaknesses), and are free of personal or partisan considerations; (if relevant) the report indicates when there are not sufficient findings to conclude on specific issues 		
		
Contractor's comments	Contractor's comments	
5. Usefulness of recommendations		
<p>This criterion analyses the extent to which the recommendations:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> are clearly linked to and derive from the conclusions; are concrete, achievable and realistic; are targeted to specific addressees; are clustered (if relevant), prioritised, and possibly time-bound; (if relevant) provide advice for the intervention's exit strategy, post-intervention sustainability or for adjusting the intervention's design or plans. 		
		
Contractor's comments	Contractor's comments	
6. Appropriateness of lessons learnt analysis (if requested by the ToR or included by the evaluators)		

This criterion is to be assessed only when requested by the ToR or included by evaluators and is not to be scored. It analyses the extent to which:



- lessons are identified;
- where relevant, they are generalised in terms of wider relevance for the institution(s).

Strengths		Weaknesses	
Contractor's comments		Contractor's comments	
Final comments on the overall quality of the report		Overall score	

TERMS OF REFERENCE – PART B

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. Benefitting Zone

Uganda

2. Contracting authority

The European Union, represented by the European Commission, B-1049 Brussels, Belgium.

3. Contract language

English

LOCATION AND DURATION

4. Location

- Normal place of posting of the specific assignment: Kampala, Uganda
- Mission(s) outside the normal place of posting and duration(s): At least one mission for each expert for a maximum duration of one day to the following 'tentative' locations: one regional TSU, at least one UIPE branch, at least one UNRA regional office, and at least two NTCs.

5. Start date and period of implementation

The indicative start date is 12/06/2022 and the period of implementation of the contract will be 106 days from this date (indicative end date: 26/09/2022).

REQUIREMENTS

6. Expertise

The minimum requirements covered by the team of experts as a whole are detailed below:

- Qualifications and skills required for the team: At least one of the experts must have knowledge and experience with the principles and working methods of project cycle management and EU aid delivery methods.
- General professional experience of the team: The evaluation team must have a cumulative experience of at least 10 years in the area of evaluation (of which at least a minimum of 5 successfully completed intervention-level or strategic evaluations), mostly in but not limited to the field of development cooperation, with solid experience in rigorous evaluation methods and techniques. The team must have a cumulative experience of at least 3 years in the evaluation of intervention-level or strategic evaluations in the transport sector and/or the construction industry.
- Specific professional experience of the team: • At least one of the experts must have a minimum of 5 years of demonstrated ability to lead and coordinate a team of multi-sectoral disciplines of

which at least 2 experiences in the evaluation and/or management of capacity building projects. Relevant experience in the engineering or construction sector will be an added advantage; • The team must have at least 2 experiences in designing capacity building projects/programmes. Relevant experience in the engineering or construction sector will be an added advantage; • At least one member of the team: 2 experiences in the provision of technical assistance/capacity building to road agencies or ministries of public works, or other entities in the construction or engineering sector/industry. • At least one member of the team: 2 experiences in the provision of support to the development of the local construction industry and/or private sector institutions in the construction or engineering sector/industry; • Relevant evaluation and/or capacity building experience in Sub-Saharan Africa will be an added advantage.

- Language skills of the team: English

Additional expertise requirements for the team composition:

Position	Expert category	Minimum requirements	Minimum number of working days	Additional information
Expert	Cat. I (>12 years of experience)	Must have knowledge and experience with the principles and working methods of project cycle management and EU aid delivery methods; Team management skills; Communication and language skills; Computer literacy.	42	
Expert	Cat. II (>6 years of experience)		37	
Expert	Cat. II (>6 years of experience)		37	

7. Incidental expenditure

No incidental expenditure provided for in this contract.

8. Lump sums

No lump sums provided for in this contract.

9. Expenditure verification

No expenditure verification report is required.

10. Other details

1 - International Travel

Minimum quantity (if applicable): 4

2 - Intercity Travel

Minimum quantity (if applicable): 1

3 - Per Diem

Minimum quantity (if applicable): 15

4 - Dissemination Seminar


Minimum quantity (if applicable): 1

REPORTS AND DELIVERABLES

11. Reports and deliverables requirements

Title	Content	Language	Submission timing or deadline
Inception report		English	Within 14 Day(s) After the project start
Intermediary Note		English	Within 35 Day(s) After the project start
Draft final report		English	Within 49 Day(s) After the project start
Final report	The Final Report should be submitted with the content described in Annex V of Part A of the ToR. It should also be submitted together with the Executive Summary and the Comments to the draft QAG.	English	Within 78 Day(s) After the project start
Stakeholders' Seminar		English	Within 106 Day(s) After the project start

RECONSTRUCTED LOGFRAME – INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING FOR TRANSPORT SECTOR IN UGANDA (based on combination of ‘Intervention Logic’ and ‘Revised Logframe Matrix January 2020’)



2. STAKEHOLDER MAPPING

The project comprises four support components each with their stakeholders but, given the inter-connection of expected project benefits from each component, there is a considerable degree of 'overlap' of stakeholder benefits. In general terms components A, B and C are implemented by indirect GoU management by way of the EDF NAO (MOFPED) with beneficiary institutions MOWT, UNRA and URF respectively nominated as Project Managers. Component D (support to Local Construction Industry) is implemented by direct management by way of service contract and grant (direct award) with UIPE as stakeholder beneficiary.

Component	Stakeholders	
	Direct	Indirect (from all components)
A. TA to Ministry of Works and Transport (MOWT)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> MOWT 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> MOFPED/ NAO Donors/ Development Partners² Private Sector Federations Association of Logistics & Transportation Uganda Police – Traffic Dept. International Contractors Private sector companies Civil Society Coalition on Transport
B. TA to Uganda National Roads Authority (UNRA)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> UNRA UNRA Regional offices 	
C. TA to Uganda Road Fund (URF)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> URF DUCAR TSUs 	
D. Support to Local Construction Industry	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> UIPE Engineers Registration Board National Contractors & Consultants Uganda Association of Consulting Engineers Uganda National Association of Building and Civil Engineering Contractors UTCs 	

3. EVALUATION MATRIX

The ToR identifies indicative Evaluation Questions to be addressed in the evaluation. Following initial consultations, document analysis and reconstruction of log frames for all project components, a preliminary set of EQs was proposed (together with JCs, Indicators, relevant data collection sources and tools.

The final agreed upon EQ matrix, set out in full using the template specified in ToR Annex IV), is shown below:

² Including WB, EU, AfDB, DFID, Danida, JICA

EQ1: To what extent has the Transport Sector Institutional Capacity Building Programme been relevant to the needs of beneficiary institutions and organisation and aligned to national development goals (NDP II and NDP III as well as Vision 2040), National Roads Development plans and EU Cooperation objectives?				
Evaluation criteria covered	Relevance			
Judgement criteria (JC)	Indicators (Ind)	Information sources		Methods / tools
		Primary	Secondary	
JC 1.1 – Programme is responsive to national transport sector priorities and goals (as expressed in NDP, Vision 2040 and national road development plans)	I 1.1.1 – Programme objectives reflect the priorities, objectives and needs of national sector policies (as set out in NDP and Vision 2040)	Action document	Interviews	Proposed methodology/tools similar for all EQs ie <ul style="list-style-type: none"> At Inception stage available documentation will be reviewed and a background analysis undertaken. Initial (remote) interviews will be sought with focal points of key stakeholder institutions. A draft Inception Report will be submitted (this document) upon which an on-line presentation will be given to the RG. After validation of the draft Inception Report the Intermediary/Desk phase will include an in-depth analysis of available documentation together with semi-structured (remote) interviews with available key stakeholders. These activities will lead to initial generation of evidence, identification of information and documentation gaps and to preparation of 1st draft hypotheses to be tested subsequently. An Intermediary Desk Note (covering issues such as activities undertaken, difficulties encountered and action taken to overcome such issues, preliminary hypotheses, findings and conclusions, together with an outline plan for the field phase) will be produced before launching field visits. The Intermediary/Field phase will focus on face-to-face interviews with stakeholders (such as EUD, RG members, NAO, beneficiaries, EU MS, DPs, road users etc). The main purpose of this phase is primary data collection through structured interviews, meetings and FGDs to extend previous (incomplete) analysis. The Intermediary Field Note will extend the scope and depth of the preceding Intermediary Desk Note and will pave the way towards preparation
	I 1.1.2 – Programme component designs present sound and complete analysis of national priorities and needs			
	I 1.1.3 – Evidence that programme design and preparation involved participation of institutional counterparts			
JC 1.2 – Programme objectives reflect priorities and needs of UNRA, URF, UIPE and MOWT as expressed in institutional policies and strategies (including resource and capacity shortfalls)	I 1.2.1 – Evidence of identification of institutional issues and beneficiaries identified with qualitative and quantitative evidence for each project component	NDP II & III	Progress reports	
	I 1.2.2 – Degree to which intervention component activities are clearly linked to identified institutional issues	Vision 2040	Final reports	
	I 1.2.3 – Evidence of willingness of component institutional partners/beneficiaries (MOWT, UIPE, UNRA, URF) to adopt and apply enhanced capacities expected to result from project activities	Identification of strategic transport priority projects in a multi-modal environment – Phase 2 Report – May 2015	Output deliverables	
	I 1.2.4 – Perceptions of MOWT, UNRA, URF and UIPE regarding relevance of the programme in		Annual reports (of beneficiary institutions)	
			MTE – Final Report (& Executive Summary)	
			Steering Committee minutes	

	response to beneficiary institutional needs and priorities			of the draft Final Report.
JC 1.3 Project objectives were consistent with EU transport sector policies and strategies in Africa and at national level and complementary to other EU in-country interventions	I 1.3.1 - Project objectives consistent with EU communications from the Commission to the Council of the European Parliament			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Thereafter, during the Synthesis stage, building upon previous activities, there will be a final analysis, synthesis and overall assessment of findings, clustering and prioritisation of lessons learned, conclusions and recommendations. The draft Final Report containing all such evaluation results shall be formally submitted for comments by RGF and stakeholders and be subject to a face-to-face presentation. Following responses to comments and amendments a Final Report will be submitted to be followed by dissemination and communication of results (including a Dissemination Seminar).
	I 1.3.2 - Project objectives consistent with EU 11EDF National Indicative Programme/ Country Strategy Programme			

EQ2: To what extent has the Transport Sector Institutional Capacity Building Programme achieved expected results of capacity building for MoWT, UNRA, URF and UIPE? And to what extent has the capacity building contributed to the improvement of institutional performances and public services?				
Evaluation criteria covered	Effectiveness (efficiency, coordination, complementarity)			
Judgement criteria (JC)	Indicators (Ind)	Information sources		Methods / tools
		Primary	Secondary	
JC 2.1 – Expected results of project capacity building were achieved (for MoWT, UNRA, URF and UIPE) in terms of institutional and individual capacities	I 2.1.1 – Evidence of completion of training and institutional building, results of capacity tests before and after training, and application of enhanced capacities			
	I 2.1.2 – Perceptions of training beneficiaries regarding quality of training and resulting capacity enhancement			
JC 2.2 – Improved institutional performance and service provision	I 2.2.1 – Evidence of adoption and application of revised strategies/business plans, M&E frameworks, planning, programming and procurement systems etc	Inception reports	Interviews (with TA, DPs, stakeholders, beneficiaries, road users)	Proposed methodology/tools similar for all EQs - see EQ1 above
		Progress reports		
	I 2.2.2 – Perceptions of sector institutions, road users and beneficiaries regarding trends in service provision	Final reports	MTE – Final Report (& Executive Summary)	
	I 2.2.3 – Evidence of beneficiary institution commitment and ownership of programme activities and objectives (including management commitment and counterpart contribution)	Annual reports (of beneficiary institutions)	Steering Committee minutes	
	I 2.2.4 – Trends in delivery of capital investment and road maintenance contracts			
	I 2.2.5 – Trends in budgetary adequacy of routine and periodic maintenance compared with			

	needs			
	I 2.2.6 – Evidence of increased competitiveness and involvement of the local construction industry in the national transport sector			

EQ3: To what extent has the Transport Sector Institutional Capacity Building Programme design and implementation been conducive to an efficient delivery of expected results?

Evaluation criteria covered	Efficiency			
Judgement criteria (JC)	Indicators (Ind)	Information sources		Methods / tools
		Primary	Secondary	
JC 3.1 – Organisation, management, coordination and delivery of EC services (EUD and BXL) has facilitated project implementation and achievement of results	I 3.1.1 – Time periods between programme planning, preparation and intervention implementation for all components	Interviews (TA, beneficiary institutions stakeholders)	MTE – Final Report (& Executive Summary)	Proposed methodology/tools similar for all EQs - see EQ1 above
	I 3.1.2 – Implementation physical progress compared with programme for all components			
	I 3.1.3 - Evidence of EC procedures (e.g. procurement) facilitating/hampering implementation			
	I 3.1.4 – Disbursement performance compared with project budget (timeliness and costs)			
	I 3.1.5 – Stakeholder institutional perceptions of efficiency of EU procedures for project preparation, procurement, monitoring and back-up			
JC 3.2 – Technical assistance provided to each project component has positively contributed to implementation and achievement of results	I 3.2.1 – Evidence of technology transfer, improved performance (and potential sustainability of function)		Steering Committee minutes	
	I 3.2.2 – Comparison of TA provided with needs assessment			
	I 3.2.3 – Evidence of achieving			

	'lessons learned' during project implementation (e.g. ROM, MTE)			
JC 3.3 – The choice of programme implementation modality, governance, management mechanisms and resources allocated have adequately addressed Ugandan sector institutional needs, capacities and constraints	I 3.3.1 – Quality of monitoring and reporting of project implementation progress (including adequacy of monitoring indicators and BL information)			
	I 3.3.2 – Evidence of 'feedback' action being taken to expedite implementation progress (in case of remedial actions being flagged)			
	I 3.3.3 – Evidence of consideration of alternative modalities at project preparation stage			
	I 3.3.4 – Stakeholder perception of adequacy of implementation modality, resources allocated, governance and management mechanisms			
	I 3.3.5 – Evidence of any governance, management and contractual issues arising during implementation (and of resolution)			

EQ4A: To what extent has the Transport Sector Institutional Capacity Building Programme contributed to opportunities for long-term changes? Has the programme contributed to unintended changes?

Evaluation criteria covered	Impact (effectiveness, sustainability)			
Judgement criteria (JC)	Indicators (Ind)	Information sources		Methods / tools
		Primary	Secondary	
JC 4A.1 – Increased institutional capacity (MoWT, UNRA, URF) to define and update strategies, monitoring parameters and service provision	I 4A.1.1 – Evidence of institutional capabilities to establish, implement and monitor changing strategies adapting to evolving transport sector needs I 4A.1.2 - Existence of clear institutional mission statements and descriptions of responsibilities, mandates, etc I 4A.1.3 – Evidence of political interference in technical management I 4A.1.4 – Perceptions of stakeholders regarding increased institutional capacity and improved service delivery	Progress reports	Interviews (beneficiaries, road users, stakeholders, DPs, TA)	Proposed methodology/tools similar for all EQs - see EQ1 above
JC 4A.2 – Increasing participation of national stakeholders in sector decision making and management	I 4A.2.1 – Existence of consultation mechanisms with stakeholders and transport users (with no marginalisation of minority or vulnerable groups) and evidence of participation of NGOs, NSAs, CSOs etc I 4A.2.2 – Perceptions of stakeholders and transport users as to the extent to which their views have been considered I 4A.2.3 – Evidence that conflicting views have been publicly expressed and that decision making has considered	Final reports	MTE – Final Report (& Executive Summary) Steering Committee minutes	

	such views ³			
JC 4A.3 – Unintended effects (positive and negative) identified as resulting from programme activities	I 4A.3.1 – Evidence of unintended effects			
JC 4.A.4 – Policy dialogue has addressed issues of multimodal (and intermodal) transport planning and implementation, financing for road maintenance and autonomy of sector institutions	I 4.A.4.1 - Evidence of sector reforms (e.g. policy, statutory, institutional, budgetary, etc) regarding multimodal (and intermodal) transport planning and implementation in transport sector operations and management			
	I 4.A.4.2 - Evidence of reforms (e.g. policy, statutory, institutional, budgetary, etc) regarding financing for road maintenance			
	I 4.A.4.2 - Evidence of reforms (e.g. policy, statutory, institutional, budgetary, etc) regarding autonomy of sector institutions			

³ Which does not necessarily mean such views were accepted

EQ4B: To what extent has the Programme been aligned to address needs of the local construction industry and has contributed to deliberate policy actions, strengthened strategic capacities and/or recommendations to promote the local construction industry and develop the necessary tools to achieve the desired change?

Evaluation criteria covered	Impact (effectiveness, sustainability)			
Judgement criteria (JC)	Indicators (Ind)	Information sources		Methods / tools
		Primary	Secondary	
JC 4B.1 – Increased UIPE capacity to define and update strategies and service provision to the local construction industry resulting from evaluation of UIPE strategies and capacity	I 4B.1.1 – Evidence of UIPE operationalisation of recommended strategic and operations plans and management capacity to better respond to the needs of the local construction industry I 4B.1.2 -Evidence of clear UIPE mission statements etc I 4B.1.3 – Evidence of increased UIPE subscription revenues I 4B.1.4 – Evidence of effective implementation of the Engineers Registration Enhancement Programme I 4B.1.5 – Perceptions of sector stakeholders regarding changing UIPE capacities and effectiveness	Progress reports (Grant Contract – GTP; Service Contract – UIPE) Final report UIPE Annual reports	Interviews (beneficiaries, road users, stakeholders, national and international contractors, TA, national consultants, CISCOT) MTE – Final Report (& Executive Summary)	Proposed methodology/tools similar for all EQs - see EQ1 above
JC 4B.2 – Increased numbers of trained/qualified engineering graduates entering the national construction industry	I 4B.2.1 – Trends in numbers of trained/qualified graduates I 4B.2.2 – Trends in graduate training undertaken by national colleges I 4B.2.3 – Evidence of placement of graduates in full-time employment with national (and international) contractors & consultants and MDAs		Steering Committee minutes	
JC 4B.3 – Project design, activities, policy dialogue and results have	I 4B.3.1 – Evidence of policy dialogue regarding greater participation of national			

addressed issues of increasing national contractor and consultant involvement in transport sector construction and maintenance works contracts in Uganda	contractors and consultants in road sector construction and maintenance projects			
	I 4B.3.2 – Evidence of revision of pre-qualification and contractual requirements (e.g. advance payment guarantees, performance bonds) and the approval and implementation of statutory instruments (e.g. the contractors' register, reservation scheme) for national contractors involvement (as main contractor or sub-contractor) in transport sector construction and maintenance contracts (ICB and NCB)			
	I 4B.3.3 – Evidence of increasing involvement of national contractors in transport sector construction and maintenance contracts (ICB and NCB e.g. the performance of the reservation scheme for local contractors)			

EQ5 To what extent will the flow of benefits for beneficiary organisations and the transport sector continue after the end of EU Cooperation support? And to what extent did the programme design and implementation mainstream policy priorities related to :				
i) Gender equity and women's empowerment~				
ii) Environmental impact and adaptation to climate change				
iii) Good governance (including 'leave no-one behind' and 'Rights-based Approach' (RBA)?				
Evaluation criteria covered	Sustainability (effectiveness)			
Judgement criteria (JC)	Indicators (Ind)	Information sources		Methods / tools
		Primary	Secondary	
JC 5.1 – Programme-delivered results are likely to be institutionally sustainable	I 5.1.1 – Evidence of factors of potential sustainability of national transport sector institutional capacity for road network management and maintenance	Institutional policies and strategies		Proposed methodology/tools similar for all EQs - see EQ1 above
	I 5.1.2 – Evidence of increased involvement of national private sector construction industry in transport sector capital investment and maintenance contracts	Budget allocations and resources (compared with needs)		
	I 5.1.3 – Evidence of adequacy of financial resources (from all sources) to meet current and future investment and maintenance needs	Annual reports (or beneficiary institutions)		
	I 5.1.4 – Exit strategies have been implemented for all programme activities	Media reports (including Graphic Identity Manual & EUD Leaflet V007)	Interviews (TA, beneficiary institutions, stakeholders, road users)	
JC 5.2 – Programme design, activities and results have mainstreamed and contributed to gender empowerment and women's' employment	I 5.2.1 – Evidence of in-depth analysis and strategies promoting gender empowerment in strategic planning and oversight of project design programming, implementation monitoring and reporting (including multi-modal transport planning)	Reports – Communication Campaign	Evaluation Guidelines (Gender sensitivity)	
		Progress reports	MTE – Final Report (& Executive Summary)	
		Final reports	Steering Committee minutes	
	I 5.2.2 – Trends in 'women's' employment on road sector			

	<p>construction and maintenance contracts</p> <p>I 5.2.3 – Proportion of women in management structures of MoWT, UNRA, URF and UIPE</p> <p>I 5.2.4 – Proportion of women participating in Graduate Traineeship Programme</p>			
JC 5.3 – Programme design, activities and results have mainstreamed and contributed to better environmental impacts and adaptation to climate change	<p>I 5.3.1 – Evidence of in-depth analysis and strategies considering environmental (and social) impacts and adaptation to climate change in programme design, programming implementation monitoring and reporting</p> <p>I 5.3.2 – Systematic use of ESIA's in works programming</p> <p>I 5.3.3 – Evidence of consideration and measures to better ensure resilience of transport sector infrastructure to extreme weather events and climate change</p>			
JC 5.4 – Programme design, activities, policy dialogue and results have mainstreamed and contributed to better sector governance	<p>I 5.4.1 – Evidence of in-depth analysis and strategies considering transparent sector governance in project design, programming, implementation, monitoring and reporting</p> <p>I 5.4.2 – Explicit reference to 'Rights based' approach⁴ in project design, documentation, monitoring and reporting</p> <p>I 5.4.3 – Explicit reference to 'Leave no-one behind'⁵ in project design, documentation, monitoring and reporting</p>			

⁴ RBA Objectives – Do not harm; do maximum good. RBA Principles – Apply rights, participation and access to decision making process, non-discrimination and equal access, accountability and access to ROL, transparency and access to information

⁵ 'Leaving no-one behind' is a core principle of the 2030 Agenda and UN SDGs which EU has endorsed

	I 5.4.4 Evidence of positive sustainable results of sector reforms (policy, statutory, institutional, budgetary, etc) regarding integrated multimodal transport, road maintenance financing, autonomy of UNRA & URF, and the local construction industry			
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EQ6: To what extent has EU cooperation had value added for the Transport Sector Institutional Capacity Building Programme design and implementation, compared to what could have been achieved by Member States?

Evaluation criteria covered	EU added value (impact, sustainability)			
Judgement criteria (JC)	Indicators (Ind)	Information sources		Methods / tools
		Primary	Secondary	
JC 6.1 – Clear identification of EU strategies competencies, capacities and experience contributing to ‘Added Value’	I 6.1.1 – Evidence of application of EU capabilities in the transport sector in Uganda	Interviews (DPs, EU MS, sector partners, stakeholders, beneficiaries)	MTE – Final Report (& Executive Summary)	Proposed methodology/tools similar for all EQs - see EQ1 above
	I 6.1.2 – Evidence of consideration being given to optimisation of EU added value relative to other sector development partners			
	I 6.1.3 – EU perceived to be a long-term partner to Uganda prepared to predictably provide substantial resources			
	I 6.1.4 – Perceptions of sector partners, stakeholders, beneficiaries			
JC 6.2 - EU support policies strategies and project management offer added value compared with other sector development partners (including EUMS)	I 6.2.1 – Perceptions and awareness of sector partners, stakeholder beneficiaries and public of EU sector cooperation and results		Steering Committee minutes	
	I 6.2.2 – Evidence of			

	identification of potential EU added value (and visibility) in project design			
	I 6.2.3 – Evidence (and visibility) that similar (or stronger) results could have been achieved without EU support			
	I 6.2.4 – Examples of joint programming in place for transport sector support			
JC 6.3 – EU brings added value to coordination of sector development partners and policy dialogue	I 6.3.1 – Perceptions of sector partners, stakeholders and beneficiaries			
	I 6.3.2 – Evidence that EU is better able than sector development partners (including EUMS) to raise critical issues in policy dialogue			

EQ7: To what extent has the Transport Sector Institutional Capacity Building Programme been aligned with evolving EU MS and Development Partners' strategies and cooperation objectives?

Evaluation criteria covered	Coherence			
	Judgement criteria (JC)	Indicators (Ind)	Information sources	
Primary			Secondary	
JC 7.1 – EU support and the actions of EU MS and other sector development partners (including European IFIs) complemented and reinforced each other	I 7.1.1 – Degree of complementarity, coordination and task division between EU and other sector development partners (including MS and European IFIs) I 7.1.2 – Evidence of joint analysis monitoring and programming (EU MS) I 7.1.3 – Evidence of synergies between EU support and the actions of EUMS, European IFIs and other sector development partners	Action document EU Country Strategy/NIP 2014-2020	Interviews (DPs, EU MS, IFIs, sector partners, stakeholders) MTE – Final Report (& Executive Summary) Steering Committee minutes	Proposed methodology/tools similar for all EQs - see EQ1 above

<p>JC 7.2 – ‘Team Europe’ approach, combining resources from EU, EU MS and European agencies institutions and IFIs has been mobilised by the project (in response to Covid and other issues)</p>	<p>I 7.2.1 – Degree to which the ‘Team Europe’ approach, combining resources from the EU, EUMS European agencies and IFIs has been effectively used in project implementation</p>			
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Annex 4 Detailed answers by judgement criteria

EQ1: To what extent has the Transport Sector Institutional Capacity Building Programme been relevant to the needs of beneficiary institutions and organisation and aligned to national development goals (NDP II and NDP III as well as Vision 2040), National Roads Development plans and EU Cooperation objectives?

JC 1.1 – The Programme is responsive to national transport sector priorities and goals (as expressed in NDP, Vision 2040 and national road development plans)

This programme is well aligned with and responsive to national transport sector priorities and goals as set out in NDP2, NDP3 and Vision 2040 and national road development programmes as regards transport sector human capacity development and strategic investment and maintenance of transport infrastructure.

Programme component design was based upon analysis of national and institutional programmes and needs as regards MoWT, UNRA and URF. As regards support to LCI the withdrawal of DFID support to the 'Crossroads' programme resulted in the focus of support switching to UIPE capacity (and GTP) which in turn was expected to contribute to development of the LCI. Programme design was informed by participation of institutional counterparts (arguably more strongly expressed by UNRA and URF) and all specified programme results were signed off by the beneficiary organisations. There has also been CSO participation in programme design and implementation management (including progress monitoring) by way of CISCOT representation on the Steering Committee.

It was expected that the programme would be supported institutionally and thematically by EUD transport sector dialogue in which EU has historically taken a leading role in Uganda. During the programme implementation period there has been reporting of such dialogue having taken place but with limited reference to the cabinet decision to reduce the number of transport sector institutions which could result in transfer of UNRA and URF to MoWT.

JC 1.2 – The Programme objectives reflect priorities and needs of UNRA, URF, UIPE and MoWT as expressed in institutional policies and strategies (including resource and capacity shortfalls)

Programme objectives clearly reflect priorities and needs of sector institutions as expressed in institutional policies and strategies (including capacity shortfalls, but less so regarding resources). Whilst support to UIPE meets UIPE institutional priorities and needs, the extent to which the needs of LCI will be directly met by this support to UIPE is less clearly stated. However, it is recognised that if competences of local engineers can be enhanced through graduate technical training, being then admitted as members of UIPE and registered by ERB, they may be more readily employed by the LCI players (such as UNRA, UNABCEC, District Local Governments, MoWT and other private sector players) and so may contribute to the growth of the LCI. The programme can thus be considered to be highly relevant to transport sector needs.

There is clear evidence of identification of institutional issues and beneficiaries being identified with qualitative rather than quantitative evidence for each programme component at this stage. Issues identified included:

- capacity of MoWT in strategic planning, policies and responsiveness to gender and environmental/climate change resilience;
- UNRA capacity in road sector management;
- URF oversight function including capacities of DUCAR DAs in maintenance management;
- performance of LCI (including UIPE capacity) and lack of professional skills;
- DP coordination and policy dialogue;
- limited involvement and engagement with civil society in sector management.

Intervention component activities are clearly linked to identified institutional issues.¹ Only limited evidence is available to the evaluation on the ownership of programme activities by component institutional partners or on willingness to adapt and apply any enhanced capacities resulting from programme activities. In contrast there are reported to be positive perceptions of institutional partners regarding programme relevance in response to their institutional needs and priorities² albeit with some reservations regarding limited interface and strengthening of MoWT operations and lack of clarity about how to maximise results of institutional support to UIPE in strengthening of LCI. Summarizing the situation for each of the programme components as regards relevance is shown below.

TA to MoWT

TA support covered two phases. Phase 1 comprised the MTR of the NTMP³ (2008-2023) whilst the MTR itself finds policy objectives of NTMP/GKMA highly relevant to all transport modes it is less clear how the TA services under Phase 1 directly strengthened '*MoWT capacity in gender responsive strategic planning and oversight in a multi-modal transport environment contributing to an appropriate investment – maintenance mix, climate change mitigation and building climate resilience of the sector*' as TA services do not appear to have included stakeholder participation to any great extent. Phase 2 activities were more explicitly relevant to capacity building of MoWT transport planning systems (including PPP) by greater involvement of MoWT counterparts in preparation of a national intermodal/multimodal transport strategy (including SEA). The planned absorption of UNRA and URF by MoWT have necessitated a planned revision of the organogram of the MoWT. The retention of the Planning Department in MoWT has not yet been approved by the Ministry of Public Service.

TA to UNRA

TA support is highly relevant to UNRA needs⁴ (although the sheer scope and range of such identified needs gives pause for thought in adequate coverage by allocated TA services) which are described in the ToR for TA support to UNRA.⁵ However, there was reported to be generally good engagement between TA and UNRA management concerning needs assessment and deliverables.

TA to URF

TA support was highly relevant to URF institutional needs⁶. Although expected impacts of 'improved operational efficiency of road maintenance' will be facilitated by 'improved URF institutional capacity and corporate governance' (including TSUs and DUCAR DAs) the actual road maintenance operations are in the hands of UNRA (and DUCAR DAs). Thus, it is suggested that the stated impact may be a 'step too far' for this component.

Support to LCI

There are undoubtedly needs of the LCI⁷ in Uganda but such needs are only addressed in part or indirectly by this component. Relevance of the component is high as regards UIPE needs and the needs of graduate engineers and technicians for continuing professional development training but limited as regards the needs of the ICT.

Studies carried out in 2015 and 2016⁸ noted capacity problems recommending that the DFID Crossroads programme should continue ongoing support.⁹ Although EU discussed supporting

¹ i.e. Premature deterioration of infrastructure assets, high construction costs, issues of road safety, environment, climate change, gender and social safeguards; weaknesses in planning, design, procurement, PFM, governance and project delivery; weaknesses in legal, policy and institutional frameworks, human and institutional capacities and LCI competitiveness.

² i.e. for UNRA and URF regarding improved capacity in planning, project delivery, maintenance and sector management capability

³ Including the Master Plan for the Greater Kampala Metropolitan Area (GKMA)

⁴ UNRA institutional needs were documented in 'Diagnostic Study of UNRA Transformation Draft Recommendations' Report, WB, May 2019

⁵ i.e. specific objectives: improved delivery of road projects and development of a culture of excellence with focus on individual accountability for results in UNRA

⁶ Stated objectives include improved institutional and individual capacity and performances, sector governance, accountability

⁷ Such as capacity and experience deficits of local firms and engineers, difficulties in meeting pre-qualification requirements, lack of access to finance and credit, financial and project cycle management issues, poor competitiveness of local firms, quality issues

⁸ Consultancy services do identify Strategic Transport Priority projects in a Multimodal Environment ARS Progetti 2015; Final Evaluation of EDF10 Capacity Building Programme, ARS Progetti, 2016

⁹ i.e. Advocacy through the Roads Industry Council (RIC) and access to equipment through Crossroads Guarantee Fund (CGF)

Crossroads, DFID closed this programme (due to doubts of sustainability and exit strategy). As an alternative, this programme support component was diverted to support UIPE capacity and thus the UIPE mandate to support the LCI (and thus, indirectly, private sector competitiveness).¹⁰ Expected outputs of the TA contract include multiple deliverables which are directly relevant to UIPE capacities and activities¹¹ but impact upon LCI depends upon UIPE mobilisation of expected results. However, in parallel is the Graduate Training Programme (GTP) and support to UTCs training which, assuming the curriculum of such training is aligned to local construction industry needs, would be of direct relevance to the LCI. Falling somewhere between these two support pillars in terms of relevance is the EREP – Engineers Registration Enhancement Programme.¹²

JC 1.3 The Project objectives were consistent with EU transport sector policies and strategies in Africa and at national level and complementary to other EU in-country interventions

The Programme objectives were fully consistent with multiple EU transport sector policies, guidelines and strategies in Africa which advocated sector approaches, multi-modality, strengthened regional approach and increasing commercialisation of sector operations and management. At national level, project objectives were compliant with 11 EDF NIP whilst not addressing all NIP sector objectives. However, highly relevant Government policy commitments regarding sector institutions and maintenance funding remain unfulfilled and sustainability aims are unlikely to be achieved given the continuing chronic maintenance funding deficits, however the effectiveness of sector institutions may be enhanced by this programme.

EQ2: To what extent has the Transport Sector Institutional Capacity Building Programme achieved expected results of capacity building for MoWT, UNRA, URF and UIPE? And to what extent has the capacity building contributed to the improvement of institutional performances and public services?

J.C 2.1 – The Expected results of project capacity building were achieved (for MoWT, UNRA, URF and UIPE) in terms of institutional and individual capacities

Expected results of capacity building (MoWT, URF, UNRA and LCI/UIPE) in terms of institutional capacities were largely achieved as regards mainly technical issues with clear reporting of training courses carried out. Before/after assessment of individual training courses is lacking in some of the training courses although individual beneficiary perceptions are reported to be largely positive with expressions of ownership even though participation and direct interface with TA services varied.¹³ Most training and capacity building activities have been carried out by STEs and this approach has been effective overall. However, it is the local stakeholder's opinion that local experts performed better due to their knowledge of the local context and availability. The procurement process should be revised in order to favour local expertise over international experts. There have been some constraints to effectiveness including limited period for training and capacity building results to be applied, Covid disruptions, high staff turnover in sector institutions, institutional processes and governance issues (URF) and doubts about future individual and institutional roles after 2018 cabinet decision.¹⁴

J.C 2.2 – Improved institutional performance and service provision

There is evidence of improved institutional performances by sector institutions, but this improved

¹⁰ In other words, it was assumed that support to UIPE would indirectly improve private sector competitiveness and thus the LCI

¹¹ Strengthened UIPE Secretariat and branches, implementation of debt collection and recovery of arrears; follow up system of UIPE membership; establishment of business plan, customer unit, database, communications strategy, power supply connection; promotion of collaboration with international organisations and counterpart institutions (e.g. ICE, UK).

¹² An engineer may only legally practice in Uganda (in effect 'sign off' on designs etc) if he/she is a paid-up member of UIPE and registered with ERB. This system is akin to the UK system of 'Chartered Engineer'.

¹³ E.g. Greater participation was noted in UNRA and URF than MoWT Phase 1 (although Phase 2 participation was greater with nomination of counterparts from MoWT and other sector institutions)

¹⁴ To transfer UNRA and URF to MoWT

performance has not translated into commensurately better service provision. There are multiple factors in play here. Capacity needs of institutions exceed the TA coverage and resources under this programme, concentrating on selected needs (all of which were valid choices) for a relatively short time period which was also a time of Covid restrictions which restricted TA activities. Also, institutional issues and political decisions cast a shadow on the future of some institutions which affected motivation and application/adoption of some changes even though individual beneficiaries were supportive and positive about such capacity enhancements. Also, the political decision to undertake maintenance by direct labour force account plant-based methods operated by under-resourced and under-capacitated DUCAR districts constrains both effectiveness of the process and reduces potential involvement of local contractors. Chronic funding deficits for maintenance (~50% of needs) and skewed balance of construction/maintenance (~89%/11%) further reduce service provision. However, because of the volatility in the sector, it is difficult to estimate the improvement of the institutional performance and an eventual ex-post evaluation in a few years may give a more decisive answer to this question..

EQ3: To what extent has the Transport Sector Institutional Capacity Building Programme design and implementation been conducive to an efficient delivery of expected results?

J.C.3.1 – Organisation, management, coordination and delivery of EC services (EUD and BXL) has facilitated project implementation and achievement of results

Organisation, management, coordination and delivery of EC services¹⁵ has processed programme procurement from signature of FA in Nov/Dec 2016 to commencement of TA services approximately one year later (e.g. TA to URF contract signed Dec 2017; TA to MoWT commenced Phase 1 activities in January 2018) – the procurement process for TA services was short. However limited technical capacity at NAO and at the institutions being capacitated required an important involvement of the EUD in the management of the programme. From documentation scrutinised to date, implementation of some components (TA to URF, support to LCI) suffered constraints for various reasons. The extent to which EUD was able to mitigate such constraints was limited. In terms of the overall policy framework the programme support was based upon the ‘conventional’ transport sector management approach which advocated inter alia: separation of client/policy making and implementation functions, adequate funding for road maintenance ‘balance’ of capital investment and maintenance; progression towards 2nd generation road fund with ‘ring fencing’ of fuel levy revenues and appropriate levies; (semi) independent Road Agency and Road Fund; progressive commercialisation and increasing participation of LCI. However, even before the 2018 Cabinet decision there were indications that this policy framework was at risk with the importation of heavy equipment for direct labour/force account maintenance units in districts. After the decision in 2018 it was only in June 2019 that an Administrative Order was issued for TA to URF to urgently start a study on ‘Institutional and Funding Models for URF’ for which other TA activities were halted as no additional resources were provided. This reactive response to the Cabinet decision was not prompt. At the time of writing some records of sector dialogue and sector DP consultation have been scrutinised by the evaluation so it is possible to place recorded actions in the context of ‘behind the scenes’ activities. EUD played a consistent role in regular DP meetings¹⁶ throughout the implementation period with also participation in the annual JTSR. A further issue of institutional governance was the public dispute between the Board and Executive Director of URF which constrained programme implementation activities in URF due to delayed decision making.

J.C 3.2 – Technical assistance provided to each project component has positively contributed to implementation and achievement of results

TA provided to each component has positively contributed to implementation and achievement of results (but not necessarily sustainability). Capacity improvements have been supported by technical management of sector institutions, less so by governance representatives at Board level. There was adequate monitoring of implementation activities and outputs but to a lesser extent as regards higher level outcomes and impacts, which take longer to materialize. On the whole TA

¹⁵ In this case EUD; no reference to involvement of BXL in documents scrutinised to date

¹⁶ 2015, 2016 & 2017 – 5 meetings; 2018 – 6 meetings; 2019 – 0 meetings; 2020 – 2 meetings; 2021 – 1 meeting.

resources were appropriate for the specified activities although there is only limited evidence of needs assessments being undertaken at design stage. However, in contrast to other components, the needs of private sector (LCI) and how the support was expected to respond to such needs, was not clearly articulated. Overall, the programme did address the specified issues reasonably efficiently until 'de-railed' by Covid although the programme could reasonably address only a proportion of total needs, capacity and governance issues for each sector institution. All recommendations of the MTE were accepted, but not all have been implemented so far and not all 'lessons learned' identified by MTE were actioned although such lessons referred more to potential future support rather than during continuing implementation. The Action document spells out the lessons learnt from 9th and 10th EDF projects namely related to: (i) Comprehensive Sector Support, (ii) Sustainability and, (iii) Policy coherence and coordination.

J.C. 3.3 – The choice of programme implementation modality, governance, management mechanisms and resources allocated have adequately addressed Ugandan sector institutional needs, capacities and constraints

The choice of programme implementation modality, governance and management mechanisms allocated were an adequate response to some institutional needs, capacities and constraints in an institutional landscape as it existed at the start of 11EDF NIP although these resources and TA services as provided could address only a limited proportion of institutional capacity development needs and an even more limited proportion of LCI needs. Although the programme support was expected to, by application of programme outcomes, to lead to more effective maintenance, sector management and transport service delivery, such objectives would continue to be frustrated by chronic maintenance funding deficits (even if the programme may have contributed to more effective use of limited available resources) which were further jeopardised by the decision to transfer routine maintenance to force account/direct labour operations in (under-capacitated and under-resourced) DUCAR districts. In these circumstances, effectively applied TA could have been expected to achieve (albeit limited) results although efficiency was impacted by Covid and other issues. However, the cabinet decision to go against a decade or more of DP advocacy and policy dialogue suggests that at least the non-technical aspects of programme support may be potentially irrelevant¹⁷. Should the changed institutional set go ahead then this would be a major failure of DP advocacy and policy dialogue to convince GoU of international practices.

EQ4A: To what extent has the Transport Sector Institutional Capacity Building Programme contributed to opportunities for long-term changes? Has the programme contributed to unintended changes?

J.C 4A 1 – Increased institutional capacity (MoWT, UNRA, URF) to define and update strategies, monitoring parameters and service provision

Increased institutional capacity has been delivered to some extent (MoWT, UNRA, IUPE, URF) to define and update strategies, monitoring provision and service provision in that individual capacities have been strengthened. However, the expected longer term institutional and policy strengthening has not been actioned to any great degree due to the relatively limited time period of the programme (curtailed also by Covid) and due to proposed sector institutional changes 'hanging over' URF and UNRA which have stifled any adoption of such changes. Similarly, under these circumstances, the degree to which enhanced individual capacities in URF and UNRA may be manifested in the future is unclear. Basically, potential longer-term impacts of the components of TA to UNRA and TA to URF are inhibited by political decisions which if actioned extend to the very basis of maintenance activities (i.e. force account/direct labour or private sector, chronic maintenance funding deficits). Policy changes, if finally carried out, represent a reversal of sector

¹⁷ Support to technical issues relevant to sector service delivery and management of those issues is expected to be relevant whatever the future institutional structure of the sector may be as these functions will still need to be carried out (for example for maintenance, axle load control, climate resilience issues and so on) whatever institutional arrangements are made in future. However, non-technical issues (for example governance issues related to a semi-autonomous Road Fund) will differ depending upon the nature of the body responsible for the sector function (i.e., the UNRA and URF mandates may be 'taken over' by MoWT and MOFPED respectively) but the institutional situation, mandate as legally defined and management responsibility will differ from existing structures

management principles which have been strongly supported by DPs in policy dialogue over more than a decade, and Uganda would thus be 'out of step' with most international practice. On the other hand, MoWT capacity has been enhanced regarding planning and sector policy (NITMP 2021-2040) although it is not clear how MoWT institutional capacity and procedures may require further amendment if UNRA is absorbed in some form.

JC 4A 2 – Increasing participation of national stakeholders in sector decision making and management

TA to URF

The evaluation has not found evidence of increasing participation of national stakeholders in sector decision making and management. On the contrary, although consultation mechanisms with stakeholders and transport users do exist preliminary findings indicate that these systems are not working well and that doubts exist among sector stakeholders about URF value for money, responsibilities and results. These doubts may be assigned, at least in part, to limited communication by URF with road users. Meanwhile, a very public squabble between the URF Board and first Executive Director has reportedly resulted in reputational damage to URF which has undermined stakeholder confidence in the institution whilst also constraining decision making and consuming the time of URF technical management.

J.C 4A.3 – Unintended effects (positive and negative) identified as resulting from programme activities

There are major unintended effects arising from programme response to unexpected events which strongly affected implementation activities, and thus, outcomes and impacts of the programme although these unexpected events were external to the programme, with programme mitigation response being limited. These external events were completely different in nature i.e. the Covid pandemic (which could not reasonably have been predicted) and the Cabinet decision to end the 'independence' of UNRA and URF by absorption into MoWT and MoFPED respectively (which seems to have been a surprise to participants in sector policy dialogue although hints of such a decision go back to the 2015 'shake up' of UNRA). This latter decision had a serious 'overshadowing' effect on future planning and sector governance activities given the future uncertainty of mandates and responsibilities. Reactive measures taken to adapt to and mitigate effects have impacted on implementation efficiency and effectiveness for all programme components resulting in only partial achievement of expected impacts.

JC 4A.4 – The Policy dialogue has addressed issues of multimodal (and intermodal) transport planning and implementation, financing for road maintenance and autonomy of sector institutions

The Policy dialogue has addressed issues of multimodal (and intermodal) transport planning and implementation, financing of road maintenance and autonomy of sector institutions and these issues have formed the basis of long term 'conventional' sector dialogue. The first of these issues can be said to have borne fruit in that the programme component (TA to MoWT) included support to establishment of a planning department in MoWT (although there are reported doubts regarding resources for continuing operation). The long-standing issue of adequacy of funding for road maintenance (and 'balance' and prioritisation of capital investment and maintenance) cannot be said to have been mitigated by prolonged dialogue as there continues to be a significant maintenance funding deficit. Linked to this issue is the decision to establish TSUs in DUCAR districts for force account/direct labour operations of maintenance thus rolling back dialogue advocacy and policies of greater commercialisation and involvement of local private sector.¹⁸ Again policy dialogue appears to have been ineffective.

The issue of sector institutional landscape and autonomy of sector institutions is a less clear issue due to evolutionary institutional changes being advocated (e.g. progression from 1st generation to 2nd generation Road Funds) and despite major long term support to UNRA and URF significant governance capacity and resourcing issues appear chronic (and arguably led to the 2015 imbroglio of suspension of WB support and the 'shake up' of UNRA).¹⁹

¹⁸ Leaving aside very real doubts about capacities, experience, resources and funding in DUCAR districts to do the maintenance using Japanese and Chinese plant (with dollar-based mining costs – fuel, spares)

¹⁹ Anecdotally it has been suggested by more than one source that the 'writing was on the wall' in 2015 but that sector dialogue did not subsequently address these issues

EQ4B: To what extent has the Programme been aligned to address needs of the local construction industry and has contributed to deliberate policy actions, strengthened strategic capacities and/or recommendations to promote the local construction industry and develop the necessary tools to achieve the desired change?

JC 4B.1 – Increased UIPE capacity to define and update strategies and service provision to the local construction industry resulting from evaluation of UIPE strategies and capacity

The TA to UIPE suffered from a slow start and was further hurt by COVID. The expected results were obtained late and only partially, in addition the TA was affected by the high turnover of experts.

The Inception Report was delayed by 14 months. The Team Leader in charge of the Strategic Plan left, and his replacement needed time before continuing with the Strategic Plan. The UIPE Strategic Plan developed by the Consultant was only approved by the Council recently in June 2022, a month before the end of the TA. The Business Plan was only presented on 21st July 2022 to the Council as a first draft. The implementation plan is now being worked on by the Council. As Institutional Capacity Strengthening is concerned, this was also not delivered to the full. All training meant to strengthen the Secretariat, so that the Council could delegate most of the activities, were not done by the Consultant.

At this stage there is little clear evidence of increased UIPE capacity to define and update strategies and service provision to LCI resulting from evaluation of UIPE strategies and capacity. The current UIPE Strategic Plan, Action Plan and M&E Framework are not clearly defined and results are being monitored only to a limited extent.

However more UIPE members are paying their subscriptions, and UIPE receives also revenues from the CPD training courses, adjudication, conferences, etc. UIPE also strongly increased its membership. There is no clear evidence of improved effectiveness of the ERB as a result of the 'Engineers' Registration Enhancement Programme'. The Consultant has not delivered on EREP. A request for a no-cost addendum was submitted by the Consultant two days to the close of the contract (contrary to the contract conditions (Article 20 of GC) which provide for a request within at least 30 days to contract closure).

JC 4B.2 – Increased numbers of trained/qualified engineering graduates entering the national construction industry

From limited reporting information it is tentatively concluded that increasing numbers of trained/qualified engineering graduates are entering the LCI. However, available quantification is patchy with trainee involvement in GTP having been reduced from 200 to 120 so far and actual achievements regarding placement of graduates in employment being unclear.

JC 4B.3 – Project design, activities, policy dialogue and results have addressed issues of increasing national contractor and consultant involvement in transport sector construction and maintenance works contracts in Uganda

Apart from policy dialogue and advocacy, programme component design, activities and results have only peripherally addressed issues of increasing national contractor involvement in transport sector construction and maintenance works contracts in Uganda. There is recognition of the limited involvement of LCI in transport sector works and there is national legislation on proportions of contract value to be sub-contracted to national contractors. However, such provisions are not fully actioned and changes to procurement, qualification and eligibility requirements which could improve prospects for local contractor participation, are limited in scope. These issues have not been directly addressed by this programme.

The Government should aim at building a healthy thriving local private contractors' sector. The reduced maintenance funding and late payments by government are hurting the private sector. UIPE activities improved relations between various actors in the road transport sector: UIPE, UTCs, UACE, UNABCEC.

EQ5 To what extent will the flow of benefits for beneficiary organisations and the transport sector continue after the end of EU Cooperation support? And to what extent did the programme design and implementation mainstream policy priorities relate to: i) Gender equity and women's' empowerment; ii) Environmental impact and adaptation to climate change; iii) Good governance (including 'leave no-one behind' and 'Rights-based Approach' (RBA)?

JC 5.1 – Programme-delivered results are likely to be institutionally sustainable

It is not entirely clear the extent to which programme-delivered results will be institutionally sustainable. Programme support has delivered better institutional capacity to manage these aspects of institutional mandate addressed by the programme whilst at higher policy level the MTR of NTMP (and Greater Kampala Metropolitan Area Master Plan) plus preparation of the NITMP 2021-2040 give a structural policy framework for the sector (not just the roads sub-sector). There are reports of adequate levels of ownership being expressed by the four beneficiary institutions although such expressions have not, apparently, always been manifested in delivery of commitments.²⁰ In terms of institutional capacities there is evidence of potential sustainability. However, in terms of application of such institutional enhancements for wider sector sustainability goals (such as better road sector delivery and standards of maintenance) there are doubts which go beyond direct programme results.

It is suggested that funding deficits represent the single greatest threat to sustainability of transport sector source delivery in that whilst institutional capacity building can improve management of available funds and maximise effectiveness in use of said funds (together with better response to governance, environmental, social, gender and climate change issues) there is a limit to how far such enhanced capacities can realistically compensate for serious chronic resource deficits.

Finally, there is the pending Cabinet Decision to remove the (semi) autonomy of URF and UNRA by embedding these organisations' responsibilities within MoWT. This reorganisation would represent a reversal of sector institutional change initiated about 15 years ago that were advocated and supported by sector partners (especially WB). Sector partners accept that performance of sector institutions has not always met expectations in terms of technical effectiveness, governance and PFM and that some institutional reorganisation is desirable (and arguably overdue)²¹ but that the existing separation of planning and control (client) functions (i.e. MoWT) from works execution and financing (contractor) functions [i.e. UNRA (and URF)] should be maintained. The Evaluation Team was informed that the MoWT organogram was under review and a new organogram is being proposed to accommodate URF and UNRA under the Roads Department. Policy dialogue is required at the highest level of Government so that URF and UNRA are not mainstreamed in MoFPED and MoWT.

J.C 5.2 – Programme design, activities and results have mainstreamed and contributed to gender empowerment and women's' employment

There is evidence of analysis in programme design of the need for better coverage of gender issues including promotion of gender empowerment in strategic planning and sector policies and such concerns were expressed in the ToR for TA for all components. There was thus an expectation that gender issues would be mainstreamed in programme implementation. Although there are some doubts that implementation mainstreamed gender issue²², there is a reported to be increased awareness of gender equity and the role of gender in strategic planning. Also, in terms of policy documentation produced, the NITMP 2021-2040 clearly sets out sector aspirations regarding gender empowerment. There is thus more evidential coverage of gender issues in the MoWT, UNRA and URF components than in the 'support to LCI' component (which has very little mention of cross-cutting issues in documentation scrutinised by the evaluation).

JC 5.3 – Programme design, activities and results have mainstreamed and contributed to better environmental impacts and adaptation to climate change

Programme design, activities and results have better mainstreamed coverage of ES issues and

²⁰ e.g., TSU rollout being delayed (URF), limited axle load control activities (UNRA), delayed office facilities and staffing for planning office (MoWT) – source MTE Final Report

²¹ Including URF operating as a '2nd Generation Road Fund'

²² Certainly, implementation reporting does not support the thesis that gender was mainstreamed

adaptation to climate change. There is historical record of violation of ES standards on WB-funded road construction projects²³ and programme design thus identified the need for better sector coverage of ES standards, climate change adaptation and climate resilience. There is evidence of inclusion of ES and climate change issues in three programme components (TA to MoWT, TA to UNRA and TA to URF), less so in the case of support to the LCI/TA to UIPE. Although more recently there has been more consistent compliance with Ugandan environmental legislation, the programme TA has provided training in better application of ES and RAP safeguards in accordance with international practices and consolidation/better mainstreaming of ES and RAP safeguards in planning, design, construction and maintenance activities. Such mainstreaming includes provision in the NITMP 2021-2040.

J.C 5.4 – Programme design, activities, policy dialogue and results have mainstreamed and contributed to better sector governance

Higher level national policy documents clearly advocate good governance across all sectors e.g. NDP3 requires good governance as an enabler of development whilst Uganda Vision 2040 refers to the need for better national governance (whilst also acknowledging challenges to this aim). Sector governance has been covered to some extent in programme design, activities and results but coverage has varied across these programme stages and across the four programme components.²⁴

TA to MoWT has delivered outputs (Planning Dept and NITMP 2021-2040) both of which have clear reference to principles of sector governance in prepared strategies policies and management principles²⁵. There are clear indications of ‘mainstreaming’ of governance in NITMP 2021-2040 but there is limited evidence of the degree to which mainstreaming of governance may be said to be applied to MoWT itself.

Support to LCI, whilst identifying governance policy and regulatory issues to be addressed in practice such support to governance appears to be limited to better definition of responsibilities between the UIPE Secretariat and Council. Governance cannot be said to have been mainstreamed in this component.

Both components (TA to UNRA and TA to URF) addressed issues of governance associated with institutional capacities, although there is limited evidence to confirm mainstreaming of governance in implementation of results. Overall, considering the overall objective of the programme as set out in the Financing Agreement (and LFM) it is suggested that actual achievements regarding improved core principles of good governance – fairness, accountability, responsibility and transparency governance have not been fully delivered as expected in terms of the management of the individual sector institutions.

In terms of internal programme governance, the role of the Steering Committee was confirmed in monitoring implementation progress (rather than strategically directing implementation or problem solving) and as a forum for all programme partners.

Although there is reference to both ‘Rights Based Approach’ or ‘Leave No-one Behind’ in higher level national policy documentation there are no explicit references to either in project documentation scrutinised. However, the guiding governance principles of the programme are compliant with these approaches even if not explicitly articulated as such.

EQ6: To what extent has EU cooperation had value added for the Transport Sector Institutional Capacity Building Programme design and implementation, compared to what could have been achieved by Member States?

JC 6.1 – Clear identification of EU strategies competencies, capacities and experience contributing to ‘Added Value’

There is clear evidence of EU strategies, competencies, capacity, resources and experience which have been applied to support to the transport sector in Uganda over some 30 years. This long-standing support has mobilised significant financing of capital investment in construction,

²³ which led to suspension of WB sector support in 2015

²⁴ Noting also that in programme documentation ‘governance’ is to some extent a ‘cover-all’ term encompassing various ‘cross-cutting’ issues such as gender, environment, climate change, institutional set-up and structures and sector institutional management, PFM and accountability

²⁵ Core principles of good governance – harness accountability, responsibility and transparency

rehabilitation and periodic maintenance and this consistency of EU sector support is recognised by all sector partners and GoU. However, no evidence has been examined of explicit consideration of optimisation of 'EU Added Value' relative to other sector partners or EU MS in programme design although it is provisionally concluded that EU does, in fact, have a comparative advantage over some other sector DPs. In particular EU programmes are managed by Government through the NAO (i.s.o. PIUs) and this is appreciated by Government.

JC 6.2 - EU support policies strategies and project management offer added value compared with other sector development partners (including EU MS)

As noted in JC 6.1 above there is clear evidence that EU support policies, strategies and experience in Uganda have offered added value compared with most sector DPs and, arguably, all EU MS. However, there is no evidence of such potential 'added value' being explicitly discussed at design stage. No evidence has been examined which might suggest that any other sector DPs would have offered more effective capacity building than EU and the MTE finding that EU has not 'leveraged' added value in terms of policy dialogue or development of policy and institutional framework for transport sector institutions is not confirmed by evidence gathered to date by this evaluation. Complementarity, synergy, donor coordination and joint programming were discussed at programme design stage and there is evidence of programme activities being complementary with those of other sector DPs.

JC 6.3 – The EU brings added value to coordination of sector development partners and policy dialogue

There is evidence that EU brings added value to both coordination of sector DPs and to policy dialogue, such added value accruing from the long history of EU sector support and the financial resources invested over successive EDF programming cycles. However, there is little evidence of consideration being specifically given to 'leveraging' such potential added value into greater effectiveness of sector support.

EQ7: To what extent has the Transport Sector Institutional Capacity Building Programme been aligned with evolving EU MS and Development Partners' strategies and cooperation objectives?

J.C. 7.1 – The EU support and the actions of EU MS and other sector development partners (including European IFIs) complemented and reinforced each other

The EU support and actions of some other sector DPs have complemented and reinforced each other (except for China) and with diminishing coherence with the EU MS due to withdrawal of some MS from the transport sector in recent years. With these sector DPs there is a high level of coordination. EU chairing sector DP working group meetings demonstrates coordination in policy dialogue which extends to the joint Annual Transport Sector Review. There is also evidence of joint programming, application of analysis undertaken by other DPs (such as WB and DFID) and synergies between EU support activities and those of other DPs (but not EU MS). Programme design complies with Agenda 2030 in contributing to SDGs 5, 8, 9 and 13. Overall the programme exhibits good coherence with OECD recommendations on Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development (PCSD) as regards development of strategic vision for achieving 2030 Agenda and contributing to SDGs in an integrated and coherence manner; development of institutional mechanisms to address policy inter-actions across sectors and align actions among levels of government and, in development of tools to address domestic, transboundary impacts and policies to address SDGs.

J.C. 7.2 – 'Team Europe' approach, combining resources from EU, EU MS and European agencies institutions and IFIs has been mobilised by the project (in response to Covid and other issues)

The 'Team Europe' approach, combining resources from EU, EU MS and European agencies, institutions and IFIs has not been explicitly mobilised by the programme (in response to Covid and other issues) as this initiative post-dates programme design whilst programme response to Covid was essentially on a component-by-component basis. However, essential features of the approach (e.g. visibility, coherence, coordination joint programming) were anticipated in programme design (as discussed under J.C. 7.1 above)

Annex 5. Evaluation matrix with data gathered and analysed by (EQ/JC) indicator

EQ1: To what extent has the Transport Sector Institutional Capacity Building Programme been relevant to the needs of beneficiary institutions and organisation and aligned to national development goals (NDP II and NDP III as well as Vision 2040), National Roads Development plans and EU Cooperation objectives?

JC 1.1 – The Programme is responsive to national transport sector priorities and goals (as expressed in NDP, Vision 2040 and national road development plans)

SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE

I 1.1.1 – The Programme objectives reflect the priorities, objectives and needs of national sector policies (as set out in NDP and Vision 2040)

The Programme objectives reflect priorities, objectives and needs of national sector policies as set out in NDP and Vision 2040.

NDP2 identifies 5 areas with greatest multiplier effect of which two (infrastructure development and human capital development) described as ‘fundamentals’ are specifically identified and are explicitly addressed by the programme. Investment in transport infrastructure includes investment in the rail sub-sector, upgrading of national roads (from 3795 km to 6000 km), strategic roads to support exploitation of minerals, oil and gas, tourism and decongestion of urban traffic together with increasing volumes of passenger and cargo by lake and maritime transport. Human capital development focuses on strategic investment in national human capital to drive growth and transformation. NDP3 identifies 5 key objectives of which two (strengthening of private sector and consolidation and increase in stock and quality of productive infrastructure) are addressed by the programme. Key development strategies include increased local participation, institutionalisation of human resource planning, enhancement of skills and enhanced partnership (with NSAs) for service delivery. Vision 2040 identifies strategic bottlenecks considering national socio-economic development including weak private sector, under-developed human resources and inadequate infrastructure. Transformational goals include strengthening infrastructure and human resources and core transport projects are identified including investment in high-speed rail, multi-lane national roads and international airports together with policy reforms that include human resource development, establishment of a national infrastructure fund and financing (including PPP, concessional loans and grants [Blending] and borrowing (domestic and IFIs).

I 1.1.2 – The Programme component designs present sound and complete analysis of national priorities and needs

The Programme component designs involved analysis of national priorities and needs (as summarised in I 1.1.1 above) and of institutional needs (as discussed in I 1.1.3 below). However, analysis of needs of the local construction industry were less conclusive. Two studies were undertaken, both concluding the need for capacity development and recommending continuation of the DFID ‘Crossroads’ programme (i.e., advocacy by the RIC – Roads Industry Council with access to equipment through the Crossroads Guarantee Fund – CGF) i.e., the studies did not assess or propose support to private sector competitiveness. DFID financing for continuation of support was not available and at programme design stage it was decided to support LCI development by way of support to UIPE (and GTP) the obvious assumption being that increased UIPE capacity would in turn contribute to local private sector development (although the logical link to increased competitiveness is less obvious).

The strategic choice to support UIPE and the decreased focus on the specific goal (private sector competitiveness) finds its rationale in the process of design of the intervention.

As a result, a different leaner intervention was designed with UIPE. The rationale was the specific mandate of UIPE to support the construction sector. This compelled the EUD to orient the design to strengthen UIPE and focus on actions within UIPE’s mandate. The strategy and follow up design also built on the assumption that UIPE capacity development would contribute positively to private sector capacities. However, the “private sector competitiveness” was not tackled directly through a measurable chain of results. The evaluation finds that UIPE is an instrument (a means) and not the end of the support.

I 1.1.3 – Evidence that programme design and preparation involved participation of institutional counterparts

The Programme design involved participation of institutional counterparts but overall objectives could have been better expressed as regards capacity building for strategic planning (for MoWT) by greater MoWT participation at this stage – there appears to have been greater participation of UNRA and URF in programme preparation. All specified programme outputs were subject to discussion and were approved by beneficiary organisations (MoWT, URF, UNRA and UIPE). Also there has been CSO participation in programme design and implementation. CISCOT (Civil Society Coalition on Transport in Uganda) is represented on the Steering

Committee whilst CUSP (Civil Society in Uganda Support Programme) contributed to UIPE training.

JC 1.2 – Programme objectives reflect priorities and needs of UNRA, URF, UIPE and MoWT as expressed in institutional policies and strategies (including resource and capacity shortfalls)

SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE

I 1.2.1 – Evidence of identification of institutional issues and beneficiaries identified with qualitative and quantitative evidence for each project component

There is clear evidence of 'identification of institutional issues and beneficiaries' being identified with qualitative rather than quantitative evidence for each programme component.

The transport sector institutional set up goes back to 2006 when UNRA (management and maintenance of national road network) and URF (financing of road maintenance) were established whilst MoWT focussed on policy regulation, oversight and planning. However, continuing institutional capacity and resource deficits led to issues of limited service delivery, governance and PFM issues, whilst sector policies and strategies were of limited scope. This led to dialogue between sector DPs and GoU concerning better protection of transport infrastructure assets and multimodal transport approach and thus to the development of this programme. Specific issues identified include: Capacity of MoWT (and associated parastatals) in strategic planning, policy, gender responsiveness and climate change mitigation; URF oversight function and capacity of DAs in planning, delivery and accountability for road maintenance; Performance and growth of local construction industry, including implementation of NCIP and capacity for UIPE in promotion of growth and professionalism of members. Further stakeholder analysis included: Lack of professional skills (student and qualified engineers, consultants and contractors) limiting local participation in infrastructure contracts; Need for coherent linkage of DP sector support, coordination and policy dialogue; Limited involvement of civil society as regards users of infrastructure, accountability and governance and monitoring, mitigation of social and environmental issues, road safety (including axle load control) and service levels of transport infrastructure (including maintenance)

The 2010 National Construction Industry Policy (NCIP) aims to enhance the performance and growth of local businesses and professions within an organised and continuously improving institutional framework. For its implementation, the Uganda Construction Industry Commission (UCICO) was recommended as next action to be established. The progress of the UCICO bill has been monitored in the Joint Transport Sector Review (JTSR) Action Plan Matrix (APM) and the proposed action was aimed at supporting the growth the NCIP by building the capacity of the Uganda Institution of Professional Engineers (UIPE) in the advancement of the professional growth of its members in both public and private sectors. However, there seems to be no progress in the legislation for forming the UCICO. More Dialogue need to come out with action plan and monitorable time lines to implement these reforms in the sector. The proposed project has, and seeks to engage with, a range of different stakeholders in both public and private sectors. The public stakeholders have been analysed in the point above (1.1.1). The local construction industry which includes student and professional members, as well as private consulting and contracting engineering firms, are still perceived as insufficiently skilled to participate in large infrastructure projects. The proposed action aimed at strengthening the functions of the UIPE and its partners, Uganda Association of Consulting Engineers (UACE) and Uganda National Association of Building and Civil Engineering Contractors (UNABCEC), in promoting the professional and business interests of their members. However, the impact of the TA was not evident in achieving the planned objectives. More direct intervention was needed to uplift the LCI in terms of direct engagement of the Private Business Contractors and Consultants in the Construction Industry.

I 1.2.2 – Degree to which intervention component activities are clearly linked to identified institutional issues

Intervention component activities are clearly linked to identified institutional issues (such as premature deterioration of infrastructure assets, high construction costs, poor road safety, environmental, climate change and social safeguards and mitigation) which arise from weaknesses in: planning and design, procurement, PFM, governance and project delivery which, in turn result from: weak legal, policy and institutional frameworks, inadequate human and institutional capacities and weak local construction industry.

Programme component interventions address such issues as follows:

TA to MoWT

TA for MTR of the NTMP (including Master Plan for Greater Kampala Metropolitan Area – GKMA) – Phase 1. Phase 2 provides TA to preparation of intermodal/multimodal transport strategy (including SEA) with objective of capacity building of MoWT planning systems and MoWT counterparts in transport planning and PPP project management.

TA to UNRA

TA for situational analysis of UNRA including capacity needs assessment and analysis of corporate and business plans going on to capacity building in contract management (including PPP), procurement, tender evaluation and validation, environmental and social safeguards (to international standards), climate change adaptation/resilience (bridge and drainage design), M&E framework, internal audit and lead control development and maintenance delivery, claims management and cost control.

TA to URF

TA for situational analysis of URF including capacity needs assessment and analysis of corporate and business plans going on to capacity building in integration of the URF and DAs IMS, internal audit systems of DUCAR DAs (including audit management software), M&E Frameworks (including 'allocation formulae' and 'unit cost models') although it is reported (MTE) that only limited numbers of URF personnel actually received training in new systems and software packages.

Support to LCI (supervised by UIPE)

TA for institutional support to UIPE including review of relevance of UIPE strategic and operational plans and activities including UIPE performance in professional development of UIPE membership. In parallel TA to design and supervise a Graduate Training Programme (GTP) with financing for supplementing salaries of participating graduate Engineers, Technologists and /technicians (30% women engineers). TA support and financing also to scaling up of training provided by 5 national technical training institutions. The Local Construction Industry Policy 2010 remains the main reference document for promoting activities in the sector. The policy however lacks clear action strategies and actions for the promotion of Local Content engagements in the sector.

The NCI generally remains fragmented, unsupported due, in part, to lack of both a definitive Government policy and a strong institutional framework.

The LCI Policy 2010 provides for the establishment of the Uganda Construction Industry Commission (UCICO) by an Act of Parliament by 2011 to promote and regulate the Construction Industry and promote the Local content of contractors. However, this action has not been achieved by the respective Ministry. There is need to have more strong Policy Dialogue on this issue if the country is deliberate to promote a strong Private Sector in the Construction Industry.

The LCI Policy 2010, provides also for the establishment of Procurement Rules and regulations to be incorporated in PPDA procurement Regulations making a provision for foreign Contractors and companies to form Joint Ventures or association with local companies or sub-contract the percentage of works & services to local contractors.

The policy on LCI and Transport Sector Review report recommends a Reservation Scheme for mandatory sub-contracting at a minimum of 20% of contract sum to local contractors and 30% of total fees & Expenses to Local Consultants. It was recommended for identification, registration and classification of local contractors

All the recommended actions aimed at promoting the LCI need to be monitored and actualised as they present the best way forward for the industry. Currently there are no clear enforceable Acts and Regulations for promoting the Local Construction Industry in Uganda.

1.1.2.3 – Evidence of willingness of component institutional partners/beneficiaries (MoWT, UIPE, UNRA, URF) to adopt and apply enhanced capacities expected to result from project activities

TA funding to UIPE increased its capacity in a way in the advancement of the science and practice of engineering in Uganda. The TA provided administrative and logistical support for stakeholder workshops and seminars focusing on

strengthening/rebranding the UIPE to improve its significance in the transport sector and subsequently its revenue collections. Funding for a Graduate Traineeship Programme (GTP) that targeted graduates from universities and other tertiary institutions in equipping them with employable skills to improve the quality of works/services in the transport sector. Support included the provision of LTTA and STTA experts for the design and supervision of the program; and administrative and logistical support for stakeholder workshops. Funding also be provided for supplementing the salaries of graduate engineers and technicians, who would participate in this program some of the beneficiary graduates were female and attention was given to opportunities to integrate environmental sustainability and climate resilience considerations in the training programme. The level of Women Graduate Engineers and Technicians and according to the UIPE program there was marked trends for Women Engineers who were enrolled in the program. Out of total 96 GTP total participants 30 were women representing 31%. Men still are predominant in this field of sciences and more efforts need to be put in place to uplift the role of women to be involved in the construction industry. Funding for the scaling up of trainings to national technical colleges saw approximately 250 Finalists trained. The TA provided administrative and logistical support for the integration of selected academic and professional courses into the curricula of five national technical colleges to equip graduates with employable skills. In addition, this TA promoted the advancement of the engineering profession in the LCI

In total in all the five UTCs in the country 250 Graduate Technicians received technical training in practical skills related with contract management and Construction. What is not known is how many were absorbed in the Job market. There should have been follow up and trails of after training placements as a post action activity. Generally, the composition of Women trained Graduate Technicians was an average of 23% combining all the 5 UTCs which remained at lower end of the scale. There are therefore deliberate actions needed to uplift the capacity of Women in this field. Lira UTC out of 55 trainees. 7 were women – 13% were women, UTC Masindi out of 26 trainees' women were 9 – 34%, Kichwamba UTC out of 28 Trainees, 7 were

women- 25%, Elgon UTC out of 35 Trainees, 8 were women- 22% and UTC Bushenyi out of 44 trainees 8 were women – 18%.

1 1.2.4 – Perceptions of MoWT, UNRA, URF and UIPE regarding relevance of the programme in response to beneficiary institutional needs and priorities

Perceptions of component institutional partners/beneficiaries regarding the relevance of the programme in response to needs and priorities are reportedly (MTE and scoping meeting interviews carried out by this evaluation) broadly positive.

Findings of the MTE are summarised below:

Overall:

Positive perceptions regarding qualitative improvements in strategic planning, project delivery, road maintenance and performance management.

MoWT:

Reported limited participation of MoWT personnel in TA activities. Although TA activities were mentioned by MoWT management but reportedly consider they have only contributed to a limited extent in strengthening MoWT capacities.

UNRA & URF:

Reportedly very positive perceptions of delivery of TA activities and contribution to institutional capacity building – confirmed during scoping meeting interview with UNRA 04/08/2022.

UIPE/Support to LCI:

Reportedly TA and UIPE perceptions of priorities were not entirely coincident and there is some lack of clarity as to how exactly component support activities would most effectively support competitiveness and participation of local companies in works contracts.

Base line employability was to increase from 50% to 90% after the Graduate Training Program (GTP) According to the progress attained 39 potential employment organizations were engaged by UIPE which secured 146 places for graduate trainees. However, there was a drop outs of graduates from the scheme leaving 96 in 35 host organisations engaged with employers, which was 80% achievement in regard to GTP. 40 of the Trainees are employed as Graduate Engineers, and overall, 60 Trainees are registered as Graduate Members of UIPE.

JC 1.3 Project objectives were consistent with EU transport sector policies and strategies in Africa and at national level and complementary to other EU in-country interventions

SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE

1 1.3.1 - Project objectives consistent with EU communications from the Commission to the Council of the European Parliament

Programme objectives are fully consistent with multiple EU Communications from the Commission to the Council of the European Parliament and other guidelines which advocate sector approaches, multi-modality, strengthened regional approach and increasing commercialisation of sector operations and management.

The EU publications scrutinised in this analysis include:

- Towards sustainable transport infrastructure: A sectoral approach in practice DGDEV 1996
- COM (2000) 422 final – Prioritising sustainable transport in development cooperation
- COM (2006) 376 final – Interconnecting Africa: The EU Africa Partnership on infrastructure
- COM (2009) 301 final – Connecting Africa and Europe: Working towards strengthening transport cooperation
- (COM (2011) 1172 & 1173) Agenda for Change 2011
- COM (2012) 556 final – The EU external aviation policy: Addressing future challenges
- Further developments impacting on continuing EU support to the transport sector in Africa included:
- Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES): Lisboa Dec 2007
- Luanda Declaration 2011
- Agreement on standards and means for the Trans-Africa Highways Network 2014
- Malaba Declaration – Transport Sector Development in Africa 2014
- Roadmap 2014 – 2017: 4th EU – African Summit
- 'Mobilising investments for African structural sustainable transformation': 5th EU-Africa Summit Nov 2017
- Single African Air Transport Market
- Agenda 2063
- Communication, A Stronger Role of the Private Sector in Achieving Inclusive and Sustainable Growth in Developing Countries

Donor coordination and policy dialogue

Donor coordination includes development partners (DPs) monthly meetings attended by all the main traditional DPs in the sector: WB, AfDB, JICA and EU (Chair). China plays an increasingly important role in the sector but does not participate in coordination activities.

Policy dialogue covers inter alia the reinforcement of axle load control, capacity development, transport policy and planning and maintenance of the existing network. Policy dialogue is formalised through bilateral and sector working groups meetings as well as a JTSR process which covers all transport modes and allows to jointly assessing agreed annual Action Plans. DP collaboration in programme development has proven possible in many ways: examples of good practice are the Crossroads cooperation between EU and DFID in support of the LCI, the close cooperation with WB in introducing output-based types of contractual arrangements and the loan/grant projects on the Northern Corridor between EU and EIB. The blending instrument is expected to increase joint programming and financing efforts reinforcing policy dialogue and to attract the participation of the private sector and commercial banking system.

1.3.2 - Project objectives consistent with EU 11EDF National Indicative Programme/Country Strategy Programme

Project objectives were compliant with the 11th EDF NIP whilst not addressing all NIP sector objectives. Of the two NIP specific objectives programme components addressed:

- i) Indirect support to operational sustainability and maintenance through institutional capacity and regulatory/governance frameworks.
- ii) Direct support to development of multi-modality by support to MoWT in preparation of NITMP 2021 – 2040.

Maintenance adequacy and sustainability whilst highly relevant, cannot be assured give the continuing chronic funding deficits whatever improved effectiveness of sector institutions may be achieved. Donor coordination and policy dialogue activities have been regularly undertaken as described in the NIP. Government financial and policy commitments have not been delivered in line with NIP* expectations with the continuing maintenance funding deficits mentioned above and the policy reversals (regarding sector institutions and establishment of force account rural road maintenance units).

In terms of Policy commitments, the strategy for the road sub-sector is embodied in the 10year RSDP based on the principles of commercialisation of service delivery with the state playing the role of regulatory and monitor. RSDP and its road investment plan are formulated with a mid-term horizon and have received considerable support from DPs.

Clear commitments have been taken by the government in the direction of separating functions, creating specialised authorities for the implementation of the policy and concentrating the action of MPWT on the function of designing, steering and monitoring of transport policy. In particular the DPs are asking government to proactively engage to keep the commitments in the area of road maintenance. A more comprehensive commitment through an ITSDP is expected to be endorsed by government within the first years of 11 EDF and to become part of the NDP 2016 2020.

EQ2: To what extent has the Transport Sector Institutional Capacity Building Programme achieved expected results of capacity building for MoWT, UNRA, URF and UIPE? And to what extent has the capacity building contributed to the improvement of institutional performances and public services?

J.C 2.1 – The Expected results of project capacity building were achieved (for MoWT, UNRA, URF and UIPE) in terms of institutional and individual capacities

SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE

1.2.1.1 – Evidence of completion of training and institutional building, results of capacity tests before and after training, and application of enhanced capacities

There is evidence of completion of most (not all) training and institutional capacity building although no results of capacity tests before and after training have been scrutinised. HR capacity development and training in the various programme components has been provided mainly by STE inputs for their specialities rather than a full-time training capacity building expert. Given the multifarious training and capacity building topics covered in the URF and UNRA components, such an approach can be considered to have been effective. However, reporting of achievement is usually confined to the title of the training, dates, and, not always, the number of trainees with no indication of before/after performance or assessment of trainees' satisfaction considering the individual support components.

TA to MoWT

Phase 1 consisted of evaluation of NTMP/GKMA and had no overt training component except as could be inferred from the findings of the MTE (e.g., Ugandan Transport Planning was weak) and MoWT observed that Phase 1 activities only contributed to a limited extent to strengthen MoWT capacities. Phase 2 had a more overt capacity building and training potential (especially for the 33 nominated counterparts)¹, although the 'headline' output (NITMP 2021-2040) was a potential capacity building vector in recommendations for sector planning, M&E frameworks etc.

TA to URF

The TA Final Report presents results of training and workshops undertaken by TA which totals 32 units, 24 (75%) of which were complete, 8 'on hold pending funding' (25%)² although TA activities had focussed on road maintenance monitoring (RMMS), annual departmental performance reviews, cost estimation systems, allocation of funds, visibility/communications with additional training in management of procurement, project cycle, business practices and accounting.

Constraints to effectiveness identified/reported include:

- Slow institutional processes (including the very public dispute between Board and Executive)
- Covid-19 disruption
- Limited time period for changes to be effective
- High staff turnover³
- TSU roll out delays

TA to UIPE

30 females and 66 Male Graduates were enlisted in the GTP. However, the initial target was to enrol 120 unemployed Graduates (100 Graduate Engineers and 20 Technicians. Currently 96 trainees are undertaking training composed of and tripartite contracts between UIPE, Contracting Firms and the Trainees were signed for 30 female and 66 males (in all 15 Technicians, 3 Technologists and 78 Graduate Engineers). 11 UIPE GTP Supervisors have been selected, trained and deployed to monitor the Trainees. In addition, 60 of the Trainees have already been approved for UIPE Membership while the rest 36 are awaiting approval. In terms of employment, 39 contracting organisations have been identified and 146 places of placements secured. It should be noted that however, some 52 Trainees had opted out of the program for reasons varying from payments or other professional development. This presents a very high employee turnover rates and indicative of lack of stability and sustainability in the industry.

1.2.1.2 – Perceptions of training beneficiaries regarding quality of training and resulting capacity enhancement

It is reported that staff of sector institutions (URF, MoWT, UNRA) had improved understanding of their roles and responsibilities because of predominantly technical issues, expressing satisfaction in the training undertaken.

UIPE: One of the outputs of the TA is the procurement of a new IT system, meant to make applications and registrations of membership easier. Improving application and registration mechanisms. The new IT system was found to be relevant to the revised objective of the support to UIPE, which is: Increased relevance of UIPE to its Members and increased influence of UIPE with stakeholders. Notwithstanding issues of relevance and performances the evaluation evidenced the high level of interest attached by UIPE to TA support. UIPE commitment is reflected in the provision of several offices for the TA staff and each of the TA staff being provided a counterpart in the UIPE secretariat., the Programme could benefit the organization significantly, resulting in greater capacity and relevance to the sector but the direct impact in terms of increasing competitiveness of LCI through this TA is not evident. More elaborate strategic intervention aimed at revamping the LCI and participation of Private Sector in Contracts and Contracts Management need to be articulated further.

J.C 2.2 – Improved institutional performance and service provision

SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE

1.2.2.1 – Evidence of adoption and application of revised strategies/business plans, M&E frameworks,

¹ Albeit that the MTE noted a limited level of participation of MoWT staff other than in selection of partners to meet and participation in visits to maintenance and construction works

² At least some training activities were suspended when the decision was taken to divert TA resources to preparation of the study of 'Institutional and Funding Models for URF'

³ Staff leave for better terms and conditions usually in the private sector so although this represents a 'loss' to URF institutional capacity, not all newly acquired skilled are necessarily 'lost' to the sector

planning, programming and procurement systems etc

There is evidence of adoption of some revised strategies and practices (including planning, programming, procurement, M&E) but less evidence of application⁴. On the whole qualitative change has been registered (MoWT, UNRA and URF) including:

- Greater sensitivity to gender issues (especially noted in MoWT and UNRA)
- Potentially enhanced institutional governance (but not clear the extent to which governance measures have been or will be applied due to the uncertainty over the future of UNRA and URF and this uncertainty extends to MoWT regarding assimilation of UNRA)
- Improved coverage of multi-modal transport policy issues (MoWT)
- Improved technical capacity for management and operations of target issues (which are expected to be manifested in more effective delivery of capital investment and maintenance works)⁵

TA to URF

Specific outputs/achievements (and non-achievements) include:

5-year Road Maintenance Plan FY 2019/20 – FY2023/4

The Board of URF is required to prepare 5-year road maintenance plans⁶ and TA supported the Secretariat in preparation of the plan. Stakeholder views were canvassed⁷ the consensus being to follow the MTEF whilst also identifying 'un-funded priorities and potential achievements from higher funding allocations. Also, road safety was flagged as a priority. A final version of the 5-year Maintenance Plan was issued in December 2019.

Corporate Plan

The Board instructed that a one-year extension to the 2013 Corporate and Strategic Plan (FY 2013/14-FY 2017/18) should be prepared and TA was requested to support the Secretariat in preparation by activities of a STE assisting the TA Team Leader and this one-year extension was issued for Board approval in November 2018. Further work on preparation of a new Corporate Plan FY 2019/20 – FY 2023/24 was suspended because of diversion of TA to preparation of the study on 'Institutional and Funding Models for URF'.

TSUs

Although it was expected that TSUs for DUCAR districts would be established before the start of programme activities this was not the case with a single TSU having been established (with TA Ashok Consult Ltd appointed June 2018 focussing on TNA and technical training)⁸ URF had committed funding to roll out of 2 more TSUs by 2020 (although, in the event, this commitment by URF was not delivered) and TA support was provided for procurement and lessons learned from the roll-out process to date. Currently there are only two TSUs operating in two lots, lot one is run by ASHOK Consult LTD. While lot two is run ICA, formerly COWI Consult. LTD.

RMMoS

URFs RMMoS was delivered in 2015 but never successfully commissioned. TA examined the system and concluded that it was not operationally or economically practical to update and that a replacement programme should be procured (with EU funding). Bids for supply and installation of the new system were received in April 2019 with recommendation on award. However, the recommendation was not actioned by URF⁹ and delivery eventually became impossible within the remaining contract period of TA services (and anyway further TA input to RMMoS was suspended due to diversion of TA to the study of 'Institutional and Funding models for URF').

Allocation formulae

A specified output of TA services a final version was issued in November 2018 although preparation of the 5-year Road Maintenance Plan FY 2019/20-FY 2023/24 required a review of the formulae. The result of which was URF declaring the approach to be too complex¹⁰ in November 2019. This was accepted by TA but in the meantime TA resources for this issue have been diverted as above.

Unit cost model

A custom-built cost model was prepared for URF and Designated Agencies in 2011. Although sample data for some districts were uploaded in 2013 thereafter the system was not used and by 2018 the on-line software was no longer available. URF contacted the original software developer, and the model became available again on-line in January 2019. TA examined this model and serious doubts were expressed on system manuals and usage, limited functionality, software operation and testing, data requirements with a recommendation that the system was not functional for DUCAR agencies and that another system should be

⁴ As regards this latter point the programme monitoring systems only addressed outcomes to a limited extent

⁵ Although in principle this linkage to greater effectiveness in management of works programmes is accepted, practical issues outside the remit of this programmes remain powerful inhibitors of such wider outcomes, not least the chronic underfunding for only about half of maintenance needs, the uncertain capacity and resources available for the intended move to force account direct labour maintenance works and overall, the uncertainties over the future of UNRA and URF

⁶ In accordance with Uganda Road Final Act 2008 section 25 (1) (C)

⁷ For some reason not including sector DPs

⁸ But not covering force account/ direct labour processes or institutional issues

⁹ The ongoing dispute between the URF Board and Executive Director being the background to this situation

¹⁰ The Final Report on TA to URF notes that the formulae (produced by this TA) were complex, mathematically, hungry for non-existent data that cannot be readily obtained whilst use of 'asset value' would arguably only be feasible for the paved road network, not for the unpaved DUCAR roads network

developed by a specialist IT consultant. Meanwhile it was discovered that MoWT from September 2018 was undertaking an independent Unit Cost Study with objectives that were clearly overlapping and duplicating the URF system although the MoWT system was, on paper, potentially superior in terms of scope of coverage. Thus, TA contacted MoWT suggesting URF defer to MoWT and contribute URF experience to MoWT¹¹. Further TA activity on this subject was then diverted to preparation of the 'Institutional and Funding Models for URF' report as noted above.

Communication and Visibility Plan

This FWC was required to develop and support the implementation of the C&V plan for the programme 'Institutional Capacity Building for the Transport Sector in Uganda' to be implemented in two phases:

Phase 1: preparation of the plan¹²

Phase 2: Implementation of elements of C&V plan by FWC and support to the implementation and monitoring of C&V plans for TA consultants and supervisors. All outputs were delivered by the FWC¹³ including establishment of a Communication Task Force.¹⁴

Although the FWC was expected to provide advice to TA consultants and supervisors implementation for each component was a responsibility of the consultants and supervisors and this led to serious challenges in terms of implementation and monitoring of these activities as by this point in implementation both consultants and supervisors were pre-occupied with other concerns.

Specific constraints to implementation included:

- Covid disruption
- Delays in finalisation and approval of TA consultant's C&V strategies
- End of TA contracts
- Limited cooperation of TA consultants and supervisors
- Limited implementation of the C&V plans by the TA consultants and sector institutions

Whilst identified risks included: i) limited 'buy-in'/ownership of C&V plan and ii) poor appreciation of the purpose and intended results of the C&V plan and some mitigation measures put in place (e.g., FWC capacity building and orientation of implementers) these measures did not prevail as there was poor communication/feedback between partners and FWC even with the intervention of EUD. In essence, the C&V component arrived too late in the implementation period to be fully effective, when TA and supervisors were coming to the end of their engagement (or otherwise distracted) or as an aid to policy dialogue in informing discussions and presenting supporting evidence of international best practices.

The project has increased relevance and visibility of UIPE towards its members and partners

There has been capacity building of your professionals (96) trained professionals in total

There has been increased relevance of Tertiary Institutions offering Engineering and Technical Training and market demand where around 250 Graduate Technicians in UTCs were trained.

Improvement of Human Resource capacity in the industry has been enhanced and job creation for the unemployed professionals in the industry. 96 trainees are undertaking training composed of and tripartite contracts between UIPE, Contracting Firms and the Trainees were signed for 30 female and 66 males (in all 15 Technicians, 3 Technologists and 78 Graduate Engineers). 11 UIPE GTP Supervisors have been selected, trained and deployed to monitor the Trainees. In addition, 60 of the Trainees have already been approved for UIPE Membership while the rest 36 are awaiting approval. In terms of employment, 39 contracting organisations have been identified and 146 places of placements secured. It should be noted that however, some 52 Trainees had opted out of the program for reasons varying from payments or other professional development. This presents a very high employee turnover rates and indicative of lack of stability and sustainability in the industry.

One of the outputs of the TA to UIPE saw the procurement of a new IT system, meant to make applications and registrations of membership easier and improving application and registration mechanisms

The new IT system was found to be relevant to the revised objective of the support to UIPE, which is: Increased relevance of UIPE to its Members and increased influence of UIPE with stakeholders. Notwithstanding issues of relevance and performances the evaluation evidenced the high level of interest attached by UIPE to TA support. UIPE commitment is reflected in the provision of several offices for the TA staff and each of the TA staff being provided a counterpart in the UIPE secretariat., the Programme could benefit the organization significantly, resulting in greater capacity and relevance to the sector but the direct impact in terms of increasing competitiveness of LCI through this TA is not evident. More elaborate strategic

¹¹ As an aside it was discovered that UNRA had also done work on this issue

¹² The C&V had 3 components. 1 C&V campaign elements to be implemented directly by FWC; 2 C&V activities to be implemented by TA consultants; 3 C&V activities to be implemented by supervisors (MoWT, UNRA, URF and UIPE)

¹³ Deliverables included: 1. Graphic Identity Manual; 2. PP template for presentation of programme; 3. Leaflets; 4. Motion graphic video; 5. Electrons 'save the date'; 6. Advocacy technical fact sheets; 7. Infographics; 8. Display board; 9. Photos and videos; 10. Edited videos; 11. Field missions; 12. Feature articles; 13. Digital campaign; 14. Media monitoring; 15. Attendance of mid-term Joint Transport Sector Review

¹⁴ Which, which in the event was never effectively utilised

intervention aimed at revamping the LCI and participation of Private Sector in Contracts and Contracts Management need to be articulated further.

1 2.2.2 – Perceptions of sector institutions, road users and beneficiaries regarding trends in service provision

Generally, there was a positive perception in regard to TA for UIPE. There was collaboration and coherence in coordination between key associations in the industry. The Uganda Association of Consulting Engineers (UACE) and UIPE almost share similar objectives in regards to membership. Whereas UACE is the association for companies UIPE acts for individual members. The UNABCEC, the Uganda Association of Building and Civil Engineering Contractors, represents interests of contractors. UACE and UNABCEC are associations caters and protects the commercial interests of their members in terms of business opportunities. Another stakeholder the Engineers Registration Board (ERB) is to regulate and control engineers and their activities in Uganda, and to advise Government in relation to those functions/ and also focuses on quality assurance of engineers. engineering practices and training provision. There are new industry associations that are coming up with new game changers and economic opportunities like Association of Uganda Oil and Gas Suppliers (AUGOS). It is proposed that the mission, objectives and functions of UIPE be clearly articulated in its Strategic Plan and Memorandum so as differentiate itself from other partner organisations in the sector including a coordination role as an overall Engineering discipline mobilizer for Local Construction industry. Overall, all the stakeholders in the industry have acknowledges the relevance of the TA which has improved the visibility of the LCI. However, there are more legal and Regulatory reforms that are need to promote this industry. In future programs there is need to consider outputs directly targeted at direct involvement of all the Private sector Associations directly involved in the LCI.

1 2.2.3 – Evidence of beneficiary institution commitment and ownership of programme activities and objectives (including management commitment and counterpart contribution)

There is evidence of variable beneficiary institution commitments and ownership of the programme activities and objectives (including management and individuals) although there is reported consensus that most trainees report better understanding of sector management structures.

TA to MoWT

Greater commitment and ownership were generated in Phase 2 when 33 counterparts were nominated from various sector institutions. However, a major (but not exclusive) thrust of the consultancy was production of reference documents (MT Evaluation of NITMP/GKMA and NITMP 2021-2040) thus limiting the potential generation of ownership.

TA to URF

There is only very limited reference to 'ownership' and 'commitment' in reporting documentation scrutinised and although commitment is mentioned in identified risks and assumptions for this component, such reference is to higher level government and political commitment.¹⁵

TA to UIPE

In general, there was visible ownership of the program which was exhibited through Policy Dialogue in promoting LCI and according reports and institutions policy objectives there is a lot of commitment and ownership of the programs.

However there has not been clear action plan, implementation and enforcement guidelines for the LCI policy.

- Local Construction Industry Policy 2010 remains the main reference document for promoting activities in the sector
- The policy however lacks clear action strategies and actions for the promotion of Local Content engagements in the sector.
- The NCI generally remains fragmented, unsupported due, in part, to lack of both a definitive Government policy and a strong institutional framework.
- The LCI Policy 2010 provides for the establishment of the Uganda Construction Industry Commission (UCICO) by an Act of Parliament by 2011 to promote and regulate the Construction Industry and promote the Local content of contractors. However, this action has not been achieved by the respective Ministry. There is need to have more strong Policy Dialogue on this issue if the country is deliberate to promote a strong Private Sector in the Construction Industry.

¹⁵ Including commitment to active transition of URF to a 2G Road Fund, institutional commitment to roll out of TSUs (and provision of counterpart funds), commitment to adequate maintenance funding and 'rebalancing' of the ratio of capital investment (of new construction) and recurrent expenditure (maintenance)

- LCI 2010, Provides for establishment of Procurement Rules and regulations to be incorporated in PPDA procurement Regulations making a provision for foreign Contractors and companies to form Joint Ventures or association with local companies or sub-contract the percentage of works & services to local contractors.
- The policy on LCI and Transport Sector Review report recommends a reservation Scheme for mandatory sub-contracting at a minimum of 20% of contract sum to local contractors and 30% of total fees & Expenses to Local Consultants.
- It was recommended for identification, registration and classification of local contractors

All the recommended actions aimed at promoting the LCI need to be monitored and actualised as they present the best way forward for the industry. Currently there are no clear enforceable Acts and Regulations for promoting the Local Construction Industry in Uganda.

1.2.2.4 – Trends in delivery of capital investment and road maintenance contracts

Delivery of capital investments and road maintenance depends on multiple factors. Given that the aims of the programme are to enhance capacity in sector agencies then obviously such results should deliver more effective management of the processes leading to works contracts and sector management such as ESMP (planning, programming, prioritisation, design, ESIA, ESMP, RAP) procurement, construction contractual issues, maintenance, road safety, axle load control and so on) and governance of sector institutions. However, certain policy decisions are outside the remit of the programme, sector institutions and DP (even though DPs are engaged in sector policy dialogue with GoU) such as allocations of funding for maintenance, modality for carrying out routine maintenance in districts (i.e., TSUs in DUCAR districts) 'balance' of capital investment (maintenance. Experience shows that these decisions risk being ineffective.

Using the UNRA Annual Performance Report FY2020/21 as the most recently available reference it is possible to assess delivery performance during that reporting period. Thus, using selected metrics from the Annual Workplan.

Objective	Indicator	Performance Rating¹⁶
Increase customer & stakeholder satisfaction	Km roads constructed	Meets expectations (ME)
	Km roads rehabilitated/reconstructed	ME
	Nr of bridges constructed	Exceeds expectations (EE)
	Routine maintenance (manual) km/paved roads	ME
	Routine maintenance (mechanised) km/paved roads	EE
	Routine maintenance improved roads/km (manual)	ME
	Routine maintenance improved roads/km (mechanical)	Poor (P)
	Periodic maintenance Paved roads/km	P
	Periodic maintenance unpaved roads/km	EE
	% Reduction of overloading	ME
	Proportion of local firms awarded contracts	ME
	Proportion of contracts sub-contracted to local firms	ME

It may be seen from this sample that routine maintenance of unpaved roads using mechanical methods (i.e., TSUs/DUCAR approach) and periodic maintenance of paved roads have unsatisfactory performances (in fact in this reporting period zero periodic maintenance of paved roads was actually carried out).

1.2.2.5 – Trends in budgetary adequacy of routine and periodic maintenance compared with needs

Trends in budgetary adequacy of routine and periodic maintenance compared with needs are not encouraging. Routine maintenance continues to be chronically under-funded in Uganda compared to other African countries¹⁷.

In terms of trends in maintenance funding adequacy compared with needs over the 'life' of the 11EDF NIP (signed 2016) the following figures are reported:¹⁸

2015/16	45%
2016/17	54%
2017/18	45%
2018/19	52%
2019/20	47%
2020/21	52%

(It is suggested that more recent figures may be an over-estimate as the 'budget required' figure on which the calculation is based has remained unchanged since FY 2017/18).

¹⁶ >100% target – Exceeds expectations (EE); 80- 100% target – Meets expectations (ME); 60-79% target – Fair (F); <60% - Poor (P)

¹⁷ i.e., Uganda – USD 867/km compared to Namibia (USD 3487/km i.e., 4x), Western Cape RSA (USD 7869/km i.e., 9X), Kenya (USD 3716 i.e., 4.3X), Tanzania (USD 4009/km i.e., 4.6X).

¹⁸ Source: Annual Performance Report FY 2020/21 UNRA

It is not clear how the programme may have been expected to influence availability of maintenance funding except by demonstrating more effective use of available funds thus encouraging greater allocations would be well-used without significant 'losses' and/or by associated advocacy and policy dialogue. Given that this line of dialogue has been a constant theme of sector policy discussions going back much further than 2015, it can only be concluded that in this respect policy dialogue has failed.

As for UIPE on average raises 400 million Uganda shillings from its membership which does not adequately cover its budgetary requirements including administrative costs, Technical Training and capacity building and corporate training. The Strategic Plan should however be streamlined to include clear vision, timeframes, targets for outputs and cost centres for each of the targeted deliverables. Most of the Membership especially Engineering Students and Technicians register for membership with great expectations of finding employment and placements and later drop out once their expectations are not fulfilled. This cause inconsistency in membership and subscription collections. UIPE is still heavily dependent on external funding for most of its operations. Increasing its relevancy and internal mechanisms for revenue generation remains of key priority for sustainability and strengthening of the Institution.

1 2.2.6 – Evidence of increased competitiveness and involvement of the local construction industry in the national transport sector

There is no evidence of increased competitiveness and involvement of the local construction industry in the national transport sector as an outcome of this programme or in absolute terms. The move towards mandatory use of force account/direct labour operations (using Japanese and Chinese heavy equipment) excludes local contractors from a potentially significant part of their market, as these relatively low-value maintenance works on rural roads, would be appropriate for local contractors (as opposed to large capital investment infrastructure construction). Also, the lack of open competition, lack of transparency regarding costs, reportedly ineffective and inefficient implementation and PFM issues makes comparisons of 'value for money' impossible. This policy is also contrary to NTMP and NITMP policies regarding development of local construction capacities and hire pools.

The NTMP had called for increased contracting out of maintenance in order to develop local contractors' capacity and a "more effective maintenance performance" (Par 6.4, art 6-21). This has been overruled by government decree

Introduction Road Reform in Uganda has been in progress for well over a decade. When the Uganda Road Fund Act 2008 was enacted, the expectations then were that the sector reforms would include: • Functional separation, whereby the Ministry responsible for roads would focus only on policy, long term planning, regulations and standards and performance monitoring and reporting. • The formation of new 'arm's length' road infrastructure agencies to plan, finance, manage and maintain the road network, namely a Road Fund and Road Agency. • The creation of a road user charging system to raise revenue from road users for road maintenance purposes, creating a clear linkage between a service and the cost of providing it. • Works implementation by the private sector through competitive bidding to improve efficiency in the construction and maintenance of roads, so as to reduce the cost of road infrastructure to Government, and the country as a whole

There was no clear indication by UIPE of clear outcomes and indicators that were obtained arising from this component.

According to the UIPE 2020-2024 Strategic Plan, it had a total membership of 4,355 (29 Fellows members, 895 Corporate Members, 6 Honorary Members, 66 Technologists, 55 Technicians, 1,125 Graduate Members and 2,179 Student Members). As at 31st August 2022, UIPE had a total of 3,631 members excluding students. There are 30 Fellows, 1,313 Corporate Members, 6 Honorary Members, 1,942 Graduate Members, 85 Technologists and 147 Technicians. Marketing Strategies of UIPE programs, branding, publicity plans and new information dissemination strategies has been upgraded and some effort has seen increase in membership registration especially more members are now registering from UIPE regional branches. For instance, Mbarara branch saw an increase from 20 members to almost 150 members since 2019 to 2022. Increased UIPE influence acts in regards to improved collaboration with other key stakeholders has been initiated where UIPE has established a contact desk at UNRA to lobby for the LCI. However not much impact is being witnessed in terms of securing more contracts due to insufficient enforcement mechanisms and lack of enforceable legal and regulatory frameworks for promoting Local Contractors and Consultants. Engineers Registration Enhancement Program (EREP) was to be put in place but it has not been well effected, there has been some increase in Membership noted over the years. A sustainable and well-structured program need to be developed followed by the retention plan to justify benefits for members in the industry. In terms of No. of Engineers and Technicians secured contracts with Contract firms, Final training agreements with trainees and Industrial placements were Organised. There has been capacity building of your professionals (96) trained professionals in total There has been increased relevance of Tertiary Institutions offering Engineering and Technical Training and market demand where around 250 Graduate Technicians in UTCs were trained. Improvement of Human Resource capacity in the industry has been enhanced and job creation for the unemployed professionals in the industry.96 trainees are undertaking training composed of and tripartite

contracts between UIPE, Contracting Firms and the Trainees were signed for 30 female and 66 male (in all 15 Technicians, 3 Technologists and 78 Graduate Engineers).¹¹ UIPE GTP Supervisors have been selected, trained and deployed to monitor the Trainees. In addition, 60 of the Trainees have already been approved for UIPE Membership while the rest 36 are awaiting approval. In terms of employment, 39 contracting organisations have been identified and 146 places of placements secured.

EQ3: To what extent has the Transport Sector Institutional Capacity Building Programme design and implementation been conducive to an efficient delivery of expected results?

J.C.3.1 – Organisation, management, coordination and delivery of EC services (EUD and BXL) has facilitated project implementation and achievement of results

SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE

I 3.1.1– Time periods between programme planning, preparation and intervention implementation for all components

The time periods between programme planning, preparation and intervention implementation have been subject to various interruptions and extensions. The 11EDF NIP¹⁹ was signed in Dec 2014 and the Financing Agreement for this programme was signed in Nov/Dec 2016 with a start date of 08/12/2017.

TA to URF

The TA contract was signed in December 2017²⁰ with three subsequent contract addenda:

- Addendum nr. 1 09/02/2018 confirmed an implementation period of 24 months (i.e., 08/12/2017 – 08/12/2019)
- Addendum nr. 2 16/07/2018 revised provision for incidental expenditure from EUR 0.4 M to EUR 0.3 M
- Addendum nr. 3 28/11/2019 extended the implementation period to 28 months (i.e., to 08/04/2020) together with commensurate COST increase (within original ceiling).

An Administrative Order 06/06/2019 instructed the TA to undertake a study of 'Institutional and Funding Models for URF' (but with no change to component resources which led to the suspension of TA activities on various OTHER on-going activities). A further Administrative Order suspended TA services from 03/04/2020 for 90 days due to Force Majeure.²¹ During the period of suspension the contract period (Addendum nr. 3) expired. Following a (remote) meeting with MoFPED on 26/08/2020²² it was concluded that there was no consensus on extension of the TA contract and on 18/10/2022 HOC EUD formally notified the NAO that the TA would not be extended and that a Final Report should be submitted by the consultant.

TA to MoWT²³

The TA team started Phase 1 (evaluation of NTMP/GKMA) on 29/01/2018 (IR February 2018) with completion September 2018. Phase 2 commenced Feb 2019 (NITMP) with completion in April 2021.

TA to UIPE

According to the progress report for the TA there were some delays in project execution due to unforeseen situations in UIPE. Some related with re-identification of Experts, change of UIPE leadership and decision-making processes and Covid epidemic related delays.

I 3.1.2 – Implementation physical progress compared with programme for all components

Implementation physical progress compared with programme (as regards deliverables and outputs) has

¹⁹ It may be recalled that the original EU proposal for 11EDF was a move away from the transport sector as a FS (which came as a surprise to sector partners (local and international alike) and their reaction was almost entirely negative (although support to rural roads as a component of EU support to rural development was expected to continue to some extent. Gou at the highest level (along with some other African countries) actively insisted that support to the transport sector should continue, and in the case of Uganda, transport sector support was included as Focal Area 1.

²⁰ 3 years after signature of the NIP, one year after signature of the FA

²¹ Due to notification by the Contracting Authority 03/04/2020 of Force Majeure event (Covid 19) under GCC 38

²² EUD requested MoFPED to decide on how it wished to proceed in terms of options presented by the consultant whilst MoFPED wished the study of Institutional and Funding Models for URF to be completed as the basis of such decision making

²³ Although an Inception Report has been made available to the Evaluation no progress reports and Final Report detailing use of TA resources, implementation progress, deliverables etc are available. During a Scoping meeting with the Project Director TA to MoWTY (Cowi) on 04/08/2022 the evaluation was advised that this was a 'Lump Sum' contract and there was no contractual requirement to provide such reporting. Thus, at this stage, pending receipt of some further documentation from Cowi, it is not possible to detail implementation history in greater detail.

suffered delays in most components.

TA to URF

In addition to formal deliverables²⁴, technical notes were prepared as follows:

Report	Draft	Final
Fund allocation	11/05/2018	19/11/2018
TNA & Training Programme	26/07/2018	28/11/2018
Review of HR manual	26/07/2018	20/12/2018
Reviews of Board Manual	03/08/2018	
Training Plan (with TR2)	26/07/2018	04/10/2018
RMMoS Status and Future Direction	01/10/2018	
IDSS 'As-is' Report	01/10/2018	
Study of Institutional and Funding Models for URF		
Scoping Report	09/10/2019	02/12/2019
Interim Report	30/01/2020	
Final Report	01/02/2022	

It is clear the impact of the latter 'additional' study on activities connected to other studies. Physical progress has also been constrained by institutional issues (in URF conflict between the Board and Executive Director) whilst MoFPED has not demonstrated support for the proposed 'direction of travel' for some support activities (especially the study on 'Institutional and Finding models for URF' and has refrained from comment on reports when so invited).

TA to MoWT²⁵

Report	Draft	Final
Evaluation of NTMP/GKMA	Sept 2018	
NITMP	April 2021	
Functional Transport Planning		
Office		
Mainstreaming SEA		

The UIPE TA saw 30 females and 66 Male Graduates were enlisted in the GTP. However, the initial target was to enrol 120 unemployed Graduates (100 Graduate Engineers and 20 Technicians).

Currently 96 trainees are undertaking training composed of and tripartite contracts between UIPE, Contracting Firms and the Trainees were signed for 30 female and 66 males (in all 15 Technicians, 3 Technologists and 78 Graduate Engineers).

11 UIPE GTP Supervisors have been selected, trained and deployed to monitor the Trainees. In addition, 60 of the Trainees have already been approved for UIPE Membership while the rest 36 are awaiting approval. In terms of employment, 39 contracting organisations have been identified and 146 places of placements secured. It should be noted that however, some 52 Trainees had opted out of the program for reasons varying from payments or other professional development. This presents a very high employee turnover rates and indicative of lack of stability and sustainability in the industry.

In terms of No. of Engineers and Technicians secured contracts with Contract firms, Final training agreements with trainees and Industrial placements were Organised. There has been capacity building of your professionals (96) trained professionals in total There has been increased relevance of Tertiary Institutions offering Engineering and Technical Training and market demand where around 250 Graduate Technicians in UTCs were trained. Improvement of Human Resource capacity in the industry has been enhanced and job creation for the unemployed professionals in the industry. 96 trainees are undertaking training composed of and tripartite contracts between UIPE, Contracting Firms and the Trainees were signed for 30 female and 66 male (in all 15 Technicians, 3 Technologists and 78 Graduate Engineers). 11 UIPE GTP Supervisors have been selected, trained and deployed to monitor the Trainees. In addition, 60 of the Trainees have already been approved for UIPE Membership while the rest 36 are awaiting approval. In terms of employment, 39 contracting organisations have been identified and 146 places of placements secured.

1.3.1.3 - Evidence of EC procedures (e.g., procurement) facilitating/hampering implementation

See also 1.3.1.1 above.

There was a two-year gap between signing of the 11EDP NIP in December 2014 and signing of the FA in

²⁴ Inception Report, Quarterly & 6 monthly Progress Reports, Draft Final Report and Final Report

²⁵ In the absence of further information on TA implementation progress (see reference above) at this stage it is not possible to give delivery dates

Nov/Dec 2016 for this capacity building programme. Thereafter the contracts for the individual programme components were signed as follows:

TA to URF – December 2017

TA to MoWT – December 2017

TA to UNRA – December 2017

Support to LCI – Service Contract: December 2017; Grant Contract: December 2019

This timeline suggests that EU procedures for procurement did not hamper implementation progress. Thereafter, implementation progress of the component varied (and all were affected by the Covid pandemic) but it is concluded that EU procedures were not a major contributory factor in implementation delays.

1.3.1.4 – Disbursement performance compared with project budget (timeliness and costs)

Detailed information on disbursement performance is not (yet) available for all components.

TA to URF

Item	Budget Addendum 3/EUR	Actual/EUR	
Fees	746000	745100	99.9%
NKE	517530	515460	99.6%
Total Fees	1263530	1260560	99.8%
Incidentals	300265	192296	64.0%
Lump sum (training materials)	6000	0	0%
Audit etc	30000	16154	53.8%
Total	1599795	1469010	91.8%

TA to MoWT

Phase	Budget/EUR	Actual/EUR
Phase 1		
Pre-financing		299999
Approved FR		456001
Total Phase 1		756000
Phase 2		
Pre-financing		1222000
Interim payment		916500
Balance		916500
Total Phase 2		3055000
Grand Total	4300000 ²⁶	3811000 ²⁷

UIPE disbursement included

Total contract amount of EUR 1,450,043 which included

EUR 1,159,863 FOR Experts fees

EUR 290,180 for Capacity Building workshops and other incidentals

1.3.1.5 – Stakeholder institutional perceptions of efficiency of EU procedures for project preparation, procurement, monitoring and back-up

In regard to the TA to UIPE and the LCI, the policy dialogue discussions have not had a lot of impact in actualising and promoting the industry.

- The LCI Policy 2010 provides for the establishment of the Uganda Construction Industry Commission (UCICO) by an Act of Parliament by 2011 to promote and regulate the Construction Industry and promote the Local content of contractors. However, this action has not been achieved by the respective Ministry. There is need to have more strong Policy Dialogue on this issue if the country is deliberate to promote a strong Private Sector in the Construction Industry.
- LCI 2010, Provides for establishment of Procurement Rules and regulations to be incorporated in PPDA procurement Regulations making a provision for foreign Contractors and companies to form Joint Ventures or association with local companies or sub-contract the percentage of works & services to local contractors. No action on this has been evidently recorded and enforced to that effect.

²⁶ Financing Agreement

²⁷ Source: MTE – Final Report

- All these actions have not been realised and the Policy dialogue could put more emphasis of some of these actions for actual implementation.

J.C 3.2 – Technical assistance provided to each project component has positively contributed to implementation and achievement of results

SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE

1 3.2.1 – Evidence of technology transfer, improved performance (and potential sustainability of function)

There is evidence supporting the transfer of technology having improved institutional capacities (but not necessarily sustainability of function given continuing funding deficits, high staff turnover and national decisions regarding sector institutions [UNRA and URF] and maintenance modalities). This enhancement of capacities has been supported by technical management and staff, less so by representational management (including some Board members) and there is reported 'ownership' of such technical techniques. However, whilst there was adequate monitoring and measurement of outputs (i.e., assists monitoring of implementation efficiency), quantification of outcome results was less sure and the degree to which the programme may have contributed to such results (i.e., effectiveness) is less clear considering the individual components.

TA to MoWT

A large proportion of TA effort was devoted to delivery of two major reports (i.e. Phase 1 – Evaluation of NTMP/GKMA; Phase 2 – NITMP) such that capacity development efforts in Phase 1 were generally subordinate to these activities (and the design of this phase did not focus on capacity development to any great extent as capacity development activities, outputs and deliverables were not specified).²⁸ Phase 2 activities were more focussed on capacity development both from the priorities of NITMP and establishment of the Planning Department (and application of SEA) including the nomination of 33 counterparts from MoWT and other sector institutions

TA to URF

TA to URF has delivered a large proportion of expected deliverables albeit that overall implementation efficiency was compromised by Covid, institutional difficulties (dispute between Board and Executive Director and uncertainty over URF future) and TA services were eventually suspended due to declaration of Force Majeure and expiry of TA services contract during that suspension. Also, efficiency of activities was compromised by the additional task of preparation of the 'Institutional and Funding Model for URF' to the detriment of other activities. It is reported that satisfaction was expressed with TA performance efficiency by EUD and URF²⁹ (with mention being made of team-building exercises) whilst on the other hand suggesting the time period of TA support was somewhat limited to realistically achieve expected results (especially given high levels of URF turnover).³⁰ URF (and TA to URF) involvement in roll out of TSUs to DUCAR districts has been limited (as this roll out is the subject of a different consultancy) but, given the essential role of TSUs in maintenance this 'side-lining' by URF has not improved efficiency or maintenance operations as a whole.

TA to UIPE:

One of the outputs of the TA is the procurement of a new IT system, meant to make applications and registrations of membership easier. Improving application and registration mechanisms the new IT system was found to be relevant to the revised objective of the support to UIPE, which is: Increased relevance of UIPE to its Members and increased influence of UIPE with stakeholders. Notwithstanding issues of relevance and performances the evaluation evidenced the high level of interest attached by UIPE to TA support. UIPE commitment is reflected in the provision of several offices for the TA staff and each of the TA staff being provided a counterpart in the UIPE secretariat., the Programme could benefit the organization significantly, resulting in greater capacity and relevance to the sector but the direct impact in terms of increasing competitiveness of LCI through this TA is not evident. More elaborate strategic intervention aimed at revamping the LCI and participation of Private Sector in Contracts and Contracts Management need to be articulated further.

1 3.2.2 – Comparison of TA provided with needs assessment

Broadly, TA resources amended were appropriate for expected activities³¹ although there was limited

²⁸ It is reported that TA staff were not initially based in MoWT during Phase 1

²⁹ Although quality of STE outputs was reportedly somewhat variable with multiple revisions of some deliverables being required

³⁰ Although it has been suggested that such turnover is due at least in part due to better capacitated URF personnel being attracted to private sector employment (i.e., capitalising on enhanced skills

³¹ Although keeping in mind that TA activities were aimed at only a proportion of overall sector institutional needs

evidence of needs assessments including BLs being carried out before the start of TA contracts.³² Also the needs of the private sector (and competitiveness) were not clearly articulated in terms of how the 'Support to LCI' component was expected to address said needs. That being said the programme did, on the whole, address sector institutional needs efficiently. (Relevance to needs is discussed in EQ1). Although not directly related to TA resources compared with needs, the resources devoted to complementary policy dialogue should also be considered.

TA to MoWT

TA services were adequate for the specified needs (strategic planning and oversight for multi modal transport sector) as expressed in the specified outputs (Evaluation of NTMP/GKMA and NITMP 2021-2040), rather less so as regards capacity building activities (especially Phase 1³³).

TA to URF

Whilst TA resources could be considered as adequate for the targeted capacity needs (with the exception of support TSUs which was a somewhat 'open ended' task albeit necessary for better maintenance effectiveness in rural areas) until the disruptions of Covid (governance issues arising from the internal Board disputes and the additional requirement for the study on 'Institutional and Funding Models for URF'.

TA to UIPE

The TA provided should have covered or incorporated all key stakeholders in the Local construction industry to include interventions aimed at increasing physical participation of local contractors in the sector contracts and service provision. Additional future TA and Capacity building need to be well focused to address the real needs and uplifting the Local Contractors. The problem has to be well targeted and focused to directly impact the capacity of the Local Contractors and Consultants to compete for Works and services in the industry. Other critical stakeholders which could create program impact in the long run include; Uganda Association of Consulting Engineers (UACE),

Federation of Uganda Consultants (FUCO), Uganda National Association of Building & Civil Engineering Contractors (UNEBCEC), Uganda Society of Architects (USA), Uganda Institute of Surveyors of Uganda (ISU), Uganda Institute of Physical Planners (UIPP), Engineers Registration Board (ERB), Architects Registration Board (ARB). However, through UIPE collaboration UACE, and UNABCEC were involved in the training of UTC Final Graduates in technical skills for Contracts.

1.3.2.3 – Evidence of achieving 'lessons learned' during project implementation (e.g., ROM, MTE)

There is little or limited evidence of application or achievement of 'lessons learned' during project implementation. MTE listed a total of 11 lessons but are these referred to lessons to be applied in design of future similar support projects rather than in the resulting implementation periods (which were disrupted by Covid anyway).

TA to UNRA

Specific recommendations were made by MTE for this component, most of which were not achieved (or achieved in part) as summarised below:

- a) MoFPED to launch financing of additional TSUs – not achieved
- b) URF to launch procurement for additional TSUs in 2019 – no information
- c) TSU consultant to be well advanced by end 2019 – limited action
- d) Once TSU consultants are contracted, a 6-month limited cost extension for TA should be granted – overtaken by events (suspension of TA contract due to Force Majeure and contract time expiry during suspension)
- e) EUD to receive request for extension from ANO 3 months before end of TA contract – as d) above
- f) RMMoS to be procured by Feb 2020 and training (T of T) to be provided to URF and TSUs from March 2020 – TA activity on RMMs withdrawn to prepare study 'Institutional and Funding Models for URF'
- g) If not accepted and acted upon by URFD and NAO when the timeframe contract should be ended as schedules (97/12/2019) – as d) and e) above

TA to MoWT

Specific recommendations were made by MTE for this component, all of which were reportedly achieved to some extent.

- a) TA to be integrated in MoWT – TA team operated from MoWT during Phase 2
- b) Deepen participation of the Ministry – partially achieved
- c) Strengthen participatory approach for TA services – achieved to limited extent
- d) Identification of national counterparts to start Phase 2 – 33 staff nominated to work with TA consultant (COWI)³⁴

³² WB undertook a 'Diagnostic Study of UNRA Transformation' in 2019 which provided a basis for consultation with UNRA on perceived needs

³³ In a scoping meeting with the Cowi Project Director it was explained that this was a Fixed Price contract which, due to logistical issues resulting from Covid (and other reasons) required considerably more inputs and resources than originally expected

³⁴ 28 from MoWT, 2 from UNRA, 2 from CAA, 1 from URC (letter MoWT 04/06/2019)

TA to URF

Conclusions and Recommendations Based on their investigations, based on an overall positive assessment of relevance, delivery and perceived benefits for the three Institutional Components there is need to improve needs assessment and design and for strengthening result orientation, measurability and monitoring of capacity development outcomes. The following recommendations are made in respect of the TA to URF: a) MoFPED to launch the financing of additional TSUs, b) URF to launch procurement for additional TSUs in 2019 and the next financial year; c) TSU Consultant procurement to be well advanced by end of 2019; d) Once TSU consultants are contracted, 6 months

limited cost extension for the TA should be granted; e) EUD must receive request for an extension from NAO three months before the TA contract was scheduled to end; f) RMMS to be procured by February 2020 and training in it - Training of Trainers – is to be provided to URF and existing and newly contracted TSUs, commencing March 2020. g) If not accepted and acted upon by URF and NAO within the timeframe, the contract should be brought to an end as scheduled (then 7 December 2019)

TA to UIPE

The Needs for the LCI in future be assessed based on the ability of the institutions to directly being able to advocate with government institutions to increase the allocation of contracts and Consultancy works to the Private Sector directly. There is need to advocate for the addressing of the Regulatory and legal frameworks to have clear cut guidelines for promoting LCI.

J.C. 3.3 – The choice of programme implementation modality, governance, management mechanisms and resources allocated have adequately addressed Ugandan sector institutional needs, capacities and constraints

SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE

1.3.3.1 – Quality of monitoring and reporting of project implementation progress (including adequacy of monitoring indicators and BL information)

The quality of monitoring and reporting information as set out in the Intervention Logics and LFM for various programme components is comprehensive as regards outputs and implementation progress by comparison with BL values and targets. However, for higher level results such as outcomes, measurement is less sure, even allowing for the elapsed time necessary for application of outputs to achieve expected results. Programme design did not consider measurability of even direct outcomes (or impacts) adequately and the TA teams were otherwise engaged in overcoming constraints to their activities (not least due to Covid) to be engaged in monitoring and reporting except as contractually required. The most difficult results to capture or quantify change were institutional performance, capacities and governance. However, all components involved development or improvement of M&E Frameworks (e.g., NITMP 2021-2040 has an M&E Framework (Sub-programme level; TA to UNRA developed a M&E framework covering individual and departmental performances; TA to URF started (and abandoned) work on RMMS for road maintenance). Direct oversight and monitoring of the programme as a whole was carried out by the Steering Committee (which comprised representatives of sector stakeholders, civil society and transport users.

In terms of overall relevance of the capacity building, most institutions were satisfied with the TA.

UNRA: The Capacity building program was relevant and practical. It addressed very critical areas which have been deficient in UNRA in regard to Compensation, Procurement, Audits, PPPs, Contract Management and Cross cutting social issues.

MoWT: The capacity building saw the Ministry Prepared a National Integrated Transport Master Plan which is a landmark strategic document for the Sector. However other Capacity building components aimed at strengthening capacity of staff was perceived as very short, not well sought out and hence created little impact.

URF: The Capacity for URF was beneficial and focused through it only benefited the few top management categories, it was not spread across the institution. Also, some of the Components in the TA such as TSUs, Road maintenance planning capacity were not well focused to achieve maximum benefits. As it was indicated as one of the actions for instance there were no physical TSUs established on the ground, the main action was to do days trainings of some selected District Road maintenance staff.

UIPE: One of the outputs of the TA is the procurement of a new IT system, meant to make applications and registrations of membership easier. Improving application and registration mechanisms The new IT system was found to be relevant to the revised objective of the support to UIPE, which is: Increased relevance of UIPE to its Members and increased influence of UIPE with stakeholders. Notwithstanding issues of relevance and performances the evaluation evidenced the high level of interest attached by UIPE to TA support. UIPE commitment is reflected in the provision of several offices for the TA staff and each of the TA staff being provided a counterpart in the UIPE secretariat., the Programme could benefit the organization significantly, resulting in greater capacity and relevance to the sector but the direct impact in terms of increasing competitiveness of LCI through this TA is not evident. More elaborate strategic intervention aimed at revamping the LCI and participation of Private Sector in Contracts and Contracts

Management need to be articulated further.

1 3.3.2 – Evidence of ‘feedback’ action being taken to expedite implementation progress (in case of remedial actions being flagged)

There is evidence of ‘feedback’ action being taken to facilitate progress and/or mitigate constraints but such action has not always been timely (or pro-active). The main channels for such ‘feedback’ have been the monitoring by EUD and the Steering Committee which has responsibility for oversight and validation of overall direction, policy and implementation of the programme although there is an impression that the SC has operated in practice as a means for MoWT to monitor sector institutions. Although issues have been reported (by TA teams) as they chase the timing of SC meetings³⁵ (at best 6-monthly intervals but then disrupted by Covid) did not permit prompt consideration of such issues as they arise. Also, a finding of the MTE was that there was inadequate follow-up on the resolutions of the SC – this evaluation concurs with this finding (even though the Covid disruptions were a contributory factor). Also hinted at in minutes of SC meetings is a sense of frustration by a committed EUD that issues were not being addressed by the SC as expected. Examples of issues where decisive SC action could have contributed to implementation effectiveness include:

- Support to LCI – lack of progress³⁶ was noted in successive SC meetings but there was little or no SC follow-up
- SC1 requested for information on the delayed roll-out of TSUs to DUCAR districts and without response, SC3 repeated the request. URF promised response to EUD but only towards the end of the TA contract period.³⁷
- The report (by URF TA) on ‘Institutional and Funding Models for URF’ was noted in SC4 as not complete considering only a progress report on composition of study team, methodology and stakeholder views.

On the other hand, progress of the TA to MoWT and TA to UNRA components was reported to SC apparently without comment (which was reportedly expanded by TA teams).

Although civil society (CISCOT) was represented in SC meetings there is little or no reference to such participation in minutes of SC meetings. Although the SC and Project Management Committees (PMCs) for the programme components were arguably aimed as different ‘levels’ of involvement (SC – higher level direction and policy/strategies for effectively achieving outcomes; PMCs were more hands-on regarding implementation) both contributed to programme governance.

Programme support strengthened individual and organizational capacities for the 4 targeted institutions Civil Society and users of transport facilities were involved in monitoring and directing the Programme, through CISCOTs participation in the Steering Committee.

Steering Committee and management Committee roles and capacities need to be strengthened for pro-active guidance and follow up of programme outcomes. The role in inter service coordination and policy dialogue needs as well to be reinforced (JC2)

Programme Governance the Programme Steering Committee has been following up implementation and addressed key issues. All the organizations of the Transport Sector have participated regularly in the Meetings. In some cases, it appears that there was not adequate follow up on the indications of the Steering Committee:

The Steering Committee asked UIPE for a plan to approach the private sector to achieve the goals, but this request does not appear to have been responded to.

The Steering Committee took up the issue of the roll out of the TSUs, but again it appears a lack of follow up.

- The study of Institutional and Funding Models for the Uganda Road Fund – this has been followed up. The Steering Committee has been following implementation in terms of contractual deliverables. The governance of the programme did not focus on the steering function of outcomes and expected changes of capacities and institutional performances

Annex 9 Steering Committee and Project Management Committee Meetings

The Steering Committee appears to function as a forum enabling the MoWT to monitor progress in its sector institutions. It is noteworthy that the first Steering Committee asked the UIPE for clarification on how the local construction industry was going to be supported. However, the UIPE does not appear to have answered the question. At the time of the MTE, a third Inception Report had been submitted, and it has just been approved. However, the UIPE has similar management plans in place to those of the other three beneficiaries, which draws on representatives of the private sector and UIPE’s senior officers. Furthermore, at the initial Steering Committee meeting, the EUD informed the meeting that a grant will be signed with the UIPE, following the building of their financial capacity. Therefore, the UIPE, IMC success of the service contract is necessary for the signature of the grant contract. This may explain why the UIPE does not feel that it can control the TA. In the course of the Steering Committee meetings, the three operational TA provided regular updates of progress achieved and challenges experienced. This was provided by the Ugandan partners in the cooperation,

³⁵ 27/03/2018, 24/09/2018, 08/04/2019, 31/01/2020, 22/02/2022 – although no minutes have been scrutinised for this most recent SC meeting

³⁶ Problems included high TA staff turnover (by the 3rd SC meeting the entire TA team had been replaced including TL) and lack of clarity how the LCI private sector might directly benefit from the TA to UIPE

³⁷ In fact, there was brief discussion of this issue in SC4 31/01/2020

supported by the consultants

The TA to UIPE was characterized by high staff turnover. By the third SC meeting, the entire TA team had been replaced including the two Team Leaders. The absence of any real progress in the UIPE contract was noted by the Steering Committee. But the Steering Committee did not take action on the lack of progress and the lack of a logical framework indicating how the private sector was going to be covered by the TA contract. The first Steering Committee meeting also asked for clarification of URF's support to District Engineers through the roll out of planned Technical Support Units (TSUs). This topic was raised again in the third SC meeting. The URF undertook to write to the EUD communicating the organization's plans to establish more TSUs by December 2019. December 2019, which is when the current TA contract ends.

1.3.3.3 – Evidence of consideration of alternative modalities at project preparation stage

Alternative modalities were considered at project preparation stage, as discussed in the Finance Agreement. Implementation modalities considered included:

- Grant: direct award/direct management for 'Implementation of the GTP'.
- Procurement (direct management) for 'Support to LCI' i.e., TA services
- Indirect management with partner country (NAO as contracting authority for procurement and grant procedures) for TA to MoWT, TA to UNRA, TA to URF (with provision to change from indirect to direct management mode due to exceptional circumstances should the NAO be unable to fulfil its role for indirect management).

Extract from Financing Agreement dated December 2016

2. Implementation

2.1 Implementation modalities

2.1.1 Grant: direct award 'Implementation of the Graduate Traineeship Programme' (direct management)

(a) Objectives of the grant, fields of intervention, priorities of the year and expected results

The grant will be one of the modalities for achievement of Result 4: Increased competitiveness of the local construction industry in the transport sector, under the Support to the Local Construction Industry component. The main objective of the grant is to have a highly attractable/skilled local workforce in the transport sector through supplementing the salaries of fresh graduates from engineering colleges and universities to practice engineering. Currently, most engineering graduates are drawn to other professions such as banking and auditing, due to their lack of practical experience and/or low salaries offered in the engineering profession in Uganda. Therefore, this action will not only offer the graduates a platform for practical training but also leverage for attracting gainful employment in the future. Accordingly, the expected result of the action is increased local content/expertise in transport sector projects.

Within this grant financial support to 3rd parties may take place in the form of:

- Salary subventions, of up to 50%, for a maximum of one hundred graduate engineers and technicians in the first year of the action
- Salary subventions, of up to 25%, for a maximum of one hundred graduate engineers and technicians in the second year of the action

The grant will also cover:

- Administrative costs for quarterly monitoring visits by Professional Support Officers (PSOs) and overall management of the program

(b) Justification of a direct grant

Under the responsibility of the Commission's authorising officer responsible, the grant may be awarded without a call for proposals to the Uganda Institution of Professional Engineers (UIPE).

Under the responsibility of the Commission's authorising officer responsible, the recourse to an award of a grant without a call for proposals is justified because the beneficiary is in a legal monopoly situation (Article 190(1) (C) of RAP). In accordance with the Engineers Registration Act (E>RA Cap 271) which provides for the registration of engineers in Uganda, membership to the UIPE is recognised by the board as furnishing a sufficient guarantee of academic knowledge of, and practical experience in engineering. Accordingly, the UIPE is mandated to promote the general advancement of the science and practice of engineering and its applications, and to facilitate the exchange of information and ideas for that purpose.

(c) Maximum rate of co-financing

The maximum possible rate of co-financing for this grant is 76.64%.

In accordance with Articles 192 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 if full funding is essential for the action to be carried out, the maximum possible rate of co-financing may be increased up to 100%. The essentiality of full funding will be justified by the Commission's authorising officer responsible in the award decision, in respect of the principles of equal treatment and sound financial management.

(f) Indicative trimester to conclude the grant agreement

Third trimester of the year 2017

2.1.2 Procurement (direct management)

Subject in generic terms, if possible	Type (works, supplies, services)	Indicative number of contracts	Indicative trimester of launch of the procedure
Support to the	Services	1	Second trimester - 2017

Local Construction Industry			
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2.1.3 Indirect management with the partner country

A part of this action with the objective of support to the line ministry and public institutions in the transport sector may be implemented in indirect management with the Republic of Uganda (in particular the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, the NAO in Uganda) in accordance with Article 58(1)(C) of the Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 applicable in accordance with Article 17 of Regulations (EU) 2015/323 according to the following modalities:

The partner country will act as the contracting authority for the procurement and grant procedures. The Commission will control ex ante all the procurement and grant procedures. Payments are executed by the Commission.

In accordance with Article 190(2)(b) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 and Article 262(3) of Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1268/2012 applicable in accordance with Article 36 of the Regulation (EU) 2015/323 and Article 19C(1) of Annex IV to the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement, the partner country shall apply procurement rules of Chapter 3 of Title IV of Part Two of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012. These rules, as well as rules on grant procedures in accordance with Article 193 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 applicable in accordance with Article 17 of the Regulation (EU) 2015/323, will be laid down in the financing agreement concluded with the partner country.

a) Overview of implementation

Activity/objective/result, include location	Type of financing (works, supplies, or service contract, grant, programme estimate)
Technical Assistance to the Ministry of Works and Transport, Uganda (nationwide)	Service contract
Technical Assistance to the Uganda National Roads Authority, Uganda (nationwide)	Service contract
Technical Assistance to the Uganda Road Fund, Uganda (nationwide)	Service contract

2.1.4 Changes from indirect to direct management mode due to exceptional circumstances

If for circumstances outside of the Commission's control, the NAO cannot fulfil its role for indirect management as listed above in the section 2.1.3, it is proposed to follow procurement under direct management for the abovementioned components targeted to public sector institutions (TA to MoWT, UNRA and URF).

Subject in generic terms, if possible	Type (Works, supplies, services)	Indicative number of contracts	Indicative trimester of launch of the procedure
Technical Assistance to the Ministry of Works and Transport	Services	1	4 th trimester 2016
Technical Assistance to the Uganda National Roads Authority	Services	1	4 th trimester 2016
Technical Assistance to the Uganda Road Fund	Services	1	4 th trimester 2016

I 3.3.4 – Stakeholder perception of adequacy of implementation modality, resources allocated, governance and management mechanisms

Perceptions collected through stakeholder beneficiary and sector partner interviews during the Intermediary/field phase indicate that these were generally adequate.

I 3.3.5 – Evidence of any governance, management and contractual issues arising during implementation (and of resolution)

Multiple governance, management and contractual issues have arisen during implementation, not all of which have been satisfactorily resolved.

Following a review of MDAs (undertaken by Adam Smith International/UMACIS/DCI/Insafe) which reported in April 2015 many MDAs face major reform (not only in the transport sector). In response Cabinet took a decision (10/09/2018) to nationalise MDAs in order to:

- i) Align functions, structures, plans and budgets in line with national strategic goals and public service efficiency
- ii) Eliminate ambiguities and overlaps
- iii) Eliminate waste with view to re-allocate resources to other socio-economic priorities
- iv) Harmonise terms and conditions between MDAs and civil service
- v) Streamline legal and institutional frameworks~

In the roads sector specific changes by Cabinet:

- a) UNRA to be collapsed as department in MoWT
- b) URF functions to be transferred to MoWT with financial management by MoFPED.

On 22/02/2021 Cabinet received and noted a 3-year roadmap for reorganisation including:

- i) Inter-Ministerial Technical Committee
- ii) Freeze on creation of new MDAs and guidance on transition arrangements
- iii) Development of change management strategy
- iv) Engagement workshops for affected staff
- v) Review of legal framework of MDAs
- vi) Review of institutional and structural framework of MDAs (including terms and conditions of staff)
- vii) Presentation of revised structures for Cabinet approval
- viii) Implementation

MOPS was instructed by Cabinet (09/08/2021) to prepare a Cabinet Memorandum for implementation in November 2021.

Applicable to road sector as a whole

- Continuing uncertainty over future of URF and UNRA
- Continuing institutional and technical capacity and systems capacities, shortfalls and governance issues in sector institutions (high staff turnover is a contributory factor)
- Maintenance funding deficits³⁸ (associated with lack of 'ring fencing' of fuel levy revenues and diversion to other ends, inefficient use of available funds and PFM/corruption issues)
- Roll out of TSUs to DUCAR districts for resumption of direct labour/force account operation for maintenance (doubts about district capacities, resources, back up and potential reduction in LCI involvement)
- Equivocal government support for current institutional and policy/strategy structure of sector management (at highest levels)

Overall, the Cabinet decision of 2018 has introduced considerable uncertainty into road sector management as a whole, whilst turning around the direction of sector reform as advocated in policy dialogue with DPs. Given that the whole justification for this programme was to the existing support institutions and sector management and financing studies, these changes if finally implemented render at least part of programme activities and outputs regarding institutional structures and governance as potentially ineffective.

TA to URF

Problems specific to URF include;

- Uncertainty as to future institutional identity of URF (and limited political support or engagement)
- Multiple addendum and Administrative Orders amended scope of TA services culminating in instruction to undertake a study on 'Institutional and Funding Models for URF' without extension of time, costs or resources which led to diversion of TA from other activities.³⁹
- Suspension of contract performance in April 2020 (Force Majeure) during which time the contract period expired.

EQ4A: To what extent has the Transport Sector Institutional Capacity Building Programme contributed to opportunities for long-term changes? Has the programme contributed to unintended changes?

J.C 4A 1 – Increased institutional capacity (MoWT, UNRA, URF) to define and update strategies, monitoring parameters and service provision

SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE

I 4A 1.1 – Evidence of institutional capabilities to establish, implement and monitor changing strategies adapting to evolving transport sector needs

There is evidence of institutional capabilities to establish, implement and monitor changing strategies adapting to evolving transport sector needs given the current sector institutional framework but such improvements were less than expected due to reallocation of TA inputs to new activities to the detriment of some ongoing

³⁸ Currently reported to be a deficit of ~50% of maintenance needs

³⁹ A final version of the report has been produced but reportedly without engagement of MoFPED and MoWT (and limited engagement of the URF Board)

activities towards the end of the (extended) TA contract period. If proposed structural changes regarding URF and UNRA (consolidation in MoFPED and MoWT respectively) it is not clear the extent to which current capabilities may be appropriate for such altered institutional arrangements.

TA to URF

The HR Manual (2015) was reviewed in 2018 and findings highlighted a need for more user-friendly policies and procedures which should be regularly reviewed to ensure they keep pace with evolving URF needs.

In 2018 the UTSDPG considered how DPs could most effectively support URF in future development⁴⁰. It was accepted by DPs that given the uncertainty about the future of URF that preparation of 5-year corporate and strategic plans by TA to URF (including future role and operating modalities) could not realistically proceed. Thus, it was eventually decided that a study of URF Institutional and Funding Models should be undertaken by TA to URF. Although the proposed ToR was accepted by EUD in October 2018, the administrative order was only issued in June 2019 and the study commenced in September 2019. Work was in progress when the Covid pandemic led to 'force majeure' suspension of the TA contract in April 2020 (and the {extended} contract period expired during the suspension).

Absorption of this study into existing TA contract (no time or cost extension) thus required postponement of a number of other TA activities until such time as an extension was granted or abandoned if no such extension was granted. Activities including⁴¹: revision of URF financial regulations; preparation of new corporate plan; further development of fund allocation formulae; revision of URF unit cost model⁴²; development of RMMS; further development and implication of V&C plan (including participation in communication task force).

TA to UIPE

The UIPE has well organised structure and collaboration to implement and monitor sector needs. There is need to lay clear action plan and strategy of joint collaboration and mobilization of resources with other key Stakeholders – including but not limited to MOWT, UNRA, URF, UTCs, UACE, FUCO, and Development Partners who have interest in the sector such as EU, WB, AfDB, The Current Strategic Plan 2022-2026 need to be beefed up with logical implementable Action Plan and monitorable indicators and business plan developed.

1.4.A 1.2 - Existence of clear institutional mission statements and descriptions of responsibilities, mandates, etc

TA to URF

Institutional mission statements and descriptions of responsibilities and mandates have been reviewed but adoption is suspended pending confirmation of future institutional orientation. TA reviewed the 2018 Fund Management Board Manual, which was found to be a significant improvement on the preceding 2014 Manual and which aligned with good corporate governance principles. Some limited alterations were recommended as regards the operation of the Board⁴³ and articulation of the distinct roles of the Board and Secretariat. A need was identified for better training of Board members and Technical Report nr 4 on review of the Manual was submitted in August 2018. No URF comments were received on the draft and the training did not take place.

One of the tasks in the assignment was to review and revise the existing Fund Management Board Manual (Revised April 2018) (the 'Manual') which itself is a revision of the first Board Manual that was adopted by the Board in April 2014. The review was to: (i) [ensure] consistency with good corporate governance principles, in the context of quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisations and general good practice, (ii) suggest amendments to improve effectiveness of Board oversight, including needs for orientation and training of Board members in the proper exercise of their roles, as prescribed by the URF Act (2008) and other relevant legislation. The review found that the Board Manual was a comprehensive document which, in its then current form, contained practices and requirements which align with good corporate governance principles. The revised 2018 edition of the Manual is a significant improvement on the 2014 edition. The review suggested a limited number of alterations or additions that could help improve corporate governance within URF, especially with respect to the operation of the Board.

UIPE: The Strategic Plan specifies the objectives, functions, activities and structures of the Institution. However, it's a Mundane Strategy that needs clear vision and precise targets, Action program, Budgetary projections and expected sources. The Business Plan has not been developed.

1.4.A 1.3 – Evidence of political interference in technical management

TA to URF

This indicator was intended to examine potential over-ruling of technical/engineering prioritisation and

⁴⁰ Especially regarding models for road maintenance funding

⁴¹ Some of these outputs could be superseded if proposed sector institutional changes are achieved.

⁴² A parallel initiative was found to be in progress in MoWT of which URF was unaware

⁴³ Principally that the Board is responsible for development of policies, strategies, plans and budgets but had limited oversight of these

decision making for political advantage. Whilst there is some (at this stage anecdotal) evidence of such political interference⁴⁴, there is considerable reference to political will for institutional change.

A number of options for future URF operations:

- a) 'Dissolve and mainstream' – the transfer of URF responsibilities/mandates to MoFPED appears to have political momentum (following 2018 Cabinet decision)
- b) 'Retain status quo' – although feasible the political decision noted above explicitly rejects this option
- c) '2nd generation Road Fund' – this would require explicit ring-fencing of URF revenues (mainly from fuel levies) which is strongly opposed by MoFPED (due to the significant value of such revenues)

Intermediate options:

- 1) 'Do minimum/re-balance'- requires political commitment to multi-year funding levels i.e., partial ring-fencing
- 2) 'Combination' requires political agreement to multi-year allocations

A parallel development with the highest political support involves the transfer of all routine maintenance to direct labour/force account units in districts and the roll out of TSUs in DUCAR districts. This is an historically retrograde step which rolls back the years of activity to encourage the LCI and experience internationally suggests potential accountability and PFM issues.

Study of Institutional and Funding Models for the Uganda Road Fund - Final Report

The risks to the successful execution of the study include: § Lack of political will to contemplate an alternate road funding and asset management model The choice of model is political and it would appear that the Government of Uganda, at the highest level, has chosen the traditional approach, turning its back also on the agency model that grew out of the earlier sector reforms, which followed the "New Public Management" approach of the 1980s

Summary of stakeholder views There was also widespread acknowledgement of a bias in favour of new development at the expense of maintenance expenditure, which was said to be politically driven and would be difficult to shift. It was felt that pressure from development partners should be exerted in attempting to redress this balance.

Criteria for Uganda Drawing on the situational analysis, stakeholder consultations and the study tour, the following criteria are considered essential for Uganda. These are deemed conditions to be fulfilled, regardless of whatever future model for the Uganda Road Fund is considered. 1. The political and institutional atmosphere must be supportive of and conducive to improved road maintenance. That is, there should be recognition that the stock of roads and highways is a national asset and its preservation essential to the national economy. Future Models for URF 7.1 Identification and feasibility of future models. From the study five models have been identified which are briefly described below. Many parameters determine the precise modalities of the models. A selection of key parameters that this section will focus on are listed below: § Funding sources: whether to increase maintenance funding levels, to diversify the URF revenue streams, to enhance stability and predictability of funding and to find a politically feasible solution that is acceptable by Parliament and parent ministries;

Dissolve and mainstream

The UIPE has a range of stakeholder collaboration organisations both private and public. Evidence indicates high level and cordial collaborations. However, it is recommended that some of the organisations like UACE could have some cross cutting objectives with UIPE and therefore need for close collaboration and Harmonization of objectives and activities to create greater impact in the industry.

1.4.1.4 – Perceptions of stakeholders regarding increased institutional capacity and improved service delivery

MoWT was of the perception that the capacity building for staff was so short and not directly targeted for long term benefit.

URF- perception of some stakeholders contend that the main beneficiaries of the capacity building were the top management and most of the lower cadre staff were not well catered for.

UNRA capacity building program was perceived as success story as it was well targeted to relevant functions which were of priority and in addition the trainings were well structured with appropriate duration.

Despite the TA to UIPE, the Local Construction Industry is still fragmented with various stakeholders targeting various objectives. The LCI Policy 2010 had recommended establishment of the construction industry support framework funded by Government in support from Development Partners and consequently an establishment of the Uganda Construction Industry Commission (UCICO) and LCI levy

⁴⁴ E.g., a political bias for new development to be prioritised to the detriment of adequate maintenance of existing infrastructure

Perceptions collected through stakeholder beneficiary and sector partner interviews (remote and face-to-face during the Intermediary/Field phase) indicate that there is need to have a coherent and Apex organisation to advocate and mobilize for LCI with one voice at national level. The current various Associations are pursuing individual institutional objectives and yet they are similar in nature in terms of final outcome. The LCI need to work as a unified unit to engage public Institutions with a common goal.

JC 4A 2 – Increasing participation of national stakeholders in sector decision making and management

SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE

I 4A 2.1 – Existence of consultation mechanisms with stakeholders and transport users (with no marginalisation of minority or vulnerable groups) and evidence of participation of NGOs, NSAs, CSOs etc

TA to URF

Consultation mechanisms with stakeholders and transport users do exist but there has been repeated criticism of URF for not demonstrating value for money or communicating directly to local users about URF's role, responsibilities, policies, programmes and results. Consequently, there has been little 'buy-in' or support of URF from road users of stakeholders. Under the URF Act (2008) the URF Board should comprise private and public sector representation (with a majority of road users) although nominations are subject to Ministerial appointment and Cabinet approval. No information has yet been examined on participation of NGOs, NSAs or CSOs, other than MTE noting that civil society has been involved in the programmes' capacity development effort with CISCOT membership of the Steering Committee.

Study of Institutional and Funding Models for the Uganda Road Fund - Final Report

Summary of stakeholder views

URF's monitoring and evaluation activities were considered useful but inadequate in scope and extent. Furthermore, a repeated criticism was that URF has not demonstrated value for money in its activities. The fund was criticised for failures to advocate its activities directly to road users

Lead organisation:

URF, designated agencies independent assurance that funds have been used effectively and efficiently is paramount for the URF to get a buy in from road users and stakeholders.

A COMMERCIALY-MANAGED ROAD FUND

The required revenues are generated by a Road Tariff putting roads on a fee-for-service basis and depositing the proceeds into a commercially-managed Road Fund (user-pay concept or commercialization). Road users should be involved not only in the financing of the Road Fund, but also in its management. Road financing problems cannot be solved without the strong support of road users. This support cannot be won without ensuring that resources are used efficiently. This requires clearly defined managerial responsibilities and accountability

THE ROAD FUND BOARD

The Road Fund should have a representative Road Fund Board. Members should be in majority representatives of road users, be 7. Fund Management Board. (1) There is established a Fund Management Board. The Fund Management Board is constituted and appointed in accordance with the Act. It does Technical Assistance to the Uganda Road Fund EuropeAid/138563/IH/SER/UG Study of Institutional and Funding Models Funded by the European Union 57 Road Fund Features7 URF Act (2008) Present Status nominated by the constituencies they represent and elect an independent Chairperson

Indeed, the UIPE involved UACE and UNABCEC in the UTC training which was hailed as good collaboration.

No clear evidence of proper other key stakeholder consultations mechanisms by UIPE aimed at enhancing the capacity of the LCI Industry. For the Capacity enhancement to be effective, it should be holistic in its approach and cover all key stakeholders in the industry.

There is need to have a coherent and Apex organisation to advocate and mobilize for LCI with one voice at national level. The current various Associations are pursuing individual institutional objectives and yet they are similar in nature in terms of final outcome. The LCI need to work as a unified unit to engage public Institutions with a common goal

I 4A 2.2 – Perceptions of stakeholders and transport users as to the extent to which their views have been considered

According Policy dialogue reports and consultative forums, there are substantial evidence which indicates a lot of collaboration in the sector and well-articulated strategies for the industry.

The missing gap is actual implementation by the responsible public and Business associations.

There is dire need to establish elaborate and deliberate mechanisms for advocacy of policies, preparation of regulations and a jointly agreed monitoring and Evaluation of Action Plans thereof.

There is need to have a Lead Institution to coordinate, report and spearhead the Local Construction Industry. In the LCI Policy 2010, it was proposed to establish the UCICO by Act of Parliament which has not been actualized by the Transport Sector There is need to have a coherent and Apex organisation to advocate and mobilize for LCI with one voice at national level. The current various Associations are pursuing individual institutional objectives and yet they are similar in nature in terms of final outcome. The LCI need to work as a unified unit to engage public Institutions with a common goal

1 4A 2.3 – Evidence that conflicting views have been publicly expressed and that decision making has considered such views

TA to URF

There is clear evidence of conflicting views being publicly expressed but this expression was in house and led to a paralysis of related decision making and questioning of URF corporate governance. Open conflicts between the Board and Executive Director (i.e., between Board and Secretariat), arguably resulting from non-adherence to defined roles set out in the Board Manual⁴⁵ played out in news media and led to reputational damage to URF which undermined trust in the organisation. This situation has led to dysfunctional decision making and institutional management.

The Program of promoting the LCI is well perceived by all stakeholders. However, there is need to harmonize the Strategy by all stakeholders underpinned by the policy. Organisations such as MOWT, URA, PPDA, NPA in collaboration with IUPE, UACE need to foster more collaboration and seal some gaps which are still hindering the full implementation of the program. The Contracting mechanism for URA and MOWT who take the biggest chunk of Works and services contract need to greatly buy-in into this concept in implementation of the proposed Reservation Scheme in the LCI. There should be special consideration to cater for participation of marginalized groups in the industry especially the youth, Women, physically challenged persons to access gainful employment as provided for in the LCI Policy 2010 Sec. 5.6

J.C 4A.3 – Unintended effects (positive and negative) identified as resulting from programme activities

SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE

1 4A 3.1 – Evidence of unintended effects

There is strong evidence of unintended effects arising from the programme response to unexpected events outside the control of the programme (i.e., Covid and the Cabinet decision in 2018 to absorb UNRA into MoWT and URF into MoFPED).

Measures taken because of the Covid pandemic⁴⁶ had a negative impact on implementation efficiency and effectiveness during 2019, 2020 and 2021 for all programme components resulting in reduced impacts for most components.

TA to URF

This component was based on a series of assumptions, most of which were not realised⁴⁷ and this situation undermined the activities of the TA team, leading to only partial achievement of expected deliverables and thus to limited impacts. The response to changed sector situations resulted in TA resources being diverted from original activities to the new 'Study of Institutional and Funding Models for URF' without commensurate increase in time or resources which led to other activities not being developed as intended with impaired impacts. The force majeure suspension of the TA contract in April 2020 was a final event which constrained expected impacts.

TA to MoWT

The main deliverables of the TA support were two reports: Phase 1: Mid Term Review of NTMP/Greater Kampala Metropolitan Area 2008-2023 and NITMP 2021 – 2040 plus the establishment of a functional Transport Planning office in MoWT and mainstreaming SEA in MoWT planning systems. All deliverables were achieved despite Covid disruptions such that there were no significant unintended effects.

C&V

There is evidence of the C&V component not achieving all expected impacts due to 'distraction' of TA (URF

⁴⁵ Regarding Board oversight and delegated responsibilities for organisational management

⁴⁶ Including closure of learning/training and other institutions under March 2020 curfew, travel restrictions

⁴⁷ i.e. TSUs for DUCARs well established – little roll out of TSUs actually took place; GOM support for commercialisation of road maintenance activities – high level political thrust toward force account/direct labour implementation of routine maintenance; GOM commitment to URF progressing to 2nd generation road fund – Cabinet decision in 2018 to absorb URF into MoFPED (and implied rejection of 'ring-fencing' of funds which is a pre-requisite for a 2G Road Fund; changes in management and oversight of road sector institutions – proposed changes would effectively relocate UNRA and URF to be absorbed by other institutions

and UNRA) and incomplete alignment of the activities of the consultant preparing the Visibility and Communication Plan for the programme as a whole and the four TA teams. Again, Covid response measures were an unexpected (external) situation that affected implementation efficiency and effectiveness, and thus, impacts.

TA to UIPE

The intended benefits to the LCI will be long term and are not evidently immediate according to the program evaluation results. The initial intended impacts of increasing the participation of the private sector in the Construction industry could not be realised with the current interventions in place. In future deliberate efforts and intervention need to focus on the inherent challenges of the industry.

JC 4A.4 – Policy dialogue has addressed issues of multimodal (and intermodal) transport planning and implementation, financing for road maintenance and autonomy of sector institutions

SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE

I 4.A.4.1 - Evidence of policy dialogue regarding multimodal (and intermodal) transport planning and implementation in road sector operations and management

The TA helped the Ministry of Works to come up with Transport Master Plan document for 2022-2040. This process promoted a lot of stakeholder involvement and will improve the policy dialogue channels including EUD to higher levels of governance. However, it should be noted that overall policy dialogue to be effective will require discussing policy issues at higher levels where the Donor community engages high [political levels]. There is also need for Action plan on policy issues to be implemented and time frames with monitoring frameworks. Otherwise, most of the agreed policy actions have remained on paper and shelved without actual implementation being seen on the ground.

I 4A 4.2 - Evidence of policy dialogue regarding financing for road maintenance

Road maintenance program has remained a bit challenge in the sector. There is currently a backlog of maintenance which has been shelved due to limited budgetary resources. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that Uganda has not created a second-generation road fund as it was envisaged. The situation will be worsened by the fact that the Government has proposed reforms aimed at abolishing the URF institution.

It's at this stage that the Development Partners need to escalate policy dialogue levels to engage the top levels of governance in the country. If need be there would be need for some conditionalities for financing some of the programs based on certain reforms.

In regard to the promotion of the LCI, the policy dialogue has not clearly articulated the desired policy direction. There is need to increase dialogue between Development Partners including EUD to identify particular deliberate actions aimed at promoting the private sector participation in the transport sector aimed at promoting the LCI in Uganda in general.

I 4A 4.3 - Evidence of policy dialogue regarding autonomy of sector institutions

At the time of writing reporting documentation on sector policy dialogue has been recently received and analysis of this documentation has yet to be carried out. This section is therefore based on review of secondary programme reporting documents. However, there is clear evidence of policy dialogue involving sector DPs and GOM regarding multimodal (and intermodal) transport planning and implementation in road sector operations and management, financing for road maintenance, autonomy of sector institutions, separation of client (regulation) and implementation functions, commercialisation and increased involvement of the local construction industry. This dialogue has continued in this vein for more than a decade with more active local dialogue partners in Uganda being EU, WB, AfDB and JICA supported by a diminishing number of sector DPs (as some long-term sector partners have withdrawn from supporting this sector e.g. Danida). EU is perceived by stakeholders as having Added Value in such policy dialogue (due to long involvement in sector and mobilisation of significant funds) especially since suspension of WB support in 2015, but there is no evidence that EU has 'leveraged' this Added Value in such dialogue or pro-actively suggesting solutions to sector governance and management issues. However, this does not imply inertia. After 2018 Cabinet decision (and given no increased resources at the time) it was decided to postpone URF TA activities⁴⁸ to concentrate on preparation of 'Institutional and Funding Models for URF' to support reactive policy dialogue. No information has been examined as to the impacts resulting from this 'trade off' (for URF or policy dialogue).

EQ4B: To what extent has the Programme been aligned to address needs of the local construction industry and has contributed to deliberate policy actions,

⁴⁸ i.e., support to RMMS, M&E, audit and data management

strengthened strategic capacities and/or recommendations to promote the local construction industry and develop the necessary tools to achieve the desired change?

JC 4B.1 – Increased UIPE capacity to define and update strategies and service provision to the local construction industry resulting from evaluation of UIPE strategies and capacity

SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE

I 4B.1.1 – Evidence of UIPE operationalisation of recommended strategic and operations plans and management capacity to better respond to the needs of the local construction industry

There is no clear evidence of UIPE operationalisation of recommended strategic and operational plans – the current UIPE Strategic Plan and Action Plan are not clearly defined whilst the M&E Framework does not adequately monitor activities and results. Further information is required to comment on UIPE capacity to respond to wider LCI needs.

UIPE Strategies and Action Plan of the Institute need to be clearly redefined. The Current Strategic Plan is not well structured and lacks clear Action Plan. There is need a clear strategic vision and achievable objectives.

A clear monitoring and Evaluation strategy of planned action is paramount and need to be prepared. The Business Plan has not been prepared

I 4B.1.2 -Evidence of clear UIPE mission statements etc

The UIPE Strategic Plan 2020 – 2024 is not well aligned with LCI requirements, lacking actions and targets.

The strategic plan Exist but needs to be streamlined and aligned to the industry over all purpose. There are no clear actions and Targets, Also the Business Plan has not been developed. The mission, Vision and Strategic Objectives need to be realigned to needs of industry.

I 4B.1.3 – Evidence of increased UIPE subscription revenues

UIPE revenues increased by 10% from 2019 to 2020⁴⁹ but the UIPE Strategic Plan 2020 – 2024 records projected average membership subscriptions as UGX450m (i.e., from this source subscriptions account for only about 34% of total revenues), the balance coming from external (non-member) sources⁵⁰. Although there are trends of more members actually paying their UIPE membership subscriptions⁵¹, financial sustainability of UIPE is certainly not assured.

Each Stakeholder in the Industry imposes its own levy toward management its member association. However, the levy collected is not effectively contribute to capacity enhancement of the Local Industry in totality due to fragmentation of associations with differing objectives. Total revenue for UIPE including Subscription revenue and Development Partner funding stood at 1.2 bn shs in 2019 and 1.32 bn in 2020. It should be noted as reported in the 2020-2024 UIPE Strategic Plan however that the projected average annual membership subscriptions are Shs.450m. This means that more than 50% of the revenue comes from external sources which threatens the future self-sustainability of the institution and negating its visibility. More effort should be put on visibility and communication strategy to raise the profile of UIPE and market its relevance to attract more membership and self-generated revenue. Final TA reports should ascertain the impact of increased membership and revenue in 2021 and 2022 and if any change was realised arising from the EU TA project related initiatives.

I 4B.1.4 – Evidence of effective implementation of the Engineers Registration Enhancement Programme

There is no clear evidence at this stage of improved effectiveness of the ERB as a result of the 'Engineer's Registration Enhancement Programme'.

The TA component Project of ICT Equipment was to enhance;

- Membership fee registration and improvement of fees collection information mechanisms and procedures

⁴⁹ 2019 UGX1.2bn, 2020 UGX1.32bn

⁵⁰ However, there may be a reporting discrepancy here in that subscription revenue for 2018 was alternatively reported to be UGX1.1bn (although it is suspected that this refers to total UIPE income from all sources)

⁵¹ 2018 – 57%, 2019 – 70%, 2020 – 80%

- Information dissemination and publicity of its programs and activities
- Improve online learning and e-learning mechanisms
- Dissemination of information and materials to members
- Increase involvement of UIPE in collaborating with International Organisations, Development Partners and create policy dialogue for the industry
- Generate Management Reports and statistics

The TA provided capacity for development of ICT systems for Marketing communications, visibility and increased accountability. IT equipment was acquired and some systems developed. However, the immediate impact of these upgrades and Capacity development actions is yet to be realised. There is need for UIPE to indicate clear outcomes and indicators that were obtained arising from this component. According to the UIPE 2020-2024 Strategic Plan, it had a total membership of 4,355 (29 Fellows members, 895 Corporate Members, 6 Honorary Members, 66 Technologists, 55 Technicians, 1,125 Graduate Members and 2,179 Student Members). As at 31st August 2022, UIPE had a total of 3,631 members excluding students. There are 30 Fellows, 1,313 Corporate Members, 6 Honorary Members, 1,942 Graduate Members, 85 Technologists and 147 Technicians.

1 4B.1.5 – Perceptions of sector stakeholders regarding changing UIPE capacities and effectiveness

Perceptions of sector stakeholders regarding changes in UIPE capacities and effectiveness have been gathered during the Intermediary/Field phase by way of FGDs and stakeholder discussions.

There is little effective private Sector participation in the policy dialogue to promote the LCI.

JC 4B.2 – Increased numbers of trained/qualified engineering graduates entering the national construction industry

SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE

1 4B.2.1 – Trends in numbers of trained/qualified graduates

Under the GTP (Graduate Training Programme) 200 trainees were identified (160 technicians, 40 engineers) with a target requirement of 30% women. Total numbers have reportedly been reduced to 120 (although the reasons are not known). Trends in numbers of trained/qualified graduates have been confirmed during the Intermediary/Field phase. There has been capacity building of your professionals (96) trained professionals in total. There has been increased relevance of Tertiary Institutions offering Engineering and Technical Training and market demand where around 250 Graduate Technicians in UTCs were trained. Improvement of Human Resource capacity in the industry has been enhanced and job creation for the unemployed professionals in the industry. 96 trainees are undertaking training composed of and tripartite contracts between UIPE, Contracting Firms and the Trainees were signed for 30 female and 66 male (in all 15 Technicians, 3 Technologists and 78 Graduate Engineers). 11 UIPE GTP Supervisors have been selected, trained and deployed to monitor the Trainees. In addition, 60 of the Trainees have already been approved for UIPE Membership while the rest 36 are awaiting approval. In terms of employment, 39 contracting organisations have been identified and 146 places of placements secured.

1 4B.2.2 – Trends in graduate training undertaken by national colleges

From available information trends in graduate training by national colleges cannot be discerned. However, some information about national training institutions gives an indication of likely trends in that these institutions suffer from chronic capacity constraints which hinder their contribution to LCI training (e.g., capacity constraints, shortage of training staff, limited exposure to industry practices and practical experience) whilst financial issues deter final year undergraduates from undertaking final year practical placements.

The public Colleges involved in the survey are Kichamba, Bushenyi, Mount Elgon, Lira and Kyema.

Further evaluation and reporting with UIPE will ascertain what the current enrolment situation is caused by the impact of this TA training project of Professionals.

The project has increased relevance and visibility of UIPE towards its members and partners. There has been capacity building of your professionals (96) trained professionals in total. There has been increased relevance of Tertiary Institutions offering Engineering and Technical Training and market demand where around 250 Graduate Technicians in UTCs were trained. Improvement of Human Resource capacity in the industry has been enhanced and job creation for the unemployed professionals in the industry. 96 trainees are undertaking training composed of and tripartite contracts between UIPE, Contracting Firms and the Trainees were signed for 30 female and 66 males (in all 15 Technicians, 3 Technologists and 78 Graduate Engineers). 11 UIPE GTP Supervisors have been selected, trained and deployed to monitor the Trainees. In addition, 60 of the Trainees have already been approved for UIPE Membership while the rest 36 are awaiting approval. It should be noted that these Training Institutions however have their own challenges of capacity that hinder them in contribution

to the development of the industry in general. Some limitations are related to; Limited Exposure with the Industry Practices which UIPE could address through its sensitisation programs to key stakeholders Limited exposure to practical projects related with Works and Services in the Sector Financial constraints that limit the Student finalists to undertake their final year project practical skills and apprenticeships There is need to establish and categorise Technical Training Colleges on the basis of Centres of Excellence based on establishments that accord them comparative advantage

1 4B.2.3 – Evidence of placement of graduates in full-time employment with national (and international) contractors & consultants and MDAs

Available reporting permits only limited appreciation of placement of graduates in full time employment with national contractors. Targets included concluding 50 employer/employee agreements and contracts per annum (with post-placement employability rates increased from 50% to 90% but results of achievement have not been scrutinised.

96 trainees are undertaking training composed of and tripartite contracts between UIPE, Contracting Firms and the Trainees were signed for 30 female and 66 males (in all 15 Technicians, 3 Technologists and 78 Graduate Engineers). 11 UIPE GTP Supervisors have been selected, trained and deployed to monitor the Trainees. In addition, 60 of the Trainees have already been approved for UIPE Membership while the rest 36 are awaiting approval.

JC 4B.3 – Project design, activities, policy dialogue and results have addressed issues of increasing national contractor and consultant involvement in transport sector construction and maintenance works contracts in Uganda

SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE

1 4B.3.1 – Evidence of policy dialogue regarding greater participation of national contractors and consultants in road sector construction and maintenance projects

There is clear evidence of policy dialogue regarding greater participation of national contractors in road sector works contracts and this issue has featured in JTSRs in 2020, 2021 and 2022 and in meetings of UTSDPG (Uganda Transport Sector Development Partners Group) which, in September 2020, further advanced proposals in this respect. Among proposed actions for strengthening private sector capacity and widening potential for LCI involvement are: continuing advocacy, revision of tender documents and qualification/eligibility requirements, detailed dialogue with road sector agencies, better monitoring of the LCI situation, expeditious of revised regulations governing LCI contractor categorisation and better communication efforts on extolling the benefits of engineers' registration.

It's evident there has been continuous dialogue and call for action between government agencies, EU and other Development Partners and Professional Organizations towards improved and strengthening of private sector capacity to undertake more opportunities and more scope in road sector and services. More advocacy and dialogue for emancipation of the local contractors can be initiated between UIPE, UACE and UNRA. Deliberate efforts should be evident in the tenders for Works and services and contract documents for major Road projects. Further dialogue will be explored with the Works and Services execution agencies such as MOWT, UNRA, MELTC and URF to ascertain the Extent of such action. The key actions on the LCI strategy annual Action Plan Matrix on Integrated Transport Infrastructure and Services (IT IS) need to be given priority. Need to enhance the capacity for Monitoring and Evaluation for the actions and policy directions formulated during the annual JTSR between Stakeholders, other Development Partners and the EU.

- There is urgent need to finalise the NCI Policy laws and Regulations
- Finalisation and gazetting and Accreditation of the Local Contractors Register
- There should be mechanism on annual reporting and monitoring the application and performance of the Reservation and Preferential Scheme as provided for in the PPDA Act 2021 including setting up an online Local Contractor Registration and Classification System
- Need to address weak institutional capacity of designated agencies and support Engineers at Local Government levels to register
- There is inadequate publicity of the IT IS program policy actions and therefore need to create quarterly updates and publications.
- There is also need for establishment of a LCI Apex organisation which can spearhead sustained policy dialogue and advocacy for purposely towards development of a strong private sector in the LCI.

Its apparent that there is a strong need for a well refined and structured communication Strategy on sector policy actions and strategies spearheaded by the EU in the sector.

1 4B.3.2 – Evidence of revision of pre-qualification and contractual requirements (e.g., advance payment guarantees, performance bonds) and the approval and implementation of statutory instruments (e.g., the contractors' register, reservation scheme) for national contractors' involvement

(as main contractor or sub-contractor) in transport sector construction and maintenance contracts (ICB and NCB)

There is little or no evidence of any recent revision of pre-qualification and contractual requirements for national contractors' involvement in road sector construction and maintenance contracts. National policies cover such issues but have rarely been actioned to any great extent⁵². NDP 3 has provisions for PSD and Advocates that sub-contracting to local firms should be 50% of total contract value⁵³.

The Reservation Scheme as proposed in the LCI Policy need to take practical effect in works and Service contracts awarded in the sector.

Regulatory agencies need closer collaboration in harmonising regulations and procedures in promoting the policy including MOWT, UNRA, PPDA, URF and MELTC in consultation with key private sector players in the sector including UPIE, UACE, FUCO, UNABCEC, USA, ISU and Civil Society Coalition on Transport (CISCOT).

The Establishment of the UCICO has not been done as per the action plan of the LCI Policy, this needs to be fast tracked.

Some of the best practices in such cases has been South Africa which established the Construction Industry Development Board (CIDB) 2004 and its further establishment of the Construction Sector Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment Charter (BBBEE) 2006 as in South Africa which has effectively promoted interests of Local Business in the construction and other sectors.

14B.3.3 – Evidence of increasing involvement of national contractors in transport sector construction and maintenance contracts (ICB and NCB e.g., the performance of the reservation scheme for local contractors)

No current figures have been examined regarding trends in involvement of national contractors in road works contracts and performance reports of sector institutions have only limited mention of such issues e.g., UNRA Performance Report FY2020/2021 has outcome indicators regarding increased local content in road projects⁵⁴ with two targets:

- i) Proportion of contracts awarded to local firms following the law and PPDA guidelines
- ii) Proportion of contracts sub-contracted to local firms following the law and PPDA guidelines (target 30%, actual 25.7%)

However, affirmative action by UNRA to increase levels of participation of local firms includes certain categories of work to be reserved for local providers including: mechanised maintenance⁵⁵, periodic maintenance, LVSRs, swamp crossings, selected (small scale) bridges and culverts, LB maintenance, selected feasibility and design for road upgrading (for local consultants)⁵⁶ and communication on local content.

The Reservation Scheme as proposed in the LCI Policy need to take practical effect in works and Service contracts awarded in the sector.

Regulatory agencies need closer collaboration in harmonising regulations and procedures in promoting the policy including MOWT, UNRA, PPDA, URF and MELTC in consultation with key private sector players in the sector including UPIE, UACE, FUCO, UNABCEC, USA, ISU and Civil Society Coalition on Transport (CISCOT).

There is need to develop and implement a holistic all-inclusive local content policy, strategy, targets and Action for the local indigenous contractors in the country

EQ5 To what extent will the flow of benefits for beneficiary organisations and the transport sector continue after the end of EU Cooperation support? And to what extent did the programme design and implementation mainstream policy priorities relate to : i) Gender equity and women's' empowerment; ii) Environmental impact and adaptation to climate change; iii) Good governance (including 'leave no-one behind' and 'Rights-based Approach' (RBA)?

⁵² E.g., the 2010 LCI Policy has never been fully operationalised for procurement guidelines for sector institutions

⁵³ Although the previous target of 30% has not been consistently applied (or attained)

⁵⁴ Ie % of contracts provided to local providers by value

⁵⁵ Although maintenance of rural roads has been instructed to be undertaken by force account/direct labour operations in DUCAR districts i.e., no participation of LCI

⁵⁶ By accreditation from PPDA

JC 5.1 – Programme-delivered results are likely to be institutionally sustainable

SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE

I 5.1.1 – Evidence of factors of potential sustainability of national transport sector institutional capacity for road network management and maintenance

There is evidence of potentially improved sustainability of national transport sector institutional capacity for road network management and maintenance whilst overall, there is evidence of partner satisfaction with the role played by EU support regarding governance and institutional sustainability.

TA to MoWT

TA services were relevant to needs for better sector planning (in terms of establishment of a Transport Planning Office) although a large proportion of TA effort went into the Mid Term Review of the NTMP/Greater Kampala Metropolitan Area Master Plan 2008-2023 (Phase 1) and preparation of NITMP (National Integrated Transport Master Plan) 2021-2040 (Phase 2) both of which contribute to the overall objective of improved sector governance, planning, implementation and sustainability of transport sector infrastructure. However, doubts expressed by the MTE about MoWT ability to cover long term operational costs of the planning office have not yet been resolved. As regards sustainability prospects for the transport sector the NITMP 2001-2040 notes that the transport sector as currently set up and managed, without serious correction, is unsustainable. NITMP proposes reversing the 'bottom-up' approach of NTNIP 2008-2023 which focused on physical infrastructure outputs to provide a 'top-down' approach focussing on social and economic outcomes.

TA to URF

Noting that the 'status quo' was not necessarily a sustainable model TA effort was considered to have effectively supported URF in terms of delivery of URF responsibilities. However, a key TA activity envisaged support to roll out of DUCAR TSUs (Technical Support Units) but establishment of a pilot TSU was delayed as was expansion and roll-out of additional TSUs. TA (in accordance with TOR) concentrated on technical training, but it became increasingly clear that there were institutional issues (including force account management and resourcing) still unresolved in practice.

TA to UNRA

TA to UNRA covered a wide range of UNRA mandate and responsibilities delivering improved institutional sustainability in these issues.

Support to LCI

The aims of the policy for development and strengthening of the NCI (and 'Vision for the NCI') include delivery, stability, performance, governance and increased participation of local contractors and engineers. Support to UIPE and GTP aim at one component of the LCI issue (i.e., technical and professional skills and registration).

The best options for sustainability in the industry will be great when the LCI policy will be fully realised and implemented to deliberately promote the local Contractors who will gain and enhance their local capacity both in the construction sector as well as self-financing through sustainable guarantee schemes.

There is need for development of Legal and Regulatory frameworks for promoting the LCI in Uganda. There is need to be clear enforceable defined actions and respective institutions responsible for accountability purposes and Monitoring

I 5.1.2 – Evidence of increased involvement of national private sector construction industry in transport sector capital investment and maintenance contracts

There is no evidence that the programme support to LCI has directly led to increased involvement of the national private sector construction industry in transport sector capital investment and maintenance contracts. UIPE is an instrument (a means) and not the end of the support' and there was no consistent understanding of how programme support to UIPE and GTP would improve private sector competitiveness. TA support to UIPE addresses clear UIPE needs but it is not clear how such improved institutional capacity would result in expected sustainable LCI outcomes.

UIPE through the EU Capacity building program has increased the number of Engineers and Technicians trained for employment in the Construction industry. UACE has also been advocating for the accommodation of its local members in the contract for works and services The real TA EU Project impact will be ascertained based on final outcomes of the funding with UIPE. However, other impact and increased Private sector involvement will be provided and assessed through UNRA contracts awarded that have taken consideration of 30% local content as provided for in the LCI Policy 2010.

The Reservation Scheme for involvement of the Local Private Sector Industry Contractors in the Contract awards for Works and services need to be ever emphasised and prioritised by all Public Contracting agencies.

Efficiency and effectiveness of support to UIPE and GTP are considered under EQ3 and EQ2 respectively.

I 5.1.3 – Evidence of adequacy of financial resources (from all sources) to meet current and future investment and maintenance needs

Although resources and budgets allocated to the transport sector for capital investment in new construction

have significantly increased in recent years there continues to be a significant budget deficit in terms of meeting maintenance needs (routine and periodic maintenance). However, considering the four beneficiary institutions that received programme support (MoWT, UNRA, URF and UIPE) there is only limited evidence of any increases in budgets/resources that will guarantee continued operation of improved institutional capacities at the enhanced levels of performance/service delivery delivered by programme capacity building results. Also, the MTE noted a lack of exit strategy for any support component that could credibly contribute to sustainability.

According to UIPE Strategic Plan 2020-2024 the annual estimated membership revenue averages to shs.450m per year. This means most of the Activities for the Institute are Development Partner dependent. To achieve sustainability more efforts, need to be put in place to attract more Members and collect more fees. The UIPE needs to create more visibility and Communication Strategy to market its mandate and activities to the relevance of the members to be attracted to join the institution.

There is need for a strategy and action for building the capacity of the Private Sector in the LCI in terms of Contracting and consulting business as well as building financial sustainability for private sector competitiveness.

The sustainability of the support to UIPE should be based on the development of UIPE's capacity to provide value services to private sector contractors in the LCI as a motivation for e UIPE to attract and retain and encourage joining members.

The TA had provided UIPE to strengthen its capacities in ICT systems to improve on its accountability systems, enhance membership registration, increase visibility, improve communication systems with its members and enhance its internal management systems. The evaluation could not establish evidence of how UIPE used this TA component to enhance its capacity in increasing membership and its revenues, the impact may be experienced in distant future.

1 5.1.4 – Exit strategies have been implemented for all programme activities

No components of the programme had overt exit strategies designed into the support components although this issue was a subject of MTE Conclusions and Recommendations, see also I 5.1.3.

UIPE has come up with a rolled strategic plan 2022-2026 which was prepared through TA. However, the current is not comprehensive and the plan lacks clear Action plan and business strategies for its future operations and sustainability.

The UIPE need to increase its building capacity in Information Management and Corporate Governance and increase in membership recruitment as part of sustainability strategies.

UIPE need to redefine its mission and vision underpinned by clear Action Plans and Targets, indicators and collaborations plans in its Strategic Plan. The Plan should articulate UIPE opportunities and future sustainability plans.

UIPE need to put in place a SMART Business Strategy.

J.C 5.2 – Programme design, activities and results have mainstreamed and contributed to gender empowerment and women's' employment

SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE

1 5.2.1 – Evidence of in-depth analysis and strategies promoting gender empowerment in strategic planning and oversight of project design programming, implementation monitoring and reporting (including multi-modal transport planning)

There is evidence of analysis in programme design of the need for better strategies promoting gender empowerment in strategic planning and oversight, programming, project implementation, monitoring and reporting. The 'Action Document' for 'Institutional Capacity Building for the Transport Sector in Uganda' sets out sector shortcomings and analyses current policy and strategy developments going on to suggest issues which this programme could address and the expected results of such support. The MTE findings noted an increased awareness of gender equality and the role of gender in strategic planning going on to note that 'priorities of gender equality and women's empowerment.....have been adequately mainstreamed through the different results and beneficiary institutions (MoWT, UNRA, URF and UIPE). It can thus be concluded that the design of ToR for TA contracts to MoWT, UNRA and URF did address gender mainstreaming. However, the degree to which programme implementation mainstreamed gender issues is less clear as it is reported only to a limited degree in reporting documents.

UIPE had 30 females and 66 Male Graduates were enlisted in the GTP. However, the initial target was to enrol 120 unemployed Graduates (100 Graduate Engineers and 20 Technicians. Currently 96 trainees are

undertaking training composed of and tripartite contracts between UIPE, Contracting Firms and the Trainees were signed for 30 female and 66 males (in all 15 Technicians, 3 Technologists and 78 Graduate Engineers). 11 UIPE GTP Supervisors have been selected, trained and deployed to monitor the Trainees. In addition, 60 of the Trainees have already been approved for UIPE Membership while the rest 36 are awaiting approval. There are concerns and reports of low female staffing levels in projects in transport programs. Women are not a specific class of membership in UIPE, but recent focus on boosting women's participation merits a separate segment from a branding perspective. There are some organisations that which have deliberately started to promote women in engineering Business sector in Uganda: WETSU: - Association of Women Engineers and Scientist in Uganda, and WITU: Women in Technology Uganda. The issue of promoting women in the LCI and the Sector in general should be mainstreamed in the main policy documents and contract documents by both MOWT and UNRA in collaboration with key stakeholder in the industry including UIPE, URF, ERB and UACE

1 5.2.2 – Trends in women's employment on road sector construction and maintenance contracts

No evidence has been examined of trends in women's employment on road construction and maintenance contracts (although Uganda has a long history of specifying at least 25% women's participation in labour-based road works on rural roads).

Currently women make up about 10% of UIPE membership and around 4% of ERB registered engineers are women. The Representation of women in projects has been improving though slowly. There are initiatives aimed at promoting women involvements in projects designed specially to boost women's participation such as program under the Global Challenges Research Fund Catalyst implemented through the Royal Academy of Engineers.

Women are not a specific class of membership in UIPE, but recent focus on boosting women's participation merits a separate UIPE has a WETT (Women Engineers, Technologists & Technicians) Committee. However, it has been observed that fewer women take up engineering courses as a profession as is reflected in UIPE membership.

There should be a deliberate mobilisation of Women to enlist in Engineering Courses and training through existing associations for Engineers like UIPE and UACE could boost participation of women in engineering through advocacy programs aimed at grassroots targeting in secondary schools.

1 5.2.3 – Proportion of women in management structures of MoWT, UNRA, URF and UIPE

No detailed figures have been scrutinised which show the proportion of women in the management structures of the component institutions (UNRA, MoWT, URF and UIPE). MTE observed that 'equal gender relations are difficult to achieve in the transport sector' and limited information yet available to this evaluation bears out the MTE finding.

According to the reports 30 females and 66 Male Graduates were enlisted in the GTP. However, the initial target was to enrol 120 unemployed Graduates (100 Graduate Engineers and 20 Technicians).

Currently 96 trainees are undertaking training composed of and tripartite contracts between UIPE, Contracting Firms and the Trainees were signed for 30 female and 66 males (in all 15 Technicians, 3 Technologists and 78 Graduate Engineers). The Road Fund is overseen by the Fund Management Board, appointed by the Minister of Finance, Planning and Economic Development. The Board has representation from both the public and private sector, whose representatives are representatives of the transport sector and relevant professions. The chairperson of the Board is from the private sector representatives and at least one third of the members of the Board shall be women

1 5.2.4 – Proportion of women participating in Graduate Traineeship Programme

The target for women's participation in the GTP was 30% with final figures of 60/200 (i.e., 30%) with applications by 466 engineers and technicians (358 male, 108 females i.e., 23% women). However, it is noted that the GTP Two Year Annual Progress Report 06/01/2020 – 31/05/2022 appears to be incomplete (or work-in-progress) with activities ongoing and reported budgetary constraints reducing the targeted number of trainees from 200 to 120 although it is not clear what the effects of this situation may have on proportion of women.

UIPE had 30 females and 66 Male Graduates were enlisted in the GTP. However, the initial target was to enrol 120 unemployed Graduates (100 Graduate Engineers and 20 Technicians).

Currently 96 trainees are undertaking training composed of and tripartite contracts between UIPE, Contracting Firms and the Trainees were signed for 30 female and 66 males (in all 15 Technicians, 3 Technologists and 78 Graduate Engineers).

According to UTCs training reports and attendances out of 250 Graduate trainees from UTCs 23% were Women which represented a fair proportion given that women have been lacking in the Engineering profession.

There is however need for Gender mainstreaming practices in the Sector as it is always perceived that few

women enrol in Engineering courses compared to men. The observation that fewer women take up engineering as a profession and this is reflected in UIPE membership. UIPE need to boost diversity in engineering through outreach in secondary schools. The UIPE brand should explicitly embrace women. Boosting engineering for women should be mainstreamed. It was noted that this initiative has been embarked on especially by UIPE Regional representatives where outreach programs have been started in Secondary Schools to sensitize women at an early education stage about enrolling in science courses.

The industry should have a deliberate Gender and Equity Strategy for the promotion of women in the Construction industry.

Main Public Contracting Entities in the Sector such as MOWT, UNRA should have a deliberate Policy and Action agenda to make provision for female contractors by using a reservation scheme designed for that purpose. Women are not a specific class of membership in UIPE, but recent focus on boosting women's participation merits a separate segment from a branding perspective. Currently, women make up about 10% of UIPE membership. Around 4% of ERB registered engineers are women. Representation has improved in recent years, partly as a result of projects designed specially to boost women's participation such as under the Global Challenges Research Fund Catalyst implemented through the Royal Academy of Engineers. As In addition UIPE has a WETT (Women Engineers, Technologists & Technicians) Committee.

There are at least two organisations that specifically promote women in engineering in Uganda: WETSU: Association of Women Engineers and Scientist in Uganda, and WITU: Women in Technology Uganda.

JC 5.3 – Programme design, activities and results have mainstreamed and contributed to better environmental impacts and adaptation to climate change

SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE

I 5.3.1 – Evidence of in-depth analysis and strategies considering environmental (and social) impacts and adaptation to climate change in programme design, programming implementation monitoring and reporting

There is evidence of analysis in programme design of the need for better coverage of environmental and climate change issues in strategic planning, programming, monitoring and reporting and such concerns are covered in the ToR for TA to all components. Deliverables include strengthened capacity of MoWT in strategic transport sector planning which cover environmental issues, climate change mitigation and climate resilience in sector infrastructure – such issues are covered in the NITMP 2021-2040 (which includes a Strategic Environmental Analysis (SEA) of the proposed multi-modal transport network). Sector mismanagement (which led to suspension of WB sector support included violation of ES standards in WB-funded road construction projects (plus misappropriation of funds) and insufficient sector capacity in better use of tools for identification of climate adaptation needs and contribution to climate-proofing of transport was identified as a potential area of programme support. There is more evidential coverage of environmental and climate change issues in the MoWT, UNRA and URF components than in the 'support to LCI' component (there is no mention of environmental or climate change issues in reporting documents scrutinised for this component).

I 5.3.2 – Systematic use of ESIA's in works programming

Under Ugandan environment legislation road construction projects require a mandatory ESIA and preparation of an ESIP before implementation. The UNRA Environmental and Social Safeguards Unit (under the Department of Planning) received training from TA are best practices in preparation of ESIA's (and evaluation of ESIA's prepared by consultants). This training included consolidation of ES safeguards in planning, design, construction and maintenance. From the perspective of an overview of the sector MoWT has an Environmental Liaison Unit (ELU) and sector institutions have environmental units (including UNRA as mentioned above).

I 5.3.3 – Evidence of consideration and measures to better ensure resilience of transport sector infrastructure to extreme weather events and climate change

There is evidence of analysis in programme design of the need for measures for better coverage of issues of transport sector resilience to extreme weather events and climate change including strengthened MoWT capacity in strategic planning and oversight of climate change mitigation and building climate resilience in multi-modal transport. Such issues have been covered in ToR for TA and may be highly relevant to long term sector planning needs. Transport is a major contributor to national GHG omissions and has been accurately identified as a key sector of attention under Uganda's INDCs (2015) and 2nd National Communication to UNFCCC (2014). As such the issue is included in DP/GOU sector dialogue which includes protection of transport infrastructure assets and multi-modal transport policy.

J.C 5.4 – Programme design, activities, policy dialogue and results have mainstreamed and contributed to better sector governance

BRIEF SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE

I 5.4.1 – Evidence of in-depth analysis and strategies considering transparent sector governance in project design, programming, implementation, monitoring and reporting

There is evidence of analysis of governance issues in programme design, programming and implementation (and to a lesser extent in monitoring and reporting), 'governance' being used, in some cases, as a cover-all term encompassing various cross-cutting issues (including gender, environment and climate change, institutional set up and governance structures) which MTE concluded had not been as fully addressed across all four components as was indicated in the Financing Agreement and LFM.

Some governance issues go back to the sector reform programme in 2006 which established UNRA and URF, but which were attributed to insufficient resources and institutional capacity which led to gaps in sector governance and PFM (and eventually to the 2015 shake-up of UNRA). EU sector support going back to 8th EDF has had a consistent interest in sector governance, an interest that continues with adoption of the blending modality. Thus, objectives of this programme included strengthened sector governance although the MTE noted limited 'measurability and management of results' hampered programme contribution to good governance goals. However, overall, MTE found limited programme coverage of governance and that this focus could have been better expressing disappointment that TA support did not achieve a potential 'step change' in sector governance.

TA to UNRA

Programme deliverables included improved governance arising from improved institutional capacities including better, more transparent cost estimation techniques whilst the MTE noted that UNRA performance had been positively affected by UNRA institutional governance.

Support to LCI/TA to UIPE

The Inception Report indicated that UIPE governance policy and regulatory issues were to be addressed whilst the MTE identified major UIPE governance issues (including a need to reinforce financial management regulations and control together with clear definitions of responsibilities between Council and Secretariat.

TA to MoWT

An overall objective of this component was improved sector governance although this was manifested principally in the provisions of NITMP 2021-2040 regarding sector governance policies and strategies (e.g., core principles of good governance to be applied – fairness, accountability, responsibility and transparency) on the grounds that good governance will better attract investors.

TA to URF

One component of support was revision of the Road Fund Management Board Manual to better ensure consistency with good corporate governance principles (including greater effectiveness of board oversight). The review found that the Manual aligned with good governance principles with a few recommendations to improve corporate governance.

TA to UIPE:

Support to the Local Construction Industry in Uganda 6-Month Progress Report PART A – REPORT Uganda Institution of Professional Engineers In recognition of the need to establish Council as the owners and leaders of change at UIPE and bearing in mind the concerns regarding Council member commitment and Secretariat capacity (see 1.5 below), the aim is to establish high level commitment to complete the strategic planning process, and enable various other governance and management outputs to be finalised and submitted to Council for approval.

Actions have resulted in:

- KE1 submitting a proposal to UIPE on 23/08/2019 for a workshop in November 2019 aiming to conclude the strategic planning process undertaken earlier in the year and commence the Corporate Governance training.
- E-mail correspondence of 22/10/2019, followed up the submission including a draft of a Corporate Governance Training Module 1. On 31st November 2019, KE1 submitted to UIPE a module to kick-off the strategic planning and governance training planned for the immediate future.

In Regards to KE1: UIPE has come up with a rolled strategic plan 2022-2026 which was prepared through TA. However, the current is not comprehensive and the plan lacks clear Action plan and business strategies for its future operations and sustainability.

The UIPE need to increase its building capacity in Information Management and Corporate Governance and increase in membership recruitment as part of sustainability strategies.

UIPE need to redefine its mission and vision underpinned by clear Action Plans and Targets, indicators and collaborations plans in its Strategic Plan. The Plan should articulate UIPE opportunities and future sustainability plans.

UIPE need to put in place a SMART Business Strategy.

EUD/NAO Oversight (including Steering Committee)

MTE found evidence of adequate programme governance and contract management including actions of the Steering Committee in monitoring of implementation (even if follow-up action by the SC was limited).

Overarching sector governance consideration is NDP3 advocacy of good governance for enabling development linking this to rule of law and to Agenda 2030 (and SDG16). Aspiration 3 of Agenda 2063 is for an Africa of good governance whilst the Uganda Vision 2040 refers to good governance tenets including democracy, protection of human rights, rule of law, transparency, accountability etc. However, NDP3 (427) ruefully noted continuing major challenges to effective governance.

I 5.4.2 – Explicit reference to ‘Rights based’ approach in project design, documentation, monitoring and reporting

There is no explicit reference to a ‘Rights based Approach’ in project design, documentation, monitoring and reporting but this is not to suggest that the issue has not been considered at all. Referring to relations of ES safeguards on WB-funded projects (which led to suspension of WB sector support in 2015) the programme design considered specific activities concerning promotion of human rights, labour standards and women’s empowerment.

Whilst there is reference to HRBA in NDP3 and all sectors, ministries, agencies and local government are expected to adopt HRBA principles there is no reference to RBA in the NITMP 2021-2040 or in programme documentation scrutinised by the evaluation

I 5.4.3 – Explicit reference to ‘Leave no-one behind’ in project design, documentation, monitoring and reporting

There is no explicit reference to the ‘Leave No-one Behind’ principle in programme documentation, monitoring or reporting scrutinised by the evaluation, although NITMP 2021-2040 states *‘The transport systems of Uganda will be fully inclusive and leave nobody behind, nor will they be discriminatory’, ‘Access is important to produce a cohesive society, one that leaves nobody behind’* and *‘... Uganda cannot be left behind’*.

Whilst there is no explicit reference in other sector institution documentation it is suggested by other references that the principle has been accepted, if not actually articulated by sector institutions (URF and UNRA). The mainstreaming of Gender and other

Social Dimensions in the transport sector is progressing well. There has been evidence of increased participation of Women in the Road Maintenance where women ratios are almost matching men.

I 5.4.4 - Evidence of positive sustainable results of policy dialogue regarding integrated multimodal transport, road maintenance financing, autonomy of UNRA & URF, and the local construction industry

There is clear evidence of policy dialogue activities during the 11EDF NIP implementation period (5 – 6 DP meetings each year up to Covid disruptions (2019 – 2021) which reduced the frequency of such meetings. A JTSR event has been organised each year since 2015. EUD has played a leading role in all these events. Issues covered in dialogue included multi-modality (and regional connectivity), road maintenance financing and implementation methodology, sector institutions, LCI, low-cost sealing techniques, environmental and climate change resilience and gender issues. Whilst policy dialogue may have been energetic evidence of effectiveness of this dialogue is limited given the possible absorption of UNRA and URF by MoWT and MoFPED, instruction to undertake rural road maintenance by force account/direct labour PB methods in DUCAR districts and chronic shortage of maintenance funding and positive sustainable results in these issues appears unlikely. Project component activities did address some of these policy issues:

TA to MoWT – multi-modality (preparation of NITMP 2021 – 2040), planning (establishment of department) and training

TA to UNRA – climate resilient drainage design, ES Safeguards

URF – RMMoS (not complete)

EQ6: To what extent has EU cooperation had value added for the Transport Sector Institutional Capacity Building Programme design and implementation, compared to what could have been achieved by Member States?

JC 6.1 – Clear identification of EU strategies competencies, capacities and experience contributing to ‘Added Value’

SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE

I 6.1.1 – Evidence of application of EU capabilities in the transport sector in Uganda

There is clear evidence of application of EU capabilities in the transport sector – EU support goes back to the 8th EDF with consistent support in subsequent EDF cycles up to this capacity building programme under 11EDF⁵⁷ although the majority of such support being to the road sector, multi-modal transport only being considered in more recent cycles. EU national support has been provided in the context of a broad portfolio of major policies, Guidelines and ‘Communications from the Commission to the Council and European Parliament’ directing EU support internationally⁵⁸.

⁵⁷ 11EDF Specific Objectives: To reinforce sustainability of the national transport system ensuring the necessary regulatory frameworks and applying low-cost maintenance in rural areas and; To improve development of multi-modal transport network.

⁵⁸

- Towards sustainable transport infrastructure: A sectoral approach in practice DGDEV 1996
- COM (2000) 422 final – Prioritising sustainable transport in development cooperation
- COM (2006) 376 final – Interconnecting Africa: The EU Africa Partnership on infrastructure

This long-standing sector support has mobilised significant financing, much of which has financed capital investment in construction, rehabilitation and periodic maintenance (of predominantly rural roads)⁵⁹.

I 6.1.2 – Evidence of consideration being given to optimisation of EU added value relative to other sector development partners

EU TA to the UIPE is timely and a boost for the promotion of the LCI which has been stagnant in Uganda. Based on various transport reports and policy meeting recorded, the EU remains one of the key players and Development Funding agency in the Transport Sector.

I 6.1.3 – EU perceived to be a long-term partner to Uganda prepared to predictably provide substantial resources

It is matter of record that EU has been a long-term partner to Uganda having provided substantial resources over the years (going back to the 8th EDF) (including supporting inter alia governance, human rights, rural development and rule of law). It is observed that a finding of the MTE was that DPs suggested that EU could be more pro-active in leading EU MS in sector policy dialogue.

JC 6.2 - EU support policies strategies and project management offer added value compared with other sector development partners (including EU MS)

SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE

I 6.2.1 – Perceptions and awareness of sector partners, stakeholder beneficiaries and public of EU sector cooperation and results

EU is one of highly visible Development Partner in the Transport Sector according to the various Sector reports and Policy dialogue documents.

This TA program to UIPE is an additional effort that compliments the EU commitment and effort in funding the industry activities. The positive impact results of this TA will add the visibility perceptions of the stakeholders in recognizing the key role EU plays in the Sector in general.

It was evident and a common perception that EU offers distinct added value in comparison with EU MS in sector support (including capacity building) due to: long cooperation history of EU support to the transport sector, going back to 8EDF; significant financial support (beyond that of most EU MS); better positioned to participate in and lead road sector policy dialogue and donor coordination.

However, EU need to 'leverage' such added value in terms of dialogue or development of 'favourable policy and institutional environment for sector institutions.'

I 6.2.2 – Evidence of identification of potential EU added value (and visibility) in project design

EU TA to the UIPE is timely and a boost for the promotion of the LCI which has been stagnant in Uganda. Based on various transport reports and policy meeting recorded, the EU remains one of the key players and Development Funding agency in the Transport Sector. Through its influence and coordination substantial coordination role in the sector the EU could be one of the Lead advocates for the further strengthening of the Construction industry. The key policy actions pending in the sector are critical and need fast tracking to revamp the sector especially the local contract reservation schemes, Capacity Building of the local construction industry key players and enactment of the Act. On establishment of the Uganda Construction Industry Commission (UCICO) as recommended in the LCI Policy. There is need for further study on the challenges hindering an efficient and competitive LCI and action plan that be implemented to strengthen the Private Sector participation in the sector.

- COM (2009) 301 final – Connecting Africa and Europe: Working towards strengthening transport cooperation

- COM (2011) 1172 & 1173 – Agenda for Change 2011

- COM (2012) 556 final – The EU external aviation policy: Addressing future challenges

Further developments impacting on continuing EU support to the transport sector in Africa included:

- Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES): Lisboa 2007

- Luanda Declaration – African Action Plan for Road Safety 2011

- Malaba Declaration on Transport Sector Development in Africa 2014

- Agreement on standards and means for the Trans-Africa Highways Network 2014

- Roadmap 2014 – 2017: 4th EU – African Summit

- 'Mobilising investments for African structural sustainable transformation': 5th EU-Africa Summit Nov 2017

- Single African Air Transport Market 2018

- Agenda 2063

⁵⁹This investment has continued with EU support to rural road rehabilitation under >Component 2 (Road Upgrading and Maintenance) of the UNCDF-implemented DINU (Development Initiative for Northern Uganda) Programme

I 6.2.3 – Evidence (and visibility) that similar (or stronger) results could have been achieved without EU support

No evidence has been examined that similar or stronger results could have been achieved without EU support – provisional findings suggest the contrary (i.e., that whilst similar support could have been financed by certain sector DPs [e.g., WB or AfDB] there is no evidence that such support would have been more effective than EU support).

I 6.2.4 – Examples of joint programming in place for transport sector support

Complementarity, synergy, donor coordination and joint programming of transport sector support are discussed in the 'Action Document' for this capacity building programme and there is evidence of such alignment of DP activities in earlier EDF cycles. Whilst earlier EU sector support included TA to UNRA and URF this latest '2nd generation' support focusses on sector policy, governance and safeguards.⁶⁰ Support to UNRA continues DFID support (procurement) whilst support to MoWT continues DFID support to policy issues. AfDB and EU (including EU MS and IFI) collaboration continues in development of potential PPP and blending projects for transport infrastructure investment.

JC 6.3 – EU brings added value to coordination of sector development partners and policy dialogue

There is evidence that EU brings added value to both coordination of sector DPs and to policy dialogue, such added value accruing from the long history of EU sector support and the financial resources invested over successive EDF programming cycles. However, there is little evidence of consideration being specifically given to 'leveraging' such potential added value into greater effectiveness of sector support.

SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE

I 6.3.1 – Perceptions of sector partners, stakeholders and beneficiaries

Based on available reports and joint meeting briefs, there seems to be a positive perception in regard to promoting the industry. However, more action-oriented plans need to be developed. The lacking policy framework and regulatory framework need to be put in place if the full benefits of the industry are to be realised. The Role of various stakeholders needs to be documented in the Action Plan and Policy framework. Joint implementation and advocacy are recommended vs individual organisational efforts

As of date the EU has taken a lead in the promotion of the LC I. The industry has been lagging behind for quite some time. The presence and involvement of EU may still be critical in nurturing and enhancing more capacity of the Institutions like UIPE, MOWT, UNRA, and others in promoting the industry. More precise actions and strategies need to be identified that can address the remaining gaps in capacity and institutional policy frameworks and regulation. Furthermore, EU can take a lead role in mobilizing other development Partners to join in and promote the LCI to its full potential and make it competitive.

I 6.3.2 – Evidence that EU is better able than sector development partners (including EUMS) to raise critical issues in policy dialogue

The European Union has been the lead Development Partner concerned with transport, that includes the EU's sister projects in the Uganda Road Fund, MOWT, UIPE and Uganda National Roads Authority.

Other Partners in the sector like The World Bank are interested in supporting infrastructure more generally. Some other projects in the sector have been supported by AfDB JICA and DANIDA

See reference to MTE finding in I 6.2.1 above. Action Document for Institutional Capacity Building for the Transport Sector in Uganda the highest level of dialogue in the country is the bi-annual National Partnership Forum between the Government of Uganda and Development Partners. Regular dialogue is coordinated by the Local Development Partners Group (LDPG). The LDPG oversees a series of Sector Working Group (SWGs), which provide a forum for

⁶⁰ Which strongly conform with WB environmental and social guidelines, road safety and axle load control as WB re-enter sector support having suspended some construction projects in 2016.

more technical discussions. The EU is presently chairing the Transport Sector DP Working Group.

There is evidence that EU is well placed to raise critical issues in policy dialogue being a member of the LDPG (Local Development Partners Group) and a participant in the bi-annual National Partnership Forum between DPs and GOU. As EU is chair of the Transport Sector DP Working Group it is to be expected that EU should be better placed than most sector DPs (including EU MS) to advocate policy issues.

EQ7: To what extent has the Transport Sector Institutional Capacity Building Programme been aligned with evolving EU MS and Development Partners' strategies and cooperation objectives?

J.C. 7.1 – EU support and the actions of EU MS and other sector development partners (including European IFIs) complemented and reinforced each other

SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE

1 7.1.1 – Degree of complementarity, coordination and task division between EU and other sector development partners (including MS and European IFIs)

There is a high degree of coordination between EU and other sector development partners (except for China which is increasingly active in the transport sector) with EU chairing the sector DP Working Group meetings. Equally there is coordination regarding policy dialogue (covering sector issues such as axle load control, maintenance, capacity development, policy and planning) by way of sector working group meetings and the JTSR (Joint Annual Transport Sector Review). Less clearly evidenced is the degree of complementarity and task division among DPs (although there are examples of both in sector support e.g., DFID Crossroads programme in support of LCI preceding EU support to LCI under this programme) – See 1 7.1.2 below.

The programme design refers to compliance with Agenda 2030 contributing primarily to SDG 9 (Build resilient infrastructure, promote sustainable industrialisation and foster innovation) but also to SDGs 5, 8 and 13.⁶¹ In this respect OECD recommendations on Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development have been considered as a metric for programme coherence (although there is no specific reference to these OECD recommendations in programme documentation scrutinised). Overall, the programme exhibits a good level of coherence with the OECD recommendations i.e.

- Development of strategic vision for achieving 2030 Agenda and SDGs in integrated and coherence manner by defining, implementing and communicating strategic vision supporting policy coherence and orientation towards common sustainable development goals and improving policy integration but less so regarding building political commitment.
- Development of institutional mechanisms to address policy interactions across sectors and align actions among levels of government by engaging sub-national levels of government where they have a role in policy coordination to promote coordinated actions and coherence promotion of actions across sectors and institutions and engagement of stakeholders (to sustain support for PCSD principles but less so as regards 'whole of government coordination').
- Development of tools to address domestic, transboundary and impacts of policies to address SDGs by: analysing and assessing policy and financing impacts to inform decision making together with strengthening monitoring and reporting systems.
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1 7.1.2 – Evidence of joint analysis monitoring and programming (EU MS)

There is evidence of joint analysis and programming (e.g., with DFID in support to LCI, with WB in introduction of 'performance contracts' (outputs-based contracts) for routine maintenance⁶² and with EIB for blending project financing of tranches of the Northern Corridor. However, there is no evidence of commercial bank financing of Ugandan transport sector projects.

As regards monitoring of sector activities and results the individual sector institutions have their individual in-house monitoring systems⁶³ which inform joint assessment of agreed Annual Action Plans by way of the JTSR.

1 7.1.3 – Evidence of synergies between EU support and the actions of EUMS, European IFIs and other sector development partners

There are clear synergies between EU support and the actions of other sector DPs (e.g., WB, DIFID, JICA) and European IFI (EIB), less so regarding EU MS as a number of long-term sector support DPs have exited the

⁶¹ SDG5: Achieve gender equality and empower women and girls; SDG8: Promote inclusive and sustainable economic growth, employment and decent work; SDG13: Take urgent action to combat climate change and impacts

⁶² These institutions are not EU MS

⁶³ Some indicators feed into the higher- level performance indicators specified in NDP 1&2.

sector in recent years. There has also been a continuity of EU sector support over successive EDF cycles⁶⁴ with obvious synergies between successive support programmes.⁶⁵ Examples of synergies between EU support and other sector DPs include DINK (Development Initiative for Northern Uganda).⁶⁶ The TA to UNRA component of this programme covering safeguards management in conformity with WB and environmental and social standards and guidelines; continuation of DFID support to UNRA under the 'Crossroads' programme, and AfDB/EIB co-financing of the Northern Corridor.

J.C. 7.2 – 'Team Europe' approach, combining resources from EU, EU MS and European agencies institutions and IFIs has been mobilised by the project (in response to Covid and other issues)

SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE

I 7.2.1 – Degree to which the 'Team Europe' approach, combining resources from the EU, EUMS European agencies and IFIs has been effectively used in project implementation

The 'Team Europe' approach was developed in the context of response to Covid and thus post-dates this programmes design (and much of the implementation activities).⁶⁷ However, the principles of the approach include visibility, coherence and coordination of EU cooperation⁶⁸ which have been included in programme design going forward. 'Team Europe Initiatives' (TEI) form a component of MIPs (Multi-annual Indicative Programmes)⁶⁹ aiming to strengthen EU and EU MS joint programming and coherence. In the 2nd batch of TEIs there are 2 in Uganda⁷⁰.

⁶⁴ Although the original proposals for 11 EDF (which come as a surprise to sector partners) were to cease such transport sector support in many countries, including Uganda and shift focus of EU support to regional approaches, for Uganda such sector support was reinstated following representations by GoU and EUD. Source: Evaluation OF EU Support the Transport Sector in Africa 2005 – 2013 Final Report September 2015

⁶⁵ e.g., complementarity between capacity building in public and private sectors in 10EDF SPSP and UEDE

⁶⁶ Synergies between EU support to rural road rehabilitation and HNCDF implemented support to rural development, governance and SME support in Northern Uganda.

⁶⁷ Programme response to Covid is covered under EQs 3 and 4 i.e., 'Efficiency' and 'Effectiveness' respectively.


⁶⁸ In line with commitments to the Busan Effectiveness principles and 'Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation'.

⁶⁹ As per NDICI/Global Europe Programming Guidelines


⁷⁰ 'Demography and Social Service' and 'Sustainable Business in Uganda'

Annex 6: Reconstructed logical frameworks


RECONSTRUCTED LOGFRAME – INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING FOR TRANSPORT SECTOR IN UGANDA (based on combination of 'Intervention Logic' and 'Revised Logframe Matrix January 2020')




RECONSTRUCTED LOGFRAME- SUPPORT TO LOCAL CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY based on Revised Logical Framework Jan 2020



RECONSTRUCTED LOGFRAME – TA to UNRA (based on ‘Phase 2 Revised Logframe Matrix January 2020)




**RECONSTRUCTED LOGFRAME – TA to MOWT
(based on 'Phase 2 Revised Logframe Matrix January 2020')**




RECONSTRUCTED LOGFRAME- TA TO UGANDA ROAD FUND

(based on 'Revised Logical Framework January 2020)



Annex 7 : Geographic maps

The following maps come from NPD III






NDP III ROAD PROJECTS



Legend

- NDP III Roads
- Road Progress
- Complete
- Ongoing
- Procurement
- National Road Class A
- National Road Class B
- National Road Class C
- East Africa Boundary
- District Boundary
- Waterbody



Map Disclaimer
 This collection of data, ideas, or maps, opinions are strictly for
 used in this map should not be used for any other purpose.
 For Further Planning Purposes by the Road Planning Authority.
 Date of Map Creation: January 2020



Data Source
 Ministry of Works and Transport
 Road Sector Development

Annex 8: List of persons/organisations consulted

Name	Organisation	Position
1. EUROPEAN UNION DELEGATION (EUD)		
[REDACTED]	EUD	Operations Adviser – Infrastructure Inclusive Green Economy Section
[REDACTED]	EUD	Operations Advisor -Infrastructure
2. WORLD BANK (WB)		
[REDACTED]	WB	Senior Transport Specialist-STS
3.AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (AfDB)		
[REDACTED]	AfDB	Principal Transport Engineer (PICU)
[REDACTED] a	AfDB	Task Team Leader Transport
4.JAPAN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AGENCY (JICA)		
[REDACTED]	JICA	Representative
[REDACTED]	JICA	Senior Programme Officer
[REDACTED]	JICA	Project Formulation Advisor
[REDACTED]	JICA	Programme Officer
[REDACTED]	JICA	Programme Assistant
5. MINISTRY OF FINANCE, PLANNING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (MoFPED)		
[REDACTED]	MoFPED	Economist
6. MINISTRY OF WORKS AND TRANSPORT (MoWT)		
[REDACTED]	MoWT	Principal Planner/ TA Contract Manager
[REDACTED]	MoWT	Commissioner Policy and Planning
[REDACTED]	MoWT	Director of Transport
7. UGANDA NATIONAL ROADS AUTHORITY (UNRA) HEADQUARTERS		
[REDACTED]	UNRA	Director National Road Network Planning
[REDACTED]	UNRA	Head Research & Development
[REDACTED]	UNRA	Human Resource Manager Development
8. UNRA REGIONAL OFFICE MBARARA		
[REDACTED]	UNRA	Regional Manager
[REDACTED]	UNRA	Assistant Branch Manager/ RME -Mbarara
[REDACTED]	UNRA	Administration Assistant-Regional Office
9. UNRA REGIONAL OFFICE MBALE		
[REDACTED]	UNRA	Regional Manager
[REDACTED]	UNRA	Station Manager
[REDACTED]	UNRA	Road Maintenance Engineer
10.UGANDA ROAD FUND (URF)		
[REDACTED]	URF	Executive Director
[REDACTED]	URF	Project Coordinator/URF

Name	Organisation	Position
11. UGANDA INSTITUTION OF PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS (UIPE)		
[REDACTED]	UIPE	Executive Secretary/ Project Coordinator
	UIPE	UIPE Reference Group
	UIPE	Professional Development Manager (PDM)
12. UIPE MBARARA REGIONAL BRANCH		
[REDACTED]	UIPE	Chairperson uipe/mbarara
	UIPE	Member
	UIPE	Member
	UIPE	Member
	UIPE	Member
13. TECHNICAL SUPPORT UNIT (TSU)-BUSHENYI DISTRICT		
[REDACTED]	TSU	District Engineer
	TSU	Superitendant of Works
14. UGANDA TECHNICAL COLLEGE (UTC) BUSHENYI		
[REDACTED]	UTC	College Principal
	UTC	Deputy Principal
	UTC	Institutional Relations Officer
	UTC	Estates Officer
15. UGANDA ASSOCIATION OF CONSULTING ENGINEERS (UACE)		
[REDACTED]	UACE	Secretary General
	UACE	Executive Director
16. MOUNT ELGON LABOUR BASED TRAINING CENTRE (MELTC)		
[REDACTED]	MELTC	Principal
	MELTC	Deputy Principal
	MELTC	Training Engineer
	MELTC	Training Engineer
	MELTC	Training Engineer
	MELTC	Project Accountant
	MELTC	Hostel Manager
	MELTC	Senior Training Engineer
	MELTC	Training Engineer
	MELTC	Training Engineer
	MELTC	Sociologist
	MELTC	Environmentalist
	MELTC	Training Engineer
17. UGANDA TECHNICAL COLLEGE (UTC) -ELGON		
[REDACTED]	UTC	College Principal
	UTC	College Accountant
	UTC	Procurement Officer

Name	Organisation	Position
18.UGANDA NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BUILDING AND CIVIL ENGINEERING CONTRACTORS (UNABCEC)		
[REDACTED]	UNABCEC	Programs Manager
[REDACTED]	UNABCEC	Board Member /Trainer
[REDACTED]	UNABCEC	Board Member
19. Internet meetings		
[REDACTED]	IMC	TA to UIPE
[REDACTED]	IMC	TA to UnRA
[REDACTED]	IMC	TA to URF
[REDACTED]	Euronet	Communication Visibility FWC
[REDACTED]	COWI	Ta to MoWT
[REDACTED]	COWI	Ta to MoWT

Annex 9 : Literature and documentation consulted

- Minutes of Steering Committee for the Institutional Capacity Building Programme for the Transport Sector in Uganda 23/03/2018, 24/09/2018, 08/04/2019, 31/01/2020, 22/02/2022
- List of RG members/contacts
- Consultants & Framework Contractor contacts
- NIP 11EDF (& Addendum n°1)
- NDP II – 2nd National Development Plan 2015/16 – 2019/20
- NDP III – 3rd National Development Plan 2020/21 – 2024/25
- Mid-term Evaluation Institutional Capacity Building for the Transport Sector in Uganda, NIRAS/RAMBOLL, 29/07/2019 (includes Project Programme Evaluation – Executive Summary)
- Evaluation with Gender as a Cross-cutting Dimension, Version April 2008
- Graphic Identity Manual Institutional Capacity Building for the Transport Sector in Uganda
- Financing Agreement UG/FED/039-149 (& Addenda n° 1, 2 & 3)
- Consultancy services to identify strategic transport priority projects in a multi-modal environment: Phase 2 Report 11/05/2015 ARS Progetti SPA
- Uganda Vision 2040 National Planning Authority
- Diagnostic Study of UNRA Transformation Draft Recommendations Report, WB, May 2019
- UNRA Corporate Strategic Plan 2020/21 – 2024/25
- UNRA Annual Performance Report FY 2020/2021 & FY 2019/2020
- Road User Satisfaction Survey Report URF 2019, 2020
- Transport Sector Annual Performance Report MoWT 2020/2021
- Analytical Comparative Transport Costs Study along the Northern Corridor Region Final Report Vol 1 & 2 June 2018

Intervention Reports

C&V

- Development & Support to Implementation of the Communication and Visibility Plan for the Institutional Capacity Building Programme for the Transport Sector in Uganda
- Inception Report v2 August 2019 ALNnetglobal
- Communication & Visibility Plan Final version February 2020 ALNnetglobal
- End of Campaign Report Final version April 2022 ALNnetglobal
- Detailed Concept for Communication Campaign May 2020 ALNnetglobal
- Final Report Final version May 2022 ALNnetglobal

Support to LCI

Grant Contract

- Implementation of GTP through development and delivery of industry-relevant IPD training GTP Year 2 Annual Report 06/01/2020 – 31/05/2022 UIPE
- Implementation of GTP through development and delivery of industry-relevant IPD training Interim Narrative Report 06/01/2020 – 05/01/2021
- Annexes I, II, III, IV, V & VI
- Grant Contract (December 2019)
- TOR: Study to investigate the factors that influence the competitiveness and job creation potential of the domestic road construction industry in Uganda

Service Contract

- Support to LCI in Uganda 6-monthly Progress Report 01/06 – 30/11/2019 UIPE

TA to MoWT

Phase 1 Reports

- Lot 1: TA to MoWT Phase 1: Mid-term Review of National Transport Master Plan/Greater Kampala Metropolitan Area 2008 – 2023 Final Report September 2018 Gauff, WYG, COWI JV

- Lot 1: TA to MoWT Phase 1: Mid-term Review of National Transport Master Plan/Greater Kampala Metropolitan Area 2008 – 2023 Inception Report February 2018 Gauff, WYG, COWI JV
 - Presentation to Sector Working Group – Draft Interim Findings 16/05/2018
- Phase 2 Reports
- Lot 1: TA to MoWT Phase 2: Preparation of National Integrated Transport Master Plan 2021 – 2040 Interim Report Revised September 2020 Gauff, WYG, COWI JV
 - National Integrated Master Plan 2021 – 2040 Draft April 2021 MoWT

TA to UNRA

- Institutional Capacity Building Programme for the Transport Sector in Uganda Lot 02: Inception Report v2 July 2018 IMC Worldwide AECOM
- Institutional Capacity Building Programme for the Transport Sector in Uganda 6-monthly Progress Reports N°1 Dec 2017 – May 2018; N°2 June 2018 – Nov 2018; June 2019 – Nov 2019 (Appendices 4-6 only)
- Addendum N°3 July 2021 (& Annex V – Budget)
- Annex 2 - TOR

TA to URF

- Institutional Capacity Building Programme for the Transport Sector in Uganda TA to URF Inception Report April 2008 IMC Worldwide
- Institutional Capacity Building Programme for the Transport Sector in Uganda Final Report Feb 2022 IMC Worldwide

Policy Dialogue

Policy Documents received from EUD in hard copy (to be returned to the EUD after Final Evaluation)

- A. Joint Monitoring Mission Reports (JMMR)
 - 1) 4th JMMR dated September 2017
 - 2) 6th JMMR dated September 2019
- B. Annual Sector Performance Reports (ASPR)
 - 1) ASPR FY 2015/16 dated September 2016
 - 2) ASPR FY 2017/18 dated September 2018
 - 3) ASPR FY 2018/19 dated September 2019
- C. Joint Transport Sector Review (JTSR) Workshop Presentations
 - 1) 12th JTSR Workshop Presentations dated September 2016
 - 2) 13th JTSR Workshop Presentations dated September 2017
 - 3) 14th JTSR Workshop Presentations dated September 2018
 - 4) 15th JTSR Workshop Presentations dated September 2019

Other documents:

- UIPE Strategic Plan 2022-2026
- Ministry of Works and Transport Sector Final Draft National Integrated Transport Master Plan 2021-2040
- Reports of EUD responses to MTE
- Intervention Contracts Documents reports (LCI Administrative order and signed contracts, TA to MoWT), TA to UNRA signed Contracts & Addendums, TA to URF signed Contracts & Addendums,
- Summary Report of URF progress implementation of the TA
- Reports of the Support to LCI
 - Streamlining of UIPE's application and ERB's Registration Procedures
 - GTP Course Outlines for IPD & Implementation Guidelines
 - UIPE Strategic Plan amended Draft 2020-2024
 - 6-Months IMC progress report on support to LCI

- UIPE HR Policy & Procedures Manual
- UIPE Governance Manual Charter
- UIPE Procurement Policy& Procedures Manual
- UTC Training Course Booklet & Training Material Version Document
- List of UIPE -UTC trainees
- Uganda Cabinet report and directive on restructuring and Reorganisation of Government Institutions, Parastatals and Agencies.
- World Bank Diagnostic Study Report of UNRA Transformation 2019
- Mount Elgon Labour Training Centre Profile 2019
- URF Road User Satisfactory Survey 2019

Annex 10 : Review of Lessons, Conclusions & Recommendations of Mid-Term Evaluation

Review of lessons learned, conclusions and recommendations of Mid-Term Evaluation	
Mid-Term Evaluation	Preliminary comments – Final Evaluation
<p>Lessons Overall</p> <p>The overall lesson learned by the EU is, that it is extremely difficult to develop the institutional structures in another country. With this aim, the Partner – EU – has to remember:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To be extremely proactive in the policy and other dialogue supporting the interventions, • To recognise that success with institutional and organisational development is difficult. Because in the process other factors are influencing the partners worked with. Most important is that the institutional framework is interested in change. This appears to be the case in the transport sector in Uganda itself, but factors outside the transport sector may be working against it. • To recognise that this requires very good consultants, who can work with individuals, groups and organisations at the same time. <p>The Transport Sector Institutional Capacity Development Programme Mid-term Evaluation finds a number of lessons:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The design needs to link individual organisational and institutional capacity development. 2. Clear definition of responsibility, roles and deep participation of stakeholders are essential conditions to support capacity development and to strengthen the institutional structure in parallel. 3. The capacity development should be orientated towards functions and offices that are weak in the performance of the organisation/institution. TA work should always support the development of capacities, even when working on specific offices, functions, products and mechanisms Working on capacity development requires expertise on capacity development. If the consultant is working in a specific area – create a group to share the lessons learned and make use of them. 4. Capacity building should target both senior, middle management as well as operational level. If a new capacity is developed within an organisation, special support needs to be given to bring the new capacity to work for the organisation. 5. The design of the programme should strengthen linkages and complementarities across Components. The external stakeholders should support the roles and responsibilities of each of the institutions or organisations in the sector. 6. The capacity development needs to be supported by dialogue between the organisations in the country and development partners. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Confirmed (although there is a history of GoU taking unilateral (sovereign) decisions contrary to DP advocacy (which raises doubts about the effectiveness of such dialogue) • Confirmed (although effectiveness of capacity development is constrained by other (external) factors (eg lack of resources, chronic funding deficits for maintenance, unilateral strategy/policy decisions by GoU) • Confirmed <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Confirmed (but suggesting this is more a monitoring issue than structural) 2. Confirmed 3. Confirmed – it is noted that certain STE inputs were immediately directed to dealing with ‘today’s problems’ to the possible detriment of building ‘tomorrow’s capacities’ (eg claims resolution expert was immediately engaged on settlement of claims on Kampala Northern Bypass and Fort Portal road – this may have potential ‘learning by doing’ effects on counterpart staff but longer term claims analysis procedures and systems was at least delayed and appears not to have been finally completed) 4. Confirmed 5. Confirmed 6. Confirmed

<p>7. Complex capacity development intervention should be supported by an excellent design, based on participatory needs assessment, supporting measurability, accountability and appreciation of value for money. Interventions need to be supported by a clear logical framework, with well-defined and fully measurable objectives, outcomes, outputs and activities.</p> <p>8. The institutional context affects TA performances considerably either positively or negatively. Open management systems and delegation of responsibilities support capacity development favourably.</p> <p>9. Institutional capacities and performances rely on strengthened skills but also on i) a governance and management supportive to changes, ii) a conducive policy and institutional framework, iii) adequate mechanisms and processes.</p> <p>10. Capacity development should be supported by a »management by results« approach with full attention and measurability of outcomes and impacts.</p> <p>11. When working with the private sector it is essential to align capacity development to private sector needs and priorities. The organisation and the consultant in charge must understand and focus on the private sector.</p>	<p>7. Confirmed</p> <p>8. Confirmed. Institutional and governance issues were a constraint on TA effectiveness (eg threat to continuing autonomy of URF and UNRA; public dispute between the URF Board and Executive both hampered decision making and TA implementation activities)</p> <p>9. Confirmed</p> <p>10. Confirmed (but this implies specific detail of the monitoring system eg UNRA Annual Performance Reports)</p> <p>11. Confirmed (but suggest the support to LCI component, whilst addressing confirmed needs, will only have a very limited relevance to expressed LCI core needs (such as access to roads construction and maintenance contracts, pre-qualification requirements, access to finance/credit, technical and financial management capacities and quality issues)</p>
<p>Conclusions</p> <p>C1 – Overall positive assessment of relevance, delivery and perceived benefits for the three institutional components (MoWT, URF and UNRA)</p> <p>C2 – Need to improve need assessment and design</p> <p>C3 – Need for strengthening result orientation, measurability and monitoring of capacity development outcomes</p> <p>C4 – Challenges related to the private sector competitiveness component design and implementation support the rationale for a profound adjustment of the component</p> <p>C5 – Need to strengthen focus on institutional capacity development and transformational changes; this includes a reinforced focus on sector governance and gender equity</p> <p>C6 – Reinforce ownership, commitment and broader participation with all organisations; a broader participation embracing the private sector is needed</p> <p>C7 – Need to strengthen the participatory approach in all TA services</p> <p>C8 – Need to engage on policy dialogue supporting transport sector institutional framework</p>	<p>C1 Confirmed</p> <p>C2 Confirmed</p> <p>C3 Confirmed</p> <p>C4 Confirmed – see Comment 11 above</p> <p>C5 Confirmed</p> <p>C6 Confirmed</p> <p>C7 Confirmed</p> <p>C8 Confirmed (although EUD and sector DPs have been engaged in policy dialogue throughout)</p>
<p>Recommendations</p> <p>General</p> <p>R1 – Support a positive conclusion of three institutional components (MoWT, URF and UNRA)</p> <p>R2 -. Improve logical frameworks with outcome specification and measurability (baselines and targets) for all component; increased attention to</p>	<p>Comment (& degree to which MTE recommendation actioned)</p> <p>R1 Confirmed - however, the exit/conclusion of TA activities to UNRA and URF were characterised by diverted TA inputs to other tasks and some 'unfinished business' for some support components</p> <p>R2 Confirmed –</p>

<p>good governance and gender; the design and planning effort should include the improvement of synergies and complementarities across components, while evidence results related to non-financial cooperation and sector dialogue</p> <p>R3 – Substantial improvement of the design of the private sector component supported by i) a definition of transport sector competitiveness and ii) participatory assessment and baseline of the competitiveness gap. The assessment should be facilitated by an external team to avoid issues of conflict of interest. UIPE support should be instrumental to increase competitiveness. Results with issues of relevance to private sector competitiveness should be trimmed down. Measurable targets should be set for each result and for competitiveness changes.</p> <p>R4 – Strengthen monitoring and management attention to outcomes and impacts</p> <p>R5 – Strengthen focus on institutional capacity development and transformational changes</p> <p>R6 – Reinforce ownership, commitment and participation within each organisation</p> <p>R7 – Need to ensure a full participatory approach to all TA services</p> <p>R8 – Develop exit strategies for all components; exit strategies should be developed through a full participatory approach ensuring the ownership of the organisation and its inclusion in its operational plans. Exit strategies will be designed to strengthen sustainability and impact opportunities</p> <p>R9 – Engage in evidence-based policy dialogue on transport sector; dialogue should be promoted in close coordination and harmonization with sector development partners. New and effective mechanisms of dialogue should be sought. Dialogue should promote amongst other issues the autonomy of UNRA and URF</p> <p>R10 – For the private sector component and for future interventions: ensure adequate design standards and due diligence</p> <p>Specific</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Recommendations for the follow up of MoWT support services <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) TA to be integrated within MoWT b) Deeper participation of the Ministry c) Strengthened participatory approach for TA services d) Identification of national counterparts to start phase 2 2. Recommendations for the follow up of UNRA support services <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) 6 months extension with limited cost to facilitate training of supervisory and design consultants – to make savings for the transport sector b) Facilitate further inputs from and capacity development of the Claims process c) Allow the proposed alignment of private and public design and supervision consultants’ approach in accordance with UNRA’s manual 	<p>R3 Confirmed - recommendation not actioned to any great extent</p> <p>R4 Confirmed</p> <p>R5 Confirmed</p> <p>R6 Confirmed – actioned</p> <p>R7 Confirmed – actioned in Phase 2 of TA to MoWT</p> <p>R8 Confirmed – the services agreed to implement the recommendation but in general TA services were overtaken by events such as Covid. TA to URF mentioned that if their contract had been extended they would have been able to develop exit strategies.</p> <p>R9 Confirmed – actioned to some extent (eg the late engagement of the C&V FWC consultant in 2019 to inform and publicise ongoing policy dialogue and capacity building activities</p> <p>R10 Confirmed - not actioned</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Actioned in Phase 2 2. Addendum N°2 issued 3. Not actioned (TA services re-directed from ongoing activities to preparation of 'Institutional and Funding models for URF' before suspension of TA service contract due to declaration of 'Force
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<p>3. Recommendations for the follow up of URF support services</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) MoFPED is to launch the financing of additional TSUs b) URF is to launch procurement for additional TSUs this year and the next financial year c) TSU Consultants contracting to be well advances by end of 2019 d) Once TSU consultants are contracted, a 6 months limited cost extension for the TA shall be granted e) EUD must receive request for an extension from NAO by 6 September 2019, three months before the TA contract is scheduled to end f) RMMS to be procured February 2020 and training in it – Training of Trainers – is to be provided to URF and existing and newly contracted TSUs, commencing March 2020 g) If not accepted and acted upon by URF and NAO within the timeframe, the contract should be brought to an end as scheduled (7 December 2019) <p>4. Recommendations for the follow up of UIPE support services</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Extending the contract by 18 months b) Support to revise the conservative dominance of the councils of UIPE c) Support to strengthen the secretariat managing UIPE d) Ensuring that training offered to graduate engineers and technicians includes a part of private sector financing e) Ensuring the communication of UIPE takes account of the private sector f) Ensuring that a cheap power supply is installed for UIPE, within the next 6 months supplying power at all times g) Ensuring the IT system installed supports UIPE needs, within the next 6 months 	<p>Majeur' and expiry of contract period during this suspension</p> <p>4. Partly actioned</p>
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Annex 11: Pictures



Visit of the evaluation team to the UNRA regional office in Mbarara

From left to right [REDACTED], ET Team Leader, [REDACTED], UNRA Regional Manager, [REDACTED], ET Transport Economist, [REDACTED], UNRA Administration Assistant-Regional Office, [REDACTED], ET Back-up Expert and Road Engineer, [REDACTED], UNRA Assistant Station Manager/ RME-Mbarara.



Visit of the evaluation team to the Mount Elgon Labour-based Training Centre (MELTC) in Mbale.

Evaluation Team with Principal and staff of Mount Elgon Labour-based Training Centre Mbale.



Visit of the evaluation team to the UNRA regional office in Mbale

From left to right [REDACTED], Road Maintenance Engineer, Mbale regional office, [REDACTED], ET Team Leader, [REDACTED], UNRA Regional Manager, [REDACTED], ET Back-up Expert and Road Engineer, [REDACTED] Station Manager Mbale and [REDACTED], ET Transport Economist.