

**The 10th European Development Fund
(EDF X)**

*Mid Term Review of the Project:
Trade Related Assistance and Quality
Enabling Programme (TRAQUE) - Ghana*

(GH/FED/22200, CRIS N° 022/200)

*FWC Beneficiary 2013 — Lot 10
Specific Contract Nr 2016/373009,
Ref. Ares (2016) 1584718 - 04/04/2016*

Final Report – Revised Version 5



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DELEGATION of the EUROPEAN UNION to GHANA

GHANA

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**FWC BENEf 2013 - Lot 10 – Trade, Standards and Private Sector
EuropeAid/132633/C/SER/Multi**

Final Report

Revised version 5

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Table of Contents

GLOSSARY	II
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	IV
1. INTRODUCTION	7
1.1 EVALUATION OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE	7
1.2 EVALUATION OBJECTIVES & RESULTS	7
1.3 EVALUATION METHODOLOGY	8
1.4 REPORT STRUCTURE	9
2. THE TRAQUE PROJECT	9
2.1 PROJECT SYNOPSIS	9
2.2 PROJECT BACKGROUND	10
2.3 PROJECT OBJECTIVES & EXPECTED RESULTS	10
3. FINDINGS	11
3.1 RELEVANCE	11
3.2 EFFICIENCY	16
3.3 EFFECTIVENESS	24
3.4 IMPACT	33
3.5 SUSTAINABILITY	37
4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	40
ANNEXES	46

Glossary

ACP	African Caribbean and Pacific countries	GCCI	Ghana Chamber of Commerce and Industry
AESA	Agriconsulting Europe S.A.	GCX	Ghana Commodity Exchange
AFRAC	Africa Accreditation Cooperation	GEA	Ghana Employers Association
AGI	Association of Ghana Industries	GEPA	Ghana Export Promotion Authority
AGRA	Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa	GEPC	Ghana Export Promotion Centre
ARSO	African Organisation for Standardisation	GGC	Ghana Grain Council
AVL	Accra Veterinary Laboratory	GGLS	Ghana Green Label Standard
BUSAC	Business Sector Advocacy Challenge Fund	GHS	Ghana Cedi
CBU	Capacity Building Unit	GIMPA	Ghana Institute of Management & Public Administration
CEPS	Customs, Excise and Preventive Service	GIMPA	Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration
CET	Common External Tariffs	GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
Cn	Conclusion	GNCC	Ghana National Chamber of Commerce
CSIR	Council for Scientific and Industrial Research	GoG	Government of Ghana
CSP	Country Strategy Paper	GPRS	Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy
CSR	Corporate social Responsibility	GSA	Ghana Standards Authority
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (OECD)	GSB	Ghana Standards Board
DDA	Doha Development Agenda	GSGDA	Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda, 2010-2013
DFID	United Kingdom Department for International Development	GSGDA II	Ghana Shared Growth And Development Agenda, Second Phase
DP	Development Partners	HoD	Head of Delegation
EBA	Everything but Arms	HPLC	High Performance Liquid Chromatograph
EBES	Enabling Business Environment Support programme	HR	Human Resources
EBO	European Business Organisation	HRMIS	Human Resource Management Information System
EC	European Commission	IEC	International Electro technical Commission
ECOWAS	Economic Community Of West African States	IIR	Institute for Industrial Research (an Institute of the CSIR)
EDAIF	Export Development and Investment Fund	IPA	Initial Plan of Action
EDF	European Development Fund	ISO	International Organization for Standardization
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement	ISPM	International Standards for Phytosanitary Measures
EQ	Evaluation Question	ISSER	Institute of Statistical Social and Economic Research
EU	European Union	LI	Legislative Instruments
EUD	European Union Delegation	LTE	Long Term Expert
FA	Financing Agreement	M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
FAGE	Federation of Associations of Ghana Exporters	MDAs	Ministries, Departments and Agencies
FARA	Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa	MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
FDA	Food and Drugs Authority	MOAP	Market-Oriented Agriculture Programme
FDB	Food and Drugs Board	MOF	Ministry for Finance
FFD3	Third International Conference on Financing for Development	MoFA	Ministry of Food and Agriculture
FRI	Food Research Institute	MOFEP	Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
GAPs	Good Agricultural Practices		
GASIP	Ghana Agriculture Sector Investment Programme		
GC/MS	Gas Chromatograph equipped with Mass Spectrometer detector		

MoTI	Ministry of Trade and Industry	WAQSP	West Africa Quality System Programme
MS	Mass Spectrometer	WRS	Warehouse Receipt System
NAB	National Accreditation Body	WTO	World Trade Organisation
NAO	National Authorising Office		
NBSSI	National Board of Small Scale Industries		
NDPC	National Development Planning Commission		
NEDP	National Export Development Programme		
NES	National Export Strategy		
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation		
NIP	National Indicative Programme		
NPPO	National Plant Protection Office		
NQI	National Quality Infrastructure		
NQP	National Quality Policy		
NSA	Non State Actors		
NTE	Non-Traditional Exports		
NTEs	Non Traditional Exports		
PCR	Polymerase Chain Reaction		
PE	Programme Estimate		
PEF	Private Enterprise Foundation		
PPRSD	Plant Protection & Regulatory Services Directorate		
PRAG	Procurement and Grants for European External Actions		
PSD	Private Sector Development		
PSDS	Private Sector Development Strategy		
PSDS II	Support to Private Sector Development Strategy Phase Two		
PTB	Physikalisch Technische Bundesanstalt		
QI	Quality Infrastructure		
RCN	Raw Cashew Nut		
RINA	Registro Italiano Navale		
Rn	Recommendation		
SANAS	South African National Accreditation Service		
SEC	Ghana Securities and Exchange Commission		
SPS	Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures		
STE	Short Term Expert		
SWG	Sector working group		
TA	Technical Assistance		
TAPS	Technical and Administrative Provisions		
TAT	Technical Assistance Team		
TBT	Technical Barriers to Trade		
TL	Team Leader		
ToR	Terms of Reference		
TRAQUE	Trade Related Assistance & Quality Enabling Programme		
TSSP	Ghana Trade Sector Support Programme		
UFE	Utilization-Focused Evaluation		
UPS	Uninterruptible power supply		
VSD	Veterinary Services Directorate		

Executive Summary

The mid-term evaluation of the project Trade Related Assistance and Quality Enabling Programme (TRAQUE) in Ghana in May 2016 identified causes for implementation problems. The Ministry of Trade and Industry has low capacities as implementing body. The coordination and consensus among the project stakeholders is low. Delays in delivery have affected the impact.

Relevance: good

TRAQUE had a good relevance, both to the stakeholders in Ghana as to the European Union. As the overall private sector development strategy was not coherently implemented as assumed, the project became marginalised from related activities. The pro-poor approach to Aid for Trade was not consequently translated into objectives and activities. The uncertain situation of the Regional EPA became an unfavourable condition for the project. The private sector and other non-state actors as were not adequately involved to speed up the processes.

The 2013 Addendum to the FA addressed real additional needs, but established a Roadmap that has proven to be too ambitious. The Government failed to establish quickly the legal framework, which was needed for starting two new institutions (National Accreditation Body, Ghana Commodity Exchange). The new National Quality Policy implies a reform of the institutional landscape, but conflicts of interests among institutions persist.

High-level commitment and political leadership occurred, but was not supportive enough throughout the implementation. Economic policy suffered from changes and inconsistencies within the Government. TRAQUE lost ownership within the Ministry's leadership. Trade negotiations and quality infrastructure were seen as technical issues, while the political attention concentrated on protecting the national industry while supporting exports in traditional and non-traditional value chains.

Efficiency: with problems

The efficiency was good in terms of quantity and quality, but had serious problems with timeliness. Considering the quantity of resources, the results are not yet reached and not all activities can be carried out within the timeframe of the project.

The project was driven by the budget - while using five different implementation instruments - rather than by result orientation. Especially the procurement of metrology equipment was delayed. The budget allocations in Technical Assistance and the Programme Estimates were rearranged several times, which allowed a flexible implementation according to needs, but did not catch up with the delays. The grants for the four public agencies could have been included in the Programme Estimates. Frequent staff changes reduced the efficiency. Almost all key personnel changed over the implementation time, leaving gaps and some information blackouts.

Project implementation capacities of MoTI were not sufficiently supported; while the NAO was not able to follow up all contractual and financial matters though the bureaucracy in a timely manner. Communication, visibility and knowledge management had constant problems and often lead to disagreement among the stakeholders, mostly upon procedures.

The Steering Committee ensured representation of key beneficiaries, but the private sector did not participate actively. One annual meeting was not enough to direct efficiently the project implementation. The overall donor coordination mechanism was not efficiently implemented by the PSDS, therefore TRAQUE did not benefit from it. Visibility was improved, but stayed rather incidental, without transmitting background knowledge on the contents of the project.

Quality of monitoring was low. The Steering Committee and the ROM missions in June 2012 and June 2013 called to establish clear measurable indicators, but MoTI did not introduce a result-based monitoring.

Effectiveness: good / with problems

Objective 1: Most training modules on subjects related to capacity building at the Ministry of Trade and Industry have been implemented and completed. Nevertheless, the follow up was limited in practical applications in an overall strategy to upgrade the capacity of MoTI in carrying out its mandate. In consequence, efforts put in implementation of training programmes produced only partial change in the Ministry. Training is not sufficient to improve the capacity of Government institutions to carry out timely and effectively changes.

Objective 2: Most of expected equipment was delivered as specified and to the satisfaction of beneficiaries, even if some small problems occurred (and still remain), but with a limited impact on the outputs. Some extreme delays in procurement had a negative impact on the effectiveness. The technical capacities are raising, but the complete quality landscape has to be operational for obtaining the benefits of using improved laboratory services. The draft National Quality Policy document is ready for Cabinet approval after some final updates.

Objective 3: The National Accreditation Body was tightly linked to the adoption of an Accreditation Law. Now the NAB is supposed to be established under Ghanaian commercial law, ad-interim, until an Accreditation Law is passed. If MoTI decides not to go further with the establishment of the NAB, this would mean a loss of momentum and resources.

Objective 4: The Warehouse Receipts System did not advance as expected, for various reasons. Physical assessment of the proposed warehouse operators is ongoing, procurement and certification has not started. Considering the technical and legal difficulties and the time needed for procurement, the evaluators do not see the objective realistic within TRAQUE'S timeframe. The SC advises to discontinue activities on this objective.

Impact: with problems

Impact yet cannot be fully assessed because of the delays. Trade led pro-poor growth faces challenges about the macro-economic management of the country, infrastructure, governance and labour market efficiency. Increased private sector and public infrastructure investments, as well as an improved macroeconomic framework and political stability, are needed for recovery.

TRAQUE has contributed to economic policy making in Ghana. TRAQUE successfully supported MoTI to negotiate two major trade agreements: The ECOWAS Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the European Union and the ECOWAS Common External Tariff (CET). However, as the CET only started to be effective in February 2016 and the EPA is not signed by all ECOWAS countries, no development impact can be attributed to the project.

Farmers and other food producers have started to use the NBSSI services supported by TRAQUE to improve credibility of their products and see perspectives for better income through quality. They expect a higher credibility for their products in the local market, which shall translate in higher income for them.

Sustainability: good

The positive outcomes of the project are likely to continue after EU funding ends. MoTI and Agency staff will continue to apply the new skills to raise institutional capacity. The laboratories will use the equipment and capacities to provide better services. Because of the delays, the maximum effects are expected only after TRAQUE has ended.

Training is not sufficient to improve the capacity of Government institutions to carry out timely and effectively changes, if it is not accompanied by an overall well designed strategic plan, with sufficient resources.

Ghana's public institutions, including the public part of the quality infrastructure, are not financed sustainably. The longer-term impact on the wider development process can only be sustained if DPs continue funding at sector level. Ghana's import driven economy records huge trade deficit. National policies are being reformulated to support a trade-led growth. Cabinet has approved the creation of a Ghana Export-Import Bank to lead in the strategic positioning of Ghana as an export-led economy.

Recommendations

12 Recommendations follow these conclusions for both, the remaining implementation of the TRAQUE Programme, and for future cooperation in Ghana.

Criteria	Recommendation (Rn)	Now	Future
Relevance	Re-establish high-level policy dialogue on trade and private sector development. MoTI should aim to be the leading actor on economic policy when ending TRAQUE. MoTI should call the DP working group on private sector development more often. The EU DEL should be more active in reviving the donor coordination process. (Rn 1)	☹	
Relevance	Frequently visit business associations to discuss their needs and concerns. Inform them regularly on trade and quality aspects, so they can consult with their members on this. (Rn 4)	☹	☹
Relevance	In project identification and formulation, rely on best practices and established methodologies. Use the latest result-based planning tools, establishing a Theory of Change. (Rn 7)		☹
Efficiency	Speed up what works, avoid what still needs legal or political clearance. Make clear that the deadline is approaching. (Rn 2)	☹	
Efficiency	Raise capacities of the NAO to take decisions and manage all contractual and financial matters. Establish fast track mechanisms, in which the line ministry gives the NAO a mandate to proceed without further hold points; while the ministry concentrates on the results. (Rn 9)	☹	☹
Effectiveness	Organize the learning from experience. Deliver the training for the labs as planned, with emphasis to trade related services. Apply new skills, and then learn. Ensure linkages between receiving training and delivering training to other officials, build into the capacity building programmes, dissemination and skills transfer processes. (Rn 3)	☹	
Effectiveness	Get the National Quality Policy approved by Cabinet and Parliament. Update the implementation plan for the National Quality Policy and identify means to overcome obstacles. Take a clear decision on how to advance with the National Accreditation Body. Consider a regional solution in ECOWAS. (Rn 5)	☹	
Effectiveness	Tell all stakeholders, that the support to the Warehouse Receipts System will not be possible within TRAQUE's timeframe. Meet with GCX to agree on future cooperation. (Rn 6)	☹	
Impact	Get all stakeholders on board. The private sector needs to be enabled to steer the programmes for trade and business environment. Policy uncertainty, burdensome rules, and last minute changes in regulations need to be avoided. (Rn 8)		☹
Impact	Build knowledge and capacity of business membership organizations for advocacy on Trade and Quality issues. Coordinate interventions with all other DP, especially the EU Member States. (Rn 10)		☹
Sustainability	In new programmes, seek also active participation of civil society, trade unions, consumer groups, media, and other non-state actors' interest groups, in order to build capacity and consensus over sustainable economic development. (Rn 11)		☹
Sustainability	Learn from failure: Understand how learning happens within and outside a programme; Identify obstacles to learning and overcome them; Create an environment that values and rewards learning and knowledge sharing, through storytelling, peer assessments, conducting participatory impact assessments and other evaluations. (Rn 12)		☹

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Evaluation Objectives and Scope

1. This report describes the findings, conclusions and recommendations of a mid-term evaluation (MTE) of the project Trade Related Assistance and Quality Enabling Programme (*TRAQUE*) in Ghana. The evaluation assignment¹, with a total of 50 workdays, was carried out in the period 4 April – 30 June 2016. The field work for the – summative – evaluation, involving a review of the extensive project documentation and conducting semi-structured interviews with representatives of Project beneficiaries and stakeholders, was carried out in the period 24 April – 22 May.
2. The following sections of the report:
 - Present the objectives and expected outcomes of the MTE assignment;
 - Set out the methodology deployed for the MTE;
 - Summarise the background, objectives and expected results of the Project;
 - Present the findings of the MTE in accordance with the five main evaluation criteria (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact & sustainability), [**Chapter 3 & Annex 3**];
 - Summarise the conclusions of the MTE, based on the findings; and
 - Formulate recommendations with regard to the project and its follow-up, based on the conclusions.

1.2 Evaluation Objectives & Results

The Terms of Reference (ToR) for the assignment [**Annex 1**] specify the following objectives for the evaluation. The Evaluation was assigned to provide the decision-makers and stakeholders with information needed to ensure that the Programme is being executed in accordance with the stipulated conditions and the desired benefits have been achieved.

The evaluation assignment was carried out by independent experts on behalf of the Delegation of the European Union to Ghana (EUD), in line with Section 5.2 of the FA, which provides for external evaluations, including mid-term evaluations.

This Mid-Term Review must also serve as final evaluation. It comes too late to induce major changes in implementation, as *TRAQUE* has to end in 2017 with the 10th EDF. The resources are already committed and deadlines are final. Thus, the main attention is to detect failures and reasons for delay as a learning exercise for future cooperation.

The decision-makers need to know if *TRAQUE* is on the right track. They need to learn how to direct their cooperation towards better performance on desired results, considering the upcoming challenges. This is the moment for gathering the learning experience of the first years in order to use it systematically to adjust the implementation towards delivering all results.

During a briefing at EUD (27 April 2016), the specific objective of the evaluation was amended with the request to assess which of the ongoing activities are likely to reach the results. It was highlighted that due to the small period of implementation left for *TRAQUE*, recommendations should look at what can be done over the last 12 months of the projects.

¹ Implemented by AETS Application Européenne de Technologies et de Services SARL, under the EUD's Specific Contract Nr 2016/373009, Ref. Ares (2016) 1584718 - 04/04/2016, in the context of FWC BENEFICIARIES 2013 - LOT 10: Trade, Standards and private sector (EuropeAid/132633/C/SER/multi).

1.3 Evaluation Methodology

The evaluation is of a summative character, involving a qualitative approach – based on applicable EU Evaluation Guidelines² – to answering a total of 47 evaluation questions (EQ) specified in the ToR and summarised in **Annex 2**. Thus, they relate to the five main evaluation criteria and a number of other salient issues as set out in **Chapter 3** of the present report.

The EU DEL, the NAO and MoTI are the key stakeholders of the evaluation. The Inception Workshop on 28 April 2016 was attended by Asare Amoyaw (MoF/NO), Daniel Sowah (MoTI), Christian Peters (EUD), Delphine Aupicon (EUD), Valerie Bour (EUD), Mariella Sandini (TRAQUE TAT TL) and Ines Escudero (TRAQUE TAT STE). The reference group, excluding the TAT, also was present at the debriefing of the evaluation.

The evaluators are committed to the OECD DAC Quality Standards for Development Evaluation and to evaluation standards established by their evaluation societies regarding purpose, planning, designing, implementing, reporting, and learning from and using evaluation results. The Donor Committee for Enterprise Development (DCED) Standard for Results Measurement are recognised as best practice in results measurement.

The selected methodology refers to the Utilization-Focused Evaluation (UFE), as developed by Michael Quinn Patton. This approach is based on the principle that an evaluation should be judged on its usefulness to its intended users. Therefore, the evaluation was planned and conducted in ways that enhance the likely utilization of both the findings and of the process itself to inform decisions and improve performance.

The Evaluation Questions given in the ToR were further formulated, in order to allow stakeholders to build on their own experience and contribute to the evaluation process. The inception workshop (27.04.2016) served to prioritize questions. Out of 68 proposed questions, 47 received at least one vote by one of the stakeholders. The key stakeholders (EUD, NAO, MoTI) were personally engaged at the beginning of the evaluation process to ensure that their primary intended uses could be identified. The primary intended users were able to guide all other decisions about the evaluation process.

In addition to interviews with EUD officials, the assignment involved interviews [**Annex 8**] with more than 60 representatives of the main stakeholders of the TRAQUE project, including the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MoTI) as implementing agency, the National Authorising Office (NAO) at the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA), the Ghana Revenue Authority and the Private Sector Development Secretariat were interviewed on the context. The Technical Assistance Team supported the evaluation, gave background information, and facilitated contacts.

The four grant operators Ghana Standard Authority (GSA), Food and Drugs Authority (FDA), National Board for Small Scale Industries (NBSSI) and Ghana Export Promotion Authority (GEPA) were visited. Some guided trips to beneficiaries. The Ghana Commodity Exchange (GCX) and Ghana Grains Council (GGC) were interviewed as additional stakeholders.

Laboratories and facilities were visited at GSA, FDA, Centre for Scientific and Industrial Research - Food Research Institute (FRI) and Institute of Industrial Research (IIR), Plant Protection and Regulatory Service Department (PPRSD), Customs Inspection Unit, and Veterinary Services Directorate.

Private sector stakeholders interviewed included Association of Ghana Industries (AGI), Ghana Chamber of Commerce & Industry, Bio Ghana Network, Federation of Association of Ghanaian Exporters (FAGE), and European Business Organization in Ghana (EBO), and the Savannah Fruits Company. NGOs consulted were Navrongo-Bolgatanga Catholic Diocese and Third World Network-Africa. Farmers and small business were visited in Greater Accra and Afumkrom, Tamale, Bolgatanga, Diare, and Navrongo.

Other DPs consulted include the Embassy of Denmark (Danida), the Embassy of Switzerland, USAID, and GIZ. Related Projects implemented by UNIDO, Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt (PTB) and the Business Sector Advocacy Challenge Fund (BUSAC) were met for benchmarking.

The interviews with beneficiary and key stakeholder representatives [**Annex 8**] were based on the EQs, as well as a review of the extensive project documentation [**Annex 7**] made available by EUD, and the Technical Assistance Team (TAT), based in Accra.

² *Inter alia* to be found at: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/evaluation/methodology/guidelines/gba_en.htm.

The field work for the MTE was carried out by the evaluation team³ in the period 24 April to 21 May 2016 and involved an extensive debriefing – based on preliminary answers to the EQs and a presentation of the main findings, conclusions and recommendations – at EUD’s premises in Accra. The presentation of the final evaluation conclusions and recommendation was part of the Fifth Steering Committee meeting on 18 March 2016. The observations and comments provided during the SC and the debriefing are reflected in this report.

1.4 Report Structure

1. The remainder of this evaluation report consists of 3 chapters:
 - Chapter 2 sketches the background of the Project and sets out its objectives and expected results;
 - Chapter 3 presents the evaluation findings against each of the EQs in relation to the five main evaluation criteria, as well as eight specific issues raised by EUD in connection with the Project;
 - Chapter 4 presents the conclusions – including lessons learned – of the evaluation, together with the recommendations based on the conclusions. All recommendations in Chapter 4 are related to specific conclusions in the same chapter; all conclusions link to particular findings in Chapter 3.
2. The annexes to the report contain:
 - The terms of reference [Annex 1];
 - A summary table of the Evaluation Questions [Annex 2];
 - Comments on the Indicators [Annex 3];
 - Recommendations for efficient procurement [Annex 4];
 - The Project documentation reviewed [Annex 5]; and
 - The persons consulted in the course of the assignment [Annex 6].

2. THE TRAQUE PROJECT

2.1 Project Synopsis

Table 1: TRAQUE – Key Features

Item	Date/Value	Item	Date/Value
Duration:	78 months	Budget:	€ 15 000 000
Start – End Dates:	13 Jan 2011 – 12 Jul 2017	MTE cut-off date:	18 May 2016
Core TAT:	4.230.165 €	Local staff:	2 for accounting services and visibility and communication
DAC Code	331 Trade Policy & Regulation	Sector	33110-Trade policy & administrative management
Aid method	Project approach	Management mode	Partially decentralised management

³ Consisting of Karsten Weitzenegger, Team Leader and Trade and Private Sector Development Expert and Jacques Cabourdin, Quality Policy and Infrastructure Expert.

Breakdown of budget as per the modified Financing Agreement	Euro
Service Contract (Technical Assistance and support to Accreditation Body)	4.230.165
Programme Estimates (Office, trade capacity training, EPA support, National Quality Policy, rules of origin focused on custom services)	1.500.000
Supplies labs, WRS (including installation & training) and Accreditation body	7.892.685
Grants Agreements	700.000
Communication & Visibility	100.000
Monitoring, External Evaluation & Audit, mid-term review and final evaluation	250.000
Contingencies	327.150
TOTAL	15.000.000

2.2 Project Background

Since 2011, the TRAQUE Programme has been implementing continued support to the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MoTI) and its related agencies in private sector development, trade facilitation and capacity building. A special attention was given to capacity issues in industrial strategy and implementation support to post Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) as well as Standards, National Quality institutions, the National Export Promotion Agency and small sized industries support organisations.

The overall cost covered by the 10th European Development Fund (EDF) is estimated EUR 15 million. The Financing Agreement between the Government of Ghana and the European Commission of 13 January 2011 foresaw an initial budget allocation of EUR 9 million that was extended in December 2013 in time and budget, from EUR 9 million to EUR 15 million, funded from the 10th EDF remaining resources earmarked for Trade and Private Sector Development. The increase in the overall budget of the TRAQUE Financing Agreement aims to accommodate the additional Results 3 and 4. A first extension in time was 18 months ending in July 2016.

In March 2015, the Ministry of Finance requested for a second extension in time by 12 months. The implementation will end 12 July 2017. The operational duration of the programme is 78 months + 24 months of closure period.

The programme is under the contracting authority of the National Authorising Office at the Ministry of Finance (MoF), and being implemented by the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MoTI). The Programme is implemented through four different modalities: Programme Estimates implemented by MoTI, Services for Technical Assistance to MoTI and other implementers, Grant Agreements, Works and Supplies. The international technical assistance is provided by a consortium led by Agriconsulting Europe S.A (AESA).⁴

The main stakeholders of the TRAQUE Programme are (according to PE3):

- Ministry of Finance;
- Ministry of Trade and Industry;
- National Quality Institutes and related organisations;
- Ministry of Food and Agriculture;
- Chambers of Commerce and sector associations, private sector associations, producer associations, private companies.

2.3 Project Objectives & Expected Results

The Trade Related Assistance and Quality Enabling Programme (TRAQUE) aims at facilitating trade and stimulating trade led pro-poor growth for Ghana. The specific objectives of the TRAQUE

⁴ In addition to AESA, consisting of Ghana Institute of Management & Public Administration (GIMPA) and Registro Italiano Navale (RINA).

programme are Improving trade related capacity and performance of MoTI and related agencies and Supporting the national quality policy and the related National Quality Infrastructure.

Main identified results (see FA Addendum 1 signed 19 DEC. 2013) are formulated as follows:

- Result 1:** Strengthened capacity of MoTI and other relevant Government agencies in trade policy analysis and formulation and for the implementation of trade policies and trade agreements (including the I-EPA and EPA). (reformulated in 2013)
- Result 2:** Effective institutions for the implementation of the national quality policy and the creation of a performing quality infrastructure covering areas such as metrology, accreditation, standardisation, conformity, certification and regulation. The institutions will have clear mandates and the capabilities to control and promote compliance with TBT and SPS requirements, conditioning access to international markets. (original as FA 2011)
- Result 3:** The establishment of a National Accreditation Body for and in Ghana will provide an affordable alternative to obtaining accreditation to ISO standards (for example ISO 17025) for organisations within the country and the region. (added by FA 2013)
- Result 4:** Improved capacity of Ghana Grains Council and other warehouse receipt systems to (1) aggregate agricultural products from small scale growers into larger, tradeable qualities, (2) to guarantee delivery of products of certified quality and quantity and (3) to establish quality control, weight control and Ghana Standards Authority (GAS) certification of storage facilities, weighers, samplers, and laboratory staff to add value and build confidence. (4) This will enable efficient trading of agricultural products of small-scale growers and (5) establish a prerequisite for a future Commodities Exchange. (added by FA 2013)

3. FINDINGS

3.1 Relevance

N°	Summary of Evaluation Questions re Relevance
1	Is the Intervention based on a clear Theory of Change? Do the objectively verifiable indicators of achievement mark the change conditions well?
2	Are the overall objectives, purpose and results clear and consistent?
3	Was TRAQUE well aligned with national policies?
4	Was high-level commitment and political leadership sufficient?
5	To what degree was the Addendum in 2013 according to the needs and situation of the country?
6	How can Ghana get the most out of the implementation of the EPA? Is TRAQUE supporting this by all meanings?
7	Is the established roadmap for the Quality Infrastructure realistic? What are the critical points on the way towards an international recognized accreditation body in Ghana?
8	How can the upcoming EU-ECOWAS Competitiveness Programme build on TRAQUES's experience and outcomes?

EQ 1: Is the Intervention based on a clear Theory of Change? Do the objectively verifiable indicators of achievement mark the change conditions well?

EQ 2: Are the overall objectives, purpose and results clear and consistent?

The EU and its Member States have a Joint Strategy on Aid for Trade from 2007 which includes the as key goal to enhance the pro-poor focus and the quality of EU Aid for Trade. TRAQUE has the pro-

poor aspect in the Overall Objective, but it was never specified or detailed. Thus, there appears to be an assumption that growth in trade will automatically benefit the poor.

Theory of change' is an outcomes-based approach that applies critical thinking to the design, implementation and evaluation of initiatives and programmes intended to support change in their contexts. It is being increasingly used in international development by a wide range of governmental, bilateral and multi-lateral development agencies, civil society organisations, international non-governmental organisations and research programmes intended to support development outcomes. This approach has not been used for planning TRAQUE.

The intervention logic for TRAQUE does not specify on how trade leads to pro-poor growth nor does it identify necessary preconditions. Assumptions counted on policy support, while this could have been included in the strategy. The activities were designed for the public sector only. The private sector as engine for trade, jobs and development was not core part of the strategy. No feasibility or baseline studies were carried out.

Planning errors were detected by the ROM exercise in 2012, quoting as follows: The original logframe was confusing and the indicators very poor. To some extent, this has been resolved in the FA Rider. The logframe was made clearer in the FA rider, but not improved in the sense of RBM. The logframe is still not supporting a result-based management, which would need to distinguish at least two types of development result: outputs and outcomes. Currently TRAQUE is working on a revised logframe proposed by the TA in the Interim Reports (as Annex 1), which has a very high number of indicators. However, the OVIs [Annex 8] are not quantified but use words such as "improved" "increased" "number of". The TA did modify the logframe in almost each Interim Reports, but it did not come to an official alteration.. The MTR took the logframe of the FA Addendum 1 as official.

EQ 3: Was TRAQUE well aligned with national policies?

TRAQUE was in line with national and regional policies. However, GoG and DPs did not harmonize enough their cooperation on PSD over recent years. TRAQUE is seen as a significant, but isolated input by many stakeholders and some other DPs. The related national policies were not supported and/or not implemented as planned alongside TRAQUE.

Private sector development was one of the key focus areas of national development in the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA), the medium term national development policy framework 2010 – 2013 developed by the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC).

The Government of Ghana (GoG) negotiated with the DPs the second Private Sector and Trade Enabling Programme (PSTEP II) in 2009/2010. It aimed at supporting the implementation of the Private Sector Development Strategy (PSDS). The first Private Sector Development Strategy (PSDS), which encompassed a Trade Sector Support Programme (TSSP) previously developed and led by MOTI, had been successfully operating since 2004.

The PSD Council proposed in 2010 a GHS 1 billion Private Sector Development Fund to implement PSDS II. The fund will receive money from the government of Ghana and attract funding from Development Partners. Although the DPs agreed largely on the PSD and trade issues, the entire pool-fund mechanism was under discussion. Most of the DPs continued to contribute to the PSD through individual projects or by joining the pool-fund (Denmark, UK, WB and Germany, at that stage). The EU was the last DP to stick to Sector Budget Support (SBS) modality.

The project was thus originally planned in 2010 as part of the PSTEP programme as complementary support to the SBS. It was directly targeting immediate specific needs around the EPA and trade facilitation. A third component was foreseen for "Increased trade development and promotion through business support Institutions targeting the firm level", which was later not continued.⁵

In December 2014, the medium-term National Development Policy Framework, the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA II, 2014-2017) replaced GSGDA I, that has been in operation since 2010. Anchored on the GSGDA II, the Support to Private Sector Development Phase Two (PSDS II), among other aims, is meant to create an enabling environment for the private sector.

The objectives of TRAQUE are still perfectly in line with GSGDA II. This new national policy framework does not detail on quality policy, but count "operationalise the Ghana Commodities Exchange and the

⁵ See ADE, Ghana PSTEP II – Formulation (Phase I) Final Report, January 2010.

Warehouse Receipts System (WRS); develop standards and promote good agriculture/ aquaculture practices along the value chain” explicitly as priority measures.⁶

EQ 4: Was high-level commitment and political leadership sufficient?

High-level commitment and political leadership existed, but TRAQUE did not benefit enough from it. Stakeholders remember a drop in leadership during 2013.

Since taking office in July 2012, President Mahama showed strong leadership in favour of the regional EPA. He defended it as the only way to ensure economic growth against concerns raised by civil society, trade unions and other interest groups, He even convinced other countries to sign and was elected in 2014 to preside over ECOWAS and soon afterwards also to chair the African Union’s (AU’s) High-Level African Trade Committee (HATC).

However, the TRAQUE Programme stayed much below the Presidential attention and benefitted only indirectly from this high-level support. TRAQUE kept out of the political sphere, being rather on a technical level. Policy makers confirmed that TRAQUE was much linked with MoTI and QI. Therefore, it was left in MoTI when the President moved other economic development matters to a higher level, because of the great political importance. Within MoTI, TRAQUE was moved early from the Policy Planning, Monitoring & Evaluation Division, which was to be the main EPA Negotiator, to the Standards Division. This is also seen as a sign of its technical character.

Along with MoTI, TRAQUE became more separated from the PSD policy level. During two years of implementation, TRAQUE was not placed close to policy level. In December 2012, the responsibility for PSD (the TSSP and PSTEP Coordinator) was moved from MoTI to the Minister of State at the Office of the President. This office has no suitable budget allocated for the tasks. A letter was sent to the development partners in November 2014 informing that the implementation of the PSDS II had been brought back under the Ministry of Trade. MoTI then had to rebuild its capacities. The MoF currently implements the Public Private Partnership (PPP) Project with the World Bank. The Private Sector Development Unit is still at the Office of the President. The Divisions for Economic Research & Forecasting as well as External Economic Relations are still in the Ministry of Finance, which dropped Economic Planning recently only in the name.

Change in MoTI’s leadership did affect the implementation of TRAQUE. With the change in February 2013, the ministry was lacking a full mandate for trade-related PSD. However, the leadership was briefed successfully on TRAQUE and took ownership of the project. Major decisions have been taken in this short period, including the signature of the EPA and the CET. From July 2014, new priorities were set and the commitment to the project’s former approach reduced. During 2013, MoTI formulated a new National Export Development Programme (NEDP) and National Export Strategy 2016–2020⁷, without consulting with TRAQUE. However, no signs of implementation of the strategy were observed and the Ministry had new priorities. The NEDP was designed as an implementation vehicle for projects, among them a “Quality and Standards Project”, which promotes voluntary standards and a National Traceability System. This would not be in line with TRAQUE’s objectives. The NEDP was not promoted among stakeholders, but must have been a valid policy document for MoTI, as the Minister referred to it in March 2016, when introducing the Cashew trade ban.⁸

From the beginning, the non-state actors were not enough involved in TRAQUE. TRAQUE has little contact with civil society, trade unions, and consumer organisations, if any. In addition, the private sector was not sufficiently involved in the project. TRAQUE could have dialogued closer with the non-traditional exporters, raising their capacity to convince other sectors of the economy (or even society) how market access and quality can be beneficial for all.

⁶ Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA) II, 2014-2017. P. 83, <http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/gha152510.pdf>.

⁷ MoTI, National Export Development Programme and National Export Strategy 2016 – 2020, <http://www.ghanatrade.gov.gh/Laws/national-export-development-programme-and-national-export-strategy-2016-2020.html>

⁸ MoTI Press Declaration 9 March 2016 <http://moti.gov.gh/press-release/1457971607/administrative-directive-for-the-exportation-of-raw-cashew-nut-rcn>

EQ 5: To what degree was the Addendum in 2013 according to the needs and situation of the country?

TRAQUE was targeted to deliver very specific inputs to the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) preparation, within an overall private sector development strategy.

The reasons for the rider were linked to the two new activities namely accreditation and warehouse receipt system, as the GoG requested explicitly. The GoG requested the amendment of the FA since December 2012. MoTI and the Finance Ministry called for a budget increase and for “addressing the technical gaps in the original design of the Programme”. In addition, they also asked for an extension because of the unsuccessful first tendering progress.⁹

The EC signed the Rider to the FA almost one year later dated 19/12/2013, increasing the overall amount from EUR 9 million to EUR 15 million (10th EDF A envelope) and extending the implementation and execution periods until 12/07/2016 and 12/07/2018 respectively.

The Addendum responded to real needs that were still expressed by the GoG at the time of signature. The preparation of the extension was done very carefully and based on solid findings. The inclusion of the two new subjects in the FA extension was quite valid at the time of writing and based on the best of current knowledge. However, both new objectives were linked to institutions that do not even exist yet. Both, the National Accreditation Body and the Warehouse Receipt System/Ghana Commodity Exchange need an institutional and legal framework to operate. Several studies have been made for accreditation and GCX and the government committed to develop the required legal framework. The commitment of the GoG to establish the legal framework reduced during the implementation period.

Result 1 was reformulated slightly to refer to the I-EPA. That was suitable in the context of the EPA negotiations in that period.

EQ 6: How can Ghana get the most out of the implementation of the EPA? Is TRAQUE supporting this by all means?

Ghana follows an export led growth strategy, which requires a functioning quality infrastructure in the country in support of the exporting industries. However, increasing incomes will invariably lead to an increasing demand for better and safer products, and quality infrastructure organisations will have to provide their services and activities also in support of increasing levels of consumer protection on the domestic market.

TRAQUE has already contributed to make Ghana ready to take advantage of the EPA. In line with EU Aid for Trade strategy (2007) and the Economic Partnership Agreement Development Programme (PAPED), TRAQUE has a specific contribution to the implementation of the EPA. The TRAQUE programme is correctly centred on two main groups of activities:

One is the support to capacity building in the MoTI for trade policy analysis and development, in particular related to regional integration within ECOWAS and the European Partnership Agreement (EPA).

Another group of activities is focussed on issues of Quality Infrastructure, in which the support to testing and calibration laboratories takes a central place. Assessments of publicly owned laboratories had been made to establish performance levels, technical and managerial capabilities, organisational structures, and development needs in terms of staff training, equipment, and market development. The other main topic for Quality Infrastructure is the review and reform of the legal and regulatory framework.

With some delay, TRAQUE is delivering results on these objectives. However, TRAQUE would have had more potential, if implemented parallel to the EPA, as planned. Ghana initialled an interim Economic Partnership Agreement (iEPA) in 2007 with the EU which has, however, not yet been signed by the Government of Ghana.¹⁰ Thus, the effects of the EPA - positive and negative - are not yet known; but there is a broad fear that local industries and jobs will get lost because of imports. Already the media attributes negative effects to the EPA, e.g. the low competitiveness of Ghana

⁹ See Letter annexed to the FA Rider.

¹⁰ After the initialling of the iEPA in 2007, the EU afforded Ghana provisional duty-free-quota-free access to the EU market through market access regulation 1528/2007, which was subsequently amended in April 2013. (EUD)

against cheap imports of chicken and vegetables. TRAQUE is now in a position to support the stakeholders in Ghana with guidance on taking advantage of the EPA while reducing the costs.

EQ 7: Is the established roadmap for the Quality Infrastructure realistic? What are the critical points on the way towards an international recognized accreditation body in Ghana?

The Roadmap established with the FA Rider 2013 was too optimistic, according to the QI experts interviewed. The Roadmap established with the Addendum has proven to be too ambitious when tested against initial implementation phases. It implies too many changes in short time, while the stakeholders were not yet committed to the desired changes.

Some concerns were raised that TRAQUE was too closely linked with GSA, which had an unclear mandate. GSA currently has too many functions within the national quality infrastructure, such as standardisation, metrology, testing, inspection and certification of products, services and systems, inspection of weights and measures, market surveillance and export and import inspection. There is no conflict of interest as long as the institution that enforces the mandatory conformity measures (technical regulations) is not the testing or inspection facility itself. In the current set-up of GSA such conflicts of interest cannot be avoided. GSA became a multi-skilled entity with many roles and mandates that should have been assigned to several independent entities instead of a single one. Metrology should be separated from other functions. Conformity assessment is a service that can be done by private sector organisations.

Public sector institutions dominate the sector of the conformity assessment bodies (testing, calibration, certification, and inspection). They are generally of moderate to good quality and about half a dozen have been accredited. Private companies are not well represented among the conformity assessment bodies, with the exception of a substantial number of medical laboratories, and some branch offices of the larger internationally operating certification and inspection bodies.

An accreditation body is considered the keystone of the QI system. The fourth SC in June 2015 adopted a roadmap for the setting-up of the accreditation body, which was synchronized with the National Quality Infrastructure, which is to be fully described in the NQP. The roadmap described the steps to full independence of the NAB until 2024, based on a business plan from March 2015. The minutes confirm that “Government considers the accreditation body important hence will mobilize funds to support.” However, it did not progress. The long-term perspective of the roadmap was later a reason for MoTI to withdraw, as this would have required an approval by Parliament.

TRAQUE therefore issued a revised Business Plan for the establishment of an ad-interim NAB now called GHANAS (Ghanaian National Accreditation Service) in January 2016. It takes into consideration the outputs of the service contract, which was supposed to start soon. GHANAS is now proposed to be a private company limited by guarantee. The financial simulations over 5 years provide a better situation than those of March 2015; the break-even cost/turnover is reached after about 4.3 years. This plan, however, did not change the decision of MoTI.

No consistent review of the legal and regulatory framework was carried out beforehand. The political priorities are on trade agreements, not on accreditation. Commitment to TRAQUE's objectives continues for trade and quality, except the NAB. The benefits of having a NAB are not considered enough by MoTI. The quality system works as well with accreditation from South Africa or Europe, but this keeps the cost of doing business high. MoTI did not see the market potential for accreditation in West Africa. As Ghana did not advance in accreditation issues, probably other countries are more advanced by now. Experts mentioned Nigeria and Burkina Faso as strong competitors for accreditation services, but this evaluation did not study on this.

EQ 8: How can the upcoming EU-ECOWAS Competitiveness Programme build on TRAQUE's experience and outcomes?

MoTI directors showed strong interest to continue with the results of TRAQUE. They call for a diplomatic solution to continue in a small new project on the outstanding results. In fact, TRAQUE has delivered some results and opened some active tasks that can be considered for continued cooperation.

TRAQUE will end at a moment, when Ghana has to take first steps to implement the new NQP. Without conducting a need analysis in this MTR, there are many reasons to predict upcoming needs beyond TRAQUE. Once the IEPA is implemented, supply-side constraints (infrastructure, PSD) and

adjustment costs will become more apparent, and MoTI has to react consequently. The NQP, once approved, will have to be implemented efficiently by all stakeholders. The non-state actors have to take over their stakes in the implementation.

In the context of the 11th European Development Fund (EDF), it was decided that aid in the field of trade and support for the private sector would not be a focal sector of the National Indicative Programs. Ghana has chosen employment and social protection as focal sector of its National Indicative Programme 11th EDF.

Support for economic integration, the promotion of regional / international trade and strengthening private sector competitiveness was referred to the Regional Indicative Programme (RIP), which devotes a budget of EUR 175 million for 15 ECOWAS countries + Mauritania. Main objective is to contribute to economic development and poverty reduction through strengthening of regional economic integration.

The new Program “Strengthening the competitiveness of West Africa” has the overall objective to improve the competitiveness of the private sector, the production, transformation and export capacity of the region. It will support the implementation of the regional industrial and SME strategy and strengthen key values chains agreed at the national level. The focus will be on support to SMEs, employment creation and environmental issues.

Aid for Trade can be continued in revision and simplification of procedures for export (single window), support for trade-related infrastructure (marketing, storage, distribution), support for distribution strategies, export / import and systems information (market access) for small and medium operators, etc. At national level, support may cover the macro, meso and micro level.

TRAQUE already had a clear regional focus in objectives 1 and 2. TRAQUE serves as reference for the Regional Support to Quality in the framework of the ECOWAS industrial strategy: Monitoring the implementation of regional policy, quality promotion, harmonization of norms, standards and SPS.

The new objectives (WRS, NAB) lacked the regional perspective, which could have given both more meaning in the West African market. The new Regional Programme can support a regional accreditation system, instead of the national solution supported by TRAQUE. TRAQUE’s preparations for the Warehouse Receipt System could be a useful experience to support for trade-related infrastructure (marketing, storage, distribution) with a regional perspective.

3.2 Efficiency

Nº	Summary of Evaluation Questions re Efficiency
9	What were the major factors or moments that reduced or boosted efficiency?
10	What were the main bottlenecks in the implementation and how were they solved?
11	What were the problems in the day-to-day management of the programme, and what was done to solve them?
12	In general, what has gone wrong?
13	How well was the Steering Committee used to steer the implementation?
14	How do the different stakeholders perceive the effectiveness of the programme with regard to perception of programme results and achievements? Was it good value for money?
15	How well did the contractors deliver (TA, equipment, supplies) and how efficiently was the compliance enforced? How well were the different implementation instruments (TA, PE, Grants, Supplies) interlinked?
16	Why did it take so long to issue the Grants and what are their implementation problems?
17	Is the monitoring consistent and easy to follow for steering purposes? Does it report well enough on the OVI and unintended results?
18	How were the ROM reports perceived and used?
19	What indicators or data is needed for efficient programme management?
20	Which best practices for efficient implementation in Ghana can be learned from other DPs or stakeholders?

EQ 9: What were the major factors or moments that reduced or boosted efficiency?

- The add-on of EUR 6 million to an existing project was in principle seen as efficient solution. A single programme structure is implementing all the different aspects of TRAQUE. However, the original program had design problems and was already behind schedule. The rider improved efficiency for objective 1 by linking it closer to the EPA. The attention for objective 2 was reduced during the implementation period, because the post of the quality component expert changed and was vacant for some time. The long-term quality TA was discontinued in 2015. The NQP and the procurement still needed more constant efforts. The two new objectives added not only new technical challenges but also a whole new set of stakeholders (CGX, GGC). They remained to be additional stakeholder in TRAQUE;
- Over time, objectives 3 and 4 proved not to be feasible within the given timeframe. Some stakeholders now speculate, if it would have been more effective to open two separate project structures for objectives 3 and 4, as they have separate scopes and different stakeholders. In addition, the technical knowledge of the TRAQUE team in the new issues was questioned, even as specialized STE were recruited. The argument is, that more focused projects might have been more efficient to detect the obstacles for the objectives early enough to be removed;
- NAO capacity problems: Can only push documents, depends on decisions. Delays in communicating problems from MoTI/TA to the NAO. NAO needs to go through internal hierarchy of the Ministry of Finance and MoTI, which has many hold points.

EQ 10: What were the main bottlenecks in the implementation and how were they solved?

- TRAQUE lost attention within the Ministry's leadership. Throughout the implementation, TRAQUE had difficulties to get adequate responsiveness of MoTI officials. An explanation for the initial misunderstanding was that former projects in MoTI only co-financed allowances and fees for training participations and did not enter into the Ministry to be implemented there. In recent years, each director limited the perception of TRAQUE to the particular activities in his field. Everybody knows that TRAQUE does various things, but nobody even in MoTI has the complete picture. TRAQUE is detached from the department that deals with trade agreements. EUD became very active, showed ownership similar to a contractor, with a tendency to micro-manage the implementation by seeking clarification on every detail.
- Frequent staff changes reduced the efficiency. The ministers for trade and industry changed twice in February 2013 and July 2014 due to Cabinet reshuffle. Key staff was not retained for a meaningful term at MoTI. Capacity was lost when the Standards Chief, HR Director or Policy Advisor changed. Whatever the reasons for change are, the individuals take their knowledge and networks with them, along with their mobile numbers and emails, sometimes the documents too. In addition, posts at EU DEL remained vacant for months. The TAT TL was replaced leaving a gap. The LTE for QI left in 12/2013 and was replaced only for some months. The LTE position was then filled with a trade expert. This was urgently needed, but in addition to the quality expert, not as alternative. Several stakeholders expressed that a lack of a permanent quality expert reduced the efficiency.
- Sometimes individuals take initiative, but have little institutional backup. Summarizing various interviews, TRAQUE's implementation record is marked by individuals who took a lead, showed responsibility, acquired knowledge, started dialogues, took decisions, etc. On the other hand, persons who were not able or willing to perform, which was also mentioned often, slowed down the project. Big gaps opened when leading people left or retired, moved or were removed. People are a crucial factor for success or failure. However, there is a very low ability to keep and transfer knowledge and skills within institutions;
- Hierarchies prevail in the public administration and complicate the contacting procedures. While the NAO office itself seems to be efficiently organized now, but it depends on procedures within the MoF and among ministries, which take time and are difficult to monitor. The NAO office sees their capacities improved by the experience gained with TRAQUE and other projects.
- Challenges have been raised regarding the NAO office notably in terms of human resources and capacities for operational tasks and financial management to react quickly and ensure smooth implementation of TRAQUE activities. There are still today numerous pending issues. The NAO

office keeps track of them, but is unable to influence decisions taken elsewhere. It is hard to find out whether there are political or technical problems somewhere, or a lack of knowledge or awareness or the decision is on hold because a director is absent. Even in clear procedures (duty free certificates of donated equipment, cancellation of a non-compliant supply contractor) delays occurred that affected the effectiveness;

The project had little flexibility to react to upcoming needs. This was amended by reformulating and rescheduling all PEs according to needs on MoTI. In case of the Green Label, a new feature was introduced in cooperation with MoFA, GSA and GIZ. However, stakeholders raised questions if this should have been an additional priority for the project.

EQ 11: What were the problems in the day-to-day management of the programme, and what was done to solve them?

- The TAT refurbished the TRAQUE Office based within MoTI. It became an attractive work environment and helped to facilitate processes and dialogue. After the office renovation was completed, the Project Director and the Deputy have moved to work in on a full time basis, although this possibility was not initially foreseen. This has allowed a much better and prompt communication, facilitating administrative requirements and implementation matters. Internal meetings have been virtually suspended, because the TL sees this obsolete because of constant communication;
- A standing problem is rather related with the space limitation in the office. The three rooms allocated to TRAQUE within the main building of the Ministry of Trade and Industry are primarily meant to host the Technical Assistance. Initial space was made to accommodate also the Accountant recruited by MoTI under the PE budget. Some of the consultants must work in the premises of the beneficiary institutions;
- After initial tensions, good personal contacts on working level at MoTI, TA, NAO and DEU prevail. Weekly management meetings serve for close monitoring and steering. It was decided later to have weekly meetings only once every two weeks. It happens sometimes that for 3 or more weeks, no meetings can be organised;
- The recruitment of a temporary consultant to bridge the gap for the delivery of laboratory equipment was a very good solution and the expert demonstrated to be competent and very capable to handle the situation in very urgent and sometimes unpredictable circumstances;
- Appropriate experts were difficult to mobilise due to general delays and mission approval. The per diem rate was fixed for 2011 prices while it officially doubled since then, reducing the financial attractiveness of the project to STE. This might have contributed to so many experts resigning or declining the posts;
- The procedures for the recruitment of the short term experts remain cumbersome; however the management has earned in experience and now the overall process is under much better control and coordinated among all those who have different roles in it;
- The same holds true for the procedures related to the exemption of duties and taxes associated with the clearing of the equipment. The management has learnt by experience and now the coordination between the consignment with the technicians who come for training and the staff to be trained has improved;
- The four grant implementers did not set up initially a pre-assessment monitoring procedure and indicators, in particular for the training programmes. This aspect has been brought to their attention and they are now recording and verifying indicators that will be useful to evaluate final impact and efficacy of the programmes; this will help to consider possible follow up;
- Document and knowledge management remains a challenge. The TAT has no document library or even a common file server. Getting access to relevant information is time consuming and takes many days for experts, as several of the STE complained. Nobody has a complete set of project documents. Several drafts circulate and the final version is not always in the hands of the project staff;
- Experts complain that missions were postponed without known reason, no communication and coordination with them, Visa problems with Ghana;

- For the TAT, the situation in MoTI and the agencies often was unpredictable, with a number of issues which are not under direct and immediate project control;
- Preconditions for training sessions were delayed. Absenteeism from training courses was reported, also frequent disturbance by day-to-day tasks. In some cases, the participants had another training going on paralleled. Public employees tend to charge fees for attending training, a circumstance that other DPs validated as typical for Ghana. National staff was sometimes not available for internship or secondment positions abroad because they did not get a valid passport in time. MoTI's HR database therefore records the validity of passports.

EQ 12: In general, what has gone wrong?

- The mixed interest and understanding for TRAQUE can be explained by uncertainties in the trade negotiations. Quality and competitiveness would have a higher attention, if the trade environment was stable. There is still a political debate with strong tendencies to protectionism and alternative development pathways. Local importers face competition from abroad or fear to lose their markets. This is not always rational and attributable to trade regimes, but makes the field for MoTI more complex than this ministry can handle alone. MoTI can promote quality "Made in Ghana", but is weak in solving conflict cases.
- TRAQUE was designed and implemented in the context of an upcoming EPA. All stakeholders were in good faith that once all ECOWAS members sign the EPA TRAQUE would "take off". The signature of this agreement has been delayed and its content is being called into question as Nigeria and other countries assess whether the deal is in the interest of their economies. All ECOWAS countries are working hard with their civil society, business groups and development partners to find a solution. Although TRAQUE itself is not involved, this is an overarching challenge in the same context.
- Now even Ghana's access to EU market after September is at stake. According to some MoTI officials, the reason for Ghana not having signed the I-EPA earlier were the "economic challenges of market adjustment" that might be implied. Strong non-state actors, among them trade unions and industry associations, would prefer "no deal over a bad deal". Now the challenges are still present, but Ghana still lacks the experience of confronting the market dynamics. Comparison was sometimes made with the neighbouring countries. Cote d'Ivoire did sign a bilateral I-EPA with the EC already in 2008, faced certain challenges, but now can count on experience how to regulate under market adjustments. The problem keeps most stakeholders of TRAQUE busy, while a stable trade environment would be needed to progress on trade and quality issues.
- TRAQUE was supposed to assist the implementation of an EPA (IEAP or regional EPA). The EU has initialled the regional EPA with ECOWAS and at the same time with the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). Some interviewed partners saw as worst case scenario that the EU signs the EPA with the WAEMU members, leaving Ghana isolated.

EQ 13: How well was the Steering Committee used to steer the implementation?

- As per FA, the Steering Committee (SC) of the TRAQUE Programme is chaired by the Ministry of Trade and Industry and is comprised of representatives from the Ministry of Finance, the EU Delegation, the Ghana Standard Authority, Ghana Export promotion Authority, the Food and Drugs Authority and the National Board for Small Scale Industries as well as representatives of the private sector and the lead development partner of the PSD sector working group (being Danida);
- The SC is a board or assembly of stakeholders, rather than a body that takes decisions by majority vote. The SC should ensure key institutions are represented. The membership was institutional, not personal. In practices, individuals have been designated or identified as members / participants.
- These are the key stakeholders and the grant receiving public agencies. The private sector was later specified to be represented by GCCI, FAGE, AGI and EBO. They felt as invited guests and liked to be informed about the project, but did not get an active role. At the 3 first SC meetings, they have not been invited. They have been invited from the 4th SC meeting onwards. The private sector was absent at the 4th SC meeting but some representative attended the last SC meeting (5th).
- The private sector representatives would prefer more frequent written information on policies and technical issues (at their locations and with interactive formats). Thus, their members can raise

questions and concerns according to the needs and interests. They are not interested in detailed project implementation issues.

- Including the lead development partner of the PSD sector in the SC was the PSD SWG, which was called not frequently enough by MoTI, should ensure a symbol for alignment with the DPs. Coordination.
- The SC was called only annually by MoTI. This is not often enough to steer a project.¹¹ The meetings were rather ceremonial, with prepared statements from the institutions. The media presence (usually only at opening ceremony) and size of the event made it difficult to make it an operational body. The content was prepared by the TAT with close guidance from the EUD. As far as the minutes detail, all known problems and critical points were addressed transparently. The SC confirmed main decisions, which were taken already or depended on a key stakeholder anyway;
- As the minutes support, the EUD took a stronger role in steering the project since 2013. The new EUD staff monitored closely the financial and contractual matters and took part in the weekly steering meetings;
- The weekly meetings have been organised continuously, but with less frequency, with the participation of the Imprest Administrator, the Deputy, the Accountant, the NAO officer and the EUD Representatives. They represent a key element of the Programme management since all the decisions approved during the meetings have immediate operative effect. The minutes are regularly distributed to all officers involved with programme implementation;
- There was a gap between the weekly project meetings at working level and the annual SC meeting at diplomatic level. There was no intermediate level steering structure. It would have improved relations with MoTI to have a regular management panel with the Chief Director several times per year to keep the project connected with the current strategic priorities of MoTI leadership.

EQ 15: How well did the contractors deliver (TA, equipment, supplies) and how efficiently was the compliance enforced? How well were the different implementation instruments (TA, PE, Grants, Supplies) interlinked?

TRAQUE have five different Modalities of Implementation

Programme Estimates by MoTI	Direct decentralised operations, implemented directly by MoTI Programme Implementing Unit/Team, which includes an Imprest Administrator and Project Director and an Imprest Accounting officer assigned to the management and implementation of the project by the relevant representative of the MoTI, in agreement with the National Authorising Officer and the Head of Delegation. MoTI has also assigned a Deputy Director/ Manager to support in carrying out day-to-day work.
Technical Assistance to MoTI and other implementers	This is a service contract, designed to assist the beneficiary in the implementation of the activities of the TRAQUE Programme, in terms of technical capacity and administrative support during the project lifetime
Grant Agreements	Four grant agreements have been awarded to 4 different Institutions in Ghana: the Ghana Export Promotion Authority (GEPA), the National Board for Small Scale Industries (NBSSI), the Ghana Standards Authority (GSA) and the Food and Drugs Authority (FDA). Scope of the grants is to enhance the capacity of the agencies to serve their clients in areas related to international and regional exports and in understanding and overcoming their TBT and SPS challenges, as well as strengthening the competences in standards and food safety in line with the national quality policy requirements. Subjects include Standards and Quality processes, quality chain requirements, direct support actions to private sector.

¹¹ When the new team leader joined, one of the first thing she asked was to have the SC called twice a year, in order to have the possibility to timely address challenges with the many activities under implementation. Since July 2014 the SC were held on 18/11/2014, 03/06/2015, 18/05/2016. The SC scheduled for December 2015 was cancelled because not many activities were under implementation yet after the starting of PE3.

Supplies	The TRAQUE programme is providing support equipment to 28 laboratories of main quality institutions (e.g. the National Metrology Institute, the Plant Protection & Regulatory Services Directorate, the Accra Veterinary Laboratory, the Food Research Institute), including some minor renovation works and specific training for instruments installation and maintenance. Equipment is procured also to selected warehouses, in the framework of the support to Warehouses Receipt System.
Other services	With the extension of the programme, assistance is provided to the establishment of a national accreditation body through a service contract.

As detailed later in this Chapter, problems included:

- Delays at any stage;
- Mixed level of understanding and complying with EU procedures;
- Slow tendering, due to a lack of experience and decision power (retendering, contract cancellation);
- In some cases (GSA, PPRSD, VSD) the labs were not ready to install the new equipment. Delays in customs clearance;
- Cancellation of a supply contract due to long delays and non-compliance of equipment' requested specifications;
- Grant beneficiaries had no experience with the EU. Some had problems to recover the costs occurred, because they implemented the activities as under normal public procedure and only read the EU contract details afterwards.

The reasons for delays are usually well known and could have been limited by several specific measures. However, we can identify a number of four key issues responsible of important delays in the TRAQUE project:

1. **Too long delays to draft the specifications of equipment (6/8 months) and to prepare the tender dossiers:** that gave a first call of tender launched almost 1 year after the start of the project;
2. **Unsuccessful first round of tenders** because of inadequate division of equipment into separate packages (lots): the retendering induced a further one-year delay in the procedure;
3. **Defection of a supplier**, unable to provide equipment complying with the specifications (AGMIN: UPS, printers and computers): today these equipment are tremendously expected by the laboratories as it is impossible to use some electronic equipment without UPS because of frequent power cuts. (AGMIN contract represents the 2% missing equipment still to be delivered - EUR 113 425);
4. **Delay in clearance procedures:** Tax exemptions were granted by the MoF, but in addition, the destination inspection feed are granted exemption by MoTI, which took unnecessarily long. As a result, some equipment was still stuck in Customs when supplier's mission for installation and 1st level training took place.

Smaller problems included:

- Some items of equipment were not according to the wishes (microscopes for PPRSD without computer screens, drying cabinets for CSIR-FRI not fitting into space, oven without timer). Mostly related to poor specification when tendering;
- A lack of some small accessories such as adaptors, connectors and cables (CSIR-IIR lab);
- Some missing calibration certificates (or not provided in English). Same problems with manuals at GSA and CSIR-IIR labs;
- Some unexpected undersized equipment such as a too small distillation stand at FRI and non-professional microscopes at FRI or PPRSD;
- At Customs lab, a compressor is needed to operate a Photometer (not included in the tender);

- At GSA Petroleum lab, a nitrogen generator is needed to fully work the distillation unit (not included in the tender);
- All equipment for the GSA Food lab is not yet definitely installed because the building is not available.

EQ 16: Why did it take so long to issue the Grants and what are their implementation problems?

The Grant procedures were initiated in time, but the application was delayed. The experience with grant procedures was low at the beneficiaries, all of them being public agencies. The EU Grant administration is different from the usual public administration. Some beneficiaries requested more training and guidance on the procedures. One had to clear the formulas for valorisation of own inputs with the MoF, the others then followed this clearance. The EU rates for reimbursement were different from national amounts. An example the beneficiaries gave was, that the travel allowances paid by the GoG are higher than in the EU grant contract. All beneficiaries started the activities with the prefinancing payments in good faith that the EU will reimburse them, but did not read well enough the financial conditions. In some cases, the collection of receipts and other proof was done much after the activities. The beneficiaries had no external monitoring during the implementation of the Grants. Instead of applying the grant instrument, the four public agencies could have been easily included in the PEs.

The knowledge level on contract procedures was low. Some beneficiaries were unable to qualify all expenses in the financial report and therefore underspent the budget. Another factor was that the initial budget was overestimated and the activities were carried out more efficiently with local means. Looking back some beneficiaries said that they had no idea what an EU Grant means. NBSSI and GEPA requested an extension of six months, while GSA and FDA requested a budget reallocation. The agencies were not able to file financial reports for the full amounts.

Beneficiary	Components	Duration	Amount
FDA Food and Drugs Authority (MoFA)	Risk assessment and risk management Inspection of Food/Drugs manufacturing	01/04/2014-30/11/2015 Final Report 02/04/2016	€ 191 239 (86% used)
NBSSI National Board for Small Scale Industries (MoTI)	Capacity building in food safety, Support to MSEs in quality upgrading.	01/05/2014-30/10/2015 Final report 04/04/2016	€ 174 270 (77% used)
GEPA Ghana Export Promotion Agency (MoTI)	Export quality management and market information (Groundnuts, cereals, yam)	01/05/2014-30/10/2015 Final Report 19/04/2016	€ 146 340 (73% used)
GSA Ghana Standards Authority (MoTI)	IRCA certification of the Industrial Support Department. Establishment of an ISO 14001 scheme	01/03/2014-31/08/2016 Final report due 30/11/2016	€ 188 150 (79% used)

Finally, a STE had to guide the grant beneficiaries through the reporting requirements. This was appreciated as a learning exercise, but should have been done beforehand. Now all grant beneficiaries confirmed that they have learned how to handle EU grants.

EQ 17: Is the monitoring consistent and easy to follow for steering purposes? Does it report well enough on the OVI and unintended results?

The SC concluded in the third session in November 2014: "Indicators presently in use are not sufficient to measure efficiency, effectiveness and impact of the actions promoted and sustained by TRAQUE." There was no monitoring of the indicators [Annex 4] done before or after this conclusion of the SC. The SC also called for specific indicators for monitoring effectiveness of training. The suggestion had no follow-up.

EQ 18: How were the ROM reports perceived and used?

Weaknesses were found in the follow-up of ROM findings. The annual monitoring exercise called “Results-Oriented Monitoring” (ROM) was carried out by external experts in 2012 and 2013. The EUD did not call the ROM exercise since then. ROM should cover all projects over EUR 1 million every six months from start of implementation. ROM can be very useful and the Background Conclusion Sheet for TRAQUE is revealing problems from an early stage. The ROM reports already gave recommendation that this evaluation can repeat, as the following quote show.

“The process of designing TRAQUE was mostly done with MoTI and there have since been staff changes in both MoTI and the Delegation. MoTI needs to take a more decisive leadership role to get the programme back on track. Re-launch the project through a Steering Committee Meeting with all beneficiaries setting out clearly how the project will involve all parties. Reformulate the FA, establish clear measurable indicators, and include the private sector in the Steering Committee. Support to the Imprest Officer needs to be resolved ideally through the provision of local experienced EC procedural expertise. Manage the dissemination of reports through a tracking system.”

The EUD did perceive that there were difficulties, but lost the opportunity to address them with the other stakeholders. It is hard to understand why the ROM reports were not used and why the monitors were not called again, as there was even a budget for them in TRAQUE. As per the service contract with AESA, the Technical Assistance should also ensure internal monitoring and evaluation of the project activities.

EQ 19: What indicators or data are needed for efficient programme management?¹²

Projects like TRAQUE increasingly use the DCED Standard to formulate and monitor indicators. The Donor Committee for Enterprise Development (DCED) is a forum in which donors and UN agencies share their practical experience on private sector development, and agree guidelines on best practice. In 2008, the DCED commenced a participatory process to collect and define best practices in results measurement. The process involved a number of private sector development programmes and consultants, and produced the Standard for Measuring Achievement in Private Sector Development. The Standard is now on its fifth version.¹³

The Standard comprises the minimum elements required in any results measurement process, and provides tool and a framework for building a results measurement system. A number of donor programmes are in various stages of adopting the standard

The elements of the DCED Standard

1. Articulating the Results Chain
2. Defining indicators of change
3. Measuring changes in indicators
4. Estimating attributable changes
5. Capturing wider changes in the system or market
6. Tracking programme costs
7. Reporting results
8. Managing the system for results measurement

The DCED Standard is a framework that helps practitioners to articulate the hypothesis very clearly, and to systematically set and monitor indicators that show whether events are occurring as expected. This empowers programmers to learn and adapt based on the monitoring data which they collect – which many would say is simply good management.

EQ 20: Which best practices for efficient implementation in Ghana can be learned from other DPs or stakeholders?

- There is an unused potential to learn from others. Donor coordination on PSD is not effective since 2011 in Ghana. The other international DPs interviewed offered their experience and learnings to

¹² This Evaluation Question was chosen during the inception meeting as interesting for future cooperation.

¹³ Available from <http://www.enterprise-development.org/measuring-results-the-dced-standard/>

the EUD. Communication among international DPs seems to be a preferred channel, compared to the official working groups with the counterparts.

- All international DPs interviewed wished for a more active participation of the EUD in the SWG meetings. However, MoTI did not call these meetings frequently enough, and there is no established knowledge sharing mechanism between meetings. The EUD is a member of the PSD SWG, but has a minor role here. Compared to the overall portfolio of around 400 M€ in the 10th EDF, the support of 18 M€ to PSD in Ghana did not mean a focus on PSD for the EUD. The EU was not even considered as a key partner by Ghana in this area as we were not invited to the Private Sector Development Council.
- In procurement of laboratory equipment, the PTB project was mentioned as best practice. PTB procedures allow negotiating directly with the manufacturer of equipment. PTB can easily procure multi-purpose equipment, which saves money and space. PTB is known for delivering exactly the brand devices as ordered. Some labs mentioned that PTB stepped in to complete equipment obtained from TRAQUE. That is also a sign that the labs can build on the results and use them for their service delivery. In EU procurement procedures, direct negotiations are possible under a certain ceiling. Experience is needed in tendering for this relatively rare equipment, to ensure transparency and fair competition above that ceiling.
- In addition, USAID is reported to use local procurement easily, and their tenders proceed much more rapidly and it should be said successfully. The EU procurement management is decentralised, which can work efficiently, but in the case on TRAQUE faced many delays.
- The BUSAC has impact indicators on a highly aggregated level and still can attribute its effects because control groups are used to compare sectors of intervention with non-treatment sectors. They use external monitors to follow the impact indicators.
- Projects of that scope and size would have several key experts present during the entire implementation. Long-term experts would be needed to lead the technical aspects of each component, under an overall team leader. The components are related to own results, involving different stakeholders. Some donors work with intermitting long-term experts and national coordinators.

3.3 Effectiveness

Nº	Summary of Evaluation Questions re Effectiveness
21	How far did the delivered trainings to staff raise the capacities of the Ministry of Trade and Industry and related agencies?
22	What effects does the modernization of the training and career development of MOTI have so far?
23	What effects does the HR management system have in MoTI and beyond?
24	What support does trained staff get from the decision-makers to lead institutional changes?
25	How do testing and calibration laboratories use the supplied high technology equipment in the areas of testing of food and non-food products, and in industrial and legal metrology (including the Accra Veterinary Laboratory)?
26	Did the laboratories improve tests related to product compliance and conformity (e.g. on fuel composition, food quality and controls on imports and updated standards.)?
27	How far did the Ghana Export Promotion Agency and the National Board for Small Scale Industries raise the quality of their services after receiving the Grants?
28	What are the situation and perspectives for developing and implementing a National Quality Policy?
29	Which required pre-conditions are missing for setting-up the National Accreditation Body? When will it be in the position to verify the conformity of testing laboratories, calibration laboratories and inspection and certification bodies in Ghana?
30	What is missing for the Ghana Commodity Exchange (GCX) to be fully operational?
31	Do the activities lead to improvements and other effects?

N°	Summary of Evaluation Questions re Effectiveness
32	How do Ghanaian entrepreneurs, notably exporters along agricultural value chains, assess the benefits for themselves and their sector?
14	How do the different stakeholders perceive the effectiveness of the programme with regard to programme results and achievements?
33	Do unplanned results affect the benefits received?

Table : (Likely) Achievement of Expected Outputs

N°	Expected Output/Outcome	(Likely) Extent of Achievement: A (Actually Achieved); O (Ongoing Measures); S (Suggestions for Action)
Component 1:		
R1	Strengthened capacity of MoTI and other relevant Government agencies in trade policy analysis and formulation and for the implementation	A: MoTI training delivered. HR database. 3 grants closed. O: Training (RoO, EU market access). 1 grant ongoing S: Complete training and HR database. Interim EPA strategy advice.
R4	Improved capacity of Ghana Grains Council and other warehouse receipt systems	A: Selection of warehouses O: Physical assessment of the proposed warehouse operators, procurement and certification not started S: Discontinue activities on this objective.
Component 2:		
R2	Effective institutions for the implementation of the national quality policy and the creation of a performing quality infrastructure	A: Equipment operational. NQP drafted. GhGL supported. O: Agree on NQP. Retendering for UPS + Computers. Training for metrology and testing S: Get NQP approved. Finish lab training.
R3	The establishment of a National Accreditation Body	A: Delayed. Unclear legal and political situation. O: Cancellation of TA contract. S: Discontinue. Seek regional solution.

EQ 21: How far did the delivered trainings to staff raise the capacities of the Ministry of Trade and Industry and related agencies?

The TRAQUE programme has delivered a number of training courses to staff of the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MOTI) to have a better understanding of issues related to international trade. TRAQUE has also been supporting the modernization of the training and career development unit in order to improve the capacity of MoTI in such fields as the implementation for instance of the WTO's trade facilitation agreement and the EPA.

Most training modules on subjects related to capacity building at the Ministry of Trade have been implemented and completed, but with limited follow up in practical applications in an overall strategy to upgrade the capacity of MoTI in carrying out its mandate, with the consequence that efforts put in implementation of training programmes produced only partial change in the Ministry.

Training is not sufficient to improve the capacity of Government institutions to carry out timely and effectively changes, if it is not accompanied by an overall well designed strategic plan, with clear procedures and coordination. To develop such a strategic plan, that is very much needed, will be very difficult within the present organisation and management of MoTI.

MoTI directors see as effects of the training that the staff is more professional and can complete assignments faster than before TRAQUE. As specific example young officials were mentioned, who became able to draft Cabinet Proposals. Especially the Standards Division raised capacities with TRAQUE, which was also confirmed by stakeholders outside MoTI. MoTI benefitted from the ISO 17025 training and relies on a pool of more than 50 assessors in the laboratory network. In addition, Ghana's active role in the African Organisation for Standardisation (ARSO) was mentioned twice in attribution to TRAQUE.

MoTI did formulate a new export policy without direct input from TRAQUE. In April 2016, the Ministry launched the National Export Development Programme (NEDP) 2016-2020¹⁴. This policy document¹⁵ is very different from the Ghana National Export Strategy for the Non-Traditional Sector 2013–2017. The documents itself, however, shows no influence of TRAQUE. ECOWAS is mentioned only marginally, trade with the EU not at all.

New incentives, such as less tax or tax exemptions on locally produced goods, legal and regulatory allowances, are to encourage domestic companies to export local goods or services in order to keep domestic products competitive on the global market. MoTI recently announced, that it “would ensure the aggressive implementation of the national export strategy which focused on the non-traditional exports sector and the national export development programme whose objective was to enhance the quality of export products and compliance with global market requirements through investment in relevant technologies, trained manpower and effective relationships with quality assurance institutions.”¹⁶ Here the Ministry mentions some elements supported by TRAQUE, but without referring to the project.

During the evaluation, several examples were mentioned by interviewed partners to illustrate the still low capacity level of MoTI as an institution:

- There is a long pipeline of Cabinet Proposals under preparation in MoTI, that all should pass before the election season this year. Among them is the Quality Policy, the local content policy, competition policy, sugar policy and cost of credit policy, made in Ghana policy. The quality of the proposals is reported to be mixed, as they come from different sources and processes. It is seen very sceptical that MoTI can launch these proposals on fast track procedures this year;
- On 21 March 2016, MoTI had to withdraw its own Administrative Directive for the Exportation of Raw Cashew Nut (RCN), which was issued on 9 March. The directive was introduced without dialogue as an urgent measure to protect the national processing industry. It came too late for protecting the national industry, because 10 of 12 processors went out of business already. MoTI had outdated information on local processing capacities. Farmers and buyers from the cashew-producing region protested successfully against MoTI’s directive. The decision generated a heated debate in Parliament with MP’s describing it as illegal, among other terms. The Parliament advised the Minister to immediately withdraw the Directive in a vote of censure;
- Another protection attempt in March 2016 should ban cement imports. Cement importers, the ministry said, will henceforth be issued a permit “to avoid the chaos that has lately saddled the sector”. The ministry has therefore given all cement importers up to 31st March to register with it, even though it said “companies that are legitimately licenced under the ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme are exempted from the need to apply for a permit”;
- Several private sector groups have formed the Coalition for Trade Facilitation, which blamed MoTI recently general lack of knowledge on the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA), which is due to be ratified and implemented since 2013¹⁷;
- MoTI is under pressure to protect Ghana’s Exports into EU market after September 2016. One option presented in April 2016 was to draw up compensation mechanisms for companies exporting to the EU, especially for non-traditional exports before the end of August 2016. As this is obviously not financed, some industry contacts already question how serious the other options might be. Capacity to negotiate trade agreements included credibility at all sectors of the economy, not only the exporters. Even exporters express doubts that MoTI has the capacity to negotiate in their interest.

¹⁴ MoTI Press Declaration 9 March 2016 <http://moti.gov.gh/press-release/1457971607/administrative-directive-for-the-exportation-of-raw-cashew-nut-rcn>

¹⁵ MoTI, National Export Development Programme and National Export Strategy 2016 – 2020, <http://www.ghanatrade.gov.gh/Laws/national-export-development-programme-and-national-export-strategy-2016-2020.html>

¹⁶ The Graphic, 29 April 2016, <http://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/ministry-of-trade-to-boost-export-of-non-traditional-products.html>

¹⁷ The TFA is one of the main outcomes of the World Trade Organisation’s 9th Ministerial Conference in Bali, Indonesia, in December 2013 aims at reducing the time and cost of international trade. See <http://ghanabizfinance.com/2016/05/27/private-sector-calls-for-the-ratification-of-tfa/>

EQ 22: What effects does the modernization of the training and career development of MOTI have so far?

EQ 23: What effects does the HR management system have in MoTI and beyond?

EQ 24: What support does trained staff get from the decision-makers to lead institutional changes?

- The HR database in MoTI is operational since April 2015, but the data entry was completed in February 2016, thus the effects are still fresh. It was difficult to convince all staff members to register their details. It lists now 321 staff members in core MoTI (not Agencies), which should be complete. No “ghost employees” were detected. Entries on training are still not complete; even the TRAQUE training is not fully recorded. TRAQUE provided training and the required computer equipment and software, through the PE budget.
- It is now the Master List of MoTI staff, which did not exist before. It solved the problem that personnel files get frequently lost, and is said to reduce administration cost.
- The most practical use of it so far is to use it as a telephone and e-mail directory of the ministry. As the older staff generation know each other well without it, especially the younger staff generations frequently pass by and consult it for a contact in another or even the own department. It could serve to strengthen the networks of junior staff. Most frequent enquiry, however, is the search for the own staff number.
- Another practical use is the calculation and control of leave days, which did not exist before. However, the software needs to consider all bank holidays before the leave calculation can be effective.
- The original purpose of the HR database was to keep track of who has participated in which training and how that fits with their career development planning.
- Now, the HR system serves to identify suitable participants for trainings on offer, if requested. The selection is done by the division heads and directors as before. MoTI received many invitations for training events, mostly abroad. Important training providers for MoTi are WTO, ITC, UNCTAC and Tralac Trade Law Centre. The participation is largely financed by Chinese and Japanese scholarships and grants.
- More often staff members and directors come and inquire for upcoming training offers. As highly demanded were mentioned “Negotiating trade agreements” and “Writing cabinet proposals”. However, the database does not yet have a matching function of training demand and offers.
- The database reveals the demographics of MoTI staff. Within the coming five years, a generation shift has to be managed. Most senior officials are to retire and have to be succeeded. MoTI needs staff that will be able to contribute to its long-term development goals and priorities. In other words, the HR department needs to match organisational objectives and personal aims to become a capable and decisive organisation. It would be a strong incentive to capacity development, if career decisions were taken based on competencies.
- So far, MoTI offers not enough incentives to apply new skills. More coaching and on-the-job training would be useful, also guidance to take controlled risk when doing mistakes. Peer learning networks of young professionals could also contribute to innovation.
- The HR database in MoTI is not linked to any network. It is not related to the general GoG database, which is used for salary payments. The database is at risk, as it has no backup in a separate location. The evaluators asked the operators to keep notes on errors and adjustments of the software, so that TRAQUE can opt on upgrading and completing the activity. Needs expressed include legal issues of HR, due of the system for generating reports, copy the system to mobile computers for presentations, and having an UPS to protect data from power cuts.

EQ 25: How do testing and calibration laboratories use the supplied high technology equipment in the areas of testing of food and non-food products, and in industrial and legal metrology?

EQ 26: Did the laboratories improve tests related to product compliance and conformity (e.g. on fuel composition, food quality and controls on imports and updated standards.)?

In terms of supporting the national quality infrastructure, three main Government testing laboratories have been renovated. In addition, 28 public laboratories have received high technology equipment in the areas of testing of food and non-food products, and in industrial and legal metrology. The equipment include inter alia autoclaves, temperature measurements, weights and balances, acoustics, chromatographs, incubators, transducers, isolation transformers, electrical, temperature and pressure measurements.

This is expected to improve test related to product compliance and conformity – e.g. on fuel composition, food quality and controls on imports and updated standards. Current TRAQUE trainers expressed their confidence that the laboratory professional staff currently trained will raise the service quality of their institutions.

Procurement of laboratory equipment was difficult and met a large scope of problems and delays. However, this is not surprising given the complexity and variety of technical equipment, mainly intended for metrology and calibration, testing and analysis laboratories. Such tenders are usually very difficult to carry out and the pitfalls are many all over the procedure, from the draft of technical specifications to the final installation and reception of the equipment. Most laboratories learned how to draft specifications for successful tendering.

Most of expected equipment (98% representing EUR 5 721 485) was delivered to the great satisfaction of beneficiaries, even if some problems occurred (and still remain), but with a limited impact on the final results, with the exception of some extreme delays which had a negative impact on the project.

Delays are often penalizing factors for activities directly related to the availability of equipment, such as training and accreditation process of testing activities. These induced problems are very time-consuming at the expense of other activities undertaken by the project.

Some delays had a negative impact on the effectiveness. Some installation experts came before equipment was cleared from the port. The experts left without conducting substantial training on the use of equipment because of equipment not arriving on time for installation and training. IRR brought this up to the SC already on June 2015. The SC recommended that application for exemptions delay hence copies of the Bill of Lading should be issued to the Ministry of Finance immediately consignments or lots are put on board. Still the supply of UPS and Computers did not arrive, that are urgently needed to operate the equipment safely.

The Veterinary Service Directorate (VSD) in Accra received equipment, training, and ingredients as specified, except for the UPS, printers, and computers from Agmin. The UPS are urgently needed, because of frequent power cuts. VSD gets samples of live animals and products, fodder, disease surveillance from all regions in Ghana for export and import. VSD works with Togo, Benin, Niger on surveillance of poultry (Avian flu), with Benin on Argentine cattle, and provides lab training to Liberia and Sierra Leone,. VSD confirmed to have the clients/market to earn money and sustain the use of equipment, Recalibration is supported by the Ghana Atomic Energy Commission.

EQ 27: How far did the Ghana Export Promotion Agency and the National Board for Small Scale Industries raise the quality of their services after receiving the Grants?

The agencies evaluated for the grants showed ability to learn as institutions, but also here the key person has to be present to access the knowledge. They are organized around their specific scope. MoTI itself, however, has no visible public service, no physical reception, no organigram, numbers but no names or functions on the doors. Officials bring their personal mobile and e-mail; sometimes keep their own document system. If they leave the post, everything has to be reconstructed. Among the phenomena is, that decisions are not taken if the director is not in, even if the post is vacant. Personal networks prevail, which pass information and prepare decisions.

Both agencies, GEPA and NBSSI, gave examples on how they maintain the knowledge and the capacity to apply the training again. Both mentioned their effort to distribute the training content to all

regions. They did, however, not yet repeat the training from own resources, but required additional funding to carry it on.

EQ 28: What are the situation and perspectives for developing and implementing a National Quality Policy?

The NQP document should be ready for approval after the Consultative Workshop in June.

MoTI requested TRAQUE to revise the National Quality Policy (NQP) document, which integrates the National Quality Infrastructure. The draft NPQ document was revised several times and improved significantly compared to the 2011 version. Significant weaknesses were discovered in the area of the management of existing quality infrastructures, as well as the conceptual policy framework. Main stakeholders (GSA, FDA) would have to reform. Expertise of Unido and PTB is involved in the process.

Of the 80 stakeholders invited to comment on the draft in 2015, only 4 replied, among them GSA and from West Africa Quality System Programme (WAQSP). A national workshop that was scheduled during the evaluation mission was postponed, reportedly because MoTi was not sure that enough comments were received. WAQSP reminded to harmonize with the West African Quality Policy (ECOQUAL).

GSA did not raise major concerns on the draft, but emphasised on their existing capacity to serve in a 5-years transitional period. When asked about the laboratory situation, GSA staff saw good market potential in West Africa for their services, once the NQP will be approved. GSA would need this competitive advantage.

GSA derives its mandate from the Standard Decree, NRC 173 (1973), which has to be upgraded and modernised to fit into a metrology body acceptable at international standards. GSA was trying to renew its mandate with a GSA law. The Quality Policy should come first, not a law. MoTI requested the assistance of TRAQUE to revise the draft document of the GSA bill, so to ensure that the bill is not in contradiction and incongruent with the requirements of the National Quality Policy, the National Accreditation framework, the related set of regulations, as well as with ECOWAS guidelines.

According to MoTI, the Parliament Committee on Trade and Health is well informed and can fast track the approval. The health sector has a strong interest in accreditation and quality infrastructure in general. Health bodies, both public and private, participated in dialogue event, but the position of the Ministry for Health is unknown to the evaluators.

The National Quality Policy is not only essential for Ghana to remain competitive both within and outside but also to ensure the protection of the Ghanaian consumers from non-compliant goods and services. QI has an increasing role in trade facilitation and equipping of national quality institutions to ensure safety of foods consumed on the local market and for exports as well. The link to competitiveness in the domestic markets, health and consumer protection was not enough worked on in TRAQUE so far.

EQ 29: Which required pre-conditions are missing for setting-up the National Accreditation Body? When will it be in the position to verify the conformity of testing laboratories, calibration laboratories and inspection and certification bodies in Ghana?

Since December 2013, TRAQUE has the objective to Support the establishment of a National Accreditation Body (NAB) and the preparation of all participating Conformity Assessment Bodies (CABs) for Accreditation.

The TA recruited a long-term accreditation expert (200 working days) for internal quality management system, procedures, administration, job descriptions, financial system, IT system, etc. A tender with the amount of €600,000 for a supporting project (service contract) of 15 months was launched and awarded to IBF (Belgium). It engages the South African National Accreditation System SANAS and Slovak National Accreditation Service SNAS, two vested accreditation bodies for twinning cooperation, who would train the personnel of the future Ghanaian NAB, develop any administrative procedures and the quality manual and do finalising witness testing of Ghanaian staff. An amount of € 100,000 for material means for the NAB.

However, the main task of the foreign AB is to accredit the Conformity Assessment Bodies (labs, certification and inspection bodies), which are supported by the TRAQUE programme and to provide them with international recognition.

Accreditation is non-existing in Ghana. This is a serious omission within the framework of a National Quality Infrastructure. There is no NAB, and there is no relevant supported legislation. All accreditation is acquired through the services of foreign accreditation bodies, often in the framework of multilateral or bilateral technical assistance.

Therefore, local conformity assessment bodies use the services of foreign accreditation bodies, mostly from Europe or South Africa. Foreign accreditation is usually more expensive than local accreditation, consequently conformity assessment bodies, but also companies with internal laboratories or the health sectors with its many medical laboratories, and even the private sector at large are faced with a higher level of compliance costs. This means high cost of doing business.

Another evenly important consequence of not having a NAB is that the know-how of Ghanaian technical experts (lead and technical auditors) is seriously delayed because of lack of real accreditation projects.

Each and every accreditation body needs to have a legal identity or status, which will give it the legal authority to be the sole organisation for the accreditation of CABs in the country. Furthermore, the legal status needs to provide impartiality in its decision making, confidentiality of information, liability for its actions, and preservation from conflicts of interest, as well as identification of the sources of funding.

A major difficulty for starting the NAB was that an Act of Parliament regulating the subject of accreditation in Ghana was believed to be necessary. A draft legal document for the creation of this ad-interim NAB has been developed end of 2015 considering the requirements of ISO/IEC 17011, relevant ILAC/IAF documents and the legal system in Ghana. This law would set the legal status and the legal authority for the NAB, as well as the safeguards for the realisation of the basic principles of accreditation, and the financing of the institution. According to the Policy Director, MoTI has ruled out this option for lack of financial sustainability.

The solution provided in the TRAQUE programme is the establishment of an ad-interim National Accreditation Body under Ghanaian commercial law. While establishing a law on accreditation would be a lengthy process and given the time constraints of the TRAQUE programme, an interim NAB solution is seen as a feasible way forward, until the Law on Accreditation has been transposed/implemented, considering that many other countries in the region/worldwide have followed a similar route.

However, due to a change of the MoTI policy advisor in same period among others, the work of establishing the NAB has been slowed down. The general-director of the NAB is not available yet. The renovation of an office for the NAB has been delayed. In addition, as the contract with IBF has already been signed, this would entail the cancellation of the contract and the need for MoTI to pay a penalty fee.

If MoTI decides not to go further with the establishment of the NAB, this would mean a loss of momentum (a work of at least 1 year of an international expert, including the preparation of the ToRs for the engagement of the accreditation expert as well as for the service contract).

It is questionable that the Law on Accreditation would be approved within the next 3 years. So the roadmap is not realistic, as the MoTI is not really aware and not sure of a National Accreditation Body needs (despite they know what accreditation is because TRAQUE organised ISO 17025, ISO 17021-1 and ISO 17020 trainings).

It is unlikely that the MoTI would fulfil preconditions in time to achieve IBF contract within the remaining TRAQUE implementation period. However, it does not depend on MoTI but more on the adoption of the NQP in Parliament. A session is scheduled for July 2016 but a decision was uncertain at the time of the MTR.

The 5th SC agreed that swift decision should be taken and the EU recommended to stop the activities. The SC recommended to focus during the next 12 months to what works.

A feasible alternative is, to downgrade the TA contract with IBF to support accreditation by training and preparing the laboratories, raising awareness for accreditation and assessing the future business potential for GHANAS in West Africa. This seems to be a necessary and useful step to reach the point

of formal decision for a NAB.

EQ 30: What is missing for the Ghana Commodity Exchange (GCX) to be fully operational?

GCX is an initiative by private sector investors and as well as the Government of Ghana (GoG) to establish a regulated and professional trading platform for selected commodities such as Maize, Soybean and Rice. The GCX is planned since 2009 as a new market platform for trading local commodities in a transparent and uniform manner. Buyers and sellers can trade under a warehouse system governed by rules. Farmers all over Ghana shall get easy access to the platform and trade their commodities, including maize, paddy rice, beans, and groundnuts.

President Mahama announced in February 2014 that the Government has committed itself to the establishment of a Ghana Commodity Exchange (GCX) and associated Warehouse Receipt System (WRS). President Mahama, who announced it also in the 2014 budget statement, internally approves it. The GCX is delayed, but planned to be operational in 2016.

Ghana follows the models from Ethiopia and South Africa, but has introduced some interesting market innovations. The public GCX will not own the warehouses, but operate with private equity under a PPP-arrangement. Sellers would get money immediately, but not at a guaranteed price.

Main stakeholders of the WRS are the Bank of Ghana (BoG) and the Ghana Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which regulates the GCX. Regulation and supervision are needed, as it is a system of financing where loans will be given out based on goods or commodities, held in trust as collateral. The other key player is the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA), implementing the Ghana Commercial Agriculture Project (GCAP) funded by the World Bank with USD 100 million. Key financial partner was to be the IFC, but the revised investment policy does not allow an equity share as foreseen. The London-based 8 Miles equity fund retrieved from investing, because the fund's term ends in 2017. Ecobank and Ghana Commercial Bank are partners mainly as payment agencies with countrywide branches. NAFCO was reported to negotiate a participation in the GCX.

The WRS is an element accompanying to the GCX, but both can develop separately. The challenge is to enforce the standards, which exist in GSA, to the WRS by providing testing and calibration services locally all over Ghana. GSA was foreseen to inspect and certify the warehouses and to train resident inspectors (in Weighing, Sampling, Grading). The regulatory framework to be setup by SEC and adopted by Parliament does not designate GSA as inspection and certification body, meaning that any support from TRAQUE to GSA leading to another body /institution being appointed for these functions would be clearly lost.

Substantial levels of capital investment are needed to bring the WRS to the level of small farmers. It must be capable to safely grade and store even small quantities of "surplus" maize and other soft commodities that Ghanaian farmers are producing in excess of their own consumption needs. This is the rationale to interfere with development finance in this highly competitive market.

The Ghana Grains Council (GGC) is one of many interest groups in the ecosystem, but not the main operator. The FA mentions GGC as operator of the WRS, but leaves options to work with other partners as well. At the time of decision, GGC had a capable expert in charge, who was trained in the Ethiopia Commodity Exchange, but later left because the USAID-funded "Advance" project end the subsidy for the post.

MoTI has limited technical capacities and only a minor role in the GCX, while MoFA seems to be much more involved. In addition, the EUD and the TAT had no technical expertise in the matter, which was pointed out by several interviewed partners as bottleneck for the objective. A specialized STE was hired, but not used efficiently.

In addition, by the time of selection, TRAQUE had no expert experienced in EU tendering procedures and confusion is reported on how, when and in what format tender documents had to be forwarded. Support from the NAO and EUD was either not requested or not available at the time of drafting MoU.

TRAQUE drafted MoU with MoTI and after approval; copies were taken to each potential support recipient with WB matching grant warehouses under construction. Each MoU was set out in the name of a potential recipient and the procedures of EU tendering, responsibilities of the recipient and status of the equipment to be tendered for was explained to them in detail.

The selection of the warehouses was later rejected, as it did not comply with agreed and transparent criteria. In addition, no link was made in the selection to the GCX ensuring that the supported

warehouses will be eventually participating of the GCX. The selection needed to be redone, which affected also the effectiveness.

The number of selected warehouses was reduced in March 2015 to be in line with the final list of selected warehouses received from GCX. GCX and EUD accuse each other for this decision. Several warehouses have not heard from MoTI/TRAQUE since the MoU were signed.

Considering the technical and legal difficulties and the time needed for procurement, the evaluators do not see the objective realistic within TRAQUE'S timeframe. The SC has decided to discontinue activities on this objective.

EQ 31: Do the activities lead to improvements and other effects?

EQ 32: How do Ghanaian entrepreneurs, notably exporters along agricultural value chains, assess the benefits for themselves and their sector?

TRAQUE has contributed to economic policy making in Ghana. Ghana has confirmed plans to improve its level of industrialisation and to become a manufacturing hub for West Africa and one of the challenges facing the country is to ensure the highest quality in the standards of manufactured products. Beyond oil, which is the major export product to the EU, the most important products exported to the EU are cocoa and processed cocoa products, fruit and vegetables and processed fish. SPS issues are one of the main constraints to be able to trade globally, including for Ghana when exporting to its largest export market, the European Union. It is of utmost importance for Ghana to improve its quality infrastructure to take full advantage of the implementation of the Economic Partnership Agreement and to integrate into global value chains.

Farmers and other food producers have used TRAQUE to improve credibility of their products and see perspectives for better income through quality. When asked about the time when these financial benefits occur, none of the farmers or producers has already a better income, they expected it between 2 month and 2 years from now. The interventions and benefits were too diverse to get a representative answer. A common characteristic of the participating entrepreneurs seems to be, that they base their business on knowledge and skills already. The interviewed entrepreneurs were aware that investing in better knowledge improves quality and pays off.

Farmers interviewed confirmed their commitment to the practices associated with the Green Label (on chili pepper, cucumber, cabbage). They highly expect a higher credibility for their products in the local market, which shall translate in higher income for them. However, this income effect can only be evaluated in tree month or later, as they just start to apply their new skills. Already the farmers see their learning progress on agricultural practices and share in in their group. They mentioned the potential benefits for health in their community. The GhGL manual revealed new needs: soil analyser, Aflatoxins fluorescence detection, money to buy better seeds and chemicals. Farmers expressed their worries that the EU could ban their products. None of this group however, did try to export their products.

EQ 14: How do the different stakeholders perceive the effectiveness of the programme with regard to programme results and achievements?

- TRAQUE is primarily known for the supplies of laboratory equipment. It is recognised as a “multi-functional project”, while the stakeholders only know the part they deal with;
- TRAQUE is widely known as EU-financed project in MoTi. The evaluators receive positive comments on the cooperation. TRAQUE is mostly identified with the TA TL among the national stakeholders, while the international DPs refer to the EUD staff. MoTi seems to be difficult to approach even for the business community. TRAQUE obviously is easier to deal with and sometimes serves as a gateway into MoTi.
- Several external stakeholders showed surprisingly deep insights into the project's problems and conflicts. The exchange of the TA TL is seen as a necessary move to overcome personal conflicts and to establish a more people-centered management style. The present TA TL is mostly seen responsible the entire project covering all the activities. The TA experts have a good reputation in their particular fields. The skills of the TL are limited to a certain technical area, which is understandable. Her expertise in QI was sometimes questioned, while this was often linked with the wish to have the former LTE for QI back.

- The relatively good effectiveness of the project is not perceived by all stakeholders. The conflicts and delays stay in the mind of many interview partners, while the results are not acknowledged appropriately. This perception is hard to overcome with intensified visibility measures. The attention regarding the project lies on the unsolved failures, while the overall successful cases of trade agreements, equipment supply and training results are commonly ignored. The reason behind the negative feelings could be the missing impact from the trade agreements to date, because they were not yet implemented. The results of the project will probably be better recognized, as soon as the exports increase and the quality infrastructure is in use to support this.
- MoTI explains the delays mainly with miscommunication among the people in charge initially. In addition, directors call in mind that MoTI was not fully in charge of PSD, which separated TRAQUE from other strategies. However, MoTI was always in charge of trade and quality.
- Individual leadership increased efficiency of the project in several occasions. Periods of efficient implementation were often linked to a particular director or expert. When the intermitting experts were not present, implementation was felt to slow down.

Other DPs included warnings to stay away from legislative issues, or better to keep the implementation well below Cabinet level.

EQ 33: Do unplanned results affect the benefits received?

Unplanned results have been observed that affect the benefits in any sense.

3.4 Impact

Nº	Summary of Evaluation Questions re Impact
34	To what extent the planned overall objectives have been partly or totally achieved, and how far that was directly due to the project?
35	Why is TRAQUE not stopping Ghana's competitiveness indicators to decline?
36	What else is needed that trade can lead to pro-poor growth in Ghana?
37	What else is needed to provide better services to the business sector?
38	How and to what cost do producers in Ghana get accreditation to ISO standards?
39	Did producers along the groundnut value chain succeed to avoid aflatoxin contamination of their produce? Did they increase their exports to the EU?
40	How far did the Green Label Certification Scheme improve market access for vegetable and fruit produced in Ghana?
41	How far is warehousing stabilizing income for farmers?
42	How could the desired wider impact been better achieved otherwise?

EQ 34: To what extent the planned overall objectives have been partly or totally achieved, and how far that was directly due to the project?

Since 2011, Ghana took relevant decisions on international economic co-operation:

- Jointly with ECOWAS member countries in July 2014, Ghana endorsed the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the European Union (EU). The regional agreement covers goods and development-cooperation and includes rendezvous clauses providing for further negotiations on services and rules chapters.
- As a member of ECOWAS, Ghana has endorsed the ECOWAS Common External Tariff (CET) which was adopted by ECOWAS finance ministers in March 2014. The CET was expected to be implemented in January 2015 by all countries but the implementation was delayed in most of them. Now Ghana, Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Mali, Togo, Benin and Niger are effectively implementing the CET. Ghana started only in February 2016. The CET is intended to facilitate free trade and create a uniform regime of customs and related charges to help address the problem of cross-border smuggling, combat dumping as well as bring economic benefits to the sub-region.

TRAQUE was successful in supporting MoTI in the negotiations by training, studies and technical advice. The project was a core input needed to reach the results.

EQ 35: Why is TRAQUE not stopping Ghana's competitiveness indicators to decline?

TRAQUE had little designation to impact on Ghana's competitiveness. An impact can be expected only in the long run, and in the context of a consolidated economic development programme.

Ghana's competitiveness within sub-Saharan Africa has declined in the last four years due to the country's weakening macro-economic indicators. Despite increased participation in regional economic co-operation, Ghana's external trade has continued to perform poorly and export earnings decline. Ghana's non-traditional exports remained unchanged, a reflection of sustained growth despite a number of challenges facing the productive sector. The economy faces major challenges in the form of sharp currency depreciation, deepening energy crisis, deteriorating macroeconomic imbalance, and rising inflation and interest rates.

Ghana scored 3.58 points out of 7 on the 2015-2016 Global Competitiveness Report published by the World Economic Forum. According to WEF, the most problematic factors for doing business are access to financing, Inflation, Foreign currency regulations, Tax rates, Corruption, Inadequate supply of infrastructure, Inefficient government bureaucracy, and Policy instability. This has almost nothing to do with the scope of TRAQUE. Trade tariffs and duty was the worst performing in the category "Good market Efficiency". In 2015, Ghana ranked 104th out of 144 countries. In other trade related indicators (Prevalence of non-tariff barriers, Imports/Exports as a percentage of GDP), Ghana is in the middle level. Local supplier quality (103 of 144) is low.¹⁸

In the World Bank's Doing Business 2016, Ghana stands at 171 in the ranking of 189 economies globally on the ease of trading across borders. This low level was maintained, while all other indicators for Doing Business went down in 2016. Two factors were recorded recently: Ghana added to the time required to import by increasing its scanning of imports and changing its customs clearance system. Ghana reduced the documentary and border compliance time for importing by developing electronic channels for submitting and collecting the final classification and valuation report.¹⁹ In addition, here the attribution to TRAQUE is not possible.

The experience from the BUSAC Fund, which explicitly seeks impact on the Global competitiveness and Doing Business indicators, shows that attribution is possible, if data on supported and not supported sectors is disaggregated.

EQ 36: What else is needed that trade can lead to pro-poor growth in Ghana?

Trade led pro-poor growth faces challenges about the macro-economic management of the country, infrastructure, governance and labour market efficiency. Increased private sector and public infrastructure investments, as well as an improved macroeconomic framework and political stability, are needed for recovery. Ghana agreed on an assistance package with the IMF in April 2015. The \$918 million loan shall support a reform program aimed at faster growth and job creation while protecting social spending.

Trade is not fully used as a measure against poverty. Although Ghana proclaims a trade-led development policy, it did not become reality yet. The EPA is not effective, the NES/NEDP are not effectively implemented either. The trade policy has strong protective elements for the national industry. The competition from the world markets gets stronger. This is rather due to unregulated globalisation than to trade agreements, which would include tools to control imports. Since 2007, media and critical NGO report market problems from cheap imports of poultry, tomato and rice. Criticism is often linked to the EPA, but cannot be attributed to it.

Trade is a means by which poor countries can leverage economic growth, reduce their levels of poverty and even meet the SDGs. For example, SDG 2 on ending hunger and food insecurity points towards correcting and preventing trade restrictions and distortions in world agricultural markets as an indicator towards its achievement. Trade has furthermore emerged as a means to finance development – a position catalysed by significant reductions in ODA by traditional donors – as it was

¹⁸ See <http://www3.weforum.org/docs/gcr/2015-2016/GHA.pdf>

¹⁹ See <http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/ghana#trading-across-borders>

featured in the Third International Conference on Financing for Development (FFD3) outcome document.²⁰

EQ 37: What else is needed to provide better services to the business sector?

EQ 38 How and to what cost do producers in Ghana get accreditation to ISO standards?

No comprehensive assessment of the business environment and cost of certification was done by the MTR. TRAQUE did not collect data on doing business, not even in the NAB business plan.

Specific findings to this question are:

- Farmers and food processing industry need better access to testing and certification. both, in physical means and in costs. Laboratory facilities and testing services are concentrated in Accra;
- The Northern regions are the main agro industrial production zones. The airport of Tamale is becoming the hub for fresh product cargo flights to Europe. Testing and certification are needed country-wide, not only in Accra;
- The cost of testing and certifying quality is extremely high. GSA has fixed fees for SMEs, but charges for obligatory certificates even if no standard exists. SME have additional transaction cost to get information on the procedures;
- NBSSI collects samples and brings them to Accra laboratories. NBSSI affiliates get a discount, if they use this collective service;
- FDA has started to enforce conformity certification for food products in formal shops, but not in ambulant sales. In general, there is limited enforcement of laws and policies by regulators. It disadvantages compliant business.

EQ 39 Did producers along the groundnut value chain succeed to avoid aflatoxin contamination of their produce. Did they increase their exports to the EU?

The groundnut producers raised their awareness and detection capacity for aflatoxin contamination, but have not enough means to avoid the problem. No effect in the volume of groundnut products exported from Ghana to the EU since 2015 was observed, as data is not yet available.

TRAQUE through GEPA trained farmers to improve know-how and awareness on aflatoxins: risks on health and the ways to avoid aflatoxins appearance by enhancement of storage conditions (dry produces, storage on pallets to avoid moisture). The contents also included good agro practices, appropriate time of harvest, treatment, drying methods, storing conditions and fumigation (pest control). It works well. GEPA reached a total of 1090 farmers with this training.

GEPA has developed a “Groundnut Training Manual” to build the capacity of export-oriented companies. This includes local producers, traders and exporters. The project included seminars to provide up-to-date information on the latest techniques, controls and EU regulatory requirements for exports, as well as field training on good agricultural practices and post harvesting operations, focusing on hazards in the groundnuts supply chain. The GEPA said through effective use of the manual, operators would update and strengthen their knowledge, insight and skills on how to reduce aflatoxin infestation in groundnuts. The fungus producing the aflatoxin can be reduced to an acceptable level by proper drying, sorting, storage, and cleaning of peanut. The training for operators included to meet food safety standard requirements in the European markets.

However, interviews with farmers and operators in the groundnut value chain show that aflatoxin contamination is seen as a purely European problem. The health effects are not immediate and therefore widely ignored in Ghana. Producers mention that they never had a problem with aflatoxin with consumers in Ghana. IFPRI confirms in a recent scientific study, that groundnuts, which are likely to be contaminated, are indeed sorted out but that the ‘rejects’ are not eliminated from the food system. Instead, they are offered to consumers in a crushed form as an ingredient in cooking and

²⁰ Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development, United Nations A/RES/69/313, 2015.

flavouring. Testing for aflatoxins by IFPRI confirmed high levels of contamination, particularly in products that contained crushed groundnuts.²¹

Members of Savannah Farmers Association switched to produce soya beans & maize instead of groundnuts because they had too much trouble with aflatoxins. Soya beans and maize are easiest to dry before storage, and have not so many problems with aflatoxins, except when harvest coincides with the rain season.

Mobile devices and cheap testing kits are lacking to grade the product on the field. Farmers just check aspect, and because of the training know about aflatoxins contamination, impurities, stones, bad aspect... Farmers see it impossible to send samples to Accra labs because it is too long (several weeks), for expensive costs. That is why farmers from Afum-Krom previously trained on Green Label manual asked for Aflatoxins fluorescence detection devices to be sure that their produces were aflatoxins-free before sending them to export.

EQ 40: How far did the Green Label Certification Scheme improve market access for vegetable and fruit produced in Ghana?

Ghana Green Label Scheme (GhGL) is an initiative independent from TRAQUE. It was started by the Horticulture Development Unit of the Crops Services Directorate of the MoFA, the GIZ Market Oriented Agriculture Program (MOAP) and the Ghana Standards Authority (GSA). These parties, in 2011 begun discussions on the introduction of a certification scheme for fruits and vegetables sold on the domestic market.

The aim of the scheme is to increase competitiveness and enhance access to quality and safe horticultural produce traded on the domestic market. It was envisaged that when the Ghana Green Label Scheme is developed, it would serve as an incentive for the adoption of Good Agricultural Practices (GAPs) and Integrated Crop and Pest Management (ICPM) among producers.

During the various stages of discussions, it became eminent to have standards developed to guide producers who will subscribe to the scheme. The GIZ-MOAP signed a financial agreement with GSA to develop the standards in 2012. The Technical Committee (TC) of GSA developed the Good Agricultural Practices²² in 2013. On this base, the Green Label Manual has been developed by the Ministry of agriculture with the assistance of TRAQUE. The scope of the manual is to train the farmers to comply with the requirements of the Green Label Scheme, in order to apply to GSA for certification.

The TRAQUE Programme supported the GhGL by training activities for 400 farmers in seven different locations in Greater Accra and Eastern regions and by printing 400 copies of the manual. The extension officers taken through this training have the mandate of transferring the knowledge gained to farmers in their various districts. Results are expected after the next harvest in August 2016, according to the farmers. They expect to earn significantly more when selling under the GhGL. However, the notable effect is already, the groups of farmers organized themselves in a learning process, considered the benefits to the health of their families and talked about the conditions in their communities. For several farmers this was the first time to take a formal agriculture training based on a handbook. Their capacity rose, even if the translation into better income is uncertain.

EQ 41 How far is warehousing stabilizing income for farmers

This effect was not evident within TRAQUE. TRAQUE has not supported the warehouses so far because the activity is on hold and will be cancelled. The warehouses assessed by the TA were trading companies who bought commodity on a crop credit basis, advancing funds for growing a crop to farmers and then taking their grain in payment. Therefore, although they were described as WRS warehouses by GGC, were said to be providing receipting services for farmers, the receipts were issued to the warehouse owners by themselves and backed by their own organisation GGC, and were not for the benefit of the farmer.

²¹ See Wojciech J. Florkowski, Shashidhara Kolavallin (2016) Aflatoxin Control in Groundnut Value Chain in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Case of Ghana, Food Protection Trends, vol. 36, no. 2, pp. 96-107, Mar 2016, Volume 36, Issue 2: Pages 96–107.

²² Ghana Green Label Scheme – Requirements for Fresh Fruits and Vegetables Conforming to “Green Label” FDGS – 1054, Green Label Interpretation – Guidelines FDGS 1074.

EQ 42: How could the desired wider impact been better achieved otherwise?

- An alternative approach could have been to concentrate the activities on the value chains that are most probably facing quality problems and at the same time have the highest potential for pro-poor growth. This approach was taken by GIZ MOAP and the Swiss-funded Unido project;
- Another option would have been to empower the business sector to advocate stronger for their needs in the enabling environment, with a focus on QI services. This is more or less the approach of BUSAC, which also has EU contributions;
- After all, there is no shortcut to quality. An emerging country needs a functioning Quality Infrastructure, with well-equipped laboratories in all fields of metrology. And it needs a quality policy that clears the roles of institutions free from conflicts of interest;
- Trade agreements need active participation by the private sector. However, there is no way to avoid having capable negotiators loyal to the public sector, who can dialogue with all stakeholders and regulate the implementation. The project could have involved business associations further, but capacity of MoTI remains the key factor of success.

3.5 Sustainability

Nº	Summary of Evaluation Questions re Sustainability
43	How do the relevant national, sectorial and budgetary policies and priorities affect the results?
44	Do all stakeholders still on board and remain in agreement with the objectives?
45	How far can the public institutions and the private sector sustain the results with adequate and trained staff, sufficient budget and equipment?
46	Are the training results sustainable without further activities?
47	Are the equipment supplies cum training sustainable without further activities?
48	What is likely to happen after the TRAQUE Programme ends?

EQ 43: How do the relevant national, sectorial and budgetary policies and priorities affect the results?

The Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA) has introduced a new income tax law from 2016 onwards. The act also covers taxation of operations in industries such as petroleum, minerals and mining, and financial services. The IMF recently welcomed the steps taken by the government in addressing payroll irregularities and advancing public financial management reform. Inflation, which remains high at 19.2 percent in March 2016, is being affected by the increase in utility tariffs, energy sector levies and transportation costs, but core inflation has started to decline in recent months. The IMF supports the authorities in a few areas, including on the new PFM law, the amended BOG Act and the strategy for addressing the financial situation of State-owned enterprises.²³

The country's external balance improved in 2015, despite unfavourable global economic conditions. Nevertheless, Ghana's current account deficit narrowed to 7.8 % of GDP in 2015 from 9.6% of GDP in 2014 as the rise in other services exports and private transfers including remittances more than compensated for the increased merchandise trade deficit. (World Bank)

Ghana's import driven economy records huge trade deficit of about USD 3.9 billion for 2015. Ghana continues to import food items that can be produced locally with appropriate support mechanisms in place. Ghana could reduce the trade deficit by first expanding its exports and then reducing imports. However, sudden reduction in imports would hurt the economy. Since the economy is largely import-based, such policies can lead to shortage of essential commodities, higher inflation, falling standards of living and falling government revenue among others.

EQ 44: Are all stakeholders still on board and remain in agreement with the objectives?

Yes, within the limitations described in 3.1.

²³ IMF Staff Report, May 11, 2016, <https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2016/pr16212.htm>

The public debate on cost and benefits of the EPA and other trade agreements is still ongoing in Ghana, as in all West Africa. The majority might move away from support to more protectionist or alternative development models. There is no consensus on market liberalisation.

Policy makers and DPs might neglect trade and quality and concentrate on other issues (resilience, food security, education, health, migration, climate adaptation etc.). Trade agreements are decreasingly seen as solution for development problems. The European Consensus on Development is currently in public consultation to be revised. The UN 2030-Agenda for Sustainable Development has set Sustainable Development Goals, in which trade has a supporting, but not prominent role. There is still strong opposition to EPAs in Africa and Europe, as well as a rising criticism in Europe on external aid.²⁴

EQ 45 How far can the public institutions and the private sector sustain the results with adequate and trained staff, sufficient budget and equipment?

Ghana's public institutions, including the public part of the quality infrastructure, are not financed sustainably. Fiscal consolidation and decentralisation are needed. The IMF's Extended Credit Facility (ECF) supports Ghana's financial and economic programme. Given the high level of public debt and financing constraints, the planned fiscal adjustment under the program will be strengthened. Revenues for statutory funds continue to reduce budgetary flexibility.

The President's 2015 budget statement outlined among other measures that Ghana's successful structural transformation will rest on strategic interventions including promoting export-led growth through products that build up on Ghana's comparative strength in agricultural raw materials.

National policies are being reformulated to support a trade-led growth. MoTI stated that their main facility, the Export Development, Agricultural and Industrial Fund (EDAIF) does not have the resources to meet the demand from all industries. It receives about GHS 10 million per month from the export levy.²⁵ The fund seeks synergies with specialised institutions such as Exim Guarantee Company, the Export Finance Company and Venture Capital Trust to achieve its purpose and will have a presence in the regions through the regional offices and agencies of the Ministry of Trade and Industry.

Meanwhile, the EDAIF Act 2013 (Act 872) has already been repealed following the coming into force of the Ghana Export-Import Bank (EXIM) Act, 2016 (Act 911). All fresh applications for funding under the EXIM Act may only be made in line with approved guidelines consistent with the EXIM Bank Act.

Ghana will establish an Export-Import (EXIM) Bank in 2016 as part of efforts to transform the economy. To achieve the desired transformation, Cabinet has approved the creation of a Ghana Export-Import Bank to lead in the strategic positioning of Ghana as an export-led economy. The cabinet had already accepted that 50 percent of EDAIF funds should be used to set up the bank, stressing: "Ghana Exim will be a vehicle for the consolidation of the current export finance activities of the EDAIF, Eximguaranty Company and Export Finance Company. The establishment of the EXIM Bank "will also enable us to take advantage of international trade initiatives such as African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), and Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA)."²⁶ Canada announced to support the EXIM Bank, which is a quasi-governmental institution that will act as an intermediary between national governments and exporters to issue export financing.

Nevertheless, national policies and strategies are not always implemented as announced. Many interviewed partners commended on the low implementation and enforcement capacity of the state. Even the legal framework is not always enforced; contradictory rules might coexist. Approval of policies is not linked to financial resources. Especially difficult it is to finance budgets for new tasks, if they are outside or across the existing Ministerial budgets. Even if Ministries agree on joint activities, they cannot access common funds. Ghana suffers from a lack of a legal mechanism for collaboration in crosscutting issues. Institutions lack or are very weak at the local level. Resistance to changes is common, especially if budgets are under threat.

²⁴ See <http://stopepa.twnafrica.org> for the Stop EPA campaign, based in Accra, and on the other hand the Mail on Sunday petition to stop the EU foreign aid madness,

²⁵ Minister Spio-Garbrah gave this figure in April 2016 according to <http://ghana.ahk.de/news/single-view/artikel/govt-to-streamline-cashew-trade/?cHash=9a993dbf5849de3ecf36341f4b3189e2>

²⁶ Ghana to establish Exim bank to drive economic growth, <http://www.ghanatrade.gov.gh/Latest-News/ghana-to-establish-exim-bank-to-drive-economic-growth.html>

EQ 46 Are the training results sustainable without further activities?

Training results are not sustainable, if not supported by institutional reforms. Trained staff performing with new skills and behaviour needs an innovative institutional environment. Training is not sufficient to improve the capacity of Government institutions to carry out timely and effectively changes, if it is not accompanied by an overall well designed strategic plan, with sufficient resources.

EQ 47: Are the equipment supplies with training sustainable without further activities?

The installed equipment is likely to be used for a long period. The laboratories are technically sound, staff is dedicated to training. The demand for metrology is growing. The financial sustainability might require continued subsidies, but commercial perspectives of the lab services are good, even for the public operators.

Frequent power cuts remain a problem for producers. In addition, lab equipment might be damaged by power cuts and some already suffer from temperature shocks.

EQ 48: What is likely to happen after the TRAQUE Programme ends?

The positive outcomes of the project are likely to continue after EU funding ends. MoTI and Agency staff will continue to apply the new skills to raise institutional capacity. The laboratories will use the equipment and capacities to provide better services. Because of the delays, the maximum effects are expected only after TRAQUE has ended.

On the operational level, TRAQUE will come to a standstill as soon as the TA ends. The undisbursed budget will be retransferred to the EDF accounts.

The sustainability depends on the following key factors, which can still be worked on:

- The ratification of an EPA (interim or regional) that secures preferential access to EU markets.
- MoTI and the Agencies ownership of objectives and achievement. A milestone would be the approval of the NQP in the Parliament, which was uncertain at the time of the evaluation. It will be crucial that MoTI continues policy support and responsibility for the relevant national, sectoral and budgetary policies and priorities for trade and quality infrastructure.
- The sustainability rises with the degree of commitment of all institutions involved, such as Government (through policy and budgetary support) and law enforcement institutions.
- Enough funds must be available to cover all costs (including recurrent costs, operating and maintenance costs), when the funding will end; and the QI must be economically viable;
- Crosscutting issues such as gender equity, environmental impact and good governance or more over-arching issues such as poverty alleviation, contribute the sustainability of the project.

The macro-economic conditions will mean a continued demand for TRAQUE'S results: Ghana's trade with the rest of the world increase constantly. The EU continues offering market access for Ghana. EU continues economic cooperation with West Africa. The longer-term impact on the wider development process can only be sustained if DPs continue funding at sector level.

4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The mid-term evaluation of the project Trade Related Assistance and Quality Enabling Programme (TRAQUE) in Ghana in May 2016 identified causes for implementation problems. The Ministry of Trade and Industry has low capacities as implementing body. The coordination and consensus among the project stakeholders is low. Delays in delivery have affected the impact. The following conclusions were derived from the findings.

Relevance: good

- Cn1 TRAQUE had a good relevance, both to the stakeholders in Ghana as to the EU. The project was targeted to deliver very specific inputs to the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) preparation and implementation, which was a real need within an overall private sector development strategy. As this overall strategy was not coherently implemented as assumed, the project became marginalised from related activities undertaken elsewhere by Government and other donors.
- Cn2 The Addendum to the FA in 2013 also addressed real needs, as expressed by the GoG at the time of request. However, the GoG failed to establish in time the legal framework that was needed for starting the two new institutions (National Accreditation Body, Ghana Commodity Exchange). The Roadmap established with the Addendum implied too many changes in short time, as some technical experts pointed out. The delays are linked to overall economic governance implementation problems. The new National Quality Policy implies a reform of the institutional landscape, where conflicts of interests are avoided and private sector bodies can take a share of the services.
- Cn3 The project design came from sector budget support to a project approach. Local key stakeholders were not consulted sufficiently. The private sector and other non-state actors were not adequately involved. The pro-poor approach to Aid for Trade was not consequently translated into objectives and activities. The intervention was not based on a clear theory of change, did not apply result-based management and lacked suitable impact indicators from the beginning. The logframe was amended, but not used as a management tool. No baseline study or impact monitoring was done. The ROM helped to detect and solve some management problems, but did not re-establish a result-based approach. It was unclear in the decentralized management structure, who has the power to decide on major corrections.
- Cn4 High-level commitment and political leadership existed, but was not supportive enough for TRAQUE. Economic policy suffered from changes and inconsistencies within the Government. TRAQUE lost ownership within the Ministry's leadership. Trade negotiations and quality infrastructure were seen as technical issues, while the political attention concentrated on protecting the national industry and supporting exports in traditional and non-traditional value chains.

Efficiency: with problems

- Cn5 The efficiency was good in terms of quantity and quality, but had serious problems with timeliness. Considering the quantity of resources, the results are not yet reached and not all activities can be carried out within the timeframe of the project. The two objectives introduced in 2013 are beyond reach in the remaining time.
- Cn6 The project was driven by the budget rather than by result orientation. Management of the budget was difficult due to the five different implementation instruments and the various technical components. With the rider to the FA in 2013, more funds and objectives came into an already deficient project management structure. The rider was used to change the TL at the beginning of 2014, but this was not enough to allow the TA to lead the implementation. About half of the budget was spent on supplies. Especially the procurement of metrology equipment was delayed. The first tender failed because the bidder prices were out of the available budget. The process was cancelled and the budget had to be re-adjusted. The procurement capacities improved and the bulk of laboratory equipment is installed now in laboratories of the public beneficiaries. However, some little mistakes (supply of UPS, customs clearance) reduced the efficiency significantly and needed major administration efforts. The budget allocations in TA and the PEs were rearranged several times, which allowed a flexible implementation according to needs, but did not catch up with the delays.

- Cn7 Management of personnel and information was not efficient. Frequent staff changes reduced the efficiency. Almost all key personnel (GoG, TA, EUD) changed over the implementation time, leaving gaps and some information blackouts. The quality component was affected by change of LTE. Day-to-day management of the project has to deal with its diverse technical aspects and modalities. The TA had difficulties to synchronize short-term missions with the national process. The grants for the Agencies on MoTI could have been easily included in the Programme Estimates.
- Cn8 Project implementation capacities of MoTI were not sufficiently supported; while the NAO was not able to follow up all contractual and financial matters though the bureaucracy in a timely manner. Communication, visibility and knowledge management had constant problems and often lead to disagreement among the stakeholders, mostly upon procedures. Hierarchies prevail in the public administration and complicate the contacting procedures.
- Cn9 The Steering Committee was used to ensure that key beneficiaries are represented. This was not sufficient to involve the private sector, or to coordinate with other DPs. Relation and co-ordination with local authorities, institution, and beneficiaries were occasionally linked to activities. Visibility was improved, but stayed rather circumstantial, without transmitting background knowledge on the contents of the project.
- Cn10 Quality of monitoring was low. The chosen indicators were not suitable to monitor the results, as even the Steering Committee concluded. In addition, the ROM missions called to establish clear measurable indicators, but no action was taken to result-based monitoring.
- Cn11 Procurement procedures of other DPs were mentioned as more efficient, as they allow more flexibility and are faster than the EU procedures. Knowledge on EU procedures was deficient at some stakeholders, including the TA, the laboratories and the grant beneficiaries. Positive examples also show that with good knowledge of the EU procedures they can be applied successfully to meet the needs.

Effectiveness: good / with problems

- Cn12 Objective 1: Most training modules on subjects related to capacity building at the Ministry of Trade have been implemented and completed. However, it has been done with limited follow up in practical applications in an overall strategy to upgrade the capacity of MoTI in carrying out its mandate. The consequence is that efforts put in implementation of training programmes produced only partial change in the Ministry. Training is not sufficient to improve the capacity of Government institutions to carry out timely and effectively changes, if it is not accompanied by an overall well designed strategic plan, with clear procedures and coordination. To develop such a strategic plan, that is very much needed, will be very difficult within the present organisation and management of MoTI. Despite some training efforts, MoTI is still seen as weak in formulating and implementing policy, as well as solving conflicts among economic sectors. MoTI did formulate a new export strategy focussing on the non-traditional exports sector, which cannot be directly attributed to TRAQUE.
- Cn13 Objective 2: Most of expected equipment (98% representing EUR 5 721 485) was delivered as specified and to the satisfaction of beneficiaries, even if some small problems occurred (and still remain), but with a limited impact on the final results. The technical capacities are raising, but the complete quality landscape has to be operational for obtaining the benefits of improved laboratory services. Some extreme delays in procurement had a negative impact on the effectiveness.
- Cn14 The draft National Quality Policy document has been improved significantly. The policy document is ready for Cabinet approval after some final updates. The situational analysis should be updated and the conflict of interest notably at GSA should be properly addressed. The link of quality infrastructure to competitiveness in the domestic markets, health and consumer protection was not enough worked on in TRAQUE so far.
- Cn15 Objective 3: The National Accreditation Body was tightly linked to the adoption of an Accreditation Law. Now the NAB is supposed to be established under Ghanaian commercial law, ad-interim, until an Accreditation Law is passed. Establishing a law on accreditation would be a lengthy process. Given the time constraints of the TRAQUE programme, an interim NAB solution is seen as a feasible way forward. When the Accreditation Law is being transposed/implemented, some other countries in the region/worldwide might follow a similar

route, meaning more market completion for Ghana's NAB. If MoTI decides not to go further with the establishment of the NAB, this would mean a loss of momentum and resources.

- Cn16 Objective 4: The Warehouse Receipts System for the Ghana Commodity Exchange did not advance as hoped, for various reasons. The TA is still completing the physical assessment of the proposed warehouse operators. Procurement and certification has not started. Considering the technical and legal difficulties and the time needed for procurement, the evaluators do not see the objective realistic within TRAQUE'S timeframe. The SC has decided to discontinue activities on this objective.

Impact: with problems

- Cn17 Impact yet cannot be fully assessed because of the delays. Trade led pro-poor growth faces challenges about the macro-economic management of the country, infrastructure, governance and labour market efficiency. Increased private sector and public infrastructure investments, as well as an improved macroeconomic framework and political stability, are needed for recovery.
- Cn18 TRAQUE has contributed to economic policy making in Ghana. TRAQUE successfully supported MoTI to negotiate two major trade agreements: The ECOWAS Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the European Union (EU) and the ECOWAS Common External Tariff (CET). However, as the CET only started to be effective in February 2016 and the EPA is not signed by all ECOWAS countries, no development impact can be attributed to the project.
- Cn19 Farmers and other food producers have started to use the NBSSI services supported by TRAQUE to improve credibility of their products and see perspectives for better income through quality. They expect a higher credibility for their products in the local market that shall translate in higher income for them. However, the benefits of quality do not yet cover the cost for most of the businesses interviewed. GEPA successfully trained operators along the groundnut value chain. The groundnut producers raised their awareness and detection capacity for aflatoxin contamination, but have not enough means to avoid the problem. Contaminated groundnuts are now detected and banned from exports, but largely stay in the domestic food chain. FDA has started to enforce conformity certification for food products in formal shops, but not in ambulant sales. In general, there is limited enforcement of laws and policies by regulators. It disadvantages compliant businesses. The Ghana Green Label Scheme introduced a certification scheme to increase competitiveness and enhance access to quality and safe fruits and vegetables traded on the domestic market. It is widely accepted by small producers, but the technical and financial results are to be seen.

Sustainability: good

- Cn20 The positive outcomes of the project are likely to continue after EU funding ends. MoTI and Agency staff will continue to apply the new skills to raise institutional capacity. The laboratories will use the equipment and capacities to provide better services. Because of the delays, the maximum effects are expected only after TRAQUE has ended.
- Cn21 Training is not sufficient to improve the capacity of Government institutions to carry out timely and effectively changes, if it is not accompanied by an overall well designed strategic plan, with sufficient resources.
- Cn22 The macro-economic conditions will mean a continued demand for TRAQUE'S results, as Ghana constantly integrated into the global economy. The EU continues offering market access for Ghana and continues economic cooperation with West Africa.
- Cn23 Ghana's public institutions, including the public part of the quality infrastructure, are not financed sustainably. The longer-term impact on the wider development process can only be sustained if DPs continue funding at sector level. Fiscal consolidation and decentralisation are needed, especially when trade tariff revenues will start to reduce. Ghana's financial and economic programme supported by the IMF's Extended Credit Facility (ECF) shows some progress. It will nevertheless reduce budgetary flexibility, especially for new talks and inter-ministerial cooperation. The legal reforms introduced under IMF assistance keep the Government and the Parliament busy.
- Cn24 Ghana's import driven economy records huge trade deficit. Ghana continues to import food items which could be produced locally with appropriate support mechanisms in place. Ghana could reduce the trade deficit by first expanding its exports and then reducing imports. Nevertheless, sudden reduction in imports would hurt the economy. Since the economy is largely import-based, such policies can lead to shortage of essential commodities, higher inflation, falling standards of living and falling government revenue among others.
- Cn25 National policies are being reformulated to support a trade-led growth. Ghana's successful structural transformation will rest on strategic interventions including promoting export-led growth through products that build up on Ghana's comparative strength in agricultural raw

materials.

Ghana is establishing an Export-Import (EXIM) Bank in 2016 as part of efforts to transform the economy. Cabinet has approved the creation of a Ghana Export-Import Bank to lead in the strategic positioning of Ghana as an export-led economy.

The above conclusions suggest a number of recommendations, *inter alia* in respect of the specific EQs posed in the ToR.

For the remaining implementation of the TRAQUE Programme, the stakeholders should consider the following recommendations:

- Rn1** Relevance: Re-establish high-level policy dialogue on trade and private sector development. The government needs to take over ownership of own policies and strategies, and needs to provide own funds to implement. High-level political leadership for results is essential. MoTI should aim to be the leading actor on economic policy when ending TRAQUE. MoTI needs to progress significantly in capacity building and institutional knowledge management, also considering the upcoming generation shift of staff. Use TRAQUE resources to advise on suitable interim solutions for Ghana's EU market access. MoTI should call the DP working group on private sector development more often. The EU DEL should be more active in the PSD SWG. (Cn1, Cn2, Cn4, Cn18, Cn22, Cn24, Cn25)
- Rn2** Efficiency: Speed up what works, avoid what still needs legal or political clearance. Make clear that the deadline is approaching. 12th July 2017 is the final date for completion of any TRAQUE activity. Build implementation networks. Hold informal meeting with the people involved. Have an up-to-date address list. Let experts present on trends and challenges in their particular field. (Cn5, Cn6, Cn8, Cn9)
- Rn3** Effectiveness: Organize the learning from experience. Deliver the training for the labs as planned, with emphasis to trade related services. Apply new skills, and then learn. Use the HR database to identify training needs at MoTI and to establish a career curriculum for each Division. Use the error log to adjust the software in all modules. Do more coaching and peer learning. Ensure linkages between receiving training and delivering training to other officials, build into the capacity building programmes, dissemination and skills transfer processes. (Cn4, Cn7, Cn10, Cn21)
- Rn4** Relevance: Frequently visit business associations to discuss their needs and concerns. Inform them regularly on trade and quality aspects, so they can consult with their members on this. Preferred over large showcase events are decentral discussion rounds with prior information for the members (Cn3, Cn6, Cn9, Cn25)
- Rn5** Effectiveness: Finalize the Cabinet Proposal on the National Quality Policy, considering the recent workshop results. The situational analysis should be updated and the conflict of interest notably at GSA should be properly addressed. Get the National Quality Policy approved by Cabinet and Parliament before the elections. Update the implementation plan for the National Quality Policy and identify means to overcome obstacles.
- Take a clear decision on how to advance with the National Accreditation Body.
- Consider to amend the TA contract with IBF to support accreditation by training and preparing the laboratories, raising awareness for accreditation and assessing the future business potential for GHANAS in West Africa. This seems to be a necessary and useful step to reach the point of formal decision for a NAB.
- For establishing an Accreditation Body, consider a regional solution in ECOWAS, guided by AFRAC's Mutual Recognition Agreement. The Southern African Development Community Accreditation Service (SADCAS) can serve as model. (Cn2, Cn13, Cn15, Cn23)
- Rn6** Effectiveness: Tell all stakeholders, that the support to the Warehouse Receipts System will not be possible within TRAQUE's timeframe. Meet with GCX to agree on future cooperation. Offer support to the future inspection and certification body for the GCX. (Cn5, Cn16)

For future cooperation, the stakeholders should consider the following recommendations:

- Rn7** Relevance: In project identification and formulation, rely on best practices and established methodologies. Use the latest result-based planning tools, establishing a Theory of Change. Involve all stakeholders from the beginning, and keep the public informed, backed by media training. Build in policy reforms and implementation principles, instead of assuming too much. Have agreed result indicators. Contract external monitors locally, who observe and report progress on results and follow up (e.g. on legal framework). (Cn2, Cn3, Cn21, Cn10)
- Rn8** Impact: Get all stakeholders on board. The private sector does not need grants, but conducive business conditions to be the engine for sustainable development. It needs to be enabled to steer the programmes for trade and business environment. The civil society, consumer organizations, trade unions and other interest groups have to be consulted and considered when making policy decisions aiming at pro-poor growth. Policy uncertainty, burdensome rules, and last minute changes in regulations need to be avoided. (Cn4, Cn6, Cn7, Cn8)
- Rn9** Efficiency: Raise capacities of the NAO to manage all contractual and financial matters and to facilitate communication among stakeholders. Establish fast track mechanisms, in which the line ministry gives the NAO a mandate to proceed without further hold points while the ministry concentrates on the results. Ensure high-level commitment for efficient implementation. Raise the ownership at implementing line ministries or agencies, but do not expect them to build up all management capacities just for EDF-projects. Explore possibilities to use delegated procedures. Use the learning from the procurement failures to raise capacity for the next time. Use advice from procurement experts, even before PMUs are operational. (Cn5, Cn6, Cn7, Cn8, Cn11, Cn13)
- Rn10** Impact: Build knowledge and capacity of business membership organizations for advocacy on Trade and Quality issues. Possibly do this through the BUSAC Fund. Coordinate interventions with all other DP, especially the EU Member States. (Cn1, Cn9, Cn22, Cn20)
- Rn11** Sustainability: In new programmes, seek also active participation of civil society, trade unions, consumer groups, media, and other non-state actors interest groups, in order to build capacity and consensus over sustainable economic development. (Cn3, Cn4, Cn23, Cn25)
- Rn12** Sustainability: Learn from failure: Understand how learning happens within and outside a programme; Identify obstacles to learning and overcome them; Create an environment that values and rewards learning and knowledge sharing, through storytelling, peer assessments, conducting participatory impact assessments and other evaluations. (Cn4, Cn5, Cn6, Cn7, Cn8, Cn21)

ANNEXES

ANNEX 1 Specific Terms of Reference 47
ANNEX 2 Evaluation Questions Table..... 54
ANNEX 3 Comments on the Indicators 56
ANNEX 4 Recommendations for efficient procurement..... 58
ANNEX 5 Documentation used 59
ANNEX 6 Persons Met..... 61

ANNEX 1 Specific Terms of Reference

Annex VII-b

SPECIFIC TERMS OF REFERENCE
Mid-term Evaluation of the Trade related Assistance and Quality enabling Programme
(TRAQUE)
FWC BENEFICIARIES 2013 - LOT 10: Trade, Standards and private sector
EuropeAid/132633/C/SER/multi

1. BACKGROUND

The Financing Agreement n° GH/FED/22200, signed by the Government of Ghana and the European Commission in January 2011 and amended in December 2013, provides 15M€ to facilitate trade and stimulate trade led pro-poor growth in Ghana. The project is targeting specifically the Ministry of Trade and Industry and its related agencies to increase further the institutional capacities to develop and implement the national trade policy.

The specific objectives of the TRAQUE programme are:

1. Improved trade related capacity and performance of MoTI and other relevant Government agencies.
2. Support the national quality policy and the related National Quality Infrastructure.

The following were identified as the main results to be expected for each of the components of the project:

Component 1: Trade Related Capacity Development

1. Strengthened capacity of MoTI and other relevant Government agencies in trade policy analysis and formulation and for the implementation of trade policies and trade agreements (including the I-EPA and EPA).
2. Effective institutions for the implementation of the national quality policy and the creation of a performing quality infrastructure covering areas such as metrology, accreditation, standardisation, conformity, certification and regulation. The institutions will have clear mandates and the capabilities to control and promote compliance with TBT and SPS requirements, conditioning access to international markets.

Component 2: National Quality Infrastructure Support

3. The establishment of a National Accreditation Body for and in Ghana will provide an affordable alternative to obtaining accreditation to ISO standards (for example ISO17025) for organisations within the country and the region.
4. Improved capacity of Ghana Grains Council and other warehouse receipt systems to (1) aggregate agricultural products from small scale growers into larger, tradable quantities, (2) to guarantee delivery of products of certified quality and quantity and (3) to establish quality control, weight control, and Ghana Standards Authority (GSA) certification of storage facilities, weighers, samplers, and laboratory staff to add value and build confidence. (4) this will enable efficient trading of agricultural products of small-scale growers and (5) establish a prerequisite for a future Commodities Exchange.

2. DESCRIPTION OF THE ASSIGNMENT

> Global objective

The Mid Term evaluation will provide the decision-makers in the Government of Ghana, the relevant external co-operation services of the European Commission and the wider public with sufficient information to:

- Make an overall independent assessment about the past performance of the project/ programme, paying particularly attention to the results and if possible the impact of the project actions against its objectives;
- identify key lessons and propose practical recommendations for the implementation and follow-up of the project if additional funds become available.

- Assess whether value-for-money has been achieved, inputs were used economically to achieve the desired output
- Determine whether the project is being implemented in an efficient and effective way

The midterm evaluation is to ensure that the Programme Components are being executed in accordance with the stipulated conditions and the desired benefits have been achieved.

The beneficiaries of the evaluation are the Government of Ghana through the National Authorising Officer (NAO) of the European Development Fund and the Ministry of Trade and Industry.

> Specific objective(s)

The specific objective of this assignment is to analyse the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of the project with regard to its purpose, objectives, expected results and impact (as established in the Development Assistance Committee guidelines).

> Requested services

The Consultant is required to carry out this assignment in accordance with the Project Cycle Management Guidelinesⁱ and the Evaluation Methodology of the European Commissionⁱⁱ.

The evaluation will carry out:

- A quantitative and qualitative assessment of the activities carried out since the beginning of the project;
- An identification and description of the problems (technical and /or managerial) encountered by the project, proposing possible measures to overcome them.

The evaluation shall be based on a participatory approach, involving beneficiaries and all stakeholders concerned as well as in accordance with the OECD's Development Assistance Committee's (DAC) agreed set of standard international criteria to guide all evaluations of development assistance. The DAC criteria are shown below:

DAC CRITERIA	
Relevance	The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners' and donors' policies.
Effectiveness	The extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.
Efficiency	A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted to results.
Impact	Positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.
Sustainability	The continuation of benefits from a development intervention after major development assistance has been completed. The probability of continued long-term benefits. The resilience to risk of the net benefit flows over time.

With reference to the above, the Consultant shall carry out, inter alia, the following overall tasks, and the appropriate intervention levels:

A) Relevance and Quality of design:

The relevance concerns the appropriateness of the project design to the problems to be resolved at two points in time: when the project was designed, and at the time of the evaluation.

- 1) Study all related documentation and reports and familiarize with the project's specifications, its beneficiaries and stakeholders.
- 2) Assess the relevance of the project with regard to the economic, socio-economic and environmental context in Ghana;
- 3) Assess the relevance of the project in view of the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA I and II);

- 4) Visit and consult the different stakeholders including, but not limited to:
- i. National Authorising Officer;
 - ii. The Ministry of Trade and Industry and related agencies (Standards Division/TRAQUE Office, Ghana Export Promotion Authority-GEPA, Ghana Standards Authority-GSA, National Board for Small Scale Industries-NBSSI);
 - iii. Food and Drugs Authority-FDA;
 - iv. Ghana Commodity Exchange programme;
 - v. The Delegation of the European Union in Ghana;
 - vi. The relevant beneficiaries supported by the programme (laboratories, SMEs);
 - vii. Other Development Partners active in support to trade facilitation and quality infrastructure, including USAID, UNIDO and Swiss Embassy;
 - viii. The Technical Assistance consortium AESA.

The evaluation analysis of relevance will therefore focus, without being limited to, on the following:

- Identification of real problems or needs, and of the correct beneficiaries, and how the project's initial design addressed them;
- Preparatory activities undertaken and how well the findings were incorporated into the final project document, and any obvious omissions;
- Appropriateness of initial consultations with, and participation by, local key stakeholders including the Delegation, national authorities and intended beneficiaries before implementation started;
- Complementary and coherence with related activities undertaken elsewhere by Government or other donors, at the same level or at a higher level;
- The quality of the entries in the assumptions, risks and conditions column of the Log Frame at the appropriate level;
- Overall design strengths and weakness including:
 - Quality of the Log Frame;
 - Clarity and internal consistency of the stated overall objectives, purpose and results;
 - Whether the objectively-verifiable indicators of achievement were well-chosen;
 - Realism of quantity of inputs.

The visit to the different stakeholders will enable the evaluation team to assess the effectiveness of the programme with regard to perception of programme results and achievements.

B) Efficiency

The efficiency criterion concerns how well the various activities transformed the available resources into the intended results in terms of quantity, quality and timeliness.

The evaluation analysis of efficiency will therefore focus, without being limited to, on the following:

- The quality of the day-to-day management of the programme, including:
 - Management of the budget
 - Management of personnel, information, property
 - Relation/co-ordination with local authorities' institution, beneficiaries
 - Respect for deadlines
- A cost effectiveness analysis (how far the costs of the project were justified by benefits?);
- Quality of monitoring (its existence, accuracy and flexibility);
- Whether the chosen indicators of efficiency are suitable; if not what should be these indicators?
- Did any unplanned result arise from the activities?
- Any side effects planned or unplanned

C) Effectiveness

The effectiveness criterion concerns how far the project's results were used or their potential benefits were realised (do they achieve the project purpose?).

The evaluation analysis of effectiveness will therefore focus, without being limited to, on the following:

- Whether the planned benefits are delivered and received, as perceived mainly by the key beneficiaries.

- The appropriateness of the indicators of benefit used in the above assessment to measure achievement of the project purpose.
- Whether behavioural patterns have changed in beneficiary organisations at various levels; and how far the changed institutional arrangements and characteristics have produced the planned improvements;
- Whether the balance of responsibilities between the various stakeholders was correct.
- How unplanned results may have affected the benefits received

D) Impact

The analysis, which should be both quantitative and qualitative wherever possible, will need to take account of the fact that, at this level, the project will normally be only one of a number of influences contributing to the wider outcome.

The evaluation analysis of impact will therefore focus, without being limited to, on the following:

- To what extent the planned overall objectives have been partly or totally achieved, and how far that was directly due to the project;
- If there were unplanned impacts, how they affected the overall impact;
- Whether the project's Log Frame indicators at this level were suitable and, if not, whether management amended them;
- Whether overall the desired wider impact could have been better achieved otherwise;

E) Sustainability

The sustainability relates to whether the positive outcomes of the project at purpose level are likely to continue after external funding ends, and also whether its longer-term impact on the wider development process can also be sustained at the level of the sector, or country.

The evaluation analysis of sustainability will therefore focus, without being limited to, on the following:

- **Ownership of objectives and achievement.** How far all stakeholders were consulted on the objectives from the outset, and whether they agreed with them and remain in agreement at the time of the evaluation;
- **Policy support and responsibility of the beneficiary institutions.** How far Commission policy and national policy corresponded, and the effects of any policy changes; how far the relevant national, sectoral and budgetary policies and priorities affected the project positively or adversely; the level of support from governmental, public;
- **Institutional capacity.** The degree of commitment of all parties involved, such as Government (through policy and budgetary support) and counterpart law enforcement institutions; the extent to which the project is embedded in the Police Strategic Plan; whether the institution appears likely to be capable of continuing after the project ends (is it well-led, with adequate and trained staff, sufficient budget and equipment?);
- The adequacy of the **project budget** for its purpose;
- **Financial sustainability.** Whether enough funds were available to cover all costs (including recurrent costs, operating and maintenance costs), and continue to do so when the funding will end; and the economic sustainability;
- Wherever relevant, **crosscutting issues** such as gender equity, environmental impact and good governance; or more over-arching issues such as poverty alleviation, all of which bear on sustainability from the outset of the project.

In addition, the Consultants shall review the follow-up to the conclusions and recommendations of the Results Oriented Mission of the TRAQUE programme.

> Required outputs

- An inception report after commencement of contract
- The preliminary findings presentation
- A final report, including its annexes

> Language of the Specific Contract

The contract shall be executed in English including the submission documents.

3. EXPERTS PROFILE or EXPERTISE REQUIRED

> Number of requested experts per category and number of man-days per expert or per category

The mid-term evaluation is to be executed by one Category I expert (Team leader) and one Category II expert for approximately 25 and 25 working days (including local travel).

> Profile per expert or expertise required:

Qualification and skills:

Education of at least a Master's degree academic level in development studies or related fields or equivalent professional experience of at least 2 years in addition to the requested general professional experience

General professional experience:

For the Category I expert:

A minimum of 12 years of experience of international professional experience in development, with at least 8 years' experience in the fields of trade facilitation and private sector development and at least two professional assignments in the evaluation/implementation/follow up or monitoring of development projects in trade and private sector development.

For the Category II expert:

A minimum of 6 years of international professional experience in development, with at least 3 years' experience in the fields of quality policy and infrastructure and at least one professional assignment in evaluation/implementation/follow up or monitoring of development project.

Both experts must be familiar with Project Cycle Management and Logical Framework Approach.

Knowledge of African and sub-Saharan region, experience in Ghana would be an asset. Both experts must be fluent in English and computer literate.

4. LOCATION AND DURATION

> Starting period

The start of the assignment is planned for the **1 April 2016**.

> Foreseen finishing period or duration

The period of engagement will last approximately 3 months to **end June 2016**.

> Planning including the period for notification for placement of the staff as per art 16.4 a)

A kick-off meeting will be organized with all the relevant stakeholders upon arrival of the consultant in Ghana.

The duration of the experts' assignments will be of 25 working days for the category I Expert and 25 working days for the category II Expert, and comprises:

Category I expert:

- 25 days on activities related to the Mid-term Evaluation exercise in Ghana (place of assignment).
- 5 days for report writing.

Category II expert:

- 25 days on activities related to the Mid-term Evaluation exercise in Ghana (place of assignment)
- 5 days for report writing.

> Location(s) of assignment: in case of more than 1 location of assignment, identify for each location the working days per expert needed

The location of the assignment will be in Accra with some travel to the beneficiaries, notably the laboratories. A maximum of 3 days travel is foreseen to visit some of the beneficiaries outside Accra.

5. REPORTING

> Content

The required core output under this mission is the generation of a Mid-term Evaluation Report for the TRAQUE programme. The following outputs shall be provided:

1. A short **inception outline (maximum 5 pages)**, presenting the understanding of the assignment and a proposed schedule of activities. The inception outline shall be presented to the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the EU and the NAO within 3 working days of the arrival of the team in the country.
2. A **TRAQUE Mid-term Evaluation report**, summarising the assessment, analysis and findings from the consultations with stakeholders, taking into account the deliverables detailed under requested services and outputs. The report should be limited to **maximum 50 pages** and should include an executive summary.

> **Language**

All reports have to be prepared and submitted in the English language.

> **Submission/comments timing**

The Inception Outline shall be presented no later than 3 working days after the commencement of the assignment.

The debriefing with relevant stakeholders shall take place at the end of the field mission to present the first findings of the field mission.

The Draft Report shall be submitted 5 working days after the debriefing. The stakeholders have then 14 calendar days (two weeks) to submit their comments. The consultant will have respectively 5 working days to incorporate the comments and draw up the final report.

The final report shall be submitted within 21 calendar days after the submission of the draft report.

> **Number of report(s) copies**

The requested documents shall be submitted in electronic format to the EU Delegation ([REDACTED]) and the NAO office ([REDACTED]).

The documents shall be compatible with MS Word/Excel.

The final report shall be submitted in MS Word/Excel compatible file and a PDF file.

> **Meetings**

There shall be a briefing in Accra at the start of the field mission and a debriefing in Accra with the EU/NAO at the end of the field work to present preliminary findings.

A dissemination meeting is planned for the presentation of the preliminary findings to solicit comments and discuss any amendments necessary before conclusion. The venue shall be agreed jointly.

6. INCIDENTAL EXPENDITURE

> **Other imitatively identified reimbursable costs, with their details**

- International travels (including visa)
- Per diems for Ghana
- Local transport for the missions
- An indicative provision should be included in the budget for the dissemination meeting costs to be organised for approximately 30 participants. The experts will be responsible for all costs related to the organisation of the workshop (incl. rental of conference facilities, lunch and refreshments, telecommunications and other administrative costs including secretarial support if required).

> **Tax and VAT Arrangements**

In general, the contract will be free from taxes and duties in Ghana, except for goods and services, purchased by the Consultant on the local market, on which taxes and duties have already been levied.

7. ADMINISTRATION

> **Organisation and Methodology**

A short organisation and methodology must be presented with the offer.

> Interviews

Interviews with the potential experts may be carried out during the evaluation of the offers. Please clearly indicate how the experts can be contacted.

> Resources

Any office accommodation required by the experts during the assignment will have to be provided by the consultants. Respective costs including office supplies and communication expenses will be covered under the fee rates.

ANNEX 2 Evaluation Questions Table

N°	Evaluation Questions re Relevance
1	Is the Intervention based on a clear Theory of Change? Do the objectively verifiable indicators of achievement mark the change conditions well?
2	Are the overall objectives, purpose and results clear and consistent?
3	Was TRAQUE well aligned with national policies?
4	Was high-level commitment and political leadership sufficient?
5	To what degree was the Addendum in 2013 according to the needs and situation of the country?
6	How can Ghana get the most out of the implementation of the EPA? Is TRAQUE supporting this by all meanings?
7	Is the established roadmap for the Quality Infrastructure realistic? What are the critical points on the way towards an international recognized accreditation body in Ghana?
8	How can the upcoming EU-ECOWAS Competitiveness Programme build on TRAQUES's experience and outcomes?
N°	Evaluation Questions re Efficiency
9	What were the major factors or moments that reduced or boosted efficiency?
10	What were the main bottlenecks in the implementation and how were they solved?
11	What were the problems in the day-to-day management of the programme, and what was done to solve them?
12	In general, what has gone wrong?
13	How well was the Steering Committee used to steer the implementation?
14	How do the different stakeholders perceive the effectiveness of the programme with regard to perception of programme results and achievements? Was it good value for money?
15	How well did the contractors deliver (TA, equipment, supplies) and how efficiently was the compliance enforced? How well were the different implementation instruments (TA, PE, Grants, Supplies) interlinked?
16	Why did it take so long to issue the Grants and what are their implementation problems?
17	Is the monitoring consistent and easy to follow for steering purposes? Does it report well enough on the OVI and unintended results?
18	How were the ROM reports perceived and used?
19	What indicators or data is needed for efficient programme management?
20	Which best practices for efficient implementation in Ghana can be learned from other DPs or stakeholders?
N°	Evaluation Questions re Effectiveness
21	How far did the delivered trainings to staff raise the capacities of the Ministry of Trade and Industry and related agencies?
22	What effects does the modernization of the training and career development of MOTI have so far?
23	What effects does the HR management system have in MoTI and beyond?
24	What support does trained staff get from the decision-makers to lead institutional changes?
25	How do testing and calibration laboratories use the supplied high technology equipment in the areas of testing of food and non-food products, and in industrial and legal metrology? (including the Accra Veterinary Laboratory)?
26	Did the laboratories improve tests related to product compliance and conformity (e.g. on fuel composition, food quality and controls on imports and updated standards.)?

27	How far did the Ghana Export Promotion Agency and the National Board for Small Scale Industries raise the quality of their services after receiving the Grants?
28	What are the situation and perspectives for developing and implementing a National Quality Policy?
29	Which required pre-conditions are missing for setting-up the National Accreditation Body? When will it be in the position to verify the conformity of testing laboratories, calibration laboratories and inspection and certification bodies in Ghana?
30	What is missing for the Ghana Commodity Exchange (GCX) to be fully operational?
31	Do the activities lead to improvements and other effects?
32	How do Ghanaian entrepreneurs, notably exporters along agricultural value chains, assess the benefits for themselves and their sector?
33	Do unplanned results affect the benefits received?
N° Evaluation Questions re Impact	
34	To what extent the planned overall objectives have been partly or totally achieved, and how far that was directly due to the project?
35	Why is TRAQUE not stopping Ghana's competitiveness indicators to decline?
36	What else is needed that trade can lead to pro-poor growth in Ghana?
37	What else is needed to provide better services to the business sector?
38	How and to what cost do producers in Ghana get accreditation to ISO standards?
39	Did producers along the groundnut value chain succeed to avoid aflatoxin contamination of their produce? Did they increase their exports to the EU?
40	How far did the Green Label Certification Scheme improve market access for vegetable and fruit produced in Ghana?
41	How far is warehousing stabilizing income for farmers?
42	How could the desired wider impact been better achieved otherwise?
N° Evaluation Questions re Sustainability	
43	How do the relevant national, sectorial and budgetary policies and priorities affect the results?
44	Are all stakeholders still on board and remain in agreement with the objectives?
45	How far can the public institutions and the private sector sustain the results with adequate and trained staff, sufficient budget and equipment?
46	Are the training results sustainable without further activities?
47	Are the equipment supplies cum training sustainable without further activities?
48	What is likely to happen after the TRAQUE Programme ends?

ANNEX 3 Comments on the Indicators

GENERAL INDICATORS

1. Increased bilateral, regional and multilateral trade flows. Increased contribution to GDP growth from private sector (**available Ghana-EU export trade statistics**)
2. Improved human resources in MoTI and related MDAs and Private Sector capable to analyse trade issues (**list of relevant attendees trained by TRAQUE**)
3. Improved private sector opportunities for import and export and increase in FDI (**benefits of training of 10 export food companies**)
4. Increased activity and dissemination of trade policy, formulation and implementation (**new legislation in the pipe, state of endorsement, national export strategy**)
5. Improved reputation of Ghana products in overseas markets (**new products exported with the help of TRAQUE? Cheaper products?**)
6. Increased exports and reduced % of quality rejections in destination (**5 products self-banned recently... Increase of awareness**)
7. Creation of linked Service Sectors and Industries (**market surveillance, testing...**)
8. Improved and reliable quality standards of export products:

(Comments: this can be checked through:

- **The number of created/transposed new (quality) standards since Oct 2011 (of export products)**
- **The adoption of standardization action plans: accuracy with needs, frequency (scheduled/realised)**

INDICATORS LINKED TO RESULT 1 - Strengthened capacity

9. Number of trade agreements being negotiated/concluded at bilateral, regional and multilateral level (**to be discussed with MoTI**)
10. Number of trained personnel (**included local trainers (scheduled/effective), use of trainees' new capacities, and trainings delivered by the new local trainers (number, attendance...)**)
11. Number of reforms adopted by the Government in key sectors and in industries that are conducive to a better trade-enhancing business environment (**new legislation? New trade agreements? EPA?**)
12. Number of studies and consultative documents shared with private sector and civil society (**scheduled/carried out**)

INDICATORS LINKED TO RESULT 2 - implementation of the national Quality infrastructure

13. Equipment procured (**scheduled/delivered**)
14. Institutions mandated (**list**)
15. Number of personnel trained and enhanced with technical skills and qualifications (**use of the new skills**)
16. Extensive dissemination and private sector awareness of quality and conformance systems, related issues and access to improved services (**number of events, attendance**)
17. Increased volume of products exported (**available export trade statistics**)
18. Reduced rate of rejections by EU authorities (DG SANCO/FVO records) on the basis of non-compliance with SPS requirements (**available Ghana-EU export trade statistics**)

INDICATORS LINKED TO RESULT 3 - Establishment of a National Accreditation Body

19. National accreditation body registered as a non-profit legal entity (**N/A**)
 20. Memorandum of Understanding signed between the Government of Ghana and the national accreditation body granting it exclusive right to perform accreditation (**N/A**)
 21. Law on Accreditation adopted (**N/A**)
 22. Number of accreditation certificates issued by the national accreditation body (**N/A**)
- (Comment: **These indicators could be replaced by a check on the compliance level of the required milestones to start a TA programme for NAB**)

INDICATORS LINKED TO RESULT 4 - Improved capacity of Ghana Grains Council and other warehouse receipt systems (for the future Ghana Commodity Exchange)

23. GSA accredited as inspection and certification body for warehouse operations and operators **(to be checked with GSA)**
24. Number of warehouses certified
25. Number of warehouse testing laboratories accredited
26. Tonnage and type of agricultural commodities handled by warehouses
27. Number of contracts/warehouse receipts issued

ANNEX 4 **Recommandations for efficient procurement**

Recommendations for efficient procurement

1. **Inception tendering phase:** next time, start the procurement experts' mission (Laboratory and PRAG experts) as soon as possible after the signature of TA contract, even before the PMU installation:
 - Collecting the beneficiaries' wish lists;
 - Checking the lists, adding forgotten equipment;
 - Identifying requests for derogation regarding rule of origin and requested models (to be used by all CABs);
 - Adding accessories, consumables, services associated;
 - Evaluating costs, prioritizing the need;
 - Drafting specifications as a minima, but without forgetting essential ones, as the lowest bidder will be awarded;
 - Do not hesitate to ask for additional specifications during the open bidding phase (even if it slows the procedure);
 - Taking advantage of requests for clarification during the open bidding phase to re-specify;
 - Do not hesitate to ask for clarification during the evaluation process of the offers;
 - It is better to structure a tender process through several specific tenders (each of them structured in one or several lots), such as one for IT equipment, one for chemical analysis equipment, one for technical testing equipment, etc. In this case, no need to wait for the completion of a large and complex single tender dossier to be ready for issue.
 - Better to include that kind of equipment (UPS, computers, printers) as accessories to other devices that need them to work efficiently.

2. **Sub-division of tenders into lots:** the Contracts Unit is generally inclined to limit the number of lots in order to limit the number of contracts after the selection of awarded suppliers. If lots should be merged or kept separated is a decision that needs technical expertise. Some suppliers cannot propose a large scale of equipment because in laboratory sector they are highly specialised. The short-term laboratory experts know that and the Contracts Unit has to follow their recommendations, even if it includes a large number of lots.

3. **Defection of a supplier:** it is very difficult to anticipate this kind of problem. In this case, it is particularly penalising because UPS are absolutely necessary to operate sophisticated and expensive electronic devices in Ghana where electricity cuts are frequent. Cancellation of AGMIN contract and retendering under a simplified tender procedure is the only way to fix it now.
 It would have been worth asking suppliers to provide the electronic equipment directly with UPS. Indeed, this has been done for instance with DNA analyser and some spectrometers and gas chromatographs for GSA or FRI labs.
 Some suppliers have already been identified as already making problems in previous bids: it might be interesting to know this before awarding them.

4. **NAO's autonomy:** consider having a Contracts Unit that can take decisions autonomously under the sole responsibility of the NAO.
 In the same way, it is necessary to ask the supplier to provide all necessary documents for Custom clearance just after the signature of the contract (at least ask for a first shot of scanned documents in order to anticipate the original ones).

 Specify also in tender dossier that the installation / 1st level training suppliers' missions have to wait for a travel order to be issued by NAO/PMU: no need to carry out such missions if equipment is not available... If it happens, it is possible to federate trainings on available equipment if provided to several beneficiaries.

ANNEX 5 Documentation used

N°	Title	Provenance	Date
1	Contract AESA with Riders	TAT	
2	Description of the action and logical FW for the 4 grants	TAT	
3	Draft manual on quality mango production in Ghana	TAT	
4	Draft National Quality Policy	TAT	2015
5	Equipment laboratories (list of laboratories and list of equipment per lab)	TAT	2016
6	Final EPA strategy	TAT	
7	Final report Grant FDA	TAT	
8	Final report Grant GEPA	TAT	
9	Final report Grant NBBSI	TAT	
10	Financing Agreement	EUD	2011
11	Ghana Industrial Policy	MoTI	2011
12	Ghana PSTEP II – Formulation (Phase I) Final Report, by ADE	EUD	2010
13	Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA) II, 2014-2017	MoTI	2014
14	Ghana Trade Policy	MoTI	2005
15	Ghana Yam Sector Development Strategy	MoTI	2013
16	Interim Report 6 TA	TAT	
17	Interim report 7 TA	TAT	
18	Interim report 8 TA	TAT	
19	Interim report 9 TA (draft)	TAT	
20	Minutes Steering committee n. 1	TAT	
21	Minutes Steering committee n. 2	EUD	
22	Minutes Steering committee n. 3	EUD	
23	Minutes Steering Committee n.4	EUD	
24	Monitoring reports	EUD	2012, 2013
25	National Export Development Programme and National Export Strategy 2016 – 2020	MoTI	2014
26	National Export Strategy	MoTI	2012
27	National Export Strategy for the Non-traditional Sector (2012 - 2016)	MoTI	2012
28	Programme Estimate 1 with Riders	EUD	2012
29	Programme Estimate 2	EUD	2013
30	Programme Estimate 2 Rider 1	EUD	2013
31	Programme Estimate 2 Rider 2	EUD	2014
32	Programme Estimate 3	TAT	2015
33	Programme Estimate 3 Rider 1 (draft)	TAT	2016
34	Progress reports Grant GSA	TAT	
35	Quarterly reports of PE 2 and riders	EUD	2014
36	Riders to Financing Agreements	EUD	2013
37	Terms of reference Short term Experts	TAT	
38	The Ghana Sugar Policy - Intent and Development Process,	MoTI	2015
39	Training manual on Green label certification	TAT	2015

N°	Title	Provenance	Date
40	Training manual on groundnut production	TAT	2015
41	Visibility leaflets	TAT	
42	Weekly meeting minutes n. 95	TAT	
43	Workplan 2015	EUD	2015
44	Workplan 2016	EUD	2016