



**EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION EXTERNAL ACTION**

**THEMATIC EVALUATION**

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# **MID-TERM EVALUATION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EU GENDER ACTION PLAN III**

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Final Report

Volume II – Case Study Notes

*April 2023*

A photograph of a group of women in a market setting. They are carrying large, colorful bundles on their heads. The women are wearing patterned dresses and headwraps. The scene is outdoors and appears to be a busy market area.

**EVIDENCE  
MATTERS**

International  
Partnerships

Prepared by:



**Lead**  
Merzhauser  
D-79100 Freiburg



Str.



**company**  
183

Consortium composed by

Particip, Ecorys, ECDPM, Mancala Consultores

Leader of the Consortium: Particip GmbH

Contact Person: tamara.ulla@particip.de

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#### Authors

Landis MacKellar (Team Leader)

Dana Peebles

Charlotte Vaillant

Camille Massey

Tamara Ulla

#### Contact information:

European Commission  
Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA)  
Directorate D - Sustainable Development Policy and Coordination  
Unit D.4 - Performance, Results and Evaluation; Knowledge Management and Collaborative Methods  
Email: [INTPA-EVALUATIONS@ec.europa.eu](mailto:INTPA-EVALUATIONS@ec.europa.eu)  
B-1049 Brussels, Belgium

EU International Partnerships:  
[https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/our-impact/monitoring-and-evaluation\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/our-impact/monitoring-and-evaluation_en)

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# Mid-Term Evaluation of the Implementation of the EU Gender Action Plan III Final report

The report consists of three volumes:

## VOLUME I – MAIN REPORT

1. Executive Summary
2. Introduction
3. Key methodological elements
4. Overview of the EU external action in the area of GEWE<sup>1</sup>
5. Main findings
6. Conclusions
7. Recommendations

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<sup>1</sup> Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment

<sup>2</sup> Throughout the report, this designation shall not be construed as an EU recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the EU Member States on this issue

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# 1 Introduction

## *Purpose of the case studies under this evaluation*

This Volume presents the evaluation team's notes for the thematic and country case studies. The evaluation team has adopted a **sampling strategy** aimed at selecting cases which represent the range of EU support to GEWE and the GAP III implementation, looking to ensure a sample that reflects thematic and geographic diversity (at both the regional and the country level).

## *Selection criteria*

The selection of case studies was intended to ensure a sample that reflects thematic and geographic diversity (at both the regional and the country level). The selection was based on information currently available to the evaluation team. In proposing the additional and alternative case studies, the evaluation team has adopted a **sampling strategy** aimed at selecting cases which represent the range of EU support to GEWE and the GAP III implementation. When selecting country case studies, the evaluation team considered the criteria in the table below:

Table 1 *Criteria for the selection of country case studies*

<i>Dimension</i>	<i>Criteria</i>
<b>EU portfolio</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Volume:</b> this criterion relates to the amount of EU financial support to GEWE and its relative share in the EU portfolio in the country, as well as the country's overall share in the total EU portfolio supporting GEWE. The idea is to ensure that a substantial part of the EU portfolio is covered in the final analysis</li> <li>• <b>Diversity in terms of the delivery of EU support:</b> this is to cover the main implementation modalities (e.g. project, budget support, blending), the type of channels / implementing partners and the specific tools used in the country/region; to be illustrative of the broad EU portfolio, we suggest that the sample also includes some of the major EU-funded interventions implemented in recent years such as the ones funded in the context of the EU-UN Spotlight Initiative.</li> <li>• <b>Diversity in terms of thematic focus and entry points used to support WEE:</b> to cover a variety of themes and strategic entry points used by the EU to support WEE in partner countries (the focus of EQ4).</li> <li>• <b>Team Europe/Joint programming:</b> Initiatives fostering the cooperation between European actors.</li> </ul>
<b>Partner country context</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Geographical areas and income status:</b> to ensure a balance between regions/income status categories.</li> <li>• <b>GEWE indicators:</b> to take into the diversity of partner countries in terms of progress towards GEWE.</li> <li>• <b>Conflict and Fragility:</b> to ensure a good balance between different country contexts and ensure opportunities to explore issues such as WPS and the HDP nexus.</li> </ul>
<b>Other</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Evaluability:</b> this relates to, for instance, availability of documentary evidence and for the field phase, access to data/key informants in the country.</li> <li>• <b>Contemporary relevance:</b> the idea is to select cases where the processes examined are still within the normal 'recall period' of those interviewed and reflect the approaches and strategies currently in place.</li> </ul>

## *Proposed case studies*

On this basis, and in close consultation with the ISG, the evaluation team selected **10 case studies** (6 country case studies, three thematic case studies and one EU MS good practice case study) – see Figure 1.


- **Country case studies:** in line with the Terms of Reference (ToR), the team implemented **six case studies** (2 in Neighbourhood/Enlargement countries, 2 in Africa, 1 in Asia and 1 in Latin America)
- **EU MS good practices case study: Sweden.** Sweden has, been selected, in consultation with the ISG, for several reasons. With its feminist foreign policy initiated in 2014, Sweden has become a global leader in GEWE, including through its external actions. It has substantial gender expertise field presence, including in some case study countries.

- **Thematic case studies:** With the aim of collecting additional insights into the implementation of GAP III so far, the evaluation team proposed to additionally carry out the following three thematic case studies:
  - Women’s Economic Empowerment (WEE)
  - Women, Peace, and Security (WPS)
  - Country Level Implementation Plans (CLIPs)

The case study notes do not constitute separate evaluations of the EU support in a country/thematic area or its situation with regard to gender equality. It presents country-related or thematic findings relevant to the overall assessed evaluation questions/judgement criteria and feeds into the main evaluation report of the Mid-Term Evaluation of the Implementation of the EU Gender Action Plan III.

Figure 1

Selected case studies<sup>3</sup>



Source: Particip.

**Focus of country case studies** The **country case studies aim at** i) establishing an overall view on how the EU cooperation in the area of GEWE and the GAP III has been formulated and implemented in each country; ii) a more in-depth analysis of the evaluation questions in a given context; iii) based on selected interventions, assessing EU contributions to results; and iv) identifying good practice and broader lessons for future EU external action.

To allow for a more detailed analysis of the EU portfolio, the evaluation team did not cover all EU-funded interventions in each country, but put emphasis on a **sample of interventions** selected on the basis of the mapping analysis (see Annex 5, Volume III) and in collaboration between the team and the EU delegations.

**Methods and tools used in case studies** The main methods used to generate evidence for the country and thematic case studies include: i) **analysis of documents** (e.g., CLIPs, MIPs, SSFs, EU civil society roadmaps, External Assistance Management Reports – EAMRs, Budget support disbursement reports, ROM, etc) from EU databases and other documentation provided by EU and implementing partners’ staff (including relevant evaluation reports and documents produced by other international and local organisations); ii) **semi-structured interviews** with relevant EU/EU MS staff, project staff; other international organisations; national/local authorities; civil society; iii) **in-country group discussions** (in cases where it was possible to bring together a sufficient number of persons with comparable backgrounds and linkages to similar topics); iv) **remote regional focus groups with GFs**; and v) **quantitative analysis** (mapping of EU financial support).

<sup>3</sup> Throughout the report, the designation “Palestine” shall not be construed as an EU recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the EU Member States on this issue

## 2 Country case study: Colombia

### 2.1 Introduction

#### 2.1.1 Context

As an Upper Middle-Income Country (UMIC), Colombia should have 'graduated' from EU bilateral cooperation under the DCI in 2014. However, the European Parliament, the EC and the EU Council decided to make an exception and Colombia continued to receive bilateral cooperation in a phasing-out mode from 2014 and until 2017. In 2017, following the review of the Multiannual Indicative Programme (MIP) 2014-2017 for Colombia, decision was made by the EU to extend the MIP 2014-2017 to 2018-2020.<sup>4</sup> The extension of MIP was related to strategic reasons, including the need to better adjust "EU's response strategy in support of Colombia's efforts to consolidate peace in the regions and tackle remaining development challenges including sustainable and inclusive local economies".<sup>5</sup>

The latest MIP is expected to last seven years, divided in two periods: 2021-2024 and 2025-2027, with EUR 75 million being allocated to the first period.<sup>6</sup>

In addition to bilateral cooperation, Colombia has benefitted from specific migration and conflict-related EU assistance, which includes EUR 58 million for regularisation, protection and integration of migrants and host communities. The EU also supports humanitarian needs of Colombians affected by violence, including internally displaced people, communities isolated or confined due to the armed conflict, refugees, and migrants. Since 1994, the EU contributed with more than EUR 328 million focusing on providing protection, healthcare, water and sanitation, education and food assistance to vulnerable groups such as women, children, and indigenous and Afro-Colombian populations.<sup>7</sup>

The EU and its Member States are long-time partners of Colombia and have supported the peace process in Colombia since its beginning through the use of different tools including political dialogue, international cooperation, humanitarian aid and civilian protection.

After decades of internal conflict, the signature of the Peace Agreement with the FARC guerrilla in 2016 represented a significant step towards stabilisation. The Peace Agreement, in its 5th year of implementation (monitored by a UN Verification Mission) is still a defining feature for the political and societal landscape. Since 2022 with the first EU-funded 'Peace laboratories', the EU has invested over EUR 650 million. This includes as its key instrument the European Trust Fund for Peace in Colombia (EUTF) which was set up at the end of 2016, after a process of high-level dialogues which started in 2013 involving national authorities as well as EU Member States (EU MS). EUTF projects support local economic development and the reintegration of ex-combatants, as well as land formalisation.

Other key areas of EU support to Colombia include the promotion of respect for human rights gender equality; fighting all forms of inequality; promoting trade and investments; and promoting efforts to adapt to and mitigate climate change impact, protect the environment and promote green growth. The first period of the most recent MIP (2021-2024) foresees at least EUR 30 million for the environment priority area and EUR 39 million for the peace sector.

In parallel with the preparation of the latest MIP for Colombia, the EUD and EU MS launched a Joint Programming process, including two Team Europe Initiatives (TEI) focused in the aforementioned priority areas: i) TEI Peace, and ii) TEI Environment.<sup>8</sup>

In April 2020 Colombia officially became a member of the OECD, and is part of the EU-Colombia/ Ecuador/ Peru Trade Agreement, provisionally applied since 2013. The EU is the biggest foreign direct investor in Colombia and its third trading partner. In 2021, the net worth of bilateral trade between the EU and Colombia amounted to EUR 10 billion.

Complementing trade relations and EU financial support, the EU and Colombia hold consultations on political issues focusing on bilateral, regional and global meeting annually for high-level political and sectorial dialogues. Of particular importance is the bilateral human rights dialogue and the security and defence dialogue. On 20 September 2021, the EU and Colombia signed the "EU-Colombia Memorandum of Understanding on an Agenda of enhanced political and sectoral dialogue and cooperation for the next decade", where they manifested their mutual political and economic interest to engage in a more structured partnership.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Between 2014-2017, EU programming amounted to EUR 67 million. The extension was accompanied with additional resources (EUR 60 million).

<sup>5</sup> EU (2017) Addendum N° 1 to the MIP 2014-2017.

<sup>6</sup> EU (2021) Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2021-2027: Colombia

<sup>7</sup> EU (2022) EU-Colombia Relations Factsheet

<sup>8</sup> EU (2021) Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2021-2027: Colombia

<sup>9</sup> EU (2022) EU-Colombia Relations Factsheet

As stated in the latest MIP, the programming process for 2021-24 should be informed by and align to the National Development Plan (NDP). In August 2022, a new government took up duty, leading to some changes in vision and governance practices. Political alternance did not put in question the strong partnership with the EU, but certain changes need to be reflected in the cooperation. During 2023, the Delegation is therefore reviewing the MIP with the new government based on the new National Development Plan to ensure alignment for the following period.

Even though Colombia has made great efforts and implemented public policies directed to reduce the main threats that affect its development, important challenges remain, some of which have been aggravated by the severe socio-economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. In this sense, key challenges for EU engagement include insecurity in some areas of the country, violence against human rights defenders and social leaders, presence of criminal networks, and the deteriorating economic, social and political conditions in neighbouring Venezuela, among others.

Colombia has ratified all current international treaties on human rights and women's rights,<sup>10</sup> and according to UN Women has made significant progress towards drafting laws to promote gender equality and provide, protect, promote and fulfil the human rights of women.<sup>11</sup> In 'Women, Business and the Law 2022', an index measuring progress toward gender equality by examining the laws and regulations that affect women's economic opportunities, Colombia scored 84.4 out of 100. The overall score for is higher than the regional average observed across Latin America and the Caribbean (80.4), but lower than the maximum score observed in Peru (95).<sup>12</sup>

Examples within the normative system that protects women's rights include a Quota Law requiring that women candidates comprise at least 30% of party electoral lists; Law 1413 recognising the economic contribution of unpaid care work (2010); the Victims and Restitution of Land Law (2011) with important provisions on gender equality; also Law 1257 "whereby regulations are issued to raise awareness, prevent and punish forms of violence and discrimination against women" (2008); and Law 1719 (2014) by which measures are set in place to guarantee access to justice to victims of sexual violence, especially sexual violence during the armed conflict, among other. The National Policy on Gender Equality (CONPES 161, 2012) is the leading policy document on the topic. The National Development Plan 2018-22 also includes an entire chapter on women's rights.<sup>13</sup>

This normative framework has been accompanied by the development of other national and territorial mechanisms for the promotion of gender equality, such as the Presidential Advisory (Consejería Presidencial), the Legal Commission for Women at the Congress of the Republic, the Gender Commission of the Judicial Branch, entities delegated for gender issues in control bodies, and a network of secretariats and offices focusing on gender equality at territorial level.<sup>14</sup>

Although these normative provisions and institutional arrangements give a solid framework to advance in women's rights and despite the country's achievements, obstacles continue to hinder women's political participation, access to justice at the local level, and gaps persist in the economic, social and cultural spheres, with a marked asymmetry in rural areas.

An important factor affecting women in Colombia has been the civil armed conflict of recent decades. More than 8.8 million people have been registered as victims of the armed conflict. The majority are victims of forced displacement, and about 80% of the internally displaced are women and children.<sup>15</sup>

Between 2018 and 2020 Colombia had seen a positive evolution from being ranked 40th to 22th in the Global Gender Gap Index, however this evolution was more recently followed by a drop to 59th in 2021, and to 75th place in 2022. These variations are mostly due to Colombia's relative stagnation, whereas other countries climbed up in the rankings. In absolute terms, Colombia's gender gap index improved slightly in 2020 (from a multi-year stable 0.73 to 0.76) only to fall back at 0.73 in 2021 and 0.71 in 2022, which represents a 29% gender gap (women are 29% less likely than men to have equal opportunities).

Within this framework, the Delegation of the European Union (EUD) and its Member States present in Colombia have prioritised four thematic areas of intervention based on their programming priorities, the country's strategic development goals and consultations with various actors. These areas, as described in the CLIP, are: i) Ensuring a life free of sexual violence and all forms of gender-based violence, ii) Strengthening economic and social rights and empowering women and girls, iii) Integrating the women, peace and security agenda, and iv) Challenges and opportunities for the ecological transition.

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<sup>10</sup> Concluding observations on the 9th periodic report of Colombia : Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3801128>

<sup>11</sup> <https://lac.unwomen.org/en/donde-estamos/colombia>

<sup>12</sup> World Bank (2022) Women, Business and the Law 2022

<sup>13</sup> OECD (2020) Gender Equality in Colombia: Access to Justice and Politics at the Local Level

<sup>14</sup> EU (2021) CLIP Colombia


<sup>15</sup> OECD (2020) Gender Equality in Colombia: Access to Justice and Politics at the Local Level

### 2.1.2 Focus of the case study

This country case study examines EU support to GEWE in Colombia and aims at identifying country specific factors that influenced design, implementation and the results achieved. The analysis covers the diversity of EU support to Colombia in terms of modalities (contribution / delegation agreements, action grants, TA & services) and channels (National Government, UN & development agencies, EU MS, (I)NGOs and private sector).

The evaluation team has identified a portfolio of **EUR 222 million contracted amounts allocated to GEWE**<sup>16</sup> which have been implemented or contracted during the lifespan of GAP III (though some were programmed and contracted before). Funding for GEWE-specific interventions peaked around 2019, but then declined towards 2022, in effect following the same trend as the overall EU portfolio in Colombia. This decrease, which diverges from the global trend for the GEWE-specific financial volume (which increased in absolute terms during the period in scope)<sup>17</sup>, can be explained in the case of Colombia largely by the temporality of the programming process and the transition between two multi-annual budget cycles (2014-2020 and 2021-2027). At the time contract data was extracted for this evaluation (January 2023), not all programmes planned or committed for the period had yet been contracted or started to have a visible effect in 2022. Furthermore, a more detailed analysis of the overall EU portfolio in Colombia including gender markers (see Figure 3) shows that while the level of funding of the gender-marked portfolio in the country has decreased in terms of volume of funds (in line with the decline in the overall EU portfolio in the country), the proportion of G1+G2 funds relative to the total portfolio has remained largely stable. Another aspect to consider is that the mapping of both the GEWE portfolio and the overall total portfolio of EU support to Colombia included until 2021 EU contributions to the EU Trust Fund for Colombia, which has been a key instrument in the country until the end of 2021, and that this analysis does not account for the contributions of, for example, MS, who also contributed relevant amounts to this instrument.

*Figure 2 Evolution of funding (contracted amounts) of GEWE-mainstreamed or targeted actions in Colombia, by type of support 2019-2022*



Source: Particip, based on Statistical Dashboard data

Data collection and analysis was structured along the EQs. Some issues related to the policy and strategic framework (EQ1) and to the design and implementation of the CLIP (EQ2) were examined looking at the whole portfolio. Most issues (including those related to the effects of WEE and WPS) were examined focussing on a sample of EU-funded interventions identified by the evaluation team for a more in-depth analysis. The final sample of interventions was selected through i) the global mapping EU support (see main report) and ii) feedback from the EUD. The sample reflects the diversity of EU support to GEWE in Colombia by including: i) gender-targeted and gender-sensitive interventions; ii)

<sup>16</sup> The evaluation team has carried out the present portfolio analysis on the basis of retrieved information on contracted amounts for all EU external actions from EU internal databases (EU Statistical Dashboard). The category "GEWE" mainly includes interventions categorised as with gender as a main objective (i.e., 'Gender Equality' marker = 2) or as a significant objective (i.e., 'Gender Equality' marker = 1). Nonetheless, as explained in Annex 5, this category may contain interventions identified as Non targeted (i.e., 'Gender Equality' marker = 0) but which the team has identified as having a link to GEWE and therefore considered as within the scope of the evaluation.

<sup>17</sup> For further details, see Annex 5 in Volume III.

interventions implemented through different modalities and channels; iii) interventions that were designed before and after the launch of GAP III<sup>18</sup>; and iv) interventions covering a variety of sectors, including WEE and WPS.

Table 2 Main contracts sampled in Colombia

Year	Intervention/ Contract title	Cris ref.	Contracting party	Planned amount
	<b>Civil Society Organisations as actors of Governance and Development Work in the Field</b>	<b>D-40919 D-41713</b>		
2020	Atención integral a mujeres víctimas de violencia intrafamiliar en tiempos de Covid-19	c-416353	Corporacion Sisma Mujer	780.685
<b>2020</b>	<b>Economic Autonomy of Rural Women of Cauca</b>	<b>D-42374</b>		
2020	ALPINA - Autonomía económica de las mujeres rurales del Cauca.	c-417771	Fundacion Alpina	700.000
2020	Mercy Corps - Autonomía económica de las mujeres rurales del Cauca	c-417868	Mercy Corps Europe	800.000
	<b>EU Trust Fund for Colombia</b>			
2019	Programa de desarrollo socioeducativo para la mujer desmovilizada del conflicto armado en Colombia (Mestiza, Indígena, Afrodescendiente)	T06.37	Accion Cultural Popular	522.000
2020	Apoyo presupuestario de reincorporación con la Agencia de Reincorporación Nacional	T06.68	Republica de Colombia	10.980.000
<b>2020</b>	<b>Sector Reform Contract for Local Sustainable Development in Colombia (DLS II)</b>	<b>D-38166</b>		
2020	Apoyo Presupuestario Desarrollo Local sostenible en zonas marginadas de Colombia - FASE II	c-417860	Republica de Colombia	9.000.000
<b>2020</b>	<b>Contrato de Reforma Sectorial "Apoyo a la Política de Desarrollo Rural en Colombia" Fase II (DRET II)</b>	<b>D-41517</b>		
2020	Asistencia técnica para mejorar la eficiencia en la implementación de las Políticas de Desarrollo Rural territorial y de Medio Ambiente en Colombia	416581	Agencia Italiana per la Cooperazione	3.000.000
2020	Apoyo Presupuestario Desarrollo Rural en Colombia - FASE II	417922	Republica de Colombia	15.000.000
	<b>Several decisions</b>			
2017	Jóvenes rurales cultivadores de emprendimientos de vida, generadores de arraigo y convivencia pacífica, en el macizo, sur y centro del Departamento del Cauca (Colombia)	c-394046	Federacion Campesina Del Cauca (FFC)	1.670.623
2018	Tejiendo Caminos de Paz en Caquetá, Cauca y Putumayo	c-394078	Comunita' Impegno Servizio Volontario (CISV)	800.000
2019	Resguardos de paz: acciones para la protección comunitaria, defensa de los derechos humanos y construcción de memoria histórica en comunidades indígenas de los departamentos de Chocó y Antioquia	c-413024	Stichting War Child	798.479

<sup>18</sup> While the temporal scope of the evaluation covers the period immediately following the launch of GAP III (January 2021) and all of 2022, we have also included interventions designed and funded prior to 2021 as long as i) their objectives and expected results contributed to GAP III implementation and ii) they were implemented in the time frame mentioned above (01/2021-12/2022).

Year	Intervention/ Contract title	Cris ref.	Contracting party	Planned amount
2021	Strengthening the capacity of the Colombian health sector and access to health services for migrants in the context of COVID-19	c-426181	Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo (AECID)	14.000.000

Table 3 Main regional contracts sampled in Latin America

Year	Intervention/ Contract title	Cris ref.	Contracting party	Planned amount
2016	EUROsociAL+	D-37821	Various	32.000.000

Table 4 Main TEIs identified in Colombia

Name	EU MS involved	EDFI involved
TEI Peace	DE, ES, FR, IE, IT, NL, SE, PT	KfW
TEI Green Alliance	DE, ES, FR, IT, NL, PT, SE	KfW, EIB, CDP, FMO, Proparco

The case study relies on a mix of tools/methods for data collection and analysis. It combines quantitative analysis of CRIS data with qualitative analysis of factors influencing design, implementation and effects of EU support to GEWE. Most data collection activities were conducted in-person through a one-week field mission in November 2022 and complemented by additional remotely conducted key informant interviews between December 2022 and February 2023. Annexes 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 3.3.1 present the full lists of persons and documents consulted for this case study.

## 2.2 Findings

### 2.2.1 Policy and strategic framework (EQ1)

During the period under review, the senior managers in the EUD have taken gender issues under their wing and increasingly pushed this issue not only in the political dialogue, but also internally. They have given prominence to the role of the GFP as a GEWE expertise provider supporting task managers, rather than centralising all gender-related activities with the GFP. They also emphasised the need for joint ownership of gender issues.

This EUD-internal process mirrored the strong synergy which had long existed between the EU, the EU MS, and the Government, on prioritising GEWE. Since most interviewees concurred that the continuous conducive policy objectives on GEWE, upheld by the successive Governments', have boosted the EUD's and the EU MS' efforts to both mainstream and target GEWE in their respective and joint actions. This synergy was materialised, even before GAP II by the EU Trust Fund established after the 2016 peace agreement between the Government and the Farc, whereas both the agreement and the Trust Fund define GEWE as an important priority and as a central aspect of other top priorities.

As a result, the EU's programming, jointly with EU MS, has pioneered some of the thematic priority areas of GAP III. This alignment before its time is illustrated by the 2018 MIP which already matched many GAP III principles and priorities, and even more so by the current MIP.

#### 2.2.1.1 Programming reflects GAP III objectives: MFF and policy documents (JC1.1)

N/A, Brussels-level JC.

#### 2.2.1.2 Conducive institutional environment ensured (JC1.2)

**There is strong synergy between the EU and the successive Governments about the centrality of GEWE to the country's peace and development nexus, which has boosted the prominence of GEWE within the cooperation between the EU and Colombia.**

**The framework of the EU's strategic programming with national authorities** is structured around the 2016 peace agreement with the FARC, which in turn includes gender as a central concern. The country's National Development Plan 2018-2022 "Pact for Colombia, Pact for Equity"<sup>19</sup> insists on the

<sup>19</sup> <https://www.dnp.gov.co/Plan-Nacional-de-Desarrollo>

nexus between peace and development, and puts GEWE forward as an inherent aspect of both. This strategic framework **has been conducive to bringing GEWE to the forefront of EU-Colombia cooperation.**

GEWE has thus occupied growing space in the EU's political and policy dialogue, including at the highest political level: under the previous Government, the Vice President herself has been actively engaged on GEWE, and has directly cooperated with the EUD on the topic. After the change of government in 2022, the importance given to the issue has been maintained, and even further reinforced,<sup>20</sup> with numerous new initiatives and renewed political will to address GEWE throughout the territory of the country, including in hard-to-reach areas and with a strong intersectionality perspective (e.g. outreach to indigenous communities, rural women, conflict-affected women, women victims of violence). At the same time, with turnover of key actors at the political level and of senior officials since 2022, the continuity of the existing dialogue at policy and technical levels should be closely monitored to ensure that it remains on this course. EU interviewees recognize the need to streamline cooperation on GEWE and prioritize among the Government's objectives, while retaining the outreach potential of this cooperation. In this context, GAP III is seen by the EUD as a necessary platform for structuring priorities at the national level, particularly through the MIP.

The challenge remains to use the strategic programming framework on GEWE (GAP III and its uptake in the MIP) in all policy sectors and in dialogue and cooperation, at all levels of government, and throughout the Colombian territory, which is a particularly complex task in the context of a change of authorities, and in view of the territorial complexities inherent to the conflict.

**The current prominence of the gender agenda within the EUD owes much to the successive 'positive GEWE leaders', who dovetailed EUD-internal progress on GEWE to the consensus with the successive Governments.**

The rotation at the level of governmental authorities is, however, counterbalanced by the continuity of some of the EUD's national staff (who have been with the EUD for over 20 years), and the increasing strategic relevance given by successive Heads of Delegation (HoD)/Heads of Cooperation (HoC) to GEWE. Initially, when the current GFP was appointed, the person concerned had limited decision-making capacity and experience, and the area was indicatively earmarked for a 10%-time allocation. Thanks to the personal commitment of the GFP, who was able to use the GAP III framework to give increasing importance to the GEWE portfolio, and because the successive HoDs and HoCs gave GEWE increased prominence, a strong commitment emerged at various levels of leadership. The role of the GFP has transformed consequently, from being broadly in charge of GEWE issues, to providing support, coaching and advice to all EUD sectors who, in turn, have gradually taken the lead on mainstreaming GEWE in their own portfolios.

Gender-related activities now occupy more than half of the GFP's time, and GEWE has progressively become a cross-cutting priority that is owned by staff throughout the EUD and managed by each person in the team in his or her respective sector, without it being the GFP's exclusive responsibility, making it more efficient and focused. The GFP is therefore perceived as someone with the capacity to coordinate and make sure that gender is systematically included at all levels.<sup>21</sup>

The support of the GFP and several external gender-related consultancies, including one within the EU Trust Fund for Colombia, have contributed to sectoral task managers becoming more sensitive to gender issues. GEWE is more systematically mainstreamed in action documents, dialogue related to migration, competitiveness or rural development, and successive budget support programmes.

This notwithstanding, there is still room for improvement in the degree of ownership and intra-office communication, as well as in training. While many EUD staff expressed incorporating gender mainstreaming 'based on their experience' or as a 'learn-by-doing' type of exercise, few indicated having had access to specific training, something that also resonates with the findings of the regional focus group in this regard.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>20</sup> Examples of measures from the new government include the announced National Action Plan on implementation of UNSCR 1325, the political reform bill presented before Congress (which includes universality and parity as basic principles), and the announced implementation of a Feminist Foreign Policy in Colombia.

<sup>21</sup> EU Delegation to Colombia (2021): GAP III reporting 2021

<sup>22</sup> The regional focus group of GFPs in the Latin America region, including Colombia, highlighted as difficulties i) the fact that many of the available EU trainings are delivered online, sometimes for several hours at a time, which makes it extremely difficult to engage in; ii) the lack of opportunity to share experiences and create support networks with other Gender focal persons (GFP) or EUD staff; and iii) the scheduling of trainings, webinars and meetings which are usually scheduled according to the European time zone, which means that in Central/South America the event might be held in the middle of the night.



### 2.2.1.3 Gender-responsive programming and M&E (JC1.3)

**The current MIP builds on continued alignment with the Government on GEWE, placed GEWE on top of priorities, and was aligned with GAP III before its time.**

**There is significant and continuous progress on GEWE mainstreaming from one MIP to the next since 2014.** From the 2014-2017 MIP to the 2018-2020 MIP, and the current MIP (running until 2027), GEWE transformed into more than just a transversal aspect. In 2018, it was already presented as a core objective, and this was further reinforced subsequently.

The current MIP is thus fully aligned with GAP III before its time: GEWE is presented as a key political interest, including gender equality and the fight against all inequalities in the first paragraph, outlining the foundations of the EU's programming in Colombia. In Colombia the EU has had the advantage that successive Governments and political majorities (including the former conservative one) have essentially pursued the implementation of international standards on GEWE as a legitimate goal, which is aligned with the EU's position on GEWE. This has not entailed the need for strenuous struggles regarding the relevance of gender at a macro level. Yet, programming for GEWE has encountered some resistance from a range of stakeholders at technical level and in the society, either in some sectors (e.g., in the agricultural or business sectors, which are still male-dominated activities) or in territorial terms (i.e., there is considerable resistance, especially to the LGBTIQ dimension, in rural areas).

**The EUD has produced strong sectoral analysis to support effective GEWE mainstreaming, especially in peace and environment, the priority areas of the current MIP.** The Gender Country Profile was followed by sector-specific analysis, which informs political and policy dialogues. As a result, messaging is strong, coherent, and unified at all levels of governance (including top political leadership), which is reflected in the perception among EUD staff that everyone is 'doing their part' with regard to gender and that the issue is a constant advocacy and dialogue point within the delegation. Interviews with state authorities confirm this perception.

A concrete example is the integration of a gender perspective in the negotiations and dialogue around budget support programmes in the areas of rural development, environment and competitiveness/economic development. In the case of budget support to the Ministry of Agriculture, for instance, the EUD succeeded in introducing gender disaggregation of indicators as a cornerstone, as well as incorporating a gender indicator for the government to report on.

Team Europe also benefited from an already existing consensus among the EU MS present in the country about core thematic concerns, such as human rights and environment, and the existence of a dedicated space on gender issues coordinated by the EU with EU MS that has regular meetings and is used for joint communication and coordination.

**Team Europe in Colombia builds on the pre-existing EU Trust Fund, which was already strongly geared towards GEWE.**

**Colombia has a long history of joint work between the EU and EU MS, including on gender and peace.** Team Europe's positioning on GEWE is strong and, as put by EU staff, "Team Europe existed in Colombia even before the Team Europe concept was coined". Team Europe benefited from an already existing consensus among the EU MS present in the country about core thematic concerns, such as human rights and environment, and the existence of a dedicated space on gender issues coordinated by the EU with EU MS that has regular meetings and is used for joint communication and coordination.

This explained the existence of the EU Trust Fund for Colombia since 2016 (before Team Europe).<sup>23</sup> Even before GAP III, the Fund included a specific objective on "Population inclusiveness: women, youth, and ethnic groups", and it had the Trust Fund had developed specific tools to align the projects to GAP II. The Fund has funded several GEWE-targeted projects, and it has mainstreamed GEWE in most projects since its creation. GAP III implementation is now reaping the fruits of this long-time efforts.

The Trust Fund saw the mainstreaming of GEWE in sectors where it had traditionally been lacking, such as competitiveness, productivity, rural development, and reintegration. A dedicated consultancy led to a significant improvement in gender mainstreaming within actions supported by the Trust Fund, which has even resulted in several staff members working within it being considered as ad-hoc gender experts within the EUD due to the practical experience and support received. The Trust Fund also supported two budget support programmes, each with gender-specific indicators and a strong gender component in complementary technical assistance (TA). Under the Trust Fund, many project proposals were submitted by the EU MS and reflected a range of cross-dimensional gender and geographic/ territorial priorities.

<sup>23</sup> EU, Government of Colombia, Fondo Europeo para la Paz en Colombia, <https://www.fondoeuropeoparalapaz.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/Fondo-Europeo-para-la-Paz.pdf>

The added value of the Trust Fund as a mechanism, compared to the overall Team Europe approach and its Initiatives (particularly in the area of peace), is still a debated issue. For some, Team Europe is seen as "a step backwards compared to what [they] had before with the Trust Fund". This notwithstanding, the Team Europe Initiative (TEI) on peace was developed in a collaborative manner, and included comprehensive intervention logic with several results and indicators, which was fine-tuned with inputs from EU MS. The TEI Peace is reported as "strongly linked to GAP III with results and indicators taking gender into account".<sup>24</sup>

## 2.2.2 Design and implementation of CLIPs (EQ2)

The preparation process of the CLIP built on several existing assets. The first one is a long-standing high-level agreement on the importance of GEWE among the stakeholders who have contributed to the CLIP: EUD, EU MS, successive Governments, and long-standing civil society partners of the EU in Colombia. The second one is the gradually strengthened recognition of the EU as a pivotal actor on GEWE on the country's political and policy landscape. The third asset was the EUD's capacity to conduct genuine, creative, and sector-specific gender analysis.

Thanks to this conducive environment, GAP III and the CLIP have deployed their potential to further boost GEWE within the overall EU-Colombia cooperation. The CLIP may not have been the key vehicle for operational decision making – but in complement to the experience of the EU Trust Fund, it offered an inclusive platform for joint analysis of GEWE issues and deep understanding of the GEWE aspects of the various sectors where the EU is active in Colombia. As a result, the CLIP facilitates knowledge-based actions which mainstream GEWE, including in "non-traditional" sectors such as rural and local development. Along these lines, the EUD has developed several pioneering initiatives which strongly mainstream GEWE: these include particularly blending and budget support and blending operations. It has also experimented with innovative GEWE-sensitive monitoring practices.

This positive trend is not limited to spending activities: it also permeates political and policy dialogue. The EU's challenge in policy dialogue in Colombia is now to translate an agreement on high-level narratives into concrete policy and implementation, which is where CLIP starts to contribute thanks to its strong knowledge basis and its user-friendly format.

Another opportunity – and challenge – came with political alternance in 2022. While the new Government presents continuous political commitment to GEWE, it has also launched many initiatives, and integrated CSO cadre, thus creating a new space. In this context, GAP III and the CLIP can provide the EU with a clear platform to support streamlined gender transformative policies, while contributing to the emergence of rejuvenated GEWE-friendly civil society leaders.

### 2.2.2.1 CLIPs reflect a clear, relevant and integrated vision (JC2.1)

**The preparation of the CLIP in Colombia was particularly inclusive, and resulted in a knowledge-based document, which the entire EUD co-created and owned.**

In Colombia, for the sake of efficiency, the CLIP consultations were integrated into broader consultations (e.g., on human rights, in discussions with civil society and government representatives), as well as various existing activities designed to address the gender gap. This created conducive conditions for an inclusive CLIP preparation process.

**The preparation of the CLIP reflected a participatory process marked by consultations and working groups with EU Member States, UN, government members, private sector and civil society, as well as a genuine experiment in co-creation within the EUD,** facilitated by the Gender focal person together with task managers. The various instances of consultation were aimed at identifying priority areas as well as strategic objectives for each area. **The thematic areas prioritised in the CLIP and sectoral analyses thus reflect main areas of EU MS cooperation in the country.** An example of this is the active participation of Italy in the implementation of the sectoral analyses on environment and rural development.

The platform was comprehensive and, in the end, the EUD had to prioritise and select from the many inputs and contributions received, which was a challenging undertaking. This entailed the alignment of the objectives selected for the CLIP with the priority areas described in the MIP. The current MIP, building on its predecessor, formed a good basis for the CLIP to be aligned with GAP III. **Overall, the CLIP reflects GAP III and offers distinct orientations for future programming and policy dialogue.** The document, which was structured in a concise manner, included a forward-looking perspective and consideration of the EU's role in the future.

<sup>24</sup> EU Delegation to Colombia (2021): GAP III reporting 2021

Identifying concrete entry points that matched the MIP and GAP III was at times particularly challenging. For example, it was difficult to find a suitable entry point within the MIP for sexual and gender-based violence, although this is an important issue in the Colombian context (and indeed one of the main areas of EU action on gender). Some EU MS consulted expressed concern that the CLIP needs to remain pragmatic and feasible. To help bring the CLIP's commitment down to concrete actions, they suggested revisiting how each member state can practically contribute to the four different priority areas. Along these lines, there is a **general perception among EU MS that the CLIP remains a representative tool** that may be "still in the making". Several interviewees shared the view that the "EUD made good efforts to reach consensus, centralise and find a common denominator among EU MS' contributions".

#### **The Colombia CLIP is knowledge-based and sector-specific.**

The GFP was the lead author of the CLIP and received support from Brussels HQ for its development, but not specifically in terms of structure or sectoral elements. The EUD responded by developing its own structure (based on guidelines from the European Institute for Gender Equality) for a **knowledge-based CLIP**, consisting of:

1. **A general context analysis** identifying gender gaps and future challenges as a rationale for selecting sectors for deeper analysis. This analysis was informed by the first Gender Profile (2017), developed by the GFP with support from an external consultant, and its updated version from 2020.
2. **Structured and harmonised, in-depth sector analyses and stakeholder mapping.** In 2020, the updated Gender Profile was produced based on 2019 data containing five specific sectoral analyses, in which the GFP involved resources from existing sector programmes (e.g. BS programmes and complementary support) allowing for thematic specialisation. These sectoral analyses went beyond the MIP core priority areas (namely peace and environment) to cover **all sectors in which the EU has strategic cooperation**: migration, competitiveness, rural/local development, environment and sustainable development, human rights, and peacebuilding. These also included a set of suggested indicators to facilitate the use of gender sensitive indicators when formulating new actions.<sup>25</sup> The EUD shared its structure and resources for sector gender analysis with other EUDs in the region, through a network of GFPs in Latin America. This was appreciated, among other reasons because of the bilingualism (English-Spanish) of these resources.

The CLIP further integrates these general and sectoral gender analyses, effectively merging the Gender Country Profile into the CLIP, with a visual and attractive presentation of the data and a specific chapter on communications and policy dialogue, which is intended to provide a pragmatic and purposeful feature to the document.

According to EUD interviewees, this knowledge-based, co-creative CLIP development process contributed to prioritisation; it now provides guidance for the delivery of GEWE messages by EUD management and task managers in policy and political dialogue, as well as on the governance of cost activities.

#### **2.2.2.2 CLIPs facilitate gender mainstreaming and targeted actions (JC2.2)**

**EU gender-mainstreamed and gender-targeted actions have become the norm in Colombia, owing mostly to the continuous sensitisation and the growing ownership of the EUD staff towards GEWE.**

**In Colombia, there is a marked commitment to gender mainstreaming in the various interventions and Action Documents assessed.** Gender expertise is systematically integrated into the technical assistance services provided through an array of EU-funded actions, including projects under the EU Trust Fund, and Budget Support programmes.<sup>26</sup> These efforts, which also informed the development of the new actions formulated in the framework of the latest MIP, appear to be in line with a progressive integration of gender mainstreaming within the EUD.

**However, the contribution of the CLIP to gender mainstreaming and gender targeting in the ongoing and already planned actions is unclear. The team noted a lack of connection between the document and its operational applicability** when analysing the CLIP document within a sample of 27 CLIPs (see Thematic case study: Country Level Implementation Plans (CLIPs)): the Colombia CLIP ranges among those which do not propose new actions directly responding to the analytical conclusions and selected priority areas. Within the Colombia CLIP, it was difficult to connect the findings of the Gender Country Profile (and the CLIP gender analysis directly flowing from it), the selection of

<sup>25</sup> EU Delegation to Colombia (2021): GAP III reporting 2021


<sup>26</sup> E.g. The second phase of the Budget Support to the Sectorial Policy on Rural Development (DRET II) integrated a specific indicator with the commitment of the National Government to measure the number of rural women who benefitted from the programme.

priorities for the future, and the planning of future actions. The CLIP sets out general priorities for future actions, but it does not describe how these priorities will be implemented, nor by which actions.

Similar findings emerge from interviews with EUD staff working in sectoral units, who explained that they had participated in the development process of the CLIP (or at least were aware of it), but nevertheless acknowledged not having used it as a tool during programming and preparation of action documents. The continuous strengthening of GEWE within the EUD's actions seems to owe more to the long sensitisation of the EUD staff, and their understanding of shared responsibility for GEWE, than to the CLIP as a document. **GAP III, the CLIP preparation process itself, and the stewarding efforts of the GFP and the EUD leadership have spurred attention to GEWE in operational planning.**

**Since the launch of GAP III at the end of 2020, the number of non-gender-marked interventions (G0) has thus decreased substantially.** The effects on funding for gender-marked actions is not mechanical, though. While the level of funding in the gender-marked portfolio in Colombia has decreased in terms of volume of funds, reflecting the reduction of the EU's overall portfolio in the country, the proportion of G1+G2 funds has remained largely stable, representing over 90% of the total portfolio in 2019, with a decrease in proportion in 2020 and 2021, and a further increase towards 2022, where G1+G2 accounted for 78% of all EU funds contracted that year in Colombia. It is important to mention that the mapping of both the GEWE portfolio and the total overall portfolio of EU support to Colombia only includes EU contributions and excludes those from, i.e., EU MS to the EU Trust Fund for Colombia.

**Figure 3** Evolution of the funding of gender-marked actions (contracted amounts) in Colombia under GAP III, by Gender Marker, 2019-2022



Source: Particip, based on Statistical Dashboard data

**Concrete actions exemplify the gradual progression of gender-responsive budgeting, budget support and blending, as avenues to further incentivize gender mainstreaming and gender targeting in the State's production of public goods.**

**Both the CLIP and the latest MIP pay attention to the aspect of promoting gender-responsive budgeting.** The MIP 2021-2027, incorporates a specific result within one of the strategic objectives of the peace priority area, which aims to report on "government efforts to reduce inequalities through land, anti-corruption, tax and social welfare/protection reforms and gender sensitive budgeting (...)".<sup>27</sup> In the case of the CLIP, it mentions that the EUD "contemplates designing an internal instrument to promote the formulation of gender-responsive budgets and to identify the resources allocated for this purpose, so that reporting can be based on objective and verifiable data".<sup>28</sup>

However, the team has found no evidence that such an instrument has been developed yet. Instead, gender-responsive budgeting appears in various past and ongoing actions. As with programming more broadly, the role of the CLIP in this regard seems to be more about reflecting on aspects that the delegation had already been working on for some time. The EU together with UN Women had already engaged in the past with the Colombian government in the framework of the Gender Responsive Budgeting Initiative, assisting in building national capacity for gender-responsive policy making and evaluation. Programmes such as the Budget Support in the area of Rural Development (DRET II, for its

<sup>27</sup> European Commission (2021): Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2021-2027 for Colombia

<sup>28</sup> EU Delegation to Colombia (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Colombia

name in Spanish)<sup>29</sup> and that in the area of Local Sustainable Development (DLS II, for its name in Spanish)<sup>30</sup> both include a focus on sectoral programme budgeting issues and the inclusion of gender issues in the preparation of actions carried out in their respective fields.<sup>31,32</sup>

The current MIP highlights the relevance of blending in the context of the reforms foreseen under the Peace Agreement, which require important investments in rural areas, aimed at ensuring connectivity, creating employment, supporting small and medium-sized enterprises, and providing public goods and services. Some blending actions, although programmed before GAP III, contain meaningful GEWE intended results and/or indicators.

Colombia takes part in the regional blended finance mechanism, the Latin America Investment Facility (LAIF). Two programmes focused on migrant populations were launched and funded under LAIF: one approved in late 2020 and implemented by the Inter-American Development (IADB) Bank; and the other approved in 2021, implemented by the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID) in partnership with the IADB. The latter in particular, “Strengthening the capacity of the health sector in Colombia and migrants’ access to health services in the context of COVID-19”, sets as one of its two specific objectives to improve health management at the territorial level and the health coverage of the irregular migrant population and host communities, with special emphasis on women’s sexual and reproductive rights and gender-based violence. In addition, gender aspects are mainstreamed throughout the description of the action, including specific indicators.<sup>33</sup> This project, in comparison with that approved at the end of 2020, shows a positive progression in terms of gender mainstreaming: although both actions are marked as G1, the 2020 project incorporated gender-specific indicators but did not set any specific objectives. Not only does this reflect on how the EUD has increasingly mainstreamed gender, but also on the positioning and influence of an actor such as Spain, whose work in the country on the gender agenda is recognised and long-standing, notably in connection with civil society and women’s organisations.

### 2.2.2.3 CLIPs contribute to gender perspective into political and policy dialogue (JC2.3)

**The EU has gradually gained traction and visibility, while progressively engaging in new policy areas on Colombia’s gender ‘scene’. This role now culminates under the new Government which relies abundantly on former civil society activists including GEWE champions.**

Several EU MS agree that “in general, gender is gaining a lot of space, also in terms of policy dialogue, probably now at a higher level (of importance) than before”. **The CLIP, which is known by the EU MS thanks to an inclusive drafting process, acts as an additional spur in a long-lasting trend. The CLIP analysis is fully in line with GAP III, with clear guidelines linked to policy dialogue, including a specific chapter on the subject.** As the delegation itself reports, efforts to contribute to gender equality in political and policy dialogue have been expanded in several sectors, in particular rural and sustainable development, migration, transitional justice and peacebuilding: in these areas, gender equality is systematically a part of the dialogue with the Government and other partners.<sup>34</sup> This is the result of a long-lasting effort by the EU and its member States to steer coordination and play an active role in an expanding array of policy areas.

At first (around 2018), thanks to its involvement in the International Donor Roundtable on Gender Issues (the Roundtable), the EU’s role gained more visibility, although it was not yet perceived by other actors (i.e. UN agencies) as structured or formally voiced. It was not until 2019 when the EU assumed the presidency of the Roundtable (whose technical presidency is held by UN Women), that a much clearer and more marked interest of the EU was made visible.<sup>35</sup> The EU’s main contributions while holding the presidency of the Roundtable, as highlighted by interviewees, involved successfully channelling the alignment and coordination between the national government and the Roundtable.

While the chairpersonship of the Roundtable is no longer in the hands of the EU since 2020, it remains the main forum for coordination with donor actors within and outside the EU, and a strong entry point for advocacy and policy dialogue. Some interviewees pointed out that the EU and its member States are often “acting as a bloc” at the Roundtable. While this is positive for financial mobilisation and engagement, some interviewees are concerned that it may also come with risks such as politicisation,

<sup>29</sup> Budget Support for Rural Development in Colombia - Phase II

<sup>30</sup> Budget Support for Sustainable Local Development in Marginalised Areas of Colombia - Phase II

<sup>31</sup> EU (2018): Assessment of cross-cutting issues D-41517

<sup>32</sup> EU (2019): Assessment of cross-cutting issues D-38166

<sup>33</sup> EU (2021): Description of action “Strengthening the capacity of the Colombian health sector and access to health services for migrants in the context of COVID-19”.

<sup>34</sup> EU Delegation to Colombia (2021): GAP III reporting 2021

<sup>35</sup> EU (2020): Evaluation of EU support to Gender Equality and Women’s and Girls’ Empowerment (2010-2018)

leading to situations where Team Europe is perceived as being 'at the service' of the government of the day.

**From a long-standing perspective, there has been broad and deep agreement between the government and the EU on gender issues**, including LGBTIQ issues, although this topic may be sensitive for some stakeholders. In contrast with other case study countries, even in the last conservative government, there was no perception on the part of the government that GEWE represented an imposition of European values. If there is any sense of resentment towards GEWE, and an inclusive definition of it in Colombia, it is in some rural areas, where some aspects of gender equality can be seen as imposed from the capital city. The CLIP itself acknowledges that the EUD's strategy "will continue to focus on mobilising the necessary political will to advance gender equality, building on points of consensus, articulating with actors and relying on communication for equality as a 'sounding board' and vehicle for change".<sup>36</sup>

**Despite reservations about continuity due to the change of government, sectoral dialogues reflect the long-standing collaborative relationship between the EU, EU MS, and the government on gender issues.** Although there were gender equality advocates in the previous conservative government, GEWE has benefited from even stronger political leadership under the new one, even at the cost of counterpart turnover, loss of institutional memory and uncertainty about how the current government's many commitments and initiatives will be channelled. In the midst of ongoing political changes, the EU therefore continues to advocate and advise on furthering GEWE at all governance levels.

In 2021, for example, despite the change of Agriculture and Environment Ministers, the EUD was able to continue the policy dialogue with the government at the highest level, focusing on issues of EU interest, such as reducing inequalities.<sup>37</sup> Bioexpo, one of the largest gatherings on rural development and environmental issues, also provided a showcase for EU support to rural women in close cooperation with the Ministries of Rural Development and Environment.<sup>38</sup>

Another interesting illustration comes from the negotiations of the sector Budget Support for Sustainable Local Development in Colombia (DLS II) with the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Tourism. The EUD managed to introduce discussions on gender mainstreaming. Initially this was mainly in relation to data disaggregation, but this evolved into a more overarching dialogue about gender issues in the trade sector - a field where the added value of gender mainstreaming is still difficult to grasp for some actors. In the complementary support associated to this programme, the EU managed to integrate gender elements, including within policy making support.

**The EU in Colombia has built on a pre-existing partnership with CSOs, which included GEWE as a common objective, but the evolution of the civil society landscape increases the relevance of more diverse GEWE-friendly civil society partners.**

As mentioned above, the drafting process of the CLIP was participative and inclusive, involving both EU MS and government, as well as civil society organisations. Several NGOs consulted indicated that they had participated in the dialogue process around the development of the CLIP and found the document useful. This was made possible by the strong partnerships which pre-existed with CSOs. In Colombia, the strategic dialogue with civil society, framed in the 'Roadmap for Engagement with Civil Society' (the Roadmap), is known to be strong and extensive.

During the pandemic, while many meetings had to go virtual and the situation forced a readjustment of the overall planning, this did not weaken the dialogue. In turn, the EU and EU MS held meetings with CSO platforms to get a sense of the challenges facing civil society, exchanges that fed into the EU's response to the pandemic, as well as policy dialogue with national and local authorities. As the end of the second Roadmap approached, the dialogue focused on identifying priority areas for the third Roadmap and for the new MIP 2021-2027, including GEWE.<sup>39</sup>

According to findings from the evaluation of EU support to GEWE (2010-2018), the EU has been a key actor accompanying CSOs and women's organisations in Colombia throughout the conflict and the peace process, providing technical and political support that contributed to the government's recognition of the role of CSOs and women as political interlocutors and, in particular, of women as peace negotiators.<sup>40</sup> Findings from the present assignment show that the EU continues to be a key actor on which CSOs rely in their own dialogue with the government. An example of this is the reopening of the

<sup>36</sup> EU Delegation to Colombia (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Colombia

<sup>37</sup> EU Delegation to Colombia (2021): EAMR 2021

<sup>38</sup> EU Delegation to Colombia (2021): GAP III reporting 2021

<sup>39</sup> EU Delegation to Colombia (2021): EAMR 2021

<sup>40</sup> EU (2020): Evaluation of EU support to Gender Equality and Women's and Girls' Empowerment (2010-2018)

'macro cases', where the EU and EU MS (Sweden in particular) played a key role in putting pressure on the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz -JEP-).<sup>41</sup>

As a counterpoint to this, some actors consulted deplored the sometimes-limited diversity of civil society actors with whom the EU engages, indicating that it would be worthwhile to involve different voices among women's organisations in order to encourage and strengthen smaller or less traditional organisations that do not have enough of a voice. The reshuffling of the civil society scene, which is taking place since the 2022 change of majority, may constitute an opportunity for such diversification. Many human rights activists, including feminists, are now in government and need to make the transition from advocacy to policy and decision-making. Paradoxically, the EU is now in a position that it needs to establish connections with new actors and new cadres of civil society activists, as the current government has absorbed important civil society actors into public office.

#### 2.2.2.4 CLIPs facilitate gender-sensitive monitoring of results (JC2.4)

**Since GAP III, Colombia EUD has pioneered several avenues to strengthen gender-sensitive results-based management and monitoring.**

**Linkages were identified between the CLIP, the MIP and GAP III.** As described above, the CLIP included sector-specific elements to guide the integration of gender equality and women's empowerment into the project cycle, including model indicators. The five sectoral analyses produced by the EUD under this framework included a set of sample indicators to facilitate the use of gender-sensitive indicators in the formulation of new actions.

**Furthermore, the EUD made additional efforts to ensure that gender analysis was properly developed at a very early stage of the formulation of new programmes** to improve the way in which gender effectively becomes a transformative asset in new actions. These efforts were manifested, for example, in the form of technical assistance or external support within EU-funded actions. Such coordination and dialogue with the technical teams has ensured not only that gender-specific and gender-disaggregated indicators are part of the monitoring and evaluation systems, but also that new programmes include gender-sensitive indicators at the formulation stage.<sup>42</sup>

An illustration of this is the second phase of the Budgetary Support to Rural Development Sector Policy (DRET II) which integrated a specific indicator with the National Government's commitment to measure the number of rural women benefiting from land formalisation, access to credit and agricultural extension services. The EU and the government agreed on specific gender targets in support to sectoral public policies on migration, reincorporation of ex-combatants and competitiveness.<sup>43</sup>

Consulted NGOs, which had received funding under the CSO&LA budget line, reported having benefited from specific support in monitoring and evaluation. The technical assistance focused mainly on aspects of project design, but also on gender considerations, including the disaggregation of data by sex and specific indicators to measure transformation. This was a major challenge, as gender was an issue that was not perceived in the same way amongst the communities with which the organisations were working. In addition to technical expertise, the support included the exchange of experiences with other organisations funded under the same instrument and/or working on similar themes.

**As for the two TEI, whose design began in spring 2021, the EU also sought to align its design to GAP III.** To this end, workshops were held with EU MS, UN agencies, government and civil society. With the support of an external consultant and based on the inputs from the workshops, the EU formulated a comprehensive intervention logic with a number of outcomes and indicators. As a result, the TEI Peace is strongly linked to GAP III with gender-sensitive outcomes and indicators.<sup>44</sup>

#### 2.2.3 Effects on Women's Economic Empowerment (EQ3)

The EU's action in Colombia has gradually reflected the complex nexus between WPS, WEE, and intersectionality (with an emphasis on rural women and women belonging to various groups such as the youth, indigenous communities, conflict-affected communities, and migrants). As a result, and through a coherent incremental approach, the EU has expanded and diversified its WEE portfolio thematically: it has invested in WEE in varied sectors such as health, the care economy, rural and local development, migration, disarmament/demobilisation/reintegration, and land rights. The EU's WEE portfolio in Colombia is also varied geographically, as it reaches to both the capital and the

<sup>41</sup> The JEP initially opened 10 cases representing the most serious acts of the Colombian armed conflict. The victims have already presented their reports and the witnesses continue to offer their testimonies. Now, the Jurisdiction is preparing to open three new macro-cases and from there it will determine how the victims will be compensated and what type of sanction the participants will receive.

<sup>42</sup> EU Delegation to Colombia (2021): GAP III reporting 2021

<sup>43</sup> EU Delegation to Colombia (2021): GAP III reporting 2021

<sup>44</sup> EU Delegation to Colombia (2021): GAP III reporting 2021

provinces including rural and remote areas, covers several areas of the country, and comprises regional programmes. Finally, this portfolio is diversified in terms of implementation modalities, including project modalities such as grants and technical assistance, as well as budget support modality.

All these are underpinned by increased attention to WEE in the policy and political dialogue. The EU contributes to WEE-targeted policies, and to the inclusion of WEE in non-targeted policies. It has also successfully promoted the participation of civil society actors in the policy dialogue.

During the period under review, the EU has thus contributed to a new normative and institutional framework on WEE. It has further supported the implementation of this framework, by funding some activities, mechanisms and direct services – in particular but not only to rural women.

The EU Trust Fund has explored synergies with EU MS in the area of WEE, but these synergies have yet to realize through Team Europe Initiatives or joint policy efforts.

### 2.2.3.1 Strategic engagement / policy and political dialogue; M&E and communication on WEE (JC3.1)


**During the period under review, the EU in Colombia has branched out from its existing WPS portfolio, to develop WEE as a diversified, promising portfolio.**

**Within the EU portfolio for Colombia, WEE is advancing as a distinct priority from WPS**, which has historically been one of the key pillars through which GEWE has been supported in the country. The growing importance and diversification of the EU's WEE portfolio in Colombia is the result of a continued and coherent effort by EUD to mainstream gender in its portfolio of projects in all areas.

The Trust Fund, which supported peacebuilding and economic and social development in the territories most affected by the armed conflict, first explored the synergies between WPS and WEE. WEE as a thematic area then expanded thanks to favourable factors that include a strong drive on the part of EUD staff, combined with a good institutional memory, the willingness to hire external expertise when needed, and the close involvement of civil society organisations.

The following graph on contracted funding to GEWE interventions promoting WEE reflects the relative importance of WEE, even compared to WPS. It is important to note, however, that given the scope of the evaluation, the analysis does not account for Trust Fund contracts separately, but only for EU-specific contributions, which may influence the observed breakdown and concentration of funds in a specific year.

Figure 4 Evolution of funding (contracted amounts) to GEWE (G1/G2) interventions promoting WEE and WPS in Colombia, 2019-2022



Source: Particip, based on Statistical Dashboard data

The WEE portfolio in Colombia is diverse. Sectors in which WEE is integrated include rural development, productivity and competitiveness, and forestry. Within these areas, access to land, access to credit, care economy, green economy/ green business, and environmental and climate change issues, are of particular relevance. Among the five sectoral gender analyses prepared within the CLIP, were the



analyses on competitiveness, on rural/local development, and on environment and sustainable development: they may all inform the preparation of new actions under the current MIP.

Projects contracted prior to this also show a strong analysis of gender issues at the identification phase, even in projects not marked as G2, or not solely focused on WEE. To serve these issues, the EUD elected diverse implementation modalities and channels, as well as political and policy dialogue. Both DRET II and DLS II **budget support projects**, for example, use a 'Gender Equality Assessment' template<sup>45</sup>, in which there is a detailed analysis of the gender context in their respective areas of action. DRET II, for instance, has gender-specific disbursement indicators linked to rural women. DLS II, while unable to reach agreement on a specific GEWE indicator, disaggregates general indicators by sex, including, among other, the identification of women's organisations involved in forestry production.

In the context of successive **budget support programmes to the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Tourism**<sup>46</sup> the EU has sought to build on its experience in the area of rural development to introduce the discussion on gender mainstreaming in the trade and competitiveness sector, albeit not without some resistance. Despite this, and although there were no gender-specific indicators associated to disbursements, sex disaggregation was incorporated within negotiated indicators during the first programme (2016-2020). In addition, the EU found more flexibility to mainstream gender, for example, through the complementary support of this programme which included workshops to promote public policy for local development with a gender and territorial approach, and workshops with sector officials to raise awareness on gender (together with ILO and the Bogota Chamber of Commerce). The most recently negotiated programme (2021), which has a component on socio-economic integration of migrants, also incorporates disaggregation of indicators by sex, as well as specific target for the number of women supported through business development programmes. The programme started in 2022 so there has been no review of indicators as of the date of this evaluation.

Recently, within its support to the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Tourism, the EU has joined forces with the Bavaria company and FENALCO (traders' union), to launch the second phase of "Mujeres Más Productivas", a partnership with merchant women ("tenderas") from vulnerable communities to receive advice on how to strengthen their commercial and productive capacities and increase their income.<sup>47</sup>

An interesting case comes from a programme contracted in 2020 (with a duration of 24 months) **focused exclusively on the economic autonomy of rural women in the Cauca region**. This decision, which finances two projects (contracts) implemented by Fundacion Alpina and Mercy Corps respectively, builds on the work of pilot projects implemented by these organisations, which in turn were building on their sustained work in the region. The overall intervention's theory of change focuses on increased productivity and access to productive inputs and assets for rural women. Perhaps the most novel point is the incorporation of elements of violence prevention and the promotion of gender equality practices in the care economy, building on the Government's care system reform.

As regards **policy dialogue**, the EU has also sought to increase its visibility and involvement in WEE. In 2021, for example, a high-level meeting on women's economic empowerment opportunities was held with the Vice-President and Minister of Foreign Affairs, together with the head of the main national mechanism for gender equality. EU support also contributed to the inclusion of gender-sensitive indicators in the National Development Action Plan and helped involve new actors, especially CSOs, in the production of data, by creating a link between them and the national authorities.

**WEE, although not prominent in the Team Europe vision on GEWE, emerges as an area of new opportunities for joint action.**

Several projects funded under the Trust Fund, such as support to the national strategy for rural women, have a component focused on WEE within a peacebuilding scenario. The project "Empoderamiento Político y Económico Territorial con Enfoque en las Mujeres Rurales (Alianza Tejedoras de Vida del Putumayo)", for example, aims to improve the economic and social well-being of families through support to women's organisations' initiatives and the implementation of actions related to income generation for rural women.

**Apart from the Trust Fund, which is supported by EU and EU MS contributions, no TEIs linked to WEE have so far emerged**, but some degree of synergy and coordination does exist in the context of the regular meetings of the EU MS gender group.

Perhaps the most outstanding case is that of Italy, a relatively new donor in Colombia, which is currently providing technical assistance (delegated cooperation) within the framework of the DRET II budget

<sup>45</sup> The "Gender Equality Assessment for identification and formulation phases for Project Modality and Budget Support" is part of the "Toolkit on Mainstreaming Gender Equality in EC Development Cooperation".

<sup>46</sup> First the "Sector Reform Contract for Regional Competitiveness in Colombia" (CRIS ref: D-38302), and the more recent "Sectoral reform performance contract for an inclusive, green and competitive economy in Colombia" (CRIS ref: D-42948)

<sup>47</sup> <https://www.mincit.gov.co/prensa/noticias/industria/mujeres-mas-productivas-2022?page=2>

support programme. Cooperation between Italy and the EU in the field of rural development is growing, including in terms of contribution to sector analysis.

**An interesting insight arising from discussions with EU MS is the identification of partnerships with the private sector as an under-explored entry point to WEE.** France, for example, is an important foreign employer in Colombia and seeks to create synergies between its cooperation portfolio and its business/ commercial initiatives. Cooperation in the area of WEE is mainly linked to promoting training, including in digital and innovation aspects<sup>48</sup>, market access and encouraging mobility of female students in STEM disciplines.<sup>49</sup> Sweden, for its part, also highlighted the private sector as a relevant entry point for funding and fostering the sustainability of initiatives they promote, and is currently working in strengthening their alliance with the sector.

### 2.2.3.2 Strengthening of women's rights (incl. TVET, decent work, equal pay, social protection systems, inclusion in the formal economy, green economy and digital transformation) (JC3.2)

**The EU has supported the development and the implementation of WEE-targeted and WEE-friendly normative framework.**

The evaluation team identified a series of actions, either bilateral or regional, which have supported:

- The development of targeted normative framework on WEE: policy, legislative and regulatory acts specifically addressing WEE;
- The mainstreaming of WEE in non-targeted normative framework;
- The development or strengthening of institutions and institutional mechanisms to implement the above-mentioned normative framework;
- The funding of activities and services designed to implement this normative framework.

**The EU, since the first phase of the DRET, has supported first the creation and then the strengthening of the Rural Women's Directorate (DMR) in the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development.** This included the design of the DMR's Strategic Plan 2017-2020, the design and implementation of the Rural Women's Information System (SIMUR), and the design of a multidimensional index to measure the degree of progress in rural women's empowerment.<sup>50</sup> In DRET II, EU support focused on the continuation of support to the DMR, including the design and implementation of measures to strengthen institutional gender capacities in the entities ascribed to the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, and the design of mechanisms to promote women's participation in sectoral decision-making bodies at the territorial level.<sup>51</sup> The DRET II programme, which runs until 2025, by its first disbursement in 2021 had already managed to secure access to productive assets (land tenure rights) for more than 19,000 (mostly rural) women, and to grant more than 36,000 agricultural and rural credit operations to rural women.<sup>52</sup>

Through a budget support programme (funded by the Trust Fund) to the Agency for Reincorporation and Normalisation (ARN), the EU supported the implementation of the National Policy for Social and Economic Reincorporation (PNRSE), in particular its contribution to the objectives of the National Development Plan on reconciliation and the social and economic reincorporation of former FARC combatants.<sup>53</sup>

A major regional programme, EUROsociAL+, has accompanied Colombia in several key public policy reforms including gender equality policies. Among them, the EuroSocial+ programme supported the redesign of the operational model of the **Development Fund for Rural Women (FOMMUR)**, a fund that supports the inclusion of women in the agro-industry. The objective is equal opportunities for women in rural areas, who are at a marked disadvantage in terms of access to income generation and access to

<sup>48</sup> The #MujeresEnLaNube project, with support from the Embassy of France and the company GLOBANT, has as main objective that young women (ages 17-24) gain interest in the ICT sector and develop digital and life skills.

<sup>49</sup> Within the framework of the promotion of studies in France for Colombian students, the Embassy of France in Colombia has as one of its objectives to promote the mobility of female students in STEM disciplines, through a mobility grant under the «Women Scientists» programme

<sup>50</sup> EU Delegation to Colombia (2018): Indicator Verification Report for the Disbursement of the Fourth Variable Tranche: Budget Support Rural Development in Colombia Phase (DRET)

<sup>51</sup> EU Delegation to Colombia (2021): Public Policy Dialogue Report - Budget Support Rural Development in Colombia Phase II (DRET II)

<sup>52</sup> EU Delegation to Colombia (2021): Indicator Verification Report for the Disbursement of the First Variable Tranche - Budget Support Rural Development in Colombia Phase II (DRET II)

<sup>53</sup> EU Delegation to Colombia (2020): Action document - Sector Reform of the National Policy for the Social and Economic Reincorporation of former members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army (FARC-EP).

services: the FOMMUR means to facilitate their access to economic resources. **The evaluation of FOMMUR under EUROSociAL+ identified that EU support contributed to putting FOMMUR and rural women on Colombia's public agenda.**<sup>54</sup> Furthermore, the evaluation identified problems in the representativeness of the organisations that had historically mediated the dialogue with the DMR. This analysis prompted the DMR to open more plural channels of participation, in accordance with the dynamism of the women's movement.<sup>55</sup> In the framework of the comprehensive rural reform, the programme EurosociAL+ also supports the Ministry of Justice through technical assistance to strengthen access to justice for women in matters of rights and conflicts related to land use and land tenure.<sup>56</sup>

**In addition to the EU's strong focus on working with rural women, it has also promoted diverse actions with other target groups, in particular youth, indigenous and afro-descendant people and migrants.**<sup>57</sup> Several recent projects, such as those implemented by AECID and IADB mentioned above, have focused on migrant populations, particularly in light of developments in the Venezuelan crisis. An interesting case in this regard is the project "Atención integral a mujeres víctimas de violencia intrafamiliar en tiempos de Covid-19", which, although focused on violence against women, had a WEE component. In this project, the organisation Sisma Mujer worked initially with nurses (as frontline workers during the pandemic). As the pandemic evolved, domestic workers were identified as the most vulnerable, and towards the end of the project, they started working with migrant women in Bogotá, Cali and Medellín. With all of them (nurses, domestic workers, migrants) they addressed all aspects of economic empowerment, including paid employment, and set up an entrepreneurship fund that enabled them to provide funding for the project.

Other projects, such as "Tejedoras de Vida del Putumayo" or "Economic Autonomy of Rural Women in the Cauca region", have achieved positive results at the time of this evaluation<sup>58</sup>, despite the negative impact of the pandemic. Results include increasing household income through the productive initiatives of women's organisations, strengthening capacities for participation in decision-making in the governance of productive chains, improving the commercialisation of products and diversification of marketing channels by women's organisations, improving the distribution of time in an equitable manner to unpaid domestic and care work, and achieving the substitution of illegal production.<sup>59 60</sup>

#### 2.2.4 Effects on Women, Peace and Security (EQ4)

The original feature of the EU's WPS intervention in Colombia is that it is holistic, cross-dimensional, and intersectional. WPS is envisaged through intersectional lenses (in particular as regards conflict-affected women, rural women, indigenous communities). It is also approached as a nexus with all the thematic priority areas of GAP III in particular WEE, and more broadly with development, peace and governance.

The EU's cooperation with Colombia is largely designed around the 2016 peace accords, because both men and women played an important role in these accords, and because these accords give GEWE high importance. Therefore, all sectors in which the EU is active in Colombia contain at least an element on WPS – and often a central one. In this context, WPS is engrained in all the EU's GEWE-targeted or GEWE-mainstreamed actions. And since the vast majority of the EU's actions in Colombia are significantly gender mainstreamed, analysis of WPS in the EU's cooperation with Colombia since 2020 is part and parcel of the analysis of almost all actions conducted by the EU in Colombia during that period.

The conclusions drawn on all other EQs therefore already address most of the findings on WPS. More specifically, the EU has registered positive results on WPS. It has supported important normative framework, and it is now going further to reach out to conflict-affected, remote, and under-served geographic areas and population groups to implement this normative framework, increase access, and facilitate inclusion. It has engaged in inclusive dialogues on durable solutions from security, social, political, economic, and environmental perspectives. The EUD has thus had an important

<sup>54</sup> EU (2022): Evaluation of the Development Fund for Rural Women (FOMMUR)

<sup>55</sup> The DMR therefore activated a permanent dynamic of dialogue with women's organisations, with the presence of the Procurator General's Office, the Comptroller General's Office, the Presidential Council for Women's Equity, the National Planning Department and the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit. National Planning Department and the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit.

<sup>56</sup> EU Delegation to Colombia (2018): Indicator Verification Report for the Disbursement of the Fourth Variable Tranche: Budget Support Rural Development in Colombia (DRET)

<sup>57</sup> EU Delegation to Colombia (2021): EAMR 2021

<sup>58</sup> The former still under implementation and the latter in its closing phase.

<sup>59</sup> EU (2021): ROM report: "Empoderamiento Político y Económico Territorial con Enfoque en las Mujeres Rurales (Alianza Tejedoras de Vida del Putumayo)"

<sup>60</sup> Fundación Alpina (2021): Mid-term report "Economic Autonomy of Rural Women in the Cauca region"

added value at both political and operational levels in the context of European efforts to support the peace process and the implementation of the peace agreement, as well as conflict recovery and long-term peacebuilding.

#### 2.2.4.1 Strategic engagement / policy and political dialogue; M&E and communication on WPS (JC4.1)

**In the context of the conflict, and of its resolution with a strong gender perspective, WPS has laid at the core of the EU's cooperation with Colombia even before GAP III. Since the adoption of GAP III, and with the implementation of the peace accords, WPS has remained central to the EU's interventions, with an increasingly holistic and cross-dimensional character.**

WPS has historically been an important aspect of the GEWE priorities of the EUD, MS, government and civil society in conflict-affected Colombia. It has continued to gain importance since the 2016 peace accords between the Colombian Government and the FARC, which constitutes a seminal document for the country's development strategy, and international partners' support – including the EU. In Colombia, the MIPs have therefore largely designed to accelerate development by taking advantage of the opportunities offered by the 2016 peace agreement.

Given the important role played by women during conflict, during the negotiations leading to the peace agreement, and subsequently in its deployment, WPS (as defined in UN Security Council Resolution 1325) is a key aspect of the peace and security agenda in the country. Therefore, **the question has not been whether the issue of women and security should be given a high profile, but how the EU can support it through concrete actions.**

The EU has supported the WPS agenda from several entry points. **In Colombia, the WPS agenda is closely linked to sexual and gender-based violence, women's participation in peace agreements and their implementation, the reintegration of women ex-combatants and, increasingly, the impact of peace agreements on women's socio-economic opportunities.**

Initially, support to CSOs and women's organisations centred on the conflict and the Havana peace process, providing technical and political support that has contributed to the government's valorisation of the role of CSOs and women as political interlocutors and, in particular, of women as peace negotiators. Another key theme through which the EUD has engaged with the WPS agenda is its linkage to GBV and to rural and sustainable development - and with it to WEE.<sup>61</sup>

Guided by Point 1 of the Peace Agreement, (Integral Rural Reform), which seeks a structural transformation of the Colombian countryside, EU cooperation in Colombia has made peace and sustainable rural two interrelated strategic development objectives. The promotion of the rural women's agenda, for example, has not only focused on rural women's economic strengthening, but also on increasing the participation of women, in many cases involving women ex-combatants and victims of the conflict.<sup>62</sup>

The EUD support has also contributed to creating an enabling environment for the implementation of existing legislation and for improving the prevention and protection of victims of VAWG.

This **holistic integration of the WPS agenda in the EU portfolio in Colombia** is also reflected in the fact that the priority areas for the implementation of the peace agreement (infrastructure, agricultural development, coca crop substitution, access to land, etc.) also have a clear environmental relevance, which is reflected in the evolution of the selected strategic areas presented in the subsequent MIPs.<sup>63 64</sup>

**The choice of EUD funding instruments has gradually evolved in line with the changing nature of the conflict and post-conflict context in Colombia:** from modest, short-term projects - to the establishment of the Trust Fund and support to sectoral reforms through budget support to the government, which pursue a coherent and complementary logic. This approach builds on the nexus between WPS and all other thematic priority areas of GAP III. It also acknowledges the centrality of WPS in most development axes in the Colombian context.

<sup>61</sup> EU (2020): Evaluation of EU support to Gender Equality and Women's and Girls' Empowerment (2010-2018)

<sup>62</sup> EU Delegation to Colombia (2021): Action Document - Budget Support Rural Development in Colombia Phase II (DRET II)

<sup>63</sup> NIP 2007-2013 focus areas were i) Peace and stability, including alternative development, ii) Rule of law, justice and human rights, and iii) Competitiveness and trade. MIP 2014-2020 focused on i) Local development and institution building and ii) Sustainable trade and investment. The latest MIP's (2021-2027) priority areas are i) Peace and ii) environment.

<sup>64</sup> EU Delegation to Colombia (2021): Action Document - Budget Support for Sustainable Local Development in Colombia (DLS II)

**The comprehensive and coherent WPS portfolio of the EU in Colombia has been underpinned by corresponding political and policy dialogue entry doors. While benefitting from a common understanding on WPS among the EU and EU MS, materialised by the Trust Fund, WPS has not been the subject of explicit synergies.**

**In addition to spending actions, the EU participates in policy dialogue around the WPS agenda,** which has generally been around the role of women in peacebuilding, human rights defenders and the implementation of the gender provisions included in the peace agreements.<sup>65</sup>

More recent developments have raised concerns on the part of the EUD, its EU MS and civil society regarding targeted attacks on social leaders in different rural regions of the country. In 2020 the EUD launched together with EU MS a local campaign (#Defendamoslavida) to reaffirm their joint commitment and priority to defend human rights and promote the work of human rights leaders and defenders.<sup>66</sup>

Towards the end of 2021, efforts for the elimination of violence against women, protection women human rights defenders and enhancement of women's participation in peacebuilding, were at the centre of political dialogue and communication agendas. One of the scenarios was the series of high-level meetings held during the visit of the EU Special Envoy for Peace, which served to draw public attention to the rise of violence against women in politics and how it prevents them from actively participating in electoral processes.<sup>67</sup>

**In terms of EU MS collaboration, the EU Trust Fund has been instrumental in positioning the EU as a key partner in the implementation of the peace agreement,** providing an excellent forum for MS coordination as well as political dialogue with the government, and fostered joint implementation. Outside of the Trust Fund and political dialogue, however, there have been no clear examples of coordination and division of labour between the EU and its member States around WPS interventions. More recently on the agenda, however, is the consultation, design and deployment of the national action plan on the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325. There is a strong consensus on WPS between the government, EU and EU MS (e.g. Italy, Sweden), UN agencies and civil society, which can lead to synergies and complementarities.

#### **2.2.4.2 Strengthening of women's rights (on WPS pillars) (JC4.2); Increased participation of women in peace building, negotiations and mediation (J4.3)**

**Through both spending and non-spending actions, the EU has contributed to amplifying women's voices and galvanising their influence on policy and legislative reforms.**

During the post-peace agreement period (post-2016), the EUD's focus was specifically on empowering women as human rights defenders and as 'peace building agents' who play a key role as mediators, technical experts in formal conflict prevention, peace negotiations and peace-making processes. In addition, EU support for women's voices has contributed to increasing the visibility of women's proposals and priorities in the follow-up and monitoring of the Peace Accords.

While EU support has contributed to positive changes in policy and legal frameworks over the past decade, evidence from the 2020 evaluation points to a greater role in supporting actions that address forms of gender-based violence in the post-Peace Agreement context. According to the evaluation, together with several other international donors, the EU has played a positive role in strengthening the capacities of rights-holders to present their claims in the area of VAWG, and of duty-bearers to fulfil their obligations. The EU has also contributed to the construction and preservation of safe spaces to ensure the protection of girls and women from all forms of violence by public authorities. These efforts seem to have yielded positive results.<sup>68</sup>

**In more recent years, EU support has concentrated on maintaining the ground gained during the peace accords by continuing to support women's organisations and collectives, particularly in the conflict-affected territories, and with growing outreach to remote and rural areas.** In addition, as mentioned above, EU support has focused on strengthening capacities around the peacebuilding and WPS agenda within the state apparatus (e.g. the ARN, or even the DMR) and supporting the social and economic reintegration process of ex-combatants.

In terms of actions, most of the programmes directly targeting WPS relate to the reintegration of women or children previously involved in or affected by the conflict (the ARN reintegration budget support, with a WPS component) or community-based peacebuilding (i.e. grant programmes in Chocó, Caquetá, Cauca y Putumayo). Other initiatives aimed at economic empowerment in conflict-affected areas also

<sup>65</sup> EU Delegation to Colombia (2017): GAP II reporting 2017

<sup>66</sup> EU Delegation to Colombia (2020): EAMR 2020

<sup>67</sup> EU Delegation to Colombia (2021): GAP III reporting 2021

<sup>68</sup> EU (2020): Evaluation of EU support to Gender Equality and Women's and Girls' Empowerment (2010-2018)

have a strong WPS component: **WEE is seen as a pathway to WPS** (e.g. grant programme targeting youth in the Cauca region).

"Resguardos de Paz", for example, is a community protection project focused on strengthening indigenous communities in Chocó. The project worked, among others, with indigenous women's groups, among whom the discussion around gender has always been a challenge. The project managed to address issues from a critical perspective regarding men's roles, and many participants managed to be vocal about sexual violence, including that of the armed sectors. Among other things, the project aimed to involve men in caregiving, and also to challenge traditional gender roles.

In the framework of the project "Tejiendo Caminos de Paz en Caquetá, Cauca y Putumayo", the EU supported training activities with men and women, leaders and associations on non-violent relations, which served to identify common challenges in the territories. This project also addressed social mobilisation and cultural change, the participation of women prevention agents (peace promoters) in decision-making spaces, as well as the prevention of gender-based violence and the transformation of violence perceptions.

The budget support to the ARN succeeded in establishing a gender working group within the reincorporation process, as a response to the important gaps in the way women were accessing services were identified. Thirty per cent of reintegration participants are women, and the ARN now has more than 4,000 people in reincorporation.

An interesting aspect emerging from the support to the ARN is the link between the WPS agenda and women's participation -in peace processes, but also more broadly in political terms-, and the care economy. This project has included among its indicators, for example, one that promotes the linking of the children of former FARC members to early childhood care services to strengthen their integral development, protection and guarantee of rights, with the objective of promoting strategies to reduce barriers for women related to care work, allowing effective access to the other aspects of the reincorporation process.

## 2.3 Annex

### 2.3.1 List of persons consulted

<i>Organisation</i>	<i>Position/ Role</i>
<b>EU</b>	
ECHO	Programme Officer ECHO
EU HQ	Team Leader - South America
EUD	Private sector development
EUD	Economic & Rural development
EUD	Head of Delegation
EUD	Gender focal person
EUD	Trust Fund staff
EUD	Trust Fund staff
EUD	Human Rights Officer
<b>EU MS</b>	
Embassy of France	Political and gender issues
Embassy of Italy/ AICS	Cooperation officer
Embassy of Sweden	Regional cooperation, gender equality portfolio
Embassy of Sweden	Peace & security
Embassy of Sweden	Programme officer Gender
GIZ	Gender focal person
<b>National and local authorities</b>	
Agencia de Reincorporación Nacional	Gender Specialist
Agencia de Reincorporación Nacional	International Cooperation Adviser
Agencia de Reincorporación Nacional	Territorial Sub-directorate
Agencia de Reincorporación Nacional	Programme Directorate Adviser
Dirección de la mujer rural (Min. of Agriculture)	Staff
<b>UN agencies</b>	
UN Women country office	Deputy Representative
UNFPA country office	Gender, Rights and Interculturality Adviser
<b>Local and international CSOs</b>	
Accion Cultural Popular	M&E Coordinator of the MIA programme

Accion Cultural Popular	Technical Manager
Accion Cultural Popular	Communications
Accion Cultural Popular	Cooperation and Partnerships Coordinator
Comunita' Impegno Servizio Volontario (CISV)	Programme Manager
Corporacion Sisma Mujer	Deputy Director Justice
Mercy Corps	Director of Land and Rural Development
Oxfam Colombia	Advocacy Manager
Stichting War Child	Protection and Psychosocial Support Coordinator

### 2.3.2 List of documents

#### 2.3.2.1 EU Strategy Programming

- European Commission (2014): Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2014-2020 for Colombia
- European Commission (2021): Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2021-2027 for Colombia
- European Commission (2020): Annual Financial Action Plan for Colombia 2021

#### 2.3.2.2 EU Reporting

- EU Delegation to Colombia (2019): External Assistance Management Report (EAMR)
- EU Delegation to Colombia (2020): External Assistance Management Report (EAMR)
- EU Delegation to Colombia (2021): External Assistance Management Report (EAMR)
- EU Delegation to Colombia (2021): GAP III reporting 2021

#### 2.3.2.3 EU gender-specific

- EU Delegation to Colombia (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Colombia

#### 2.3.2.4 Project documentation

- The team reviewed the available project documentation (action fiches/TAPs, grant contracts, implementation and monitoring reports, evaluations, etc.) of the projects presented in the tables in section 2.1.2.

#### 2.3.2.5 Other

- EU (2020): Evaluation of EU support to Gender Equality and Women's and Girls' Empowerment (2010-2018)
- EU (2022) EU-Colombia Relations Factsheet
- EU (2022): Evaluation of the Development Fund for Rural Women (FOMMUR)
- <https://www.mincit.gov.co/prensa/noticias/industria/mujeres-mas-productivas-2022?page=2>
- OECD (2020) Gender Equality in Colombia: Access to Justice and Politics at the Local Level
- World Bank (2022) Women, Business and the Law 2022

## 3 Country Case Study: – Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

### 3.1 Introduction

#### 3.1.1 Context

The new regime in place, following the election of the long opposition leader, Felix Tshisekedi as President in December 2019, has reiterated the country's commitments to promote gender equality. The president has positioned himself as the champion of "positive masculinity" amidst his African peers. This led to an African Union communiqué signed in Kinshasa in November 2021, calling for an end to gender-based violence (GBV) and the active participation and leadership of women and girls in all political, social, cultural and economic spheres. Changes in the country, however, have been overall slow, and despite some progress made over the past five years, particularly on the legal front, significant gender inequalities persist in all aspects of life in DRC.

The DRC has ratified a large number of important national, sub-regional, regional and international legal instruments, which commit the country to respecting women rights. In 'Women, Business and the Law 2022', an index measuring progress toward gender equality by examining the laws and regulations that affect women's economic opportunities, DRC scored 78.8 out of 100. The overall score for is higher than the regional average observed across Sub-Saharan Africa (71.5), but lower than the maximum score observed in Mauritius (89.4).<sup>69</sup>

The main advancements on the domestic front date back 2016, when the « code de la famille » (including minimum age of marriage) and "code du travail" were revised, giving men and women more equitable equal marital status and worker's rights. DRC is a signatory for the 2003 Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa ('the Maputo Protocol'). This Protocol guarantees extensive rights to African women and girls and includes progressive provisions on: Harmful traditional practices, e.g. child marriage and female genital mutilation; reproductive health and rights; women roles in political processes; economic empowerment; ending violence against women.

Over the years, the international community has supported key strategic plans, amongst which the Gender-Based Violence national strategy (revised in 2020) and the National Action Plan for Women Peace and Security (Resolution 1325) (2019-22). In the National Development Strategic Plan (2020-24), priorities on gender equality are to (i) mainstream gender into development policies, programs and projects in all areas; (ii) promote women's leadership and their participation in decision-making bodies; and (iii) eliminate GBV, including child marriage and harmful practices.

Over the past decade, the DRC has experienced a succession of conflicts in which women have played a role in conflict prevention, consolidation and peacekeeping. The implementation of the first Action Plan of the 1325 resolution by the DRC has shown some progress being made in the participation of women in the management and resolution of conflicts.

While on the decline and despite the government "zero tolerance campaign", violence against women still remains a concern in all DRC. The persistence of armed conflicts has perpetuated sexual violence in certain parts of the national territory, with the displaced being the first victim of the armed groups' retaliations on the civilian population. In the Ituri and North Kivu, SGBV cases have been on the increase as a result of renewed instability, with the UN Human Right Bureau indicating that 70% of the cases reported in 2021 were committed by rebel groups (against 30% by the regular army).<sup>70</sup>

One progress of significance has been the increase in women participation in parliament, from 9.8% in 2011 to 13.2% in 2018. A woman was appointed for the first time as President of the National Assembly in 2019 (until December 2020). Women account for 27% of the government. In other areas, the participation of women in high government positions remains very low.

Based on (outdated) national statistics, the 2022 Gender Profile confirms the lower economic participation of women and a significant gender pay gap. Women's access to information, land, finance and markets, remains limited. Despite the law providing equal rights to land, the land tenure system and customs in rural areas, continue to discriminate against women. The proportion of formal enterprises owned by women is 15.1%, the percentage of women with a bank account in a banking or mobile institution is 24.2% and that with access to bank credit is 3.6%. Microfinance Institutions are therefore the most common source of credit for MSMEs headed by women or girls.

<sup>69</sup> World Bank (2022) Women, Business and the Law 2022


<sup>70</sup> MONUSCO (2021): Main trends in human rights violations during year 2021.



### 3.1.2 Focus of the case study

This country case study examines EU support to GEWE in DRC and aims at identifying country specific factors that influenced design, implementation and the results achieved. The analysis covers the diversity of EU support to DRC in terms of modalities (contribution / delegation agreements, action grants, TA & services) and channels (CSOs, UN & development agencies, EU Member States (EU MS)). The evaluation team has identified a portfolio of **EUR 344,5 million allocated to GEWE**<sup>71</sup> significant- or targeted interventions under GAP III. Overall, the amounts contracted increased over the period observed, with a marked increase from 2021 to 2022, as shown in Figure 5, in line with the global trend for the GEWE-specific financial volume, which increased in absolute terms during the period in scope<sup>72</sup>,

Figure 5 Evolution of GEWE funding (contracted amounts) in DRC under GAP III, 2019-2022



Source: Particip, based on Statistical Dashboard data

Data collection and analysis was structured along the EQs. Some issues related to the policy and strategic framework (EQ1) and to the design and implementation of the CLIP (EQ2) were examined looking at the entire portfolio, and particularly the main decisions adopted in 2021 and 2022 (see Table 5). Issues related to the effects of WEE and WPS were examined mostly focussing on a sample of EU-funded interventions identified by the evaluation team in Table 6.

The final sample of interventions was selected through i) the global mapping EU support (see main report) and ii) feedback from the EUD. The sample reflects well the above outlined diversity of EU support to GEWE in DRC by including: i) gender-targeted and gender-sensitive interventions; ii) interventions implemented through different modalities and channels; iii) interventions that were designed before and after the launch of GAP III<sup>73</sup>; and iv) interventions covering a variety of sectors, including WEE and WPS.

Table 5 Main decisions sampled in DRC (2021-2022) consulted under EQ1 and EQ2

Year	Intervention/ Contract title	Cris ref.	Planned amount (EUR)	Gender marker
2021	Unis pour l'égalité des genres	D-43338	20.000.000	G2
2021	Unis pour la prospérité	D-43123	20.000.000	G1
2021	Unis pour le développement durable	D-43346	67.000.000	G1
2021	Unis pour la paix et la sécurité	D-43280	30.000.000	G1
2021	Programme de Facilité de Coopération Technique	D-41856	8.000.000	G0

<sup>71</sup> The evaluation team has carried out the present portfolio analysis on the basis of retrieved information on contracted amounts for all EU external actions from EU internal databases (EU Statistical Dashboard). The category "GEWE" mainly includes interventions categorised as with gender as a main objective (i.e., 'Gender Equality' marker = 2) or as a significant objective (i.e., 'Gender Equality' marker = 1). As explained in the Annexes, this category may contain interventions identified as Non targeted (i.e., 'Gender Equality' marker = 0) but which the team has identified as having a link to GEWE and therefore considered as within the scope of the evaluation.

<sup>72</sup> For further details, see Annex 5 in Volume III.

<sup>73</sup> While the temporal scope of the evaluation covers the period immediately following the launch of GAP III (January 2021) and all of 2022, we have also included interventions designed and funded prior to 2021 as long as i) their objectives and expected results contributed to GAP III implementation and ii) they were implemented in the time frame mentioned above (01/2021-12/2022).

Year	Intervention/ Contract title	Cris ref.	Planned amount (EUR)	Gender marker
2021	Unis pour la santé et l'éducation	D-43305	50.000.000	G1

Table 6 Sampled interventions in DRC with a WEE / WPS component

Year	Intervention/ Contract title	Cris ref.	Contracting party	Planned amount (EUR)	WEE/WPS
	<b>Action de résilience pour la sécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle en République démocratique du Congo</b>	<b>D-42377</b>			
2020	Projet de résilience à la sécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle dans la province d'Ituri (RDC)	c-17538	Action Contre la Faim (ACF)	4.850.000	WEE
2020	Prévention de la malnutrition et relèvement économique pour les populations rurales de Beni et du Lubero	c-417986	Deutsche Welthungerhilfe Ev	4.850.000	WEE
	<b>Civil Society Organisations as actors of Governance and Development Work in the Field</b>	<b>D-41719</b>			
2021	Renforcement de la démocratie et consolidation de la paix en République démocratique du Congo à travers la participation significative des OSC aux processus de reconstruction socio-économique et l'autonomisation sociale et économique des femmes.	c-430969	Croix Rouge Espagne	1.125.000	WEE WPS
	<b>Various decisions</b>				
2020	Renforcement de la cohésion sociale et la résilience économique des communautés affectées par les conflits au Nord-Kivu et en Ituri « TUJENGE AMANI LEO »	c-17119	Solidarite Feminine Pour La Paix Et Le Developpement Integral	899.955	WEE
2021	Projet d'amélioration du dispositif sécuritaire de Panzi	c-425893	Fondation Panzi	200.000	WEE WPS
2021	Projet d'amélioration du dispositif sécuritaire de Panzi (financement complémentaire)	c-429891	Fondation Panzi	100.000	WEE WPS

The case study relies on a mix of tools/methods for data collection and analysis. It combines quantitative analysis of CRIS data with qualitative analysis of factors influencing design, implementation and effects of EU support to GEWE. Most data collection activities were conducted in person through a one-week field mission in November 2022 and complemented by additional remotely conducted key informant interviews after the in-person mission. Annexes 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 3.3.1 present the full lists of persons and documents consulted for this case study.

## 3.2 Main Findings

### 3.2.1 Policy and strategic framework (EQ1)

**High staff turn-over, coupled with a limited access to training, has meant that the level of awareness and knowledge of GAP III (and also CLIP, see EQ2) varies across EUD sections.**

In DRC, the MIP, which was adopted in December 2021 covers all GAP III thematic priorities, albeit not explicitly so. Because of high staff turn-over, the level of awareness and knowledge of GAP III (and also CLIP, see EQ2), however, has varied across EUD sections and declined over time. In addition, while the human-rights based approach is well integrated, there is a limited shared understanding amongst staff of what constitutes the other two GAP III fundamental principles, intersectionality and gender transformative approach.

At a programming level, five out of six actions adopted as part of the 2021 Annual Action Plan (AAP) are marked as G1 or G2, although some marker requirements have yet to be met. With GAP III, there was evidently an increased momentum to have at least one action marked as G2, with the new decision 'Unis pour l'égalité des genres' amounting to EUR 20 million. In addition, the EU DRC's

approach to gender, by being holistic and multi-dimensional, is well suited to promoting a gender transformative approach.

### 3.2.1.1 Programming reflects GAP III objectives: MFF and policy documents (JC1.1)

N/A, Brussels-level JC.


### 3.2.1.2 Conducive institutional environment ensured (JC1.2)

**In DRC the picture is quite mixed. Gender knowledge is variable across sectors, with some heads of section having no knowledge of either the CLIP or GAP III.** Incoming staffers have little time available for online training and some staff object that they already have sufficient gender expertise, which is debatable. At the level of individuals, definitions of fundamental GAP III concepts such as “gender transformative approach” and “intersectionality” differ.<sup>74</sup> Appointed in late 2022, the new GFP had to rely mostly on the hand-over notes and discussion with the previous GFP (still at EUD DRC) and resources made available online to build on her expertise. In DRC, the GFP position was also left vacant for six months in 2022.

### 3.2.1.3 Gender-responsive programming and M&E (JC1.3)

**The MIP was finalised in December 2021 (a few months after the CLIP and 2021 political dialogue), with the new programme covering all six GAP III thematic priorities.** A key change under the current MIP is the EU decision to launch a much more significant G2 action, amounting to EUR 20 million. The action entitled ‘United for gender equality’ aims to contribute to the eradication of GBV in DRC, by strengthening socio-economic empowerment and political leadership of women in the country. In 2021, five out of six actions were marked as G1 (4) or G2 (1) – which is above the 85% target. Some G1 marker requirements have not been met yet, however, (in part because of the delayed gender profile). For the action, ‘*Unis pour la prospérité*’ there has been some internal discussion on whether this governance action should stay G1.

Figure 6 Evolution GEWE funding (contracted amounts) in DRC under GAP III, by Gender Marker, 2019-2022



Source: Particip, based on Statistical Dashboard data

**Since the launch of GAP III at the end of 2020, the number of non-gender-targeted interventions (G0) has decreased substantially, while the volume of funds dedicated to gender has steadily increased,** with a marked rise between 2021 and 2022. The inventory (mapping) developed by the team for the period 2019-2022 provides evidence of the impact of GAP III on the number of GEWE-oriented actions (G2+G1) contracted and the volume of funds dedicated to these actions. Overall, the amounts contracted for G1/G2 interventions increased over the observed period, as shown in Figure 6, while the amounts contracted for G0 interventions decreased sharply.

**The EUD DRC incorporates many aspects of what constitutes a gender transformative approach, but this is not well reflected in the strategic programming documents.** This is despite the EU in DRC being well positioned to promote such an approach. Gender transformative approach (and to a

<sup>74</sup> A training event on gender mainstreaming and human rights was planned, but this did not happen because of COVID-19.

lesser extent intersectionality) are principles that implementing partners are already familiar with and committed to, which they try to put into practice as much as they can. Changing social norms is embedded in many of their projects' activities. The EU's programmatic approach to gender in DRC is clearly based on the premises that women need a voice and need to take part as equal partners in the decision-making, including within their own households, to be empowered. As such, the EU support to gender in DRC - from addressing GBV to promoting economic livelihoods- follows a holistic, integrated, approach that seek to address all gender-related obstacles (economic, political, social, cultural), which is in line with the gender transformative approach.

**Concerning Team Europe, GAP III was described by EU MS as “in continuation of GAP II” rather than one involving a drastically improved approach.** At the time of the country visit, there was limited information yet on whether gender would be mainstreamed in the team Europe initiatives.

### 3.2.2 Design and implementation of CLIPs (EQ2)

**According to interviews, designing the CLIP brought the EU, EU MS, and ECHO together. The document was co-produced, and commitments to work as one Team Europe strengthened.**

The CLIP instructions from HQ were also seen as having usefully increased EUD management attention. The CLIP also proved a useful platform for the heads of EU delegation and cooperation to take the lead on donor coordination from 2022. A main contribution from the CLIP is that it has become a plan co-owned by the EUD political section and cooperation section.

At the same time, external stakeholder engagement around the CLIP has not led to the expected effects; on the contrary, government officials at the Ministry of Gender have expressed discontent over what they perceive to be a limited engagement, not just for the CLIP but also for the Gender Profile.

Irrespective of the CLIP, the EUD in DRC is strongly committed to promoting gender equality. Gender has evidently featured as a cross-cutting issue in the EU political dialogue since it resumed in 2020. On a less positive note, EUD's commitments to engage with civil society as key partners in GEWE dialogue have not been met.

From a programming perspective, the EUD already reported that gender equality features as a marker in all of its new decisions under the previous MIP. This claim remains largely unsubstantiated, however, with data available showing conflicting results.

The CLIP has yet to become a living document, based on a set of measurable outcomes.

#### 3.2.2.1 CLIPs reflect a clear, relevant and integrated vision (JC2.1)

**The CLIP suffers somewhat from being based on the outdated 2014 Gender Country Profile (as well as an updated “mini” conflict analysis conducted by the EU).** The new gender profile, mainly funded by the European Union (INTPA), in a consortium composed of the ADB and UN Women, was finalised only after delays in September 2022, with the Ministry of Gender still not fully expressing ownership and expressing concern that the Profile was donor led. The Gender Profile still cannot be considered an analysis shared by all parties and able to inform high-level dialogue.

**On a more positive note, the DRC CLIP was drafted in a participatory manner and provided an opportunity for already well-coordinated EU MS (and ECHO) to produce a joint document.** As well as being like-minded, the EU MS share a good knowledge of their respective strengths and/or interests on gender. In particular, the CLIP helped the EUD and ECHO to coordinate approaches and positions and agenda.

**Despite these positive aspects, the CLIP has missed opportunities.** The final CLIP was not circulated widely or early enough to leave an imprint on stakeholders, including CSOs. Few external stakeholders interviewed during the field visit appeared to know of its existence. As in the case of the Gender Profile, officials at the Ministry of Gender expressed discontent over limited consultation by the EUD and, indeed, professed no knowledge of the document. This is despite evidence that the EUD had consistently and repeatedly requested the Ministry of Gender for its participation and review of the CLIP and GAP III.

#### 3.2.2.2 CLIPs facilitate gender mainstreaming and targeted actions (JC2.2)

**GAP III - and more specifically, the CLIP instructions - have lent momentum within EUD to promote gender, thanks to the direct involvement of the Head of Delegation and Head of Cooperation.** By conveying HQ expectations at country level, the CLIP requirements contributed to increasing management's attention on gender. The instructions for the CLIP were addressed to both head of cooperation and head of delegation, with the latter requested to sign the document before sending it to HQ. However, while the CLIP may have helped to strengthen ownership within the EUD at the time of its design, few (some newly recruited) EUD staff interviewed during the country visit still knew

about the document, by the time the country visit took place in November 2022. See also JC 1.2. in section 3.2.1.2.

**According to EUD reporting, the 85% target (number of new decisions marked as G1 and G2) had already been reached under the previous MIP, which also included a G2 action.** The EUD has questioned the veracity of CRIS data. In addition, as well as showing lower percentage (between 40 and 60%), project data (as shared by the EU) shows that there is a risk that G1 decisions will not translate into G1 contracts.

### 3.2.2.3 CLIPs contribute to gender perspective into political and policy dialogue (JC2.3)

**Political dialogue between the EU, EU MS and the authorities resumed in 2020. Talking points include some reference to gender** – but generally no more than any other cross-cutting issues. In the 2021 political dialogue communiqué, for example, the government committed to promoting women's socio-economic empowerment, but it is likely that this would have happened without the CLIP.

**The consultations around the CLIP and the gender profile were expected to lead to a closer EUD dialogue with the Ministry of Gender, but this has yet to happen.**<sup>75</sup> There is limited capacity and high staff turnover on both sides of the table. Despite promises made, consultations with civil society (which is viewed as highly politicised) stopped with the drafting of the CLIP and there was no follow-up.

**The CLIP has plausibly raised the EUD's profile in gender dialogue with the DRC authorities,** which will continue mostly to take place in a multi-donor setting. In 2022, the EU replaced Sweden as chair of the inter-donor gender group (GIB) and became co-chair of the One+One group, which includes bilateral donors and UN agencies and has regular engagement with the Ministry of Gender and other line Ministries. Since its launch, the CLIP has also been used as a key reference document to inform the EU's cultural and outreach events (some co-held with EU MS) and structure the discussions of the One+One gender group, which the EU Ambassador co-chairs and which meets with the Gender and other line Ministries on a regular basis.

### 3.2.2.4 CLIPs facilitate gender-sensitive monitoring of results (JC2.4)

The team has found no evidence that the CLIP has affected the monitoring of results; in fact, it was decided at drafting stage that, since EU MS (following different programming cycles) would need to align their programmes to the same indicators, the CLIP would not be results-oriented.

## 3.2.3 Effects on Women's Economic Empowerment (EQ3)

**In DRC all G1 decisions approved in 2021 except for one, include a component on WEE.** EU-funded interventions in the East benefit from the long experience of implementing partners, which seek to address gender barriers on multiple fronts (economic, political, health, cultural and social). Similarly, many decisions approved in 2021 cut across a range of GAP III thematic priorities, including WEE. Looking further back, the Panzi foundation, which the EU and many donors have supported over the years, shows that such multi-dimensional approach can contribute to WEE, by increasing direct women beneficiaries' access to services, income-generating activities, and credit.


### 3.2.3.1 Strategic engagement / policy and political dialogue; M&E and communication on WEE (JC3.1)

**In DRC all G1 decisions approved in 2021 except for one ('*Unis pour la paix et la sécurité*') include a component on WEE.** The G2 GBV action also includes a WEE component. This multiplication of strategic entry points is in alignment with EUD's integrated approach to GEWE. Since the decision '*Unis pour la prospérité*' was approved, the relevance of having a gender (and more specifically WEE) component, notably through the use of gender-based budgeting, was nonetheless being questioned. Looking forward, the EU also has plans to support business enabling reforms; this could well provide an opportunity to promote WEE.

The multiplication of entry points for WEE is reflected in the increase of WEE-specific funding in the country, which peaked most significantly in 2022. Although WPS funding is comparatively lower in absolute terms, it has seen a significant increase as a priority area under GAP III, in particular between 2021 and 2022.

<sup>75</sup> Crucially, whether known or not to the Ministry, the CLIP's reference to the LGBTIQ agenda is likely to be poorly received, should the document become more widely publicised

Figure 7 Evolution of funding to GEWE (G1/G2) interventions promoting WEE and WPS in DRC, 2019-2022



Source: Particip, based on Statistical Dashboard data

**EU support in DRC includes a WEE dimension, with implementing partners demonstrating a strong commitment to gender mainstreaming as an approach to WEE.** In the East, for example, the Spanish Red Cross has carried out an in-depth diagnosis on the impact of the socio-economic crisis on women and plans to use “positive discrimination” in favour of women. While it is too early to talk about results, EU’s support to food security, nutrition and resilience, in the East targets the most vulnerable households, with activities indicating a balanced participation between men and women across all main areas.

**Measuring results remains challenging**, however, as shown with SOFIPADI (a long-standing partner for both EUD and ECHO), which can report sex-disaggregated results on improved access to Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR) but not for its work on improving social cohesion and women subsistence.

### 3.2.3.2 Strengthening of women’s rights (incl. TVET, decent work, equal pay, social protection systems, inclusion in the formal economy, green economy and digital transformation) (JC3.2)

**EU support to the Panzi Foundation has shown good success in following an integrated approach to fighting GBV, including through WEE.** EU flagship support to the Panzi Foundation in South Kivu started in 2017 and finished in 2022. The Panzi Foundation has gained worldwide reputation since Dr Denis Mukwege was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his work with SGBV victims at the Panzi Hospital in DRC. This support typically includes medical and psychological care; support to socio-economic re-integration; and access to justice. Support to the Panzi foundation remains an important EU funding in the MIP, and specifically through the 2021 G2 program “Unis pour l’égalité des genres”.

According to the final evaluation of the intervention, the holistic approach of the project made it possible to take charge of and support the beneficiaries on several dimensions of their lives (medical, psychosocial, socio-economic and legal) and produce changes and a significant impact in their living conditions life. The integrated use of *‘mutuelles de solidarité’* and support to Income-Generating Activities (was seen as particularly effective).

### 3.2.4 Effects on Women, Peace and Security (EQ4)

**In DRC, the EU’s main support to the WPS agenda is linked to protection and participation.** In 2022, the EU ambassador participated and/or chaired multi-stakeholder dialogues on WPS. The new action “unis pour la paix et la sécurité” will build on EU previous efforts to mainstream gender in the army. Thanks to EU support, the Panzi Foundation play a lead role in addressing Sexual and Gender-based Violent (SGBV) in South Kivu. the EU (under the previous MIP) has had some small success in incorporating gender-targeted actions in its support to local conflict resolution and security sector reforms in DRC.

### 3.2.4.1 Strategic engagement / policy and political dialogue; M&E and communication on WPS (JC4.1)

In DRC, the EU's main support to the WPS agenda remains largely unchanged from the previous MIP and focuses on protection and participation.

Compared to previous years, the EU is well placed to lead on dialogue on WPS. In November 2022, the EU ambassador co-chaired a One+One gender group meeting on how to promote greater women participation in the country's Nairobi peace process. EU core funding to the global spotlight initiative has also opened doors with the EU in DRC participating the steering committee of Women Peace and Humanitarian Fund.

The new action '*Unis pour la paix et la sécurité*' – working with the army – also includes some gender elements (police/army recruitment, work with local communities), which are more likely to succeed compared to the EU's previous support (also see JC4.3, below).

While the government has committed to the WPS agenda, however, other "more pressing" priorities are likely to dominate the ongoing East African Community-led Nairobi peace process (and with it search for external funds).

### 3.2.4.2 Strengthening of women's rights (on WPS pillars) (JC4.2)

The recent evaluation of EU's long-standing support for the Panzi Foundation shows some good results in securing women protection against SGBV. With the Panzi Foundation, a total of 3,905 patients, including 2,754 women and 1,151 men, received medical care and benefited from psychosocial care (counselling and group therapy). The project was less successful in providing women access to justice. There were concerns that the sustainability of legal clinics in the absence of external funding would be quite limited despite the dedication of local paralegals.

### 3.2.4.3 Increased participation of women in peace building, negotiations and mediation (J4.3)

According to EU implementing partner, SOFIPADI, the East has witnessed some slow but steady evolutions in the gender dynamics: for example, the role of women mediators in local conflict is now better accepted.

Security Sector Reforms in DRC, which the EU has supported for many years, appear mature enough to promote gender. EU's early support to the army had already contributed to some modest achievements, more specifically with the creation of a gender department; the revision of the army code of ethics; and the revision and/or addition of compulsory training modules for soldiers, including, notably on gender, SGBV, and human rights.

## 3.3 Annex

### 3.3.1 List of persons consulted

Organisation	Position/ Role
<b>EU</b>	
EU HQ	Geo-desk Cooperation Officer - DRC
ECHO	Gender in Humanitarian Crisis Management Officer
EUD	Head of Section Environment Agriculture, Food Security
EUD	Programme Officer, Environment, Agriculture, Food Security Section
EUD	Programme Officer, Political Governance, Justice, Security, Culture Section
EUD	Head of Section Political Governance, Security, Culture
EUD	Programme officer
EUD	Project assistant
EUD	Programme Officer, Economic Governance and Regional Cooperation Section (former Gender focal person)
EUD	Gender focal person, Infrastructure and Health Programme Officer
EUD	Head of Section Economic Governance - Regional Cooperation
EUD	Head of cooperation
EUD	Programme officer
<b>EU MS</b>	
Embassy France	Cooperation Officer
Embassy Sweden	Human Security, Resilience and Peace Programme Officer
Embassy Sweden	Programme Officer

Embassy Sweden	Health Programme Officer
Embassy The Netherlands	Policy Advisor
<b>National and local authorities</b>	
Ministry of Gender, Family and Children	Director of Cabinet
Ministry of Gender, Family and Children	Advisor in charge of cooperation and partnership
Ministry of Gender, Family and Children	Deputy Director of Cabinet (currently Secretary General of the Ministry of Gender, Family and Children)
<b>UN agencies and CSOs</b>	
Action contre la faim	CSO staff
Action contre la faim	CSO staff
Croix Rouge Espagne	Head of delegation
Croix Rouge Espagne	Project officer
Deutsche Welthungerhilfe (WHH)	CSO staff
Fondation Panzi	Gender expert
Fondation Panzi	Former Chief of Party of the Integrated Holistic Support Programme.
Fondation Panzi	BADILIKA project coordinator
Fondation Panzi	Field Supervisor
SOFEPADI	Programme Assistant
SOFEPADI	Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability and Learning Officer
SOFEPADI	National Coordinator
UN Women	Women-Peace and Security Programme Specialist
UN Women	Assistance to the National Gender Coordinator
UN Women	Programme Specialist on Violence against Women and Girls
UN Women	Deputy Programme Officer

### 3.3.2 List of documents

#### 3.3.2.1 EU Strategy Programming

- European Commission (2014): Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2014-2020 for DRC
- European Commission (2021): Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2021-2027 for DRC
- European Commission (2020): Annual Financial Action Plan for DRC 2021

#### 3.3.2.2 EU Reporting

- EU Delegation to DRC (2019): External Assistance Management Report (EAMR)
- EU Delegation to DRC (2020): External Assistance Management Report (EAMR)
- EU Delegation to DRC (2021): External Assistance Management Report (EAMR)
- EU Delegation to DRC (2019): Progress Report 2019
- EU Delegation to DRC (2020): Progress Report 2020
- EU Delegation to DRC (2021): Progress Report 2021
- EU Delegation to DRC (2021): GAP III reporting 2021

#### 3.3.2.3 EU gender-specific

- EU Delegation to DRC (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for DRC
- EU Delegation to DRC, UN Women, ADB (2022): Gender Profile DRC

#### 3.3.2.4 Project documentation

- The team reviewed the available project documentation (action fiches/TAPs, grant contracts, implementation and monitoring reports, evaluations, etc.) of the projects presented in the tables in section 2.1.23.1.2.
- In addition to the above, the EU's implementing partners (Action contre la faim, Croix Rouge Espagnole, WHH, Fondation Panzi, SOFEPADI) shared more project documents with a gender dimension, including baseline / needs assessment / surveys and monitoring and evaluation framework tools or reports. The evaluation team also used some available monitoring and



evaluation reports from EU's previous phase of support to security sector reforms to inform its findings for EQ4.

#### 3.3.2.5 Other

- Ministère du Genre, famille et enfants avec l'UE, ONU Femmes et AfDRC (2022), Profil genre pays de la RDC
- Gender Inter-Donor Group (2022): Concept note & annex
- Gender Inter-Donor Group (2022): Other internal documents (schedule of meetings, list of relevant interventions, etc)
- MONUSCO (2021): Main trends in human rights violations during year 2021, [https://monusco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/bcnudh\\_-\\_communique\\_de\\_presse\\_-\\_note\\_annuelle\\_2021\\_.pdf](https://monusco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/bcnudh_-_communique_de_presse_-_note_annuelle_2021_.pdf)
- World Bank (2022) Women, Business and the Law 2022

## 4 Country case study – Palestine<sup>76</sup>

### 4.1 Introduction

#### 4.1.1 Context

Palestine, or the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), is a lower middle-income country under an Israeli occupation that strangles economic development, gives rise to human rights abuses, and poisons the political environment. There is a significant difference between the West Bank (per capita GDP roughly USD 5,000) and Gaza Strip (roughly USD 1,500), according to World Bank statistics. Poverty, according to World Bank measures, is a problem largely confined to the latter. The COVID-19 pandemic, as elsewhere, led to serious declines in living standards. Movements of people and goods are restricted by Israeli occupation and there is a worsening cycle of violence and repression on both sides. As the Government of the OPT (Palestinian Authority or (PA) has been impeded from delivering growth and development to its citizens by the occupation, there has been radicalisation within Palestinian society. This has been amplified by the perceived weakness of the PA leadership in confronting the occupation.

The **PA's National Development Plan**<sup>77</sup> is based on three pillars: ending the occupation, excellent public service provision and sustainable development. All are challenging in view of the fact that trade and fiscal revenues are essentially outside the PA's control; in addition to the fact that the business and investment climate in the OPT is rated as poor; for example, by the World Bank's Ease of Doing Business Index.

The **European Joint Strategy** (EU JS) 2021-2024 provides a framework through which European support is coordinated with Palestinian partners in line with the Palestinian National Development Plan. In order to accelerate the roll-out of the EU External Investment Plan, the EU-OPT Investment Platform has been established in 2020, with the objective of promoting inclusive growth, job creation and sustainable development, leveraging finance and fostering policy dialogue on investment-climate reforms. The translation of the external dimension of the 'European Green Deal' and the principles underpinning the green economic recovery agenda in the OPT is considered as a priority for all European Development Partners, notably by supporting the development of a green economy, supplying clean, affordable and secure energy, while developing a more sustainable, inclusive, and resilient growth model.

Issues related to Gender Equality and Women Empowerment (GEWE) in the OPT are similar to those elsewhere: discrimination, access to justice, Gender Based Violence (GBV), traditional family law, land ownership, etc. Yet, the Palestinian population in general, and Palestinian women, in particular, are well-educated and gender values are progressive relative to some other parts of the Arab world. There has, however, in recent years been a backsliding, as its political weakening has forced the PA to rely more on local authorities and traditional leaders for political support. In 'Women, Business and the Law 2022', an index measuring progress toward gender equality by examining the laws and regulations that affect women's economic opportunities, the OPT scored 26.3 out of 100. The overall score for is lower than the regional average observed across the Middle East and North Africa (53).<sup>78</sup>

EU-supported initiatives together with women's rights defenders associations and NGOs as well as UN Women, such as the Family Protection Law via the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) have given rise to very animated political debates, and ultimately the CEDAW convention and FPB still have not been ratified by the Palestinian Authority (PA), since conservative forces successfully characterised them as being in conflict with the Islamic Sharia law and/or Palestinian traditions. An EU support of the old-age pension system has suffered a similar fate because of inheritance law issues. Gender rights defenders have been vilified and subject to threats and even violence, with impunity.

Symptomatic of the challenging context, in 2020 and 2021, the Ministry of Women Affairs (MoWA) has ignored and not reported on the recommendations to the CEDAW Committee. The continuing refusal to report on CEDAW was confirmed by an interviewed representative from the Ministry of Women's Affairs.

#### 4.1.2 Focus of the case study

This country case study examines EU support to GEWE in the OPT and aims at identifying country-specific factors that influenced design, implementation and the results achieved. The analysis covers

<sup>76</sup> Throughout the report, this designation shall not be construed as an EU recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the EU Member States on this issue


<sup>77</sup> <https://andp.unescwa.org/plans/1293>

<sup>78</sup> World Bank (2022) Women, Business and the Law 2022

the diversity of EU support to the OPT in terms of modalities (contribution / delegation agreements, action grants, TA & services and the PEGASE mechanism) and channels (National Government, UN & development agencies, EU MS, (I)NGOs, EFIs / IFIs and private sector).

The evaluation team has identified a portfolio of **EUR 733 million allocated to GEWE**<sup>79</sup> significant- or targeted interventions under GAP III. There was a notable increase in G1/G2 EU funding between 2021 and 2022, indicative of GAP III and NDICI-GE target effects, in line with the global trend for the GEWE-specific financial volume, which increased in absolute terms during the period in scope.<sup>80</sup> At the same time, there is concern about the meaningfulness of the gender markers, as discussed below.

**Figure 8** Evolution of funding to GEWE in the Occupied Palestinian Territories under GAP III, 2019-2022



Source: Particip, based on Statistical Dashboard data

Data collection and analysis was structured along the lines of the EQs. Some issues related to the policy and strategic framework (EQ1) and to the design and implementation of the CLIP (EQ2) were examined looking at the whole portfolio. Most issues (including those related to the effects of WEE and WPS) were examined focussing on a sample of EU-funded interventions identified by the evaluation team for a more in-depth analysis. The final sample was selected through i) the global mapping EU support (see main report) and ii) feedback from the EUREP. The sample reflects well the above outlined diversity of EU support to GEWE in the OPT by including: i) both bilateral and regional interventions; ii) gender-targeted and gender-sensitive interventions; iii) interventions implemented through different modalities and channels, iv) interventions targeting Gaza, the West Bank, East Jerusalem and / or Palestinians in Israel; v) interventions that were designed before and after the launch of GAP III<sup>81</sup>; and vi) interventions covering a variety of sectors, including Women's Economic Empowerment (WEE) and Women, Peace and Security (WPS). Table 1 and Table 2 below present the sampled interventions at bilateral and regional level, while Table 9 presents the two Team Europe Initiatives (TEIs) benefitting the OPT.

**Table 7** Main bilateral contracts sampled in the Occupied Palestinian Territories

Year	Intervention/ Contract title	Cris ref.	Contracting party	Planned amount
2017	Support for East Jerusalem	D-40199		
2019	Ta'lim Lil'Jami'a: Inclusive Education Intervention for East Jerusalem children	408198	Terre des Hommes	1,897,650

<sup>79</sup> The evaluation team has carried out the present portfolio analysis on the basis of retrieved information on contracted amounts for all EU external actions from EU internal databases (EU Statistical Dashboard). The category "GEWE" mainly includes interventions categorised as with gender as a main objective (i.e., 'Gender Equality' marker = 2) or as a significant objective (i.e., 'Gender Equality' marker = 1). As explained in the Annexes, this category may contain interventions identified as Non targeted (i.e., 'Gender Equality' marker = 0) but which the team has identified as having a link to GEWE and therefore considered as within the scope of the evaluation.

<sup>80</sup> For further details, see Annex 5 in Volume III.

<sup>81</sup> While the temporal scope of the evaluation covers the period immediately following the launch of GAP III (January 2021) and all of 2022, we have also included interventions designed and funded prior to 2021 as long as i) their objectives and expected results contributed to GAP III implementation and ii) they were implemented in the time frame mentioned above (01/2021-12/2022).

Year	Intervention/ Contract title	Cris ref.	Contracting party	Planned amount
2019	Emergency Housing Rehabilitation for Women Headed Households and Vulnerable Families in East Jerusalem and Jerusalem Governorate.	408561	Palestinian Housing Council	927,939
2019	CEDAW Implementation in Jerusalem	410209	The Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy (MIFTAH)	465,895
	<b>Middle East Peace Process (MEPP)</b>			
2019	Our Path for prospers Future – Promote Palestinian – Israeli Women leadership in Southern of West Bank and Negev Marginalized and Bedoui Communities.	411864	Roles for Social Change Association (ADWAR)	600,000
2019	Qarari Mostaqbali (My Decision is my Future)	412261	CARE Norway	500,000
	<b>CSOs as actors of Governance and Development work in the Field</b>			
2020	Gender Equality in the Economic Sphere: Our Right, Our priority	420955	Democracy And Workers Rights Center Association	755,770
2021	Women and Youth Transforming local public services in Hebron	420969	Palestine Information Technology Association	700,176
	<b>Gender equality and human rights</b>			
2019	Working Together as Agents for Change: Towards the Protection and Promotion of Women's Human Rights	411911	Women's Centre for Legal Aid & Counselling Association (WCLAC)	617,076
2019	Identification study for action on gender equality in Palestine – AAP 2021	412409	IBF	103,412
2019	Protection and respect of the rights of vulnerable women and girls with and without disabilities survivors of GBV in the Gaza Strip.	412204	Women's Affairs Center Gaza	648,000
	<b>Sustainable Economic Development</b>			
2019	Promotion of inclusive agricultural growth to ensure improved living standards and resilience of vulnerable communities in Area C of the West Bank	405532	Oxfam Solidarite	3,800,000
2021	Building Economic Resilience for Gaza	423572	Oxfam Novib	3,350,000

Table 8 Main regional contracts sampled in the Occupied Palestinian Territories

Year	Intervention/ Contract title	Cris ref.	Contracting party	Planned amount
2021	Social dialogue for formalization and employability in the Southern Neighbourhood Region (SOLIFEM)	419310	ILO	4,000,000.00
2020	SAWT ¿ Supporting Arab Women at the Table: Women as Actors in Peace Processes	421992	Centre Pour Une Initiative Arabe de reforme	2,969,121.55

Table 9 Main TEIs identified in the Occupied Palestinian Territories

Name	EU MS involved	EDFI involved	Planned amount
Sustainable Growth, Jobs and Resilience	SE, NL, AT, DE, BE, FR, DK, DE, FI, ES	EIB, EBRD, AFD/Proparco, KfW	n/a
Jobs through Trade and Investment in the Southern Neighbourhood (Regional Southern Neighbourhood)	DE, FR, ES, IT, SE, (NL)	EBRD. EIB	n/a

The case study relies on a mix of tools/methods for data collection and analysis. It combines quantitative analysis of CRIS data with qualitative analysis of factors influencing design, implementation and effects of EU support to GEWE. Most data collection activities were conducted in person through a one week field mission in November 2022 and complemented by additional remotely conducted key informant

interviews between December 2022 and February 2023. Annexes 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 present the full lists of persons and documents consulted for this case study.

## 4.2 Findings

### 4.2.1 Policy and strategic framework (EQ1)

EU gender equality strategy in the OPT under GAP III has been largely a continuation of the strategy under GAP II with minor modifications. The political context for gender equality issues is unfavourable; in addition, EUD staff report difficulty in translating GAP III objectives into concrete actions. In part, this appears to be because there has been significant turnover in the GFP position. While they are successful at mainstreaming gender at upstream level (funding for G1 actions has increased sharply under GAP III, and a new G2 gender-targeted action is planned to support the Ministry of Women's Affairs and gender units in line ministries), as programming moves downstream to the actual design of projects and negotiation of contracts, gender tends to be progressively diluted. However, EU gender actions are largely being implemented by partners, international agencies or national NGOs who have long-standing gender policies largely in line with GAP III. While the EU participates in gender coordination mechanisms, it is not perceived by MS as playing a leading role in the area.

#### 4.2.1.1 Programming reflects GAP III objectives: MFF and policy documents (JC1.1)

**Despite a few additions, GAP III vs. GAP II is regarded in the OPT as more continuity than change.** Notable additions recognised include transformative change (indicating high ambition) and intersectionality, as well as more emphasis on localisation and on men and boys. Most implementing partners in OPT have their own pre-existing gender strategies and action plans that are well in line with GAP III, so the actual contribution of GAP III is difficult to assess.

**In the OPT, the political environment for support to GEWE is unfavourable**, as the Government is increasingly dependent on traditional local authorities and leaders for support. GEWE is widely (mis)perceived as a European import inconsistent with Palestinian traditions, values, and way of life (see also section 4.1.1 above).

**Translating high-level GEWE narratives into concrete goals and indicators at project level was found to be difficult.** A common theme among EU staff interviewed was, that while gender was mainstreamed in programming at the upstream level (i.e., the MIP), there is a trend for gender to be steadily diluted further downstream, especially at project (i.e., contract) level. EU staff interviewed attributed this to a lack of effective gender-sensitive quality assessment, particularly at the level of indicators, many of which end up being generic or ill-suited (e.g., gender-disaggregated data available). Improving existing quality assessment processes would require either more gender capacity within EUREP or better use of external expertise.

See also JCs 1.2 and 1.3.

#### 4.2.1.2 Conducive institutional environment ensured (JC1.2)

**The key person for ensuring GAP III conformity at EUREP level is the Gender focal person (GFP), which appears to be a position with variable standing or influence.** there is as in all EU Delegations, a staff rotation every 3 to 4 years, and the current GFP arrived in September 2022 and the GAP III evaluation took place in November 2022. The GFP is part of the Operations section, functioning at the same time as programme manager and as focal person for civil society, limiting her availability for specific GFP tasks. According to Progress Reports, specific tasks related to GEWE are still not part of the staff position description. There is no gender focal person appointed by EEAS for the political section in the EUREP. In her daily business, the GFP reviews Action Documents (ADs) for gender content and represents the EU on the Donor Technical Working Group on Gender (see JC 1.3).

**The GFP is widely understood as an internal function** – most EU / EU MS-external stakeholders interviewed did not know who the EUREP GFP was. EUD Management, particularly the Heads of Section and the Head of Cooperation, have been supportive of GFPs. Due to limited institutional memory within the EUREP, the extent of GFP involvement in the elaboration of the EU Joint Strategy and the Gender Country Profile are unclear. The last Gender Country Profile dates from 2018 and was reportedly prepared by a consultant. It is considered adequate, but generic.

**Greater input of gender expertise is required by programme managers when it comes to mainstreaming of GEWE** (see also JC1.1 above). Programme managers interviewed cite lack of gender-expert input into their daily work and a Gender Country Profile that is not of high quality. Brussels INTPA G.1 guidelines and trainings for mainstreaming gender have been provided but are not systematically used. Limitations in terms of time and resources are perceived as a hindering factor. These issues have become even more important in the light of the political developments of the past


years. As the political and security situation has deteriorated, GEWE has become a very difficult topic for the PA Government to deal with. The national counterpart, the Ministry of Women's Affairs at the PA, is weak and relations between it and UN Women, a key EU partner, have also deteriorated, as is also the case for the EU. While there are gender units within line ministries, they are almost without exception with little power to influence decision making, despite efforts at networking and monitoring of gender focus campaigns. .

**Opinions on the extent of successful mainstreaming of GEWE issues differed substantially between programme managers interviewed.** As mentioned above, guidelines exist and were provided, but there is lack of clarity on how these can be used in a context where EU is dependent on implementing partners to deliver results. See also JC 1.3. on EUREP-level programming processes.

#### 4.2.1.3 Gender-responsive programming and M&E (JC1.3)

**Since the introduction of GAP III, the number of Gender not-targeted (G0) interventions has substantially declined, while the amount of gender-earmarked funding has clearly increased.** The inventory (mapping) developed by the team for the period 2019-2022 provides evidence of the impact of GAP III in the number of GEWE-oriented (G2+G1) actions contracted and the volume of funds dedicated to these actions. Overall, the amounts contracted for G1/G2 interventions increased over the period observed, despite a small decrease in 2020, as shown in Figure 6, while the amounts contracted for G0 interventions drastically declined. Regarding the complete absence of G2 contracted amounts in 2022, it should be noted that a EUR 3 million G2 action proposed under the AAP 2021 was still pending signature by the end of 2022 and is therefore not reflected in the diagram.

Figure 9 Evolution of funding (contracted amounts) to GEWE in the Occupied Palestinian Territories under GAP III, by Gender Marker, 2019-2022



Source: Particip, based on Statistical Dashboard data

**However, according to EUD interviews, while gender marking serves an important signalling function, it is an unreliable measure of true GAP III alignment because of the risk of gender-dilution as the programming process proceeds.** Gender priorities invariably figure in results frameworks and log frames early in the programming process. The EU JS Results-Oriented Framework (ROF) attempts to align with GAP III priorities (despite the fact that the PA failed to contribute due to the low priority they assign to the area). At decision level, programme managers are encouraged by GAP III to meet gender-responsiveness targets, which can easily result in 'gender significance shopping' and a checkbox approach, causing problems when the programming process for G1/G2-marked decisions reaches the AD level. Once an action has been marked G1, the mark persists with little influence on actual project design. Without a thorough gender analysis, language in the ADs usually tends towards a description of the problem rather than an analysis and response. This leaves the EUREP heavily dependent on the gender guidelines of contracted implementing partners.

**The problem of gender dilution should not be overemphasised, because most of the EU's implementing partners have gender strategies and practices fully in line with GAP III.** Nonetheless, this makes the EU in significant degree dependent on implementing partners to ensure GAP III conformity. Programme managers interviewed expressed the view that the Gender Country Profile and CLIP provided insufficient detail to be useful at sector level (see EQ2 for further details). Specific gender focus studies may be conducted upon request by sector, since the Gender Country

Profile and the CLIP are not exhaustive and detailed documents, but only reference documents at this stage.

**Many EU MS (and other donors) are supporting GEWE in the OPT** Coordination takes place through the Donor Technical Working Group on Gender, which is led by Italy and co-chaired by the EUREP (represented by the GFP). The group's members meet quarterly and comprise the EU, EU MS and other donors. While these provide opportunities for sharing experiences and developing joint approaches and priorities under GAP III, EU MS' work is mostly driven by their own interests and priorities, resulting according to MS interviewed in some overlap. The EU is also part of the gender sector group under the local aid coordination structure (LACS), which is led by the Government and co-chaired by Italy. Collaboration within the group has not been easy, as members (claim to) pursue different agendas.

**The lack of dedicated joint reporting on GEWE in the past years is considered a missed opportunity that may have hampered monitoring of progress in implementing GAP integration.** EAMRs and EU JS reporting includes GEWE aspects (see JC 2.4), but there was no EU MS annual reporting to the EUREP on GAP implementation as in previous years. Due to staff turnover, this practice that had been institutionalised under GAP II fell into abeyance, but it is now reportedly being re-established.

**The nexus approach in the OPT between development, peace and humanitarian actors could be strengthened.** The recent 'Evaluation of the EU's implementation of the DG ECHO Thematic Policy Document "Gender: Different Needs, Adapted Assistance" of July 2021'<sup>82</sup> covered the OPT as a case study country. It touches upon the triple nexus by linking it to Pillar II of GAP III (promoting a coordinated, strategic and coherent EU engagement). According to the evaluation report, in the OPT the nexus process is known and discussed, but a disconnect was found between humanitarian and development interventions, caused by a lack of coordination between development and humanitarian actors and a lack of knowledge of the other's respective work. The evaluation found this to have an immediate negative effect on the progress on women's rights and protection needs. According to interviews, this disconnect has become more pronounced in the past years, when no physical meetings took place due to COVID. The EUREP and DG ECHO GFPs do not exchange, and DG ECHO, although interested in participating, is not (anymore) part of the donor technical working group on gender.

**Overall, the EU is not seen as a driver of GEWE discussions. Some EU MS and other donors are perceived as playing a bigger role;** e.g., Italy, which has the EU cooperation lead on gender under the cross-cutting pillar 6 of the EU JS. It is still too early to see the impact of the two recent Team Europe Initiatives, but according to the two TEI programme managers interviewed (Digital Transformation and water), gender is being taken seriously in the design of the TEIs. The same interviewees expressed concern, however, that gender is not taken sufficiently into account in blending, due to the attitude of financial institutions.

Unfortunately, the team was not able to receive any information / preliminary findings from the ongoing 'Evaluation of the EU cooperation with the OPT' (2022-ongoing).

#### 4.2.2 Design and implementation of CLIPs (EQ2)

The OPT CLIP is well aligned with GAP III but suffers from several weaknesses. It was written on the basis of a Gender Country Profile that, given the speed with which the political and security situation in the country has changed, was outdated. EUD ownership does not appear to be high, institutional memory on how the document was produced is limited. There is no shortage of national gender expertise in the OPT, and this need not be a fatal weakness, but it suggests that producing the CLIP did little to contribute to EUD gender capacity or awareness. While the CLIP identifies priority areas for action, it does not provide guidance specific enough to inform programming, monitoring, or policy dialogue. There was a degree of EU MS participation in preparation of the CLIP and, until the post of GFP was empty for a space of time, there was annual reporting on CLIP implementation (this has evidently resumed). CSOs consulted in this evaluation had little knowledge of the CLIP, and the relevant government ministry (Ministry of Women's Affairs) was unfamiliar with it. In the extremely fraught political environment described in Section 1.1, the CLIP has contributed little to gender policy dialogue.

##### 4.2.2.1 CLIPs reflect a clear, relevant and integrated vision (JC2.1)

**The OPT CLIP clearly aligns with GAP III and provides an overall direction of progress towards GEWE. However, it lacks guidance for future programming.** The CLIP identifies five thematic priority areas: i) Ensuring freedom from all forms of gender-based violence; ii) Promoting economic and social

<sup>82</sup> DG ECHO (2021): Evaluation of the EU's implementation of the DG ECHO Thematic Policy Document "Gender: Different Needs, Adapted Assistance" of July 2013.

rights and the empowerment of girls and women; iii) Promoting equal participation and leadership; iv) Integrating the women, peace and security agenda; and v) Challenges and opportunities of green transition and digital transformation. That these are relevant is unquestionable, although the timing of the coordination between the Gender Country Profile and the CLIP is critical. The latest Gender Country Profile dates from 2018 and did not include specific enough recommendations to inform the 2021 CLIP. The CLIP is integrated in the sense of an overall direction of progress towards GEWE rather than an 'implementation plan'. While the document may have implicit objectives, there is nothing beyond GAP objectives that could inform programming, monitoring, or policy dialogue.

**Outside MS embassies, awareness of the CLIP and even of GAP III is low. EU MS, but neither NGO nor government representatives interviewed, recall being involved in an effective consultative process.** The CLIP references the EU JS, extensively quotes the Gender Country Profile, and states that its *"prioritization was informed by the results of the Country Gender Profile developed in 2018 but, more importantly, by consultations with the civil society in both West Bank and Gaza Strip as well as with Member States active in The OPT."* While EU MS confirm their consultation (meetings and commenting on the draft document), no CSOs consulted for this evaluation recall having been consulted. EU institutional memory on how the CLIP was produced is basically non-existent. Government stakeholders consulted were not familiar with the CLIP at all. The DG ECHO country office was not involved in the design of the CLIP.

#### 4.2.2.2 CLIPs facilitate gender mainstreaming and targeted actions (JC2.2)

**The CLIP for the OPT cannot be considered a credible implementation plan because nothing in it could guide programming, monitoring or policy dialogue in a concrete way.** There is a description of specific actions planned or underway, but only general descriptions of the way forward for mainstreaming. While the documents include very specific gender-targeted interventions by both the EU and MS, it provides only a very general description of what will be done to mainstream gender in non-targeted projects and programmes. Most important, according to EUD programme managers, sector specificities and details that could guide such efforts are absent. As a result, there is no evidence that the CLIP facilitated either gender mainstreaming or targeted actions; nor did it generate additional resources for gender.

The evaluation acknowledges that there was only limited time for the implementation of the CLIP and therefore limited potential for it to achieve visible results, given its late adoption in 2021. Nonetheless, so far **there is no evidence that the CLIP has facilitated gender mainstreaming and targeted actions in EU planned spending activities at country level**, despite the increase of gender-targeted funding presented in Figure 6 above. All new Action Documents are marked G1, which – in theory – means that proper gender mainstreaming has been carried out, including sex-disaggregated data, specific objectives on gender equality and context informed by the Gender Country Profile. However, when analysing these numbers, one needs to consider the above outlined caveats regarding gender-dilution in the programming process below decision level (JC 1.2): the G1 markers are in part a result of 'significance-shopping' rather than evidence for gender mainstreaming at action level.

**There is no evidence either that the CLIP has encouraged gender-responsive budgeting**, which have long been present in the OPT and is promoted by both the Ministry of Women Affairs (MoWA) and international NGOs (e.g., Oxfam), or gender-auditing of projects. Regarding blending, concerns have been expressed that gender is not taken sufficiently taken into account (e.g. in the form of gender analyses).

#### 4.2.2.3 CLIPs contribute to gender perspective into political and policy dialogue (JC2.3)

**Stakeholders consulted did not perceive any visible change following the introduction of the CLIP in October 2021**, for the time being, although CLIP and GAP III are the current working reference documents.. For instance, there is no evidence pointing towards increased human and resources for GEWE deployed by the EU in the OPT. The fact that there is no institutional memory within the EUREP on how the CLIP was produced – probably by an external consultant – strongly suggests that the preparation had no benefit in terms of EUREP gender capacity. This is an opportunity lost, as there is no shortage of national gender expertise. EU MS consulted perceived a deterioration in terms of joint communication and reporting since the introduction of the CLIP (see JC 1.3), although this seems be more related to EUREP staff turnover than to GAP III or the CLIP as such.

**The CLIP did not serve as a useful framework for EU political and policy dialogue because the OPT is a difficult environment in which to discuss any issues that refer to gender or are perceived as feminist.** Besides the caveats outlined in previous JCs, progress is also hindered by the increasingly obstructive country context described in Section 1.1. As the political situation has deteriorated and violence under occupation has risen, the entire subject of gender has become fraught. With the political strength of the Palestinian Authority weak, it has become increasingly dependent on the support of the



more traditional, hence patriarchal, and extremist factions of Palestinian society. The recent flashpoint has been the Family Protection Draft Law, which has been mis-characterised as not in line with Islam and the traditional Palestinian way of life. Anti-feminism has escalated to the point that it is difficult to discuss CEDAW and women human rights defenders and feminist NGOs have been subjected to harassment and violence, in an atmosphere of impunity. Both international agencies and feminist NGO representatives interviewed expressed concern that the international community (not only the EU) overplayed their hand in aggressively supporting the Law.

#### 4.2.2.4 CLIPs facilitate gender-sensitive monitoring of results (JC2.4)

**The EU JS ROF contains a detailed sector result matrix for gender** (under pillar 6 cross-cutting issues), reporting on progress towards the impact “*Equal rights and opportunities in the public and private sectors*” and towards four thematic outcomes: i) violence against women; ii) increased women participation in decision-making positions; iii) increased women participation in the economic sector; iv) institutionalisation of gender equality and equity. Under a fifth ‘induced’ output, the matrix reports on the existence of Palestinian monitoring systems to measure achievements towards gender equality.

**The CLIP itself does not present a results framework** that would allow for monitoring progress towards its objectives. While it is well aligned with EU JS and GAP III, it did not include a section on how the actions outlined will be managed, coordinated, and monitored. This weakens operationalization.


#### 4.2.3 Effects on Women’s Economic Empowerment (EQ3)

Support for WEE, long an area of support for the EU, has increased with a G2 capacity building project under the AAP 2021. Both the Ministry of Women’s Affairs and gender units in line ministries will benefit, as will Palestinian NGOs. At the same time, concrete results from EU support for WEE are difficult to find. Female labour force participation, even for highly educated women and despite shortages of male workers, remains low. The EU has supported formalisation of two highly female sectors (textile production and private schools), but this is in a context of an economy where the benefits of having a formal labour contract are, for many currently informal workers, low. Along the same lines, the long-term impact of EU support to women’s cooperatives can point to some short-term results, but sustainability can be questioned when the actual services rendered to cooperative members are limited. Stakeholders interviewed saw little opportunity

##### 4.2.3.1 Strategic engagement / policy and political dialogue; M&E and communication on WEE (JC3.1)

**As previously mentioned, the CLIP identifies WEE as one of its five engagement areas, but lacks specific targets** (as well as a framework for measuring progress towards them). Objectives as outlined in the CLIP are: i) increased access for women in all their diversity to financial services and products, and productive resources, and ii) Women in all their diversity have improved access to entrepreneurship opportunities, including social entrepreneurship, and alternative livelihoods and strengthened participation in the green and circular economy. After a declining trend, the volume of actions supporting WEE increased in 2022, as shown in Figure 10. This may reflect, in part, impact of GAP III and the CLIP.

Figure 10 Evolution of funding (contracted amounts) to GEWE (G1/G2) interventions in the Occupied Palestinian Territories promoting WEE and WPS, 2019-2022



Source: Particip, based on Statistical Dashboard data

**Following the CLIP, a new G2-action has been proposed under the AAP 2021, but it is too early to assess its design and results.** At the time of field activities for this case study (November 2022), the action had not been contracted yet but was awaiting signature from the PA. Under this action, the EU, through the Italian cooperation agency, will provide financial and programming support to the MoWA and gender units in line ministries for gender-responsive policy and law-making. Through support to CSOs, the action will also address social norms hindering women's rights and promote gender equality in public discourse. It will thereby assist the PA in fulfilling its commitments to gender equality outlined in the National Development Plan and in its (cross-)sectoral strategies. While the new action has a particular focus on WEE, there seems to be an overlap with a EUR 1 million programme funded by Italy that has supported MoWA in gender mainstreaming since 2021.

**Despite no major changes introduced by GAP III, implementing partners continue to deliver high-quality WEE-related programming with EU support.** The EU's support for WEE in the OPT consists of support for women's involvement in agricultural cooperatives, economic resilience in Gaza, and social dialogue in sectors employing many women (textiles/garments, kindergartens/private schools). While the EU's development partners are (mostly) not aware of GAP III and / or the CLIP, their strategies and programmes are well aligned with EU priorities. The new action on gender mainstreaming at institutional level with a focus on WEE plans to work with both the Ministry of Women's Affairs (MoWA) and gender units of line ministries as well as with Palestinian NGOs specialised in employability. While this seems like a reasonable choice, given the weak capacities of MoWA, it comes with the risk of MoWA feeling further 'side-lined' by the EU and may further harm the already poor relationship between MoWA and NGOs working on GEWE.

#### 4.2.3.2 Strengthening of women's rights (incl. TVET, decent work, equal pay, social protection systems, inclusion in the formal economy, green economy and digital transformation) (JC3.2)

**There is no evidence of EU contribution to transformative or systemic change. Results obtained by EU support to WEE are scattered, small in scale, and of doubtful sustainability.** The EU's support for WEE in the OPT consists of support for women's involvement in agricultural cooperatives, economic resilience in Gaza, and social dialogue in sectors employing many women (textiles/garments, kindergartens/private schools). The occupation, with its stranglehold on economic growth, is a massive barrier to progress, but is not the only one. Despite a highly educated female population, the labour force participation rate of women is low although there is a labour market shortage due to males, especially skilled ones, choosing to work in Israel. Conservative patriarchal values are easy to blame, but highly educated women are also strikingly absent from the labour force. Values in the OPT are, moreover, far from conservative relative to other Arab states.

**The EU interventions designed to empower women that were reviewed are unlikely to succeed and illustrate the risks of, as alluded to under EQ 1, the EU's dependence in programming on the**

**gender agenda of implementing agencies.** The project ‘Promotion of inclusive agricultural growth to ensure improved living standards and resilience of vulnerable communities in Area C of the West Bank’ (lead by Oxfam) promoted WEE and gender mainstreaming in cooperatives, including a component on women’s transformative leadership. While the project indeed has increased (female) farmers’ production and as well as incomes and employment for women, results are small in scale. Approaches must be better adapted to the context – as cooperatives actually provide relatively few services to its members, many female farmers are better off selling in the local market or to friends and neighbours than to the cooperative that could possibly connect them with major markets. Further, the overall sustainability of the project is highly dependent on beneficiaries’ access to resources in Area C and therefore questionable.

**Labour market policy in the OPT is hampered by a commitment to formalize an economy when the much of the legal and regulatory framework discourages formality.** The regional ILO-led project ‘Social dialogue for formalization and employability in the Southern Neighbourhood Region (SOLIFEM)’ encourages formality in two pilot sectors with a traditionally high share of female labour force – education and garment. As project activities have not yet started, it is too early to assess any effects of the project. ILO draws on a toolkit that provides a useful menu of alternatives to be assessed and goals to be prioritised. In the OPT, however, the context for formalisation includes a typical alliance between the public authority responsible for pensions and a confederation of trade unions closely allied with Government. The labour market is highly informal and the public pension system is widely distrusted. Formality is unattractive for many Palestinian firms (overwhelmingly small or micro-) and workers. A strategy to reduce or eliminate informality would need to be very carefully designed, indeed; if to be successful, it would need to be multi-dimensional and carefully sequenced.

**The cash transfer system, subsidized by the EU under PEGASE to the PA and administered by the Ministry of Social Development, functions reasonably well.** There is gender targeting (female-headed households), but persons interviewed did not perceive any gender mainstreaming in the programme. The level of social assistance provided is low and unpredictable, depending as it does on the prevailing level of fiscal crisis.

#### 4.2.4 Effects on Women, Peace and Security (EQ4)

As can be seen from the chart above, the level of spending on WPS has been extremely low. The EU provides more than half of UNRWA’s budget, and that organisation has increasingly worked on Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV) in the camps. In Gaza, the EU has supported a women’s centre to assist survivors of SGBV. Several Palestinian women’s NGOs have received grants to document human rights abuses and produce CEDAW shadow reports. All of this, however, is in a very difficult political and social environment. Possibilities for women to contribute an end to the conflict are few, as there is currently no appetite on either side for reconciliation. Women who have raised their voices in favour of pursuing a road towards peace have been subject to public outrage.

##### 4.2.4.1 Strategic engagement / policy and political dialogue; M&E and communication on WPS (JC4.1)

**As previously mentioned, the CLIP identifies WPS as one of its five engagement areas, but lacks specific targets** (as well as a framework for measuring progress towards them). Objectives as outlined in the CLIP are: i) prevention, ii) protection, and iii) relief and recovery. The volume of actions supporting WPS in the OPT was comparatively low in both pre- and post-GAP III years (see Figure 10).

**In fact, the political context has been so difficult that work on peace building is exceptionally difficult.** CSOs who benefitted from EU training and attempted to subsequently contribute to reconciliation have been threatened and their members assaulted. CSOs supported by the EU document SGBV by both Israeli and Palestinian security forces. The EU’s limitations when it comes to political dialogue are particularly visible in Gaza due to the no-contact policy with Hamas.

##### 4.2.4.2 Strengthening of women’s rights (on WPS pillars) (JC4.2)

**UNRWA’s work was reported to increasingly focus on gender, including Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV), but what can be achieved is limited by the host countries’ political environments.** UNRWA is the biggest service provider for registered Palestinian refugees in the region, delivers good quality daily services with an increasing focus on gender, including SGBV. The EU and EU MS provide substantial financial support to UNRWA, having covered more than 50% of the annual UNRWA budget for the last decades. However, as UNRWA works exclusively with core funding (instead of project approach), it is not clear to what extent GAP III has affected the gender responsiveness of UNRWA’s work. Further, UNRWA’s work on politically sensitive gender issues, e.g. comprehensive sexuality education in schools, is limited by the political environment of the host countries in which UNRWA is operating. As the organisation cannot work in a void, in order to achieve more results, the

issues need to be tackled holistically, with donors supporting their pushing for a more gender-sensitive agenda through policy dialogue.

**The EU has funded a number of Palestinian and international NGOs to implement projects promoting the protection and respect of the rights of (vulnerable) women and girls. While good results were achieved, sustainability is hindered by the overall unfavourable political environment.** For instance, in Gaza, the Women's Affairs Centre Gaza works towards increasing awareness of women, girls and communities to women's rights, with a particular focus on SGBV survivors. In East Jerusalem, an EU-funded projects allows Palestinian women's NGOs to document human rights abuses and write shadow CEDAW reports.

#### 4.2.4.3 Increased participation of women in peace building, negotiations and mediation (J4.3)

**In the OPT, the WPS agenda is mainly supported by Norway and UN Women, but EU has made some contribution, supporting work on bringing together civil society to generate trust and increasing women's participation in peace building.** In 2021, EUREP attended the '2021 Open Day - High-level Dialogue on Women, Peace and Security in the OPT, organised by UN Women, which brought together women and youth leaders from civil society organisations with high-level senior officials. Topics discussed covered Israeli violations, women in reconciliation processes, existing peacebuilding initiatives and a gender-sensitive reconstruction of Gaza. The EU has also funded projects on protection under the WPS umbrella, consisting largely in documenting human rights abuses allegedly committed by Israeli security forces and Israeli settlers. Unfortunately, past progress is being eroded by the deteriorating political environment, growing radicalisation, and the fracturing of Palestinian politics and society. the OPT is included in a recent regional project, SAWT, aiming to promote women's role in peace-building. However, stakeholders interviewed stated that there is currently no appetite for reconciliation in the conflict and correspondingly, little willingness to take risks in its pursuit. The latter are not abstract, as rare feminist voices speaking for reconciliation have been publicly vilified.

### 4.3 Annex

#### 4.3.1 List of persons consulted

<i>Organisation</i>	<i>Position</i>
<b>EU &amp; EU MS</b>	
Consulate General of Sweden Palestine	Programme Manager / Gender focal person
(EU) DG ECHO Field Office	Programme Officer
(EU) DG NEAR A.2	Team Leader
(EU) DG NEAR B.1	International Aid / Cooperation Officer
(EU) DG NEAR B.1	Team Leader - Head of Sector for Israel, the Occupied Palestinian Territories and UNRWA
Italian Agency for Development Cooperation (AICS)	Consul
Italian Agency for Development Cooperation (AICS)	Gender Equality Programme Officer
Italian Agency for Development Cooperation (AICS)	Head of Agency
EUREP to the OPT	Cooperation Officer OPS1
EUREP to the OPT	Task manager Economic Development & Trade
EUREP to the OPT	International Aid / Cooperation Officer OPS3
EUREP to the OPT	Programme manager for Civil Society, Human Rights, Gender & Disabilities (OPS3), Gender focal person
EUREP to the OPT	Head of Political Section
EUREP to the OPT	Project officer OPS1
EUREP to the OPT	Task Manager / Governance and Democracy OPS3
EUREP to the OPT	Project Officer OPS3
EUREP to the OPT	Head of Cooperation
EUREP to the OPT	Task Manager
EUREP to the OPT	Programme Officer OPS1
EUREP to the OPT	Cooperation Officer OPS2
<b>National and local authorities</b>	
Ministry of National Economy	Minister's Chief of Staff

<i>Organisation</i>	<i>Position</i>
Ministry of Women's Affairs	Gender and Development Planning
<b>Civil Society Organisations</b>	
Care International	Project Manager
Oxfam	Gender Officer
Oxfam	Project manager
Oxfam	Project Manager
Oxfam	Economic Justice Programme Manager-West Bank
Terre des Hommes	Inclusive Education Technical Advisor
Terre des Hommes	Desk Officer
Terre des Hommes	Country Delegate
East Jerusalem YMCA	Director Women Development Program
Palestinian Housing Council	Technical Director/Projects Manager
Palestinian Housing Council	Fundraising Director
The Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy MIFTAH	Director Development, Communication and Outreach
Women's Affairs Center Gaza	Public Relations Officer
Women's Affairs Center Gaza	General Director
Women's Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling	Director of Programs
<b>UN &amp; development agencies</b>	
International Labour Organisation (ILO)	Programme Analyst
International Labour Organisation (ILO)	Project Officer
UN Women	Programme Coordinator

### 4.3.2 List of documents

#### 4.3.2.1 EU Strategy Programming

- EC (2021) European Joint Strategy in Support of Palestine (Occupied Territories) 2021-2024

#### 4.3.2.2 EU Reporting

- EC (2019): External Assistance Management Report (EAMR) Palestine (Occupied Territories) 2019
- EC (2019): Progress Report 2019 Palestine (Occupied Territories)
- EC (2020): External Assistance Management Report (EAMR) Palestine (Occupied Territories) 2020
- EC (2020): Progress Report 2020 Palestine (Occupied Territories)
- EC (2021): External Assistance Management Report (EAMR) Palestine (Occupied Territories) 2021
- EC (2021): Progress Report 2021 Palestine (Occupied Territories)

#### 4.3.2.3 EU gender-specific

- EC (2018): Gender Country Profile for Palestine (Occupied Territories)
- EC (2021): Gender Action Plan III – 2021-2025 Country Level Implementation Plan – CLIP Palestine (Occupied Territories)

#### 4.3.2.4 Project documentation

- The team reviewed the available project documentation (action fiches/TAPs, grant contracts, implementation and monitoring reports, evaluations, etc.) of the projects presented in the tables in section 4.1.2.

#### 4.3.2.5 Other

- DG ECHO (2021): Evaluation of the EU's implementation of the DG ECHO Thematic Policy Document "Gender: Different Needs, Adapted Assistance" of July 2013. <https://civil-protection->

humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2021-06/ade\_gender\_policy\_evaluation\_final\_report\_final\_without-executive-summary.pdf

- Prime Minister's Office (2020): National Development Plan 2021-2023. <https://andp.unescwa.org/plans/1293>
- State of Palestine Ministry of Social Development (2020): The updated Social Development Sector Strategy 2021-2023
- World Bank (2022) Women, Business and the Law 2022

## 5 Country case study – Serbia

### 5.1 Introduction

#### 5.1.1 Context

The **cooperation between the EU and Serbia** is governed by the Stabilisation and Association Agreement<sup>83</sup>, which followed the granting of candidate status to Serbia by the EU in 2012. Currently, this cooperation is channelled through the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) III 2021-2027<sup>84</sup>. The strategic directions for this cooperation are set in the **IPA III Strategic Response – Republic of Serbia**, which has the same temporal scope as the IPA III. The Strategic Response is the equivalent, for candidate countries of the Multi Annual Indicative Programme (MIP) in other countries supported by the EU. The current Strategic Response has an anticipated country-specific programmatic budget of EUR 224.8 million, plus an envelope of EUR 30.8 million anticipated for cross-border programmes with neighbouring countries.

The Strategic Response is further implemented through Annual Action Programmes, under which the European Commission adopts individual programmes through Action Documents, which are then implemented through a variety of modalities (e.g. budget support, grants to CSOs and international organisations, contribution agreements with international organisations, project modalities, blending operations, macro-financial assistance).

At country level under the Strategic Response, or regionally under IPA III, the programmatic approach to big thematic areas is typically delineated by large facility programmes, such as the EU Civil Society Facility and Media Programme in favour of the Western Balkans and Turkey (regional), or the European Integration Facility (country level).

Along these lines, a specificity of EU-Serbia cooperation is the **Gender Equality Facility II**, approved in 2021, covering the period 2021-2024 with EUR 2 million from IPA II. In addition, the EU has funded several country and regional programmes in various thematic areas with a strong gender component.

Changes in norms and values underpinning gender equality are slow in Serbia despite visible social changes and modernisation processes of gender relations, especially among the younger generation of women and men. In 'Women, Business and the Law 2022', an index measuring progress toward gender equality by examining the laws and regulations that affect women's economic opportunities, Serbia scored 93.8 out of 100. The overall score for is higher than the regional average observed across Europe and Central Asia (84.1).<sup>85</sup>

The prevalence of domestic and intimate partner violence against women is exceptionally high. Despite the high level of education and engagement in public life, there is prevalent and highly publicised backlash against prominent women's roles in the public and private domains, widespread gender stereotypes, and prejudices. Women face obstacles in advancing careers and participating in politics and decision-making, particularly at the local level and in executive positions. They have equal access to education, but their education choices and, consequently, their employment opportunities, are mainly shaped by gender roles<sup>86</sup>. Of particular significance has been the political positioning of ruling party politicians in the face of adamant Orthodox church-led campaigns against progressive gender policies. Apart from the Church there has also emerged a secular conservative, sometimes far-right discourse against gender equality. Despite highly publicised allegations of sexual harassment, abuse, and worse by persons in high position, "anti-gender" discourse has found a welcoming audience in the context of worsening populations economic and social well-being due to the ongoing health, security and financial crisis.

Social and gender norms related to age, ethnic origin, disability, social status and background, migrant status, sexual orientation and gender identity particularly contribute to disadvantage and discrimination against specific groups of women. Older women, rural women, Roma women, women with disabilities, migrant women, lesbians, poorly educated rural and Roma girls and women etc., are particularly exposed to risks of multiple and intersectional discrimination<sup>87</sup>. Women and girls from marginalised communities, victims of gender-based violence, encounter stereotypical beliefs when seeking help from the authorities, resulting in insufficient responses. Statistical data relating to the position of these women are scarce and insufficient for an adequate policy response. Younger men and men belonging to

<sup>83</sup> EC (2013): 2013A9018

<sup>84</sup> EC (2021): C(2021) 8914 final

<sup>85</sup> World Bank (2022) Women, Business and the Law 2022

<sup>86</sup> Government of Serbia (2021). Gender Equality Index for the Republic of Serbia 2021. Digitalization, future of work and gender equality

<sup>87</sup> Beker, K., Janjić, B., Lepojević, V. (2021). Izveštaj o pravima žena i rodnoj ravnopravnosti u Srbiji za 2020

marginalized and vulnerable groups are also particularly challenged by societal requests to perform their traditional masculine roles.


The new **EU Progress Report for Serbia** emphasises that the Serbian normative framework (laws, regulations, policies) is mostly aligned with international and European standards (UN Conventions, European Conventions, EU norms and directives). The Gender Equality Act (GEA) adopted in May 2021, proclaims gender equality in Serbia in all areas of public and private life. In 2021 the Government adopted the Strategy for gender equality for the period from 2021 to 2030 with an accompanying Action Plan. The strategy aims to address gender-based inequalities in all relevant spheres of public and private life. An important overarching strategy for combating discrimination is the Strategy for prevention and protection against discrimination for the period from 2022 to 2030. Other important strategies for GEWE are the Strategy for Social Inclusion of Roma in the Republic of Serbia 2022-2030 and; the Strategy for Preventing and Fighting against Gender-Based Violence against Women and Violence in the Family 2021-2025<sup>88</sup>. Yet, this overarching normative and operational framework is either insufficiently implemented by the authorities, or under-used by the population – or both, given the insufficiently developed gender equality mechanisms at the national and local levels).

### 5.1.2 Focus of the case study

This country case study examines **EU support to GEWE in Serbia** and aims at identifying country specific factors that influenced design, implementation and the results achieved. The analysis covers the diversity of EU support to Serbia in terms of modalities (contribution / delegation agreements, action grants, TA & services) and channels (National Government, UN & development agencies, EU MS, (I)NGOs, EFIs / IFIs and private sector). It also considers dialogues and public diplomacy activities.

The evaluation team has identified a portfolio of **EUR 135 million** allocated to GEWE<sup>89</sup> significant- or targeted interventions under GAP III in the country. As shown in Figure 5, EU support to GEWE in Serbia steeply increased after the adoption of GAP III, in line with the global trend for the GEWE-specific financial volume, which increased in absolute terms during the period in scope.<sup>90</sup> This is likely attributable to the deployment of the Gender Equality Facility, and more systematic application of the gender markers.

Figure 11 Evolution of funding (contracted amounts) to GEWE under GAP III, 2019-2022



Source: Particip, based on Statistical Dashboard data

Data collection and analysis was structured along the EQs. Some issues related to the policy and strategic framework (EQ1) and to the design and implementation of the CLIP (EQ2) were examined

<sup>88</sup> Krstic, I. (2022). Gender equality - How are EU rules transposed into national law? - Country report, Serbia

<sup>89</sup> The evaluation team has carried out the present portfolio analysis on the basis of retrieved information on contracted amounts for all EU external actions from EU internal databases (EU Statistical Dashboard). The category "GEWE" mainly includes interventions categorised as with gender as a main objective (i.e., 'Gender Equality' marker = 2) or as a significant objective (i.e., 'Gender Equality' marker = 1). As explained in the Annexes, this category may contain interventions identified as Non targeted (i.e., 'Gender Equality' marker = 0) but which the team has identified as having a link to GEWE and therefore considered as within the scope of the evaluation.

<sup>90</sup> For further details, see Annex 5 in Volume III.



looking at the whole portfolio. Most issues (including those related to the effects of WEE and WPS) were examined focusing on a number of main interventions identified in Serbia and complemented by interventions recommended for review by the EUD as yielding learnings. Table 10 and Table 11 below present these interventions at bilateral and regional level.

Table 10 Main bilateral contracts sampled in Serbia

Year	Intervention/ Contract title	Cris ref.	Contracting party	Planned amount (EUR)
<b>Education, children and youth intervention mainstreaming gender</b>				
2019	Country Action Programme Serbia IPA 2016 – Objective 2 – Education Sector Budget Support	D-39806	Ministry of Education of Serbia, Ministry of Finance of Serbia	27,400,000
2019	Capacity building of relevant institutions under the Sector reform contract for Education Reform in Serbia – strengthening links with employment and social inclusion	C-405242	UNICEF	2,696,000
2021	Enhanced Equal Access to and Completion of Pre-University Education for Children in Need of Additional Support in Education	C-419147	UNICEF	4,499,821
2021	Protecting the Rights of Street-Involved Children in Serbia	C-424377	Centar Za Integraciju Mladih	250,000
<b>Social inclusion mainstreaming gender</b>				
2019	EU support to social housing and active inclusion	C-409003	UNOPS	20,000,000
<b>Environment and Climate Action mainstreaming gender</b>				
2020	EU support to social housing and active inclusion – addendum no 2	C-417697	UNOPS	7,000,000
2021	EU and EBRD for Energy Efficiency in Belgrade	C-420918	EBRD	11,000,000
2021	EU for Green Agenda in Serbia: Get Started, Take Action, Scale-up	C-429150	UNDP	3,599,884
<b>Gender-targeted intervention</b>				
2019	Improving democratic society through strengthening the capacities of female NGOs and citizens	C-413364	Forum Zena Prijepolja	62,170
2020	Support to Priority Actions for Gender Equality in Serbia II (Gender Equality Facility)	C-420725	UN Women	2,000,000
2020	Integrated Response to Violence against Women and Girls in Serbia III	n/a	UN country team Serbia	Sweden funding USD 1.5 million

Table 11 Main regional contracts sampled in Serbia

Year	Intervention/ Contract title	Cris ref.	Contracting party	Planned amount
2019	Ending violence against women in the Western Balkans and Turkey, Phase II. Implementing Norms, Changing Minds	C-413716	UN Women	2,500,000 (859,337 for Serbia)
2019	Women for Peace and Security – Towards good neighbourly relations between Serbia and Kosovo	C-414581	Udruzenje Zena Pescanik	230,603
2020	Supporting the Effective Reintegration of Returnees in the Western Balkans Phase II	C-420518	World Bank	2,200,000
2020	Regional Project to mitigate the impact of COVID-19 on the lives of children and families in the Western Balkans and Turkey.	C-418039	UNICEF	5,000,000
2020	Strengthening refugee and migrant children's health status in Southern and South-Eastern Europe ('RM Child-Health' initiative)	n/a	UNICEF	DG SANTE funding 4,300,000

## 5.2 Findings

### 5.2.1 Policy and strategic framework (EQ1)

The EUD's institutional environment was conducive to mainstreaming and promoting GEWE. The EUD GFP, supported by senior management, GFPs in Brussels, and providing expertise to a strong staff, played a consultative role. At strategic level, GEWE is an important EU transversal priority, corresponding to a general trend of growing visibility afforded to GEWE in strategic documents. Both the EUD-prepared Programming Framework 2021-2027 and Government-drafted Strategic Response 2021-2024 reflected priorities from GAP III. However, neither provides details and specific measures apart from i) the gender-targeted mechanisms, legal, regulatory and policy framework for GEWE and ii) actions under a rights-based approach to prevent and remedy VAWAG and domestic violence. While both are important to GEWE, they are at best gender-sensitive and/or gender-responsive; not gender-transformative. Other thematic areas of strategic documents, where the causes of gender inequalities are rooted, only declare that gender equality will be taken into account, mainstreamed or supported – but without specifying how this will be achieved, or what specific priorities may be.

While some EU MS quote the GAP III in their own country programming documents, there is no evidence that gender mainstreaming in the strategic documents is connected to strategic-level joint programming with the EU MS, or IFIs, or other partners. EU MS participate in the respective Sector Coordination Working Groups involving the EU, EU MS, other donors, and relevant ministries, where the EU reports bring up GEWE as a horizontal issue. However, there is no evidence of how this dialogue materializes into specific GEWE support in EU programming documents. There is no forum of exchange among Gender focal persons of the EUD, other international organisations, and EU MS. Some EU MS (Sweden, Germany) routinely refer to GAP III, and gender-code their projects. Some blending actions contained G2 components, however there is no evidence that these relate to strategic-level dialogue on GEWE between the EU and IFIs.

The latest strategic country evaluation on Serbia included gender-sensitive indicators in most evaluation questions and was more vocal than the last regarding the EU's and the Government's commitments to supporting GEWE as well as their effects. However, it has not issued any recommendation on GEWE.

Likewise, in 2021 and 2022, the EC Annual Progress Reports on Serbia have been more vocal on GEWE than their predecessors. At the same time, the 2022 Report still tends to reduce GEWE to a matter of fundamental rights and a matter of VAWG and domestic violence, not as a more encompassing, transversal issue which is relevant to all spheres of public and private life. As a result, despite accurately describing the normative framework and noting the gap between reasonably adequate legislation and poor implementation, the Report paid insufficient attention to the obstacles faced by women in all chapters; to the actual and equal realisation of their rights by women and girls and the need for an implementation plan with adequate budget.

#### 5.2.1.1 Programming reflects GAP III objectives: MFF and policy documents (JC1.1)

Not applicable to country level.

#### 5.2.1.2 Conducive institutional environment ensured (JC1.2)

**The EUD GFP played a consultative role, as did (indirectly) GFPs in Brussels.** It is plausible that both the EUD-prepared Programming Framework and Government-drafted Strategic Response reflected recommendations stemming from the analysis in the Gender Country Profile as an analytical document. However, both documents lack in details and specific measures apart from i) the gender-targeted mechanisms, legal, regulatory and policy framework for GEWE and ii) actions under a rights-based approach to prevent and remedy VAWAG and domestic violence. While both are important to GEWE, they are at best gender-sensitive and/or gender-responsive; not gender-transformative.

Other thematic areas, where the causes of gender inequalities are rooted, only declare that gender equality will be taken into account, mainstreamed or supported – but without specifying how this will be achieved, or what specific priorities may be.

#### 5.2.1.3 Gender-responsive programming and M&E (JC1.3)

**The most recent strategic programming documents are the EU's IPA III Programming Framework 2021-2027, and the Government's matching IPA III Strategic Response 2021-2024. Both emphasize gender equality and the empowerment of women as part of key transversal priorities.** Each author (EU and Government) makes reference to their own and each other's normative framework: they both quote the GAP III, recall its principles and make reference to Serbia's Law on Gender Equality

and the Gender Equality Strategy (pending at the time of drafting the IPA III Programmatic Framework and the Strategic Response). This corresponds to a general trend of growing visibility afforded to GEWE in strategic documents. While some EU MS quote the GAP III in their own country programming documents, there is no evidence that gender mainstreaming in the strategic documents is connected to strategic-level joint programming with the EU MS, or IFIs, or other partners. This could be partly explained by the situation during the COVID-19 pandemic. In difference with sector-specific programming which benefits from dedicated Working Groups<sup>91</sup>, EU MS were not solicited, nor actively engaged in EU specific programming for GEWE (Gender Country Profile, CLIP). Due to the restrictions in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, the EUD was only able to organize an online consultation meeting for representatives of EU MS, but reports this was met with limited interest and involvement by MS representatives. There is no forum of exchange among Gender focal persons of the EUD, other international organisations, and EU MS.

**Some EU MS (Sweden, Germany) routinely refer to GAP III, and gender-code their projects.** Some blending actions contained G2 components, however there is no evidence that these relate to strategic-level dialogue on GEWE between the EU and IFIs.

**The latest strategic country evaluation on Serbia included gender-sensitive indicators in most evaluation questions** and was more vocal than the last regarding the EU's and the Government's commitments to supporting GEWE as well as their effects. However, it has not issued any recommendation on GEWE. Likewise, in 2021 and 2022, the EC Annual Progress Reports on Serbia have been more vocal on GEWE than their predecessors. At the same time the 2022 Report still tends to reduce GEWE to a matter of fundamental rights and a matter of VAWG and domestic violence, not as a more encompassing, transversal issue which is relevant to all spheres of public and private life. As a result, insufficient attention was paid to the obstacles faced by women in all chapters. Communication efforts to publicise the Report gave insufficient space to GEWE as compared to other issues. Many interlocutors also regretted that the Report did not focus sufficiently on the actual and equal realisation of their rights by women and girls. They considered that the Report's opinion on the existing and pending normative framework was accurate (the Report points to the overall adequacy of legislative and strategic framework but regretted the lack of an implementation plan with associated budget), expressing the view that insufficient attention was paid to the obstacles faced by women in all chapters.

## 5.2.2 Design and implementation of CLIPs (EQ2)

In a challenging environment, the EUD has used the GAP III, Gender Country Profile, and CLIP to take stock of gender analysis and reflect it in its priorities. However, the CLIP preparation process was not used to make decisions about interventions: it was rather an internal and external consultative moment, which served to identify key priorities for GEWE – but it did not affect the set of already planned actions, which do not necessarily correspond to the selected future priorities. Given the long cycle of programming, contracting, and implementation, actions planned before GAP III will continue to be implemented for a while before the EUD starts planning actions that directly address the CLIP priorities. Addressing the thematic areas identified under the CLIP will therefore lay on the respective Action Documents.

The EUD largely entrusted the Gender Country Profile, the implementation of the Gender Facility Project (the flagship GEWE intervention), and the GEWE review of Action Fiches from the Government, to UN Women. This was viewed as a means to mobilise expertise but was also perceived by various actors as revealing of shortcomings in terms of internal capacity, and sometimes restraining the access of some (local) CSOs to consultative or implementation processes.

The CLIP can be improved in terms of coherence between analysis, objectives, and actions described. It can also give more space to G2 actions. The process of preparation of the Gender Country Profile and CLIP, while building on existing synergies, could also serve as a vehicle to expand synergies with more like-minded actors.

### 5.2.2.1 CLIPs reflect a clear, relevant and integrated vision (JC2.1)

**The CLIP closely reflects most of the recommendations issued in the Gender Country Profile (prepared by consultant engaged by UN Women with EUD dedicated funding from the Gender Equality Facility action) which, in turn, closely followed the GAP III priorities.** The choice of thematic objectives corresponds to the Gender Country Profile's recommendations. The CLIP differentiates clearly between the Thematic Objectives (under intervention areas) which it intends to

<sup>91</sup> EU MS participate in the respective Sector Coordination Working Groups involving the EU, EU MS, other donors, and relevant ministries, where the EU reports bringing up GEWE as a horizontal issue. However, there is no evidence of how this dialogue materializes into specific GEWE support in EU programming documents.

pursue in the future, and the concrete targeted actions which are planned or being implemented. This makes the CLIP difficult to monitor and blurs the links between the GAP III, the Gender Country Profile, the CLIP, and the actions envisaged under the Annual Action Programmes (which themselves implement the IPA III Programmatic Framework). The situation is further complicated as the CLIP only includes gender-targeted actions, but it does not list all actions with a G2 objective; thus, the CLIP may not fully give justice to the GEWE efforts deployed by the EUD. Despite these shortcomings, the CLIP is a strong document, in that it clearly presents the GEWE-related concerns of the EUD, follows the guidelines issued by DG INTPA, and gives a sense of strong priority in all types of activities of the EUD. It provides details on dialogue and communications.

**Opinions on the inclusivity and participatory nature of CLIP preparation differed sharply among stakeholders.** Some CSOs criticised the fact that preparation of the Gender Country Profile, and management of the Gender Equality Facility, was entrusted by the EU to UN Women. While there was consultation with the EUD, it is not clear to what extent there was actual input of the EUD to either document. The fact that the Gender Country Profile was mostly delegated to a consultant contracted through the Gender Equality Facility, while positive in terms of quality, may also reflect limited capacity and time engagement of the EUD sectors. Despite these reservations, those actors who were familiar with the CLIP judged it to be of good quality. Descriptions of Actions drafted before availability of the Gender Country Profile are of lesser quality; for example, they do not make the distinction between gender-sensitive, -responsive, and -transformative actions.

**The EUD, with support of expert engaged through the EU-funded GEF project implemented by UN Women, engaged with extensive consultations in preparation of the Gender Country Profile and CLIP.** Those organisations not consulted (or not able to participate due to limitations related to COVID-19) had gender policies largely in line with EU gender objectives.

**The EUD in Serbia invests some human resources into the gender equality area.** The Gender focal person dedicates, depending on the periods, up to 25% or 30% (estimated) of her time to GEWE. This effort is supported by her hierarchy. Interviews reveal strong attention to GEWE priorities, not just from the part of the Gender focal person, but also among the EUD senior staff. The size of the EUD in Serbia (over 100 persons) increases the opportunity to task the staff for GEWE prioritisation, consult stakeholders on the topic, and produce dedicated documents.

#### 5.2.2.2 CLIPs facilitate gender mainstreaming and targeted actions (JC2.2)

**A review of ADs and interviews with EUD staff and implementing partners reveals three types of actions.** In order of increasing ambition, these are i) gender-sensitive actions, ii) gender-responsive actions, and iii) actions including gender-transformative objectives. There is no necessary correlation with size. Gender-sensitive actions include very large ones such as energy efficiency; gender-responsive ones include a mix of large (environment and climate change) and small (NGO social inclusion) projects. Gender-transformative ones include education of vulnerable children (especially Roma) and social housing. It is striking that gender-transformative projects identified all deal with multiply and uniquely vulnerable populations; they do not attempt overall GEWE transformation in social, economic, and political life.

**There is evident mainstreaming, based on thorough gender analysis and consultation, at AD level in actions targeting these most vulnerable populations.** At implementation level, mainstreaming is weaker, but occurs even in sectors and areas where GEWE was not a major theme. Mainstreaming in Government-drafted Action Fiches represents a challenge, but the Gender Equality Facility has been used to provide GEWE mainstreaming trainings in all Ministries, and Action Fiches (initial proposals for interventions, originating from the Government in the IPA region) are reviewed by UN Women.

**Overall, there is a decrease in the number of actions which do not have at least a G1 gender marker** (significant objective), and some actions with a high budget (e.g. in the climate change and green transition areas) now have a G1 marker.

Figure 12 Evolution of funding (contracted amounts) to GEWE under GAP III, by Gender Marker, 2019-2022



Source: Particip, based on Statistical Dashboard data

While Gender-responsive Budgeting is officially part of the Serbian budget process, that process and its accounting protocols are so complex that it is almost impossible to judge the gender-responsiveness of the budget in the format ultimately made available to the public. Responding to this challenge, the Ministry of Finance, the Coordination Body for Gender Equality, and UN Women have produced and published annual progress and impact reports on Gender-responsive budgeting. Yet, CSOs and various experts argue that this information remains difficult to trace and interpret, thus reducing accountability for Gender-responsive Budgeting.

While gender analysis is not found in blending Descriptions of Actions, there is evidence that when activities are implemented, local decision-making processes do give rise to gender-sensitivity and gender-responsiveness.

### 5.2.2.3 CLIPs contribute to gender perspective into political and policy dialogue (JC2.3)

**EU political and policy dialogue and public diplomacy in Serbia on GEWE have become stronger**, as a result of which the EU's public and political image is increasingly associated with gender equality. Since 2021, EU advocacy, strengthened by the CLIP, has contributed to a number of significant advances. The recently adopted Law and Strategy on Gender Equality are closely aligned with Serbia's international commitments, as advocated for by the EU, and with Chapters 23 and 19 of the pre-accession negotiations. The 2017 Law on Domestic Violence, and the corresponding Strategy adopted in 2021, as well as the legislative framework on anti-discrimination (especially the Law on Prohibition of Discrimination as amended in 2021) have made progress towards the implementation of the Istanbul Convention and the CEDAW respectively. In both cases, interviewees and the Gender Country Profile highlight the important role played by the pre-accession dialogue, and the integration of the EU's acquis. Some sector strategies are informed by GEWE analysis (e.g. in the areas of transport, infrastructure, energy/energy poverty, public procurement, waste management, etc...) and include GEWE targets.

**The normative framework in certain sectors lags behind, despite the EU's advocacy.** For instance, the definition of rape in Serbia's Criminal Code is not fully in line with the Istanbul Convention, although the EU has repeatedly pointed to this gap. The Gender Equality Facility, by building the capacity of the relevant civil servants to conduct gender equality tests,<sup>92</sup> may plausibly contribute to gradually bridging this gap, however the evaluation team did not find evidence of the effects of these efforts to mainstream GEWE in all sectors. Rather, the available data, as reported in the Gender Country profile, show that the effects on the concrete situation of men and women are still limited. All stakeholders interviewed agree that an unintended result of more effective EU political and policy dialogue has been an increase in negative associations between the EU and 'non-traditional family values', understood as the conjunction of equality and equivalence between men, women, and LGBTIQ persons. While the EU's communication with and to national and local authorities places increased emphasis on GEWE, it is not always perceived as recurrent, clear or strong enough to carry a powerful message and result in unequivocal action by the authorities.

<sup>92</sup> In 2022, the Secretariat for Public Policy introduced a regulatory requirement for the respective public bodies, to run a Gender Equality Test when developing new laws and regulations.

**The CLIP highlights the Gender Equality Facility as the flagship programme which facilitates dialogue, policy and planning at both national and local levels, including a broad range of actors.** The GEF and Civil Society Facility have, in particular, strengthened the participation of civil society. At the same time, the EU's actions tend to reach a relatively small circle of high-capacity, capital-based CSOs, and efforts to engage smaller, decentralised ones have proven difficult because of the low capacity of the latter to complete grant applications and credibly demonstrate the ability to manage grants. While the Gender Equality facility aims to increase this capacity – and likely does for those CSOs which receive grants – multiple sources report that its requirements are still too high for some of the organisations which it would naturally target. Some interlocutors also expressed concerns that the selection process operated by the implementing partner was extremely demanding, and therefore not adequate for some of the target groups (small, local CSOs with limited means). Several informants further deplored that both applicants and grantees had experienced dismissive attitudes from the part of local authorities, which were prejudicial to their ability to implement supported activities. While EU dialogue contributed substantially to progress in areas such as the Law and Strategy on Gender Equality, and despite some efforts by the EU to involve civil society, there is no evidence that this support has effectively strengthened civil society contribution to this progress. There appears to be a dichotomy between civil society-focused programmatic, project-oriented work, and bilateral EU-Government cooperation on the implementation side.

### 5.2.3 Effects on Women's Economic Empowerment (EQ3)

The EU approaches WEE through several angles, and in several sectors: education, social housing, environment, business environment. This may be done through policy dialogue and support to the country's normative framework, through programming and planning, but also during implementation: in some instances, gender analysis takes place locally, during the operational planning of activities. The gender country profile and the capacity of government and implementing partners are then decisive factors which allow, or curtail, the ability to gender mainstream activities.

Overall, the greatest successes have been achieved in the alignment of the country's legislative and policy framework: it is now mostly harmonised with the international commitments entered by Serbia – although some shortfalls remain. Implementation, in particular at the local level, is lagging far behind. There is a tendency to equate high representation of women in the countries' executive government structures (e.g. local and national administrations) and judiciary, and generous maternity leave entitlements, with empowerment. However, as confirmed by the Gender Country Profile and interviews, stark inequalities persist, especially in terms of career paths, access to childcare, equal pay, and representation of women at higher management levels (especially in the private sector). The EU's support, which targets the gender machinery through the Gender Equality Facility, plausibly contributes to bringing about remedies, however, it may not be sufficient to address the dire intersectional obstacles faced by rural women, women above 45, retired women, women from national minorities, and women living in poverty. WEE requires intensified support and pressure beyond the sole Gender Equality Facility.

#### 5.2.3.1 Strategic engagement / policy and political dialogue; M&E and communication on WEE (JC3.1)

**There has been a strong trend of increasing and diversifying WEE entry points beyond the classical entry points of formal education and lifelong training.** These have included digital education targeting the most vulnerable, retraining for employability (part of the approach to social housing), and support to small and medium-sized women-owned firms through grants and loans under blending. WEE aspects were not always fully developed at the Description of Action stage but were often built in during the roll-out of activities, e.g. in energy and transport. The availability of the CLIP, closely based on the Gender Country Profile, contributed to clear upgrade in WEE representation in Descriptions of Actions.

#### 5.2.3.2 Strengthening of women's rights (incl. TVET, decent work, equal pay, social protection systems, inclusion in the formal economy, green economy and digital transformation) (JC3.2)

**The EU has strongly contributed to the alignment of the WEE normative framework of Serbia to international and EU standards.** The EU role (through cooperation and policy dialogue in the pre-accession process) has been one of the three key factors contributing to the broad alignment of Serbia's normative framework to WEE and GEWE. Other factors are relatively gender-sensitive heritage from Yugoslavia's legal framework, and the advocacy by feminist CSOs. The EU contribution is considered having a particularly notable impact on the WEE framework, especially in terms of regulations of the

labour market, when prohibiting discrimination and promoting gender equality. National policies and legislation are mostly in line with the EU's acquis.

**However, implementation of Serbia's broadly EU-aligned normative framework for WEE has been lagging.** The GEWE mechanism at national level has been reshuffled repeatedly. At local level, GEWE mechanisms are not always established nor functional. They are not always translated into operational documents (such as action plans to implement the strategies, or relevant regulations such as job descriptions of civil servants and post tables).

**Objectively speaking, women continue to be at a disadvantage relative to male comparators in the labour market.** Particular problems concern women's entry into the workforce, inequalities in remuneration and access to higher-paid positions, access to social housing and property, as well as life-work imbalances in the form of unequal intramural distribution of work and resources. Women combining several vulnerabilities (e.g. women over 45, women in pension, rural women, women belonging to national minorities, women survivors of violence, single mothers) face the most problematic barriers to access and are least empowered economically. Some of these problems were exacerbated by the COVID pandemic. Among the EU's responses have been direct support to implementing the Gender Equality Strategy through policy dialogue and the Gender Equality Facility, targeting of vulnerable women, including skills training and retraining under the social housing programme (as well as requiring husband-wife signatures on property documents), and COVID-related emergency response to alleviate the impact of lockdowns and school closures on women and girls.

There are also sector-specific EU interventions, which may have positive effects on WEE. For instance, due to the global energy crisis, the IPA 2023 allocation is reserved specifically for energy. Even so, this planned intervention targets vulnerable population in Serbia, including women-led households, which are identified as energy vulnerable/ at risk of poverty.

#### 5.2.4 Effects on Women, Peace and Security (EQ4)

WPS has been practically absent from spending actions of the EU in Serbia during the period under review, apart from one CSO grant action at local level focusing on inter-territorial cooperation among CSOs (with CSOs from Kosovo).

Overall, the national and local authorities, as well as most international actors (including the EU) do not prioritize WPS because they consider it to be of little relevance to Serbia: the prevailing opinion is that the conflict in Kosovo was of no consequence to the population in the rest of Serbia (particularly to women), that the WPS aspects of the conflicts in other parts of former Yugoslavia (e.g. Bosnia and Herzegovina) are only relevant to a small number of refugee women, and that any other aspects of the conflicts of the 1990s do not have a WPS aspect relevant to Serbia. Yet, there is evidence and abundant CSO interviews suggesting that WPS would be highly relevant in terms of women participation to peacebuilding, recovery for victims of GBV in relation with or fuelled by conflicts, and in terms of women's access to resources.

The Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue for the normalisation of relations facilitated by the EU would be an obvious entry point, however, there is no evidence that WPS is a priority, or being considered, in this platform. There is no action in this regard documented from the side of the EUD in Serbia.

##### 5.2.4.1 Strategic engagement / policy and political dialogue; M&E and communication on WPS (JC4.1)

**Overall, there was little evidence on WPS, due to the absence of significant activities** (and corresponding documentation), and because the majority of stakeholders had little to nothing to say about WPS – other than acknowledging its importance and stating that little was done to address it, whether by the Government, the EU, or other international partners of Serbia. Serbia is often not considered 'conflict-affected'. This neglect is unfortunate, yet the dialogue with women CSOs and other interlocutors, as well as various academic or international organisations' publications, testify to the lasting effects of the past conflicts on women's rights and socio-economic dynamics in Serbia – a prism which remains underutilized in analysing the implementation context for planning the EU actions in Serbia. In addition, there is no evidence that a substantial attention is paid to the role of women in Belgrade-Pristina dialogue. There are no women participants in the dialogue, not only from Belgrade or Pristina, but neither from the EU and the US. Even though there is an action implemented in Kosovo to help CSOs provide inputs to the Pristina authorities in dialogue, there is no evidence of this input being utilized by the relevant authorities. No comparable action is carried out in Belgrade.

### 5.2.4.2 Strengthening of women's rights to protection, prevention, relief and recovery (on WPS pillars) (JC4.2)

The EU no longer implements projects of relief and recovery related to the 1990s wars. Most closely related to relief and recovery are EU actions benefiting migrants who have experienced conflict.

### 5.2.4.3 Increased participation of women in peace building, negotiations and mediation (J4.3)

As Belgrade-Pristina talks are confidential, it is impossible to document the role of women's perspective behind the closed doors. None of the parties to the talks have delegated women to take part in them. The new EU Special Representative appointed in 2020 has declined further action/EU-internal joint planning on the integration of WPS agenda in the talks on the grounds, as the talks are so fragile that priority must be placed on preserving them.

## 5.3 Annex

### 5.3.1 List of persons consulted

<i>Organisation</i>	<i>Position</i>
<b>EU &amp; EU MS</b>	
Council of Europe	Country office deputy director
Council of Europe	Gender focal person
(EU) DG NEAR D.2	Policy Officer - European Integration
(EU) DG NEAR D.2	Policy Officer - European Integration Negotiator
Embassy of Sweden	Gender Focal Person
EUD Serbia	Gender focal person
EUD Serbia	Head of Cooperation
EUD Serbia	Political Officer
EUD Serbia	Programme manager for Education
EUD Serbia	Programme manager for Green Agenda
EUD Serbia	Programme manager for Social Inclusion and Minorities
GIZ	Gender Focal Person
<b>National and local authorities</b>	
Equality Commission (NHRI)	Commissioner
Ministry of European Integration	Department for planning, programming, monitoring and reporting on EU funds and development assistance, Gender focal person
Ombudsperson's Office (NHRI)	Deputy Ombudsperson responsible for GE
n/a	Former Special Adviser for Gender Equality to Minister of Human and Minority Rights and Social Dialogue
<b>Civil Society Organisations</b>	
A11	Member
Amity	Member
ASTRA	Member
ATINA	Member
Autonomni zenski centar	Member
Fenomena Kraljevo	Member
Kvinna till Kvinna	Senior Program Officer
Pescanik, Krusevac	Member
SECONS	Member
Viktimolosko drustvo Srbije	Member
<b>UN &amp; development agencies</b>	
OSCE	National Programme Officer
UN WOMEN	Country office director
UNDP	Portfolio Manager-SDGs/Gender Equality
UNFPA	Project Assistant
UNFPA	SRH and Youth Programme Analyst
UNICEF	Education Officer
UNICEF	Gender Based Violence and Child Protection in Emergencies Consultant
UNOPS	Program Manager
UNOPS	Social Inclusion Associate



### 5.3.2 List of documents

#### 5.3.2.1 EU Strategy Programming

- EC (2014): Indicative Strategy Paper for Serbia (2014-2020)
- EC (2013): STABILISATION AND ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT between the European Communities and their Member States of the one part, and the Republic of Serbia, of the other part (2013A9018)
- EC (2021): IPA III Strategic Response 2021-2024 Republic of Serbia
- EC (2021): COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING DECISION adopting the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III) Programming Framework for the period 2021-2027 (C(2021) 8914 final)

#### 5.3.2.2 EU Reporting

- EC (2019): Serbia 2019 Report
- EC (2020): Serbia 2020 Report
- EC (2021): Serbia 2021 Report
- EU Delegation to Serbia (2019): External Assistance Management Report (EAMR) 2019
- EU Delegation to Serbia (2020): External Assistance Management Report (EAMR) 2020
- EU Delegation to Serbia (2021): External Assistance Management Report (EAMR) 2021
- EU Delegation to Serbia (2021): GAP III reporting 2021

#### 5.3.2.3 EU gender-specific

- EU Delegation to Serbia (2021): Gender Action Plan III – 2021-2025 Country Level Implementation Plan – CLIP Republic of Serbia
- EU Delegation to Serbia, UN Women (2021): EU Gender Country Profile for Serbia

#### 5.3.2.4 Project documentation

- The team reviewed the available project documentation (action fiches/TAPs, grant contracts, implementation and monitoring reports, evaluations, etc.) of the projects presented in the tables in section 4.1.25.1.2.

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## 6 Country case study – Tanzania

### 6.1 Introduction

#### 6.1.1 Context<sup>93</sup>

Following the death of President Magufuli, Vice-President Samia Suhulu Hassan was appointed President in March 2022. Samia Suhulu Hassan is the country's first female president. She is seen as a gender champion. In her first cabinet reshuffle, a new stand-alone ministry responsible for Gender issues (previously under the Health Ministry) has been created in Tanzania Mainland (Ministry of Community development, gender, women and Special groups); the same happened in Zanzibar with the newly established Ministry of Community Development, Gender, Elders and children; nine Ministries are led by women<sup>94</sup>; and a third of Ministries have already appointed a Gender focal person. These changes have created a more conducive environment for promoting GEWE in Tanzania – including taking distance from former administration, when the President was refusing that pregnant girls could go back to school.<sup>95</sup>

However, GEWE in Tanzania still face some challenges. The national Gender policy and the marriage law (allowing girls to be married at 15-year-old) need updating. Yet, the authorities have taken some time to push for essential reforms, despite advocacy from CSOs, and donors (including the EU), and (for the marriage law) a ruling from the High Court<sup>96</sup>. In addition, the Ministry responsible for Gender, who is a major recipient of EU support under the new MIP, still faces challenges in providing gender-disaggregated data across the many different areas their mandate cover and from other line ministries. Gender dynamics has led to an under-representation of women in most areas (political, economic, social) and sectors. In mainland Tanzania (especially rural areas), and Zanzibar, women are often assigned to traditional roles and domestic responsibilities, while men are more likely to own land (residential and agricultural) and control productive assets. As acknowledged by most, a transformation of social norms is needed but this will take time and consistent commitment, with the OECD/UN Women<sup>97</sup> recently calling for *“the prioritisation of multisectoral programmes alongside structural interventions, as well as an engagement with all relevant stakeholders at all levels”*.

Many donors (including most EU Member States) actively support the gender equality agenda in Tanzania. The main donor platform is the Development Partners Group – Gender Equality (DPG-GE), which the EUD will co-chair with the High Commission of Canada and UNFPA in 2023., being then chair in 2024, and outgoing co-chair in 2025 – in the troika system set up for the group coordination This donor group has monthly meetings; co-chairs meets twice per year with the each Permanent Secretary (PS) of the Ministries responsible for Gender in Mainland and Zanzibar; twice per year the PS are attending the DPG-GE meetings with director and technical staff to discuss with DPs. Donor coordination is viewed by most as strong, although a recent exercise shows that it is easy to map interventions with gender as a principal objective (G2), much more difficult for interventions with gender as a significant objective (G1).

While there are still some gaps, the country's legal framework broadly gives women equal rights to employment, equal pays, and land ownership in particular. The application of the laws is sometime inadequate or inconsistent, however, often because of a conflict with customary laws. In 'Women, Business and the Law 2022', an index measuring progress toward gender equality by examining the laws and regulations that affect women's economic opportunities, Tanzania scored 81.3 out of 100. The

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<sup>93</sup> This context analysis was informed by stakeholders interviews and recent gender reports on Tanzania, including the draft 2021 UN Women / African Development Bank gender profiles for mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar (not published yet as of early 2023)

<sup>94</sup> <https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/magazine/samia-leading-women-in-her-first-year-of-gender-agenda-3753080>

<sup>95</sup> <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/jun/30/tanzania-president-ban-pregnant-girls-from-school-john-magufuli>

<sup>96</sup> In 2019, the Tanzania Court of Appeal upheld the landmark 2016 ruling by the High Court against child marriage. The High Court ruled that marriage under the age of 18 was illegal and directed the government to raise the minimum age of marriage to 18 for both boys and girls within one year.

<sup>97</sup> Tanzania Social Inclusion and Gender Index report (co-produced by OECD Development Centre and UN Women in March 2022 (<https://www.genderindex.org/sigi-tanzania/>))

<sup>97</sup> <https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/magazine/samia-leading-women-in-her-first-year-of-gender-agenda-3753080>

overall score for is higher than the regional average observed across Sub-Saharan Africa (71.5), but lower than the maximum score observed in Mauritius (89.4).<sup>98</sup>

According to the World Bank (2022)<sup>99</sup>, Tanzania has made important progress in several areas over the last two decades, including with regard to labour-force participation; access to paid jobs and salaries; and paid agricultural work. There are, however, some persistent gender gaps notably in relation to access to land, home ownership, and financial services. According to this report, agriculture (which provide a livelihood for 65% of the population) is where the gender gap is the highest, with women locked into low productivity agricultural work, because of limited access to labour, agricultural inputs and land ownership.

On the policy front, the main government policy document, Blueprint for Regulatory Reforms to Improve the Business Environment (2018), was found to be gender-blind but this could change with the forthcoming Tanzania Generation Equality Programme, which donors plan to support.

The Women Peace and Security (WPS) agenda is relatively new in Tanzania. At the time of writing this report, the UN Women, with Denmark and Ireland, was supporting the government in developing their first National Plan of Action on WPS.

Another relevant initiative is the National Plan of Action to End Violence Against Women and Children in Tanzania. Addressing Gender-based violence (GBV) in Tanzania is only loosely associated with the WPS agenda, however it is indeed object of discussions in the elaborations on the NPA WPS: GBV is prevalent in all regions, not just the regions affected by conflict and violent extremism. At the same time, GBV (alongside Female genital mutilation, land ownership and marital issues) has started to feature more prominently in local mediation / conflict resolution initiatives, such as those support by EU partner, Search for Common Ground.

### 6.1.2 Focus of the case study

This country case study examines EU support to GEWE in Tanzania and aims at identifying country specific factors that influenced design, implementation and the results achieved. The analysis covers the diversity of EU support to Tanzania in terms of modalities (contribution / delegation agreements, action grants, TA & services) and channels (National Government, UN & development agencies, EU Member States (EU MS), CSOs, and private sector).

The evaluation team has identified a portfolio of **EUR 316 million allocated to GEWE**<sup>100</sup> in the timeframe considered in this evaluation significant- or targeted interventions under GAP III. Overall, the amounts contracted increased over the period observed, with a marked increase from 2020 to 2021, as shown in Figure 13, in line with the global trend for the GEWE-specific financial volume, which increased in absolute terms during the period in scope.<sup>101</sup>

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
<sup>98</sup> World Bank (2022) Women, Business and the Law 2022

<sup>99</sup> World Bank (2022): Tanzania Economic Update 17 Final Report: Empowering Women - Expanding Access to Assets and Economic Opportunities

<sup>100</sup> The evaluation team has carried out the present portfolio analysis on the basis of retrieved information on contracted amounts for all EU external actions from EU internal databases (EU Statistical Dashboard). The category "GEWE" mainly includes interventions categorised as with gender as a main objective (i.e., 'Gender Equality' marker = 2) or as a significant objective (i.e., 'Gender Equality' marker = 1). As explained in the Annexes, this category may contain interventions identified as Non targeted (i.e., 'Gender Equality' marker = 0) but which the team has identified as having a link to GEWE and therefore considered as within the scope of the evaluation.

<sup>101</sup> For further details, see Annex 5 in Volume III.

Figure 13 Evolution of GEWE funding (contracted amounts) in Tanzania under GAP III, 2019-2022



Source: Particip, based on Statistical Dashboard data

Data collection and analysis was structured along the EQs. Some issues related to the policy and strategic framework (EQ1) and to the design and implementation of the CLIP (EQ2) were examined looking at the entire portfolio, and particularly the main decisions adopted in 2021 and 2022 (see Table 12). Issues related to the effects of WEE and WPS were examined mostly focussing on a sample of EU-funded interventions identified by the evaluation team in Table 13.

The final sample of interventions was selected through i) the global mapping EU support (see main report) and ii) feedback from the EUD. The sample reflects well the above outlined diversity of EU support to GEWE in Tanzania by including: i) gender-targeted and gender-sensitive interventions; ii) interventions implemented through different modalities and channels; iii) interventions that were designed before and after the launch of GAP III<sup>102</sup>; and iv) interventions covering a variety of sectors, including Women's Economic Empowerment (WEE) and Women, Peace and Security (WPS).

Table 12 Main interventions sampled in Tanzania (2021-2022) consulted under EQ1 and EQ2

Year	Intervention/ Contract title	Cris ref.	Contracting party	Planned amount (EUR)
	<b>Gender Transformative Action in Tanzania: breaking the glass ceiling</b>	<b>D-43327</b>		<b>70.000.000 +20.000.000 top up</b>
2022	Budget Support - Gender Transformative Action	c-433206	United Republic of Tanzania	28.000.000
2022	Ending Violence Against Women & Girls and Advancing Women's Leadership in the Public Sector in Zanzibar & Tanzania Mainland	c-434952	UN Women	5.000.000
2022	Second Phase - Productive Social Safety Net Phase Two (PSSN II)	c-433229	SIDA	20.000.000
	<b>Green and Smart Cities SASA</b>	<b>D-43413</b>		<b>75.000.000</b>
2022	Budget Support - Green and Smart Cities SASA (TEI)	c-433498	United Republic of Tanzania	28.000.000
	<b>Digital for Tanzania - D4T</b>	<b>D-43414</b>		<b>35.000.000</b>
2022	Budget Support - Digital4Tanzania	c-433524	United Republic of Tanzania	28.000.000
2022	Tanzania Inclusive Digital Economy (TIDE)	c-434133	United Nations Capital Development Fund	4.500.000
	<b>Other committed decisions</b>			
2022	Finance for Growth (F4G)	n/a	Financial Services Tanzania (FSDT)	50.000.000
2022	Blue Economy Programme (TEI)	n/a	n/a	110.000.000

<sup>102</sup> While the temporal scope of the evaluation covers the period immediately following the launch of GAP III (January 2021) and all of 2022, we have also included interventions designed and funded prior to 2021 as long as i) their objectives and expected results contributed to GAP III implementation and ii) they were implemented in the time frame mentioned above (01/2021-12/2022).

Table 13 *Sampled interventions in Tanzania with a WEE / WPS component*

Year	Intervention/ Contract title	Cris ref.	Contracting party	Planned amount
	<b>Agri-Connect: Supporting value chains for shared prosperity'</b>	<b>D-39797</b>		
2019	Make it grow! Horticulture for sustainable economic development in Zanzibar	c-413849	Trias	4.500.000
2019	"Kilimo Bora cha matunda na mbogamboga kwa Wanawake na Vijana (KIBOWAVI)	c-413861	Helvetas Swiss Intercooperation	4.500.000
	<b>Civil Society Organisations as actors of Governance and Development Work in the Field</b>	<b>D-40919 D-41713</b>		
2019	Jenga Amani Yetu: Building peaceful communities in Tanzania	c-412388	Search for Common Ground	900.000
	<b>Support to a peaceful, inclusive and transparent electoral process and to political party dialogue</b>	<b>D-42772</b>		
2020	Strengthening Community Peace Mechanisms in Zanzibar	c-419782	Search for Common Ground	1.000.000
	<b>Support to the Business Environment, Growth and Innovation (BEGIN)</b>	<b>D-41067</b>		
2021	Funguo Innovation Program and Facility Phase I	c-426343	UNDP	5.000.000
2021	QUALITAN: Quality standards and compliance programme for the United Republic of Tanzania	C-428294	UNIDO	7.000.000

The case study relies on a mix of tools/methods for data collection and analysis. It combines quantitative analysis of CRIS data with qualitative analysis of factors influencing design, implementation and effects of EU support to GEWE. Most data collection activities were conducted in person through a one-week field mission in November 2022 and complemented by additional remotely conducted key informant interviews after the in-person mission. Annexes 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 3.3.1 present the full lists of persons and documents consulted for this case study.

## 6.2 Main Findings

### 6.2.1 Policy and strategic framework (EQ1)

**In Tanzania, the Head of Cooperation (HoC) and Head of Delegation (HoD) have been strong gender champions. GFP time is overstretched, and gender expertise uneven within the EUD. The EUD's strengthened partnership with EU Member States and UN Women, and use of TA have helped the EU match its gender mainstreaming ambitions.**

The new programming phase in Tanzania started shortly after the launch of GAP III. This provided a good timing opportunity for integrating GAP III into all key strategic and programming documents (MIP, CLIP, AAP 2021, the new CSO roadmap and Human Right and Democracy Strategy). Because it was drafted under the previous government, the MIP's coverage of gender and human rights appears nonetheless less ambitious in scope than the CLIP and the new G2 action, Breaking the Glass Ceiling (BGC), both of which plan to cover all GAP III thematic priorities.

Under the MIP implementation the EUD in Tanzania has progressed well in designing and launching its planned gender mainstreaming and targeted actions, often using innovative and ambitious approaches. On the back of NDICI and GAP III, the EUD in Tanzania is pushing for 100% of its actions to be marked as G1 or G2. The G1 decisions approved in 2021 and 2022 (which include two Team Europe initiatives) show that they broadly meet G1 (design) requirements, although none have gone so far as conducting a stand-alone sector gender analysis and/or having a gender-specific objective. Attempts to use gender-disaggregated outcome indicators have also varied.

**A key aspect of EUD Tanzania's approach under the new MIP is its use of combination of modalities, including budget support and blending, to support GEWE.** As a result, significant time was invested in developing gender mainstreaming and targeting in key decisions, starting with BGC; the first blending operation (which includes a gender specific dimension) is due in early 2023. Budget support is seen as the right modality to promote a gender transformative approach. The difficulties

encountered in the first year of implementation of the BGC budget support operation have come to challenge EUD's ambition on this front, however.

### 6.2.1.1 Programming reflects GAP III objectives: MFF and policy documents (JC1.1)

N/A, Brussels-level JC.

### 6.2.1.2 Conducive institutional environment ensured (JC1.2)

**In Tanzania, the HoC and HoD have actively championed gender, with the EUD seen by Brussels and other EUDs as leading by example.** Since 2020, the Delegation received support from two successive GFPs, with turnover occurring in 2021 and the incoming GFP already involved in formulating the G2 Breaking the Glass Ceiling (BGC) budget support project. The GFP advises sector Programme Managers on mainstreaming gender (and represents the EU in the donor gender group), but gender is not her only portfolio and there are limits on her time.


The EUD appreciated INTPA G1 support and access to key knowledge products and resources through the GFP network. Gender expertise is uneven across sectors, however, and, with the GFP role already overstretched. For the implementation of specific components of the programmes, the EU Delegation relies on specialised implementing partners such as UN Women, some EU Member States; a Technical Assistance under different programmes will also contribute to support GFP work but also mainstream gender in , including in new areas of engagement, such as the Blue Economy.

### 6.2.1.3 Gender-responsive programming and M&E (JC1.3)

**The programming phase took place soon after the launch of GAP III, as the country was witnessing significant political changes (see Context) . First drafted under the previous regime in early 2021, the MIP only makes some brief references to GAP III and gender.** In the latter part of that year, the EU worked simultaneously on drafting the CLIP, the CSO roadmap, and Human Rights and Democracy Strategy while finalising the MIP and the first round of Action Documents (including a G2 action). While there is a good coherence across the programming documents, as a result, the CLIP and G2 action are more ambitious in scope than the MIP, covering all six GAP III thematic priorities (against a selected few under the MIP).

**In Tanzania, the EUD's target is now to have 100% of its actions marked as G1 or G2.** The HoC was determined that all 2021 and 2022 actions should be gender-marked at least G1, and the combination of GAP III and the NDICI instrument provided a strong incentive to adopt a vigorous approach to gender mainstreaming and targeting. At the same time, the G1 actions do not follow the preferred OECD/GAP III options, that is, having a stand-alone gender analyses, a specific gender objective. Their plans to use of gender disaggregated outcome indicators varies (from none to 50%), with little examples of GAP III proposed outcome indicators being used.

Figure 14 Evolution of GEWE funding (contracted amounts) in Tanzania under GAP III, by Gender Marker, 2019-2022



Source: Particip, based on Statistical Dashboard data

**Since the launch of GAP III, the volume of non-gender-targeted funds (G0) has decreased substantially, while the volume of gender-specific funding has increased, especially between**

**2020 and 2021**, and then again between 2021 and 2022. The inventory (mapping) developed by the team for the period 2019-2022 provides supporting evidence of the impact of GAP III on the number of GEWE oriented actions (G2+G1) contracted and the volume of funds dedicated to these actions. Overall, the amounts contracted for G1/G2 interventions increased during the observed period, as shown in Figure 2, while the amounts contracted for G0 interventions decreased.

**The portfolio of decisions approved in 2021 and 2022 include two Team Europe Initiatives (TEI), Green and Smart Cities and Blue Economy.** The G2 action providing support to the Ministry responsible for Gender (BGC mentioned above, EUR 28 million budget support and EUR 42 million complementary support) is a pathbreaking programme aiming at transformative change, although its start-up has been somewhat of a learning curve, largely because of the novelty that Budget Support modality was to the sector (see JC2.2).

The EIB blending operation (under the Africa Investment Platform) was due for approval end-2022, opening credit lines to local financial institutions with 30% to be allocated to women enterprises, according to the 2X challenge definition. FMO-EU NASIRA guarantee scheme under EFSD+ financing has already been operationalised with the local banks in February 2023.

## 6.2.2 Design and implementation of CLIPs (EQ2)

**The CLIP design in Tanzania has been a useful exercise to promote GEWE within the EUD and demonstrate a Team Europe approach to gender.** In line with HQ guidance, the CLIP mostly builds on already planned and ongoing actions. There is limited evidence that the UN Women/African Development Bank (AfDB) gender profile and/or consultations with CSOs were actually used to inform CLIP priorities or make new commitments. The CLIP in Tanzania has been more an end-product rather than a driving factor to gender mainstreaming. The EUD already had strong gender mainstreaming ambitions before the CLIP. Since the CLIP was launched, the EUD has continued to demonstrate a good level of commitment to gender mainstreaming, not just as part of its annual programming, but also during the contracting phase and in ongoing operations.

**The CLIP has not been used to showcase EU support and/or for external communication.** But the CLIP – but perhaps more significantly, the BGC action– has helped to strengthen EUD position and leadership on gender, with EUD recently appointed as co-chair of the main gender donor group. Irrespective of the CLIP, the move to sector budget support offers good prospects for having a stronger gender perspective in policy dialogue. Key reforms are being discussed as part of the assessment of the sector policy within the budget support operation. On a less positive note, plans to have regular dialogue with CSOs have not materialised yet but have been agreed at the Dialogues with government. As such Call for proposal under the Gender programme was ongoing at the time of the evaluation and new initiatives and dialogues are expected to be contracted at the end of the year 2022.

The CLIP's contribution to gender-based monitoring appears limited: At present, there is no plan (or high-level indicators) to report progress against the CLIP. However, Gender Monitoring is largely part of the Gender Programme efforts under the Technical assistance.

### 6.2.2.1 CLIPs reflect a clear, relevant and integrated vision (JC2.1)

**The CLIP responds to HQ guidance to have a concise and strategic document, while also covering the main and significant ongoing actions whose results are expected in 2022 or 2023.** It provides a useful overview of the MIP and recent decisions made by the EU. Each intervention is linked to relevant GAP III thematic priorities.

**The CLIP has helped to encourage an integrated view of GEWE as part of Team Europe.** Within the EUD, an internal task force on gender was established and a CLIP draft was shared with EU MS and commented upon.

Early drafts of the UN Women/AfDB gender profiles for Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar were made available to support the elaboration of the CLIP. The CLIP was also based on a participatory approach, with joint consultations organised in the context of producing the CSO Roadmap. There is limited evidence to show, however, that the early draft recommendations of the Gender Profile(s) and outcome of the CSO consultations contributed to shaping CLIP priorities .

### 6.2.2.2 CLIPs facilitate gender mainstreaming and targeted actions (JC2.2)

It is likely that the EUD in Tanzania would have maintained the same level of ambition for gender mainstreaming and targeting without **the CLIP, which was more the end-product of a programming process rather than its main driving factor.**

Since the CLIP was launched, the contracting phase of the MIP in Tanzania had also started, with good evidence that EUD sections have remained committed to gender mainstreaming, when and where



deemed relevant. During the field visit, for example, the EUD was commended for promoting gender in specific sectors (PFM, social inclusion). Approved in 2021, the TEI on Green and Smart Cities, has evidently continued to mainstream gender during its contracting phase (scoping mission, call for proposals).

**The main action designed to contribute to transformative change is the BGC, which includes a EUR 28 million budget support action in favour of the mainland Ministry of Gender.** Early implementation was difficult, however, mostly due to the Government's limited understanding of the Sector budget support modality; a new modality which needs to form a strong partnership between the Ministries of Finance and line Ministries; in this case not only the Ministry responsible for Gender but also other line Ministries because of the cross-sectoral nature of gender (Education, Health, Justice). For the newly created Ministry of Gender, it has been difficult to cope with the novelties of this programme together with the rising expectations due to international commitments taken from the President of Tanzania. Although the programme is aligned with national and international engagement, the fine tuning has taken time and required a lot of discussions. Although Breaking the Glass Ceiling is not a TEI, MS are implementing partners of different components (Germany, Sweden), complementary to other MS interventions (Finland, Ireland). The EIB/FMO are also main partners on Women Economic Empowerment through financial instruments.

Previous experience (see EQ3 and EQ4) also indicate that the loss of gender focus remains an important risk further down the line, as implementing partners get into delivery and the challenges of meeting gender objectives become apparent.

### 6.2.2.3 CLIPs contribute to gender perspective into political and policy dialogue (JC2.3)

**Key stakeholders, starting with the Ministry of Gender, did not know about the CLIP.** This is because the EUD sees the CLIP as internal.<sup>103</sup> Instead, the catalysts for more consequential policy and political dialogues on gender have been the change in regime, the institution of the Ministry responsible for Gender, and budget support. A regular dialogue with CSOs (as also announced in the CLIP) has not materialised yet, but it is planned under the Gender programme dialogues

**The most important boost to resources, and by far the greatest contributor to enhanced possibilities for gender-related policy and political dialogue, was the BGC budget support programme,** already well into the preparation stage when the CLIP was drafted. In addition to having selected gender-based performance indicators, key reforms are under discussions and dialogue, as part of the Policy performance assessment of the BS operations Outside BGC (and now inclusive finance), plans to integrate gender into sector policy dialogues remained largely tentative at the time of writing this report. However, the Ministry responsible of Gender has suggested to be part of the sector dialogues of the other EU programmes to ensure this integration.

**The CLIP, however, has contributed (along with budget support to the Ministry responsible for Gender) to strengthening EU's leadership role among donors.** The EU has emerged as the co-chair (with High Commission of Canada and UNFPA) of the development partners group on gender equality (see context) and is seen as a lead strategic partner by TEI as well as UN Women.

### 6.2.2.4 CLIPs facilitate gender-sensitive monitoring of results (JC2.4)

**The CLIP's contribution to gender-based monitoring appears to be limited,** although the EUD appears committed to maintaining gender mainstreaming at the operational programming (contracting) stage. The Tanzania CLIP does not involve indicators, and, at present, there is no plan to report progress against the CLIP. The EU has, long before the CLIP, engaged in public events promoting women's rights

## 6.2.3 Effects on Women's Economic Empowerment (EQ3)

**The EUD in Tanzania has increased its ambition to support WEE under the new MIP.** WEE features in all MIP pillars and is listed as a priority under the CLIP. WEE is also an objective in many newly approved actions, with all planning to use sector budget support to inform policy dialogue. In addition, Tanzania receives support from the regional EUR 20m program (Women Entrepreneurship for Africa).

The EU's ongoing portfolio (i.e., BEGIN and . EDF-funded Agri-Connect initiatives) shows mixed performance in mainstreaming gender. With BEGIN, there has been a loss of gender ambitions at an early stage, in part because of the then lack of clear government priorities on WEE. For Agri-Connect, there has been a strong focus on gender and available data show that women have benefited the

<sup>103</sup> A recent decision was made to put all CLIPs on Capacity4Dev. While this means that CLIPs can no longer be described as internal documents, their access remains limited to those that know about this platform.

most from EU support. Implementing partners also report that their support has helped strengthen women and youth participation in economic activities, although there is no verifiable data.


### 6.2.3.1 Strategic engagement / policy and political dialogue; M&E and communication on WEE (JC3.1)

**While still in development (and not quantifiable), the EUD has convincingly multiplied its strategic entry points to support WEE in Tanzania under GAP III.**

WEE features in all MIP pillars and is a component in the majority of its Actions approved in 2021 and 2022. WEE is an objective in four recently approved Actions BGC, Green and Smart Cities TEI, Finance for Growth, and the Blue Economy TEI. While the focus on WEE is less explicit, the G1 Digitalisation Action identifies its focus on addressing the e-gender digital gap as a step towards removing barriers to women's entrepreneurship. The EUD also has plans to include WEE in its forthcoming top-up Education decision. Through Sweden, the EU is also contributing EUR 20 million to the World Bank's support to the Government social protection programme<sup>104</sup>. In addition, Tanzania receives support from the regional EUR 20m program (Women Entrepreneurship for Africa).

The multiplication of entry points for WEE is reflected in the increase of WEE-specific funding in the country, which peaked most significantly in 2021. Comparatively, and as highlighted in the following section, G1 and G2 funding to WPS has remained low in the period.

Figure 15 Evolution of funding (contracted amounts) to GEWE (G1/G2) interventions promoting WEE and WPS in Tanzania, 2019-2022



Source: Particip, based on Statistical Dashboard data

Women Economic Empowerment objectives are pursued using innovative instruments directly addressing access to finance.

**With sector budget support (and programme-based approach for social protection) being used as the main modality, the EU plans to mainstream WEE in policy dialogue across sectors.** Such a broad approach represents a change compared to the previous MIP, where WEE was mostly supported (also as a cross-cutting issue) through a limited number of decisions, including BEGIN (focus on business enabling reforms) and Agri-Connect (focus on gender in agriculture).

These latter interventions show mixed result on gender mainstreaming, with M&E remaining a key challenge. Agri-Connect (which started before GAP II) has made WEE a core priority, as shown by the integration of gender in the partner selection process, the choice of sectors (notably horticulture), the use of gender baseline, and the formulation of gender-responsive objectives. Their contribution to WEE (at outcome level) remains, however, poorly captured, despite some partners having sophisticated M&E systems.

<sup>104</sup> Second Phase - Productive Social Safety Net Phase Two (PSSN II) (CRIS ref: c-433229)

In contrast, there is limited evidence to show that BEGIN has been gender-responsive, as initially intended. In fact, the gender focus was lost very early for all the components, sometimes deliberately so. The limited inclusion of gender in BEGIN points to challenges in using a gender lens when following a demand-led approach and/or supporting a specific institution. In addition, BEGIN planned to support Tanzania's Blueprint for Regulatory Reforms (2018), a government document which includes no reference to women economic rights and is gender blind. Looking forward, the forthcoming Tanzania Generation Equality Programme should help donors align to government efforts on this front. (see context)

### 6.2.3.2 Strengthening of women's rights (incl. TVET, decent work, equal pay, social protection systems, inclusion in the formal economy, green economy and digital transformation) (JC3.2)

**There is limited evidence to show that EU's ongoing portfolio has contributed to strengthening WEE.** BEGIN's contribution to WEE reforms is likely to stay limited unless new gender mainstreaming opportunities are explored. In agriculture, available data confirms that women have benefited the most from Agro-connect activities and outputs and there are convincing (yet not verifiable) testimonials that the life of some women has been turned around. The partners also shared interesting good practices, such as ensuring the local partners have the right level of awareness and tools to promote gender, taking more fully into account gender dynamics between women and men, and, closely engage with traditional and religious leaders. The lack of independently verifiable data, however, makes it difficult to verify partner claims that they have increased youth and women engagement in socio-economic activities within the family households and in local communities (notably through village savings and loans associations, income generating activities).

### 6.2.4 Effects on Women, Peace and Security (EQ4)

**WPS is a relatively new area of engagement in largely peaceful Tanzania.** The CLIP foresees new opportunities on the back of the forthcoming Action Plan on WPS, which some EU Member States support.

EU support to Search for Common Ground contained a strong gender and youth component, backed up by gender-sensitive baseline and Conflict Assessments, but the actual mainstreaming of gender in Tanzania project fell short. The final evaluation concludes that the project nonetheless contributed to increased women participation in local mediation and decision-making processes.

#### 6.2.4.1 Strategic engagement / policy and political dialogue; M&E and communication on WPS (JC4.1)

**WPS is a relatively new area of engagement in largely peaceful Tanzania (see Context). There has been little involvement from the EU embassy on this front,** except for supporting a campaign to end human trafficking (which affect women and youth disproportionality) in Zanzibar. The CLIP foresees new opportunities for synergy, as the country finalises its first ever National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, UNSCR1325, with support from Ireland and Denmark.

The BGC Action Document envisaged CSOs grants to enhance equality in participation, leadership and decision making, *"including in actions related to justice, peace and security"*. But the reference to WPS was lost in the subsequent call for proposal.

The EUD follows and supports the elaboration of the NPA WPS under the policy assessment of the sector under the BS operation; as such EU MS are more directly leading the support to WPS.

The EUD is mostly working on WPS area through FPI and at regional level, notably one project that specifically focuses on the role of women and youth in peacebuilding along the Swahili coast.

While being committed to GEWE, and having an in-depth knowledge of local dynamics, Search for Common Ground, which the EU supports, did not appear to have adequate capacity and tools to monitor results through a gender lens.

#### 6.2.4.2 Strengthening of women's rights (on WPS pillars) (JC4.2)

**The BGC programme comes with a strong focus on GBV** but, in the context of Tanzania, the programme does not pay specific attention to GBV in locations affected by possible forms of violent conflict. Nonetheless, GBV (and marital issues) have increasingly featured in local, EU-supported, conflict resolution mechanisms.

#### 6.2.4.3 Increased participation of women in peace building, negotiations and mediation (J4.3)

**EU-supported Search for Common Ground has made visible efforts to promote women's participation in local mediation and decision-making processes.** Providing a safe space for women where they can interact without the presence of men was shared as good practice. As put by one stakeholder "in traditional patriarchal society, it takes longer for women to find their voice".

The Final Evaluation of the Search for Common Ground project provides a positive assessment of the project's gender performance (less so on their inclusion with people with disability), noting specific needs of women, such as those in the areas of land rights, marital issues, and GBV, had been addressed. The evaluation also shares evidence that women participation in decision-making and mediation processes (including on land disputes) had been enhanced. The final evaluation also noted the positive contribution from the media in helping change attitudes.

## 6.3 Annex

### 6.3.1 List of persons consulted

<i>Organisation</i>	<i>Position/ Role</i>
<b>EU</b>	
EU HQ	Geo-desk for Tanzania
EU HQ	Geo-desk for Tanzania
EUD	Infrastructure team
EUD	Natural resources team
EUD	Natural resources team
EUD	Natural resources team
EUD	Section lead governance
EUD	Gender focal person
EUD	Infrastructure team
<b>EU MS</b>	
Embassy of Ireland	Development Specialist
Embassy of Sweden	Program Manager
<b>National and local authorities</b>	
Ministry of Finance	Gender focal person
Ministry of Gender	Gender focal person
Ministry of Gender	Statistician/department of policy and planning
<b>UN agencies</b>	
UN Women	Country Representative
UN Women	Program Specialist- Gender responsive budgeting & planning
UN Women	Senior Advisor policy and strategic Planning
UN Women	Program Analyst- women peace and security
UNCDF	Investment officer
UNCDF	Investment Impact officer
UNCDF	M&E Advisor
UNDP	Partnership and Knowledge management
UNDP	Project Manager
UNFPA	Technical Advisor/Chair-DPG-Gender
UNIDO	Project Manager Qualitan Project
<b>Local and international CSOs</b>	
AWLIN	Lecturer/Peace builder
Helvetas Swiss Intercooperation	Project Manager
SfCG	M&E officer
SfCG	Country Manager
TGNP	Staff member
TRIAS	Project Manager
VSO	Staff member
WFT-T	Program Manager
WiLDAF	Staff member

### 6.3.2 List of documents

#### 6.3.2.1 EU Strategy Programming

- European Commission (2014): Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2014-2020 for Tanzania
- European Commission (2021): Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2021-2027 for Tanzania
- European Commission (2020): Annual Financial Action Plan for Tanzania 2021

#### 6.3.2.2 EU Reporting

- EU Delegation to Tanzania (2019): External Assistance Management Report (EAMR)
- EU Delegation to Tanzania (2020): External Assistance Management Report (EAMR)
- EU Delegation to Tanzania (2021): External Assistance Management Report (EAMR)

- EU Delegation to Tanzania (2021): GAP III reporting 2021

### 6.3.2.3 EU gender-specific

- EU Delegation to Tanzania (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Tanzania
- EU Delegation to Tanzania, UN Women, AfDB (2021, draft): Gender Profile for Zanzibar
- EU Delegation to Tanzania, UN Women, AfDB (2021, draft): Gender Profile for Mainland

### 6.3.2.4 Project documentation

- The team reviewed the available project documentation (action fiches/TAPs, grant contracts, implementation and monitoring reports, evaluations, etc.) of the projects presented in the tables in section 4.1.26.1.2.
- In addition to the above, the EU's implementing partners (Trias, Helvetas, Search for Common Ground, UNDP, UNIDO) ) shared with the evaluation team some relevant internal documentation with a gender dimension, including baseline / needs assessment / surveys and monitoring and evaluation frameworks, tools and reports.

### 6.3.2.5 Other

- Government of Tanzania (2016), Blueprint for Regulatory reforms to improve the business environment <https://www.mit.go.tz/uploads/files/BLUEPRINT-BOOK-compresed.pdf>
- <https://www.amnesty.org.uk/lgbti-lgbt-gay-human-rights-law-africa-uganda-kenya-nigeria-cameroon>
- <https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/magazine/samia-leading-women-in-her-first-year-of-gender-agenda-3753080>
- <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/jun/30/tanzania-president-ban-pregnant-girls-from-school-john-magufuli>
- World Bank (2022): Tanzania Economic Update 17 Final Report : Empowering Women - Expanding Access to Assets and Economic Opportunities. <https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/099850002282226344/p174894034150b0080a42e081bd547a37b8>
- World Bank (2022) Women, Business and the Law 2022

## 7 Country case study: The Philippines

### 7.1 Introduction

#### 7.1.1 Context

The Philippines is a lower middle-income country that comprises over 7,000 islands and has a population of about 110 million. Philippine society is both diverse and homogeneous, and the country has a long democratic tradition, a vibrant civil society and a free press. However, it has a history of high inequality in the distribution of its resources, of internal armed conflicts, largely but not entirely along religious lines.<sup>105</sup> It also has a history of intermittent authoritarian rule, which may now be in the process of repeating itself.

The Philippines performs well on education, life expectancy and GNI per capita indices although it has continued to lag on what the World Bank, in the 1990s, termed “the Southeast Asian economic miracle.” While the foundations for economic growth are in place, headcount poverty remains stubbornly high, declining only from 26.3 per cent in 2009 to 21.9 per cent in 2018. It was expected to decline to 19.8 per cent in 2020 before the emergence of the Covid-19 pandemic, but in the first quarter of 2021, the poverty rate was assessed as being at 23.7%, meaning that it has been essentially stuck for over ten years. Extremes of geographical isolation contribute to the persistence of rural poverty.

**The Philippines is a signatory to international human rights instruments that have shaped its legislative framework for advancing gender-responsive development.** The Philippines' track record in legislation and policies for gender equality and women's empowerment is well advanced, resulting in an acceptable normative framework for gender equality. For instance, in August 2009, the country adopted the Magna Carta of Women, considered as the national translation of the CEDAW. As per the Magna Carta, the Philippine Commission on Women (PCW) becomes the primary policy-making and coordinating body of the women and gender equality concerns. The government's concern for women is embodied in the Philippine Plan for Gender Responsive Development 1995-2025. In 2019, the PCW also introduced the Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment (GEWE) Plan 2019 -- 2025.<sup>106</sup>

**However, barriers to meaningful implementation continue to impede the advancement of gender equality.** While scoring high in some indexes (e.g. 17th out of 156 countries in the 2021 World Economic Forum Global gender equality index), the Philippines scores only at the 104<sup>th</sup> place in the 2020 UNDP Gender inequality index. Philippines scored 78.8 out of 100 in 2022 on the World Bank's Women, Business and the Law (WBL) Index<sup>107</sup>; slightly above the East Asia and Pacific region (unweighted average). However, the WBL Index reflects only normative, i.e., legal frameworks. Underlying structural issues persist: the incidence of gender-based violence remains high; access to sexual and reproductive health is restricted; divorce and abortion are forbidden; teenage pregnancy is increasing at an alarming rate, especially in rural areas; maternal mortality is still high; disparities still exist between women and men in terms of labour force participation despite the higher functional literacy rate of women. While women and girls from the National Capital Region and other urban areas have equal access to education, many of those from rural areas, particularly in Mindanao, are lagging behind; political participation of women remains weak with a ratio of 20:80 women vis-ii-vis men holding ministerial positions in the government. In addition, the country's response to the COVID-19 pandemic (community quarantine) has a negative impact on women.<sup>108</sup>

The framework for economic policy is the Philippine Development Plan 2017-2022 (PDP), a medium-term strategy for poverty reduction and achievement of the SDGs, which emphasises making growth more inclusive and to accelerating job creation through investment, particularly in infrastructure, better governance and by improving the business environment including better business services. Gender and Development are a cross-cutting issues in achieving the goals set in the PDP and the Government's 25-year long-term vision to end poverty (AmBisyon Natin 2040). EU development assistance is closely aligned with the PDP. The Plan provides a framework that allows the EU to align its development cooperation programmes with Government policies and programmes with clear leadership and ownership on the part of the Philippine authorities.

Government institutions are functional, occasional military upheavals have always been followed by a return to democratic institutions and processes (however flawed) and civil society is vibrant even though increasingly repressed, with women human rights defenders targeted, with impunity, for harassment,

<sup>105</sup> [https://www.eeas.europa.eu/philippines/european-union-and-philippines\\_en?s=176](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/philippines/european-union-and-philippines_en?s=176)

<sup>106</sup> EU Delegation to the Philippines (2021): Gender Action Plan III – 2021-2025 Country-Level Implementation Plan – CLIP Philippines

<sup>107</sup> 'Women, Business and the Law' is an index measuring progress toward gender equality by examining the laws and regulations that affect women's economic opportunities.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid.

assault, and in some cases, deadly violence. The Duterte-era phenomenon of “red tagging” (identifying progressive gender voices as associated with terrorist organisations) does not appear to have abated. Public institutions crucial to gender equality, such as the Human Rights Commission (specifically the Gender Unit) and the Philippines Commission for Women, are being politicised and defunded, or at least threatened with defunding. The multi-layer decentralised nature of the Philippines’s governance structure often frustrates the implementation of reforms approved at the highest level.

The centrality of upholding human rights, good governance, democracy, rule of law, the promotion of social and economic development, as well as peace and security in the region is a key feature of the bilateral relationship between the Philippines and the EU. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), which was ratified in January 2018 provides an enhanced policy framework for overall Philippines-EU relations and advances partnership across multiple sectors and areas of mutual interest, which include justice and security reform, migration, trade and development cooperation, regional challenges, the environment and political dialogues.

The EU’s support to the Philippines currently focuses on governance, job creation, renewable energy, and assistance to vulnerable populations, specifically in Mindanao which is the poorest region of the Philippines and has been affected by conflicts and population displacement. The EU remains one of the biggest foreign development partners in support of Mindanao and the Peace Processes through a comprehensive approach targeting directly the political settlement with the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace and longer term development.<sup>109</sup> The EU has supported significant policy and legislative change, often with success, but governance in the Philippines is complicated both vertically (national, regional, municipal and, at least in the form of communities, barangay) and horizontally at each level. The geographic, ethnic, linguistic, and religious landscape can accurately be called complex, and clan politics cuts through all. Lack of political will appears to be less of an issue in the Philippines than the sheer difficulty of steering reforms from legislation to action.

Under MIP 2014-2020 out of a total budget of EUR 95 million, an indicative 29% was allocated to support strengthening the rule of law through legal and judicial reform, and EUR 225 million (69% of total) to inclusive growth through access to sustainable energy and job creation.<sup>110</sup> EU cooperation for the period 2021-2027 focuses on two priority areas: i) Green, Resilient Economy and Green Jobs (EUR 91 million, 62% of total), and ii) Peaceful and Just Society, Good Governance (EUR 51.5 million, 35% of total).<sup>111</sup>

### 7.1.2 Focus of the case study

This country case study examines EU support to GEWE in the Philippines and aims at identifying country-specific factors that influenced design, implementation and the results achieved. The analysis covers the diversity of EU support to Philippines in terms of modalities (contribution / delegation agreements, action grants and TA & services) and channels (National Government, UN & development agencies, EU MS, (I)NGOs, EFIs / IFIs and private sector).

The evaluation team has identified a portfolio of **EUR 122 million (contracted amounts) allocated to GEWE**<sup>112</sup> significant- or targeted (i.e., Gender Marker 1 or 2) interventions under GAP III. There was a notable increase in G1/G2 EU funding between 2020 and 2021, indicative of GAP III and NDICI-GE target effects. At the same time, there is an even more notable decrease in G1/G2 funding visible between 2021 and 2022 (see Figure 5). This decrease, which diverges from the global trend for the GEWE-specific financial volume (which increased in absolute terms during the period in scope, including 2022)<sup>113</sup>, can be explained in the case of The Philippines largely by the temporality of the programming process and the transition between two multi-annual budget cycles (2014-2020 and 2021-2027). At the time contract data was extracted for this evaluation (January 2023), not all programmes planned or committed for the period had yet been contracted or started to have a visible effect in 2022. Furthermore, a more detailed analysis of the overall EU portfolio in The Philippines including gender markers (see Figure 17) shows that while the level of funding of the gender-marked portfolio in the country has decreased in terms of volume of funds, the proportion of G1+G2 funds relative to the total portfolio has remained largely stable, and has even increased from 54% in 2019 to 93% in 2022.

<sup>109</sup> [https://www.eeas.europa.eu/philippines/european-union-and-philippines\\_en?s=176](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/philippines/european-union-and-philippines_en?s=176)

<sup>110</sup> European Commission (2014): Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2014-2020 for the Philippines


<sup>111</sup> Ibid.

<sup>112</sup> The evaluation team has carried out the present portfolio analysis on the basis of retrieved information on contracted amounts for all EU external actions from EU internal databases (EU Statistical Dashboard). The category “GEWE” mainly includes interventions categorised as with gender as a main objective (i.e., ‘Gender Equality’ marker = 2) or as a significant objective (i.e., ‘Gender Equality’ marker = 1). Nonetheless, as explained in Annex 5, this category may contain interventions identified as Non targeted (i.e., ‘Gender Equality’ marker = 0) but which the team has identified as having a link to GEWE and therefore considered as within the scope of the evaluation.

<sup>113</sup> For further details, see Annex 5 in Volume III.



Figure 16 Evolution of funding to GEWE in The Philippines under GAP III, 2019-2022



Source: *Particip*, based on Statistical Dashboard data

Data collection and analysis was structured along the lines of the EQs. Some issues related to the policy and strategic framework (EQ1) and to the design and implementation of the CLIP (EQ2) were examined looking at the whole portfolio. Most issues (including those related to the effects of WEE and WPS) were examined focussing on a sample of EU-funded interventions identified by the evaluation team for a more in-depth analysis. The final sample was selected through i) the global mapping of EU support (see main report) and ii) feedback from the EUD. The sample reflects well the above outlined diversity of EU support to GEWE in the Philippines by including: i) both bilateral and regional interventions; ii) gender-targeted and gender-sensitive interventions; iii) interventions implemented through different modalities and channels, iv) interventions that were designed before and after the launch of GAP III<sup>114</sup>; and v) interventions covering a variety of sectors, including Women's Economic Empowerment (WEE) and Women, Peace and Security (WPS). Table 14 and Table 15 below present the sampled interventions at bilateral and regional level, while Table 16 presents the two Team Europe Initiatives (TEIs) benefitting the Philippines.

Table 14 Main contracts identified in Philippines

Year	Intervention/ Contract title	Cris ref.	Contracting party	Planned amount
	<b>Mindanao Peace and Development Programme (MINPAD)</b>	<b>D-39903</b>		
2021	DE-CONFLICT: Dialogue and Engagement in Communities to Foster Peaceful Camps Transformation	c-428095	Centre Henry Dunant pour le Dialogue Humainitaire	1.300.851
2021	PROACTIV: Programme on Assistance for Camp Transformation through Inclusion, Violence Prevention, and Economic Empowerment	c-428097	UNDP	3.903.658
	<b>Justice Sector Reform Programme: Governance in Justice II (GOJUST II)</b>	<b>D- 42023</b>		
2020	Technical Assistance to Justice component of GOJUST II	c-418821	The British Council Royal Charter	5.000.000
2020	Logistical Support and Procurement for the Justice Sector Reform Programme: Governance in Justice II (GOJUST II) - Philippines	c-419438	UNOPS	9.000.000

<sup>114</sup> While the temporal scope of the evaluation covers the period immediately following the launch of GAP III (January 2021) and all of 2022, we have also included interventions designed and funded prior to 2021 as long as i) their objectives and expected results contributed to GAP III implementation and ii) they were implemented in the time frame mentioned above (01/2021-12/2022).

Year	Intervention/ Contract title	Cris ref.	Contracting party	Planned amount
2021	Component 2 Human Rights of the Justice Sector Reform Programme	c-423967	Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo (AECID)	4.000.000
	<b>Civil Society Organisations as actors of Governance and Development Work in the Field</b>	<b>d-40919 / d-41713 /</b>		
2019	Strengthening Accountability and Civil Society Engagement with Local Government Units (LGUs) for Stronger Disaster Response Mechanisms to Protect Children and Women in Emergencies in Eastern Samar	c-410836	Save the Children Germany	500.000
2019	Enhancing the role of women in protected area governance for social change	c-411830	Haribon Foundation	499.975
2020	Enhancing Women Fishers' Livelihood Opportunities in thirty-four (34) coastal barangays of Siargao Island Protected Landscape and Seascape (SIPLAS) Women Managed Areas	c-420101	SIKAT	448.000
	<b>AAP 2020 - EIDHR Country Based Support Scheme</b>	<b>d-41342</b>		
2021	Enhancing Advocacy and Action for Human Rights Defenders at Risk in the Philippines	428698	National Council of Churches in the Philippines	475.000
2021	ENGAGE: Empowering Girls as Agents of Change towards Gender Equality in Indigenous and Disadvantaged Communities in Cotabato Province	428699	Save the Children Philippines	500.000
	<b>Support to Bangsamoro Transition (SUBATRA)</b>	<b>d-41779</b>		
2020	Infrastructure, Logistical Support and Procurement for the Support for the Bangsamoro Transition (SUBATRA) Programme – Philippines	c-417874	UNOPS	11.000.000
2021	SUBATRA Justice and Society	c-417875	AECID	5.000.000

Table 15 Main regional contracts identified in Philippines

Year	Intervention/ Contract title	Cris ref.	Contracting party	Planned amount
2019	Promoting Economic Empowerment of Women at Work in Asia (WE Empower Asia)	c-404960	UN Women	7.500.000.00
2019	Spotlight Initiative for Asia	c-414226	UNDP	40.000.000.00

Table 16 Main TEIs identified in Philippines

Name	EU MS involved	EDFI involved	Planned amount
TEI Circular Economy	ES, FR, DE	EIB, AFD, FMO	400.000.000
TEI Digital Transformation and connectivity	ES, FR	EIB	n/a

The case study relies on a mix of tools/methods for data collection and analysis. It combines quantitative analysis of CRIS data with qualitative analysis of factors influencing design, implementation and effects of EU support to GEWE. Most data collection activities were conducted in person through a one-week field mission in November 2022 and complemented by additional remotely conducted key informant interviews between December 2022 and February 2023. Annexes 7.3.1 and 7.3.2 present the full lists of persons and documents consulted for this case study.

## 7.2 Findings

### 7.2.1 Policy and strategic framework (EQ1)

**The presence of gender within the EU cooperation programme has increased with time, a trend to which GAP III contributed.** Also contributing to this have been a number of exogenous factors. There has been a growing presence of women at the EUD and the current HoC is supportive of gender. The continued presence of a dedicated and experienced EU Gender focal person has also made a difference in gender sensitiveness of EU programmes and strategies GAP III is more structured than GAP II and there was pressure from Brussels, via G1's review of ADs in the QSG, to take gender seriously. The CLIP (see EQ2) has been drafted in a co-creative process involving the EU MS. The EUD Head of cooperation and programme managers contributed to the identification of the CLIP areas of engagement.. The GFP reviews all ADs, each of which has a gender annex, and ensures that, as upstream programming moves downstream towards actual contracted projects, the gender aspect is not diluted or lost. There is concrete evidence that Team Europe initiatives in green economy and digital transformation are incorporating gender aspects. While the political and social context is not ideal, public authorities are not hostile to EU goals in the areas of GEWE; if there is a constraint, it is that the structure of governance in the Philippines is complicated, raising barriers to implementation of reforms.

#### 7.2.1.1 Programming reflects GAP III objectives: MFF and policy documents (JC1.1)

Not relevant to country level.

#### 7.2.1.2 Conducive institutional environment ensured (JC1.2)

**The presence of gender within the EU cooperation programme has increased with time.** As recently as five years ago, there was a tendency to treat gender with benign neglect. Stakeholders interviewed attributed this to the fact that, at the level of elites, the Philippines performs apparently well on GEWE indicators due to the presence of important female politicians, business executives, etc.; but below this tip of the iceberg, the situation of women is much worse. Mainstreaming in cooperation was difficult, because few in the EUD were interested.


**Gender sensitivity has been facilitated by the presence of a dedicated and experienced GFP at the EUD, of more women at the EUD, the fact that the HoC is highly supportive, and the innovation of the CLIP.** These have, in combination, alleviated the problem of “gender significance shopping” upstream in the programming cycle (at the gender marking stage), and the close relationship between the GFP and programme managers has addressed the problem of “gender dilution” later, further downstream, in the programming process.

#### 7.2.1.3 Gender-responsive programming and M&E (JC1.3)

**In terms of funding to GEWE under GAP III,** as shown in Figure 16 above and Figure 17 below, there is a positive trend in G1+G2 funding until 2021, which then declines in 2022.<sup>115</sup> If analysed as a proportion of the total spent per year, however, G1+G2 represented 86% of the total in 2021, and 93% in 2022. The inventory (mapping) developed by the team for the period 2019-2022 provides evidence of the impact of GAP III in the number of GEWE-oriented (G2+G1) actions contracted and the volume of funds dedicated to these actions. Since the introduction of GAP III, the number of Gender not-targeted (G0) interventions has substantially declined, but so has the amount of gender earmarked funding (see Figure 17).

<sup>115</sup> As explained above ( ) this decrease in 2022 can be explained largely by the temporality of the programming process and the transition between two multi-annual budget cycles (2014-2020 and 2021-2027). At the time contract data was extracted for this evaluation (January 2023), not all programmes planned or committed for the period had yet been contracted or started to have a visible “effect” in the database for 2022.

Figure 17 Evolution of funding (contracted amounts) to GEWE in The Philippines under GAP III, by Gender Marker, 2019-2022



Source: Particip, based on Statistical Dashboard data

**GAP III was more structured than GAP II and, in addition, there was more pressure from Brussels to deal with gender.** G1 is a member of the Brussels QSG and exerted pressure for more gender responsiveness in course of AD reviews. In addition, at EUD level, there is QA of ADs for gender-sensitivity, with the GFP ensuring that every AD has a gender-sensitive SO; that gender is not relegated to the cross-cutting issues section. For example, the GFP inserted a gender SO in the Green Economy AD. Every AD contains a gender analysis Annex. There are increased gender reporting requirements and more intense involvement and ownership by MS as a result of GAP III.

For example, in negotiating the contract for GOJUST II, the EU insisted that British Council hire a gender expert (a good example of how downstream “gender dilution” has been avoided). In negotiating a WPS contract with the Centre Henry Dunant pour le Dialogue Humainaire, the EU programme officer ensured that gender aspects were represented. The GFP is also the focal point for civil society and can ensure that gender is represented in all CfPs. This has had a significant impact on projects funded; whereby those oriented towards civil and political rights now include a gender component. The GFP, with the CLIP as guiding framework, offered a forum for meeting CSOs in addition to Government.

**Team Europe initiatives in the Philippines (Green Economy and Digital Transformation) are at a too-early stage to assess how GAP III will actually influence design and programming but, based on interviews with the relevant programme managers, the current initiatives in the Philippines take gender seriously.** However, there is the threat (detected in countries other than the Philippines, as well) that there are likely to be **difficulties to ensure that gender will continue to be well represented as EU support is “financialised”** (i.e., switches from grants to loans though blending, loan guarantees, and other innovative modalities) and moves into less explicitly social, more economic growth-oriented areas such as these. Based on experiences in other countries, the difference in approach between IFIs and traditional development-oriented, grant-making actors is perceptible. The use of financial instruments brings its own challenges in terms of ensuring that these instruments reach and benefit women and gender equality.

One approach, which the EUD is following in the Philippines Green Deal TEI is to work with local authorities. A possible entry-point is **the gender equality-growth link**, long established in Southeast Asia by research in the vein of the *World Bank’s Southeast Asian Economic Miracle* study. (ca. late 1990s) An entry point may be **closer partnership (presumably through EuroCham) with European firms operating in the Philippines**, many of whom are committed to Corporate Social Responsibility including gender aspects.

There is **no real need for joint programming** in the Philippines because the CLIP provides a framework for a coordinated EU-MS approach to gender. A problem with both Team Europe and JP is that EU donors are shifting down in the Philippines. However, the EU can still call on their expertise, for example, in circular economy.

### 7.2.2 Design and implementation of CLIPs (EQ2)

**The Philippines CLIP has served as an effective implementation plan to guide programming and monitoring.** It not only identified GAP III priorities but ensures the presence of gender in all MIP focal areas. Ensuring the latter, the GFP responsible for the CLIP drafting process contributed to the MIP. EU MS GFPs and EUD programme managers and the HoC were involved in the CLIP drafting

process, as were EU MS GFPs and, to lesser extent, CSOs and Government. However, the comprehensive Gender Country Profile used in the design and drafting of the CLIP already reflected consultations with a large variety of CSOs, Government agencies and other relevant stakeholders (like UN agencies), and there was no need to consult the same stakeholders again. At the end of each year, there is a EU MS GFP meeting at which progress towards the CLIP is reviewed. Within the EUD, there is ongoing dialogue and consultation between the GFP and programme managers to ensure that the gender is mainstreamed at project level.

The CLIP makes a significant contribution to policy dialogue. Upon its launch, the EU Gender Champion and the Head of Delegation (HoD) met with the Commissioner of the Philippines Commission on Women to discuss implementation issues. The EU Gender Champion and the EU MS GFPs subsequently met with the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) and civil society representatives in 2021. In 2022, the EU Gender champion and the GFPs continue the dialogue through meetings with high level officials in Government agencies (like the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health) working on GEWE issues, as well as UNFPA, in particular on 'promoting sexual and reproductive health and rights' and 'ensuring freedom from all forms of gender based violence' (two priorities of the CLIP), in order to present EU's commitment, better understand how these agencies coordinate their efforts on GEWE, identify their needs and ways to collaborate.. The CLIP's contribution to political dialogue has been leveraged by the presence of an EU MS Gender Champion, for whom the EUD (as well as the GFP in the relevant embassy) can serve as a secretariat. The GC brings gender into the monthly meetings of Heads of Mission (among whom interest in gender issues is variable) and, in dealing with Government, the presence of an Ambassador lends weight. The choice of the GC, which rotates every year, is done through informal consultations and, in the end the GC is a volunteer.

#### 7.2.2.1 CLIPs reflect a clear, relevant and integrated vision (JC2.1)

**The GFP produced a first-draft CLIP, which was then shared with EU MS GFPs for comment and revision.** The resulting CLIP was a joint effort, with priorities identified as a group. As annex to the CLIP, the EU GFPs update twice a year a table with GEWE targeted interventions foreseen by each (EUD, EU MS) for the coming period.

In the course of producing the CLIP, the EUD commissioned a Gender Country Profile from the University of the Philippines; this served as a basis for the CLIP. In addition, the EU also commissioned a Gender analysis of Mindanao, a target region in the Philippines for the EU cooperation, complementing the findings and recommendations of the Gender country profile. In 2023, in 2023, the EUD will launch a service contract supporting the implementation of the CLIP, whose priorities and activities have been decided following a brainstorming session with the Member States gender focal persons.

#### 7.2.2.2 CLIPs facilitate gender mainstreaming and targeted actions (JC2.2)

**The Philippines CLIP can be considered a credible implementation plan** because of its precise statement of GAP III priorities and goals in each of the MIP thematic areas. Alignment with the MIP was ensured because the GFP also contributed to drafting the MIP. Three of the CLIP areas of engagement are directly related to the new EU MIP priorities: Addressing the challenges and harnessing the opportunities offered by the green transition and the digital transformation; Integrating the women, peace and security agenda; and Ensuring freedom from all forms of gender based violence (and access to justice). The CLIP is capable of guiding programming and monitoring and has been strongly promoted as an implementation tool. Upon its launch, the EU Gender Champion (see EQ 1) and the Head of Delegation met with the Commissioner of the Philippines Commission on Women to discuss implementation issues. The EU Gender Champion and the EU MS GFPs subsequently met with the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) and civil society representatives to identify gaps, interests, and priorities in the thematic areas identified in the CLIP.

#### 7.2.2.3 CLIPs contribute to gender perspective into political and policy dialogue (JC2.3)

**The CLIP serves as a basis for EU and MS policy and political dialogue related to gender.** Lines to take on gender equality, rights of sexual and gender minorities and women empowerment have been drafted by the EUD GFP and complemented by MS GFPs (who are well familiar with the CLIP) for Heads of Missions / EU Missions, to support their political dialogue with the new Philippine administration (new President and Ministers). Since the new administration plan is mainly focused on growth and economic development, the messages/lines to take by the Heads of Missions are mainly targeting women's economic. Empowerment. However, based on interviews, the CLIP remains more a conversation guide than an overarching framework, and gender takes second place to more pressing issues such as civil, political, and human rights. Communication between the Cooperation and Political sections is, again based on interviews, reported to be good.

**Gender enters as a factor into human rights dialogue due to the targeting of women human rights defenders and feminist NGOs** under the Duterte administration, a problem that has not disappeared under the Marcos government. The CLIP is especially useful in presenting EU priorities to the legislature, and the presence of an EU Ambassador in the form of the Gender Champion gives it leverage. At the end of each year, there is a EU MS GFP meeting at which progress towards the CLIP is reviewed. Within the EUD, there is ongoing dialogue and consultation between the GFP and programme managers to ensure that the gender is mainstreamed at project level.

**The EU and EU MS invariably raise gender issues in political dialogue**, but actual strong public statements at HoD level have been few and far between. LGBTIQ is an emerging test case for how strongly the EU wishes to promote its gender objectives. A lightning-rod gender equality bill is moving through the legislative process, and battle lines between conservative and progressive groups are drawn. However, while GEWE is ideologically sensitive, EU attempts to promote universal gender equality values are not broadly mis-perceived in the Philippines as an existential threat to identity and a way of life.

**The CLIP's contribution to policy dialogue has been leveraged by the presence of an EU MS Gender Champion**, for whom the EUD (as well as the GFP in the relevant embassy) can serve as a sort of secretariat, is important. In fact, the presence of the GC gives leverage to an EU MS GFP Group that might otherwise serve only as an information-sharing mechanism. The GC, who is endorsed at Heads of Mission level at the beginning of each year, brings gender into the monthly meetings of Heads of Mission (among whom interest in gender issues is variable) and, in dealing with Government, the presence of an Ambassador lends weight. The choice of the GC, which rotates every year is done through informal consultations and, in the end the GC is a volunteer.

#### 7.2.2.4 CLIPs facilitate gender-sensitive monitoring of results (JC2.4)


**As reported under EQ 1, gender has been thoroughly mainstreamed in EU actions.** One of the main aspects of "gender dilution," observed in some other countries examined, is that the indicators that feature in project documents are weak or generic (e.g., "gender-disaggregated data collected"). This is not observed in the Philippines.

#### 7.2.3 Effects on Women's Economic Empowerment (EQ3)

**Women's Economic Empowerment in the Philippines presents a number of specificities. The most obvious is the large number of Filipino women working abroad**, some in sectors making them vulnerable to exploitation and violence; but informality, geographical isolation, and the WPS-WEE nexus in Mindanao are also part of the context. The EU has supported a wide range of NGO (typically national) projects in WEE under GAP III but, while some, taken one by one, have produced laudable results, their overall impact is limited in both scale and scope. Female labour participation remains low despite high male labour emigration, women's access to finance remains problematic. More ambitious and aiming at transformative and systemic change have been EU-supported regional projects, especially WeEmpowerAsia (UN Women) and Safe and Fair (UN Women and ILO, a Spotlight initiative). The first has brought to bear its gender expertise in policy dialogue with Government; it has also brought together the social partners to discuss issues related to women's economic empowerment, especially in the SME sector. More broadly, it injected GEWE concerns into the policy process of updating the Philippine Development Plan and the response to COVID-19. Safe and Fair has supported the establishment of Migrant Resource Centres to advise women migrant worker both pre-departure and post-return, and also advocated for the innovation of Violence Against Women focal points in Philippine missions abroad. As also discussed under EQ 4, gender has been mainstreamed as a theme in the EU's support to peace building in the MINPAD and SUBATRA programmes. TEI initiatives in Green Economy and Digital Transformation are still too recent for gender effects to be observed.

### 7.2.3.1 Strategic engagement / policy and political dialogue; M&E and communication on WEE (JC3.1)

Figure 18 Evolution of funding (contracted amounts) to GEWE (G1/G2) interventions in The Philippines promoting WEE and WPS, 2019-2022



Source: Particip, based on Statistical Dashboard data

As with other GAP III priority areas, contracted amounts increased in 2021, then fell back in 2022.

**Typical of EU support to WEE, with EU support the national affiliate of a major international environmental NGO supported municipality-based women's federations by providing training on the basics of environmental protection, basic life skills, and household / livelihood skills that contributed to preserving natural resources.** In another project, the NGO has worked closely with Local Government Units, the military, and the police to protect biodiversity. In a third, the NGO worked on eco-friendly livelihoods for adult women and the EUD used the EIDHR budget to organise workshops for the EU funded CSO partners (from the CSO programme and the EIDHR) on gender mainstreaming and communication Gender focal person. Other national NGO-implemented projects supported fisherwomen or women living within protected environmental areas and indigenous girls and women who live in geographically isolated and disadvantaged areas (GIDA) whose already vulnerable status was adversely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. The results of such projects, while often impressive taken one by one, can be seen, taken as a whole, as somewhat scattered, small in scale, and often of limited sustainability.

**In contrast, regional projects have been ambitious and aimed at transformative change.** The UN Women-implemented and Partnership Instrument-financed Asia regional project Promoting Economic Empowerment of Women at Work in Asia programme (WeEmpowerAsia), implemented in the Philippines from 2019 to 2022, aimed at promoting income security, decent work and economic autonomy. The overall objective was access to business opportunities, voice, and leadership, with emphasis on the private sector and Philippines focal sectors manufacturing, retail trade, hotels and restaurants, and agriculture. In 2021, the EUD has provided visibility through serving as a member of the project Steering Committee and making introductory speeches to the main programme activities and events, including on safe spaces and workplaces. EU Gender Champions have been actively engaged in WeEmpowerAsia. The EUD GFP was also one of the Philippine Women's Empowerment Principles Awards (WEPs Awards)<sup>116</sup> 2021 judges, an event that since 2020 has gained regional momentum with more than 1.500 applications from over 700 participating businesses across Asia and the Pacific.<sup>117</sup>

<sup>116</sup> The WEPs Awards recognize outstanding initiatives and practices that promote gender equality in the world of work.

<sup>117</sup> <https://asiapacific.unwomen.org/en/stories/press-release/2022/11/22-asia-pacific-firms-recognized-by-un-women-for-workplace-gender-inclusivity#:~:text=The%20WEPs%20Awards%20is%20an,Asia%20and%20the%20Pacific%20region.>

Another regional programme, Safe and Fair: Realizing the Rights and Opportunities of Women Migrant Workers in the ASEAN Region has been implemented by the ILO and UN Women in the Philippines since 2018 (with a foreseen end date on 31 December 2023) in cooperation with governments, workers, employers and social partners. It was part of a global EU-UN Spotlight Initiative to eliminate violence against women and girls. In the Philippines the programme advised on policies and providing Migrant Resource Centres to advise women pre-departure and post-return (migrants are dealt with differently during their stay abroad). The EUD is a member of the National Project Advisory Committee. The newly created Department of Migrant Workers, which oversees recruitment and service provision for migrant workers has, with Safe and Fair inputs, incorporated gender into its provisions; for example, designating gender focal persons that serve as Violence Against Women focal points in Philippine missions abroad. This is the first time that the major labour migration law in the Philippines has included a specific VAW provision

Under the Mindanao Programme implemented by UNDP, the project Assistance for Camp Transformation through Inclusion, Violence Prevention, and Economic Empowerment (PROACTIVE) has only started in 2022 but aims at linking WEE and WPS themes in the six camps where it works to encourage peaceful and productive communities.

### 7.2.3.2 Strengthening of women's rights (incl. TVET, decent work, equal pay, social protection systems, inclusion in the formal economy, green economy and digital transformation) (JC3.2)

**Under WeEmpowerAsia, policy discussions and dialogues have informed two legislative action directly affecting The Philippines.** In partnership with the Philippine Business Coalition for Women's Empowerment (PBCWE), WEA Philippines convened leading representatives of Government and the social partners including SME owners to discuss issues faced by women led- and owned businesses. The discussion ranged from the need for safe spaces (online and offline) covered discussion on safe spaces for women online and offline, unpaid care work and women in the informal economy. The increase in opportunities in the digital world has also been a space for women to explore work virtually. The project was involved in providing expertise to the House of representatives regarding women in the digital economy (both opportunities and threats), gender equity generally in updating the Philippine Development Plan 2017-2022. WeEmpowerAsia also provided expertise on consultations regarding the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on women.

The CLIP has been identified circular Economy as a priority and includes the targeting of women and youth as its third objective. The related actions are however, still mostly in the planning stages. The Safe and Fair programme referred to above had strong social protection and decent work components.

**In 2021, a gender analysis of Mindanao has been undertaken**, including specific analyses on peace building, agriculture and job creation sectors which the EU supports through the new programmes. This enabled a comprehensive and effective understanding and approach towards gender equality and women's empowerment in Mindanao, the poorest region in the Philippines. Gender aspects of transitional justice have been addressed. The study has also provided specific gender analyses of the new EU programmes implemented in Mindanao as well as recommendations to ensure or strengthen the gender sensitivity of these EU interventions. Finally, gender experts conducted trainings for project implementing partners in Mindanao.

### 7.2.4 Effects on Women, Peace and Security (EQ4)

**The EU has been active in supporting the WPS, including the WPS-WEE nexus through the MINPAD project, largely camp-based.** The more recent initiative, still in early phases is Support to Bangsamoro Transition (SUBATRA). The project is too recent to cite effects, but gender has been effectively mainstreamed through all its components. Gender expertise has been effectively engaged. TA to the new regional government has contributed to establishing a Gender focal person system across ministries. Gender aspects of transitional justice with a strong gender component are being addressed with EU support and, under MINPAD, the EU specifically addressed GBV in the camps. A flashpoint on women's rights has been child marriage, but the resistance to the new national law within the region is not strictly across religious lines. The peace situation is fragile, however, and no specific evidence of women's involvement in the peace negotiation process has been found.

#### 7.2.4.1 Strategic engagement / policy and political dialogue; M&E and communication on WPS (JC4.1)

**The Financing Agreement for SUBATRA stipulates GEWE as a component and specifies mainstreaming.** A GAP III implementation Action Plan at programme level is mandated and is now being prepared by a consultant in consultation with Ministries and CSOs. The SUBATRA project Description of Action and all guidance and conceptual frameworks provided by the EU enshrine and



elevate gender equality. The consistent promotion of Gender Equality in their guidelines is very important in setting policy direction, enabling and facilitating project proponents to be mindful about placing women's rights, WPS and gender equality at the centre of all that they do and to ensure project implementing partners do the same. SUBATRA has contracted with a GEWE/ WPS consultant to develop a Gender Action Plan which is undergoing a series of validation consultations with partners such as the Bangsamoro Women's Commission (BWC) and the Ministry of Interior & Local Government (MILG). The work with BWC, which was established to advance the protection, promotion of women's rights in the Bangsamoro territories, is now mapping Local Government Units mechanisms protecting and promoting rights of women and assessing whether they are in place and functional. The BWC government has set up a Gender focal person system across ministries. BWC coordinates all Gender and Development activities and how each ministry and unit uses 5% GAD budget; Re GBV mapping, BWC is asking the Ministry of the Interior and Local Government to support their effort by issuing EO to support BWC initiatives and integrate GFPS

#### 7.2.4.2 Strengthening of women's rights (on WPS pillars) (JC4.2)

**As a young regional bureaucracy, Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) has a unique opportunity to design and embed gender-responsive governance in its institutional and systemic design and policy development.** One clear aspect to monitor and pay attention to are the areas where former women combatants may not be equitably receiving normalization packages.

**SUBATRA is supporting the MILG in working with barangay justice system,** how to merge traditional community-based justice practices (largely mediation by community leaders) with barangay-level rule of law, ordinances and judicial practices. Although this is a general approach, there is impact on women and girls.

Despite the fact that a national law prohibiting child marriage has been passed, there is strong resistance by the new BARMM government to its application in that region. However: (i) the resistance is not a purely Muslim one; it cuts across religions and, more important (ii) the main point of contention is not child marriage per se but the imposition of penalties on parents and community facilitators, and (iii) the argument being advanced is that overall economic and social development progress, not a legislated rule, is the best way to combat the practise.

In the area of transitional justice, a Non-Violent Peace Force is convening a set of CSOs, the Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society Organisations (CBCS) with EU funding, while GIZ is also organizing another network. The Bangsamoro law establishing transitional justice (TJ) has facilitated the collaboration of CSOs concerned with these issues and raising BARMM ministries' awareness of TJ. This initiative, named "Dealing with the Past," has a strong gender dimension, developed by feminist professors participating in the consortium, which has been widely adopted and used by various TJ and WPS practitioners. The impact of this framework is seen in participating municipalities, who have since adopted local ordinances on TJ. Next steps are to have it adopted by the ministries. The transitional justice commission TWG on Dealing with the Past was funded by AECID and is perceived to have strongly informed the integration of the WPS agenda onto the mainstream agenda of the Bangsamoro Transition Authority.

**Outside BARMM, the two EU-financed camp-based projects under MINPAD, DE-CONFLICT: Dialogue and Engagement in Communities to Foster Peaceful Camps Transformation and PROACTIV: Programme on Assistance for Camp Transformation through Inclusion, Violence Prevention, and Economic Empowerment have been described above.** The EU-financed project ENGAGE: Empowering Girls as Agents of Change towards Gender Equality in Indigenous and Disadvantaged Communities in Cotabato Province partners with a wide range of NGOs and CSOs in Maguindanao and conflict affected areas outside BARMM. It has a focus not conflict per se but violence in families, schools, communities. There is specific focus on indigenous communities; examining the drivers of human rights violations, mostly consisting of discrimination by majority ethnic communities that limit access to resources.

#### 7.2.4.3 Increased participation of women in peace building, negotiations and mediation (J4.3)

**All actors, including the EU, are aware that the current peace arrangement in Muslim Mindanao is very fragile.** Even during the BARMM transitional phase, clan feuds and electoral violence have generated waves of displacement, severely affecting women and children. The EU has supported the Mindanao peace process and the current SUBATRA Programme in Cotabato State supports the new BARMM government, as well as local CSOs, in multiple dimensions. One executive TA component strengthens government capacities. The Justice and Society component supports access to justice and CSOs, respectively. Gender is mainstreamed throughout the programme. No information was found specific to encouraging women's participation in peace building, but the project supports peace building

overall. In SUBATRA's CSO component, the target beneficiaries are the widows of former combatants. The project prioritises these women for livelihood training and provision of equipment because economic security contributes to and enables their contributions to WPS.

## 7.3 Annex

### 7.3.1 List of persons consulted

<i>Organisation</i>	<i>Position</i>
<b>EU &amp; EU MS</b>	
Embassy of Finland	Deputy Head of Mission
Embassy of Finland	Finnish ambassador (EU Gender Champion)
Embassy of Spain	Deputy Chief of Mission
Embassy of Spain / AECID	AECID Gender focal person
Embassy of Spain / AECID	Team Leader
Embassy of Sweden	Gender Focal Person; Communications Officer
Embassy of the Netherlands	Senior Policy Officer for Political and Human Rights
EUD Philippines	Attaché – Programme Manager, Gender & Civil Society Focal Person (Cooperation section)
EUD Philippines	First Secretary, Political Officer (Political, Press & Information)
EUD Philippines	Head of Cooperation
EUD Philippines	Programme Officer (Cooperation section)
<b>National and local authorities</b>	
Commission on Human Rights	Center for Gender Equality & Women's Human Rights, OIC
Philippine Commission on Women (PCW)	Executive Director
<b>Civil Society Organisations</b>	
Centre Henry Dunant pour le Dialogue Humanitaire	Country Representative
Haribon	Manager, Site Action Department
Haribon	Women Go Site Coordinator
NCCP	Program Assistant for Education & Training
NCCP	Program Assistant for Lobbying & Networking
Save the Children	Director for Awards
<b>UN &amp; development agencies</b>	
UN Women	Programme analyst
ILO	Project coordinator

### 7.3.2 List of documents

#### 7.3.2.1 EU Strategy Programming

- European Commission (2014): Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2014-2020 for the Philippines
- European Commission (2021): Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2021-2027 for the Philippines

#### 7.3.2.2 EU Reporting

- European Commission (2019): External Assistance Management Report (EAMR) Philippines
- European Commission (2020): External Assistance Management Report (EAMR) Philippines
- European Commission (2021): External Assistance Management Report (EAMR) Philippines
- European Commission (2021): Progress Report 2020 Philippines

#### 7.3.2.3 EU gender-specific

- EU Delegation to the Philippines (2021): Gender Action Plan III – 2021-2025 Country-Level Implementation Plan – CLIP Philippines
- European Commission (2021): GAP III reporting Philippines 2021
- Strategia Development Research Institute, Incl. (2021): Gender analysis of Mindanao

- University of the Philippines Center for Women's Studies Foundation (2020): Gender Country Profile for the Philippines

#### **7.3.2.4 Project documentation**

The team reviewed the available project documentation (action fiches/TAPs, grant contracts, implementation and monitoring reports, evaluations, etc.) of the projects presented in Tables 1-3.

#### **7.3.2.5 Other**

- European Commission (2020): Political Economy Analysis for the Republic of the Philippines
- National Economic and Development Authority (2017): Philippine Development Plan 2017-2022
- Philippine Commission on Women (1995): Philippine Plan for Gender-Responsive Development 1995-2025
- Philippine Commission on Women (2022): Updated Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment Plan 2019-2025
- World Bank (2022) Women, Business and the Law 2022

## 8 Thematic case study: Country Level Implementation Plans (CLIPs)

### 8.1 Introduction

#### 8.1.1 Focus of the case study

Within the Mid-Term Evaluation of the EU Gender Action Plan III (GAP III), this report presents the case study on Country-Level Implementation Plans (CLIPs) of GAP III.

The case study was designed to set the factual and analytical background of Evaluation Question 2 of Evaluation: “To what extent have the design and implementation of the CLIPS strengthened i) the programming, design and monitoring of EU support to GEWE at country level and ii) related political and policy dialogue?” Based on the guidance issued to the EU services for the preparation of CLIPs, the evaluation team identified key items to be checked. This case study therefore analyses these items, which also inform the judgement criteria under this evaluation question:

- Alignment of CLIPs with GAP III thematic areas and principles;
- Alignment of CLIPs with the applicable programming frameworks (MIP or equivalent, or IPA III Programming framework in the IPA region)
- Quality of context analysis and alignment of CLIP with the relevant context
- Inclusiveness of the CLIPs’ preparation, through: i) Alignment of the consultation process leading to the CLIPs with EU GAP III and CLIP guidance; ii) Team Europe approach to the implementation of GAP III through the CLIPs
- Actions identified by the CLIPs to serve GAP III implementation (cost activities)
- Policy and political dialogue (non-cost activities) and communication, encompassed under (public) diplomacy.
- Internal EUD capacity to elaborate and implement the CLIP as the tool for implementation of GAP III
- The case study is based on four different types of data sources: i) Document review, ii) Focus group discussions<sup>118</sup>, iii) Interviews; iv) e-survey.

To this end, the evaluation team has systematically reviewed the CLIPs in an extended sample of 27 countries, including the sample of six full case study countries (Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Occupied Palestinian Territories, Philippines, Serbia, Tanzania), and an additional 21 countries in all regions covered by the EU’s external action: Bangladesh, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cameroon, El Salvador, Georgia, Guatemala, Guinea Conakry, India, Kenya, Kosovo\*<sup>119</sup>, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Moldova, Rwanda, South Africa, Uganda, Venezuela. This extended sample was selected in consultation with DG INTPA, based on geographic representation, feasibility, and representativeness in terms of the types of activities and operations carried out by the EU. In addition, the evaluation team reviewed all GAP III guidance provided to relevant EU services; in particular, guidance related to the preparation of CLIPs. The evaluation team also reviewed the overview of all CLIPs carried out by DG INTPA in February 2022. The evaluation team organised one focus group per region, gathering a total of 15 representatives of relevant EU Delegations. It also took into account the wealth of semi-structured interviews conducted in the EU’s headquarters with a variety of services, and in the six case study countries with EU staff, implementing partners, national authorities, CSOs, experts and academia, international and regional organisations, and international NGOs. Finally, the evaluation team used the results of the e-survey to EU staff, deployed within the scope of the evaluation: this survey contained a series of four questions dedicated to CLIPs. The survey is the subject of a separate report (see Volume III – Annex 5).

#### 8.1.2 Context

**Function of the CLIPs:** The EU GAP III calls on “EU Delegations, Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations and missions in coordination with EU Member States’ embassies, to prepare a ‘country-level implementation plan’, setting the policy priorities and identifying actions and key objectives”. The function of the CLIPs is therefore to set priorities and identify actions and key objectives.

<sup>118</sup> Focus Group Discussions were conducted for all regions, except for the South Neighbourhood. For the East Neighbourhood, only two EUDs were represented (including one from a case study country).

<sup>119</sup> In this document, any mention of Kosovo, its territory, inhabitants, institutions or normative framework should be understood within the context of UN Security Council Resolution 1244, and as bearing no opinion on the future status of Kosovo.

This function deserves clarification and elaboration. The training material used to train EUD staff on preparing CLIPs is particularly clear, as it states that a CLIP should represent “**a collective political and operational EU approach to GEWE in a specific country**”. It should therefore be aligned with GAP III thematic areas and underlying principles.

**Content of the CLIPs:** According to the CLIPs template, which forms the key guiding document issued to the relevant EU staff for the preparation of CLIPs, a CLIP should cover “**both the political and the programmatic commitments for gender equality**”. The Checklist on CLIPs, another guidance document, adds that CLIPs “should not report on ongoing/past actions”, but be a **forward-looking** document.

**Strategic alignment of the CLIPs:** the CLIP template foresees that CLIPs should be **aligned with key strategic documents**: a CLIP “should be prepared in close articulation with the Multiannual Indicative Programme (MIP)” and “coordinated with other relevant processes including the Human Rights and Democracy Country Strategy, the Roadmap for engagement with CSOs”.

**Contextualisation of the CLIPs:** The guidance documents envisage that CLIPs should be **informed by detailed analysis**. The same document adds: “It should be based on the gender country profile, informed by gender sector analysis”. Quality and detailed analysis is therefore a cornerstone of CLIP preparation, and the Gender Country Profile and the CLIP are closely dependent on each other.

**Design process of the CLIPs:** The template foresees a **consultative process**: “coordinated by the EUD, in cooperation with CSDP missions and operations (when present), it should be set-up jointly with Member States, reflecting a shared EU vision, and in consultation with all other relevant EU actors, national stakeholders, including civil society organisations and international actors.”

Finally, all these items, rely on the **capacity of the EUDs** who coordinate the preparation of CLIPs.

## 8.2 Main Observations

### 8.2.1 Overall alignment of CLIPs with of GAP III objectives and principles

Adherence to the objectives and guidelines of the CLIPs is high, with room for improvement to match objectives with actions.

#### **Almost all CLIPs analysed are aligned with GAP III priorities and relevant strategic document(s).**

The evaluation team reached conclusions identical to those that emerged from DG INTPA’s analysis of the CLIPs from February 2022: “CLIPs identify priorities among the six GAP III Thematic Areas of Engagement. The most frequent choice is ending GBV, followed by economic and social rights and empowerment”. Of the CLIPs in our sample, only the CLIP Moldova did not include GBV as a thematic area (yet, it foresees a specific action). Then come participation and leadership, Green Economy, and Digital Transformation. Sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR), and women, peace, and security (WPS) are least often selected. One CLIP (Guinea-Conakry) does not select any GAP priority, but instead recalls the (provisional) MIP priority areas and specifies GEWE priorities under these MIP priority areas.

#### *Box 1 Good practice on CLIPs – Incorporating “leading by example” objectives*

Good practice 

CLIPs developed by the EUDs in **Bangladesh, Morocco, and South Africa** outline specific objectives for EUD-internal GEWE changes, under the “Leading by Example” pillar of the GAP III document. Some of the specific objectives in these

CLIPs feature EUD training on GEWE (analysis, mainstreaming, often sector-specific), a “no women, no panel” approach to policy dialogue and other consultation or decision-making platforms, and internal parity.

Our **e-survey** shows that 84% of EUD respondents consider that the CLIP was aligned with the MIP (56% to a great extent, and 28% to some extent). All CLIPs reviewed note their alignment with the MIP or equivalent document<sup>120</sup>, however, this alignment is substantiated to varying degrees. Some CLIPs present explicit links between the MIP priority areas, MIP indicators, and the respective GAP III thematic areas selected in the CLIP (e.g., Bolivia, Morocco, South Africa, Uganda). This may be done through a

<sup>120</sup> In some countries, there is no MIP nor any equivalent document: in our sample, this concerns Kosovo and Myanmar. In some countries, other overarching country-specific strategic documents apply such as the IPA III Programmatic framework (IPA countries), an EU joint strategy (Occupied Palestinian Territory), or a Partnership Roadmap (India). In IPA countries, some CLIPs also take into account the most recent EC Opinion on the country’s membership application.

synoptic table, or through a succinct review of MIP priority areas, their GEWE relevance, and correspondence with GAP III thematic areas. Several CLIPs (e.g., Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cameroon, El Salvador, Pakistan, DRC, Moldova) mention the MIP, and identify GEWE as a sub-sector, relevant issue, or set of indicators in one or several MIP sector(s). In Myanmar and Cameroon, where the context is particularly challenging, the CLIP freely reorganised the GAP III thematic areas and objectives to match country-specific objectives and areas: this was done through merging, re-classification and reformulation of GAP III standard specific objectives. Other CLIPs simply mention the MIP (or equivalent document) and state that the CLIP is aligned, without substantiating further. There is at least one example (Bangladesh) where the CLIP assesses the MIP's level of GEWE mainstreaming – at times critically.

Many CLIPs state that the MIP and CLIP were developed “in parallel”, which suggests that they influenced each other. Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) and country-level interviews show that the GEWE aspect was often discussed during the preparation of the MIP, thanks to EUD-internal dialogue to select GAP III thematic areas for the CLIP. This data shows that the CLIP preparation process was at least as important as the document itself to “engender” the MIPs (or equivalent). Yet, 55% of our EUD survey respondents believe that the MIP has facilitated gender mainstreaming in the CLIP, either to a great extent (17%) or to some extent (38%). Compared to other figures, this shows that the CLIP was aligned to the MIP, rather than the opposite.

Almost half of the sampled CLIPs (Georgia, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Guatemala, Kenya, Kosovo, Pakistan, Philippines, DRC, Serbia, Uganda) link their priority areas and/or stakeholder analysis, and/or dialogue priorities with an additional country-specific thematic strategic document: the Civil Society Roadmap, and/or the Human Rights Roadmap. This was also observed by DG INTPA's analysis. However, in several cases, the CLIP just mentions these strategic documents, stating that they are aligned. Few explain which part of these documents is implemented through the CLIP, or vice-versa.

**CLIPs all seek to uphold GAP III principles, particularly a “policy first” contextualized approach, a human rights-based approach, and intersectionality.**

All CLIPs reviewed include at least one section where one or several GAP III transversal **principles** are strongly considered. The most frequent case is the inclusion of **intersectionality** in the analytical sections of the CLIPs (Section 1 on country context, and/or justification of the chosen thematic areas where this is done): these CLIPs identify groups facing multiple vulnerabilities, such as women and girls who are migrants, from national minorities or indigenous communities, LGBTIQ persons, and many others. However, this intersectional approach is rarely translated into concrete actions: there is very little correspondence between the identified groups, and the target groups of the current or future actions described (Section 3 on targeted actions).

The majority of CLIPs also profess, or demonstrate, that they consider a **human rights-based** approach. The analysis conducted by DG INTPA in February 2022 identified 74 CLIPs (out of 119) claiming a human rights-based approach. In addition, the evaluation team found that, in our sample, many CLIPs start with a review of the international human rights instruments ratified by the country, and the identification of gaps and progress reported by international human rights or regional monitoring mechanisms (i.e. UPI, CEDAW, GREVIO). The context analysis section of the CLIPs often identifies obstacles to GEWE from a human rights perspective: several CLIPs highlight which human rights women tend to enjoy less than men (or not at all) in law and/or in practice, and point to systematic human rights violations (e.g., female genital mutilation, gender-based violence and absence of effective redress, lack of access to land ownership, civil rights issues). This is often done in conjunction with the identification of intersectional vulnerabilities and/or discrimination. In human rights terms, this corresponds to a basic gap analysis. According to country-level interviews and document review, this approach owes much to the Gender Country Profiles (which in turn are often outsourced to external consultants or partner agencies such as UN Women). However, the link between a human rights-based analysis and programming is unclear. The G2 actions described in the CLIPs, for instance, do not clearly respond to the identified violations.

The same can be said of **gender transformative approach**: while about half of the CLIPs analysed by DG INTPA (and likewise in our sample) refer to a gender transformative approach, the majority of G2 actions described in the sampled CLIPs are gender-responsive, rather than gender transformative. They tend to respond to GBV or to compensate obstacles to participation or economic empowerment. Encouragingly, in our sample, future actions (programmed under GAP III) are more likely than ongoing ones (programmed under GAP II) to be transformative. Examples of gender transformative G2 actions include, among others: Gender Equality Facilities in the IPA region, some technical assistance projects (e.g., in Georgia), and a programme on women's economic empowerment (WEE) called “Ciudad Mujer” in El Salvador.

Finally, almost all CLIPs adopt a “**policy first**” approach, which ties well with the GAP III principle of **context-specific GEWE programming**. In a few cases, the CLIP identifies fundamentally opposed government and EU visions in the context of serious human rights backslides (e.g., in El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Venezuela) or of a coup (e.g. in Myanmar, Guinea-Conakry), which render support to the normative framework (legislation, regulations, policy documents) moot. In virtually all other cases, the CLIP includes a review of the applicable normative framework, and it anchors the selected thematic areas and actions in this framework.

### 8.2.2 Overall alignment of CLIPs with country contexts (JC2.1, JC2.2)

All CLIPs are based on in-depth substantive consultations, although the inclusiveness of these vary depending on the context and capacity of each EUD. Also, CLIPs are all informed by some form of gender analysis, albeit with varying levels of ownership and quality. In general, CLIPs were found to be context-sensitive, but it is not yet clear whether they can pave the way for responding to context through programming.

#### **All CLIPs are informed by substantive consultations. The inclusiveness of these consultations varies to respond to context and capacity.**

Like DG INTPA, the evaluation team found that all CLIPs followed the guidelines, in that they all rest on some consultations which inform the country’s GEWE context in terms of current situation and actions of various stakeholders. During interviews and focus group discussions, a few EUD Gender focal persons (GFPs) deplored the limited time afforded to EUDs for consultations ahead of the Gender Country Profiles and CLIPs. DG INTPA’s analysis lists the following **consultation partners**: “government, CSOs including women’s rights organisations, trade unions, private sector, EUMS, and international organisations.” In our sample, however, the trade unions were not mentioned as consultation partners. Furthermore, five CLIPs do not specify which partners were consulted.<sup>121</sup>

Our sample, concurring with DG INTPA analysis, **features EU MS and CSOs as the most often consulted partners**. Among the CLIPs which describe consultations, all include EU MS. All but three include CSOs, including but not limited to organisations supporting GEWE specifically: generalist human rights organisations and sector-specific CSOs, both national and international, are sometimes featured. INTPA, in its analysis of CLIPs, rightly notes that CSOs are overwhelmingly included, “even in countries where civil society space is restricted.” In fact, in countries experiencing a backslide on human rights and democracy, the EUDs have consulted CSOs and activists in priority for the preparation of the CLIPs (unless, as in Myanmar, where the Do No Harm principle made this inadvisable): in these contexts, CSOs, and at times the private sector, appear as the main viable GEWE partners.

INTPA notes that “72% (85/119) CLIPs reported consultation with partner government”, especially the “body in charge of gender equality (Ministry, National Gender Equality Mechanism)” and national human rights institutions. In our sample, five out of 27 CLIPs report consultations, but not with the Government. This is usually associated with a particularly difficult situation (coup, authoritarian regime). Where the Government was consulted, this concerns in priority the dedicated GEWE institution(s): dedicated ministry, interinstitutional national GEWE body, equality body/NHRIs. In very few cases, consultation extended to local authorities or to other sectors’ ministries.

**Like-minded donors and international organisations** also often contributed to the CLIPs. These include chiefly UN agencies (typically UN Women, UNFPA, UNICEF, and in conflict or fragile contexts OCHA and other specialised agencies such as UNRWA or UNODC). Country case studies also show that consultation and preparation of the CLIP was sometimes done in very close partnership with UN Women (e.g., Serbia, Kenya). Where present and if the diplomatic context permitted, consultation sometimes extended to international financial institutions, and in some cases non-EU countries (such as Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, Canada, etc...)

The **private sector** is least represented among consulted partners, with only seven CLIPs mentioning it in our sample of 27. Where it was, this logically corresponds to a CLIP which places high emphasis on WEE.

**Consultation modalities** vary widely from country to country, and depending on the actors: in a few countries, it included semi-structured interviews and workshops (Serbia, Colombia, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Morocco among others), usually with CSOs, Government and/or EU MS. Other actors, or in some countries all partners, were often consulted in writing (through a questionnaire, or request for review and commenting of the draft CLIP). Beyond the presence or absence of certain partners (e.g., not all EU MS or UN agencies have representation in all countries; not all countries have a Ministry mandated with GEWE), case studies showed that these differences depend on several factors:

<sup>121</sup> They either do not mention consultations, or mention consultations without specifying.

- Capacity of the EUD to organise in-depth consultations, and of the partners;
- Timing of consultations, and possible collision with other deadlines, or synergy with other consultation processes (e.g., CSO roadmap implementation);
- Diplomatic situation and pre-existing level of cooperation with the respective partners: EUDs tend to include more deeply their usual partners. This is particularly the case as regards CSOs and other international organisations. This may pose problems in terms of outreach, richness of input and variety of opinions, as well as perception (as some actors may feel side-lined). Some NGOs interviewed complained of the “usual suspects” approach, tending to favour large, capital-based, well-funded NGOs at the expense of small, innovative ones, often outside capital.

**All CLIPs are informed by some gender analysis, although with varying levels of ownership and quality.**

All CLIPs, following guidance, open with a contextual section outlining the main findings of a country gender analysis. This is meant to underpin all other sections, and it is at the root of the contextualisation and gender transformative principles of GAP III. In this sense, the CLIP is inseparable from the Gender Country Profile, which serves as a basis for the CLIP’s analytical section. EUDs usually prepared their Gender Country Profile ahead of the CLIP, or in a few cases (Occupied Palestinian Territories, Morocco) even before GAP III. The quality of the CLIPs depends largely on **the ownership** and **the quality** of this gender analysis.

**Box 2**

*Good practice on CLIPs – Comprehensive sector analysis<sup>122</sup>*

Good practice



The **CLIP in Colombia** contains a strong gender analysis, both general and under the respective GAP III selected areas.

To produce this analysis, the EUD in Colombia prepared its CLIP in-house through a co-creative process strongly backed by the Head of Cooperation and with the participation of all task managers, coordinated by the GFP.

The process was made possible because the EUD developed their own guide for gender analysis about the MIP priority areas prioritized in the CLIP under the selected GAP III thematic areas. They then shared this guide across other EUDs in the region of their own initiative.

**Ownership** depends on the **process** which led to drafting this section of the CLIP: inclusive or co-creative analytical processes, especially within the EUD staff, yield stronger EUD-wide ownership – which in turn conditions the implementation of the CLIP objectives and the effective mainstreaming of GEWE in all actions of the EUD. In most cases, the GFP took the lead for both the Gender Country Profile and the CLIP, sometimes with the support of a consultant. Many EUDs chose to inform their Gender Country Profile with broad consultations (DRC, Serbia, Morocco, Georgia, among others), but in two case study countries (Serbia, DRC), this process was led by a consultant hired through a facility implemented by UN Women, or by UN Women directly, rather than the EUD itself. In some countries, the EUD fully outsources the production of the Gender Country Profile to another organisation such as UN Women (Serbia), or to a consultant, as a part of a Technical Assistance contract.<sup>123</sup> Others, like Colombia EUD, have produced the Gender Country Profile, largely channelled into the CLIP, internally and through a co-creative process with the respective sector teams.

The **content** of this contextual section also varies. In most CLIPs, this section is a general snapshot, a factual overview of the current GEWE situation, rather than a dynamic analytical section feeding directly into the selection of thematic areas and the design of actions. A minority of CLIPs (e.g., Occupied Palestinian Territories, South Africa, Colombia among others) delve into the root causes and consequences of the manifestations of gender inequality and the specificities in each sector.

The CLIP template envisages the systematic review of the existing international and domestic normative framework, and this guideline has been followed by all CLIPs reviewed, at least in a descriptive fashion. The vast majority (except, for instance Occupied Palestinian Territory and Cameroon, among others) consider the legal and policy framework “well advanced” or “well developed”. They also often deplore

<sup>122</sup> EUD Nepal plans three sector GEWE analysis for its most pressing and relevant priorities: nutrition, forestry and WASH. EUD Serbia’s Gender Country Profile has strong analysis under the GAP III thematic areas: this sector analysis was done by a consultant hired through a UN Women-implemented EU project, and is reflected in the CLIP, but it was not led within the EUD.

<sup>123</sup> For instance: Bangladesh EUD hired a consultant to prepare the Gender Country Profile. Cameroon EUD has no Gender Country Profile but plans to outsource it to a consultant in 2023. DRC and Moldova EUD plans to hire consultants to update their Gender Country Profile.



their lack of implementation, often attributed to weak institutional capacity. While some issues with implementation may be global, the ubiquity of these terms contrasts with the actual variety of the domestic normative frameworks. It is therefore unclear what this “advance” really means. This indicates need for further EU-internal capacity building on international GEWE standards and on the range of good practices in terms of legislation and policy regarding the various GAP III thematic areas.

Usually, the analytical section further presents key statistics: among these, GEWE indexes, percentages of women in Parliament and local elected positions, pay gap, percentage of girls at various levels of education are most typical. These often follow the GAP III areas, or more often the MIP priority areas/priorities/windows. A few EUDs plan sector-specific gender analysis in the future (e.g., Kenya plans a gender conflict analysis).

The evaluation team observed a frequent trade-off between process and content. When arbitrating between the two, EUDs sometimes took outsourcing as a shortcut, but this may not be the best choice to serve the implementation of GAP III. Where gender analysis was done in-house, it may have been more challenging, and may have lacked expertise – challenges which wide and in-depth consultations should largely address. But review of the CLIPs shows that in-house analysis, especially at the sector level (e.g., Colombia) leads to better, stronger capacity and commitment across the staff to mainstream GEWE in a variety of actions. In short, bringing in opinions and expertise is useful to the implementation of GAP III through the CLIPs – but fully outsourcing entire parts of the CLIP process (consultation, analysis) is a stopgap and a double-edged sword.

**The CLIPs are generally aligned with the context, but it is still unclear whether they can pave the way to respond to it through programming**

The word “Programming” is used interchangeably by our EU interlocutors (in FGDs and interviews) to designate **strategic programming** (through the MIP and associated processes), and **operational programming** (through AAPs and action documents). According to the guidance provided during the CLIP training, CLIPs should be a tool for both as regards GEWE.<sup>124</sup> While it is clear that CLIPs align with the first and contribute to it at least to some extent, they rarely contribute significantly to the second.

The CLIP seems to have been used **as a vehicle to consult and reflect on GEWE at strategic level**. EUDs select their GAP III thematic priorities in line through this reflection. But the choices of priorities are usually aligned with the EUs’ overall objectives, constraints and opportunities identified: the CLIPs align with the MIPs. The links with gender analysis are not always obvious. Analysis and programming function too much in silos – all the more when analysis (through the Gender Country Profile) was fully outsourced.

**At the operational level, the CLIPs were mostly used to report**, not so much to channel strategic thinking into programming actions: they were not seen as an operational tool. Out of our 27 sampled CLIPs, 15 only report ongoing actions (or pending actions already planned before GAP III), four present planned actions under the new MIP, six present both, and three present none. All in all, a bit more than a third of the CLIPs reviewed present concrete future actions for GEWE. Several case study countries confirm that the CLIP was mostly used as a mapping / stock-taking exercise, rather than as an opportunity to feed into programming, and/or make new commitments, drawing from new evidence, analysis and consultations.

The CLIPs are not the document carrying operational decision-making to respond to the GEWE context: for this, as highlighted by several FGD participants and some interviewees in case study countries, AAPs and Ads are the key. But the programming cycle is such that EUDs currently implement mostly pre-GAP III actions. The effects of the CLIPs on programming will only be visible once the majority actions under the current MIPs are deployed – a process which is only just starting, with the start of implementation of the 2021 AAPs. Meanwhile, several case study countries show that the 85% target for G1 and G2 actions is mostly attained. The survey administered for this evaluation also shows that the CLIP contributes to better gender mainstreaming of actions: 62% respondents consider that it helped gender mainstreaming projects – either a lot (35%) or to some extent (27%). Budget support action design seems to benefit less from the CLIP: 29% considered the CLIP helpful to gender-mainstream these actions – to a great extent 11%, and to some extent 18% respondents. However, it is unclear how much they respond to the GEWE context as analysed for the CLIPs. According to the interviewees, this depends on the individual commitment and capacity of the sector leaders in the EUDs, rather than on the CLIP process.

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<sup>124</sup> The training material for EUDs on CLIP preparation contains the clearest definition of the CLIPs’ function: “a collective political and operational EU approach to GEWE in a specific country”

### 8.2.3 Collaboration (EU MS, Team Europe)

All CLIPs were elaborated on the basis of some form of consultation with EU MS, although they are rarely understood as a joint and binding strategy document for the EUD and EU MS. More often than not, CLIPs are seen as an EUD document channelling the results of EU MS consultations.

#### All CLIPs were prepared based on some consultation with EU MS, but some countries stand out in terms of joint programming for GEWE.

DG INTPA analysis found that 82% of the CLIPs reported consultation with EU MS. In our sample, they all do. The CLIP is sometimes used as a Team Europe document, but the understanding of the CLIP's function in relation to Team Europe varies: the CLIP is **rarely understood as a joint, committing strategic document for the EUD and EU MS** (as is the case in Morocco, for instance – see Box 3); **most often it is understood as an EUD document channelling the outcomes of EU MS consultations**. About half of the CLIPs are also used as **a vehicle to agree on one or more Team Europe Initiatives**. Testimony to these differing perceptions, the modalities of consultation, and the extent to which this led to a common strategic position on GEWE, or to Team Europe Initiatives, depends on several factors.

#### Box 3 Good practice on CLIPs – CLIP as a genuine joint programming document <sup>125</sup>

Good practice



The **CLIP Morocco** is a strong programming document, and a genuine joint EU/ EU MS document. It was approved by all EU MS' Embassies (except Hungary and Poland) as a Joint Response document and, to the team's knowledge, it is the first of its kind exclusively dedicated to GEWE.<sup>126</sup> The CLIP includes several annexes, including: i) a comprehensive review of all GEWE actions; ii) a very precise results and monitoring framework, including a monitoring plan with indicators, and a "labour division"; iii) a Roadmap for Joint Political dialogue and public diplomacy on GEWE, identifying priorities and responsibilities among these stakeholders.

This CLIP is owned jointly by the EUD and all EU MS, represented by their Heads and Deputy Heads of Missions. This was made plausibly because:

1. Morocco is a country where virtually all EU MS have diplomatic representation, and many have cooperation activities;
2. The State has a clear GEWE policy and institutional framework;
3. The EUD in Morocco is large and well-capacitated;
4. There is a practice of policy dialogue and planning on GEWE, thanks to an existing GEWE Budget Support Operation.

**Consultations with EU MS** were sometimes limited by the EU MS' country presence: where only few EU MS have diplomatic representation and/or cooperation, or which do not rank very high among EU MS' priorities, GEWE consultations are fairly limited. In countries with high MS representation, this may include countries which did not formally approve GAP III. In a continuum from extremely challenging to extremely conducive Government partners on GEWE, genuine Team Europe joint programming is usually observed at the ends of the spectrum. A particularly challenging context (e.g., Myanmar) encourages EU and EU MS to plan, fund, implement, and communicate jointly, as they reinforce one another in a political landscape which is hostile to GEWE and generally to human rights-oriented efforts. On the other end, a particularly like-minded Government on GEWE (e.g., Colombia) encourages a Team Europe approach as a multiplier to progressive Government policies; which led, in that country, to the transformation of an existing Trust Fund into a Team Europe Initiative.

<sup>125</sup> Other EUDs have used a similar approach to the CLIP as a joint programming document (e.g. Bangladesh, Kenya, Uganda), or supported it with a robust results framework (e.g. Guatemala), but none to that level. It should be noted, however, that the CLIP Morocco does not feature the most elaborate analytical section: instead, it refers to a Joint GEWE analysis implemented jointly by the EUD and EU MS.

<sup>126</sup> Though reminiscent of other joint programming documents, such as the Joint analysis conducted in Moldova in 2018, it is to the team's knowledge the first of its kind exclusively dedicated to GEWE.

## Box 4

*Lessons learned from CLIPs – Trade-off between EU/ EU MS-internal, and external consultations*

Lessons learned

**The CLIP from DRC faced a trade-off between EU/ EU MS-internal, and external consultations**

In one case study country (DRC), there was a trade-off between strong co-creation of the CLIP on one hand, and external consultations on the other hand: the second were mostly left out. This has led to some discontent in the Government, and may have impoverished the CLIP, and missed an opportunity to collaborate.

The EUD actively engaged EU MS and DG ECHO, but the Government and CSOs were not included.

The reasons for this choice are not obvious, however, it appears mostly driven by time and capacity constraints within the EUD and in the Government.

In our sample, we found 13 **Team Europe Initiatives** mentioned in the CLIPs as G2 or G1 (reportedly strongly mainstreamed). They **almost all relate directly or indirectly to WEE**, as they are usually dedicated to supporting women's gainful employment or entrepreneurship. The majority (seven) envisage WEE **through support to the green or digital transition** (usually with a strong element of WEE), whereas four concern WEE in other areas. The other two concern gender-based violence and women, peace and security. In addition, seven CLIPs in our sample foresee a Team Europe approach to policy dialogue and/or public diplomacy, including some joint communication initiatives and events on GEWE.

## Box 5

*Good practice on CLIPs – Building on Gender focal persons Group*

Good practice



The CLIP in the **Philippines** built on an existing and very active Gender focal persons Group, which strongly contributed to the analysis and the identification of opportunities for actions, policy dialogue, and communication.

The group is composed of the EUD and EU MS GFPs, as well as the EU Gender champion. The group is conducting dialogue with several

stakeholders, like the National Commission on Women, UN agencies, Gender Institutes, CSOs etc.

This Group has long held monthly meetings. Its members are therefore accustomed to working together for common objectives.

Other EUDs such as Rwanda follow similar approaches, though none can rely on a group convening that regularly

**8.2.4 Capacity and leadership to support CLIPs**

CLIPs reveal significant disparities among EUDs in terms of gender equality mainstreaming and gender programming capacity. In this regard, the proactive engagement of EUDs' leadership has proven to be a key factor in increasing the quality and acceptance of the CLIP. Furthermore, the CLIP, both as a process and as a document, has increased the capacity of EUDs to communicate on GEWE, both in policy dialogue and in public diplomacy. The next challenge will be to guide and support the monitoring and updating of CLIPs.

**The CLIPs reveal important disparities among EUDs in terms of GEWE mainstreaming and GEWE programming capacity**

The evaluation team found large disparities among the CLIPs' quality and level of elaboration. They range from 5 to 65 pages, with an average around 12 pages in length: while this is no indicator of quality, it shows that approaches differ widely from EUD to EUD. CLIPs unevenly elaborate on the respective sections and their components: review of normative framework and general GEWE context and trends, review of institutional and societal stakeholders, justification of the chosen GAP III thematic areas, specific objectives, relation with MIP and expected results, description of past and/or future actions, and elaboration on political/policy dialogue and public diplomacy activities.

**The size of EUDs** plays a double-edged role. CLIPs review, FGDs and interviews suggest that large delegations may have more financial and human resources to dedicate to the CLIP. This was particularly felt as CLIP preparation had to compete with other priorities. The CLIPs' production was timed to match the preparation of the MIP. In some countries, it also coincided with the preparation of the Civil Society Roadmap. These processes happened in parallel, but this sometimes thinned the EUDs' human

resources too much – in which case the MIP took precedence, and GFPs were sometimes left alone to produce the CLIPs, with leadership and sector leaders merely reviewing.

**Box 6** *Good practice on CLIPs – CLIP and programming relying on multiple GFPs*

Good  
practice



In the EUD **Rwanda**, the main GFP has been supported by three GFPs in the respective operation teams since 2019. This included the CLIP development and subsequent programming. This practice has significantly increased ownership and capacity for GEWE programming within the EUD.

As a result, the CLIP really focuses on the future. It features various G1 actions which are credibly gender-mainstreamed, and two G2 actions to be contracted (empowering youth for GBV prevention, strengthening capacities and enabling environment on SRH).

Some smaller delegations, however, found that their size made co-creation and buy-in easier. As a FGD participant summarized: “in small delegations, it is easier for GFP to reach to other colleagues”. When Delegations have large sector teams, GFPs may encounter more resistance to GEWE mainstreaming and contribution to the CLIP, coming from busy or more distant sector leaders, especially in sectors which are perceived as more “traditional” and less prone to GEWE mainstreaming (public finance, energy, connectivity, transport, business environment).

Some CLIPs also feature some unfortunate formulations (e.g. “granting equality to women” or “women’s development”), which reveal the progress still required in terms of GEWE awareness, understanding and capacity.

Sometimes, very practical shortcomings curtailed the EUDs’ capacity to prepare the CLIPs. Language barriers limited the capacity to use guidance documents (in English exclusively), and timing of online trainings (Brussels time) was not suitable for some regions of the world.

Overall, the CLIPs which clearly tie GAP III thematic areas with MIP priority areas, sub-sectors and indicators, are also most likely to review GEWE stakeholders, identify clear messages, and strongly uphold GAP III principles in their CLIP. **Good practices are usually underpinned by stronger, in-house GEWE analysis**, especially sector-specific analysis (even when merely referring to the Gender Country Profile as a separate document). A good, practical example is Nepal, where the EUD used the CLIP to draw a strong link between the countries’ top strategic priorities and GEWE: transition to federalism and transition from development country to middle-income country both demand and enable GEWE transformative changes. The strategic analysis conducted in-house for the CLIP enabled the EUD to acknowledge and seize this opportunity.

**Box 7** *Lessons learned from CLIPs – Outsourcing in full is but a stop-gap measure*

Lessons  
learned



**Outsourcing completely some steps of the Gender Country Profile, CLIP, or subsequent programming is but a stop-gap measure.**

Where the CLIPs which rest on completely outsourced analysis and/or consultation (e.g., outsourced Gender Country Profile), the connection between analysis and decision (selection of GAP III priorities and future-oriented section on relevant actions) tends to be weaker.

This practice is exemplified in Cameroon, DRC, Serbia, El Salvador, Georgia, Tanzania.

Timing could be one explanatory factor. As one FGD participant put it, “Guidance for gender sectoral analysis arrived after the design of programmes, so it could not inspire project design.” Some EUDs also wished to bring in very specialised expertise and saw outsourcing as a good avenue for this. Finally, lack of dedicated human resources and/or capacity was decisive.

Case studies and FGDs show that the EUDs which invested their own human resources, with strong leadership backup, are often the ones that feature the best practices. In a few instances, these front-runners inspired their peers. For instance, the EUD in Colombia, which prepared its CLIP in-house through a co-creative process strongly backed by the Head of Cooperation, developed their own guide for gender analysis about the MIP priority areas prioritized in the CLIP under the selected GAP III thematic areas. They then shared this guide across other EUDs in the region of their own initiative.

**Pro-active engagement of EUD leadership is a key factor to increase the quality and uptake of the CLIP.**

These trends suggest that internal ownership is key for the EUDs to bring the maximum out of the CLIP template and guidelines and produce a high-quality, well-owned CLIP. The decisive factor leading to that is the commitment of the leadership to GEWE, and their personal engagement in the production of the CLIP – thus leading by example within the EUD.

Some GFPs explained, during the focus group discussions and in country case study interviews, that their functions as GFP were not reflected in their job descriptions. In large delegations, several GFPs argued that they would require a 100% FTE to perform their GFP functions. As a result, and despite their motivation, GFPs often lack the time to engage, coach and support their colleagues in the delegation to mainstream GEWE. They lack time to self-train, and to perform in-depth gender analysis. They resort to external actors for some of the core tasks which they and their EUD sector colleagues should perform. Several explained that this was the reason for outsourcing the Gender Country Profiles, and/or CLIPs consultations to consultants or to UN Women, along with the wish to mobilize extremely specialized expertise (e.g., Cameroon, Serbia, Tanzania). Unless reflected in job descriptions, GFP tasks are likely low on the incumbents' priority lists, because they are not necessarily part of their individual performance review. In order to increase the meaningfulness, EUD-wide ownership, and sustainability of the CLIP as a tool, the GFP role requires better recognition and dedicated time, as a part of job descriptions and individual performance reviews.

Meanwhile, GFPs, supported by task managers, invest themselves in the preparation of the CLIP and the mainstreaming of action documents, if their hierarchy allows and encourages them to spare sufficient time and backs them up with dedicated resources. In some EUDs, the Head of Delegation or Heads of Cooperation and Political engaged personally. For instance, in Nepal, the Head of Delegation presented the GAP III to all staff, which stirred motivation for the CLIP. Such commitment culminates in the two countries (Bangladesh, Morocco) where the CLIP expressly defines specific objectives, expected results, and dedicated resources on "Leading by example" and EUD-internal capacity building. Philippines was another example where the presence of a Head of Cooperation committed to GEWE and Gender focal person with extensive experience contributed to a strong CLIP. Three CLIPs also foresee EUD capacity building through a small technical assistance contract with dedicated funding. These examples of self-investment for GEWE are promising.

#### Box 8 Good practice on CLIPs – Regional GFP network

Good practice



CLIPs in **pre-accession countries** were supported by a Regional GFP network.

This regional network organised regional online training on how to translate GAP for green agenda project, bringing together EUD teams from the region dealing with green agenda and all GFP. This was considered as a good process to put gender mainstreaming into practice.

The network includes GFPs from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo\*, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, and Turkey.

The GFPs in this region are all also engaged in the same portfolio (EIDHR), which helps to utilise opportunities to discuss also GAP among other issues.

#### **The CLIP, as a process and as a document, has increased the capacity of EUDs to communicate on GEWE, both in the political/policy dialogue and in public diplomacy.**

The survey deployed for this evaluation shows that 59% EUD respondents consider that the CLIPs facilitated the GEWE mainstreaming of communication products and events. 50% believe that, since GAP III (and the CLIPs), dialogue on GEWE with institutional actors has become stronger (about 40 % think it remained the same). Similar figures are found regarding dialogue with the civil society, including women's rights CSOs.

Interviewees in the case study countries and FGD participants (including GFPs but also task managers, Heads of Cooperation, Heads of Delegation, and some CSO or government counterparts) explained that the CLIP consultation process, and the final documents (particularly the selection of thematic areas) have had three main effects the EUDs' messaging on GEWE:

- The messages are more harmonised, more constant across events, sectors, and as time passes. The messages on GEWE are also more often common with EU MS;
- GEWE has become more visibly an issue championed by the EU: GEWE messages are stronger and more frequently issued. The EUDs have become more vocal because, by preparing the CLIP, they have a stronger sense of responsibility for GEWE (although in some EUDs this feeling is not entirely shared according to interviews and FGDs);

- The messages have become clearer, and more grounded in evidence (for instance, the use of statistical data to reinforce messages is more frequent), because they rely on the CLIP as an approved country-specific overarching document on GEWE;
- Where the CLIP inspired budget support actions marked G1 or G2, their policy dialogue platforms are used to advocate for GEWE normative framework and concrete measures.
- Some CLIPs contain specific entries on political dialogue, which commit both the EUD and EU MS (e.g., Cameroon, Morocco).

This is very useful in a challenging global context: GAP III, and its country-level translation into CLIPs, help EUDs react through non-cost activities to two important changes: i) the worsening backlash against GEWE, and feminist views overall, in many partner countries, sometimes accompanied by harassment and actual violence directed at CSOs advocating for GEWE, women politicians, or other women public figures such as journalists or human rights defenders; and ii) The growing importance of ensuring equal realisation of rights, including by LGBTIQ persons, both as a part of the EU's priorities, and in the priorities of some EU MS – which is not always positively perceived by the partner governments.

Some EUDs use CLIP itself as a vehicle for public diplomacy. For instance, the Philippines EUD prepared a one-pager summary CLIP for visibility purposes; the Colombia EUD produced a very visual CLIP and plans to prepare sector-specific one-pagers on GEWE in its priority sectors. As one focus group discussion participant, “CLIP is short, quite strategic, going to the main point, no one can say that they did not have time to read it.” In the Philippines, a good practice has been the emergence of an EU gender champion at MS Ambassador level who, based on the CLIP, can advocate for EU GEWE objectives at high political level.

In our sample, four CLIPs foresee or report reinforced integration of GEWE in the EUD's communication strategy. The CSO roadmaps are also a good vehicle to communicate on GEWE, and on the CLIP's thematic areas and specific objectives with CSOs and more broadly, through consultations and public events. Several CLIPs mention them explicitly in their public diplomacy section.

Yet, there is still some way to go for the non-spending activities to match the GAP III ambitions with creativity, intensity and context-specific initiatives. The sections on non-spending activities and communication are among the most standardised, brief and most general within the CLIPs structure. Several CLIPs stop at a general pledge to communicate on GEWE on the occasion of dedicated international days. Some good practices could serve as an inspiration. In Serbia, the EUD is partnering with the International CSO Kvinna Till Kvinna for communication and events on GEWE. In South Africa, the CLIP foresees the promotion of positive role models, and partnerships with celebrities to communicate about the root causes of gender inequalities in social media and public events. In El Salvador, the CLIP identifies specific, concrete entry points (both topics and platforms) for policy dialogue and public diplomacy on GEWE. The Guatemala CLIP includes indicators on policy dialogue and foresees partnership with the press for public diplomacy. The Morocco CLIP has an extremely detailed roadmap for non-cost activities, which is common with EU MS (see Good Practices).

#### **The upcoming challenge will be to guide and support the monitoring fulfilling of the CLIPs.**

The CLIP template states: “The CLIP is meant to be a concise and a dynamic document of indicatively 3-5 pages, to be revised or further completed when needed. An update is foreseen in 2023, in parallel with the mid-term reporting on GAP III.” FGD participants and case study EUD interviewees systematically point to the need to regularly updating the CLIP, and to their uncertainty as to when and how this will be done, as they have not received guidance in this regard yet. As one EU interlocutor put it: “It would be good to think of mechanisms to ensure that the CLIP can evolve, that it becomes a more ‘alive document’ in line with its original purpose.”

In countries where major events happened, which changed the support priorities since the preparation of the CLIP (e.g. massive floods in Pakistan), the necessity to update the CLIP is most strongly felt. Some interviewees and FGD participants suggested to tie the CLIP update to the MIP mid-term review. In fragile and/or conflict contexts (e.g. Guinea Conakry, Occupied Palestinian Territories) where the CLIPs cannot hinge on national policies, the CLIP also needs to be flexible enough to accommodate possible shifts: seizing new opportunities, acknowledging emerging partners (e.g. within judicial or local institutions in the Occupied Palestinian Territories), or reacting to a worsening security situation.

Along with the CLIP as “a living document”, EUDs are often concerned about monitoring and reporting on the CLIP: interviewees and FGD participants expect guidance. The frequent mismatch between a future-oriented section on thematic priorities, and an often past-oriented section on flagship G2 and G1 actions, does not help structure the monitoring of results under the CLIP. Those CLIPs which, going beyond the guidelines, feature a result framework (e.g. Morocco, Bangladesh, Kenya, Uganda), in some cases with indicators, already display strong institutional capacity to monitor the CLIP, but such detailed and comprehensive framework may not be feasible for all EUDs.

## 8.3 Annex

### 8.3.1 List of persons consulted

The list below presents the interviewees at the global level. This case study, being crosscutting in theme, has also drawn on inputs from the country case study interviews, the Swedish good practice study, e-survey responses and focus group discussions. Details of the interviewees for each of these can be found in the annexes to each of the relevant case studies/ annexes.

<i>Organisation</i>	<i>Position/ Role</i>
<b>EU</b>	
EU HQ (EEAS – SG Gender and Diversity)	Gender and Diversity Adviser
EU HQ (TRADE C4 – Trade and Sustainable Development)	Policy Assistant – Labour and Gender
EU HQ (INTPA G1- Gender Equality, Human Rights and Democratic Governance)	Policy Officer – Chargé de la qualité – Egalité Hommes Femmes
EU HQ (NEAR.A.2 – Rule of Law, Governance and Security)	Policy Assistant – Team Security and Peace
EU HQ (INTPA G.6 – Migration and Forced Displacement)	Programme Manager and Policy Officer on Migration and Forced Displacement
EU HQ (EEAS – ISP.2.SEC1 – Early Warning and Conflict Prevention)	Policy Officer
EU HQ (INTPA E.1 – Macro-economic Analysis, Fiscal Policies and Budget Support)	Gender focal person
EU HQ (INTPA E.4 – External Action Guarantees)	Financial officer + gender focal person
EU HQ (ECHO.DDG.C.1 – Neighbourhood and Middle East – Humanitarian Aid Thematic Policies)	Policy Officer
EU HQ (INTPA G.6 – Migration and Forced Displacement)	Gender focal person
EU HQ (EEAS – ISP.2.SEC2 – Peace Mediation and Dialogue)	Policy Officer
EU HQ (INTPA B.2 – Mexico, Central America, Caribbean and Regional Operations 2)	Gender focal person
EU HQ (INTPA E2 – Micro-economic Analysis, Investment Climate, Private Sector, Trade and Employment)	Policy Officer – Women’s Economic Empowerment, Gender focal person, Civil Society contact
EU HQ (EEAS – European Union military staff – Horizontal coordination (EUMS.4))	Head of Division
EU HQ (EEAS – ISP.2 – Conflict Prevention and Mediation Support)	Deputy Head of Division
EU HQ (NEAR A2)	(former) Policy Assistant – Gender Equality
EU HQ (INTPA E.4 – External Action Guarantees)	International Aid / Cooperation Officer + gender focal person
EU HQ (INTPA D.1 – Effective Development Policy and Team Europe)	Gender focal person
EU HQ (INTPA.G.5 – Human Development, Migration, Governance and Peace – Resilience, Peace, Security)	Policy Officer – Thematic Expert – Peace
EU HQ (EEAS – SG Gender and Diversity)	Senior Gender Expert to EEAS Principal Advisor on Gender (PAG) and on UNSCR 1325/WPS
EU HQ (EEAS – Coordination and Horizontal Affairs (DMD.CPCC.1))	Gender and Women, Peace and Security
EU HQ (INTPA A.3 – Western Africa)	Gender focal person
EU HQ (EEAS – SG Gender and Diversity)	Gender and Diversity Adviser
EU HQ (INTPA A.4 – Eastern and Central Africa)	Gender focal person
EU HQ (EEAS – ISP.1.SEC1 – Methodology of the Integrated Approach)	Policy Officer – Human Rights and Gender
EU HQ (EMPL.E.3)	International Relations Officer – External relations
EU HQ (INTPA G.1- Gender Equality, Human Rights and Democratic Governance)	Policy officer- Gender equality and non-discrimination
EU HQ (NEAR.A.2 – Rule of Law, Governance and Security)	Senior Expert – TEAM LEADER – Security and Peace Team
EUPOL COPPS Palestine	Gender Advisor

<i>Organisation</i>	<i>Position/ Role</i>
EUAM Ukraine	Gender Advisor
EUAM Ukraine	Gender Advisor
EUTM Somalia	Gender Advisor
<b>Other</b>	
Union for the Mediterranean	Gender Expert
The Kvinna till Kvinna Foundation	Policy and Advocacy Adviser – Western Balkans

### 8.3.2 List of documents

#### 8.3.2.1 EU gender-specific (CLIPs, country profiles)

- EC (2022): CLIPS State of Play.
- EC (2022); GAP III implementation strategy: an overview of the Country Level Implementation Plans.
- EU (2022): Gender-responsive Audit/Assessment of the Overall Cooperation of the EU Delegation to Libya.
- EU Delegation to Bangladesh (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Bangladesh
- EU Delegation to Bolivia (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Bolivia
- EU Delegation to Bosnia and Herzegovina (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Bosnia and Herzegovina
- EU Delegation to Cameroon (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Cameroon
- EU Delegation to Colombia (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Colombia
- EU Delegation to DRC (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for DRC
- EU Delegation to DRC, UN Women, ADB (2022): Gender Profile DRC
- EU Delegation to El Salvador (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for El Salvador
- EU Delegation to Georgia (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Georgia
- EU Delegation to Guatemala (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Guatemala
- EU Delegation to Guinea Conakry (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Guinea Conakry
- EU Delegation to India (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for India
- EU Delegation to Kenya (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Kenya
- EU Delegation to Libya (2022): Updated Gender Country Profile – Libya.
- EU Delegation to Moldova (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Moldova
- EU Delegation to Morocco (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Morocco
- EU Delegation to Myanmar (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Myanmar
- EU Delegation to Nepal (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Nepal
- EU Delegation to Nicaragua (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Nicaragua
- EU Delegation to Pakistan (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Pakistan
- EU Delegation to Rwanda (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Rwanda
- EU Delegation to Serbia (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Serbia
- EU Delegation to Serbia, UN Women (2021): Gender Profile for Serbia
- EU Delegation to South Africa (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for South Africa
- EU Delegation to Tanzania (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Tanzania
- EU Delegation to Tanzania, UN Women, AfDB (2021): Gender Profile for Zanzibar
- EU Delegation to Tanzania, UN Women, AfDB (2021): Gender Profile for Mainland
- EU Delegation to The Philippines (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for The Philippines
- EU Delegation to Uganda (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Uganda
- EU Delegation to Venezuela (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Venezuela



- EU Representative Office West Bank and Gaza Strip (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for the Occupied Palestinian Territories
- European Union Office in Kosovo (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Kosovo

#### **8.3.2.2 Other**

- Kvinna till Kvinna Foundation (2018): Mind the GAP – An independent evaluation of the implementation of the EU Gender Action Plan II in Western Balkan countries
- Kvinna till Kvinna Foundation (2020): Strengthening EU Support to Gender Equality Through External Action (2020)

## 9 Thematic case study: Women's Economic Empowerment

### 9.1 Introduction

#### 9.1.1 Focus of the case study

The global case study on Women's Economic Empowerment (WEE) focuses on contributing to the answer for EQ3. To this end, the evaluation team has developed a typology of the WEE-related actions outlined in GAP III and, building on the mapping exercise (see Volume III – Annex 4), has reviewed a sample of actions under each main category of this typology to determine in which types of WEE-related actions the EU is investing resources and the extent of this investment in each area.

The case study also examines in what ways these actions are contributing to WEE results. The thematic global case study draws mostly on evidence from the evaluation's case study countries,

The thematic global case study draws mostly on evidence from the evaluation's case study countries, interviews with selected personnel working on WEE issues at the HQ level and also from the e-survey and regional focus group discussions. It also draws upon a sample of external actions from other countries or units as needed to provide a credible evidence base. The evaluation team has also developed a typology of the WEE-related actions outlined in GAP III and, building on this mapping exercise has reviewed a sample of actions under each main category of this typology to determine in which types of WEE-related actions the EU is investing resources and the extent of this investment in each area

The analysis is focused on assessing: 1) Whether the EU's strategic engagement with WEE (incl. Green and Digital aspects) has strengthened due to the adoption of GAP-III; 2) Whether EU support has strengthened women's claims to economic empowerment; 3) If the EU has sound delivery mechanisms that support WEE; 4) Whether there have been tangible and potentially transformative results, whether observable or credibly foreseeable; 5) What is the contribution of EU support to WEE and related GAP III thematic objectives; and 6) linkages with the Green Deal and Digital Economy and the transformative potential of the EU's support to WEE.

It also reviews basic definitional and conceptual issues regarding WEE, such as how the EU's guidance on WEE is interpreted at the country level.

#### 9.1.2 Context

The Treaty of the EU agreed in 2016 states that equality between women and men must be ensured in all areas, including employment, work and pay. This underlying principle guides GAP III.<sup>127</sup>

##### 9.1.2.1 EU definition of WEE

**INTPA's 2021 guidance on WEE observes that:** *"the definition of WEE varies, but [that] it is generally agreed that WEE is a transformational process in which women gain increased access to and power over economic assets and decisions and that economic empowerment is a process that enables a woman to succeed and advance economically and have the power to make and act on economic decisions."*<sup>128</sup>

The guidance further elaborates that to succeed and advance economically, women need the skills and resources to compete in markets, as well as fair and equal access to economic institutions and that to have the power and agency to benefit from economic activities, women need to have the ability to make and act on decisions and control resources and profits. This general approach to WEE is reiterated in the types of actions suggested in GAP III in its social and economic rights section for women and girls.

##### 9.1.2.2 EU GAP Commitments regarding WEE

These have changed significantly over time, starting with broad and fairly generic commitments to support WEE in GAP I to a much stronger focus on multiple specific aspects of WEE which are clearly and explicitly outlined in GAP III.

For example, **GAP I (2010-2013)** noted that "women are also productive factors for the economy" but that progress on women's economic empowerment of women had been weak compared to men with regard to formal labour force participation, access to credit, entrepreneurship rates, income levels and

<sup>127</sup> EU (2017): Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union, Official Journal of the European Union, Volume 59.

<sup>128</sup> EC (2021): Thematic Review: Women's Economic Empowerment. Directorate-General for International Partnerships European Commission.

property rights. GAP I indicated the EU needed to take action to correct the underlying causes that restrict women's economic opportunities. This was to be done by providing support for WEE through programming and political dialogue, particularly on macro-economic policies. GAP I also noted the need to maintain women's economic security within conflict contexts.<sup>129</sup>

GAP I also indicated that the EU should strengthen its support to partner countries in their efforts to achieve MDG 3 and MDG 5 by: Including gender equality issues in the dialogue and interventions on Education, Health, Vocational training and Employment and increasing support to economic empowerment. This was to be measured using the following indicators:

- Under the Thematic Programme Investing in People, budget allocations for gender were to be increased by €10 million for 2011-2013.
- In 2011, a call for proposals focusing on supporting women's economic empowerment activities was to be launched under the Thematic Programme Investing in People.
- By 2012 Gender-specific indicators were to be used to ensure that the gender dimension is taken into account in the EU approach and interventions in Private Sector Development (at macro-, meso- and micro levels).<sup>130</sup>

However, none of GAP I's nine overarching objectives specifically highlighted the need for actions related to women's economic empowerment. There were also concerns that GAP I provisions did not appear to have much influence on higher-level deliberations in Brussels and other capitals on top policy agenda matters related to trade or the need to include a gender perspective in trade negotiations.<sup>131</sup>

**GAP II (2016-2020)**, by contrast established women's social and economic rights and their economic and social empowerment as a goal and as one of four thematic priorities. This GAP also included specific WEE-focused objectives such as "Access to decent work for women of all ages" and provided a solid list of sample related activities as well specific indicators to measure the achievement of this objective. For example, the types of actions related to WEE were described more explicitly. For example, the "Number of countries that have ratified and implemented fundamental ILO labour standards and complied in law and practice (SDG 8.5.7)".<sup>132</sup>

Additional WEE-focused GAP II objectives included:

- Equal access for girls and women to all levels of quality education and vocational education and training (VET) free from discrimination.
- Equal access by women to financial services, productive resources including land, trade and entrepreneurship.

EU personnel were required to identify on which specific objectives from the GAP II Annex they would focus their interventions, either through targeted gender actions or through mainstreaming gender equality in other actions supported by systematic gender analysis. This review was to inform the selection of gender-sensitive indicators. However, EU staff were not expected to report on all the GAP objectives.

An assessment of the implementation of GAP II concluded that there was a need for EUDs to pay particular attention to specific groups of women and girls in an intersectional perspective (e.g., geographic area, disability status or sexual orientation). This assessment also recommended that trade agreements should be gender-sensitive to ensure that they do not exacerbate existing inequalities or create new ones and that trade-related gender impact assessments must be conducted.<sup>133</sup> The report also recommended that policy in other areas of external action, including migration, must also be gender sensitive, and gender issues must be included in political dialogue between EU Delegations and governments.

**GAP III (2021-2025)** built on these and other policy framework concerns related to WEE and provided an even greater level of specificity related to the areas of work EU external actions should support in this thematic area. While GAP III does not define WEE, it does state that the EU's overarching goal related to women and girls' social and economic rights should be that:

1. Women and men in all their diversity should have equal opportunities, equal access to employment, decent work, equal pay for equal work in order to be economically independent as

<sup>129</sup> EC (2010): EU Plan of Action on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment in Development 2010-2015.

<sup>130</sup> EC (2010), op. cit.

<sup>131</sup> Helen O'Connell (2013): Implementing the European Union gender action plan 2010-2015: challenges and opportunities.

<sup>132</sup> Council of the European Union (2015): Gender Action Plan 2016-2020- Council conclusions (26 October 2015).

<sup>133</sup> Concord (2018): Transforming Lives: EU Gender Action Plan II – from Implementation to Impact.

well as that women and men should equally share care responsibilities and have access to adequate social protection, public services, and financial and business opportunities.

2. Women and girls also need to have access to enabling conditions, such as access to safe, affordable and accessible public transport and other mobility options, both in rural and urban areas.
3. To support the adoption of non-discriminatory and inclusive social protection schemes, formal employment, to extend labour rights and entitlements to informal and precarious workers with a particular focus on improving the working conditions and pay of care workers.<sup>134</sup>

GAP III includes explicit actions related to the development of gender-sensitive trade agreements and to female migrants within the context of forced displacement as well as voluntary female migrants. All three actions represent a considerable expansion and clarification of what the EU's expectations are regarding the provision of providing support for different WEE-related actions. However, while GAP III mentions the negative impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on women's health and increased rates and severity of Gender-based Violence, it does not cover the gender-specific negative economic impact of the pandemic on women's employment and incomes given their predominance in the service sector and hospitality industries globally.

GAP III does outline the following specific actions related to diverse areas of WEE to which the EU should be contributing:

- Promoting decent work, equal pay and labour rights<sup>135</sup>, and women's transition to the formal economy, among other by reducing labour market segregation, boosting women's leadership and increasing their bargaining power in economic and household decision-making and social dialogue, in sectors with a majority of women workers, including domestic work, as well as in non-traditional sectors
- Creating an enabling environment for women's economic activities and access to productive resources and eco-system services, including women's access to land, seas and oceans activities, remittances, technology, finance, as well as to identification and control over mobility, including access to safe and affordable transport options
- Supporting universal social protection systems, and recognising, reducing and redistributing unpaid care and domestic work by providing more support for gender-responsive budgeting
- challenging gender norms within the household and the labour market, recognising men and boys' responsibilities and fostering legislative developments, such as the introduction of paid paternity leave
- Supporting women's entrepreneurship and women-led businesses, including social entrepreneurship, and their access to finance by providing innovative investments schemes through the EIP, addressing the market's failure to reach women and promoting the creation of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). Additional targeted action will include business development services and support for employment, including for women in recovery contexts and in forced displacement
- Supporting and empowering migrant women to contribute to the sustainable development of countries of origin, transit and destination through remittances, skills and knowledge
- Promoting gender equality through trade policy, including through the EU's engagement in the World Trade Organisation and its work on Aid for Trade, and ensuring robust use of sustainability impact assessments of trade initiatives and policy reviews.

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<sup>134</sup> EC (2020): Together towards a Gender Equal World.

<sup>135</sup> The ILO conventions that the EU is supporting through its focus on decent work, equal pay and labour rights include: No. 100 – Equal Remuneration Convention (1951) and recommendation No. 90; No. 111 – Discrimination (Employment and Occupation Convention (1958 and Recommendation 111; No. 156 – Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention (1981) and Recommendation No. 156; No. 183 – Domestic Workers Convention (2011) and Recommendation No. 201; and No. 190 – Violence and Harassment Convention (2019) and Recommendation No. 216. ILO, EU and UN Women, (N.D.), The Power of Working Together: Emerging Practices that advance Women's Economic Empowerment.


The key content of GAP III related to WEE serves to both broaden the scope of what WEE covers as well as provides more explicit guidance as to what constitutes a WEE-related action for EU personnel and partners.

**9.1.2.3 EU portfolio in the priority area of WEE under GAP III**

*9.1.2.3.1 Mapping analysis*

The mapping analysis carried out by the team for this evaluation shows that of the total funding focused on GEWE over the period 2019-2022, 23% is earmarked for WEE (both targeted and mainstreamed initiatives), which amounts to **EUR 7.3 billion** for the whole period. When analysed over time, both overall GEWE funding and WEE funding have increased, the latter particularly by 45% between 2019 and 2022, with the sharpest increase taking place between 2021 and 2022 (83% from one year to the next).


Figure 19 WEE portfolio (financial volume)<sup>136</sup> under GAP III – 2019-2022.



Source: Particip, based on Statistical Dashboard data

Geographically, the regions where the largest amount of WEE funding is concentrated (aggregated over the whole period) are Africa, Neighbourhood and Asia, which follows the trend in the distribution of GEWE funding overall. It is important to note that the proportional importance of the Neighbourhood region is partly explained by the increase in funding to social protection programmes in Ukraine as a reaction to the war.

Figure 20 WEE portfolio (financial volume)<sup>137</sup> by region under GAP III – 2019-2022.




Source: Particip, based on Statistical Dashboard data

<sup>136</sup> Contracted amounts

<sup>137</sup> Contracted amounts

In terms of case study countries, Tanzania receives the most WEE funding in absolute terms (EUR 232 million), while Serbia, Philippines and Colombia also receive relatively high WEE funds as a proportion of total GEWE funding, with 54%, 39% and 38% respectively.


Figure 21 WEE portfolio (financial volume)<sup>138</sup> in case study countries under GAP III – 2019-2022.



Source: Particip, based on Statistical Dashboard data

In terms of channels, national governments and UN and development agencies appear first and second in the WEE portfolio, implementing 36% and 18% respectively of the funds in this priority area. In terms of modalities, the main ones are delegation/ administration agreement and budget support, which is consistent with the main types of channels. That is, the EU has found in budget support programmes through national governments a way to implement its support to WEE through social protection, employment, education, and livelihood programmes.

Figure 22 Main channels and modalities within WEE portfolio under GAP III – 2019-2022.



Source: Particip, based on Statistical Dashboard data


### 9.1.2.3.2 Priority WEE-related interventions

The EU databases (i.e., Statistical Dashboard) do not yet include a category to identify if an intervention addresses WEE or not. Using the mapping built for this assignment (see Volume III – Annex 4), the evaluation team reviewed a sample of actions from 2019 to 2022 to assess how many and which included any aspects of GEWE and used a typology based on the key WEE-related objectives in GAP III to narrow these down to those that had either mainstreamed or targeted WEE components. Based on this typology and an analysis of the funds invested in these interventions, the team then identified the top 50 interventions in terms of volume of funds under the WEE rubric to determine where the priority spending was in this regard. The team conducted this review with the understanding that many of these interventions were either started or planned just before the adoption of GAP III. They, therefore, provide

<sup>138</sup> Contracted amounts

a snapshot of a transition process of what were considered to be the priority areas for WEE investment just before and after GAP III.


**Figure 23** Strategic entry points by sector for top 50 (by financial volume) WEE interventions under GAP III – 2019-2022.



Source: Particip, based on Statistical Dashboard data

By way of comparison, an analysis of the volume of funds associated with WEE using the OECD-DAC sector codes shows that social protection, education policy, and general budget support-related aid are among the most funded sectors. As described above, the lack of a specific categorisation currently in the EU databases and the use of categories “catch-all” categories such as “general budget support-related aid” do not allow to clearly distinguish entry points, so the team carried out this task with a sample from interventions that mention WEE using either a targeted or mainstreamed approach.

**Figure 24** Main OECD-DAC sectors associated with WEE interventions under GAP III – 2019-2022.



Source: Particip, based on Statistical Dashboard data

A more detailed review of WEE related interventions in 2020 and 2021 in Table 2 in section 2.2 below showcases a broader range of strategic entry points and an inventory analysis for WEE in EU interventions since the adoption of GAP III.

## 9.2 Main Observations

### 9.2.1 EU's strategic engagement with WEE (incl. Green and Digital aspects) has strengthened due to the adoption of GAP III

GAP III references to women's economic empowerment have helped EU staff to promote its inclusion in discussions with partners.

Beyond this, and although the EU provides guidance on defining WEE, EU staff still do not have a common understanding of what is meant by WEE, although GAP III has certainly contributed to refining this approach.

Furthermore, GAP III has a clear influence on a number of regional strategies and has directly contributed to a greater focus on WEE and gender equality in general in these strategy documents.

Work on green economy and digital transformation was generally at too early a stage of planning and programming to assess how GAP III will actually influence the implementation of these processes.

#### **GAP III's references to WEE have helped EU personnel promote its inclusion in their discussions with different partners.**

In particular, EU HQ personnel observed that GAP III includes reference to the three priority areas of policy work and engagement. These include:

- Creation of an enabling environment (i.e., addressing underlying barriers, regulations,) support structures such as women's representation in chambers of commerce, and structures and processes that can increase women's participation
- Women's increased access to finances and investments through the EU's financial instruments and the EFSD+.
- Specific sectoral support to improve WEE such as entrepreneurship support, training and incubation, and the targeting of sectoral actors in sectors where women are more prevalent such as textiles.

**HQ level** informants observed a significant difference in terms of what the EU is doing in these areas since GAP III was adopted. They also noted that this shift occurred in the regulatory area which, being normative, is the most difficult on which to work and which generally requires a long-term approach to change to effect results.

**At the country level**, EUD personnel interviewed also reported that that GAP III was a helpful document and that they use it to provide guidelines to understand what kind of actions they can take to help fulfil WEE-related goals, particularly with regard to specific sector areas using both mainstreamed and targeted approaches. They also use it as a reference to help to advocate key EU messages and have found that they are able to refer to it in their meetings and that their counterparts seem to be aware of it.

GAP III has also helped EUD officials promote a more intersectional approach to WEE. In Serbia, for example, an EUD official noted that previously the gender focus in their portfolio five years ago was rather vague, but that now, they have several documents that oblige them to include a certain percentage of Roma women and girls such as the Poznan Declaration, the National Roma Inclusion Strategy, and the country's Gender Equality National Strategy. They found that it is this combination of GAP III commitments related to gender and intersectionality with these national strategies that has made it possible to push their national fulfilments to comply with these new approaches. The Regional Gender focal person Focus Group Discussions also confirmed the positive impact of the EU's support for this type of intersectional policy change.

Another example of an action that now has a stronger focus on WEE due to GAP III's influence is the Sub-Saharan Africa Team Europe Initiative "Investing in Young businesses in Africa" which was launched in 2021. This focus includes a specific working group on WEE which is looking at how EU mechanisms can target WEE more effectively and specifically. The Working Group is coordinated by Spain and INTPA.

A contrary view regarding the influence of GAP III was expressed in the e-survey by several respondents who observed that:

- *"Here WEE [was] a priority since and before [and] it is not the GAP III which makes an improvement"*
- *"There are more relevant documents (than GAP III)".*



- “GE is considered [to be] a marginal aspect despite efforts to change this perception”
- “The hierarchy is not aware of the GAP and it is never asked to report regularly or engage on GEWE. It cannot be expected that this would happen if these aspects are not made compulsory.”

Despite these observations the overall results of the e-survey indicated that the overall influence of GAP III on support for WEE has been positive.

#### Box 9

#### Good practice on WEE – Investment Climate Reform Facility

Good  
practice



The EU has had particular success in extending an existing regional programme, the Investment **Climate Reform Facility**, to become much more inclusive of WEE related supports. It is a demand-driven technical assistance in the ACP countries. The ICR Facility is co-funded by the European Union (EU), the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS) under the 11<sup>th</sup> European Development Fund (EDF), together with the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and the British Council. It is implemented by GIZ, the British Council, Expertise France, and SNV. It is working on Business Environment Reforms. This means working on tailor-made economic reforms based on public-private dialogue to help creating a better business environment, now with focus on supporting women’s full participation in the economy. The extension of the Facility coincided with the adoption of GAP III and as a result, its current iteration added EUR 10 million of EU funding to address WEE issues. This was followed also by BMZ adding additional funding to support the new WEE focus in line with Germany’s new feminist foreign policy.

EU HQ personnel attribute this change also to GAP III.

The coincidence of this timing was cited as one contributing factor influencing the strengthened WEE focus of the Climate Reform Facility

The technical assistance interventions now include for instance supporting the Federation of West African Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FEWACCI), with the objective of Identify successful business models and recommendations for business environment reform to help improve the prospects of women-led businesses in agri-food value chains in West Africa in post covid 19 period and benefit from the future potentials of an African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA). Other examples includes undertaking an evaluation study of the Federation of Uganda Employers’ (FUE) Female Future Program (FFP) in Uganda to support improving its impact and to increase action towards women’s in leadership in Uganda. Other example is supporting Employers’ Confederation of Zimbabwe (EMCOZ) in working with its members and policymakers to build conditions that minimise the prevalence of workplace GBV.

**While the EU provides guidance on definition of Women’s Economic Empowerment its personnel do not have a common understanding of what WEE covers, although GAP III has helped sharpen this focus.**

Several key informants indicated that the EU does not have a formal definition of WEE while others indicated that this definition is outlined in the EU’s Guidance on WEE. However, the latter group also acknowledged that the EU is a large institution and that many personnel may not be familiar with the document leading to an overall lack of awareness of the relevant guidance. Other EUD officials also noted that “*the guidance doesn’t trickle down*” so that how the guidance issues related to GE and WEE are addressed still remains dependent upon the individual initiative/good will of specific EUD officials and the extent of their understanding of what constitutes a transformative result from a WEE perspective.

**GAP III is clearly influencing diverse regional strategies and has directly contributed to greater attention being paid to WEE and to gender equality in general in these strategic documents.**

Prior to GAP III the EU’s regional Strategies made little or no reference to WEE. For example, the 2014-2020 Multi-annual Indicative Strategy for Asia makes no reference to women, gender or empowerment in the document.<sup>139</sup> It does indicate that there should be a focus on support for the green economy in the areas where it will make the greatest pro-poor impact and for inclusive economic integration and trade but without any accompanying reference for how related actions could be applied strategically to contribute to increased WEE or GE in general.

<sup>139</sup> EU (2014): Regional Programming for Asia – Multiannual Indicative Programme (2014-2020)

The 2021 to 2027 MIP for Asia, by contrast, includes detailed references and indicators to ways in which this MIP will contribute to very specific means of increased gender equality, including aspects of WEE. For example, “*ER1.1: Increased digital skills and capacities of Central Asian populations, in particular women, youth, people with disabilities, people living in rural areas and minority groups, in view of integration in the global digital economy.*”<sup>140</sup> There are also multiple references throughout the text that reference WEE using language and actions similar to those outlined in GAP III.

This strategic document review also noted a similar pattern in the 2016 strategy document related to “*Strengthening European Investments for jobs and growth: Towards a second phase of the European Fund for Strategic Investments and a new European External Investment Plan*”. This document briefly mentions creating jobs for women and young people through support for SMEs but provides no related analysis or other recommendations for strategic actions related to WEE. The 2020 “*Towards a comprehensive Strategy with Africa document*” however, includes multiple references to WEE that draw upon the strategic actions outlined in GAP III.<sup>141</sup> This pattern is also quite evident in the EU’s post-Cotonou agreement.<sup>142</sup>

**Work related to the Green Economy and Digital Transformation were generally at too early a stage of planning and programming to assess how GAP III will actually influence the operationalisation of these processes.**

This was clearly the case for Team Europe Initiatives in the **Philippines** and also in **Tanzania** where the EU’s new Green Economy project has just started but which plans to mainstream gender. EU HQ personnel also indicated that in the sectoral support area the number of digital start-up actions are still relatively low since this is a new focus area for the EU. This assertion is borne out by a review of the country case study 2021 GAP III Country-level Implementation Plans (CLIPs) as well as in the other case study countries.

In the **Philippines** for example, in the CLIP green economy was identified as a priority and using a mainstreamed approach includes the targeting of women and youth as its third objective. The related actions are however, still mostly in the planning stages. Similarly in **Pakistan**, the CLIP highlights skills development and the green economy as priorities and notably has set a target of 30% of women participants in the skills development area, including skills related to the development of an inclusive green economy. **Nepal’s** CLIP also takes a mainstreamed approach for all actions related to its green growth priority. This includes a small energy programme focused on energy efficiency, renewable energy grants and helping two partners work together to bring in this transformative agenda.<sup>143</sup>

The evaluation’s **e-survey results** also found that since the adoption of GAP III that at the EUD level close to quarter (23%) of respondents indicated that WEE been strengthened / improved to a great extent with regard to the strategic entry points used to support WEE such as the Green Economy and Digital Transformation and that an additional 42% thought this was the case to some extent. At the HQ level this perception is somewhat less positive, standing at 19% in the to a great extent category and 35% to some extent. Overall, however, the perception is that there has been a positive change in this regard and the e-survey data appear to support the fact that there is starting to be a shift in some countries to using the Green Economy and Digital Transformation as strategic entry points for WEE. Additional related comments from the e-survey also noted that, “*EU engagement of women in non-traditional sectors increased through EU-funded programmes*” since the adoption of GAP III and that “*Most of EU engagement to WEE was committed before GAP III [but] new discussions are emerging, with stronger analysis and consultations foreseen.*”

## 9.2.2 Strengthening of women’s rights-based claims to economic empowerment due to EU Support

EUD staff often find it easier to promote WEE issues in their policy dialogue processes than other gender equality and equal opportunities issues, such as sexual and reproductive health and rights, which are perceived as more culturally and politically sensitive.

The EU has used GAP III to add weight to the work it was already doing to create an environment in which women’s economic rights are strengthened. For some EUDs, from a WEE perspective, GAP III represents continuity rather than a significant change in approach.

<sup>140</sup> EU (2021): Regional Programming for Asia – Multiannual Indicative Programme (2021-2027)

<sup>141</sup> EC (2020): Towards a comprehensive Strategy with Africa

<sup>142</sup> EU (2021): Partnership Agreement between the European Union/The European Union and its Member States, of the One Part, and Members of the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States, of the other Part.

<sup>143</sup> Based on regional GFP FGD, Asia-Pacific region.

**EUD personnel often find it easier to promote WEE-related issues in its policy dialogue processes than other GEWE issues, such as Sexual and Reproductive Health Rights, which are perceived to be more culturally and politically sensitive.**

One reason for this includes that it is easier to talk about increasing women's incomes and for women in diverse contexts to gain family and spousal support for earning an income (often in selected sectors where women predominate or which are perceived to be an extension of "traditional" household responsibilities). The latter are not seen as being as threatening to or as undermining existing social norms regarding women's work in and outside the home. SRHR, by contrast, speaks directly to highly charged societal values related to sexual behaviour and norms. Where discussion of WEE issues can become more sensitive however, occurs when it touches on themes such as the unpaid care economy and women gaining increasing financial agency at the household level (depending upon the context).

Qualitative observations emerging from the **e-survey** about how GAP III has helped EUDs address WEE in the policy dialogue process included a range of views:

- *"The process has just started, [we] need more orientation among colleagues as well as need sensitisation of top management."*
- *"During our gender policy dialogue, we have reiterated our request for government to finalise the Gender Equality Bill and Disability Bill. "*
- *"The EUD GFP participated to initiatives advocating for more WEE. However, the translation of this into practice is lacking in some cases. The EUD does not foresee financial support for these specific aspects directly. [However,] the local government is starting to address this issue independently from any EU initiative which is good."*

In some countries, policy dialogue on WEE has been initiated through the targeted **Spotlight Initiative** but is mainly restricted to related discussions. In others, respondents noted that the EUDs face strong challenges related to a lack of political will or interest on the part of national governments to address policies and reforms related to gender equality and WEE.

**The EU has been using GAP III to add more weight to work that it was already doing to create an environment in which women's economic rights are strengthened. For some EUDs, from a WEE perspective GAP III provides more continuity than a significant change in approach.**

Many EUDs were already working on policy and legislative change designed to reduce discrimination against women from an economic perspective at the time GAP III was developed. For example, there is not yet a provision to prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender in employment in Mauritania, Jordan and Lebanon and in Tunisia women are not allowed to work at night; in Libya, there are also restrictions on the hours women can work except in selected professions such as nursing.<sup>144</sup> The presence of strong provisions in GAP III related to creating an enabling environment for WEE, particularly with regard to decent work, labour rights and pay equity, is assisting EU personnel to raise these issues in policy dialogue and provides a greater impetus to fund diverse supports to fund legislative changes.


In other contexts, the political and social environment overrides any significant effect GAP III can have on this type of dialogue. In **the Occupied Palestinian Territories**, for example, EUD personnel indicated that GAP III had not introduced any clear changes and that it is a challenging environment in which to discuss issues that refer to gender or are perceived as feminist. However, the EU's development partners have been able to continue to deliver high quality WEE-related programming. There are also cases such as **Tanzania** where the EUD is in the process of starting and approving two projects that focus on the Green and Blue Economies and which have significant mainstreamed WEE components.

Using the typology previously described in the introduction to identify interventions in diverse sectors that had either mainstreamed or targeted WEE components, we then analysed these based on the main WEE-related categories outlined in GAP III and key economic and social sectors. This analysis assessed what was the current distribution strategic entry points for addressing WEE issues in 235 interventions that included WEE in their activities and were listed as either active/ongoing (the majority), contracted or signed during 2020 and 2021. The results of this review are outlined below.

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<sup>144</sup> Katarzyna Sidło, Iakov Frizis, Olimpia Dragouni, Anna Ruzik-Sierdzińska, Karolina Beaumont, Givi Gigitashvili, Anne-Christin Winkler and Christopher A. Hartwell (2018): Women's Empowerment in the Mediterranean Region

Figure 25 Strategic entry points by sector for WEE interventions (2020-2021)



Source: *Particip*, based on *Statistical Dashboard data*

This review shows that while the key strategic entry points for WEE remain the provision of support for women's entrepreneurship and employment (including youth) and private sector development; the strengthening of social and economic rights, education and skills training and work in diverse areas of the agricultural sector, there is also significant support for interventions related to decent work, social protection and labour rights and growing support for economic interventions in the climate adaptation and environment area. Digital Transformation and the economic aspects of GBV also appear as significant strategic entry points. There are still smaller numbers of interventions related to newer thematic areas introduced in GAP III such as the green and blue economic, trade and the intersection between WPS and WEE. It is also a common practice in EU support is to integrate WEE as a cross-cutting component in other sectors or areas of interventions other than private sector development, including SGBV, agriculture, and increasingly, Green Economy, Digital Transformation, and blending operations.

### 9.2.3 EU has sound delivery mechanisms that support WEE

The CLIPs of the case study countries are largely informed by the GAP III WEE objectives and suggest actions to outline strategic programming and policy approaches in each country, but do not always provide sufficient detail on how the CLIPs will inform the implementation of these priorities.

The requirement to conduct or update country gender profiles to inform CLIPs and for thematic priority areas represents a strengthened process. However, the findings of these gender analyses have not been systematically applied in EU action documents.

EU joint programming in the thematic area of WEE is well established and coordinates its work with other funding institutions on this issue. However, this coordination is not systematically carried out at country level.

Often, EUD staff review the gender aspect of interventions after the initial project proposals have been received, too late in the process to be useful. The quality review process at headquarters also does not systematically address gender in project proposals.

**The CLIPs in the country case study countries draw strongly upon GAP III WEE objectives and suggest actions to outline strategic programming and policy approaches in each country, but do not always provide sufficient details regarding how the CLIPs will inform the operationalisation of these priorities.**

A review of the case study country 2021 CLIPs found that each country had included WEE components drawn directly from GAP III using a combination of mainstreamed and targeted approaches. This included increased future attention to the inclusion of women in the transition to green and circular economies and in three of the countries, also increased access to the digital economy. It is too soon however, to determine to what extent these latter two approaches will translate into actions.

**The Philippines** CLIP also outlined a clear process and the forms of resource allocation which the EUD would use to ensure that these WEE and other gender components related to GAP III would be mainstreamed across EU-supported actions. This stands out as an exceptional good practice, as gender mainstreaming is a process that is often not accompanied by explicit related funding and resources that can be tracked, measured and accounted for.

In **the Occupied Palestinian Territories**, the evaluation team found that the was CLIP well aligned with EU Joint Strategy and GAP III but that it did not include a section on how the actions outlined will be managed, coordinated, and monitored. This was a challenge that the CLIP review found across the board with there being weaker links between stated CLIP objectives and processes to be put in place to monitor and coordinate this proposed work at the EUD level.

A review of a **sample of 27 CLIPs** from across all regions found that most EUDs identified the mainstreaming of WEE into future actions as their preferred strategic approach with selected G2 targeted actions in specific sectors. A summary of the associated actions proposed in the 27 sample countries found 3 related to the Green Economy, 1 in Digital Transformation, 2 related to changing norms, 4 to support increased women's participation in WEE, 18 related to diverse aspects of GBV (but more in terms of services and the justice system than related to WEE) and 11 actions in business support. This latter finding confirms the perspective offered by diverse EU personnel that GAP III has predominantly reinforced existing approaches and actions related to WEE. Although multiple personnel interviewed indicated that the EU has covered the policy reform area well with regard to WEE, this is not borne out by the future proposed actions outlined in the 27 country CLIP sample, which identifies only a few future actions in this area outlined. However, the evaluation **e-survey** did find evidence that the EU's support for policy change in the past has been contributing to change in policies related to decent work and non-discrimination, with 16.8% of respondents at the EUD level indicating that this type of change had occurred to a great extent. The remaining 20% did not think there had been much or any change.

**The requirement to conduct or update Gender Country Profiles to inform the CLIPs and for priority thematic areas represents a strengthened process. However, the findings from these gender analyses are not applied systematically in the EU's action documents.**

In general, the EU's acquis has a high set of requirements related to gender analysis but the EUDs do not always follow these very well in all regions (e.g., Africa). In some cases, the challenge is related to the timing of the analyses, as while EUDs endeavoured to ensure that gender country profiles were updated prior to the development of their CLIPs, this was not always possible. Where these were done prior to the CLIPs, these analyses have generally focused on the EU's strategic areas of engagement in each country and, where this was prioritised, also included WEE-related actions.

The timing of the coordination between the updated gender country profiles is critical. In the Occupied Palestinian Territories, for example the last time the Gender Country Profile was updated was in 2018 and it did not include specific enough recommendations to inform the 2021 CLIP. In **Georgia**, the Gender Country Profile process was timed to be completed prior to the development of the CLIP and adequate resources provided to facilitate this process. This clearly helped inform how the CLIP for Georgia addressed strategic GEWE issues, including WEE.

The evaluation **e-survey results** also show mixed results, with 6% of HQ respondents indicating that the quality of gender analysis underpinning EU support to WEE had improved to a great extent since the adoption of GAP III and an additional 39% that this had happened to some extent. At the EUD level, the responses are more positive, standing at 20% within the great extent category and 48% who saw improvements in gender analysis related to WEE to some extent. At the EUD level this still leaves 23% who saw this improvement only to a little extent and 3% not at all which represents a significant minority.<sup>145</sup> Overall, this indicates a positive trend in the right direction. It does indicate however, also

<sup>145</sup> N=150 with 31 HQ respondents and 116 from the EUDs.

confirm that there remain some weaknesses in WEE-related gender analysis quality. Field interviews indicated that the main challenge remains one of timing and having the gender analysis take place at the right time in the project/programme development cycle to inform action design.<sup>146</sup> Additional comments from the e-survey included the observations that gender analysis is done but not used by colleagues to inform programme planning and that a key challenge is that “the level of details of the analysis conducted is not appropriate for the template of the Annual Action Plan, or Action Document”.

**The EU’s has well established joint programming in the WEE thematic area and coordinates its work with other funding institutions on this theme. However, this coordination is not consistently well done at the country level.**

For example, 20% of the EU and UN Women’s joint programmes between 2012 and 2022 globally were concentrated in the WEE area, making it the second largest area of EU-UN Women cooperation.<sup>147</sup> The EU’s Practitioners’ Network sparked the creation of the Investment Climate Reform Facility (ICR Facility), which with the influence of GAP III did a top-up of EUR 10 million that focused on WEE. The TEI “Investing in Young Business in Africa” was also initiated with some influence from GAP III and involves participation from 10 MS and one specific focus area (and a dedicated working group) work on WEE. Under this initiative, EU and Germany are creating a new EUR 25 million program on women’s entrepreneurship, and other MS might be still joining.

In the **Occupied Palestinian Territories**, the team found that donor coordination on WEE issues could be improved as there was some overlap between actions. The evaluation e-survey again found a more positive view of the situation with regard to the coordination of joint programming related to WEE at the EUD than the HQ level due to GAP III. The HQ respondents indicated that 13% thought that Joint Programming / coordination / consultation among EU (incl. EU MS) interventions related to WEE had improved to a great extent since the adoption of GAP III and an additional 26% were of the opinion that this had happened to some extent. At the EUD level, 15% thought this Joint Programming coordination had improved to a great extent and 40% to some extent, with 25% indicating that this had happened only to a limited extent and 3% not at all.

**Although gender analysis is a mandatory process, EUD personnel often analyse the gender aspect of interventions after they have received the initial project proposals, too late in the process to be useful. The HQ-level Quality Review process also does not systematically address gender in project proposals.**

This applies to GEWE in general and not just to WEE. It is due in part due to a lack of understanding of why it is important to conduct the gender analyses prior to the project design or as an essential part of that process, and in part, because of a lack of time and structured process to mainstream gender in programming. EUD officials noted, for example, that there is a need for more than instruction notes (which they find tend to be shelved) and a more formal process to analyse proposals from a gender equality perspective in the EU’s Quality Review process. Currently the Quality Review teams do not have gender expertise, and the EUD officials interviewed indicated that they have never seen comments on gender regarding project proposals from the Quality Review team in Brussels. Their observation was that “*in words we are very good – but in methodologies and capacity we are behind*”.

The 2021 FPI Gender, Age and Diversity Facility (GADF) also found that the FPI streamlined aspects of its proposal development process so that some initiatives, particularly at the regional level, are now presented together as a group of actions. This provides significantly less room in the proposals to provide specific details about how these actions will address gender and makes it much more difficult to assess if these actions are mainstreamed or not. Often even in the single action proposals there was little or no mention of GEWE beyond a line in the cross-cutting issues section indicating that it would be mainstreamed with no indication as to how – even when the originators of the proposals rated the proposal as having gender as a significant objective. The new limitations of the regional grouping approach have been mitigated to some extent by the fact that the FPI monitoring system now explicitly requires the inclusion of sex-disaggregated data for some selected types of actions<sup>148</sup> and as FPI has provided gender training to the consultant team that reviews the FPI action proposals from a monitoring perspective.

#### 9.2.4 Tangible gender-responsive and potentially transformative results

WEE is a thematic area where the EU had already worked in previous GAPs and work in this area has continued under GAP III and support for initiatives that started before 2020. However, some

<sup>146</sup> Based on regional GFP FDGs.

<sup>147</sup> The first is GBV, which between 2012 and 2022 represented 49% of the EU and UN Women’s joint programming. EU and UN Women, (2022): Working Together for Gender Equality – The EU-UN Women Partnership.

<sup>148</sup> EU (2020): Partnership Instrument Monitoring System.

EUDs are also starting to introduce new initiatives in the new WEE strategic entry points outlined in GAP III.

GAP III has had the greatest impact on women's access to finance and some but not significant impact on work related to the Care Economy (which may be in part as this work is not always reported under the rubric of Care Economy). GAP III's requirement for 85% of actions classified as G1 and G2 has contributed significantly to the former change.

GAP III has not yet contributed to significant transformative change related to several areas of WEE, in both mainstreamed and targeted interventions.

**WEE is a thematic area on which the EU had already worked under previous GAPs and work in this area has continued under GAP III and support for initiatives that started prior to 2020. However, some EUDs are also starting to introduce new initiatives in the new WEE strategic entry point areas outlined in GAP III.**

Given this ongoing attention and support for WEE, EUDs in case study countries reported that they have achieved positive results related to WEE in both mainstreamed and targeted interventions. However, there was no significant evidence of transformative or systemic change in these countries. This is, in part, because this type of change tends to require long-term inputs to generate measurable change, e.g., in policy reform related to decent work. What EU personnel at HQ reported is that GAP III has strengthened and amplified policy related actions and that WEE is becoming more embedded in blending and guarantees. There was clear evidence of this latter trend with there being a systematic process in place to ensure that gender equality is considered seriously in blended finance options and guarantees. EU HQ personnel attributed this to the clear directions outlined in GAP III. This was less evident at the country level however.

There has also been an increase in the number of actions which are self-rated as having gender as a significant objective but there is considerable inconsistency in how this rating is applied and the content of action documents does not always reflect clear evidence as to why this rating is merited.

**Box 10** *Lessons learned on WEE – Integration of Gender into Private Sector Development Projects*

Lessons  
learned



The EU-supported EU4PSL project in **Libya** is a general entrepreneurship support project which has four components. These include support for institutions working on economic issues, environment and business issues, support for youth and women's entrepreneurship, and finance – working with the Libyan Central Bank to develop tools for entrepreneurs and provide related education and training. The project is supporting approximately 60 Libyan entrepreneurs. The Gender Country Profile for Libya (2022) identified following key lessons learned from the work the EU has been doing with women entrepreneurs in private sector development projects: Projects that offer “one-stop shopping” in terms of business support for women's businesses make it much easier for women entrepreneurs to learn about and access these services.

- There is a need for different projects and institutions working on the issue to coordinate their work more effectively.
- Offering access to micro-finance after providing technical training on business development is particularly critical for women entrepreneurs.
- An important factor that will encourage women-owned businesses to adopt better organised business practices is to offer diverse incentives such as small start-up grants, access to mentors, tax incentives, etc.

Incremental growth and strategic learning about each step of setting up a business was the most effective way to operate in the Libyan context.

The evaluation team also observed that this change is due to the strong commitment of relevant EU personnel at HQ to ensure that this is done systematically based on a consistent set of questions related to safeguards, women's participation rates in the economic sector affected by the loans and guarantees and clear guidance provided on these by the EU to the EIB and other EFIs. The timing of GAP III also has served to reinforce the gender strategies and actions plans the EIB and EU MS financial institutions have put in place in recent years. At the same, time EUD staff continue to express concern that gender tends to be downplayed in investment projects. “In finance,” one put it, “money flows to the strongest.” As in the case of Tanzania, some blending projects that involve on-lending to SMEs have targets, set-

asides, and quotas for female-owned firms. Such quantity rules raise issues of their own and can sometimes create a backlash effect even while ensuring more equitable representation.

Personnel at the EUD level also observed that there has been a change which GAP is driving in terms of thinking but that there remains a need for the EU's way of working to evolve as WEE is still often treated as more of a background issue and tends to be integrated into existing actions to a limited degree.<sup>149</sup> Their observation was that to get things done, the EU needs to explicitly dedicate funds to related issues and concrete activities. The Libya EUD, for example, has set clear targets to ensure that women entrepreneurs are included and benefit from EU supported private sector development actions and have allocated specialist resources to help achieve this in a challenging private sector development and security context.<sup>150</sup>

In **Colombia**, EU MS representatives noted that there are several areas in which the EU is contributing to WEE. This includes work with migrants and domestic workers which focuses on WEE and provides seed capital for economic development projects for Afro-Colombians.<sup>151</sup> The EU's work related to COVID-19 recovery in Colombia has also included some mainstreamed WEE components. One of the EU's development partners in the country is also working with women to support coffee production cooperatives. Overall, the evaluation team observed that in Colombia, within a coherent portfolio that mainstreams inclusion and equality in general, the EUD sees WEE as a priority (in addition to WPS, which has historically been the key vehicle of GEWE priorities in the country).

This is also the case in Tanzania, where WEE is significant priority within the country programme and there several projects contributing to women's economic empowerment using a mainstreamed approach. These include: Support to the Business Environment, Growth and Innovation (BEGIN) (EUR 30 million, 2021) and Agri-Connect: Supporting value chains for shared prosperity (EUR 103 million, 2018).

The regional Gender focal person discussions also identified the range of ways in which diverse EUDs are addressing WEE. In Latin America and the Caribbean this includes both targeted and mainstreamed approaches:

- In **El Salvador** there is a targeted WEE project (with AECID -Spain) focusing on the most vulnerable municipalities working with the government Institute for Women's Development.
- In **Nicaragua**, the EU is supporting a project on value chains in the cocoa sector that includes a mainstreamed explicit objective to support women's initiatives in cacao production and targets women's cooperatives in other planned outcomes (i.e., it is using a mainstreamed approach).
- In **Guatemala**, there is a project on value chains in the cardamom sector that includes mainstreamed support to women's cooperatives, micro-business and the strengthening of female leadership in partnership with the Export Agency of Guatemala.
- Still at the planning stages is a project on circular economy in Bolivia, which it was reported might include a gender equality objective (with GTZ-Germany). However, this project is still in the process of conducting the background sectoral analysis and no final decision has been made in this regard yet.

In **Serbia**, the EU has provided support for legal and policy changes that have contributed to a new law on Gender Equality that is inclusive of minority rights and support for women's unpaid work within the home. This would fall within the targeted approach to WEE. The EU has also been supporting a targeted project for unemployed women and youth, working with

the Ministry of Employment and Labour and the National Employment Service based on direct grants for specialised programmes. EU officials report that these actions have generated good results for young people and younger women, but more limited results for women aged 45+.<sup>152</sup>

In **Rwanda**, the EUD now has an indicator on women's entrepreneurship under their Business Support programme in the agriculture sector. It is designed to identify all actors working in agriculture and what they are doing to train women about entrepreneurship.<sup>153</sup> This represents the first EU-supported programme in that country where results can also be assessed from a WEE perspective as opposed to solely other PSD indicators. The EUD there also plans on mainstreaming WEE into other actions with the support of consultants.

The EU has also had particular success in extending actions in areas where WEE aspects might not always be so obvious, such as Business Environment Reforms (BER). For example, an existing regional

<sup>149</sup> Based on interviews with EU personnel

<sup>150</sup> EU (2022): Gender-responsive Audit/Assessment of the Overall Cooperation of the EU Delegation to Libya.

<sup>151</sup> Based on FGD with MS representatives in Colombia

<sup>152</sup> Based on regional GFP FGD, NEAR region.

<sup>153</sup> Based on regional GFP FGD, Africa region




programme, the Investment Climate Reform Facility – a demand-driven technical assistance in the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries working on creating an enabling business environment – has been transformed to become more focused on WEE related BER support. EU HQ personnel attribute this change directly to GAP III.

An additional relevant example includes that the EU has invested in a private equity fund “Women’s World Banking Capital Partners II”, which supports financial service providers in emerging markets to reach more low-income women clients. This EUR 10 million anchor investment has helped the fund raise additional public and private investments towards this objective, and in 2021 it closed at a total of EUR 103 million. These funds are now being invested to support women’s economic empowerment and access to finance. In Tanzania, as a part of its participation in the regional WE4A programme the EU has also been working with a number of women entrepreneurs to support them with capacity building and access to finance activities.

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Figure 26 Extent to which EU support has contributed to improvements in WEE since 2020 (e-survey responses)



Source: Particip, based on Statistical Dashboard data

The evaluation e-survey also indicated that EUD officials have observed the most change in women’s access to education incl. TVET, training and skills, followed closely by changes to community and social norms and cultural practices that restrict women’s economic participation and economic and social policies. The WEE areas where EUD officials observed the least change are those of the reduction of occupational gender segregation & diversification of the types of employment opportunities open to women (and men), economic empowerment of migrant women and the promotion of GE through trade policy (see The EU has also had particular success in extending actions in areas where WEE aspects might not always be so obvious, such as Business Environment Reforms (BER). For example, an existing regional programme, the Investment Climate Reform Facility – a demand-driven technical

assistance in the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries working on creating an enabling business environment – has been transformed to become more focused on WEE related BER support. EU HQ personnel attribute this change directly to GAP III.

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Figure 26).

When disaggregated by HQ and EUD respondents, it was evident that the majority of “I don’t know” responses were registered by HQ respondents, as not all had direct knowledge of country level programming. For all change categories except those related to women’s access to education and the reduction of occupational gender segregation, HQ personnel’s perception was between 5 to 10% less positive than that of EUD personnel. For those two categories 6 and 9% more HQ personnel thought there had been positive change to some degree than EUD personnel. Both categories of personnel thought that there had only been a 26% positive change related to the promotion of gender equality through trade policy.

#### Box 11 Good practice on WEE – Targeted Private Sector Development Interventions

Good practice



The EU has been working with UN Women in different regions to support a series of joint gender targeted programmes designed to increase the number of women who lead and participate in private-sector businesses. In Asia, this WE Empower programme operated in China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Viet Nam. Its aim was to advance inclusive and sustainable growth and build stronger links between European and Asian markets through supporting adoption of gender-sensitive trade and supply chains. This work built on similar programmes introduced during GAP II in Latin America and among the G7 countries. WE Empower Asia had a duration of 36 months (2019-2022) and a budget of EUR 8 million.

It represents a good practice which provides targeted and gender-specific approaches to private sector development to accelerate women’s participation in the private sector. It does this by promoting adoption of seven core women’s empowerment principles by the private sector, working

with 700 women entrepreneurs to increase their participation in supply chains and strengthen their business approaches, and contributing to WEE related policy dialogues in the region – amongst other actions.

It also sought to build women’s links with international trade in ways that are more far reaching than it is sometimes possible to achieve using a more integrated approach to private sector development. This is partly a question of a targeted approach serving to increase the numbers of women led or owned businesses reached and partly due to the level of gender sensitive expertise a targeted approach can make to address a gender specific challenge in a particular regional context. The programme also served to complement other EU-supported PSD initiatives in the region by increasing awareness of what the gender-related issues are for women involved in the private sector that these other interventions need to consider in their more gender-integrated approaches.

#### **The EU’s work on the Care Economy is not yet that visible. This challenge is not related to GAP III implementation.**

Several informants indicated that the EU has not strengthened or increased the work it is doing on the care economy since GAP III began to be implemented. One key informant also thought that this was

because GAP III did not address the care economy. However, a clear reference is made to the care economy in the first paragraph of Section 3.3 of GAP III related to the strengthening of the economic and social rights of women. Additional feedback was that the EU is supporting work in the care economy area but that this work is mainstreamed into other projects and not reported in its systems as care economy work. Another challenge, instead, may lie in the fact that EU's investments are being redirected from social protection, health and education to the economic development in development and especially the Green Economy. Changes related to the care economy also require two types of longer term investments: work to promote the adoption of social protection legislation, policy and regulations related to the care economy such as enhanced maternity and paternity leave; and actions to promote changes in underlying societal values that allocate the majority of unpaid care work to women in most countries.

The evaluation team did find some evidence that the EU Trust Fund in **Colombia** supported the government's rural women's strategy (through the National Land Agency), which recognises care activities as productive activities. The EU's budget support to the government for work with rural development – particularly for rural women – has helped the EU establish a strong relationship with national-level ministries and women's machinery. EUD personnel noted that a key lesson learnt from phase 1 of this project was that there is a need to work on transforming women's decision-making power regarding access to and use of resources within their household (i.e., to strengthen their economic independence). This implies a need for support for the redistribution of domestic and care responsibilities.<sup>154</sup>

There has been a strong interest in supporting work related to the care economy in Latin America in general. However, the evaluation also found evidence of some interest in support for this area in the NEAR region, particularly within Eastern Europe. An innovative example of this that stands out is the EU's support that contributed to the drafting and adoption of Serbia's new Law on Gender Equality. This law includes a cutting-edge legal provision for unpaid home-based work. However, this new policy will still require many institutional changes to actualise.<sup>155</sup> In Nepal, an EU-supported G2 action financing agreement proposed was finally signed by government and includes a pillar on decent work in the care economy.<sup>156</sup>

At the regional level, targeted projects appear to have the most success with regard to promoting increased WEE. This is particularly the case for the regional We Empower programme which just finished in the Asia region. While its success is not directly attributable to GAP III, it built on the foundations for WEE outlined in GAP II.

**From a WEE perspective, the area in which GAP III has led to most traction is women's access to finance. The 85% obligation on G1- and G2-rated actions has contributed to this significantly.**

GAP III was cited as being particularly effective to help increase women's access to blended finance options with the European Investment Bank by both HQ and EUD personnel. In particular, HQ informants indicated that blending WEE through the European Investment Bank (EIB) guarantees has been an effective approach. This is, however, not the only influencing factor as the EIB has also been working a lot in the recent years on related issues through its adhesion to the 2Xglobal.

The other area which some EU HQ indicated that the EU has been working to strengthen WEE is that of agency. This is especially since the EU does a lot of work with women entrepreneurs. At the country level, there were more mixed reports regarding results and actions related to the strengthening of women's agency. This was often due to the country context. In **the Occupied Palestinian Territories**, for example, the EU is working within a weak regulatory and legal environment but is also not perceived to be a leading actor pushing for GEWE issues (including WEE) and that this agenda seems to be more driven by implementing partners.

In **Serbia**, while there remain some legislative challenges, there is still a stronger enabling environment for WEE-related issues. The evaluation team found that human rights and inclusion related to WEE are well channelled in interventions, especially with regard to the use of an intersectional approach, and the targeting of women and girls with multiple vulnerabilities. The approach the EU has taken to WEE in Serbia is to place a strong focus on education-related actions. However, there may be room the EU to place more emphasis on the gendered effects of EU actions related to WEE. The EU's counterparts in that country also sometimes have the misperception that EU action on GEWE is primarily focused on GBV. This raises the question of how well GAP III WEE objectives have been disseminated to the EU's counterparts.

<sup>154</sup> Based on Regional FGD with EU GFPs, Latin America and Caribbean

<sup>155</sup> Based on Regional FGD with EU GFPs.

<sup>156</sup> Based on Regional EU GFP FGD, Asia Pacific region

In **Colombia**, the WEE portfolio fits well within the EUD's coherent approach to mainstreaming inclusion and equality in general and is a country priority. There are several key factors contributing to this, including: a strong push from EUD personnel and a strong institutional memory; readiness to procure expertise; committed implementing partners and the strong involvement of women CSOs/actors. WEE-related actions however, face potential sustainability challenges due to current programmes having been agreed before the recent national elections, which led to a government change.

**GAP III has not yet contributed to significant transformative change related to the diverse areas of WEE.**


This includes how Development Finance Institutions prioritise gender, with key informants having observed that GAP III has not yet contributed to significant changes in this area in the ACP region. They did note, however, that awareness of the need to do so is gaining traction.<sup>157</sup>

- The Investment Climate Reform Facility noted that:
- The leap from awareness of the importance of the topic to action can be great;
- DFIs promote gender for a variety of reasons;
- There is a missing link between policy development and implementation; and
- There are gaps in sex-disaggregated data.<sup>158</sup>

EU staff also noted that most development banks have ambitious gender strategies and that consequently, there is a good potential to see this reflected in the EU's blended finance and loan instruments. These financial institutions also interact with other actors such as the Ministries of Finance and GAP III provides clear ways that EU personnel could reiterate these possibilities to make the message stronger. It was also thought that the EU could take greater advantage of the WEE provisions in GAP III to promote this with the DFIs. There is also growing interest in gender-based investing.<sup>159</sup>

At the country level the field missions also did not find evidence of transformative change related to WEE. In **the Occupied Palestinian Territories**, the results obtained in WEE have been scattered, small in scale, and are of doubtful sustainability and reach. This is, in part due to the Occupation as it has created a stranglehold on economic growth, in part due to women's low labour force participation in the country and region and partly related to the weak WEE programming approaches.

**Figure 27** Extent to which GAP III has improved/ strengthened policy dialogue since its adoption (e-survey responses)



Source: Particip, based on Statistical Dashboard data

<sup>157</sup> Interviews with EU HQ and country level personnel and; Investment Climate Reform Facility. (28 June, 2022). Empowering Women in ACP Countries through Business Environment Reform, Infopoint Virtual Conference.

<sup>158</sup> Investment Climate Reform Facility, op.cit.

<sup>159</sup> Investment Climate Reform Facility, op. cit.

However, often the first step required to effect transformative change starts at the policy dialogue level. Therefore, it is significant to find that roughly 50% of EUD personnel indicate that they have engaged in policy dialogue related to different types of transformative change related to WEE since the adoption of GAP III (see Figure 27). This sets a foundation for longer term change in the future that may be more transformative in nature.

### 9.2.5 Contribution of EU support to WEE and related GAP III thematic objectives

The most dynamic aspect of GAP III is to encourage EU staff to consider underexplored areas where WEE has never been considered before.

Despite this, the willingness to address WEE and related thematic objectives remains dependent on individual EU staff and ranges from a high degree of commitment to ensure that GAP III objectives are addressed to a limited or superficial treatment. Moreover, EU staff often lack the capacity to do so effectively.

#### **The most dynamic aspect of GAP III is incentivising EU personnel to consider under-explored areas in which GEWE and WEE were never envisaged as issues before.**

This includes some EUDs starting to look at ways to make the transition to the Green Economy and Digital Transformation more gender inclusive and to mainstream gender in economic infrastructure and urbanization projects. However, an EU rapid assessment found that Gender Responsive Budgeting is not usually mentioned in their sampling of TEIs in the CLIPs, with the São Tome and Principe TEI on Governance standing as an exception.<sup>160</sup> The evaluation review of 2020 and 2021 actions also only found one reference to an EU-supported GRB-related intervention.

Other, newer, areas for action support outlined in GAP III which some EUDs have started to integrate in their CLIPs and future programme planning include selected actions related to the care economy. There now appears to be at least one care economy-oriented project or project element per region whereas previously this WEE action area was mainly found in Latin America.

While there are still relatively few interventions that address gender and trade issues, this is still an area where the EU has started to actively support related actions. This work is fairly innovative in nature and at the global level includes:

- Work with the ITC to commission four targeted studies related to gender and trade that are looking more in-depth at the gender aspects of e-commerce, investment facilitation, procurement, and labour standards.
- A project on gender statistics designed to fill in some of the data gaps related to gender and trade
- Work on Trade for Decent Work in collaboration with the ILO which has the goal of assisting some countries to sign core ILO conventions with significant gender implications
- The monitoring of the General Scheme of Preferences to determine if beneficiaries are respecting women's rights in their labour conventions

At bilateral level, the EU has recently developed and signed trade agreements with Chile and New Zealand which both include gender chapters using a mainstreamed approach. The gender chapter for the trade agreement with Chile covers commitments to ensure: non-discrimination against women in law and increased awareness of related laws; the collection and use of sex-disaggregated trade data; the promotion of equal opportunities for women and men to participate in trade and investment; to be guided by relevant international conventions/agreements on gender and trade and to monitor and assess the impact of the trade agreement on gender equality.<sup>161</sup> Prior to GAP III the EU also concluded the Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement. It included a substantial gender chapter. As a part of this agreement the EU established a Joint Committee to provide support for the agreement's Trade and Gender Recommendation. This work has served in part as a model for the inclusion of gender chapters in bilateral trade agreements signed after the adoption of GAP III.

**The will is to address WEE and related thematic objectives is still being left to individual EU personnel and ranges from high levels of commitment to ensure that the GAP III objectives are addressed to limited or only a cursory treatment. Often the capacity to do so effectively is also lacking among EU personnel.**

<sup>160</sup> EC (2022): Assessment of integration of GAP III/ CLIPs in a sample of TEI's : Findings based on a rapid assessment of 126 TEI/ 134 documents, INTPA D1.

<sup>161</sup> EU-Government of Chile (2022): Chapter 27 – Trade and Gender Equality – Article 27.1.

The EC's 2016 evaluation of the Cotonou Agreement concluded that the "EU's strong policy commitments on gender equality and the empowerment of women have not always been matched by its organisational capacity to deliver results, which has led to country strategy objectives, programmes and dialogues that have not given sufficient consideration to a balanced gender approach".<sup>162</sup> A similar conclusion is borne out by the 2021 Gender, Age and Diversity Facility "*Recommendations towards the Development of a Gender, Age and Diversity Strategy for the Foreign Policy Instrument*" which found that, while there was a strong awareness of and support for gender equality issues related to WEE and a rights-based approach to gender equality, staff capacity and understanding of how to integrate related objectives effectively into FPI. 4 external actions was limited.<sup>163</sup>

This was further confirmed by a gender review of FPI.4's 2021 proposed actions, which found that 21 of 26 projects (80.7%) had not targeted gender under the Gender Marker system; and that 50% had made no mention of gender equality in the Cross-Cutting Issues (CCI) section in the action document proposals. Eight projects did not target gender, but did make reference to gender equality in the CCI section of the proposals; however, often with limited specifics. Of the 5 projects (19%) which indicated that GEWE was a significant objective, only 2 were specific about how they would go about achieving this.<sup>164</sup> This is particularly significant from a WEE perspective as many of FPI.4's projects focus on work with the private sector. This is counter-balanced by the fact the FPI.4 has supported a series of highly effective regional targeted WEE projects over the past four years.

Some EU HQ gender personnel also reported that they receive many requests for technical support related to how to integrate WEE into the EUD-level actions. At the country level, in Colombia, while EUD personnel drew upon existing tools and guidance they found that they needed to hire external expertise to ensure that they were able to mainstream gender into a rural development and forestry project.

### 9.2.6 Linkages with the Green Deal and Digital Economy and the transformative potential of the EU's support to WEE

The CLIPS review of the national case studies revealed that most of these EUDs plan to address the inclusion of women in the transition to a green and circular economy, and that half of them will also take measures to support inclusive digital transformation.

Criticisms of the EU Green Deal focus, in part, on the need for related EU actions stemming from GAP III to actively work to ensure more balanced job creation for women.

At the conceptual level, EUD staff tend to interpret GAP II's provisions on WEE from the perspective of women as vulnerable groups or victims, as opposed to economic actors and leaders of change.

The review of country case study CLIPS found that most of these EUDs plan on addressing inclusion of women in the transition to a green and circular economy and that half of them to also take actions to support inclusive Digital Transformation.

In some cases, such as Tanzania, this builds on an existing action related to Digital Transformation inclusive of women and which addresses gender-based challenges. For most, however, it is a reference to future planned actions or plans to integrate women's participation in a green and circular economy into more general as opposed to targeted actions.<sup>165</sup>

The country case study CLIPs however, do demonstrate a future commitment to work in these two areas, with there being stronger support for work related to the green and circular economy. The accompanying gender analyses still, however, tend to focus on women's vulnerability in this regard as opposed to seeing women as potential dynamic economic actors.

In **Tanzania**, the field mission found that there is also significant emphasis on the transition to a green and circular economy in new projects, demonstrating strong commitment to support for WEE as a priority for this country programme. These projects include "Green and Smart Cities SASA" (approved in 2021) which has two specific objectives with entry points to WEE. Thus far, there has been a scoping mission that included a gender dimension to identify economic infrastructure needs and interventions for women. Another project objective is to stimulate a sustainable local economy in the selected cities, creating economic opportunities especially for women and youth. The interventions (under direct contracting) will work on including action to remove barriers and facilitate women's access to finance as well as promote women's entrepreneurship and skills development for self-employment. The EUD in Tanzania is also in the process of developing a blue economy project to be approved later this year in which there will be

<sup>162</sup> EC (2016): Evaluation of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement.

<sup>163</sup> FPI Gender, Age and Diversity Facility (2021): "Recommendations towards the Development of a Gender, Age and Diversity Strategy for FPI". EU – FPI.

<sup>164</sup> FPI Gender, Age and Diversity Facility (2021): Gender Review of 2020 Proposed External Actions (draft).

<sup>165</sup> Based on interview with HQ personnel; and, Review of 2021 CLIPs from six case study countries.

special emphasis on WEE across its three pillars of: sustainable management of marine / coastal areas; economic development and productive use of natural resources; and governance.

**Critiques of the EU’s Green Deal focus, in part, on the need for related EU actions stemming from GAP III to work actively to ensure more balanced work creation for women.**

A 2021 report by the European Environmental Bureau and Women Engage for a Common Future (WECF) noted that women are under-represented in the overall energy workforce, standing at just 22% in the oil and gas industry. However, they also observe that the renewable energy market outperforms the traditional energy sector in this regard. A global survey conducted by the International Renewable Energy Agency, found that 32% of the people employed in this sector are women.<sup>166</sup> Another recent report on a similar theme concluded that the European Green Deal is based on a narrow conception of a ‘just and inclusive transition’ which does not adequately address the organisation of employment and unpaid work, the distribution of income, wealth and political power along unequal gendered lines.<sup>167</sup> Both reports are implicitly critical of the way GAP III has addressed WEE issues in its transition to a green and circular economy and call for a more feminist and gender just approach which would work actively to ensure that green economy transition actions supported by the EU generate equitable numbers and quality of jobs for women.

**At a conceptual level, EUD personnel tend to interpret GAP III WEE provisions from the perspective of women as being vulnerable groups or victims as opposed to economic actors and change leaders.**

EUD personnel at the EUD level, for example, indicated that the challenge they are finding is to tackle GEWE transversally and to go beyond “women as victims” to an understanding of “women as the beacon”. This would mean that when they are working with indigenous people, and on production support projects, the EU would need to both be inclusive of indigenous women, since women often in lead production locally. It also would require the EUD to consider women in labour unions in the striking of diverse agreements.

The CLIPs reviewed for the country case studies make frequent use of the phrase “women in all their diversity” to refer to the need to apply an intersectional approach. This language is derived directly from GAP III and use of this phrasing represents a move towards more inclusive thinking without the automatic assumption that women represent vulnerable groups. However, there still appears to be a need for EU personnel to gain a better understanding of what it means to empower women from a WEE perspective and that to achieve transformative change requires that women be active actors in this process.

## 9.3 Annex

### 9.3.1 List of persons consulted

The list below presents the interviewees at the global level with a specific link to WEE. This case study, being crosscutting in theme, has also drawn on inputs from the country case study interviews, the Swedish good practice study, e-survey responses and focus group discussions. Details of the interviewees for each of these can be found in the annexes to each of the relevant case studies/ annexes.

Organisation	Position/ Role
<b>EU</b>	
EU HQ (INTPA G1- Gender Equality, Human Rights and Democratic Governance)	Policy Officer-- Quality Manager-- Gender Equality
EU HQ (INTPA E2-- Micro-economic Analysis, Investment Climate, Private Sector, Trade and Employment)	Policy Officer-- Women’s Economic Empowerment, Gender focal person, Civil Society contact
EU HQ (TRADE C4-- Trade and Sustainable Development)	Policy officer, GFP

### 9.3.2 List of documents

#### 9.3.2.1 EU policy and gender-related key reference documents

- Council of the European Union (2019): Council conclusions on the New EU Strategy on Central Asia

<sup>166</sup> European Environmental Bureau and WECF (2021): Why the European Green Deal Needs Ecofeminism.

<sup>167</sup> Larissa Nanning (2022): Gender Equality, the Climate Crisis and the European Green Deal.

- Council of the European Union, (2015): Gender Action Plan 2016-2020- Council conclusions (26 October 2015).
- EC (2010), EU Plan of Action on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment in Development 2010-2015.
- EC (2018): 2018 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy.
- EU (2017): Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union, Official Journal of the European Union, Volume 59.

### 9.3.2.2 EU Strategy Programming

- EU (2014): Regional Programming for Asia – Multiannual Indicative Programme (2014-2020)
- EU (2014): Regional Programming for Latin America – Multiannual Indicative Programme (2014-2020)
- EU (2014): Regional Programming for the Partnership Instrument – Multiannual Indicative Programme (2014-2020)
- EU (2021): Regional Programming for Asia – Multiannual Indicative Programme (2021-2027)
- EU (2021): Regional Programming for Latin America and the Caribbean – Multiannual Indicative Programme (2021-2027)
- EU (2021): Regional Programming for Sub-Saharan Africa – Multiannual Indicative Programme (2021-2027)

### 9.3.2.3 WEE-specific documents

- EC (2017): Strengthening European Investments for jobs and growth: Towards a second phase of the European Fund for Strategic Investments and a new European External Investment Plan
- EC (2019): Actions to Increase Women's Access to and Benefit from the Opportunities Created by CETA. FPI Gender Facility.
- EC (2021): Commission sets course for an open, sustainable and assertive EU trade policy. Press release.
- EC (2021): Thematic Review: Women's Economic Empowerment. Directorate-General for International Partnerships European Commission.
- EC (2021): Thematic Review: Women's Economic Empowerment. Directorate-General for International Partnerships European Commission.
- EU (2018): Communication on a new Africa – Europe Alliance for Sustainable Investment and Jobs: Taking our partnership for investment and jobs to the next level.
- EU-Government of Chile (2022): Chapter 27 – Trade and Gender Equality – Article 27.1.
- European Environmental Bureau and WECF (2021): Why the European Green Deal Needs Ecofeminism.

### 9.3.2.4 EU gender-specific (CLIPs, country profiles)

- EC (2022): CLIPS State of Play.
- EU (2022): Gender-responsive Audit/Assessment of the Overall Cooperation of the EU Delegation to Libya.
- EU Delegation to Bangladesh (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Bangladesh
- EU Delegation to Bolivia (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Bolivia
- EU Delegation to Bosnia and Herzegovina (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Bosnia and Herzegovina
- EU Delegation to Cameroon (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Cameroon
- EU Delegation to Colombia (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Colombia
- EU Delegation to DRC (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for DRC
- EU Delegation to DRC, UN Women, ADB (2022): Gender Profile DRC
- EU Delegation to El Salvador (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for El Salvador
- EU Delegation to Georgia (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Georgia
- EU Delegation to Guatemala (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Guatemala



- EU Delegation to Guinea Conakry (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Guinea Conakry
- EU Delegation to India (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for India
- EU Delegation to Kenya (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Kenya
- EU Delegation to Libya (2022): Updated Gender Country Profile – Libya.
- EU Delegation to Moldova (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Moldova
- EU Delegation to Morocco (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Morocco
- EU Delegation to Myanmar (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Myanmar
- EU Delegation to Nepal (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Nepal
- EU Delegation to Nicaragua (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Nicaragua
- EU Delegation to Pakistan (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Pakistan
- EU Delegation to Rwanda (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Rwanda
- EU Delegation to Serbia (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Serbia
- EU Delegation to Serbia, UN Women (2021): Gender Profile for Serbia
- EU Delegation to South Africa (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for South Africa
- EU Delegation to Tanzania (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Tanzania
- EU Delegation to Tanzania, UN Women, AfDB (2021): Gender Profile for Zanzibar
- EU Delegation to Tanzania, UN Women, AfDB (2021): Gender Profile for Mainland
- EU Delegation to The Philippines (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for The Philippines
- EU Delegation to Uganda (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Uganda
- EU Delegation to Venezuela (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Venezuela
- EU Representative Office West Bank and Gaza Strip (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for the Occupied Palestinian Territories
- European Union Office in Kosovo (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Kosovo

#### 9.3.2.5 Other EU documents

- EC (2016): Evaluation of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement.
- EC (2020): Communication on the Global EU response to COVID-19.
- EC (2020): EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024.
- EC (2020): Partnership Monitoring Instrument Monitoring Guidelines V1.3.
- EC (2020): Together towards a Gender Equal World.
- EC (2020): Towards a comprehensive Strategy with Africa
- EC (2022): Assessment of integration of GAP III/ CLIPs in a sample of TEI's : Findings based on a rapid assessment of 126 TEI/ 134 documents, INTPA D1.
- EU (2019): Joint Communication – European Union, Latin America and Caribbean: joining forces for a common future.
- EU (2020): Partnership Instrument Monitoring System.
- EU (2021): Partnership Agreement between the European Union/The European Union and its Member States, of the One Part , and Members of the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States, of the other Part.
- EU and UN Women, (2022): Working Together for Gender Equality – The EU-UN Women Partnership.
- FPI Gender, Age and Diversity Facility (2021): “Recommendations towards the Development of a Gender, Age and Diversity Strategy for FPI”. EU – FPI.
- FPI Gender, Age and Diversity Facility (2021): Gender Review of 2020 Proposed External Actions (draft).

#### 9.3.2.6 Other

- CONCORD (2018): Transforming Lives: EU Gender Action Plan II – from Implementation to Impact

- <https://asiapacific.unwomen.org/en/focus-areas/women-poverty-economics/weempowerasia/our-programme>
- ILO, EU and UN Women, (N.D.), The Power of Working Together: Emerging Practices that advance Women's Economic Empowerment.
- Investment Climate Change Facility (2022): Empowering Women in ACP Countries through Business Environment Reform, InfoPoint Virtual Conference.
- Katarzyna Sidło, Iakov Frizis, Olimpia Dragouni, Anna Ruzik-Sierdzińska, Karolina Beaumont, Givi Gigitashvili, Anne-Christin Winkler and Christopher A. Hartwell (2018): Women's Empowerment in the Mediterranean Region
- Nenning, Larissa (2022): Gender Equality, the Climate Crisis and the European Green Deal. European Public Sector Union.
- O'Connell, Helen. (2013): Implementing the European Union gender action plan 2010-2015: challenges and opportunities, European Development Cooperation Strengthening Programme.
- Sidło, Katarzyna and Iakov Frizis, Olimpia Dragouni, Anna Ruzik-Sierdzińska, Karolina Beaumont, Givi Gigitashvili, Anne-Christin Winkler and Christopher A. Hartwell, (2018): Women's Empowerment in the Mediterranean Region, European Committee of the Regions.
- World Bank Group ( 2022): Women, Business and the Law.

## 10 Thematic case study: Women, Peace and Security agenda (WPS)

### 10.1 Introduction

#### 10.1.1 Context

On 31 October 2000, the UN Security Council (SC) unanimously adopted **resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security** (hereinafter UNSCR 1325). This resolution contains four pillars of prevention, participation, protection, and peacebuilding and recovery, based on the founding idea “that peace is only sustainable if women are fully included, and that peace is inextricably linked with equality between women and men.”<sup>168</sup> Since then, the UN Security Council has issued several follow up and complementary resolutions: UNSCR 1820 (2008) Addresses sexual violence in conflict; UNSCR 1888 (2009) Strengthens efforts to end sexual violence in conflict; UNSCR 1889 (2009) urges States, UN bodies, donors and civil society to take into account women’s protection and empowerment during post-conflict needs assessment and planning; UNSCE 1960 (2010) establishes a monitoring and reporting mechanism on sexual violence in conflict; UNSCR 2106 (2013) focuses on accountability for perpetrators of sexual violence in conflict and stresses women’s political and economic empowerment; UNSCR 2122 (2013) addresses persistent gaps in the implementation of the women, peace and security agenda; identifies UN Women as the key UN entity providing information and advice on participation of women in peace and security governance; UNSCR 2242 (2015) focuses on women’s roles in countering violent extremism and terrorism and improved SC working methods on women, peace and security.

In parallel, the EU has made **specific commitments on WPS**, building on UNSCR 1325. In 2008, the EU Council adopted its Comprehensive Approach to the EU implementation of the UNSCRs 1325 and 1820, which served as a defining document. Ten years later, the EU Council Conclusions on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) of 10 December 2018 charted the EU’s Strategic Approach to WPS in a changing world (replacing the Comprehensive Approach document). On 5 July 2019, the EU Council adopted the EU’s Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2019-2024. The EU Council Conclusions on Women, Peace and Security of 14 November 2022 reiterate previous commitments and the ever-increased relevance of WPS in the current context, commit to closer partnership with civil society organisations, and highlight the importance of basing WPS support on gendered conflict analysis. The EU Council’s Strategic Compass for Security and Defence of 21 March 2022 integrates a strong WPS component serving as a guideline for all EUDs. In addition, EEAS has issued in 2021 a Strategy and Action Plan to enhance Women’s Participation in civilian CSDP Missions (2021-2024).

In line with the approach of the above commitments, the successive EU Gender Action Policies (GAPs) have evolved. GAP I (2010-2015) refers the 2008 Comprehensive approach: it focuses on protection and participation. GAP II (2016-2020) emphasizes the importance of differentiating the effects of conflict and reconstruction on women, highlights the prevalence of gender-based violence (GBV) in conflict situations, insists on women’s participation in peacebuilding and reconstruction, and stresses the opportunities for gender equality offered in reconstruction contexts. In the phase leading up to the development of GAP III (2020-2025), EEAS and INTPA integrated WPS as an entire priority thematic area. Interviewees reported that this approach was meant to avoid further fragmentation of the agenda. This was without prejudice to the distinction of roles between INTPA, which has the lead for programmatic activities, and EEAS, which has the lead for the political WPS agenda.

Compared to other thematic areas of the GAP III, WPS has mostly been promoted by the EU through the **EEAS**, considering its relation to security policy. The EEAS has led the work on the development of strategic documents and EU WPS Taskforce as well as specific strands of action such as multilateral work, mediation, particularly through its civilian and military missions and operations, through participation in peace talks, and at political dialogue level. For instance, EEAS has facilitated dialogue between armed forces, government representatives and local civil society organisations listing recommendations on WPS for consideration by local Armed and Security Forces. The EC staff, both in headquarters and in EUDs, also contribute to WPS through political and policy dialogue, public diplomacy and programmes.


#### 10.1.1.1 EU portfolio in the priority area of WPS under GAP III

The **mapping analysis** carried out by the team for this evaluation shows that of the total funding focused on GEWE over the period 2019-2022, **3% is earmarked for WPS**, which amounts to EUR 1 billion for the whole period.

<sup>168</sup> UN Women (2015): Global Study on the Implementation of UNSCR 1325

In absolute terms, the volume of funding for WPS has **increased** over the period (2019-2022), with the highest peak in 2022 (EUR 357 million). However, when analysed as a proportion of total GEWE funding per year, it has decreased from 4% in 2019 to 3% in 2022.


Figure 28 WPS portfolio (financial volume)<sup>169</sup> under GAP III – 2019-2022.



Source: Particip, based on Statistical Dashboard data

**Geographically**, the regions with the highest volume of funds dedicated to WPS are Africa and Asia, with a significant share going to the Americas and the Neighbourhood regions, the latter mainly due to the war in Ukraine, as shown in Figure 29.

Figure 29 EU support (contracted amounts) to WPS under GAP III by region, 2019-2022




Source: Particip, based on Statistical Dashboard data

In terms of the case study countries analysed in this evaluation, Colombia is the country that in absolute (total volume of funds) and relative terms allocates the most funds to WPS, with EUR 104 million for the period 2019-2022, which represents almost half (47%) of the total funds allocated to GEWE in the period.

<sup>169</sup> Contracted amounts


Figure 30 EU support (contracted amounts) to WPS under GAP III by case study country, 2019-2022



Source: Particip, based on Statistical Dashboard data

In terms of **channels**, UN and development agencies and international CSOs appear first and second in the WPS portfolio, implementing 32% and 23% respectively of the funds in this priority area. In terms of **modalities**, the main ones are delegation/ administration agreement and project-related (grants), which is consistent with the main types of channels.

Figure 31 Main channels and modalities within WPS portfolio under GAP III – 2019-2022.



Source: Particip, based on Statistical Dashboard data

## 10.2 Main Observations

### 10.2.1 Capacity within the EU (EUDs, CSDP)

The EU has gradually invested more resources, both financial and human, in WPS. This is particularly the case in EEAS. EEAS is also deploying more sizeable, systematic WPS training than before GAP III. However, these resources remain too dependent on the staff secondment modality, and insufficient overall, particularly in the EC.

The EU has also produced an increasing amount of policy, strategic, and operational guidance documents to support the implementation of its WPS commitments, integration of a peace and security perspective into GEWE efforts, and integrate a gender perspective into peace and security efforts. What is still missing is a strong link between the two, as the first is led by EEAS, the second by INTPA, and interviews show some limitations in reciprocal awareness and cross-fertilisation. The analytical capacity, although slowly increasing, remains insufficient to properly inform decision-making in general, and programming in particular. Improved dialogue with external stakeholders on WPS (CSOs, governments, other regional/international organisations...) contributes to partly compensating the challenges identified.

**Guidance and training on WPS have increased since the adoption of GAP III.** Among informants and in the literature review, there is a general agreement that GAP III rejuvenates the commitment to WPS already contained in the EU's Women, Peace and Security Agenda. To this end, the EC and EEAS both have guidelines and dedicated personnel who provide sensitisation, guidance, advice and training on WPS to the staff in the field and in headquarters. However, there is also a general concern that the EU's needs in the form of operational guidance, training and dedicated workforce to operationalise these commitments in a tangible and coherent matter are not being filled.

#### *Operational guiding documents*

**In EEAS**, the CSDP staff integrates a gender perspective into peace and security interventions using dedicated operational documents, which complement the normative framework described in introduction above:

- In civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions, the 2018 Civilian Operations commander operational guidelines on gender mainstreaming.
- Instructions from Headquarters to missions and operations (2021) on the implementation of GAP III framework relevant objectives and indicators including a tailor-made monitoring and reporting framework.
- In military CSDP missions, an EU Military Staff Gender Action Plan on the GAP III implementation and operational guidance on, both from 2022. These documents are comprehensive and complement pre-existing standard operating procedures on GEWE. All these documents were prepared by the EU Military Staff main Gender Adviser, and cleared by all headquarters for training missions and in the respective regions. In addition, the military missions and operations have their Action Plans and other operational documents.

**In the EC**, particularly the EUDs, the key documents are the Notes to Gender Focal Points (GFPs) and Heads of Cooperation on GAP III, and the CLIP template and thematic briefing notes, complemented by the Gender Country Profile (GCP) template, all insisting on the importance of WPS. The EC's thematic guidance note on Gender, based on the GAP III, proposes a comprehensive set of possible specific objectives. The Guidance Note on Conflict Analysis further includes a commitment to incorporate gender-sensitive conflict analysis – but it does not provide detailed guidance on how this EUDs should do so. However, these documents do not provide details on how to integrate WPS in gender analysis, CLIPs, or design of action documents. For instance, none of the seven briefing notes concerns WPS. The glossary of terms developed for GAP III does not cover any aspect of WPS (as opposed to some aspects of WEE, or sexual and reproductive health). Likewise, the Briefing Note 7— Model Terms of Reference for a Gender Sector Analysis, developed in 2022— suggests sector-specific sections which directly apply to WEE and GBV, but not to WPS. The GCP template does not have a section on fragility and conflict.

#### *Training*

All **CSDP missions' and operations' staff** undertakes mandatory pre-deployment provided by EU MS which should include a section on human rights and gender equality, and initial training provided by the ESDC, which does include a section on human rights and gender equality. At headquarters, the staff does not have a general orientations course or Human Rights & Gender Mainstreaming training. In addition, after deployment, the EU Military Staff training centre in Spain has trained part of the GFPs on GEWE, and some civilian Missions held several trainings for their GFPs (the evaluation team did not

receive details about the percentage of trained staff, which fluctuates due to frequent turnover inherent to the nature of CSDP missions). Gender Focal Points and Gender Advisers have further undergone targeted training organised by the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability and delivered with the support of the Folke Bernadotte Academy. This training includes general GEWE awareness, the EU normative framework, guidelines and operating procedures, as well as entry points for WPS. All Gender Advisers (field and headquarters) from the military and the civilian sides meet monthly for coaching, ongoing training and discussions led by the EU Military Staff main Gender Adviser. Training on the 2022 GAP III implementation Action Plan for military CSDP and on the corresponding Operational Guidance on GEWE will be rolled out in 2023. Some member States additionally provide pre-mission training (prior to the ESDC-provided pre-deployment training, or instead of it) to their secondees for CSDP missions, and sometimes include WPS (e.g. Italy, as reported by an interviewee.)

**In the EC headquarter Directorates and EUDs**, the GAP III training for GFPs includes a specific section on WPS, delving in particular into peacebuilding and gender and conflict. However, interviewees in case study countries usually express their concern or regret that they have limited knowledge about WPS. The review of all EUD and HQ semi-structured interviews, shows that the section dedicated to WPS is significantly shorter than any other (strategic framework, CLIPs, WEE), and in some cases even non-existent. The exceptions are specialised staff (INTPA G5 in particular) and EEAS. INTPA G5 piloted training on gender, conflict and peacebuilding, but is currently redesigning it for a shorter and more practical approach, to be redeployed in 2023. Some interviewees in the EC considered that the primary target of WPS training should be senior managers in EUDs, because good practices (e.g., Colombia, Nepal, Myanmar) show that their level of awareness and competence on conflict and gender are key to the inclusion of WPS as an informed priority and intervention topic.

Overall, the informants in headquarters and in the EUDs (country case studies, regional GFP Focus Group Discussions) and in the CSDP Missions (group interview) considered that, since the adoption of GAP III and the emphasis it places on WPS, the amount of guidance documents on WPS has increased. However, several informants have also expressed the concern that the coverage of training has been insufficient to ensure that this guidance is taken up uniformly and widely enough. Our e-survey<sup>170</sup> results confirm this perception: the percentage of “don’t know” answers to all WPS-related questions is much higher than on any other subject, ranging from 37% to 54% of respondents, which is extremely high. There is also a concern that these tools (guidelines and training) have been developed on separate tracks for the EC and EEAS respectively: there may be a missed opportunity to explore joint training, and to bring the EUD and CSDP staff closer in their daily, operational approach and coordination.

**Analysis and programming capacity for WPS is gradually increasing, but it has not reached critical capacity yet to systematically produce knowledge-based outputs on WPS.**

### *Staffing*

In **EEAS**, one WPS adviser (seconded) seats in the team of the **Ambassador for Gender and Diversity**, complemented by one adviser on gender and gender-responsive leadership.

EEAS ISP1 (Crisis Management team) has one seconded official fully dedicated to GEWE, who directly contributes to all relevant EEAS policy documents, and to the planning functions of the CSDP missions. EEAS ISP2 (Thematic team) has two GFPs (one working on mediation, one on conflict prevention). Both are seconded. They contribute to communications and positions (e.g., briefings for high-level meetings), and to relevant EEAS policy documents. They design training and guidance tools, and provide advice across the service, to the EUDs (in particular for the design of Annual Action Programmes), and to FPI in the EC.

Under the EEAS Civilian Planning and Conduct Capabilities (CPCC), there is a fulltime Gender Adviser/Expert for civilian missions (since 2018) and one per Headquarter location for military missions (since 2019): they advise senior management, guide and support the field-based Gender Advisers in the civilian and military missions.<sup>171</sup> All civilian and military missions have Gender Advisers and in addition, at least one civilian missions have created GFP networks in each Department, in both headquarters and missions, totalling about 100 GFPs. In the EU Military Staff is a system of GFPs in each Directorate, coordinated by Senior Adviser on Gender. In the military missions and operations, there are gender advisers and focal points in Operational Headquarters (OHQs) and Force Headquarters (FHQs), as well as in the larger military missions. Some of the GFPs also fulfil the function of human rights or legal adviser. Most often, GFPs are Military Advisers, and thus have direct access to mission command).

<sup>170</sup> Survey respondents include Gender Focal Persons and Heads of Cooperation at EUDs, going beyond the case study countries, and ii) Gender Focal Persons of various units (incl. DG INTPA, DG NEAR, EEAS, and other DGs) at the EC in Brussels.

<sup>171</sup> The number of CSDP field-based gender advisers fluctuates as missions evolve

Interviewees consider that the civilian side of CSDP has taken a lead, chronologically, on integrating a gender perspective in line with policy on WPS into CSDP missions and operations contexts, due to early recruitment of dedicated expert staff, and ensuing preparation of operational guidelines.

In the EC headquarter Directorates and EUDs, the network of GFPs supported by the G1 UNIT (INTPA), and the A2 Unit (NEAR) brings together generalists with a GFP function (EUDs), GEWE specialists (G1, A2), and a thematic expert on peace and WPS (within the G5 unit in INTPA). In headquarters, GFPs are mostly GEWE experts, whereas in EUDs they are usually, either relatively junior international staff or national staff who trained and learned about GEWE on the job. Beyond the G5 Unit, no specialised staff on WSP was identified. Country case studies suggest that the level of experience on WPS, and the percentage of time dedicated to the issue, are fairly limited in the EUDs, even compared to other areas of GEWE (e.g. women's economic empowerment).

**Box 12** *Good practice on WPS – Conflict-specific gender task force*

Good  
practice



The EU and EU MSs established a Gender task force at the very onset of the war in Ukraine, which inspired the EU's response at the onset of the conflict (though interviewees concur that this attention is brittle and has since then plummeted).

In other conflicts, such task forces and GEWE mainstreaming usually took off later on during the conflict – too late according to most interviewees, after women were already left out and suffered from the conflict.

Overall, despite some progress, there is still a lack of human resources specifically dedicated to WPS – and where these exist, they are often seconded by Member States. The issue is compounded by the feeling that the staff which is not specifically dedicated to WPS lacks the capacity and/or the interest to proactively work on it. Some officials report internal resistance. This leads to dilemmas: as an official said, “I have to choose files, I have to protect my health and refuse some files although I know nobody else will work on them and they are important.”

*Analysis and operational programming outputs*

The overall picture is that the EU (**both EC and EEAS**) has invested in internal tools and capacity to strengthen the gender perspective in conflict analysis, but that the results of these efforts are slow to materialize. Gender equality is still under-invested in conflict analysis, and conflict/WPS issues are still under-represented in gender analysis.

According to our survey, 27% of the EU staff consider that “gender analyses underpinning support to WPS” have been strengthened to some (23%) or to a great extent (4%) since 2021. This result should be seen in the light of increased consultations with CSOs, which may inform a gendered conflict analysis: this is the first-ranking WPS-related internal improvement since 2021, noted by 37% of the surveyed EU staff: 26% consider it strengthened to some extent, and 11% to a great extent. There is hard evidence to show that civil society consultation contributes to the EU's WPS analysis: in several case study countries (e.g., **DRC, Serbia, Colombia, Serbia, Philippines**), and reportedly in other EUDs (e.g., Burkina Faso) gender-progressive CSOs were consulted for conflict analysis and/or about conflict-related aspects of the CLIP. The EEAS ISP facilitates a Community of Practice on Peace Mediation, which gathers CSOs among other groups and is particularly active on WPS. Likewise, the EU brings in WPS expertise from the UN system. For instance, in Central African Republic, EEAS piloted a joint gendered conflict analysis with the UN (including UN Women), based on the Strategic Compass. This was an encouraging pilot which could be reproduced.

**Box 13** *Good practice on WPS – Gender equality and conflict analysis*

Good  
practice



Gender equality remains underrepresented in conflict analysis, and issues related to conflict and women and peace and security remain underrepresented in gender analysis, as well as in many of the documents of delegations including CLIPs.

A good example comes from **Colombia**, where the EUD produced a full-fledged Sector Analysis on Peace and Human Rights, based on specific guidance on WPS analysis produced in-house and shared with other EUDs in the region.

Another sign of improvement is strengthened dialogue on WPS within the EU, particularly within EEAS, and between EEAS and EUDs, INTPA, NEAR, and FPI. The consultation process for GAP III may have served as an accelerator, as suggested by several interviews – followed with internal consultations for the MIP. As an interviewee put it, “the thinking evolves through the analytical process – and that's also when interesting project ideas are born”.



EEAS continues to devote efforts to increase gender-sensitive conflict analysis and early warning:

- training and guidance,
- 2022 updated Baseline Study on the Integration of Human Rights and Gender in the CSDP,
- Community of Practice on peace mediation,
- inclusion of GEWE qualitative and quantitative indicators under one out of six Clusters of the EEAS' Early Warning conflict risk analysis framework
- inclusion of several GEWE indicators (including on GBV) in the Conflict Prevention monitoring on fragile States.

Yet, most interviewees concurred to say that, even within EEAS, the gender perspective lens is still lagging behind in conflict analysis. Interviews in headquarters and case study countries, as well as focus group discussions with GFPs, suggest that these improvements should be taken with a grain of salt, since they started "from a low basis", as one informant put it. More recently, as an interviewee put it, "*with multiple crises (energy, war, migration) there's no space left to talk about WPS, no analysis of the gender causes or impacts of these crises – therefore, instead of being a part of how decision makers consider these crises, gender is still a separate, secondary issue.*" EEAS staff also notes that there is only a limited literature on gendered-conflict analysis, especially at the country level. Progress is difficult in view of the limited human resources dedicated by the EU to WPS specifically. Illustrative of this trend, the NDICI thematic concept note on the "Peace, Stability and Conflict Prevention" thematic programme mentions gender equality as a cross-cutting area, and foresees participation of women in confidence-building efforts -- but not, at least explicitly, in any other area. Among analytical tools, it does not mention gendered conflict analysis. In the EUDs, analysis dedicated to WPS is still limited. Among our extended sample (27 EUDs), WPS is under-represented in the GCPs and in the analytical sections of the CLIPs – with some noteworthy exceptions such as **Colombia or Myanmar**. What is concerning is the contrast, in some CLIPs, between the absence of gendered conflict analysis, and the commitment to work on the issue: in our extended sample of 27 EUDs, 8 do not integrate WPS nor conflict in their analytical section (and do not refer to a recent, full-fledged gendered conflict analysis), although they foresee cost- or non-cost actions, and/or identify WPS as a thematic area of engagement.

The risk is that the corresponding interventions are ill-informed. Several interviewees regret the low level of gendered conflict analysis and the poor of some WPS-related indicators within relevant action documents which they assess as poor - despite the efforts invested for the country profiles, and for country-level conflict analysis. There is a general agreement that, despite gradual efforts, gender-sensitive conflict analysis (where applicable), and conflict- or security-sensitive gender analysis, both lag behind. Whereas the first is not relevant in all countries, the second is virtually relevant everywhere. Where one or the other type of analysis is performed it is not sufficiently channelled into action document design. There is also a lack of capacity in EUDs to design actions on WPS. In particular, interlocutors saw a lack of capacity to work on the various pillars of WPS, and on the interconnections between WPS and other GAP III thematic areas (e.g. SGBV, WEE, women's political participation). The limited WPS-specialised human resources in headquarters, particularly in the EC, do not suffice to support the EUDs in this respect. Conversely, EUDs are not always aware of this resource.

**Efforts towards gender parity within relevant services, including CSDP missions and operations, face structural challenges.**

In 2021, a study noted the continued under-representation of women, including in leadership positions within the EEAS and in the field, (Almqvist 2021, quoted in ECDPM, *How the women, peace and security agenda is integrated into the EU's gender action plan*). Responding to this challenge, the EEAS adopted an Action Plan to enhance women's participation in civilian missions (2021), covering (1) equal opportunities with recruitment, retention and career development, review of all job descriptions; (2) inclusive and harassment-free work; (3) gender-responsive leadership; (4) strategic communications and reporting. Various programmes are rolled out already, such as a mentoring programme for women in civilian missions. However, the EEAS relies on Member States for most of the CSDP mission personnel: the missions' gender structure therefore also reflects the gender structure in the member States' institutions from which the secondees originate to some extent, particularly but not limited to the security apparatus. The EEAS Force Generation Conference on security promoted the secondment of women to CSDP missions among the Member States. The balance is easier to achieve among the civilian staff in headquarters. For instance, the Integrated approach for Security and Peace (ISP) teams reported being quite gender balanced.

The Code of Conduct for EU military staff, civilian Missions Code of Conduct, and the Upgraded Generic Standards of Behaviour for CSDP Missions and Operations, all put emphasis on the elimination of harassment and on establishing a conducive working environment for men and women – which in turn could encourage women to join, and stay in the missions. Yet, there have been some reports of difficult

working environment experienced as a woman serving in the military branch, especially when advocating for WPS.

In the EC headquarter Directorates and EUDs, there are no credible data on the level of parity in positions relevant to WPS. Headquarter staff directly involved in the issue is almost exclusively women.

### 10.2.2 Significance of EU's WPS engagement

The EU's engagement on WPS is weaker than on other thematic priorities of the GAP III. It is often seen as less relevant, because many actors (including within the EU) associate it to active or imminent conflict situations – whereas WPS, in line with strategic documents and guidance, has its place in conflict, post-conflict, fragility situations, or simply in the context of EU-supported security sector reform. In addition, WPS is not often tackled through sizeable spending actions: it is often left to policy and political dialogue, where it often remains a low priority and sometimes gets completely de-prioritized when sensitivity escalates. Finally, the bulk of WPS-related operational activities is ensured by EEAS through CSDP missions and operations and despite no specific budget line dedicated to the topic, the missions and operations self-report that they include WPS-related activities in their daily work. In the absence of dedicated budget lines, within the scope and feasibility of this evaluation, the evaluation team was not in a position to assess the magnitude of such activities. Some interviewees report that an integrated approach within each country or territory is gradually increasing. Interviewees exemplified the potential of the EU's external action on WPS with a few good practices where such approaches are combined.

**WPS remains under-represented in CLIPs, although it would be relevant in the majority of cases – in relation to conflict, post-conflict, fragility situations, or simply in the context of EU-supported security sector reform.**

WPS, although selected in many CLIPs, is the least-often selected thematic area in the CLIPs, together with Digital Transformation and Green Economy. This was found by the INTPA G1 CLIP Overview Report (February 2022), and confirmed in our extended sample of 27 CLIPs:

- Ten out of these 27 CLIPs do not even mention WPS
- 14 select WPS as a priority area (almost 50%, which is the lowest score for a thematic area), but out of these, five (Kenya, Nicaragua, Philippines, Tanzania, Uganda) do not plan any cost- or non-cost activities (suggesting that there is no concrete plan to act on WPS as a thematic area, or that WPS-relevant actions are not identified as such and therefore reported in the CLIP). This makes only 8 out of 27 CLIPs actually planning something based on WPS as a priority area.
- Three CLIPs do not prioritise WPS, but still foresee cost- (Moldova, DRC) or non-cost (Pakistan) activities.

**13 out of 27 CLIPS** do not prioritize or foresee any activities (cost- or non-cost), though some of these feature WPS in their analytical sections. In some conflict-affected countries, the CLIP surprisingly does not select WPS as an area (e.g. Moldova).

*Box 14      Lessons learned on WPS – Relevance of coherence and compatibility of strategic frameworks*

Lessons  
learned



The GAP III WPS thematic area was designed hand-in-hand between the EC (DG INTPA in the lead) and EEAS. GAP III integrated WPS indicators (both EU-internal and on results) which had originally been prepared for the EEAS' WPS action plan in close cooperation with Member States within the EU WPS Taskforce. There is a differing perception within the EU on the compatibility between the GAP III vision on WPS and the pre-existing EU policy and strategic framework on external action. Differences of views concern particularly the indicators and results framework on WPS, which originated in the EEAS WPS Action

Plan, before GAP III, and were not further adjusted. The situation improved compared to GAP II in terms of close cooperation for the drafting of GAP III, yet EEAS operates in a constrained policy and regulatory environment. There are also different perceptions on the level of interaction between EEAS and the DGs: while some consider that internal consultation and coordination remains active, others perceive it as decreasing after the adoption of GAP III, each services going on a separate track.

This may be partly explained by the low importance given to WPS by some partner governments. For instance, in Serbia, WPS is referred to as a non-issue by Government counterparts and, to some extent, by some international actors present in Serbia.

**WPS-relevant interventions/action documents are usually addressed through more general security-related actions**

The most expert interviewees within the EC concluded that there are no data – reliable or not – about the amounts committed or spent for WPS, because there is no DAC coding related to WPS, nor meta-data relevant to WPS in CRIS or any other database or platform of the EC. Despite long-standing attempts to adjust the DAC codes to shed light on the issue, no progress has been accomplished. As an interviewee put it, “We absolutely cannot tell how much is spent on WPS”.

The review of the CRIS database, and of the portfolios in the case study countries confirm this: WPS is usually addressed through more general security-related actions (often without earmarking of GEWE-relevant funds) or through more general GEWE actions (without necessarily earmarking security-relevant funds), and rarely as a stand-alone topic (except for relatively modest CSO grants as in Kosovo\* and Serbia, and a limited number of WPS-specific actions as planned, for instance, in Colombia and Myanmar). The evaluation team therefore examined the extended sample of CLIPs to identify WPS-relevant actions – but CLIPs do not necessarily indicate amounts for these actions, even less for their WPS component, and they may not identify all WPS-relevant actions.

Only two CLIPs (**Serbia, Tanzania**) in our sample report on on-going actions identified as WPS-relevant: both concern CSO grants, which are modest in terms of funding compared to actions in other areas. This may also mean that some of these EUDs implement WPS-relevant actions, but they did not identify them as such. For instance, the CLIP DRC lists the action “*Unis pour l’égalité des genres*” but does not link it to WPS; it does not mention the follow up action in support to Security Sector Reform (approved in 2021), although even its predecessor included WPS as a cross-cutting issue and implemented specific WPS activities. There are cases, however, where the CLIPs refer to WPS not as concrete ongoing actions, but from a forward-looking perspective with prospective future potential. This is the case of the Tanzania CLIP, which foresees potential opportunities for synergy, as the country finalises its first ever National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, UNSCR1325, with support from Ireland and Denmark.

Country case studies and FGD discussions suggest that GAP III is contributing to slightly increased attention to WPS in planning cost-activities, particularly where the EUD was actively engaged in the production of gendered conflict analysis and/or the political environment is favourable. The case of **Colombia** is particularly illustrative: WPS is an integral part of the peace accords with the FARC, and stands high on the agenda of the Government the EU, and several member States. As a result, the EUD could develop particularly elaborate initiatives reaching out to underserved groups, including in remote regions. These initiatives are at the intersection of WPS and WEE, which makes them all the more powerful, because they are in essence gender transformative: they mean to empower women as economic actors and as actors of peace, both aspects reinforcing each other.

However, the review of CLIPs, the review of portfolio in the case study countries, and the interviews in Headquarters and in the case study countries (EUDs and partners) converge to indicate that WPS is lagging far behind, both in frequency and amounts, the effort on WEE (including the intersection between WEE and green/digital transformations) and GBV.

The intersection between WPS and other thematic areas of the GAP III are particularly underexplored. For instance, some interviewees pointed to action documents on WEE in sub-Saharan Africa which did not mention at all the fragility context and/or the context of ongoing conflict. Yet, there are some encouraging practices, for instance, from other regions regarding the reintegration of women combatants (e.g. Colombia and Philippines).

**WPS is not often tackled through sizeable spending actions: it is often left to policy and political dialogue.** Six out of 27 CLIPs foresee non-cost activities related to WPS. These usually concern political dialogue, and to a lesser extent, public diplomacy. Some CLIPs provide concrete examples, such as in Cameroon: gender responsiveness in humanitarian actions, peace negotiations, peace operations, mediation and peacebuilding in 3 areas: North (Boko Haram), N-W and S-W (separatism and refugee influx). Some CLIPs, such as in Georgia, Kosovo or Pakistan, select WPS as a thematic area but explicitly foresee that it will be addressed through non-cost, rather than cost-activities.

In parallel, EEAS has invested efforts to raise WPS issues in various multilateral, regional fora such as the Community of Practice on Peace Mediation and Afghan Women Leaders Forum. EEAS is also active through the public diplomacy and expertise provided by the SG. Gender and Diversity office. Much of these efforts are deployed at global or regional level.

At the country level, where spending and non-spending actions on WPS coexist, they operate on separate tracks. This is partly due to the institutional structure, partly due to the sensitivity of peace talks

– but also to the fact that coordination between the political and cooperation wings of EUDs addresses issues of high priority, whereas WPS is often viewed as less urgent, less relevant, and overall less important. WPS therefore may be underserved in preparation for high-level policy dialogue.

The same issue appears in peace-related Dialogue platforms. Persons interviewed attribute the difficulty covering the gender dimension of conflicts in various peace Dialogue platforms, to the fact that peace-related Dialogue is male-dominated and does not include CSOs. For instance, since the departure of the former woman EU High Representative, the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue does not feature a single woman (whether from the EU's side, or from the side of the parties to the Dialogue), and WPS issues have fallen out of the agenda after the Dialogue was interrupted: the fragility of the Dialogue is considered too high to bring up the issue of WPS, and the EU focuses on “urgent, higher priority issues” or more consensual issues.

Another explanatory factor is the occasional “division of labour” between the EU and member States, whereby the EU is not in the lead on WPS. This was noted for instance in Tanzania, where the EU does not take the lead on WPS, but two member States do, in cooperation with UN Women, through support to the preparation of the national WPS action plan.

### 10.2.3 Support to participation of women in security and peace/conflict settlement

There is only very scarce evidence regarding the results of the EU's WPS action on the ground. On the side of the EC, the inventory identified a relatively small number of WPS actions, and many of these are still ongoing, thus yielding limited information on results. Reporting on WPS by CSDP operations is limited and, EEAS acknowledged, WPS indicators are mostly quantitative, whereas qualitative indicators are few, and mostly conveyed through narrative reporting. The existing data suggests some results on the advancement of women's role in the security sector reform and in peace processes, both formal (Dialogue platforms) and informal (public debate, voluntary input to policies related to peace and conflict). The EU has also increasingly empowered women CSOs and women leaders as mediators, peacebuilders, and conflict prevention actors. However, these efforts and their results are not commensurate to the obstacles faced by women in access to, and influence in conflict prevention, peace processes, and generally security issues. Transformative change in WPS is in its infancy.

#### **The EU registers encouraging results on capacity building for WPS national policies, particularly within the security sector.**

With its contribution of EU support to the “gender equality machinery” and/or as a part of its support to security sector reform, the EU has often adopted a mix of gender transformative and gender responsive approaches. As a result of this contribution, several partner countries or territories have strengthened their national policies on UNSC 1325 and on the integration of women in security sector reforms at various levels and in various services. In addition to providing advice and contributing to policy dialogue in this area, the EU then provides funding, expertise and cross-fertilisation of good practices for the implementation of these policies. In some cases, there are initial indications that procedures, behaviours and recruitment/career management patterns in the security sector institutions are improving. However, successes in these areas remain highly dependent on the willingness of the partner governments, and on the anterior presence of women in these institutions: these two factors constitute the common core upon which EU support can build to accelerate transition towards gender inclusive security institutions. Attention to WPS within security sector reforms, including in conflict or fragile contexts, has recently increased.

For instance, the EU Advisory Mission for Ukraine (civilian CSDP operation) has equipped the border guards with guidelines and standard operating procedures on sexual harassment. Building on this experience, the Mission now supports the Customs Service, who requested capacity building on gender-responsive leadership. This was made possible by the existing national policies on WPS (National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325).

In **Colombia**, the EU supports the design and rollout of the national action plan on implementation of UNSCR 1325. Results are already felt in terms of women's participation in decision-making on security-related matters, with strong alignment between the Government, the civil society, the EU, EU Member States, and other like-minded donors.

In the **Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT)**, which has a National Action Plan on gender including aspects related to UNSCR 1325. OPT signed the Istanbul Convention, a step that was encouraged by the EU. Reinforcing these commitments, the EU has long supported gender equality sector-specific training with several law enforcement and judiciary institutions, such as the High Judicial Council. This is particularly relevant to WPS in the conflict context. With the EU's contribution (in partnership with UN Women), the Palestinian police was one of the first police services in the Arab world, to adopt a gender action plan, complemented by a gender curriculum in the Police Academy. EEAS estimates that in the

Palestinian security sector, 6% officials are now women as opposed to 1.6% in 2010. Women start to be represented in senior ranks, and Palestinian women police officers are members of the International Women Police Officers network. The EU helped develop a network of Gender Units in the law enforcement and the judiciary throughout the territories. The main obstacle to capitalise on these results and foster a genuinely inclusive security sector is the legal framework, which is often contradictory and discriminatory, as an old heritage of former mandates by other countries. And, at the same time, as described below, the poisoned political environment and increase in Occupation-related violence have defeated any effort to empower women as peacemakers. Women who have spoken out for reconciliation have been viciously attacked on social media.

Apart from the legal and policy framework, another determining factor is the perception of security threats and the resurgence of conflict. For instance, in DRC, the EU has had little (visible) success in incorporating gender-targeted actions in its support to security sector reforms in DRC, despite initial plans to do so. While the government has committed to the WPS agenda, other “more pressing” priorities tend to dominate the ongoing East African Community-led Nairobi peace process (and with it search for external funds).

In the **Philippines** the EU in partnership with a network of CSOs supports women human rights defenders and feminist CSOs. The Justice and Society components support access to justice and build capacity at CSOs, respectively. Gender is mainstreamed throughout the programme. However, in the current threatening environment, EU and Member States’ public advocacy in this area, while not absent, is restrained.

**Despite frequent EU efforts to facilitate women’s participation in formal peace processes, results do not usually reach a critical size that would make peace processes inclusive of women. In addition, participation of women does not guarantee gender mainstreaming within peace processes.**

Peace processes – supported, mediated, facilitated, or simply attended by external parties such as the EU - are particularly sensitive and unstable processes, where tensions and stakes are typically elevated. The actors are wary of change and inclusion, which are often seen as potential destabilising factors rather than helpful steps towards peace. As conflict-resolution processes are typically male-dominated, and the actors of the conflicts form the core of peace processes, the entry barriers to peace processes are particularly high for women. To mitigate this situation, the EU has often adopted gender-responsive approaches, with mixed success. Overall, participation of women in peace processes – and the EU’s support to it – tend to be more likely where women were involved in conflict (e.g., Colombia), or where there were women in high-level positions related to diplomacy and/or national integrity before recent conflicts (e.g., Georgia).

One of the responsive approaches is the “no women=no panel” approach. There are no data on its results, but interviews in at least one case study country suggest that when it happens, it conveys a strong message. The EU has also advocated for and facilitated (e.g., by organising encounters) the participation of women in some EU-facilitated formal negotiation platforms. An example is the Philippines, with peace process in Mindanao.

In **Latin America** the EU is now starting to support indigenous groups, including indigenous women, to prepare their positions and participate in Dialogue processes. Interviewees concurred that it was too early to assess results, but talked about a promising approach.

In several cases, as in **the OPT, Moldova and Kosovo\*** the EU has supported, financially, technically and politically, women’s CSOs and other CSOs with a gender equality vision, to contribute policy input to the existing peace Dialogues or processes. Interviews and document review show that the results are excellent in terms of the quality of peace policy proposals produced by these CSOs. The difficulty is, however, to channel these inputs into peace processes. Due to the confidentiality, or the suspension of these processes, it was not possible for the EU or for the evaluation team to assess the extent to which the CSOs’ inputs had been considered, discussed, or translated into concrete agreements.

At times, these initiatives even backlashed against the supported civil society actors. For instance, in the OPT, CSOs who tried to participate, backed by EU (through training and advocacy), have been threatened and assaulted. Past progress is also eroded by the deteriorating political environment, growing radicalisation, and the fracturing of Palestinian politics and society. There is currently no appetite for reconciliation and correspondingly rare feminist voices speaking for reconciliation have been vilified. In the Philippines, the “red-tagging” (false accusations of terrorist affiliations) of women’s organisations by law enforcement authorities has been documented.

Another limitation is that the EU’s actions for women’s participation and gender mainstreaming in peace processes are often responsive rather than transformative. For instance, EEAS observed that women’s CSOs and local CSOs are often constrained economically or by care duties – and EU does not support them to address these constraints (e.g. by paying transport and childcare to facilitate their participation), either because the EEAS, who is in the lead on Dialogue platforms, does not have the funding channels

for it, or because the EC which does, is not directly involved in Dialogue platforms. Specific processes are therefore needed to practically enable women's participation.

Overall, the evidence shows that initiatives to support women's participation in Dialogue platforms and other formal peace processes are few, limited in scale, and often recent. In comparison, obstacles are ubiquitous, huge, and long-dating. There is, therefore, potential for the EU to contribute to increasing women's participation.

#### **Facilitation of women's participation in grass-root consultations, conflict prevention and peacebuilding.**

In many locations, the EU is supporting the role of women and the mainstreaming of gender equality questions in community-level interactions for conflict prevention or peacebuilding. Typically, EU actions train women community mediators who facilitate the settlement of disputes among groups that are affected by, victims of, and/or vulnerable to conflict dynamics.

The **FPI** has recently conducted a series of projects building capacity of women as mediators and promoting their mediation activities, notably in Africa. Some EUDs started implementing similar initiatives under other instruments (e.g., in DRC), but it was too early for the stakeholders to observe results. Overall, interviewees acknowledged that the implication of these negotiators has been very useful, especially in the most challenging peace processes (Afghanistan, Liberia, Azerbaijan, Burundi, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chad, Central African Republic, Central Asia).

In Moldova (confidence and security building measures), Kosovo and southern Serbian regions, the EU has enabled various rapprochement projects involving CSOs from both sides over concrete community issues such as health, social protection, environment, preservation of cultural heritage, and rural development. These initiatives help create the necessary conditions for peace and reconciliation in the communities – and a demand for peaceful settlement of State-level disputes. But in Kosovo, there is no evidence of links or synergies with the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue.

Various other actions, although too recent to ascertain results, illustrate the materialisation of the EU's approach to bottom-up WPS support. In Nicaragua, the EU facilitates civil society-internal consultations on WPS, thus preparing capacity in the context of increasing social vulnerability and potential security risks. In **Tanzania**, the EU is strengthening CSOs' role in addressing violent conflict in local communities and fostering gender balance and social inclusion in all activities. The project under the global Search for Common Ground programme contained a strong gender and youth component, backed up by gender-sensitive Baseline and Conflict Assessments, but the actual mainstreaming of gender in this project fell short. Despite this, the Final Evaluation of the SFCG project provides a positive assessment of the project's gender performance, noting specific needs of women, such as those in the areas of land rights, marital issues, and GBV, among stakeholders. The project had contributed to increased women's participation in peace and security (as well as land dispute) discussions in some locations.

In **Ukraine**, a mediation action of 6 million EUR, the most sizeable to date, is supporting UN and CSOs to mainstream gender in the entire conflict resilience and conflict response approach, from the bottom up.

#### **10.2.4 EU support to GEWE in protection, relief and recovery in conflict-affected and fragile contexts**

Gender-mainstreamed protection, relief and recovery in fragile or conflict-affected still tends to focus predominantly on GBV. Yet, even within this area, a more integrated approach (prevention, protection, prosecution, and link with other thematic areas such as WEE as a vehicle to counter GBV) are starting to emerge. More politically challenging, gender-equal access to resources as a part of relief and recovery efforts is less prominent in the EU's action – largely because the political and social stakes associated are higher.

**Facilitation of women's access to resources forms part of gender-transformative conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Although recent, rare and little documented, this approach is particularly promising, particularly when coupled with demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR).**

There are almost no data available on the existence and results of EU actions focused on access to resources, which would have a WPS aspect. In active- and post-conflict situations, the first entry door to gender-equal access to resources is the targeting of relief efforts. In a longer-term, and more transformative, perspective, the EU also promotes women's access to sustainable material resources (land, reconstruction resources) in situations of fragility or post-conflict.

**Ukraine** is generally viewed as a test for the EU's commitment to mainstream gender in reconstruction, and to adopt a WPS approach to future reconstruction efforts. Recently, a high-level forum on WPS gathering the government, EU, and CSOs, focused on the future recovery plans. The discussions

exposed that when it comes to infrastructure, the financial flows determine the space afforded to gender mainstreaming, and a contest between “hard” and social infrastructure (health, education, other social relief and integration infrastructures) was observed, which could be detrimental to GEWE mainstreaming – as it was demonstrated that GEWE mainstreaming tends to be less present in “hard” infrastructural projects such as energy, transport and the like. It is commendable that the EU is already paying attention to this dilemma, so as to proactively mainstream gender and ensure a balance between both types of reconstruction initiatives.

**Colombia** is another good illustration of an integrated approach to WPS. A budget support action on reintegration with a WPS component, particularly focused on the local level, is starting to yield initial results on the reintegration of women or children previously involved in, or affected by, the conflict. In parallel, the EUD in Colombia manages two grant programmes on community-based peacebuilding in conflict-affected regions. Other initiatives targeting economic empowerment in conflict-affected areas also have a strong WPS component – whereby WEE is seen as an avenue for WPS (one grant programme targeting youth in Cauca region). The strength of this nexus between WPS, WEE, and disaster recovery, is thanks to the EUD’s investment into in-house WPS analysis; the channelling of this analysis in to joint programming with the Governments, civil society, and EU Member States; and strong anchoring points in the peace accords and particularly progressive national strategies.

In **Mali**, the WEE/WPS/GBV nexus is also integrated to some extent in dialogue on peace dividends in Mali, supported by FPI/GIZ and EEAS.

#### Box 15

#### *Good practice on WPS – A comprehensive integration of WPS*

Good  
practice



Interviews and inventory of actions revealed several examples in which EU support envisages WPS **comprehensively**, covering i) GBV response; ii) reintegration of women (former) combatants, participation of women in peace negotiations and in the rollout and implementation of peace accords where applicable; and iii) WEE and women’s political participation as avenues towards lasting peace. This tends to be the case where women themselves imposed their role as actors of conflict (as cadre in the Defence Ministry, current/former combatants, or as peacebuilders, or a

combination of the above; e.g. Colombia, Philippines, Ukraine). For instance, in Colombia, WPS spending actions cover reintegration of women combatants, WEE as an avenue for peacebuilding, and community-based peacebuilding. WPS forms an integral part of the political and policy dialogue. In the Philippines, gender has been thoroughly mainstreamed in all aspects of the EU’s ambitious programme supporting peacebuilding in Mindanao and the EU supported Government to design its peacebuilding strategy, including gender aspects.

More ambitious, transformative approaches such as GEWE in access to resources as a means to conflict prevention are only just emerging. Interviewees concurred to say that this was an important area of improvement for the future – although politically or socially sensitive, even in the countries most committed to WPS such as Colombia.

**The facilitation of women’s access to GBV-related support and resources remains the most common “port of call” of WPS.**

Historically, GBV in fragile situations, as well as during and after conflicts, has been the first aspect of WPS to benefit from international cooperation support, including that of the EU external action. In the WPS agenda, it is also an important aspect of gender responsiveness. While the GAP III has contributed to expanding the focus, this area remains the most frequently represented in WPS actions. It is also viewed by many stakeholders as the least politically sensitive of all WPS aspects. Over the recent years, and in line with the WPS agenda and the Istanbul Convention, these actions have focused on three key angles of GBV: prevention, prosecution, and comprehensive protection services for survivors (justice, social, health) Interviews show a growing concern for earlier, strengthened prevention. The EU’s action on WPS regarding the war in Ukraine also focuses on GBV, but it is also seen as a test for the EU’s ability to deliver on early prevention, both in Ukraine, and in the countries (including EU countries) where refugees from Ukraine transit or settle (temporarily or not). Support to war crimes prosecution and survivor protection seem to increasingly integrate preventive aspects, particularly in terms of awareness raising. This is taking place in a context where women are very present in the law enforcement and especially justice authorities in Ukraine, which eases this more integrated approach to GBV in conflict. The results are not yet visible, but they need to be monitored in partnership with civil society and Ukrainian authorities.

Other examples show, however, that an integrated approach is not always favoured. For instance, in Serbia, the new Action Plan on Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence, supported by the EU, has no link with the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue or regional security issues. It is largely conflict-blind.

## 10.3 Annex

### 10.3.1 List of persons consulted

The list below presents the interviewees at the global level with a specific link to WPS. This case study, being crosscutting in theme, has also drawn on inputs from the country case studies, and the Swedish good practice study. Details of the interviewees for each of these can be found in the annexes to each of the relevant case studies.

<i>Organisation</i>	<i>Position/ Role</i>
<b>EU</b>	
EU HQ (EEAS - ISP.1.SEC1 - Methodology of the Integrated Approach)	Policy Officer - Human Rights and Gender
EU HQ (EEAS - ISP.2 - Conflict Prevention and Mediation Support)	Deputy Head of Division
EU HQ (EEAS - ISP.2.SEC1 - Early Warning and Conflict Prevention)	Policy Officer
EU HQ (EEAS - ISP.2.SEC2 - Peace Mediation and Dialogue)	Policy Officer
EU HQ (EEAS - SG Gender and Diversity)	Gender and Diversity Adviser
EU HQ (EEAS - SG Gender and Diversity)	Senior Gender Expert to EEAS Principal Advisor on Gender (PAG) and on UNSCR 1325/WPS
EU HQ (EEAS - SG Gender and Diversity)	Gender and Diversity Adviser
EU HQ (INTPA.G.5 - Human Development, Migration, Governance and Peace - Resilience, Peace, Security)	Policy Officer - Thematic Expert - Peace
EU HQ (INTPA.G.5 - Human Development, Migration, Governance and Peace - Resilience, Peace, Security)	Policy Officer - Thematic Expert - Peace
EU HQ (NEAR.A.2 - Rule of Law, Governance and Security)	Policy Assistant - Team Security and Peace
EU HQ (NEAR.A.2 - Rule of Law, Governance and Security)	Senior Expert - Team Leader - Security and Peace Team

### 10.3.2 List of documents

#### 10.3.2.1 EU Strategy Programming

- EU (2021): European Joint Strategy in support of Palestine (Occupied Territory) 2021-2024
- European Commission (2014): Indicative Strategy Paper for Serbia (2014-2020)
- European Commission (2014): Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2014-2020 for DRC
- European Commission (2014): Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2014-2020 for Colombia
- European Commission (2014): Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2014-2020 for The Philippines
- European Commission (2014): Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2014-2020 for Tanzania
- European Commission (2014): Single Support Framework for European Union support to Palestine (Occupied Territory)
- European Commission (2021): IPA III Strategic Response 2021-2024 Republic of Serbia
- European Commission (2021): Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2021-2027 for DRC
- European Commission (2021): Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2021-2027 for Colombia
- European Commission (2021): Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2021-2027 for The Philippines
- European Commission (2021): Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2021-2027 for Tanzania



### 10.3.2.2 EU WPS-specific documents and guidance

- EU (2016): EEAS working document 2016, Report on the Baseline Study on Integrating Human Rights and Gender into the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy
- EU (2018): EEAS/CSDP/Civilian Missions 2018 operational guidelines on gender mainstreaming (EEAS(2018)747)
- EU (2019): EU Action Plan on WPS, 2019-2024
- EU (2021): EEAS Working Document, Strategy and Action Plan to Enhance Women's Participation in Civilian CSDP Missions 2021-2024
- EU (2022): EU Strategic Compass on Security and Defence

### 10.3.2.3 EU Reporting

- EU Delegation to Colombia (2021): GAP III reporting 2021
- EU Delegation to DRC (2021): GAP III reporting 2021
- EU Delegation to Serbia (2021): GAP III reporting 2021
- EU Delegation to Tanzania (2021): GAP III reporting 2021
- EU Delegation to The Philippines (2021): GAP III reporting 2021
- EU Representative Office West Bank and Gaza Strip (2021): GAP III reporting 2021

### 10.3.2.4 EU gender-specific (CLIPs, country profiles)

- EU Delegation to Bangladesh (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Bangladesh
- EU Delegation to Bolivia (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Bolivia
- EU Delegation to Bosnia and Herzegovina (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Bosnia and Herzegovina
- EU Delegation to Cameroon (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Cameroon
- EU Delegation to Colombia (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Colombia
- EU Delegation to DRC (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for DRC
- EU Delegation to DRC, UN Women, ADB (2022): Gender Profile DRC
- EU Delegation to El Salvador (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for El Salvador
- EU Delegation to Georgia (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Georgia
- EU Delegation to Guatemala (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Guatemala
- EU Delegation to Guinea Conakry (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Guinea Conakry
- EU Delegation to India (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for India
- EU Delegation to Kenya (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Kenya
- EU Delegation to Moldova (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Moldova
- EU Delegation to Morocco (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Morocco
- EU Delegation to Myanmar (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Myanmar
- EU Delegation to Nepal (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Nepal
- EU Delegation to Nicaragua (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Nicaragua
- EU Delegation to Pakistan (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Pakistan
- EU Delegation to Rwanda (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Rwanda
- EU Delegation to Serbia (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Serbia
- EU Delegation to Serbia, UN Women (2021): Gender Profile for Serbia
- EU Delegation to South Africa (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for South Africa
- EU Delegation to Tanzania (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Tanzania
- EU Delegation to Tanzania, UN Women, AfDB (2021): Gender Profile for Zanzibar
- EU Delegation to Tanzania, UN Women, AfDB (2021): Gender Profile for Mainland
- EU Delegation to The Philippines (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for The Philippines

- EU Delegation to Uganda (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Uganda
- EU Delegation to Venezuela (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Venezuela
- EU Representative Office West Bank and Gaza Strip (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Palestine (Occupied Territory)
- European Union Office in Kosovo (2021): Country-Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for Kosovo

#### 10.3.2.5 Other

- ECDPM (2021): How the women, peace and security agenda is integrated into the EU's gender action plan.
- UN Women (2015): Global Study on the Implementation of UNSCR 1325
- [https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/gender-and-diversity\\_en](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/gender-and-diversity_en)
- [https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/missions-and-operations\\_en#9620](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/missions-and-operations_en#9620)
- [https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/news-stories/news/ukraine-eu-stepping-support-sexual-and-gender-based-violence-survivors-2022-05-13\\_en](https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/news-stories/news/ukraine-eu-stepping-support-sexual-and-gender-based-violence-survivors-2022-05-13_en)

## 11 EU Member State Good Practice case study: Sweden

### 11.1 Introduction

#### 11.1.1 Focus of the case study

The aim of this **EU MS good practices case study** is to illustrate and analyse progress made by one EU MS (in this case, Sweden), broadly held to be a leader in its support and implementation of progressive gender policy both internally and externally. The case study also examines how Swedish policies and actions have contributed to EU objectives in Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment (GEWE) and examines whether and how GAP III has contributed to this progress. The study focuses on issues related to EQ1 but also makes links with different parts of the analysis, with particular attention to Swedish actions at the partner country level. The latter is linked to the response to EQ2, which focuses on the Country Level Implementation Plans (CLIPs) and on coordination between European actors at that level. It also examines how Swedish actions and support are supporting the EU's work on Women's Economic Empowerment (WEE) (with reference to EQ3 on WEE) and on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) (see EQ4 on WPS).

The primary data collection methods for this analysis include evaluation team interviews with Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Swedish International Development Cooperation (Sida) personnel as well as EU HQ personnel and European Union Delegations (EUD) personnel in the case study countries selected for a more in-depth review as a part of the evaluation (Colombia, the Democratic Republic, of Congo, Tanzania, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, the Philippines and Serbia – where applicable). This is complemented by a comprehensive documentary review of documents produced by both the EU and by the MFA and Sida.

#### 11.1.2 Context

**Sweden is perceived to be a world leader** regarding both its support for and championing of **gender equality** at home as well as in its external actions. In the words of one key informant, "Gender equality is supposed to be a part of our DNA". Sweden has served as a GEWE champion both within the EU and at global levels. As a part of this championing, gender equality is considered to be the responsibility of the entire government of Sweden. Up until the recent national election in September 2022 the Swedish Government was a feminist government, meaning it espoused a Feminist Foreign Policy (FFP). Therefore, Government of Sweden (GoS) personnel were expected to integrate a gender perspective throughout all policy and programme areas, including in the budget process.

In 2014, Sweden became the **first country in the world to adopt a Feminist Foreign Policy** requiring its Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Sida personnel working for the MFA, in embassies for example, as well as all public sector institutions that have external relations (also referred to as Team Sweden) to integrate a gender perspective in all foreign policy, including trade and development policy and related programming. Gender equality is also a part of Sweden's Policy Framework for development cooperation and humanitarian assistance and has been a thematic priority for Sida since 2007. Team Sweden also includes the Folke Bernadotte Academy, the Swedish agency for peace, security and development.<sup>172</sup> In 2022, the government dropped this policy approach and has indicated that it will focus on providing support to women and girls. However, the Feminist Foreign Policy was in effect for the period covered by the MTR and so is discussed in some detail here from a lessons learned perspective.

The Feminist Foreign Policy covered three main areas: Foreign and Security Policy, Development Cooperation and Trade and Promotion Policy. Key actors include the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its different divisions, as well as Sweden's embassies and representatives abroad. A number of government agencies also support implementation in the different geographic and policy areas. Sida, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, implements development cooperation on behalf of the Swedish government. Internationally, Sida staff are integrated as a part of embassy staff teams in the countries where Sweden has bilateral strategies.

At the EU level, Sweden has played an instrumental role in supporting a progressive gender agenda and in providing significant inputs in the development of ambitious **EU Gender Action Plans**. Its own strategies and action plans were developed both prior and in parallel to the EU gender action plans and while in line with EU commitments, they did not include a strong operational link to the EU GAP II, e.g., regarding reporting or indicators. This is shifting to some extent with GAP III.

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<sup>172</sup> Folke Bernadotte Academy. 2022. <https://fba.se/en/>

## 11.2 Main Observations

### 11.2.1 Reflection of GAP III Objectives within Swedish programming (JC1.1)

The way in which Sida has implemented Sweden's FFP has influenced the key approaches of GAP III; specifically, the adoption of the transformative, intersectional and rights-based approaches to change.

For Sweden, GAP III is seen as a key policy tool within the EU. At the national level, GAP III has also influenced Sida's work, especially with regard to its coordination of gender equality work with the EU. This is partly because GAP III is closely aligned with Swedish national gender equality policy and because the EU is starting to support more gender-related actions and integrated processes.

Sida was already integrating many of the core actions outlined in GAP III into its programming prior to its adoption, but its staff, like those of the EU, continue to face some difficulties in applying gender analysis in a consistent manner.

#### **How Sida has applied Sweden's FFP has influenced key approaches in GAP III; specifically, the adoption of transformative change, intersectional and rights-based approaches.**

Prior to GAP III, it was mostly Sida and the UK's DfID that applied this **three-pronged approach** to gender equality in their work. With the integration of these core principles into GAP III and with most Member States supporting this shift in approach, Swedish government personnel interviewed find there is greater clarity with regard to how gender equality should be and is being addressed within the EU's gender equality guidance. This is also reflected in diverse aspects of the EU's external actions, including those jointly supported by the Swedish government.

#### **Sweden considers GAP III as a key policy tool within the EU.**

Sweden's aim is to work through GAP III as a policy tool and not to suggest new approaches during its implementation. To this end, the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is looking at how to operationalize this more in the field so that both the MFA and Sida staff can actualize GAP III in their work.

For Sweden, GAP III also reflects a strong gender and rights approach which aligns closely with the country's long term overall focus and support for human rights. Swedish personnel also observed that this stronger human rights and gender equality focus represents a shift from GAP I and II. GAP II, for example, was quite significant for countries applying for EU membership and many aspects of its gender equality provisions formed core actions and principles that became part of the requirements for the accession process in the Enlargement NEAR region.<sup>173</sup> GAP I focused more on development issues related to gender and women and girls. The increased focus on human rights and gender equality within a development context were broadened further with GAP III. GoS personnel observed that this change is contributing to a similar impact within the EU as that which occurred when Sweden first implemented its FFP. This is, in part, because all aspects of GAP III apply to regions beyond the Enlargement region.

Sweden has also tried to use GAP III as a guide as much as possible in the recent Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instruments (NDICI) negotiations to help set targets. The FFP helped them in this process to some degree because everyone was expecting Sweden to push the hardest on gender equality issues to help move the EU forward in this area. This gave them some leeway in the negotiations, as it did for Finland and a few other countries which have a history of promoting gender equality. Essentially, the combination of the FFP and GAP III gave Sweden increased leverage to advocate for increased coverage of gender equality in the NDICI negotiations. This influence also has been emerged coming through in other negotiations for the Council and in other key documents. The **GAP III 85% target** for integrating gender in EU external actions at the G1 or G2 level was also cited as being particularly helpful as a form of leverage to ensure that EU-supported external actions addressed gender more often.

There are, however, three countries that do not subscribe to the GAP III (Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria) so that there remains a problem with negotiating some gender equality clauses at the HQ/global level in some areas. Nevertheless, Sweden's experience has been that this lack of consensus does not really seem to matter at the field level, as there are other factors at play there which influence the extent to which a country programme is able to integrate GAP III provisions. These factors can include factors such as whether a country is a signatory to all or some of the key international conventions on gender equality, if they are a fragile state or operating in a conflict context, and the core political values of the ruling parties, amongst others.

<sup>173</sup> Based on interviews with Swedish government personnel and: Kartini International, Sida Gender Equality Indicators by Sector. 2013.

**At the country level, GAP III has influenced Sida's work, particularly with regard to its coordination of gender equality work with the EU. This is, in part, because GAP III is closely aligned with Swedish national gender equality policy and is finding the EU is starting to support more gender-related actions and mainstreamed processes.**


Sida actively works in collaboration with the EU at the country level and the key GAP III approaches are closely aligned with Sida's approaches, so there is considerable reflection of the GAP III approaches at the country level in jointly funded programming. Sweden uses GAP III as a reference at global level. In particular, Sweden has aligned common issues related to the allocation of resources, strengthening of women's rights organisations, strengthening women's political participation, and GBV.

For example, in **Tanzania**, the alignment between Swedish foreign policy on GEWE and GAP III fits with the country priorities and is linked to Sida's gender action plan. The Sida Strategy for Development Cooperation in Tanzania has gender equality as a central objective and it is also mainstreamed in all components (human rights, democracy, rule of law; inclusive education; inclusive growth (particularly work with the private sector and agriculture); environment and climate change. The Strategy – like GAP III – also promotes additional support for specific targeted interventions to ensure gender equality addressed at the strategic level.

**Sida was already integrating many of the core actions outlined in GAP III in its programming prior to the adoption of GAP III, but its personnel, much like those of the EU, still encounter some challenges in applying gender analysis consistently.**

A 2018 assessment of Sida's implementation of its gender integration plan found that: i) Sida's partners have a very positive view of Sida's inputs; ii) the agency often stands out due to the constant weight that it attaches to gender equality and women's rights; and iii) Sida is noted for its often-practical approach to these issues. However, the assessment's review of project documents also found that Sida's approach to gender integration and gender analysis was inconsistently implemented and not yet found in all of Sida's projects. Nevertheless, by 2018, overall the amount of projects in which gender equality was the principal objective, and in which gender analysis is performed, had increased in line with Sida's Gender Integration Plan.<sup>174</sup>

**Figure 32** Sweden ODA for gender equality – Constant 2020 USD billion, bilateral allocable aid commitments.



Source: Particip GmbH, based on [data extracted from OECD.Stat](#)

Between 2016-2018, Sweden significantly increased its aid commitments marked as significant and principal objective (G1 and G2 respectively) reaching a total of USD 2.8 billion committed to gender equality in 2018, the highest amount in the period under review. As shown in Figure 32 above, Sweden

<sup>174</sup> Elin Bjarnegård and Fredrik Uggla, (2018): Putting Priority into Practice: Sida's Implementation of its Plan for Gender Integration

already had a high proportion of funding allocated to supporting gender (G1 and G2) prior to the adoption of GAP III. In 2016, 2017 and 2018, the volume of funds committed by Sweden targeting gender equality represented over 87% of all screened ODA funds for each year. However, Sweden's overall ODA volumes together with G1 and G2 funding dropped significantly by 2020. With a visible recovery after the 2020 plummeting, in 2021 Sweden committed 74% of its total screened bilateral allocable aid to gender equality and women's empowerment (down from 79% in 2019, and up from 73% in 2020).<sup>175</sup> This trend is partly explained by changes in the use of gender markers in recent years as a result of quality assurance.

### 11.2.2 Sweden has created a conducive institutional environment to integrate GAP III (JC1.2)

Sweden's Feminist Foreign Policy has been instrumental in creating an enabling environment for the integration of GAP III, as it reinforced gender mainstreaming approaches in Sweden's external actions and sent a clear message from the top that promoting gender equality was a priority for Sweden.

Although the new Swedish government has indicated that it will focus more on women and girls than on the continuation of Sweden's Feminist Foreign Policy, this approach is still in line with many parts of GAP III.

**Sweden's Feminist Foreign Policy has been instrumental in creating an environment conducive to integrating GAP III since it strengthened gender mainstreaming approaches within Sweden's external actions and provided clear messaging from the top that promoting gender equality was a Swedish priority.**

The FFP was very successful in communicating messages as to why gender equality is so important, particularly regarding women's and girls' rights. It also served to bring GEWE issues to the forefront for areas of work in which Sweden was already engaged, such as trade and Women, Peace and Security. The FFP also meant MFA and Sida staff took gender mainstreaming more seriously and provided the impetus for staff to spend the extra time needed to make it work. The FFP's messaging on gender mainstreaming was clear and issued from the top. This meant that more was expected of Swedish public servants and partners and that the promotion of gender equality was no longer left primarily to external activists.

It was possible to see the extent of this change in reports coming in from the embassies and HQ staff where both the MFA and Sida saw the FFP approach being integrated in the work done at the country level. One ambassador indicated that he found the FFP influenced who Swedish personnel spoke to and which types of actions they took. In general, the FFP had a significant impact on what people did regarding gender equality.

It also increased collegial awareness and gender specialists in the MFA and Sida found that they no longer had to be the sole person saying that programmes needed to address gender. The general awareness of the importance of gender equality issues is now quite high and it became clear to MFA and Sida personnel how important the political will behind support for these issues was in order to effect change both within and beyond their borders.

At the **field level**, Sweden is also known to be supportive of cultural norm transformation and in Colombia, for example, Sweden is one of the few allies that local actors in the region have on the issue, especially in the face of the emergence of conservative discourses and pushback on women's rights issues. One reason behind this reputation is that Sweden had staked out a very long-term approach to its cultural norm transformation work and the related cooperation strategies have not changed much over time. This has helped build a relationship of trust with diverse partners, since they are working with a policy and strategy approach that has been quite stable and know what to expect from Swedish development cooperation actors.

**While the new Swedish government has signalled that they will be shifting to more of a focus on women and girls than a continuation of Sweden's Feminist Foreign Policy, this approach still aligns to many parts of GAP III.**

This is, in part, because Sweden had been working on gender equality for a long time prior to the adoption of its FFP. This is evident from a review of Sida's policy frameworks since 2010. The most recent, from 2016, placed global gender equality as one of four priority areas for both immediate and long-term action and related supporting analysis along with: Human rights, democracy and the rule of law; Environmentally and climate-related sustainable development and sustainable use of natural resources; and Inclusive economic development.<sup>176</sup> The Government of Sweden's 2010 Policy for

<sup>175</sup> OECD (2022): "Sweden", in Development Co-operation Profiles, OECD Publishing, Paris.

<sup>176</sup> Government of Sweden, (2016): "Policy Framework for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance"

Gender Equality and the Rights and Role of Women in Sweden's Development Cooperation (2010-2015) preceded Sweden's FFP by four years and focused on the following four action areas:

- Women's political participation and influence
- Women's economic empowerment and working conditions
- Sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR)
- Women's security, including combating all forms of gender-based violence and human trafficking.<sup>177</sup>

All four had a strong rights-based focus.

Thus, while the FFP helped broaden and strengthen Sweden's treatment of gender equality, it is clear that there is still a strong foundation for equality work within a focus on women and girls. In addition, some key informants interviewed observed that given the sensitivity of some aspects of the gender equality discourse today, they find that, in some contexts, it is easier to work with a women- and- girls approach than from a FFP perspective, particularly with regard to policy and normative dialogue.<sup>178</sup>

### 11.2.3 Sweden has a gender-responsive programming and M&E (JC1.3)

Gender equality is one of Sida's key development objectives and managers are responsible for working to ensure that progress is made towards this goal.

Education and training has been an important factor in helping Swedish government staff to integrate a gender perspective and to increase the gender sensitivity of their programming.

The Swedish government holds its own staff in all areas of foreign affairs accountable for mainstreaming gender equality and works to ensure the same level of accountability among the various international actors with whom it collaborates.

#### **Gender equality is one of Sida's key development objectives and managers are held accountable for working to ensure progress is made on this objective.**

Sida and MFA personnel reported that the adoption of a Feminist Foreign Policy in 2014 forced Sida to report on gender equality issues more seriously both through their own internal reporting systems and to relevant international bodies, e.g., by providing the OECD-DAC with more explicit gender equality related data. Gender equality is considered to be one of Sida's most important objectives and perspectives within its current development cooperation framework. As a part of the priorities established by the Swedish government which included gender equality Sida personnel were required to include a gender equality goal in each of the organisation's regional, thematic and country strategies and to report on how these actions have contributed to increased gender equality. Again, both the MFA and Sida had been promoting gender equality for a long time so the adoption of the FFP was built on a foundation of commonly agreed core values related to women's human rights and the reputation that Sweden built over time related to their promotion.

#### **Education and training have been an important factor contributing to how Swedish government personnel mainstream gender and to increase the gender-responsiveness of their programming.**

It was mandatory for everyone in the MFA take a two-hour online course on Sweden's Feminist Foreign Policy and for Sida personnel to take a mandatory e-learning course on gender equality. This made a significant difference to people's understanding of what their government's expectations of them were in this regard. It also added to their basic knowledge of what is a gender- equality focused approach to development cooperation and external relations and actions. This was supplemented by the hiring of specialised gender experts in the MFA. Sida personnel already had access to a specialised Gender Help Desk they could call upon to help them work out the best ways to integrate gender equality into their specific areas of work.

Some Swedish government personnel observed that their experience with the EU from a similar perspective is that, despite the presence of some highly qualified and sensitised staff, the overall understanding of gender equality issues is slightly low and that, while quite supportive of gender equality, many EU staff need to have basic knowledge of how gender mainstreaming and GAP III applies to their work. They also found there are some EU personnel who are quite knowledgeable and familiar with the topic.

<sup>177</sup> Government of Sweden. (2010): Policy for Gender Equality and the Rights and Role of Women in Sweden's Development Cooperation (2010-2015).

<sup>178</sup> Based on interviews with Swedish government personnel.

**The Government of Sweden holds its own personnel working in all Foreign Affairs areas to account for integrating gender equality as well as is working to ensure this same level of accountability among the diverse international actors with which they engage.**

In 2019, the Government of Sweden committed its Foreign Service to work actively to ensure that the EU and bilateral, multilateral and international actors and institutions:

- Have legislative and policy documents based on international law and international agreements, and comply with them;
- Apply an intersectional perspective to gender analyses and other work;
- Produce sex- and age-disaggregated statistics;
- Enhance their expertise in gender equality and the rights of women and girls;
- Enhance their expertise and strengthen their prevention efforts to combat discriminatory rules, norms and stereotypes about gender, gender identity, gender expression and sexual orientation;
- Pursue organisational and human resources policies that create non-discriminatory organisational structures and promote gender equality, including more women in leadership positions;
- Allocate resources to promote gender equality and the rights of women, girls and LGBTI people, including human resources and expertise for action on gender equality.<sup>179</sup>

This represents a clear commitment to hold other international actors and institutions accountable for integrating gender equality in their monitoring and evaluation processes.

Sida's organisation's regional, thematic and country strategies and staff are expected to report on how these actions have contributed to increased gender equality in keeping with Swedish government priorities and objectives.

#### 11.2.4 Coordination between European actors and participation in CLIP development (JC2.1)

Swedish government staff have found that gender analysis is not systematically applied at the right time or in the right order to inform CLIPs, but that when it is done, it is effective.

GAP III and the corresponding CLIP requirement are facilitating coordination between Sweden and EUDs.

**Government of Sweden personnel have found that gender analysis is not consistently applied at the right time or in the right order to inform the CLIPs, but that when it is, it is effective.**

The quality of the CLIPS is highly dependent upon whether or not the EUD updated its gender country analysis prior to the CLIP development. Where this has been done the CLIPs have addressed gender equality more effectively. Where this analysis was done after the fact, the gender country analysis had little or no influence in the overall CLIP analysis. Examples include in **Georgia** where the EUD has a full-time gender expert on staff and conducted the gender analysis prior to developing its CLIP. Ukraine did things in a reverse order to less effect.<sup>180</sup> Libya conducted its country gender analysis parallel to its CLIP and was able to integrate key findings from this analysis but faced challenges with the capacity of some EUD staff in understanding how to effect transformative change and a rights-based and intersectional approach in a particularly challenging environment.

**GAP III and the related CLIP requirement are facilitating coordination between Sweden and the EUDs.**

Swedish government personnel indicated that, at the embassy level, being able to call upon GAP III combined with Sweden's FFP helped them use the CLIPs as a tool to promote and push the GAP III agenda in specific countries. They also noted that they are promoting pushing for this from their HQ as a Member State and both the MFA and Sida have specific staff whose role it is to coordinate external programming and policy work with the EU.

In **Colombia**, Sweden participated in the formulation of the CLIP as well as the related gender action plan for Colombia. What is pending for next year is each member country to review where they can contribute to the four different strands identified in the CLIP. The CLIP process there is thus helping to facilitate EU and MS coordination on GEWE actions. Currently, however, Sweden does not have any structured joint work with the EU in this area and the approach to joint programming until the adoption of GAP III was a bit more ad-hoc.

<sup>179</sup> Government of Sweden, (2019): The "Swedish Foreign Service Action Plan for feminist foreign policy 2019-2022, including measures and directions for 2019".

<sup>180</sup> Based on interviews with Swedish government personnel. EUD-Ly 2021 Draft CLIP.



In Colombia, Sweden and other EU MS have sought the support of the EU to coordinate other types of actions related to GEWE. Some of these actions were more symbolic, and at policy/political dialogue level (i.e., were more related to the political agenda than to cooperation aspects). However, the two are closely intertwined in the Colombian context, so this kind of coordination helps facilitate future cooperation work, particularly with regard to GEWE and the successful acceleration and implementation of the peace agenda.

**In the Occupied Palestinian Territories** the CLIP process was found to be very inclusive, and Sweden had opportunity to engage in it. However, since then, coordination with EU on GAP and GAP reporting outside of the donor gender working group has decreased.

In **Tanzania**, Sweden and the EU met on a monthly basis to discuss and coordinate their work, including on GEWE. This practice precedes GAP III but has been strengthened from a gender perspective since its adoption. This is largely due to the fact that the Swedish Embassy participated in the drafting of the CLIP and consultations around its development.. This entailed attending two events (one with all stakeholders – not just those supported by the EU and one for EU partners). Discussions to inform the CLIP focused on the current status of GEWE in Tanzania and identifying gaps as well as governance and political participation, CSO capacity, youth; policy and legal reforms. It was a very inclusive process with good participation in terms of the different partners involved.

#### **The first CLIPs that came in were not very strong on WPS.**

Swedish government personnel observed that this may be, in part, if some EU personnel perceived GAP III to be more of a development tool.<sup>181</sup> In the Libyan CLIP process, for example, it took considerable discussion to obtain agreement that GBV and Conflict-related Sexual Violence (CRSV) (outlined in GAP III) were priority areas for action. This was not due to lack of support for these issues, but more a lack of EUD staff understanding of their relationship to the WPS agenda.<sup>182</sup>

An exception to this trend is found in the Colombian CLIP where there is a strong integration of WPS and WEE and the links between the two are clearly outlined. There is also programming designed to address the needs of migrant women displaced by the long- term conflict in the country which covers aspects of the intersection of the WPS agenda and WEE as well as key GAP III objectives in both areas.

#### **11.2.5 Effects on WEE (JC3.1, JC3.2)**

Sida has invested significant intellectual resources in defining what women's economic empowerment is and to ensure that its messaging with various partners and donor institutions is clearly and consistently based on this definition.

Since 2014, Sida has worked systematically to strengthen its approach and support to WEE. Although this work was carried out prior to the adoption of GAP III, it aligns closely with the WEE approaches now outlined in GAP III. Sweden's FFP contributed directly to the integration of gender equality in non-traditional areas such as trade.

#### **Sida has invested significant intellectual resources in defining what women's economic empowerment is and to ensure its messaging with diverse partners and donor institutions is both clearly and consistently based on this definition.**

This definition has both helped to inform several of the GAP III results objectives and shapes Sida's own approach to WEE. Since 2009, Sida has defined WEE as,

“the process which increases women's real power over economic decisions that influence their lives and priorities in society. To achieve this, Sida believes that women need to gain equal access to and control over critical economic resources and opportunities, and the elimination of structural gender inequalities in the labour market, including a better sharing of unpaid care work.”

This shows a strong parallel with the overall GAP III objective which states that “women and men in all their diversity should have equal opportunities, equal access to employment, decent work, equal pay for equal work in order to be economically independent [and that] furthermore, women and men should equally share care responsibilities and have access to adequate social protection, public services, and financial and business opportunities.”<sup>183</sup>

<sup>181</sup> Based on interviews with Swedish government and EU personnel. EUD-Ly, (2022), Gender-Sensitive Assessment: Libya and: EUD-Ly, (2022), Update of the Libya Gender Country Profile.

<sup>182</sup> EUD-Ly, (2022), Gender-Sensitive Assessment: Libya and: EUD-Ly, (2022), Update of the Libya Gender Country Profile; EUD-Ly 2021 Draft CLIP.

<sup>183</sup> EU, GAP III, 2020, p. 12.

Sida's investment included a portfolio analysis of 17 Sida contributions or programmes from a WEE perspective in 2021. The purpose of this review was to help inform the development of a new WEE strategy and definition Sida conducted The review covered:

- Agriculture and rural development
- Digital inclusion
- Education and skills development
- Energy
- Financial inclusion
- Productive employment and decent work
- Social protection and unpaid care work.<sup>184</sup>

The main findings and lessons learned from this review are summarised in the box below.

#### Box 16

#### *Lessons learned from an EU MS – Lessons from the WEE portfolio*

Lessons  
learned



As such, Sweden's work on WEE as analysed in its 2021 Portfolio Review provides valuable lessons learned:

Lesson #1: Get the right partners who can deliver built-in sustainability and scaling up. Closer collaboration between economic development actors and women's rights organisations is often needed.

Lesson #2: Define, identify and implement gender-transformative approaches. These are more likely to be used when programmes include research that applies a strong gender analysis from an intersectional perspective.

Lesson #3: Move beyond a homogenous view of women.

Lesson #4: Gather the evidence for transformative change. Rigorous and independent evaluation and learning, including monitoring and evaluation frameworks and indicators, need to be strengthened from the start.

Lesson #5: Use the gender marker accurately: the meaningful gender marker is often not applied correctly despite the existence of strategy entry points in programming.

Lesson #6: Inclusion of overlooked but strategic issues in the gender equality and women's empowerment agenda (including childcare and women's role in domestic reproduction).

**Since 2014 Sida has worked systematically to strengthen its approach to and support for WEE. While this work took place prior to the adoption of GAP III, it aligns closely to the WEE approaches now outlined in GAP III.**


"The Swedish Foreign Service Action Plan for feminist foreign policy 2019-2022, including measures and directions for 2019" highlights that Government of Sweden work under the auspices of the MFA, Ministry of Trade and Ministry of International Cooperation will, "promote women's and girls' economic and social empowerment" and that this would require working with legal and normative frameworks; against child marriage and gender-based violence; and for gender equality in trade and businesses.<sup>185</sup> This precedes slightly but aligns closely with similar provisions in GAP III.

It follows a long-time Swedish government commitment to work in the Women's Economic Empowerment area. For example, Sida conducted a thematic overview of WEE in 2009 when it addressed this thematic area from the perspective of a focus on Inclusive Growth as well as added WEE as a sub-result area in its core results strategies. In 2014, Sida conducted a limited portfolio analysis and found that WEE comprised just 2% of its programming portfolio. From 2016 to 2020, Sida made a concerted effort to introduce WEE in their policy and normative dialogue at the global level with multilateral level and donor partners. This dialogue has focused its work with the World Bank, the OECD-DAC WEE working group and the Donor Committee on Economic Development. In 2021, Sida adopted the Gender Equality Action Plan 2021-2023. This plan included a strategic shift to focus on WEE, particularly from the perspective of gender equality in sustainable economic development and financing. The latter has included work on Gender Lens Investment.

<sup>184</sup> Tripleline (2021): Sida's Women's Economic Empowerment (WEE) – Portfolio Analysis, PPT presentation.

<sup>185</sup> Government of Sweden, (2019): The "Swedish Foreign Service Action Plan for feminist foreign policy 2019-2022, including measures and directions for 2019".

Figure 33 Sida's disbursement to contributions with gender as principal objective (2015-2018) per main sector (%).



Source: Sida (2018) "Gender Mainstreaming and Women and Girls' Empowerment".

Figure 33 above shows the extent of Sida's contribution to gender by sector for the 2015-2018 period. This shows a substantial investment in the combined areas of Business and other services, Trade Policy and Regulations, Banking and Financial Services, Forestry and Agriculture. All are key sectors in which targeted gender equality inputs can contribute significantly to Women's Economic Empowerment.

### Sweden's FFP contributed directly to the integration of gender equality in non-traditional areas such as trade.

With the FFP in place, Sweden started to look at how trade benefited or could benefit both male and female entrepreneurs. The MFA and embassies started to look at how items were being affected by tariffs, etc. and where these might affect women and men differently (depending upon the sector and which ones were male or female dominated). This stronger focus on WEE represented a shift regarding Sweden's foreign policy which previously had been more concentrated on issues related to women's representation. Sweden is now raising WEE issues with multilateral and other larger scale partners. Again, the Swedish approach aligns closely with the recommended action areas in GAP III. But it is a process that has run parallel to GAP III development since Sida was working on these issues in a significant way prior to the adoption of GAP III.

### The EU is also investing significantly in WEE-related actions in several of the case study countries and working closely with Sweden on several of these actions.

In **Serbia**, EU, national authorities and Swedish officials noted that concrete results have been achieved, and a large amount of funds have been given to this sector. For example, the EU Pro Project invested EUR 2 million in procuring equipment to strengthen the competitiveness of companies owned by women and they were given an advantage in the open call. In addition, many initiatives in this area, for example involving the European Development Bank and private foundations, have experienced certain notability.

In **Colombia**, WEE remains closely linked to how far women's participation in the new accords can be ensured as this remains a challenge. There are also some concerns about the sustainability of the EU initiatives to support economic development for rural women as many of the projects are very small-scale which can limit their sustainability as do challenges related to market access and security challenges in the rural areas. However, there is a clear need for the EU and MS to continue to provide support to facilitate the transition from the informal to formal sector in Colombia as there is a substantial informal sector, particularly for women workers and entrepreneurs.

In **Tanzania**, Sweden and the EU have focused on supporting inclusive growth. This includes work in the social protection area such as working with TASA using an EU delegated fund to increase focus on gender in this area. Sweden provides considerable support for this initiative, being the main contributor and the EU coming second. It is a part of a wider initiative operating in multiple countries. In the agriculture sector, the EU is also supporting PASTRust, a guarantee instrument and another initiative (TAHA) both of which have mainstreamed gender. The latter is supported by a different MS. On the strictly Swedish end of things, the Embassy in Tanzania is currently looking at innovative finance, working with the World Bank and are currently engaged in a scoping mission.

### 11.2.6 Effects on WPS (JC4.1, JC4.2, JC4.3)

In the case of Sweden, GAP III reiterated the key messages related to women, peace and security that its Feminist Foreign Policy advocates.

Over the past ten years, both the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sida and the EU have experienced a significant shift in the understanding of what women's foreign and security policy entails.

Sweden's Feminist Foreign Policy and its reputation as a strong advocate for gender equality globally has enhanced its role in the framework of its work on women, peace and security. Despite the EU's commitment to women's human rights as an institution, the EU is not perceived as a strong international actor on women, peace and security.

#### **For Sweden, GAP III reiterated key messages related to WPS espoused by its Feminist Foreign Policy.**

“*The Swedish Foreign Service Action Plan for feminist foreign policy 2019-2022, including measures and directions for 2019*” stated that in 2019, Sweden would work to “enhance action on the Women, Peace and Security agenda [and that this would] involve promoting women’s participation in peace processes, not least through work in the UN, the EU and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)”.<sup>186</sup> The WPS provisions in EU’s GAP III therefore, were aligned closely with the Government of Sweden’s FFP action plan, which covers a similar time period. Swedish government personnel indicated that this close alignment has helped them with the WPS work in which they are engaged on various fronts.

Swedish government personnel also reported that there is an expectation that, if Sweden deploys a new mission somewhere, there should be a gender analysis as background to that process and that enough time allocated to ensure this analysis is done prior to the mission. The combination of the FFP and GAP III also led to greater awareness among Swedish personnel of what some of the key issues related to WPS are. For example, if they enter peace negotiations and only see men around the table they know they should talk about this and work to find ways to ensure higher levels of participation by women at multiple levels. This is contrast to the experience of EU personnel working on WPS issues within the its Foreign Policy Instrument unit where in 2020, staff surveys and interviews found that while staff knew gender analyses were required to help support rapid response projects related to conflicts, they often were not provided the time needed to conduct these analyses and that the main performance indicator on which their work was judged was the timely and quick disbursement of funds.<sup>187</sup>

#### **There has been a significant shift in understanding of what WPS entails within both the Swedish MFA and Sida and the EU over the past ten years.**

Around 2016 the WPS agenda was not really well known although Sweden had developed its third National Action on WPS in 2016. This plan includes both thematic and geographic coverage and requires reporting on how Sweden is working with over 30 countries on related issues.<sup>188</sup>

The EU has had its own WPS action plan since 2018 but some Swedish and EU personnel at the time considered it to be a bit backward as an approach and that the agenda focused more on women rather than gender equality. Others thought that it was more about peace and security than the challenges women face in conflict contexts. Some activists at the time considered that WPS was not really included as part of the gender agenda and that it did not have a strong enough equality focus. Over the next six years these lines between WPS and a rights-based gender equality have lessened and there was a growing convergence of the two perspectives.

<sup>186</sup> Government of Sweden, (2019): The “Swedish Foreign Service Action Plan for feminist foreign policy 2019-2022, including measures and directions for 2019”.

<sup>187</sup> Gender, Age and Diversity Facility (2020): “Recommendations towards the Development of a Gender, Age and Diversity Strategy for FPI”.

<sup>188</sup> [www.government.se/globalassets/regeringen/lena-micko-test/wps-swedish-nap](http://www.government.se/globalassets/regeringen/lena-micko-test/wps-swedish-nap)

This is, in part, because the WPS agenda now carries more weight since it is now also covered by GAP III and as there are clear UN Security Council resolutions related to WPS that both Sweden and other EU member states need to follow. Sweden is also working to implement the WPS plan adopted by the EU.

**Sweden's FFP and reputation as a country that is a strong advocate for gender equality globally has enhanced its role within its WPS work. Despite the EU's commitment to women's human rights as an institution, the EU is not perceived as being as strong an international actor in WPS.**

During Sweden's term on the UN Security Council in 2017/18, the issue of sanctions for conflict-related sexual violence was raised as an agenda item for consideration. Prior to this, there had not been any relationship to gender equality in sanctions on part of either Sweden or the EU. However, early into Sweden's 2017/18 term the Security Council asked Sweden to include special criteria for both Conflict Related Sexual Violence (CRSV) and sexual violence as a part of the sanctions process. This was new for both Sweden's MFA staff and gender personnel and multiple departments in the MFA combined efforts to promote this new approach. This level of support was possible because MFA staff knew that this was what their leadership expected them to do as a part of the FFP's implementation. At that time, Sweden also found that more progress was possible within the UN than in the EU context due to the origin of the WPS agenda within the UN Security Council.

During Sweden's 2017/18 term in the Security Council, there were also meetings every morning and gender equality was always raised as an issue, especially if there was a resolution. The political will to do this was quite evident for Sweden within both the UN and Swedish systems. Sweden was also able to draw upon much of the existing knowledge that they and other institutions had gathered and bring evidence-based data to help build increased gender equality from a WPS perspective in specific portfolios.

#### Box 17

#### *Good practice from an EU MS – Women's Political Participation in Conflict Contexts*

Good practice



In a mission to Iraq prior to national elections, the UN worked with a wide variety of parties to develop a way to run the elections in a fair way and developed a lengthy document on how to do this. They also held a related conference and were able to get the different parties to sign it. However, there was no document produced related to about women or gender equality in the election process document produced. This aroused concern a big issue, in particular, as it became clear that women's campaigns and participation were being actively sabotaged. This challenge was brought

up as an issue to Security Council and the MFA reflected that it demonstrated that, even after all the action plans the UN and partner countries developed, gender equality can easily be missed, and this omission can "blow up in your faces and that it is too important an issue to miss." What Sweden also learned from this situation is that by working with the WPS and considering related actions to be a means of increasing gender equality, it elevates the role of WPS in diverse processes.<sup>189</sup>

At the country level, the evaluation found a greater divergence of approaches between Sweden and the EU with regard to WPS. In **Colombia**, for example, the EU works in a more disjointed/ uncoordinated way on WPS issues; whereas for Sweden has participated in the negotiations and has consistently provided support for women's summits and women's platforms to help them position themselves to participate in the peace dialogues. Other forms of support Sweden provides to support the WPS agenda in Colombia includes that Sweden serves as an international accompanier for the monitoring of gender measures (together with UN Women and others) of the peace accords, as well as provides direct support related to gender equality during negotiations as well as the implementation of the gender measures of the peace agreement (e.g., truth commission). These processes are further strengthened with technical support in the security and gender areas to the team implementing the peace agreement as well as to state institutions such as the Agencia para la Reincorporación y la Normalización (ARN), Special Commission for Peace, Ministry of Defence, Armed Forces and Police). Sweden is also currently working with the Government of Colombia on security sector reform with a gender focus.

In **Serbia**, WPS is a new area of work for Sweden and the Swedish government is supporting projects to work with the police. SIDA instituted a new international aid development strategy for 2021-2027, which includes peace and security, and conflict prevention as one of the goals at the regional strategy level for the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, and Turkey. However, at the country level Swedish

<sup>189</sup> Based on interviews with Swedish government personnel.

development officials are not obliged to have projects that cover with all of Sweden's development goals and human rights, gender equality and environmental protection do not have to be equally distributed. They do, however, have to mainstream gender equality into all related actions.

In **DRC**, Sweden has linked their WEE and WPS efforts and are supporting work that benefits 35,000 people. This includes reporting of the different aspects of the WPS agenda as well as having set up an exchange between women and the police along two borders of the country.

#### Box 18

#### *Good practice from an EU MS – Women's Advisory Boards*

Good  
practice



**Sweden** has been working to support the creation of women's advisory boards to increase women's participation in peace processes. They did this in Syria and had also done a lot of work in the area to do so in Ukraine, as well, before the war started there earlier this year. This was a Swedish MFA initiative. In general, Sweden has found that their increased role in supporting the WPS agenda is less

geared towards specific projects supporting women and more towards influencing the related background analysis needed to help identify where Sweden should put its efforts and supports. MFA staff are also learning how speak to the right people and engage more women in mediation and at different levels in mediation processes, from the community level upwards.

#### 11.2.7 Overall assessment

Sweden has been working actively to promote gender equality for several decades. An even stronger impetus for this work was generated by Sweden's adoption of its Feminist Foreign Policy in 2014. However, this policy was built on all the work done in the previous decades to both define what gender equality entails in diverse sectors and to build a body of related knowledge as to which strategies work well in different contexts. This approach has also been subsequently picked up by Germany which has recently adopted its own feminist foreign assistance policy and can be seen in the policy level and diplomatic approaches now being used by France.

The Government of Sweden also invested in training all the personnel working on external affairs Foreign Affairs to become more aware of how to translate the FFP into their specific areas of work and made basic level of training on this mandatory for all foreign affairs staff. What the Government learned from this process is that, when there was clear direction from the top and clear messaging, their staff were able to respond relatively rapidly. This clear messaging and stance also strengthened Sweden's negotiating position in key international arenas on gender equality issues and solidified the country's reputation as a global advocate for gender equality.

GAP III is both in alignment with Sweden's past practices and policies related to integrating gender equality in its external actions and its adoption in 2020 has helped further strengthen Sweden's ability to negotiate and promote related issues in diverse fora and its external programming. GAP III provisions have also made it easier for Sweden to coordinate on related issues at the EUD level, particularly through the CLIPs. The thought leadership work SIDA has done on defining WEE and in other gender-related themes and sectors has also helped shape some aspects of the development of GAP III.

## 11.3 Annex

### 11.3.1 List of persons consulted

<i>Organisation</i>	<i>Position/ Role</i>
Sida	Lead Policy Specialist Gender equality
Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Deputy Director Foreign Affairs and WPS focal point person
Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Swedish Member State Delegate of CoDev
Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Serbia	Gender Focal Person
Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Colombia	Programme Officer – Gender Portfolio
Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Colombia	Regional Cooperation for Latin America – Gender Portfolio
Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Colombia	Peace Thematic Area and WPS
Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs - DRC	Chargé Democracy, gender and justice
Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs - DRC	Health Portfolio
Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs - DRC	Private Sector Portfolio
Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Tanzania	Programme Manager
Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs – The Philippines	Gender Focal Person; Communications Officer
Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Palestine	Programme Manager / Gender focal person

### 11.3.2 List of documents

- Bjarnegård, Elin and Fredrik Uggla (2018): “Putting Priority into Practice: Sida’s Implementation of its Plan for Gender Integration”. Expertgruppen för biståndsanalys (EBA)
- EC (2018): Country Report – Sweden.
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- Sida (2017): The Year in Review – Sida’s Activities in 2017.
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- Sida (2021): Brief: Sexual and reproductive health rights (SRHR)
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- Sida (2022): Brief: Trade, employment and poverty – an evidence-based overview
- Sida (2022): Thematic support unit: Gender transformative change – an evidence-based overview
- Tripleline (2021): Sind’s Women’s Economic Empowerment (WW) – Portfolio Analysis, Ppt presentation.

- Tripleline (2021): Sind's Women's Economic Empowerment (WW) – Portfolio Analysis – Final Report, Sida.
- [www.government.se/globalassets/regeringen/lena-micko-test/wps-swedish-nap](http://www.government.se/globalassets/regeringen/lena-micko-test/wps-swedish-nap)



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