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ANNEX 1

to the Commission Implementing Decision on the financing of the annual action plan for the European Instrument for International Nuclear Safety Cooperation for 2024

Action Document for Nuclear safety culture 2024



ANNUAL PLAN

This document constitutes the annual work programme within the meaning of Article 110(2) of the Financial Regulation, within the meaning of Article 7 of the INSC Regulation.

1 SYNOPSIS

1.1 Action Summary Table

| | |
|--|--|
| 1. Title OPSYS business reference Basic Act | Nuclear safety culture 2024 ACT-62490 & ACT-62491 Financed under the European Instrument for International Nuclear Safety Cooperation Regulation |
| 2. Team Europe Initiative | No |
| 3. Zone benefiting from the action | The action shall be implemented worldwide, in particular in the Neighbourhood East and Neighbourhood South |
| 4. Programming document | European Instrument for International Nuclear Safety Cooperation Multiannual Indicative Programme (2021-2027) of 3 December 2021 (C(2021)8687) |
| 5. Link with relevant MIP(s) objectives / expected results | This action is contributing to the promotion of an effective nuclear safety culture and implementation of the highest nuclear safety and radiation protection standards in the partner countries |
| PRIORITY AREAS AND SECTOR INFORMATION | |
| 6. Priority Area(s), sectors | Promotion of an effective nuclear safety culture and implementation of the highest nuclear safety and radiation protection standards |
| 7. Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) | Main SDG: 16 (Strong Institutions) Other significant SDGs: SDG 11 (Disaster Risk Reduction), SDG 5 (Gender Equality) and SDG 10 (Reduced Inequalities) |
| 8 a) DAC code(s) | 23510 – Nuclear energy electric power plants and nuclear safety – 100% |
| 8 b) Main Delivery Channel | 10000 – Public sector institutions |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 9. Targets | <input type="checkbox"/> Migration <input type="checkbox"/> Climate <input type="checkbox"/> Social inclusion and Human Development <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Gender <input type="checkbox"/> Biodiversity <input type="checkbox"/> Education <input type="checkbox"/> Human Rights, Democracy and Governance | | | |
| 10. Markers (from DAC form) | General policy objective @ | Not targeted | Significant objective | Principal objective |
| | Participation development/good governance | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| | Aid to environment @ | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | Gender equality and women's and girl's empowerment | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | Reproductive, maternal, new-born and child health | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | Disaster Risk Reduction @ | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | Inclusion of persons with Disabilities @ | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | Nutrition @ | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | RIO Convention markers | Not targeted | Significant objective | Principal objective |
| | Biological diversity @ | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | Combat desertification @ | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | Climate change mitigation @ | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | Climate change adaptation @ | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 11. Internal markers and Tags: | Policy objectives | Not targeted | Significant objective |
| Digitalisation @ | | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| digital connectivity digital governance digital entrepreneurship digital skills/literacy digital services | | YES <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |  |
| Connectivity @ | | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | |
| digital connectivity energy transport health education and research | | YES <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |  |

| | | | | |
|-------------------------------|--|-------------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| | Migration @ | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | Reduction of Inequalities @ | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | Covid-19 | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| BUDGET INFORMATION | | | | |
| 12. Amounts concerned | Budget line: 14.060100 Total estimated cost for 2024: EUR 17 500 000 Total amount of EU budget contribution for 2024: EUR 17 500 000 | | | |
| MANAGEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION | | | | |
| 13. Type of financing | Direct management through: - Procurement for Components B (Armenia) and C (Egypt) Indirect management with: - the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU) and/or the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) for part of Component A (Ukraine) - the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for another part of Component A (Ukraine) | | | |

1.2 Summary of the Action

The overall objective of the action is to contribute to an effective nuclear safety culture and standards for radiation and nuclear safety in third countries and regions, comparable with those in the European Union. Three countries have been proposed for this action: Ukraine, Armenia and Egypt.

The main focus in Ukraine is to support maintaining, restoring and strengthening the nuclear safety of the nuclear facilities, in particular those threatened by Russia's military aggression. The action should also help the national regulatory authority of Ukraine to re-establish control over the nuclear safety of all nuclear installations and nuclear materials.

Armenia will be supported in implementing results of the stress tests and in the regulatory oversight for the first periodic safety review of the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant (ANPP). Additional support will be provided in establishing a national radiation measurement laboratory in line with EU best practices.

The support to Egypt is aimed at strengthening the national nuclear regulatory authority, after Egypt joined the Convention on Nuclear Safety on 24 December 2023.

The action is in line with the EU Gender Action Plan 2021-2025 (GAP III)¹ and its thematic areas of engagement "Promoting economic and social rights and empowering girls and women" as well as "Promoting equal participation and leadership".

2 RATIONALE

2.1 Context

The promotion of radiation protection and nuclear safety is a key priority for the EU since the early days of the European Economic Community and EURATOM. The European Instrument for International Nuclear Safety Cooperation² (INSC) is the specific tool of the EU addressing nuclear safety issues in partner countries, including candidate countries, complementing other financing instruments for external action such as the Neighbourhood,

¹ https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/gender-action-plan-iii-towards-gender-equal-world_en

² Council Regulation (Euratom) 2021/948 of 27 May 2021 establishing a European Instrument for International Nuclear Safety Cooperation complementing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe on the basis of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, and repealing Regulation (Euratom) No 237/2014

Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI) and the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III).

The added value of the INSC was acknowledged at the 7th Convention on Nuclear Safety review meeting in 2017. In the meeting, “the implementation of the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation Program for assisting non-EU countries” was internationally recognised as ‘a good practice’. The final evaluation of the INSC 2014-2020³ appreciates the positive contribution of the Instrument, noticing its capability to respond swiftly to new needs. It acknowledged the INSC's unique added value due to the institutional framework that allows the Commission to act at a global level; the instrument is supporting complementarities, coordination and synergies and is effective in leveraging financial resources for nuclear safety.

The main target of this Action is to support partner countries in achieving the highest possible level of nuclear safety by aligning their regulatory framework with the EU *acquis* and by transferring best EU practices in the field.

The Action is in line with the EU Gender Action Plan 2021-2025 (GAP III)⁴ and its thematic area of engagement “Promoting economic and social rights and empowering girls and women” as well as “Promoting equal participation and leadership”.

Women are less than a quarter (24.9%) of the overall nuclear sector workforce in Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) countries, adjusted for national differences in the size of the workforce. Only one-fifth (20.6%) of Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) roles in the nuclear sector are held by women, and women represent only 18.3% of senior leadership⁵.

The NEA has developed a policy framework to tackle the key barriers that women have and to support a better representation of women in the sector, support their career development, and enhance their contributions. Recommendations for direct, practical actions are organised around three pillars ((i) attract women into the nuclear sector, (ii) retain and support women in the workforce and (iii) advance and develop women as leaders) and undergirded by a reporting regime for data and accountability.

The European Commission’s services maintain a close working relationship with the EEAS and its EU Delegations in partner countries, in order to help ensure a coherent approach, taking the latest relevant developments into account.

2.2 Problem Analysis

Component A: Ukraine – Maintaining, restoring and strengthening nuclear safety

Following Russia’s unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine, the illegal occupation and seizure of Ukrainian nuclear installations by Russian forces, and the reported shelling and bombarding of some nuclear facilities, nuclear safety, radiation monitoring and radioprotection measures have to be restored.

The activities in Ukraine will focus on providing support to the nuclear regulator in the regulatory assessment of supplies and/or works for maintaining, restoring and strengthening nuclear-safety-related equipment, installations and services. Activities in the Chornobyl Exclusion Zone and other nuclear facilities will focus on replacement and recovery of radiation monitoring equipment damaged, looted or lost during Russia’s war of aggression. Furthermore, support will be given to the continuous strengthening of nuclear safety and radioprotection infrastructure and introducing best practices.

Ukraine is an EU candidate country since 23 June 2022 and will need to further align its regulatory framework with the Euratom *acquis*. It will, in particular, concern the Directive 2014/87/Euratom on nuclear safety of nuclear installations, Directive 2011/70/Euratom on responsible and safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste and Directive 2013/59/Euratom on basic safety standards.

³ https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-09/evaluation-report-insc-2014-2020_en.pdf

⁴ https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/gender-action-plan-iii-towards-gender-equal-world_en

⁵ Gender balance in the nuclear sector. OECD Library: <https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/725b1894-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/725b1894-en#:~:text=Women%20are%20less%20than%20a,only%2018.3%25%20of%20senior%20leadership.>

A number of previous and ongoing INSC projects have already addressed Euratom *acquis* alignment and nuclear legislative framework consolidation. However, in view of a successful integration of Ukraine within the EU, further support is needed to achieve full legislative harmonisation within a reasonable timeframe.

The IAEA is carrying out vital missions to the occupied territories, including to Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. Financial support to those missions is included in this Action.

Component B: Armenia – Strengthening nuclear safety and radioprotection infrastructure

Armenia has committed to implement results of the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG) post-Fukushima stress test. Ongoing activities have identified that the containment needs more sealing activities than originally foreseen to reach an acceptable and sustainable leak tightness level. The ongoing activity would be extended to ensure sustainability and reach a technically improved level.

To increase Armenia's ability to detect environmental radon levels and implement an independent radiation monitoring laboratory, support will be provided for acquiring, installing and training on the use of the laboratory equipment. This activity was originally foreseen under AAP 2019, but the proposed location of the laboratory was not definitive and the designated budget was insufficient. This activity therefore needs to be reprogrammed.

INSC's cooperation with the Armenian Nuclear Regulatory Authority (ANRA) will continue, including to allow for expert support to the first periodic safety review of the ANPP.

Component C: Egypt – Strengthening nuclear safety and radioprotection regulatory infrastructure

Egypt has formally joined the Convention on Nuclear Safety on 24 December 2023, committing to maintain transparency of its nuclear power programme and adhere to the IAEA fundamental safety principles and standards. Egypt has been constructing a nuclear power plant of four units at the El Dabaa site on the Mediterranean coast since July 2022. Licensing and regulatory supervision of the construction is performed by the Egyptian Nuclear and Radiological Regulatory Authority (ENRRA).

ENRRA has expressed interest to participate again in the INSC programme to learn from the best EU practices and methodologies. In a workshop with EU representatives held in Cairo early 2024, ENRRA representatives outlined their actual needs and possible scope of the cooperation.

ENRRA has requested support mainly in regulatory oversight and operational staff licensing, environmental monitoring, emergency preparedness and response and improving public communication. This cooperation project is aligned with the recent reaffirmation of the EU wish to cooperate with Egypt on energy⁶.

Within the framework of its work since the 2000s, the National Council for Women has drawn up plans to mainstream a gender perspective in Egypt through national plans, and this effort has been culminated in the National Strategy for the Empowerment of Egyptian Women 2030⁷. The Strategy focuses on highlighting the role of women as a key driver in achieving sustainable development, in a country that guarantees their protection and economic, social and political opportunities in such a way that enables them to advance their capabilities.

Identification of main stakeholders and corresponding institutional and/or organisational issues (mandates, potential roles, and capacities) to be covered by the action:

As duty bearers:

Component A: Ukraine – Maintaining, restoring and strengthening of nuclear safety

The Ukrainian nuclear regulatory authority (SNRIU) and nuclear operators, the Ministry of Energy, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources as well as their supporting organisations in charge of radiation protection and remediation issues. A stronger cooperation between SNRIU and other organisations will be promoted.

Component B: Armenia – Strengthening nuclear safety and radioprotection infrastructure

The Armenian Nuclear Regulatory Authority (ANRA), its Technical Support Organisation the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Center (NRSC), and the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant operator.

⁶ Commissioner Olivér Várhelyi's press statement during the joint press conference following the EU-Egypt Association Council, Brussels, 23 January 2024.

⁷ Egypt Human Development Report 2021, chapter 4. Ministry of Planning and Economic Development, UNDP: <file:///C:/Users/sara.sotillos/Desktop/Sara/HUB/Assignments%20March%202024/Egypt%20Human%20Development.pdf>.

Component C: Egypt – Strengthening nuclear safety and radioprotection regulatory infrastructure

The Egyptian Nuclear and Radiation Regulatory Authority (ENRRA).

As right holders:

Organizations of civil society, including associations of women working in the nuclear sector, Black Sea Women in Nuclear Network (BSWN), Women in Nuclear (WIN), organizations of persons with disabilities, academia and media.

3 DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTION

3.1 Objectives and Expected Outputs

The Overall Objective (Impact) of this action is to contribute to an effective nuclear safety culture and standards for radiation and nuclear safety in third countries and regions, comparable with those in the European Union.

The Specific Objectives (Outcomes) of this action are:

1. Restored and strengthened nuclear safety infrastructure in Ukraine
2. Strengthened nuclear safety and radioprotection infrastructure in Armenia
3. Strengthened nuclear safety and radioprotection regulator in Egypt

The Outputs to be delivered by this action contributing to the corresponding Specific Objectives (Outcomes) are:

Contributing to Outcome 1 (Ukraine):

- 1.1 Successful implementation of IAEA missions
- 1.2 Strengthened nuclear regulator carrying out its duties effectively despite the current context of Russia's war of aggression
- 1.3 Nuclear legislative framework harmonized further with Euratom *acquis*
- 1.4 Restored and strengthened radiation monitoring system and other nuclear infrastructure

Contributing to Outcome 2 (Armenia):

- 2.1 Containment tightness of the ANPP improved in a sustainable way
- 2.2 National radiation laboratory established
- 2.3 ANRA supported in reviewing the ANPP first periodic safety review

Contributing to Outcome 3 (Egypt):

- 3.1 Enhanced regulatory oversight of nuclear power plants
- 3.2 Improved emergency preparedness and emergency response capabilities of ENRRA
- 3.3 Enhanced ENRRA competences in public outreach / communication to a state-of-the-art level
- 3.4 Integrated Management System (IMS) of ENRRA independently verified
- 3.5 Mutual understanding on border regulatory radiation detection and measurement practice enhanced and alignment with international standards focusing on radiation checks of goods entering Egypt
- 3.6 National Stress Test Report drafted

3.2 Indicative Activities

The description of the activities may not be exhaustive.

Outcome 1 - Restored and strengthened nuclear safety infrastructure in Ukraine

Activities relating to Output 1.1:

- IAEA observatory missions to Ukraine, in particular Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant
- IAEA expert missions as needed to help stabilize the situation, assess the situation on the ground, current status of needs and provide expert advice and support
- Technical support and assistance to Ukraine (in terms of equipment, supplies, services) that meets their needs arising from Russia's war of aggression and addressing areas such as (1) safe operation of nuclear installations, including radioactive waste management facilities and facilities with radioactive sources; (2) medical support and care for the nuclear power plant operating personnel; and (3) restoration of damaged nuclear safety infrastructure
- Provide gender-sensitive training for all operating personnel involved in nuclear safety, including engineers, technicians, and emergency responders to ensure that women are also represented in decision-making processes.

Activities relating to Output 1.2:

- Support to regulator on regulatory assessment of safety relevant documentation with gender sensitive approach
- Conduct assessment on the situation of persons with disabilities to prevent the challenges they face in this sector

Activities relating to Output 1.3:

- Support to regulator and other governmental bodies on drafting and/or amending the relevant legal and regulatory framework, followed by assistance with their implementation after adoption

Activities relating to Output 1.4:

- Support to improve and restore radiation monitoring systems in specific nuclear facilities such as the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone as well as the whole territory of Ukraine.
- Reconstruction activities in Ukraine, in particular the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone

Outcome 2: Strengthened nuclear safety and radioprotection infrastructure in Armenia

Activities relating to Output 2.1:

- Improved sealing of leaks in the containment
- Improving leak detection capacity at ANPP
- Training and workshops with gender and human rights sensitive approach including persons with disabilities challenges

Activities relating to Output 2.2:

- Supply of equipment for the national radiation laboratory
- Defining measurement methods
- Knowledge transfer to users

Activities relating to Output 2.3:

- Regulatory cooperation on reviewing and inspection of activities related to the first periodic safety review of the ANPP

Output 3: Strengthened nuclear safety and radioprotection regulator in Egypt

Activities relating to Output 3.1:

- Improving ENRRA abilities in using modelling and/or simulation codes (computer software) to verify plant safety analyses submitted by licensees
- Improving the ENRRA system for licensing NPP operating staff according to best EU regulatory practices.

Activities relating to Output 3.2:

- Upgrading the current radiation monitoring network in Egypt, installing a state-of-the-art Decision Support System (DSS) at the ENRRA Situation Analysis Centre (SAC)

Activities relating to Output 3.3:

- Developing a new ENRRA communication strategy compliant with the best EU regulatory practice, covering all kinds of ENRRA public activities with gender sensitive approach including persons with disabilities challenges

Activities relating to Output 3.4:

- Reviewing of current ENRRA Integrated Management Systems (IMS) and Electronic Document Management Systems (EDMS), providing recommendations for potential upgrading

Activities relating to Output 3.5:

- Alignment of Egyptian radioprotection regulations and practices with international standards, focusing on radiation checks of goods and materials entering Egypt as some imports have been refused due to too high radiation levels

Activities relating to Output 3.6:

- Supporting ENRRA in preparing the EU Stress Test National Report

3.3 Mainstreaming

Environmental Protection & Climate Change

The activities contribute to the protection of the environment by enhancing nuclear safety.

Gender equality and empowerment of women and girls

Women are underrepresented in nuclear safety, as well as in the nuclear field in general, so it is important to understand and tackle the barriers that women can face to joining and thriving in this field. The contribution of the INSC to gender equality is mainly achieved through activities related to training and tutoring for which the European Commission strongly encourages the participation of women that in turn will provide additional

opportunity for career development. Women are also underrepresented in STEM⁸ and leadership roles, even when considered in terms of their representation in the nuclear workforce.⁹ This action aims amongst others at gender balanced training and tutoring on nuclear safety culture and promoting women's representation at senior level within nuclear institutions as well as during the engagement and dialogue with diverse local stakeholders. Studies and advisory services will fully integrate gender aspects. Gender-specific indicators and data disaggregated by sex, age and disability will be included, where relevant. This action will work with partners to ensure a balanced representation of women and men in all activities. Therefore, as per the OECD Gender DAC codes identified in section 1.1, this action is labelled as G1.

Human Rights

This action is designed and will be implemented taking into account the need to uphold national and international human rights and to respect the five working principles of the human rights-based approach: respecting all human rights, non-discrimination, accountability and transparency principles, as well as ensuring participation of all stakeholders.

Disability

As per OECD Disability DAC codes identified in section 1.1, this action is labelled as D0. This implies that the action is not considered relevant for inclusion of persons with disabilities. However, this action will ensure that rights of persons with disabilities will be respected and will encourage stakeholders and programme participants to take the initiatives to protect and ensure equal access of persons with disabilities. This action is in line with the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)¹⁰ and the EU Strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2021-2030¹¹.

Disaster Risk Reduction

All components have aspects of disaster risk reduction, because nuclear safety activities are directly and indirectly reducing the chance of or the impact of incidents or accidents relating to nuclear activities or applications of radioactivity.

3.4 Risks and Lessons Learnt

| Category | Risks | Likelihood (High/ Medium/ Low) | Impact (High/ Medium/ Low) | Mitigating measures |
|-----------------------------|---|---|-------------------------------------|---|
| People and the organisation | Lack of political commitment and administrative support in the partner countries | L | M | Continued dialogue with authorities at all levels in partner countries on the importance of INSC actions |
| People and the organisation | Insufficient or inadequate gender mainstreaming could reinforce gender inequalities and the nonrealisation of human rights including the lack of respect for persons with disabilities in the sector and hinder | M | M | Use of available knowledge and tools of gender mainstreaming taking into consideration persons with disabilities. Gender-sensitive monitoring, use of sex-disaggregated data, and gender-sensitive indicators Gender mainstreaming in all phases of the intervention cycle |

⁸ STEM: Science, Technology, Engineering, Mathematics

⁹ [Gender Balance in the Nuclear Sector, Nuclear Energy Agency \(NEA\) 2023](#)

¹⁰ [Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities \(CRPD\)](#)

¹¹ [EU Strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2021-2030](#)

| | | | | |
|----------------------|--|---|---|-------------------------------------|
| | the efficiency and sustainability of the action | | | |
| External environment | Ukraine: Engaging will remain difficult because of the continuation of Russia's unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine | H | H | Maximum flexibility will be applied |

Lessons Learnt:

Extensive and broad experience has been gained in successfully implementing similar INSC projects in partner countries and regions, both in the framework of the TACIS¹² Nuclear Safety Programme and the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC). This experience will be used in optimising the design and implementation of this action.

Communication and support from the partners and end-users will remain a key element for successful implementation.

The findings, conclusions and recommendations of the report of the 'Evaluation of the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation 2014-2020'¹³ have informed the formulation of this Action.

Component A (Ukraine)

Since the start of Russia's war of aggression on 24 February 2022, outputs and activities of ongoing INSC interventions had to be adapted, as well as their implementation modality and timeframe, due to dramatic events, e.g. extensive damage in the Chornobyl Exclusion Zone. Hence for Ukraine in particular, new INSC interventions should be defined with a broad enough scope and timeframe to allow for an easy and rapid adaptation to changing circumstances. Regular donor coordination, including with Member States providing bilateral support, under the leadership of the Ukraine government avoids overlap and gaps while ensuring a more effective and synergetic use of scarce resources.

Component B (Armenia)

The partnership with Armenia started in 1991 first in the frame of TACIS, then under the INSC umbrella. In addition to the cooperation with ANRA and NRSC, considerable efforts improved the safety of the ANPP.

Component C (Egypt)

EG3.01/10, the last Egyptian INSC project was concluded in 2017 and it enhanced the capabilities of ENRRA. Objectives and tasks of that INSC project had been defined before the El Dabaa project started. During implementation of the EG3.01/10 project, cooperation between ENRRA and the European contractor (RISKAUDIT) was considered very good by ENRRA. When completing the project, ENRRA expressed their intention to continue the nuclear safety cooperation with the EU.

¹² Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States

¹³ https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/climate-environment-and-energy/nuclear-safety_en

3.5 The Intervention Logic

If the assumptions in the logical framework matrix hold true (see Section 3.6), then the outputs described in Section 3.1 will be produced.

If the outcome/s are achieved and the assumptions in the logical framework matrix at this level hold true, then the action will contribute to the desired impact (see Sections 3.1 and 3.6). Experience has shown that enhancing capabilities within a regulatory authority in one or other technical or organisational area improves safety culture more generally, not only in the areas targeted by the intervention.

The underlying intervention logic for this action is based on requests of the beneficiary, which will ensure their commitment and lessons learned of previous activities and assessments during expert missions, discussions with the relevant and diverse stakeholders, and coordination with the main partners and the IAEA, with which this programme is strongly coordinated.

The interventions are designed on the basis of lessons learned, previous activities and with a focus on the expected impact and outcomes. During implementation, the actual situation will be reanalysed, and flexibility will be built into the implementation to adjust to developing circumstances using independent experts, in particular JRC technical experts.

This will ensure that the impact and expected objectives will be achieved and the sustainability will be ensured.

3.6 Logical Framework Matrix

This indicative logframe constitutes the basis for the monitoring, reporting and evaluation of the intervention.

On the basis of this logframe matrix, a more detailed logframe (or several) may be developed at contracting stage. In case baselines and targets are not available for the action, they should be informed for each indicator at signature of the contract(s) linked to this AD, or in the first progress report at the latest.

New columns may be added to set intermediary targets (milestones) for the Output and Outcome indicators whenever it is relevant.

- At inception, the first progress report should include the complete logframe (e.g. including baselines/targets).
- Progress reports should provide an updated logframe with current values for each indicator.
- The final report should enclose the logframe with baseline and final values for each indicator.

The indicative logical framework matrix may evolve during the lifetime of the action depending on the different implementation modalities of this action.

The activities, the expected Outputs and related indicators, targets and baselines included in the logframe matrix may be updated during the implementation of the action, no amendment being required to the Financing Decision.

PROJECT MODALITY (3 levels of results / indicators / Source of Data / Assumptions - no activities)

| Results | Results chain (a): Main expected results (maximum 10) | Indicators (a): (at least one indicator per expected result) | Baselines (values and years) | Targets (values and years) | Sources of data | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|--|--|---|
| Impact | To contribute to an effective nuclear safety culture and standards for radiation and nuclear safety in third countries and regions, comparable with those in the European Union | 1 Feedback on INSC cooperation during meetings of the IAEA Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) 2 Feedback from IAEA peer reviews missions | 1 Recognised as good practice (2017) 2 Depending on country (2024) | 1 Positive (2028) 2 Positive in all INSC partner countries (2028) | 1 IAEA CNS reports 2 IAEA peer review reports | <i>Not applicable</i> |
| Outcome 1 | 1 Restored and strengthened nuclear safety infrastructure in Ukraine | 1.1 Feedback on Ukraine national report submitted for the IAEA CNS peer review process | 1.1 TBD (2024) | 1.1 Positive (2028) | 1.1 IAEA CNS reports | |
| Outcome 2 | 2 Strengthened nuclear safety and radioprotection infrastructure in Armenia | 2.1 Feedback on Armenia national report submitted for the IAEA CNS peer review process | 1.1 TBD (2024) | 2.1 Number of identified shortcomings reduced (2028) | 2.1 Project reports, IAEA CNS reports | |
| Outcome 3 | 3 Strengthened nuclear safety and radioprotection regulator in Egypt | 3.1 Status of capacities of ENRRA for adequate supervision of Egyptian nuclear power plants 3.2 Status of emergency preparedness and response capacities of ENRRA | 3.1 Independent regulatory verification of safety analyses is not available (2023) 3.2 A modern decision support system is not operated yet (2023) | 3.1 Independent verification is carried out routinely (2028) 3.2 A modern DSS is in operation at ENRRA (2028) | 3.1 Project reports and results of benchmark analyses 3.2 Reports on a successful national emergency exercise | ENRRA will have access to EU safety analysis tools and a modern decision support system |
| Output 1 relating to Outcome 1 | 1.1 Successful implementation of IAEA missions | 1.1.1 IAEA mission reports available | 1.1.1 Regular mission reports (2023) | 1.1.1 Regular mission reports (2026) | 1.1.1 IAEA mission reports / updates | IAEA team is given access to nuclear facilities |
| Output 2 relating to Outcome 1 | 1.2 Strengthened nuclear regulator carrying out its duties effectively despite the current context or Russia's war of aggression | 1.2.1 Licensing, guideline preparation and implementation, oversight activities are carried out effectively in accordance to international standards and best practices | 1.2.1 Partially achieved due to the context of Russia's war of aggression (2023) | 1.2.1 Complete (2026) | 1.2.1 Regulatory Authority reports, IAEA review reports | War ends / no further significant deterioration of the country security situation |

| | | | | | | |
|---|--|---|--|---|--|--|
| Output 3 relating to Outcome 1 | 1.3 Nuclear legislative framework harmonized further with Euratom <i>acquis</i> | 1.3.1 National strategy to achieve further alignment with EURATOM directives. 1.3.2 Consistent set of regulations aligned with EURATOM directives | 1.3.1 Strategy partially developed (2024) 1.3.2 Baseline currently evaluated by ongoing project U3.01/21 (2024) | 1.3.1 Strategy fully developed (2026) 1.3.2 Consistent set of regulations ready to be adopted (2028) | 1.3.1 Strategy adopted by Council of Ministers 1.3.2 Harmonized legislation adopted by parliament and enforced (2028) | Political commitment to pass new laws |
| Output 4 relating to Outcome 1 | 1.4 Restored and strengthened radiation monitoring system and other nuclear infrastructure | 1.4.1 Radiation monitoring systems provide reliable readings to both Ukrainian and European authorities | 1.4.1 Baseline evaluated by ongoing project U3.01/19B (2024) | 1.4.1 100% of monitoring stations operational (2028) | 1.4.1 Monitoring reports | War ends / no further significant deterioration of the military situation |
| Output 1 relating to Outcome 2 | 2.1 Containment tightness of the ANPP improved in a sustainable way | 2.1.1 Leak rate of ANPP 2.1.2 ANPP Staff trained for leak rate measurement and new sealing technologies with EU support | 2.1.1 257.62%/24h (2023) 2.1.2 0 (2023) | 2.1.1 100%/24h (2028) 2.1.2 15-20 staff trained (Course + OJT) (2028) | 2.1.1 Project reports 2.1.2 Training certificates | |
| Output 2 relating to Outcome 2 | 2.2 National radiation laboratory established | 2.2.1 Equipment installed and operational 2.2.2 Number of measurement methods defined 2.2.3 Staff trained disaggregated by sex and disabilities | 2.2.1 0 % 2.2.2 0 % 2.2.3 0 % | 2.2.1. 100% (2028) 2.2.2 methods defined for an effective functioning of the laboratory (2028) 2.2.3 necessary number of staff members trained for the effective functioning of the laboratory (2028) | 2.2.1 Signed final acceptance certificates 2.2.2 Working instructions 2.2.3 Training certificates | Building will be completed in 3 years (2027), with lab part expected to be completed in 2 years (2026) Adequate Human Resources allocated to the laboratory |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|--|--|--|--|---|
| Output 3 relating to Outcome 2 | 2.3 ANRA supported in reviewing the ANPP first periodic safety review | 2.3.1 Oversight activities are carried out effectively in accordance to international standards and best practices. | 2.3.1. Baseline to be evaluated in contract AAP 2020: - IAEA SALTO Follow-up Mission 2021 implemented recommendations | 2.3.1 The activities related to the first periodic safety review of ANPP are defined and scheduled in an action plan (2026) | 2.3.1 ANRA reports and IAEA review reports (expected SALTO mission in Q4 2025) | ANPP and political commitment to safety standards and culture |
| Output 1 relating to Outcome 3 | 3.1 Enhanced regulatory oversight of nuclear power plants | 3.1.1 ENRRA staff trained to expert level for performing independent safety analysis using European codes, disaggregated by sex 3.1.2 EU practice and experience shared for operating staff licensing | 3.1.1 Codes present and first training received, European codes not used for independent review (2023) 3.1.2 System for research reactor operating staff licensing is in place (2023) | 3.1.1 Experts using European codes routinely in ENRRA (2028) 3.1.2 European practice for NPP operating staff licensing is available to ENRRA (2028) | 3.1.1 Project reports, Training certificates | |
| Output 2 relating to Outcome 3 | 3.2 Improved emergency preparedness and emergency response capabilities of ENRRA | 3.2.1 Egyptian regulator using state of the art Decision Support System (DSS) 3.2.2 Radiation monitoring network designed | 3.2.1 No DSS in place (2024) 3.2.2 Preliminary design to complete monitoring network around El Dabaa completed (2024) | 3.2.1 State of the art DSS in place (2028) 3.2.2 Design reviewed with budget completed (2028) | 3.2.1 Project reports 3.2.2 Design documentation | |
| Output 3 relating to Outcome 3 | 3.3 Enhanced ENRRA competences in public outreach / communication to a state-of-the-art level | 3.3.1 ENRRA use state-of-the-art public outreach / communication methodology and tools | 3.3.1 Strategy and plan in place (2024) | 3.3.1 Strategy & plan updated according to best EU practice and experience (2028) | 3.3.1 Communication plan, press releases | |

| | | | | | | |
|---|--|--|--|---|--|--|
| Output 4 relating to Outcome 3 | 3.4 Integrated Management System (IMS) of ENRRA independently verified | 3.4.1 IMS/EDMS review completed | 3.4.1 IMS review in 2023 performed by IAEA; Fully audited IMS. | 3.4.1 New independent benchmarking peer review implemented based on EU experience (2028) | 3.4.1 IMS review report | |
| Output 5 relating to Outcome 3 | 3.5 Mutual understanding of border regulatory radiation detection and measurement practice enhanced and alignment with international standards focusing on radiation checks of goods entering Egypt. | 3.5.1 Relevant experience exchanged between ENRRA and EU | 3.5.1 Insufficient mutual understanding on border radiation detection regulations and practices (2023) | 3.5.1 Full mutual understanding and alignment with international standards of border radiation detection regulations and practices (2028) | 3.5.1 Project reports, Imported goods acceptance rules | |
| Output 6 relating to Outcome 3 | 3.6 National Stress Test Report drafted | 3.6.1 National Stress Test Report submitted to ENSREG | 3.6.1 First version of El Dabaa NPP external hazard assessment done (2024) | 3.6.1 Egypt ready to consider participation to the ENSREG peer review after the IAEA IRRS mission (2026) | 3.6.1. Stress test report | Decision can be taken after the IRRS mission is completed (tentatively 2025) |

4 IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS

4.1 Financing Agreement

In order to implement this action, it is envisaged to conclude a financing agreement with the Republic of Armenia for Component B.

In order to implement this action, it is not envisaged to conclude a financing agreement for Components A and C.

4.2 Indicative Implementation Period

The indicative operational implementation period of this action, during which the activities described in section 3 (for Component B) will be carried out and the corresponding contracts and agreements implemented, is 84 months from the date of entry into force of the financing agreement.

The indicative operational implementation period of this action, during which the activities described in section 3 (for Components A and C) will be carried out and the corresponding contracts and agreements implemented, is 84 months from the date of adoption by the Commission of this Financing Decision.

Extensions of the implementation period may be agreed by the Commission's responsible authorising officer in duly justified cases.

4.3 Implementation Modalities

The Commission will ensure that the EU rules and procedures for providing financing to third parties are respected, including review procedures, where appropriate, and compliance of the action with EU restrictive measures¹⁴.

4.3.1 Direct Management (Procurement)

Components B and C will contribute to enhancing the capabilities of Armenia and Egypt to levels comparable with those in the EU in the area of nuclear safety culture, as described in section 3.2 (Outcomes 2 and 3).

| Subject | Indicative type (works, supplies, services) |
|----------------------|---|
| Component B: Armenia | supplies, services |
| Component C: Egypt | Services |

4.3.2 Indirect Management with an entrusted entity

A part of Component A (Ukraine) of this action may be implemented in indirect management with the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU) and/or the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).

Another part of Component A (Ukraine) of this action may be implemented by the IAEA, which is the only organisation which can operate in the areas of Ukraine that Russia has temporarily occupied to contribute to safety by having on-site presence.

This implementation entails all activities detailed under chapter 3.2 (Outcome 1). The envisaged entities have been selected using the following criteria:

- STCU: Strong expertise in managing nuclear safety related projects; close and productive working relationship with the Ukrainian authorities in charge of nuclear safety; demonstrated management capacities under recent and on-going INSC interventions; necessary competences and privileges (e.g. tax exemptions) for project implementation; proven track record in efficient and effective implementation of nuclear safety projects; up-to-date knowledge on the situation in Ukraine; and headquarters in Kyiv since 2005 with many of its staff based in Ukraine.

¹⁴ www.sanctionsmap.eu. Please note that the sanctions map is an IT tool for identifying the sanctions regimes. The source of the sanctions stems from legal acts published in the Official Journal (OJ). In case of discrepancy between the published legal acts and the updates on the website it is the OJ version that prevails.

- EBRD: Strong expertise in managing funds linked to nuclear safety related programmes in Ukraine; Close relationship with the Ukrainian authorities in charge of nuclear safety; manager of the multi-donor fund (International Chernobyl Cooperation Account (ICCA), to which the EU is the main contributor, dedicated to the reconstruction of the nuclear safety capacities in Ukraine; demonstrated management capacities under recently closed and still ongoing multi-donor funds to which INSC contributed substantial amounts; necessary competences and privileges (e.g. tax exemptions) for project implementation; and proven track record in efficient and effective implementation of nuclear safety projects.
- IAEA: Only organisation that can independently operate in the occupied nuclear installations, in particular Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant

4.3.3 Changes from indirect to direct management mode (and vice versa) due to exceptional circumstances (one alternative second option)

If part of the action in direct management as per section 4.3.1 cannot be implemented due to circumstances outside the Commission's control, it may be replaced by implementation through indirect management with a pillar assessed entity meeting the following criteria: experience with nuclear safety related projects, demonstrated capacity to perform similar activities in the partner country or region and the willingness to agree to comply with the EU communication and visibility guidelines.

If negotiations with potential entities in indirect management as per section 4.3.2 fail due to circumstances outside the Commission's control, that part of this action may be implemented in direct management.

4.4 Scope of geographical eligibility for procurement and grants

The geographical eligibility in terms of place of establishment for participating in procurement and grant award procedures and in terms of origin of supplies purchased as established in the basic act and set out in the relevant contractual documents shall apply.

The Commission's authorising officer responsible may extend the geographical eligibility on the basis of urgency or of unavailability of services in the markets of the countries or territories concerned, or in other duly substantiated cases where application of the eligibility rules would make the realisation of this action impossible or exceedingly difficult (Article 11(8) INSC Council Regulation (Euratom) 2021/948 of 27 May 2021).

4.5 Indicative Budget

| Indicative Budget components | EU contribution (amount in EUR) |
|--|--|
| Implementation modalities – cf. section 4.3 | |
| SO 1 Restored and strengthened nuclear safety infrastructure in Ukraine, composed of | |
| Indirect management with STCU and/or EBRD and with IAEA - cf. section 4.3.2 | 7 800 000 |
| SO 2 Strengthened nuclear safety and radioprotection infrastructure in Armenia, composed of | |
| Procurement (direct management) – cf. section 4.3.1 | 6 500 000 |
| SO 3 Strengthened nuclear safety and radioprotection regulator in Egypt, composed of | |
| Procurement (direct management) – cf. section 4.3.1 | 2 700 000 |
| Procurement – total envelope under section 4.3.1 | 9 200 000 |
| Indirect management – total envelope under section 4.3.2 | 7 800 000 |

| | |
|-------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Evaluation – cf. section 5.2 | may be covered by another Decision |
| Audit – cf. section 5.3 | |
| Contingencies | 500 000 |
| Total | 17 500 000 |

4.6 Organisational Set-up and Responsibilities

Each intervention will tentatively include a steering committee, set up with representatives of the key organisations, including the partner country and the implementing partner. Each steering committee provides support, guidance and oversight of the intervention and shall meet whenever deemed necessary by the end user, the European Commission, or the implementing partner.

As part of its prerogative of budget implementation and to safeguard the financial interests of the Union, the Commission may participate in the above governance structures set up for governing the implementation of the action and may sign or enter into joint declarations or statements, for the purpose of enhancing the visibility of the EU and its contribution to this action and ensuring effective coordination.

5 PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT

5.1 Monitoring and Reporting

The day-to-day technical and financial monitoring of the implementation of this action will be a continuous process, and part of the implementing partner's responsibilities. To this aim, the implementing partner shall establish a permanent internal, technical and financial monitoring system for the action and elaborate regular progress reports (not less than annual) and final reports. Every report shall provide an accurate account of implementation of the action, difficulties encountered, changes introduced, as well as the degree of achievement of its results (Outputs and direct Outcomes) as measured by corresponding indicators, using as reference the logframe matrix (for project modality) and the partner's strategy, policy or reform action plan list (for budget support).

The Commission may undertake additional project monitoring visits both through its own staff and through independent consultants recruited directly by the Commission for independent monitoring reviews (or recruited by the responsible agent contracted by the Commission for implementing such reviews).

Roles and responsibilities for data collection, analysis and monitoring:

- The indicators, corresponding data sources and baselines are indicated in the logframe above. Arrangements for monitoring and reporting will be specified in the individual contracts.

All monitoring and reporting shall assess how the action is considering the principle of gender equality, human rights-based approach and rights of persons with disabilities including inclusion and diversity. Indicators shall be disaggregated at least by sex and age, and disability if possible.

All monitoring and reporting shall assess how the action is considering the principle of gender equality, human rights-based approach, and rights of persons with disabilities.

5.2 Evaluation

Having regard to the nature of the action, a final evaluation will not be carried out for this action or its components.

In case an evaluation is not planned, the Commission may, during implementation, decide to undertake such an evaluation for duly justified reasons either on its own decision or on the initiative of the partner.

All evaluations shall assess to what extent the action contributes to gender equality and women's empowerment and disability inclusion and how it is taking into account the human rights-based approach. Expertise on gender equality, disability and human rights will be ensured in the evaluation teams.

The evaluation reports may be shared with the partners and other key stakeholders following the best practice of evaluation dissemination¹⁵. The implementing partner and the Commission shall analyse the conclusions and recommendations of the evaluations and, where appropriate, apply the necessary adjustments.

In addition, all evaluations shall assess to what extent the action is taking into account the human rights-based approach as well as how it contributes to gender equality and women's empowerment and disability inclusion. Expertise on human rights, disability and gender equality will be ensured in the evaluation teams.

Evaluation services may be contracted under a framework contract. The financing of the evaluation may be covered by another measure constituting a Financing Decision.

5.3 Audit and Verifications

Without prejudice to the obligations applicable to contracts concluded for the implementation of this action, the Commission may, on the basis of a risk assessment, contract independent audit or verification assignments for one or several contracts or agreements.

6 STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

The 2021-2027 programming cycle will adopt a new approach to pooling, programming and deploying strategic communication and public diplomacy resources.

In line with the 2022 “[Communicating and Raising EU Visibility: Guidance for External Actions](#)”, it will remain a contractual obligation for all entities implementing EU-funded external actions to inform the relevant audiences of the Union's support for their work by displaying the EU emblem and a short funding statement as appropriate on all communication materials related to the actions concerned. This obligation will continue to apply equally, regardless of whether the actions concerned are implemented by the Commission, partner countries, service providers, grant beneficiaries or entrusted or delegated entities such as UN agencies, international financial institutions and agencies of EU member states.

However, action documents for specific sector programmes are in principle no longer required to include a provision for communication and visibility actions promoting the programmes concerned. These resources will instead be consolidated in Cooperation Facilities established by support measure action documents, allowing Delegations to plan and execute multiannual strategic communication and public diplomacy actions with sufficient critical mass to be effective on a national scale.

¹⁵ See best [practice of evaluation dissemination](#)

Appendix 1 REPORTING IN OPSYS

A Primary Intervention¹⁶ (project/programme) is a coherent set of activities and results structured in a logical framework aiming at delivering development change or progress. Identifying the level of the primary intervention will allow for:

- Articulating Actions or Contracts according to an expected chain of results and therefore allowing them to ensure efficient monitoring and reporting of performance;
- Differentiating these Actions or Contracts from those that do not produce direct reportable development results, defined as support entities (i.e. audits, evaluations);
- Having a complete and exhaustive mapping of all results-bearing Actions and Contracts.

Primary Interventions are identified during the design of each action by the responsible service (Delegation or Headquarters operational Unit).

The level of the Primary Intervention chosen can be modified (directly in OPSYS) and the modification does not constitute an amendment of the action document.

The intervention level for the present Action identifies as:

| | | |
|--|----------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Action level (i.e. Budget Support, blending) | | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | Single action | |
| Group of actions level (i.e. top-up cases, different phases of a single programme) | | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | Group of actions | |
| Contract level | | |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | Single Contract 1 | Contract under Component A (Ukraine) |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | Single Contract 2 | Contract under Component A (Ukraine) |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | Single Contract 3 | Contract under Component B (Armenia) |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | Single Contract 4 | Contract under Component C (Egypt) |
| Group of contracts level (i.e. series of programme estimates, cases in which an Action includes for example four contracts and two of them, a technical assistance contract and a contribution agreement, aim at the same objectives and complement each other) | | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | Group of contracts 1 | |

¹⁶ For the purpose of consistency between terms in OPSYS, DG INTPA, DG NEAR and FPI have harmonised 5 key terms, including 'Action' and 'Intervention' where an 'Action' is the content (or part of the content) of a Commission financing Decision and 'Intervention' is a coherent set of activities and results which constitutes an effective level for the operational follow-up by the EC of its operations on the ground. See more on the [concept of intervention](#).