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Evaluation of the European Union's Cooperation with the Republic of Chad 2008-2014

Executive summary

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*Le rapport ne reflète pas nécessairement les opinions de la Commission européenne ni
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Executive Summary

Purpose of the Evaluation

This report presents the results of the strategic evaluation of the European Union's cooperation with the Republic of Chad over the 2008-2014 period. The main objectives of this study are to provide an independent and comprehensive evaluation of past and present relations in the cooperation with Chad and identify the key lessons to improve current and future European Union (EU) strategies and programmes. The evaluation results are addressed to EU services, member-States, the government of Chad, and more broadly all parties involved in EU-Chad cooperation.

Evaluation Methodology

Based on a reconstitution of the intervention logic revealing the causal relationships between the activities planned and the expected results and impacts, the evaluation team formulated eight evaluation questions and the associated evaluation criteria measured by objectively verifiable indicators. The methodology used, in accordance with the methodology defined by EU services, made it possible to collect and analyse reliable and useful information to reach statements and formulate valid answers to the evaluation questions, and thereby conclusions and recommendations.

To answer the evaluation questions, the evaluation team relied on a series of tools. Thus, more than 300 documents were consulted, 278 people were met in individual interviews and focus group discussions, and 17 projects¹ were examined in more detail, 11 of which were visited in the field.

Background to the Evaluation

Located in Central Africa, Chad is a very vast landlocked country (1,284,000 sq. km) with a semi-tropical climate in the south and a desert climate in the north. The population, growing at the rate of 3% per year, is estimated to have been 13.5 million in 2014, for an average population density of 10.5 people per sq. km. Anthropogenic pressure on natural resources is increasing in a worrying manner, notably because of the strong population growth.

Since its independence in 1960, Chad has undergone recurrent periods of instability and conflict. From 2010 to 2014, the country went through a period of relative political stability (end of the conflicts in the east) and economic growth (carried mainly by oil). This situation is, however, still precarious because of several elements combined:

On the political level, the reforms undertaken in the 2000s to consolidate the rule of law, end impunity and corruption among public security forces, clean up public life, and strengthen democracy have not been fully implemented. The human rights situation in particular has improved but significant gaps remain.

Regional security has worsened because of increased trafficking and terrorist movements in the Sahel and the crises faced by different countries in the region (Mali, Sudan, Central African Republic, Libya, Northern Nigeria, and Northern Cameroon). While Chad now

¹ These 17 projects account for 49% of total cooperation funds over the course of the period studied.

appears as a “hub of stability” in this context, these crises result in a massive inflow of refugees and flows of displaced populations, and this is creating many difficulties, among which considerable disturbances in trade with neighbouring countries.

The country's economy is highly dependent on oil, but its oil reserves are limited and international prices dropped sharply at the end of the period evaluated. In this context, diversifying sources of growth, improving management of public finances and the business climate, creating jobs (especially for young people) and increasing rural households' purchasing power are major challenges.

On the social level, human development indicators have levelled off or are even worsening in the country. Advances in attaining the Millennium Development Goals have been very timid, with the exception of access to drinking water. The Chadian government's institutional capacity to provide quality, equitable and affordable social services to the population remains low.

EU-Chad Cooperation

According to the OECD, the total amount of official development assistance received by Chad over the 2008-2013 period was nearly 2.9 billion USD. European institutions (26% of the total) and EU member-States (12%) are among the country's main technical and financial partners. In 2013, official development assistance was estimated at 10% of the annual state budget.

The main objectives of the cooperation strategy for the 10th European Development Fund (EDF) (2008-2013), adopted in 2007, were to contribute to a return to stability and security, renew citizens' confidence in the State, and create the conditions that could stimulate the economy. To this aim, the strategy concentrated on two sectors: (i) good governance and the rule of law (both centrally and locally); and (ii) sustainable development (transport, rural development, water and sanitation). Outside these focal sectors, support was notably planned for the health sector and demining activities. Over the whole period under scrutiny (2008-2014), EU-Chad cooperation represented a total commitment volume of €457 million,² 83% of which from the EDF and 17% from the budget of European institutions.

The strategy relating to the 11th EDF (2014-2020) aims to support a development strategy that relies on sustainable natural resource management (including oil) and targets the most vulnerable segments of the population and most disadvantaged zones; this strategy also aims to help consolidate peace and implement the necessary reforms to improve governance. These guidelines led to the selection of three focal sectors: (i) food security, nutrition and rural development; (ii) sustainable natural resource management; and (iii) consolidation of the rule of law. The strategy also provides for specific resources to strengthen civil society.

² This amount does not include financing from the EU Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department (ECHO) or financing from the European Investment Bank (EIB) as these instruments are not within the scope of the evaluation.

Conclusions

Cooperation Strategy:

C1. As formulated, the 10th EDF's cooperation strategy was a response to Chad's main development challenges and covered the five principles of Peacebuilding and Statebuilding of the "New Deal". During implementation, it was adapted to changes in the national and regional context; however, in most sectors, the objectives were too ambitious in relation to both the capacity/will of the government to achieve the targeted outcomes and the means mobilised (number of human resources at the EU Delegation, quality of monitoring and evaluation systems, adequacy of technical assistance, etc.).

The strategy of the 11th EDF is also highly relevant. The withdrawal from the road sector nevertheless creates a detrimental gap in maintaining progress in this sector when few other technical and financial partners are able to take over from the EU.

C2. The EU's overall "peace security and development" approach was implemented, notably at the start (in response to the conflicts in the east of the country) and at the end (in response to the rise of extremist and terrorist movements) of the period evaluated. However, the effectiveness of this approach was limited by: (i) insufficiently deep analysis of factors contributing to fragility and sources of conflict; (ii) the Chadian government's very low commitment to reforming the security sector; (iii) the difficulty establishing intense and fruitful sectoral dialogue in most sectors of cooperation; and (iv) a lack of continuity between certain components of the actions in the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace and EDF programming.

Main Areas of Cooperation:

Overall, the EU's interventions during the period evaluated were not very effective. This overall determination must be nuanced, however, by two things: first, measuring the effects and impacts of the EU's cooperation is difficult, primarily because Chad's national statistics system is weak and many projects had gaps in their monitoring and evaluation systems; and second, the regional context deteriorated, which had an impact on the country's economic and social situation.

C3. The EU's cooperation helped **improve people's living conditions**, in particular those of the most vulnerable, in the intervention zones. These positive results concern access to drinking water (800,000 additional people have access to drinking water), markets (asphalting of 300 km of roads) and health (support in four health districts), as well as probably food security. However, the durability of these results is medium (roads, drinking water) to short (health).

C4. The EU's interventions made a relatively modest contribution to Chad's **economic growth and diversification** through support to two value chains (livestock and gum arabic) and by financing the construction of asphalt roads. However, the results attained are diminished by the persistence of structural problems in the business climate and by the non-adoption of certain sectoral policies (e.g. the pastoral code).

C5. On the national level, the EU supported important reforms in how **political life operates and in regard to judicial and economic governance.**

- In the areas of justice and domestic security forces, EU support has until now been little effective, primarily because of the government of Chad's reluctance to actually undertake the supported reforms. This low effectiveness is also the result of gaps in the conception and implementation of the support and insufficient coordination among the TFPs working in these sectors.
- When it comes to consolidating democracy, the EU's heavy involvement in supporting the national reconciliation process at the start of the period notably allowed for a complete electoral cycle to be held in 2011-2012. However, focusing support on electoral processes and electoral management bodies was done to the detriment of a more comprehensive approach to peace, the rule of law and the democratic process.
- When it comes to local governance, EU support made it possible to run productive experiments in participatory local planning; however, the support bore little fruit in implementing decentralisation and civil registry reforms.
- When it comes to management of public finances, where performance is still very poor, EU support enabled advances to be made in planning reforms to implement and improving transparency regarding oil resources.

C6. The EU provided support in diverse forms to many **civil society** stakeholders.³ This support was relevant and, in several cases, complementary to the EU's cooperation with public institutions. However, in the various sectors concerned (justice, electoral processes and citizenship, decentralisation and local development, food security, agricultural value chains), a comprehensive long-term intervention strategy was missing. The 2014-2017 roadmap, adopted in 2014 by the EU and other technical and financial partners, should make it possible to remedy this gap.

Aid Modalities:

C7. The actions taken in the area of **capacity building** (for individuals and organisations) correspond to considerable funding and are highly relevant. However, their effectiveness is limited, on one side, by structural problems that weigh on human resource management in Chadian administrations and, on the other side, by insufficient strategic guidance and monitoring & evaluation.

C8. Consideration of **crosscutting issues** in EU interventions increased during the period evaluated when it comes to human rights and gender. However, it remained poor regarding HIV/AIDS and environmental sustainability. Overall, the link between crosscutting issues, factors contributing to fragility, and the goals pursued has not been established in a very precise manner in (sectoral) intervention strategies.

C9. **The efficiency and effectiveness of the cooperation scheme** are middling. The main weak spots deal with partnership structures, implementation channels, coordination with regional cooperation, and finally visibility efforts.

C10. Despite heavy investment by the EU Delegation in **aid coordination** mechanisms, the results obtained are fairly thin. This is due to the government's insufficient implication in playing its role coordinating foreign aid and the small number of TFPs present in the

³ Media, development NGOs, human rights organisations, advocacy NGOs, socio-professional organisations, local bodies to manage public amenities, etc.

country. The **division of labour** between the EU and France—the only member-State to have maintained bilateral cooperation with Chad—is expressed in sectoral specialisations but it is not optimal in the governance sector.

Recommendations

Cooperation Strategy:

R1. Increase consideration of factors contributing to fragility when defining and implementing the EU's cooperation strategy for Chad, notably by:

- providing long-term support for national and regional capacity building for research and studies;
- drawing up, in the framework of the implementation of the 11th EDF, an analysis process (political economy, activity systems, social relations, etc.) common to the main areas of cooperation, leading to the formulation of more relevant sectoral intervention logics than in the past; and
- establishing appropriate operational systems (sharing analyses of sources of conflict, strategy support, etc.).

R2. Deepen implementation of the EU's overall strategy by:

- improving coordination between development actions, sectoral dialogue and political dialogue;
- extending the sectoral dialogue to all stakeholders concerned;
- studying specific intervention approaches for the northern regions of the country; and
- bolstering consideration of crosscutting issues in sectoral intervention approaches (link to be established with the analysis of causes of fragility).

Cooperation Sectors:

R3. Continue support for shoring up the rule of law and improving governance of public affairs:

- Justice: Contribute to better understanding of laws by all citizens and better regulation of judicial pluralism by the government.
- Domestic security forces: Continue support for the reform of the sector so that the institutions concerned fulfil their missions efficiently while complying with the principles of the rule of law.
- Democratic and political governance: Consolidate the dynamics sparked during the period evaluated when it comes to decentralisation support and democratic openness.
- Management of public finances: Combine crosscutting support (to public finances as a whole) and support targeting the sectors supported by the EU under the 11th EDF.

R4. Concentrate food and nutrition security support on a limited number of regions, emphasising: (i) capacity building for deconcentrated technical services⁴, (ii) sectoral and multi-sector dialogue (agriculture, health, water, sanitation, etc.) on the national level, and (iii) intervention impact measurement and assessment-documentation efforts to fuel more active sectoral dialogues.

R5. When it comes to rural development and natural resource management, combine support for transport infrastructures, social safety nets, and inclusion in markets.

Aid Modalities:

R6. Bolster the attention paid to capacity building (notably in public administrations and civil society organisations) by deepening the link between the analysis of factors contributing to fragility and the goals of the sectoral reforms undertaken on the one hand and capacity building approaches on the other.

R7. Improve the effectiveness of EU-Chad cooperation, notably by increasing intervention coherence and improving the visibility of EU action.

R8. Improve coordination—both strategic and operational—between the EU and the other TFPs (notably France), and support the government in its role coordinating aid.

⁴ Services provided locally by central government.