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Final Report

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ECORYS Consortium

Implemented by:



Bunafsha Gulakova, Team Leader

Ahmed Harris R. Pangcoga, Senior Expert

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ECORYS Nederland BV
P.O. Box 4175
3006 AD Rotterdam
Watermanweg 44
3067 GG Rotterdam
The Netherlands

T +31 10 453 88 00
F +31 10 453 07 68

W www.ecorys.nl
Registration no. 24316726

Dept. of Marketing & Communication
T +31 (0)10 453 88 31
F +31 (0)10 453 07 68

Anneke Slob, Project Director

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Table of contents

Abbreviations	4
1 Introduction	6
1.1 Background and context of the EU's engagement in Mindanao	6
1.2 Context of the Final Evaluation.	8
2 Findings	12
2.1 Evaluation Question 1.	12
2.2 Evaluation Question 2	16
2.3 Evaluation Question 3	18
2.4 Evaluation Question 4	21
2.5 Evaluation Question 5	23
2.6 Evaluation Question 6	25
2.7 Evaluation Question 7	26
2.8 Evaluation Question 8	28
2.9 Evaluation Question 9	28
2.10 Evaluation Question 10	29
2.11 Evaluation Question 11	30
3 Conclusions and Recommendations	32
3.1 Conclusions	32
3.2 Recommendations	34
3.3 Lessons learnt	36
Annex I: TOR	37
Annex II: List of stakeholders consulted	38
Annex III: Literature and documentation consulted	43
ANNEX IV: The Evaluators	47
Annex V : Evaluation Methodology	48
Annex VI : Detailed answer by judgement criteria	58
Annex VII : Evaluation matrix with data gathered and analysed by judgment criteria indicator	61
Annex VIII: Intervention Logic/Logical Framework	68
Annex IX: Relevant geographic map(s) where the intervention took place	69

Abbreviations

AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines
AHJAG	Ad Hoc Joint Action Group
AoR	Area of Responsibility
ASG	Abu Sayyaf Group
ARMM	Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
BARMM	Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
BASULTA	Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi (islands)
BBL	Bangsamoro Basic Law
BOL	Bangsamoro Organic Law
BCF	Bangsamoro Coordinating Forum
BHRAC	Barangay Human Rights Action Centre
BHRC	Bangsamoro Human Rights Commission
BIAF	Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces
BIFF	Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters
BIWAB	Bangsamoro Islamic Women's Auxiliary Brigade
BLGU	Barangay Local Government Unit
BNWC	Bangsamoro National Women's Council
BTA	Bangsamoro Transition Authority
BTC	Bangsamoro Transition Commission
CAB	Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CBCS	Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society
CCCH	Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities
CHD	Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
CHR	Commission on Human Rights
CPC	Civilian Protection Component
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DCI	Development Cooperation Instrument
DepED	Department of Education
DG ECHO	Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
DSWD	Department of Social Welfare and Development
EAMR	External Assistance Management Report
EIDHR	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
ENI	European Neighbourhood Instrument
EU	European Union
EWER	Early Warning and Early Response
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FSD	Fondation Suisse de Déminage (Swiss Mine-clearing Foundation)
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GPH	Government of the Philippines
HEART	Humanitarian Emergency Action and Response Team
IAG	Institute for Autonomy and Governance
ICG	International Contact Group
IcSP	Instruments Contributing to Stability and Peace
IDB	Independent Decommissioning Body
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IID	International Initiatives for Dialogue

IMT	International Monitoring Team
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IP	Indigenous People
IPA II	Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance
IPDM	Institute for Peace and Development in Mindanao
JPSC	Joint Peace and Security Committee
JPST	Joint Peace and Security Team
KAS	Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (Konrad Adenauer Foundation)
KBS	Kapatut Bangsa Sug
KFI	Kalimudan Foundation, Inc.
KII	Key Informant Interview
LEO	Law Enforcement Operation
LGU	Local Government Unit
LMT	Local Monitoring Team
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MLGU	Municipal Local Government Unit
MMI	Magungaya Mindanao, Inc.
MOA-AD	Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain
MOGOP	Muslim Organization of Government Officials and Professionals
MPOC	Municipal Peace and Order Council
MPOS	Ministry of Public Order and Safety (BARMM)
NGO	Non-Government Organisation
NP	Nonviolent Peace force
OPAPP	Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (previous)
OPAPRU	Office of the Presidential Adviser for Peace Reconciliation and Unity (present)
OTLAC	Organization of Teduray and Lambangian Conference
PAG	Private Armed Groups
PLGU	Provincial Local Government Unit
PNP	Philippine National Police
READI	Rapid Emergency Action on Disaster Incidence (BARMM)
ROM	Results Orientated Monitoring
RRUC	Regional Reconciliation and Unification Commission (ARMM)
SPMS Box	Salbu-Pagatin-Mamasapano-Shariff Aguak Box
TFBM	Task Force Bangon Marawi
TKI	Tiyakap Kalilintad, Inc.
TLWO	T'eduray Lambangian Women's Organization
TSS	Tumikang Sama Sama
TWG	Technical Working Group
UBJP	United Bangsamoro Justice Party
UCP	Unarmed Civilian Protection
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance

1 Introduction

The report is structured as follows: Chapter 1 introduces the reader to the country and Mindanao region and the challenges of the peace process currently facing the community. As part of the same chapter, information is provided regarding the evaluation context. Chapter 2 summarises the evaluation's main findings as they relate to the evaluation questions, which are generally aligned with the evaluation criteria. The report's conclusions, recommendations, and lessons learned are summarized in Chapter 3. Annexes provide information on beneficiaries consulted, a literature review, detailed methodology, an evaluation matrix with evaluation questions, indicators, and judgment criteria.

1.1 Background and context of the EU's engagement in Mindanao

Nature of the conflict in Mindanao

Mindanao is the southernmost Philippine island and the name for the island group in which the adjacent Sulu Archipelago lies. An ethnoreligious mosaic of Muslim Moro groups, Christians, and Indigenous groups known as Lumads together comprise the population of the Bangsamoro region in southwestern Mindanao. The Bangsamoro communities' experience with armed conflict over the past 20 years has negatively affected the region. Thousands of people have been killed or displaced, while property and resources have been destroyed due to the violence. Additionally, it has impeded social advancement and economic growth. A large portion of Mindanao is affected by poor governance, underdevelopment, and nearly six decades of armed conflict between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) - Mindanao's largest rebel group – which seeks autonomy for Filipino Muslims. There are significant economic and social costs associated with this situation. Over the past 20 years, Bangsamoro communities have experienced various kinds of armed violence. These consist of the following:

- Attacks between non-state armed groups and the military: MILF¹, splinter groups of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)², the Abu Sayyaf Group³ and its Ajang Ajang faction⁴, and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF)⁵ are just a few of the several non-state armed organisations that call the Bangsamoro region home. These armed organisations have engaged the Philippine government and security forces in a number of rebel attacks.
- Armed organisations have committed numerous acts of violence against civilians, such as bombings, killings, and kidnappings⁶. In Bangsamoro, these attacks have bred a culture of fear and insecurity that has negatively impacted human security and made it challenging for people to lead normal lives.

¹ Inquirer Archives (October 9, 2012). What Went Before: The proposed MOA-AD. Philippine Daily Inquirer. Extracted from: <https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/285604/what-went-before-the-proposed-moa-ad>

² Falcatan, R. (September 9, 2022). Zamboanga City remembers infamous 2013 siege, honors 38 heroes. News. Rappler.com. Extracted from: <https://www.rappler.com/nation/mindanao/zamboanga-city-remembers-2013-siege/>

³ Aljazeera (November 25, 2019). Philippine troops rescue couple kidnapped by Abu Sayyaf. News. Aljazeera Online. Extracted from: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/11/25/philippine-troops-rescue-couple-kidnapped-by-abu-sayyaf>

⁴ Macasero, R. (January 31, 2019). Troops clash with Abu Sayyaf faction suspected in Jolo bombing. Headlines. Philstar Global. Extracted from: <https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2019/01/31/1889743/troops-clash-abu-sayyaf-faction-suspected-jolo-bombing>

⁵ Lozada, B. (February 2, 2014). Philippine flag planted on BIFF stronghold. Inquirer.net. Extracted from: <https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/572914/philippine-flag-planted-on-biff-stronghold>

⁶ Ugarte, E. (November 2008). The phenomenon of kidnapping in the southern Philippines: An Overview. South East Asia Research Vol. 16, No. 3. School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. U.K.

- Clan violence, violence between competing clans or families, is also a problem in Bangsamoro⁷. Land, resource, or power issues are common causes and drivers of clan warfare and conflict.
- Women and children are especially exposed to violence in Bangsamoro. Armed groups have a history of enlisting children as combatants⁸ and sexually assaulting women⁹.

The Peace Process

After decades of war, the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) was established in 2019 to support peaceful coexistence between communities. In March 2023, BARMM marked its fourth anniversary as a self-governing entity.

The peace process promised to address the wishes of the majority-Muslim population, including respect for minority rights and meaningful political representation for women¹⁰. However, these hopes are still not entirely fulfilled, and the interim government, led by ex-MILF rebels, needs to focus on delivering a more inclusive peace¹¹. Nevertheless, there has been progress in the overall Bangsamoro peace process. Violence in the region has decreased compared to the past decades, and peace dividends have led to more resources being available for efficient health and social services. This progress, however, is clouded by the following lingering issues:

- Displacement continues to affect the Indigenous population of the region.
- The people of the Sulu Archipelago feel neglected by regional authorities, and the relationship between ex-rebels and influential tribes is tumultuous.
- Disproportionately affected by the armed conflict, Bangsamoro women are still far from having achieved the “meaningful political participation” the 2014 peace agreement promised them.
- Finally, funding constraints still affect the government’s ability to deliver promised socio-economic packages for ex-combatants.

Many different factors and bottlenecks affected the successful implementation of the peace agreement. In the period before and during the implementation of the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) projects, the Bangsamoro people at large were practically unable to protect themselves, their livestock, and their property from the protracted and sporadic armed conflict between the GPH and the MILF. This volatile situation was exacerbated by violent acts of other armed groups, privately armed militias, and powerful feuding clans¹², as well as the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) among non-state armed groups such as MILF, MNLF, the ASG as well as among private armed groups and civilian volunteer organisations¹³.

⁷ International Crisis Group (April 14, 2020). Southern Philippines: Tackling Clan Politics in the Bangsamoro. Report. CrisisGroup.org. Extracted from: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/philippines/306-southern-philippines-tackling-clan-politics-bangsamoro>

⁸ United Nations and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (2017). Children in Armed Conflict: Philippines. Processes and Lessons Learned 2009-2017. Action Plan on the Recruitment and Use of Children in Armed Conflict. United Nations Children’s Fund. Extracted from: <https://www.unicef.org/philippines/sites/unicef.org.philippines/files/2019-06/phl-report-unmilfactionplan.pdf>

⁹ Nario-Galace, J. and Piscano, F. (2011). Security Council Resolution 1325: In-Country Civil Society Monitoring Report 2011. Global Network of Women Peacebuilders. Philippines. Extracted from: https://gnwp.org/wp-content/uploads/Philippines_0.pdf

¹⁰ Source: International Crisis Group

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Amnesty International (August 25, 2009). Philippines: Shattered lives - beyond the 2008-2009 Mindanao armed conflict. Reliefweb. Extracted from: <https://reliefweb.int/report/philippines/philippines-shattered-lives-beyond-2008-2009-mindanao-armed-conflict#:~:text=In%20May%202009%20the%20Mindanao,go%20back%20to%20their%20villages.>

¹³ Santiago-Oreta, J. (July 23, 2013). Gun Proliferation and Violence: Complicating Conflict Dynamics & Peacebuilding. United Nations Development Programme. Ateneo de Manila University School of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science, Working Group on Security Sector Reform.

The IcSP and the EU added value.

One of the EU's main instruments in crisis response, conflict prevention, peacebuilding, crisis preparedness, and global and trans-regional threats is the IcSP, which came into force in 2014, replacing the Instrument for Stability (IfS). The IcSP provides quick, short-term support in countries where a crisis is emerging or unfolding, and longer-term support to **conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and crisis preparedness activities**. These activities complement those of the EU's geographical and other thematic instruments. Through an integrated approach with other EU instruments, close coordination, and cooperation with the EU Member States, the EU not only increases the coherence of the response but also provides greater leverage to impact actors and developments on the ground. As part of IcSP, the EU supported the transition and implementation of the agreed-upon peace roadmap through several actions. It is also important to note that IcSP interventions build upon the support rendered through IfS.. Furthermore, **the eight IcSP projects built upon each other and were implemented during a period in which there were significant developments, including the adoption of the Bangsamoro Organic Law (2018) as well as the establishment of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao in 2019.**


1.2 Context of the Final Evaluation.

1.2.1 Objectives of the Final Evaluation

The primary objective of this evaluation is to provide the relevant sections of the European Union and relevant stakeholders with the following:

- A) Independent assessment of the eight projects' design and performance; examining how strategic and coherent they were (as opposed to reactive); if lessons learned from previous projects were taken into account during design, assessing whether the projects and actors were properly coordinated during implementation, and whether results achieved were satisfactory and had a lasting impact.
- B) Compiling key lessons learned from the long-term presence and support of EU IfS/IcSP funding (2009-2020), conclusions, and recommendations to enhance future interventions.

Thematic coverage: projects funded under the IcSP, which have been active between 2017 and 2020, with the evaluation and analysis contextualised by interventions implemented from 2009, to put into perspective the EU's support under IfS/IcSP from 2009 onwards. The evaluation covers eight projects described below structured around assistance in response to situations of crisis or emerging crisis to prevent conflicts, assistance for conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and crisis-preparedness assistance with addressing global and trans-regional threats.

2017	Foster sustainable peace and human security in conflict-affected areas of Central and Western Mindanao, Philippines (IcSP/2017/383-403) Budget: EUR 1,839,575.95 Implementation date: 01/02/2017 – 30/06/2018	
2017	Mine Action Support to the Implementation of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (IcSP/2017/383-944) Budget: EUR 1,000,000 Implementation date: 01/05/2017 – 31/07/2018	
2017	Democratic Leadership and Active Civil Society Empowerment in the Bangsamoro (DELACSE Bangsamoro) Budget: EUR 398,730.94 Implementation date: 01/03/2017 – 31/03/2018	
2017	Promoting Stability and Peace in the Bangsamoro Region and Sulu Archipelago (IcSP 2017/384-788) Budget: EUR 722,292.76 Implementation date: 01/04/2017 – 31/03/2018	
2018	Strengthening civilian protection towards sustaining peace and promoting community resilience and social cohesion in Mindanao (IcSP/2018/398-197) Budget: EUR 3,409,214.00 Implementation date: 01/07/2018 – 31/10/2018	
2018	Mine Action Support to Strengthen Peace and Stability in Mindanao Budget: EUR 1,473,124.27 Implementation date: 01/08/2018 – 30/11/2020	
2018	Democratic Leadership and civil society empowerment in the Bangsamoro – Phase 2 (IcSP/2018/398-191) - IAG Budget: EUR 767,068.94	
2018	Fostering a Sustainable Peace Process in the Bangsamoro Region (IcSP/2018/398-199) – HD Centre Budget: EUR 1,034,541.41 Implementation date: 01/08/2018 – 31/07/2020	

The Evaluation Team evaluated these actions mentioned above according to the OECD DAC criteria: relevance, coherence, sustainability, impact, and the EU added value. Additionally, the evaluation team considered conflict sensitivity, gender equality and women's empowerment, age, diversity, environment, and climate change adaptation. An attempt was made to identify relevant Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and their interlinkages, the principle of Leave No One Behind, and the Human Rights-Based Approach in the design, as well as the extent to which these factors have been taken into consideration when implementing the intervention and governing and monitoring it.

1.2.2 Phases of Evaluation

Inception Phase and Desk review of internal project documentation

In total, 89 implementation documents relevant to the eight projects evaluated by the Evaluation Team (ET) were compiled, reviewed, and analysed by the ET from the start of the Inception Phase in January 2023. In addition, a total of 20 additional country and global reports, independent evaluations, articles, and development studies were reviewed to answer the EQ. The ET and Evaluation Reference Group (RG) discussed the Inception Report and endorsed methodologies and strategies in February 2023.

Interim Phase: Desk and Field Activities

This phase was conducted between February and March 2023. Data was collected by visiting various beneficiary groups, such as affected communities and stakeholder groups, and via online modalities for those unable to attend the physical meetings. This led to 87% of interviews being conducted face-to-face. In addition, semi-structured interviews were conducted with a range of stakeholders, including beneficiaries of project activities, to discuss the projects as well as the broader context in the area and connections between those, based on the evaluation matrix developed at the inception stage, and taking into account each stakeholder's particular area of work, level of knowledge or experience of the specific Project, and other factors.

The ET conducted a total of 22 key informant interviews and engaged with the IcSP project implementers' partners, EU staff and government and non-government stakeholders. It quickly became apparent that most EQs relating to Coherence and EU-Added Value would be best addressed by interviewing more EU staff members responsible for managing these projects. Regrettably, some attempts to reach these individuals were unsuccessful and instead, the ET studied more relevant country reports during the Synthesis Phase. All planned sites for the Field Mission were visited, and data was subsequently collected. The Field Mission was completed in February-April 2023 by the national expert.

Semi-structured, one-to-one Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were conducted during the mission. The Team Leader (TL), who did not travel to the Philippines, continued the desk review as well as online meetings with stakeholders, international experts, and some former EU staff involved in the evaluation. Thirty informants were interviewed during the evaluation assignment. Of this number, 20 are men, and 10 are women.

FGDs with beneficiaries were conducted in Cotabato and Marawi. The ET adopted a neutral-assessment approach to safeguard objectivity throughout the study. The FGDs focused on respondents' views on conflict, peace, and social cohesion in their localities and communities and any changes they have seen during and since the period of the interventions under evaluation. In addition, the FGDs touched upon the participants' experiences in working with the various implementors and the sustainability of any outcomes and activities implemented. FGDs were conducted in separate groups based on gender to increase the respondents' comfort in answering questions and to support gender-disaggregated data collection.

Although the evaluators made every effort to ensure a participatory evaluation, ensuring the equal participation of all vulnerable groups was not possible. As a result, 44% of the respondents were representatives of the Meranao population of Mindanao. The majority of participants were residents of Marawi City and surrounding municipalities (44%), followed by residents of Cotabato City and surrounding municipalities (37%).

The ET applied the following ethical standards during the FGDs and KIIs:

- Informed consent: All participants were asked for their informed consent to participate in the interview and assured of their anonymity and the confidentiality of their responses; at any time, all participants were given the right to choose whether or not to participate and/or withdraw from the evaluation. Prior permission was requested to take and use photographs during individual and focus group interviews.
- Sensitivity: the team was mindful of cultural differences, local customs, religious beliefs and practices, personal interaction and gender roles, age, and ethnicity when planning, implementing and reporting on the results.
- Privacy and Confidentiality: the team ensured that no harm happened to the evaluation participants and that, in particular, respondents' identification through data presentation and discussion in the note was not possible.
- Respect and empowerment: the evaluation process and communication of results will be conducted in a way that respects the stakeholders' dignity and self-worth and contributes to their empowerment.
- Fair representation: the selection of participants was made in relation to the aims of the evaluation, not simply because of their availability; inclusion of both women and men from the excluded or most disadvantaged groups was ensured when relevant.

Synthesis Phase

The Synthesis Phase was completed in May 2023, and the draft Final Report was submitted on June 9, 2023. During this period, the evaluation team conducted a final, full analysis and synthesis of the evidence and data collected during the previous phases to provide a final answer to the Evaluation Questions.

A remote presentation of the Draft Final Report to the Reference Group (RG), supported by a slide presentation, is pending before RG.

2 Findings

2.1 Evaluation Question 1.

Evaluation Question 1. Were the interventions aligned with the beneficiaries, stakeholders, and partners' needs in accordance with a correct understanding of the conflict situation?

Data from the desk review revealed that interventions were broadly relevant to Mindanao's conflict context and the evolving dynamics of the peace process at the time. All stakeholders interviewed by the team appreciated the EU's support and involvement in the peace process. Some specific examples of relevant actions mentioned include direct participation in the International Monitoring Team (IMT), where the EU led and coordinated one of the four IMT components; the Humanitarian, Rehabilitation and Development Component (HRDC). There was a need to strengthen the IMT mechanism¹⁴, including its information-gathering capability, field-level visibility, and, by extension, its legitimacy among the stakeholders. These were achieved by streamlining the EU's support to these important processes.

Finding 1. EU efforts streamlined Human Rights issues within the important monitoring mechanisms.

The IMT mechanism was established by the Peace Agreement between the Moro and the State. International monitors observed the peace negotiations in terms of the ceasefire agreement made between the Government of the Philippines (GPH) and MILF. Initially composed of international military personnel from Malaysia, Brunei, Japan, and Turkey, the EU incorporated two human rights experts, which rendered more credibility to the IMT by reinforcing the link between security and humanitarian needs. For example, **they enhanced the visibility of civilian participants in the process and were able to streamline human rights issues into the monitoring process by focusing on women and minorities and the importance of addressing land issues.** As a result of this initiative, **human rights were raised within the monitoring process of the IMT, communication channels were established with civil society organisations, and a proper reporting system was arranged.**

Finding 2. EU support was also timely, and with the assistance of the EU's IcSP funding, actors in Marawi were able to quickly address the impact of violent conflict in the short term.

For example, as part of the Joint Ceasefire Monitoring and Assistance Centre (JCMAC), the Non-Violence Peace Force (NPF) provided emergency support during the 2017 siege of Marawi thanks to the funds provided by the EU. In addition, the NPF helped to coordinate the **transfer of civilians from ground zero (during the first week of the siege, before the ICRC had access) as part of the support for opening a peace corridor.**

Furthermore, although the Joint Ceasefire Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (JCCCH) was established in the early years of the GPH-MILF Peace Talks, the reach of their community counterparts, the Local Monitoring Committees (LMTs), was low in membership and struggled to mitigate collateral damage from the armed encounters that occurred in many Bangsamoro communities. Moreover, **the communities themselves**

¹⁴ The mandate of the IMT is explained further below in this report.

were not able to monitor, document, and report these armed encounters nor negotiate with the ground commanders of both state and non-state armed groups.

Finding 3. The EU-funded actions were essential to support the role of the CSO community at the height of the peace talks between the government and MILF.

There was overlapping discourse between and among government, civil society, and the international community on 1) the level of participation of civil society organisations in the peace negotiations (even prior to 2009),¹⁵ 2) the level of representation, engagement, and power-sharing arrangements that the MNLF can have with MILF¹⁶, and 3) defining mutually agreed provisions between MILF and the Philippine government and the subsequent implementation thereof at the stages of the Framework Agreement of the Bangsamoro (FAB), the Comprehensive Agreement of the Bangsamoro (CAB), and then the BARMM from 2012 to 2020. All discourse was considered urgent and important but, at the same time, complex, unpredictable, and prone to delays. **This necessitated the involvement of organisations that could open and facilitate spaces for dialogue between MILF and MNLF and train civil society organisations (CSOs) in the concept and practice of participatory governance and political party building.**

To this end, empowered CSOs acted mainly as informal conciliators between the two parties and as a conduit between the affected Bangsamoro communities and the parties at the negotiation table while helping to push the peace talks forward. However, when the peace agreement was in sight, two critical issues that needed to be addressed surfaced: 1) A lack of knowledge of all the sectors and people in the region on the proposed parliamentary form of government for the autonomous government that was about to be established, and 2) lack of clarity on the level of engagement and contribution to decision-making that the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) would be provided with upon establishment of said autonomous government.

Accordingly, this overall scenario illustrates how IfS funding and funding for its successor IcSP, were implemented at a time when Mindanao and the BARMM were certainly in need of them.

Finding 4. Besides meeting the needs of beneficiaries, and stakeholders, the interventions also extended their support to places where the government or armed forces did not have access or lacked technical expertise.

Over several decades, communities and their immediate surroundings have been polluted with unexploded ordinances (UXOs) used by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the GPH, the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF) of the MILF, and other (non-state) armed groups. However, there has been a lack of awareness in these communities of the proximity of the UXOs, the risks that they pose to their safety and security, and a lack of knowledge on what to do should community members unearth UXOs. **The EU-funded actions increased needed awareness to ensure safety for communities and prevent more casualties.** In addition, a major aspect of the EU-funded interventions was that they addressed gaps in government provisions, working in locations where the government and military had no access or providing technical solutions unavailable elsewhere, such as mine action-related work¹⁷. For example, the sporadic armed encounters that occurred throughout the conflict period resulted in the increase of UXOs in many inhabited locations.

¹⁵ Rood, S. (January 1, 2005), Forging Sustainable Peace in Mindanao: The Role of Civil Society. East-West Center Washington. Policy Study 17. Washington D.C., USA. Extracted from: <https://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/forging-sustainable-peace-mindanao-role-civil-society>

¹⁶ ReliefWeb (March 4, 2016), MILF, MNLF jointly call on Bangsamoro for unity and solidarity. OCHA Services. Extracted from: <https://reliefweb.int/report/philippines/milf-mnlf-jointly-call-bangsamoro-unity-and-solidarity>

¹⁷ External evaluation of the Mine Action Support to Strengthen Peace and Stability in Mindanao, Southern Philippines. Evaluation report. 2020.

This indicates that the **EU-supported civilian peacekeeping and mine action were imperative interventions that could contribute to the Bangsamoro Peace Process's success by mitigating the conflict's direct consequences and ensuring improved access and human security.**

However, the desk review indicates that **not all categories of beneficiaries were adequately targeted by the projects. Examples are former women combatants and children associated with armed groups (the BIAF).** In addition, as a desk review of the projects indicates, **not focusing on the root causes of conflicts, such as land disputes, was detrimental to the design of the intervention logic.** The latter is specifically important as land dispossession is acknowledged as a **root cause of historical and contemporary conflict in Bangsamoro** that a wide range of stakeholders must jointly address¹⁸.

Finding 5. The programmatic approaches of established IFS/IcSP implementing partners remained unchanged for a long period despite a frequently shifting context in Mindanao.

There were significant shifts in the Mindanao context several times between 2009 and 2020, some of which overlapped:

- The MOA-AD Debacle in 2008-2009. In this period, the peace talks almost collapsed when the Supreme Court of the Philippines issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) stopping the signing of the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) on August 4, as filed by several Philippine senators. This subsequently triggered armed clashes between the AFP and the BIAF in Lanao del Norte and North Cotabato, lasting several months, resulting in the displacement of about 750,000 individuals in Central and Northern Mindanao.¹⁹ Survival and safety from direct violence was the most urgent need of the affected communities then. Their aspirations for peace were there, but these communities cannot live in "peace", regardless of any ongoing formal or informal process, as long as there are frequent armed clashes in their communities over which they have no control.
- The first two years of operations of the newly established BARMM were between 2019-2020. This period saw the formation of the transition government, the drafting of a regional budget, the start of the decommissioning process of thousands of BIAF combatants, and the task of initiating coalition-building, which was complicated by strong competition between rival Moro factions, MILF, MNLF, and the traditional political oligarchy.²⁰ Moreover, increasing community and civil society participation in governance and decision-making was not a top priority at the time.
- The potential for an eruption of violence at grassroots levels remained high between 2009 to 2020. There were numerous and unpredictable violent events, often triggering forced displacement all over the region, threatening the ceasefire agreement from 2009 to 2012, threatening the continuing gains of the peace process of the Framework Agreement of the Bangsamoro (FAB) in 2012, and threatening to undermine the efforts of the Bangsamoro Transition Commission in pushing for the Comprehensive Agreement of the Bangsamoro (CAB), and the passing of the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL). For example, sporadic armed clashes occurred on the island provinces of Sulu and Basilan, primarily between the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, and portions of North Cotabato between the MILF or the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) and the AFP

¹⁸ See: Land Rights, Displacement, and Transitional Justice in the Bangsamoro: Insights from household-level mapping in Marawi City and Maguindanao by Initiatives for International Dialogue. Mar 6, 2023.

¹⁹ Philippine Daily Inquirer (October 9, 2012), What Went Before: the Proposed MOA-AD. Extracted from: <https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/285604/what-went-before-the-proposed-moa-ad>

²⁰ Abuza, Z. Lischin, L. (June 10, 2020), The Challenges Facing the Philippines' Bangsamoro Autonomous Region at One Year. Special Report. United States Institute of Peace (USIP). Washington D.C., USA. Extracted from: <https://www.usip.org/publications/2020/06/challenges-facing-philippines-bangsamoro-autonomous-region-one-year>

or the Philippine National Police (PNP as well as inter-clan clashes due to land dispute, politics, or other reasons.

While the context changed considerably from 2009 to 2020, the project's identified needs of the Bangsamoro people, particularly the beneficiaries of the IcSP projects, largely remained the same in the project documents. However, despite the efforts of the IcSP implementing partners to address these needs, **the IcSP projects had a very limited reach in this regard.** Though project documents state that all major political subdivisions in Mindanao, where the armed conflict between the GPH and MILF, was occurring, were "covered" by project activities, it was noted that **more community-oriented IfS and IcSP projects could only cover a portion of the total barangays and municipalities that experienced sporadic or recurring armed encounters between elements of the GPH's AFP and MILF's BIAF.** Covering all of these conflict-affected communities would have required exponentially more resources.

On the other hand, **IfS and IcSP projects that focused on dialogue, mediation and advocacy did not reach all conflict-affected communities *per se*.** Instead, these activities invited representatives of conflict-affected communities to gatherings held in urban or semi-urban centres with facilities for meetings and workshops. They were also **more focused on strategic consensus building or constituency building** towards policy advocacy connected to the peace negotiations in the early years of the transition processes **rather than directly addressing community needs in conflict-affected communities.** **This bolstered the finding that the needs of a large portion of the Bangsamoro people remained the same over the course of 11 years and the course of two funding instruments.**

The sporadic armed encounters throughout this period resulted in an increase of unexploded ordnances, or UXOs, in many inhabited locations. This clearly indicated that **civilian peacekeeping and mine action were imperative interventions that could support the progress of the Bangsamoro Peace Process.** Furthermore, by reducing the prevalence of the eruption of community-based armed conflict, the low-intensity conflict impacted less on the trust relations between the GPH and MILF and supported their ability to negotiate with each other without frequent distractions.

In light of the shifting peace and conflict context and the still prevailing needs of the Bangsamoro people described above, interventions of both **the first batch of IcSP projects in 2017-2018 and the second batch in 2019-2020 mostly aligned with the needs of the beneficiaries identified by each project.** In addition, the design of these projects, which utilised the unique approaches of each IcSP implementing partner to respond to beneficiary needs (while working to attain the purpose and objectives of EU's IcSP funding), clearly built on the gains of projects that were implemented under the previous IfS funding, as well as to the overall direction of the shifting context in the Bangsamoro Region.

Finding 6. There was an unclear and uneven use of conflict analysis in the project design.

Among the reviewed projects, only one implementing partner, NP, carried out regular conflict analysis in the different field sites where it has a presence and utilised various tools for this purpose. This included assessing conflict profiles, conflict histories in particular provinces, conflict mappings, actor analysis, capturing of conflict causes and triggers, identification of „hot spots“ and „potential hot spots“, and categorisation of specific conflict incidents by type (e.g. confrontations between main armed actors; conflict impacts,

such as population displacements)²¹. However, there is no evidence that conflict analysis was a well-entrenched and regular practice for other implementing partners.

Finding 7. Due to an incoherent Theory of Change and an irrelevant result framework, the earlier projects could not adequately communicate their results.

According to one evaluation report, the earlier projects (2010 – 2016) had difficulties communicating their achievements. Specifically, this was due to the lack of a coherent theory of change (ToC) or intervention logic²². For example, one project had a brief ToC for the mine action component and a separate one for the peace-building component. However, no consolidated ToC included all components as part of a holistic approach to peacebuilding²³. The emerging findings from the desk review on the intervention logic of the eight projects are:

- All projects *aimed* to foster peace and human security in conflict-affected Central and Western Mindanao areas in the Philippine islands.
- Regarding specific objectives, some intervention designs deferred their choice of implementing partners, strategies, and modalities.
- The overarching goal (impact) was envisaged to be reached by supporting peace-building facilities and processes by:
 - Monitoring agreements at the local and political levels.
 - Civilian protection.
 - Conflict prevention and response capacity building.
 - Overall promotion of community resilience and social cohesion through equal participation.
 - Peaceful dialogues and political pluralism for good governance.

The expected change these projects pursued was that people would enjoy stability, inclusivity, and peace in the Bangsamoro Region, including the Sulu Archipelago. The envisaged mid-term to long-term outcomes included reduced risk of casualties from UXOs and explosive remnants of war in Mindanao, the realisation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Demilitarisation based on internationally recognised standards, reduced vulnerability, and prevention of violence.

Except for the projects implemented by NP (IcSP/2017/383-403 and IcSP/2018-31/10/2018/398-197), the other six assessed IcSP projects did not have a distinctive theory of change (ToC). However, the later IcSPs offered a more relevant and specific intervention logic and explained that change would be achieved through the participation of Joint Peace and Security Teams, the conduct of mine action (AFP, PNP and BIAF), and SALW standardisation and implementation. Added by developing the ability of members of armed groups, women, and youth, to resolve disputes peacefully by mediating at the community level, enhancing the capacity of local institutions, and engaging the religious sector in dialogue or mediation.

2.2 Evaluation Question 2

Evaluation Question 2. How well did the evaluated projects meet the objectives outlined in the IcSP regulation?

²¹ See: Evaluation of NP projects. 2013.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

Due to the lack of knowledge regarding the IcSP regulation among the local partners and stakeholders, the field mission could not collect sufficient data to address this EQ²⁴. Therefore, answers provided by respondents from the implementing organisations and from their partners or from stakeholders they engaged vary. For example, respondents from the implementing organisations are familiar with the IcSP regulation and stated that **their project activities are consistent with said regulation and have their own set of policies that are parallel to or consistent with this regulation**. On the other hand, **local partners and stakeholders engaged** by the implementing organisations **stated that they are not familiar with such IcSP regulations since they have never applied for any funding from the EU before and, over the many years that they have been engaged by one or another implementing partner of any EU instrument, there was never an occasion where such regulations were explained to them as part of practice or policy during the start of the activity**.

It is, however, the opinion of the ET that most of the evaluated projects were designed to achieve the objectives of said regulation under Article 3, thus adapted to aid in response to crises. To a lesser degree, projects achieved the objectives of contributing to the sustained prevention of conflicts and ensuring capacity and preparedness to address pre-and post-crisis situations and build peace. Finally, no evidence was gauged to support the financing that evaluated projects had addressed global and trans-regional threats to peace, international security and stability.

Finding 8. A design of a few of the projects supported the IcSP's objectives and contributed to the instrument's goals.

The desk review revealed that some projects were able to deliver significant results. For example, the NP-implemented project (IcSP/2017/383-403) provides that *“ceasefire violations between GPH and MILF decreased, incidents of attacks to civilian properties also went down, and the cases of civilian casualties resulting from GPH-MILF conflict decreased”*. Further, it was concluded that despite a severe and unexpected incident in Marawi City in October 2017, the impact was achieved to a large extent²⁵. In spite of this, independent studies and EU officials have documented that one of the aims of the IcSP - establishing a sustainable **EWER mechanism** - **was not achieved during the period under consideration**.

The desk review also indicates that activities financed under the IcSP were consistent with the objective of this regulation in terms of mine detection, mine clearance, and stockpile destruction. Specifically, FSD-implemented projects in 2017 and 2018 were designed with relevant result areas. To this end, the EU-funded mine action projects provided support in response to the situations described in Article 3 of the IcSP Regulation: *(a) a situation of urgency, crisis or emerging crisis; (b) a situation posing a threat to democracy, law and order, the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, or the security and safety of individuals, in particular, those exposed to gender-based violence in situations of instability; or (c) a situation threatening to escalate into armed conflict or to destabilise the third country or countries concerned severely*. Furthermore, through these rounds of implementation, **a critical mass of the affected population was educated, and territories were cleared of mines**. Furthermore, one informant stated that many EU-funded initiatives (such as the National Operation Centre for Explosive Hazard Management and Response) that were a **longstanding objective of the IfS and IcSP projects over the past eight years have finally been implemented**. Last but not least, **the cascaded support provided by various EU-funded initiatives contributed to stabilising the situation, paving the way for peaceful transitions to occur**. Despite this,

24 See: Art 1, par. Subject-matter and objectives, Regulation (Eu) No 230/2014 of The European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014. Establishing an Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace.

25 See: Result Acceptance Note. Contract IcSP/2017/383-403

it must be noted that **such an accomplishment would not have been possible without the support of other development partners, who, despite their differing political orientations, also played an integral role in the process.**

2.3 Evaluation Question 3

Evaluation Question 3. To what extent were the projects' activities and results coherent, particularly for projects that are a continuation of prior actions?

The **protracted conflicts** in Mindanao were characterised by **complex contextual factors which were not considered when 18-month-long interventions were launched.** In other words, **the multifaceted conflicts involving a range of stakeholders, beneficiaries, and people in need of constant protection would have been better supported with a long-term, joint implementation modality and adequate coordination mechanisms between the implementing partners and stakeholders.** In addition, **government structures within the implementation regions were undergoing a multi-year transition, making it difficult for them to absorb the programmatic approaches of the IfS/IcSP implementing partners for sustainability purposes.**

This **necessitated the IfS/ IcSP implementing partners to continue their programmatic approaches** (e.g. civilian peacekeeping and early warning-early response by Nonviolent Peace force (NP), **mine action by FSD France, and 'creative dialogue' by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (CHD)) until such time that the new BARMM government and its local government units are ready and prepared to continue addressing these needs on their own.**

Finding 9. The other factor that supported the continuous support is that the majority of initial EU-funded projects focused on addressing the symptoms of conflict rather than its causes. Upon review of the evaluation reports, it appears that many projects made incorrect assumptions about how change would occur in the Philippine context, which led to the failure of projects to produce the expected results. In addition, the overall objective of the projects was too ambitious, and the outcome results were outside the sphere of influence of the Implementing Partners (IPs). The projects did indeed deliver mid-term results as intended because the expected overall changes from these particular set of actions did not aim to address drivers of conflict; for example, one of the projects brought together leaders from opposing sides to pursue common goals unrelated to the peace process, and although relationships improved, attitudes about the other and the peace process did not. The desk review found that **the continuation of actions was also justified by the evaluations conducted over the period under the present evaluations.**²⁶ These recommendations were followed and resulted in several rounds of the project granted to the same implementing partners.

The case of NP

NP began its engagement with the EU through the IfS funding. The original focus of their project was on civilian peacekeeping, which utilized a small number of

²⁶ See: For example, one evaluation specifically recommended: "Based on the highly relevant present support, it is recommended to start planning a new support package, maintaining the same overall objectives, over the new facility of the IfS for a 36-month duration of support. The new programme should include scenario planning, risk analysis, and a mid-term review for the new programme to be sufficiently flexible to adapt to possible changes such as the finalisation of the peace-agreement, protracted negotiations or the resumption of hostilities. Mentioned in the Assessment of EU support to the peace process in Southern Philippines under the Instrument for Stability February 2012.Letter of Contract No. 2011/280644/1

international peacekeepers deployed in conflict hotspots of the former ARMM. It largely banked on their international status to mitigate violations of the Ceasefire Agreement of the Government and MILF by the AFP and the BIAF and deterring violence towards civilians during such incidents. The NPs participated in the Civilian Protection Component (CPC) of the International Monitoring Team (IMT). Under the subsequent IcSP projects, NP's approach to civilian peacekeeping was modified, with the replacement of international civilian peacekeepers by a much larger group of local civilian peacekeepers who are residents of the municipalities where conflict hotspots are located.

At this time, the application of civilian peacekeeping was also diversified to include the early warning–early response (EWER) approach, which involved grassroots monitoring, documentation and reporting of armed incidents that violate the ceasefire agreement and inflict violence on civilians. Though both versions of NP's civilian peacekeeping approach responded to the same kind of phenomenon throughout the IfS and IcSP funding, the older version of utilising international civilian peacekeepers was later found to be not coherent or as effective as expected, compared to its application in other countries, particularly in Africa. In addition to the very limited number of internationals that NP could deploy in conflict hotspots in the region and the lack of systematic monitoring, documentation and reporting of ceasefire violations, their international status did not deter local armed groups from their activities and, instead, viewed them as potential kidnap-for-ransom targets²⁷. This experience triggered NP's transition from organising and mobilising international civilian peacekeepers to local civilian peacekeepers who, with their local status, were able to immerse easily into conflict hotspots and conduct monitoring, documentation, and reporting.

The other case to consider is the action implemented by the Swiss Mine-clearing Foundation (FSD). FSD's engagement began during the third round of the IfS funding. Its project focused on "*delivering peace dividends through the reduction of Explosive Remnants of War.*" The project design aimed to strengthen the anti-UXO capabilities of the security sector of the Philippine government by training Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams and assessing the Philippine Government's current requirement to ensure proper ammunition facilities. In 2017, the FSD Mine Action programme continued to reduce the risk posed by explosive hazards and facilitated the cooperation and coordination of the GPH and MILF in joint clearing operations, which was also utilised as a confidence-building approach between the parties' ground units. However, it shifted its focus in two areas: 1) in the capability building area, it shifted to build anti-UXO capacity from purely government security sector groups to the quasi GPH-MILF Joint Peace and Security Teams (JPST), which is part of the Normalization Process of the Comprehensive Agreement of the Bangsamoro, and 2) based on the unanticipated eruption of violence in and around Marawi City, the so-called 'Marawi Siege'²⁸. FSD trained two teams of local MRE volunteers from DSWD and DepEd at the early stages of the siege. In the second IcSP project, FSD focused on reducing risk from UXOs, continued anti-UXO capability building for the JPST, and SALW demilitarisation planning based on internationally recognised standards. Throughout the IfS and IcSP facilities, FSD never deviated from its mine risk action programme.

The CHD's IfS project started in 2009 through the International Contact Group (ICG). The IcSP projects by CHD and the Institute for Autonomy and Governance (IAG) promoted social cohesion, encouraged creative dialogue, and facilitated trust-building between the

²⁷ Laude, J. (February 14, 2009), Another peace worker kidnapped. Philstar Global. Extracted from: <https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2009/02/14/439946/another-peace-worker-kidnapped>

²⁸ The conflict's primary phase lasted from May to October 2017, when the AFP reclaimed control of the city. After five months of urban warfare, the city centre was damaged, unusable, and covered in UXO and IEDs.

government and MILF, MNLF, and civil society in co-designing a roadmap for peace in the Bangsamoro Region through an autonomous juridical entity that eventually became the BARMM. **Under the subsequent IcSP projects, with the establishment of the BARMM government, the focus of CHD's activities gradually transitioned from providing the same approaches of dialogue and multi-track mediation to the negotiating panels of GPH and MILF to more dialogues between key community-based sectors within and outside the BARMM, as well as between these sectors and GPH and/or MILF.**

Finding 10. The extended funding support of the IfS and IcSP to implementing partners in Mindanao is largely based on the Country Strategy Paper for the Philippines in 2007 and 2014 and not on a per-project basis.

Though the desk review did not show a clear justification for the extended duration of IfS and IcSP funding in Mindanao, it is worth noting that the EC-Philippines Strategy Paper of 2007–2013 included "*support to the Mindanao Peace Process*" as a priority for the EU, while the EC-Philippines Strategy Paper of 2014-2020 included "*peace and security, including in the Bangsamoro Region.*" These were considered **preconditions to make the EU's development goals in Mindanao feasible.** Country strategy papers (CSPs) are updated every four to six years. This provides a framework for coordinating EU cooperation with partner countries and ensuring that EU assistance is effective. EU funding instruments such as the IfS and the IcSP utilised the Country Strategy Papers for the Philippines as reference documents in implementing projects in relation to peace and security in Mindanao. In EU official Houvenaeghel's 2015 EIAS Briefing Paper, it is stated that **three rounds of the IfS-IcSP funding had already been financed and implemented and that a fourth round was expected "to bridge the gap until the end of the interim period of the peace agreement"**. This implies that the **implementation of multiple rounds of the Instrument can largely be attributed to the practice of observing the parameters of the EU-Philippine Country Strategy Paper and that the Mindanao peace and security situation did not necessitate any need for the EU to diverge from said strategy.**

On December 2015, during the meeting between the EU officials in Cotabato City with peace stakeholders, it was announced that the EU had decided to increase funding to support peace and development in Mindanao, launching IcSP to "*contribute to peacebuilding and conflict mitigation, support the implementation of the Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro and strengthen local institutions and political processes.*"²⁹

To this end, projects from the IcSP continued or scaled up what IfS projects initiated while consistently remaining relevant to the shifting contexts of the period covered by both funding instruments. So far, it has not been clear why IcSP has been selected as the primary funding method for such an extended period.

Finding 11. The flexibility and relatively small budgets of the IcSP might be one of the essential characteristics that ensured this financing instrument's continuity. Among others, IcSP's crisis response activities (Article 3) can either run as Exceptional Assistance Measures (EAMs) with a duration of up to 18 months and a possible extension of up to 12 months without comitology procedure or as Interim Response Programmes (IRPs) that required comitology and lasted up to 36 months. It is intended that the decision-making process for Article 3 measures will allow financing decisions to be adopted within three months. Only EAMs exceeding the €20 million threshold and IRPs trigger comitology. Additionally, inter-service consultations are a relatively fast procedure for Article 3 actions

²⁹ European Union (December 9, 2015). EU vows continuing support to Mindanao and its peace process. News and Press Release. Reliefweb

due to a standard agreement within the service to use short deadlines (usually a few days) for such projects.

2.4 Evaluation Question 4

Evaluation Question 4. To what extent were projects coherent with/complementary to other EU and internationally supported actions in this area? To what extent did these actions supported by IcSP contribute to a multilateral approach to conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and stabilisation in the given context?

In addition to its role as the EU's main Instrument in addressing the development-security nexus, the IcSP is also designed as a bridge-builder in its legal and institutional terms between the development and security policy realms. First introduced into EU external relations by its predecessor, the Instrument for Stability transformed from a primary law (the EU Treaty) into a secondary law requiring EU institutions to ensure policy coherence on the external front³⁰.

Similarly, the IcSP Regulation states that measures funded by the IcSP should be complementary and consistent with activities adopted under the Common Foreign and Security Policy³¹. It was a key objective behind the creation of IcSP's first-response capacity to pave the way for long-term development cooperation projects implemented by other EFIs³². Even though the IcSP appears to carry out this “bridging” role, there were also challenges in terms of coordination with other instruments such as EIDHR, DCI, ENI, IPA (Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance) II, EDF and EU Trust Funds.

There was insufficient evidence to confirm that the projects were coordinated or coherent with other EU and international efforts. No data could be used from the desk review to assess how the earlier projects ensured synergies and complementarities with other development interventions. One reason for such shortcoming could be that the evaluation criteria *Coherence* was introduced as a sixth OECD DAC only in 2018³³. However, despite the inclusion of these criteria in the evaluations after 2018, there was a lack of clarity in the information gathered from the last group of projects. Evaluations conducted by other development partners, such as the UNDP and the World Bank, have revealed an even worse situation, disregarding the coherence criteria of the OECD DAC.

While a study states that the EU supported CPPB initiatives in Bangsamoro and other international actors through different coordination mechanisms such as a) World Bank-managed Mindanao Trust Fund (supported by Australia, Canada and the US), as well as the IMT supported by Japan, Malaysia and Norway and the b) International Decommissioning Body (supported by Japan, Norway, and Turkey),³⁴ the same source stated that **synergies were mostly created around funding and co-funding** (for example, via the MTF), delegated cooperation (with UNDP, Spain and GIZ), **or through funding of implementing INGOs with a track record in local coordination and mobilisation of**

³⁰ See: Furness & Gänzle, 2016, p. 149; Gänzle, 2012, p. 125. Quoted in A Bridge over Troubled Water? The Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) and the Security-Development Nexus. EU External Policy, p. 11. German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE). 2018.

³¹ Ibid.

³² A Bridge over Troubled Water? The Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) and the Security-Development Nexus in EU External Policy, p.

³³ See: OECD. On December 10, 2019, the OECD DAC (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee) adopted the 'Evaluation Criteria: Adapted Definitions and Principles for Use' which contains six criteria.

³⁴ See: External Evaluation of EU's Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace Building (2013-2018). Final report Vol. 2 – May 2020 – Particip GmbH

funding from different international partners to supplement funding received from the EU.

The implementing partners reported that while developing initiatives, EU staff specifically sought to ensure that implementing partners did not duplicate project activities. For example, a ROM report conducted in 2016 found a high degree of complementarity of EU-supported interventions in areas such as community security or women's empowerment with activities implemented by the Asia Foundation, the UK, Australia, UNDP, and other development donors and agencies who were involved in projects in Mindanao, to support the peace talks between the Government of the Philippines and MILF. However, **the present evaluation could not triangulate the findings of the ROM³⁵ because there was no institutional memory to assess and no contacts available to engage with on this.**

The respondents to the present evaluation stated that **there had been little inter-agency coordination among the implementing partners, even though international donors shared the common goal of supporting the Bangsamoro Peace Process.** The only relevant coordination and convergence platform in Mindanao where many of these implementing partners interacted was the Mindanao Humanitarian Team (MHT), an arm of UN-OCHA's Humanitarian Country Team (HCT). The MHT is a coordination mechanism composed of UN agencies, International NGOs, and affected local government units from Mindanao that ensures humanitarian action in Mindanao is conducted in accordance with the humanitarian principles³⁶ and that humanitarian action is conducted in a timely, effective, and efficient manner that contributes to longer-term recovery³⁷. The MHT was established when UN-OCHA's presence was upgraded to a country office in 2010, having a dual focus on preparedness for and response to sudden emergencies and the ongoing conflict in Mindanao at that time³⁸. But not all implementing partners are members of this platform, and only NP and FSD have humanitarian portfolios that allow them to join the MHT. Their humanitarian portfolios are connected with their work under the IfS and IcSP facilities, as these respond to human-induced crises, which fall under UN-OCHA's humanitarian coordination work. These two organisations have a functional familiarity with each other's work, compared to the work of CHD and IAG, considering that they regularly share updates on their project activities with other development partners.

Finding 12. Although Mindanao has received substantial development assistance from the EU and other development partners, the sustained internal coherence, including the complementarity with other EU-funded ongoing and planned response, was not ensured. Furthermore, EU-funded interventions and other development projects did not have an adequate external cohesion mechanisms, which may have resulted in duplication of effort and confusion among beneficiaries, who could not identify during the interview the right implementation partner for the support .

A global report on the EU's support of peacebuilding suggests that satisfactory to good working relations existed between the political and cooperation sections at EUDs at the time, including in the Philippines³⁹. The EU strengthened its ability to combine its multiple instruments, modalities, policy tools and diplomacy in more coherent and complementary ways over the course of the period evaluated. The IcSP mid-term evaluation, for example,

³⁵ See: ROM report. Building Peace in Mindanao through Public Participation in Governance. 2016 C-313555, p4, mentioned in. External Evaluation of EU's Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace Building (2013-2018). Final report Vol. 2 – May 2020 – Particip GmbH

³⁶ Humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence.

³⁷ International Organization for Migration (IOM), Partner Agency Profile. Extracted from: https://www.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd1486/files/migrated_files/Country/docs/Annex-12-Agency-Profile-final.pdf

³⁸ About OCHA in the Philippines. Extracted from: https://www.unocha.org/philippines/about-ocha-philippines?gclid=CjwKCAjwue6hBhBVEiwA9YTx8P8YmVhmOKpQBJSqCpuNrXKnbEH8vaTluMjtlQifQ_Mo4UbiuaX5BoCnRkQAvD_BwE

³⁹ See: External Evaluation of EU's Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace Building (2013-2018). Final report Vol. 2 – May 2020 – Particip GmbH

noted that the IcSP had a number of functional interfaces, including with CSDP missions and DG ECHO, but that synergies between IcSP action and other instruments were hampered by a lack of flexibility and the lengthy procedures of most financing instruments (e.g. DCI, ENI, IPA II, EIDHR, as well as in the EDF and EU Trust Funds).¹³ The same report mentions how multilateral trust funds offered a means of coordinating with other actors, as Steering Committees provided opportunities to develop a common understanding and approach among partners, including national actors. To this end, the World Bank Mindanao Trust Fund in the Philippines provided an alternative venue for dialogue⁴⁰.

In the Philippines, during the pre-2016 period, when coordination primarily involved information sharing, there was evidence of strong coordination and complementarity between the EU and EU Member States and between the EU and international organisations, particularly the World Bank and UNDP.⁴¹ Reportedly, the World Bank's Mindanao Trust Fund, to which the EU allocated significant financial support, provided a platform for strategic and operational dialogue between international actors, the Philippine government, and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front during a period when relations between the Government of the Philippines and the international community were at a low point⁴². Moreover, in 2016, the ability to discuss concrete issues that needed to be addressed kept communication lines open and indirectly supported the resumption of talks and collaboration with the Duterte government⁴³.

On a project level, despite the apparent complementarity of work under EU funding instruments, little coordination was done, and coherence with interventions implemented by other actors was not possible to determine. Although some of the IcSP implementing partners indicated they were familiar with the work of the other implementing partners, especially those with whom they worked closely, there was not a balanced level of mutual knowledge across the eight projects launched in 2017 and 2018. There was a perceived difficulty in relating each organisation's work to the others. This was found to be comparatively stronger in the case between FSD France with the other three IcSP implementing partners and all other implementing partners of the EU's other funding instruments. The interviewed stakeholders mentioned that, overall, the implementing partners of the different international donors supporting the Bangsamoro peace process work in so-called silos. For example, there is no known direct convergence or collaboration between NP's CP-EWER work with the Mine Risk action of FSD or CHD's "creative dialogue" work with the political party building and civil society participation work of IAG and KAS-Philippines. Respondents confirmed that Mine Risk Education trainings were conducted with the help of at least one common local partner of IAG and CHD (Tumikang Sama Sama) and members of the community EWER structures of NP.

2.5 Evaluation Question 5

Evaluation Question 5. How have the projects ensured the sustainability of their results or achievements?

Engaging CSOs was an effective method for maintaining the results. To this end, the CSOs participating in IAG's project utilised their knowledge of parliamentary forms of

⁴⁰ European Commission (2016): External Assistance Management report (EAMR) Delegation: Philippines. Period 01/01/2015 to 31/12/2015, p. 5.

⁴¹ European Commission (2012): External Assistance Management report (EAMR) Delegation: Philippines. Period /01/2011 to 31/12/2011, p. 7; European Commission (2014): External Assistance Management report (EAMR) Delegation: Philippines. Period 01/01/2013 to 31/12/2013, p. 9

⁴² External Evaluation of EU's Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace Building (2013-2018). Final report Vol. 2 – May 2020 – Particip GmbH

⁴³ Ibid.

government to help the BARMM orient the Bangsamoro people on the same, thereby increasing appreciation and support for the fledgling autonomous government. However, **the lack of scale-up funds prevented the CSOs from reaching a greater number of communities, which led to the continued presence of a significant number of constituents who do not support, doubt, or do not understand the BARMM.** Through continuous fundraising and seeking new donors, these participating CSOs sustain their work.

Finding 13. Sustainability efforts were primarily focused on empowering individuals at the grassroots level.

The component of IAG's project, which organises and empowers youth and women to participate in the political exercises of the BARMM, has resulted in women participants running for office in the 2022 local elections. Unfortunately, there is no data to prove success rates, and it was noted that none of the participants of IAG's project who ran for public office won. Nevertheless, the youth and women's political groups that were formed through this project continue to operate and have active plans to participate in the next local and upcoming regional elections, beginning in 2025 and every three years thereafter.

The achievement of many results could not be sustained adequately without the assistance of human or financial resources. For example, enabling a normative environment was also an adequate strategy to sustain the results, and to this end, the explosive ordnance risk education/mine risk education has been useful in terms of raising the awareness of the community about how to remove mines properly and safely. However, full-fledged enforcement of the ordinance and other important acts need adequate technical and financial resources, which are unavailable now.

NP continues to scale up the establishment and operationalisation of the EWER mechanism to more conflict-prone and conflict-affected communities as violent conflict continues in many parts of the BARMM, particularly connected to the rise of terrorism and violent extremism. They additionally provide support in legal registration processes for these mechanisms to become full-fledged community-based organisations, as well as providing each one with the means to engage in income-generating projects to help sustain their civilian peacekeeping activities.

It could be inferred that CHD's creative dialogue approach contributed to the current level of engagement and power-sharing that the MNLF has in the MILF-led BARMM. Moreover, to a certain degree, that same approach contributed to the level of autonomy the BARMM is currently enjoying, which may partially result from the many levelling-off discussions between MILF and the Philippine government in the dialogue workshops facilitated by CHD. These may have also led to the formulation of some key provisions in the various peace agreements and annexes that have been signed.

The degree of sustained capacities and ownership of the projects was affected by the limited funding available to sustain the results. Moreover, an earlier evaluation provides that community-based organisations face major capacity problems. They would not be able to function properly without the proactive accompaniment of (international and) experienced local partners. As one interviewee explained, after ten years of accompaniment, communities have learned how to connect horizontally and deal with conflict issues. However, they are **not yet sufficiently equipped to connect these activities and build information exchanges, including the conflict early warning system, vertically with local government and higher levels in the administration.**

Moreover, own resources to do, for example, peace monitoring work at a local level were absent⁴⁴.

2.6 Evaluation Question 6

Evaluation Question 6. Which features have proven or remain useful or operational as intended at present, and to what extent?

Respondents assert that the EWER mechanism of NP remains most valuable, as members of the community utilise these mechanisms themselves in responding to community-based horizontal conflicts that may occur (especially land conflicts, clan feuds, and terrorism), despite the positive gains attained by the Bangsamoro Peace Process.

Finding 14. The sustainability of the Early Warning and Early Response aspects of Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping relies heavily on understanding the importance of the processes and linkage between the existing local monitoring networks and the appropriate governmental agencies.

FSD's primary goal of establishing a mine action centre managed by the government in Mindanao failed. Many of the government officials and MILF members engaged by FSD for the Mindanao Peace Process were **unaware of how mine risk education is delivered and how mine risk action is institutionalised**. Mine risk education is **not seen as part of the normalisation process and was not completely appreciated within the Joint Normalisation Committee, specifically under the Joint Peace and Security Committee (JPST)**. Although FSD's mandate as a technical partner was part of the CAB⁴⁵, the leadership of the JNC never fully appreciated what it meant within the peace agreement. However, FSD continues to introduce mine risk education and explosive ordnance risk education to diversified groups, including the basic education sector. **Work is needed to facilitate the passing of policies in institutions that will ensure the continued practice of this intervention beyond FSD's engagement**, considering that a large part of communities in the BARMM that are in close proximity to UXOs and unexploded IEDs and require improved awareness of the risks this situation poses.

Finding 15. The majority of the evaluated actions did not have an effective exit strategy and did not assess whether the ownership and political will were sufficient to assume responsibility for the processes established as part of the projects.

To this end, the National Government has not allocated any large-scale IEC campaign for such information purposes and, from the period 2019-2020, the fledgling BARMM government set its priorities around the expeditious establishment and immediate operation of the regional autonomous governance structure and, therefore could not allocate time, resources, or manpower to conduct a large-scale IEC campaign. In addition, most of the tiers that support the peace panels of the GPH and MILF were not fully aware of the details of an autonomous parliamentary form of government and, therefore, do not have the capabilities to roll out related IEC campaigns, which was mutually considered by the GPH, MILF and the CSO community as urgent at that time.

While various capability-building interventions produced a pool of catalysts for peace, respondents stated that it is unclear if the partner agencies are committed to continuously "re-seeding" this pool by using their resources to conduct follow-up trainings. And while

⁴⁴ See: External Evaluation of EU's Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace Building (2013-2018). Final report Vol. 2 – May 2020 – Particip GmbH

⁴⁵ FSD was named in the Normalisation Annex of the CAB as a technical partner in the peace agreement, mandated by the CAB to provide technical advice to the parties on mine risk education, detection, non-tactical survey, and clearance of exploded ordnance, with a view to supporting the security line of operations in the normalisation process

these agencies have recognised, accepted, and even duplicated the interventions of the IcSP projects - in unarmed civilian protection, early warning-early response mechanisms, and participatory governance - it is unclear to the respondents if the capacitated CSOs and local structures have applied their learnings, or if there are platforms already set up to push sustainability of these interventions forward. They are also unaware if government agencies have passed policies and local ordinances to sustain these initiatives.

2.7 Evaluation Question 7

Evaluation Question 7. To what extent has the overall support led to the desired change, including in the transformation of discourse, increased public awareness, and/or enhanced dialogue in relation to trust-building and conflict transformation in Mindanao?

According to the stocktaking of the desk review documents, the long-term EU support for the MTF has produced tangible results by providing basic infrastructure to alleviate poverty as early as 2011. The 2012 External Assistance Management Report (EAMR) notes how a Results Orientated Monitoring (ROM) mission verified that *“the basic infrastructure established have improved access to basic services (water, core shelters, sanitation, medicines, education facilities), and overall improved the quality of life of the conflict-affected people”*. According to representatives of the Philippine government, these interventions helped to address the underlying causes of conflict and contribute to long-lasting peace in Muslim Mindanao⁴⁶.

Respondents felt that, while **the work of NP and FSD helped mitigate direct violence on the ground and thereby contributing to the building of an environment of “negative peace,” or the absence of violent conflict, CHD and IAG maximised the significant reduction of violent conflict incidents brought about by NP and FSD’s work by influencing the various stakeholders in the Bangsamoro Peace Process to work collectively and inclusively in building the BARMM.** At the same time, they had fewer obstacles to do so.

The other observation in the evaluation is that all projects, without exception, used output indicators to measure the expected results. In this regard, projects systematically collected and monitored the numbers and types of activities carried out by different field sites, included in daily, weekly, and monthly reports, aggregating them, and including them in donor reporting. However, these types of indicators are insufficient to determine whether the cumulative effect of these activities is what was intended, i.e. they fall short in relation to impact measurement. This resulted in difficulty in establishing a link between delivered outputs and anticipated outcomes.

Finding 16. The lack of outcome indicators makes assessing the change in discourse, public awareness, and/or dialogue in Mindanao concerning trust-building and conflict transformation difficult.

In the absence of adequate indicators that could help measure the support's overall impact, the evaluators used indicators and evidence produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) and the Global Peace Index (GPI), which is the world's leading measure of global peacefulness. The report on the Philippines presents the most comprehensive data-driven analysis to date on trends in Peace, its economic value, and how to develop peaceful societies. To this end, a positive change in the Philippines is measured by three specific indicators as explained in the table hereunder:

⁴⁶ See: External Evaluation of EU’s Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace Building (2013-2018). Final report Vol. 2 – May 2020 – Particip GmbH

Indicator ⁴⁷	Baseline data 2017	Evidence gathered/analysed in 2023
1.1.1. Global Peace Index ⁴⁸	Overall score 2.46 Global average 2.459	For 2022, the Global average is 2.339/5, and the overall score is 2.34.
1.1.2. Country Ranking	136 out 163	In 2022, the country ranking by 125 out of 163
1.1.3. Number of battle deaths from internal conflict.	3.028/5	In 2023, the country ranking has improved to 2.361

Despite the existence of these data, neither the actions nor the studies commissioned by the EU have used them as a baseline. Neither the monitoring bodies nor the available statistics have ever taken these statistics into account.

Finding 17. Over time, the role of civil society organisations in the peace process has gained acceptance in the Philippines, where both sides of the conflict embrace it.

There appears to be a positive trend in maintaining peace, as shown by these indicators. Informants at the grassroots level had difficulty identifying and understanding the differences and similarities between interventions provided by the EU, other international actors, and local actors. However, state actors demonstrated a greater awareness and understanding of autonomous governance as manifested by the BARMM. Some described the impact as creating several platforms and more space for dialogue and maintained between capacitated CSOs, MNLF, and MILF key personalities in managing and leading the BARMM.

Finding 18. There has been a change in the way people think about preserving their homes.

Based on statements made by many interviewees, the direct involvement and support of the EU has contributed significantly to positive dynamics and mindsets, not only of those directly involved in the negotiations but also of a large part of the population in Mindanao.

Specifically, according to grass-root CSOs, people's mindset has changed from individual to collective responsibility, and statements such as "we are one people" and "we need to care for our home region/homeland together" have become clearer in their narrative.

State actors affirmed that changes are underway, but their full benefits cannot yet be seen. One informant stated that in terms of the EU remaining engaged in a long-term project they had supported (for ten years), that is delivering results and tangible impact in supporting normalisation and security in the BARMM. The beneficiaries measured the success of all development and national efforts by the absence of large-scale conflicts. Furthermore, the eight IcSP projects built upon each other and were implemented during a period that witnessed significant developments, including the signing of the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (2012), the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (2014), the adoption of the Bangsamoro Organic Law (2018), and the establishment of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao in 2019.

⁴⁷ A composite index measuring the peacefulness of countries made up of 23 quantitative and qualitative indicators, each weighted on a scale of 1-5. The lower the score, the more peaceful the country.

⁴⁸ See: <https://www.visionofhumanity.org/maps/#/>

2.8 Evaluation Question 8

Evaluation Question 8. What is the strategic significance of EU support for actions in Mindanao, particularly through the IcSP, versus other EU channels of support and funding?

A report provides that the EU was one of a core group of external actors that provided important political and financial support for the peace processes and assisted the parties in overcoming obstacles during the peace negotiations and in the implementation of the peace accords⁴⁹. The government and the international community recognised the EU's contribution to the Mindanao peace process in the Philippines⁵⁰. The same report mentions that a representative of the government of the Philippines stated: *“The peace process as such and its (so far successful) progression over time would not have been possible without the EU's support.”* In addition, a member of the international community characterised the EU support as *“definitely a positive contributing factor, helping with long-term stabilisation, institution-building, and development initiatives in conflict contexts that have addressed recurring cycles of violence and created the enabling environment for peace.”*⁵¹

The interviewed, in general, agreed that the relevance of EU involvement is based on a perception among the various parties that the EU has no major economic or strategic interest in the Philippines but that its involvement is based on values that are generally recognised as positive by the Philippine stakeholders, such as the EU's commitment to international humanitarian assistance, human rights, and general values of liberal democracy.

Finding 19. IcSP has contributed to the reduction in direct violence at the community level and prepared the ground for other EU-funded actions to be implemented effectively.

IcSP projects mitigate the prevalence of direct violence at the grassroots level while promoting participatory and collective participation among peace stakeholders. Moreover, IcSP is reinforced by peace and stability projects funded by other international donors. IcSP approaches contributed to pushing the peace process forward towards its completion. IcSP actions help establish the enabling environment that would allow other funding instruments to be implemented without hindrances and impediments.

2.9 Evaluation Question 9

Evaluation Question 9. To what extent do the IcSP interventions benefit the EU's other forms of support and donor's interventions?

The EU is recognised as a neutral and capable actor with great political weight, especially compared to regional actors, who were – according to the interviewed – generally not trusted, as they are perceived to pursue their own economic and strategic interests. The EU's neutrality and expertise bring credibility, and the EU is seen as a serious interlocutor which can interact with all actors. Several interviewees urged the EU to play a more active role diplomatically and put pressure on all parties to finalise a peace agreement soon⁵².

⁴⁹ See: External Evaluation of EU's Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace Building (2013-2018). Final report Vol. 2 – May 2020 – Particip GmbH

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid. Box 9.

⁵² See: P. 15. Assessment of EU support to the peace process in Southern Philippines under the Instrument for Stability February 2012. Letter of Contract No. 2011/280644/1

The interviewed stakeholders stated that the EU provided non-biased support to the peacebuilding process compared to any other bilateral agreement. Another significant factor was continued support from EU-funded interventions over three administrations. In addition, it was admired how the EU-funded intervention held the line on promoting and protecting Human Rights principles during President Duterte's administration.

Finding 20. The EU has a distinct advantage over other development partners in that it has the capability to reach broad acceptance and buy-in at top government levels and can align and standardise the process.

It was clear that the EU was able to appreciate the uniqueness of the peace process and focused on implementing the peace agreement by 2025. This is demonstrated by securing a document signed by the President Duterte. The EU is a longstanding development partner supporting the Mindanao region. Over time, the budget of the EU actions became larger and the goals more ambitious, focusing more on infrastructure development and enterprise activities of vulnerable communities. Examples are the EU's support of the Mindanao Peace and Development Programme (MINPAD-RISE Mindanao), with a total of PHP 8.2 billion in cooperation with the DA and the World Bank. This partnership contributes to better livelihoods, peace, and stability⁵³ by supporting socio-economic activities.

2.10 Evaluation Question 10

Evaluation Question 10. To what extent was a gender perspective mainstreamed throughout the evaluated projects, and to what extent were they successful in promoting the empowerment of women and girls?

The interviewed informants stated that the mainstreaming of gender perspectives was primarily achieved through greater representation of women and youth in project activities. However, the desk study of the project reports indicates that gender mainstreaming and gender equality are two concepts that implementing partners overly misinterpreted. For example, results reporting on gender equality would only be measured by the number of women attending training and workshops. In addition, earlier EU-funded interventions did not comply with the mandatory Gender Mark during design and implementation.

The projects tried to enhance women's participation in activities, such as community orientations or trainings, seeking balanced numbers between women, men, and young people. However, representative participation of women in public forums, especially in communities where traditionally women are less likely to be given the floor if men are also present, continues to be a major challenge. Considering this was and remained a common challenge for implementing partners, a more deliberate approach to design activities that reflect good practices in gender empowerment was absent in the earlier projects.

Finding 21. The desk review findings indicate that projects missed opportunities to include former women combatants, for example, by empowering them to engage and support peacebuilding, promotion of gender-responsive, inclusive, and culturally sensitive legislation, policies, and programmes, and building the resilience of communities through collaborative socio-economic activities and inclusive community-based reconciliation mechanisms.

However, other development partners supported such initiatives in partnership with the same national implementing partners. For example, the Supporting Conflict Transformation Towards Effective Peacebuilding in the Bangsamoro Region (STEP)

⁵³ https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/philippines/world-bank-eu-expand-support-rural-communities-mindanao-through-da-prdp_en

Project, funded by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) in partnership with NP, was implemented in North Cotabato, Maguindanao, and Lanao Del Sur to fortify reintegration efforts for these women.⁵⁴

Nevertheless, interviewed participants perceived that, at present, the local and regional government structures engaged in project activities now ensure the inclusion of women and youth in decision-making processes, including women's participation in political exercises. Moreover, in some cases, women who currently participate in project activities and attend government decision-making processes bring their husbands along to appreciate and recognise women's roles in the community.

2.11 Evaluation Question 11

Evaluation Question 11. In light of the shift in legal basis to the single umbrella of the NDICI, how could EU assistance and actions on peacebuilding be coordinated in the future?

The Neighbourhood, Development, International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) replaces ten previous external instruments. As a result, the IcSP, which has served as the EU's 'flagship' mechanism for funding civilian crisis response, conflict prevention, and peacebuilding for many years, will be integrated into the NDICI's rapid response pillar. Through simplifying procedures, increasing flexibility, and improving transparency, the EU's external financial instruments are intended to maximise their impact and facilitate coherent responses.

The overall coordination of the EU-funded intervention was below satisfactory, as noted elsewhere in this report. The main EU funding instruments, such as DCI, ENI, IPA II, EIDHR, EDF and EU Trust Funds, were not able to build synergies with IcSP actions due to the lack of flexibility, the lengthy procedures of their financing instruments and perhaps the lack of importance they are giving to coordination (internal and external). For example, there are many internal documents within the Union explaining the benefits of the coordination: to provide donors, implementing agencies with access to complementary resources and tools; paving the way for a more comprehensive and synergistic approach; and offering a platform for addressing common issues together. The EU does not place sufficient emphasis on the consequences of poor coordination. Consequently, there has been no evaluation of how the lack of coordination negatively impacts cost-efficiency and cost-effectiveness in Mindanao, and generally, such studies are rare in the conflict-affected countries. As a result, the cost of duplicated efforts might be much higher, whilst more coordinated initiatives would multiply their impact and decrease possible cases of corruption.

Under such circumstances, the EU services will continue to have difficulty achieving stable peace unless a clear strategic framework is established that places policy coherence at the centre of its external action and specifies the division of labour among all stakeholders. Therefore, in order to coordinate future actions better, it is necessary to examine the underlying challenges that have affected the EU's engagement in fragile and conflict-affected countries. It will not be sufficient to focus solely on the restructuring of financial instruments. Along with such reform, it is important to employ strategies and approaches that prevent the diffusion of competencies and responsibilities across the EU's toolbox for crisis prevention, management, and

⁵⁴ See: Step by Step: How a Group of Former Women Combatants are Moving Towards Peace. Philippines. Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP). June 2022.

peacebuilding. NDICI will continue to be shared by a multitude of EU actors and their inter-institutional relationships as a single instrument, and this risk should be mitigated through adequate coordination mechanisms.

Another challenge is the different change theories underpinning the various EU policy actions, such as humanitarian and development aid, conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities, and military capacity building. These need to be reconciled to promote complementarity for achieving the common objective of sustainable peace.

A way to mitigate such risks would involve developing a balanced and clear conceptual and strategic framework that makes policy coherence a central component of its engagement in crisis prevention, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding. Establishing mechanisms for coordination between different actors to reach a higher degree of EU coherence is insufficient. **An adequate strategic framework and overarching normative principles are needed to guide coordination mechanisms in order to achieve coherence.** Such a framework and principles can serve to overcome unavoidable conflicts of interest between different institutional actors.

3 Conclusions and Recommendations

3.1 Conclusions

Relevance

1. The EU-funded actions were relevant to the needs of the final beneficiaries. The IfS and IcSP's joint effort enhanced civilian participants' visibility and streamlined human rights issues into the monitoring process by focusing on women and minorities and the importance of addressing land issues. The EU supports were relevant to the needs of actors in Marawi to quickly address the impact of violent conflict in the short term. The EU-funded actions were essential to support the role of the CSO community at the height of the peace talks between the government and MILF. Besides meeting the needs of beneficiaries and stakeholders, the interventions also extended their support to places where the government or armed forces did not have access or lacked technical expertise.
2. The absence of relevance was noted in the design of programmatic approaches of IfS/IcSP that remained unchanged for an extended period despite a frequently shifting context in Mindanao between 2009 to 2020.
3. More community-oriented IfS and IcSP projects could benefit the relevance of actions to address the sporadic or recurring armed encounters between elements of the GPH's AFP and MILF's BIAF. In light of the shifting peace and conflict context and the still prevailing needs of the Bangsamoro people, interventions of both the first batch of IcSP projects in 2017-2018 and the second batch in 2019-2020 mostly aligned with the needs of the beneficiaries identified by each project. As a final note, the relevance of implementing modalities with respect to the "leave no one behind" development paradigm was not considered.

Effectiveness

4. The eight IcSP projects built upon each other and were implemented during a period that witnessed significant developments, including the signing of the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (2012), the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (2014), the adoption of the Bangsamoro Organic Law (2018), and the establishment of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao in 2019. A large number of the IcSP's objectives were achieved through some of the projects. To date, it is reported that the number of ceasefire violations between GPH and MILF decreased, incidents of attacks on civilian properties also decreased, and the cases of civilian casualties resulting from the GPH-MILF conflict decreased. One of the important aims of the IcSP - establishing an EWER mechanism - was achieved during the period under consideration. Furthermore, through these rounds of implementation, a critical mass of the affected population was educated, and territories were cleared of mines. In addition, the Explosive Hazard Management and Response, a longstanding objective of the IfS and IcSP projects over the past eight years, has finally been implemented. Last but not least, the cascaded support provided by various EU-funded initiatives contributed to stabilising the situation, paving the way for peaceful transitions. Despite this, it must be noted that such an accomplishment would not have been possible without the support of other development partners, who, despite their differing political

orientations, also played an integral role in the achievements of these results and the peace process.

Coherence

5. Although Mindanao has received substantial development assistance, sustained internal and external cohesion mechanisms have been lacking. Inter-agency coordination among implementing partners had been limited, although international donors shared a common goal of supporting the Bangsamoro. Internally, the IcSP had a number of functional interfaces, including with CSDP missions and DG ECHO. Still, the synergies between IcSP action and other instruments were hampered by a lack of flexibility and the lengthy procedures of most financing instruments (e.g. DCI, ENI, IPA II, EIDHR, as well as in the EDF and EU Trust Funds).
6. A lack of coherence was also observed between the action's implementing partners (local and international) and between the different international donors supporting the Bangsamoro peace process who worked in so-called silos. However, the flexibility, including a short duration of up to 18 months and a possible extension of up to 12 months without a comitology procedure, relatively small budgets of the IcSP might be one of the essential characteristics which ensured the continuity of this financing instrument over the ten years. Moreover, inter-service consultations are a relatively fast procedure for Article 3 actions since short deadlines (usually a couple of days) are normally used for such actions within the service.

Sustainability

7. The majority of the evaluated actions did not have an effective exit strategy and did not determine whether sufficient ownership and political support were present to assume responsibility for the processes established within the projects.
8. Sustainability efforts were primarily focused on empowering individuals at the grassroots level and limited to community capacity building through stand-alone trainings. The limited funding available to sustain the results also affected the sustained capacities and ownership of the projects.
9. While the objective of establishing an Early Warning and Early Response of Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping was broadly achieved, it heavily depends on sustained human and financial resources, genuine political will from all stakeholders to continue the work, quality of local monitoring, and coordination between the networks and the appropriate governmental agencies.

Impact

10. The beneficiaries measured the success of all development and national efforts by the absence of large-scale conflicts. Based on the desk review and field data collection, the evaluation concludes that overall the actions under the IcSP jointly contributed to establishing basic infrastructure, improved access to basic services (water, core shelters, sanitation, medicines, education facilities), and overall improved the quality of life of the conflict-affected people". To some extent, these interventions helped to address the underlying causes of conflict and contribute to long-lasting peace in Muslim Mindanao, building an environment of "negative peace", reduction of violent conflict incidents, influencing the various stakeholders in the Bangsamoro Peace Process to work collectively and inclusively in building

the BARMM. A critical achievement of the continuous support to the national CSOs is that over time, the role of civil society organisations in the peace process has gained acceptance in the Philippines, where both sides of the conflict embrace it. In addition, the direct involvement and support of the EU have contributed significantly to positive dynamics and mindsets, not only of those directly involved in the negotiations but also of a large part of the population in Mindanao.

EU-added value

11. The EU is recognised as a neutral and capable actor with great political weight, especially compared to regional actors, who were – according to the interviewed – generally not trusted as they are perceived to pursue their own economic and strategic interests. The EU’s neutrality and expertise bring credibility, and the EU is seen as a serious interlocutor which can interact with all actors. The EU was one of a core group of external actors that provided necessary political and financial support for the peace processes and assisted the parties in overcoming obstacles during the peace negotiations and in the implementation of the peace accord. Moreover, the EU has a distinct advantage over other development partners. It can reach broad acceptance and buy-in at top government levels and align and standardise the process.
12. The government and the international community recognised that the peace process’ progression over time would not have been possible without the EU’s support. The relevance of the EU involvement is based on a perception that the EU has no major economic or strategic interest in the Philippines but rather the EU’s commitment to international humanitarian assistance, human rights, and general values of liberal democracy.

Cross-cutting issues

13. Rather than mainstreaming the features of cross-cutting issues such as gender equality, empowerment, and environmental sustainability, IcSP’s projects missed out on the opportunity to mainstream the attributes of these cross-cutting issues. In spite of several rounds of applicable EU’s Gender Action Plan with a specific result framework addressing gender equality and empowerment, it is impossible to assess the impact of the actions on these vulnerable groups, including former women combatants and ethnic and religious minorities.

3.2 Recommendations

The evaluation puts forward four interrelated recommendations.

Evaluation Criteria	Recommendation	Target	Priority
Coherence	<p>Recommendation 1: Improve internal and external coherence and coordination.</p> <p>Ensure an adequate strategic framework and overarching normative principles to guide coordination mechanisms in order to achieve coherence between regional, national, and thematic cooperation structures, focusing on the roles of EU Delegations and Headquarters. Maintain the</p>	EU	High

Evaluation Criteria	Recommendation	Target	Priority
	<p>institutional memory of lessons learned, successes, and analyses for sharing with other delegations in countries facing conflict and transition.</p>		
<p>Relevance and Coherence</p>	<p>Recommendation 2: Enhance the role of coherence in the formulation of actions.</p> <p>The EU should ensure that implementing partners have a coherent design supported with clear ToCs, attribution and contribution assumptions, and articulated criteria for the exit, focusing on institutionalisation and organisational capacity development for civilian protection and EWER.</p> <p>Furthermore, the relevance of the actions could also be strengthened by the rigorous use of conflict analysis in the project design evaluation of internal and external coherence of the actions within the larger implementation framework.</p> <p>Conflict analyses can be strengthened by including training on conflict analysis in the projects as a valuable capacity-building exercise to generate qualitative and up-to-date data and documentation and make conflict analysis a mandatory component. The use of relevant statistics and data from the appropriate sources should be used to guide the implementation towards the desired change. A comprehensive rights-based approach in programming and implementation should be ensured by including relevant SDGs in the result framework of the actions.</p>	<p>EU</p>	<p>High</p>
<p>Coherence</p>	<p>Recommendation 3: Enhance aid effectiveness by promoting joint thematic evaluations with the development partners.</p> <p>In order to strengthen the cohesiveness of the humanitarian-development-peace nexus in Mindanao using lessons learned and best practices, it would be helpful to commission thematic evaluations periodically. Develop a donor coordination platform to generate lessons learned, recommendations, and a status report on implementation.</p>	<p>EU</p>	<p>High</p>
<p>Cross-Cutting Issues</p>	<p>Recommendation 4: Integration of a gender perspective in the conflict analysis.</p> <p>The prospective interventions could provide valuable insights and guide the implementation of integrating a gender lens into the activities. Among all other criteria, the potential EU grantees must include gender-trained staff and a gender Audit so that partners can reflect and analyse their own</p>	<p>EU</p>	<p>High</p>

Evaluation Criteria	Recommendation	Target	Priority
	gender capacity, challenges, and good practices, as well as promote organisational learning on gender equality and gender mainstreaming.		

3.3 Lessons learnt

Lessons Learned

Coordination. Despite some good temporary practices, there was a lack of synergies between regional cooperation and other EU actions. This pertains to the coordination and complementarity of EU-funded actions with other development programmes (national and thematic) as well as the role of other institutions and agencies involved. Because adequate coordination systems did not exist, institutional memory was lost, efforts were duplicated, and lessons were not learned.

Project design. Due to an incoherent Theory of Change and an irrelevant result framework, the earlier projects could not adequately communicate their results. The lack of outcome indicators makes assessing the change in discourse, public awareness, and/or dialogue in Mindanao concerning trust-building and conflict transformation difficult. Despite the existence of these relevant data, neither the actions nor the studies commissioned by the EU used them as a baseline.

Choice and relevance of the Financing Instrument. The protracted conflicts in Mindanao were characterised by complex contextual factors not considered when 18-month-long interventions were rapidly and frequently launched. The multifaceted conflicts involving a range of stakeholders and beneficiaries in need of constant protection would have been better supported with long-term, joint implementation modality and adequate coordination mechanisms between the implementing partners and stakeholders.

Monitoring and Evaluations. While the EC and the implementing partners conducted numerous independent evaluation assignments, the internal and external coherence level was never appropriately monitored or evaluated. To this end, the justification of recommendations to follow with the same modality, strategies, and approaches that resulted, in some instances in five rounds of funding, was never questioned.

Cross-cutting issues. The certain important category of groups was never adequately defined, thus left behind for a relatively large implementation period. These include former women combatants and ethnic and religious minorities. Empowering these groups would be achieved by engaging and supporting peacebuilding, promoting gender-responsive, inclusive, and culturally sensitive legislation, policies, and programmes, and building the resilience of communities through collaborative socio-economic activities and inclusive community-based reconciliation mechanisms.

Annex I: TOR



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
Annex II: List of stakeholders consulted

Name	Organisation Represented	Interview Location	Date of Interview	Area of Concern	IcSP Project
	Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process Cotabato Director	Zoom	Feb 7	Coherence, Impact	The entire implementation process.
	Institute for Autonomy and Governance (IAG)	Zoom	Jan14	Sustainability of project	The entire implementation process.
	EU Delegation of the European Union to Indonesia and Brunei Darussalam Delegation of the European Union to ASEAN	Zoom	Feb.5	Overall implementation	Programme Officer and Communication Correspondent (ComCord) for International Partnerships
	Ateneo de Zamboanga Peace Center	Zoom	Jan. 9	Tawi-Tawi	DELACSE
	Tiyakap Kalilintad	Zoom	Jan. 9	Maguindanao / Lanao del Sur	UCP-NP
	Ministry of Public Order and Safety (MPOS)-BARMM	Cotabato City	Feb. 6	BARMM	UCP-NP
	Nonviolent Peaceforce		Feb. 6	BARMM	UCP-NP
	UVPN		Feb. 7	BARMM	CHD
	Noorus Salam, Inc	Davao City	Feb. 16	Lanao del Sur / Lanao del Norte	DELACSE
	Thuma, Inc.		Feb. 16		
	Kapamagogopa, Inc		Feb. 16		
	Kalimudan Foundation, Inc.		Feb. 16		
	Tarbilang Foundation, Inc		Feb. 17	Tawi-Tawi	
	Kapatut Bangsa Sug, Inc.		Feb. 17	Sulu	
	Bantey Basilan, Inc		Feb. 17	Basilan	
	OPAPP - Co-Chair, Joint Normalization Committee		Zoom	Feb. 20	
	MARADECA	Marawi City	Feb. 21	Lanao del Sur / Lanao del Norte	DELACSE
	Pakigdait	Iligan City	Feb. 22		CHD UCP-NP FSD DELACSE
	Magungaya Mindanao, Inc.	Zoom	Feb. 22		UCP-NP DELACSE

Name	Organisation Represented	Interview Location	Date of Interview	Area of Concern	IcSP Project
					CHD FSD
	FSD France	Cotabato City	Feb. 28	BARMM	FSD
	Joint Normalization Committee	Cotabato City	Mar. 3	BARMM	FSD
	Former Human Rights Expert to IMT	Zoom	Apr. 6	Coordination/Coherence	
FGD	Organization Represented	Interview Location	Date of Interview	Area of Concern	IcSP Project
	Young Centrists Union, Inc.	Cotabato City	Feb. 7	Maguindanao / North Cotabato	DELACSE
	United Bangsamoro Justice Party		Feb. 7		
	Institute of Bangsamoro Studies		Feb. 7		
	UNIPYO		Feb. 7		
	Young Centrists Union, Inc.		Feb. 7		
	EWER Marawi	Marawi City	Feb. 23		UCP-NP
	EWER Marawi		Feb. 23		UCP-NP
	EWER Marawi		Feb. 23		UCP-NP
	EWER Marawi		Feb. 23		UCP-NP
	EWER Marawi		Feb. 23		UCP-NP
	EWER Marawi		Feb. 23		UCP-NP
	EWER Marawi		Feb. 23		UCP-NP
	EWER Marawi		Feb. 23		UCP-NP

Total: 30. Men: 21, Women: 11

Graph of Stakeholders consulted disaggregated by origin



Stakeholders Map

The geographical scope of the evaluation is Mindanao/Bangsamoro in the Philippines. The type of stakeholders that have been identified for the Evaluation:

- Level One – duty bearers with visible Project decision-making authority based in Manila;
- Level Two – secondary duty bearers with direct responsibility over Project implementation.
- Level Three – right holders who are beneficiaries of Project activities and their informal and formal networks (IMG, WSB, Ulama, youth, teachers, etc.).
- Level Four – development partners and other peacebuilding stakeholders.

ABBREVIATION	FULL NAME	ROLE
GOVERNMENT		
AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines	The military forces of the Philippines.
ARMM	Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao	The precursor of the BARMM was created in 1989 and strengthened in 2001. It was replaced as an autonomous region of the Bangsamoro people in January 2019.
BARMM	Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao	An autonomous region in the Philippines, located in the southeastern portion of the island of Mindanao, was established with the passing of the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL) in January 2019, representing the Bangsamoro people.
DSWD	Department of Social Welfare and Development	The executive department of the Philippine Government is responsible for the protection of the social welfare of rights of Filipinos and for promoting social development. 16 local volunteers of the DSWD in Marawi were trained as Mine Risk Education (MRE) Providers in the aftermath of the Marawi Siege ⁵⁵ .
DepEd	Department of Education	The executive department of the Philippine government is responsible for ensuring access to, promoting equity in, and improving the quality of basic education. It is the main agency tasked to manage and govern the Philippine system of basic education. 20 local volunteers of DepEd in Marawi were trained as Mine Risk Education Providers in the aftermath of the Marawi Siege.
GPH	Government of the Philippines	An archipelagic country located in Southeast Asia, composed of over 7,000 islands, and has a unitary form of government.
MPOS-BARMM	Ministry of Public Order and Safety - Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao	The regional executive department of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao is responsible for affairs relating to public order and security in the region.

⁵⁵ See: Amnesty International (AI) On 23 May 2017, a firefight broke out between Philippine government forces and an alliance of IS-aligned militants in Marawi – a city of 200,000 in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, in the southern Philippines. Within a month, the conflict displaced 360,000 people in Marawi and surrounding areas. Hundreds, if not thousands, of civilians remained in the besieged city for weeks or months, either as hostages or trapped in the crossfire. The battle lasted for five months, and resulted in the mass displacement of civilians, the widespread destruction of civilian infrastructure, and the loss of civilian lives. According to official figures, 920 militants, 165 soldiers and 47 civilians were killed in the fighting, and more than 1,780 hostages were rescued from the IS-linked militants. But restrictions on access to Marawi during the conflict have precluded any independent corroboration of these numbers.

ABBREVIATION	FULL NAME	ROLE
OPAPP / OPAPRU	Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process / Office of the Presidential Adviser on Peace, Reconciliation, and Unity	A government agency which handles peace talks and negotiations related to internal conflict and rebellion in the Philippines, most notably the CPP-NPA-NDF and Moro conflicts.
PNP	Philippine National Police	The law enforcement agency of the Philippines.
TFBM	Task Force Bangon Marawi	A government inter-agency task force group was organized to facilitate the rehabilitation, recovery, and reconstruction efforts in Marawi City after the Marawi Siege.
NON-STATE ACTORS		
ASG	Abu Sayyaf Group	A Jihadist militant and pirate group operating in Western Mindanao.
BIAF	Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces	The military arm of the MILF.
BIFF	Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters	An Islamist militant organization. It is a smaller player in the overall Moro insurgency in the Philippines and is mostly active in Maguindanao and other places in central Mindanao.
BIWAB	Bangsamoro Islamic Women's Auxiliary Brigade	The non-combatant support group of the BIAF.
DI - Lanao	Dawlah Islamiyah - Lanao	A radical Islamist group composed of former Moro Islamic Liberation Front guerrillas and foreign fighters led by Omar Maute and responsible for the Marawi Siege.
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front	The largest militant organization in the Philippines seeks autonomy for Filipino Muslims.
MNLF	Moro National Liberation Front	Precursor of the MILF is a political organization in the Philippines. It was the leading organization among Moro separatists for about two decades, beginning in the 1970s.
UBJP	United Bangsamoro Justice Party	A political party based in Mindanao, which is affiliated with the MILF.
QUASI GOVERNMENT BODIES		
AHJAG	Ad-Hoc Joint Action Group	The cooperative mechanism between the GPH and the MILF that responds to criminality and terrorism in areas with MILF presence.
CCCH	Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities	The cooperative mechanism between the GPH and the MILF ensures that the terms of the ceasefire agreement between both parties are observed on the ground.
IDB	Independent Decommissioning Body	A body created by the GPH and MILF to oversee the process of decommissioning MILF forces and weapons. It is a key component of the normalization structure in accordance with the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro.
JNC	Joint Normalization Committee	The cooperative mechanism between the GPH and the MILF, tasked with establishing a functional

ABBREVIATION	FULL NAME	ROLE
		system and effective mechanisms for coordinating all components of the normalization process.
JPSC	Joint Peace and Security Committee	The cooperative mechanism between the GPH and the MILF, part of the security component under the normalization track of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro and is tasked to ensure peace and security in mutually-agreed areas by the GPH and MILF.
JPST	Joint Peace and Security Team	The operating units of the JPSC are composed of AFP, PNP, and BIAF personnel. 20 JPST personnel were trained as MRE instructors in the aftermath of the Marawi Siege.
TPMT	Third-Party Monitoring Team	Body jointly set up by the GPH and MILF to monitor the implementation of the GPH-MILF peace agreement, as provided for in the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) signed on 15 October 2012.
INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS		
IMT	International Monitoring Team	A monitoring team composed of 60 members composed of representatives from various countries that monitor the implementation of peace between the GPH and the MILF.
ICG	International Contact Group	An informal, non-permanent international body that is created ad hoc with the purpose of coordinating international actors in their aim of managing a peace and security crisis in the Philippines. The ICG of Mindanao was composed of four states and four international NGOs.
ACADEMIA		
IPDM	Institute for Peace and Development in Mindanao	A unit of the Mindanao State University System (MSUS) found in its seven major campuses mandated to institutionalize and integrate peace into basic and tertiary education, as well as linking academia with multi-sector stakeholders through peace education, peace research, and peace action.
API	Ateneo Peace Institute	A unit of the Ateneo de Zamboanga University that is mandated to coordinate, develop, implement, and monitor peace education programs in all levels of instruction and formation in the curricular and co-curricular areas of the university. Has programs related to developing a culture of peace in various government, non-government, sectarian communities, military, and other non-school entities
EU SERVICES		
	Frank Robert	Coordinated FPI-managed projects in the Philippines until August 2021
	Eduardo Manfredini	Managed FPI projects supporting the peace process with the MILF in Mindanao from the Delegation in Metro Manila until the post was cut.
	Pierard Cedric	Managed the first generation of IcSP projects in 2017

Annex III: Literature and documentation consulted

I. EU Documents

- Project “Accompanying the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in Transition” implemented by the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies.
- Documents pertaining to the Donor coordination in the Philippines in the area of Counter-Terrorism and Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism (CT and P/CVE), driven by the USA and Australia, started in August 2018 and culminated in November 2020
- EU Multiannual Indicative Programme (MIP) for the Philippines (2014-2020).
- Multiannual financial framework 2021-2027 and Next Generation EU.

II. Country and Regional Reports/Documents

Articles:

- Bridge over troubled water? The IcSP and the security-development nexus in EU external policy. German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE). 2018.
- The MoA-AD Debacle – An Analysis of Individuals’ Voices, Provincial Propaganda and National Disinterest, in Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 29, 1, 121-144.
- Step by Step: How a Group of Former Women Combatants are Moving Towards Peace. The Philippines. Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP). June 2022.
- Evaluation of the Nonviolent Peaceforce Project with the Civilian Protection Component of the International Monitoring Team in Mindanao, Philippines. C. Gündüz and R. Torralba
- Transitional Justice Monitor Vol 1 Issue 1. by Initiatives for International Dialogue. Mar 27, 2023
- Transitional Justice and Reconciliation in and Beyond the Bangsamoro by Initiatives for International Dialogue. Dec 6, 2022.
- An explosive cocktail Counter-terrorism, militarisation and Authoritarianism in the Philippines A. Arugay M. Batac and J. Street

III. Methodological Tools

- Manual for gender audit facilitators: The ILO participatory gender audit methodology (2nd Edition). ILO
- Assessment of EU support to the peace process in Southern Philippines under the Instrument for Stability. Final Report, February 2012.

IV. Project Documents

1) Project IcSP/2017/384-788 “Promoting Stability and Peace In the Bangsamoro Region and the Sulu Archipelago”, Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue.

1. Grant Application Form (Description of Action) of the project IcSP/2017/384-788.
2. Budget of the project IcSP/2017/384-788.
3. Logframe matrix of the project IcSP/2017/384-788.
4. Addendum no. 1 to Grant Contract no ICSP/2017/384-788.
5. Revised budget of the project IcSP/2017/384-788 (addenda or use of contingencies).
6. Final Narrative Report, 1 April 2017-31 March 2018, IcSP/2017/384-788.
7. Logframe Matrix to the Final Narrative Report of the project IcSP/2017/384-788.
8. Report on Factual Findings “Promoting Stability and Peace in The Bangsamoro Region and Sulu Archipelago” (Final Financial and Audit Report), April 1, 2017 - March 31, 2018. IcSP/2017/384-788.

2) Project IcSP/2018/398-199 “Fostering a Sustainable Peace Process in the Bangsamoro”, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue.

9. Grant Contract with Special Conditions. IcSP/2018/398-199
10. Annex 1 to the Grant Contract. Description of action. IcSP/2018/398-199.
11. Annex 2 to the Grant Contract. Budget for the action. IcSP/2018/398-199.
12. Logframe matrix to the Project IcSP/2018/398-199.
13. Addendum # 1 to the Grant Contract, IcSP/2018/398-199.
14. Amended Description of Action (add.# 1), IcSP/2018/398-199.
15. Amended Budget for the Action (add. #1), IcSP/2018/398-199.
16. Amended Logframe matrix (add.# 1), IcSP/2018/398-199.
17. Interim Narrative Report, 1 August 2018 – 31 July 2019, IcSP/2018/398-199.
18. Logframe Matrix to the Interim Narrative Report. IcSP/2018/398-199.
19. Final Narrative Report, 1 August 2018 – 31 July 2020, IcSP/2018/398-199.
20. Annexes to the Final Report (Annex 1a – Updated Logframe, Annex 2 – Evaluation Report, Annex 3 – Latest Submitted Contingency Plan, Annex 4 – Publications), IcSP/2018/398-199.
21. Final report “External Evaluation of HD’s Work in the Philippines Under ‘Fostering a Sustainable Peace Process in the Bangsamoro’ supported by the European Union’s Instrument for Stability (IfS) and (subsequently) by the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), 2012-2020”, 19 November 2020.

3) Project IcSP/2017/383-945 “Democratic Leadership and Active Civil Society Empowerment in Bangsamoro (DELACSE Bangsamoro Project)”. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. (KAS) and Institute for Autonomy and Governance (IAG).

22. Grant Contract with Special Conditions. IcSP/2017/383-945.
23. Annex 1 to the Grant Contract. Description of action. IcSP/2017/383-945.
24. Annexes 2, 4, 6, and 7 to the Grant Contract. (General conditions, Procurement, Payment request, reports templates and ToR Expenditure Verification) IcSP/2017/383-945.
25. Annex 3 to the Grant Contract. Budget. IcSP/2017/383-945.
26. Final Narrative Report, 01.03.2017 - 31.03.2018, IcSP/2017/383-945.
27. Logframe matrix Annex to the Final Narrative Report. IcSP/2017/383-945.
28. Final evaluation report, 28 February 2018. IcSP/2017/383-945.

4) Project IcSP/2018/398-191 “Democratic Leadership and Active Civil Society Empowerment in the Bangsamoro - Phase 2 (DELACSE Bangsamoro)”, IAG (Institute of Autonomy and Governance), KAS (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Philippines) and IID (Initiatives for International Dialogue)

29. Grant Contract with Special Conditions of the project IcSP/2018/398-191.
30. Annex 1 to the Grant Contract. Description of the action, IcSP/2018/398-191.
31. Annex 2 to the Grant Contract. Budget of the project IcSP/2018/398-191.
32. Logframe matrix of the project IcSP/2018/398-191.
33. Interim Narrative Report, 01 August 2018-31 July 2019. IcSP /2018/398-191.
34. Updated Logframe matrix to the interim report. IcSP/2018/398-191.
35. Final Narrative Report, 01.08.2018-31.07.2020. IcSP/2018/398-191
36. Updated final sources to the budget, IcSP/2018/398-191.
37. Updated Logical Framework for the Final Report IcSP/2018/398-191.
38. Project Evaluation Report, IcSP/2018/398-191 “Democratic Leadership and Active Civil Society Empowerment in the Bangsamoro - Phase 2 (DELACSE Bangsamoro)”, 15 July 2020.

5) Project IcSO 2017/383-944 “Mine Action Support to the Implementation of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Balsamaro”, Association FSD France.

39. Grant contract with Special Conditions, IcSO 2017/383-944.

40. Annex 1 to the Grant Contract. Description of action. IcSO 2017/383-944.
41. Annex 2 to the Grant Contract. Budget for the action. IcSO 2017/383-944.
42. Addendum #1 to the Grant Contract. IcSO 2017/383-944.
43. Amended Description of action (addendum #1). IcSO 2017/383-944.
44. Budget with amendments (Addendum #1). IcSO 2017/383-944.
45. Logframe matrix of the project (addendum # 1), IcSO 2017/383-944.
46. Final narrative report. 01 May 2017 – 31 July 2018. IcSO 2017/383-944.
47. Logframe matrix annex to the final narrative report. IcSO 2017/383-944.
48. Final Project Evaluation Report. 8 November 2018. IcSO 2017/383-944.

6) Project IcSP/2018/398-196 “Mine Action Support to Strengthen Peace and Stability in Mindanao”, Association FSD-F.

49. Grant contract with Special conditions, IcSP/2018/398-196.
50. Annex 1 to the Grant Contract. Description of the action. IcSP/2018/398-196.
51. Annex 2 to the Grant Contract. Budget of the action. IcSP/2018/398-196.
52. Logframe matrix of the project. IcSP/2018/398-196.
53. Addendum #1 to Grant Contract, IcSP/2018/398-196.
54. Addendum #2 to Grant Contract, IcSP/2018/398-196.
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56. Revised Budget of the action, Addendum #1, IcSP/2018/398-196.
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59. Interim Narrative Report, 01/08/2018-31/07/2019. IsSP/2018/398-196.
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61. Annex A to the Final Narrative Report. Logframe matrix. IcSP/2018/398-196.
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64. External evaluation Report of the Mine Action Support to Strengthen Peace and Stability in Mindanao, Southern Philippines, IcSP/2018/398-196, FSD, January 2020.

7) Project IcSP/2017/383-403 “Foster Sustainable Peace and Human Security In Conflict-affected areas of Central and Western Mindanao, Philippines”, Nonviolent Peaceforce.

65. Grant Contract with Special Conditions, IcSP/2017/383-403.
66. Annex 1 to the Grant Contract. Description of action. IcSP/2017/383-403.
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68. Logframe matrix of the project IcSP/2017/383-403.
69. Addendum #1 to the Grant Contract. IcSP/2017/383-403.
70. Amended Logframe (Addendum# 1). IcSP/2017/383-403.
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76. Annex 1 to the Grant Contract. Description of action. IcSP/2018/398-197
77. Annex 2 to the Grant Contract. Budget of the action. IcSP/2018/398-197
78. Logframe matrix to the Project IcSP/2018/398-197.
79. Addendum # 1 to the Grant Contract. IcSP/2018/398-197.
80. Explanatory Note to the Grant Contract Addendum.
81. Amended budget (addendum # 1). IcSP/2018/398-197.
82. Amended Description of Action (addendum # 1). IcSP/2018/398-197.

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85. Updated logframe matrix annexe to the final narrative report. IcSP/2018/398-197.
86. Endline Study “Strengthening Civilian Protection Towards Sustaining Peace and Promoting Community Resilience and Social Cohesion in Mindanao”, Nonviolent Peaceforce, April 2021.
87. Impact Evaluation Report “Strengthening Civilian Protection Towards Sustaining Peace and Promoting Community Resilience and Social Cohesion in Mindanao”, IcSP/2018/398-197.

Annex VI : Detailed answer by judgement criteria

Judgement criteria (JC)	Evaluation criteria covered
EQ1. 1. Were the interventions aligned with the beneficiaries, stakeholders, and partners' needs in accordance with the correct understanding of the conflict situation?	
	Relevance
JC 1.1 Evidence of identification of most-at-risk groups (with source and beyond generic mentions)	<p>EU efforts streamlined Human Rights issues within the important monitoring mechanisms.</p> <p>EU support was also timely, and with the assistance of the EU's IcSP funding, actors in Marawi were able to quickly address the impact of violent conflict in the short term.</p>
JC 1.2. - Evidence of 'do no harm' risks, and mitigation strategies identified, especially regarding the participation of women, girls, and other vulnerable groups.	<p>The EU-funded actions were essential to support the role of the CSO community at the height of the peace talks between the government and MILF.</p> <p>Besides meeting the needs of beneficiaries, and stakeholders, the interventions also extended their support to places where the government or armed forces did not have access or lacked technical expertise.</p>
JC 1.3. The extent of the project design concerning the needs of the partner institution and beneficiaries.	<p>The programmatic approaches of established IfS/IcSP implementing partners remained unchanged for a long period despite a frequently shifting context in Mindanao.</p> <p>There was an unclear and uneven use of conflict analysis in the project design.</p>
EQ2. How well did the projects meet the objectives outlined in the IcSP regulation?	
	Relevance
JC 2.1. The extent to which the interventions aligned with the EU's peacebuilding strategy (adequacy of the design and the ToC).	<p>Ceasefire violations between GPH and MILF decreased, incidents of attacks to civilian properties also went down, and the cases of civilian casualties resulting from GPH-MILF conflict decreased”.</p> <p>A critical mass of the affected population was educated, and territories were cleared of mines. The cascaded support provided by various EU-funded initiatives contributed to stabilising the situation, paving the way for peaceful transitions to occur.</p>
JC 2.2. To what extent was the intervention compatible with programmes implemented by other donors in the fields of human rights at the federal and provincial levels	<p>IcSP had a number of functional interfaces, including with CSDP missions and DG ECHO, but that synergies between IcSP action and other instruments were hampered by a lack of flexibility and the lengthy procedures of most financing instruments (e.g. DCI, ENI, IPA II, EIDHR, as well as in the EDF and EU Trust Funds).</p>
EQ 3. To what extent were the projects' activities and results coherent, particularly for projects that are a continuation of prior actions?	
	Coherence

JC 3.1 To what extent the continuing support was justified?	<p>The factor that supported the continuous support is that the majority of initial EU-funded projects focused on addressing the symptoms of conflict rather than its causes, so partners continued the work to reach the high-level and ambitious goals.</p> <p>The flexibility and relatively small budgets of the IcSP might be one of the essential characteristics that ensured this financing instrument's continuity.</p>
EQ 4. To what extent were these projects coherent with/complementary to other EU- and internationally-supported action in this area?	
Coherence	
JC 4.1 Contributions of IcSP to multilateral approaches to conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and stabilisation	Assessment of internal policy coherence from a horizontal perspective was challenging because many development partners, including the EU, implemented interventions covering development, military and security policies. This is why the humanitarian-development-peace nexus needs strong coherence.
EQ 5. How have the projects ensured the sustainability of their results or achievements?	
Sustainability	
JC 5.1 Extend to which the attitudes, supported institutions and structures created and sustained peaceful societies.	<p>Sustainability efforts were primarily focused on empowering individuals at the grassroots level.</p> <p>The sustainability of the Early Warning and Early Response aspects of Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping relies heavily on understanding the importance of the processes and linkage between the existing local monitoring networks and the appropriate governmental agencies.</p>
JC 5.2. Evidence of changes (pre/post) in institutional capacities and implementation as reflected through operational policies, operating procedures	The majority of the evaluated actions did not have an effective exit strategy and did not assess whether the ownership and political will were sufficient to assume responsibility for the processes established as part of the projects.
EQ6. 6. Which features have proven or remain useful or operational as intended at present, and to what extent?	
Sustainability	
JC 6.1 Availability and adequacy of the budget required for continuing the enhancements, improvements, and developed capacities	The degree of sustained capacities and ownership of the projects was affected by the limited funding available to sustain the results. Moreover, an earlier evaluation provides that community-based organisations face major capacity problems. They would not be able to function properly without the proactive accompaniment of (international and) experienced local partners.
JC 6.2. The extent to which benefits continue to be generated for all categories of end beneficiaries (women, children, minorities, transgender communities, persons with disabilities, religious minorities, and persons living with HIV/AIDs)	The desk review findings indicate that projects missed opportunities to include former women combatants, for example, by empowering them to engage and support peacebuilding, promotion of gender-responsive, inclusive, and culturally sensitive legislation, policies, and programmes, and building the resilience of communities through collaborative socio-economic activities and inclusive community-based reconciliation mechanisms.

EQ7. To what extent have the overall support led to the desired change, including in the transformation of discourse, increased public awareness, and/or enhanced dialogue in relation to trust-building and conflict transformation in Mindanao?	
Impact	
JC 7.1 To what extent the intervention succeeded in achieving its overall objectives	The overall objective of the projects was too ambitious, and the outcome results were outside the sphere of influence of the Implementing Partners (IPs). The projects did indeed deliver mid-term results as intended, but the expected overall changes from these particular set of actions did not address drivers of conflict
EQ 8. To what extent has the overall support, by way of the evaluated actions, contributed to building the capacities of beneficiaries and stakeholders as reflected after the assignment's end?	
Impact	
JC 8.1 To what extent the intervention facilitated enhanced capacities of partner institutions to deliver their mandate	IcSP has contributed to the reduction in direct violence at the community level and prepared the ground for other EU-funded actions to be implemented effectively.
EQ 9. What is the strategic significance of EU support for actions in Mindanao, particularly through the IcSP, versus other EU channels of support and funding?	
Evaluation criteria covered	EU-added value
JC 9.1 The extent to which the best EU Practices were addressed in the design and implementation	The EU has a distinct advantage over other development partners in that it has the capability to reach broad acceptance and buy-in at top government levels and can align and standardise the process.
JC 9.2. The extent to which the continuous decade support affected the Peace process	The EU was one of a core group of external actors that provided necessary political and financial support for the peace processes and assisted the parties in overcoming obstacles during the peace negotiations and in the implementation of the peace accord.
EQ 11. To what extent do the IcSP interventions add benefits to what would have resulted from the EU's other forms of support and other donor's interventions?	
Eu-Added Value and other Cross-cutting issues	
JC 11. The extent to which the Project complements the other MS's interventions	An adequate strategic framework and overarching normative principles are needed to guide coordination mechanisms in order to achieve coherence. Such a framework and principles can serve to overcome unavoidable conflicts of interest between different institutional actors.
JC 11.2. Extend to which these eight projects have collectively increased the role of women in the peace process	Rather than mainstreaming the features of cross-cutting issues such as gender equality, empowerment, and environmental sustainability, IcSP's projects missed out on the opportunity to mainstream the attributes of these cross-cutting issues. In spite of several rounds of applicable EU's Gender Action Plan with a specific result framework addressing gender equality and empowerment, it is impossible to assess the impact of the actions on these vulnerable groups, including former women combatants and ethnic and religious minorities.
JC 11.3 Extend to which these eight projects have collectively increased the role of ethnic and religious minorities, and youth in the Peace Process	

Annex VII : Evaluation matrix with data gathered and analysed by judgment criteria indicator

EQ1. 1. Were the interventions aligned with the beneficiaries, stakeholders, and partners' needs in accordance with the correct understanding of the conflict situation?		
Evaluation criteria covered	Relevance	
Judgement criteria (JC)	Indicators	
JC 1.1 Evidence of identification of most-at-risk groups (with source and beyond generic mentions)	1.1.1 - Evidence of 'do no harm' risks, and mitigation strategies identified, especially regarding the participation of women, girls, and other vulnerable groups.	<p>The interviewed informants stated that the mainstreaming of gender perspectives was primarily achieved through greater representation of women and youth in project activities. However, the desk study of the project reports indicates that gender mainstreaming and gender equality are two concepts that implementing partners overly misinterpreted. For example, results reporting on gender equality would only be measured by the number of women attending training and workshops. In addition, earlier EU-funded interventions did not comply with the mandatory Gender Mark during design and implementation.</p>
JC 1.2. - Evidence of 'do no harm' risks, and mitigation strategies identified, especially regarding the participation of women, girls, and other vulnerable groups.	<p>1.2.2 -Number of situational analyses undertaken of key social, legal, economical, practical, and normative barriers impacting women and girls, ethnic and religious minorities.</p> <p>1.2.3. Number/share of most-at-risk groups targeted by Project</p>	<p>The projects tried to enhance women's participation in activities, such as community orientations or trainings, seeking balanced numbers between women, men, and young people. However, representative participation of women in public forums, especially in communities where traditionally women are less likely to be given the floor if men are also present, continues to be a major challenge. Considering this was and remained a common challenge for implementing partners, a more deliberate approach to design activities that reflect good practices in gender empowerment was absent in the earlier projects.</p>
JC 1.3. The extent of the project design concerning the needs of the partner institution and beneficiaries.	<p>1.3.1. Evidence of targeting strategies for the partner institutions.</p> <p>1.3.2. Evidence of situational analysis</p>	

	undertaken of key social, legal, economic, practical, and normative barriers impacting women and girls' human rights.	
EQ2. How well did the projects meet the objectives outlined in the IcSP regulation?		
Evaluation criteria covered	Relevance	
Judgement criteria (JC)	Indicators	
JC 2.1 The extent to which the interventions aligned with the EU's peacebuilding strategy (adequacy of the design and the ToC).	2.1.1. Evidence of strategic framework for the promotion of Peace in Mindanao	The EU services will continue to have difficulty achieving stable peace unless a clear strategic framework is established that places policy coherence at the centre of its external action and specifies the division of labour among all stakeholders. Therefore, in order to coordinate future actions better, it is necessary to examine the underlying challenges that have affected the EU's engagement in fragile and conflict-affected countries.
JC 2.2. To what extent was the intervention compatible with programmes implemented by other donors in the fields of human rights at the federal and provincial levels	2.2.1. Number of coordinated programmes with other development partners 2.2.2. Status of donor coordination mechanisms.	<p>Synergies were mostly created around funding and co-funding (for example, via the MTF), delegated cooperation (with UNDP, Spain and GIZ), or through funding of implementing INGOs with a track record in local coordination and mobilisation of funding from different international partners to supplement funding received from the EU.</p> <p>The implementing partners reported that while developing initiatives, EU staff specifically sought to ensure that implementing partners did not duplicate project activities. For example, a ROM report conducted in 2016 found a high degree of complementarity of EU-supported interventions in areas such as community security or women's empowerment with activities implemented by the Asia Foundation, the UK, Australia, UNDP, and other development donors and agencies who were involved in projects in Mindanao, to support the peace talks between the Government of the Philippines and MILF. However, the present evaluation could not triangulate the findings of the ROM because there was no institutional memory to assess and no contacts available to engage with on this.</p> <p>The respondents to the present evaluation stated that there had been little inter-agency coordination among the implementing partners, even though international donors shared the common goal of supporting the Bangsamoro Peace Process. The only relevant coordination and convergence platform in Mindanao where many of these implementing partners interacted was the Mindanao</p>

		Humanitarian Team (MHT), an arm of UN-OCHA's Humanitarian Country Team (HCT).
EQ 3. To what extent were the projects' activities and results coherent, particularly for projects that are a continuation of prior actions?		
Evaluation criteria covered	Coherence	
Judgement criteria (JC)	Indicators	
JC 3.1 To what extent the continuing support was justified?	3.1.1. Number of recommendations supporting the continuation. 3.3.2. Number of requests from the national stakeholders. 3.3.3. Sample results that could justify the continuation would enhance the impact.	All respondents in this evaluation have recommended the continuation of the projects of the implementing partners, in as far as the programmatic approaches or technologies that these partners are utilizing. It is of secondary consideration if such projects are funded by the IcSP or another. NP continues to scale up the establishment and operationalisation of the EWER mechanism to more conflict-prone and conflict-affected communities as violent conflict continues in many parts of the BARMM, particularly connected to the rise of terrorism and violent extremism. However, MPOS-BARMM does not yet have the government funding and the technical capacity to absorb the EWER mechanisms into their structure in a way that it remains consistent to its design.
EQ 4. To what extent were these projects coherent with/complementary to other EU- and internationally-supported action in this area?		
Evaluation criteria covered	Coherence	
Judgement criteria (JC)	Indicators	
JC 4.1 Contributions of IcSP to multilateral approaches to conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and stabilisation	4.1.1. Number of activities from the National or Regional action Plans supported.	Even though the IcSP appears to carry out this “bridging” role, there were also challenges in terms of coordination with other instruments such as EIDHR, DCI, ENI, IPA (Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance) II, EDF and EU Trust Funds. There was insufficient evidence to confirm that the projects were coordinated or coherent with other EU and international efforts. No data could be used from the desk review to assess how the earlier projects ensured synergies and complementarities with other development interventions.
EQ 5. How have the projects ensured the sustainability of their results or achievements?		
Evaluation criteria covered	Sustainability	
Judgement criteria (JC)	Indicators	
JC 5.1 Extend to which the attitudes, supported institutions and structures created and	5.1.1. PHP index on Positive Peace	Sustainability efforts were primarily focused on empowering individuals at the grassroots level and limited to community capacity building through stand-alone trainings. The limited funding available to sustain the results also affected the sustained capacities and ownership of the projects.

sustained peaceful societies.		
JC 5.2. Evidence of changes (pre/post) in institutional capacities and implementation as reflected through operational policies, operating procedures	5.2.1 Perception of the beneficiaries on inclusiveness, well-being, and happiness.	While the objective of establishing an Early Warning and Early Response of Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping was broadly achieved, it heavily depends on sustained human and financial resources, genuine political will from all stakeholders to continue the work, quality of local monitoring, and coordination between the networks and the appropriate governmental agencies.
EQ6. 6. Which features have proven or remain useful or operational as intended at present, and to what extent?		
Evaluation criteria covered	Sustainability	
Judgement criteria (JC)	Indicators	
JC 6.1 Availability and adequacy of the budget required for continuing the enhancements, improvements, and developed capacities	6.1.1. Number of institutionalised training curricula supported with human and financial resources.	While various capability-building interventions produced a pool of catalysts for peace, respondents stated that it is unclear if the partner agencies are committed to continuously "re-seeding" this pool by using their resources to conduct follow-up trainings. And while these agencies have recognised, accepted, and even duplicated the interventions of the IcSP projects - in unarmed civilian protection, early warning-early response mechanisms, and participatory governance - it is unclear to the respondents if the capacitated CSOs and local structures have applied their learnings, or if there are platforms already set up to push sustainability of these interventions forward. They are also unaware if government agencies have passed policies and local ordinances to sustain these initiatives.
JC 6.2. The extent to which benefits continue to be generated for all categories of end beneficiaries (women, children, minorities, transgender communities, persons with disabilities, religious minorities, and persons living	6.2.1. Number of interventions carried out post closure for reaching end beneficiaries	<p>Respondents assert that the EWER mechanism of NP remains most valuable, as members of the community utilise these mechanisms themselves in responding to community-based horizontal conflicts that may occur (especially land conflicts, clan feuds, and terrorism), despite the positive gains attained by the Bangsamoro Peace Process.</p> <p>FSD's primary goal of establishing a mine action centre managed by the government in Mindanao failed. Many of the government officials and MILF members engaged by FSD for the Mindanao Peace Process were unaware of how mine risk education is delivered and how mine risk action is institutionalised. Mine risk education is not seen as part of the normalisation process and was not completely appreciated within the Joint Normalisation Committee, specifically under the Joint Peace and Security Committee (JPST).</p>

with HIV/AIDS)		
EQ7. To what extent have the overall support led to the desired change, including in the transformation of discourse, increased public awareness, and/or enhanced dialogue in relation to trust-building and conflict transformation in Mindanao?		
Evaluation criteria covered	Impact	
Judgement criteria (JC)	Indicators	
JC 7.1 To what extent the intervention succeeded in achieving its overall objectives	7.1.1. Country score according to the Global Peace Index (GPI) Negative Peace indicator on the intensity of the organised internal conflict.	The Philippines is ranked 139th in the Global Peace Index of 2016 and was ranked 129th 2020. Though there is a 10-point improvement in ranking, its 139th rank is rated as “low”, while its 129th rank is rated as “very low,” which means that there are more factors contributing to the state or “unpeace” in the Philippines in 2020 than there were in 2016.
EQ 8. To what extent has the overall support, by way of the evaluated actions, contributed to building the capacities of beneficiaries and stakeholders as reflected after the assignment's end?		
Evaluation criteria covered	Impact	
Judgement criteria (JC)	Indicators	
JC 8.1 To what extent the intervention facilitated enhanced capacities of partner institutions to deliver their mandate	8.1.1. Number of professionals on demining. 8.1.2. Number of capacitated peace negotiations available. 8.1.3. Number of early warning mechanisms available (including scope and scale). 8.1.4. Number of operationalised SALW programmes within the law enforcement agencies.	The degree of sustained capacities and ownership of the projects was affected by the limited funding available to sustain the results. Moreover, an earlier evaluation provides that community-based organisations face major capacity problems. They would not be able to function properly without the proactive accompaniment of (international and) experienced local partners. After ten years of accompaniment, as one interviewee explained, communities have learned how to connect horizontally and deal with conflict issues. However, they are not yet sufficiently equipped to connect these activities and build information exchanges, including the conflict early warning system, vertically with local government and higher levels in the administration. Moreover, own resources to do, for example, peace monitoring work at a local level, were absent .
EQ 9. What is the strategic significance of EU support for actions in Mindanao, particularly through the IcSP, versus other EU channels of support and funding?		
Evaluation criteria covered	EU-added value	

Judgement criteria (JC)	Indicators	
JC 9.1 The extent to which the best EU Practices were addressed in the design and implementation	9.1.1. Type and Number of EU/MS best practices introduced	<p>The EU is recognised as a neutral and capable actor with great political weight, especially compared to regional actors, who were – according to the interviewed – generally not trusted, as they are perceived to pursue their own economic and strategic interests. The EU’s neutrality and expertise bring credibility, and the EU is seen as a serious interlocutor which can interact with all actors. Several interviewees urged the EU to play a more active role diplomatically and put pressure on all parties to finalise a peace agreement soon .</p> <p>The interviewed stakeholders stated that the EU provided non-biased support to the peacebuilding process compared to any other bilateral agreement. Another significant factor was continued support from EU-funded interventions over three administrations. In addition, it was admired how the EU-funded intervention held the line on promoting and protecting Human Rights principles during President Duterte’s administration.</p>
JC 9.2. The extent to which the continuous decade support affected the Peace process	9.2.1. Perception of national stakeholders on the EU-funded interventions 9.2.2. Perception of development partners.	

EQ 11. To what extent do the IcSP interventions add benefits to what would have resulted from the EU's other forms of support and other donor's interventions?		
Evaluation criteria covered	Eu-Added Value and Other Cross-cutting Issues	
Judgement criteria (JC)	Indicators	
JC 11. The extent to which the Project complements the other MS's interventions	11.1.1. Number of jointly completed activities or interventions	<p>The mainstreaming of gender perspectives was primarily achieved through greater representation of women and youth in project activities. However, the desk study of the project reports indicates that gender mainstreaming and gender equality are two concepts that implementing partners overly misinterpreted. For example, results reporting on gender equality would only be measured by the number of women attending training and workshops. In addition, earlier EU-funded interventions did not comply with the mandatory Gender Mark during design and implementation.</p>
JC 11.2. Extend to which these eight projects have collectively increased the role of women in the peace process	11.2.1. Number of women supported by the IcSPs	
JC 11.3 Extend to which these eight projects have collectively increased the role of ethnic and religious minorities, and youth in the Peace Process	11.3.1. Number/share of most-at-risk groups targeted by Project	<p>The projects tried to enhance women’s participation in activities, such as community orientations or trainings, seeking balanced numbers between women, men, and young people. However, representative participation of women in public forums, especially in communities where traditionally women are less likely to be given the floor if men are also present, continues to be a major challenge. Considering this was and remained a common challenge for implementing partners, a more deliberate approach to design activities that reflect good practices in gender empowerment was absent in the earlier projects.</p>

		At present, the local and regional government structures engaged in project activities now ensure the inclusion of women and youth in decision-making processes, including women's participation in political exercises. Moreover, in some cases, women who currently participate in project activities and attend government decision-making processes bring their husbands along to appreciate and recognise women's roles in the community.
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Evidence Log

Indicator	Baseline data 2017	Evidence gathered/analysed (A composite index measuring the peacefulness of countries made up of 23 quantitative and qualitative indicators, each weighted on a scale of 1-5. The lower the score, the more peaceful the country.)	Quality of Evidence
1.1.1. Global Peace Index ⁵⁶	Overall score 2.46 Global average 2.459	Evidence produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP). The Global Peace Index (GPI) is the world's leading measure of global peacefulness. The report on the Philippines presents the most comprehensive data-driven analysis to date on trends in Peace, its economic value, and how to develop peaceful societies. For 2022, the Global average is 2.339/5, and the overall score is 2.34.	2
1.1.2. Country Ranking	136 out 163	In 2022, the country ranking by 125 out of 163	2
1.1.3. Number of battle deaths from internal conflict.	3.028/5	In 2023, the country ranking has improved to 2.361	2

⁵⁶ See: <https://www.visionofhumanity.org/maps/#/>

Annex VIII: Intervention Logic/Logical Framework

IMPACT

People enjoy stability, inclusivity, and peace in the Bangsamoro Region, including the Sulu Archipelago

OUTCOMES	Reduced number of armed conflicts	More gender-responsive inclusive, climate- and conflict-sensitive and sustainable management of land	Enhanced and gender-responsive early warning, early action and response to crisis, disasters, and conflicts
	ASSUMPTION: Government has an adequate understanding that strong local governance can foster long-term, sustainable peace		

OUTCOME INDICATORS	Perception of population of the effectiveness of non-violent mechanism for dispute resolution	Existence of locally based organizations that contribute to effective dialogue with central authorities and security actors	Number of women or members of underrepresented groups included in the peace process
	ASSUMPTION: The project design is based on adequate conflict analysis and the strategies used address the root causes		



OUTPUTS	Clans, barangays, and leaders are capacitated to resolve disputes peacefully through community level mediation	Capacities are built to maintain stability and peace and order in the Bangsamoro.	Communities supporting and monitoring agreements on civilian protection, peace, and human security at the local and political levels
	Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) is managed and reduced	Responsive, inclusive, participatory, and representative decision-making is promoted	Capacities of local partners and key stakeholders in protection, conflict prevention and response are strengthened
ASSUMPTION: The project design is based on adequate conflict analysis and the strategies used address the root causes			



APPROACHES & STRATEGIES	Continuous high-level dialogue between the parties and key stakeholders, capacity building, advocacy, mediation, monitoring of the peace process, inclusion of women and vulnerable groups and members of armed groups in the peace process.
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Annex IX: Relevant geographic map(s) where the intervention took place




Figure 5. Map of the BARMM where IcSP Interventions took place.

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P.O. Box 4175
3006 AD Rotterdam
The Netherlands

Watermanweg 44
3067 GG Rotterdam
The Netherlands

T +31 (0)10 453 88 00
F +31 (0)10 453 07 68

Registration no. 24316726

W www.ecorys.nl

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