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# **Mid-Term Review of Maritime Security Programme in the Eastern, Southern Africa and Indian Ocean Region (ESA-IO Region)**

## **Final Report**

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## GLOSSARY OF TERMS

AML	Anti-Money Laundering
BCS	Background Conclusion Sheet
CMR	Critical Maritime Routes
CRIMARIO	Critical Maritime Routes project
CRIS	Common RELEX ( <i>External Relations</i> ) Information System
DCoC	Djibouti Code of Conduct
DRTC	Djibouti Regional Training Centre
EC	European Commission
EU	European Union
EUD/EUDEL	EU Delegation
Experts' Team	Refers to the team of independent experts hired to perform the study
GoA	Gulf of Aden
HoA	Horn of Africa
ICC	Inter-regional Coordination Centre
IcSP	Instrument contributing to Security and Peace
IF	Identification Fiche
IFC	Information Fusion Centre
IMDA	Indirect Management Delegation Agreement
INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organization
IS	Information Sharing
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MARSIC	Critical Maritime Routes project for Gulf of Aden and Horn of Africa
MDA	Maritime Domain Awareness
MR	Monitoring Report
MSA	Maritime Situation Awareness
MSCC	Maritime Security Coordination Committee
OO	Overall Objective
OVI	Objectively Verifiable Indicator
PCM	Project Cycle Management
PG	Partner Government
PIU	Project Implementation Unit
PMS	Participating Member States
PP	Project Purpose/Programme Purpose
QA/TL	MASE Quality Advisor/Team Leader
QSG	Quality Support Groups
ReMISC	Regional Maritime Information Sharing Centre (YEMEN)
RE-WIO	MASE Regional Expert –Western Indian Ocean
RIFC	Regional Information Fusion Centre Madagascar
RS	Response Sheet
RP	Regional Programs
SAR	Search and Rescue
TA	Technical Assistance
TC	Technical Cooperation
TL	Team Leader
TM	Task Manager
TOR	Terms of Reference
WIO	Western Indian Ocean

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Introduction

The Regional Maritime Security (MASE) programme has been a response to the Regional Strategy and Action Plan against piracy and for maritime security as adopted by the 2nd ESA-10 Ministerial Conference in Mauritius on the 7th October 2010. The Programme, which amounts to EUR 37,500,000, is funded under the 10th EDF Regional Indicative Programme for the Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean region (ESA-IO)<sup>1</sup>.

MASE is a five-year programme which is being implemented in the Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean region and has been extended for two years more. The Financing Agreement for the MASE Programme entered into effect after the final signature on 12 June 2013 by the Executive Secretary of IGAD, who is the Regional Authorizing Officer (RAO) for the programme, mandated under the Interregional Coordination Committee (IRCC) framework. The Financing Agreement makes provision for the sub-delegation to IOC to implement Results 4 and 5, to COMESA for Results 3, and to EAC for Result 2.

### MASE Objectives

The **Overall Objective** of the MASE programme is to enhance maritime security in the ESA-IO region hence contribute to global security and create a favourable environment for the economic development of the ESA-IO region and beyond.

The **Specific Objective** of the programme is to strengthen the capacity of the ESA-IO region in the implementation of the Regional Strategy and Action Plan against Piracy and for Maritime Security.

The MASE Programme has five specific result areas, as follows:

- Result 1:** Managed by the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD)  
Alternative livelihood for unemployed youth and supporting intra somali maritime coordination structures;
- Result 2:** Managed by the East Africa Community (EAC)  
National/regional legal, legislative and infrastructural capability for Arrest, Transfer. East Africa Community;
- Result 3:** Managed by the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA)  
Regional capacity to disrupt the financial networks of pirate leaders and their financier while also addressing the structural vulnerability factors and minimize the economic impact of piracy is strengthened;
- Result 4/5:** Managed by the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC)  
Enhanced national and regional capacity for maritime tasks and support functions.  
Improved regional coordination and information exchange.

### Methodology

The development of the MASE methodology and instruments were adopted from the following resource: [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/ensure-aid-effectiveness/monitoring-results\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/ensure-aid-effectiveness/monitoring-results_en.htm).

The handbook related to the Results Oriented Monitoring procedure methodology was also followed. [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/ensure-aid-effectiveness/documents/rom\\_handbook2011\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/ensure-aid-effectiveness/documents/rom_handbook2011_en.pdf).

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<sup>1</sup> IGAD (2014) Regional Programme for Promotion of Maritime Security (MASE).IGAD- MASE Progress Report: From 2014- to date

The MASE evaluation index allowed for the assessment of the relevance, quality, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability, coherence and synergies, EU visibility as well as the EU-added value of MASE projects. The methodology<sup>2</sup> encompassed specifically developed and appropriate methodology and instruments enabling to judge the performance of external aid programmes.

The research design incorporates a mixed multidisciplinary qualitative and quantitative methodology; this was selected to prevent reliance upon a single method and thus increase the reliability and validity of results. By adopting a multi-method research framework and combining three or more different approaches it is possible to support the qualitative research elements within a triangulation<sup>3</sup> process ensuring that potential gaps and weaknesses of one method would be compensated for by the strengths of the others.

## **Context**

This is an in-depth evaluation, the purpose of which is to provide guidance to the MASE Programme on key issues that may impact upon the future development and to inform the MASE's various stakeholders on the programme as detailed in the Terms of Reference (ToR). The evaluation was conducted using desk review of appropriate documentation and the interviewing of relevant stakeholders. These interviews were semi-structured and consisted of some standard questions and additional questions targeted at the relevant stakeholder group(s) in order to answer the specific requirements of the ToR. The ToR can be found at Annex I, the standard questionnaire on page 19, the evaluation matrix at Annex VIII, the list of individuals interviewed throughout the course of this evaluation at Annex V and the desk review material at Annex VI. Objectivity was built into the overall methodology by triangulating the analysis from different sets of stakeholders to ensure the effect that inherent biases have on the analysis and evaluation process was reduced. Limitations included a general lack of programme documentation being made available to the evaluation team across most of the Result Areas, a lack of in-region support from the European External Action Service (EEAS) teams, and some unwillingness to recognise the evaluation by some key stakeholders.

The review found that MASE does not have a corporate programme output, and that by the nature of its design is in fact five separate outputs from the five Result Areas. Although steps have been taken to remedy this by the appointment of a MASE Coordinator based in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the post is yet to produce any realistic changes and the Report is therefore an amalgam of the five Result Areas, with little overarching coherence.

Results across the Result Areas vary widely, the more successful Areas are those which have International Organizations as Implementation Partners, and these also achieve greater effect across the whole Eastern, Southern Africa and Indian Ocean (ESA-IO) region. Other Result Areas are having less success and momentum in these is at risk of being lost. This is particularly evident when States outside the RO's direct membership exercise their sovereignty and do not comply with policies made within the RO senior levels. The evaluation has identified a need for a more robust strategy and policy system for engagement at the full ESA-IO regional level for all aspects off the MASE Result Areas. Once there is clarity that policy decisions are made and agreed at a pan-regional level, then the ROs and MASE Coordinator jobs should be made easier to implement those decisions. Thus, the review places great importance on the ESA-IO Ministerial Meeting (which was annual but after modification by Rider 1 is no longer) for stronger strategic guidance and policy making.

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<sup>2</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/methodology/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/methodology/index_en.htm)

<sup>3</sup> Triangulation involves the conscious combination of quantitative and qualitative methodologies as a powerful solution to strengthen a research design where the logic is based on the fact that a single method can never adequately solve the problem of rival causal factors (Denzin 1978; Patton 1990; De Vos 1998).

## Conclusions and Recommendations

### Conclusions

The mid-term assessment and evaluation has been extremely problematic, the limitations and problems experienced by the team were extensive, notably:

- i. The fact that MASE encompasses 5 distinct elements has complicated an overall assessment because the experts' findings differed from sub result to sub result. If all the elements were put together as one, the overall assessment would have been skewed, poorer results would have not been exposed as the more successful result areas would have influenced the scoring.
- ii. The 27 days allowed for the examination were insufficient to provide a thorough examination, and this was exacerbated by a lack of provision of centralised documentation at the start of the review process, and regional visits being generally limited to the ROs that are tasked with delivering MASE rather than a wider stakeholder base.

<b>OVERALL EVALUATION OF THE MASE MID TERM REVIEW</b>		
<b>ROM Area</b>	<b>Scoring</b>	<b>Achievement</b>
Quality of Design	2.87	B
Efficiency to Date	2.82	B
Effectiveness to Date	2.87	B
Impact Prospects	2.67	B
Sustainability	3.05	B

As can be seen by the Table above with all scores amalgamated the MASE programme has fared well. Scoring B for Quality of Design, Efficiency to Date, and Effectiveness to Date, Impact Prospects as well as also scoring a B for sustainability. This means that in general the MASE Programme is on track, but requires some modification in areas.

The reason the Evaluation Team decided to dig deeper and independently assess the different aspects of the programme as individual units was to try and uncover where problems might be and how these can be mitigated for. There is a great deal of statistical evidence still available for analysis but unfortunately the time allowed was a barrier. Without the individual scorings it would be difficult to discern the precise problems.

Currently the MASE purpose and overall objectives remain consistent with, and supportive of Partner Government policies. More importantly evidence suggests that piracy is no longer at the top of the agenda for many of the project partners; with wider maritime and land based challenges moving to the fore.

The MASE supports EC development and cooperation strategies in the concerned field (special consideration given to CSP/NIP, Paris declaration, EU effectiveness agenda). There is a great deal of missed opportunity within the application of the MASE programme, to overcome this it will be necessary for MASE to adopt a more flexible approach to ensure that added value and the subtle changes within the scope of MASE in the maritime security landscape are covered and addressed.

Opportunities that would allow the project to better align to other projects with a similar focus are not pursued diligently, for example there are other programmes being delivered which have some connotations for MASE such as the EU Galileo Satellite programme which is promoting maritime as

an important enduser for the satellite services for Africa. These types of services could provide information and intelligence opportunities for result 4 and 5.

Collaboration with **INTERPOL, EUCAPNestor, EUNAVFOR, ATALANTA and REFLECS 3** are ongoing through the High-Level Meeting on Piracy chaired by the minister from Seychelles. Seven local coordination meetings were held involving EU delegations, JRC and other delegations these aimed at better planning and coordinating actions.

Beneficiaries of the MASE are the ESA-IO Regional Organizations, Governments in the region and their agencies (to the exception of France/Réunion). The East-African Standby Force (EASF) and EAC military cooperation is a key partner but were not really promoted by the interviewees; so, it is difficult to understand their relevance in the context of MASE. However, results showed that MASE aspirations to explore modalities and to involve and work closely with SADC (Southern Africa Development Community).

It is evident that the MASE programme makes efforts to operate jointly with EU-led action EUCAP Nestor and makes considerable effort to consult with other key partners such as AU, SADC, UN, IMO, AMSSA (DRTC, sub regional IFCs), UN Security Council mandated Contact Group against Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), the Ports Management Authority of Eastern and Southern Africa (PMAESA) and INTERPOL. However, the effort could be increased and where applicable developed into delivery partnerships if real and tangible efforts are to be realised into the future.

These need to embrace the activities already implemented or foreseen by other partners and under other projects: EUCAP Nestor team based in Somalia, EU NAVFOR Atalanta, International Maritime Organization (IMO), African Union and INTERPOL. Attendance by an expert at the Contact Group against Piracy off the Coast of Somalia highlighted that there are generic activities that permanently emerge from the Contact Group against Piracy off the Coast of Somalia and its two Working Groups.

**Intervention Logic:** The MASE log-frame is clear and sets out how the different result areas will achieve their results and deliver impact. However, the log frame no longer holds true, and will require attention to bring the programme up to date.

The MASE Overall Objective, Programme Purpose and Results are clear and logical, and address identified needs. However, whilst the Programme Purpose (PP) is achievable within the ‘dimensions’ concept of the project framework, the 2-year extension is clearly a requirement to enable the overall implementation. This is frustrated by the fact that parts of the MASE programme lacks well defined, and informative OVIs/ targets. The data results show that in general they do not conform completely to SMART<sup>4</sup>. However, as it stands the MASE individual result activities, outputs and outcomes have been planned appropriately to achieve the PP, albeit the implementation in some result areas have not complied to the overall planning structure. The risks and assumptions that were set out in the initial project planning phase are holding true, but it is advised that these are revisited to take into account emerging risks as there is evidence that these types of risk have impacted on the risk management process to respond effectively. Sustainability is integral to the majority of the result areas of MASE and has scored well overall but in general there is a lack of a vigorous comprehensive approach, and in some result areas sustainability will require adjustment in implementation. For example, there is a lack of a phase out/hand over strategy and it is recommended that all result areas prepare an exit strategy because the timeline is now extended.

Initial discussion with stakeholders has shown that for the majority of the result areas key stakeholders have to some extent been involved in the design process. However, it is also evident that in some result areas there are gaps in stakeholder engagement; with stakeholders expressing frustration with regards to the process for policy establishment management and implementation of their engagement expectations. In general, this could be attributed to the late start with some stakeholders reporting that there was an initial engagement then it was over 6 months before a second engagement.

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<sup>4</sup> Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic and Time-bound.



In general, the MASE coordination, management and financing arrangements are clearly defined and they advocate institutional strengthening and local ownership.

Discussions with project partners have been mixed, with partners associated with some of the MASE result areas being very clear on the MASE Overall Objective (OO) and Programme Purpose (PP), whilst others are unsure of the OO. The MASE programme is ambitious and has moved off at a slow pace, it is difficult in some cases to determine whether the range of proposed results are realistic with regard to stakeholders current capacities. The MASE programme has adopted an approach that can allow adjustment to ensure the project remains relevant for stakeholders needs. This aspect is well taken care of within the contractual arrangements.

Cross cutting issues are not addressed particularly well in the MASE program. None of the MASE Result Area leading agencies have issued explicit instruction or offered guidance and support to their implementing partners on what is required to mainstream gender into MASE funded activities. Any gender mainstreaming that has occurred has been done under the initiative and existing Standard Operating Procedures of the implementing agency or organisation e.g. INTERPOL or FAO. There is no consistent, uniform message being promulgated by the MASE programme to ensure gender issues are given appropriate priority and how each activity should approach gender mainstreaming. It is only Result 1.2 that has made attempt to ensure gender is addressed. It is critical that all result areas and the coordination teams make an effort to encompass gender and other cross cutting issues as these are key concerns for the EC.

It is evident that MASE got off to a slow start, which impacted significantly on the **availability/usage of means/inputs managed** and this could be justified by the fact that the project covers so many diverse areas. In particular, for MASE the overall linkages between the results areas are complex, with the diversity of objectives demanding an array of different measures of expertise. Stakeholders have indicated that there have been significant time-lapses between activities and any tangible execution, one of the causes being the difference between the different elements. Evidence gained from this evaluation underlines that both Result area 2 and 3 are virtual projects in their own right. There is an opportunity therefore to identify the development progress of each of the MASE components; which in turn will allow the coordinator to ascertain and nurture the needs of each component. This would require the MASE Programme to function as an umbrella programme aimed at binding each of the components together, whilst identifying other relevant embryonic projects and supporting their amalgamation into the MASE wider picture. This will also help accelerate and encourage the growth and development of MASE sub-components to move from embryonic to a mature status.

It is evident that the MASE programme nor its sub components have well developed in-house monitoring mechanisms from which the MASE programme can be monitored on a regular basis. It is recommended that both MASE as a programme and each component develop a monitoring mechanism as soon as possible, as this would assist cost-effective implementation of activities.

The MASE programme has utilised a log-frame as the overarching management tool. However, as reported earlier, this requires updating and could adopt a quasi-flexible approach to ensure that subtle changes in the security landscape are addressed. The individual result area managers have developed their own activity and resource schedules; these are well presented at each steering group meeting and adjusted where necessary.

There are problems with some components of the different results areas where committed funds have not been spent in line with the implementation timescale. However, discussions evidenced that these problems were being addressed and there is no specific reason to go into great depth here.

MASE has, since inception been encouraged to join with similar regional projects and in particular the CRIMARIO project, which parallels much of the work envisaged in result areas 4 and 5. In reality, agreed implementation schedules that streamline and optimise almost parallel objectives have not been fully explored or implemented in a way that encourages synergy and avoids overlaps.

## Outputs achieved

IGAD due to internal issues and the complexity of the Somali maritime domain (which IGAD operates), and regional coordination with all partners has impacted significantly on the respect of the timelines for the programme. Moreover, from the start it took several months between the programme initiation and approval processes which affected the initial scheduled implementation timeframe as well as the overall programme absorption capacity by RO's. It was underlined that one of the key issues was the delay of IGAD's management due to complexities with the EC associated with the identification of the correct IGAD portfolio holder and the considerable delay for the selection of the IGAD coordinator which did not come about until July 2015.

However, that said as the key coordinator IGAD has completely revamped its approach since engaging a full-time coordinator. Since that time IGAD have proven to provide excellent coordination for the MASE programme. Preparing meetings and enabling good communications between the partners, as well as preparing and implementing the Ministerial Meeting 2016.

Results 2 and 3 have demonstrated excellent consistency with the implementation of their activities. Issues raised are, for the East Africa Community (EAC) delays in staffing and recruitment of staff at the EAC impacted negatively on implementation capacity; exasperating the situation further was/is the delay in concluding a cooperation arrangement with INTERPOL which has delayed the implementation of the investigative training component. However, within the ROM criteria it scored well for implementation up to date, which underscores the importance of the MASE programme and its capabilities. Whilst COMESA faced challenges in delivering in a wide area where capacity disparity between jurisdictions/countries involved in the fight against financial crimes, with some relatively well mature jurisdictions operating in the same environment and region as weaker and nascent jurisdictions. This is a challenge because the successful AML/CFT is only if implemented with a regional perspective.

In some jurisdictions, there seems to be capacity disparity among the key AML/CFT stakeholders (i.e. capacity of FIUs, reporting entities and LEAs are at different levels within the same country) so that some entities are strong and well resources and others are weaker and poorly resourced. This could render the efforts ineffective due to the inter-linkages between actions of respective stakeholders.

In Results 4 and 5 the IOC is making good progress on developing the management framework and legal structures to support information sharing and operational patrolling; however the implementation actions are slow-moving in comparison.

The APU is well established in the Seychelles, the Regional Information Sharing Centre in Madagascar is established and has started its work, while the Regional Operational Coordination Centre has still to be established (pending legal recognition). Full operationalisation of these Centres is a key step forward and there are concerns that delays in implementation have resulted in a loss of engagement by some regional States to be fully involved in this process. Additionally, there is a strong sense that whilst information sharing protocols might be agreed on paper, they will not become a reality as reduced engagement and with the continuing demise of Somali piracy, the lack of a common threat, the trust basis for information sharing has reduced.

Time spent on conducting the PMAR maritime domain awareness (MDA) project has not delivered the results the region is able to sustain in terms of costs and a new, possibly more commercial look is required to develop an MDA structure that is affordable and meets the needs of the region.

In both the above cases there are other existing platforms that could be used, many of which are already being used by regional States.

Without clear technical solutions for MDA or information sharing, the potential for joint patrolling is reduced and tangible outputs in Result Area 4 are difficult to see. States will need to work within a common 'awareness' if they are to share assets to meet a common 'threat'. There are existing bi-lateral patrols taking place between States maritime forces as well as work with international forces such as NATO and EU ATALANTA and these should be captured as quickly as possible as the

bedrock on which to grow. The fact that those forces should disappear end 2018 underlines the need for prompt action if opportunity is to be seized.

Given the above it is clear that greater priority should be given to delivery of Result Area 5 to create the information and awareness infrastructure within which to identify and grow the rationale for joint patrolling at a later stage.

The MASE programme in general is shown to possess a well thought out and commendable logical sequence for the majority of each of the result areas. However, Result 1 has been subject to a change in direction, which has caused it to function outside of the original logical sequence. In general, the MASE deliverables to date are of a high quality, contribute to the intended results and PP.

### **Partner Contribution / Involvement working?**

The MASE project has a very strong inter-institutional structure, which is evident through the steering committee arrangements, technical working groups and the ministerial meetings. This is one area that the MASE project has really excelled, the papers and working documents produced at the meetings have been a major source of information for the M&E procedure. It is clear that these arrangements are a vital element to the functionality of MASE especially with regards to the project implementation.

### **EFFECTIVENESS TO DATE**

#### **How well is MASE achieving its planned results?**

The M&E team found a variety of results across the results areas and given the paucity of project data available found it hard to gauge what success or failure looked like. In this snapshot report, it is sufficient to say that beyond the time allocated to the team more analysis is required before any true measurement of effect can be made.

MASE Result area 1 has already been adapted to changing external conditions due to delays, currently a number of other result areas will also require subtle changes to ensure benefits for the target groups. The detailed review of the specific areas will be presented post analysis.

There is no evidence that the MASE programme has produced any unplanned negative effects for the target groups. There are some Result areas that have demonstrated unplanned positive effects and at first overview these have excelled the contribution to the outputs.

### **IMPACT PROSPECTS**

In general, the MASE direct impact prospects are good in particular at the political level the programme has created for a strong network of high level experts and professionals that are representative of Regional Economic Communities, Regional Organisations and Member States. This network is being expanded by way of partner and stakeholder engagement, and has the potential to grow exponentially, given the correct conditions.

However, with the overall MASE programme so far behind in its delivery schedules, and new risks to regional delivery creating a lack of confidence it is perhaps unsurprising that political will is starting to erode the further away you move from the RO direct membership. The holding of a high-level Ministerial gathering every three years to keep everyone within the ESA-IO region engaged and to give policy direction is sound but the process and follow-up of any actions requires addressing for it to influence across the whole region and in all Result Areas. This is the only corporate gathering of MASE, it should have a pan-programme output.

### **POTENTIAL SUSTAINABILITY**

This is an area where MASE on first overview appears to be strong, however this is due to the amalgamation of the different MASE components. Further in the report it will show a breakdown of scoring for each component and here it will show that some components are doing far better than others. In all the reports provided by the experts across the different Result areas, very little

information aligns to planning or budgeting for future sustainability, especially post project. What information was made available showed that Result 2 and 4/5 were underspent to the budget. It is recommended that financial sustainability is revisited by all partners and outputs should be aligned to the monitoring mechanism discussed earlier.

### **MASE Programme contribution to institutional and management capacity**

The MASE programme is complex, multi-dimensional and covers a wide range of different thematic areas that are loosely strung together within the programme structure. Each of the result areas will require careful analysis before an accurate understanding as to how far the project is embedded in institutional structures and if these will survive beyond the life of the project. However, there is evidence that in some Result areas the project partners are being properly developed (technically, financially and managerially) and in all cases these actions will help to continue the delivery of the programmes benefits into the future.

It is evident from the evaluation that the stakeholders of the MASE programme have developed a very strong relationship with other external stakeholders (UNODC, AMSSA, CRIMARIO) involved in the implementation of MASE, sometimes the relationship is better than between MASE and the partner organisation.

In most jurisdictions, the aspect of asset recovery is very weak and hence renders the whole fight against AML/CFT is less effective because criminals may not feel the full impact of any punitive action against them if the assets remain intact. Many jurisdictions have not conducted National Risk Assessments and therefore are not fully informed about all the important areas of risk. The present thrust of the MASE programme is to sensitize member states with the aim of updating (national and consolidating regional approaches/policy) and this should be pursued diligently.

In the Indian Ocean Region, whilst political progress was noted with respect to developing frameworks for the implementation of Results 4 and 5, there was little evidence of technical progress. The hiatus created by political discourse as well as the significant drop in piracy attacks during the same period has resulted in the loss of some political will to proceed. The Implementation Plan prepared by IOC which was presented to the Steering Committee in April 2016 demonstrates that any further progress depends upon the operationalisation of the two regional Centres. It is here where there is a need for a change of approach as political decisions regarding the Centres have impacted negatively on the trust required for successful cooperation in information sharing – and subsequently on sharing operations. If technical progress is to be made within existing timescales, then the programme will need to draw on existing information sharing protocols and networks such as that created under the Djibouti Code of conduct and administered by CRIMARIO. This would be beneficial to bringing the implementation back on track in terms of wide regional membership, trust, and timeliness. Little practical evidence was seen at a regional level of the creation of joint patrolling, although some bilateral work between States is being done. Without a joint picture and joint information sharing, and a commonality of maritime security threat it is unlikely that regional joint patrolling will develop much further without significant financial support, perhaps as a separate initiative to delink it from the problems in Area 5.

### **Overall lessons learned on the regional maritime security programme**

The need for continuous consultations among the various implementing partners to enhance relative competence and advantage in the project implementation is very essential. There is also need for continuous consultations between the RECs and the EU delegations for ease of addressing any emerging issues that may impede programme implementation.

Internal and external coordination and collaboration is an imperative for the success in combating illicit financial flow a successful whereas AML/CFT is contingent upon a comprehensive and all rounded approach (this is also line with a decision of the COMESA Ministers of Foreign Affairs Investigation of financial crimes should not be viewed in the same way as investigation of other

criminal acts and require specialized training. Implementing of a successful anti-money laundering regime is possible and it can be enhanced by Government commitment and political will.

## **OVERALL RECOMMENDATIONS**

Because there are so many recommendations many associated specifically with the independent Result areas, where there are synergies throughout these have been prioritised.

1. Make MASE an umbrella programme with the different result areas taking on their own characteristics and clustered underneath. This will allow for embryonic projects to evolve to maturity and move on; whilst encouraging new projects to amalgamate with the programme. In doing so the MASE programme will be able to maintain overarching oversight of other relevant projects aligned to maritime security and make effective use of MASE expertise and knowledge. The thrust of the recommendation is to promote better visibility of MASE and encourage related projects to develop better relationships with MASE to reduce duplicity and enable better amalgamation;
2. Future MASE programming must include a strong strategy on gender equality which will be consistent across all Result Areas and will detail the minimum standards that must be met by each MASE funded activity to ensure gender equality, balance and mainstreaming;
3. MASE risk factors, assumption and risk management strategies need to be revisited, expanded and focused to ensure that the programme can better adapt to changing external conditions; possible risks must include the potential impacts of those intent on disrupting political processes and other issues;
4. The MASE Log Frame requires immediate update. Consideration needs to be given to the actual geographical reach of the current programme and an investigation carried out to the feasibility of extending the MASE remit. There is a requirement to update with regards to the term of 'piracy'. This is restrictive and effort needs to be made to expand the remit to cover other maritime and land based crimes especially emerging transnational threats/maritime crimes. Associated with the main programme log frame, each result areas should also prepare its specific log frame;
5. The MASE programme should develop (i) a well-defined phase out/hand over strategy; (ii) and a well-defined sustainability strategy. Both will also require individual strategies referring to each result area. This should include a strategy for the MASE programme to encourage additional public and private sector engagement aimed at assisting the longevity of MASE results post sub components ending;
6. There is a requirement for a robust monitoring system across all MASE result areas to ensure that coordination reporting modalities are reinforced;
7. Urgently start to implement the MASE Communication and Visibility Strategy. Increase MASE visibility through a unique brand of the EU MASE programme, to include the EU flag on all publications, including annual reports and training materials. That a dedicated MASE Twitter account should be created; and develop better conduits of communication to avoid extended time lapses as well as to employ new modern communication mechanisms such as the internet via Skype to improve cooperation between EU, RECs and Implementing Partners;
8. Extend the remit and structure of the existing ministerial conference of ESA-IO States to provide strategic orientation and to agree on implementation policy across all MASE Result Areas. Scope the potential advantages and disadvantages for the development of regional 'hubs' with similar countries working together across the five Result Areas of the EU MASE programme and how that could assist implementation policy across all MASE Result Areas. Discussions to be initiated to assess if this Conference could take on the role of regional working groups on capacity building – Indian Ocean, Somalia MSCC as part of the regional capacity building and ownership;

9. Result area 1.1 to consider the development and implementation of a Framework Administrative Agreement (PAGODA) with the EC and UNODC;
10. Result 1.1 - SFG to request for support in the development of a **national maritime policy** that would build from the outputs of the Maritime Security Coordination Committees (MSCC's) and provide a National policy under the leadership of National Maritime Coordination Committees (NMCC's), reflecting the developing needs of the nation;
11. Result 1.1 SFG to develop an annual work programme setting out meetings, studies, trainings, and events and make it available to IGAD;
12. Appropriated attention to encourage additional public and private sector engagement aimed at assisting the longevity of MASE post project;
13. Ensure wider regional integration for MASE to be coherent with other strategies such as the IGAD Regional Maritime Integrated Strategy – African Maritime Strategy AIMS (2030); in particular for Result 1.1.
14. Support the procurement of DNA collection kits and supply two sets of Forensic Art hardware and software for training to be conducted by the core team trained in Mauritius in May 2016;
15. Result area 4 and 5 to overview the financial budgets and to transfer where possible financial support from area four to area five to accelerate financial and technical support for information sharing.

#### **ADVISORIES**

- a) Give consideration to altering the funding model of INTERPOLs capacity building training programme for law enforcement agencies – LEAs to improve efficiency. This could include a streamlining of the 3 monthly reporting mechanism between INTERPOL and COMESA or agreeing a 6 or 12 monthly reporting mechanism;
- b) Maritime Information fusion should be done inter-agency at a national level to agree a national 'product' and then it is that product that is sent to the RFC for regional fusion over the regional information sharing system based on the existing CRIMARIO platform or in the existing RMIFC. In this regard CRIMARIO could be invited to assist the delivery of information sharing in Result 5;
- c) That consideration be given to an amalgam of interviewees' proposed MDA and information sharing views along the following lines:
  - There is a need for ESA-IO regional requirement for an oceanic or sub-oceanic MDA picture; national pictures should be generated using national mechanisms for detection and tracking;
  - The MDA area should be proportionate to the regional sustainability capability and the limited regional response capability that will be coordinated through the Regional Fusion Centre (RMIFC). If done in a modular fashion this could be grown as capability develops;
- d) Future capacity building activity planning to take cognizance of beneficiary budgetary cycles and to subsequently mitigate the potential risks this may cause in programme delivery.

<b>Recommendation Grid</b>	
<b>Result 1</b>	<b>Result 2</b>
<p>1) Recommendation 1. Due to new emerging transnational threats/maritime crimes, Result 1. 1 will need to take account of these in its future programme planning;</p> <p>2) SFG to request for support in the development of a <b><u>national maritime policy</u></b> that would build from the outputs of the MSCC and provide a National policy, reflecting the developing needs of the nation;</p> <p>3) Specific sub log frames need to be developed for each of the objectives; that can be linked into the overarching result 1 log frame;</p> <p>4) Risk factors, assumption and risk management strategies need to be developed and sharpened to ensure that the project can better adapt to changing external conditions; risks must include the potential impacts of groups who may wish to destabilise Somalia;</p> <p>5) Result 1.1&amp;2 the development of a robust financial/economic phase-out strategy. The exit strategy may be national development support from the National Indicative Programme for Federal Republic of Somalia 2014 to 2020.</p> <p>6) Result 1.1&amp;2 requires a well-defined sustainability strategy;</p> <p>7) Result 1.1 SFG to develop an annual work programme setting out meetings, studies, trainings and events and make it available to IGAD;</p> <p>8) Increased attention on cross cutting issues such as environment, gender, governance and donor coordination;</p> <p>9) Studies need to be carried out to set out the actual requirements of the target group for Result 1.1;</p> <p>10) Result area 1.1&amp;2 there is a requirement for the development and implementation of a robust monitoring system;</p> <p>11) Result 1.1 to better coordinate its actions within the framework of the IGAD Regional Maritime Strategy in particular to Objective One: To promote a safe and secure IGAD maritime domain and contribute to the security of the global maritime domain and Objective 1.9 which is to assist in the setting up of National MSCCs.</p> <p>12) Result 1.1&amp;2 there is a requirement to develop a MSCC communication strategy which will enable better conduits of communication; this should promote the MSCC beyond Somalia; and contribute to the IOC communication strategy.</p> <p>13) Further attention needs to be appropriated to encouraging additional public and private sector engagement aimed at assisting the longevity of MASE Result 1 post project.</p>	<p>1) Support the procurement of DNA collection kits and supply two sets of Forensic Art hardware and software for training to be conducted by the core team trained in Mauritius in May 2016,</p> <p>2) Result 2. Actions have actually achieved very successful results of the MASE PROJECT and could be used as a best practice model.</p> <p>3) It is recommended for result 2 that coordination reporting modalities should be reinforced to include the following:  -Recommendation to expand its programming under MASE geographically in particular expansion of its programming, <b>to include Madagascar and Comoros</b>, and financially, to allow for infrastructure improvements to pre- and post-conviction detention facilities in Tanzania following <b>the signing of the Tanzania-EU Transfer Agreement</b>.  -Recommendation for continuation of the MASE training sessions and maritime crime training despite the decline of piracy. It is significant to note that UNODC is currently implementing activities beyond piracy. In this connection, the IOFMC has had participation of 22 Indian Ocean states, including those covered under the MASE programme. UNODC will continue to promote regional responses and coordinated capacity building to combat maritime crimes under the framework of the IOFMC. Within the perspective of future interventions, it is recommended for result 2 to cover maritime crimes under the geographical scope of the IOFMC programme:  i. Four thematic areas: Heroin trafficking, TiP/SoM, wildlife and forest crime, fisheries crime,  ii. Technical level/prosecutors' and law enforcement networks,  iii. Proposal for continued contribution to UNODC Maritime Crime Training Programme for judges, prosecutors, police and prison officials,  iv. With regard to Maritime Crime and Law Enforcement and Maritime Crime and Correctional Administration courses,</p> <p>4) Recommendation to brand the EU MASE programme, to include the EU flag appears on all publications to which significant EU MASE contributions have been made, including annual reports and training materials.</p> <p>5) To press visibility considerations it highly recommended that a twitter account should be created dedicated to the MASE programme.</p>
<b>Result 3</b>	<b>Result 4/5</b>
<p>a) Scope the potential advantages and disadvantages for the development of regional 'hubs' with similar countries working together across the five Result Areas of the EU MASE programme.</p>	<p>1) That an annual ministerial conference of ESA-IO States be structured to provide agreed implementation policy across all MASE Result Areas.</p> <p>2) That CRIMARIO be invited to deliver the technical</p>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>b) All future Result Area 3 activities to have a discrete sustainability strategy written and agreed with beneficiaries before capacity building support is delivered.</li> <li>c) All current and future Result Area 3 activities to have an appropriate and robust Monitoring and Evaluation regime developed and administered by COMESA.</li> <li>d) Future capacity building training must include an appropriate level of training within the judiciary in the application of Anti-Money Laundering legislation.</li> <li>e) Closer cooperation with Financial Action Task Force-style Regional Bodies (FSRBs) in the development and adoption of model anti-money laundering legislation in the ESA – IO region.</li> <li>f) Ensure that all capacity building output continues to be tailored to the national environment recognizing that each country within the region has its own specific needs.</li> <li>g) Future capacity building activity planning to take cognizance of beneficiary budgetary cycles and to subsequently mitigate the potential risks this may cause in programme delivery.</li> <li>h) All future result areas 3 activities to have a discrete sustainability strategy written and agreed with beneficiaries before capacity building is provided.</li> </ul>	<p>platform for information sharing in Area 5. That consideration be given to the majority of interviewees' proposed MDA and information sharing views to create a mechanism along the following lines:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Information fusion should be done inter-agency at a national level to agree a national 'product' and then it is that product that is sent to the RFC for regional fusion over the regional information sharing system based on the existing DCoC/CRIMARIO platform.</li> </ul> <p>Gain: maintains control over security of national data by informing the network at an initial low security level; allows interaction now between operators using VOIP; and creates a framework of trust and credible information.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>3) There is a need for ESA-IO regional requirement for an oceanic or sub-oceanic MDA picture; national pictures should be generated using national mechanisms for detection and tracking.</li> <li>4) The MDA area should be proportionate to the regional sustainability capability and the limited regional response capability that will be coordinated through the Regional Fusion Centre (RMIFC). If done in a modular fashion this could be grown as capability develops.</li> <li>5) That the implementation of the joint patrolling initiative should start once framework documents are agreed, and deferred until successful information sharing and an agreed MDA environment are in place.</li> <li>6) That result area 4 &amp;5 financial budgets to be reassessed (Rider 3) and budget transferred from result 4 to result 5 to enable additional technical support for information sharing.</li> </ul>
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## 1. INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 CONTEXT

The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) reported in 2009 that the Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean (ESA-IO) region had become the most pirate-infested waters in the world. Somali pirates were attacking vessels off Somali coast and much further in the maritime areas of Kenya, Yemen, Tanzania, Seychelles, and Madagascar and even further off into the Western Indian Ocean.

Amongst the global response and action against piracy included multiple UN Security Council Resolutions on piracy off the coast of Somalia i.e. Resolutions **1816(2008)**, **1838(2008)**, **1846**, **1851 (2008)** (2008), **1897(2009)** and **1918 (2010)**. Some of the Resolution 1816(2008) covered acts of piracy committed in the high seas, whereas the coastal states has exclusive jurisdiction for acts of piracy committed their territorial waters. The most important effect of this resolution is that it authorizes the international naval force in the Gulf of Aden to ‘enter the territorial waters of Somalia for the purpose of repressing piracy’ including through the ‘use of all necessary means’. These resolutions have been renewed further with Resolution 1846 (2008) and Resolution 1897 (2009).

Piracy undermines the integration processes and the region's economic and social development. It affects trade, food security, and income from exploitation of fisheries and other marine resources as well as tourism, and increases the risks of smuggling of people, weapons, drugs and terrorism. The ESA-IO coastline and marine area, too extensive to be permanently patrolled by individual countries, is vulnerable to piracy, terrorism and other criminal/illegal activities as the region does not have sustained deep-water maritime surveillance capabilities and relies heavily on outside forces to protect maritime communication lines. In most cases, the criminal justice framework is not able to cope with the necessary detention, prosecution, trials and imprisonment of piracy suspects. It is recognised that piracy can only be rooted out with the return of the rule of law to Somalia and that this objective can only be addressed at the international and regional levels. Piracy has become an international problem requiring a comprehensive and multilateral solution with an integrated short-, medium- and long-term strategy.

### 1.2 REGIONAL MARITIME SECURITY STRATEGY (MASE PROGRAMME)

In order to contribute to this global effort, a Programme for the Implementation of a Regional Maritime Security Strategy (MASE Programme) for the ESA-IO region was proposed in accordance with (i) the provisions of the ESA-IO 10th EDF Regional Strategy Paper/Regional Indicative Programme; and (ii) the ESA-IO Regional Strategy and Action Plan against Piracy and for Promoting Maritime Security («Regional Strategy»), as adopted by the 2nd Regional Ministerial Meeting held on 7th October 2010 in Mauritius.

The Regional Maritime Security (MASE) programme has been a response to the Regional Strategy and Action Plan against piracy and for maritime security. The Programme, which amounts to EUR 37,500,000, is funded under the 10th EDF Regional Indicative Programme for the Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean region (ESA-IO)<sup>5</sup>.

MASE is a five-year programme which is being implemented in the Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean region and has been extended for two years more.

The Financing Agreement for the MASE Programme entered into effect after the final signature on 12 June 2013 by the Executive Secretary of IGAD, who is the Regional Authorizing Officer (RAO) for the programme, mandated under the Interregional Coordination Committee (IRCC) framework. The Financing Agreement makes provision for the sub-delegation of powers to the other Regional organisations (Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) to implement Results 4 and 5 (letter from the IGAD

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<sup>5</sup> MASE (June 2016) Regional Programme for Promotion of Maritime Security (MASE).IGAD- MASE Progress Report: From 2014- to date

Executive Secretary, Ref. ES30- 220/386/13 dated 12 June 2013), to COMESA responsible for Results 3, and to EAC for Result 2.

The MASE programme builds on the EUR 2.0 million Start up MASE project which started in January 2012 as well as on efforts already undertaken in the region, and is working in close cooperation with the implementing organisations/authorities in the region. The MASE programme is part of the EU Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa which led to the approval of the EU Action Plan against Piracy and the appointment of the EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa. The Programme fits in the EU Maritime security and safety strategy along with its implementing Action Plan were adopted on 24 June and 16 December 2014; ensures coordination with the EU funded capacity building projects financed through the Instrument for Stability (IcPS) short and long-term components and is scheduled to build upon short-term actions financed under the IcPS at the national level. It also planned on close coordination with the IcPS Critical Maritime Routes programme which as MARSIC and latterly CRIMARIO is developing regional information sharing systems and networking and regional training. Activities related to financial flows (Result 3) are implemented in close coordination with the existing CRIMLEA I and II projects focussing on the proactive investigation of piracy ‘kingpins’ and financiers (implementing partner for both is INTERPOL).

### 1.3 MASE OBJECTIVES

The **Overall Objective** of the MASE programme is to enhance maritime security in the ESA-IO region hence contribute to global security and create a favourable environment for the economic development of the ESA-IO region and beyond.

The **Specific Objective** of the programme is to strengthen the capacity of the ESA-IO region in the implementation of the Regional Strategy and Action Plan against Piracy and for Maritime Security.

*The MASE Program has five specific result areas theses are as follows;*

- Result 1:** Managed by the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD)  
Alternative livelihood for unemployed youth and supporting intra somali maritime coordination structures;
- Result 2:** Managed by, the East Africa Community (EAC)  
National/regional legal, legislative and infrastructural capability for Arrest, Transfer. East Africa Community;
- Result 3:** Managed by the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA)  
Regional capacity to disrupt the financial networks of pirate leaders and their financier while also addressing the structural vulnerability factors and minimize the economic impact of piracy is strengthened;
- Result 4/5:** Managed by the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC)  
Enhanced national and regional capacity for maritime tasks and support functions. Improved regional coordination and information exchange.

A Regional Ministerial Meeting (3<sup>rd</sup>) for promoting Maritime Safety and Security in the Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean Region, took place in Djibouti on the 15<sup>th</sup> May 2016 and adopted a Declaration on Maritime Safety and Security in the ESA-IO Region, notably: The Ministers and High representatives **reaffirm** the importance of the region to take responsibility for the protection of its waters, including against IUU fishing and dumping of toxic materials; **reiterate** their political commitment to combat all forms of maritime crimes and to address safety actions at sea issues; **reaffirm** their commitment to support the implementation of the Regional organisations' maritime Strategies in line with the AU 2050 AIMS and Maritime Transport Charter; **reaffirm** their support to the ongoing programmes, in particular the MASE Programme, and activities which contribute to enhance national and regional capacities.

Furthermore, the **Djibouti Declaration** acknowledges the progress made in the implementation of the 2010 ESA-IO Regional Strategy with the support of the MASE programme, recognises its participation in capacity building addressing maritime security, acknowledged its support to the Somalia MSCC (Maritime Security Coordination Committee) and requested support for the operationalization of the maritime information Fusion Centre in Madagascar and the Regional Coordination Operational Centre in Seychelles.

Activities related to Somalia coastal areas are to be implemented by FAO and will be complementary to the EU on going activities in Somalia and those related to maritime capacity building will be also in line with the ESA-IO Fishery programme implemented by IOC.

## 2. METHODOLOGY

### 2.1 MASE II RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

*“The aim of an evaluation is to produce operational recommendations supported by solid conclusions which are based on clear judgement criteria, solid and concrete information and rational argumentation”*

-Evaluation Methods for the European Union’s External Assistance.

The development of the MASE methodology and instruments were adopted from the following resource: [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/ensure-aid-effectiveness/monitoring-results\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/ensure-aid-effectiveness/monitoring-results_en.htm).

The handbook related to the Results Oriented Monitoring procedure methodology was also followed. [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/ensure-aid-effectiveness/documents/rom\\_handbook2011\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/ensure-aid-effectiveness/documents/rom_handbook2011_en.pdf).


The MASE evaluation index allowed for the assessment of the relevance, quality, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability, coherence and synergies, EU visibility as well as the EU-added value of MASE projects. The methodology<sup>6</sup> encompassed specifically developed and appropriate methodology and instruments enabling to judge the performance of external aid programmes.

The research design incorporates a mixed multidisciplinary qualitative and quantitative methodology; this was selected to prevent reliance upon a single method and thus increase the reliability and validity of results. By adopting a multi-method research framework and combining three or more different approaches it is possible to support the qualitative research elements within a triangulation<sup>7</sup> process ensuring that potential gaps and weaknesses of one method would be compensated for by the strengths of the others.

### 2.2 MASE ASSESSMENT IMPLEMENTATION PHASES AND TOOLS

*As proposed by the EC methodology the assessment analysis process was conducted in three phases*

### 2.3 MASE DESK PHASE



*MASE ROM Monitoring Cycle processes*

During this phase the MASE intervention logic was analysed on the basis of official documents. The first two days of the MASE Assessment were thus dedicated to the collection, collation and classification and analysis of secondary data. This included the reports of similar projects as well as Lessons Learned and Best Practice documents.

Additionally, the desk phase required the collection and collation of significant reference documents that are deemed vital to the implementation of MASE.

This included the collection, collation and analysis of various reports and other relevant materials from a range of sources. In particular, reports pertaining to the different activities delivered by the MASE project by managers along with

records from meetings that influenced the project’s delivery. Published statistics, texts and secondary analyses made by other experts as well as other support materials. This provided a literature review

<sup>6</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/methodology/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/methodology/index_en.htm)

<sup>7</sup> Triangulation involves the conscious combination of quantitative and qualitative methodologies as a powerful solution to strengthen a research design where the logic is based on the fact that a single method can never adequately solve the problem of rival causal factors (Denzin 1978; Patton 1990; De Vos 1998).

and allowed the MASE team manager to develop a specific ‘information platform’ which was used to store and make available the collected data for the whole team.

The MASE M&E logical framework is based on the EUROPEAID ROM Handbook 2012.8 As defined by the ROM Framework, there are eight stages in this ROM process and this method is mirrored as much as possible within the MASE assessment logical process. (See Diagram below.)

The MASE evaluation has identified the following interested parties with whom it will be necessary for the project to develop relationships with, during the project lifestyle these are:

**Project Stakeholders [PS]:** Individuals or institutions that may directly or indirectly, positively or negatively – affect or be affected by a MASE project or the programme.

**Project Beneficiaries [PB]:** Persons or groups who benefit in whatever way from the implementation of the project<sup>9</sup>.

**Project partners [PPa]:** Those who implement the projects in-country (who are also stakeholders, and may be a ‘target group’).

## 2.4 MASE SYNTHESIS PHASE

During the synthesis phase the MASE Team used all information to generate the final draft report; this included the findings and conclusions from the questions to make the overall assessment. The Final Report was compiled during the synthesis stage by utilising all desk-based and interview based information. Recommendations may suggest for some small alterations in the delivery of MASE to enhance its productivity.

## 2.5 MASE SECONDARY DATA ANALYSIS<sup>10</sup>

Secondary data analysis involves the analysis of existing datasets, information and reports that have been collected previously by another source. By using existing data means that the data is readily available and will make a substantial contribution to the reduction costs and time constraints.

Secondary data collected by the MASE M&E was classified by date, relevance and quality, after which selected data was cleared and placed into a prepared ‘knowledge repository’.

Classification was undertaken through a process of grounded coding or ‘creating specific codes relating to the key questions’, collected data then underwent a data reduction process in order to make a large amount of data more manageable.

Once the extrapolation and coding of information was complete the resulting data was used as a reference tool for the MASE Team and provided evidence to where data gaps might exist as well as provide a snap shot of the current picture in relation to the implementation of the MASE programme.

Data analysis was carried out using the EU ROM methodology. However, a number of limitations were identified. There was a dearth of desk review material from which to draw an insightful Inception Report. The methodology envisaged reconstructing the logic model which existed at the beginning of the MASE programme from the documentation available to the programme developers at the time. These documents were either non-existent or not supplied to the evaluation team. It was therefore impossible to construct a baseline against which the achievements of the MASE programme

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
<sup>8</sup> ROM Handbook: Results-oriented Monitoring. EUROPEAID 2012 /127731/C/SER/Multi EVA/219719

<sup>9</sup> Distinction may be made between: (a) Target group(s): The group/entity who will be directly positively affected by the project at the Project Purpose level. This may include the staff from partner organisations; (b) Final beneficiaries: Those who benefit from the project in the long term at the level of the society or sector at large, e.g. “shipping companies” due to increased spending on ports, “consumers” due to improved conditions for the Blue and Maritime sectors.

<sup>10</sup> Analysis of secondary data, where “secondary data can include any data that are examined to answer a research question other than the question(s) for which the data were initially collected” (p. 3; Vartanian, 2010).

could be benchmarked. There was a lack of key stakeholder engagement resulting in information gaps remaining unfilled within the data collection plan. It proved difficult – in some instances impossible – to interview certain individuals whose work impacts on MASE implementation. Given the already scant information from the desk review phase this inability to draw further information from key stakeholders via interview resulted in a wholly incomplete data collection plan.

MASE as an EU M&E process has adopted the BSC<sup>11</sup> Guide for its primary data collection, data analysis and reporting structure and this will be utilised within the MASE assessment.



The Five OECD-DAC evaluation criteria (Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Impact and Sustainability)

<sup>11</sup> BCS is not a questionnaire but a guide for structured thinking

### **3. ANSWERED MASE QUESTIONS/ FINDINGS**

MASE used the methodology and instruments that have been specifically developed by the EU to assess the performance of external aid programmes. The inception meeting was carried in October 2016. It implied numerous exchanges between the experts and EU stakeholders.

The overall purpose of the evaluation was to provide a comprehensive Mid-term review assessment of the current status of the Maritime Security Programme in the Eastern, Southern Africa and Indian Ocean region (ESA-IO region). In doing this, the evaluation will identify aspects of the Results Delivery that may require attention and or minor changes. One objective of this assessment is to develop a set of recommendations that may improve the delivery of the MASE program post assessment; taking into account the different characteristics of the Operational Programme, the institutional settings and administrative systems of the beneficiary Member States and regions, as well as the wider socio-economic context.

The evaluation needed to demonstrate what has and has not worked, in which context, and to demonstrate the rationale for findings by identifying key factors for success and failure. The rationale for each result was defined and considered against the expectations of the main stakeholders. Extensive data was gathered and used to analyse and assess the performance of each result, to evaluate the functionality of the intervention logic and its relevance to practical delivery issues.

#### **3.1 MASE Portfolio**

##### **Classification of the MASE Project within ROM Criteria**

MASE project classification is that of a HYBRID ascertained through the categories supported by ROM of National, Regional, Hybrid or Pseudoprojects. This was carried out because the classification will influence the manner in which ROM will be appropriated for MASE.

##### **Hybrid RP (category C)**

MASE falls into the Hybrid category because it possesses elements that facilitate with autonomous national components in that;

- Overall objective is first and foremost regional, but is partially based on the reinforcement of the national capacities;
- Results are both regional and national. National results contribute to regional results;
- Activities are regional and national. Regional activities coordinate and complement national activities;
- Failure of one national activity/component to deliver outputs would harm the regional outcome. However, some regional outcomes would be produced anyway; national outcomes in other countries will persist.

#### **3.2 MASE QUESTIONS**

##### *1) Assessment Questions*

The MASE assessment questions also take into consideration the EU strategic peace and stability interests.

One of EU's key interests – within the framework of its external action - is to increase cooperation with international and regional organisations, and third partner countries. EU approach encompasses short and long term actions, and is cross sectorial. It is a comprehensive approach that seeks to improve maritime governance at different levels, thus targeting different sectors. The assessment questions are as follows, each expert employed his/her own professional field of knowledge from which to derive the answers.

## *QUALITY OF PROJECT DESIGN*

### **What is the present level of relevance of the project?**

- Are the project purpose and overall objectives consistent with, and supportive of Partner Government policies?
- Does it support EC development and cooperation strategies in the concerned field (special consideration given to CSP/NIP, Paris declaration, EU effectiveness agenda)?
- Does the project still respond to the needs of the target groups?

### **As presently designed, is the intervention logic holding true?**

- Does a logframe or similar tool exist? If yes, what is its present quality (does it clearly show how activities will achieve results and impact)? If not, why not?
- Are the OO, PP and results clear and logical, and do they address clearly identified needs?
- Is the PP achievable in the project framework?
- Are there suitable and informative OVIs/ targets, e.g. are they Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic and Time-bound (SMART)?
- Are the activities, outputs and outcomes planned appropriate to achieve the PP?
- Are the risks and assumptions holding true? Are risk management arrangements in place?
- Is sustainability an integral part of the design i.e. is there a phase out/hand over strategy?

### **Is the current design sufficiently supported by all stakeholders?**

- Have key stakeholders been involved in the design process?
- Are coordination, management and financing arrangements clearly defined and do they support institutional strengthening and local ownership?
- Is the sustainability strategy (handing over strategy to partners) fully understood by the partners?
- Are the OO and PP clearly understood by the project partners?
- Is the timescale and/or range of activities realistic with regard to the stakeholders' capacities?
- If applicable: How well has the project design been adapted to make it more relevant? Was it straightforward to do contractually?

### **Is the current design sufficiently taking cross-cutting issues into account?**

- Have the relevant cross-cutting issues (environment, gender, human rights and governance, donor coordination or others) been adequately mainstreamed in the project design?

## *EFFICIENCY OF IMPLEMENTATION TO DATE*

### **How well is the availability/usage of means/inputs managed?**

- To what degree are inputs provided/available on time to implement activities from all parties involved?
- To what degree are inputs provided / available at planned cost (or lower than planned), from all parties involved?



- Are inputs monitored regularly to encourage cost-effective implementation of activities?
- By whom are they monitored?
- Are project resources managed in a transparent and accountable manner? Are all contractual procedures clearly understood and do they facilitate the implementation of the project?

#### **How well is the implementation of activities managed?**

- Is the logframe or similar tool used as a management tool? If not, why not?
- Is an activity schedule (or work plan) and resource schedule available and used by the project management and other relevant parties?
- To what extent are activities implemented as scheduled? If there are delays how can they be rectified?
- Are funds committed and spent in line with the implementation timescale? If not, why not?
- How well activities are monitored by the project and are corrective measures taken if required?
- If appropriate, how flexible is the project in adapting to changing needs?
- If appropriate how does the project co-ordinate with other similar interventions to encourage synergy and avoid overlaps?

#### **How well are outputs achieved?**

- Have all planned outputs been delivered to date? And in a logic sequence?
- What is the quality of outputs to date?
- Are the outputs achieved likely to contribute to the intended results?
- Are they correctly reflected through the OVIs/targets?

#### **How well is the Partner Contribution / Involvement working?**

- Do the inter-institutional structures e.g. steering committees, monitoring systems, allow efficient project implementation?
- Have all partners been able to provide their financial and/or HR contributions?
- Is the communication between responsible actors in the partner country, the EC Delegation and the project management satisfactory?

#### *EFFECTIVENESS TO DATE*

#### **How well is the project achieving its planned results?**

- Have the planned results to date been achieved?
- Are the OVIs/targets for the PP appropriate and are they being reported against? What is the quality of the results/services available?
- Have all planned target groups access to / using project results available so far?
- Are there any factors which prevent target groups accessing the results/services?

**As presently implemented what is the likelihood of the PP to be achieved?**

- To what extent has the project adapted or is able to adapt to changing external conditions (risks and assumptions) in order to ensure benefits for the target groups?
- If any unplanned negative effects on target groups occurred, or are likely to occur through the project, to what extent did the project management take appropriate measures?
- To what extent are unplanned positive effects contributing to results produced / services provided?

*IMPACT PROSPECTS*

**What are the direct impact prospects of the project at Overall Objectives level?**

- What, if any impacts are already apparent?
- What impacts appear likely?
- Are the current OVIs/targets realistic and are they likely to be met?
- Are any external factors likely to jeopardise the project's direct impact?
- To what extent does/will the project have any indirect positive and/or negative impacts? (i.e. environmental, social, cultural, gender and economic)
- Have there been/ will there be any unplanned positive impacts on the planned target groups or other non-targeted communities arising from the project?
- How did this affect the impact?
- Did the project take timely measures for mitigating the unplanned negative impacts?
- What was the result?
- Does donor coherence, complementarity and coordination exist and have any indirect impact on the project?

*POTENTIAL SUSTAINABILITY*

**Financial / economic viability?**

- If the services/results have to be supported institutionally, are funds likely to be made available? If so, by whom?
- Are the services/results affordable for the target groups at the completion of project?
- Can the benefits be maintained if economic factors change (e.g. commodity prices, exchange rate)?
- Are the beneficiaries and/or relevant authorities/institutions able to afford maintenance or replacement of the technologies/services introduced by the project?
- Is there a financial/ economic phase-out strategy? If so, how likely is it to be implemented?

**What is the level of policy support provided and the degree of interaction between project and policy level?**

- What support has been provided from the relevant national, sectoral and budgetary policies?
- Do changes in policies and priorities affect the project and how well is it adapting in terms of long-term needs for support?

- Is any public and private sector policy support likely to continue after the project has finished?

### **How well is the project contributing to institutional and management capacity?**

- How far is the project embedded in institutional structures that are likely to survive beyond the life of the project?
- Are project partners being properly developed (technically, financially and managerially) for continuing to deliver the project's benefits/services?
- Will adequate levels of suitable qualified HR be available to continue to deliver the project's stream of benefits?
- Are there good relations with new or existing institutions and are there plans to continue with some or all of the project's activities?

### *HORIZONTAL ISSUES*

#### **Role of Quality Support Group (QSG) and ROM in project quality**

### *CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES*

#### **Have practical and strategic gender interests been adequately considered in the project strategy?**

*If so, how and to what effect? If not, why not? If n/a, explain.*

*Please consider the following aspects of gender mainstreaming:*

- Has the project been planned on the basis of a gender-differentiated beneficiaries' analysis?
- To what extent will / could the gender sensitive approach lead to an improved impact of the project?
- What is the likeliness of increased gender equality beyond project end?
- According to the OECD Gender Policy Marker how would you classify this project?

#### **Is the project respecting environmental needs?**

*If so, how and to what effect? If not, why not? If n/a, explain.*

*Please consider the following aspects of mainstreaming environmental aspects:*

- Have environmental constraints and opportunities been considered adequately in the project design?
- Are good environmental practices followed in project implementation (in relation to use of water and energy and materials, production of wastes, etc.)? Does the project respect traditional, successful environmental practices?
- What capacities exist (within project, project partners and project context) to deal with critical risks that could affect project effectiveness such as climate risks or risks of natural disasters (in the case of projects in sensitive geographical areas / natural disasters hotspots)?
- Has environmental damage been caused or likely to be caused by the project? What kind of environmental impact mitigation measures has been taken?
- Is the achievement of project results and objectives likely to generate increased pressure on fragile ecosystems (natural forests, wetlands, coral reefs, mangroves) and scarce natural resources (e.g. surface and groundwater, timber, soil)?

**Has (good) governance been mainstreamed in the project/programme (P/P)?**

*If so, how? If not, why not? If n/a, explain.*

- Has there been an analysis of “winners and losers” regarding possible “discrimination” of target groups by the P/P?
- Will the P/P help to ensure respect for any relevant human rights and not cause them to be reduced in any way?
- Do any interested parties and observers raise HR concerns?

2) *Assessment team organisation*

In order to carry out the assessment, the experts were divided in 4 analytical areas. Each expert was tasked with the data collection and analysis of one of the specific MASE result areas:

**Result 1:** *M&E, Maritime Security and Governance Expert:*

**Result 2:** *Law Enforcement Maritime Legal Framework Expert*

**Result 3:** *Economics, Finance, Financial Crimes and Investigation Expert*

**Result 4/5:** *Maritime Information Sharing and Information Fusion Expert*

## 4. MASE FINDINGS

### Coordination Component

There is one coordination body, IGAD, for overseeing and coordinate the overall implementation of MASE Programme. Additionally, IGAD is implementing Result area 1.1

#### **The Intergovernmental Authority for Development [IGAD]:**

The most significant setback for the MASE programme and more importantly Result 1 was the delay in the operationalisation of the overarching MASE coordination body the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD). Information gathered showed that this was caused by a raft of issues. The coordination of the MASE program was ‘frozen’ by the project portfolio holder at the time; this due to a backlog of issues and other engagements with the EU. The FA was signed in June 2013 but the coordinator was not appointed until July 2015. The consequence of the holdups impacted significantly on the Programme, especially Result area 1.

Duplications are well known to be contentious and the expertise built in the ISSP Maritime Pillar should be embraced as missions engaging with the Somalia stakeholders with regards to a Maritime Security Regime for the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and North Indian Ocean are ongoing.

*It is advised that the arrangement is maintained for the IGAD Director for the Security Sector Program [ISSP] being the project portfolio holder.*

*It is advised that the Head of the IGAD Maritime Pillar and the MASE Coordinator work in closer collaboration.*

#### **The Indian Ocean Commission [IOC]**

The IOC have worked tenaciously on drawing together what can only be described as a political and dynamic platform of maritime professionals and an annual ministerial meeting which draws all the results of the MASE programme into a single meeting enabling political engagement of the countries involved.

The first steering committee meeting was held on 1st and 2nd of December 2014 in Brussels, convened by the EC in absence of the coordination body. It provided an opportunity to take stock of the results achieved by the four regional organizations of the Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean (ESA-IO) responsible for the programme. Once the coordination established, regular SC meetings took place. The dynamism shown by the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) in carrying out activities related to results 4 and 5, dealing respectively with “Regional and national capacity for maritime tasks and support functions” and “Regional coordination and information exchange”, for which it is responsible, was praised by participants, in particular the EU. The validity of the recommendations and the decisions taken by the IOC was confirmed, especially those concerning the creation of a regional centre for maritime information fusion.

It was proposed at the steering meeting that IOC should play a supporting role to the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) in two areas: coordination of the regional Ministerial Conference and communication. It was also agreed that IOC will prepare a robust harmonized communication and visibility strategy for the whole of the programme with a consequent budget; however this has seen significant delays to actual implementation and will require immediate action as a rider to the financial agreement had to be done by the EC services (done Rider 3).

*Recommendation that the IOC continue political dialogue with the output of enhancing and building on the development of the MASE Ministerial Meetings*

### 4.1 RESULT 1

**Alternative livelihood for unemployed youth and establishing maritime government structures in Somalia- Managed by the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD)**

## **Background**

The Intergovernmental for Development [IGAD] provides both the administrative process for Result area 1 as well as providing the overarching coordination for Result area 1, 2, 3 4 and 5.

Key Objectives of **Result 1 aim at:**

- Strengthening the maritime security coordination mechanism in Somalia.
- Creating alternative livelihoods strategies and employment opportunities for youth in coastal communities in Somalia

IGAD is the lead partner.

### ***Total Funds: EU7.5 million***

Implementation of **Result 1** MASE Programme is to support the implementation (a) the Somali Maritime Resource and Security Strategy (SMRSS) and maritime policy development. (b) Establishing and operationalizing Maritime Security Coordination Committees (MSCC's) as framework and forum for dialogue for Somali administrations to support structured bilateral and multilateral counter piracy.

Whereas Food Agricultural Organization (FAO) is implementing the alternative livelihood for unemployed youth in Somalia coastal communities as a way of tackling piracy on land with a budget of EUR 5.3 million. The component has been designed in way that it was to provide alternatives for youth and wean them off criminal tendencies. The component is re-designed and financial adjustments are made to include coastal communities and fishing infrastructure to support livelihoods initiatives for youth. IGAD oversees the implementation by FAO.

The MASE programme still addresses Maritime insecurity issues which include strengthening capacities of governance as a whole in the ESA-IO region.

### **Result Area 1 Objective 1.**

#### **Building the capacity of Somalia to manage and coordinate maritime security requirements.**

The Result 1.1 of the Programme is supporting the Maritime Security Coordination Committee (MSCC) which is the Somali instrument to facilitate cooperation and maritime security development between the Federal Government's National Maritime Coordination Committee (NMCC), the Somali Regions Maritime Coordination Committee (MCC) including Puntland, Galmudug, Jubbaland and future regional administrations - and with Somaliland's Counter Piracy Programme. The MSCC should comprise the Federal Government, Somali Regions (to include Puntland, Galmudug, Jubbaland and future regional administrations and Somaliland) and representatives of the international community such as the UN, IGAD (facilitator), US and the UK, as well as a technical expertise support to be provided by EUCAP Nestor/Somalia, UNODC/OBP and UNSOM.

Result 1 will support the MSCC to implement the Somali Maritime Resource and Security Strategy (SMRSS) and maritime policy development. In particular, it will support the MSCC efforts for:

- Monitoring security of Somali maritime resources,
- Facilitate and monitor assessment of renewable and non-renewable natural resources availability and access capacity;
- Reforms in maritime security, law enforcement agencies, safety at sea, response and recovery, search and rescue;
- Establish and monitor progress of maritime governance structures;
- Development of essential maritime infrastructure, to include ports, customs, immigration etc.

The MSCC report six-monthly to the capacity building WG Somalia under the CGPCS new configuration following the Seychelles meeting on 31<sup>st</sup> may 2016.

The overall Result 1 is currently conducted under the umbrella of IGAD in cooperation with the Somalia and Djibouti EU Delegations for the component related to Somalia.

Where relevant, the activities should be implemented in coordination and complementarity with those undertaken by EUCAP Nestor/Somalia mission and other Partners including UN agencies and other Europeans Partners who are supporting the MSCC works.

## **MSCC WORK**

In May 2016, the Somali MSCC met and produced the Somali maritime coordinating committee architecture, as well as the terms of reference for the Maritime Security Coordinating Committee, the National Maritime Coordinating Committee and the National Maritime working group. The report reaped from that meeting is very encouraging with regards to content and context in that it sets out the missions for each of the sub groups. However, the report lacks finesse and does not reflect the expectation of a report of its stature. It has not yet been signed off by the Members which compromise of the FGS, Federal Member States (Puntland, Jubbaland, Southwest, Galmudug and Hiran & Sh. Dhexe) and Somaliland with its special status.

The Kampala meeting also produced a communique which at point seven stated that the Meeting reiterated and emphasized the importance of the Somali Maritime Resource and Security Strategy (SMRSS) as the one single Somali maritime strategy. However, it was stated by representatives of the SFG that there were aspirations to develop a Somali maritime policy. The SFG voiced concerns on the added value provided by the coordinator, in that outputs from the meetings had resulted in work that the MSCC had already previously carried out. A number of other respondents also stated that it was critical that guidance was provided by an individual with a strong maritime security background. The SFG recognised<sup>12</sup> IGAD's cooperation as instrumental in assisting the Federal Government of Somalia and Somaliland to move forward with the agenda of securing Somalia maritime waters. The SFG considered that the MSCC mechanism is one of the main instruments to realize the government's objectives and attributes that add to the support and willingness of IGAD to engage in partnership with the SFG. This new positive development is to be noted for the time being. The future may be different as there is a new government and the MSCC faces many internal tensions.

### **Result area 1 Objective 2. Creating alternative livelihoods strategies and employment opportunities for youth in coastal communities in Somalia**

FAO is the implementing partner for the Alternatives for Youth Living in Coastal Communities in Puntland, Galmudug, and Mogadishu. The work is encompassed in the FAO Somali Country Programme 2014-2017.

The objective is fully aligned with both the World Bank Group's Country Partnership Framework (CPF) and Economic Recovery Plan (2014-2015) setting principles for the transition from emergency relief to early recovery and development. It also feeds into the New Deal Compact (PSG4- Economic Foundations) which aims at revitalizing and expanding Somali economy with focus on livelihood, employment and inclusive growth.

This activity proposes an integrated approach to creating long-term, sustainable employment opportunities to youth within the coastal communities of Puntland, Galmudug and Mogadishu where traditionally communities have combined seasonal fishing and pastoral activities. This will include:

1. Technical and material support to develop sustainable new livelihoods in the fisheries sector,
2. Identification of young fishermen,

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<sup>12</sup> letter dated on the 6<sup>th</sup> October 2016, from the Deputy Prime Minister Mohamed Omer Arteh, to IGAD ES

3. Provision of fisheries equipment,
4. Support post-harvest management of fish and feed to increase production in a sustainable way,
5. Development of temporary employment for youths in cash-for work schemes in pastoral activities.

Furthermore, IOC is currently implementing a vast regional Programme for fisheries management and development funded by EU and which also benefits to Somalia. FAO will take specific steps for coordination with the General Secretariat of the IOC to include capacity building actions for responsible fisheries management in compliance with IOTC and, as well, to avoid duplication of activities, ensure complementarity and coherence during the whole period of implementation of this component of the Programme.

1. Increased food production in the targeted households and communities,
2. Distribution of small ruminants and kits for animal health capable to adapt to very dry conditions, to youth groups,
3. Trainings on animal production and health,
4. Productive tools and infrastructure are improved by distribution and installation of fish aggregating devices (FADs) to attract oceanic fish unavailable to artisanal Somali fishermen; rehabilitation of water catchments to support livestock production and local markets; clearing of land to be destined to fodder production,
5. Advocacy and community sensitization, a campaign will be designed to make piracy and other maritime crime unappealing to Somalis in highlighting the negative aspects of and positive alternatives available for Somali youth.

### **EXPECTED RESULTS - CCAP**

This project will contribute to the creation of sustainable skilled employment among the youth of Somalia's Indian Ocean coastal communities based on a number of activities targeting under-exploited marine fisheries resources and livestock value chain trade.

The project results framework will ensure that at risk households are better equipped to anticipate, resist and recover quickly from pressures and shocks, and thus less likely to be attracted to illegal activities.

#### **Outcome 1: Diversification of livelihood strategies and employment opportunities for youth at risk of recruitment into piracy in coastal communities are created**

- Output 1.1: Youths have received technical and material support to develop sustainable new livelihoods in the fisheries sector,
- Output 1.2: Youths and women from female dependent households – organized through groups – have received material support and training for fodder and fish post-harvest processing to add value to their production,
- Output 1.3: Youths have benefited from temporary employment in cash-for-work schemes.

#### **Outcome 2: Sustainably increased food production in the targeted households and communities.**

- Output 2.1: Productive infrastructure is expanded or rehabilitated to support and sustain new livelihoods,
- Output 2.2: Communities are sensitised, informed and made aware of natural resources conservation and co-management principles.



**Outcome 3: Targeted households and producer organizations are able to sell their produce and obtain better prices**

- Output 3.1: Producer organizations have received technical and material support to better deliver market-related services,

**Outcome 4: Targeted households and communities have access to knowledge and support services for productive activities**

- Output 4.1: Youth Community Animal Health Workers trained and provided with kits for animal health services.

**Planned activities**

- Mobilisation of PM to Bossaso (16/10) & establishment of Project Office
- Official launch and 1<sup>st</sup> PSC (Project Steering Committee) Meeting in Mogadishu, 9<sup>th</sup> November 2016,
- Field work and initial site survey/identification of beneficiaries,
- Monthly reporting procedure established,
- Recruitment of staff – 5 positions (3 International & 2 National) to be advertised,
- Request for EOI for interested NGOs to work with FAO – closed Wednesday 19<sup>th</sup> October 2016 (advertised on UNGM website and in papers in Mogadishu and Puntland),
- FAO fisheries team meeting planned in Bossaso (late November),
- Puntland NGO (Help Leads to Hope) contracted (mid-October) to implement micro-finance study (over a 5-month period).

The assessment of Result area 1.2 is extremely encouraging, all the different elements set out in the mission plan are being implemented. In fact, the objective is performing better than expected. The project manager seizing the opportunity to attract added value at every opportunity. R1.2 is also the only result objective that has considered gender issues, and have ensured that gender opportunities are balanced. Delays caused a slowdown of the expected activities. However, with the 2-year extension it is extremely likely that Result 1.2 will achieve is PP and OO.

*RESULT AREA ONE QUALITY OF DESIGN*

<i>a = very good; b = good; c = problems; d = serious deficiencies.</i>	Overall conclusion: Quality of Design Result 1	2.80	<b>B</b>
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The Result area 1 is of particular relevance to the MASE project in that it addresses some of the root causes of piracy from within the geographical piracy hotspot. In the main it focuses on the development of Somalia addressed through a comprehensive approach with regards to maritime security challenges and alternative livelihood youth opportunities. Youth being one of the most vulnerable in society and the most likely target for the piracy recruitment process. The prevention and fight against piracy cannot be achieved just by strengthening regional coordination and capacity for maritime security, it must be supported by creating alternative livelihoods and economic opportunities for those groups more at risk of engaging in illegal activities.

Result area 1 project purpose and overall objectives are consistent with, and supportive of both the National (Somalia) policies as well as Partner Government policies. Result 1 also reflects the individual components of the IGAD Integrated Maritime Strategy (2030) which was approved in 2014

by seven of the eight countries of the Horn of Africa inclusive of Somalia. Furthermore, the result area also supports EC development and cooperation strategies within the maritime framework.

However, evidence shows that Result 1.1 does not respond completely to the needs of all the target groups. In particular IGAD noted that there is pressure in the region in terms of instability due to the new conflicts in Yemen across the Gulf of Aden, these manifesting as threats due to its maritime proximity. Result 1.1 therefore would need to take into account in its programme planning these emerging transnational threats/maritime crimes. Interviews with the SFG revealed that due to the fact that they had made substantial headway with the development and delivery of the MSCC that there were aspirations to take more of the lead on the implementation of Result area 1.1 along with the representative of UNDOC who has contribute to develop the Somali maritime Resource and Security Strategy.

Currently, a specific log frame for result 1.1 and 2 is unavailable. This for one part is because IGAD only finalized with Somali regional entities on the way forward towards the existence of the Somalia MSCC on the 17 – 18 December 2015 when “Protocols of Cooperation” were signed effectively establishing the MSCC structures. The FAO who are the managing body for the implementation of result 1.2 is also in the process of developing a log frame, but similar to result 1.1 the formation and initiation of the "Coastal Communities against Piracy" (CCAP) has also been slow to start. The inauguration of this component took place in November 2016.

The development of specific log frames for each of the two objectives that can feed into the overall log frame of the Programme must be considered as priority. The fact that the two objectives are really quite diverse demands for a unique approach if the result area is to keep on track. Currently the Coastal Communities against Piracy has its own budget of EUR 5.3 million.

Result area 1 OO and PP are clear and logical they also clearly address identified needs. However, currently and because the result area has been subject to numerous delays, the extension is welcomed as it provides the window of opportunity within which to achieve the objectives.

Result 1.2 (FAO) has overcome the obstacles that were holding up the mission and has started to develop suitable and informative OVIs/ that are Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic and Time-bound. However, it is too early assess if the proposed activities, outputs and outcomes planned are appropriate to achieve the PP.

In general, the MASE programme has numerous issues relating to the original risks and assumptions; the risk and assumptions identified are holding true, but the totality of risks and assumptions were wanting. In particular, there was no way of identifying the risks with regards to the delays in the administrative process by the managing body [IGAD] and therefore no risk management arrangements were in place.

Although result 1 is embryonic, there is strong evidence that shows that both the key objectives are very well supported (albeit there still appears to a lack of signed commitment) by stakeholders, and that the key stakeholders have been an integral part of the design process. However, with regards to the result object 1.1 the budgets and timelines are not clearly defined by IGAD to the recipients; and to increase transparency it is required for the SFG to develop a clear and agreed annual agenda of proposed meetings, studies and events that can be costed accordingly. It is therefore extremely difficult to ascertain to what extent they support institutional strengthening and local ownership. In reverse the Result 1.2 who have their own budget by way of a Delegated Agreement –Pagoda FAO-EC are very clear on the coordination, management and financing arrangements and to the manner in which they will support institutional strengthening and local ownership.

It was evident from discussions that stakeholders’ representatives of result 1.1 would welcome a Framework Administrative Agreement (PAGODA) with the EC (Pagoda UNODC-EC) much the same as the Result area 1.2. They were clear that they were already delivering on the MSCC and would like to continue with UNODC as they are the key designer of the Somalia Maritime Resource and Security Strategy.

Currently there is little evidence to the development of an overall sustainability strategy and how that resonates with partners. Respondents after analysis were clear that they completely understand the OO and PP, and in fact incorporated the objectives into their developmental plans, in particular for Objective 1.2 where they continued unaided by the MASE program.

However, due to the late start of Result 1 it is difficult to assess if the overall timescale is still realistic, and the project will really benefit from the 2-year extension provided to ensure targets are to be achieved. In fact, the mid-term review will provide a real opportunity for Result 1 to adapt its design to make it more relevant; this will depend on the contractual arrangements. Additionally, it will provide a window from which better account can be made of cross cutting issues such as environment, gender, governance and donor coordination. Currently this is not mainstreamed into the overarching document for Result 1. However, FAO has evidenced that these issues are well taken care of.

*EFFICIENCY TO DATE*

<i>a = very good; b = good; c = problems; d = serious deficiencies.</i>	<b>Overall conclusion: Efficiency to Date Result 1</b>	2.80	<b>C</b>
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The most significant setback for the Result 1 was the delay in the operationalisation of the overarching MASE coordination body the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD). Information gathered showed that this was caused by a raft of issues and is explained earlier. The coordinator not appointed until July 2015 the consequence of the holdups impacted badly on the project especially Result area 1.

It is impossible to report on efficiency with regards to the implementation of activities. However, in the last 6 months there is evidence to demonstrate that activities are taking place. Such as the meeting held in May 2016 to draw up the Terms of Reference and the meeting held in Kampala, Uganda.

Currently there is not a clear monitoring system in place to oversee the complete Result area 1; and the overall programme; this will require attention.

***Recommendation that a definable monitoring system is developed and implemented for all parts of Result 1.***

Analysis of data showed that for the Result 1.1 the available resources were seemingly not being managed in a transparent and accountable manner and that no information with regards to financials distribution was made available. Evidence shows that this is down to the lack of an annual forward looking agenda, that details proposed meetings, studies and/or events by the SFG.

***A recommendation would be therefore for the SFG within Result area 1.1 to work on the basis of Delegated agreement with either a UN agency or a similar agency rather than in a decentralised cooperation.***

***Recommendation is to change the Chairmanship and give the chair to a UN Agency or another Agency with the skills and competence to provide the steering and guidance as required.***

***Recommendation that the SFG on an annual basis prepares forward looking agenda, that details proposed meetings, studies and/or events by the SFG.***

The Result 1.1 have accelerated their actions in line with their sub objectives and expected results. However, there is no apparent log frame by the project management for the implementation of each of the result objectives; neither is there a clear activity schedule for Result 1.2. One observation in relation to the extent of scheduled activity implementation, is that the long delay created the mechanism whereon the recipient partners such as the SFG and Somaliland etc., began implementing the objective themselves; in doing so they have managed to claw back lost time.

***Recommendation to develop a clear log frame for the implementation of Result are 1.1***

This procedure was different for the Result 1.2 whereon the implementing responsibility was removed from IGAD and assigned to FAO to enable the implementation of the livelihood programme.

The analysis underlined how the MASE programme needs to begin to look to the future in order to adapt to changing needs. Result area 1.1 and 1.2 are currently undergoing some subtle changes whereon the original needs are starting to change. This mid-term review is therefore an opportunity to embrace those changes and should be explored fully to avoid further delays.

There is no concrete evidence of Result area 1.1embracing the IGAD Regional Maritime Integrated Strategy which is the RECs fundamental strategy for maritime in the horn of Africa, building from the AU AIM strategy 2050 and maritime transport charter 2009.

Recommendation: Result 1.1 to better coordinate its actions within the framework of the IGAD Regional Maritime Strategy in particular to Objective One: **To promote a safe and secure IGAD maritime domain and contribute to the security of the global maritime domain** and Objective 1.9 which is **to assist in the setting up of National MSCCs.**

However, Result 1.2 implemented by FAO, is fully in line with the FAO Somalia Country Programming Framework (CPF), aligned with the Economic Recovery Plan (2014-2015). It also fits into the New Deal Compact (PSG4- Economic Foundations) which aims at revitalizing and expanding Somali economy with focus on livelihood and employment.

Partner involvement has been high for both elements of the Result 1. Both parts have well developed steering group mechanisms which exist to enable future efficient project implementation. However, communication between the responsible actors in the partner country, the EC Delegation and the project management appear to be far from satisfactory for the Result 1.1. With long time lapses between transmitted information emphasised as a ‘problem’ for partners trying to contact the administrative partner.

***EFFECTIVENESS TO DATE***

<i>a = very good; b = good; c = problems; d = serious deficiencies.</i>	<b>Overall conclusion: Effectiveness to Date Result 1</b>	1.50	<b>D</b>
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Due to the long delays, the original planned results have failed, the initial OVIs/targets for the PP although appropriate required a complete change for one part. Due to the embryonic state of Result 1 it is impossible to assess the quality of the results/services available. Analysis showed that the Result 1.2 has enabled a system where on all planned target groups can gain access to the project results available. However, this is not the case for Result 1.1 as they are completely dependent on communications from the administrative body, and this was described as poor.

The agreed 2 years’ extension will increase the likelihood of the PP being achieved for Result area 1 as it is already 3 years + behind schedule. It will be vital that the risk factors and assumption are better set out to ensure that the project can better adapt to changing external conditions if benefits for the target group are to be maintained.

***IMPACT PROSPECTS***

<i>a = very good; b = good; c = problems; d = serious deficiencies.</i>	<b>Overall conclusion: Impact Prospects Result 1</b>	2.00	<b>C</b>
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The Result area 1 will significantly contribute to the overarching objectives of the MASE program, which is to enhance maritime security in the ESA-IO region hence contribute to global security and create a favourable environment for the economic development of the ESA-IO region and beyond. It is difficult to make an assessment of impacts at this stage as the result area is only at the inception stage.

However, the actions that have taken place underline the willingness by the Somalia Federal Government and the Regional representatives such as Somaliland to engage with the Result 1.1. The expert was not provided with any OVIs/targets for Result 1.1. However, the FAO provided some detailed targets for the Result 1.2 and from an overview these are within the capacity of the programme to be met, especially as there is a time extension of the Programme.

There are a number of external factors that may jeopardise Result 1 direct impact; these will need to be captured in the development of a robust risk and assumption matrix and supported by a strong risk management plan. In particular, risks must include the potential impacts of terrorism and other groups who may wish to destabilise Somalia.

***Recommendation to develop a clear log frame and a risk and assumption matrix for each of the result one objectives***

**SUSTAINABILITY**

<i>a = very good; b = good; c = problems; d = serious deficiencies.</i>	<b>Overall conclusion: Sustainability Result 1</b>	2.50	<b>C</b>
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Financial / economic viability, as discussed earlier Result 1.1 has already demonstrated that it will be supported institutionally, as some meetings were provided for by the Somalia Federal Government prior to securing of the IGAD coordinator. Outputs of the interviews underlined the commitment of the SFG and other partners in developing a robust MSCC. In this regards analysis indicates that this will be an ongoing process post programme. The FAO in charge of Result 1.2 are also putting in place the necessary actions to ensure longevity of the activities post MASE. FAO objective is part of a broader fisheries programme within which FAO Somalia is supporting the Federal Government and its regional administrations to transform and revitalize the fisheries sector through strategic interventions that include the strengthening of fisheries policy and legal framework, fisheries compliance (Monitoring, Control and Surveillance), infrastructure development and fleet renewal, and promotion of fish consumption. The fact that these actions are linked to economic development it is likely that the benefits can be maintained if economic factors change (e.g. commodity prices, exchange rate).

Currently a financial/ economic phase-out strategy does not exist for the Result 1 objectives and this will require attention during the log frame development. The exit strategy may be national development support from the National Indicative Programme for Federal Republic of Somalia 2014 to 2020.

The level of policy support provided and the degree of interaction between Result 1 and the Somalia policy level is extremely high and thus very encouraging. There has been substantial support provided by the relevant national and sectorial offices. It is also unlikely that changes in policies and priorities will affect Result 1 because it is the main supporting the development of new policy as well as contributing to a very well recognised economic sector. An area that does require attention is the encouragement of additional public and private sector policy that will assist the longevity of MASE result 1 after the project has finished.

MASE Result 1 is fully contributing to institutional and management capacity and is fully embedded in the institutional structures that could survive beyond the life of the project. If sustainability is to be achieved it will be vital that R1.1 works are nurtured; and that a purposeful sustainability strategy is

developed and implemented. Although there is no visible log frame or project plan, Result 1.2 main effort is to develop (technically, financially and managerially) fisheries communities to ensure that they can continue to deliver the programme's benefits/services post programme. Clearly the development of suitable qualified HR will be critical if the MASE result 1.2 can continue to deliver its benefits. This will also require the development of good relations with new or existing institutions to underpin that expectation.

### **Result 1. Recommendations**

- 1. Due to new emerging transnational threats/maritime crimes, Result 1.1 will need to take account of these in its future programme planning;
- 2. SFG to request for support in the development of a **national maritime policy** that would build from the outputs of the MSCC and provide a National policy, reflecting the developing needs of the nation;
- 3. Specific sub log frames need to be developed for each of the objectives that can be linked into the overarching result 1 log frame;
- 4. Risk factors, assumption and risk management strategies need to be developed and sharpened to ensure that the project can better adapt to changing external conditions; risks must include the potential impacts of groups who may wish to destabilise Somalia;
- 5. Result 1.1&2 to develop a robust financial/ economic phase-out strategy. The exit strategy may be national supported from the National Indicative Programme for Federal Republic of Somalia, 2014 to 2020;
- 6. Result 1.1&2 require a well-defined sustainability strategy;
- 7. Result 1.1 SFG to develop an annual work programme setting out meetings, studies trainings and events and made available to IGAD;
- 10. SFG to invite AMSSA to join the MSCC to ensure that where possible outputs align to the IGAD Integrated Maritime Strategy;
- 11. Increased attention on cross cutting issues such as environment, gender, governance and donor coordination;
- 12. Studies need to be carried out to set out the **actual requirements** of the target group for Result 1.1;
- 13. Result area 1.1&2 there is a requirement for the development and implementation of a robust monitoring system;
- 14. Result 1.1 to better coordinate its actions within the framework of the IGAD Regional Maritime Strategy in particular to Objective One: To promote a safe and secure IGAD maritime domain and contribute to the security of the global maritime domain and Objective 1.9 which is to assist in the setting up of National MSCCs.
- 15. Result 1.1&2 there is a requirement to develop a MSCC communication strategy which will enable better conduits of communication; this should promote the MSCC beyond Somalia and contribute to the IOC communication strategy.
- 16. Further attention needs to be appropriated to encouraging additional public and private sector engagement aimed at assisting the longevity of MASE Result 1 post programme.

## 4.2 RESULT 2

Four Activities under Result 2 (activities 2.2 to 2.5) of the MASE Programme, are currently being implemented in a coordinated fashion by **EAC (and Implementing Partners including INTERPOL)** in its capacity of RAO by sub-delegation of the RAO in charge of the overall MASE Programme (IGAD).

**Activity 2.1 is independently managed by the UNODC** (see below)

EAC has been implementing the programme under partially decentralized management, with *ex-ante* control, by means of Programme Estimates, the first of which ended on 15<sup>th</sup> October 2015.

The Second Programme Estimate covering a period of 12 months commenced on 11<sup>th</sup> December 2015 was due to on 10<sup>th</sup> December 2016.

Result 2 relevant framework (purpose of the project) is: *National/regional legal, legislative and infrastructural capability for Arrest, Transfer, Detention and Prosecution of Pirates is developed and/or strengthened*

The 4 Activities that which are been conducted are the following:

- Activity 2.2-Support to investigative capacity
- Activity 2.3-Support to prisons/correctional services reform
- Activity 2.4-Support to capacity building for Prosecutors
- Activity 2.5-Support to capacity building for Courts' staff

### **Activity 2.2-Support to investigative capacity**

The idea is that Capacity of **Police and other investigative agencies** in Member-States of the ESA-IO region is being developed/strengthened, along with upgrading the forensic capacity.

The following results have been achieved:

- a) Survey of regional forensic capacities & needs: this activity was undertaken and included triangulation with the Mauritius Forensic Science Laboratories.
- b) RFRC strategy development: the Strategy was developed concluded and adopted by Police Chiefs.
- c) Development of Tech Dossiers for RFRC: this activity was not undertaken the reason being the need to initially technically prepare officers responsible for this action. The two senior officers of the RFRC were attached to the Mauritius FSL for a month to familiarise themselves with process management and identify technical document that can be adopted to the Uganda scenario.
- d) Procurement of priority forensic equipment: Equipment was not procured as deliberations were still underway on the nature and type of forensic discipline the MASE Project was to support .This has since been concluded.
- e) Regional training needs identification: this activity was undertaken but with the hindsight that INTERPOL was to provide standardised training for adoption to the region.
- f) Start-up of RFRC: was deferred to the second PE pending procurement of equipment.
- g) Development of harmonized regional syllabi: The Regional syllabi will be adopted from the modules to be offered by INTERPOL.
- h) Validation of the INTERPOL Curricular and Training Manuals.

### **Activity 2.3-Support to prisons/correctional services reform**

The idea is that Capacity of Prisons/Correctional Services in member States of the ESA-IO region is being developed/strengthened, following proper training and mentoring, legal and procedural reforms, equipment upgrading and improvement of regional coordination.

The following results have been achieved:

- a) Prisons: Training needs identification: The Prisons Chiefs identified the need for integration of UN Mission Standards into the regular Prisons Training Curriculum through reorientation and inclusion of an aftercare component. This was undertaken.
- b) Development of training and mentoring guidelines: Training Guidelines inclusive of curriculum and manuals were developed. Additionally, benchmark visits were made to Tanzania by officers from the region and Mombasa by officers from Tanzania to familiarise themselves on management of high risk inmates. Four officers spent one month each in Mauritius familiarizing themselves with process of achieving ISO certification in offender management.
- c) Regional training of trainers: a Regional Training of Trainers on the new curriculum and manual was undertaken.
- d) Implementation and evaluation of staff training: was not undertaken as the operational training is yet to be undertaken.
- e) Establishment of regional prisons network: A network was established with the first meeting held on May 20<sup>th</sup> 2015.
- f) Procurement of equipment: a needs assessment survey of the four Prisons targeted was carried out and presented to Prisons Chiefs for adoption on 20<sup>th</sup> May 2015.
- g) Identification of other training needs, with specific focus on mentorship attachments, benchmark visits and joint trainings to be offered by the proposed Mauritius Correctional Training Centre (Regional Centre of Excellence).
- h) Regional Training of Trainers on the UN Training Manual.
- i) Joint Regional Trainings.
- j) Development of an M&E framework and Implementation and evaluation of training and mentoring for staff.
- k) Procurement of priority equipment for Prisons/Correctional Services as Shimo La Tewa, Kenya and Ukonga Tanzania is not underway.

### **Activity 2.4-Support to capacity building for Prosecutors**

**The following results have been achieved:**

- a) Prosecution: training needs identification: in line with the PE provisions, in consultation with UNODC, a training curriculum already developed by the Australian Defence University and already offered in the region was adopted as most appropriate considering the minimal work that had been done on maritime law in the region. The Team of Consultants from Australia offered the training to a select team of officers drawn from the Prosecution, Judiciary and Law schools. Prosecution staff also held a separate in house assessment of the syllabi, training manual and aids. There was overall agreement on the need to adopt the curriculum to the Eastern Africa Region will relevant case studies reflective of the nature of maritime security challenges. The overall assessment of the syllabi was that it filled an important gap in application and practice of maritime law in the region. The contract amount of Euro 18,200 due to the Australian University is yet to be paid.



- b) Development of harmonized regional syllabi: was not undertaken but to be based on the revised syllabi.
- c) Implementation and evaluation of staff training: not undertaken as staff had not been trained.
- d) Revision and Domestication of the Maritime Law Training Program is done partially.
- e) Development of training manuals and aids.
- f) Development of an M&E framework and Implementation and evaluation of training for Prosecutors is not done.

### **Activity 2.5-Support to capacity building for Courts' staff**

Uganda has already made available a building in Kampala, agreed to take care of staff and hiring costs and as a show of commitment invested in cyber forensics. Other actions within MASE Result 2 would include following inputs, which are to be accompanied by EAC States own resources on the subsequent running costs of the centre:

- Development and validation of the key **technical dossiers**, including: (i) management and regulatory procedures; (ii) forensic internal and external SOPs and protocols; (iii) engineering and facilities guidelines and technical specifications for procurement tenders.
- Support to all necessary validation and international certification procedures.
- Procurement for forensic equipment and indispensable adaptation works enabling an early start-up the centre, with the minimum required baseline capability (eg: analysis pertaining to ballistics and other scene of crime related evidence).
- Training of staff (seconded or recruited), in direct connection with the SOPs and the specific equipment installed and foreseen.

Under PE2, provisions have been made for supporting some of the priority inputs that are likely to be derived from the Strategic Plan of the Regional Forensic Referral Centre, developed under the PE1 (including: SOPs and other technical arrangements, procurement of elementary equipment and commodities, training for the staff at start-up).

With regard to *non-RFRC* areas of priority concern under Result 2-Activity 2.2., the following results have achieved:

- Validation and adoption of the INTERPOL harmonized syllabus
- validation of relevant training aids
- Creating a regional pool of duly certified Trainers
- Undertaking of specific training on other Scene of Crime related Investigations.

It should be emphasized and recognized that INTERPOL, is indeed a key-Partner in the MASE Programme, will bring crucial value-added on all investigative capacity-related know-how. INTERPOL shall thus be closely associated throughout the implementation phase for the RFRC where possible. Thus a serious delay in the implementation was noticed that impacted the commitment of 600.000 euros approximately.

**Activity 2.1 UNODC and activities fall under Results Area 2:** National/regional legal, legislative and infrastructural capability for arrest, transfer, detention and prosecution of pirates is developed and/or strengthened.

## QUALITY OF PROJECT RESULT 2

<i>a = very good; b = good; c = problems; d = serious deficiencies.</i>	Overall conclusion: Quality of Design Result 2	2.90	<b>B</b>
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Purpose: to extend successful support under MASE Start up- criminal justice chain supporting fair and efficient piracy prosecutions and secure and humane detention.

### *Realised Support to Piracy Prosecution Centres*

- Kenya, Seychelles, Mauritius, (Tanzania)
- Funding of legal defence
- Full time Somali interpretation
- Other interpretation for foreign witnesses (Farsi, Urdu, Japanese)
- Travel of prosecutors in Kenya and foreign civilian witnesses to Seychelles/ Kenya
- Support to video-link testimony in Kenya, Seychelles, Mauritius
- Expert medical age assessments of suspected minors

### *EFFICIENCY TO DATE*

<i>Note: a = very good; b = good; c = problems; d = serious deficiencies.</i>	Overall conclusion: Efficiency to Date Result 2	3.05	<b>B</b>
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### **Result 2 achieved good results thanks to the effectiveness of UNODC**

Support delivered under this component has succeeded in significantly increasing the capacity of national criminal justice systems in the region to effectively arrest, prosecute and detain convicted pirates in accordance with universally accepted norms and standards pertaining to crime prevention, criminal justice and penal reform. There is a need to develop a monitoring and evaluation framework. There is a need also for clarity on reporting between EAC and UNODC (UNODC is taking the lead on the matter) UNODC reports to EU and should share reports with EAC on a regular basis, EAC and INTERPOL should hold dialogue ahead of the next PE to tackle existing cooperation challenges. In this regard, EAC and COMESA are requested to coordinate on matters of training related to investigators and prosecutors. EU Delegation Dar es Salaam to coordinate this activity

It should be underlined that the financial commitment of the EAC is only of 63.3%. Moreover the Service contract with INTERPOL still not concluded

### *EFFECTIVENESS TO DATE*

<i>Note: a = very good; b = good; c = problems; d = serious deficiencies.</i>	Overall conclusion: Effectiveness to Date Result 2	3.05	<b>B</b>
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**Activities carried out by UNODC have probably actually achieved the most successful results of the MASE programme within the implementation period (November 2013 – June 2018)**

Budget: € 2.38 M (two tranches) of € 5M distributed

### *Reporting and coordination modalities with EAC*

***It is strongly suggested to reinforce coordination reporting modalities***

- Direct financial and reporting relationship with EU – Agreement reports can be shared with EAC
- Email updates of implementation every two weeks (GMCP Fortnightly Update)
- Ad hoc coordination with Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam
- Implementation updates at MASE Steering Committee meetings
- Communication on the internet via Skype should help capacity building between EU, EAC and UNDOC

***The most serious challenge to the success of this Project***

The most serious challenge to the success of this Project is the application of Art 2(5) of the Contribution Agreement, which prohibits issuing any individual contract “ after the third year of the four and half year project”. The effect of this article would be that UNODC after 3 years of implementation could only deliver extremely limited support activities besides the payment of staff for the last year and half of the project, damaging the outcomes of the programme, which is to date achieving strong success in implementation. To overcome the restrictions presented by Art 2(5), one option is for UNODC to contribute financially, the Programme being transformed on a multi- donor action" implying a new period of contracting. This issue is open, but efforts are on-going from UNODC to overcome those difficulties in the framework of the existing rules.

***The possible expansion of its programming under MASE geographically***

In 2014 and 2015, UNODC had discussed with the EU the possible expansion of its programming under MASE geographically, to include **Madagascar and Comoros**, and financially, to allow for infrastructure improvements to pre- and post-conviction detention facilities in Tanzania following the signing of the Tanzania-EU Transfer Agreement.

The EU had initially shown positive interest on both matters, particularly the geographic expansion, which would allow for more inclusive and integrated capacity building in the region. Recent discussions have been more reserved on both issues. UNODC is eager to move forward on both matters of expansion and would welcome any guidance from the EU. And the expert is in favour of this expansion.

**SUSTAINABILITY**

<i>Note: a = very good; b = good; c = problems; d = serious deficiencies.</i>	Overall conclusion: Sustainability Result 2	3.80	<b>A</b>
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The UNODC-EU MASE project is aimed at developing the capacity of national criminal justice institutions in Kenya, Seychelles, Mauritius and Tanzania to prosecute and detain individuals suspected of piracy and maritime crime. Now days, maritime piracy is under decline.

Therefore, even if piracy is on the decline in the region, it is strongly suggested to continue the training sessions and maritime crime training.

Within the perspective of future interventions,, it could be suggested to cover maritime crimes under the geographical scope of the IOFMC programme.

***Proposal for contribution to IOFMC as a future intervention***

- Four thematic areas: Heroin trafficking, TiP/SoM, wildlife and forest crime, fisheries crime
- Technical level / prosecutors’ and law enforcement networks

- Proposal for continued contribution to UNODC Maritime Crime Training Programme for judges, prosecutors, police and prison officials
- With regard to Maritime Crime and Law Enforcement and Maritime Crime and Correctional Administration courses.

Each offering an Advanced Diploma, University of Seychelles to 12 law officials from Kenya, Seychelles, Mauritius and Tanzania, which means that the trainings are officially recognized.

### **Overlapping**

Some overlapping can be met with the CRIMLEA programme dealing also with Law enforcement capacity building in East Africa and between UNODC and EAC programmes for interventions in Tanzania (interventions in prisons).

### **Recommendations**

EAC has reported a lack of communication with UNODC, due to various delays in coordination. It is suggested that a weekly meeting on the internet via skype should be organized in a view to liaise more frequently with the REC, EU Delegation and UNODC.

### **VISIBILITY**

- UNODC GMCP runs a strong advocacy programme for its work under the EU MASE programme.
- A Visibility Plan was developed and agreed in 2013 at the signing of the programme. The programme held a UNODC/EU MASE launch event in Seychelles in 2014. A new global visibility strategy is developed.
- Branding of the EU MASE programme, including the EU flag appears on publications to which significant EU MASE contributions have been made, including annual reports and training materials.

### **Result 2. Recommendations:**

- Support the procurement of DNA collection kits and supply two sets of Forensic Art hardware and software for training to be conducted by the core team trained in Mauritius in May 2016.
- Actions have actually achieved very successful results of the MASE and could be used as a best practice model.
- It is recommended for Result 2 that coordination reporting modalities should be reinforced to include the following:

1 Recommendation to expand its programming under MASE geographically. In particular expansion of its programming, **to include Madagascar and Comoros**, and financially, to allow for infrastructure improvements to pre- and post-conviction detention facilities in Tanzania following **the signing of the Tanzania-EU Transfer Agreement**.

2. Recommendation for continuation of the MASE training sessions and maritime crime training despite the decline of piracy.

3..Recommendation to cover maritime crimes under the geographical scope of the IOFMC programme, within the perspective of future interventions. It is significant to note that UNODC is currently implementing activities beyond piracy. In this connection The IOFMC has had participation of 22 Indian Ocean states, including those covered under the MASE programme. UNODC will continue to promote regional responses and coordinated capacity building to combat maritime crimes under the framework of the IOFMC.

- Four thematic areas: Heroin trafficking, TiP/SoM, wildlife and forest crime, fisheries crime.
- Technical level / prosecutors' and law enforcement networks.
- Proposal for continued contribution to UNODC Maritime Crime Training Programme for judges, prosecutors, police and prison officials.

With regard to Maritime Crime and Law Enforcement and Maritime Crime and Correctional Administration courses:

- Recommendation to brand the EU MASE programme, to include the EU flag appears on all publications to which significant EU MASE contributions have been made, including annual reports and training materials.
- To press visibility considerations, it is highly recommended that a Twitter account should be created dedicated to the MASE programme.

### 4.3 RESULT 3

**Regional capacity to disrupt the financial networks of pirate leaders and their financier while also addressing the structural vulnerability factors and minimize the economic impact of piracy is strengthened. Managed by the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA)**

#### Background

The objective of Result Area 3 is given within Annex A of the MASE programme initiation document as “[to] *“Strengthen regional capacity to disrupt the financial networks of pirate leaders and their financiers while also addressing the structural vulnerability factors and minimise the economic impact of piracy”*”.

Since the adoption of the Regional Action Plan and the development of the regional programme (MASE), COMESA has made progress towards building the capacity of member states to establish sound laws, regulations and policies to prevent money laundering by building capacity of the member states to analyse, detect and track financial flows that relate to piracy and other transnational crimes, and also to investigate and prosecute financial crimes at all levels.

In addition, there seems to be increased commitment on Anti Money Laundering/ Combating Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT), which among other things is reflected by the removal of all the core countries from the International Cooperation Review Group (ICRG) list. COMESA commenced implementation by conducting the state of play of ten countries in the Eastern and Southern Africa countries that border the Indian Ocean as well as neighbours of Somalia. The assessment was done in line with recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FAFT). The assessment was validated by participating countries and it formed the basis for the capacity building programme. In that regard, COMESA has so far cooperated well with appropriate international bodies and partners. The programme component under COMESA did sensitize reporting entities including financial and non-financial sectors in nine of the ten countries reaching over four hundred representatives. It is expected that the sensitization will increase the volume and quality of suspicious transactions transmitted to the Financial Intelligence Units (FIU).

The sensitization exercise was also an opportunity to identify challenges and capacity needs facing the respective countries and agree on actions to be undertaken by respective stakeholders in order to strengthen the AML/CFT regimes. The programme also trained analysts from FIUs in nine out of the ten countries on basic and strategic analysis techniques in order to improve and speedup the analysis of the Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) received and hence disseminate the intelligence to the law enforcement agencies to trigger actual investigation and prosecution. In addition to joint trainings

the programme is supporting individual trainings and exchange visits. So far representatives from Seychelles FIU have benefited from financial investigation training courses organized by OECD.

The formulation in October 2014 of specific activities with respect to the Result 3 of the MASE by the ESA-IO region on Money Laundering with a view to finding international procedure standards for the region to prosecute the enablers of piracy. In that connection, a workshop was held in the month of October 2014.

It has been the first anti-money laundering activity under the MASE programme. Mauritius and IOC have become active members of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) Working Groups. COMESA has joined in and the follow up will be done under Result 3 of the MASE programme.

The support to FIUs Information Communications Technology to provide hardware, software, connectivity and security to Madagascar FIU also took place. The programme has also got plans to support Comoros, Eritrea, Somalia and Djibouti once they are ready for the support.

The assessment also evaluated the state of play with respect to membership of the relevant regional and international bodies, FATF-Style regional bodies (FSRBs) and the Egmont Group of FIU. With respect to FSRBs Membership of any country to a FATF-Style Regional Body is a requirement of FATF and it therefore promotes compliance with respect to international standards as set by FATF in its 40 recommendations. In that regard COMESA lent its support to Madagascar and facilitated its joining of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) as a full member in September 2016.

The programme is also targeting the other jurisdictions that do not belong to FSRB for support including Djibouti and Eritrea.

The programme has also committed to assist its members, Ethiopia FIU, Kenya FRC and Madagascar FIU to join the Egmont group of FIUs and thus join Mauritius, Seychelles and Tanzania, which belong to Egmont, in order to benefit from secured information exchange and capacity building programmes. Given the importance of exchanging information with other jurisdictions, the programme has commenced supporting FIUs that do not belong to Egmont to sign Agreements for information exchange.

Within Result Area 3 COMESA has identified four main areas where work should be focused, namely:

1. Financial analytical capacities in the region strengthened by setting up and strengthening FIUs to analyse, detect and track financial flows strengthened.
2. Common coordinated inter anti-money laundering and piracy funding developed / strengthened.
3. National AML laws and regulations drafted or amended and regional policy frameworks to counter piracy and to address the economic impact developed/ adopted.
4. Regional capacity to investigate and prosecute financial crimes at national and international levels assessed and strengthened.

This Result Area seeks to sustainably strengthen the region's capacity to detect and prevent the financial sources and vehicles that support, facilitate or propagate piracy, particularly money laundering. One of the key objectives is to provide the regional states with the tools and training to disrupt the financial networks of pirate leaders and their financiers. Therefore, tracking and disrupting of illicit financial flows as well as confiscation of assets and proceeds of criminal activity are important tools to deter acts of piracy and to apprehend and prosecute those who finance piracy.

Regional states will be able to identify how the proceeds from ransom payments are laundered, identify vulnerabilities in current regional Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering regimes and

develop the capacity to address these vulnerabilities, including the development of Financial Intelligence Units. It will also address structural factors including strengthening of legal and policy frameworks to discourage the flow of proceeds from piracy into the region and break business model of piracy.

The implementation will continuously draw from outputs of the 5th Working Group of the CGPCS on Piracy, which is closely linked to international efforts to track financial flows and implement in line with UNSC resolutions 1976 and 2020; ensuring to build on on-going work by Critical Maritime Routes (CRIMLEA) project implemented by the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and other relevant initiatives. Implementation will be done in close collaboration with INTERPOL, the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), World Bank, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Global Money Laundering Group and other actors to ensure to draw on synergies. It will focus on:

1. Strengthening financial analytical capacity in the region by setting up and strengthening of national Financial Intelligence Units, and the financial institutions in the region to analyse, detect and track illicit financial flows linked to piracy;
2. Developing common, coordinated and inter agency framework on anti-money laundering and piracy funding, including supporting linkages with national Financial Intelligence Units;
3. Drafting or amending national money laundering laws and regulations and adopt regional policy frameworks to counter piracy and to address economic impact of piracy;
4. Assessing and strengthening the regional capacity to investigate and prosecute financial crimes at national and international levels.

The COMESA Governors of Central Bank, the COMESA Monetary Institution, the COMESA Clearing House, the Africa Trade and Insurance and the COMESA Reinsurance company and the COMESA Court of Justice will be valuable supportive institutions.

#### PROJECT DESIGN

<i>Note: a = very good; b = good; c = problems; d = serious deficiencies.</i>	Overall conclusion: Quality of Design Result 3	3.50	<b>A</b>
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Activities related to financial flows are coordinated with the "Law enforcement in East Africa" (CRIMLEA I, II) projects focusing on effective pro-active investigation on piracy organisers and financiers.<sup>13</sup> INTERPOL and the European Police Office (EUROPOL) share and analyse piracy-related evidence and data. A joint entity, the Analysis Working Group (AWG) on Maritime Piracy, is focusing on organised crime structures, and suspicious financial transactions linked to piracy. Moreover, the EU is supporting INTERPOL's initiative through "Critical Maritime Routes" programme – the "Law enforcement capacity building in East Africa" project that focuses on training and capacity building for investigations, including on financial networks, and provision of equipment to the law enforcement agencies of Seychelles, Kenya and as feasible Somalia (Somaliland and Puntland).<sup>14</sup>

There is reference made to some reporting that was undertaken by COMESA to establish both the relevance and need in the ten countries ESA – IO countries that border the Indian Ocean as well as Somalia. The 'sensitization assessments' were made from August 2015 to February 2016 and were based on the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FAFT) as the standard. Using FAFT requirements to drive policy support to tackle ML appears a wise strategy and part of the criteria for selection of the initial eight countries to receive AML training and FIU support through

<sup>13</sup> ToR p.5

<sup>14</sup> Action Fiche MASE 2011 p.2

MASE funding was done on the acknowledgement of government policy support. The assessment was validated by participating countries and it formed the basis for the capacity building programme.

The outputs / outcomes and activities of Result Area 3 are not clearly defined. Without the needs assessment(s) being made available to the evaluator it proved difficult to determine if they addressed clearly identified needs and were therefore, by extension, relevant. Interviews with stakeholders suggested Result Area 3 was addressing a need. Additionally, COMESA has only partnered with INTERPOL in strengthening prosecuting and investigative capacities of law enforcement agencies, which is a sub-result area 4 of the COMESA MASE. COMESA is enhancing financial analytical of FIUs and its analytical tools under sub-result area 1 independent of INTERPOL. Due to delayed starting of INTERPOL in implementing MASE, so far COMESA MASE has had one Law Enforcement Agencies workshop which was done in collaboration with INTERPOL in May 2016. The rest of activities done under COMESA MASE are independent of INTERPOL interventions. Such activities include money laundering sensitization workshops, ICT support, training of FIU officials, sponsorship to capacity enhancement meetings, among others. On another note, following COMESA discussions with INTERPOL during the LEA workshop, on COMESA's plans to attach Eritrean officials to Seychelles, Kenya and Mauritius FIUs in order to learn FIU operations, when INTERPOL visited Seychelles on its missions under MASE, it relayed the conversation they had with COMESA on the possible attachment of Eritrean officials. The three, Seychelles, Eritrea and COMESA exchanged messages to that effect and finally COMESA funded the mission and Head COMESA GPS joined the Eritrea team in Seychelles. Thus, it can be said that INTERPOL has come into collaboration with COMESA on these two instances.

The level of engagement with partner governments in the key countries in the region is an indicator of relevance. The documentation that does exist – including Ministerial statements – further suggests that MASE Result Area 3 is consistent with the MASE general and specific objectives and that partner governments are, by-and-large, relatively well engaged.

Given the change in the amount of piracy and - thus - money generated through piracy some of the target groups that are more specifically aimed at counter-piracy efforts are finding the programme marginally less relevant. However, those projects and programmes that are looking more broadly at maritime crime still see the value in MASE Result Area 3 since money laundering is a cross-cutting crime. Thus, so far Result Area 3 has not had to redesign, however it almost certainly will have to do so as more money is generated from other forms of maritime crime e.g. illegal fishing than from piracy in the future. This will need to tie into any overall redesign of the MASE programme as a whole.

#### *EFFICIENCY TO DATE*

<i>Note: a = very good; b = good; c = problems; d = serious deficiencies.</i>	Overall conclusion: Efficiency to Date Result 3	3.25	<b>B</b>
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The figure (Annex Tables *Timeline for Implementation*) aptly demonstrates the major efficiency barrier for Result Area 3. The Financing Agreement was signed in July 2013 yet the start of implementation did not begin until July 2015. This delay has frustrated stakeholders and partners alike and given that Result Area 3 has only been fully operational for 15 months it is exceptionally difficult to assess the majority of the DAC criteria for evaluation outside 'relevance'. The operational timeframe is simply too short.

This delay is also reflected in the expenditure on the four main work areas (see p. 7, para 4) under Result Area 3. Just over 17% of the allocated funds of EUR 5,451,404 have been spent or are allocated to be spent to date.

The main 'sub-contractor' for the delivery of the programme training activities – INTERPOL – has expressed some frustration at the time it took to sign off on the contract between COMESA and INTERPOL. This was viewed as a 'wasted' year vis-à-vis delivery of project activities. Furthermore,



the 3-monthly return that has to be submitted to obtain further funds to implement activities was also cited as inefficient although it is accepted that it does act as an oversight vehicle. There is a body of opinion that questions the value of COMESA's role in this aspect of delivery in Result Area 3 and that the funds for this aspect would be more efficiently used if passed directly from EC to INTERPOL. However, it should also be recognised that COMESA is an active leading agency and is assisting in laying the groundwork for the establishment and development of networks to improve regional capacity to tackle money laundering. There may be an increase in efficiency if INTERPOL managed the funds directly however there could be a negative impact on partnership, cooperation and – potentially – effectiveness.

The activity schedule compiled by INTERPOL shows no delays to date – but (due to the late signing of the contract between COMESA and INTERPOL) there have been very few activities delivered yet that would constitute a delay. The evaluator is satisfied that INTERPOL has compiled a logical and achievable work-plan to deliver the training envisaged under Result Area 3. In particular, it is positive to note that INTERPOL and COMESA have identified that some countries are further advanced in the identification, investigation and analysis of financial crime and money laundering whilst others require a more basic level of support. As a result, INTERPOL is conducting training tailored to the levels required by 'twinning' similar countries together. This also has the advantage of fostering the development of informal peer networks in the area of AML.

As noted above with such a short lead-in time it is almost impossible to judge the efficiency of the operational aspects of the programme under Result Area 3 to date. However, with the two major exceptions of the late beginning of the programme, the delayed start-off implementation time for INTERPOL and the concern over the delay that 3 monthly reporting can introduce, the partners and stakeholders interviewed expressed only one other concern regarding efficiency. This revolved around budget cycles with some FIUs and other beneficiary departments working to a different financial year than the MASE programme. It would be unreasonable to expect uniform budgetary cycles however MASE should factor this into their activity and capacity building planning work, recognising different cycles and mitigating them where possible.

Result Area 3 predominantly uses the Steering and Technical meetings to keep abreast of other results and has made a great deal of effort to increase visibility in an effort to keep abreast of other actors in the field and to identify where there may be areas of mutual benefit. For example COMESA led a high-level on-site mission to Madagascar in November, 2015 to assess political will and identify compliance and state of play as a pre-requisite to join ESAAMLG. It also works closely with Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Style Regional Bodies (FSRBs) in different countries and encourages those countries to join the appropriate FSRBs and the Egmont Group. Discussions and interviews with representatives of the Mauritius and Tanzania Financial Intelligence Units disclosed the importance of the COMESA interventions.

The programme ran into some trouble with its approach to capacity building through the delivery of appropriate anti-money laundering software. The industry standard 'GoAML' was prohibitively expensive so the programme envisaged using i2 software instead and committed EUR 350,000 for that purpose. GoAML – as of March 2016 – became significantly cheaper and it is now incumbent upon the programme (or any subsequent revision of the programme) to finalise a decision on the way forward vis-à-vis capacity building through software deployment and training. This should also include a discrete sustainability strategy since software is usually licensed annually and will require the purchase of upgrades and upgrade training. However, discussions with the 2 FIUs showed that both the units wanted software and were eager to engage to identify the most optimum opportunities.

COMESA also collaborates with UNODC when need be. Further, as cooperating partners and observers in FSRB meetings (ESAAMLG), all institutions UNODC, World Bank, IMF, AfDB collaborate and strategize how synergies can be pooled together to effectively assist the countries in the FSRB who are currently 18 in total. Further, during each ESAAMLG meeting a joint paper is done reflecting ideas and suggestions of all the collaborating partners including COMESA and UNODC. As of now COMESA MASE has also discussed and contacted UNODC on possible resourcing during a forthcoming Financial Investigation and Asset Recovery training.

## EFFECTIVENESS

<i>Note: a = very good; b = good; c = problems; d = serious deficiencies.</i>	Overall conclusion: Effectiveness to Date Result 3	4.00	<b>A</b>
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The current approach of concentrating on improving capacity through improved cooperation, improved AML legislation, AML training and building up FIUs in appropriate states is a valid approach. COMESA is taking an active role in encouraging development in these areas in what is a challenging environment. For example, Somalia – within their National Security Department – has set up a Financial Intelligence Office which will become their focal point for MASE Result Area 3 work.

For countries such as The Seychelles that have a relatively well structured FIU and good AML political support, the activities envisaged under the Project are realistic. For other countries, a more realistic set of activities should be designed. In fairness to COMESA and INTERPOL they have recognised a 'two-speed' approach will have to be taken. The programme has conducted generic training for FIU analysts at both strategic and operational levels in November 2015 and is further assisting FIUs with software and hardware e.g. Madagascar. Other FIUs have also indicated a desire for more training in strategic analysis to allow them to be better prepared to deal with potential future threats and risks. Additionally, where AML legislation is being developed and enacted there will need to be a greater focus on the training of the judiciary in applying that legislation. It is critical that Result Area 3 continues to recognize that under all four work areas there needs to be a tailoring of the approach to suit the national environment.

COMESA should also be commended for attempting to identify which countries in the region would benefit most from working together, recognizing that not all countries in the region share the same problems or difficulties. Thus, Madagascar is 'linked' with Mauritius, Seychelles and Kenya; Ethiopia with Mauritius and Tanzania; and Tanzania with Seychelles and Kenya. This approach of finding regional 'hubs' with the same countries might have value in being developed across the MASE programme as a whole, thereby identifying possible inter-Result Area themes.

The flexibility of the COMESA / INTERPOL approach and relatively positive operational working relationship between the two organisations can certainly be viewed as an advantage in this 'effectiveness' context. However, the strategic concept of partner delivery is not so obviously beneficial within an 'efficiency' context as was noted within that section.

The evaluator has seen no evidence of the cross-cutting issues of gender balance or human rights being properly addressed. There are no figures available for gender balance and there does not appear to be any due diligence from an HR perspective on training / course participants etc.

## IMPACT PROSPECTS

<i>Note: a = very good; b = good; c = problems; d = serious deficiencies.</i>	Overall conclusion: Impact to Date Result 3	3.20	<b>B</b>
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This aspect of Result Area 3 has been difficult to evaluate given the relatively short period of time the Result Area has been fully operational. There is no Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) regime set-up for the Result Area as a whole or for three of the four main work areas. The only exception to this is the training that INTERPOL design and deliver for the FIU staff. However, due to the late start to programme activities already referred to in this project review, the data from this M and E which consists of training evaluation forms is too few to be statistically valid.

Anecdotal reporting from stakeholders, partners and actors impacted by Result Area 3 have expressed a generally positive view of the impact the Result Area **could** have (as opposed to currently has)

suggesting they have not yet witnessed any concrete impact but can see the value in the approach(es) being taken. Thus, the score of ‘a’ obtained by this evaluation is based on the potential impact that Result Area 3 could have on the overall and specific objectives of the MASE programme as well as its own four Result Area 3 work areas.

It is imperative that the Result Area 3 invests time and energy in implementing a proper M and E regime for work over its four work areas and that it is COMESA that takes ownership of and administers that task. It is a crucial overarching element that will allow COMESA and the EU to assess the added value of each element of Result Area 3 activities. Any revised programme design and reworked logical framework must define the indicators that will be used to verify outcomes and how they impact upon the objectives of the programme.

### SUSTAINABILITY

<i>Note: a = very good; b = good; c = problems; d = serious deficiencies.</i>	Overall conclusion: Sustainability Result 3	3.50	A
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A large part of the capacity building approach relies on training. There is a Training-of -Trainers part to the Project however there is no express monitoring of the quality of training delivered through this method and, historically, many individuals who receive training move from their positions. If those trained individuals move quickly then the loss of their skills will be seen in a reduced capacity of that organisation / department to tackle money laundering. Connected to this part of the capacity building strategy is to supply anti-money laundering software to FIUs and training in that software to FIU analysts. It was clear from interviews with the Financial Intelligence Units that there is a plan to maintain the software licenses, update the software versions and retrain new FIU staff or existing FIU staff in the new version(s).

The MASE programme Result Area 3 through COMESA has made certain that any contribution made by the project is sustainable in the long term by ensuring that there is existing country-by-country capacity. Countries like The Seychelles and Mauritius have some capacity to self-fund key elements of the project now and into the future. However other countries for example Djibouti and Ethiopia, whilst keen supporters do not have the same sustainability capacities and MASE makes no express sustainability distinction between countries within the ESA – IO region.

Given that the MASE Result Area 3 is all about improving capacity through coordinated training of FIU staff and building the inter-agency cooperation networks and agreements and improving the entire anti-money laundering continuum from investigation, arrest and prosecution there is no discernable sustainability strategy outside of admitting there should be a strategy. The entire concept of sustainability must be addressed through, ideally, a sustainability strategy document which sets pre-requisites for sustainability before any capacity building support is delivered.

Representatives of the Financial Intelligence Unit were of the opinion that the development of a FIU data exchange platform that could provide timely exchange of pertinent data would help the long term sustainability of result 3 post project.

### Recommendations for Result Area 3:

- INTERPOL is not responsible for FIUs training rather for police and judiciary (financial investigators). FIU story in law enforcement hinges on analysis which is singlehandedly done by COMESA through training in Tacti and Strategic analysis as most FIUs at hand are administrative. The only Law enforcement type of FIU which may find INTERPOL police interventions a plus is Seychelles only. So on the overall law enforcement agencies entrusted with INTERPOL to enhance prosecution and investigation capacity, it is only Seychelles FIU, since its model is law enforcement, which can be looked at as such, otherwise the rest cannot hold for other FIUs which may not develop necessary capacity as regards their operating

models (Administrative) with law enforcement interventions which are inherent in Seychelles FIU model only. Give consideration to altering the funding model of INTERPOLs capacity building training programme for FIUs to improve efficiency. This could include a streamlining of the 3-monthly reporting mechanism between INTERPOL and COMESA or agreeing a 6 or 12 monthly reporting mechanism.

- Scope the potential advantages and disadvantages for the development of regional ‘hubs’ with similar countries working together across the five Result Areas of the EU MASE programme.
- All future Result Area 3 activities to have a sustainability strategy written and agreed with beneficiaries before capacity building support is delivered.
- All current and future Result Area 3 activities to have an appropriate and robust Monitoring and Evaluation regime developed and administered by COMESA.
- Future capacity building training must include an appropriate level of training within the judiciary in the application of Anti-Money Laundering legislation.
- Closer cooperation with United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in the development and adoption of model anti-money laundering legislation in the ESA – IO region.
- Ensure that all capacity building output continues to be tailored to the national environment recognizing that each country within the region has its own specific needs.
- Future capacity building activity planning to take cognizance of beneficiary budgetary cycles and to subsequently mitigate the potential risks this may cause in programme delivery.

#### **4.4 RESULTS 4/5**

##### **National and regional capacity for maritime tasks and support Functions are enhanced and Regional coordination and information exchange is improved. Managed by the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC)**

- Result Area 4: National and regional capacity for maritime tasks and support functions are enhanced.
- Result Area 5: Regional coordination and information exchange is improved.

##### **Background**

The **IOC Anti-Piracy Unit (APU)** based in Seychelles was officially inaugurated on 4<sup>th</sup> June 2012 (supported by a previous Start up MASE programme) and has the role for supporting the implementation of **Result 4 and Result 5** of the MASE programme. The APU works under the direct responsibility of the Secretary General of the IOC who has designated a chargé de mission for the day to day supervision and monitoring.

The APU is structured so as to enable it to discharge its duties enumerated under Result 4 and 5 of the MASE programme. There are five designated national maritime piracy experts seconded by their respective governments, and they are all based in Seychelles. The APU have exchanges with the Secretary General of the IOC for matters regarding strategic and operational decision.

Efforts are taken to continue to promote close coordination and complementarity with all other EU related funded projects, in particular the “Critical Maritime Routes” programmes including CRIMARIO (enhancing capacity in line with the Djibouti Code of Conduct) and CRIMLEA (Law Enforcement in East Africa), the EUCAP Nestor operation.

An MOU has been signed for maritime capacity building mission which has an office in Seychelles, the EUNAVFOR Operation, ATALANTA the Smart Fish programme for the implementation of a regional fisheries strategy for the ESA-IO region (in particular the Monitoring Control and Surveillance component), as well as the World Bank-funded centres created by the Maritime

Highways Programme. The main achievements of the IOC component under the Start-up MASE project (FED/2011/021-703), which has been partially implemented by the IOC from 12 January 2012 up to 27th May 2015 have been:

- A "Host Agreement" between the IOC and Seychelles was signed, and the IOC APU was set up there June 2012.

The first meeting of the ESA-IO Contact Points on Piracy was held in March 2013 to review the situation regarding piracy, implementation of the Start-up MASE project, and make proposals for the way forward. The Contact points are now involved in the decision-making process and implementation of the MASE programme. In May 2013, an initial assessment of the capacity to accept, detain and judge pirates by regional states such as Madagascar and Comoros was undertaken by the APU.

A coordination mechanism in the region involving the EUCAP Nestor team, RAPPICC the IOC and Seychelles High Level Committee on Piracy was initiated in June 2013.

The Seychelles & Mauritius coast guards were provided with light equipment in June 2013.

On the international platform, the IOC/APU has represented the region and participated in different working committees such as the UN Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia Working Groups (WG 1 for coordination, WG 2 for legal issues and WG 5 for Money laundering issues) and to ensure visibility of the regional actions against piracy.

During the period July 2013 to November 2013, the IOC initiated six studies related to the implementation of Results 4 and 5, namely; assessment of operational abilities of maritime law enforcement agency; evaluation of adequate maritime domain awareness system in the region; preparation of a comprehensive review of the national and regional capabilities for maritime safety, search and rescue; assessment of the needs of maritime disaster management capacity; preparatory work for the assessment of information need and the effective data sharing platform and coordination mechanism among the interested countries; preparatory work to determine network modalities.

There have been several consultative meetings with relevant stakeholders namely: IOC SmartFish programme, the AU, the JRC, INTERPOL, EUCAP Nestor, CRIMSON, and EUNAVFOR Atalanta Operation with a view to coordinate efficiently the activities of MASE Programme. APU experts attended meetings to work out procedures and specifications for the acquisition of light equipment for the Mauritius Coast Guards. An APU expert attended the Marine pollution regional coordination meeting from 13th to 14th September 2013 held at IOC Headquarter in Mauritius.

#### **Result 4 - enhanced national and regional capacity for maritime tasks and support functions**

There are four objectives/desired outputs:

- a) Improved operational ability of the Maritime Law Enforcement agencies in the region.
- b) Improved maritime domain awareness (MDA).
- c) Assessment of existing means and an exchange of lessons learnt in the domain of maritime safety, SAR.
- d) The development of a joint operational patrol initiative.

##### *RESULT 4.1 Improved operational ability of the maritime law enforcement agencies in the region*

- a) Procurement of replacement of spares parts, navigation and communication packages
- b) Supplementing the operational budgets (fuel and supplies, operational maintenance and various tools)
- c) 3 Studies undertaken to prepare for the process for:

- Assessment of operational abilities of maritime law enforcement agency, enforcement agency,
- Evaluation of adequate maritime domain awareness system in the region,
- Preparatory work for the assessment of information need and the effective data sharing platform and coordination mechanism among the interested.
- *RESULT 4.2 Improved maritime domain awareness*
- Evaluate and procure an adequate MDA with existing systems in particular the Pilot PMAR
- ToRs ready to prepare national strategies for focus countries; a regional Strategy agreed on integrated maritime safety and security.
- Develop a maintenance plan and a maintenance plan and operators to support the MDA system.
- Report on the PMAR pilot project done and plan bilateral and regional maritime sharing.
- Undertake a study for a draft legal framework for information sharing.

*RESULT 4.3 An assessment exchange of lessons in maritime security*

Undertake a comprehensive needs assessment of regional capabilities for maritime capacity based upon internationally recognised conventions for SAR, maritime safety, including disaster management.

- a) Establish a set of ToRs ready for a study,
- b) Establish an MSCC of each participating State and finalise the modalities.

*RESULT 4.4 The development of a joint operational patrol initiative.*

- a) Initiate a dialogue with interested countries and develop a modality for a system established to develop the operating procedure.
- b) Formulate a regional legal framework.
- c) Formulate a regional operational coordination centre with enforcement agencies at sea with IMO.
- d) Train in the operational vessels for the Coast Guards with partners.
- e) Establish operational characteristics of States vessels.
- f) Determine the means by which the States will contribute to support the joint/coordinated patrol.

**Result 5 - improved regional coordination and information exchange**

- a) Operationalize the Regional Maritime Information Fusion Centre.
- b) Plan to equip the focus countries adequately for the Fusion Centre .
- c) Establish a process for the hosting of the Centre.
- d) Develop the agreement(s) and the modalities of cooperation.
- e) Gain experience from other regions on similar activities.
- f) Nominate operational Contact Points on Piracy as a national gateway into the information sharing network.

- g) Establish a set of standing operating procedures (SOPs) for ESA-IO regional information exchange.
- h) Prepare a Plan of Action for the further development of the AU Maritime Strategy and the implementation of the African Plan of Action on Maritime Transport in the ESA-IO region.

**Major Findings for Results 4 & 5:**

- a) Whilst the original project design was relevant when piracy was the main-focus for the ESA-IO region it is, after six years, now only partially relevant for current issues and Partner Government needs.
- b) The project is two to three years in arrears of planned delivery. Priority remains is getting agreements signed which should improve delivery within Results 4/5
- c) The project framework has been extended in time but not in financial support, it remains unlikely that the full OO of Area 5 will be achieved with a subsequent effect on delivery of Area 4.
- d) The design whereby a single Regional Organization (RO) is held responsible for the delivery of Result Areas could be weakened when non- RO member States disagree with the ‘policy’ decisions the RO is making. Policy needs to be determined at a higher pan-regional level. (Annex VIII pages 100-118 refer).
- e) Funds appear to be well managed with limited expenditure to date. A significant increase in expenditure is anticipated during the final years of the project as tangible mechanisms for information sharing, enhanced maritime domain awareness (MDA), and enhanced maritime response become functional.
- f) Non-regional partners feel that despite sporadic consultation, they have not been fully involved to the full extent of their capacities in the programme delivery and in particular the shipping industry and MSCHoA could advise on information exchange best practice.
- g) The proposals of the PMAR project do not meet the needs of the ESA-IO region in the areas of target information rate and are unsustainable in terms of cost.
- h) There is a strong desire to move forward more quickly and the use of existing information sharing platforms such as that being developed by CRIMARIO might help to build on existing protocols and trust whilst mitigating some of the risks associated with Area 5.
- i) The costs of the proposed joint operational patrolling structure could require a long-term investment in the region as this work is additional to the current operational tempo of the partner States.
- j) Implementation of joint patrolling is being adversely affected by delays in joint information sharing and MDA and the may be benefit in de-latching Result Areas 4 and 5. The priority must be to get a working agreement and the buy-in of all ESA-IO member States to the RMIFC

*QUALITY OF DESIGN*

Note: a = very good; b = good; c = problems; d = serious deficiencies.	Overall conclusion: Quality of Design 4&5	2.30	<b>C</b>
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The MASE programme was far-sighted in its concept of regionally led projects leading to regionally owned solutions. This held true when the region faced the common threat of Somali piracy, but has been somewhat diminished as member States re-assess their maritime needs and increasingly focus on protection of their national maritime economies and resources.

An RO can bring strong influence to bear over its member States especially when project policy decisions are taken by the RO's Council of Ministers as is the case in the IOC led Areas 4 and 5. Influence across the whole ESA-IO region is more tenuous however, and non-member States need to be kept fully engaged at all levels.

This aspect of the design and the IOC's ability to influence across the ESA-IO region as a whole has been significantly exposed and weakened through political decisions resulting from external political influences with regard to the siting of the RFC.

The significant delays that have occurred have shown that the anticipated capacity of the region to implement the project was unrealistic. The region has made steady progress in areas of political and framework agreements and the creation of steering bodies, but the general view was that the technical aspects required a more advanced level of expertise than could currently be found in the region.

Many interviewees were surprised that less had been made of the CRIMARIO project, which although working to different timelines, ambitions, and EU internal reporting structures was sufficiently similar to the information sharing aspects of Result Area 5. All documentation from the initial MASE Action Fiche onwards recognised that CRIMARIO (then called MARSIC) should be a clear partner but cooperation seems only to have materialised sporadically in training, whilst the technical aspects of information sharing and MDA have followed separate routes, which is both inefficient use of EU funds as well as confusing for the region.

There was discussion by regional and non-regional stakeholders about adopting a dual functional design for MASE Area 5 with the IOC continuing to produce the regional frameworks, legislation etc. for information sharing, whilst CRIMARIO drew on the proven functionality of the MERCURY system and information sharing network (ISN) and information sharing centres (ISCs) established under the Djibouti Code of conduct (DCoC), to which all ESA-IO members were already members. Although CRIMARIO is an EU led programme the results to date are a regionally owned and regionally managed system within the spirit of MASE and could provide the platform for regional information sharing as anticipated by MASE Area 5.

The flexibility and modularity of design, and the inherent will for progress across the ESA-IO region mean that the project could be adapted to meet current requirements and overcome the new risks it faces, particularly in Result Area 5.

Little consideration has been given to the Shipping Industry as a potential provider and customer of a regional mechanism, and this design omission should be overcome through greater engagement with the Industry, as well as enhanced liaison with MSCHoA based in Northwood, UK, which has considerable expertise in information sharing and the handling of sensitive information.

*EFFICIENCY OF IMPLEMENTATION TO DATE*

Note: a = very good; b = good; c = problems; d = serious deficiencies.	Overall conclusion: Efficiency of implementation to date4&5	2.20	<b>C</b>
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The management process and flow of inputs appear to be consistent and well accounted for, although no financial documents were available for the Evaluation Team to make a full assessment in this area.

The EU financial management procedures can at times limit flexibility of delivery as they are based on planned activity. This could be improved if the measurement of success were based upon longer-term outcomes rather than detailed project activity and budgets were allocated to an outcome within which the RO would have flexibility to plan activities required to meet that outcome.

The RO is scheduling funding on the basis that spending in the first half of the project is low as frameworks are built, but recognises that the transition from framework building to operational



information sharing, MDA, and joint patrolling will see a significant uplift of spend in the last years of the project without additional risk.

Decision making and political will works well within the RO’s member States but non-members are increasingly less engaged. It was felt that a means of overcoming this might be to hold an annual ESA-IO ministerial conference to discuss all MASE Result Areas. Building on this idea it was also felt by some that this new conference might be the successor of the CGPCS allowing regional issues to move fully under regional control, and adding regional benefits to AIMS 2050 and AU Maritime Charter work.

MASE Area 5 is a prime example of how political change of direction can upset the efficiency of a previously well considered plan. The process around the decision to site the Regional Fusion Centre in Madagascar and the Operations Centre in the Seychelles has set back project delivery in Area 5 by between 2 to 3 years, with a consequent effect in Area 4. It has also lost the political will of some ESA-IO States to fully engage, and has created risks about the provision of security and confidentiality of any information shared with the RFC for fusing. As a result, a number felt that information would now need to be sanitized between agencies at a national level before any consideration could be given to sharing. The issues around data sharing (and intelligence) are even more complex and there was a broad feeling that little if any would be shared until greater confidence had been gained. Some felt that existing bi-lateral exchange agreements between law-enforcement agencies might be as far as some States would be prepared to go.

All agreed that trust could further recede with time and that using an extant information sharing system for the RFC could start the information sharing process earlier and from a higher baseline of trust. Many felt that CRIMARIO would be in a position to deliver this if MASE adopted the existing CRIMARIO platform.

*EFFECTIVENESS*

Note: a = very good; b = good; c = problems; d = serious deficiencies.	Overall conclusion: Efficiency of implementation to date 4&5	2.50	<b>C</b>
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Framework structures remain the current focus of work, and in general the region has improved its awareness of maritime security issues in almost all States.

The 2-3-year hiatus over the RFC has had significant negative impact on effectiveness and impact, and could risk project sustainability.

The lengthy and costly PMAR project had a negative effect on project delivery and built unrealistic regional expectations; the project’s proposals are unsuitable for most States in terms of cost and data update. There are more affordable options that might be considered as technology has progressed. Some of those interviewed proposed that a more modular approach could be built upon using AIS sources, VMS (such as used by SMARTFISH), and LRIT.

Regional interviews showed that some believed that the project might make quicker progress if the region’s States current requirements for enhanced maritime safety, SAR, counter narcotics and protection of national maritime resources, notably fish, were to be addressed ahead of a broader, trans-national crimes which required more complex solutions. They recognised that this complex issue could be delivered by a more sub-regionally focussed MDA package with enhanced coordination obtained via a trusted information sharing mechanism as opposed to the envisaged costly large area surveillance which is not commensurate with the affordability, response ability, or needs of the region’s States.

Given the risks now associated with the RFC, and the broad dislike of the PMAR proposals, a number gave alternative solutions on building effective regional cooperation within realistic timescales, the key aspects of which are listed in Key Recommendations.

## IMPACT

Note: a = very good; b = good; c = problems; d = serious deficiencies.	Overall conclusion: Efficiency of implementation to date 4&5	2.20	<b>C</b>
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Little tangible impact had been achieved in both Result Areas, and delays in Area 5 were impacting on establishing joint patrol initiatives in Area 4. Regionalisation of fused information through the RFC must be a priority.

The functionality of the Anti-Piracy Unit (APU) in the Seychelles and the structured framework that has been created are small but significant impacts in the region. Trust is growing generally and the Focal Points meetings are collegiate and open. RFC issues have impacted on the trust to share information in Result Area 5.

Agreements on information exchange protocols and the establishment of national centres are key. If stakeholders are unwilling to share information it will be extremely difficult to justify the operation and costs of a RFC or establish any coordinated joint patrolling, and States are likely to revert to national procedures in the absence of a coordinated solution.

Positive tangible operational results need to be delivered more quickly by building on existing mechanisms rather than inventing new ones.

The programme retains the ability to have significant impact but faces severe risks and must now stabilise the political base, mitigate the new risks of trust, credibility, and capacity that have been created around the Regional Fusion Centre (RFC), and find ESA-IO regionally acceptable and sustainable frameworks and technical solutions for MDA and Information Sharing.

Joint patrolling initiatives need to be run more widely and on a regular basis through a personnel 'loan' scheme as sea-riders or observers on existing national patrols. This will establish a mechanism and form a trust base for joint patrolling which will underpin a more formal protocol. There is an increasing case for IOC's focus to be to implement Area 5 to get a common data base of information sharing to identify where operational overlaps occur, and only then commence full regional joint patrolling implementation based upon the foundation frameworks that are being discussed now.

## SUSTAINABILITY

Note: a = very good; b = good; c = problems; d = serious deficiencies.	Overall conclusion: Efficiency of implementation to date 4&5	2.20	<b>C</b>
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In its current form, there will be considerable on-costs to keep the benefits envisaged within the programme going, and these are likely to reduce States' ability to sustain the work without further external assistance.

Technical solutions must be based upon States' abilities to afford them, and this suggests that existing infrastructure such as MERCURY network and DCoCISCs which are already operational and affordable should be considered as the basis for an Information Sharing platform. Whilst this calls into question work already done within MASE, it was the view of a number of interviewees that a quicker tangible solution building on existing agreements and infrastructure was needed.

PMAR and other large scale MDA proposals are widely considered as unaffordable and thus unsustainable. The region should be given options to assess regional need vs affordability to find a common solution. The RFC and national Centres should prioritise this.

Risks associated with the RFIC remain sufficient to affect the sustainability of the project. Whilst costs are agreed to be borne by host nations, other risks such as building trust for meaningful information sharing are yet to be finalised.

Costs for maintenance have not yet been addressed as there is very little technical development within the project against which to calculate them. Agreements as to whether this will be done by host nations for the Centres or collectively across ESA-IO are yet to be agreed.

Whilst there appears to be a phase-out strategy understood by the IOC Coordinator, it is based upon the original timescales and should now be reviewed based on the new project timescales.

Regional States are currently not taking sufficient ownership of the project, possibly because of over-regulation by the RO, but also because simple clear deliverables remain hard to quantify. Whilst there has been a regional will to own decisions and actions, it would be of benefit if this were re-addressed as the project has developed from initial understandings.

Without a central ESA-IO regional strategy and policy system, such as the regional ministerial conference or similar authorized high-level meeting, the ability of the RO to sustain pan-regional engagement will remain diminished.

#### *HORIZONTAL ISSUES*

There was very little feedback in this area.

#### *CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES*

Gender issues are not a prime consideration of project development and some regional States felt that they should now be given greater prominence within the project.

Environmental, and in particular MARPOL, issues are being addressed in training activities, but again some felt that these should be given greater emphasis in project documents.

There appear to be no Human Rights issues or concerns.

#### **Main Conclusions for Results 4 & 5**

The MASE project remains broadly relevant but requires new momentum in technical delivery in Result Area 5. New momentum is linked with the establishment of the Centres and the commencement of information sharing.

ROs have greater influence over their members than non-members resulting in a drop-back of non-member engagement. Thus, a tangible positive difference must be created to attract the non-members back.' The holding of an annual high-level gathering to keep everyone within the ESA-IO region engaged and to give policy direction is sound but the process and follow-up of any actions requires addressing for it to influence across the whole region and in all Result Areas. This is the only corporate gathering of MASE, it should have a pan – MASE output with links between Result Areas.

There is merit in considering any ESA-IO ministerial gathering as possibly being a natural successor to the CGPCS. Whilst this view has come from within the region, it is not yet a widely-held view and will require further political exposure and negotiation. With IOC currently chairing the CGPCS could be advised to transfer WGs 1 & 2 to full regional control. Membership could remain the same as now, but ownership of coordination of capacity building, implementation, legislation etc. would become regional under ESA-IO mechanism created under MASE. CGPCS would then only retain counter piracy networks and financial flows. ESA-IO thus takes over maritime security in its region whilst UN mandate for countering piracy remains with remnants of CGPCS. ESA-IO annual meeting gains all the key stakeholders including shipping industry, aid donors, and UN organizations such as UNODC, FAO and IMO which would bring longer-term benefits of exposure to international donors, focus on regional maritime security other than countering piracy, and wider international accountability. ROs could Chair on a rotational basis with a small coordinating secretariat in IGAD.

There are opportunities to utilise existing regional information sharing platforms and protocols to increase the likelihood of successful project delivery in Area 5 by direct partnering with the CRIMARIO project.

Large scale MDA proposals from trials have not provided affordable or sustainable solutions. Regional will seems to have shifted towards generating nationally generated MDA and information products which if shared in a timely, secure manner with suitable analysis and fusion, will help support shared operational patrolling as envisaged in Area 4.

Implementation of joint patrolling should be delinked in timescale from implementation of information sharing and MDA mechanisms, which should be given more focus. Once satisfactory information is being shared, the case for joint patrolling will become stronger. Current work on framework documents for joint patrolling should be agreed and then held until the regional information fusion centre can develop information on which to base operations. Then the joint patrolling accord can be actioned in full to react to that information.

### **Key Recommendations for Results 4 & 5**

That an annual ministerial conference of ESA-IO States be structured to provide agreed implementation policy across all MASE Result Areas.

That CRIMARIO be invited to become a delivery partner and be funded to deliver the technical platform for information sharing in Area 5. That consideration be given to the majority of interviewees' proposed MDA and information sharing views to create a mechanism along the following lines:

- Information fusion should be done inter-agency at a national level to agree a national 'product' and then it is that product that is sent to the RFIC for regional fusion over the regional information sharing system based on the existing DCoC/CRIMARIO platform. Gain: maintains control over security of national data by informing the network at an initial low security level; allows interaction now between operators using VOIP; and creates a framework of trust and credible information.
- There is a need for ESA-IO regional requirement for an oceanic or sub-oceanic MDA picture; national pictures should be generated using national mechanisms for detection and tracking.
- The MDA area should be proportionate to the regional sustainability capability and the limited regional response capability that will be coordinated through the Regional Fusion Centre (RMIFC). If done in a modular fashion this could be grown as capability develops
- That the implementation of the joint patrolling initiative should start once framework documents are agreed, and deferred until successful information sharing and an agreed MDA environment are in place.
- That result area 4 &5 financial budgets are reassessed (Rider3) and budget transferred from result 4 to result 5 to enable additional technical support for information sharing.

## 5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### 5.1 CONCLUSIONS

The mid-term assessment and evaluation has been extremely problematic, the limitations and problems experienced by the team were extensive, notably:

- i. The fact that MASE encompasses 5 distinct elements has complicated an overall assessment because the experts' findings differed from sub result to sub result. If all the elements were put together as one, the overall assessment would have been skewed, poorer results would have not been exposed as the more successful result areas would have influenced the scoring.
- ii. The 27 days allowed for the examination were insufficient to provide a thorough examination, and this was exacerbated by a lack of provision of centralised documentation at the start of the review process, and regional visits being generally limited to the ROs that are tasked with delivering MASE rather than a wider stakeholder base.

<b>OVERALL EVALUATION OF THE MASE MID TERM REVIEW</b>		
<b>ROM Area</b>	<b>Scoring</b>	<b>Achievement</b>
Quality of Design	2.87	B
Efficiency to Date	2.82	B
Effectiveness to Date	2.87	B
Impact Prospects	2.67	B
Sustainability	3.05	B

As can be seen by the Table above with all scores amalgamated the MASE programme has fared well. Scoring B for Quality of Design, Efficiency to Date, and Effectiveness to Date, Impact Prospects as well as also scoring a B for sustainability. This means that in general the MASE Programme is on track, but requires some modification in areas.

The reason the Evaluation Team decided to dig deeper and independently assess the different aspects of the programme as individual units was to try and uncover where problems might be and how these can be mitigated for. There is a great deal of statistical evidence still available for analysis but unfortunately the time allowed was a barrier. Without the individual scorings, it would be difficult to discern the precise problems.

Currently the MASE purpose and overall objectives remain consistent with, and supportive of Partner Government policies. More importantly evidence suggests that piracy is no longer at the top of the agenda for many of the project partners; with wider maritime and land based challenges moving to the fore.

The MASE supports EC development and cooperation strategies in the concerned field (special consideration given to CSP/NIP, Paris declaration, EU effectiveness agenda). There is a great deal of missed opportunity within the application of the MASE programme, to overcome this it will be necessary for MASE to adopt a more flexible approach to ensure that added value and the subtle changes within the scope of MASE in the maritime security landscape are covered and addressed.

Opportunities that would allow the project to better align to other projects with a similar focus are not pursued diligently, for example there are other programmes being delivered which have some connotations for MASE such as the EU Galileo Satellite programme which is promoting maritime as

an important end-user for the satellite services for Africa. These types of services could provide information and intelligence opportunities for result 4 and 5.

Collaboration with **INTERPOL, EUCAPNestor, EUNAVFOR, ATALANTA and REFLECS 3** are ongoing through the High-Level Meeting on Piracy chaired by the minister from Seychelles. Seven local coordination meetings were held involving EU delegations. JRC and other delegations these aimed at better planning and coordinating actions.

Beneficiaries of the MASE are the ESA-IO Regional Organizations, Governments in the region and their agencies (to the exception of France/Reunion). The East-African Standby Force (EASF) and EAC military cooperation is a key partner but were not really promoted by the interviewees; so, it is difficult to understand their relevance in the context of MASE. However, results showed that MASE aspirations to explore modalities and to involve and work closely with SADC Southern Africa Development Community.

It is evident MASE project makes efforts to operate jointly with EU-led action EUCAP Nestor and makes considerable effort to consult with other key partners such as AU, SADC, UN, IMO, AMSSA (DRTC, sub regional IFCs), UN Security Council mandated Contact Group against Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), the Ports Management Authority of Eastern and Southern Africa (PMAESA) and INTERPOL. However, the effort could be increased and where applicable developed into delivery partnerships if real and tangible efforts are to be realised into the future.

These need to embrace the activities already implemented or foreseen by other partners and under other projects: EUCAP Nestor team based in Somalia, EU NAVFOR Atalanta, International Maritime Organization (IMO), African Union and INTERPOL. Attendance by an expert at the Contact Group against Piracy off the Coast of Somalia highlighted that there are generic activities that permanently emerge from the Contact Group against Piracy off the Coast of Somalia and its two Working Groups.

**Intervention Logic:** The MASE log-frame is clear and sets out how the different result areas will achieve their results and deliver impact. However, the logframe no longer holds true, and will require attention to bring the programme upto date.

The MASE OO, PP and results are clear and logical, and address identified needs. However, whilst the PP is achievable within the ‘dimensions’ concept of the project framework, the 2-year extension is clearly a requirement to enable the overall implementation. This is frustrated by the fact that parts of the MASE programme lacks well defined, and informative OVI/ targets. The data results show that in general they do not conform completely to SMART<sup>15</sup>. However, as it stands the MASE individual result activities, outputs and outcomes have been planned appropriately to achieve the PP, albeit the implementation in some result areas have not complied to the overall planning structure. The risks and assumptions that were set out in the initial programme planning phase are holding true, but it is advised that these are revisited to take into account emerging risks as there is evidence that these types of risk have impacted on the risk management process to respond effectively. Sustainability is integral to the majority of the result areas of MASE and has scored well overall but in general there is a lack of a vigorous comprehensive approach, and in some result areas sustainability will require adjustment in implementation. For example, there is a lack of a phase out/hand over strategy and it is recommended that all result areas prepare an exit strategy because the timeline is now extended.

Initial discussion with stakeholders has shown that for the majority of the result areas key stakeholders have to some extent been involved in the design process. However, it is also evident that in some result areas there are gaps in stakeholder engagement; with stakeholders expressing frustration with regards to the process for policy establishment management and implementation of their engagement expectations. In general, this could be attributed to the late start with some stakeholders reporting that there was an initial engagement then it was over 6 months before a second engagement.

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<sup>15</sup> Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic and Time-bound.

In general the MASE coordination, management and financing arrangements are clearly defined and they advocate institutional strengthening and local ownership.

Discussions with project partners have been mixed, with partners associated with some of the MASE result areas being very clear on the MASE Overall Objectives (OO) and Project Purpose (PP), whilst others are unsure of the OO. The MASE project is ambitious and has moved off at a slow pace, it is difficult in some cases to determine whether the range of proposed results are realistic with regard to stakeholders current capacities. The MASE programme has adopted an approach that can allow adjustment to ensure the project remains relevant for stakeholders needs. This aspect is well taken care of within the contractual arrangements.

Cross cutting issues are not addressed particularly well in the MASE program. None of the MASE Result Area leading agencies have issued explicit instruction or offered guidance and support to their implementing partners on what is required to mainstream gender into MASE funded activities. Any gender mainstreaming that has occurred has been done under the initiative and existing Standard Operating Procedures of the implementing agency or organisation e.g. INTERPOL or FAO. There is no consistent, uniform message being promulgated by the MASE programme to ensure gender issues are given appropriate priority and how each activity should approach gender mainstreaming. It is only Result 1.2 that has made attempt to ensure gender is addressed. It is critical that all result areas and the coordination teams make an effort to encompass gender and other cross cutting issues as these are key concerns for the EC.

It is evident that MASE got off to a slow start, which impacted significantly on the **availability/usage of means/inputs managed** and this could be justified by the fact that the project covers so many diverse areas. In particular, for MASE the overall linkages between the results areas are complex, with the diversity of objectives demanding an array of different measures of expertise. Stakeholders have indicated that there have been significant time-lapses between activities and any tangible execution, one of the causes being the difference between the different elements. Evidence gained from this evaluation underlines that both Result area 2 and 3 are virtual projects in their own right. There is an opportunity therefore to identify the development progress of each of the MASE components; which in turn will allow the coordinator to ascertain and nurture the needs of each component. This would require the MASE Programme to function as an umbrella programme aimed at binding each of the components together, whilst identifying other relevant embryonic projects and supporting their amalgamation into the MASE wider picture. This will also help accelerate and encourage the growth and development of MASE sub-components to move from embryonic to a mature status.

It is evident that neither the MASE programme nor its sub components have well developed in-house monitoring mechanisms from which the MASE programme can be monitored on a regular basis. It is recommended that both MASE as a programme and each component develop a monitoring mechanism as soon as possible, as this would assist cost-effective implementation of activities.

The MASE programme has utilised a log-frame as the overarching management tool. However, as reported earlier, this requires updating and could adopt a quasi-flexible approach to ensure that subtle changes in the security landscape are addressed. The individual result area managers have developed their own activity and resource schedules; these are well presented at each steering group meeting and adjusted where necessary.

There are problems with some components of the different results areas where committed funds have not been spent in line with the implementation timescale. However, discussions evidenced that these problems were being addressed and there is no specific reason to go into great depth here.

MASE has, since inception been encouraged to join with similar regional projects and in particular the CRIMARIO project, which parallels much of the work envisaged in result areas 4 and 5. In reality, agreed implementation schedules that streamline and optimise almost parallel objectives have not been fully explored or implemented in a way that encourages synergy and avoids overlaps.

## 5.2 OUTPUTS ACHIEVED

IGAD due to internal issues and the complexity of the Somali maritime domain (which IGAD operates), and regional coordination with all partners has impacted significantly on the respect of the timelines for the programmes. Moreover, from the start it took several months between the project initiation and approval processes which affected the initial scheduled implementation timeframe as well as the overall programme absorption capacity by RO's. It was underlined that one of the key issues was the delay of IGAD's management due to complexities with the EC associated with the identification of the correct IGAD portfolio holder and the considerable delay for the selection of the IGAD coordinator which did not come about until July 2015.

However, that said as the key coordinator IGAD has completely revamped its approach since engaging a full-time coordinator. Since that time IGAD have proven to provide excellent coordination for the MASE programme. Preparing meetings and enabling good communications between the partners, as well as preparing and implementing the Ministerial Meeting 2016.

Results 2 and 3 have demonstrated excellent consistency with the implementation of their activities. Issues raised are, for the East Africa Community (EAC) delays in staffing and recruitment of staff at the EAC impacted negatively on implementation capacity; exasperating the situation further was/is the delay in concluding a cooperation arrangement with INTERPOL which has delayed the implementation of the investigative training component. However, within the ROM criteria it scored well for implementation up to date, which underscores the importance of the MASE programme and its capabilities. Whilst COMESA faced challenges in delivering in a wide area where capacity disparity between jurisdictions/countries involved in the fight against financial crimes, with some relatively well mature jurisdictions operating in the same environment and region as weaker and nascent jurisdictions. This is a challenge because the successful AML/CFT is only if implemented with a regional perspective.

In some jurisdictions there seems to be capacity disparity among the key AML/CFT stakeholders (i.e. capacity of FIUs, reporting entities and LEAs are at different levels within the same country) so that some entities are strong and well resources and others are weaker and poorly resourced. This could render the efforts ineffective due to the inter-linkages between actions of respective stakeholders.

In Result Areas 4 and 5, the IOC is making good progress on developing the management framework and legal structures to support information sharing and operational patrolling; however, the implementation actions are slow-moving in comparison.

The APU is well established in the Seychelles, the Regional Information Sharing Centre in Madagascar is established and has started its work, while the Regional Operational Coordination Centre has still to be established (pending legal recognition). Full operationalisation of these Centres is a key step forward and there are concerns that delays in implementation have resulted in a loss of engagement by some regional States to be fully involved in this process. Additionally, there is a strong sense that whilst information sharing protocols might be agreed on paper, they will not become a reality as reduced engagement and with the continuing demise of Somali piracy, the lack of a common threat, the trust basis for information sharing has reduced.

Time spent on conducting the PMAR maritime domain awareness (MDA) project has not delivered the results the region is able to sustain in terms of costs and a new, possibly more commercial look is required to develop an MDA structure that is affordable and meets the needs of the region.

In both the above cases there are other existing platforms that could be used, many of which are already being used by regional States.

Without clear technical solutions for MDA or information sharing, the potential for joint patrolling is reduced and tangible outputs in Result Area 4 are difficult to see. States will need to work within a common 'awareness' if they are to share assets to meet a common 'threat'. There are existing bi-lateral patrols taking place between States maritime forces as well as work with international forces such as NATO and EU ATALANTA and these should be captured as quickly as possible as the



bedrock on which to grow. The fact that those forces should disappear end 2018 underlines the need for prompt action if opportunity is to be seized.

Given the above it is clear that greater priority should be given to delivery of Result Area 5 to create the information and awareness infrastructure within which to identify and grow the rationale for joint patrolling at a later stage.

The MASE programme in general is shown to possess a well thought out and commendable logical sequence for the majority of each of the result areas. However, Result 1 has been subject to a change in direction, which has caused it to function outside of the original logical sequence. In general, the MASE deliverables to date are of a high quality, contribute to the intended results and PP.

### **Partner Contribution / Involvement working?**

The MASE project has a very strong inter-institutional structure, which is evident through the steering committee arrangements, technical working groups and the ministerial meetings. This is one area that the MASE project has really excelled, the papers and working documents produced at the meetings have been a major source of information for the M&E procedure. It is clear that these arrangements are a vital element to the functionality of MASE especially with regards to the project implementation.

### **EFFECTIVENESS TO DATE**

#### **How well is MASE achieving its planned results?**

The M&E team found a variety of results across the results areas and given the paucity of project data available found it hard to gauge what success or failure looked like. In this snapshot report, it is sufficient to say that beyond the time allocated to the team more analysis is required before any true measurement of effect can be made.

MASE Result area 1 has already been adapted to changing external conditions due to delays, currently a number of other result areas will also require subtle changes to ensure benefits for the target groups. The detailed review of the specific areas will be presented post analysis.

There is no evidence that the MASE programme has produced any unplanned negative effects for the target groups. There are some Result areas that have demonstrated unplanned positive effects and at first overview these have excelled the contribution to the outputs.

### **IMPACT PROSPECTS**

In general, the MASE direct impact prospects are good in particular at the political level the programme has created for a strong network of high level experts and professionals that are representative of Regional Economic Communities, Regional Organisations and Member States. This network is being expanded by way of partner and stakeholder engagement, and has the potential to grow exponentially, given the correct conditions.

However, with the overall MASE programme so far behind in its delivery schedules, and new risks to regional delivery creating a lack of confidence it is perhaps unsurprising that political will is starting to erode the further away you move from the RO direct membership. The holding of three yearly high-level Ministerial gathering to keep everyone within the ESA-IO region engaged and to give policy direction is sound but the process and follow-up of any actions requires addressing for it to influence across the whole region and in all Result Areas. This is the only corporate gathering of MASE, it should have a pan-programme output.

### **POTENTIAL SUSTAINABILITY**

This is an area where MASE on first overview appears to be strong, however this is due to the amalgamation of the different MASE components. Further in the report it will show a breakdown of scoring for each component and here it will show that some components are doing far better than others. In all the reports provided by the experts across the different Result areas, very little

information aligns to planning or budgeting for future sustainability, especially post project. What information was made available showed that Result 2 and 4/5 were underspent to the budget. It is recommended that financial sustainability is revisited by all partners and outputs should be aligned to the monitoring mechanism discussed earlier.

### **MASE Programme contribution to institutional and management capacity**

The MASE programme is complex, multi-dimensional and covers a wide range of different thematic areas that are loosely strung together within the programme structure. Each of the Result areas will require careful analysis before an accurate understanding as to how far the project is embedded in institutional structures and if these will survive beyond the life of the project. However, there is evidence that in some Result areas the project partners are being properly developed (technically, financially and managerially) and in all cases these actions will help to continue the delivery of the programme's benefits into the future.

It is evident from the evaluation that the stakeholders of the MASE programme have developed a very strong relationship with other external stakeholders (UNODC, AMSSA CRIMARIO) involved in the implementation of MASE, sometimes the relationship is better than between MASE and the partner organisation.

In most jurisdictions, the aspect of asset recovery is very weak and hence renders the whole fight against AML/CFT is less effective because criminals may not feel the full impact of any punitive action against them if the assets remain intact. Many jurisdictions have not conducted National Risk Assessments and therefore are not fully informed about all the important areas of risk. The present thrust of the MASE programme is to sensitize member states with the aim of updating (national and consolidating regional approaches/policy) and this should be pursued diligently.

In the Indian Ocean Region whilst political progress was noted with respect to developing frameworks for the implementation of Results 4 and 5, there was little evidence of technical progress. The hiatus created by political discourse as well as the significant drop in piracy attacks during the same period has resulted in the loss of some political will to proceed. The Implementation Plan prepared by IOC which was presented to the Steering Committee in April 2016 demonstrates that any further progress depends upon the operationalisation of the two regional Centres. It is here where there is a need for a change of approach as political decisions regarding the Centres have impacted negatively on the trust required for successful cooperation in information sharing – and subsequently on sharing operations. If technical progress is to be made within existing timescales, then the programme will need to draw on existing information sharing protocols and networks such as that created under the Djibouti Code of conduct and administered by CRIMARIO. This would be beneficial to bringing the implementation back on track in terms of wide regional membership, trust, and timeliness. Little practical evidence was seen at a regional level of the creation of joint patrolling, although some bilateral work between States is being done. Without a joint picture and joint information sharing, and a commonality of maritime security threat it is unlikely that regional joint patrolling will develop much further without significant financial support, perhaps as a separate initiative to delink it from the problems in Area 5.

### **Overall lessons learned on the regional maritime security programme**

The need for continuous consultations among the various implementing partners to enhance relative competence and advantage in the project implementation is very essential. There is also need for continuous consultations between the RECs and the EU delegations for ease of addressing any emerging issues that may impede programme implementation.

Internal and external coordination and collaboration is an imperative for the success in combating illicit financial flow a successful whereas AML/CFT is contingent upon a comprehensive and all rounded approach (this is also line with a decision of the COMESA Ministers of Foreign Affairs Investigation of financial crimes should not be viewed in the same way as investigation of other

criminal acts and require specialized training. Implementing of a successful anti-money laundering regime is possible and it can be enhanced by Government commitment and political will.

### 5.3 OVERALL RECOMMENDATIONS

Because there are so many recommendations many associated specifically with the independent Result areas, where there are synergies throughout these have been prioritised.

- 1 Make MASE an umbrella programme with the different result areas taking on their own characteristics and clustered underneath. This will allow for embryonic projects to evolve to maturity and move on; whilst encouraging new projects to amalgamate with the programme. In doing so the MASE programme will be able to maintain overarching oversight of other relevant projects aligned to maritime security and make effective use of MASE expertise and knowledge. The thrust of the recommendation is to promote better visibility of MASE and encourage related projects to develop better relationships with MASE to reduce duplicity and enable better amalgamation;
- 2 Future MASE programming must include a strong strategy on gender equality which will be consistent across all Result Areas and will detail the minimum standards that must be met by each MASE funded activity to ensure gender equality, balance and mainstreaming;
- 3 MASE risk factors, assumption and risk management strategies need to be revisited, expanded and focused to ensure that the programme can better adapt to changing external conditions; possible risks must include the potential impacts of those intent on disrupting political processes and other issues;
4. The MASE Log Frame requires immediate update. Consideration needs to be given to the actual geographical reach of the current programme and an investigation carried out to the feasibility of extending the MASE remit. There is a requirement to update with regards to the term of 'piracy'. This is restrictive and effort needs to be made to expand the remit to cover other maritime and land based crimes especially emerging transnational threats/maritime crimes. Associated with the main programme log frame, each result areas should also prepare its specific logframe;
- 5 The MASE programme should develop (i) a well-defined phase out/hand over strategy; (ii) and a well-defined sustainability strategy. Both will also require individual strategies referring to each result area. This should include a strategy for the MASE programme to encourage additional public and private sector engagement aimed at assisting the longevity of MASE results post sub components ending;
- 6 There is a requirement for a robust monitoring system across all MASE result areas to ensure that coordination reporting modalities are reinforced;
- 7 Urgently start to implement the MASE Communication and Visibility Strategy. Increase MASE visibility through a unique brand of the EU MASE programme, to include the EU flag on all publications, including annual reports and training materials. That a dedicated MASE Twitter account should be created; and develop better conduits of communication to avoid extended time lapses as well as to employ new modern communication mechanisms such as the internet via Skype to improve cooperation between EU, RECs and Implementing Partners;
- 8 Extend the remit and structure of the existing ministerial conference of ESA-IO States to provide strategic orientation and to agree on implementation policy across all MASE Result Areas. Scope the potential advantages and disadvantages for the development of regional 'hubs' with similar countries working together across the five Result Areas of the EU MASE programme and how that could assist implementation policy across all MASE Result Areas. Discussions to be initiated to assess if this Conference could take on the role of regional

working groups on capacity building – Indian Ocean, Somalia MSCC as part of the regional capacity building and ownership;

9. Result area 1.1 to consider the development and implementation of a Framework Administrative Agreement (PAGODA) with the EC and UNODC;
10. Result 1.1 - SFG to request for support in the development of a **national maritime policy** that would build from the outputs of the Maritime Security Coordination Committees (MSCC's) and provide a National policy under the leadership of National Maritime Coordination Committees (NMCC's), reflecting the developing needs of the nation;
11. Result 1.1 SFG to develop an annual work programme setting out meetings, studies, trainings, and events and make it available to IGAD;
12. Appropriated attention to encourage additional public and private sector engagement aimed at assisting the longevity of MASE post project;
13. Ensure wider regional integration for MASE to be coherent with other strategies such as the IGAD Regional Maritime Integrated Strategy – African Maritime Strategy AIMS (2030); in particular for Result 1.1.
14. Support the procurement of DNA collection kits and supply two sets of Forensic Art hardware and software for training to be conducted by the core team trained in Mauritius in May 2016;
15. Result area 4 and 5 to overview the financial budgets and to transfer where possible financial support from area four to area five to accelerate financial and technical support for information sharing.

## **ADVISORIES**

- a) Give consideration to altering the funding model of INTERPOLs capacity building training programme for law enforcement agencies – LEAs to improve efficiency. This could include a streamlining of the 3 monthly reporting mechanism between INTERPOL and COMESA or agreeing a 6 or 12 monthly reporting mechanism;
- b) Maritime Information fusion should be done inter-agency at a national level to agree a national 'product' and then it is that product that is sent to the RFC for regional fusion over the regional information sharing system based on the existing CRIMARIO platform or in the existing RMIFC. In this regard CRIMARIO could be invited to assist the delivery of information sharing in Result 5;
- c) That consideration be given to an amalgam of interviewees' proposed MDA and information sharing views along the following lines:
  - There is a need for ESA-IO regional requirement for an oceanic or sub-oceanic MDA picture; national pictures should be generated using national mechanisms for detection and tracking;
  - The MDA area should be proportionate to the regional sustainability capability and the limited regional response capability that will be coordinated through the Regional Fusion Centre (RMIFC). If done in a modular fashion this could be grown as capability develops;
- d) Future capacity building activity planning to take cognizance of beneficiary budgetary cycles and to subsequently mitigate the potential risks this may cause in programme delivery.

<b>Recommendation Grid</b>	
<b>Result 1</b>	<b>Result 2</b>
<p>1) Recommendation 1. Due to new emerging transnational threats/maritime crimes, Result 1. 1 will need to take account of these in its future programme planning;</p> <p>2) SFG to request for support in the development of a <b><u>national maritime policy</u></b> that would build from the outputs of the MSCC and provide a National policy, reflecting the developing needs of the nation;</p> <p>3) Specific sub log frames need to be developed for each of the objectives; that can be linked into the overarching result 1 log frame;</p> <p>4) Risk factors, assumption and risk management strategies need to be developed and sharpened to ensure that the project can better adapt to changing external conditions; risks must include the potential impacts of groups who may wish to destabilise Somalia;</p> <p>5) Result 1.1&amp;2 the development of a robust financial/economic phase-out strategy. The exit strategy may be national development support from the National Indicative Programme for Federal Republic of Somalia 2014 to 2020.</p> <p>6) Result 1.1&amp;2 requires a well-defined sustainability strategy;</p> <p>7) Result 1.1 SFG to develop an annual work programme setting out meetings, studies, trainings and events and make it available to IGAD;</p> <p>8) Increased attention on cross cutting issues such as environment, gender, governance and donor coordination;</p> <p>9) Studies need to be carried out to set out the actual requirements of the target group for Result 1.1;</p> <p>10) Result area 1.1&amp;2 there is a requirement for the development and implementation of a robust monitoring system;</p> <p>11) Result 1.1 to better coordinate its actions within the framework of the IGAD Regional Maritime Strategy in particular to Objective One: To promote a safe and secure IGAD maritime domain and contribute to the security of the global maritime domain and Objective 1.9 which is to assist in the setting up of National MSCCs.</p> <p>12) Result 1.1&amp;2 there is a requirement to develop a MSCC communication strategy which will enable better conduits of communication; this should promote the MSCC beyond Somalia; and contribute to the IOC communication strategy.</p> <p>13) Further attention needs to be appropriated to encouraging additional public and private sector engagement aimed at assisting the longevity of MASE Result 1 post project.</p>	<p>1) Support the procurement of DNA collection kits and supply two sets of Forensic Art hardware and software for training to be conducted by the core team trained in Mauritius in May 2016,</p> <p>2) Result 2. Actions have actually achieved very successful results of the MASE PROJECT and could be used as a best practice model.</p> <p>3) It is recommended for result 2 that coordination reporting modalities should be reinforced to include the following:  -Recommendation to expand its programming under MASE geographically in particular expansion of its programming, <b>to include Madagascar and Comoros</b>, and financially, to allow for infrastructure improvements to pre- and post-conviction detention facilities in Tanzania following <b>the signing of the Tanzania-EU Transfer Agreement</b>.  -Recommendation for continuation of the MASE training sessions and maritime crime training despite the decline of piracy. It is significant to note that UNODC is currently implementing activities beyond piracy. In this connection, the IOFMC has had participation of 22 Indian Ocean states, including those covered under the MASE programme. UNODC will continue to promote regional responses and coordinated capacity building to combat maritime crimes under the framework of the IOFMC. Within the perspective of future interventions, it is recommended for result 2 to cover maritime crimes under the geographical scope of the IOFMC programme:  i. Four thematic areas: Heroin trafficking, TiP/SoM, wildlife and forest crime, fisheries crime,  ii.. Technical level/prosecutors' and law enforcement networks,  iii. Proposal for continued contribution to UNODC Maritime Crime Training Programme for judges, prosecutors, police and prison officials,  iv. With regard to Maritime Crime and Law Enforcement and Maritime Crime and Correctional Administration courses,</p> <p>4) Recommendation to brand the EU MASE programme, to include the EU flag appears on all publications to which significant EU MASE contributions have been made, including annual reports and training materials.</p> <p>5) To press visibility considerations it highly recommended that a twitter account should be created dedicated to the MASE programme.</p>
<b>Result 3</b>	<b>Result 4/5</b>
<p>a) Scope the potential advantages and disadvantages for the development of regional 'hubs' with similar countries working together across the five Result Areas of the EU MASE programme.</p>	<p>1) That an annual ministerial conference of ESA-IO States be structured to provide agreed implementation policy across all MASE Result Areas.</p> <p>2) That CRIMARIO be invited to deliver the technical</p>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>b) All future Result Area 3 activities to have a discrete sustainability strategy written and agreed with beneficiaries before capacity building support is delivered.</li> <li>c) All current and future Result Area 3 activities to have an appropriate and robust Monitoring and Evaluation regime developed and administered by COMESA.</li> <li>d) Future capacity building training must include an appropriate level of training within the judiciary in the application of Anti-Money Laundering legislation.</li> <li>e) Closer cooperation with Financial Action Task Force-style Regional Bodies (FSRBs) in the development and adoption of model anti-money laundering legislation in the ESA – IO region.</li> <li>f) Ensure that all capacity building output continues to be tailored to the national environment recognizing that each country within the region has its own specific needs.</li> <li>g) Future capacity building activity planning to take cognizance of beneficiary budgetary cycles and to subsequently mitigate the potential risks this may cause in programme delivery.</li> <li>h) All future result areas 3 activities to have a discrete sustainability strategy written and agreed with beneficiaries before capacity building is provided.</li> </ul>	<p>platform for information sharing in Area 5. That consideration be given to the majority of interviewees' proposed MDA and information sharing views to create a mechanism along the following lines:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Information fusion should be done inter-agency at a national level to agree a national 'product' and then it is that product that is sent to the RFC for regional fusion over the regional information sharing system based on the existing DCoC/CRIMARIO platform.</li> </ul> <p>Gain: maintains control over security of national data by informing the network at an initial low security level; allows interaction now between operators using VOIP; and creates a framework of trust and credible information.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>3) There is a need for ESA-IO regional requirement for an oceanic or sub-oceanic MDA picture; national pictures should be generated using national mechanisms for detection and tracking.</li> <li>4) The MDA area should be proportionate to the regional sustainability capability and the limited regional response capability that will be coordinated through the Regional Fusion Centre (RMIFC). If done in a modular fashion this could be grown as capability develops.</li> <li>5) That the implementation of the joint patrolling initiative should start once framework documents are agreed, and deferred until successful information sharing and an agreed MDA environment are in place.</li> <li>6) That result area 4 &amp;5 financial budgets to be reassessed (Rider 3) and budget transferred from result 4 to result 5 to enable additional technical support for information sharing.</li> </ul>
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## Annex I Terms of Reference

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation — EuropeAid

### *TERMS OF REFERENCE*

*Framework Contract reference: FWC- BENEf 2013 Reference of request for services: 2016 /376-157*

#### **Mid-term review of Maritime security Programme in the Eastern, Southern Africa and Indian Ocean region (ESA-IO region) MASE**

**Region: ESA- IO**

**Sector**

**(as defined in CSP/NIP) Regional political integration and cooperation**

**Project reference FED/2013/024-098**

#### **1. EVALUATION MANDATE**

Systematic and timely evaluation of its programmes and activities is an established priority<sup>16</sup> of the European Commission<sup>17</sup>. The focus of evaluations is on the assessment of achievements, the quality and the **results** of interventions in the context of an evolving cooperation policy with an increasing emphasis on **result-oriented approaches**<sup>18</sup>. Evaluations should provide an understanding of the cause and effects links between activities and results.

Evaluations should serve decision making, learning and management purposes.

The MASE Financial Agreement establishes that the Commission will carry out external evaluations via independent consultants as follows:

- a mid-term evaluation mission;
- a final evaluation, at the beginning of the closing phase;
- possibly, an ex-post evaluation.

<sup>16</sup> EU Financial regulation (art 27); REGULATION (EC) No 1905/2006; REGULATION (EC) No 1889/2006; REGULATION (EC) No 1638/2006; REGULATION (EC) No 1717/2006; COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 215/2008

<sup>17</sup> SEC(2007)213 "Responding to Strategic Needs: Reinforcing the use of evaluation"

<sup>18</sup> COM (2011) 637 final "Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change"

## **2. BACKGROUND**

Under the provisions of the Cotonou agreement, the regional program of EDF 10<sup>th</sup> for the Eastern, Southern Africa and Indian Ocean Region has had foreseen a support to the focal sector 2 "*Regional political integration and cooperation*" and special focus on security issues. In this sector a Maritime and security Programme MASE of EUR 37 500 000 has been developed under the responsibility of Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) as Regional Authorised Officer which has sub delegate its authority for the implementation of the component/Result 2 to East Africa Community (EAC), of the component/Result 3 to Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and of the components/Results 4 and 5 to Indian Ocean Commission (IOC).

### **1. Description**

The Eastern and Southern Africa and Western Indian Ocean region (ESA-IO) is increasingly subject to security challenges linked to piracy, maritime insecurity and organised crime. International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reported in 2009 that the ESA-IO region had become the most pirate-infested waters in the world. Somali pirates have been attacking vessels in the marine areas of Kenya, Tanzania, Seychelles, and Madagascar and further off into the Indian Ocean. An insecure marine area has serious negative repercussions on trade, food security, fisheries, other marine resources and tourism (tourism revenues in the Seychelles alone have declined by 10% and fisheries revenues by 30% over the past few years), not only for the region itself but also for the broader international community.

Maritime security and law enforcement in the western Indian Ocean region are of international importance due to the high level of trade routed via sea and the threat that piracy and armed robbery at sea represent for crews and passengers, and for the security of navigation. Piracy and lack of maritime security continue to increase transport costs, trade costs and insurance. This ultimately affects the regional integration process by undermining development efforts which negatively impact on the inclusion of the region in the global economy (90% of ESA-IO regional trade by volume is transmitted by maritime transport in 2008). Furthermore piracy increases the risks of terrorism and smuggling of weapons and drugs.

The ESA-IO coastline and marine area are too extensive to be permanently patrolled individually by countries. The region itself does not have an effective Coast Guard capacity or a sustained deep-water maritime surveillance and relies heavily on outside forces to protect maritime commerce and shipping. As a result, much of this area is in effect, ungoverned and vulnerable to piracy, smuggling, terrorism as well as unlicensed and illegal fishing. Even if the region is capable to make arrests, or, as in the case of countering piracy, foreign navies make arrests, the criminal justice framework and law enforcement capacity at the regional and national level are not in all cases able to cope with the necessary detention, prosecution, trials and imprisonment. In addition, there is limited capacity to cope with maritime disaster or search and rescue operations and basic safety navigation and marine pollution prevention.

It is recognised that piracy is today an international problem which requires a comprehensive, multilateral solution with an integrated short, medium and long-term strategy including the establishment of a functioning Somali government.

The increasing concern in the region from a political, social and economic perspective, especially in the economically vulnerable small island states prompted the region to attribute to all the Regional Organisations a specific mandate for the fight against piracy. The 13<sup>th</sup> COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) Summit held in June 2009 in Zimbabwe condemned acts of piracy, adopted an Action Plan and called upon the International Community to adopt a coordinated approach in a holistic manner through the UN. The EAC (Eastern Africa Community) Summit as well as the Council of Ministers meetings held in November and December 2010 took note of the Strategy and Action plan. Meanwhile, IGAD (Inter-Governmental Authority on Development) has adopted an Inland Somali Action Plan and the African Union (AU) is developing its continental African Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIMS) 2050 addressing Africa's maritime challenges, threats and



opportunities and also providing a continent-wide framework for the protection of African Maritime Domain including responding to threats such as piracy off the continent's east and west coast, illegal fishing, pollution and human trafficking.

A High Level Regional Ministerial Meeting on Piracy was held on 7 October 2010 in Mauritius and adopted the ESA-IO Regional Strategy and Action Plan against Piracy and for Promoting Maritime Security. This Regional Action Plan is a 'rolling' process which would be updated by the ESA-IO

Ministerial meeting on the basis of results achieved and evolution of the situation. In line with the Action Plan, a Programme for the Implementation of a Regional Maritime Security Strategy (MASE) for the ESA-IO region was approved in June 2013 in accordance with the provisions of the ESA-IO 10th EDF Regional Strategy Paper/Regional Indicative Programme.

A Regional Ministerial Meeting (3<sup>rd</sup>) for promoting Maritime Safety and Security in the Eastern and

Southern Africa and Indian Ocean Region, took place in Djibouti on the 15<sup>th</sup> May 2016 and adopt a Declaration on Maritime Safety and Security in the ESA-IO Region. The Ministers and High representatives **reaffirm** the importance of the region to take responsibility for the protection of its waters, including against IUU fishing and dumping of toxic materials; **reiterate** their political commitment to combat all forms of maritime crimes and to address safety actions at sea issues; **reaffirm** their commitment to support the implementation of the Regional organisations' maritime Strategies in line with the AU 2050 AIMS and Maritime Transport Charter; **reaffirm** their support to the ongoing programmes, in particular the MASE Programme, and activities which contribute to enhance national and regional capacities.

Furthermore, the Djibouti Declaration acknowledges the progress made in the implementation of the 2010 ESA-IO Regional Strategy with the support of the MASE programme, recognises its participation in capacity building addressing maritime security, acknowledges its support to the MSCC and requests support for the operationalization of the maritime information Fusion Centre in Madagascar and the Regional coordination Operational Centre in Seychelles.

The MASE programme builds on the EUR 2.0 million Start up MASE project which started in January 2012 as well as on efforts already undertaken in the region, and is working in close cooperation with the implementing organisations/authorities in the region. The MASE programme is part of the EU Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa which led to the approval of the EU Action Plan against Piracy and the appointment of the EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa. The Programme ensures coordination with the EU funded capacity building projects financed through the Instrument for Stability (IcPS) short and long-term components. Actually, the MASE Programme is securing the continuity of the short term actions already financed under the IcPS at the national level. It also ensures coordination with the on-going long term IcPS "*Critical Maritime Routes*" programme in the region. Namely, activities related to maritime information-sharing system and networking are coordinated with its "MARSIC/CRIMARIO" project (Enhancing maritime security and safety through information sharing and capacity building and is supporting the establishment of a maritime security information fusion centre (IFC) in the Region mentioned above. Activities related to financial flows are coordinated with the "Law enforcement in East Africa" (CRIMLEA I, II) projects focusing on effective pro-active investigation on piracy organisers and financiers.

Activities related to Somalia coastal areas are to be implemented by FAO and will be complementary to the EU on going activities in Somalia and those related to maritime capacity building will be also in line with the ESA-IO Fishery programme implemented by IOC.

The MASE programme ensures full coordination with stakeholders in the region dealing with maritime capacity building through the Capacity Building Working Group (CBWG) of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS). The CBWG facilitates the coordination of regional and international maritime capacity building projects in the West Indian Ocean region. The IMO sponsored Djibouti Code of Conduct is also be taken into account to foster information sharing, capacity building and provide a framework for regional cooperation.

Furthermore, close collaboration is pursued with Pan African and International partners and in particular with the EU Common Security and Defence (CSDP) Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) Operation ATALANTA, as well as with the EUCAP NESTOR/Somalia mission for regional maritime capability building.

Collaboration is developed with the Ports Management Authority of Eastern and Southern Africa (PMAESA) and the Djibouti Code of Conduct, the Eastern African Stand-by Force (EASF) maritime cell. Steps are taken to ensure conformity and adherence to the implementation of the AU African Maritime Transport Charter and Plan of Action, the AU Durban Declaration on Maritime Safety and Security. Activities are coordinated with other bilateral partners (Norway, US, Japan, UK, Germany ...).

The **Overall Objective** of the programme is to enhance maritime security in the ESA-IO region hence contribute to global security and create a favourable environment for the economic development of the ESA-IO region and beyond.

The **Specific objective** of the programme is to strengthen the capacity of the ESA-IO region in the implementation of the Regional Strategy and Action Plan against Piracy and for Maritime Security.

The activities of the project will be implemented according to the following principles:

- Gender neutrality in its employment and outsourcing actions, and gender balance in all of its committees, workshops and training interventions;
- Participatory approach on direct involvement of civil society and the private sector;
- Promotion of good governance issues;
- Visibility ensured notably by publicity campaigns and publications valorising programme results.

## 1.2 Expected results

The project will achieve five results in line with the Regional Strategy and Action Plan as adopted by the ESA-IO Ministerial Meeting in Mauritius in October 2010, as follows:

- **Result 1:** Alternative livelihoods through vocational development initiatives and advocacy against piracy are supported; maritime coordination mechanisms are reinforced in Somalia;
- **Result 2:** National/regional legal, legislative and infrastructural capability for Arrest, Transfer, Detention and Prosecution of Pirates is developed and/or strengthened;
- **Result 3:** Regional capacity to disrupt the financial networks of pirate leaders and their financiers while also addressing the structural vulnerability factors and minimise the economic impact of piracy, is strengthened;
- **Result 4:** National and regional capacity for maritime tasks and support functions are enhanced;
- **Result 5:** Regional coordination and information exchange is improved.

The total cost of the project is EUR 37499 260 allocated as follow: (ref annex)

Result 1 -- IGAD	7 959 000
Result 2 – EAC	11 603 966
Result 3 – COMESA	5 451 400
Result 4 - IOC	9540 800
Result 5 - IOC	1 306 000

Communication and visibility	80 000
Evaluation	150 000
Audit	100 000
Contingencies	1 308 094
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>37 499 260</b>

The implementation period started on the 12 June 2013 and will end ended on 11 June 2018.

As Regional Authorizing Officer, IGAD is responsible for overall programme coordination as well as implementation of the planned activities related to Result 1 with exception of the support to alternative livelihoods and advocacy which is implemented by FAO through an EC Delegation agreement. IGAD sub-delegated the responsibilities for implementation of the activities leading to result 2, 3, 4 and 5 to EAC, COMESA IOC respectively. COMESA is implementing the activities related to Result 3 through a Contribution Agreement, while IGAD and EAC partially (Contribution agreement with UNODC) and IOC followed the EDF procedures in the implementations of the programme (10th EDF).

A request for 18 months extension of the D+3 contracting date (12 June 2016) has been requested and approved by the EC/DEVCO as well a request for a 24 months the extension of the Programme.

### **3. EVALUATION OBJECTIVES AND MAIN USERS**

The mid-term review, which had been planned in the Technical and Administrative Provisions of the Programme's Financing Agreement, will provide the decision-makers of IGAD, EAC, COMESA, and IOC and the European Commission and the wider public with sufficient information to:

1. Make an overall independent assessment about the performance so far of the Programme, paying particular attention to the impact of the activities with respect to its objectives;
2. Draw key lessons, explore new orientations and propose recommendations of future development of the Programme (MASE II to be financed under the 11<sup>th</sup> EDF funds) moving beyond piracy to address all forms of maritime threats and crimes in the ESA-IO region.

### **4. EVALUATION SCOPE, INTERVENTION LOGIC AND EVALUATION QUESTIONS:**

#### **4.1. SCOPE**

As indicated below all results of the programme will be evaluated by using the standard 5 DAC evaluation criteria (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact).

All the components of the programme should be covered and particular attention shall be given to the following aspects:

#### **Relevance**

If the relevance of the design of the programme is it still accurate.

To which extend objectives/results have been /should be updated in order to adapt to changes in the context.

The level of stakeholders' participation in the management/implementation of the project. - Logframe: if the indicators/targets are SMART or should be improved.

#### **Efficiency**

Implementation and achievements so far according to the agreed logframe and the successive annual work plans.

Reasons for the Programme to lag behind and what should be done to accelerate progress;

Quality of day-to-day management: operational work planning and implementation, management of the budget, management of personnel, information, communication flow among all implementing stakeholders.

Quality of communication and internal monitoring: its existence (or not), its accuracy and flexibility, and the use made of it.

### **Effectiveness**

Overall value for money so far.

Reasons for low absorption of funds.

Assessment of the extent to which the Programme's results are contributing to the purpose.

Assessment of the administrative and financial burden of the Programme.

### **Sustainability**

Whether the stakeholders appear likely to be capable of capitalizing the flow of benefits after the project ends.

Financial sustainability.

### **Impact**

As far as this can be assessed, to which extent the 5 results could still realistically contribute to the overall objective of the Programme (whether direct or indirect, positive or negative, and intended or unintended), taking account also the Djibouti Declaration

The ways and strategies to capitalize on programmes' outputs and outcomes.

### **Coherence**

The coherence of the 5 results managed by the implementing partners and the involved regional organisations.

Likelihood that results and impacts will mutually reinforce, duplicate or conflict with other similar activities.

### **Visibility**

Assess activities in the field of visibility, information and communication for the entire programme.

### **Conclusions and Recommendations**

Draw conclusions, summarize the overall outcome.

Formulate specific recommendations for the 5 results and possible future interventions in the context of the Djibouti Declaration and in particular on the elaboration of an evaluation and internal monitoring system.

Analyse whether the delays and challenges faced by each result of the programme can be overcome and justify possible rearrangements developing different scenarios, particularly considering the D+3 extension.

## **4.2. INTERVENTION LOGIC OF THE PROJECT/PROGRAMME**

To strengthen the capacity of the ESA-IO region in the implementation of the Regional Strategy and Action Plan against Piracy and for Maritime Security.

### 4.3. ISSUES TO BE STUDIED / EVALUATION QUESTIONS

As indicated below, the evaluation will assess the project/programme using the standard 5 DAC evaluation criteria, namely: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact. In addition, the evaluation will assess two EU specific evaluation criteria:

- the EU added value of the project/programme, both regarding its design and implementation;
- the coherence of the programme itself, with the EU Maritime Security Strategy; the EU Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa; the ESA-IO Regional Strategy and Plan of Action against Piracy and on Maritime Security; the IGAD Integrated Maritime Strategy 2030, the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC) and the activities implemented by Crimario, Eucap Nestor/Somalia, UNODC, UK, the Critical Maritime Routes" programme, the IGAD maritime security program and other complementary programmes implemented in the region.

The evaluation team should also consider whether the following cross-cutting issues gender neutrality, participation of civil society and good governance are to be considered were taken into account in the identification/formulation documents and the extent to which they have been reflected in the implementation of the project and its monitoring.

The evaluation criteria will be translated by the consultants into specific evaluation questions. These questions will be proposed to the EU delegations and discussed during the Inception Phase. However, once agreed the evaluation questions are contractually binding.

### 5. METHODOLOGY, TOOLS AND MAIN DELIVERABLES

The methodology to be used is based on the DEVCO Evaluation methodology for projects/programmes as set out on the website <http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/node/71165>

[http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation\\_reports/reports/2008/1258\\_isspap\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/reports/2008/1258_isspap_en.pdf)

#### 5.1. EVALUATION APPROACH AND MAIN DELIVERABLES

The evaluation process will be carried out in five phases: an Inception Phase, a Desk Phase, a Field Phase, a Synthesis Phase and finally a Dissemination phase. Deliverables in the form of reports and/or slide presentations should be submitted at the end of the corresponding stages.

<i>Phases of the evaluation:</i>	<i>Methodological Stages:</i>	<i>Deliverables</i>
1. <u>Inception Phase</u>	Structuring the evaluation	<i>Inception report/Note</i>
2. <u>Desk Phase</u>	Data Collection Analysis	<i>Desk Report / Note</i>
3. <u>Field Phase</u> (Mission in the country)	Data collection Analysis Verification of hypothesis/preliminary findings	<i>Intermediary report / Note</i> <i>Slide Presentation</i>
4. <u>Synthesis phase</u>	Analysis and Judgements Drafting and Finalisation of the report	<i>Final report</i>
5. <u>Dissemination phase</u>	EU in charge	

##### 5.1.1 Inception phase

The process will start with a briefing session in Brussels with the evaluation manager. One day presence of the whole team of experts is required.

In the inception phase, the relevant documents will be reviewed (see annex 1). The evaluation team will then analyse the Intervention logic as set up at the beginning of the /programme cycle. On the basis of the information collected the evaluation team should:

Describe the development co-operation context.

Comment on /analyse the intervention logic / logical framework.

Comment on the evaluation questions proposed or, when relevant, propose an alternative or complementary set of evaluation questions justifying their relevance.

Check the consistency and validity of the evaluation questions, propose judgement criteria and identify provisional indicators and their means of verification.

Present an indicative methodology for the overall assessment of the project/programme.

Describe the approach for answering each evaluation questions.

Propose the work plan.

Confirm the final schedule for the evaluation exercise.

During the inception stage a report/note shall be prepared (see section 6).

### **5.1.2 Desk phase**

In the Desk Phase, the evaluation team shall carry out the following tasks:

Analyse systematically the relevant available documents;

Interview the programme management, EU services and key partners in the concerned countries;

Provide preliminary responses to each evaluation question stating the information already gathered and their limitations identify the issues still to be covered and the assumptions to be tested, and describe a full method to address the question;

Identify and present the list of tools to be applied in the Field Phase; • List all preparatory steps already taken/to be taken for the Field Phase.

At the end of the desk phase a desk report/presentation will be prepared. A presentation by the evaluation team to the Reference Group<sup>19</sup> will be shared.

### **5.1.3 Field phase**

The Field Phase starts after approval of the Desk Phase report by the evaluation manager.

Before going to the field, the evaluation team must submit its detailed work plan, including the list of people to be interviewed, and other data collection tools to be used, dates of visit, itinerary, and name of team members in charge. If any significant deviation from the agreed work plan or schedule is perceived as creating a risk for the quality of the evaluation, these should be immediately discussed with the evaluation manager.

In the first days of the field phase, the evaluation team shall hold a briefing meeting with programme management, Delegation, local authorities and other relevant stakeholders.

During the field phase, the evaluation team shall ensure adequate contact and consultation with, and involvement of the different stakeholders; working closely with the relevant government authorities and agencies; using the most reliable and appropriate sources of information.

At the end of the field phase, each expert of the evaluation team shall summarise its work, discuss the reliability and coverage of data collection, and present preliminary findings in a meeting with the relevant programme manager at the concerned EU Delegation.

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<sup>19</sup> Reference group consist of members of the EU concerned Delegations (Djibouti, Somalia, Tanzania, Zambia and Mauritius).

#### **5.1.4 Synthesis phase**

This phase is mainly devoted to the preparation of the draft final report. The evaluation team will present in a single document their findings, conclusions and recommendations in accordance with the agreed structure (Annex II).

The evaluation team will make sure that:

Their assessments are objective and balanced, statements accurate and verifiable, and recommendations realistic.

When drafting the report, they will acknowledge clearly where changes in the desired direction are known to be already taking place.

The team leader will present to the evaluation manager in Brussels the draft final report to discuss the draft findings, conclusions and recommendations. (one day presence maximum is required). On the basis of comments expressed by the task manager and the project managers in Delegations, the evaluation team has to amend and revise the draft report. While potential quality issues, factual errors or methodological problems should be corrected, comments linked to diverging judgements may be either accepted or rejected. In the latter instance, the evaluation team should explain the reasons in writing.

#### **5.1.5 Dissemination phase**

EU will take care of the dissemination phase.

### **5.2. QUALITY OF THE FINAL EVALUATION REPORT**

Besides the provisions of the article 8.6 of the Global Terms of Reference, the quality of the final report will be assessed by the evaluation manager using a quality assessment grid (see annexe III).

### **5.3. MANAGEMENT AND STEERING OF THE EVALUATION**

The evaluation is managed by the evaluation manager in DEVCO D/ Brussels with the assistance of a Reference group consisting of members of the EU concerned Delegations (Djibouti, Tanzania, Zambia and Mauritius). The evaluation manager oversees the evaluation on behalf of the Commission.

The reference group member's main functions are:

To facilitate contacts between the evaluation team, the EU services and external stakeholders.

To ensure that the evaluation team has access to and has consulted all relevant information sources and documents related to the project/programme.

To define and validate the Evaluation Questions.

To discuss and comment on notes and reports delivered by the evaluation team. Comments by individual group members are compiled into a single document by the evaluation manager and subsequently transmitted to the evaluation team.

To assist in feedback of the findings, conclusions, lessons and recommendations from the evaluation.

## **6. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS**

The reports must match quality standards. The text of the report should be illustrated, as appropriate, with maps, graphs and tables; a map of the project's area(s) of intervention is required (to be attached as Annex).

The evaluation team will submit the following reports:

	Number of Pages <i>(excluding annexes)</i>	Main Content	Timing for submission <i>(please refer to section 8 for a timetable)</i>
<b>Inception note</b>	10 pages	Intervention logic (if necessary) Evaluation questions, Judgement criteria and Indicators Encountered and anticipated difficulties Detailed evaluation approach and work plan	End of Inception phase
<b>Desk report</b>	15-20 pages	Preliminary answer to each evaluation questions stating the information already gathered and their limitations Issues still to be covered and the assumptions to be tested Full description of the methodology used to answer the questions Field phase detailed plan	End of the desk phase
<b>Draft Final report</b>	30-45 pages	<b><u>Cf. detailed structure in Annex 2</u></b> Answer to the evaluation questions Synthesis of all findings, conclusions and recommendations into an overall assessment	End of Synthesis phase
<b>Final report</b>		•Same specifications as above, incorporating any comments received from the concerned parties on the draft report that have been accepted	

All reports will be in English using Font Arial or Times New Roman minimum 11 and 12 respectively, single spacing. Each report will be submitted first in electronic version as a draft.

For each report/output, the Evaluation manager will submit comments within 2 calendar days for the inception note, 3 calendar days for the desk report and 10 calendar days for the final report. The revised reports/outputs incorporating comments received from the concerned parties shall be submitted within the same calendar days from the date of receipt of the comments. The evaluation team should provide a separate document explaining how and where comments have been integrated or the reason for non-integration of certain comments.

The Final Report (final version) will be provided in 1 paper copies and in electronic version. The executive summary will be translated into *French*.



## 7. THE EVALUATION TEAM

The mission will be composed of one (1) senior expert – Team Leader, Maritime security expert, and 3 experts:

No	Experts	Category	Total estimated number of working days + travel
1	Team leader (IGAD Component) and overall coordination	I	23+4 =27
2	EAC component and UNODC component)	II	18+4 =22
3	(COMESA/Interpol component)	II	18+7 =25
	IOC component	II	18+5 = 23

### 7.2. Profile per expert:

#### *Common Minimum requirement to all experts:*

University degree or equivalent; General experience on monitoring/evaluation EC and UN programmes

Solid and diversified experience in the specific field of expertise needed;

Experience in evaluation/monitoring of similar projects/programmes;

Relevant experience of at least 5 years in developing countries;

At least one of the experts is fully conversant with the principles and working methods of project cycle management and EU aid delivery methods;

At least one of the experts proposed should have knowledge of gender, environment and governance mainstreaming;

At least one of the experts proposed should have direct experience on maritime issues maritime criminality, with civil society in conflict prevention and resolution;

At least one of the experts proposed should have direct experience in law enforcement issues and capacity building activities;

Full working knowledge in English and excellent writing skills plus working knowledge in French

Excellent computer skills with at least Microsoft offices usual software (Word, Excel, MSProject, Power Point) or equivalent.

Excellent writing skills

#### *Additional requirements:*

#### **Expert 1 – Team leader (IGAD component and overall coordination)**

Master degree in economics or in Law enforcement and Maritime security knowledges or equivalent experience

Substantial experience in monitoring and evaluation of EC and UN agencies programmes as team leader,

Experience as a team leader in the last 5 years; (*Minimum required skills*)

At least two experiences in programme evaluation in the last five years in management and maritime security strategies ;(*Minimum required skills*)

Recent experience (last five years) in the region EAC/COMESA/IGAD/IOC region is an advantage;

**Expert 2 EAC component – for national /regional legal issues for arrest, transfer detention and prosecution**

- Master degree in law and good knowledge on maritime legal framework;
- Recent experience in maritime law enforcement institutions ;
- Demonstrated recent experience (last 3 years) in procurement processes and EDF procedures at national or regional level;
- Experience on monitoring evaluation of EC and UN programmes
- Good knowledge of EAC is an advantage.
- Experience in the region is an advantage
- Demonstrated experience in EDF procurement

**Expert 3 – COMESA/Interpol component**

- Master degree in law or economics/finance and substantial experience/expertise in relevant fields such as money laundering, financial crimes and related investigation/prosecution ;
- Recent experience (last 3 years) in regional related programmes in COMESA region;
- Good knowledge of the COMESA region is an advantage
- Experience on monitoring evaluation of EC and UN programmes.

**Expert 4 – IOC component**

- Master degree in maritime studies or equivalent experience
- Experience on maritime domain awareness systems,
- Experience on maritime safety surveillance and control mechanisms,
- Experience on maritime information sharing and information fusion.
- Good knowledge of maritime security issues in the ESA-IO region
- Experience on monitoring evaluation of EC and UN programmes

## Annex IV Map of Project Area



## AnnexVI Literature and DocumentationConsulted

### RESULT AREA 1

20151008\_CGPCS-Newsletter-October.pdf  
Bueger Future of the CGPCS  
Maritime Security TOR 1 (1).pdf  
MASE Progress Report for ESA – IO Ministerial.docx

### RESULT AREA 2

Action Fiche MASE 2011.pdf  
General Information Note (1).pdf  
MASE Communication Strategy\_final report\_22Ap16.pdf  
Start up – MASE 1.pdf  
Maritime Safety and Security beyond the Piracy Phase COMESA KL Rev3.doc

### RESULT AREA 3

Action Fiche MASE 2011.pdf  
Concept Note Technical Experts & ESA – IO Meetings 12 May.docx  
MASE Annex 4-2 ESA – IO strategy to counter piracy 7<sup>th</sup> May (1).doc  
Priority Actions\_May 15 Djibouti Declaration.pdf


### RESULT AREA 4 / 5

20151008\_CGPCS-Newsletter-October.pdf  
Annex 2 Status of the Programme – Regional strategy for Piracy and Maritime Security in the ESA – IO.docx  
Maritime Safety and Security beyond the Piracy Phase COMESA KL Rev3.doc  
MASE Progress Report for ESA – IO Ministerial 13<sup>th</sup> May.docx  
Substantive Notes April 2016 3<sup>rd</sup> Steering Committee.pdf


### GENERIC DOCUMENTATION

MASE Technical Steering Meeting 2016  
1003465\_Brochure.pdf  
Annex 1 Regional Strategy for piracy and maritime security in the ESA – IO.docx  
IGAD Draft Agenda 2016 Ministerial Meeting – 2.docx  
MASE financing current.pdf  
Stratégie Régionale-2.pdf

**Result 1.**




Note: a = 4 (very good); b = 3 (good); c = 2 (problems); d = 1 (serious deficiencies)




Note: a = 4 (very good); b = 3 (good); c = 2 (problems); d = 1 (serious deficiencies)

### Effectiveness to Date Result 1




Note: a = 4 (very good); b = 3 (good); c = 2 (problems); d = 1 (serious deficiencies)

### Impact Prospects Result 1




Note: a = 4 (very good); b = 3 (good); c = 2 (problems); d = 1 (serious deficiencies)




Note: a = 4 (very good); b = 3 (good); c = 2 (problems); d = 1 (serious deficiencies)

### Result 2




Note: a = 4 (very good); b = 3 (good); c = 2 (problems); d = 1 (serious deficiencies)

### Efficiency to Date Result 2



Note: a = 4 (very good); b = 3 (good); c = 2 (problems); d = 1 (serious deficiencies)


### Effectiveness to Date Result 2



Note: a = 4 (very good); b = 3 (good); c = 2 (problems); d = 1 (serious deficiencies)




### Project Impacts Result 2




Note: a = 4 (very good); b = 3 (good); c = 2 (problems); d = 1 (serious deficiencies)

### Potential Sustainability Result 2




Note: a = 4 (very good); b = 3 (good); c = 2 (problems); d = 1 (serious deficiencies)

### Result 3




Note: a = 4 (very good); b = 3 (good); c = 2 (problems); d = 1 (serious deficiencies)




Note: a = 4 (very good); b = 3 (good); c = 2 (problems); d = 1 (serious deficiencies)

### Effectiveness to Date Result 3




Note: a = 4 (very good); b = 3 (good); c = 2 (problems); d = 1 (serious deficiencies)

### Impact to Date Result 3




Note: a = 4 (very good); b = 3 (good); c = 2 (problems); d = 1 (serious deficiencies)



Note: a = 4 (very good); b = 3 (good); c = 2 (problems); d = 1 (serious deficiencies)



### Result 4/5


#### Quality of Design



Note: a = 4 (very good); b = 3 (good); c = 2 (problems); d = 1 (serious deficiencies)


Efficiency to Date





Note: a = 4 (very good); b = 3 (good); c = 2 (problems); d = 1 (serious deficiencies)

#### Sustainability



Note: a = 4 (very good); b = 3 (good); c = 2 (problems); d = 1 (serious deficiencies)

## RESULT 2.

### Financial Table

	Description	Activities and other costs for PE221	EDF contribut. Imprest commit.22 (1)	EDF contribut. Specif commitment (2)	Contribution of the beneficiary country/ Other contributions/projects own resources (3)23	TOTAL (1 to 3)
	Activities					
2.1	Activity 2.1 (N/A)					
2.2	Activity 2.2 "Support to investigative capacity"	489,850	489,850			489,850
	Activity 2.2.1 "Interpol contract"	609,800	0	609,800		609,800
2.3	Activity 2.3 "Support to prisons/correctional services reform"	507,100	507,100			507,100
2.4	Activity 2.4 "Support to capacity building for Prosecutors"	182,500	182,500			182,500
2.5	Activity 2.5"Support for capacity building for courts' staff"	180,000	180,000			180,000
	Subtotal Activities	1969,25	1359,45	609,800		1969,25
2.6	Project Management					
2.6.1	Investments					
2.6.1.1	Office Equipment	10,000	10,000			10,000
2.6.1.2	Vehicles	50,000	50,000			50,000
2.6.1.3	Furniture	5,000	5,000			5,000
2.6.1.4	Forensic Equipment	1,000,000	100,000	900,000		1,000,000
2.6.1.5	Prisons Equipment	250,000	250,000			250,000
	Subtotal	316	415	900,000		316
2.6.2	Operating costs					
2.6.2.1	Staff costs	150,000	150,000			150,000
2.6.2.2	Office rental	0	0			0
2.6.2.3	Office operating costs	12,000	12,000			12,000
2.6.2.4	Vehicle operating costs	9,600	9,600			9,600
2.6.2.5	Travelling	36,000	36,000			36,000
2.6.2.6	Training	30,000	30,000			30,000
2.6.2.7	Technical Assistance (PM)	110,000	110,000			110,000
	Subtotal	347,600	347,6			347,6
2.6.3	Bank charges and exchange differences	5,000	5,000			5,000
2.6.4	Audit/expenditure verification	20,000		20,000		20,000
	Sub-Total 2.6					1,687,600
	TOTAL	3,656,850	2,127,050	1,529,800		3,656,850

<sup>21</sup> Includes new activities and those not fully executed in PE1 (remaining amount from activities under previous imprest).


<sup>22</sup> Idem footnote 1.

<sup>23</sup> Includes contributions from the beneficiary, from other contributions and eventual project's own resources.

**MASE Programme- Result 2 Indicators and Targets**

	<b>EAC project (Acts 2.2-2.5)-PE2</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 450 law enforcement Officials from all Member States in the region are trained in investigative skills and provided with basic forensic equipment by end of 2017</li> <li>• 60 Trainers and 150 Participants from all Member States receive peer reviewed needs based prison training in 6 training sessions by the end of 2017</li> <li>• Basic prison equipment is procured, based on needs assessment, for at least 1 prison in Kenya, Seychelles, Mauritius and Tanzania each by end of 2017</li> <li>• Network of National prisons/correctional services Heads established by 2017</li> <li>• 30 Trainers and 20 Participants from all Member States receive peer reviewed needs based training for Prosecutors and for judicial staff on piracy in 5 sessions each, by end of 2017.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Establishment of a regional forensic reference centre, with relevant capabilities, by October 2016.</li> <li>• 60 Trainers and 30 participants from each of the member states receive peer reviewed needs based prison training by October 2016.</li> <li>• Basic prison equipment based on needs assessment is the object of at least 2 tender procedures by October 2016</li> <li>• Network of National prisons/correctional services Heads is the object of at least 2 specific foundation meetings by October 2016</li> <li>• 30 Trainers and 20 Participants from all member states receive peer reviewed needs based training for Prosecutors and for judicial staff, on sea-related criminal subjects, by June 2016.</li> </ul>

**RESULT AREA THREE – Timeline for Implementation**





**Annex VIII Detailed Answers to the Evaluation Questions, Judgment Criteria and Indicators  
(Evaluation Matrix)**

RESULT AREA 1

RESULT AREA 2

RESULT AREA 3

INTERPOL	a	b	c	d	REMARKS
Q1.1		x			Given the change in the amount of piracy and - thus - money generated through piracy some of the target groups that are more specifically aimed at counter-piracy efforts are finding the Project marginally less relevant. However those Projects that are looking more broadly at maritime crime such as INTERPOL still see the value in MASE Result Area 3.
Q1.2			X		INTERPOL has created its own type of logical framework outside COMESA / MASE support / guidelines. New MASE logical framework required.
Q1.3		X			The major stakeholder in this project from a delivery perspective is INTERPOL and they have been given a 'free hand' by COMESA to design their part of the Project. INTERPOL contacted those they believed to be the key stakeholders vis-à-vis AML and FIU training. The financing arrangements between COMESA and INTERPOL are clearly defined however there is no information available to suggest they support institutional strengthening or local ownership.
Q1.4			X		No obvious link (see CC7.2)
E2.1			X		INTERPOL has expressed some frustration at the time it took to sign off on the contract (1 year) and the 3 monthly returns that have to be submitted to obtain further funds implement activities.
E2.2	X				The activity schedule compiled by INTERPOL shows no delays to date - however (due to the late signing of the contract between COMESA and INTERPOL) there have been very few activities delivered yet that would constitute a delay.
E2.3	X				Yes but as noted there was a technical delay of a year through lack of a contract between INTERPOL and COMESA
E2.4		X			The structure allows for a relatively effective deployment of resources.
EF3.1	X				Outputs achieved although much of the planned activity has still to be delivered.
EF3.2		X			No evidence of COMESA adapting from an INTERPOL perspective however there hasn't been an obvious need to adapt yet.
I4.1		X			Political willingness by most countries to engage in tackling piracy financing / terrorist financing and money laundering

INTERPOL	a	b	c	d	REMARKS
I4.2			X		Unable to judge on other impact but little obvious donor coherence
S5.1		X			Yes, insofar as the key result is the delivery of training.
S5.3			X		Possibly as there are other international actors working in this area and providing impetus for continued AML work however there is no obvious in-country sustainability approach.
S5.4			X		There is a risk that properly trained personnel will move from their positions relatively quickly and their training and skills will be lost.
H6.1					
CC7.1			X		INTERPOL claims to incorporate HR and gender issues however there was no documentary evidence to back this up. COMESA as Leading Agency should have policy in this area for their partners but again no evidence of this was provided.
CC7.2			X		Indirectly insofar as the project tackles money laundering from piracy and - increasingly - other forms of maritime crime including illegal fishing, illegal logging and the transportation of logs via waterways etc. So the link is exceptionally tenuous but there is a link.
CC7.3			X		In general, yes. The three monthly requirement of INTERPOL to submit a report on activities. However the consultant has not been provided with any internal COMESA documents detailing their own, internal governance.

#### RESULT AREAS 4/5

MSCHoA	a	b	c	d	REMARKS
Q1.1			X		The establishing of a Fusion Centre in Madagascar and the lack of will and trust by the shipping industry to share data means that the idea of addressing Maritime Security in the whole region has become a distant one.
Q1.2			X		See 1.1 above East African States see the current Fusion Centre as being for IOC IUUF matters and not to address wider trans-national crime and regional maritime security.  The length of time to deliver the programme means that the project has fallen behind the immediacy for action and window of opportunity to deliver change created by piracy, and is thus struggling to meet the wider regional needs.
Q1.3		X			
Q1.4		X			
E2.1		X			
E2.2		X			

MSCHoA	a	b	c	d	REMARKS
E2.3			X		See 1.2 above
E2.4		X			Communication with external partners could be improved, a dialogue with MSCHoA might assist the design and acceptance of an information sharing system.  The same is true of CRIMARIO which has a workable data platform based upon DCoC frameworks.
EF3.1			X		MASE Area 4 & 5 are struggling to deliver at the technical, regional, and legal levels to build an infrastructure for the sharing of maritime security information at a multi-national and multi-agency level.  If these are not resolved it will prove difficult to create a trusted information sharing network and associated maritime operational response.  Could IMO be approached to host the fusion centre servers and act as an 'honest broker' to improve trust in the system.
EF3.2			X		Not in its current form.  Expectations of the programme could be reduced and the work could be adapted to create an IOC IUUF surveillance programme, this has most chance of gaining a legal agreement in the short term and of being resourced sufficiently to provide a security response as it is economy based.
I4.1			x		Few impacts are apparent.
I4.2			x		There is plenty of potential but it hinges on creating a trusted data collection and sharing system, and a corresponding maritime response mechanism all of which look quite distant and currently have significant risks to their delivery.
S5.1			X		In its current form it looks unsustainable; further cooperation, currently uncharacteristic, is required with CRIMARIO, MSCHoA, IMO.  Satellite AIS data to provide a shipping picture outside 30nm from the coast is expensive and with (currently) only 25% of the Indian Ocean's shipping participating in the EMSA picture (PMAR conclusions),  a cost benefit analysis is required and alternative solution considered.
S5.3		X			
S5.4			X		Improving in IOC but hardly at all in east African States, is there a problem with the design in that MASE beneficiaries do not reflect the lead RO in Areas 4&5?
H6.1					
CC7.1					

MSCHoA	a	b	c	d	REMARKS
CC7.2		X			Some work has been achieved on managing oil spills.
CC7.3					

CRIMARIO	a	b	c	d	REMARKS
Q1.1		X			The relevance of the project remains intact but its response to the needs of the target groups has changed with time as piracy is no longer the main maritime threat to the region.
Q1.2			X		<p>The logic was for improved operational capability in SAR and Maritime Safety with a joint patrolling initiative based within a regional framework for information sharing system, coordination, and training.</p> <p>New risks and considerable delays have been generated by the notion of a Fusion Centre that will handle both information and data.</p> <p>The logic was based upon IMO work in DCoC, and existing and ongoing work by MARSIC (now CRIMARIO).</p> <p>The logic was that an RO (IOC) would manage Result Areas 4&amp;5, the reality is that the RO can only influence its own members directly and other non-RO MASE members find this structure difficult especially when issues such as the creation and siting of a Fusion Centre are decided after a consultation process and an application dossier submitted by all IOC countries, including those outside IOC (namely Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania). One should wonder if the selection committee (the APU) had the full autonomy (selection criteria) to perform its task.</p>
Q1.3			X		<p>The new design with a regional Fusion Centre has split opinion on the types of information that will be shared, by what means, and at what level of security.</p> <p>All these issues cut across States' sovereignty of data protection and are proving extremely difficult to resolve and are creating uncertainty among members.</p> <p>Lack of confidence in the RIFC also affects the Shipping Industry, which is currently unlikely to share its operational data.</p> <p>CRIMARIO which has remained tied to DCoC notion of Information Sharing and has built on the wider trust and confidence for a similar but slightly broader set of beneficiaries.</p> <p>Within CRIMARIO there was an idea of a Fusion Centre for the analysis and dissemination of information, but this was based upon standardization of procedures with a framework agreement, much of which was in motion. This was cut across by MASE, added to the politically driven decision on siting of the RIFC, and effectively has come to a standstill.</p>

CRIMARIO	a	b	c	d	REMARKS
					<p>Whilst there have been formal requests from DEVCO for cooperation in practice this has proved difficult owing to:</p> <p>Different timelines;</p> <p>Different ambitions;</p> <p>Different internal reporting structures; and,</p> <p>A lack of clear central lead in MASE.</p> <p>This has created a reluctance at all levels to engage.</p>
Q1.4					n/a
E2.1			X		It is difficult to get clarity over MASE decisions.
E2.2			X		<p>If a Fusion Centre is to be fully established, then there is currently no clarity of what the funding stream will be and from where it will be generated.</p> <p>CRIMARIO is engaged on training activities for MASE but the training requirement needs to be more closely aligned to building the capabilities outlined in Area 4.</p> <p>There remain real areas of overlap and duplication between MASE (4&amp;5) and CRIMARIO</p> <p>CRIMARIO is developing training based on its project concept (namely information sharing, analysis, etc) which is also in line with the expectation of MASE R5. MASE did not have training programme foreseen.</p> <p>This support was strongly requested by DEVCO and IOC and CRIMARIO is gladly fulfilling its contractual obligations developing training on sites (Beneficiaries of MASE are also beneficiaries of CRIMARIO...).</p>
E2.3					
E2.4			X		<p>Coordination remains weak in many areas.</p> <p>The main area of inefficiency is that two EU funded programmes are working on similar projects within a similar geographic region without common policies:</p> <p>Policy for CRIMARIO is decided between a contractually engaged company and DEVCO; policy for MASE 4&amp;5 is decided by the IOC.</p>
EF3.1			X		Very little of substance has been achieved.
EF3.2			X		<p>As currently configured there is little likelihood of success.</p> <p>Factors such as the RIFC, and the ongoing influence of the PMAR project are undermining progress.</p> <p>PMAR was an expensive trial that built regional expectation but at a cost that is unlikely to be acceptable unless always funded</p>

CRIMARIO	a	b	c	d	REMARKS
					<p>externally.</p> <p>Access to Satellite AIS will enhance regional maritime domain awareness, but there are more affordable options that could be considered as technology has progressed. A possible solution might be a modular approach that could be built upon with all AIS sources + VMS + LRIT.</p> <p>There is a link here between the States' needs for enhanced maritime safety, and SAR as outlined in the MASE documents, and an international desire to track trans-national crime. The first requires better MDA in the local region with enhanced coordination via a sharing platform, the latter requires a costly large area surveillance which is out with the affordability and needs of most of the region's States.</p> <p>The discussions and process to decide the siting of the RIFC have delayed the project by 2-3 years. The decision has resulted in a loss of confidence in the ability and credibility of the RIFC to handle 'sensitive' data, and continues to delay delivery in Area 5 with consequent negative effects on Area 4.</p> <p>CRIMARIO, based on the sound experience of MERCURY, is harmonising the existing network (2 ISNs), by creating a new regional platform that will be regionally managed and owned</p>
I4.1			X		No tangible impact
I4.2			X		<p>PMAR has had an unintentional negative impact by alienating States on cost grounds.</p> <p>RIFC process and decisions have had a heavy negative impact on delivery, and regional confidence.</p>
S5.1			X		If the emphasis in Area 5 remains on RIFC and doing the difficult work of gaining and fusing data to fight trans-national crime there will be a constant need for external economic support for operating, maintaining, and regionally manning the RIFC.
S5.3			X		Many of the policy issues stem from different [EU] programmes doing slightly different things in the same region but reporting activities up different reporting chains. Thus there is no common policy for activities in Area 5 in particular.
S5.4			X		Some training is taking place, but without clear policies and end states it is unfocussed and needs to be more clearly aligned to an incremental approach to providing HR in areas 4&5.
H6.1					
CC7.1					
CC7.2					
CC7.3					

EEAS Mauritius	a	b	c	d	REMARKS
Q1.1	x				Whilst there remains a threat of piracy from Somalia MASE remains relevant to address the root causes, and bolster the region's ability to respond to any similar occurrence.
Q1.2			x		<p>Given the length of time that the project has taken and especially the hiatus of political discussion regarding the siting of the Fusion Centre which has put the programme back 2-3 years the original design is showing some weakness in that some stakeholders have reduced interests because they are not members of the lead organisation (IOC).</p> <p>This was a far-sighted programme design in 2012, but is proving to be slightly less manageable now and the gap between original targets and achievable ones is growing.</p>
Q1.3			x		<p>See above, the route of the programme has moved for political reasons over time and some regional beneficiaries particularly those outside the IOC have lost momentum.</p> <p>The timescale already shows that regional capacity to deliver is slower than the design anticipated and the programme has required to be extended.</p>
Q1.4		X			There is little in the design with regard to cross-cutting issues for Areas 4 & 5 however, environmental and economic considerations are being incorporated into planning.
E2.1	x				Ok
E2.2		X			<p>The original work plan has been a victim of political considerations especially regarding the Fusion Centre but also to a certain extent the use of the PMAR project to conduct a trial programme for maritime data collection. Implementation has been delayed because of this.</p> <p>The overall plan in Areas 4&amp;5 means that expenditure will increase as the work shifts from building a politically and legally acceptable framework to creating tangible information exchange platforms, functional Fusion and Operations Centres and a programme of coordinated patrolling.</p>
E2.3			X		The outputs to date are grounded in achieving regional agreements and political discussions. Only when these are in place can functionality be achieved in the Fusion and Operations Centres.
E2.4			X		<p>Partnering with UNODC is going well, more could be done with CRIMARIO especially regarding a platform for information sharing.</p> <p>Some training is being achieved with CRIMARIO and EUNAVFOR.</p>
EF3.1			X		The programme is behind and efficiency and effectiveness have been side lined thus far in order to build an agreed political base.
EF3.2		X			New risks to the programme have been generated by political

EEAS Mauritius	a	b	c	d	REMARKS
					<p>decisions, these have created new work for the IOC and are inter alia:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Not all States are fully engaged making the programme look like an IOC – only venture;</li> <li>b. Uncertainty remains over the capability and credibility of the Fusion Centre host;</li> <li>c. Uncertainty remains over the type of data that will be released by States and the shipping industry to generate the fused picture;</li> <li>d. Uncertainty remains regarding the ability or will of the region to use the PMAR proposed system with its associated costs.</li> </ul> <p>All of these are critical to programme delivery.</p>
I4.1		x			<p>The programme retains the ability to have a significant impact if the political base can be stabilised and the risks listed above mitigated. IOC is focused on this.</p> <p>Agreements on a data exchange protocol and the establishing of national centres are key, and as the direct threat from piracy has diminished the need to look more widely at trans-national crime (drugs, smuggling, etc.) and their economic impacts as well as the impacts of IUUF on regional economies are the new challenges to be addressed.</p> <p>If stakeholders are unwilling to share information associated with trans-national crime, or the shipping industry is unwilling to share shipping data it will be extremely difficult to justify the operation of a Fusion Centre.</p>
I4.2					
S5.1			X		<p>Ongoing financial support for service remains uncertain.</p> <p>PMAR proposals are widely considered as unaffordable.</p> <p>The on-costs for maintenance are yet to be addressed.</p> <p>There is a phase-out strategy, but with the programme time extension this might need reviewing.</p> <p>As yet regional States are not taking sufficient ownership.</p>
S5.3			X		<p>There was some discussion regarding where policy decisions were taken; was it the IOC or did Brussels retain control?</p> <p>Level of interest from Brussels has decreased since direct threat from piracy has decreased and EU has handed over CGPCS to region.</p>
S5.4		X			<p>The process thus far has been focussed on creating regional frameworks that should endure beyond project end.</p>
H6.1					



EEAS Mauritius	a	b	c	d	REMARKS
CC7.1			x		Although not negatively addressed, there are far greater issues within the programme at this stage.
CC7.2		X			Environmental impacts are considered with the programme addressing pollution issues from oil spills and off-shore oil production.  No environmental damage is likely from the project.  Regulation of IUUF will bring economic benefits to the region, and is a key link back to root causes of Somali piracy. Links with the SMARTFISH programme are key.
CC7.3	x				There are no HR issues with the programme.

IOC	a	b	c	d	REMARKS
Q1.1		x			Whilst the root causes of piracy remain in place it is entirely relevant to continue with all phases of the programme.  Whilst Somalia continues to require special focus, in order to improve its development, it should also now be brought into aspects of the main programme such as Areas 4&5 which are relevant to the MSCC work being developed. This requires further consideration and a possible change in programme design.
Q1.2			x		New risks have been created through political decisions and IOC is addressing these namely:  i. Not all States are fully engaged making the programme look like an IOC – only venture;  ii. Uncertainty remains over the capability and credibility of the Fusion Centre host;  iii. Uncertainty remains over the type of data that will be released by States and the shipping industry to generate the fused picture;  iv. Uncertainty remains regarding the ability or will of the region to use the PMAR proposed system with its associated costs.
Q1.3			x		RECs and ROs work best with their own member States; there are some issues with non-IOC MASE members buy-in to the project direction, especially regarding the functionality of the Fusion Centre.  MASE is a long-term programme, ROs and RECs have greater influence over their members than non-members resulting in a drop-back of non-member engagement. Thus, a tangible positive difference must be created to attract the non-members back, in the case of Areas 4&5 this is functional Fusion and Operations Centres.  IOC countries have increased their awareness of maritime crime

IOC	a	b	c	d	REMARKS
					<p>issues in their waters.</p> <p>Links with other projects are in place but the differences in structure between a regionally run project (MASE) and an EU run project (CRIMARIO) can cause issues to arise requiring constant liaison.</p>
Q1.4		x			Environmental and economic issues are addressed regularly.
E2.1			x		<p>The project appears to be efficient, resources are being used for continuous discussion and engagement.</p> <p>Sometimes EU procedures limit flexibility of delivery and this would be improved if the measurement of success were based upon longer-term outcomes rather than the detail of project activity.</p> <p>Too great an adherence to financial protocols based on EU work practices can restrict flexibility for delivery at the operational level.</p>
E2.2		x			<p>Political decisions have affected the delivery schedule, but tasks are well managed and considered in a logical progressive approach.</p> <p>The nature of the programme, and the inherent delays, means that the spending of resources will increase as political discussions are completed, and risks are mitigated and the work of providing functional information sharing and operational patrolling commences (possibly a further 2 years (2018)).</p>
E2.3			x		See 2.2
E2.4			x		<p>The IOC element works well, but at the expense of non-IOC members. A means of overcoming this would be to hold an annual ESA-IO ministerial conference to discuss all MASE related matters.</p> <p>The partners engage as follows:</p> <p>Countries – slow progress</p> <p>UNODC – good progress</p> <p>CRIMARIO – committed to their platform solution, further investigation required to bring cross-relevance to MASE 4&amp;5;</p> <p>PMAR – proposals look unsuitable for most regional States on the basis of cost, thus the project needs to explore viable alternatives and have a region-wide discussion about which MDA system is relevant and sustainable.</p> <p>Credibility of the Fusion Centre host nation is an issue that is having a negative effect on the engagement between partners and MASE countries. Is there scope for lessening the impact of the political decision by embedding key elements of the Fusion Centre (e.g. servers) elsewhere? Perhaps IMO as a trusted international body encompassing Flag States and the shipping</p>

IOC	a	b	c	d	REMARKS
					<p>industry might help assist in this?</p> <p>Views of shipping industry regarding information sharing, and creating the trust that information will be handled securely and will be directly linked to their safety and security is needed; greater communication with industry as a service customer and potential data provider is required.</p>
EF3.1				x	Effectiveness has been hampered by a 2-3year hiatus resulting from political discussions regarding the siting of a Fusion Centre.
EF3.2		x			With the mitigation of the risks outlined above and the time extension to the programme, there is a good likelihood of the PP being achieved.
I4.1			x		Whilst framework structures remain the current focus there has been a baseline improvement in awareness and capability in all States.
I4.2			X		<p>The economic effects of harvesting resources from the maritime domain is key to the IO islands' maritime strategies (IOC).</p> <p>Environmental information sharing and response is key to protecting off-shore assets, as well as beach focused tourism etc.</p> <p>There is no donor coherence or coordination.</p>
S5.1			x		<p>EU MASE is the only source of funds at present.</p> <p>The IOC believes that with more flexibility it can use funds more effectively and achieve greater output.</p>
S5.3			x		<p>Policy decisions come from the IOC Council and the IOC Ministerial Committee.</p> <p>Interaction needs enhancing at full regional level.</p> <p>Proposal is for an annual ESA-IO ministerial conference to discuss all MASE Result Areas</p>
S5.4			x		The APU based in Seychelles is functional, but otherwise the remainder of outputs are a work in progress awaiting political decision and agreement.
H6.1					
CC7.1			x		<p>There are no gender restrictions but little cross gender encouragement in what is a technical programme.</p> <p>More non-State actors should be encouraged to engage in MASE.</p>
CC7.2		x			<p>Environmental issues, whilst not the driving requirement, are being addressed.</p> <p>Oil spill management and response is being taught.</p> <p>Trans-national crimes such as ivory or timber smuggling have an environmental impact and are considered in the programme.</p>

IOC	a	b	c	d	REMARKS
CC7.3		x			There are no HR concerns.

<b>Mauritius Govt &amp; CG</b>	a	b	c	d	REMARKS
Q1.1		x			Ok
Q1.2			x		<p>Areas 4&amp;5 need to shift away from countering piracy to addressing broader maritime crime.</p> <p>Trans-national crime whilst of great concern is not the main driver for most maritime States, which will look to protecting national maritime resources as their first priority. The programme should reflect this as the piracy threat has reduced.</p> <p>New risks to delivery have been created through political interventions.</p>
Q1.3			x		<p>The design and direction is not always apparent at the national level. This is due in part to a lack of feedback between meetings but also duplication of effort between regionally focused initiatives, e.g. MASE, CRIMARIO, DCoC. This is a design flaw which can lead to confusion at a national level.</p> <p>Having MASE controlled by an RO means that engagement across the whole region is more difficult whereas EU controlled projects have regional impact. Thus, a structure whereby CRIMARIO (EU controlled) had primacy for developing the technical aspects of Areas 4&amp;5 with MASE (IOC controlled) providing the IOC grouping agreements and protocols might be more effective in programme delivery. Currently the two are loosely aligned doing similar things.</p>
Q1.4		x			There are environmental issues being addressed, but little on economic other than the macro effect of piracy.
E2.1					N/a
E2.2					N/a
E2.3				x	No outputs have been seen other than political agreements. Follow-up actions on agreements generate further discussion but little tangible action.
E2.4				x	Feedback on progress is weak and tends to occur only in advance of meetings.
EF3.1				x	<p>Little has been achieved and the programme is behind.</p> <p>States such as Mauritius are waiting to support a regional programme by committing resources on a 'shared effort' basis.</p>
EF3.2				x	<p>In its current form it is unlikely to deliver as planned in the near future.</p> <p>There are risks associated with the siting of the RIFC and the type</p>

Mauritius Govt & CG	a	b	c	d	REMARKS
					<p>of information that is shared.</p> <p>Most States already share information in areas of mutual interest: SAR, IUUF.</p> <p>Exchanging data is far more complex and requires different levels of classification and trust, requiring new protocols and agreements.</p> <p>There is a greater likelihood of successful programme delivery in Areas 4&amp;5 if existing information sharing is built upon with regional technical solutions whilst agreements continue to be sought to exchange data on trans-national crime issues for later inclusion. Thus an information sharing network and shared patrolling protocol could be agreed using existing SAR and IUUF (utilising the SMARTFISH programme) as a short-term deliverable upon which to build the bigger MASE programme targets.</p>
I4.1				x	<p>There are no impacts to date</p> <p>An external factor that is affecting delivery is the siting of the RIFC, which has created new risks. RIFC host credibility will need to be enhanced at regional and international levels in order to build sufficient trust for States and shipping to share information and data for fusing.</p>
I4.2			x		<p>There is potential for positive economic and environmental impacts in the region.</p> <p>The key to success will be to build on existing practices such as national patrolling of TTWs and EEZ, SAR and IUUF relationships, and coordinate and extend them through external funding and reciprocal arrangements to create a regional response.</p>
S5.1				X	<p>If there is no external funding States will continue to protect their national waters as they do now in the more maritime aware countries such as Mauritius.</p>
S5.3				X	<p>Despite a good relationship interaction between the IOC and States is weak and feedback on meetings and decisions is poor resulting in a reduction in confidence in the programme.</p>
S5.4				X	<p>Mauritius is giving its full support to the programme and is ready to share information in specific areas, and provide resources on a shared and reciprocal basis.</p> <p>There are real concerns about a lack of tangible progress; a lack of feedback; and, new risks that have been created through political decisions regarding the RIFC, which have already caused significant delay to programme delivery and, which could undermine future agreements on information sharing.</p>
H6.1					n/a

Mauritius Govt & CG	a	b	c	d	REMARKS
CC7.1		X			There are no known HR issues
CC7.2			X		Environmental issues are address for pollution, but wider eco-environmental issues could be better served.  Additional risks to the environment are not envisaged.
CC7.3			X		Not known

IOC Seychelles	a	b	c	d	REMARKS
Q1.1		X			MASE is important in terms of its regional scope and scale;  It has been successful at uniting the RECs in a single format;  It has been validated by CGPCS and ESA-IO meetings;  Regional ownership is very important;  There is sufficient regional ownership and validation to consider a senior ESA-IO led meeting under MASE as now replicating the work of CGPCS, they are on a diverging path.  The overriding need to achieving Areas 4&5 is the creation of regional frameworks, cooperation and trust and these are key deliverables of MASE if the more tangible results are to be forthcoming.
Q1.2			X		The OO results remain relevant, but are the subject of extended political dialogue. Whilst strong political agreement is necessary, it is unlikely that OO will be achieved within planned timescales.
Q1.3			X		Using a single RO (IOC) has been good for influencing IOC members but some no-IOC States have reduced their interest in participation and historically work more closely with other similar EU programmes (CRIMARIO).  Timescales are difficult when new regional agreements and mechanisms require adopting before any tangible work can commence.  The ongoing discussions to create agreed and trusted arrangements especially in areas of information sharing and joint patrolling etc. are creating delivery delays.  This could offer an opportunity to re-align MASE with other EU initiatives such as CRIMARIO, with the MASE outcome being focussed on: politically agreed

IOC Seychelles	a	b	c	d	REMARKS
					frameworks and cooperation agreements into which EU led projects (CRIMARIO) deliver the technical solutions and training. This would play to the strengths of both the RO approach and the EU led approach whilst reducing duplication and competition between projects. There is a precedent for this approach in some of the work UNODC has undertaken for MASE. Subsequently the sustainability programme within MASE [or any extension thereto] could then be used to fund operations within Areas 4&5 with CRIMARIO providing training for technical handover to full regional operational functionality particularly in Area 5.
Q1.4		X			Ok
E2.1	X				IOC is transparent in its work and project management is well handled.
E2.2			X		There is an activity schedule but it is overset by political delays. IOC spends a lot of time managing programme delays to keep the focus during political discourse.  Is there a case for re-defining the MASE output as creating the political will and regional mechanisms for achievement of areas 4&5 (see proposal above)
E2.3			X		
E2.4	X				The committees work well and have a collegiate feel.
EF3.1	X				Political agreements are in place and are being negotiated for a more technical approach  Anti-piracy Unit is operational and effective; it helps speed up implementation and has provided advice to other Result Areas  Creation of a Regional Coordinator within IGAD is a very positive step  Role of IOC enhanced by Chair co-Chair of CGPCS WG1 with Kenya – there are positive issues about regional ownership here.
EF3.2			X		There remain regional agreements to be finalised before any further progress can be made.
I4.1		X			Structured framework is in place  Knowledge of regional States' political will and capacity to participate is clearer  Trust is growing – the Focal Points meetings have a collegiate feel about them.

IOC Seychelles	a	b	c	d	REMARKS
I4.2		X			By 2020 Ownership will be in place; mobilisation of resources will have occurred, and maritime awareness will have improved across the region.
S5.1			X		If the focus remains on building functioning mechanisms, then ownership will build trust and cooperation upon which to add resources and begin implementation.  Technical solutions will require some follow-on external funding  Technical solutions should be based upon existing infrastructure such as the MERCURY network, and DCoCISCs which are all operational and affordable now and, commercial technologies for MDA rather than an expensive bespoke solution (PMAR). See proposal at 1.3
S5.3			X		OO has been delayed by around 2 years by external and internal policy changes in particular regarding the siting of a RIFC. There remain some risks that need to be overcome regarding trust and regional will to operate through the RIFC as planned.
S5.4		X			Regional awareness and the regional running of steering groups etc. has improved awareness and management capacity.  All IOC States are fully committed to delivery of Areas 4&5
H6.1					
CC7.1					Not discussed
CC7.2					Not discussed
CC7.3					Not discussed

APU	a	b	c	d	REMARKS
Q1.1		X			MASE is important in terms of its regional scope and scale;  Strengths are its modularity and adaptability;  Regional ownership is very important;  Regional capacity baseline is low including in conceptualising the issues, thus a generic programme forces region to learn as well as implement. This type of programme helps the region to become more expert.  The overriding need to achieving Areas 4&5 is the creation of regional frameworks, cooperation and trust



APU	a	b	c	d	REMARKS
					and these are key deliverables of MASE if the more tangible results are to be forthcoming.
Q1.2			X		<p>The reduction of piracy means that the pressure for delivery is reduced and offers a period of consolidation for the region to learn and build frameworks at its own pace. This will build sustainability.</p> <p>Risks have changed over time, with the biggest risks being created by external influence on key political decisions (RIFC).</p> <p>The OO results remain relevant, but are the subject of extended political dialogue. Whilst strong political agreement is necessary, it is unlikely that OO will be achieved within planned timescales.</p>
Q1.3			X		<p>Using a single RO (IOC) has been good for influencing IOC members but some no-IOC States have reduced their interest in participation and historically work more closely with other similar EU programmes (CRIMARIO).</p> <p>The ongoing discussions to create agreed and trusted arrangements especially in areas of information sharing and joint patrolling etc. are creating delivery delays.</p> <p>The design for large area maritime domain awareness particularly as suggested by the PMAR Project is no longer valid due to threat changes and the new risks created through RIFC politics and siting.</p>
Q1.4		X			Ok
E2.1		X			IOC is transparent in its work and project management is well handled.
E2.2			X		<p>There is an activity schedule but it is overset by political delays. IOC spends a lot of time managing these delays to keep the focus during political discourse.</p> <p>APU provides expert advice to IOC, but as APU is building its own capacity there are sometimes errors in decision making.</p> <p>A joint programme was agreed during a MASE/CRIMARIO/MSC meeting but has generally been ignored by MASE.</p>
E2.3			X		<p>Outputs are not logical despite the best efforts of IOC as they have been severely hampered by external political influence.</p> <p>Policy decisions should be made in region and not be communicated to external players who then bring political influence to bear.</p>

APU	a	b	c	d	REMARKS
E2.4		X			<p>While committees work well and have a collegiate feel the lack of shipping industry involvement is an issue.</p> <p>The region still does not understand the difference between information/data security, and confidentiality. These are key if progress is to be made in information sharing.</p> <p>MASE is not sufficiently using the maritime expertise base within CRIMARIO, especially in information sharing systems.</p> <p>The PMAR project had two main flaws:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. There was too much time delay for useful prosecution of targets; and,</li> <li>b. It was too expensive.</li> </ol> <p>Information fusion should be done at a national level between agencies, and then the national product is shared over a fused information sharing system. There is no big MDA picture thus reducing costs and increasing likelihood of States' buy-in and system sustainability. It also makes the MDA area proportionate to the limited regional response capability.</p>
EF3.1		X			<p>Anti-piracy Unit is operational and effective; it helps speed up implementation and has provided advice to other Result Areas</p> <p>The programme is not achieving planned results because of political issues.</p> <p>Information/data fusion should be kept to a simple double-sourcing input methodology.</p>
EF3.2			X		<p>There remain regional agreements to be finalised before any further progress can be made.</p>
I4.1			X		<p>It is hard to see real impact from the programme other than enhanced political dialogue.</p> <p>Impact needs to be based on information and resources being available where and when they are needed.</p> <p>As piracy has reduced so the greater threats to the region are economic ones based around the protection of maritime resources (especially fish in IOC) from illegal exploitation and environmental threats; countering an increased narcotics trade; and protecting regional trade. MASE is not focused on the economic needs of members.</p> <p>States' national strategies need tying to the MASE concept</p>

APU	a	b	c	d	REMARKS
I4.2					
S5.1			X		<p>If the focus remains on building functioning mechanisms, then ownership will build trust and cooperation upon which to add resources and begin implementation.</p> <p>Technical solutions will require some follow-on external funding</p> <p>Technical solutions should be based upon existing infrastructure such as the MERCURY network, and DCoCISCs which are all operational and affordable now and, commercial technologies for MDA rather than an expensive bespoke solution (PMAR). See proposal at 2.4</p>
S5.3			X		<p>OO has been delayed by around 2 years by external and internal policy changes, in particular regarding the siting of a RIFC.</p> <p>There remain a number of risks that need to be overcome regarding ESA-IO regional trust and will to operate through the RIFC, which if unresolved will undermine the ability of the region to sustain the programme in Areas 4&amp;5.</p> <p>Understanding and implementation of security and confidentiality clauses are important to allay fears about what is being shared.[Proposal at 2.4]</p>
S5.4		X			There has been an uplift of awareness across the region but capability and capacity remain low.
H6.1					
CC7.1				X	The regional perception is that women have no place at sea, MASE needs a stronger gender clause to address this
CC7.2			X		There are environmental threats but whilst mentioned they are not well covered by MASE.
CC7.3					Not discussed