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**THIS ACTION IS FUNDED BY THE EUROPEAN UNION**

**ANNEX**

of the Commission Implementing Decision on the financing of the special measure in favour of Yemen  
for 2022

**Action Document for Supporting Peace and Security in Yemen**

**SPECIAL MEASURE**

This document constitutes the annual work programme within the meaning of Article 110(2) of the Financial Regulation, and a special measure within the meaning of Article 23 (4) of NDICI-Global Europe Regulation.

**1 SYNOPSIS**

**1.1 Action Summary Table**

<b>1. Title CRIS/OPSYS business reference Basic Act</b>	Supporting Peace and Security in Yemen OPSYS n° ACT-60650 Financed under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument ( <u>NDICI-Global Europe</u> )
<b>2. Team Europe Initiative</b>	No
<b>3. Zone benefiting from the action</b>	The action shall be carried out in Yemen
<b>4. Programming document</b>	No programming document / Special Measure
<b>5. Link with relevant MIP(s) objectives / expected results</b>	N/A
<b>PRIORITY AREAS AND SECTOR INFORMATION</b>	
<b>6. Priority Area(s), sectors</b>	Government and Civil Society, DAC Code 150
<b>7. Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)</b>	Main SDG: <b>SDG 16</b> on peace, justice and strong institutions Other significant SDGs and where appropriate, targets: <b>SDG 5</b> on gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls.
<b>8 a) DAC codes</b>	15220 Civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution 60% 15150 Democratic participation and civil society 30% 15170 Women's rights organisations and movements, and government institutions 10%
<b>8 b) Main Delivery Channel</b>	41000 Delegation agreements with international organisation 20000 Non-governmental organisations 10000 Public Sector Institutions (EU Member States' Agencies)

<b>9. Targets</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Migration <input type="checkbox"/> Climate <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Social inclusion and Human Development <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Gender <input type="checkbox"/> Biodiversity <input type="checkbox"/> Education <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Human Rights, Democracy and Governance			
<b>10. Markers</b> <b>(from DAC form)</b>	<b>General policy objective @</b>	<b>Not targeted</b>	<b>Significant objective</b>	<b>Principal objective</b>
	Participation development/good governance	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Aid to environment @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Gender equality and women's and girl's empowerment	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Trade development	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Reproductive, maternal, new-born and child health	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Disaster Risk Reduction @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Inclusion of persons with Disabilities @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Nutrition @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<b>RIO Convention markers</b>	<b>Not targeted</b>	<b>Significant objective</b>	<b>Principal objective</b>
	Biological diversity @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Combat desertification @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Climate change mitigation @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Climate change adaptation @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>11. Internal markers and Tags:</b>	<b>Policy objectives</b>	<b>Not targeted</b>	<b>Significant objective</b>	<b>Principal objective</b>
	Digitalisation @ digital connectivity digital governance digital entrepreneurship digital skills/literacy digital services	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
	Connectivity @ transport people2people energy digital connectivity	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
	Migration @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

	(methodology for tagging under development)			
	Reduction of Inequalities (methodology for marker and tagging under development)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Covid-19	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>BUDGET INFORMATION</b>				
<b>12. Amounts concerned</b>	Budget line: BGUE-B2022-14.020130-C1-INTPA Total estimated cost: EUR 14 000 000 Total amount of EU budget contribution EUR 14 000 000			
<b>MANAGEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION</b>				
<b>13. Type of financing<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>Direct management</b> through: - Grants - Procurement <b>Indirect management</b> with the entity(ies) to be selected in accordance with the criteria set out in section 4.3.3			

## 1.2 Summary of the Action

<p>Development gains in Yemen can only be safeguarded and strengthened if a lasting peace is achieved<sup>2</sup>. It is thus a cornerstone of EU development engagement in Yemen to work towards this peace objective through an inclusive peace process resulting in a broadly consensual peace agreement that can take hold sustainably and pave the way to reconciliation and recovery.</p> <p>The main objective of this Action is to <b>contribute to inclusive peace and security in Yemen through a multitrack approach to peacebuilding</b>. It will support various strands of peacebuilding efforts, with the aim of complementing and supporting the official negotiations between high-level political representatives led by the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen (OSESFY), referred to as track I of the peace process. The Action will ultimately aim to tangibly improve the daily life of Yemenis by supporting institutions and capacities that contribute to sustainable peace.</p> <p>The Action seeks to create a linked-up approach to peace efforts in Yemen, whereby initiatives on different levels are able to cross-fertilise their efforts. Building on lessons learnt from previous Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) and Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) funded activities, the Action will focus on national and local level peace initiatives (track II and track III), aiming to build inclusive security and peace approaches and build the capacity of national and local actors to meaningfully contribute to peace initiatives at all levels.</p> <p>The action will in particular align development cooperation activities to the <b>EU Integrated Approach to Peace and Security in Yemen</b>, which the EEAS, together with Commission services, has worked out and presented to EU Member States. In line with the recommendations of the Integrated Approach, this action will continue supporting the UN-led peace process, while also enabling the EU to take a more coherent and proactive coordination role in the field of local-level peace and security initiatives, as well as to ensure complementarity with UN-led efforts for increased impact.</p>
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<sup>1</sup> Art. 27 NDICI

<sup>2</sup> [Assessing the Impact of War in Yemen | UNDP in Yemen](#)

The peace process in Yemen is dynamic and has been prone to periods of relative stagnation and moments of rapid development. This is why a degree of **flexibility** will be included in the design of activities. At the same time, political and rapid response services will provide key inputs for the strategic steer of the Action.

**In line with the multitrack approach to supporting the peace process, one component of the Action will be dedicated to supporting the UN-led peace process. This will include support to the Peace Support Facility (PSF) and/or Peace Support Project (PSP) that are the dedicated tools at the disposal of the UN to support the UN-led peace efforts and confidence building measures in a timely and flexible manner.**

**The second component seeks to strengthen coherence among national and local level processes and initiatives and – wherever possible – ensure linkages and feedback loops between the national and the local level. An important aspect of this component will be to build capacities at the national and local level for Yemeni communities to advocate for themselves and have their voices heard in various peace initiatives. Thematically, this support will be centred on:**

- **Building capacities and initiatives for peace:** Both during periods of meaningful progress in the national-level peace process and during periods of lack thereof, strengthening the grassroots demand for peace through national as well as local level peace initiatives remains important. Hence, a major aspect of this component will be improving the quality, representation and value added of national and local level peace initiatives and mediation efforts. Yemeni Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and peaceful coexistence projects will be supported, targeting decision makers, youth, women and vulnerable groups including internally displaced persons (IDPs), and wherever relevant ensure linkages to the UN-led peace process and other high-level political processes.
- **Coordination of peace initiatives:** Supporting communication and cooperation channels for partners active in the field of national and local level peace and mediation will help ensuring not only a coherence of approach but also identifying avenues for linking national, sub-national and grassroots level peace initiatives wherever possible. Hence, specific attention will be given to coordination efforts among different levels of peace support.
- **Local security.** Security and stability at local level are paramount not only for the implementation of a future peace agreement but also for enhancing the prospects of a subsequent broader peace and reconciliation process. Activities will focus on improving inclusive local security approaches and structures.

## 2 RATIONALE

### 2.1 Context

Prior to the onset of the current conflict, Yemen was already the poorest country in the Arab World. Projections were clear that Yemen would not achieve any of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030, even in the absence of conflict. In 2014, the Fragile States Index ranked Yemen the 8<sup>th</sup> most fragile state, out of 120 states.

Since March 2015, Yemen has descended into a **full-fledged violent conflict**, with regional dimensions, causing a massive loss of life, internal displacement, destruction of infrastructure, near collapse of the economy and public service delivery, the loss of household incomes and exacerbating existing high levels of poverty and social and political vulnerabilities. Poverty now affects two thirds compared to less than half the population before the war started.<sup>3</sup> In July 2015, the United Nations (UN) declared Yemen a Level 3 Emergency and, in 2017, the UN categorised the crisis as the world's largest humanitarian disaster. UN Development Programme (UNDP) estimates that by the end of 2021, the conflict had caused 377,000 deaths with 154,000 due to direct combat and violence and 223,000 – or nearly 60 per cent – indirectly caused by the conflict.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> The World Bank in Yemen, "Overview," March 25, 2021, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/overview>

<sup>4</sup> <https://www.ye.undp.org/content/yemen/en/home/library/assessing-the-impact-of-war-in-yemen--pathways-for-recovery.html>

As a consequence of protracted conflict, in 2020 Yemen ranked first on the Fragile States Index.<sup>5</sup> The conflict has **fractured Yemen's formal and informal governance systems** resulting in a dynamic, complex, and fragmented context of authority in different parts of the country. The country remains divided between the areas under the authority of the internationally recognised government and the Ansar Allah authorities controlling large areas, including the country's capital, Sana'a, and most of the population. The south is witnessing a strong resurgence of separatism. The creation of a new broad-based government at the end of 2020 and its return to Aden in early 2021, as well as the announcement of a two-month truce in April 2022 and the creation of a Presidential Council and advisory bodies were all important steps towards potential stabilisation, yet the situation remains volatile.

Wherever feasible, EU action strives to support the entire population in a neutral way across all parts of the country ("**whole of Yemen**" approach). However, neutrality does not mean that it is possible or prudent to design and implement the same activities and timelines in all parts of Yemen. All Actions and activities should be based on a **conflict analysis and a Do No Harm (conflict sensitivity)** analysis to determine the most appropriate entry points, activities and realistic timeframes for implementation given the unique opportunities, constraints and risks in various parts of the country.

The UN **Special Envoy** has requested from the **EU to contribute to a better coordination of track II mediation** support actions and implementing partners. In this context the EU has conducted various mapping exercises and is aiming to support a dedicated coordination mechanism. The aim is to allow ongoing and future track II and track III activities to fully realise their potential to create synergies and support the overall peace process.

The progress achieved by **local civil society (CSOs)** in Yemen has been negatively impacted by a number of factors, including a lack of funding, high levels of political instability and the liquidity crisis. The conflict has increased the risk of human rights abuses and severely limited civil society's ability to advocate for the respect of human rights and journalists to cover such issues. While civil society has continued to operate during the current crisis, many organisations have re-focused their efforts towards the humanitarian response to continue their operations.

Organisations working on **peace and women's rights** have faced particular difficulties in recent years. Yemeni women are particularly disadvantaged in the conflict, struggling under a disproportionately negative impact in displacement, as survivors of various types of gender-based violence and facing a range of obstacles to entering the labour market. Persons with disabilities, and especially women and girls, are at higher risk of losing their lives or being exposed to violence during conflicts.<sup>6</sup>

Yemen continues to score at the bottom on most global indices related to gender, including the Gender Gap,<sup>7</sup> the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Index,<sup>8</sup> and UNDP Gender Inequality Index.<sup>9</sup> Inequalities coupled with exclusion of women from power, opportunities, services and security create a fertile ground for conflict and gender-based violence, especially when linked to weak state capacity or legitimacy.

Women in Yemen were active participants in the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) in 2013-2014 but have unfortunately played a marginal part in the subsequent peace process post-2015. In addition, women are systematically excluded from governance structures both on the Government of Yemen and Ansar Allah-led authorities' side. Women with disabilities or from other marginalised groups have even more difficulties to engage in governance structures, also because of operational and administrative obstacles imposed by authorities on aid actors (e.g. Mahram and denial of approval for gender sensitive activities). However, Yemeni women are rising to the challenges in all aspects of society and contributing to developing creative solutions to challenges in their

<sup>5</sup> <https://fragilestatesindex.org/data/>

<sup>6</sup> <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N21/196/98/PDF/N2119698.pdf?OpenElement>

<sup>7</sup> Yemen has been ranked as the lowest on World Economic Forum's from 2006, although in 2021, Afghanistan came in the lowest. World Economic Forum. "Global Gender Gap 2021." [http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF\\_GGGR\\_2021.pdf](http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2021.pdf).

<sup>8</sup> 167<sup>th</sup> OUT OF 167 COUNTRIES RANKED. "WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY INDEX 2019/20: TRACKING SUSTAINABLE PEACE THROUGH INCLUSION, JUSTICE, AND SECURITY FOR WOMEN." GEORGETOWN INSTITUTE FOR WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY AND THE PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE OSLO. <HTTPS://GPS.PRIO.ORG/PUBLICATIONS/PUBLICATION/?X=1288>.

<sup>9</sup> In 2019/2020 Yemen was ranked 179<sup>th</sup> out of 189 countries. UNDP. "Gender Inequality Index." <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/gender-inequality-index-gii>.

homes and communities. Traditionally, in some areas women have played a key role in indigenous conflict management and everywhere women can play a role to promote or mitigate social cohesion.

**Young Yemenis** constitute 30% of the population<sup>10</sup> and they have suffered significantly from the current crisis. They lack opportunities in education and employment. Additionally, young men in particular have been recruited by parties to the conflict to fight, often expressing that they feel used by political and military elites, and the presence of various radical groups in the country – from Al-Qaida in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) to Daesh or the Islamic State (IS) – constitutes a very dangerous combination of elements for youth. Many young people have also been injured and live with disabilities, which further aggravates their economic and social situation.

Finally, as a result of the weakness of central authorities to provide sufficient **security** as part of basic services to citizens, local actors, stakeholders and governance structures (mostly at the level of governorates or cities) must take over these responsibilities. Some efforts are currently underway to improve local security. Yet security for citizens remains elusive; challenges relate to the weakness in law enforcement, difficulties in reactivating the judiciary and a lack of resources for strengthening the rule of law. Competition among local security actors, the proliferation of weapons and the lack of reintegration perspectives for members of non-statutory forces will create further challenges in ongoing attempts to enhance local security. Security organs are often perceived as a means of repression and the citizens' trust is low in their capacities and commitment to provide safety and security.

## 2.2 Problem Analysis

The main problems that this Action intends to address are:

### 1. Lack of inclusion.

The current legal set up of the UN-led peace process (UN Security Council Resolution 2216) singles out two parties to the conflict as the main interlocutors. However, a sustainable political settlement will only be reached and sustained with adequate support and buy-in from civil society and the population at large, in all its diversity. This means addressing near-term needs, such as strengthening the demand for peace negotiations among civil society, as well as the longer term issues necessary for preparing local populations for a sustainable peace agreement and the practicalities of 'the day after', including durable solutions for IDPs. In this context, local level peaceful coexistence, security and stability are important not only for the implementation of a future peace agreement but also for enhancing the prospects of a subsequent broader peace and reconciliation process.

Local level initiatives may be useful in helping to create an environment that is riper for sincere peace talks. Efforts at these levels may help to foster conditions and attitudes that may eventually help the process move forward should the official peace process be resumed.

### 2. Lack of coordination, feedback loops and complementarity between and among local and national level peace efforts

Over the past years of protracted crisis and intermittent successes in the national peace efforts, many international donors have engaged in support to peace initiatives – including Track II dialogues, a wide array of capacity building for CSOs and women's/youth groups to participate meaningfully in broader peace processes, sub-granting to organisations to plan and implement confidence building projects at the local level but also targeted mediation activities. There is a rich body of lessons learnt and best practices which has so far remained untapped by the donor community due to a lack of strategic mapping and coordination efforts. In particular, there has been a limited understanding of how local level initiatives can best complement or even support the national level peace process. There is also a lack of coordination between different track II and track III initiatives.

### 3. Lack of trust between citizens and security providers.

Peace and stabilisation are not possible without a minimum level of security. The absence of national institutions that control the whole territory of Yemen has enabled the proliferation of local militias and local powers. Local police had to face unsurmountable problems, not only due to the lack of capacity, preparation and equipment, but also due to the lack of trust from the citizens. The concept of citizens' and community security should replace the "regime security" concept, thus underlining how the latter is perceived as a negative force by most of the

<sup>10</sup> Youth aged 15-24 comprise 21% of the population, with a further 9% aged 25-29. <https://www.Worldometers.info/demographics/yemen-demographics/>.

population. To restore trust in security services, serious effort will have to be exerted to strengthen the typical services that local law enforcement can provide. Discussions on local security principles and frameworks that consider human rights and freedom of expression will need to inform donor action going forward.

#### 4. Yemeni civil society struggles to increase its impact on peacebuilding

The war has greatly affected the capacity and survival of CSOs as a result of the narrowing of civic space in the country due to conflict dynamics, lack of funding for non-humanitarian action and increasing instrumentalising of such institutions by parties to the conflict. All CSOs have felt the impact of the conflict on the economy.<sup>11</sup> The history of civil society in the country and the activism and commitment of many Yemenis to contribute to positive change in their society holds the potential to positively contribute to the current context, as well as help to rebuild society and heal the wounds of war following a negotiated peace settlement.

Identification of main stakeholders and corresponding institutional and/or organisational issues (mandates, potential roles, and capacities) to be covered by the action:

This action will provide links and coordination between a wide range of stakeholders.

The actors that will have a stake in this action include but are not limited to:

- **Commission services** involved in the Yemen response and EEAS.
- **EU Member States:** A number of other EU Member States provide support to the Peace Support Facility. A smaller number of Member States have active programmes in the field of Track II and local level peace support in Yemen, most notably Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands.
- The **Office of the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for Yemen**. The Mission focuses on supporting Yemen's return to a peaceful political transition in accordance with the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative, the outcomes of the National Dialogue and United Nations Security Council resolutions.
- **Civil society organisations and activists**, including women's organisations, youth groups, representatives of traditionally excluded groups such as IDPs, Muhammasheen and people with disabilities, tribal and community leaders, and religious leaders.
- **Yemeni local authorities**, local **law enforcement representatives** and local **representatives of the judiciary**. These may include officials working for local courts.
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### 3 DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTION

#### 3.1 Objectives and Expected Outputs

The **Overall Objective (Impact)** of this action is to

contribute to a sustainable and inclusive peace in Yemen.

The **Specific Objectives (Outcomes)** of this action are to

1. Enhance effectiveness and inclusivity of the peace processes
2. Preserve and strengthen inclusive national and local peace approaches, institutions and structures.

The **Outputs** to be delivered by this action contributing to the corresponding Specific Objectives are

1.1 contributing to Specific objective 1: Inclusivity in peace talks is broadened.

1.2 contributing to Specific Objective 1: National and local level peace, mediation and confidence building initiatives are promoted.

2.1 contributing to Specific Objective 2: Capacity of civil society organisations is enhanced in peace-building and mediation.

<sup>11</sup> Colburn, Marta, "A New Path Forward: Empowering a Leadership Role for Yemeni Civil Society," Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies, 26 January 2021.

2.2 contributing to Specific Objective 2: Women, youth and marginalised groups, such as people with disabilities and IDPs are supported to play a role in future peace dialogue through the provision of capacity building, enhanced participation mechanisms and coordination efforts among different support actions.

2.3 contributing to Specific Objective 2: Capacity of community groups and where relevant key local security providers is strengthened to ensure inclusive local security approaches and structures.

2.4 contributing to Specific Objective 2 Linkages, information sharing and exchanges between and among peace initiatives at the local and national level are strengthened.

### 3.2 Indicative Activities

Indicative Activities related to Outputs 1.1 to 1.2 to be operationalised through the PSF:

- Providing support to Track II (and III) initiatives, notably those which are focusing on transitional issues such as future constitutional reform, electoral reform, and national dialogue, and security-related issues.
- Identifying and building consensus around possible solutions and options for the peace agreement and the transitional period, reflecting the views of women and men from different background, including women and men among IDPs, women and men with disabilities etc.
- Strengthening existing mechanisms for inclusion, such as existing women's networks, and youth networks.
- Engaging with tribal leaders inside and outside Yemen.
- Supporting and strengthening local capacities and efforts on dialogue and mediation with the conflict parties to ensure local de-escalation and ceasefire agreements as well as the establishment of effective monitoring mechanisms.
- Engaging and building the capacity of political parties to engage in dialogue processes and the peace process.

Indicative Activities related to Outputs 2.1 to 2.4:

- Support to CSOs working on peace, including capacity building as well as support to implementation of local-level peace building initiatives
- Supporting CSOs working on gender equality and women's empowerment in engaging in policy dialogue in order to advocate for gender sensitive policy making, alignment and respect of international frameworks on human rights and gender equality.
- Capacity building to form young leaders for their empowerment and participation in peace talks.
- Capacity building for women and men involved in security at local level: community leaders, *sheikhs*, local judiciary, local law enforcement actors, youth.
- Maintaining a convening mechanism and supporting exchanges and coordination among donors and implementers in the sphere of peace support. This may include mapping of initiatives and ensuring linkages among various Track II efforts and role of OSESGY and Track I efforts through coordination activities.

### 3.3 Mainstreaming

#### **Environmental Protection & Climate Change**

Environmental peacebuilding integrates natural resource management in conflict prevention, mitigation, resolution, and recovery to build resilience in communities affected by conflict. Environmental sustainability and peacebuilding will be given due consideration in the context of the programme by; encouraging applicants to adopt a mainstreamed approach and raising their awareness on environmentally friendly operations; supporting initiatives that promote improved natural resource governance in the context of conflict prevention and mediation, and encouraging projects' linkage to existing international knowledge platforms and communities of practice on environmental peacebuilding

#### **Outcomes of the EIA (Environmental Impact Assessment) screening**

The EIA (Environment Impact Assessment) screening classified the action as **Category C (no need for further assessment)**.

### **Outcome of the CRA (Climate Risk Assessment) screening**

The Climate Risk Assessment (CRA) screening concluded that this action is **no or low risk (no need for further assessment)**

### **Gender equality and empowerment of women and girls**

As per OECD Gender DAC codes identified in section 1.1, this action is labelled as G1. This implies that the Action will seek coherence with the EU Comprehensive Approach to the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 on Women, Peace and Security. Initiatives directly addressing women and the meaningful participation of women in the analysis, design, planning, actions and evaluation will be carried out. Engagement of women will remain a priority under the programme and is in line with the Joint Staff Working Document on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment: Transforming the Lives of Girls and Women through EU External Relations 2016-2020, the EU Gender Action Plan (GAP III) adopted in November 2020 and the GAP III Country Level Implementation Plan for Yemen<sup>12</sup> developed jointly by the EU Delegation to Yemen and EU Member States for the 2021-2024 period, which identifies women, peace and security as a key priority.

The EU recognises gender equality and women's empowerment as a prerequisite for dealing with the conflict cycle (prevention, management and resolution), and the Action will be implemented in full synergy with the GAP III, which also addresses women and girls in conflict, post-conflict and peacebuilding through the Women Peace and Security agenda, and by supporting women's full participation in political and public life, and in decision making processes, including peace processes and conflict resolution. The EU emphasises the importance of women's leadership and agency in all areas of policy and programming related to peace and aims to ensure that women and girls from diverse and variable backgrounds, including women who are particularly marginalised and often discriminated against, such as women with disabilities, are entitled to participate equitably and substantially in preventing and resolving conflicts and conflict-related violence.

In line with the GAP III, at least 85% of development interventions in Yemen will have gender equality or women's and girls' empowerment as a principal or significant objective. The EU Delegation's co-chairing of the International Gender Coordination Group for Yemen will be used as a sounding board for identifying needs and potential interventions jointly with other international actors.

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### **Human Rights**

In line with the 2021 "Updated Tool-box for placing rights-holders at the centre of EU's Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation"<sup>13</sup> and the respective Council Conclusions, all actions shall be designed and implemented following a human rights-based approach, encompassing all human rights, which will be particularly relevant for people in vulnerable and disadvantaged situations, including IDPs and those living in rural and marginalised areas. The values of solidarity, connection, non-violence, tolerance, understanding the other, good neighbouring relations, reconciliation, justice, equity, local leadership, empowerment and democratisation, just and sustainable peace, respect of human rights as a set of values (including international humanitarian law) supportive of peaceful coexistence will be promoted throughout the programme and projects. Actions should be designed according to a Human Rights Based Approach, taking into account the following working principles: (i) applying all human rights for all (ii) meaningful and inclusive participation, (iii) non-discrimination and equality, (iv) accountability and rule of law, (v) transparency and access to information.<sup>14</sup> The actions will be aligned with the EU's Human Rights and Democracy Country Strategy for Yemen, which was developed in partnership with EU Member States in 2021.

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### **Disability**

As per OECD Disability DAC codes identified in section 1.1, this action is labelled as **D0**. This implies that persons with disability are not specifically targeted (ref. to paragraph, although individual actions funded under this programme may have a specific focus on inclusion of people with disabilities, and all actions that seek to broaden

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<sup>12</sup> [https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/topics/gender-equality-and-empowering-women-and-girls\\_en#header-5139](https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/topics/gender-equality-and-empowering-women-and-girls_en#header-5139)

<sup>13</sup> [https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/system/files/swd-2021-human-right-based-approach\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/system/files/swd-2021-human-right-based-approach_en.pdf)

<sup>14</sup> Council conclusions on a rights-based approach to development and Tool-box – a rights-based approach encompassing all human rights for EU development co-operation: [https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/142682.pdf](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/142682.pdf)

the inclusivity of peace initiatives will seek to proactively involve the population as a whole, including traditionally excluded groups such as people with disabilities .

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### **Democracy**

The Action will take into account the principles of good governance when designing activities for local actors. The Action encourages an open participation of women and youth, from the diverse background of Yemen society, in the public discourse on de-escalation, peacebuilding, conflict prevention and stabilisation.

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### **Conflict sensitivity, peace and resilience**

The Action will be guided by the upcoming **Conflict Analysis Screening (CAS)** for Yemen. The Action will ensure that the complexity of the Yemeni conflict will be thoroughly taken into consideration, by applying a stringent conflict-sensitive approach, ensuring adherence to the “Do No Harm” principle. Conflict sensitivity means ensuring that, to the best of its abilities, this EU action avoids having a negative impact and maximise the positive impact on conflict dynamics, thereby contributing to conflict prevention, structural stability and peace building. All EU actions in a conflict affected setting can, and are likely to, have an impact on the conflict. Acknowledging the complexity and diversity of this conflict situation, emerging best practice highlights the importance of the use of conflict analysis in the continuous assessment of the context.

The EU has further developed a best practice in incorporating a **conflict sensitivity platform** within the structure of its largest programme for resilience support (EUR 70 million for two phases of the Enhancing Rural Resilience in Yemen (ERRY) programme, implemented by four UN agencies under the lead of UNDP), an international NGO (Search for Common Ground) was specifically tasked with monitoring and advising implementing agencies regarding local conflict dynamics and local perspectives on programme activities. This best practice will be taken on board in the design of actions under the new programming period. The current action will exercise constant awareness and sensitivity at the local level based on Do No Harm and conflict sensitivity principles. By focusing on inclusion and practical rights, it is expected that the projects will contribute to social justice and social peace. The intervention will be implemented where a certain degree of security and access can be ensured.

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### **Disaster Risk Reduction**

N/A

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### **Other considerations if relevant**

**Youth involvement and youth leadership:** The strong involvement of youth in the Action will be applied according to the UNSCR 2250 which emphasises the need to engage youth inclusively in sustainable social and economic development and to promote their involvement in planning and policy-making, political participation, violence prevention, and promotion of societal peace by means of positive change towards peacebuilding in conflict. The inclusion of young women and men in the peace process in Yemen has to date been sub-optimal, hence their engagement in this Action will thus be central.

As Yemen is a priority country under the EU Action Plan for children and armed conflict<sup>15</sup>, and the EU Delegation co-chairs the Group of Friends on Children and Armed Conflict Yemen, focused interventions targeting children will also be considered.

**Inclusion:** Yemen has a rich and diverse population, yet all segments of the population do not enjoy equal access to state and humanitarian services. Cultural, political and conflict dynamics drive the exclusion of particular groups such as *Muhammasheen* (a caste-like group suffering from extremely marginalised group), women, older people, people with disabilities, refugees and migrants, and IDPs. Inclusion of these populations is vital to ensuring that assistance meets the needs of the entire population, and leaves no one behind.

**Social cohesion:** Social cohesion will be enhanced through targeted initiatives addressing dialogue, diversity and reconciliation. Different groups from different political and religious affiliations will be involved in their community of origin. Special focus will be given to engaging women, youth and civil society.

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<sup>15</sup> [https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/01\\_hr\\_guidelines\\_children\\_en\\_1.pdf](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/01_hr_guidelines_children_en_1.pdf)

**Coordination with relevant EU services and other donors active in the field of peace support:** Many international donors, including the EU, have engaged in support to local level peace initiatives in Yemen. Some of these initiatives even predate the current conflict. There is a rich body of lessons learnt and best practices which has so far remained untapped by the donor community due to a lack of strategic mapping and coordination efforts. The current action will aim to consolidate the lessons learnt and establish a more structured mode of cooperation between stakeholders under a humanitarian – development – peace nexus approach. In addition, the current Action will benefit from the outcomes of EU-led initiatives, such as a convening platform for track II/track III operators in Yemen and the working group on cessation of hostilities in Yemen (co-chaired by EU and OSESGY).

**Migration and Forced Displacement:** 7 years of conflict have displaced 4.2 million persons internally in Yemen. The country has the fourth-largest IDP population due to conflict in the world. Internal displacement remains one of the defining features of the Yemen crisis. Peace and security interventions need to take into account the specific vulnerabilities and needs of IDPs, including related to durable solutions to their displacement in safety and dignity. Peaceful coexistence with hosts communities and communities of return as well as issues of land ownership will need to be taken into account.

### 3.4 Risks and Lessons Learnt

Category	Risks	Likelihood	Impact	Mitigating measures
1. External environment	<p>Overall unpredictability due to the lack of rule of law and the ongoing civil war. Airstrikes and fighting on the ground pose a significant risk to the safety of the participants and staff. Violent crime, terrorism and kidnapping are on a high level throughout Yemen. Medical and non-medical safety remains difficult to manage due to the low level of hygiene and a lack of support infrastructure on the ground.</p> <p>Security situation: a deteriorating security situation would impact on the implementation capacity. This may further reduce the scope of interventions that are possible with partner institutions under tremendous stress and the possibility for real collaboration acutely diminished.</p>	<b>H</b>	<b>M</b>	<p>Flexibility in implementation, for example using flexible procedures for crisis and emergency situations.</p> <p>Flexibility and swiftness in project management e.g. on requests for changes in projects, budget flexibility and adjusting project documents to the changing context.</p> <p>Flexibility in terms of activities' location is required. Due to the volatile security situation, locations may be changed during project planning or implementation. Contingency plans will be developed during the inception phase.</p> <p>Contingency planning will allow implementing projects despite political uncertainty and instability.</p>
1. External environment	<p>Extremely restricted mobility inside Yemen, the continued closure of Sana'a Airport, and instability in Aden pose additional restraints on project implementation.</p>	<b>H</b>	<b>L</b>	<p>Flexibility in implementation, for example using flexible procedures for crisis and emergency situations.</p> <p>Flexibility and swiftness in project management e.g. on requests for changes in projects, budget flexibility and adjusting project documents to the changing context..</p> <p>Less reliance on international staff for project delivery in the project design; the importance of national non-governmental, active local authorities and civil society organisations has</p>

				already been elevated and substantively engaged in the project design.
2. Planning, process, systems	Implementation of project activities is delayed due to various political and bureaucratic hurdles, such as delays in issuing permits or travel documents.	<b>H</b>	<b>H</b>	Making better use of virtual means to organise access to workshops and trainings.  Building in sufficient time in project implementation periods to remain flexible.  Maintaining a flexible, adaptive approach to project implementation.
2. Planning, process, systems	Corruption and financial mismanagement.	<b>M</b>	<b>L</b>	Applying strict practices and procedures will help mitigate the risk of corruption effectively. Monitoring and evaluation tools and processes effectively utilised and deployed.
5. Communication and information	In a highly polarised context, the risk of not being seen to maintain an impartial profile and act accordingly leads to a situation where an individual or a group views the project as one-sided and declines to participate.	<b>M</b>	<b>L</b>	Whenever necessary due to sensitivity and security, beneficiaries should be granted confidentiality and the visibility of their activities could be kept low.
5. Communication and information	Perception of inequity: perception of inequity of benefits among regions, communities or involved project participants	<b>M</b>	<b>L</b>	The selection of participants, communities and regions will be done on equitable basis following an objective needs assessment and will consider the representation of different groups within the community. Inclusive and accessible participatory processes will be utilised.

### Lessons Learnt:

The proposed areas of engagement build on past and ongoing EU efforts (including support to the PSF) and are informed by a solid base of lessons learned through a variety of engagements of different services in the sector. The EU has built some leverage and is seen as a reliable partner in the selected areas of intervention by local and international counterparts alike.

Some major lessons learned can be distilled from the EU's engagement in this sector in the past six years based on the **most recent evaluation of EU efforts in peace and stability in Yemen (2021)**:

#### In relation to programming content:

- Efforts in the area of **Track II dialogue** have so far led to good quality outputs but as yet uncertain longer-term impact. This is largely due to the lack of a strategic approach and a disconnect among the various initiatives and mediation tracks. The EU should continue to play a role in this area and in order to achieve greater impact it would need to aim for much more focused efforts that are more context-specific, better coordinated with other efforts (including the role of OSESGY) and based on a longer-term approach.
- The **community security** efforts are small steps that should be seen as part of a much longer-term effort. Major lessons learned are related to the importance of planning realistically; keeping projects initially small; not to go in too quickly; and taking a localised approach.
- **Community-level projects** are less effective when not connected to tangible results for the population. It is important that community dialogue projects include tangible elements such as capacity building including training, infrastructure, and creating job opportunities whenever possible.
- A **conflict analysis with a strong gender lens** is often lacking in designing and implementing many of the existing Actions. Gender requires sensitivity and nuance, in holding implementing partners accountable to gender mainstreaming and in furthering gender analysis on specific topics.

### **In relation to support to local actors:**

**Ensuring the ability of CSOs in Yemen** to influence peace making is of crucial importance. Donor funding mainly through UN agencies and a small group of international NGOs has so far not managed to build and sustain adequate capacities among local CSOs and institutions. A stronger approach to localisation is needed. The EU should seek ways to work more directly with national and local organisations in order to reduce overheads and increasing the sustainability of projects through locally-designed and locally-led efforts. The EU should also seek to cross-fertilise activities between the current engagement with CSOs and its parallel initiatives on support to CSOs through the thematic portfolio. The EU has a long-standing relationship with NGOs and CSOs in the area of development. The Communication "The roots of democracy and sustainable development: Europe's engagement with Civil Society in external relations"<sup>16</sup> and related Council Conclusions proposed an enhanced and more strategic EU engagement with CSOs in partner countries, with a particular focus on local CSOs. This represents a more strategic approach of the EU's engagement with civil society, aimed at creating a policy shift towards supporting CSOs not only as providers of aid, social service delivery and the promotion of inclusive and sustainable growth, but also as democracy actors, highlighting their role to improve the impact, consistency, and visibility of EU actions. This commitment is reflected in the EU Roadmap for Engagement with Civil Society in Yemen, adopted in 2021<sup>17</sup>.

Organisations can do incredible work with small grants but **graduating partner organisations from micro- to medium-sized grants is important** to build capacity, apply lessons learned and provide longer-term funding for organisations to build sustainability. Support of overhead costs is essential to contribute to organisational capacity building.

### **In relation to implementation approach :**

- Most of the Actions in this sector to date have been based on **overly ambitious logframes** and Theories of Change, especially in view of tight timelines and a challenging operating context. Key aspects that are not adequately factored into project timelines include the time it takes to build relationships and trust on the ground; delays due to slowness in securing permits from authorities, access and authorisations in particular when attempting to work in Ansar Allah-controlled areas; and EU and implementing partners' bureaucratic and procedural processes that take time.
- A **flexible, adaptive programming approach** would be much more suited to manage these politically sensitive projects. A Theory of Change approach and more iterative monitoring methods such as outcome harvesting methods would also be fitting.
- In a challenging context such as Yemen, taking risks is unavoidable. The EU should develop a **solid approach to risk management** and mainstreaming of **conflict sensitivity principles** across all EU engagement in Yemen.
- The evaluation pointed to the importance of **implementing programmes outside of major cities**, e.g. Aden and Sana'a. Often in big cities it is the usual suspects who join in activities and take such opportunities for granted. While in rural areas participants may be less exposed to ideas, they are often highly motivated to learn and are very appreciative of new information and ways of looking at a topic.

<sup>16</sup> <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0492:FIN:EN:PDF>

<sup>17</sup> [https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/file/122825/download?token=4tXtj8\\_P](https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/file/122825/download?token=4tXtj8_P)

### 3.5 The Intervention Logic

The underlying intervention logic for this Action is that preparations for a nation-wide ceasefire and eventual peace agreement in Yemen have to be seen in the context of **local conflict dynamics**. Irrespective of the rate of progress towards peace at the national level, building and sustaining the foundations for peace at the local level and preparing the ground for a smooth and sustainable implementation of an eventual peace agreement across the country remain crucial.

The Action aims to support projects that can lead to an improved atmosphere in which peace negotiations can resume and progress, or at the other end, to prevent escalation of violence. This means addressing near-term needs, such as strengthening demand for peace negotiations among civil society, as well as longer term needs for capacity building and structural support to prepare local populations for a sustainable peace agreement and the practicalities of “the day after”. In this context, peaceful coexistence, security, and stability at local level will be very important not only for the implementation of a future peace agreement but also for enhancing the prospects of a subsequent broader peace and reconciliation process.

Building on lessons learnt from previous DCI and IcSP funded activities, the Action will focus in parallel on national and on local level peace initiatives and mediation efforts, building inclusive local level security approaches, and capacity building of Yemeni CSOs – in particular focused on women and youth.

These mutually reinforcing objectives allow the programme to reach a wider range of stakeholders and beneficiaries, while specifically focusing in a cross-cutting way on youth (young men and young women from diverse backgrounds) and women as agents of positive change, rather than being limited to only certain kinds of organisations or population groups, also in line with the priorities of the EU Gender Action Plan III.

The **Theory of Change** for the Action reads as follows:

**IF**, the Action successfully supports initiatives that that:

- Enhance the effectiveness and inclusivity of the peace process;
- Preserve and strengthen inclusive national and local peace approaches, institutions and structures;
- Strengthen the grassroots demand for peace through local level peace initiatives;
- Strengthen Yemeni CSOs as a voice for peace and social cohesion.

**AND**, the following assumptions hold true:

- Security operating environment remains stable enough to allow staff to access/travel to project areas, secure visas and travel to external events;
- Key public and social figures in target governorates and at the national level accept and create a conducive environment for project implementation;
- The perception of the implementing partners as neutral and impartial actors remains. Communities and individuals are receptive of the programme and its activities without fearing repercussions.
- Civil Society Organisations are able to register and get the necessary approvals to implement activities in this specific field.

**THEN**, this will contribute to revitalising, maintaining and fostering the conditions for eventual lasting peace and stability of Yemen.

This measure has been closely coordinated with the OSESGY, and it will support actions implemented within the UN managed PSF for Yemen. It will build on previous peacebuilding efforts financed by the IcSP and other EU financing instruments. In case of a lasting ceasefire agreement and significant progress in the political negotiations, EU action in this priority area could be scaled up to support the implementation of the peace process.

### 3.6 Logical Framework Matrix

This indicative logframe constitutes the basis for the monitoring, reporting and evaluation of the intervention.

On the basis of this logframe matrix, a more detailed logframe (or several) may be developed at contracting stage. In case baselines and targets are not available for the action, they should be informed for each indicator at signature of the contract(s) linked to this AD, or in the first progress report at the latest. New columns may be added to set intermediary targets (milestones) for the Output and Outcome indicators whenever it is relevant.

- At inception, the first progress report should include the complete logframe (e.g. including baselines/targets).
- Progress reports should provide an updated logframe with current values for each indicator.
- The final report should enclose the logframe with baseline and final values for each indicator.

The indicative logical framework matrix may evolve during the lifetime of the action depending on the different implementation modalities of this action.

The activities, the expected Outputs and related indicators, targets and baselines included in the logframe matrix may be updated during the implementation of the action, no amendment being required to the Financing Decision.

PROJECT MODALITY (3 levels of results / indicators / Source of Data / Assumptions - no activities)

Results	Results chain (e): Main expected results (maximum 10)	Indicators (e): (at least one indicator per expected result)	Baselines (values and years)	Targets (values and years)	Sources of data	Assumptions
Impact	Contribute to a sustainable and inclusive peace in Yemen.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. # of national and local level mediation efforts that involve women/minority/IDP voices.</li> <li>2. Score on global indicators relating to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Global peace index</li> <li>- Perception of safety and security</li> <li>- Etc.</li> </ul> </li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. TBD in 2023 (based on mapping to be performed)</li> <li>2. Ranking: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 162 in 2022</li> <li>- 161 in 2022</li> </ul> </li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. 20 by 2026</li> <li>2. Improvement in trend</li> </ol>	<p><u>For 1 and 2:</u></p> <p>UN, EU and other donor reports and context analysis; statistical evidence and surveys, including but not limited to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) Global Peace Index</li> <li>- World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) Rule of Law Score</li> <li>- World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) Voice and Accountability Score</li> <li>- World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)</li> </ul>	Not applicable

					Government Effectiveness Score	
<b>Outcome 1</b>	1 – Enhance effectiveness and inclusivity of the peace processes	1.1 # of groups, established at local level, that contribute to peace 1.2 # of groups financed by funding opportunities in the fields 1.3 # of state institutions and non-state actors supported by the EU on security, conflict prevention, conflict mediation and human rights 1.4 # of people directly benefiting from EU-supported interventions that specifically aim to support conflict prevention, disaggregated by sex fields	1.1 0 in 2023 1.2 0 in 2023 1.3 0 in 2023 1.4 0 in 2023	1.1 20 by 2026 1.2 20 by 2026 1.3 4 by 2026 1.4 TBD by 2026 (based on mapping to be performed in 2023)	<u>For 1.1 through to 1.4:</u>  ROM reports; project interim and final reports; evaluations; OSESGY reports; UNDP reports, public surveys	-Security operating environment remains stable; staff can access/travel to the project areas. - Acceptance of the action activities by key stakeholders
<b>Outcome 2</b>	2 – Preserve and strengthen inclusive national and local peace approaches, institutions and structures.	2 2.1 Percentage of people who report that they are leaders or active members of a voluntary association or community group (disaggregated by gender, age, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, disability status, administrative sub-region, and location - urban/perurban/rural) 2.2 # of local NGOs/CSOs that define their core mandate as contributing to peace negotiations 2.3 # of Local Security Committees participating in a common approach to local conflicts and gender 2.4 # of youth perceiving positively their ability to impact on	2.1 0 in 2023 2.2 5 in 2023 2.3 0 in 2023 2.4 0 in 2024 2.5 0 in 2023 2.6 TBD in 2023 (based on mapping to be performed) 2.7 TBD in 2023 (based on mapping to be performed)	2.1 30 by 2026 2.2 8 by 2026 2.3 60 by 2026 2.4 60 by 2026 2.5 10, approx. 15% by 2026 2.6 TBD in 2026 (based on mapping to be performed) 2.7 TBD in 2026 (based on mapping to be performed)	<u>For 2.1 through to 2.7:</u>  ROM reports; project interim and final reports; evaluations; OSESGY reports; UNDP reports, public surveys	- Existence of enabling conditions to allow Civil Society Organisations to register and perform in this specific field.

		<p>leadership (disaggregated by sex and disability)</p> <p>2.5 # of women perceiving an agency on gender and peace</p> <p>2.6 # of women mediators, negotiators and technical experts present in formal as well as informal peace processes, (disaggregated by leadership status)</p> <p>2.7 proportion of women mediators, negotiators and technical experts present in formal as well as informal peace processes, disaggregated by leadership status</p>				
<p><b>Output 1</b> <b>related to Outcome 1</b></p>	<p>1. Inclusivity in peace talks is broadened</p>	<p>1.1 # of beneficiaries from institutions trained the EU-funded intervention with increased knowledge and/or skills on inclusivity in peace process, disaggregated by sex and type of institutions</p> <p>1.2 # of beneficiaries trained by the EU-funded intervention with increased knowledge and/or skills on conflict de-escalation and effective monitoring mechanisms, disaggregated by sex (disaggregate on type</p> <p>1.3. # of participants in the groups and consultations disaggregated by type of target group (CSOs, youth, women, disadvantaged)</p>	<p>1.1 0 in 2023</p> <p>1.2 0 in 2023</p> <p>1.3. 0 in 2023</p>	<p>1.1 10 by 2026</p> <p>1.2 10 by 2026</p> <p>1.3 6 by 2026</p>	<p><u>For 1.1 to 1.3:</u></p> <p>Pre- and post-training test reports</p> <p>ROM reports; project interim and final reports; evaluations; OSESGY reports; UNDP reports, public surveys.</p>	<p>-Security operating environment remains stable; staff can access/travel to the project areas.</p> <p>-Acceptance of the action activities by key stakeholders.</p> <p>- Communities and individuals are receptive of the programme.</p>

<p><b>Output 2</b> related to Outcome 1</p>	<p>1.2 National and local level peace, mediation and confidence building initiatives are promoted.</p>	<p>1.1 # of track I confidence building initiatives evaluated and funded by the Peace Support Facility steering committee.</p> <p>1.2 # of Track II initiatives evaluated and funded by the PSF steering committee</p> <p>1.3 # of Track III initiatives evaluated and funded by the PSF steering committee</p>	<p>1.1. 0 in 2023</p> <p>1.2. 0 in 2023</p> <p>1.3. 0 in 2023</p>	<p>1.1. 2 by 2026</p> <p>1.2. 3 by 2026</p> <p>1.3. 5 by 2026</p>	<p><u>For 1.1 to 1.3:</u></p> <p>PSF Steering committee reports; PSF interim reports; ROM reports; project evaluation.</p>	<p>-Security operating environment remains stable; staff can access/travel to the project areas.</p> <p>-Acceptance of the action activities by key stakeholders.</p> <p>- Communities and individuals are receptive of the programme.</p>
<p><b>Output 1</b> related to Outcome 2</p>	<p>2.1 Capacity of civil society organisations is enhanced in peace-building and mediation.</p>	<p>2.1.1 # of CSO representatives trained by the EU-funded intervention with increased knowledge and/or skills on mediation, disaggregated by sex</p> <p>2.1.2 # of CSO representatives trained by the EU-funded intervention with increased knowledge and/or skills on operational and financial management, disaggregated by sex</p> <p>2.1.3. # of CSO representatives trained by the EU-funded intervention with increased knowledge and/or skills on inclusion and on gender equality, disaggregated by sex</p>	<p>2.1.1 0 in 2023</p> <p>2.1.2 0 in 2023</p> <p>2.1.3. 0 in 2023</p>	<p>2.1.1 15 by 2026</p> <p>2.1.2 15 by 2026</p> <p>2.1.3. 15 by 2026</p>	<p>2.1.1 Pre- and post-training test reports</p> <p>2.1.2 Pre- and post-training test reports</p> <p>2.1.3. Pre- and post-training test reports</p> <p>Training attendance sheets; ROM reports; project's interim and final reports; evaluation.</p>	<p>-Security operating environment remains stable; staff can access/travel to the project areas.</p> <p>-Acceptance of the action activities by key stakeholders.</p> <p>- Communities and</p>

						individuals are receptive of the programme.
<b>Output 2 related to Outcome 2</b>	2.2 Women, youth and marginalised groups, such as people with disabilities and IDPs are supported to play a role in future peace dialogue through the provision of capacity building, enhanced participation mechanisms and coordination efforts among different support actions.	2.2.1 # of beneficiaries trained by the EU-funded intervention with increased knowledge and/or skills on peace talks, disaggregated by sex, age, disability status and population group 2.2.2 # of youth attending training on peace talks 2.2.3 # of marginalised people (disaggregated by disability, IDPs, <i>muhammasheen</i> ) attending training on peace	2.2.1 0 in 2023 2.2.2 0 in 2023 2.2.3. 0 in 2023	2.2.1 70 by 2026 2.2.2 200 by 2026 2.2.3. 50 by 2026	Training attendance sheets; ROM reports; project's interim and final reports; evaluation.	-Security operating environment remains stable; staff can access/travel to the project areas. -Acceptance of the action activities by key stakeholders. - Communities and individuals are receptive of the programme.
<b>Output 3 related to Outcome 2</b>	2.3 Capacity of community groups and where relevant key local security providers is strengthened to ensure inclusive local security approaches and structures. .	2.3.1 # of established Community Security Councils with support of the EU-funded intervention 2.3.2 # of local police trained by the EU-funded intervention with increased knowledge and/or skills on gender issues, disaggregated by sex 2.3.3 # of judges and prosecutors trained by the EU-funded intervention with increased knowledge and/or skills on how to handle intra-community disputes, disaggregated by sex	2.3.1. 5 in 2023 2.3.2. 0 in 2023 2.3.3. 0 in 2023	2.3.1 10 by 2026 2.3.2. 200 by 2026 2.3.3. 40 in 2026	Training attendance sheets; ROM reports; project's interim and final reports; evaluation.	-Security operating environment remains stable; staff can access/travel to the project areas. -Acceptance of the action activities by

						key stakeholders. - Communities and individuals are receptive of the programme.
<b>Output 4 related to Outcome 2</b>	2.4 Linkages, information sharing and exchanges between and among peace initiatives at the local and national level are strengthened	2.3.1 # of established coordination meetings among mediation and peace actors  2.3.2 # of initiatives of participating initiatives involved in coordination mechanisms of this action			Based on baseline mapping performed under this activity	

## 4 IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS

### 4.1 Financing Agreement

In order to implement this action, it is not envisaged to conclude a financing agreement with the partner country.

### 4.2 Indicative Implementation Period

The indicative operational implementation period of this action, during which the activities described in section 3 will be carried out and the corresponding contracts and agreements implemented, is **72 months** from the date of adoption by the Commission of this Financing Decision.

Extensions of the implementation period may be agreed by the Commission's responsible authorising officer by amending this Financing Decision and the relevant contracts and agreements.

### 4.3 Implementation Modalities

The Commission will ensure that the EU appropriate rules and procedures for providing financing to third parties are respected, including review procedures, where appropriate, and compliance of the action with EU restrictive measures<sup>18</sup>.

#### 4.3.1 Direct Management (Grants)

**Grants:**

**(a) Purpose of the grant(s)**

The purpose of this grant is to contribute to the achievement of outcome 2 of the Action: Improve inclusive local peace approaches and structures (Support to civil society, youth, women, local security).

**(b) Type of applicants targeted**

The applicant targeted consists of one or more non-governmental organisations, international organisations or EU Member State agencies active in the following fields: peace building, civil society, youth, women, and/or local security.

**(c) Justification of a direct grant**

Under the responsibility of the Commission's responsible authorising officer, grants may be awarded without a call for proposals to one or more non-governmental organisations, international organisations or EU Member State agencies, selected using the following criteria:

- Proven experience in Yemen and in the Middle East/Gulf region;
- Relevant technical expertise in working on peace building, civil society, youth, women and/or local security;
- Possess the necessary financial and operational capacities to carry out the action.

Under the responsibility of the Commission's responsible authorising officer, the recourse to an award of a grant without a call for proposals is justified because the country is in a situation of emergency as stipulated under Art.195 (b) FR. Moreover, the Action has specific characteristics requiring field and technical expertise as well as the capacity to access insecure and remote areas.

<sup>18</sup> [www.sanctionsmap.eu](http://www.sanctionsmap.eu). Please note that the sanctions map is an IT tool for identifying the sanctions regimes. The source of the sanctions stems from legal acts published in the Official Journal (OJ). In case of discrepancy between the published legal acts and the updates on the website it is the OJ version that prevails.

#### 4.3.2 Direct Management (Procurement)

The procurement will contribute to achieving Specific Objective (Result) 2: Improve inclusive national and local peace approaches and structures. In particular, it will operationalise Output 1.1 (contributing to Specific Objective 2).

#### 4.3.3 Indirect Management with a pillar assessed entity

A part of this action may be implemented in indirect management with an entity, which will be selected by the Commission's services using the following criteria:

- Ability to directly support the UN role in the peace process
- Significant presence in the country;
- Proven experience as EU implementing partner;
- Proven experience in the region;
- Relevant technical expertise in the sectors tackled by this Action;
- Previous experience in conflict affected countries

The implementation by this entity entails on one hand, working towards broader inclusivity in peace talks and on the other – promoting national and local level peace, mediation and confidence building initiatives.

In case the envisaged entity would need to be replaced, the Commission's services may select a replacement entity using the same criteria. If the entity is replaced, the decision to replace it needs to be justified.

#### 4.4 Scope of geographical eligibility for procurement and grants

The geographical eligibility in terms of place of establishment for participating in procurement and grant award procedures and in terms of origin of supplies purchased as established in the basic act and set out in the relevant contractual documents shall apply.

The Commission's authorising officer responsible may extend the geographical eligibility on the basis of urgency or of unavailability of services in the markets of the countries or territories concerned, or in other duly substantiated cases where application of the eligibility rules would make the realisation of this action impossible or exceedingly difficult (Article 28(10) NDICI-Global Europe Regulation).

## 4.5 Indicative Budget

Indicative Budget components	EU contribution (amount in EUR)	
<b>Specific Objective 1:</b> 1.Enhance effectiveness and inclusivity of the peace processes involving individuals, institutions and national as well as local structures.	<b>5,000,000</b>	
Indirect management - cf. section 4.3.3.	5,000,000	
<b>Specific Objective 2:</b> Improve inclusive local peace approaches and structures.	<b>9,000,000</b>	
Grant (direct management) - cf. section 4.3.1.	8,500,000	
Procurement (direct management) – cf. section 4.3.2.	500,000	
<b>Evaluation</b> – cf. section 5.2 <b>Audit</b> – cf. section 5.3	Will be covered by another Decision	N.A.
<b>Contingencies</b>	N.A.	N.A.
<b>Total</b>	<b>14,000,000</b>	

## 4.6 Organisational Set-up and Responsibilities

A **Steering Committees (SC)** already exists for the PSF, which will be support under the first component of this Action. The EU will play an active role in the Steering Committee, including by promoting a stronger link to the objectives of OSESGY, and strengthening the joint voice and impact of EU donors to the PSF by facilitating intra-EU coordination in the PSF Steering Committee.

For the second component of this Action, a coordination body will be set up to ensure programme oversight, coordination and advisory functions. In addition, specific Steering Committees may be set up for individual projects funded under the action. Gender equality, human rights and human rights-based approach expertise will be ensured during the implementation of the Action as possible. They will also be integrated in relevant technical assistance and capacity building activities and documents (i.e. ToRs etc.) as minimum requirements of expertise.

# 5 PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT

## 5.1 Monitoring and Reporting

The day-to-day technical and financial monitoring of the implementation of this action will be a continuous process, and part of the implementing partner’s responsibilities. To this aim, the implementing partner shall establish a permanent internal, technical and financial monitoring system for the action and elaborate regular progress reports (not less than annual) and final reports. Every report shall provide an accurate account of implementation of the action, difficulties encountered, changes introduced, as well as the degree of achievement of its results (Outputs and direct Outcomes) as measured by corresponding indicators, using as reference the logframe matrix (for project modality) and the partner’s strategy, policy or reform action plan list (for budget support). Indicators shall be disaggregated at least by sex. Monitoring and reporting shall assess how the action is taking into account the human rights based approach and gender equality.

The Commission may undertake additional project monitoring visits both through its own staff and through independent consultants recruited directly by the Commission for independent monitoring reviews (or recruited by the responsible agent contracted by the Commission for implementing such reviews).

Roles and responsibilities for data collection, analysis and monitoring:

- The implementing partners are responsible of collecting data and for implementing the necessary analysis in line with the logical framework (disaggregated by sex);
- The specific requirements in terms of information and data collection methods are defined by the implementing partners;
- The selection of monitoring tools should always be compatible with the competencies of the people in charge of data collection, analysis and reporting;
- Monitoring and evaluation will assess gender equality results and the implementation of the rights based approach working principles (applying all human rights for all; meaningful and inclusive participation and access to decision-making; non-discrimination and equality; accountability and rule of law for all; and transparency and access to information supported by disaggregated data). Monitoring and evaluation will be based on indicators that are disaggregated by sex, age and disability when applicable.

## 5.2 Evaluation

Having regard to the importance of the Action, a mid-term and final evaluation(s) will be carried out for this Action or its components via independent consultants contracted by the Commission.

All evaluations shall assess to what extent the action is taking into account the human rights-based approach as well as how it contributes to gender equality and women's empowerment. Expertise on human rights and gender equality will be ensured in the evaluation team.

The Commission shall inform the implementing partner at least 1 month in advance of the dates foreseen for the evaluation missions. The implementing partner shall collaborate efficiently and effectively with the evaluation experts, and inter alia provide them with all necessary information and documentation, as well as access to the project premises and activities.

The evaluation reports shall be shared with the partner country and other key stakeholders following the best practice of evaluation dissemination. The implementing partner and the Commission shall analyse the conclusions and recommendations of the evaluations and, where appropriate, in agreement with the partner country, jointly decide on the follow-up actions to be taken and any adjustments necessary, including, if indicated, the reorientation of the project.

The financing of the evaluation shall be covered by another measure constituting a Financing Decision.

## 5.3 Audit and Verifications

Without prejudice to the obligations applicable to contracts concluded for the implementation of this action, the Commission may, on the basis of a risk assessment, contract independent audit or verification assignments for one or several contracts or agreements.

## 6 STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

The 2021-2027 programming cycle will adopt a new approach to pooling, programming and deploying strategic communication and public diplomacy resources.

It will remain a contractual obligation for all entities implementing EU-funded external actions to inform the relevant audiences of the Union's support for their work by displaying the EU emblem and a short funding statement as appropriate on all communication materials related to the actions concerned. This obligation will continue to apply equally, regardless of whether the actions concerned are implemented by the Commission, partner countries, service providers, grant beneficiaries or entrusted or delegated entities such as UN agencies, international financial institutions and agencies of EU Member States.

However, action documents for specific sector programmes are in principle no longer required to include a provision for communication and visibility actions promoting the programmes concerned. These resources will instead be consolidated in Cooperation Facilities established by support measure action documents, allowing Delegations to plan and execute multiannual strategic communication and public diplomacy actions with sufficient critical mass to be effective on a national scale.