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ANNEX 3

to the Commission Implementing Decision on the the financing of the annual action plan for the European Instrument for International Nuclear Safety Cooperation for 2024

Action Document for Nuclear safeguards 2024

ANNUAL PLAN

This document constitutes the annual work programme within the meaning of Article 110(2) of the Financial Regulation, within the meaning of Article 7 of the INSC Regulation.

1 SYNOPSIS

1.1 Action Summary Table

1. Title	Nuclear safeguards 2024
OPSYS business reference	ACT-62494
Basic Act	Financed under the European Instrument for International Nuclear Safety Cooperation Regulation
2. Team Europe Initiative	No
3. Zone benefiting from the action	The action shall be carried out in the EU neighbourhood, and in Iran
4. Programming document	European Instrument for International Nuclear Safety Cooperation Multiannual Indicative Programme (2021-2027) of 03.12.2021 (C(2021) 8687)
5. Link with relevant MIP(s) objectives / expected results	This action is contributing to the effective safeguards and effective systems of accountancy and control of nuclear materials which are key elements of nuclear non-proliferation
PRIORITY AREAS AND SECTOR INFORMATION	
6. Priority Area(s), sectors	Nuclear safeguards
7. Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)	Main SDG: 16 (Strong Institutions) Other significant SDGs: SDG 11 (Disaster Risk Reduction), SDG 5 (Gender Equality) and SDG 10 (Reduced Inequalities)
8 a) DAC code(s)	23510 – Nuclear energy electric power plants and nuclear safety – 100%
8 b) Main Delivery Channel	1000 – Public sector institutions

9. Targets	<input type="checkbox"/> Migration <input type="checkbox"/> Climate <input type="checkbox"/> Social inclusion and Human Development <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Gender <input type="checkbox"/> Biodiversity <input type="checkbox"/> Education <input type="checkbox"/> Human Rights, Democracy and Governance			
10. Markers (from DAC form)	General policy objective @	Not targeted	Significant objective	Principal objective
	Participation development/good governance	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Aid to environment @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Gender equality and women's and girl's empowerment	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Reproductive, maternal, new-born and child health	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Disaster Risk Reduction @	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Inclusion of persons with Disabilities @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Nutrition @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	RIO Convention markers	Not targeted	Significant objective	Principal objective
	Biological diversity @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Combat desertification @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Climate change mitigation @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Climate change adaptation @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11. Internal markers and Tags	Policy objectives	Not targeted	Significant objective	Principal objective
	Digitalisation @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	digital connectivity digital governance digital entrepreneurship digital skills/literacy digital services	YES <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	/
	Connectivity @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	digital connectivity energy transport health education and research	YES <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	/

	Migration @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Reduction of Inequalities @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Covid-19	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BUDGET INFORMATION				
12. Amounts concerned	Budget line: 14.060100 Total estimated cost: EUR 3 785 000 Total amount of EU budget contribution for 2024: EUR 3 785 000			
MANAGEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION				
13. Type of financing	Indirect management with: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - a pillar-assessed entity for Component A - the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for Component B 			

1.2 Summary of the Action

<p>The overall objective of the action is to provide support to the development of effective safeguards and effective systems of accountancy and control of nuclear materials as key elements of nuclear non-proliferation.</p> <p>This action aims to increase the preparedness in the EU neighbourhood, in particular candidate and potential candidate countries, for alignment with the EURATOM <i>acquis</i> on nuclear safeguards.</p> <p>This action aims to support extensive safeguards verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Iran, as part of the implementation of the Joint Cooperative Plan of Action (JCPOA).</p> <p>The action will contribute to the realisation of the EU Gender Action Plan 2021-2025 GAP III, in particular to its thematic area of engagement “Promoting economic and social rights and empowering girls and women” as well as “Promoting equal participation and leadership”.</p>

2 RATIONALE

2.1 Context

<p>Component A - Alignment with Euratom safeguards <i>acquis</i></p> <p>Regulation EURATOM/2021/948 of 27 May 2021 defines the strategic framework for the implementation of the European Instrument for International Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC) 2021-2027¹. Deriving from the legal basis, the Multiannual Indicative Programme 2021-2027 has been adopted on 03 December 2021. In its article 2, the Regulation describes ‘establishing efficient and effective safeguards for nuclear material in third countries’ as one of its objectives.</p> <p>The EU neighbourhood, in particular candidate and potential candidate countries, are aligned with the IAEA safeguards systems as signatories of the non-proliferation treaty (NPT). The main target of this action is to establish and improve safeguards systems in those partner countries in order to effectively align themselves to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) <i>acquis</i>.</p> <p>Component B - Safeguards verification in Iran</p> <p>The European Commission is implementing its part of the Joint Cooperative Plan of Action with Iran and would like to maintain the JCPOA Annex III dynamic. The IAEA requires an additional EUR 1.1 million to cover its</p>
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¹ COUNCIL REGULATION (Euratom) 2021/948 of 27 May 2021 establishing a European Instrument for International Nuclear Safety Cooperation complementing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe on the basis of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, and repealing Regulation (Euratom) No 237/2014

extrabudgetary resources for verification in Iran in 2024. This Action will cover part of these additional extrabudgetary resources.

The European Commission's services maintain a close working relationship with the EEAS and its EU Delegations in partner countries, in order to help ensure a coherent approach, taking the latest relevant developments into account.

2.2 Problem Analysis

Component A - Alignment with Euratom safeguards *acquis*

The EU neighbourhood, in particular candidate and potential candidate countries, have signed the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). In agreement with this treaty, each country undertakes not to conduct research on, develop, manufacture, stockpile or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over any nuclear explosive device by any means anywhere; not to seek or receive any assistance in the research on, or development, manufacture, stockpiling or acquisition, or possession of, any nuclear explosive device; and not to take any action to assist or encourage the research on, or development, manufacture, stockpiling or acquisition or possession of, any nuclear explosive device.

Under the NPT, each State Party undertakes to conclude a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSAs) with the IAEA and not to export source or special fissionable material, or especially designed or prepared equipment or material, to Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWSs) unless subject to a comprehensive safeguards agreement.

The EU neighbourhood, in particular candidate and potential candidate countries, need assistance in establishing and improving their nuclear material accounting and control systems so that they can effectively align themselves to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and fulfil the Regulation (Euratom) No 302/2005 on the application of Euratom safeguards² requirements and any updates of the latter.

Over the past few years, a growing number of NPT State Parties have stressed the importance of improving gender equality and promoting gender perspectives in the NPT review process. Equal representation in decision-making needs to be complemented by gender analyses in nuclear policies and technical programmes. Applying a gender analysis to all three pillars of the NPT could be useful for understanding how gender affects issues such as exposure to nuclear risk, the impact of ionizing radiation resulting from the use of nuclear weapons, the ability to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and access to education and training in the nuclear field. Further integrating gender analyses and perspectives into the IAEA's work could help to ensure that people's diverse needs are equally addressed when accessing and benefiting from nuclear technology and its products.³

Component B - Safeguards verification in Iran

A vital part of the implementation of the Joint Cooperative Plan of Action with Iran is the limitation of the stockpile of enriched uranium in Iran, which is independently verified by IAEA safeguards inspectors.

Identification of main stakeholders and corresponding institutional and/or organisational issues (mandates, potential roles, and capacities) to be covered by the action:

As duty bearers:

Component A - Alignment with Euratom safeguards *acquis*

The national nuclear regulatory bodies in the EU neighbourhood, in particular candidate and potential candidate countries.

Component B - Safeguards verification in Iran

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Department of Safeguards; Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI); Iran Nuclear Regulatory Authority (INRA)

As right holders:

² This regulation is under revision. Revised version COM(2023) 793 is pending Council approval:

³ IAEA - How can we achieve gender break-throughs in nuclear negotiations and technical cooperation?

<https://www.iaea.org/bulletin/>

Organizations of civil society, including associations of women professionals representing different job profiles in the nuclear field, technical experts, women independent researchers, organizations of persons with disabilities, and media.

3 DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTION

3.1 Objectives and Expected Outputs

The Overall Objective (Impact) of this action is to contribute to establishing efficient and effective safeguards for nuclear material in third countries.

The Specific Objectives (Outcome) of this action are:

1. Further alignment of EU (potential) candidate countries with Euratom *acquis* related to nuclear safeguards
2. Continued implementation of the nuclear safeguards dimension of the Joint Cooperative Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran

The Outputs to be delivered by this action contributing to the corresponding Specific Objectives (Outcomes) are:

Contributing to Outcome 1 (Alignment with Euratom *acquis*):

- 1.1 Strengthened and sustainable capacity with regards to Euratom nuclear safeguards
- 1.2 Nuclear material control systems aligned to Euratom treaty and relevant regulations

Contributing to Outcome 2 (Iran):

- 2.1 Regular reports of IAEA safeguards inspections in Iran

3.2 Indicative Activities

The description of the activities may not be exhaustive.

Outcome 1: Further alignment of EU (potential) candidate countries with Euratom *acquis* related to nuclear safeguards

Activities relating to Output 1.1

- Needs assessment related to the maturity of the nuclear sector, organisation of seminars, education, training and instructing, provision of materials, joint development of outreach materials, including awareness campaigns about the need to increase the presence of educated and professional women in the nuclear sector

Activities relating to Output 1.2:

- Education, Training and instructing, technical consultations, peer review of legislation, regulations and procedures, provision of materials, tools, and equipment, exchange of scientific and technical information for collaborative studies, technology modification, testing and common presentations and publications with gender perspective.

Outcome 2: Continued implementation of the nuclear safeguards dimension of the JCPOA with Iran

Activities relating to Output 2.1.:

- Safeguards inspections in Iran by the IAEA

Preparatory work will be essential to analyse the current status and needs. The starting point is the survey of the situation with the NPT treaty and agreements (CSA, Small Quantities Protocol, Additional Protocol). The information on status to use of nuclear energy (nuclear power, research, mining, export/import, small users) and the 10-years plans are the basis for safeguards system improvement. Also, mapping the safeguards implementation situation is needed, like roles and responsibilities; legislation; licensing; export/import control; and state system of accounting for and control of nuclear materials (SSAC).

3.3 Mainstreaming

Environmental Protection & Climate Change

The activities contribute directly to the protection of the environment by enhancing nuclear safeguards.

Gender equality and empowerment of women and girls

Women are underrepresented in nuclear safeguards, as well as in the nuclear field in general, so it is important to understand and tackle the barriers that women can face to joining and thriving in this field. The contribution of the INSC to gender equality is mainly achieved through activities related to training and tutoring for which the

European Commission strongly encourages the participation of women that in turn will provide additional opportunity for career development. Women are also underrepresented in STEM⁴ and leadership roles, even when considered in terms of their representation in the nuclear workforce.⁵ This action aims amongst others at gender balanced training and tutoring for nuclear safeguards. Studies and advisory services will fully integrate gender aspects. Gender-specific indicators and data disaggregated by sex, age and disability will be included, where relevant. This action will work with partners to ensure a balanced representation of women and men in all activities. Therefore, as per the OECD Gender DAC codes identified in section 1.1, this action is labelled as G1.

Disability

As per OECD Disability DAC codes identified in section 1.1, this action is labelled as D0. However, to the extent possible, the inclusion of persons with disabilities will be taken into account in the activities across the action and policy dialogue.

3.4 Risks and Lessons Learnt

Category	Risks	Likelihood (High/Medium/Low)	Impact (High/Medium/Low)	Mitigating measures
Legal and regulatory aspects	Revision of Euratom safeguards regulation	L	L	Monitor closely regulatory developments and, where necessary, update the content of capacity development
Legal and regulatory aspects	Delay in elaboration of legal documents in beneficiary states	L	L	Continued dialogue with authorities at all levels in partner countries on the importance of INSC actions
Planning, processes and systems	Delays in implementing commitments undertaken by beneficiary states	L	L	Continued dialogue with authorities at all levels in partner countries on the importance of INSC actions
People and the organisation	Lack of capacity/resources in beneficiary states	M	M	Good understanding of the task content and set goals.
External environment	Unforeseen political and social unrest in recipient countries and/or national institutions	M	H	Shifting of resources to other areas/countries Flexibility in implementing activities

Lessons Learnt:

Extensive experience has been gained in successfully implementing similar INSC projects in partner countries and, like the on-going Programme for Strengthening the Nuclear Material Control Systems in Africa. This experience will be used in optimising the design and implementation of this action. For Component B, we can build on experience gained through a project on “Strengthening the State System of Accounting and Control of Iran” through Contribution Agreement INSC/2021/428-845.

⁴ STEM: Science, Technology, Engineering, Mathematics

⁵ [Gender Balance in the Nuclear Sector, Nuclear Energy Agency \(NEA\) 2023](#)

Communication and support from the partners and end-users will remain a key element for successful implementation in partner countries.

The findings, conclusions and recommendations of the report of the ‘Evaluation of the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation 2014-2020’⁶ have informed the formulation of this Action.

3.5 The Intervention Logic

The underlying intervention logic for this action is that if the assumptions in the logical framework matrix hold true (see Section 3.6), then the outputs described in Section 3.1 will be produced.

Overall, the action contributes to enhanced nuclear safeguards in the partner countries. Thereby the risk of use of nuclear materials for purposes for which they are not intended will be reduced.

The underlying intervention logic for this action is that if nuclear material control systems and respective regulatory capacity and Euratom safeguards knowhow in EU neighbourhood, in particular candidate and potential candidate countries, are improved, and a sustainable basis for future implementation and use of this know-how has been established, then, at the end of the project, the states have established efficient and effective nuclear safeguards as a key element of nuclear non-proliferation and responsible use of nuclear safety technologies.

The underlying intervention logic for this action is based on the request of the partner states to align themselves to Euratom *acquis*, ensuring that all stakeholders of the project, regulatory authorities in particular, are committed to the project goals with sufficient participation and resources.

For Component B, the underlying intervention logic is that the implementation of the JCPOA with Iran aims, amongst others, at the limitation of the stockpile of enriched uranium in Iran. This is independently verified by IAEA safeguards inspectors.

⁶ https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/climate-environment-and-energy/nuclear-safety_en

3.6 Logical Framework Matrix

This indicative logframe constitutes the basis for the monitoring, reporting and evaluation of the intervention.

On the basis of this logframe matrix, a more detailed logframe (or several) may be developed at contracting stage. In case baselines and targets are not available for the action, they should be informed for each indicator at signature of the contract(s) linked to this AD, or in the first progress report at the latest. New columns may be added to set intermediary targets (milestones) for the Output and Outcome indicators whenever it is relevant.

- At inception, the first progress report should include the complete logframe (e.g. including baselines/targets).
- Progress reports should provide an updated logframe with current values for each indicator.
- The final report should enclose the logframe with baseline and final values for each indicator.

The indicative logical framework matrix may evolve during the lifetime of the action depending on the different implementation modalities of this action.

The activities, the expected Outputs and related indicators, targets and baselines included in the logframe matrix may be updated during the implementation of the action, no amendment being required to the Financing Decision.

PROJECT MODALITY (3 levels of results / indicators / Source of Data / Assumptions - no activities)

Results	Results chain (@): Main expected results (maximum 10)	Indicators (@): (at least one indicator per expected result)	Baselines (values and years)	Targets (values and years)	Sources of data	Assumptions
Impact	To contribute to establishing effective and efficient safeguards for nuclear material in third countries	1 Alignment of nuclear safeguards framework in the EU neighbourhood, in particular candidate and potential candidate countries	1. Aligned with IAEA (2024)	1. Aligned with Euratom (date of accession)	1. EC reports and/or partner countries official state documentation	<i>Not applicable</i>
Outcome 1	1 Further alignment of EU (potential) candidate countries with Euratom <i>acquis</i> related to nuclear safeguards	1.1 Number of countries preparing nuclear legislative framework for implementing the Euratom treaty safeguards requirements	1.1 Depending on country (2024)	1.1 All (potential) candidate countries (2028)	1.1 Project documentation and/or official states documentation	Partner states are committed to align themselves to Euratom <i>acquis</i> . Factors outside project management's control that may influence on the outcome-impact linkage: 1) lack of commitment among individual states, 2) Unforeseen political and social unrest in recipient countries and/or national institutions
Outcome 2	2 Continued implementation of the nuclear safeguards dimension of the JCPOA with Iran	2.1 Iran does not withdraw from JCPOA	2.1 Iran is a participant of the JCPOA, although not fully compliant (2023)	2.1 Iran is still a participant of the JCPOA (2026)	2.1. IAEA reports	JCPOA is not ended.
Output 1 relating to Outcome 1	1.1 Strengthened and sustainable capacity with regards to Euratom nuclear safeguards	1.1.1 Number of educational programmes and trainings on Euratom safeguards organized with EU support 1.1.2 Number of participants educated and trained on Euratom safeguards for nuclear material with EU support (disaggregated by sex and disabilities) 1.1.3 Percentage of female students and trainees (disaggregated by age and disabilities)	1.1.1 0 (2024) 1.1.2 0 (2024) 1.1.3 N/A (2024)	1.1.1 at least one per partner state 1.1.2 TBD during inception phase (2028) 1.1.3 at least 20% of all participants (2028)	1.1.1 Project documentation 1.1.2 Copies of training certificates 1.1.3 Project documentation	Beneficiary states remain committed to align themselves with Euratom safeguards <i>acquis</i>

Output 2 relating to Outcome 1	1.2 Nuclear material control systems aligned to Euratom treaty and relevant regulations	1.2.1 Number of states taking steps towards implementing Euratom treaty 1.2.2 Number of safeguards technologies, tools, and approaches introduced with EU support	1.2.1 Depending on country (2024) 1.2.2 Depending on country (2024)	1.2.1 All (potential) candidate countries (2028) 1.2.2 TBD during inception phase (2028)	1.2.1 Official states documentation 1.2.2 Project documentation	
Output 1 relating to Outcome 2.1	2. Regular reports of IAEA safeguards inspections in Iran	2.1 Number of agency reports delivered	2.1 100% of foreseen (2023)	2.1 100% of foreseen (2025)	2.1. IAEA reporting	JCPOA is not ended

4 IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS

4.1 Financing Agreement

In order to implement this action, it is not envisaged to conclude a financing agreement with the partner countries.

4.2 Indicative Implementation Period

The indicative operational implementation period of this action, during which the activities described in section 3 will be carried out and the corresponding contracts and agreements implemented, is 72 months from the date of adoption by the Commission of this Financing Decision.

Extensions of the implementation period may be agreed by the Commission's responsible authorising officer in duly justified cases.

4.3 Implementation Modalities

The Commission will ensure that the EU rules and procedures for providing financing to third parties are respected, including review procedures, where appropriate, and compliance of the action with EU restrictive measures⁷.

4.3.1 Indirect Management with an entrusted entity

Component A (alignment with Euratom *acquis*) of this action may be implemented in indirect management with a pillar assessed entity. This implementation entails activities related to Outputs 1.1 and 1.2 detailed under chapter 3.2. The entity will be selected using the following criteria: has the necessary competences and legal role on nuclear safeguards, privileges (e.g. tax exemptions) and resources for project implementation; proven track record in efficient and effective implementation of nuclear safeguards projects.

Component B (Iran) of this action may be implemented in indirect management with the International Atomic Energy Agency, which was selected by the Commission's services using the following criteria: experience with safeguards verification in Iran, and being an independent international organisation mandated by the Security Council to monitor and verify the implementation of the nuclear non-proliferation commitments under the JCPOA. This implementation entails activities related to Output 2.1 detailed under chapter 3.2.

In case the envisaged entity would need to be replaced, the Commission services may select another replacement entity using the same criteria. If the entity is replaced, the decision to replace it needs to be justified.

4.3.2 Changes from indirect to direct management mode (and vice versa) due to exceptional circumstances (one alternative second option)

If part of the action in indirect management as per section 4.3.1 cannot be implemented due to circumstances outside of the Commission's control, the implementation modality in indirect management may be replaced by direct management and a part of the action under Component A may also be replaced by a Service Level Agreement with the Joint Research Centre (JRC) in order to mobilise its expertise for the achievement of the output of this action.

4.4 Scope of geographical eligibility for procurement and grants

The geographical eligibility in terms of place of establishment for participating in procurement and grant award procedures and in terms of origin of supplies purchased as established in the basic act and set out in the relevant contractual documents shall apply.

The Commission's authorising officer responsible may extend the geographical eligibility on the basis of urgency or of unavailability of services in the markets of the countries or territories concerned, or in other duly substantiated cases where application of the eligibility rules would make the realisation of this action impossible or exceedingly difficult (Article 11(8) INSC Council Regulation (Euratom) 2021/948 of 27 May 2021).

⁷ www.sanctionsmap.eu. Please note that the sanctions map is an IT tool for identifying the sanctions regimes. The source of the sanctions stems from legal acts published in the Official Journal (OJ). In case of discrepancy between the published legal acts and the updates on the website it is the OJ version that prevails.

4.5 Indicative Budget

Indicative Budget components	EU contribution (amount in EUR)
Implementation modalities – cf. section 4.3	
SO 1 Further alignment of EU (potential) candidate countries with Euratom <i>acquis</i> related to nuclear safeguards	
Indirect management with an entrusted entity – cf. section 4.3.1	3 000 000
SO 2 Implementation of the nuclear safeguards dimension of the JCPOA with Iran	
Indirect management with IAEA – cf. section 4.3.1	785 000
<i>Indirect management – total envelope under section 4.3.1</i>	<i>3 785 000</i>
Evaluation – cf. section 5.2	may be covered by another Decision
Audit – cf. section 5.3	
Total	3 785 000

4.6 Organisational Set-up and Responsibilities

All interventions will tentatively include a steering committee, set up with representatives of the key organisations, including the partner country and the implementing partner. Each steering committee provides support, guidance and oversight of the intervention and shall meet whenever deemed necessary by the end user, the European Commission, or the implementing partner.

As part of its prerogative of budget implementation and to safeguard the financial interests of the Union, the Commission may participate in the above governance structures set up for governing the implementation of the action and may sign or enter into joint declarations or statements, for the purpose of enhancing the visibility of the EU and its contribution to this action and ensuring effective coordination.

5 PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT

5.1 Monitoring and Reporting

The day-to-day technical and financial monitoring of the implementation of this action will be a continuous process, and part of the implementing partner's responsibilities. To this aim, the implementing partner shall establish a permanent internal, technical and financial monitoring system for the action and elaborate regular progress reports (not less than annual) and final reports. Every report shall provide an accurate account of implementation of the action, difficulties encountered, changes introduced, as well as the degree of achievement of its results (Outputs and direct Outcomes) as measured by corresponding indicators, using as reference the logframe matrix (for project modality) and the partner's strategy, policy or reform action plan list (for budget support).

The Commission may undertake additional project monitoring visits both through its own staff and through independent consultants recruited directly by the Commission for independent monitoring reviews (or recruited by the responsible agent contracted by the Commission for implementing such reviews).

Roles and responsibilities for data collection, analysis and monitoring:

- The indicators, corresponding data source and baseline as indicated in the logframe matrix above. Arrangements for monitoring and reporting will be specified in the individual contracts.

All monitoring and reporting shall assess how the action is considering the principle of gender equality, human rights-based approach and rights of persons with disabilities including inclusion and diversity. Indicators shall be disaggregated at least by sex and age, and disability if possible.

5.2 Evaluation

Having regard to the nature of the action, a final evaluation will not be carried out for this action or its components.

In case an evaluation is not planned, the Commission may, during implementation, decide to undertake such an evaluation for duly justified reasons either on its own decision or on the initiative of the partner.

The evaluation reports may be shared with the partners and other key stakeholders following the best practice of evaluation dissemination. The implementing partner and the Commission shall analyse the conclusions and recommendations of the evaluations and, where appropriate, apply the necessary adjustments.

In addition, all evaluations shall assess to what extent the action is taking into account the human rights-based approach as well as how it contributes to gender equality and women's empowerment and disability inclusion. Expertise on human rights, disability and gender equality will be ensured in the evaluation teams.

Evaluation services may be contracted under a framework contract. The financing of the evaluation may be covered by another measure constituting a Financing Decision.

5.3 Audit and Verifications

Without prejudice to the obligations applicable to contracts concluded for the implementation of this action, the Commission may, on the basis of a risk assessment, contract independent audit or verification assignments for one or several contracts or agreements.

6 STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

The 2021-2027 programming cycle will adopt a new approach to pooling, programming and deploying strategic communication and public diplomacy resources.

In line with the 2022 “[Communicating and Raising EU Visibility: Guidance for External Actions](#)”, it will remain a contractual obligation for all entities implementing EU-funded external actions to inform the relevant audiences of the Union's support for their work by displaying the EU emblem and a short funding statement as appropriate on all communication materials related to the actions concerned. This obligation will continue to apply equally, regardless of whether the actions concerned are implemented by the Commission, partner countries, service providers, grant beneficiaries or entrusted or delegated entities such as UN agencies, international financial institutions and agencies of EU member states.

However, action documents for specific sector programmes are in principle no longer required to include a provision for communication and visibility actions promoting the programmes concerned. These resources will instead be consolidated in Cooperation Facilities established by support measure action documents, allowing Delegations to plan and execute multiannual strategic communication and public diplomacy actions with sufficient critical mass to be effective on a national scale.

Appendix 1 REPORTING IN OPSYS

A Primary Intervention⁸ (project/programme) is a coherent set of activities and results structured in a logical framework aiming at delivering development change or progress. Identifying the level of the primary intervention will allow for:

- Articulating Actions or Contracts according to an expected chain of results and therefore allowing them to ensure efficient monitoring and reporting of performance;
- Differentiating these Actions or Contracts from those that do not produce direct reportable development results, defined as support entities (i.e. audits, evaluations);
- Having a complete and exhaustive mapping of all results-bearing Actions and Contracts.

Primary Interventions are identified during the design of each action by the responsible service (Delegation or Headquarters operational Unit).

The level of the Primary Intervention chosen can be modified (directly in OPSYS) and the modification does not constitute an amendment of the action document.

The intervention level for the present Action identifies as:

Action level (i.e. Budget Support, blending)		
<input type="checkbox"/>	Single action	
Group of actions level (i.e. top-up cases, different phases of a single programme)		
<input type="checkbox"/>	Group of actions	
Contract level		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Single Contract 1	Contract under Component A (alignment with Euratom <i>acquis</i>)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Single Contract 1	Contract under Component B (Iran)
Group of contracts level (i.e. series of programme estimates, cases in which an Action includes for example four contracts and two of them, a technical assistance contract and a contribution agreement, aim at the same objectives and complement each other)		
<input type="checkbox"/>	Group of contracts 1	

⁸ For the purpose of consistency between terms in OPSYS, DG INTPA, DG NEAR and FPI have harmonised 5 key terms, including 'Action' and 'Intervention' where an 'Action' is the content (or part of the content) of a Commission financing Decision and 'Intervention' is a coherent set of activities and results which constitutes an effective level for the operational follow-up by the EC of its operations on the ground. See more on the [concept of intervention](#).